THE CULTURAL POLICIES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR CULTURAL INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

The central theme of this study is the relationship between culture and polity in a transnational setting. The conceptualisation of culture-polity relationship has been largely dominated by the classical model of the nation-state in which officially sanctioned, territorially bounded culture is thought to generate among the population a sense of belongingness to a shared community, thereby strengthening legitimacy of the polity. The question, then, is whether such a strong, reciprocal link between political and cultural integration is being replicated at the level of the European Union. This study analyses the EU’s cultural schemes encompassing education, audiovisual media as well as traditional arts, focusing on different and often conflicting views on culture advocated by various policy actors in which different visions of European society and governance are implicated. Through the systematic examination of specific EU cultural policy measures, the thesis puts forward two main arguments. Firstly, in the course of the development of EU cultural policy, the notion of culture modelled on state-sanctioned, unified national culture has given way to a focus on more market-oriented, pragmatic aspects of culture. Secondly, this change in the conceptualisation of culture is related to a new way of organising cultural spaces in which the networking and exchanges of cultural professionals and organisations play a central role. The thesis concludes that so far the EU has not had much success in articulating a viable model of culture which could reconcile the twin ideal of unity and diversity in the context of contemporary Europe.
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Introduction

Over the past decade, the theme of European culture and identity has become a highly topical issue both in scholarly and political debates. This growing interest in the cultural dimension of European integration has undoubtedly been stimulated by phenomena such as a steadily diminishing turnout for the European Parliament elections or the negative results of the Danish and French referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as well as the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001. The problem, which has increasingly come to dominate many EU officials' concerns, is that market integration alone has not been able to generate the commitment and allegiance of the citizens which are thought to be pivotal in sustaining the legitimacy of the European Union. As Jacques Delors famously put it, 'You don't fall in love with a common market; you need something else'. According to this logic, the task that now confronts EU policy makers is to find a way to go beyond purely technical or economic issues and foster a 'European identity' that will extend the integration into more 'cultural' or 'meaningful' spheres. In parallel to those concerns which are driven by political imperatives, scholarly attention on the EU’s legitimacy problem has also shifted from questions that exclusively centre on the decision-making structures and institutional structures of the EU to those regarding identity, social cohesion and solidarity, or more specifically, the question of a European demos.

The problem of legitimacy has not always been a pressing issue in the history of European integration. The European project was conceived as an elite enterprise in a post-war Western Europe whose political and economic climate was very different from today's situation. While the memory and fear of war were strong, and while economic recovery dominated popular concerns, the incremental, project-based approach of the Monnet method worked well. By virtue of the fact that the member states were not fighting with each other, and that Europe's economy was in expansion, European integration stood for peace and prosperity, and this helped people to make sense of the project (Dehousse, 2000).

1 With the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the 'European Community (EC)' became part of the 'European Union (EU)'. Throughout this thesis, I generally use the term 'EU' except when I specifically refer to the European Community or the Community in the pre-Maastricht period of integration.
However, these post-war circumstances are now several decades in the past, which means that the underlying basis for continuing integration may have also shifted considerably. The current legitimacy crisis of the EU, then, is not solely about insufficiently democratic EU institutions, or popular perceptions of the EU with its seemingly ever-expanding competence that is increasingly considered to be intrusive of people's daily lives. It is also about a crisis of 'European ideals' as a mobilising factor and as an essential raison d'etre of the EU (Scott-Smith, 2003). The most fundamental of the EU's political aspirations, as articulated in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, is 'to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. But this hardly constitutes a guiding principle, apart from a guarantee that the EU is to remain a union among distinct peoples. With the twin challenge of Eastern enlargement and the constitutional settlement that presently dominates the European political agenda, European integration is now at the threshold of another major transformation. Against this backdrop, the questions regarding the meaning of 'Europe' have acquired more salience than ever before. Is Europe being unified beyond economic spheres, and in which direction is the European integration heading? What are the possible bases of European social solidarity? What does it mean to belong to 'Europe'? If, as the treaty stipulates, European integration is to leave the distinct peoplehood of its components intact, what kind of unity is the EU trying to achieve? How are the definitions of European-ness being articulated, and who is excluded in the process?

This thesis is an attempt to address the above questions, at least in part, through an analysis of EU cultural policies. The understanding of 'cultural policy' that frames this study is that it is about the politics of culture in a broad sense – it is about the clash of ideas, and the discursive and material determinations of the production and dissemination of cultural meanings (McGuigan, 1996). Accordingly, the main focus of the analysis covers policy areas that include education, audiovisual media, cultural industry, as well as the traditional arts. The thesis investigates how particular notions of 'European-ness' are institutionalised through specific EU cultural policy measures, examining the different and often conflicting views on

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culture advocated by various policy actors in which different visions of European society and governance are implicated.

The EU’s involvement in the sphere of culture is a relatively new development, and it was not until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that the EU acquired a formal mandate in this policy domain. Given this recent origin and the legal limitations, it is perhaps surprising that the EU already boasts an impressive array of cultural programmes encompassing wide areas of cultural activities. In fact, EU cultural measures date back to the 1970s, and received a major impetus towards further expansion during the 1980s as a means to improve the EU’s image so as to tackle the aforementioned legitimacy problem. Despite the fact that there are cultural initiatives organised and implemented at the EU level, and despite the growing recognition of the importance of the EU’s cultural dimension, this is an area of research that suffers from relative neglect. Most writings on European culture and identity have so far remained somewhat impressionistic, without any empirical grounding. Many of these writings only pay cursory attention to what the EU has actually done in those policy fields, and they hardly provide explanations for changes in the form and contents of cultural policies. In this context, the present thesis seeks to redress this neglect by putting forward a detailed and systematic study of EU cultural policies.

The argument

The culture-politics nexus at the EU level has been problematic from the very beginning, not least because at the root of EU cultural intervention lies a fundamental dilemma which is encapsulated in the recurrent theme of ‘unity in diversity’ in EU discourse. On the one hand, there is a desire on the part of many European elites to build Europe around the notion of culturally integrated community. This has led to the EU’s many attempts at top-down imposition of standardised set of values and practices much akin to the ‘invention of tradition’ model of nation-building process described by Hobsbawm (1983). On the other hand, there is the undeniable fact that this putative European cultural unity the elites are trying to create is currently divided into nationally (or regionally) structured media, education systems and other cultural institutions with their own ways of organising and demarcating a cultural space. As
we shall see in the following chapters, as much as EU policy makers have tried to expand EU competence in the cultural sphere, the EU does not have any power, both legally and financially, to homogenise the different cultural traditions and practices of its constituent parts. The overriding question, then, is how to reconcile the ideal of unity with this apparent diversity. If, as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the EU aims to ‘contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States … at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’ (Article 128), we need to see how such a seemingly contradictory principle is put into practice on the level of concrete policy choices.

In both academic and more general discussion, questions about European identity and the construction of communal unity are typically framed by an assumption that the achievement of a culturally defined community is a prerequisite to the establishment of a political community. In this perspective, the nation-state appears as a convincing model in which officially-sanctioned, territorially-bounded culture is thought to generate among the population a sense of belongingness to a shared community, thereby consolidating the legitimacy of the policy. Much of the existing literature that approaches the problem of cultural integration within the framework of the EU’s legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit tends to view EU cultural initiatives from this particular perspective, and many commentators try to assess the (in)effectiveness of the EU’s current attempt at cultural policy-making by drawing a parallel between national cultural integration and European integration. However, as I hope to show in the following chapters, this approach is incomplete and even misleading in important ways. First and foremost, it treats national cultural unity as self-evident and unproblematic, and the value judgements made about the engineering of European cultural commonality thus rest on an idealised vision of national cultural homogeneity, which overlooks the politics of representation involved in establishing and maintaining the idea of ‘official’ culture.

The problem of the link between culture and politics in the EU is further confounded by a widely accepted recognition that the emergent Euro-polity is a *sui generis* political entity and differs in many ways from the familiar concept of the nation-state. Recent EU studies literature indicates that the EU represents a novel form of political system which entails not the creation of a hierarchical centre of power in Brussels but the linking of multiple, dispersed sites of political authority
spread among supranational, national and regional actors as well as non-governmental policy experts and interest groups. The emphasis here is on the management of cross-border cooperation between the affected interests rather than the government of a unified citizenry. Conceived in this way, the governance of culture at the European level deviates from the conventional model of national cultural policy in which the state is seen as an authoritative regulator and disseminator of nationally-codified cultural knowledge and traditions among the general populace. This leads to the questions that lie at the centre of this thesis. If, as many writers on European integration suggest, the EU is not evolving into an approximation of a national state writ large, what does European cultural policy entail? Is it designed to promote Europe-wide cultural integration? What are the objectives and how are those objectives translated into actual policy practices? What kind of cultural elements are appropriated as representing ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’?

Some of these questions are in fact the theme of a few of the recent works which I have drawn on and which I also hope to complement. *Building Europe* by Cris Shore (2000) is probably the first monograph specifically dedicated to the study of the EU as a cultural construction (as opposed to the more abstract and historical idea of Europe and European unity). Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out among EU civil servants, Shore shows how EU elites have deliberately tried to engineer a European consciousness through cultural and symbolic devices. I share Shore’s critical stance toward the Commission’s reified, essentialistic view on European cultural unity, but his account puts too much emphasis on demonstrating the affinity between the current attempts of EU cultural integration and the historical processes of nation-building, even though the similarities between the two are in no way insignificant. As a result, Shore downplays the possibility that the cultural politics of the EU may entail a new configuration that cannot be fully captured by a classical nation-building model, which in my view obscures the direction and impact of EU cultural policies especially since the 1990s. With this regard I wish to add a more contemporary dimension. This study attempts to situate EU cultural measures within the general debates about contested relationships between culture and polity in the context of globalisation, the crisis of the welfare-state, the commercialisation of cultural processes and the transformation of the notion of governance.
I have also drawn many theoretical insights from a series of writings by Gerard Delanty (1995; 1998; 1999). Delanty also argues against an essentialising myth that European unity is founded upon cultural cohesion and its deep historical roots, and maintains that integration in a societally complex entity such as the EU entails not so much cultural homogenisation as cultural pluralisation. One of the questions that occupy the central place in Delanty’s works is how European integration can articulate a cultural model which would give expression to the reality of European society. I concur with Delanty that attempts to address this question have been confused by superimposing the reified image of national cultural cohesion onto Europe. However, my approach differs from Delanty’s analyses which remain almost exclusively on a theoretical level and pay little attention to the institutional embeddedness of the European project. Rather than addressing the question of the EU’s cultural dimension solely as a theoretical problem, my principal concern in this thesis is to trace the ways in which the relationships between culture and politics have been negotiated in concrete institutional settings and to account for the contradictory pulls and pressures of the ‘unity and diversity’ principle as they appear in specific policy-making contexts.

The thesis puts forward two main arguments. First, there have been considerable discrepancies between the rhetorical claims of EU policy actors and the actual organisations and mechanisms of EU cultural measures. In various EU policy documents, speeches or press releases, ‘European culture’ is characteristically regarded as the expression of distinct European values and practices, and therefore as the locus of European identity that binds the peoples of Europe together. On the other hand, at the level of actual policy management, the notion of European culture and identity very often seems to be articulated not in terms of its symbolic contents but according to pragmatic, technical criteria. Europeanisation in this respect entails not the creation of a unified citizenry ‘glued’ together with a fixed set of cultural canons, but merely increased transnational cooperation involving cultural operators across the member states. In putting the general commitments to support culture into practice, the EU has largely moved away from a monolithic concept of culture to the emphasis on more pluralistic cultural exchanges and transnational networks ‘from below’.

Second, and closely related to the above, in the course of the development of EU cultural policy, its emphasis has largely shifted from a notion of culture modelled
on a state-sanctioned, unified national culture to more market-oriented, utilitarian conceptions of culture. The rise of the neoliberal agenda in the overall process of European integration, coupled with new understandings about the distinct modes of EU governance, has brought a particular aspect of culture to the fore, namely, its capacity to generate multiple benefits of a primarily non-cultural nature. As we shall see, EU cultural policy is now articulated as something that contributes to urban regeneration, enhances European economic competitiveness through the promotion of cultural industries or improves the employment potential of the general population. As a result, the older rationale for EU cultural intervention as a way of fashioning a common European cultural identity has in large part receded into the background (but has not entirely disappeared from EU official discourse).

At this stage, let me clarify the scope of this research. This thesis cannot cover all the potentially meaning-generating practices of the EU. As stated above, the main focus of the analysis is these areas of policy that fall within the responsibility of the Directorate-General for education and culture (see below). Other policy domains, such as citizenship, immigration, or external relations obviously have a crucial role in defining European identity, but do not in themselves constitute the central concern of this study. Nor is the thesis about people's personal identification with the EU, or how EU cultural measures affect people's sense of attachment and loyalty. Important as those issues may be, the fact that most cultural initiatives were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s implies that it is probably too early to assess any tangible effects on people's perceptions that these measures may or may not have. There is a related problem of whether different definitions and meanings of Europe articulated through EU cultural policy have a resonance in the wider social sphere, but that is also a question which cannot be fully expounded within the scope of this thesis. Similarly, it does not deal with the Europeanisation of member-state policies or national cultures, and therefore national case studies are not provided.

Method

This study is based on the analysis of documentary evidence. This includes official EU documents (policy proposals, opinions, recommendations, and various forms of legislation issued by EU institutions), speeches of major EU actors (Commissioners
and the heads of state/government), EU commissioned agency reports and studies, press releases and other relevant documents which are publicly accessible on-line or available as hard copies at the European Documentation Centre (LSE). The reason for choosing documentation-based analysis over other methods is twofold. The first concerns the time-frame of this study. The thesis examines how cultural policies of the EU have developed and changed over time, covering a period beginning from the early 1970s to present. The advantage of using documentary evidence is that it can foreground this temporal dimension, compared to snapshot views offered by interviews or participant observations. Secondly, the thesis posits that there is a discrepancy between the EU rhetoric and actual policy practices. Rather than relying on the claims of individual EU policy actors, therefore, the analysis is based on texts produced within practical policy-making contexts as a way of highlighting what goes into concrete cultural policy measures.

The EU policy-making process is famously arcane, and in order to appreciate the different weight carried by the different types of policy documents, it is helpful to identify the basic modus operandi of EU institutions that has a bearing on cultural policies. As the executive organ of the EU the most important power of the European Commission (hereafter the Commission) lies in its function to initiate policy proposals (in the form of Commission Communications), although it also produces recommendations or opinions and executes adopted legislations. The Commission proposals are usually a product of an extensive process of consultation, involving the networks of interest groups, experts, national civil servants and politicians, the result of which is sometimes published. The administrative and technical work of the Commission is carried out by the Directorates-General (DGs). Of particular relevance to this study are the DG X (information, communication, culture and audiovisual media) and DG XXII (education and training) which have recently been reorganised into a single Directorate for Culture and Education, covering wide areas of policy relating to audiovisual media, languages, youth, sport and issues concerning civil society.

The Council of the European Union (hereafter the Council), which used to be called the Council of Ministers, adopts or amends proposals from the Commission to whom it delegates the implementation of its decision. Despite the fact that treaty reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have extended qualified majority voting across a
wide range of policy domains, culture is an area where unanimity rule still applies in the Council's voting procedure.\(^3\) Besides binding legislative instruments (regulations, directives and decisions), the Council can adopt an array of non-binding, but just as important, texts such as resolutions, declarations, recommendations or opinions which have been a major part of EU's cultural policy outlook. In addition, national interests are also represented in the European Council (the meeting of the heads of state and/or government) which has provided a forum for successive treaty reforms as well as shaping the 'big' strategic questions regarding the overall direction of the EU. Apart from its decision on the Maastricht Treaty including its 'cultural clause', the European Council has made indirect inputs in the cultural domain by setting agendas that influenced the course of the development of cultural policy.

Among EU institutions, the European Parliament has been most consistent in advocating pro-integration causes. In the area of cultural policies, this can be seen from the Parliament's various resolutions and opinions dating back to the 1970s, urging the Commission to make inroads into measures to protect and promote 'European culture'. However, and despite its increased decision-making powers, the Parliament's role in influencing the EU's cultural agenda still remains limited.

Plan of the thesis

The thesis is roughly divided into two parts. The first two chapters mostly deal with theoretical problems through the review of existing literature, with the aim of building a conceptual context for understanding the culture-politics relations in the EU. The rest of the thesis is dedicated to the empirical analysis of EU cultural initiatives, with each chapter focusing on a specific area of cultural policy. Chapter 1 examines theories of European integration. Theoretical debates about the nature of European integration have been dominated by neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. This has begun to change in recent years, with the emergence of a new type of literature that foregrounds the distinct form of EU governance. These works emphasise the complex and pluralistic nature of EU political processes which are captured by terms such as the 'regulatory state' or 'multilevel' or

\(^3\) However, the Council's decisions in the area of education are made by the qualified majority voting.
‘network’ governance. Instead of conceptualising European integration as a centripetal process, the ‘governance’ literature highlights different and conflicting tendencies within the EU political system not governed by a single, overarching logic. Following this ‘governance turn’ in EU studies, the chapter argues that the question of the future direction of integration should not be reduced to a simple dichotomy between national and supranational levels.

The second chapter looks at the politics of culture at the level of the nation-state. It starts with a review of theories of nationalism with the aim of highlighting national cultural integration as a contentious process. This will be followed by a brief history of the cultural policies of the Western European states, which is intended to provide a sketch of a general background against which EU cultural policy has developed over the years. It will be my contention that whereas national cultural policies up until the immediate post-war era had centred on establishing and disseminating national canons of ‘high’ culture, more recent developments indicate that conceptions of national culture and the ways in which the state intervenes in this sphere have undergone some changes following the rise of neoliberal discourse and the increased commercialisation of cultural processes.

Chapter 3 charts the general evolution of the EU cultural policy framework and examines the official discourses on culture from their emergence in the 1970s to the most recent comprehensive cultural programme, *Culture 2000*. It also looks at other policy areas (e.g. Regional policy, information and technology, employment policy) whose main concerns are outside the immediate realm of ‘culture’ but which carry significance in influencing the overall shape of EU cultural policies. The central argument of this chapter is that there has been a shift from a symbolic notion of culture towards a more pragmatic approach that emphasises the multiple instrumentalities of culture.

The topic of Chapter 4 is education and training policies. Although normally regarded as outside the narrowly defined areas of cultural policy, state education has traditionally been one of the most important components in the cultural construction of nationhood. In keeping with this national model, the EU has also attempted to influence national curricula of the member states. These efforts to change the contents of national education have not been successful, and have given way to mobility-oriented schemes promoting transnational teacher or student exchanges. The
chapter traces chronologically the developments and changes in EU education and training programmes such as ERASMUS, LINGUA and CONNECT, and argues that EU agenda on education policy has been increasingly geared towards preparing people for transnational labour markets.

Chapter 5 examines the representations of European history prevalent in the EU official discourse and discusses their role in the construction of a European cultural space. In its attempts to underline the cultural and historical roots of the current European project, the EU has launched several projects, one of which is the publication of its semi-official history ‘textbook’, *Europe: the History of Its Peoples*, written by a French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. The analysis of these history-related projects are placed in the context of Europe’s boundary-drawing process, whereby the definition of ‘who belongs to Europe’ is inherently bound up with the construction of the ‘Other’.

In the sixth chapter, I examine the EU’s schemes for the conservation of cultural heritage. Although this support mechanism was designed to preserve and promote cultural (mainly architectural) heritage which is deemed to be of ‘European importance’, the EU has never offered any official criteria for determining what makes certain historical sites or objects more ‘European’ than others. Instead, in opting for technical criteria for eligibility for EU support, the operational framework of heritage programmes effectively prioritises the economic dimension of heritage over its cultural contents. However, the representation of cultural heritage as a locus of distinct European cultural identity has also come to be used by EU policy-makers to activate the rhetoric of antithesis between European particularity and the perceived homogenising threat posed by globalisation.

The theme of Chapter 7 is the European City of Culture as one of the most widely recognised Europe-wide festivals. The European City of Culture event was conceived as a means of displaying the cultural richness of Europe both in its commonality and diversity, and each year several cities are selected by the EU to host various cultural events with a theme related to Europe. In practice, however, the cities have tended to see the event as a means to tackle local problems that can be alleviated by urban regeneration strategies rather than as an opportunity to celebrate Europe’s cultural wealth. This chapter thus investigates why the City of Culture event has taken this particular course of development, which is set against the recent trend
for urban entrepreneurialism, and shows how this relates to the EU’s rationale for the
continuous support for this event.

The final chapter deals with EU programmes for European audiovisual
productions. The audiovisual issues were one of the most hotly debated topics in the
Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations involving American officials insisting on
market liberalisation on the one hand and European (mainly French) representatives
claiming to make a stand for European particularity and diversity on the other. As it
turned out, however, the dichotomy between market and culture was largely a
rhetorical device deployed by anti-liberalisation interests. With this regard, the
chapter aims to show that the main objectives of EU audiovisual programmes lie less
in protecting a distinctive European cultural identity than in strengthening the
competitiveness of European audiovisual industries against their American
counterparts.

The thesis concludes that so far the EU has not succeeded in articulating the
‘unity in diversity’ ideal in a form that is viable in the context of contemporary
European society. EU policy makers seem to have recognised that the promotion of
an ethno-cultural definition of European unity and identity is neither tenable nor
desirable in multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Europe, although the desire for common
roots still intrudes into their thinking. At the same time, while the EU’s support for
cultural policy networks points towards the representation of plural cultural interests
which may encourage the plurality of cultural spaces and authorities within Europe,
the increasing dominance of market reasoning in EU cultural discourse altogether
reduces the question of public responsibility and commitments towards the provision
of diverse cultural resources down to a mere pursuit of economic growth.
CHAPTER 1

The European Polity

As we saw in Introduction, the principal concern of this thesis lies in the relationship between culture and polity. With this in mind, this chapter addresses theoretical problems about the 'politics' side of the argument. More specifically, the central question to be asked is: what sort of a political entity does the EU represent? The basic premise here is that different forms of governance may entail different kinds of cultural/social organisations, which also means distinct links between the two. The ideal of the nation-state postulates the congruence between political and cultural communities. In Gerard Delanty's terms, 'the great dreams of project of modernity' was 'the creation of unitary principle of integration capable of bringing together the domain of economy, polity, culture and society' (2000: 87). This is, of course, an idealised model which does not often correspond with reality. However, the nation-state ideal has proven to be so pervasive that, even when thinking about political integration at the transnational level, our conceptual universe is still framed in the language of the sovereign state and its national forms of societal organisation. As Schmitter says, this model 'seems self-evident to us that this particular form of organizing political life will continue to dominate all other, spend most publicly generated funds, authoritatively allocate most resources, enjoy a unique source of legitimacy and furnish most people with a distinctive identity' (1996:132).

How, then, can we conceptualise the EU as a polity? Studies of European integration frequently refer to the *sui generis* character of the European project. For many scholars, the distinctiveness of the EU lies in its 'between-ness' - neither a traditional form of nation-state nor a 'normal' international organisation (Laffan, 1998). In an attempt to understand the nature of the EU as a political system, this chapter reviews theories of European integration starting from older theoretical paradigms including neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. It argues that the older debate tends to be trapped in a supranational-national dichotomy largely excluding the possibility of various intermediate forms lying in between those two poles. The chapter then devotes much of its attention to recent 'governance' literature
which goes some way towards explaining the distinctiveness of the EU without relying on conventional concepts linked to major characteristics of the modern nation state. My objective here is not so much to use different theoretical models in order to test my empirical findings in the subsequent chapters. Rather, this chapter aims to introduce analytical concepts which help to situate EU cultural policies in the overall development of European integration.

Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism

Analysis of European integration has for a long time been dominated by two approaches - intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Despite their crucial differences and disagreements, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism share a common feature that they are primarily theories about process and do not begin from explicit assumptions about end-states (Schmitter, 1996).

Ernst Haas, the early proponent of neofunctionalism, saw integration as 'the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over pre-existing national states' (1958: 16). The central elements of the neofunctionalist formulation focus on the linkages between policy-making elites across boundaries and the process of incremental problem-solving. Elites' activities are initially motivated by overlapping interests rather than shared ideals or common identity, although political actors are expected to learn from their cooperative decision-making and may develop new ideals or identities. This self-interested shift in elites' expectations would result in a delegation of political power to a central supranational authority, which, as a locus of transferred legitimacy, increases the dynamic towards the development of a new political community.

Facilitating the process of this 'authority-legitimacy transfer' was the logic of technical or functional spillover. Refining the original concept of spill-over (developed by functionalism) which relied on the notion of 'technical self-determination', Haas argued that spillover was neither automatic nor free of conflict.

4 The relationship between the nation state and culture will be the topic of the next chapter.
Emphasis was thus placed on the potential linkages between sectors, beginning with those considered to be the least controversial. It was predicted that, as the process expanded to affect more actors and adjacent issue arenas, controversy would increase.

Contrary to the commonly-held view, neofunctionalism did not specifically predict that incremental problem-solving by transnational elites would lead to the supersession of the nation-state by a kind of a superstate. As a theory geared towards explaining the process of integration, neofunctionalism has left open the question of the end result. However, neofunctionalists, by defining the process largely in terms of the transfer of sovereignty to a single and overarching regional centre of authority, seemed to imply that something like a super-state was the probable outcome (Schmitter, 1996: 137). There was no concept in neofunctionalism of transcending the traditional territorial division of states. Almost by default, neofunctionalism suggested that those divisions were simply to be supplemented/ replaced by new territorially based organisations at the European level (Cram, 1997: 13). Interestingly, neofunctionalists’ implicit premise about the state as the basic unit of analysis goes against the direction mapped out by their predecessor, David Mitrany’s functionalism. Rejecting the widespread idea that political action must be underpinned by territorially-based central authorities, Mitrany advocated the view that governance arrangements could vary according to the function of political action (Schmitter, 1996:137, Cram 1997:44).

Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, saw national governments as the principal agents engaging in interstate bargains which either drive or prevent progress in European integration. Stanley Hoffmann (1966), in his critique of neofunctionalism, highlighted the limits of ‘functional method’ to draw attention to the contingent nature of transnational cooperation. He argued that, contrary to the logic of ‘spill-over’ anticipated by the neofunctionalists, it was in fact the ‘logic of diversity’ which prevailed in the integration process. Each member state was a distinct entity with its own culture, interests and capabilities, and they were also situated differently within the broader global system. Drawing on some of the insights rooted in a realist tradition, Hoffmann emphasised the importance of the international environment and the role which national governments played within the global system (Cram, 1997:48). The role of national governments was to promote the
interests of their peoples to the best of their abilities within an adversarial world system. Where vital interests are at stake, national governments would choose to maintain tight control over decision-making process instead of allowing incremental ‘spill-over’ (Hoffmann, 1966).

Thus, in intergovernmentalist accounts, the preferences of member state governments are heavily weighed toward the preservation of sovereignty. If they create institutions above the level of the state, it is because the benefits of collective action through international institutions are deemed to outweigh any possible risk to autonomy. On this reading, crucial decision-making powers remain in the hands of member governments regardless of institutionalisation at the European level. It follows that political bargains struck between the member states determine the scope and limits of European integration (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995). Far from undermining the sovereignty of the nation-state, European integration might well strengthen the problem-solving capacities of the member states, since the Europeanisation of previously domestic issues tends to remove those issues from domestic controversy and into the area of executive control (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1993). The intergovernmentalist perspective reminds us that losing formal authorities in some policy areas should not be readily equated with the loss of states’ actual capacity to act.

Although somewhat marginalised by the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debates, there are other approaches developed in the earlier periods of European integration which have also provided ways of analysing European integration from different perspectives. Federalism, with its strong roots in the European resistance movement, was particularly popular among proponents of European integration in the immediate post-war period. Some authors point out that a federalist approach is more a political strategy designed with particular goals in mind than a theory explaining political integration (Cram, 1997). Federalism commonly describes political systems in which there is a division of authority between central and regional government. These territorial units yield a measure of authority to common, centralised institutions, but remain largely intact as units (Rosamond, 2000: 23-29). The expectation of a federal state-like entity as the end product of European integration suggests that federalists saw statehood as either a desirable or inevitable mode of political organisation which could be stretched to fit governance at the
European-level. Indeed, for Euro-federalists such as Denis de Rougemont, ‘Europe’ meant cultural as well as political unity, and their vision was essentially the reproduction on the European level of the nineteenth-century project of the nation-and state-building (Delanty, 1998).

In contrast to the result-oriented federalist approach, the main concern of transactionalism was the background conditions necessary for political integration to occur. In the work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues, integration is defined as ‘the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its populations’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). For Deutsch, cross-border transactions or communications (the flow of goods, services, people and messages) were necessary prerequisites that would give rise to ‘mutual relevance’. However, political community required ‘mutual responsiveness’ which would result from a complex learning process involving the emergence of shared symbols, identities, memories, values and norms. Central to this vision of integration was the interaction of societies and peoples as opposed to interstate relations, leading to the creation of a ‘security community’ in a social-psychological sense. Deutsch distinguished two separate categories of security communities. First, ‘amalgamated security communities’ involved the formal integration of states into a larger unit in the institutional domain. This more or less corresponds to the model of integration envisaged by neofunctionalists and federalists (Rosamond 2000:43). Second, ‘pluralistic security communities’ involved integration in the social sphere while the component governments retain their separate legal identities (thus preserving the nation-state system), and therefore did not necessitate the presence of any overarching authority structure at the transnational level (Deutsch, 1966). In this classification, the EC/EU would represent an instance of the former, but Deutsch was in favour of the ‘pluralistic’ communities as he considered them to be more durable and more likely to arise in practice (Rosamond, 2000: 43).

All the above approaches share the same conventional concept of the state in analysing political integration. Whether implicitly (for neofunctionalists or transactionalists) or explicitly (for intergovernmentalists or federalists), the basic unit of analysis remains the territorially-based state system (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 57).
This is not to dismiss the significance of their contributions to European integration studies, but those theoretical paradigms do not in themselves capture the distinctiveness of the EU. Standard analyses rooted in traditional state-related concepts 'run the risk of underestimating the novelty of this open-ended integration process' (Wessels, 1997: 270).

'Doldrums period'

During the period beginning from the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the completion of the customs union in 1968, it was neofunctionalism that provided the most influential framework for European integration studies. The popularity of neofunctionalism was closely connected to the success of the so-called 'Monnet method' with its incremental, technocratic approach which worked well when the scope and scale of integration was still limited. The triumph of this method was not just in terms of the efficiency of supranational decision-making but also in a sense that gradual integration via the 'Monnet method' was widely regarded as a legitimate path to the attainment of dominant ideals in post-war Europe which provided an underlying motivation for the European project in the first place - the securing of peace, the achievement of prosperity, and the undermining of nationalism (Weiler, 1999). To the extent that the member states were peacefully co-existing with each other and their economies were growing, European integration was deemed a success, and no serious challenge was mounted against the rationalist logic of Monnet's supranational method.

However, the initial enthusiasm for neofunctionalism as a powerful all-encompassing theory was to be subdued by the 1965-1966 Empty Chair crisis, a series of incidents which undermined the theoretical premise of neofunctionalism and instead validated intergovernmentalism. Subsequently, the EC's development generally stagnated until the early 1980s, a period which some theorists call the

\footnote{In June 1965, because of de Gaulle's opposition to (amongst other things) the Commission's proposal to introduce qualified majority voting procedure in the Council of Ministers, the French officials boycotted the attendance of Council meetings, leading to the virtual paralysis of the Community. The 'crisis' lasted until January 1966 when a compromise was made between France and the other five member states. This incident had an effect of curtailing the Commission's opportunism until the early 1980s (Dinan, 1999).}
‘doldrums era’ or the ‘dark ages’ of the Community (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995:37). With the faltering progress of European integration, this period also marked the decline of scholarly interest in theorising regional integration. The research produced during this ‘doldrums era’ nevertheless served as a forerunner for later studies of both the integration process and of the functioning of the EC/EU as a polity. The scholarship of this period (e.g. Puchala, Wallace, Webb), whose focus was on micro-level case studies rather than on the elaboration of a grand theory, shared a view that the EC developed in an asymmetrical fashion, with differing degrees of policy integration from one sector to another, involving different but overlapping groups of actors at the European, national and even subnational levels. A corollary of this was that the EC existed in a ‘state of messy equilibrium’, not following a clear-cut, linear process envisaged by Haas’s neofunctionalism (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 39-41).

1992 and a new wave of integration theories

The relaunch of the EC/EU with the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty coincided with a renewed momentum for the study of European integration. To a significant extent, however, ‘the new debate paralleled the old’ in the mould of neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 43; Rosamond, 2000). In explaining the factors behind the acceleration of integration in the late 1980s, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) revived some of the key insights of neo-functionalism, namely, the importance of supranational institutions and transnational economic elites. Aided by a transnational industry coalition, they argue, the Commission was able to mobilise national governments to support the overall objective of market unification. But Sandholtz and Zysman also added a crucial dimension which supplements neofunctionalism’s tendency to ascribe too much explanatory power to the internal logic of integration without taking account of the impact of external environment. According to them, it was changes in international and domestic conditions that provided the source of new opportunities and constraints. Changing international economic structure such as the rise of Japan and the relative decline of the US, and the evident failure of existing national policies to redress the consequences of the protracted economic crisis since the late 1970s,
together set the stage which both the Commission and business groups were able to exploit to their advantage, thereby triggering the 1992 process.

In contrast, Moravcsik in 1991 argued that it was not an elite alliance between the European officials and pan-European business elites which had brought about the Single European Act. Instead, he presented a model based on intergovernmentalism, lowest common denominator bargaining, and strict limits on sovereignty transfer. A central component of his argument is that there was a convergence of interests among leaders of France, Germany and Britain as an important precursor of agreement on the SEA. Moravcsik (1993) further elaborated on the topic of how the preferences of national governments, which determine their positions in international negotiations, are shaped by domestic societal forces. Within the framework of what he termed 'liberal intergovernmentalism', national governments are seen to have used EC/EU institutions to increase the policy autonomy of national governments in relation to domestic interests, 'particularly where domestic interests are weak or divided, EC institutions have been deliberately designed to assist national governments in overcoming domestic opposition' (1993:515). Seen from a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, instead of supranational elites tying member states into a process to which they may be resistant, the EC/EU may in fact strengthen the state by allowing national executives to manipulate their own domestic constituents into accepting common policies.

The Single Market programme also prompted a partial resuscitation of federalist theory. John Pinder's 'neo-federalist' approach combines neofunctionalism's emphasis on economic and political linkages and federalism's concern with constitutional principles. Unlike the original federalism, which placed too much emphasis on a once-and-for-all constitutional settlement to make a huge leap towards the 'United States of Europe', Pinder is attentive to the power of countervailing forces and thus more aware of the need to follow incrementalist strategies in view of (eventually) achieving a federal arrangement as a more viable solution (Pinder, 1986). Despite these scholarly inputs, the idea of federalism has until recently only received modest support in the actual political context.\footnote{For instance, the European Parliament, in anticipation of the Single European Act, presented in 1984 the 'Draft Treaty establishing the European Union' underlining the federal principles. However, suggestions contained in the Draft Treaty were hardly incorporated into the SEA.} Given this
history, it was perhaps quite unexpected that in the last couple of years questions regarding federalism and a European constitution have come to occupy centre stage in the EU political agenda. It can be argued that by entering into mainstream debate the idea of a constitution has lost part of its progressive-integrationist connotation (Weiler, 2002). Advocates of a ‘federal Europe’ - Jacques Delors, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Joschka Fischer among others - are at pains to point out that their visions of federation do not entail the creation of a ‘superstate’, and that the nation-state will still be irreplaceable in ensuring the EU's legitimacy. Some authors argue that the EU already has most of the characteristics of what political science literature defines as a federation and therefore the current debate about whether the EU should evolve into a federal system misses the point (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Putting aside the question of the desirability or necessity of a Constitution, the prevailing debate surrounding the 'finalité politique' of European integration has been welcomed in some quarters as a way of tackling the crisis of legitimacy in a post-Cold War Europe where the fundamental rationale for continuing integration had shifted considerably.

'Governance' literature

Lately, attempts to understand European integration in its post-SEA, post-Maastricht state are accompanied by a growing literature examining the functioning of the EU as a polity or a system of governance. To a large extent, this new wave of literature has shifted their attention from the study of integration to the study of governance (Rosamond, 2000: 109). Whereas the earlier theories tended to view the EC/EU in terms of its process of becoming something else and therefore as a transitory phenomenon, this new type of literature converges on the point that the EU can be treated as an instance of a polity, or at least a political system, in its own right. Accordingly, the main focus of analyses has also shifted from the process of major institutional changes (such as treaty reforms) to the day-to-day functioning of the EU as a polity. It also means that these analyses tend to privilege policy actors involved in everyday politics (EU institutions, interest groups, numerous committees attached to the Commission and the Council, etc.) rather than the member state governments which are the main actors in 'high politics'. The 'governance literature' does not deny the significance of national governments in EU politics, but its value lies in the
fact that, by highlighting the less visible side of EU policy-making, these analyses draw our attention to concepts and practices that have been overlooked by more conventional approaches to European integration.

The term 'governance' is usually defined as being about the exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of government. In recent years, however, the term has come to be used to note the drift of authority away from government, and this has become a major theme in both International Relations and policy analysis literature. Despite their different theoretical origins and emphases, a common thread running through those works is that they emphasise new processes of governing which depart from the traditional notion of the state (Jachtenfuchs, 1997; Rosamond, 2000; Stoker, 1998). One of the defining characteristics of this type of literature is that they stress the absence of a central authority and the transformation of the role of state actors who, although still powerful, no longer occupy their place at the hierarchical centre of an integrated society. The political arena is conceptualised as a space populated by autonomous political, economic and social actors who are linked by multifaceted interdependencies. Governance, on this reading, therefore involves the maintenance of order and patterns of structured cooperation among state and non-state actors in the absence of a central organising authority (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999).

The above characteristics are portrayed as a pervasive feature in all advanced capitalist societies, but it is an image which has become increasingly acceptable in EU studies circles. The basic assumption of the EU governance literature may be compatible with the intergovernmentalism in that European integration is seen to have started as the product of rational choices made by member governments (Wessels, 1997; Pierson, 1998). Or, it may have a neofunctionalist slant and privilege the role of supranational institutions and private interests (Mazey and Richardson, 1995). But the fundamental difference from the earlier debate is that various actors are thought to become increasingly embedded in common institutional frameworks, as a result of which no single groups of actors can entirely dominate the policy process. To the extent that they portray a complex and pluralistic political process, not firmly under the control of national governments and not explicable either in terms of simple diplomatic bargaining or super-state in the making, the 'governance' literature marks a break away from simple, binary oppositions of power between
national and European-level governments. Also crucial in this respect is a recognition that it is not analytically useful to place European integration on a linear continuum from intergovernmental cooperation to fully-fledged state-like entity. According to Brigid Laffan:

The Union’s system of collective governance has produced a ‘prismatic political system’ in which rays of activity and authority are scattered or focused more or less effectively through institutions and social forces ... Rather than amassing extensive and autonomous political authority, the Union gradually alters the exercise of national political authority by enmeshing the member states in a web of collaboration and cooperation (1998: 243).

What, then, is the context that gave rise to such dispersal of authorities? The governance literature does not necessarily point to the specific causes of this transformation, but connections are normally made with domestic and international structural changes. One argument which is particularly pertinent to the west European context relates to the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in responding to a vast extension of state powers and its provision of public goods. This is linked to the post-war evolution of the western European system towards the welfare and service state for which the major raison d’être is the fulfilment of the citizens’ basic needs (Wessels, 1997). Since the mid-1980s the trend has been for the state to withdraw from parts of the economy, to retract from the provision of certain public goods, and to reduce the powers of government. In their differing adjustments to these changes west European states found themselves losing, and in some cases deliberately renouncing, certain public policy powers. Another notable feature in western Europe in the past decade or so is the proliferation of bodies with public policy functions outside the central governments. The shift towards more autonomous or semi-autonomous agency represents a move away from the inherited heavy state version of government towards a kind of partnership model incorporating

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7 There is a growing body of research that investigates how the member states’ participation in EU governance impacts upon domestic policy-making. (see, for example, Cowles et al., 2001) But the concern of this chapter is not the Europeanisation of national politics but the transformation of EU governance itself.
both state and non-state actors. On this reading, contemporary politics in western Europe were changing anyway, with traditional forms of politics and government being transformed in quite radical ways. Against this background, the EU has emerged as a part of reconfigured pattern of broader European governance (H. Wallace, 2000b:7-9; Wessels, 1997).

With regard to international structural changes, many authors see the evolution of new governance patterns in the light of globalisation. Globalisation is most often associated with increasingly free flow across borders of goods, services, money, people, technology and ideas. This is said to have enhanced opportunities for non-state (especially economic) actors to develop cross-border activities which often escape the reach of formal government. In this world of interconnectedness, the ‘centralization and hierarchization of power within states and through states in the international system are steadily replaced by the pluralization of power among political, economic, cultural and social actors, groups, and communities within states, between states and across states’ (Axtmann, 1998: 10). Yet there remain serious controversies about the extent to which this represents a diminution of national autonomy.

This is not the place for a full engagement in the many debates about globalisation, so I would simply note here that the emerging form of governance in Europe may be read either as a defensive reaction against or a facilitator of globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; Castells, 2000b). A common line of argument is that global economic changes such as the free movement of capital and the emergence of transborder production networks have influenced the interests of key policy actors and have accelerated the momentum towards the liberalisation of the European economy. This has further unleashed market forces, which, in turn, renders national, territorially-bound government even more vulnerable to external pressures (Castells, 2000b, Streeck, 1996). In this context, the growth of EU-level

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8 See, for example, Held et al. who define globalisation as ‘a process ... which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power’ (Held et al. 1999: 16).

9 I will explore in subsequent chapters how globalisation discourse has shaped EU policy agendas in the cultural sector.
governance capacities may represent a sort of a second-best option chosen by West European states caught between the forces of globalisation and overloaded demands from the domestic arena in their efforts to manage the consequences of (economic) globalisation (H. Wallace, 2000a and b).

However, globalisation is not necessarily best understood as an independent variable affecting the EU and its constituent member states ‘from outside’, as causal arrows drawn between globalisation and Europeanisation may well run in the opposite direction (Rosamond, 1999; Ross, 1998). This leads us to the distinction drawn by William Wallace about formal and informal integration. Informal integration ‘consists of those intense patterns of interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks, and social change’. On the other hand, formal integration refers to ‘changes in the framework of rules and regulations which encourage - or inhibit, or redirect - informal flows’ (1990:9). Depending on the analysts’ viewpoint, there are varying accounts about the push-pull balance between formal institution building and the level of informal cross-border interaction.

The EU as a regulatory order

One of the major contributions in the governance literature is made by Majone (1996a and 1996b) who has analysed the EU as a ‘regulatory state’. A regulatory state ‘may be less of a state in the traditional sense than a web of networks of national and supranational regulatory institutions held together by shared values and objectives, and by a common style of policy-making’ (1996a:276). Majone’s aim is to understand the EU in terms of the policy-making functions of the state. In advanced market economies, the state normally undertakes three roles. The first is regulation, that is, measures to address problems of market failure (such as monopolies). The others are redistribution (resource transfers, welfare provision including elementary education and medical care) and macro-economic stabilisation (the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to ensure economic growth, price stability

10 Depending on the theorist’s position, the key policy actor could be transnational business interests and/or the Commission (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989), or the member state governments (Streeck, 1996).
and satisfactory employment levels). In the European context, the EU is most active in the regulatory functions, while showing little progress in the other two. This distinguishes the EU from the normal model of European statehood. But if we look beyond the sphere of political economy which is Majone’s immediate concern, it is possible to list other core functions of the modern state which the EU crucially lacks. The most obvious example is that the EU does not have the characteristics which are central to the Weberian concept of the state - the monopoly of legitimate violence and a fixed, clearly demarcated territory.11

The primacy of the regulatory mode of governance represents the comparative advantage of the EU. Regulatory policy-making is inherently technocratic, based on the articulation and application of clear rules. Most crucially, it is possible to produce and implement regulatory policies with very limited expenditures of financial resource, because the costs of regulations tend to fall upon those who have to comply with them (businesses, employers, etc.). This can be linked to the Commission’s bureaucratic propensity towards increasing its own power. Not only does regulatory policy allow the Commission to expand its competence without much financial constraints, technical expertise required for complex social regulations also puts the Commission in a superior position vis-a-vis other EU institutions (notably the Council) as the main locus of lobbying in the EU (Cram, 1997; Mazey and Richardson, 1995; see also below). According to Majone, the preferred instruments of regulatory governance are ‘independent regulatory bodies, like independent central banks, courts of law, administrative tribunals or the European Commission’, which, unlike majoritarian institutions of the member states, have the effect of diffusing power (1996b:285).

The rise of regulatory instruments as a predominant mode of policy in the EU is closely bound up with the development of the Single Market. Until quite recently, that is, before the market-building project became an overwhelming concern in the mid-1980s, the dominant policy paradigm for many EU policy practitioners was a ‘Community method’ or ‘Monnet method’ of supranational policy-making according to which more and more powers were transferred from the national to the EU level.

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11 In this connection, one may note the significance of the role of warfare in the formation of nation-states and national identities (Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). The EU was founded, at least at the level of ideas, on the goal of attaining peace.
through incremental processes much akin to the neofunctionalist logic (H. Wallace, 2000b). As the distinctive ‘Community method’ is largely, but not entirely, displaced by the regulatory model, the application of regulatory instruments has been expanded beyond the narrow confines of the economic sphere to include social and environmental policies (Majone, 1996b).

These changes in policy instruments reflect a shift in prevailing ideas in the EU from redistributive to efficiency concerns. Wolfgang Streeck (1996) argues that the history of European integration may be characterised by continuous conflict between two alternative political economic projects, that of a free trade and a welfare state-building. This has culminated in the 1980s in a (somewhat simplified) form of a battle between Jacques Delors’s ‘European social model’ project and the Thatcherite vision of neoliberal market-building. In Streeck’s view, ‘Thatcher won and Delors lost’, and the result is that ‘United Europe has not only failed to develop sovereign public power for governing its economy, but has over the years accumulated an institutional legacy … that effectively precludes such development for any foreseeable future’ (1996:302). Similarly, Pierson and Leibfried argue that the reinvigoration of European integration in the 1980s ‘depended precisely on the emergence of an anti-social democratic consensus on economic policy within the major member states’ (1995: 450). The battle on the EU’s political economy may yet have to be settled, but there is growing evidence suggesting that even in policy sectors traditionally associated with protectionist line of reasoning, the policy debates about social concerns are increasingly framed in the language of market efficiency (H. Wallace, 2000b).

Acceptance of the regulatory model as a useful description of the EU implies a possibility that the EU may never perform the functions currently performed by nation-states. It means that we should not expect the EU to look like a traditional nation-state at all, nor its future development to follow a path from an intergovernmental forum to federation. Instead we could envisage a political division

12 For Delors, market building through the 1992 programme was not just to liberalise European economic space but was also intended to be a launching pad for constructing a supranational European state on the model of the nation state. One of the main features of his vision for state-building was the ‘European model of society’ in which government, ‘beyond stimulating economic activity to provide welfare, should craft a wide range of public goods...in response to demands of solidarity’. However, most of his strategies for a ‘social Europe’ failed to materialise (Ross, 1995:46).
of labour between the member states on the one hand, focusing on social and redistributional policy, and the EU on the other hand, focusing on regulatory policy (Caporaso, 1996:41). It may be that the EU’s main functions will continue to revolve around enhancing economic competitiveness and forcing structural adjustments in response to wider forces in the global economy (Laffan, 1998: 244). The transfer of regulatory functions to the EU, however, is not a politically neutral process. As Walby argues, the emergence of a EU regulatory state and the predominance of neoliberal policy orientation mean that ‘[t]here is a new balance of social and political forces which is inimical to traditional policies of redistribution through welfare expenditure. The relative decline of the working class and increase in the middle classes have facilitated the development of political strategies and coalitions led by the better off which have marginalized and stigmatized many of those who were traditional beneficiaries of welfare’ (1999: 125). From this standpoint, Majone’s contention that regulation is a technical matter and therefore is not a political activity seems to miss an important point.

Multilevel Governance

The observation that European integration may not be a precise analogue for the processes of nation- or state-building is also central to the concept of multilevel governance:

The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels. Member state executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity...MLG theorists argue that in a growing number of cases no one of these actors has exclusive competence over a particular policy (Marks et al., 1996: 41-42).

If we viewed the development of the EU solely in terms of authority transfers to its central institutions, European integration may look as though it is mirroring the trajectories of the modern nation-state. However, the main contention of the
multilevel governance approach is that centralisation of new powers at the supranational level over the past couple of decades has been accompanied by decentralisation of decision-making to subnational levels of government. To be sure, this approach does not maintain that the nation state is on the verge of political impotence. Rather, their claim is that the dominance of national governments in policy processes has become diluted in several policy areas, with the result that 'the EU has become a polity where authority is dispersed between levels of governance and amongst actors, and where there are significant sectoral variations in governance patterns' (Rosamond, 2000:111). In this polity, states are not an exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Thus, multilevel governance analysis posits a set of overarching policy networks encompassing supranational, national, regional and local levels of authority (Marks et al., 1996).

The de-centring of authority depicted by the multilevel governance model shares many features with federalism, although multilevel governance pictures political arenas at different levels as interconnected, and not nested as in the federalist model. That is to say, subnational actors are not exclusively nested in the hierarchical structure of the nation-state, as they simultaneously operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational connections in the process (Marks et al., 1996). The idea that European integration promotes the empowerment of regions lies behind the concept of 'Europe of the Regions', even though the political resources and ability of subnational actors to reap benefits from this multilevel governance greatly varies from region to region (Rumford, 2002).

The model of multi-level governance typically rests on the analysis of EU cohesion policy which had become the second largest line item in the EU budget\(^{13}\). Significant in this respect is the 1988 cohesion policy reform which not only doubled its budget but also admitted new actors in the policy-making process by requiring collaborative networking among public and private actors at multiple levels for designing regional

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\(^{13}\) Cohesion policy is designed to reduce disparities and promote a more even pattern of economic development across the EU. Its primary instrument has been the structural fund which targets regions suffering from low GDPs or industrial/agricultural decline.
However, as we have seen, the mode of EU governance is much more developed in the regulatory sphere than in the redistributive sphere, so the mobilisation of subnational actors has little to do with the availability of EU funding. In fact, it is argued that even at the present level the cohesion funds are not large enough to make a significant difference in economic terms, and that the political gesture of redistributing money has been more important than the actual effect (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999:149). Therefore, the emergence of certain subnational actors as key players in some EU policy sectors should be seen in the context of how much autonomy those subnational governments enjoy and whether there are any conflicts of interest with their national states (Marks et al., 1996). The point stressed here is that the cracks created in the relations between national- and subnational-level authorities have opened windows of opportunities, enabling subnational actors to take advantage of direct contacts with the European institutions without having to channel their interest through the nation-state. However, the model of multi-level governance has a broader utility in the analysis of policy areas other than cohesion policy. The Single European Act ‘institutionalised a double shift of decision making away from national states - to the market and to the European level’ (Hooghe and Marks, 1999:73). One consequence was a broadening of participation in EU decision-making, incorporating more private actors as well as different levels of governments.

Another important point is that multilevel governance is understood as a pattern of policy-making that has arisen in recent years and therefore ‘may not be a stable equilibrium’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001:28). This leaves open the possibility that other dominant patterns may emerge in the future. Indeed, there are signs indicating that the development of cohesion policy, around which the patterns of multi-level governance have crystallised, has taken a turn to retrenchment after its renegotiation in 1999. This is partly due to the rise of neoliberal ideology, and partly because of backlash from member governments in their attempts to regain control

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14 Although the Commission did not use the term ‘multi-level’ governance to describe the 1988 reform, it was actually the Commission’s intention, by prescribing elaborate rules about where and how to spend the fund, to establish direct connections with subnational actors beyond the control of national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). More intergovernmentalism-inspired account maintains that cohesion policy has developed as side-payments for poorer member states designed to facilitate package deals for advancing economic integration (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).
over EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). In addition, the current preoccupation with constitutionalism may be seen as demonstrating the persisting influence of the hierarchical model of the state. At the same time, however, the tendency of the EU since the 1990s to become even more polycentric has added a new dimension to the concept of multi-level governance, with more diverse and anomalous arrangements being devised for decision-making which allow different member states to integrate in different policy areas (Peterson and Bomberg, 2000).\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, concepts such as multi-speed Europe and a European ‘core’ or ‘centre of gravity’, which came to receive a considerable degree of interest in the context of a EU constitution, may be an expression of diversification within the EU, a tendency which will be reinforced in view of the immanent Eastward enlargement. In this sense, those recent developments do not necessarily diminish the significance of the concept of multilevel governance in underlining complexity as the principal feature of the EU policy system and its attendant variability, unpredictability and diversity (Rosamond, 2000).\textsuperscript{16}

The metaphor of a multi-level or multi-tier system has also been applied to the different levels of policy process. Peterson and Bomberg (1999) distinguish three different types of EU decision: history-making (such as treaty revisions, involving actors at the highest political levels), policy-setting (inter-institutional legislative process), and policy-shaping (determining policy details involving sub-systemic committees and working groups). Each tends to be taken at distinct levels of governance in most EU policy sectors, involving different actors and the different types of rationality which inform their actions. They conclude that no single theory can explain EU governance at all levels of analysis. Broad ‘macro’ approaches to

\textsuperscript{15} The Maastricht Treaty sanctioned flexible integration in the form of the EMU and other opt-out clauses, as well as setting up the intergovernmental second and third pillars outside the Community structures. The Amsterdam Treaty further accelerated the drift towards a differentiated EU by explicitly permitting groups of member states to deepen cooperation between themselves (Gstühl, 2000).

\textsuperscript{16} The emphasis on the fragmentation of power and the lack of overall coherence in EU governance has given rise to a more radical claim that the EU represents a postmodern (post-sovereign) political form (Caporaso, 1996; Ruggie, 1993). Others liken European integration to a medieval order with its dispersed and overlapping forms of authority which existed before the rise of the modern state (Bull, 1977). These claims have been criticised for relying on the reified conception of the modern state as a fixed unit of sovereign space which in turn serves to exaggerate the novelty of the present situation (Anderson, 1996).
integration, such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism are particularly useful for explaining the major 'history-making' decisions of the EU. However, when it comes to explaining 'policy setting' or 'policy shaping' decisions which are shaped at a level far below the politicised worlds of ministers, Commissioners and EP party group leaders, 'new institutionalism' or policy network analysis (see below) would provide a more valuable approach. In a similar vein, Helen Wallace (2000) has identified variations in EU policy-making models across different policy sectors, each involving a distinct logic and therefore requiring different theoretical approaches.

New Institutionalism

The new institutionalism rests on a simple, commonsensical premise that institutions are an important factor that can influence political action. Rather than focusing on procedural or formal aspect of institutions which have been a central feature in EU studies (such as decision-making mechanisms or role of EU institutions), it asserts that institutions should be understood more broadly to include issues of both formal and informal rules, norms and values embedded in them, and day-to-day practices as well as organisations (Bulmer, 1994). Although this approach is more a set of assumptions for deriving analytical insights than a proper theory, institutionalism has a particular virtue in the study of the EU where informal and experimental practices tend to carry more weight compared to a stable, long-established polity (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 21). If the EU indeed represents a form of governance without the formal government, it is essential that we pay attention to those aspects of policy-making beyond formal institutions.

Paul Pierson (1998) applies his 'historical institutionalist' approach to European integration. His starting point is that, despite intergovernmentalists’ claim about tight control exercised by the member states over the evolution of European organisations, there seem to be constant 'gaps' in their control which create room for supranational actors to influence the integration process and which, in turn, constrain the member states themselves. While incorporating some aspects of neofunctionalism including the significance of supranational actors and spillover logic, Pierson draws attention to the temporal dimension of institutional designs. Member state
governments are often preoccupied with short-term outcomes which are geared towards domestic electoral success. Their decisions can produce all sorts of unanticipated consequences in the longer term. The preferences of national governments may also shift, leaving them with already-agreed commitments and highly developed policies that do not fit their current needs. However, institutions (standard operating procedures and conventions of behaviour as well as formal rules), once in place, are resilient to subsequent arrangements to reverse the course of their development. Thus, previous decisions of the member states may have a 'lock-in' effect, meaning that social adaptation to EU policies and practices drastically increases the cost of exit from existing arrangements, thereby making the evolution of the EU 'path-dependent'.

Such constraints on the power of the member states cannot be fully explained by intergovernmentalist accounts with their almost exclusive focus on 'grand bargains'. As the outcomes of interstate bargains and treaties always need to be translated into actual political conduct and rule implementation, much happens in the intervals between interstate bargains during which the ability of member state governments to control the process becomes weaker. On the other hand, a crucial difference between institutionalism and neofunctionalism is that 'neofunctionalism sees political control as a zero-sum phenomenon, with authority gradually transferred from member-state governments to supranational actors, while historical institutionalism emphasizes how the evolution of policies, rules and practices along with social adaptations create an increasingly structured polity which restricts the options available to all political actors' (1998:48, emphasis in original). Historical institutionalist work points to the embeddedness of European policy actors (both national and supranational) in an evolving institutional setting. Viewing institutions as extending beyond the formal organs of government captures the complexity of political integration that cannot be reduced to simple accumulation of visible, formal

17 Such ‘lock-in’ effect manifests itself in the EU in the form of the acqui communautaire (which in English means ‘shared property’). There is no clear definition for this term, but it is usually understood among EU policy actors to refer to an accumulated body of formal and informal rules, norms, practices, procedures and meanings of the EU which any new member state must accept in its entirety (Wiener, 1999:38). Article C of the Treaty on European Union specifies: ‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acqui communautaire’.

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power at the European level (Olsen, 2000). The significance of informal codes of conduct, 'soft' (non-binding) law and policy cooperation in EU integration is a crucial point to bear in mind because, apart from important exceptions such as the Television without Frontiers Directive, the EU's policy instruments in culture and education mostly consist in secondary or non-binding legislation involving a large number of 'informal' actors.

Another strand of new institutionalism is called 'sociological institutionalism', which places greater emphasis on the cognitive or ideational dimensions of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Here, 'institutions' are defined as the mechanisms through which the world is rendered meaningful to social actors. In this perspective, institutions have a dual character. They are not only neutral devices for the accommodation of different interests in the pursuit of common policies, but also provide 'symbolic guidance function'. This symbolic function 'can be analysed in terms of its fundamental idea, which motivates actors in a specific way and creates links and obligations with regard to the specific order it incorporates' (Jachtenfuchs, 1997: 46). The central tenet of this approach, therefore, is a prominent and autonomous role assigned to ideas, norms, symbols and values with regard to both specific policy choices and political systems on a more general level. Ideas such as 'democracy', 'federalism', or 'liberal market economy' do not just perform mechanisms for delivering public policies, but embody specific values about how political and social life should be organised. While actors may accept various obligations of EU membership based on utility-maximising calculations, it is also possible that compliance to rules, norms and practices, etc. is 'based on the consent of actors who have internalised the belief that they have a normative obligation to accept certain institutions and policies under certain conditions' (Olsen, 2000). For sociological institutionalists, therefore, actors' interests are endogenous (as opposed to the rationalists' view of material, exogenously-derived interests) to the processes of interaction that institutions represent (Rosamond, 2000).

The emphasis on the subjective aspects of institutions connects the debate with broader sociological concern about the social construction of reality which has recently been influential within International Relations. Social constructivism is a specific metatheoretical position that builds on Giddens' structuration thesis (1984) in which actors and structure are conceptualised as co-constituting each other in the
process of structuration (Christiansen, 1997). The starting point here is that the political world is not materially given but socially constructed. This leads to a line of analysis that does not say either that structures determine action, or that action determines structure. Rather it is through the processes of social interaction that structural properties are reproduced, and the interests and identities of actors are treated as endogenous to the interaction. The constructivist position therefore challenges taken-for-granted concepts such as ‘states’ and ‘international system’ which are assumed to be simply given and objective (Rosamond, 2000: 171-174).

There are clear affinities here with the new governance model which blurs established conceptual boundaries between public and private, state and market, or domestic and international.

Constructivism has been applied to EU studies within the framework of the sociological strand of institutionalism which aims to locate EU institutions at the interface between structural change and political agency (Christiansen et al., 1999). With its focus on dynamic interaction between institutional norms and political action, sociological institutionalist research centres on the role of prevailing ideas and dominant discourses that can shape, but not dictate, the boundaries of what is politically possible. Without discounting the relevance of instrumental rationality, the constructivist position maintains that actors’ interests and preferences can also be shaped by their intersubjective understanding about what constitutes a legitimate political choice, which, in turn, produces/reproduces the EU political arena (Risse-Kappen: 1996:56). Thus shared beliefs and understanding about EU collective governance not only limits conceivable or acceptable policy options but also contributes to the creation of novel forms of governance.

That said, however, a qualification needs to be made about the extent to which EU governance embodies shared values among policy actors. Simon Bulmer argues that ‘culture’ in the EU context is likely to be shared procedural norms which should not be conflated with shared political culture embedded within the national

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18 Risse-Kappen (1996) suggests that, although ideas can also be used in an instrumental way to legitimise policies motivated by purely material interests, instrumental use of ideas works best when there is an established consensus among actors about their value.
context (Rhenish or Anglo-Saxon capitalism, for example) (Bulmer, 1994:372).\(^{19}\) Being a relatively recent phenomenon, the EU only amounts to an aggregation of different political cultures. However, precisely because of its heterogeneous composition, the EU requires convincing policy concepts and their interpretations around which actors' expectations can converge (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999:275). EU actors come from different national settings and traditions, and in that sense, the negotiation of Community policies involves a competition between those actors who try to introduce what they consider to be the most appropriate mode of governance. But it is still possible to delineate prevailing sets of ideas that become predominant at different points of time. Thus while the EU lacks fundamental principles in the sense of a preconceived blueprint, actors in the course of engaging in multilateral negotiation processes develop a common discourse that provides a framework for consensus (W. Wallace, 2000).\(^{1}\) The most notable example of this is the shift in the 1980s towards the widespread acceptance of neo-liberalism and the decline of the European model of the welfare state as the basis for pushing European integration forwards, although liberal market-building doctrines are not unambiguously dominant as a guiding concept in different policy sectors and among different actors (H. Wallace, 2000a). Neo-institutionalism would argue that actors accept this particular idea not just because of its potential for increasing material welfare but also because it is believed to be an appropriate governing framework at the European level.

Network Governance

The use of the ‘network’ metaphor has now become widespread across the social sciences. There is no complete agreement on what constitutes a network, although it is understood that a network is an open structure in which social relationships are constituted in a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature. Participants in networks typically share a common interest but networks have no common or central

\(^{19}\) An example of procedural norms in EU policy-making is a considerable emphasis placed on achieving consensus. This is evident in the fact that, even in areas of Council decision-making where the treaty now allows majority voting, national governments put a premium on unanimous decisions as
organising principles (Axford and Huggins, 1999). The most comprehensive work to date on the network form of social organisation is probably that of Manuel Castells (2000a and b). His concept of the 'network society' is built on a sociological concern with the transformation of (mainly) advanced capitalist societies worldwide rather than European integration as such. However, Castells sees the EU as the clearest manifestation of what he calls 'the network state' developed as a response to the challenges of globalisation:

It is a state characterized by the sharing of authority... along a network. A network, by definition, has nodes, not a center. Nodes may be of different sizes, and may be linked by asymmetrical relationships in the network, so that the network state does not preclude the existence of political inequalities among its members... [R]egardless of these asymmetries, the various nodes of the European network state are interdependent on each other, so that no node, even the most powerful, can ignore the others, even the smallest, in the decision-making process (2000: 363).

In the study of European integration much of the work done by political scientists has centred on the phenomenon of policy networks. Policy networks describe structures of governance involving national and supranational officials, interest groups, lobbyists and other specialists who are linked together by mutual dependencies through the pooling and/or exchange of information and resources. The image of networks depicts the highly segmented nature of EU policy making in which consultation, advice and technocratic rationality are means used by policymakers to cope with highly-developed and complex social regulations. Policy networks tend to 'spring up around specific EU policy sectors, marshalling technocratic expertise and seeking to shape policy options which are likely to be endorsed by political decision-makers at the systemic level' (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 23). Policy network research therefore provides empirical evidence that governing does not have to be about the popular notion of centralised direction within an encompassing authority.

they recognise the political costs of defeating any one of the member states too badly or too frequently (Mazey and Richardson, 1995).
Rather, the emerging picture is that of opportunity structures opened up at the European level which may be exploited by interdependent but autonomous actors with differing interests and agendas but also with willingness to engage in joint problem-solving (Kohler-Koch, 1996).

There are institutionalised forums for such bargaining and coordination, but compared to policy networks operating at the national level, the EU is characterised by more informal and flexible networking (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). This makes EU policy-making processes more unpredictable but at the same time relatively open for influence and access from affected interests, although it would be wrong to assume that the ability to take advantage of such opportunities is evenly distributed across different types of actors (Mazey and Richardson, 1995). For instance, it is generally the case that businesses are much better organised and resourced than groups representing labour, environmental or consumer interests when it comes to lobbying in Brussels.

There are significant variations in the nature of policy networks and in some policy areas there may be no networks at all. Nevertheless, more and more policy areas appear to be showing a high degree of ‘group density’ in the sense that most of the interests have become organised and are active at the European level (Mazey and Richardson, 1995). Where a relevant policy network does not exist in a particular sector, the Commission has been active in helping to create and sustain European-level associations and interest groups, sometimes by providing direct or indirect funding (Mazey and Richardson, 1995:349). The integration of these societal actors into the decision process may be regarded as an attempt to mobilise support groups not only for certain policies but for the integration process as a whole, since participation in these networks involves recognition of the EU as a legitimate level of governance (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999). But the push for channels of access and influence has been as considerable as the pull by the

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20 Policy networks are also a prevalent feature in national politics in which the administration needs to call on private actors to supplement technical knowledge and/or to avoid taking the blame for a contested issue by de-politicising it. These networks are called ‘policy communities’ and are said to be more stable and more tightly integrated than EU policy networks (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 22-23).

21 This tendency has led Michael Mann to call the EU as ‘primarily a capitalist state’ (1998:204). However, it should also be mentioned that the distribution of opportunity between producer and non-
Commission (Wessels, 1997). Private groups, however, are by no means the only significant actors in EU policy networks. Policy network research also points to the intensive participation of national governments and administrations in both the preparation and implementation stages in the EU policy cycle. Their presence is manifest in the extensive substructure of Council and Commission committees and working groups which ensure the flow of information about the diversity of national working practices. Far from being insulated from the reach of member state governments, EU policy networks in fact gain strength from being so closely integrated in the whole process of exchange of information, negotiating and bargaining (Kohler-Koch, 1996).

Network models are not always confined to sectoral analysis, and have been expanded to describe a general mode of governance (although issue-specific variations remain). In her work on the EU as constituting a network mode of governance, Kohler-Koch (1996, 1999) distinguishes four different ideal-types of governance: statism, corporatism, pluralism and network. Her analysis builds on the policy network model combined with the insights of neo-institutionalism about the ideational (as well as organisational) dimensions of governance. The above typology of governance is a classification based not only on structural properties of the political system but also on actors’ perception of legitimate organising principles. The latter relates to belief systems about what is appropriate and exemplary in the ways problems are solved, how conflicts are mediated and how public-private relations are organised. Accordingly, network governance rests on a shared, if diffuse, understanding among political, societal and economic actors that this particular mode of governance can ‘bridge the heterogeneity of the EC’s members and compensate for the lack of democratic accountability by introducing elements of

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22 An indicator of the growing importance of national participation in the sub-systemic level of decision-making is provided by Wessels’ study (1997) which presents a dramatic increase in recent years in the number of committee and working group sessions attended by national civil servants and Commission representatives. This trend is particularly noteworthy considering that policy preparation and implementation are areas which were originally earmarked as prerogatives of the Commission.

23 The four categories are characterised as follows: statism is based on majority rule and a dedication to a common collective purpose; corporatism incorporates competing social interests in a consensus formation for the common good; pluralism combines majority rule and the individualistic pursuit of interests; and network governance builds on self-interested actors who aim for pragmatic positive-sum solutions rather than pursuing a preconceived common good (Kohler-Koch, 1999).
functional representation’ (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 275). Legitimacy in this context is sector-specific and output-oriented with particular emphasis on performance efficiency. This is described as ‘a post-sovereign political system in which the outcomes agreed justify the continuing collective input’ (W. Wallace, 2000: 533).

When compared to other systems, the most obvious feature of a network system is that politics is not about unifying a community of citizens in order to achieve the common good but of managing differentiation. This is a feature particularly evident in the case of the EU. In contrast to political systems where politics is based on the notion of common identity which is given expression through the pursuit of collective purpose, the network form of policy-making is characterised by actors’ voluntary participation and their recognition about the plurality of interests. Affected interests engage in collective decision-making based on the assumption that institutionalised cooperation may turn into mutual benefit for its participants despite differing interests and preferences (Kohler-Koch, 1996: 195). Political relations therefore depend more on pragmatic consensus than on affective commitment (H. Wallace, 2000: 63). Nevertheless, actors are not solely motivated by rational calculation, as bargaining is more about the distribution of benefits in joint problem-solving rather than simply enhancing individual gains. The EU political system, therefore, is ‘a negotiating system which embraces Community institutions as well as economic and social actors and defines the role of the ‘state’ … not as the apex of a decision-making hierarchy, but as a mediator in the common endeavour to come to terms with competing interests and an activator pushing for designing common policies’ (Kohler-Koch, 1999: 18). Governing thus involves bringing together the relevant actors of society who are then tied up in dense and highly interwoven networks of interaction through which they reach agreement. Underlying this system is a question of recognition whereby ‘an increasing range of actors has come to acknowledge the EU as an appropriate framework for politics, alongside and not in place of national and subnational levels of government’ (Banchoff and Smith, 1999:12).

It is worth recalling Castells’s formulation of a ‘network state’ (2000b) in which power is asymmetrically distributed across various nodes within a network. The ‘network governance’ model conveys little sense of political contestation and
power, but in actual fact actors involved in EU policy networks are far from equal. As has been mentioned above, business lobbyists are much better represented in Brussels than interest groups in such areas as, for example, environment or consumer protection (Walby, 1999). Inequalities also exist between EU institutions, where the Commission and the Council (one might also add the European Court of Justice) have the upper hand over the European Parliament in shaping the contours of the EU polity. Not only do national governments still retain much decision-making capacity (in the form of the Council and intergovernmental treaties), but there are important differences of power among the member states, although the hierarchy of power varies in different policy sectors (Castells, 2000b). One is reminded here of the re-emergence of the idea of a European ‘centre of gravity’ which is often discussed in conjunction with an acknowledgement that historically Franco-German cooperation was one of the most important factors in moving European integration forward (see Fischer, 2000). The point that the network model pays insufficient attention to the issues of material power and politics can also be made with regard to ‘new governance’ theories in general (van Apeldoorn et al. 2003). However, there is no reason to assume these theories cannot be combined with other approaches which could supplement those shortcomings. In this connection, one author underlines the continuing utility of intergovernmentalism: ‘For all its empirical and descriptive limitations … the enduring insight of the intergovernmentalist position is that the question of the authority of governance mechanisms cannot ultimately be finessed by appeals to non-political criteria’ such as functionality, efficiency, or actors’ intersubjective understanding about their interests and identity (Bromley, 2001:301).

Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter was to draw a broad outline of the EU as a political system. The chapter underlined the necessity to go beyond the intergovernmental-supranational divide in conceptualising European integration. It also tried to highlight the significance of the ‘governance turn’ (Rosamond, 2000) in EU theoretical literature which demonstrates that political authority and accountability can be shared and dispersed in a complex multi-level, multi-issue policy-making system. The idea of the new governance model is not just an analytical tool for academic debates but
also a political concept which has found expression in the EU’s own governance discourse. A recent White Paper on European Governance states: ‘the Union cannot develop and deliver policy in the same way as a national government; it must build partnerships and rely on a wide variety of actors’ (CEC, 2001c:32). Similarly, in his elaboration of ‘network Europe’, the current Commission president Romano Prodi stresses that EU governance involves an interaction between multiple levels of the exercise of power, and the involvement of non-governmental actors in the policy-making process. His idea of governance is that it comprises a partnership between ‘EU institutions, national governments, regional and local authorities and civil society interacting in new ways: consulting one another on a whole range of issues, shaping, implementing and monitoring policy together’.24

However, the ‘new governance’ analyses also accept that the present state may represent an ‘unstable equilibrium’ and therefore may change in the long term. It is worth emphasising that the new mode of governance emerging at the EU level co-exists with existing patterns of governance at the national and sub-national level. The EU was created in a context of established state authority, and national states continue to have considerable reserves of loyalty along with extensive organisational and financial resources. Therefore, to note the flexible and plural nature of EU governance is merely to suggest that competition among different modes of governance and complex patterns of overlap within the EU are likely to continue.

To draw a preliminary conclusion, different theories of political integration help to situate the development of EU cultural policy in the context of evolving political constellations. If the EU represents a new pattern of political configurations quite distinct from that of the nation-state, there may be no necessary co-relations between political integration and cultural integration. In this regard, recent studies of EU governance provide valuable conceptual tools in analysing the relationship between culture and polity. In the context of the foregoing discussion, I would now like to specify four points which will be elaborated throughout the rest of the thesis:

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1. The theoretical orientation of this study is consistent with neo-institutionalism in that it focuses on how different ideas about European culture and identity are developed and promoted through specific institutional (formal and informal) practices.

2. The rise of a neoliberal agenda in the 1980s and 1990s as one of the underlying principles in European integration has had an important structuring effect for subsequent developments in EU cultural policies.

3. The manner in which EU cultural policies came to be organised since the 1990s can be characterised as constituting a form of network governance.

4. Although the process of European integration is quite different from nation- or state-building processes, the EU official discourse continues to give expression to the quasi-nationalist, ethno-cultural understanding of 'European-ness'.
CHAPTER 2
Culture and the nation-state

My argument in the previous chapter was that European integration is not exactly analogous to the processes of national integration. Yet, growing concern with the EU’s democratic deficit in the past decade has led many in academic and political circles to draw a parallel between the construction of a European demos and the nation-building process. The underlying assumption is that European political integration requires at least a certain level of cultural unity as the basis of social solidarity. The main theme of this chapter is to problematise this assumption which is implicated in the idealised model of the nation-state. In the first section, I will review literature on nationalism with the aim of highlighting the dynamic nature of the processes of nation-formation that include many tensions and inconsistencies. This will be followed by an observation about how the analyses of nations and national cultures can inform the study of European cultural integration in different ways. The last section will be a brief review of developments in the cultural policies of the EU member states, which provide a contextualisation for the examination of various EU cultural programmes in subsequent chapters.

At this point, and before moving on to a closer look at the configurations of national culture, something needs to be said about a host of different meanings ascribed to the term ‘culture’. Culture is a notoriously nebulous term, and many discussions about culture have been confused by the inability of theorists to agree on a common definition. In his many writings on the subject, Raymond Williams distinguished four main strands of meaning. The first refers to the ‘process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’ of individuals and is derived by metaphor from earlier definitions concerning the cultivation of the land, crops, and animals (1983:90). A second usage indicates a general process of social development or culture as a universal process, which is more less analogous to modern definitions of ‘civilisation’. In the third, more recent definition, culture denotes ‘the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ (1983:90). This is the definition most commonly associated with aesthetic and literary traditions which constitute the main target of modern cultural policy.
Fourth, there is an anthropological understanding of culture that can be described as ‘a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group or humanity in general’ (Williams, 1983:90; 1981). It was Herder and the German romantic movement that first popularised the usage of ‘cultures’ in the plural so that the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods are recognised and clearly differentiated from a unilinear sense of ‘civilisation’ (Steinmetz, 1999). The idea of coherent and organic cultural units, each embodying a distinct, whole ‘way of life’, is closely bound up with the discourse of nationalism and national culture. It pictures the space of culture primarily in terms of a series of separate ‘cultures’, with the interactions between them being of secondary importance. Williams’ own position initially favoured this holistic model as a way of challenging the elitist connotations of the other three meanings of culture, although his vision of cultural community was articulated along class, not ethnic or national, divisions (Couldry, 2000). The romantic model of culture has been very influential in social science, but at the same time has been subject to much criticism for its nostalgic tendency to idealise a lost cultural wholeness in which culture is essentialised and almost naturalised. Another problem with the anthropological concept of culture is that it can be too expansive for it literally encompasses everything and as a result loses its value as an analytical category (Hesmondhalgh, 2002).  

Williams in his later writings sought to overcome both these problems by positing the definition of culture as: ‘the signifying system through which ... a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored’ (Williams, 1981:13). The notion of culture conceived in this way retains distinctions between that which is first and foremost about meaning and signification and that which is principally not, without the trappings of essentialism. From this perspective, what defines culture rests very

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25 The problem of stretching the definition has become even more complicated by a recent ‘cultural turn’ in social theory, which either focuses on an unprecedented increase in the importance assigned to culture (advertising, design, etc.) in contemporary society or on the role of culture as universally constitutive of diverse social phenomena (Giddens’ structuration theory) (Nash, 2001; Steinmetz, 1999). The sociological/cultural strand of new institutionalism reviewed in Chapter 1 belongs to the latter approach. But my understanding of ‘culture’ in this chapter is narrower than the general and broad usage favoured by most studies influenced by the cultural turn. See Williams’ revised definition above.

26 For instance, activities such as film-making and cinema-going are socio-economic activities but they are distinguishable from the production and consumption of commodities that function mainly as means rather than ends in themselves, such as transport systems.
much on a question of degree, ‘a question of balance between its functional and communicative aspects’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2002:12). All of the above meanings of culture have their relevance to the present chapter, and they constitute a useful reference point as we proceed with our discussion.

Nationalism and culture

If a simple distinction can be drawn between state-formation and nation-formation, it could be that the former is mainly concerned with the building of a body of law and public institutions, etc. whereas the latter is more of a cultural process (McCrone, 1998; Wintle, 1996: 17-18), although of course these two spheres often overlap with and reinforce each other. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the theories of European integration, largely drawn from International Relations and political science literature, offer many valuable insights into the issues of political integration, but do not specifically address as their central concern how culture shapes, and is shaped by, that process. It is in an attempt to fill this theoretical gap that we now turn to the studies of nationalism. A caveat here is that I would not be able to do justice to the theoretical complexities of the literature on nationalism within the scope of this chapter, and neither would it be possible to take account of various elements involved in the rise and spread of nationalism. Accordingly my discussion will be mostly confined to examining the way in which the nation-state and nationalism embody particular constellations of culture and politics.

A good starting point for such a task is provided by Ernest Gellner’s work *Nations and Nationalism* (1983). His central thesis is that the formation of nation-states is the inevitable outcome of processes of industrialisation and its concomitant complex division of labour. Whereas in agrarian societies the main source of collective identity was one’s place in a given, relatively fixed social structure, industrialisation and its attendant rapid social changes elevated the importance of ‘culture’, understood here as the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community, which replaces structure as the provider of identity. This is so because social mobility and the context-less forms of communication required by industrial order demand social units to be large and yet culturally homogeneous. Thus ‘culture’ requires standardisation over wide areas and needs to be maintained and
serviced by centralised agencies in the form of an overarching system of education using a standardised linguistic medium. As the state is the only organisation large and powerful enough to sustain such a system, the state becomes a protector of culture, providing its 'political roof'. This process then brings about an inevitable 'deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture', leading to 'the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous groups' (Ibid.: 35), with a consequence that 'Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture' (Ibid.:36).

Gellner's particular usage of the term culture mostly refers to a literate, standardised, 'high' culture - 'garden' or 'cultivated' culture in his own terms, which is contrasted to 'wild' or 'savage' culture of premodern times. His point is that nationalism, contrary to nationalists' self-presentation, is not founded upon the affirmation of premodern folk culture. In fact, its basic operation depends on a self-deception:

nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low culture had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of the previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. That is what really happens (1983:57, emphasis in original).

So what happens to the many 'wild' cultures that are not elevated to the status of state-sponsored culture? According to Gellner, they would either be assimilated into an overarching official culture or would secede and seek their own political roof. Partly because the industrialisation process is uneven, fault lines develop between those who have been socialised into the new culture and those who, while living in the same country, speak a markedly different dialect or a language, or between the
new dominant culture and those who adhere to cultural practices that have withstood the tidal wave of modernisation (Dunkerley et al, 2002). Culturally plural societies are ruled out under the conditions of modernity: ‘Nowadays people can live only in units defined by a shared culture... Genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions’ (Gellner, 1983: 55).

Gellner’s work has been enormously influential, and puts forward a powerful explanation of nationalism that ties in culture, the state and the modes of production. But his theory is not without its weak points, and has been criticised for, among other things, its structural determinism and over-reliance on functionalist explanation, his neglect of nationalism’s vital connection with democracy and politics in general (O’Leary, 1998), or its failure to account for the emotive aspect of nationalism and why the masses should willingly follow modernising imperatives and be assimilated by all-powerful national cultural organisations (Smith, 1998). The most problematic in the context of the present discussion, perhaps, is that his theory too readily assumes as a norm a culturally homogeneous nation whose boundary is co-terminus with the state. The factual state of affairs is that national cultures are far from homogeneous, nor is the congruence between culture and the state as neat as Gellner suggests (McCrone, 1998; Smith, 1998). Although Gellner recognises this difficulty in addressing the problem of ‘entropy-resistant’ traits, the main thrust of his theory overemphasises the rigidity of culture and as a consequence plays down the significance of various sources of differentiation within national cultures. An important perspective which is left out here is that boundary-drawing entails the mechanisms of exclusion as well as inclusion, a process in which certain ethnicities, religions, languages and regions are accommodated by the state while others are marginalised or rejected as insufficiently national.

Closely related to this is Gellner’s lack of attention to the need for a continued reproduction of cultural boundaries. His assertions seem to suggest that, once nationally-codified cultural canons are established and their dissemination mechanisms (education system) are in place, a standardised national culture would take on an autonomously homogenising role. There is no doubt that historically there have been attempts to incorporate a broader populace into a nationally sanctioned ‘high’ culture. But the struggle for inclusion is an ongoing battle which cultural authorities cannot always control. As Schlesinger points out, we need to analytically
separate the questions of how a national culture is first constituted and how it persists through time. This requires a viewpoint that problematises national culture ‘and interrogates the strategies and mechanisms whereby it is maintained and its role in securing the dominance of given groups in a society’ (1987: 244).

If Gellner’s theory is overtly structuralist, Hobsbawm and his colleagues’ work on ‘invented traditions’ puts more emphasis on politics and political agents. The traditions Hobsbawm focuses on were ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature’, devised by elites to inculcate among the masses ‘certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). This includes the national anthem, the national flag, monuments and festivals. According to Hobsbawm, the practices of inventing traditions reached its apogee just before the first world war, that is, between 1870 and 1914. As the state’s relations with its subjects or citizens as individuals increasingly became intrusive and direct, the older forms of stratified social hierarchies were transformed, undermining the older devices by which their legitimacy had been maintained. And especially with the extension of political enfranchisement, some sort of mechanisms had to be ‘invented’ to maintain social cohesion by means of creating a sense of ‘continuity with a suitable historic past’. (1983: 1)

Thus if this particular period witnessed a flurry of activities that instituted various public ceremonies and public monuments, such practices are fundamentally bound up with the increased public management of the economy and society (the expansion of state bureaucracy, centralised education systems, etc.) which went hand in hand with the spread of mass politics, and this is where state, nation and society converged (1983: 265). Or, to borrow Gellner’s phrase, this is where a deep adjustment between polity and culture took place. Of particular interest here is the term ‘invention’ which conveys a sense of deliberate manipulation by political elites who have the power to create, or even fabricate, cultural traditions. This is at odds with Hobsbawm’s own admission that invented symbols tend to be more readily accepted when they are grounded in pre-existing cultural resources, which implies that culture is not as malleable as he himself suggests. It also raises a question as to whether ideological manipulation consciously programmed by the elites could actually prompt a desired reaction on the part of the masses. Again, what is missing
is a view on culture as an object and product of contention. Hobsbawm may have gone a little too far in his attack on essentialism, but his work has an important implication for a conceptualisation of culture that does not rely on an exclusive focus on the authenticity and continuity of national cultural traditions and points towards the importance of recognising the changing meanings and functions of symbolic elements.

The point that culture cannot be pinned down to a fixed set of (inherent) commonalities can also be found in Deutsch's model of national and transnational integration (see Chapter 1) which identifies cohesive communities by the 'efficiency' and 'complementarity' of their distinct communication networks. In his formulation, what counts in the definition of the membership of a nation is not cultural uniformity but 'mutual compatibility': 'the ability to communicate more efficiently, and over a wide range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders' (1966: 97). Political institutions encourage community because they foster communication facilities that ensure such complementarity. Therefore, for Deutsch, the case of the Swiss nation (and its linguistic divisions) represented a formidable example that attests to the validity of his theory rather than, as Gellner believed, constituting an anomaly. However, as Schlesinger (1987) notes, the fundamental problem here is that this approach postulates the model of cultural integration so open and so relative that it offers no criteria of boundedness - it could refer to a village, a nation, or indeed, given the presence of sufficient communication facilities, the entire world.

The last point about boundedness is addressed by Anderson (1983) who adopts a similar but more sociologically oriented approach than Deutsch. In his now famous formulation, Anderson proposes that communities are 'to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined' (1983:6). Anderson develops a complex argument starting from macrohistorical changes - the decline of universal religions and dynasties and the changing conception of time, all of which lay the foundation for a novel way of conceptualising collective solidarity. But it was not until the advent of print capitalism that such a distinctively modern style of imagining became possible. Or, in other words, it is the 'half-fortuitous interplay' between capitalism, print technology and the fatal diversity of languages which set the stage for the modern nation, as it created print language, which constitutes 'unified fields of exchange and
communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars’ (Ibid.: 44). The
nation, therefore, is a particular kind of cultural entity which is imagined as limited
because it cannot in principle extend to all humanities and has finite boundaries. It is
also imagined as a community because it is based on feelings of ‘deep, horizontal
comradeship’ that persist regardless of inequality and exploitation within particular
nations (Ibid:7). Anderson then sets out to trace several distinctive paths to the
‘imagined community’, and devotes his attention to various mechanisms and
practices - of which the novel and the newspaper are accorded particular significance
- that contributed to these processes. Through those mechanisms nations are endowed
with a real, palpable existence, grounded in everyday life. Hence the abstract unity
becomes taken-for-granted frames of reference experienced through mundane rituals
(such as reading a newspaper) whereby national identity is ingrained upon
unreflexive forms of ‘common sense’ (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002).

In my view, one of the most valuable insights offered by Anderson is that his
theory directs our attention to the issues of representation - how the nation is
represented, and how this is intimately connected to people’s subjective
understanding of the world (Eley and Suny, 1996). This position clearly conjoins
with the constructivist approach to EU studies that focuses on the intersubjective
making of social reality (see Chapter 1). Culture is not only an objective reality
expressed in visible characteristics, but consists in what people perceive as reality.
This is of course not to suggest that culture has no actual substance and is nothing but
the imagination of some people. But instead of regarding culture as only identifiable
by a list of characteristics, the emphasis on the conceptual component of culture
allows us to recognise the significance of the discursive dimension of nationalism.
Ways of thinking about social solidarity and collective identity play a crucial role in
drawing and maintaining group boundaries. The world view prescribed by
nationalism, which represents people as divided into culturally discrete nation-states
and naturalises our attachments to our nation, has become so pervasive that it is
difficult to conceptualise other modes of belonging. It is this general imbrication of
nationalism discourse in our everyday life that gives nationalism at least part of its
power (Billig:1995, Calhoun, 1997). On this reading, the coherence of national
society and the congruence between the nation (culture) and the state (politics) exist
to the extent that people’s self-understanding is organised around the cultural framing
of nationalism. Anderson’s view on the constitution of national culture seems quite close to Williams’s definition of culture as a system of signification.

The implications of this theory is that social realities are not fixed or given but unstable, changeable and contestable. This is a terrain which has been well explored by cultural studies. For example, Stuart Hall (1996) conceives of the nation as a system of cultural representation, and argues that, instead of thinking about cultural identity as an accomplished fact, we should think of it as always in process and constituted within representations. Although Anderson himself does not push the argument so far as to insist that social realities do not exist outside representations, his account shares the weakness of other ‘social constructivist’ approaches which tend to downplay the realm of material interest and power. This is one of the reasons why his theory can explain the way in which new kinds of ideas about the way communities should be organised are generated, but does not explain how and why these cultural frameworks gain social and political salience (Breuilly, 1996). This reminds us of a common problem with other theories of nationalism that devote much attention to how the nation is first constituted but do not address the question of how a national culture continues to be reproduced and maintained. To say that cultural identity only exists within (not outside) representations may be an overstatement, but if, as Anderson’s theory suggests, the formation of cultural communities depends on mental constructs of individuals, their stability must be ensured by political and institutional mooring (Brubaker:1996).

The above theories posit that the conditions of national identity and culture arose in processes of institutional development that enable a sense of shared loyalties to take shape - that is, the creation of standardised institutions, whether centralised apparatuses of government or a comprehensive system of communications. Because those structural properties belong to modernity, those perspectives view nation-formation as a distinctively modern phenomenon. In contrast to this ‘modernist’ position, Smith (1991; 1998) stresses that we need to understand the premodern origins of nations to see how and why certain nationalisms flourish in the modern era. The main argument advanced here is that, rather than simply ‘inventing’ national cultures, nationalist movements draw on elements of pre-existing cultures of core ethnic groups. He holds that there have been two main routes to nationhood in Europe: bureaucratic incorporation and vernacular mobilisation. The former is
characterised by countries such as France and England where the state has developed over centuries during which the mass of the population was gradually assimilated into the culture of the dominant ethnic group. The latter, characteristic of central-east Europe, is marked by the process whereby an ethnic group is mobilised by (non-state) elites drawing on myths and traditions appropriated from the pre-existing ethnic culture. It is because of this continuity and historical embeddedness that the nation is capable of evoking powerful expressions of belonging. This 'ethno-symbolist' approach provides persuasive accounts of why the idea of the nation has a popular resonance and addresses affective problems that are not sufficiently explored by other theorists such as Gellner and Hobsbawm.

In addition, ethno-symbolism also highlights the persistence of cultural divisions within nations whose recurring contestation about descent, history, culture and territory offer alternative visions of nationhood and community. The 'modernist' authors, in envisaging a fundamental break between premodern and modern forms of social organisation, have a tendency to reify modernity and as a result portray nation-formation in 'quasi-teleological terms as a progressive permeation of all classes and sectors', which is seen to create a total, unitary society that controls economic, cultural and political frontiers (Hutchinson, 2001: 75). On the other hand, however, the emphasis placed by Smith and other ethno-symbolists on the continuity of premodern cultural traditions embodied in collective memory tends to play down innovative and more contemporary formulations of culture. While not denying the continuing hold of national (and ethnic) collective memories on our cognition and emotion, it is important to recognise that both the form and contents of cultural units could go through various changes depending on historical and social conditions.

Taken together, theories of nationalism illuminate different facets of nation-formation from different angles, and offer valuable insights into the ways the nation came to represent a certain constellation of culture and politics in the modern age. One of their main theoretical disagreements revolves around the issue of how much political action is needed to transform a segmented and disunited population into a larger collectivity, and whether potential cultural communities precede such interventions (Eley and Suny, 1996). However, my main concern in this chapter is not whether cultural integration preceded political integration or vice versa in the formation of the nation-state. Rather, what I have been trying to emphasise is the
closely intermingled and mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between culture and politics both on material and discursive levels which is at the heart of the constitution of national society. I have also tried to draw attention to the oft-forgotten fact that even established nations with their supposed cultural unity do have a plurality of different, sometimes conflicting representations about themselves. The harmonious notion of national cultural unity is necessarily compromised by the actualities of social fragmentation, class divisions, gender and ethnic exclusions, and hierarchies and relations of power (Calhoun, 1999). This means that the nation and national culture do not arise painlessly from consensual reflection on a naturally homogeneous culture, but is shaped in complex ways which embody conflicts and tensions and in conditions of contest between different political and social as well as cultural interests (Cubitt, 1998).

The implication of the above is that the process of nation-formation is never entirely complete, since the boundaries and nature of a national community are not static but routinely re-negotiated. In the words of Eley and Suny, ‘What looks from outside and from a distance as a bounded group appears much more divided and contested at closer range. Culture is more often not what people share, but what they choose to fight over’ (1996: 9). Following Brubaker (1992; 1996) who maintains that, rather than asking what the substance of a nation is, we should look at how particular cultural idioms of that nation are activated and reinforced in a specific institutional setting, I am proposing an analysis of EU cultural policies that centres on a question of how particular visions of European-ness are articulated and institutionalised as policy practices. Although national culture and identity may not be as ‘fluid’ as some postmodernist authors would argue, emphasising the changeable and contestable aspect of culture has a particular utility in the study of European integration which, as a ‘cultural project’, is very much in its nascent stage and whose future direction still remains unclear.

European demos and the problems of cultural integration

Given the pervasiveness of the discourse of nationalism, it should come as no surprise that many debates about the present stage and the future direction of European integration are also framed in the language of nationalism and nation-
building (Schmitter, 1996). The overwhelming concern with culture and identity in the European context has so far centred on the plausibility and requisiteness of Europe as a ‘demos’, i.e. a political community with the potential for democratic self-governance as expressed in the concept of the modern nation (Zurn, 2000). As one author put it, the ‘politicization of integration and its extension into sensitive political space necessities renewed attention to questions of community-building and the affective dimension of integration’ (Laffan, 1996:83). The implicit assumption is that Europe requires its demos without which the EU would not be able to overcome its crisis of legitimacy, and this problem is thought to be inextricably linked with a shared identity and culture. This is also reflected in the thinking of many EU elites, who seem to believe that in order to create a Europe-wide political order the EU must first and foremost constitute itself culturally (Shore, 2000). At the basis of such an assumption lies a tacit understanding that national homogeneity provides the basis of legitimation for the state, and the nation-state the basis and articulation of national identity. It is the politically charged nature of ‘cultural identity’ that is underlined by those debates (Hedetoft, 1997).

In the context of discussing the possibility for the emergence of a European demos, Lars-Erik Cederman (2001) identifies four different approaches to the question of supranational identity formation combining theories of nationalism and European integration. I discuss his classification in some detail as it neatly categorises the theoretical literature examined so far along the culture-polity axis in relation to the EU. As each of the four categories consists of theories derived from very different intellectual traditions and does not constitute a coherent approach, it would be more accurate to treat Cederman’s taxonomy as overlapping interpretive frameworks rather than the classification of distinct theoretical positions.

The first category is represented by the 'ethno-symbolist' approach to nationalism. Although Smith’s culture-driven account leaves room for political intervention, its emphasis on the existence of the ethnic core in national identity formation significantly limits the extent of cultural ‘invention’. With respect to European integration, Smith maintains that we can trace a diffuse sense of European identity based on a European ‘family of cultures’ - Roman law, democracy, Judaeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism, etc. But since the European Union crucially lacks the emotional anchoring of historical memories of community which formed
the basis of successful nationalisms, the EU officials' attempt to furnish European cultural identity 'from above' is unlikely to find popular resonance, if not downright impossible (Smith, 1997). This position is broadly compatible with traditional forms of intergovernmentalism in European integration studies which underline the 'logic of diversity' (as opposed to the neofunctionalist 'logic of spillover') embedded in 'the weight of geography and history' (Hoffmann, 1966: 868). Stretching this line of reasoning a little further, one may add to this category the 'no Demos' thesis made famous by the decision of the German Constitutional Court concerning the Maastricht Treaty ratification which, put in crude terms, applied the organic-cultural notion of Volk to Europe and declared the non-existence of a European demos (see Weiler, 1997b).

Contrary to the first, the second perspective does not just posit that the politico-cultural bond of the nation-state is historically contingent but actively advocates the separation of cultural and political identities. This is best exemplified by the 'hyper-rationalist' approach (Schlesinger, 1997) of Habermas who argues in favour of overarching civic values detached from national cultural traditions as a common denominator for a Europe-wide 'constitutional patriotism'. To the extent that appropriate mechanisms required for a European public sphere (citizenship, transnational political discourse, etc.) are in place, European identity transcending the nation-state is a distinct possibility (Habermas, 1992). As this approach is predicated on political values, full cultural assimilation (or integration) is not required. Rather than approximating culture-politics configuration of the nation-state model, therefore, constitutional patriotism entails a qualitative transformation of political membership.

This argument in some sense taps into the distinction made between civic and ethnic nationalisms. Habermas's proposal is basically the idealisation of the civic model transferred to the transnational level, while leaving unquestioned the presumption that the basis of cultural community 'naturally' resides in the nation (Calhoun, 2002). Empirically, most nationalisms combine the elements of both, and considering the increasingly politicised nature of cultural identities in contemporary society, the post-nationalist appeal to the de-coupling of the two organising principles of the nation-state raises a question as to whether a political community masquerading as culturally neutral may in fact end up suppressing cultural
differences and potential rival claims (Kraus, 2003). Within integration theories, this culturally sanitised model is implicitly affirmed by classical neofunctionalism which viewed European integration as proceeding according to rationalist logic eventually leading to a supranational political unity. Along similar lines, Cederman classifies Hobsbawm's 'invention of tradition' theory in this post-nationalist approach. However, while predicting the demise of the nation-state in a globalising world (1990), Hobsbawm is elsewhere sceptical about the prospects for the consolidation of popular allegiance to the EU, concluding that 'Europe will remain "a Europe of nations"' (1997:274).

Third, there are pan-nationalists who apply essentialist, Herderian notions of culture not to European nation-states but to Europe itself. The assumption of this approach is that Europe is a unique cultural entity whose essence nevertheless lies dormant. To establish European supernational (not supranational) identity, therefore, all that is needed is to activate those latent cultural commonalities. This approach is most prominently advocated by Denis de Rougemont (see Chapter 5), but is also shared by some traditional Euro-federalists.

Finally, the fourth approach, which Cederman terms 'bounded integration', emphasises the stability of national identities upheld by institutional mechanisms. Cultural communities may be constructed in politically driven processes, but through various institutional practices of identity maintenance those identities become resilient to change. Among theories of nationalism this perspective is exemplified by Gellner's account on the role of state-organised education in establishing and maintaining national culture. In addition to national education systems there are obviously other identity-conferring mechanisms such as various forms of communication media (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995; Deutsch, 1966; Schlesinger, 1987). To be clear, the 'bounded integration' approach does not in principle preclude the possibility of European identity construction via the EU. After all, the implication of Gellner's thesis is that a 'post-industrial' world, or one in which fewer people were employed in heavy industry, would be a post-national world, which may entail possibilities for supranational identity formation as demanded by a globalising economy (Calhoun, 1997: 80). But the crucial difference with post-nationalists is that, because of its emphasis on the institutional equilibrium of the nation-state, the bounded integration approach posits much more demanding conditions for
supranational integration. Although Cederman does not explicitly spell it out, this approach clearly corresponds to the theoretical premise of new institutionalism in European integration studies described in Chapter 1.

As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, all the above strands of theoretical perspectives have bearings on the study of EU cultural policies as each of them features recurrently in EU discourse in which different and competing meanings of Europe and Europeanness find their expression. The theoretical orientation of the present study is broadly in line with the bounded integration approach in that its focus lies on the institutionalisation of culture, but there is one qualification to be made with regard to this particular approach. Cederman’s own position holds that ‘bounded integration’ is the most promising approach not just as an analytical tool for an academic enquiry but also as a realistic option for actual attempts at identity construction (which means that he is implicitly advocating the construction of Europe-wide identity-conferring institutions). As with other studies premised on a view that a European demos is desirable in order to redress the EU’s democratic deficit, Cederman’s account tends to put too much weight on the unity and coherence of putative common culture and therefore fails to problematise the role of culture as the basis of European solidarity and legitimacy. The argument concerning cultural integration then hinges on an opposition between the presence and absence of ‘common culture’, and how to create cultural commonality. Putting aside normative concern about the necessity of a European demos, this starting point is misleading, because it obscures the ambivalent and contentious nature of European discourse which is not just about unity and inclusion, but is also about the strategies of exclusion and the construction of difference which operate internally as well as externally (Delanty, 1995). Culture may be integrative, but it may also be disintegrative at the same time. Treating culture simply as a social glue leaves out an important aspect in (re)drawing of cultural boundaries, that is, specific interests and social circumstances involved in legitimising certain boundary markers over others (Wicker, 1997).

Connected to the above is that Cederman’s taxonomy tends to conceive of identity formation in ‘either-or terms’ - either national or supranational identity, presumably because ‘common culture’ must be located in one or the other, replicating the problematic dichotomy of supranational-national division in the EU
debate. Common membership of a cultural community may be one source of solidarity, but hardly the only one. There are many ways in which collective identities are constructed and maintained, although one of the most prominent identity-markers in modern times is arguably culture. Functional integration, concrete social networks and mutual engagement in the public sphere are also sources or dimensions of solidarity, which could co-exist with national forms of social organisation with varying degrees of salience (Calhoun, 2002). The question of how collective identities are constructed, therefore, is as much about the existence of cultural commonalities as with how some of the many possible features that can be used for group definition are selected and given social meaning (Benda-Beckmann and Verkuyten, 1995: 18). My contention is that, if we pose the idea of unified national culture as the only standard against which EU cultural integration is to be measured, we risk overlooking the politics of representation by which such internally diverse phenomena as cultures and social groups are made to appear as 'natural' and internally coherent (Calhoun, 1999). Seen from this perspective, a key question becomes how cultural fields are symbolically encoded with competing discourses and become socially operative as practices. It involves looking much more closely at the social foundations and power of competing ideas and discourses and the choices to be made between them.

However, in foregrounding the procedural aspect of European cultural project, I do not want to exaggerate the flexibility and changeability of culture. If the purposiveness of institutions is that they survive, it is also true that some institutionalised cultural forms do acquire a certain degree of stability and durability through continuous reproduction (Schopflin, 2000). I am suggesting here that the emerging European cultural space (or spaces) should be viewed as a contested space within finite limits of possibility, and that we need a perspective which can accommodate both change and continuity.

Cultural politics of the nation-state

One of my propositions in the preceding section is that the construction of the EU as a cultural entity needs to be situated in the social and political context. Having reviewed selected theories regarding the formation of the nation-state, we now move
on to concrete issues of national cultural policies. Cultural policy has so far received scant attention from social scientists. That this area has not been among the priorities of political scientists may not be so surprising, given the relative financial insignificance of culture compared to other responsibilities of government (Eling, 1999). Literature on nationalism, whose focus mainly lies on the historical emergence and spread of nationalism, does not explicitly address the question of what happens once the idea of the nation and national culture has become widely accepted. On the other hand, cultural studies, which foregrounds the 'oppositional' role of contemporary popular culture (or 'sub-culture'), have until recently avoided policy-oriented research. Lately, the emphasis of cultural studies have been placed more and more on the audience, consumption and reception, and displaced attention from production and distribution of culture (Kellner, 1997:20). In consequence, apart from a small body of research dealing with the specialised issue of the administration of the 'arts', the literature on which we might draw in exploring national cultural policies is quite limited.

Bearing in mind the above limitations, the following is an attempt to map out the development and variations of European cultural policies from an institutional perspective, as the resources, tasks and functions of cultural measures have undergone constant changes to adapt to the new balance of political, economic and social forces. Cultural policy is principally about 'the conditions of culture, the material and, also, the discursive determinations in time and space of cultural production and consumption' (McGuigan, 1996: 22). The approach adopted here is to study cultural policy not only in the narrow terms of public administration of 'the arts' but as a crucial site where the meanings of 'the nation', 'national identity', or 'Europe' is (re-)produced and circulated. As one writer put it, 'a cultural policy is

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27 In the early 1990s scholars associated with the Institute for Cultural Policy Studies at Griffith University, Australia, started to advocate a reorientation of cultural studies so as to align its research agenda with the Foucauldian notion of 'governmental technologies', thereby challenging the traditional preoccupation of cultural studies with cultural criticism and the anthropological notion of culture as a whole way of life, expounded by Raymond Williams (Hunter, 1988; Bennett, 1998). There is an ongoing debate on whether a theoretical framework that construes culture primarily as a bureaucratic or administrative process can be justified. The full extent of this debate cannot be recounted here, but I would point out that putting policy at the fore of cultural analysis does not necessitate such a single-minded focus on bureaucratic practices, and that cultural policy needs to be approached from a broader perspective, along with a range of other ideas, activities and sites that influence the production and circulation of cultural meaning (see O'Regan, 1992; McGuigan, 1996; Couldry, 2000).
about more than simply supporting arts for art's sake. ...a 'policy' is also a concerted plan of action embodying a state view of the place and purpose, even perhaps the usefulness, of the arts and culture in the national community' (Loosely, 1995:243). Because the space is limited, my discussion here will be quite sketchy, and will be based on broad generalisations, simplifying and subsuming disparate European cases under a few archetypes. In focusing on governmental cultural programmes I am in no way suggesting that the nation-state is the only site of culture that is worth investigating. Instead, this is simply to say that the state has been, and still remains, one of the most influential institutional mechanisms which shape and regulate cultural meanings and flows in the modern world.

The idea of arts and culture as a public policy arena requiring systematic government intervention only became prevalent in Europe in the post-war era. It is indicative in this connection that the Ministry for Culture in France - one of the countries with the tradition of a very strong link between the state and culture - was founded in 1959. However, from a broader perspective (cultural provision through the collection and disbursement of tax revenue), public support for cultural activities is far from new. Government or dynastic support for the production and consumption of culture stretches back to the age of absolutism when royal or aristocratic patronage began to replace the role of the church. In very general terms, as far as the structure of support is concerned, it is possible to distinguish two overall patterns that form the background against which twentieth-century cultural policies have evolved (Cummings and Katz, 1987). On the one hand, there were states with absolutist monarchies with strong traditions of court culture, typified by France and Austria. On the other hand, there were the more plutocratic, mercantilist states with more limited monarchies, such as England or the Netherlands, with the German and Italian proto-states showing mixed traits.

As Elias (1983) has demonstrated, court society revolved around a structure of rituals and procedures which was founded on the need to exhibit power, wealth, status and above all, royal splendour in a conspicuous manner. This was crystallised into the construction of palaces and gardens as well as the establishment under royal patronage of major artistic projects on a grand scale. Hence, in Austria, Emperor Joseph I financed the construction of an opera house in Vienna in 1705 and of the Theater am Kärnthner-Thor in 1708. In the same vein, many of the most prestigious
institutions in France were born in the age of absolutism, including the Comédie Française, created under the reign of Louis XIV in 1680 as an ‘official’ theatre company. Remarkably, the basic stance regarding the centrality of public support for the arts and culture survived the Revolution. The succeeding regimes, far from destroying the former objects of royal largess, continued to support the institutions established by the dynasties they replaced. Thus, the initiative for the Louvre, conceived under Louis XVI, outlived its original patron and the museum was opened in 1793 to celebrate simultaneously the overthrow of the ancien régime and the glory of the Republican government (Duncan, 1995). What might have been the symbol of personal wealth and self-glorification, therefore, was co-opted as a display of spiritual value and, crucially, national splendour. Subsequently, public support for culture would be marked by the official recognition accorded to a clearly circumscribed group of ‘academic’ artists, and by the material encouragement granted to these official artists by means of public commissions or work on projects such as the Opera Garnier. As the scope of public intervention expanded throughout the nineteenth century, so did the number of institutions effectively controlled by the state not only to determine their budgets but also to appoint and dismiss their artistic directors. The preoccupation with national and international prestige rooted in monarchical traditions was to live on in French cultural policy through de Gaulle to Mitterand (Loosely, 1995; Eling, 1999).

Things were quite different in countries such as the Netherlands, and especially, England. Monarchs in those countries avoided the conspicuous consumption of the Bourbons or the Hapsburgs both as an expression of financial constraints and of Protestant antipathy towards grandeur (Cummings and Katz, 1987). In the Netherlands, the rise of the Protestant middle class who attained economic dominance comparatively early led to the development of a thriving art market controlled by burghers and merchants, with the result that the division between ‘mass’ and ‘high’ culture was not so marked as elsewhere (Prior, 2002). In addition, there was often significant support from the towns which hosted regular concerts or plays. Similarly, in England, cultural sponsorship was largely left to the private pursuits of the aristocracy, or increasingly during the eighteenth century, to the upwardly mobile commercial class keen to use such artistic intervention as a mark of social distinction. On the other hand, artistic events such as concerts, theatre,
and operas were mainly commercial ventures. Despite an apparent reluctance for directly financing artistic projects, however, the monarchy did intervene in the some aspects of cultural activities, either in the form of social protection through licensing plays or theatrical performances, or censoring the production of books (Williams, 1981; Gray, 2000). It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the state gradually began to make inroads into publicly funded projects including the establishment of museums, academies, art schools and public libraries, the prime example being the foundation of the National Gallery in 1824. Even then, the Gallery was run by a system of trusteeship based on an ‘arm’s length’ principle instead of direct government control (Prior, 2002).

Notwithstanding national and regional variations, two common sets of ideas legitimated public support for culture in eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century Europe. First, debates on public funding of museums, galleries, libraries, art education, etc. during this period were framed largely by a discourse of moral betterment and social control. These institutions were expected to cultivate the masses, to bring them up to a higher level of civilisation. It was thus that the state entered as an active patron in the nineteenth century, presenting itself as the benevolent guardian of the most civilised of human expressions for the putative good of the public (Prior, 2002). In practical terms, publicly funded cultural projects had a political function to contain class struggle and secure civil order (McGuigan, 1996). As such, state intervention in the cultural sphere can be seen as part of the complex surveillance systems of the state developed during the nineteenth century to monitor social conditions and contain elements that might lead to instability (Tilly, 1992).

Secondly, with the rise of nationalism, the idea of consecrating a national culture came to the fore. This is most clearly illustrated by the Louvre, which became the paradigm model of a national museum and was replicated throughout Europe.28 As Duncan (1995) argues, these institutions of national cultural canons did not just act as a repository of national pride, reproducing a key set of values and ideals. They also addressed the visitor as an idealised citizen and an equal inheritor of those values, thereby uniting him/her with other citizens regardless of their individual

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28 The influence of the Louvre on other nations was such that museum building accelerated markedly after its opening in 1793. For example, the Swedish national museum was founded a year after the Louvre, the Rijksmuseum in 1808, and the Prado in 1819.
social position. The discourse of national cohesion and universal access, however, should not conceal the fact that museums, along with other institutions of cultural authority, were effectively closed for the masses, the very section of the population that was believed to be in need of spiritual enlightenment. The internal regulations of those institutions clearly prescribed the types of visitors to be discouraged, and very little help was given to uninitiated visitors by way of popular guides. Fine art in this sense was a symbolic resource for the differentiation of bourgeois elites from other social groups (Bourdieu and Darbel, 1991).

National ideals embodied in dominant aesthetic and literary traditions were also disseminated in more accessible forms through other institutional channels such as public education (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Weber, 1976) or public festivals and ceremonies (Hobsbawm, 1983). I do not mean to underestimate the impact of these mass-oriented mechanisms of cultural integration, but it is worth noting that the institutions of culture purporting to serve the public good can be as much internally dividing and alienating as unifying, very often along class lines (Bourdieu, 1990; Hoggart, 1958; Williams, 1958). What is significant is that the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the actual practices did not necessarily diminish the discursive power of 'official' national culture, as it continued to shape national cultural policies well into the twentieth century. In this sense, education systems, which are so central to Gellner's account of cultural integration, do not so much integrate the people of a nation as they objectify the idea of the nation itself. It is a matter not only of a propagandistic content in the curriculum but also of the perception of schooling as an egalitarian institutional mechanism that implicitly legitimates inegalitarian outcomes in economic and political positions (Schudson, 1994).

The period between the first and the second world war marked a decisive turning point in the role of government in financing the arts and culture. Just as the idea of a self-conscious and systematic cultural policy was taken to its extreme in the fascist system, governments in many liberal democracies became actively involved in the cultural funding process in the defence against Nazism or fascism not only for
reasons of national morale but also for propaganda (Rásky, 1998). But it was in the post-war reconstruction phase that state support for culture massively increased, to the extent that it was able to have a real impact on cultural production and distribution. The emergence of culture as a new policy arena needs to be placed in the context of the expansion of the general role of the state which was already noticeable in the nineteenth century but exploded in the years between World War I and World War II. This has culminated in the creation of the welfare state complex that dominated European political, social and economic life until the mid-1970s. Along with this change came the idea that the state should play an active role in bringing the ‘good life’ to average citizens, providing for the working class on a collective basis what the upper and middle classes had been able to provide for themselves individually. Access to culture thus became analogous to access to medical care (Cummings and Katz, 1987a). Another significant change in this connection is the spread of the electronic media of mass communication, which became a major medium of cultural dissemination. Coupled with general social changes such as the rising standard in educational level, and the increase in disposable income and leisure time, the above trends have combined to create strong pressures for government intervention in the field of culture.

In terms of administrative structures, the cultural policies of post-war Western Europe can be differentiated into four types (Rásky, 1998). Generally speaking, the organisational structure of cultural programmes tends to follow the way the government is organised and does its business in other fields (Cummings and Katz, 1987b):

1. The ‘French Ministry of Culture’ model, where there is a centralised bureaucracy in charge of cultural policies, and the funds are allocated through the budgetary processes. Responsibility for culture is either concentrated in a single ministry (France), or divided among several ministries (Italy).
2. The ‘arm’s length’ principle. Cultural policies are mainly formulated and implemented by quasi-autonomous organisations, as in the UK and Ireland. These

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29 The examples of this are the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) established in 1940 in Britain (Gray, 2000), or the active involvement in the 1930s of the French Popular Front in cultural matters (Loosely, 1995).
organisations were supposedly designed to keep culture and politics separate, so that cultural policy judgements are made by experts based on artistic/aesthetic merit. Major cultural institutions tend to be private or semi-private, and receive far less public funding than in the other models.  

3. The Nordic welfare-state model, where the government is heavily involved in directly subsidising cultural activities and artists. This is based on socio-economic considerations that cultural and artistic work is useful to the well-being of society in general and that artists should be supported through various mechanisms including grants, prizes, and artists’ income guarantees.

4. The federal model. In countries such as Germany and Switzerland, cultural policy is primarily the responsibility of regional or local authorities with substantial autonomy accorded to them.

The immediate post-war age saw a delineation of the field of culture as a target of systematic state intervention. Before this period, the administrative organisation of cultural measures was too fragmented for a self-conscious ‘cultural policy’ to emerge. Thus cultural policy, which had usually been subsumed under the educational functions of the state, diverged from other policy areas and became a specialised area. The above-mentioned birth of the French cultural ministry was not the creation of something entirely new. Its constituent parts were drawn from already existing departments in other ministries - arts and letters, architecture, and the national archives coming from the Ministry for Education, and the National Centre for Cinematography being transferred from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Ahearne, 2002).

After the war, cultural policies in most west European countries inherited the nineteenth century concerns about the preservation and promotion of ‘high’ and prestige culture, together with the idea about culture’s civilising role. Culture at this time still meant the highest and lasting forms of artistic achievement of the past,

30 The Arts Council of Great Britain was never wholly independent of the political process, even if its status as a ‘quango’ has allowed the pretence to be maintained. As neither politicians nor the Arts Council were wholly independent of the other, a consequence of this ambiguous status was that responsibility and accountability for culture were blurred (Gray, 2000). However, with the establishment of the Department of National Heritage - later relabelled as the Department for Culture,
clearly distinguished from mere leisure or popular entertainment. Cultural policy was thus equated with the institutional dissemination of national ‘high’ culture as a process of bringing artistic excellence to the people, to construct a cultural stronghold against the devastating effects of commercial and foreign (mainly American) influence. Accordingly, concrete measures mainly consisted of the administration and financing of major museums, orchestras, theatres and high-profile educational institutions. (Rásky, 1998) While some folk elements have been incorporated into national cultural canons, there is again a logic of exclusion at work here, as commercial or mass culture was seen to represent a danger to the achievement of the common good. What was new, however, was that cultural policy now became part of the commitment to societal, rather than class-based, improvements in the standard of living contained in the welfare state paradigm. This is encapsulated in slogans such as ‘cultural democratisation’, even though the priority accorded to such goals at the level of aspirations and declarations was only partially matched by substantive policy initiative, both in terms of resources allocated to cultural measures and the content of the support (Eling, 1999).

The goal of incorporating the lower strata was aided by the new media, which transformed the cultural practices and values of these strata from the ground up. Thus it was no accident that the electronic media in Europe was assigned a public duty from the very beginning (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Radio, and later, television had clear and sharply defined cultural and educational functions. John Reith, the first Director General of the BBC, saw his aim as establishing ‘an institution for cultural enlightenment, a bulwark against the baleful influence of commercial entertainment, and for political education also, with the task of enabling a newly enfranchised general public to exercise their citizenship rights responsibly’ (McGuigan, 1996:56). In this way the BBC consolidated itself as one of the leading institutions of British national culture. Localism and regionalism was neglected in order to construct a national audience. Although the BBC monopoly of the public service broadcasting had already ended with the advent of regional ITV companies in the 1950s, these companies were required to observe principles of public service alongside their

Media and Sport - in 1992, the British ‘arm’s length’ model may be changing towards a more centralised structure.
populist aims. The BBC also actively promoted ‘high culture’ with broadcasts of classical music and drama, in particular. This provided an important contextualisation for the foundation of the Arts Council of Great Britain at the end of the Second World War (McGuigan, 1996).

Government financial support for the arts continued to expand almost everywhere in the 1960s and 1970s, but the decision of many countries to concentrate support on large-scale, national and professional arts at the expense of small-scale, local, minority or amateur cultural provisions did not go unchallenged. The social movements of the 1960s brought identity issues to the fore by demanding, among other things, that ‘the rights and respect due to citizens not be conditional on conforming to any set of cultural ideal but instead be open to those who found in themselves or wished to forge different kinds of identities’ (Calhoun, 2001: 45). It is worth recalling that this period also witnessed a massive surge of immigrants of non-European origin, followed by the popularisation of the word ‘multiculturalism’ in immigrant-receiving countries in Europe, which could mean not only that a right to be different was actively endorsed but also these immigrants were simply presumed to be unassimilable (Jopke and Morawska, 2003).

The changing social and political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s led to the questioning of the imbalance of the distribution of funds, which greatly privileged Establishment arts and kept experimental and popular-participatory activities very much on the margins of public subsidy. The effect of such challenge was first translated into concrete policy programmes in the Nordic countries in the 1960s. Cultural politics in Scandinavian countries have a long tradition characterised by the active participation of numerous voluntary organisations, such as adult education organisations, amateur theatres, traditional folk music and dance groups, which emerged alongside state-run institutions of ‘high’ culture. In the 1960s and 1970s these grass-roots organisations and artists’ unions provided a basis for a broad consensus that creativity and cultural participation contributes to the self-realisation of people and therefore the revitalisation of social milieux (Toepler and Zimmer, 2002). Active state involvement in the funding of cultural activities thereby came to be linked to such concepts as equity and social justice, rather than being perceived as a vehicle to symbolise ‘grandeur’. The main issue during this period has shifted from access to high culture to the question of how to foster creativity in ways that are
relevant to the cultural reality of most people, especially the underprivileged, as a way of personal empowerment. Influenced by the Nordic states' social democratic approach to cultural policy, governments in other parts of Europe (especially north-western Europe) also started to promote an extended concept of culture covering areas of activity which had hitherto been excluded, although at this stage commercial or popular entertainment was still discouraged. The emphasis was accordingly laid on personal involvement and participation in amateur activities, in which community centres, a cultural policy innovation of the seventies, played an important role (Rasky, 1998). Also part of this change was the decentralisation of administration structures, aimed at improving social and geographical access through the provision of culture at the level closest to one's own locale. Whereas in the 1950s and 60s regional and local governments mainly acted as agents for the implementation of centralised cultural measures, the responsibility for cultural planning itself began to shift to local authorities, most noticeably in the countries of northern Europe.

The goal of broader access to culture was made possible against the background of economic growth. The dramatic increase in cultural spending in the 1960s and 1970s was part of a much larger explosion of government spending for social programmes in general. Thus, after the protracted economic crisis abruptly ended the expectations of permanent unbridled growth in social spending, the budgetary squeeze of the 1980s invariably affected the cultural sector as well. This was most obvious in Thatcherite Britain which initiated a series of radical restructurings as a necessary adjustment to changing economic circumstances (McGuigan, 1996). The rise of neoliberal thinking meant that private interests were seen as better equipped to manage public assets and services (Hansen, 2000). The most tangible result of this change in the cultural sphere was the increasing emphasis placed upon the economic effectiveness of cultural institutions. These public-sector organisations were called upon to think and function as though they were private businesses and to become ‘entrepreneurial’, which in specific terms involved introducing profit-maximising management practices and seeking private sources of funding (Bianchini, 1993). But what was significant in the marketisation of culture was not just that cultural activities needed to be economically efficient, but that arts and culture were ‘discovered’ as an economic sector in its own right. Culture came to be conceived of as an important economic resource which can make a significant
impact on employment, investment and the balance of trade. In this context, cultural industries (television, film production and distribution, popular music, design, fashion, etc.) became for the first time an important part of 'public' culture. The combination of culture, commerce, and economistic reasoning proved to be particularly influential in the urban regeneration strategies of cities suffering from the negative effects of de-industrialisation. (see chapter 7).

The linking together of culture and economics, either through using culture as a tool for the attainment of economic objectives or through insisting upon a more economically orientated approach to the delivery of cultural policies, has not been simply a British phenomenon. Elsewhere in Europe, there has been a partial shift of emphasis from the social-democratic doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s to a more liberal doctrine fostering the idea of public-private partnership. Even in Italy, whose cultural administration is generally considered to be one of the most bureaucratic in Europe, cultural institutions were given a degree of legal independence so that they could generate some private income to supplement shrinking state subsidies (Rásky, 1998).

Government retrenchment in the 1980s also manifested itself in the decentralisation or regionalisation of cultural responsibilities. Since the 1970s, the major feature of much of the European experience has been toward an increased role for more localised forms of financing and control of culture. But decentralisation could mean territorial decentralisation with the consequent development of regional cultural administrations, or institutional de-governmentalisation in the sense of the establishment of a range of quasi-autonomous intermediary organisations. There are variations depending on the specific situations of individual countries. In the cases of Belgium and Spain, the introduction of new organisational structures with a responsibility for culture arose from the internal political demands of regions for cultural autonomy rather than being a direct consequence of the crisis of the welfare state. In the UK, the establishment of the Department of National Heritage in 1992 may indicate a shift towards a more intrusive central government position, while a devolutionary shift can be observed in the splitting up of the Arts Council of Great Britain into three regionalised Councils of England, Scotland and Wales (Gray, 2000).
France was the only country that went against the general move of the 1980s towards austerity, as the state's cultural budget effectively doubled under the presidency of Francois Mitterand (Toepler and Zimmer, 2002). Far from cutting back cultural spending, the prestigious investment projects initiated by the President - known as the grands project, including the construction of the Louvre pyramid, the Opera Bastille or the Bibliotheque de France - continued throughout the 1980s, and could be seen as the most ostentatious instance of the continuity with prior traditions. However, such projects were also justified on economic grounds, since, it was argued, encouraging creativity, enterprise and the presence of beauty will dynamise not just France's art world but also revitalise its economy, indicating that French cultural policy was not immune to the ideological restructuring of the 1980s (Eling, 1999). As for the decentralisation of cultural policy-making, while the funding balance between the Ministry and the local authorities had shifted unambiguously in favour of the latter throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Ministry was still able in many cases to influence the financial decisions of local policy-makers by tying them into institutional mechanisms devised and dominated by them.

On the other hand, one of the main features of Jack Lang's (the Minister of Culture during the Mitterand era) cultural agenda was his rejection of a rigid distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture, giving an official recognition to the commercial dimension of the cultural sector. The concept of culture, at least on a symbolic level, was thus extended to cover virtually everything to do with one's lifestyle, even though the funding involved never amounted to more than a fraction of the subsidies allocated to institutional high culture. Another focal point in this period was a series of battles fought by French cultural elites during the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations which pushed the idea of cultural security to the forefront (see Chapter 8).

Despite all the claims made about the profitability of the cultural sector which proliferated in the eighties, it is important not to overstate the case. Contrary to its rhetoric, the British Conservative governments never endorsed the extremist line of privatising the publicly subsidised arts. Instead, cultural organisations were obliged to seek joint funding from public and private sources, but business sponsorship never grew much beyond a ten per cent supplement to public subsidy in general. Similarly, in other parts of Europe, although attempts to raise finance from private sources have
become increasingly common, this is still running at relatively low levels. Therefore, the most profound consequences of the eighties shift towards market discourse for cultural policy restructuring has been more ideological than material (McGuigan, 1996). The predominance of neoliberal thinking continues up to present, but it is also increasingly coming under attack. The major strikes, protests and other forms of popular manifestations against prevailing market reasoning, which have been commonplace in many EU member states during the 1990s, may be taken to testify to a certain degree of de-stabilisation of neoliberal discourse (Hansen, 2000).

Government intervention in the cultural sphere has also been subject to much controversy on other fronts. The increase in leisure time and the higher educational level of wide sections of the population has led in recent years to a broadening of cultural interests, but also to growing requirements for personalised, creative leisure-time organisation. The artistic and cultural development potential has become ever more comprehensive and more diverse, and the quality of cultural amenities is now seen as an important measure of the general quality of life, giving rise to the articulation of new demands on cultural policy (Bianchini, 1993). One explanation offered for the unprecedented role that culture came to play in contemporary society can be found in the shift to a post-industrial service economy, where the means of communication and information become more important than the mass production of commodities, giving more weight to signs (advertising, design, etc.) that increasingly mediate the social relations (Lash and Urry, 1994). In any case, attacks against publicly-subsidised Establishment art are regularly made on the grounds of more equitable management of the resources of society, while policy-makers are confronted with an ever-expanding definition of ‘culture’ and shifting opinions concerning the responsibilities of the state (Gray, 2000).

It should be remembered here that even in countries where culture is supported ‘lavishly’, all cultural programmes taken together account for only one or two per cent of the total national budget. So far the relative unimportance of culture has been a political asset much of the time, the positive effect being that controversies over the cultural agenda have been kept minimal (Cummings and Katz, 1987b). Nevertheless, cultural support has actually continued at impressive levels despite general government retrenchment, and what is most impressive is that often the cuts proposed for the arts have actually been less than those proposed for much
longer established government programmes (Gray, 2000). Both a cause and a consequence of this institutionalisation and growth of cultural programmes has been the tendency for culture to become a policy field in which the normal rules of the political process apply as in other fields. A parallel development is that the organisations of artists, institutions, and cultural professionals have evolved into interest groups that speak for cultural community in the governmental arena. National cultural terrain is now characterised by a plethora of interest groups, experts and other intermediaries who form policy networks, championing a variety of cultural forms and practices (Gray, 2000). As a result, there has been a remarkable increase in the political sophistication of the constituency for the arts and culture (Cummings and Katz, 1987b). Even in France, increasing involvement of professionals and interest groups in cultural policy has been observed, which means that the state and its core executive are not as powerful or autonomous vis-a-vis societal interests in this field, nor as united as the statist view of French policy-making would suggest (Eling, 1999).

Conclusion

The implication of the foregoing review of cultural policy developments is that we can observe both continuity and change at the same time. As political pressures and economic and social forces that influenced cultural practices have been broadly similar throughout the advanced-industrial democracies, there has been a marked tendency for the cultural policies of different countries to become more similar over time, but this has by no means eradicated country-specific variations. The commitment towards cultural support in Europe has remained fairly consistent, but the mechanisms utilised to undertake this task have been subject to amendments which have been driven by other concerns than those of culture itself (Toepler and Zimmer, 2002). In almost all European countries, the lion’s share of funds remains the preserve of institutions purveying elite culture and insulated against the laws of supply and demand. National elites, governments and cultural experts continue to perpetrate the idea that ‘high’ culture is something that the nation must be associated with, as a form of national and international prestige. Yet whilst the institutions of high culture remain at the heart of official versions of national self-imagery, forms of
cultural authority have multiplied and fragmented (Edensor, 2002). As the means to
develop and transmit culture have expanded over decades, important parts of
contemporary cultural processes have come to escape the grip of the state, being
transmitted through commercial and more informal networks. This, however, is not
to suggest that traditional forms of national culture have become irrelevant. Rather, it
means that an increasing range of activities and cultural fields has been endowed
with national significance and converted into facets of national culture (Cubitt:1998).

If we follow Gellner, the role of the state was to provide a political roof for
nationally-codified canons of high culture. However, cultural guardianship is no
longer such a predominant feature of national culture, and in fact, it may even be
argued that it was never as important as has been claimed. If anything, the more
recent changes and adjustments that took place in the cultural policies of post-war
Europe are characterised more by a bottom-up process whereby official
understanding of national culture continuously expanded to incorporate new demands
than by a top-down imposition of ‘high culture’. The state is increasingly having to
mediate between different lobbyists and claims and decide where funds should be
provided. In doing so, it must rank the tastes and desires of particular classes, ethnic
groups, regions and so on. Perhaps this is why more and more emphasis is placed on
the utility of cultural forms that lend themselves to a multitude of different uses in a
pluralistic, multicultural society. Nearly every programme of cultural support has had
multiple objectives. Different people will support the same programme for different
reasons, and conversely, each supporter of government involvement in the cultural
field is likely to have more than one objective in mind. The Pompidou Centre in
Paris, for example, was built to symbolise the glories of French culture, to stimulate
the redevelopment of the Beaubourg area of Paris and its tourist trade, to provide a
cultural mecca for the enrichment of popular taste, and as a monument to the second
President of the Fifth Republic (Cummings and Katz, 1987b). To the extent that
public support for culture has had different political, economic or social functions but
has never been purely about creativity and cultural expressions, the link between
culture and polity has always involved elements of instrumentality. While such a
statement may give undue weight to the instrumentality of culture, it does capture the
multiple uses and ever-changing notions which centre upon certain cultural forms,
and testify to their symbolic flexibility.
My aim in tracing the developments of national cultural policies in Western Europe was twofold. First, I tried to show that putting the idea of culturally constructing the nation into actual policy practices involves a certain degree of discrepancy between the rhetorical commitments to the idealised national culture and actually managing concrete programmes with limited resource. The centrality of the nation-state as a regulator and disseminator of ‘national’ culture remains intact, but at the same time the cultural boundaries of what is perceived to be appropriately national and the ways in which those boundaries are maintained have gone through various adjustments if not total transformations. Second, European integration as a cultural project does not take place in a vacuum, and various actors who have a stake in the cultural dimension of the EU bring their own (nationally and locally formulated) ideas and practices to the EU political arena. Thus it is crucially important to take into account the continuities and changes in the cultural politics at the national level that shape the background against which EU cultural policies are formed. Without drawing a direct parallel between European and national integration, understanding how national cultures are institutionalised by the state allows us a vantage point for analysing EU cultural policies.
CHAPTER 3
The evolution of the EU cultural policy

The aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical background for the subsequent chapters through an overview of how EU cultural policy has developed over the years. It traces the emergence and development of EU cultural action as it has been shaped and reshaped according to the economic and legal tools with which the EU has been able to act at different stages of European integration. Although the original Treaty of Rome did not specifically recognise the Community competence in the field of culture, initiatives in this area had already begun to take shape in the 1970s. The seemingly expanding scope of cultural activities at the EU level has led many commentators to note that the ultimate aim of the EU could be to create a super-nation in which the relationship between a polity and culture is moulded in a classical nation-building model (see Shore, 2000; Axford and Huggins, 1998; Wood, 1998). As I hope to show below, the link between the EU and culture is not as straightforward as these authors may suggest. Cultural policy has developed unevenly as part of the process of the formation of the EU, and it reflects changing ideas about culture in concert with the tools and priorities of the Union (Beale, 1999). As a consequence, legal, political and economic conditions that prevailed at any given time have so far largely determined the shape of EU cultural policy, which exists in very different forms from those of the nation-state.

The chapter chronologically follows the evolution of EU cultural policy, and is divided into five sections. The first two sections will look at developments in the 1970s and the 80s. This will be followed by the examination of the cultural provisions in the Maastricht Treaty introduced in 1992. The rest of the chapter will deal with the question of how and to what extent the conceptualisation of 'culture' and 'cultural policy' in the EU has changed in the latter part of the 1990s. In charting the development of EU cultural agenda over three decades, the chapter argues that the focus of cultural action has shifted from the forging of symbolic unity to the

31 Until quite recently, the European Commission has avoided using the word ‘EU cultural policy’. Instead, what can be described as cultural policy has normally been called ‘cultural action’ or ‘Community action in the cultural sector’.

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pragmatic promotion of cultural cooperation, with profound implications for the possible form of relationships between the EU, culture and identity.

The emergence of Community cultural action (1970-1984)

Until the introduction of the ‘cultural clause’ in the Maastricht treaty in 1992, culture was, from a strictly legalistic point of view, not a sphere of Community competence. However, the absence of a legal basis for ‘culture’ did not impede Community involvement in cultural matters, and the starting point for EU cultural action dates back as early as the beginning of the 1970s. The European Parliament was the first European institution that specifically called for Community action in the field of culture (McMahon, 1995: 122). In a more indirect and ambiguous way, the European heads of state also issued a series of statements which endorsed the idea that European integration involved not only economic but also cultural dimensions (CEC, 1977: 5). A more tangible step towards defining a cultural basis for European integration was made in 1973 when leaders of the then nine EC member states signed ‘the Declaration on European Identity’ at the Copenhagen Summit. As the declaration itself makes it clear, the concern with the issue of ‘European identity’ at this stage mainly lay in the need to define a common position of the member states vis-à-vis external actors (i.e. external identity in world affairs), which should not be conflated with the EU’s later attempts at generating European identity among ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, the statement underlined internal cultural commonality to legitimise a move towards a common foreign policy, proclaiming that ‘[t]he diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life … all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism’.  

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33 For instance, the 1969 meeting at the Hague summit regarded Europe as an ‘exceptional seat of development, culture and progress’, and that it was ‘indispensable to preserve it’, Point 4 of the Communiqué, Bulletin EC 1-1970, Part one, Chapter 1. Also see the final declaration of the Paris Summit in 1972, Bulletin EC 10-1972, Part one, Chapter 1.
In the wake of all those statements, the European Commission created in 1973 a cultural affairs unit which later became the Directorate-General X (Culture, audiovisual and sport) (Bekemans, 1990: 48). In 1977 this unit produced the first comprehensive document concerning Community action in the cultural sector. The Commission’s main intention in presenting this document was to identify the areas in the cultural sector where the Treaty’s existing provisions could be applied. The absence of explicit legal basis for cultural action in the original Treaty of Rome meant that there was a built-in bias towards framing culture in terms of economic integration. Thus, the 1977 document defined the cultural sector as ‘the socio-economic whole formed by persons and undertakings dedicated to the production and distribution of cultural goods and services’. Accordingly, Community action in the cultural sector was ‘necessarily centred on solving the economic and social problems which arise in this sector as in all other’ (CEC, 1977: 5). This included, among other areas, freedom of trade in cultural goods, combating theft of works of art, free movement and the right of establishment of cultural workers, and harmonisation of copyright and taxation in the cultural sector. Apart from the action inspired by the socio-economic rationale, however, the Commission’s proposal also contained some initiatives that fell outside the immediate scope of the Treaty, such as the preservation of architectural heritage, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of socio-cultural activities at the European level (CEC, 1977: 19-25). Specific measures included Community patronage for a youth orchestra, organisation of ‘European rooms’ in museums, and support for the European co-production of television programmes. Nonetheless, no action was taken in response to these proposals, despite the favourable reaction of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (McMahon, 1995).

The Commission’s own assessment of the 1977 proposal, published in 1982, reaffirmed the EC’s ‘economic and social responsibilities towards the cultural sector’, and once again established the same lines of priority action: freedom of trade in cultural goods; improving the living and working conditions of cultural workers; enlarging the audience; and conservation of the architectural heritage (CEC, 1982: 4). The relevance of the first two areas to the existing Treaty provisions is quite evident. But this time the Commission also emphasised how the areas that were beyond the strict application of the Treaty were related to the overall priorities of economic
integration. Thus, in the area of ‘widening the audience’ (which in this context mainly referred to the development of the audiovisual media), widening access to culture was said to ‘offer cultural workers more opportunities for work and thus enhance their earnings’ (CEC, 1982: 15). As for the action regarding heritage conservation, the document stressed that ‘it is a contribution to a rich resource that generates economic activity…and that conservation is itself an economically and socially viable activity for the firm and workers connected to it’ (Ibid.: 18).

In contrast to the previous proposal, the 1982 document elicited a response from the Council in the form of the first ever meeting of culture ministers in 1982. The meetings, which were held informally at first but later on a formal basis, marked the first stage in institutional recognition of the Community’s cultural role (CEC, 1992a). However, this did not diminish the contested nature of its competence in the field of culture, as the meetings acquired a very ambiguous and confusing legal status: these meetings were called ‘the Council and the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs meeting within the Council’ which could adopt either Community acts (as ‘Council’), intergovernmental acts (as representatives of member state governments, and therefore outside the Community framework), or mixed acts (Bekemans, 1990: 23). Indeed, at most of the meetings throughout the 1980s, the ministers made no commitments and confined themselves to declaring an intention for further cooperation in this area. When specific measures were actually adopted, they were passed in the form of resolutions ‘of the representatives of the governments of the Member States’, indicating an unwillingness on the part of the member states to consider the subject matter of the resolutions as falling within the Community competence (McMahon, 1995: 136). Thus, leaving aside the areas of culture that directly affected the formation of the single market, the actual implementation of the Commission’s recommendations remained extremely modest.


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35 These resolutions were regarding audiovisual piracy, the promotion and development of a European programme industry and harmonisation of rules on the sequence of film distribution through the various media, Bulletin EC 6-1984, point 2161.
The complex legal status of the Council of culture ministers is just one instance where the promotion of, and resistance to, EC cultural action manifest themselves simultaneously. But by the mid-1980s, the discourse on EC cultural action started to cluster around a different set of premises. Several factors provided an impetus to this change. First and foremost, there was a growing awareness among the European officials that the image of technocratic Europe was alienating ordinary citizens. The desire to promote people’s involvement in the unification process was first expressed clearly in the Tindemans Report on the European Union which was drawn up by the Belgian Prime Minister in 1976. In underlining the importance of ‘a Citizen’s Europe’, the report recommended that Europe ‘must make itself felt in education and culture, news and communications’ as a ‘concrete manifestation of European solidarity’. The theme of EC cultural action was relaunched by the Solemn Declaration on European Union, issued in 1983 at the European Council meeting in Stuttgart. The section on cultural co-operation upheld the need to extend the scope of European co-operation in the cultural field, which was to be pursued not for its own sake but ‘in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity’. No immediate action was taken following this Declaration, but combined with an embarrassingly low turn-out at the direct election to the European Parliament in 1984, it acted as yet another reminder that the lack of popular involvement in European integration could impede ‘an ever closer union’ envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the Fontainebleau European Council meeting shortly afterwards considered essential once again that ‘the Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world’. To this end, it established an ad hoc committee on ‘a People’s Europe’ (the Adonnino Committee), which submitted a report to the European Council in Brussels and Milan in the following year.

The Adonnino Report consisted of two parts. The first report concentrated on measures to promote citizens’ rights such as the free movement of persons and

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37 Bulletin, EC 6-1983, Ch. 6.
38 Bulletin, EC 6-1984, Part 1, Ch. 1.
right of residence throughout the Community. The second part of the report dealt with cultural initiatives, stressing that ‘it is also through action in the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community’s image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought’ (CEC, 1985a: 21). More surprising than this general statement were the specific measures chosen from amongst the various aspects of ‘culture’. These included proposals for the development of a European ‘audiovisual area’ and a multilingual, ‘truly European television channel’, the creation of an Academy of Science, Technology and Art (‘Europe needs an institution with international influence to highlight the achievements of European science and the originality of European civilization in all its diversity’), and an Euro-lottery (‘to make Europe come alive for the Europeans, an event with popular appeal could help promote the European idea’). The report also called for the creation of Community sport teams, increased level of youth exchanges, and the promotion of a ‘European dimension’ in education. The Adonnino Committee went even further and proposed a new set of symbols which was clearly inspired by the centrality of national symbols as the locus of national identity. Foremost among these was the creation of the EC emblem and flag, a circle of twelve gold stars set against an azure background, which was adopted from the logo of the Council of Europe. Similarly, the music from the ‘Ode to Joy’ from the fourth movement of Beethoven’s ninth symphony, which is also the anthem of the Council of Europe, was proposed as the European anthem.40 The report also recommended the creation of the Europe Day, the harmonised European passport, driving license and car number-plates, and European postage stamps ‘bearing identical designs of subjects which highlight the Community or its underlying values’ (CEC, 1985a: 18-30).

The emphasis on those symbolic campaigns as a strategy for creating ‘a People’s Europe’ thus represented a departure in the Commission’s approaches to the hitherto neglected domain of culture. The Commission’s own formulation on the relationship between culture, collective identity and European unity betrays the idea behind this change: ‘European identity is the result of shared history and common

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40 The idea for this was also borrowed from the Council of Europe. It is only the music of ‘Ode to Joy’ that was adopted as the official anthem, as Schiller’s lyrics pose the problem of language.
cultural and fundamental values. But awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic action, a consciousness-raising campaign and the growing convergence of European ambitions' (CEC, 1988b: 5). Here, cultural action was conceptualised in terms of awakening and activating forgotten common traits based on a historically-rooted cultural unity. A rediscovered European identity would in turn strengthen people’s sense of belonging to the European Community. There is a clear discursive similarity between this type of argument and the ‘Euro-nationalist’ writings championed by writers such as Denis de Rougemont in the immediate post-war era (Varenne, 1993). At this point, then, the Commission was following the model of culture on which the nation-state had traditionally been founded (Shore, 2000).

Following the endorsement of the Adonnino Report by the European Council in June 1985, many of the proposals contained in the report have been implemented. The European flag was hoisted for the first time outside the EC headquarters in Brussels at a formal ceremony on 29 May 1986. As a commemoration of decisive moments in the history of European integration, the first Europe Day was celebrated on 9 May 1986, the anniversary of the 1951 Schuman Declaration which led to the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Commission has launched a number of other symbolic initiatives, including EC-sponsored competitions and awards (such as the ‘Europe of Tomorrow’ young scriptwriters competition), the European Youth Orchestra, the European City of Culture events, a series of ‘European Years’ dedicated to the promotion of certain EC-chosen themes (such as ‘the European Cinema and Television Year’ (1988) or ‘the European Year of Music’ (1985)) (CEC, 1988b). Along with those highly symbolic measures, various low-key cultural projects were also introduced in the mid-1980s. These ranged from the audiovisual ‘Media’ programme and pilot projects for the conservation of heritage, to schemes to support cultural or youth exchanges, training and business sponsorship of arts.41 Reviewing the progress towards the achievement of a People’s Europe in 1988, the Commission showed confidence in the effectiveness of such ‘consciousness-raising campaigns’: ‘[the] sense of European identity has begun to take shape thanks partly to the concrete measures taken by the Community’ (CEC, 1988b: 3).

41 More detailed discussion of those schemes will be given in the later chapters.
In parallel to the pursuit of 'a People’s Europe', an accelerated drive towards the completion of the single market in the late 1980s created an additional momentum pushing for a stronger cultural action at the Community level. The Commission’s orientation document drawn up in 1987 put forward a rationale behind an increased effort in the cultural sector: ‘The sense of being part of European culture is one of the prerequisites for that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market, and the considerable changes it will bring about in living conditions within the Community, is to secure the popular support it needs.’ (CEC, 1987: 1) The same document envisaged five fields of activity as the framework programme for the period between 1988 and 1992, which were nothing more than a reorganisation of past proposals under different headings: the creation of a European cultural area (creation of an internal market for culture, better living and working conditions for cultural workers); the promotion of the European audiovisual industry; access to cultural resources (promotion of multilingualism, support for heritage conservation and culture in the regions); training for the cultural sector (cultural administrators, specialists and translators/interpreters); and dialogue with the rest of the world (cultural exchanges with non-member countries, especially in Eastern Europe).

There are in fact two different notions of culture that were employed in the 1987 Communication. Firstly, the document can be read as yet another attempt by the Commission to engineer popular consensus in support of economic integration. To counteract the impact of the emerging single market, cultural measures were designed ‘to win the support of the general public and the special interest groups involved’ (CEC, 1987: 3). By emphasising an image of the Community which was neither economistic nor technocratic, the Commission sought to portray a positive picture of Europe. This is a variation of Euro-nationalist discourse. According to the Commission, ‘Europe’s cultural dimension is deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of its inhabitants’, so cultural action at the Community level is simply an ‘answer to the legitimate expectations of the people of Europe’ (CEC, 1987: 1 - note the singular use of ‘people’).

But it is also possible to identify a different type of discourse which was to become increasingly dominant in the course of 1990s, based on the concept of culture as an instrument of economic development. This was in fact a theme already explored at an EC-sponsored conference held in Florence in March 1987 on culture
and its relations with technology and the economy. The conference recognised the increasing economic significance of cultural activity, and concluded that culture should be seen as a common denominator in all areas of economic activity. Building on the outcome of this conference, the 1987 document highlighted the responsibility of the Community in 'the creation of new jobs in the cultural sector in association with the expansion of tourism and regional and technological development' and in 'the emergence of a cultural industry which will be competitive within the Community and in the world at large' (CEC, 1987: 3). This may seem similar to the socio-economic justification for cultural action which the Commission had initially employed in the 1970s. However, it marks a departure from the period when culture was simply a residual category in European integration. As a result of the growing inter-relationship between culture, economy and technology, so the new logic goes, culture could now positively contribute to the overall aims of economic integration as a resource to be valorised, rather than being seen as a secondary element in the pursuit of economic prosperity.

The Commission communication of 1987 was welcomed at the meeting of the culture ministers in December 1987. Nevertheless, the Ministers did not adopt the priority measures as identified by the Commission. Instead, they were rearranged along the following lines, which effectively narrowed the scope of action: the audiovisual sector; books and reading; the training of cultural workers; and business sponsorship of cultural activities. Despite an impetus generated by the twin goals of 'a People's Europe' and the completion of the single market, the achievements in the period between 1985 and 1991 remained quite limited in practical terms. Many Commission proposals met with no response, and even if the Council approved certain schemes, they were adopted in the form of non-binding acts for which the Commission could find small amounts of money under its own authority (Shore, 2000: 53). Even though the symbolic measures launched during this period may have appeared threatening enough to cause suspicion about the emergence of a European super-nation, cultural action was a marginal area in the overall activities of the Community, with direct cultural spending only amounting to 0.014% of the total

42 EC Bulletin 3-1987, Part 1, Ch. 1.
budget (Bates and Wacker, 1993). The lack of formal legal competence and sufficient funding meant that the declared, ambitious aims of cultural initiatives actually ended in variegated, small-scale, and mostly one-off initiatives without any coherence or structure (CEC, 1992a: 3-4).

The Maastricht provisions

As far as the Community’s legal competence in culture is concerned, the situation has changed dramatically with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. Article 3(p) of the Maastricht Treaty stipulated that the Community shall contribute to the ‘flowering of the cultures of the Member States’. This was further developed in Article 128 which provided for the first time a specific Community competence in the field of culture:

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between the Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
   - improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
   - conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
   - non-commercial cultural exchanges;
   - artistic and literary creation, including the audio-visual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

Estimates made in 1993. This figure excludes spending in the audiovisual sector (such as MEDIA). But even if this sector is included, it only brings the figure up to 0.06% (Bates and Wacker, 1993).
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty.

5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this article, the Council:
   - acting in accordance with the precedence referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of laws and regulations of the Member States. The council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 189b;
   - acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.

It is a common view that Article 128 is very much a product of compromise between differing positions on cultural action at the European level, and a closer look at the provisions reveals that they are as much limiting as they are enabling. First of all, cultural action, as in other fields of EU activities, would have to respect the general principle of subsidiarity, which was also introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. This means that EU action in culture should only play a supplementary role to national or regional cultural policies ‘if necessary’. Any future harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the member states concerning culture is thus expressly ruled out. The emphasis here is clearly on promoting the diversity of national (and sub-national) cultures, as opposed to a centrally-planned, homogenising EU cultural policy. The Treaty provisions do not regard the EU as the first contact for cultural support. What they seek is the promotion of cooperation between European cultural and arts institutions in order to contribute to a qualitative improvement and quantitative increase in transnational movements and communications, which is significantly different from the conventional model of national cultural policies that seek to disseminate centrally-codified cultural canons (Ellmeier, 1998: 127).

Secondly, Article 128 established a complex decision-making procedure that requires a wide consensus for any cultural measures to be taken. On the one hand, the
introduction of ‘co-decision’ procedure gave the European Parliament much greater say in the shaping of EU cultural affairs. And the Committee of the Regions (CoR), newly created to advise the Commission on regional and local issues in the EU, must be consulted before the adoption of cultural initiatives. The empowered EP and the COR together established the grounds for much stronger representation in EU policy-making of interests likely to be supportive of stronger, more extensive cultural policy. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers would have to act unanimously throughout the procedures, even when it adopts non-binding measures such as Council recommendations. The principle of unanimity could allow even one member state to block the process of implementing cultural action. This is in clear contrast to other policy fields where qualified majority voting is sufficient.

The Maastricht Treaty's emphasis on cultural diversity and plurality is also evident in the requirement that makes it compulsory for the Council to consult the CoR's opinions. Since its introduction, the CoR has been very vocal about the need for the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity, understood here as distinct 'ways of life' embedded in local and regional practices and traditions (Barnett, 2001). The CoR has also challenged on many occasions the Commission's tendency to construe cultural diversity as the diversity of national cultures, and therefore as the primary responsibility of the member states, arguing that it falsely posits homogeneous national cultures within the member states (COR, 1994 and 1997). Although the CoR's role in formal decision-making process is very weak vis-à-vis other EU institutions, it plays an important informal role as a platform for exchange and networks between subnational actors with common interests (McCarthy, 1997). Along with the subsidiarity principle, the institutionalisation of regional interests in the form of the CoR may demonstrate the growing importance of multilevel governance in European integration.

It is important to emphasise at this point that the formal recognition of cultural action was not meant to establish the grounds for a Europe-wide cultural policy which would surpass or replace existing cultural provisions at the national or

45 Article 3b, ‘The Community shall take action ... only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.’
regional level. The only explicit cultural brief for direct action that the EU was given by the Maastricht was to contribute to the 'flowering of the cultures of the Member States', and this has to be seen in the context of past suspicion of many member states that the Commission was working towards a centrally-planned EC cultural policy based on the EU officials' uniform concept of what constitutes 'European culture' (Sandell, 1996: 271). This is also reflected in the fact that the only amendment to the 'cultural clause' made by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 was a further obligation for the Community to respect and promote cultural diversity. The Council reaffirmed this in 2002 stating that 'it is essential to encourage co-operation and cultural exchanges in order to respect and promote the diversity of cultures in Europe and to improve their knowledge of one another'. However, it is the fourth section of Article 128 which in many respects is having the most impact on EU involvement in culture as it stipulates that the EU takes cultural aspects into account in its actions under other provisions of the Treaty. As I will show in the later section, this clause has officially created a new basis on which cultural activities came to take a greater share of resources within EU policy whose objectives are not specifically cultural.

Post-Maastricht cultural programmes

Notwithstanding the limits built into the 'cultural clause', the Maastricht Treaty formed a springboard from which the new conceptualisation of EU cultural action was formed. In the words of the Commission, '[t]he Community is on the threshold of a new era in which it will be able to grow beyond its purely economic dimension and enjoy unprecedented opportunity for cultural cooperation and support ... thought should therefore be given to the future thrust of cultural action in this new environment.' (CEC, 1992a: 1). In endorsing the future work programme proposed by the Commission in 1992, the Council noted:

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46 The draft Constitutional Treaty, if adopted, would remove the unanimity condition in the file of culture.
47 Article 151 (formally Article 128), Title IV. The following phrase in italics were added to the original: 'The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures'.
Future programmes may specifically include: encouraging the activities of European cultural networks of arts practitioners and cultural institutions such as museums, archives, libraries and monuments; encouraging business sponsorship of the arts; exchanges and training of personnel in the cultural field in support of the activities of Member States; increasing awareness of different cultures and safeguarding the Community's linguistic diversity, as well as promoting respect for shared values.49

These priority areas of action were further developed into three new framework programmes: RAPHAEL, KALEIDOSCOPE, and ARIANE.50 Although these programmes focused on different areas of cultural activities, they all shared the same objectives and organising principles. One of the defining characteristics of the post-Maastricht cultural programmes is a renewed attention to the connection between culture and socio-economic development. As well as generating a sense of belonging to the Community among European citizens, cultural action was assigned the role of turning cultural resources into economic capital. In giving expression to Article 128, the programmes were intended to achieve the following:

- encouraging cultural cooperation in the form of networks and partnerships between different players and promoting the circulation of cultural works;
- supporting emblematic cultural initiatives;
- making use of the opportunities provided, in an information society, by new communication technologies;
- enhancing the cultural dimension of socio-economic development. (CEC, 1994b: 4)

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48 Council resolution on the role of culture in the development of the European Union, Official Journal C32, 05/02/2002.
49 Official Journal C336/1, 1992
50 In the early 1990s, the audiovisual policy started to branch out of the EU cultural policy and since then, EU official documents have been dealing with the culture and audiovisual sectors separately. For the development of the audiovisual programmes such as MEDIA, see Chapter 8.
The KALEIDOSCOPE programme had existed since 1991 as an experiment, and was extended in 1996 to cover larger numbers of projects for the period between 1996 and 1999. It supported various types of artistic creation including the performing arts (dance, music, theatre, opera), plastic and spatial arts, applied arts and audiovisual works (creative works using multimedia). The programme was divided into two action lines. Firstly, support was given to events and cultural projects carried out in partnership or through networks. To be eligible for this type of support, projects had to be organised by networks or by partners involving at least three member states. In 1999, 119 projects were selected with a budget of approximately EURO 8 million. Secondly, it supported large-scale, high-profile co-operation projects of a symbolic nature. Under this heading, existing individual support measures that were deemed to be emblematic (the European City of Culture, Europe Day, the European Community Youth Orchestra, etc.) were also incorporated into this programme.

RAPHAEL

Introduced in 1997 to cover the period until 1999, RAPHAEL supported projects for the conservation of heritage. Prior to that, a pilot programme in this area had been running since 1988. The programme supported the protection of cultural heritage, professional exchanges and cooperations, the development of conservation techniques and vocational training. As in the Kaleidoscope programme, eligible projects must involve networks or partners from at least two or three member states, depending on the scale of projects. The support covered cooperation of over 500 operators from all the member states. The detailed analysis of this programme will be given in Chapter 6.

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51 Decision No 719/96/EC establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a European dimension (Kaleidoscope), Official Journal L99/20, 20/04/1996. The initial proposal for this programme was forwarded to the Council by the Commission in October 1994 (CEC, 1994b), but was not adopted until March 1996 due to differences in the positions of the member states.

ARIANE\textsuperscript{54}

ARIANE, the EU support programme in the field of books and reading, was implemented from 1997 to 1999 based on three actions. Action 1 concerned the translation of quality twentieth century literary works and of reference works which had already been published and had won critical acclaim. Action 2 supported cooperation projects with an aim to improve citizens’ access to books and reading. Eligible projects had to involve at least three operators from three member states. Action 3 dealt with vocational training of translators and other professionals in the field of publishing. The total number of projects supported was 767, one of which was the Aristeion Prizes (European Literature and Translation Prize).

As the brief descriptions above show, these programmes were aimed directly at cultural professionals, institutions and organisers of cultural events, as opposed to the ‘consciousness-raising campaign’ of the 1980s which targeted the general public. Along with this change in the method of cultural action, the notion of what constitutes the basis of EU cultural policy was also modified. In contrast to its earlier insistence on the existence of common cultural roots, the Commission has opted for a practical definition of ‘European-ness’ in EU cultural action after 1992, highlighting its form rather than the content. The word ‘European dimension’, as used in documents concerning those post-Maastricht cultural programmes, referred not to some supposed cultural unity, but simply to the fact that they involved cross-border cooperation between cultural operators from different member states. In putting flesh on the commitments of Article 128, therefore, the emphasis of EU cultural action has shifted from attempts to engineer a unified European cultural identity to the functional networking of occupational groups in the cultural sector.

At one level, this is purely an administrative problem. Given the limited resource available to this sector (in terms of funding, legal authority and a number of staff), the Commission has to rely on the knowledge and experience of already-

\textsuperscript{53} Decision No 2228/97/EC establishing a Community action programme in the field of cultural heritage (Raphael), Official Journal L305, 08/11/1997.
\textsuperscript{54} Decision No 2085/97/EC establishing a programme of support in the field of books and reading (Ariane), Official Journal L291, 24/10/1997.
established cultural institutions and organisations in order to aim for a maximum impact and greater visibility of their chosen line of action. The operational rules for KALEIDOSCOPE and RAPHAEL are particularly indicative of such limitations. First of all, to be eligible for funds under these programmes, applicants had to be organised in an association or other form of legally recognised body, and their proposed projects had to be on a scale over ECU 5,000. The reason given for this was disproportionately high administration costs involved in the application process for both the Commission and the applicants. Further, EU contributions granted through this programme must not exceed 50% of overall project costs, and could not be used as a basic funding for the applicant organisation itself. In other words, this part-funding mechanism was only designed to contribute to actual projects through which to develop lasting cooperation frameworks and not to the establishment of new organisations (Ellmeier, 1998: 128). This has created a tendency in the EU that privileges high-profile, well-organised groups and institutions. According to a recent study carried out at the request of the Commission, many cultural operators participated in EU cultural programmes found EU support in this area to be 'too professionally oriented, requiring too much long term planning and offering possibilities too complex and distant for many cultural actors to grasp' (ECOTEC, 2003: 36).

The limitations of Community resource also manifest themselves at the initial stage of drafting proposals. It has long been customary for the Commission to gather expertise from external professional bodies for the development and the writing of policy proposals (Fuchs, 1995). Before deciding on a specific course of action, the Commission organises Europe-wide consultation meetings with selected experts from different member states and often commissions professional associations and think-tanks to undertake background research or the evaluation of past measures. The way the proposals for the above three programmes came into being is no exception to this general rule (CEC, 1994b: 13). As one observer remarked in describing the nature of European telecommunications policy, the character of EU policy 'is not so

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55 Kaleidoscope programme - Information and call for applications, Official Journal C144/12, 19/04/1996 and C298/09, 09/10/1996.
56 This observation applies to the EU's other policy fields. See Fuchs, 1995.
much owed to the predilections of the Commission but owed to the way they are formulated in a network-like process' (Fuchs, 1995: 427).

Effective policy measures thus require the construction of alliances between EU institutions, a range of policy experts and interest groups. This means that in the area of cultural policy, the Commission is dependent on the formation of European networks not only for the implementation of its measures but also for their information and expertise. In fact, the Council had already adopted a resolution in 1991 which explicitly established the centrality of networks of cultural organisations as intermediaries for fostering cross-border cooperation. In the previous chapter, I have mentioned that the cultural sector has since the mid-1980s suffered from cutbacks in public funding as part of general neoliberal restructuring. Against this backdrop, new opportunities opened up at the European level provides a valuable source of funding for cultural professionals and organisations whose activities are supported less and less by their respective national states. Concentrating support on the formation of transnational networks also provides an additional justification for EU intervention in this sphere, as individual countries tend to finance national or bilateral operations, whereas support for multilateral European partnerships are relatively neglected at national or regional levels (CEC, 2004a:9).

The increased formation and presence in Brussels of Europe-wide cultural umbrella groups such as European Forum for Arts and Heritage (EFAH) or International European Theatre Meeting (IETM) may testify to the growing importance of those cultural networks in EU policy-making process (Ellmeier, 1998: 121-122). Independently of financial support allocated within the framework of the above cultural programmes, the EU has also been providing support grants to cultural organisations which are deemed to be of ‘European interest’ under budgetary headings entered in the Commission’s administrative expenditure. The emergent patterns of decision-making in the EU, therefore, represent a restructuring of political opportunities for different actors, favouring certain sorts of action and organisation

57 Council resolution on cultural networks, Official Journal C314, 05/12/1991
58 There are 17 of these organisations: EFAH; IETM; European Union Youth Orchestra; European Union Baroque Orchestra; European Opera Centre; European Chamber Orchestra; EuropaChorAkademie (Choir); EJYO/Swinging Europe (Jazz); European Writers’ Congress; European Council of Artists; Europa Nostra (heritage); European League of Institutes of the Arts;
over others (Barnett, 2001). If the evolving nature of the EU is best described as ‘a
network polity’, cultural action in the EU might be considered as one policy field in
which the feature of a Europe-wide network polity is emerging, characterised by a
form of transnational governance which exists in the absence of formally
representative political institutions (Axford and Huggins, 1999).

This is not to say that the EU officials have totally abandoned the ‘mass
campaign’ approach to their symbolic construction of Europe, because this form of
cultural politics continue under a different guise. Following the near-disastrous
French referendum in 1992, Jacques Delors enlisted a group of public relations
experts to suggest ways to improve the EU’s image. The resulting report, drawn up
by a Belgian MEP Willy de Clercq, was approved by the Commission in 1993. De
Clercq report reflected the idea, which has become prevalent in political
communication strategies of the Commission, that the democratic deficit is simply a
case of communication failure, and underlined the need to send ‘the right message to
the right people in the right way at the right time and in the right place’ (De Clercq,
1993:5). The report then recommended that European governments should stop
trying to explain the Maastricht Treaty to their publics and concentrate instead on
presenting and promoting the EU as a ‘good product’ (Ibid: 13). In order to ‘sell’
Europe, therefore, the beneficial effects of the EU ‘must be interpreted and
personalized to each of the target audience in their language, using stimuli to which
they will respond, appealing to their emotions, to their common sense …’ (Ibid: 25).
Most of the concrete measures proposed had already been suggested by the Adonnino
Report, but the most remarkable aspect of the de Clercq report is that the theme of
identity and belonging were superseded by a utilitarian notion of ‘European citizen’
as the consumer of a brand called ‘Europe’.

More recently, the Commission launched a series of public information
campaigns just before the introduction of the single currency, sending out posters,
leaflets and videos that extolled the benefits of Euro. Other strategies for promoting
Euro included organising teams of trained speakers and celebrities to participate in
public debates on Euro and a travelling exhibition for schools, banks, local

European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centres; EUnetART; European Theatre
Convention; Pegasus Foundation; and International Yehudi Menuhin Foundation.
authorities and businesses (Shore, 2000: 103). Using marketing and PR techniques in political campaigns is obviously not unique to the EU, but in the absence of formal political representation structures at the European level, these public campaigns of the EU merely serves to highlight the deep-seated problems of legitimacy. The way in which political problems are being commodified in Europe is described by Weiler as a process whereby 'the Union has become a product for which the managers, alarmed by customer dissatisfaction, are engaged in brand development', giving expression to 'a Saatchi & Saatchi European citizenship' (Weiler, 1997a: 500 and 502).

Culture for multiple utilities

If the emphasis on networks has established a new set of terms around which the development of cultural action would be organised after 1992, there is another element in Article 128 which was significant in opening up a different possibility for EU cultural policy (Sandell, 1996). The ‘cultural compliance clause’ (Title IV) of Article 128 turned cultural matters formally into a cross-cutting issue, and has allowed culture to take a greater share of resources within existing programmes whose objectives are not specifically cultural. As has been pointed out in the earlier section, documents dating back to the late 1980s already exhibited awareness on the part of the Commission that culture could play a key role in the fields of employment, regional development or training. But it was only with Maastricht providing a legal base for culture within the Community that culture-related activities in other policy fields were identified as properly constituting the EU’s cultural measures as such. The significance of such official recognition becomes apparent when one looks at a study on EU cultural funds carried out for the Commission in 1993. The study calculated that, apart from the direct DG X interest in culture, the EU, through other Directorates-General of the Commission, had indirectly channelled ECU 2.47 billion into cultural activities in the period 1989-93, which represented approximately 0.8% of the total Community budget. Of all the funds invested in the cultural sector, 82.7% came from the structural funds, 9.6% from science and technology-related programmes, and only 7.7% from specific EU cultural programmes of the DG X (Bates and Wacker, 1993). From this study, the
fact emerges that programmes with a direct and conscious cultural objective (funding handled primarily by DG X - such as Kaleidoscope and Ariane) were in reality a sideshow to the overall cultural initiatives which are indirectly managed by other Directorates-General (Sandell, 1996: 272).

In 1996, the Commission published a ‘First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community Action’ in response to the ‘cultural compliance clause’ of the Maastricht Treaty. In this first attempt to provide a comprehensive list of what constitutes the EU cultural policies, the Commission has adopted a very broad definition of culture: ‘the concept of Culture is a nebulous one which can vary from one school of thought to another, from one society to another and from one era to another. It may include the Fine arts, literature, etc., but may also include all types of knowledge and features which characterise a society and make it possible to understand the world’ (CEC, 1996a: I, 3). This potentially ever-expanding definition means that virtually all EU programmes could mutate into cultural programmes, and the report covers an incredibly wide spectrum of activities, ranging from the regulatory aspects of the single market to foreign policies. The main objective of drawing up this list was to assess whether cultural elements in those various activities were compatible with the economic logic of market integration. While noting that ‘a great majority of the policies and actions implemented by the Community now include a cultural dimension or have an impact on certain cultural fields’, the report concluded that in many of these policy areas cultural objectives were not sufficiently respected due to the economic and commercial nature of the activities in question (CEC, 1996a: V, 1). The Commission thus suggested a number of ways in which the balance between different imperatives of ‘culture’ and ‘economy’ could be achieved in different policy areas, with audiovisual policy and copyright harmonisation being held up as examples of such reconciliation. In other words, the report was focused on the question of how ‘culture’ and ‘cultural diversity’ could be utilised to serve multiple objectives which are essentially non-cultural. Culture has thus become a multi-dimensional sector through which various different policy issues could be managed. Among those EU actions that impinge

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59 The Commission maintains that in those areas the economic logic of market integration and harmonisation actually facilitates the promotion of cultural diversity as it guarantees a more effective expression of individualised consumer preferences (see also Chapter 8).
upon culture, there are some policy areas in particular in which ‘culture’ features prominently. In what follows I will give a summary of three closely inter-related policy areas whose spheres of activities also overlap with those of the three cultural programmes above.

**Structural policy**

With approximately 80% of Community cultural expenditure originating from the Structural Funds, Structural policy occupies a central place in the overall EU cultural action. Structural action aims to promote coherent social and economic development of the Community by reducing regional inequalities. Two types of regions are eligible for this funds: rural or ‘peripheral’ areas and areas suffering from industrial decline. Up until 1992, there was hardly any mention of ‘culture’ in Structural policy documents, even though money from Structural Funds had been going to the cultural sector. The connection between the two has become explicit with the introduction of the ‘cultural compliance clause’ (Delgado Moreira, 2000). In its 1996 communication on ‘Cohesion Policy and Culture’, the Commission firmly established the role of culture as providing an endogenous potential for regional and local development: ‘Culture is not merely a public occupation creating extra costs but also an increasingly important part of the private economy with considerable growth potential, fostering creative, innovative and productive effects for regional and local economies’ (CEC, 1996c: 2). In this context, the importance of culture was identified at three levels. Firstly, culture could be a major source of employment. Activities related to the cultural heritage as well as cultural works and artefacts create jobs directly (arts and cultural industries) and indirectly (tourism). Secondly, culture makes a substantial contribution to the image and attractiveness of a region or a city, which is an important factor for further investment and relocating firms with significant implications for regenerating deprived urban or rural areas. Thirdly, culture can play a positive role in promoting the integration of disadvantaged sectors of society and thus contribute to social cohesion (EP, 1998: 45; CEC, 1996c: 4). Cultural diversity rather uniformity is here envisaged as a distinct advantage since it is cultural difference that would give to a region its uniqueness, thereby increasing the potential of a region to attract more tourists and business investments. Thus, for
example, the Temple Bar regeneration project received assistance from the EU Structural Funds which mobilised the culture and media sector for the revitalisation of an area in Dublin. Temple Bar became a cultural quarter, with an Irish Film Centre, artists’ studios, art galleries, exhibition rooms, a jewellery design centre and a children’s theatre. As a result, 72 businesses moved into Temple Bar, and 1200 jobs were created. Today, Temple Bar is Ireland’s third biggest tourist attraction (Ellmeier, 1998: 154).60

Information and communication technologies

EU’s Research and Development and Advanced Technologies sector has a major focus on information and communication technologies. Its objective is to strengthen the technological bases of European industry and to favour the development of its international competitiveness (CEC, 1996a: II, 23). These activities are led within the Fifth Framework Programme (1998-2002) which puts more emphasis on the development of the cultural sector compared to the previous Fourth Framework Programme (1994-98). Two of the programmes covered by the current framework pay particular attention to culture: the user-friendly Information Society programme and the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development programme.61 The latter features a key action called ‘The city of tomorrow and cultural heritage’ which, with a budget of EUR 170 million, promotes the protection and sustainable management of cultural heritage. The Information Society programmes, on the other hand, features a key theme ‘multimedia content and tools’ with an allocated sum of EUR 564 million. It seeks to stimulate the development of tools and systems for managing, disseminating and using digital content with a cultural theme. The relevance of this sector to the EU audiovisual policy is quite obvious, but the application of digital technologies extends to more ‘traditional’ areas of culture including the music, publishing, museums and heritage sectors.62 The Commission presents the

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60 For a more detailed examination of culture and urban regeneration, see Chapter 6
62 For example, the ‘Artiste’ project, funded by this programme in conjunction with sponsorship from the private sector, is in the process of digitalising, filing and networking high-quality reproductions of paintings held by Europe’s leading art museums (CEC, 2002f).
relationship between technology, economy and cultural diversity as mutually complementing, as cultural diversity ensures the supply of original cultural content to the various content industries in Europe, thereby improving their competitive positions on the world market. This, in turn, is believed to protect and enhance Europe’s creativity and diversity which would otherwise be wiped out by the forces of globalisation (CEC, 1998c: 27).

Employment

The imperative to redefine cultural action in ways that reconcile with what remain the overwhelmingly economic imperatives of the EU has led to an emphasis upon the existing and potential employment impact of the cultural sector. Especially since the new Amsterdam Treaty included the employment issue as ‘a matter of common interest’, employment initiatives have become one of the key foci of EU policy in the late-1990s. According to a Commission document presented jointly by DG V (employment and social affairs) and DG X (culture, audiovisual and sport) in 1998, there is a strong case for ascribing more importance to culture in relation to employment (CEC, 1998e). The document estimated that some 3 million people are employed in the cultural sectors in the EU, amounting to about 2% of total employment. The assumption here is that the general increase in cultural demand, coupled with developments in the new technologies and other areas such as cultural tourism, would provide a background against which cultural activities could become an invaluable resource for the future development of employment in Europe. But the most interesting aspect of this analysis is not how the cultural sector as such can expand to absorb the unemployed population. What is novel in the Commission’s recent approach to culture and employment is the way in which cultural activities are believed to improve the employability of the general population. Significant in this respect is the European Employment Strategy which was agreed upon in December 1997 at the Luxembourg summit of the European Council for the combating of unemployment. As a result of this summit, ‘the whole policy of the Community’ was to be ‘mobilised for employment more systematically and consciously than previously’ and the following four guidelines were established for future action: developing entrepreneurship; improving employability; encouraging adaptability;
strengthening equal opportunities policy. In pursuing those objectives, culture's 'utility' extends beyond its role in a culture-industries employment strategy whose central pillar is to encourage networking and cooperation agreements between small- and medium-sized enterprises that dominates this particular sector (CEC, 1998e: 16-18). Culture is now considered a medium for cultivating those skills such as creativity and flexibility that are set to become crucial to the 'jobs of the future':

The nature of work has altered radically: to participate more fully in society and the world of work, people are required to develop professional qualities based on more specific individual skills, such as creativity, initiative, flexibility, and human relations skills. Increasingly employers are seeking the potential for personal development and growth which cultural practices (exhibitions, performing arts, fine arts, etc.) may help to shape (CEC, 1998e: 19, emphasis in original).

Cultural practices are therefore framed as instruments which can make individuals more creative, entrepreneurial and adaptable, and which can, moreover, strengthen equal opportunities by promoting mutual respect (Barnet, 2001: 418-420). Furthermore, culture not only encourages personal development which can be channelled into the growth potential of Europe's economy, but it also plays a role in overall social cohesion, thereby encouraging marginalised groups to resume their place in society in the context of occupational integration: 'Training and participation in a variety of cultural activities are increasingly emerging as a significant tool of social integration whereby people can acquire new or improved skills and qualifications' (CEC, 1998e: 19, emphasis in original).

One example of such occupational integration through culture is the workshop schools in Spain for jobless young people, jointly financed by the European Social Fund (part of the EU Structural Fund). These are training schemes designed to provide young people with qualifications in areas related to heritage conservation. As well as learning very specialised skills which are directly transferable to employment, the Commission claims that those young people have

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63 Official Journal, C30/1, 28/01/1998.
improved their ‘initiative, flexibility and self-confidence’ through cultural activities which gave them ‘a very positive image in terms of identity, cultural memory and community development’ (CEC, 1998e: 20). Here, in a way that closely resembles the ‘social development’ approach to culture advocated by UNESCO, culture has come to contribute to social and employment policy objectives as it has been integrated into EU education and training programmes (Beale, 1999).64 Closely related to this is the concept of ‘Culture for all’ which has been on the EU agenda for cultural action since the mid-1990s: ‘access for citizens to culture in an operational or user capacity is an essential condition for full participation in society’.65 The role of culture in facilitating the development of society as a whole is further expanded by the recent addition of the concept of ‘the knowledge society’. As the Council resolution of January 2002 stated, it is crucial ‘to ensure that every citizen of the European Union is equipped with the skills needed to live and work in the information and knowledge society and that no one is excluded from access to the Internet and to other multimedia resources’, because ‘the shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy … will be a powerful engine for growth, competitiveness and jobs’, the basis of which is ‘exploiting and networking European cultural diversity’.66 In this integrated vision of the ‘knowledge society’, the connections between culture, technology, employment, and social and economic cohesion are mobilised to form a fundamental basis on which the future development of the EU as a whole is thought to depend.

The latest attempt to incorporate this integral approach to culture in an ‘inherently’ cultural programme (i.e. a programme operated by DG X) is exemplified by an initiative called Culture 2000 which has replaced the old Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphael programmes. Culture 2000 combines those three programmes into a single framework with a commitment of 167 million EUR over a five-year period from 2000 to 2004. For the preparation of this programme, the Commission undertook the most extensive consultations which have ever been conducted on

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64 According to the report of UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Conference in 1998, cultural policies ‘need to encompass new challenges in the arts and heritage yet go beyond these areas to embrace human development and the promotion of pluralism, as well as the fostering of social cohesion and creativity’, quoted in Beale, 1999.
65 Council resolution on access to culture for all, Official Journal C242/1, 1996.
66 Council resolution on culture and the knowledge society, Official Journal, C32/1, 05/02/2002.
cultural issues within the EU, involving the member states, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and UNESCO as well as cultural organisations (CEC, 1998c: 9). A consensus that emerged out of those consultation procedures was that ‘culture is no longer considered a subsidiary activity but a driving force in society, making for creativity, vitality, dialogue and cohesion’ (Ibid.: 3). Culture was therefore considered to be ‘intrinsic to any response to the major challenges that we face today’ such as the acceleration of European integration, globalisation, the information society, employment and social cohesion. Thus, as well as the immediate goal of fostering cultural cooperation, the Culture 2000 programme is ultimately expected to tackle various problems arising from those contemporary socio-economic challenges. In practical terms, the methods through which this overall aim is pursued represent the combination of the two approaches examined above.67 As in the previous three programmes, the main target of support is cooperation and networking between cultural professionals, operators and cultural organisations of the member states. At the same time, this new programme also adopts a multi-dimensional approach and will ‘promote synergy and develop cultural creation, as much through the promotion of trans-sectoral activities involving a number of cultural sectors, as through supporting joint activities involving different Community programmes and policies’.68

What is more, Culture 2000 also aims to make culture, through the activities of cultural professionals, accessible to the greatest possible number of people and to encourage creativity in European society (CEC, 2002f). Ordinary citizens are thus expected to involve themselves more closely in European integration via EU cultural initiatives whose instrumentality lie less in changing people’s cultural orientation than in serving the economic and social imperatives of integration. This seems to represent a novel way of using cultural practices as a means of strengthening public engagement in the EU as it does not necessarily postulate cultural unity at the centre of people’s identification with a polity. Instead, it envisages a very utilitarian form of public involvement which can be measured by the extent to which people have been

68 Ibid.
functionally integrated into a pragmatic vision of a society delineated by the EU institutions.

Despite these ambitious objectives, the interim evaluation reports on the implementation of the Culture 2000 programme demonstrate certain limitations of this programme (CEC, 2003; ECOTEC, 2003). First, the geographical penetration of the programme is uneven. Of all the participating countries, France, Italy, Germany, Greece and Spain received 61% of overall Culture 2000 funding, which approximately corresponds to the number of applications submitted by these five countries (CEC, 2003). Secondly, as has been noted above, although the programme does seem to promote transnational cultural collaboration and exchange of resources (information/technology), the agency report found that cultural networks supported by this programme were not always inclusive, not visible or accessible to newcomers, and lacked involvement by minority cultures. Lastly, many cultural operators interviewed in the survey noted that cultural projects tend to follow funding opportunities rather than reflecting strategic, long-term goals set by the EU (such as socio-economic goals or its contribution to citizenship). In this sense, cultural cooperation has only developed in so far as it has helped individual organisations develop their own projects and achieve their own goals, and this has not improved the prospects for building shared European culture or citizenship (ECOTEC, 2003).

The latest Commission guideline for EU cultural programmes published in March 2004 (CEC, 2004b) confirms the role of cultural operators and networks as main actors in the emerging European cultural space. The guideline posits three central objectives: to improve the transnational mobility of people working in the cultural sector; to improve transnational circulation of works of art; and to facilitate intercultural dialogue. In the Commission’s words, the EU’s new cultural programme, which is due to replace the Culture 2000 programme in 2006, ‘will actively contribute to the bottom-up development of a European identity, by giving cultural operators and citizens more opportunities to create networks, to implement projects, to be more mobile and to enhance the cultural dialogue within Europe and

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69 This figure is based on the nationalities of ‘project leaders’ (under whose names applications are made). However, it is difficult to assess the distribution of funds on a nationality basis as most projects had to include, as required by the operational rules of Culture 2000, a partnership of at least 3 operators from 3 different countries.
with other parts of the world’ (CEC, 2004b:12). This is a much more pragmatic and modest goal compared to the ambitious ‘People’s Europe’ campaign of the 1980s.

Conclusion

Cultural action in the EU started as a subsidiary area of economic activities without adequate funds or legal authority. Materially speaking, the peripheral position of cultural initiatives in the overall EU policy has not changed significantly since the 1970s, except that the Maastricht Treaty has officially recognised culture within the realm of EU competence. What has changed, however, is the way EU cultural policy came to be conceptualised, the process of which can be characterised as ‘the multiplication of culture’s utility’ (Bennet, 1995). In the 1980s, the utility of culture was framed principally in terms of its effectiveness in transforming the affective identification of the general public. But the introduction of the cultural clause in the Maastricht Treaty created both constraints and possibilities that have led the development of an EU cultural agenda in the 1990s in a different direction. Putting general Treaty commitments to support culture into practice has involved a shift from a symbolic notion of culture towards a more specific and practical approach in which culture is understood more as regional (or local) and diverse, and as a resource to be exploited in line with multiple objectives. Those objectives include: to increase direct employment; to boost the image of regions to attract investment; to strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural/audiovisual industry; and to enhance people’s employability and to combat social exclusion.

With this shift in the role assigned to culture, the preferred method of implementing cultural action has also been modified to prioritise professional networking and partnerships over mass-oriented campaigns. It is interesting to ask whether the EU cultural policy embodies the postnational or postmodern form of governance, but that question is beyond the scope of this chapter. What the argument so far has tried to show is that the evolution of the triangular relationship between culture, the EU and its citizens is not likely to be shaped in a process akin to that of nation-building. The new understanding about how to govern a cultural space
suggests an alternative locus of opportunity structures that undercut national states and national cultures.
CHAPTER 4

Education in the European Union

It is often argued that the success of European integration depends on the EU’s ability to forge a sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe. This type of argument is typically based on the assumptions of polity-formation which are drawn on the model of the nation-state. The nationalism literature turns the attention, among other things, to the function of mass education as providing a crucial identity-conferring mechanism in the nation-building process (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). In this connection, this chapter looks at the EU’s education policy and explores its significance in the development of European integration.

For the purpose of the present chapter, I draw a distinction between the socio-economic dimension and the politico-cultural dimension of education (Moschonas, 1995). The former is primarily directed towards the investment in human capital, thereby contributing to the enhancement of the productivity of labour and the competitiveness of the economy. The latter, on the other hand, involves the transmission of cultural values and practices, thereby contributing to the creation/construction of a citizenry. In the context of the European Union, the socio-economic dimension of education can be said to represent a function of economic integration, whereas the politico-cultural dimension is a function of political integration. Although these two dimensions are not mutually exclusive, I will argue that the development of EU education policy has been largely driven by economic imperatives while the cultural function of education continues to be left with the member states.

Early institutionalisation: 1971-1984

The development of EU programmes in education has taken on a similar path to those in culture. Until the introduction of educational provisions in the Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), education did not formally fall within the competence of the European Community. But unlike cultural policy, there were a few indirect references to education in the original Treaty of Rome, including provisions
for vocational training (Article 41, 118 and 128) and mutual recognition of certificates (Article 57) both of which concern the free movement of workers across the Community. As these provisions did not touch upon broad educational issues which were not directly related to the functioning of the single market, proposals for Community actions in the field of education were normally framed in economic terms which, in most cases, meant vocational training. In the early years of European integration, vocational training was not given a high priority in the overall Community agenda. The earliest move towards the development of a common policy in this area was taken in 1963 in the form of a Council decision laying down general principles for future action.\textsuperscript{70} One of the objectives of a common vocational training policy, the decision noted, was that vocational training was to be broadened and based firmly on general education. The question as to where a dividing line between general and vocational education could be drawn had been a controversial issue, but later in 1985, the European Court of Justice passed a landmark judgement that any form of education which prepares for a qualification for employment could be considered as vocational training.\textsuperscript{71} The Court therefore broadened the definition of vocational training to cover university or higher education and even some aspects of general education such as language learning.

Partly because of this connection with vocational training, Community action in the field of education started to take shape as early as 1971. In July 1971, the Commission set up two new bodies dedicated to the study of educational issues, the Working Party on Teaching and Education and the Interdepartmental Working Party on Coordination (CEC, 1973: 9). In November of the same year the Ministers for Education held their first meeting, and stated that Community measures in vocational training ‘should be supplemented by greater cooperation in the field of education as such’, the ultimate aim of which is ‘to define a European model of culture correlating with European integration’ (EC, 1987:11).\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} Case 293/83 Gravier. The European Court of Justice has played a major role in extending the Community competence in education through a series of other progressive rulings. See McMahon, 1995.
\textsuperscript{72} As in the case of Cultural Ministers Council, the meetings of Educational Ministers often took the form of ‘Ministers for Education meeting within the Council’ rather than ‘the Council of the Ministers for Education’, indicating that education was outside the competence of the Community (and therefore...
In 1972, the Commission appointed the former Belgian minister of education Henri Janne to undertake a review of areas that might lend themselves to a future programme of action in the field of education. Janne enlisted a number of educational experts to form an advisory panel, and the resulting report, commonly referred to as the Janne Report, identified a possible scope for a Community policy on education. While acknowledging the limited competence allowed by the Treaty, the report noted that specific actions at the Community level should include promotion of foreign languages, staff and student exchanges between schools and universities, adult and continuing education and the introduction of the ‘European dimension’ in education, especially in subjects such as geography, history and civics (CEC, 1973).

In responding to the Janne Report, the Commission produced its first memorandum on education in 1974. Measures proposed in this communication were not as extensive as those envisaged by the Janne Report, and mainly consisted of pilot projects and feasibility studies in three areas: mobility of academic staff, researchers and students in higher education, education of the children of migrant workers and encouragement of the ‘European dimension’ in education (foreign language learning and the study of Europe) (CEC, 1974). The Ministers for education considered the Commission’s proposal at their second meeting and confirmed in their resolution ‘the need to institute European cooperation in the field of education’. The basis of Community action in this area was to be cooperation rather than the harmonisation of existing policies and systems. It was therefore stated that allowance must be made for the traditions of each country and the diversity of their respective education policies and systems (EC, 1987:15). Having agreed the principles of cooperation in the field of education, the Ministers set up an Education Committee, composed of representatives of the member states and of the Commission, whose first task was to prepare a detailed Action Programme.

The Action Programme was adopted by the education ministers in 1976, and identified six priority areas: better facilities for the education and training of national and the children of nationals of other member states and non-member countries; promotion of closer relations between education systems in Europe; compilation of...
up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; cooperation in the field of higher education; teaching of foreign languages; and achievement of equal opportunity for free access to all forms of education (EC, 1987:23-7). Compared to the proposals contained in the Janne Report, the 1976 action programme is marked by its modesty. This was hardly surprising considering the relative silence of the Treaty on education. It adopted a two-pronged approach whereby a distinction was made between actions to be carried out at Community level and those which fell under the responsibility of member states. This 'dual' nature was to characterise the subsequent stages of developments of EU education policy, and eventually found legal expression in the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty. Since the 1976 resolution was not a binding decision, the implementation of a major part of the action programme was dependent upon the good-will of each member state. As for initiatives to be taken at the Community level, measures proposed in the action programme were limited to a number of 'non-committal' measures such as studies and evaluation of existing educational policies, exchange of information and experience between the member states, study visits and seminars for teachers, and pilot projects, all of which belongs to a pre-decisional stage of policy-making (Beukel, 1993:160). Nevertheless, the 1976 action programme was significant in the development of EU educational policy in that it marked an acceptance of education beyond the strict legal limits of vocational training as a legitimate area of policy interest for the EU (McMahon, 1995:11).

Thus, although education came to be recognised in the 1970s as an area which required common solutions at Community level, the role assigned to the Community in this field was largely confined to the gathering and dissemination of information regarding the educational practices of the member states. In fact, the only substantial measure that was taken in the 1970s in the area of education was a Council Directive on the equal access for the children of migrant workers to education in the host country, the primary rationale of which, of course, was to facilitate the free movement of workers within the Community.73

If the period between 1971-1980 marked a modest beginning in the evolution of the EU education policy, the 1970s also saw a gradual shift in the context of how education policy was planned both in the member states and in the Community institutions themselves. The oil shock of 1973 and the economic downturn that followed had triggered off dramatic rises in unemployment levels across European societies especially among young people. In adopting the 1976 action programme, therefore, the education ministers attached special weight to measures related to the preparation of young people for work and the transition from school to working life (EC, 1987: 25). At the time of the Ministers' 1976 resolution, European policymakers assumed the problem of youth unemployment to be a passing phenomenon that would disappear once the economy picked up, and the planning of Community action accordingly consisted of one-off modifications to education on the one hand and vocational training on the other (Neave, 1984). By the latter part of 1978, however, belief in the short-term nature of youth unemployment could no longer be sustained, calling for a rethinking in existing approaches to training and education. Although the Community's interest in education was legitimated by its connection to vocational training, the Community had hitherto upheld the traditional differentiation between education and vocational training, where the former maintained a more academic orientation (Neave, 1984; Moschosas, 1998). Faced with deep economic crisis and high levels of unemployment, the Community's initial position of viewing education mostly in the context of academic qualities gave way to a more functional approach to education and training. What was required (or thought to be required) was a closer, integrated planning between the two sectors of education and training, which should contribute not only to the immediate goal of providing guidance and training for the unemployed but also to alleviate social and economic problems caused by unemployment. Thus, education and training together came to be conceived of as playing a crucial role in a wider context of social and employment strategies both at the levels of the member states and of the Community.

Such an approach is best exemplified in the institutional reorganisation of the Commission in 1981. Since January 1973, responsibility for education was placed under Directorate-General XII (Research and Science). Vocational training, on the other hand, was within the ambit of Directorate-General V, which dealt with employment and social affairs. In 1981 education and vocational training were
brought together under DG V to form an integrated social policy DG. Following this move, the first joint Council meeting of the Ministers of Labour and Social affairs and Ministers for Education was held in 1983. The conclusions of this joint session noted that education and vocational training policies could complement the interplay of economic, financial and employment policies in eradicating unemployment (EC, 1987: 95-96).

This integrated approach to social policy has significantly raised the profile of education within the Community. But the increased level of interest was not necessarily translated into concrete action. In this connection, mention must be made about the role of the European Social Fund. The European Social Fund was established in 1974 as part of the Structural Funds with the principal aim of reducing regional inequalities across the member states by supporting vocational training for the unemployed. It is organised around a set of common objectives set by the Community but the fund itself is managed by the member states. When European leaders became preoccupied with the issues of unemployment in the late-1970s, it was in fact largely through the European Social Fund, and not through education or training policy, that the Community efforts to combat unemployment were channelled.

The single market and a People’s Europe

Apart from its implications for employment, education also came to play another important role in the strategic thinking of the Commission in the 1980s. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Adonnino Report of 1985 on a People’s Europe identified various ways to improve the image of the Community among its citizens. The first part of the report maintained that the most attractive aspect of the single market was for individuals to enjoy freedom of movement, emphasising the importance of mutual recognition of qualifications and strengthening the general right of residence. The second report, which contained sections specifically dedicated to education and training, proposed measures ‘to involve and interest young people in the further development of Europe’, including language training, school exchanges, voluntary work camps for youth, university cooperation, and enhancing Europe’s image in education and vocational training (CEC, 1985a). Similarly in 1985, the
Commission White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market stressed that as part of the process of economic integration, the Commission intended to 'increase its support for cooperation programmes between further education establishments in the different Member States with a view to promoting the mobility of students, facilitating the academic recognition of degrees and thus diplomas, and helping young people, in whose hands the future of the Community's economy lies, to think in European terms' (CEC, 1985b: 26).

Although nothing substantially new was proposed in those two documents, the 'People's Europe' initiative and the goal of completing the single market created a background against which the Community made substantial inroads into education policy. In the run-up to 1992, education and training came to acquire a prominent supporting role in two respects. Firstly, the heightened interest in education in the 1980s reflected a widespread concern that economic integration must be underpinned by popular support. Education was viewed in this context as a mechanism to create conditions conductive to political legitimisation through fostering a common European identity among future generations. Secondly, to the extent that Community measures introduced in the late 1980s were focused on facilitating the freedom of movement among a certain section of population (i.e. students and teachers) across the member states, education and training initiatives were simply an extension of the single market principles. The underlying rationale was economic, rather than cultural, in that preparing students and education professionals to operate more effectively within the single market was thought to help maximise Europe's economic performance. As the Commission's memorandum on the guidelines for educational actions for the period between 1988 and 1992 put it:

The new Commission has therefore decided to place education and training at the forefront of its priorities to spearhead a new Community-wide commitment to invest in people, in their skills, their creativity and their versatility. Without investment in the present future workforce, Europe's capacity to innovate, to compete, and to create wealth and prosperity for all its citizens will be severely impaired (CEC, 1988a:1).
From the mid-1980s to 1992, the Commission launched nine new education and training action programmes with a combined budget of well over a billion ECUs (See Table 1). Most of these programmes have in fact their origin in the 1976 action programme, but have been adopted as a result of the renewed impetus arising from the drive towards the completion of the single market. The EU’s earliest attempt to develop a training programme that was clearly its own was EUROTECNET (new technologies in training), which was approved in 1983. COMETT (Community action programme for Education and Training for Technology), the EU’s first programme in education, was established to promote university-industry cooperation in the field of new technology in 1986. Its objective was fourfold: to give a European dimension to cooperation between institutions of higher education and industry in the area of new technologies; to foster joint development of training programmes, exchange of experience and optimum use of training resources at Community level; to improve the supply of training at local, regional and national levels; and to develop the level of training in response to technological and social changes.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Budget execution up to 1992 (ECU M)</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMETT</td>
<td>1986-1995</td>
<td>206.6</td>
<td>University-industry cooperation in the field of technology training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERASMUS</td>
<td>1987-1994</td>
<td>307.5</td>
<td>Mobility of university students and staff and joint curriculum projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROTECNET</td>
<td>1983-1994</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Promote innovation in training in respect of the new technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE</td>
<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>Promote continuing vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINGUA</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>Promote foreign language competence within teacher education, secondary and higher education and vocational training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was followed by the adoption of ERASMUS (mobility of university students), LINGUA (promotion of foreign language competence), PETRA (Action programme for the vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life), YOUTH for Europe (Youth exchanges), IRIS (European network of vocational training projects for women), FORCE (Action programme for the development of continuing vocational training), and TEMPUS (Trans-European mobility scheme for University studies in central and eastern Europe). Despite their different target areas and objectives, these programmes were all built around the idea of facilitating mobility and exchange between the member states. The programmes also share the organising principle which involves the creation of transnational networks of organisations or joint projects between partners in different member states. They were all designed to establish direct relations between relevant organisations and the Commission based on voluntary participation from educational institutions and professionals. To the extent that initiatives for joint projects had to come from the participating organisations, the programmes sought to stimulate ‘bottom-up’ demands for education policy at the European level (CEC, 1993a; McMahon, 1995). In the following section, I discuss what I consider to be three of the most important areas in the development of Community education policy in the 1980s: mobility in higher education (Erasmus); foreign language competence (Lingua); and European dimension in education.

Transnational mobility in higher education
Cooperation between institutions of higher education was identified as one of the priority areas in the 1970s, and pilot projects in this area had been in operation before the introduction of an independent Community programme, ERASMUS (European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students). The ERASMUS programme was adopted in June 1987, based on Articles 128 (vocational training) and 235 of the Treaty. It was expected to achieve two broad objectives: firstly, to significantly increase the number of students spending an integrated period of study in another member state 'in order that the Community may draw upon an adequate pool of manpower with first hand experience of economic and social aspects of other member states'; secondly, to increase the full intellectual potential of the universities 'by means of increased mobility of teaching staff, thereby improving the quality of the education and training provided by the universities with a view to securing the competitiveness of the Community in the world market'; and finally, 'to strengthen the interaction between citizens in different member states with a view to consolidating the concept of a People's Europe'.

In pursuing these objectives, ERASMUS set out three types of measures: the establishment and operation of inter-university cooperation programmes (ICPs) for exchanging students and teachers; a scheme for student mobility grants to be awarded for at least one term of study in another member country; the setting up of a European Community Course Credit Transfer System (ECTS) for the multilateral transfer of course credits, to be connected to the European Community Network of National Academic Recognition Information Centre (NARIC). Unlike previous cooperation arrangements supported by the Community, individual institutions could send applications under this programme without any reference to the national ministry or to regional authorities. Thus it achieved high visibility at the level of educational institutions.

Among all the education/training programmes introduced in the mid-1980s, ERASMUS was by far the largest both in terms of its budget and the attention it attracted. The centrality of this programme needs to be understood in the context of

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75 Decision 87/327/EEC, Official Journal L166, 1987. Article 235 allowed the Community to attain objectives mentioned in the Rome Treaty but not spelled out in any detail. In the present case, it was argued that the adoption of the Erasmus programme contributed to the fundamental objective of completing the single market.
the Community's long-standing attempts to foster labour mobility. The mobility of labour was one of the 'four freedoms' (along with capital, goods and services) which the Treaty of Rome originally set out to achieve. The Commission initially concentrated on encouraging employers and member states to recognise one another's qualifications (Field, 1998). As the deadline for the completion of the single market approached, however, it became apparent that simple encouragement had failed to create a more mobile labour market, particularly among highly qualified employees. This experience has led to two strands of action in the sphere of education. One of them was a Directive on a general system for the recognition of higher education.76 This Directive, which was adopted in 1988, meant that each member state had to accept that a university degree awarded in one member state must be treated as a university degree in all member states. The other is the development of education and training programmes exemplified by Erasmus, which were designed to produce ever more graduates with 'first-hand experience of studying, living and working in another Community country' and 'for whom the whole Europe as opposed to the single nation state is a natural area of activity' (CEC, 1991:28). In this sense, supporting student mobility represented a long-term investment for the creation of highly mobile, professional workers of the future.

In 2000, the Commission published an interesting survey (CEC, 2000a) on the socio-economic background of students participated in the Erasmus scheme. The survey results show that the majority of Erasmus students are from families with above-average income, having managerial/professional jobs and higher educational background. Of course, this just reflects the general situation regarding the access to higher education at member states level. However, considering that Erasmus, promoted as it is as the flagship programme of EU education policy, did not (and still does not) have any mechanisms to provide special support to groups that are financially less well-off, the Parliament's concern about the tendency of the programme to unequally benefit the elite groups cannot be dismissed (EP, 2000b). Another finding of the Commission's survey is the geographically uneven influence of Erasmus. The most popular destinations have been UK and Ireland because of linguistic reasons, while 'unpopular' areas do not attract enough students even to fill

all available places. Rather than fostering cultural diversity through intercultural experiences which is one of the objectives of Erasmus, the unintended side-effect of Erasmus may be to contribute to the dominance of English which is fast becoming the semi-official language of the EU.

Teaching of foreign languages

As in the Community's efforts to facilitate mobility in higher education, the learning of foreign languages was one of the first areas to be identified as a priority in the Community educational policy. This was already evident in the 1976 action programme, and as early as 1978 the Commission was proposing a series of measures involving the exchange of language teachers and support for early language teaching in primary school (CEC, 1978). However, the member states' unwillingness to concede national prerogatives in this area has led the Community to shift the emphasis in its policy proposals from language learning at school to the vocational aspect of language teaching (Neave, 1984: 129). Thus, the first action programme in this area, 'Lingua', which was adopted in 1989 initially for the period of 1990-1994, was founded on the premise that improving technical and teaching skills of language teachers constituted a basic factor of vocational training. But this did not necessarily prevent the programme from becoming the subject of controversy in the course of its adoption. In one of the Council deliberations, Britain, Denmark and Germany expressed the view that the Commission's original proposal marked an unacceptable extension of Community competence (Beukel, 1993:163). The resulting Decision duly emphasised that the role of Community-wide measures was merely to help promote the implementation of the member states' policies and schemes in this area. The programme consisted of three action lines: measures to promote in-service training of foreign language teachers; measures to promote the learning of foreign languages in universities and in particular to develop the initial training of foreign language teachers; and measures to promote knowledge of foreign languages used in work relations and in economic life.

The establishment of the Lingua programme was also viewed as directly supporting the completion of the internal market, as the lack of foreign language competence among citizens was ‘not only a barrier to freedom of movement’ but also ‘a handicap to the increasing business and trading connections within the Community’ (CEC, 1989b:16). While the logic of the market would present linguistic diversity as an obstacle, however, the Lingua programme is expressly committed to ‘preserving the linguistic diversity and cultural wealth of Europe’. This commitment is clearly a concession made to the interests of the member states, as is evident in the fact that Lingua only supports the teaching/learning of the national languages of the member states, excluding regional or minority languages.\(^7\)\(^8\) Besides Lingua programme, the EU has demonstrated its commitment to promote lesser used languages (CEC, 1994f), but it has also made it clear that minority languages supported by the EU are those ‘indigenous’ to Europe, excluding major immigrant languages such as Arabic and Turkish.\(^7\)\(^9\)

**European dimension in education**\(^8\)\(^0\)

The notion of a ‘European dimension’ in education appeared at the very early stage of the Community’s involvement in education and has been present throughout the development of EU discourse on education over three decades. Yet, there is still no agreed definition of what the European dimension in education amounts to and, accordingly, preferred means to promote such a dimension have differed from one proposal to the other (Field, 1998). Initially, a European dimension was understood to refer to the curricular and extra-curricular modes by which schools are encouraged to promote not only the dissemination of knowledge about the EU but also pupils’ identification with ‘Europe’. In other words, it was not just about a question of teaching about Europe, but of educating for European citizenship (Neave, 1984;

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\(^7\) At the time of Lingua’s adoption the official languages of the Community were Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish.

\(^8\) Official Journal C79, 31/03/1995.

\(^9\) Apart from the EU’s attempts to influence the school curricula of the member states, the EU runs the European Schools of which there are now ten. They were created in 1953 for the education of the children of EU officials, although other can also apply (but must pay school fees and are granted places only when available). The European Schools have been hailed by some as a valuable laboratory
Sultana, 1995). As such, the European dimension represented the only area of the EU education policy where primacy was given to cultural-political concerns. It was also the most sensitive area as it touched upon the actual contents of education systems in each member state.

The recommendation contained in the 1973 Janne report suggested a number of ways in which a European dimension could be inserted into school curricula, ranging from the correction of history textbooks 'with a view to expurging or amending nationalistic, biased passages' to the teaching of European civics 'based mainly on Community practices and institutions, on pluralism and on democracy' (CEC, 1973:52). These suggestions obviously went far beyond the powers conferred upon the Community, and the Education Ministers quickly established that primary responsibilities for developing the European dimension lay with the member states while the Community initiatives in this area would only play a supporting role (Council of the EC, 1987: 25). Accordingly, it was suggested that a European dimension in schools should be complementary to existing subjects rather than replacing or modifying already established curricular provisions (Neave, 1984: 125).

A more favourable situation for the development of the European dimension was provided in the mid-1980s in the form of a move towards 'a People's Europe', which drew the attention of European policy-makers to the desirability of European identity among ordinary citizens as a way of anchoring the process of economic integration. This has generated a renewed impetus to the Community's attempts in educational fields, and the Education Ministers repeatedly declared their intention to strengthen the European dimension in schools first in September 1985 and then in May 1988. In their 1988 resolution, the Education Ministers indicated that one of the objectives of encouraging the European dimension in education was to:

Strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization and of the foundations on which the European peoples intend to base their development today, that

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for forging a future generation of European citizens, but also attracted criticisms for their elitist tendency to serve the privileged few (Finaldi-Baratieri, 2000).
is in particular the safeguarding of the principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{81}

Along with this cultural-political objective, an equal emphasis was placed on the preparation of young people to take part in the economic and social development of the Community in the context of the single market. In contrast to these ambitious goals, however, the actual measures proposed were rather limited. This was hardly surprising given the lack of Community competence in the sphere of school education. The resolution called for action both at the level of the member states and the Community, with most of the practical recommendations being addressed to the member states who were encouraged to, firstly, to incorporate the European dimension in educational systems, school programmes and teaching, teaching material and teacher training and secondly, to boost contacts between pupils and teachers from different countries. It may be noted that the 1988 resolution, as with its predecessors, has failed to establish a mechanism by which the member states could be held accountable for (not) carrying out the agreed upon curricular changes. At the level of the Community, action to be taken consisted of supporting the member states’ activities, monitoring and evaluating their progress. To this end, the Commission created within DG V a special European Dimension in Education Unit in 1989, which, in addition to the above task of monitoring, organised a number of small-scale activities such as summer schools and a teacher exchange scheme (Ryba, 1995a).

While most member states responded positively to these recommendations, the practical consequences of the 1988 resolution remain quite problematic, not least because of the sheer variety of educational structures and practices maintained by different national and regional authorities (Ryba, 1995b). Unlike mobility-centred education and training programmes which proliferated in the late 1980s, no substantial progress was made in relation to Community-level actions in enhancing the European dimension. In the meantime, the concept of the European dimension has acquired a more pragmatic emphasis than a cultural one. As Raymond Ryba, a former Director of the European Dimension in Education Unit, observed, EU policy

\textsuperscript{81} Official Journal, C177, 1988.
actors increasingly conceptualise the question of education for European citizenship in terms of how to prepare young people to make the most of the single market:

gone ... are any hints that may have existed of curricular changes aimed at substituting a European loyalty for existing national and regional ones... What is now seen as more to the point is the need to help young people in European countries to understand the new situation in which they are increasingly finding themselves, to know something of new rights and responsibilities which this new situation brings (Ryba, 1995b: 148).

In 1993, the Commission sought once again to stimulate interest in the subject with the publication of the Green Paper on the European dimension in education (CEC, 1993:d). But, as will be discussed in the following sections, the change in the legal status of education brought about by the Maastricht Treaty hardly did any favours to the developments of content-related reforms. The momentum generated by 'a People's Europe' to give substance to European identity through education was not sustained throughout the 1990s. Although EU institutions (especially the European Parliament) continued to underline the cultural foundations of EU education measures, it was the predominance of human resources agenda that characterised the policy direction of the 1990s. Furthermore, studies show that the rate by which the 'European dimension' is incorporated into textbooks and school curricula of the member states has been very low, and even in countries where the status of 'European' or EU themes has been improved, the 'European dimension' in national curricula is still relatively marginal (Ryba, 1992; Theiler, 1999).

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82 A desire to lay claim to a European cultural heritage is reflected in the EU's choice of titles for its educational programmes (Socrates, Erasmus, Comenius, Leonardo da Vinci, etc.) (Field, 1998). But this attachment to European cultural ideal does not seem to go beyond the level of a purely symbolic gesture.
By the time the Treaty on European Union was agreed, the Community had already established a wide array of education and training programmes primarily focused on the promotion of mobility and exchange. Yet, the Community’s achievements in this field should not be exaggerated. Financially, education and training policies only accounted for 0.57% of the Community’s total budget in 1992. The Community’s largest instrument in the field of human resource measures remained the European Social Fund, which, in 1992, had at its disposal sixteen times the yearly budget available to education and training action programmes (Field, 1998). Due to the lack of reference to education in the Treaty of Rome, the Community had no real role in primary or secondary education or in general adult education. Even in the areas where Community measures had already been launched, its action programmes were falling short of its own expectations. For example, the Erasmus programme’s original target was to see one student in ten spending some of their studies in another member state by 1992. The figure achieved in 1992 was actually around 4 per cent, even though the Commission’s own assessment of the programme deemed this figure as ‘significant progress towards the 10 per cent mobility target’ (CEC, 1993a:10).

With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU acquired clearly specified responsibilities for education as distinguished from vocational training. Article 126 set out the EU’s role in education, while the new Article 127 is concerned with vocational training. One of the main consequences of the Treaty, therefore, was that there would be separate and different legal bases for education and training. This meant that the EU no longer needed to base its education policy on its powers in relation to vocational training, as was the case with Erasmus or Lingua. Having a competence in education proper also removed, at least legally, the need for educational policy proposals to be focused exclusively on their economic implications. As we shall see in the following section, however, the division between education and vocational training turned out to be not as clear-cut as the new Treaty provisions might have implied.

83 The exception is the LINGUA programme where secondary education institutions could participate to a limited degree.
Article 126

1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

2. Community action shall be aimed at:
   - developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;
   - encouraging mobility of students and teachers, *inter alia*, by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;
   - promoting cooperation between educational establishments;
   - developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States;
   - encouraging the development of youth exchanges and the exchange of socio-educational instructors;
   - encouraging the development of distance learning;

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the Council of Europe.

4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:
   - acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b, after consulting the economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States;
   - acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.
Another notable feature of Article 126 is the principle of subsidiarity. As in the case of cultural provisions, the Maastricht Treaty confirmed the primacy of the member states’ sovereignty in making clear that the primary responsibility for the organisation and content of education remains with the member states. The role of the EU is to support and supplement their actions instead of harmonisation or regulations of national education systems. Although its field of operation was enlarged to include sectors of education which were in no sense forms of vocational training (pre-school, primary and liberal adult education), the EU’s competence did not extend beyond the provision of incentives to member states to co-operate with each other. Thus, despite its symbolic importance in formally recognising the EU’s competence in the field of general education, the Treaty mostly served to confirm the status quo, merely acknowledging what had already been taking place (Barnard, 1995). On the other hand, however, Article 126 introduced the qualified majority voting procedure in the Council, which may reduce instances where the Council can block proposals from the Commission.

The Maastricht Treaty may not have significantly changed the development of EU education policy, but it did provide a new framework along which the Commission could restructure its action programmes. One of the main results of the Maastricht Treaty was the designation of a separate Directorate-General within the Commission for education, training and youth (DG XXII). Compared to the previous arrangement where educational policy was somewhat subordinated to the wider social policy concerns of DG V, this new institutional arrangement has given the Commission greater room for manoeuvre. The new DG XXII grouped its education and training programmes into two overarching frameworks broadly corresponding to the competences granted in Articles 126 and 127 of the Treaty.

On the strength of the inclusion of school-level education into the EU’s legal mandate, the Commission in 1993 published a Green Paper on the European dimension in education. Accepting that most of the consequent decisions lay with the member states, the Green Paper argued that the ‘added value’ of action at the EU level should contribute to three main objectives: a European citizenship based on the shared values of interdependence, democracy, equality of opportunity and mutual respect; extending the opportunities for improving the quality of education; helping pupils towards social integration and a better transition to working life (CEC,
Nevertheless, the Green Paper also reflected the shift in the Commission’s thinking, in which the ‘European dimension’ has come to be conceived of as just another label for educational exchanges instead of something that involves curricular or content-related changes (Theiler, 1999). Thus the Green Paper suggested that the EU might focus on developing partnerships between schools with a shared interest in specific areas such as languages, environment or cultural heritage, and cooperation between teacher training institutions in order to familiarise teachers with aspects of the EU. As its authors acknowledged themselves, the Green Paper lacked detail and offered no specific proposal.

The Commission’s concern with introducing the European dimension in schools was partly incorporated in a more tangible form of the post-Maastricht restructuring of educational programmes. The new framework programme for education, SOCRATES, was adopted in 1995 for the period between 1995 to 1999. SOCRATES was effectively a collection of the existing programmes (Erasmus, Lingua, Arion and Youth for Europe). This meant that, although the Maastricht Treaty has given a legal mandate in general education, the EU’s programme on education proper continued to have significant vocational elements. Therefore, the decision which established the SOCRATES programmes was based on both Articles 126 (education) and 127 (training). The only new elements added to this new framework was a small-scale programme for primary- and secondary-level education and cooperation in adult education. The former, named COMENIUS, has incorporated suggestions contained in the Green Paper on European Dimension, and was designed to support school partnerships for developing activities related to Europe (i.e. language teaching, exchange of teaching materials, etc.). The budget allocation within the SOCRATES framework confirms the continuing emphasis on higher education (an area covered by Erasmus). Of the total budget earmarked for the period 1995-1997, 55 per cent was allocated to the area of higher education, 10 per cent to school education (Comenius) and 25 per cent to ‘horizontal action’ such as LINGUA and open and distance learning.

If SOCRATES incorporated very little novel features, its equivalent in the area of vocational training was even less innovative. The programme, called

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LEONARDO DA VINCI, was adopted in 1994 and covered activities previously supported by the EU under PETRA, FORCE, EUROTECNET and COMETT. One notable feature that differentiated LEONARDO from its predecessors was that its objectives had a greater focus on the use of new technologies and the social integration of disadvantaged groups. In short, the post-Maastricht restructuring of education/training programmes hardly represented a change in the direction of Community policy in education. Even after the inclusion of educational provision in the Treaty, the EU’s basic approach in this area was to follow a pragmatic course, whereby primacy was given to actions with vocational emphasis. One way of explaining this is to say that the Maastricht Treaty has permanently blocked actions in culturally sensitive areas of education by enshrining the subsidiarity principle, under which the responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems is left with the member states (Koslowski, 1999). However, subsequent developments demonstrate that the EU’s persistent emphasis on the vocational aspects of education policy is not just because of its circumscribed legal competence, but also due to its overwhelming concern with the EU’s overall economic growth for which all the policy instruments available, including education, are to be mobilised.

Growth, competitiveness and employment

Within months of launching the two new framework programmes, the EU was already reviewing its policy towards this area. If the developments of the EU education since the mid-1990s can be characterised as being dominated by EU policy-makers’ preoccupation with human resources strategy, such concern is probably best captured in the Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (CEC, 1994d). Drafted in 1993 under the direct supervision of the then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, the Growth White Paper portrayed a bleak picture of the state of the European economy. It identified a number of external factors which have been shaping the global economy and their acceleration since the 1970s, namely, the emergence of new technologically

advanced rival economic spaces, the end of Communism, the new skills revolution, the shift to a knowledge-based economy and growing market interdependence. Against this background, it was suggested that Europe was losing its competitive edge against the US, Japan and increasingly, the countries of Asia-Pacific region, because ‘while we have changed, the rest of the world has changed even faster’. In order to redress the chronic unemployment situation within the EU, the White Paper argued, it is imperative that Europe should overcome this crisis of competitiveness and increase its growth rate. In this context, education and training were thought to be one of the crucial conditions for the development of more employment-intensive growth: ‘In a society based far more on the production, transfer and sharing of knowledge than on trade in goods, access to theoretical and practical knowledge must necessarily play a major role’ (CEC, 1994d: 133). By employing the ‘discourse of crisis’, the Commission has given a sense of inevitability to its diagnosis that education and training systems must be reworked so as to fit the agenda of intensive investment in human capital (Field, 1998).

Such discourse of crisis and social change had a profound influence on how the EU education policy was conceptualised. The idea that severe economic pressures in the global market place presented a fundamental challenge to EU education policy had been aired since the 1980s (see, for example, CEC, 1988a; CEC, 1989b). But this theme surfaced more clearly in the 1995 White Paper on ‘Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society’. Elaborating on the idea contained in the Growth White Paper, the Commission began its argument in the 1995 White Paper by identifying three ‘factors of upheaval’ which have ‘transformed the context of economic activity and the way our societies function in a radical and lasting manner’: the onset of the information society; the internationalisation of the economy; and the impact of scientific and technological knowledge (CEC, 1995b: 5). Since they have fundamentally transformed work organisation and the skills learned, new opportunities arising from these upheavals requires people to adapt, ‘particularly in assembling one’s own qualifications on the basis of ‘building blocks’ of knowledge acquired at different times and in various situations’ (CEC, 1995b: 2). A new principle of post-industrial social structure, so the White Paper goes on, would be centred on the ‘learning relationship’ which is determined by the ‘position of everyone in relation to their fellow citizens in the context of knowledge and skills’
This has increased uncertainty for all and for some has led to situations of exclusion, creating a serious risk of a rift in European society ‘between those who know and those who do not’. In response to this risk and uncertainty, the While Paper proclaimed an urgent need to adjust to the society of the future which will be a ‘learning society’, as immaterial ‘investment and getting the best out of our human resources will improve competitiveness, boost jobs and safeguard social achievements’ (Ibid.).

Europe’s success for the future, therefore, was said to depend on the need to instil a broad knowledge base and developing everyone’s employability and capacity for economic life. This required everyone to constantly update their knowledge and skills throughout their working life. This ‘lifelong learning’ approach is contrasted with the traditional emphasis upon once-and-for-all qualifications gained at school or in initial training and lasting for almost a lifetime. In this context, the traditional distinctions between general education and vocational training are thought to disappear: ‘A broad knowledge base and training for employment are no longer two contradictory or separate things’, as there is ‘increasing recognition for the importance of general knowledge in using vocational skills’ (CEC, 1995b:23).

Following the extensive analysis of human resources issues across the EU, the White Paper then urged the pursuit of five general objectives: promoting the acquisition of new knowledge; bringing schools and business closer together; combat exclusion; proficiency in at least three Community languages; and treating capital investment and investment in training on an equal basis. The Paper also noted that the Commission can only fund new initiatives by reallocating existing funds for education and training. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in many cases action would have to be taken by member states, local government or trade unions and employers. Thus, while the White Paper contended that the creation of the learning society entails radical change, the measures proposed were far from adequate in pursuing the declared objectives. Furthermore, although it paid lip-service to the need for personal development and social learning, and even active citizenship, there was no sign that the Commission had any concrete proposals in these areas.

Of course, the Commission is not unique in making a direct connection between education/training and economic competitiveness. As the Commission made it clear in its own guideline for future actions in education, a wide consensus has long
been established throughout the member states as well as the rest of the world that ‘human or intangible capital’ is the most vital resource of advanced economies, without which their capacity to compete in the world market would dwindle (CEC, 1993b: 2). The concept of a ‘learning society’ as a central strategy to enhance the innovative capacity of the workforce was adopted by the US Government in the early 1980s, which was then followed by the Confederation of British Industry and the British Government at the beginning of the 1990s (Moschonas, 1998: 87). Similarly, OECD’s report produced in 1992 upheld a view that the economic challenges faced by the advanced industrial societies require structural adjustments and rapid technological development wherein lifelong learning becomes pivotal to contemporary progress (OECD, 1992).

But the interesting point in the Commission’s approach exemplified by the 1995 White Paper is that its concern with maintaining Europe’s competitive edge is such that the Commission has seemingly lost interest in the role education could play in the cultural and political aspects of European integration. In assessing the White Paper, the Education Ministers criticised the Commission’s assumption that there was a linear relationship between learning, economic development and employment growth. In their view, the framework for analysing education and training problems in Europe should avoid placing excessive emphasis on information technology and the globalisation of the economy, and should include other important factors such as democracy, environmental issues, multiculturalism and the problem of combating social marginalisation.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the White Paper continued to shape the developments of the EU education policy in the latter half of 1990s. One of the concrete outcomes of the White Paper was the designation of the year 1996 as the European Year of Lifelong Learning.\(^7\) For this, the Commission organised activities to celebrate and promote lifelong education and continuing training throughout the year. The Commission further attempted to place education and training at the centre of the EU’s overall objectives with its memorandum ‘Towards a Europe of Knowledge’, declaring that ‘[r]eal wealth creation will ... depend first and foremost

\(^6\) Official Journal C195, 06/07/1996.
\(^7\) Official Journal L256, 26/10/1995.
on our efforts in the field of research, education and training and on our capacity to promote innovation' (CEC, 1997b: 1). The growing interest in ‘knowledge policies’ as a key to Europe’s future developments has also affected the existing arrangements of education and training programmes. In implementing the second phase of SOCRATES and LEONARDO DA VINCI\(^8\), the Commission has once again highlighted the importance of an integrated approach spanning the boundaries between vocational and general learning for ‘a progressive construction of European educational space’ (CEC, 1998a: 2). Although the contents of those two programmes remain essentially the same, the previous provisions have been refocused so that they would contribute to the central objective of ‘the promotion of a Europe of knowledge’ characterised by the development of lifelong learning.

The predominance of the Commission’s growth-oriented agenda in the EU education policy was further confirmed by the heads of states of the member countries at a series of European Council meetings. The 1997 Luxembourg European Council on employment, for example, stressed that all Community policies must be harnessed in support of employment and must ‘help unleash the potential for dynamism and enterprise to be found in Europe’s economy’.\(^9\) In this context, lifelong education and training was identified as an important factor in enhancing employability, adaptability and the ‘culture of entrepreneurship’. Additionally, the Lisbon European Council in 2000 set a goal that Europe should become by 2010 ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. This would require not only a ‘radical transformation of the European economy’ but also ‘a challenging programme for the modernisation of social welfare and education systems’, calling for ‘a substantial annual increase in per capita investment in human resources’.\(^90\)

It is important to recognise that behind the rise of this growth-oriented education agenda lie interest groups representing European business. It is quite well known that the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT - mostly composed of

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\(^9\) Presidency Conclusions of Luxembourg Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, downloaded from <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=56855&from=LANG=1>
the CEOs of Europe's biggest multinational companies) exerted strong pressure on the EU in the run-up to the completion of the single market (see for example Green Cowles, 1995). Their spheres of influence extend beyond purely economic or market issues, and it has been noted that big European businesses, including the ERT, have been lobbying both individual member states and the EU for convergence in European education systems in an attempt to create better labour market conditions (Sultana, 1995). In 1995, for example, ERT published a report entitled *Education for Europeans: towards the Learning Society*. Two years later, the EU released the aforementioned White Paper, *Teaching and Learning: towards the Learning Society* (Slowinski, 1998). In 1997, ERT published *Investing in Knowledge: the Integration of Technology and European Education*, which was followed by a Commission document published in the same year, *Towards a Europe of Knowledge*. This has eventually led to the adoption by the Council of 'a multi-annual programme for the effective integration of information and communication technologies in education and training systems (eLearning programme)'. The convergence of agendas is more than a coincidence, and could be taken as a manifestation of a 'tightly woven policy network that extends at all levels of education' (Sultana, 2002: 122; van Apeldoorn, 2000).

From the Lisbon Council in 2000 onwards, EU education and training policy has gained a dynamic that is almost unprecedented. Between 2000 and 2004, the Commission produced numerous proposals, recommendations and consultation papers all citing the goals of 'knowledge society' set out in the Lisbon conclusions, which were mostly endorsed by the Council in the form of resolutions or declarations. In 2002, for instance, the Commission and the Council jointly adopted a detailed work programme on education and training for the period between 2002 and 2004, organised around 13 objectives (developing skills for the knowledge society, ensuring access to information/communication technologies, increasing mobility and exchange, etc.) (CEC, 2002a). The work programme was approved at the Barcelona European Council later that year, where heads of the state/government declared their intention to make Europe’s education and training systems a world-wide reference by


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90 Downloaded from <http://ue.eu.int/presid/conclusions.htm>, 01/03/03
2010. Importantly, one of the factors that accounts for the fast pace at which the Commission drafted policy proposals and the member states readily accepted these proposals is a broad consensus that exists among the member governments regarding the role of education in the globalising economy.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this 'Lisbon process' is the chosen method by which to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The method, labelled as the 'open method of coordination' or 'benchmarking', basically entails appraising and comparing different policy practices of the member states, organised as mutual learning processes. The goal is not to establish a single common framework or to impose harmonisation measures, but to share knowledge and to encourage the spread of best practice (H. Wallace, 2000). The advantage of this method is that it offers a way to achieve coordination without appearing 'too threatening', as it is 'a fully decentralised approach using variable forms of partnerships and designed to help Member States to develop their own policies progressively' (CEC, 2002a:10). As in other areas of EU policy reviewed in this thesis, the key components here are voluntary cooperation, centred networking and the accumulation of expert knowledge (Nóvoa, 2002). The role of the EU is one of coordination rather than enforcement, establishing guidelines and norms that provide the context for further policy debate at both EU and national levels. The development of this new method also signals the growing influence of private business practices in EU policy making (Lawn, 2002). Concepts and practices that originated in business management such as 'benchmarking', 'outputs', 'target-setting', 'flexible frameworks', 'knowledge investment' and 'efficiency' now proliferate in EU education discourse, again attesting to the prevalence of neoliberal thinking in the public sector (recent examples include Commission reports entitled 'Investing efficiently in education and training: an imperative for Europe' (CEC, 2002d), 'European Benchmarks in Education and Training' (CEC, 2002c)).

While the EU has come to place such a high priority upon human resources issues, it is also becoming apparent that there is a growing gap between the EU's policy thinking and its actual capacity to implement such thinking (Field, 1998). The far-reaching goal of the creation of 'a European education area' or a 'learning society' in response to the perceived crisis of European competitiveness would require Europe-wide convergence of education policy. Yet, the ambition of this
strategy clearly exceeds the limits of the EU’s Treaty competences. In contrast to the ever-increasing significance of education in the EU’s diagnosis for the future, the actual achievements in education and training initiatives so far remain very much limited.92

From the EU’s education discourse there emerges a picture of a ‘good European citizen’ conceived around the notion of labour mobility and competitiveness. Being part of Europe now means having the right knowledge and skills that enable people to survive and thrive in the knowledge-based, globalising economy. The notion of European identity in this context is more focused on individual competence in transnational labour markets instead of qualities normally associated with collective identity such as feeling of belongingness and rootedness. The close connection forged between education and employment also means that unemployment is now seen as a problem of uneducated people. The problem of unemployment in the social or economic sphere has therefore become the problem of employability of each individual (Novoa, 2002: 141). The corollary of this argument could be that the responsibility for solving the crisis of the welfare state and ultimately the European social model is being passed onto the citizens, who are invited to reinvent themselves by ‘constantly updating their knowledge both in order to enhance employability, by acquiring skills attuned to developments in the nature and organization of work, and also in order to serve as a framework for the process of consolidating European citizenship’ (CEC, 1997b).

Conclusion

This chapter argued that the education initiatives of the Community are expressions of a dual necessity: to foster economic competitiveness through improvement in the qualities of human capital; and to create a sense of identity, of a shared European citizenship among young people. However, the possibility for an EU-wide education policy designed to fulfil both of these needs has been conditioned by two factors.

92 Some authors argue that the Europeanisation of education in the cultural sense is occurring outside the institutional framework of the EU, often organised under the auspices of the Council of Europe or UNESCO. There are initiatives devised by semi- or non-governmental bodies such as teacher
Firstly, the original legal provisions of the Community excluded general education from its jurisdiction. The Maastricht Treaty, while providing the space for EU intervention in this area, also limited its scope of action by the subsidiarity principle. Secondly, the primary nature of the EU as an economic entity means that supporting economic growth still remains a strong priority in the Union's overall strategy for development. Consequently, this technocratic, growth-oriented agenda has also reinforced a utilitarian approach to education and training in the EU.

Throughout the short history of EU education policy, therefore, the cultural dimensions of education have been sidelined by economic concerns. This is evident both at the level of policy discourse and in its actual implementation. The rise of education in the EU agenda has been to a large extent a direct response to perceived economic challenges. In the 1970s, it was the necessity to remedy youth unemployment that drew policy makers' attention to education and training. From the mid-1980s to 1992, despite the move towards the 'People's Europe', education tended to be viewed mainly in terms of its contribution to achieving the single market. After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has adopted an even more functional approach seeking to promote the concept of the learning society as a way of adjusting to the global market place. As for the contents of education policy, the EU's action programmes have been consistently vocational, utilitarian and instrumental in orientation. The cultural function of education remains an area where the responsibility has been left entirely with the member states. While this 'dual' approach to education may represent an outcome of a consensus among the member states and EU institutions, it leaves open the question of overarching identity underpinning political integration. In so far as the EU has some influence in shaping an educational policy agenda both at national and European levels, Sultana argues, 'there is a very real danger of peripheralising countries, belief systems, languages, rendering invisible the histories and concerns of the politically and economically weak regions' (1995:126).
CHAPTER 5
Representations of European History and Europe’s ‘Other’

In the previous chapter on education, we have seen that the EU came to prioritise the function of education for its contribution to European economic competitiveness rather than as an instrument for forging European (cultural) identity. However, this does not mean that EU officials have entirely abandoned the quest for common cultural roots, and the preoccupation with ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘shared civilisation’ is nowhere more obvious than in EU discourse on history. Studies show how common it is for nationalism to search for origins to legitimate present claims of belonging to a common lineage and cultural heritage and to a specific territory. If the ‘subjective perception and understanding of the communal past by each generation of a given cultural unit of population … is a defining element in the concept of cultural identity’ (Smith, 1997: 321), representations of a European history take on great symbolic significance.

In this chapter, I will look at how the official representations of European history are constructed and what kind of implications these representations have for drawing the boundaries of European identity and its corollary of demarcating Europe’s ‘Others’. The focus of analysis is on what many authors term ‘Euro-nationalist’ history writings which have acquired in the EU the status of a semi-official version of European history. In particular, I will examine Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s *Europe: a History of its Peoples* as a representative of such Euro-nationalist discourse. Duroselle’s book was supported by the European Commission, and its significance lies in the fact that it is the only major piece of history writing officially funded by the EU or its predecessors. His book is also important because it exemplifies the Commission’s and the Parliament’s approach to culture in the pre-Maastricht period when the goal of EU cultural measures was heavily geared towards the achievement of internal cultural unity based on a reified notion of ‘common European heritage’. In the last section, I will argue that the EU’s boundary-drawing exercises and the resulting ingroup-outgroup dynamics have recently acquired particular salience through the Europeanisation of immigration issues.
European integration as a future-oriented project

Looking at the EU official statements from the early periods, one striking feature that emerges is that the meaning of the European project is frequently located in the future rather than its assumed historical unity (Howe, 1995). In the Preamble of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the Community is depicted as marking the beginning of an ‘organised Europe’, equipped with ‘institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared’. Similarly, the Rome Treaty in 1957 portrays European integration as a forward-looking, ongoing process, and its Preamble states that the objective of the Member States in creating the common market is ‘to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Because ‘ever closer union among the people of Europe’ did not exist prior to these treaties, the images of Europe in this sense belong to the future and not to the past, ‘to the world of “ought” rather than that of “is”, expressing the future state of things which the act is designed to achieve’ (De Witte, 1989: 132).

The wording of the treaties thus incorporated a tension between a short-term, utilitarian image of Europe as a common market and an ambitious long-term goal that points towards ‘an ever closer union’ without defining what this exactly entails. The absence of clearly defined goals did not seem to bother the ‘founding fathers’ as the practical problems and short-term objectives were pressing enough to occupy their attention. It could even be argued that the functionalist method of integration relied on this particular set of myths which directed people’s attention to a vague, neutral future and which therefore enabled the labelling of the integration process as non-political, rational and technocratic (Hansen and Williams, 1999).

These future-oriented images of Europe reflect how the European elites perceive the European past and also its relation to the EU. Altiero Spinelli, a federalist MEP who drew up a draft European constitution in the 1980s, wrote: ‘The Community is not primarily a continuation of a past: it is a resolution for the future, or it is nothing’ (quoted in CEC, 1973: 28). This view is shared by Jacques Delors, who describes the Treaty of Rome as a ‘birth certificate of a revolution’ (Delors, 1992: 5). The underlying image here is the idea of a newly created community born out of a resolution of the Europeans, a community whose development is to be catalysed by possible future events that might in time promote solidarity among
Europeans. So, the Europeans can leave their pasts as a moral lesson in the savagery and futility of war, and start a wholly new project based on a thriving economic partnership (Delors, 1992: 22). This idea also finds a strong echo in recommendations put forward by one of the consultants on educational policy: ‘part of teaching in Europe should be prospectively turned towards the future and its virtualities, taking into account the European framework and spreading integration’ (CEC, 1973: 28).

To illustrate this point further, I would like to say something about the symbolism of Euro banknotes. After a design competition launched by the European Monetary Institute (the forerunner of the ECB), the winning designs of Euro banknotes were selected at the Dublin European Council in December 1996. The most noticeable aspect of the banknotes, especially compared to most national currencies, is the conspicuous absence of historical figures or identifiable cultural heritage. In fact, the design that features abstract architectural themes – doors, arches, windows and bridges – was chosen precisely because it does not represent an existing monument (Shore, 2000: 111-118). Rather than referring back to people or events in the past, these symbols represent something unspecified. Because we do not see where these bridges, windows, doors, etc. are leading, they can also be taken to signify a state of transition, an opening to somewhere unknown.

What these representations of Europe imply is an interest on the part of European leaders in stressing a break with the past. They aim to build a ‘broader and deeper community among peoples’, but this community cannot be founded on a view of history in which conflicts and wars between states take a central role. Thus, European integration is presented as ‘progress’, a process to correct the past plagued with ignorance and prejudices. The construction of ‘Europe’ as a break from the past is a familiar theme in German political discourse, in which ‘Europe’s Other’ is understood as Germany’s own past of wars and nationalist excesses (Risse, 2001).

However, one of the problems of presenting the EU as a forward-looking creation is that none of the treaties, declarations or any officially adopted texts specifically states what constitutes the substance of this ‘shared destiny’, despite their

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93 However, the design on seven denominations are meant to represent, respectively, a specific period of Europe's architectural history – Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo, the nineteenth-century iron and glass architecture, and modern twentieth-century architecture.
repeated emphasis on an ambitious, permanently moving image of integration. At the time when the EEC was established, a short-term, practical goal of a common market may have sufficed as a guiding image for the future. As de Witte argues, contrary to the expectations of neofunctionalism, the integration 'mechanism could not, as had been hoped, set the agenda for future activity by its own motion, but had to be embedded within some broader purpose of action' (1989: 133). This is where the problem of European history comes in, as the concept of identity entered into EU vocabulary in the 1970s against the backdrop of a rising sense of legitimacy crisis among EU elites.

European history and Euro-nationalism

Although the EU’s interest in European identity and history arose fairly recently, the idea of European unity based on shared cultural heritage is far from new. There is no shortage of literature charting the history of the ‘idea of Europe’ (recent examples include Heater, 1992; Pagden, 2002), although a detailed examination of such history cannot be provided here.94 I would simply note that the idea of Europe gained strong momentum in the pan-European movements in the inter-war period and then in the aftermath of the Second World War. The movement for European unity after 1945 is characterised by efforts to remove nationalistic bias from history writing, often supported by organisations such as the Council of Europe (Davies, 1997). Denis de Rougemont was one of the most prolific writers on the topic, and his book *The Meaning of Europe* (1965) is dedicated to determining what Europe was and in what ways it was distinct from its neighbours.

The pursuit of common European characteristics is also revealed in numerous post-war writings, which, on the basis of such purportedly distinctive traits, justify the promotion of ‘the’ European identity and culture (Varenne, 1993). It was perhaps ironic that, despite their alleged aim of transcending nationalism, the conceptions of European identity and European-ness articulated by those intellectuals are framed in a nationalistic language, drawing on a Herderian understanding of culture as a bounded, coherent whole (Wilterdink, 1993: 120-125). Their common assumption is

94 A critical reflection of the idea of Europe is provided by Delanty (1995).
that, on the one hand, Europe has an actual, unique substance which is based on long-standing, uninterrupted cultural traditions, and which is somewhat superior to other cultures and thus should be preserved and protected. On the other hand, they are also acutely aware of discrepancies between their belief in the existence of cultural distinctiveness and the lack of its manifestation in reality, so they strive for confirmation and activation of an allegedly distinct European identity.

To appreciate the significance of these 'Euro-nationalist' writings, we need to relate such post-war efforts to the changing position of Europe since the Second World War – loss of power by the Western European states, coupled with an increase in power for the United States and the Soviet Union, plus a dissolution of the European colonial empires. So the post-war undertakings to achieve unity in Europe, whether it is on the level of idea (as in history writings) or institutions (as in the establishment of the ECSC and the EEC), were also founded upon power considerations of a defensive nature. As Wilterdink observes, 'As Europe had weakened itself by raising the internal difference to disastrous proportions, so it could strengthen itself by achieving unity' (1993: 124).

These 'Euro-nationalist' views also feature heavily in EU discourse on European identity. Even though the EU has not officially defined the term 'Europe' or 'European', EU institutions – particularly the Commission and the Parliament – do insist upon the existence of a single European identity (however weak it might be) which is supposedly founded on cultural commonality underlined by historical continuity:

A community of culture in Europe is already an undeniable fact. Beneath the surface diversity of languages, tastes and artistic styles, there is a likeliness, a kinship, a European dimension or identity based on a common cultural heritage. The contributions of different individuals, ideas, styles and values have, over the centuries, created our common civilisation (CEC, 1985c: 3).

Elsewhere the Commission’s official statements speak of the existence of essential European identity which is yet to be awoken: 'European identity is the result of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values. But
awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic action, consciousness-raising campaigns and the growing convergence of European ambitions' (CEC, 1988b: 7).

Instead of presenting the present state of Europe as a break with the past and therefore legitimising it by directing our attention towards the future, these official documents explicitly state that there is a fundamental unity and that it has deep historical roots. Yet, on the other hand, there is the belief that this unity is still insufficiently realised. Thus, as in the case of the 'Euro-nationalist' writings of the post-war period, 'a discrepancy between essence and manifestation, between the essential unity and the empirical reality of the moment is assumed, and this implies a summons to achieve, and justifies the pursuit of, further unity' (Wilterdink, 1993: 122). The effect of all this is that EU discourse on history implicitly gives a de facto definition of European-ness, by reifying the notion of European identity as an expression of historically rooted cultural unity (Pieterse, 1991; Shore, 2000). Such a definition follows a path that has now become quite familiar: ancient Greece and Rome, the spread of Christianity, the Renaissance and the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, inevitably culminating in the post-war integration.

**A European history project**

Although the EU was advised by its own cultural experts not to present an authorised version of a European history, for fear 'it might lead to distortions or wrong interpretations' (CEC, 1992a, Annex B), the Commission gave financial support to history project called 'An Adventure in Understanding' which consisted in three parts: a 500-page survey of European history, a school textbook and a 10-part television series (Davies, 1997). The project did not originate in the EU, but was in fact a product of a personal venture conceived by Frédéric Delouche, a French/Norwegian banker educated in Britain, whose determination to challenge nationalist bias in history-writing attracted interest from Jacques Delors among others.

The one-volume history of Europe, *Europe: a History of its Peoples*, was written by a French historian, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. To ensure that the book would be free of Gallic bias, a committee of historians from other European countries met
regularly to review each section as it was completed. Despite such efforts, however, the book became the subject of a huge controversy even before it was published. For a start, Duroselle hardly took any account of Eastern Europe, an omission which led one reviewer to call the book 'half truths about half of Europe' (Guardian, 25 Oct. 1991). But the most outraged criticisms came from the Greeks, who claimed that the book paid insufficient attention to the contributions of ancient Greece and the Byzantine Empire. The Greek EC Commissioner, members of the Athens Academy, the Archbishop of Athens and several Greek politicians all sent angry letters to the then President of the Commission Jacques Delors, while a major Greek publisher refused to publish the book unless an extra chapter was inserted outlining Greek influence on Europe (Financial Times, 25 April 1990). Amidst the disputes, the Commission retracted its official endorsement, dissociating itself from the project, although Duroselle's book was published in 1990 simultaneously in eight European languages (but not in Greek).

The textbook version of the history book, entitled *Illustrated History of Europe: a Unique Guide to Europe’s Heritage*, was composed by twelve school teachers and historians from twelve different European countries. Each of them wrote one chapter which was then submitted to joint scrutiny, with Delouche acting as the general editor. It was published in 1992 with the aim to 'encourage parents, teachers, pupils, educationalists ... to consider taking a view wider than that obtained from a primarily national standpoint' (Delouche, 1992: 6). However, to date no EU member states have prescribed the book as an official history textbook.

After the troubles caused by Duroselle's book the Commission has not officially promoted any attempts to present a definitive account of European history. The European Parliament, however, has been consistent in advocating the Europeanisation of national histories, and recently passed a resolution urging the Commission to draw up a school textbook on European history which, followed by the Council's approval, would be recommended for study in all the member states.\(^{95}\) The EP's proposition has not been taken up by the Commission.

*Europe: a History of its Peoples* by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle was published in 1990, originally in French, but simultaneously translated into eight European

\(^{95}\) Official Journal, C55, 24/02/97.
languages. To the extent that it propagates the essential unity and continuity of Europe, Duroselle’s book represents the Commission’s and the Parliament’s approach to culture in the pre-Maastricht, ‘People’s Europe’ phase of integration (the 1980s) in which the design of EU cultural measures largely followed the ‘nation-building’ model of cultural policy. Despite the controversy caused by the book, Duroselle is confident about the non-biased nature of this book and, in its epilogue, stresses its historical objectivity:

Our task has been historical in the sense that the historian’s humble and exacting role is to seek the truth....for past events are immutable. ...the genuine historian is not engaged in propaganda. There can be no such thing as ‘committed history’. ....(the author and his colleagues) have done their best to write nothing but the truth (1990: 410).

The approach that presupposes a fixed existence called ‘the past’ which is waiting to be recovered is frequently adopted by conventional national historiography. Duroselle’s work is not exception in this respect, and derives its meaning by presenting a particular representation of European history as unalterable and self-evident, while at the same time relegating alternative accounts to the sphere of the marginal or even the invisible. Thus, in order to analyse this text it is necessary not only to question its underlying presuppositions but also to examine the absence of other possible representations and reconstitute an alternative account.

Europe and the Other

If a particular representation of Europe can only be established at the expense of other possibilities, the notion of Europe employed in Duroselle’s study of history can also be delineated by what is not ‘Europe’. Indeed, from the very beginning of this book which deals with the pre-historic period, ‘Europe’ is regarded as one single unit and is contrasted with its Other, as though ‘Europe’ and the other parts of the world had always been in competition ever since the dawn of humanity. Defining ‘Europeans’ in racial terms, Duroselle writes that ‘the original inhabitants of western
Europe were white-skinned, barely touched by the Mongol invasions - or by Asian and African immigration until after the end of World War II' (1990: 5).

According to Duroselle, 'around 12,000 or 13,000 BC western Europe appears to have been in the forefront of human progress' but 'Europe' is 'outstripped by the Neolithic revolution in the Middle East' and as a consequence, 'the west lags behind' (Ibid., 28-29) while 'their Middle Eastern contemporaries were far more advanced' (Ibid. 31). But with the coming of the Hallstatt Iron Age, Europe started to catch up with the east: 'If a name had to be found for the eighth to the fifth centuries BC, it might well be "The Awakening of the West"' (Ibid. 42). Here, a conceptual demarcation that distinguishes Europe from the Other is already drawn through a discourse of West-East dualism with its corresponding us/them polarity. It does not matter whether the concept of Europe or the Middle East existed in the Neolithic period, but the opposition of East versus West which clearly excludes the Middle East from the notion of 'Europe' is retrospectively imposed by using the metaphors of competition.

Throughout the book, the theme of the Other contrasted with Europe appears recurrently, even though what, or who, is signified by the Other changes constantly. Whether 'Europe' is juxtaposed with Islam, 'colonial' peoples in the New World, communism, or America, the fundamental division of East-West remains a focal point in the discursive construction of Europe. The separation of 'Europe' from the rest of the world is kept intact by minimal contribution to the supposedly European elements from those of the Other. Until the age of Antiquity, 'with the exception of south-east Europe, which was marginally influenced by Middle Eastern civilisation, western Europe remained isolated' (Ibid. 29, my emphasis). Despite some emphasis on Greek heritage in Europe, no mention is made of the Egyptian or Phoenician influence which constitutes an important part in the Greek civilisation (See Delanty, 1995: 17-23). The (controversial) 'fabrication’ thesis of Martin Bernal demonstrates that the Ancient Greeks recognised themselves as the successor of the ancient Orient, and that it was the nineteenth-century European intellectuals who invented a cultural tradition whose roots lay in a purified ancient Greece that bore no recognition of its roots in the Orient (Bernal, 1987). Duroselle’s historical narrative belongs to this intellectual tradition that extracts Greece from the ancient Mediterranean world in
which it developed and annexes it to Europe as the principal factor in the maintenance of European cultural continuity (Amin, 1989).

As for the treatments of outside influence in the later periods in history, they simply serve to enhance the division between Europe and non-Europe, the most recurrent representation of which is the Islamic world:

‘When the Prophet Mohammed founded Islam, the West took little notice of what seemed a distant, Oriental phenomenon…. [Islam was] generally unpopular in the West.’ (Duroselle, 1990: 111)

‘Many Europeans naturally hoped …to recover the lands lost to the Saracens. But other Christians had to live with the invaders of Spain and southern Italy’ (Ibid. 114)

‘There were several possible reactions to the Turkish threat…Should they be resisted at all costs? Or should Europeans flee before them…?’ (Ibid. 200)

Muslim influence, therefore, is presented either as negligible, or, where it is thought to encroach on the ‘European’ territory, as something negative which is to be avoided, feared, or defended against. In this discourse that stresses the adversarial nature of the relationship between Europe and Islam, the so-called essence of Europe is reified, and is written into the text as if it has a concrete existence. The Arabs, ‘like the Arabs of Spain’, the text goes, ‘have remained influential but largely separate’ (Ibid. 20), and their contribution in transmitting the ancient Greek texts and their impact on science and trade, which are integral to the components of ‘European progress’, are acknowledged only in passing (Ibid. 114 and 180). The tendency to ignore or undervalue the Other is justified because ‘This is not the place to discuss countries outside Europe’ (Ibid. 299).

The fact that Duroselle’s book was largely written before the fall of communism may explain why there is hardly any mention of Eastern Europe, except when the Byzantine empire is differentiated from ‘western Christendom’ as the ‘Orient’. ‘Europe’ throughout this text is used almost interchangeably with western Europe. At the beginning of the book, Duroselle draws a chronological list of ‘phases of shared experience’ in Europe, which clearly indicates that his account is concentrated on the West: the megalith phase; the Celtic phase; the western Roman
Empire; the Germanic centuries; the Carolingian Empire; western Christianity and the schism with Greece; the age of the Gothic cathedrals; the Renaissance including the divisive effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; the Imperial Age (Ibid. 20). Having reviewed more than 5000 years of European history, the author finally concedes that Europe 'for the moment means Western Europe' (Ibid. 414). The same kind of ambiguity is evident in the treatment of Russia: ‘Only the future can decide whether Russia will be European’ (Ibid. 392).

Eurocentrism

The Other plays a significant role in consolidating and reifying the boundaries that distinguishes ‘Europe’. However, what is significant in the European myth-construction is less the division between Europe and the rest of the world than the accompanying value judgement it entails. Eurocentrism is an implicit but recurring theme throughout Duroselle’s book. One of the components that is attributed to European moral superiority is Christianity. Incredibly, Duroselle claims that Christianity, through such principles as equality and tolerance, helped, among other things, to diminish the savagery of wars and improve the status of women. Therefore, the ‘two centuries that were the apogee of western Christendom….were also marked by the growth of certain values making for an improvement to human life’ (Ibid. 158). That which does not conform to this ideal Christian type is usually ascribed to the Other. For example, Emperor Frederick was described as:

‘Born near Ancona, …and brought up in Sicily, Frederick had been much influenced by Islam. Insanely proud, and indifferent to ethics, he seemed less like a Christian king than an Oriental despot living in sybaritic luxury. There was nothing German about him.’ (Ibid. 139)

But, as Amin argues, one of the main sources of Eurocentrism lies in the development of capitalism coupled with the advance of technology which enabled European powers to conquer others, and, the self-granted right to represent and judge non-Europeans and, perhaps most importantly, to impose these representations on
them (1989). In the text, European conquests are represented as if they were an inevitable outcome following the logic of Social Darwinism:

‘For four and a half centuries, Europe’s military superiority had enabled her to dominate other peoples of the world. Perhaps it was inevitable that she should. Weak, ill-protected areas attract powerful invaders, who tell themselves that someone else will march in if they do not.’ (Duroselle, 1990: 392)

Indeed, the idea of Europe as being the repository of civilisation and progress provided a major legitimation of imperialism and the extermination of other cultures (Delanty, 1995: 95). Clearly, this sense of mission civilisatrice, although less explicitly than before, still permeates Duroselle’s account of European history. With regard to the strength of the European civilisation, the author endorses without any reservation a quote from Charles Moraze: ‘Having mastered the world, Europe developed a civilisation which carried within it the seeds of progress. ...And this progress in human behavior, in science, in society, and in education was Europe’s gift to the world...’ (Duroselle, 1990: 283). It is not surprising to find the recurrent theme of progress in a work which views history as a continuous movement toward the realisation of the present. For example;

Without making invidious or complacent comparisons with other parts of the world, it is nevertheless possible to discern in Europe’s history a general if halting growth in compassion, humanity, and equality (Ibid. 21).

In this type of discourse which celebrates European progress, darker sides of Europe tend to pass unacknowledged, and Duroselle’s text is no exception. Poverty and oppression among the peasants and, later, the industrial working class are barely mentioned. A brief reference is made to the savage nature of the Crusades which targeted the Jews as well as the Muslims but only in connection with its diminishing savagery in the later periods. In the same vein, brutality by Europeans in the New World is acknowledged, but its textual effects are marginalised by the emphasis on the early navigators’ spiritual quality:
Europeans were neither totally surprised nor wholly fascinated by what they found. …What is striking about this cool, inquisitive, dispassionate observer of humanity is his sense of relativity. People being what they were, and climate and society acting upon them (Ibid. 198).

The topic of the New World is treated here as if there had been a more or less equal exchange between Europeans and the indigenous population. The author goes further by refusing to describe the relationship between Europe and the colonised world as imperialism: ‘It is worth pointing out that the theory of “economic imperialism”…is not confirmed by history’ (Ibid. 292-293). Accordingly, the word ‘imperialism’ never appears anywhere else except for this passage. And terms such as ‘racist’ or ‘racism’, the concept of which is closely associated with imperialism, are used only in relation to Nazism.

The myth of European unity

While the emphasis on division between Europe and its Other establishes the superior and essential existence of ‘Europe’, the discursive strategy of historical unity in Europe points to the affirmation of internal coherence and continuity. The focal point of this discourse is cultural heritage. Whenever the political situation produces discords and divisions, cultural and spiritual continuity is invoked. On the decay of the Carolingian empire: ‘This was the end of what the poet had called “the kingdom of Europe”, and the beginning of political anarchy. But intellectual culture lived on…’ (Ibid. 108). During the period when Christians were attacked by Muslims, Vikings and Hungarians, ‘as always in Europe, individual reactions…remained distinct from politics’ (Ibid.132). And therefore, in the ‘midst of these troubled three centuries, the intellectual and spiritual unity of Europe was marked by the … development of the new monastic orders’ (Ibid.133). From this narrative, Christendom emerges as ‘the’ Europe: ‘These [appeals for a crusade by Europe against the Muslims] expressed the conviction -repeated here and there and since the time of Charlemagne- that Christendom was Europe’ (Ibid.200).

In the later periods of a secularised world, this idea of Europe is also secularised and effectively inherited by the peace movements of philosophers and
intellectuals. Duroselle lists such advocates of the European idea as Kant, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mazzini, Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, Ernest Renan, Romain Rolland and so on. It must be noted that some of them did not pursue the unity of Europe as such, but regarded European unity as a means to achieve either the consolidation of national strength or simply as a step towards universal peace. The key to establishing the continuity from Christendom to the modern age is the rhetoric of 'the European idea'. Duroselle's account of European history virtually strips Europe of various negative meanings associated with it, while privileging the notions which represent anything that resembles the peaceful unity of Europe as embodying the ultimate European idea (see Delanty, 1995). The effect of this is a vision of Europe characterised by an uninterrupted, linear progress towards a peaceful harmony. The culmination of this quest is, as can be expected, the post-war process of European integration, which is seen as the first step towards a genuinely united Europe (Duroselle, 1990: 409).

Just as Europe is placed in opposition to the external Other to reinforce the boundary, certain images of Europe are also juxtaposed with supposedly negative features in European history. The enemy of purified Europe is not just foreigners beyond the boundaries of Europe, but also 'unfortunate' historical developments inside Europe – nationalism, religious strife, fascism, etc. The picture portrayed by these formulations is the opposition between a Europe of harmonious unity on one side, and internal strife, national divisions and wars on the other. Major developments in European history such as the nation-state, the consequences of the French Revolution, or Fascism are presented as though they are somehow not 'European' in a real sense, as aberrations from the long history of European ideals. The same principle applies to the historical forms of unity which were achieved by force or were dominated by a single country, in other words the political reality which cannot be accommodated within this notion of 'Europe'. Therefore, Europe's cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth century, with its accompanying French predominance, is equated with 'the False Europe' (Ibid. 239); Napoleon's empire is a 'universal empire' and not 'European' (Ibid. 275-76); and the Concert of Europe is called 'an imperfect vision of Europe' (Ibid. 317).

As a principal stumbling block in the road to unification, the influence of nationalism is underplayed as much as possible: 'nationalism has declined,
accompanied by the growth of a “European” awareness which is no longer unconscious and historical, but conscious and purposive.’ (Ibid. 21); ‘Nationalism, and the fragmentation of Europe into nation-states, are relatively recent phenomena: they may be temporary...people...(began) to rise above their nationalistic instincts’ (Ibid.413).

If, as Delanty (1995) argues, the European idea postulated as peaceful unity and harmony is not compatible with the political reality of Europe, a certain form of European history has to be constructed, so that the present project of integration appears to be ‘natural, realistic, and legitimate’ (Duroselle, 1990: 413). The discourse constructed accordingly searches for the things that reconcile and overcome the negative image of a divided Europe, and these are found in ‘high culture’ (Wilterdink, 1993: 123). This is a process whereby themes such as European culture or intellectual thoughts are detached from the very milieu of their development, condensed into the concept of unity, and then appropriated as the embodiment of European essence. Brands points out that this type of history designates normative nature, ‘namely all those so-called definitions of what Europe ought to be if it were best’, which he calls ‘the Sunday clothes of European culture’ (1987: 73). It is an image of European culture which overshadows the political notion of Europe and which incorporates only a small section of society and excludes all the others.

After a lengthy examination of more than 5000 years of Europe’s history to enquire if a united Europe is possible at all, Duroselle concludes that European unification ‘is natural, realistic, and legitimate, because there has long been a community of Europe – embryonic at first, but growing with time’ (Duroselle, 1990: 413). And this long historical evolution has given Europe ‘a unique personality of its own, distinct from the other great regions for the world’ (Ibid. 409). Despite Duroselle’s claim to have tried to avoid any partisanship, his account of European history is widely regarded as ‘a programmatic attempt to rewrite Europe’s history in order to deliver the mythical foundations for a political project of unity’ (Riekmann, 1997: 64). Those in favour of promoting the rewriting of history books from a ‘European’ perspective typically justify such endeavour on the grounds that this is necessary to combat the hegemony of nationalist ideology. The result, however, is that nationalist ideology is simply replaced by a new ideology of ‘Europeanism’ (Shore, 2000: 58). Duroselle’s attempt, like de Rougemont’s much earlier, is also a
highly elitist project. It is a selective view of history which centres on the ‘high culture’ of the ruling class and intellectuals, and it does not take into account of the perspective of minority peoples or of the periphery (Bloomfield, 1993: 265-266). It can also be seen as an attempt to re-Christianise European history, which was also one of the hallmarks of Euro-nationalist history writing since 1945 (Bands, 1987).

Characteristically, this semi-official symbolism of Europe leaves out one particular element which has been central to the formation of national identity. Whereas conventional national symbolism draws much of its evocative power from specific battles, war heroes and accompanying virtues, European symbolism focuses much more on culture and civilisation. More specifically, cultural traditions are identified to a high degree with principled intellectual and artistic movements. This selection is not coincidental because European integration is to be achieved through a peaceful process, overcoming hostility and differences between the member states. This makes a strong contrast with many national independence movements where the means of violence were openly justified. Thus, the EU ‘cannot accommodate a view of history in which conflicts between states take a central role, on the contrary, it searches for the things that reconcile and overcome national differences, and these are found in culture or civilisation’ (Wilterdink, 1993: 123).

This emphasis on cultural unity in the official representations of Europe is related to another problem concerning European identity. To the extent that drawing of group boundaries is simultaneously the exclusion of ‘others’ outside the group, the formation of collective identities always involve some elements of negation. In other words, identity is constructed through difference, in contradistinction to others (Billig, 1995b). This is particularly true in the case of the nation-state where national unity and autonomy have usually been won from external or internal enemies. In consequence, ‘the discourses about the national ingroup – its history, its culture, its interest – are not innocent’ but ‘they are both an affirmation of “us” and also a negation of otherness’ (Billig, 1995b: 98). Pieterse comments on this exclusionary aspect of the EU’s representation of European history:

It is wrong as regards the origins of European culture; it is wrong in so representing European culture that European regional cultures and subcultures are overlooked; it is wrong in representing elite culture as culture tout court and
in denying popular culture; it is wrong in defining European culture in terms of the past ... and in totally ignoring Europe’s contemporary multicultural realities (1991: 4).

The ‘Other’ and EU immigration discourse

If, as Delanty (1995) argues, most of ‘the history of Europe’ is only retrospectively European and results from the attempt of the European elites striving to see unity even where there never was any, it is easy to dismiss these officially formulated representations of the European past as nothing more than trivial attempts of the European elites. However, these elites’ representations as a whole open up the possibility for a new discourse on Europe, and the new systems of conceptual ordering through which the rhetoric of European solidarity and identity emerges (Shore, 1996). In fact, it is not so much the existence of internal unity or coherence as attempts to differentiate ‘Europeans’ from non-Europeans which find strong expressions in the EU institutional sphere, and which have become the basis for much of the articulation of European identity. After all, the aim of protecting ‘European culture’ from external forces could appear less controversial than trying to construct and impose uniformity at the inside (Theiler, 2001). This is where Europe’s historic frontier of confrontations with the outside world, especially Islam, is being reactivated (Pieterse, 1991).

Van Ham suggests that Europe has three external points of reference, three principal Others that have a bearing on its self-understanding, and those are the US, Russia and Islam (2001). As we shall see in the chapters on European heritage and EU audiovisual policies, the rhetoric of ‘cultural war’ between the alleged unique diversity of Europe and the homogeneity of American cultural influence (which is often equated with globalisation) forms a strong basis in EU policy discourse for portraying European identity ‘under threat’. Fears of cultural Americanisation have a relatively long history in many European countries, with many cultural elites bemoaning the alleged vulgarity of American mass cultural imports long before the Second World War. But what is at stake here is not just a matter of aesthetics or cultural refinement. The general European concept of culture assumes a distinct relation between national culture, identity and the state. If Americans seem willing to
follow the market logic as the centre of their self-constitution, the European model of society posits the moral responsibilities of public service provisions which include culture. While such a dichotomy between American and European culture may be too simplistic, fears about the excessive marketisation of culture and society in general have undoubtedly fuelled lingering cultural resentment among European and national elites. Thus the EU was able to mobilise these fears in their construction of the anti-Americanisation rhetoric for the purpose of bolstering its own cultural ambitions in the project of Europeanisation.

Although the idea of Europe existed for centuries, it was within the confines of the Cold War politics that European integration as an idea acquired an institutional framework (Delanty, 1995). To the extent that fear of the Soviet Union provided one of the fundamental rationales for post-war integration efforts, Russia constituted a symbol of that which Western Europe is not. This East-West divide has also offered Western European states an opportunity to accentuate and reinforce the political, economic and cultural qualities that they supposedly have in common. Since the collapse of communism, however, the ‘Othering’ of Russia took on a different meaning. Rather than being a principal security threat to the ‘West’, Russia now features as the ultimate Asian Other in many debates about Europe and enlargement in Central European countries (van Ham, 2001: 207).

It can be argued that the demise of the Cold War and the communist threat left a perceived ‘threat vacuum’ in Europe, which, particularly in the post-9/11 context, is now filled by an abstraction called ‘Islam’ (van Ham, 2000: 210). On a more concrete level, the EU’s discursive construction of Islam as the ultimate ‘Other’ crystallises in its troubled relationship with Turkey. Turkey applied for Community membership as long ago as 1959, but as a predominantly Muslim country, its application was simply deemed invalid. Turkey made a formal bid for full integration in 1987, but was again rejected by the European Commission two years later. In December 1999, the EU finally agreed to start discussions on Turkish membership which might eventually evolve into official accession negotiations. Although Turkey has reacted with enthusiasm to these new EU moves, there remains frustration that it has had to wait so long and is still at the end of a queue, being ‘skipped over’ by many Eastern European countries (van Ham, 2000; Hansen, 2004). In the autumn of 2002, just a few weeks before the EU’s Copenhagen Summit was due to take up once
again the question of Turkish membership, the former French president and the Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, caused alarm in some quarters by publicly proclaiming that if Turkey, which in his view is not a European country, became a member of the EU, ‘it would be the end of Europe’. Although several high-ranking EU officials voiced their disapproval of this remark, his claim has created another setback in the process of building a bridge toward the Islamic Other.

Giscard d'Estaing is not alone in speaking of an essential Europe whose historical anchoring lies in the Christian heritage. Although frequently overshadowed by an emphasis on the pragmatism and technocratic rationality of the ‘Monnet method’, the ‘founding fathers’ of the EC had a tacit understanding that the idea underlying Europe was Christian. Schumann’s vision of European integration was based on Christian moral values, which were shared by the Christian democratic founders of the Community including Monnet (Bloomfield, 1993: 264). The current President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, refers to a ‘reunification’ of Europe, the original unified Europe, according to Prodi, being Charlemagne’s empire. Prodi’s formulation of a ‘European soul’ alarmingly echoes Euro-nationalist discourse:

Europe’s destiny is not inherently Eurocentric, but one of universality. It should therefore reassert its role as the ‘beacon for world civilization’. This is possible and sustainable as long as its historical memory goes back beyond the ideals of the last few centuries and ... rediscovers its religious roots. Such a role could eventually revive the Christian soul of Europe which is the basis for unity (2000: 46).

The ‘objective’ reason for excluding Turkey is that it does not fulfil the EU’s criteria for accession, including respect for human rights and international law. However, objections to Turkish membership are often read as expressions of thinly-disguised anti-Islamic sentiments, and this feeling seems to be shared not just in Turkey but in countries on Europe’s Islamic periphery in general (van Ham, 2000: 213). From across the Mediterranean, therefore, European integration could look like an
exclusionary fortress-building exercise, the ultimate purpose of which is to keep the Islamic Other at bay.97

This connects our debate to the issue of immigration as a concrete manifestation of the EU’s boundary-drawing process. Since the 1970s, it has become common in (west) European states to link international crime with immigration as signifying threats and security problems, and therefore something which the citizens need to be protected from (Geddes, 2003). But with the acceleration of integration since the 1990s, issues regarding immigration are increasingly perceived as a problem that requires a ‘European’ solution. The underlying assumption is that a space of free movement would necessarily provide improved opportunities for terrorists, international criminals, asylum seekers, and immigrants to develop their illegal and criminal activities. The Treaty of Amsterdam virtually sealed this Europeanisation process by moving the sections of the intergovernmental ‘third pillar’ of the EU relating to immigration, asylum and refugees to the ‘first pillar’ – i.e. within the competence of the Community (Huysmans, 2001).98

Significantly, EU policy statements consistently conflate issues about immigrants, foreigners and border controls with fears about terrorism, drugs and crime (Shore, 2000). The result is that while national barriers within Europe have come down, the walls separating the EU from its ‘Others’ – both internal and external – have grown higher. What seems to be happening in this process is that the very same people who do not conform to the definitions of ‘Europeans’ propagated by authors such as Duroselle are sometimes also labelled as ‘problems’, ‘burdens’, or even ‘threats’ (Hansen, 2004). The idea of erecting a ‘Fortress Europe’ is further highlighted by the development of what has been termed a ‘two-tier human rights system’ – one that grants EU citizens the most sophisticated protection from human rights abuses but excludes from full human rights protection ‘unwanted aliens’ (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001: 222). While EU officials dismiss the notion of an ‘official’

97 Morocco also applied for EC/EU membership in 1986 but was resolutely turned down on the grounds that the organisation was only open to Europeans and that Morocco was unambiguously judged to be ‘non-European’ (Hansen, 2004).

98 Contrary to the rapid development of EU immigration and asylum policies in the 1990s, the EU has neglected its responsibility in the areas of anti-discrimination law, minority rights and measures against racism and xenophobia (Geddes, 2003). The Treaty of Rome has not provisions on forms of discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion, although it specifically prohibits nationality or gender-based discrimination.
category of 'European', we can observe the emergence of a de facto definition through the administrative process of establishing directives and regulations governing the statuses of immigrants and refugees (Holms, 2000: 31). It is in this process that the terms 'non-EU nationals', 'third countries' and 'non-European' take on a concrete meaning and become entangled in immigration debates often framed as a defence against unwanted outsiders based on the exclusive, ethno-cultural model of community.

Of course this is not to suggest that EU officials have any intentions of trying to fuel hostilities towards people born outside of the ethno-culturally defined Europe. My point is that there are some parallels between the way in which EU immigration policies came to differentiate 'Europeans' and 'non-Europeans' on the one hand and Euro-nationalist discourse on history which embraces the essentialised definitions of what should constitute its 'natural' citizenry on the other, even though blatant Euro-nationalist themes have almost disappeared from the cultural policy sphere at least since the mid-1990s. Having reorganised its post-Maastricht cultural priorities around the idea of citizens' voluntary participation in a networked space, the EU's attempts to achieve some sort of cultural cohesion within Europe seem to have acquired an external focus, whereby the terms of debate have shifted from the question of how to create internal unity and commonality to that of how to determine those who do not belong to Europe. As such, these ethno-cultural elements in EU immigration discourse are at variance with the overall direction of recent policy developments evident in specific cultural programmes, and therefore represent an earlier stage of EU cultural politics when the overwhelming concern of cultural measures lay in the engineering of a 'European consciousness' based on essential cultural qualities.

On a more positive note, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a new Article 13 that established, for the first time in the EU, a legal basis for action to combat discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as on gender, age, disability and sexual orientation. This was followed in 2000 by the Council's adoption of two Directives on race equality, partly as the member states' reaction against the entry into the Austrian coalition of Haider's Freedom Party (Geddes, 2003). These legal frameworks may in time come to offer a new platform for pro-migrant mobilisation. In addition, a more recent tendency of general EU discourse on
identity is to invoke abstract, diffuse civic ideals such as liberal democracy and respect for human rights without relying on the notion of a bounded, exclusive cultural community. This is a more open, inclusive articulation of European ideals, not dissimilar to Habermas's idea of constitutional patriotism, which can hardly be affixed specifically to Europe or to the member states (Soysal, 2002).

Conclusion

The images of the European past constructed by the elites enfold a fundamental dilemma in articulating a cultural model for a Europe-wide community. On the one hand European elites aim to break away from the past and to mark a wholly new beginning. On the other hand they also long for common historical roots and dig into the past in the hope of finding a unifying theme. The main topic of this chapter was that Euro-nationalist writing represented by Duroselle's book put forward an essentialised view on European unity and history in which a distinctive, bounded cultural community is set apart from others by race, religion, language or habitat. This way of delineating European identity is also laden with ethnocentric and elitist assumptions about what constitutes Europe's 'cultural heritage'. I have also tried to show that this type of ethno-cultural discourse on European identity has implicitly become enmeshed in exclusionary practices whereby 'extra-Europeans', be they Muslims, immigrants from the 'Third World', or non-White people in general, are not only branded as 'unwanted' but often targeted as potential security threats. Although the EU has recently come to reconceive European cultures as plural and non-homogeneous, based on reciprocal interaction and exchange, immigration is an (only) area where holistic conceptions of unity still retain strong influence in EU policy thinking. In this sense, the construction of European identity and Europe's 'Other' poses a serious problem in today's multiethnic, multicultural Europe.
CHAPTER 6
Conservation of Heritage in the European Union

In the previous chapter, we have seen the way in which reified notions of European culture and identity are constructed in the representations of European history. In such a view on culture, 'European heritage' is regarded as an exemplary expression of European distinctiveness rooted in history and collective memory. In EU documents, speeches and declarations concerning culture, the representation of the European heritage as a locus of European identity is used to activate the rhetoric of antithesis between European particularity and the homogenising thrust of global market forces, which normally leads to the conclusion that there is an utmost need to protect and promote the European heritage 'under threat'. Despite this rhetoric formulated by EU officials, however, the actual practices of the EU programmes concerning cultural heritage suggest that the EU's policy agenda prioritises the economic dimension of heritage over its cultural contents. Thus, in setting the operational framework of its heritage conservation policies, the EU tends to adopt a technicist and economistic outlook on culture rather than relying on an essentialist definition of Europeanness.

This chapter looks at those two contradictory representations of culture which are being articulated around the EU policy on cultural heritage. My argument here is that both of the two opposing representations of culture can be seen as part of the EU's strategies to survive in a world increasingly dominated by market forces. In the first part, I will briefly sketch the development and structure of the EU programmes on cultural heritage which should highlight the EU's pragmatic stance towards culture. This is followed by an analysis of the relationship between 'European culture' as the locus of collective identity on the one hand, and 'European culture' as a vehicle for economic growth on the other in the context of globalisation.

Conserving Europe’s cultural heritage

Conservation of the cultural heritage is one of the first areas of cultural activities in the EU. The European Parliament, the most enthusiastic advocate of European
cultural policies among the EU institutions, passed a resolution as early as 1974 to press the Commission for measures to protect the European cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{99} In 1976, the Commission introduced scholarships for training and for the development of new techniques in the field of conservation, and then in 1980, Community grants were introduced to contribute towards financing specific conservation projects. Under this heading, the 1980 appropriation went to the Market Street Building in Edinburgh, a nineteenth century building that was turned into a cultural centre.\textsuperscript{100} These grants were made on an ad hoc basis until 1984, when an annual scheme for pilot projects was launched. With the introduction of this new scheme, Community action in this field was reorganised into four categories: specific conservation projects; financial support for the restoration of European monuments and sites of special historical significance; grants for training in restoration techniques; and sponsoring events (exhibitions, conferences, etc.) on the theme of cultural conservation.

a) Specific conservation projects

This annual scheme, implemented from 1984 to 1995, was intended to support exemplary projects, as much for the artistic and historical value of the monument as for the cultural and technical quality of the work carried out.\textsuperscript{101} It is a direct successor to the Community grants launched in 1980, but with a significant budgetary increase and new selection criteria. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the funds allocated to this scheme accounted for almost half of the total cultural budget of the EU. Unlike the grants before 1984 when there was no publicity about the programme, a notice for call for applications for these grants was published every year in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Projects were chosen first by national or regional bodies responsible for historic monuments and sites, and then submitted to the Commission who made its final decision with an independent panel of experts.

\textsuperscript{99} Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ), 1974, C62, p.5
\textsuperscript{100} OJ C99, 1986, p.21 Subsequently, grants were awarded to the following sites: Milos, Greece (museum and site) in 1982; Parthenon restoration project in Athens, Rainsford Street Hops Store in Dublin, Kerkom Castle (Belgium), Palazzo della Corgna and Palazzo dei Consoli (Italy), and the East Indiaman ‘Amsterdam’ (Netherlands) in 1983. No explanation was given as to why these sites were chosen.
This selection process was repeatedly criticised, especially by the members of the European Parliament, for lacking transparency and openness, since even a list of selected projects was not made available for the general public.\textsuperscript{102} It was in response to such criticism that the Commission started a public awareness campaign in 1992 through travelling exhibitions of selected projects, although it is hard to establish how far this form of publicity has improved the transparency and visibility of the scheme.

In 1989, for a more efficient use of the Community's resources, the Commission decided to concentrate its effort on an annual theme highlighting certain aspects of problems involved in conservation work. Under those themes, around 30 to 50 projects were selected each year:

1989: Emerging civil and religious monuments/sites (monuments and sites, archaeological sites, historic gardens which are of exceptional interest due to their historical message or their architectural value)
1990: Historic buildings which define and characterise an urban or rural pattern
1991: Buildings and sites bearing witness to human activities in industry, agriculture and crafts
1992: Integrated upgrading of public spaces in historic centres (to restore the link between historical buildings and public spaces while adapting their social use to their character)
1993: Conservation projects for gardens of historic interest
1994: Historic buildings and sites related to entertainment and the performing arts
1995: Religious monuments (still serving their original religious purposes)\textsuperscript{103}

b) Financial support for the restoration of European monuments and sites of special historical significance

\textsuperscript{101} Support for pilot projects to conserve the Community's architectural heritage, OJ C111, 1984, p.5
\textsuperscript{102} See, for example, questions by MEPs to the European Commission, in OJ C269, 1985, p.20, OJ C60, 1997, p.93
At the initiative of the European Parliament, the Commission has also given financial support for several years for the restoration of following major European monuments: the Parthenon and the Acropolis in Athens; the monasteries of Mount Athos; the historic quarter of the Chiado in Lisbon; Trinity College in Coimbra; and several monuments located on the route to Saint James, Santiago de Compostella (CEC, 1992a:7). It is not clear why these particular monuments/sites were chosen as no explanation was given for this selection. In addition to the above, emergency aid has been allotted due to some catastrophe such as fire or bombing, and the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, the Liceo Theatre in Barcelona, the Brittany Parliament building in Rennes, the site of Delphi and the theatre of Fenice in Venice, have all received Community aid.

c) Grants for training in restoration techniques

From the outset, the Commission linked the problem of heritage conservation to that of providing vocational training in restoration techniques. Thus, the Commission has been allocating a lump sum to the following international institutions specialising in restoration, which then use these funds to award grants to those undertaking training courses: ICCROM (Rome); Centre for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Buildings (Leuven); Centre for Conservation Studies (York); Pro Venetia Viva Foundation (Venice); Institute of Archaeology Conservation Summer School, UCL (London); and Centro Universitario Europeo per i Beni Culturali (Ravello) (CEC, 1992a).

In hindsight, it makes sense that it was ‘cultural heritage’ that was first chosen from the broad spectrum of possible arts and cultural fields, because the cultural heritage is a sector that was easily linked to the improvement of the tourist infrastructure and with employment policy measures. Moreover, it turned out that the technical aspects of heritage conservation needed injections from latest technological developments, which also coincided with the concerns of the EU research and development policies.

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In evaluating policy developments in the cultural field, the Commission commented in 1992: 'The feeling was that, in addition to the intrinsic value of this irreplaceable heritage, Community action was also justified by the social and economic benefits of conservation, in terms of jobs, training, research, new technology, regional development, the tourist and environment industries and quality of life' (CEC, 1992a:4). Because the EU did not have a legal mandate in the cultural field before the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission was often prompted to disguise its cultural aspirations under socio-economic objectives. But it can also be argued that, as part of the general dynamics of European integration where more and more areas of human activities are dominated by transnational market forces, 'European heritage' is also transformed through the EU cultural policy from cultural assets that have intrinsic values into something that generates profits, a strategy which was not so evident in the pre-Maastricht period but which came to constitute a key theme in EU approaches to the cultural heritage at a later stage. As one MEP put it rather crudely, 'conservation brings in more money than it costs' (EP, 1988b:14).

Thus, in selecting conservation projects eligible for support, the 'European dimension' is defined not as some supposed 'Europeanness' that certain monuments or sites symbolise. Rather, the emphasis is on the 'multifaceted importance' attached to those projects in European economic and social, as well as cultural, terms. The pilot projects were thus 'designed to reinforce the bonds of interdependence existing between these three sectors by bringing to the fore the effect that investment in Europe’s past can have upon its future cultural, social and economic development'. This justification explains to a certain degree the seemingly random and incoherent support given to some heritage sites during the initial period, as the beneficiaries of EU support seemed to concentrate in poorer areas and countries among the member states. But this apparent randomness also goes hand in hand with the EU's inability to give a concrete expression to the concept of the European heritage. The Commission has so far evaded disseminating certain sets of images as 'European heritage' or imposing a unified definition of what constitutes common features of European heritage. Indeed, when questioned about the possibility of

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105 OJ C308, 1988, p.3
designating specific sites as being ‘European heritage’, a Commission spokesman specified that it does not have the competence to do so.\textsuperscript{106}

‘RAPHAEL’ Programme

Following the introduction of the ‘cultural clause’ in the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission adopted a proposal for the programme ‘Raphael’ to give a new impetus to Community activities in the field of cultural heritage. The centrality of promoting and preserving cultural heritage within the overall EU cultural policies is highlighted by the fact that Article 128 (Article 151 as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty) specifically identifies cultural heritage as one of the priority fields of action. Although the programme was initially designed for a five-year period from 1996 to 2000, disagreements between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament on its operational details delayed its actual implementation until 1998, and EU support for conservation projects continued in the form of a ‘preparatory framework for Raphael’ during the ‘in-between’ period.

In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the operational framework of Raphael was intended to support and supplement, but not to supersede, the action taken by the member states in the field of the preservation of cultural heritage. Its types of actions were divided into three categories:\textsuperscript{107}

1) Conservation, safeguarding and development of the European cultural heritage through European cultural cooperation

This line of action aimed to encourage the conservation, safeguarding and enhancement of the European cultural heritage by promoting the pooling of skills and the development of best practice. As in the previous scheme for pilot projects, priority was given to projects with a multiplier effect in cultural, technical and socio-economic terms, involving highly qualified labour and/or new technologies and services.

\textsuperscript{106} Question by Ian White to the European Commission, OJ C150, 1991, p.32
a) Support for projects for the conservation and safeguarding of the cultural heritage which qualify as ‘European heritage laboratories’ for its historical, architectural or artistic importance. Particular attention was given to projects that addressed complex conservation problems from the scientific or technical point of view. These projects must be submitted by the competent authorities in the Member States.\(^\text{108}\)

b) Support for the establishment and activities of cooperation networks aimed at studying, protecting and enhancing heritage in line with common themes determined every year by the Commission (the 1998 theme: non-movable heritage, the 1999 theme: movable heritage). The heritage in question must concern a group of buildings or cultural sites distributed over or preserved in at least three countries.

2) Cooperation for the exchange of experiences and the development of techniques applied to the heritage

a) Support for projects aiming at the mobility and training of professionals, especially in the field of new technologies, advanced information and communication services

b) Support for the exchanges of experience and information to develop best conservation practices, including seminars and events that employ advanced information communication technology

3) Public access to, participation in and awareness of the cultural heritage

a) Support for transnational cooperation projects between museums and institutions for the enhancement of and accessibility to the heritage using interactive, multimedia systems and multilingual presentations

\(^{108}\) In 1998, the following ten projects were selected: the site of the battle of Waterloo (Belgium); the Acropolis (Greece); the Camino de Santiago (Spain); ‘AREA’ (safeguard of archives in European archaeology, France); archaeological park in Boyne Valley (Ireland); the tower of Pisa (Italy); the development of long-term durability of marble coated facades (Finland); ‘Tanum’ site with prehistoric engravings (Sweden); the proactive earthwork management of Hadrian’s Wall (UK); and Nidaros Cathedral (Norway). The programme was also open to the EEA countries.
b) Support for innovative events to raise public awareness of the cultural heritage with the use of new technologies (virtual exhibitions, use of multimedia, transnational cultural itineraries, etc.)

4) Cooperation with third countries and international organisations, in particular the Council of Europe and UNESCO

Between 1997 and 1999, the overall budget was ECU 30 million, and support was given to 222 projects and 18 ‘European heritage laboratories’ (CEC, 2004a:6). Compared to previous schemes for the conservation of the cultural heritage, three features stand out in particular. First, the definition of ‘heritage’ was significantly broadened. Whereas earlier support schemes were limited to the restoration of built heritage, Raphael covered movable and immovable heritage (museums and collections, libraries and archives including photographic, cinematographic and sound archives), archaeological and underwater heritage, assemblages and cultural landscapes, as well as architectural heritage. Similarly, support became available to any activities that contribute to better knowledge, management, conservation, restoration, presentation and accessibility of cultural heritage.

Second, and closely related to the first point, Raphael explicitly placed the promotion and preservation of ‘cultural heritage’ within the overall project of growth, competitiveness and employment, whereas in the earlier stage the link between heritage conservation and its wider socio-economic significance was more implicit. The Commission’s proposal for Raphael listed various benefits that heritage conservation is expected to generate (CEC, 1995a). The heritage sector is not just a source of new jobs, but can also ‘contribute significantly to the research/growth/employment dynamism in that it is a sector where the results of research could be exploited more effectively’ by a highly-skilled workforce required at the level of both management and practical implementation of heritage projects (1995a: 2). Moreover, heritage projects are ‘increasingly integrated in regional

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109 Some examples of the selected projects are: a web page on European arctic heritage; seminars and workshops on the promotion of traditional crafts; virtual itineraries for textile heritage; the restoration of baroque altars; and electronic networking of archives and museums. ‘European heritage laboratories’ included financial support for Acropolis.
development policies, particularly in schemes to encourage urban renewal and combat depopulation' (Ibid.). Despite this economic focus, the Commission proposal still continued to pay lip service to the cultural dimension of the programme, although this time the stress was on the dual (or plural) nature of European cultural identity: ‘Europe’s cultural heritage … displays certain common characteristics that transcend national or regional difference. This interplay of diversity and constancy perfectly illustrates the regional, national and European roots of Europe’s citizens’ (CEC, 1995a: 1).

Third, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, Raphael placed a considerable emphasis on the creation of trans-national ties between cultural operators and professionals. We have already seen that the EU’s post-Maastricht cultural programmes are typically organised around the concepts of transnational networks, partnerships and exchanges, and Raphael is no exception. According to Ellmeier, one of the characteristics of EU policies in general is that their structure distinguishes itself in ‘building, stabilising and intensifying connections, consciously refraining from establishing centres but increasing the frequency of movements between nodal points and bases, to a certain extent establishing a new, flexible system of co-operation’ (Ellmeier, 1998: 124). Apart from the action lines 1(a) and 2(a), the eligibility criteria of Raphael required that projects applying for support had to involve technical and financial participation of professionals or organisations from at least three Member States. What is meant by ‘European dimension’ with this regard is simply European collaboration, different nationalities working together on common cultural projects, rather than the realisation of projects having a ‘European theme’. So, while the European cultural heritage is purported to symbolise the interplay of diversity and commonality, the Commission has resorted to presenting the issue of heritage conservation not as a matter of cultural or symbolic contents, but as a technical problem needing solution through an injection of new technologies or transnational cooperation. The technical, objective criteria set out by the Raphael programme allow a European dimension to be claimed without having to single out what constitutes the ‘common cultural heritage’. Raphael thus replicates the basic dilemma that characterises many of the EU’s cultural measures: the existence of differences and overarching unity are both underlined, but this dual theme crucially lacks a clear vision about what would constitute this unity. The basic meaning of
'heritage' as 'something in common ownership received from the past' (Corner and Harvey, 1991: 50) seems to lose much of its significance in the practical context of policy implementation.

Although the main target population of the Raphael programme was cultural professionals and organisations, the projects supported under Action 3 specifically aimed to improve public access to cultural heritage so as to raise their awareness of shared features as well as diversity in European heritage. Here, as in other line of actions in the programme, special attention was given to the use of multimedia systems and products. As the Commission proposal for this programme stated, 'cultural heritage is a priority area for the development of applications and standards of advanced information and communication technology and services...The likely benefits of such work will not be solely in terms of growth, competitiveness or employment...the general public will benefit from a whole range of new and sophisticated cultural products and services' (CEC, 1995a: 2-3).

In this formula, the cultural heritage is no longer that which merely needs to be protected and preserved as an embodiment of the past. Rather, it is conceived as something that needs to be packaged and marketed and also as a vehicle for advancing communication technologies. Accessibility to cultural heritage, therefore, is expected to improve through a presentation that is more technologically sophisticated. In other words, once cultural heritage is attractively packaged with the help of multimedia systems, it would appeal to the contemporary consumers who are in turn believed to increase their European awareness through the consumption of those technology-oriented 'products and services'. In his discussion on EU audiovisual policy, Schlesinger asks whether the EU may be advocating a vision of 'techno-utopia', where differences and divisions are overcome through new developments in information technology and where citizens are held together by technology-driven consumption (Schlesinger, 1997). This observation has a direct relevance to the approach the EU has adopted in relation to 'European heritage'.

Heritage, tourism and information technologies

The Raphael programme was later integrated, together with other cultural programmes (Kaleidoscope and Ariane), into the Culture 2000 programme. But the
conservation of cultural heritage features prominently in this framework programme, with approximately 34% of Culture 2000 earmarked for cultural heritage. This new framework was adopted in order to redress the problem of public access to and participation in culture by offering a comprehensive and transparent structure, since previous programmes were seen as fragmented and 'can be detrimental to the Community’s image among the European public, who are unaware that such efforts are being made to preserve and promote their cultures or that the cultural dimension is taken into account in furthering European integration' (CEC, 1998c: 5). In its policy statement, the Commission once again employed the rhetoric of culture as a basis of European identity: 'If citizens give their full support to, and participate fully in, European integration, greater emphasis should be placed on their common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity'.

Nevertheless, apart from the fact that it now includes cultural activities aimed at social integration of the young and the socially disadvantaged, the basic approach of the Culture 2000 programme does not differ from that of 'Raphael'. European cultural heritage, through the operational structure of this programme, is again constructed as a strategic site through which transnational, technology-led production and consumption patterns can develop.

In addition to the above programmes, the EU has a range of other measures that are relevant to the heritage sector outside the narrowly-defined scope of its cultural activities. There are two policy areas that deserve mention here, not only because they directly concern cultural heritage conservation, but also the scope and the impact of these policy areas far exceeds that of the Raphael (and Culture 2000) programme. They also demonstrate the extent to which the agendas of different Commission DGs converge on a particular interpretation of 'European culture' and 'cultural heritage'. This is an important point as EU institutions have repeatedly stressed the centrality of enhancing 'synergetic effects' between culture and other relevant areas and activities of the EU (see Chapter 3).

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10 OJ L63, 2000, p.1
11 See for instance, the Council's recent resolution on 'the horizontal aspects of culture: increasing synergies with other sectors and Community actions and exchanging good practices in relation to the social and economic dimensions of culture', Official Journal C136, 11/06/2003.
The first of such areas is tourism. The EU does not have 'tourism policy' as such, but its activities in various fields are directly related to tourism. Most EU funding for tourism is channelled through structural funds, the most important of which is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). ERDF has a category dedicated to projects on cultural heritage sites and monuments where these contribute to the development of the region in which they are located. The European Social Fund, another major component of the structural funds, also supports heritage conservation where it is relevant for training or resettlement of unemployed workers. I have noted in Chapter 3 that more than 80% of overall EU support for cultural activities comes from the structural funds. It is estimated that between 1989 and 1993 ECU 400 million was allocated through the structural funds to projects with a cultural dimension (excluding tourism), and the figure would be ten times this amount if the tourism sector is included (EP, 1998: 24).

Interestingly, it is European cultural diversity, not unity, which makes the link between culture, tourism and cohesion so valuable. According to the Commission document 'Cohesion Policy and Culture', 'The diversity of cultural heritage in Europe is one of the most valuable assets. It forms a major part of the continent's identity. As yet, however, the full potential of this asset remains under-exploited, as do opportunities for further innovation' (CEC, 1996c: 2). Simply put, culture is an economic asset for poor regions (Delgado-Moreira, 2000: 462). The broadening of the definition of cultural heritage under the Raphael programme needs to be understood in this context. 'Cultural heritage', if we follow the EU's definition, now includes movable and immovable heritage, archaeological and architectural heritage, natural heritage, linguistic and gastronomic heritage and traditional crafts and occupations. Because every region has a culture to offer for tourist consumption, tourism, and more specifically cultural tourism, came to be seen as a convenient way of enticing tourists to as yet 'undiscovered' (and therefore underdeveloped) regions and areas of Europe, thereby contributing to the EU's economic and social cohesion. In this process, local, regional or national cultures and heritage become

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112 OJ C99, 1986, p.22
113 For example, ERDF has given financial support to the restoration of Byzantine architecture and the construction of a vast museum complex in the Greek town of Mystras. ERDF support was also given
crucial as 'unique' or 'authentic' elements of culture are mobilised to accentuate place-specific differences and enhance the distinctive qualities of a region or locality (Richards, 1996).

Another policy strand that has a particular bearing on the cultural heritage is the area of Research and Development. The Information Society programme that has been running under the 5th (1998-2002) and the 6th (2002-2006) research and development frameworks has several research strands with cultural heritage themes. For example, within the key action 'The City of Tomorrow and Cultural Heritage' (1998-2002), the EU encouraged industrial participation, particularly high-tech companies, in the development of methodologies for protecting cultural heritage through research networking and technology transfer.\textsuperscript{114} In another research domain, the DigiCult (Digital Heritage and Cultural Content) programme was designed to ensure that institutions holding cultural heritage resources (libraries, museums, archives, universities, etc.) fully exploit the opportunities offered by digital technologies for preserving them for the future as well as for providing quality access to European citizens.\textsuperscript{115}

Recently, the EU has introduced a more market-oriented programme called eContent, with a budget of EUR 100 million for the period between 2001 and 2005. It aims to promote the commercial use of cultural contents (heritage, art, archives, etc.) that can be distributed via multimedia products and digital networks. Again, it is the diversity of European cultural heritage that constitutes the focal point here. The underlying assumption is that, because of Europe's cultural and linguistic diversity, European firms are better positioned to develop diversified services tailored to the customer's needs. In announcing the launch of eContent, Erkki Liikanen, the Commissioner responsible for enterprise and Information Society, noted: 'We should turn Europe's rich content base into a competitive advantage in the Information Society ... the customers are not likely to be willing to pay for content unless it is available in a culturally customised format and in their own language'.\textsuperscript{116}

to the COAST network which aims to preserve, revitalise and commercialise the cultural heritage of coastal regions.

\textsuperscript{114} Press release downloaded from \textlangle http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2000/pr2011en.html\textrangle

\textsuperscript{115} Available at \textlangle http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka3/digicult\textrangle.
European heritage and cultural identity in a post-industrial world

In contrast to what the above analysis of the EU policy programme suggests, Vivian Reding, European Commissioner responsible for education and culture, stresses the identity-conferring qualities of cultural heritage: 'In the field of safeguarding and promoting heritage of European importance, the European Community recognises the value of the foundations of Europe, more precisely; the cultural roots and trends which are common to Europeans. In this respect heritage is an irreplaceable means of increasing European awareness and of spreading knowledge about our culture.'

This view, which regards culture as an embodiment of the collective memories of Europeans and therefore a guarantee for the uniqueness of Europe, often appears in the EU discourse as part of a critique of globalisation. Commissioner Reding thus continues: '[o]ur action should be continued not only in order to protect heritage against the ravages of time and environmental damage, but also in order to counteract the erosion of cultural identity by globalisation and because we have a responsibility to hand this heritage down to future generations'.

This is a somewhat ironic argument when European integration represents for many people a homogenising force which threatens national or regional cultures and identities. If globalisation means de-nationalisation, European integration is indeed part of this broader process.

According to Alain Touraine, the most important aspect of the process of de-nationalisation is:

the dissociation between mass production and the diffusion of material and cultural goods on the one hand, and the cultural meanings that are created by memory, education, self image and the material presence of the past in landscape, monuments and language on the other. The new Europe is becoming “postmodern”, if this expression is taken to mean such a separation between....markets and values.’ (1994:15-16)

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116 Available at <http://www.cordis.lu/econtent/release.htm>
117 Available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/artiredeuropostra_en.html>, 06/06/01
118 Ibid.
Once the centre of both economic activity and a particularistic cultural life, the nation state is losing its power to hold these two universes together as the gap between them grow bigger and bigger. People participate in flows of money or information, but these activities are not easily transformed into value orientations. In such cases, Touraine argues, individuals and groups tend to become inwardly oriented, and often seek refuge in defensive identities.

This separation between globalising economic activities and localised cultural meanings in a (post)modern society is formulated somewhat differently by Giddens. For him, the core of globalisation is, simply put, the stretching of social relations across time and space beyond the constrictions of face-to face interactions in the localities of pre-modern times (Giddens, 1990). So the link between our mundane cultural experience and our location is transformed at every level: ‘the very tissue of spatial experience alters, conjoining proximity and distance in ways that have few parallels in prior ages’ (1990: 140).

However, he argues against the familiar claim that modernity means the loss of the existential comforts and assurances of local communal experience in the face of distant social forces which increasingly structure our lives. Rather, he maintains that we retain a sense of familiarity in our day-to-day experience of local contexts, but that this familiarity no longer derives from the particularities of localised place. So people may still feel ‘at home’ in their localities but they are at some level aware that these are what he calls ‘phantasmagoric places’ in which familiar features are often not unique to that locale and part of its ‘organic development’ but, rather, features that have been ‘placed into’ the locale by distanciated forces. This experience -‘dis-placement’ in Giddens’ terminology- means that people ‘own’ their local places phenomenologically in a sort of provisional sense, recognising the absent forces which structure this ownership. And this perception is linked to the reality of a steadily declining local ownership of public space in a direct material sense linked to the globalisation of capital.

Seen in this context, the EU’s attempts to promote European cultural heritage can be described as reclaiming of ‘ownership’ of localities in a phenomenological sense by asserting supposedly distinct characteristics of European culture. The EU’s promotional booklet entitled ‘Investing in Culture: an Asset for all Regions’ alarms
the reader that the 'European way of life' - identity rooted in particularities of place - is now under threat due to globalisation:

At a time of increasing internationalisation, the Internet and the global village, the disappearance of certain local cultures is a genuine fear. Even national cultures seem threatened, as well as the distinctive character of European culture as a whole... What we do, what we buy and how we live: is there anything typically European about these? The answer is not self-evident. So, coming up to the end of this century, does Europe still have the means to defend its own identity, or is it on the point of merging for good with the great Western identity? (CEC, 1998g:4)

Considering that the EU attaches so much importance to border-transcending communication technologies as a means to heighten European awareness among the general public, this dichotomy between globalising and homogenising 'Western' identity and European identity seems rather misplaced. But the Commission tries to assure us of the EU’s role as a guarantor of local particularities: '(the) European Union preserves the identities and the cultural rights of each community; the public need not consider the Union as something which dilutes their cultural identities, but rather as something which guarantees the existence and flowering of their cultures’ (CEC, 1998c: 3). It should be noted here that when a term such as 'the cultural rights of each community' appears in the EU discourse on culture, 'European culture' is typically placed on the same level as national or local cultures as something that gives people assurance of communal experience as opposed to the 'false' or 'phantasmagoric' familiarity generated by globalisation.

Where once Europe symbolised dominance and expansionism, the present invocation of 'European heritage' is filled with elitist nostalgia, in which Europe retreats into the images of 'the past grandeur as a bastion against future uncertainties' (Morley and Robins, 1995:88). This makes a stark contrast with the insularity and certainty of European identity and continuity, a picture of Europe which authors such as Duroselle are at pains to portray. The EU officials thus draw on 'classical' images in their quest to revive the past 'golden age', as can be seen in the targeting of the Acropolis and Mount Athos as two of the largest EU-funded projects within its
programmes to support heritage conservation. As Morley and Robins argue, such an effort amounts to a ‘retrenchment of Europe’ (1995: 88), signifying the defensive nature inherent in the present construction of European identity.

Thus, in the context of the ‘new Europe’, the past glory is being revived as a shield against uncertainties brought about by globalisation, in a manner that echoes the British obsession with heritage during the 1970s and 1980s (Hewison, 1987). The ‘heritage mania’ in Britain, according to Wright, had an ideological function for the Neo-Conservative government whose strategy to counter the destabilising effects of transitional periods was to ‘freeze the whole of social life over, raising a highly selective image of British particularity to the level of Absolute Spirit and presenting it as the essential identity of the betrayed nation to which we must all return’ (1985:26). Heritage provided a convenient rhetorical mediation which allowed Thatcher governments to pursue the economic logic of international business and finance while still retaining the idea of the historical nation (Corner and Harvey, 1991). However, if ‘heritage’ functioned as a compensatory mechanism in relation to the undertones of destabilisation and fragmentation carried by the neoliberal imperative, it is the connections between the celebration and marketing of a selective past and economic and commercial expansion which are more apparent in the 1990s (see below). In the case of ‘European heritage’, EU policy makers have so far failed to give substance to the arguably vacuous concept of the ‘European heritage’, despite their desire to lay claim to the communal ownership of ‘European home’. Regardless of a nostalgic image promoted by the EU’s rhetoric of anti-globalisation and cultural protectionism, the notion of ‘European heritage’ prevalent in the context of concrete policy measures seems to embrace and reinforce, but not to counteract, the predominance of neoliberal discourse.

The EU’s ambivalence toward European culture and heritage may be seen as a direct reflection of general tendencies in a contemporary world which is characterised by ‘the intersection of manifest technical possibility with a low point in cultural-political confidence’ (Tomlinson, 1999:99). It is against this background that ‘heritage industries’ have come to proliferate in post-industrial nation states, and it is one approach to culture that clearly prioritises economic logic over cultural contents. A common feature of those heritage industries lies in their belief that conservation pays. As heritage sites and public museums are increasingly required to
perform like private businesses, they have begun to adopt pro-active visitor strategies, charging for admission or marketing their commodities in gift shops. Another issue is that, because the museum’s role in representing the past is now shared to a much greater extent with the modern visual media, the rationale for public museum has become more problematical. One way of responding to this twin challenge is to embrace the technological advancements, a trend which gave rise to the ‘multimedia museum’ (Lumley, 1988). Thus they use the images of the past to create, employing all the technologies available, a spectacle, or an environment that is different but remains somewhat familiar and safe so as to provide an experience of particular localities to the consumers of those images (Walsh, 1992). As a form of leisure and entertainment, these images of the past are manipulated to produce the most attractive package, which sometimes results in a complete re-stylisation of historical elements involved (Hewison, 1991). From interactive museums to theme parks with a computer simulated ‘trip’ to the past, the heritage industry channels a sense of dislocation and dis-embeddedness in modern times into leisurely consumption, thereby transforming the images of past into just another element within an expanding realm of flexible capital. However, as Walsh points out, while the number of museums and heritage sites have increased and attendance has risen as a result of the flourishing heritage industry, it is mostly the professional managerial ‘service class’ who benefited from these commodified packages of the past (Walsh, 1992).

Clearly, the EU has adopted, at least in part, this ‘heritage industry approach’ in relation to its cultural heritage, while still retaining the essentialist definition of European culture which is counterposed to the ‘anti-culture’ of globalisation. After all, the strongest impetus behind European integration lies in the sphere of market, rather than in culture or politics. J. G. A. Pocock argues that the entity presently being shaped by Europeanisation is not a political community but ‘a set of arrangements for ensuring the surrender by states of their power to control the movement of economic forces which exercise the ultimate authority in human affairs’ (1997: 311). In this ‘empire of the market’, the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion are redrawn, and the new European ‘other’ would be ‘those populations who do not achieve the sophistication without which the global market has little for them and less need for them’ (1997: 314).
Conclusion

The EU policy on the conservation of cultural heritage represents two conflicting views on culture. In various documents, speeches or press releases emanating from Brussels, 'European culture' or 'European cultural heritage' is characteristically regarded as the expression of distinct European values and practices which must be protected from the distant social and economic forces of globalisation. On the other hand, at the level of actual policy management, culture is increasingly seen not in terms of its symbolic values but of its capacity to generate economic profits. Does 'Europeanisation' mean the creation of a 'Europe' which is filled with essentialised cultural contents, or is it based on the dominance of the market mechanism and growth in European competitiveness in a global market? As far as EU cultural programmes such as 'Raphael' can give us any indication, the EU seems to be veering towards the latter path. At the same time, while EU policy regarding cultural heritage, at least at the level of practical policy implementation, have moved away from a monolithic concept of European culture and has increasingly stressed the multiple character of European cultures, the EU is still entangled in conceptual confusion by trying to fit them into some sort of unity. And perhaps this is why the EU has not yet been able to establish a political framework which could guarantee cultural pluralism.
CHAPTER 7
European City of Culture

Since its launch in 1985, the European City of Culture programme has developed over the years from an extended summer festival to a year-long event with an impact that extends beyond the sphere of culture. But the evolution of this programme also meant that different approaches adopted by cities have tended to divert from the original aims of this scheme. This was marked by a shift in the functions of the European City of Culture event. From being a mere accessory to places with an established cultural reputation, it has come to be used as an instrument for solving urban problems that lie outside the immediate realm of the arts. This shift was also accompanied by the broadening of the definition of culture that encompasses wide areas including tourism, leisure, sport and the media.

This chapter thus focuses on the discrepancy between the official objectives of European City of Culture and its actual implementation, and investigates why this event has become a tool of cultural policy capable of achieving multiple goals. This will be examined in the context of overall structural changes in Europe’s economy and society. Since it is almost impossible as well as impractical to collect the detailed data of all the Cities of Culture to date and to present it within the space of one chapter, I will concentrate my analysis on the case of Glasgow in 1990. I chose Glasgow not only because it represents a shift in the way in which the designation has been handled by local policy-makers, but also because it is the best documented case of all the European City of Culture events so far. The organisation of the event by other cities will be also reviewed briefly where relevant.

Legal framework of the European City of Culture programme

An idea to designate each year a ‘European City of Culture’ arose from a suggestion by the then Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri, at the first meeting of Culture Ministers of the European Community in November 1983. This was in response to the ‘Solemn Declaration of European Union’ made by the EC Heads of State in June 1983, which had invited member states to promote European awareness
and to undertake joint action in a number of cultural areas (Myerscough, 1994). The City of Culture event was thus designed to ‘help bring the peoples of the Member States closer together’ through ‘the expression of a culture which, in its historical emergence and contemporary development, is characterized by having both common elements and a richness born of diversity’. In view of the fact that the proposal came from Greece, Athens was nominated the first City of Culture in 1985. Since then, the event has rotated around the member states of the EU, with a different city being awarded the title every year. The first cycle of 12 EC member states was completed in 1996, after which non-member states in Europe were also given eligibility to host the European City of Culture event as long as they base ‘themselves on the principles of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law’. Recognising the growing interest in holding the event inside and outside the Community, the Ministers for Culture also launched in 1990 a further cultural event, the European Cultural Month which in principle only lasts for a month, as an alternative to the European City of Culture.

Although this event has frequently been cited as a part of the Commission’s ‘consciousness-raising campaign’ (see Barnet, 2001; Shore, 2000), the European City of Culture was until recently not formally a Commission programme. In fact, all decisions concerning the designation of the cities until 2004 were taken on an intergovernmental basis by representatives of member states (the ministers for culture) meeting within the Council. The Commission provides limited financial support to organise the event once the selection has been made, but as the former Commissioner for the DGX (now the Directorate-General for education and culture) has emphasised, no Council decision designating the cities refers to any Community support. Between 1985 and 1994, the Commission’s financial contribution to the European Cities of Culture averaged less than one per cent of the total budget (Myerscough, 1994). Furthermore, applications for the title are made by national

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119 Resolution of the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, meeting within the Council, of 13 June 1985 concerning the annual even ‘European City of Culture’, Official Journal C 153.
120 Conclusions of the Ministers of Culture Meeting within the Council of 18 May 1990 of future eligibility for the European City of Culture and on a special European Cultural Month Event, Official Journal C162.
121 In a strict legal sense, the decisions of ministers ‘meeting within the Council’ are taken by ministers acting in the capacity of national representatives and not by the Council itself as a collective body.
governments on behalf of candidate cities, and the member state in which the designated city is situated appoints the body which would be solely responsible for the actual organisation and financing of the event. This means that, despite the fact that it is an intergovernmental scheme initiated by the Council of Ministers, the cities have been given freedom of action with minimal institutional input from the EU, the content of the project being left to the particular city in question according to its own needs. This may account for growing popularity of this event among national and local authorities, which is evidenced by increasing number of candidates for the nomination. The large number of applications, as well as the particular symbolism of the beginning of the new millennium, has led the Council to select nine cities as European City of Culture for the year 2000. For the years between 2001 and 2004, the total of 13 nominations were submitted to the Council.

In 1999, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a decision to appropriate ‘European City of Culture’ as a Community action, for the cultural competence assigned to the EU by the Maastricht Treaty required that this initiative be moved from the domain of intergovernmental decisions to a programme within the Community framework (CEC, 1997a). The Decision introduces a selection system of automatic rotation between the member states, the order of which is determined by where the office of President of the Council is held, and under which a different member state nominates one city (or cities) for each year for the period of 2005 to 2019. (See below) The nomination or nominations are notified to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Committee of the Regions by the member state concerned. The Commission then each year forms a

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122 Answer given by M. Oreja to the question no. 2604/96 by D. Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Official Journal C83, 1997.
126 With this Decision, the title of the event was changed from European ‘City’ of Culture to European ‘Capital’ of Culture in line with current practice in a number of the member states. However, throughout this chapter I refer to the event as ‘European City of Culture’ for the sake of coherence and clarity.
selection panel which will judge the nomination(s) against the objectives and characteristics of this programme, after which the European Parliament may forward its opinion to the Commission. The selection panel is composed of seven ‘leading figures who are experts on the cultural sector’, of whom two will be appointed by the European Parliament, two by the Council, two by the Commission and one by the Committee of the Regions. Then the Council, ‘acting on a recommendation from the Commission drawn up in the light of the opinion of the European Parliament and of the selection panel’s report, officially designates the city in question for the year for which it has been nominated’. Currently, EU support for the City of Culture event is financed through the Culture 2000 programme in the category of ‘emblematic action’.

Table 2: Order of Entitlement to Nominate a European City of Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ireland (Cork)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Greece (Patras)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Netherlands**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The cities for the years 2005 and 2006 have already been selected
** The Netherlands was originally the host country in 2006 but swapped places with Greece with mutual agreement

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Therefore, even though the Decision is intended to place this event within a Community framework, it is still the member states who nominate a city which will then be formally designated as the City of Culture by the Council. This was despite the Parliament’s attempt to centralise, or ‘Europeanise’, the selection process as well as the planning of the event programmes. As early as 1990, the Parliament was pressing for a significant increase in financial support from the Commission and greater involvement of the Parliament both in the choice and nomination of the city and in the event itself (EP, 1990b:5,9). In the process leading up to the adoption of the above Decision, it insisted that each year ECU 2 million\(^{129}\) should be provided as the direct contribution from the EU to the European City of Culture programme.\(^{130}\)

As for the contents of the event programmes, a conclusion was made from the Parliament’s own survey of the past Cities of Culture that more effort has to be made by the cities ‘to encourage cooperation and the sharing of culture and ideas between Member States’, because ‘[c]ultural integration has often been sacrificed for the sake of the city’s promotion’ (EP, 1990b:9).

The Decision also sets out for the first time a list of criteria that a selected city should satisfy, ‘in order to maintain the cultural value of the action’.\(^{131}\) A designated city’s programme must first of all include ‘a cultural project of European dimension’ that highlights ‘the city’s own culture and cultural heritage as well as its place in the common cultural heritage, and involving people concerned with cultural activities from other European countries with a view to establishing lasting cooperation’.\(^{132}\)

For this objective, the following elements have to be taken into account by the planners of the event:

1. Promotion of shared artistic movements and styles in the development of which the city has played a particular role
2. Organisation of artistic events (music, dance, theatre, visual arts, cinema, etc.) and improvement of the promotion and management of the arts

\(^{129}\) ECU corresponds to 1 EURO.
\(^{130}\) Legislative Resolution embodying Parliament’s opinion on the proposal establishing a Community initiative for the European City of Culture events, Official Journal C152.
3. Promotion of European public awareness of the figures and events which have marked the history and culture of the city

4. Organisation of specific activities designed to encourage artistic innovation and to generate new forms of cultural action and dialogue

5. Organisation of measures to increase access to and awareness of fixed and movable artistic assets and artistic productions specific to the city

6. Organisation of specific cultural projects designed to bring young people to the arts

7. Organisation of specific cultural projects designed to increase social cohesion

8. Taking the planned activities to a wider public, particularly through the use of multimedia and audiovisual means and a multilingual approach

9. Contribution to the development of economic activity, particularly, in terms of employment and tourism

10. Need to develop high-quality and innovative cultural tourism with due allowance being made for the importance in this connection of managing the cultural heritage on a sustainable basis and reconciling the wishes of visitors with those of the local population

11. Organisation of projects designed to encourage the development of links between the architectural heritage and strategies for new urban development

12. Joint organisation of initiatives designed to promote dialogue between the cultures of Europe and the cultures of other parts of the world.\[33\]

It should be noted here that some of the above criteria do not easily fit into the nominal objective of this scheme which is inherently cultural: ‘the purpose [of the European City of Culture] ... is to highlight the cultural wealth and diversity of the cities of Europe whilst emphasising their shared cultural heritage and the vitality of the arts.’ (CEC, 1997a) In other words, it is not enough that a designated city promote culture in its ‘unity in diversity’ so that European citizens can reaffirm their cultural identity as ‘Europeans’. Its programme is expected to serve a number of

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133 Ibid.
other objectives including social cohesion, creation of employment, urban development, promotion of tourism and the development of economic activity. In fact, by setting out a list of elements that focuses not only on cultural aims but also on economic and social benefits that could be generated from cultural activities, this criterion effectively validates the actual practices of the Cities of Culture in seeking multiple utility of culture for their own ends rather than, as advocated by the Parliament, aiming to rectify a current imbalance between European cultural dimension and city promotion.

**TABLE 3: European Cultural Months**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Cracow</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Graz</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ljubljana</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Linz</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Plodiv</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Riga</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4: European Cities of Culture and their budgets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget (MECU)</th>
<th>EU contribution (thousand ECU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Berlin (West)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>E1</td>
<td>E2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Antwerp</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Thessaloniki</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>295.0</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Weimar</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santiago de Compostella</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>33.89</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avignon</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cracow</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>12.29</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Porto</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Brugge</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Graz</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Myerscough, 1994; Cogliandro, 2001

* : data not available

Early examples

The only comprehensive study to date of the European City of Culture event is one by John Myerscough published in 1994. The study, carried out at the request of and with financial subsidy from the Commission, reviews the organisation and the impact
of the event since its inception and highlights the way in which different cities treated the designation. For instance, Athens, the first City of Culture, focused on 'high culture' and brought some improvements to the physical infrastructure for cultural activities in the city. Florence interpreted the designation as an opportunity to reinforce its widely-perceived cultural reputation, while Amsterdam assembled a programme that centred around professional art and studiously avoided 'populism'. West Berlin sought to create a meeting point for artists from both West and East Europe, while in Paris the event, with no extra programming, was totally overshadowed by the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution (Myerscough, 1994). Despite these differences in approach, the common feature of those first five Cities of Culture is that they were all already established cultural centres with a wealth of cultural facilities (Richards, 2000).

The turning point for the European City of Culture event came with the designation of Glasgow in 1990. Compared to the first five Cities, Glasgow was not a place normally associated with the word 'culture'. And as will be examined in detail in the following sections, that was precisely the point which the planners of Glasgow 1990 set out to change (Booth and Boyle, 1993; Ward, 1998). Unlike its predecessors where the nomination was not always at the request of the city concerned and where planning could be compromised by the short run-in times, the UK for the first time adopted an internal bidding process to select its candidate (Myerscough, 1994). This meant that the chosen city was able to formulate objectives reflecting its own needs and to give a thorough preliminary consideration to its organisation and implementation. Thus Glasgow was the first city to undertake a full 12 months programme, with a significantly larger number of performances and exhibitions presented throughout the year. It was also the first city to secure major sponsorship support from the private sector. This was in contrast to the earlier period (especially Athens and Florence) when the national authorities carried most of the financial responsibilities (Myerscough, 1994). After Glasgow, there was a shift to the partnership approach between the state, the local authorities and the private sector. Moreover, while it was West Berlin which first allocated a significant budget (ECU 1.9 million) to promoting its event, Glasgow more than tripled this sum with a budget of ECU 6.55 million, and subsequently almost all cities made substantial provision for promotion and publicity in the range of 10 to 15 per cent of the project cost.
(Myerscough, 1994). Also in 1990, the organisers of former and forthcoming Cities of Culture set up a network called the Network of the European Cities of Culture and Cultural Months, with a main aim ‘to promote and extend cooperation and to encourage cooperation between member cities, organisations and people working in cultural and creative fields in those cities’ (quoted in Cogliandro, 2001:19).

Glasgow, therefore, represents a break from its predecessors in terms of scope, scale, programme components and what it entails to be designated as the City of Culture. One of the benefits accrued from hosting the event in 1990 was a greater exposure of the city to the outside world, with marked increase in visitor numbers and press coverage, giving a strong boost for the city’s tourism industry (Myerscough, 1994). The event was also widely judged an economic success, producing a net economic benefit to the city of between £10 million and £14 million, mainly as a result of tourist expenditure (Myerscough, 1991). Still hailed as one of the most successful example of European City of Culture (See Sjoholt, 1999; DCMS, 2001), Glasgow inspired other cities to capitalise on the potential presented by this scheme. Since Glasgow, many of the designated European Cities of Culture were cities which do not conform to the traditional category of ‘cultural centres’, such as Antwerp (1993), Thessaloniki (1997), Bergen (2000), Reykjavik (2000), Rotterdam (2001), Porto (2001), Genoa (2004) and Lille (2004). The entry of such not-so-cultural cities into the European City of Culture scheme has tended to emphasise economic and social aspects of the event while still retaining a cultural focus (Richards, 1996). As a consequence, the overall function of the scheme has changed over time, from merely reinforcing already established cultural profile of cities to utilising culture as a tool for economic and urban development. This is also reflected in a marked increase in EU support since 1991 as the event came to touch upon not just the direct policy concerns of the DG X (networking, cultural sponsorship, etc.) but also several other areas of Commission competence such as urban regeneration, training and tourism.

However, this is not to say that all the designated cities since Glasgow placed economic targets at the centre of their objectives. There are cases where the primary concern of the event organisers lay somewhere else, although they were also mindful of the incidental economic benefits success might bring. Madrid (1992), for example, set a broadly political objective, namely to establish the democratic credentials of the
city and of Spain as a whole by reasserting the capital’s own cultural claims to be a European city of first rank (Myerscough, 1994). Thus the event was used as a part of a wider Spanish image-building campaign as a fully democratic and prosperous state, which included EXPO 92 in Seville and the Olympic games in Barcelona in the same year. Similarly, the designation of Weimar (1999) was important for symbolising the integration of East and West Europe as well as for contributing to the physical transformation and restoration of the city (Roth and Frank, 2000). Therefore, without making an over-generalised statement about the centrality of economic goals in the organisation of these events, one may note at this point that European City of Culture has become a versatile tool capable of incorporating multiple objectives rather than a purely cultural manifestation. In order to examine this shift, we now need to go back to the case Glasgow 1990 in detail as it reflects broader change in the nature and functions of a city in relation to its culture in today’s Europe.

The case of Glasgow 1990

It is well known that many places in advanced capitalist world have in the past decades suffered enormous losses of manufacturing employment resulting from de-industrialisation. In Glasgow, this problem presented itself in more acute forms than in any other cities in Britain due to its over-reliance on metal manufacturing, in particular ship building and mechanical engineering (Ward, 1998). Those traditional heavy industries fell into a decline in the course of the 1960s, and with its economic core in crisis, Glasgow’s entire manufacturing base was drawn into the downward spiral. Between 1971 and 1983, the city’s manufacturing employment dropped by no less than 45 per cent. From the ‘second city of the empire’, Glasgow came to be known in some quarters as the ‘cancer of the empire’ (Boyle and Hughes, 1991: 219). Glasgow was one of the first European cities to fall a victim to de-industrialisation and its severe consequences, with population, employment, income and the level of services in the area falling into a fast decline (Van der Borg et al., 1995: 108). Thus the local authorities of Glasgow found themselves faced with the task of reversing that downward development in both economic and social terms.

The difficulty in Glasgow, as in many other de-industrialising cities, was that the growth of the service sector could not compensate for the loss of industrial job
opportunities. After years of futile attempts to regenerate the city, the recognition of this shift in the economic base had brought about the development of post-industrial policy in the early 1980s, led by the Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow District Council and the Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Central to this new policy orientation was the strategy of attracting capital investment from external sources. A major obstacle in pursuing this objective, however, was the negative images of Glasgow, traditionally perceived as 'hard, dirty and violent, a seemingly unstormable stronghold of the left' (Ward, 1998: 191). It was against this background that Glasgow District Council launched a campaign for the city's image building and self-promotion. Deeply impressed by New York's city marketing campaign in the 1970s which was credited with rescuing the city from the brink of bankruptcy, Lord Provost (Mayor) Michael Kelly initiated the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' campaign in 1983 with the support of the city business and institutional interests. Advertisements of this city were placed in the underground and railway stations as well as in the national and international press, proclaiming that Glasgow had transformed itself into a vibrant post-industrial city (Ward, 1998).

Although dismissed by many as no more than just self-congratulatory hype, this campaign was built on a strong belief of those local policy makers in Glasgow's unrealised potential, a belief that Glasgow did have a rich artistic and cultural heritage which could be used to its own advantage. Significant in this connection is the opening of a new museum that coincided with the 'Mile's Better' campaign, to house the internationally renowned Burrell Collection, a 8,000 piece accumulation of art works initially built up by a major Glasgow shipowner. Hence Glasgow's existing cultural resources, such as Scottish Opera, the National Orchestra and the Citizens' Theatre, together with the newly-opened Burrell Collection, 'became part of the marketing literature, joining references to the city parks, access to outdoor recreation, and the proximity to the Scottish Highlands, promoting the city for tourism, for inward investors, for business' (Booth and Boyle, 1993: 31). Also fundamentally tied to this strategy was Mayfest International, an annual arts festival, and the Glasgow Garden Festival organised by the Scottish Development Agency in 1988. With major property developments such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre and the upmarket retail complex of Prince's Square, those events and facilities have formed cultural attractions to draw in the right types of people and investment. Thus
by the mid-1980s, the importance of urban cultural life in Glasgow was rediscovered and then re-positioned at the centre of the city’s economic renewal programmes. In this way, ‘culture’ began to be developed as a marketable commodity aimed at potential business investors, high-income consumers and tourists. Seen in this context, the European City of Culture event in 1990 represents another way of extending a series of those rigorous city marketing campaigns designed to fuse culture and economic regeneration.

The submission for consideration as European City of Culture was made by Glasgow District Council in April 1986. The British Minister for the Arts invited local bids for the title to be held in 1990, and the resultant shortlist included Edinburgh, Cardiff, Swansea, Bristol, Bath, Cambridge, Leeds and Liverpool, as well as Glasgow (Ward, 1998: 204). The bid documents for Glasgow identified the objectives of hosting the event as follows:

1. To maintain momentum already generated by the image building initiatives and the marketing effort
2. To provide a corporate marketing platform for the city’s various artistic activities
3. To utilise and build upon the existing organisational experience and co-operative effort within the city
4. To stimulate increased awareness, participation and cultural developments in Glasgow (Glasgow District Council, 1987: 2-3)

The bids clearly stressed the need for Glasgow to improve its international profile by demonstrating its renewed cultural image. One of the main benefits expected of this event was economic developments directly through the attraction of tourists and indirectly through supporting an attractive image that might invite inward investment and relocated business headquarters. Strong emphasis was also placed on the city’s history of successful initiatives in culture-led urban regeneration programmes and on the prospect for securing commercial sponsorship. This approach fitted the UK government’s emphasis on entrepreneurial initiatives and public-private sector partnership (Richards, 2000), and in October 1986 Glasgow was nominated as City of Culture. The choice of Glasgow came as a surprise to many, but those with a vested interest in raising the city’s cultural reputation were determined to exploit this
opportunity as much as possible (Ward, 1998). With the mounting pressure to achieve those ambitious goals, the task of co-ordinating the event was delegated to the Festivals Office established within Glasgow District Council in the summer of 1987.

An additional and timely contribution to Glasgow’s approach to urban renewal appeared in 1988, the publication of a study by the Policy Studies Institute on the economic importance of the arts in Glasgow (Myerscough, 1988). The study, which was commissioned by Glasgow District Council, the Greater Glasgow Tourist Board, Glasgow Action\textsuperscript{134} and the Scottish Arts Council, assessed the economic potential of the arts within a regional economy and examined its productive qualities in terms of employment, income generation and cultural tourism. It estimated, for instance, that thirty-six per cent of attendance at the arts in Glasgow was by tourists whose cultural and related activities generated some four hundred jobs. Moreover, the cultural industries, broadly defined as publishing, design, broadcasting, film, music and video, created £174 million income. Altogether, it was concluded that the arts in Glasgow was a £204 million industry and employed 2.25 per cent of the working population either directly or indirectly. This report clearly substantiated in quantifiable terms the logic of promoting culture as a direct agent of urban regeneration. Tessa Jackson, the Visual Arts Officer at the Festivals Office, commented on how the idea underlying this report dominated the thinking behind the organisation of the year 1990:

The proactive Festivals Office found itself being established almost simultaneously with this form of philosophy. Although direct Government funding of 1990 was minimal, more substantial funds were made available through the Scottish Development Agency, in the form of area improvement grants or job creation projects. In all, the objectives of 1990 were clear - they were related to longer-term cultural, social and economic benefits for Glasgow. Therefore the political and economic pressures on the Festivals Office were to ensure that it was not simply a fireworks party. (Jackson, 1991: 15)

\textsuperscript{134} A branch of the Scottish Development Agency set up to undertake promotional activities for Glasgow.
The programming of the event therefore was seen not as an end in itself but as a means by which other objectives could be achieved. To start with, a major advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi was employed to market the event through the projection of image that Glasgow was now a dynamic and sophisticated metropolis buzzing with enthusiasm for the arts (Boyle and Hughes, 1991). Saatchi and Saatchi came up with the logo of ‘There’s a lot of Glasgowing on in 1990’ in a distinctive typeface which was derived from the style of Glasgow’s famous architect/designer, Charles Rennie Mackintosh. Although this slogan was taken by some as a symbol that the year would be turned into un-Glaswegian spectacles with shallow commercial techniques (Jackson, 1991), the whole point of this publicity exercise was to construct a sense of cultural vibrancy by retaining the humorous approach that characterised the Miles Better campaign and by mixing it with ‘high’ culture of international standing (Ward, 1998: 223).

Given the need for city promotion, it was inevitable that the Festivals Office used a series of ‘blockbuster’ events which specifically targeted wider populations in Europe and beyond. Some of the highlights of such programming included concerts by Luciano Pavarotti, Frank Sinatra and the Rolling Stones, the staging of Peter Brook’s ‘La Tempête’, and ‘The Age of Van Gogh’ exhibition at the Burrell Collection. The intention of the organisers, however, was to address both the local and the universal. Thus the implementation of the programme had two strands: to stage a series of events that would raise the international profile of the city and to strengthen existing cultural frameworks by supporting local artists and organisations on their own terms (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Underlying this broad scope in the programme was an all-encompassing interpretation of culture. To quote again the words of the Visual Arts Officer of the Festivals Office: ‘T S Eliot’s well known statement that ‘Culture is not merely the sum of several activities but a way of life’ reflected the way ‘culture’ in the 1990 title was interpreted’ (Jackson, 1991: 16). This led to the inclusion in the events programme of not only conventional forms of artistic works but also activities involving engineering, education, design, history, religion and sport (Myerscough, 1994). For example, the ‘Keeping Glasgow in Stitches’ project invited ordinary residents to attend to sewing sessions to produce large-scale sewn textiles which had been designed in pieces by Scottish artists to
represent the spirit of Glasgow captured in its everyday life. With a similar focus on the local community, the Scottish Trades Union Congress commissioned locally-based artists to create its banners, to be presented as part of the City of Culture programme, which would reflect the role of trade unions in Glasgow's cultural life (See Jackson and Guest, 1991).

Whilst the Festivals Office developed an extensive range of cultural activities, the Glasgow District Council endeavoured to meet the further requirement of the year, namely, to strengthen infrastructures which would have longer-term positive impacts on Glasgow's culture, economic and social environment. In the years preceding 1990, the District Council invested in projects such as the opening of the new Glasgow Royal Concert Hall (£27 million) or the refurbishment of the McLellan Galleries (£3.6 million), to coincide with the European City of Culture event (van den Berg, 1995). Other physical improvements to the city included extensive stone cleaning and lighting undertaken to reveal its fine older buildings (Ward, 1998).

However, these systematic attempts to re-fashion Glasgow as a European cultural centre provoked strong reactions in some quarters. One of the main criticisms that the organisers of 1990 attracted was the way in which the events programme failed to relate to the local citizens, even though the programme included a large number of community-oriented events as mentioned above. The fact that Saatchi and Saatchi was appointed to undertake the publicity of the year was itself enough to cause distrust that the event would only amount to superficial displays without substance (Jackson, 1991). The decision by the Festivals Office to include concerts by Pavarotti or Sinatra, for example, likewise provoked interminable debates about commercialism and exploitation (Palmer, 1991: 11). In particular, one group called Workers City, consisting of some forty or so Left wing activists, maintained that 'yuppie' contents of the 1990 programme had little relevance to the working-class cultural heritage of Glasgow, and that the money could have been better spent on basic services such as housing (Boyle and Hughes, 1991). Furthermore, it was argued that developments in local cultural industries and production were largely overshadowed by the promotion of commercial and high-profile culture.

135 These costs are not part of the European City of Culture budget.
These criticisms aside, a broad consensus existed throughout from the
planning stage to the end of 1990 about the District Council’s role in the City of
Culture event. The District Council’s ability to deliver the necessary resources for the
event was mainly due to amicable relations between the Council and the public,
between the different agencies in the city and between the Council and the private
sector (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Of the total expenditure for the 1990 events,
Glasgow District Council contributed £35 million (£15m from a special arts fund
established for 1990), with other contributions from Strathclyde Regional Council
(£12m), private sectors (£5.5m) and UK office for Arts and Libraries (£0.5m). The
short-term indicators for the impact of the 1990 event suggest that this investment
has generated the desired benefits. There were 81 per cent more visitors to (pre­
existing) art performances and attractions in 1990 than in the last-measured previous
year, 1986 (van den Berg, 1995). The city attracted considerable numbers of
additional tourists in 1990, with accommodation bookings through the city-centre
bureau increasing by 80 per cent compared to the figures in 1989 (Booth and Boyle,
1993). As a strategy to boost cultural tourism, therefore, the event was deemed to be
highly successful, although the growth in tourism sector has not been consistent after
1990. The net economic return of Glasgow 1990 to the regional economy has been
estimated at £10 - 14 million, and net extra jobs at 5,350 to 5,580 person years, and
both arose mainly from tourism-related activities (Myerscough, 1994).

The long-term impact of 1990 is hard to measure, as Glasgow was already
physically improving through a series of regeneration initiatives and the economy of
the central city was being reinforced by vigorous investment in property development
well before 1990 (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Nevertheless, the extensive programme of
cultural events, along with improved infrastructure of arts venues have further
strengthened the cultural and international profile of the city, and if this improved
image can be sustained the city has a potential of attracting more tourists and inward
investment. A survey of the social impact of the year shows that residents in Glasgow
almost unanimously agreed that the event had improved the external image of
Glasgow. About 61 per cent were even of the opinion that the cultural programme
had made the city a better place to live in (van den Berg, 1995). It may be said that
Glasgow used the year 1990 to market the city to the outside world, and to a certain
extent it succeeded in achieving this aim. What is clear from the above discussion is
that the theme of ‘European culture’ or ‘cultural integration’ never gained prominence at any stage of the event’s planning and was totally marginalised by local concerns over its economic and social effects.

European City of Culture and urban entrepreneurialism

In Glasgow, therefore, the year of European City of Culture was about ‘the title bringing the status to the city rather than the status of the city bringing the title’ (Booth and Boyle, 1993: 32). And as the list of cities designated for European City of Culture suggests, Glasgow is not an isolated case in this respect. The fact that this event has been utilised by other cities in a manner similar to Glasgow manifests itself in a number of ways. First of all, many cities designated after Glasgow are ones which have suffered the negative consequences of de-industrialisation, with the corollary of high unemployment rates and the impoverishment of some urban areas. This has led their respective national and local authorities to diversify their local economic base, and one of the means to achieve this policy goal was to promote cultural events and activities to attract tourists and affluent consumers. Antwerp (1993) and Rotterdam (2001) have been particularly active in this regard, with their comprehensive projects to transform the waterfront as a cultural attraction and to shake off the negative image of ‘a drab town of docks and industries’ (van den Berg et al., 1995; Hitters, 2001). Although on a much smaller scale, other cities such as Lisbon, Dublin, or Porto have also put emphasis on cultural tourism as an important strand in their economic regeneration strategies (Richards, 1996; CEC, 1992c). Cultural events and festivals organised or hosted by these cities are promoted in the context of their policy agenda that encourages the use of cultural resources as a tool for dealing with economic restructuring. From that standpoint, European City of Culture derives its significance from its function to provide additional cultural attractions that help to make the city more attractive and noticeable in the eyes of potential visitors.

Secondly, and related to the above point, many cities saw the event as an occasion to bring forward building projects to improve their physical infrastructure. As has happened in Glasgow, winning a title such as ‘European City of Culture’ often helps to raise necessary funds to implement such schemes already in the
pipeline, and triggers investments from both governmental and commercial sources. In Antwerp, a substantial facelift for the city was carried out for the event by the private and public sectors (Myerscough, 1994). Lisbon, where investment in culture is normally minimal compared to other EU capitals, was able to focus on its cultural infrastructure developments for the year of 1994 (Richards, 1996). Significantly, some of those urban projects carried out in connection with European City of Culture were partly financed by the EU's structural funds whose aim is to 'enable underprivileged regions to reduce the development gap separating them from the developed regions' (CEC, 1996a: 32). A notable example of this is Dublin's Temple Bar urban regeneration scheme designed to transform a derelict inner-city area into a cultural district consisting of retail outlets, restaurants and hotels as well as galleries and artists' studios (CEC, 1996c; Dawson, 1994). The project, carried out between 1991 and 1995, received substantial financial support from the DG XVI (now the Directorate-General for Regional Policy) which linked this grant to Dublin 1991 (Myerscough, 1994). What this indicates is that, far from being a showcase for cities with existing cultural wealth, the European City of Culture event sometimes acts as a catalyst for rejuvenating, both economically and culturally, run-down areas which are often categorised as 'underprivileged' even in the EU's own terms.

Thirdly, there is a symbolic importance attached to the title. For cities which tend to be perceived as 'peripheral' within the European urban system (e.g. Thessaloniki, Porto, Dublin), holding the title of 'European City of Culture' confers a symbolic credibility of being thoroughly 'European' (and therefore at the core) as opposed to 'peripheral' or 'marginal'. Underlying this idea is the notion that there is a symbolic hierarchy between different locales in Europe. Thus Helsinki in 2000 utilised the title to project the image and identity of 'European' city in order to overcome its reputation of being dull, dark and peripheral (Heikkinen, 2000). Similarly, the local authorities of both Glasgow and Rotterdam tried to show in their respective years the city's international or 'European' orientations hoping, at least rhetorically, to augment their status of being just a secondary provincial centre (Richards, 1996; Ward, 1998).

The common thread in those strategies adopted by various cities is that the European City of Culture event is used as part of wider city marketing operations targeting a particular section of population. To understand this it is important to
appreciate the differences between the ‘selling’ and the ‘marketing’ of a city. Selling involves persuading the customer that they want or need what you already have, whereas marketing is a process in which the product for sale is shaped by some idea of what the consumer wants (Fretter, 1993; Hubbard, 1998). To market a city, therefore, is to re-shape the image of a place as closely as possible to the demands and desires of current or potential residents, investors and visitors (Holocomb, 1993). This entails that city marketing does not necessarily stop at the level of extolling the existing virtues of the city, but seeks to fashion a new identity for the city, selectively weaving specific place myths and erasing any negative images associated with it. In this process, the physical spaces of the city are treated as belonging to this new urban imagery, and transformed accordingly within the capacity of each city by adding and improving urban activities and facilities (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). In these city marketing strategies, culture functions both as a complementary factor that enhances the appeal of a city and as a mask that conceals poverty, crime, and social conflicts within a city (Bianchini, 1993).

The tendency of the designated Cities of Culture to utilise the event for city promotion, and more generally, the rise of city marketing itself, can be explained as part of broader economic, political and social shifts affecting many parts of Europe. Lash and Urry (1994) identify six key factors in this trend. The first change is, as has been mentioned, the striking decline in both the size and impact of the manufacturing sector and hence its employment in most localities. Second, the changes in communication technology and transport mean that producer services can now be located in a number of different places. The reduction of spatial barriers has induced an acute competition between localities and regions to attract those ‘footloose’ companies for their economic regeneration. Third, macro-economic pressures created by the recessions of 1973 and 1979 forced national governments to introduce public expenditure cutbacks, leaving many local governments to find their own sources of finance (Bianchini, 1999). Fourth, and as the corollary of the second and the third, the declining powers of the nation state to control multinational money flows has created a condition where investment increasingly takes the form of a negotiation between international capital and local powers (Harvey, 1989). Fifth, the attraction of such multinational/transnational firms into a locality significantly depends upon the ‘quality of life’ - translated as the provision of high quality leisure, cultural and
consumer services which appeal to managerial and professional personnel (Lash and Urry, 1994; Bianchini, 1993). Finally, the increased mobility of people means that the ability of a locality to attract temporary visitors plays a crucial role in its economic development. This forges strong interconnections between tourism, leisure/entertainment services and economic development strategies.

These inter-related changes are also accompanied by shifts in the ways in which cities are being run, a phenomenon which some theorists term as ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (see Harvey, 1989; Hubbard and Hall, 1998):

This reorientation of urban government is characterised by a shift from the local provision of welfare and services to more outward-oriented policies designed to foster and encourage local growth and economic development. Furthermore, these policies are supported and financed by a diverse array of new agencies and institutions, as public agencies struggle to promote economic growth at the local level on their own terms. (Hubbard and Hall, 1998: 2)

Central to this is the mobilisation of culture to the cause of city-marketing, designed to attract mobile international capital, specialised personnel and affluent visitors. Cultural facilities and resources may not be regarded by local policy-makers as more important in determining a city’s appeal to investors than other factors such as local educational and skills levels, the quality of local schooling or the local environment. But they have become increasingly important complementary factors in the competition between cities possessing similar advantages (Bianchini, 1993).

As a component of local economic development, cultural regeneration is thus designed to assert the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a city. More and more local governments are organising prestigious arts festivals, major sports competitions and other high-profile cultural events. Greater attention is now paid to the arts and cultural sector and its related areas including tourism, sports, and leisure as a source of employment (O’Connor, 1998). Furthermore, to supplement these cultural activities, local governments are allocating increasingly high budgets for the advertising and promotion of the city to enhance its cultural image in the hope that it would stimulate investment. While the principal aim of such conscious manipulation of city image is to make the city more attractive to external investors and visitors, it
has also been argued that it plays an internal role in galvanising local support and fostering civic pride, with a potential to generate urban unification (Hubbard and Hall, 1998).

The irony, however, is that many of the innovations and investments designed to make particular localities attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly been imitated elsewhere, thus rendering any competitive advantage within a system of cities ephemeral (Harvey, 1989; Philo and Kearns, 1993). The result is the more or less same marketing package being promoted everywhere, which typically centres around the image of a city with a lively, vibrant urban culture and populated by a harmonious and cosmopolitan citizenry (Ward, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As Kevin Robins argues, with its emphasis on art, culture and consumption, the values and interests articulated in this new urban imagery are above all those of the high income middle classes (Robins, 1993). To the extent that such constructed images are being pursued by local policy-makers at the expense of welfare provisions targeted at low income or marginalised groups, the strategy of city marketing exacerbates already existing social polarisation within a city, excluding those who simply cannot afford to participate in this ‘regenerated’ city life.

In drawing on the notion of the ‘entrepreneurial city’, however, care must be taken not to rely too much on this concept as the explanatory model for different cities’ approaches to the European City of Culture event. Much of the empirical literature on urban entrepreneurialism concentrates on American as well as British cities, and some commentators argue that a model derived from such studies cannot be applied directly to European cities which, compared to the American situation, tend to rely more on central governments and less on the market for their expenditures. It has been noted that, in contrast to what ‘entrepreneurialism’ literature normally suggests, local social policies have not necessarily been subordinated to economic growth strategies in most European cities (Le Galès, 1998). Hall and Hubbard also points out that some theorists overgeneralise the mobility of capital at different scales, ignoring the fact that much capital is fixed (i.e. productive facilities and built environment) while human resources are inherently mobile. Therefore it would be more accurate to say that the possibility of hypermobile investment capital has made may local policy makers feel obliged to adopt precautionary measures, rather than the actuality of such mobile capital making
the path of entrepreneurialism inevitable (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). Some observers have also noted that explicit internationalisation strategies aimed at economic growth, which were prevalent in urban regeneration schemes in the 1980s and early 1990s, have been toned down in recent years. And in some cases this has given way to a more community-oriented approach that focuses on the development of local crafts and cultural industries (Sjoholt, 1999; Landry, 1996).

There are so many different elements involved in the organisation and implementation of the City of Culture event, and not all the designated cities explicitly set economic development as their primary objective. Likewise, different cities hosted the event under different circumstances, which means that the case of Glasgow cannot be generalised to produce a model to which all the designated cities would conform. Nevertheless, the way in which a number of different cities dealt with their designations exhibits the principal characteristics of the ‘entrepreneurial’ city: the fact that many of such cities were in need of economic and urban regeneration; their uses of cultural events both as an important source of employment and as attractions for tourists, visitors and investments; their reliance on private sector support in the form of business sponsorship; the allocation of significant budgets for the advertising and promotion of the event; their concern over raising the international profile of the city rather than stressing their local distinctiveness; and their analogous interest in promoting the image of urban cultural innovation and vibrancy.

Although it cannot be said that the cities such as Copenhagen or Stockholm, with their relatively stable economy and established cultural reputation, saw their respective years as a direct tool for economic regeneration, the general tendency of the European Cities of Culture event can be loosely categorised as adopting an ‘entrepreneurial’ approach. Whether this approach is pursued implicitly or explicitly, the local policy-makers of the designated cities have tended to use European City of Culture to promote goals that overshadowed the event’s original

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136 In fact, one the main objectives of Copenhagen 96 was very much about improving the city’s image in the context of urban development. According to a study on Copenhagen 96, the event ‘was to portray a progressive city which founded its development and competitive edge on human qualities, on knowledge, art, creativity and communication. Reformulated, this objective means Copenhagen was set to improve its reputation in the international mass media and in international political and business
aim which is to bring the European citizens together in the framework of cultural celebrations. A recent study on the nine Cities of Culture in 2000 confirms that, even though the EU specifically invited these cities to coordinate their activities and to organise a ‘European cultural space for the year 2000’, the real focus of attention was on the specificity of the city itself and on big events while the issue of having a ‘European dimension’ was largely sidelined (Sassatelli, 2002). Judging from the fact that the EU does not involve itself in the organisation of the event even after this scheme had been placed under the Community competence, the EU institutions (excluding the Parliament) are implicitly endorsing these current practices. Inasmuch as that is the case, the EU support for European City of Culture can be interpreted as encouraging the pragmatic uses of culture in terms of city marketing, increased economic productivity, reducing regional disparities and greater cohesion within the single market.

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined how and why the European City of Culture programme has been used as a tool for city marketing by local policy-makers. My argument was that their pragmatic outlook on culture can be explained as part of the globalising economic functions of the cities. The chapter also showed that an economic approach to the European City of Culture event adopted by different cities does not correspond to the original aims of this programme.

Manuel Castells argues that the future model of Europe is likely to be articulated around the two poles of economic internationalisation and cultural decentralisation. In such a model, cities present an ideal spatial scale where locally-oriented cultures and the globalising economy can be mediated. Cities thus play an increasingly important role as a locus of cultural identity (Castells, 1994 and 2000a). According to this understanding, the European City of Culture event can be viewed as an instance where local cultures and economic internationalisation are coordinated through the initiatives of local governments.
CHAPTER 8
The audiovisual policy of the European Union

In this chapter, I will look at the relationship between European culture, economic
globalisation and the role of public authority as embodied in the EU’s audiovisual
policy. That the main motive for the EU audiovisual policy is economic seems to be
widely recognised, yet some authors maintain that such seemingly economic logic
masks the EU officials’ desire to use the audiovisual industry as an instrument to
create a common European cultural identity, with the ultimate effect of achieving a
congruence between economic and cultural space. This chapter argues that the EU
policy agenda in the audiovisual sector is not so much a disguised attempt to recreate
the cultural model of the nation-state as downright economic promotion mostly
uninterested in cultural objectives.

The main focus of this chapter is on the film policy of the EU. However,
because the EU policy documents seldom treat the film industries as distinct from
television or other areas of the audiovisual sector, I will not try to separate different
sections of the audiovisual industry unless my discussion specifically centres on film
or television. The general usage of the ‘audiovisual industry’ or ‘audiovisual policy’
may be justified in view of the current interdependence of film and television
industries. But to keep the scope of this chapter manageable, I will mostly leave
out topics concerning the regulatory aspects of the audiovisual policy (such as the
‘Television without Frontiers Directive’) and instead concentrate on the EU’s support
mechanisms.

Audiovisual policy as economic policy

The EU’s audiovisual policy has the largest share of the budget allocated to its
cultural activities. The centrality of this sector in the EU cultural policy can be
explained by the apparent industrial aspect that characterises the production and
circulation of audiovisual works. At least before the introduction of the cultural
clause in the Maastricht Treaty, it was essential for the EU’s actions in respect of culture to be presented as an exercise of Community jurisdiction in the economic, rather than cultural, sphere. Nevertheless audiovisual policy was placed on the EU policy agenda later than areas of ‘traditional’ cultural activities such as the conservation of cultural heritage.

In its 1982 communication ‘Stronger Community action in the cultural sector’, the Commission pointed to the economic, social and cultural implications of the boom in audiovisual media, maintaining that the task to be accomplished by Community action in this area ‘hinges on the social implications, in other words on how audiovisual techniques will affect the earnings of creative artists and the jobs and incomes of performers’ (CEC, 1982: 16). To help improve the working conditions of those engaged in the audiovisual sector, the Commission proposed a feasibility study on measures including an European film festival and incentives to develop a European film distribution circuit, which were expected to widen the audience, thereby creating more job opportunities for cultural workers. This view on the audiovisual industry as a creator of jobs has been one of the most recurrent element in EU discourse on audiovisual policy.

If it is a socio-economic concern that was a driving impetus behind those developments, there was also a significant cultural dimension in the EU’s promotion of the audiovisual industry. Some theorists argue that the European agenda carries with it certain expectation of EU officials that new, European media market will ‘improve mutual knowledge among the peoples of Europe and will increase their consciousness of the life and destiny they have in common’ (Morley and Robins, 1995: 3). As a Community-wide audiovisual market reinforces Europe’s production capacity, it is hoped, so will it come to promote the ideals of European cultural unity.

What the EU is struggling to create is, according to this thesis, the nation-state model of congruence between economic, political and cultural spaces expanded to the level of Europe (Morley and Robins, 1995:177-178; see also Shore, 2000). Others point out that the themes of a single market and a unified European culture prevalent in the 1980s were replaced by the rhetoric of ‘diversity’ in the early 1990s. Collins, for

137 This is reflected in the fact that today the main outlet of films is not the cinema but television (and video). The bulk of the film revenue comes from the sale of broadcasting rights to television channels (CEC/DGX, 1997).
example, stresses that the MEDIA programme was introduced to counter the perceived threat to cultural diversity posed by integrationist forces. Such a move has resulted in the proliferation in the EU discourse of the slogan ‘unity in diversity’ which offers a convenient rhetorical mediation between integration and pluralism (Collins, 1994). In what follows, I will try to show that neither of these accounts seems to offer an accurate depiction of developments in the EU audiovisual policy which have been taking place especially since the mid-1990s.

In the early 1980s, it was indeed a concern with the construction of European identity and legitimacy that provided a strong rationale for EU intervention in the audiovisual policy sector. For example, after the Parliament called upon the Commission to create the legal and political foundations for the establishment of a pan-European television service, the Commission took upon the proposal, arguing that ‘[the European channel] will become a powerful unifying factor... This sharing of pictures and information will be the most effective means of increasing mutual understanding among the peoples of Europe, and will give them a greater sense of belonging to a common cultural and social entity’ (CEC, 1983:22). Underlying this project for a pan-European television channel was the EU officials’ belief about the role of public broadcasting in shaping and maintaining collective identities, which is clearly based on the national public sector model (Ward, 2002). Despite much opposition from many quarters and the initial failure of a pilot project, the multilingual Europa channel was launched in October 1985, with the financial backing coming from the Commission, the Dutch government, several participant broadcasters and advertising revenue. After one year of transmitting to a small European audience, however, the Europa channel had to discontinue its broadcasting due to financial problems and internal disagreements.

Along with the pan-European television project, the European Parliament and the Commission also tried to make inroads into subsidy schemes for European audiovisual co-productions. In April 1985 the Commission, backed up by the Parliament, issued a proposal for a ‘Community aid scheme for non-documentary cinema and television co-productions’ with an objective to ‘increase the number of mass-audience cinema and television co-productions involving nationals of more than one Member State’ (CEC, 1985c: 1). This plan was vehemently opposed by several national governments, most notably by Germany, Denmark and the UK,
forcing the Commission to drop the proposal altogether (Theiler, 2001). To the extent
that this scheme was designed to directly subsidise multilingual production process
itself, it was regarded as an encroachment upon the realm of culture which was
strictly outside the sphere of Community competence.

The failure of those two major policy initiatives in the audiovisual sector
makes a sharp contrast with the Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF)
adopted in 1989 after a prolonged dispute about some of the rules contained in the
directive, particularly the quota system which the French negotiators were so keen to
include. The Green Paper on TVWF was published in 1984 in parallel with the
Commission’s proposal on pan-European television. Unlike the above measures
whose central rationale was cultural and public policy concerns, the focus of TVWF
Green Paper lay in commercial audiovisual market which was explicitly situated
within the framework of market integration: ‘Action on broadcasting is needed for
two reasons. One is the Community’s brief to create a common market for this
important branch of the economy. The other is the desire to facilitate cross-frontier
broadcasting in the Community and to exploit its integrating effect’ (CEC, 1984: 37).
TVWF was thus designed to promote the free and unhindered movement of
television programming throughout the Community, although public interest
objectives, including rules regarding advertising and the protection of minors, were
also considered.

After the successive failure of culturally-oriented audiovisual initiatives, the
Commission began to re-align its aspirations in the audiovisual sphere with the logic
of overall market integration. The first sign of this shift, along with the TVWF Green
Paper, was the Commission’s 1986 concrete action plan which addressed the theme
of strengthening the European audiovisual sector as part of industrial policy. The
publication of the action programme was based on the Commission’s growing
awareness of the increasing importance of the audiovisual industry as a strategic
sector in the services economy in Europe. In this context, it advocated that ‘the
opening of the market for audiovisual products to the scale of the whole of Europe is
a positive reality which the Community must encourage and ensure its balanced
development’ (CEC, 1986: 3). In order to establish a Community-wide market and to
promote European programme industry, therefore, the Commission proposed
measures which centred around three aspects of film and television: production,
distribution and financing. In concrete terms, they consisted of projects such as encouraging the exploitation of multimedia distribution networks, rationalising the production process, and developing dubbing/subtitling systems to facilitate cross-border circulation of programmes and films. These proposals were taken up later to form a basis of pilot projects which lasted from 1988 to 1990. The pilot projects were subsequently incorporated into MEDIA, an acronym in French standing for 'measures to encourage the development of the audiovisual industry'.

GATT dispute on audiovisual services

Before moving on to the analysis of EU support mechanisms, it is important to emphasise once again that what the EU says it would do is quite different from what its policy programmes actually set out to do. The 'official' position of the EU is that it ensures the protection of public interests, and there is no better example for illustrating this aspect of the audiovisual policy than a dispute during the last round of negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Since its inception in the late 1940s, GATT's remit had been limited to 'goods' whereby cultural goods were excluded from the liberalisation process as an exception. However, with the massive expansion of the services sector over the recent decades, the emphasis in trade negotiations shifted from trade in goods to trade in services, and the Punta del Este Declaration at the beginning of the so-called Uruguay Round in 1986 put 'services' at the centre of GATT debates largely due to pressure from the US (Miller, 1996). 'Trade in services' was found to comprise, among other things, film, television, and broadcast advertising production and distribution. The round of negotiations which started in Uruguay in 1986 had to be agreed by a deadline of 15 December 1993, and the audiovisual sector, alongside agriculture, was to become one of the main outstanding issues threatening this deadline.

Audiovisual trade is a strategically important sector in the US economy, and its already huge surplus is growing even further in an expanding global market for films and television programmes. US sales of programming in Europe rose from $330 million in 1984 to $3.6 billion by 1992, with a steady rise in US-EU trade gap (Finney, 1996). For the US, GATT was the perfect mechanism through which to
pressure for the removal of trade barriers such as media content quotas or state subsidies to film productions in order to create an environment even more favourable to US audiovisual exports. After the US failed to have audiovisual industries incorporated in the 1988 Free Trade Agreement with Canada, its trade officials were particularly at pains to convince its trade partners that state support for this sector contravened the free-trade principles enshrined in GATT. Although the US attempts to have the Uruguay Round derail such policies were almost universally opposed, with significant participation from India, Canada, Japan and Australia, it was a dispute between the US and Europe that developed into a crisis which nearly jeopardised the whole edifice of GATT (Miller, 1996). Given the fact that unifying Europe represents the most lucrative foreign market for US audiovisual products, and the growing preoccupation within both the EU and its member states about how best to ‘rescue’ the seemingly declining European audiovisual industry, it was hardly surprising that the negotiations triggered off a major row. In particular, the dispute revolved around various national subsidies to the film industry, co-production treaties and other cooperation agreements made within the framework of the Council of Europe, and the EU’s 1989 ‘Television without Frontiers’ Directive which requires that 51 per cent of televised programmes broadcast in the member states be of European origin (Hill, 1994).  

During 1992 and 1993, having become aware of the danger in American insistence on opening European markets to the unrestricted circulation of audiovisual products, French politicians and intellectuals launched a debate about the fate of the audiovisual sector not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. Their argument was that, because the US had excluded ‘cultural products’ in 1947 when GATT came into being, this cultural exemption should be maintained to cover audiovisual services (Palmer, 1996). At issue here was not just the survival of French (or European) audiovisual industry which owes its very existence to various forms of national and European aid schemes, but also the preservation of Europe’s cultural identities whose

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138 It hardly mattered to the US that this particular ‘European quota’ provision in the TVWF Directive contains the phrase ‘if practicable’. In effect, not all the EU member states have complied with the 51% requirement. The compliance to the quota system suggests that the system is in reality nothing more than a symbolic token. Despite the Parliament’s repeated attempts to reinforce the quota system, the language of the ‘where practical’ clause is retained even after the revision of the TVWF Directive in 1997 (Ward, 2002).
distinct expressions are supposed to be found in audiovisual media. The then French Minister of Culture Jack Lang, who in the early 1980s had launched the battle against American 'cultural imperialism' in the most virulent fashion, repeatedly defended cultural pluralism against the 'perverse effects of globalization and cultural homogenization' (Danan, 2000). Thus, the opposition against the deregulation of audiovisual trade became linked to issues of cultural identity and cultural sovereignty. The French president, François Mitterand, expressed this in his speech at Gdansk in Poland on 21 September 1993, defining the official French position in the GATT dispute on audiovisual services:

Creations of the spirit are not just commodities; the elements of culture are not pure business. Defending the pluralism of works of art and the freedom of the public to choose is a duty. What is at stake is the cultural identity of all our nation. It is the right of all peoples to their own culture. It is the freedom to create and choose our own images. A society which abandons to others the way of showing itself, that is to say the way of presenting itself to itself, is a society enslaved (quoted in Jeancolas, 1998: 55).

French politicians and audiovisual industry professionals succeeded in gaining the support of the EU, leading the Commission to adopt a protectionist stance that advocated for the inclusion of a 'cultural specificity' clause in the agreement. The European Parliament, on its part, adopted a resolution in July 1993 on the cultural aspects of GATT, pressing the Commission to 'reject any concession which might jeopardize either the preservation or indeed the future development of the cultures of Europe'\(^\text{139}\). In contrast to such arguments, Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and an influential lobbyist, maintained that cultural activities would benefit from market liberalisation: 'If a cinema/TV industry is to be healthy, it must be able to leap beyond its national borders to attract audiences from all over the world...Competition so stirs the creative juices that film

\(^{139}\) Resolution on the cultural aspects of GATT, Official Journal C255, 20/09/93.
makers and TV programmers rise to the highest level to which the creative spirits can fly' (quoted in Palmer, 1996:34).\footnote{Since 1922, the MPAA has collectively defended and lobbied for the corporate interests of major Hollywood studios. In 1993, its members included: Buena Vista International; Sony Pictures Entertainment; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; Paramount Pictures; Twentieth Century Fox International; \ldots}  

Thus, those engaged in the debate on both sides of the Atlantic were pursuing an argument based on entirely different premises. On the one hand, the position pursued by the Americans, including Jack Valenti and the principal trade negotiator Mickey Kantor, was indicative of the neo-classical view of market economics in which the provision of culture is left to the market mechanism and is accordingly subject to a competitive environment of free trade and global capitalist growth (de Garzia, 1998: 30). On the other hand, European nations, headed by successive French cultural ministers Jack Lang and Jacques Toubon, advanced a view that cultural products are public as well as private goods, with a historic and national significance which cannot be reduced to a matter of trade (Miller, 1996). Underlying this approach to culture is a long-standing French preoccupation with the role of state intervention in shaping national culture (Schlesinger, 1997:376). Because this particular approach came to be adopted as the European negotiating position in the Uruguay round, overriding differences in approach among the EU member states, discourses surrounding the trade disputes became couched in a simplistic counterposition between 'American' and 'European' culture, and between the refined and the vulgar, the cultural and the commercial, and the creative and superficial (Mommaas, 1996). More fundamentally, it was not just France or other individual states that had recourse to the rhetoric of cultural sovereignty in resisting American pressure to liberalise the audiovisual market. During the negotiation, the EU itself acted as though it had a legitimate right to protect its culture (or cultures) and pursued an argument which was largely based on the traditional model of the nation-state in its relation to national culture. In effect, as Schlesinger argues, the EU was advancing an argument about national culture translated to the level of Europe (1997: 377).  

Just before the deadline in December 1993, and faced with the situation that was going nowhere, Mickey Kantor accepted continued state subvention in cultural
products in Europe and elsewhere in the interests of settling the overall trade deal. In the end, Kantor and his EU counterpart Leon Brittan agreed to disagree, and a compromise was reached in which neither side achieved their objectives (Wheeler, 2000). As a result, audiovisual sector neither enjoys any special cultural status nor is committed to the particular terms of liberalisation. Although this was initially hailed in France as a victory for Europe, the EU in fact failed to obtain a specific clause in the agreement endorsing the principle of cultural exemption (Palmer, 1996). This means that audiovisual services would be subject to subsequent rounds of negotiations. Not only will the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the GATT’s institutional legacy, address what was left undecided, but the advent of new cultural and communications technologies will further complicate the issue and make protectionism increasingly difficult to sustain.

A recognition among EU policy makers that the results of Uruguay Round negotiations would only offer a temporary respite constituted an important springboard for the formulation of a new strategy designed to give a boost to the audiovisual industry. Thus, in the post-GATT context, there was a shift in focus in the EU audiovisual policy, marked by documents such as the Commission’s Green Paper on ‘Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry’ and a proposal for the MEDIA II programme. Nevertheless, externally, the EU has adhered to its cultural protectionist stance throughout subsequent trade negotiations, insisting that the promotion of culture should be pursued as public policy goals rather than as a means to achieve international competitiveness. A recent speech by Vivian Reding, the Commissioner for culture, illustrates this very clearly:

As a result of their political, social and cultural impact, audiovisual services and content play a crucial part in our representation of the world and in how we define our own identities in that world. From this point of view, the audiovisual industries and their undeniable economic dimension must be regarded as the tools of an essentially cultural form of expression...What the Community obtained as a result of the Uruguay Round is more than a vague exception

Universal International Films; and Warner Bros, a division of Time Warner Entertainment Company (Palmer, 1996).
subject to the restrictive interpretation of a WTO panel of experts. It obtained the freedom to act, which is essential in order to maintain and develop national and Community policies in the audiovisual sector.\(^{141}\)

MEDIA programmes

Despite a seemingly united front put on during the negotiations, the GATT affairs in fact served to expose how fragmented European states are in their approach to the audiovisual sector. While the French in particular talked about the defence of national culture, the British tended to talk about reviving a national film industry (Nowell-Smith, 1998: 11). Some, including Leon Brittan, the EU trade negotiator himself, were not so enthusiastic in supporting the French position since the economic stakes of the audiovisual sector were relatively minor when compared to other contentious areas such as agriculture, telecommunications or financial services (Jeancolas, 1998: 58; Palmer, 1996: 29). Regardless of these variations in approach, however, audiovisual industries in different European countries share the same set of problems, and the successive MEDIA programmes were specifically aimed at tackling these common European problems.

EU policy documents identify three main factors lying at the root of the current crisis of the audiovisual industry in Europe: fragmentation into national markets made up of a large number of undercapitalised, small and medium-sized firms; a low rate of cross-border programme circulation/distribution; and insufficient financial resources (CEC, 1990b: 1-3; 1994c: 4). This has engendered a ‘vicious circle’ of under-investment right from the conception of audiovisual works, and then at the production and distribution stage, resulting in low profitability of the works and hence a reduced investment capacity (CEC, 1999c: 4). Because of these weaknesses, European audiovisual industry is not keeping up with growing demands for audiovisual content created by the proliferation of new, digital dissemination techniques, leading to an ever-increasing domination of European markets by non-European programmes (mostly from Hollywood).

The Commission's analysis portrays a bleak picture. In the space of ten years between 1984 to 1994, European films have lost two-thirds of cinema audiences in Europe, with their market share falling to less than 20%. European films have been the worst hit by the drop in overall cinema attendance (CEC, 1994c: 5). This decline was certainly not helped by the fact that European films seldom travel outside their country of origin. In addition, the number of hours of television broadcast by European stations has more than doubled from 1988 to 1994 without any corresponding increase in the production of European works. Although the film industry in particular started showing signs of a slow recovery since 1993 in terms of market share, the EU's trade deficit towards the US in audiovisual products was still estimated at $6.3 billion in 1996 (CEC/DG X, 1997). Nonetheless, the audiovisual industry is one of the most dynamic sectors, and the estimates made in 1999 have predicted that the income from this sector would grow by 70% by 2005, which could be translated into more than 300,000 highly qualified jobs. So, the policy documents go, Europe needs urgent action to survive global competition and to benefit from the growth of the industry (CEC, 1999c: 2-4).

The EU's response to such a situation was to introduce the MEDIA programme, whose objective was to improve the environment of audiovisual business without directly intervening in production by concentrating its support on the upstream (covering training and development or pre-production stage) and downstream (distribution, promotion and screening stage) of the audiovisual production chain. An important point to remember here is that the Commission and the Parliament had already tried to introduce EU support for the production process itself in the mid-1980s in an attempt to Europeanise the cultural contents of audiovisual productions. After this proposal was categorically rejected at the Council, the EU has re-organised its policy priorities in the audiovisual sector, and MEDIA schemes are not designed to deal with the actual content of programmes as such. Another crucial point is that, unlike the commonly-used forms of national support for the audiovisual sector, the programmes do not provide a system of subsidies. Instead, what they intend to do is to stimulate the market by injecting seed capital into the industry, which was expected to attract additional finance from private investors, professional organisations and various promotion bodies (CEC, 1990a: 8).
After the experimental phase from 1987 to 1990 in which several pilot projects were launched, the first MEDIA programme entered into its main phase of operation in 1991, with a total budget of ECU 200 million for the period up to 1995. The overall direction of the programme was in line with the general drive at the beginning of the 1990s towards the completion of the single market, and it sought to create an ‘European audiovisual area’ as part of the new, enlarged economic space (CEC, 1990a: 12 and 14). This was also reflected in the fact that the decision to establish the first MEDIA programme was based on Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. The programme was expected to have the following effects:

- To strengthen national industries through the distribution of their products on a Community scale, while creating collaborations between such industries
- To decompartmentalise national markets by creating transfrontier cooperation networks of cultural and economic agents
- To contribute to the restructuring of the audiovisual industry by giving priority to networks of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises)
- To create a balance between ‘minor’ and ‘major’ national industries
- To support networks which are as extensive as possible to generate effects of scale

(CEC, 1990a: 23-24)

The idea was that if a structure of long-term, cross-frontier networks could be established, the audiovisual sector would be able to reap full benefits from the unified European market which is large enough to sustain an economically viable audiovisual industry in Europe without the need to break into the US market. As its emphasis on networking suggests, the first MEDIA programme was less concerned with

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143 Article 235 contains a provision for ‘implied powers’, which allows the Community to attain objectives mentioned in the Rome Treaty but not spelled out in any detail. In the present case, the completion of the common market was the Community priority objective but the Treaty does not specify the Community’s competence over the audiovisual sector.
with forging a supranational industry than with complementing the member states' respective policies by promoting national industries through measures to enhance their transnational dimension (Hill, 1994: 67).

Taking those objectives as a starting point, the Commission set up five lines of priority action: distribution, exhibition and promotion; improvement of production conditions (excluding production proper); stimulation of investment; training in business and marketing for professionals; and development of potential in countries with low production capacity\textsuperscript{1} or limited linguistic or geographical area. In a manner that often characterises bureaucratic administration, these were subdivided over time into smaller and smaller units with little co-ordination between them (Dale, 1997: 209). By 1995, there were nineteen project structures and over twice as many mini-projects (see Annex I for the list of projects). In order to ensure an active commitment by the industry, it was decided that these structures be managed by associations of professionals specifically formed for the purpose, and involving more than 20,000 companies and institutions (CEC, 1993: 4). From the outset, the funding granted to the projects over the five-year period was to enable them to become self-financing as they gained financial momentum (CEC, 1994c: 10). Thus, except for projects such as SCALE or BABEL, the principle of the funding was repayable loans covering up to 50\% of overall project costs. Curiously for a programme aimed at generating an effect of scale, most of the nineteen projects were deliberately designed to help low-budget, experimental or 'art' works rather than 'mainstream' films/programmes with a wider circulation potential. Indeed, few of the projects and films/programmes they supported succeeded in establishing themselves as viable commercial propositions (Jackel, 1996: 94). This caused confusion among applicants as to whether the overall priority of the programme lay in cultural or economic objectives (CEC, 1993c).

By the end of 1994, support had been given to over 5,000 professional initiatives launched within those structures. The Commission's assessment report, drawn up on the basis of an independent audit report and consultation with industry

\textsuperscript{1} Countries where investment in feature-length production is less than ECU 40 million per year. Majority of the countries participating in MEDIA belongs to this category. They include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden.
professionals, identified certain shortcomings of the programme. According to this report, the majority of those involved in the consultations felt that financial resources were insufficient to achieve the programme's objectives and were spread too thinly over the whole range of 19 projects. They were also of the opinion that, because the scale of economic promotion varied from project to project, the programme should concentrate more on market requirements and large-scale activities in order to make a real structural difference (CEC, 1993c: 8-9). In the light of these comments, the Commission published a proposal to amend MEDIA, which called for an increased budget needed to deepen the 'economic valorisation' of the audiovisual sector by concentrating on projects with industry restructuring effects (CEC, 1993e: 1-3).

These recommendations were incorporated into the MEDIA II programme which was established as a successor to MEDIA for the duration of 1996 to 2000.145 Another important background document to MEDIA II is the Green Paper on 'Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union', which was drawn up, as has been mentioned, in the aftermath of the GATT affairs.146 After an extensive review of the current 'crisis' of the European programme industry, the Green Paper stressed an urgent need for Europe to adapt to the emergent digitised, multichannel, multimedia, convergent 'information area', for otherwise there would be a 'risk of being sidelined into local markets and so missing out on the overall growth in the audiovisual sector' (CEC, 1994a: 15). The prospects for digitalisation was thought to be particularly promising in Europe, since the capacity to offer a wide selection of programmes, one of the main results of the digital revolution, would enable the industry to cater for a wide range of requirements and types of user: 'the cultural fragmentation of Europe has been a negative factor for the competitiveness of the European audiovisual industry: exploiting cultural diversity can be turned into an opportunity to be seized' (Ibid.: 12). In order to make the most of these 'market niches', however, a pan-European approach was required, as 'the narrower the target audience, the greater the

145 Council Decision 95/563/EC on the implementation of a programme encouraging the development and distribution of European audiovisual works (MEDIA II - Development and distribution, 1996-2000), and Council Decision 95/564/EC on the implementation of a training programme for professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (MEDIA II - training), Official Journal L 31, 20/12/95
need for broad geographical coverage' (Ibid.: 20). Contradicting the cultural protectionist approach adopted during the GATT negotiations, the Green Paper went on to criticise national and regional subsidies which tend to pay little, if any, attention to market requirements, creating 'lame duck mentalities' in the European industry (Ibid: 7). It then advocated a more market-oriented approach and 'an industrial structure of the critical size needed to secure the necessary financing, technology and enough market segments on which its profitability can be guaranteed'. Finally, it concluded that 'only a genuine European industry, backed by its most powerful players, can be a match for the world’s communications giants' (CEC, 1994a: 18).

Following the Green Paper, the Commission proposal for the MEDIA II programme was heavily geared towards industrial restructuring, with any cultural consideration that was left being pushed towards the margin of the overall agenda: 'it is obvious that the radiation of the influence of national cultures is itself dependent to a considerable extent on the industry’s general competitiveness' (CEC, 1994c: 7). The preoccupation with the industrial aspects of the audiovisual sector manifested itself in the decision to base MEDIA II on the new Article 130 of the EC Treaty on industrial policy rather than on Article 128 which defines the Community’s cultural competence, even though the responsibility for implementing the programme lay with the DG X (now the Directorate-General for culture, education and audiovisual). Together with the Green Paper on Strategy Options, MEDIA II marks a shift in emphasis in the post-GATT period from a micro-economic to a macro-economic approach (Schlesinger, 1997). Compared to its predecessor, MEDIA II was more ambitious, outward-looking and competition-oriented, with an eye to expand Europe’s market share not just within Europe but also on a global stage. Accordingly, its budget was 55 per cent higher than the previous MEDIA programme (ECU 310 million spread over five years) and its activities were refocused on three priority sectors - vocational training, development of projects and businesses, and

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146 'Programme industry' is used here to mean the industry producing cinema films and television programmes (CEC, 1994a: 13).
147 Article 130 of the EC Treaty, as inserted by the Maastricht Treaty, requires the Community to take steps aimed at ‘speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes’ by adopting specific measures to complement action taken by the member states in order to ensure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community’s industry. There are in fact two Treaty bases for MEDIA II, as the programme consists of two separate instruments - one for training and one for development.
transnational distribution of films and audiovisual products (see Annex II). Each of
these action lines was co-ordinated by an Intermediary Organisation which
technically assessed all the applications, and made recommendations to the jury of
professionals appointed by the Commission. The Commission then made the final
decision on the advice of the jury.

Training

In the area of training, the overall direction of the initiatives drew upon the lines
already established by the Media Business School and EAVE. It aimed to help people
in the audiovisual industry ‘adapt to the European and worldwide dimension of the
market by promoting training on economic and commercial management, legal
aspects and new technologies’ (CEC, 1994c: 22). The theme of enhancing general
employability of the population was drawn from the Commission’s White Paper on
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment which underlined the rapid expansion of
employment opportunities in the audiovisual industry and its accompanying demand
for highly skilled professionals. Potential beneficiaries were required to include a
‘European dimension’, particularly in the choice of trainers and their openness to
non-national European students. MEDIA training had access to ECU 45 million over
a five-year period to the end of the year 2000, which went to beneficiaries in the form
of non-returnable grants of up to 50 per cent of a project budget.

Development

The development wing of MEDIA II was structured to deal with three main
components of the pre-production stage - screenplay writing, financial engineering
and marketing strategy. Central concern in this area was that in Europe far less
attention and resources are devoted to project development than in the US, although
the preparation of the above three components largely determines the chances of

and distribution. The former is based on Article 127 (vocational training), and the latter on Article
130.
market success.\textsuperscript{148} Thus the aim of MEDIA Development was to encourage production companies to become more aware of projects' profitability by paying attention to the tastes of European and international audiences. Emphasis was placed on two initiatives, consisting of project funding and company support. The former provided projects with likely appeal to global consumers with a loan of up to 35,000 ECU per project. The latter provided a loan of between 50,000 and 150,000 ECU for companies' structuring/diversification efforts 'to consolidate the economic structures of production companies with growth potential on the European and world market' (CEC, 1994c: 32).

- Distribution

With more than half of the whole budget at its disposal, distribution was the central pillar of MEDIA II. This is because distribution was perceived to be the weakest area by the European policy makers. Very few European distributors have maintained the capacity for pre-distribution investment in the form of advance buying of transmission/distribution rights which helps to finance productions. Subsequently access to the most commercially promising European works is increasingly difficult for European distributors. This means that they are unable to compile sufficiently attractive catalogues and therefore have difficulty finding distribution outlets. To remedy this situation, MEDIA distribution was intended to strengthen the link between production and distribution/transmission structures by encouraging distributors and broadcasters to involve themselves in financing works right from the production stage by purchasing in advance all or part of the rights. The expected spin-off of increased cooperation was the production and distribution in Europe of large-budget films, a market segment largely dominated by Hollywood.

Funding for distribution was divided into five categories: cinema distribution; cinema exhibition; distribution of television programmes; distribution of works on video; and promotion. Among those five, cinema distribution received the largest allocation. This sector took the place of EFDO, and was composed of two main

\textsuperscript{148} In Europe, investment in the development stage of projects represents 2 or 3\% of the production budget, whereas in the US the figure is around 10\%. 
funding systems: 'selective' and 'automatic'. In the so-called 'selective' system, at least three distributors from three different countries had to join together in the application, with a plan to release one or more non-national European film(s). As with EFDO, 'selective' scheme focused on supporting the circulation of experimental or more 'difficult' works, but there was nonetheless considerable room for supporting bigger budget films. The 'automatic' distribution aid initiative was introduced in 1996 as an experiment. Under this system, grants were made to distributors proportional to the number of seats sold for non-domestic European films. The aid had to be reinvested in the acquisition, editing (copying, dubbing and subtitling), or promotion and publicity costs of non-domestic European films. By linking the aid mechanism with actual market success, the system was intended to encourage the circulation of films with commercial potential, as well as to strengthen the position of enterprising European companies on the market. Not surprisingly, this mechanism quickly gained the approval of those with a vested interest in increasing the profitability of the industry, and its initial experimental phase was extended to the end of the programme (CEC, 1999c).

The results of MEDIA II (Annex III) indicate that the beneficiaries of the support tend to be relatively high-profile, large-scale projects, involving directors and casts with already-established names. Judging from the number of international awards those projects have received, it seems that they have achieved a certain level of visibility and media coverage which has a direct bearing on their market performance, although it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the EU support has actually contributed to their success. Since the operational term of MEDIA II expired at the end of the year 2000, its structure was inherited by MEDIA Plus in 2001. The programme's basic objectives and implementing mechanism remain the same, except that MEDIA Plus puts even more weight on making an impact in the

149 I have not been able to obtain detailed data indicating the production costs, revenues or the level of EU support for all the projects that have received funding from the MEDIA programmes, so I cannot give an in-depth analysis here.

global market. Mindful of the digital revolution and its accompanying proliferation of dissemination methods, the challenge facing the European audiovisual industry is now formulated as 'defining marketing strategies developed at international level for the entire range of means of distribution', since internationalisation is 'no longer an option' but 'a vital necessity' (CEC, 1999c: 4). In order to enable 'the development of concerns capable of developing, financing, marketing of large volumes of European content', more emphasis is now placed on 'automatic' support than 'selective' support, on new, transnational forms of programme dissemination such as DVD, pay-per-view or Internet and also on promoting large-scale European film/television festivals to provide a 'showcase' to attract international audiences (CEC, 1998d).151

The approach represented by MEDIA II (and MEDIA Plus) and the Green Paper on Strategy Options met criticisms even within the EU institutions. Intersectoral conflicts are not an unusual feature in EU policy-making, and here the clash was between the proponents of marketisation/liberalisation and the sections that advocate social-democratic notions of public interest (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 131-132). The European Parliament criticised the Commission that 'an approach excessively oriented to the demands of the world market will disregard European demands necessary for production of a local, regional and national character and for interest in avantgarde or creative productions' (EP, 1995a). It also questioned the choice of the legal basis for MEDIA II (industrial policy) and anticipated that the programme would practically limit the scope of involvement and eligibility of professionals from states with limited production capacities or lesser-used languages as MEDIA II, unlike its predecessor, contained no explicit provision for such countries (EP, 1995b).152

151 Along with MEDIA Plus, some new schemes were introduced which are relevant to the development of new technology in the area of audiovisual production and distribution. These are eEurope (initiative for European information society), 'Audiovisual i2i' (the European Investment Bank's finance mechanism for SMEs) and the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Development.

152 The EP argued for a joint legal basis of Article 130 and 128 not just to emphasise the cultural focus of the programme but also because Article 128 would have given the EP greater degree of competence during the decision-making process.
The strongest opposition, however, came from the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) which attacked the Commission’s disregard for cohesion objectives and repercussions on the social and cultural front:

The Commission works on the premise that there is an inexorable world trend towards liberalization and deregulation of services, and that early and efficient action is needed to remove the barriers to the Single Market. Consequently it makes no attempt to look into the possible social consequences of the influence and pressure wielded by large international media groups, or of the foreseeable increased competition in the audiovisual sector.153

Furthermore, the ESC argued that the programmes proposed by the Commission would tackle the problems facing the audiovisual industry only in terms of its financial or organisational potential, leaving out the issues regarding the cultural content of the production: ‘It has long been an open secret that promoting such [competitive] programme industries from a purely commercial angle does nothing to advance cultural diversity, but leads to productions which promise the highest possible ratings and which are more and more alike’.154 The ESC therefore made it clear that the Commission’s policy orientations were inconsistent with the EU’s priority ‘to put our “European cultural identity” first’, a position which was widely accepted in December 1993 at the GATT trade negotiations.

Against such claims, the Commission has resorted to the principle of subsidiarity: ‘it is not the purpose of Community mechanisms to replace the mechanisms operated by the Member States to foster their national cultural identities’ (CEC, 1994c). The reason why the MEDIA schemes concentrate on pre-production and distribution stage of the audiovisual production is that those stages are better organised at European/international level, so MEDIA complements the traditional emphasis of national support mechanisms on the production process itself which are thought to be culturally specific. Thus, as far as the audiovisual policy is concerned,

the EU specialises in structural and industrial aspects, while a commitment to cultural creation is relegated to the domain of national and regional policy. Such 'complementarity' was endorsed by the majority of the participants at the European Audiovisual Conference in Birmingham in 1998, organised by the Commission for the industry professionals and European policy-makers (CEC, 1999a: 7).

As for the EU's own role in safeguarding cultural diversity, the Commission sees a direct correlation between the maintenance of cultural diversity and allocating support funds on a fair geographical basis. Thus MEDIA II allows 'positive discrimination' whereby priorities would be given to structurally disadvantaged states/regions. As a proof of this, the Commission notes that professionals in the countries with a low production capacity have received a third of the amounts allocated by MEDIA II whereas they represent only 13% of total investment in feature-length production in all the participating countries (CEC, 1999a: 12). However, it should not be forgotten that EU financial aids are designed to act as an incentive for professionals and companies to standardise their operating conditions by networking and/or intensifying their market dimensions, ultimately simulating a structure to match multinational media groups. The Commission seems to be working on an assumption that the presence of a production sector in local/national culture industries is a sufficient condition for the cultural expression of a population.

While it would be too simplistic to say that rationalising organisational structure of the industry automatically leads to the proliferation of homogenous, low-quality works, it is hard to deny a certain degree of interrelationship between how the work is produced and circulated and what goes into the work in terms of its style, aesthetics, and cultural content (for an example of this correlations in the national context, see below). The Commission even remarked that works which only appeal to a specific regional or national audience do not lend themselves to cross-border circulation and therefore hamper the competitiveness of the audiovisual industry (CEC, 1994c: 5). This does not entail, as some commentators have argued, that the EU is promoting the Europeanisation of both the audiovisual industry and its output so as to spread the idea of European cultural unity and common identity. The ultimate aim of the EU audiovisual policy is 'to make the European programme industry a profit-making concern in an open and dynamic world market', and to this end professionals in the audiovisual sector are encouraged to produce works tailored
to the tastes of audiences not just in Europe but beyond (CEC, 1994c: 57). Thus, European cultures represent to the Commission both an obstacle and an asset, depending on what they signify. On the one hand, cultural specificity is conceived as a negative factor preventing European audiovisual industries from taking advantage of both the European and global market. On the other hand, as was indicated by the Green Paper on Strategy Options, Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity is valued when it can be manipulated to fit fragmented, ‘post-modern’ consumption patterns in the increasingly diversifying global market. Where cultural resources cannot be exploited to serve the growth of the industry, the task of managing them is passed onto national and regional authorities.

Notwithstanding the opposition from the advocates of public interest, the push towards marketisation remains the thrust of EU audiovisual policy. To illustrate this further, one could look at a related issue of pluralism and media concentration in Europe. Against the background of increasing concentration of media ownership, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions in defence of public interest and especially of public service broadcasting. As a response to repeated EP requests to regulate this trend, the Commission produced a Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in 1992. The Green Paper, while endorsing the respect for pluralism and for freedom of expression as fundamental requirements of a democratic society, identified the issue as outside the jurisdiction of the Community, again passing the responsibility to the member states (CEC, 1992b). Subsequently, freedom of expression became equated with freedom to provide audiovisual services, and the EU’s task concerning the issue of pluralism was accordingly reformulated as ensuring the maximum number of operators (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996; CEC, 1999b).

This is in contrast to a view expressed by the ‘High Level Group’ (consisting of industry professionals and national and European officials) on audiovisual policy that an essential element of European audiovisual policies has always been to educate and inform the audience/viewer ‘over and above purely commercial considerations’, and that EU policy needs to ensure ‘balance between the free play of market forces and the preservation of the general public interest’ (CEC, 1998f).155 However, a

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155 The High Level Group was set up in 1997 by DG X as part of a general review of EU audiovisual policy. It was chaired by Commissioner for DG X, Marcelino Oreja.
report published by DG X on the European film industry openly welcomes recent merger trends of large media groups:

After the big US mergers and acquisitions...came a wave of European mergers and agreements in late 1996 and 1997... These were just the most important moves in an industry which is busy adapting to this new and increasingly competitive global market. Companies from across the EU are having to join forces to produce the investment and economies of scale required in this capital-intensive industry (CEC DG X, 1997).\textsuperscript{156}

Underpinning such thinking is the assumption that convergence on corporate terms is an inevitable and inescapable trend, and therefore that the EU's role should be to allow European corporations to compete on equal terms with other companies in the global economy. This functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy: policy change is brought about by a perceived trend of globalisation, and at the same time is likely to accelerate the trend (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 132).

Commercialism, Hollywood and European culture

It may be clear by now that EU literature on audiovisual policy is very conscious of the American presence in the European market while at the same time looking increasingly towards the US as a model for how to organise a European audiovisual industry. Seen from this angle, the apparent incongruity between the GATT negotiating stand and EU policies inspired by neo-liberal market economy actually constitutes two sides of the same coin: a notion of cultural sovereignty underpins concerns vis-à-vis the US, but so too does support favouring large concerns and the larger states with bigger production capacity within the EU (Miller, 1996: 80). This type of defensive policy in the audiovisual sector is by no means unique to Europe. Audiovisual productions in other parts of the world have also been predominantly

\textsuperscript{156} The report was referring to companies such as Bertelsmann AG which merged with Audiofina SA, leading to the emergence of CLT-UFA, Canal Plus which merged with Nethold, Canal Plus and Pathé which concluded a distribution agreement, Kirch and CLT-UFA which agreed on the development of digital pay TV in Germany.
determined by Hollywood, in a sense that they have either tried to adopt the Hollywood model or resisted and rejected its example in favour of alternative aesthetics, systems of production and distribution, and ways of relating to an audience (Moran, 1996).

Such unrivalled global influence of Hollywood should be understood in connection with the fundamental nature of film/audiovisual industry (Aksoy and Robins, 1992). What distinguishes the audiovisual industry is the high level of risk attached to the product. Due to its dependence on creative talent, it is very difficult to achieve control over the economic performance of the resulting output, and the vast majority of investments end up in failures. Added to this, developing, producing and marketing a film (and to a lesser extent, television programmes) is an extremely costly business. Film production involves producing a master copy only once, but producing a different one each time, which means that new rounds of investment have to be dedicated to each new project. The combination of high risk and the need for a continuous flow of funds have made it a prerequisite for the survival of economically-minded film/audiovisual companies to devise strategies that would enable them to reach the widest audience possible, as maximising audience means maximising revenues and spreading risks. One of them is called the 'slate' strategy, whereby a slate of 25 or so films are made each year, all of which are aimed at the commercial market place. Because it is practically impossible to predict which films will be successful, producers have better chances of recouping losses if they can spread their possible risks wider (Finney, 1996: 70). Another crucial strategy is to hold control over distribution, and this is achieved through vertically integrated distribution networks across different media and across geographically distinct markets to ensure maximum exploitation of the products. In short, it is only the vertically integrated Hollywood majors\(^{157}\) which have been able to generate enough

\(^{157}\) The major studios are companies that historically dominated Hollywood, and all of them have now become divisions of large conglomerates: Paramount (now part of the Viacom media conglomerate); 20\(^{th}\) Century Fox (sold to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation in 1985); Warner Bros (merged with Time and then with AOL); Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (now trading as MGM/UA); Universal (taken over by Matsushita in 1986, by Seagram in 1995 and by Vivendi in 2000); Columbia (bought by Sony in 1988); United Artists (merged with MGM); Disney (not part of the classic Hollywood oligopoly but grown into a conglomerate since setting up its own distribution wing, Buena Vista) (see Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 61-62).

These 'major' studios have since the 1980s further strengthened their core activity of film-making by horizontally integrating themselves into huge entertainment and leisure service conglomerates (Balio, 1996). They have now established links with other areas of culture/communications industry including publishing, television (both terrestrial and cable/satellite), video, music and related merchandising. This not only ensures a guaranteed outlet for their feature films and television programmes, but also enables them to make the most of 'hits' if and when they happen. If Hollywood is now enormously more profitable and better-capitalised, it has also incorporated many other elements into its sphere of influence so that it has become hard to label it as specifically 'American'. The 1980s and the early 1990s witnessed a series of take-overs and buy-outs that saw many of the majors no longer in the hands of American companies. The majors have also been forging international bases of film financing by partnering with foreign companies (Balio, 1996). Furthermore, today more than half of their revenue come from foreign markets, and the content of their products are increasingly tailored to suit international audiences as much as Americans. This has led to a split, although with some degree of overlap, between Hollywood which specialises in expensive blockbuster productions and indigenous American cinema most of which is made with medium- to low- budget and devoted to exploring particularities of contemporary US realities (Hill, 1994).

Given the overwhelming economic advantage of the Hollywood studios, it is not surprising that the EU has drawn on their organisational structure as providing a key to the revival of its audiovisual industries which are not economically viable. However, as we have seen in the case of GATT negotiations, the EU, at least in principle, has not totally abandoned a commitment to the 'European' way of organising audiovisual productions. Traditionally, audiovisual sector in Europe has enjoyed a certain level of protection by the state due to its social, cultural and political importance. State intervention in film industries may be less visible than in television broadcasting, but it is the state that has been sustaining the continued

158 For example, Time Warner Entertainment created a joint venture with Japanese companies Toshiba and C. Itoh. European companies, such as the French Canal Plus and Ciby 2000, the Dutch Polygram, and the Italian Penta, have all done deals with Hollywood (Hill, 1994).
existence of audiovisual industries in Europe, either directly through subsidies by public organisations such as the Arts Council (UK) or the Centre National de la Cinématographie (France), or indirectly through television broadcasters many of whom have legal obligations to invest in their respective national film industries (Dale, 1997).\textsuperscript{159} Despite the Commission’s insistence on the role of European nation states in safeguarding cultural diversity, a brief review of national film policy reveals that the tripartite relationship between the state, culture and the film/audiovisual industry is not so straightforward.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the involvement of the state was mostly limited to measures which were either directed against film imports (import and screen quotas) or aimed at supporting domestic film industries regardless of the nature of the product.\textsuperscript{160} Apart from censorship mechanisms which filtered out politically or culturally ‘unsuitable’ materials, these measures were undertaken for economic reasons such as the safeguarding of local employment, and cultural motives, such as lessening the ‘American’ influence on ‘national’ culture, were often secondary (Moran, 1996). However, a change in emphasis in European government policy took place in the 1960s when France, Italy and Germany all moved in the direction of more targeted support mechanisms. This is exemplified by the introduction in a number of European countries of the ‘selective’ support system which distributes subsidies to projects based on their artistic and cultural merits (Nowell-Smith, 1998; Dale, 1997).\textsuperscript{161} The result of this shift can be seen in the form of the New German Cinema of the 1970s, or the French New Wave and its continuing legacy of ‘auteur’ tradition, which all helped to elevate the status of film industries to the realm of ‘high’ culture. The emergence of such art film, however, coincided with the decline in the European popular genre film and with the rise of television which took over the place of cinema as a form of mass entertainment.

\textsuperscript{159} UK, Italy, France and Portugal have obligations for television channels to invest in the film industry. In other countries such as Spain and Germany, there is no such statutory obligation but TV channels nonetheless play a considerable role in film financing (CEC/DG X, 1997).

\textsuperscript{160} This obviously does not apply to the fascist regimes where national film industries became a crucial tool for state propaganda.

\textsuperscript{161} The ‘selective’ system in this context refers to support mechanisms for the production process itself and differs from the selective support used by the EU which aids the distribution of films. The selective systems existed alongside other forms of support which may have been indifferent to the cultural objectives, but because of the cultural prestige attached to it, the selective mechanism was considered to be central to the national support system.
Consequently, European films have become a medium which predominantly attracted the cultural elite, thereby consolidating the dependency of the European film industry on state support.

If the policy shift in the 1960s had contributed to (rather than 'caused') the decline of traditional popular cinema, a new trend that emerged in the mid-1990s can also be partly attributed to recent changes in policy orientations in Europe. Prompted by a recognition that 'cultural subsidies' have undermined the performance of European films, governments in a number of European countries have started to redirect support towards more commercial projects since the beginning of the 1990s (Dale, 1997: 186-199). Some countries have introduced new support schemes such as Spain's 'automatic' system, French new tax incentives or the lottery-funded 'Greenlight Fund' in the UK, all of which, although through very different mechanisms, are designed to encourage the production of big-budget, mainstream films targeted at wider audiences in the global market (Danan, 2002; Dale, 1997). In addition, the past decade saw the conclusion or renewal of co-production agreements between several European countries (for instance, Italy and France and Germany and Spain) which also points towards the increase in bigger-budget productions (CEC/DG X, 1997). Another important change is that a number of larger production companies - including French companies Studio Canal Plus and Gaumont and the Spanish company Sogepaq - have started to produce Hollywood-style, English language films which lend themselves to international distribution relatively easily. As far as the French companies are concerned, this was related to a change in French regulation allowing films shot in English to be eligible for state support (Danan, 2002:356).

Whether or not these programmes will be effective in bringing about the desired effects, these changes simply show that the pressure towards globalisation and marketisation is proving extremely difficult for national policy makers to resist. And this tendency was even more obvious in the field of broadcasting when in the 1980s almost all the governments in Western Europe rushed towards deregulation and privatisation. Several factors have contributed to such policy change. The rise of neoliberalism, the globalisation of the audiovisual industries, the onset of new media technologies, and the intensified business interest in the cultural industries in general, and the weakening of the traditional cultural hierarchy (such as 'high' and mass
culture) have all helped the apparent commercialisation of national audiovisual policies (Mommaas, 1996). While it is important to recognise that most European nation states still regard national film and television industries as a symbol of cultural identity, and that ‘selective’ forms of support still occupy a central place in national support systems, national audiovisual policies have shifted their emphasis from the promotion of cultural creation and diversity to adjusting to the market reality of internationally-operating audiovisual industries. And since the EU audiovisual policy is even less concerned with those cultural objectives which have traditionally been associated with national cultural policy, it raises the question as to who will take the responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the general public.

This is not to suggest that cultural creativity and commercial, mainstream audience appeal are mutually exclusive, and nor is cultural diversity necessarily incompatible with globalisation. The point I am trying to make is that the economic imperative of the audiovisual industry is increasingly in conflict with the traditional model (at least in Europe) of relationship between state and culture established during the nation-building process in the 19th and the early 20th century (Mommaas, 1996). Some authors argue that recent economic, political and cultural change has made it possible for the emergence of transnational cultural spaces which are based not only on the coordinated activities of a globalised industry but also on the globalised networking of more locally operating institutions (See, for example, Castells, 2000a; Lash and Urry, 1994). Although such claims may not be applicable to the whole cultural sector in general, it is certainly the case with the audiovisual industries whose arrangement is being disembedded from the former national system of cultural politics and re-embedded in the new transnational dynamics of the global cultural industries. This may also signal the shift of authority from the traditional social elite to a corporate elite, with serious implications for the protection of public interests. The efforts of corporate elites to pursue profits are often (although not always) detrimental to the interests of people as citizens, even if they give us more choice and control over our leisure time as consumers.

Thus, both EU and national audiovisual policies are, albeit to a different extent, characterised by their tendency towards marketisation. The EU’s attempt to create an ‘European audiovisual space’ does not seek to refashion national cultural space at the European level. Instead, it draws its model from the Hollywood mode of industry
organisation in which the arrangement of audiovisual production is largely determined by the market mechanism. As this Hollywood model itself is being de-linked from national cultural and economic systems, EU audiovisual policy looks towards a new international system of cultural trade. In this connection, Wolfgang Streeck makes an interesting observation:

Today, the European state system is undergoing deep changes in response to economic internationalization, especially with respect to the uses of public power in the economy. The expectation of the 1950s and 1960s that the European nation-states would be gradually superseded by a supranational interventionist state built in their image is now recognized as fallacious... Instead of supranational institutions taking over post-war state interventionism, the present condition of the European Union would seem to tell us more about the future condition of the nation-state than the traditional condition of the nation-state prefigures the future condition of the Union. (Streeck, 1996: 313-314)

Conclusion

My argument was that there are two facets of EU audiovisual policy. On the one hand, it purports to defend the (supposed) cultural distinctiveness of Europe, but on the other hand it seeks to maximise the competitive position of European businesses committed to satisfying the needs of consumers in global markets. I have tried to show that the abiding logic behind both policy strands is commercial, and that such marketisation of culture is locked into the broader structural trend in which the role of public authorities is beginning to be conceived in a fundamentally different way from the traditional model of cultural organisation.

In January 2002, undoubtedly prompted by criticisms for the EU's overtly economistic approach, the Council issued a statement reaffirming that the audiovisual sector essentially constitutes 'an expression of creativity, particularly of identities' and 'a fundamental means of promoting democracy', as well as 'an economic activity
of growing importance. Some commentators also point out that there are signs that much of the over-exaggerated importance placed on unadulterated free market deregulation in the early 1990s is now abating, and that the EU audiovisual agenda increasingly advocates a more balanced approach (Barnett, 2003; Ward, 2002). The EU may be trying to mediate between cultural and economic goals and between the interests of citizens and dominant business interests. But so far its policy practices in the audiovisual sector have proven to be dominated by the preoccupation with the EU's global competitiveness.

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Conclusion

The cultural construction of Europe is a complex process that involves different tendencies and logics which sometimes reinforce and sometimes contradict each other. However, as this thesis has tried to show, there are certain sets of dominant ideas and practices that have shaped the form and contents of the cultural politics of the EU, with each of them having important implications for the relationship between culture, politics and identity.

Tracing the EU's attempts in the cultural sphere since the 1970s, the evolution of EU cultural policies can be broadly divided into three periods: the 1970s, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and from the mid-1990s to the present. Generally speaking, cultural aspects of European integration first began to attract attention from EU policy makers in the 1970s. In retrospect, this period served as a preparatory stage for the development of cultural policy in the subsequent periods, characterised by non-committal declarations or resolutions and feasibility studies. The proposals that were actually translated into binding legislation were those with a direct connection to the creation of the single market, such as the freedom of trade in cultural goods, free movement of cultural and education workers, and issues relating to copyright and taxation in the cultural sector. Although the European Parliament kept urging the Commission to take action in the areas of activity traditionally associated with 'culture', the conservation of heritage or support for museums, for example, most of these initiatives were not implemented at all or, at best, carried out as pilot projects on an ad hoc basis.

Thus, until the mid-1980s, culture and education had kept a low profile in EU integration. But a growing awareness among the European elites that the lack of popular involvement could impede the success of accelerating market integration has triggered a sudden surge of interest in questions of culture and identity. This is best exemplified by the 'People's Europe' campaign, designed to bring the EU closer to the ordinary citizens of Europe. The period between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s therefore witnessed the introduction of various cultural schemes which are highly symbolic, from the adoption of the European flag and the European anthem to the launching of the European City of Culture festivals. It was also during this period
that major support programmes such as MEDIA and ERASMUS were launched despite the absence of a clear legal mandate for the EC/EU to act in these areas. The EU in the late-1980s also attempted to make inroads into what may be termed cultural standardisation measures, including the promotion of a 'European dimension' in school curricula, the support for a 'European' history textbook and the creation of Europe-wide, multilingual television channel.

The overriding concern of EU officials in the 1980s seemed to lie in using culture and education as an identity device, as a means to generate feelings of belonging and solidarity among the general public. Such a 'consciousness-raising campaign' was legitimated by invoking the idea of common cultural heritage which, according to EU discourse, Europeans needed to be made aware of. The underlying assumption is that public commitment rests on a culturally integrated community as the basis of social solidarity. This clearly draws on the idealised model of the nation-state in which a political unit is built upon a homogeneous (or homogenising) cultural unit.

The growing significance of cultural policy from the mid-1980s onward culminated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which introduced Community competence in the cultural sphere. However, having EU competence in culture and education clearly spelled out also meant that Europeanisation in these policy areas has been circumscribed in important ways. The Treaty provisions explicitly rule out any harmonisation of member states' laws in the spheres of both education and culture, and limit EU involvement to those measures which 'contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States'. Thus the Maastricht Treaty signalled an overall change of direction in EU cultural policies, as captured by the slogan 'unity in diversity' (as opposed to a single-minded focus on 'unity') which began to proliferate in EU official discourse during the 1990s. This has involved a shift in emphasis in the EU cultural agenda from the notion of a 'common European culture' as a symbolic tool for transforming the affective identification of the masses to a more pragmatic approach in which culture is prioritised in terms of its utility for various social and economic objectives. These objectives include, among other things, strengthening the competitiveness of the European cultural industry, improving the image of cities to attract business investment, boosting the regional/local economy through cultural tourism, and enhancing people's
employability and combating social exclusion. During the course of the 1990s, therefore, commercial, market-oriented reasoning came to outweigh the popular identity concerns that were the driving force behind many of the cultural initiatives of the 1980s.

Seen from a broader perspective, such a shift can be understood as forming part of a general ideological restructuring that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. In Chapter 2 on national cultural policies, we saw how the rise of neoliberalism has influenced changing conceptions about the role of the state in regulating cultural spaces at the national level. In the case of the EU, the effect of neoliberal discourse is even more pronounced, to the extent that the preoccupation of EU policy actors with European competitiveness in the global market has transformed the fundamental rationale for EU intervention in the cultural sphere. This tendency is most noticeable in audiovisual and education/training policies, but the language of the market increasingly seems to penetrate other areas of EU activities seemingly unrelated to the pursuit of economic growth, such as heritage conservation (Chapter 6) and the European City of Culture (Chapter 7).

Although the EU officials (especially in the Commission and the European Parliament) still rely on the rhetoric of shared culture and identity, the function of culture in ensuring social cohesion now takes on a different meaning in the context of a developing neoliberal economic order. Fostering a sense of cultural identity and belonging becomes not just a means of psychologically anchoring European integration on a popular level, but also of helping to cope instrumentally with potentially adverse socio-economic conditions within the EU where the European model of the welfare state is increasingly challenged by de-regulation and monetarist goals both at the national and European levels. Hence the importance attached to participation in cultural activities in regional development or employment training policies as a way of empowering marginalized individuals and groups, although it is not clear (yet) if, and how, concrete cultural measures initiated by the EU can contribute to social cohesion beyond the level of a rhetorical exercise.

Another distinctive characteristic that marks the period from the mid-1990s onwards is a change in the preferred method of implementing cultural measures. Whereas a large part of the 'People's Europe' initiatives was mass-oriented campaigns, the support programmes which were mostly introduced in the mid-1990s,
and which came to constitute the core of the post-Maastricht cultural policy, tend to focus on the networking and partnerships of cultural professionals and organisations across Europe. The Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphael programmes and their successor 'Culture 2000', as well as MEDIA and SOCRATES, all point to the promotion of cultural exchanges and the building of professional networks. Judging from the way these programmes are organised and administered, it seems to matter less what goes into the supported projects in terms of their cultural meanings and contents, as long as there is an element of partnership between individuals and organisations from different member countries. This is a far cry from the top-down imposition of standardised, homogenous culture, which is the model of national cultural integration propounded by theorists such as Gellner. Instead of the simple accumulation of authority in EU institutions in a formal, legal sense, the developments of cultural policies since the 1990s can be taken as an instance that testifies to the emergence of a more decentred and diffuse system of power in which the networks of cultural professionals and institutions play a crucial role in the European project alongside national (as well as subnational) and supranational actors.

If the EU cultural policies are not meant to bring about cultural integration as postulated by the conventional model of the nation-state, how can we conceptualise the relevance of culture within the overall European project? It is my contention that the notion of 'Europeanness' is currently being institutionalised through EU cultural policies along three lines. First, in line with the 'network' model of governance, EU cultural measures are mobilising those professionals and organisations with a vested interest in specific provisions the EU is able to offer. These actors form cross-border partnerships and networks as a way of reaping benefits from a new window of opportunity opened up at the European level. By encouraging those 'informal' actors to participate in EU-wide networks of policy programmes, the EU in turn gains recognition as a legitimate level of governance. This is a functional, fragmentary mode of integration in which Europeanisation proceeds on a group-by-group, sector-by-sector basis.

Second, and related to the above, Europe as a cultural project is also being built around the notion of individual market opportunity. Whether be it in the area of audiovisual media, cultural heritage or even in education, EU cultural policies seem to attach particular importance to the commercial aspects of culture. The EU, so the
official discourse goes, encourages people's engagement in European culture by promoting cultural tourism and urban regeneration projects, by ensuring the provision of high-tech audiovisual products and service, or, in a more general sense, by enabling people's access to the best cultural and educational services within a border-free, integrated market. In this context, social inequality and disenfranchisement become framed as a lack of skills or a lack of consumer access to marketised and increasingly digitally-mediated cultural commodities. Taking this line of argument further, some authors suggest that European integration may be better conceptualised as a process of transnational class integration than as a variation on national integration (Holman and Pijl, 1996; van Apeldoorn, 2000). It is not clear if European integration is generating any intra-class solidarities, but such a claim does sound plausible to the extent that the emergent European cultural space consists of cultural professionals, exchange students and those with a sufficient means and skills to partake in leisure travelling and other forms of cultural consumption.

Third, although the focus of EU cultural policies has shifted from creating a feeling of belonging to establishing a new political/economic opportunity structure, the language of identity and community continues to frame EU intervention in the cultural sphere. This manifests itself most strongly in the essentialised discourse of European culture and heritage which is invoked whenever there is a perceived threat from Europe's 'Other' – whether it is construed as the economic Other (the US, Japan) or cultural Other (Muslim and non-White populations inside and outside the EU borders). Manuel Castells argues that debates about the transformation of European societies in the age of globalisation are expressed in the opposition between the power of flows and the power of identity (2000: 345). If the two meanings of Europeanisation described above revolve around transnational flows and exchanges within a circumscribed space in a globalising economy, the EU's articulation of European cultural heritage can be said to represent an opposite direction, a search for Europe's roots and organic unity. As Chapter 5 on European history tried to show, this type of defensive identity is not just problematic but can be politically dangerous given the multiethnic, multicultural composition of contemporary European societies.

In sum, instead of generating cultural cohesion, the effect of EU cultural policies seems to be one of creating increased opportunities for certain sections of the
population on the one hand, and new forms for exclusion and polarisation on the other. Delanty's observation about the general process of European integration applies directly to the construction of European cultural space:

It may be suggested that European integration is being conceived around a notion of mobility rather than one of citizenship, the fluidity of which enhances fragmentation. The drive for greater convergence is one that is achieved by bringing about the provision of possibilities for the enhanced mobility of goods, capital and labour. A societal framework that is held together by processes of mobility runs the risk of achieving convergence on some levels, at the cost of divergence on others (Delanty, 2000b:86).

In this context, Europeanisation may be characterised as cultural fragmentation and pluralisation as opposed to standardisation or unification. The EU as it currently stands does not qualify as a community of belonging in the sense that may be applicable to the nation-state. EU cultural measures construct the meaning of being part of 'Europe' according to what individuals do or might aspire to do with reference to economic and political participation. On the other hand, such a pragmatic, instrumental way of conceptualising European identity seems to omit serious questions about social solidarity, and this omission is sometimes brought to the surface in the form of ethno-cultural discourse on European culture and history. The biggest task that now faces the EU in this regard is to articulate a model of European society without relying on an exclusivist kind of cultural identity while at the same time going beyond the idea of integration based solely on the instrumental interests of the participants.
ANNEX I

Projects supported by MEDIA (1991-1995)

Distribution, exhibition and promotion

**EFDO (European Film Distribution Office):** support for cross-frontier distribution of films with particular emphasis on low-budget productions

**MEDIA Salles and Europa Cinemas:** promotion of European films in cinemas

**EVE (European Video Area):** promotion of the production and cross-frontier distribution of European films/programmes on video

**BABEL (Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Language):** promotion of the circulation of programmes by providing support for dubbing and subtitling

**EUROAIM (European Association for an Independent Productions Market):** support structure providing a range of services to assist independent producers in the marketing, promotion, and sales of their productions

**GRECO (European grouping for the circulation of works):** promotion of the transmission of television programmes produced by independent producers

**European Film Academy:** an association formed by prominent figures in the media industry to promote the European film in general

Improving production conditions

**SCRIPT (European Script Fund):** a fund to encourage the development of screenplays and the pre-production of works of fiction

**DOCUMENTARY:** support for the development of creative documentaries as regards production, promoting and marketing

**SOURCES (Stimulating Outstanding Resources for Creative European Screenwriting):** support to improve screenplay writing by organising training courses for European authors and scriptwriters

**CARTOON:** support for the animated film industry competitive by reorganising production infrastructure, providing incentives for projects and training professionals
MEDIA Investment Club: support for audiovisual works using advanced technologies (computer graphics, digital and computer techniques in television, HDTV, interactivity)

MAP-TV (Memory-Archives-Programmes Television): development grants to promote audiovisual productions using archive material

LUMIERE: conversion and restoration of cinematographic works stored in film libraries

Mobilisation of finance

EMG (Euro Media Guarantee): a mechanism to attract investors by sharing the risk attached to audiovisual productions

Training

EAVE (European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs): long-term courses to train entrepreneurs in the audiovisual industry

MEDIA Business School: short-term training courses to help professionals to improve their managerial skills

Measures for countries with low production capacity or limited geographical and linguistic area

SCALE (Small Countries Improve their Audiovisual Level): support for initiatives by countries with a low production capacity

(Source: CEC, 1993c)
ANNEX II

MEDIA II (1996-2000)

Development

- Support for project development: Loans are granted to European independent production companies to develop production projects in the following genres: film and television drama, creative documentaries, animation, productions using new technologies or archive based productions, to assist writing techniques, establishing financial arrangements and business plans, and marketing schemes

- Support for production companies: Funds are made available for financing part of the investment for the expansion of independent production companies to support drawing up of a business plan and their structuring efforts

- Support for developing multimedia projects: Support for projects submitted by companies specialising in audiovisual productions using digital technology

- Industrial platforms: Financial support for the groupings of European companies

Distribution

- Video and cinema distribution

  Selective support: Loans granted to the groupings of at least three distributors from different countries for the distribution of one or more recent non-national films

  Automatic support: Grants are made to distributors proportionate to cinema attendance in previous years for non-national European films. It must be reinvested in production, guaranteed minimum receipts or the distribution of films outside their national territory.

  Video distribution: Support given to publishers and distributors of European films/ audiovisual programmes on video

- Television broadcasting

  Support is given in the form of advances on receipts to independent producers whose drama, documentary or animation projects involve at least two member states’ broadcasters, preferably in different language communities
- Support for marketing the operating rights of European audiovisual works
  A loan granted to TV distributors on the basis of a catalogue which they intend to market
- Promotion and access to the market
  Grants made to European initiatives aiming to facilitate the promotion of European independent production, either at major markets and audiovisual festivals or at more specific events
- Cinema exhibition
  Funding is provided for the networking of cinemas showing European films. The amount of funding is redistributed between the member cinemas of networks which undertake to screen a majority of European films and to take measures to promote the European cinema

Training
- Training in economic and commercial management
  Support for updating of training modules on management and for facilitating exchanges/networking of training programmes and students/professionals
- Training on new technologies
  Support for updating of training modules on new audiovisual technologies, and for facilitating networking and exchanges between training institutions and students/professionals, with particular emphasis on distance learning on interactive media and on regions with a low production capacity

(Source: CEC, 1999a)
ANNEX III

Results of MEDIA II

- Support for the development of 1690 European works (films, TV films, documentaries, animated films, multimedia), including *Elizabeth* by Sheka Kapur (6 awards at BAFTA 1999 and Golden Globe), *East is East* by Damien O'Donnell (Alexander Korda Prize for the best British film at BAFTA 2000 and Espigo de Oro at Valladolid), *Solas* by Benito Zambrano (5 awards at the Prix Goya 2000 and Iris d’Or at the Brussels Festival), *Dancer in the Dark* by Lars von Trier (Palme d’Or at the Cannes Festival 2000), *Pane e Tulipani* by Silvio Soldani (7 distinctions at the David di donatello 2000) and *Kirikou et la sourcière* by Michel Ocelot (Grand Prix for full-length films at the Annecy Animated Film Festival 1999), *The Million Dollar Hotel* by Wim Wenders, *Pearls and swine* by Fridrik Thor Fridriksson, etc.

- Support for the development of 281 European production companies


- Support for co-production and distribution of 380 works for television (fiction, documentaries, animated programmes), such as *Le Comte de Monte Cristo, St Ives, Carvalho, Mobutu Roi de Zaïre, Balzac* or *Simsalagrimm*
- Support to publish and distribute on video 212 catalogues of European works

- Support for 350 cinemas, with a total of 831 screens in 213 European cities

- Support for 64 film festivals (each year) showing total of 7500 European works

- Support for 40 training schemes, attended by more than 5000 professionals (producers, scriptwriters, creators, etc.). Films benefited from the advice given under these initiatives include Character (Oscar for best foreign film 1998), *Breaking the waves, Antonia's Line, Death and the Maiden, The Ulysses' Gaze, Too Much, Ma vie en rose.*

(Source: CEC, 1999;
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/media/media2_en.html>)}


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