THE SPATIALITY OF INFORMAL SECTOR AGENCY:
PLANNING, SURVIVAL AND GEOGRAPHY
IN BLACK METROPOLITAN CAPE TOWN

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ABSTRACT

One of the most significant urban phenomena over the past thirty years has been the rapid, widespread and originally unanticipated growth of informal sector activities. While it is now recognised that such activities have substantially transformed cities across the world, their urban geographies remain under-studied, especially in the fast-changing South and with special reference to planning practice. This thesis addresses this surprisingly large lacuna through a detailed account of the planning for, and survival within, Black Metropolitan Cape Town’s informal food distribution system. The discussion shows that, to date, this planning experience has proven profoundly difficult and uneven, notwithstanding the relatively progressive nature of the interventions themselves. Why, exactly? Why has this particular experience been so difficult? More, why has it been so uneven? Where has it succeeded, where has it failed, and in what sense? Finally, what can we learn more generally from these successes and failures?

Extant theorisations of informal sector development planning emphasise class, state or land use variables. Rather than argue “against” these variables, this thesis argues “across” them (and others), hypothesizing the importance of the configurations — the spatialities — that dialectically connect various scales of heterogeneous relations. It is not simply that “space matters”; it is that the constitution of how space is actually produced in real places matters. Ultimately, this thesis explores the implications of this spatial hypothesis for planning theory and practice and for informal sector development.

The discussion is advanced through a framework of theoretical inquiry derived principally from the work of Henri Lefebvre, Bruno Latour and Michel de Certeau. Specifically, the narrative architecture of the thesis is built around Lefebvre’s central claim that urban space is “produced” through three, intimately related modalities or “moments” — representations of space, spatial practices and representational spaces. Investigating each of these moments in succession, but also binding them together, the discussion deploys Latour’s “constructivist” ontology of the actor-network as a central analytical and metaphorical device. More, de Certeau’s attention to strategies, tactics and the local state’s attempt to capture and direct “belief” is also used to explore the developmental geographies associated with planning and survival as major empirical processes shaping the post-apartheid city.
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DEDICATION

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THOUGHTS FOR A PRELUDE

The black flecks swirled, found a pattern, and settled. He thought briefly of divination, seeking the future in the arrangement of coffee grounds, tea leaves, hog entrails, shapes of clouds. As if pattern told something worth knowing.

— Charles Frazier (1998: 19)
Chapter I.

INTRODUCTION

Planning Informal Sector Development: a Spatial Theorization

1.0

Overview

What are we to do with the informal sector?
— Portes, Castells and Benton (1989b: 300)

To change life...we must first change space.
— Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 190)

This thesis is about the geography of planning and survival in post-apartheid South Africa. Specifically, it is about a largely local effort in Cape Town to address the problems and possibilities that attend one particular type of “informal sector” activity: the everyday distribution of ordinary foodstuffs necessary for the social reproduction of a fast-growing, relatively poor African population. But the story that unfolds in the coming chapters has broader relevance. The urban informal sector (UIS) is now everywhere: in the commercial streets and commodity chains of Algiers and Nairobi; in the squatter homes and land markets of Hyberadad and Jakarta; in the working class backyards and manufacturing relations of Caracas and Mexico City. Indeed, Alain Duran-Lasserre (1999) marvels and frets over the dynamic city-building qualities of the UIS in large swaths of Asia, whilst Deborah Potts (2000) calls the UIS the “real” economy in much of Africa. Cape Town’s intriguing and instructive experience with planning informal sector development is therefore part and parcel of an international phenomenon of increasing empirical and theoretical importance, not only in major conurbations in the South, but all across the world. To plan informal sector development is to engage in an increasingly crucial dimension of the overall urban experience.
Many worthy research questions arise from this experience. But the narrative that follows here turns on the axes of the two quotes given above. Like many other localities, Cape Town too has asked itself the difficult question posed by Portes, Castells and Benton: what to do with a burgeoning informal sector? Following Lefebvre, moreover, its answer has been profoundly spatial. As I shall demonstrate in some empirical detail, Cape Town has been trying very hard indeed to transform the urban spatialities — the urban geographies — of the informal food sector, in no small measure through urban planning technologies. It has been trying, that is, to change informal sector life by first changing informal sector space (suggesting that if theorists do not always accept the importance of space, practitioners certainly do). To date, however, this has proven a difficult and uneven policy experience, notwithstanding Cape Town's relatively progressive and well-intentioned interventions. Why, exactly? Why has Cape Town's post-apartheid experience with this specific informal system proven so difficult? More, why has it proven so uneven? Where has it succeeded, where has it failed, and in what sense? Finally, what can we learn more generally about planning “informal” cities from this specific empirical experience?

It will take the whole of this thesis to answer these research questions. But the core of the theorization and approach deployed in the coming chapters can be summarized at the outset by referring to the simple analogy presented in Figure 1.1 below, which maps the spatiality of a hotel's key return policy. Everything is here that will become important later on. The figure shows that the spatiality of even the simplest policy is a never-ending accomplishment: a product of relatively benign but still surprisingly contested agency. “Thickening up” the key-return goal requires a choreographed performance of a delegation of heterogeneous actors: manager and guests, of course, but also keys, oral and written notices, wooden weights. Despite all this, not everyone believes in the policy. A spatial configuration therefore emerges from the dialectics of success (observers) and failure (dissenters). There is a story to excavate, then — a geo-history that unfolds from left to right of “...how one privileged trajectory is built” (Akrich and Latour 1997: 263).

It is an unusual story. The generative source is economic: a space emerges for the supply and demand of a particular service. But things soon turn technical: a key is delegated room-opening tasks by the manager. Indeed, the key shifts action from the manager to the guest, improving administrative efficiencies. But the key is an inconvenient gadget to replace if lost. Some guests “know” this and return the key
without being told. Most guests do not. So the manager issues an oral notice. A discursive space now emerges. Guests are instructed to return the keys before going out. Things improve some, but many guests still dissent. So the manager now issues written notices, handing key-return leaflets to the guests upon check-in and posting these same leaflets on the doors of the hotel rooms. Still more guests return the keys. Not everyone, though. Finally, the manager attaches heavy weights to the keys. This nearly solves the problem in toto — nearly. Dissent remains. Keys vanish. The policy is “thinner” on the ground than is intended.

Figure 1.1 Mapping the spatiality of a key-return policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
<th>TACTICS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hotel manager</td>
<td>Notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice</td>
<td>Notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>Dissenters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE


HYPOTHESIS

The challenge of planning informal sector development is similar to the challenge of getting keys back to the hotel manager’s desk. If the analogy seems forced, if planning fast-growing, rapidly informalising cities seems grander and harder than managing hotels, it is only necessary to consider Henri Lefebvre’s (1971: 4) remarkable observation that “the history of a single day includes the history of the world.” Put differently, and to shift the metaphor of choreographed performance to a musical register, it is only necessary to hear the improvisational rhythms of ordinary people doing ordinary things — food traders, shoeshine boys, shacklords — to capture the whole of the urban challenge. Planning informal sector development is an attempt to orchestrate these rhythms; to create jazz from noise; to find melody in dissonance. Like managing the keys of a hotel, it is an attempt to problematize the world and its (im)possibilities; to
break new recruits from old habits and give them new identities; to enrol them into new
spaces; and to mobilise new policies and new performances towards, it is usually
supposed, a better state of affairs (fewer lost keys, improved administrative efficiencies,
lower units costs, etc.). To put the matter as broadly as possible, it is an attempt to patch
together — to produce — an urban spatiality that dialectically connects up various scales
of remarkably heterogeneous relations (practical, technical, discursive, symbolic). And
indeed, it is precisely this spatial state of affairs, of which more presently, that illuminates
why UIS development planning is so difficult.

Accordingly, the main purpose of this thesis is to recount Cape Town's post-
apartheid experience in the informal food trade in order to substantiate the larger
hypothesis that the difficulties of informal sector development planning, by which I
mean the (attempted) transformation of urban survival conditions through publicly-
mediated collective action, are best “explained” by excavating how urban space is actually
produced in particular places. Explanation, then, is not found in a set of factors moving
through space, as if space were a container; explanation is found in the agency-driven
“becoming” of space-as-it-is-made-and-remade. Notwithstanding the importance of
urban planning and economic survival and, indeed, the spatial turn in so much social
theory over the past several years, no one has approached the issue of informal sector
development like this before. By placing the empirical processes of urban planning and
economic survival within the theoretical context of critical human geography, then, I
seek to make an original contribution to the larger social science debate about societal
change and urban development.

1.1
Theoretical Approach: Dialectics, Heterogeneity and Symmetry

The analogous spatiality of the key-return policy and indeed the substantive spatiality of
informal sector agency (a synoptic phrase I use to theorise informal sector development
planning) can be mapped most effectively by applying three major bodies of theory.
These three bodies of theory in turn highlight three important spatial concepts: dialectics,
heterogeneity and symmetry.

LEFEBVRE

The first body of theory is associated with the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]).
Like many other theorists, but with a far greater critical attention to the spatialities of the
urban experience, Lefebvre is concerned ultimately with a political and ethical question: how to locate and nurture "...the rich creativity of the excluded...into a concrete alternative to the present spatial system" (Shields 1999: 185)? Lefebvre provides a relatively simple set of analytical lenses through which to refract this question. In Lefebvre's schema, these lenses bring into view three dialectically related, but still analytically distinctive, "moments" of what he famously called "the production of space." These are: representations of space (mental spaces); spatial practices (material spaces); and representational spaces (symbolized spaces). In my view, these three moments constitute a powerful heuristic framework through which to explore not only "...how one privileged trajectory is built", but also to theorise why this privileged trajectory is constantly resisted. That said, Lefebvre's overall meta-theoretical agenda does not really provide a particularly useful set of intermediate concepts for precisely how "moments" are occasioned. This requires a second body of scholarship: actor-network theory.

**ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY**

Actor-network theory (ANT) emphasises the "boundedness" or "togetherness" of how the world around us actually gets built in particular blocks of space-time (cf. Gregory 1994b). This is intimated in Figure 1.1. Like Torsten Hagerstrand's (1982) time-geography, which also values context and process, ANT simply refuses to sift out the economic from the technical or the discursive: the hotel transaction, for example, from the key or the written notice. ANT holds these together. Indeed, as Figure 1.1 shows quite didactically, ANT tracks the piecemeal construction or "engineering" of new spaces and relationships across putatively separate domains of reality (the social, the economic, the technical, the physical).

This is possible because ANT derives from the ontological commitment to a world of strong or weak network performances between people, buildings, gadgets, ideas, symbols (managers, guests, keys, wooden weights, policies). When the people, buildings, gadgets, ideas and symbols all work together, when the collective performance jells, this heterogeneous world is "translated": it is configured into a new functional space. ANT is dialectical in this sense (like Lefebvre) because it emphasises the creativity of relations, of processes, of simultaneous multiplicities; it is heterogeneous, moreover, because it binds humans with nonhumans, social with natural, discursive with physical; and it is symmetrical because it foregrounds none of these and because, more importantly, it does not create hard divisions between micro-scale dynamics (key-return policies) and macro-
scale dynamics (planning cities), at least as a theoretical a priori. In short, ANT is a type of post-structuralist semiotics that helps to track how a particular spatial reality comes to exist and persist — or once again, how one privileged trajectory is built

**Excavating Lefebvre with ANT**

Eric Swyngedouw (1999: 447; cf. 1996) in recent years has used actor-network theory to excavate the production (or construction) of Lefebvre’s three spatial moments:

Lefebvre’s triad opens up an avenue for inquiry that insists on the materiality of each of the component elements, but whose contents can be approached only through the [actor-network] excavation of the metabolism of their becoming....

These are important but admittedly challenging ideas. Fortunately, they can be made more intuitive by referring once again to Figure 1.1. Through the first of Lefebvre’s lenses, we observe representations of space: the spatial ‘rules’ that guests carry in their heads at registration and indeed the spoken and written notices subsequently deployed to structure performance within that space. Here we find policies about space: about what keys are for; about why they have weights attached to them; about why they must be returned. Through a second lens, however, we perceive spatial practices: the commonsense transacting and transporting of space. Here space involves material and movement and things getting lost (which all feed back into representations of space). Finally, through a third lens, indeed through what Edward Soja (1996) calls a “thirspace”, we have the lived dialectics of representational space. Here space betrays a symbolic texture through, for instance, the relationships between alternative practice (refusing to return keys) and hegemonic representation (written notices). The following questions emerge: what is this space for, exactly? What can be performed? What can be believed? What can be dreamed? To ask these types of questions is not to ignore the “moments” of representation and practice; but it is to acknowledge that the dialectical process of building heterogeneous and symmetrical networks is also the dialectical process of building meaning.

**DE CERTEAU**

The actual “moment-to-moment” building of “networks” is quite similar to Michel de Certeau’s (1984) theorisation of strategies. De Certeau’s work is instructive because he does a better job than most ANT writers (and indeed Lefebvre) of mapping the spatial dialectics between strategies and tactics — and therefore of accounting for the role of
"alterity" in the dialectical production of urban space (though see Law 2000). For de Certeau, strategies refer to the means of control that are embodied within, and emerge from, the network building process itself. In contrast, tactics fall under the control of strategies but simultaneously rework them through constant dissent. Here is another dialectic: a recognition that "the effects of power and resistance...are woven into various spatial forms" (Hetherington, cited in Murdoch 1998: 364). Thus in Figure 1.1 the "dissenters" participate in hotel life (they are part of the story) but their recursive dissent changes the strategic constitution of this life over time: specifically, new resources are mobilised (oral and written notices and weighted keys) that affect the constitution of the strategic space. Through his practical discussion of tactics, de Certeau skilfully exposes the seemingly impregnable forces of strategies to the transformative power of alterity.

De Certeau (1985) extends these ideas with the notion of "belief", which is more synoptic than, for example, interests, values or trust. Naturally, other actors often participate in networks because it is in their interest to do so (as game theory suggests). But it often takes time for interests to mature. Meanwhile, actor-networks rely on the mobilisation of belief, on the emotional heart (fear, angst, excitement) as well as the rational head (maximizing utility). Similarly, new actors might not trust — typically will not trust — other actors, but they participate in networks anyway because they believe they can come to trust other actors later on. The absence of belief, on this reading, is what keeps tactics from becoming strategies. Seen this way, the modern state is for de Certeau (1985) in the business of manufacturing and directing belief: belief in an (emotional-rational) development programme (South Korea); belief in an (emotional-rational) cultural mission (the American Dream); and closer to home belief in the (emotional-rational) possibilities of a new spatial ordering (urban policies and plans). Strategies are the social relations that attend successfully mobilised belief.

MAPPING THE SPATIALITY OF INFORMAL SECTOR AGENCY

Lefebvre, actor-network theory and de Certeau collectively provide a new way to theorise what the Dutch usefully call ruimtelijke ordening: "spatial ordering." Specifically, these three bodies of theory provide a way to explain the geography associated with how urban planning and economic survival meet up in the post-apartheid city. I consider this an important, and badly neglected, dimension of the overall UIS debate. Accordingly, informal sector development planning shall be narrated in this thesis as a dialectical
(multi-moment) story of heterogeneous (physical, social, technical) and symmetrical (multi-scaled) spatial ordering.

But as already briefly alluded to, I refer to this “spatial ordering” more broadly as informal sector agency. I register this organising term here at the outset because I want to foreground the hotel guests as well as the manager (not to mention the wooden weights). I want to write about planning as a collective performance, where the term “agency” captures the unrelenting geographical work of that collective performance (of planning and survival), and where the notion of informal sector development refers to the specific objective pursued by local authorities in Cape Town.

For the informal sector — as an extant and desired spatiality — is not simply the tactical handiwork of survivalists working outside the strategic project of government and economy. Indeed, as this thesis will show, for all its improvisational rhythms much of the informal sector is routine, classically measured, and even re-productive of the strategic space of the city. Likewise, and more interesting still, not all planning is strategic; some planning is tactical; some planning is about dissent; some planning is about the representational space of alternative possibilities. The crucial geographical dialectic, then, is not between planning and survival; it is between strategies and tactics. To map the spatiality of informal sector agency is therefore to eschew an overly romantic engagement with survival. But it is also to eschew an overly caricatured and empirically inaccurate rejection of planning tout court (cf. Escobar 1995). It is not an “either/or” geography, but a search for a different relationship between planning and survival.

1.2

Empirical focus, Key Arguments and Narrative Approach

This thesis has three parts. Part A sets out the problem, theorisation, and methodology; it includes three chapters. Part B then details the empirical application; it includes four chapters. Finally, Part C, which consists of only one chapter, recapitulates and synthesises the overarching insights of the discussions in Parts A and B and furthermore suggests a frontier for future research and reflection.

PART A. PROBLEM, THEORIZATION, APPROACH

Part A has three over-arching objectives: (1) to establish the problem and its investigation in the literature (Chapter II); (2) to develop a framework for an alternative
theorisation of this problem (Chapter III); and (3) to outline how the problem and theorisation have been applied methodologically in the empirical application developed in Part B of the thesis (Chapter IV).

Chapter II. Planning Informal Sector Development

Within the context of a literature review, chapter II opens the thesis with an overview of informal sector development as a major empirical and theoretical issue, especially where this involves local planning interventions. Attention is given initially to general debates waged mainly in the development studies literature, where the UIS experience has been most consistently researched. The discussion then focuses on three key “schools” associated with planning informal sector development. The first school is associated with radical or neo-Marxist scholarship. The second school is associated with neo-liberal or anti-statist scholarship. And the third school is associated with mainstream and progressive planning scholarship.

Chapter II reviews the key contributions of each of these schools but ultimately provides a synoptic critique that mandates, it is argued, an alternative theoretical approach to the questions of interest here. In the main, this new approach seeks to move beyond what these schools, despite their obvious differences, all have in common: a “compositional” rather than “contextual” approach to spatial theorisation, theoretical terms associated originally with Torsten Hägerstrand but developed subsequently by Nigel Thrift (1983; cf. Gregory 1994b, 1994c). In brief, a compositional approach breaks down or “fragments” the world into general categories of analysis based on similarity (e.g. class, state, land use, society, economy, politics); in contrast, a contextual approach refuses to sever what Gregory (2000: 110) calls the “...series of associations and entanglements” between such categories in particular places. This has already been intimated in simple form in Figure 1.1. It is developed much further as this thesis unfolds. Chapter II concludes that this distinction is decisive in compellingly theorising informal sector development planning.

Chapter III. An Alternative Theorisation

This conclusion is carried into chapter III, which develops a distinctive contextual approach to urban theorisation. As suggested by the hypothesis of this thesis, the approach developed emphasises the dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical nature of how space is actually produced. Referring to the themes broached earlier, this alternative
approach deploys mainly the work of Lefebvre, ANT and de Certeau, although other theorists are also drawn upon where appropriate. Chapter III starts with a general discussion of space and spatial thinking, but then moves directly into a specific elucidation of Lefebvre's theory of spatial dialectics, emphasising his most useable heuristic device: the production of space as representations of space; spatial practice and representational spaces. Selective attention is also given to David Harvey's (1996) explication of dialectical propositions.

Chapter III then turns to the specific empirical problem of how spatial "networks" (like urban food systems) are actually made, used, changed and potentially stabilized. Here the discussion outlines the work of Bruno Latour (and other actor-network theorists inspired by his work) as well as the work of Michel de Certeau, who as just mentioned offers the parallel concepts of strategies, tactics and belief. All of this, chapter III concludes, might help us to re-think the larger problematic of informal sector development planning, providing us with new ways to theorize both the extant (substantive) and desired (normative) spatialities of UIS empirics, particularly where these involve actual policy approaches to urban development and societal change. I therefore do not move "against" other approaches, which (usefully) foreground class, the state, and the built environment; rather, I move "through" them, using Lefebvre, ANT and de Certeau as a theoretical vehicle to do so.

Chapter IV. Empirical Focus and Research Methodology

With the literature review and theoretical commitments laid out, the thesis turns at this point to an empirical interrogation of one particular policy experience: the post-apartheid planning for, and survival within, the informal food distribution system of Black Metropolitan Cape Town. Specifically, chapter IV ends Part A of the thesis by briefly outlining the analytical parameters, definitions, data needs and research methods undertaken to communicate this investigation in Part B.

It is important to recognise at the outset that all research is conducted from a particular "position." I am a white, relatively wealthy American male; many of the subjects of this study are relatively poor South African females of African descent. This dynamic structured much of the empirical work reported here — and should be borne in mind at all times. The data presented are comparatively rich and varied, then, but this is likely due as much to research sensitivity as to research method. This is not to say, of course, that method is unimportant. The empirical discussion excavates three scales of
the urban experience (the metropole of Cape Town itself, the trading market, and the African subject). This necessitated the use of several methods. Chapter IV outlines these data collection methods in detail. But as with the issue of "positionality," it is worth highlighting the overall data collection approach. In the main, I focused on the geographical "heart" of the African community in Cape Town, because this area includes the full range of socio-economic and settlement geographies associated with this particular city (Awatona et al. 1996). My survey work aimed to capture the essential dynamics of these communities. While much of the research was conducted myself, then, I also deployed enumerators, who were trained to sample randomly specific communities. Funds limited and determined the number of households and traders ultimately surveyed, but as discussed throughout Part B, the data eventually collected cohere well with other public and private data collection efforts in Cape Town.

PART B. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

Part B of the thesis has four main objectives: (1) to provide geo-historical background material and introduce major empirical themes (chapter V); (2) to analyse representations of space as "rhetoric" (chapter VI); (3) to analyse spatial practices as "travel" (chapter VII); and finally (4) to analyse representational spaces as contested and co-opted "alterities."

Chapter V. History, Space and Black Metropolitan Cape Town

Chapter V sets the stage for the detailed empirical work. But it does its own work too. Specifically, it broaches Black Metropolitan Cape Town in terms of the Apartheid State's attempt to deal with processes of informality, including both the informality of the built environment (especially the squatter camp) and the urban economy. While the main purpose of the discussion is to introduce the reader to the case study area, an important empirical theme is also simultaneously developed: namely, that "things fall apart," and that informality in particular has consistently breached the state's intended spatialities for urban development in (Black Metropolitan) Cape Town. Because of this main theme, more attention is paid to the 1970s than to the 1980s — notwithstanding the well-known importance of the 1980s in South Africa's overall urban history (Simon 1984, 1989). Against this backdrop, the chapter then reviews the post-apartheid institutional and philosophical basis for planning strategies vis-à-vis informality. Here attention is paid to the twin discourses of local economic development and developmental local governance. The chapter ends by asking whether these (new) strategies and the beliefs they entail
might prove more “successful” in dealing with the informal urban terrain of Black Metropolitan Cape Town.

Chapter VI. Representations of Space

Chapter VI begins the actual case study analysis of the informal food system by drawing on Latour’s (1987) actor-network notion of “strong rhetoric.” Building on insights gained from chapter V, chapter VI shows that post-apartheid urban space is being discursively (re)shaped through a particular constellation of spatial representations. Central to this imaginary is a highly laboured attempt up to link up certain places in certain ways. Following the empirical focus laid out in chapter IV, chapter VI analyses the rhetorical construction of three main “places”: the “integrating” metropole; the “stimulating” market; and the “pre-entrepreneurial” subject.

The first argument developed here is that these cross-scalar “links” form a particular spatialisation of post-apartheid society, in general, and a possible urban world for informal sector development in particular. At the same time, and paradoxically, chapter VI also argues that these imminent links are tenuous and reversible. A reason for this is proposed: the overly physical, homogeneous and abstract spatial assumptions informing the representations themselves. Informal sector development planning in this particular case is theorized as difficult, then, because (to start with) a discursive space for that development has not (yet) been heterogeneously and symmetrically engineered. This rhetorical conclusion is important. But it is only part of the dialectical story of informal sector agency. The world is not simply a discursive effect. Indeed, it is primarily a material one.

Chapter VII. Spatial Practices

The shift to the material world means that chapter VII turns the narrative on its head. It relocates the empirical discussion and the research questions to a quite different but nonetheless related set of spatial modalities, namely the “travel stories” — the spatial practices — of informal food traders in select African communities. Here urban space is perceived as primarily physical and embodied rather than primarily mental and discursive. After providing further detail on the case study communities, the discussion focuses on the nature of food consumption thresholds and the extent to which informal traders “capture” these thresholds.
The discussion then narrates a number of “travel stories” from the everyday life and rhythms of the informal food trade in (and beyond) Black Metropolitan Cape Town. While related to the planning representations of chapter VI, the “travel stories” in Chapter VII are narrated as Hagerstrand’s (1970, 1976) time-geography “projects” (rather than as rhetorical efforts). These “projects” show not only how multiple places and domains are tied together symmetrically across scale during the performance of informal daily routines; they also show how heterogeneous materials (wood, lorries, cash, auction rooms, parasites) are “folded” into these routines. This general spatial heterogeneity — this “remaking” of the material world — occurs not only within time-space projects but also across them. Hence a second paradox: part of its capacity to “capture” thresholds derives precisely from this heterogeneity and multiplicity; from this improvisational ability to make and remake urban space in idiosyncratic, protean ways.

Ultimately, chapter VII shows how much this spatial heterogeneity complicates the planning imaginary outlined in chapter VI (itself struggling for acceptance). Quite simply: the travel stories of survival transgress the “clean” spaces of entrepreneurship, stimulation and integration — constantly building and rebuilding urban spaces to perform other objectives. While interpreted through Lefebvre’s meta-theory of how space is produced, then, both chapters VI and VII follow on from the actor-network theme broached in chapter V, which explains how hard it is to produce and maintain particular kinds of urban spatialities — to “snap” things into place, as it were, and keep them there. As in chapter VI, chapter VII ends with a crucial query: are the two “moments” of planning representation and survival practice reconcilable with one another? To answer this question is to turn to the problem of meaning and belief — and therefore to the third moment in Lefebvre’s overall spatial schema: the moment of representational space.

Chapter VIII. Representational Space

The final empirical chapter of this thesis builds upon one of Lefebvre’s main insights: that the “fragmentation” of representation from practice (which he associates with the rapid urbanization and commodification of the twentieth century) can only be overcome by recovering the representational spaces of “fully-lived lives.” For Lefebvre, fully lived lives resist the crushing spatial practices of economic and bureaucratic abstraction. Instead, these lives imagine and/or practice different ways to be in the world — different ways to plan and to survive. With this close to hand, chapter VIII moves the empirical
narrative of Part B to the final and certainly least intuitive spatial terrain — the terrain of Lefebvre's much heralded third moment, the difficult-to-excavate geography of "representational space" itself. It does so by disrupting the temporal narrative, re-excavating chapters V, VI and VII to unearth this geography. In particular, the analysis draws more explicitly on de Certeau's (1985) theme of alterity, using Scott Lash's (1999) notion of reflexive "rule-finding" as a metaphor for this alterity. Writing affirmatively, chapter VIII finds this geography of alternative rule-finding everywhere and thus suggests that here are symbolic "flashes" where a different kind of urban spatialisation for informal sector development resides.

Potentially, it is suggested, these flashes form the basis to overcome the severance of representation from practice. They form the basis to re-consider development within the context of Lefebvre's theorisation of fully lived lives. All the same, chapter VIII argues that it is far easier to assert with Lefebvre the normative value of these alternative spaces than it is to mobilize them into a sustainable alternative. Much of the reason for this, chapter VIII concludes, is that like many other resources "alterity" is symbolically co-opted; it is neutralized by its own dialectical successes because it is put into symbolic circulation, as ANT would have it. In short, and here is a third and final paradox, alterity is not "wiped out" so much as it is "made normal" through symbolic absorption into the strategic management of space (cf. Pieterse 1998). Several practical examples are given to make this larger point.

PART C. CONCLUSIONS

The thesis ends in Part C with chapter IX. Chapter IX has three main objectives: to recapitulate and synthesise the main arguments and themes of the thesis; to revisit the hypothesis in the light of these arguments and themes; and to consider the frontier for future research and reflection. This last objective focuses on both empirical and theoretical issues, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the research that follows.

1.3

Conclusions

The expansion of the urban informal sector in fast-growing cities of the South presents formidable challenges to larger processes of public management, urban development and societal change. In this chapter, I have suggested that one way to improve our current understanding of this challenge is to focus more sharply than we have on its contextual
spatialities. Specifically, I have suggested that we excavate the production of “informal sector space” in order to understand much better than we do the difficulties associated with planning informal sector development. Drawing on Lefebvre, actor-network theory and de Certeau I have hypothesized that in fact it is the \textit{dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical nature of how space is actually produced in real places} that best “explains” the difficulties associated with planning informal sector development. I will explore this hypothesis within the specific empirical context of the post-apartheid informal food distribution system of Black Metropolitan Cape Town. To provide a basis for this empirical work, I now turn to Part A, which establishes the conceptual and theoretical content for this empirical investigation.
PART A.

PROBLEM, THEORIZATION, APPROACH
Chapter II.
INFORMAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:
A Spatial Review of the Literature

2.0 Overview

...[Our] crisis is essentially a crisis of perception.
— Fritjof Capra (1982: xviii)

The purpose of this chapter is to engage with the literature that has addressed in some detail the fundamental problem of planning informal sector development, mainly as experienced in fast-growing cities in the South. In order to provide a backdrop for this discussion, attention is paid initially to wider UIS debates regarding economic development and societal change. The discussion then focuses more narrowly on planning scholarship, particularly where this scholarship has attended either theoretically or empirically to the urban geographies that characterize informal sector development. As might be expected, there has been a close association between the geographies mapped in the planning literature and the wider debates about economic development and societal change. But there has also been a notable failure of spatial imagination.

This chapter argues that the literature on informal sector development planning has relied far too heavily upon compositional as opposed to contextual approaches to urban theorization. As suggested in chapter I, compositional approaches invariably sever the dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical entanglements and associations of urban life, preferring instead to theorize reality in terms of “purifications”, to use a word from actor-network theory. The discussion that now follows will show that this tendency to purification generates overly simplistic geographies in the service of overly simplistic theoretical claims about development and change, both for and against the promise of planning practice. Specifically, the discussion will show that in their geographies of informal sector development (1) radical neo-Marxists have over-emphasised exploitative class relations; (2) conservative neo-liberals (and skeptical post-modernists) have over-emphasised the over-regulated individual; and (3) the progressive planners have over-
emphasised the built environment. Put differently, the discussion will show that the literature is dominated by compositional as opposed to contextual geographies: "maps" of exploitation on the Left, individualism on the Right, and progressive morphologies somewhere between. But if this world is not an abstracted "place" at all, but a passage across place — a connecting "performance" from left to right via the middle — then these compositional geographies do not suffice. For "our crisis," as Capra noted almost a generation ago, "is essentially a crisis of perception." We cannot see what is in front of us (Thrift 2000c). This chapter therefore concludes that we need new geographies, new imaginaries — not simply to map the world for the sake of it, but to map the world so that we might better understand the problems and possibilities that attend changing it through the collective planning and management of cities.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 2.1 first provides an overview of the general informal sector experience, focusing on debates relating mainly to the South. Special attention is paid to problems of definition and to the theoretical evolution of the UIS experience over the past three decades. Section 2.2 then outlines the small body of this larger literature that explicitly addresses spatial planning themes, highlighting its major claims and central theoretical orientations. Finally, section 2.3 concludes the chapter with a brief critique of these claims and orientations and a call for an alternative theoretical engagement with the problem of planning informal sector development.

2.1 The Urban Informal Sector: Context, Definitions, Debates

The urban informal sector (UIS) of economies in developing countries has attracted sustained research since its formal identification and popularization in the 1970s (ILO 1972, Hart 1973). An International Labour Organisation (ILO) annotated bibliography covering mainly the 1980s lists over two hundred serious academic studies of the UIS in Africa alone (ILO 1991). Internationally, the Asian Institute of Technology has compiled a list of 890 UIS academic and policy studies between 1972-1993 (Perera and Amin 1993). This section briefly reviews the empirical emergence of the UIS as an international phenomenon. It then lays out some of the most important debates that have directly impacted upon the urban planning and spatial management literature.
At the end of World War II less than one-third of the world's 1.2 billion people lived in urban areas. Today the figure is approaching one-half of the world's six billion people and by the year 2025 almost two-thirds (4.4 billion) of a projected total global population of 7.3 billion people will live in cities (Figure 2.1). As the historian E. J. Hobsbawm (1994) has eloquently put it, the twentieth century will be remembered above all for "the death of the peasantry."

**FIGURE 2.1** Percent of total population urbanised: 1950-2025

Due to this urbanization dynamic, over the past fifty years the percentage rate of annual increase in the urban population has slowly declined (Figure 2.2), as have total fertility and death rates. The mean annual global increase in urban population is today about 2.5% and will fall to less than 2% per annum by 2025. However, because the world's richest countries have largely urbanized, most of the world's new urban residents will reside in developing countries, whose percentage rates of annual urbanization (3.5-5%) are currently several times higher than for the richest countries (now less than 1%).

These new urban residents are facing, and will continue to face, labour markets much more perilous than was imagined at the beginning of the post-WWII era. The close historical correlation between urbanization and industrialization over the nineteenth century led many Western theorists in the 1950s and 1960s to anticipate that similar patterns would characterize economic and social development in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In particular, modernization theorists such as Arthur Lewis (1956),

SOURCE: United Nations 1995
Robert Solow (1956) and W.W. Rostow (1960) argued that increases in the rate of industrial output would transform predominantly agricultural labour markets via urbanization and, through multiplier and spread effects, lead to a self-generating and essentially irreversible process of “take-off.” Coupled with Talcott Parsons’ structuralist-functionalist theory of social action, which posited the steady displacement of traditional, risk-averse behavior with modern, risk-taking behavior, the modernization analysis “...seemed to offer every country an equal chance,” as Brookfield has put it (cited in Preston 1996: 177). The development process was therefore conceived as “jumping into the historical queue — a question of time, not of space” (Massey 1997, no page number).

**FIGURE 2.2 Urbanization rates: by type of country: 1950-2025**

![Graph showing urbanization rates](source: United Nations 1995)

All this proved mostly erroneous. Spatial differences turned out to matter a great deal. Industrial expansion did take place in the post-WWII era — in some cases dramatically so. As Table 2.1 shows, by 1980 industrial activity accounted for over one third of the overall gross domestic product of developing countries. And a few nations and city-states, notably Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, pursued highly successful export-oriented industrialization strategies that seemed to confirm the authoritative, plan-led interventionist themes of the Keynesian-inspired modernisation school — at least until the 1980s. But the uncomfortable fact remained that the import substitution strategies that most countries used to stimulate this impressive industrial activity failed to transform national labour markets along the lines envisaged by modernization theorists (Table 2.2.). In hindsight, some of the main reasons for this are
clear. Import substitution strategies were aimed at stimulating “infant industries” with macro-economic policies that curtailed foreign imports, erected high tariff walls, overvalued exchange rates and imported high-tech capital plant (Agenor and Montiel 1996)

TABLE 2.1 Structure of GDP: all developing countries: 1960-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 2.2 Labour force structure: developing countries: 1960-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The theory, originally formulated as “structuralism” by Raúl Prebisch in the Latin American development studies literature but widely adopted elsewhere, was to meet domestic demand for basic consumer goods and then shift production to intermediate and capital goods or export markets once the limitations of such demand were reached (Preston 1996: 181). In practice, however, as Gilbert and Gugler (1992: 88) have outlined, “[a]s capital stock expanded during the industrialization of [developing] countries, the productivity of labour rose dramatically, and labour became relatively more expensive. Hence modern technology increasingly sought to minimize the role of labour.” They further suggest that all this contributed eventually to a long-term inability
of the so-called "formal" urban economy to absorb rural-to-urban migrants, attracted by these high wages. This pushed people into "informal" economic activity.

Fixing this conundrum proved difficult (Peet 1999: 40-46). At least four obstacles mitigated a more labour-intensive industrialization process: the unavailability of local labour-intensive technologies; the propensity of national elites to favor up-to-date equipment; the solidification of wage and benefit increases by trade unions; and the tendency of foreign direct investment to utilize capital-intensive technologies (Gilbert and Gugler 1992: 87-89). Some of the end-results of these obstacles are shown in Table 2.3, which presents Gini coefficients for economically active populations in selected countries in 1970, and Table 2.4 below, which presents estimates of the share of urban labour forces in the informal sector for selected countries between 1968 and 1976.

**TABLE 2.3** Gini coefficients for select countries: 1965-1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GINI COEFFICIENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SOURCE: Sethuraman, 1981: 212*

Largely in the light of these (once unexpected) data, which now suggested highly unequal and indeed substantially informal economic conditions, Moser (1978: 1043) echoed a generation of development theorists when she concluded in 1978 that "...accelerated growth strategies based on maximizing GNP were neither leading to the desired level of income redistribution nor solving the problem of poverty and employment." Income redistribution, poverty and employment therefore assumed greater prominence in the development debate, taking their place alongside of, and even displacing, the traditional theoretical fixation on economic growth (Singer 1977; Portes 1978). The ILO's World Employment Programme (Seers 1970) and the catch phrases of the 1970s development discourse — growth with redistribution; basic needs; appropriate technology; community participation; small is beautiful; the New International Economic Order — reflected this prominence (Bromley 1978a; see also World Bank 1978).
TABLE 2.4  Estimated share off labour force in the informal sector for urban areas of select countries: 1968-1876

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% INFORMAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (West)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Sethuraman 1981: 214

It was squarely in the face of this much larger, mid-1970s recognition that modernization, industrialization and labour markets might just have substantially different temporal and indeed spatial patterns around the world — indeed, that societal change did not necessarily follow a single “privileged trajectory” (Akrich and Latour 1997: 263) — that both theorists and practitioners began to look more closely at the potentialities associated with the “at once ancient and new” concept of informal sector, to employ Borja and Castell’s (1997) phrase. But as they did so, clear battle lines around hypothesized trajectories were drawn — and discussions about urban development became fragmented along these battle lines. Accordingly, in the 1970s and early 1980s theorists expended much effort on “defining” the UIS; but these definitions inevitably clashed. For they involved different interpretations of linkages with the so-called “formal” sector (if any) and different views on capital accumulation processes.

All of this implied disagreement over appropriate urban policy (if any). Not surprisingly, these early disagreements remain unresolved in the present (Peattie 1987; Sanyal 1988; Amin 1996). However, as Caroline Moser (1978) once suggested, each interpretation hinges on a particular discourse about the nature of development and change. The first discourse is grounded in a basically mainstream analysis of social and economic change. The second discourse is more radical, employing modes of production theory. A review of the major debates about definitions, empirical characteristics and policy needs is therefore most easily organized around these two main discourses. This review will excavate some of the major insights gleaned from this literature. It will then
extend these insights directly into the planning literature in Section 2.2, where the various geographies of informal sector development are discussed.

**MAINSTREAM ACCOUNTS: DUALISM AND STATE POLICY**

The mainstream discourse on the UIS emphasizes “dualism” within urban economies and societies and the promise (for some) and plague (for others) of state policy. Sanyal (1988: 65) sympathizes with this approach: for all its disadvantages, he states, “[d]ualism [is] a method of social enquiry...[that] helps us to comprehend this confusing world through two neatly contrasting, and hence easily identifiable, categories.” The dualist view of the UIS, particularly in the body of work that emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s, updates and revises the central concept of economic and social duality inherent in modernization theory, which, as outlined above, conceived of national economies in terms of traditional (largely rural) and modern (largely urban) activities (see Geertz 1963). However, whereas modernization theory assumed the anachronistic character of the informal economy, and therefore privileged the formal sector, mainstream dualists now assumed its growth potential and overall utility. Most proponents of the informal sector in the urban context therefore soon conceived of it as a distinct set of viable activities within the economy that might mature and service desirable developmental goals (i.e. poverty alleviation, job creation, skills acquisition).

Dualists disagreed — and disagree still — on definitions of the UIS and on the extent to which the UIS is actually autonomous from the formal sector (Tokman 1978). But there has long been broad agreement on two major propositions: first, that the informal sector is capable of capital accumulation if only the ‘constraints’ and ‘bottlenecks’ preventing this accumulation could be removed — either through appropriate policy or through non-interference (or which more in a moment); and second, that whatever backwards and forward linkages it has with the ‘formal’ sector (if any) are benign and not inherently detrimental to this capital accumulation; indeed, that linkage provides the solution, not the problem to employment in developing cities. Dualist theorization of the UIS started off in the early 1970s, and in particular with the ideas of one scholar: Kenneth Hart.

**Hart’s “informal sector”**

Kenneth Hart undertook seminal anthropological research on urban labour markets in Accra, Ghana in the mid-1960s but only reported this work in the early 1970s. Although
theorists such as Geertz (1963), Reynolds (1965), McGee (1967) and Santos (1970) had also written in similar terms, Hart (1973) is widely credited with introducing the term “informal sector” into development discourse and, of no less importance, with initiating its first conceptual mapping (Amin 1996). Hart’s contribution was to rethink the concept of (un)employment in developing cities by focusing on what was happening rather than what was not happening. This was a crucial turn. With an eye on the largely unenumerated activity he observed amongst the urban poor in Accra — “...night watchmen sleeping on the job to work the next day...” (1973: 64) — he posed the following question: “Does the ‘reserve army of urban unemployed and underemployed’ really constitute a passive, exploited majority in cities like Accra, or do their informal economic activities possess some capacity for generating growth in the incomes of the urban poor?” (1973: 61, emphasis added).

Hart answered that there was capacity for growth in incomes (capital accumulation) — and offered for the first time a definition-orientated “typology of income opportunities” that cleanly separated formal sector wage earning activities from informal sector self-employed activities (Table 2.5 below). These self-employed activities were exceptionally diverse. They included legal and illegal primary activities (“corn and cannabis” growing); secondary activities (artisan work and gin distilling); tertiary activities (landlordship and loan-sharking); and small-scale distribution (food retailing and drug-running). Within the context of this typology, Hart called for more research on income “flows” within the urban economy, particularly between the newly named “formal” and “informal” sectors, and he suggested an empirically creative input/output methodology for the implementation of this research.

Hart’s affirmative approach to informality per se, his call for empirical research, and, not least, his positive assessment of the central role for public policy was infectious; both the “informal sector” term and his attitude towards what the term represented soon stimulated wider discussion. But to many his richly textured typology was frustratingly vague.1 His mapping of the UIS included individuals (musicians), activities (market gardening and gift giving) and organizational forms (tertiary enterprises), some of which were more or less “autonomous” from the formal sector (gardening), others not

1 In light of his concern for income flows, it is incorrect to argue as Tokman (1978) has that Hart’s typology depicts a totally autonomous informal sector. Hart’s assumptions are dualist, but he sensed informal sector linkages with the formal sector — and furthermore thought these links should be strengthened through generative public policy wherever possible.
(transport). It also included criminal activities and inadequately accounted for the extent to which new migrants rather than long-term residents populate the UIS, an important issue in the larger debate about labour market constitution in rapidly urbanizing societies.

TABLE 2.5 Hart’s 1973 typology of income activities: formal and informal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMAL INCOME OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Public sector wages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Private Sector wages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Transfer payments – pensions, unemployment benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMAL INCOME OPPORTUNITIES: LEGITIMATE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Primary and secondary activities – farming, market gardening, building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoemakers, tailors, manufactures of beers and spirits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tertiary enterprises with relatively large capital inputs – housing, transport, utilities, commodity speculation, rentier activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Small-scale distribution – market operatives, petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, bar attendants, carriers (kayakaya), commission agents, and dealers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Other services – musicians, launders, shoeshiners, barbers, night-soil removers, photographers, vehicle repair and other maintenance workers; brokerage and middlemanship (the maigida system in markets, law courts, etc.); ritual services, magic, and medicine.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Private transfer payments – gifts and similar flows of money and goods between persons; borrowing; begging.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMAL INCOME OPPORTUNITIES: ILLEGITIMATE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Services – hustlers and spivs in general; receivers of stolen goods; usury and pawnbroking (at illegal interest rates); drug-push, prostitution, poncing ('pilot boy'), smuggling, bribery, political corruption Tammany Hall-style, protection rackets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Transfers – petty theft (e.g. pickpockets), larceny (e.g. burglary and armed robbery), peculation and embezzlement, confidence tricksters (e.g. money doublers, gambling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This quickly resulted in “complete confusion” about what was meant by the UIS (Moser 1978: 1051); about what forms it took and who was involved; about its relationship to migration and economic development; about how best to slice into its complexities; about whether it was mainly autonomous from or mainly integrated with the formal sector and, if mainly integrated, about whether this integration was benign or exploitative (Tokman 1978).
The International Labour Organisation

“Complete confusion” was ill suited to international policy-makers who were searching for explicitly defined target groups. Hart’s initial exploratory research was therefore tightened up (and hence dramatically narrowed) by the International Labour Organisation in a series of country and city studies in the early 1970s. The most important of these studies was the Kenyan Mission Report (ILO 1972). The report focused on three major employment problems: frustrated job-seekers unable to find work commensurate with their skills and training; under-utilization of labour resources at the national level; and the low-level of return for work that is done. However, its major focus was on the last problem, which inter alia highlighted the new concept of the informal sector, at least as it related to non-criminal enterprises.

The report re-emphasized Hart’s claims about the efficacy of the UIS and its potential for capital accumulation, but over-emphasized his arguments about its basic autonomy within the urban economy: the “… bulk of employment in the informal sector, far from being marginally productive is economically efficient and profit-making, though small in scale and limited by simple technologies, little capital and lack of links with the other (“formal”) sector” (1972: 5, emphasis added). This pointed to an inexorable conclusion (1972: 226): “… given a framework within which to function, informal economic activity on a small scale can strongly influence the structure of Kenya’s economy and can aid in the process of expanding the range of income-producing activities needed for the rapidly growing population.” Accordingly, several specific policy actions to help construct this framework were recommended:

- To cease the demolition of informal sector housing;
- To review trade and commercial licensing with a view to eliminate unnecessary licenses;
- To give licenses to any applicant willing to pay the fee;
- To intensify technical research and development work on products available for production and use in the informal sector;
- To induce larger firms to train sub-contractors and to use industrial estates for promoting subcontracting; and
- To encourage government tendering of informal sector products

In order to aid the targeted implementation of these policies, the report offered its own (much simpler) definitional framework or “mapping” that has been widely cited, as well as severely criticized, in the UIS literature. This framework is presented in Table 2.6.
Both concrete and crude, the ILO framework reflects the dualist and proclivities of its authors and the main focus on enterprises — rather than individuals, activities and enterprises as in Hart’s typology.

**TABLE 2.6 ILO Kenyan Mission Framework for Labour Markets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE INFORMAL SECTOR:</th>
<th>THE FORMAL SECTOR:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ease of entry</td>
<td>Difficult entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on indigenous resources</td>
<td>Frequent reliance on overseas resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family ownership of enterprises</td>
<td>Corporate ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small scale of operation</td>
<td>Large-scale of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-intensive and adapted technology</td>
<td>Capital-intensiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills acquisition outside the formal school system; and</td>
<td>Formal skills acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unregulated and competitive markets</td>
<td>Protected markets (through tariffs, quota, trade licenses)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** ILO 1972

**The UIS as enterprise**

The enterprise focus quickly gained momentum in the UIS literature, dovetailing with a more general interest in small- and micro-enterprise (SME) development and appropriate technology, whilst the concomitant insistence on its overall autonomy gradually weakened. Particularly illustrative of this trend is the work of Sethuraman (1975, 1976, 1981). Pushing aside approaches that emphasized non-enterprise definitions of the UIS, Sethuraman (1976) refined dualist theory by distinguishing more clearly than the ILO between formal and informal enterprises in five different sectors: manufacturing; construction; transport; trade and services. Specifically, Sethuraman proposed that informal enterprises are characterized by at least one of the following criteria: employs less than 10 persons; operates on an illegal basis; employs members of the household; does not observe fixed hours/days of operation; operates in semi-permanent or temporary premises, or in a shifting location; does not use any electricity in the manufacturing process; does not depend on formal financial institutions for its credit needs; output normally distributed directly to the final consumer; and almost all those working in it have fewer than six years formal education (1976: 81). Thomas (1995: 22)
notes that "[t]his classification is not derived from any conceptual model..." but that it is "operational." It nevertheless implied a conceptual model of the UIS, albeit a partial and largely descriptive one.

Exhibiting connections with the ILO Kenyan Mission, Sethuraman's (1976) early descriptions of the UIS depicted two distinct (indeed "compositional") sectors in the urban economy: one populated by formal enterprises and the other by informal enterprises. The interactions (or linkages) between these two sectors were presumed to be weak; that is, inputs and outputs of UIS goods and services were seen to circulate largely within the economic and social structure of the UIS. Inputs from — and outputs to — the formal sector were considered far less important. However, as evidence of more integrated relationships between the UIS and formal sector mounted, Sethuraman backed away from these early claims of autonomy. Rather Sethuraman proposed in a more general way that "...the distinguishing feature of the informal sector unit and the [formal sector] small enterprise is their orientation: whereas the former is motivated primarily by employment creation, the latter is concerned primarily with profit maximization" (1981: 17). He cited empirical studies to support this claim and further suggested that informal enterprises generate more employment and output per unit invested than the formal sector. Sethuraman did acknowledge that "...the extent to which (potential) surplus generated in the informal sector is ... appropriated by the formal sector is a matter for empirical investigation depending on the nature and extent of backwards and forward linkages" (1981: 32). But he argued that if informal enterprises do not realize surplus, this is due mainly to imperfections in the "nature and extent" of linkages, which can be dealt with through appropriate policy.

UIS as labour market

Other mainstream dualists defined the UIS in non-enterprise terms, with the analytical focus on the political economy of labour markets. Implicit in this labour market perspective was that the enterprise focus inadequately accounts for the various organizational forms that informal sector activities take — that much of Hart's initial "mapping" was being ignored. The clearest example of this approach is found in the work of Mazumdar (1976), who argued that the UIS is best conceptualized as "...a theory of personal income distribution which stresses 'structural' factors in explaining earnings differentials as against rival explanations in human capital terms" (1976: 655). 'Structural' factors that effect income (and therefore life chances) include market forces,
institutional arrangements and especially public policies — such as investment incentives, protection from imports, collective bargaining, minimum wage legislation, licensing requirements and rationing of public sector jobs. These structural factors work together to erect "barriers to mobility" which effectively block off the informal sector from the formal sector. As a result, Mazumdar argued that the UIS is best thought of as "unprotected" labour while the formal sector, shielded behind these barriers, is essentially "protected" labour.

Similarly, Weeks (1975: 3) argued that the compositional duality between the two sectors is brought about mainly by "...the organisational characteristics of exchange relationships and the position of the economic activity vis-à-vis the State." Sharing Mazumdar's concern for the totality of UIS activities, Weeks built his argument on the proposition that no activity (or sector) in an urban economy is inherently dynamic. Rather, dynamism is associated with "resources of all types," including tariff and quota protection, import tax rebates on capital and internal goods, restricted licensing, foreign technology and credit, the acquisition of which is largely negotiated through the state. He therefore concluded that what makes an informal sector enterprise informal is that, unlike the formal sector enterprise, it has limited access to such resources and therefore struggles to evolve and mature. However, as with other mainstream dualists, he held that the UIS could evolve and mature — or be "evolutionary" rather than "involutionary" because the UIS does many things very well: it efficiently distributes a high percentage of consumer goods within the urban economy; it reduces dependence on imports and it provides practical fora for entrepreneurial skills acquisition.

Of the two main perspectives, the enterprise focus has arguably proven more influential. Until the 1980s, there were three main reasons for this. The first reason was that its "operational" nature gave policy makers (and politicians) a concrete target to assist — the enterprise, however differentially or contentiously defined. The second reason was that it strongly suggested that the right combination of policies exists and — if only "discovered" for particular situations — could help informal enterprises grow and mature; indeed, it placed enlightened policy-making vis-à-vis the enterprise unit at the centre of the UIS "problem." The third reason was that it suggested that this growth and maturation could occur through building linkages with formal sector enterprises, underscoring the up-beat "partnership" language wherein a rising tide lifts all boats.
The UIS as entrepreneurialism

As the 1970s shaded into the 1980s, however, the tone of the larger UIS debate changed decisively (World Bank 1984, 1987). Market-led policies under IMF-led structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) swept through much of the developing world; part and parcel of this process was that many enthusiasts of the UIS enterprise now viewed bureaucratic policy meddling as the main problem, not the main solution. On this account, informal enterprises remained latent, or more frequently oppressed, because government decision-makers saw the informal urban economy as a "dysfunctional problem" that needed fixing through resource endowment. Such fixing, in other words, included too much planning.

Interestingly, Chickering and Salahdine (1991: 3) call this a "bureaucratic/Newtonian" theory of development. In contrast, they note, "... post-Newtonian development theory focuses on nonmaterial factors — [the] creation of an environment for realizing the energies and creativity of ordinary people to work for self-government in economic, social and political life" (p. 4). In their view at the time this is basically accomplished through liberalization, deregulation and rolling back the state. The ultimate hero of this putatively post-Newtonian view is Hernando de Soto (1989), whose writings on informal enterprises in Latin America emphasize the historical oppression of the enterprising poor by an essentially clientelist state (see also Harper 1996). This constituted the basis of a new neo-liberal reading of UIS dynamics.

THE RADICAL CRITIQUE: MODES OF PRODUCTION THEORY

In stark contrast to this generally sanguine and even celebratory discourse, radical Marxian theorists have employed Marx's modes of production (MOP) framework to argue that the informal sector is essentially incapable of long-term capital accumulation or institutional evolution. MOP theory as applied to developing countries (Melotti 1977) maintains that the central dynamic of less-developed countries is the "non-organic" process of capitalist development, wherein industrial production processes are "grafted-on" to society over time as "elements" rather than "structurally integrated sectors." Because these industrial elements do not develop directly ("organically") from existing social and economic structures, they do not lead to modernization, which is defined as the more efficient transformation of previously existing social and economic relationships. Instead, as Hyden (1980) has brilliantly shown in the case of Tanzania, peripheral societies exhibit a stalemate in production relationships. The partial
penetration of industrial elements fails to "... generalize the effect of modernization throughout the productive matrix in its entirety and so is equally incapable of eliminating the previous organizational forms of economic activity" (Quijano 1974: 396). The focus of attention, particularly in world-systems theory, is thus on the economistic notion of an "accumulation process at the world level" (Tokman 1978: 1067).

Marginality theorists
Attempts to apply these global arguments at the urban scale of analysis have been empirically awkward (cf. Booth 1985, 1993). A few MOP theorists (Santos 1970; Nun 1969 cited in Tokman 1978; and Quijano 1974) assume the UIS's empirical distinctiveness, though not necessarily its absolute autonomy.² In this sense, they also employ an essentially "dualist" conception of urban labour markets, albeit one based on a materialist conception of historical change. For this reason they are referred to as "marginality" theorists who write of an informal "pole" in the urban economy (Tokman 1978) and use a different terminology for the two components of these markets. For example, Santos (1979) speaks of a "lower circuit" "polarized from" an "upper circuit" in the urban economy but argues that "[t]hough the two circuits are independent [i.e. distinctive], the linkages between them are considerable and are characterised by the dependence of the lower upon the upper."

According to Tokman (1978), marginality theorists hold that this "dependence" is based on two concrete factors. The first factor is the existence (and persistence) of surplus labour settings and the second factor is the "lower circuit's" lack of access to inputs and product markets. These "factors" are of course similar to those identified by mainstream theorists such as Mazumdar (1976). However, unlike mainstreamers, marginality theorists see these factors as "... mechanisms by which surplus extraction operates and hence, by which the capacity of accumulation is restricted" (Tokman 1978: 1068). Public policy, which services the dominant mode, does not offer a set of tools that can overcome this structural reality.

Petty commodity production theorists
Other radicals also employ MOP theory but dismiss the concept of a distinctive "circuit" or "pole" altogether and avoid the more structurally deterministic polemics of the

² Again, Tokman (1978) incorrectly argues that all radical marginal theorists "implicitly" assume the autonomy of the UIS. In fact many simply assume its empirical distinctiveness (Santos 1979)
marginality school. These “softer” radicals (Bienfield 1975; LeBrun and Gerry 1975; Moser 1978), generally referred to as petty commodity production (PCP) theorists, base their critique of mainstream dualism and marginality on the “conceptually inadequate” (Bremen 1976) and “difficult to identify” (Papola 1980) concept itself. While Pearlman (1976) launched the most devastating overall critique, Moser (1978: 1056) put it most concretely: “the inability of the dualist models to handle the complexities of relationships such as [subcontracting and casual labour], which fit inadequately into a wage/self employment or formal sector/informal sector dichotomy, has resulted in the utilization of [PCP] framework more able to include the social as well as technical relations of production.” The PCP framework therefore shares with the marginality approach an emphasis on the exploitative nature of the dominant mode of production, despite fairly esoteric debate over whether subordinated PCP activities constitute an actual “mode” (Bienefeld 1975) or simply a “form” (LeBrun and Gerry 1975). But unlike the marginality approach it emphasizes that linkages between the two sectors are strong and complex (Bose 1974) and therefore a “continuum approach” better captures their essential nature.

Ultimately PCP typologies eschew the “either/or” criteria setting of the dualists in favor of a continuum of possibilities. For example, Bromley and Gerry (1979: 5) propose that petty commodity production can be conceived of as “casual work,” which they define loosely as “...a way of making a living which lacks a moderate degree of security of income and employment.” This “way of making a living” falls under one of four main types: true self-employment; dependent work; short-term wage work; and disguised wage work. True self-employment refers to a situation wherein the individual has a free choice of suppliers and outlets and owns his/her own means of production. Dependent work refers to artisans who work in rented premises and buy equipment with a loan or to taxi drivers who operate someone else’s vehicle. Short-term wage work refers to casual labour, such as intermittent low-skilled construction work. Finally, disguised work refers to piecemeal work, such as textile sub-contracting (Beneria and Feldman 1992).

TOWARDS SPATIAL STORIES OF UIS DEVELOPMENT

Employing both mainstream and radical frameworks, then, scholars of the UIS have probed a multitude of theoretical and policy themes. In so doing, as Amin (1996) argues, these scholars have contributed much to larger discussions of urban development and underdevelopment, modes of urban analysis, and thinking about (in)appropriate public
policy vis-à-vis non-agricultural employment. That said, most of this research has been aspatial, a characteristic of the literature noted by several urban scholars (Sanyal 1988; Paddison 1990; Balbo 1993; Harper 1996; Mani 1996; Perera 1995; Perera 1996; Dewar and Todeschini 1999). As Post (1992: 38) succinctly puts it: “...only a few [UIS] authors have shown an awareness of space.” And as Harper further confirms, informal sector activity has been investigated largely as “... an economic and legal phenomenon rather than a spatial one” (1996: 103).

An important exception to this overall state of affairs has been scholarship focused on urban planning and the morphological structure of urban space; that is to say, on both the substantive and normative “geographies” of informal sector development planning. Before turning to this body of work, however, it is perhaps useful to pause momentarily in order to rehearse the major hypothesis of this thesis. For the objective of this chapter is not to dismiss thirty years of urban scholarship. Rather, it is to take the whole of this scholarship seriously by hypothesizing that the difficulties of planning informal sector development, in Cape Town or anywhere else for that matter, might be more productively theorized by mobilizing a very different spatial imaginary — indeed, a different “geography” — than has been mobilized to date. In particular, the challenge of bringing about new UIS geographies through planning technologies might be better “explained” by mapping the inherently dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical nature of space-as-it-is. Or put another way, by mapping contextual rather than compositional geographies. Contextual geographies do not begin by severing exploitative class relations from the bureaucratic state from small enterprises from labour markets from supportive land use policies, and so on. Rather they generate connective tissues across these categories — or least try to. In so doing, it is argued here, they look very different from the geographies of “purification” that now follow.

2.2

Mapping the “Purified” Geographies of Informal Sector Development Planning

This section focuses on three major explanations or “schools” for why informal sector development planning is difficult. It does so by excavating the hypothesized geographies associated with this effort. The first school is associated with radical or neo-Marxist scholarship. The second school is associated with neo-liberal or anti-statist scholarship. And the third school is associated with mainstream or progressive planning scholarship. Within the context of this last school, special attention is given specifically to the “Cape
Town School," which offers a progressive analysis of considerable importance to the empirical focus of this thesis. The discussion reviews the key insights associated with each of these schools, but ultimately provides a synoptic critique that mandates an alternative theoretical approach to the research problem in question.

NEO-MARXIST MODERNISATION, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND UIS DEVELOPMENT

In perhaps one of the most under-rated contributions to urbanization theory made in the 1970s, Milton Santos (1970, 1972, 1979) developed a general hypothesis about space and informal sector dynamics that requires initial examination here — not simply because of its own claims, but also because of its subsequent influence on other UIS scholars, such as Terrance McGee. As briefly alluded to earlier, Santos based his urbanisation and modernization hypothesis on the notion of "shared spaces" between the "upper" (formal) and "lower" (informal) "circuits" of developing economies. Defining modernization (and thus urban development) as "...the diffusion of an innovation from a core region to a peripheral subordinate region or from an anterior historical period to a subsequent one," (1979: xx) he built up from the proposition that lower and upper circuits of developing countries are part and parcel of the technological modernization dynamic characteristic of the post-WWII era. In keeping with early UIS attempts at one-off conceptual typologies, he even offered his own simplified, oft-cited "mapping" of these two circuits, presented in Figure 2.3 below.

Working together, the two circuits depicted in Figure 2.3 transform what Santos calls "neutral space" into "operational space." Urbanization and modernization theories that ignore lower circuit dynamics and their attendant operational spaces are incomplete; hence the urgent need to accord a central role to the lower circuit in theorizing the overall LDC urbanization process. Much of Santos' fundamental analysis fits easily within widely discussed UIS concepts already outlined, particularly with respect to marginality theory and the so-called 'development of under-development' thesis associated with 1970s world-systems thinking (Wallerstein 1979). He links the existence of the lower circuit to agricultural modernization, rural emigration and employment-limiting import substitution strategies and he highlights the exogenous — and poorly integrated — nature of export-orientated industries. In his view at the time, these export-orientated industries basically act to subsidize foreign capital, do little to stimulate ancillary economic activity and tend towards monopoly — all problems directly exacerbated by the state, which according to Santos almost always allies itself with upper
circuit interests through infrastructure provision, fiscal codes and, of most importance here, urban and regional development plans geared towards, and supportive of, a capitalist modernization ideology and historical trajectory.

**FIGURE 2.3** Santos’s “Two Circuits” Typology

![Diagram of Santos's Two Circuits Typology](source)

**SOURCE:** Redrawn from Santos (1979)

Where Santos moved beyond these assertions was in his attempt to construct from them a general theoretical framework within which to understand the macrospatial organisation of LDC urban hierarchies. Building on the work of the French theorist Paul Claval, Santos argued that “State and [upper] circuit activities (particularly those of monopolies and multinational firms) form the essential elements of macrospatial organisation, whilst lower circuit activities are limited to more restricted area” (1979: 147). The short-term outcome is a “shared space” between the two circuits throughout the urban hierarchy. He maps these spaces according to four urban types: the complete metropolis, which is capable of serving most of its own consumption requirements (e.g.
Mexico City and Cairo); the partial metropolis, which relies in part on the complete metropolis or abroad (e.g. Guadalajara and Alexandra), the intermediate city and the local town.

At the macrospatial scale, two principles govern this mapping. The first is captured below in Figure 2.4, wherein the lower circuit plays a horizontal rather than vertical role in spatial integration. The second is captured below in Figure 2.5, wherein Santos posited that lower circuit activity declines in relative (though not absolute) significance as the urban hierarchy is climbed. Based on these two principles, Santos argued that “...the upper circuit’s [market hegemony] is unified whilst that of the lower circuit is highly fragmented” (1979: 197). Accordingly, if there is functional complementarity between these two circuits, there is also a deeper structural antagonism: “...the lower circuit competes with the upper circuit for control of space” (ibid.). Applied at the intra-urban scale, this spatial competition works through consumption patterns and requirements, which in turn are conditioned by the size of the elite, middle and lower classes, income and credit distribution, transport systems, cultural tastes and, not least, the city-wide production and marketing system.

FIGURE 2.4 The macro-system of inter-urban relations

FIGURE 2.5 Relative significance of the two circuits in the urban system as a whole

Source: Re-drawn from Santos (1979)

3 Few empirical investigations have picked up on these hypotheses, although Onyewuenuyi (1991) has examined the urban hierarchical spatial diffusion of informal dressmaking in Yorubaland, Nigeria. Onyewuenuyi seeks to describe the spatial diffusion of dressmaking within the Yoruba urban system, but he employs probability of location and rank-order correlation methods.
An early and particularly revealing empirical application of these general theoretical principles is found in Terrance McGee’s (1973) still fascinating monograph on hawking in Hong Kong. Operating within an (uneasy) neo-Marxist/human ecology framework, McGee (1973: 26) employed Santos’ concept of upper and lower circuits to argue similarly that “… the two circuits have different spatial and sectoral requirements and demands”, which leads inexorably to transformed land use patterns and spatial structures, as depicted in Figure 2.6 below. Following Santos directly, McGee suggested that over time the “…more efficient upper circuit will eventually penetrate and transform the lower circuit. In simple terms the supermarket will eventually take over from the hawker” (p. 8). In short, urban development is basically about (adroitly managing) the steady encroachment of the ‘upper circuit.’

**FIGURE 2.6 McGee’s Two Circuit-Land Use Model of Urban Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC STRUCTURE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 — CBD, offices and department stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 — Middle and upper class residential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 — high density tenements, multi-functional use of same site, mixed land use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 — Squatter settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 — Large scale industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 — Low cost and lower middle income housing area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Redrawn from McGee 1973
McGee recapitulated Santos' argument that informal sector activity carves out its own, largely distinct operational spaces. Writing at a time when public officials saw street hawking in a particularly pejorative and dismissive light, however, McGee argued that planners should at least recognize the structural logic driving the "space-occupying patterns" of the lower circuit, if only to manage urban change more effectively. Without such recognition, he concluded, attempts to interfere with the "zones of lower circuit land use" through relocation, licensing or education campaigns would be invariably counter-productive.

While McGee thus exhibits a heightened sensitivity to urban planning and service management vis-à-vis the empirical spatialities of the "lower circuit" (cf. Chadwick 1986), his fundamental conviction is that the UIS is basically a developmental non-starter (Figure 2.6). Like other neo-Marxists who heavily emphasize the role of capital accumulation, Santos (1979) sees the UIS in much the same way. In particular, both authors theorize the UIS as a spatial expression of the more general capitalist failure "...to generalize the effect of modernization throughout the productive matrix" (Quijano 1974: 396). On this reading, modernization is an almost pre-given urban development trajectory, a conflict-laden but essentially inexorable (Western-like) movement from "Phase I" to "Phase III." If there is a stronger sense of spatial stalemate for Santos, in McGee's geographical imaginary squatter camps, to highlight only one element, eventually recede ("4") while large-scale industrial estates ("5") expand. Implicitly, planning is about managing this historical process on behalf of dominant classes (but towards an industrialized, increasingly militant labour force). UIS development planning is therefore envisaged through a capitalist, material, structural space driven by an almost teleological belief in the historical dynamism of dualist class relations.

STATE OPPRESSION, ECONOMIC AGENCY AND POSSIBLE UIS LIBERATION

The inability of the UIS to develop (or to be developed through planning interventions) is also taken up by a second body of spatially-informed theorists who focus mainly on the geographies of the (universally) oppressive and/or clumsy developmental state (cf. Scott 1997; Tripp 1997). Unlike neo-Marxists, however, this group of theorists share no single ontology of the city; indeed, they are more like a warring family of writers awkwardly united by either (1) a collective concern for state violence in general and planning interventions in particular; or (2) a quasi-romantic belief (albeit often implicitly
communicated) in the developmental possibilities of appropriately “liberated” UIS agency.

For instance, Johan Post (1992, 1994, 1995a, 1995b) in his important work on Kassala, Sudan examines the “spatial-economic-behavior” of informal entrepreneurs and the ways in which the Sudanese State’s “accommodation” strategies have negatively impacted this behavior. Specifically, Post offers warnings in regard to the poor performance of Kassala’s planned, but decentralized market places. He differentiates between survival and growth enterprises — arguing that survival-orientated enterprises are less willing to move locations, even when business performance is poor — and concludes that spatial management initiatives which fail to incorporate these internal UIS realities lead to inefficient resource deployment, the creation of under-utilized urban spaces, and increasing (rather than diminishing) land use conflicts.

The latter themes are all explored in great detail by Ray Bromley (1980, 1981) in his serious of empirical studies on market development and street traders in Cali, Colombia. One of Bromley’s main concerns in this body of work is to determine the factors affecting the success and failure of municipal retail markets in the city. To this end, he compares an unsuccessful (planned) market with a successful (unplanned) market (Bromley 1980). Emphasizing mainly state’s clumsiness, Bromley finds that the planned market suffers from both local and citywide problems. Local problems include the market’s peripheral nature relative to residential areas in the immediate catchments zone and the inward and sterile design of the facility itself. City-wide problems include the subsidized diversion of commercial activity to supermarkets; the failure to control street traders, who “have a major impact on reducing [the planned market’s] traders income”; the disruption of the food marketing system occasioned by the eradication of a central wholesaling market; and the pattern of road axes and traffic movements. In contrast, Bromley finds a synergistic and harmonious set of relationships in the unplanned market, where street traders and permanent market traders offer complementary goods and services and thereby create “an effective and attractive agglomeration” (1980: 224). Based on these insights, and this is the key point, Bromley concludes with a trenchant

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4 There is also a very small body of work that draws on the flexible specialization/industrial clustering school and argues that, under certain circumstances, intra-informal social networks grow into “new industrial districts.” Though normally associated with analyses of the Third Italy or Silicon Valley; a few researchers have documented examples of incipient “agglomeration” conditions in developing countries, such as India and Senegal (see Van Dijk 1993). But this work has not yet been linked to planning issues.
critique of what he terms "developmental modernism" inappropriately imported from the USA.

An interest in unplanned local agglomerations and the potential damage associated with developmental modernism also characterize creative but essentially exploratory arguments made by Marcello Balbo (1993). Adopting a post-modern skepticism of current urban integration narratives, Balbo reasons that,

Though very little is known on the subject, it seems fairly obvious that the particular features of the informal sector have an important say in shaping urban space. As demonstrated in many case studies, lack of capital, use of local resources, poor technologies, small market size and large participation of women and children in the labour force are among the main features of any activity belonging to the informal sector. All of these are likely to benefit from a local dimension, giving them the possibility of establishing and strengthening the network of linkages essential to secure credit promptly, raw materials, skilled labour and 'specialised' services when needed, at the least cost. ... Informal space — physical as well as economic and social — is primarily local space (p. 28).

Balbo stops well short of an empirical engagement with those "particular features" of the informal sector, such as the growing participation of female-headed households or small market size, that do shape what he sees as local-informal urban space. Hence his heterodox hypothesis — that urban fragmentation itself may be "...a means of resource redistribution and political dynamisation" (1993: 33) — remains underdeveloped. It is therefore difficult to contradict or support his conclusion that "...we need to be very careful in fostering solutions which aim at making the city more integrated, homogenous, legal" (ibid.).

This deep suspicion of the presumed benefits attending the state's search for integration, homogeneity and legality underpins Malcolm Harper's (1996) arguments about the relationship between urban planning and informal businesses. Harper, a scholar of small business development, asks what urban planners can realistically do for informal businesses, and therefore speaks to the kind of urban spaces such businesses require. Conceiving of urban planners as public officials concerned with spatial layouts (mainly permanent land use but also footpaths, roads and open space), Harper points out that "...informal businesses represent an enormous challenge for urban planners, and although a great deal has been written about them, there are no prescriptions and no generally acceptable ways of dealing with them." This lack of consensus leads Harper to justify the benefits of "benign neglect," wherein the generative proposition is

are more like games in the park or even conversations in the street. Planners should be aware of the need for them, and should plan in full awareness of this need, but need not, indeed should not know about them in detail. Perhaps all that can or should be expected of planners, in the past or in the future, is recognition of the existence and importance of informal businesses, and some general strategies for facilitating their existence and at the same time reconciling this with other conflicting interests. Urban master plans should not necessarily be expected to include a new shading labeled “informal businesses,” nor should intense efforts by planners be welcomed in monitoring exactly what informal activities are taking place. Benign neglect or even random but limited interference may be far more beneficial for informal businesses than positive intervention (Harper 1996: 99).

Strangely, Harper does not cite the important work of Sarin (1982) whose case study of urban planning in Chandigarh, India examines inter alia the conflicts between “plan” and “non-plan” economic activities within the urban economy. Sarin’s analysis, which remains one of the most instructive of its kind, turns on the impracticalities and injustices associated with public efforts to implement Le Corbusier’s original master plan for the city. At times both farcical and tragic, Sarin outlines a story of urban (and especially land use) management predicated on an unattainable and oppressive vision completely out of step with the organic, informal developments taking place in the city.

With specific reference to economic activities, the discussion highlights above all the tensions attending recurrent public initiatives to anchor informal traders into a Procrustean bed of planned (and controlled) space — to integrate, homogenize, and make legal. Sarin notes that unplanned agglomerations of informal market were especially targeted. In one such market, “[t]he main argument for clearing [the area] was that its location and form violated the master plan. It was tolerated only as long as planned facilities were not available” (1982: 187-88). Once authorities made planned facilities available, attempts to relocate “eligible” traders ensued — “under the beat of the drum.” (1982: 188). This aggressive spatial engineering vis-à-vis “the unplanned, the ineligible” ignored the inherent locational and socio-economic logic of these markets as well as the unsuitability of the new planned sites. In the light of these dynamics, Sarin concludes that — at least over the period of this study — Chandigarh was essentially a city for the elite, planned by the elite, and urban space was one of the critical fora in which this reality played itself out.

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This theme linking elitism, spatial engineering and the informal poor has occupied the attention of a few other commentators as well, although the focus is typically on regulation and policing rather than land use planning per se. Notable examples include Rogerson and Beavon (1985), who map the steady expansion of central Johannesburg's "defended space" and see it as the critical mechanism to repress hawkers and street traders; Cohen (1985), who explores the urban poor who "get in the way" of Indonesia's development juggernaut; and Eades (1985) who outlines the regressive impacts of regulation on marketplace enterprises in Papua New Guinea, West Africa and Singapore.

A slightly different, though still related theme, is addressed by Jones and Varley (1994), who juxtapose the conflicts between the needs of street traders and the State's (tourist-focused) desire for urban conservation in Puebla, Mexico.

URBAN PLANNING AND THE THEORETICAL SPACE OF UIS INTEGRATION

The third and final school of theorists examined here shares the above belief in the possibility of UIS development, but simultaneously rejects the anti-statist critique that spatial management necessarily leads to Sarin's Chandigarh-like nightmare. For many, (good) urban planning and (progressive) state activity creates a crucial theoretical and practical space for UIS integration. For these theorists, the experience of Curitiba, Brazil in particular during the 1970s and 1980s stands as an exemplary counter-example of the benefits that can (and do) flow to the informal poor from aggressive public intervention and proactive spatial ordering (Rabinovitch 1992; Lloyd-Jones 1996). The difference in places like Curitiba, these observers suggest, lies principally in the progressive, collaborative character of governance and planning, not in governance and planning in themselves. Accordingly, as Karunanayaka and Wanasignhe (1988: 94) put the case more generally, "... there is much [state-mediated] potential for strengthening locational linkages to expand income and livelihood opportunities for the poor."

Under the original leadership of a mayor-planner, Jaime Lerner, Curitiba is widely credited by such theorists with successfully confronting many of the problems attending rapid urbanisation — notwithstanding the fact that some consider it "too good to be true" (Herbst 1992) or "undemocratic but sustainable" (Robinson 1998). The "Curitiba Model," based squarely on a master plan adopted in 1966, emphasized urban sustainability principles long before such principles gained general currency (Fowler 1992; Barton 2000). These principles included: the preservation of open space; the integration of land use and transport along linear growth patterns; the consolidation of a
fixed urban edge; the alleviation of central city congestion; the promotion of recycling; and the use of low-cost technology. Taniguchi (1988) argues that classic planning tools to implement these principles — e.g. zoning, volume regulation, and public transport subsidization — have worked together to improve the overall metropolitan environment, for the poor no less than the wealthy.

While the Curitiba experience emphasizes comprehensive metropolitan structures, other scholars have focused more narrowly on well-planned elements within the urban space-economy that appear to facilitate informal economic activity. One example is Dewar and Watson's (1990) empirical study of the relationship between informal retailing and urban markets in five different cities. Echoing Bromley's (1981) findings on urban markets in Cali, Dewar and Watson report that the specific nature of the location, design and management of urban markets makes a crucial difference for informal retailers. As a result, they argue that well-located, well-designed and well-managed urban markets should be provided by public authorities as part of the “social infrastructure” of the urban terrain — no different than schools or parks. Dewar and Watson's detailed study is particularly important because of the relative under-theorisation of informal retailing as a whole in the UIS literature (Al-Otaibi 1990; Findlay and Paddison 1990).

A different, but certainly related approach is taken by Van Dijk (1983). Noting that spatial planning for small-scale enterprise has been largely neglected, and that ignorance has much to do with this, Van Dijk developed a behaviorist location theory of small-scale informal enterprises in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. As part of this model, he tests four hypotheses derived from the fundamental neo-classical assumption that UIS entrepreneurs act rationally through satisfying rather than profit maximizing behavior. These hypotheses are: (1) that residential location, followed by proximity to customers and then land prices, most strongly influence business location; (2) that entrepreneurs prefer to buy rather than to rent plots; (3) that entrepreneurs prefer to locate in an industrial or handicraft zone, where security of tenure is more common; and (4) that entrepreneurs prefer to integrate living and working while the larger enterprises prefer to separate living from working. Based on a survey of two hundred small-scale businesses, Van Dijk concludes that taken together these four hypotheses seem to explain the empirical spatial arrangements in Ouagadougou. He therefore argues that “...in a master plan for Ouagadougou or parts of the city, space should be reserved for small enterprises in such a way that these activities over the city can be realized” (1983: 105).
In a similar vein, Mochache (1990) in his study of the UIS in Nairobi also highlighted the ignorance of and/or hostility to the locational "logic" of informal activities, although he placed more emphasis than did Van Dijk on urban space conflicts brought about by these activities. Mochache's explicit concern was to understand the spatio-structural logic of the UIS well enough to enable planners to manipulate it — and therefore hopefully reduce unnecessary land use conflicts. In this sense, he shares the classic planning motivation running through Van Dijk's work. In Mochache's view, the spatio-structural logic of UIS activities in Nairobi results from both economic and political factors, although the weight of his analysis rests with economic explanations. Employing Christaller's central-place concepts of minimum market demand and maximum range, he traces the dynamic loci of UIS activities in city space and concluded that "...given the variability of incomes ... and therefore the same variation in the demand for specific goods at different times and seasons, an ISA [informal sector activity] cannot viably keep stationary locations." Based on this insight, he argues that planners should provide "...activity spaces in areas which are accessible to all the other activity systems with which the informal units relate" (no page number).

Finally, Perera and Amin (1995: 199) in their analysis of informal sector accommodation schemes in Colombo, Sri Lanka look explicitly at "activity spaces." They suggest that "...lack of suitable premises (i.e. basically physical accommodation) for production and business operations constitutes the fundamental cause that limits the growth of informal enterprises." In making this claim, they reason that extension of credit is a function of collateral, which in turn is a function of secure land tenure. Therefore, they see physical accommodation of the UIS — i.e. "... its role as a legitimate constituent of the urban local economy and the urban built environment..." — as the most important factor in UIS growth and maturation. Employing these arguments, Perera and Amin differentiate between street-operated enterprises (SOEs) and business location operated enterprises (BLOEs) in order to examine four types of planning interventions by the municipal authorities of Colombo: full provision of custom-built schemes (i.e. site, services and shelter) for BLOEs using undeveloped public land; partial provision of space (i.e. site only) for BLOEs who erect their own shelters; provision of sidewalk and leftover land parcel sites (i.e. site only) for SOEs who erect their own structures; and the provision of purpose-built stalls for SOEs (i.e. site, services and shelter). They note that BLOEs and SOEs accommodated in one of these four schemes pay user fees for the right of occupation and the use of services, if provided. They also
report that over 60% of enterprises regularly pay their user fees and that an additional 14% pay irregularly. Further, accommodated enterprises earned 40% more than unaccommodated enterprises and 90% of the entrepreneurs running these enterprises attribute this improvement in earnings to accommodation.

**Urban Space, the Informal Sector and Cape Town**

Most of these ideas have received at least partial treatment in the specific case of Cape Town. However, since the early 1980s Dewar and Watson (1981, 1982, 1990, 1991), Dewar and Todishichi (1999), Dewar (1995) and Watson (1991, 1993) of the University of Cape Town have focused in particular on the relationship between the legacies of modernist planning techniques undertaken within an apartheid planning apparatus, on the one hand, and the character and performance of small scale enterprises, on the other. The main policy theme informing this work has been the problem of unemployment and informality within the context of rapid urbanisation. This body of work arguably constitutes a "Cape Town School" on the relationship between urban space and the informal sector. For this reason, and because of the empirical focus of this thesis, its theoretical logic warrants some detail here.

Dewar and Watson (1991: 185) build up from the following profoundly geographical proposition about UIS development:

The spatial structure and form of urban areas has a fundamental impact on the ability of small business to survive and grow. ...[It] has a major effect on the spatial pattern and intensity of economic activity (particularly small-scale, informal economic activity) because it determines the pattern and intensity of population movement, and hence spending power.

This proposition can be broken down into two component relationships. First, with respect to the relationship between "spatial structure and form" and "the pattern and intensity of population movement," Dewar (1995) and Dewar and Todishichi (1999) posit that the following problems are inherent in the modern South African city in general and Cape Town in particular:

- The generative "building block" of urban development (whether formal or informal) is the free-standing house, with attendant "open" space privatised and cut-up; along with apartheid-created buffer zones, public use land reserves and major transport thoroughfares, this generates coarseness rather than detail within the urban fabric;

- Collections of free-standing houses give rise to notional programmes of standardised infrastructural requirements (whether such notions make social or financial sense);
Engineering efficiencies yield neighbourhood structures which produce convoluted, inwardly-orientated movement systems, disconnected from other neighbourhood structures with their own convoluted, inwardly-orientated movement systems; this promotes fragmentation rather than integration.

Transport linkages between these inwardly-orientated neighbourhood structures emphasise limited-access forms of movement (cars and trains), which, in locational-market space, favour large capital agents; and

Working, residing and recreational activities are spatially separated into monofunctional areas within the metropolitan fabric.

Second, with respect to the relationship between and “the pattern and intensity of population movement” and “the ability of small business to survive and grow,” Dewar and Watson (1981: 113) argue that coarseness in low-income areas generates densities “...too low to allow a reasonable range of economic activities to survive — potential small-scale entrepreneurs simply do not have real opportunities in local areas. Consequently, they are forced to seek locations at points of city-wide or metropolitan accessibility and are often priced entirely out of the land market by prevailing land prices.”

This situation leads to the artificial extension of the existing (inadequate) range of enterprises (Figure 2.7 below) and therefore to high friction of distance and distorted consumer behaviour: “[If] people cannot shop locally, they will do so at their place of work, or near the residence of a frequently visited friend, rather than at the venue closest to their place of residence” (ibid.). The net result is a local space-economy that promotes monopoly and high prices, further discourages local consumption, and promotes income leakage (capital flight) and inconvenience. Moreover, because these local space-economies are inwardly orientated and disconnected from other local space-economies, “...there is no way in which the combined flows of a number of these areas can be used to the advantage of all. Thus flows are so thinly spread that their potential is being wasted” (1981: 116). Dewar and Watson refer to this dynamic as the “dissipation of thresholds.”

Threshold dissipation is compounded by a number of additional factors. The first additional factor is the planned attempt to provide a full commercial hierarchy in low-income areas — CBD, regional centres, neighbourhood centres and local centres — all located “...mechanistically at the geographic centre of its anticipated trade area” (ibid.). In Dewar and Watson's view, the consequences of such attempts are disastrous: “Because too many levels of centre are competing for inadequate thresholds, the entire
system is worsened" (1981: 117). One of the most negative outcomes (shown in Figure 2.8) is that “... most inhabitants of these areas are forced to patronise more successful high order centres in higher income areas and there is a leakage of income (and thus thresholds) out of the area” (ibid.).

FIGURE 2.7 Density and UIS activity

A low density - large range - high friction of distance - inadequate facilities - monopoly - high prices - income leakage and inconvenience

B high density - small range — low friction of distance — competition — income accumulation

The second additional factor compounding threshold dissipation is the nature of land use zoning. Dewar and Watson (1981: 120-21) identify four negative effects of land use zoning on UIS activity: it is slow to change and hence often diverts development away from areas in which it is most needed; it results in a situation where each activity requires a separate journey, and thus generates flows “ thinly spread across urban space”; it solidifies “the intensity and pattern of opportunities across the urban surface” through bureaucratic controls; and it is as major factor encouraging speculation and thus the artificially inflated exchange value of land. Finally, threshold dissipation results from the way in which movement routes are conceived and provided. “Viewed exclusively as channels for specialised movement,” Dewar and Watson argue, “there is an increasing divorce between routes and flanking activities” (1981: 121). This deflects through-traffic in an attempt to protect “privacy,” places excessive pressure on a limited number of points in the urban fabric, raises land prices at these points and increases commercial commuting distances. These movement processes entrench “...ever-larger businesses and monopoly capital at the expense of the weaker section of the economic continuum” (ibid.).
What then to do? In the light of the negative impact of these spatio-structural elements on employment creation and capital accumulation, Dewar and Watson conclude with the following policy argument:

The manipulation of the urban spatial structure is therefore an important tool for influencing the number and performance of small [informal] operators. There are several physical planning measures which are essential to the promotion of small business activity in the South African city. (1991: 185).

Dewar and Todischini (1999: 9) outline these physical planning measures in detail, arguing that they constitute the “... structural preconditions to maximise opportunities for small-scale income generation.” These measures include the long-term promotion of:

- Compaction as opposed to sprawl;
- Integration as opposed to fragmentation;
- Greater structural complexity;
- Mix, not separation;
- A fixed, permanent urban edge; and;
- Place-making and resource creation.

In fundamental disagreement with conclusions drawn by Harper (1996) and Balbo (1993), and more in line with the Curitiba experience, Dewar (1995) argues that these strategic policies constitute “a planning paradigm shift” much in need of proactive implementation in South African cities, not only because of their presumed relationship to UIS development, but also because of their clear urban sustainability themes. The “Cape Town School” thus suggests that, far from retreating into a benign backdrop, appropriately conceived strategic physical planning can positively impact UIS dynamics.
— an immodest design thesis conceptually similar to the hypothesized linkages between community spirit, social capital and neo-traditional neighborhood form (Talen 1999).

TOWARDS NEW GEOGRAPHIES

To summarize before offering general conclusions, it is difficult to criticize too harshly the above three schools, notwithstanding their clear differences. The aspatial nature of most UIS scholarship means that any attempt to consider the geographies of informal sector development planning is welcome. There is much to learn here, particularly from the Cape Town School. At the same time, in their effort to map both substantive and normative geographies of informal sector development planning: (1) radicals have over-emphasised exploitative class relations; (2) neo-liberals (and skeptical post-modernists) have over-emphasised the autonomous individual; and (3) the planners have over-emphasised the built environment. This is not to suggest, of course, that class relations are unimportant; nor is it to gloss over the insights gained from theorists concerned with an aggressive state; nor is it, finally, to dismiss the possibility that a restructured built environment might actually help to restructure informal sector dynamics.

But is to suggest that there are, once again, contextual geographies missing from these imaginaries of informal sector development planning. In these contextual geographies, space is not a “passive locus of social relations,” as Lefebvre (1991) complains, but an accomplishment — a never-finished product of dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical agency built from the in loco connectivities of class, state and land use (amongst other heterogeneous material). Seen this way, space is theorized quite differently than it is in any of the above schools, which tend to “purify” the urban world, to abstract “domains” of the urban experience without connecting them to other domains in the same places. Such abstraction, it is argued here, does not provide a compelling geographical basis to consider the difficulties and possibilities attending informal sector development planning. Something different is needed. Accordingly, something different shall be set out in what follows.

2.3 Conclusions

The urban informal sector is one of the most important processes shaping society and space in the contemporary era. For this reason, the international UIS literature is vast, if still largely aspatial. This chapter has reviewed work that has addressed the specific
problem of planning informal sector development, mainly as experienced in fast-growing cities in the South and with special references to the "geographies" associated with this effort. The discussion began with an overview of the general informal sector experience, focusing on key debates relating mainly to the South. The discussion then turned to the relatively small body of this overall literature focused on planning themes, highlighting its major geographical claims and central theoretical orientations. The main argument emerging from this review is that, despite many important insights, extant scholarship has relied too heavily upon compositional as opposed to contextual approaches to urban theorization. One of the unacceptable implications of this is that, following Lefebvre, space has become little more than a "passive locus of social relations" — a "container" within which (unrelated) social and physical processes move.

What we now need, then, is a different theory of space — a theory that emphasizes the context and connectivity that actually bind these various domains of explanation together. Such a theory would not ignore class relations; nor state behavior; nor land use configurations; nor would it elevate structures over individuals or individuals over structures. What it would do, however, is to relate these various "domains" of reality as if they were actually all part of a collective spatial "performance"; as if they were all part of a never-ending movement. Amongst other things, this chapter has suggested that the elements of a compelling explanation are present. It is now a matter of creating a theoretical approach that allows us to pull these elements all together into a single spatial project. It is to this task that the discussion now turns.
Chapter III.
THEORISING SPATIALITY
Moments, Networks, Alterity

3.0
Overview

[Lefebvre's] recognition of difference assembled together[the user, who is both a conservative and subversive figure in the reproduction of social relations[and the theory of moments [— these] are all themes relevant to the study of cities.

— Kofman and Lebas, "Lost in transposition — time, space and the city" (1996: 41)

The product of transformation and not the containers for transmission, spaces and times are outcomes of the combination and recombination of a full world.

— Bingham and Thrift, "Some new instructions for travellers" (2000: 289)

Statistical debates are our theological wars.

— de Certeau, "The jabbering of social life" (1985: 151)

The purpose of this chapter is to offer an alternative theoretical approach to the conundrum of informal sector development planning. Again, the generative motivation of this effort is that new ways of theorising the UIS are needed and that an explicitly spatial-contextual approach might assist in this regard. This is not to dismiss the utility of extant theoretical contributions. The Cape Town School, for example, provides key insights into informal sector potential and how planning might unlock that potential. For this reason, it constitutes a welcome, if largely normative contribution to an otherwise aspatial UIS literature. Nor is it to devalue the formidable empirical challenge. Indeed, as chapter II outlined in some detail, existing empirical scholarship on UIS space is patchy. Certainly one of the hopes of this thesis is that the empirical work outlined later
will help to alleviate this situation. But the main theme developed in this chapter, and one that informs the thesis from here on, is that a contextual theorisation focused on the production of spatiality would improve our empirical understanding of informal sector agency, particularly with regard to the question of managing and planning urban development and societal change. Accordingly, two main questions need attention here: (1) what is meant by spatiality? And (2) with specific reference to the research questions of interest in this thesis, how should the urban spatiality of informal sector agency actually be explored?

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 3.1 first addresses the overall problematic of space as a general issue. Although various authors are discussed, particular attention is paid to the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), whose "three-moment" meta-theorisation of urban (social) spatiality provides the main heuristic and narrative device for the whole of the thesis. The discussion then turns to more specific operational and metaphorical tools, drawing on two additional bodies of theory. The first body of theory, dealt with in section 3.2 via the theme of "networks", is actor-network theory. The second body, dealt with in section 3.3 under the theme of "alterity," is associated with the writings of Michel de Certeau. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter with a brief recapitulation of the main ideas and then introduces chapter IV, which lays out the analytical framework and research methodology.

3.1

"Moments" — or the Dialectics of Spatiality

The empirical complexity of human phenomena on the earth's surface invites a multitude of ontological and epistemological approaches, that is, "statement[s] about what the world is [ontology] and method[s] of organizing this world for the purpose of study and representation [epistemology]" (Merrifield 1993: 517). The daily, often gruelling life-efforts of perhaps a billion men, women and children currently engaged in informal sector activities throughout the cities of the developing world — Kenneth Hart's (1973) barbers, spivs and money-lenders; prostitutes, shoes shine boys and gardeners — cannot be the province of a single approach. Thinking economically, thinking politically, thinking anthropologically, thinking historically — each of these modes of reasoning provides insights into the nature and meaning of an ever-burgeoning urban and African
"informality." The objective here, however, is to think spatially and furthermore to find ways to link such thinking to informal sector dynamics in Black Metropolitan Cape Town. To that end, this section first develops a general approach to spatial theorisation in order that we may apply this to the study of informal sector agency. Following Henri Lefebvre, this approach emphasises dialectics.

DIFFERENTIATING AND UNIFYING SPATIALITY

The concept of 'space' (and therefore 'spatiality,' 'urban spatiality,' 'urban spatial structure,' and so on) eludes singularity. Space means vastly different things to different people. For most of its long history, for example, classical regional geography was associated with the rational description of the earth's surface (Dickinson and Howarth 1933). From Ptolemy onwards, description, whereby areal differentiation was refined by ever more sophisticated methods of empirical analysis, occupied centre stage. Well into the 1950s regional geography remained ideographic, a science particularly comfortable with thick description — or chorology as its practitioners put it. In this distinguished tradition, space emerged as the domain of observable, largely physical configurations of natural and unnatural, socially-constructed things: "objective space" for Shatski (1991), "first nature" and "second nature" for Soja (1985) and "the natural or socially-produced material environment" for Simonsen (1996). For purposes of brevity, henceforth this conception will be referred to strictly as "physical space."

Physical versus mental space

Despite the increasingly sophisticated and technologically impressive tools associated with the description of this physical space, one of its chief epistemologists, Richard Hartshorne (1939, 1959), rejected the notion that the region was something researchers uncovered objectively — as if these physical configurations were already present or real but merely obscured by the cacophony of the world-as-stage (Haggett 1990). This view therefore opened up another kind of space: mental space. Indeed, Hartshorne consistently upheld the idealist quality of space: regions, he argued, "exist only in our minds" and are "not inherent in the world" (cited in Peet 1998: 17). A compelling synthesis of patterns, borders, regularities, flows, nodes and activities — the material building blocks of the larger story of regional distinctiveness — is something we create, something we fashion from the physical "things" that fall within our line of sight: the region is not in-the-material-world but of-the-mental world. Thus even the heavily descriptive chorologies of the Greek philosophers, whose Euclidean spaces suggested
material concreteness and objective physicality, were subsumed by Homeric poetry, by mental images and mythical constructs of how the world must surely be ordered (Dickinson and Howarth 1933). Here, from the earliest beginnings, physical space emanated from a mental domain — a theme picked up again and developed much further by the post-structuralist dissent to the assumption of rational interpretation in scientific modernism (beginning perhaps with Kuhn 1970).

This idealist line of reasoning congealed in particular around Kant's interpretation of phenomena as the combination of sensations and "things-in-themselves". For Kant, the observer "...does not experience things-in-themselves but only the representations they occasion in [the observer's] sensibility" (Peet 1998: 18). As Osterberg (cited in Simonsen 1996: 496) succinctly puts it: "...a rock reveals itself as steep if I try to climb it, but as solid if used as a shelter." Idealist conceptions therefore differentiate space into two distinct, discrete domains — the physical and the mental — but the physical assumes its coherence, its configurational patterning via the mental. Rocks per se have no inherent space. Space is largely a conceptual creation of mental play — of ideas, visions, constructs, images and emotions. Accordingly, in this view epistemological crossings between these two spatial domains, the physical and the mental, are largely one-way: from the mental to the physical.

Social space

This Kantian interpretation has stimulated much of the most creative work on space. But for many theorists a major problem with this interpretation of space, and the relationship between its two manifestations, is that it ignores the presumably powerful structural media of society, which exercise the attention of Marxist (Harvey 1973, 1982, 1990) and realist interpreters of space (Sayer 1979; see also Pratt 1994). So too does it sidestep the objective world at the heart of logical positivism. Differences between these two anti-ideationalist schools are famously pronounced: the realist school's emphasis on "relations not accessible to direct observation" (Pratt 1994: 11) in the generative production of space is profoundly hostile to the logical positivist's presumption that directly observable spatial phenomena are best theorised with respect to other directly observable, typically aspatial phenomena — and vice-versa (cf. Popper 1972). But both these schools deny that space is something "only imagined," only mental. The proverbial tree in the woods does fall and does make a sound. Spatial phenomena exist outside mental ones.
The key point here is that these materialist views are, for its advocates, much better equipped analytically to address a third major space: social space. This is particularly true in their more critical variations. Put more directly: as a distinct domain in need of detailed exploration, social space simply cannot be adequately conceptualised outside a critical materialist philosophy. For, on the one hand, the idealist approach lacks an ontological framework to build in social space and, on the other, the positivist approach, emphasising methodological individualism, lacks a sense of its ultimate production and reproduction. As Lipietz (1997: 260) puts it with respect to the latter: "[the positivist approach] forgets that the 'habitus' and the 'map' at an individual's disposal are the products of a structured social totality which exists prior to [the individual's] action...."

Within the context of these claims, what then is this third notion, this social space?

Although risky to define too tightly, to indefinitely “stabilize,” as Doreen Massey (1994: 5) has put it, in Shatski’s (1991: 652) discussion “social space” is conceived fluidly as “...the shared opening and inter-related occupation of places by pluralities of lives.” Two important ideas are at work in this simple definition. First, social space is material rather than only imagined precisely because it is shared and inter-related by the multiple acts (or “openings”) of multiple human agents. And second, it is distinct, though not independent from “place” — a particularly concrete word that Shatski uses to refer to the spatial territory discussed above as physical space (although he prefers the term “objective space”). However, Shatski’s definition needs development. It is useful simply as a point of departure. For the two ideas that inform Shatski’s suggestion run through much of the work on social space and, arguably, find their generative source in the arguments of Henri Lefebvre, especially as found in his now classic book *The Production of Space* (1991 [1974]). Indeed, Lefebvre’s project here is nothing less than to “unify” (his word) the physical, mental and social into a single spatial theory, with the latter term ensembling, making use of, but transforming the former two. For this reason, Lefebvre’s work on the production of space is addressed here.

HENRI LEFEBVRE AND THE THREE-MOMENT META-THEORISATION OF SPACE

Henri Lefebvre’s ideas concerning space are complex, multi-disciplinary and difficult to summarise succinctly. Indeed, for a few Anglo-American scholars in particular Lefebvre’s perambulatory prose constitute an impassable thicket of Gallic obfuscation (Sayer 1993; Molotch 1993; Unwin 2000). However, mainly through the interpretative lenses of Edward Soja (1985, 1989, 1996, 2000), David Harvey (1973, 1990), Neil Smith
(1984), Kirsten Simonsen (1996), Erik Swyngedouw (1996, 1999), Derek Gregory (1994a), Rob Shields (1989, 1999) David Perry (1995), and Michael Dear (2000), amongst many others (Merrifield 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000; G. Jones 1994; Robinson 2000; Lash 1999), Lefebvre’s central contributions have become increasingly deployed in urban and social theorisation. At the heart of these contributions is Lefebvre’s original, anti-Kantian and massively influential claim that “space” is always a product of historically situated social relations — always a social space, albeit tied up dialectically with nature (Swyngedouw 1996, 1999; cf. Smith 1984). This social space, moreover, can be opened up epistemologically as three, co-equal “moments”: viz. spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces. It is this general, three-moment epistemology that is of particular consequence for this thesis. This three-moment approach is visualised dialectically in Figure 3.1 below.

**FIGURE 3.1. Lefebvre’s three-moment spatial approach**

* Varying according to place, period and research problem

**SOURCE:** Developed but adapted substantially from Merrifield (1993), Soja (1996), Harvey (1996), Swyngedouw (1999)
Lefebvre's triad of moments is the first feature to elucidate in Figure 3.1. In brief, spatial practices refer loosely to "...the close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life and leisure)" (1991: 38). This is the most intuitive understanding of space. Lefebvre illustrates it by referring to an eclectic group of examples: "the 'corner' of a street, a marketplace" (1991: 16) as well as "the daily life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise housing project," "motorways" and "the politics of air transport" (1991: 38). In similarly loose and eclectic fashion, Lefebvre summarises representations of space, such as local area development plans, as "...conceptualised space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers" (ibid.) whose "practical impact" comes through intervention and modification of the "spatial texture" via "construction" and "architecture" (ibid.: 3). 1

Finally, Lefebvre refers to representational space as "...space directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'...[which] overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects" (ibid.: 39). Also referred to simply as "lived space," representational space is undoubtedly the most heavily contested in the overall literature on Lefebvre's work. It is a major theoretical contribution to our understanding of space; but it is also the least intuitive of the three moments depicted in Figure 3.1. For this reason, and with the assumption that the first two moments are more intuitive and need less attention, Lefebvre's notion of representational space calls for disproportionate analysis here.

Representational space

For Edward Soja, who has written most extensively on the subject (1996), representational spaces are "instantiations" in their own right (Figure 3.1). But they also lie at the transformative confluence of the first two moments. In other words, something distinct — something "third" — is produced when the first two moments are brought together. The only way to understand this is to think dialectically. But before dialectical thinking is broached below, a simple (non-Soja) analogy might provide initial clarity: when two primary colours (e.g. yellow and blue) flow together, a third colour emerges

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1 Dear (2000) argues the origins and spread of the planning mentality meant a new spatial order. In turn, Boyer (1985: 282) describes this new spatial order as the "cold and sober aesthetic" associated with a proclivity for rationality and order (i.e. modernism).
Soja calls this process "thirding-as-Othering," "...with the third term different yet encompassing and partially dependent on the first two."²

For Soja the first term is "real" space (spatial practices) and the second term is "imagined" space (representations of space). So he refers to all representational space — whether generated under feudalism or capitalism; whether modern or postmodern; whether in the service of the dominant order or against that order — as simultaneously "real-and-imagined". Real-and-imagined space can be found in, for example, the "highly regulated urban anarchism" (p. 287) of Amsterdam’s Centrum. Equally, it can be found in the "corporate New Town" of Mission Viejo, California (p. 269). How can these two (seemingly incompatible) examples both be interpreted as representational spaces? Because both are, for Soja at least, simultaneously "real" and "imagined." That is to say, they are material spatial practices infused with particular spatial imaginations; they are, if one will, green as well as yellow and blue.

Some spatial theorists see Soja’s "real-and-imagined" approach to representational space as too expansive, preferring to collapse Lefebvre's concept solely into the realm of spatial "alterity," i.e. that which does not fit or that which "remakes" the dominant order — either through imagination or through practice. For example, Marcus Doel (1999: 10) defines representational space more narrowly as "...[those spaces] lived and practiced by human beings over and against the crushing force of spatial abstraction such as money, clock-time and calculation." Doel's reading, which hardly seems to refer to "corporate New Towns", is important because it questions Soja's apparent discomfort with a purely "imagined" (or psychological) alterity, a discomfort arguably rooted in Soja's Marxist proclivities (see also Soja 1997). The problem with Doel's reading, however, is that Lefebvre's representational space is not simply the handiwork of agents always and forever working against or outside the dominant ordering of space and society (i.e. agents of alterity). Rather, the architecture of the modernizing state and the symbolic landscape of planning and capitalism, to give only two examples, also produce representational spaces.

²Soja (1996: 70) also notes Lefebvre's other dialectical triads. For instance, Lefebvre sees "possibility" as emerging out of the relationship between "totality" and "contradiction." Similarly, Lefebvre see "harmony" from "melody" and "rhythm." The colour metaphor is also apt. Lefebvre (1991: 352) notes that: "Just as white light, though uniform in appearance, may be broken down into a spectrum, space likewise decomposes when subjected to analysis."
Lefebvre is clear about this. He refers to the urban iconography of authoritarian power (the “collective mirrors” of Mussolini’s monumentality) and the “ensemble of images, signs and symbols” of the consumer economy (the “prettified faces” of billboards) as “representational spaces” (Lefebvre 1991: 275, 288; see also Shields 1989; Lash and Urry 1994: 250). Furthermore, he argues that these (hegemonic) types of representational space are, along with spatial representation and spatial practice, equally crucial moments in the re-production of the dominant order. They are equally crucial in the re-production of an urban spatialisation that steadily colonizes daily life, stripping human beings of joy and fulfillment (Lefebvre 1995: 170-4, 178; cf. Shields 1999).

But politically and ethically Lefebvre is after something more specific than this. Everything in and of space represents something; everything is saturated with (imagined) meanings of particular practices (the house as female home, the tower as male power, and so on). So Lefebvre’s representational space is, in point of fact, everywhere. Indeed, it is cognate in some ways with what is generally meant by a cultural or even humanistic landscape (e.g. Tuan 1976; Cosgrove 1989; Schama 1996), an underdeveloped insight in the Lefebvrian literature. But Lefebvre ultimately argues that it is the representational space of alterity or difference that we should most attend to (Plate 3.1).

**PLATE 3.1 Tianenmen Square and the representational spaces of ‘revolution’**

(a) Practicing hegemony, 1999

(b) Living alterity, 1989

“Conservative figures”

“Subversive figures”

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3 Consider Lefebvre’s (1991) evocative, often ancient references to the “square, church, graveyard,” “dwelling,” “holy places, damned places,” “lyrical spaces of myth” within the context of Cosgrove’s (1989) work on landscape, culture and power or Schama’s (1996) work on forests, rivers and mountains in the cultural construction of a metaphoric earth. Finally, Mitchell (2000: 129-30) uses Lefebvre to map the cultural landscape of late capitalism (“shopping for signs”).
This is clearly a normative political and ethical statement. For example, we should attend to Tiananmen Square in Plate 3.1 as representational space of resistance ('b') rather than representational space of Maoist hegemony ('a'). For this reason the debates between the expansive Soja and the narrower Doel (and others) are manageable ones. For in Lefebvre's overall theorisation, it is the representational space of "alterity," always struggling to emerge, that is the real hope of just transformation. All Lefebvrian theorists seem to agree on this principle (providing a politics missing in ANT). The larger point to draw from this discussion is that all three moments matter to the making of "place." As this is the core feature of Figure 3.1, it requires our attention here.

MAKING PLACE

To understand the "place-space" relationship, Andrew Merrifield (1993) draws on Fritjof Capra's (1982: 37-62) trenchant rejection of mechanistic, Cartesian and Newtonian methods of research that "[break up] thoughts and problems into pieces[,]...arranging them into their logical order." This specific rejection is cognate in some ways to what Thrift (1983), in turn drawing on Hagerstrand (1970), calls a compositional approach to place theorisation. For Merrifield, place is basically the "thingification" of space — or more properly the "thingification" of multiple spatial flows coming together at particular sites (local, global, ecological, cultural, economic, etc.).

It is this relational-dialectical rather than areal-Newtonian imaginary that is important. In this way, Merrifield insists, local places embody supra-local spaces even as supra-local spaces become concrete (and useable) in place. "Things," however, are not simply materialized, concrete objects (office buildings, roads systems) but also planning strategies, collective intentions, symbolic landscapes (Plate 3.1). Accordingly, Lefebvre's over-arching concern in equally privileging his three moments rests upon distinguishing but also upon holding them together. This requires that urban researchers keep these three moments from being theoretically sundered by the peddlers of reductionism. Such peddlers include the urban semiologists, who privilege the linguistic and dismiss the material, but also the rigid materialists, who tend to read off representations — the spaces of the planning mentality — and representational spaces of lived resistance from the dense infrastructure of capitalist spatial practices.

There is certainly more to Lefebvre's overall project than this "theory of moments," as Kofman and Lebas (1996: 41) refer to it. But even this much requires further clarification. Lefebvre's spatial "moments" are difficult to apply directly to
empirical research (Harvey, pers. com.). A second level of theory, more operational in nature, is needed — for Lefebvre is not enough. Initial clarification, however, comes through an elucidation of dialectical reasoning itself. This begs the obvious: what kind of dialectics, exactly, as there are many versions (Castree 1996)? While Shields (1999) offers the most self-conscious treatment of Lefebvre’s “spatial dialectics,” Harvey (1996) offers the most accessible, useable set of dialectical propositions. Without necessarily adopting Harvey’s (1982) well-known methodology of historical-geographical materialism, this particular framework helps to pin down Lefebvre’s theory of moments (though see A. Jones 1999 for a polemical counter-critique). For this reason, it is adopted here.

Lefebvre’s moments as “instantiations”

Harvey’s (1996: 48-57) theorisation of dialectics includes the following key propositions, some of which have already been discussed:

- Elements or “things” are constituted out of flows, processes, and relations operating within fields which constitute structured systems or wholes;
- Relations and flows manifest themselves as “things” (cf. Merrifield 1993);
- “Things” and systems which many researchers treat as irreducible and therefore unproblematic as seen in dialectical thought as internally contradictory by virtue of the multiple processes that constitute them;
- By virtue of this multiplicity, “things” are internally heterogeneous;
- Spaces and times are contingent and contained within those multiple processes that constitute “things”; and, finally, and perhaps most importantly for the present effort,
- The research task is to identify those “moments” (or “instantiations”) that contribute either to the stabilisation of things we experience as “permanences” (“relatively stable configurations of matter and things”) or to the transformation of these permanences through creativity.

That said, one problem theorists have with Harvey’s work arguably has less to do with dialectics and more to do with the theoretical a priori that class relations are the “most important relationship” structuring urban space and society. Ecologists too insist on flow and the processual, hybrid nature of things, without foregrounding the class imperative (Barash 2001). For their part, post-structuralists highlight “different” forces, notably race, sexuality and ethnicity (Doel 1999: 15-24). My own view is that a particularly effective critique of the putative explanatory supremacy of class deals with the multiple axes of identity formation, which are crucial in understanding state-civil society dynamics, in (South) Africa no less than elsewhere. For “class consciousness” alone is a limited explanatory tool, unable to account for, to take one early but devastating example, the national solidarity of the proletarian and bourgeois classes in WWI. The identity debate challenges us to recover Nietzsche’s insistence on the contextual and multiple nature of being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is important when thinking about agency.
Re-interpreted through these dialectical propositions, Figure 3.1 makes further sense. Lefebvre's three moments are three (of the many possible) "instantiations" of wider flows, fluxes and relationships in society. They are momentary opportunities, in other words, where either the re-production or transformation of society can be affected. They are spaces to inhabit; spaces to build; spaces to re-build; spaces to contest; spaces to negotiate. They are open sites for collective agency even as they embody and are defined by the structural forces of a society captured by the dotted circles in Figure 3.1: viz. gendered labour markets; cultural values, attitudes towards race and ethnicity, and so on (Harvey's "systems or wholes").

Because everything "flows," however, any formal understanding of this process creates artificial divisions. In Figure 3.1, then, knowledge awkwardly but necessarily leads to "a 'cooling' of the world...so that it can be treated dispassionately and objectively" (Shields 1999: 41). Empirical research thus focuses on empirically retrievable "permanences" (maps, conversations, routines, laws). At the same time, each of Lefebvre's moments "flow" into one another. For this reason, it is impossible to discuss representations of space (development plans) without simultaneous reference to spatial practices (land use), even as they are analytically different dynamics. It is also impossible to divorce representational spaces from spatial practices and representations of space. And so on. Taken together, a sustained study of spatial "instantiations" organised through Lefebvre's theory of moments can lead to an improved understanding of the (re)production of "permanences" (development plans, discourses, laws, routines, symbolic landscapes) that, in turn, constitute place and its developmental potentialities — a metropolitan area, for example, or a neighbourhood market or even a human body.

Within the context of Figure 3.1, then, a city, an informal marketplace, a food trader — all are part of "physical" spatial practices. But they also can be (and are) represented on, and materialised through, a development plan. They are no less "real" in representation than in practice. Furthermore, these places are part of a wider "representational space" that combines the first two but also embodies differences in power; a sense of peripheral marginality or corporate dominance; sentiments, affiliations, dreams; ways of being. They are therefore part and parcel of a lived cityscape worked up culturally. Finally, as Harvey (1973, 1989) and Smith (1984) emphasise, a metropole is also a "concrete" manifestation of the "abstract" machinations of capitalist market forces, an empirical appearance that exists because certain production and circulation forces are at work, in certain ways, for a certain historical time period. Lefebvre (1991: 220-4)
elaborates on what might be called this heterogeneous, if often contradictory, “unity” within the context of his analysis of monuments (cf. Plate 3.1). “For millennium,” he writes, “monumentality took on all the aspects of spatiality...: the perceived, the conceived, the lived; representations of space and representational spaces.” In this sense, the monuments of Tianenmen are the “strong points” and “anchors” of China’s spatial practices; but they are also “collective mirrors” reflecting an “element of repression” (Plate 3.1a) as well as an “element of exaltation” (Plate 3.1b). Different times produce different places at the same location.

Social space thus works upon and through “place” — a marketplace, a subject, a monument — via spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces. Each of these can be studied in isolation, analytically lifted out of the “dense city,” to deploy Richard Sennett’s term (1970), and temporarily “thingified” for purposes of (quite literally) momentary clarity. That is, each can be the main focus of a particular set of research questions in order to discover how each “...contribute[s] in different ways to the production of space” (Lefebvre 1991: 46).

Ultimately, however, Lefebvre asks us to hold them together. For the production of space remains a “three-moment” dynamic or what Soja (1996) refers to as “trialectical.” And “[t]ricaltical thinking,” Soja continues, “is difficult for it challenges all conventional modes of thought and taken-for-granted epistemologies” (1996: 70). In particular, trialectical thinking requires an ability to operate within, and competently communicate the empirical qualities associated with, all three moments. This in turn requires that the three-moment approach to understanding the production of space is not fractured. “Splendid isolation” is not an overall epistemological commitment, then, but a practical methodological requirement, a necessary “staging” that attends the narrative form of academic communication.

LEFEbvRIAN LIMITATIONS

Such a narrative staging is not easy. There are two immediate problems. The first problem is that Lefebvre’s apparatus for passing through and engaging with spatial “moments” is a never-ending circle of complexity (Figure 3.1). As he (1991: 85-86) himself puts it: “an instant infinity” of maps, both descriptive and more traditionally “geographical,” would be needed to deal exhaustively with a given place, to code and decode all its meanings and generative sources. Indeed, “[t]he idea that a small number of maps,” Lefebvre (1991: 86) continues, “or even a single (or singular) map might be
sufficient can only apply in a specialised area of study whose own self-affirmation depends on isolation from its context.” The second, more practical problem is that Lefebvre’s “theory of moments” is meta-theoretical in nature. Like any meta-theory (see Booth 1993), Lefebvre’s framework notably lacks an adequate range of nimble, intermediate range concepts that directly facilitate empirical work.

The purpose of the next two sections is to provide such a range of concepts, using them to delineate the empirical work that lies ahead. The move here is from the meta-theoretical to the theoretical. Specifically, Lefebvre is put to work in the city, among the traders and planners and consumers of the African communities of Cape Town by outlining a series of concepts that, it is argued, directly facilitate an investigation of the overall research questions posed by this thesis. Two very different but still complementary bodies of work are deployed. The first body of work, generally referred to as actor-network theory or the sociology of translation, offers the deceptively simple concept of the “network,” a spatial metaphor Lefebvre frequently deployed (1991: 116-18, 349-51; and see Merrifield 1997). The second body of work draws on the ideas of Michel de Certeau (1984, 1985), who offers three concepts of particular merit here: strategies, tactics and belief.

Naturally, the selection of these particular bodies of work (and their attendant concepts) does not foreclose the possibility of other combinations with or amendments to Lefebvrian theorisation. Indeed, if we take Lefebvre’s long-term project seriously, if we accept that urban space can only be opened up and understood through an “instant infinity” of maps, then many other theoretical approaches must be drawn upon, not only for the story of informal sector development but also for all the other stories associated with the contemporary urban experience. Those chosen here simply abet the immediate research problems that this thesis must engage with. We start with actor-network theory.

3.2

“Networks”— or putting Lefebvre ‘to work’

Actor-network theory was developed initially by sociologists of science and technology. But it has subsequently influenced geographical and planning research (Hinchliffe 1996; Bingham 1996; Murdoch 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Thrift 1996; Kortelainen 1999; Swyngedouw 1996, 1999; Selman and Wragg 1999; Bingham and Thrift 2000). It now represents an important new approach to the overall theorisation of space and society.
This section outlines the major tenets of actor-network theory that are of interest here and suggests the specific utility of these tenets within the context of an overall examination of the synoptic themes in this thesis.

**SYNOPSIS**


Like Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, this new approach, which is also called the sociology of translation, attempts to resolve the problem of how to think about micro-level phenomena, on the one hand, and macro-level phenomena, on the other. It does so in a novel way: by proposing that the only substantial difference between these two types of phenomena resides in their size. As Law (1992: 380) puts it: "...[we should not] take it for granted that there is a macro-social system on the one hand, and bits and pieces of micro-social on the other." That is to say, there is no "in kind" difference between the micro and the macro. Macro-systems or "macro-agents" (such as markets and states and ultimately capitalism itself) are simply highly "durable" forms of collective agency that succeed in re-producing themselves again and again over time and through space. Macro-agents are thus always "becoming," always resultants, always "outcomes" of ever-more complex, linked up micro-agency activities. As Law (1992: 385) puts it: "...[a macro-agent like] social structure is not a noun, but a verb."

Micro and macro-agents are therefore theorised as "networks" or networks of networks that become institutions and systems (Harvey's "permanences"). But these networks are particular kinds of networks. They are steadily constructed or "engineered" from heterogeneous materials, a theme similar to the Lefebvrian "recognition of difference assembled together" (Kofman and Lebas 1996: 41). It is probably upon this point of heterogeneity that much of the power and controversy of ANT rests. For ANT networks are not simply social networks, as defined in traditional sociology, not simply the structured milieu of human relations.
Rather, ANT networks are "ordered" through "heterogeneous engineering," which is defined as an on-going process whereby "...bits and pieces from the social, the technical, the conceptual, and the textual are fitted together, and so converted (or "translated") into a set of equally heterogeneous...products" (Law 1992: 381). This set of heterogeneous products is composed of people, but also of "...machines, animals, texts, money, architectures" (ibid). Thus in ANT the world is "nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous material?" (ibid., original emphasis). In Murdoch's (1995: 747) view, the power of this approach is that it "...combines the insights of economics, that it is things that draw actors into relationships, and of sociology, that actors come to define themselves, and others, through interaction. Putting these together leads to [Callon's] idea that 'actors define one another in interaction — in the intermediaries [texts, technical artefacts, human beings, money] that they put into circulation.'"

There are six key tenets associated with actor-networks that are of particular relevance here. These are: (1) heterogeneity; (2) symmetry; (3) translation; (4) obligatory points of passage; (5) durability; and (6) networked effects. As with the discussion of Lefebvre, these ANT tenets do not exhaust the burgeoning literature on ANT. Nonetheless, they aid the empirical themes of interest here. After this elucidation of ANT, the discussion turns to the work of Michel de Certeau. Section 3.3 then relates all three theorists to the specific empirical problematic of informal sector agency.

**KEY TENETS EXPLAINED**

1. **Heterogeneity.** ANT attempts "to see the world as it really is" (Thrift 2000c: 5): viz. a world actually occasioned by relating (or engineering) heterogeneous materials with one another. To see the world like this, however, means that "[s]acred divisions and distinctions have been tossed into the flames" (Law 1999: 3); it means that "...all the usual boundaries from which and with which western knowledge is constituted..." have to be resisted. To put it mildly, this is not easy to do. A simple example will to make the point. "There is a cloud in this [doctoral] sheet of paper... [for] [w]ithout a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper" (cited in Barash 2001: B13). To assert heterogeneity, then, is to assert the multiplicity of connections (rather than divisions) that make up sheets of paper; it refers

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5 This section follows Murdoch (1997b) in contrasting ANT with structuration theory — and therefore owes much to Murdoch's overall analysis in this respect.
to how the natural and social worlds (clouds and paper mills) connect with one another to fashion heterogeneous products.

Writers like Giddens miss this point (Murdoch 1997b: 324), over-emphasizing the sociality of social relations. Despite Giddens' use of time-geography, which shares many ontological propositions with ANT, "...the physical world seems somewhat removed, therefore, from [his] structure; it exists 'only at the edges' of society, not as something which enters into the centre of our being" (ibid.). Yet this is a momentous omission in thinking about the (informal) world of cities — and more particularly about planning urban development. We cannot descend into physical determinism; but neither can we avoid physical form. As Craib (1992) argues: "social relationships are mediated not just by members' interaction but by the relationship of all the members to the physical world" (cited in Murdoch 1997: 324).

There are parallels here with Lefebvre's approach. Lefebvre argues (1991: 101) that "[t]he form of social space is encounter, assembly, simultaneity." He asks: "But what assembles, or what is assembled?" And he answers:

...everything that there is in space, everything that is produced either by nature or by society, either through their co-operation or through their conflicts. Everything: living beings, things, objects, works, signs and symbols... Social space implies actual or potential assembly at a single point, or around that point. It implies, therefore, the possibility of accumulation (a possibility that is realised under specific conditions).

While this parallel should not be pushed too far, he also writes repeatedly and in a multitude of ways about networks — or the "meshwork" of space, as he sometimes puts it (see e.g. p. 117) — linking these metaphors explicitly to heterogeneity:

Social space contains a great variety of objects, both natural and social, including networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material and information. Such 'objects' are thus not only things but also relations. As objects, they possess discernible peculiarities, rearranging their positions within spatio-temporal configurations without necessarily affecting their materiality, their natural state (1991: 77).

Explicitly urban examples of such heterogeneous ("natural and social") configurations are legion. Yeoh (1996: 9) in her study of colonial Singapore criticises scholarship that ignores the "...the actual physical use of the colonial city" in explaining the relationships between urban form and social power. Similarly, Kesteloot and Meert (2000: 243) highlight the "ideal milieu" of inner city Brussels — "...[the] confusing muddle of cramped living quarters, middle class dwellings ...workshops, businesses,
shops, warehouses and backyards” (ibid.) — in quite literally structuring informal economic activity among Turkish émigrés in that city (see also Serageldin 1997). Thus, as Figure 3.2 above shows, ANT (and to some extent Lefebvre) seeks to “transcend” both society and nature (physicality) in order to consider the reality of human society as "socionatural" — what Latour (1988: 298) sums up didactically as “mixing humans and nonhumans together.”

2. Symmetry. “Mixing humans and nonhumans together” is a kind of symmetry. But there are other kinds as well. Radical and mainstream social theory has long rested on an uneasy “dualism” between individual and society, society and nature, agency and structure, micro and macro, subject and object. Indeed, as outlined in chapter II, this uneasy dualism framed the early debate about the UIS — but steadily broke down in the 1970s as empirical research increasingly revealed complex inter-linkages between the so-called formal/modern and informal/traditional sectors of LDC urban economies. Arguably, this UIS breakdown reflected a general breakdown in theories based on dualist ontologies. Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory was essentially an attempt to move beyond this dualism (cf. Mestrovic 1997). Specifically, Giddens replaced dualism with the concept of “duality,” wherein (micro) agency and (macro) structure are recast as co-constitutive of one another.

ANT bears some resemblance to structuration theory, as for example in rejecting structuralism and voluntarism in social theorisation. But the modus operandi of ANT is quite different. In terms of ontology, it counter-proposes that social reality is better understood as a continuum of constructed complexity, rather than a duality as in Giddens’ account. In other words, social reality is a steadily more complex architecture of organisation — from micro to macro, with no clean ‘break’ between agency and structure. It is therefore said to be symmetrical. This has important implications for how we theorise the scalar connectivities between, say, physical metropoles, trading markets and human bodies. For reasons developed later on, these scalar connectivities are extremely important in thinking about the research questions posed here.

ANT thus replaces Giddens’ duality of agency and structure, subject and object, micro and macro (and so on), with the single idea of the actor-network itself. Following the concept of symmetry, then, differences in the social world are questions of size or scale, i.e. how complex an actor-network becomes, not questions of kind, in the sense that the micro is ontologically different from the macro. Under certain conditions,
relatively simple micro-actor-networks "grow into" extremely complex, relatively stable macro-actor-networks. The "macro" is therefore by the sheer fact of its existence relatively durable as a network form. Giddens implicitly rejects such a move via a general critique of theorists who overly privilege human co-presence at the micro level in the theorisation of society (1984: xxvi). But in so doing he does not really offer an account of how macro-structures actually come about over time (except vaguely as "outcome[s] of the practices they recursively organise" (ibid.)). Rather his main concern is with understanding how micro-agency and macro-structure once in existence as "things" in reality reinforce each other in the constitution of society through routinization (daily life) and regionalisation (the space-time articulation of daily life) (ibid., xxiii - xxv), a problem that also plagues much Marxist theory.

This leads to a different approach from ANT in the overall theorisation of the social (and hence the spatial). This difference is captured in Figure 3.2 below. In Latour's "flowing" schema (depicted below the dotted line), theorists such as Giddens recast society as a "meeting point" between structure and agency, or subject and object, while ANT theorists see it as ever-spiralling, upwards complexity: from micro-agents to macro-agents.

**Figure 3.2 Latour's "Actor-Network" Approach to Theorisation**

![Diagram of Latour's Actor-Network Approach](source: Latour (1990: 170), slightly modified to emphasise differences with Giddens' structuration theory)
3. Translation. Connections between heterogeneous products across multiple scales are forged, constructed, given shape, engineered, indeed “produced,” through a specific dynamic that ANT writers typically call translation. Law (1986: 6) defines translation as the process,

by which actors (including collectives) struggle to impose versions of reality on others which define (a) the number of those others, both natural and social, that may be said to exist in the world, (b) their characteristics, (c) the nature of their interrelations, (d) their respective sizes and (e) their positions with respective to the actor attempting the translation.”

Translation involves, according to Callon (cited in Murdoch 1997a: 739), four key stages. The first stage is “problematization,” wherein the problem in question is formally identified and solutions are conceived. The second stage is “interessement,” “…which refers to the means by which [actors] attempt to impose and stabilise the identities of other actors. The third stage is “enrolment,” wherein actors negotiate with other actors. The forth and final stage is “mobilisation,” wherein all the actors assume (usually after much “resistance”) their roles in the newly (re) ordered network. Aside from a rejection of duality, the other crucial difference from approaches like structuration theory, and the one of particular consequence for this thesis, is that in ANT this on-going, upwardly spiralling process of translation involves human and non-human actors (or actants). It privileges neither. Indeed, it considers nonhumans (like planning documents and parasites) consequential “participants” in the form and function of particular networks. In short, translation is about how resistance is overcome.

4. Obligatory points of passage. Crucial to moving from one stage to the next, from actually translating actors in space and through time (cf. Lefebvre 1991), are “obligatory points of passage.” Law (1986: 8) observes that these points of passage (or nodes) are “…crucial to the analysis of translation” because they exist along the “channels” of the networks themselves. The link to urban planning is most obvious here. For such nodes represent, if they nothing else, spatial impositions by particular actors that simultaneously “open up” certain possibilities for some and “bar access” to others (ibid.). Quite literally translated into spatial realities, the “obligatory point of passage” is the discrete node — the dialectically mental, physical and symbolic place — where certain kinds of subjectivities and physicalities are constituted. The node is therefore, following Lefebvre, a “strong point” in a network (Mao’s Tiananmen). It is the desired “place” for particular relations to mesh together.
5. Durability. What is crucial to emphasise now is that this meshing together may not actually happen. "Translation" is not always successful (Latour 1996b) — or it may only be successful for a short period of time. As often as not, points of passage fail to become "obligatory." The world is according to ANT precarious; its putative accomplishments reversible. Actors that participate in one network (passing through certain points to do so) might very easily be "enrolled" into another network. This constant possibility of alternative enrolment raises the crucial issue of what a "successful" actor-network actually is. In ANT the answer is simple because it basically avoids any political judgement of what networks should be about: thus an actor-network is "successful" if is "durable" — and if it basically remains so.

Durability is therefore the main concept in describing how simple networks of heterogeneous products progress through time and over space to become, via ever-more complex linkages with other heterogeneous networks, complex macro-agent structures. This is captured visually in Figure 3.3 below, where "a," "b" and "c" are interpreted within the context of Figure 3.2 above. Durability involves the "stickiness" and "adaptability" of a heterogeneous network, the degree to which it can overcome the centrifugal conflicts inherent in the network ordering process and "lock in" human actors and non-human actants (Bridge 1997; Dugdale 1999). It describes the quality of the dynamic that keeps the "bits and pieces" within the network itself from "...following their own inclinations and making off" (Law 1992: 386). In the end, durability is about the long-term survival qualities of the constantly cultivated, always imminent alliances of heterogeneous networks: year after year, generation after generation, or, in the case of capitalism itself, century after century.6

6. Networked effects. In this specific respect, a network of heterogeneous actors that happens to become durable through successful translation takes on all the constraining and enabling properties of "structures" and "systems" that Marxists, realists and Giddens employ in their social theories. But in ANT structures and systems are simply the

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6 The unnerving precariousness of even a supposedly "durable" system was evidenced dramatically in the Florida electoral chaos of 2000. "The secretary of state's first duty, as specified in Florida's 122-page voting law, is to 'maintain uniformity'," the Washington Post later reported: "But in a state in which authority to run elections is divided between Tallahassee and 67 county elections supervisors, that was easier said than done. The supervisors — all but one of them elected by popular vote — are so famous for their independence that a post-election report by the Florida Senate asserted that some 'often intentionally disregard' election laws. The rest of the time, they made individual decisions as they saw fit" (Washington Post 31/5/01).
“effects” of network agency. One of the best examples of such an effect is what Bruno Latour calls “strong rhetoric.” In *Science in Action*, Latour (1987) shows how pieces of information about the world — claims about reality — typically move in one of two directions: towards “facts” or towards “artefacts.” Facts, Latour posits, are the basis for strong rhetoric in that they are widely believed to be true. When networks of actors are successfully translated, when they are made durable through heterogeneous engineering, “the power of [their] rhetoric lies in making the dissenter feel lonely” (Latour 1986: 44).

On this post-structuralist account, the production and maintenance of collective rhetoric and discourse — the hard, unrelenting work that goes into making specific claims “strong” — matters as much as the original piece of information (the claim) itself. For Latour, strong rhetoric is engineered; it is an “effect” of network formation. Accordingly, the inability to create it is a manifestation of weak actor-networks.

**FIGURE 3.3 Actor-network evolution**

- Growing complexity through successful translation of heterogeneous human actors and non-human actants (from a to c as in Figure 3.2)
- Durability of heterogeneous networks over time through growing complexity and successful translation
- Resultant power as “performative” (i.e. embedded in nature of network) rather than “allocative – possessive”

As with Lefebvre (1991), there is much more to actor-network theory, which continues to mature as its influence is felt across disciplines (Ward 1994; Hassard and Law 1999). However, symmetry; heterogeneity; translation; obligatory points of passage; durability — here is a constellation of concepts sufficiently broad to (help) put Lefebvre’s project to work in a place like Black Metropolitan Cape Town. Lefebvre provides us with
an epistemological triptych to organise a study of the dialectical production of urban space; ANT provides us with a set of nimble tools to begin to excavate the actual production of that triptych. To be sure, ANT's insistence on the sweaty, agency-driven nature of making new networked patterns of heterogeneous products "stick," particularly in regard to translation and durability, is a different methodological approach than one finds in most Lefebvrian scholarship. But as Swyngedouw (1999) in particular has noted, Lefebvre and ANT can work well together if their respective strengths are combined (and see Lash 1999).

**ACTOR-NETWORK LIMITATIONS**

Like Lefebvre, though, ANT suffers its own limitations. Chief amongst these limitations is a problem with "alterity." As Nigel Thrift (2000b: 214) puts it:

> actor-network theory is much more able to describe steely accumulation than lightning strikes, sustained longings and strategies rather than the sharp movements that may also pierce our dreams."

"Actor-network theory," he therefore posits (and here we might turn back to the subversive alterity of Tianenmen, 1989), "...dies a little when confronted with the flash of the unexpected and the unrequited." More prosaically, if urban planning is following Christine Boyer (1985) about "dreaming the rational city" then such limitations need serious attention.

In recent years, there have been attempts to address these weaknesses. Jonathan Murdoch (1998) for example, observes that actor-networks occasion at least two kinds of spaces. Aside from durable spaces ("spaces of prescription") Murdoch also writes of "spaces of negotiation." These are "...provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to establish" and where standardization "...is fraught with difficulty and the entities which compose them might easily be enrolled into alternative networks." Here he draws on Hetherington's Nietzsche-like argument that "...we avoid seeing particular spaces as containing singular identities — for instance, central or marginal, dominant or resistant..."; and furthermore,

...that all spaces should be seen as complex interrelations between modes of ordering and forms of resistance so that the 'effects of power and resistance are intertwined' (1997b, p.52). ... Hetherington takes from ANT the idea that modes of ordering are never complete, closed totalities: they always generate uncertainties, ambivalences, transgressions and resistances (Murdoch 1998: 364).

Ambivalences, transgressions and resistances certainly mark the terrain of alterity. But there are other bodies of work that map this terrain more directly (and more skilfully)
than does ANT. One body of work, of course, is Lefebvre's, particularly as pushed through representational space. The other body of work is found in the writings of Michel de Certeau, where empirical themes of everyday survival work very well.

3.3

"Alterity" — or de Certeau's tactics in the face of strategies and beliefs

Michel de Certeau's writings focus extensively on everyday practices (walking, eating, shopping, dwelling, speaking, cooking, and so on), particularly those associated with marginal peoples (e.g. the Kabyle migrant in Paris). This suggests immediate applicability to an empirical study of alterity and survival. But de Certeau moors everyday practices within a larger context. Central to his understanding of the "everyday," a theme also central to Lefebvre's (1971) work, is the tense interplay between what he calls "tactics" and "strategies." These two concepts — tactics and strategies — are developed in his book, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984). A third theoretical concept, "belief," is intimated in an important article published just before his death, "The jabbering of social life" (1985). These three concepts are reviewed here under the synoptic theme of alterity.

TACTICS AND STRATEGIES

For de Certeau (1984), the "tactics" of individual agents operating in society can be understood practically as "indeterminate trajectories": patterns of travel, movement and behaviour that directly or indirectly defy, often passively, the "panoptic procedures and apparatuses" associated with the rational, scientific and bureaucratic production of the West's experience of urban modernity (one of the most well-developed themes in twentieth century French social theory; cf. Foucault 1986; Lefebvre 1971, 1991; see also Shields 1999). This is rooted in Foucault's notions of embodied "resistance" to governing discourses and power and therefore to the urban spatialisation associated with that governance. Simple examples include: littering, jaywalking, running a red light, free-riding on the bus, disobeying curfew hours in a public park. Crang (2000: 137) notes that this is not resistance for the sake of resistance, but the practical consumption and piecemeal remaking of urban space. "Tactics are the 'ruses'," Crang argues, "that take the predisposition of the world and make it over, that convert it to the purposes of ordinary people" (ibid.).

However, not every action in everyday life is an "indeterminate trajectory" pregnant with Thrift's "flashes" of resistance. Not everything *quotidien* is tactical or truly "lived" as Lefebvre would put it. Indeed, much (perhaps most) of the daily rhythm of
urban life is routinised, prescribed, bureaucratic (or "abstract," again following Lefebvre): getting up everyday at a certain hour; commuting to work on the same bus; eating at a certain time and at a certain place — to say nothing of the forty-plus hour work week itself, which in turn is made up of a thousand small, individually realised actions. Put simply, the everyday is not the same thing as the tactical. Rather, following the dialectical analysis detailed above, the everyday is often the "instantiation" in place of wider, increasingly global processes of "colonisation". This is what Kofman and Lebas (1996: 41) mean in the headquote that began this chapter when they characterise the "user" as "... a conservative and subversive figure in the reproduction of social relations." While this point should border on the banal, it is nonetheless easy to romanticise everyday action just because it is everyday action (and therefore somehow authentic). And yet, even as the modern space-economy and bureaucratic state both colonise the details of everyday life, de Certeau (1994) suggests that much remains "uncaptured". It is this uncaptured terrain where the geography of alterity resides.

In contrast to tactics is what de Certeau calls strategies. Crang (2000: 250) defines the strategic through its relationship to power and knowledge: "Strategic power works by controlling and organising space to construct proper knowledge." Understood spatially, strategies for de Certeau (1984) are the imposed terrains that accompany the institutional expansion of the state and the market. Like his older compatriot, Henri Lefebvre, de Certeau also locates strategies specifically in the "Concept-Cités" of the town planners and urbanists; in the "constructed, written, prefabricated space[s]" that carry within them a matrix of "prescribed syntaxes." This is the city of development plans and other representations of space. Gregory (1994a: 169) sees such examples as central to de Certeau's (1984) argument that "...strategies typically involve the mastery of place through sight." Gregory (ibid.) further points out that for de Certeau the production of "readable spaces" is indeed a prerequisite for successfully managing the "uncertainties of history." For visual representation, so crucial to Lefebvre (Figure 3.1), is also crucial to the kind of pre-figured urban change that de Certeau (1985: 122-4) suggests is the hallmark of traditional urban planning as a strategic technology of the state.

On this reading, changing the visualised space of today is the basis for changing the material history of tomorrow: "The desire to see the city," de Certeau (1995: 124) observes, "precede[s] the means of fulfilling desire. Medieval and Renaissance painting showed the city painted in a perspective by an eye that did not yet exist. [...] [But] the fiction ... slowly became fact." Strategies of pre-visualisation are therefore followed by
"the means" or spatial practices to actuate that pre-visualisation: through *inter alia* traffic bays, warning signs prohibiting certain actions, zoning codes, agreements to extract planning gain; job training programmes; volume regulation — all to prevent negative externalities, to provide public goods or to compensate for market failure (Klosterman 1985). De Certeau (1984) worries deeply about this; he calls it the "jungle of functionalist rationality." But he also recognises that this jungle creates "an ensemble of possibilities."

Employing these two broad concepts and the relationship between them, de Certeau concludes that:

One can analyse the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system [is] supposed to administer or suppress.... One can follow the swarming activity of these [practices] that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance.

In making this conclusion, de Certeau suggests that both tactics and strategies need illumination — that it is not enough to study tactics without reference to strategies, and vice-versa (cf. Soja 1996). Put differently, the practice of everyday life is both space-contingent (strategically situated) and space-making (tactically spontaneous). This is similar to Lefebvre's (1991: 175) observation that:

Around the living body, and through its activity, which may be legitimately described as 'productive', is constituted the field which behaviouralists call 'behavioural'. This field comes into play as a network projected and simultaneously activated by the living being as it acts within, in conjunction with, and upon its spatial 'milieu'.

Indeed, it is also similar to Spiro Kofto's notion of *la ville spontanée* (the chance-grown city) versus *la ville créée* (the planned city), which the planning theorist David Perry (1995) thinks is at the heart of the planning conundrum. "It's hard to produce a plan," he argues (1996: 210-11), "which at once captures the conditions of the society, city or policy area and also meets the demands of each of the citizens experiencing the problems in society it is mobilised to process. It's hard to be both scopic and comprehensive and immediate and individually responsive." It is harder still in the wholesale absence of what de Certeau (1985) calls "belief," the final theoretical concept of importance here.

**BELIEF**

Seeing the state's determination to inspire and "capture" belief as one of the hallmarks of modernity and development (Hyden 1980), de Certeau (1985) simultaneously notes the paradoxical erosion of mass belief in the capacities of the state. This theme is less

De Certeau's (1985) own argument runs as follows. "Belief" is the innate human search for love, identity and most importantly purpose (cf. Shields 1999). It is expressed through two conduits: religiosity and politics. Religiosity has died out with the rise of science, rationality and state capacity. In the past few centuries, political organizations acting 'scientifically' have steadily become the principal sites for the practice of belief. (Thus Rousseau's notion of the state as a "civic religion.") This institutional transposition has come in discrete stages, but has always involved the notion of generating, "capturing" and making use of belief-as-resource:

...[Historically] one tried to 'capture' this force [of belief] and to move it from one place to another...from the churches it was then moved on towards a monarchical politics; next, from a traditionalist religiosity towards the institutions of the Republic, of National Education or the types of socialism. Such "conversions" consisted of capturing the energy of belief.... (1985: 147).

De Certeau implicitly engages with the contemporary developmental state and technologies like planning systems associated with that state. The constant "jabbering of social life" of his title is in fact the hegemonic discourse associated with the state's ongoing drive to inspire, use and direct belief. But a new language structures this jabbering. "Statistical debates," he says, "are our theological wars.... They set themselves up as messengers of a reality" (1995: 151). "Quotation then [of opinion polls, survey results, 'best practice' experiences] is the ultimate weapon for making one believe" (p. 154). For de Certeau (1995: 152), statistics, surveys, and the like, are "narratives of reality" that "...have a function of providence and predestination: they organise our work, our celebrations — even our dreams — in advance" (cf. Gitlin 2000: B9). They are crucial material for the (attempted) production of new spaces and new times.
A WAY FORWARD

Each of these bodies of work contributes to the empirical story this thesis hopes to tell. Specifically, each contributes to mapping the spatiality of informal sector agency. Lefebvre's insistence that space is a dialectical product couples fruitfully with ANT's focus on the heterogeneity and symmetry of networks-in-the-making, wherein "the social" and "the physical" (and indeed the "mental") interpenetrate one another to create functional "actor-network" spaces. ANT offers a simple metaphorical vehicle to excavate the production of Lefebvre's different spatial "moments" — to follow actors and actants through these moments — whilst also keeping these moments bound into a single spatial story. At the same time, de Certeau's notions of tactics, strategies and belief help chart the terrain of alterity, recognizing that the network metaphor does not quite capture the full promise of a dialectical approach to theorisation. The production of moments, networks and alterity therefore constitute a thematic triptych signposting the way forward.

3.4
Conclusions — mapping the spatiality of informal sector agency

This chapter has offered a theoretical framework emphasising the production of space, the construction of actor-networks, and the challenge of alterity. The promise of this spatial approach to theorisation, it has been suggested, is that it might allow us to think differently about the fundamental question of informal sector development planning and its problems and potentialities (hopefully with a new creativity and intellectual energy). Specifically, this chapter has outlined a series of theoretical concepts that abet a contextual study of spatiality. It has done so through three synoptic concepts. First and foremost, the discussion has promoted a dialectical perspective on urban spatiality, deploying in particular the meta-theoretical claims of Henri Lefebvre, especially as found in his book, *The Production of Space* (1991 [1974]). Special attention in this regard has been paid to his insistence on three constitutive "moments": representations of space, spatial practices and representational spaces.

Stepping down from (but with) Lefebvre's propositions about the importance of these three moments in thinking dialectically about urban space, the discussion has next offered a more "operational" range of theoretical concepts, drawing attention in particular to heterogeneity and symmetry. Here the discussion has drawn on arguments about the actual construction of "networks" associated with actor-network theory.
Certainly this is not the only or necessarily the best way to operationalise the dialectics of urban spatiality. However, as an attempt to put Lefebvre “to work” in the gritty, and often confusing empirical terrain of informal sector agency in post-apartheid South Africa, this chapter has suggested that this second terrain of actor-network theory provides a body of ideas potentially quite useful in the detailed excavation and analysis of informal sector agency. Finally, this chapter has outlined the problematic of alterity by foregrounding the work of Michel de Certeau. What is required now is to apply this overall theoretical agenda to a specific analytical approach within the context of a specific research methodology. It is to this approach and methodology that the discussion now turns.
Chapter IV.

EMPIRICAL FOCUS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Definitions, Data, Fieldwork

4.0

Overview

The 'big picture' is not given in one frame of reference, but in going from one frame to all others....


To summarize the discussion so far, this thesis seeks to supplant the "compositional" geographies of informal sector development planning (chapter II) with more "contextual" ones based on a theoretical sensitivity to the dialectics, heterogeneity and symmetry of space (chapter III). The hypothesis is that such a geographical re-theorization better explains the difficulties that attend informal sector development planning. To explore this hypothesis, however, it is impossible to map all the "frames" of the big (contextual) picture, to use Latour's terminology. Theoretical sensitivity to context, to what Lefebvre (1991) calls the "instant infinity" of maps that shape the contemporary world, cannot involve an empirical journey across all of Cape Town.

This chapter narrows down the empirical work that lies ahead. The focus is on what can be reasonably communicated in the space of a single research project, undertaken by a single researcher. To that end, the discussion has three objectives. The first objective is to define and delineate the operational meanings of planning and survival as they relate to the spatiality — the geography — of informal sector agency. The second objective is to report on the data issues (types, sources, limitations, lacunae) that accompany the investigation of this spatiality. Finally, the third objective is to outline the data collection methodology and, where appropriate, the modes of data representation. These three objectives are dealt with in sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Section 4.4 then briefly recapitulates the discussion and sets up Part B. This chapter closes Part A of the thesis.
4.1
Planning and Survival

Planning and survival are notoriously broad terms. In this first section, the discussion places practical, usable parameters around the detailed empirical exploration of these three key concepts. Within the context of the theoretical propositions just outlined, in other words, this section operationalises planning and survival. The first concept to operationalise is planning.

PLANNING

The American planning theorist, David Perry (1995), writes that planning is about making space, not plans (cf. Faludi 1973; Healey 1982; Forester 1989; Campbell and Fainstein 1996; Fainstein 2000). Drawing directly on Lefebvre, de Certeau and Foucault, he specifically argues that “[w]e should think about planning spatially...[which] means seeing the various politics and technologies of planning — its various discourses — in their contextualised place(s) in society” (p. 213). Perry’s definition accords very well with the theoretical approach just outlined. But the spatiality of planning practice is a vast terrain. This raises the difficult methodological question of which “contextualised places” warrant detailed attention. For the purposes of this thesis, three such places have been identified: the metropole; the marketplace; and the subject. Each of these is discussed below within the context of the overall theoretical commitments of this thesis.

Metropole, market and subject

The Cape Metropole. The first “place” investigated in this thesis is the city of Cape Town itself. Here the scale of analysis is metropolitan in nature, though with particular reference to African communities and areas (thus Black Metropolitan Cape Town). Over the course of the twentieth century, planning technologies attempted to shape both the materiality and sociality of Cape Town (a common maneuver of symmetry). Planning goals and strategies shifted dramatically in the late apartheid and immediate post-apartheid era, but the fundamental effort to shape both urban materiality and sociality continued apace. Planning imaginaries and practices pitched at the development of the metropole as a whole thus provide an initial contextualized place to explore the desired, obtained, unattained (and collapsed) spatialities of urban development, including those that indirectly and directly condition informal sector dynamics.
The Local Marketplace. The metropole, however, is everywhere and at all points a network of discrete sites. It is everywhere simultaneously local. This requires a "scaling down" of the empirical analysis to specific places within the overall metropole. It also requires a specific empirical focus (an urban "system" to look at). Given the interests in this thesis, these discrete places will be discussed in what follows as those bound up in the networks of UIS dynamics, especially popular marketplaces for various kinds of commodity exchange. These constitute a second kind of contextualised place. This means that planning is discussed not simply as strategic spatial planning or metropolitan-scale planning but also site or project planning (one-off interventions with discrete timelines and budgets). The empirical discussion therefore explores project-specific policy interventions into the current and future uses of specific locales within and beyond African communities in Cape Town (the latter crucial to the constitution of African urban space). What is theoretically important about the marketplace, as developed in chapter III, is its role as a possible obligatory point of passage: a locale where actor-network consolidation either strengthens or weakens across all of Lefebvre's spatial moments.

The African subject. Finally, the empirical discussion of planning focuses on the African subject herself as a place for intervention (or production). Admittedly, this scale is unusual in discussions of planning. It should not be, especially in the context of this thesis and given chapter III's specific insistence on the importance of (symmetrically) linking materiality and sociality in the spatial theorization of urban development. Indeed, deploying the work of Lefebvre and Foucauldian approaches like ANT and de Certeau, it is relatively easy to treat the human subject (or body) as a "sub-region", a "place like any other place" (Nast 1998: 95), which so defined can be coded, zoned, policed, marketed, invested in or produced (Pile and Thrift 1995; Elder 1998). Simultaneously, it is also easy to understand "places through the body" (Nast and Pile 1998).

The relevance of this "place" here is that urban planners have not always understood this dialectic, this "tying up" across scale, across people-thing dualities, even as they intervene in the actual production of certain kinds of subjectivities. Put simply, planners expect people to perform certain roles to fit in with their plans. Feminists in

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1 Such discussions are far less unusual in South Africa, however, for one obvious reason: the pass-system applied to the African subject-body, which was so crucial to the production and maintenance of apartheid urban space. More will be said of this in chapter V.
particular have exposed this failure of understanding (see e.g. Delores Hayden (1985) in the “North” and Caroline Moser (1995) in the “South”). But it is Harvey’s (2000) dialectical notion of the human subject (the body) “as an accumulation strategy”, derived from Lefebvre (1991) and Haraway (1991), that will be especially useful later in the thesis, when the post-apartheid production of particular kinds of subjectivities is analyzed within the context of local marketplace development and strategic spatial planning.

The crucial message of this literature, in Harvey’s work no less than anyone else’s, is that particular kinds of geographical projects, including strategic and local area planning projects, require particular kinds of subjectivities. By way of analogy, Thrift (2000a: 675) argues in a recent reading of the new economy that a different kind of “managerial subject” is now emerging — “change agent” rather than “Organization Man” — because the geographical project of modern Western business confects this subjectivity. Anni Dugdale (1999: 118-9) writes in similar terms: she links the production of specific subjectivities directly to the syntactic and contextual materiality of particular sites. “We are prone to treat [the specific materiality of sites] as background, as essentially unimportant,” she argues,

but [such materiality] [is] crucial to producing the bodies that are assembled together as subjects. It is the mixing together of [materiality] with bodies that constitutes subjectivities of a particular kind. [...] Subjects do not come ready-made [...] Subjectivity is constituted in material arrangements.

This kind of insight ought to interest urban planners a lot more than it currently does, especially where implementation “failure” is a central issue. But again, such an insight involves the theorization of urban spatiality as contextual. For post-apartheid informal sector development planning as a geographical project — as an attempt to produce new, ostensibly more effective urban spatialities — involves new cities, new markets and new subjectivities. We thus need dialectics, heterogeneity and symmetry “to think about planning spatially” (Perry 1995: 213-4).

SURVIVAL

These three places might be related rather easily to a host of informal sector activity. This requires an initial caveat. Not all informal activity is “survivalist” in nature, as even a cursory review of, say, drug trafficking or small-scale manufacturing would immediately

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2 For example, Hayden’s (1985) analysis in her important book, The Grand Domestic Revolution, focuses on the co-production of post-WWII suburbs and the Fordist-era “housewife.”
reveal. And yet, non-criminal urban survival constitutes an extraordinarily large percentage of informal sector activity, in South African cities no less than elsewhere. Urban-based survival is typical if not wholly interchangeable with urban informality. As Thomas (1995: 129) concludes: “From the point of view of numbers, those involved in survival form a majority of those working in the UIS.” So whilst this thesis opens up a type of informal sector activity, rather than all types, survivalist activity nonetheless reflects a fairly weighty proportion of the overall phenomenon, certainly in Black Metropolitan Cape Town (Shay, pers. com.).

Understood as a specific but representative kind of informal sector activity, then, Simone (1998: 13) usefully adds that survival is basically any income-generating activity “...removed or marginal from the predominant streams and flows of economies.” This does not necessarily mean that survival is “local,” as Balbo (1993) argues (see chapter II), in that it is cut off from distant places (metropole, region, national, world). Indeed, urban survival might well be de-territorialised (Simone 1998), stretching far outside local spaces (as for example in hawking curios that originate in Ghana). But Simone’s characterization nonetheless succinctly highlights the unrecorded and therefore unofficial nature of most of these activities. For this reason, his simple characterization is adopted here. But this still leaves a wide swath of possible activities to consider. Accordingly, survival is operationalised in the coming chapters as those unregistered, unrecorded, untaxed income-generating activities of African men and women engaged daily in the trading of fruits, vegetables and meats within African communities and key metropolitan places connected to these communities (such as wholesaling markets).

There are two main reasons for this sectoral and geographical research focus. First, with regard to the sectoral focus, the principle motivation is intellectual neglect. Urban food is a surprisingly recent topic for academic research, policy analysis and urban planning (Tinker 1998; Coquerie 1998). Foodstuffs \textit{per se} — vegetables, fruits and meats, amongst other major commodities — have received exhaustive treatment in the agricultural development (Johnson and Kilby 1975), health (FAO and WHO 1992), famine (Sen 1981), ‘North-South’ trade (Sarkar 1992) and political ecology literatures (Watts 1983). But foodstuffs as part and parcel of the urban arena remain strangely under-studied — and indeed have only attracted significant attention since the late 1980s (Lynch 1995; Ellis and Sumberg 1998). As Drakakis-Smith and Kevill (1990: 158-9; and see Drakakis-Smith 1994) suggest, “[d]irect research on [food] distribution systems is limited.” Within this sub-literature, Southern Africa “...remains remarkably under-
researched” (ibid.). An interrogation of the informal distribution of perishable foodstuffs in Cape Town therefore serves not only the major requirements of this thesis, but also potentially contributes to these adjacent bodies of research much in need of empirical illumination (Maxwell 2000).

The second, more immediate reason is practical — and historical. In the post-apartheid era, Cape Town’s urban planners, development officers and service managers have engaged extensively and repeatedly with the informal food sector, especially in African communities where it is empirically ubiquitous. Accordingly, there is a substantial corpus of actual policy and planning work to examine in this recent engagement. That has not been the case with all UIS sectors, many of which do not fall within the rubric of local institutional support. The most glaring examples, of course, are highly publicized criminal activities such as the gang-driven drug trade, which now forms one of the most important urban dynamics in Cape Town, touching on the overall political, economic and cultural profile of this city (Duffey 1998; Wilkinson 2000). Nevertheless, even less dramatic, non-criminal UIS sectors that have received appreciable policy attention, such as small-scale manufacturing enterprises or textile activities, do not lend themselves as well to the analytical choices and parameters of this thesis. The simultaneously natural and social qualities of foodstuffs; their circulation, representation and materiality; their role in figuring everyday life — all these qualities provide a fascinating empirical basis with which to consider the research questions posed by this thesis.

4.2
Establishing the Database

In general, planning processes are relatively easier to document than survival processes. The section considers the approach taken to establish a database required to understand both planning and survival. Three issues are broached: types of data; sources of data; and data limitations and lacunae.

TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA

By definition, planning is formal and public, whereas survival is undocumented and private (though of public concern). For this reason, most research that is focused on informal sector issues highlights at some point the extreme difficulties of tracking its empirical dynamics; this is mainly due to the absence of secondary and particularly quantitative data in most countries, both in the North and the South (see Fernandez-
Kelley and Garcia 1989). The absence of secondary quantitative data is one reason why Aili Tripp (1997: xi) laments the fact that “...the study of the informal economy by social scientists appears to be woefully slow, trailing developments.” Moreover, planning statements are easier to excavate than planning processes. So the overall task of building up an empirically rich database to understand processes, which is central to understanding spatiality, requires certain methodological commitments. Two commitments in particular structured the empirical work of this thesis.

The first commitment related to the need to generate a wealth of primary data. Under the rubric of planning and survival, Table 4.1 below summarizes both the types and sources of primary data that were collected for this thesis.

**TABLE 4.1 Primary data collected, 1998-1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Contemporary attitudes towards and decisions taken in re: to collective plans and goals</td>
<td>Planners and public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Past attitudes towards and decisions taken in re: to collective plans and goals</td>
<td>Minutes of meetings and official reports, Cape Archives Depot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Attitudes towards collective plans and individual economic and social goals</td>
<td>Informal traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Daily habits and rituals</td>
<td>Informal traders, markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Food consumption habits</td>
<td>African households, homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Food distribution system</td>
<td>Planners, public officials, traders, African households, managers in the formal food sector of the metropolitan economy, academics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the main, primary planning data focused on attitudes and decisions impacting upon collective plans and goals, both in the past (pre-1990) and in the contemporary (post-1990) eras. The principal source of past primary data (used in chapters V and VIII) was the Cape Archives Depot, in Cape Town, where minutes and reports from various local, regional and national authorities in charge of African areas were studied (these
authorities included: Cape Divisional Council; Administration of the Western Cape; Bantu Affairs Administration Boards; and Black Local Authorities). More contemporary data were found in the verbal observations of planners and officials currently practicing in the city. Primary data on survival, however, was even more important. Almost all of the crucial data on survival used in particular in chapters VII and VIII were gathered from direct participants in the informal food system (traders, consumers, other public and private market participants). These data focused mainly on general attitudes and daily practices and rituals.

The second methodological commitment to establishing a database for this thesis related to the need to reflect upon primary data within the context of a large amount of secondary data. For all sorts of reasons (apartheid, strong planning traditions, relatively advanced local institutional capacity), South African cities like Cape Town generally have extremely rich collections of planning documentation. Such documentation includes, for example, structure plans; strategic spatial plans; land use plans; economic development plans; consultancy reports; newsletters; notes from official meetings; and reports and memos from public officials. Indeed, the City of Cape Town maintains its own library, from which some of the documentation used in this thesis was collected. Other sources of planning documentation included officials in charge of specific aspects of informal sector management. Still more secondary information about the relationship between planning and survival was found in a wide range of newspaper stories.

More traditional forms of secondary data were also deployed. These included datasets collated by the Central Statistical Service (later renamed StatsSA) that report on national informal sector dynamics and, of particular importance, household income and expenditure data by province and type of household. Legal information relating to spatial regulation and informal sector management was collected from the Provincial Gazettes published by the Province of the Western Cape. Where appropriate Acts of Parliament and other national documents were also consulted. But the most important type of secondary data consulted here were the spatial plans, projects and policies actually conceived in the planning offices of Cape Town, especially from the Cape Metropolitan Council and the Cape Town City Council. A summary of the major types and sources of all the secondary data collected for this thesis is presented in Table 4.2 below.
TABLE 4.2 Secondary data collected, 1998-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal decisions impacting UIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial Gazette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative and spatial policies relating to UIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Provincial Authority, Western Cape Provincial Administration, Consultancies, Cape Metropolitan Council, Cape Town City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General public attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspapers (hard copy and electronic on www)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National estimates of informal sector activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Statistical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Household income and expenditure data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>StatsSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATA LIMITATIONS AND LACUNAE

The actual fieldwork methodology used to collect the data summarised in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 is addressed below. Before this is done, however, it is important to report on the most important data limitations and lacunae impacting upon the empirical discussion laid out in Part B. Despite the wide range of material collected, much remains impressionistic and necessarily broad-brushed. This is particularly true in painting the spatiality of survival dynamics. Two issues require brief attention here.

The first issue was the difficulty associated with tracking cash flows “in” and “out” of the African community’s space-economy. Proxies for that cash flow (based mainly on survey data and household expenditure numbers) are reported in chapter VII. But these are estimates only. While some of the limitations of tracking money flows are a problem everywhere, the informal nature of food transactions amplifies the challenge. It is thus difficult to know precisely how well or how poorly informal sector operators actually perform in market terms vis-à-vis other actors. Specifically, is it difficult to establish with some certainty how much “leakage” (or threshold dissipation) is occurring from the

3 In his discussion of planning local economic development in the relatively data-rich USA, Edward Blakely (1989) argues that it is difficult to obtain data on capital leakage even when it is visible. See also Gunn and Dayton-Gunn (1991).
community economy and, therefore, whether or not spatial changes in land use might impact upon such leakages (as hypothesized by the Cape Town School and as currently believed by many planners in Cape Town).

The second issue relates to the challenge of actually tracking the daily rituals and habits of extremely mobile and busy informal traders. There are several sub-points here. Most informal traders get up early, move through the city with speed, and conduct business with little need for researcher distraction. Ascertaining how they do all this — how they encounter the city and "get on with things" — requires delicate and flexible fieldwork skills, sensitivity to language and literacy difficulties, and a recognition that human memory fails after a day or so. Capturing the urban travel of traders was therefore one of the most exhausting and difficult areas of the fieldwork reported later in this thesis. It was also one of the most revealing, as chapter VII will hopefully show. Accordingly, not every detail on every movement was captured along the lines originally hoped for. However, the data collected do communicate the major flows and rhythms and, ultimately, ontological constitution of this movement.

4.3
Fieldwork Methodology and Modes of Investigation

A host of research methods were deployed to collect the data just outlined, principally during two fieldwork trips in Cape Town. This section summarizes the fieldwork methodology and modes of investigation followed over the course of the research process. It does so chronologically.

INITIAL FIELDTRIP

The first trip to Cape Town, conducted from May 5-28, 1998, consisted principally of exploring the initial idea to research survival activity in the informal food trade of African areas. This was done mainly through informal conversations with public officials, academics, consultants and community development specialists working for nongovernmental organizations. All available secondary information on informal food trading issues was also collected at this time. Trips to possible African communities, including Khayelitsha, Nyanga, KTC, Guguletu, and Crossroads, were also made in an effort to ascertain possible case study areas of the extended fieldwork phase of the
research. A final goal of this first trip was to find a local research partner who could assist with local institutional support, data collection and funding.

Based on the information gathered during this first trip, the decision was made to study the informal food trade in partnership with a yet-to-be-determined local research partner. Upon returning to London in June, 1998 a project framework and funding proposal was written and sent to several local institutions working on informal sector research issues in Cape Town. Subsequently, funds were secured from the Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR), a Cape Town-based think tank set up originally by the African National Congress. Their interest in the research related to a wider research programme addressing the theme of sustainable livelihoods and led to the production of a published research report (Dierwechter 1999).

THE EXTENDED FIELDTRIP

The second trip was an extended period of data collection and fieldwork that was undertaken from January to August 1999. Data collection was broken down into five main research phases:

I. Project planning and training, January-February
II. Human activity analysis (HAA)/time-geography, March-April
III. Structured interviewing as standardized social survey, June
IV. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews and participant observation, June-August
V. Archival work, August

The five main research phases

Phase I. Phase I consisted of refining an initial project plan written to secure funds, project planning, financial preparation and training. In particular, a research team was assembled and trained with the assistance of FCR. Training consisted of three in-service sessions for two Xhosa-speaking fieldworkers, one from KTC (a squatter camp) and one from New Crossroads (a formal housing area). At this point, the case study area for the research project consisted solely of KTC and New Crossroads, although Nyanga, Brown's Farm and Philippi East were identified as possible communities for the social survey work.

Phase II. The human activity analysis (HAA) consisted of a study of the time-space habits of twenty-three individuals engaged daily in the informal food trade (Appendix 1).
Some of the results of this study are presented in chapter VII using a simplified version of Torsten Hagerstrand's (1970, 1976, 1982) time-geography. A contextual approach to theorization, time-geography provides a visual language that captures succinctly what Giddens (1984) has famously called the "structuration" of individual agency and institutional systems in specific locales. This language is summarized in Figure 4.1 below (see also Thrift 1977; Pred 1977).

**FIGURE 4.1 Elements of time-geography**

1. Individuals and things 'travel' through time and space, tracing out coded, intentional and random "projects";
2. Points of association or "couplings" occur between projects; couplings overcome a series of constraints (e.g. the need to be at work during certain hours and that a person can only be in one place at a time
3. e.g. a construction worker meets up with a trader late in the day after time at

**(a) Individual projects as "time-space paths"**

1. Domains are whole zones where "projects" occur; could include one or many "stations" (e.g. a shop or a business improvement district);
2. Bundlings symmetrically articulate people, things, buildings, information, electronic signals, and may therefore change the domain even as the station remains the same;
3. Following, Chapter III, the domain becomes a "spatial effect" because of use and bundling even as it thingifies and structures uses and bundlings.

(b) Stations, Domains, Bundlings
Time-geography has rarely — if ever — been used with Lefebvre or with ANT and de Certeau, but there is no reason why this should be the case. With regard to Lefebvre’s method, “[t]ime-geography,” as Nigel Thrift and Alan Pred (1981: 283) once put it, “is fundamentally dialectical.” That is, its method is to emphasize the processes or flows that constitute things. And indeed, Hagerstrand was influenced by Lefebvre’s overall project (Agnew et al. 1996: 650). With regard to ANT, moreover, time-geography is equally nimble in moving symmetrically across scales; furthermore, it considers the importance of non-humans in the constitution of urban reality. It considers not only the time-space “paths” of human beings, in other words, but also of animals, tools, energies, even buildings — particularly as constraints to agency (Thrift 1977: 7). In Pred’s (cited in Agnew et al 1996: 639) formulation, time-geography is about “…the physical existence and “life-paths” of “individuals” belonging to tool, machinery, building, manufactured good, vegetation, raw-material and other non-human populations….”

As developed originally by Hagerstrand and his colleagues at the University of Lund and within the context of urban and regional planning research, time-geography emphasizes not only the “bundlings” of individual paths that occur at physical “stations” between different actors. It also emphasizes the constraints imposed upon paths (cf. Anderson 1971). Paths stretched out in time-space are called “projects.” Projects are both constrained and enabled by all the coupling domains, projects and things (including non-humans) that “populate” a project. For Giddens (1984) especially, time-geography is one of the principle axes around which to theorize the constitution of society because it ably demonstrates the “convergence” of projects and the ways such convergence enters into system reproduction.

Phase III. After Phase II was completed, two large-scale standard social surveys were conducted in “KTC”, New Crossroads, Nyanga, Old Crossroads, Brown’s Farm and Philippi East. The first survey was of 101 African traders. The objective of this survey was to “widen” the database out from the narrower, if more richly detailed insights gleaned from the HAA’s. The second survey was of 125 African households who consume informally traded foods (Appendix 1). Here the objective was to determine the frequency and amount of typical purchases from informal operators. Both surveys were carried out by the author (Dierwechter) and five other fieldworkers, all trained by the author. The survey took approximately one month to complete. Information
collected with the two survey tools was then coded and entered into an Excel spreadsheet for later analysis (see Appendix 1).

**Phase IV.** Although a few interviews were conducted before June, most of the important discussions with public officials, planners and market officials were conducted during June, July and August. A total of thirty-five people were interviewed formally or extensively consulted over the course of two fieldwork trips. Of these, two were telephonic interviews; the remainder were consultations or unstructured/semi-structured interviews. A short telephone survey of formal perishable food providers was also carried out in order to situate the research and get a broad sense of the overall food system in Cape Town. The data generated by all the various interviews are particularly important to the story developed in Chapter V, which focuses on rhetoric, representation and discourses in the production of UIS development. Also deployed during this phase of the research was participant observation of informal traders, particularly where this was coupled with unstructured interviews. Data from this technique are used in particular in chapter VIII.

**Phase V.** Finally, formal archival work was undertaken at the Cape Archives Depot in August. Material was collected to use for chapter V, which deals with the history of planning and survival in Black Metropolitan Cape Town and the contemporary institutional set-up of local government and planning. Although it would have been possible to write chapter V based entirely on published accounts, and on secondary data sources, archival data enhances the sense of the times, the technologies, materials, discourses, memos and so on, that contributed to the production of Cape Town.

### 4.3 Conclusions

This chapter has explained the empirical focus for the thesis and has reported on the research methodology deployed. It has done so in order to apply the theoretical approach developed in chapter III to the geographical problem of informal sector development planning outlined in chapter II. The discussion unfolded in three main sections.

In section 4.1, operational definitions were given for “planning” and “survival,” the two major empirical themes investigated in this thesis. In brief, planning was defined as the process of making and connecting up “space” across scale and across materiality (land uses) and sociality (people). Following this definition, which derives from some of
the theoretical points made in chapter III, three focal points for planning analysis were identified for Part B of this thesis: the metropole; the marketplace; and the African subject. "Survival" was defined more narrowly but sharply as daily labour within the informal food distribution system that flows through African communities of Cape Town.

Section 4.2 then briefly laid out the data requirements attending the study of these processes, whilst section 4.3 discussed the overall research methodology and key modes of fieldwork investigation. Five phases of fieldwork in Cape Town were outlined, with special attention paid to time-geography methods of data representation. This now accomplished, the discussion can turn to the empirical application in Part B.
PART B.

EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
Chapter V.

HISTORY, SPACE AND AFRICAN 'INFORMALITY'

Planning Black Metropolitan Cape Town, 1900-2000

5.0

Overview

Things fall apart.

— Chinua Achebe, 1958

"History," Brian Redhead has observed, "is what people make of their geography" (1994: 1). This laconic dictum, made with popular reference to Manchester, only just misses the mark: in fact, history is the geography that people make — for themselves and for others and through instruments like planning systems. In order to set the stage for a detailed excavation of the urban geography — the urban spatiality — of planning and survival in the post-apartheid era, this chapter first presents a history of Black Metropolitan Cape Town from 1900-2000. Following Lefebvre, this history draws its meta-theoretical logic from the hypothesized struggle to produce a particular kind of urban space. Following Latour, moreover, this space is narrated empirically as a precariously stabilized, constantly resisted, symmetrical and heterogeneous actor-network: a conceived-and-perceived constellation of memoranda, plans, laws, concepts, subjectivities, buildings, bulldozers.

A comprehensive engagement is neither possible nor necessary. Rather, the objective here is a selective but representative account. A major state technology, planning was crucial to the (attempted) production of an urban spatiality that, as late as 1980, quite literally had no place for African informality (again, at the various scales of urban analysis). For its part,

1 "If space is produced," Lefebvre (1991: 46) forcefully argues, "if there is a production process, then we are dealing with history." Compare with Landes (1998).
African informality — or the African UIS as survival activity — did much to blow apart the “durability” of that spatiality. Over the pre-apartheid and apartheid eras, the empirical collision of planning and survival thus left a profoundly disfigured urban terrain. During the early years of the post-apartheid dispensation, new local institutions, new strategic discourses, and new local area urban plans would attempt a reconstruction of that terrain — a new spatial ordering, a new historical trajectory. This chapter outlines this twentieth century story as succinctly as possible, highlighting major themes that critically inform the empirical analysis that lies ahead.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The discussion has four parts. Section 5.1 sketches the emergence of African “informality” as a major urban problematic, that is, as a serious empirical challenge to the State’s expectations for Cape Town’s urban spatiality up to 1994, when the post-apartheid era opened. Section 5.2 then briefly outlines a fin-de-siecle socio-spatial profile of Black Metropolitan Cape Town, linking this profile to the informalisation processes highlighted in section 5.1. Section 5.3 next lays out the local institutional basis for “re-engaging” with informal sector activities located within Black Metropolitan Cape Town in the immediate post-apartheid era (1994-2000). Special attention is paid here to local economic development (LED) and developmental local governance (DLG). Section 5.4 closes the chapter with a recapitulation of the main insights and themes. The overall discussion draws on the theoretical framework developed in chapter III, and thus establishes a basis to excavate the three spatial modalities associated with chapters VI, VII and VIII.

5.1

Black Metropolitan Cape Town and ‘Informalisation’ to 1994

Now almost 350 years old, the port city of Cape Town is one of the great conurbations of the African continent (Wilkinson 2000). But its distinctively “African” nature only emerged forcefully in the twentieth century (Map 5.1). Even today, after decades of rural-to-urban migration and relatively high urban birth rates, Africans still make up only about 27% of the...
MAP 5.1  Cape Town, South Africa, showing decades of African residential development, 1997

SOURCE: based on CMC (1997a); RSA "inset" from CMC (1996b)
total population of some three million (50% are Coloureds and 23% White). That said, however, the long-contemplated if ultimately panicky construction of the (then) peripheral “Native Location” of Ndabeni in 1903 (Map 5.2), putatively in response to a serious health epidemic (Swanson 1977), put the vexing question of “African urban space” at the heart of Cape Town’s overall urban agenda from the opening moments of the century (Saunders 1984a; 1984b). Arguably it has remained at this centre all along. This has stimulated an instructive, if still far from complete literature on the multiple consequences of Cape Town’s “Africanization” — from around 10,000 people in 1910 to perhaps 805,000 by 1996 (Wilson and Mafeje 1963; Silk 1981; Cole 1986; Kinkead-Weakes 1985, 1992; Fraser 1990; Cook 1992; Fast 1995, 1996; Mazur and Qangule 1996; Saff 1997). One consequence, of course, has been the concomitant “informalisation” of the built environment and urban economy over the same period of time. It is this consequence that is of interest here.

THE PRE-APARTHEID ERA: THE LANGA LOCATION AND STATE STRATEGY

The 1903 location at Ndabeni is historically significant because it was one of the first state-directed efforts to segregate the residential if not economic life of an urban African population in South Africa. But as project of racial segregation it was a failure. Ndabeni suffered from immediate financial neglect and was, as Fast (1995: 29) notes, “unfit for human habitation.” Far from employment loci, it was largely avoided by Africans, which worsened its financial viability.

Cape Town’s second major effort, the location at Langa, fared somewhat better but likewise failed as a project of segregation. Initiated in 1927, Langa proceeded upon the (then) liberal assumption that “…[legally resident] Africans would build their own homes and cultivate their own gardens” (Saunders 1984b: 195). But for all sort of reasons — low African wages; relatively expensive housing deliver; inadequate funding instruments; no freehold rights; inner city “slum lords” and industrialists who resisted the metro-level segregation of African workers; central and local authority haggling about financial and managerial responsibility (Kinkead-Weakes 1985) — this putative “African garden city” never materialized. In actor-network parlance, it was never stabilized as “a point of passage”

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2 Racial categories are always problematic, but especially so in Cape Town. Unusual for South Africa, Coloureds are the majority population in Cape Town (see Wilkinson 2000).
MAP 5.2  Key Urban Developments, 1901-1946, with ‘black spot’ activity in 1950 and Old Location in 1946

SOURCE: (Fast 1996); plate insert of Nyanga (AWC 3/48)

— limiting the State’s administrative power over African places and bodies (cf. Robinson 1991). Indeed, most Africans of this period found self-made shelter in racially mixed and unauthorized slums, or “black spots” in the language of the day, scattered haphazardly throughout the Cape Peninsula (Wilson and Mafeje 1963:4-5) (Map 5.2).
What would only later be labeled “informalisation” had therefore taken hold, not only in a land use sense but in an economic one too. Physically isolated, Cape Town’s black spots literally pulsed with all those unrecorded economic transactions that typically support the social reproduction of poor urban populations, then and now (Freidmann and Salguero 1988; Lomnitz 1997). Illegal beer brewing was especially prominent in this respect, as in other South African cities (La Hausse 1984); but other income-generating activities in the African economy, which probably involved women in greater numbers that men, also increasingly attracted official attention and consternation: namely, prostitution, food growing, animal husbandry and medicinal spiritualism (Preston-Whyte and Rogerson 1991).

Building state capacity

Black spots betrayed the uncoordinated, generally ineffectual nature of the young dominion’s early approaches to African urbanization (Mabin 1992). This was true not only in Cape Town but all across the newly created Union of South Africa. For while the infamous Native (Urban Areas) Act passed in 1923 ostensibly tightened up African urban location and movement de jure, the law remained largely unenforceable on the ground for many years (Davenport 1991). Further national legislation attempted to rectify this. The most notable legislation was the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937, which prohibited Africans from purchasing urban land from non-Africans, and the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, which defined anew those areas acceptable for African residence; strengthened ministerial power to build or demolish these areas; outlined the precise conditions under which Africans could work and reside in cities; restricted street trading; and thus established the basis for which Africans could be removed as “redundant” or “idle.”

Though necessary pre-conditions for segregationist intervention, little of this would have mattered absent a parallel expansion of practical-administrative capacity at the local level (cf. Maylam 1982). And that capacity was tied, in no small measure, to the broader, inter-war acceptance and rapid maturation of public planning and urban management as legitimate state-driven activities all across the world (Mazower 1998; Taylor 1999). This is a particularly crucial point. For here was the era when the space of the city first became a single, malleable project, a project of what Scott Lash (1999) now calls “deliberate rationality”: a transcendent, universal rationality of the (Western) same. In South Africa, as Parnell and Mabin (1995) note, all this was in one sense quite prosaic: fire-fighting, housing
finance, sewerage and storm water provision, disease prevention, and so on. But in another sense it was quite profound: "A general tendency which developed in [this] period," they conclude, "was for 'urban planning' to emerge as a panacea for urban problems" (p. 53). This involved a concern with best practice and ideal type. The new, white's-only Garden Village of Pinelands, immediately adjacent to Langa, was a case in point (Map 5.2). Practicing town planners in the late 1940s considered it "...a good example of positive planning in the past" in that it reversed "the speculator's gridiron suburb"; as such, it was "the ideal type of development to aim at" (Joint Town Planning Committee 1948: 9-13).\(^3\)

But the planners' problem and indeed that of the local state in general extended well beyond subversion of "the ideal type" by "the speculator's gridiron suburb." Urban management now meant peering into the increasingly intractable conundrum of African urban space. Often this meant informal space. By the early 1940s, when labour was in heavy demand again because of the war effort, at least 44,000 Africans resided in the immediate region; this was about 10% of the total metropolitan population (Fast 1995). 'Garden City' Langa was hopelessly inadequate for such figures. Extant black spots thus grew — and new ones emerged. So the challenge was overwhelming but prosaic: what to do both about the informalisation and Africanisation of the city, especially when they overlapped precisely? For the most part, managerial concern at this point in time focused on the built environment (though as mentioned earlier a concern with economic informality was growing). Typical of the time was a report from a local city engineer, who complained of "a contravention of Business Regulations no 836 and 937" in the form of "... a wooden spare structure 13'6" x 10' x 9' ... without sanction of Council used for human habitation...." (3/CT).

THE APARTHEID ERA: THE "MODEL TOWNSHIP" AND THE "TEMPORARY" AFRICAN

It was a thousand, daily "contraventions" like this one all across South Africa that contributed to the National Party's (NP) surprise victory in 1948. For the Union years had manifestly not stopped these contraventions. Indeed, one of the last major African housing initiatives of the Jan Smuts' era, the "Old Location" of what is today the township of

\(^3\) The original layout plan for Pinelands was prepared by a firm of architects who were also involved in the planning of Welwyn, one of England's first garden cities; furthermore, Howard's original idea of a self-administered trust fund was also attempted, though Pinelands was eventually transformed into a fairly traditional municipality.
Nyanga, probably contributed to even more contraventions, as had Ndabeni and Langa in earlier epochs (Map 5.2). The mistakes were the same. Though designed as sub-economic, few who lived in “a wooden spare structure 13'6" x 10' x 9’” — the targeted beneficiaries — could realistically afford the new housing in Nyanga, which also ostensibly followed transcendent, universal garden city principles (AWC 3/48). Those who could were not squatters, of course, but the already housed, which invariably generated corruption in allocation (Fast 1995). So mixed-race “black spots” continued to proliferate across the metropole into the 1950s.

For a modernizing regime now committed ideologically to racial classification and Group Areas principles, this would not do (O’Meara 1996: 41).4 Within ten years of coming to power, and with the draconian Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 now on the books, Cape Town’s ubiquitous “black spots” were all but removed: “Cook’s Bush has already been entirely cleared of Natives,” one local official reported, “Turner’s Bush is now being operated on and should be shortly cleared, and after that there will virtually be only two fair sized pockets of Native Squatters to be cleared, i.e. in Jackel’s Vlei and Raapkraal…” (4/CT 112). In itself, this was not an unusual application of state power in the 1950s; such strategies were common in many countries. However, the 1952 Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act appreciably tightened up African influx control procedures inherited from the previous government and, in 1955, the Western Cape was declared a “Coloured Labour Preference Area,” which in turn meant that African labour was in theory to disappear steadily from the metropole’s economic structure (Simon 1984, 1989). Given the American Civil Rights movement of the same period and, much more importantly, the relatively rapid de-colonization of Asia and Africa, this was unusual. The urban spatiality of race and labour in South Africa was now heading in a radically different direction.

The precarious spatiality of urban apartheid

The Coloured Labour Preference Area politicised and spatialised the nature of labour as never before. But it too would be difficult to engineer, much less maintain. One reason was

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4 The new apartheid government pushed through the Population Registration Act in 1950, which required people to be identified and registered from birth as belonging to one of four distinct racial groups and was more rigid than earlier race classification laws. Similarly, the 1950 Group Areas Act No 41 provided for areas to be declared for exclusive use of one particular racial group, as classified in the Population Registration Act.
because of unceasing pressure for African workers from organizations like the Cape Chamber of Industries and from Western Cape farms (Muthien 1987). Private interests often diverged from those of the state. Despite this, permanent African urbanization would not be officially accepted by the apartheid state until 1979, and even then African freehold rights in Cape Town would not be granted until 1985, when a new giant township node called Khayelitsha — of which more presently — was under construction (Map 5.1).

In the intervening years, the African family in Cape Town was in serious trouble. This is revealed in a September, 1955 memorandum from the new Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr. Werner Eiselin, to Cape Town’s skeptical town clerk (who really only wanted fresh funds for site and service schemes):

After all the natives now living in the various squatter camps have been concentrated under proper control in the [proposed] emergency camp all those [African] families in accordance with policy who are not entitled to be in the area will be repatriated and approved houses will be built for those who quality under Section 10 of the Act [of 1945] to remain in the urban area. The type of house should be capable of conversion to single quarters in order that when the declared long-term policy of replacing married natives by migratory workers is put into effect, the conversion will be a simple and inexpensive operation. Similarly the buildings can be converted into family dwellings should the native migratory labour ultimately be replaced by Coloureds.5

The material landscape of African urban space steadily instantiated this ideologically-constituted planning discourse, as Map 5.3 of Nyanga shows. From the garden city pretensions of the “Old Location” in 1946, much of Nyanga was by 1962 — at least in administrative discourse — a “transit camp” for putatively migratory Africans. With the black spots (momentarily) cleared, more “family housing” would be built for legally resident African families, especially in Guguletu, a new “model native township” (Cape Argus 1953) that grew out of the transit camp in Nyanga (Map 5.1). But once again this housing was to be “capable of conversion to single quarters.” And in 1966 even this “family housing” was stopped, a victim of the state’s latest diktat that Western Cape employers should finally and truly reduce dependence on African labour 5% every year, until all such labour was unnecessary. In a 1967 Master Plan for the Cape Flats, “Bantu townships” are barely mentioned (Joint Town Planning Committee 1967). African space was being discursively eliminated within hegemonic representations of urban apartheid. More practically, there was

5 AWC 2/26 copy of Cape Town City Council memorandum from Ministry of Native Affairs labelled 77/313 (C) (1) dated 10/9/55.
quite literally fewer and fewer 'places' — fewer accounts; fewer master plans; fewer memorandums — to budget or to visualize an African future in Cape Town.

MAP 5.3 Nyanga, c. 1962

Or so it seemed. The urban spatiality of apartheid was far more precarious than it appeared. By 1972, when the central government desperately took over the direct administration of African townships from local authorities, the urban plans of the 1950s and 1960s had already begun to unravel, and at precisely the historical moment when the high GDP growth of the 1960s (5.9% per annum) faltered, as it did in many parts of the world in
the 1970s. Of immediate concern for the State was that Nyanga and Guguletu struggled mightily with adequate hostel development, eventually sub-contracting projects to large private employers of African labour (Divisional Council of the Cape 1971; see also AWC 2/26). Much of this privately constructed hostel accommodation was so bad that male migrants, separated from their families, had to build shacks inside them “...in an attempt to keep out the cold and provide some privacy” (Wilson 1977: 123). Coupled with the fact that local authorities no longer made any financial contributions, the environmental quality of these townships deteriorated precipitously (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). Here was an almost perfect formula for large-scale squatting.

The squatting came, swiftly reversing the “anti-black spot” initiatives of the 1950s and blowing large holes in the urban meshwork of apartheid modernity. In 1974 there were some 115,000 “legally” housed Africans in the metropole — but as many as 30,000 total squatters (Fraser 1990: 2-4). By 1977 the figure was perhaps 50,000 squatters (Western 1981: 278). The economic geography of this squatting was instructive. Although overall unemployment was on the rise (Sunday Times 2/9/79), and the newly christened “informal sector” was now mushrooming, squatter households were mostly employed and in the traditional sense of this term. Ellis et al. (1977) found that 79% of squatter households surveyed in 1977 had at least one member who was employed “formally.” Maree and Connell (1977) found similar patterns. (Indeed, it was this formal sector employment that provided much of the raw cash to stimulate informal sector supply). Despite this, and indeed the State’s own failures at housing provision for both African and legally favored Coloured workers, the government closed legal loopholes which had momentarily saved squatter camps and brought in the bulldozer (South African Outlook 1975, 1977). The results were predictably tragic (Plate 5.1).
A spatial impasse?

The bulldozer only fell silent at Crossroads, a squatter camp of (then) 20,000 located near Nyanga. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is the extraordinary resistance associated with Crossroads, arguably the most effective in South Africa’s resistance-rich urban history (NUSAS 1978; CTCC 1977; Cole 1986). The second reason is that times had changed. The silent bulldozer symbolized a major shift in African urbanization policy first signaled in 1979, with the (accepted) recommendations of the Rieckert Commission; as alluded to earlier, the Rieckert Commission finally recognized the principle of permanent African urban residence.6 It also sought to develop an African “middle class” as a buffer against radical actors within the urban polity, which initially meant lease-hold rights for a select few and, through the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, a certain measure of local political autonomy.

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6 Ironically, this was what the Smuts government’s Fagan Commission had recommended thirty years earlier. See O’Meara (1996: 273).
This new urbanization policy also meant a fresh, fairly sustained period of significant state-funded African housing developments, the first in a generation. In the early 1980s, this development took place in Cape Town near Nyanga and Crossroads. A new housing scheme, called New Crossroads, filled up the undeveloped land just west of the Old Location (see Map 5.3). Here the African family was back on the map. Like all maps, however, this one had a particular ideological topography, as indicated by comments made by Dr. Piet Koornhof, an institutional successor to Dr. Werner Eiselin:

If the people in the [N]ew Crossroads prove themselves to be responsible people, if they look after their jobs, if they build up their families in a proper way and look after them, if they are not criminals and vagrants, they can stay until their deaths. They can stay [in New Crossroads] forever (cited in Surplus People's Project 1984: 27).

Arguably, Koornhof was attempting in such power plays nothing less than to co-construct African site and African subject, a symmetrical maneuver symptomatic of apartheid state activity. But even this paternalistic magnanimity proved ephemeral. Reversing what was technically more efficient “in-fill development” in New Crossroads, in 1983 P.W. Botha’s government announced the mass construction of Khayelitsha, a sprawling, 3,220 hectare “super-township” of four main towns located about 35 kilometers southwest of the Cape Town CBD, well outside the then extant urban fringe (Dewar and Watson 1984).

Importantly, it was only in 1985 that the fantastic idea of moving all of Cape Town’s Africans (including those in Langa, Nyanga, Guguletu, Crossroads and other nearby squatter camps, such as Brown’s Farm and Philippi) to Khayelitsha — at least 280,000 people and probably more — was dropped (Cook 1992). Thereafter, and on through the 1994 elections that famously brought Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) to power, attention focused mainly on squatter camp “roll-over” schemes, as for example in Crossroads and KTC (another 1980s-era squatter camp located north of New Crossroads); on upgrading extant housing stock and services; and on promoting “community development” projects (creches, parks, etc.) in the formal townships (AWC 16/1/4/3), particularly with private sector sponsorship. Part and parcel of “community development” was an emerging interest in the urban informal sector, of which more below (VKE 1988; CTCC 1985). Lest it be forgotten, however, much of this activity, including belated support for the informal sector, was part and parcel of P.W. Botha’s five-year, one billion rand
"hearts-and-minds" initiative (Tapsott 1995: 181-86). It coincided with some of the most violent years in South African urban history, including a state of emergency, an international boycott and a general collapse in local authority efficacy in African areas. The two — urban development and political agency — were intimately related with one another.7

LEGACIES

More will be said later in this thesis in regard to the African communities briefly introduced here, particularly New and Old Crossroads, KTC, Nyanga and Brown’s Farm-Philippi. For the moment, however, three key points — which also constitute legacies — need emphasis before moving on to discuss the post-apartheid institutional context. The first point is that informalization and Africanization gravely threatened two related but distinct discourses struggling for efficacy in Cape Town over this period of time. Informalisation threatened the incipient urban planning imaginary which assumed that the space of the modern city was more-or-less malleable and that, accordingly, future development could be pre-figured through the production and maintenance of stable spatialities (the “ideal types”; the garden cities; the building codes, etc). Africanization, of course, threatened apartheid modernity itself, especially in Cape Town after 1955 (Nesvåg 2000).

This leads to the second point. Apartheid modernity — apartheid history — emerged through the symmetrical construction of different scales, through the production of different “places” — all linked up spatially and dialectically. Constitutive of the Coloured Labour Preference Area, for example, was the pre-apartheid and apartheid Cape “metropole,” which in turn worked only through the construction of particular kinds of African “nodes” (“model township”-as-transit camps) and, tied up with these nodes, particular kinds of African subjectivities (migratory males). Before that, segregated Cape Town in the 1930s emerged through inter alia the production of Langa, which in turn emerged through the production of “non-redundant” or “non-idle” African subjectivities; finally, late apartheid

7For example, the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape secretly placed the overall upgrading of KTC (and Crossroads) in the explicit service of the national security project. All upgrading efforts, it demanded, should: “Ensure that radical groups do not claim the initiative [sic] for the upgrading; Obtain unanimity with regards to upgrading; Prevent negative reaction regarding up-grading from Black residents; Prevent orchestrated action against planned upgrading development” (AWC 6/9/1/10/7 S).
Cape Town spawned New Crossroads and the concomitant production of "responsible people."

The third and final point is that all this failed — and decisively so. Despite at times monumental effort to engineer a particular, socio-physical urban order of people and places and things — despite the accretion of legal statutes; the circulation of ideologically-laden memoranda; the policing of passbooks; the privatisation of hostel construction; the violence of bulldozers and bullets; and, indeed, a visual and communicative apparatus of budgets and master plans (amongst other 'heterogeneous' materials) — informalisation blew apart the planned city just as Africanization below apart the apartheid one. It is possible, of course, to cite a host of "reasons" for this failure, to "explain" through long lists: the poverty of the planning ideas themselves; the weakness of the local planning system vis-à-vis the market; vastly divergent material interests; the profound stimulus and "gravity-like" characteristics of urban agglomeration; centre-local urban management tensions; and large-scale and unremitting African defiance. Indeed, both the urban historical and historical geographical literatures on Cape Town weigh up these factors in great detail (Davenport 1991; Fast 1996).

But the details miss, it might be argued, a larger insight. From the perspective of actor-network theory, development is about the dialectical construction and stabilisation of heterogeneous topologies across scale (i.e. new spaces) that, in turn, demand constant, unrelenting maintenance and a certain amount of submission. More, the threat of resistance or alternative enrolment — in other spaces and indeed other historical trajectories — is constant and everywhere. More simply, "things fall apart," as Chinua Achebe (1958) famously phrased it. For "disbelief," to co-opt de Certeau (1985), is both everywhere and active: African subjects march against passbooks technologies; clever lawyers exploit legal loopholes; town clerks drag their feet on national diktats; buildings decay in the harsh rain and wind of the Cape Flats; squatting contravenes the regulated city; and, indeed, 'informal sector' counter-identities are forged (cf. Nesvåg 2000).

March; exploit; drag; decay; counter. In the face of this ubiquitous disengagement, then, a new, post-apartheid urban project was urgently needed. This new project had to tap into, mobilise and stabilise (to deploy de Certeau once again) a new, presumably more acceptable set of "beliefs" in the service of a new, presumably more acceptable urban spatiality and the New Temples that would mark the symbolic landscape of that spatiality.
Part of this emerged from the global euphoria of post-1989 democratisation — with Mandela's long-awaited release from prison finally coming in February 1990. But by the mid-1990s, the specific syntax of Cape Town's post-apartheid urban geography was increasingly clear. This geography would draw on statistics and other forms of planning representations in order to build a new kind of urban project. And as in the past, though to very different ends, African survival was caught up in the spatialities of this project.

5.2
Black Metropolitan Cape Town in the 1990s: a socio-spatial profile

The post-apartheid urban challenge was unquestionably daunting. Cape Town spent the better part of a hundred years wasting the latent talents of too many people. Socio-economic data relating specifically to the metropole in the mid-1990s underscore this point. The median personal income of Cape Town's economically active whites (about 21% of the metropolitan population) was in 1996 three times higher than the median personal income of economically active Coloureds (50% of the population) and eleven times higher than the median personal income of economically active Africans (27% of the population). Only about 8% of economically active whites in Cape Town earned less than R12,500 per annum, whereas the figures were 25% for Coloureds and 57% for Africans. Only 5% of Cape Town's economically active white males were without work in 1996, whereas 50% of economically active African females had no formal job. Similarly, economically active white females were five times less likely to be unemployed than economically active African men (CMC 1999a). These figures simply open up the structure of Metropolitan Cape Town's labour market in the 1990s, summarized in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 shows that in percentage terms a few sub-sectors within the formal labour market had grown, such as finance. In contrast, certain key sectors such as manufacturing had declined, not least due to capital deepening (CMC 1998b). However, the most obvious economic shift from 1980 to 1996 was the steady expansion in unemployment, from 6% to 18%, and more particularly the explosion in (identifiable) "informal" sector jobs, from 9% to 17.4%, where the informal sector is defined in this data set as "business activities not registered for taxation." Figures for both years likely under-estimated the total numbers (see Tomlinson 1996). Moreover, as already discussed in chapter II, many unemployed people
also typically engage in ad hoc informal activities (Cross and Bekker 1999), complicating the numerical dichotomy presented here.

TABLE 5.1 Labour Force Structure in Cape Town, 1980 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>% total</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>% total</th>
<th>Wage index AVE=100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1,523</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td>5,885</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>12,566</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
<td>15,180</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>56,509</td>
<td>6.36%</td>
<td>61,507</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>56,335</td>
<td>6.34%</td>
<td>61,731</td>
<td>4.41%</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>43,655</td>
<td>4.91%</td>
<td>75,062</td>
<td>5.36%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>135,165</td>
<td>15.21%</td>
<td>198,320</td>
<td>14.17%</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>183,719</td>
<td>20.67%</td>
<td>227,904</td>
<td>16.29%</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>217,723</td>
<td>24.49%</td>
<td>252,803</td>
<td>18.07%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Informal&quot;</td>
<td>125,788</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>244,000</td>
<td>17.44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMPLOYED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>50,315</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>18.21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>888,899</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1,399,378</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: CMC (1998a Tables 2.1.1 and 2.1.3); CMC (1998b, Figure 1)

Conservatively, then, by 1996 probably more than one-fifth of the officially estimated labour force of the metropole was engaged in informal sector activity of some kind. Remarkably, this constituted a larger percentage of the metropolitan labour force than
services, trade and very likely manufacturing. Most of this was in retailing. Indeed, at the end of a century notable for the discourse of economic modernization and industrialization, the Cape Metropolitan Council (1998b: 9) concluded that, along with globalization, technology and telecommunications, human capital investments and public empowerment programmes, “informal sector growth” was one of major “underlying forces” shaping the spatial structure of the city, depicted in Map 5.4 below.

MAP 5.4 “Levels of Living” in Metropolitan Cape Town

SOURCE: CMC (1997a)
Drawn from Cape Town’s own spatial self-representation, the GIS ‘frames’ in Map 5.4 communicate a “layered,” inter-locking and mutually reinforcing urban geography of [a] African poverty; [b] African unemployment; [c] inadequate African human capital accumulation; and [d] African over-crowding. That is, these frames re-present materialized instantiations of the income and employment relationships outlined above. The sea of red, largely though by no means exclusively captured within the three ever more expansive, ever more peripheral regions of African urban space, are labeled the “worst off 20%” or “next worse 20%” in all four categories of analysis. A far more didactic way to capture what these numbers mean is to randomly excavate local newspaper headlines at the turn of the millennium (Box 5.1). For Cape Town’s urban authorities, these circles (and the headlines they generate) constituted one of the greatest socio-spatial challenges to urban development in the metropole. Part and parcel of this challenge was, of course, finding a new institutional apparatus through which to occasion a progressively just urban space.

**BOX 5.1 Stories on Cape Town’s ‘Southeast,’ 2000-2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army called in to help patrol Hanover Park</td>
<td>2001-02-16 10:09:152.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two arrested for motorist’s N2 killing</td>
<td>2001-02-16 10:03:283.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precious wetland buried under tons of rubble</td>
<td>2001-02-02 11:00:277.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Dad lay dying on N2 as cops refused to help'</td>
<td>2001-01-25 16:07:359.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents to be charged if kids play truant</td>
<td>2001-01-23 00:53:3311.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five hurt as cops fire at striking guards</td>
<td>2000-12-22 19:51:5212.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads blaze leaves 75 homeless</td>
<td>2000-12-20 15:58:2113.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man stoned to death in Cape suburb</td>
<td>2000-12-20 12:32:0214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train driver traumatised by four deaths</td>
<td>2000-12-12 10:28:4116.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Shooting spree' cop wants time to explain</td>
<td>2000-11-14 20:46:05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Random search on Independent Online (http://www.iol.co.za)
5.3

The institutional setting the 1990s: Re-engaging Black Metropolitan Cape Town

At the local level in places like Black Metropolitan Cape Town, the socio-spatial challenge — the reconstruction of urban space — required new planning strategies at all scales and new institutional arrangements to carry out these strategies. The planning strategies will be considered in greater detail in chapters VI, VI and VIII, in particular where they involve the African informal food sector. The remainder of this chapter, however, first considers the new institutional arrangements for these strategies. In particular, the focus is on the local authority level, albeit within the context of national legislative and policy priorities. The discussion thus starts with the stage-setting backdrop of the so-called LED turn of the 1980s and 1990s, which informed the local institutional arrangements of the post-apartheid era. Attention then shifts to what South Africans now call developmental local governance (DLG).

LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As discussed briefly in section 5.1, apartheid policies profoundly warped the character and structure of Cape Town’s labour markets, overall spatial structure and local authority capabilities, especially in regard to Black Metropolitan Cape Town. But major transformations in the global political economy after the 1970s were also important in shaping the urban strategies of the 1990s. Mandela’s new government had to confront the legacies of apartheid and a new global order, an order wherein the “problematisation” of the urban condition and its possibilities had been discursively reshaped through, amongst other things, the putative promise of local economic development (LED) (Beall et al. 1999).

The Global LED Debate

Widespread job losses in the Anglo-American and European manufacturing sectors — ostensibly occasioned by globalising, post-Fordist production geographies — precipitated a whole new “Northern” debate in the 1980s about the appropriate responsibilities and long-term potentialities of local government institutions (Peterson 1981; Logan and Molotch 1987; Hall and Hubbard 1996). Previously such local institutions had not been particularly prominent vis-à-vis strategies of economic development and social change (Harvey 1989). At the heart of this new “Northern” debate was and remains a strong emphasis on local
economic development as both conceived and organized at the scale of the hypothetically nimble and enterprising locality (Defilippis 1999). Though a complex and multifaceted issue, this “Northern” LED discourse soon focused on locally-constructed collective action dedicated principally to the retention and addition of employment opportunities through the use of existing (and leveraged) human, natural, and institutional resources (Blakely 1989).

Placing emphasis on the new, “enterprising” local actors LED supposedly binds together as part and parcel of this collective action, John Lovering (1995: 110-111, emphasis added) usefully highlights the one crucial assumption of the overall “LED turn”:

The policy emphasis [of LED] is on the need to construct new social networks linking key local economic and political actors. If these important groups *can get their act together*, so the story goes … a new era of urban economic growth may be anticipated. [...] This in turn creates a convergence of interests between capital, labour and other local constituencies.

Lovering argues that this key LED assumption leads to a misguided obsession with “creating discourses rather than jobs.” Healey (1995) likewise emphasizes the discursive dimension of LED initiatives. But she sees this dimension in a very different light. With specific respect to strategic development plans — of which more in chapter VI — Healey celebrates the constitutive and coordinating nature of LED’s discursive dimension, highlighting through Giddensian social theory its constructivist utility in seeking conscious urban transformation:

[The development plan’s] conceptions offer structuring ideas and its policy criteria offer decision rules through which influence is exerted on the development of resources. It thus “carries structure” and to agency and, in use, its reinterpretation remolds the structuring forces embedded within it (p. 255).

**The LED debate in Cape Town**

As these important “Northern” debates about LED discourse and conceptions thickened, and they are important to keep in mind henceforth, the parallel development of a “Southern” LED debate was also set in motion, particularly where this involved public-private partnerships, financial decentralization, and more effective state engagement with the “third sector” of non-governmental organizations (World Bank 1991; Zaaijer and Sara 1993; Payne 1999; Kombe and Kreibich 2000). This can be seen, for example, in the specific case of Cape Town (Rogerson 1999). Suffering from stagnant manufacturing growth (Table 5.1), an LED-focused urban development discourse was already visible at the local authority level
in Cape Town by the mid-1980s, though it was only superficially related to impoverished African communities then at the centralizing core of P.W. Botha’s late apartheid urban reforms (CTCC 1986a, 1986b).

By the early 1990s, however, LED language vis-à-vis (Black Metropolitan) Cape Town was *de rigueur* (CTCC 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b; cf. Maharaj and Ramballi 1996). And as in the “Northern” discourse, the language of Cape Town’s new LED initiatives focused heavily on the re-definition and thus re-location of local government responsibilities and capabilities: viz. from service provision to “place-making”; from regulation to “investment”; from mutually exclusive dualities (state versus market) to institutional hybrids and symmetries (“public-private partnerships”) — all in the service of much needed local employment creation. The LED “problemisation” of the urban condition and its strategic possibilities as conceived in the North had thus decisively penetrated the Cape Town debate. The trouble, however, was that institutions and strategies went hand-in-hand. The illegitimacy of the former meant that the latter had to await a democratically constituted post-apartheid polity at all scales. Accordingly, a sense of this new, post-apartheid polity is now needed.

**“PRE-INTERIM” LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND LED, 1995-1996**

South Africa’s interim 1993 constitution, and the closely related Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) of the same year, successfully identified the road to a post-apartheid democratic society. (Indeed, here was the institutional basis for the widely admired South African “miracle” of the early 1990s.) At the local level, the road was to be taken in three main stages: “pre-interim” (1994-1996), “interim” (1996-1999/2000) and “final” (2000-onwards). But in 1993 the journey was inevitably schematic, particularly around the politically and racially charged extent of devolution and autonomy (Cameron 1995); it also disproportionately reflected the apprehensions of a dying but still formidable National Party apparatus (Pycroft 1996). As part of its “pre-interim phase,” then, the LGTA left much, if not all of the local political geography of late apartheid basically untouched. From 1994 to 1996, for example, predominantly African areas in Cape Town — including large communities such as Khayelitsha (440,000), Guguletu (109,500) and Nyanga (77,000) —

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*Dave Gretton (1995), a local economic development official, writes that the first serious LED document in Cape Town was the “Corporate City Plan for Cape Town” formulated in 1986. Amongst other things, this plan established an Economic Development Planning Unit within the Town Planning Branch of City Planning Department.*
remained under the precarious jurisdiction of “transitional” Black Local Authorities (BLAs), which as previously mentioned had been created in 1982 by the Apartheid State (Shubane 1992).

Four such BLAs existed in Cape Town well into 1996: Crossroads, Mfuleni, Lingelitu West and Ikapa. Ostensibly responsible for local service delivery and administration, land use planning and “community development,” massive arrears from years of rent boycotts (R1.8 billion nationally by late 1993); inadequate cross-subsidies; corruption; and wholly insufficient tax bases left these much maligned entities little more than financial, administrative and developmental “shells,” incapable of technical maintenance much less urban transformation (ANC 1994). Indeed, many non-BLA entities, such as the Western Cape Provincial Administration (formerly the Cape Provincial Administration) and the Cape Metropolitan Council (formerly the Regional Services Council) were directly involved in both the conception and management of African urban development programmes, including core service provision and low-income housing and land servicing (Awotona and Briggs 1995; PAWC 1993, 1994). This supra-local intervention was necessitated by BLA incapacity.

Partially legitimized by the April, 1994 national elections, however, which brought Mandela’s ANC to power, but more especially by transitional local elections in February, 1995, Cape Town’s four BLAs — armed with newly energized mayors but old administrative structures — attempted to strengthen traditional service and infrastructure delivery in order to end the financially crippling rates boycotts of the apartheid years, in part through new grants funneled through the ANC’s first Municipal Infrastructure Programme (Strategic Management Plan 1996; see also Burger 1999; Tomlinson 1996: 53).9 But they also attempted, often for the first time, “participatory LED” (Wesgro 1995; Chetty 1995). Sometimes both were launched concomitantly, as for example in efforts to restructure household refuse provision in order to promote local employment opportunities and local capital sedimentation (Dierwechter and Macdonald 1996). On the whole, however, these early “pre-interim” efforts suffered from a loud dissonance between late apartheid institutional form and early post-apartheid planning process. Locally-driven urban development remained hard. Despite a national government putatively committed to

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9 Due to intense demarcation disputes, local elections in the Western Cape were later than in the rest of the country.
massive poverty alleviation through housing construction and service delivery, improvements in education and basic needs provision, promised harmonies remained difficult to orchestrate.\(^\text{10}\)

**DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND INTERIM LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 1996-2000**

This began to change in 1996, though only slowly, during the “interim” stage of transition towards “final” post-apartheid local authorities. Following the adoption of the 1996 constitution, Cape Town’s BLAs were amalgamated into new, multi-racial, much larger and relatively better equipped local authorities (LAs). This was a dramatic rationalization. From thirty-nine smaller, racially defined entities in 1994, Cape Town now had only six LAs and one metropolitan-wide authority, the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC). Thus Lingelethu West (the BLA that governed Khayelitsha) and Mfuleni (an adjacent BLA) were incorporated with historically white and Coloured communities into the new City of Tygerberg; similarly, Ikapa (which included Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga) and the Crossroads BLA joined the City of Cape Town (Map 5.5).

This political amalgamation meant, amongst other things, an immediate improvement in administrative capacity, planning and management expertise, at least from the point of view of a long-suffering local African leadership (Ngcuka, pers. com.). But it also brought together a more diverse body politic; different traditions of “doing development,” especially in regard to local and national organs of civil society (for example, white ratepayer associations versus broad-based African development forums); an onerous clause in the 1993 LGTA, which required a two-thirds majority for budgetary decisions; and, putting intense pressure on all of the above, vastly disparate constituent needs (as earlier outlined). Most serious, however, was the financial squeeze this political amalgamation placed on these interim local authorities (Business Day 11/04/96). For whilst the former BLA areas required large-scale attention, they obviously offered little in the way of financial resources — and cross-subsidization and redistributive taxation had its political limits. As one local planner wearily put it in 1999: “This is my life. I have to fight off the masses at the front

\(^{10}\)In no small measure this was due to an awkward, sometimes violent institutional arrangement whereby 50% of councillors were appointed as statutory members (culled from existing apartheid-era BLAs) whilst the other half were appointed as non-statutory members (culled from activists, civic associations etc). The deputy mayor of Lingelethu West, for instance, was shot and killed only two weeks into the new dispensation.
MAP 5.5  “Interim” Local Authority Jurisdictions and major African communities (1996-2000): Cities of Cape Town and Tygerberg (Solid) and Cape Metropolitan Council (Dotted)

SOURCE: Based on CMC (1997a)
door that are demanding services, equity, redistribution, etc. And on the other hand, I am trying to protect, if you like, a budget that has too many holes that need to be filled” (Olivier 1999: 35).\textsuperscript{11}

Such institutional and financial complexity, characteristic of any new governing body, was compounded by two additional, uniquely South African factors. First, soon after the establishment of these “interim” LAs, national discussion quickly turned to the demarcation of “final” LAs for 2001 and thereafter (Business Day 12/10/97). Within this context, the contiguous Metropolitan Cape Town region — the exact jurisdiction of the “interim” Cape Metropolitan Council — was now increasingly discussed as a probable “megacity,” that is, as a metropolitan area that would come under only one local authority: the Cape Metropolitan Council itself (Business Day 19/12/97). Megacities were to have a single metropolitan budget and common systems of property rating and service tariffs. Given the institutional patchwork of urban apartheid, this was a significant transformation, but one that occasioned as much frustration as excitement. “We’ve just warmed up our chairs,” one CMC official fretted in mid-1999, “and now all these changes again [...] It’s distracting us from delivery. Where’s the delivery?” (Romanovsky, interview). Although the megacity solution was not finalized for Cape Town until the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) and the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) that emerged from it, both in 1998, Cape Town’s six “interim” LA’s had to plan LED increasingly with self-extinction in mind (Gretton 1995).

Second, new clauses in the 1996 Local Government Transition Act (Second Amendment Act) required municipal councils to “…formulate and implement a metropolitan integrated development plan incorporating land use planning, transport planning, infrastructure planning and the promotion of integrated economic development” (RSA 1996). This was high-principled; but integrated development plans (IDPs) were far easier to legislate than to implement (FCR 1999). The government the same year initiated a Decentralised Development Planning (DDP) Project to support the institutional aspects of local IDP processes (GTZ 2000). But administration and budgeting procedures had long followed sector-focused delivery systems — and “different sectors [continued] to pursue

\textsuperscript{11} This was true everywhere in the country. David Solomon wrote in 1997 (Mail and Guardian 13/5/97) that “[t]he existing tax base of largely commercial, industrial and white-owned residential properties, was barely adequate for the needs of the white community in the apartheid era. It now falls far short of the need to develop the drastically neglected black townships.”

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their self-interest in a fairly narrow way (FCR 1999). Old performances died hard. Moreover, official and non-official “development plans” of all kinds, including ones for UIS development, were coming fast and furious and from a host of local and non-local actors: viz. community-based organs within civil society; trade unions; non-governmental organizations; private sector investors; national ministries. Indeed, a late 1990s inventory revealed that 107 public, private and non-governmental institutions (two-thirds founded after 1980) were delivering LED-related services (CMC 2000a).

In the bright light of a successful political transition, in other words, a thousand flowers bloomed; invariably strategic coordination and project prioritization proved difficult. As part of its macro-level poverty-alleviation framework, called the Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC 1994), the national government alone passed more than five hundred acts between 1994 and 1999 — about two each week. Many impacted urban development issues. The national government launched new, complex policies in housing and water supply in 1994 (RSA 1994a, 1994b); a new national strategy for the development and promotion of small businesses in 1995 (RSA 1994c); large privatization of parastatals to help pay for these new policies the same year; and, also in 1995, the Development Facilitation Act, which required LAs to establish equitable, “progressive” land development objectives. Finally, in late 1999 the Ministry for Provincial and Local Government launched the LED Fund and the Social Plan Fund (Regenerating Local Economies Programme), both of which provided central financial support for local authority projects related directly to job creation and poverty alleviation (Burger 2000). Through the hypothetically nimble instrument of local-level IDPs, of course, all this was (somehow) to cohere, “synergize,” and promote integrated economic development (Beall et al. 1999).

Put differently, Cape Town’s local authorities were now being asked to become, as Parnell and Pieterse efficiently summarize it (1998: 15-16), “…the primary development champion, the major conduit for poverty alleviation, the guarantor of social and economic rights, the enabler of economic growth, the principal agent of spatial or physical planning and the watchdog of environmental justice.” All this, moreover, in addition to ensuring financially sustainable bread-and-butter services like water, electricity, sanitation and refuse collection. Indeed, this new activist role was codified formally as “Developmental Local Governance” in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), wherein four major
domains of local authority responsibility were now identified: maximizing social development and economic growth; integrating and coordinating disparate agencies, departments and plans across scales; democratising development; and finally "leading and learning," which meant finding, building and maintaining effective institutional networks between state and society in the service of sustainable urban development.

"Developmental local governance" thus subsumed LED, but also linked it more explicitly to a wider set of political and social values intimately associated with legitimizing post-apartheid society. This was not simply urban policy work — fairly easily reversed or abandoned after a few years of heady experimentation. This went to the heart of the New South African experiment. Indeed, according to Section 152 of the 1996 Constitution, a municipality like Cape Town was now constitutionally required to: "(a) structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community; and (b) participate in national and provincial development programmes" (RSA 1996, chapter 7). The CMC (2000b: 10) at least took this responsibility to heart, framing its LED research agenda in terms the "...services required to fulfill local government's constitutional obligations." Here was, in other words — and more theoretical language may now be appropriate — the state as a collective agent of societal reconstruction assertively engaged in the translation of a local authority actor. A new spatial ordering was in the offing. A new history was in the making. And so here too were new roles, new identities and new expectations.

5.4
Conclusions

The three empirical chapters that now follow will excavate the implications of this new spatial ordering, this attempt to make a new history, in one particular sector of the post-apartheid urban economy: the (in)formal food distribution system as experienced in predominantly African communities of the Cape Metropolitan area. Following the main research questions posed by this thesis, special attention will focus on the intended development of this sector, principally as advanced through local planning technologies and within the new institutional and strategic context just outlined. However, the main themes
advanced in this chapter regarding the nexus between history, urban space and African informality need brief extension here.

The temptation is to conclude with an emphasis on spatial and historical continuity, rather than discontinuity, between the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. (Put practically, the spatiality of African survival will go largely "untransformed.") Several recent discussions of South Africa's overall societal transition temper enthusiasm for political and institutional change with deep pessimism about prospects for significant economic and social change. Hein Marais (1998: 1), for instance, "questions not only the inevitability but also the likelihood" of significant post-apartheid transformation, including transformation of the burgeoning urban informal sector (cf. Saul 1993; Murray 1994). Similarly, Patrick Bond (2000) sees much of the 1990s as a neo-liberal betrayal of the anti-apartheid struggle — amounting to little more than "an elite transition." On such accounts, the new spatial ordering intimated above can only be superficial, with any new history emerging from truly transformed spatialities occluded by what they see as the all-important economic base.

As it turns out, and as shall be shown in the coming pages, there is a case for spatial and historical continuity, at least with respect to the UIS, but not for the heavily structuralist reasons offered by Marais or Bond. For if history is, in fact, the geography that people make then a different kind of theorization is needed — one that actually attends much more closely to what Lefebvre (1991: 40) calls "the production process," and to what actor-network theorists think of as "network-weaving." Can the UIS be developed? One of the Big Ideas of the post-apartheid urban planning imaginary is that, yes, it can if — at long last — it is "integrated" into the conscious geometry of city-space. Specifically, the assumption is that a new, more unified urbanism can emerge through the proliferation of a new, more appropriate set of "beliefs" — DLG, mixed use, entrepreneurship. For the practices that we call development," as Vincent Tucker (1999: 3) puts it, "depend on shared beliefs rather than on nature or destiny." Such beliefs will not simply move through Cape Town like mist. They have to be instantiated in real places, in real subjects, with real policies. Apartheid urban space failed profoundly. Things fell apart. This chapter has shown that "African informality" was one of the reasons why. Will the new set of "beliefs" associated with the post-apartheid Cape polity occasion something quite different?
Within the new institutional context of developmental local governance, South Africa’s first post-apartheid government could talk with more legitimacy about UIS policies and plans. Registering the growing influence of LED, moreover, the new government could place more rhetorical emphasis on small business support (ANC 1994). That fit the 1990s. UIS policies and plans nested comfortably within the larger discourse of “micro-enterprise development” (RSA 1994c). Such development involved regulatory, financial and legal reforms. But it also involved the urban built environment. One early national statement, for example, highlighted the profound neglect of African communities specifically in terms of “…basic services and road infrastructure in commercial and industrial areas, facilities for fresh produce and other markets, industrial incubator structures…and appropriate business zoning and planning processes” (RSA 1994c: 24). It was the task of local authorities, the statement continued, to redress this neglect, especially in regard to those “micro-enterprise” activities that dominated South Africa’s post-apartheid UIS. This implied a new planning agenda.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an empirical analysis of Cape Town’s new planning agenda. Specifically, the focus here is on some of the urban plans and development policies designed to transform (directly and indirectly and at different urban scales) the spatiality of informal food distribution in African communities. As suggested in chapter III, plans and policies, as well as the ordinary dialogues and discussions about
them, are “representations” that are crucial to the production of space. For plans and policies are not simply mimetic “reflections” of spatial practices. They are related to spatial practices. But representations of space are, following Henri Lefebvre, important “moments” in their own right. They are imagined (but not unreal) places that directly facilitate, as Annie Dugdale (1999: 113) again puts it, “...a narrowing from many competing versions [of the world] to a single stabilized reality.”

Or so we might suppose. But what does it mean when a “single stabilized reality” fails to come about — not an insignificant question given the importance recently attached by some planning theorists to “collaboration”, “communication” and “consensus” (Forester 1989; Healey 1997a, 1997b)? What does it mean, to put the question more sharply, when a “single stabilized reality” is resisted? For Bruno Latour (1987) the answer to these types of questions is simple: the failure to construct a “single stabilized reality,” he theorises, means the failure to first construct “strong rhetoric”: a dominating visual and technical “language” through which actors envisage spatial change. But this begs a much more fundamental question: why, exactly, is it hard to construct “strong rhetoric” in the first place? This chapter provides an answer to this last (actor-network) question by drawing on Lefebvre’s critique of space. In so doing, it begins to provide an overall answer to the research questions posed by this thesis. Specifically, this chapter argues that in their drive to construct a “single stabilized reality” — largely through the “rhetoric” of spatial representation and discourse — post-apartheid planners and policy makers have relied too heavily on physicalist, homogeneous, and ultimately “abstract” representations of space. Ultimately, the chapter will suggest why this is such a problem for UIS development.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The discussion is developed in five sections. Section 6.1 first provides a general overview of the strategic planning policies and visions that, taken together, constituted the immediate post-apartheid planning agenda for UIS development in Cape Town. Particular attention is paid here to one of the most important representations of urban space on offer anywhere in post-apartheid South Africa: the Metropolitan Spatial

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1Since late-1980s planning theory has been dominated by the “communicative” planning school, particularly as found in the influential writings of John Forester (1989) and Patsy Healey (1997a). Forester writes through Habermas, while Healey prefers Giddens. But both emphasise the importance of planning as a search for more effective “communication.” Recently, planning theorists such as Bent Flyvbjerg (1998) have critiqued this approach using Foucault. Flyvbjerg argues that communicative theories pay far too little attention to unevenly distributed power.
Development Framework. Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 then excavate this representation: (1) as an actual spatial production process at lower scales of urban analysis; (2) within African communities; and (3) with more direct reference to the informal food distribution system itself. The approach here, then, is to track how various actors are actually (trying) to construct the overall MSDF vision through the use of “strong rhetoric” and spatial representation. To that end, section 6.2 analyses the Wetton-Landsdowne-Philippi Corridor Project, which subsumes most of the African communities introduced in chapter V. Section 6.3 then unpacks the informal (food) markets constituted by, and constitutive of, this corridor agenda. Finally, and probably most importantly, section 6.4 outlines the planning imagination of the “body-subject-trader” that these higher scales of representations “require.” The nexus of metropole, market and body thus forms a particular spatialisation — a multi-scaled geography — of how Cape Town imagines UIS development. Section 6.5 closes the chapter with a discussion of the main insights that emerge from the analysis that now follows.

6.1
Visions of a Unified City

As already discussed in some detail in chapter V, the Apartheid City of racially defined Group Areas was already dying in the early 1970s. By 1989-90 it was dead, with physical and economic “informality” one of its principal slayers. At length a new kind of city, non-apartheid if not yet explicitly post-apartheid, was being vigorously debated, often in an ad hoc way between Cape Town’s leading urbanists (Blandy, interview). As the negotiation of a post-apartheid polity gathered momentum at the national scale, however, a self-consciously post-apartheid vision for the Cape Metropole steadily emerged (CTCC 1992c; WCEDF 1993). This vision, moreover, was explicitly anti-apartheid and was eventually called the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework.

THE METROPOLITAN SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

The Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) is many things at once. That is to say, it is dialectical. First and most practically, it is a document. It is physical “thing” — a durable mobile — that sufficiently interested actors can pass around, refer to, open up, write about, quote, damn, praise or eventually ignore. It physically exists (CMC 1996). Following ANT, then, it too is an “actor” constitutive of the agency of spatial change. Second, and more importantly for the present discussion, it is a Lefebvrian
representation of space (Map 6.1). It is an outcome paradigm, a highly normative theorization for how to overcome the spatial consequences of urban apartheid: viz. the inter-township "buffer zones" that circumscribe and contain races; the subsequent sprawl and waste of land; the mismatch between jobs and poor people; the costly and insufficient public transport grids; the unsustainable and inefficient resource implications. As such, the MSDF is also a spatial "problematization" of the urban world and its solutions conceived largely by land use planners, architects, designers and engineers.

Building UIS-friendly Corridors: from Curitiba to Cape Town

The MSDF's conceptual genealogy is found in the strategic spatial planning experience of Curitiba, Brazil. As already discussed in some detail chapter II, Curitiba has been frequently touted in the global academic and policy literature (e.g. Lloyd-Jones 1996). For its part, the MSDF document (CMC 1996: 25) asserts in a kind of best practice language that Curitiba is "what works best." Briefly, this is an example of what Latour (1987: 259) sees as typical of attempts to construct strong rhetoric. "Scientists and engineers [and planners and architects]," he proposes, "speak in the name of new allies that they have shaped and enrolled; representative among representatives, they add these unexpected resources to tip the balance of force in their favour." As with the English Garden City at the turn of the twentieth century, the ideal model of Curitiba was already out there. That model was an "unexpected resource" to be enrolled in the post-apartheid search for a unified city. Accordingly, an earlier and aptly named "fact-finding" document (Curitiba Fact-Finding Team 1995) not only pointed out that "the literature [reveals] Curitiba to be an international success" (p. 4, emphasis added) but that, luckily enough, "...the city is as old as Cape Town and about the same size" (p.2). The inference was ineluctable: Cape Town was enough like Curitiba to become even more like it.

As the MSDF envisaged it, the main reason for Curitiba's "international success" was its corridor approach to urban planning. Curitiba's "activity corridors" not only integrated land use with public transport, they "mixed" land uses intelligently. Different types of residence, public services, retail and industry synergised to produce a more aesthetically, ecologically, physically and economically vibrant urban terrain. A Curitiba-type corridor programme, then, was both metaphorically and literally the golden thread.

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2 A process also found in the modernist invocation of Los Angeles by the Milton Keynes Development Corporation in late 1960s.
The following are the activity spines of the corridors shown:

1. Voortrekker Road
2. Woomera Road
3. Koeberg Road
4. Old Paarl Road
5. Durban Road
6. AZ Berman
7. North-South Link
8. Bonga Drive
9. Van Riebeeck Road
10. Blue Downs
11. Kraaifontein

Source: CMC 1996: 109
with which the racial patchwork of the Apartheid City could be stitched back together. The MSDF thus proposed a kind of “visual hypothesis” for activity corridors in Cape Town (Map 6.2, Plate 6.1 below).

MAP 6.2 The “Activity Corridor” of the MSDF

SOURCE: CMC 1996: 42

There is much to this visual hypothesis that falls beyond the parameters of the present discussion. However, what is relevant — and profoundly so — is the long-term ideal of spatial “implosion,” especially around key nodes. Here implosion has a particularly literal, physical, “crowd-packing” meaning. Curitiba’s corridor experience was a matter of bringing about dramatic initial changes in the metropolitan transport system (Herbst 1992). These changes, the MSDF held, directly facilitate changes in economic and social life by “imploding” consumption forces through collective and public movement (buses) rather than individual and private movement (cars). Moreover, the “mixed” land uses just referred to act as magnets for holding thresholds in space. All this, the MSDF claims, stimulates UIS development.
As the MSDF document puts it:

The need to create employment and promote economic development is central to the aims of the MSDF. For many, the only hope of access to formal housing lies in their ability to find work. Significant priority, therefore, is given in the MSDF (in spatial terms) to creating opportunities for business and employment. The structure of activity corridors with public transport routes will promote economic development by increasing thresholds and access to markets by [UIS] traders (CMC 1996: 77, emphasis added).

Accordingly, and with specific reference to spatial policy prescriptions,

Spaces for informal activities and markets where mobile urban services can locate and attract activity should be encouraged, especially at modal interchanges (ibid.).

This line of thinking should be a familiar one. It was first encountered in chapter II as the “Cape Town School” on UIS development. For that reason, it is detailed no further here (see 2.2). Rather, a new line of analysis needs attention. As shall be shown in a moment, the Cape Town School had long had an impact on the mentality and professional proclivities of local planners and urbanists. Indeed, many of the key players in the MSDF planning process trained originally at the University of Cape Town (see Watson 1998). So the theoretical and policy conceptions of possible UIS development
were not simply sitting on shelves. They were quite literally embodied ideals. Now acting as intermediaries, UCT-trained planners carried them out of the classrooms and into state offices and daily agency (see e.g. CTCC 1992c).

The MSDF edified these (local) ideals by connecting them up with the (distant) experience of "successful" Curitiba, which by now was harder to question — especially after the "fact-finding" mission dispatched to Curitiba confirmed the "international" consensus. Via this conceptual analysis, then, the "Cape Town School's" original hypothesis on urban space and UIS development became less and less like an hypothesis and more and more like a "fact" ("...will promote economic development"). More especially, from a basically conjectural and normative birth, the original UIS development statement passed through what Latour (1996b: 33) calls "chains of transformations." It was being modified positively, that is, by urbanists interested in a particular kind of spatial solution for Cape Town — and getting others interested in it.

This process would continue after the MSDF was drafted. Other actors interested in the same spatial solution also modified the UIS development statement — again largely positively. For example, the 1997 Urban Development Framework of the Department of Housing (RSA 1997a) suggested that, indeed, planning higher-density land-use through densification, mixed use and enhanced public transport would ameliorate urban poverty by stimulating UIS opportunity. So a remarkable thing was now happening: through the successive strengthening of rhetorical statements, building corridors also meant building the UIS. A new conceptual geography was emerging through this dialectic. Specifically, as both a network intermediary — a physical "thing" that "...[organizes] attention to real possibilities of action" (Forester, 1989: 3) — and as an "effect" of a great deal of network agency, the MSDF's representations helped to "produce" a particular urban world. But was "a single stabilized reality" for Cape Town's spatial future immanent? Far from it, as the remainder of this chapter will now demonstrate.

6.2

Constructing Belief: the Wetton-Lansdowne-Philippi Corridor

To make the move from paper to roadway, from spatial representation to spatial practice, the MSDF had to "thicken" its vision appreciably with far more details at lower scales of urban analysis. For the spatial reality intimated by the MSDF was still "polymorphous"
Planners, architects and designers might have broadly agreed on its long-term desirability. And that alone was an impressive accomplishment. But many other actors remained well outside the MSDF. Interpreted theoretically, the MSDF actor-network (now already populated "heterogeneously" by planners, architects, the buses and thresholds of Curitiba, the "international" academic and policy literature, "fact-finding" missions, the Department of Housing, design ideals, glossy policy documents and, yes, UIS rhetoric) was certainly stronger and thus more "durable" than it was when it started life as ad hoc discussions between urbanists. But it was also still empirically "thin" from a local institutional point of view. Most notably absent from the MSDF register were Henri Lefebvre’s tactical "users" of urban space, especially informal sector actors, of which more later on. But even other strategic actors within the state — including national transport engineers; local economic development officers and environmental health people — had yet to be "enrolled." The planning agenda was therefore clear: get these other actors on board. The way to do that, it seemed, was to visualize more specific spatial projects and principles that serviced the interests of a wider variety of stakeholders. But as these projects took off, the MSDF vision soon evinced fundamentally physicalist, homogenizing and ultimately abstract assumptions about urban space. And these assumptions, it shall now be argued, would prove especially critical to the larger question of UIS development.

**MOVEMENT, CLUSTERS, DEVELOPMENT**

All this can be seen in the Wetton-Lansdowne-Philippi Corridor Project (henceforth the "WLP Corridor"), a massive planning scheme initiated by the City of Cape Town in 1996 (Map 6.3). Borne originally from a growing national concern with transport subsidies, at the turn of the twenty-first century the City of Cape Town (2000a, no page number) marketed the WLP corridor as "...a major economic development initiative in the heart of the city’s most deprived areas." It is therefore a strategic spatial plan linked to an overarching transport concern in the concomitant service of LED. In this sense, it is a good example of the conceived relationships between "physical planning," on the one hand, and "economic growth" and "poverty alleviation," on the other — three crucial dimensions of Parnell and Pieterse’s (1998) summary of development local governance and LED in post-apartheid South Africa.
MAP 6.3 The Strategic Spatial Plan for the Wetton-Landsdowne-Philippi Corridor, with Local Area Plan ③ for the Philippi Node

Source: CTCC 1998a
In practical terms, then, the WLP Corridor re-imagines in more detail the larger MSDF relationship between three major processes: movement, clustering and development, including UIS development. But it is the finer details that are instructive. The long-term objective of these details is to re-structure the East-West activity corridor that runs from Wetton and Lansdowne Roads to Philippi Road. As indicated in Map 6.1, this corridor passes through the roughly contiguous African residential complex of Guguletu, Nyanga, KTC, New and Old Crossroads and Brown's Farm. “Movement” is therefore the first process to understand. For if the MSDF linked up (distant) Curitiba with the (local) Cape Town School’s UIS development hypothesis, then the WLP Corridor in turn linked up the MSDF with (then) unrelated concern with financially unsustainable urban transport.

Rethinking movement

Rob McGaffin, a UCT-trained member of the WLP corridor planning team from its inception, explained the origins of this second linkage in an April, 1999 interview:

For a long time transport subsidies [in the WLP area] have been off the chart. And we’ve got nothing much for it in terms of development. Horrific figures have been spent on transport. [...] It was quite a big break, then, when the [national] transport guys realized its not about [efficient] movement — its about land use and continuity. So they said ‘OK, time-out — we’ve got to drop these subsidies off.’ But they recognized that they couldn’t do it with the [land use] structure in place (McGaffin, interview).

Whether or not South Africa’s national transport engineers, long obsessed with issues of congestion (efficient movement), were now converts to an urban planning imagination focused on “land use and continuity” (spatial implosion) is an open debate (Behrens, pers. com.). But if McGaffin’s analysis of this crucial conceptual linkage is correct, then there are two key points to emphasize. The first point relates to how planning agency works to change extant “structural” realities. McGaffin reported that Cape Town’s Director of Planning at the time, Amanda Young, quickly saw in this national transport concern a much-needed financial resource to begin to thicken up the MSDF vision, to get it moving forward, to put it “in place” (McGaffin, interview). Specifically, Young saw a new nexus. By linking the MSDF to the parallel issue of transport subsidies; by getting national engineers first interested and then enrolled

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3 As the urban planners Behrens and Watson (1996: 1) put the matter in the first year of the WLP Corridor: “[South Africa’s] [transport and civil engineers tend to approach layout from the perspective of maximizing the efficiency and operation of the infrastructural element.]”
(getting the “transport guys” to “realize”); and finally, by securing reliable financial resources (money) — all this highly focused, network-making effort meant that Cape Town’s (latest) spatial agenda could mobilize even further as a collective, if still fairly elite entity. Young had changed conceptual structures, that is, by forging a new institutional relationship.

The second key point to emphasize, however, relates to precisely why this new nexus occurred at all. And here we are obliged to turn away from ANT and towards Lefebvre. For Lefebvre, the production of space involves the production of contradiction. In part, this is because “...the entirety of space must be endowed with exchange value” (p. 336-7) — and thus with abstraction and homogeneity. But it also involves the ways in which the contemporary state, in no small measure through its discourses and representations, relates to this process. One of the elusive goals of the state, Lefebvre argues, is to “...[enforce] a logic that puts an end to conflicts and contradictions” (p. 23). To that end, “...it plans and organizes society ‘rationally’, with the help of knowledge and technology” (ibid.).

On this reading, the transport engineers “realized” the land use rationality of WLP Corridor because they had fewer and fewer options. The contradictions bequeathed by the Apartheid City (and the technical agency of their own fraternity in producing that City) had pinned them in: if they dropped off the “horrible” transport subsidies, the risk was that the poorest households would simply invade lands nearer to work to make up for the shortfall (CTCC 1992d: 28). On the other hand, as McGaffin himself notes, they simply could not afford to continue with the subsidies. The network “enrolment” of the transport engineers was therefore innovative, creative and skillful; it highlighted the role of planning agency in bringing about new spatial possibilities. But it was also made much easier by the “structural” need to conceive a new spatial logic for the Post-Apartheid City in the face of existing contradictions.4

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4 One historical example will make the point. Deeply concerned with “... the undesirable mixing of races at Mowbray station...,” a railway hub in the Cape Town metropole, Cape Town’s transport planners hoped that “...new Native [railway] lines would do much to improve matters” (from DCM 4/CT 112). Yet these “new lines” were, in effect, little more than “a limited service using steam engine, to Nyanga by the 1st July, 1958...[j]” and, due to the still appreciable distance from the station itself to extant residential areas, “a bus feeder system” (ibid.). Aside from the impossible need to network people whilst simultaneously avoiding their “undesirable mixing” (and keeping public costs down), all this long-haul transport of African labour made little sense in the first place. Manchester’s textile barons, after all, built residential zones on the very doorsteps of their cotton mills. On many other such urban contradictions see Maylam (1995).
Re-imagining Clusters, Overcoming Resistance, Enrolling Believers

It is difficult to overstate the importance of getting the transport engineers to "rethink movement." First, as Marshall (2000) writes, "[t]he structure of human settlement rests on a three-legged stool of politics, economics and transportation...[o]f these, transportation is the most visible and active in shaping place" (p. xi). Second, because corridor-based transport was considered the main ingredient of Curitiba's "international success" it was the spatial *sine qua non* of the MSDF. Most importantly, however, and certainly most practically, the national transport link had immediate material implications for the next major process of interest here: clusters. Rob McGaffin again:

[Because of this new national transport interest] we got an initial R2.2 million for planning and put together a dedicated team in the town planning branch. It dealt with lots of things. "Transport things. Housing things. Local area planning. And [also] a public participation programme" (McGaffin, interview).

Accordingly, much more detailed representations of space emerged through a new round of "dedicated" planning agency. The new town planning team first undertook a classic Geddes-like regional survey. The objective of that survey, McGaffin reported, was to unearth a reasonably "organic" corridor. But this actually meant constructing a whole new statistical and quantitative reality where none had yet existed. "We [the interim City of Cape Town] took over from the BLAs [Black Local Authorities] and the RSC (regional service Councils)," McGaffin recounted,

and our first problem was bad records and bad data. So, you know, we had a bad understanding of the situation in those areas. And the problem was that we had to put a boundary around it — not to be hard about it, but to focus attention. The boundary [today] is the Corridor. It's not a 100 meter wide issue" (McGaffin, interview, emphasis added).

The "100 meter wide issue" referred to a competing, and for the WLP planning team far too narrow, definition of corridor space then running with some legitimacy through policy debates about urban movement. This competing definition — essentially, an alternative representation of urban space and its policy logic — had to be killed off as soon as possible. Specifically, a new MSDF-like corridor, consistent with the larger, Curitiba-inspired vision of the post-apartheid city, had to be produced in order "to focus attention," of which more below. This turned out to be difficult, and not simply because of "bad data." The planning survey revealed movement patterns fantastically at odds with the MSDF dream. McGaffin further reported that "...we found out that 70% of the
[human and vehicular] movement was in a North-South direction — not East-West as the MSDF wants. Especially on Vanguard Road ... we missed badly that dynamic.”

What is fascinating about this discovery, though, was precisely how it was subsequently used. As a new quantitative space — filled up the new statistics and new indices — it did not lead to a “North-South” corridor plan. As a general matter, it did not lead to alternative calls for imploding future development around North-South movement. Quite the contrary. The results “proved” just how important the East-West spatial ideal had now become. In other words, the spatial fix was conceived well before “the real world” was researched (once again suggesting, with Lefebvre, just how powerful conceived spaces can be in the production of space). The main “job” of the data, then, was to edify the still precariously instituted shibboleths of post-apartheid planning. Notwithstanding the multitude of technical justifications, this related to the discredited nature of the Apartheid Gty itself, and therefore to the widely shared political and ideological hostilities towards its extant rhythms, flows, disconnections and connections (cf. Robinson 1998). Science-in-action was therefore politics-in-action (cf. Latour 1986).

By nesting their statistical analyses squarely within the MSDF vision, by killing off the “100 meter wide issue,” the WLP Corridor could now re-imagine new clusters (“Transport things. Housing things. Local area planning.”) In so doing, they could also re-imagine in remarkable detail precisely how UIS development might come about in real African communities. Referring to Map 6.3 above, the planning theory was that new synergistic clusters — referred to more simply as “nodes” — could emerge piecemeal by strategically “reshaping” the North-South movement over time. As the WLP Corridor Spatial Plan (CTCC 1997b: 51) explains:

The analysis shows that the major North - South routes crossing Wetton and Lansdowne Roads will continue to carry significant traffic through the area and the proposed nodes provide the opportunity to capitalise on the potential this movement will create.

And so,

If these nodes develop as strong pressure points, the collective development momentum will over time eventually spread along the entire length of the Corridor (ibid.).

But what made up “strong pressure points,” exactly? Here the town planners’ spatial imagination blossomed. Now working at the (familiar) scale of the local area, their plans revealed a new developmental geography — a new representation of what building
post-apartheid space involved. Moreover, the plans re-imagined not only the spatial basis for future urban development in this particular region of the city. They also re-imagined the crucial role of UIS activity in securing that development. Indeed, the UIS was no longer conceived as part of yesterday's spatial problems. Rather, it was now considered crucial to tomorrow's spatial solutions — to the development of "strong pressure points".

All this is seen quite clearly in the Local Area Plan for the (Eastern) Philippi Node of the WLP Corridor (Map 6.4 below). Following the MSDF, its major organizing principle is "mixed-use" clustering. Map 6.4 shows new transport facilities [LR 11,12; S1] and road improvements [R], but also new spaces for high-density housing [H1-4], a range of public facilities (F1-4.) and formal commercial activity [L1-16]. Finally, and most importantly for the present discussion, the plan shows the strategic importance of different types of "informal markets." Much more will be said of these informal markets in section 6.3. At this point, however, two lines of analysis need to be developed in regard to the new local area plans as representations of space. The first line of analysis relates to the on-going (actor-network) need to extend the conceptual power of the MSDF to a wider array of actors; that is to say, to continue to build towards a "single stabilized reality" for urban development and UIS transformation (focusing as before on how this is done and what is involved.) The second line of analysis relates to the on-going (Lefebvrian) theme of why this happens as it does. Or to conflate these two lines of analysis into a double-barreled research question: how could the "strong pressure points" actually be achieved — and what would such spatial achievement mean? Let us take the front-half of the question first.

**Overcoming "Resistance" within the Local State**

The general problem of "achieving" things in local space relates, it can be argued here, to the LED ability of a particular locality to "get its act together," to borrow again from John Lovering (1995). While this involves building new state-society institutions — or "relational resources", as Patsy Healey (1997a) usefully calls them — it also involves efficiently and creatively aligning intra-state policies and budgetary priorities. And that is so small matter.

Rob McGaffin analysed the administrative situation three years into the WLP Corridor planning process:
MAP 6.4 Local Area Plan: Philippi, WLP Corridor (1999), with Clustering Approach and UIS Markets

SOURCE: WLP Corridor Business Plan (CTCC 1999), legend and dotted boxes added
The Local Government Transition Act says everything has to be linked to integrated budgets and better coordination. In theory the Corridor and the MSDF go into the IDP [integrated development plan]. But there’s lots of internal politics. [...] So right now we’re looking at things that can be done: environmental improvements, street signs. But the budget is the issue. It’s a parallel process. Getting budget lines that match up. Because of all the other processes it’s been intense. The sewerage branch; roads branch — all that is important. We are integrating the budgets. But on the budgeting, we’re not as powerful as we would like to be. [jokingly] We’d like to play God in terms of improving the linkages (McGaffin, interview).

Rae Wolpe, an LED officer with the Cape Metropolitan Council, explained the internal challenge from the metropolitan perspective in an August 1999 interview. His (similar) views on the difficulties of actually “doing” post-apartheid developmental local governance (DLG) are worth quoting at some length:

That kind of [DLG] language and thinking was pretty much new to local government, I think. We are actually grappling with what does that mean organizationally and in terms of the way we plan our business plans and plan our budgets. And the way we structure our local authority in terms of line management. How do we actually work with each other in a local authority to examine our cross-impacts and to maximize our positive impacts? And particularly I think for economic and social development — how do you function so that you can play that integrating and coordinating role and in conjunction with environmentally sustainable sort of concerns in South Africa? How do you actually prioritize between investment in housing and transport, for example?

Wolpe continued, emphasizing in particular the challenge of discourse coordination:

Well, we don’t really have models to do [any of this] at this stage. At the level of, between functions, the key thing is to see how do people from different functions start to talk to each other? And to examine that issue in terms of outcomes — I mean what are the outcomes we are actually trying to achieve here? [...] And the national phase that we’re now in, all the national line departments, policies, policies, policies the past five years. So now we’ve got all these wonderful policies, but you put it all in one big bowl and mix it around what is actually happening? (Wolpe, interview)

It is possible to argue that such institutional coordination around “outcomes” depends at least partly on intra-state acceptance of particular representations of the appropriate Post-Apartheid City — “a single stabilized reality” that structures the “language and thinking” of local institutional agency. But the representations associated with the MSDF and the WLP Corridor were, once again, driven by town planners, architects and urban designers; because of this, many critiqued them as overly
physicalist. Rob McGaffin admitted that the WLP Corridor (like the larger MSDF) “is often criticized for being spatially deterministic” (McGaffin, interview). One such critic, Dave Gretton, another experienced LED official, sympathetically but sharply emphasized in a May, 1998 discussion that “yeah, o.k., the MSDF’s spatial layer is all there, but where’s the economic layer? How do all these spatial [planning] people know this fits together?” (Gretton, interview).

Skepticism like this was everywhere. An environmental health officer concerned specifically with the informal markets policy, Alec Gooden, concurred with Gretton’s concerns, but with far more criticism of the institutional assumptions driving both the “UCT School” and LED:

We’re in this new [administrative] cluster and its not really working that well. It’s all grouped in “community services” — housing, libraries, parks, arts and culture and health. But you tell me what does health have to do with libraries? We’re just too different to work all together. It’s very hard. [...] The planners just want all these abstract concepts. They’re trained in universities and have all these fancy ideas about cities. Engineers are even worse. You know, really, it was really bad. We used to call it the “UCT gang.” All these UCT planners and these abstract ideas. Environmental health people — and I include myself — are trained at technikons. We are more practical. We’re not interested in all these high ideas. Planners always have to think conceptually. We just say: ‘look that won’t work, you can’t do that’ (Gotten, interview, emphasis added).

But it is Rae Wolpe, trained originally as one of Gotten’s supposedly “conceptual” UCT planners, who provided the most pertinent observations on this theme:

When I was studying [planning] I was always unhappy with the emphasis on the spatial — or the physical, land use, however you call it. I saw that, well o.k., especially in our context, its one important lens on things, but I was always more interested in wider political, economic kinds of forces and how those impact on people’s lives. That’s how I got involved in this local economic development thing....

Later, and then specifically with respect to the overall integrated development planning [IDP] process, Wolpe became more pointed in his concerns:

The IDP is... (long pause) ... I mean, it’s very spatially dominated, which we’re trying to balance [out in this office]. Yeah, I mean we are quite concerned about that. I’m fairly unhappy about that.

After reading a passage from a policy document, and within the context of a discussion of the WLP Corridor, he then asked:

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5 Most of the individuals interviewed for this thesis used the term “spatial” to refer to the physical lay out of cities — and thus to the physicality or morphology of the urban terrain.
So you coordinate the strategies in relation to their ‘geographic impact?’ It’s quite an interesting way [to think] and I’m not completely against it. But exactly how economic development objectives relate to all this, I’m not really sure (Wolpe, interview, emphases added).

An actor-network view of how a new urban reality actually get “constructed” (or produced) suggests that this is all quite normal. A collective social product, representations of space are not one-off events, “fireworks” of inventive realization, but piecemeal processes of discursive, technical (and indeed budgetary) alignments. To be sure, the impressive bridge-building to Curitiba and the national transport engineers helped to forge a captivating urban vision — one of the most interesting in post-apartheid South Africa. But the WLP Corridor remained a precarious, and highly contested, representation of space. In this sense, in the late 1990s it was still, as Latour (1987) would put it, more of a cultural “artefact” than a scientific “fact.” Its attempt to move steadily towards a fact-like existence, that is, to become the central “rhetoric” for urban development met up with a host of dissenting actors even within the local state. And much of the reason for this intra-state resistance was that the planners’ conceptions of space were, at least for its dissenters, overly physicalist. They were also overly homogenous, as the next section shows.

Enrolling “Believers” through Public participation

The conceptual challenge the WLP planners faced within the local state was nothing compared to the challenge the planners faced in the impoverished neighborhoods they wanted to develop. Like many state products, the WLP Corridor tried to embed itself in the collective consciousness of ordinary citizens through a massive participation program. Following de Certeau (1985), that is, it tried to get people to “believe” — just as the MSDF had done with the transport engineers. And like the intra-state project, that too was no easy matter.

Rob McGaffin recalled the difficulties of the experience. “[The participation] thing was hard because it was always really local issues. Parochial issues. Local, local stuff” (McGaffin, interview). A professional concern with “parochialism” is a common plaint in the participation literature. But its importance here lies in the possibility that the “local, local stuff” churched up by the participation programme actually amounted to an alternative, and generally much more heterogeneous, analysis of what was really wrong in
these areas — an analysis that did not flow inexorably into the larger MSDF-WLP

dream, particularly amongst squatters (see CTCC 1998a, 1998d).

For the WLP corridor and the movement and clustering it championed were not

necessarily in the interest of squatters. As Watson (1998: 342) explains within the

context of the wider MSDF planning process of the early 1990s:

Political euphoria, or perhaps an inability on the part of many participants to

understand the implications such a plan may have in terms of a distribution of

resources, led some to overlook the fact that the plan did not serve all interests

equally. [...] The civic associations on the forum generally represented more

established township residents, who would be able to take advantage of the

higher-density (and higher-priced) corridor-related housing proposed in the plan.

Occupants of the informal settlements, however, being amongst the poorest of

Cape Town's population, could never have done so, other than perhaps as sub-

tenants.

The inability of the “poorest of Cape Town’s population” to afford the latest ideas

in plan-shaped housing has already been broached in chapter V. But most African

squatters had battled long and brutal decades for their “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996).

They did not strive for sub-tenancy (Fast 1996). Indeed, other evidence suggests that

squatter projects which have placed primary emphasis on “participation” itself rather

than on a larger, more abstract planning principle of some kind have led to material

formations and thus conceptions of urban development notably different from those

sought by the WLP corridor.

One example in this vein is found in the squatter upgrading of Crossroads and

KTC, of which more in the coming chapters, carried out under the auspices of the

“Integrated Services Land Project” or iSLP (a 10 year, R1.5 billion housing initiative first

started in the late apartheid years by the Cape Provincial Administration but then placed

on Mandela’s “Presidential Lead” list in 1994). Until the WLP corridor, the iSLP was the

most important urban development project in Black Metropolitan Cape Town. And in

one sense, the iSLP’s many accomplishments, particularly in terms of residential

densification (PAWC 1993), fit well within the conceptual meshwork of the WLP

Corridor (Kuhn, interview). Indeed, the WLP Corridor actively sought to build on the

iSLP. But as Mareek Kanjeia, a provincial planner involved in the iSLP from the

beginning, revealed in a July 1999 discussion:

To be honest with you, in terms of the product on the ground, what we have been

able to get, well, could have been built under the [1950] Group Areas Act. But it's

the process that has been different — it's been about community participation in
administration and implementation. That’s the great success. Not so much the houses and all that — but the process. Adjacent communities have accepted these places. If you think about where we were in the ‘eighties [during the state of emergency], well, that’s really important” (Kanjeia, interview).

Kanjeia’s crucial distinction between the politics of post-apartheid integration (also captured by the goal of “inclusion”) and the subsequent materiality of that integration was, it might be argued, a manageable one throughout the 1990s. For if the “Group Areas”-like serviced landscapes of the iSLP were far from ideal, they nonetheless fell well within the boundaries of the WLP Corridor itself (PAWC 1999). The problem remained, however, that a continued commitment to the politics of integration vis-à-vis squatters might not always lead to an urban materiality so easily subsumed within a nicely aligned corridor-driven vision. In particular, as public and private capital investment pours into the Corridor, which is obviously the transport and LED expectation, squatter invasion and the alternative “integration” associated with such invasion might accelerate, not decline, because of the inflationary and/or unintended influence of this investment on residential land markets.6 (Was this not another contradiction attending the endowment of space with exchange value?) As Mattingly (1993: 106) has warned from the comparative international experience: “Urban land management [in the South] pays too little attention to urban land markets, understands them poorly, and suffers greatly as a result.” And as the WLP Corridor Spatial Plan (CTCC 1997b: 33) itself admits: “There is a lack of information relating to land availability [and to] the market characteristics.”7

That said, the WLP Corridor planners forged ahead, intent on embedding their newly minted representations into the public consciousness whenever and wherever they could — a process the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) would soon call “democratising development.” The project team earmarked in 1997 a massive R520,000 of its overall R2.2 million budget for “public involvement and marketing” (City of Cape Town 1997:12). Some of this money paid for a monthly newsletter, “Let’s Talk,” which

6 This in addition to “normal” land invasions, such as the high profile case in 1994 of approximately 500 families (2000-3000 people) in the buffer area near Langa. There was also pressure in the WLP Corridor near New Crossroads in the late 1990s, but this invasion was halted before it gathered momentum (Michael Tukayi, pers. com.).

7 Richard Taub (1994: 9-10) in his discussion of urban economic development and “community capitalism” puts the issue succinctly: “For those trying to generate ‘development,’ the tension is obvious. [...] On the one hand, they must encourage improvement of the area. On the other hand, they must not improve it enough to raise property values. [...] This tension underscores one of the unexplored, almost unconscious issues of [urban] economic development.”
summarized the overall process in August under the direction-setting title “The Way Forward” (not “A Way Forward”; see Thrift 2000d):

After a marathon consultation process, the Wetton-Lansdowne Corridor stakeholders have adopted the spatial plan to promote development in their formerly disadvantaged communities. [...] The endorsement, enthusiastically welcomed by the delegates, followed the wide distribution of the draft spatial plan. The plan comprised comments and suggestions by stakeholders on how the potential of their impoverished areas can be unlocked. [...] The adoption caps a process that has included six workshops and exhaustive consultation with various groupings, including Metropolitan Development forums, community organisations and civic bodies (Let’s Talk, 8/97).

There is little reason to doubt that the planners involved did not work diligently and ably. Indeed, the participation process was a “marathon” precisely because it had to be. It was “exhaustive” because the attempted stabilization of any new space is, following actor-network theory, constant, unrelenting, hard. Where it could, the plan adopted “comments” and “suggestions” to strengthen the new network’s overall durability as a discursive space and, furthermore, to prevent “stakeholders” from “…following their own inclinations and making off” (Law 1992: 386). Nor is there any reason to take exception with the boosterist language of the newsletter (yet another “durable mobile” along with the widely distributed spatial plan itself). That too is part and parcel of the drive to build strong rhetoric — even as it harkens back to Davies’ (1972) model of the “evangelistic bureaucrat” (see Plate 6.1).

Rather, what is important to note here are the spatial assumptions driving the representations of the WLP Corridor. In reporting that “stakeholders have adopted the spatial plan,” and that “the adoption caps a process,” the planners both literally and metaphorically papered over the contradictions that attend the (never-capped) production of space, contradictions which have already been addressed within the context of the national transport conundrum. Specifically, in their effort to build a “single stabilized reality” for collective action (a uniform, rational and efficient space for urban development) the planners bracketed off what Lefebvre theorizes as “other forces on the boil” — most notably the latent squatting forces that, only a few years earlier, had produced a spatiality that “could have been built under the Group Areas Act.” But for Lefebvre (1991), representations of space are the handiwork of “technocratic subdividers” (p.3). As such, they can be expected to service abstraction and homogeneity, which he calls “…those forces that make a tabula rasa out of everything that stands in their way, of whatever threatens them — in short of differences” (p. 285).
This is a very tough critique, particularly when applied to the empirics of post-apartheid (as opposed to apartheid) urban planning. All the same, Lefebvre’s theorization is compelling. It helps to explain the second line of analysis associated with ‘re-imagining clusters, overcoming resistance and enrolling believers.’ Specifically, its helps to answer the second-half of the question posed earlier: what did the spatial search for “strong pressure points” actually amount to — and why? To answer this question is to take stock of both the successes and failures of the MSDF and the WLP Corridor as new rhetorical spaces for UIS development. It is to make sense of the resultant spatial “effects” implied by this process. It is to discern why spatialities are occasioned (Lefebvre), rather than only how they are occasioned (Latour).

And here we arrive at a curious insight: the successes and failures just outlined emanated from the same spatial assumptions. On this reading, the abstract, physicalist and homogenizing perspective of the planners’ new strategic visions succeeded when
other actors shared that perspective — or had an interest in sharing that perspective (even if momentarily). Accordingly, "Curitiba" was elevated to an ideal, neo-utopian model "of what works best" when everybody wanted to find a spatial solution for apartheid. But the (abstract) model "...led some to overlook the fact that the plan did not serve all interests equally" (Watson 1998: 342). That was unsurprising: the plans put forward left the spatial conflicts of Curitiba in Curitiba, separating the developmental wheat from the political shaft. For their part, the national transport engineers sought to escape the contradictions of their own apartheid schemas, and thus "re-thought movement" to do so. But their vision was mechanistic. So for a time, it did appear that a single stabilized reality was at hand. But when the abstract, physicalist and homogenizing basis of that reality was understood, subsequent "network-building" got much tougher. The planners ran into skepticism, at best, and opposition, at worst, even within the local state. They engaged in a "marathon consultation process," distributing (and marketing) their ideas with great skill and unremitting agency. But the "local, local stuff" — the parochial issues — subsequently unearthed betrayed the raw material of potential resistance, especially amongst squatters and other "informals." That material was bracketed off and papered over. Yet it was the bourgeoning "informals" who were so crucial to the abstract vision of a unified city in the first place.

6.3
Stimulating Informal Markets

The spatial assumptions driving the representations of the WLP Corridor as a whole were not simply a scale problem — that is to say, a problem of synoptic representations of spatial transformation. Detailed representations were equally problematic, exposing the abstractions and homogeneities of the overall planning process with perhaps even greater clarity than before. The most important of these representations, at least for the present discussion, related to policy statements about informal markets.

SECOURING INFORMAL SECTOR SPACE

The strategic nature of the Corridor's "movement" and "clustering" vision stretched well over twenty years. The planners needed much quicker LED achievements. For this reason, the City of Cape Town and the Cape Metropolitan Council explored "the viability of informal markets as stimulatory devices" (Blandy, interview). It is worth re-emphasizing here the general point made earlier about the crucial role now attached to
UIS activity in securing post-apartheid urban transformation. This was no longer a matter of simply “tolerating” UIS activity. Rather, here was a major strategic spatial plan, in a major South African city, that quite literally built much of its transformation logic around the spatialities associated with UIS activity (Maps 6.3 and 6.4). Accordingly, these markets were urban spaces that needed to be stimulated through LED, but also urban spaces that could stimulate LED. Nowhere is this easier to see than in a detailed site plan for “integrating” the informal fresh produce wholesaling system into the WLP Corridor dream.

The Philippi Fresh Produce Wholesaling Initiative

Rory Mills explained the planning origins of, and goals for, a new fresh produce wholesaling market in Philippi (Map 6.5; cf. CMC 1997b, 1998d). A private development consultant contracted with most of the technical work in the latter 1990s, Mills linked the Philippi market topologically in two directions: “downstream” to the area’s ubiquitous informal food trade and “upstream” to the overall urban vision for the Corridor. The Philippi market in Mills’ account thus occupies a crucial intermediary space — indeed another network-building nexus — between the unified post-apartheid metropole and the African subject:

The concept of a fresh produce market in that area [was proposed] to create a little bit of economic activity. [...] And then we had the MSDF and the Wetton-Lansdowne Corridor come into being. And town planners ...did this whole exercise where they identified the need for a new CBD in the Philippi East area ["strong pressure point"] and that that CBD would be linked with the others via various corridors — and the Wetton-Lansdowne Corridor being the first of those. However, and I think that it was quite natural decision to come to, the fresh produce market was a good vehicle through which we could create some economic activity in that area because the barriers to entry in terms of [informal] fresh produce trading are virtually zero. Anybody can go, if he’s [sic] got a few bucks in his pocket, he [sic] can buy a day’s worth of turnover — and trade without any structures. And that is happening (Mills, interview).

Taken at face value, Mills simply framed the problem that gave rise to the Philippi market as one of LED, drawing on traditional LED arguments. One such argument emphasized the public sector’s role in improving “investor confidence” in order to impact positively on unemployment and poverty:

So the problem was really, something needed to be done to stimulate the economy of that area. And if it had a desirable effect then it would hopefully act as a catalyst — a stimulus — for further investment into the area. Seeing local authority money being invested to, let’s say, the extent of 10-15 million rand — that would be an act of faith. There was another initiative by Norwich [a private
MAP 6.5. The Philippi Fresh Produce Market: “Preferred Model,” 1998*

*Location and design being negotiated at time of study

SOURCE: CMC (1998c: 78)
Mills reference to "faith" is more than semantic. It is crucial to LED, to the construction of Patsy Healey's (1997a) "relational resources." For there is evidence that (somehow) breaking the historical unease in regard to African urban space — getting investors to believe — might yield inward investment. As Rob McGaffin reported: "Philippi East is greatly under utilized and can be developed a lot more. To put a bloc the size of the Cape Town CBD — that's irresponsible. But there is potential there. An industrial developer recently said to us: 'Nowhere can you find such a good site at this price'" (McGaffen, interview). Opportunities and actualities only needed to be linked up.

But there is much more to this, especially in regard to the incipient urban spatialisation of interest here. The wholesaling focus per se was, arguably, less traditional from the LED standpoint — and indeed the project itself seemed unusual. Mills agreed:

The thing is that we are now promoting a completely new animal here. There's no precedent as far as we know in this country. There's even no precedent in the other countries that we looked at. Because those are sort of traditional, "Third World" markets that evolved over a period of time.

Did Mills mean something "organic" or "spontaneous" by this last comment?

Yeah, and here we are playing with something completely new. We're in an established metropolitan area — with infrastructure and all that sort of thing — we are actually now almost contriving a facility for a specific purpose. It's not being allowed to evolve in a sense. And there's no precedent" (Mills, interview, emphasis added).

But "contrived" for what, exactly? What sort of urban spatiality were the planners trying to confect? There is something instructive about Mills' explicit references to "newness" — and to the imagined modernities carried within them. But to answer these questions we need not parse Mills' views any further. For it is only necessary to consider what the Philippi market project actually proposed would happen if the market could be built (CMC 1998c: 35):

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8 Particularly where community actors are trying to control economic resources, building them into new institutions. See Gunn and Dayton-Gunn (1991) and Schuman (1998).
1. **Metropolitan access**: The site is extremely well located for delivery by producers of suppliers from within, as well as beyond, the metropolitan area as it is served directly by the freeway system....

2. **Expansion and Scale**: The site is 44Ha in size and virtually none of it is built up yet....

3. **Local access**: The site is bounded on two sides by arterial roads linking directly to centres of surrounding community areas....

4. **Public transport interchange**: There is potential for a relatively significant Public Transport Interchange through the combination of a rail station, Long distant bus terminus and taxi interchange either on or adjacent to the site....

5. **Local demand threshold**: There will be 6 000 households within easy walking distance of the market....

6. **Compatible land uses**: The site is well located in relation to a range of compatible land uses, including residential, industrial, commercial, public facilities and public transport.

7. **Role within the MSDF**: The site is located at the heart of the [WLP Corridor] Philippi Node and the market is the kind of facility that could kickstart the accelerated development of the node and promote the realisation of the MSDF.

Here the planning imagination soars high above the urban terrain — via de Certeau's "strategies" (1984) — to conceive of the city like a big jigsaw puzzle (abstract, rational and physical) with the various (color-coded) pieces snapping "into place." Yet the sharp query posed earlier by the economic development officer, David Gretton, remains relevant: "how do all these [spatial] people know this fits together?" (Gretton, interview). Specifically, where are the other "layers" (ibid.)? Where are the individual and collective interests (and tensions and contradictions) attached to each and every piece of the puzzle? Where are the long-sedimented meanings that wash different colours into the clear, pastel hues of the planning schema? Where are the everyday, ordinary tactics that, Lefebvre holds, resist "state-imposed normality"? And, finally and probably most importantly, where are the necessary subjectivities that these plans seem to demand to work at all?

These questions require us to step down from the scale of the metropole and the market; they requires us, that is, to explore the bodies — the people, the subjects, the performances, the survival tactics — carried within these plans. And this we shall begin to do in a moment. But it is first necessary to complete the analysis of the market scale. For the Philippi wholesaling project was entirely unique — a one-off. There were other
markets as well, as Map 6.4 shows. These markets were designed for retailing rather than wholesaling, for the "coalface" of the informal food distribution system in this area of Cape Town.

**Informal Retailing Markets**

If a concern for "contrived" stimulation was important for the Philippi wholesaling initiative, it was even more so for the numerous informal retailing markets that pepper the WLP Corridor local area plans (e.g. CMC 1998d; CTCC 1998c). Indeed, in a May 1999 interview Nellie Agingu, a town planner with City of Cape Town, admitted as much within the context of a recently tabled project plan for a new "informal market" in Old Crossroads (CTCC 1999b):

> Thing's don' t fit neatly. Facilities don' t 'talk' to each other... I don't see that happening in the townships. The structural preconditions are not there. [So] people just transition through, as better opportunities come along. That's one main reason I am feeling nervous about [this new] Crossroads market. [An initiative like this one] needs so many synergies — because informal traders will go where they want. Any open space. It's anarchy of a kind (Agingu, interview).

Much is here: a respect for the "wildness" of informality; an acknowledgment that much has to go right, and stay right, to overcome this wildness; a sense that planning involves extremely complex contrivance ("...so many synergies..."). These are refrains of issues previously developed. But there is something else too. Reigning in "anarchy," getting "things to fit neatly," making facilities "talk to each other," getting the "structural preconditions" in the townships — all this is another way for Agingu to reproduce the WLP Corridor vision. If it worries her, it nonetheless also guides her. The 'jigsaw' imagination keeps her moving forward. For here is the quotidian rhetoric of post-apartheid planning practice. Arguably, such rhetoric is an important way to keep that vision alive and meaningful. McGaffin exemplifies this very well, especially with respect to the UIS development hypothesis:

> In the townships, informal trading is everywhere — like fresh produce — but your chances of a reasonable turnover are low. You need concentrations, nodes. And interchanges like around public transport are critical, critical generators of economic activities. That's a UCT idea — the clustering of facilities: we heard about that again and again. So [for example] a school development has a community library. Facilities using each other. (McGaffin, interview)

This constant discursive referencing is significant; it solidifies attitudes and conceptions about what is possible in the urban world (even if probabilities require more
Indeed, most planners (land use or otherwise) interviewed for this thesis repeatedly emphasized the mental or attitudinal dimensions of post-apartheid change. In particular, the words "mindset" and "perspective" recurred. Here is McGaffin's sanguine interpretation of the matter:

There's been a mindset change from control to a facilitation approach. It used to be that transport interchanges were designed — and then informal traders would come in and bugger it up. So we said, "Look, we've got to start with trading and transport — and build decent public space [from there]. Decent public space — that's the key idea. Not concrete and blacktops but something more than that (McGaffin, interview).

In a similar vein, Ebrahim Isaacs, an urban manager charged by the City of Cape Town with the new LED emphasis on small business development, also emphasized the role of a "the right kind of perspective" vis-à-vis the informal sector:

[In the past] urban managers saw their function as [one of] enforcement, the utilization of space, things other than LED. But people have developed the right kind of perspective. They now see informal trading as an opportunity. So it's not just a burden to the city (Isaacs, interview):

And then later in the same discussion:

We've got funds available for community development and upgrading [trading] spaces. But it's not just the development of physical projects. It's important to change the mindsets. The construction of a physical world is not enough. I've built all the arguments. Its skills training and access to finance [too] (Isaacs, interview).

Even Alec Gotton, the environmental health officer so suspicious of the land use planners, paid much attention to the problem of attitude:

The informal trading of food has always been a problem for environmental health people. In the 1980s we were really tough on street foods. We didn't go for that: we were anti-street foods. We insisted on refrigerated trucks and all that. But who could afford that? We — [my colleague] Arthur and myself — had to spend a lot of time convincing people — environmental health people — that all these requirements were not necessary. We had to get people to realise the cultural aspects (Gotton, interview).

Gotton's environmental health colleague, Arthur Luyt, agreed, particularly in regard to the issue of culture. But he expanded this to include everyone, not just state actors:

The cultural dimension is really important and should not be forgotten. We [the city] think in a Western way that is not necessarily the way Africans think. So we need to work from the grassroots up, from what people already do. This top-down thing is totally wrong. We need to educate people, to bridge that gap from
culture. If every African mother realized how dangerous some meat was, she
would not feed it to her kids. We'd solve the problem in a day (Luyt, interview).

Problems are not of course solved "in a day." Lest we conclude, then, that the new
"mindset" vis-à-vis the UIS emerged as a fait accompli across the whole of the local state
apparatus — a "single stabilized reality" — we must consider comments from a Cape
Metropolitan Council Environmental Health Officer, Edgar Carolissen. When
interviewed in mid-1999, Carolissen was dealing with growing public concerns about
disease diffusion linked empirically to the informal trading of meat and offal in Langa
(CMC 1998e). But it was not disease per se (carried by tapeworms and liver flukes
amongst other non-humans) that most concerned him. "The frustrating thing about my
job," he complained,

is the mindsets you still have. [...] An informal meat market — where all these
diseases come from (sarcastically) — is a clear example of how people will not lie
down and die. People have to create out of dust and dirt and then we come in
and say 'this is not allowed.' I mean, most [local authority] energy is going to
checking up, throwing the book (Carolissen, interview).

"Checking up" and "throwing the book" are state actions derived from mainly seeing an
informal meat market as a space of disease — and this was hardly a new perspective in
the twentieth century governance of African communities in Cape Town. Unqualified,
such a perspective fit quite comfortably within the history of township management
outlined in chapter V.9 Carolissen's comments thus suggest, at the very least, a certain
measure of conceptual unevenness within the local state, with the inertia of old
mentalities and managerial instincts about as powerful as "new perspectives."

In point of fact, the best example of "old mentalities" emerged most dramatically
in the management experience of the Guguletu informal meat market, a 1996 City of
Cape Town initiative originally directed at improving the informal trading of meats and
offal in African communities. The Guguletu experience highlighted in particular Wolpe's
earlier observations in regard to how difficult it is for different people talk to one
another, work together, conceptualize problems together, and produce new results

9In the late 1960s Nyanga residents were told that, following Nyanga Location Regulation No. 5,
"...licensed traders' operations are always closely watched to ensure cleanliness and hygienic
handling of food in the best interests of your good health." This was necessary, moreover,
because "... there are some unscrupulous people who trade illegally, especially after 5 p.m."
(Nyanga News 1968 (1) 5).
together. To wit: Isaacs blamed the environmental health people for the meat market’s growing troubles:

The central meat market in [Guguletu] has been experiencing problems. People who used to trade for free now have to pay rent. But those things — that wasn’t understood well. They [environmental health] only saw it as an environmental issue. The economic development [team] wasn’t that involved. My brief is because we haven’t addressed the economic component (Isaacs, interview).

But Alec Gooden, the environmental health officer, blamed the planners (and the informal traders):

The planners want to put in markets and things like that — but there are problems with that kind of approach. Sometimes they just don’t work. Ok, these markets can work I suppose, but we don’t seem to be learning why that is. Look at the Guguletu meat market. That’s not really working. They thought they’d get 91 traders — but they actually have only forty or so. Why is that? Because all the traders who say they will go in the market then go somewhere else. They don’t necessarily want to trade there even though they say they will So we need to learn from all that. And this new market in Crossroads [we] were just talking about — we need to think really about how things went in Guguletu (Gooden, interview).

So the pieces of the planners’ ‘jigsaw puzzle’ — even the tiniest ones — were not that easy to snap into place. Something was wrong. The languages, instincts, perspectives and analyses diverged, often considerably. That said, the really substantial problem was not located within the state, as serious as the coordination issues here were. Nellie Agingu knew this, but so too did Isaacs and Gooden, who all drew practical attention to the attitudes and instincts of informal traders themselves. The Guguletu experience was especially important in this regard: it was the first real “test” of the post-apartheid UIS development hypothesis. A small temple for urban transformation, then, the central meat market had by mid-1999 partially succeeded in drawing in congregations of traders on a regular basis. Yet the coffers necessary for the market’s long-term financial self-sustainability were not always full, as revealed in an ordinary 1998 progress report, two years after the idea of the meat market first took off (CTCC 1998c: 2):

Whilst the initial payment levels for the stalls were good there has been a fall off in payments [more recently]. A late payment penalty of R5 has been implemented and the Board is calling for a General meeting of the traders to try and rectify the problem.

The faith wavered. Belief atrophied. Trader “enrolment” into the new nodes and networks of informal sector development remained laborious (“...all the traders who say they will go in the market then go somewhere else. They don’t necessarily want to trade there even though they

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But financial self-sustainability was another major pillar in the rhetoric of “development local governance” (indicating the internal tensions that attend most synoptic philosophies and approaches). In fact, few pillars were more attended to, as another passage from the same progress report reveals:

It is very important the [Market] Company achieves 100% payment levels and increases the number of traders in the market. To do this the Council is requested to close down traders operating directly opposite the Market in unhygienic conditions (ibid.).

As an institutional voice, the City of Cape Town in this passage is less romantic about informality and the city. The City had already proclaimed its desire to extricate itself from such management responsibilities in future. “We don’t want to run these markets anymore,” Nelli Agingu reported, “so we’re getting out of it. We’re now looking for the private sector to step in here” (Agingu, interview). It is easy to see why, even as this shedding of responsibility to the private sector simply displaces the problems to someone else. Having investing R1.1 million in Guguletu initiative, and with regular interest payments to make, the City is not averse to “closing down” traders that fall beyond the sanctioned space for UIS development. Accordingly, two sets of spaces were now in conflict. The “node” of market stimulation — as both idea and form — was by 1998 the legitimate, invested in, healthy, mapped “inside”; in contrast, the “unhygienic conditions” nearby were the illegitimate, dangerous, unmapped “outside.” Separated physically by only a few meters, the two spaces could not have been further away from one another in terms of the overall vision of post-apartheid urban development. Enter the new “temple” and be active, the City pronounced, and be rewarded; stay outside and risk excommunication. The wholesaling and retailing markets were thus conceived as crucial intermediary spaces — crucial sites — for securing the kind of urban transformation envisaged by the MSDF and WLP Corridor. That was why these official sites were of such strategic importance. They were stimulating spaces for LED, “points of passage” for new developmental possibilities.

But once again, stabilizing them was not easy. In part, of course, this was because of the (by now familiar) actor-network theme of network-alignment. But alignment itself was a question of spatial dialectics, and therefore a Lefebvrian issue. The “jigsaw” metaphor did not capture the urban world. Rather, multiple relations simultaneously constituted these new sites. These relations included economic, environmental, administrative and financial relations. So like all “sites” constituted from multiple
relations, a series of tensions and contradictions soon followed (Harvey 1996). And it is precisely upon this last insight that the final section of this chapter can now be built.

6.4 Producing the 'Pre-Entrepreneurial' Subject

To enter the new "temples" of post-apartheid urban development — to trade in the new informal markets — implied particular subjectivities, particular bodies, particular performances. That much is already apparent. Plainly, the planners needed certain kinds of people for their plans. But the issue can be usefully taken one step further here. For the "subject/space" actually represented in post-apartheid urbanism, in general, and UIS development policies, in particular was, to quote specifically from the City of Cape Town's (2000b) Informal Trading Policy, a "pre-entrepreneurial" one. This makes perfect sense if pushed through Harvey's dialectical theorization of the "body as an accumulation strategy" — or to borrow from Giddens' discussion of Foucault (1984: 137): "...the arrangement of bodies in space has to correspond to the technical relations of production."

THE UNFINISHED PROJECT

So theorized, the "pre-entrepreneurial" subject was given certain tasks to perform in the yet-to-be-realized post-apartheid city:

Pre-entrepreneurs...should be in a position to plan their activities according to the guidelines and strategic direction enunciated in this policy document for Informal Trading. They will better be able to understand the framework within which they have to work and which will enable them to grow their businesses into the economic mainstream, meaning formal tax paying enterprises which are competitive, both locally and internationally.

There is a clear spatiality to this policy imperative — this representation of a possible urban world, populated with possible urban people. For the pre-entrepreneurial journey to the "economic mainstream," to "paying taxes" and being "formal" and "competitive," is linked topologically to market nodes and metropolitan integration, as the following two passages suggest:

By recognizing that the [informal] sector is important from a social and economic development point of view and that informal trading is really here to stay, there is therefore the need to ensure that this activity is undertaken in an orderly and sustainable fashion. The aim is therefore to create mini-markets that will provide
the opportunities to informal traders to conduct their businesses and grow [them] in an orderly and efficient manner.

And thus:

The ultimate goal is to plan and design a City that is able to cater for informal trading markets. The full integration of informal trading into planning and design of the City is therefore necessary, in order to aesthetically enhance the City, to promote economic development and expand employment opportunities.

It is easy to see to the metropole and the market as places for planning intervention and urban development. This is the natural ground of planning practice. But just as these places are “unfinished projects, historically and geographically malleable in certain ways” (Harvey 2000: 98), so too is the subject-space of the informal trader an “unfinished project” — and thus also a site for planning intervention. On need only consider section 6.4 of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy, entitled “Conduct of People Engaged in Informal Trading”:

— The conduct of traders will be strictly monitored and will be within guidelines set out in a formal agreement or permit arrangement.
— Agreements reached between council and traders, or council and (leasing) bodies must be honored.
— Peer pressure to conform to agreements must be encouraged.
— Recourse for misconduct or lack of compliance must be put in place.

All the same, the production of pre-entrepreneurial subjectivities was not simply a matter of such “disciplinary” strategies. These were empirically important. But other types of policies were also mobilized. Emphasizing “belief” rather than “control,” end-states and new forms of developmental identities rather than enclosures, they may have been even more important. “Street traders,” one Schedule of Principles drawn up for UIS policy engagement promised, “shall be treated equally to Entrepreneurs engaged in formal economic activity...” (Cape Town City Council 1997c: no page number). Furthermore, “…individual traders who do not belong to an organization or association [are] to be given a chance to join an association” (ibid). This was a different strategic approach. Khilnani (1997) summarizes this well in his essay on the tension between cities, development and democracy. The success of any conceptual “imposition,” he argues, “depends less on “…active surveillance and police, more on the ability to fabricate shared, self-disciplinary meanings: of what a city [is], of its public and private spaces, and the rules of each.” (p. 118, emphasis added)
At the same time, the urgent need to transform subjectivities in the service of larger development objectives is marked. The best example of this is the frequent use of business skills training programmes in community/urban development projects. Such programmes seek to accumulate human capital for business maturation, which in turn is thought to help sustain the subsuming urban development project itself. The troubled Guguletu meat market swiftly promulgated a business skills training programmes in late 1998. The rationale was typical of such programmes (CTCC 1998b: no page number):

The purpose of this training is to help traders improve their individual business skills so they can become more efficient, increase the volume of their business and earn more income.

But from the City’s point of view:

A capacity building programme has been arranged with the co-operation of the Department of Trade and Industry ... to educate ... [informal] traders in business skills and Company Management (CTCC 1998b: no page number).

This is far less about “active surveillance and police,” and more about “the ability to fabricate shared, self-disciplinary meanings: of what a city [is], of its public and private spaces, and the rules of each.” It is not all one direction. It is not all about control, but about “belief” as well — about the hard work of education and enrolment. Traders too seek a place in the city. Nonetheless, and this is the crucial caveat, it is a particular kind of place, where only certain kinds of post-apartheid agency are really needed. That is the truly important point to grasp about the “new space” of the informal trading subject. For not everybody is the same — free to receive training; able to trade openly and for long hours in legitimated public space; committed to a long-term process of business development. Not every body is, in other words, “pre-entrepreneurial.” Indeed, the highly gendered qualities of these particular policies are breathtaking.

And yet, it is Harvey’s singular, pre-entrepreneurial “body of accumulation,” linked up with these larger needs and larger spaces, that is most required in the overall spatialisation of post-apartheid UIS development. The non-trained, non-disciplined, non-entrepreneurial, non-tax-paying “body-subject” simply will not do; indeed, it might even be chased from the streets, as earlier discussed. To enter the planning space of “informal sector” urban development is therefore to be imagined as a particular kind of human being. But for Lefebvre, the production of an “abstraction” (including a bodily
one) leads inexorably to an erasure of difference (1991: 285). And that, he warns, is the basis for a great deal of spatial trouble.

6.5
Conclusions

The institutional shift to developmental local governance in the early years of post-apartheid South Africa implied a new planning agenda for UIS development. This chapter has provided an empirical analysis of this agenda in Cape Town within the context of the theoretical framework developed in chapter III. The focus has been on some of the urban plans and development policies designed to transform the spatiality of informal food distribution in African communities. Accordingly, the main work of this chapter has been the empirical excavation of a fundamentally discursive attempt to construct, step-by-step, what Annie Dugdale (1999: 113) calls “a single stabilized reality.” Latour’s notion of “strong rhetoric” has aided this excavation.

In particular, this chapter has suggested that in their drive to construct a “single stabilized reality” — largely through the “rhetoric” of spatial representations and discourse — post-apartheid planners and policy makers have relied heavily on physicalist, homogeneous, and ultimately “abstract” representations of space — and they have done so across all scales of urban thinking. This has proven paradoxical. One the one hand, these qualities have, in actual fact, facilitated a certain measure of network “mobilization”: the Curitiba-inspired MSDF rapidly gained early adherents; the national transport engineers came on board the more detailed WLP Corridor plan. On the other hand, the physicalist, homogeneous, and ultimately abstract representations caught up with the local institutional agency of the planners. Dugdale’s “single stabilized reality” remained elusive: other actors within the state balked; and, most important of all, local traders began to lose faith in the new ‘temples’ of UIS development.

Such “resistance” is a problem for any new actor-network. But following Lefebvre (and de Certeau), it is particularly so at the scale of the body itself, where tactical attempts to breakout of the enveloping meshwork are most pronounced. For “[s]tate-imposed normality,” Lefebvre warns, “makes permanent transgression inevitable” (1991: 23). Accordingly, we are now obliged to turn to an empirical analysis of the spatialities of these “transgressions” in the informal food distribution system alluded to (but not fully detailed) in this chapter. For the production of space is a multiple moment dynamic. On
this reading, planning is unquestionably crucial to understanding the representations of
the spatiality of informal sector agency. We have therefore begun to answer the overall
research questions posed by this thesis. But it is the multiple transgressions of everyday
survival that give material form to agency. And so it now time to excavate the spatial
practices of everyday life as actually experienced in the post-apartheid informal food
distribution system of Black Metropolitan Cape Town.
7.0 Overview

Every story is a travel story — a spatial practice.

— de Certeau (cited in Thrift 1996: 16)

Without losing sight of the planning story just outlined, the main purpose of this chapter is to excavate in some detail everyday life in the informal food trade of Black Metropolitan Cape Town. To that end, the narrative strategy deployed in chapter VI is turned on its head. Rather than focus primarily on discursive, technical and rhetorical spaces made for informal trading, as important as these are to the larger question of UIS development, the discussion now highlights material spaces made by informal trading. Following Lefebvre, this means an epistemological shift from representations of space to spatial practices. It also means that the empirical investigation moves, with de Certeau, from the “strategic” realm of collective imagination to the “tactical” realm of getting-by. The main theme, then, is the production of survival.

As indicated in chapter IV, one way to excavate this theme is to follow the traders themselves, to perceive spatial practices with de Certeau as “travel stories.” Accordingly, the heart of this chapter is organised around a detailed mapping of the daily activities of several informal food traders, using Torsten Hagerstrand’s (1970, 1976, 1982) “time-geography” as a simple notational schema to capture these activities (see also Thrift 1977; Pred 1977; Thrift and Pred 1981; Giddens 1984). As means rather than ends, however, these schemas are not simply the idiosyncratic “time-space diaries” of a few people’s everyday lives. These are urban maps of agency, context and constraint that help substantiate the theoretical claims of this thesis. For the traders discussed in what follows exhibit prototypical practices that take us through a range of networked urban spaces.
Specifically, their movement within (and often beyond) the city form other topologies than those imagined in chapter VI — contextual, heterogeneously constructed journeys of survival and transgression that connect up the micro-spaces of the retailing moment to the macro-spaces of the metropole and beyond. The discussion thus folds in many other voices, “things” and practices along the way, including those of planners. Ultimately, this chapter will show that these journeys complicate the neo-utopian planning imaginary of chapter VI because they produce a greater variety of spaces — at all scales — than that planning imaginary can easily subsume, direct, facilitate and/or control. This major insight provides a second realm of empirical support for the synoptic arguments of this thesis. It simultaneously provides a basis to then re-consider the challenge such inherently heterogeneous spaces present the planning of informal sector development. That reconsideration is undertaken in chapter VIII.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The discussion here is divided into four sections. Section 7.1 first provides more detail on the particular African communities at issue than has been provided thus far. In particular, the material geographies of Nyanga, New Crossroads, KTC, Philippi East and Brown’s Farm are surveyed. Ultimately, however, section 7.1 maps food consumption thresholds — the spatial practices of demand — and the role of informal agents in ‘capturing’ this demand in the local space-economy. Here the positive theme of “going informal” is developed. Section 7.2 then focuses on the practices and spaces implicated in the everyday journeys of traders operating in the ubiquitous informal fruit and vegetable sector. At this point, the focus shifts to the range of activities that constitute the so-called “commodity chains” (from consumption to production) that are, where appropriate, pulled into the lives of these traders. In the main, the analytical focus here is on communicating the dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical ontology of informal sector actor-networks. Section 7.3 then interrogates this ontology within the context of traders operating through the informal meat sector, particularly where this involves the distribution of offal parts, the most common informal trading activity in the case study area. Here the principal focus shifts to some of the implications for UIS development planning. Finally, section 7.4 closes the discussion with a recapitulation of the main themes and a brief introduction to Lefebvre’s final spatial moment, which deals with alterity and difference.
Case Study Area: the Spatial Practices of Demand and Consumption

Before considering the spatial practices of informal trading as a supply dynamic, it is first necessary to consider the demand side of the informal food market. Often treated as an aspatial variable, something that precedes space fully formed, this section shows that in fact “demand” is a spatial product — a materialized threshold that defines what Lefebvre holds to be the abstract contours of capitalist society. Specifically, this section shows the dialectical and hybridised connections that link up settlement typologies (physical space), social and economic realities (socio-economic space) and informal agents (subject space) in meeting the daily metabolic requirements of African households (reproductive space). All of these themes — dialectics, hybridity and interweaving — are important to highlight early. For they will be developed in sections 7.2 and 7.3 through a series of “practices vignettes” that trace out the supply side of the informal food market.

AFRICAN THRESHOLDS AT THE CENTRE OF CAPE TOWN

“Market demand” for commodities is different in different places. It is a geographical product. In the simplest terms, market demand for food is a spatially concentrated collection of metabolising families with latent purchasing power, ready to buy certain commodities, offered by someone, selling somewhere. In more complex language, market demand for food is a “threshold” built from the dialectical co-articulation of heterogeneous relationships. Heterogeneous co-articulation means in the present case that demand is (ultimately) an economic threshold emerging from a particular urban spatialisation of settlement densities, metropolitan employment geographies, cultural tastes, and the human body’s innate metabolic need for a particular range of calories.  

Settlement Typologies

Aside from the bio-metabolic process that generates the human need for minimum caloric intake on a daily basis, then, the genesis of market demand is residential density. The more people, the more demand. Black Metropolitan Cape Town is relatively dense, particularly when compared with adjacent urban developments in White and indeed

1 According to the WHO, human maturation and reproduction comes from the regular consumption of the following: protein, vitamin A and carotene, vitamin D, vitamin E, vitamin K, thiamine, riboflavin, niacin, vitamin B6, pantothenic acid, biotin, vitamin B12, folate, vitamin C, antioxidants, calcium, iron, zinc, selenium, magnesium and iodine (from WHO, http://www.who.int/nut/).
many Coloured communities in the metropolitan area. It is true that the African communities of Nyanga, New Crossroads, KTC, Brown’s Farm and Philippi East — the area of interest here — include the full range of residential forms and settlement typologies characteristic of contemporary Black Metropolitan Cape Town as a whole. As Awatona et al. (1996: 2-3) have observed: “The development of housing in Nyanga [alone] … bears the stamp of every state policy affecting urban Africans over the past 50 years, and it has therefore evolved into a highly differentiated and extremely complex area — probably one of the most complex in the entire Cape Town region.” But the simple experience of urban densification through time transcends this complexity. This density is a spatial and economic resource. It thus partially “structures” the spatiality of informal sector agency and development.

The Case Study Area

In the immediate post-apartheid era (1994-2000), the case study area (Map 7.1) consisted of an African population of approximately 115,000 housed in one of five main settlement typologies: formal bricks-and-mortar schemes; backyard shacks; hostel accommodations; site and service areas; and unserviced informal settlements. But once again, the formal schemes dissipated over time. Nyanga started off in the late 1940s as an ‘African garden city,’ consisting of relatively high quality housing stock (Fast 1995), with formal, well-consolidated houses and large yards (at about 12 dwelling units/hectare). But dwelling units per hectare (d.u./ha) increased considerably after the 1940s, not only because of the appreciably more modest public hostel developments of the 1950s and 1960s and the privately built hostel schemes of the 1970s (which today range from 31-62 d.u./ha), but more especially because of backyard and open space squatting ascendant since the late 1970s and early 1980s (100 to 236 d.u./ha). On the eve of the post-apartheid era, then, Nyanga’s much denser shack dwellings outnumbered its formal houses by a ration of 5:3 (Davies et al. 1991). As time passed, in other words, more and more people populated African urban space — ‘densifying’ the physical fabric of the city even as Cape Town’s wealthy communities generated urban sprawl. The ‘sprawling shackland’ imagination is therefore something of a myth.

There were, of course, exceptions to this trend. New Crossroads, for example, was developed just west of the Old Location by the Apartheid State in the early 1980s as a political and spatial antidote to the African squatter crisis of the 1970s; this despite contemporaneous invasions in the Philippi East and Brown’s Farm areas (Cole 1986).
particular, New Crossroads was developed as a major strategic response to the high-profile struggle at Old Crossroads, the squatter camp east of Nyanga (Surplus Peoples Project 1983; Fraser 1990; see also Parnell 1992). And like Old Location, Nyanga, New Crossroads was at the end of the 1990s traditionally residential in nature, although the original master plan included a (never built) North-South commercial spine, and there were also a few schools and a central community centre.

MAP 7.1  Case Study Area, 1999

Unlike Nyanga, however, New Crossroads had no squatter developments at the time of this study, despite large open fields located around its schools as well as a substantial buffer zone along Lansdowne Road on its southern edge (similar zones were invaded in Nyanga). Relative to KTC and other shack areas, moreover, including those
in Nyanga, Brown’s Farm and Philippi East, the quality of the residential stock and urban services in New Crossroads was high. New Crossroads further enjoyed full infrastructure services, including completely tarred roads, water and electricity reticulation, and waterborne sewerage.

But New Crossroads was an urban blip in the overall settlement trends in the case study area. It was the exception that proved the rule of increasing urban densification. In contrast with New Crossroads, KTC, Brown’s Farm and Philippi East — which all followed New Crossroads — were at the end of the 1990s still mainly squatter camps characterised by informally constructed shacks, albeit ones undergoing rapid upgrading intervention through “roll-over” and site and service schemes.² The best documented of these communities, KTC, is today located just north of New Crossroads. Drawing its name from an informal store located at one corner of the original camp (the “Kakaza Trading Company”), KTC was in the mid-1980s little more than a spontaneous invasion of open space that was originally dedicated to the second phase of the New Crossroads initiative (Ngcokoto 1990; Moreku 1996). After the township violence of the mid-1980s, and with the steady repeal of apartheid legislation following that violence, however, KTC, Brown’s Farm and Philippi East managed to consolidate their once illegal position in the urban fabric.

This meant a piecemeal shift from emergency services (e.g. sand pipes and pit latrines) to local authority and province-led housing and urban service consolidation (water reticulation, sewerage disposal, electricity provision, road upgrades and, wherever possible, housing stock improvements). Like Brown’s Farm and Philippi East, KTC over the 1990s was a beneficiary of the Integrated Service Land Project (iSLP), discussed briefly in chapter VI, as were the informal settlements situated within formal areas of Nyanga.³ As of the late 1990s, then, KTC, Brown’s Farm, Philippi East and the Nyanga-based informal settlement areas still had large under-serviced zones of residence. Due mainly to the iSLP initiative, however, the majority of the population in these

²“Roll-over” refers to a process whereby a group of shacks are actually physically moved in toto; once removed, the land is then fully serviced and engineered, and the shacks are then moved back or, alternatively, replaced with new structures financed through housing subsidies.

³ Squatter upgrading schemes, in these areas and elsewhere in post-apartheid South Africa, were linked to the ANC’s new housing policies, instigated in 1994-5. The core of these policies was — and remains — a graded national subsidy scheme linked to overall household income. For households earning less than R800/month, who constitute about one-fifth of the population, the subsidy was R 15,000. Households may use this money to purchase building materials, expand an existing structure or offset existing housing loans. See Republic of South Africa (1994a).
communities was now beginning to gain basic access to urban services. But the larger fact remained: the case study area was far denser than anyone in 1946 would have thought possible. The steady informalisation of the African built environment thus provided, ironically, a physical spatiality where the threshold of purchasing power could be fairly substantial.

Employment and socio-economic situation

Purchasing power is a question of household income. And the employment and socio-economic geography of the case study area in the late 1990s worked in precisely the opposite direction of residential density, a contradiction typical of township dialectics. Awatona et al. (1996) in their mid-1990s survey of Nyanga, KTC and New Crossroads calculated unemployment rates of between 26.5% and 68%, depending on the settlement typology, and household dependency ratios of between 2.3:1 and 6.6:1, also depending on settlement typology. Survey work conducted for this thesis in 1999 broadly substantiated these figures. The overall unemployment rate of the surveyed population was 30%, and the mean household dependency ratio was just under 3:1 (or three dependents for every one wage earner); Awatona et al. (ibid) reported a slightly higher dependency ratio of 3.4:1, reflecting their relatively higher sampling of unserviced squatter areas (especially in Nyanga). Differences notwithstanding, these realities limited the amount of cash washing around the local economy.

Awatona et al. (ibid) also reported that only 41 of 238 working age people they surveyed (17%) laboured within the local community. So most of the money to “build” demand thresholds had to be imported into the local space-economy, principally through the wage labour system. As depicted in Map 7.2 below, survey work for this thesis revealed that only 12% of working age people worked locally; another 17% worked in other African communities (typically in the informal sector or for local government); 15% worked in Coloured communities. The remaining 53% worked in the Southern and Northern suburbs, the Cape Town CBD/Waterfront area, and in the industrial areas of the metropole. The case study area thus ‘emptied out,’ with vast numbers of people journeying to distant locales to sell their labour for economic remuneration. Those distant places are thus equally crucial locales in the production of local consumption thresholds (Figure 7.1 below).
MAP 7.2 Employment geography of surveyed population, 1999

53% CBD, Atlantic Coast, northern and southern suburbs, industrial areas

12% local

15% Coloured/Asian communities

17% other African communities

SOURCE: Base map CMC 1996; data from author’s survey

Estimated daily flows to places of employment (journeys to work)

Case study area
Ultimately, however, all of this movement around the city — all of this quotidian "travel"— added up to a median household income of between R1,250-R1500/month, a figure that reflects the structurally disadvantageous place of African households within Cape Town’s labour markets. A third of the surveyed population survived on less than R1000/month (Table 7.1). About 86% of the population earned less than R1,750/month. And so, informal densification provided concentrated “markets”, but the same forces that produced that informal densification in the first place simultaneously limited its overall income potential. Hence a contradictory result: “densified” poverty.
Table 7.1  Household income, surveyed population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (R' s)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 500</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-750</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751-1000</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-1250</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1251-1500</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501-1750</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-2000</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2500</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501- up</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=91</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Author’s fieldwork, 1999

Understood as a “threshold,” then, the spatial construction of densified poverty is another way of talking about the real “structural” limitations of the African food market, an important theme in UIS literature, particularly the neo-Marxist literature. Demand is only so big. There are only so many homes, only so many jobs, only so many Rands. “Development” of the UIS is, without question, constrained by this structured urban spatiality. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, this “structural” limitation is also a “structural” breeding ground, as it were, for informal sector agents, who specialise in supplying basic urban reproductive commodities to this particular market (food, but also housing, energy, clothing, etc.). To understand this point further, however, it is necessary to move on with the analysis, shifting the focus from the spatiality of market demand to the spatiality of food consumption, particularly as the latter implicates informal traders, who seek to capture cash flows within the local space-economy.

FOOD CONSUMPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR

The geography of demand is not the same thing as the geography of consumption. Specifically, demand is the “moment” that precedes consumption. To actually meet their (minimum) metabolic needs, to consume, African households in the Western Cape Province, the majority of whom reside in metropolitan Cape Town, purchased an average
of R5,560 of food in 1995, the last year for which reliable figures are presently available (Table 7.2).

**TABLE 7.2 Annual household expenditures, Western Cape, 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rand per annum</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>5,560</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing/footwear</td>
<td>1,821</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical services</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>4,309</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21,753</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Central Statistical Service, 1997

Importantly, this represented about one-fourth of total household income per annum, putting the economic importance of food far ahead of other comparatively well-researched material requirements: housing, transport, education and medical services. In a word, food was big business, poverty notwithstanding. Food expenditures (26%) as a percentage of total household income were and likely remain almost double housing costs (14%) — and roughly equal to what is spent on paying taxes (9%); buying (public and private) transport (9%); and purchasing clothing and footwear (8%) — combined.

**Income, African culture and the food basket**

These purchasing acts were mediated by, amongst other things, the ways that income and cultural proclivities interacted. As shown in Table 7.3 below, for instance, the “average” food basket of a “typical” African household in the Western Cape Province — a household earning between R1250-1500 per month — was an expected bundle of disparate commodities. However, two of the top three food items listed in Table 6.4 are in the first instance meats, which make up 29% of the total monthly food budget, and in
the second instance fruits and vegetables, which make up 13% of this budget. The dominance of meat is particularly important, as meat expenditures increase with income, whilst fruit purchases tend to stay the same (CSS 1997).

**TABLE 7.3 Monthly food baskets of African household, Western Cape**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Item</th>
<th>Rands per month</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meats</td>
<td>137.08</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>113.67</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruits</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>43.42</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter, fats, oils</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar products</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, tea, cocoa</td>
<td>21.08</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.92</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and seafood</td>
<td>13.58</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrups, jams, related</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snacks</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** (Months imputed from) Central Statistical Service, 1997

Significantly, informal retailers dominate the fruit and vegetable trade in the case study area. As might be expected, the meat trade is far more complex, with specific types of meat items betraying very different commodity chains, especially regarding the role of the informal sector. However, one type of meat product where the informal sector is particularly important in BMCT is offal bits (liver, hearts, tripe, sheep crowns, etc.), as these bits tend to be cheaper than other kinds of fresh (and frozen) meats. Furthermore, offal is a relatively more important part of the African diet, again reflecting cultural proclivities (Karaan and Myburgh 1992). All African income groups consume substantial amounts of offal (CSS 1997). Accordingly, the remainder of the discussion here will focus principally on these three food types: fruits, vegetables and offal, though with comparison to other basic foodstuffs when necessary.

**Fruit and vegetables and offal markets 'captured' informally**

How important are informal agents in the geography of food consumption in the case study area? In a word, very important, particularly for the three commodities of interest
here. Based on typical expenditure patterns provided by ninety-one African households randomly surveyed for this thesis, and comparing this sample data with official expenditure data for the Western Cape province as a whole (CSS 1997), Table 7.4 below calculates the annual fruit and vegetable and offal markets in the case study area and, most importantly, the percentage of these markets “captured” by local informal operators. While these are broad estimates only, and should not be taken too literally, they do suggest noteworthy empirical realities.

**TABLE 7.4 Local thresholds in Case Study Area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(BMCT)</th>
<th>Total Randi per annum</th>
<th>% UIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits and Vegetables</td>
<td>112,860,000</td>
<td>125,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offal</td>
<td>5,367,000</td>
<td>25,865,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total market value</td>
<td>118,227,000</td>
<td>151,265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL cash to UIS</td>
<td>112,853,000</td>
<td>142,110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Case Study Area</td>
<td>20,924,000</td>
<td>26,349,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Survey data from author’s fieldwork, 1999 and CSS 1997; estimates based on household numbers included in Mazur and Qangule, 1997.

Bracketing this share with low and high estimates, Table 7.4 calculates that by the end of the 1990s local informal traders captured about 96% of the total annual African demand for fruit and vegetables, which itself totalled somewhere between R112 (low) and R125 million (high). (The majority of this demand was for vegetables, with potatoes, cabbages, onions and carrots the most popular items [Myburgh and Karaan 1999; see also CSS 1995]). Similarly, local informal traders captured about 84% of the local offal market, which itself totalled somewhere between R5.4 and R25.8 million. Local informal agents operating within the case study area’s space-economy captured other

4 The differences between low and high estimates given here for offal are due to the use of official data for “low” estimates and the author’s own fieldwork for “high” estimates. As seen in the data given in Table 7.4, fieldwork and official estimates for fruits and vegetables were largely the same; however, official estimates appear to badly estimate offal expenditures. Whereas official consumption figures estimate that African households only spend R2-3/month on offal, estimates for this thesis estimate that the figure is more like R10/month. Indeed, only 16% of the households surveyed for this thesis reported never buying offal; half of these households reported buying it 1-3 times a month, whilst a third reported buying it once or twice per week. A typical offal purchase is around R4.
kinds of African household expenditures. For instance, housing, transport and personal services all involve informal consumption dynamics. They also captured parts of all the food commodity markets that shape African consumption. However, it is difficult to imagine two specific commodity markets more thoroughly dominated by the local informal sector than the fruit and vegetable and offal trades. Visualised as a kind of abstract space-economy, Figure 7.2 presented below shows this dominance. Figure 7.2 "maps" the consumption practices of nine randomly selected African households (10% sample size).

FIGURE 7.2  "Capturing cash," nine households and local informal operators, by food type

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, 1999

Distance cash "travels" from each household

"Informal" economy  Local space-economy
There are two main points to make from this simple mapping. The first point is that only one of the African households (household number "4") purchased the sampled food basket (cereals, mutton, poultry, offal and fruits/vegetables) exclusively from local informal sector agents. This accords with the sample population: only 7 of 91 households surveyed (8%) did likewise. All the other households purchased from both informal and formal agents. More, five of the nine (56%) households (those labelled "1," "5," "6," "7," and "9") purchased at least one type of commodity from non-local formal agents. This too generally reflects the patterns of the larger surveyed population, where 60 of 91 (66%) households purchased food from non-local formal agents (supermarkets). The larger significance is that the local informal sector does not necessarily thrive because African consumers have no other options. Linked to the employment geography depicted in Map 7.2 above, African households purchase food products all over the city as part of their daily movement. Cash is transferred accordingly.

The second point is that whilst informal operators “capture” cash transfers in all the food commodity types listed (and these are just sample items), all of the households transfer cash to fruit and vegetable traders, and six of the eight households (75%) who reported buying offal bits on a regular basis did so from local informal operators. These figures also basically accord with the aggregated data presented in Table 7.4, where nearly all (i.e. 96%) fruit and vegetable sales and 82% of offal sales were channelled informally.

"GOING INFORMAL"

Map 7.2 and Figure 7.1 (above) both show quite dearly that there is ample opportunity for African households to by-pass the local informal sector in toto; households send members out to work, where they also shop. They do not do so, as Figure 7.2 above shows. In fact, African consumers typically split their food purchasing patterns: transferring cash to the non-local (and local) formal economy as well as the local informal economy. What this suggests is that informal agents are, in fact, building supply chains that are extremely useful to African consumers in the case study area. In a word, “going informal” is not a forced practice, but a considered one.

One of the crucial material resultants, then, is that, as Figure 7.2 also shows, local informal agents who build these supply chains in the fruits, vegetables and offal markets are “capturing” hard-won community capital, “retaining” it for further developmental work in the local space-economy (cf. Gunn and Dayton-Gunn 1992). On this account, where capital retention, multiplier effects, and local “thickness” are deployed as indices
of urban development, informal agents may actually be contributing more to LED than is generally considered. This does not mean that this contribution is without contradiction; nor does it elevate a romantic view of informal trading dynamics; more does it sidestep real "structural" limitations. But the competencies of the informal sector — the things it does and, more importantly, the heterogeneity of how it does them — should not be lost in what follows.

7.2

Fruits, vegetables and the spatial practices of informal supply

With the material geography of African food demand and consumption broadly established, it is now possible to consider in some detail the spatial practices of supply, particularly as these practices implicate the structurally situated agency of informal food traders themselves. In this section, a series of short "practice vignettes" are sketched. These vignettes first focus on the fruit and vegetable trade. Section 7.3 then shifts the discussion to the informal meat trade, most especially as this involves the distribution of offal parts (tripe, intestines, liver, hearts, etc.).

With the exception of the first vignette detailed below, which addresses the "absent" producer-trader of Black Metropolitan Cape Town, each vignette is fundamentally about the practical life of an individual trader. But as each of these traders also moves through the real, material world, each vignette is also an avenue through which the material spatiality of the informal sector can be more productively explored. As such, each vignette provides empirical evidence of a larger theoretical principle associated with the production of space. We follow the traders, then, not only to learn about them, but also, and no less importantly, to learn about the urban conditions they both create and confront.

"PRACTICE VIGNETTE 1": THE (ABSENT) PRODUCER-TRADER AND THE AGRICULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF NON-PRODUCTION

This first vignette is, paradoxically, about a kind of African food trader that does not (yet) exist in Black Metropolitan Cape Town: the agent who (informally) produces the food in loco that is then (informally) traded in the marketplace in loco. For African households in Cape Town do not by and large grow their own food — this despite years of encouragement by community development advocates (Karaan and Mohammed 1998) and much urban policy speculation (Eberhard 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d). Such an
observation may seem superfluous for an urban population or indeed irrelevant to the present discussion. It is neither. We are obliged to start with the (non-existent) producer-trader because the overwhelming focus of urban food research, in Cape Town as elsewhere in Africa, is presently on in loco vegetable production or the immediate potential therein (on Cape Town see Karaan and Myburgh 1992; Sandler 1994; Khan 1994). As discussed in chapter VI, this in turn reflects an overall LED interest in re-imagining African space in toto, particularly in the late and post-apartheid eras, from a place of re-production and circulation to a place of production — wherever possible (Wesgro 1995).

This also reflects growing policy recognition worldwide that urban food production is no longer considered an “oxymoron” in rapidly urbanizing cities of the South (Tinker 1994a, 1994b), as the recent literature on urban agriculture suggests (see e.g. Sanyal 1985; Rakodi 1988; Smit and Nasr 1992; Choguill 1995; UNDP 1996; Webb 1998). For example, in Kampala fifty percent of the land by the early 1990s was farmed by about thirty percent of the population and between 1990-94 “open space cultivation” in Harare grew from 4,822 hectares to 8,392 hectares, remarkable land use transformations by any standard (Tinker 1994a; Mougeot 1998). But Cape Town is neither Kampala nor Harare. Whilst poverty and unemployment are certainly on the rise (see Beall et al. 1999), urban cultivation is not (Eckert et al. 1997a, 1997b). As Table 7.5 shows, fewer than one in ten (7.7%) African households surveyed for this thesis in mid-1999 were growing food for self-consumption on their own plot, a situation almost unchanged from research conducted in the late 1980s (Eberhard 1989a).

TABLE 7.5 African household-based food production, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On-site food production</th>
<th>% (Most important reason)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No space for garden</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate soil</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have tried in past, too difficult</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack production skills</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backyard shack</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheaper to buy food</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce food and save money</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Survey data from author’s fieldwork, 1999
Importantly, fewer than one in eight (13.2%) households had tried gardening activities in the past. But subsequent attrition was high (about two-thirds). And those few who do produce vegetables do not, for the most part, sell them in the local marketplace (Karaan and Mohammed 1998: 7), although one local urban food advocate claims, “whilst mainly for self-consumption, gardeners are slowly selling food.”

Indeed, those in Table 7.5 who “have tried” gardening (even for themselves) but then subsequently abandoned their efforts mentioned a kaleidoscope of specific problems: insects, snails, high winds and not least theft (cf. Khan 1994; Karaan and Mohammed 1998). But it was the form and function of the built environment itself, hewed out mainly in the apartheid years, which mattered most. In terms of urban form, almost one in four households (38.5%) cited “inadequate space” for gardening activities, a syntactic constraint associated with the demise of garden city design commitments, the move to low-cost labour hostels and temporary family housing in the 1950s and 1960s and, most importantly, the squatter invasion of the 1970s and subsequent upgrading schemes in the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of function, the phenomenon of “backyard shacks,” itself a manifestation of pent-up housing needs (Gilbert et al. 1998), prevented almost one in ten households (8.8%) from engaging in production (at least as the primary reason stated).

**Geography matters: the structuring role of untidy local contingencies**

The difficulty of transforming African space into a space of production is another way of saying, with Massey (1993), that geography matters — that what Michael Peter Smith (2001: 3) calls the “untidy contingencies” of place matter, and in a structural sense. Not all forms of agency are possible. Specifically, the material geography of the city has militated actively against the easy “weaving together” of production and trading networks (cf. Law 1992), even at the margins of the informal food trade and even with much local institutional support and well-meaning intervention. Climatic processes are at work here, to be sure, but no less important are bio-ecological, architectural, economic and politico-ideological processes. It is neither nature nor society that accounts for these empirics, an important theme in what follows. To meet their fundamental metabolic requirements for fruits and vegetables, then, African households rely on a wide range of provisioning systems. And whilst fruit and vegetable production mostly falls within the sphere of a
formal, world-class horticultural complex (Eckert et al. 1997a), some of this production directly implicates African trading agents, as the next vignette shows.

“PRACTICE VIGNETTE 2”: MAMA J AND THE STREET MEILIES OF KTC

For the most part, cooked street foods in the African townships involve meat products (as section 7.3 will show). An important exception, however, is the cooked mielie (or maize) trade. During the maize growing season in the Western Cape (January-June), cooked mielie hawkers appear all over the African townships, selling boiled and salted ears to customers for between R2 and R2.5 each. But the overall population of such hawkers is limited relative to other kinds of food commodities. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that African consumption thresholds for mielie ears are limited. Urban African households in the Western Cape in 1995 spent on average less than R1/month on mielies (CSS 1997). This figure probably underestimates actual expenditures on mielies as African households also spent an average of about R10/month of “snacks away from home,” and part of these expenditures would certainly include street food consumption (ibid). But the overall thresholds are limited compared with the general fruit and vegetables and meat markets. The second, and far more important reason, is that what appears to be at the “moment” of retailing a relatively simple, undemanding job turns out to be, on any account, one of the most taxing forms of income generation in the entire metropolitan labour market.

This is revealed, for instance, in the spatial practices of “Mama J,” a married, 32-year-old mother of three who was trading daily on Mjodo Street at the heart of KTC in April, 1999. Mama J reported that, “Oh, all the [African] ladies — they are doing the same thing like me.” And indeed, conversations with other mielie traders in the Nyanga/New Crossroads area suggest this is the case. Mama J’s movements are therefore fairly typical ones. These movements and the practical, material spatialities they produce are summarized in Figure 7.3 below, using the simple notational schema of Hagerstrand’s time-geography. Reading this schema from left to right, and in the direction of cash transfers, seven concrete sites, four main domains of interaction, and three forms of informal labour are discernable.

But the schema is best read from the bottom-up, and through the movements of Mama J herself, whose agency (bold arrow) both structures (and is structured by) a topology of connections that bind body, market, township, metropole and region into a single daily routine. This routine starts at 2:00 a.m. when a 12-seater taxi-bus (informally
FIGURE 7.3  Spatial practices of street-based mielie hawking: “Mama J” in April 1999

Cash transfers (R$)

Evening
Afternoon
Morning
Night

Metro Township Local Township Metro Regional

Consumption

RANDS
WOOD
TAXI
MIELIES
FIELD

Retailing
Distribution
Production

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Places of non-township employment
African residences outside of KTC
KTC residences
Mama J’s street stall
Mama J’s home
Shared taxi
Mielie fields in Caledon

Consumer movements
Mama J’s movements

Station-domain, coupling point, shaded when “used”

SOURCE: Author’s fieldwork, KTC, April 1999

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Informal food vendors in KTC, pedestrian flows and “Mama J’s” spatial practices

SOURCE: Base map (CTCC 1999); Author’s fieldwork, April 1999

Consumer movements

Mama J’s movements

Domain, coupling point

Informal vendor
operated) picks up Mrs J at her shack [5], which is located about three hundred meters from where she trades (Map 7.3). This taxi-bus proceeds to pick up another eight to ten people, all women like Mrs J who trade in cooked mielies [6]. "The ladies are mostly from Philippi and Brown's Farm, but some are from Old Crossroads," Mrs J states. This initial township-based transport ritual can take an hour or more, depending on the order she is picked up. Each of the traders pays the taxi-bus driver R80, the price of a "return ticket" to the Caledon area, a maize growing region about 150 kilometres outside of Cape Town [7]. Normally, the taxi-bus arrives in Caledon at about 6:30 a.m. And here the real process of informal labour commences.

From 6:30 to about 8:30 or 9:00, Mrs J and her taxi-mates work in the maize fields of select farmers, picking the ears off the stalks themselves. "Sometimes the mielies are not alright. But the quality must be good because the people [African consumers] — they just want the good ones. So we ladies, we pick them." Here, then, in the fields of Caledon, the spatiality of the informal food sector is the spatiality of production. Mrs J normally fills up six sacks. But most of the other women do the same. Any less and the trip would not pay; any more and the taxi-bus could not accommodate them. (There is an economic floor, as it were, and a technical ceiling.) She pays the farmer R25-30 sack, depending on the weight, and thus by 9:00 a.m. has already spent a total of between R230 and R260. She has to sell one hundred ears in KTC later in the day just to cover these costs. This means that, upon returning home at about mid-morning [5], she has to get out onto the street soon as she can [4]. Most of her business comes in the late afternoon and early evening, when "the people come home [to KTC] from work [all over Cape Town]" ([1] to [3]). But she is obliged to begin hawking just before noon, catching the local flows of people who do not work (unemployed households members, pensioners, children, etc.). "[In the early part of the day] old women come — and they sit and talk to you. It's the people I know. And some children. They have the mielies. It's nice for them. Later [on], I don't know those people. Most of those people I don't know. But all kinds buy from me."

Though a simple operation, throughout the day she boils her mielies on a wooden fire, an energy source that like her transport needs is also acquired through informal channels. "There is a man I know with a bakkie [small lorry], he sells the wood." So there are impacts on the local economy. Two main backward linkages — to transport and energy — benefit other informal agents. Mrs. J buys "bundles" at R3.5 each, further
cutting into her profits, which forces her to sell an additional two mielies just to pay for each bundle. An inefficient form of energy, she needs several bundles over the course of the day. Finally, the day ends at 7:00 p.m., about 17 hours after it began. Mrs J claims profits of about R600-700 per month, or a little over R20/day — hardly more than R1 for every hour worked on the days she sources. While she does not do this everyday, she is obliged to make the trip with some frequency, usually two to three times a week. "The mielies are not so fresh after two days," she complains. Wastage through biological spoliation is sometimes deplorably high; but, again, it is mainly the freshness and quality of the mielies that attracts her customers in the first place. And she has competitors, one right across the street. "That woman over there," Mama J pointed out, "changed from selling meat to mielies when she saw me with the mielies. So I lost a little bit." For all of these reasons, then, she sets out again to Caledon regularly, even when she has (unrefrigerated) stock at home.

Heterogeneity and symmetry

The spatial practices of Mrs J's search for urban survival — the misleadingly mechanical "time-geography" of a seventeen hour daily ritual that over the course of a month "translates" into R600-700 of hard cash — is, indeed, just that: a translation. It is a networked topology that transgresses a myriad of spaces that are normally apprehended separately. Is this economic geography? Yes and no. Is this social geography? Yes and no. Is this natural geography? Yes and no. Is this transport geography? Yes and no. Is this urban geography? Yes and no. "Yes," because it is all of the above, all at the same time. "No," because it is not any one of these exclusively. This is a hybrid. The technical space of the taxi — a crucial network intermediary here — links up seamlessly with the natural space of the mielie field. Both are needed. More, the economic space of mielie production in Caledon is linked back to the physical space of Mjodo Street-as-street in KTC [4].

Additional "bits and pieces" enter the story. Water is boiled with chopped wood that is acquired from yet another informal actor. And Mjodo Street as a physical, syntactic place — a quality Giddens (1984) ignores in his structuration of society — "funnels in" possible consumers who carry cash earned from the application of their labour in a thousand employment sites around the metropole [1]. The form and function of the city "act". The spatial practices of Mrs J's search for urban survival, then, are heterogeneous networks populated not only by human "actors," but non-human ones.
too. Aside from the cash and the taxi and street, the mielies degrade immediately through microbiological activity, forcing Mrs J into more trips to Caledon than she would like. And there is scalar symmetry as well. Mrs J moves from the micro-space of her home to the macro-space of the region, drawing in metropolitan labour thresholds through the flow of township customers. Social at one end, natural at the other, physical in between, the spatial practices of the informal food sector in Black Metropolitan Cape Town also melt agency (Mrs J's daily movements) and structure (e.g. consumption thresholds, the African labour market, the morphology of the city) into the single space of the heterogeneously engineered actor-network.

“PRACTICE VIGNETTE 3”: ‘MAMA N’ AND THE BI-FOCAL NEIGHBORHOOD

If Mama J's agency opens up the material spatiality of the informal food trade in particularly revealing ways, it is, at the same time, not that representative of the overall sector. In addition to the limited numbers of traders actually involved, the mielie trade only lasts six months. Other commodities traded more or less all year long therefore need to be tracked, particularly vegetables like potatoes, cabbage and onions (which together form 50% of African vegetable demand) and deciduous fruits like apples, pears and grapes (CSS 1997). Three additional vignettes will help in this regard. The first vignette focuses on “Mama N,” a 34-year-old mother of four who resides in New Crossroads. The next vignette will then focus on “Mr. M,” a 28-year old, unmarried man who trades near Mama N, but through slightly different spatial practices. Finally, the third vignette focuses on a much larger trader, 55-year-old “Mr. H,” who operates out of the Nyanga Terminus transport interchange and employs several workers. Together, these three traders instantiate most of the tactics that shape the overall material spatiality of the fruit and vegetable trade in Black Metropolitan Cape Town.

Mama N

Like Mama J, Mama N does not trade from home, despite heavy reproductive responsibilities (she has an elderly mother as well and an absent husband). And like Mama J, Mama N undertakes a series of movements that knit together a heterogeneous topology of survival that, in most respects, is broadly indicative of a larger population of informal traders. But Mama N differs from Mama J in three respects. First; she sells a lot of different kinds of food commodities. Second, she does so at two distinct places over the course of the day: a small stand near here home and a local primary school. And third, she sources near Epping Market, the central wholesaling point in the
metropole, and from larger informal retailers like "Mr. H" at Nyanga Terminus. As before, Mama N's movements are summarized in Figure 7.4 below, again using the simple notational schema of Hagerstrand's time-geography. But these are supplemented with locales. Demarcated in red, Figure 7.4 also shows Mama N's trading locations and daily pathways [spatial practices] as well as the locations of all informal food traders in New Crossroads (depicted both here and in the other maps that follow as small white circles).

Figure 7.4 shows that Mrs N spends most of the day linking up two sites: the market stall [4] and the primary school [6]. In between, she attends to brief chores at home [5], such as checking up on her elderly mother or churning a washing basin. As with almost all other informal food traders of her economic size, three time per week Mrs N. wakes up at about 5:30 a.m. and takes a taxi-bus, usually from Nyanga Terminus [7], to a locale where she can purchase wholesale a sufficient variety of vegetables and fruits. She spends about R7.00 getting to this locale. For Mrs N, as for 50% of the fruit and vegetables traders surveyed for this thesis, this locale is typically Epping Market [8]. Given the importance of Epping both to Mama N and to the overall informal trading population, then, the functional use of Epping is briefly profiled here before returning to the pathway of Mama N's spatial practices (Map 7.4).

The Informal Uses of Epping Market

The principal focal point of the overall fresh produce distribution system in Cape Town, "Epping Market" is actually three distinct locales: first, it is the publicly managed market facility itself, built in 1965, where formal wholesaling agents operate; second, it is the recently accommodated informal or emerging wholesalers operating within Epping grounds but not within the market facility per se; and, lastly, it is the informal wholesalers and informal agents of farmers (called "Hawker's Paradise," which is itself of varying quality and consolidation) operating alongside the road leading to the market facility. These three locales are progressively informal in nature, with only Epping market itself and the adjacent upgraded area managed by the Cape Metropolitan Council (Map 7.5). However, with the exception of the immediate Hawker's Paradise, the entire area around Epping was gazetted in July 1999 as a Hawkers Prohibited Area (Province of the Western Cape 1999). According to one local official, the mid-1999 strategy was "to develop that [Hawker's Paradise] area into a formalised market" (Williamson, interview). This follows the informal markets imagination laid out in chapter VI.
FIGURE 7.4 Spatial practices of fruit and vegetable trading: “Mrs. N” in April, 1999

Cash transfers (R's)

Metro Township Local Township Metropolitan

Consumption

Evening

Afternoon

Morning

Retailing Distribution Sourcing

1. Places of non-township employment
2. Residences outside New Crossroads
3. New Crossroads residences
4. Corner stand near home
5. Mama N’s Home
6. School yard
7. Taxi rank
8. Three locales at Epping market area

Mrs N’s movements

Consumer movements

SOURCE: Author’s fieldwork, KTC, April 1999
MAP 7.4  "Mrs. N's" Informal spatial practices, New Crossroads

Informal vendor of foodstuffs
Mrs. N's movements
Consumer movements

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, April, 1999
Hawker’s Paradise mushroomed dramatically in the 1990s (Williamson, interview). Indeed, by the end of the decade only one-third of those who frequented the “Epping” area actually entered the formal market facility itself as their primary source of produce. Typically, this was three times per week. Only 10% of those surveyed for this thesis used the recently accommodated emerging traders on the grounds of the facility as their primary source of produce, also typically three times per week. Rather, 60% typically bought directly (though not necessarily exclusively) from other informal traders and intermediaries outside the market facilities, in the Hawker’s Paradise area. They largely did so, in the succinct words of Mama N, “because they have ‘less price’,” an economic condition arising from the very informality of the locale, which externalises operating costs to the public at large and leaves out market agents (cf. Wolpe 1995: 103-113). Moreover, they do so with greater variety. In contrast to the typical three times per week

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5 These practices are not mutually exclusive. As a population, informal traders visit all three locales. However, when asked, “where do you get the food you are selling here?” the majority of fruit and vegetable traders surveyed emphasised the informal street market outside of Epping as their most important destination.
usage of the formal facilities, about 17% of traders who use the informal street market do so once or twice each week; 25% of these traders source three or four times each week; 17% source five times each week; and, most significantly 42% of this sub-population source six or seven times each week. This latter group, which represent 12% of the overall trading population, suggests that active, higher volume agents are more likely to buy through other informal agents near Epping, rather than in Epping. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that the larger enterprises become more formal. Indeed, the relationship may be precisely the opposite: capital accumulation may actually depend upon the on-going ability of traders to circumvent formal systems. Enterprise growth does not necessarily occasion more formal modes of operation.

*Mama N's sourcing, transport and retailing*

And so, like many others, Mama N tends to avoid the actual market facility. Whenever possible, she purchases goods from Western Cape farmers who send their own middlemen directly from Western Cape farms. Mrs N purchases between R125-175 of stock, depending on prevailing quality and what is available. She then pools resources with three other traders like herself to hire transport back to New Crossroads, normally paying R20 to carry her and her goods back. Mama N has to sell about R530 per week just to break even. So the selling day begins at about 8:30-9:00, first at a small stand erected on the corner of a street near her house. Ostensibly, this corner is zoned for a children’s park, but funds have never been acquired. And so, by default, functionally the park is an informal market. But the planners are right: local thresholds are minimal. As shown in Map 7.4 Mama N does not draw on township thresholds [2]. Unlike Mama J in KTC, people do not pass by her stand on their way to somewhere else. She is, quite literally, physically embedded in the residential space of New Crossroads. In all likelihood, then, Mama N would not be able to cover costs, much less make a profit, based only on the neighbourhood thresholds attracted to her small stall.

Accordingly, she develops a bi-focal strategy to compensate. “At 10:00 [in the morning],” she pointed out, “the children at that school take a break”. It is a small opportunity in a big city. But Mama N seizes it. She moves to the school grounds for these 20 minutes in space-time. She sells fruits to the children (apples, pears, bananas), who are eager for a quick bite; but she also prepares small sandwiches and snacks, augmenting her primary trading activity. With the break over, she moves back to her

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6 Calculated as follows: average of R150 of stock/trip x 3 trips per week + R21 for travel costs to Epping + R60 for return travel costs = R531 in total costs/week.
stall until the early afternoon, when the children break again for lunch. The cycle repeats itself. After this second school break is over, she returns to her stall to complete the selling day at about 7:30. By this time the residents of New Crossroads have all returned home after a long day's work [1], stopping off to buy a few items from Mama N [5]. After a month of this, she might "capture" R900-R1000 in profit. It is (just) enough to survive in New Crossroads.

**Relational dialectics**

It is unnecessary to repeat here the insights already gained from Mama J's cooked mielie practices. Suffice to note briefly that, like Mama J, Mama N in her daily rituals also transgresses and knits together a topology of heterogeneous spaces and intermediaries: stand, home, school, taxi, market, children, cash, pedestrians, food. But there is something else too. For Lefebvre (as for Harvey (1996), Olman (1993) and Swyngedouw (1999)), urban spatial practices like those associated with Mama N occasion a material dialectics of internalised relations. What does this mean here? Put in the language introduced in chapter VI, it means that the subject, market and metropole co-create each other. They are tied up with one another across scale. Hence Mama N does not precede the city; flinging herself upon it fully formed, a "trajectory"; she becomes who she is, at least in part, by encountering the city, by constructing from its spaces a way of being in the world, by building compensatory tactics.

This is not rank voluntarism. Mama N internalises the contradictions of the city, but "engineers" a space to resolve those contradictions as best she can: in the (structural) face of inadequate consumer thresholds, for example, she binds in another urban space, the space of the school. This is untidy business, difficult to zone, but it works. Following Lefebvre, there is a certain spatial "competence" here that gives material shape to New Crossroads' local economy, even as this "competence" allows for little more than urban survival. For its part, school space has its own rhythms, its own spatial practices. But Mama N maps those rhythms and practices into her own life as best she can. In like terms, the market and the metropole internalise her constant agency. The "school" is no longer just a school; it is an economic space too, a temporary marketplace formed out of the spatial flows and relations of New Crossroads. And the metropolitan space of distant Epping is concomitantly reconfigured, tied to small, almost invisible practices like these that are conducted deep within the neighbourhood terrain of African townships.
Not everyone who trades foodstuffs informally within the neighbourhood terrain of African townships is female. “Mr. M” is a 28-year old male, long retrenched from a manufacturing job, who was in May, 1999 slowly building up a R1,100/ month fruit and vegetable enterprise also in New Crossroads (See Box 7.1 below). “I will make it bigger,” he reported, “but I need to get the transport for that.” Mr. M is not alone. Only about one in eight informal traders surveyed for this thesis owned their own transport.

**BOX 7.1** A morning out with Mr. M, 29 March 1999

I accompanied “Mr M” on his urban rounds for an entire morning, starting at 6:00 a.m. on 29 March 1999. Chatting about the latest football news, we first drove to Hawker's Paradise outside Epping, where he purchased most of the goods that he acquired that day from the Epping area. On this particular morning, he purchased apples, grapes, tomatoes, avocados, butternut squash, pears, plums and pineapples. He purchased the pears and plums from the recently accommodated emerging traders, and inside the Epping facility itself he also purchased one box of pineapples, saying, “a few people — they can buy these things. But they cost too much. I only buy a little bit.” The pineapple agent I spoke with agreed. He said that about 20% of his sales were probably to informal vendors, but he saw little real growth in the African market: “It's just a bit too expensive for the [African] township market right now,” he said (Theron, interview). In value terms, about 90% of Mr. M's produce were actually purchased outside the formal Epping facility. Dissatisfied with most of the produce left on the floor by 7:00 (“it's too late now; you must come at five”), we then went to the Philippi Horticultural Area, where Mr. M purchased about 100 cabbages — all that my car could hold — paying R280 for them. He would have bought more. By mid-afternoon, he said, all these cabbages would be gone (I checked later; mostly, they were). Mr. M had made a profit of R100 on his cabbages. But when he visits both Epping and Philippi his normal transport costs can come close to this. So his fresh cabbages draw in business; his other commodities make him profits.

At the time of the study, Mr. M’s principal place in the urban world was a wooden structure with roof, built up over several months out of private savings, that sat in the back portion of a fully serviced parcel of land where his “many relatives” live in a formal state-built home. He does not technically reside in this house, although he uses its facilities. Rather, he resides in a small backyard shack behind his back yard business — two layers of informality, folded into the other. The larger site therefore accommodates four distinct spaces: three private spaces and one public space, all located on a site originally designed for single-family residence only. Mr. M’s two main local spaces
(business and bed) are physically connected by a corrugated roof, which creates an additional space, enclosed but also open, not quite outside, not quite inside, where he conducts both business and pleasure.

Like other home-based fruit and vegetable traders, this place is, from Mr. M’s point of view, the epicentre of a network of metropolitan-wide locales that he recurrently deploys to trade food. Once again, this deployment is represented in Figure 7.5 below in the same notational manner as previously. In comparing these practices, much is similar to those of Mama N, his nearby competitor. Mr. M wakes early and takes a taxi from Nyanga to Epping, where he sources a variety of goods. As Table 7.6 below shows, about a quarter of the fruit and vegetables traders surveyed for this thesis do likewise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sourcing transport pattern</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxi direct to Epping area</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi and train combination to Epping</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk to local informal wholesaling point</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own my own transport</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No travel, another trader brings to me</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N = 54</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Author’s fieldwork, June 1999

Like Mama N, moreover, Mr. M also tends to buy outside the facility grounds. This said, however, he sometimes enters the Epping facility for items not grown in the Western Cape, such as pineapples, which are marketed exclusively by agents who represent growers in semi-tropical Kwazulu Natal (see Box 7.1 above). At the same time, the differences with Mama N are important. As a local-place, Mr. M’s stall draws not only on adjacent neighbourhood space [3], but also on pedestrian through flow [2]. Mama N does not locate her market stall on a main road, despite available space. (Almost certainly this is to allow quick and recurrent access to home life.) Mr. M’s home life and market life overlap in toto. Fortunately for him, this location happens to lock in both zonal (neighbourhood) and fluvial (passing) spaces of consumption (Map 7.6).
FIGURE 7.5  Spatial practices of home-bad retailing: “Mr M” in March 1999

Cash transfers (Rs)

Metro  Township  Local  Township  Metro

Consumption

Evening

Work

Afternoon

Rands

Morning

Retailing

Early hours

Foodstuffs

Sourcing

Sourcing

Distribution

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

1. Places of non-township employment
2. African residences outside of New Crossroads
3. New Crossroads residences
4. Mr. M's home/stall
5. Nyanga junction taxi
6. Three locales at Epping
7. Private backie (pick-up/small lorry)
8. Philippi Horticultural Area

Consumer movements

Mr. H's movements

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, KTC, April 1999
MAP 7.6  Informal spatial practices of Mr. M, New Crossroads

SOURCE: Base map (CTCC 1999); author's fieldwork, April, 1999
Philippi Horticultural Area

But the biggest difference from Mama N is that, rather than return directly home, Mr M hires transport from Epping to the Philippi Horticultural Area (PHA). The PHA takes up about 3,000 hectares and is located at the heart the Cape Metropole (Map 7.7). In 1995, about eighty-five producers cultivated 1900 of these hectares, growing forty-four different kinds of vegetables, flowers and herbs (Wolpe 1996). Historically, the PHA has supplied the Cape metropolitan area; in the mid-1990s, for example, about three-quarters of the loose vegetables sold at Epping originated in the PHA (ibid). But in recent years, PHA producers have also begun to export their produce. One PHA farm, for instance, specialized in supplying the U.K. carrot market (Rix, interview).

MAP 7.7 Philippi Horticultural Area, Metropolitan Cape Town

SOURCE: CMC 1996b; PHA demarcation added
But PHA’s global links are still exceptional. More fundamental are local links, including those with the informal agents. Aside from supplying Epping (and increasingly food store chains such as Shoprite, Pick-n-Pay and Spar), in the late 1990s the PHA also had four “farmers’ markets.” These are wholesaling points that distribute both Epping and PHA foodstuffs directly to the public at large and, more importantly, to small informal sector retailers. During the spring months, Mr. M is particularly fond of sourcing from the PHA “farmers’ markets”, despite the extra costs involved. “The [PHA] cabbages are always better,” he reported, “because they are fresh. Picking up one of the cabbages, he continued, “I will sell all these ones. They will be gone. Everyone likes to buy the fresh cabbages.” Of course, Mr. M was right: as discussed in section 7.1, cabbage is a good product in the townships. But they are bulky and difficult to transport efficiently. And the key to improved turnover is freshness, as in the cooked mielie trade.

Informal/formal/spatial

The tactics and practices of Mr. M continue the theoretical themes suggested by the earlier vignettes. Heterogeneity, symmetry and dialectics are all at work here too. But Mr. M’s topologies betray another important feature: they create a not quite formal, not quite informal urban geography. Or as Murdoch (1998) has put it, Mr M’s topologies create urban spaces that are simultaneously “prescriptive” and “negotiated”. Informal and formal are co-created places and moments. At the point where cabbage becomes cash, for instance, the spatiality of Mr. M’s agency is informal, a negotiated “hole” in the otherwise prescriptive “meshwork” of an early 1980s apartheid landscape. (For this retailing activity escapes the Receiver of Revenue and zoning pretensions.) Moreover, as Mr N moves out into the city, his home-based informality moves with him: he hops a “black taxi” to Epping, ‘sedimenting’ cash in the informal transport sector along the way, just as Mama J sediments cash in the informal wood trade in order to prepare her mielies.

7 That is not the case, of course, for the Western Cape’s overall agricultural complex. A major exporter of world-class fruits and wines, particularly to the European Union, the Western Cape’s more than 8,300 commercial farms also produce wheat, barley and vegetables and husband for domestic consumption cattle, pigs, sheep and poultry. In 1993, export earnings from deciduous fruit production and wine topped R2.25 billion. Though directly responsible for only 4.16% of total value added within the old provincial economy of 1992, the agricultural sector as a whole nonetheless generated 13% of the total Cape workforce — and directly sustained 350,000 lives. Two-thirds of agricultural workers were in the 1990s employed within the apple industry alone. In stark contrast with South Africa’s leading foreign exchange earners — the gold and diamonds which structure the mine-based space-economy — the Cape’s comparative advantage in horticulture and viticulture trickles more equitably down the labour chain (see Eckert et al. 1997a, 1997b).
Leaving the taxi behind, Mr M then spends most of his time outside the electronic space of Epping’s computer systems. His small purchasing habits help to re-produce the informality of Hawkers’ Paradise, forcing the local state to respond with calls of formalization (even as Western Cape farmers deploy that informal space no less than Mr M). But Mr M does eventually enter Epping, to buy a few pineapples. And here he plays by the rules of the formal economy. The transaction includes VAT and finds its way into the nation’s economic statistics. But Mr. M soon re-enters the “informal” economy when he hires private transport to the PHA. Once here, Mr. M moves quickly back into the “formal,” or enumerated economy because the wholesaler at the farmers’ market writes out a receipt. And so, like the pineapples at Epping, but not the apples, grapes or butternuts at Hawkers Paradise, Mr M’s cabbage transactions have been officially noted. They are part of the formal space of the state and the market. Ultimately, however, he returns home, selling his goods informally in a township that is otherwise entirely formal in nature (unlike KTC). This tactical cycle of survival repeats itself, day after day, month after month, year after year. In so doing, it articulates informal and formal into a single, practiced spatiality.

“PRACTICE VIGNETTE 5”. MARKET POWER AND MR. H

None of this is to gloss over the many empirical linkages that are essentially informal-informal in nature. A case is point is the crucial distributional relationship between small informal traders and large informal traders. This is also shown in Table 7.6 above. About a quarter of the fruit and vegetable traders surveyed for this thesis rely on other informal traders for their goods (13% received goods directly, whilst another 15% walked to central locales dominated by these traders). Large informal traders also play an important role in retailing directly to African households, mainly from key transport hubs. For example, three large traders, all of whom have lorries and several employees, supply Nyanga Terminus, effectively controlling one edge of the covered market constructed in 1995.

From such locales, these large traders perform their wholesaling role in supplying neighbourhood-based traders, linking up producers directly with African consumers. All of this is evident in the spatial practices of Mr. H, a fifty-five year old man residing in KTC, but operating out of Nyanga. Though cagey with numbers, evasive about his movements, and feigning poverty-like profits throughout, it was clear from several
discussions with “Mr H” that his network of sources was both wide and dense. Whilst he generally favoured the Epping area, Mr H reported that he often buys large volumes of cabbages directly from farmers, saying “its much better from the farms.” Mr. H also said he purchased about R4,000-R5,000 of fruits and vegetables daily, “depending on what's available.” Despite his turnover, however, Mr H claimed that wages paid (R150/week * 4 workers) and transport/vehicular maintenance costs (R500/week) ensured that he made weekly profits of “no more than R300 each week.” In order for this to be true, his average mark-up would be 1%. In fact, as he later admitted, he typically charges, for example, R12.50 for a box of tomatoes that he buys for R8 -- a mark-up of 56%. Whether he is a R1,200 per month trader, as he claims, or a much wealthier trader, as the evidence suggests, the turnover index alone (R120,000/month) greatly distinguishes people like Mr H from the small operators who make no more than R600-700 a month (people like Mama N). And indeed this shows up in how these larger traders view themselves. As Mr H put it: “I’m creating jobs, but the government doesn’t care. They want us to be a ‘community’ but we are not; the community is not good, I’m good. Not everyone is a hard worker.”

Most of the informal traders surveyed for this thesis draw on larger, township-based traders like Mr H for at least part of the produce they eventually retail. However, the extent varies. Only one-third of them rely principally on this relationship. Two of these traders are depicted in Map 7.8 below. These two traders rarely, if ever, leave township space for business purposes, practicing their trade entirely within the bounds of the KTC-New Crossroads-Nyanga area. The remaining two-thirds, people like Mr N, draw intermittently on this relationship, often when cash for extensive transport is tight, or when stocks are low and there is still selling time left in the day. When purchasing from Mr H, smaller traders typically use shopping trolleys. Surveyed traders undertake this trolley-based sourcing ritual twice or thrice weekly, with only a few sourcing once/week and even fewer four times or more/week. The “petrol-free” shopping trolley then, is the ubiquitous, “eco-sustainable” transport vehicle of township foodscapes, a reality that has not prevented the recurrent call by local authorities for “...practical arrangements to prevent shop trolleys from leaving their premises” and, furthermore, to

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*No time-geography analysis is presented for Mr. H because of his caginess and evasiveness during the two interview sessions. On a third occasion, I spoke with Mr. H's wife about these movements (how many farms visited in the past week, where they were, how much was bought, what kinds of goods, etc.) without success.
Mr. H's movements  ○ Informal foodstuff vendors
Small traders' 'sourcing' rituals

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, April, 1999
make it an "...offence to use shop trolleys in the City's streets, enforceable by law" (see CTCCb "Bulletin" 1999). In this situation, and in this manner, smaller traders effectively act as distribution agents for the larger, emerging traders (and indeed for Western Cape farmers). The overall relationship is therefore "informal-informal-formal," extending the fruit and vegetable channels of the Province deep into African space through the micro-capillaries of very small agents.

Networked power

Mr H's spatial practices reinforce an insight already gleaned from the network analysis of Mama J's agency: namely, that the local spaces of survival are connected to regional and national spaces. On this reading, the so-called "micro-spaces" of the case study area — the spaces of the stall and shopping trolley — are simply points along a line of connections that stretches across regional and national space. But in forging a crucial nexus between these spaces, Mr H has forged something else as well: power. For Mr H is, by any definition, a relatively powerful market actor. His turnover is many times higher than the other traders discussed so far. At the same time, Mr H's power is not possessed; it is performed. More fundamentally, it is engineered by successfully associating (and constantly holding together) across scale lorries (whose cam shafts break down), workers (who show up late), cash (that can be stolen at gun point), fruits and vegetables (that rot), market areas (that open and close at certain times), big farmers (that haggle), and small traders (that haggle even more). From all of this, Mr H creates a useful "road" for Western Cape (and national) producers to reach African consumers in Nyanga, New Crossroads and KTC. That "road" passes through Nyanga Terminus, which thus becomes for the small traders in the immediate environs what Law (1986) and others call an "obligatory point of passage."

But all this power is highly precarious. If the small traders currently dependent upon Mr H's "road" fail to pass through Nyanga Terminus, Mr. H's networks as constructed begin to weaken — and with it, his market power. Mr H knows this. When asked about the newly proposed Philippi Wholesaling Market last discussed in chapter VI, Mr H responded quickly: "As soon as I heard about that thing [Philippi East]," he stated, "I started to worry." What he meant by this was that, with Philippi eventually built, small traders like those depicted in Map 7.8 could then buy their produce elsewhere. They could be enrolled in other networks. His space within Nyanga
Terminus would no longer be “obligatory,” but optional, his power less formidable then it might otherwise appear.

SPATIAL ONTOLOGY AND UIS DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

It would, of course, be possible to continue with more “practice vignettes” from the fruit and vegetable trade. A multitude of traders labour everyday in Black Metropolitan Cape Town. But hopefully these vignettes have done their main job: namely, to provide empirical evidence for the ontological claim that the spatial practices of the UIS are dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical. While this is valuable in its own right, it begs an obvious question: why is all this important to know when considering the larger research question of UIS development planning, particularly as outlined in chapter VI? In part, the answer to this crucial question has already been broached in several of the vignettes, especially where the emphasis has been on spatial heterogeneity. Thus, for instance, the importance attached to the heterogeneously-built urban “palimpsest” in militating actively against the “weaving together” of locally-constituted production and trading networks within BMCT space. But such insights need further support here. Accordingly, the next section considers more explicitly the implications of this particular spatial ontology for UIS development planning as the “metropole-market-subject” transformation outlined in chapter VI. Moreover, this is done within the meat trade, not the fruit and vegetable trade. The first implication addresses the notion that practice networks produce contending, indeed contradictory “effects”; the second implication addresses the actor-network concept of translation.

7.3

(In)formal abattoirs, offal and the spatial practices of informal supply

Cape Town’s African population consumes more meat than fruit and vegetables. As a matter of empirical judiciousness, then, some attention to the informal meat trade is in order. Naturally, the great importance of meat to the African diet in Cape Town means that comprehensive material spatialities of specific meat commodities cannot be excavated completely. So this section focuses mainly on consumption practices particularly illustrative of, if not necessarily absolutely unique to, African urban space. Specifically, the first practice vignette addresses informal slaughtering (informal township abattoirs), which has grown in empirical significance in the post-apartheid era (see CMC
For its part, the second practice vignette addresses the street offal trade, which is the most common form of informal meat trading in the case study area.

"PRACTICE VIGNETTE 6": 'MRS B'S INFORMAL ABATTOIR

Cape Town’s African townships are full of animals: chickens, pigs, sheep, even cattle. Most of these animals emanate from elsewhere, however, and are probably only momentarily ‘husbanded’ for purposes of both domestic (private) and public slaughtering. Indeed, recent survey work on informal (public) slaughtering practices, conducted under the auspices of the Protection, Health and Trading Services Committee of the Cape Metropolitan Council, has revealed that “... all [metropolitan local councils] in the [Cape metropolitan area] are, in [sic] a greater or lesser degree, experiencing problems with the illegal slaughtering of animals for the purpose of sale of meat to the public” (CMC 1998e: 4; see also CMC 1998f, 1998g).

There is also a booming informal trade in live poultry (Botha, interview; Patterson, interview). But sheep are particularly prominent in the informal slaughtering practices of BMCT, which is unsurprising given the nature of African consumption thresholds outlined in section 7.1. Mutton steaks and mutton offal remain particularly favoured cuts. One such informal operator, Mrs B, reported to a local reporter that “…the people need us here, it is the best way for them to buy meat” (Cape Times, 28 May 1999). And an environmental health official concurred, emphasising the economic service informal operators like Mrs B provide to low income residents in particular: “These places are really useful for [African] people, especially if they don’t have fridges and have to buy meat frequently in small quantities” (ibid.).

Much of the meat eventually sold (steaks and offal bits) comes directly from formal producers outside African communities, emphasising again the conjoined systemic and spatial interdependencies of formal and informal modes of operation. In their work on red meat marketing in the early 1990s, for instance, Karaan and Myburg (1992: 290) reported that:

Small holder farmers used to sell sheep to the public from their smallholdings on the fringes of the Cape Metropole. Nowadays this has become very much a fully fledged business for some smallholders, especially in the Philippi area. ... In Philippi there are about four speculators who recognised the opportunity and economic advantages of marketing livestock (mostly sheep) in the townships. They are now supplying roadside informal butchers in the townships on a regular basis.
This supply dynamic remained true in the late 1990s (Botha, interview). Formal producers (like those in adjacent Philippi) continued to market live animals via informal operators, who in turn slaughter these animals informally (particularly sheep) for African consumption, after grilling them informally from street-side stalls. Thus “Mrs B” slaughters the animals she buys in her own backyard, with no ablution facilities, behind her informal shack. “I keep it clean. I know what must be done. I have water. I wash [the blood] away” (Cape Times, 28 May 1999).

Washing the blood away, to say nothing of the slaughtering itself, is in direct contravention of the Abattoir Hygiene Act (Schrader, interview). Many issues arise from this contravention. One issue, which touches on classic planning themes, is the local conflict and violence brought about by incompatible land uses. An example is a woman in Brown’s Farm, who reported being threatened with “big knives” when she was about to expose her neighbour’s adjacent slaughtering business to health authorities, despite the nuisance of such an adjacent activity (Cape Times, 7 June, 1999).

But it is public health concerns that have prompted the most local government anxiety, not only from within the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC), but also from within the interim local authorities. As H.J. Schraeder, a CMC environmental health officer, put it in a June, 1999 interview:

The [public health] problem is potentially very serious in Langa, Guguletu, Nyanga, Crossroads and those surrounding African areas. We don’t want to take bread out of [the informal slaughterers’] mouths, but we’re very concerned about the safety of food because of these practices (Schraeder, interview).

Schraeder pointed out that informally slaughtered animals like sheep sometimes carry parasites that are not spotted precisely because they do not pass through a formal abattoir setting. These non-humans — stilesio tapeworm, ascaris, liver flukes, to name a few — survive the journey from the farm because “there is a tendency to undercook” (ibid.). Ultimately, research by the Cape-based Medical Research Council has linked these types of parasites to, amongst other things, paediatric epilepsy and intestinal infections severe enough to require surgery (Cape Times, 7/6/99).

The contradiction of contending “effects”

Because the spatial practices attending Mrs B’s informal animal slaughtering business constitute a quasi-object — a ‘thing-like’ material formation of heterogeneous connections — they also generate contending, indeed contradictory effects, a proposition
first developed by Swyngedouw (1999). This reality builds specifically on the previous insight gained from Mr. H's construction of market power in Nyanga. But rather than one "effect" (market power, for example), there are many effects all emanating from the same heterogeneous network (or spatialized quasi-object). And these multiple effects do not always sit easily with one another. For urban space, as Lefebvre (1991) repeatedly argues, internalises the contradictions of its own production. On the one hand, then, Mrs. B's spatial practices generate basically positive "economic" effects: by actually trading, she helps to ensure the survival of both herself and her family in the city. Mr. Schrader both recognizes and values this effect. Moreover, Mrs B also provides "access" to low-income denizens who lack refrigeration, and need small amounts of affordable meat as part of their daily metabolic requirements. Other urban officials recognise and values that.

On the other hand, the same spatial practices of Mrs B (and many like her) also generate negative "health" effects. By operating informally, she cannot guarantee that other actants (parasites, above all) do not move through the same channels as the cash and meat. Disease cuts a pathway into the urban terrain. It follows the same route as the cash. And there may be land use conflicts and classic problems of nuisance as well. In other words, as in the other practice vignettes in this chapter, the "economic" and "microbiological" (to say nothing of the "formal" and the "informal," the "local" and the "non-local", the human and the nonhuman) fold in to one another ontologically. But in the present case the contradictory effects of this empirical simultaneity are particularly dramatic.

"PRACTICE VIGNETTE 7": THE OFFAL TRADE AND THE "SISTERS G"

Like urban gardening, however, informal slaughtering practices garner more policy attention than their numerical weight probably warrants. As Alec Gotton of the Cape Town City Council put it in an August, 1999 interview:

We don't know about how much meat goes through informal slaughtering. It could be quite a lot. But I [myself] think maybe we're making a pretty big issue out of it. Maybe a few pinprick operations is what we need. In Langa, we think it's probably only six houses where that goes on. So, no, I don't think its everywhere all the time. It's more concentrated. But, sure, it's a problem. (Gotton, interview).

Despite the absence of comparative data on township slaughtering/retailing, then, the "street offal" trade is in all likelihood principally a retail activity. For although
informal abattoir operators retail choice cuts and offal directly to the public, the much more numerous and visible street offal traders, who also offer cooked and uncooked products, do not typically source from these slaughterers. Indeed, only one street offal trader surveyed for this thesis reported, “local people keeping animals in the townships” as her primary source of supply.

Rather, as with the fruit and vegetable trade, network relationships in the informal offal trade are more extensive and non-local. Though the sample size is relatively small, large, township-based traders appear to supply small traders with about half of their pens, livers, heads, intestines (and other dirty and clean offal parts). An additional third (34%) of the small traders source offal directly, mainly through wholesalers located near the Cape Town CBD. Finally, about 10% source from animal producers directly, especially from Philippi (5%) and non-metropolitan farmers (4%). Put simply, then, the offal trade appears more controlled and centralised around the city’s public abattoir, than the fruit and vegetable trade is around Epping, with a few key “emerging” traders dominating the entry portals of township distribution networks. Again, this is not exclusively the case, but it is mostly so. An example of this particular distributional modality is thus presented in the final “practice vignette” of this chapter, the trading story of the two “Sisters G”.

The Sisters G

Viewed strictly from their physical location on a map, the two “Sisters G” depicted on Figure 7.6 below [4], ought to be making more money than they reported. Hawking ox and sheep tripe on one of the busiest streets in Nyanga (Sithandatu St), with relatively favourable pedestrian through flow [1-3], the two sisters only make about R220 profit a month, one of the lowest overall figures of any of the informal traders interviewed for this thesis. This is not because their product in unpopular. Tripe sells well. But the two sisters have appreciable local competition; the intense agglomeration of other hawkers along this road thus diffuses their take, rather than concentrates it (the opposite of the planned market thesis). More, they are dependent upon an intermediary for their supplies, and end up with little margin for profit-making.

The two sisters start their day like all other informal traders discussed in this chapter: sourcing. But unlike most of these other traders, they do not go far. They walk to Ntanlango St [5], near the hostels, and typically buy two bags full of small and large tripe (of both ox and sheep). Each bag costs R95 and includes large and small tripe on a ratio of 7/3. In general, they source five times each week, returning with a trolley to
FIGURE 7.6 Spatial Practices of the “Sisters G,” April 1999

Cash transfers (R$)

Metro Township Local Township Metro Beyond

Grazing LANDS

ANIMALS

Consumption

Work

Evening

Ntlangano

OFFAL

Retailing Distribution Production

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Places of non-township employment
African residences outside of Nyanga
Nyanga residences
Sisters G Street stall
Home (unknown)
Distribution point
Maitland offal pool

Commodity movement
Movements of the Sisters G

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, Nyanga, March-April 1999
MAP 7.9 ‘Sisters G’ and Nyanga Terminus

Key: refer to Figure 7.6

SOURCE: Author’s fieldwork, 1999; Squatter maps from Awatona 1996.
their stall near the taxi terminus in Nyanga, where they spend the rest of the day hawking (Map 7.9). That is their life, everyday, day after day, five-to-six days per week. As the younger sister wearily reported, “we stay here until about 8:00 [p.m.]. We are just staying here all day. We don’t go anywhere.” Sharing shifts, with only one sister handling the stall, and perhaps another family member helping out from time to time, breaks up the intense monotony. But their collective family labour translates into about R1 an hour. R10-R11 per day. That is one English pound.

The intermediary they rely on sources his tripe from the Maitland abattoir. For this reason, the specific structure of this locale is crucial to understand — not only in regard to the “Sisters G,” but also in regard to all the other small offal traders who rely on Maitland as the primary source of supply.

The offal trade via the Maitland abattoir

In 1995, the Maitland abattoir, which is at the physical heart of Metropolitan Cape Town, slaughtered 48,717 cattle (9.7 million kilos); 1,181 calves (70 thousand kilos); and 539,501 sheep (9.7 million kilos). Much of the resultant offal from these carcasses found its way into African diets via informal/emerging traders (van Heerden, interview). The distribution of offal occurs from two municipal “gateways”: the offal pool, managed by the abattoir company, Maitland Abattoir Functions Pty Ltd (Dietrichs, interview), and the “gut factory,” managed by a private sausage casing firm (Visagin, interview). Each of these gateways is notable to the extent that ostensibly informal dynamics have been translated into “normal” production dynamics (CMC 1999c).

Maitland Abattoir Offal Pool. Distribution of offal from the first gateway is organised around a weekly auction that operates according to the following principles. Traders who wish to purchase offal must open up an account with the abattoir and provide a guarantee (typically R5,000). They must also possess a canopied vehicle and closed containers capable of passing a yearly health inspection. Actual participation therefore requires resources and comfortable cash flow. It also requires business acumen. The auction is a sophisticated market mechanism that involves at most thirty or forty traders, generally African but also Coloured/Muslim and White traders. Administered electronically, it was started in the mid-1990s because with meat board deregulation market prices were difficult to establish. “Before we just set the prices based on our best guess,” the manager of the auction, Chris Dietrichs explained. “But
now we have a real price. And we’re the only public auction in the Western Cape. So other people set their prices from our [auction]."

Market prices (for specific offal parts like beef hearts, beef livers, sheep tripe, sheep heads, etc.) are literally established on a weekly basis within the context of an hour-long auction. However, the auction operates like a futures market in that traders are buying meat that will be processed in the coming week; traders commit ahead of time to buy a certain percentage of the total kill expected for the coming week. While many of the payment rules are stiff, especially regarding arrears (Maitland Abattoir Functions Pty Ltd 1999), Maitland officials have sought to develop a working and sustainable relationship with specific traders. “Some of the traders have been with us a long time,” Dietrichs further explained,

... so we know them. If they have committed to buying a certain number of lots, and then the market is flooded by the farmers, we don't necessarily make them take it. We know that they will lose a lot, and that they are our partners. Everybody knows everybody. We all lose if the market is flooded (Dietrichs, interview).

This social sentiment of collaboration extends to the traders themselves, who often cooperate with one another, despite the fiercely competitive nature of the trade outside the affective confines of the abattoir facility. As one Muslim offal trader, Riza Ashraff, emphasized: “You must not make enemies around here, especially in the summer, when offal doesn’t sell as well [amongst Muslims]. You need black people [Africans] at that time. And it’s the same for them. Sometimes they need you” (Ashraff, interview). At the same time, the offal market outside the abattoir follows racial relationships, with nearly impenetrable barriers at work further down the network. Acknowledging the large market for offal in African communities, Mr. Ashraff nonetheless pointed out the “no-go” aspects of that market:

Yeah, the blacks like their offal. They really do. And, you know, there’s opportunity there. But imagine a guy like me in a Black area! It might take a week but something would happen to you. There’s opportunity out there, yeah — that’s true. But I don’t have any business out there — no way.

Real geographies of power and fear and race are helping to give structure to the food distribution system of the urban terrain.

The “Gut” Factory. While the organization and subsequent trading of offal pool products is crucial, no less so is the tight linkage between emerging African traders and formal slaughtering processes at the “gut” factory, an area of the Maitland Abattoir
leased by a private sausage casing firm, Hirsh Ltd. This constitutes a second major Maitland portal into the township offal distribution system, albeit one focused only on sheep crowns (Visagin, interview). As in the offal pool, the production process involves an extraordinary “meshing” together of formal and informal labour and trading agency. Here, as nowhere else in the city, formal and informal melt into one another — physically, socially, economically.

A conveyor belt, connected directly to the sheep slaughtering division within the Maitland abattoir, transports freshly killed sheep carcasses into the factory, where employees of the private casing company (not the abattoir) then “strip off” intestines using specially designed equipment. These intestines are then cleansed and sterilized in bathing pools before being packaged and wholesaled to butcheries and meat processing firms for sausage making purposes. This is all standard sausage casing production. However, standing side-by-side with these private sector employees are labourers who work for African traders, all females. “Sometimes another lady will come in and try to buy too, but they [existing female traders] don’t like that very much (laughing)” (Visagin, interview). The “informal” workers take the bits and pieces of the sheep carcass (called “the sheep crown”) for which the Hirsh Company has no economic use. This less desirable offal is then sent down a long shoot, where it drops into a large container. When full, this container is loaded onto the bakkies (small lorries) of female traders and then distributed in the townships.

For the most part, the contents of these containers — and those associated with the offal pool system — end up in the hands of people like the “Sisters G”, who fetch their supplies from central distribution points (e.g. Ntanlango St.). Few informal meat traders enjoy direct delivery from larger traders. One reason may be that, again, real geographies of power and fear create clear distribution turfs, with certain traders controlling certain portals, where “something will happen to you” if competition for retailing clients is increased; but another reason may be that, like Mama J’s mielie efforts, street offal traders like to hand pick their stock, knowing that the difference between a successful sale and spoilage is razor-thin.

**Translating ‘informality’?**

Although the informal slaughtering trade associated with people like “Mrs B” circumvents the formal abattoir system of the metropole, and furthermore creates contradictions in the process, the much more common story of the “Sisters G” and their
direct connections to sanctioned places like Maitland tell still another story. That story is notable precisely because, at certain points, “informality” is locked into the normal modus operandi of meat production dynamics. Indeed, it is a normal part of the way the metropole works. It is not peripheral, local, disconnected. Two distinct economic spaces within the municipal abattoir, for instance, are dedicated to “translating” informal actors. This translation is far from causal. It is a complex undertaking. A lot of work goes into it. A future’s market, conveyor belts, factory efficiencies, divisions of labour, bank books, purchasing rules, R5,000 down payments, yearly health inspections, and so on — all these dynamics come together to integrate certain African traders into the metropolitan meat distribution system. The so-called “informal” is, quite literally, part of the “inside,” sanctioned reality of distribution dynamics. But it is only momentarily so. When the bakkies leave the abattoir facility the networks soon fall “outside” the sanctioned space of the managed city: the bakkies are unrefrigerated, the distribution points ad hoc, unsupported, unzoned; the sourcing and selling strategies of people like the sisters G unrecorded. The “translation” dynamic thus becomes weaker and weaker the further down the distribution chain the offal moves.

7.4 Conclusions

The geography of the “everyday,” the perceived materiality associated with what ordinary people do to survive in the city, is not the only way to think about the spatial practices of informal sector dynamics. But as de Certeau (1996) suggests in the head quote that began this chapter, the advantage of the travel story lies in the way that time-space journeys betray the contextual, contradictory, heterogeneous qualities of urban space. With Lefebvre, then, this chapter has shown that informal sector urban space is certainly a product, simultaneously cohesive and contradictory, a set of “relations” — a relational dialectics — brought together to circulate cash, food, bodies, vehicles. There is a topology of lines, nodes and flows that can be and has been mapped. This is not a comprehensive mapping, of course, but Hagerstrand’s dialectical “projects” and the comments of the actors themselves help us to perceive these relations concretely. With Latour, moreover, this chapter has also shown that this relational product — this ‘thing-like’ topology of consumption, retailing, distribution, processing and production — is an “effect” of situated, constant, unrelenting, daily, hourly, heterogeneous agency, the
that is created when women and men do the one thing that Latour says they can do — “move” (Latour 1988: 67).

Our travel stories of survival have thus taken us some ways away from the relatively stable, fixed, neo-utopian spaces of “pre-entrepreneurship,” “stimulation” and “integration” associated with the planning representations laid out in chapter VI. It is not so much that these spaces are absent from the spatialities mapped here. Entrepreneurship, stimulation and integration are all present. Rather, it is that so many other spaces are present too. For the material geography of everyday informality instantiates what Thrift and Bingham (2000: 289) call the “full world,” a contextual, associational nexus of heterogeneous, often contradictory, and also surprisingly precarious products. Paradoxically, part of these traders’ collective capacity to “capture” thresholds derives precisely from this heterogeneity and multiplicity; from this ability to make and remake urban space in idiosyncratic, protean ways. We have therefore reached something of a theoretical and practical impasse, with neo-utopian planning representations (themselves struggling for rhetorical legitimacy, as Chapter VI showed) and daily survival practices apparently veering off in different spatial directions, vastly complicating the probable trajectories of post-apartheid urban development.

This raises a final question: can they be aligned with one another? Put differently, can UIS “development” involve something other than a “...story of convergence, of movement from difference to sameness, of a narrowing from many competing versions to a single stabilized reality” (Dugdale 1999: 113). Dugdale’s thesis is, interestingly, that it has to be — that in fact planning for UIS development can only truly succeed if it resists what Scott Lash (1998) calls the rationality of “rule-application,” wherein “...actors come under the sway of pre-given rules.” Instead, it might be argued that successful informal sector planning deploys what Lash dubs “a second rationality,” a rationality where actors “find the rules to use to encounter specific situations ...[and where they] innovate rules in a bricolage of their own identities...” (Lash 1999: 3). To do this, to find the rules, to innovate, indeed to develop the spatial circumstances for “fully lived lives,” Lash hypothesizes that actors draw upon what Lefebvre theorises as “representational spaces.” It is to these final spaces that the discussion now turns.
Chapter VIII.

REPRESENTATIONAL SPACE:

Geography, 'Rule-Finding,' and the Alterities of UIS Development

8.0

Overview

We need an understanding of relationality that takes into account the possibility of alterity.

— Kevin Hetherington and John Law (2000: 128)

Without Henri Lefebvre, the empirical analysis of this thesis could well end here. The empirical story could simply rest on a kind of familiar epistemology: on one hand, the neo-utopian geography of the “planning” imagination (fixed, abstract, homogenous); on the other hand, the everyday geography of “survival” (mobile, concrete, heterogeneous). But as argued in chapter II, such epistemological fragmentation has been the preferred (and limiting) method to date. Lefebvre challenges us to move beyond it. Specifically, he challenges us to unearth a “third” geography: planned-and-survived; symbolic; sometimes imagined; sometimes practiced; too often hegemonic; potentially alternative. This requires one final effort here: to explore the dialectics of (dominating and dominated) representational space — and to link these dialectics back to the larger research questions posed by this thesis.

The discussion, then, cannot simply address survival. It must address planning as well. To be sure, Lefebvre usually denounced planning with alacrity (1991: 45, 308, 362-4). But true to form he also instinctively left unexplored openings for an alternative planning praxis, for planning as a progressive/radical project. Thus Lefebvre (1991:43) favorably contrasts Lloyd Wright’s Broadacres (a “communitarian” representational space) with LeCorbusier’s machinic urbanism (a “technicist” representation of space). All the same, the continued inclusion of planning here is less a theoretical imperative than an empirical one. For just as planning and survival have shaped the two spatial moments of representation and practice, so too have they shaped this hypothesized
“third” geography — this representational space — of UIS development. It is this empirical reality that demands our theoretical attention. Lefebvre’s main service is simple but profound: he alerts us to its existence and to its potential. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a necessarily selective, but detailed, empirical account of this final spatial relationship.

As intimated at the end of chapter VII, the account that follows will specifically deploy Scott Lash’s (1998) reflexive notion of a second rationality shaping the production of space (cf. Pieterse’s 1991). Here actors “find” rather than “apply” rules to encounter specific situations; here they “innovate rules in a bricolage of their own identities…” (Lash 1999: 3). Following now familiar ANT themes, the discussion will continue to show that the production of this “rule-finding” project is no less difficult, no less contested, no less precarious, than any other project. At the same time, the main argument of this chapter is that this “rule-finding” agency yields a promising but too easily submerged or coopted terrain. In other words, this representational space provides a possible way out of the impasse between neo-utopian strategies (chapter VI) and everyday tactics (chapter VII); between the geography of planning and the geography of survival; between the collective and the individual; between the homogeneous city and the heterogeneous one. But the possibilities of this alternative development are subsumed and relocated by the forces of abstraction and rule-application.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This argument unfolds in three main sections. Section 8.1 re-excavates the ground first introduced in chapter V. Here the analysis explores the historical experience of the UIS mainly in the “late apartheid” era of the 1970s and 1980s. Attention is focused on the contested production and subsequent “use” of the African experience as an imagined/symbolic space for urban development. Section 8.2 then re-considers the post-apartheid experience of the 1990s, focusing mainly on a radical planning practice. Section 8.3 then returns to the theme of survival. In each section, Lefebvre, Latour and de Certeau all continue to provide key theoretical concepts that help us to understand the production of this final spatial moment.

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1 Pieterse (1991) and Lash (1999) both emphasize reflexivity (loosely, “rule-finding”). Pieterse reads it through development; for him reflexivity is a “feedback mode” wherein “boundaries between political and non-political…have become fluid.” Lash (1998: 137-8) reads reflexivity through modernity; he asks “...what sort of self, what sort of institutions are possible in an age of chronic contingency, of chronic ambivalence?”
8.1

The Appropriated Alterity of History

Urban spatial change can come from anywhere. Contradictions attending “structural” forces well beyond the agency of individual planners and traders are important (Marais 1998). But no less important (for Lefebvre, Latour and de Certeau, amongst others) are the spatial meanings carried in the minds, hearts and practices of citizens and elites alike. Re-mapping these meaning — re-producing them as symbolic “resources” for new spatial “rules” — is an open, contested and reversible project, constructed recursively from the dialectics of order and disorder; core and periphery; inside and outside; sameness and difference. Accordingly, the UIS dynamics that Cape Town experienced in the mid-1970s were, at one level, “structural.” But at another level, they were entirely representational. It is this latter dimension that interests us here.

TOWARDS THE ‘ORDINARY’ AFRICAN

Initial engagement with Cape Town’s UIS emanated mainly from the academy, legal professions and research community in the mid-1970s (Athlone Advice Office 1975; Ellis et al. 1977), when the international UIS debate outlined in chapter II first found local articulation (Maree and Cornell 1977). But such engagement proliferated quickly, especially when linked to the mounting public concern with African unemployment. Soon other opinion-shaping actors emboldened by “international” experiences began to acknowledge, for example, “the organised life of squatters” (Cape Times 7/3/77).

This particular reference was to life in Modderdam, the unauthorized, racially mixed squatter camp that emerged in 1975 along with Crossroads in direct respond to the housing crisis (Silk 1981). Less a centre of filth and disease — the old, powerful symbolism mobilized repeatedly by the Apartheid State during its “anti-black spot” campaigns in the 1950s — Modderdam was now re-coded positively as “... a highly organised town [of] 7000 inhabitants, with shops, restaurants, medical services, churches and a planned school” (Cape Times 7/3/77). Indeed, a whole formerly impossible urban geography — a “highly organised” terrain of predominantly informal spaces knocking at

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2 GNP growth declined from 5.9% in the 1960s to 3.3% in the 1970s. It would sink to 1.8% in the 1980s. With this in mind, see Sunday Times (2/9/79) “The Unwanted.”; Cape Times (3/9/79) “Unemployment dangers.”; Cape Times (14/9/79) “One in four blacks jobless — research.”; Financial Mail (20/6/80) “Small is good”; and Cape Times (21/11/80) “5.4 million black jobs needed in 20 years.”
the gates of the city — was being mapped for the first time. A symbolic reversal was in the making.

What is important for present purposes is that this particular urban geography was a necessarily romantic one, as much imagined as real, cultural as political. It selectively emphasized across multiple urban scales what might be called an “ordinary” cartography of the urban African experience. This was a strikingly paradoxical tactic. In emphasizing, for instance, the “… shops, restaurants, medical services, churches and a planned school,” the representational space of the squatter camp in fact challenged the apartheid mantra of African difference (African Otherness)! In other words, this representational move re-coded the urban African as “ordinary” — a “community-builder” living, in Lefebvre’s words, “a fully lived life” within “ordinary” urban spaces, drawing on older, liberal ideas present at least since the 1920s. This ordinary coding excluded the spatialities associated with the prostitute, the drug-runner, the loan shark, the spiv, the petty thief (all “informal sector” actors present in the local economy).

This selective re-mapping directly nurtured an anti-hegemonic urban politics. For this reason, it did not go unnoticed. Challenged yet again by African urbanization but also by a new, more formidable network of dissent, the Apartheid State was soon busy producing and projecting its own representational space. For once again informally constituted labour of any kind was, for the state, criminal de jure. Its tactical wildness threatened strategic security, a reality that supports ANT’s view of precarious and reversal “structures”. For the State, then, it was a matter of controlling the spatial meaning of informal sector labour — including even simple informal food trading. Evidence for this is found in the policies of separating out Africans who had contract employment under Section 10 of the 1952 Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act and those who did not, as well as a larger willingness to use the squatter camp as a temporary holding pen until formally employed Africans could be re-located. Put another way, while the squatter camp was an anathema, informal sector activity within it was the real

3 It was not just journalists and the stories they put into circulation. The journalists were both reporting and participating in, a much wider social movement of dissent that connected up human rights lawyers, mainstream churches, winter floods, academics, students, citizen activists, the New York Times. Although no critical spatial interrogation of this movement has ever been undertaken (and it cannot be undertaken here) good empirical work on the “squatter movement” in the Western Cape of the late 1970s and early 1980s is found in Surplus Peoples Project (1984), Cole (1985) and Fraser (1990). Key insights into anti-state agency can also be gleaned from contemporary periodicals such as South African Outlook, which covered these issues in impressive ethnographic detail.
problem because, as argued in chapter V, such activity fundamentally broke the
topological connections between temporary body and accumulating metropole that
defined the basic strategy of apartheid modernity itself. For this reason, the state
deployed older notions of wild, dangerous informal sector activity to mobilize support
for its administration of these areas. One hundred informal enterprises in the
“Crossroads market” were razed in 1982 because, as the Western Cape Administration
Board director put it at the time, “We had no control; [traders] kept on putting up new
stands; and many of them were from outside Crossroads” (Cape Times 19/10/82).

Symbols, Circulation, Rules

Lefebvre’s (1991: 231) notes that “...conflict is not rare between representational
spaces.” In the present case both the apartheid state and the incipient, increasingly
connected network of dissent organized against the apartheid spatial project vied to
(re)code the symbolic meaning of places like Modderdam and Crossroads. Both agents
therefore fought hard to win control over the representations of urban space, particularly
in the local authority imaginary (see Cape Town City Council 1977). They also fought
over what spatial practices ought to be allowed in the city. But in so doing, they
simultaneously fought over what places like Modderdam and Crossroads actually
represented and, indeed, ought to represent. In so doing, both agents fought over the
representational spatiality of the UIS.

The Apartheid State lost this particular battle. The bulldozers eventually fell silent.
Was the agency associated with counter-constructing a different kind of urban space —
one that drew heavily on the (real-and-imagined) symbolism of the “ordinary” African
already connected to the “normal” life and soul of the city — actually responsible for this
defeat? In part, yes. On this reading, the metropole that Cape Town would try to
become in the 1980s was in no small measure built up with (and through) the successful
late 1970s re-spatialization of what the UIS could mean in future. In other words, the
ultimately successful counter-construction of the “informal” as a place of possibility — as a
place where “communities” could emerge and indeed, where the spatial elements of such
communities (churches, schools) were said to be already emerging — played a powerful
role in re-defining what Cape Town as a whole was all about.

But as Latour (1996) theorizes, symbols do not remain at rest. Like any other
resource (money, food, ideas), they are put into “circulation;” they are relocated; they are
co-opted. Specifically, they are re-territorialized and often alienated from their origins.
This helps to explain why they are, as Lefebvre (1991) believes, fleeting, ephemeral, easily dominated. The production of the “ordinary” African person and place was the production of a new representational space, a new (real-and-imaged) symbolic coding. Following Lash, it captured a new “identity” not seen in the city before, an identity confected through a “bricolage” of poverty, Africanness, liberalism, community, romantism. This bricolage would stimulate a new set of rules for urban management, in general, and UIS development, in particular. But as shown below, these new rules, once associated with an “alternative” spatial reading, soon had a way of servicing the abstractions of accumulation and control.

“BLACK MAN [sic] — THE FUTURE IS YOURS!”

In its policy deliberations into “Trading by Blacks in Black residential areas” (AWC A30), then, the Western Cape Development Board, an important governing organ of African urban space during the mid-1980s, gathered together deregulationist sentiment from a host of influential local institutions. If the African was now “ordinary” then things had to change. Keen to support “…meaningful [African] participation in a Western free market formal economy,” for example, the City of Cape Town’s Engineering Department (Cape Town City Council 1985: 3) argued that occupational safety regulations, environmental health concerns, nuisance issues, and ultimately land use schemes were largely preventing such participation.4 The administrative “meshwork” of the city was not working.

A period of “rule-finding” had to be instituted. New administrative space had to be invented. It was easy for this space to flow into neo-liberalism. For its part, the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce lamented, amongst other things, the “unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions” on capital accumulation in the informal sector (from AWC 30, no page number). Further, it commented as late as 1992 that: “Fears that beaches and scenic drives will be inundated by [UIS] vendors and their wares can be allayed by judicious identification of non-trading areas by the [Provincial] Administration and market forces” (Commerce Bulletin 9/10/92). Indeed, in 1991 this deregulationist zeal culminated in a new Business Act (RSA 1991), which similarly championed the potentiality of unfettered, universal market forces. “Black man [sic] —,” one paper enthusiastically chimed in, “the future is yours!” (Argus, 31/5/81).

4 As one example, in the mid-1980s “…the [street] hawker must not be suffering from ‘any infections or contagious diseases’” (City of Cape Town 1985: 36).
The representational space of the “ordinary” African was being steadily transformed into the “pre-entrepreneurial” body detailed in chapter VI. And that body was tied up with the overall re-spatialisation of the city. Consider, for example, the following principle, taken from the 1988 structure plan for Crossroads (VKE 1988: no page number):

In the process of upgrading the informal to the formal sector, small business can play an important role in developing a viable informal sector, thereby creating employment, political stability and development of entrepreneurial and market stimulation.

This is a familiar echo of the spatial themes first developed in chapter VI. But there is another insight relevant to the themes of this chapter: the once unacceptable alterity of the “ordinary” African was now being re-located into a hegemonic space of control and stability; more, it was driven by a particular imagination of urban modernity, in general, and UIS development, in particular.

This is seen in the late 1980s interventions into the KTC squatter camp, adjacent to Crossroads. Concerned to re-assert control over what a later commentator would call “Cape Town’s Beirut” (Ngcokoto 1990), the Department of Manpower sent an emissary to meet with the Mayor of the nearby Black Local Authority. The immediate subject was KTC’s “upliftment”:

Dr Fick [of the Department of Manpower] sketched the main reason for meeting with the Mayor to be the possible utilisation of the [newly proposed] Training and Work Creation Scheme to break the deadlock between the ‘establishment,’ being the Provincial Administration and the IKAPA [Black Local Authority], and the ruling elements in KTC. He indicated that something similar to the project in Crossroads can be considered for KTC — involving the community in its entirety in the development of the community they belong to. He reminded the Mayor of his visit to Crossroads with the opening of their Training and Work Centre by the State President and the dramatic positive transformation the Crossroads community experienced via the involvement of the Department of Manpower in the upliftment. This particular Department is perceived to be ‘independent’ and is very successfully spearheading development and stabilisation in troubled areas (LHAC 6/9/1/10/7 S).

The either/or colours of the apartheid mentality wash into this passage: the uplifted “community” is constructed via a single spatial solution, even as its political fragmentation is recognized (cf. Scott 1997). But previous to the 1980s, engagements like this one had sealed out the potentialities of the African UIS in toto. So Dr. Fick’s new strategic emphasis on training access and skills improvement, targeting in particular the extant “informal sector” (LHAC 6/9/1/10/7 S, [A1]), was a remarkable change in the
basis of urban modernity itself, with the definition of "labour" and indeed acceptable
urban space expanding well beyond where it was before the 1980s. That change cannot
be waved away as mere technical gloss. It came from somewhere. Specifically, it was the
empirical manifestation of informal sector alterity, now considered part of the "ordinary"
geography of the city. The spatiality of informal sector alterity — a representational
"resource" confected out of the anti-hegemonic campaigns of the 1970s — was in fact
changing the fundamental nature of how the city could be represented and practiced.

Modernity, Development, Space

The anti-hegemonic squatter movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s provided an
alternative possibility for African body and African community — and therefore an
alternative spatial trajectory, an alternative modernity, for the whole of the Cape
metropole itself. Ironically, it did so by re-mapping as "ordinary" the previously
"different" African subject and African community so crucial to the reproduction of
urban apartheid. Specifically, it traced out a formerly impossible urban geography of
"fully lived life" around this ordinariness, tapping into older, liberal discourses to do so
(churches, schools, doctors, etc.). And it set in train a search for "new rules":
occupational safety regulations, environmental health concerns, nuisance issues, land use
schemes, and so on. In this specific sense, it provided the most promising terrain to re­
think the spatial impasse between the dialectic of the planned, ordered, homogenous city,
on the one hand, and the unplanned, disordered, heterogeneous city, on the other.

Cape Town changed because of this dialectic. That is important to note. As part of
a larger, worldwide post-developmental critique (Pieterse 1991: 344), the alternative
representational space of the UIS was an active moment (and resource) in the production
of contemporary urbanism. But what eventually happened was entirely predictable, at
least according to Lefebvre (1991). The fully lived “ordinary” was re-territorialized by
both the state and the market, by the forces of abstraction, by the tendency of such
symbolic alterities to fall apart, to be submerged and co-opted. Indeed, the
representational space of the ordinary now became the represented space of the “Black
Man” now encouraged to participate fully in the “Western free market economy.” For
ordinary meant, of course, Western. The state would begin to re-arrange physical and
administrative space in order to facilitate that “participation.” And with that re­
arraignement the possibilities for an alternative UIS development trajectory waned. As
Lash (1999: 65) interprets it:

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Lefebvre offers two formulae for the production of space: one which leads to the production of grids, or what he calls ‘abstract space’...; and another which leads to the production of labyrinths, or ‘historic space,’ the space of the ‘body’. [...] Abstract space is the space of the grid, of the word over the real and place, of ‘discourse’ over ‘figure’. Abstract assumes the hegemony of time over space....

Here the possibilities for an alternative modernity, a different development built squarely upon the extant “labyrinths” of the ordinary UIS, were swiftly relocated to a more abstract modernity marked by its own symbolic spaces: the (chapter VI) discourse of the “pre-entrepreneurial” Black Man — itself an abstraction — where time is, moreover, hegemonic and therefore presumably inexorable. For the key policy agenda was, in fact, “formalization,” regardless of the space at issue (VKE 1988; see also City of Cape Town 1992b).5 Informing this formalization in turn was an older, intuitive, comfortable imagination of modernity and development, one predicated on a fundamentally linear expectation of social change more or less congruent with the experience of Europe (Cape Times 15/11/79; cf. Landes 1998: 505-6).

So, to return now to the largest question of all, why was it so hard to develop the UIS? In part, the answer has already been outlined in previous chapters. But the answer is also because UIS development could not be symbolized for long “outside” this Western experience; because an “alternative paradigm” (Peiterse 1991) to that experience required not a fragile social movement, but a long-term, difficult-to-maintain urban politics; and because alternative spaces are, according to Lefebvre, fleeting, dominated, easily crushed (cf. Manzo 1991; Schuurman 1993; Rist 1997; Munck 1999).6 Latour’s network-weaving theory therefore helps us to understand how such an alternative spatiality might be patched together — through the dedicated construction of symbolic “effects” no less than concrete ones. This takes agency, work, sweat, and resiliency. But Lefebvre in turn helps us to understand why these alternatives struggle to come about, to “translate” into “durable” spatialities, as Latour would put it. Taken together, each helps us to understand the failure to build an “…alternative external to the mainstream, a counter-utopia carried by different social actors in the interstices of the mainstream” (Peiterse 1991: 344).

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5 “Formalization [of the informal sector],” Sanyal (1996: 161) argued in the mid-1990s, “...remains the centrepiece of international donor policies even after twenty-five years.”

6 Thus the Cape Times fretted at the end of the tumultuous 1970s that Cape Town had become “the most violent city in the West.” This symbolic/cartographic linkage to “the West” was important. Securing Cape Town as a Western City in the 1980s meant removing the basis for African violence, which again related to the (re)cognition of (in)formal African labour.
All the same, the submerged struggle for an “alternative paradigm” for UIS development continued. It would soon reflect the never-ending search for a way out of the spatial impasse holding Cape Town in its grips. This meant a new round of “rule-finding” agency — and therefore new maps of reflexive, state-society possibility.

8.2

The Appropriated Alterity of Planning

Emblematic of this new round of “rule-finding” agency were the representational spaces of radical planning praxis. Here is one story of such praxis from the post-apartheid era. This story now takes us back to the planning themes of chapter VI. But the agency involved is very different. For it is directed at the re-construction of the local state itself.

Building Space for Radical Praxis

In June, 1999 an official from the Cape Metropolitan Council, the post-apartheid local government authority with strategic planning responsibilities across the whole Metropole, met with the Langa Development Forum, a key community agent in Cape Town’s oldest surviving African area. It was one of many meetings, both before and after this one. The “official,” Edgar Carolissen, had agreed to meet with me for an interview earlier. His immediate brief was “public health,” and as that took him straight into the heart of the informal meat trade I was eager to ascertain his views. I had expected the usual office-based discussion. Upon meeting him for the first time, however, he said: “I’m going out to Langa in a few days. Do you want to come with me?” I agreed.

While driving out, Mr. Carolissen laid out a personal and professional agenda that immediately signaled an alternative planning praxis — an alternative planning identity and “pattern-weaving” role. He started off in a general way. He came out of the Left, a former “resistance academic” who was now interested in “getting the theories and ideas into actual practice.” He continued: “The problems we have out here are inter-related — but our service provision is highly fragmented.” This was a common complaint, of course, but he went further. He spoke of the “inter-relatedness of all things — and not [just] this housing we deliver.” Housing was key, he thought, because “health is more than the absence of disease — it’s compounded by high density and poverty.” So he worried a lot about housing, even though it was ostensibly somebody else’s problem.

7 This section uses the first person to convey the intimacy of the research experience itself and, therefore, to disrupt the hypothesized advantages of “distance” in social science research.
Carolissen soon turned to the immediate issue — how to manage informal meat trading in the townships, which was then causing public officials considerable angst, especially within the context of a new commitment to the U.N.'s "Healthy Cities" initiative (CMC 1998e, 1999b). But when Carolissen first started his job, he confronted a planning approach to the informal meat trade that disturbed him:

_The issue [was] how we negotiate[d] standards._ The Agriculture Department has 'minimum standards' [for abattoirs]. But how do we deal with this is a developmental way — not in an old way — imposed down on communities? I mean, the old imposed ways just lead to deviance. _People need to create the law themselves._ A lot of the people dealing with this issue are medically trained; they're less oriented to community development practices (Carollisen, interview, emphasis added).

Here was the voice of a "second rationality" at work in the city. And so here was an alternative space for urban development. For Carolissen, "the approach in the past was top-heavy." This meant the "...need to retrain the bureaucracy entirely." He understood what this meant — and how transformative of praxis and imagination it was. "We need a whole different array of skills from government people. We need network-developers willing to wear different hats." It was this administrative multiplicity that was so intriguing. No one spoke like this. He took multiplicity on board personally, as if it were part of his job description: "I came in and said 'look, we need to get all the players together — before we get the scary posters.'"

The "scary posters" he referred to were scary. They were full-colour pictures of contaminated (informally traded) meats full of tapeworm and liver flukes — examples of what happens when "standards" are circumvented. With mounting evidence of negative public health externalities linked directly to the informal meat trade, the CMC naturally wanted to distribute these posters without delay throughout the African townships, warning the public about the dangers of undercooked or informally handled meats. It was a particular kind of urban management, understandable from a particular point of view, which nonetheless deployed an older, often deployed symbolic link between danger and informality.

But Carolissen's life experiences, forged in the anti-apartheid movement, led him to a different type of problem analysis and therefore to a different type of planning. As quoted originally in chapter VI, but worth rehearsing here: "An informal meat market — where all these diseases come from (sarcastically) — is a clear example of how people will not lie down and die. People have to create out of dust and dirt — and then we
come in and say 'this is not allowed.' I mean, most [local authority] energy is going to checking up, throwing the book.” This was profoundly wrong, he thought, and he rejected it entirely: “We need an approach, not a programme. It’s almost acting subversively.”

This last point was extremely powerful and radical for a metropolitan planner/manager and he followed it up with, “Gosh, I’m sounding like a politician.” He was not a politician, but he was involved in a kind of urban politics (and planning) that few of his state colleagues understood (or valued):

The thing we [the Council] have to do is link with existing networks — NGOs, CBOs and all that. We need to get away from officialdom level — the legislation level — where we’ve been a long time [in this city]. Let’s start with Langa, build from up from there and then move out with the model of how to do it. A bottom-up, more progressive model of how to do it. [Trading] standards need to be created with a developmental role in mind. The community forums, like the Langa Development Forum — that’s the muscle. The community networks — that’s the muscle.

We soon arrived in Langa — to meet with the “muscle.” And they flexed, citing a litany of daily problems that weighed down on their 12-hour-a-day working lives:

One woman said:

At the taxi rank, we have problems when it’s raining. Things get clogged. And we are not covered.

Another similarly noted:

That Zone 20, where they are selling chickens and meat — the bins given by council are not big enough. The town council collects on Mondays — that’s not enough. And there’s no toilets. No water. But they are selling food there. And the flies in the summer are a problem!!

And still another admitted:

I’m confused. Because the health inspectors come in and tell us what we can do. I agree that most of the places are unhealthy. But we shouldn’t suffer. This process must be open to me.

After about an hour of this, Carrollisen concluded the session:

We need to get the city council here. We need to get the people that make legislation here. We need all the people here. We need to ask — how are we going to meet each other halfway? How will we go forward, then? Should we form a committee?

The answer he got was immediate and uniform:

Oh no! No committees, everyone must participate!!
Alternative space, alternative development

This is a very different planning terrain from the discursive and rhetorical spatialities mapped out in chapter VI. There are a few (post-Lefebvrian) planning theorists who have charted the theoretical possibilities of this reflexive and dialectical terrain. One is Leonie Sandercock (1998). "The primary [characteristic of radical planning] practice," Sandercock (1998. 99) has argued,

... is allocating enormous amounts of time to 'hanging out' with the mobilized community...[to] recognize the value of the contextual knowledge that those in the front line of local action ... bring to the issue at hand.... This implies an epistemological break with past ways of thinking and doing...of what it means to be a planner, and what it is that planners do.

More than this, however,

It is [the] antagonistic yet also dialectical relationship between the state and the mobilized community that radical planners have yet to address. The first is to get beyond the notion of the state as always and only adversary. (p. 102).

Arguably, Edgar Carolissen has gotten beyond the notion of the state as always and only adversary. He has confronted and intuitively grasped the dialectical relationship between the state and "the mobilized community," where both are transformed. Indeed, Carolissen's agency is exemplary of René Lemarchand's (1992: 178) wider re-theorization of the contemporary African state. "Nowhere in Africa," Lemarchand writes, "is there a clear line of demarcation between state and society; they interpenetrate each another in more or less complex ways and at different levels (symbolic, normative or structural), evolving over time into patterns reminiscent of the hybrid phenomena analysed by Jean-Francois Bayart under the rubric of 'etat rhizome.'" (See also Bayart (1992); cf. Davidson (1992) and Leys (1994)).

In one sense, it is easy to discern in Carolissen's agency the traces of "equity" planning, defined as the "conscious attempt to devise redistributive policies in favor of the least powerful and to enhance the avenues of participation" (Krumholtz and Clavel 1994: 1). But there is also a communicative, mutual learning approach too that resonates with Habermasian claims of practical rather than instrumental knowledge, although less emphasis is placed on the planner as expert, as attention shaper. In Sandercock's world, moreover, planning emerges in action, in the second rationality of rule-finding rather than rule-applying agency associated with co-constructing something new: it is a process of mutual becoming, not a fitting together of community-defined ends and planner-
shaped means. It is a process of building a new radical planning rationality, neither all state, nor all society — but “hybrid,” alternative, third. “The appropriate image,” Sandercock (1998: 102) therefore rightly concludes, “may be of crossing back and forth, of blurring boundaries, of deconstructing [the ‘community’ and the ‘state’] and reconstituting new possibilities.” Ultimately, these “new possibilities” amount to what Friedman calls “alternative development” (1992: 72-73), a development that implies a “… greater autonomy over the life spaces of the poor in the management of resources, collective self-empowerment, [and] the importance of respecting cultural identities….”

Planning like this belongs in Lefebvre’s third moment. But it is a particular kind of planning. It is a planning (of both talk and travel; of rhetoric and movement) that produces particular kinds of spaces. For Carolissen and his life efforts in Langa betray the feint, precarious outlines of a new representational space organized around the possibility (if not probability) of a different kind of urban and community modernity: one that “crosses back and forth”. When I initially met Carolissen, when I saw how he worked, I thought of him in equity planning terms because he worked for the local state. I thought he was pushing for the poor. That is both true and limited. Analyzed spatially it is much more than that. Though he is a public employee, Carolissen brings a kind of insurgency that fits uncomfortably within the local state, as he himself recognizes when he speaks of “acting subversively.” Ultimately, the (political, communicative and administrative) spatiality of Carolissen’s actions captures a different way of “developing” the informal sector and the local state along with it. For he pays remarkably close attention to the network-making qualities of his job — to rule-finding — and to the ways that these qualities and rules are emerging from dialectical practices that bring the discursive space of the state (order, health, rules) and the insurgent space of informal society (wildness, mobility) into a kind of mutual, transformative collision. A collision of space. A collision in place.

When he speaks of “[getting] the city council here, [getting] the people that make legislation here,” Carolissen moves the space of praxis/imagination into a new, if difficult to pin down realm: not-quite state/not-quite society/not-quite actual, but still extant, imminent, tangible. A new “bricolage,” as Lash would have it, of institutional and individual identities. A tactical counter-space, as de Certeau would put it. At the same time, neither Carolissen nor the African women he is working with harbor an unrealistic, overly romantic sense of the informal meat trade. For this reason, Carolissen does not code this space as a neo-liberal zone of pent up oppression that could do wonders if only
the state had the good sense to get out of the way. Nor does he deploy, in contrast, a map of danger, chaos and conflict.

Carolissen is unwilling to abandon the power of the state — the power to link up, for instance, a global effort to make cities healthier into a nimble agenda appropriate to the “muscle space” of the Langa Development Forum. As a former resistance academic, he has learned from other countries and other cities and he seeks to mobilize that knowledge in place. “How are we going to meet each other halfway?” he asks. But in working through the local state he also pushes its organizational habits and managerial norms to its limits. He is a committed, but uncomfortable public employee, wary of the strong forces of spatial bureaucratization. He wants to destabilize the local state and regroup around a new, self-consciously critical space of urban possibility. It is a space Lefebvre would happily inhabit.

NORMALIZATION

But it is also a rare space, probably “fleeting” in nature, and extremely difficult to mobilize across the width of an entire polity. This is the crucial point. Like the symbolic spaces occasioned through social movements, it too is easily re-territorialized, contributing to, rather than challenging, mainstream administration. And this again teaches us about the difficulties of counter-constructing an alternative path for UIS development. One example of this process of re-location is found in the municipally owned fresh produce facility at Epping, last highlighted in chapter VII within the context of “Mr. M’s” daily routines.

Again, transactions at Epping had turned increasingly “informal” by the mid-1990s, both because farmers and traders like Mr. M sought such informality. This increasing informality in turn challenged the economic viability of the formal facility, which had suffered a loss of market share for years but was now trying to turn things around (Planning and Production Engineers 1996). The situation was serious enough that by 1997 the director of Epping complained openly and bitterly that informal traders “literally ‘steal our clients by ‘intercepting’ them” (TygerTalk 22/5/97).

As the City of Cape Town’s informal trading co-coordinator, Paul Williamson, summarised the situation at the time:

The ratepayers and [the nearby industrial estate owners] were reasonably unhappy about all the [informal trading] activities that took place on that road reserve; the Epping Market people were also unhappy because the [informal] fresh produce
trade there was undercutting their prices; and the ordinary residents [nearby] were unhappy because of all the litter generated and some 'anti-social' activity that took place. I mean there was a whole industry going on there — like [cooked] meat trading activities in the early morning, and even allegations of theft. ... People started living there too... Eventually everybody said to Council: 'That's enough. You sort it out or we'll stop paying rates' (Williamson, interview).

The representational space of 'wildness' returned to the front burner. Importantly, this complex situation developed despite earlier attempts to accommodate emerging informal traders. This earlier effort was marked above all by the construction of a new R3 million facility on the grounds of the market, a new Temple of Transformation in the incipient spatialisation of post-apartheid development detailed in chapter VI. The director of the market facility at the time stated that: 'This [new] facility is our contribution to the informal trading sector and will provide a conducive environment' (TygerTalk 22/5/97). But the problems outside this market continued — forcing further action. Ultimately, the Western Cape Province gazetted an area outside the grounds of the facility for market trading but according to the following logic (Province of the Western Cape 1999b; see also Province of the Western Cape 1998, 1999a):

The end-result of all the problems outside Epping was that we said there would be no objection to a market operating on the road reserve, as long as they [the traders] operated under the same constraints as the formal sector.... (Williamson, 1999, interview).

Modernity, Development, Space II

Why is Williamson's 'planning' more common than Carolissen's praxis? Specifically, why is the alterity of radical planning ultimately dominated by mainstream urban management strategies? Why is the third geography — the representational space — of planning UIS development such an uphill battle?

Williamson moves uneasily between an engagement with informal sector possibilities and a fairly standard concern with the expressed needs of ratepayers and industrialists — the "forces of abstraction," as Lefebvre calls then. That movement both informs and is informed by a particular coding of informal sector space: the wild space of litter, theft, anti-social behavior, but also its transformative potential as a space of dynamism, development, hustle. So the symbolism of an alternative planning is here. Ultimately, however, Williamson chooses sides — he stands with the powerful who pay the bills and who code space as clean and ordered and safe, even as he clings precariously
to the possibility of informal sector transformation. So once again, and as before, the state re-arranges physical and administrative space in order to facilitate “participation.” But that re-arrangement comes at a price. Modernity, development and space confect a normalization that in turn wipes out difference. Why is UIS development so hard? At least partly because the possibilities of development are swiftly subsumed by the forces of abstraction and rule-application.

8.3
The Appropriated Alterity of Survival

Nothing alternative is easy to build, and a planning praxis/imagination that defines a new kind of urban space — a “third” geography that negotiates the impasse between representation and practice — is probably more difficult to build than most things. As sections 8.1 and 8.2 just showed, this third geography easily re-located. This is not only because, in the present case, such geography faces constant resistance from within the local state. Nor is it only because alternative networks of any kind invariably fall apart under sustained pressure. It is also because the individual traders that planners like Carolissen seek to include in this “third” space of planning-and-survival have their own dreams, just as they have their own constrained travels.

And yet, like all other actors, planners like Carolissen badly need commitment — and commitment is a function of de Certeau’s notion of belief: belief in the immediate process; belief in the city; belief in the other actors; belief in both individual and collective “development” (or what actor-network theorists think of as the sustained ability to mobilise as a collective). But what of these “inhabitants and users,” as Lefebvre calls them, from whom Carolissen seeks commitment? What of their life-as-lived-and-dreamed? What of their beliefs? What of their representational spaces? To answer these final questions, we must return to the intimate, but also colonized “lifeworld” of traders. We must return, that is, to the alterities of survival. This we shall do momentarily. But it is first necessary to understand the “meshwork” of limitations that dialectically envelop these traders and their beliefs about the urban world.

SOME FINAL SOCIAL STATISTICS
After meeting urban survival requirements (housing, clothing, transport, education, health, etc.), the qualitative data gathered for this thesis suggest that traders contribute to
building local institutions of civil society: savings clubs, churches, burial societies. They also save for other dreams: opening up hair salons, for example. But taken together, all of these other commitments squeeze capital for (and personal interest in) commitment to consolidating the informal food trade; to working with the planners around their dreams, to engaging seriously with the re-construction of a radical planning praxis, to finding new rules for UIS development. And profits are, of course, hardly substantial to begin with. As shown in Figure 8.1 below, both mean and median profit levels in the informal African food trade in 1999 hovered between R200-250/week.

**FIGURE 8.1 Informal trading profits, weekly**

![Graph showing informal trading profits, weekly](image)

**SOURCE:** Author’s fieldwork, 1999

**Profits**

For about 44% of the traders surveyed, the average weekly profits of R200-250 accrued from informal food trading make up 100% of total household income. That is, just over four in ten households rely exclusively on the income gained by the individual trader, with no access to remittances, pensions or other wages of any kind. This is about 33% under mean household income in African communities and about R3,500 below (or 82% under) mean household income in the Cape metropolitan region (CSS 1997, Table 8.1). What this means is that “accumulation,” whether concretized as cash savings or as productive investments in human capital, housing upgrades, business consolidation or...
remittances to absent family members, works only with residual capital, i.e. "non-survival" capital. How residual? In quantitative terms, this is estimated in Table 8.8 below. A basket of expenditures deemed minimal and therefore utterly survivalist in nature for an African household is presented. These costs totaled R23.02/day, or R161/week in the mid-1990s. When subtracted from estimated total profits, this leaves about R50-75/week in "non-survival" capital.

In consequence, traders readily admitted — like Patience — that a "poor physical environment" impacts their business, an observation of considerable interest to the planning imaginary laid out in chapter V. As Table 8.7 below shows, by an almost two-to-one margin traders cited such conditions as either "important" or "very important". At the same time, as shown in Table 8.8 below, almost half of these same traders said they would be willing to co-pay "nothing" on a regular basis if the government upgraded their trading location. What accounts for this empirical slippage between open recognition, on the one hand, and developmental commitment, on the other? Appeals to general conditions of poverty and inability to pay, while true enough in themselves, only take the analysis so far. As Table 8.8 also shows, more than 80% of the surveyed population hesitated to commit to more than R5 per week for an upgraded trading locale, perhaps suggesting benefit/cost skepticism that such upgrading would, in fact, pay in the long term. Or perhaps not. Perhaps the generative source of this widespread hesitation (Table 8.9) to commit to the city and its transformation is more complex, moving theoretical explanation from simple materialism and self-interest to something more nuanced.

The capacity of individual agents like Patience to reinvent alternative meanings for urban space — to create new representational spaces — is therefore not boundless. Like the "travel stories" laid out in chapter VII, representational spaces are situated by a matrix of extant power relations, the physicality of the city, and societal and cultural practices. We are therefore obliged to outline some of these relations and practices by presenting data on gender, age, education, training, migration history, and urban labour force experience. What is important here is how the realities that these data partially capture and constrain the different kinds of representational spaces that can be built through individual agency. This is most obvious when considering gender and age.
Gender and age

Aside from race, few attributes matter more than gender as a determinant of the global urban experience — a theme explored in different ways by Moser (1993) and Chant (1997), amongst others. This is certainly true in the informal food trade of Cape Town, especially when linked with age. Table 8.1 below shows that, on the whole, women outnumber men three to two, and that about two-thirds of traders are between twenty and forty years old (some of the most productive years of life).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 or older</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: author's fieldwork, 1999

However, and much more interestingly, until the age of thirty women and men each make up about half the trading population of this age group (15% and 16% of the total population, respectively). After this point, and particularly between the ages of thirty and fifty, women outnumber men 2 to 1 (35% to 18%). The median age for the trader population is thirty-six. In other words, assuming a random application of the survey, this suggests that whilst both young women and men enter the informal food trade in equal numbers, men tend to exit the trade with time, leaving this particular trade more (though not exclusively) feminine as the population ages. What accounts for this gendering dynamic? One explanation is that men have relatively easier access to a wider variety of casual and unskilled/semi-skilled formal opportunities in the labour market (construction, manufacturing, gardening, security work, and so on) than do women (domestic service), especially in this age group. Another explanation, also external to the individual per se, relates to the disproportionate re-productive responsibilities loaded on to African women, especially those in their early thirties.
The weight of this load appears in Table 8.2 below, which displays trader attitudes to reproductive responsibilities (note: within the context of problems possibly hindering the performance of their businesses).

**TABLE 8.2 Importance of “family responsibilities”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family needs</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: author’s fieldwork, 1999

Less than half (45%) of men described family responsibilities as “very important” within this context, whereas almost two-thirds (64%) of women did. Conversely, whilst only a quarter of female traders viewed such responsibilities as “not important,” the figure jumps to 40% for male traders. Specific manifestations of this dynamic provide concrete examples of what this implies. For example, when one married, thirty-two year old women, who was earning less than R500/month, was asked whether she would accept a salaried (formal sector) job *in lieu* of selling vegetables, she responded categorically: “No, because my child is still young.”

**Educational attainment and training**

If male traders were on the whole substantially better educated than female traders, the labour market or reproductive responsibility hypotheses for this “gendering-with-age” insight would have less merit (for labour markets, even in developing countries, generally reward more educated workers, male or female). However, as Table 8.3 below illustrates, this is not the case. No significant difference in the formal educational preparation of male and female traders entering this sector can be discerned. Rather, the profile is what might be expected from this particular population: only about one-fifth have gone beyond Standard 10; just under half have reached Standards 5-8; and about one-fifth have Standard 3 education or lower. At the other end, only one in twenty have matriculated or have gone on to obtain tertiary training of some kind, although men constitute a slightly larger proportion of this group than do women.

249
TABLE 8.3 Educational attainments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education attained</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than St. 3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. 3-5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. 6-8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. 9-10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: author's fieldwork, 1999

However, about one-third of male traders (32%) reported access to non-school training, whereas less than one-fifth (19%) of female traders did. This is a subtle but noteworthy difference. Training does not guarantee labour mobility, but it does indicate intention and expectation — and it certainly improves the odds of mobility; moreover, men’s higher access to training in the anticipation of mobility also partially explains the higher male exodus with age from the informal food trade.

Migration

Again, apartheid legislation — the Native (Urban Areas) Act, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, the Coloured Labour Preference Law, etc. — profoundly influenced the migration experience of Cape Town. Despite original intentions, it did not prevent African migration. However, it significantly warped it. The years preceding and just after the repeal of influx control legislation (1978-1992) therefore saw a massive, unprecedented movement of African people into Cape Town (Table 8.4). Since then, African migration appears to have fallen off in relative terms, probably back to more “normal” annual rates for a developing urban area in a middle income country (see Mazur and Qangule 1995, pp. 18-21).
TABLE 8.4. Birthplace and year of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Eastern Cape</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Eastern Cape</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other region</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of migration</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-93</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-88</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-78</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1979</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 SOURCE: author’s fieldwork 1999

Not surprisingly, this overall dynamic frames the migration experience of informal food traders. As shown in Table 8.4, only 12% were born in Cape Town. The remaining 78% migrated, principally from the Eastern Cape and mainly after 1979 but before the 1990s. Hence, this is a migrant population but not a particularly recent one: three in four traders surveyed have been urbanized for at least ten years. Why is this important? Because the median and mean age of informal food businesses are three and four years, respectively, suggesting two insights: first, that it is long-term urban residents — not recent migrants — who start these businesses; and, second, and flowing from this, that individuals who enter this trade have either (1) experienced long-term, unbroken periods of urban unemployment or (2) have engaged in various other income earning activities in the labour market.

**Experience in the urban labour market**

Although the number of traders who have never worked before is noteworthy — about one-quarter of the overall population — the evidence supports the second point above.
(see Table 8.5 below). That is, nearly 75% of informal food traders have experienced other types of income earning activities in the urban economy. But interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, only about one-fifth of the total trader population (22%) reported "loss of job" as the immediate reason for entering the food trade. Four-fifths had other reasons, among them the following: sudden changes in household labour or demographic profiles ("My husband died, so I lost that income"); a desire for more control over daily life ("Working for a boss is no good — it's unreliable"); and indeed ordinary opportunism (13% reported wanting to start a small business, seeing money in the informal food trade).

### Table 8.5 Past work experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past work</th>
<th>% responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No past work experience</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal services</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General services</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** author's fieldwork, 1999

Over 25% of the trader population, all females, have engaged in "char" (personal services) work. Contrawise, 29% have engaged in construction or manufacturing activities, which have been traditionally male-dominated industries. Both these private sectors shed and attract unskilled and semi-skilled labour with wider cyclical swings than, say, government work, which is relatively protected from such swings. However, government work makes up only 1.7% of the profile in Table 8.5. Moreover, only about 15% have ever participated in the private service economy (restaurants, hotels, petrol attendants, old age homes, etc.). Yet such services make up the largest and fast-growing sector of the urban economy (Mail and Guardian, July 2-8, 1999). One reason for this might be because relatively few Africans who do penetrate this sector then fall back again into activities like informal food trading, a finding that partially explains the lower-than-
expected percentage of traders reporting “job loss” as the immediate reason for engaging in this type of activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household expenditure Item</th>
<th>(Rs) Daily</th>
<th>(Rs) Weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>87.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>14.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and power</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture/equipment</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>25.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>161.13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** CSS 1997

**Structure, agency ... sedimentation?**

In the preferred parlance of social science, the above statistics capture “structural” realities, even as these “structures” are maintained through collective, recursive agency (Giddens 1984). No single individual, however creative or dynamic, can change these realities through individual effort. No single individual can transform, for instance, the gendered nature of the metropolitan labour market; nor can any single individual arrest the migration legacies of the apartheid experience. Understood dialectically, these various structural realities “flow” into people's lives, defining both their identities and the contours of their material and imagined existence. Even so, and this is the important point hereafter, individual agents can negotiate these “structural flows” differently. And it is in that differential negotiation of dialectical flows that different kinds of “sedimentation” occur in the urban terrain. In what follows, this metaphor of “sedimentation” is described as a representational space associated with one remarkable woman, Patience, who lives and works as an informal meat trader in Nyanga. Patience's urban “re-mapping” is then linked to those of others, suggesting a general socio-spatial condition.
TABLE 8.7  Importance of “poor physical environment”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Author's fieldwork, 1999

TABLE 8.8  Willingness to pay for “upgrading”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would pay/month</th>
<th>No. of traders</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing/unsure</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5-10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10-20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R30 plus</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: author's fieldwork, 1999

'PATIENCE' AND COMMITMENT

At 59 and now frail, life is mostly behind Patience. So her plans are mostly about consolidation. In her various interview sessions for this thesis, she spoke repeatedly of retirement and preparing for death. She dreamed of being released from what she does. “This is my place now [her road stand]. [But] I’m getting so tired to come here.” She migrated illegally to Cape Town from the Transkei in 1970 — and settled into “Kensington,” a squatter camp area similar to Modderdam from the early 1970s era. Kensington no longer exists. It is only a memory. With the bulldozer campaigns of the 1970s, Patience eventually settled in Nyanga and found work as a domestic servant. She also worked in the restaurant business — “I got the experience there,” she said.

Soon divorced and out of work, however, and thus exceptionally vulnerable to expulsion from Cape Town, Patience started a small informal “restaurant” for taxi drivers in the Nyanga Terminus area. “It was breakfast and late lunch, and that was a good business.” With the upgrading of the Terminus area in the mid-1990s, she lost this good business and moved to a nearby location, where she switched to selling cooked
meats only (including fish, which is rare in African townships). Tragically, taxi violence ensued and “...some bad people burnt down my [new] place — so my business went down. But the government — they didn’t say anything about that. They said nothing. That happens to people like me. You learn all these things [at times like that]. But you [have] to think for yourself, otherwise you are going to be without food.”

“Business was better over there [the Terminus area] because I was inside. And there was not so many [other food traders] — there were fewer than twenty in the 1980s. But now there are those foreigners [too].” Similar to the Langa meat traders working with Edgar Carolissen, Patience also complained repeatedly about her new place: “It’s not so clean here. And it’s cold in the winter.” Notably, she reported that she had a nice place at home where, in theory, she could sell cooked meats:

I have some space at my house. But the community would drag me down by asking for credit, which they won’t pay. Here [on the street] I can shout them to give me my money but [if] I [did] that in my home, it would be different. You have to move away from those who know you if you want a success.

By “moving away” from those she knows, Patience’s monthly profits ebb and flow with the income thresholds of the overall township economy (discussed in chapter VII). She “captures” on average about R800/month of these flows: “My profit, it depends on whether it’s fortnight [payments], pensioner’s pay or the month’s end [payments]. But sometimes people at month’s end don’t buy [from me] but pay their debts.”

For various reasons, including her previous locational experiences, she is convinced (like the Cape Town City Council) that a “better place” would mean more profits for her. But she hedges (like those in Guguletu Meat Market) when asked about paying regular fees for a “better place”: “It depends,” she says curtly. In contrast, she reserves more enthusiasm when asked what the business means to her overall life:

Nobody assists me with this business. But recently, I bought some new furniture and I am going to pay it off in six months. I have a beautiful house in the Transkei. You can ask anyone. It’s beautiful, with furniture too.

In both her daily use and long-term imagination of the urban space of Nyanga, Patience creates a small but sinuous world that ties Cape Town to the Transkei, the city to the country, the present (and past) to the future. For the planners, of course, the market space of the African township is represented as a kind of logical node: a place of congregation; the spatial face of supply and demand. For Patience, market space is different: it is a place to escape the thick social meshwork of the neighborhood. In the
latter, she observes, money can be made but generally is not — because there is too much intimacy.

Terminus thus represents an abstract space economy of strangers/consumers, not an intimate space of families who are also neighbors. Terminus is in abstract space where she can “shout” for her money. Indeed, here she can “perform” pre-entrepreneurialism. And so here she and the planners meet up. At the same time she loathes this place. Arguably, she tolerates it less because it is a part of the city and more because it is a part of the Transkei — an abstract node connected to the distant representational space of retirement, release, preparing for death after a long, hard urban experience: the lifeworld of the most intimate meaning — the denouement of a life. And herein lies the tension. While Patience needs the city, and while the abstract space-economy and the representational space of her daily life are entwined one within the other, she manifests little belief in the city (exactly what the planners need). Why should she? The city, for her, does not really need her. Shunted around during the apartheid years, she also watched her post-apartheid business “inside” the market evaporate in the face of transport improvements, in the face of urban development and progress. She then watched her less profitable business on the periphery of Terminus burn down and “the [post-apartheid] government — they didn’t say anything about that.”

It is difficult to assess (much less “measure”) the importance of the chains of human memories, the flowing, dialectical lines that connect up, in this case, Kensington squatter camp, divorce and vulnerability, a gendered labour market, an arrested business venture, a conflagration. But there is a sense of hesitation in the voices of people like Patience that betray the consequences of these chains, these dialectics of time-space experience. The marketplace of Terminus is thus a place where the collected memories of an urban life sediment (and thus cannot be captured adequately by urban vision statements or, indeed, by time-space diaries). And that life suggests limited belief in the possibility of collective urban development. For Patience, as for many others, of which more in a moment, the informal economy is a realm to slide in and out of, to make a few Rands that can be exported to another realm of existence. She hesitates when asked a proxy question for assessing commitment — the familiar “willingness-to-pay” inquiry. And that hesitation suggests the crucial crux of the challenge: the challenge of commitment.
The dialectical space of commitment: moving with the local state?

It is upon this last point above all others that Lefebvre's project offers ideas of use to Latour's, even as Latour's project helps to put Lefebvre to work. For the actor-network mantra of "enrolment" — so crucial to weaving together new realities, new spaces, new possibilities; so helpful in thinking about the precariousness and "sweatiness" associated with making space — gives us remarkably little insight into the well springs of human intention! *Why* be enrolled, exactly? *Why* resist, exactly? Here actor-network theory is strangely silent. In suggesting that the production of urban spaces (new collectively-built networks) is *partially contingent on the production of representational space* — dreams, emotions, hopes, aspirations, memories, symbols, sedimentations of meaning — Lefebvre provides a theoretical opening to help account for the "hesitation" in the voices of the informal traders. Box 8.1 below captures more trader voices, which betray other dreams and thus other spaces.

Time and time again, as shown in Box 8.1, a spatial dialectic was uncovered between rural consolidation and urban participation, between the absent family member(s) and the present work of daily life. More, the young were as likely to betray these lineaments as the middle aged and aged. It was not just Patience. While the older traders prepared for rural retirement and supplied sustenance to rural relatives, the young supported those who were already retired, who had left them behind in the city. And so, most traders surveyed for this thesis had lived in Cape Town for several years; most had entered the informal food trade only after a few years of urban residence. Yet connections with rural areas, especially the Transkei, were formidable — and this drew traders into a long, extended spatiality of "development" and indeed commitment that was not urban but not exactly rural either.

Commitment, then, is not simply a head game, a condition of self-interested, self-contained economic rationality. Rather, commitment (or the lack of it) is felt, emoted, dreamt, symbolic. Commitment is a sedimented experience of expectation and memory — and thus a spatial reality that (dis)connects the subjectivity of the informal agent with the physical objectivity of the city; it is a "mid-point" between imagined and material worlds. In hesitating (like so many others) to participate indefinitely in the neo-utopian transformation of the city, Patience imports a lived, felt, sensed urban spatiality that codes "Terminus" and the local state as unreliable. It is every bit as consequential as
development frameworks (representations of space) and daily routines (spatial practices). But it is a different kind of urban space.

BOX 8.1 “What does the money you earn mean to you?”

I support my family, pay contributions to a burial club, pay contributions to a church. When I have to go home [Transkei] I use this same money. Every month I send some [money] home.

— 54-year-old man, selling meat in Crossroads

I wouldn’t survive with this money alone, but myself and my wife we put together our money and do what we have to do. I have children at school so I have to buy monthly tickets for the bus, school uniforms, fees and clothes. We also have a house in Transkei and have to support these relatives living there.

— 47-year-old man, selling offal in Crossroads

This business has helped me to survive in Cape Town for two years. Now at least I can send some money to my parents.”

— 24-year-old woman, selling offal in Nyanga.

I support my family in Ciskei.

— 39-year-old woman, selling meats in Brown’s Farm

I am planning to open up a hair salon when I have enough money.

— 24-year-old woman, selling cooked meats in Brown’s Farm

I have parents at home, so they depend on me. So the business means a lot to me. And I have to buy food and all the other things you need here.”

— 34 year old man, Brown’s Farm

SOURCE: Author’s fieldwork, 1999
For this reason it is not easy to engage. When Patience says, “that happens to people like me,” she washes personal, fully lived suffering into state-driven urban development (apartheid and post-apartheid). She links it to a practical sense that power generally wins in space and power she specifically lacks, no matter the nature of the urban project. She uses the (abstract) space-economy of the informal market; she relies on it. But she also “…insinuate[s] other routes into the functional and historical order of movement” (de Certeau, cited in Thrift 1995: 16). For like so many others, she ties Terminus to the Transkei, she disembeds the city from the city. She re-locates this space within the representational life space of rural retirement, rest and release.

All the same, pointing out that everyone builds “representational” space in order to service the lifeworld reaches important political limits. It is the problem of what V.S. Naipaul (1990) calls “a million mutinies.” Such “mutinies” limit the analyses of too many accounts of informal sector dynamics. Alei Tripp (1996), for instance, in her important monograph on the urban informal economy in Dar es Salaam deploys James Scott’s (1985) famous notion of “passive resistance” within a specific intellectual heritage bequeathed by Goran Hyden (1980), who first theorised the Tanzanian State’s consistent incapacity to “capture” its citizens for Afro-socialist modernization.

There are solid reasons for this thematic focus, particularly in regard to rapacious, corrupt and abusive state agency in Africa (Bayart 1992; Lemarchand 1992). Ultimately, however, Tripp and other scholars tend to over-substantiate the “exit tactics” of informal agents. Caricaturing the state, they fail most notably to document the negative, even dangerous externalities of these “exit tactics,” around urban food systems no less than other sectors (Ellis and Sumberg 1998). Put another way they fear spatial solutions more than spatial problems, assuming away the possibility of collective action. More, they come perilously close, with Hernando de Soto (1989), to a neo-liberal affirmation of spontaneous urbanism, where the local state and its planning programmes have little productive role to play.

That is not the way forward. “Hesitation” to commit one’s beliefs to a new city of new streets and new markets is not the same thing as passive resistance, much less a million small mutinies against state-led development. So there is an opening for progressive, post-apartheid spatial change vis-à-vis the UIS. But that opening will be difficult to pass through as long as the local state approaches the management of urban space with a fully formed spatial imaginary, a rule-applying “solution” to late 20th century
urban contradictions that deploys a (strong) rhetoric of spatial representation postulating an already-made “neo-utopia” of cross-scalar integration, stimulation and pre-entrepreneurship — a “best-practice” urbanism of sustainability and LED imported from the latest planning ideals developed in the USA, Europe and even Brazil. Rather, the opening — the Lefebvrian moment? — will be capitalized on only when the local state has to change its visions and practices as much as informal traders are asked to change theirs, which is fundamentally what the radical planning space sensed by Edgar Carolissen is all about. As Beall (1997: 21) puts it:

Under any circumstances and towards all forms of social development, full participation necessitates the empowerment of disadvantaged and disenfranchised people, on both personal and organisational levels, so that their engagement in urban development is around their own priorities and on their own terms, rather than according to an agenda the terms of which have already been set elsewhere.

In highlighting the possibility (remote and precarious as it is) that planning and survival can co-create an alternative urban space, building commitment is about critically understanding and repeatedly tapping into the representational spaces of the city — and furthermore recognizing the power of this spatiality for a different kind of social and urban development. If that sounds hard, harder still is a development project that ignores these spaces. Lefebvre (1991) could never quite accept a progressive local planning agenda. But the impressive work of (admittedly lonely) planners like Edgar Carolissen suggests Lefebvre may have been too dismissive. Indeed, Carolissen’s efforts suggest that Lefebvre’s (1995) oft-quoted “right to the city” is not simply the right to resist, but also the right to change the spaces of the city through productive, mutually transformative engagement with the local state. Patience awaits.

8.4
Conclusions

Within the specific empirical context of planning UIS development, this chapter has explored the general problem of how hard it is to weave “…the rich creativity of the excluded…into a concrete alternative to the present spatial system” (Shields 1999: 185). It has done so by offering more than a geographical survey of that “rich creativity” in Black Metropolitan Cape Town. For in a way this has been done before (though not in Cape Town). Most notably, Soja (1996, 2000) has sketched a “thirdspace” in Los Angeles, whilst Shields (1999) has conjured up (after Lefebvre) the “favela” and the “slum” as
representational spaces of alterity. But neither of these two eminent Lefebvrian scholars really tells us why these spaces typically do not come together as a sustainable "alternative to the present spatial system." Neither of them tells us, more to the point, why the "possibilities" of such alterities rarely become probabilities.

Strong normative commitments to alterity are important. But we need to ground these commitments with more empirical analyses that expose their actual substantive character. This chapter has attempted to undertake such an analysis. Following de Certeau (1984, 1985), the discussion has specifically shown that "alterities" based on tactical resistance to strategic spatial projects do not fall outside strategies. Rather, they "flash" through these strategies, producing new symbolic resources of some empirical importance. In the main, these resources are attempts to find new rules for urban life, "second rationalities" for modernity and the city, as Lash (1999) argues. At the same time, the discussion has also shown that these alterities are often symbolically co-opted; they are made "normal" through abstract absorption within the networks of power and place, even as these networks of power and place are themselves (partially) transformed through this dialectic. The (once alternative) "ordinary" African becomes the basis for "pre-entrepreneurial" subjectivity, for example, and the participatory search for negotiated standards becomes a participatory exercise in applying standards.

The representational space of informal sector development therefore provides, at least in theory, a possible way out of the impasse between neo-utopian strategies (chapter VI) and everyday tactics (chapter VII); between the geography of planning and the geography of survival; between the collective and the individual; between the homogeneous city and the heterogeneous one. But the possibilities of this alternative development are so easily subsumed and relocated by the forces of abstraction and rule-application. The difficulty of planning informal sector development is therefore the difficulty of meaning itself: what is a city for? Who is it for? What spaces are required for this project? As we excavate new spatialities for urban change, it is these questions that should inform this excavation. For the third geography of representational space provides a final terrain from which to re-think the possibilities of urban life in the South.
PART C.

CONCLUSIONS
Chapter IX.

CONCLUSIONS
Recapitulation, Synthesis, Future Research

9.0
Overview

Space is becoming the principal stake of goal-directed actions and struggles.
— Lefebvre (1991: 410)

...[W]e are not yet expert at weaving together....

In the preceding pages I have sought to make an original contribution to the larger debate about the nature and meaning of societal change and urban development. I have done so by excavating in some empirical detail the (extant and desired) spatialities of the informal food distribution system in post-apartheid, Black Metropolitan Cape Town. More generally, I have posed the following research questions: why has planning and management for informal sector development in Black Metropolitan Cape Town been so difficult? Where has it succeeded? Where has it failed? In what sense? And what can we learn about the management of increasingly diverse cities — and more specifically, about “the empowerment of disadvantaged and disenfranchised people” (Beall 1997: 21) — from these empirical experiences? I have outlined the various dimensions that make up an original answer to these larger questions over the past eight chapters.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The purpose of this final chapter is to bring these dimensions together as succinctly as possible. The remainder of this chapter is therefore divided into four key sections. Section 9.1 first recapitulates the main arguments and themes developed over the course of the thesis as a whole. Section 9.2 then synthesizes these arguments and themes,
drawing out the larger lessons and insights gained with regard to the main research questions. Section 9.3 next places these lessons and insights within the context of a new research frontier for informal sector development planning. Finally, Section 9.4 closes both this chapter and the entire thesis with some general conclusions and observations.

9.1 Recapitulation: Motivation, Theoretical Approach, Empirical Application

This section recapitulates the main arguments and themes developed over the course of the thesis as a whole by breaking down the discussion into three main research issues: original motivation and justification; the alternative theoretical approach deployed; and the empirical excavation undertaken.

MOTIVATION

The original motivation for the research reported here was that little is known about the geographies — the spatialities — of informal sector development planning in the rapidly urbanizing South. That seemed a remarkable lacuna. But there was another problem. It was not only that we possessed limited knowledge of the "patternings" or "configurations" associated with how informal sector relations "stretch" themselves out in the city, as Doreen Massey (1994) might put it. It was also a matter of constitution: what relations, exactly, make up informal sector spatialities? More than that, how do planning interventions weave themselves into the spatialities of informal sector development? The first task of this thesis was to review both the general UIS literature and to critically appraise the relatively small corpus of work directed in some manner to the interrogation of such questions, particularly where they have involved discussions of local planning practice. This was done in chapter II.

The review conducted in chapter II critiqued sympathetically but sharply the neo-Marxist, anti-statist and progressive planning "explanations" of informal sector development planning and its prospects. Without question, each of these schools has important things to say, but in my view none provides a compelling theorization of the developmental geographies that planning and survival co-create. I suggested that this limitation derives from epistemological and ontological fragmentations of urban space; and that, in the end, this state of affairs limits our ability to account for successful or unsuccessful informal sector development planning. This provided a justification for a
sustained research project investigating the UIS experience via a different kind of theorization.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Chapter III thus developed an alternative theoretical approach to the problematic of informal sector development planning. The generative source of this approach was found in some of the most intriguing and influential work grouped loosely under the rubric of critical spatial studies, particularly where this has registered the influence of French social theory and philosophy. Working through this literature, chapter III outlined a new theoretical framework. Three synoptic themes structured this framework: spatial dialectics; network ordering; and alterity. Furthermore, three key authors animated the discussion of these concepts, respectively: Henri Lefebvre, Bruno Latour; and Michel de Certeau.

The meta-theories of Henri Lefebvre were applied in order to elucidate a particularly revealing empirical process: the dialectical production of urban space, or more simply “spatial dialectics” (Shields 1999). In my view, “spatial dialectics” means that multiple processes — discursive, physical and symbolic, amongst others — simultaneously constitute or “thingify” the places around us. One way to understand this process, I suggested, is to deploy Lefebvre’s most cited heuristic device: the epistemological “triad” of representations of space, spatial practices and representational spaces. Amongst other functions, this triad refuses (with both Marx and Nietzsche) the common-sense “singularity” of places, that for example allows us to speak of “things-in-themselves” (market buildings, cash, meats) without reference to the multiple processes that constitute these things — or “instantiations” as David Harvey (1996) has recently called them. The promise of this more “unified”, fundamentally dialectical and in my view contextual approach to understanding empirical realities is that it allows us to overcome, at least theoretically, the epistemological and ontological “fragmentations” that limit existing theorizations of UIS development planning. For processes take us on journeys that inexorably cut across the mental, the material, the symbolic.

Like other students inspired by Lefebvre’s complex, nuanced and multi-layered approach to contemporary spatialities, however, I brought other theoretical voices into the narrative (see e.g. Idvall 2000). Focusing on the specific empirical problem of how spatial “networks” (like urban food systems) are actually made, used, changed or potentially stabilized — that is to say, focusing on network ordering — I applied the
work of Bruno Latour (and other actor-network theorists inspired by his work) as well as the work of Michel de Certeau, who offers the parallel concepts of strategies, tactics and belief. Chapter III concluded that all of this helps us to re-think the larger problematic of informal sector development planning, providing us with new ways to theorize both the extant (substantive) and desired (normative) spatialities of UIS empirics, particularly where these involve actual policy approaches to urban development and societal change. The thesis thus turned at this point towards an empirical interrogation of one particular policy experience: the post-apartheid planning for, and survival within, the informal food distribution system of Black Metropolitan Cape Town. Chapter IV ended Part A of the thesis by briefly outlining the analytical parameters, definitions, data needs and research methods that were undertaken to communicate this investigation.

EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

Taking its logic directly from the framework outlined in chapter IV, Part B of the thesis then unfolded in four empirical chapters. The first of these empirical chapters, chapter V, was “geo-historical” in nature. It initially traced the evolution of Black Metropolitan Cape Town as an urban space specifically in terms of the state’s local and national attempts to deal with burgeoning informality, both of the built environment and of the metropolitan space-economy. An important empirical theme emerged from this history: that “things fall apart,” and that informality in particular has consistently breached the state’s intended spatialities for “urban development” in (Black Metropolitan) Cape Town. Understood theoretically, I argued that this state of affairs reflects the way that such “things” (e.g. apartheid cities, racial townships, migratory males) are constituted dialectically through the symmetrical ordering and resistance of heterogeneous materials.

In the face of the Apartheid State’s infamous failure, the chapter ended with a review of the new post-apartheid institutional basis for planning strategies vis-à-vis the “informal sector” city. A specific question was posed: will these new, post-apartheid institutions and strategies (multi-racial local authorities; local economic development; developmental local governance) be more “successful” in consciously shaping the developmental geography of the informal sector urban terrain of Black Metropolitan Cape Town? With this key question in mind, the empirical heart of the thesis was next developed in chapters VI, VII and VIII — each organized around one of Lefebvre’s three spatial “moments.”
Chapter VI opened the case study analysis of the informal food system by showing that the planning of post-apartheid urban space is first constituted through a communicative and textual modality, drawing on Latour's (1987) actor-network notion of “strong rhetoric” to do so. Reflecting back upon insights gained from chapter V, chapter VI held that post-apartheid urban space is being constructed through a planning imaginary of spatial representation that is trying to link up and symmetrically co-constitute particular “places” in particular ways. The discussion mapped three such places: the “integrating” metropole, the “stimulating” market and the “pre-entrepreneurial” subject. Specifically, the discussion showed that each “place” emerges from a particular imagination of the other — that for example, the neo-utopian modernity of metropolitan “integration” is tied up with the WLP Corridor-driven “strong pressures points” of “stimulating” informal markets and that, in turn, such markets pre-suppose (and even require) “pre-entrepreneurial” subjectivities and performances. The empirical modalities constitutive of these links are text and talk; planning language and budgetary (dis)agreement; participatory persuasion and banter; technical ideas about appropriate urban management; and indeed appeals to “belief” (cf. Crush 1995). To adapt David Perry's (1995) use of Lefebvre, “planning as a mode of thought” was explored as a (state-defined) space of collectively held possibility.

Chapter VI ultimately showed how incomplete, difficult and unstable the detailed process of actually making such representations has been in post-apartheid Cape Town (as in earlier epochs). If they are hegemonic, the discussion suggested, they are only precariously so — precisely as actor-network theory hypothesizes. The discussion showed in particular that the successes and failures of building strong rhetoric for UIS development emanated from the same qualities: an overly physical, homogeneous and abstract spatial imagination of such development. This was paradoxical. On the one hand, it allowed for a captivating imaginary to “take off”: the Curitiba-inspired metropolitan spatial development framework. But as the networks formed around this imaginary, resistance was encountered, both within and outside the state. Skepticism soon appeared ("All the traders who say they will go in the [new] market," as one official lamented, "then go somewhere else.") Informal sector development planning in this particular case was documented as extremely difficult, then, because (to start with) a discursive space for that development could not be fully engineered; nor could it be sustained.
Chapter VII shifted the empirical discussion and the research questions to a quite
different but nonetheless related set of modalities, namely the “travel stories” — the
spatial practices — of informal food traders in select African communities. Here urban
space was perceived as primarily physical and embodied rather than primarily mental and
discursive. After introducing the case study in some detail, the discussion focused on the
nature of food consumption thresholds and the extent to which informal traders
“capture” these thresholds. Here the positive theme of going informal was developed.
The discussion then focused on the travel stories themselves. While tied up with the
state representations of chapter VI, the “travel stories” in chapter VII were narrated as
Torsten Hagerstrand’s (1982) time-geography projects. These “projects” showed not
only how multiple places were linked (again, symmetrically) across scales in informal
daily routines, but also how heterogeneous materials (wood, lorries, cash, auction rooms,
parasites) were “folded” into these routines. The discussion emphasized this general
spatial heterogeneity — this remaking of the material world — not only within time-
space projects but also across them. Hence another paradox: part of its capacity to capture
thresholds derives precisely from this heterogeneity, from this ability to make and remake urban
space in idiosyncratic, protean ways.

Ultimately, chapter VII showed how much this spatial heterogeneity complicates
the UIS development planning imaginary outlined in chapter VI (itself struggling for
legitimacy). Quite simply: the travel stories of survival transgress the “clean” spaces of
entrepreneurship, stimulation and integration — constantly building and rebuilding
urban spaces to perform other objectives. While pulled through Lefebvre’s meta-theory
of how space is produced, both chapters VI and VII thus followed on from the actor-
network theme broached in chapter V, which again emphasized how hard it is to
produce and maintain particular kinds of urban spatialities — to “snap” things into
place, as it were, and keep them there. As in chapter VI, chapter VII ended with a
query: are the two moments of representation and practice reconcilable?

One of Lefebvre’s main arguments is that the “fragmentation” (or severance) of
representation from practice can only be overcome by recovering — and working within
— the alternative representational spaces of “fully-lived” lives: lives that resist the
sharpening forces of economic and bureaucratic abstraction; lives that imagine and/or
practice different ways to be in the world; lives that both plan and survive. With this
close to hand, chapter VIII moved the empirical narrative of Part B to the final and
certainly least intuitive spatial terrain — the terrain of Lefebvre’s much heralded third
moment, the difficult-to-excavate third geography of "representational space" itself. Here the analysis also drew more explicitly on de Certeau’s (1985) theme of alterity, using Scott Lash’s (1999) notion of reflexive “rule-finding” as a metaphor for this alterity. Chapter VIII found this geography of rule-finding everywhere: in the negotiation of the “ordinary” African; in one planner’s search for an alternative planning practice; in the small dreams of retirement and rest. The discussion suggested that here were moments — flashes, even — where a different kind of urban spatialisation for informal sector “development” (or perhaps more precisely post-development) resides. Potentially this forms the basis, at least theoretically, to overcome the fragmentation of representation from practice. It forms the basis to re-consider development within the context of fully lived lives.

That said, it is far easier to assert (with Lefebvre) the normative value of these alternative spaces than it is to mobilize a sustainable alternative to the homogenizing “abstractions” of state and market (see Spiegel et al 1996). Much of the reason for this, chapter VIII concluded, is that like many other “resources” alterity is quickly co-opted; it is neutralized by its own dialectical successes. This is a more general problem, noticed by a host of (post)development scholars. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1998: 350), one of the most insightful of these scholars, has put it:

The informal sector, a twilight zone unnoticed by mainstream developers mesmerized by the state, has been embraced [in recent years] by development agencies. The companying message of deregulation and government rollback beautifully dovetailed with the prevailing neo-liberal outlook (cf. Friedmann 1992; Crush 1995; Rist 1997).

Thus to reprise only one example documented here, the once “alternative” mid-1970s programme celebrating the “ordinariness” of African (informal sector) space was soon transformed by the state into a mainstream programme of (symbolic) individualism and, indeed, “pre-entrepreneurship” during the neo-liberal turn of the 1980s and 1990s. In short, alterity was not “wiped out” so much as it was “made normal” through absorption into the strategic management of space. Following de Certeau, this dialectic changed the strategies, indeed the basis of urban modernity itself. But once put into symbolic circulation, it also acted to blunt the possibilities of a substantially different looking (and different feeling) spatialisation of urban life and social meaning. So the rift between representation and practice continued.
9.2
Synthesis: Dialectics, Heterogeneity, Symmetry

In offering an account of these three moments I simultaneously explored a new hypothesis about informal sector development planning — quite different from any that has come before. This hypothesis was and remains that the (1) dialectics, (2) heterogeneity and (3) symmetry of space (or together, the production of space) best “explains” the difficulties of Cape Town’s planning experience. Using the hotel key-return policy first broached in chapter I as an analogous theoretical model once again, this section now revisits each of these three major terms, relating them back to the empirical insights generated from the whole of Part B. In so doing, this section also gives attention to the constellation of other theoretical concepts that have aided my exploration of this new hypothesis.

THE HYPOTHESIS REVISITED

The dialectics of Lefebvre’s three main moments — the theoretical claim that the production of space is a three-moment dynamic — indicates, in my view, the complexities associated with pre-figuring a particular trajectory for urban life, which is what planning in any form is about. First of all, dialectics means that space is not a container, but a contested and often contradictory accomplishment. (Think again of the hotel key-return policy and scale this “up” to the whole of the city.) As explored empirically in this thesis, dialectics involves the production of rhetoric and representation; the production of travel and practice; AND the production of resistance and alterity (and co-optation). Attending to the dialectics of space therefore means attending to the rational head, the working body, the desiring heart. One cannot “fragment” these dynamics here. For on such an account the world is simultaneously mental, physical, symbolic — with each moment, as Lefebvre insists, theoretically co-equal. Ultimately, then, dialectics is about how processes constitute things; about how post-apartheid cities, trading markets and African subjects come about and how they internalise each other across scales of experience.

More than this, as Harvey (1996) notes, dialectics is about the heterogeneity of how processes produce “things” (including, as Merrifield (1992) theorizes, “places”). Harvey stops well short of extending this principle beyond the “internal” heterogeneity of things (the fact that, as he puts it, things are themselves constituted by heterogeneous relations). But this need not be the case, as Swyngedouw (1999) in particular has argued.
Indeed, Lefebvre (1991) senses, time and time again, the "assemblage" qualities of spatial dialectics ("What is assembled?", he asks (1991: 101): "everything that there is in space", he answers). So again, Lefebvre's larger argument that we should try to avoid the fragmentation or severance of this "assemblage" is, in my view, a contextual approach cognate to, if by no means interchangeable with, actor-network theory and indeed time-geography approaches.

Accordingly, the informal sector network, like the hotel key-return policy, is heterogeneously built. This has real consequences for planning practice. To move food and cash around a city is to translate physical materials (food, cash, lorries, etc.). But to (re)plan that movement is to relate representations about possible spatialities (the MSDF, the Wetton-Landsdowne Corridor, the "stimulating" market) to this heterogeneous physicality. That creates tensions because the "Concept-cities," to re-use de Certeau's (1984) term, tend towards abstractions of this heterogeneity (even as they are themselves built up through heterogeneous engineering!). Thus the practiced spatialities of travel in chapter VII complicated the desired spatialities of rhetorical agency in chapter VI. Specifically, the "obligatory points of passage" in chapter VI — the market areas and pre-entrepreneurial subjectivities — were never fully "translated," and thus never really made "durable" as a new spatial ordering.

That these (not-quite translated and thus precarious) "points of passage" were documented as physical and social, discursive and material, highlights the final concept of symmetry. Arguably, even more than the other two main concepts, which are easier to accept if not necessarily agree with, symmetry foregrounds the profoundly contextual rather than exclusively compositional nature of geographical formations. There are two ways to understand the relevance of symmetry to the questions posed by this thesis. The first is to recognize the role of "non-social" dynamics in social relations, arguably the most controversial and explosive of actor-network claims. Perhaps the best example documented in this thesis related to the difficulties of retaining the economic qualities (cash) of informal meat networks whilst extinguishing through policy the negative microbiological qualities (parasites). We heard from a variety of public health officials, all struggling to find a way around this conundrum. The ontological and contextual assertion that these networks are simultaneously social and natural — simultaneously about cash and parasites — is in my view helpful in theorizing the difficulties of transforming the spatialities of these networks. If the world were not symmetrical, in other words, planning neo-utopias would be easier.
The second way to understand the importance of symmetry to the questions posed by this thesis is, once again, to consider the problem of scale. Here we return to the dialectics of how post-apartheid cities, trading markets and African subjects come about and how they co-constitute each other. Chapter VI argued, for instance, that the metropolitan physicality of the post-apartheid city of “integration” in part turns on the ability to produce particular kinds of “pre-entrepreneurial” subjectivities (to say nothing about “stimulating” markets); the opposite is also true. That is to say, chapter VI argued that planning is about confecting materialities with subjectivities; buildings with behaviours. This cross-scalar and cross-ontological symmetry is therefore also extremely important in understanding how new spatial orderings come about or, indeed, do not come about. Put another way, one simply cannot have certain kinds of cities without certain kinds of subjectivities. For development involves, amongst other things, the production of new forms of identity.

It is of course the (tactical) resistance to this (strategic) process of (abstracted) subjectification that so attracted Lefebvre and de Certeau. It was therefore necessary to highlight the role of alterity in figuring the dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical production of urban space. Like the guests who refuse to perform hotel rituals, traders (and planners) who resist the spatial abstractions of the MSDF produce a dialectical dynamic full of potential to change the overall nature of these abstractions. Indeed, as shown in chapter VIII, these tactical resistances feed back into the strategies themselves, and therefore into what can be “believed” about cities and development.

**THE JAZZ OF PLANNING**

My hypothesis is tough, then, but hopefully not disabling of planning practice. To argue that the dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical production of space begins to account for some of the most important challenges to planning informal sector development (in Cape Town at least) does not mean that collective urban action is impossible. Difficulty is not the same thing as impossibility. I emphatically do not wish to argue, in a kind of neo-liberal voice, that planning is just too hard (or necessarily oppressive). To make such a general argument is close to asserting, and I now return to a metaphor last used in chapter I, that the only kind of sound we can make in cities is spontaneous noise. Let everyone bang away; let the market role; let the sousaphones and piccolos have at it; let informal sector actors perform as they wish (assuming that they are “free” to perform, despite gendered labour markets, etc.).

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At the same time, planning cannot be about perfectly conceived and laid out musical scores dropped into the theatre of the city by the genius composer (Howard, LeCorbusier, Lord Rogers, the Mayor of Curitiba). It cannot be performed the same way, every time, everywhere (cf. Soja 1997). For planning can be likened to playing jazz, not Bach. To be sure, it is about orchestration around common themes, moods and colourings (indeed common beliefs and dreams and imaginings). We should be able to recognize a popular melody, a shared cultural yearning. But there is plenty of room for flashes of improvisation and individual expression. And similar melodies can be played by different constellations of instruments (even sousaphones and piccolos) at different venues. The jazz of planning, then, is the search for a particular kind of spatial performance at a particular moment in history. Like the art of Miles Davis, it can be a rule-finding, paradigm-shifting performance. “The issue is how we negotiate standards,” as Edgar Carollisen put it (Carollisen, interview).

All this suggests that planning informal sector development is less about making (land use) plans per se, its traditional ‘task’, and more about making social spaces, or more specifically, about making equitable social relations (Perry 1995). Seen this way, and admittedly this is an expansive way to see planning, the fundamental challenge is less to “get the design right,” to imagine fully-formed, pre-figured neo-utopias (an old, but now re-emerging story in many countries), and much more to constantly co-build, co-maintain and co-transform spatial relations based on equity and justice. As David Harvey has argued many times: we should focus on spatial processes rather than spatial things. Accordingly, we should not plan things but plan processes. We should be “network-makers,” as Carollisen reflexively demands.

This theorisation of planning (for informal sector development in particular) merges to some extent with Patsy Healey’s (1997) sense that planning is fundamentally about engineering what she calls “relational webs” of inter-subjective, institutional norms. It merges as well with what Susan Fainstein (2000: 452) calls a “just city” theorization of planning practice — “a model of spatial relations based on equity” (cf. Krumholtz and Clavel 1992). But ultimately it probably merges most with Leonie Sandercock’s (1998) argument that planning can only really succeed when it involves a search for how the local state might support submerged spaces, working constantly from the ground up with the instruments it has at its disposal (see also Friedmann 1992). For while Healey’s “institutional” approach captures the possible social spatialities of “successful” planning and social-environmental change, Sandercock’s approach captures
more adroitly and directly the ostensibly marginal, submerged, "not-quite-included" dynamics of city-life.

Accordingly, there is some room for optimism. The original rhythms of jazz are African. And so perhaps it is within an African city that a new type of planning practice and spatial performance might emerge. There is some evidence already, not only on the pages of this thesis but across the continent. Basset and Jabobs (1997), for instance, document neither all formal nor all informal collective land tenure arrangements in Voi, Kenya, whilst Fourie (1998) finds new roles for local land administrators in Namibia. Not Bach, then, but not noise either.

9.3
Across not against: a spatial agenda for future research and reflection

In its largest sense, this thesis has been an experiment. It has tried to interrogate the empirics of an important contemporary urban issue through a framework developed from some of the most interesting work in critical spatial theory. The heavy theoretical emphasis on space is entirely warranted, in my view, because the empirical issue itself is profoundly spatial. Reflecting back on the headquotes that began this thesis, the question of what to do with the informal sector is, in Cape Town at least, a question of what to do with space itself.

It remains a matter for other researchers to ascertain whether this is equally true in other sectors and other cities. My sense is that it is. And here we might extend the point even further, drawing on the headquotes that began this chapter. Lefebvre's sense that space is becoming "the principal stake of goal-directed action and struggles" is another way of re-affirming the importance of interrogating the spatiality of what I am calling, more broadly, informal sector agency: the geography of informal sector development planning; the geography of planning and survival. The way to interrogate spatiality, in turn, is to get better (with Latour) at "weaving together" domains of urban life that we almost instinctively want to separate and fragment. More simply, it is to get better at mapping contextual rather than compositional geographies. While this clearly involves a theoretical agenda, it also involves key empirical issues.
The contextual approach to urban research deployed here is extremely demanding in the field. It is not only that different "moments" have to be excavated; it is that "following" the excavation of these moments presents formidable research challenges. We do not necessarily need more geographies of planning or more geographies of survival (although I would welcome both). What we need, in truth, are the geographies that arise from their interrelationships: "in-between" or "both/also" geographies (cf. Soja 1996). That has been my goal here. But it is obviously easier to think of planning, on the one hand, and survival, on the other, just as it is easier to think of any duality: order/disorder; formal/informal; planned/unplanned. Thinking spatially (and contextually) allows us to move across these dualities, at least in principle. But the ordinary fieldwork that accompanies data excavation tends to sever such crossings. And it is not always easy to reassemble relations later on. I have done my best here. But there are planning documents and planning interviews; and then there are survival habits and survival attitudes. The geographical nexus is sometimes obscured from view by the tenacious tendency to put things in boxes.

Two issues

With this in mind, future research would perhaps benefit from some of the limitations and mistakes I made in excavating data for this thesis (in addition to those mentioned in chapter IV). Two issues stand out.

Locating the nexus of people and texts. It is easy to accept that people "make" geographies and that texts "represent" these geographies; but the opposite is also true, as chapter VI showed. Texts (like the quantitatively-rich WLP "Corridor") often "shift" collective agency (like the oral notices in hotel rooms); and people (like planners) sometimes represent the nature of that agency. This is a difficult dialectic, though. In particular, "seeing" the agency of texts requires a sense of the way it pulls people together or keeps them apart. That is to say, it requires a symmetrical analysis.

This creates problems when historical work is required, as in chapter V. While most of the abbreviated historical work in this chapter was based on the work of other scholars, I did try to excavate some primary data from the archives, drawing for example on minutes of local authority meetings, which record the flow of past discussions about as well as any textual material can. While this process informed my broader understanding of "planning" Black Metropolitan Cape Town over the twentieth century,
however, I ultimately did not use a lot of these data. In part this was due to space constraints and to the larger nature of the thesis, which is mainly about the post-apartheid era. But it was also because I spent too much time on the texts and not enough time on the people associated with those texts.

This can be excused for historical research: many (though not all) of the “people” are long gone and all that remains are “texts.”1 But it is less excusable when researching contemporary issues. While all researchers lament the limitations of time and resources (perhaps amplified in a doctoral context), I do not think the issue here is getting “more” data: i.e. interviewing “more” people. I think the problem is interviewing the right people. That is less banal than it might sound. In the thick of fieldwork it is hard to know who the right people are. It is easy to “follow the actors,” as Latour instructs us, when you know which actors warrant attention. I did not always know. So I missed opportunities to investigate more closely the really important connections between people and texts largely because I missed opportunities to interview the right people (as I think I collected the right texts).

The best example is probably my failure to interview the right actors in the Wetton-Landsdowne Corridor “participation” programme (discussed in chapter VI). I argued that the capacity to embed the Corridor in the public consciousness, to get people to believe, to “enroll” them, was crucial to the desired spatiality of informal sector agency. And I documented much skepticism and resistance. However, a more richly detailed interrogation of that particular moment could have been presented here. Accordingly, future research might avoid the temptation of “more data” and instead focus on the promise of finding the right moments to excavate.

Detailing the contextual nature of ‘travel.’ This last point relates to a second major methodological issue in need of future attention: detailing the “travel stories” of chapter VII. In a way, the concern here is paradoxical. Arguably, chapter VII presents the most richly detailed picture of any of the four empirical chapters. But the actual empirical

1Many of the key players are still around, though. One crucial example is Dr. Piet Koornhof, who is an important figure in the geo-history of Black Metropolitan Cape Town. Koornhof is infamously associated with the squatter crisis of the 1970s and, more specifically, with the establishment of New Crossroads in the early 1980s (the heart of my case study area). At the time of my fieldwork, Dr. Koornhof lived in Cape Town. My failure to interview him now seems a lost opportunity. That said, my attempts to recover many of the planning documents associated with New Crossroads were unsuccessful. Mareec Kanjeia, a planner with the Western Cape Province, reported that: “I have not seen any of those [New Crossroads] documents in the past ten years; and if you don’t see things for that long, they’re gone” (Kanjeia, interview).
process of getting these stories could be improved. For once again, the time-space projects detailed in chapter VII were necessarily schematic ones, especially in terms of time. The reason for this related mainly to the difficulties of working within low-income, high-illiteracy and dangerous areas. Much more methodological attention needs to be paid to extracting "time-space" data from people on the move in cities of the South. To my knowledge, little work has been done on adapting techniques originally conceived in more developed urban settings. Indeed, this is one of the problems with both ANT and time-geography as presently conceived, at least as I experienced these methods.

One relatively heterodox possibility is to deploy mobile phone technology, forging a continuous "electronic relationship" between the researcher and the informant. ("Where are you? I am at x. When did you go there? I left at y. What are you doing now? I am doing z."). This would overcome the problem of ex post facto recall and informant ennui about relevance; it would also promote research participation. But it would be intrusive and labour intensive for everyone involved. It would also raise issues of sustainability and ethics: how to take a mobile phone away from someone who could obviously not afford to continue using it without subsidy? And what about places with no mobile phone infrastructure? Innovation in method, particularly around the twin themes of travel and context, is therefore crucial to mapping more effectively the spatiality of informal sector agency in place like (Black Metropolitan) Cape Town. It is not simply a question of individual research skills or experience.

THE THEORETICAL AGENDA

These empirical issues are important because data cannot be theorized that is never collected. But a spatial agenda for future research and reflection would also consider the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical approach and heuristic strategy adopted here. If the way to interrogate (the production of) spatiality is to get better with Latour at "weaving together" domains of urban life, including Lefebvre's discursive, practiced and symbolically lived domains, then some sort of contextual approach, such as ANT, seems mandatory. The danger in moving to such approaches, however, is to argue "against" other compositional approaches, rather than "across" them. Put differently, it is not so

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2 Another Cape Town-based researcher, Roger Behrens, has examined this methodological issue in some detail. Interested in transport planning issues, Behrens (2001) argues that time-space/activity holds much promise in critiquing mainstream transport planning approaches. But he notes the need to adapt techniques to suit developing countries. For a more general discussion of the failure "to study the actual physical use of the colonial [and post-colonial] city" see Yeoh (1996: 9).
much that class (exploitation) or state (oppression) or (an inadequate) built environment
each misses the "essential" point about informal sector development planning. Rather, it
is that all of these "domains" and others might be at work at the same time. Indeed, it is
the context of these interrelationships that holds so much promise. To develop an insight
made earlier, it is not so much an "either/or" question as a "both/also" question. Soja
(1996, 2000) argues precisely this in his engaging use of Lefebvre; but he does not really
show us how "both/also" geographies actually come about in his chosen locale: Los
Angeles. This is particularly true in his Postmetropolis (2000) discussion of "representations
of space," which is more a rehearsal of elite discourses than an empirical analysis of

Part of the reason for Soja's problem, in my view, is that Lefebvre (1991) simply
does not provide a practical method for this kind of work; indeed, capturing the
empirical details of "processes" is a limitation of political economy approaches in general
(cf. Rudel 1989, who marries "growth-machine" theory with "game theory" in his
compelling explanation of American land use). My use of time-geography and ANT is
based on an early realisation that Lefebvre's basically meta-theoretical approach calls for
linkages to other traditions of thought. Still, the weaknesses of ANT vis-à-vis alterity
and, more seriously, human motivation (why be enrolled, exactly?), means that more than
ANT is needed. Coupled with de Certeau's notion of belief, Lefebvre gives us a strong
sense that space is not only about network construction. More than that, Lefebvre's
work is perhaps more helpful than his frequently cited "three-moment" heuristic device
suggests (Figure 3.1). It would be possible, I think, to write about the spatiality of
informal sector agency by moving through Lefebvre's (1991) geo-historical spaces, rather
than his spatial moments, especially if the history of a particular UIS experience were
more important that it has been here. That is to say, it would be possible to write about
abstract space (p. 229-291), contradictory space (p.292-351) and differential space (p.
352-400), rather than to narrate matters according to "moments." Indeed, such geo-
historical research would be extremely illuminating of changes over time.

That said, the advantages that attend a "moment-by-moment" account relate
directly to the advantages of ANT. For ANT gives us a way to excavate how these
moments come about. In this sense, Eric Sywngedouw's (1996, 1999) recent turn to
ANT from an original and continuing interest in Lefebvre should be developed further.
Indeed, when applied to an empirical focus on urban food systems, particularly in cities
where urban agriculture is relatively more important than it is in Cape Town, the
theoretical marriage proposed here might be even more helpful. But this marriage requires more thinking about what theoretical resources each partner brings to the association. None of these bodies of theory provides a perfect set of ideas. But their articulation with one another, as hard as this is to do at times, does begin to unearth the extraordinary spatiality of the urban experience.

9.4
General Conclusions

The twentieth century turned out to be substantially different from what most people had likely expected in 1901. From a world of rural peasants, it became increasingly a world of urban workers. Urban settlement patterns in turn expanded explosively. By the end of the twentieth century, as many people lived in cities as lived in the countryside — for the first time in human history. With this great wheel of urbanisation came not a modernity based exclusively on formal labour, as anticipated by some modernization theorists as late as the 1960s. Instead what came was a modernity based on a burgeoning informality of urban space and society. It would be foolhardy, then, to predict in 2001 urban trajectories for the next hundred years. All the same, it is safe to suggest that the informal nature of today’s cities, particularly in the South, will be with us for some time, challenging us to address both its problems and its possibilities.

This thesis has explored Cape Town’s intriguing and instructive effort to remake a particular constellation of survival activities through its newly restructured post-apartheid planning and governance system. It has offered a new theoretical approach and indeed a new hypothesis for explaining why attempts to transform these survival activities through this system have been so difficult, so uneven, so laborious. In so doing it has also opened up a new way to explore the larger relationships between planning, survival and geography — a research triptych that we need to think a lot more about. For the spatiality of informal sector agency, I have shown here, is the spatiality of rhetoric, travel and alterity; of linkage and fragility; of creativity and improvisation. It is not a spatiality of planners, on the one hand, and of traders, on the other. Rather, it is a spatiality of dialectical, heterogeneous and symmetrical production; a spatiality of performance, of collective agency, that moves across domains of the urban experience — planning and survival; the political, the technical, the economic and indeed the microbiological. It is this movement across domains, I believe, that can teach us new things about the world, if only we can commit ourselves to “weaving together.”

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As we search for new ways to address the problems and possibilities of informal sector dynamics, my abiding hope is that the research reported here will in some manner inform that search. In closing, then, it is perhaps useful to note that much of the narrative of this thesis has excavated small events, lived out in small, "ordinary" ways (like getting keys back to the hotel manager's desk). That is altogether fitting and proper (see Amin and Graham 1997; Thrift 2000d). For the "real work of planet-saving," Wendell Berry writes,

will be small, humble, and humbling, and (insofar as it involves love) pleasing and rewarding. Its jobs too many to count, too many to report, too many to be publicly noticed or rewarded, too small to make anyone rich or famous" (cited in Schuman 1998: no page number).

The great stories of this thesis were not grand stories. They were humble and humbling ones — and far too many to report. But they were (and remain) pleasing and rewarding.
APPENDIX I.

Data Collection Tools
1. I first want to ask you about the living and working situation in your home.

A: First, can you first tell me **WHO NORMALLY STAYS WITH YOU** in your household?

B: Next, what is the **RELATIONSHIP OF EACH PERSON** in the household (e.g. head of household, daughter, brother-in-law, "stay-in")?

C: Now, what is the **OCCUPATION** or normal activity of each person? For example, construction worker, clerk in a shop, student, unemployed, part-time work as a char.

D: Finally, **WHERE** is the occupation or activity for each person?

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<tr>
<td>A. Person</td>
<td>B. Relationship</td>
<td>C. &quot;Job&quot; or &quot;normal activity&quot;</td>
<td>D. Where do they do this?</td>
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2. Does anyone in the household **REGULARLY** receive a pension, government grant or compensation payment of any kind?

- [ ] No [1]
- [ ] Yes. What type of payment is it?
  - [ ] Old age pension [2]
  - [ ] Disability grant [3]
  - [ ] Family allowance of some kind (e.g. from a life insurance plan) [4]
  - [ ] Other [5]

3. Do you ever receive money from a family member not staying with you in this house?

- [ ] No [1]
- [ ] Yes [2]
4. Adding up #1, #2 and #3, estimate your Household’s average monthly income (all income from the people staying in this house)?

- less than R500 □ [1]
- R500-750 □ [2]
- R750-1000 □ [3]
- R1000-1250 □ [4]
- R1250-1500 □ [5]
- R1500-1750 □ [6]
- R2000-R2500 □ [8]
- R2500-3000 □ [9]
- more than R3000 □ [10]

5. How long has your family lived in Cape Town? ____________

6. Estimate how much money your household spends IN 1 MONTH on meat, vegetables and fruit:

   (NOTE: put a ✓ for the amount of rands the best applies)

   \[
   \begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
   \hline
   \text{Meat} & \text{Vegetables} & \text{Fruits} \\
   \hline
   \text{[1]} & R1-10 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[2]} & R10-20 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[3]} & R20-50 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[4]} & R50-100 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[5]} & R100-150 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[6]} & R150-200 & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \text{[7]} & R200 or more & \text{✓} & \text{✓} & \text{✓} \\
   \hline
   \end{array}
   \]

7. Estimate how much money your household spends in 1 month on ALL FOODS you eat in your house (not only meats, vegetables and fruits, but also bread, mealie meal, tins, drinks, sugar, milk, and so on).

   \[
   \text{Amount} \quad \text{put a ✓ in the box that best applies}
   \]

   100-200 □ [1]
   200-300 □ [2]
   300-400 □ [3]
   400-500 □ [4]
   500-600 □ [5]
   600-700 □ [6]
   700-800 □ [7]
   800-900 □ [8]
   900-1000 □ [9]
   1000-1500 □ [10]
   1500 or more □ [11]

8. MEILIES: When they are in season (January-June), how often does someone in your family buy mealies from a local street hawker?

   □ never [1]
   □ only 1-3 times a month [2]
   □ maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
   □ between 2-5 times a week [4]
   □ more than 5 times a week [5]
9. Estimate how often someone in your family buys fruits and vegetables from a local spaza or hawker?

- never or rarely [1]
- only 1-3 times a month [2]
- maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
- between 2-5 times a week [4]
- more than 5 times a week [5]

10. Estimate how much you or someone in your family spends each time you buy fruit and vegetables from a hawker or spaza shop?

- nothing or less than 1 rand [1]
- between 1 and 5 rands [2]
- between 5 and 10 rands [3]
- between 10 and 20 rands [4]
- more than 20 rands [5]

11. Estimate how often someone in your family buys fruits and vegetables from Shoprite, Pick and Pay, or another kind of "formal" supermarket?

- never or very rarely [1]
- maybe 1-3 times a month [2]
- maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
- between 2-5 times a week [4]
- more than 5 times a week [5]

12. Estimate how much you or someone in your family spends each time you buy fruit and vegetables from a formal shop like Shoprite or Pick and Pay?

- nothing or less than 1 rand [1]
- between 1 and 5 rands [2]
- between 5 and 10 rands [3]
- between 10 and 20 rands [4]
- more than 20 rands [5]

13. Compare the FRUITS AND VEGETABLES sold by local hawkers and spazas with "formal" shops like Pick and Pay or Shoprite. Are the FRUITS AND VEGETABLES of local hawkers and spaza shop "much better", "a little better", "about the same" or "worse" in terms of price, quality and convenience?

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<td>13.1 Price</td>
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<td>13.3 Convenience</td>
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14. SHEEP HEADS. Estimate how often someone in your family buys from a sheep head hawker?

- never or rarely [1]
- only 1-3 times a month [2]
- maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
- between 2-5 times a week [4]
- more than 5 times a week [5]

Why do you buy sheep heads this number of times? __________________________________________
15. PENS and LIVERS. Estimate how often someone in your family buys from a pens and livers hawker?

- never or rarely [1]
- only 1-3 times a month [2]
- maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
- between 2-5 times a week [4]
- more than 5 times a week [5]

Why do you buy pens/livers this number of times? ________________________________

16. T-BONES and SAUSAGES. Estimate how often someone in your family buys from a local meat hawker?

- never or rarely [1]
- only 1-3 times a month [2]
- maybe 1-2 times a week [3]
- between 2-5 times a week [4]
- more than 5 times a week [5]

Why do you buy street meats this number of times? ________________________________

17. Compare LOCAL MEAT HAWKERS with “formal” shops like Pick and Pay or Shoprite. Are the local hawkers and spaza shop “much better”, “a little better,” “about the same” or “worse” in terms of price, quality, health and safety and convenience?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[2]</th>
<th>[3]</th>
<th>[4]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Compare local meat hawkers with African butcheries in the townships. Are the local hawkers and spaza shop “much better”, “a little better,” “about the same” or “worse” in terms of price, quality, health and safety and convenience?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[2]</th>
<th>[3]</th>
<th>[4]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.1</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Do you ever buy live animals from someone in your community or nearby that you then kill/have killed and/or prepare yourself?

- No we don’t [1]
- Yes, we sometimes buy:
  - live chickens [2]
  - live sheep [3]
  - other animals [4]

Where? ________________________________

20. Has your family ever grown food (e.g. cabbage, spinach, melies, pumpkins, tomatoes)?

- No...... (Put a ✓ next to ALL that apply)
Why not?

☐ we don’t know how to grow food [1]
☐ there is no space to grow food [2]
☐ the ground is not very good for growing food [3]
☐ because the space to grow food on my property is being used for a backyard shack [4]
☐ because it is too expensive to buy the things you need to grow food [5]
☐ it is cheaper to buy food than to grow food. [6]
☐ OTHER [7] ____________________________

Yes......

☐ and it has saved us money because we don’t need to buy as much food from shops [8]
☐ but we stopped doing it because it was too expensive, too difficult or not worth the time [9]
☐ OTHER [10] ____________________________

21. Please fill out the following boxes dealing with HOUSEHOLD FOOD PURCHASING HABITS (note: please interview the person or people most familiar with these habits).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOOD</th>
<th>WHO BUYS?</th>
<th>OUTLET AND PLACE?</th>
<th>HOW-CONTEXT?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For example:</td>
<td>“Mother”</td>
<td>“Terminus in Nyanga”</td>
<td>On foot, after I get off the taxi coming home from work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals (rice, bread)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh/frozen beef and veal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh frozen mutton, lamb and goat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sausages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-bones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pens, intest., livers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep heads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and dairy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# FOOD TRADING SURVEY

Date of interview: _______________________________
Location of selling site: _______________________________
Gender: _______________________________
Type of business: □ on street, simple stand □ on street, with simple building
□ From the home, simple stand or simple building in front

1. Age
2. Birthplace: □ Cape Town area [1]
   □ Rural area in Eastern Cape [2]
   □ City in Eastern Cape [3]
   □ Other [4]
3. Where do you normally stay? ___________ (name of neighbourhood)
4. How many years have you stayed in this community? ___________
5. How many years have you stayed in Cape Town? ___________
6. In which of the following communities have you stayed before? ✓ ±

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUGULETU - formal areas</td>
<td>PHILLIPPI - Brown's Farm (upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- informal area (e.g. Pola Park Tambo Sq., New Rest, Gxa)</td>
<td>- Brown's Farm (not upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHYELITSHA - Site B or C</td>
<td>UNIBEL - NPC/Vietnam/Samora Machel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal areas</td>
<td>WERKGENOT - Philippi East (Stock rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other informal areas</td>
<td>WERKGENOT - Bluebell, VRYGROND, COOK'S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENSINGTON</td>
<td>BUSHE, GRASSY PARK or RETREAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTC</td>
<td>ATHLONE, CRAWFORD, SURRY EST.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGA - formal areas</td>
<td>WELCOME EST., JAKKALSVELI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- informal areas</td>
<td>EUREKA EST., ELSIES RIVER,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODDERDAM</td>
<td>TIERVELI, VASCO, GOODWOOD ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYANGA - formal areas</td>
<td>WINDEMEIER, OAKDALE, KRAIFONTIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- informal areas</td>
<td>OTHERS NOT LISTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- informal areas (Mkonto, Mahobe, Black City, Mposha)</td>
<td>SAKKIESDORP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLD CROSSROADS/BOYS TOWN</td>
<td>SAKKIESDORP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Do you rent? ✓ □ yes, I pay money to a family [1]
   □ yes, from the council [2]
   □ no, we own our home [3]
   □ Yes, built in 19 [__] - [2]
9. Is your family planning to stay in this house? ✓
   □ No, we will move to ___________ [1]
   □ Yes [2]
10. Have you used money you have earned from your food business to “up-grade” your home in any way? ✓

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11. Are there other renters on your property?  ✓
   □ No [1]
   □ Yes [2]

12. Education  _________ (last level achieved)

13. Have you ever received any special training?  ✓
   □ No [1]
   □ Yes
      □ Skills or business training (e.g. sewing, butchery, small business skills) [2]
      □ On the job training [3]
      □ Other [4]

14. Over the year, do you have other work besides selling food?  ✓
   □ No [1]
   □ Yes, I also work
      □ in Cape Town  (__________) [2]
      □ outside of Cape Town  (__________) [3]

15. Are you looking for other jobs at this time?  ✓

16. If you could find a job with a salary would you stop selling foods?  ✓
   □ No  □ Yes

17. What type of work have you done in the past?  ✓ +
   not working  □
   personal services  □
   commerce  □
   services  □
   construction  □
   manufacturing  □
   Government  □
   Other  □
   School or training  □

18. Please tell me about the living and working situation in your house.
   A: First, can you first tell me **WHO NORMALLY STAYS WITH YOU** in your household?
   B: Next, what is the **RELATIONSHIP OF EACH PERSON** in the household (e.g. head of household, daughter, brother-in-law, “stay-in”)?
   C: Now, what is the **JOB or normal activity** of each person? For example, construction worker, clerk in a shop, student, unemployed, part-time work as a char.
   D: Finally, **WHERE** is the occupation or activity for each person?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Person</th>
<th>B. Relationship</th>
<th>C. JOB or “normal activity”</th>
<th>D. Where do they do this?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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19. Does anyone in the household REGULARLY receive a pension, government grant or compensation payment of any kind? ✓

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Old age pension
- Disability grant
- Family allowance (e.g. life insurance plan, child grant)
- Other (e.g. unemployment insurance)

20. Do you ever receive money from a family member not staying with you in this house? ✓

| Yes | No |

21. ADDING UP #18, #19 AND #20, estimate your TOTAL Household's MONTHLY INCOME (Pensions, plus salaries, plus money from relatives, plus money earned informally): ✓

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than R500</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R500-750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R750-1000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R1000-1250</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1250-1500</td>
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<td>R1500-1750</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1750-2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2000-R2500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2500-3000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than R3000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Marital Status: ✓ +

- Married
- Unmarried
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Remarried
- "Stay-in"

23. Years together with current husband, wife or "stay-in": __________

24. Is your food business the ONLY money coming into the house on a regular basis? ✓

| Yes | No |

25. How long have you been selling at this site? __________

26. Why did you start selling food here? ✓ +

- I saw other people making money selling food and thought I could also make money
- I lost my job and needed to get money
- There was no one else selling food nearby
- I work, but I wanted to get extra money selling part-time
- Someone in my house works, but we needed extra money
- I wanted to start a small business and work for myself

27. Since you started your food business, has business improved, stayed the same or got worse? ✓

- My business has improved (I make more money now)
- My business is about the same (I make about the same amount of money)
- My business is worse (I make less money)
28. Explain how you 'got' this site? ✓
- No one "owns" this site; I did not ask anyone; I just came here; I do NOT pay rent
- My friend "owns" this site, so it was no problem for me to sell here; I just asked permission
- My relative owns this site, so it is no problem for me to sell here
- I negotiated with someone but I do NOT pay "rent"
- I negotiated with someone and I PAY "rent"

29. Have you ever had problems with other traders, other businesses in the area or foreigners? ✓ +
- No
- Yes
  - with the taxis/violence
  - with other food traders
  - with other businesses in the area
  - with foreigners
  - other problems

30. What types of food do you sell? ✓ +
- fruits
- vegetables
- cooked meats
  - sausages
  - T-bones
  - Pens, liver or intestines
- uncooked meat
  - Pens, liver or intestines
  - Chicken
  - Other
- other cooked foods
  - Mielies
  - Other

31. Where do you buy the food you are selling here? ✓ +
- Epping Area
  - Farmers and informal traders OUTSIDE of Epping market (along the road)
  - Traders inside the Epping "Fence" but NOT inside the Epping Building
  - Inside Epping Building
- Farmers in the Phillipi Farming area
- Farmers outside of the Cape Town area (e.g. Stellenbosch, Caledon)
- Big informal traders at Terminus Market
- Big informal traders at another market
- Formal wholesaling shops (e.g. in Rylands)
- Local people who raise animals in the townships (e.g. Phillipi area)
- Maitland/ Ndabeni Slaughtering Factory

32. Tell me how you get to the place where you buy your food AND how much you pay to get there.
- I don't go anywhere, a trader brings me my food.
- I go the following way: ✓ +

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I have my own transport</th>
<th>less than R5</th>
<th>R5 to R10</th>
<th>more than R10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxi to the train station, train to Epping</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi to Epping /or other area</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus to Epping /or other area</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk (with trolley) to Terminus /or other market</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33. How many times each week do you buy food? ✓
   - 1
   - 2
   - 3
   - 4
   - 5
   - 6
   - 7

34. How much money do you spend on food each time you buy it? ✓
   - less than R50
   - R50-100
   - R100-150
   - R150-200
   - R200-250
   - R250-300
   - R300-350
   - R350-400
   - R400-450
   - R450-500
   - More than R500

35. Do you sometimes sell food for the same price that you bought it? ✓
   - No, I make a profit on EVERYTHING I sell
   - Yes, sometimes I sell food for the same price I paid for it

36. What are your normal trading hours?
   - morning: 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11
   - afternoon: 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11
   - evening: 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11

37. What food makes you the most money? ____________________

38. Do you hire transport to carry your food back to your shop? ✓
   - No
   - Yes

39. If you answered “yes”, how much do you normally pay for this transport each time?
   ____________________

40. What things do you use to sell your food? ✓ +
   - dumplings
   - trolley
   - wood for fire
   - wooden planks for a table
   - plastics
   - electricity
   - paraffin oil
   - cooking pots
   - OTHER ____________________
41. Which of the following do you share with other traders: ✓ +
   - transport
   - wood for fire
   - time minding the business
   - same selling site, stand or building
   - other________________________
   - I do not share anything with other traders

42. How often do you buy wood for a fire? ____________

43. How much do you pay for wood each time you buy it? ____________

44. Who do you buy wood from? ✓
   - someone from the community who has no transport
   - someone from the community who has transport (bakkie or truck).

45. Do you have any plans to “improve” this site? ✓
   - No, I have no plans to improve this site.
   - Yes, I plan to “upgrade” this site with money I earn from my business or from my family.

46. If the government “upgraded” your site, how much money would you be willing to pay each month? ✓
   - I would pay nothing for this site to be upgraded
   - 5-10 Rands/month
   - 10-20 Rands/month
   - 20-30 Rands/month
   - More than 30 Rands per month

47. Tell me how important you think the following problems are for your food business:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epping too far away</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family responsibilities (children, etc.)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of the business</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No transport</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical environment not good</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many people selling food</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. In general, how many people do you sell to each day? ✓
   - less than 10
   - Between 10 and 20
   - Between 20 and 30
   - Between 30 and 40
   - More than 40

49. How much do most customers spend when they buy food from you (i.e. average sale)? ✓
   - less than 1 Rand
   - less than 5 Rands
   - less than 10 Rands
   - less than 20 Rands
   - More than 20 Rands

50. Are your customers usually the same people? ✓
   - Not usually same
   - Mostly same
51. Do most of your customers work? ✓
   □ Yes
   □ No
   □ I don't know

52. Do you offer credit to your customers?
   □ Never
   □ Sometimes

53. After one week, estimate about much food you sell (TURNOVER). ✓
   □ less than R50
   □ R50-100
   □ R100-150
   □ R150-200
   □ R200-250
   □ R250-300
   □ R300-350
   □ R350-400
   □ R400-450
   □ R450-500
   □ R500-750
   □ R750-1000
   □ More than R1000

54. After one week, estimate how much PROFIT you make? ✓
   □ less than R50
   □ R50-100
   □ R100-150
   □ R150-200
   □ R200-250
   □ R250-300
   □ R300-350
   □ R350-400
   □ R400-450
   □ R450-500
   □ R500-750
   □ R750-1000
   □ More than R1000

55. Are you a member of any organisation, club or association that you think helps your food business?
   □ No
   □ Yes, ____________________________________________________________

56. FINALLY: Tell me in your own words, what do you do with the money you get from this business? What does the money mean to you and your family?

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

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### Human Activity Analysis

#### FIELDWORK MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Who Involved?</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Morning</th>
<th>Afternoon</th>
<th>Evening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE LIFE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath, wash myself</td>
<td>myself</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child-minding for money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (eat)</td>
<td>myself</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (prepare)</td>
<td>myself</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help children at home</td>
<td>myself, my daughter</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help other family members</td>
<td>myself, my daughter</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting/sewing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to radio/TV</td>
<td>myself, children</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake up</td>
<td>myself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel/ Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel by me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Walking to somewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Time at rank/station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Travel time to the destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Travel time from the destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Walking from somewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel by another person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to buy food for the business:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Walking to station/rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Time at rank/station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Travel time to the destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Travel time from the destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Walking from somewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>BUSINESS AND PUBLIC LIFE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buy food to sell for business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetch children from creche/school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to a shebeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to the bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to the doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minding the business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play football, sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping for family needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking/chatting with other traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit neighbor or friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work around the house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Other | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | |

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