

**THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

Gabriele Birnberg

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Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MRes/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

Despite their explicit intent to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, EU member states manage to do so only some of the time. Which are the factors that determine whether or not the EU member states successfully coordinate their positions in the international arena? To find out, I propose to examine the voting behaviour of the EU member states inside the United Nations General Assembly; a forum in which, notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences, they intend to coordinate their votes and are thus subject to coordination pressures. This means that for divisive resolutions, each member state must try to reconcile its national policy preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I hypothesise that the balance a member state strikes generally depends on how important it views the issue at hand, how powerful it is, what type of relationship it maintains with the EU and under certain conditions, what type of relationship it maintains with US. I further argue that the balance is expected to tip in favour of EU unity when increasing the collective bargaining power by working together becomes a tangible objective. By adopting a multi-method approach, the thesis shows that the EU member states make a genuine and continuous effort to coordinate their votes inside the General Assembly. Significantly, the thesis illustrates that member states, at times, are able to override their heterogeneous national policy preference in order to stand united. I conclude by connecting the findings with the constructivist/rationalist debate, which juxtaposes foreign policy cooperation according to the logic of appropriateness with the logic of consequence. The results obtained have implications not only for the study of EU voting behaviour in the United Nations, but also for theoretical debate underlying it.

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Finally, I owe a great debt to my parents for their encouragement and unwavering support. As most parents, they have had many aspirations for their children. Growing up in Communist East Germany, however, doctoral studies in the free world were probably not among them. As most children, I hope I made them proud.

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------|
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CMD | Comparative Manifesto Dataset |
| EC | European Community (used interchangeably with EU) |
| EFP | European Foreign Policy |
| EP | European Parliament |
| EPC | European Political Cooperation |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| GA | General Assembly |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IR | International Relations |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| OLS | Ordinary Least Square |
| QMV | Qualified Majority Voting |
| TEU | Treaty of the European Union |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| US/USA | United States/United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The small Balkan state of Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in February of 2008. This decision has been seen as highly sensitive and controversial by the world community. This is not surprising, considering both, the history of the Balkans, including the more recent episode of turmoil and bloodshed following the political disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s; as well as the larger questions about territorial integrity and the possible implications of unilateral declarations of sovereignty for the world community. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains divided on the issue, with Russia plainly rejecting Kosovo's declaration as illegal and China expressing concerns as well. To date, of the international community, only 60 countries have recognised its independence.

By virtue of Kosovo's geographical vicinity to the European Union (EU), in addition to the fact that some of its formerly Yugoslav neighbours have already joined or are in the process of joining the Union; the position taken by the EU was seen as crucial and thus highly anticipated by all involved. Falling short of any such expectation, the EU as a whole did not take a decision on Kosovo's independence. Twenty-two of the 27 European Union member states have recognised Kosovo's independence to date, while five EU members – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus – have not. The five member states that have not recognised Kosovo, officially base their opposition on the legal uncertainty that surrounds Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.

Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that for each of these countries irreconcilable national interests are at stake as well. Most of them have sizable minorities of their own (e.g. Basque minority in Spain, ethnic Hungarian minorities in both Slovakia and Romania). They fear that by recognising Kosovo a precedent might be set in their own countries; if not for outright separatist movements (such as in Spain), at least for the strengthening of minority rights (such as in Slovakia and Romania). Cyprus heavily sympathises with Serbia's position, which views the declaration as illegal. Shortly after Kosovo's declaration of independence, Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias was reported as stating in an interview with the Russian magazine *Ellada*, that "the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of both Serbia and the Republic of Cyprus [are] being violated in the most brutal manner" (p. 29). Finally, the position of Greece is less clear, especially as officials publicly vacillate between being on the verge of recognition and considering recognition under no circumstances.

In short, the EU has failed to manage a united response on the question of Kosovo independence; making this an example of EU disunity in foreign affairs¹. And not even the recently adopted non-binding resolution by the European Parliament (EP), calling on all EU member states to recognise Kosovo's independence, has had the intended effect (European Parliament, 2009). If anything, it has led the five member states to reiterate their original positions. The divided response by the EU on the question of Kosovo independence serves as only one of many examples where the EU member

¹ In this thesis I use the terms 'foreign affairs' and 'international affairs' interchangeably.

states do not speak with a single voice in foreign affairs.² Other notable examples include questions pertaining to Zimbabwe (where the member states remain divided over how much to cooperate with Mr Mugabe) and Russia (where the member states remain divided over how to deal with Russia's increased assertiveness); with the possibility to further extend the list. That is not to say, however, that the member states never reach a common position. While generally considered less newsworthy, some of the time, they in fact stand united on the international stage, for instance matters of human rights (K. E. Smith, 2006b).

This then raises questions about which factors decide whether or not the member states of the European Union speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. The casual observer of EU affairs might swiftly reach the conclusion that if the EU member states are unable to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs at all times; as sovereign nation states they quite naturally must only do so when they happen to share the same view (see Glarbo, 1999, p. 635). I, on the other hand, shall use the present thesis to investigate the matter of EU (dis)unity a bit further and explore alternative explanations.

In fact, EU disunity runs counter the member states' explicit intent to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) provides a useful example of a forum in which the EU member states work very thoroughly on negotiating a common position between them, despite the fact that it is an

² Throughout this thesis, I use the phrase 'speaking with a single voice' in colloquial terms – similar to how it is used by politicians and journalists, and some academics – to mean the successful coordination of one common position by the EU member states in foreign affairs (e.g. Jones & Evans-Pritchard, 2002; Owen, 2002; K. E. Smith, 2006a; Solana, 2002). Unless otherwise stated, the phrase does not refer to the delegation of (foreign) policy responsibilities to Brussels institutions, as is typical for trade matters for instance.

international forum in which they act in their capacity as sovereign nations and as such are free to vote as they wish. Diplomatic representatives of the twenty-seven EU member states convene on a regular basis to coordinate their respective positions on all those UNGA resolutions that are tabled for a vote. They diligently engage in highly systematised coordination efforts. They plough through pages upon pages of resolution text, they analyse its content, if applicable compare and contrast it with previous resolutions on the topic and subsequently send a report to their capitals. With national instructions in hand, they then meet the other national diplomats to coordinate their views. If no common EU position is reached, additional discussions with the capital followed by further meetings in New York become necessary. In such instances, efforts to identify a position acceptable to everybody are usually undertaken until right before the roll-call vote.

Taking it all together then, the puzzle guiding my research project can be summarised as follows: Despite their explicit intent to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, EU member states manage to do so only some of the time. Which are the factors that determine whether or not they stand united? For the purpose of this thesis, I take the term ‘to *speak* with a single voice’ quite literally and propose to examine the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the United Nations General Assembly.³ Within that framework, I argue that the EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in the United Nations General Assembly despite their heterogeneous policy preferences. It is theoretically plausible that they do so in order to signify their unity (constructivist approach) or to increase their collective bargaining power (rationalist approach). The

³ The advantages and disadvantages of choosing this particular framework are discussed in more detail in chapter 4.

theoretical framework underlying these assumptions is further discussed in the subsequent chapters. It follows then, that for those resolutions for which national positions diverge from the EU majority⁴, each member state must find a way to reconcile its national policy preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I hypothesise that the balance a member state strikes between the two generally depends on four aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it is affected by external factors, precisely how it is affected by its relationship with the United State (US). I further argue that the balance is expected to tip in favour of EU cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power by working together becomes a tangible objective (that is to say, in instances in which it makes a difference whether or not they speak with a single voice). The objective of this introductory chapter is to illustrate the importance of the study in section 1.1 and to provide an overview of the remainder of the thesis in section 1.2. I will provide a brief conclusion to the chapter in section 1.3.

1.1 Importance of the Thesis

As highlighted in the introduction, to some, analysing the conditions under which EU member states speak with a single voice in foreign affairs is likely to result in a foregone conclusion. Because the EU member states frequently do not stand united, quite naturally the expectation is that as sovereign nation states they speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, only when they happen to agree on the issue at hand. As is evident by this thesis, I consider it to be worthwhile to further explore the question

⁴ EU majority is defined as the votes cast by the majority of the EU member states per resolution.

of EU cohesion in foreign affairs. That is so for a number of theoretical as well as practical reasons.

In a world dominated by Westphalian nation-states the European Union is a relatively new type of political entity. If such a new type of political entity were in a position to formulate a cohesive foreign policy, it would affect current international relations (IR) theory in a profound manner.

“Both Keohane and Grieco agree that the future of the European Community will be an important test to their theories. If the trend toward European integration [including in foreign policy formulation] weakens or suffers reversals, the neorealists will claim vindication. If progress toward integration continues, the neoliberals will presumably view this as support for their views.” (Baldwin, 1993, p. 5)

If the member states of the European Union were able to achieve the same level of cohesion in negotiating foreign policy matters, as they have been in the economic realm; such a development could ultimately lead to a new post-national world, in which political systems such as the EU can be effectively compared to that of a nation-state and can fully develop into prominent international actors (Hix, 2005; H. Smith, 2002). Conversely, if the EU failed to formulate a foreign policy comparable to that of the traditional nation-state, the predominance of the traditional Westphalian nation-state in the international arena would be reinforced.

In such a situation, it is only prudent not to rely exclusively on prevailing ideas but to take stock of the situation empirically. Pijpers (1991) rightly highlights the importance of questions, such as: “why, when, and to what extent [would] something like a joint European foreign policy develop” (p. 13). I make no claims to provide definitive

answers to these questions. Rather, this thesis serves as acknowledgement that these are important questions that need to be addressed. And by investigating the extent to which EU member states are able and willing to successfully coordinate their votes in the United Nations General Assembly – even perhaps overriding national policy preferences – I hope to help take a step in the right direction.

With that in mind, there are furthermore practical reasons for undertaking such a study. Any insight gained into the member states' ability and willingness to reconcile differences between them so as to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, is useful in two ways. One, at the very minimum it may help to manage expectations in this regard, harboured inside the EU or by other international actors. Two, realistic expectations in turn may lead to better informed policy options. And better informed policies, in many ways, tend to be more economical.

1.2 Thesis Outline

The thesis consists of eight chapters and is divided into four parts. I use this section to briefly outline the remainder of the thesis.

Part I: Introduction

Part I is introductory in nature and incorporates chapter 1 and chapter 2. It provides a platform for contextualising the thesis with reference to the more general academic field of European foreign policy (EFP) analysis, as well as with reference to the more specific field of EU coordination inside the United Nations. To this end, chapter 1 serves as starting point; introducing research question and argument, and providing an outline for the remainder of the manuscript. In chapter 2, I present an overview of the

existing bodies of research, which this thesis touches upon. To this end, I place the thesis in the larger field of EFP on the one hand and discuss in more detail research which specifically deals with EU coordination inside the UN on the other hand. I will furthermore discuss how both areas are informed by a set of theoretical considerations that draw on elements from IR theory as well as EU integration theory.

Part II: Conceptual and Methodological Discussion

Part II incorporates chapter 3 and chapter 4 and serves as platform for discussing the conceptual underpinnings and various methodological aspects of the thesis. To this end, in chapter 3, I set out to explore the central idea that the EU member states intend to coordinate their votes, notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences. I further seek to elaborate on the factors which I hypothesise determine their voting behaviour. In chapter 4, I lay out the methodological framework and discuss aspects pertaining to the operationalisation of the study. The chapter is used to explain my choice of the United Nations General Assembly as suitable framework of analysis, readily availing itself to quantitative and qualitative analysis. In addition to a versatile analytical framework, the empirical analysis also benefits from the possibility to measure certain variables in a variety of different ways so as to account for the various contexts in which they may be conceptualised. For instance, the transatlantic relationship may be measured in economic, political and cultural terms.

Part III: Empirical Analysis

Part III incorporates chapters 5 to 7 and makes up the empirical core of the thesis. The first two of the chapters present the quantitative analysis, while the last chapter presents the qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis can best be described as a

voting pattern analysis and examines the data by means of system-level analysis in chapter 5 and by means of individual-level analysis in chapter 6. The former sets out to highlight any systematic variation in the overall levels of EU cohesion in the UNGA, while the latter examines the way in which individual member states contribute to the variation in overall EU vote cohesion levels. In chapter 7, I set out to examine the vote coordination process that takes place between the member states prior to the roll-call voting. The particular focus shall be on resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as on resolutions in the military realm.

Part IV: Conclusion

Part IV serves as framework for the conclusion of the thesis. It is tantamount to chapter 8, where I summarise in a few words the main argument and outline the propositions, before highlighting its key findings. I further discuss shortcomings of this particular thesis and suggest ways of taking the research agenda forward, followed by some concluding remarks.

1.3 Conclusion

Chapter 1 served as starting point of this thesis. This is a thesis about EU foreign policy. More specifically, it is a thesis about the ability and willingness of EU member states to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. While using this chapter as platform to introduce my research question and the main arguments, I also emphasised the theoretical and practical importance of such a study. I argued that because the European Union is a relatively new political entity on a world stage dominated by Westphalian nation-states, its attempts to formulate joint foreign policies and to stand united in foreign affairs – if successful – may have far-reaching implications for current

IR theory. Furthermore, I explained that gaining a deeper understanding of the member states' ability and willingness to speak with a single voice has practical implications for EU policy options as well. For these reasons, I argued, it is prudent to take empirical stock of the current situation. In chapter 2, I will attempt to place the present study in the larger academic framework, discussing the various bodies of research it touches upon.

CHAPTER 2: EXISTING RESEARCH

The thesis touches upon various bodies of existing research. In broad terms, this is a thesis in the area of European foreign policy studies. In the narrowest terms, it is an analysis of EU vote coordination in the United Nations General Assembly. Research in both areas is informed by a set of theoretical considerations that draw on elements from IR theory as well as EU integration theory. I shall use this chapter to summarise the main constituents of the above-mentioned bodies of research and to set out ways in which this thesis seeks to contribute to them.

To this end, chapter 2 is divided into four sections. In section 2.1, I seek to highlight existing research in the field of EFP. Section 2.2 serves as platform to thrash out how the existing research is informed by the theoretical debate. In section 2.3, I focus specifically on the EU in the UN, discussing existing research and highlighting possible points of departure for this thesis. A brief conclusion to the chapter is provided in section 2.4.

2.1 European Foreign Policy Studies

Broadly speaking, this is a study about European foreign policy; a discipline that is naturally multifaceted. It includes but is not restricted to research in the following areas, listed in no particular order of importance: institutional evolution of EU foreign policy in general (e.g. Cameron, 1999; Ginsberg, 2001; Ifestos, 1987; Norgaard, Pedersen, & Petersen, 1993; Nuttall, 2000; Elfriede Regelsberger, Tervarent de, & Wessels, 1997; Rummel, 1990; K. E. Smith, 2003, pp. 25-53) and 2nd pillar institutional evolution in particular – European Political Cooperation (EPC) (e.g. Hill, 1992; Nuttall,

1992, 1997; Elfriede Regelsberger, 1988), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (e.g. Eliassen, 1998; Ginsberg, 1997; J. Peterson & Sjursen, 2002; Elfriede Regelsberger & Wessels, 1996; Rummel, 1992) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the EU as a civilian power (e.g. Telo, 2005); the EU as a normative power (e.g. K. E. Smith, 2003, p. 253); EU policy towards third countries (such as Neighbourhood Policy, Near Abroad, ACP etc) (e.g. Bicchi, 2007; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Martenczuk, 2000) and also the role of national foreign policies in the study of EU foreign policy (e.g. Hill, 1996).

Despite the diversity of the academic field, virtually all of the studies pertaining to EFP are essentially guided by the three following questions: Who is the foreign policy actor? What type of foreign policy is executed? And, is it successful? In analysing these questions, the difficulty of studying European foreign policy frequently lies in the “uncertainties about how to define basic terms such as [foreign policy actor] or ‘foreign policy’” (Allen, 2002, p. 43; Weber, 1995, p. 193). It further lies in the complexity of deciding upon foreign policy success or failure. In order to effectively place the present thesis in the larger field of EFP studies, in this section, I shall consider these three guiding questions in more detail before linking them to the study of EU vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly in section 2.3.

2.1.1 Foreign Policy

In very loose terms, ‘foreign policy’ can be conceptualised as the “coherent, coordinated and consistent identification and pursuit” of an actor’s external interests (Allen, 2002, p. 46). Traditionally, the dividing line between what is considered “politico-military” foreign policy as opposed to “external economic policies” has been

rather stark (Allen, 2002, p. 46). To this end, analysts “have tended to assume a distinction between external economic relations as ‘low politics’ (‘external relations’ for short) and more traditional politico-diplomatic activities as ‘high politics’ (or ‘foreign policy’)” (Morgan, 1973). With ‘high politics’ considered more important for the survival of the nation state, only the former would be considered foreign policy proper. Nevertheless, since “the distinctions between external relations governed by *commercial* policy and foreign relations inspired by *foreign* policy have become increasingly fuzzy”, external economic relationships are more and more considered “genuine acts of *foreign* policy”, particularly when they are pursuant of a political objective (Piening, 1997, p. 9 italics in original; also see M. Smith, 2002, pp. 77-95). Conceptionalising the term in such a way ensures the inclusion of military, diplomatic as well as politically motivated external economic policies under the foreign policy umbrella. This is a fruitful adjustment, particularly when discussing foreign policy with reference to the EU, as shall become evident in the following paragraphs.

2.1.2 Foreign Policy Actor

The European Union is neither a state nor a conventional international institution. By virtue of its “supranational authority structures” (Krasner, 2001, p. 233), the EU can be termed a polity.⁵ But because there “is a tendency to see foreign policy as essentially an act of government and therefore exclusive to states” (Allen, 2002, pp. 44-45), the EU makes a rather “unorthodox actor in international affairs” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 13; Ginsberg, 1997, p. 15).

⁵ Simpson and Weiner (1989) define a polity as “being constituted as a state or other organized community or body” (pp. 35-36).

Nevertheless, “the EU has become a force in international affairs, especially in trade, development, cooperation, the promotion of regional integration, democracy and good governance, human rights and to an increasing extent, also in security policy” (Söderbaum & van Langenhove, 2005, p. 250). It uses “[t]rade agreements, cooperation and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition and eventual EU membership” as foreign policy instruments (K. E. Smith, 1998, p. 253). The EU has over time, also developed a certain *modus operandi* for diplomatic coordination in international affairs (Strömvik, 1998, p. 181).

Looking at it up closely then, it transpires that with regards to foreign policy, the EU essentially incorporates three types of foreign policy actor. Depending on international forum and policy instruments used, the EU can either be termed a supranational foreign policy actor or an intergovernmental foreign policy actor. As part of the former, decision-making power is transferred to an authority broader than the governments of the member states and decisions tend to be taken by qualified majority (QMV). As part of the latter, the member states of the EU take EU legislative and executive decisions amongst themselves (mostly by unanimity but sometimes by QMV) without them having to pass through national parliaments.⁶ Additionally, since the “EU clearly lacks a monopoly on foreign policy-making in Europe” (Allen, 2002, p. 43), its member states may also conduct foreign policies independently. While they may refer to their EU membership in doing so, they act in their capacity as sovereign nation-states.

⁶ The three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty are illustrative of the policy areas subject to the different decision-making frameworks. Accordingly, all EU policies governed exclusively by supranational decision-making are summarised under pillar I. Policies in the areas in which the member states favour closer cooperation without wanting to subsume them to supranational decision-making are summarised under the two pillars governed mostly by intergovernmental decision-making. That is to say, foreign, security and defence policy is summarised under pillar II and asylum and immigration policy and criminal and judicial cooperation is summarised under pillar III.

The EU as a Supranational Foreign Policy Actor

Two of the EU's most powerful foreign policy instruments fall under the remit of the European Community (EC): the capacity to enter into international agreements and the provision of financial assistance to third countries (K. E. Smith, 2003, p. 55). "The EU is above all an economic power and trade provides the foundation of its actorness." (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 62) There is a huge demand for agreements with the Community, the largest trading bloc in the world. To this end,

"the Union has developed a repertoire of roles in the world political economy. Most evident, to the very large number of states that rely upon trading access to the single market, is its role as gatekeeper and negotiator of access to the markets of others" (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 47).

The Community is also one of the world's largest aid donors. For a number of years now, more than half and up to 60% of overall development assistance comes from the EU and its member states (European Union, 2008b). While these are primarily economic instruments, they give the EU the potential to exercise considerable influence in international affairs (K. E. Smith, 2003, p. 55).

All economic agreements fall under pillar I and are thus subject to supranational decision-making rules. Here, the European Commission has the sole right of initiative and the Council of Ministers together with the European Parliament decide upon the fate of the tabled measure. The decisions are usually taken by means of qualified majority voting.

The EU as an Intergovernmental Foreign Policy Actor

Cooperation under pillar II is more akin to what traditionally has been perceived as foreign policy – mainly diplomatic coordination and as of recent also to a certain extent military cooperation. Diplomatic instruments include: common positions, joint actions, common strategies, declarations and decisions. These are mostly adopted by unanimity in the Council and are (politically) binding for the member states. Diplomatic coordination by the member states in international affairs formally took root in the early 1970s when the EPC was established. More recently, the EU has also ventured into the military realm of foreign policy and under its European Security and Defence Policy. It launched its first ever military operations in 2003. A UNSC-backed operation, entitled CONCORDIA, replaced a NATO assignment in the West Balkans. And 1800 troops were sent to Congo the same year in an operation, entitled ARTEMIS (European Union, 2009). The EU has since embarked on numerous civilian missions as well as military operations in regions as varied as Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia (European Union, 2009).

In Pillar II, the Commission does not enjoy a special right of initiative and is merely considered to be associated with the policy process. Here, decision-making takes place outside the community framework, within the Council of Ministers. This essentially means that member states have a final veto on any decision put to the table. What makes cooperation in the second pillar so problematic is that “no EU Member State, with the possible exception of Luxembourg, appears ready to subsume its statehood into a European state” (Allen, 2002, p. 44).

The EU Member States as Foreign Policy Actors

The member states of the European Union remain crucial actors – within the EU but also on the international stage more generally (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, pp. 10-12). While, as sovereign nation states, they predictably hold on to their national foreign policies, there is also an expectation, anchored in Article 18 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) for them to act as “strategic agent[s] of the EU” (Kissack, 2007, pp. 4-5). The United Nations is a point in case. It is an international forum in which EU member states participate in their capacity as sovereign nation-states. Nevertheless, a strong connection to Brussels exists. This connection is based on Article 19 of the TEU, whereby “member states shall coordinate their action in international organizations” (European Union, 1992`, Article 19(1)). In particular, EU member states are requested to “uphold the common positions” they have agreed upon as part of the CFSP (European Union, 1992`, Article 19(1)). To this end,

“every year, well ahead of the beginning of the UNGA session, a draft paper is circulated by the Presidency which outlines the basic line to take on various agenda points in the forthcoming UNGA session. It is submitted to EU coordination in the framework of the Council and goes through several revisions before the UN starts. This triggers a coordination process in the relevant Council Working Groups, but which can take place at different levels in Brussels. That process feeds into the positions which the EU will take on the spot in New York” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 40).

To summarise, for some then European foreign policy is “synonymous with EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) which should be differentiated from the European Community external competences (the traditional trade policy and the new development policy complementary to those of the Member States)” (Churrua, 2003, p. 1). Michael Smith (2002) however, suggests that students of the Common Foreign

and Security Policy are misguided in their assumption that the essence of European foreign policy is to be found within pillar II. Since “foreign economic policy [...] falls under the competencies of the EU itself” (Weber, 1995, p. 193), Smith (2002) argues that Europe’s international potential is mostly in pillar I (also see Allen, 2002, p. 47). Hill (2002) employs the term “European foreign policy” to identify the ensemble of international activities of the European Union, including relevant activities emanating from all three pillars. Others find the singular focus on EU activity too restrictive and consider that in addition to Community external relations and CFSP, EFP also includes the foreign policies of the member states (e.g. Churruarín, 2003).

2.1.3 Foreign Policy Success or Failure

When studying the success or failure of anything, the natural question that arises is by what standard is success or failure measured; in this case foreign policy success or failure (Jørgensen, 1997). With respect to EFP, two overarching yardsticks emerge. The baseline of each EFP study is whether or not EU member states speak with a single voice in international affairs (e.g. Farrell, 2006; Ginsberg, 1999, p. 430; Kissack, 2007, p. 1; Knodt & Princen, 2003, p. 201; Laatikainen, 2006, p. 78; Luif, 2003, p. 1; Meunier, 2000, p. 105; Rummel, 1988; K. E. Smith, 1998; Stadler, 1989, p. 3). If one stopped there, instances where EU member states speak with a single voice would be considered a success. That is to say, speaking with a single voice in international affairs would be considered an end in itself: Bearing in mind that previously warmongering European nation-states have come together and are able to speak with a single voice in international affairs, it is in itself not a small achievement. In fact, “in the recent past there were those, such as the Benelux states or the European Commission, who argued for a European foreign policy as a symbol of integration, without much

apparent concern for its substance or effectiveness” (Allen, 2002, p. 44). That is to say, to strive for a collective position so as to signify EU unity.

If, on the other hand, one took it a step further, instances where EU member states speak with a single voice would be seen as necessary condition for conducting successful EU foreign policy. That is to say, speaking with a single voice in international affairs would be considered a means to an end. According to this argument, signifying EU unity on the international stage is only a necessary pre-condition to wielding collective influence. And that collective influence is what counts as success. Anything that falls short of actually giving the EU a “greater say in international politics” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 88; Scheel, 1988) cannot be considered a success. In fact, one of the main criticisms of EU foreign policy is that it “consists largely of declarations” (Rummel, 1988, p. 120).

2.2 The Underlying Theoretical Debate

“EU’s external activities have been sitting uneasily between (European) integration studies and the discipline of International Relations.” (Del Sarto, 2006) Even though the former is to a certain extent incorporated in the latter, integration theory is generally “more concerned with the process of integration than with the political system to which that integration leads” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3). Having said this, the emerging “new system of governance” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3) entails implications for foreign policy. And these are of interest here.

Traditionally of course, the relationship between sovereign states has almost exclusively been covered by IR. However, with the expansion of EU foreign policy into

the area of economic foreign policy on the one hand, and EU member states trying to work together in the diplomatic field on the other hand, European integration theories have something to add to the study of foreign policy cooperation between the member states. Having said this,

“EU member states assert the right [to ‘domaines réservés’] over certain foreign policy problems [and even within the EU framework] retain a capacity and willingness to take some decisions on a purely national basis, although they may need to justify them at the EU level. For these largely unilateral decisions one can rely on standard foreign policy decision-making models” (M. Smith, 2004, p. 748).

A certain degree of overlap between relevant IR theories and EU integration theories is hence inevitable. For instance, one can easily see connections between rationalism and intergovernmentalism. Similarly, constructivists and neofunctionalists both emphasise the role of supranational institutions (see, e.g. Haas 2001). Notwithstanding the occasional overlap, I want to use this section to highlight the contribution of relevant IR and EU integration theories to the study of foreign policy cooperation between the EU member states. The following main theoretical approaches are discussed in more detail: realism, liberalism, rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism, and neofunctionalism.

The Realist View

According to the realist view, sovereign states are the main foreign policy actors in the international arena, which they describe as anarchic. This means that realists see the international arena as lacking hierarchical political order based on formal subordination and authority (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10). Given the constraints of anarchy in the international arena, “realists are in general sceptical about the possibility of

international cooperation” (Andreatta, 2005, p. 25). They see survival as their fundamental motive. Wanting to maintain their sovereignty, states “think strategically about how to survive in the international system” (Mearsheimer, 1994-5, p. 10). That is to say, they are occupied with power and security, whereby power is seen as a facilitator of security in an anarchical system (Waltz, 1986, p. 331). While this does not mean that states never cooperate (states may decide to form temporary alliances against a common enemy for instance), concerns for relative gains are likely to limit cooperation (Waltz, 1979) and alliances are expected to quickly come apart. According to the realist then, identically cast votes in the United Nations General Assembly would be indicative of similar preferences rather than active vote coordination.

The Liberal View

The liberal perspective consists of a “broad family of liberal theories” (Stephen M. Walt, 1998, p. 32). And similar to the realists, they generally see sovereign states as the main foreign policy actors in the international arena. However, liberalists do not share the realist assumption that power is the means by which security is guaranteed (Cranmer, 2005). Rather, they see cooperation as pervasive element in international affairs (Stephen M. Walt, 1998, p. 32).

The main aspects underlying the optimism about (foreign policy) cooperation is the emphasis of a state of interdependence between the actors, facilitated particularly by international institutions, free trade and to a lesser extent by peace and democracy more generally. In the broadest terms, “interdependence suggests a relationship of interests such that if one nation’s position changes, other states will be affected by that change” (Rosencrance & Stein, 1973, p. 2; see also Young, 1969).

Some liberalists believe that cooperation between states can be made more tenable through formal or informal institutions (Andreatta, 2005, p. 28; Mowle, 2003, p. 561). Institutions, such as the WTO, may reinforce the prospect of cooperation by enhancing the commonality of interests among players, by reducing the number of uncertain variables, and by reiterating the interaction in a more structured setting (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Keohane, 1984). Economic institutions, moreover, “further interdependence in both a ‘purely institutional’ manner, but also in an economic manner: such institutions make free trade easier by lowering transaction costs, [resulting in] greater amounts of trade” (Cranmer, 2005, p. 13). Economic interdependence tends to imply an “increased national “sensitivity” to external economic developments (Rosencrance & Stein, 1973, p. 2; see also (Cooper, 1968, p. 59).

Although liberal theorists acknowledge that states have an incentive to cooperate, they “are quick to point out, however that an incentive to cooperate does not necessarily translate into the act of cooperation itself” (M. Smith, 2004, p. 743; Sterling-Folker, 2002, p. 51). Particularly democratic states have to take the national politics, interest groups and public opinion into consideration, which could inhibit cooperation. This point has also been highlighted by the liberal intergovernmentalists and I shall discuss it in more detail in the ensuing paragraphs. With the emphasis on economic policy, the liberal view seems especially suited to help explain cooperation in the area of EU foreign economic policy (Andreatta, 2005, p. 30).

The Rationalist View

Most broadly speaking, rationalism refers to “any ‘positivist’ exercise in explaining foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behaviour” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 54). States are seen as unitary actors which calculate the marginal utility of their actions. Faced with the possibility of cooperation, “actors calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes their utility under the circumstance” (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 77). Their behaviour is inspired by the logic of consequentiality. That is to say it is driven “by preferences and expectation about consequences” (J. G. March & Olsen, 1989, p. 160). Cooperation is likely when the perceived gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige (Gordon, 1997, p. 80). Agreements reached at the bargaining table thus reflect the relative power of each member state (Pollack, 2000) as well as their preferences. According to the rationalist view then, EU member states are expected to coordinate their positions inside the United Nations General Assembly, as long as the perceived gains of doing so prevail over the potential costs of overriding their national policy preferences.

The Liberal Intergovernmentalist View

The rationalist view and the liberal intergovernmentalist view share some of their core assumptions. Specifically, rationalism “overlaps loosely with liberal intergovernmentalism in its insistence on unitary actors, marginalist calculations, and credible commitments” (P. Schmitter, 2004, p. 48). Having said this, liberal intergovernmentalism famously emphasises the role played by domestic actors. Hence, liberal intergovernmentalism can essentially be described as a two-step sequential model of domestic preference formation and international bargaining

(Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 19-20). Influenced by national politics, interest groups and public opinion, states aggregate their interests domestically and act rationally to advance their preferences internationally (Pollack, 2000, p. 17).

Having said this, with particular reference to the area of foreign policy, the treatment of national preference formation as distinct domestic political process, as heralded by liberal Intergovernmentalism, may not be quite as crucial. Intensive domestic lobbying on CFSP issues is rather rare relative to other EU policy domains, nor do EU states typically 'ratify' common policy decision, either formally or informally" (M. Smith, 2004, p. 741). Accordingly, in foreign policy matters, the state can be treated as a "unitary actor according to the IR tradition because [it is assumed] that domestic actors do not play a significant independent role in negotiations beyond the state" (Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77).

The Constructivist View

Like the aforementioned approaches, constructivism also views the state as the principal actor in international relations. What distinguishes constructivism as approach, is its emphasis on the intersubjective structure of the state system which helps formulating state identities and interests (Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 385). In essence then, the constructivist perspective stresses the importance of "shared ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of actors"(Copeland, 2006, p. 1). States are driven by the logic of appropriateness – they do what they consider proper within the context of the group. This is not to say that "states are irrational or no longer calculate cost and benefits [; rather,] they do so on a higher level of social aggregation" (Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 386). Constructivism is best

placed to offer an explanation for *continued* cooperation. “Through repeated acts of reciprocal cooperation, actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue cooperation.”(Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 390) The constructivist would further stress that

“by engaging in cooperative behaviour, an actor will gradually change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new identity for itself. By teaching others and themselves to cooperate, in other words, actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other – to see themselves as a “we” bound by certain norms. [...] The fact that humans do associate in communities suggests that repeated interaction can transform an interdependence of outcomes into one of utility”(Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 390).

Acknowledging its relative weakness in explaining the initiation of cooperation, constructivism does not preclude the existence of material interests altogether; it simply does not view it as the only motivating driver for inter-state cooperation. The argument goes that in addition to interests, “political co-operation leaves room for a social integration that stems from diplomatic communication processes set up through political co-operation history” (Glarbo, 1999, p. 636). According to the constructivist view then, EU member states vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly is the result of “informal, ‘societal’ development that have created a dense web of consultation with integrative effects” leading to the creation of a diplomatic community within the EU (Glarbo, 2001). Collective votes would hence signify EU unity.

The (Neo) Functionalist View

In many ways, the neofunctionalist perspective finds itself opposite the realist perspective. One, rather than largely disregarding the possibility of inter-state

cooperation, it moves beyond it by considering the option of full-fledged integration, whereby “loyalties, expectations and political activities [would shift] toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Andreatta, 2005, p. 21; see also Haas, 1958, p. 13). The basic motivational driver for inter-state cooperation and eventual integration is the so-called spill-over effect. Accordingly, integration between states in one sector (in the case of the EU, the economic sector for instance) will quickly create strong incentives for integration in further sectors (e.g. the political sector); in order to fully capture the benefits of integration in the original sector.

Two, instead of ‘high politics’, the neofunctionalists framework commonly focuses on ‘low politics’. As already explained above, the former tends to focus on more traditional politico-diplomatic activities considered essential for the survival of the nation-state, while the latter tends to focus on external economic relations. That sometimes leaves it to underestimate the potential resistance of the nation state, particularly in power politics. Because of its distaste for power politics, foreign policy is relegated to an ancillary position (Andreatta, 2005, pp. 22-23). Since neofunctionalism envisages full-fledged integration of the EU member states, as such, it would be rather ill-equipped to explain EU vote coordination inside the UNGA; particularly because it is a forum in which the member states continue to participate in their capacity as sovereign nation-states.⁷

⁷ The only forum within the United Nations, where the EU has obtained an elevated position is the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in which, since 26 November 1991, the “EC can vote on behalf of the EU Member States, particularly in the fields of trade, agriculture and fisheries”(European Union, 2007b).

Summarising the approaches that I have outlined above, it can be noted that with the exception of neofunctionalism, which sees a shift of loyalty, expectation and activity towards a new supranational centre (Haas, 1958), all of the theoretical perspectives discussed view the state as the chief actor in international affairs. Furthermore, state preferences are most narrowly defined for the realist, for whom the ultimate driving force is state sovereignty; a means to security and facilitated by power. The preferences for the remaining theoretical approaches are more broadly defined. As regards preference formation, constructivism stresses the importance of the intersubjective structure for interest (and identity) formation and liberal intergovernmentalism acknowledges a domestic role in preference formation.

The Constructivist/Rationalist Debate

Particularly interesting from the perspective of this research appears to be the constructivist as well as the rationalist approach. According to the former, foreign policy cooperation between the EU member states is the result of “the so-called ‘co-ordination reflex’, the wide-spread tendency to co-ordinate foreign policy with other member states rather than going it alone” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 4). The co-ordination reflex in itself is the result of “informal, ‘societal’ development that have created a dense web of consultation with integrative effects” leading to the creation of a diplomatic community within the EU (Glarbo, 2001). According to the latter, foreign policy cooperation between the EU member states is the result of utility maximisation calculations, which implies that the actors are willing to cooperate, even on foreign policy matters, as long as the perceived gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige (Gordon, 1997, p. 80). Cooperation is facilitated either “if the gains of

common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing sovereignty is worth it, or if their interests converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is entailed”(Gordon, 1997, p. 81).

Both approaches are enmeshed in the constructivist/rationalist debate, which juxtaposes rationalist ideas with constructivist ideas about inter-state cooperation. In ontological terms,

“rationalism is usually seen as assuming an individualist ontology, in which wholes are reducible to interacting parts, [while] constructivism [is seen] as assuming a holist ontology, in which parts exist only in relation to wholes” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 53).

Nevertheless, rather than ‘competing Weltanschauungen’, they can also be seen as, to a certain degree, complementary analytical tools used for a pragmatic interpretation of inter-state cooperation (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, pp. 53, 67). Cooperation may be initiated by means of rationalist ideas about utility maximisation. And while actors would be predicted to cooperate as long as doing so has a utility maximising effect, over time a shared identity may develop which further facilitates cooperation among the actors even if there was no explicit opportunity to maximise their utility by cooperating together. As Diez and Wiener importantly point out: “the extent to which [either or both of these perspectives] is true is a matter of empirical analysis” (2004, p. 4). Such empirical analysis is carried out in this thesis. To this end, I examine which are the factors that determine whether or not EU member states successfully coordinate their votes in the UNGA and to what extent, if at all, member states are willing to override their heterogeneous policy preferences. By developing and testing hypotheses that on the one hand highlight features associated utility maximisation

(e.g. hypotheses on power, salience and collective bargaining power) and on the other hand are emphasising the integrative effects of EU membership (e.g. hypotheses on enthusiasm about EU membership and extent of voluntary integration), I seek to tease out some of the differences in the debate.

2.3 The EU in the United Nations General Assembly

As already mentioned, the focus of this thesis is on the European Union member states as foreign policy actors. The ‘foreign policies’ that I am concerned with are their respective votes in the United Nations General Assembly. Research about the EU at the UN can loosely be divided into two groups. One group focuses on EU representation at the UN. A second group focuses on EU-UN cooperation (e.g. Brantner & Gowan, 2008; Hoffmeister, Ruys, & Wouters, 2006; Ruys & Wouters, 2005). While the former studies EU “behaviour as a [...] cohesive bloc within UN political forums”, the latter investigates “significant operational (and financial) cooperation at the field level” between the EU and the UN (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 37). The focus here rests on the former, not the latter.

Of the research conducted in the field of EU representation inside the United Nations, some scholars choose to study EU representation inside the United Nations Security Council (Biscop et al., 2005, pp. 69-83; Bourantonis & Kostakos, 2000; Hill, 2006; Verbeke, 2006). Others elect to focus on EU representation in other UN bodies or specialised agencies, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or the EU in Geneva (e.g. Damro, 2006; Kissack, 2006; Taylor, 2006). Particularly recent research has extended the “scope of investigation into the areas of [...] economic and social organisations, environment and labour standards” (Kissack, 2007, p. 2). The vast

majority of scholars working in the area of EU representation at the UN, however, selects to analyse EU representation inside the United Nations General Assembly (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Featherstone & Ginsberg, 1996; Hurwitz, 1976; Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 2006; Luif, 2003; Rees & Young, 2005; Wouters, 2001). In the remainder of this section I will focus on EU representation inside the United Nations General Assembly.

2.3.1 Existing Research

The United Nations General Assembly is a popular framework for studying EU representation inside the United Nations.⁸ As pre-eminent multilateral deliberation forum, it is “often seen as a natural showcase for the European Community and its Member States” (Bruckner, 1990, p. 174). And since it so readily avails itself to both, quantitative voting pattern analysis and qualitative analysis of the vote coordination process, the UNGA presents an especially rewarding framework for empirical analysis.⁹ Researchers tend to investigate EU voting patterns over several UNGA sessions – anywhere from two annual sessions (Foot, 1979: years 1975-1977) to over twenty annual sessions (Luif, 2003: years 1979-2002).

It appears that research on EU representation inside the United Nations General Assembly has been particularly popular in connection with EU institutional developments pertaining to European foreign policy. Since its inception in 1958, the

⁸The United Nations General Assembly has been a popular framework for the analysis of voting patterns and voting bloc alignments, practically since its inception in 1946 concerning not just the EU but the entire UN membership (e.g. Ball, 1951; Hovet, 1960; Kim & Russett, 1996; Lijphart, 1963; Marin-Bosch, 1998; Meyers, 1966; Moore, 1975; Newcombe, Ross, & Newcombe, 1970; Russett, 1966; Vincent, 1976; Voeten, 2000).

⁹UNGA voting pattern analysis is the most prominent type of analysis within the specific field; however, some scholars have looked into analysing resolution sponsorship (Mower, 1962; Rai, 1977), or EU statements and explanation of votes (K. E. Smith, 2006a).

EC/EU has undergone two major institutional developments with reference to its foreign policy. These are the initiation of the European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s and the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. Earlier studies tend to investigate EC voting patterns inside the UNGA with reference to the EPC development (e.g. Bruckner, 1990; Foot, 1979; Hurwitz, 1976; Lindemann, 1976, 1978, 1982; Stadler, 1989, 1993). Later studies tend to investigate EU voting behaviour with reference to the CFSP (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Rees & Young, 2005; K. E. Smith, 2006b; Sucharipa, 2003; Wouters, 2001). A few specialised studies explore the voting patterns of candidate countries prior to the 2004 Eastern enlargement (e.g. European Union, 2004b; Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 2006; Luif, 2003). Other authors focus on national case studies. For instance, Thijn (1991) and Laatikainen (2006) have investigated the voting behaviour of the Netherlands, while Holmes, Rees et al. (1992) have analysed Ireland's voting behaviour.

Theoretical/Conceptional Perspectives

Research in the field of EU coordination inside the General Assembly (GA) is dominated by two theoretical perspectives. The realist perspective tends to be employed to explain a lack of vote cohesion (Stadler, 1989). Researchers using this perspective maintain that "power remains a divide" among the member states and that powerful countries continue "to protect national proclivities to a degree that middle powers and smaller states are unable to" (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 14). The constructivist perspective on the other hand tends to be relied upon to explain the presence of vote cohesion (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999). Researchers who view things through the constructivist prism propose that EU member states coordinate their positions for the sake of EU unity, regardless of national interests. They maintain that the "reflex of

seeking and promoting a common position, typically under the leadership of the EU Presidency, is [...] firmly entrenched in the GA" (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). Above and beyond that, they argue in favour of a gradual reconciliation of divergent positions leading to increased agreement over time (Kissack, 2007, p. 5).

Methodology

The two main methodological tools that are used in the existing studies are descriptive voting pattern analyses and qualitative expert interviews. The vast majority of these studies employ descriptive statistical analysis. At a minimum, they all present and discuss a table of fully cohesive votes (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Bruckner, 1990; Johansson-Nogues, 2006; K. E. Smith, 2006a). Taking it a step further, some of the studies analyse vote defection. That is to say they analyse the occurrence of two-way splits (possible constellations: yes/no, yes/abstain, no/abstain) and three-way splits (possible constellations: yes/no/abstain) in the EU vote (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Stadler, 1993; Strömvik, 1998; Wouters, 2001). Luif (2003) and Strömvik (1998) each include a ranking measure and calculate respectively the distance between the votes of the individual EU member states and the distance between the individual member states and third countries. In doing so, Strömvik (1998) follows a model proposed by Lijphart (1963). None of the studies that concern themselves with EU representation inside the UNGA employ inferential statistical analysis. However, studies that explore voting alignment in the UNGA more generally do. The methods that are used range from factor analysis (Kim & Russett, 1996; Newcombe, Ross, & Newcombe, 1970), hierarchical cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling (Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995) to NOMINATE analysis (Voeten, 2000).

In addition to quantitative analysis, much of the research on EU representation inside the UNGA benefits from qualitative analysis as well. Most of the information is derived by means of expert interviews with officials in Brussels, the capitals or New York (e.g. Bruckner, 1990; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Luif, 2003; Paasivirta & Porter, 2006; Rasch, 2008; K. E. Smith, 2006a).

Empirical Findings

Collectively, research on EU cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly (i.e. the extent to which the EU member states cast identical votes in the General Assembly) spans over several decades and considers a varying size of EU membership. Nevertheless, there is a broad agreement in the field that the “degree of a common European ambition” (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 38) and EU cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly varies over time and by issue area. Scholars agree that EU cohesion levels have neither been constant over time, nor that they have unequivocally increased since the initiation of the European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s. Rather, EU cohesion levels have noticeably fluctuated. After an initial period of vote convergence during the 1970s, cohesion levels reversed to lower levels again in the 1980s (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, p. 71). Coinciding with the 1992 inception of the CFSP, an “unprecedented rise in the share of unanimous votes” took place (Strömvik, 1998, p. 185). For the time periods under consideration, annual EU cohesion levels peaked in 1994 (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Strömvik, 1998, p. 185). EU cohesion levels vacillated again afterwards, but have not dipped below their 1992 levels.

The voting patterns of France and the United Kingdom (both nuclear powers and UNSC member states) have been identified as the most isolated of all the EU member states (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Fassbender, 2004, p. 862; Foot, 1979; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 14; Rees & Young, 2005, p. 200; Wouters, 2001). The Benelux countries, on the other hand, have been identified as part of the EU core that votes with the EU majority most of the time (Rees & Young, 2005; Stadler, 1989, p. 15; Sucharipa, 2003, pp. 783`, 791). And while Greece's voting behaviour has been perceived as maverick during the 1980s (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Stadler, 1989, p. 74); its voting record with regards to the EU majority has markedly improved during the 1990s (Rees & Young, 2005).

Some issue areas produce persistently low levels of EU cohesion. Scholars agree that UNGA resolutions pertaining to military questions and decolonisation are particularly divisive for the EU member states and produce continually low EU cohesion levels (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Brantner & Gowan, 2008: 39; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; e.g. Luif, 1995: 279; Luif, 2003: 3; Wouters, 2001). As such, these tend to be issues that within the EU fall under the remit of the CFSP. And with the "UN [...] traditionally [...] an arena for national diplomacy, the EU diplomats are not always 'CFSP minded' enough" (K. E. Smith, 2006a, p. 165). The European Commission supports this view in a 2003 report, where it states that the "[v]otes in which the EU is unable to agree on a common line continue to occur, mainly on issues in the area of CFSP" (European Union, 2003b, p. 4). And Tank (1998) explains that the efforts of the EU member states in finding a common ground, particularly on these issues, is undermined by their historical ties and individual "relationships to countries beyond the Community framework"(p. 14).

Other issue areas generate persistently high levels of EU cohesion. EU member states tend to vote much more cohesively on resolutions pertaining to human rights issues (Luif, 2003). In fact, this is an issue area, where the EU as a whole has been much more active and rather than having to deal with internal divisions, is confronted with external opposition (Wouters, 2001, pp. 393-396). Nevertheless, even though human rights resolutions tend to yield relatively high cohesion levels; they are not perfect. And according to Smith (2006a) “voting cohesion [for resolutions pertaining to human rights] is not visibly improving, though fears that the 2004 enlargement would lead to much less cohesion have not, as yet, been realized”(p. 163).

Finally, a third group of resolutions has seen its cohesion levels increase over time. A case in point is the group of resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict. In the early to mid-1980s Middle East resolutions did not generate high levels of EU cohesion (new EU members Greece, Portugal and Spain tended to vote in isolation) (Stadler, 1989, p. 186; Strömvik, 1998). However, EU cohesion levels on Middle East issues started to increase and continued to rise well into the 1990s (Luif, 1995, p. 279).

In an attempt to generalise EU voting patterns, especially with view to particular issue areas, a number of scholars have thought it helpful to divide the member states into a progressive and a conservative bloc (Hurwitz, 1976; Rees & Young, 2005; Stadler, 1989). France, the United Kingdom and Germany are seen as more conservative, while Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden have been categorised as more progressive (Rees & Young, 2005). Hurwitz (1976) includes Denmark in the progressive bloc. This categorisation tends to hold exceptionally well when analysing military resolutions,

and resolutions pertaining to decolonisation. More specifically with regards to nuclear resolutions, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden tend to cast their votes together on one side of the nuclear issues (Rees & Young, 2005); while France and the UK can be found on the other side (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Wouters, 2001). Similarly, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden do not share the sensitivities France and the UK experience with reference to resolutions pertaining to colonial issues (Rees & Young, 2005). Finally, there tends to be a general impression, that the neutral states and the Southern states are more sympathetic to 3rd World demands (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 23).

2.3.2 Proposed Research

In this section, I set out to compare the existing research in the field of EU voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly to my proposed research with reference to theoretical/conceptual, methodological and empirical aspects in an attempt to identify possible points of departure.

Theoretical/Conceptual Perspective

Notwithstanding different theoretical approaches, the existing body of research does not sufficiently discriminate between EU member states casting identical votes due to shared interests and EU member states casting identical votes despite of divergent interests. Isolated voting tends to be explained by diverging and strong national interest, while high levels of EU cohesion tend to be explained as the result of socialisation effects (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Luif, 2003; K. E. Smith, 2006a). Only a handful of studies acknowledge the predicament. Kissack (2007) points out that “in situations where the level of consensus is high among all parties voting, one cannot rule out the possibility that cohesive voting by the EU Member States is coincidental”

(p. 5-6). And Rees and Young (2005) find that while “in general it has been found that member states now vote more often together than they did in the past, [...] whether this reflects improved EU coordination and/or greater member state consensus on international issues is more difficult to assess” (pp. 205-206). In the present thesis, I seek to address this issue and to this end, will present a corresponding conceptional framework in the ensuing chapter.

Separately, a number of researchers make casual observations about EU voting behaviour with reference to US voting behaviour. Kim and Russett (1996) and Marin-Bosch (1998) have observed that particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s France, Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries could be counted on as the US’s most reliable allies in UNGA voting. And while Voeten (2002, p. 213) and Johansson-Nogues (2004, pp. 74, 79) point towards a voting pattern that indicates that European countries overall have moved away somewhat from the United States during the post cold war period; Fassbender (2004) sees particularly the UK and France, as permanent UNSC members and nuclear powers remaining rather close and “often [aligning] themselves with the United States” (p. 862). Employing a distance measure, Luif (2003) finds that “the overall gap between the EU majority and the United States has become quite large since 1979, though less so during the Clinton years. This gap has been widest on Middle East issues (especially concerning Israel)” (p. 4). Encouraged by these observations, in the present thesis, I seek to consider the transatlantic relationship in a more methodical manner, developing and testing a number of hypotheses about it.

Methodology

Existing research on EU representation in the UNGA tends to rely heavily on descriptive statistics; with the main focus on analysing voting patterns over time and across issue areas. Most conventionally, intra-EU voting disagreements are discussed in terms of split votes, where “two-way split votes mean that EU voting behaviour falls into two camps (in favour/against, in favour/abstention or against/abstention)” and “three-way split-votes mean that EU voting behaviour falls into three camps (in favour, against, abstention)” (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Wouters, 2001, p. 387). In the present thesis, I seek to strengthen the current set of descriptive statistical analysis, by applying more sophisticated indices for measuring EU cohesion as well as for measuring voting distances between individual member states. I further seek to complement the existing descriptive statistical analysis with inferential statistics where appropriate.

Empirical Findings

There is a general agreement among existing researchers that EU cohesion in the UNGA varies over time and across issue area, with some issue areas more prone to disagreement than others. With the expectation to find the results generally confirmed, I further seek to illustrate that the picture of EU vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly may be more complex than to simply draw dividing lines along the neutral states or the nuclear powers with seats in the UNSC; or to make general statements regarding particular issue areas such as military matters or decolonisation.

2.4 Conclusion

The thesis touches upon various bodies of existing research. In broad terms, this is a thesis in the area of European foreign policy studies. In the narrowest terms, it is an analysis of EU vote coordination in the United Nations General Assembly. Research in both areas is informed by a set of theoretical considerations that draw on elements from IR theory as well as EU integration theory. The objective of chapter 2 was to summarise the main constituents of the above-mentioned bodies of research and to set out ways in which this thesis seeks to contribute to them. To this end, I started out by setting the larger theoretical and empirical framework before discussing existing research about the EU in the UN more specifically. With reference to the latter, I highlighted that only limited attention is being paid to the difficulties that emerge from the inability to differentiate between EU member states casting identical votes due to shared interests and EU member states casting identical votes despite of divergent interests; an issue which I seek to address in the next chapter of this thesis. I further explained that in methodological terms, I seek to build on the existing descriptive voting pattern analysis by employing more sophisticated indices and applying inferential statistics where appropriate. Finally, I pointed out that existing research tends to find that EU cohesion varies over time and across issue area. I stressed that I expect to confirm these findings by and large; albeit hoping for some scope to further break down the results. Although any results will in the most direct way be applicable to the field of EU coordination in the United Nations General Assembly, the thesis findings will also have implications for the larger field of EFP studies and conceivably feed into the constructivist/rationalist debate.

PART II: CONCEPTUAL & METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION

CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In chapter 1, I outlined the overarching research question for this thesis. To reiterate, the thesis is motivated by an underlying interest in analysing which factors determine whether or not EU member states speak with a single voice in international affairs. Having narrowed it down to an analysis of EU vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly, I discussed the merits of this thesis with reference to other studies in the field in chapter 2. Following on from that, it is the objective of chapter 3 to provide the conceptual framework for the analysis.

The central idea is that the EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in the UNGA, notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences. I will use the present chapter to elaborate on this idea and develop testable hypotheses. The chapter is divided into four sections. In section 3.1, I set out to explain in more detail the notion of intended vote coordination as well as heterogeneous policy preference. In section 3.2, I hypothesise which factors might determine a country's voting behaviour in the UNGA. The model presented here contains an operational limitation that warrants a theoretical discussion, which takes place in section 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4, I offer a conclusion to the chapter.

3.1 The EU Member States in the UNGA

In this section, I seek to explain in more detail the notion of vote coordination intent as well as heterogeneous policy preference and how they are linked to the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA. To this end, I shall elaborate on the

role of institutions and discuss the notion of actors assuming multiple roles, before narrowing in on intended vote coordination and heterogeneous policy preferences.

The Role of Institutions

The study of EU member state vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly focuses on the very narrow aspect of state interaction and cooperation in international institutions (on state interaction within the context of institutions see Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 238; Keohane, 1984). Here, 'institution' refers to the United Nations as well as the European Union. According to Checkel (1998), rationalists and constructivists by and large agree that institutions matter. However, the two approaches differ fundamentally about how institutions matter (Pollack, 2000, p. 18). With the notion of strategic calculation deeply embedded in rationalist theory, rationalists argue that state behaviour is initially motivated extrinsically by self-defined political preferences, assumed to be material and power-oriented and culminating in the desire to attain and maintain political power (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 830). Consequently, states enter institutions in pursuit of their (exogenously given) preferences. Seeking to maximize their interest and given the institutional constraints, they might modify their behaviour.

Constructivists on the other hand tend to envisage a more essential role for institutions, one which shapes actors' preferences and identities (Pollack, 2000, p. 18; see also A Wendt, 1994). According to this approach, while states retain ultimate control over their policies and do not transfer any of their sovereignty to the institution, they tend to conform to the institutional rules and 'scripts' to which they have subscribed (Hall & Taylor, 1996). "In other words, states adopt the logic of

appropriateness according to which they follow institutional rules, [...], because they fear being considered untrustworthy or 'inappropriate' (J. March & Olsen, 1998).” (Andreatta, 2005, p. 32) Seen in this light, the European Union would be considered a normative entity, the existence of which at the very least would be expected to exert pressure to preserve its unity, developing a consistent bias toward common, rather than national positions. And at most it would help develop a European identity (Andreatta, 2005, p. 32).

Following on from the discussion in section 2.2, it is important to note, however, that in the form of new institutionalism, March and Olsen (1989) make room for the possibility that political actors are driven by institutional roles as well as by calculated self-interest (p. 159). In their own words:

“Human actions, social contexts and institutions work upon each other in complicated ways, and these complex, interactive processes of action and formation of meaning are important to political life. Institutions seem to be neither neutral reflections of exogenous environmental forces nor neutral arenas for the performances of individuals driven by exogenous preferences and expectations.”(J. G. March & Olsen, 1984, p. 742)

So, it is possible that “what starts as behavioural adaptation, may – because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects – later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internationalization and preference change (Checkel, 2005, pp. 808-809). A transformation of the logic of consequentiality into a logic of appropriateness has thus taken place.

Actors' Rights and Responsibilities

The participants meet within the context of the United Nations, yet in their capacity as EU member states. But because they meet within the context of the United Nations, notwithstanding that they do so in their capacity as EU member states, they simultaneously meet as sovereign states (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 6). As such, the actors “embody multiple roles” (Krasner, 1999, p. 6).

The basic rationale maintains that there is an overlap between the responsibility associated with a country's EU membership and the rights associated with its UN membership. As United Nations members, countries act solely in their capacity as sovereign nation states. That is to say, for all roll-call votes in the General Assembly, they are free to cast their votes according to their heterogeneous policy preferences. As EU member states, on the other hand, their intention to speak with a single voice in international affairs extends to their voting behaviour inside the United Nations General Assembly. So, while they may be free to vote as they please as UN member states, as EU member states in the UNGA, they are subject to coordination pressures to cast a unified vote. Adam (1999) summarises aptly that:

“As a group of fifteen sovereign States, the European Union does not act or behave [...] like a single nation in the United Nations. The UN system is composed of sovereign States, not regional unions. This [...] has the inconvenience of a cumbersome coordination mechanism due to the present state of the European common foreign and security policy.” (p. 3)

Any coordination pressure within the EU stems from their underlying intention to coordinate their positions. This intention in turn is resultant from their objective to speak with a single voice in international affairs either to signify EU unity (constructivist approach) or to increase their clout by signifying EU unity (rationalist

approach). As highlighted in the previous chapter, both possibilities are theoretically appealing.

And as explained below, they are also both plausible when applied to the study of EU voting behaviour in the UNGA. At the UN, “the member states’ foreign ministries are the privileged players and remain central to the process” (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 14). Rationalist would argue that as such the member states are expected to protect their geopolitical interests (Hix, 1999, p. 15); which may include using their EU membership for the pursuit of shared goals and joint gains (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 6; Walsh, 2001, p. 61). That is to say, EU member states come together to coordinate their otherwise individually cast votes in the United Nations General Assembly so that, by speaking with one voice, they may “increase the collective bargaining power of the area vis-à-vis other international actors” (also see Jorgensen, 1997, p. 95; P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). In other words, EU member states coordinate their positions when it allows them to defend their interests better than going it alone (Allen, 2002; S.M Walt, 1987). Constructivists would argue that while EU member states “continue to be international actors in their own right”, the emergence of a diplomatic community between the EU member states at the UN has led to a foreign policy “coordination reflex” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 4). In essence then, EU member states “try to act in concert at the UN and try to make their unity visible” (Fassbender, 2004, p. 882).

A potential conflict of interest emerges when a country’s national policy preference does not coincide with the EU majority position, defined as the vote cast by the majority of the EU member states, leaving that country in a position to vote either

according to its national policy preference or to vote with the EU majority. This is the moment when coordination pressure is most difficult to deal with.

Whether the intention to speak with a single voice is illustrative their objective to signify EU unity or to increase their clout by signifying EU unity at this point, the member states must consider “the trade-off between the advantages [...] and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences” (Frieden, 2004, p. 261).

Speaking in the rationalist vein, Allen (2002) points out that while

“all [expect] an effective EU to exert more power and influence than any one of them could aspire to individually [...], there is little appreciation of the fundamental contradiction between seeking to maximise the external potential of the European Union and seeking to maintain national competence and authority in foreign policy” (p. 45).

Constructivists on the other hand would “argue that the likelihood of such compromises might be higher within the European Union than in other, looser, coalitions of states because of underlying political tendencies within the European Union to search for common positions and institutionalized mechanisms for coordination” (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 39; Carlsnaes, Sjursen, & White, 2004; K. E. Smith, 2006b).

The validity of this conceptual framework rests on the correctness of the notion that EU member states intend to coordinate their voting positions inside the United Nations despite their heterogeneous national policy preferences. If member states did not intend to coordinate their voting positions, irrespective of the level of vote cohesion, studying EU coordination would not be justified. And if member states had

identical voting preferences they would be expected to cast identical votes by default; irrespective of whether or not they coordinated their voting positions. For, “where interests are in full harmony, the capacity of states to cooperate [...] is irrelevant to the realization of mutual benefits” (Oye, 1985, p. 6). Or as Axelrod and Keohane (1985) put it: “Cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.” (p. 226)

In what follows I will address the question of how serious member states are about vote coordination and how heterogeneous their policy preferences can truly be expected.

3.1.1 Intentional Vote Coordination

“Only states have the right to vote within the UN’s main bodies.” (Farrell, 2006, p. 28; United Nations, 2006, p. 34; Rule 124) That means EU member states vote individually inside the UNGA with no automatic vote cast on behalf of the EU. That notwithstanding, EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in the General Assembly and they “aim for unanimity” (European Union, 2004b, p. 11).

The aim for EU member states to speak with a single voice on the international stage first took shape informally outside the UN realm before it extended into the UN realm. Over time it has become much more formal and finally codified. I will in a few words sketch a historical picture of how the intent for foreign policy coordination developed informally outside and inside the UN before I provide a few key examples as to where these intentions have led to institutional developments and have manifested in

writing, followed by several examples of senior national politicians who openly promote effective EU foreign policy coordination.

The aspiration for the member states of what was then the European Community to speak with a single voice (Solana, 2002) globally became evident at a point in time when not even all member states had obtained UN membership.¹⁰ The establishment and further development of the European Political Cooperation from 1970 onwards, where effective coordination was already a principal objective (Elfriede Regelsberger, 1988), is testament to the endeavour of the EU member states to try to speak with a single voice in world affairs. For example, irrespective of, in all likelihood rightful, claims that the Venice Declaration only had limited effect (Tomkys, 1987), it nonetheless provides “a striking example of EPC’s capability to produce a bold initiative” (Nuttall, 1992, p. 168).

Given their objective to act in accord outside the UN realm, it would appear only logical for EU member states to also intend to coordinate their positions inside the UN.¹¹ To that end, shortly after being admitted as member to the UN, the West German government in late 1974 called on its fellow EC members to prioritise the development of a common strategy by the Nine with regards to the United Nations (Lindemann, 1982, p. 82). The aspiration for EU member states to speak with a single

¹⁰ The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (and for that matter the German Democratic Republic (GDR)) did not formally gain UN membership until 1973.

¹¹ Both, the UN and the EU are multilateral systems which share the same values - the protection for human rights, the respect for international law, the concern with democracy promotion and the belief in the role of international institutions in fostering international cooperation. Any EU “commitment to strengthen relations with the UN” (Farrell, 2006, p. 45) would therefore not be surprising. By strengthening its relations with the UN, the EU as one multilateral system supports and helps to legitimise another multilateral system and in turn has an opportunity to help legitimise its own role in international affairs (see Laatikainen & Smith, 2006). In more practical terms, by virtue of its voting system, the UNGA makes for a useful vehicle for member states to demonstrate their unity.

voice in the UN in particular is illustrated in two ways. One, over time, a gradual build-up of European institutional capacity in the UN in general and the UNGA in particular can be observed. Two, references to intended policy coordination are made repeatedly in a variety of documents considered significant for EU integration. In what follows, both aspects are discussed.

Even without the EU ever having obtained a designated EU ambassador or EU seat in the UNGA or UNSC, a gradual build-up of European institutional capacity at the UN can be observed, as the following two examples illustrate. One, the European Commission holds a delegation office at the UN in New York. This office originated as an information office in 1964 and was turned into the delegation office ten years later, when the EC was granted observer status in the UNGA in 1974 (Farrell, 2006, p. 38). As permanent observer in the UNGA, the European Community, represented by the European Commission is allowed to take the floor (European Union, 2008c). Two, “[t]he system of the rotating EU Presidency supported by the Council Secretariat has become entrenched” in the UN network (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 13). The member state holding the Presidency presents the EU position to the General Assembly, whether in negotiations or debates, in the form of a Presidency statement. EU member states work together with the Council and the Commission to prepare and finalise EU statements. The first of such statements was expressed by the Italian Foreign Minister on 23 September 1975, at the beginning of the 30th UNGA session (Luif, 2003, p. 10). Over time, the amount of times the Presidency speaks on behalf of member states has become striking (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 22; Farrell, 2006, p. 31).

Repeated references to deliberate policy coordination in a variety of major EU agreements and declarations can be seen as written manifestations of the EU's intent to speak with a single voice in international organisations in general and the UN in particular. As subsequent examples illustrate, while some documents simply indicate a need or objective to work together in international organisations, others spell it out in less ambiguous terms. Several texts even attempt to discuss mechanisms to help coordinate these positions. In earlier documents, member states simply "agree to adopt common positions wherever possible" (European Union, 1973) or "endeavour to adopt common positions" (European Community, 1986, Title 3, Art 7a) and "signal their resolve to clear their concertation of all obstacles, so that the Community may come out with all the weight of its responsibility in the UN (European Community, 1975; Luif, 2003, p. 10). In later documents wording is not only more precise but also stronger. 1992's Treaty of the European Union as well as its successors, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty set out that: "Member States *shall co-ordinate* their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They *shall uphold the common positions* in such forums." (European Union, 1992, Article 19, emphasis added)¹²

Finally, several documents even attempt to address possibilities of how policy coordination might be achieved (European Union, 2003b; Rees & Young, 2005, p. 179). Generally, early action is seen as crucial. That includes "early coordination of national positions on as many UNGA topics as possible and the early drawing up of common

¹² The Lisbon treaty, albeit not directly relevant for this dissertation as its applicability extends beyond the framework of analysis, illustrates a continuation of this trend by stipulating that the High Representative for the Union in Foreign and Security Studies shall organise the coordination of the member states action in international organisations (Lisbon Treaty Article 34[19]). In doing so, coordination between the EU member states in international organisations, among them the UNGA, becomes ever more tied to the EU.

positions, Presidency statements and resolution”(European Union, 1995; Lindemann, 1978, p. 83; Luif, 2003, p. 11). Currently, “[m]ore than 1,000 internal EU coordination meetings are conducted each year in both New York and Geneva” (European Union, 2008c). The ambitious 1975 Dublin report was supposed to provide the foundation for the systematic coordination of EC member states positions in the UNGA. However, member states had difficulties in finding agreement on the requirement to vote in unison. They finally agreed that in case of diverging opinions votes should be adopted so as to avoid direct opposition in UNGA roll-call votes. That is to say, in case of direct opposition a “yes” or a “no” vote should only be matched by an “abstain” (Lindemann, 1978, p. 83; Stadler, 1989, p. 15).¹³

At last, there is no shortage of national and EU politicians calling for the EU member states to speak with a single voice in international affairs, as the following, by no means exhaustive, list of examples illustrates. Former Vice-President of the European Commission, Lord Brittan of Spennithorne has stated that “the EU should endeavour to [...] strengthen its political role and standing in the world” (Gilmore, Henery, Newton, Owen, & Syal, 2005). Berlusconi and Prodi, leading Italian politicians of different parties, both said at separate occasions that if Europe wanted to strengthen its political role and “increase its influence on the world scene [...] it must speak with a single voice on all aspects of external relations (Jones & Evans-Pritchard, 2002; Owen, 2002). Finally, former British Liberal Democrat leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, adds that in order for Europe to be able to speak with a single voice, cooperation in foreign affairs must be increased (Gilmore, Henery, Newton, Owen, & Syal, 2005).

¹³ Since the report was not published, Lindemann’s statements are based on interviews which she has conducted in Dublin in April 1973, in London in January 1976 and in Bonn in July 1976 and March 1977.

3.1.2 Policy Preference Heterogeneity

“The EU’s effort to speak with one voice in the UN runs up against the traditions of national diplomacy by member states, reflecting different national interests and prerogatives.” (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 12) Even if one only considered the 15 old member states, “Europe is characterised by the great diversity of its [...] national and state traditions” (Loughlin, 2008, p. 187).

For, despite the notion of liberal democracy presenting a “strong unifying link between the members of the European Union, [...] there are substantial differences between the political societies of Europe regarding constitutionalism, the rule of law as well as forms and processes of representative democracy” (Athanasopoulou, 2008, p. xi). Furthermore, there are “economic [...] and military differences among [them]” (Rummel, 1988, p. 118). In addition to political and economic differences, more generally, member states have idiosyncratic world views (Breedham, 1996; Jorgensen, 1997, p. 92) and on the whole, while some countries are more progressive, others are more conservative (Rees & Young, 2005). Thus, one would expect different policy preferences.

The underlying idea is that a nation’s set of policy preferences is informed by its political framework. A nation’s political framework, consisting of appropriate institutions and norms, tends to be established in response to its need for political stability and is never created in a historical vacuum. Rather, based on its cultural traditions and historical ties, a nation’s political framework reflects that nation’s interpretation of the political, economic and fiscal currents of the time. And that is

precisely the reason why policy preferences even between countries that share basic democratic values may differ (Kimmel, 1992, p. 26). “Given the history and heterogeneity of the member countries” (Hooghe, 2001, p. 10; Rummel, 1988, p. 119), their difficulty in achieving successful vote coordination is thus not surprising.

3.1.3 Coordination Pressure and Bargaining Tactics

As already emphasised earlier in this chapter, a country whose national policy preference does not coincide with the EU majority is still subjected to coordination pressures. This country may decide either to sustain the pressures and vote according to its national policy preference or to succumb to the pressure and vote with the EU majority. Negotiating from the minority position, or in other words from the weaker position, a country which is minded to succumb to the coordination pressure eventually, might still try to take advantage of the knowledge that successful vote coordination is generally valued highly among the EU member states. The mere fact that the EU member states get together to coordinate their votes inside the General Assembly is a strong indication of their intention to speak with a single voice in the forum. Based on the assumption that the fellow negotiators are keener on a successfully coordinated vote than on the precise point on the preference spectrum at which it takes place, the member states holding the minority position may engage in bargaining tactics to shift the final position closer to their ideal point before caving in.

When negotiating from a weaker position, a popular tactic used to shift the coordinated position closer to one’s ideal point involves the evocation of an “irrevocable commitment” (Schelling, 1960, p. 24).

“The essence of [this tactic] is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. [It rests] on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.” (Schelling, 1960, p. 22)

In other words, these may be seen as red lines illustrative of domestic constraints.¹⁴

Among the officials at the EU coordination table in New York, it is known as the “power of defection” (Official #29, 18 September 2008; Official #32, 4 December 2008). As long as national representatives in international negotiations are able to create a bargaining position based on some sort of domestic constraint (which could be legislative in nature or based on public opinion) their “initial position can [...] be made visibly “final”” (Schelling, 1960, p. 28). The use of a bargaining agent in form of the national diplomats sitting at the EU negotiation table is further aids their purpose insofar as the “agent may be given instructions that are difficult or impossible to change, such instructions (and their inflexibility) being visible to the opposite party” (Schelling, 1960, p. 29). Having said this, member states engaging in such tactics “all run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown” (Schelling, 1960, p. 28). Hence, particularly in an arena where repeated games are the norm, member states are quite careful not to isolate themselves too much.

Moreover, with particular reference to the UNGA, the bargaining potential inside the EU vote coordination meetings is limited. For the majority of resolutions, the member states have no say on the text of the resolution and are only able to coordinate their

¹⁴ See section 3.2 for an example.

respective voting positions. EU member states are only able to negotiate the text of a resolution, which they have sponsored or co-sponsored. One notable exception are the resolutions dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are drafted by the Palestinians and usually sponsored by the Arab group; however, by special invitation, the EU member states are requested to negotiate among themselves any amendments that might be needed for their unified support for these resolutions (see chapter 7).

3.2 Hypotheses

I have demonstrated in the previous section that EU member states intend to coordinate their votes inside the UNGA despite their heterogeneous national policy preferences. The key to understanding their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon understanding how the EU member states respond to whatever coordination pressures they are exposed to.¹⁵

As already explained at length in the previous paragraphs, there is no fixed EU position inside the UNGA and each member state casts its vote individually. The EU majority position is thus defined as the position chosen by the majority of the member states. In those instances in which no majority of member states emerges, no EU majority position exists. As will be demonstrated in the ensuing empirical chapter, this happens extremely rarely. Following on from that, for those resolutions for which national policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position each EU member state experiences a conflict of interest and must find a way to reconcile its national policy

¹⁵ As shall become evident in the ensuing paragraphs, many of the factors hypothesised to have an impact on the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA fit loosely into the constructivist/rationalist debate. That is to say, some implicitly test whether the member states work together so as to signify EU unity and others whether they seek to signify unity so as to maximise their utility.

preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I call these *divisive resolutions*. Issue areas for which most resolutions are divisive are called *divisive issue areas*. For divisive resolutions, EU member states have two options. They either engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour. That is to say, they vote alongside the majority of the EU member states even though that means overriding their heterogeneous policy preferences. Alternatively, they stick with their national policy preferences and defect from the EU majority position.

I hypothesise that the balance a member state strikes between the two options generally depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its relationship with the US as external factor. I furthermore argue that the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a concrete possibility at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective, that is to say if increasing the collective bargaining power helps them achieve another goal. I shall use this section to discuss the hypothesis in more depth.

3.2.1 State-Focused Factors (National Interests)

State-focused factors emphasise the national position as the driving force behind UNGA voting.

Hypothesis One: More powerful EU member states are less susceptible to vote coordination pressures and are less likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour than less powerful EU member states.

Cooperation in international organisations entails benefits and costs for all participating countries. On the upside, cooperation in international organisations decreases the cost of action for individual participants and simultaneously increases the legitimacy of an action as well as adding clout to a common cause. On the downside, cooperation in international organisations imposes constraints on the freedom of individual actions. With reference to the EU member states in the United Nations General Assembly, cooperation means vote coordination. Depending on how powerful they are, states are affected differently by the benefits and costs of vote coordination (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 486-487). In essence, the potential gains of EU vote coordination inside the UNGA through 'increased scale' must be evaluated with reference the costs associated with overriding one's national policy preference (Gordon, 1997).

Why then is it considered less likely for more powerful countries to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour compared to less powerful countries? Compared to less powerful countries, more powerful countries gain less from the 'increased scale' of successful vote coordination. Because more powerful countries are the chief providers of clout and legitimacy, as such they gain little extra clout by cooperating with less powerful countries. On the other hand, effective vote coordination provides a lot of extra clout for less powerful countries. To illustrate, consider the following: the difference between the effect of the EU taking a stance and the UK taking a stance is much smaller than the difference between the effect of the EU taking a stance and Luxembourg taking a stance.

In addition, more powerful countries suffer the costs of overriding one's national policy preferences tend to be higher for more powerful countries for the following reasons. More powerful countries have more pronounced individual foreign policies. The breadth and depths of their international interests makes very often for unique positions for which they are unwilling to find a compromise (Tonra, 1997, p. 188). Less powerful states, on the other hand, "possess little effective sovereignty to begin with" (Tonra, 1997, p. 192). Through successful vote coordination they "lose something, which is largely irrelevant, which is the capacity of standing up and saying that [they] disagree; [but they] win something which is far more relevant to the practical life of international relations, which is the capacity to influence outside events" (Tonra, 1997, p. 193).

Hence, more powerful countries can be expected to be more reluctant to give up their national policy preference in exchange for 'increased scale' and have a tendency not to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour in order to pursue their individual interests more often than less powerful countries. Less powerful countries, on the other hand, are not only expected to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour more often; they are further expected to turn a blind eye to the occasional vote defection by more powerful states because they value EU vote coordination very much, and fear that more powerful states might withdraw from vote coordination altogether if they were not allowed to defect from the EU majority position from time to time. At any rate, punishing the defectors becomes more difficult as the EU membership increases in size, because "strategies of reciprocity become more difficult to implement without triggering a collapse of cooperation." (Oye, 1985, p. 20) In

essences then, those who gain the most compromise the most, whereas those who gain the least impose conditions (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 3).

Hypothesis Two: The more salient an EU member state perceives an issue to be the less susceptible it is to vote coordination pressures and the less likely it is to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour.

“The dividing line between compromise and confrontation within political cooperation remains national interest.” (Tonra, 1997, p. 194)¹⁶ Having said this, from time to time member states are willing to overcome their diverging national interests. As long as they view “jointly accessible outcomes as more preferable to those that are or might be reached independently” (Stein, 1982, p. 311); or as long as they are indifferent enough with regards to the resolution (Heritier, 1999), they might view compromise as part of the ‘one hand washes the other’ strategy. Accordingly, member states might decide to vote for a resolution that they are fairly indifferent to, in exchange for support by other member states for a resolution they perceive as important. And with the United Nations General Assembly an ideal arena for repeated games, states are more or less aware that if they indiscriminately pursue their own interest vis-à-vis other states – regardless of how successful they might be in their pursuit of these interests – they might at the very least forfeit the support of others for a matter close to their heart. In 2007, for instance, EU Commission President Barroso warned Poland that by blocking an EU deal on the future of the constitutional treaty (now called the Lisbon Treaty), the country would risk other members turning their backs on it in future budget talks (EurActiv, 2007).¹⁷

¹⁶ “National interest [is] usually understood to be defined ultimately by state governments.” (Allen, 2002, p. 44)

¹⁷ And even at the top end of power, with a real possibility to go-it-alone, the United States has acquired the reputation of “a ‘lonely superpower’ (Huntington, 1999), alone not only in its preponderant power but also in its preferred resolution of many issues” (Voeten, 2004, p. 72).

Having said this, it is not always possible to harmonise diverging national interests. The more salient a member state perceives the issue at hand the less likely it is to compromise with reference to its national interest.

“If an issue or a vote engages a significant domestic political constituency, if national citizens are involved, if trade or investment is affected or if long-established foreign policy principles are at stake then diplomats have been willing, and remain willing and able to break consensus.” (Tonra, 1997, p. 194)

Experience illustrates that each member state cultivates a number of taboo areas which are not subject to compromise (Rummel, 1988, p. 119; Stadler, 1989, p. 14). Countries are known to draw red lines and map out no-go zones to that effect. Mutually acceptable positions are often arrived at, if at all, only after long and painful negotiations (Rummel, 1988, p. 119).¹⁸ The four red lines drawn by the UK in the negotiations about the Lisbon Treaty serve as case in point. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband insisted that only after “Britain had secured concessions in four “red line” policy areas during negotiations over the new pact”(EU Business, 2008), was a referendum no longer necessary. As outlined earlier in this chapter, however, not every time a member state proclaims that under no circumstances will it overstep its “red lines” does it intend to do so; rather they simply may be part of a bargaining tactic (see section 3.1.4 for a discussion on bargaining tactics).

Traditionally, political spheres have been divided into low politics and high politics. To this end, analysts “have tended to assume a distinction between external economic

¹⁸ For the purpose of the thesis, it suffices to acknowledge that a) states have preferences and b) these policy preferences are heterogeneous. It is of no concern to this study, how these preferences emerge.

relations as ‘low politics’ (‘external relations’ for short) and more traditional politico-diplomatic activities as ‘high politics’ (or ‘foreign policy’)” (Morgan, 1973). By using these terms, it was implied that diplomacy was more important than ‘mere’ economic relations (Allen, 2002, p. 43; Keohane & Nye, 1971; Waltz, 1993). The reason for that is two-fold. First, low politics issues tend to be considered less salient for the survival of the nation state and therefore less controversial among participants. This means consensus can be reached fairly easily. Second, some low politics issues, for instance externalities stemming from pollution and global warming are actually more successfully dealt with collectively. However, it is argued here that the matter of issue salience must be considered in a more nuanced manner, since “state preferences are neither fixed nor uniform: they may vary within the same state across time and issues” (Schimmelfennig, 2004). That is to say, what is trident for the UK might be fisheries for Sweden and a Green party in power can be expected to have different views on certain issues than, say, a Christian Democrat party. As will become evident in the ensuing methodological chapter, in this thesis I seek to address this issue and stress the nuanced way in which to measures salience.

3.2.2 Institutional Factors (EU Membership)

Institutional factors emphasise aspects pertaining to EU membership as the driving force behind UNGA voting.

Hypothesis Three: While all EU member states are expected to be susceptible to institutionalised vote coordination pressures, member states less dedicated to the EU are less likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour than member states that are more dedicated to the EU.

A country’s membership in the EU is expected to play an important role with reference to its voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly. After all, it is their EU

membership which provides the basis for their intent to coordinate their votes. The EU consists of a set of “*voluntary* agreements [and] treaties that have created *supranational authority structures*” (Krasner, 2001, pp. 233, emphasis added). By virtue of its “supranational authority structures” (Krasner, 2001, p. 233), the EU can be termed a polity. Because individual member states at one point or another, have taken the deliberate choice to join such an elaborate union, it is reasonable to assume that they are susceptible to its institutionalised pressures for vote coordination and the upholding of common positions in international forums such as the UN (European Union, 1992, p. Article 19).

These institutionalised pressures can be divided into informal pressures and formal pressures. Informal pressures (e.g. resolutions which the member states have collectively sponsored or co-sponsored) call for the member states to coordinate their votes without obliging them to vote in unison. Member states are expected to vote cohesively on these, because they already have as a collective endorsed them. Formal pressures are embedded in EU legislation and thus “limit definitional ambiguity” (Oye, 1985, p. 17). Accordingly, if there is a CFSP policy agreed on the same topic as is discussed in UNGA, member states are required to uphold the common position in the UNGA and thus vote in unison.

Beyond mere EU membership, it also matters how dedicated a member state is to the EU. Countries which benefit less from their EU membership (e.g. net beneficiaries of the EU budget rather than net contributors), which are less involved in the European project (e.g. countries which have opted out of a number of voluntary agreements) and which are less enthusiastic about the EU in general can be expected to be less

susceptible to coordination pressures and thus less likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, than member states that are more dedicated.

Hypothesis Four: EU member states are expected to be more susceptible to vote coordination pressures, and thus more likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour when the increase of collective bargaining power is a tangible objective.

One of the arguments inherent in this thesis is that EU member states intend to work together to gain more clout in international affairs. That is to say, they come together to coordinate their otherwise individually cast votes in the United Nations General Assembly so that, by speaking with one voice, they may “increase the collective bargaining power of the area vis-à-vis other international actors”(also see Jorgensen, 1997, p. 95; P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). In this regard, Frieden (2004) highlights an expectation or hope among many proponents of European integration that “a single Europe would speak with more authority – and more influence – in the international arena” (p. 262). This notion is further summarised appropriately by the spirited words of a 1992 French pro-TEU campaign ad: “Let’s unite. And the world will listen to us.”¹⁹ (Meunier, 2000, p. 103) Member states perceive that by acting together they carry more weight externally than when acting separately (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 483). There is a widespread sensitivity that without much internal coherence, there is little external clout (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 95; Van Den Broek, 1996).

It follows then, that if a concrete chance of increasing their collective bargaining power presents itself, EU member states should be more susceptible to vote coordination pressures. But how would they know if such a chance presented itself? EU member states are in possession of high quality information on the projected voting behaviour,

¹⁹ “Qu’on s’unisse. Et le monde nous écouterà.” September 1992; Meunier’s translation.

not only of their fellow EU members, but also as concerns the wider UN membership. This is the case for three reasons. One, many of the resolutions put to the vote are so-called repeat resolutions.²⁰ Previous voting behaviour with reference to those resolutions is a very good indicator of present and future voting behaviour. Two, some countries, such as the United States lobby for votes they perceive as important. The US subsequently publishes a list of these resolutions on the State Department website (US Department of State, 2008). Three, EU member states are in talks with the wider UN membership as regards voting.

Before moving on to hypothesis five, at this point I want to briefly discuss the notion of agenda setting and how it relates to the analysis of EU vote coordination and EU vote cohesion inside the UNGA. Each time the EU member states collectively sponsor a draft resolution, they jointly act as agenda setter - “by controlling what comes to the floor” (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2009, p. 823). In this circumstance, even a highly heterogeneous group may be able to vote in unison, as long as its members are able to reconcile their heterogeneous preferences beforehand and are able to collectively agree on a draft resolution. The ability to set the agenda thus “plays an important role in determining the level of vote cohesion (Kissack, 2007, p. 9). Even so, agenda setting is only marginally relevant for a study of EU voting behaviour inside the UNGA. I shall describe the way in which the UNGA agenda is shaped in more detail in chapter 4. Looking ahead though, neither EU member states nor Western states more generally act as predominant agenda setters in the General Assembly. In fact the Western states

²⁰ The concept of ‘repeat resolution’ is explained in detail in chapter 5. For the purpose of the discussion in the present chapter, it shall suffice to say that repeat resolutions are resolutions that recur in the course of multiple UNGA sessions.

tend to occupy a rather reactive position inside the General Assembly where they are left responding to third world demands rather than realising own political ideas (Stadler, 1989, p. 3).

3.2.3 External Factors (Transatlantic Relationship)

External factors emphasise outside factors as the driving force behind UNGA voting.

Hypothesis Five: In instances of transatlantic divergence inside the United Nations General Assembly, disagreement between the EU member states increases and member states that foster closer ties with the US are less susceptible to EU vote coordination pressure.

This hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that external factors may in fact exert any influence on a country's voting behaviour inside the General Assembly. This assumption is supported by McGowan and Shapiro (1973) who suggest that, due to the interactive nature of the international system, the foreign policy output of one actor (country) is inter alia influenced by "other nation's policies" (p. 41). And Rosenau (1966) furthermore acknowledges that "the external world impinges ever more pervasively on the life of national societies" and speaks of the "growing interdependence of national political systems" (Rosenau, 1966, p. 63). And because of this interdependence, Hanrieder (1967) suggests that policy is made not only in response to "domestic impulses" but also in response to "international restraints" (Hanrieder, 1967, p. 980). He "highlights the challenges and opportunities of the external environment in which the actor seeks to realize his objectives" (Hanrieder, 1967, p. 979).

External factors may refer to global or regional events of a certain magnitude (e.g. war), or they may refer to relationships between actors/states. The focus here is on the latter group, which can further be divided into multilateral relationships and bilateral relationships. As regards multilateral relationships, a number of formal and informal alliances have emerged inside the UN. Formal alliances include the OSCE Minsk Group.²¹ Less formal alliances inside the UNGA are the regional and politically affiliated groups.²² In what follows, I shall take a closer look at bilateral relationships.

Relationships may be built on affinity. Kissack (2007) highlights that

“states remain part of other networks of states based on shared history, language, culture, geography or political similarities. These include Spain’s links with Latin America, Britain and France’s links to the Anglophone and Francophone worlds respectively, and Denmark’s to the Nordic group of states (Manners & Whitman, 2000)” (pp. 1-2).

In addition to affinity (or instead of affinity), power or status in the international arena tends to have some magnetism as well. Consider to this effect the bipolar Cold-war period, where both the USA and the Soviet Union (USSR) accumulated their share of allies. Following the demise of the bipolar international system, several potentially important players have emerged. While there are a number of ways to identify these ‘most important states’ in the international system – some of which would probably include India, Pakistan, Brazil and Japan – the most conventional way is to focus on the member states of the United Nations Security Council.²³ Beyond the two EU member

²¹ The OSCE Minsk Group regularly makes statements inside the UNGA, regarding the Caucasus conflict. It is co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States. The following member states also participate in the group: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

²² These are discussed further in chapter 5.

²³ Interestingly enough, amongst others, Japan, India and Brazil all have been lobbying to become permanent Security Council members.

states France and the UK, that includes China, Russia and the US. Having said this, the US – by most measures – remains the most powerful actor in the international arena. Of the post-Cold War UNSC members, it uses its veto power most frequently (Global Policy Forum, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to assume that US positions command a certain level of attention in international organisations.²⁴

In addition to US power, the transatlantic relationship can claim to be built on affinity as well. It is generally seen as politically and economically the most important relationship worldwide. In political terms, the transatlantic partners share by and large the same vision of democracy, liberty, freedom and rule of law. In economic terms, the EU and the US are each others' main trading partners and colossal trade flows amount to nearly two billion Euros per day (European Union, 2008a). Within this framework, the transatlantic bilateral economic relationship is both highly advanced and considerably balanced. The profoundness of the transatlantic relationship is furthermore underlined by its historic ties. Historically, the modern transatlantic relationship emerged as a need-based alliance immediately following World War II. It was initiated by the US and welcomed by the Europeans to contain the Soviet Union as well as to rebuild the European and expand the American economies (Cameron, 2002; Lundestad, 1986). And because the US is universally recognised as important player and also considered a genuine transatlantic partner, it is conceivable that the US has the most potential to be an influential actor as regards the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA.²⁵

²⁴ To illustrate, a group of scholars has analysed the UNGA voting behaviour of US aid recipients with reference to US UNGA votes (e.g. Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2006; Wang, 1999; Wittkopf, 1973).

²⁵ While the multivariate analysis focuses on the US only, Russia and China, the other two UNSC members that are not also EU members, are included in the descriptive voting pattern analysis.

This hypothesis further presumes a certain degree of transatlantic voting divergence in the UNGA. Transatlantic voting divergence is defined as the difference between the vote cast by the US on the one side and the EU majority position on the other side. Given that a moment ago I highlighted the kinship between the transatlantic partners, transatlantic voting divergence at the UNGA seemingly comes as a surprise. Since the transatlantic partners are democracies and market economies, it is expected that they “vote with each other in issues concerning principles of political and economic liberalism” (Voeten 2000, 213). As members of the Kantian pacific union, they should furthermore “agree on issues that concern human and political rights” (Voeten 2000, 190). In fact, transatlantic vote divergence draws on the same ideas about preference heterogeneity that explains divergent preferences between the European member states (see earlier in this chapter). That is to say, the Kantian liberal internationalism thesis that underlies Michael W. Doyle’s interpretation of the democratic peace does not imply that democracies would generally follow a specific kind of foreign policy on all issues (Doyle, 1983). Therefore, at second glance, transatlantic divergence at the UNGA is not altogether that surprising anymore. Kagan (2003) suggests that the transatlantic partners see the world with different eyes, which should reflect in their voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly.

Hence, assuming that external factors have an impact on a country’s voting behaviour, further assuming that the US is such a factor for EU member states, for instances of transatlantic divergence, the hypothesis plays out as follows. As discussed previously, EU member states are under pressure from their fellow EU members to successfully coordinate their votes inside the General Assembly. In those instances then, where the US (perceived as powerful and genuine partner) and the member state both diverge

from the EU majority position, countries which foster closer ties with the US in economic, political or cultural terms are expected to be less susceptible to the EU vote coordination pressure and therefore less likely to engage in EU-consensus oriented voting behaviour.

3.3 Operational Limitation

The hypotheses in the previous section were developed for those resolutions for which national policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position; in other words for divisive resolutions. In theoretical terms this is a very useful distinction to make, as it aids the process of understanding member state voting behaviour in instances in which they do not agree with the EU majority. In other words, it helps understanding when member states engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, thereby overriding their national policy preferences. Nevertheless, without reliable data on national policy preference, it is exceptionally difficult to test this empirically. The result is an operational limitation, which in the present section I seek to explain in more detail before suggesting ways in which to move beyond it.

3.3.1 Nature of the Operational Limitation

Addressing the question of EU voting behaviour in the UNGA is complex in nature. While it is certainly easy to ascertain whether or not EU member states vote in an identical manner, without reliable data on national policy preference, the question of why they do vote in an identical fashion, if they do so, is more difficult to answer. Member states may vote in unison because they share identical policy preferences or they may vote in unison despite the fact that they do not share identical policy preferences (See for example Lijphart, 1963, p. 904; MacRae, 1954, p. 192; Suganami,

1999, p. 6). While the latter would allow some indication as to intent, the former illustrates a mere consonance of preferences. To underline the dilemma, I borrow a phrase from Krehbiel (1993) who sees similar problems emerging in the area of partisan voting in legislations:

“In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members *in spite of their disagreement* about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party members *because of their agreement* about the policy question? In the former case, ... partisan behavior may well result in a collective choice that differs from that which would occur in the absence of partisan behavior. In the latter case, however, ... the apparent explanatory power of the variable, party, may be attributed solely to its being a good measure of preference.” (1993, pp. 238, italics in original)

The dilemma is illustrated with help of Figure 3.1. To simplify the matter, let us assume that a country's national preference is either divergent from the EU majority position or it is identical to the EU majority position. Let us further assume that a country casts its vote either with the EU majority or contrary to the EU majority. A country that votes with the EU majority (row 1), can do so either in instances in which its national policy preference is divergent from the EU majority or in instances in which its national preference is identical to the EU majority. Without reliable data about national policy preferences, however, a vote with the EU majority because of agreement or despite disagreement becomes observationally equivalent.

Shifting the attention to row 2, a country that votes contrary to the EU majority, can do so either in instances in which its national preferences is divergent from the EU majority or in instances in which its national preference is identical to the EU majority position. Having said that, it would not be rational for a country to vote against the EU

majority position in instances in which its national policy preference is identical to that of the EU majority. In instances in which a country votes as part of a minority or even in isolation, it is reasonable to assume that its national policy preference does not coincide with the position held by the majority of the EU member states.

| Observable Voting Patterns | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| | National Policy Preference same as EU majority |
| | National Policy Preference differs from EU majority |
| Vote with EU majority | Observationally equivalent |
| Vote against EU majority | Not rational |

Figure 3.1: Observable Voting Patterns

While the theoretical focus of this study spans across column 2, due to the observational equivalence illustrated in row 1, the operational focus of the voting pattern analysis is reduced to the lower right cell, and thus shifted to instances of vote defection (Dedring, 2004).

3.3.2 Response to the Operational Limitation

To reiterate, the empirical analysis conducted in the present thesis, consists of a quantitative voting pattern analysis on the one hand and a qualitative analysis of the vote coordination process that takes place between the member states prior to the roll-call vote on the other hand. The quantitative voting pattern analysis is further divided into a system-level analysis and into an individual-level analysis. As I shall illustrate in the following paragraphs, each individual analysis is affected differently by the operational limitation.

Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis

As illustrated in Table 3.1., the operational focus of the voting pattern analysis is reduced to the lower right cell, and thus shifted from instances of EU majority – oriented voting to instances of vote defection. Effectively that means that, instead of studying instances in which countries vote with the EU majority by overriding their national policy preference, the emphasis is on instances in which they do not. EU majority – oriented voting behaviour and vote defection are diametrically opposed. The question that needs asking then is: *How does focusing on vote defection, rather than on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour affect the authority of the finding?* Or put differently: *How does not knowing the national policy preference affect the authority of the finding?*

Here it is useful to make a distinction between the system-level analysis and the individual-level analysis, as they are affected differently by this limitation. On both levels, vote defections (voting against the EU majority) are juxtaposed with vote convergence (voting with the EU majority). With reference to vote convergence, however, the individual-level analysis further distinguishes between EU majority – oriented voting behaviour (voting with the EU majority despite disagreement) and voting behaviour reflecting genuine agreement with the EU majority position. Only analyses that focus on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, rather than on vote defection are affected by this operational limitation.

The focus of the system-level analysis is already on vote defections – whether EU cohesion levels increase or decrease is directly linked to a decrease in vote defection

or an increase in vote defection respectively. Hence, this is not a problem for the system-level analysis. The individual-level analysis on the other hand is affected. Surprisingly, however, the impact of shifting the focus from EU-consensus oriented votes to vote defections appears to be rather marginal. Having said this, one must distinguish between factors, such as power or EU dedication, that are applicable to individual actors (i.e. the member states) and factors, such as issue salience, which is applicable to resolutions (as well as actors). With reference to the former it can be said that if the basic rationale holds that certain factors will leave countries more likely (less likely) to engage in EU majority voting behaviour, it automatically implies that the same factors will leave these countries less likely (more likely) to defect from the EU majority position. For instance, if, as I hypothesise, more powerful countries are less likely to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, that implies that they are more likely to defect from the EU majority position. Similarly, if, as I hypothesise, countries that are less susceptible to institutional pressures (i.e. less dedicated to the EU) are less likely to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour that implies that they are more likely to defect from the EU majority position.

The situation is more complicated for resolutions where the factors are also applicable to the resolution. For those resolutions, knowing whether or not a member state is in agreement with the EU majority position is crucial in setting out the expected observation. For instance, I may hypothesise that countries are less likely to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour the more important they perceive the issue at hand to be.²⁶ In reality, that actually depends on whether or not they agree with the

²⁶ Data for issue salience is derived from the Manifesto Dataset. The data specifically focuses on how important a country perceives an issue, but not exactly where it stands on that issue.

EU majority position. Only in instances in which their national policy preference diverges from the EU majority position, becomes vote defection more likely the more salient an issue is perceived. In instances in which their national policy preference is identical to the EU majority position, identical voting is expected irrespective of how salient the issue is perceived. Not knowing a country's national policy preference makes any prognosis uncertain. Having said this, I still opt to include the variable salience in the analysis simply to test whether or not the variable salience produces statistically significant and consistent results. If it does, one might be able to take this as encouragement for further investigation.

Qualitative Analysis of Vote Coordination Process

Because of the categorical shift between theory and operationalisation, from EU majority – oriented voting behaviour to vote defections, one might wonder why not set up the hypothesis in a way so as to test for vote defection, rather than EU majority – oriented voting behaviour. The decision to set up the hypothesis with an emphasis on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour thus warrants further explanation. Although, as just discussed, a lack of EU majority – oriented voting behaviour implies vote defection; and vice versa, there is a subtle difference between the two concepts that is worth drawing out. Vote defection simply illustrates when a country acts according to its national policy preference – something that is to be expected. EU majority – oriented voting illustrates when a country overrides its heterogeneous national policy preference in order to vote with the group, which is not necessarily expected and thus analytically more interesting. And while the quantitative voting pattern analysis fails to draw out the difference and in fact cannot tell if any of the EU member states ever exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, the qualitative

analysis is able to draw out the difference. To this end, it is able to illustrate whether the EU as a whole can find agreement even in divisive issue areas. By conducting a qualitative analysis of the vote coordination process that takes place prior to each roll-call vote (see chapter 7) it is possible to shed some light on whether or not EU member states vote with the EU despite of divergent national foreign policy preferences.²⁷

3.4 Conclusion

In chapter 3, I discussed the conceptional underpinnings of the thesis. To this end, I established in section 3.1. that despite their right to vote according to their heterogeneous national policy preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, EU member states find themselves under constant pressure to coordinate their votes so that by speaking with a single voice in the forum, they may increase their collective bargaining power. I further elaborated in section 3.2. that the key to understanding their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon understanding how the EU member states respond to whatever coordination pressures they are exposed to. For those resolutions for which national policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position each EU member state experiences a conflict of interest and must find a way to reconcile its national policy preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I hypothesised that the balance a member state strikes between the two generally depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its relationship with the US as external factor. I furthermore argued that the balance tips in favour of

²⁷ At this point, the attentive observer must have noticed that although the coordination process between the member states takes place prior to the roll-call voting, the set-up of this project is such that it does not reflect the chronological order. This is because the analytical focus rests on the quantitative analysis while the qualitative case-study subsequently serves to mitigate the operational limitation inherent in the quantitative analysis.

vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a concrete possibility at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective. The lack of reliable data on national policy preference necessitated a discussion of how this operational limitation is likely to affect the validity of the expected findings for the empirical analysis. This discussion took place in section 3.3., where I argued that any of the quantitative findings, while limited, would still be valid. I further suggested seeking to shed more light on the issue by means of a qualitative analysis presented in chapter 7. In chapter 4 I seek to discuss aspects of methodology and operationalisation before moving on to the empirical analysis in Part III.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALISATION

As illustrated in the introductory chapters, this thesis, in the broadest sense, is interested in factors which determine whether or not EU member states speak with a single voice in international affairs. In the narrowest sense then, I suggest to operationalise it as a study of EU voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly. I discussed the conceptional underpinnings of this study in chapter 3. Crucially, whilst the hypotheses have been set up with a focus on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, due to the operational limitation discussed in chapter 3, with reference to the quantitative voting pattern analysis, the focus has to be moved towards vote defections. Before putting the hypotheses to the test in the ensuing empirical chapters, it is the objective of the present chapter to lay out the methodological framework for the analysis and to discuss aspects pertaining to the operationalisation of the study. To this end, I shall discuss the analytical framework in more detail in section 4.1 before thrashing out variable measurement in section 4.2. I shall look into methodological aspects in section 4.3 and a brief conclusion to the chapter will be provided in section 4.4.

4.1 The UNGA as Analytical Framework

In this section, I seek to make the case for the United Nations General Assembly as suitable framework of analysis by carefully weighing its advantages against its limitations. I shall subsequently discuss in more practical terms how the framework is being used respectively for the quantitative and the qualitative analysis.

4.1.1 Advantages and Limitations of the Framework

Naturally, every framework of analysis contains advantages and limitations and the usefulness of discussing EU voting behaviour inside the United Nations General Assembly might not seem immediately obvious. However, there are a number of compelling reasons – conceptional reasons as well as methodological reasons – for selecting this framework. These are outlined below, along with a discussion of any potential limitations.

Thanks to its “global purview” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 68), the United Nations General Assembly is considered the “pre-eminent forum of global political discussions” (Wouters, 2001, p. 378). It is the forum in which “the international community [is] called on to give a political judgement” (Smouts, 2000, p. 37) on a wide-ranging set of issues, including “social and economic matters, human rights and humanitarian issues, the environment, development of international law and security and disarmament issues” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). The resulting resolutions illustrate a genuine (although perhaps misguided) attempt “to find long-term solutions to persistent global problems” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). Analysing EU vote coordination inside the UNGA hence provides a useful proxy for analysing EU coordination on the international stage more generally. It thus offers the possibility to gain some insight into the ability and willingness of the EU member states to speak with a single voice (Solana, 2002) on a broad array of foreign affairs issues.

Nevertheless, UNGA’s relevance as international forum for political discussions has been called into question on more than one occasion. For instance, it has been pointed

out that: “The General Assembly is not a world legislature. It has no authority to issue mandatory norms. Except for internal governance, budgetary or membership issues, its resolutions are mere recommendations, without binding authority.” (Smouts, 2000, p. 51) To this end, the forum has been described as a “merely passive arena for political interaction” (Dixon, 1981, p. 47) with its voting depicted as “largely symbolic” (Voeten, 2000, p. 185). While this argument stands largely undisputed, I maintain that for the purpose of the present thesis, resolution relevance is only of secondary importance. Primarily in this study, UNGA votes are used as a vehicle for understanding EU cohesion. How valuable or useful UNGA resolutions are in and of themselves is inconsequential, as long as they are generally accepted as manifestations of foreign policy stances (Holmes, Rees, & Whelan, 1992, p. 161) and as such can be seen as “indicators [that] help [...] understand the underlying dynamics of foreign policy preferences” (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, p. 71). And although critics might question what incentives EU member states have to vote in unison when it does not matter, the counter argument would obviously be that, given their intent to speak with a single voice in international affairs, what reason would they have not to vote together and show a united front for precisely that reason? After all they are casting their votes in a forum “where the value in making choices is most modest” (Gartzke, 2006, p. 2).

It almost goes without saying that UNSC discussions are vastly more topical and consequential. Nevertheless, using UNSC votes for the analysis would be operationally forbidding since only the UK and France hold permanent membership in the UNSC and on average less than two other EU member states sit on the UNSC at any given point for the time period under consideration (United Nations, 1992-2004a). More to the point, the United Nations General Assembly is an exceptionally versatile framework of

analysis. It readily avails itself to quantitative voting pattern analysis on the one hand and in-depth analysis of the vote-coordination process that takes place prior to the roll-call voting on the other hand. The quantitative voting pattern analysis can further be divided into system-level analysis and individual-level analysis. With regards to the former, the focus is on scrutinising the variations in overall EU cohesion levels. With regards to the latter, the focus is on the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states; more precisely the focus is on their vote defection from the EU majority position. Finally, the qualitative analysis benefits from the possibility to carry out research interviews with experts at the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the individual EU member states in New York. For the purpose of this project, quantitative and qualitative analysis complement each other well, since the “analysis of the voting pattern of EU Member States in the UN perhaps provides us with the most reliable quantified evidence” of EU vote coordination (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 45). By comparison, most CFSP decisions in Brussels are reached by unanimity. Even with the option of ‘constructive abstention’, which essentially permits a member state to abstain from a CFSP vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision, this does not leave much room for analysing the voting behaviour of individual EU member states, especially since Council deliberations are generally not made public (European Union, 2004a).

This particular framework of analysis furthermore allows for the inclusion of the transatlantic angle into the study in a straight-forward fashion. The UNGA is the only forum in which the US and the member states of the EU, among others, deliberate and vote on a regular basis on a broad range of issues concerning the international community (Voeten, 2000, pp. 185, 186). Moreover, the votes cast in the UNGA are all

in response to the same question for all UN members. This circumstance makes therefore a direct comparison of foreign policy positions between the transatlantic partners possible without having to standardise the data. Finally, with the focus of the thesis on the fifteen 'old members' of the European Union, it makes for a useful starting point to systematically compare the voting patterns of "old Europe" (CNN, 2003) with those of the newly enlarged Europe.

4.1.2 UNGA Workings

The member states of the United Nations usually meet during their annual regular sessions, which begin in mid-September and last until right before Christmas (United Nations, 2006). Since 1978 these annual sessions also have "resumed every year for at least one day in the spring or early summer" (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57). In fact:

"In 1991, the General Assembly decided that its 46th session would go up until the eve of the opening of the 47th! Since then, the GA has fallen into the habit of meeting frequently between January and September." (Smouts, 2000, p. 35)

Furthermore, as specified in chapter IV, Article 20 of the UN Charter, special sessions may be convened on request of the Security Council or a majority of the member states. Mostly, these "special sessions are called by decisions made at an earlier regular assembly session" (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57; Smouts, 2000, p. 35). Finally, emergency special sessions may be called within 24 hours at a request of the Security Council on the vote of any nine members of the Security Council, or by a majority of the United Nations members, or by one member if the majority of members concurs (United Nations, 1945). They are convened under the procedures for rapid action

established by the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950 (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57; Smouts, 2000, p. 35).²⁸

Up from “46 separate agenda items at the first session in 1946” (Smouts, 2000, p. 35), “the agenda of the annual General Assembly session now includes more than 150 items” (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005, p. 24). Topics comprise “international law, human rights, and all forms of international social, economic, cultural, and educational cooperation” (Fasulo, 2004, pp. 68-69). Six different main committees have been established to better deal with the vastness of issues coming before the UNGA. These main committees are the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee), the Economic and Finance Committee (Second Committee), the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (Third Committee), the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee (Fourth Committee), the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). “These committees are ‘committees of the whole’”, that is to say “exact reproductions of the plenary Assembly” (Smouts, 2000, p. 36). Each main committee starts work on issues within its remit at the beginning of the annual session around 28 September (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 59).

The General Committee, comprised of the President of the Assembly and the chairmen of the six main committee, is tasked with considering provisional agenda items, put forward by UN member states (M. J. Peterson, 1986, p. 266), and with deciding whether or not they should be included on the UNGA agenda (United Nations, 2009).

²⁸ To put these into context: Between 1947 and 1998 twenty special sessions were held; and between 1956 and 1997 ten emergency special sessions were held (Smouts, 2000, p. 35).

And because its members are selected by a formula that accounts for the different regions of the world in a proportional manner, Third World countries make up the majority of the Committee. As de facto agenda setter, the Committee has the power to deny provisional agenda items. Yet, “it has never fully exploited any of these powers” and “has seldom used its power to screen the agenda to keep items off” (M. J. Peterson, 1986, p. 268).

Issues are generally put forward in forms of draft resolutions and are sponsored directly by a delegation and can be co-sponsored by multiple other delegations. After the relevant committee has duly considered its content, the draft document is submitted to the plenary assembly for adoption. Some resolutions are submitted for adoption without references to any of the main committees. UNGA decision-making is governed formally by a “two-tier system” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 69), where resolutions are passed either by a two third majority or by a simple majority. Chapter IV, Article 18 of the UN Charter stipulates which matters are to be decided by a two third majority:

“Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.” (United Nations, 1945: Chapter IV, Art. 18, 2)

Furthermore, “resolutions outside the remit of Article 18 including the determination of putting additional resolutions into the remit of Article 18, shall be decided by a

simple majority of the members present and voting” (United Nations, 1945: Chapter IV, Art 18, 3). Nevertheless, not all resolutions are put forward to a vote in the UNGA. If, as often happens, “the leadership can establish a consensus on a given matter, a formal vote may not even be needed” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 69). It must be noted, however, that this is an informal arrangement between the UN member states; and any one member state can request a vote. The percentage of resolutions put to a vote varies from year to year. By and large, over the years the proportion of resolutions put forward to a vote has decreased from around 80% in the early days of the United Nations to roughly 20% now (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 19; Marin-Bosch, 1998).

Aspects Pertaining to the Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis

In this thesis, I am particularly interested in the 12 year time period between 1992 and 2004. This marks the period between the signing of the Treaty of the European Union and the Union’s Eastern enlargement. As explained in the previous section, the annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly start in September and run until the following summer. That is to say, UNGA sessions are not synonymous with calendar years. For instance, the 47th session commences in September 1992 and runs until the following summer and the 58th session commences in September 2003 and runs until the following summer. For the purpose of this project then, I shall either refer to the session, or to the year in which the session commences (See codebook Voeten & Merdzanovic, 2002). The countries included in the study are listed in Table 4.1. These are the 12 EU member states between 1992 and 1995 and the 15 EU member states from 1995 onwards.

| EU Member State | Year of Accession to the EU |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| Austria | 1995 |
| Belgium | 1957 |
| Denmark | 1973 |
| Finland | 1995 |
| France | 1957 |
| Germany | 1957 |
| Greece | 1981 |
| Ireland | 1973 |
| Italy | 1957 |
| Luxembourg | 1957 |
| Netherlands | 1957 |
| Portugal | 1986 |
| Spain | 1986 |
| Sweden | 1995 |
| UK | 1973 |

Table 4.1: List of EU Member States and Accession Year

The variable of interest is *EU majority – oriented voting behaviour*, an occurrence that takes place each time a member state casts its vote with the EU majority despite holding a divergent national policy preference. Due to the lack of sufficiently quantifiable data for national policy preferences, however, for the purpose of the quantitative analysis this variable translates into *vote defection*, an occurrence which takes place each time a member state does not cast its vote with the EU majority when holding a divergent national policy position. In essence then the difference between vote defection and EU majority – oriented voting behaviour is the decision a country takes when its national policy preference diverges from the EU majority position. I examine vote defections by means of voting pattern analysis. As discussed earlier already, the UNGA framework avails itself to both system-level voting pattern analysis and individual-level voting pattern analysis. The system-level analysis focuses on the variation in overall EU cohesion levels, while the individual-level analysis

explores the voting behaviour of the individual member states and investigates to what extent they contribute to the EU majority or alternatively to what extent they defect from the EU majority .

The unit of analysis are the 829 resolutions subject to UNGA roll-call voting between 1992 and 2004 (see table 4.2). Of course, resolutions are not the only type of document emanating from the UNGA. There are also decisions and motions. Resolutions, however, are the main focus of this study because unlike decisions, which generally deal with non-substantive matters such as elections, appointments, the time and place of meetings and the taking note of reports, resolutions are substantive in nature. The data has been compiled by using first and foremost the UN Index to Proceedings 1992 until 2004 (United Nations, 1987-2005). Records which were not accessible through this source, such as voting records for Germany for the 47th, 48th and 49th session, were retrieved from the General Assembly Official Records for those years (United Nations, 1992-2004b).²⁹ These are in fact verbatim records of individual meetings and include information about all roll-call proceedings. Voting records of countries other than the EU member states and voting records outside of the time period under consideration have been obtained from a dataset made available by Voeten and Merdzanovic (2002). For some resolutions amendments or individual paragraphs are put to the vote. These are included in this study.

For each of the 829 resolutions that are put to a vote, member states have the possibility to vote “yes” when in favour of the resolution, or “no” when in opposition

²⁹ Other studies record data for German roll-call voting as missing for the 47th, 48th and 49th session (e.g. Laatikainen & Smith, 2006).

to the resolution. Member states can also “abstain” from voting. Alternatively, member states may choose not to participate in the voting altogether. Only affirmative or negative votes are counted towards the passing of a resolution (United Nations, 2006, pp. 23, Rule 86).

The difference between absenteeism and abstentions is the physical presence at the General Assembly. In order for a country to abstain from voting, it must be present at the General Assembly. Absenteeism on the other hand occurs when a member state either involuntarily or deliberately fails to attend the UNGA roll-call voting altogether. In fact, many times particularly smaller delegations from poor countries find it difficult to consistently occupy a seat in New York, which can lead to involuntary absenteeism (Russett, 1966, p. 329). However, absenteeism can also be a deliberate choice by means of which a country “intends[s] to demonstrate opposition to the resolution or a conviction that the Assembly is overstepping its bounds of its authority in considering the issue” (Russett, 1966, p. 329). Sometimes, countries accidentally miss the roll-call and officially record its position later on (Russett, 1966, p. 329).

When considering recorded votes, one must decide how to deal with abstentions and absenteeism. While abstentions are not counted towards the passing of the resolution in question, I have decided to include abstentions in the analysis. Since the focus of the thesis is on EU coordination/EU cohesion inside the UNGA, it does in fact not matter whether or not the member states vote in the affirmative, the negative or abstain. It only matters, whether or not they do so collectively.

Dealing with absenteeism is slightly more complicated. It emerges from the data that there are several cases where individual EU member states do not participate in the voting procedure. At first sight, Greece's failure to participate in the voting for most of the 51st session marks a serious problem. When asked for the reason of this failure to participate the "Greek Foreign Ministry [refuted] any complicated political disagreement scenarios and attributed this stance to a protracted strike by Greek diplomats in December 1996" (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 24). This strike, which was related to a government debate of the 1997 austerity budget, did not only affect Greek diplomats, but also Greek farmers, doctors, civil servants and seamen (CNN Reuters, 1996). More interestingly, twice, EU member states collectively refrain from participating in the voting procedure, namely in resolutions A/Res/47/59 and A/Res/48/80 which deal with the implementation of the Indian Ocean as zone of peace and with environmental questions pertaining to Antarctica respectively. This indicates a collective decision by EU member states not to participate in the roll-call vote.

In general, researchers are divided as to how to treat absenteeism in quantitative studies. While Russett (1966) treats absenteeism as abstentions, Johansson-Nogues (2004) decides not to include any cases where one or several EU members have been absent altogether. Finally, Voeten (2000) treats absenteeism as missing data. In this research I follow Voeten's (2000) model. All instances, in which individual member states do not record a vote, are treated as missing data. Since Greece's extended failure to participate is due to domestic political problems (budget discussions), and declared wholly unrelated to its position in EU or UN by the Greek government, treating those instances as missing data is deemed acceptable. Less acceptable, yet

necessary for the sake of consistency is the exclusion of the two resolutions for which EU member states collectively fail to take a vote.

Resolutions that are put to a vote tend to pass with a large margin (Marin-Bosch, 1998, p. 95). In fact, they rarely fail in the plenary session (Voeten & Merdzanovic, 2002). However, should a vote be equally divided, a second vote would be taken within 48 hours. If that vote were to be equally divided again, the resolution would be regarded as rejected (United Nations, 2006, Rule 95(133)). In any case, since the focus of this research project is on EU coordination and vote cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly, whether or not a resolution is passed in the General Assembly is only of secondary importance.

As discussed in the previous section, not all resolutions are put to a vote. Some resolutions are adopted without a vote. The percentage of resolutions put to a vote varies over time. As illustrated in Table 4.2, the 829 roll-call votes analysed here make up approximately 21% of all resolutions discussed in the UNGA during the 12 year time period under consideration.

Naturally, the decision to exclude the other 78% of resolutions warrants further explanation. Excluding resolutions that were adopted without a vote from this analysis is justifiable on two grounds. One, the focus of this study is not on explaining how much divergence there is, rather the focus of this study is on explaining whatever divergence there is. Therefore, the risk of artificially inflating the amount of disagreement by only including a small sample of available resolutions seems not a relevant concern here.

Two, by including all those resolutions that were adopted without a vote, an element of speculation would be introduced to the dataset and thus into the analysis. That is so for the following reasons. The only point known for certain is that these resolutions have not been put to the vote. Beyond that, presuming how individual countries would have voted if the resolution had been put to a vote is a matter of mere speculation, as a case can be made for all three voting options. The most frequent assumption is that in case of a consensus resolution a member state agrees with the resolution and would vote in favour of it, if it were put to the vote. The logical extension would then be that all EU member states agree with regards to all consensus resolutions and therefore perfect EU cohesion would be obtained. It is also conceivable, however, that a member state without a particular strong desire to make its voice heard (and therefore not calling for a vote), could still be minded to abstain from a vote, or vote against the resolution if it was put to the vote by another delegation. To justify including consensus resolutions in the analysis would require that only one of the three options for votes is plausible. While one option may be more plausible than another, none are implausible. So, all that is known is that consensus resolutions are adopted without a vote – where individual countries stand with regards to them remains subject to speculation. On those grounds, consensus resolutions are excluded from the dataset. The remaining dataset still leaves considerable amounts of variation in the dependent variable (Keohane, King, & Verba, 1994, p. 129).

| Annual Resolutions and Roll-call Votes | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------------|
| Year | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | Total |
| Session | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | |
| All | 319 | 358 | 338 | 342 | 318 | 298 | 303 | 341 | 329 | 360 | 351 | 324 | 3981 |
| Roll-Call | 73 | 66 | 63 | 69 | 75 | 70 | 61 | 69 | 67 | 67 | 73 | 76 | 829 |
| % | 22.9 | 18.4 | 18.6 | 20.2 | 23.6 | 23.5 | 20.1 | 20.2 | 20.4 | 18.6 | 20.8 | 23.5 | 20.8 |

Table 4.2: Annual Resolutions and Roll-Call Votes

Aspects Pertaining to the Qualitative Analysis of the Vote Coordination Process

While the quantitative voting pattern analysis is well designed to shed light on the occurrences of vote defection, it still falls short of explaining EU majority – oriented voting behaviour. That is to say, the quantitative voting pattern analysis is unable to provide any insight into whether or not EU member states ever override their heterogeneous national policy preference so as to vote with the EU majority. Hence, an in-depth case study of the EU vote coordination process that precedes roll-call voting may be useful in detecting whether or not countries exhibit any EU majority – oriented voting behaviour at all.

With more than 1000 internal meetings annually (Official #13, 13 October 2008), the coordination among EU member states at the UN is extensive and highly systematised. Rasch (2008) illustrates that between 1995 and 2005 the annual EU coordination meetings in New York have increased from 917 meetings in 1995 to 1023 meetings in 2005. Most of the coordination takes place throughout the autumn with October and November usually the busiest months (Rasch, 2008, pp. 62-63).

Member states coordinate at different levels and to different ends. While vote coordination makes up an important part of their work, the coordination between the EU member states extends beyond mere vote coordination and includes coordination of statements and other initiatives. For instance, so-called Article 19 meetings take place weekly (Official #19, 27 October 2008). They have their name from the relevant Article in the Maastricht Treaty and are used to debrief those EU member states which are not members of the United Nations Security Council on what has been discussed at

the UNSC.³⁰ There are regular meetings at the ambassadorial level to discuss topical issues.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, I shall restrict my attention to the coordination of votes. To deal with the vastness of agenda items placed before them, the EU member states have emulated the UNGA main committee system, to facilitate their coordination efforts. Correspondingly, First Committee experts deal with military issues, Second Committee experts discuss development issues, Third Committee experts focus on resolutions pertaining to human rights, Fourth Committee experts deal with decolonisation and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Fifth Committee experts discuss budgetary issues and Sixth Committee experts focus on legal questions. The meeting schedules vary from Committee to Committee and are linked to the overall GA time schedule. Second and Third Committee experts meet most frequently. The Third Committee experts even divide themselves into two clusters, so as to manage the workload. The Fourth Committee experts, on the other hand, meet fairly irregularly. The First Committee experts first come together in early October, while the Fifth Committee experts do not meet before early November. These expert meetings are most of the time conducted by the Missions' First Secretaries. Depending on the Mission, this can mean a fairly "seasoned diplomat" (Official #11, 20 November 2008) or a "young diplomat" (Official #14, 7 October 2008). The meetings take place at the

³⁰ In accordance with Article 24(3), "Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the other Member States and the High Representative informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed." (European Union, 1992, 19 (2))

offices of the Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations, which is located in walking distance to the UN building and most of the Permanent Missions.

The country holding the EU presidency chairs the meetings. It is thus also responsible for disseminating all relevant documents and meeting times. It does so by means of various communication systems, including NYCE (New York Collaboration Environment).

“NYCE allows users to share information, organize meetings and to collaborate on documents providing to the users the ability to work between different workgroups. This system is destined to become the primary medium in which the documents and information are communicated among the NYLO personnel and the members of the Permanent Representations in the UN of the EU Member States.” (Mermig, 2008)

The Presidency may, by means of burden-sharing, allocate the role of chairman for a number of resolutions to another member state. “The bigger countries usually offer to take on a burden sharing role.” (Official #26, 16 September 2008)

At times, the negotiation process can be described as a seemingly endless exercise marked by many empty chairs (Official #33, 13 October 2008). When First Secretaries are not able to agree on a common stance, the coordination process is delegated upwards until it reaches the Heads of Missions. The use of languages proves an interesting aspect of the interaction between the EU member states. The meetings are usually conducted in English. Both native and non-native speakers acknowledge that native English speakers have an advantage and that the negotiation skills of non-native speakers sometimes suffer. From time to time, a conversation might take place in

French, another major EU official language. The French EU Presidency tends to open the meetings in French. Yet, in those instances it is not clear whether or not all participants are able to follow the conversation.

4.2 Variable Measurement

In addition to a versatile analytical framework, the empirical analysis also benefits from the possibility to measure certain variables in a variety of different ways so as to account for the various contexts in which they may be conceptualised. In this section, I set out to present in detail all variables included in the empirical analysis.

4.2.1 Dependent Variables

As already discussed with reference to the project parameters, the variable of interest is *EU majority – oriented voting behaviour*, an occurrence that takes place each time a member state casts its vote with the EU majority despite holding a divergent national policy preference. While it is possible to isolate EU majority – oriented voting behaviour by means of a qualitative descriptive case-study of the vote coordination process between the EU member states, I am unable to do so by means of quantitative voting pattern analysis. Here the analytical focus shifts to vote defection. Calculating vote defection at both, system-level and individual-level is useful as it opens up the possibility to analyse EU voting behaviour inside the UNGA from different perspectives. The system-level analysis provides an overall picture and highlights possible trends of EU cohesion in the UNGA. The individual-level analysis takes account of the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states. Especially in instances of low overall EU cohesion in the UNGA, it is of analytical importance to know which way individual countries cast their votes.

Quantitative Analysis: System-Level Analysis

To assess EU cohesion inside the UNGA, I employ a cohesion index by means of which the level of overall EU agreement in the UNGA is calculated as a continuous variable. Several different ways of measuring cohesion have been suggested in the field of political research (e.g. Attina, 1990; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007, pp. 91-93; Rice, 1928). The cohesion index used here makes use of the 'Agreement Index' employed by Hix, Noury et al (2007, p. 91):

$$AI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)}$$

“where Y_i denotes the number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given vote, N_i denotes that number of No votes and A_i the number of Abstain votes” (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007, p. 91). Its main advantage compared to the Rice-Index is that it can accommodate voting choices in excess of two. Values can range between 0 and 1, whereby a value of 1 illustrates perfect cohesion and a value of 0 indicates no cohesion at all (which means that all choices are equally distributed between all actors).

Quantitative Analysis: Individual-Level Analysis

There are various ways in which to capture vote defection for the purpose of the individual-level analysis. One common option is to measure vote defection in a binary fashion; to take stock of whether a member state casts a vote with the EU majority or in opposition to the EU majority position per resolution. Another option is to count the

number of voting partners a member state has for each resolution (see for instance Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). Each option has certain advantages and limitations.

Measuring EU vote defection in a binary fashion ordinarily relies on the existence of a pre-determined EU majority position. As already discussed earlier in this thesis, however, strictly speaking, there is no fixed EU majority vote inside the UNGA, which would provide a definite benchmark against which to assess a member state's voting behaviour. The concept of EU majority is fluid. It thus bears the risk that when casting a vote, especially for tight resolutions, a member state, while intending to vote with the majority, may end up on the wrong side of the vote by mistake. However, although the concept of EU majority is fluid, because of the lengthy coordination process preceding the roll-call voting, and the cyclical nature of UNGA proceedings (i.e. repeat resolutions)³¹, member states have high quality information on each other's projected voting behaviour and are acutely aware of whether or not they are about to defect from the established consensus. In addition, the dataset reveals that resolutions where no distinct EU majority position is evident occur in less than 1% of all resolutions. They have been removed from the analysis.³²

Another shortcoming is that by measuring vote defection in a binary fashion, it is impossible to account for the strengths of the different groups, since there is no way to differentiate between a 6 to 9 ratio and a 1 to 14 ratio. That is to say, it is not feasible to distinguish between a member state that votes as part of a fairly large minority and one that casts an isolated vote. Calculating a voting partner score would

³¹ See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of repeat resolutions.

³² That is to say, the unit of analysis has decreased from 829 to 821 votes.

circumvent this problem by shifting the focus away from any sort of EU majority voting position to the number of other countries voting in the same manner, the so-called voting partners. It could therefore provide some insight about the strength of the group, as some analytical potential clearly lies in the difference between being the only country going against a well established EU majority, or voting as part of a substantial minority. However, since a country's voting partner score is the direct function of the voting behaviour of all the other countries, with reference to the statistical analysis, the methodological requirements for independence are seriously violated. I thus opt for measuring vote defection in a binary fashion.

Qualitative Analysis: Comparative Analysis

As already mentioned above, the dependent variable for the qualitative analysis is EU majority – oriented voting behaviour. In this thesis, the qualitative analysis is the only analysis that offers the possibility to test whether or not the EU member states are able and willing to override their heterogeneous policy preferences so as to speak with a single voice – and if so, why.

4.2.2 Independent Variables

The independent variables can be categorised into state-focused factors, institutional factors and external factors. I have also included control variables. The state-focused factors include measures for salience and power. The variable power is measured in military terms, economic terms, and as institutional power. The variables summarised as institutional factors measure institutionalised vote coordination pressure on the one hand, and EU dedication on the other hand. They further gauge EU leadership. Vote coordination pressures take into account whether or not a relevant CFSP position is in place, or whether or not the EU collectively sponsors the resolution in question. EU

dedication includes measures for EU commitment, accounts for whether or not a country is a net beneficiary of the EU budget and how enthusiastic the incumbent government is about the EU. EU leadership is also categorised as institutional factor. Finally, external factors refer exclusively to the transatlantic relationship. It includes measures for transatlantic divergence, and whether or not the US designates a certain resolution as important. Furthermore, it gauges the transatlantic bilateral relationships in economic, political and cultural terms. I use the present section to discuss all variables in more detail.

State-Focused Factors

Under the category of state-focused factors fall the variables salience and power.

Salience – The variable salience measures the level of importance a government attaches to a particular policy area. That is to say, it measures how strongly a government feels about a specific policy area. It is calculated as a continuous variable, whereby higher values indicate higher levels of salience. The Comparative Manifesto Dataset (CMD) (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) serves as foundation for the measurement of the variable salience. The authors have put together party positions in fifty-six categories in seven major policy areas based on the parties' manifestos. These party positions consist of percentages of quasi-sentences put into the manifesto (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006, pp. 153, 154). The assumption then is that the more a party talks about a particular issue area, the more important that particular issue is to the party.

The positions relevant for this study have been extracted for all parties in government between 1992 and 2004. Government positions are made up of the policy positions of their constituent parties. In a single party government as is prevalent in the UK, the ruling party's position counts as the government position. To illustrate, for the time period between 1997 and 2004, Labour's position counts as the government position. In a coalition government as is prevalent in Germany, I calculate the average between the positions of the ruling parties and count it as the government position. To illustrate, for the time period between 1998 and 2004, the average between the SPD and Green Party positions is calculated and counts as the government position. While it is possible to calculate the government position for coalition governments so as to take account of the relative parliamentary strength of the individual parties inside the coalition, the data reveals that in most cases their differences on the various issue areas are small enough to justify calculating the simple average.

The following issue areas are included: anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism; military (positive and negative), peace, internationalism (positive and negative), freedom and human rights, democracy. The issue areas put forward by the CMD research team fit very well with the overarching issue areas according to which UNGA resolutions can be identified. These are (1) military issues, (2) decolonisation, (3) peace and security, (4) democratisation/democracy, (5) freedom and human rights, (6) internationalism, (7) self-determination/sovereignty.³³

The variable salience is measured per electoral cycle (in each country) per issue area. A change in leadership may mean a shift in perceived salience for some or all issue areas.

³³ See Appendix 4.1 for a more detailed comparison between CMD and UNGA issue areas.

For issues pertaining to the military framework which the CMD research team has divided into positive and negative groupings, the positive difference between these two values makes up the level of salience government attaches to that particular policy area. For issues pertaining to internationalism, the CMD research team has created two separate variables. These are internationalism positive and internationalism negative. For the purpose of this study these have been converted into two separate variables, measuring the desire for more international cooperation (internationalism positive) and the desire for more sovereign autonomy (internationalism negative).

Power – The concept of power may be defined as the capacity of one actor to modify the conduct of other actors in a manner in which the former desires (Kaplan & Lasswell, 1950). Or as Robert Dahl's (1976) "common sense notion"(p. 29) has it, it can be defined "broadly to include all relationships in which someone gets someone else to do something that he or she would not otherwise do" (Baldwin, 1985, p. 20). As such power is a relational concept and,

"in order to make a meaningful statement about an (actual or potential) influence relationship, one must (explicitly or implicitly) specify who is influencing (or has the capacity to influence) whom (domain) with respect to what (scope)" (Baldwin, 1985, p. 20).

That is to say, the concept of power is not an overarching concept. Rather, how powerful an actor is deemed by its fellow actors depends on the context in which power is measured. That is to say it depends on 'scope' and 'domain'. In a world that consists of largely self-reliant actors and that is based on the survival of the fittest, power may be perceived in military terms. However, in an economically interdependent world, power may be perceived in economic terms. While not

inconceivable that the same actor will fit both bills, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, the most powerful actor in a small domain may belong to the least powerful actors in a larger domain. The fact that I set out to measure the variable power in three different ways seeks to reflect this complexity. Two of the proposed measurements consider different scopes (military and economic), while the third seeks to take account of domain (EU institutional power).

For the purpose of this thesis, I measure military power in terms of a country's annual military expenditure in absolute terms. It finds its grounding in the perception of the international system as a realist system where countries are more or less dependent upon themselves for their survival and progress is directly linked to their ability to attack others or defend themselves. Measuring power in terms of a country's military expenditure is output-focused and gives an indication of the country's ability to attack and defend itself. The data has been derived from the Sipri's Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2008b).

Power can furthermore be measured in economic terms, with an emphasis on annual gross domestic product (GDP). Measuring power this way underlines the shift in perception of the international system from a realist international system to an economically integrated system. GDP data used in this thesis has been taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2004).

While the above-mentioned indicators generally focus on power distribution in the international arena, power distribution can also be considered in smaller forums, such as the EU. While "power" might be determined by the gross domestic product of each

state, [one could equally consider the weighted votes] in the Council, since [they are] determined by the institutional rules and thus should be shaped by state power” (Thomson, Stokman, Achen, & Koenig, 2006, p. 106). A useful way in which to measure power within the EU is then to consider the voting weights that have been allocated to the individual member states in the Council of Ministers and that are applied for all decisions taken by a quality majority vote (QMV).³⁴

Although, in anticipation of Eastern enlargement, a redistribution of voting weights had been discussed in the context of the Nice Treaty, for the time period under consideration, the allocated voting weights have been constant (Hosli, 2000, p. 9). That is to say, when Sweden, Austria and Finland joined the EU in 1995, the voting weights for the other countries did not change. Neither did any new regulations or treaties take effect during the time period under consideration that may have had an impact on the allocated voting weights.

Institutional Factors

The variables pertaining to institutional factors can further be divided into institutionalised voting pressure and EU dedication (exclusively for individual level analysis). They also take account of EU leadership.

Institutionalised voting pressure – Variables in the group of institutionalised voting pressures include existing CFSP positions and indications of whether or not the EU member states collectively sponsored a resolution. Information on the former has

³⁴ There are of course more elaborate indices which use the basic distribution of voting weights as their foundation. Examples include the Banzhaf Index or the Shapley-Shubik Index (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997; Shapley & Shubik, 1954). For the purpose of this thesis, however, the allocated voting weights suffice.

been collected from the EU Council Secretariat (European Union, 2007a). The UN Index to Proceedings (United Nations, 1987-2005) has been a useful source for information on resolution sponsorship.

EU dedication – The category EU dedication incorporates the following three variables: EU commitment, negative opinion about the EU, and EU beneficiary. The variable EU commitment is measured in an ordinal manner and is based on the notion of “differentiated integration” (Luif, 2007, p. 3). That is to say it accounts for the number of voluntary agreements a country makes with regards to its EU membership. The agreements considered here are membership in Schengen and in the Euro, participation in JHA and in military cooperation via battle groups. Essentially, this variable captures to what extent a country participates or opts out from the various intra-EU commitments on offer.

The variable negative opinion about the EU has been extracted from the Manifesto Dataset (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) and is measured as a continuous variable based on information provided in parties’ manifestos. The variable EU beneficiary is measured in a binary manner and illustrates whether or not an EU member state is a net contributor to or a net beneficiary of the EU budget. Budget information has been collected from EU Commission sources (e.g. European Union, 2003a) as well as media sources (e.g. EurActiv, 2005).

EU leadership – The variable EU leadership tries to measure whether successful vote coordination between the EU member states becomes more likely for divisive and contentious resolution, when that means increasing the collective bargaining power.

Because the focus here is entirely on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour (rather than vote defection), it is only possible to measure this variable by means of the qualitative analysis. I have considered measuring in quantitative terms, the extent to which a collective EU vote has been pivotal in deciding the fate of a resolution. However, UNGA resolutions tend to be passed by rather large margins. That is to say, of the 821 resolutions considered in this study, the EU had opportunity to change the fate of a resolution only five times. The member states cast a unified vote for all five resolutions. In three of the five resolutions would a change in the collective EU vote have made a difference. (In those three cases the EU voted with the majority of the UN and if it had not done so, the No votes would have been in the majority.) For the other two votes, the EU member states collectively cast a vote different from the UN majority and a change in the collective vote would have not made a difference to the fate of the resolution.

External Factors – Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship is considered in a multi-stage process. First of all, I set out to determine the degree of transatlantic divergence. Moreover, I measure the bilateral relationship between individual member states and the US in economic, political and cultural terms. I finally provide a list of resolutions which the US considers “important”.

Transatlantic Divergence – The variable Transatlantic Divergence measures the extent to which the transatlantic partners do not cast identical votes in the UNGA. As such, it simply illustrates the extent to which the US voting record differs from that of the majority of the EU member states. The variable is conceptualised in binary terms,

whereby identical votes receive a value of 0 and non-identical votes receive a value of 1.

Transatlantic bilateral relationships in economic, political and cultural terms – The bilateral relationship between the individual EU member states and the US can be estimated in economic, political as well as cultural terms. In economic terms, I account for the bilateral trade relationship by calculating the yearly trade volume between the US and the individual EU member states. The data has been derived from the IMF's *Direction of Trade Statistics* (IMF, March 2009). In political terms I account for the relationship by measuring the number of international multilateral military interventions both countries participate in together. The data has been derived from SIPRI's *Facts on International Relations and Security Trends* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2008a). Finally, in cultural terms I calculate the number of successful non-immigrant visa applications (e.g. student visas) issued for each EU member state by the US government per year (US Department of State, 2003). In order to take account of the varying population sizes across the EU member states, those numbers have further been calculated as the percentage of population.

Important for the US – The variable Important for the US is included as auxiliary variable. The variable Important for the US refers to resolutions which the US considers to be important and for which it lobbies the other UN member states heavily. An annual list of these resolutions is published on the US Department of State website (US Department of State, 2008). The variable Important for the US is measured as a dichotomous variable, whereby a value of 1 indicates that the US considers the resolution as important and a value of 0 indicates that it does not.

Control Variables

In addition to fixed effects (see next section), I am including three control variables in the analyses. For the system-level analysis I include a measure for UN Cohesion in order to determine whether or not EU cohesion levels are in fact a function of UN Cohesion levels. The UN voting data has been derived from the UN Index to Proceedings (United Nations, 1987-2005). For the individual-level analysis, I am including two control variables: government type and government position. The variable government type is measured by using the index Lijphart (1999) has developed as part of his study on *Patterns of Democracy*. The index is two-fold and measures democracies alongside the executive-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. The index essentially distinguishes between so-called 'Westminster-style' democracies and so-called 'Consensus-style' democracies. In the simplest and most polarising terms, the former describes a system in which the concentration of executive power lies with a single-party majority in a unitary structure; whereas the latter describes a system in which a coalition of parties shares power in a decentralised structure. The variable government position is measured by using the index developed by the team working on the Comparative Manifesto Dataset (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) and positions a government alongside a left-right spectrum.

4.3 Methodological Tools

Inspired by Lieberman's nested analysis approach, which "combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample"(Liebermann, 2005:435-436), I take

advantage of the methodological versatility of this particular analytical framework and combine quantitative voting pattern analysis (system-level analysis and individual-level analysis) with the in-depth examination of the vote coordination process by means of research interviews. In this section, I shall explain the methodological aspects pertaining to each in more detail.

Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis

The quantitative voting pattern analysis begins with an instructive breakdown of existing voting patterns over time and across issue areas. I further investigate voting patterns that are indicative of intra-EU dialogue as well as indicative of heterogeneous policy preferences. Subsequently, an attempt is made to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly but not exclusively with reference to the votes cast by the US.

As part of the inferential statistical analysis, I employ binary logistic regression both at the system-level as well as at the individual-level of analysis. As the name suggests, binary logistic regression is generally used to predict categorical outcomes. It thus appears a natural choice for the individual-level analysis, where I seek to estimate the likelihood of vote defection from the EU majority position by individual EU member states. It is a less obvious choice for the system-level analysis, where I seek to estimate the extent of overall EU cohesion, which is measured as a continuous variable. The decision to employ binary logistic regression for the system-level analysis thus warrants further explanation. The dependent variable in the system-level analysis is called EU cohesion index. The variable is in fact measured as a continuous variable

ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher levels of overall EU cohesion. At first sight, ordinary least square regression (OLS) would thus seem more suitable. However, the assumptions that need to be met for OLS regression to produce reliable results are especially stringent. And with a system-level dataset that is heavily lopsided in favour of instances of perfect cohesion (i.e. “hard 1’s”; see table 5.3), it appears more appropriate to analyse the data by means of logistic regression, in which case the variable EU cohesion index is treated as a binary variable, whereby all instances of perfect cohesion are coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0.

The dataset used for the individual-level analysis contains only 576 observations of vote defection and 11071 observations of non-defection. Considering the ratio of 5% to 95%, this dataset qualifies for rare events logistics as King and Zeng (2001) point out that there is a danger that standard binary logistic regression “underestimate[s] the probability of rare events” (p. 693). By using their ReLogit software, logit coefficients are replaced with bias-corrected coefficients; and in the end, “when the results make a difference, [their] methods work better than logit; when they do not, these methods give the same answer as logit” (King & Zeng, 2001, p. 702). It will not be necessary to use the ReLogit command for the system-level analysis. The dataset contains 597 observations of full cohesion and 224 observations of partial cohesion. That is a ratio of 73% to 26%.

Fixed effects are included in all models, so as to remove any omitted variable bias. (Dranove, 2004). I differentiate between issue fixed effects and year fixed effects. As already established in existing research (see chapter 2), the extent to which the EU member states speak with a single voice varies across issue area. In order not to distort

the findings, it thus appears prudent to control for issue area. In addition, year fixed effects have been included.

Finally, by means of a statistical tool called CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003), I shall attempt to estimate the predicted probabilities of the variables in the models presented. CLARIFY “uses stochastic simulation techniques to help [...] interpret and present statistical results” obtained by a number of models including binary logistic regression as well as interaction terms (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003, p. 5).

Qualitative Analysis of the Vote Coordination Process

Research interviews with officials involved in the vote coordination process are used to circumvent the operational limitation faced by the quantitative voting pattern analysis. To this end, I conducted a total of 39 face-to-face research interviews at the United Nations in New York between September and December 2008. I met with ambassadors, counsellors and first secretaries of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the individual EU member states. The interviews lasted between 60 and 180 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured. They included a list of five open-ended questions (see Appendix 7.1 and 7.2) and the interviewee’s “responses were followed up with prompts and probes” (Gillham, 2007, p. 24). I contacted some of the interviewees with follow-up question after the interview had taken place.

In addition to interviewing officials (mainly ambassadors and counsellors) who were able to provide me with a more general picture of the coordination process that takes place between the EU member states at the United Nations General Assembly; I also sought out those that are particularly familiar with the coordination process pertaining

to military questions and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I furthermore attended two coordination meetings, in which EU officials negotiated the EU majority position with respect to a number of resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict that were about to come to a vote in the General Assembly. Unfortunately, it was not possible for me to attend similar negotiation meetings with respect to the military realm.

While these research interviews are an invaluable part of the overall thesis,

“it must be acknowledged that the analysis may be biased towards the self-interest and personal or collective agenda of these policy makers. Whether conscious or unconscious, it is certainly possible that in an effort to rationalize or defend their own positions, [interviewees] may be led to exaggeration, distortion or inaccuracy” (Tonra, 1997).

In order to counteract this phenomenon, and “to reduce the pressure for self-justification and open their analysis to greater self-criticism” (Tonra, 1997) absolute anonymity was granted to the interviewees and the possibility to provide comments on the finished product.

The discrepancy between the time period used for the quantitative voting pattern analysis and the time period in which I conducted the interviews warrants further explanation. The secondment of national civil servants to the country’s diplomatic missions tends to be based on a principle of rotation. That is to say, there is a time limit on how long an official may be delegated to a particular mission. This time limit varies between countries and of course there are exceptions to the rules, but generally it does not exceed beyond a few years. This means that presently, it makes it exceptionally difficult to get in touch with officials that manned the individual

Permanent Missions between 1992 and 2004. Some of the officials I have spoken to, had been at their Mission since 2001 (thus covering parts of the relevant time period), but most have been there for less than that. However, officials that have been there the longest have confirmed a sense of continuity in the EU coordination efforts over the years. This sense of continuity is further confirmed by cross-checking the results of the voting pattern analysis with the information received in the interviews.

4.5 Conclusion

In chapter 4 I discussed aspects of methodology and operationalisation. To this end, I justified the choice of the United Nations General Assembly as framework of analysis. While acknowledging that this forum may be seen as largely inconsequential in world politics, I argued that in this study resolution relevance is only of secondary importance. Instead, I highlighted the methodological versatility of a framework which not only readily avails itself to quantitative and qualitative analysis but also makes room for incorporating the transatlantic relationship in a straight forward manner. I further illustrated how the framework is used in relation to the quantitative and qualitative analysis. In the subsequent sections, I discussed variable measurement and methodological tools. The ensuing three chapters serve to present the results of the empirical analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the system-level voting pattern analysis and the individual-level voting pattern analysis respectively. The focus of chapter 7 is on the analysis of the research interviews.

4.6 Appendices

Appendix 4A: Mapping Policy Preferences: Comparative Manifesto Dataset

MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES: COMPARATIVE MANIFESTO DATASET

| MD Code | MD Variable | MD Variable Description | Thesis Code | Thesis Variable |
|---------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Per 103 | Anti-Imperialism, Anti Colonialism | Negative reference to exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states; negative reference to controlling other countries as if they were part of empire, favourable mention of decolonisation, favourable mention of greater self-government and independence of colonies, negative reference to imperial behaviour of manifesto and other countries | 2 | Decolonisation |
| Per 104 | Military Positive | Need to maintain or increase military expenditure, modernise armed forces and improvement in military strength, rearmament and self-defence, need to secure adequate manpower in military terms. | 1 | Military (Disarmament, Mercenary, Nuclear) |
| Per 105 | Military Negative | Favourable mention of decreasing military expenditures, disarmament, evils of war, promises to reduce conscription | 1 | Military (Disarmament, Mercenary, Nuclear) |
| Per 106 | Peace Positive | Peace as a general goal, declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises, desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries | 3 | Peace & Security |
| Per 107 | Internationalism Positive | Need for international cooperation, cooperation with specific countries other than per101, need for aid to developing countries, need for world planning of resources, need for international courts, support for any international goal, support for UN | 6 | Internationalism |
| Per 109 | Internationalism Negative | Favourable mention of national independence, & sovereignty as opposed to internationalism | 7 | Self-Determination /Sovereignty |
| Per 201 | Freedom HR Positive | Favourable mention of importance of personal freedom and civil rights, freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom of speech, freedom from coercion in political and economic spheres, individualism in manifesto country and in other countries | 5 | Freedom & Human Rights |
| Per 202 | Democracy Positive | Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal in national and other organisations, involvement of all citizens in decision-making as well as generalised support for manifesto country's democracy | 4 | Democracy /Democratisation |

Source: Klingemann, H.-D., A. Volkens, et al. (2006). Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003 Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PART III EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Following the conceptual discussion in chapter 3 and the presentation of the methodological framework in chapter 4, it is the purpose of chapters 5 to 7 to present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis consists of a quantitative voting pattern analysis conducted in chapters 5 (system-level analysis) and 6 (individual-level analysis) as well as of a qualitative analysis of the vote coordination process that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes, presented in chapter 7.

The focal point of the voting pattern analysis is the voting behaviour of the EU member states inside the United Nations General Assembly as seen from the collective as well as from the individual perspective. That is to say, my interest lies in analysing the overall levels of vote agreement between the member states on the one hand; and on the other hand, I am interested in examining how the voting behaviour of the individual member states fits into the picture of overall EU cohesion levels. The voting pattern analysis further attempts to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United Nations General Assembly, in particular with reference to the votes cast by the United States.

The voting pattern analysis is well equipped to isolate vote defections and link them to divergent policy preferences. In instances of vote cohesion, the voting pattern analysis is not able to determine if an EU member state cast a vote with its fellow member states because of shared preferences or despite of divergent preferences. To address this operational shortcoming and shed some light on the issue, a qualitative analysis of

the vote coordination process that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes is presented in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS I: SYSTEM-LEVEL ANALYSIS

In chapter 5 I set out to examine the EU member states' voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly from a system-level perspective. That is to say the focus of this chapter is on EU cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly. The quantitative analysis begins with an instructive breakdown of EU cohesion levels over time and across issue areas, before illustrating that whatever agreement exists between the member states is not exclusively a coincidence of overlapping preferences but that there is some evidence for vote coordination intention. This is followed by an attempt to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United Nations General Assembly, in particular with reference to the votes cast by the US. As part of the subsequent inferential statistical analysis, I employ Logistic regression to gauge the likelihood of a fully cohesive vote considering an array of state-focused factors, institutionalised pressures, and the position upheld by the US.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided into five sections. I shall inspect overall levels of EU cohesion in more detail in section 5.1, focusing on the extent to which cohesion levels vary over time and across issue areas. In section 5.2, I set out to identify patterns in the voting behaviour of the member states that strongly point towards their intention to coordinate their votes. Ahead of the multivariate analysis in section 5.4, I shall use section 5.3 to contextualise EU cohesion levels with reference to other UN members, in particular the US. Finally, a brief conclusion to the chapter will be provided in section 5.5.

5.1 EU Cohesion Levels in the UNGA

In this section, I shall provide an overview of the dependent variable EU Cohesion. To this end, I shall scrutinise EU cohesion levels over time and across issue areas. As already discussed in chapter 4, although EU cohesion is a continuous variable and thus suitable for OLS regression, the variable has been recalibrated for logistic regression because the vast majority of resolutions yields perfect cohesion levels leaving the dataset lopsided. I shall further introduce EU cohesion as binary variable.

EU Cohesion Levels over Time

Figure 5.1 illustrates EU cohesion levels over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion index. The line depicts the average EU cohesion levels calculated for each individual session between 1987 and 2005. For sessions 42-49 (1987-1994), the voting behaviour of the 12 existing EU member states is recorded. For sessions 50-60 (1995-2005) the voting behaviour of the 15 existing EU member states is recorded. Voting behaviour for the ten member states that joined in 2004 have not been included. The two vertical lines at $x = 47$ and $x = 58$ indicate respectively the beginning and end of the time period under consideration in the quantitative analysis.

With the possible range of the EU cohesion index reaching between 0 (no cohesion) and 1 (perfect cohesion), the figure illustrates very clearly that high levels of EU cohesion in the UNGA are by far no anomaly. For the time period under consideration, the average EU cohesion level is .917. Average cohesion levels calculated for individual sessions range between .883 in the 49th session (1994/1995) and .948 in the 53rd session (1998/1999). That is to say that between 1992 and 2004, on average 14 (11)

out of 15 (12) member states cast identical votes inside the UNGA. Nevertheless, each year there are a number of resolutions for which the member states do not successfully coordinate their votes.




Figure 5.1: Average EU Cohesion Levels over Time

EU Cohesion Levels across Issue Areas

Figure 5.2 illustrates average EU cohesion levels across issue area. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual issue areas, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion index. The individual columns represent the average cohesion levels per issue area. Despite a generally high level of average cohesion in most issue areas, successful vote coordination comes by slightly more difficult for resolutions in some issue areas. Member states are most successful in reaching agreement on resolutions pertaining to democracy, the Arab Israeli conflict as well as human rights. For those three issue areas, overall cohesion levels are near perfect. On the other hand, resolutions pertaining to mercenaries as well as those pertaining to decolonisation yield the lowest average EU cohesion levels.




Figure 5.2: Average EU Cohesion Levels across Issue Area

As already discussed in chapter 2, existing research tends to look at military resolutions as particularly divisive between EU member states (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 39; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Luif, 1995, p. 279, 2003, p. 3; Wouters, 2001) And as expected, member states do not generally reach full agreement with reference to resolutions pertaining to military issues. Nevertheless, by disaggregating the topic into resolutions dealing with disarmament, nuclear issues and mercenaries, it appears that while less agreement is reached on nuclear issues and particularly on resolutions pertaining to mercenaries, member states tend to do fairly well on resolutions dealing with disarmament. This implies then that in addition to fluctuations across issue area or over time, cohesion levels may also vary within issue area.

EU Cohesion in Binary Terms

Figure 5.3 shows that a little more than 73% of the time, EU member states speak with a single voice in the forum. The remaining 27% are distributed across lower levels of EU cohesion. So, even though the “EU cohesion index” is measured in continuous terms, due to the overwhelming number of fully cohesive votes (i.e. “hard 1’s”), I suggest to analyse the data by means of logistic regression. For this purpose, “EU Cohesion” must be converted into a binary variable. In this section then, I shall provide an overview of the dependent variable EU Cohesion in binary terms and shall scrutinise EU cohesion levels over time and across issue area.




Figure 5.3: EU Cohesion Levels across Resolutions

Figure 5.4 presents binary EU cohesion over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the division between fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions in percentage terms. Each bar illustrates the percentage of fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions within that particular year.

Absolute values are depicted as well. For sessions 42-49 (1987-1994), the voting behaviour of the 12 existing EU member states is recorded. For sessions 50-60 (1995-2005) the voting behaviour of the 15 existing EU member states is recorded. Voting behaviour for the ten member states that joined in 2004 have not been included. The amount of fully cohesive votes increased over time from less than 50% prior to 1992 to between 70% and 80% towards the end of the time period under consideration. The share of fully cohesive votes peaked in session 53 (1998) above 80%.




Figure 5.4: Binary EU cohesion over Time

Figure 5.5 illustrates binary EU cohesion across issue area. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual issue areas, while the vertical axis represents the division between fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions in percentage terms. Each bar illustrates the percentage of fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions within that particular issue area. Absolute values are depicted as well. For the vast majority of issue areas, more than half of the resolutions put forward to a vote receive full EU endorsement – including resolutions pertaining to disarmament as well as including

resolutions pertaining to nuclear issues. Predictably, resolutions dealing with questions of decolonisation tend to not be fully cohesive. The same is true for resolutions pertaining to sovereignty issues. Resolutions on mercenaries are the only group to never once reach full cohesion. Having said that, the total number of resolution differs widely between the issue areas with 267 Arab/Israeli resolutions on top and only 12 resolutions dealing with mercenaries and another 12 resolutions on democratisation at the bottom.




Figure 5.5: Binary EU Cohesion across Issue Area

5.2 Intentional Vote Coordination

As we shall see in chapter 7, the expert interviews with EU diplomats at the UN make explicit intention of the EU member states to coordinate their votes, I shall use this section to analyse in more detail the observable implications of this intent for their voting patterns. If the member states intended to coordinate their votes, one would naturally expect to observe a voting pattern that is indicative of intra-EU dialogue.

One would furthermore expect to see that the EU cohesion levels inside the UNGA are not a function of cohesion levels obtained by larger groups of which the EU member states constitute a part of. Accordingly, this section is divided into two subsections. I first set out to analyse the extent to which collective EU voting behaviour inside the UNGA is indicative of intra-EU dialogue. I then seek to compare EU cohesion levels to the cohesion levels of other relevant groups inside the UNGA. To this end, EU cohesion levels are compared to overall UNGA cohesion levels, and to cohesion levels of regional groups, with particular reference to the Western European regional group.

5.2.1 Indications of Intra-EU Dialogue

At least two types of voting patterns are indicative of intra-EU dialogue. Both, a sudden rise in overall EU cohesion levels and the collective change of fully cohesive voting positions point towards the possibility that member states coordinate their positions. Each type is discussed in more detail below.

Sudden Rise in EU Cohesion Levels

A dramatic and abrupt increase in EU cohesion levels makes for a strong indication of intra-EU dialogue as it hints at a collective choice taken by the member states to work together. Figure 5.1 illustrates EU cohesion levels over time. In doing so it depicts a dramatic increase in EU cohesion levels following the end of the Cold War – at a time when cohesion levels for all other regional and politically affiliated groups temporarily plummet (see Appendix 5.1. and Figure 5.8.). This sudden rise in EU cohesion levels provides a very strong indication of intra-EU dialogue especially as it takes place in the immediate run-up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which, as discussed in chapter 3,

requires the member states to coordinate their positions in international organisations including the United Nations.

Within-Resolution Movement: Collective Change

In order to explain collective change, I must first introduce the concept of repeat resolutions. Repeat resolutions are resolutions that after appearing during one session re-appear during subsequent sessions. They are easily identified because in case of a repeat resolution each individual resolution refers to its predecessor(s) (Voeten, 2004, p. 734). Many appear for all years under consideration, some for less. All in all, 758 of the 821 resolutions in this study are repeat resolutions. They can be grouped into 123 individual strings of repeat resolutions. Repeat resolutions are useful for observing within-resolution movement. Within-resolution movement essentially refers to any type of change in EU cohesion levels over time with reference to the same resolution (repeat resolutions). This could, for instance, mean an increase in cohesion levels or a decrease in cohesion levels. One particular type of within-resolution movement is highly indicative of intra-EU dialogue. This is collective change. Collective change takes place when the EU membership in its entirety votes one way in a certain year and on the same resolution votes another way the following year.

The resolution entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” shall serve as an example. A version of this resolution appeared in each of the annual UNGA sessions between the 47th session and the 58th session (A/RES/47/51; A/RES/48/74A; A/RES/49/74; A/RES/50/69; A/RES/51/44; A/RES/52/37; A/RES/53/76; A/RES/54/53; A/RES/55/32; ARES/56/23; A/RES/57/57; A/RES/58/36). The EU member states, without fail, cast a unified vote with regards to these resolutions. Although not part of

the dataset, Austria, Sweden and Finland cast votes identical to those of the EU member states for the three years prior to the 1995 enlargement. The collective vote cast by the member states changed twice during the time period under consideration. The member states support the resolution during the first three sessions (47th-49th session), subsequently abstained for 3 years (50th session-52nd session) before returning to their support of the resolution for the remainder of the time period under consideration (53rd session-58th session).

The difference between A/RES/49/74 (full support) and A/RES/50/69 (full abstention) is a matter of language: In the former, the resolution “requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space”. In the latter, language is stronger. Here the General Assembly “regrets the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1995” and “requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1996 and to consider the question of preventing an arms race in outer space”. It is thus not surprising that the member states switched from fully supporting the resolution, to merely abstaining from voting on it. No such linguistic difference can be observed between A/RES/52/37 (full abstention) and A/RES/53/76 (full support). This then highlights a second aspect concerning UNGA voting. Aside from the content of a resolution or the language used in a resolution, sometimes member states in their votes react to resolution sponsorship. That is to say, they might reject a resolution neither for content nor for language but simply because they disagree with the sponsor of the resolution (Official #7, 18 November 2008; Official #20, 6 November 2008).

23% of the repeat resolution groups have been subject to at least one collective change, tallying a total of 32 individual swaps. Figure 5.6 illustrates the distribution across issue area. Almost half of them have occurred for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with human rights and disarmament taking another 25%. Sovereignty, decolonisation and peace and security take the rest of the share. Generally, repeat resolutions tend to be fairly constant over time. For fear of losing support, any changes made by the resolution sponsor are generally minimal (with co-sponsors allowed input).




Figure 5.6: 'Collective Change' Resolutions across Issue Area

5.2.2 Independence of EU Cohesion Levels

The preceding paragraphs illustrate that EU cohesion levels are high inside the UNGA. The dramatic increase in vote coordination around 1992 and the occurrences of collective change for some of the repeat resolutions furthermore strongly point

towards intra-EU dialogue. Nevertheless, in order to instil more confidence in these findings, they must be contextualised and be made subject to additional scrutiny. A circumstance in which EU cohesion simply were a function of the vote cohesion of larger groups inside the UNGA, for instance, would call into question the justification of analysing EU cohesion inside the UNGA. Despite the fact that existing research already suggests that EU unity might be changing rather independently of the overall UNGA climate (Foot, 1979, p. 352); to make sure that this is the case, I set out to compare EU cohesion levels to those of the UNGA in general and more specifically to the cohesion levels obtained by the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).

Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with UNGA Cohesion Levels

If the patterns of EU cohesion levels were to be very similar to those of the UNGA in general, it would simply be more difficult to interpret any changes in EU cohesion as indicative of intra-EU dialogue. If, for instance, UNGA cohesion in general rose sharply between 1990 and 1992, it would be more difficult to argue that such an increase is linked to the run-up to Maastricht. Alternative explanations would have to be sought.

Figure 5.7 compares EU cohesion levels with UNGA cohesion levels over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion index. “EU12/EU15” depicts average EU cohesion levels calculated for each individual session between 1987 and 2005. “UNGA” depicts average UNGA cohesion levels calculated for each individual session between 1987 and 2005. The two vertical lines at $x = 47$ and $x = 58$ indicate respectively the beginning and end of the time period under consideration in this dissertation.




Figure 5.7: Comparison between Average EU and UNGA Cohesion Levels over Time

Initially, between the 42nd and 45th sessions, EU cohesion levels are a function of UNGA cohesion levels. Their voting patterns run largely parallel to each other, with UNGA cohesion levels consistently higher than those of the EU member states. By the 47th session, the picture has changed. Not only has EU cohesion surpassed UNGA cohesion, but at a point when UNGA cohesion declines sharply, EU cohesion rises sharply. The wide margin between the cohesion levels of these two groups remains intact for the rest of the period under consideration, with EU voting patterns running a much smoother course than those of the UNGA in general. Based on these results, it can thus be assumed that for the time period under consideration EU cohesion levels are not a function of UNGA cohesion levels beyond what must be expected. The results are in fact confirmed by the multivariate analysis carried out in this chapter.

Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with Cohesion Levels of Regional Groups

Many “pre-voting consultations” in the UNGA “take place in group meetings”(Baehr & Gordenker, 2005, p. 49). And although “these groups or caucuses are not mentioned in the charter and have no official status [...], they are of crucial importance to the decision making process” (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005, p. 49). Two types of groups exist in the UNGA. These are geographical or regional groups on the one hand, and groups based on political affinity on the other hand. Of direct relevance to the thesis is the voting behaviour of regional groups. Details comparing EU cohesion with the cohesion levels of other groups based on political affinity can be found in Appendix 5.1. The main geographical or regional groups are the Asian Group, the African Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group, the Western European and Others Group as well as the Eastern European Group (Eye on the UN, 2008). Of particular relevance to this study is the comparison between EU cohesion levels and cohesion levels of the WEOG. The following countries make up the WEOG: Andorra, Australia, **Austria**, **Belgium**, Canada, **Denmark**, **Finland**, **France**, **Germany**, **Greece**, Iceland, **Ireland**, **Italy**, Liechtenstein, **Luxembourg**, Malta, Monaco, **Netherlands**, New Zealand, Norway, **Portugal**, San Marino, **Spain**, **Sweden**, Switzerland, Turkey, **United Kingdom**. Although the United States is not officially in WEOG, for all practical purposes it is a full member (Eye on the UN, 2008). All EU member states are part of WEOG and constitute approximately 52% of its membership.

In order to justify analysing EU cohesion inside the UNGA, one would expect that EU cohesion levels are not a function of WEOG cohesion levels beyond what is to be expected. Given that at 52%, EU member states constitute a significant part of the

WEOG, a certain amount of correlation in vote cohesion is to be expected. Nevertheless, a distinct similarity of voting patterns beyond what is to be expected would make it difficult to trace any changes in EU cohesion levels back to factors solely connected to the EU. Thus, here we are looking for cohesion levels that higher (rather than identical or lower) compared to WEOG cohesion.

Figure 5.8 compares EU cohesion levels to the cohesion levels of other regional groups over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion index. The two vertical lines at $x = 47$ and $x = 58$ indicate respectively the beginning and end of the time period under consideration in this dissertation. Average cohesion levels between the 42nd and 60th session are depicted for the following regional groups: WEOG, Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Average cohesion levels for the same time period are also depicted for “EU12/EU15”.




Figure 5.8: Regional Comparison of Average Cohesion Levels over Time

The main focus here is the comparison between the voting patterns of the EU member states with the voting patterns of the WEOG. Due to the fact that the EU member states constitute a large section of the WEOG, it is hardly surprising that the voting patterns for EU and WEOG run largely parallel to each other. However, it should be noted that EU cohesion levels are consistently higher than those obtained by the larger regional WEOG, which indicates that those member states which belong to the EU and the WEOG vote more in unison than those only belonging to the WEOG, lending further justification to studying EU cohesion in the UNGA.

Comparing EU and WEOG cohesion levels to cohesion levels of other regional groups, it transpires that following the end of the Cold War, all regional groups enter some sort of temporary freefall, while the WEOG and EU are able to increase their cohesion levels dramatically in the run-up to Maastricht. Another not entirely surprising observation is that prior to the end of the Cold War the member states of the Eastern European group display the highest levels of cohesion, then dropping to the lowest cohesion levels immediately thereafter before aligning themselves more closely with EU and WEOG voting behaviour in the run-up to the 2004 Eastern Enlargement (see Johansson-Nogues, 2004). Based on these results, it can thus be assumed that for the time period under consideration EU cohesion levels are not a function of WEOG cohesion levels beyond what must be expected.

5.3 Transatlantic Relationship in the UNGA

Because the US is one of the key players in the international system and is considered a genuine transatlantic partner, it is not inconceivable that the positions upheld by the US in some ways influence the voting behaviour of the EU member states. In

anticipation of the logistic regression carried out in the next section, I set out to use the current section to shed more light in general terms on the transatlantic relationship inside the UNGA. In order to gain a better understanding of how special the transatlantic relationship is, I set out to examine to what extent the transatlantic partners speak with the same voice in the UNGA and further to contextualise the transatlantic partnership by comparing the voting behaviour of the transatlantic partners with that of several other countries. I shall further test if EU disagreement increases in face of transatlantic divergence.

The transatlantic partners do not coordinate their UNGA votes in any systematic manner. That is to say, the transatlantic partners do not meet on a regular basis to discuss their voting behaviour on up-coming resolutions. In fact the US may not engage in any sort of coordination efforts as regards General Assembly roll-call voting. But, the EU member states (and for that matter the rest of the UN membership) are aware of how the US intends to vote. That is so for several reasons. One, due to the cyclical nature of the UNGA, where many resolutions are in fact so-called repeat resolution, experience shows that a country's voting behaviour on resolutions that have been tabled before is likely to be the same. This is true for many if not all countries, not just the US. Two, the United States specifically, has adopted a practise whereby each year identifies a set of resolutions that it considers important and lobbies extensively for all those resolutions that deal with "issues which directly [affect] important United States interests" ("Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991: Annual Report to Congress on Voting Practices at the United Nations", 1992). As already highlighted in the previous chapter, it subsequently lists these resolutions in an annual report to Congress which then is published on the website of the State Department

(US Department of State, 2008). Lobbying for these resolutions may inter alia involve sending demarches to other countries (Official #22, 2 October 2008; Official #28, 8 October 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008). Three, in some areas, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US position is so set, it may as well be written in stone. As one EU member state official says:

“For those resolutions there is no necessity for a transatlantic dialogue since the US is in a world of its own and away from all reality. The perception is such that any change in the US position must be preceded by a change in Israel’s position first.” (Official #21, 20 November 2008)

The Transatlantic Partnership in Voting Records

The voting records of the transatlantic partners are illustrated in tables 5.1 to 5.3.

Transatlantic convergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the EU majority position are identical. Transatlantic divergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the majority of the EU member states cast different votes. Fully Cohesive Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states speak with a single voice. Split Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states do not speak with a single voice.

As illustrated in Table 5.1, the transatlantic partners disagree more often in the UNGA than they agree. The EU member states speak with a single voice in the forum slightly more often in face of transatlantic divergence compared to transatlantic convergence. As Kissinger (1966) pointed out, “in many respects [European unity] may magnify rather than reduce [Atlantic disagreements]”(p. 232). However, they also disagree more often in face of transatlantic divergence compared to transatlantic convergence.

| All Resolutions | Fully Cohesive vote | Split Vote | Total |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------------|-------|
| Transatlantic Convergence | 284 | 69 | 353 |
| Transatlantic Divergence | 313 | 155 | 468 |
| Total | 597 | 224 | 821 |

Table 5.1: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes

Both, the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as military resolutions make up a fair proportion of the overall number of resolutions considered as part of this analysis. By considering resolutions pertaining to either topic separately the overall impression of the transatlantic relationship inside UNGA changes somewhat.³⁵ It becomes evident that of the originally 313 resolutions for which the EU member states speak with a single voice in face of transatlantic divergence, more than two-thirds deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is not entirely surprising. Looking ahead to chapter 7, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a well-known bone of contention between the transatlantic partners. Further noteworthy is the extremely small number of split votes in this issue area more generally. In fact, EU member states cast diverging votes less than 10% of the time for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict.

| Arab/Israeli Conflict Resolutions | Fully Cohesive vote | Split Vote | Total |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------|-------|
| Transatlantic Convergence | 28 | 1 | 29 |
| Transatlantic Divergence | 218 | 20 | 238 |
| Total | 246 | 21 | 267 |

Table 5.2: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes – Arab/Israeli Conflict

³⁵ Resolutions pertaining to the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as those dealing with military issues are furthermore selected as case studies for the qualitative analysis. The reasons for this selection are explained in more detail in chapter 7. However, because they are selected as case studies in chapter 7, I thought it useful to isolate them, where appropriate and relevant, as part of the quantitative analysis.

As already mentioned, military resolutions also make up a fair share of the overall number of resolutions. Interestingly, more than 40% of all split votes occur for resolutions pertaining to military issues. Slightly more than half of the time that the member states disagree with each other on military resolutions, the majority of them also disagrees with the US.

| Military Resolutions | Fully Cohesive vote | Split Vote | Total |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|------------|-------|
| Transatlantic Convergence | 109 | 41 | 150 |
| Transatlantic Divergence | 29 | 53 | 82 |
| Total | 138 | 94 | 232 |

Table 5.3: Comparison Transatlantic Votes – Military Resolutions

Overall then, it can be said that the bulk of transatlantic disagreement lies with resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, even if one disregarded those resolutions, for the time period under consideration the transatlantic partners still disagree almost nearly as much as they agree (230 to 324 resolutions). Although it has to be pointed out that much of the time they disagree with the US, they also disagree with each other.

Contextualising the Transatlantic Partnership

By comparing the transatlantic voting pattern to that of other voting dyads in the UNGA, the extent of the transatlantic partnership in terms of UNGA voting behaviour can be contextualised. Undoubtedly, several UN member states would make likely candidates for such a comparison. For fear of an excessively arbitrary selection, I limit myself to the permanent member states of the UNSC. Shifting the focus to a

comparison between the EU voting position and other countries, I've opted to replace France and UK with the EU majority position.

In order to measure the voting distance of the dyads, I employ Gartzke's (2006) index of affinity scores. These are calculated with help of a formula developed by Signorino and Ritter (1999) who call them similarity scores. Signorino and Ritter (1999) calculate the voting distance between two countries by year. The voting distance between two countries could also be calculated for longer/shorter time periods as well as for issue areas. Per resolution, each member state receives a code for whichever vote it casts; a 1 for "no", a 2 for "abstain" and a 3 for a "yes". The distance between them is calculated in absolute terms. The maximum distance between two countries per resolution is 2, since if they are diametrically opposed one would receive a 1 and the other one would receive a 3. All resolutions are weighted equally. The weight for the individual resolution is calculated as an average of all resolutions considered per year.

The distance d is calculated as follows:

$$d = \text{weight} / \text{max distance} * (|\text{vote}(a) - \text{vote}(b)|)$$

The similarity score S , of which the distance d is an integral part of, is calculated as follows:

$$S = 1 - 2 * (d) / \text{max distance}$$

The result is a continuous variable which can range between (-1), indicating least similar voting record and (1) indicating identical voting record. The voting affinity between the resulting six dyads is presented in Figure 5.9. The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents Gartzke's affinity index. The various dyads illustrate how similarly its members vote in the UNGA on average each session.




Figure 5.9: UNGA Voting Affinity of Selected Dyads

In the affinity index the value of zero represents a threshold, whereby scores above zero indicate on average a more similar voting pattern and scores below zero indicate on average a more dissimilar voting pattern between the partners. With reference Figure 5.9, only dyads that include the US exhibit scores below zero, either consistently (as with China), with strong tendency (as with Russia) or intermittently (as with the EU). Of all possible dyads, the US and China exhibit the least similar voting patterns, followed by the US and Russia. The EU is the voting partner most closely aligned with the US, although in the 50th session (1995), the US voting record is as similar to that of

the EU as it is to that of Russia. In 2002 and 2003, the transatlantic partners on average cast more dissimilar votes than similar votes.

The EU, on the other hand, exhibits a voting pattern that is more similar to that of Russia and China, than to that of the US. Indeed, while from the US perspective the EU exhibits the most similar voting pattern, from the EU perspective, the US exhibits the least similar voting pattern. That indicates that the US is the odd one out. Having said this, as is illustrated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the Arab Israeli conflict, a major sticking point between the transatlantic partners, makes up about half of all the transatlantic divergent resolutions and is included in the calculations.

EU Support for Resolutions Considered Important by the US

The above paragraphs show that the transatlantic partners disagree more often than they agree inside the UNGA. They also indicate that the EU voting behaviour is more compatible with the votes cast by Russia and China than with the votes cast by the US. It is the purpose of this section to further scrutinise the proclaimed specialness of the transatlantic relationship further by examining EU voting behaviour for those resolutions considered important by the US. As already elaborated on in chapter 4 and in the beginning paragraphs of this chapter, for the time period under consideration, there are 150 resolutions which the US considers highly important and for which it lobbies heavily. These are the focus of the current section. The question is, to what extent does the EU collectively stand behind the US on these?

The voting records of the transatlantic partners for these lobbied votes are illustrated in table 5.2. Transatlantic convergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the

EU majority position are identical. Transatlantic divergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the majority of the EU member states cast different votes. Fully Cohesive Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states speak with a single voice. Split Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states do not speak with a single voice. The final column depicts the average cohesion levels for all resolutions falling under transatlantic convergence and for all resolutions falling under transatlantic divergence separately.

| | Fully Cohesive Votes | Split Votes | Total | Average EU cohesion |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-------|---------------------|
| Transatlantic Convergence | 86 | 10 | 96 | 0.98 |
| Transatlantic Divergence | 38 | 16 | 54 | 0.91 |
| Total | 124 | 26 | 150 | |

Table 5.4: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes – Resolutions Considered Important by the US

As opposed to the overall picture provided in the previous section, for those resolutions deemed important by the US, the transatlantic partners agree roughly twice as many times as they disagree. Nevertheless, in a quarter of all resolutions, the EU member states collectively oppose the US position.

5.4 Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate model employed in the present chapter estimates the impact of an array of factors on the likelihood that EU member states achieve full cohesion on the resolutions tabled for a vote. As already discussed in chapter 4, despite the fact that the variable EU cohesion index is measured in continuous terms, I choose not to

employ OLS. Instead, I transform the continuous variable into a binary variable and employ binary logistic regression. I include two fixed effects (year and issue area each included separately and then combined) in the models. Taken all this into consideration, I develop 4 variations of the same basic model. The results, including post estimation statistics can be found in Appendix 5.1.

The Multivariate Model

I chose one of the models (Model 4 in Appendix 5.1) for further analysis and interpretation in the chapter. In addition to control variables, the model includes state-focused factors, institutional factors as well as external factors. In terms of state-focused factors, each model includes a measure of issue salience. No measure of power is included in the system-level analysis, since the variable power is measured by individual member states and thus only applicable to the individual-level analysis. In terms of institutional factors, the model includes measures of institutional pressures (relevant CFSP position in place, EU collectively sponsors resolution). The model does not include measures of institutional dedication (degree of voluntary integration, EU net-beneficiary, and degree of negative opinion about the EU), since, again, these are only applicable for individual-level analysis. Also included is a measure to account for the degree of transatlantic divergence (that is to say, for the distance between the EU majority vote and the US vote). Additionally, a measure of UN cohesion has been included in the analysis, mainly to determine whether or not any level of EU cohesion is a function of UN cohesion. Finally, year fixed effects as well as issue area fixed effects are incorporated as well.

| Dependent Variable: Perfect EU Vote Cohesion | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| State Focused Factors | | |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | 0.608 (0.168)*** |
| Institutional Factors | | |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1.283 (0.435)*** |
| | Collective EU sponsorship | 0.300 (0.357) |
| External Factors | | |
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | -2.209 (0.294)*** |
| Control Variables | UN Cohesion | 2.475 (1.994) |
| Constant | | |
| | | -1.315 (1.856) |
| Fixed Effects | | |
| | Issue Area | Yes*** |
| | Year | Yes* |
| Model Specifications | | |
| | Observations | 505 |
| | Pseudo R2 | 0.3 |
| | Wald chi2 | (23) 125.6 |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 |

Table 5.5: Logistic Regression – Determinants of ‘Perfect EU Vote Cohesion’

The model is statistically significant. The only state-focused factor included in the analysis is issue salience. The results indicate a positive relationship between how salient an issue is perceived on average by the member states and the likelihood that they achieve full cohesion on that particular resolution. These results appear to be contrary to the supposition made in chapter 3, where I hypothesised that the more salient an EU member state perceives an issue to be the less susceptible it is to vote

coordination pressures and the less likely it is to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour. However, given the problematic conceptional set-up of the variable salience, also discussed in chapter 3, the results are in fact non-conclusive.³⁶ Without knowing a country's national policy preference, it is impossible to determine whether the member states happen to share the same policy preferences as regards issues they consider salient, or alternatively whether the member states prefer a cohesive vote on an issue they perceive as salient, even if it means overriding one's national policy preference. Any results must therefore be interpreted with caution and should be considered in conjunction with the results of the individual-level analysis conducted in chapter 6.

Of the institutional pressures, only the existence of a relevant CFSP position increases the likelihood of the EU speaking with one voice in the UNGA at a statistically significant level. This is an interesting finding in as far as one could argue that rather than the binding nature of an existing and relevant CFSP position causing the member states to speak with a single voice in the General Assembly, it is the fact that an existing CFSP position (which in most cases is agreed unanimously) illustrates already existing agreement between the member states on that particular issue. While the latter may certainly be an appealing explanation at first sight, there are several aspects which point into the direction of the former (binding nature of existing and relevant CFSP position). In those instances in which there are corresponding UNGA resolutions and CFSP positions, it cannot be said that they are in fact identical. CFSP positions are generally phrased in much broader terms than respective UNGA resolutions. Because it is the EU member states drafting their CFSP positions, they are able to draft them in a

³⁶ The problematic conceptional set-up of this discussed in chapter 3.3.

way so as to ensure everybody's consent. Most UNGA resolutions are not (co)sponsored by the EU member states. That is to say, they do not have an automatic input on the text. Because these UNGA resolutions are narrower and EU member states usually do not have an opportunity help draft the text, it is not only feasible but also likely, that these resolutions include aspects that the member states do not agree on. Hence agreement in a relevant CFSP position does not automatically translate into shared views on a corresponding UNGA resolution. Still, EU cohesion levels are higher when relevant CFSP positions are in place. The conclusion that this is the case because of their binding nature has been corroborated during the interviews undertaken with EU diplomats at the UN as part of this study. They highlight that EU member states are remarkably aware of existing CFSP positions and that they are expected to speak with a single voice on issues on which CFSP positions exist.³⁷

Collective EU sponsorship, while positive, is not a statistically significant indicator of EU cohesion. Even though one EU official pointed out to me that generally speaking the EU member states tend to speak with one voice when they collectively sponsor a resolution (Official #15, 7 October 2008), resolution sponsorship generally does not seem to be playing as much of a role. In fact, EU member states very rarely sponsor or co-sponsor a resolution – individually or collectively. Collectively, they sponsor or co-sponsor only 12% of all resolutions considered in this study. Furthermore, the ratio between split votes and fully cohesive votes is approximately the same for collectively sponsored resolutions and for those resolutions which have not been sponsored. Seen in this context, the findings are not surprising.

³⁷ This particular aspect is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.5.

As regards the transatlantic relationship, the results seem to indicate that transatlantic divergence generally decreases the likelihood of perfect EU cohesion at a statistically significant level. However, this does not necessarily mean that transatlantic divergence causes a decrease in EU cohesion. Transatlantic divergence might simply be an indicator for resolutions that also tend to be controversial among the EU member states. Finally, the relationship between EU cohesion and UN cohesion is not statistically significant, which seems to confirm that EU cohesion is not a function of UN cohesion.

Further Interpretation Using CLARIFY

A few of the variables have proven to be robust across the entire range of models and will be subject to further scrutiny and interpretation. In doing so, I shall employ the methodological tool CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003). The variables of particular interest are whether or not a relevant CFSP position exists and transatlantic divergence. Although issue salience also yielded statistically significant results, I opt to exclude it from further analysis on the grounds of its difficult conceptional set-up. Two baseline models are presented. One model predicts the likelihood of perfect EU cohesion for nuclear issues for the year 1997, while a second model predicts the likelihood of perfect EU cohesion for Arab/Israeli issues for the year 1997. In the baseline model all continuous variables are set to their mean and all other variables are set to their minimum. CFSP position and Transatlantic Divergence are set to the value of 0. That is to say, no relevant CFSP position is in place and the US voting position is identical to that of the EU majority position. Even for the baseline models, one immediately notices the near certainty in reaching full EU cohesion for resolutions pertaining to Arab Israeli conflict. Further, for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli

conflict, transatlantic divergence only marginally decreases the likelihood of obtaining a fully cohesive vote.³⁸ The picture is slightly more varied for nuclear issues. The probability of reaching full EU cohesion for the baseline model is 0.784. Reaching full EU cohesion becomes roughly 1.2 times more likely when a relevant CFSP position is in place. Conversely, in instances of transatlantic divergence, EU cohesion is more than two times less likely. However, as discussed in the above paragraphs, transatlantic divergence may not be the cause, but could simply be indicative of generally controversial issues

³⁸ This observation is corroborated by interview material.

| Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Arab/Israeli Issues, 1997 | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------|
| | | Baseline Model Probability | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
| Institutional Pressure | CFSP position in place | 0.985 | 0.997 | 0.993 | 0.999 |
| External Factors | Transatlantic Divergence | 0.985 | 0.928 | 0.861 | 0.968 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for all other variables. | | | | | |

Table 5.6: Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Arab/Israeli Issues, 1997

| Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Nuclear Issues, 1997 | | Baseline Model Probability | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------|
| Institutional Pressure | CFSP position in place | 0.784 | 0.925 | 0.810 | 0.979 |
| External Factors | Transatlantic Divergence | 0.784 | 0.337 | 0.154 | 0.562 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for all other variables. | | | | | |

Table 5.7: Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Nuclear Issues, 1997

5.5 Conclusion

In chapter 5 I set out to examine the EU member states' voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly from a system-level perspective. To that end I illustrated that despite some variation over time and across issue area, EU cohesion levels are generally high. In fact, the vast majority of all roll-call votes yield perfect cohesion levels. This circumstance led me to opt for binary logistic regression instead of OLS regression as part of the multivariate analysis later on in the chapter.

Prior to that I highlighted voting patterns that strongly support the claim that EU member states intend to coordinate their votes inside the UNGA. Voting patterns indicative of intra-EU dialogue include a sudden rise in EU cohesion levels in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty as well as instances of collective change, whereby member states uniformly adjust their positions for repeat resolutions. I also illustrated that EU cohesion levels stand on their own and are not a function of the cohesion levels of other regional groups or that of the UN at large beyond what is to be expected.

An entire section was dedicated to the close scrutiny of the transatlantic relationship. By contextualising the transatlantic relationship and comparing voting patterns of the transatlantic partners to that of several other countries, it emerged that far from a special relationship, the EU exhibits voting patterns more similar to Russia and China than to the US. Furthermore, for a quarter of resolutions explicitly considered important by the US, the EU collectively opposes the US vote. Having said this, the chapter has also highlighted that the Arab-Israeli issues is a particular bone of contention between the transatlantic partners.

The multivariate analysis has produced some interesting findings. As hypothesised, a strong positive link is present between existing and relevant CFSP positions and EU cohesion in the General Assembly. Importantly, the analysis has confirmed that EU cohesion levels inside the UNGA are in fact not a function of UNGA cohesion. While perceived issue salience as well as transatlantic divergence both produce statistically significant results, for both it is difficult to unambiguously interpret the results and both will benefit from further scrutiny in the subsequent chapter where EU member states' voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly are examined from an individual-level perspective.

5.6 Appendices


Appendix 5A: Models Including Postestimation Results

| Determinants of Perfect EU Cohesion | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|
| | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| State Focused Factors | | | | | |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | 0.635 (0.128)*** | 0.693 (0.129)*** | 0.586 (0.163)*** | 0.608 (0.168)*** |
| Institutional Factors | | | | | |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1.511 (0.364)*** | 1.695 (0.384)*** | 0.976 (0.4)** | 1.283 (0.435)*** |
| | Collective EU sponsorship | 0.239 (0.3) | 0.318 (0.318) | 0.277 (0.334) | 0.300 (0.357) |
| External Factors | | | | | |
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | -1.586 (0.225)*** | -1.677 (0.242)*** | -2.083 (0.279)*** | -2.209 (0.294)*** |
| Control Variables | | | | | |
| | UN Cohesion | 2.352 (1.438) | 2.669 (1.588) | 2.407 (1.77) | 2.475 (1.994) |

| Table 1. Logistic regression results for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the use of digital technologies in the retail sector | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| Dependent Variable | | Logistic Regression Coefficients (Odds Ratios) | | | |
| Issue Area | | Year | | | |
| Fixed Effects | Constant | -1.645 (1.308) | -1.590 (1.46) | -1.960 (1.629) | -1.315 (1.856) |
| | Issue Area | | | Yes*** | Yes*** |
| | Year | | Yes** | | Yes* |
| | Model Specifications | Observations | 516 | 516 | 505 |
| | Pseudo R2 | 0.207 | 0.246 | 0.267 | 0.3 |
| | Wald chi2 | (6)98.190 | (17) 108.9 | (12) 108.76 | (23) 125.6 |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Post-estimation Statistics | Linktest | 0.451 | 0.292 | 0.61 | 0.613 |
| | Lfit | 0.0007 | 0.2462 | 0.3343 | 0.1542 |
| | Lroc | 0.8035 | 0.8194 | 0.828 | 0.8493 |
| | Mean VIF | 1.17 | 1.53 | 1.65 | 1.72 |

Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levels: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 5

Appendix 5B: Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with Cohesion Levels of Politically Affiliated Groups



CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS II: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

In chapter 5, I illustrated that EU member states are by and large successfully able to coordinate their voting positions inside the United Nations General Assembly. Cohesion levels are generally high and the voting patterns observed are indicative of intra-EU dialogue. Moreover, several of the factors that were hypothesised to influence whether or not the EU member states speak with a single voice in the General Assembly performed as expected during multivariate analysis and EU cohesion levels varied accordingly.

In chapter 6 I set out to examine the EU member states' voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly from an individual-level perspective. That is to say the focus of this chapter is on the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states with reference to the overall EU position. The quantitative analysis begins with an instructive breakdown of individual votes cast over time and across issue areas, before illustrating how heterogeneous policy preferences play into the voting behaviour of the member states. This is followed by an attempt to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United Nations General Assembly, in particular with reference to the votes cast by the US. As part of the subsequent inferential statistical analysis, I employ logistic regression to gauge the likelihood of a member state defecting from the EU majority position considering an array of state-focused factors, institutionalised pressures, and under certain circumstances, the position upheld by the US.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided into five sections. I shall inspect the voting behaviour of the individual member states in more detail in section 6.1, focusing on vote defections more generally and isolated votes in particular. Comparisons are made over time and across issue area. In section 6.2, I set out to identify patterns in the voting behaviour of the member states that strongly point towards heterogeneous policy preferences. Ahead of the multivariate analysis in section 6.4, I shall use section 6.3 to analyse the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states with reference to the US. Finally, a brief conclusion to the chapter will be provided in section 6.5.

6.1 UNGA Vote Defections by EU Member States

Of the 821 resolutions put to the vote before the United Nations General Assembly between 1992 and 2003 (47th session to 58th session), the EU member states voted in unison for 597 of the resolutions. For the remaining 224 resolutions, the member states did not vote in unison. Because in this chapter the focus is on how each country votes for each resolution, the dataset contains a total of 11647 observations (number of resolutions x country x year)

Vote Defection per Country over Time

In this section I investigate vote defections per country over time more generally before focusing on isolated votes in particular. As illustrated in table 6.1, over the twelve-year time period, the 224 split votes led to a total of 643 individual vote defections. France and the UK have incurred the majority of the vote defections and together account for approximately 37% of all of them. Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg each have incurred less than 20 vote defections and together account for less than 6% of all vote defections. Despite a one year hiatus, at 50 vote defections, Greece's vote

defection record is still above the average. Despite a three year hiatus, Austria's and Sweden's vote defection record is at the median level and above the median level respectively. While almost half of the member states have years in which they do not defect from the EU majority vote at all (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands), each EU member state has defected from the position held by the majority of the member states at some point or another. Generally speaking, vote defections are most prevalent during the early years under consideration, decrease by nearly half by 1998 and abruptly rise again towards the end of the time period under consideration. In 2003 they in fact surpass early year figures.³⁹

Isolated Votes per Country over Time

As is illustrated in table 6.2, in 44 of the 224 resolutions for which EU member states do not speak with a single voice, isolated voting behaviour takes place. That count includes non-participations. That is to say, in 44 instances one EU member state either does not participate in the roll-call vote at all or votes alone against the EU majority. If non-participations are disregarded, there are still thirty instances in which one member state or another votes alone against the EU majority. Most of the isolated votes are incurred by the UK, France and Ireland, while Belgium, Finland and Italy do not incur any. If non-participations are discounted, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria also never vote in isolation. While at least one isolated vote is cast in each year under observation, their occurrence is more prevalent during the early years. During the last years under observation the occurrence of isolated votes has approximately halved. And as opposed to vote defections more generally, the number of isolated votes do not increase again during the 2002 and 2003 sessions.

³⁹ The voting behaviour of the three countries joining the EU in 1995 (i.e. Sweden, Finland and Austria) is illustrated separately in the Appendix 6.2.

| Vote Defections per Country over Time | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Country | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | Total |
| Austria | n/a | n/a | n/a | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 31 |
| Belgium | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| Denmark | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 24 |
| Finland | n/a | n/a | n/a | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 22 |
| France | 8 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 119 |
| Germany | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 22 |
| Greece | 13 | 12 | 5 | 7 | n/a | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 50 |
| Ireland | 11 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 75 |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 13 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 20 |
| Portugal | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 34 |
| Spain | 12 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 55 |
| Sweden | n/a | n/a | n/a | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 37 |
| UK | 12 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 13 | 117 |
| Total | 67 | 70 | 50 | 52 | 55 | 49 | 34 | 44 | 40 | 43 | 65 | 74 | 643 |

Table 6.1: Vote Defections per Country over Time

| Isolated Votes per Country over Time | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------|
| Country | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | Total | NP* |
| Austria | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Denmark | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Finland | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4 |
| Germany | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 |
| Greece | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Ireland | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Spain | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Sweden | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| UK | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 1 |
| Total | 8 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 44 | 14 |
| <i>*NP = not participated in roll-call vote</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6.2: Isolated Votes per Country over Time

Vote Defection per Country across Issue Area

In this section I investigate vote defections per country across issue area more generally before focusing on isolated votes in particular. Table 6.3 tabulates instances of vote defection across issue area. The 643 individual vote defections do not spread evenly across issue areas. Most vote defections occur for resolutions pertaining to nuclear issues and decolonisation, followed by a middle-group consisting of resolutions that deal with sovereignty and self-determination, mercenary issues, disarmament, peace and security and the Arab Israeli conflict. Resolutions pertaining to internationalism, human rights and democracy incur fewer vote defections still.

Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area

Although resolutions pertaining to human rights and internationalism by far do not incur the most vote defections, along with nuclear issues they incur most of the isolated votes. And while resolutions dealing with mercenaries issues draw much of the vote defections, they incur not a single isolated vote. Unsurprisingly then, the UK and France are the two most confrontation-prone countries followed by Ireland as distant second. And while Spain and Greece both incur above average vote defections, especially Spain does not match that voting behaviour with isolated votes. Also unsurprisingly, resolutions dealing with decolonisation and sovereignty and self-determination as well as those dealing with various aspects of military issues incur most of the vote defections. These are also the issue which, among others, incur the majority of the isolated votes.

Vote Defections per Country across Issue Area

| | AT | BE | DK | FI | FR | DE | EL | IE | IT | LU | NL | PT | ES | SE | UK | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Decolonisation | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 19 | 6 | 9 | 11 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 1 | 24 | 112 |
| Peace/ Security | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 12 | 50 |
| Democratisation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Human Rights | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 27 |
| Internationalism | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 38 |
| Sovereignty/Self-determination | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 19 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 19 | 65 |
| Arab-Israeli Conflict | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 0 | 6 | 50 |
| Disarmament | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 52 |
| Mercenary | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 11 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 61 |
| Nuclear | 22 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 31 | 4 | 5 | 33 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 28 | 31 | 187 |
| Total | 31 | 11 | 24 | 22 | 119 | 22 | 50 | 75 | 13 | 13 | 20 | 34 | 55 | 37 | 117 | 643 |

Table 6.3: Vote Defections per Country across Issue Area

Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area

| | AT | BE | DK | FI | FR | DE | EL | IE | IT | LU | NL | PT | ES | SE | UK | Total |
|---------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Decolonisation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| Peace/ Security | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Democratisation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Human Rights | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Internationalism | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 8 |
| Sovereignty/Self-determination | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Arab-Israeli Conflict | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Disarmament | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Mercenary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nuclear | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 |
| Total | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 44 |
| <i>NP*</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>0</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>14</i> |

**NP = not participated in roll-call vote*

Table 6.4: Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area

6.2 Policy Preference Heterogeneity

In chapter 3 I argued that EU member states intend to coordinate their votes inside the UNGA despite holding heterogeneous policy preferences. I further pointed out that for those resolutions for which the member states vote in unison, it is impossible to detect whether they do so because they hold homogeneous policy preferences or despite the fact that they have heterogeneous policy preferences. However, resolutions for which EU member states do not cast their votes in unison, in and of themselves, are indicative of heterogeneous policy preferences. Looking ahead to chapter 7, it has been suggested during the expert interviews that while EU member states do not easily break EU cohesion; once the EU is split, member states are quite happy to vote according to their individual policy preferences – which may or may not overlap (Official #32, 4 December 2008).

It is not unreasonable to assume that heterogeneous policy preferences exist between the EU member states. As already highlighted in chapter 3, despite the many similarities between the advanced societies of the European Union and the notion of liberal democracy presenting a “strong unifying link between the members of the European Union, [...] there are substantial differences between [them]” (Athanasopoulou, 2008, p. xi; also see Doyle, 1983).

Socially Progressive/Conservative Countries

This notion is supported by Inglehart’s World Value Survey, designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern – from religion to politics to economic and social life (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The corresponding factor analysis puts the focus on two dimensions. The Traditional/Secular-rational

values dimension emphasises the contrast between societies where religion is very important and societies where religion is not so important. The Survival/Self-Expression values dimension emphasises the transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies.

Because the fifteen EU member states under analysis here are similarly advanced and tend to cluster together on the Survival/Self-Expression values dimension, of the two dimensions, the Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension plays the more important role in outlining possible differences between the EU member states. While some countries are more progressive, others may be deemed more conservative (Rees & Young, 2005). Of the countries in this thesis, the Inglehart Values Map categorises the Nordic countries as well as Germany and the Netherlands as socially progressive. The following countries are mapped as increasingly socially conservative: Greece, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, UK, Austria, Italy, and Spain.⁴⁰ Ireland is the most socially conservative country in the EU 15 (Inglehart, 2009).

Militarily Progressive/Conservative Countries

In addition to differences in their views on social issues, EU member states also differ in their views on military issues (Rummel, 1988, p. 118). They may be divided into militarily conservative and militarily progressive countries. The two nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom may be classified as militarily conservative, while the four neutral countries Finland, Austria, Ireland and Sweden may be classified as militarily progressive.

⁴⁰ Portugal is not listed in the map, but may also be deemed socially conservative.

As these illustrations highlight, “even if we limit ourselves to the national level of the [...] fifteen member states, Europe is characterised by the great diversity of its [...] national and state traditions” (Loughlin, 2008, p. 187). Based on its cultural traditions⁴¹ and historical ties, a nation’s political framework reflects that nation’s interpretation of the political, economic and fiscal currents of the time. And that is precisely the reason why policy preferences even between countries that share basic democratic values may differ (Kimmel, 1992, p. 26).

6.3 The Transatlantic Relationship in the UNGA

I illustrated in chapter 5, that there is more disagreement between the EU member states in instances of transatlantic divergence than in instances of transatlantic convergence. I further highlighted, that even for those resolutions considered important by the US, EU member states do not consistently support the US position.

The Bilateral Transatlantic Relationships in Voting Records

Taking a closer look at the voting behaviour of the individual member states, Figure 6.8 illustrates the voting position of individual EU member states with reference to the US position on the one hand and the EU majority position on the other hand. The voting distances are calculated from the perspective of the individual EU member states with references to the EU majority position (light) and with reference to the US position (dark). The closer a score is to (1) the smaller the distance between the dyad’s voting records (i.e. many identical votes). The closer the score to (-1), the bigger the distance between the dyad’s voting records (i.e. many directly opposing votes). Scores close to

⁴¹ “Culture is a system of attitudes, values and knowledge, widely shared within a society and may vary between societies.” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 18)

zero indicate that countries either agree as many times as they disagree or alternatively tend to only indirectly oppose each other (i.e. one party tends to abstain while the other either supports or rejects a resolution).

Even for the votes considered important by the US (the so-called lobbied votes), the voting records of the individual member states are generally more similar to that of the EU majority position than to that of the US. If we only look at the voting record distance to the US (the marks towards the centre of the chart), we find that of all the EU member states, the voting record of the UK is most similar to that of the US, followed by the three Nordic countries and Belgium, closely followed by France. Greece's voting record is the least similar to the US.⁴²




Figure 6.1: Average Voting Distance between EU and US

⁴² Please note that no voting records have been included for the 3 Nordic countries between 1992 and 1995 and for Greece during 1996.

6.4 Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate models employed in the present chapter estimate the impact of an array of factors on the likelihood that a member state defects from the EU majority position. I employ binary logistic regression. As illustrated in chapter 4, I measure the variable power in three different ways (one, as the member states' military expenditure; two, as their GDP; and three, as their allocated voting weights in the Council of Ministers). I further measure the variable Transatlantic Relationship in three different ways (one, in political terms; two, in cultural terms; and three in economic terms). And finally, I include two fixed effects (year and issue area each included separately and then combined) in the models. Taken all this into consideration, I develop 27 variations of the same basic model. The results, including post estimation statistics can be found in Appendices 6.1 to 6.3.

The Multivariate Model

I chose three representative models for further analysis and interpretation in the chapter. The models include state-focused factors, institutional factors as well as external factors. In terms of state-focused factors, each model includes a measure of power (measured as military expenditure, GDP or allocated Council voting weights) and a measure of issue salience. In terms of institutional factors, each model includes measures of institutional pressures (relevant CFSP position in place, EU collectively sponsors resolution) and measures of institutional dedication (degree of voluntary integration, EU net-beneficiary, and degree of negative opinion about the EU). Also included are measures to account for transatlantic relationship (transatlantic trade as

percentage of GDP, number of joint international military operations, number of non-immigrant visas to US as percentage of home population). Additionally, measures of government type and government position are included as control variables. Finally, year fixed effects as well as issue area fixed effects are incorporated as well. The results are illustrated in Table 6.5.

Dependent Variable : Vote Defection

| | | Model 2 | Corrected Estimates | Model 4 | Corrected Estimates | Model 9 | Corrected Estimates |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| State Focused Factors | | | | | | | |
| Power | Military Expenditure as % of GDP GDP | 0.000 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000)*** | | | | |
| | | | | -0.001 (0.000)*** | -0.001 (0.000)*** | | |
| | Council Voting Weights | | | | | 0.128 (0.022)*** | 0.126 (0.022)*** |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | -0.084 (0.087) | -0.078 (0.087) | -0.062 (0.093) | -0.062 (0.093) | -0.179 (0.100)* | -0.171 (0.100)* |
| Institutional Factors | | | | | | | |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | -1.755 (0.350)*** | -1.696 (0.349)*** | -1.781 (0.355)*** | -1.781 (0.355)*** | -1.755 (0.353)*** | -1.694 (0.352)*** |
| | Collective EU sponsorship | 0.160 (0.162) | 0.164 (0.161) | 0.143 (0.164) | 0.143 (0.164) | 0.137 (0.161) | 0.140 (0.160) |
| Institutional dedication | Degree of voluntary integration | -0.142 (0.075)* | -0.141 (0.074)* | 0.102 (0.054)* | 0.102 (0.054)* | 0.005 (0.058) | 0.006 (0.057) |
| | Member states is net- beneficiary | -0.946 (0.162)*** | -0.939 (0.161)*** | -1.174 (0.154)*** | -1.174 (0.154)*** | -1.310 (0.159)*** | -1.298 (0.158)*** |
| | Degree of negative opinion about EU | 0.485 (0.112)*** | 0.481 (0.111)*** | -0.286 (0.118)*** | -0.286 (0.118)*** | 0.529 (0.107)*** | 0.523 (0.106)*** |

| External Factors | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | -1.142 (0.275)*** | -1.119 (0.273)*** | 1.101 (0.114)*** | 1.101 (0.114)*** | 0.575 (0.092)*** | 0.568 (0.091)*** |
| Cultural Relationship | Non-immigrant visas as pop % | | | | | 1.841 (0.322)*** | 1.811 (0.320)*** |
| | TD*Cultural Relationship | | | | | -0.303 (0.174)* | -0.291 (0.173)* |
| Political Relationship | Number of joint international military operations | -0.508 (0.060)*** | -0.502 (0.060)*** | | | | |
| | TD*Political Relationship | 0.181 (0.027)*** | 0.178 (0.027)*** | | | | |
| Economic Relationship | Trade as % of GDP | | | 0.349 (0.046)*** | 0.349 (0.046)*** | | |
| | TD* Economic Relationship | | | -0.113 (0.021)*** | -0.113 (0.021)*** | | |
| Control Variables | | | | | | | |
| Government Position | Right/Left (Laver/Budge Index) | -0.012 (0.006)*** | -0.012 (0.006)*** | -0.019 (0.006)*** | -0.019 (0.006)*** | -0.014 (0.006)** | -0.014 (0.006)** |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Government Type | Consensus/Westminster (Lijphart) | -0.394 (0.086)*** | -0.388 (0.086)*** | -1.169 (0.086)*** | -1.169 (0.086)*** | -0.338 (0.084)*** | -0.333 (0.084)*** |
| Constant | | 0.735 (0.679) | | -4.058 (0.492)*** | | -2.023 (0.394)*** | |
| Fixed Effects | Issue Area | γ*** | | γ*** | | γ*** | |
| | Year | γ*** | | γ*** | | γ*** | |
| Model Specifications | Observations | 6841 | | 6632 | | 6841 | |
| | Pseudo R2 | 0.215 | | 0.266 | | 0.207 | |
| | Wald chi2 (31) | 510.640 | | 522.800 | | 519.78 | |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | | 0.000 | | 0 | |
| Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; corrected estimates calulated with relogit command | | | | | | | |

Table 6.5: Logistic Regression – Determinants of ‘Vote Defection’

For these three models I present the corrected estimates (calculated with the ReLogit software) to address the potential dangers associated with using a rare events dataset. The corrected estimates obtained by ReLogit by and large correspond with the original estimates. There are no changes in levels of significance or in direction. While for some coefficients, no change at all can be observed, for some of the institutional pressures and for some of the transatlantic relationship a small change in the value of the coefficient can be observed. The three models are statistically significant.

The coefficient for power measured as military expenditure and measured as GDP virtually is equal to zero, and thus indicates no relationship between dependent and independent variable. Only when power is measured in EU institutional terms, as allocated voting weight in the Council, can a positive and statistically significant relationship be observed. That is to say, increased levels voting power in the Council are associated with an increased likelihood of vote defection. Having said this, it should be noted here that this variable is neither consistent nor robust across all 27 models.

The other state-focused variable is salience. Although not always statistically significant and producing fairly small coefficients, the variable salience consistently predicts a decreased likelihood of vote defection the more salient an issue area is perceived by the individual member states. In conjunction with the corresponding findings of the system-level analysis – which indicate a positive relationship between how salient an issue is perceived on average by the member states and the likelihood that they achieve full cohesion on that particular resolution – this makes for an interesting result for two reasons.

One, the results of both system-level analysis and unit-level analysis run contrary to the hypothesis that I developed in chapter 3. I hypothesised that the more salient an EU member state perceives an issue to be the less susceptible it is to vote coordination pressures and the less likely it is to override its national policy preference in order to vote alongside its fellow EU members; whereas it appears that the member states tend to speak with a single voice on issues they each individually consider important (although the results are not able to determine whether or not the EU member states are in fact overriding heterogeneous policy preference so as to speak with a single voice on issues they consider important).

Two, even without a working hypothesis in addition to operational limitations faced by the variable (i.e. there is no reliable data on national policy preference), the results are consistent across a total of 31 models (i.e. 4 models for the system-level analysis and 27 models for the individual-level analysis) and are sometimes highly significant. For this reason they should be noted and used as a starting point for further investigation. As it stands, they are still non-conclusive. Without knowing a country's national policy preference, it is impossible to determine whether the member states tend to agree on issues they consider salient, or alternatively whether the member states prefer a cohesive vote on an issue they perceive as salient, even if it means overriding one's national policy preference.

Overall, it appears that institutional factors make more robust indicators (that is to say statistically significant and one-directional) for predicted voting behaviour than do state-focused factors. For instance, member states that can be considered net-

beneficiaries of the EU budget as well as the existence of a relevant CFSP position are consistently associated with decreased likelihood of vote defection. Both variables are statistically significant across all 27 model variations. The responses for all other institutional factors are neither robust nor consistent and should be interpreted with caution.

The bilateral transatlantic relationships are estimated in economic, political as well as cultural terms, by considering trade volume, numbers of joint military operations and the number of non-immigrant visas (as percentage of population) respectively. In addition, I have included an interaction term, accounting for instances of transatlantic divergence; that is to say for instances in which the US and the majority of the EU member do not cast identical votes.

Table 6.6 depicts the marginal effects of the transatlantic relationship on the likelihood that a country will defect from the EU majority position in instances of transatlantic divergence. The strength of the bilateral transatlantic relationship is categorised as weak, medium and strong. These terms refer to the minimum value, mean value and maximum value of the individual measures. For instance, the number of joint military operations ranges between four military operations and fourteen military operations. The mean is at approximately nine military operations.

The results indicate that the likelihood of vote defection decreases as the political relationship becomes stronger, while the likelihood of vote defection increases sharply as the economic and cultural relationship becomes stronger. In addition to the opposing trends between the political relationship and the one hand and the economic

and cultural relationships on the other hand, the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities are partially overlapping. This makes it difficult to report conclusively on the extent to which the transatlantic relationship reflects in the voting pattern of the EU member states. The qualitative analysis conducted in chapter 7 provides further insights into the matter.

Marginal Effects of the Transatlantic Relationship on Likelihood of Vote Defection in instances of Transatlantic Divergence

| Transatlantic Relationship | Model 2 (Political) | | | Model 4 (Economic) | | | Model 9 (Cultural) | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| | Probability Vote Defection | Confidence Interval | | Probability Vote Defection | Confidence Interval | | Probability Vote Defection | Confidence Interval | |
| Weak | 0.136 | 0.810 | 0.215 | 0.083 | 0.068 | 0.100 | 0.106 | 0.088 | 0.125 |
| Medium | 0.095 | 0.077 | 0.114 | 0.104 | 0.086 | 0.122 | 0.125 | 0.104 | 0.147 |
| Strong | 0.070 | 0.039 | 0.115 | 0.184 | 0.095 | 0.305 | 0.668 | 0.472 | 0.828 |

Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for their binary variables.

Table 6.6: Marginal Effects of the Transatlantic Relationship on the Likelihood of Vote Defection in Instances of Transatlantic Divergence

Finally, both of the control variables, government type and government position, are consistent indicators. Here, the results seem to indicate that ‘consensus democracies’ are less likely to defect from the EU majority position than the so-called ‘Westminster-style democracies’ (Lijphart, 1999).⁴³ And while the signs consistently indicate that centre-left governments are less likely to defect from the EU majority position compared to centre-right governments, in fact the coefficients for government position are very close to zero.

Further Interpretation Using CLARIFY

A few of the variables have proven to be robust across the entire range of models and will be subject to further scrutiny and interpretation. In doing so, I shall employ the methodological tool CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003). The variables of particular interest are whether or not a relevant CFSP position exists, whether or not the EU member state is a net beneficiary of EU funds and government type. Moreover, I have included power (measured as Council voting weights). Corresponding to the three models presented in this chapter, I am devising six baseline models, two for each of the models presented. One baseline model is set for nuclear issues in 1997 and the second baseline model is set for Arab Israeli resolutions in 1997.

In the baseline models, all continuous variables are set to their mean, which all categorical variables are set to their minimum value. That is to say, for instance, in the baseline models CFSP position and transatlantic divergence are set to 0, indicating that

⁴³ The correlation coefficient between government type and power (military, economic, institutional) is (.18; .46; .26). The correlation coefficient between government position and power (military, economic, institutional) is (.10; .20; .25). The correlation coefficient between government type and government position is .14.

no relevant CFSP position is in place and the US voting position is identical to that of the EU majority position. Moreover, the interaction term between the transatlantic divergence and type of transatlantic relationship is set as the product of transatlantic divergence (set to its minimum value) and the number of joint military operations (set to its average value) (On interaction terms and CLARIFY see King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000; King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 2)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.136 | 0.028 | 0.012 | 0.056 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.136 | 0.057 | 0.032 | 0.094 |
| Government Type | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.136 | 0.055 | 0.026 | 0.097 |
| | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.136 | 0.191 | 0.128 | 0.270 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables | | | | | | |

Table 6.7: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 2)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 4)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.077 | 0.015 | 0.006 | 0.030 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.077 | 0.025 | 0.015 | 0.042 |
| Government Type | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.077 | 0.015 | 0.007 | 0.030 |
| | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.077 | 0.144 | 0.095 | 0.207 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables | | | | | | |

Table 6.8: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 4)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 9)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Power | Council Voting Weights | Mean to Max | 0.121 | 0.178 | 0.120 | 0.254 |
| | Council Voting Weights | Mean to Min | 0.121 | 0.072 | 0.047 | 0.109 |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.121 | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.049 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.121 | 0.036 | 0.021 | 0.058 |
| Government Type | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.121 | 0.060 | 0.033 | 0.101 |
| | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.121 | 0.161 | 0.107 | 0.230 |

Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables

Table 6.9: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 9)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 2)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.025 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.013 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.005 | 0.022 |
| Government Type | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.004 | 0.022 |
| | ‘Consensus’/‘Westminster’ (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.025 | 0.037 | 0.019 | 0.068 |

Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables

Table 6.10: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 2)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 4)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Government Type | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.005 | 0.017 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables | | | | | | |

Table 6.11: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 4)

Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 9)

| | | Change | Probability Baseline Model | Probability Modified Model | Confidence Interval | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Power | Council Voting Weights | Mean to Max | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.006 | 0.020 |
| | Council Voting Weights | Mean to Min | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | 1 | 0.008 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Institutional Dedication | Member states is net-beneficiary | 1 | 0.008 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Government Type | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Max | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| | 'Consensus'/'Westminster' (Lijphart) | Mean to Min | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.018 |
| Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at at their minimum for all other variables | | | | | | |

Table 6.12: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 9)

Across all baseline models, it becomes evident that the probability of vote defection is virtually non-existent for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict and a fully cohesive vote is a near certainty. The picture is considerably more varied for resolutions dealing with nuclear issues. Here the probability of vote defection differs between the baseline models and ranges from .07 (Model 4) to .14 (Model 2). Moving on from there, when a relevant CFSP position is in place, the likelihood of vote defection decreases approximately 4 to 5 fold, depending on the model (considering both, resolutions pertaining to Arab Israeli conflict and military resolutions). The impact of being a net beneficiary of the EU budget, while in the same direction, is not always quite as large. Net beneficiary status decreases the likelihood of vote defection by a factor of 2 to 5 fold (depending on the model) Government type also plays a role. Changing the Lijphart index from its mean to its maximum ('Consensus') and subsequently to its minimum ('Westminster') highlights that consensus-style democracies are at least three times less likely to defect from the EU majority position than 'Westminster' democracies. (For two models the difference between the two is almost ten-fold.)

Countries that hold most of the weighted voting power in the Council of Minister are approximately three times more likely to defect from the EU majority positions with regards to Arab/Israeli resolutions than countries holding the least weighting power in the Council. For nuclear resolutions, countries that hold most of the weighted voting power in the Council of Ministers are 2.5 more likely to defect from the EU majority position than countries holding the least voting power. Having said this, while the

coefficients for Council Voting Weights were robust in this model, they are not across the 27 models and should thus be interpreted with caution.

6.5 Conclusion

In chapter 6 I set out to examine the EU member states' voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly from an individual-level perspective. To that end I illustrated that while every single EU member state at some point or another has defected from the EU majority position, only on very few occasions have countries done so alone. The UK and France lead both rankings. I further highlighted that resolutions pertaining to decolonisation and military issues tend to be more frequently subject to vote defections than resolutions pertaining to human rights and the Arab Israeli conflict. The concept of preference heterogeneity was further explored in this chapter. To this end, I reiterated that vote defection in itself is indicative of preference heterogeneity and further supported the notion by discussing Inglehart's World Value Survey, designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern – from religion to politics to economic and social life (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). An entire section was dedicated to the close scrutiny of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of the individual member states, by comparing their voting distance to the US and to the EU majority position (the extent to which they defect from the EU majority), I illustrated that member states on the whole are fairly far removed from the US. The UK is, unsurprisingly, a notable exception. The results of the multivariate analysis indicated that institutional factors (i.e. relevant CFSP position in place, EU net-beneficiary) are strongly associated with a decrease in vote defection. The state-focused factors are less robust in the case of power and highly interesting in the case of salience. Without a working hypothesis in addition to operational

limitations, the results consistently and sometimes statistically significantly predict a decrease in vote defection as issue salience increases. Finally, the results of the interaction term are inconclusive. In addition to overlapping confidence intervals, the predicted voting behaviour changes direction depending on the type of relationship. Chapter 7 shall be devoted to examine the EU coordination process in depths.

6.6 Appendices

Appendix 6A: Models 1 to 9 Including Postestimation Results

Dependent Variable: Vote Defection from EU Majority Position

| | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| State Focused Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Power | Military Expenditure as % of GDP | 0.000 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000)*** | | | | | | |
| | GDP | | | | -0.001 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000)*** | | | |
| | Council Voting Weights | | | | | | | -0.172 (0.027)*** | 0.245 (0.050)*** | 0.128 (0.022)*** |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | -0.130 (0.098) | -0.084 (0.087) | -0.145 (0.101) | -0.062 (0.093) | -0.168 (0.091)* | -0.190 (0.098)* | -0.115 (0.095) | -0.159 (0.091)* | -0.179 (0.100)* |

Institutional Factors

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | -1.777 (0.354)*** | -1.755 (0.350)*** | -1.768 (0.354)*** | -1.781 (0.355)*** | -1.747 (0.351)*** | -1.754 (0.353)*** | -1.782 (0.353)*** | -1.752 (0.352)*** | -1.755 (0.353)*** |
| | EU collectively sponsor resolution | 0.149 (0.163) | 0.160 (0.162) | 0.110 (0.163) | 0.143 (0.164) | 0.166 (0.162) | 0.135 (0.160) | 0.151 (0.163) | 0.167 (0.162) | 0.137 (0.161) |
| Institutional dedication | Degree of voluntary integration | 0.018 (0.052) | -0.142 (0.075)* | -0.037 (0.052) | 0.102 (0.054)* | -0.145 (0.061)** | -0.002 (0.059) | 0.043 (0.051) | -0.325 (0.070)*** | 0.005 (0.058) |
| | Member states is net-beneficiary | -1.246 (0.171)*** | -0.946 (0.162)*** | -1.156 (0.153)*** | -1.174 (0.154)*** | -1.048 (0.155)*** | -1.225 (0.155)*** | -0.907 (0.148)*** | -1.195 (0.160)*** | -1.310 (0.159)*** |
| | Degree of negative opinion about EU | -0.100 (0.116) | 0.485 (0.112)*** | 0.159 (0.106) | -0.286 (0.118)*** | 0.593 (0.113)*** | 0.597 (0.103)*** | -0.153 (0.116) | 0.633 (0.109)*** | 0.529 (0.107)*** |

External Factors

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | 1.095 (0.113)*** | -1.142 (0.275)*** | 0.910 (0.100)*** | 1.101 (0.114)*** | -1.486 (0.310)*** | 0.583 (0.090)*** | 1.066 (0.113)*** | -1.253 (0.301)*** | 0.575 (0.092)*** |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Cultural Relationship (Non-immigrant visas as pop %) | | | | 1.451 (0.339)*** | | | 1.747 (0.322)*** | | | 1.841 (0.322)*** |
| TD*Cultural Relationship | | | | -0.620 (0.204)*** | | | -0.348 (0.176)** | | | -0.303 (0.174)* |
| Political Relationship (Number of joint intl military operations) | | | -0.508 (0.060)*** | | | -0.339 (0.055)*** | | | -0.514 (0.064)*** | |
| TD*Political Relationship | | | 0.181 (0.027)*** | | | 0.212 (0.031)*** | | | 0.187 (0.029)*** | |
| Economic Relationship (Trade as % of GDP) | | 0.322 (0.046)*** | | | 0.349 (0.046)*** | | | 0.300 (0.046)*** | | |
| TD* Economic Relationship | | -0.112 (0.021)*** | | | -0.113 (0.021)*** | | | -0.108 (0.021)*** | | |
| Control Variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Government Position | Right/Left (CMD) | -0.021 (0.006)*** | -0.012 (0.006)*** | -0.020 (0.005)*** | -0.019 (0.006)*** | -0.022 (0.006)*** | -0.013 (0.006)** | -0.015 (0.005)*** | -0.024 (0.006)*** | -0.014 (0.006)** |
| Government Type | Consensus/Westminster (Lijphart) | -1.265 (0.101)*** | -0.394 (0.086)*** | -1.186 (0.097)*** | -1.169 (0.086)*** | -0.102 (0.107) | -0.307 (0.095)*** | -1.174 (0.092)*** | -0.266 (0.088)*** | -0.338 (0.084)*** |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| Constant | | -1.235 (0.428)*** | 0.735 (0.679) | -0.478 (0.377) | -4.058 (0.492)*** | 0.058 (0.663) | -1.615 (0.382)*** | -3.463 (0.494)*** | 3.028 (0.633)*** | -2.023 (0.394)*** |
| | Issue Area | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** |
| | Year | γ** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** | γ*** |
| Model Specifications | Observations | 6632 | 6841 | 6841 | 6632 | 6841 | 6841 | 6632 | 6841 | 6841 |
| | Pseudo R2 | 0.261 | 0.215 | 0.2533 | 0.266 | 0.2005 | 0.2001 | 0.259 | 0.2074 | 0.207 |
| | Wald chi2 (31) | 503.670 | 510.640 | 533.83 | 522.800 | 516.58 | 510.95 | 520.58 | 512.78 | 519.78 |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0 | 0.000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Postestimation | Linktest | 0.100 | 0.209 | 0.507 | 0.373 | 0.578 | 0.754 | 0.239 | 0.325 | 0.72 |
| | Lfit | 0.249 | 0.331 | 0.6307 | 0.075 | 0.3503 | 0.1492 | 0.3051 | 0.1168 | 0.5104 |
| | Lroc | 0.863 | 0.833 | 0.6802 | 0.866 | 0.8262 | 0.8282 | 0.8619 | 0.8286 | 0.8307 |
| | Mean VIF | 2.960 | 4.300 | 2.97 | 2.940 | 4.35 | 3.01 | 4.34 | 4.5 | 2.98 |

Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levels: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 6

Appendix 6B: Models 10 to 18 Including Postestimation Results

| Dependent Variable: Vote Defection from EU Majority Position | | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| State Focused Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Power | Military Expenditure as % of GDP | 0.000 (0.000)** | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000)** | | | | | | |
| | GDP | | | | -0.001 (0.000)*** | -0.001 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.00)*** | | | |
| | Council Voting Weights | | | | | | | -0.098 (0.032)*** | -0.115 (0.055)** | -0.084 (0.031)*** |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | -0.069 (0.084) | -0.030 (0.079) | -0.101 (0.088) | -0.044 (0.084) | -0.023 (0.079) | -0.072 (0.087) | -0.053 (0.83) | -0.015 (0.078) | -0.086 (0.086) |
| Institutional Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | -1.711 (0.329)*** | -1.722 (0.333)*** | -1.729 (0.331)*** | -1.726 (0.330)*** | -1.737 (0.334)*** | -1.738 (0.331)*** | -1.713 (0.328)*** | -1.723 (0.333)*** | -1.729 (0.330)*** |
| | EU collectively sponsor resolution | 0.138 | 0.154 | 0.128 | 0.161 | 0.161 | 0.130 | 0.135 | 0.150 | 0.123 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | (0.148) | (0.149) | (0.148) | (0.147) | (0.149) | (0.148) | (0.148) | (0.149) | (0.148) |
| Institutional dedication | Degree of voluntary integration | -0.068 | -0.182 | -0.038 | -0.045 | -0.115 | -0.009 | -0.045 | -0.112 | -0.020 |
| | | (0.049) | (0.052)*** | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.054)** | (0.049) | (0.050) | (0.066)* | (0.049) |
| | Member states is net-beneficiary | -0.880 | -0.755 | -0.925 | -0.913 | -0.789 | -0.949 | -0.778 | -0.678 | -0.826 |
| | | (0.178)*** | (0.166)*** | (0.171)*** | (0.158)*** | (0.146)*** | (0.152)*** | (0.146)*** | (0.137)*** | (0.142)*** |
| | Degree of negative opinion about EU | -0.076 | 0.131 | 0.145 | -0.078 | 0.099 | 0.084 | -0.101 | 0.083 | 0.106 |
| | | (0.100) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.097) | (0.097) | (0.095) | (0.101) | (0.093) | (0.092) |
| External Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | 0.856 | -1.283 | 0.784 | 0.778 | -1.270 | 0.795 | 0.857 | -1.260 | 0.785 |
| | | (0.087)*** | (0.215)*** | (0.078)*** | (0.100)*** | (0.210)*** | (0.078)*** | (0.087)*** | (0.210)*** | (0.078)*** |
| | Cultural Relationship (Non-immigrant visas as % of population) | | | 1.654 | | | 1.631 | | | 1.598 |
| | | | | (0.325)*** | | | (0.326)*** | | | (0.326)*** |
| | TD*Cultural Relationship | | | -0.527 | | | -0.531 | | | -0.534 |
| | | | | (0.187)*** | | | (0.188) | | | (0.188)*** |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Political Relationship (Number of joint international military operations) | | -0.431 (0.049)*** | | | -0.361 (0.045)*** | | | -0.371 (0.061)*** | |
| | TD*Political Relationship | | 0.207 (0.022)*** | | | 0.207 (0.021)*** | | | 0.205 (0.021)*** | |
| | Economic Relationship (Trade as % of GDP) | 0.241 (0.042)*** | | | 0.194 (0.064)*** | | | 0.229 (0.042)*** | | |
| | TD* Economic Relationship | -0.084 (0.019)*** | | | -0.053 (0.029)* | | | -0.083 (0.019)*** | | |
| Control Variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Government Position | Right/Left (CMD) | -0.012 (0.006)** | -0.011 (0.005)*** | -0.009 (0.006) | -0.010 (0.006)* | -0.013 (0.005)** | -0.008 (0.006) | -0.009 (0.006)* | -0.007 (0.005) | -0.006 (0.005) |
| Government Type | Consensus/Westminster (Lijphart) | -1.071 (0.107)*** | -1.073 (0.103)*** | -0.995 (0.103)*** | -1.063 (0.093)*** | -0.948 (0.083)*** | -1.001 (0.088)*** | -1.101 (0.05)*** | -1.113 (0.105)*** | -1.020 (0.101)*** |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Constant | Constant | -0.752 (0.334)** | 1.439 (0.520)*** | -3.204 (0.337)*** | -3.033 (0.351)*** | 0.874 (0.519)* | -3.217 (0.318)*** | -2.912 (0.361)*** | 1.229 (0.544)*** | -2.969 (0.363)*** |
| | Issue Area | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** |
| | Year | | | | | | | | | |
| Model | Observations | 6193 | 6402 | 6402 | 6193 | 6402 | 6402 | 6193 | 6402 | 6402.000 |
| Specification | Pseudo R2 | 0.235 (20) | 0.2576 (20) | 0.2382 (20) | 0.234 (20) | 0.2535 (20) | 0.2404 | 0.236 | 0.2585 (20) | 0.239 (20) |
| | Wald chi2 | 532.390 | 571.27 | 549.76 | 531.88 | 568.24 | (20) 549.4 | (20) 529.4 | 573.06 | 547.94 |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Postestimation | Linktest | 0.246 | 0.622 | 0.201 | 0.24 | 0.61 | 0.218 | 0.240 | 0.687 | 0.217 |
| | Lfit | 0.1081 | 0.006 | 0.3255 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.02 | .00096 | 0.3209 |
| | Lroc | 0.8415 | 0.8508 | .8405 | 0.8405 | 0.8477 | 0.8449 | 0.842 | 0.8518 | 0.8441 |
| | Mean VIF | 3.42 | 4.46 | 3.45 | 3.39 | 4.4 | 3.41 | 3.39 | 4.58 | 3.43 |

Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 6

Appendix 6C: Models 19 to 27 Including Postestimation Results

| Dependent Variable: Vote Defection from EU Majority Position | | Model 19 | Model 20 | Model 21 | Model 22 | Model 23 | Model 24 | Model 25 | Model 26 | Model 27 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| State Focused Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Power | Military Expenditure as % of GDP | 0.000 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000)*** | 0.000 (0.000)*** | | | | | | |
| | GDP | | | | -0.001 (0.000)*** | -0.001 (0.000)** | -0.001 (0.000)*** | | | |
| | Council Voting Weights | | | | | | | -0.166 (0.026)*** | -0.185 (0.068)*** | -0.174 (0.028)*** |
| Salience | Perceived issue salience | -0.468 (0.095)*** | -0.472 (0.094)*** | -0.495 (101)*** | -0.456 (0.096)*** | -0.459 (0.093)*** | -0.488 (0.103)*** | -0.466 (0.096)*** | -0.461 (0.092)*** | -0.481 (0.099)*** |
| Institutional Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Institutional Pressure | Relevant CFSP position in place | -2.277 (0.348)*** | -2.296 (0.346)*** | -2.250 (0.347)*** | -2.274 (0.348)*** | -2.305 (0.346)*** | -2.253 (0.348)*** | -2.274 (0.347)*** | -2.306 (0.345)*** | -2.257 (0.347)*** |


| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | EU collectively sponsor resolution | 0.119 (0.154) | 0.114 (0.156) | 0.088 (0.153) | 0.118 (0.153) | 0.124 (0.156) | 0.091 (0.153) | 0.119 (0.153) | 0.122 (0.155) | 0.093 (0.152) |
| Institutional dedication | Degree of voluntary integration | 0.036 (0.047) | -0.097 (0.055)* | 0.011 (0.049) | 0.111 (0.050)** | -0.134 (0.066)*** | 0.064 (0.050) | 0.079 (0.048) | -0.082 (0.076) | 0.044 (0.049) |
| | Member states is net-beneficiary | -1.329 (0.159)*** | -1.456 (0.155)*** | -1.280 (0.147)*** | -1.164 (0.141)*** | -1.158 (0.138)*** | -1.114 (0.135)*** | -0.983 (0.139)*** | -1.045 (0.135)*** | -0.954 (0.136)*** |
| | Degree of negative opinion about EU | -0.026 (0.110) | 0.218 (0.107)** | 0.178 (0.102)* | -0.192 (0.110)* | 0.111 (0.113) | 0.081 (0.108) | -0.105 (0.111) | 0.109 (0.109) | 0.091 (0.04) |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| External Factors | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transatlantic Relationship | Transatlantic Divergence (TD) | 0.567 (0.098)*** | -1.829 (0.259)*** | 0.667 (0.095)*** | 0.791 (0.107)*** | -1.646 (0.243)*** | 0.641 (0.095)*** | 0.777 (0.108)*** | -1.656 (0.245)*** | 0.649 (0.096)*** |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Cultural Relationship (Non-immigrant visas as % of population) | | 1.375 (0.332)*** | | 1.440 (0.330)*** | | 1.305 (0.332)*** |
| TD*Cultural Relationship | | -0.584 (0.202)*** | | -0.532 (0.194)*** | | -0.573 (0.201)*** |
| Political Relationship (Number of joint international military operations) | | -0.441 (0.055)*** | | -0.508 (0.064)*** | | -0.445 (0.074)*** |
| TD*Political Relationship | | 0.262 (0.027)*** | | 0.240 (0.025)*** | | 0.239 (0.025)*** |
| Economic Relationship (Trade as % of GDP) | 0.092 (0.027)*** | | 0.285 (0.046)*** | | 0.247 (0.046)*** | |
| TD* Economic Relationship | -0.031 (0.029) | | -0.091 (0.021)*** | | -0.090 (0.021)*** | |

| Control Variables | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Government Position | Right/Left (CMD) | -0.018 (0.005)*** | -0.018 (0.005)*** | -0.017 (0.005)*** | -0.017 (0.006)*** | -0.016 (0.005)*** | -0.015 (0.005)*** | -0.013 (0.005)** | -0.011 (0.005)** | -0.012 (0.005)** |
| Government Type | Consensus/Westminster (Lijphart) | -1.274 (0.100)*** | -1.502 (0.112)*** | -1.267 (0.101)*** | -1.132 (0.086)*** | -1.293 (0.096)*** | -1.084 (0.090)*** | -1.202 (0.090)*** | -1.355 (0.100)*** | -1.189 (0.095)*** |
| Constant | | -2.419 (0.371)*** | 2.553 (0.582)*** | -2.255 (0.337)*** | -3.194 (0.395)*** | 2.832 (0.617)*** | -2.434 (0.341)*** | -2.617 (0.411)*** | 2.729 (0.633)*** | -1.975 (0.357)*** |
| | Issue Area | | | | | | | | | |
| | Year | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** | YES** | YES*** | YES*** | YES*** |
| Model Specifications | Observations | 6781 | 6994 | 6994 | 6781 | 6994 | 6994 | 6781 | 6994 | 6994 |
| | Pseudo R2 | 0.2028 (24) | 0.2281 (24) | 0.2035 (24) | 0.2064 (24) | 0.2258 (24) | 0.2012 (24) | 0.2048 (24) | 0.2235 (24) | 0.2014 (24) |
| | Wald chi2 | 417.53 | 464.00 | (24) 442.8 | 450.72 | 726.01 | (24) 472.5 | 442.89 | 483.13 | 461.18 |
| | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Postestimation | Linktest | 0.004 | 0 | 0.002 | 0.01 | 0.004 | 0.02 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.01 |
| | Lfit | 0.0001 | 0 | 0.0011 | 0.0012 | 0 | 0.015 | 0.0033 | 0 | 0.0147 |
| | Lroc | 0.8302 | 0.8391 | 0.8294 | 0.8306 | 0.835 | 0.8267 | 0.8297 | 0.8347 | 0.827 |
| | Mean VIF | 1.56 | 3.74 | 1.92 | 1.89 | 3.56 | 1.89 | 1.89 | 3.85 | 1.91 |

Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.1$; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 6

Appendix 6D: Vote Defection of 1995 Accession Countries prior to Accession



CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU VOTE COORDINATION PROCESS

The quantitative voting pattern analysis has been very useful in identifying factors that affect the likelihood of EU member states to defect from the EU majority position and in that it has highlighted instances in which EU member states, holding a divergent policy preference, prefer not to cast a vote in accordance with the EU majority position. As discussed several times in this thesis already, the quantitative voting pattern analysis suffers from an operational shortcoming, which makes it impossible to unequivocally draw the important distinction between a country casting a vote with fellow EU members “in spite of their disagreement” or “because of their agreement” (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 238). Despite its usefulness, the quantitative voting pattern analysis is not equipped to explore whether EU member states ever vote with their fellow EU member states despite of disagreements. By investigating the vote coordination process that takes place between the member states prior to roll-call votes in more detail in the present chapter, I seek to address this question.

In chapter 3, I hypothesised that for divisive and contentious resolutions the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion, when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective. At this point, member states work hard to “hammer out collective external positions” (P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). That is to say, when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective, member states attach a higher value to EU unity, are more willing to compromise with regards to their national policy preferences and are generally more susceptible to coordination pressures. In the absence of such a tangible objective in divisive and contentious issue

areas the balance is less likely to tip in favour of vote cohesion. Consequently, when increasing the collective bargaining power is not a tangible objective member states attach a lower value to EU unity, are less willing to compromise with regards to their national policy preference and are less susceptible to coordination pressure. Unable to put this hypothesis to the test as part of the quantitative voting pattern analysis (see section 4.2), I seek to illustrate in this chapter that EU member states are able to successfully coordinate their voting positions in divisive and similarly contentious issue areas; that is to say, they are able to successfully coordinate their voting positions “in spite of their disagreement” (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 238).

The chapter is set up as follows: I shall explain my selection of cases in section 7.1. In section 7.2 I describe the fundamentals of EU vote coordination for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict and for resolutions pertaining to military issues. I seek to illustrate how increasing the collective bargaining power by means of successful vote coordination is a tangible objective in the former, but not the latter. In section 7.3, I set out to illustrate how member states view EU unity as very important for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as opposed to for resolutions pertaining to military issues where they view it as only marginally important. Section 7.4 serves to illustrate how member states are remarkably willing to compromise on their national policy positions with reference to resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict compared with resolutions pertaining to military issues. In section 7.5 I seek to illustrate that more coordination pressure is exerted and member states are more susceptible to it for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict compared with resolutions pertaining to military issues. In section 7.6 I will offer a conclusion to the chapter.

7.1 Case Selection

By means of a comparative analysis, I set out to contrast the coordination efforts for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict with vote coordination efforts that take place in the military realm. This is not an in-depth analysis of either issue area. The comparative case study is not motivated by a desire to account for particular events and outcomes; rather it serves as a framework to evaluate the EU coordination process in the United Nations General Assembly, with particular view to EU vote coordination in divisive and contentious issue areas.

I have chosen these two issue areas for the following reasons. One, both issue areas are divisive and similarly contentious, in which EU member states hold divergent preferences, illustrated by polarised cleavages. Successful vote coordination, if at all feasible, is the result of excessively “lengthy” (Official #22, 2 October 2008) and “painful” (Official #33, 13 October 2008) negotiations. Yet, while coordination efforts for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict generally lead to high levels of EU cohesion, the voting pattern is much more varied in the military realm.

Consider Figure 7.1 to this effect. Figure 7.1 illustrates a scatter plot of EU cohesion and resolution leverage per topic for the entire time period under consideration. The vertical axis depicts average cohesion levels calculated per topic. The horizontal axis depicts the resolution leverage, calculated by multiplying the average cohesion level with the number of resolutions per topic. The more often a topic comes up, the higher its resolution leverage index. The average cohesion level across all topics for the time period under consideration is depicted by $y = 0.8489$. The average leverage value across all topics for the time period under consideration is depicted by $x = 82.99$.

Generally, the figure can be read as follows: the higher a topic is located on the graph, the higher its average cohesion levels; the further to the right a topic is located on the graph, the more often it comes up in UNGA roll-call votes. To break it down even further, the top-right box represents all those topics which are frequently voted on and produce high levels of cohesion, while the bottom-left box represents all those topics which are not frequently voted on and which produce low levels of cohesion. With reference to the two issue areas under consideration, the graph clearly illustrates that resolutions pertaining to both issue areas are similarly prevalent on the agenda. However, resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict are on the whole much more cohesive than military resolutions. As highlighted by the European Commission : “Even on contentious issues like the Middle East, the EU has managed to achieve unanimity on virtually every occasion over the past decade” (European Union, 2004b, p. 12).



Figure 7.1: Average EU Cohesion and Resolution Leverage across Issue Area

Two, the United States plays a very different role in the member states' coordination efforts for each of the issue areas. Its position tends to be taken into consideration for military issues while largely ignored for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Wouters (2001) observes:

“Especially in the First Committee, there is a very close coordination between the EU and the USA. A practice has grown in which, during the Committee's session, troika meetings with the USA are held on a regular (sometimes even weekly) basis during the session.” (p. 388)

This view has been confirmed by the interviews with First Committee experts. Conversely, for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict, the US position is perceived “so far from reality” (Official #21, 20 November 2008) and non-negotiable that the EU member states by and large ignore it. This allows us to draw a distinction between the two issue areas, with one adding the US position and the other one not.

7.2 Coordination Basics

“The EU certainly has the potential to lead within the UN and heavily influences the positions of states in its ‘orbit’.” (K. E. Smith, 2006a, p. 165) In fact, there is “a regular pattern for the EU to reach out to States which are not EU members and associate them to its official positions (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 35). As such the EU in the UNGA is a “dominant player [with] the ability to muster significant numbers of votes”(Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 16).

Yet, in order for EU member states to increase their bargaining power by voting collectively in the United Nations General Assembly, equally important to overcoming their divisions, they must first encounter an opportunity that in fact enables them to increase their bargaining power by voting collectively. The Arab Israeli conflict offers such an opportunity. Approached as a bloc by the Palestinians, as long as the EU member states manage to speak with one voice, they are able to shape the text of the resolutions and by means of casting their votes collectively, they are able to assume a bellwether function that other UN member states follow. The resolutions pertaining to the military realm, on the other hand, are a diffuse mix of resolutions seeking to highlight concerns mainly as regards nuclear and conventional disarmament. They do not offer an outright opportunity for EU member states to increase their bargaining power by acting collectively.

Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict

Resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict are negotiated by the Middle East experts based at the Permanent Missions of the individual EU member states to the United Nations in New York. They usually, but not exclusively, come together in the 4th committee. Each year, they discuss their intended voting behaviour for about twenty such resolutions. The resolutions deal with a variety of different aspects pertaining to the conflict. With most of the resolutions drafted by the Palestinians, they unsurprisingly tend to serve as outlet for the Palestinians to address their grievances. Without a seat at the United Nations, the Palestinians usually have countries of the Arab group sponsor their resolutions. Before they do so, however, they present the text to the EU presidency, for the EU member states to negotiate among themselves any amendments that might be needed for their unified support for these resolutions.

A unified EU vote in support of the Palestinian resolutions is useful for the Palestinians because it pulls along another 20 to 30 non-Arab UN member states which explicitly align their votes with the EU member states in such an instance (Official #29, 18 September 2008). To this end, the Palestinians approach the EU as a bloc and “for policy purposes of their own, decide to treat the [EU] as [...] a viable, authoritative” actor (P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). By acting as a bloc, the EU member states “are able to shape the text” (Official #21, 20 November 2008). Additionally, successful vote coordination as regards these resolutions enables the EU to assume a bellwether function inside the General Assembly. Consequently, “the negative impact of a lack of cohesion in the Arab-Israeli conflict is much more problematic than in other areas” (Official #19, 27 October 2008). If the EU member states were not able to successfully coordinate their votes, the Palestinians would be less inclined to view the EU as its partner; the EU would lose its opportunity to shape the text and finally would lose its bellwether function as regards the votes. Nevertheless, with the Arab-Israeli conflict being such a highly politicised and contentious topic among the EU member states, it usually takes weeks or months to find a common position. Two major camps have emerged inside the EU. On the one hand, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark make up the core of the pro-Israeli camp with Germany and Italy part of the more moderating forces.⁴⁴ They essentially see these resolutions that are drafted by the Palestinians as unbalanced and are looking to replace some of the more emotional language with more neutral terms (Official #21, 20 November 2008). The members of the Pro-Palestinian camp including Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and France⁴⁵ are essentially happy with the text as it stands. In fact the

⁴⁴ Of the post-2004 enlargement group, the Czech Republic also belongs to this camp.

⁴⁵ Of the post-2004 enlargement group, Malta and Cyprus belong to this camp.

Southern enlargement in the 1980s, including the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal meant a shift within the EU in favour of the pro-Palestinian camp (Stadler, 1989, p. 24).

Military Resolutions

Resolutions pertaining to military issues are negotiated by the military experts, based at the Permanent Missions of the individual EU member states to the United Nations in New York. For the time period of intense negotiations every autumn, most of the EU member states fly in additional military experts from their Missions at the United Nation Office at Geneva; the core setting for international diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In New York, they usually come together in the 1st committee. Each year, they discuss their intended voting behaviour for about twenty such resolutions.⁴⁶ Resolutions pertaining to military issues generally deal with aspects pertaining to nuclear and conventional disarmament.⁴⁷ Member states are faced with a multitude of cleavages, most pertinently the following: nuclear/non-nuclear, Nato/non-Nato, aligned/non-aligned.

As opposed to the Arab Israeli conflict, where the EU Middle East experts assume an active role in shaping the text, in the 1st committee the experts “rarely draft new texts” (Official #34, 1 December 2008) with much of the coordination already having taken place in Geneva, the capitals or Brussels (Official #31, 13 November 2008). In fact “practically no resolutions are introduced by the Presidency on behalf of the EU” and while member states might sponsor draft resolutions on their own, particular in the

⁴⁶ Approximately 40 more resolutions are discussed which ultimately are adopted without a vote.

⁴⁷ In the early to mid 1990s they also still included resolutions pertaining to mercenary issues.

area of nuclear disarmament, they do not tend to be co-sponsored by the rest of the EU membership (Wouters, 2001, p. 390).

The wider context of the international debate on military issues has a bearing on the discussions in the 1st committee and general guidelines and major documents, such as the European Security Strategy or the European Strategy against Proliferation, inform the negotiation process (Official #31, 13 November 2008). And while 1st committee resolutions are by no means a-political, whatever political issues there are, they are unlikely to be addressed in the 1st committee (Official #20, 6 November 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008). Thus there is little scope for member states to shape the texts and to take on a leading role in the debate by working together collectively.

7.3 Value Attached to EU Unity

In abstract terms, all member states proclaim the value of EU unity in international affairs in general and in the United Nations General Assembly in particular. They view it as their “moral obligation to coordinate their voting positions” (Official #3, 15 September 2008; Official #22, 2 October 2008). They see EU unity as a “matter of pride” (Official #6, 23 October 2008) and an “expression of strength”(Official #24, 16 September 2008), so much so that they have devised ways of presenting EU cohesion, even in the presence of voting splits. As, for instance, when for a particular resolution the EU voting pattern displays a split between No-votes and Abstain-votes, the member states still legitimately claim that the EU as a whole cannot support this particular resolution (Official #31, 13 November 2008). This “masking of policy differences” is generally seen as “strength of the process” (Tonra, 1997, p. 182).

Predictably, smaller countries go as far as to see EU unity as an end in itself. They believe in the “diplomatic reflex to look for a common position”(Official #28, 8 October 2008) and “know it is better to swallow a national point of view to show EU unity” (Official #3, 15 September 2008). They “feel the pulse of others before making up [their] own minds” (Official #28, 8 October 2008). As such they quite naturally tend to perceive their interest to be close to that of the EU majority (Official #2, 15 September 2008). While larger countries without a doubt appreciate the value of EU unity, they disagree that “it should be an objective per se” (Official #14, 7 October 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008). Nevertheless, even some countries which could certainly weather breaking EU cohesion prefer to “go along with the EU majority ” (Official #33, 13 October 2008) as soon as a “palpable EU position emerges” (Official #20, 6 November 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008).

Further to universally supporting a resolution or to universally rejecting a resolution, a common abstention is another way to arrive at a unified EU vote. As such a common abstention fulfills multifaceted functions. It may be used to introduce aspects into the resolution that are perceived as missing. It may furthermore be used as a sign of disagreement that the General Assembly was chosen as forum to address the issue at hand, or it could also highlight opposition to a particular sponsor of the resolution (Official #7, 18 November 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008). Alternatively it may serve as a sign of neutrality, trying to avoid choosing sides on particular issues (Official #3, 15 September 2008).

Most controversially among the EU member states, in lieu of arriving at universal support or universal rejection of a resolution, it is seen by some as a justified means to

achieve EU cohesion (Official #9, 27 October 2008; Official #19, 27 October 2008; Official #32, 4 December 2008). Others view this “vacuity of unanimous common statements” (Tonra, 1997, p. 182) as complete failure of impact and a sign of weakness (Official #12, 7 October 2008; Official #23, 7 October 2008; Official #29, 18 September 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008). One might even call it a “fake consensus” (Official #33, 13 October 2008). This distinction is not made purely along power lines, but appears to be more based on the importance a member state attaches to making a point. Those against using a common abstention merely as means to achieve EU cohesion fear that by opting for a common abstention there is a risk of getting a position that does not make much sense outside of the EU (Official #26, 16 September 2008). They fear that a common abstention prevents the member states from making a substantive point. As one official put it:

“Sometimes you run the risk of putting the value of EU cohesion so high that you stand ready to give up everything else, ..., [while] abstention can make sense in some cases, [...]it is [generally] not very satisfactory as you withdraw yourself from positioning yourself.” (Official #14, 7 October 2008)

In more concrete terms it can be observed that EU member states attach a higher value to EU unity for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict compared to resolutions pertaining to the military issues. As opposed to the military experts, the Middle East experts furthermore more frequently contemplate a common abstention as a tolerable means to achieve EU cohesion.

Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict

The Arab Israeli conflict is a “major conflict” and serves as ideal platform to “demonstrate a common foreign policy” (Official #8, 18 November 2008).

Consequently, the EU member states attach a high value to EU unity for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By means of successful vote coordination, they are able to increase their collective bargaining power and have an opportunity to strengthen the role of the West in this particular conflict.

“For their part, third countries are often keen to know the European attitude [...] while the member states themselves increasingly wait for a common European point of reference to emerge before fixing their national opinion and communicating it to the public.” (Rummel, 1988, p. 120)

The Palestinians only care to deal with the EU if it speaks as one. And only if they view the EU as negotiation partner, can the member states shape the resolution texts and can assume a bellwether function for other UN member states to follow. Furthermore, the EU as representatives of the West, by negotiating with the Palestinians has an opportunity to act as a bona fide mediator in the conflict. With the majority of the resolutions sponsored by the Arab group and designed to address Palestinian grievances, collective EU support brings the point across to the Israelis in a more profound manner, rather than if it was simply made by the Arab world (Official #21, 20 November 2008). Achieving and maintaining EU cohesion is therefore seen as crucial.

As one official put it:

“Sometimes you have to join a consensus you do not want. The only way we can play a role in this conflict is by being united. The Palestinians do not care so much about what we say if we are not united.” (Official #32, 4 December 2008)

With such importance attached to successful vote coordination in an issue area this contentious, a common abstention is at times contemplated as one way to achieve cohesion. And although it does not come down to it excessively, the EU’s Middle East

experts seem far more likely to opt for a common abstention as means to achieve EU cohesion than its military experts.

Military Resolutions

The general perception in the military realm is that EU cohesion cannot be stipulated at any price. While cohesion is certainly taken into consideration and reached when possible, it is never set as a “blank cheque” goal (Official #31, 13 November 2008). Many countries have a selected few areas, for which they rather uncompromisingly pursue their national policy preferences. Especially without the added advantage of an increased bargaining power by voting collectively, a general acceptance exists that for certain resolutions, agreement is unlikely to be found (Official #7, 18 November 2008; Official #20, 6 November 2008). In relative terms then, compared to the Arab-Israeli conflict a lower value is attached to EU unity.

7.4 Importance of National Policy Preference

The relationship between the Permanent Mission at the UN and the capital is important. It is not a one-sided relationship, whereby the capital provides the instructions which the delegate subsequently simply relays to his or her colleagues during the negotiations. Rather, the regular dialogue between the capital and the Permanent Mission informs the policy formation process (Official #38, 9 October 2008).

Naturally, the delegates at the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York do not negotiate in a political vacuum (Official #35, 3 October 2008). That is to say, they all receive instructions from their capitals and are in regular contact with the

relevant ministries at home. Nevertheless, the extent to which the delegates receive instructions varies between countries. The bigger states tend to have more rigid and more codified instructions on more resolutions (Official #17, 7 October 2008; Official #25, 16 September 2008). Smaller states tend to work on so-called framework instructions (Official #37, 7 November 2008) or general guidelines (Official #23, 7 October 2008). For them, the hierarchy tends to be rather flat and the information flows quickly (Official #1, 13 November 2008; Official #10, 20 November 2008). Because they generally do not have as many resources, they sometimes choose a limited number of issues they follow with interest and bandwagon on EU majority position for the remaining issues (Official #6, 23 October 2008). Most of the time instructions are based on substance (Official #12, 7 October 2008). They may include suggested changes in resolution language (Official #27, 5 September 2008), such as replacing the term “cease fire” with the term “period of calm” (Official #5, 10 November 2008) for instance. At times instructions may stipulate to accommodate the EU majority (Official #9, 27 October 2008; Official #22, 2 October 2008). Instructions tend to become more detailed on trickier issues (Official #10, 20 November 2008), epitomised by strong national views (Official #34, 1 December 2008). Regardless the initial directions, instructions also tend to become more detailed when a rift emerges between the EU member states (Official #26, 16 September 2008), at which point capitals “all of a sudden wake up and realise they have red lines” (Official #29, 18 September 2008).

But, even with detailed national instructions, there is generally still room for manoeuvre (Official #20, 6 November 2008), since capitals do not give their instructions in a political vacuum either. They are attentive to the negotiation process

going on between the EU delegates in the General Assembly and are keenly aware of voting constellations between the EU member states (Official #32, 4 December 2008). For the most part, instructions do not seem to be written in stone and allow for a certain amount of flexibility especially when a member state finds itself in isolation. Capitals view the actual vote coordination process as important. They tend to more or less heavily rely on the expertise of their delegates in the Missions to set the negotiation tactics (Official #6, 23 October 2008; Official #8, 18 November 2008; Official #11, 20 November 2008; Official #26, 16 September 2008; Official #37, 7 November 2008). The reason for that is that the capitals are not familiar with the dynamics inside the coordination meetings (Official #9, 27 October 2008) and at times delegates have to react quickly to changes in the ongoing negotiations (Official #3, 15 September 2008; Official #6, 23 October 2008). Especially the last point can naturally at times create difficulties for the negotiator. He or she might be left with making a quick decision in a situation where he or she might not have obtained the exact concessions demanded by the capital, but potentially enough to warrant a convergence towards the EU majority (Official #29, 18 September 2008). Formal instructions are definitely sought when there is a split (Official #32, 4 December 2008). Especially if breaking the consensus is at stake, it is important for the negotiator to have the full support of the capital (Official #26, 16 September 2008). Conversely, whenever a member state assumes the EU Presidency for the duration of which national preferences are supposed to be secondary, it is not unheard of that the delegates ask the capital to refrain from sending instructions altogether (Official #15, 7 October 2008; Official #17, 7 October 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008; Official #32, 4 December 2008).

In more concrete terms then it can be observed that substantive instructions exist for both issue areas, whereby hard-liner capitals in both issue areas predictably tend to release more detailed instructions. Instructions can be particularly uncompromising, where capitals have “strong sense of national interest in the formulation of policy” (Laatikainen, 2006, p. 81; see also Official #29, 18 September 2008). Nevertheless, compared to military issues, a much larger scope for compromise can be observed for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where national instructions additionally to substantive points might also specifically emphasise the importance of accommodating the EU majority.

Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict

For resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, national instructions are generally substantive in nature. They tend to highlight resolution language which is not deemed acceptable by the capital and may include suggestions for compromise. That is to say instructions may include a change of term or a change of location within the resolution text for a certain sentence or paragraph. It might also be suggested to drop the contentious paragraph altogether (Official #25, 16 September 2008). Significantly, in addition to substantive instructions, some national instructions include a “standing order to seek EU majority” (Official #22, 2 October 2008). That is to say that additionally to whatever substantive points they have to defend on behalf of their capitals, the Middle East experts enter the coordination process with a second objective. They are asked to take into consideration the atmosphere between the EU member states and if possible to find a common position. In the end, even the staunchest hard-liners generally come around to a common EU position.

Military Resolutions

National instructions for resolutions pertaining to military issues are also substantive in nature. They may be more detailed for newer resolutions compared to repeat-resolutions, where existing voting patterns are commonly known (Official #31, 13 November 2008). Not much flexibility exists for finding a voting compromise. National positions are mutually respected without much effort to find a commonly acceptable position. Particularly on nuclear issues, instructions tend to “be firm regardless of any hope to achieve EU cohesion” (Official #1, 13 November 2008). There is a common perception that somehow in the 1st committee “[the member states] are stuck in a classic way of dealing with matters, where national positions take precedent” (Official #4, 10 November 2008).

7.5 Coordination Pressures and Responses

Pressure for vote coordination exists. It takes on different forms and member states deal with it differently. Most of the pressure exerted can be summarised as an appeal to EU unity whereby a “friendly reminder” (Official #28, 8 October 2008) of existing Brussels positions is given. While the member states are of course bound to support any existing CFSP position, in reality the case is less straight forward with reference to United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Even comparable Brussels positions do not usually translate into UN resolutions one to one. The CFSP positions tend to be more ambiguous in language so as to facilitate agreement between the EU member states in Brussels. Resolutions in New York, meanwhile, especially those not sponsored by the EU, tend to be phrased in much more concrete terms. Consequently, with the Brussels text generally set up in a way that “one could not move a comma without losing agreement”, in those instances in which the UN text differs from the CFSP text,

member states are likely to have different positions as well (Official #9, 27 October 2008).⁴⁸ Other types of pressures include plain emotional behaviour accompanied by threats of vote retaliation at a later point. Furthermore, resistant capitals may be demarched by the EU Presidency.

In response to coordination pressure, countries may either stick with their national positions or try to look for a compromise, enabling them to vote with the rest of the member states. Even when isolated and unpopular, some governments still will not budge (Official #39, 20 November 2008). This tends to be due to a matter of national interest as well as a matter of size (Official #12, 7 October 2008). Intriguingly, some of the more traditionally isolated countries freely admit that they do not perceive much coordination pressure. This indicates either that considerably more pressure is put on those countries which are likely to budge; or alternatively, it may indicate that countries that are not likely to budge are also less sensitive to coordination pressures. Traditional isolationists tend to handle isolation especially on established points of disagreement generally in a low-key manner (Official #14, 7 October 2008). In fact the UK, traditionally in isolation on resolutions pertaining to decolonisation, finds that by letting many of those resolutions pass without calling a vote, it shows much goodwill already and subsequently does not make much effort to find a consensus on those that are called to a vote (Official #38, 9 October 2008).

There is furthermore a big difference between causing a voting split and taking advantage of an existing voting split. Some countries are explicitly uncomfortable with causing a split, and will vote with the EU majority despite divergent national positions.

⁴⁸ See chapter 5.4 for more details.

Nevertheless, once another EU member state has caused the split and the countries do no longer speak with single voice, those same countries are quite happy to vote according to their divergent national position. Strömvik (1998) summarises the problem as follows:

“If one state repeatedly breaks the unity, the choice for the rest of the members is no longer one between total EU unity versus being the one that breaks the unity. It is rather a choice between securing partial EU unity versus deteriorating the partial unity even further. In the latter situation, the “costs” of deviating from the EU line of action becomes less severe.” (p. 197)

In most instances, however, member states in isolation actively seek to find a compromise which would enable them to vote with the EU majority. They talk to their capital on the one hand and seek support at the EU coordination table, especially with the like-minded countries, on the other hand (Official #23, 7 October 2008). In fact, being in a minority but signalling willingness to compromise is a very powerful tool in this particular setting. While the threat of “[d]efections [is naturally an expression] of relative dissatisfaction with the coordination outcome”, more significantly it “is a public attempt, made at some cost, to force the other actor[s] into a different equilibrium outcome”(Stein, 1982, p. 314). And with the “clear attempt [by the consensus-seeking majority] to move towards the minority to accommodate their wishes in terms of wording” (Official #19, 27 October 2008), countries in the minority, as toughest negotiators, have the ability to dictate the majority (Official #9, 27 October 2008; Official #23, 7 October 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008).⁴⁹ Delegates occasionally try to take advantage of the fact that most of the time the EU majority position is not predetermined. Many countries do not have a set view and are happy to

⁴⁹ See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of bargaining tactics.

follow whenever a “palpable EU majority ” emerges (Official #31, 13 November 2008).

That opens up a possibility for member states with strong views to become informal agenda setters. One official reveals aspects of his negotiation tactics:

“Once you have your instructions, you engage in pre-meeting talks with others to sound out the situation. If you have a strong point you need to make it quickly (in the EU coordination meeting). Only five or six other countries (not always the same) tend to have a strong view and when you obtain the support of two or three you have won.” (Official #34, 1 December 2008)

In more concrete terms it can be observed that considerably more pressure for coordination is exerted for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, than for resolutions pertaining to military issues. Furthermore, member states are more willing to budge under pressure in the former issue area compared to the latter.

Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict

The pressure for vote coordination in the Arab Israeli conflict is intense. It generally exceeds the “friendly reminder of existing Brussels positions” (Official #28, 8 October 2008). Seemingly forgetting that everybody works under national instructions from Ministers and political directors (Official #5, 10 November 2008; Official #8, 18 November 2008; Official #26, 16 September 2008), it at times manifests itself by angry finger pointing and shouting (Official #29, 18 September 2008). There might even be threats to retaliate on other issues important to the resisting delegations. Demarches may be sent to the capital of the resisting delegation, alleging that negotiators are misbehaving (Official #29, 18 September 2008). Significantly, the Palestinians themselves at times threaten to reevaluate the relationship (Official #29, 18 September 2008). They thereby essentially threaten to undermine the very basis for

the EU to increase its collective bargaining power. It is not unusual that when disagreement at the expert level prevails, extraordinary meetings between the Heads of Missions must be called (Official #22, 2 October 2008). That varies from year to year, and to a certain extent mirrors the particular situation on the ground between the Palestinians and the Israelis at the time (Official #5, 10 November 2008). In times of relative calm on the ground, agreement is obtained more easily than in times of crisis when opposing hard-line positions become more hardened still. Nevertheless, because the desire for consensus is particularly high in the Arab Israeli conflict, isolated countries can more or less successfully make use of the “power of minority” (Official #23, 7 October 2008). They are able to exploit the situation and make their demands accordingly, knowing that in all likelihood they will be accommodated (Official #38, 9 October 2008). The subsequent compromise is found usually not in the middle but closer to the minority position (Official #29, 18 September 2008; Official #32, 4 December 2008).

Those countries that generally find themselves in the minority on resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict tend to stick together regardless of minor discrepancies between their respective positions. Most simply they stick together on virtually all resolutions for fear of being exposed at a later point. (Official #8, 18 November 2008) And because many of the resolutions are repeat-resolutions, every newly established status-quo has a potential impact on negotiations in the following year and could leave the isolated countries incrementally losing ground. For resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, EU member states are not particularly concerned about the position taken by the US. The US position is seen as

virtually identical to the Israeli position and as such so far removed from any possibility to compromise so as to render it irrelevant for discussion.

Military Issues

Negotiations at the military expert level are extremely static (Official #1, 13 November 2008). The delegates make use of a so-called matrix, which essentially is a table that illustrates their previous voting behaviour for the particular resolutions, going back one year. Delegations emphasise their sovereignty and are strongly loyal to their national instructions (Official #20, 6 November 2008). Breaking away from the EU majority position in the 1st committee is generally more easily justified than in other issue areas, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Official #19, 27 October 2008). Particularly nuclear states are not uncomfortable in their isolated position (Official #38, 9 October 2008). However, even among nuclear states some sense of community seems to exist. They see each other as well as the US as partners (Official #14, 7 October 2008). Isolation tends to be more difficult to bear for non-nuclear states (Official #34, 1 December 2008). Some find it not desirable to share a vote position with just France and the UK, so as not to be perceived as “being pocketed by the big guys” (Official #7, 18 November 2008).

There are no excessive attempts inside the 1st committee to pressure countries into vote coordination. Rather, coordination attempts tend to resemble a simple exchange of information. And as opposed to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where appeals to EU unity are accompanied by drawing attention to the significance of the conflict, appeals to EU unity for resolutions pertaining to military issues tend to be underlined by the harmlessness of the resolution at hand (Official #36, 7 November 2008). The respect

for divergent national positions is prevailing (Official #1, 13 November 2008). The groupings are well known before the negotiations and very little effort to change is sensed (Official #10, 20 November 2008). There are no thorough discussions or genuine contemplations of changing one's position. There might be talk about individual instructions but everybody is aware where the other delegations stand (Official #4, 10 November 2008).

7.6 Conclusion

In chapter 7 I presented a comparative case study of the EU vote coordination process inside the General Assembly contrasting the coordination process in the 1st Committee with that taking place in the 4th Committee. I sought to illustrate that when EU cohesion leads to a tangible increase of collective bargaining power, EU member states are successfully able to coordinate their voting positions even in issue areas deemed divisive and contentious. I demonstrated that EU member states were successfully able to coordinate their votes in the former, where EU unity results in a tangible increase of collective bargaining power.⁵⁰ I further demonstrated that EU member states were not successfully able to coordinate their votes in that latter, where EU unity does not automatically involve a tangible increase of collective bargaining power. To this end, I illustrated that for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, EU member states attach a higher value to EU unity, are more willing to compromise with regards to their national policy preferences and are more susceptible to the higher levels of coordination pressure exerted.

⁵⁰ This conclusion is based on the information received during the interviews – that in fact other UN member states openly align themselves with the EU position as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although an empirical cross-check goes beyond the scope of this research project, a future analysis of UN voting behaviour might include such a cross-check.

7.7 Appendices

Appendix 7A: Interview Guide (English)

This interview guide has been used for the research interviews conducted at all the Permanent Missions to the United Nations General Assembly included in this study, with exception of Germany and Austria. Those interviews were conducted in German.

Introduction

- EU voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly
- statistical analysis for voting pattern analysis
- social science – numbers only make up half the picture, so to talk to officials with an insight about how the EU member states work inside UNGA is invaluable

Practical Issues

- completely anonymous

Core Interview Questions

Dynamics inside EU coordination meetings

- What happens when minority groupings or isolated constellations emerge?
- What happens when you are in a minority?
- How does pressure manifest itself?
- How do you deal with pressure? (How much room for compromise do your national instructions provide for – what does it depend on?)

Complexity of trying to consolidate national instructions/positions with EU majority

- How detailed are national instructions?
- Are they substantive in manner or generally stipulate to follow EU majority ?
- How important is it to achieve EU cohesion?
- How far do you go to achieve it?
- How do you view abstention as a means to achieve EU cohesion?

Impact of Transatlantic Relationship on EU coordination

- How does the transatlantic relationship factor into EU coordination?
- How does your bilateral relationship with the US factor into your positions at the EU coordination table?

Conclusion

- Anything you want to add?
- Anybody I should talk to?

Appendix 7B: Interview Guide (German)

This interview guide has been used for the research interviews conducted at the German and Austrian Permanent Missions to the United Nations General Assembly

Einleitung

- Abstimmungsverhalten der EU Mitgliedstaaten in UNO General Versammlung
- Habe statistische Analysen erhoben
- Da es Sozialwissenschaft ist, ist es aber auch wichtig Forschungsinterviews an den einzelnen Staendigen Vertretungen der EU Mitgliedsstaaten durchzufuehren

Praktisches

- Kann vollstaendige Anonymitaet garantieren

Interview – Leitfragen

Dynamik in EU Koordinationsversammlungen

- Was passiert wenn sich Minderheiten oder Isolationskonstellationen entwickeln?
- Was passiert wenn Ihr Land in der Minderheit ist?
- Wie wird Druck ausgeuebt?
- Wie reagieren Sie auf diesen Druck? (Wie flexibel sind Ihre Weisungen aus der Hauptstadt?)

Komplexitaet wenn man versucht nationale Weisungen mit EU Koherenz zu vereinen?

- Wie detailliert sind Ihre nationalen Weisungen?
- Sind sie eher allgemein gehalten und fordern generell zur Mehrheitsfindung auf?
- Wie wichtig ist EU Koherenz fuer Sie?
- Wie bewerten Sie Stimmenthaltung als Mittel zur EU Koherenz?

Auswirkung der Transatlantischen Beziehungen auf EU Koordination

- Wie wirkt sich die transatlantische Beziehung auf die EU Koordination aus?
- Wie wirkt sich die bilaterale Beziehung zwischen Ihrem Land und der USA auf Ihre Verhandlungsposition aus?

Abschluss

- Gibt es Ihrerseits noch etwas dazuzufuegen?
- Koennen Sie Kollegen fuer weitere Forschungsinterviews empfehlen?

PART IV CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Puzzled by the inconsistency with which EU member states honour their commitment to stand united in foreign policy matters, this thesis has been motivated by the underlying interest in analysing which factors determine whether or not EU member states speak with a single voice in international affairs. The United Nations General Assembly served as a useful analytical framework. While it may not be the most topical of international forums, its methodological versatility provided for a genuine possibility to analyse EU voting behaviour in a systematic manner. As such, it has not only offered me the opportunity to employ a quantitative voting pattern analysis, but has also enabled me to conduct a qualitative in-depth analysis of the vote coordination process that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes. Because the overall UN membership encompasses virtually all of the world's states, it further made it possible to contextualise the voting patterns of the EU member states by comparing them to that of other countries. Although here, the primary focus rested on the United States, I further extended the comparison to the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The present chapter forms the conclusion of this thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections. In section 8.1, I shall in a few paragraphs rehearse the main arguments of the thesis and summarise its key findings. I subsequently seek to consider the broader theoretical and empirical conclusions of the thesis in section 8.2. Finally, in section 8.3, I shall address some of the shortcomings present in the thesis and further discuss future research opportunities.

8.1 Main Argument & Key Findings

The central argument of the thesis runs as follows: The member states of the European Union intend to coordinate their voting positions in the UNGA, despite their right to vote according to their heterogeneous policy preferences. The validity of this argument leans on the following two considerations. One, it depends on the correctness of the notion that the EU member states intend to coordinate their voting positions. For, if the member states did not intend to coordinate their voting positions, irrespective of the level of vote cohesion, studying EU coordination in the United Nations General Assembly would not be justified. Two, it further relies on the fact that national policy preferences are indeed heterogeneous. For, if the member states of the European Union had identical voting preferences, they would be expected to cast identical votes by default, irrespective of any coordination efforts on their part. Because “where interests are in full harmony, the capacity of states to cooperate [...] is irrelevant to the realization of mutual benefits” (Oye, 1985, p. 6). Hence, a considerable amount of space in this thesis has been devoted to elaborate on these points in conceptional terms (chapter 3) and to demonstrate their legitimacy empirically (chapter 5 and 7 for intentional vote coordination and chapter 6 for heterogeneous policy preferences).

Evidently, so long as national policy preferences and EU majority positions coincide, it is not a problem for the member states of the European Union to cast identical votes inside the UNGA. However, for divisive resolutions EU member states face a conflict of interest. On the one hand they are committed to successfully coordinate their UNGA positions with the fellow EU member states and thus subject to coordination pressures. On the other hand, as sovereign nation states, they are free to vote

according to their national preferences in the General Assembly. In those instances then, the resultant conflict of interest has to be reconciled. The member states must decide whether to vote according to their national policy preferences or (effectively amounting to vote defection from the EU majority position); or alternatively, whether to engage in EU-consensus oriented voting behaviour (effectively overriding their heterogeneous policy preferences in order to cast a vote alongside the EU majority)

The key to understanding their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon understanding how the member states of the European Union respond to whatever coordination pressures they are exposed to by their peers inside the EU. In chapter 3, I hypothesised that the balance a member state strikes between these two options generally depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its relationship with the US as external factor. I furthermore argued that the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a concrete possibility at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in favour of vote cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective. In the following paragraphs, I shall in a few words rehearse the core propositions and highlight the main findings.

State-Focused Factors

Both power and issue salience are state-focused factors, in that they emphasise the national position rather than EU membership as the driving force behind UNGA voting (chapter 3). As regards power, the argument holds that more powerful states are less susceptible to EU vote coordination pressure and therefore less likely to engage in EU

majority – oriented voting behaviour. In short, the reason for that is that as chief provider of whatever extra clout cooperation entails, in relative terms they gain less from successful vote coordination compared to less powerful states. For that reason more powerful states tend to be more reluctant to give up their national policy preference. And because less powerful states gain so much more from successful vote coordination, they in turn are reluctant to punish more powerful states for the occasional vote defection, for fear that the entire system might collapse. As for issue salience, the argument holds that the more important a member state perceives the issue at hand to be; the less likely it will surrender its national policy preference in favour of a uniform EU position.

Both variables have been put to the test by means of quantitative voting pattern analysis (chapters 5 and 6). Generally speaking, power is inadequate as gauge for the UNGA voting behaviour of the EU member states. Conceived of in traditional terms of military prowess or economic might, it is a rather poor indicator. Measured in institutional terms, as voting weights in the Council of Ministers, it fares slightly better but still fails to produce consistent and robust results.

The variable salience has delivered very interesting results. Across both parts of the quantitative voting pattern analysis, the variable salience consistently and sometimes significantly predicts a decreased likelihood of vote defection the more salient an issue area is perceived by the individual member states. In terms of system-level analysis, this means an increased likelihood of perfect vote cohesion, the more important an issue is perceived on average. While these outcomes alone might have been less interesting, they not only have resulted in contradiction to the stated hypothesis but

also in face of insurmountable operational limitations (both discussed in more detail in chapter 3). As it stands, the findings of the quantitative analysis are of course theoretically non-conclusive. Without knowing a country's national policy preference it is impossible to determine whether the member states simply happen to agree on issues they individually perceive as salient, or alternatively, whether the member states prefer a cohesive vote on an issue they perceive as salient, even if it means overriding one's national policy preference (!). Having said this, these results should be taken as encouragement for further exploration of this particular question.

Institutional Factors

In this thesis I suggested that institutional factors, the set of factors associated with EU membership, constitute another driving force of UNGA voting behaviour of the EU member states. The argument maintains that the countries of the European Union by mere association through membership are susceptible to those formal and informal vote coordination pressures that are manifested in their EU membership. These include first and foremost existing relevant CFSP positions but also more informal pressures, such as the collective sponsorship of a resolution. The argument further goes that in addition to these institutional pressures, a country's dedication to the EU affects how susceptible it is to vote coordination pressure. Essentially, those countries which (a) benefit directly from EU membership, (b) have demonstrated their commitment by never opting out and consistently choosing further integration, or (c) are generally enthusiastic about the concept of the EU, are expected to place a high premium on EU majority – oriented voting. Finally, if by working collectively, the EU member states see a concrete possibility at taking a leadership position – in other

words, if the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective – they are much more willing to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour.

The empirical results of the quantitative voting pattern analysis seem to indicate that a country's relationship with the EU is a much stronger determinant of its voting behaviour inside the UNGA than is either power or issue salience (see chapters 5 and 6). Particularly the existence of a relevant CFSP position serves as strong indicator of EU cohesion inside the General Assembly. Similarly, member states that are net-beneficiaries of the EU budget are much less likely to defect from the EU majority position than those that are net-contributors. Significantly, it emerges from the qualitative analysis in chapter 7 that the Union as a whole is capable of coordinating a united position, despite underlying disagreement, so long as doing so implies a tangible increase in their collective bargaining power. This is indeed an important finding, since it shows that, even in contentious issue areas, it is possible for the EU member states to override their national policy preference in order to stand united.

External Factors

External factors add another possible driving force to the mix. Rooted in the assumption that external factors may affect a country's voting behaviour inside the UNGA, the argument holds that because the United States is one of the most significant international actors as well as perceived to be a genuine partner by the Europeans, its positions inside the UNGA are likely to command a certain level of attention. And while not all EU member states are equally close to the US, for those that do foster a tight political, economic or cultural bond with the US, in instances of transatlantic divergence that bond is expected to relieve some of the vote

coordination pressure exerted by the EU, thereby providing the EU member state some room for vote defection.

Notwithstanding those academics who periodically question the soundness of the transatlantic relationship (e.g. Allin, 2004; Cohen-Tanuga, 2003; Daalder, 2001; Freedman, 1982; Morgenthau, 1957; Wallace, 2002), its specialness tends to generally be accepted by practitioners without much additional thought. The interview programme conducted as part of this study corroborates this view. It has thus come as a surprise that the presumed specialness of the transatlantic relationship does not reflect in the UNGA voting behaviour of the partners (chapter 5). Indeed, the transatlantic partners disagree more often than they agree. It appears that the votes cast by the majority of the EU states are much closer to those of Russia and China than to the votes cast by the US. Interestingly, however, from the US perspective, the EU is in fact its closest voting partner, since China and Russia are even further removed. This overall picture indicates that the US is the odd-one out. While these figures include the resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict – a well-known bone of contention between the two sides – even disregarding those, the transatlantic partners still disagree almost as much as they agree. Finally, for all those resolutions deemed important by the US, the transatlantic partners agree roughly twice as many times as they disagree; although for a quarter of the so-called ‘lobbied votes’ the EU member states collectively oppose the US position (chapter 5). Regrettably, when testing for the likelihood of vote defection in instances of transatlantic divergence in chapter 6, the strength of the bilateral relationship in political, economic or cultural terms does not produce unequivocal results. In addition to overlapping confidence intervals, the predicted voting behaviour changes direction depending on the type of relationship.

In quest of answers to the questions one has posed, there is always a possibility in each research project to stumble upon patterns and trends not previously considered. Some of the more fascinating unintended findings are summarised here. Quite naturally, much of the existing research deals with the occurrence and/or extent of disagreement between the EU member states. To this end there is a general tendency to distinguish between more disagreement-prone issue areas and less disagreement-prone issue areas (see chapter 2). In carrying out my own research, I have come to realise two things. One, the occurrence of issues where member states are unable to find agreement is generally overestimated. In fact, they make up only a small fraction of all resolutions (see Figure 7.1). Two, while the contentiousness of certain topics in comparison to other topics is not disputed in this thesis, the suggestion that levels of contention are static is rejected. For instance, by further disintegrating military issues (which are generally seen as divisive since protecting member states' proclivities), one observes that general disarmament issues are much less divisive than nuclear issues (chapter 5). Repeat resolutions make up another example (those that re-appear in several UNGA annual sessions). By looking at repeat resolutions, one can observe that for virtually identical resolutions, the level of EU cohesion varies over time.

8.2 Overall Conclusions

Following the rehearsal of the main arguments and the presentation of the key findings, I shall now outline some of the contributions of this thesis to the existing bodies of knowledge. To this end, I want to highlight how this thesis adds to the field of study on EU voting behaviour in the UNGA, before focusing on what implications the

findings of this thesis have for the larger theoretical framework concerning EU foreign policy particularly and inter-state cooperation more generally.

The Thesis in the Field of Research on EU Voting Behaviour in the UNGA

In chapter 2, I discussed the various ways in which this thesis would attempt to add to the current research assessing the voting behaviour of the EU member states inside the UNGA. To this end, I endeavoured to draw out the conceptual distinction between EU member states casting identical votes because of agreement or despite of disagreement. By means of descriptive and particularly inferential statistics, I further hoped to systematise the transatlantic relationship as well as to identify underlying patterns of the EU voting behaviour in the UNGA.

By distinguishing between vote defections (in instances of preference divergence, the member state chooses to vote according to its national policy preference) and EU majority – oriented voting (in instances of preference divergence, the member state chooses to surrender its national policy preference in favour of a uniform EU position), this thesis makes a comprehensive attempt at gaining a better insight into the ability and willingness of the EU member states to vote with the EU majority when it means overriding their national policy preferences. To this effect, I have demonstrated in the empirical chapters (chapters 5 to 7) that given certain conditions, EU member states are able to successfully coordinate their positions despite divergent policy preferences. The specifics of my findings are highlighted in the above paragraphs.

The Thesis in the Field of European Foreign Policy Studies

In chapter 1 I argued that in a world dominated by Westphalian nation-states the European Union is a relatively new type of political entity. I made the point that if such a new type of political entity were in a position to formulate a cohesive foreign policy, it would affect current International relations theory in a profound manner. For that reason I suggested it would be prudent to take stock of the situation empirically. With this thesis I attempted to take a step into that direction. The most significant score in favour of the Westphalian nation-state would have been a clear inability for EU member states to vote cohesively when it means overriding national policy preferences. This has proven not to be the case (chapters 5-7). And as highlighted already earlier, not only do member states very frequently speak with one voice in the forum; significantly, they are able and willing to successfully coordinate their votes in instances of divergent national policy preference.

Having said this, the UNGA is a very particular forum (chapter 4) and one in which the EU member states act in their capacity as sovereign nation-states. And while it is not unreasonable to assume that similar coordination efforts take place in comparable forums (e.g. for EU coordination in the ILO see Kissack, 2006), the field of European Foreign Policy is rather complex where depending on the context, EU member states might act in sovereign, intergovernmental or even supranational fashion (chapter 2). And although the research at hand provides a useful insight into those aspects of European Foreign Policy where the member states act in their capacity as sovereign nation-states, the question remains to what degree the findings of this thesis are extendable to other forums, where the member states might be required to act in an intergovernmental or even supranational fashion.

The Thesis and the Question of Inter-State Cooperation

The larger theoretical framework presented in this thesis that deals with inter-state cooperation in international affairs contains several approaches which differ in some or all of their assumptions. As outlined in chapter 2, most of the theoretical perspectives discussed view the state as the chief actor in international affairs. Furthermore, state preferences are most narrowly defined for the Realist, for whom the ultimate driving force is state sovereignty; a means to security and facilitated by power. The preferences for the remaining theoretical approaches are more broadly defined. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, furthermore, acknowledges a domestic role in preference formation, while constructivism stresses the importance of the intersubjective structure for interest (and identity) formation. Following on from this, the Realist is very pessimistic about any sort of cooperation and can see it happen only in extraordinary circumstances and on a temporary basis. Neofunctionalism, on the other side of the spectrum, envisages full-fledged integration of the member states which would imply cooperation by default. The remaining theoretical approaches are generally optimistic about the prospects of cooperation.

The Constructivist-Rationalist Debate Revisited

The thesis shows clearly that EU member states cooperate inside the General Assembly. They make a genuine and continuous effort to coordinate their votes. Both, the constructivist as well as the rationalist approach seem to be reflected in the findings. To this end, some of the results appear to support a more constructivist understanding of EU voting behaviour in the UNGA. Particularly the existence of a relevant CFSP position is associated with a higher degree of EU cohesion and lower

defection rates. Moreover, among the member states EU unity appears to be seen by the EU diplomats as a “matter of pride” (Official #6, 23 October 2008) and the result of a “coordination reflex” (Official #28, 8 October 2008). Yet, other findings seem to support a more rationalist understanding of EU voting behavior in the UNGA. Net-beneficiaries of the EU budget, for instance, are significantly less likely to defect from the EU majority position than those that are net-contributors. Furthermore, the results of the qualitative analysis suggest that for divisive resolutions, countries tend to consider the benefits and costs of their various options. They seem more willing to override their heterogeneous policy preferences where doing so results in a tangible increase of collective bargaining power. That is to say, they seem more willing to override their heterogeneous policy preferences for resolutions pertaining to the Arab/Israeli conflict, and less willing to do so for military resolutions.

As such, this thesis is not in a position to unequivocally resolve the theoretically debate surrounding foreign policy cooperation between the EU member states. Rather its results further nourish the constructivist-rationalist debate. While a certain degree of socialisation among the EU member states inside the UNGA seems to be evident, the results of the empirical analysis also suggest that “effects of socialization are often [...] secondary to dynamics at the national level” (Zuern & Ceckel, 2005, p. 1047). Accordingly, the member states are generally concerned with weighing the domestic costs of overriding heterogeneous policy preference in exchange for tangible rewards. Conformity can be expected so long as the political utility actors derive from cooperation and exceeds the domestic costs associated with it (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 830). The higher and more tangible the rewards for cooperation are, the stronger is

the incentive to override national policy preferences (see Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 828).

8.3 Opportunities for Future Research

I would like to bring this project to a close by highlighting opportunities for future research. Every research project suffers from constraints. Most frequently time, space and resources are short in supply. Hence with additional time, space and resources greater depth and accuracy could be added to the analysis presented here. More specifically, this thesis could be improved and brought forward in five ways.

One, as highlighted earlier in the present chapter, EU cohesion levels vary within repeat resolution over time. This occurrence warrants further investigation as it might provide us additional insight into the EU coordination process inside the United Nations General Assembly.

Two, for reasons outlined in chapter 4, the focus of this PhD project has been on the fifteen old EU member states. That in itself is not necessarily a shortcoming of this analysis, since I considered it necessary to focus on the 15 'old members' of the European Union, in order to make for a useful starting point for further comparisons. Having said this, by analysing fifteen of 27 member states, I have focused on only a sub-set of the entire EU membership. The analysis could easily be replicated to include the twelve newer member states and could perhaps even be extended to include the candidate countries.

Three, while this study acknowledges the potential impact of external factors on a country's voting behaviour inside UNGA, it limits its focus on the transatlantic relationship for reasons outlined in chapter 3. Regardless, also in chapter 3, I acknowledge that especially since the disintegration of the post-Cold war bipolar international system, numerous important actors have emerged. Thus any future projects might consider including those in the analysis.

Four, one of the biggest shortcomings of the current project has been the operational limitation derived from the unavailability of reliable data on national policy preference. This has entailed implications for the conceptional understanding as well as for the empirical transposition of the hypotheses. In this research project, data for issue salience has been derived from the Comparative Manifesto Dataset. (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) The CMD data specifically focuses on how important a country perceives an issue, but not exactly where it stands on that issue. In future research, this measure may be improved by using other more relevant indices. Instead of relying purely on government manifestos, additional media coverage or voter perceptions might help in the estimation of government policy positions. (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis & Pennings, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008) The consistent and sometimes robust findings with regards to the variable salience make for an encouraging start.

Five, in the quantitative chapters of this PhD (chapters 5 and 6), I have conducted a descriptive voting pattern analysis as well as an inferential statistical analysis where appropriate. Nevertheless, this type of data also conveniently avails itself to spatial modelling and one could elaborate on the work of Frieden (2004). In such analysis one

might find the possibility to further explore the power of defection (chapter 3); a phenomenon that has EU member states proclaiming red lines in an effort to move the agreed consensus position closer to their ideal point before caving in.

In this thesis, I set out to analyse EU coordination efforts and subsequent voting behaviour in the General Assembly. The results confirm that coordination efforts take place. The results further suggest that that EU member states are successful in speaking with one voice in instances other than when they share identical preferences. Despite the limited extent to which these findings can be applied to all aspects of EFP, the simple fact that the EU member states do seek to speak with a single voice in international affairs and at times successfully so, should be taken as encouragement for further research in the field of EU foreign policy.

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