What civil society after civil war?

A study of civil society organizations’ affect on peace consolidation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan

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This dissertation seeks to explain how civil society organizations can positively affect peace consolidation based on cases of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community based (CBOs) organizations from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. It aims to determine how and why civil society organizations behave as they do in post-conflict, post-communist, contexts, and assess their contribution to peace. The link between civil society and peace has been assumed in research literature, but little comparative empirical research has been carried out to explain its nature. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap.

I describe how liberal and communal definitions of civil society are applicable to the Tajik and Bosnian cases based on a brief historical analysis. NGOs are found to be the most significant organizational representation of liberal civil society, and CBOs, especially mahallas (neighborhoods) and mjesne zajednice (local communities), of communal civil society in the postwar period. I outline key post conflict challenges, classifying them as institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights based. I develop a series of preliminary hypotheses on civil society organizations’ possible contributions based on civil society and peace literature. These assumptions are tested through case studies of two NGOs and two CBOs.

I determine how the post-conflict, post-communist, environments influenced organizations’ choices of missions, programs, linkages, structures and funding sources. I conclude that experienced and charismatic leadership, clear missions, ability to build trust, understanding of donor relations, and well-developed linkages, were essential for success. I confirm many of the assumptions regarding civil society’s potential to positively affect peace, but find some critical differences. One important conclusion is that not only inter-communal but also intra-communal organizations can support peace.
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This dissertation is based on the inputs, support, and advice of a very large number of individuals who assisted me. I cannot name you all. However I hope that this work will in some way reward your trust and confidence.
**ACRONYM:**

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<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADDC</td>
<td>Association of District Development Committees</td>
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<td>AKF</td>
<td>Aga Khan Foundation</td>
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<td>ASTI</td>
<td>Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia (ASTI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAIP</td>
<td>Community Action Investment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community based organization</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CNR</td>
<td>Commission on National Reconciliation</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Communist Party of Tajikistan</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>German mark</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced person</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
<td>Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>ECCP</td>
<td>European Center for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Organization</td>
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<td>ESI</td>
<td>European Stability Initiative</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GBAO</td>
<td>Gorno-Badakshon Autonomous Oblast</td>
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<td>GFAP</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Government Organized NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly</td>
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<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (<em>Hrvatska demokratska stranka</em>)</td>
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<td>HRCC</td>
<td>Human Rights Coordination Center</td>
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<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>International Bureau for Humanitarian Issues</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPM</td>
<td>Institute for Development Policy and Management (Manchester University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEBL</td>
<td>Inter-Entity Border Line</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>(Nato) Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organization</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>IRP</td>
<td>Islamic Republican Party</td>
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Introduction:

WHAT CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER CIVIL WAR?

Introduction:
After civil wars have ended, how can civil society positively affect peace consolidation? This dissertation seeks to answer this question through the study of local civil society organizations in two countries - Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina - five years after the end of armed hostilities. With fanfare Tajikistan celebrated the fifth anniversary of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in 2002, as did Bosnia-Herzegovina the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), in 2000. In both cases five years after the signing of peace agreements armed violence had ended, refugees and displaced persons had started to return home, a central government had been elected, economic production had restarted, and society had begun to shift its thoughts from traumatic war experiences to hopes for a better future. Amidst these significant transformations what positive role did Tajik and Bosnian civil society organizations play?

The aim of this dissertation is to explain how civil society organizations can positively affect peace consolidation in post-communist post-war contexts based on cases of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community based organizations (CBOs) from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. The connection between civil society and peace has been assumed for the past decade but little comparative empirical research has been carried out to explain it further. The link was first made in the early 1990s when two of the loudest buzzwords in the academic and policy-making worlds were peace building and civil society. At the end of the Cold War there were rising expectations of a new world order in which the international community had the capacity to secure peace and stability in a host of trouble spots. The twin United Nations (UN) documents An Agenda for Peace (1992) and Building Peace and Development (1994) clearly reflected the international community’s early optimism. The 1989 revolutions in Central Europe meanwhile came to represent the victory of civil society – of groups such as Charter 77, Solidarity, and the
Introduction

Danube Circle – over authoritarianism. In policy documents from the UN to the World Bank (WB), from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to Oxfam, civil society was glorified as an essential component of peace building, democratization, and development. Civil society organizations were credited with the ability to fill democratic deficits in governmental institutions and decision-making; to support transition from state-controlled to capitalist market economies; to address the breakdown of social cohesion and trust by facilitating reconciliation; to transform popular emotions of greed and grievances; and to strengthen the rule of law and human rights protection in post-war contexts.

Ten years later, the optimism that the international community could secure peace and stability, and that civil society organizations could play an important role in peace consolidation, had begun to fade. Academics, policy-makers and development workers had all become more self-critical and wary about their capacities, and those of civil society, to build peace. Debate and ambivalence confronted the practical and conceptual usefulness of the terms “peace building” and “civil society.” The discourse on civil society, and more particularly on NGOs, was criticized by activists and academics alike as a fig leaf concealing international and mainly Western inaction or indifference to human suffering, both in humanitarian operations and development (Pearce, 2000: 20).

This study seeks to approach the question of the affect of civil society organizations on peace from a fresh perspective - neither bogged down in the current theoretical and practical malaise, nor duped by the earlier magic. Though there has been substantial debate on civil society’s affect on peace, few attempts have been made to study actual experiences in post-war contexts comparatively to explain the nature and strength of the link. When work on this dissertation began in 2000 the challenge to reconcile the literatures on civil society and peace consolidation remained largely unfulfilled. As Varshney noted in Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002: 5), “thus far scholars have either worked on civil society or on ethnic conflict, but no systematic attempt has been made to connect the two.”

This dissertation is an attempt to contribute to this bridging process. Its novelty is to propose an in-depth analysis of a handful of local civil society organizations, in two
countries at peace for five years, to explain not only how these groups behaved, but also why they behaved as they did. The organizations chosen for analyses were popularly perceived to be strong groups with the organizational capacity to effect change. As these groups are those most likely to be able to influence peace consolidation, this study aimed to explain the nature of their missions, activities, funding, leadership and ultimately their contribution to peace, in the post-war and post-communist contexts of Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Examples of NGOs and CBOs were considered. In the literature on civil society the former are generally described as being representatives of liberal civil society, and the later forms of communal civil society. Civil society scholarship has established a liberal/communal dichotomy based on the assignment of ideal types based on the missions, organizational structures and political aims of different groups. Ultimately this thesis also seeks to assess the appropriateness of this dichotomy in post war settings.

The country case studies:
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina were selected as country case studies because they share distinct attributes as post-communist states – born out of the disintegration of larger federations – with important Muslim populations. In choosing one country from the Balkans, and one from Central Asia, I hoped to advance theoretical and policy-orientated findings that are applicable throughout both regions – and potentially could also be of use to studies of peace processes in the Caucasus.

Before comparing the two countries, it is important to note the existence of some significant differences in historical socio-political developments in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The nature of communism in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was not the same. In Yugoslavia greater emphasis was given to popular participation and self-management, through a wide range of committees in the workplace and the community, than in the Soviet Union. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia while strong, did not hold a monopoly on decision-making to the same degree as the Communist Party did in the USSR. Small farms were never nationalized and citizens had the right to profits made from their production. Yugoslavs could travel outside their state borders and individual freedoms

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1 I employ the term “communism” out of convention, though in the Yugoslav case it may be more appropriate to speak of “socialism.”
Introduction

were generally more widely respected than in the Soviet Union. The nature of Sunni Islam in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina – and particularly popular Islam’s influence on society – was not comparable. In Tajikistan before 1991 Islam was the religion of the vast majority of the population. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 43.8% of the population declared themselves to be “Muslim,” while according to a 1985 survey only 17% of the total Bosnian population described themselves as religiously observant (Ramet, 1996: 155, 187). Although religion was more harshly repressed under the Soviet Union than in Yugoslavia; in Tajikistan, Muslim traditions, values and rituals were more faithfully maintained among the population. A third fundamental difference between the two countries relates to their geopolitical and cultural location. Bosnia-Herzegovina exists on the edge of Europe, and it can only questionably be considered as “non-Western.” Lockwood’s 1975 book titled “European Moslems” aptly reflected the dual – complementary and contradictory – identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims. Tajikistan’s position bordering China, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, amongst others, clearly puts it in the non-Western sphere.

Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina share the painful experience of having gone through violent wars following the breakup of the Federations to which they belonged. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, various theories have been developed to explain the causes of war in both countries. While in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina the conflict is generally defined as internal, theorists have also explored the influence of external actors. As fighting developed in the two countries, it pitted groups from different regions against one another. Consequently certain regions suffered more than others. Internal displacement caused by attempts to flee armed confrontations and “ethnic cleansing” changed the population distribution. In particular there was a large-scale movement of rural groups to urban areas. The conflicts in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina shared some characteristics, yet they were also very different in nature, as were the processes of conflict termination. As Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld do in the introduction to their study on “Peace/Conflict-Resolution Organizations in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine”, I would like to stress that the comparisons presented in this work focus on civil society, and not on the conflicts or peace consolidation processes the two countries underwent (2002: 23). I am assuming
that civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina are comparable based on the fact that they share specific features and address certain similar post-war challenges.

Furthermore, in comparing civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I am purposely studying organizations operating in two countries whose peace processes were differently affected by two significant variables – the strength of international involvement and the centralization of the state. In both conflicts international mediation and intervention helped secure peace. Yet in the first five years after the signing of the peace agreements, the level of international political and financial involvement in the peace process was much greater in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Tajikistan. While both Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina were challenged by the task of (re)-establishing effective state institutions in the post-war period, the state defined in the Tajik peace settlement was a centralized one, while the Bosnian state was de-centralized and divided. Due to these differences, with Bosnia-Herzegovina an international protectorate benefiting from large-scale foreign support and possessing a weak state, the expectation would be that civil society would play a much larger role in peace consolidation there than in Tajikistan. In Chapter 6 these significant differences between Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide useful basis for comparisons to draw hypotheses on the key interconnections between civil society, international intervention, and the state.

The literature deficit:
Few extensive empirical and theoretical studies have analyzed the affect of local civil society organizations on peace from a comparative perspective. Three that have are: a comparative research project entitled *Peace/Conflict-Resolution Organizations in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine* by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002); a large-scale analysis of *Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies* which looked at the

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Introduction


While the first two studies focus on NGOs' affect on peace, Varshney and Colletta and Cullen consider not only NGOs but also the influence of CBOs. Varshney argues that in many country contexts outside Western Europe and Northern America, formal associations that fit a liberal definition of civil society do not exist. Thus he (2002: 44) underlines the necessity of looking at other representations of civic engagement where people "connect, talk, share views, formulate strategies." As will be described in Chapter 1, I am terming this type of civil society "communal." CBOs fit within this definition. One of my aims in this dissertation is to assess whether making the distinction between communal and liberal forms of civil society organizations is empirically useful when examining the groups' likelihood to contribute to peace consolidation.

Another debate found in the literature concerns the role of intra-communal or inter-communal civil society, or bonding and bridging social capital, in facilitating peace processes. Studying inter-community zones of peace between Hindus and Muslims Varshney concludes that intercommunal and not intracommunity engagement was key. "The key determinant of peace is intercommunal civic life, not civic life per se" (2002: 282). Colletta and Cullen's (2000) findings in a study of peace processes in four countries were similar. However in addition to intercommunal associations which they relate to bridging social capital, they concluded that intracommunal linkages, which are based on bonding social capital, can serve as a basis for consolidating peace. They state (2000: 122)


3 However in a footnote (2002: 368) he added "this finding and the logic underlying it, does raise a question: are there any conditions under which intraethnic, intra-communal associations can play a peaceful role? [...] This is a tremendously important question, but it as yet [sic] not empirically explored."

4 Social capital can be defined as "the features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam, 1993: 36).
that in post-war contexts, "resilient communities rely on all forms of responsibility and social capital: bonding primary ties for protection and survival in times of crisis; bridging links for action and development in times of hope." Bonding social capital refers to kinship and other intra-group networks or associations; while bridging social capital relates to those networks or associations that link individuals and groups beyond major social categories or cleavages (WB, 2002: iv). This dissertation in part seeks to determine whether Varshney and Colletta and Cullen's findings are verified in the Tajik and Bosnia-Herzegovina contexts.

Previous case studies have examined the processes of peace consolidation in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless the vast majority of these works were concerned with the interaction between international peace efforts and the domestic peace process. They were much less focused on how domestic and indigenous factors influence peace. Except in a few cases – in accounts on Mostar for example – the national level has been the main frame of analysis. How peace evolved at the community level in specific towns and villages in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina has rarely been written about outside policy papers prepared by groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the European Stability Initiative (ESI).

This study thus seeks to contribute to the existing literature by providing a detailed description of what kind of civil society organizations have positively affected peace consolidation in two post-Communist and mainly Muslim countries.

The thesis outline:
Two levels of analysis, the national level and community level, are employed in this thesis. I seek first to understand what definition of civil society best applies in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on the existing civil society literature, and a brief historical analysis of civil society's evolution in the two countries in Chapter 1, I find that organizational representations fitting the liberal and communal civil society ideal type existed in both post-war contexts. I subsequently try to determine what civil society's positive impact could be – in other words to distinguish the main components of peace consolidation. In Chapter 2 I thus outline key post-conflict challenges classifying them as
institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights based. Based on these two macro-level studies I develop preliminary hypotheses on possible positive contributions that civil society organizations could make to peace consolidation. Secondly I seek to test these hypotheses and deepen my findings by analyzing a small number of civil society groups. I refer to positive cases of organizationally sound groups that seemingly had an impact to better understand why this was so. In Chapter 3 I describe the methodology employed and some of the challenges of conducting research on civil society in post-conflict environments. I explain how I selected my case study organizations. Chapters 4 and 5 present materials on the specific organizational case studies. In Chapter 4 the values, programs, linkages and structures of the NGOs Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori are analyzed in detail. In Chapter 5 the CBOs Mjesna Zajednica Sevarlije and Karategin Valley Village Organizations are similarly studied. Chapter 6 looks more closely at how the case studies affected peace consolidation, and considers whether the communal/liberal civil society dichotomy is useful to assess this affect. I conclude with several theoretical conclusions and policy recommendations on civil society and peace consolidation.
CHAPTER ONE

CIVIL SOCIETY IN TAJIKISTAN AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: BETWEEN LIBERAL AND COMMUNAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Introduction:
Since the end of the Cold War practitioners and scholars have contended that civil society can positively affect peace consolidation. In the immediate post-war period, leading international organizations engaged in peace efforts in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina identified civil society as a key actor in the peace process. In the Bosnian case, the Peace Implementation Council (Final Document) stated in December 1998 that the development of civil society is “essential to democratic society” and vital to “promote the healing of the wounds of war, to protect the peace.” In its 2001 Action Plan, the Human Rights Coordination Center (HRCC, 2001a: 9) - a forum led by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) including all other major international agencies - affirmed that “NGOs and Associations are to play a crucial role in the transition phase, taking over most of the tasks currently fulfilled by the IC (international community).” Similarly, in Tajikistan, international donor and policy making agencies considered that civil society could significantly affect peace consolidation. In its 2002-2004 Strategy Paper for Central Asia, the European Commission (2002: 19) stated that “to eliminate sources of political and social tension” in the region it will support reforms “aimed at establishing good governance, the rule of law, functioning civil societies, respect for fundamental freedoms and other OSCE values.” UNDP (2002) was committed to “support government and civil society partnership to address the persistent threat of poverty and to strengthen local governance institutions.” While influential policy makers appeared convinced that civil society could positively affect peace consolidation, they were rarely in agreement on what elements of the peace project civil society could influence. They also did not always share a common understanding of what they meant by “civil society.”

What civil society is most likely to positively affect peace? Civil society is a highly debated
term. It has alternatively been conceived as an idea, a political goal and an organizational form. Several authors (Kaldor, 2003: 22-27; Stevens, 2004: 24; Van Rooy, 1998: 30) have identified the existence of a tension between normative and descriptive understandings of civil society. Yet Kaldor (2003: 16-31) also argues that all versions of civil society are both normative and descriptive. They describe a political project as a goal, and at the same time an actual existing reality. In the following chapter I will thus consider civil society as a social reality and a socio-political project. I will first propose two main definitions of civil society, that are both normative and descriptive ideal types, terming them liberal and communal. Thereafter I will apply these theoretical definitions to the study of the historical evolution of Tajik and Bosnian civil society in the expectation that they can help us understand the nature of post-war civil society in the two countries.

I. Rival concepts of civil society:
Debates on civil society have traditionally shadowed great historical processes of change; and the various definitions of civil society have been significantly affected by the social-political developments that surrounded their emergence (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 16-38; Kaldor, 2001, 2003; Keane, 1988, 1998). The most recent discussion on civil society is generally considered to have commenced during the late 1980s - early 1990s with the massive social and political upheaval that transformed the nature of the state in East and Central Europe. Since then civil society’s meaning, form and nature has been the subject of much polemic among scholars and practitioners. One way in which this contention has been addressed is through the creation of ideal types (Glasius, Lewis, Seckinelgin, 2004), which suggest ways that civil society has developed as system of values, political project, and organisational form. Most frequently in the literature these ideal types operate in opposition rather then in symbiosis. In the following section two ideal types - the liberal and communal form of civil society – are described.¹

I.a Liberal definitions of civil society:
The increase in interest in civil society that started in the mid-1980s was directly linked to changes in East and Central Europe and the empowerment of dissident opposition
movements. At that time, Havel (1985) and Michnik (1985) wrote about civil society’s ability to serve as an essential form of anti-politics. As described by Michnik (1999) the “first institutions of civil society” were created in Poland in 1976. These “enclaves of independence” aimed “to allow people to defend themselves against the Communist State.” According to Havel (1985: 78-79) it is at this stage that the dissident movements began to support the development of parallel political structures – “initial attempts at social self-organization.” Shortly thereafter Western theorists (Arato and Cohen, 1992; Gellner, 1994; Keane, 1988, 1998; Seligman, 1992) started to speak openly about civil society’s ability to undermine the tyranny of the state. They pondered the practical and theoretical challenges behind using the civil society concept in East and Central European countries where decades of communism had put them on radically different trajectories from that of Western Europe.

These theorists drew inspiration from the classical concept of civil society in which civil society was normatively grounded. As a source of civic responsibility and public virtue it contributed to the public good (Lewis, 2001: 45). “Societas civilis” should be distinguished from the state of nature, an environment according to Hobbes (in Arato and Cohen, 1992: 22-23) “of continual fear, and danger of violent death,” in which “the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Civil society was “synonymous with polite society, a society in which strangers act in a civilized way towards each other, treating each other with mutual respect, tolerance and confidence (Kaldor, 2003: 17).” “Civil” was the operative word and according this definition “a civil society means a good society (Van Rooy, 1998:12).

This theoretical conceptualization of civil society closely linked the development of civil society to “modernity.” It understood civil society as having first appeared in 18th Century Western Europe, the period of the creation of nation-states. According to this understanding “to be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen – a member of the state” (Keane, 1988: 36). Members of such a society (men at least) would therefore have the right to vote and serve in public office; participation in public affairs was institutionalized. In Global

1 Other ideal types have been proposed elsewhere. For example in the Latin American context, Avritzer (2004) identifies the existence of liberal, participatory and ‘uncivil forms of civil society, while Pearce
Civil Society: An Answer to War, Kaldor (2003: 31) persuasively argues that “the emergence of the [civil society] concept was linked to the formation of states and the centralization of political power in a given territory.” Incidentally it was also associated with urbanization and industrialization: men who migrated to cities in search of employment joined groups to defend their interests and fill a sense of encroaching malaise caused by their uprooting from their traditional social networks based on kinship and proximity. A civil society was characterized by the rule of law, based on individual rights and reinforced by a state with a monopoly on violence.

Liberal civil society was thus also conceived as a political project, which aimed to promote public participation in decision-making, good governance and democratization. In 17th and 18th century Europe, civil society provided a means for members of mainly urban classes to question decisions taken by their rulers and advocate for their interests. In the 1990s civil society was again given this function when it was praised for its ability to contribute to democratic consolidation by “stabilizing expectation and social bargaining, generating a more civic normative environment, bringing actors closer to the political process, reducing the burdens of governance and checking potential abuses of power (Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien 1997: xxxi).” It was defined as being closely linked to the state and political parties that contest elections, while nevertheless maintaining an autonomous identity. This civil society was about “the need for self-organized groups and institutions outside the state and for political parties to be able to act and speak honestly without concern for the capture of political power (Kaldor, 1999a).” According to Gellner’s (1994: 5) oft cited definition,

“Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator of major interests, can nevertheless prevent if from dominating or atomizing the rest of society.”

Having gained strength in numbers, citizens in independent organizations were empowered to open a dialogue with government to protect their interests. Liberal civil society was thus understood as having the ability to encourage popular participation in policy-formulation.
and implementation, as well as political decision-making. Civil society and liberal democracy were believed to be mutually reinforcing, the stability and efficacy of the democratic systems dependent on the existence of a vibrant civil society that held elected officials accountable.

Liberal civil society was also conceived as having a role in the economic sphere. As the state-controlled economy crumbled in post-socialist East and Central Europe, civil society was deemed as having the potential to make a significant contribution to social service provision encouraging the privatization of welfare assistance. Billis and Glennerster argued in 1998 that “Distinct from the state and the market, and as a provider of social services” civil society “has a special role in the economies of liberal democratic developed regimes.” As a provider of services “nonprofits will have an advantage when societal is combined with financial disadvantage (Billis and Glennerster, 1998: 22).” Civil society was considered able to support “structural reform” and the strengthening of private property (Hyden 1997:25). Civil society was also perceived as having the ability to serve as a positive economic actor in parts of Africa and South Africa where state-led development projects were largely deemed to have failed by the 1980s (Lewis 1999:1).

Civil society that fits within the liberal definition may take up modes of action that fit within a “neo-liberal” or an “activist” ideology. The neo-liberal project is more concerned with improving relations between state-market-citizen, and the conditions of the communities it operates in, through service provision. It considers that civil society can serve as a substitute for the state. It is the definition most favored by international donors and policy makers, who see it as a way of smoothing the path towards democratization and market reform, and providing a safety net for economic and political disenfranchised individuals. The activist project on the other hand recognizes civil society as a potential opposition to the centers of political and economic power. It is involved in a clear struggle to change society and the relations between the centers of power and citizens, to make the state more accountable, through public and political action. The “activist” interpretation is critical of the market, and neo-liberal driven globalization, which has tended to deepen economic inequalities (Kaldor, 2003: 8; Howell and Peace, 2001: 31-37).
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According to the liberal definition, civil society can be conceived as an organizational form where civil society is “the realm of autonomous voluntary organizations, acting in the public sphere as an intermediary between the state and private life” (Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxii). NGOs, unions, and public interest groups who operate in a democratic environment best exemplified this form of civil society. Liberal civil society associations tended to be defined as only those groups that are explicitly political or “civic” (Hyden, 1997: 30). They were seen as independent of the state, family and local community bonds (Gellner, 1994). Civil society organizations were also related to the voluntary sector made up of organizations that are private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary (Salamon and Anheier 1996). Based on this understanding, NGOs became the most common and distinct embodiment of liberal civil society, in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s.

The liberal conceptualization of civil society provided the theoretical foundations for a large scale Western political project to assist civil society’s development throughout East and Central Europe. It was grounded in the belief that indigenous nascent civil society groups could be strengthened through external funding and capacity building. It was a specific policy objective that in practice most often translated into support for domestic NGOs (USAID: 1999:3). NGOs – particularly those engaged in advocacy – were assumed to be a critical segment of civil society that could promote democratization (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000: 295). Western civil society aid involved not only direct funding but also supporting the creation of an environment more conducive to NGO development. The environment promoted freedom of association, individualization, a non-autocratic state, social stability and economic development (McCarthy et al in Anheier and Seibel, 1998: 178).

Processes of globalization have broadened the definition of liberal civil society to extend beyond the nation-state to fit within a global perspective. As such, global liberal civil society is considered to be a space and an organizational form. It has been described as being made up of forums or “institutions where citizens of the planet may discuss the problems and take the decisions that shape their destiny” (Archibugi, 1995:157). Included are parallel summits and meetings of non-governmental groups in inter-governmental
forums. At the global level, through the promotion of transnational socio-political causes (such as women’s rights, environmental protection), liberal agents of civil society have been considered capable of providing a voice to citizens and a means to hold international multilateral institutions accountable (Clark, 2003: 165; Colas, 2002: 144-145; Kaldor, 2003). In this form liberal civil society is best represented by international NGOs, including development organizations that seek to attenuate liberalization and privatization strategies which are part of most international financial institutions’ structural adjustment programs, and humanitarian groups that provide emergency aid in times of war.

I. b Communal definitions of civil society:

A second definition of civil society, which we shall term “communal,” began to gain currency in the mid-late 1990s and questioned many of the assumptions and arguments made by liberal theorists. The communal definition primarily became influential among scholars and activists studying parts of the world considered “non-Western.” For as Keene (1998: 23-31) described, “the footprint of the term has spread well beyond the boundaries of Europe” during the 1990s from Africa, to East Asia and into the Muslim world. While liberal civil society theorists tended to be political scientists and economists, western scholars attempting to redefine civil society in non-Western contexts (Hann, Lewis) were initially most often social anthropologists. Scholars from the Islamic world (al-Sayyid, 1995; Filali-Ansary, 2002; Hanafi, 2002; Kamali, 1998; Khatami, 2000; Sajoo, 2002) were frequently at the forefront of the re-conceptualization of civil society outside Europe. According to this “non-Western” approach a great deal of the “acquis” of civil society discourse could be questioned starting from civil society’s normative basis to its organisational representation.2

Like the liberal definition, the communal definition was a product of a significant historical process of change: not the end of communism but the rapid spread of globalization. Globalization propelled the civil society argument to parts of the world that may previously have been excluded from the debate, and incited a re-consideration of the term to fit new

2 One group of civil society theorists, of which Ernest Gellner (1981, 1994) is the most prominent, firmly rejects this approach, preferring to deny the existence of civil society in non-Western contexts. However, several critical theorists in the Muslim world agree with Gellner. According to Serif Mardin (1995: 278-279)
contexts. This definition includes concepts of “religious civil society,” “traditional civil society,” and “clan based civil society.”

Proponents of the communal definition such as Varshney (2002: 46) argued that it was necessary to shift debates on civil society from formal structures and organizations towards an investigation of the host of informal group activities and meeting places that connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public concern. Communal civil society could be thus defined as a sphere of social interaction where people come together on a voluntary basis, along interest lines, to exchange information, deliberate about collective action, and define public opinion. It is a space of public and collective activity, made up of organizations as well as highly informal modes of interaction. Communal civil society could be located in “families, communities, friendship networks, solidaristic workplace ties, voluntarism, spontaneous groups and movements” (Wolfe in Dekker and van den Broek, 1998: 13). It was most often bound by a set territory, and focused in the local community, the site of face-to-face encounters.

The use of the communal concept of civil society “argues for a more inclusive usage of civil society, in which it is not defined negatively, in opposition to the state, but positively in the context of the ideas and practices through which cooperation and trust are established (Hann and Dunn, 1996: 22).” One of the distinctive characteristics of this definition is that it is less about state-society relations, and the ability of citizens to resist amoral and power hungry political elites, and more concerned with relations within society, with community solidarity, self-help and trust. Rather than directly opposing the state employing political tools, communal civil society may work in symbiosis with the state or ignore it altogether. This does not mean that civil society/state relations are unimportant. For as Roy (2002: 124) noted, this form of civil society would often “involve traditional networks of solidarity, based on primordial communities of kinship and patronage, that allow the population to resist the encroachments of a strong authoritarian state, or to compensate for the weakness or corruption of the state.”

in the Muslim world “civil society is a Western dream [...] A characteristic of the history of the transformation of the Western dream into a reality is that this metamorphosis is limited to the West.”
Based on the communal definition, civil society was mainly understood as being concerned with insuring that all members of the group had the necessary means for survival. Thus civil society organized to offer services, community infrastructure, and other essentials. In this context civility signified providing the basic material and economic conditions to people to insure that they could function in the group. It was about inspiring “cohesion and trust in local communities (Hann and Dunn, 1996: 22).” Those who had more were encouraged to share with others. When mutual aid was shared, the moment was also often “marked by extensive festive socializing” which deepens social integration and trust (Hall, 1995: 171). Assistance was provided through informal coping mechanisms based on family ties, friendship or good neighborliness.

The values that this form of civil society espouses aim first and foremost to maintain community stability and security; they tend to be conservative and patriarchic. Men are the dominant actors. Community meetings generally seek consensus and thus shared ideas and values tend to be more appreciated than diverse and innovative ones. The ensuing environment may be oppressive to those who do not wish to conform to the majority or to the generally conservative moral codes promoted (Waite, 1997: 227-228). It cannot be unconditionally assumed that all elements of civil society will be multi-ethnic and supportive of democratic decision-making. When referring to communal civil society, White’s (2000: 142-155) question about participation and civil society - participation by whom? – is particularly relevant. More often than not, in communal civil society women’s public engagement in decision-making was restricted. Communal civil society was liable to organize along ethnic and national lines, rejecting difference and multi-culturalism. It did not “necessarily promote democracy […] may be places for egotistical pursuits […] in which authoritarian values are nurtured […] its associations [may] pursue values that go against tolerance and respect for others (Hyden, 1997: 31).” Communal civil society was therefore not normatively grounded. As Robinson and White described, this civil society “contains repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as cooperation, vice as well as virtue” (cited in Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier, 2002; Hyden, 1997; Van Rooy, 1998).

Commitment to civil society was therefore not necessarily based on the assertion of the will of individual citizens, but often on group and community expressions of solidarity. Gellner
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(1995: 33) argued virulently against considering this “civil society” because it is a system that maintains “cohesion, internal discipline and solidarity by a heavy ritual underscoring of social roles and obligations.” He considered that this can easily transform itself into a “tyranny of the cousins” (1995: 33) for in communal civil society community members have little opportunity to leave the group. Participation may be “imposed either by birth or awesome ritual (Gellner, 1995: 42).” Those with divergent values are doomed to suffer hostility or rejection. However, these social relations which facilitated the process of institutional development may also restrain individualism and egotistical greed – people may be motivated by helping each other as much as by the promise of individual gain (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 32). Seligman (2002: 19) argued that the thinkers of the Enlightenment considered civil society to be a form of community solidarity because within this society “the need for respect and approval, man’s very amour de soi, rested on the praise of others.” Solidarity networks and community level associations built on family, clan and neighborhood ties help build social cohesion and collective identity. However, while conferring privileges on some, they could also severely constrain the rights of others (Eade, 1997: 112).

Communal civil society is an inclusive term with a wide global applicability. It is based on a range of institutions and practices, which are particular to the environment in which they function. The idea behind the term is that shared values and ideals bind individuals into groups or common activities. The aim of civil society is not necessarily to promote democracy or liberal economic exchange but rather to guarantee stability, unity and trust within local communities. Transposing the concept of communal civil society, as can be done for liberal civil society as described above, beyond the nation to the global level is somewhat challenging. As communal civil society is mainly identified with the community, when it expands cultural clashes are likely to occur (Clark, 2003: 167). Nevertheless the ability of communal civil society actors to maintain stability and security at the local level may be strengthened by their links to global networks. According to Kaldor (1999a: 209), “those who are trying to exert a constructive influence over local life in a globalized world can only succeed if they have outside support and access to those international organizations that can influence governments and global regulatory processes.” The Zapatista movement, which defends the rights of indigenous people of Chiapas, is one
organizational representation of communal civil society that has been successful in this regard (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 35). Religion has also been identified as a potentially unifying mechanism between geographically based communities, which may provide a basis for global understanding and solidarity.

II. Civil society in Tajikistan: historical evolution of a concept.

As Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin argue in a forthcoming book, “The power of the concept of civil society depends less on abstract definitions, than on the extent to which it is grounded in actual experiences from around the world and embedded in local realities (2004: introduction).” Current representations of civil society in all countries are the product of complex historical and social developments (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Lewis, 2001; Van Rooy, 1998). For this reason it is important to briefly analyze the historical evolution of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan before we can determine whether the civil society ideal types described above are relevant in the post-war period. We find that one set of scholars that studies the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia considers that civil society has a long history in the two regions, while the other tends to argue that civil society development began with the end of communism. The former are most likely to conceptualize civil society as including both communal and liberal ideal types, while the later generally understands civil society to be a liberal construct. The context and the theoretical definition of civil society applied affects any value judgement on civil society’s nature, as well as on its potential contribution to broader socio-political and economic change in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

II.a Communal civil society’s early development:

If civil society is considered to fit within a communal ideal type then it has deep roots in Tajikistan. For centuries, trust and solidarity networks were built around kinship ties. Kinship served as an important mobilising factor through which individuals were able to express and defend their common interests. Abdulaliev (2002) argues that in Tajik society “the dominant institution of power was the avlod - an ascent patriarchal extended family […] For generations, this avlod system provided survival, autonomy, and adaptability to its members, serving traditionalism and sustainability of the society.” Avlods “fostered communal identity and solidarity; they also reinforced social values and ‘civilized’ norms
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of behavior, acting as both moral mentor and moral censor” (Akiner, 2002a: 170). Through marriage the *avlod* extended its membership. Though the *avlod* is often considered to be a pre-Soviet social institution, Abdullaev (04.03.02) states that in 2002 it continued to play an important role in society, providing protection and assistance to obtain housing, employment, marriage partners and, in certain instances, political power.

Forms of communal civil society based on kinship were strengthened by links based on proximity. In the pre-Soviet era amongst the sedentary Tajiks the place of residence served as the basis of well-developed civic networks, particularly in urban areas where *mahallas* formed as relatively independent associations of citizens.3 *Mahallas* brought people living on the same territory together mainly on a voluntary basis, along interest lines based on profession, ethnic origin, or good neighbourliness. *Mahalla* members gathered regularly to exchange information, resolve community problems, and define public opinion in neighborhood tea-houses (*Chaihana*). *Mahallas* were self-governing and served as a forum where local values, rules of behavior, and common needs were defined. To regulate personal and family problems, inhabitants turned to councils of elders (*aksakals*). They helped organize traditional feasts and gatherings (*maraka*) to celebrate births, marriages, and funerals. The traditions of community voluntary action (*hashar*) and community giving to help those in need (*sadaqa*) were perpetuated through the *mahalla*. *Mahallas* focused on protecting local interests; they sought to improve the provision of services, rather than large-scale policy change. They were capable of taking collective action in defense of the neighborhood or trade they represented, though they rarely openly opposed the ruling khans or emirs.

Historically, religion also provided a normative framework and focal point for social mobilization. The reformist Jadid movement was an example of a religiously defined representation of communal civil society that developed in Central Asia in the early twentieth century.4 With its origins in the Crimea, it was significant because it expanded beyond the borders of the local community. Jadidism called for more progressive forms of

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3 This was particularly the case in the historical cities of Bukhara, Samarkand and Khojand.
4 Central Asia and Tajikistan has served as a cross-roads for various religions including Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam (Foltz, 1999). The Jadid movement was only one of the Islamic movements that expanded through Central Asia (Rashid, 2002; Vinatier, 2002).
teaching Islam and for the development of a clear Muslim identity that could find its place in a largely Europeanized Christian Russia (Fourniau, 1994: 99-102). Members of the Central Asian educated middle class, comprising scholars, writers and merchants, rallied around Jadidism and supported its calls for establishing Western notions of political accountability (Abduvakhitov, 1994; Kangas, 1995: 274; Khalid, 1998). Jadidism spurred on the formation of smaller groups such as in Bukhara, where supporters formed the "Young Bukharians", a secret society advocating for political and social change (Fourniau, 1994: 110). While Jadidism was a successful example of the geographic broadening of communal civil society, due to its narrow focus on the urban upper middle class, it had an almost complete lack of interest in rural concerns, which did not go beyond encouraging the rural population to become educated (Khalid, 1998). Its embeddedness in rural communities appears to have been weak. After the 1917 Russian revolution, and the failed attempt to establish territorial autonomy for Turkestan, Jadidist political activists lost their political influence, integrated into communist institutions and were repressed by Soviet forces (Khalid, 1998: 281-301).

II.b The Soviet era and the resilience of communal forms of civil society:

Scholars of the Soviet Union are sharply divided on the subject of the existence of civil society during the Soviet era. The vast majority of specialists from Western Europe and the United States (Atabaki, 1998: 41; Carley, 1995; Fish, 1996: 264-267; Hall, 1995: 22; Howell and Pearce, 2001; Kangas, 1995: 274; Keane, 1998: 21; Rau, 1991; Rose, 1996: 253-255; Ruffin and Waugh, 1999: 7; Shlapentokh, 1989; Wedel cited in Hann, 1996: 1) argue that the development of civil society was impeded during the Soviet era because it was controlled from above and not allowed to express any form of opposition to governmental structures and policies. According to this analysis the totalitarian Soviet state - and particularly the dominant Communist Party - so thoroughly controlled society that all associative spheres lost their identity and independent functions. However, a minority of experts provide an alternative view. They describe how during the Soviet era

According to Shlapentokh (1989: 10), "On the one hand the Soviet elite wants to describe Soviet society as democratic, ruled by the people through the elected state bodies (Soviets, i.e., councils), and therefore based on civil society. But on the other hand, the same elite wants to legalize its political monopoly, using the 'leading role of the Communist Party,' as a label for it. By putting the party over the state, and promising increased participation of the masses in government, the elite actually demonstrates the absence of a legal civil society through which the democratic process can more or less control the state apparatus".
many traditional means of organizing, informal institutions and solidarity groups – based on kinship, proximity and religion - were either transformed or strengthened in Soviet Central Asia. In many ways this debate about the existence of civil society in Central Asia under communism is an extension of the debate on the conceptualization of civil society as Kandiyoti (2004) and Roy (1999) have also noted.6

Though few civil society forms that expressed opposition to the government functioned in Soviet Tajikistan, organizations that provided a range of public services flourished. A range of large-scale organizations were created to defend the interests of and provide activities for workers, youth, women, intellectuals, artists... The state employed the groups to propagate Communist ideology. Yet the organizations also provided benefits, representing their beneficiaries to the state; mobilizing volunteers; organizing services at minimal costs; and informing the public or their target group about matters of public benefit (Waite, 1997). For example the Women’s Committee (Zhensoyuz) advocated for the protection of women’s rights, lobbied for collective women’s interests, and provided a forum to gather women’s personal or professional complaints (Kandiyoti, 2004: 6). In Tajikistan the population generally trusted social organizations, and most educated professionals were involved in their work. Some of the associations successfully incorporated traditional practices - the initiation of mass social campaigns like Subotnik in part replicating the traditional Tajik self-help practice of hashar for example. Soviet era social organizations harnessed a degree of volunteerism, provided people with organizing and leadership skills, offered services, information, and contacts outside their narrow community. However, as critics (Shlapentokh, 1989; Mullojanov, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 191; Atabaki, 1998: 41) have pointed out, this type of civil society may also have had a role in inhibiting the development of independent or critical social institutions and networks.

From the 1920s until the 1980s there was a significant weakening of the mahalla institution in Tajikistan, and most significantly, the mahalla transformed from an urban to a rural institution. This was arguably more attributable to border changes and rapid urbanization than to the controlling nature of the state and Communist Party. The mahalla institution

6 Roy (1999: 110) made this argument himself, stating that if we consider that two different definitions of civil society similar to the communal and the liberal exist in Central Asia “in the former sense there is already
had traditionally been strong in urban centers, which were incorporated into Uzbekistan by Stalin in 1929. After 1929, Tajikistan’s cities – especially Dushanbe – grew rapidly leaving little time for the development of an urban culture similar to the one that had existed in Samarkand or Bukhara for centuries. The *mahallas’ raison d’être* was diminished in urban areas where large populations lived sharing few contacts and common interests. Instead the Soviet system set up the concept of Housing Committees (*Dom-Kom*), partly based on the *mahalla* notion, to be responsible for the maintenance of local infrastructure. Yet the *Dom-Koms* never played the same social or public opinion-forming functions as the *mahalla*. The term *mahalla* remained in the Tajik lexicon, and legislation was passed in November 1985 defining official functions of *mahalla* committees. With the 1985 law the state sought to delegate to *mahalla* committees its information dissemination, social and organizational work at the local level. Yet as the Soviet Union was in a process of disintegration, the *mahalla* never successfully fell under the state’s control. Somewhat ironically during the Soviet period, it was rural inhabitants who more readily adopted the *mahalla* term to designate their local civil society structures.

Analysts of the communist influence on Central Asia have found that in rural areas, unlike in urban centers, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society, such as the *mahalla*, were maintained and strengthened through their reincarnation in collective farms (*kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*).¹ Traditional *mahallas* and *avlods* may not have openly countered the state, but some scholars have argued that they successfully co-opted official institutions. Humphrey (1998, 2002), Roy (2000, 2002), and Rubin (1998) have shown how soviet institutions at the local level, such as the administration of the *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* and agriculture work units (*brigades*), merged successfully with traditional forms of community organizing.² Roy (2002: 127-128) considers that the *kolkhoz* system is “the expression of the recasting

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¹ Herewith lies one of the fundamental differences between communism as it was applied in the Soviet Union (SU) and in Yugoslavia. Collectivization was not implemented in Yugoslavia, and collective farms were never established. Thus in the SU, state bureaucratic structures were formed at all levels of society all the way down to the *kolkhoz*. In Yugoslavia at this level of society the state apparatus did not exist. Therefore *mjesna zajednica*, self-managing communities of citizens that operated more independently from state structures.

² “One of the paradoxes of the Soviet system was the project of destroying traditional society and the implementation of ‘social engineering’ with a view to creating a new society translated, at least in the Muslim republics, into a recomposition of solidarity groups within the framework imposed by this system, and also into the creation of a two level culture: on the one hand an appearance of conformity with the social project
of former solidarity groups into a socialist system [...] Indeed the internal administration structure of the *kolkhoz* have reshaped and strengthened many traditional identity groups." He goes on to specify that *mahalla* structures were often duplicated at the brigade level of the *kolkhoz* (2002: 128, 2000: 87-88). Once integrated into the Soviet *kolkhoz* system, the recomposed *mahalla* “benefited from an administrative, economic, social, and even political institutionalization [...] The *kolkhoz* was relatively autonomous (2000: 88).” The Tajik *kolkhoz*, and to an ever greater degree the *brigade*, maintained a degree of independence from the state – the president was elected, decision making concerning service provision and public works was carried out locally, and people continued to meet to discuss issues of local concern. In effect the *kolkhoz* gave traditional solidarity groups organizational, economic and decision-making capacity, while maintaining their sense of common identity and loyalty to traditional leaders.

In his argument Roy emphasizes the inability of the *kolkhoz* to establish a group identity that overpowered allegiance to the *mahalla* and *avlod*.

"Collectivisation [...] in all cases involved a systematic territorialisation of solidarity groupings within the framework of the *kolkhoz*. The *awlad* (*avlod*), the *mahalla* and (in the tribal zones) lineage segments were reincarnated in the sub-divisions of the *kolkhoz*. [...] It is the logic of the solidarity group, whether pre-existent or reconstituted, which creates the kolkhozian identity. [...] The Soviets several times took steps to break these solidarities [...] Nevertheless “the *kolkhoz* itself turned into a solidarity group, and the *mahallas* did not disappear. The communities had a reality which survived bureaucratic manipulation” (Roy, 2000: 87-88).

Due to Tajikistan’s mass forced displacement of populations from the 1930s-1960s this could lead to antagonisms in *kolkhozes* in which groups from different areas were brought together, or where neighboring *kolkhoz* were dominated by groups originating from different regions (Roy 1999: 112-113). As Akhmedov (1998: 173) notes, this was particularly a problem in the Vaksh Valley, around Kurgan Tuppe, where the sense of

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imposed by the authorities; on the other, a subversion of that project by practices of factionalism and clientism.” (Roy, 2000: 85)

^ An irony of history is that even though *mahallas* were traditionally urban institutions, they survived more effectively in practice in rural areas.
allegiance to the *mahalla* amongst the displaced from Garm/Karategin Valley was particularly strong.

Based on the *avlod* and *mahalla*, communal civil society in Tajikistan was extremely resilient to external influences. Distrust reigned supreme outside networks linked to family, proximity and religion. Relations that did not follow these lines were held suspect. It could thus be argued that Tajik communal civil society was mainly inward looking, formed out of mutual support networks based on region of origin, constructed along horizontal personalized relations. Its value base was inherently conservative and its interests local. Groups within communal civil society were disconnected from national level politics and tended towards communalism and traditionalism.

**II.c Perestroika: the awakening of liberal civil society in Tajikistan though the development of advocacy based politically orientated groups.**

The new political openness that began in the 1980s with *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* offered the public space for the creation of new civil society organizations in Tajikistan that more closely fit the liberal definition. For the first time they carved out their own political positions and initiated a real public political debate to challenge the existing order (Akiner 2002a: 158, 184). Like in many countries of Central Europe and the Soviet Union, in Central Asia and Tajikistan, some of the first moves towards genuinely popular participation were made by movements protesting environmental degradation (Carley, 1995; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 196-197). These groups attracted mainly scientists, professors, teachers and students. Environmental organizations that developed in Tajikistan were influenced and strengthened by the global environmental movement (Ryazanova, 13.06.2002). The ideas and activism of the Perestroika era civil society organizations attracted mainly the upper and middle classes living in urban areas and appeared to bypass many rural communities. Some of the first groups formed as an extension of the urban *mahalla* structure by focusing on community needs. An example was *Ehyoi Khojand* founded in Khojand in 1989 by city intellectuals, journalists, and artists, which first formed to organize socio-cultural activities for the benefit of its own community. It subsequently moved into the political domain, successfully holding a referendum to return the original name of Khojand to what was then called the city of Leninabad (Sughd region).
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Glasnost provided intellectuals and urban-based elites with a unique opportunity to confront national level problems and promote solutions that rivaled those offered by the state. In Tajikistan Rastokhez (Renaissance), formed in September 1989, was the first large-scale civil society organization to draft an extensive Republican level program. For the first time in the Soviet period, Rastokhez employed nationalism to mobilize society (Vinatier, 2002: 213-114). Created by entrepreneurial elites and intellectuals, it was partly based on the model of Baltic People's Fronts, which had been operating since 1986. There was much experience sharing, communication and support exchanged between Rastokhez activists and their Baltic counterparts (Abdushukurova, 17.05.02). Rastokhez's programs gave great weight to ecological problems, education, language, national cultural renaissance and the national interests of the republic as a whole (Niyazi, 1993). Rastokhez eventually tried to influence policy and politics through the electoral process, several of its leaders setting up the Democratic Party of Tajikistan for the 1991 elections (Atkin, 1997).

Rural populations were not initially heavily engaged in the political activism of the late 1980s, yet at the time Islam was increasingly being employed as a mobilizing tool in rural communities (Atkin, 1994; Makhamov, 1994). Little has been written about how Islamic groups extended their presence in rural Tajikistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a period of mounting political and economic instability it appears that these elites acted through traditional solidarity structures of communal civil society, appealing to citizens' local level grievances and search for identity. As of 1990 the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Tajikistan began successfully mobilizing traditional groups using kin- and territory-based networks, especially in the Vaksh and Karategin valleys (Roy, 1999: 112-113; Roy, 2000). While agreeing with this analysis, Abdullaev (Abdullaev, 10.02; Abdullaev, 2004) also contends that in the 1990s a phenomenon of the 1920s was replicated when Ishans (or pirs) - religious leaders following a form of Sufism implanted in parts of Tajikistan - became an ideological inspiration and were able to rally large numbers of their followers (murids). In addition, according to Abdullaev (2002) the avlod served as

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10 Roy describes how a kolkhoz president “in the event of conflict will mobilize his supporters in his district of origin, and it is to that district that he will retire in the event of setbacks. This was a familiar scene during the 1992 civil war in Tajikistan: the supporters of the two camps in question ('Islamists' and 'communists')
a basis of a "community-oriented identity and clan network [that] determined political loyalty during the civil war in 1992-1993 and later." Islamists effectively employed traditional solidarity networks and institutions to inform and mobilize adherents. They were not the only ones, as supporters of the former communist regime under President Nabiev, and later of President Rakhmonov, did the same but focused on populations originating from other regions, especially Kulob (Barnes and Abdullaev, 2001). This provided the foundation for an explosive environment in mixed kolkhozes and amongst neighboring kolkhozes where different traditional groups, based on the locations of their original mahallas, allied with different political groups (Akhmedov, 1998: 173-174; Roy, 2000).

II.d Weakening of communal and liberal civil society during the war:
Civil society in Tajikistan was unable to play a significant conflict prevention role in large part because in 1990-1992 groups that fit within either communal and liberal civil society ideal types were deeply divided, rather than cooperating to maintain peace they tended to rival one another to gain influence. As Soviet rule disintegrated, the urban populations’ main form of organization – social organizations linked to the Communist Party – dissolved, leaving few structures through which city dwellers could rapidly mobilize. The Perestroika era liberal type organizations had just begun to function, lacked unifying national level political agendas, were urban-based and generally bypassed rural communities. In rural areas, however, populations were more easily rallied through a system of community-based organizations that had never been eradicated during Soviet times. Religious leaders, elders, and informal village leaders had the authority and trust necessary to encourage a broader representation of citizens to attend public rallies, or otherwise become more politically active. In urban areas, such traditional leaders had been largely eliminated and thus could not similarly organize the upper and middle classes. Many urban workers on the other hand were new arrivals to the city and had maintained strong ties to their village level organizations. In this pre-war environment there were few opportunities for liberal and communal forms of civil society to initiate the dialogue necessary to prevent war.

descended on the capital in trucks from their respective kolkhoz with their apparatchiks and and their mullahs in tow." (2000: 92)
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The one organization that may have had the capacity to facilitate greater integration between communal and liberal forms of civil society was Rastokhez. Yet after creating the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rastokhez activists joined forces with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in what would eventually become known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The UTO, as one of the main parties in the Tajik conflict, openly sought to obtain control of state structures. Thus at the start of the war, the leaders of Rastokhez, and many of the other liberal groups of the Perestroika era, either joined the UTO, chose exile, were killed, or limited their public activity. Rastokhez as an independent organization virtually disappeared, as did the vast majority of Tajikistan’s pre-war liberal civil society groups. Even in comparison with Bosnia-Herzegovina, as will be described in the following section, the absence of any liberal type “peace now” or human rights organizations in Tajikistan during the war was striking.

On the other hand, during the Tajik conflict communal civil society, as represented by the mahalla, played a significant yet ambiguous role. The war caused a general breakdown in local governance and the inability of central government to control or provide resources to all areas of the country created an opening for traditional communal civil organizations to fill. Mahallas obtained resources from international organizations to distribute as humanitarian assistance. According to Mamadazimov (20.03.02) Director of the National Association of Political Scientists, “during the Tajik civil war the status of mahallas increased because international humanitarian agencies preferred to distribute aid through them, rather than through the hukumats (district government).” As chair of his mahalla until 1996, the secretary of the Nosiri Khisrav jamoat in 2002 (4.06.02), described (04.07.02) how he cooperated directly with a range of international organizations (UNDP, Caritas, Save the Children) on reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in his community.

On the other hand during the war and in the immediate post-war period the position of the mahalla and other traditional forms of civic organizing was undermined by warlords, field commanders, and other militarized groups. Individuals asked for assistance and protection from them, rather than from the local government, courts, police, kolkhoz leadership,
aksakals, or mahalla members. For centuries aksakals had been the most respected leaders of the community, but during the war and its immediate aftermath they came to "represent authority but not power." Incidentally in order to build trust and allegiance within the community, gunmen carried out many of the same functions as the mahalla and aksakals. They organized banquets, community celebrations, and provided financial support to the needy (Abdullaev, 04.03.02). At the same time the kolkhozes, which had provided significant state-based financial and material support to the traditional solidarity groups based around the mahallas, began to lose their resource base, thus undermining much of the mahallas' ability to carry out independent activities.

II. Post war Tajikistan: an opportunity for liberal civil society?

The post-war period was characterized by the rapid growth of the Tajik non-governmental sector. The International Centre for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL) estimated that in 2002 a total of 1,241 NGOs were registered, compared with 33 groups in 1993 (ICNL, 2002). NGOs were generally started by members of the urban elite – very often women (Abdushukurova, 17.05.02; Khegai 23.03.02; Kuvatova, 21.10.02, Ryazanova, 13.06.02) - and based in cities (Dushanbe, Khojand and Kurgan Tuppe). The intellectuals who set up the first NGOs initiated activities in the fields they knew best: teaching, education, and research. (Rahmonderdiev, 18.09.02). They organized out of a narrow spirit of self-help and self-interest. When in 1995 the Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia (ASTI) in Khojand was created, according to its founder Farrukh Tyurryaev (27.06.02) "we simply wanted to help ourselves." Like their preceding communist social organizations, rather than being advocacy based, the new NGOs were heavily engaged in service delivery. When they did engage in lobbying, NGOs rarely sought to address clearly identified local grievances, or to protect community interests, instead they focused on universal issues: women's rights, civic education, media, health care, language and computer skills development.

The international organizations that worked in Tajikistan after the war cooperated primarily with those new NGOs that fit a liberal definition of civil society, rather than with groups that evidently belonged to communal civil society. International NGOs carrying out
humanitarian activities sought partners to help deliver assistance. Well-connected, skilled and innovative Tajiks (Akiner 2002a: 173; Roy 2002: 142-143) set up more sophisticated NGOs to meet this need. They diversified their activities to include assistance to displaced persons, income generation activities, health and sanitation projects, media training, legal protection for women, etc. NGOs expanded to rural and distant regions by 2002 creating rural-based indigenous NGOs – as had never existed before. Nevertheless large swathes of territory – in the Karategin Valley, the mountainous regions of Sughd around Aini, parts of Khatlon – remained virtually untouched by NGOs and international organizations five years after the end of the civil war.

The new NGOs in Tajikistan were weary of engaging in lobbying and advocacy, or directly holding the government accountable for its decision-making. NGOs tended to prefer to adopt the language of social partnership. Tajik NGOs cooperated with Ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs for the preparation of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy; sat on state commissions, such as the National Commission to Protect the Rights and Interests of Children; and in June 2002 took part in a National Conference hosted by Tajikistan’s President. Though initially suspected of being anti-governmental, more and more NGOs won the respect of government authorities for their experience, specialized skills, and ability to secure international funds. In addition, several governmental officials created their own NGOs such the Association of Women Lawyers in Dushanbe and Chashma Hayot in Khojand. These officials benefited from both positions or as one Tajik activist (05.02) described it: “Working in Government they have their chairs, and working in NGOs they have the investments.”

III. Historical definition of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina

III.a The pre-Titoist period: the development of communal civil society.

As in Tajikistan, the place of residence served as a key source of identity and cohesion and the basis for the development of communal civil society in Bosnian urban centers during the Ottoman Empire. Especially amongst the Muslim population living in Bosnian cities and towns, Mahallas functioned in many of the same ways as they did among Tajiks.  

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12 In Mostar thirty-two mahallas reportedly existed (Pasic, 2003). In late 16th Century Sarajevo there were ninety-three mahallas of which only two were predominantly inhabited by Christians (Malcolm, 1994: 68).
the one hand *mahallas* formed a territorial unit – a neighborhood with one or several religious structures, shops, schools, and other public facilities – on the other they served as an institution for community level decision-making and mutual aid. In each *mahalla* one or several *esnaf* (guild, corporation) may have functioned. Muslim-charitable foundations known as *vakuf* collected donations from the wealthy and provided income for religious institutions, as well as public baths, market inns, marriages, etc. (Malcolm, 1994: 68). Many *mahallas* were made up predominantly of persons belonging to the same ethnic or religious group, and tended to function mainly amongst the country’s Muslim population. However, a notion of civil good neighborliness that Bougarel defined, using the Bosnian word *komsiluk*, helped span religious and ethnic differences when they existed within and between *mahallas*. He argues (1996b: 81) that the *komsiluk* concept:

> “Designated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the daily system of coexistence between different communities. It expressed itself essentially through mutual help in work or daily life, invitations to religious ceremonies, and involvement in family events. In all three cases it obeyed the strict rules of respect and reciprocity.”

This value system helped regulate divisions and provided “daily reassurances on the stable and peaceful nature of relations between communities” (Bougare, 1996a: 84).

Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, and increasingly during Austro-Hungarian rule, communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina organized along national-religious lines, becoming ever more politicized, and gradually moving from service provision to activism. The trend began with the organization of the Christian population into *millets*\(^{13}\) during the Ottoman Empire. Decision-making was no longer carried out on a territorial basis but on a religious one, religious identity became formalized into a political identity which superseded most others. With the establishment of the *millet* system the churches came to play key social, cultural, and political roles (Bougare, 1996b: 88). Thereafter under the Austro-Hungarian Empire a more diverse number of religiously based associations developed in cities to provide services, through cultural and educational programs (Donia, 1981).\(^{14}\) In the late

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\(^{13}\) Religious communities that provided a large measure of internal autonomy to non-Muslim population living under the Khalifate in the Ottoman Empire.

\(^{14}\) At the turn of the century 1,256 societies existed in 258 locations – mainly in Sarajevo and other large cities. Very few (391) were ethnically mixed or inter-religious (Hadzibegovic and Kamberovic, 1998: 3-6).
19\textsuperscript{th} Century as Croatian and Serbian nationalism developed in Bosnia and in neighboring regions, political entrepreneurs and nationalist elites found these religious networks and structures to be useful propaganda and political mobilizing tools.\textsuperscript{15} “Nationalism spread among the Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians through the very network of priest, school teachers and educated newspaper readers which Austro-Hungarian policy had helped to bring about” (Malcolm, 1994: 149). In 1905 when political parties were authorized to form in Bosnia-Herzegovina, several were created on the basis of the pre-existing religiously based representations of civil society (Malcolm, 1994: 151; Hadzibegovic and Kamberovic, 1998: 4). Increasingly religious and nationalist ideologies converged around a strong rejection of the Austro-Hungarian regime. The new nationalist movements did not shy away from public activism (Malcolm, 1994: 153). Some adopted violent means - as most famously Gavrilo Princip, an alleged member of the organization \textit{Mlada Bosna} (‘Young Bosnia’), did in 1914 with his crime that launched the start of World War I.

\textit{III.b The Tito era: the development of civil society through the Yugoslav political project.}

Just as in the case of Tajikistan, the majority of scholars, and policy makers, who first commented on the status of civil society in Yugoslavia under communism in the 1980s and 1990s considered it to be weak or non-existent. More recently authors (Belloni 2001: 176; Hann and Dunn, 1996: 7; Smillie 1998; Stubbs, 1997; Pugh 1998) have criticized this approach, arguing that it was erroneous to compare Titoist Yugoslavia with some kind of “totalitarian deep freeze” (Gagnon, 2002: 209) that put on hold the development of all forms of civil society.

During the Titoist period the League of Communists banned the traditional national-based civic associations, but allowed other forms of organizations to develop. Bougarel (1996b: 92) contends that the Communist Party dissolved national/religious based organizations such as the Muslim association \textit{Preporod} in 1946, “less to liquidate the communitarian structure than to put it under exclusive communist control.” Correspondingly it can be

\textsuperscript{15} Bougarel (1996a: 89-90) explains the development of nationalism in Bosnia as a consequence of the Bosnian state building project. He argues that the gradual transformation of communitarian identities and relationships inherited from the Ottoman period, into nationalism, must be understood in the context of the
argued that while the state disallowed the existence of any kind of oppositional civil society, it acquiesced to other forms of public organizing. Ignatieff (1997: 40-41) argues that “Yugoslavia enjoyed one of the freest civil societies in Eastern Europe [...] In retrospect it seems clear that the relative freedom of this civil society was in fact the source of its weakness.” It was a diverse civil society but not a political one. According to the study by the International Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI, 1998: 25):

“During the socialist period, the work of civil organizations, in all fields of public, social and political life, was quite prevalent. These organizations included, inter alia, associations of citizens and youth, syndicate organizations and sports associations. They became an important feature of social life, and developed, to a certain extent, connections with international associations. A number of organizations dealt with matters of a purely humanitarian nature.”

In Yugoslavia citizens joined a myriad of mass based social organizations (ex: Socialist Alliance, trade unions, League of Socialist Youth) and smaller citizens’ associations (udruzenja gradjana) (Ferdinand 1991; Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986). These social organizations had a degree of autonomy. They were often able to determine their own activities and select their leaders, and they relied extensively on funds raised by members, the local population and local enterprises. They were part of a voluntary effort that complemented state action through self-management.

Socialism as applied in Yugoslavia was founded on the notion of workers’ self-management and social self-government (Ferdinand, 1991: 37-39). Some observers of the system (Djordjevic in Ferdinand, 1991: 41-42; Zukin, 1975: 67) have gone so far as to state that the guiding values of the Yugoslav system included the primacy of civil society over the state and political society, the spirit of volunteerism, and direct participation in decision-making. A host of institutions in Titoist Yugoslavia thus aimed to serve as an intermediary between the state, the enterprise and the family.

One such organization established under the 1963 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1974 Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia, was the mjesna zajednica (local community)
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It was created as a territorially based self-government institution, set up at the most basic level of the organized neighborhood in rural and urban areas. *Mjesne zajednice* often followed the territorial lines of the older *mahallas* and as such adopted part of their value systems. They could be considered as an extension of pre-Titoist communal civil society. *Mjesne zajednice* appear to have enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, and had important competencies in social, economic, security and justice affairs (WB, 2002a).17 They were a:

"Self-managing community of citizens, from the territory of villages and cities, in which citizens achieved self-management to carry out those activities which directly satisfy their needs and the needs of their families. [...] MZ in this period made special efforts to resolve the communal needs of citizens, especially in villages, like [engaging in efforts to provide] electrification, water supply, roads, bridges, schools, cultural centers, sports and other facilities, tree planting, cleaning and garbage collection. All these activities were achieved mainly by self-contributions and by the voluntary action of citizens." (Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 110)

The experience of *mjesne zajednice* in the pre-war period has generally been analyzed positively (Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999; World Bank, 2002a). Arguably *mjesne zajednice* were administrative units below the municipal level that were part of the state control system. Yet in their seminal book on political organizations in Yugoslavia, Seroka and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) argued that an active political life existed within the *mjesne zajednice*, and because of their strength at the community level, autonomous political organizations played an important role in the policy making process. Where there were active *mjesne zajednice*, the Titoist system was successful in incorporating communal and rural civil society into decision-making and its broader political project.

III.c. The pre-war period: the victory of nationalist civil society over civic and tolerant ideologies.

As federal Yugoslavia underwent significant political transformations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, new and different forms of civil society started to develop. Divisions between exclusionary and tolerant forms of civil society began to emerge - though much less in

16 Another important institution at the time was the *samoupravna interesna zajednica* (Self-Management Interest Community).

17 By 1980 there were over 11,000 MZs in Yugoslavia, and they were engaged in a range of construction, civic improvement, social welfare and policy making activities (Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986: 17).
Bosnia-Herzegovina than in other parts of Yugoslavia. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina tended to be less politically engaged than in Slovenia, Croatia or Serbia. A network of women’s activists, with a pole in Zagreb and another in Belgrade, for example, began to question women’s role in Yugoslav socialist thought. Few Bosnian women participated (Cockburn, 1998: 159-160; Large, 1998; Ramet, 1999). The groups that began to appear in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that could be considered as early representations of liberal civil society, tended to be less explicit in their criticism of the state or the ruling ideology. In September 1987, thousands of students marched through Sarajevo to demand improved conditions on campus, but they did not outwardly question governmental decision-making. Urban intellectuals set up human rights committees such as the Committee for the Protection of Rights and Liberties of Individuals and Groups. In Tuzla and Zenica in 1989 there were small demonstrations protesting against the polluting effects of the towns’ massive industrial complexes (Andjelic, 1995). As in other Eastern and Central European countries where communist regimes were faltering, civil initiatives developed mainly around youth, the environment and the protection of human rights. However, somewhat like their counterparts in perestroika era Tajikistan, these activists was unable to develop a clear unifying Republic-wide platform, and more importantly perhaps to reach out to rural groups. Rural populations were not significantly involved in the civic initiatives of the 1970s and the 1980s.

Nationalist entrepreneurs in the 1980s and early 1990s were highly successful in radicalizing urban and rural groups through various civil society networks. Bougarel (1996a, 1996b) and Ignatieff (1997) have persuasively described how nationalist politicians and activists exploited popular sentiments of economic and political insecurity – transforming traditional civil society structures into exclusionary ones before the war. The most marginalized communities were those most likely to turn towards nationalist political entrepreneurs and accept their rhetoric. Analyses of the 1990 election results demonstrate how nationalist parties gained most of their votes in economically disenfranchised and rural areas. Support for non-nationalist or “civic” political parties came from city-based

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18 The modern feminist movement in former Yugoslavia dates from the mid-1970s. In 1976 the first women’s studies course was organized in Dubrovnik; in 1978 an international women conference on feminism was held at the Student’s Cultural Center in Belgrade; in 1979 the independent organization Women and Society
intellectual elites and the working class — those who benefited most from Titoist era economic development (Bougarel, 1996a: 96-97). In just a few years nationalist political parties — including the SDA, HDZ, and SDS — were able to build complex Bosnia-wide party structures on the basis of church and mosque networks. At the same time they worked through elite urban-based cultural institutions such as Matica Hrvatska, the Croatian cultural center, and the Serbian Academy of Sciences, to mobilize nationalist sentiment. As nationalist political elites strengthened their grip on all spheres of power, they also gained control over the provision of services and humanitarian assistance that was previously offered by the pre-Titoist forms of civil society - including Merhamet, Caritas, and Dobrotvor - which had been revived in 1989-1990.

It was only as nationalist politics hardened in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the months leading up to the war, that tolerant forms of civil society also became more politically active and unified in a common Republic-wide attempt to stop the outbreak of violence. According to Bougarel (1996a: 101) in Bosnia-Herzegovina “more than the civic parties, courted as they were by the SDA, it was the media, the trade unions, and the students and pacifist movement that opposed the progressive intrusion of the nationalist parties into economic, social and cultural life.” Pacifist demonstrations, organized by groups that often had links to anti-war groups in Belgrade and Zagreb, were held in Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Banja Luka and other towns and villages in 1991-1992 (Kaldor, 1999b: 43). On 6 April, 1992 when the European Union (EU) recognized Bosnia as an independent state, between 50,000 and 100,000 people took to Sarajevo’s streets calling for peace (Bougarel, 1996a: 102; was formed in Zagreb to be followed by the creation of similar groups in urban centers in subsequent years (Cockburn, 1998: 159-160).

19 Ignatieff argues (1997: 41) that in 1991 the “heroes of the hour were those who had suffered under communism which in Yugoslavia’s case were the nationalists.” The leaders of the Tito era social organizations or the urban middle classes — who later attempted to lead the anti-nationalist opposition in 1991 — were not trusted amongst the majority because they were perceived as having been co-opted by the state.

20 For example the SDA used networks of the Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community, present in each town/village where a mosque was located) to mobilize voters for the November 1990 elections and in 1991-1992 to amass and distribute weapons in preparation for war (personal interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Posavina region, 1993-1996). Bougarel (1996a: 96) describes the role of the Islamic Community in creating the SDA.

21 Religiously defined humanitarian and cultural associations were not always exclusionary – the Jewish based La Benevolencija was for example famous in Sarajevo for providing humanitarian assistance to all.

22 In fall 1991 several Bosnian groups joined a Shadow Parliament bringing together 36 non-nationalistic political parties and civic initiatives from all Yugoslav Republics. They also put their signature to an Anti-War Campaign charter with 76 Yugoslav groups (Large, 1998: 28).
Kaldor, 1999b: 43; Malcolm, 1994: 235). For the first time, a large scale, democratically orientated, anti-nationalist representation of liberal civil society had surfaced. Nevertheless, as the outbreak of fighting demonstrated, it was mostly powerless vis-à-vis the nationalist political forces that had earlier taken control of key elements of liberal and communal civil society, especially through mobilization in rural areas.

As in Tajikistan, the urban/rural divide and the split between liberal and communal civil society, which existed in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina had significant repercussions on political life. The tradition of independent community organizing, for advocacy purposes, among educated urban dwellers was similarly weak. A unifying Republic level association with a clear mission for the country’s future had no time to develop. Instead, following a pattern from the end of the Austro-Hungarian rule, religious and cultural associations successfully served as the basis for exclusionary and nationalist political parties and groups to disseminate their ideology and mobilize supporters.23

III.d War and post-war civil society: the strengthening of liberal forms.

Civil society was clearly divided along national lines during the 1992-1995 war. Most of the remaining Tito era citizens’ associations split according to nationality. Several new mono-national groups were created to represent the interests of internally displaced person (IDPs), veterans, the families of fallen soldiers, the mothers of missing persons... Many ethnically mixed mjesne zajednice became the site of intensive power conflicts between members - leading to their break up and the creation of self-proclaimed mono-national mjesne zajednice and mjesne zajednice-in-exile (for displaced persons). During the war national humanitarian organizations - such as Merhamet, Caritas and Dobrotvor - according to Kuslugic (20.03.01) became “a pure extension of the activity of nationalistic parties that only fulfill the vision of nationalist parties.” As nationalists controlled these forms of civil society they also shaped their activity, most significantly determining how they carried out humanitarian aid distribution (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999; Duffield, 1999). Meanwhile state resources and voluntary contributions to support the activities of mjesne

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23 Analyzing the overall situation in Central Europe in 1990, Rau (1991: 140-141) argued that: “It was nationalism that managed to preserve pre-communist values and then mobilize masses of the population [...] The result of this process is that now civil society is relatively strong in terms of the number
zajednice and other social organizations declined significantly, weakening their ability to engage in any form of independent work.

Only a handful of the pre-war representations of liberal civil society that associated youth, women, environmental or human rights activists continued to function during and after the war – most notably the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and the Forum of Tuzla Citizens. Much of their survival was due to their engagement in transnational networks from which they gained information, the ability to maintain contacts throughout Yugoslavia, moral and financial support. Thus during the conflict years, women activists from different parts of former Yugoslavia succeeded in maintaining links, meeting in Hungary or Italy, exchanging information via the Zamir (for Peace) computer link, and initiating common projects such as the Balkan Women’s Parliament in 1995. Displaced persons (DPs) and refugees also benefited from transnational forms of civil society. In 1997 the Koalicija za Povratak/Coalition for Return was created to bring together a growing number of DP associations from all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to define common interests, lobby international organizations and local authorities, and disseminate information (through the bulletin Putokaz and its Information Centers). The Coalition for Return in turn was linked to Ziveti Zajedno/ Let’s Live Together, which starting in 1997 assembled NGOs working on the return of refugees and displaced persons in all ex-Republics of Yugoslavia. In 1998 it began publishing a magazine called Povratak/Return with contributions from journalists from throughout the former Yugoslavia.

During the war new NGOs began to form. Some were established by international organizations which sought implementing partners to assist them in the delivery of assistance or with the goal of “leaving something behind” (Stubbs, 1997; Smillie, 1998). International donors tended to focus their support on new urban NGOs, modeled on Western groups, rather than on traditional rural based community groups, socialist era social organizations or pre-war civic initiatives whose organisational structure, skills and experiences did not meet their criteria (Duffield, 1996; Pugh, 1998; Sali-Terzic 2001). International organizations generally turned to NGOs to provide services – first of its institutions and the extent of their activity, but relatively weak in terms of constructive values [...] In the region as a whole nationalism simply blocks the development of a liberally orientated civil society.”

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humanitarian assistance, subsequently in the fields of health, education, and aid provision—in an effort to bypass what they perceived to be heavily bureaucratized and inflexible governmental agencies. However, governmental and party representatives also sought a share of the international funding by creating their own NGOs (hCa, 1998: 26). In 1996-2001 a mass of GONGOs (government organized NGOs), PONGOs (party organized NGOs), and MONGOs (mafia organized NGOs) started operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, 1997: 9-11). According to the USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2001 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 1,300 NGOs were registered in 2001, though “only an estimated 300 to 500 are active and able to provide adequate services for their beneficiaries or membership.”

Although after the signing of the GFAP NGOs generally became the most prominent representation of civil society, they were virtually non-existent in numerous parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where especially Serb and Croat nationalist politicians maintained a strong hold on power. International experts tended to call these large swaths of Bosnia-Herzegovina ominously “black holes” or “neglected areas” by (Belloni, 2001: 174). Asked to identify the region that was the most difficult for NGOs to operate in, Svetlana Derajic (22.03.2001) easily responded in 2001, “It is Western Herzegovina […]. That region is not accessible for NGOs, for people from multi-ethnic political parties, to freely speak with people and know their honest will.” Furthermore only a few towns in Republika Srpska such as Banja Luka and Bjeljina had become strong centers of civic activity. In rural Herzegovina and Republika Srpska personal and private relations were paramount; and the population appeared to be resistant to NGO activity.

International donors funded local NGOs to take up service related activities, but with virtually no cooperation or coordination with governmental structures. The government-NGO disconnect led by 2001 to the formation of a parallel system of service provision with little integration or functional relationship with public bodies. At the same time “The government saw [the development of NGOs] as a threat because first they thought that NGOs were working against government. Secondly because they were getting money from

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international donors (Gordana Suvalija, 23.03.2001).” As there was little dialogue between NGOs and government there was also little opportunity for NGOs to lobby and advocate with government, or to hold it publicly accountable.

IV. General features of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan

IV.a Communal civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan:

This discussion of the evolution of civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals some important similarities in the nature of civil society in both countries. For centuries a strong communal civil society existed in which kinship and proximity served as the building blocks of civic networks. People assembled in organizations as well as in informal settings, such as weddings and funerals. Commitment to groups and practices was less a reflection of individual will than an expression of community solidarity. Communal civil society’s most well developed organizational representation (in Muslim dominated urban areas) appears to have been the *mahalla*. In Tajik and Bosnian *mahallas* people came together to exchange information, to resolve community problems and affect public opinion but they rarely confronted state authority openly. They worked together in solidarity to provide mutual aid rather than to oppose the state. Under communism – of the Yugoslav and Soviet type – traditional group practices and ways of organizing were often replicated either in the *kolkhoz* or the *mjesna zajednica* where people engaged in community efforts through voluntary work.

Yet between Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a key difference based on the fact that one country had a uniformly Muslim population and the other was mixed. Thus in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where *mahallas* based on proximity were largely uni-ethnic, civil society organizations could divide rather than unify communities. The existence of a bridging influence between local civil society groups was essential to diminish opportunities for rivalries or conflict. The *komsiluk* concept thus offered an opportunity for inter-action and confidence building through mutual aid and common action – while no

In the 2002 edition of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in BiH 196 local NGOs were listed.
such bridging notion existed in the largely mono-ethnic territories that became Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{25} To respect the values of komsiluk signified in a highly mixed environment being able to cut across religious and nationality divides to work together on small issues (Whaites 2000: 136-137). In the more homogeneous Muslim Tajikistan, Islam successfully bonded communities and not such bridging mechanism was needed to maintain peace and stability. Rather than dividing society, as would have been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the religiously based intra-communal organizations, such as those that developed around Jadidism, helped Tajik scholars expand their links with others in the Muslim world, as well as in Russia. Only in the early 1990s were religiously based communal groups based in the kolkhoz used in Tajikistan to exacerbate tensions between the Islamists and “ex-communists” – or Garmis and Kulyabis – as will be described in more detail in Chapter 2.

Though the nature of the communist system in Yugoslavia and in the USSR was different, communal civil society evolved similarly in both contexts.\textsuperscript{26} In both countries we find that the state or Communist Party was unsuccessful in eradicating communal forms of civil society. The Mahallas’ reincarnation in state sponsored kolkhoz brigade and mjesna zajednica structures illustrates how communal civil society was able to survive under communism. However here it is important to note some differences between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. Communal civil society appears in many parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to have been more effectively co-opted in state structures than in Tajikistan. Kinship linkages for example maintained greater influence in Tajikistan. In Bosnia the mjesna zajednica was explicitly integrated into the system of government as an institution of local self-government with a legal personality, while in Tajikistan the mahalla within the kolkhoz never was. When the communist system fell apart in the early 1990s the mjesna zajednica in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mahalla in Tajikistan were significantly weakened. They could no longer rely on governmental subsidies or support. The voluntary contributions that community members previously made became increasingly scarce as the economic situation worsened.

\textsuperscript{25} Whether something similar existed in the multi-national and religiously mixed cities of Samarkand and Bukhara (present day Uzbekistan) would be extremely interesting to determine, but I have found no studies on this subject.

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Due to its non-normative character, the communal definition implies the highly sensitive finding that many of the nationalist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were at the forefront of wartime atrocities disseminated their ideas and mobilized supporters through communal civil society. Similarly in Tajikistan warlords easily co-opted traditional organizations and solidarity mechanisms in the most extreme cases to perpetuate ethnic cleansing against people with different historical regional backgrounds. This seems to support the argument that communal civil society, based on bonding social capital, may “be readily perverted to undermine social cohesion and fragment society for individual and group gain, and this manipulation has the potential to lead to violent conflict” (Coletta and Cullen, 2000: 15). Or as Varshney (2002: 9) describes where inter-communal associations are weak, and intra-communal groups dominant, communal identities can cause “endemic and ghastly violence.”

**IV.b Liberal civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina**

In both contexts, though to a greater extent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religious and nationalist ideologies provided a basis for the development of the first liberal civil society organizations in the second part of the 19th Century. The first liberal organizations in both countries were heavily dependent on external ideologies and guidance for their transformation into political actors. Unlike in other contexts (Lewis, 2004: 113) Tajik and Bosnian representations of liberal civil society were not deeply rooted in traditional forms of community organization and voluntary action.

In the late 1980s a revival of liberal civil society was apparent in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that time in both countries democratic civic movements emerged mainly advocating for greater attention to be paid to mainly environmental, youth and human rights concerns. They were focused in urban areas and attracted mainly intellectuals. In both countries pre-war liberal forms of civil society proved fragile. In Tajikistan groups that had originally formed to protect community interests became ever more embroiled in party politics – several eventually joining one of the armed factions in the Tajik war. In Bosnia-Herzegovina a handful of civic initiatives attempted to provide an alternative to the

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28 Yet to some extent Tajikistan’s distance from Moscow and its social context attenuated much of the center’s control on community life as Roy (1999; 2002) argues comprehensively.
increasingly dominant and violent discourse of nationalist political leaders. But they were few, divided, lacked an overarching agenda/ideology, and possessed weak links with rural populations. During the civil war in Tajikistan (Akiner 2002a: 158-159, 183-184), as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bougarel, 1996a: 102; Gagnon 2002: 211; Kaldor, 1999a: 197) much of the pre-war forms of liberal civil society were devastated.

When a new post-war liberal civil society emerged, there were few foundations of a pre-war liberal civil society to build upon (Abdushukurova, 17.05.02). Arguably as a result, the new NGOs that formed in the post-war period more readily engaged in service delivery than advocacy or the promotion of public participation in decision-making. The NGOs thus did not fulfill all the functions of a liberal civil society – as defined earlier in this chapter – and due to this were frequently criticized for being ineffectual (Belloni, 2001: 170-174; Pugh, 1998: 19-2; Smillie, 1996: 3).

Though it has been argued (Akiner, 2002: 158-169; hCa, 1997: 6; Kaldor, 1999a: 197) that war impedes the development of civil society, our reading of Tajik and Bosnian history suggests that civil society is transformed during times of conflict – co-opted in certain cases - but does not necessarily collapse. Civil society organizations emerge or get recreated during civil war. Most dramatically, the war years were accompanied by an increase in the number of Tajik and Bosnian NGOs. According to one Bosnian activist (hCa, 1997: 7) it is precisely the breakdown in civilized relations between people and the absence of a state, that incited him to set up an organization. These NGOs in both countries tended to provide emergency assistance when government social service provision had significantly weakened – inherently contributing to a privatization of welfare delivery.

Conclusion:
The existing literature on civil society defines two main ideal types – communal and liberal forms of civil society – and suggests that it is possible to classify organizations into two groups based on their values, political aims, and organizational characteristics. As we found in this chapter, this typology can help us understand the different manifestations of civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have found that over time in both countries civil society has taken on different organizational forms, in defense of different
goals and values. Traditions in civil society keep being reinvented and transmitted to each new political era. Consequently a single universal definition of civil society cannot adequately describe the complex reality of civil society's development. Liberal and communal forms of civil society evolved in the two states, occasionally as clearly distinct entities, but also often overlapping and sharing functions. At times civil society organizations operated in harmony and at times in conflict. Most significantly, when war commenced in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, there was a sharp divide between liberal and communal forms of civil society. In both countries there were rivalries among individuals and families of urban and rural origin, and divisions between inter and intra-communal modes of organizing. Tensions between the "enlightened" urban elite's understandings of civil society and popular rural ones were clearly evident before the outbreak of war. This distance may help explain why in both countries civil society was unable to play a significant conflict prevention role.

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that after the Bosnian and Tajik wars international policy makers were convinced that civil society could positively affect peace. I posed the question: what civil society is most likely to have this affect? As this chapter demonstrated, two different conceptualizations of civil society exist in the literature and are of relevance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. This typology begins to suggest what kind of roles civil society may play in post conflict contexts. Thus my initial question may be refined and re-stated as: Is communal or liberal civil society most likely to positively affect peace? In subsequent chapters an attempt will be made to respond to this query through the study of organizational representations of liberal and communal civil society. Specifically two NGOs and two CBOs will be analyzed. As we saw in this Chapter, in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan newly created NGOs, carrying out service delivery activities but with little engagement in advocacy, were the most prominent organizational representation of liberal civil society. Communal civil society, with its long history in the two countries, could be identified with the CBOs that developed out of the Tajik mahalla and the Bosnian mjesna zajednica.

Before approaching the case studies it is necessary to consider the meaning of peace consolidation. In the following chapter I will thus present four approaches to the study of
war and peace. Each of these approaches assigns different priorities to peace consolidation based on a different understanding of the causes of war. In Chapter 2 we will describe these approaches as they relate to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan and consider what assumptions they make concerning civil society's potential to positively affect the peace process. Based on this review we will conclude the chapter with a series of hypotheses on how communal and liberal civil society may influence peace consolidation. The validity of these hypotheses will be investigated in more detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6; where I will analyze how four civil society organizations affected peace and why they behaved as they did in challenging post-war post communist contexts.
Introduction:
To determine how civil society can positively affect peace consolidation it is necessary to understand how peace is made. From the end of the Cold War until the start of the US led “War on Terror” in 2001, debates on war and peace generally shifted to investigations of intra-state processes, and of possible external intervention strategies to help build peace. There was a recognition (Holsti, 1996: 205-207; Rasmussen, 2003: 1-4) that the analytical tools developed over the past two hundred years in international relations and political science to examine the sources of war and the conditions for peace were no longer adequate. Therefore “international actors were on a steep learning curve on peace implementation throughout the 1990s” (Malone, 2002: ix). Soon after research for this dissertation began, Downs and Stedman (2002: 43) noted that “compared to the formidable scholarly literature dealing with the problem of negotiating peace agreements in civil wars, the literature devoted to the problem of implementing peace agreements, is modest.” Though theorists have been scrutinizing war and peace since time immemorial, the question “what constitutes peace?” retained much of its pertinence.

The United Nations (UN) took the lead in defining forms of intervention that could promote peace. Post-conflict peace building was designated as one of the four mechanisms at the UN’s disposal to prevent and resolve conflicts. Based on this rational approach, peace building was described (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 45-46) as a technical response mechanism to be implemented after preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 61) provided a list of post-conflict activities in lieu of a conceptual definition of the term:

1 Herewith the term “peace consolidation” is being used rather than “peace building” to reflect how our definition of peace includes the UN’s but is not limited by it.
Post conflict peace-building “through agreements ending civil strife, may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”

The 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 11) added more tasks, including: “the design and implementation of de-mining programmes, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the establishment of new police forces; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation…”

Peace consolidation thus tended to be described as the sum of activities undertaken by a range of external international actors in post conflict contexts. Scholars attempted to identify a list of peace consolidation priorities (Ball, 1996: 3), proposing specific peace consolidation mechanisms, tasks and projects (Ball, 1996: 52-54; Kumar, 1997: 4-32; Last, 2000: 86; Ramsbotham, 2000: 182). The first analysis of peace building operations (Ball, 1996; Doyle 1995, 1997; Hampson, 1996; Heininger, 1994) which focused on Cambodia and Latin America were clear examples of this approach.

To adequately respond to my research question – how can civil society positively affect peace? – I will introduce four conceptualizations of peace consolidation. These approaches can be classified as institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights-based. As will be described, each devises a distinct concept of peace, assigns different causes for war, and interprets the evolution, goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. The four make assumptions about the positive contribution that civil society can make to peace. Some apply a liberal definition of civil society, while others favor a communal one. Based on these conceptualizations of peace, we will then turn to the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan to consider the causes of conflict and the condition of peace consolidation five years after the end of civil war. The chapter will conclude with the presentation of a series of theory-based hypotheses on how civil society can contribute to peace as an institution building, conflict resolution, political-economic, and rights-based project to be investigated further in subsequent chapters.
I. The institution-building approach to peace consolidation:

I.a Institution building as a solution to failed states:

Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflict as in intra-state affair was often explained by the “failed state” phenomenon, referring to nation-states in Africa and Asia, but also the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in which economic hardships threatened to lead to governmental collapse (Helman and Ratner, 1992: 4-5). Failed states were considered to have a short-lived statehood, weak civic institutions, limited economic prospects, and close to non-existent judicial systems and rule of law. In failed states problems were understood as being mainly structural. Centralized government authority was unsuccessful in monopolizing the means of coercion; states had lost their monopolies over armed violence; and “terrorists, guerillas, bandits and robbers” were in a position to rival them (van Creveld, 1991: 197). Processes of transition, the entrenchment of authoritarianism and the rise of ethno-nationalism further undermined what institutions of governance existed. Wars in these contexts were usually fought between a weak government authority and various rebel groups. The sides struggled for control over territory and state power.

Failed states were considered worthy of international intervention because the conflicts they engendered posed threats that extended beyond their borders. In the mid-1990s, and especially during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Western European countries were reminded of how wars could launch large-scale refugee flows. Failed states’ role in facilitating trafficking of drugs and people, disseminating radical ideas and terrorism, and buying/selling the components of weapons of mass-destruction also emerged as large-scale threats to Western and global security.

As post-war societies were considered to be “cursed by institutional breakdown” (Newman and Schnabel, 2002:1), institution building was assigned as one of the main components of peace consolidation. The international community had an important role to play. For after the signing of a peace agreement, the former warring parties’ capacities to meet the demands of institution building were “constrained by institutional weaknesses, limited human and financial resources, and economic fragility (Ball with Halevy, 1996: 30). Thus there arose opportunities for a range of actors, including international organizations and financial institutions, international and domestic NGOs, and private corporations, to
become engaged. Their tasks were varied but the project was dependent on the presence of a liberalized economy, democratic institutions of government, and a secure environment where the state has the monopoly on violence. In *Making Peace Work*, Ball with Halevy (1996: 30-46) categorized peace consolidation as: building political institutions, consolidating internal and external security, and promoting economic and social revitalization. According to Duffield (2002: 11) this “liberal peace” was a political project whose “aim is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and especially stable entities.”

The institutional-building approach was also closely related to the “democratic peace” argument, which is based on the proposition that democracies seldom go to war with one another. According to the democratic peace literature (Brown, Michael, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, 1997; Gleditsch, 2003) constitutional, representative, democratic governments based on consent and rational policy making (Hoffman, 1995: 161) are less prone to engage in war than other systems of government. Thus the aim of the peace consolidation project is the establishment of democratic institutions. In practice, the holding of multi-party elections was often considered to be a clear indication of successful peace consolidation.

1.b *The contribution of civil society to institution building:*

Those who adopt an institution building approach to peace consolidation generally consider that civil society can play an essential role in contributing to the strengthening of democratic governmental structures and the establishment of free-markets. Institution building proponents thus mainly favor a liberal definition of civil society. As described in the previous chapter liberal civil society has been conceived of as a political project, which aims to promote democratic decision-making and a roll back of the state in economic affairs. Thus based on her analysis of the Cambodian peace building efforts, Heininger (1994: 118-119) argued that “Peace-building entails the rebuilding of a civil society. It can help reconstruct a failed state by strengthening institutions shattered by conflict.” In post-conflict environments civil society is seen as having a crucial part to play as “true democratization cannot occur without a strong, established, well-functioning and broadly supported civil society – which produces potential leaders and socializes and mobilizes
citizens around democratic and civic duties and responsibilities.” (Newman and Schnabel, 2002: 1-2). Civil society can support institution building as well as increased public participation.

“During the transition phase, the parties to the conflict are often consumed by the political infighting that accompanies the dissolution of wartime coalitions and are consequently unable to represent adequately the interests of ordinary citizens [...] Supporting the empowerment of civil society can help to mitigate the detrimental effects of this behavior by offering citizens the means to make their voices heard, especially at the local level.” (Ball 1996: 65).

These assumptions are informed by conclusions made in the much broader literature on democratization² and on not-for-profit management.³ Lastly civil society can play an active role as an advocate for peace, engaging in policy debates. In the post conflict phase “In civil society, the objectives should be to enhance the capacities of organizations to evaluate policy and to develop and implement programs in their sphere of activity.” (Ball with Halevy, 1996: 9)

Institution-building proponents also argue that the development of civil society is closely linked with economic development and the establishment of a liberal market system. In the Executive Summary of the 1997 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (30) civil society is assigned a pivotal role right next to the private sector. “Many elements of civil society,” the report states, “can work to reduce hatred and violence and to encourage attitudes of concern, social responsibility and mutual aid within and between groups. In difficult economic and political transitions, the organizations of civil society are of crucial importance in alleviating the dangers of mass violence.” In a Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the World Bank advises that assistance must concentrate “on re-creating the conditions that will allow the private sector and institutions of civil society to resume.” (World Bank quoted in Pugh, 1998: 3) While the process of economic liberalization and the reduction of the state’s involvement in the local economy progresses, civil society organizations have an important role to play in the provision of social services, contributing to the shifting of goods and service provision from the public to the private sector.

² Within this literature see for example: Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Burnell, 2000; Dahl, 1997; Diamond and Plattner, 1996; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000.
Since civil society can play such a role, international funds and policies are called upon to support it. Ball states that, because of the institutional weaknesses of post-conflict societies, "donors need to give top priority to building capacity in [...] civil society as early as possible" (Ball, 1996: 9). Capacity building is carried out through international civil society development programs.

When policy makers argue that civil society can make a positive contribution to institution building, they are generally employing a liberal definition of civil society, and are mainly concerned with the impact of NGOs. According to the USAID’s Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E), "We decided early on that vigorous USAID support for local non governmental organizations would be a critical element of strengthening civil society" (USAID, 1999: 3). In post-conflict environments "strengthening NGOs can help to build civil society, enhance opportunities for participation, and foster political reconciliation (Ball 1996: 93)." NGOs are the preferred channel because they are considered to be familiar with local needs, cost-effective, and to have effective community-level networks (Aall 2000a: 134-135; Ball with Halevy, 1996: 90; Goodhand with Chamberlain, 2000: 99; Minear and Weiss, 1995: 195; Prendergast and Plumb, 2002).

Nevertheless in practice it has been recognized that NGOs in many post-war environments face a host of organizational challenges. They are often new structures going through the early stages of organizational development. They may lack familiarity with outside resources, with accountability procedures, and have working "customs that from an international perspective may be questionable." (Minear and Weiss, 1995: 195) Few will be skilled in Western modes of financial management (Ball and Halevy, 1996: 92, Eade, 1997: 179). Problems with corruption in the absence of an effective legal framework to regulate NGO activity are endemic.

Scholars and practitioners who consider the causes of war to be mainly the existence of failed states, and the task of peace consolidation to be focused on institution-building,

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3 Of special relevance in the literature is: Billis and Harris, 1996; Powell and Clemens, 1998; Lewis, 1999.
argue that civil society can positively affect the peace process by supporting the twin processes of democratization and economic liberalization. Civil society organizations can help provide essential economic and social services, as well as serve as a conduit for popular participation. Those who favor an institution-building approach hypothesize that NGOs are the civil society organizations most likely to positively affect peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace consolidation approach</th>
<th>Institution building</th>
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<tr>
<td>Causes of war:</td>
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<td>Institutional breakdown</td>
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<td>Goals of warring sides:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Control of territory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defeat of enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tasks of peace consolidation that civil society may affect:</td>
<td>Build democratic participatory government</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish liberal market economy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support the privatization of social service provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society likely to contribute:</td>
<td>Liberal civil society/NGOs</td>
</tr>
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II. Peace consolidation as conflict resolution and behavioral change:

II.a Reconciliation as a solution to ancient hatreds:

Conflict resolution provides a second approach to the understanding of war and peace, that has also shifted since the end of the Cold War to emphasize peace consolidation as primarily a "local" process (Rupesinghe, 1995: 72-81). Where the institution-building approach described above argued for a sectorial and institutional response to peace consolidation, conflict resolution calls for a comprehensive strategic approach which focuses on the transformation of behaviors and beliefs. As Saunders (1999: 4) succinctly points out, "Building peace is also a human - not just an institutional - task." Thus conflict resolution theorists seek ways to address what they deem to be inadequacies in the traditional diplomatic process - of negotiation and coercion - and use of armed force to make and support peace consolidation. Theorists such as Lederach (1999: 35) conceived of peace consolidation as the transformation of a "war system" into a "peace system." It is a long-term process difficulty measured through the attainment of empirical sub-goals. (Rothstein, 1999: 224)

Rather than emphasizing the impact of "failed states," conflict resolution scholars considered the problem of "protracted social conflict, which typically involves non-state
actors whose autonomy is not guaranteed in the state system (Azar, 2002:15). While conflict could be partly caused by the absence of effective institutions of government, the state could also exacerbate tensions. This was most likely to occur in multi ethnic/national settings, where one dominant group that sought to maximize its interests monopolized state authority at the expense of others. War broke out as a result of perceptions of mutually incompatible goals among communities, often complemented by a strong sense of collective victimization. During these “protracted social conflicts,” fighting rarely descended into chaos. Rather it followed well-defined lines as populations were clearly demarcated by their identity (national, ethnic, religious, gender) and as such were drawn into the fighting as victims or perpetuators. Such conflicts were defined by their viciousness, as fighting became a question of basic survival and the aim of warring sides was total defeat of the other.

With its talk of “deep rooted human conflict” (Saunders 1999) conflict resolution analysis of the causes of war has some commonalities with what has been termed the “new barbarism” narrative (Richards cited in Duffield, 2002: 109). For proponents of “new barbarism” conflicts between ethnic or national groups are inevitable due to the destructive power of traditional feelings and attachments to identity. The unleashing of primordial nationalism, after the breakup of the Yugoslav and Soviet socialist/communist regimes, is considered to be an important cause of contemporary conflict. Supporters of “new barbarism” interpretations find little utility for intervention in other peoples’ conflict. “We are not in control” thus writes Kaplan (1997: 436-437) from a Western perspective, and “people will either solve their problems at the local level [...] or they won’t”, succumbing instead to history’s wrath.

Conflict resolution theorists generally differ sharply from Kaplan in their conviction that outside intervention can play a crucial role in peace. They do not believe in the irreversibility of the coming anarchy, and argue that differences based on identity can be transformed and relationships re-imagined to secure peace. Feuding parties can benefit

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4 This is not to say that conflict resolution theorists only focus on domestic actors when explaining the sources of post-Cold war conflict. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse speak about “international social conflicts,” which consider the complex relationships between international, state and social sources of conflict (1999: 77).
from third party or external intervention to initiate, facilitate, or sustain contacts and
dialogue between antagonistic sides. Multi-track diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald,
1996; McDonald, 2002), problem solving workshops (Azar, 2002; Kelman, 2002),
sustained dialogue (Saunders, 1999) are but three of the many tools conceived of as a
means to consolidate peace. They share the aims of changing behaviors: strengthening
contacts and trust between former warring sides; transforming understanding of the
conflict, values and modes of dialogue; and establishing a sense of group cohesion and
initiating common action.

Reconciliation between former warring sides is hampered by hatred, images of death and
destruction, feelings of victimization and dreams of revenge often promoted by political
elites. Information tends to be tightly controlled in conflict settings; citizens are limited to
one vision of the conflict and of the “other side.” Conflict resolution thus entails the
transformation of popular conceptualizations of the conflict and the “enemy.” Conflict
resolution activities seek to “develop a new language of dialogue to replace the language of
conflict and sectarianism. In doing so they may help ‘deconstruct’ and reconceptualize the
inherited history of myth and symbol that fuels confrontation (Ryan, 1995a: 151).” On one
hand the actual means of communication may be transformed – from passive to active
listening for example – and on the other the beliefs about oneself and the other may be
changed. Firstly it is necessary for former conflicting parties to meet each other. It
necessitates a place where not only “voices that seek moderation and engagement can be
heard and in which moderate constituencies can be mobilized (Kumar, 2001:183),” but also
“where the diverse but connected energies and concerns driving the conflict can meet
(Lederach, 1997:35).” Meetings are rarely one-time events (Azar, 2002: 25), but tend to
involve a systematic prolonged dialogue (Saunders, 1999:12) to gradually build trust and
confidence, and enable the identification of common concerns. The process is most likely
to have an impact at the community level where conflicting groups live in close proximity

Peace as conceptualized by conflict resolution theorists necessitates a “systematic
transformation of relationships in the affected society,” to help fill the “interdependence
gap” that was a cause of the conflict, and deepened during the fighting (Lederach, 1999:
Chapter two

29-31). On one hand there is a “need [for] good relationships at community level to manage conflict without violence” (Last, 2000: 80). On the other sustainable peace consolidation “requires both horizontal and vertical relationship building” – between people at different levels in the socio-political structure of society, and across the line of division (Lederach 1999: 30). Thus for peace to be secured, all levels of society should recognize their interdependencies, the common opportunities and responsibilities they have to improve their plight and promote change. Peace consolidation is successful when formerly hostile groups – as well as relatively non-engaged groups such as citizens’ initiatives and local government - have increased capacity and willingness to act together in joint problem solving and to implement solutions. Ultimately this cooperation may lead to the establishment of new bridging networks and institutions.

II. b  Civil society’s affect on conflict resolution:
Conflict resolution theorists emphasize the importance in peace consolidation of encouraging grassroots level, bottom up processes in parallel with state-level, top down ones. They underscore how “a multi-sectorial approach to conflict transformation is needed which emphasizes the significance of local actors and the non-governmental sector in developing effective and sustainable citizens-based peace building initiatives (Rupesinghe, 1995: 65, 80).” As Saunders (2001: 249) contends “important as governments and formal mediation and negotiation will remain, lasting peaceful relationships will not be built until citizens outside government are deeply engaged and until the civil societies in which they work provide public space in which they can span the divisions in those societies.” Those who favor a conflict resolution approach to peace consolidation thus regard civil society as a key actor. They tend to recognize liberal and communal civil society as important.

Civil society may play an extensive role in conflict resolution, providing a space in which former antagonistic sides can meet and contacts and trust can be built; reconciliation facilitated by transforming modes of dialogue; and joint problem solving and the initiation of common action supported. Thus Aall (2000: 153) describes how in post-war contexts civil society organizations may effectively:
In a community environment poisoned with violence and hatred, civil society is a forum in which local peacemakers can operate with greater freedom. By creating a space in which educated middle class people can take responsibility and learn new skills, NGOs may “be producing an important resource: a cadre of ‘organic intellectuals’ with community-mobilization skills.” (Goodhand with Chamberlain, 2000: 100) With the advantage of strength in numbers, “NGOs can provide support to independently minded individuals who feel silenced by political pressures but are nonetheless ready to take a stand” (Rotberg, 1996: 7). Those who form local civil society groups may do so in defense of the principle of inclusiveness and to create an inter-personal connection when conflict has caused divisions. Shaped by this mission, they will include individuals from different tribal or ethnic groups. In maintaining a commitment to openness in conflict and post-conflict zones, civil society groups contribute to “demilitarizing people’s minds” (Goodhand and Chamberlain, 2000: 102).

Conflict resolution theorists argue that “external interventions that build local peace capacities and/or processes stand the best chance of creating a self-enforcing peace” (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 346). Thus aid to local civil society actors should be a priority of external intervention.

Conflict resolution theorists are careful not to limit their definition of civil society organizations to NGOs but to include other groups that may be indigenous to non-Western contexts. They argue that traditional groups, at least as much as NGOs, are able to employ local mechanisms of conflict management and reconciliation that build on domestic concepts of social justice. Cases in Africa describe how traditional civil society groups have provided avenues for inter and intra-group reconciliation. Rather than NGOs, traditional civil society groups – clans, committees of elders, and religious gatherings – play the greatest role. For them to succeed, any external support should be discreet and
minimal – attentive to the danger of undermining local leadership and decision-making (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 342-344).\(^5\)

Conflict resolution theorists thus suppose that civil society can positively impact peace by strengthening contacts and trust between former warring sides; transforming modes of dialogue; and developing group cohesion through the implementation of common activities. Civil society is important as an organizational form and as a “space” of action. Arguably in post-war setting “citizens working in a wide array of associations in the civil society pursue actions designed to reconnect elements of the civil society that have been alienated and fragmented by the conflict (Saunders, 1999: 27).” Theorists do not claim that civil society organizations can force warring parties to accept peace, yet once a peace agreement has been signed, they can play a key role in encouraging transformative peace consolidation. Within civil society, NGOs are described as one of the actors capable of affecting peace consolidation, though traditional groups such as clans and committees of elders may also play a decisive role. In the conflict resolution literature it is thus hypothesized that both communal and liberal forms of civil society may affect peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of theory:</th>
<th>Conflict resolution</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causes of war:</td>
<td>Ancient hatreds</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal of warring sides:</td>
<td>Control of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redress past grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks of peace consolidation that civil society may affect:</td>
<td>Build contacts and trust between former warring sides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transform values and modes of dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase group cohesion and initiation of common action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society likely to contribute:</td>
<td>Communal and liberal civil society/CBOs and NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Political-economy interpretations of war and peace:

III.a. Equitable economic development as a response to conflict:

While war can be seen as caused by breakdowns in institutional arrangements or in relations between different groups, political economists tend to understand war as “not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of

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Armed conflicts benefit elites and the disenfranchised through the creation of war economies. Thus Keen (1998) distinguishes between two sources of violence: “top down”, which is mobilized by political and economic entrepreneurs, and “bottom up”, which develops among dissatisfied citizenry seeking to improve their plight. Elites looking to improve their economic and political position may foment violence out of greed. At the same time, amongst marginalized sections of the population in which there is high unemployment, low sense of self-worth, and resentment towards those who have done well, war can be a means to address grievances (Keen 1998: 23-54). Particularly in the UK based literature on the political economic causes of war, conflict is considered to be based on politically and economically motivated greed and grievance. Rather than being an expression of intra-state rivalries, these wars primarily reflect “the contested integration of stratified markets and populations into the global economy (Duffield 2002: 14).” According to this interpretation wars are fought mainly over control of economic resources and rarely in defense of an ideology or political program.

The political economic approach also interprets the outbreak of war as a failure of sustainable and equitable economic development. According to this analysis “the unequal distribution of resources or other benefits between social groups, and, especially, the absence of formal political mechanisms to peaceful reconcile such differences (Duffield 2002: 38)” can breed conflict. After peace agreements are signed, even if there is no return to an open war, “growing economic inequalities and hardship can fuel increased violence (Woodward, 2002: 184).”

The source of the new wars are linked with globalization because, together with the solidification of regional trade (and political) blocks, the privatization of economic relations, and the decline of the welfare state, globalization has weakened the prestige of political authority and citizens’ sense of national identity. In a rapidly changing world, where globalization brings opportunities as well as frustrations, and traditional values are challenged by imported slogans, whatever feelings of exclusion and grievance that already exist in society risk being exacerbated. Disenfranchised citizens with no strong government to turn to or no clear role models in formal positions of authority may feel a sentiment of
low worth and direction. For the elites and average citizens alike participation in the parallel war economy, while proclaiming to be fighting for a nation or region, can thus provide a powerful new "strong man" identity. Globalization also brings greater opportunity for economic gain. As Duffield (2002: 14) describes, the liberalization of trade relations and market deregulation "has deepened all forms of parallel and transborder trade and allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a means of asset realization."

The political economy approach advocates for a linking of international relief and development activities in an attempt to help build up local economic capacities in war and post-war contexts. Yet it also considers that the economic liberalization policies implemented by international agencies in peace building operations have frequently been counterproductive for long-term stability and conflict reduction. Macro economic stabilization programs advocated for by the World Bank, relying on strict fiscal and monetary policies, are criticized for not addressing the deeper structural imbalances that are part of the causes of conflict (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2000: 104-109; 2002: 96; Woodward: 2002: 192-193). International financial institutions' calls for privatization, tax cuts and reduction in state expenditures are likely to contribute to a greater loss of state revenue and legitimacy when it is crucial to strengthen confidence in government (Woodward, 2002: 185, 193). Instead political economists reason that economic programs should prioritize rebuilding the formal and legal economy, reducing corruption, and reversing discriminatory economic relationships that emerged out of war economies (Kaldor, 1999b: 131-137). To break the political entrepreneurs' ability to mobilize people along exclusionary identity projects, economic reconstruction should focus on job creation and providing the means for individual economic development (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2000: 117; Woodward: 2002: 201-203).

Political economists consider that peace will be consolidated when opportunities to satisfy greed and address grievances through violence are diminished. Keen notes that the "art of a successful transition from war to peace may lie in insuring that at least some of those benefiting from war will benefit more from peace (Keen, 1998: 66)." This also means addressing the needs of the "spoiler" (Stedman, 1997) or "warlord" with his urge to
survive, his network of vested interests and his imperative to resist a peace process at all costs” (Mackinlay, 1997: 60). It signifies establishing an equitable peace – lessening some of the social, political and economic inequalities that helped cause war.

III. b Civil society’s affect on political economic causes of war:
Political economists tend to be skeptical about civil society organizations’ capacities to positively affect peace. As war is considered to be the product of a powerful juxtaposition of greed and grievance, successful peace consolidation requires the taming of both passions. Civil society is poorly placed to affect field commanders’ greed. The problems that Alex de Waal describes in the cases of Africa are just as likely to develop in the former Yugoslavia and Central Asia. He writes:

“The power relations that exist in any society, and particularly so during wartime, present a huge obstacle to any sort of civic mobilisation for peace. It is widely noted that some political leaders and military commanders gain political and material advantages from armed conflict. Unfortunately, these same individuals who benefit from war are usually those who take the lead in negotiating for peace. By contrast, the people who lose most from war, that is ordinary citizens and especially those who are most disadvantaged in any political system, are voiceless when it comes to pressing for an end to war and setting the terms of a peaceful settlement.” (2000: 1)

Most forms of civil society emerge from years of war either weakened or co-opted by the leaders who benefited from the fighting.

In particular the close relationship between communal civil society groups and the communities in which they operate may prove detrimental to the peace efforts, as the former become implicated in processes of complicity and accommodation. In post-conflict environments there is a greater risk that community linkages will challenge organizations’ efforts to remain neutral and avoid being co-opted by political elites (Eade, 1997: 179). NGOs may choose to “dance to the tune of the prince,” in which case they become an extension of the patron-client relationship between commanders and communities (Goodhand and Chamberlain, 2000: 91, 98). Civil society groups may be created as primordial homogenous groups, whose initial intentions seem benign, but ultimately they often seek ways to strengthen the primordial group’s comparative position within a wider context of clientalism (Whaites, 2000: 128). Keen thus argues that during wartime violence is often privatized. Then “elites are likely to try to harness economic agendas within civil
society in order to fight civil wars on the cheap: violent private accumulation at the local level can serve as a substitute for supplies from the center (Keen 2000: 28)."

Political economists are wary of expecting too much from civil society in the immediate aftermath of war, and are often highly critical of international policy makers’ focus on NGOs as the main civil society form capable of contributing to institution-building. They contend that western led attempts to support NGOs as service providers or political advocates are misguided. They find this liberal civil society to be weak and ineffective; with few or no capacities to affect peace consolidation (Duffield 1999: 136-143; Stubbs 1997). International donor policies to support NGOs may provide such groups with public legitimacy and power, while bypassing local authorities in the distribution of goods and services. This may further undermine weak government capacity and legitimacy (Woodward, 2002: 208; Eade, 1997: 169). Political economists further argue that the means that international organizations employ to support civil society are inappropriate: financial assistance should be redirected to political support and facilitating local civil society organizations’ attempts to define their voice in international arenas in order to advocate for their interests. Bojicic-Dzelilovic’s argument (2002:94-95) on the potential negative impact of external assistance based on experience from Bosnia-Herzegovina comprehensively explains the concerns that:

"Numerous programmes to strengthen local civil society – and NGOs as one of its constituent parts – are pursued within the reconstruction framework, but the results have, by and large, been disappointing. In most conflict affected countries, institutions of civil society tend to be underdeveloped. Indeed, the opposite is often true in that ‘uncivil,’ exclusionary forms tend to prevail. The approach that a civil society can be created from outside against a blueprint originating in a different cultural context is in itself problematic. It gives rise to organizations that are under pressure to conform to Western models […] There is also a larger issue of the effectiveness of NGO-supported projects with respect to macro-level policy making, in the sense that the latter can undermine or even annul the results accomplished by small, community-based projects."

Rather than focusing on NGOs, “The challenge is to find legitimate, established sources of authority. These may include local authorities, traditional elders, clans structures and self-defense groups. In states close to collapse, these sources of authority will usually be local, rather than central.” (Keen, 1998: 64)
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The political economy literature contains ambiguities about the civil society’s potential affect on peace. It concurs with conflict resolution arguments about the necessity of supporting local peace capacities. It considers that civil society groups can work with this population of dissatisfied in order to show them the benefits of peace, and ensure that they are not alternatively mobilized by political elites who seek a return to the battlefield. Yet the understanding of the limits, possibilities, and diverse definitions of civil society is subtler in the political economy literature than in the two described above. While civil society groups’ close ties to local communities are often interpreted as one of their greatest assets, political economists are careful to note that linkages make local groups more susceptible to the pressures of patronage networks. In literature on greed and grievance the discussion on civil society is extended to include both communal and liberal forms, but CBOs rather than NGOs are generally considered to be most likely to positively affect peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of theory:</th>
<th>Political economy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causes of war:</td>
<td>Greed for political and economic power</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political, economic and social grievances</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inequality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal of warring sides:</td>
<td>Control state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tasks of peace consolidation that civil society may affect:</td>
<td>Control economic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diminish opportunities to satisfy greed through violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce economic inequalities and unemployment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decrease attractiveness of violence for aggrieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society likely to contribute:</td>
<td>Communal civil society/CBOs</td>
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IV. Rights based approach to war and peace:

When considering the causes of conflict, the rights based approach to peace consolidation is influenced by discussions on the origins of “new wars” (Duffield, 2001: 13-15; Kaldor, 1999b: 2, 69-90; 2000: 3-4; 2003: 119-123). According to Kaldor’s terminology, “new wars” are to be distinguished from traditional inter-state conflicts; their political character emphasized; and the increased blurring of distinctions between war, organized crime, and large-scale transgressions of human rights underlined. This approach shares the institution-building interpretation of war as generally starting in failed states (Kaldor, 2003: 120). Most often these states appear strong, but they lack popular legitimacy and rely on both legalized and illegal use of violence to remain in power. Autocratic governments, in close
cooperation with an array of military and paramilitary forces, warlords, and black marketers, conspire in carrying out massive human rights violations for personal political and economic gain.

These wars are less about the capture of territory by military means than the capture of civilians’ thought processes, the dissemination of an exclusionary political project, and the establishment of homogenous “pure” regions. Populations are kept in a state of intense fear of the “other”, or those with dissenting opinions, as authorities use the “strategy of tension” and the media as mechanisms of control. Consequently there is a top-down undermining of community, trust, and values of tolerance and mutual aid. Massive human rights violations, which are a fundamental tool of the new wars, are perpetuated against all those who refuse to follow the war project, be they members of the enemy group or internal dissenters. As Kaldor (1999b: 9) notes, “the first civilians to be targeted are those who espouse a different politics, who try to maintain inclusive social relations and some sense of public morality.” Archibugi (2003: 13) argues that these civilians should be considered like “hostages in a kidnapping.”

Closely related to the political economists’ argument - that war provides a means for elites and the disenfranchised to gain a new strong man identity - the new wars are understood as being about identity politics. Kaldor (1999b: 78-79) thus considers that in a world where politicians and traditional elites are losing their influence and power, they turn to various forms of identity politics as a means to maintain popular interest in their actions. They claim power and legitimacy on the basis of a particular identity – national, regional, religious, linguistic or other – and their ability to protect this identity from external threats. Primordial identities are “reinvented in the context of the failure or the corrosion of other sources of political legitimacy” (Kaldor, 1999b: 7) by elites aspiring to secure their power-base. Observance of universal human rights standards and cosmopolitanism, which has been defined by Brennan (2003: 41) as an “enthusiasm for customary differences [...] as well as a theory of world government and corresponding citizenship”, have been proposed as alternative sources of identity and political consciousness (Archibugi, 2003: 10-11; Kaldor, 1999b: 86-89).
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The rights-based analysis of war is concerned with all forms of non-legitimized acts of violence, not only the violence undertaken by military forces, but also the wide range of actions that violate international and domestic law. Domestic violence, intra-community violence, and the violation of political and civil, as well as social and economic, rights are thus included.

For peace to be consolidated, proponents of a rights-based approach consider that international humanitarian law, human rights law, and domestic legislation should be applied and respected. In post-war countries they advocate the rebuilding of trust between citizens and in public authorities and the re-establishment of a rule of law. It is a political and legal project. The pursuit of justice, accountability, and the re-establishment of governmental institutions' legitimacy are key. A rights-based approach calls for the holding to account of individuals who have committed atrocities during the war, through the conduct of criminal trials or the formation of truth commissions. This serves to underscore that individuals, and not entire identity groups, are responsible for human rights abuses, and to ensure that grievances are not left un-addressed to re-emerge in the future (Kritz, 1996: 594-598). Justice should be served according to international laws, norms, and institutions (Newman, 2002: 41). The rights based approach also emphasizes the necessity of re-establishing a rule of law to protect all members of society, ensure that all parties are held accountable for their actions, and establish non-violent means for people to resolve disputes (Kritz, 1996: 588). This signifies setting up an independent judiciary, a non-political law enforcement system, and a non-corrupt public administration (Kritz, 1996: 591-594; Putnam, 2002: 238).

The international community can contribute in the immediate post-war years in helping to establish public security until local capacities are strong enough to undertake these tasks alone. This can be defined as “international law enforcement” (Kaldor, 2000: 93). In this context international forces, with UN approved mandates, may undertake tasks such as protecting civilians, arresting war criminals, implementing cease-fires, overseeing demilitarization, and engaging in policing or border monitoring.
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IV.bCivil society’s contribution to rights promotion and ideological change.

Those who adopt a rights-based approach tend to conceive of civil society as a society that respects international human rights norms, and is guided by values of tolerance and justice. Generally these forms of civil society emerge from years of war weakened. During the war years, and often before, freedoms of assembly, speech and expression are limited, with civic activists imprisoned or killed. In a society dominated by fear there remains little room for dialogue, self-initiative and trust. Authorities are attuned to the value of civil society organizations in shaping and mobilizing adherents. They are thus likely to co-opt them in their own exclusionary projects or terminate their activities.

Nevertheless, even in countries where massive human rights have occurred, Kaldor (1999b: 111) maintains that “islands of civility” remain which need to be deepened and widened. The new nature of warfare, its geographic fragmentation, and non-linear trajectory, signifies that even in wartime, regions and groups can successfully resist violence (Kaldor, 1999b: 111; Varshney, 2002: 283). The representations of civil society that Kaldor and Varshney consider as having this influence are intra-communal ones, committed to notions of tolerance and with a non-exclusive political agenda. They most often fit the liberal definition of civil society but are guided by an “activist” ideology rather than neo-liberal one. “To the extent that they are capable of mobilizing support, they weaken the power of the warring parties” (Kaldor 1999b: 121) and the zones in which they are active provide a base from which it is possible to reach out to civilians living in more repressive environments. Ultimately, once a peace agreement has been signed, “the groups who defend humanistic values and refuse the politics of particularism” can play a key role by relaunching political debate, providing alternatives to exclusionary politics, and supporting the establishment of the rule of law (Kaldor 199b, 133-137).

Proponents of a rights-based approach also consider that civil society organizations can play an important human rights promotion and protection role, educating individuals about their rights and developing mechanisms for the protection of those rights (Putnam, 2002: 256-257). Civil society activists can train police and judiciary personal in international human rights standards. They can serve as mediators between citizens and law enforcement
bodies, for example providing legal aid and representation, and help rebuild trust in these institutions to resolve conflicts without violence.

Civil society organizations may furthermore contribute as partners in the international law enforcement project in countries emerging from war. Based on their knowledge of the local situation, and community level contacts, they can advise and guide external actors (Kaldor, 1999b: 121, 124, 136). Amongst indigenous populations, the involvement of civil society can provide legitimacy to outsiders. A similar outcome can be obtained at the global level when the peace-building mission is supported by international civil society or international legal bodies (Archibulgi, 2003: 12). All too often, however, international actors are reluctant to engage in serious dialogue with civil society representatives, or to support their efforts as a conscious part of their peace consolidation strategy, preferring to focus their attention on leaders of the warring parties (Kaldor, 1999b: 122).

The development of an international human rights regime, where a range of national and international human rights organizations are highly active, has initiated the enlargement of the discussion on civil society’s impact on peace to include the role of global networks (Kaldor, 2003: 128-136). Global civil society may reduce tensions between people and states as the common norms and values of a normative civil society bind those participating in it. This is a distant scheme, but as Keane (1998: 33) suggests: “The global talk of civil society may even signal the first step in the long term emergence of a common framework of meaning underneath and across state boundaries.” Civil society working together across borders has begun to find its common voice, for example in the defense of human rights or environmental issues (Falk, 1995: 164-165). In Civil Society an Answer to War, Kaldor (2003: 159) argues that it is “the job of civil groups to promote international norms and values to show that the notion of human consciousness can be actively practiced.” Global civil society may come together to affect change at the global level, but it can also play this role locally. In post-war contexts, civil society organizations operating at the national level need the assistance, and occasionally protection (Putnam 2002: 258), of partners across borders to affect change. Thus “an effective response to the new wars has to be based on a alliance between international organizations and local advocates for cosmopolitanism
(Kaldor, 1999b: 123)” which builds a political alternative to exclusion based on a commitment to human rights standards and values.

The rights-based analysis considers that civil society can positively affect peace and concurs with the conflict resolution and political economy arguments about the importance of supporting local representations of civil society in war and post-war contexts. It deems communal, as well as liberal, definitions of civil society to be valid but identifies liberal civil society as the most likely to positively affect peace. This is mainly because communal civil society, made up of non-voluntary groups based on set identities, is generally intra-communal, exclusionary, and not open to all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace consolidation approach:</th>
<th>Rights based</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causes of war:</td>
<td>Weak states and the decline of state legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion of rule of law and legitimate use of force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Globalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goals of warring sides:</td>
<td>Control of political and economic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elimination of all alternative identities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tasks of peace consolidation</td>
<td>Provide alternatives to exclusionary politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by civil society:</td>
<td>Assist in human rights protection and enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support establishment of the rule of law and trust in justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society likely to contribute:</td>
<td>Liberal civil society/NGOs</td>
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</table>

V. Peace consolidation in practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan:

V.a War and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

All four approaches to war and peace described above are useful to help explain the origins of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 Most closely related to the behavioral approach of conflict resolution, a primordial view of nationalism has been used to explain the conflict’s origins. According to this argument it was the reemergence of 14th century “ethnic hatreds” between Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims which caused the outbreak of fighting in 1991

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(Kaplan, 1993). Views that correspond more closely with the instrumental conception of nationalism link war to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation—a highly decentralized system in which the center could not adapt quickly enough to exogenous economic shifts (Hechter, 2000: 150-151). When the transition to a market economy began, "there were no effective institutional mechanisms to arbitrate and settle differences (Denitch, 1994: 10-11)." This understanding is close to an institutional line of argument that notes that Yugoslavia's communists, and the institutions they set up, failed to "solve" the national question (Ramet, 1992: 278-279). Once Croatia and Slovenia began to call for their independence, their new governments did little to alleviate the concerns of minorities or to assure them their rights would be protected. In this particular context, the people of the Balkans were led into warfare by "purposeful actions of political actors who actively create(d) violent conflict [...] by selectively drawing on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable (Glenny in Jentleson, 1998: 299)." Thus ethnicity was a "social construct" used by leaders seeking to gain political power and economic privilege. Woodward (1995: 225-236) provides lengthy arguments supporting this thesis, describing how nationalist politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperated in "psychological warfare" to create divisions along nationalist lines. In line with a rights-based analysis, the Bosnian conflict has also been described as a "war of exclusivist nationalists against a secular multicultural pluralistic society (Kaldor, 1999b: 44)."

Why the populations of the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, answered the nationalist call can arguably best be explained by political-economic factors linked to greed and grievance. In Bosnia-Herzegovina independence came ten years into a period of deepening economic crisis, public spending cuts, rising unemployment, and international financial institutions' increasing pressure for debt repayment (Hechter, 2000: 150-151; Woodward 1995: 15-17). Ramet (1992: 278-279) argues that citizens' political grievances mounted in the 1980s, and that their readiness to adopt nationalism increased because democracy was not allowed to take hold. As Ignatieff (1997: 40-41) explains, civic leaders who could have led a burgeoning democratic movement in the early 1990s were publicly distrusted by the majority, who considered that they had been co-opted by the regime a decade earlier. Greedy for political and economic influence, an elite, who until Tito's death had pledged allegiance to socialism and Yugoslavism, needed "a new language
of popular appeal” to remain in power. As democracy and multi-national ideals were largely discredited, they turned to nationalism. Nationalist sentiment appealed to citizens’ economic and political grievances and to the sense of fear of the unknown that they harbored after Tito’s passing (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999: 93; Ignatieff, 1997: 41-46). Once the war began ethnic cleansing and savage plunder became a means for aggrieved groups to “revenge their nation” and make economic gains, but also for the greedy to benefit – often with little concern for national interests (Bojicic and Kaldor, 1999; Bougarel, 1996a: 104-103). Amongst the youth that joined irregular armed militias, fighting provided a sense of belonging and purpose (Denitch, 1994: 75).

After three and a half years of intense fighting and failed international mediation, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), more frequently termed the Dayton Agreement, on 14 December, 1995.7 Approximately 200,000 persons had been killed (out of a population of some 4.3 million), two million persons displaced, and $100 billion lost (UNDP, 1998: 19). Some 845,000 people were registered as internally displaced (HRCC, 2001b). Two thousand kilometers of roads, 70 bridges, half the electricity network and more than half of the housing units were destroyed (Cox, 2001: 11). A large-scale humanitarian operation was underway. Sixty thousand NATO troops formed the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR); the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was established to supervise civilian peace building efforts together with the OHR. Nationalist political parties controlled all levels of government; the media propagated hate messages; freedom of movement was nonexistent; social services were provided on the basis of nationality or by international humanitarian agencies; the formal economy functioned meekly while the black market and organized crime flourished; and internal security and judicial bodies upheld a nationalist rule of law. Though the war had officially ended, violence perpetrated by majority ethnic/national groups against minority ones continued, as did the destruction and looting of homes. Elites saw their best chance of remaining in power to be maximum control over people’s loyalties and

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livelihoods. They considered that fear, a sense of vulnerability, and intense distrust would insure the great majority of people's continued allegiance to nationalist parties. The GFAP preserved the sovereignty of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina but legalized the existence of two separate entities – the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) with unclear powers.

Five years after the end of the war conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina had notably normalized; in no small part due to the High Representative's use of new powers conferred to him at the 1997 Bonn PIC. The introduction of common license plates and the dismantling of roadblocks contributed to freedom of movement in 1997-1998. A common currency facilitated economic transactions and trade. New media laws and regulations silenced the most virulently nationalist stations, and provided space for independent media outlets to grow and to be heard on either side of the former front lines. By 2001 five sets of countrywide elections had been organized with the support of the international community. The 2000 general elections were the first in which nationalists did not win, as the Alliance for Change, a coalition of non-nationalist parties led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) won a majority in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in several canton level and municipal races. Human rights institutions, including the Property Commission, the Human Rights Chamber, and a series of Human Rights Ombudspersons, had been set up and provided mechanisms for citizens to address violations of their human and civil rights.

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9 The 1996-2000 elections were considered as having reinforced rather than reduced nationalist parties hold on power (Cousens and Cater, 2001; ICG, 1999a; Pugh and Cobble, 2001; Woodward, 1999:7). In 2000 at the lower levels, in three Federation cantons the SDP tallied the highest number of votes, in the other nine cantons it came in second. At the municipal level the SDP won relative or absolute majorities in 15 municipalities, in the RS the Party of Independent Democrats (SNSD) gained the control of four municipalities (OSCE, 2000a, 2000b).
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In the first four years after the end of the war minority returns (guaranteed by GFAP Annex 7) were low, yet in 2000 they suddenly began to increase. Before 2000 security threats, fear, the destruction of minority owned property and the strident nationalist rhetoric of many political authorities, in addition to legal, social and economic challenges, created obstacles that appeared insurmountable to many potential minority returnees (Cousens 2001, 2002; ICG 1997; ICG 1999b; USCR 2000; USIP 1999). Yet during 2000 more than 52,000 displaced persons, and 16,000 refugees, regained their homes – a nearly four-fold increase since 1999 (HRCC, 2001b; ICG, 2000). More than 23,000 were registered as minority returns (UNHCR, 2001). The surge in returns could be explained by “refugee impatience; new international community effectiveness; and a change in the psychology of both majority and minority populations (ICG, 2000: 5).” As explained in more detail this could be seen as part of a “home grown strategy:”

“In this strategy, refugees return to remote, unoccupied, burned out villages deep within ‘enemy’ territory, where there is little or no presence of the majority group. Because the returns are low visibility and do not displace members of the majority ethnic group from their housing, ethnic tensions are usually manageable, and the local majority is able to slowly adjust to the presence of a significant minority group nearby. Success in one village is then duplicated in another nearby village (ICG, 2000:3)”

While five years of peace brought many improvements towards the normalization of daily existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian state still had no functioning “unified” governmental institutions (Cousens, 2002: 552-553; Cox, 2001). The country continued to be de facto governed by four entities – the Bosniak part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS), Herzeg-Bosna (H-B) and the OHR internationally sponsored protectorate. The state was fragmented and largely ineffective. The complexity of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s governance structures created a heavy bureaucracy, obstacles to effective decision-making, limited efficient revenue collection, and unclear responsibilities

10 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) some 19,498 Bosniak and Croat displaced persons returned to the RS, and 20,858 Serb DPs to the Federation, from 1996 to 1999 inclusive (UNHCR 2001).

11 In his inaugural speech, High Representative Paddy Ashdown (OHR, 2002) stated to his Bosnian audience: “You have 1,200 judges and prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 Ministers, four separate levels of government and three armies – for a country of less than four million people! You have 13 Prime Ministers! That’s a Prime Minister for every 300,000 citizens! The cost of government in BiH is a staggering KM1.8bn – and that’s just for the government machine itself, it doesn’t include the cost of services such as health, education and pensions. That means that just paying for politicians and bureaucrats costs every citizen of working age in BiH KM900 every year – that’s almost 3 months’ wages for the average worker!”

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concerning the level of government in charge of providing basic services. Nationalist forces in Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent in RS, had no incentive to strengthen higher levels of governance. Rather they sought to keep as many powers divulged to the local levels as possible (ESI, 1999: 2). After 2000 this posed substantive challenges to non-nationalists elected to work in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly, and in the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the first time since 1991 non-nationalists were governing, and especially at the municipal and canton levels, expectations that they would improve basic social and economic conditions were high.

In the first years after the end of the war massive inflows of foreign assistance had fueled economic growth. According to the World Bank, GDP growth in 1996 was 62% in the Federation and 25% in the Republika Srpska. (USAID B-H, 2000). Basic social services that had ceased during the war resumed. Five years after the end of the war, however, the economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was no longer progressing at the same pace with official unemployment above 40%, poor revenue collection and a substantial trade deficit (Cox, 2001: 9). Nineteen percent of the population was assessed as living in absolute poverty, GDP was 65% lower in 2000 than in 1990, and the average trade deficit was 50% of GDP (UNDP 2002b: 9-10). In 2001 the UNDP concluded that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s social policy and welfare system was in urgent need of reform as “the economically weak state is in no condition to satisfy the needs of all the people who [...] find themselves in a situation of social need (UNDP 2001: 35). The official level of unemployment in 2001 was close to 40% and opinion surveys revealed that unemployment, followed by corruption, were the two greatest popular concerns (UNDP 2001: 35).

Five years after the end of the war peace was progressing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Positive change seemed most evident in the domains of reconciliation and rights-protection. While the 2000 elections suggested that the nationalist parties’ legitimacy was decreasing, the institutional set-up and structures of government remained deeply divided. The macro-economic situation was stagnant, leaving large discrepancies between rich and poor, and maintaining a large population of unemployed and dissatisfied youth.
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V.b War and peace in Tajikistan

On 9 September 1991 Tajikistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and less then a year later it was embroiled in a war. As in the Bosnian case, primordial and instrumental theories of nationalism can start to explain the causes of the Tajik conflict. "Regionalism" or "localism" was identified as a main cause for the fighting, a line of cleavage between a modernized industrial North and more traditional agricultural South of the country that deepened in the 1980s (Niyazi, 1998: 155). Several theorists have argued that among the majority of Tajik citizens a deeply ingrained conception of the Tajik nation-state did not exist, as the country was only formed as a cohesive territorial unit in 1929 when it became a Soviet Socialist Republic. Instead the country was made up of groups bound by strong allegiances to local identity or "regionalism" (Rubin, 1998: 135). Rural-based and geographically divided, Tajik society retained strong traditional networks of solidarity built on family and community ties. Soviet power-sharing relied on the regional groupings, giving them political validity and seeding inter-regional antagonisms (Roy, 2001: 23). When the Soviet Union broke down competition between the regions broke out as there was no longer an external referee to moderate power-sharing. To demonstrate how the war in Tajikistan was mainly a war of regions, theorists describe how, during the early days of the conflict in 1992, participants at two large-scale demonstrations that stretched from April into May in Dushanbe were split by regional affiliation (Niyazi, 1998: 159).

Several authors (Atkin, 1997: 291-295, Chatterjee, 2002; Niyazi, 1998: 146-154) have provided descriptions of Tajik regions, which were divided by geography and topography but have come to be characterized by their different economic development, level of religiosity, and links to central government. In the North, Leninabad/Khojent was arguably where industry and agriculture were most well developed and from where the Tajikistan

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12 In their report the authors underline the lack of "trustworthy" national statistics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and note that GDP may be underestimated by as much as 20%, and unemployment overestimated by 20%. No nation wide census was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991-2003.
13 The dichotomy between the North and South is also frequently interpreted as one between plain-dwellers who were part of the ancient Transoxiana civilization and "mountain Tajiks" who were largely cut off from external influences (Akiner, 2002a: 152; Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 18).
14 Tajiks have been present in Central Asia for several thousand years. Yet when Stalin demarcated Uzbekistan from Tajikistan the two ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, that had majority Tajik populations, were left inside Uzbekistan's territorial borders.
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Soviet political elite originated. In the South the Kuliab region (Khatlon) was mainly agricultural, reliant on cotton growing. The mountainous Garm/Karategin Valley in the center specialized in vegetable and fruit growing and inhabitants were considered particularly pious and traditional. Further to the West, sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan had the highest level of unemployment but also the highest population of educated persons and was populated by Ismailis. Around the city of Kurgan Tuppe (Khatlon), in the Vaksh Valley, up to 90% of the population were newcomers settled from other parts of Tajikistan in the 1930-1950s to complement a mixed indigenous population, and to develop a growing cotton-processing and chemical industrial sector (Akiner, 2002a: 155; Rubin 1998: 151-152). It is in this region that the first conflicts developed as a pattern emerged of people originally from the Garm/Karategin region and from Kuliab fighting over resources, land, water and administrative and managerial posts. During the war a rough, uneasy alliance posed Leninabadis and Kuliabis against Garmis and Pamiris (people from Gorno-Badakhshan). However, unlike the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no regional group sought to establish its own secessionist state (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 17) They did not question the legitimacy of Tajikistan’s statehood and their fight was for control of the state and its institutions (Abdullo, 2001: 49).

Regionalism in itself was not enough to create the armed conflict that broke out “when ancient regional contradictions became intertwined with those of a newer ideological and political kind (Niyazi, 1998: 146).” Regionalism was superimposed on an ideological conflict between former communists on one hand (who tended to originate from Kuliab), and Islamists (often Garmis) and Democrats on the other. The dominant parties in the conflict were the government – under the leadership of President Emomali Rakhmonov – and a group of opposition parties that coalesced around the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and took the name of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The IRP, formed in 1990 and registered in 1991, advocated greater freedom to practice Islam and the incorporation of Muslim values in government. In 1991-1992 the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and some of the first liberal civil society groups including Rastokhez and La’li Badakhshan, joined the IRP, and eventually the UTO, in its political and military struggle against the Tajik government. The latter was identified as neo-communist due to its composition – of former apparatchiks – and close ties to Moscow. Other divisions based on ideology, urban
vs. rural cleavages, economic disparities, social conditions, and external pressures were also sources of tensions (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 16-21; Atkin, 1997: 279; Rubin, 1998: 131-146). Political-economic and rights-based interpretations of the origins of the conflict thus consider that the civil war “originated primarily in the dynamics of a power struggle between a new class of ‘political entrepreneurs,’ rather than in deep social divisions” (Barnes and Abdullaev, 2001: 8).

An institutional analysis can further contribute to understanding the origins of the war. In the early 1990s the lack of mechanisms or means to moderate regional and ideological differences was decisive in the outbreak of armed fighting. Newly independent, Tajikistan “lacked well-developed mechanisms to manage political conflict and competition. […] There were few counterbalances capable of arresting the escalation to war (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 18).” Rapidly “the inability of [Tajikistan's] state apparatus to integrate the population of the republic's arbitrarily demarcated territory into a common society with reciprocal rights and responsibilities” proved decisive (Rubin, 1998: 128). As Atkin (1997: 285-290) describes, attempts to mobilize public support for multi-party politics and civic activism in 1990-1992 failed when individuals in power sought to assert their monopoly by political maneuvering and the use of force. Concepts of power-sharing, consensus-building and accommodation were even farther away from Tajiks than they were from Bosnians at that time. For as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, made up of representatives of Tajik civil society, explained in 1996, “the primary obstacle to peace in Tajikistan is the absence of an adequate understanding on sharing power among the regions, political parties, and movements and nationalities (quoted in Slim and Saunders, 2001: 47).”

Political economy factors can also help explain why ordinary people remained committed to their regional grouping and the war continued for over five years. Tajikistan was highly dependent on Russia and other external influences for its economic and political development. Starting in the 1980s externally induced economic growth began to decline and unemployment started to rise. Young people were especially affected and drawn into criminal networks (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 19). Independence resulted in a sharp reduction in subsidies from Moscow, which had previously funded 80% of the country’s budget (ICG 2003: 1). Grievances increased along with mounting poverty. Authors have
pointed to the role that religion played in the conflict, in particular to the affect that non-traditional Islamic thinking imported into Tajikistan had on both “aggrieved” populations and “greedy” entrepreneurs (Akhmedov 1998: 175-182). In addition it has been alleged that Tajikistan became embroiled in larger geo-political conflicts in which Russia, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan played a role (Akhmedov 1998: 183-184).

Regardless of what caused the war, by 1993, as Atkin (1997: 300) points out, the fighting was no longer “about ideology but about who would benefit from controlling the levers of power” (also ICG 2003: 1). By then the country was “plagued by warlordism” as leaders of armed bands used force to fulfill their personal ambitions in southern and western Tajikistan. In 1996-1997 much of the fighting in the country was commanded by leaders who once supported the government side and President Rakhmonov (Atkin, 1997: 302-303).

Population displacement was characteristic of the Tajik war, but was not generally employed as a tool of “ethnic cleansing” as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only in parts of Tajikistan’s Kurgan Tuppe region were people murdered, raped and expelled according to their regional identity. In these cases “the regionalist group became community based and almost turned into an ethnic group. […] The fact of belonging to a regional group automatically implied a political solidarity which, even if rejected by the individual concerned, was assumed by others (Roy, 2000: 98). Displacement of populations occurred due to fighting, fear, lack of food and shelter. The first wave of displaced persons moved in 1992 and traveled to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Dushanbe. By 1995, 57,558 out of 60,786 refugees from Garm, Tavildara, Jirgital and Tadjikobod had regained their pre-war residences (UNDP, 1995: 51). However, in May 1996 a second wave of displacements occurred as fighting restarted. By the end of 1997 most of these persons had also returned. In the post-war period the main challenge for the majority of Tajiks was not return - as it was for many Bosnians described above - but re-establishing physical and material security, basic services, and community cohesion.

15 The ICRC estimated that 23,000 persons had fled from May-December, 1996 (ICRC, 1.12.96)
On 27 June 1997, President Rakhmonov and head of the UTO, Nuri, signed the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Accord after three years of negotiated talks overseen by the UN, OSCE and several observer nations. The number killed during the war, out of a population of some 5.2 million (in 1990), was somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000; more than 650,000 were displaced (as refugees and internally displaced persons); and war damages were estimated at $7 billion (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 16). Some 35,000 houses, 55 bridges, 61 medical centers, large segments of the electrical network and of the road infrastructure were destroyed (UNDP 1995). It is estimated that the country’s GDP fell by 65% from 1991-1997 (ADB 2002: 2). International humanitarian agencies were active in the country though their resources were extremely limited compared with funds disbursed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), which started its work in early 1993, and the CIS peacekeeping forces (composed mainly of Russian units) maintained their presence to assist in the peacebuilding effort (Goryayev, 2001). A Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) including representatives of both the government and the UTO was created to oversee implementation of the peace accord and to design reforms of the state structure.

Five years after the end of the war, Tajikistan “won deserved praise” (ICG, 2003: i) as the country had made “significant achievements [...] in the process of restoration of peace and national reconciliation” (UN, 2001: 5). Implementation of a power sharing agreement between the former opposition (UTO) and the government had insured the establishment of a legitimate central government. The President had further succeeded in centralizing most state powers in the Executive and asserting his control over the entire country. In November 1999 the first post-war presidential elections were held, followed in spring 2000 by a parliamentary election. Nevertheless, while Bosnia-Herzegovina was challenged by a highly fractured state, Tajikistan in 2002 was becoming increasingly autocratic as the former opposition was either co-opted into state structures or discredited. The Parliament was extremely weak (ICG, 2003: 10). The President was making ever more frequent statements linking political Islam with regional instability and terrorism. In 2002 there was

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a general perception amongst Tajiks that the region of Kuliob, from which the President originated, was receiving priority funding, and Kuliobis were obtaining advantages in the distribution of political and administrative posts. Throughout government institutions widespread corruption and rigidly hierarchical and weak structures continued to hamper good governance (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 7; 24, 26).

Five years after the end of the war the economic situation in Tajikistan continued to foster popular grievances. By 2000 the Government of Tajikistan considered that the country’s main needs were not linked to post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction but to poverty reduction. Poverty, unemployment and corruption were often considered by policy analysts to be the main potential sources of future armed conflict in the country (EU Strategy Paper 2002-2006, ICG 2003, Abdullaev and Freizer 2003). In her study of poverty in Tajikistan in 2000, Falkingham (2000b: iv) found that “over 95% of the population are living below the minimum consumption basket, four out of five are ‘poor,’ a third are ‘very poor’.” The UN warned in 2000 that, “economic decline and infrastructure collapse threatens to undermine further consolidation of the peace process (OCHA, 2000a: 1-2).” In 2002 it stated in its Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal that in Tajikistan “extreme poverty is the central development issue. […] 83% of the population lives under the national poverty line, the average monthly income is less than $7, and the Gross National Income per capita is $170” (UN, 2002: 4). The state budget in 2003 was estimated to be a tenth of what it was in 1990 (ICG 2003: 2). Though a large percentage of the country was destitute and in dire need of governmental assistance, in 2003 a referendum, which was widely criticized as being fraudulent by Tajik and international observers, was passed putting an end to free and universal provision of medical and educational services (ICG, 2004: 4-5).

Opportunities to satisfy greed continued to proliferate in 2002. Globalization and the opening of trade routes has tended to create new opportunities for Tajik war commanders to pursue their economic agendas through various forms of trafficking. Tajikistan was considered to be the main transit route for narcotics from Afghanistan in the early 2000s – with an estimated 100 tons of heroin transiting through the country annually (UN Office on

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17 The Government of Tajikistan completed its Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002, a comprehensive process supported by, amongst others, the World Bank and UNDP.
Drugs and Crime 2003). In 2001-2002 poppy growing in Afghanistan continued to increase, providing an ever-growing demand for secure trade routes. Thus drug money and discord over lucrative trafficking routes contributed to a continued atmosphere of tension after the war (Abdullaev and Freizer 2003: 21; ICG 2003).

By 2002 the security situation was starting to improve in the Karategin Valley, where violence and insecurity continued beyond the official 1997 end of the civil war until 2000. The region was considered to be the UTO’s base and holdout. Fighting between government forces and the UTO had been particularly violent in 1996-1997, when the Valley’s towns frequently changed hands and the warring parties violently competed for control of roads. Along these routes there were frequent hostage-taking incidents. Conditions for the civilian population were dire, with inadequate provision of food, medicine and shelter. Especially during the winter months, the region was often inaccessible as a result of military activity and weather/road conditions. The civilian population was regularly harassed, threatened and beaten by government, opposition and independent groups (HRW, 1998). In addition the growth of the UTO commander’s influence in the region tended to be accompanied by the imposition of stricter Islamic rules and the forceful internment of women in their homes. During 1997-2000, when the central government maintained uneasy control of the Valley, former opposition field commanders, carved out small “fiefdoms” (ICG 2001: 16) from where they exerted

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18 Tavildara for example changed hands five times in 1996. (ICRC, 12.12.96)
19 UN military observers were taken hostage in December 1996 (interview with former UNMOT staff, 07.02); in Feb 1997 17 expatriates were abducted by the “Sodirov group” together with the Tajik Minister of Security (ICRC, 5.03.97; HRW 1998); in July and August 1997 the “Sodirov group” kidnapped another nine people (HRW 1998). In July 1998 four officers working with the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) were killed in an attack on their convoy driving in the Tavildara district. In late June 2001 fifteen workers from the German Agro Action were taken hostage, and later released unharmed, in the same area. All of these incidents occurred in the Karategin Valley.
20 Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, Tajikistan, retrieved on 05.09.2003 at: http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki-22.htm. Generally the population were in the standard “no win” situation of civilian groups in civil wars: when the government controlled their area, they punished civilians for assisting the opposition, and when the opposition controlled the area the opposite occurred.
21 The Karategin Valley has also played a broader geopolitical role as the base of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Uzbek citizens reportedly left Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley after the murder of four policemen in 1997 triggered harsh government repression. After a series of six bombs went off in Tashkent in February 1999 more are said to have migrated to the Karategin Valley. By the summer of 1999 between 1500-2000 Uzbek citizens may have taken refuge in the Karategin Valley, especially in the hamlet of Hoit (Tadjikobod district). They are blamed for having carried out armed incursions from Tajikistan into the Ferghana Valley in 1999 and 2000. In 2000 the Uzbeks were encouraged by a former UTO commander and Minister of
pressure on the local population and authorities, collected "road fees" at checkpoints and in
some cases facilitated drug trafficking. However by 2002 the security situation in the
region had improved significantly with the roads open to traffic and local government
institutions carrying out their regular administrative duties.

Weaknesses in the rule of law permeated through large segments of the judiciary and law
enforcement even five years after the war. The majority of the population did not trust the
courts or police to be un-biased or effective. Accused often considered it easier to pay
prosecutors and judges bribes rather than go through court hearings. Though Tajikistan was
a signatory to six major international human rights instruments, in 2002 human rights
observers alleged increasing recourse to the death penalty, frequent incidents of torture,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and denial of fair trials (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 35-36;
ICG, 2003: 11-12).

Five years after the signing of the agreement that brought peace to Tajikistan no resumption
of armed conflict between the government and the UTO had occurred. Peace consolidation
had progressed most significantly at the institutional level where elections were held and a
government was established that included former opposition figures. The degree to which
reconciliation had been achieved was much more difficult to measure. In the public
discourse there were no calls for revenge or appeals to a sense of victimization among the
population. Yet conflict resolution experts remained divided on the strength and
significance of whatever unresolved and silent grievances remained (Abdullaev and
influence politics and economics (ICG, 2003: 13-14). Amongst all forms of peace,
political-economic peace seemed the most elusive, as feelings of greed and grievance –
linked to increased wealth disparities and opportunities to benefit from illicit international
trade - continued to shape political decision making and promote criminal activities.
Overall security was improving but human rights protection and the establishment of the
rule of law remained weak.

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Emergency Situations, Mirzo Ziyoev, to leave for Afghanistan (Rashid, 2002). Tajik inhabitants of the region
claim that the Uzbeks have not returned since (Hoit, 25.10.02).

22 Interview with Program Coordinator of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Regional
Office for Central Asia, Tashkent on 11.11.2002.
Conclusion: Peace, war and civil society:

This chapter outlined the difference between four main approaches to peace consolidation and introduced the assumptions that they make concerning the positive role that civil society organizations can have. All four approaches assign different causes for war, and interpret the evolution, goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. They provide different hypotheses concerning civil society’s potential to positively affect peace consolidation. In this chapter we have seen how institutional approaches to peace building tend to favor cooperation with liberal civil society in the form of NGOs, to support institution building, increased public participation and the privatization of social service delivery. Conflict resolution proponents assume that not only NGOs but also more communal forms of civil society based in local communities can advance the peace project by strengthening contacts and trust between former warring sides; modifying values and modes of dialogue; increasing group cohesion and the initiation of collective action. Political economists are more skeptical about the impact that civil society organizations can have on reducing the greed or grievances that led to conflict. They accept both a communal and liberal definition of civil society, considering that civil society can be made up of groups that are inclusive and exclusionary, independent and co-opted, progressive and traditional. They tend to consider that CBOs are nevertheless more likely to positively affect peace, especially in reducing grievances. Finally those who adopt a rights-based approach hypothesize that liberal civil society organizations – committed to an “activist” ideology, the protection of universal human rights and the strengthening of global civil society – are most able to contribute to peace.

This chapter has also served as an introduction to my two country case studies. The wars in Tajikistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina are both examples of post-Cold War conflicts that broke out after the disintegration of federations. They were caused in part by the challenges of statehood – or rather the difficult process of creating a new state where institutions and national identity were not firmly formed. In both countries, the period leading up to war was characterized by struggles between different factions seeking to take control of the state. In Bosnia-Herzegovina political leaders used nationalism to gain popular legitimacy and exacerbate cleavages, and in Tajikistan religion and regionalism served similar
functions. The fight for power led to the same outcome, and the first shots were fired in Sarajevo and Dushanbe in Spring, 1992. As predicted by political economists, during the conflict greed and grievance, as well as external forces, also played important roles. Five years after the end of the war, peace consolidation in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina was progressing to different degrees with regard to institution-building, reconciliation, alleviating greed and grievance, and human rights promotion. By the end of this study I hope to gain a better understanding of how civil society organizations contributed to this process.

In the following chapters the hypotheses introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, based on the civil society and war and peace literature, will be tested through case studies of Tajik and Bosnian civil society organizations. Our aim in Chapters 4 and 5 is to analyze in detail how civil society organizations behave and why they behave as they do in the post-conflict period. In the following chapter the methodology employed to carry out this task and the challenges encountered when doing will be explained.
Chapter three

Challenges of studying civil society organizations comparatively in post-war contexts

Introduction:

How can civil society and its affect on peace consolidation in post war countries like Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina be best scrutinized? As outlined in the first two chapters of this work civil society scholarship, as well as war and peace literature makes assumptions concerning civil society’s ability to positively impact peace. This chapter describes how these propositions may be verified. Based on a historical study of civil society development, we found that civil society evolved over time in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and can be considered as fitting within communal and liberal ideal types. In both countries’ post war contexts, NGOs were the most prominent form of liberal civil society, and CBOs, associated with mahallas and mjesne zajednice, the main form of communal civil society. In the next three chapters, I will thus concentrate on analyzing the affect of NGOs and CBOs on peace consolidation. In this chapter I describe the methodology employed: the conceptual framework applied; the choice of case studies; the data collection and analysis tools; and some of the challenges and opportunities that developed during field work in post-conflict contexts. This chapter is meant to serve as an introduction to the opportunities and limitations of employing qualitative research methodology and empirical data collection to the analysis of civil society organizations and their contribution to peace.

Civil society’s potential to positively affect peace consolidation has been acknowledged in earlier literature, but there have been few comprehensive comparative attempts to explain what type of civil society affects peace and how it does so. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002), together with Cockburn (1998), Coletta and Cullen (2000), Varshney (2002) and Goodhand and Hulme (1998, 2000) are amongst the few who have published scholarly research with this aim. In the preface to their book, Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: vii-viii) explain the methodological and conceptual challenges they faced, which due to the relevance to this dissertation, will be quoted in detail:
"We have intersected two traditionally separate fields of study – namely, the third sector, and peace processes and conflict resolution – leading us to explore new and uncharted paths. [...] We had to formulate a comparative framework that would guide our data collection and enable us to analyze the similarities and differences among the organizations. [...] We were faced with the challenge of finding creative solutions to complex substantive and methodological problems without the benefit of prior studies dealing with similar projects. In particular, we needed, on the one hand to spell out a conceptual model and set of variables that could be used to compare and explain the organizational attributes and behavior of these peace and conflict-resolution organizations. On the other hand we wanted to make sure that this conceptual model would not mute the distinct narratives of these organizations within the unique national contexts in which they existed."

Similarly in this study we are interested in defining appropriate mechanisms to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of different civil society representations in post-war environments, their effect on peace consolidation, and how the context in which they operate influences their structures and effectiveness. Our main research question is not only how does civil society affect peace but also ‘why’. The main unit of analysis is the individual organization. Four organizations were studied – two in Tajikistan and two in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were each treated as separate “cases” using qualitative data collection methodology and semi-structured interviews. Before elaborating upon the case study selection and research methodology, I will first provide a description of the research design and conceptual model applied.

I. Research design and conceptual framework:

I.a Introduction to the existing literature:

Within the NGO development field, a vast body of literature addresses international NGOs’ role in conflict. The growth of this literature occurred as NGOs became increasingly engaged in conflict zones since the 1968 Biafra war (Kouchner and Bettati, 1987; Minear, 1991; Minear, Weiss, and Campbell, 1991; Minear and Weiss, 1993; Rufin, 1994; Minear and Weiss, 1995; Rotberg, 1996; Anderson, 1999; Goodhand and Hulme, 1997, 1998, 2000). Mary Anderson’s book (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War, was one of the most influential studies to have analyzed the impact of aid on conflict. The 1994 Code of Conduct produced by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; the Sphere project; and the Humanitarian Ombudsman were practical attempts to reduce the negative affects of aid on conflict. The majority of these studies focused on the impact of international NGOs. Though there has been substantial work on the interaction between NGOs and conflict
in times of war, there is much less conceptual understanding of their affect on peace (Rupesinghe, 1995: 89).

NGO development literature has tended to cement a division between “local” and “international” organizations, focusing more on the latter than the former. “International” or “northern” NGOs are considered to be international agencies with headquarters in Western states; while “national,” “local,” or “southern” NGOs are indigenous community organizations with local leadership and staff (Smith, 1998; Sandberg, 1994: 28). Most of the NGO literature speaks of “Northern” and “Southern” NGOs (Hulme and Edward, 1997: 11-20; Bebbington and Riddell, 1997; 108-125; Hudock, 1999: 1). This dichotomy in the literature is limiting in practice. Firstly, it bypasses “Eastern” groups or those that emerged out of post-communist or Muslim majority contexts. Secondly, it fixes a boundary between local and international, Northern and Southern groups, which by the mid-1990s was increasingly becoming muddled (Carroll, 1992: 11).

In 1999 Lewis spoke about the continual existence of “two parallel research universes,” separating theorists and researchers between those focusing on NGOs in developed and developing countries (Lewis, 1999: 1-2). This division was counterproductive because organizations operating in developing and developed countries may be “struggling in different ways with essentially the same issues.” (Lewis, 1999: 3) Those studying NGO development tend to concentrate on groups concerned with relief and development outside Western settings. Those more familiar with not-for-profit management are generally interested in private organizations that provide services in developed contexts.

The comparative literature on “local” communal civil society and community based organizations is even smaller. In 1997 Kaufman and Alfonso supervised a research project studying grassroots organizations in five different countries, claiming in their introduction (1997: 2) that it was the first comparative examination of the process of community-based mobilization. They noted that there is a “need to develop broader, more inclusive theoretical paradigms for understanding and advancing community based forms of popular power.” (1997: 22) In 2002, in a study on community driven development in Central Asia, the World Bank (2002b: 2) admitted that, “we still know very little about social organization in communities – rural or urban – and the best ways
to stimulate local development. Although the Bank and other agencies have learned a great deal about centralized post-Soviet governments, and are still learning, we have given little attention to how local communities actually function and respond to the needs of the poor.”

**II.b Civil society organizations as NGOs and CBOs:**

NGO management and not-for-profit literature generally agrees on dividing society groups according to their size, activities, linkages, missions, and resources. Though various classifications of organizational forms exist, I choose to follow one that most closely mirrored my civil society taxonomy and divides groups into:¹

- **Community based organization (CBO):** They are membership organizations, which may formally represent a sectional interest. Many combine representation with some form of development, service delivery, charitable or self help activity. Their functions are both representational and operational (Bebbington and Riddell, 1997: 109) They may also be called “primary grassroots organizations,” “the smallest aggregation of individuals or households that regularly engage in some joint development activity as an expression of collective interest.” (Carroll, 1992: 11)

- **Non government organization (NGO):** Also termed “intermediary organizations” they sometimes carry out projects, but most frequently act as brokers between local groups at the grass roots (Smith, 1998: 217) They are primarily “facilitator organizations, whose management is made up of professional middle or upper class individuals.” They are not “controlled or accountable to the beneficiaries” with whom they work. (Carroll, 1992: 12)

The distinction between NGOs and CBOs is frequently found in the literature. Analyzing civil society in Sri Lanka for example, Wickramasinghe (2001: 81) explained that a “significant distinction is between grassroots organizations, which are membership organizations, found at the village level and NGOs that are grassroots support organizations that seek to create and strengthen membership organizations.” This distinction also seems appropriate in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Bosnia-Herzegovina CBOs functioned mainly as *mjesne zajednice*, and in Tajikistan as *mahallas* within the disintegrating *kolkhoz* structure. NGOs were the urban centered groups that have been created on the basis of a weak pre-war liberal civil society, with

¹ The division between community based organizations and intermediary organizations is one advanced by Thomas Carroll in *Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development*. He describes how it has been discovered that national intermediary organizations “could energize local
close ties to international organizations, and a tendency to focus on service provision activities rather than advocacy.

I.c. The definition of a practical conceptual framework:
Recent attempts to bridge the NGO development and not-for-profit management literatures offer us conceptual models and sets of variables that can help us compare and explain civil society organizations’ characteristics and behaviours. In the Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations (2001:6) David Lewis argues that,

"Despite their diversity, all NGOs need to manage in three main areas: the organizational domain of their internal structures and processes; their development activities, which may be in the form of projects or programmes, campaigns or services; and finally their management of relationships with other institutional actors – the state, the private sector, other NGOs and organized components of the communities in which NGOs operate. In the center of the triangle is the crucial variable of ‘context’ against which an analysis of any NGO must be placed, and which has political, historical and cultural dimensions.” (emphasis added)

Similarly Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme (1997, 1998, 2000) in a large-scale project entitled “Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies” developed a “peace auditing” methodology based on case studies from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Liberia. The “peace audit” aimed to assess the “peace-ability” of NGOs. It sought to identify “generic organisational capacities in NGOs that may not necessarily bring peace but raise the probability of peace” (1998:20). More specifically the “peace audit” looked at questions around:

- NGO identity and values
- NGO relationships and linkages
- NGO programs

Applying the “peace audit” methodology the authors were able to assess the contribution of NGOs to peace building, and to make suggestions concerning the ways in which NGOs, and the donors who support them, might strengthen that contribution.

To better understand the characteristics and organizational attributes of communal and liberal civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina five years after the war, I selected to employ the peace audit as a framework but adding to it an analysis of group structures and financing. As noted above, (Lewis: 2001) all NGOs must groups and provide vertical mediating links between them and the higher reaches of [...] power [...]
manage these areas. We are arguing that it is not only NGOs but all civil society organizations that must define and shape their missions and values; programs; linkages; structures and financing. Data on these key variables was thus collected to make comparisons between civil society organizations of the same type in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan in Chapters four and five, and cross-nationally between different types in Chapter six.

**I.d The research questions:**

The main aim of this research was to determine how organizationally sound civil society organizations can positively affect peace consolidation – in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We posed this question because the literature on war and peace, and on civil society, along with practitioners in post-conflict settings argued that civil society could have this affect but with little analysis of how and why. Thus this study has several sub-goals:

1. To gain a fuller understanding of what forms of civil society can positively influence what type of peace.

2. To determine the characteristics and organizational attributes of organizationally sound civil society organizations – NGOs and CBOs – in post conflict, post-communist contexts like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.

   2.a To examine how missions and values guide organizations;
   2.b To assess their projects and programs;
   2.c To study their linkages and relationships;
   2.d To determine how organizational structures and funding can support or impede organizations in their efforts.

3. To understand in what way our case studies affected peace consolidation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan five years after the end of war.

Through a series of case studies I wanted to describe how strong civil society organizations with a proven degree of organizational capacity operate in post-war

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Intermediary are one or two steps removed from primary grass-roots groups.” (p.2-3)
Chapter three

contexts such as Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to understand why they act as they do.

II. Organizational case study selection:
A qualitative multiple case study approach was adopted to analyze the cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, and to make comparisons between them. Two local civil society organizations in each country were selected for in-depth analysis: one CBO and one NGO. “Purposive sampling” (Denscombe, 1998: 15) was applied. A conscious effort was made to select structurally sound organizations reported to be performing well - “best case scenarios” - as our focus was on civil society organizations’ potential positive contributions to peace. Cases representing “extreme instances” are considered valid when the aim is to “highlight” an effect (Denscombe, 1998: 33). In this dissertation the goal was to better understand the nature of civil society’s positive affect on peace – not to determine if there is or is not a positive affect. The aim was not to obtain findings from these cases that can be applied to all civil society organizations in post conflict settings, but only to those who already are considered to be strong and to have organizational capacity to effect change.

Amongst the large number of civil society organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, I employed the following selection criteria to select four groups to study in-depth:

1. A popular perception that the group was “highly successful,” organizational sound and had the capacity to effect change.
2. The group’s organizational form (CBO or NGO).
3. The organization’s mission and target groups
4. The organization’s geographical location.

I decided not to choose cases based on their project focus. Civil society organizations can be involved in a myriad of activities. According to the International Council on Voluntary Agencies’ (ICVA) Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICVA, 2000: 475-534), groups were involved in fifteen sectors in 2000. A UNFPA 1998 survey of Tajik NGOs identified eleven fields in which the organizations were active (UNDP, 1999: chapter 2). Thus rather than select organization by specific
activity, or service delivery vs. advocacy orientation, I chose organizations based on their
target group - women, youth and displaced persons/local communities. These are groups,
which the literatures on peace building and conflict resolution identify as being significant
to peace (Rupesinghe, 1995; Lederach 1997, 1999; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000;
Anderson, 1999).

I studied two organizations that worked primarily with women, yet did not carry out a
gender analysis of peace consolidation, or rely to any significant extent on women
studies' literature. In accounts of war and post-war developments women are often
depicted as victims of "gender violence" (Allen, 1996; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000;
Richter, 2001: 139-159). Yet as others have found in the Tajikistan and Bosnia-
Herzegovina cases (Cockburn with Domuz and Hubic, 2001: 40) women may emerge
from war with new strengths, and skills that make them efficient in reconciliation
in NGOs has been described (Cockburn with Domuz and Hubic, 2001; Cockburn, 1998,
2000; Falkingham, 2000: 28-35; Kasic, 1997; Kuvatova, 2001: 131-134; Richter, 2001:
159-163; Zajovic, 2001) while much less has been written about women in CBOs
(Centlivres-Demont, 2001: 180-181). In this dissertation I was thus also interested in
determining how liberal and communal civil society organizations' way of addressing
gender relations, women's participation in political life, and male/ female equality,
affected their ability to contribute to peace.

The geographical location was another key selection criterion due to the history of the
development of civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina -
characterized by a strong rural/urban split and shaped by wars that left both countries
regionally divided. For this reason attempts were made to select cases on the basis of
their location, with groups from urban areas (Sarajevo and Kurgan Tuppe) and from
rural ones (Karategin Valley and Sevarlije in Doboj municipality). I felt that the impact
of an organization could also differ according to the localities' war experience and the
political forces that controlled them. Therefore I was interested in targeting regions in
Tajikistan that were a priori supportive of governmental forces (Kurgan Tuppe) and of
the opposition (Karategin Valley) during the 1992-1997 civil war. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina I chose an organization based in the Federation (Sarajevo) as well as one
from the Republika Srpska (Sevarlije). To be able to observe the greatest change
possible from war to peace, I looked for regions that had been significantly war affected as Kurgan Tuppe, the Karategin Valley, Sarajevo and Sevarlije were. By selecting cases from different “types” of locations, I thus hoped that my overall findings could be generalized to other examples regardless of whether they functioned in government controlled or opposition held regions.

Identifying CBOs to research proved to be more difficult than NGOs. I initially hoped to research a mjesna zajednica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a mahalla in Tajikistan. In Bosnia-Herzegovina I succeeded in this effort largely due to my extensive previous experience in the country and my significant level of access (more below). However, in Tajikistan I was unfortunately unable to identify one specific mahalla to employ as a case study. This is partly due to the difference in the nature of Bosnian mjesne zajednice and Tajik mahallas. As explained in the previous chapter, mjesne zajednice were considered to be local self-government official structures in Yugoslavia – mahallas were much more informal and traditionally based. It also had to do with the different level of knowledge, contacts, and trust I had in the two countries.

Therefore, rather than focussing on one Tajik community group, I studied six villages that were part of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) Mountain Societies Development and Support Program (MSDSP) village organization (VO) network in the Karategin Valley. The village organizations were partly mahallas in the traditional sense of the term, but also beneficiaries of an internationally supported project. Based on guidelines I defined, the specific villages were selected by MSDSP staff. I requested to visit village organizations that had effective leadership and community participation, some that were new to the MSDSP program and some that were older, and villages that were significantly affected by the war (population displacement and return, internal conflict, property destruction). I also traveled to one village which was not part of the MSDSP program, to have a baseline for comparison.

Based on this case study selection process, I carried out research on the following groups:
III. Research methodology: data collection and analysis

IIIa. Employing qualitative research methods:

The goal of this project was to deepen theoretical and empirical understanding of how strong civil society organizations affect peace consolidation, rather than measure the impact that civil society has had on peace. Impact assessment according to Roche (1999: 21) is “the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes – positive or negative, intended or not – in people’s lives brought about by a given action or series of actions.” Several authors (Large, 1997; Goodhand and Hulme, 2000; Burnell, 2000) who have looked at civil society organizations’ role in conflict and post-conflict settings have demonstrated the difficulty of drawing any conclusions about their “impact” or to establish scientific tools to measure their affect due to challenges of attribution and causality. Thus I subscribe to Goodhand and Hulme’s approach (2000: 8) – if extended to include not only NGOs but also CBOs –which postulates that:

“The problems of attribution, time frames and the lack of the counterfactual mean that it is difficult to talk with precision about the contribution of NGO programmes on peace building or conflict fueling processes. At best, we are talking about the general direction of change and the probabilities that NGO interventions had an impact on peace and conflict dynamics. The evaluative stance of those examining the role of NGOs in peace-building might best focus on ‘improving’ performance rather than ‘proving’ impact.”

Rather than focusing on the nature of the impact that civil society organizations made, and developing indicators of the causal relationship between CSOs and peace consolidation processes, I wanted to understand how, through their values, programs,
organizational structure and linkages, two ideal types of organizations could positively effect peace.

The question asked helps define the research methodologies employed. As Yin states (1984: 18) "'how' and 'why' questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments as preferred research strategies. This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time." He defined a case study (1984: 23) as an "empirical inquiry that:

- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which
- multiple sources of evidence are used.

Yin adds that when multiple case studies are employed it is necessary to develop a rich theoretical framework that will become a vehicle for generalization to new cases (1984: 49). The theoretical framework was defined in chapters 1 and 2 based on literatures that address problems of civil society, and war and peace. Thus in the first two chapters we provided some preliminary hypotheses concerning civil society’s affect on peace consolidation. These hypotheses served as the basis of the inquiry and helped establish a framework that guided the case study selection and fieldwork.

In this study the researcher had no control over the events being observed and the focus was on real-life current, ongoing, developments. Therefore the case study method seemed to be the most appropriate. In addition case studies have been used for examining linkages between civil society organizations and peace previously (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Cockburn, 1998; Goodhand and Hulme, 1997, 1998, 2000; Coletta and Cullen, 2000).

It was decided to use qualitative data collection methods, based on case studies, though aware that qualitative methodology has been regarded as “unscientific, or only exploratory, or entirely personal and full of bias” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). As Creswell explains (1994:2), quantitative methods, the opposite of qualitative ones, are “based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and analyzed with statistical procedures.” But in the post-war contexts of Tajikistan and
Bosnia-Herzegovina numbers and statistics were notoriously unreliable.² A handful of researchers have made attempts to conduct quantitative research in the two countries. Yet even relatively successful efforts such as Falkingham’s (2000: 6), who studied poverty in Tajikistan, note that “the particular circumstances of transition in Central Asia have given rise to a host of methodological issues in the measurement of household welfare.” Falkingham argues for a mix of “objective” and “subjective” approaches in a context where numbers, quantities and official statistics never tell the whole story.

In his discussion of the criteria to be applied when choosing between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, Creswell (1994: 10) justifies the use of qualitative methodology when:

- “The research problem needs to be explored because little information exists on the topic;”
- “The researcher wants to focus on the context that may shape the understanding of the phenomenon being studied;”
- “Theories available in the field are often ‘inadequate, incomplete, or simply missing.’”

This study matched the description provided above. The literature review demonstrated that little information on the affect of civil society on peace consolidation existed. As described in Chapter 1 and 2, theories on peace consolidation and civil society begin to provide hypotheses concerning the linkages between the two concepts, but they are largely inadequate, normatively based, and poorly supported with empirical evidence. The context evidently shaped the understanding of the phenomenon being studied, as I was interested in particular post conflict, post-communist, Muslim majority settings.

III.b Pre-field work preparations: preliminary visits.

Devereux and Hoddinott (1992: 10) point out that “a preliminary visit to the intended country has many practical and methodological advantages.” Most significantly a preliminary visit can feed back into the theoretical preparation at a time when the literature review is coming to an end and initial hypotheses are being formed.

Before selecting case studies and completing my field work preparation, I undertook background data collection in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 2001 and in Tajikistan in March 2002. During 2-3 week initial field trips I interviewed governmental authorities,

² A state wide census has not been organized in Bosnia-Herzegovina for example since 1991.
representatives of international organizations, and civil society activists to gather
general information on the post-war context and civil society development. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina I carried out thirty-nine interviews in eight locations. Many of the
stakeholders I spoke with I knew in my previous capacity as the Community
Development Coordinator at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996-1998. In Tajikistan I did not have
the same in-depth experience of the country and contacts. However, in March 2002 I
was hired as a consultant for the UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights
(OHCHR), to conduct an assessment of human rights protection and existing human
rights programs. This entry point enabled me to identify and arrange meetings with key
informants. I held twenty-nine interviews of relevance to my research on civil society,
and two roundtables – one with civil society organizations dealing with education and
another with groups addressing human rights issues. The interviews I conducted during
the background data collection phase in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan helped me
start to prepare the Chapter 1 historical overview of civil society development, to
identify a group of possible case study organizations, and to elucidate issues to include
in my interview questionnaires.

III.c Data collection in the field.
Due to the relative lack of analytical material and literature on my research topic, it was
necessary for me to rely predominantly on other data collection forms, especially
interviews and direct observation. Personal history collection also proved to be an
effective means to obtain responses to questions about developments before or during
the conflict.

During fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan I employed mainly semi-
structured interviews to gather information for the macro-analysis of civil society
development, as well as case study microanalysis. Semi-structured interviews involve
using a list of questions, but recognize “that departures will occur if interesting themes
emerge from what respondents say and in order to get their version of things” (Bryman
1989). My questionnaire aimed to be flexible enough to allow respondents to digress

3 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Brcko, Bjeljina, Banja Luka, Livno, Capljina, and Mostar.
4 I have been traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina since early 1993 when I was working with a Hungarian
NGO Hungarian Interchurch Aid. Subsequently I was employed by the Lutheran World Federation in
towards issues that they deemed to be important. To facilitate the drawing of comparisons I raised similar questions with all my case study interviewees in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. The types of questions that I asked reflected my conceptual framework, and could be divided into the following six topic areas (sample interview questionnaire in appendix):

1. **History of involvement in the organization**: why did you first come to this organization? What did you think the goal of the organization was? Why are you still involved? Is this your only employment?

2. **Personal background information**: what is your place of birth? What is your education? What was your previous employment? Were you previously involved in any organizations? Where were you during the war? What did you do?

3. **Description of involvement in organizational activities**: what is your responsibility here? What program are you part of? How many beneficiaries do you have? Why is this program needed? What has this program accomplished? Where do the finances for this program come from?

4. **Opinion about organizational structure**: how has the organization evolved since you started cooperating with it? How are decisions made? What role do you play in that process?

5. **Contacts and linkages with other institutions**: Do you personally have any contacts with: local government? religious authorities? political parties? media? international organizations,? other local groups? etc.? If yes how often? More or less than before?

6. **Views on peace consolidation**: What do you consider to be the most critical issue that has been resolved since the end of the war? Who resolved it/them? What are the most critical issues for the near future?

While I undertook field research in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I continued to expand my knowledge on the general development of civil society through interviews with local authorities and civil society activists. In Tajikistan interviews were carried out in Dushanbe, Khojand, Kurgan Tuppe, Shartuz, Khorog, Garm, Tavildara, and Kulob. Many of these interviews were organized with the assistance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Tajikistan and the UN Tajikistan Office of Peace building (UNTOP). In Bosnia-Herzegovina local activists
and authorities spoke with me in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Breko, Bjeljina, and Doboj.

I also engaged in direct observation. Studying NGOs I observed many of their events, office meetings, regular activities and interactions within, and to some extent outside, the organization. In the villages I observed several CBO meetings and activities. I visited their community meeting places, schools, medical clinics, small infrastructure projects. At a minimum once a week I wrote up "field notes" to record the impressions I felt, and what I saw, during this observation.

The other major source of evidence was documentation. From the NGOs I gathered a large amount of evidence including:

- Annual reports.
- Project proposals.
- Project reports (monthly, bi-annual and yearly).
- Internal documents: registration documents, statutes, job descriptions, contracts, newsletters, personal memos, strategic plans....
- External evaluation reports (from donors, international organizations and other researchers).

**III.d  Data analysis:**

This stage of the process proved to be the most difficult and painstaking. The large number of taped interviews I accumulated required much transcribing. I did all the transcribing of the tapes from my Bosnian case studies (which took three months) and hired a university student to transcribe my tapes from Tajikistan. I completed the transcription of the Bosnian tapes before leaving for Tajikistan, allowing me to conduct preliminary data analysis and revise my interview questionnaire. Based on the variables that were part of my conceptual framework, and more detailed ones that arose during my analysis, I hand coded the interviews. Based on the results of this coding I revised my project outline and began writing chapter drafts.

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5 I should have heeded Denscombe’s (1998: 128) warning that “transcribing of the tapes is generally far more time consuming than the actual collection of data.”
Findings on how “organizational form” affects data collection effectiveness:

Through practice I found that whether I was collecting information on a CBO or an NGO affected the challenges that I faced in the process. Collecting information on NGOs proved to be the most methodologically straightforward assignment. With an office, staff, filed reports and projects, I was able to spend approximately one month in the premises of Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama. From there I interviewed the founders and leadership of the organization and staff. I spoke with all twelve staff members of Zhene Zhenama. As Ghamkhori has a staff of some 45 persons, I interviewed a quarter of the employees (also 12). Each interview lasted between 50-90 minutes and was taped. With the leadership of each organization (Bahodur and Mikhail at Ghamkhori, Nuna and Jadranka at Zhene Zhenama) I carried out multiple interviews totaling between 7-8 hours. Interviews were generally conducted in Serbo-Croatian at Zhene Zhenama and in Russian at Ghamkhori.

The CBO case studies proved to be a greater methodological challenge because of their weaker organizational structures and broader community base. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the organization that I studied had transformed during the peace process from an unregistered community organization to an institution of local self-governance. It had a small office in 2001 and one salaried staff member. As a membership base organization, Sevarlije’s MZ members, of which I interviewed twelve, provided me with most of the data on the evolution of the group. As members, rather than staff, their engagement in the group was informal and it was mainly through “life stories” that I learned how the MZ functioned and affected people’s livelihoods. I also obtained information on the group’s linkages by speaking with staff of four international organizations that had cooperated with the group in the past, and one municipal (Doboj) governmental official.

As explained above, in Tajikistan I did not study one community based organizations but six that were part of the MSDP village organization program. I also visited one village in the region that was not part of the project. Half of the village organizations had small offices, but I met the staff in the leaders’ home in all but one case. As described below I was not entirely free to organize interviews with village organization staff and members randomly. I formally interviewed fifteen village organization staff members. In addition I obtained a great deal of information on the village organizations.
from MSDSP project documents, and from the thirteen interviews that I held with MSDSP employees (at the country, regional, and district office level).

The organizational type also affected my ability to review project documents. In the cases of Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama, I was provided with a wealth of documents, which are generally useful in revealing how the organization wants to portray themselves to outsiders. As they are often drafted for donors they are tinted by a positive bias. Again the review of project documents proved to be more challenging with the CBOs. I learned that the former head of the Sevarlije MZ had meticulously collected documents on the group’s development, meetings, communications and general activities from before the Bosnian war until 1998. Unfortunately, after he died in 2000, all the papers were burned. In Tajikistan I was also unable to obtain documentation on the villages’ activities before they joined the MSDSP. However, since the village groups I studied were part of a formal structure run by MSDSP, I obtained copies of documents which village organizations (VOs) had submitted to MSDSP, as well as general statistics that MSDSP has compiled on VOs, their activities, funding, level of participation, etc. Similarly I received some data from international organizations that cooperated with the Sevarlije MZ (UNHCR, USAID, Mercy Corps).

I taped all my NGO interviews, not the ones carried out with Sevarlije mjesna zajednica and Karategin Valley village organizations’ members. In highly informal village settings interviewing seemed overly formal and obtrusive, so I took detailed notes.

IV. Practical opportunities and limitations of field work in post-conflict settings:
Post-conflict environments tend to deepen the host of theoretical, methodological, practical and ethical challenges that researchers engaged in qualitative data collection face. Some theories on social science methodology argue that researchers can and should approach their subject of investigation entirely neutrally and objectively. This has been termed a “positivist” approach where the researcher is considered to have

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6 Because according to the person who destroyed the documents “nobody asked for them.” Interview in Sevarlije, Hadzic, 4.08.03.
7 Downs and Stedman (2002: 43) also point out that: “A large part of the explanation for why literature on the implementation of peace agreements in civil wars is not more well developed is that it is difficult to think of an environment that is less conducive to the conduct of evaluation research. The number of cases is small and the measurements of potentially important variables […] are often unreliable.”
access to superior knowledge by virtue of scientific methodology. However ethnographers maintain that the researcher is never dissociated from the subject he/she is studying or entirely neutral. Hammersley and Atkinson (1989: 234) thus argue for an “explicit recognition of the fact that the social researcher, and the research act itself, are part and parcel of the social world under investigation.” Thus scholars have to take into consideration existing power relationships between the ethnographer and the research subjects, such as: those resulting from the backgrounds of the researcher and the researched; those that develop during field work; and those that derive from writing about and representing others (Wolf, 1996 in Harris, 2000: 14). I am not an ethnographer, yet my experience while working on this dissertation was that ethical questions concerning the relation between the researcher and those being researched are difficult to avoid. I have thus outlined some of those that I addressed below.

IV.a Addressing issues of trust and access

Post-conflict peace consolidation is deeply dependent on rebuilding trust – trust between neighbors, between former warring parties, between citizens and the state, between the state and external powers… Much of the success of fieldwork in post conflict contexts is also contingent on trust. In the course of the fieldwork it became clear to me that trust is more likely to develop between people who resemble each other – or share certain interests. It was, for instance, much easier for me to gain the confidence of young westernized educated youth active in Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama than of rural and traditional former combatants in the Karategin Valley or Doboj. As others have found (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992: 18, Harris, 2000: 11) for me (as a female) discussions with women – especially in rural settings – tended to be more informative than those undertaken with men. Trust was more likely to develop when I was able to reveal to my interlocutor that we had shared a common experience. In Bosnia-Herzegovina this was easier for me because I had lived there for extended periods during the war, while I first traveled to Tajikistan in 2000.

The general distrust that permeates most post-conflict environments also affects who is “allowed” to speak with the researcher and who is not: the issue of access (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992: 4-18). My extensive past experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina made it much easier for me to gain access than in Tajikistan. A greater number of people knew and trusted me in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was able to mobilize my own social
networks and carried out most of my data collection alone, without any preliminary introductions from intermediaries. In Tajikistan I often relied on international organizations – the UNTOP, the OSCE and AKF – to help make initial contact.8

The access issue proved to be a greater obstacle when I was studying community based organizations. Due to my previous close relations with a Bosnian family and their community, I was able to gather information on a community-based organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a way I could not in Tajikistan. Part of this was due to the different organizations’ structures, but it was also because of my dissimilar position in the two countries. In Bosnia-Herzegovina I spent three weeks in the village collecting data, was introduced by a community member as an “old friend”, and had the freedom to walk around the village unhindered, knock on doors, sit in the village store and speak with customers.

When undertaking research on the Karategin Valley village organizations in Tajikistan, I did so as an outsider who temporarily obtained access with the assistance of MSDSP staff members. I was introduced in each village first to the head of the village organization, and started by completing an extensive interview with him. Then I spoke with the deputy of the organization, the head of the women’s group and when possible random villagers - who felt confident that their participation would not be negatively interpreted by local leadership. This formal approach limited access to dissenting opinions. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1998: 63-73) describe, when there are “gatekeepers” and “sponsors” facilitating research, it is difficult to avoid their attempts to exercise a degree of surveillance and control. Only in one case in the Karategin Valley did I speak directly with excluded segments of the community – poor, women and dissenters – without prior approval of the village leadership.9

The importance of taking responsibility to avoid negative outcomes, influenced how interviews were conducted and what questions were asked. As Roche (1999: 35-36) warns, carrying out research in conflict settings may “well lead to the emergence of conflicting views, which precipitates more conflict and generated risks for local

8 Neither in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor in Tajikistan did I obtain official clearance to conduct research by a national state or academic authority which Devereux and Hoddinott (1992: 6-17) recommend as essential.
9 And this happened when I conducted research in a village that was not part of the MSDSP program, with a Tajik unaffiliated with MSDSP but associated with another international organization (OSCE).
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populations, agency staff and others.” Generally I employed few group interviews since they do not ensure confidentiality. Where conflicts existed I took note but tried not to provoke them by prodding the interviewee to provide details on the discord. The raising of political questions concerning the use of power and authority in the local community can have negative repercussions on the interviewee. “Research, like any other form of intervention, occurs within an intensely political environment and is unlikely to be viewed by local actors as neutral or altruistic” (Goodhand, 2001). Thus responses to political questions risk putting interlocutors in positions of unnecessary insecurity. To avoid such negative consequences I found that the more sensitive questions were better reserved for persons with the highest political authority – a question on former field commanders’ influence in the community would be posed to either a former commander or a governmental official, not a farmer. This requires an understanding of who wields power, and which issues may endanger research subjects.

IV. b Literature, language and names:

Fluency in the local language has been identified as providing significant benefits to the researcher. In this study, which relied heavily on interviews, knowledge of the local language was particularly important. Language was a sensitive issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan due to the post-war context. On one hand though much has been said about the differences between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian, I speak a “foreigner’s” version of the language that I still prefer to call Serbo-Croatian. In Tajikistan, though I had the ability to conduct interviews in Russian, I found that outside urban centers most interlocutors preferred to speak in Tajik. I was thus obliged to work with an interpreter for my interviews with Tajik CBO staff and members. No interpreter can provide the same ease of communication as can be obtained discussing directly. Yet a positive characteristic of working with an interpreter is that he/she can serve as a bridge with the interviewees – and gain trust more rapidly than an outsider.

Researchers often question the appropriateness of naming their sources. In her study Harris (2000) decided to conceal all identities of the subjects of her book (except one). Cockburn (1998) found that individuals were generally content to appear in their own names in her text. During the interview process I asked my interlocutors whether I

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10 Increasingly young researchers are learning the local languages of Central Asia – Tajik, Uzbek, Kazak – though the older generation tends to be more versatile in Russian. The breakup of the USSR is definitely a cause of this shift.
could individually quote them, using their own words, and use their names for identification. Virtually all agreed. Thus I generally use (real) first names when referring to Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori, and Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return staff and last names with reference to Karategin Valley VO informants. After the person’s name I indicate the date of the interview (day.month.year). Details of the persons being referred to are available in the “interviews referenced” appendix.

IV.c Reducing expectations and field work responsibilities:

As has been noted elsewhere (Hammerley and Atkinson, 1998: 75), case study informants are likely to have a variety of expectations concerning the researchers they are assisting. I thus felt that it was of importance to avoid giving organizations and communities false expectations concerning the research’s impact, and the level of support that I could offer in return for assistance. In my relationship with NGO staff it was easier for me to offer immediate and direct assistance such as contacts with international donors, and guidance on project proposals. However in the villages the needs and expectations of persons being interviewed were more direct and practical, such as food, seeds, housing, and infrastructure. Especially in Tajikistan, as a foreigner I was immediately considered to be an international aid worker, and in some instances when collecting data on MSDSP village organizations I was perceived as an MSDSP decision-maker. Undoubtedly this affected the responses that I obtained.

If quantitative research “is purely interested in extracting information and does not allow all participants to gain insights, to reflect on their observations, and to look to the future, then the cost to some of those involved will far outweigh the benefits (Roche 1999: 35).” Finding the balance between taking and giving back - to the community, organization or individual - is a personal and challenging process (Harris 2000: 2-3, 15). While some researchers have chosen to support the initiation of a development project in the topic of their interest (Harris, 2000: 2-3) others have assisted with the organization of workshops (Cockburn, 1998: 4-5). Admittedly I adopted a minimalist approach. In the weeks after conducting fieldwork I provided technical reports to Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori and MSDSP with recommendations for their future work. These reports gave staff the opportunity to criticize, comment and make suggestions on my initial findings. In November 2002 I presented my research to a group of Ph.D. students and academic staff at the Tajik National University in Dushanbe, and an article on my
research methodology was published through the Soros Gender Studies Center (Tajik National University). Ultimately I hope to transform this work into a book – to be translated into Russian and Serbo-Croatian – so that it can be more easily shared with those who gave so many insights and knowledge.

Conclusions:
This study was constrained by a relative lack of methodological and conceptual tools to measure the successes of peace consolidation. Previous writings on peace building have shown that “defining successes and failures in complex peace operations is far from an exact science.” (Doyle, Johnstone, Orr: 1997: 369) Furthermore, authors who have looked at the role of NGOs in conflict settings have concluded that it is very difficult to make any conclusions on the “impact” of NGOs on peace building. The following is therefore not an impact assessment but an effort to understand how and why groups function as they do in post-conflict environments. The research questions that we posed aim to broaden our knowledge about what forms of civil society can positively affect what type of peace. Do the assumptions made in the civil society and war and peace literatures play out in practice in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

To answer this question I have established analytical categories and associated different civil society ideal types (communal and liberal) with different forms of organizations (CBOs and NGOs). My historical analysis of the development of civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed the deep embeddedness of communal civil society, represented by mjesne zajednice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and mahallas in Tajikistan; and the new emergence of local NGOs. As explained, I chose to focus on four case studies: two from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and two from Tajikistan. In the following two chapters I will first study two NGOs, then two CBOs, with the aim of understanding their characteristics and organizational attributes, especially their missions and values; programs; linkages; organizational and funding structures. Thereafter in chapter 6 I will consider how my four cases studies positively impacted peace consolidation.
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NGOs as a form of liberal civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan

Introduction:
With the aim of understanding what forms of civil society can positively affect peace, in the following chapter I consider two representations of liberal civil society: the NGOs Zhene Zhenama (Women to Women) and Ghamkhori (Assistance). In this chapter I reflect on some of the general assumptions about liberal civil society introduced in Chapter 1, to assess how relevant they are in practice to the study of the characteristics and organizational attributes of organizationally sound groups operating in post-communist, post-conflict, contexts. As indicated previously, the NGO form in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan is new; these groups began to appear in the immediate pre-war period, grew in numbers during the conflict, and increased dramatically after the war. During the post war period, international donors tended to adopt a liberal definition of civil society, equating NGOs with civil society as a whole and targeting funding to them.

In this chapter I depict how these two groups operated in their respective post-war contexts, and attempt to determine why they acted as they did. As explained in the previous chapter, relating to methodology, a recent merging of development and not-for-profit management theories offers us conceptual models and sets of variables that can help us understand the characteristics and organizational attributes of NGOs both as single cases and comparatively. Through the application of these modes of analysis the missions/origins, programs, linkages, organizational structures and funding relations of the two case studies will be assessed individually and then compared.

Though the context in which Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori developed shares similarities and differences, this chapter focuses solely on the two organizations, not the conflicts or post-war peace consolidation processes they influenced. We are making “the assumption
that the P/CROs were comparable across countries and cultures based on the mere fact that as organizations they shared specific features and had to address certain imperatives” as Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 23) did in their study of NGOs in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa.¹ However, as will become more evident below, the environment in which the groups developed affected them substantially.

I. Origins, missions and values of the case study NGOs:

I.a The origins of Zhene Zhenama

Zhene Zhenama was founded in Sarajevo in 1996 by three charismatic women who shared common values, ideals and wartime experiences. In establishing an organization after the signing of the GFAP, the founders sought to take advantage of the opportunity to set up a multi-national women’s center in the capital which had, until recently, been divided and the focus of intensive fighting.

I.a.1 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s founders:

Rather than impeding them from becoming active in civil society the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina galvanized the founders of Zhene Zhenama. The women shared few personal characteristics in the pre-war period but were united by their wartime experiences. Zhene Zhenama’s founders – Nuna, Jadrenka and Selma – were urban middle-class professionals. Though Nuna and Jadranka were married and had children, Selma was a twenty-one-year-old university student in 1996. During the Yugoslav era, Nuna and Jadrenka were not part of the Communist elite but lived a comfortable lifestyle. All three of the organizations’ founders would have called themselves Bosnian or Yugoslav, though Nuna was a practicing Muslim born in Montenegro, Jadranka an atheist of Serbian nationality, and Selma non-religious and from a mixed background. None of the founders of Zhene Zhenama were women rights’ activists before 1993, though Nuna was active in her company’s trade union. The outbreak of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina served as a key stimulus for their subsequent public engagement.

During the 1992-1995 war global civil society provided Zhene Zhenama’s founders with personal and professional connections which became critical to the formation, funding, and

¹ These authors use the term P/CRO to indicate Peace/Conflict Resolution Organizations.
growth of their organization. Displaced to Belgrade from 1993-1995, Jadranka joined two of the most influential women’s groups in Serbia, *Women in Black* and the *Center for Women War Victims*. Nuna and Selma worked in Zenica’s (Bosnia-Herzegovina) women’s association *Medica*. These three groups were part of a strong anti-war, anti-nationalist women’s network bridging Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that was supported by women’s groups in Western Europe and the United States. Zhene Zhenama’s founders were first introduced to each other through this network. Nuna (14.11.01) and Jadranka (14.11.01) recalled how it was at women’s conference in Cologne in 1994 that they promised each other to return to Sarajevo after the war to work together. Through their engagement, Nuna, Jadranka and Selma sharpened their own political identities and positions vis-à-vis nationalism and feminist thinking. Even in the war time context, Nuna, Jadranka and Selma had the skills to give “social meaning to infrequent, culturally diversified, professional relations,” which, as Hilhorst notes in her NGO study (2003: 185), is crucial to successful international work and interactions.

In 1996 Zhene Zhenama’s founders were motivated by common ideals, a sense of guilt for having left wartime Sarajevo, and the desire to help others which had crystallized during the war. They felt the emotional and intellectual need to continue with their activism, to maintain their contacts with women in other parts of former Yugoslavia, and to employ their skills. They recognized that they had been able to overcome their own war traumas while being engaged in women’s groups, and sought to provide a similar space for other women. Setting up an NGO gave them the necessary organizational structure to satisfy these ambitions.

I.a.2 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s staff:
The founders of Zhene Zhenama tended to draw organizational staff from their own personal networks, recruiting persons who shared many of their ideas and characteristics.

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2 *Women in Black* defines itself as a “feminist, pacifist group founded on October 9, 1991 in Belgrade. Dressed in black, in silence, […] we are a women’s activist group against war – against militarism, nationalism, ethnic cleaning, rape of women in war, sexism and fascism.” (Zajovic, 2001: 345)

3 From early 1991 there was a strong symbiosis between the women and peace movements both in Serbia and Croatia. The feminists Vesna Terselic (*Anti-War Campaign Zagreb*) and Vesna Pesic (*Center for Antiwar Actions*, Belgrade) exemplified this and were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. For an account see Terselic (1997).
From 1998-2002 the organization had 13 paid staff members. Most belonged to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s urban middle class and were not previously politically active. Like the founders of Zhene Zhenama, several of the organization’s employees worked with women victims of violence in 1992-1996. They appreciated the more independent and non-hierarchical working environments of women’s organizations. They professed commitment to tolerance and multiculturalism. All ten staff members interviewed found the question, “what is your nationality?” distasteful. Their preferred response was that they were “Bosnian and Herzegovinian.” Of those interviewed all except one claimed to have voted for the non-nationalist Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 2000.

Zhene Zhenama’s staff’s motivations to join the organization were similar: they first came because friends brought them and thereafter continued to be engaged in order to help themselves. Initially they did not necessarily know what the NGO’s activities or values were. Thus the staff of Zhene Zhenama was largely connected by friendship ties. In 1996-1997 the line between staff, members and beneficiaries was vague, as programs were rarely formalized. Women who would become staff members were initially attracted to the organization because it provided them with a means to gain confidence. As Zilha (15.11.01) one of the Psycho-Social Team members explained, “I found what I was looking for here, and the space to work on myself... Every day I am somehow stronger and more secure.” In interviews, staff members metaphorically called Zhene Zhenama their “family,” “home” and “friend.” For Radmilla, a member of the Women Studies Project Team, the refuge was not only symbolic. Originally from Mostar, Radmilla became a refugee in Belgrade in 1993 and joined the anti-war movement. She left Serbia in 2000, and unable to return to her hometown, relied on Zhene Zhenama to obtain housing, short-term employment and emotional support in Sarajevo. Only much later when Zhene Zhenama established a funding base did the possibility of obtaining a salary attract staff.

Though Zhene Zhenama’s staff did not outwardly join because of a shared sense of mission, the organization’s commitment to tolerance provided Serb and Croat women with a unique opportunity to mix with women of other nationalities and become publicly engaged. In 1996, according to Milica (13.11.01), a Serb heading the Women Studies Project Team, “there were just a few of us [Serbs in Sarajevo], and it was very hard for us
to survive the peace. We survived the war, but we had to survive the peace.” When Miriana Music of the Psycho-Social team (21.11.01), from an Orthodox family and born in Croatia, joined Zhene Zhenama she did so because she believed that “this center will not divide us. But together we will agree on things, construct our space and start to fight for our rights.”

Zhene Zhenama also encouraged staff to develop their sense of identity and political engagement. Through educational seminars they could further their understanding of women’s issues and commitment to public engagement. Sefika (20.11.01), the organization’s accountant, explained how through this process she “for the first time saw how to organize work for women, how to strengthen them.” At Zhene Zhenama it was also acceptable to be critical, which in a hierarchical, post-communist, and patriarchal society such as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s, was rare. Danijela (14.11.01) described how at Zhene Zhenama, “I decided that my role would be to say something whenever I felt that something was wrong.”

I.b Zhene Zhenama’s mission and values

Zhene Zhenama – as its name indicates – was created explicitly as an organization of women for women. The organization’s aim was to be a “grass-roots self-organized women’s association, that gathers women of different generations, social and education backgrounds, ethnic and religious orientation (Zhene Zhenama 2001a).” Zhene Zhenama filled an important niche in Sarajevo’s women’s movement due to the lack in 1996 of any truly multi-national organizations of pre-war residents and displaced persons. Significantly Zhene Zhenama defined itself primarily as a women’s organization, rather than a peace, conflict resolution, or human rights group.

Zhene Zhenama nevertheless pursued peace-related issues because the founders felt that women had a particular role to play in the peace process. Queried on why she had decided to organize a women’s association rather than a conflict resolution one, Nuna (14.11.01) responded: “Maybe it was because of the experience that I brought from Medica. I was crazy about women and wanted to be useful to women... Women took on the hardest burden amongst all that happened [during the war].” On one level her response was an
emotional one, on the other it expressed a feminist argument that war influences men and women differently. Slobodanka Konstantinovic-Vilic (2000: 187) explains this view:

"Some new situations created by war (the loss of family members, their recruitment into armed forces, separation and the necessity of refuge) demand that women adopt new, more active roles and engage in independent decision making. Life in war demands more of women and consequently they become stronger and more decisive. However suffering in war produces feelings of helplessness, hopelessness and depression."

Zhene Zhenama's mission was to help women overcome these challenges so that they would be in a stronger position to influence peace. In a promotional document (1997c), Zhene Zhenama's founders explained that they had decided to create an organization for women, because:

"During the war women were the most active population, in the defense of the country from aggression, in supporting peace initiatives, participating in peace processes, working on humanitarian issues or simply, trying to survive and struggle for their families."

In the immediate post-war period, it was important to assist women so that they did not lose these subtle "gains." The founders of Zhene Zhenama also targeted women because they initially saw it as an easier way to promote change. "Working with the converted," with women, who had expressed a commitment to peace and reconciliation, would be less difficult than approaching men.

The setting up of a multi-national women's center in Sarajevo was Zhene Zhenama's first goal: to create a space in Bosnia-Herzegovina's capital in which people belonging to different national groups could meet, discuss and cooperate. Subsequently the mission broadened. In a 2001 promotional leaflet (Zhene Zhenama, 2001a) the organization's objectives included facilitating:

- Exchange between theoretical and practical perspectives on conflict resolution
- Awareness raising about non-violence and peace education
- Peace and trust building in multiethnic communities
- The identification of social and political problems in times of transition
- Non governmental organizational development
- The establishment of an active NGO and activist network

Though not explicitly stated, Zhene Zhenama's goal was to support the strengthening of a multi-national Bosnia-Herzegovina. "I did not want to accept that we were divided in
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Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Nuna (14.11.01) explained, “if I wanted my children and other children to have a country that would not put them into question because of their religion and nationality [...] then I had to give myself the goal of building that state. But I needed people [to do it with], I could not do it alone.” Zhene Zhenama provided Nuna and the rest of the staff and membership with an organizational form to promote tolerance and cooperation across ethnic lines.

To reach its long-term objectives of increasing respect for women’s rights and tolerance, Zhene Zhenama’s mission included strengthening grassroots civil society development. At the community level Zhene Zhenama (2001a) strived to “promote a violence free culture,” by “changing the existing culture with its traditional characteristics” and helping community members see the “source of creativity as being in the diversity of relationships among human beings.” The NGO management argued that change had to occur at all levels of society, and that its greatest contribution could be at the grass roots.

I.c The origins of Ghamkhori

Ghamkhori was created in 1997 in Khatlon, a region south of Dushanbe which since 1992 was the scene of intensive wartime fighting, as well as the displacement of some 653,388 persons. It was one of the first three local NGOs to form in the region, when the Tajik NGO sector was made up of a mere 83 registered groups (ICNL 2002). In 1997, as Tajikistan moved from war to peace, Ghamkhori’s innovative approach was to teach self-reliance rather than provide emergency aid. Based in Kurgan Tuppe, Ghamkhori started its activities in the heavily destroyed villages of the Bokhtar district of the Khatlon Region.4 Ghamkhori’s founders targeted rural areas to meet the needs of returning refugees and displaced persons, as well as those of the population that had remained. According to the organization’s statute, Ghamkhori’s (1999a) goal was to improve the socio-economic existence of the population by increasing levels of popular knowledge in the fields of health and the protection of women and children’s rights.

4 According to the UNDP (1995: 50) Human Development Report, Bokhtar was where “the most damage during the war was inflicted.” “Of 132 villages, 45 are leveled to the ground completely. Over 6,400 houses were burned and 2,994 partially ruined. More than 5,700 families are without shelter. Covering these losses will cost approximately US $11.4 million.” [...] “Commercial and community structures were eliminated. These include 2 clubs, 67 shops, 13 kindergartens, 10 common-service salons, several obstetrician consulting stations, 34 schools and 2 libraries.”
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I.c.1 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s founders and staff:

Unlike Zhene Zhenama, the initiative to establish Ghamkhori did not come from a group of Tajiks but from an international consultant and researcher who was completing a Ph.D. on gender, Islam and socialism in Tajikistan (Harris, 2000). When she carried out fieldwork in rural Khatlon in 1996, Colette found that women considered the provision of free contraception to be a pressing need. She thus devised the Health of Bokhtar Women project together with a group of five Khatlon based professionals who would form the initiative group for the creation of Ghamkhori (Colette, 28.06.03). A specific need thus motivated the drafting of the project, which inspired the creation of the organization. Though “Health of Bokhtar Women” project was funded in 1997 by the international donor Christian Aid, it was not until 1999 that the group felt the need to officially register as an organization.

Unlike Zhene Zhenama’s founders, the five Tajik members of the initiative group that became Ghamkhori were not driven by a clear mission that had developed through war time activism – though they did share certain personal characteristics with the Bosnian NGO’s leaders. In 2002 two of the original founders – Bahodur and Mikhail - remained involved with Ghamkhori, while the others had joined international organizations or migrated out of Tajikistan. Like in Zhene Zhenama’s case, Ghamkhori’s core staff and leadership was composed of middle class professionals, with a limited history of pre-war activism, and eclectic national backgrounds. Bahodur was a teacher and Mikhail a doctor. They had not been activists within the Communist Party (Mikhail joined the CPT during Perestroika) though they were active in other social organizations including labor unions and the Komsomol. Bahodur was an Uzbek national and Mikhail, born in the Ukraine, came to Tajikistan as a young professional. Before Tajikistan’s independence they considered themselves to be citizens of the Soviet Union. During the war Mikhail served as the medical director in the Vaksh district and took risks to provide medicine to both sides in the conflict. However neither Bahodur nor Mikhail felt a strong drive to become publicly engaged before joining Ghamkhori: they had no earlier contacts with local NGOs or
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Perestroika era civic organizations. They were initially drawn to Ghamkhori because it offered them an opportunity to further develop their professional skills.

The founders of Ghamkhori set out to establish an organization that was reliant on paid staff. Purposely they did not depend on friendship ties to recruit personnel. The organization had a strict rule against the hiring of relatives, a practice commonplace in Tajikistan. From 1997-1999 the organization had 12 staff, by 2000 it had 40. New employees were selected based on an extensive interview process, for their professional skills and perceived ability to be communicative, innovative and critical. Out of twelve Ghamkhori staff members interviewed in the context of this research in 2002 only two stated that they knew what the aims of Ghamkhori were before they were hired. Several persons interviewed acknowledged that they were content in their previous jobs, but that they left them for the higher salary that Ghamkhori offered. Ghamkhori developed around a core group of professionals, rather than activists, who were not necessarily bound by common values, interests, or ideology.

Though the staff of Ghamkhori did not profess to be motivated by any broad sense of mission when joining the organization, many of them shared a common value base due to their background and experiences. The majority of the staff interviewed were educated, middle aged, and married with children. Several proudly described their activism in Soviet era social organizations – mainly the Komsomol, Zhensoyuz, and professional unions (Boymahmad, 08.06.02, Dilorom, 30.05.02, Kalongul, 08.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02). Staff included Tajik, Uzbek, and Russian nationals, as well as Tajiks originally from Kulyab, Garm, Kurgan Tuppe and other regions. They shared feelings of tolerance vis-à-vis people of different national or regional background. Several Ghamkhori members related anecdotes of how during the war they maintained contacts with people from all sides – and in a few cases took dangerous steps to assist others (Hoorshed, 01.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02, Mavjud, 30.05.02)

5 During Soviet times it was not uncommon for rural women to have 10-14 living children. Soviet social policies rewarded women with large numbers of children ("heroine mothers") and traditional Tajik cultural norms encouraged it (Harris, 2000).
Though the staff was not bound by pre-existing friendship ties, within Ghamkhori strong links rapidly formed. Ghamkhori’s management nurtured the development of an organizational culture. Staff shared (free) daily lunchtime meals; and met for weekly organizational planning, training and development meetings. New employees were paired with more experienced Ghamkhori workers to transfer experience and skills. Such steps ensured the gradual development of a common organizational approach and identity. Also several staff interviewed noted that close collaboration with colleagues was one of the main sources of satisfaction in their work.

The majority of those interviewed acknowledged that although the initial motivation for working with Ghamkhori was financial, the organization helped them in their own personal development. More than half the staff interviewed noted that they had undergone a significant change of mentality since joining Ghamkhori – which made them more aware of women’s roles and rights in society, and the importance of community action. The current director of the organization, Bahodur (14.06.02), admitted that in 1997, “I did not think that women have any rights. Only after I started working here did I start to understand that women’s rights are not optional but something that must be exercised.” Several of the women staff members gained new confidence and decided to further their education and public engagement. Staff was also motivated because the organization provided them with new skills. The manager of the Women’s Center, Mavjuda (11.06.02), who previously worked in a hospital, explained:

“Work here is quite different from work in the hospital. When a person came to the hospital and said that a part of her body hurt, I did not care what was the reason for this pain was. I only cared about selecting the proper kind of medicine for her to take, but I did not listen to her. Here I learned how to listen to people – to understand the problem and help, but in the other way. I learned to be patient. I learned how to talk to the people.”

Many staff members, including Ghamkhori’s founders, initially knew little or nothing about NGOs. Through Ghamkhori they found that NGOs could allow them to work independently, creatively and without being impeded by higher authorities and corruption. In 2002 most of the staff that has been working with Ghamkhori for several years recognized that this new found independence was a key factor that motivated them in their
day-to-day work. Hoorshead (01.06.02), a Ghamkhori staff member since 1998, described how:

"It is different working here. It is work which is close to a person’s soul, where no one dictates how you should work. No one is pushing you. You work as you wish to, in a way to make you proud of your work. When you do something that you are proud of – when you have a good lesson or talk to interesting people – you are happy all day long after that. This is how we do our work. We get tired but in our minds we feel satisfaction."

I.d Ghamkhori’s missions and values:

Ghamkhori’s goal at its inception was to improve the socio-economic conditions of the population of Khatlon. In post war Tajikistan the needs in Khatlon, mainly a rural area, were diverse. Some of them were directly war-related involving, for example, the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Others were linked to the breakdown of the state and its capacity to provide basic services and security. International organizations that operated in Tajikistan in 1994-1998 focused on meeting emergency needs, distributing material aid. When Ghamkhori started its activities it sought to fill a niche in the provision of information to rural populations. The initiative group was inspired by the motto “it’s better to teach how to fish than to give fish.” From the onset Ghamkhori’s mission was to break the population’s dependence on external aid. This signified learning to “help yourself” and engage in prevention. In its statute Ghamkhori’s (1999a) “organizational goal is to increase the socio-economic existence level [of the population] by improving the level of popular knowledge in the fields of health and the protection of women and children’s interests.”

Ghamkhori’s mission was to encourage local communities to take on new responsibilities under conditions of declining resources and governmental service provision. After the civil war the population of Southern Tajikistan was confronted with a rapid spread of typhoid, malaria, and other infectious disease as access to clean drinking water plummeted. To tackle these problems, Ghamkhori organized interactive courses on hygiene, reproductive health services, and alternative medicine. Dissemination of this information was necessary because, according to Bahodur (11.06.02), “people did not know how to survive or to protect themselves” after the disintegration of the Soviet era social safety net. The organization sought to change individuals’ basic expectation that health care and disease
prevention are the business of the government - to a general acceptance that they are first and foremost a personal responsibility. Lessons on health served as an entry point to address a broader range of community problems. Ghamkhori adopted a gradual approach which “took into account the mentality of our people,” and in order to do so according to Mikhail (24.05.02), “we made a program that could slowly move from health problems to family problems, that way changing the mentality towards independent decision making.”

Ghamkhori's second target was to improve conditions for women and children. The first project that the group implemented was entitled the “Health of Bokhtar Women,” and thereafter all of its projects have had a similar focus. Women were identified as Ghamkhori’s main target group because of the substantial decrease in their rights since the early 1990s. A WHO study (2000), found that 35% of women experienced sexual violence in their families and 44% psychological violence. Yet like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women also made subtle gains during the war, adopting more active public roles and engaging more openly in economic activity (Chatterjee, 2002: 118-119; Falkingham 2000a; Kuvatova, 2002). As Mikhail (14.06.02) described, war in Tajikistan affected men and women differently because:

“During the war men were afraid to go out of the house, so the women were going to the bazaar to buy and sell. Before the war you never saw so many women in the bazaar. […] The shift has happened. So now is the right time to use this situation and start giving lessons to those women.”

Ghamkhori did not explicitly define itself as a woman's organization as Zhene Zhenama did. Though women’s organizations functioned during the Soviet era there was no indigenous women’s movement comparable to the one that existed in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s. Ghamkhori did not benefit from the contacts and support from global women networks. In Tajikistan targeting women and excluding men in program activities may have caused men to prohibit their wives or sisters from participating. Nevertheless as Bahodur (11.06.02) described, Ghamkhori’s goal was clearly to promote women’s rights. He considered that it had succeeded in meeting its objective “when after our lessons a woman’s psychological vision of being a slave is broken. She understands that she has rights and that she can also express her opinions. She realizes that men and women are equal.”
Ghamkhori initially choose not to work directly on inter-ethnic reconciliation. In 1996 the security situation had improved substantially though conflicts were still breaking out between returnees and people who had not been displaced during the war, and between people of different regional origins (mainly Garmis and Kulyabis). At this time Ghamkhori's projects did not address the conflict issue because, according to Bohadur (11.06.02), "the wounds were still aching, and people had not forgiven each other. [...] We did not have much experience in reconciliation and in working on peace building.” However the organization was committed to working with all victims and persons in need. The situation in 1996-1998 was described by Bahodur (30.05.2002) in the following way:

“When we started working with one ethnic group – Garmis for instance – they did not want to work or sit together in the same room with Kulyabi people. Or vice versa. They did not want to be in the same room – even kids. There were conflicts, there was fighting sometimes actually. [...] So how did we work with them? We started our lessons with lessons on peace and friendship. We let everyone think about how wars start, why they start, what the consequences are, etc. Then, step by step, people started realizing that, for example, this woman is not guilty that the husband of the other woman was killed.”

Ghamkhori also countered tensions caused by providing a space for people of different backgrounds to interact, by maintaining a multi-ethnic staff, and working with all regional or ethnic groups present in the region, in their preferred language. Organization staff was not immune from ethnic based discrimination and violence. In one instance, in 1999, when Bahodur had recently become the director of Ghamkhori (1999b):

“Immediately the government authorities of the oblast started to pressure him to get him to resign because they considered that only a Tajik should be the head of such an organization, despite the fact that the town where the project's office has been established is 30-40% Uzbek. Things went so far that two KGB [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officials came around to the office with the expressed intention of ‘teaching the director a lesson,’ which they made clear would be by means of taking him to their office and beating him up in order to get him to resign.”

The harassment ended when another staff member intervened through his own connections with local government. Ghamkhori’s management defended a non-ethnic and non-national approach when much was being decided in the region based on people’s ethnic and national identities. By treating staff and beneficiaries the same regardless of origin, Bahodur

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6 According to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch (1995:12) there were “at least fourteen returnees and internally displaced persons who were killed in the Khatlon oblast in 1994. Harassment and beatings, often resulting in serious injuries were disturbingly common.”
(11.06.02) argued that Ghamkhori, "brings people together, makes them closer. National boundaries disappear during our lessons and people forget that they have different origins. [...] They forget who are the winners and who are the losers. Everybody is together, everyone is equal and everyone has the same rights and opportunities."

I.e. **Contrasts and similarities between Zhene Zhenama's and Ghamkhori's origins and missions:**

As theories on liberal civil society predict, Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's were grounded in a system of normative values that emphasized mutual respect and tolerance. The leaders of both organizations were adept at articulating normatively progressive visions – in support of women's rights, civic participation, self-reliance – which fortified the organization's culture and inspired staff. Theorists of the not-for-profit sector (Paton, 1996; Paton, 1999; Brown, 1998: 230) have characterized NGOs as "value driven." Organizational values motivate staff and volunteers, secure members, and amass external support and resources. Arguably values reinforce staff's commitment to organizational goals, and to a sense of shared identity, in NGOs where economic interests are less of a motivation (Jeavons, 136). Zhene Zhenama was established by a group of women, driven by a commitment to shared values and political engagement which had matured with their war time activism in the anti-war women's network. Ghamkhori's case demonstrates how even though values may not initially attract staff, gradually they can strengthen their commitment. Ghamkhori's leaders came to a more progressive understanding of their mission and shared beliefs. Ultimately values, but also the opportunity of personal development and financial gain, motivated the people engaged in both groups.

The literature on civil society emphasizes the role that liberal civil society can play in the political project of strengthening participatory and democratic forms of governance. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori shared this mission, but acting indirectly, considering that they could best contribute through awareness building and information dissemination. The post-conflict environment also directed them to other needs, as economic survival was a pressing challenge in post-war Tajikistan, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina the continuation of a multi-national way of life was in doubt. While Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both aimed to re-establish a "civil" society, the former focused on the reconciliation aspects of
Chapter four

this project and the latter the economic. Much more than Zena Zenama, Ghamkhori was committed to promoting the liberal notion that citizens' should take responsibility for their individual welfare, as the NGO's leadership perceived government's involvement in the private sphere as being in inevitable decline.

As foreseen in previous studies on NGOs (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 178; Cockburn, 2001; Whaites, 2000: 129) Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were staffed mainly by middle-class professionals, in many cases ethnic or national minorities, whose status was being challenged in the post-war era. The NGOs served as defense mechanisms and self-help groups, offering skills development, psycho-social assistance and financial resources to their staff. The leaders of the post-war NGOs were from a different social category than those who belonged to Tajik and Bosnian pre-war civic movements: intellectuals with clearly defined political agendas. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's directors generally participated in, rather than condemned, Soviet and Titoist era social activities. They also had weak links with political parties, and especially in Ghamkhori's case, with activists who belonged to pre-war forms of liberal civil society.

Observers (Roy, 2003: 142-43) have argued that NGO staff's middle class, urban, and professional backgrounds may weaken its links with the rural and poor populations its claims to serve. In the design of projects, staff may be guided by its own perceptions of needs rather than grass-roots exigencies. As Howell and Pearce (2001: 201) noted in the case of Central Asia, urban, middle class NGOs "risk being perceived as elitist, unrepresentative and ineffectual." The problem is exacerbated by international donors who "encourage the creation of LNGOs in their own professional, middle class image, thereby maintaining influence over them (Pugh, 1998: 20).” In the Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori cases staff seemed capable of nurturing and maintaining links with rural and dis-empowered groups as will be described in more detail below.

Liberal civil society has been heralded as autonomous from the state and family, immune to the "tyranny of the cousins" (Gellner, 1995: 33). Zhene Zhenama's case demonstrates how liberal civil society may on the other hand become highly dependent on friendship networks. Zhene Zhenama followed a practice common amongst NGOs to rely heavily on
friendship ties to gather staff, members and beneficiaries (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 178). In her study of eight women’s organizations, Cockburn (Cockburn, Stakic-Domuz and Hubic, 2001: 177) found that in Bosnia-Herzegovina “women’s NGOs were sometimes criticized as ‘mere friendship cliques,’ [...] But friendship is a political resource.” She added (2001: 177) that friendship based groups “can become exclusive, so that others feel always on the margins, cut out of information flows [...] and discouraged from taking responsibilities.” Thus friendship based organizations may begin to take on some of the negative characteristics of kinship based ones. Unconsciously heeding Gellner and Cockburn’s warnings, Ghamkhori’s management hired staff based on professional skills and gradually developed an organizational culture and identity through “team building” activities.

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both fit into Varshney’s definition (2002: 3) of inter-community organizations, which promote “associational” and “everyday” forms of inter-ethnic civic engagement. Addressing inter-ethnic and inter-national tensions was one of Zhene Zhenama’s primary goals. It aimed to facilitate a progressing bridging of social relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina’s populations. As we will see subsequently, many of its projects aimed to increase inter-ethnic cooperation in daily life and to create multi-ethnic associations. Ghamkhori chose to confront the issue less directly, promoting tolerance by having a multi-ethnic and multi-national staff, and speaking about it in village lessons, but not explicitly implementing conflict resolution programs in the first five years after the war. Neither Zhene Zhenama nor Ghamkhori, however, explicitly defined themselves as peace/conflict resolution organizations as those that Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) described in their volume on mobilizing for peace did.

Where pre-war forms of liberal civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina may have lacked an over-arching ideology to bind them with international forms of civil society, Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori clearly identified themselves as women’s rights organizations. They adopted a gender sensitive analysis of needs, considering that in war and its aftermath “women suffer in a way specific to women” (Cockburn, 1998: 156; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000). In both Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina rape was used as a weapon of war against women (Allen, 1996; Cockburn, 1998; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000;
Harris, 2000: 193; Richters, 2001). The trajectory of change away from communism also put an end to increases in women’s rights; which occurred during socialism/communism as systematic efforts were made to eradicate patriarchal power relations and modes of behavior (Ramet, 1996; Ramet, 1999; Harris, 2000). In the post war period women lost ground in political and economic spheres. In Tajikistan independence was accompanied by a revival of Islamic practices and a return to traditional norms limiting women’s freedoms to play active roles in public life. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori organized to address the negative affects on gender relations and women’s position in society caused by the post-war and the post-communist transitions. Zhene Zhenama in particular was able to benefit from contacts within the broader Yugoslav and global women’s network, providing them with skills, information, and funds critical to organizational development.

II. NGO programs and tactics

Past NGO analyses have attempted to define typologies of groups engaged in post-war related challenges based on their programs and activities (Aall, 2000b: 167-180; Aall, 2000a: 125-132; Goodhand and Hulme, 1997:11; Kumar, 1997: 324; The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997). Prendergast and Plumb propose a list of “important, innovative projects to address issues of long term peacebuilding,” which NGOs may engage in. Like Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002), Aall (2000a: 129) argues that a particular category of resolution organizations exists within the NGO sector. However as the Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori cases reveal, NGOs in post-conflict environments often defy such classifications. The programs that Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori implemented from 1996-2002 both concentrated on women’s rights protection

7 For instance in the 1997 municipal elections women obtained 5% of the elected positions, in the 1996 national elections they gained 2% of the seats (OSCE, 1998). See also Pavlovic (2001).

8 Citing one sign of women's decreasing status of society Alla Kuvatova writes: “Today polygamy has become an every day occurrence, due to the low economic status of women (absence of permanent work, low earnings) […]]. From the period 1991-2000 the number of officially registered marriages decreased 2.5 times. More than 60% of today's families are created without any registration in civilian registrar's registry offices. (Khegai M. Research of phenomena as polygamy in Tajikistan.- Dushanbe, 2002). Marriages are concluded in religious ceremonies called “nikoh” with the agreement of the parents of fiancée (bride). In these cases 2d, 3d wives are allowed. They don’t have any juridical rights on joint property or inheritance in cases of divorce or husband’s death.” (Kuvatova, 2002).

9 Such activities include addressing trauma, organizing problem-solving workshops, training for conflict management, creating peace media, assembling peace committees, resurrecting indigenous mechanisms for conflict management, encouraging collaborative community activities and supporting democracy and human rights (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 334).
and community-level civil society development, but implicitly aimed to influence conflict resolution or reconciliation.

**II. a Zhene Zhenama programs:**

From 1996 to 2002 Zhene Zhenama engaged in programs that spanned between service provision and advocacy, and centered on women, NGO development and supporting inter-ethnic reconciliation. At first Zhene Zhenama developed programs based on its founders and staff's skills. Nuna (14.11.01) remembered how “from the beginning […] We focused on what we knew.” Subsequently the organization developed more complex and multifaceted programs. The four main programs that Zhene Zhenama implemented from 1996-2002, which will be described in more detail below, are: the Sarajevo Women’s Center, NGO development and support, psycho-social assistance and community level conflict resolution.

**II.a.1 Zhene Zhenama’s Women Center:**

The foremost goal of Zhene Zhenama’s founders in 1997 was to establish a Women’s Center in Sarajevo, which would be open to all women but initially focused on returnees. In 1997 returnees to Sarajevo faced significant economic, psychological and emotional challenges – including feelings of isolation, guilt and discrimination. The entire system of government and public service provision had changed during the war, and women did not know whom to address with their needs concerning employment, health, property, etc. (Zhene Zhenama, 1996). Services that the Center offered included: individual and group counseling, information on employment and property rights, education, and income generation support (Zhene Zhenama, 1996).

As women’s needs and the environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed, the Women’s Center’s activities shifted to more educational and advocacy oriented ones. By 2000 many of women’s post-war emotional and psychological problems were becoming less acute,

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10 According to the organization’s registration document, Zhene Zhenama's (1997a) spheres of activity included: integrating women returnees; providing information on health and legal questions; working on the education and awareness-building of women; promoting women's rights; advocating for non violent conflict resolution and communications; and supporting the establishment of a Bosnia-Herzegovina wide NGO network.
while educational and health services remained ineffectual, rule of law and the administration of justice were poor, women were confronted with various forms of discrimination, and domestic violence was growing (Zhene Zhenama, 2000a). In response to these needs Zhene Zhenama sought to increase the role of women in politics, shifting its focus from providing services to supporting women’s empowerment. In the 2002 proposal for the Women’s Center project, goals included increasing the number of women in decision-making positions and in NGOs, advocating for the passage of a law on gender equality, and supporting the institutionalization of gender mainstreaming through cooperation with governmental bodies (Zhene Zhenama, 2001b).

Starting in 1997 the Women’s Center offered weekly or bi-monthly consciousness raising workshops to heighten awareness about issues related to women’s rights and tolerance, initiate debate and change popular opinions. Between 1997-2001, 144 workshops were organized with some 1500 participants (Zhene Zhenama, 2001c). Even in 1997 Jadranka (14.11.01) remembered how at that time “we wanted to change women’s minds. After the war, typically we needed to work with women to change their minds and show them that it is not every Serb or Croat or Muslim who is guilty.” Almost all beneficiaries interviewed spoke about how activities at the Center, particularly the workshops, raised their political consciousness and their desire to work together to fight for women’s rights.11

Zhene Zhenama’s political activism extended beyond the Women’s Center. In 1998 Zhene Zhenama was one of the leading organizations in a Bosnia-Herzegovina coalition of 14 women’s groups called “We are more (Nas je Vise)” which increased women’s participation in elections, as voters and candidates.12 The coalition succeeded in lobbying for the establishment of a quota in the election’s regulations that required all political parties to have a minimum of three women amongst the top ten persons on their electoral lists. The same year Zhene Zhenama organized a demonstration on International Women’s Day to express Bosnian solidarity with women in Afghanistan; in subsequent years it set up similar public events (Zhene Zhenama, 1999). In 1999-2000 Zhene Zhenama participated

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11 Topics covered in 2002 workshops included: violence towards women, women and armed conflicts, women and elections, women’s human rights, and women in the media. (Zhene Zhenama, 2001b)
12 Through the coalition an estimated 14,000 women took part in voter education training sessions, run by 58 NGO trainers including 5 from Zhene Zhenama.
in a program organized by the OSCE entitled “Women Can Do It” in which its staff trained women candidates for the 2000 elections (Zhene Zhenama, 2000b). The programs had immediate practical affects as by 2001 four of Zhene Zhenama’s members and staff sat on the main board of the Social Democratic Party (at the time the governing party of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Other women had gained political positions in municipal levels of government – such as in Brcko where eight women who had participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions were in the city government in 2001. Working with women in government, Zene Zename encouraged them to think about women’s issues and to work co-operatively across party lines, to challenge male dominated political agendas and discourse.

II.a.2 Zhene Zhenama psycho-social assistance:

The provision of psycho-social support was the second main axis of Zhene Zhenama’s work. It fit within the organization’s overall mission of assisting women overcome the consequences of war. In 1997, when international NGOs who had offered psycho-social support during the war were largely pulling out of these programs, and few locally led psycho-social initiatives existed, establishing a multi-national team of Bosnian professionals capable of addressing trauma filled an important gap.

Initially the psycho-social team encountered a series of difficulties due to the general lack of Bosnian familiarity with the notions of trauma and counseling. It was a major challenge for the Zhene Zhenama team to identify beneficiaries and to encourage women to attend counseling. As the Psycho-Social Team manager, Snezana (19.11.01) explained, “there is no general knowledge about the issues and problems of mental health. So there is a fear of stigmatization – that someone from the community will say, “oh you see she is crazy.” The problems were compounded in cases where violence had occurred since for many women “talking about violence meant talking about shame (Zhene Zhenama, 2001d).” These difficulties showed the limitations of applying counseling methodologies that were externally developed and rarely used previously in the former Yugoslavia. They also reveal NGOs’ propensity to serve as innovators. Through psycho-social programs like Zhene Zhenama’s, new methods came to the attention of governmental providers. As Snezana (19.11.01) described, “lately in our [governmental] clinic we are seeing some
improvements for example with the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder. [...] It is my feeling that NGOs in this sector contributed a lot.”

Like the Women’s Center project, the psycho-social assistance’s goals evolved in tandem with Zhene Zhenama’s mission and overall women’s needs. Initially the project focused on helping women adapt to the life conditions they faced as displaced or returnees, as well as overcoming the feelings of helplessness, grief, and loss, which are characteristic of post-traumatic stress. However by 2000, the project was less centered on responding to wartime traumas and sought to prevent future sources of violence. The psycho-social assistance project included an advocacy component as of 2001. The Psycho-Social Team, together with the rest of the Zhene Zhenama staff, became more engaged in working with governmental institutions - health and educational bodies, police - to increase their awareness about domestic violence. Zhene Zhenama helped form a domestic violence network of Bosnian and international NGOs in 2000. Within the network, Zhene Zhenama worked on the identification and prevention of violence in the field, while legal aid groups advocated for changes in law and legal practice. In Republika Srpska, a lobbying effort lead by the Banja Luka Women’s Association, one of Zhene Zhenama’s partner NGOs, succeeded in criminalizing domestic violence in 2001.

II.a.3 Zhene Zhenama NGO Development and Support:
Starting in 1997, Zhene Zhenama made it a priority to cooperate with CBOs in rural and strongly nationalistic parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate the development of communal civil society. Through the NGO Development and Support program its goals included: supporting the revival of civic institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the growth of the Bosnia-Herzegovina NGO sector’s legitimacy; networking among activists dedicated to peace and the development of civil society; the transformation of cultural mentalities; the establishment of a multi-ethnic society; awareness building of women’s issues; and the development of women’s leadership (Zhene Zhenama, 1997b).

The project was highly ambitious, promoting values that were far from the post-war reality of 1996-1997. Nationalist political parties were still in power, few war criminals had been arrested, and displaced persons’ attempts to return to their homes were met with hostility
and violence. Relations between people belonging to different national groups were frozen and communications broken. Almost no multi-ethnic NGOs or CBOs were present outside the main Federation cities. Whatever initiatives operated worked in isolation. Eastern RS particularly suffered from a deep information blockade. Yet it was precisely in this region – Brcko, Visegrad, Foca/Srbinje, Zvornik – that Zhene Zhenama implemented its project.

The NGO Development and Support project was essentially educational, consisting of a series of workshops targeting potential activists interested in learning more about NGO development. From April 1997 to October 2001, sixteen 2-3 day seminars were organized in various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The workshops addressed three main themes: the role of NGOs and civil society; peace building and non-violent conflict resolution, and how to organize as women. The methodology employed was highly interactive. Workshops were led by Zhene Zhenama staff, often with the assistance of expert trainers from women’s organizations based in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia. From 1999 onwards Zhene Zhenama used the workshops to encourage a group of twelve women from local NGOs to develop their skills as trainers and facilitators. In each workshop one or several of these “trainees” would lead a session to perfect her skills. Whenever possible, workshops assembled participants belonging to different national groups.

Five years after the start of the program approximately thirty-six new local NGOs and CBOs were registered by former participants of the NGO Development and Support workshops. For Zhene Zhenama, the development of the civil society groups in new regions simplified the organization’s own tasks. Relationships between governmental officials and NGO representatives improved in many “closed” communities. Part of this was due to a gradual diminishing of the powers of criminal nationalist elements. But it was also because of an increased awareness among government officials about the role of civil society; as government authorities attended NGO Development and Support workshops they gradually understood the potential for NGOs to serve as partners and not uniquely as rivals.
II.a.4 Zhene Zhenama's Community Level Conflict Resolution programs:

In Spring, 2001, Zhene Zhenama in cooperation with the Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (DRA: 2000) began implementation of a community level conflict resolution project. The project (DRA: 2000) had the aim of "rebuilding a multi-ethnic society [...] to encourage dialogue between different stakeholders in the target areas. This project emphasizes the understanding of reconciliation as a form of community building." The merging between Zhene Zhenama and DRA was effective as the latter had experience in physical reconstruction, while the former had skills in social reconciliation. DRA was able to provide large scale funding for the project – over 1.5 million DM – but it did not have the staff, expertise or contacts to carry out the project on its own. DRA selected Zhene Zhenama for its institutional strengths, and because of its "excellent psychosocial knowledge and experience in order to conduct conflict resolution workshops and group work in a sensitive and sensible way (Zhene Zhenama, 2001e)."

The community level conflict resolution program was perhaps Zhene Zhenama's most explicit attempt to affect peace consolidation. As in its other programs, Zhene Zhenama held workshops - with groups including, returnees, displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, police, women, and youth. The gatherings opened a space for dialogue about past grievances, for acknowledgement of suffering and for discussion about ways to improve future relations. In these sessions Zhene Zhenama staff played an essential role as moderators and promoters of a sense of "communality" for:

"Reconciliation is difficult without all parties concerned recognizing a shared basis of communality, something on which they agree. Points of view and bases for communality should be produced which so far had not been perceived consciously by the parties involved in the conflict. It is especially the task of the outsider to identify, visualize, and exploit the hidden potential bases for communality (DRA 2000)."

Zhene Zhenama's moderators aimed to encourage workshop participants to talk about common needs, and devise ways to meet them as a community. In its reports, it is clear that Zhene Zhenama was rarely able to reach this point. After a workshop in Foca, the Zhene Zhenama team concluded (2001f):

"The participants of the workshop [...] understand changes but they still don't know how to define their personal roles and wishes. They are squeezed between the traditional pressures of patriarchy, nationalism
Yet in instances where Zhene Zhenama came into contact with groups of people belonging to different national groups who had already identified common problems and were cooperating with each other, the NGO was able to play a greater role. Zhene Zhenama’s contribution consisted of encouraging them, providing an understanding of civil society, facilitating contacts with international donors and government officials, and teaching tactics to influence local decision-making. At the end of one workshop, participants from different national communities all signed a petition requesting the re-opening of a bus line to re-connect their villages, which was sent to local and international authorities (Zhene Zhenama 2001f). The most significant case in which Zhene Zhenama helped institutionalize the long-term sustainability of reconciliation occurred when, after a series of workshops, a Serb and a Bosniak village decided to form a mixed MZ to improve conditions in their environment (Miriana, 21.11.01).

II.b Ghamkhori programs:

Ghamkhori began its activities mainly as a service providing organization – directly assisting primary beneficiaries living in rural areas. It offered access to information on hygiene, health, family rights, women’s rights and community participation. In 1995-1996 when it started its activities, Bahodur (11.06.02) recalled how “one international organization came and provided roofs for houses, another came and gave some flour to the people, another provided medicines, another vaccinations... But no one was educating people. People did not know how to survive or protect themselves.” Ghamkhori carried out tasks that were previously undertaken by state health and education institutions, filling in gaps where Soviet-era state service provision had collapsed. It also addressed serious new health and social problems which were the consequence of the conflict and the post-communist transition. From 1996-2002 Ghamkhori engaged in four main projects that will be described below: the Khatlon Women’s Health Program, community development support, the Women’s Center, and a project on Violence Against Women.
II.b.1 The Khatlon Women’s Health Program:

Ghamkhori started implementing the *Khatlon Women's Health Program* (KWHP) in 1997 bringing information on health and women’s rights to villages in three districts in the Khatlon region and to urban neighborhoods in Kurgan Tuppe. Significantly, though different donors funded KWHP, Ghamkhori implemented the same program with few modifications for over five years. Teams of four teachers (for boys, girls, men, and women) and a midwife weekly visited communities for 6-8 months providing educational sessions in hygiene, reproductive health, family relations and rights, as well as basic medical services and training. KWHP precisely fit the organization’s goal, as defined in the statute, of improving the socio-economic existence of the population by increasing levels of popular knowledge (Ghamkhori, 1999a). KWHP’s secondary objective was to provide local teachers and midwives with interactive teaching and consultation skills.

KWHP was designed to meet needs that had developed in the post-war period in rural areas, due to the extreme decrease in all economic indicators since 1991, destruction of infrastructure, the breakdown of state sponsored social service provision, and a sudden rise in infectious disease. It is useful to describe in detail the conditions of rural populations before the project started:

“Before the start of the project the people in the village did not think much at all about how they lived, about family and interpersonal relationships. On the whole they took for granted the idea that only medical specialists understood matters of health and that it was necessary to use bio-medicine, especially antibiotics and injections to cure most illnesses. The idea of their taking steps to prevent illnesses was also absent. Their knowledge of local traditional medical practices had been largely lost during Soviet times, so that few even knew how to use local herbs and other domestic substances for treating minor problems, such as heartburn or colds. They accepted the idea that younger women and children did not have an independent social existence, that mothers-in-law and husbands had the right both verbally and physically to chastise young wives in order to force them to behave as their marital family dictated. Women put a very low value on themselves, believing themselves to be great sinners and their own needs to be of low importance. There was relatively little discussion between spouses about their relationship or interpersonal relationships between family members as a whole. Male heads of household took it for granted that their own needs should be met before those of the rest of the family and that their opinion was the only one that counted. Even adult sons were rarely consulted.” (Ghamkhori, 1999b)

Though the project sought to initiate a debate on citizens’ rights and responsibilities, it began by addressing less controversial concerns in the fields of health. In choosing this approach the organization focused on building trust, taking into account local mentalities and beliefs. Their positions as professionals and teachers provided Ghamkhori staff with
respect when they entered villages. However as several staff members explained during the
interviews, they were accepted amongst villagers because they “know the psychology of
people in rural areas [...] If you don’t know life in rural areas – you can’t work here
(Dilorom, 30.05.02).” Once trust between Ghamkhori staff and village beneficiaries
solidified, greater emphasis was put on social questions, and “it is found that such questions
are in many ways of greater interest to the villagers, and discussions around them brings
even more improvements to village life (Ghamkhori 2000).”

The second objective of KWHP was to train village medical and educational professionals
in alternative treatments and practices. Ghamkhori sought to assist doctors in making the
transition from Soviet times during which a strong reliance on antibiotics and other
synthetic treatments had developed. Ghamkhori originally encountered resistance from
medical professionals, as the provision of medicines had become doctors’ main source of
income. The practice of selling medicines – which under communism were free – created
significant resentment amongst the population and a decrease in trust in medical
professionals. Ghamkhori midwives who accompanied the teacher teams provided training
to the formal and informal village medical professionals, gynecological examinations,
consultations and contraceptives. After several years of working with medical staff,
Ghamkhori (2000) found that “the project has significantly improved their prescribing and
treatment practices [...] Medical staff finds that the loss of income incurred now that they
rarely provide injections is more than compensated for by the higher number of clients
coming to them.” In addition, in 2002, with the approval of the Regional Department of
Education, KWHP began training groups of teachers in the village in which they worked
“in order to have continuity,” and to assist teachers in increasing their knowledge and
enhance experience sharing (Ghamkhori, 2002b).

KWHP did not directly seek to promote reconciliation between former warring sides, yet
staff was frequently confronted with ethnic divisions in the villages in which it operated.
According to a 1999 project report:

If a small group of villagers from another regional group lives in a village then these people are not made
welcome in the houses of the majority group and we try to provide separate lessons for them when
necessary. At the same time the teaching staff brings up the problem of the ‘ethnic’ divides and tries to
work with the population to resolve these. One way of doing this is to organize focus group discussions. Another way is to arrange joint activities, such as football matches among the young men.” (Ghamkhori 1999b)

In 2002 ethnic tensions remained. As one Ghamkhori staff described (Dilorom, 30.05.02), “I worked in villages where Garmis and Kulyabis lived on different sides. Before the war we were not different. But the war made us different.”

II.b.2 Community development support:

In order to ensure the sustainability of the KWHP, Ghamkhori began in 1999 to support the strengthening of communal civil society organizations - especially mahalla committees. This activity fit within the organization’s overall mission of assisting people find ways to help themselves. By facilitating the development of strong village organizations, Ghamkhori staff encouraged citizens to come together and to address their common problems. Ghamkhori found that in the vast majority of villages citizens were passive and waiting for the government authorities to take steps to improve community life, to organize garbage collection, cleaning of irrigation channels, light repairs of schools and medical points, etc. However as governmental capacities were reduced due to war and transition from socialism, these works were no longer being carried out. Furthermore village level committees could fill a critical gap in local self-governance as according to the Constitution the lowest level of governmental authority was the “jamoat” made up of 5-15 villages.13 As Roy has demonstrated, previously the kolkhoz was largely responsible for local-self governance, but once the kolkhoz disintegrated no village level structures existed to formally represent grass-roots interests (Roy, 2002: 131-145). Ghamkhori staff thus encouraged communities to set up institutions that would be capable of identifying development priorities and organizing voluntary community work on the foundation of the traditional mahallas (Sharbatali, 1.06.02).

The strengthening of mahalla committees could also help nurture community cohesion, tolerance and volunteerism. For example in 2002 when Ghamkhori began working in the village of Chapaev (pop. 4000, Bohktar district) it first organized a meeting in the village

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13 According to the Tajik Constitution, a jamoat is defined as an institution of self-government in towns and villages. The framework for their authority is set forth in the 1994 Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages (Freizer, 2004a)
mosque with villagers and local government officials to identify local problems and needs. Ghamkhori suggested that villagers establish a committee to elect representatives who could work on these problems. The villagers agreed and a committee was set up with fourteen members — including four women. In the first four months of its activities, February-June 2002, the organization cleaned ditches and channels, resolved domestic quarrels and conflicts between families, taught about family planning, and encouraged people to reduce the costs of marriage and funeral ceremonies. It made a list of the 19 most pressing problems and looked for ways to address them with few financial means and active community participation employing hashar, a traditional mechanism of volunteer work. In June 2002, to commemorate the 11th anniversary of Tajik independence, the village committee composed of people of Kulyabi and Gharmis regional background, organized a “Street Day.” According to those present it was the first time in 70 years that the village held an event where Kulybis and Garmis — who live in different parts of the village, attend different mosques, and work in different groups — shared traditions. For Ghamkhori (2002c) staff it was highly successful to see that “people realized that after the war, and all the problems, they could come together and respect each other.”

Initially Ghamkhori (Ghamkhori, 1999) management admitted that staff found it difficult “to bring the villagers in as stakeholders in the project rather than as mere participants.” By 2001-2002 Ghamkhori had taken on a facilitator role and placed community development at the center of the KWHP. It introduced the concept of community activism as soon as it started planning for KWHP in a village. If villagers expressed an interest in setting up a community group that could represent them, Ghamkhori staff facilitated the organization of elections. Thereafter Ghamkhori staff worked on a weekly basis with the elected community to increase their management and organizing skills and collect their inputs for better KWHP implementation.

Ghamkhori facilitators preserved a careful balance between encouraging the village to take responsibility and influencing the process to guarantee female and minority representation in the CBOs. As described in Chapter 2 mahallas in Tajikistan are traditionally run by older

14 Also based on interview with Ghamkhori staff on 31 July 2002, field visit to Chapaev, and viewing of video of Chapaev Street Day.
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men – Aksakals – who tend to favor traditional ways of life and patriarchal systems. Initially it was difficult to ensure female representation in the mahallas, but gradually through dialogue with men and women Ghamkhori convinced both sides (Sharbatali, 1.06.02). The NGO requested that when villagers voted for their mahallas committees “half of their members will be women,” selected amongst “informal women leaders who will help to solve conflict situations connected with the infringement of women’s rights.” As Ghamkhori’s main donor for this project noted (Chris Buckley, 21.05.03), “a key strategy to promote greater representation and influence of marginalized groups, such as women and ethnic groups, is providing formal representation for these groups within a legitimate decision-making structure such as the mahalla committee.

Ultimately, through its community development program Ghamkhori hoped to contribute to the institutionalization of decision making at the village level. The NGO organized in 2002 a conference of mahallas committee leaders with higher level authorities. This opened a forum for mahalla representatives to bring to the government’s attention their problems and solutions. In 2003 Ghamkhori planned to continue with these types of meetings twice a year. The aim was to open an important channel for communities to lobby their concerns with the appropriate authorities, increasing district and regional government’s accountability to village constituencies.

II.b.3 Project for the Reduction of Violence Against Women (PROVAW):

While carrying out KWHP Ghamkhori staff became acutely aware of the widespread incidence of violence against women and the often linked cases of female self-immolation.15 Studies (Falkingham, 2000; WHO 2000; Harris 2000) have identified several causes for the high rate of violence against women including: the country’s traditional patriarchal system, Soviet era perpetuation of stereotypes about male leadership, post-war reversal of roles in the family, male post-war trauma, and women’s lack of knowledge of their rights. The problem of violence against women in Tajikistan was compounded by the

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15 According to a World Health Organization (2000) women in Khatlon reported more experiences of violence compared to women living in other parts of Tajikistan. 42% of those questioned in Khatlon reported having been beaten by their father, mother or relatives in girlhood; 59% were the victim of violence perpetuated by family members in adulthood; and 64% reported experiencing sexual violence by their husbands.
lack of services to assist victims and governmental institutions’ unwillingness to address the issue. Rather than switching the focus of KWHP, Ghamkhori’s management chose in 2001 to create a new program – the Project for the Reduction of Violence Against Women (PROVAW). The program consisted of disseminating in village knowledge about Tajik legislation, the shariat, international women’s rights standards, gender relations and the prevention of violence.

PROVAW aimed to increase women’s awareness about their rights. According to the Medical Director, Mikhail (14.06.02):

"There is a big difference between situations when there is domestic violence and women think that it is something natural, so they don’t even talk about it, and when a woman knows that she has a choice between staying in the family and continuing to suffer, or leaving it. [Through our courses] A woman will know that she can leave, sue her husband or do something else. So she will be able to protect her rights."

As with KWHP, Ghamkhori believed that it is not enough to work with women but that it is necessary to teach all segments of society, men and women, young and old, about women’s rights. Through PROVAW Ghamkhori worked with religious leaders, school teachers and medical staff. The NGO made an agreement with regional religious authorities to organize weekly lessons with local mullahs to study how the Koran addresses women’s rights. Ultimately by cooperating with opinion formers such as religious authorities Ghamkhori sought to change popular notions about violence, making it unacceptable in local communities.

As in the KWHP project, Ghamkhori used lessons and discussions on health to gain trust and find an entry point in villages. This tactic seemed the most strategic, for as Dilorom (30.05.02), a supervisor in the project, noted:

"The psychology of people is structured in a way that means you should not push them immediately. You cannot build trust immediately. [...] In the beginning we address medical themes because health is always a current concern for people. [...] Health is related to violence and will make people interested in our discussions."
The *Ghamkhori* approach was not to openly condemn men perpetuating violence as criminals, but to work with them and gradually teach them that what they are doing is wrong. As Mikhail (14.06.02) explained:

"If a man who beats his wife attends our lessons, then he will begin to think of topics such as gender, equality, women's rights etc. But of course we will never tell the guy: "Hey, you, Petrov or Abdullayev, stand up! Shame on you – you beat your wife! Let us all discuss it and blame him!" We would not do it in the Soviet style. [...] This would be dangerous."

Ghamkhori’s intention was not to reduce the incidence of domestic violence in 2-3 years, or even ten, but to begin a lengthy process of mentality change among men and women concerning the place of violence in the family.

II.b.4 The Women’s Center:

In May 2000, together with four other local women’s organizations based in Kurgan Tuppe, *Ghamkhori* set up a center to provide medical, psychological and legal assistance to women.16 *Ghamkhori* identified the need for a women’s center when in the context of KWHP women came forward with accounts of psychological and physical trauma (Malika, 09.05.02). For many women it was the first time they had spoken about these issues. Women had nowhere to go to for support. They did not trust governmental institutions, the militia, lawyers, medical professionals or the judiciary. When they did seek these bodies’ assistance they often found them un-responsive. Like the founders of *Zhene Zhenama’s* Center, *Ghamkhori* aimed to create a place where all women regardless of background would feel welcome. Women who visited the center explained that this was one of the positive contributions that the Center made: “here we are all equal. You don’t divide us into rich and poor, or rural and urban, educated or illiterate, Uzbek or Tajik. From you we feel that we are all simply women and we have even learned to change our attitudes to ourselves (Ghamkhori 2001).”

Compared with *Zhene Zhenama’s* Women’s Center, *Ghamkhori’s* was more specifically designed to assist women with legal aid, psycho-social, and medical counseling. However,

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16 By 2002 only one other organization in addition to *Ghamkhori* was involved in the project. *Mehrangen* established several micro-credit groups at the center, providing counseling and advice to women on how to start small businesses.
like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ghamkhori's staff had to overcome traditional and social stereotypes critical of publicly speaking about violence. Ghamkhori benefited from the fact that its staff was already present in local communities through the KWHP and PROVAW. To further build trust, the Center offered a range of services. As the Center's manager (Mavjud 11.06.02) justified, "If a woman will say that she is going to an obstetrician, her husband will let her go. But if she tells him that she is going to a lawyer or to a psychologist, her husband will tell her to stay at home. It is hard for us to get a woman out of her house. For that we need obstetricians." On average seventy women visited the center daily in 2002. Generally the women who came started by seeking help from gynecologists, and only later approached the Center's psychologists or lawyers.

The Center offered free legal assistance and representation; the largest percentage of cases concerned divorce, child support and/or property separation. Many of the cases brought to the Center's lawyers involved women who were unofficial second or third wives. The Center's lawyers succeeded in increasing awareness about women's rights and in making judicial authorities more sensitive to the protection of women's rights in divorce cases. In 2001 the Center's lawyers won six cases, in the first six months of 2002 seventeen cases were won. This was significant in an environment in which the legal system was under-resourced, members of the judiciary were frequently subject to threats and bribery; and in practice violence against women perpetuated at home was not penalized. According to Ghamkhori staff, "Before it never happened. In order to win a divorce case a woman had to have a lot of money or an important position. [...] Women even didn't know where to apply, or how to apply. They did not know that they could actually win a case" (Women's Center staff, 30.05.02).

Starting in 2001, Ghamkhori began to cooperate with governmental officials, offering workshops to staff from the ministry of internal affairs, fire brigades, the National Security Committee on gender relations and domestic violence. When Ghamkhori staff learned of serious violations of women's rights it also cooperated with local authorities to address the problem. Bahodur (30.05.02) depicted how,

17 Amongst 147 women who took part in psycho-social counseling from May-December 2001 forty two spoke about violence inflicted upon them by their husbands. Another 21 spoke about violence carried out by
"If there is violence against a woman in this village and this woman comes to the women's center, then we contact the governmental sector. We contact the Jamaot, the Aksakals, women leaders from this village who can protect this woman, and we contact the community police officer. If a husband every day [...] gets drunk and comes back home and beats his wife, then we contact the community police officer to deal with this problem, and he starts working on it together with the police."

In its strategy to diminish violence against women, Ghamkhori thus not only tried to increase awareness of the problem, but also to change government policies and practices – encouraging them to more readily react against violations of women’s rights. As of 2000 Ghamkhori also actively disseminated information on the Women’s Center, gender issues, and violence against women through mass media (Malika, 09.05.02).

Ghamkhori’s Women Center did not initially hold the kind of consciousness raising workshops that Zhene Zhenama did to increase female participation in political life. Partially this is because the needs in Kurgan Tuppe were different. In Sarajevo, by 2002, there were several NGOs supporting women victims of violence; the first Bosnian women’s shelter was established in 2001 whereas no such institution existed in Tajikistan. Ghamkhori in 2002 could not rely on a women’s rights network of support to engage in more targeted advocacy or training of women. However Ghamkhori (2002d) gradually became engaged in new forms of awareness raising – for example organizing a commemoration of the International Day Against AIDS in 2002 with local authorities, school teachers, NGO representatives and media coverage, and a roundtable on violence with similar participants.

II.c  Contrasts and similarities between Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s programs:
As theorists of liberal civil society would predict Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori engaged in service provision to carry out activities that were either provided by the government in previously, or to meet new post war needs. They concentrated on providing non-material assistance, particularly information, education, community-mobilizing facilitation, psychosocial and legal counseling. At times the methods they employed – based on Western European practices – were rejected by potential beneficiaries. Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs (1997: 185) have argued with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina that this is because the new

their female in-laws – a culturally acceptable form of domestic violence in Tajikistan (Ghamkhori, 2001).
methods had more to do with fashion than actual needs. Yet in other instances new methodologies were welcomed as innovative. The three positive characteristics, which the NGOs possessed to carry out these activities effectively, were professional skills, knowledge of local culture and behavior, and commitment of staff. Most importantly perhaps they succeeded in gaining the trust of their beneficiaries – which argues against the notion that when an NGO staff is middle class its ability to interact with rural beneficiaries will necessarily be limited. Ghamkhori's staff subtly encouraged women’s rights protection in highly patriarchal environments, as Zhene Zhenama taught tolerance in extremely rationalistic villages.

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori did not meet the full expectations of liberal civil society where civil society is described as well placed to check “potential abuses of power” (Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997: xxxi) or to “counterbalance the state” (Gellner, 1994: 5). When they interacted with government officials it was to offer them training and information, rather than to lobby for specific interests. Only rarely did Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori engage in the form of advocacy, defined “as the pursuit of change in policy and practice for the benefit of specific individuals or groups of people (Roche, 1999: 192).” Rather their interventions fit within another understanding of advocacy, which emphasizes the “civil society dimension.” According to this definition (Covey 1998 cited in Roche, 1999: 199) advocacy should strengthen the institutional base for citizen political action; nurture informed grassroots participation; and contribute to an inclusive political culture and public resolution of conflict through peaceful means. Through their community development programs Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama fulfilled these tasks, working in close cooperation with communal civil society, to close the gap between liberal and communal civil society, and bringing ordinary citizens closer to the political process. They also crucially increased the institutional base for female participation in public life by facilitating greater women’s’ representation in communal decision-making structures – at the mahalla level in Tajikistan and at the municipal/republic level government in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s engaged in a variety of programs and employed different tactics. Gidron, Katz, Hasenfeld (2002: 181) similarly find that in their post conflict case
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studies "most of the P/CROs adopted an eclectic tactical approach, utilizing more than one strategy." The authors described six tactics that P/CRO employed most frequently: public education, service, bridging, lobbying, protests and research. Zhene Zhenama pursued all six tactics to various degrees; while Ghamkhori focused on the first four, undertaking minimal research, and no protests. As Gidron, Katz, Hasenfeld discovered in their cases, the two NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan "preferred a specific mix of tactics based upon the unique interests, skills, beliefs of the P/CRO leaders and members, and the tactics that were known and available within each region" (2002: 181). Protest was an example of such a tactic, legally and politically acceptable in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but more harshly repressed in Tajikistan in 2002.

Korten (1990) provides a generational model of organizational development to explain why some forms of liberal civil society engage in social services while others focus on advocacy. As predicted by Korten, Ghamkhori began its work focussing on relief and welfare. By 2001 it had started to more forcefully engage in community development. In 2002 it was beginning to think about its potential to affect changes in the institutional and policy context, in the field of domestic violence prevention for example, thus entering the "third generation" of its development. Ultimately Korten speaks about a "fourth generation strategy" where NGOs join wider alliances and networks to engage in global developments. Arguably Zhene Zhenama began its activities at this level as its three founders were integrated in an extensive women and antiwar transnational network during the war and thereafter. Nuna, Jadranka and Selma continued this level of engagement through Zhene Zhenama advocating for an improvement of women's plight in Afghanistan and Kosovo. When Zene Zernama began its activities it was committed to service provision, as well as facilitating changes in the institutional and policy context, which would have placed the NGO in Korten's first and third "generations." Zhene Zhenama's case thus demonstrate the limitations of this linear model to explain what tactics liberal civil society groups employ. It indicates the importance of taking into account the experiences and ideology of individual NGO leaders and staff when predicting an organization's strategic evolution. From its inception Zhene Zhenama had the characteristics of a "first," "third" and "fourth generation" organization.
III. NGO linkages

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori operated in close symbiosis with their environment and the linkages they had contributed significantly to their effectiveness. In general one of the key advantages that NGOs are believed to have over other actors is their relationships with the communities in which they operate (Ball with Halevy, 1996: 90). Aall (2000: 134) finds that in conflict and post-conflict situations, "because of their long-standing relationships with the local community, NGOs possess valuable information [...] They see their long-term success as dependent on good and open relationships." According to Prendergast and Plumb (2002:329) these linkages provide local NGOs with a "deep contextual understanding of barriers and opportunities to making peace at the local level. [...] They are also likely to be better equipped to understand the needs of the community and more sensitive to cultural norms." Described below are the multiple linkages which Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori managed with local communities, international organizations, government and the media.

III.a Zhene Zhenama's linkages:

In 2001 Zhene Zhenama had an extensive web of linkages of various intensity and importance represented below in a Venn diagram (Roche, 1999: 178). The diameter of the circle indicates the significance of the relationship and the overlap the intensity.
Building linkages across the former Yugoslavia was one of Zhene Zhenama’s key contributions to the political project of breaking down barriers based on nationalism and exclusion. In 1997 freedom of movement within the country did not exist, and people living in the Federation and the RS were not in contact. Women activists were one of the first groups to meet across front lines – in 1996 two large scale women’s conferences were organized in Sarajevo and Zenica with the specific goal of reuniting women. Zhene Zhenama focused first on bringing women from different ethnic groups together in Sarajevo. Subsequently the organization sought access to communities – in Eastern RS and Western Herzegovina especially – that continued to be isolated in the post-war period.

Zhene Zhenama’s tactic to gain entry within isolated closed off communities was to build links around small issues and personal favors. Initially much of the organization’s work in Eastern RS and Herzegovina consisted of little more than small informal gatherings. Nuna (23.11.01) remembered how her first trips to Foca or Zvornik “opened personal contacts. Someone always asked, can you help me with this, or that?” Three years later “my organization is now benefiting from what I did for these women individually.” Ultimately these “cross-cutting ties based on trust and reciprocity between organized individuals” (Lewis, 2001: 147) contributed to breaking down barriers set up by exclusionary nationalist politics. They also provided a means for a representation of liberal civil society, which Zhene Zhenama was, to engage with communal civil society.

Zhene Zhenama staff provided mainly emotional and personal support as friendship ties developed and trust was built. The NGO also taught communications and relationship-building skills. Mirzeta (26.03.01), one of the activists with whom Zhene Zhenama worked from 1998 onwards in Brcko, recalls how Nuna offered essential support when:

“At one point there was a situation when women from a very radical party tried to undermine what we were doing. They were trying to divide women of different nationalities who had established good contacts. At that time it was necessary to react. I immediately called Nuna and told her ‘I am afraid that our organization is going to split up. It’s the aim of some people in Brcko.’ Nuna very quickly reacted, and after that came here every month. Her trainings are not only about skill development […] Thanks to Nuna, and to ourselves of course, we are today what we are […] I am an explosive woman, but with Nuna I learned for the first time to be a real listener. Through the seminars I learned first how to listen,
Two and a half years after Zhene Zhenama began to meet women activists in Brcko, they registered their own group called the Women’s Association “Roundtable Brcko.” In the deeply divided town, the new NGO’s goals were to understand the 1992-1995 war, strengthen women in politics, engage in conflict resolution, and support women in rural areas.18

Due to its extensive linkages across Bosnia-Herzegovina Zhene Zhenama could serve as an information bridge. In “closed regions” of the country, Zhene Zhenama’s Sarajevo based staff provided news and objective testimonies to persons who for years had been living under an information blockade. Zhene Zhenama collected information on parts of Eastern RS to share with displaced persons from those regions currently living in Sarajevo and considering return. Through its contacts with SFOR, Zhene Zhenama insured that some of the communities in which it worked obtained basic infrastructure rehabilitation. The Federal Ministry of Social Issues and Displaced Persons accompanied Zhene Zhenama staff to carry out needs assessments of returnees in Eastern RS, and on several occasions the NGO successfully turned to the Ministry for help. Information “from the field” was of great value when Zhene Zhenama sought to lobby authorities based in Sarajevo – it also helped the organization increase its legitimacy and status of “experts.”

Within Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia, Zhene Zhenama contributed to a deepening of women’s rights and peace networks that existed before and during the 1992-2000 wars. Zhene Zhenama’s engagement spanned three distinct geographic areas: Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia. The networking strategy gradually evolved from 1996. As Nuna (23.11.01) recollected:

“In 1996 networking meant [finding a way] to bring the experiences of women from Croatia and Serbia, in other words Yugoslavia, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. [It meant finding the mechanisms] to mobilize organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for then there were only individual groups and no one network at the Bosnia-Herzegovina level existed. In Serbia and Croatia those networks existed and we wanted to bring that model here […] We tried to bring models of women working in partnership to Bosnia and

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18 Interview with members of the Brcko Roundtable, Mara Kokanovic and Almirja Petrovic, in Brcko on 26.03.2001.
Nuna, Jadranka, and Selma’s engagement in global networks continued to expand through cooperation on women’s rights, inter-national/ethnic dialogue, and trafficking issues. When in 1998 refugees from Kosovo started to arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zhene Zhenama responded with humanitarian aid and psycho-social assistance. In 2000-2001 when tensions were boiling in Macedonia, Zhene Zhenama trained local activists there in conflict resolution and civil society development. After 1996 women networking in the former Yugoslavia became more formalized with the establishment of Living Waters/Zive Vode (since 1996); the STAR Economic Network for Bosnia-Herzegovina (1999); the RING anti-trafficking network (2000); and the organization of high profile events such as the 2002 Women’s Peace Caravan. As assumed in the literature on international liberal civil society, these networks facilitated the promotion of women’s rights and provided a voice to women throughout the former Yugoslavia. However the extension and “professionalization” of these linkages created their own tensions. Zhene Zhenama’s management argued that the networks were all too often “captured” by the international organizations that funded them to meet their own needs and goals.

Furthermore the networks did not increase Zhene Zhenama’s effectiveness in holding international multilateral institutions accountable as the literature predicts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, governed by an international “semi-protectorate,” managing linkages with bodies such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations was of key importance to affect political change. Zhene Zhenama attempted to build linkages with these international organizations, employing its habitual strategy of forging personal contacts. Though this tactic succeeded in some instances, and Zhene Zhenama cooperated extensively with OHR, OSCE and the UN, the ties proved fragile. One possible explanation is related to the IOs’ own short institutional memory and high staff turnover. Yet the causes of the weak ties between Zhene Zhenama and international organizations were also political. As other analysts have found, key international agencies failed initially to include gender, women’s rights or cooperation with women peace activists in their peace consolidation strategy (Cockburn, Stakic-Domuz, Hubic, 2001: 155). They also did not consider NGOs and civil
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society activists as serious partners in policy making, preferring to dialogue with governmental officials, generally nationalists who had gained influence during the war (Pugh 1998; Duffield 1999). Only after 1999 did the OHR and the OSCE shift their strategy – including women and women’s issues in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe process, and supporting their pre 2000 election activities for example (Chinkin and Paradine, 2001: 170-172).

Zhene Zhenama did not have the direct contacts with Bosnia-Herzegovina governmental authorities that have been understood as being essential to liberal civil society activism. Over time connections between Zhene Zhenama and the state improved but they tended to be of a personal nature, rather than institutionalized. From 1992-2000, when nationalist politicians controlled virtually all levels of government, multi-national NGOs had little interest in cooperating with them. As in other former socialist countries, suspicion between NGOs and government was strong, and NGOs lacked legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of governmental officials (Cockburn, Stakic-Domuz, and Hubic, 2001: 171-173; Brown, 1998: 232). Ultimately, political factors influenced state attitudes to NGOs as they have elsewhere (Lewis, 2001: 150). Zhene Zhenama’s relations with the state improved after the election of the non-nationalist Alliance for Change in 2000, as did overall contacts between NGOs and government. In 2000 one prominent municipal official (Kuslugic, 20.03.01) noted that “what we need now is for the new government and the activists to turn from a supplementary role to a complementary role: public/private partnership.” Zhene Zhenama’s contacts were best with Sarajevo canton and municipal authorities that it lobbied over issues such as domestic violence, trafficking and minority return. As Selma (15.11.01) related, “we cannot always influence their decision, but we can give them another insight based on our information.”

Like with governmental authorities, Zhene Zhenama’s relations with local media gradually improved – especially after the 2000 elections. As one staff member (Danijela, 14.11.01) described

“Whenever we do something we try to ensure that its covered by the media [...] if you tell them that it is something concerning feminism they don’t want to cover it because they think its anti-men. But
now we are trying to explain feminism as something new, like civil society, and step by step place that word and the theory in people's minds."

Thus, according to Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 205), Zhene Zhenama could measure its impact on social change by analyzing the extent to which it was "gaining the status of a regular media source whose interpretations are directly quoted."

III. b Ghamkhori's linkages:

Ghamkhori's relationships with local communities significantly contributed to its success in carrying out effective programs. Unlike most NGOs who first attempt to cement their position in cities and then branch out to regions, Ghamkhori started its activities in the rural districts, only four years later establishing its women's center in Kurgan Tuppe. However its linkages with more distant partners based in Dushanbe or outside Tadjikistan were much weaker. Ghamkhori's web of contacts could be depicted as follows, with the smaller circles representing stronger and more intensive contacts:

![Diagram of Ghamkhori's linkages]

Ghamkhori's relations with local communities were significant due to their breadth, intensity, depth and duration. It was committed to developing a deep and long lasting relationship with communal forms of civil society. Staff worked with all members of the community – young and older, men and women – rather than specific target groups. Management firmly believed that though one of its main goals was to improve the status of rural women, it could not be accomplished unless the entire community – including men - was involved. The director (Bahodur, 29.05.02), explained the necessity of including men as follows:
"For example if Mavjuda works with Malika, and Malika is beaten by me, her husband, if you will continue working only with Malika, but not with me, then I will continue beating her. That is why Ghamkhori starts working with boys and girls from the age of 7. [...] After our lessons with boys their opinion changes. Both men and boys change their opinions."

Through KWHP and PROVAW staff met with community members weekly for eight months. Subsequently Ghamkhori maintained informal contacts.

Past studies of NGOs have warned that when organizations are too deeply embedded in the communities in which they operate they risk being co-opted by local elites (Goodhand and Chamberlain, 2000: 91, 98; Roy, 2002: 142). Yet Ghamkhori understood local power structures and appeared able to draw on this authority without being co-opted by it. The NGO gained community trust by operating non-confrontationally, respecting traditional cultural and social norms. Ghamkhori staff appropriated rural accents and modes of dress to appear less threatening. One of the main functions of the mid-wife in Ghamkhori's rural teams was to build confidence: while husbands may not have understood why they should allow their wives out of the house to attend a teachers' "class," they would have difficulty denying his wife access to a female medical professional. Ghamkhori understood the importance of cooperating with traditional and de-facto community leaders that were part of communal civil society. This could be interpreted as cowing to patriarchal and inequitable power structures. Yet the NGO found that explaining their work to local religious leaders, collective farm presidents, mahalla heads, and other informal community leaders significantly facilitated their tasks. In some instances local leaders themselves chose to participate in Ghamkhori activities.

Initially like Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori failed to develop effective contacts with government. As Howell and Pearce have argued, "for most new social organizations in Central Asia the key challenge has been survival in a context where [...] national and local government officials are suspicious of their purposes and activities (2001: 199)." Ghamkhori was not immune to this problem. Ghamkhori sought to work without governmental support and found that:
"It was very difficult. Many people did not understand us. District heads were saying things like: ‘What are you doing on my land? Why don’t you provide humanitarian aid? What are you bringing?... You are teaching girls about sex!’ Yes they were saying that. They were also saying that we try to convince people to believe in Christianity, not Islam (Mikhail, 25.05.02)"

Initially the organization benefited from the ties of the Manager of the Medical Program, Mikhail, who had worked in the governmental sector and had links with city and regional authorities. Closer cooperation with the Kurgan Tuppe Hukumat (government) began at the end of 1998, when Ghamkhori developed a strategy to increase awareness of its activities. When starting a new project it informed all levels of government up to the regional Hukumat of its intentions, obtaining written confirmation of governmental support at each stage (Bahodur and Mikhail, 14.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02). By applying this strategy scrupulously, the NGO attained effective working relations with The Ministry of Health, the Hukumat of the Khatlon region, hospitals, The Ministry of Education, district Hukumats, and rural Jamoats. Ghamkhori staff had little interaction with Republican level authorities, though Colette maintained communication with health authorities in Dushanbe until her departure in 2000 (Harris, 28.06.03).

As in other instances there was a shift in NGO-State relations. The state began to “see the potential for NGOs to broaden the development services under an overall guiding hand from government” and to understand that “the government may benefit from resulting public gratitude and approval (Lewis, 2001).” Filling gaps in state health and educational service provision, engaging in selective collaboration with Educational and Health Departments, Ghamkhori gradually was perceived by governmental authorities as an ally. Ghamkhori made little attempt from 1997-2002 to become directly involved in policy formulation. However it maintained contacts with specialized governmental institutions – assisting them with the provision of data. In 2001-2002 Ghamkhori began to carry out public actions with the support of the local government on topics such as violence against women, AIDS, and drug abuse.

Ghamkhori also worked with religious authorities to develop common approaches, to address some of the sensitive issues it was raising, which would be in accordance with the Koran. Some observers may argue that integrating religious and spiritual values is antithetical to a NGOs modernizing project, yet it also provided an opportunity to form
alliances with an influential social actor. Starting from 1998 Ghamkhori cooperated with several mullahs (religious leaders) and the regional Religious Committee. After 2000, the regional Religious Committee invited Ghamkhori to provide lectures in Kuran Tuppe’s medressa on family relations, marriage, rights within the family, etc. As community members generally have confidence in religious leaders, Ghamkhori occasionally invited them to participate in their village sessions.

Ghamkhori’s ties with NGOs, and international organizations, based in other parts of Tajikistan and abroad, were its weakest link; and it did not use it as a source of political or advocacy support. Until 2000 Colette Harris had regular contacts with international organizations present in Dushanbe and abroad. After she left, the organization’s links became informal and ad-hoc. Ghamkhori partnered with international organizations for funding purposes but did not look at them as sources of political support as the literature on liberal civil society would assume. Staff rarely participated in international conferences in Dushanbe or outside Tajikistan. Within the NGO sector, Ghamkhori tended to work as an independent unit, rarely developing alliances with other groups. Ghamkhori’s management had little sense of the organization’s position within a larger NGO sector. Partly the weak links could be explained by Ghamkhori’s lack of technical abilities (email, internet, good phone lines). Ghamkhori did not have sufficient personnel with English language skills, comfortable and confident in networking, to do so internationally. Nevertheless the management of Ghamkhori considered that it was important to increase contacts with other organizations to gain information on new methodology and approaches in the fields of health, education, psychology, law, etc.

III.c Comparing Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s linkages:

The findings above appear to confirm the widespread assumption that the greatest comparative advantage that local NGOs have over other organizations operating in post-war environments is their contacts with local communities, understanding of grassroots level needs and sensitivity to cultural norms. However, writing about NGOs in Tajikistan, Roy (2002: 142) argues that staff trying to affect change in popular norms, values and public engagement are faced with a difficult “predicament.” He argues that “they can have an impact on the traditional social context only if they play by its rules – which puts them
at odds with the values and agenda of their employing institutions.” Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama staff appear to have overcome this challenge not by overtly rivaling local norms and beliefs, but gradually through dialogue and information dissemination transforming them. The staff of the two organizations engaged communal civil society with calculated sensitivity, and not with the persuasive power of material assistance provision.

Even though liberal civil society is expected to open a dialogue with government, as past studies on NGOs in post-conflict and post-communist contexts have found (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 329), Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama initially faced large-scale challenges in establishing their legitimacy with government. This condition was exacerbated by international organizations’ tendency in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan to present NGOs as an alternative to governmental authority, and to favor the most vocal and critical groups (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 202; Duffield 1999: 139-141). Nevertheless, over time Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s improved NGO-government cooperation through “gap filling” and “selective collaboration” (Lewis, 2001: 150). Offering effective services was important to gain credibility, as was networking between and among different government services. After five years of building linkages, Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s relationship with government was transformed. As predicted by Smith (1998: 222), “by acting as important gap-fillers and troubleshooters, NPOs shore up social stability, head off potential unrest, and sometimes pave the way for governments to learn better techniques of reaching isolated regions or marginalized groups.” Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s experience supports the argument that NGOs “may represent an important bridge between the people and the state by communicating local needs to the government and reducing the prince’s monopoly over the flow of information (Goodhand with Chamberlain, 2000: 101).”

Though international organizations often took the place of government structures as the designers and implementers of policy in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, neither Zhene Zhenama nor Ghamkhori actively lobbied them to affect policy change. In Ghamkhori’s case this could be explained by its weak links with international civil society. However in Zena Zena’s situation it demonstrated the difficulty of lobbying international organizations when these actors do not perceive NGOs as being serious partners.

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As Kaldor (2003: 11) predicted Zhene Zhenama had the advantage of extensive linkages with international civil society, which provided the necessary space to break out of the exclusionary environment that existed in war and post-war time Yugoslavia. The civil society networks that Zhene Zhenama participated in, through their contacts with advocacy networks and international media, campaigns for women’s rights and a multi-national Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributed to keeping global attention on these issues. However problems of “ownership” of the networks and questions concerning its effectiveness at transforming the policies of multilateral institutions based in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained. Ghamkhori did not benefit from the same links partly because globalization’s impact – and its basic communication and transportation tools - did not extend sufficiently to Tajikistan.

IV. NGO structures and funding

During their first five years Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori faced a host of challenges in developing their organizational structures and funding base as the literature on not-for-profit and NGO management predicts. Groups that develop in war or post-war periods face additional challenges according to several observers. Ball (1996: 91) argues that in post-war contexts “many local NGOs do not have the managerial or substantive capacity to play a major role in designing or implementing programs.” Fundraising in post-war environments tends to be a key problem for local NGOs (Aall 2000; Minear and Weiss, 1995: 195). Groups are largely dependent on foreign support, which is based on erratic criteria and geographic priorities (Valderrama in Pearce, 2000: 27).

IV.a Zhene Zhenama’s organizational structures:

When Zhene Zhenama was founded it had a small staff; its organizational structure was informal and non-hierarchical. The office and the Women’s Center were located in the same three-bedroom downtown flat. Decisions were more likely to be made around the kitchen table than at staff’s desks. Zhene Zhenama’s budget in early 1998 was under $35,000 and its activities were mainly confined to Sarajevo. Korten (1987: 155) argues that this is a common starting point for groups like Zhene Zhenama whose formation was based on the efforts of a small number of women who “have relied upon high moral purpose,
good will, hard work and common sense to make them successful […]. [In these cases] the application of effective professional management techniques […] has not been seen as relevant.” By 1999-2000 the organization had begun to change and formalize. An organizational structure dividing staff into different teams – management, administrative-financial, and project teams – was put into place. Nuna, Jadranka and Selma became the members of the management team, with responsibilities for personnel and financial management, fundraising, communications with partners and donors, program development, and strategic planning. Working contracts and official office hours were established (Zhene Zhenama, 1999b). In 2001 the office moved to a modern new building (where there was no longer an office kitchen) which it shared with other rights-based NGOs.

Though formalization has often been seen as the natural outcome of organizational development (Korten, 1990), it could also be considered as being in conflict with Zhene Zhenama’s identity as a feminist organization. The establishment of formal structures was a difficult process, full of questioning and self-doubt. The leadership and staff disagreed over the advantages of maintaining the loose informal character of Zhene Zhenama as an activist group, and establishing a more vertical organizational structure. It was generally assumed that structure and management style was undistinguishable from the NGO’s mission and vision. As a conflict resolution organization, decision making should be based on consensus and reflection. Describing how she envisioned her organization’s development Nuna (27.11.01) explained, “I did not want specialized women and specialized domains of work […] I chose to build an organizational model that would show that different women could work together with a common mission.” Zhene Zhenama’s founders tried to establish a consensus-based egalitarian structure, in which decision-making was transparent. It aimed to function employing what Alter (1998: 259) terms the “distinctive characteristic of feminist organizations.”

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19 Alter (1998: 259) adds that feminist organizations “are non hierarchical and function by means of processes that attempt to serve nondifferentiation, collaboration amongst all members, and equal attention to means and ends.”
However three factors opposed themselves to Zhene Zhenama's feminist organizational project: the NGO's strong leadership; members' and staff lack of commitment; and the increased complexity of tasks carried out by the group.

In theory it has been argued that "given their rejection of hierarchy and holistic orientation, feminist organizations operate ideally without leadership," based on membership or staff consensus (Alter, 1998: 265). However, as Cockburn notes in her study of eight Bosnian women's organizations, they "often found difficulty in activating this principle (Cockburn, Stakic-Domuz, Hubic 2001: 133)." Nuna, Jadranka and Selma attempted to distance themselves from positions of authority but failed. Decisions concerning programs were made in weekly meetings between the management and project teams – but the management team most often represented the organization in public, was responsible for resource management, and was looked upon as the source of authority by staff. Going against feminist theory, Zhene Zhenama was in fact led by three charismatic leaders. Zhene Zhenama thus fit Carroll's model of effective service delivery and participatory organizations headed by strong, charismatic managers with "extraordinary vision and personal commitment [...] where strong central leadership has been essential to the survival and strength of these organizations (Carroll, 1992: 92)."

Initially Zhene Zhenama's founders hoped to create an organization in which staff would be free to determine their level of engagement in the organization. They estimated that the staff's level of "commitment" (Alter 1998: 261) and dedication to the NGOs mission would provide sufficient impetus to fulfill all organizational tasks. However, as described in the first section of this chapter, many of Zhene Zhenama's staff members joined for self-help or to accompany their friends. Their commitment to the NGOs values was not explicit. Zilha (15.11.01) expressed the majority of the staff's attitude stating, "the management team takes care of everything, space, finances, organization. I have my working hours and I just have to come and work them." Under these conditions management was burdened with ever more tasks and responsibilities. Exhausted, and having given up on the ideal of staff self-motivation, Zhene Zhenama in 2001 transformed: clear job descriptions were drafted and people began to be hired based on merit. Previously Nuna (27.11.01) loathed
adopting a professional hiring procedure “because to me applications are very
discriminatory to women. I don’t like it when twenty women apply and I know that I can
only hire two and the other eighteen will suffer. Applications are professional but they are
not good for women.” In 2001 a highly active but poorly organized administrative secretary
was fired, and replaced by a woman recruited through a newspaper advertisement with little
or no activist experience. For Nuna (27.11.01) especially, it represented a shift to note that
previously “it was my failure not to separate the professional from the private…”

The country’s political transformation and the gradual consolidation of peace also affected
the organization’s formalization. As the country moved into the post-war development
stage popular modes of thinking shifted from the search for ad-hoc solutions to long term
sustainable change. The organization’s leaders’ initial enthusiasm, ambition and ability to
work extreme hours had begun to wane. Zhene Zhenama followed the trend that Gidron,
Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 185) identified in their study where in post-conflict settings
NGOs “have a tendency to formalize their structures over time [...] to develop legitimacy,
mobilize resources, and survive.” Formalization also accompanied the expansion of the
group’s programs. By 2001 Zhene Zhenama’s yearly budget was approximately $150,000.
It had 13 paid staff members, compared with 5 in 1998. Projects were being implemented
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and some staff also participated in activities in other parts
of former Yugoslavia.

One of the fundamental challenges for Zhene Zhenama was the establishment of an
effective structure of governance and oversight. The 1995 Law on Associations of Citizens
under which Zhene Zhenama registered required it to have an Association Assembly. The
law stipulated that NGOs should organize annual Assembly gatherings, but as Jadranka
(27.11.01) admitted “we didn’t have time.” The Assembly was composed in 2001 of a little
over 100 members, who as general supporters, “develop ideas, talk publicly and mobilize
new women to come” to the NGO (Nuna, 14.11.01). Meeting each other at best once every
12 months the members were insufficiently in touch with each other, or with Zhene
Zhenama, to form a responsible governing body. Consequently, in 2001 no actual division

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20 Interview with Zilha Carkadzic.
between the organization's decision-making and implementing structure existed – an overall supervision and oversight body was missing.

**IV.b Zhene Zhenama's funding:**

To fund its activities Zhene Zhenama was some 90% dependent on international donors between 1998-2001. This situation was common in the Bosnian NGO sector. Reliance on foreign funding could be linked to both "supply and demand." On one hand Western governments contributed significant resources to the provision of humanitarian assistance and subsequent post-war reconstruction and development. Indigenous circumstances also explained Bosnian NGOs dependence on foreign funding. No favorable tax legislation for charitable contributions existed. Zhene Zhenama's tolerant and feminist values made it an unlikely recipient of governmental support as long as nationalists were in power. After the social-democratic led Alliance for Change won the 2001 elections, the situation improved slightly with the Sarajevo municipality providing free space for the organization's activities and a small grant. By 2001 Zhene Zhenama was increasingly looking to procure government assistance, anticipating that foreign funders would shortly exit Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The war situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina galvanized women's rights and peace activists throughout Europe and Northern America, who purposively sought to provide funding for multi-ethnic Bosnian initiatives. Zhene Zhenama was able to take advantage of their particular context, and through its connections to international women's rights networks, garnered support from groups who shared many of its values. The first 10,000 DM Zhene Zhenama received in 1996 were from a small group of Swiss women who had befriended Jadranka during her time with Women in Black. The second grant arrived through a US based women's rights activist who lobbied the US Government to fund a large-scale multi-country women's rights project under the name Delphi STAR. Starting in 1998 Zhene Zhenama relied on the Swedish based Kvinna till Kvinna to provide a yearly grant for "Basic activities and outward work with supporting [sic] other organizations"\(^{21}\) and the

activities of the psycho-social team. When Zhene Zhenama developed ad hoc projects to meet pressing needs, Kvinna till Kvinna offered support at short notice. Kvinna till Kvinna's readiness to aid Zhene Zhenama was linked to its own mission and goals. Kvinna till Kvinna was founded in 1993 in Stockholm in reaction to reports about violence against women in the Yugoslav wars, to support women as important forces for change. Rather than being a long established development NGO, Kvinna till Kvinna was a small solidarity group who formed to lobby for foreign funds and political attention for former Yugoslav women's groups. By 2000 Kvinna till Kvinna's funding in Bosnia-Herzegovina extended to eleven smaller women's groups which Zhene Zhenama had helped develop. For all its positive characteristics Kvinna till Kvinna was nevertheless itself dependent on the funds of SIDA – the Swedish government's development agency - and thus could not guarantee Zhene Zhenama long-term assistance. Two of Zhene Zhenama's other donors – the Global Fund for Women and MaMa Cash – private funds run by successful female philanthropists in the US, were in a better position in this regard.

While it is generally assumed that NGOs can benefit from international funding, Zhene Zhenama is one of the most well-respected NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet did not seek out support from any of the larger donors operating in the country such as, the European Commission, USAID, or the Soros Foundation. In part this was because Zhene Zhenama's leaders were conscious of the importance of not reaching a funding level that exceeded its organizational capacities. However Zhene Zhenama was also weary of the way in which the "majority of donors think that we are their subjects. They expect from us that we will do their work" as Nuna (14.11.01) explained, "without having our own thoughts, attitudes and ideas." Selma (15.11.01) took one step further in justifying her refusal to cooperate with governmental donors, deriding not only their practical forms of "partnership" but also their political motivations. She considered that behind governmental funds "there is always

24 In this regards Nuna explained, "I know that when you have lots of funds you have few activities. Because when you have lots of money then everyone wants to get big salaries. If you have less funds – we are a poor organization – we do double the amount of activities we have funds for."
a hidden agenda.” Rather than engage in an indiscriminate funding relationship, Zhene Zhenama carefully chose to partner with “like-minded” groups.

IV.c Ghamkhori’s organizational structures:

From its inception Ghamkhori was different from traditional local NGOs because it was not self-initiated but developed by Dr. Colette Harris (28.06.03), who considered her role to be that of a “facilitator.” She brought together the first five people who started the organization, and with them selected the 12 organization founders who signed the registration forms. She trained staff in inter-active methodology, established the organizational management and administrative system, facilitated contacts with international organizations and donors, and most significantly emphasized the importance of upholding at all times the organizational mission. Colette served as an inspiration and guidance to Ghamkhori, and all the staff who cooperated with her underlined her crucial impact on the organization’s structure, methodology and personnel.

When Colette left Tajikistan in 2000, and Ghamkhori lost a key source of leadership, it would have seemed likely that the organization would weaken due to sudden vacuum in directorship. However, in Ghamkhori’s case several staff members – especially Bahodur and Mikhail – stepped in to fill the void. By 2001 they were responsible for personnel and financial management, communication with partners and donors, and leading program development and strategic planning. However this posed a challenge to Ghamkhori’s identity as a women’s organization for according to feminist practice, “we all prefer to encourage women in leadership positions” as Colette herself noted (21.05.03). Bahodur and Mikhail (14.06.02) recognized that Colette’s departure negatively affected their relationships with donors, and other international organizations, because she had maintained these links but did not adequately hand them over. Characteristics which made it simple for Colette to relate and interact with international donors and policy makers – including language, the shared experience of being a foreigner, recognizable experience and skills – could not be easily transferred to Ghamkhori staff.

Like Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori struggled to maintain a transparent and participatory decision-making structure, which would reflect its ideological commitments. For the Tajik
NGO the main obstacles were social habits and beliefs. In 2001 an organizational structure was established with Bahodur as Director, and four program directors or managers assigned for each of the organizations main activities (medical, Women’s Center, KWHP and PROVAW). These managers/directors had significant independence in organizing their staff, preparing activities, drafting project proposals, and building linkages with national or international partners relevant to the project. Once a week the director and all the managers met. Though consensus was supposed to govern decision-making, the Director was considered by most staff to have the final word. Bahodur (14.06.02) expressed this as a source of frustration:

“[When asked to take a decision] people who work in our organization sometimes answer something like: “I'll go and consult Bahodur first”. So outsiders conclude that Bahodur is a dictator and decides everything here. But [...] I am not here to say what is right and what is wrong. Staff may consult me when they need my help. And in the end [program] manager will come and tell me what they plan to do so that I have this information. But I must emphasize again that no one should come to me and ask: “Can I do this, Bahodur?”

Mikhail (11.06.02) considered that the reluctance of staff to take decisions independently was the consequence of traditional Tajik culture, which places high regard on male leadership, and the heritage of Communist-era vertical decision making. Another negative influence is the practice of international donors who often insist on speaking with the director, instead of other staff members.

Ghamkhori had problems similar to Zhene Zhenama to establish an effective oversight mechanism and board. In 1998-2000 the NGO experimented with setting up a board of experts – made up of influential and respected community members. Ghamkhori management found that these persons lacked free time and were uninterested in serving with little or no financial compensation. After 2000, Ghamkhori management established a board made up of dynamic and committed female staff members, with the Director of the Women’s Center elected as the head. Board meetings were held on average twice a month where staffing, programming, and financing issues were discussed among the seven members. In this structure the line between Ghamkhori’s management, implementing bodies and governing bodies was faint. Bahodur and Mikhail (11.06.02) recognized that establishing an effective board is “the weakest and most difficult part for our organization.” In the long term they hoped to have a board “with people with authority who could lobby
for our interests at the ministerial and government level [...] made up of enthusiasts, people who really want to fight for their society (11.06.02)."

Ghamkhori considered community activists who assisted in project implementation at the local level as its volunteers. They were responsible for determining where the NGOs classes could be held, for gathering people, and for ensuring that people understood Ghamkhori's project. In 2002 there were 19 active volunteers, many of whom were teachers. Bahodur (11.06.02) described a volunteer as:

"firstly a person with initiative. He has the desire to do a part of our work. [...] He alone starts organizing some events. He continues our work in the villages. He implements things that the teacher cannot, because our teachers are new persons, strangers, for the people of the community. But this volunteer lives together with these people. He knows them, and the people of the village will understand him better. After the end of our classes the volunteer usually comes to our office several times. We provide him with the necessary books. We work with him."

Thus the volunteers provided an essential link between Ghamkhori and the local community, and the NGO looked to its volunteers as a way to ensure the sustainability of its projects.

IV. d Ghamkhori funding:

Ghamkhori was similar to Zhene Zhenama in its dependence on international donor support to carry out its projects. From 1997-2002 it received funding from the European Union (TACIS LIEN), ACT-Central Asia, CARE and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Ghamkhori did not collect any membership dues, or receive financial support from the government. In this Ghamkhori was no different from the vast majority of Tajik NGOs. The NGO "demand" for international donor funding in post-war, post-communist Tajikistan, was created by the same factors that explain Bosnian NGOs’ reliance on foreign aid. Nevertheless the “offer” of funding was much less. As predicted by Valderrama (in Pearce, 2000: 27) the amount of foreign support earmarked for Tajikistan was limited by geographic priorities, as well as a lack of political/security interest in the region pre-2001. From this it could be assumed that Tajik NGOs were forced to identify alternative sources of funding. Yet instead a number of registered groups (1,241 according to ICNL in 2002) equal to the number of groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,300 according
to USAID in 2001) competed more intensively to divide a smaller donor pie. Project costs were budgeted significantly lower in Tajikistan than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ghamkhori benefited from a grant of $13,000 from the Swiss Cooperation Office to finance the costs of the Women Center from March 2002 to March 2003 (SCOT, 2002). In comparison Zhene Zhenama obtained $47,604 (71,406 DM) to finance its Women Center in 2001 (Kvinna till Kvinna, 2001).

Ghamkhori's founders and staff could not rely on the sort of connections with international women's rights networks that Zhene Zhenama had to secure its first grants, yet it benefited from Colette's technical expertise and networking skills to obtain funding. In 1997 Ghamkhori obtained its first 5,000 USD grant from Christian Aid whom Colette had developed a relationship of trust with (28.06.03). The KWHP was funded through a TACIS LIEN grant from December 1998 to December 2000 (Ghamkhori 1998). But due to LIEN program guidelines, EU funds had to be channeled through an international organization. Thus in EU documents CARE was named as the "lead NGO" and Ghamkhori the "partner NGO." This relationship where CARE acted as a banking intermediary for the EU and Ghamkhori (who did not have a bank account), provided limited monitoring, and training, eventually proved disadvantageous to Ghamkhori. However the TACIS LIEN project gave Ghamkhori the resources to expand KWHP into two new regions and hire 20 new staff members.26

Ghamkhori found that partnership with international donors – and in particular CARE International – could challenge their mission, programs and sense of self-worth. The NGO's predicament was not uncommon, for as Howell and Pearce have found:

"Many nongovernmental organizations in Central Asia respond to the priorities and interests of donor agencies rather than defining their own institutional identity [...] In the absence of significant alternative

25 A study by ACT (2003) Central Asia categorizes Tajik NGOs according to the level and continuity of funding they have been able to secure. It finds that the first group of NGOs made up of those who have been able to secure long-term funding partnerships with international donor organizations is made up of no more than 25 NGOs. The second group, comprising less than a hundred NGOs, is composed of organizations which have been able to secure funding for different projects relatively consistently. The remaining, vast majority of NGOs, has either never been able to secure a grant or follow up financing after an initial seed-grant.

26 In 2000 Ghamkhori was unable to obtain a second grant from the EC when TACIS temporarily terminated its activities in Tajikistan after its representative was killed in Dushanbe.
In January 2002 Ghamkhori signed a grant agreement with CARE (2002) for $38,636 to implement PROVAW. While earlier co-operation with Care had been excellent, disagreements between the donor and grantee concerning project implementation methodologies surfaced in early 2002. As the funder CARE has ultimate decision-making power; according to the Grant Agreement, CARE could suspend or terminate the grant at any time. Six months into the project, Bahodur and Mikhail (11.06.2002) stated, “we thought that the more projects we have, the better. But when we started working with CARE it really weakened our organisation; we are weaker now then we were a year ago.” In September 2002 Ghamkhori chose to pull out of its agreement with CARE. In refusing to continue, Ghamkhori expressed a readiness to “just say no” to funding opportunities which conflicted with its mission; it chose to respect its own priorities over those of the donor. As Hudock (1999: 110) argues, in shifting the power paradigm to give beneficiaries of development interventions a stronger voice it effectively made a meaningful contribution to civil society development.

Ghamkhori’s funding relationship with Christian Aid, which in 2002 took the name Act-Central Asia, was entirely different. Partly it was because it was not solely project based. Christian Aid was part of a well-established church-based organization whose mission is “to support local organisations, which are best placed to understand local needs [...] and believes in strengthening people to find their own solutions to the problems they face.” It thus shared Ghamkhori’s values and goals. Since 1997 Ghamkhori was able to rely on a yearly grant from ACT Central Asia. It proved to be flexible donor who could rapidly provide funds to meet unexpected needs. After TACIS Lien funding for KWHP ended in winter 2000, ACT Central Asia was able to fill the gap, thus ensuring that the NGO did not have to lay off 20 staff members. ACT Central Asia agreed to not only cover costs directly related to project implementation but also office rent and other overhead expenditures.

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27 The Swiss Government budgeted $563,900 (750,000 CHF) for PROVAW (09/2000 – 02/2002) of which $518,796 (690,000 CHF) were to be provided to CARE International. In this program budget 130,000 CHF were budgeted for “support to service providers and NGOs,” while the rest went to finance CARE’s operations, training and consultants. Swiss “Direktion fur Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, Abteilung fur die Zusammenarbeit mit Osteuropa und der GUS,”(2000).
With funding from various church sources, the financial commitment of ACT Central Asia was significantly more secure than that of many other international donors dependent on governmental monies.

IV.e Comparing Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s structures and resources:
Past NGO studies have emphasized how programming and budgetary increases tend to lead to a formalization of NGO structures. Our cases demonstrate that the overall socio-political context, in post-war environments moving towards peace consolidation, also pushes formalization as society moves out of an emergency, short-term mind-frame, to a more confident mindset about the future. The five factors driving Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s formalization were thus the overall socio-political post-war context, more complex programming, increased economic resources, larger staff and more extensive contacts with external partners – especially international donors. Yet three forces resisting formalization were founders’ and members’ ideological preferences; the organization’s overall mission and goals; and the dominant social cultural norms. As made most clear in Zhene Zhenama’s case, Nuna (27.11.01) resisted rapid formalization because as a strong advocate of women’s rights she considered that “at the heart of feminist ideology is the belief that people can work together for common purposes without resorting to highly structured, pyramidal hierarchy to control internal processes (Alter, 1998: 265).”

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were characteristic of groups with charismatic leaders who struggled to establish effective oversight structures. International donors encouraged the two to set up volunteer boards or governing bodies. Though both made attempts to comply, they found that what was explained to them did not function in practice. Board members sought payment, resisted responsibility, lacked self-initiative, and did not meet. The leaders of Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori claimed that the difficulty of creating boards was largely due to the unfamiliarity with the structure and the concept of volunteerism. The two organization’s experiences support the findings of other studies of NGOs in Southern and Eastern contexts that have found that the volunteer governing body model is not necessarily universal or appropriate in all contexts (Fowler 1997; Hailey and Smillie 2000 in Lewis 2001: 172).

According to the liberal conceptualization of civil society, external funding can strengthen local NGOs. *Zhene Zhenama* operated in an environment in which there was substantially more international funding available than in post-war Tajikistan, yet *Ghamkhori* was just as dependent on foreign donors as the Bosnian NGO was. Both groups’ financial resources came almost entirely from international organizations. Consequently the two organizations suffered from similar problems which previous studies (Duffield, 1996; Smillie, 1996, 1998; Stubbs, 1997; Belloni, 2001; Howell and Pearce, 2001) have found in heavily donor dependant organizations. They were forced into short-term projects, which on average had a one-year implementation cycle, and were impeded from defining longer-term strategies. Fundraising and reporting commitments took time away from project implementation or organizational development. There was little job security for staff – which had neither health insurance nor pensions. When the NGOs had innovative or daring project ideas it was a challenge to find international funds to support them – as donors preferred to support time tested activities with minimal risks. *Zhene Zhenama* and *Ghamkhori* risked becoming victims of “upwards accountability” (Hulme and Edwards, 1997), leading to a decrease in their legitimacy within local communities.

The cases of *Zhene Zhenama* and *Ghamkhori* reveal how different funding arrangements impact NGOs. Though *Zhene Zhenama* and *Ghamkhori* obtained over 90% of their resources from foreign donors they appeared to have successfully avoided the more negative consequences of donor dependency. Both groups expressed a clear preference to cooperate with international organizations that shared their values and ideological commitment such as ACT Central Asia and *Kvinna till Kvinna*. These two donors measured success in terms of their partners’ organization development more than their quantitative project outputs. The greatest difficulties for *Zhene Zhenama* and *Ghamkhori* occurred when they worked with international NGOs, subcontracted by other donors to implement projects in partnership with local groups. This finding reinforces previous arguments warning of the limited benefits of international NGO/ local NGO partnerships when they are not based on common values and agreement about long-term objectives (Beddington and Riddell, 1997; Hudock, 1999: 109-112). *Ghamkhori* and *Zhene Zhenama* benefited most when funding was accompanied by “continual dialogue about objectives and strategies rather than simply
a specification of outputs and targets (Carroll, 1002: 164).” Donors who expressed a commitment to organizational development – providing funds to cover office costs, salaries and other overheads, as well as training, and access to information and external networks were crucial to Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama. Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s experience demonstrates the importance for local NGOs to choose their donors strategically and to have the strength to turn away from them when they feel that their mission is being compromised.

**Conclusions:**
The aim of this chapter was to analyze in detail how the NGOs Zhene Zhenama in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ghamkhori in Tajikistan, operated in their respective post-war contexts, and determine why they acted as they did. The cases provided us with lessons on the nature of liberal civil society in post-conflict, post-communist environments. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were selected as comparable case studies because both focused on women’s issues, were urban based, had been operational for at least five years, and were recognized in their respective countries as highly successful groups. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori represent “best case scenarios” of organizations that have developed in the post-war period, implemented a growing and ever more comprehensive set of programs, obtained increasing amounts of external funding, enlarged their networks and deepened their linkages with governmental and non-governmental partners. Five years after their founding both groups continued, nevertheless, to face challenges in regards to their internal management structures: especially in relation to governance, leadership, and staffing.

Strong and charismatic leadership, clear mission, ability to build trust amongst their beneficiaries, understanding of donor relations, and extensive linkages helped ensure Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s success in a post-war post communist environment. Even though middle class professionals managed them, both organizations made conscious efforts to bridge gaps existing between communal and liberal civil society. They engaged with communal civil society, presenting their values in ways that would be accepted in more traditional and isolated environments. The quantity of funds available in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina for NGO support did not affect NGOs’ dependency on external donors which in both countries was at least 80%. Foreign funding was essential to
the survival of Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori, but by cooperating with donors that shared their values the two NGOs avoided some of the more negative consequences of donor accountability. Writing about NGOs in Central Asia, Howell and Pearce (2001: 225) find that few groups have capacities similar to Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's because:

"The new civil society groups are tenuously linked to local societies, especially to rural communities. The norms and values they expressed have not emerged out of deep local experiences. Their lack of rootedness and donor dependence raises crucial issues about their financial sustainability and long-term viability."

Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's experiences demonstrate the importance for liberal forms of civil society of cooperating with communal civil society to insure that the information they gather, the needs assessments they make, the programs they implement, and the long term change they facilitate are endorsed by communal, rural, groups. Cooperation helps guarantee increased effectiveness of the organizations and its interventions.

We find that civil society of a liberal type existed in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but with few or weak ties with pre-war liberal civil society organizations and activists. The assumptions made concerning liberal forms of civil society's ability to serve as "checks on potential abuses of power" (Diamond and Plattner, 1997: xxxi) were not entirely validated in Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's cases. Both groups started with poor linkages to government, which they only strengthened through engagement and progressive confidence building. In Zhene Zhenama's case co-operation with government only really began after the 2000 elections and the transformation of the dominant political discourse from an exclusionary nationalist one, to a more moderate inclusionary one. The NGO' ties tended to be with municipal or regional, rather than central, authorities. Only in a few instances did they openly affect policy formulation and political decision-making. They then aimed to transform popular perceptions about the role of women in society, domestic violence and inter-ethnic/national tolerance.

In their efforts to promote peace and women's rights, both groups targeted women as their primary beneficiary group. Regardless of country context, war and post-war developments were understood as affecting women differently from men, and women were seen as powerful locomotives of change. Yet the political culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
pre-war existence of a women’s rights movement made it acceptable to speak about feminism in the country’s urban areas, while the more traditional heritage in Tajikistan meant that this discourse would be alien to even urban dwellers. However Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both designed programs to reduce violence against women, and to increase women’s feelings of self-worth and public engagement. They both considered working with women as effective in the promotion of peace consolidation, public participation and economic development.

Both NGOs nurtured the development of liberal and communal forms of civil society characterized by mutual respect and tolerance. They fit within Varshney’s (2003: 3) definition of “inter-communal groups,” and promoted “bridging social capital” (Coletta and Cullen, 2000), the creation of daily interaction or formal groups that link individuals across major cleavages based on location, gender or nationality/ethnicity. As an advocacy strategy, rather than exerting pressure on the state Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori provided information and skills to CBOs and village leaders, increasing their capacities to interact with government officials. Smith (1998: 217) has termed groups behaving similarly “intermediary NGOs.” They “sometimes carry out projects but more frequently act as brokers between local groups at the grassroots level.” Brown (1998: 228) takes the concept of “intermediary organization” one step further arguing that such “NGOs can play critical roles in fostering cooperation among unequal powerful partners when the aim is to solve social problems.” Before proceeding to a deeper analysis of NGOs’ affect on peace, in the following chapter we will analyze the characteristics of two CBOs, which are generally referred to as belonging to the communal civil society ideal type.
Chapter Five

Chapter five:

Village Organizations and Mjesne zajednice: The Post-War Re-emergence of Communal Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan

Introduction:
In the preceding chapter the development of two NGOs which fit the liberal definition of civil society was described; herewith we turn to two examples of community-based organizations (CBOs), the Sevarlije Mjesna Zajednica (MZ) and the Karategin Valley Village Organizations (VOs), which represent communal civil society. By this definition civil society is a space for collective and public activity – made up of formal organizations as well as highly informal modes of interaction – where people come together in solidarity to meet their self-prescribed goals and defend their common interests. As described in Chapter 1, when civil society is conceptualized as a liberal construct it arguably has no antecedents in the communist/socialist systems of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. However when civil society is interpreted as communal it may be seen as having an extensive historical experience in both Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though organized differently, the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs existed before, during and after the war, evolving to respond to the changing environment, opportunities and needs. The two CBOs are thus interesting to analyze comparatively as institutions that functioned during the communist era and were forced to confront similar challenges in postwar, transitory, environments.

Inherently this chapter is also a study of the concept of local self-governance and an analysis of its relevance in post-war post-communist Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Soviet Union, soviets, factory councils, and collective farms were the main instruments of self-management. In Yugoslavia self-management and self-governance
became the guiding principles of the socialist system and were highly institutionalized.¹ Today local self-government has become a popular notion in development fields. We can consider institutions of local self-governance as fitting with the communal definition of civil society elaborated upon in Chapter 1. Yet since the early 1990s, new constitutions, legal systems, and reforms of local government have put into question the future of institutions of local self government in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in other states of the former communist system (Pickvance, 1997; Rogan, 2000, De Martino, 2004). Through the two case studies in this chapter I will thus also consider how local self-governance functioned in practice five years after the end of war in both countries.

I. Origins and history of local self governance and community development in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.

The Sevarlje Mjesna Zajednica and the Karategin Valley Village Organizations were officially established in 2000 and 2001 respectively – several years after the signing of the peace agreements in the two countries. However both the Tajik and Bosnian organizations had lengthy histories. Based on proximity ties, their development was closely linked to their geographic location, and thus to understand the history of the CBOs it is necessary to also describe briefly the evolution of the rural communities in which they were embedded.

I.a. Brief history of Sevarlje displacement and return:

Five years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Spring 2001 when I first visited Sevarlje, a village nestled in hills above the city of Doboj (Republika Srpska), the sound of hammering filled the air as Bosniak returnees affixed roof tiles and window frames to homes that still bore the scars of wartime vandalism and destruction. By 2001, 215 families, or 638 people, had returned to Sevarlje (Hamdija 22.10.01). Yet for over six years until 1998, Sevarlje had been left empty, its 490 Bosniak families expelled by Serb forces on 18 June 1992. That day 34 civilians were killed, along with another 27 in two neighboring villages (Potocani, Pridjel). According to accounts of Sevarlje citizens, during

¹ Zukin (1975: 48-50). makes a clear distinction between self-management, referring to the political system existing in work units, and self-government, which existed in residential spheres, but both fit within the Serbo-Croatian term *samoupravljanje*. See also Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986.
Chapter five

the 1992-1995 conflict another 300 soldiers and civilians from the villages of Sevarlije, Potocani and Pridjel died of war-related causes.²

When the GFAP was signed in 1995, the Doboj municipality and the village of Sevarlije were included in the Serb Entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RS).³ For the Bosniak pre-war residents of Sevarlije a stark reality set in – either they would live in a Serb majority republic or they would not return to their village. In Summer 1998, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina most returnees were moving back to areas where they were part of the majority - reinforcing war-time trends of consolidating ethnicity rather than diversifying it (Cousens, 2001: 74). Yet at that time the citizens of Sevarlije were one of the first large groups of Bosniaks to take the step of peacefully regaining the RS. The Sevarlije Board for Return, an informal structure that registered in the Doboj municipality as the Sevarlije Mjesna Zajednica (MZ) in November 2000, prepared the return. The Sevarlije MZ existed prior to 1992 as part of the Yugoslav structure of local self-government. However, due to war-time displacement the Sevarlije MZ ceased to function in 1992, and from 1993-1997 Sevarlije’s citizens were united in various formal and informal structures (see Figure 1). The Sevarlije MZ thus frequently mutated to meet changing needs and opportunities in the war and post-war period.⁴ The following chapter traces the evolution of the Sevarlije MZ through wartime displacement to return, with the aim of determining how and why this particular representation of communal civil society acted as it did.

² On war-time atrocities in the Doboj municipality see Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki (1996).
³ The municipality of Doboj is located in Northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina between Banja Luka and Tuzla. According to the 1991 census the pre-war population of the Doboj municipality was 102,546 of which the Bosniaks comprised 40.2%, the Bosnian Serbs 39%, Bosnian Croats 13%, Yugoslavs 5.5% and “others” 2.3% (Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, 1996).
⁴ When writing about the Sevarlije organizations in general in the post-war period I will herewith use the term “Sevarlije MZ” for simplicity.
Evolution of the Sevarlije MZ from 1974-2002:

1974-1992:
- Folk Dance Association
- Football club
- Mjesna Zajednica Sevarlije (within the Municipality of Doboj)
- Water works committee
- And other committees, clubs, etc...

1992-1996:
- Mjesna Zajednica in Exile of Sevarlije, Prijepolje and Potocani (within the Municipality in Exile of Doboj in Tesanj)
- Regional Association of DPs and Refugees in Zenica
  - President: Zahid Kremic – created 03.93
  - Association of Families of Fallen Soldiers of Doboj/ Tesanj region
    - Pres: Ramiz Fetic – created 08.93
  - Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica
    - Pres: Husein Hadzic – created 31.10.96
- Coalition for Return
  - created summer 97

1998 - 2000:
- Sevarlije Village Board for Return
  - 1st President: Husein Hadzic
  - 2nd President: Aziz Ibrakovic

2000 – 2002:
- President: Aziz Ibrakovic
- Mjesna Zajednica of Sevarlije (within the Doboj Municipality)
  - Women's group
  - Farmers' Association

Organization renamed or transformed
Subsidiary organization joined or created
I.b. Brief history of the evolution of the concept of local self-government and the role of the Mjesna zajednica in Yugoslavia:

As described in Chapter 1, mjesne zajednice were organizations of local self-government established as the most basic level of the organized neighborhood in rural and urban areas. Seroka and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) argue that the mjesna zajednica played an important role in local policy making, and that devolution of decision making to the local level was instrumental to the reduction of conflict and factionalism in local communities in the 1980s. Yet in the pre-war and war period, MZs' appear to have done little to support inter-communal links. In the run up to the war, many MZs became the site of intensive conflicts between members, especially between those belonging to different ethnic groups. Thereafter as populations were forcefully divided or expelled, “split MZs” and “MZ-in-exile” were established. This mirrored at the local levels the wartime ethnic and spatial fragmentation of formal Bosnian institutions and public services. After the signing of the GFAP, new laws on local self-governance were passed in the Federation (Jan, 1996) and the RS (Nov, 1999). Many MZs lost their legal personality, including the right to own buildings, hold bank accounts, initiate infrastructure projects and finance them through compulsory financial contributions. In the RS law on local self-government, the MZ was no longer described as a mechanism of government, but as a possible form of direct democracy similar to citizens' initiatives and local referenda (WB, 2002: 70).

However a World Bank study of Local Level Institutions and Social Capital found in 2002 that in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens generally trusted MZs more than liberal forms of civil society – particularly NGOs. WB survey data revealed that many Bosnian citizens continued to participate in MZ boards. Though some respondents expressed negative views about the MZs (17.76 of those sampled stated that the MZ did not exist at

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5 In Bosnia-Herzegovina there were 2,217 MZs in 1992, covering on average 1860 inhabitants (but the largest MZ had close to 10,000 inhabitants and the smallest 300) in Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic (1999:111). No census has verified the number of MZs existing after the war but it is likely to have increased significantly. In Brcko for example the number of MZs jumped from 24 in 1991 to 83 in 1996 (WB 2002: 41).
6 "MZ-in-exile" and "municipality-in-exile" were set up “ex-territorially” by groups of displaced persons from the same locality unable to return to their pre-war homes. In the post-war period many of these MZs and municipalities continued to function though with no legal status. They were officially abolished during the first municipal elections in September 1997.
all in their community), 15.6% of rural inhabitants (9.5% urban) had attended a MZ gathering (zbor gradjana) in the year preceding the survey. Inhabitants of Bosniac majority areas were most likely to be satisfied with the work of their MZ board (15%).\textsuperscript{8} They identified MZ leaders as the main initiators of collective action (14%) – ahead of members of voluntary associations (1.88%) and representatives of the municipality (1.25%).\textsuperscript{9} The study found that amongst civil society institutions, people were more likely to provide funds and assistance to MZs (after their local parish) – than to humanitarian or citizens associations, NGOs or trade unions.\textsuperscript{10}

In 2000 among the different organizational forms available to them, the leaders of the Sevarlije community selected to register their CBO as an MZ even though its legal status was much less important than before the war. According to the Sevarlije MZ’s statute, approved at a citizens’ assembly meeting on 5 November 2000, in the “MZ citizens make decisions on issues related to joint concerns and needs, related to spatial planning, to housing, to community activities, culture, sports, environment and other areas of life and work” (Article 5). In the Doboj municipality Sevarlije was the first Bosniak returnee community to register as an MZ. The following sections seek to explain this choice and the community’s success in organizing return.

\textit{I.c. Brief history of war-time and post war developments in the Karategin Valley:}

Over five years had elapsed since the signing of the Tajik General Agreement on Peace and National Accord when I traveled in 2002 up a steep pass to the village of Shulmak hidden in a picturesque mountain valley. Yet the passage of time had not dulled the words one

\textsuperscript{7} In the Federation the detailed working mechanisms of the MZs were regulated at the Cantonal level – in each Canton there is a law on local self-government – while in the RS the statutes of municipalities determined the establishment, rights and obligations of MZs (Art. 77, RS Law on Local Self-Government).

\textsuperscript{8} Only 5.47% persons living in Croat majority areas and 5.26% persons in Serb majority areas concurred.

\textsuperscript{9} In Croat majority areas the figures were 0.78% for MZ representatives, 3.91% for voluntary associations, and 0.78% for municipal authorities and in Serb majority areas, the numbers were respectively 7.02%, 2.19%, and 0.88%. Why the figures are so different in the three parts of B-H could be the subject of an entirely different study on the decline in associational life and trust in civil society organizations.

\textsuperscript{10} In Bosniac areas 29.8% are ready to help their local parish in \textit{any case}, 28.2% the MZ, 23.5% an NGO or humanitarian organization, 22.3% a citizens’ association, 20.1% a trade. In Serb majority areas 27.6% are ready to help their local parish in \textit{any case}, 14% the MZ, 13.2% an NGO or humanitarian organization, 13.6% a citizens’ association, 12.7% a trade union. In Croat majority areas 30.5% are ready to help their local parish in \textit{any case}, 8.5% the MZ, 7% an NGO or humanitarian organization, 6.3% a citizens’ association, 6.3% a trade union.
university age woman found to describe the killing of eighteen men from the hamlet on 8 April 1993. Their pictures – young men in uniform, elders weathered with wisdom and the English teacher who was my guide’s father - had been arranged in homage in the local school’s entranceway. Shulmak was the site of fighting in 1993 that caused the displacement of some 400 people (out of 1300), the destruction of the school and six homes. It was one of the six villages that I studied in the Karategin Valley.\textsuperscript{11} I selected the Valley as a region of interest because it was there that the opposition had the greatest influence during and after the war, and where the consolidation of peace was facing the greatest obstacles. A community-based organization that functioned in the region was the village organization whose establishment had been facilitated by the Mountain Societies Development Programme (MSDSP) a project of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) starting in 2000. Six village organizations, including the one in Shulmak, were the focus of my studies.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{I.d. Brief history of the evolution of the concept of local self-government, the role of the mahalla and the sovkhoz in Tajikistan:}

In Tajikistan local self-governance evolved through the establishment of collective farm decision-making structures.\textsuperscript{13} These had linkages with pre-Soviet forms of self-governance, especially the mahalla. As argued in Chapter 1, it can be considered that mahallas are a historical example of effective Tajik communal civil society and local self-governance.\textsuperscript{14} Kolkhozes’ influence diminished swiftly in the post-war period as the state-controlled collective farm system was dismantled.\textsuperscript{15} This weakened the Soviet-era institutions of local self-governance but also provided an opportunity to establish new ones. The Mountain

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} The Karategin Valley, more recently renamed the Rasht Valley, is composed of the districts of Rasht (Garm), Tojikobod, Darband, Tavildara, Jirgatol, Faizobod, and Roghun. My case studies were located in the first three districts.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} The other five were: Loyova (Rasht district, pop. 730), Khuja Ainee (Darban district, pop. 280), Tojikobod (Tojikobod district center, pop. 500 approximately), Karashahr (Tojikobod district, pop. 350), Kalai Surh (Rasht district, pop. 440).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Kolkhozes and sovkhozes both existed in Tajikistan – the later generally was larger than the former. In this text I am applying the more generic Kolkhoz term (as has Roy, 2000) to signify all collective farms, unless specified otherwise.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Mahalla is a term used to describe communal forms of civil society in various countries from the Balkans to Central Asia. See further in text about mahale in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} As of October 2001, 15,710 private farms were created out of the former kolkhoz and sovkhoz. In October 2002 a new Presidential decree was passed calling for the remaining state farms to be privatized by 2005 (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 31).
\end{itemize}

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Societies Development and Support Programme (MSDSP) thus assessed the situation at the time and considered that:

“The dismantling of the kolkhoz, which was a key social as well as agricultural institution, has contributed towards the creation of a vacuum in local governance. [...] The removal of the kolkhoz and the failure of the farmer’s association has created the opportunity for more democratic and reform orientated entities to grow in their place.” (MSDSP, 2002a: 11)

I described in the previous chapter how the local NGO Ghamkhori worked with local communities and mahallas though its “community development support” activities. Ghamkhori also sought to help fill the gap left by the closing down of the kolkhoz. MSDSP engaged in a similar effort starting in July 1998 in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, and in April 2000 in the Karategin Valley through the creation of village organizations. MSDSP’s approach was based on the assumption that “rural economic development is best catalyzed and sustained through village level institutions that are autonomous and transparent, and that contribute to democratic norms of behavior and to the growth of civil society.”\(^\text{16}\) In this chapter I seek to verify this assumption and provide a glimpse into the village organization development focusing on how local communities adapted the village organization concept to their own social and historical reality.

II. Missions and values of the case study CBOs.

II.a. Characteristics and motivations of Sevarlije MZ leaders:

The most distinctive characteristic of the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ was its leadership, which was shared by the same group of 4-5 men from the pre-war period, during the war, and until 2001. The leaders of the post-war Sevarlije MZ were linked by friendship and kinship ties, and had been active in their community since their youth.\(^\text{17}\) Four out of the six persons who formed the Board for Return to Sevarlije in 1998 had been part of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ, three were also related through marriage. The men were all born during or immediately after World War II – belonging to an era that Zukin considers to have been

\(^{16}\) AKF Activities in Tajikistan 2002, retrieved at http://www.akdn.org/akf/tajikrep_02.pdf on 28/07/03

\(^{17}\) In the late 1980s – early 1990s, Aziz Ibrakovic Sevarlije MZ President in 2001 was the head of the MZ water board; Sabrija Mujkic the Sevarlije MZ’s first secretary had been the head of the pre-war MZ’s telephone board and of the Sevarlije Communist Party Chapter; Husein Hadzic the Sevarlije Board for Return’s first leader was the pre-war MZ’s President.
uniquely committed to Yugoslav socialist values. They were part of Sevarlije’s first generation of high school and university educated youth; had been employed in Doboj businesses or services; belonged to the Communist Party or the Socialist Alliance and in the late 1980s-early 1990s all supported the SDP, except for one who joined the SDA. Queried on why the persons who led the Board for Return to Sevarlije were trusted, Sevarlije MZ community members explained that it was because they have been activists in the pre-war MZ, and continued organizing during the war.

During the war the leaders of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ built on their skills and experience within the MZ, and developed substantial knowledge on how to organize as displaced persons. In March 1993, after having been forcibly displaced from Sevarlije in 1992, Aziz Ibragovic was asked by the Doboj Municipality in Exile and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (203 Brigade) to establish a “MZ-in-exile” for the village of Sevarlije and its neighbors Pridjel and Potocani. The tasks of the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile were to maintain data on the location of inhabitants of the three villages, collect funds to support soldiers and DPs from the three villages, distribute humanitarian aid, and assist with the financing and organizing of funerals (Hamdija 22.10.01). In addition the MZ’s mission was to assist in preparing a forcible return if the opportunity was to arise (Aziz 22.10.01). In August 1996 Husein Hadzic, the president of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ, founded an alternative independent association, the Citizens’ Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica.

The Sevarlije MZ leaders’ political engagement fit within a broader refugee return movement that existed during and after the war throughout the former Yugoslavia and can be considered as belonging to international civil society. The movement was divided into

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18 Zukin identifies a Yugoslav League of Communist Youth (SKOJ) “ethic” which “prevailed in popular consciousness during and immediately after world War II [and] presented and inculcated several behavioral norms which were later transferred into the ideals of self-management: comradship, self-sacrifice, discipline, modesty, industriousness. (1975: 238)” Zukin also finds that this ethic was no longer present in young Yugoslavs in the mid-1970s.

19 According to Aziz (22.10.01) he considered this to be a war time duty similar to a military function, and after the war he obtained compensation for his work as though it was an official government employment.

20 Aziz (22.10.02) explained, “we were the first to organize because we could see our village [from territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] across the River Bosna. We did not think that the war would end as it did. We thought that we were going to return home in a different way. That is why we organized and...”

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different factions – most significantly between those who advocated for return at all costs, including through the use of violence, and on the Bosniak side tended to be associated with the SDA; and those who sought to guarantee return through peaceful compromise and dialogue.\textsuperscript{21} Interestingly members of the \textit{Sevarlije MZ} leadership initially belonged to both factions.\textsuperscript{22} After 1997 they overcame these differences when it became evident that a form of return based on dialogue with the international community and Serb authorities was most likely to succeed.

The leaders of the \textit{Sevarlije MZ} were motivated by the common goal of returning to their pre-war homes. As Aziz expressed it “for me it was my life priority to return” (22.10.2001). Like the founders of \textit{Zene Zenama}, the leaders of the \textit{Sevarlije MZ} felt an intellectual and an emotional need to continue with their activism; through their efforts they aimed to help themselves and a broader community of beneficiaries. They were willing to make tremendous sacrifices to ensure that return was successful.\textsuperscript{23} When asked what distinguished Sevarlije from other villages, a USAID program officer (Ankica, 07.11.02) who worked with them in 1998 responded, “from the beginning they had the calm and patience and will to rebuild. They did not start by telling us that it was too complicated and someone else should do it. So they really had a will and you could see that.” Like the individuals described in the previous chapter, several of the leaders of the \textit{Sevarlije MZ} also expressed a firm commitment to tolerance and inter-ethnic dialogue.

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{21}] The main dividing factor between associations of displaced persons and refugees was their attitude towards property restitution and the return process. While some associations insisted that their members had the right to remain where they were displaced to, others encouraged return and property restitution. Some of those in support of return accepted that DPs from other ethnic groups remain in their place of displacement, others insisted that they leave and return to their own homes (WB 2002a: 91).
  \item [\textsuperscript{22}] The \textit{Sevarlije Board for Return} and its predecessor the \textit{Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica} had close contacts with the SDP; while the \textit{Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile}’s links were stronger with the SDA. Aziz the head of the \textit{Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile} ran on the SDA list for the 1997 municipal elections and won a seat in the Doboj municipal council.
  \item [\textsuperscript{23}] In 1999 one of the main initiators and leaders of the \textit{Sevarlije} return process, the pre-war head of the \textit{Sevarlije MZ}, Husein Hadiz passed away due to cancer. But in the words of his brother, sitting on the veranda of his Sevarlije home: “I feel that he burned and died for this return.” (Uzeir, 21.10.2001) – \textit{this thesis is dedicated to Husein Hadzic whom I never met in person, but whose civic initiative is the object of my greatest admiration.}
\end{itemize}
remained in Serb-dominated Doboj until 1995, as a DP in Maglaj Sabrija Mukic resided with a Serb national for five years, and Hamdija Mehinovic the second secretary of the Sevarlije MZ was one of the first persons in Sevarlije to apply for an RS identity card.

II. b The Sevarlije MZ members’ motivations and goals:

Defining the membership of the Sevarlije MZ poses some difficulty as legislation postulates that MZ are made up of all citizens “from the part of one or several villages, or the part of several villages which form a territorial or economic unit” (Doboj Municipal Statute, Section 6, Art 37). Thus membership was not based on kinship or on voluntary self-selection - but on proximity. When asked whom he considered to be the members of the MZ, Aziz responded, “members of the MZ are all inhabitants of the village. Some are active, some are occasionally active and some are not active at all in the work of the MZ. But even those who are not active in the work of the MZ are members” (08.09.02). However in practice inhabitants were free to choose whether or not they wanted to participate in MZ meetings and activities voluntarily. Thus one way to measure actual participants in the MZ is to consider the number of persons attending MZ meetings or elections. In November 2000 when the first official elections of the registered MZ were held some 130-140 people participated. At a community meeting or zbor organized by the MZ in early summer 2002 approximately 100 persons attended (Aziz, 08.09.02). As some 240 families had returned by 2002 it could be argued that approximately one in every two families was actively engaged in the work of the MZ in 2002. As all inhabitants of Sevarlije were Bosniak, the MZ was a uni-national group.

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24 In September 1995 after NATO air-strikes and an offensive by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina approximately 1,500 Bosniak and Bosnian Croats who had remained in Doboj during the war were forcibly expelled. (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996: 10) Husein Hadzic’s war time experiences in Doboj included several periods of forced detention (Uzeir, 4.08.03)

25 Sabrija Mujkic (21.10.2001) related how “for five years when I was displaced in Maglaj I lived with a man of Serb nationality. I understood then that among intelligent and mature people, common life is still possible [...] when we had something to eat, we ate from the same plate. [...] I cannot even compare him with my brother. He is more than a brother to me.”

26 When I sat in Hamdija’s office the postman came with his 350 DM pension from the RS government. He joked (22.10.2001) “if I was still a resident of the Federation I would have to wait another five years for my pension because the laws are different and you can receive your pension as of 60 in the RS, while its 65 in the Federation. So tell me, where is life better?”

27 At that time Hamdija (22.10.01) estimates that some 170 families had returned.
During the entire return process, according to an unwritten agreement, the community allowed the representatives of the *Sevarlije Board for Return* to represent them, trusting them to carry out most decision-making. Outside the circle of persons involved in the *Sevarlije Board for Return* few if any Sevarlije citizens made attempts to return before July 1998, alone or collectively. A rival leadership did not form, and much of the community adopted a passive position as talks with international organizations and local authorities continued. As one Sevarlije inhabitant noted in July 1998 “we just heard that return was possible [...] without the *Board* we would probably not be here” (Ramiza 22.10.2001). Another community member explained that they did not return until 2000 because their house had not been rebuilt and “we waited and then it happened. We just waited our turn” (Nevzeta 23.10.2001).

Once return was underway Sevarlije community members activated rapidly, motivated to work on their land, rebuild their homes, and re-establish a pre-war way of life. In July 1998 during the first ten days of the return process 113 persons had been to Sevarlije. The *Sevarlije Board for Return* organized returnees into committees - responsible for various tasks including clearing the village of debris, overseeing construction materials, and running a public kitchen - and people carried out their tasks voluntarily. Every night a small group of persons remained in the village to protect it against vandalism. By winter 1998-1999, twenty-three families had returned on a permanent basis and Aziz recollected with fondness that “when the first snow fell that winter, the next morning the road was cleared [...] Immediately life started in the village.” (Aziz, 1.12.2001) A representative of USAID noted that the Sevarlije community’s activism was not to be taken for granted for it did not occur in all return villages (Ankica, 07.11.2001). A Mercy Corps Europe/ Scottish European Aid officer interviewed noted (Marko Nisandzic, 7.11.01) “Sevarlije was the first to return to Doboj and started the process. I think that it was mainly because they were well organized, and because of their leaders who went from agency to agency.”

1c  *Sevarlije values: the strength of pre-war community bonds and commitment to local self-governance*

Residents of Sevarlije interviewed explained the ability of the *Sevarlije MZ* to come together and organize return in the face of strong nationalist resistance by Serbian
authorities and neighbors as being the consequence of the cohesiveness and leadership of the pre-war MZ. As Sabrija recalled in the 1980s (21.10.2001):

"The leadership of the MZ had a tremendous vision for the village which was accepted and supported by the rest of the community. We also had a very good football club. We have a folk dance association that was among the four best in the Doboj region. We had a monthly information bulletin for the village."

A one page newspaper article from that time (Glas Komuna, 1987) depicted how the Sevarlije MZ built asphalt roads and telephone lines though volunteer work and self-contributions (samodoprinos), stating: "the identity card of Sevarlije MZ, at the edge of Doboj, speaks of its industrious inhabitants, about their commitment and self-sacrifice for a better common future, of their work and results, which can be an example to many." In the 1980s the MZ engaged in various capital improvement projects with funds from voluntary contributions, that covered over 80% of the costs according to Aziz (1.12.2001). The infrastructure and objects built were the MZ’s property, and it collected income for the provision of services to finance infrastructure maintenance.

The pre-war Sevarlije community seemed to have more readily embraced socialist era concepts and practices than other villages described by Lockwood (1975) and Bringa (1995). As Lockwood (1975) showed village solidarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina was frequently expressed through labor exchange among villagers, the joint ownership of property (the mosque, village commons), the organization of common actions based on consensus and the celebration of common ceremonies. In Dolina, the village Bringa (1995) studied, it was common for voluntary work to be carried out by neighbors for individual households – such as assisting in the construction of a private house. However “communal work,” efforts initiated by the MZ, was not undertaken as willingly. In Dolina “the village committee’s mandate was limited to being a bureaucratic link between the village and the local council, and its influence on the village was very limited” (1995: 74). This was not the case in Sevarlije where, during the 1980s, traditional forms of village solidarity were promoted further through the concepts, and instruments, of self-governance and self-management.
Chapter five

The pre-war Sevarlije village community was cohesive and homogenous, and as a result of economic developments in the 1960s and 1970s, prosperous. Sevarlije, like many villages of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lockwood, 1975; Donia and Fine, 1994), was mono-ethnic before 1992. Uncharacteristically the hamlet was not built around a mosque – instead it was located on the edge of the habitation and was shared with neighboring Potocani. According to the former imam of Sevarlije, the region had not been the site of any large atrocities during the Second World War because it was a transit point through which all armies passed (24.10.2001). It shared characteristics found in other Bosnian villages (Lockwood, 1975; Byrnes 1976; Bringa, 1995) such as a weak *zadruga* institution – extended family households – and the breakdown of the village into smaller neighborhood groupings or *mahallas*. As Lockwood (1975) found in another Northern Bosnian village (Planinica), the organizing principle in Sevarlije was residence and not kinship. However Sevarlije was an untypical village because it was located some six kilometers away from Doboj, a major regional center, and by the 1960s the majority of the population worked either in the city, or in the whitewash quarry at the foot of the village. Excellent public transportation (bus and train) linked the village to the urban center. By the 1970s agriculture in Sevarlije was a hobby rather than an occupation. The village benefited uniformly from the rapid economic development of the 1960s and 1970s (Uzeir, 20.10.01; Hamdija 22.10.01). In this sense Sevarlije could be considered a “suburbanized” village, one that had its origins in traditional village life but gained from Yugoslav industrialization and urban development. Sevarlije’s readiness to adopt the concept of local self governance – to a degree rarely found in other Bosnian villages – may in part be explained by the fact that it belonged to a

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28 “Licna karta Mjesne zajednice Sevarlije kraj Doboja govori o njenim vrijednim ziteljima, o samoprijegoru i njihovu upornom odricanju za bolje zajedničko sutra, o radnim i razvojnim rezultatima koji mogu biti mnogima primjer.” Glas Komuna, 7 July, 1987, p.9

29 The Central Bosnian village described by Bringa (1995) under the fictive name *Dolina* was mixed Bosnian Muslim/Croat.

30 Some of the main households in Sevarlije were the Alibasic, Canic, Hadzic, Jupic, Ibrakovic, Fetic, Mujkic and Mehinovic families.

31 In most cases in the 1970s “the village presents a common front to all outsiders” (Lockwood, 1975: 67) but in Sevarlije’s case easy transportation links, economic ties, jobs and education, opened the village to Doboj and institutions of the Yugoslav communist state usually more present in urban areas (Bringa, 1995).

32 Sevarlije in this case was different from many other villages, which were left behind during the 1960s and 1970s economic boom, saw their living standards decreasing and their way of life diverging increasingly from urban areas’ (Bringa, 1995).
small group of rural communities that clearly benefited from 1960s-1970s economic development.

The ability of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ to organize effectively can be explained by the strength of the village’s community ties – what Colletta and Cullen (2000) term “bonding social capital” - its experienced leadership, and commitment to the concept of local self-governance. The wartime displacement of Sevarlije’s entire Bosniak population initially annihilated the community links and MZ structures of the Sevarlije community. The physical capital that the community had constructed – including a new drinking water system, electricity supply, telephone lines, a community/medical center, a school and mosque – was burned and looted. Close to 100% of the housing stock was destroyed. Yet during the years of exile the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ succeeded in maintaining a degree of social cohesion amongst Sevarlije’s displaced persons.

II.d Characteristics and motivations of Karategin VO leaders and members:

Like the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ leadership those who led the Karategin Valley village organizations under the MSDSP program were deeply embedded in their communities, and had distinguished themselves previously by their skills and activism. In the VOs leadership was shared between the president, deputy, bookkeeper, and head of the women’s group. Those interviewed were all full-time residents of the community, middle-aged, and educated (as engineers, veterinarians, accountants, and teachers). In one of the villages observed (Loyova), the current VO President was the sovkhoz director before privatization; he had now become the largest private landowner in the village. In the other five VOs the Presidents were formerly part of the kolkhoz technical staff. Three of them had been active in socialist era institutions such as the Communist Party, trade unions and the Komsomol. None of the VO Presidents interviewed admitted to having had any ties to the opposition (IRP or UTO) during the war. In five out of the six cases, the person elected to be deputy VO head had moral status and authority either as the village mullah or aksakal. Family ties often bound members of the VO leadership and in two instances the head of the women’s group was the wife of the VO President. The leaders of the women’s groups rarely had any experience of working on women’s issues before, though three of them had
participated during the past few years in OSCE organized training programs on women’s rights.

*VO* leaders tended to humbly explain their elevation to their new positions as community-driven and not as the outcome of their own efforts and ambitions. As the head of the *VO Kalai-Surh* explained “I was not interested in becoming the President but people nominated me and I had to think of the village and accept. Nobody would want this job because it’s a lot of work for no pay [...] It is not a formal job, people force you to do it” (Hokimov, 29.07.02). The *VO* leaders thus seemed primarily motivated by community pressures, and the desire to appear effective vis-à-vis their peers, rather than by the emotional drive that galvanized the *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* leaders. As Mahmadali Saidov, the Director of MSDP in the Karategin Valley explained leaders “are not those that want it themselves, they are given this responsibility by the community” (31.07.02). Five out of six *Karategin Valley VOs* elections for the position of *VO* head were contested by only one candidate. In two cases the *VO* heads claimed that they did not want the position. Only one of the *VO* Presidents interviewed expressed his engagement as based on personal ambition “I enjoy incorporating all the people of the village and assisting them construct for the future. If I feel that I am not contributing I will leave the position.” (Eshanov, 22.07.02)

It is very difficult to determine to what extent greed and the opportunity to gain personally from their engagement in the *VO* also motivated the *VO* leadership. In four out of the six *VOs* studied, where I visited *VO* Presidents’ homes, it appeared that they lived well, in large fully equipped houses (with TVs, stereos, and cars), where guests were frequently welcomed with food and lodging. However it was unclear whether they were chosen to fill the *VO* position because the community felt that they had the resources to work voluntarily, or because they fit within a class of “rural notables” (Roy, 2000: 93) which had controlled much of village life during the Soviet Union and continued to do so post-independence. Allegations that *VO* leaders were gaining personal benefit from their community work were heard in two villages. MSDSP staff also report a small turnover rate among *VO* Presidents (Whitton 13.07.02). However, in the Garm district amongst the 16

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33 According to Roy (2000: 93) in rural Tajikistan the main symbol of social status is one’s house – how large it is and whether it is able to provide hospitality to guests.
existing VOs, two held a second round of elections to replace their VO President, when they considered that he was ineffective (Bobokhojaev, 24.07.02). It is important to note that personal gain in rural Tajikistan did not usually transit only upwards. As leaders were deeply imbedded in local communities and largely reliant on them for support, they were also bound to them through a host of patron and parochial relations (Roy, 2000, Collins, 2002). It thus seemed unlikely that VO Presidents could gain personally without having any sense of accountability.

While membership in the VOs was voluntary, MSDSP requested that a minimum of 80% of all households belong to the VO before formally accepting it into its program. According to MSDSP figures between 89% and 100% of all households had at least one member who had joined the VO. MSDSP regulations stated that VO members should be residents of the village, heads of households (who have decision-making authority), and not less than 17 years old (MSDSP VO Charter 2001). Thus membership in the VO was primarily based on residency, as membership in the mahalla and the Bosnian mjesna zajednica was. The figures that the VO leadership provided to MSDSP may not have been entirely accurate as VO leaders had an interest in inflating them to ensure that they were included in the MSDSP program. In three villages, the VO leaders explained that the number of members in their organizations was growing because people saw membership as a way to gain benefits, especially materials and credits from MSDSP. Those who did not participate were either the elderly and ill, or those for whom “life is good as it is” (Sharipov, 25.07.02).

II.e Missions and values of Karategin VOs:
The VO leadership and members interviewed explained that they considered the VO to be a continuation of past forms of village organizing, which enabled them to continue with their Soviet era activism. “Everything that we are doing now [through the VO] existed before, but was not as well documented,” explained Kokimov the VO head of Kalai-Surh (Hokimov, 29.07.02). For the head of the Khuja Ainee VO it was necessary to create a village organization structure because, “we could no longer get anything as a sovkhoz, so we had to change” (Gazoev, 23.07.02). As the VO leadership and members depicted their

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34 MSDSP Information about members of the VOs of Rasht Valley, 30.06.02
villages under the Soviet system, they were extremely cohesive and active, but this activism diminished with war and independence, as resources dried up.

Somewhat similarly to the Sevarlije MZ, the villages of the Karategin Valley organized a host of capital improvement works in the mid 1980s. The head of the Shulmak VO recalled how their chaihana/mosque was constructed in 1980-1983. At that time according to Rakhimov the work was carried out and financed by local inhabitants, with the assistance of the kolkhoz who provided heavy equipment and materials. It was a costly endeavor and the roof alone cost 3300 somoni (3 somoni = $1) (Rakhimov, 30.07.02). In Kalai-Surh, as in Shulmak, through the donation of funds, labor and materials, the community built a local school in addition to the chaihana/mosque. The Kalai-Surh VO head Hokimov explained that in the 1980s “we renovated roads, repaired damage caused by floods, enclosed the cemetery [. . .] during the Soviet Union it was much easier to organize people because they had funds, now they are unemployed.” (Hokimov, 29.07.2)

The ability of the Karategin Valley villages’ to carry out activities for the common good was in large part linked to a subtle merging of Soviet era institutions and traditional forms of communal civil society during the Soviet period. Many traditional religious practices, social norms, and modes of local decision-making continued to be relevant in Soviet Tajikistan. Through traditional self-help practices and solidarity mechanisms, villages and their leaders organized voluntary forms of service provision and resolved community disputes. My interviewees in the Karategin Valley supported Roy (2000, 2002) and Humphrey's (1998, 2002) findings that the kolkhoz structures worked in symbiosis with traditional institutions. In Kalai Surh, the VO head remembered for example that “there was a village rohbar who was in charge of the village and carried out work on a voluntary basis, and brigadier linked with the sovkhoz. People who did not work on the sovkhoz but in the district would make their contributions to the rohbar, other contributions were generally collected by the brigadier.” (Hokimov, 29.07.02)

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35 The chahana (tea-house) serves as a mosque but also as a community center, and inn for travelers. Social activities are organized in the chahana, and there may be a TV for those who don’t have access to one at home.
Villages in the Karategin Valley tended to be sparsely populated, \(^{36}\) isolated from each other, homogenous, and largely dependent on agriculture. All the hamlets studied were mono-ethnic. As explained in Chapter 1, in the Karategin Valley as in the rest Tajikistan, the basis of traditional village level solidarity remained the extended family structure or the *avlod*. As several *avlods* may have lived and intermarried in one *mahalla* or *kolkhoz* the links between families often spanned territory and kin (Chvyr, 1993: 256).

**II.f Comparisons between the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VOs**

The *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* and *Karategin Valley VOs* were intra-communal civil society organizations made up of individuals who shared the same ethnicity, regional basis and religion, and were bound together by proximity ties. In the two communities kinship was socio-politically relevant. Past anthropological studies have argued that clans and kinship networks play a significant role in Tajikistan, but were weaker in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Tajikistan kinship as expressed through the *avlod*, and solidarity networks based on place of origin, have been characterized as central to social, political and economic life (Collins 2002; Chvyr, 1993; Roy, 2000). In the Bosnian village Lockwood observed that “the evidence of organization, collective activities or group functions that characterize the clan” did not exist. He argues further that “bonds of kinship are relatively weakly developed among Bosnian Muslims. Kinship roles do not usually carry specific and distinct rights and obligations (1975: 74-75).” Nevertheless in Sevarlije three members of the same extended family were leaders of the *Board for Return/MZ* and kinship seems to have played a role in at least insuring that these men stayed in contact while in exile during the war.

The experience of the *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* and *Karategin Valley VOs* supports arguments made in Chapter 1 concerning the different levels of cooperation and co-optation that existed between communal civil society and state institutions in Yugoslavia and Soviet Tajikistan. While the *MZ* provided a means for Sevarlije to integrate into the Yugoslav system of self-government, the Karategin Valley *mahallas* remained largely insular and

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\(^{36}\) The largest village that I studied, Shulmak, had a population of 1300 (208 households). Compared with other VOs this was a large village. The biggest village in the MSDSP VO program in the Karategin Valley Shul had 497 households.
isolated. In the Karategin Valley, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society were strengthened though their reincarnation in the kolkhoz; mahallas’ integration into a broader Tajik or Soviet value system was weak. Akhmedov (1998: 173) and Roy (2000: 94-98) have underlined how, particularly in villages populated by people from Garm/Karategin Valley, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society largely usurped Soviet institutions, molding them to fit into traditional systems of patronage and mutual aid. On the other hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Sevarlije MZ appears to have been largely assimilated into the Yugoslav system of local self-governance, which at least in theory was inclusionary and sought to promote an equitable use of resources regardless of ethnicity/nationality. Employing Varshney’s (2003: 3) terminology, it seems valid to describe the Sevarlije MZ as an “intra-communal” group, which participated in a larger “inter-communal associational form of civil engagement.” Karategin Valley mahallas were purely “intra-communal.” It can be supposed that the Sevarlije MZ’s willingness to engage with Yugoslav era modes of self-management was due to its location on the edge of a major urban communications center, and the economic gains it made in the 1960s and 70s from its surroundings’ rapid industrialization. Many MZs in Bosnia-Herzegovina which did not benefit from this burst of economic growth (such as Bringa’s Dolina) evolved in ways similar to the Karategin Valley mahallas. These were often the first communities to adopt nationalism in the early 1990s.

Like in the NGO case studies, strong leadership was crucial to the success of the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs’ success. Leaders provided vision, skills, past experience and contacts. In the Karategin Valley, as predicted by Gellner (1995: 33), the VOs’ leadership appeared to be closely dependent on pre-existing social roles and obligations. Individuals accepted leadership positions as their duty to ensure community solidarity. In the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, leaders built on their pre-war skills and experience, and through self-selection and ambition drove the return process. Asked why Sevarlije was so successful, a USAID officer explained, “it must have been the determination of the population and then their leaders. Aziz was so dedicated” (Ankica, 07.11.03). Sevarlije’s case supports the conclusions of a broader study of ten MZs carried out by the World Bank which finds that “the functions and achievements [of MZs] depends largely on the personality of the President and his closest associates” and “local leadership
Chapter five

is clearly linked with associational experience." (WB 2002a: 73) Charisma and experience, as much as pre-existing standing within kinship and community networks, explain the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ leaders’ success.

Much like in the NGO cases described in the previous chapter, those who managed the Karategin Valley VOs and Board for Return/MZ could generally be considered to be “professionals:” skilled, educated, and in the rural context, in which they lived, economically “middle class.” In several cases they had lost their employment during the war, often victims of a shrinking public sector. They were thus interested in finding ways to maintain their pre-war status within the community. As one informant explained in the Bosnian case “throughout history it has stayed with our people that clergymen, teachers, doctors are the most prominent citizens. In the villages they were always the people who led others. […] It is not important that today teachers are in a very difficult economic situation with low wages – they are still the center for gathering people” (WB, 2002a: 109). A similar situation could be observed in 2002 in the Karategin Valley where former kolkhoz technicians, teachers and medical professionals were held in high esteem even though their economic position had decreased substantially. Thus CBOs, like the NGOs, provided a crucial forum for village “professionals” to retain and develop their skills, and maintain their popular status. In the postwar environment where cultures of lawlessness tended to domain, and those gaining economic and social prestige were often engaged in illicit activities, the VOs and Board for Return/MZ helped keep more traditionally respected citizens in the public eye.

Addressing inter-ethnic and inter-national tensions was not an explicit aim of the two CBOs, however maintaining community security and stability was. The leaders of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and of the Karategin Valley VOs shared a commitment to restoring to their local communities the material, physical and economic conditions they had in the pre-war period. They based their aims on the experiences of the 1980s when the village organizations carried out capital gains projects through citizens’ self-contributions in labor and funds, with the support of state institutions. In the post-war period, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs relied on their past experience
with direct participation, community self-help, and mutual aid in an attempt to promote community development.

III. Activities, tasks and tactics of the case study CBOs.

III.a  Sevarlije MZ activities and tactics

III.a.1 Preparing the return process to Sevarlije

The activities and tasks of the Sevarlije community evolved in tandem with the opportunities and challenges of the wartime and post-war political process. After the signing of the GFAP, the Sevarlije Board for Return organized to insure that Sevarlije residents benefited from the right to return. Those involved in the process admitted “we came back to Sevarlije in an un-expected way” (Sabrija, 21.10.2001) because during the war return was seen as possible only after a military victory. Not until after the GFAP was return understood to be an administrative and bureaucratic process linked to the fulfillment of a human right and towards which the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could significantly contribute.

From 1996-1998 Sevarlije leaders carried out administrative tasks, lobbied, and advocated to ensure the return of their community. Through the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile, the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica, and later the Sevarlije Board for Return, Sevarlije’s leadership organized to represent Sevarlije inhabitants vis-a-vis Bosniak authorities, Serb officials, and representatives of international organizations. The Sevarlije organizations collected, aggregated and disseminated information on return. One of the first tasks of the post-war period carried out by the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile and the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica was the distribution and collection of UNHCR Housing Forms. The Sevarlije associations also maintained ties between former Sevarlije residents displaced in different regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and strengthened links between Sevarlije DPs and DPs from other parts of the RS. The Sevarlije associations, together with the broader DP and refugee network, kept the issue of return within the public sphere, in the media, and alive in the dreams of the displaced themselves. They continuously lobbied for the fulfillment of the right to return.
with representatives of the UNHCR, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Ministry of Work, Social Policy, Refugees and DPs of Zenica/Doboj Canton and the Doboj Municipality.

As a provider of news the Sevarlije associations broke nationalist politicians’ monopoly on information. Eade (1997: 183) argues that especially for displaced populations “the lack of access to reliable information concerning one’s current situation or future options is profoundly disempowering. At best, it undermines people’s capacity to determine their own interests; at worst it leaves them prey to rumors or to the deliberate manipulation of information for political or military purposes.” In Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat-displaced persons from Central Bosnia for example were encouraged by the HDZ not to return to their homes by misleading accounts of ongoing violence against minorities in their pre-war villages. Through the provision of reliable information, the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile and the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica thus helped limit the Sevarlije displaced persons’ disempowerment and increased their capacity for action.

III.a.2 Facilitating reconciliation

The greatest obstacle to return which the Sevarlije Board for Return successfully overcame was the intense distrust that existed between Bosniak DP and Serb communities. The attitude of municipal and higher level authorities towards minority return was not categorically negative. According to the UNHCR Program Assistant, authorities suggested at the time that “if you can settle it at the grassroots level we don’t mind” (08.11.2001). Nevertheless when Sevarlije returnees first visited their homes they still risked being attacked by “organized mobs” as other minority convoys had been from 1996-1998 and continued to be in 2000 and 2001 (Cousens, 2001; Vandiver, 2001; ICG, 2001). The possibility also existed that Bosniak returnees would turn against Serbs living in the surrounding areas to exert revenge for crimes committed during the war. However on 1st

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37 The Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica for example was made up of 6 sub-bodies which became Boards for Return (such as the Sevarlije Board for Return), representing DPs of 6 different communities in the Doboj region (Zahid, 25.10.2001)
July 1998 the first day that Sevarlije residents visited their pre-war homes, there was no violence, and no violence occurred thereafter. 38

Peaceful return and reconciliation was possible thanks to the Sevarlije Board for Return's willingness to engage in a lengthy and time-consuming process of dialogue with representatives of the Serb displaced persons community in Pridjel and Potocani. 39 Dialogue was mainly facilitated by the UNHCR Doboj branch office and lasted from mid-1997 to mid-1998. It is worth quoting directly from Aziz (22.10.2001) who participated in the entire process and has a vivid memory of a radical transformation visible only to a few:

"We had direct contacts with representatives from the MZs of people of Serb nationality who live in our surrounding. Most of the meetings took place in the SFOR base outside Doboj. At first the meetings were very difficult. They were very short. And RS representatives were very hostile. They tried to persuade us that Serbs were peaceful people and that the war had been imposed on them. And etc. [...] Though at the beginning the meetings were very short, meeting after meeting they became longer, and changes became evident. Firstly in the breaks during those meetings we were left alone with the Serb representatives. So through those cigarette pauses, those coffee breaks, we came closer to each other. We started to talk openly as ordinary people. And I think that gave results. In the end we attended 77 official meetings."

Through gradual confidence-building Serb and Bosniak MZ representatives reached agreement on the return issue. The Serb MZ representatives pledged that return would happen without violence. Bosniak representatives understood the need for a gradual return process that would not pose a security threat to the Serbs, and Serb representatives accepted that return was not a direct menace to their interests. Sevarlije DPs were returning to a part of the village which had been left uninhabited, and they were not demanding that Serb DPs move (Rado, 08.11.01).

At the start of the return process, the Sevarlije Board for Return took the important step of including their Serb neighbors whenever possible in their activities. The bus hired to

38 This is significant considering that between March 2000 and July 2001, 316 incidents involving threats to or attacks on the 'minority' population in the RS were reported to the IPTF. UN statistics for the April – September 2001 season are of 208 incidents against minorities in the RS (ICG 2001b: 38).

39 Pridjel and Potocani had been majority Bosniak villages before the war. Their original inhabitants had been forcibly displaced like those of Sevarlije in June 1992. During the war Serbs, mainly from villages in the Maglaj municipality, were also forced to leave their homes and they settled in Pridjel and Potocani (destruction of the housing stock in Sevarlije was greater). They eventually formed their own MZ under the leadership of Zarko Ilicic. Zarko, and the MZ of Pridjel and Potocani he presided over, became the main Sevarlije interlocutors.
transport Sevarlije DPs from the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to Sevarlije was from a Serb firm based in Doboj. The Sevarlije Board for Return employed Serb DPs residing in Potocani and Pridjel immediately to assist them in house reconstruction. Cooperation in house building, in part replicating traditional Bosnian mutual aid habits, was also made possible because the Bosniaks offered a small salary to the Serbs to carry out the works. According to Aziz (22.10.01) at that time when the Serbs could have resisted cooperation with their war time enemies, “the Serb response was massive and every day we got more requests for work from them. I think that it was a key moment, when we put security concerns back in their proper place.”

The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ leadership was also conscientious of the necessity of carefully undertaking activities that could be interpreted as an affront to Serb values and ideas. Three years after return began in the fall of 2001 reconstruction of the Sevarlije mosque was incomplete.40 Even though exhuming and re-burying persons killed in Sevarlije at the start of the war, or later when they were displaced, was laden with meaning and value for the community, the Sevarlije Board for Return did not organize the ceremony until May 2000.41

The Sevarlije experience also gave an impetus to Serb DPs in Pridjel and Potocani to begin returning to their homes in the Maglaj municipality (Federation).42 By 2000, when the Serb DPs began this process, spatial proximity had significantly decreased any remaining cleavages between the two groups. Bosniak and Serb MZ members were now linked by a mutual interest in return. The Sevarlije MZ facilitated contacts between the Serb MZ and Maglaj authorities. When Serb DPs started their own reconstruction effort, Sevarlije MZ representatives assisted them in developing relationships with IOs and obtaining building materials. As will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter on impact, the intra-

40 As new mosques were appearing throughout the Federation after the war it was somewhat surprising to see that in 2001 the Sevarlije mosque was not rebuilt. The Sevarlije imam (24.10.01) explained that he had been unable to obtain donations from international Islamic aid agencies – who feared that their “investments may not be secure in the RS.” The imam added that he agreed with the Sevarlije MZ’s decision to prioritize other forms of reconstruction in the village.

41 At the time some 5000 people attended the ceremony and according to Aziz “the police in Doboj were up to the task, they engaged almost a whole police station for us” (22.10.2001).

42 UNHCR estimated that by 2001 more than half of the Serb DPs had left Pridjel and Potocani for their homes in Maglaj municipality (Rado Durdevic, 08.11.2001)
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communal bonding social capital that existed in Sevarlije and Pridjel, within the Bosniak and Serb DP communities, helped create new bridging social capital and networks of reciprocal social relations.

III.a.3 Providing reconstruction aid and social services

While the greatest goal for minority returnees in Bosnia-Herzegovina was regaining access to homes and land, a host of subsequent challenges confronted them, as succinctly described in a statement by the Human Rights Coordination Center (2000:2):43

"From the repossession of property, to registering one's residence and receiving an ID card, enrolling one's children in school, becoming gainfully employed, securing access to pensions, to reconnecting to electricity, water, or telephone networks – in each of these elements of daily life Bosnians are confronted by abuses emanating from the law or from the conduct of their officials. This is particularly so for returnees."

Due to its knowledge of local needs, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ adopted the role of intermediary between international donors, local authorities and local citizens. Cooperating with international donors, the MZ developed criteria to determine which houses in the village should be reconstructed. The Sevarlije MZ also served as a mediator, tempering conflicts that arose over the allocation of aid. Representatives of international organizations interviewed appreciated this contribution. As Marko Nisandzic (7.11.01), Director of Operations of Mercy Corps Europe/Scottish European Aid explained, "we trusted each other. We agreed on criteria, and they never tried to put someone on the list who did not need help."

As security for minority returnees gradually improved throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, uneven access to social services for returnees became a more pressing problem (HRCC, 2000; ICG 2002). The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ lobbied for funding from international organizations to reconstruct social and physical infrastructure. It advocated with the Doboj municipal and the RS Entity level governments to obtain the social services it had been provided with before 1992. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ submitted a proposal to USAID in 1998 for the reconstruction of the village elementary school so that

43 The Human Rights Coordination Center was a co-operative effort of the OHR, OSCE, OHCHR, UNMiBH, the Council of Europe and UNHCR within the OHR.
children could stop commuting to a school in the Federation. It obtained permission from the Ministry of Education in Banja Luka to restart the school and provide teaching staff in 2000 (Hamdija, 22.10.01). As the school functioned within the RS educational system, the parents and teachers agreed to have lessons in Cyrillic as well as Latin scripts (school teacher, 24.10.01). The community center/ clinic’s rehabilitation was completed in early 2002. The Sevarlije MZ encouraged citizens to register for RS ID cards and to take advantage of social services provided by the Doboj municipality, helping to ensure the social protection of the community. According to the HRCC in 2000 “discrimination in access to pension entitlements remains […] a tangible obstacle for many Bosnians”. Yet that year in Sevarlije returnees were obtaining RS pensions.

Gaining access to employment was another challenge for most minority returnees that the Sevarlije MZ attempted to address. Poor employment prospects in the Doboj area were linked to the depressed economy as well as employment discrimination. The whitewash quarry outside Sevarlije lost its economic utility with the breakup of Yugoslavia; many of the jobs in Doboj that Sevarlije inhabitants had filled during the 1970s and 1980s were either made redundant or filled by Serb nationals. In an attempt to address this problem, the Sevarlije MZ cooperated with international organizations to initiate income generation projects in the village.

The MZ also has the competency to intervene in local level conflicts through the MZ peace council (Mirovno vijece). Peace Councils traditionally act to resolve disputes related to the rights of citizens - especially in the areas of property disputes, trespassing, disputes related to borders between properties, inheritance, division of the common property of married couples - as well as in criminal or misdemeanor affairs, or in cases against another’s honor and reputation (Milisevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 113-114). However, according to Aziz (08.09.2002), people rarely addressed the Sevarlije Peace Council, because there were few local level conflicts.

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44 In a study of minority returns conducted in early 2000, the UNHCR found that only 5.5% of the minority returnees it had interviewed had found employment in their home regions (USCR, 2001: 7).
45 During my interviews I did not meet any Sevarlije returnee with employment in Doboj.
The MZ propagated community mobilization and action. Like in the pre-war period when MZs held large-scale volunteer community actions (*radne akcije*) the *Sevarlije MZ* in Spring 2002 called upon community members to clean the village roads. Even though “it is very difficult to organize these kinds of things because people believe that someone should do this work for them,” some 100 persons participated (Aziz, 08.09.02). The *Sevarlije MZ* also encouraged the creation of new associations to represent the interests, and satisfy the needs, of particular groups in the community. In 2001 a farmer’s association and a women’s group were registered in the RS as local NGOs (Abdullah, 23.10.01; Alma, 24.10.01).

### III.b Karategin VO activities and tactics

In 2000 needs and priorities in Tajikistan were very different from what they were in Bosnia-Herzegovina as they were linked to challenges caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Consequently the activities of the Karategin VOs were less focused on refugee return and reconciliation, but more on infrastructure rehabilitation, income generation, and social service provision. The Karategin Valley *VOs*, with the support of MSDSP, thus began with activities to meet these pressing needs, first of all to ensure that people had sufficient food and access to water.

#### III.b.1 Helping secure food sustainability, employment and infrastructure development

To a much more significant degree than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, access to food and employment were urgent problems in the Karategin Valley. In its quest to reduce poverty in Tajikistan, MSDSP and AKF began their operations by providing humanitarian assistance but the overall program purpose was to enhance the “capability of communities to increase incomes, manage communal resources and attain food security” (MSDSP 2002a: 4). In the Karategin Valley over 80% of the population worked in agriculture (MSDSP 2002a: 10) and close to 100% of households relied on the food they grew to meet at least part of their

46 The farmer association aimed to address the problem of local unemployment by encouraging people to live by working in agriculture. The women’s association *Stublicanka* established a kindergarten, and in Fall 2002 started art, dance, theater classes for children on weekends. It had its own office in the newly rebuilt community center.

47 In 1993 when AKF began working in the Gorno-Badakshan region of Tajikistan its objective was to ensure the availability of enough food for the survival of the population, and in the longer term to work towards food self-sufficiency (MSDSP 2002a: 5)
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dietary requirements. The VOs' activities were closely tied to MSDSP's, and in 2001 the VOs assisted in the distribution of vegetable seeds, tree seedlings, chickens and goats. Amongst the six VOs studied, on average six projects were implemented during the first six months of 2002. A significant addition to the VOs' program was a micro-credit program for women to promote small income generation activities. The credit ranged between 300-360 somoni ($1 = 3 somoni) per person and benefited between 4-10 women in three out of the six VOs. The credits were generally for 2-3 months and to be repaid into a revolving fund. The size of the credits, and time frame, enabled beneficiaries to engage in trade but not in production.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent war in Tajikistan caused a virtual decimation of physical infrastructure in the country and the government no longer had the resources and capacities to maintain the massive rural infrastructure (WB, 2002b: 5). Consequently, since the start of the conflict in Tajikistan, villages in the Karategin Valley rarely had access to clean water, proper irrigation and sanitation, regular electricity, and good roads. In order to tackle this problem MSDSP supported the development of community based physical infrastructure through the VOs rather than the rehabilitation of massive Soviet era systems. Its rationale was that "small infrastructure projects not only meet the short-term priorities of most communities but [...] are also good mechanisms for mobilizing community involvement and for providing opportunities for building the social and human capacity of village level organizations" (MSDSP 2002a: 27).

III.b.2 Building community cohesion:
Extending their MSDSP technical tasks, the VO leadership tended to play a broader role in the community similar to that of traditional aksakal and mahalla leaders. VO Presidents helped maintain community cohesion and resolve local conflicts. Though not considered to be a religious authority, the VO President often played a key role in religious activities and discussions. Each village tended to have its own mullah who was different from the VO

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48 MSDSP, Projects of VOs of Rasht Valley, approved for 2002, 05.07.2002
49 Some 40-50% of the land equipped with irrigation facilities are not irrigated or drained due to breakdown of pumps and related machinery and neglect of cleaning of irrigation canals (UN, 2001: 23), most of the rural population has never had access to piped water (UN, 2001: 26) and in rural areas access to safe drinking water is less than 20% (UNICEF, 2001).
President, but the two men generally worked closely together. As most VO meetings were held in the village chaihana/mosque, there was overlap and proximity in the VO and mosque’s work. In four out of the six VOs visited, the Presidents explained that the people usually approached them when planning marriages or funerals, to assist them in the organization, and sometimes to raise funds. In Tajik social life, weddings and funerals are the most significant events to occur in the community and are laden with symbols, rites, obligations, and expenses.

The VO leadership was often called upon to mediate in family crises and disputes between neighbors. When faced with problems many citizens preferred to approach the VO President, or his staff, in the first instance and only as a last resort to turn to higher level authorities, the police or the courts. In Shulmak, the head of the women’s groups explained that in six or seven instances women had come to her to ask for advice because their husbands had taken a second wife. In one case a woman came to ask how she could obtain alimony from her ex-husband (Rukhshona, 30.07.02).

Like the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, Karategin Valley VOs called for large-scale volunteer community actions (hashar). In the Karategin Valley villagers traditionally engaged in voluntary community work – such as clearing irrigation channels, contributing to building the chaihana/mosque - as willingly as they assisted neighbors, or individual households – for example to construct a house. In the past-communist, post-conflict period studies have nevertheless found that the hashar tradition has begun to wane. It can be argued that in the villages where VOs were set up hashar was more effectively maintained due to the MSDSP requirement that communities contribute funds and labor to all projects that they supported. It could also be explained by a general increase in community cohesion caused by the development of the VO. According to the Karashahr VO President, the VO encouraged the village to “organize hashar every day […] now we are all working together, to collect wheat in the fields for example” (Piramavdov, 26.07.02). In Kalai-Surh, the VO head described how he frequently organized hashar to maintain the water channel.

50 According to a survey carried out the NGO ASTI in Soghd Oblast, a large majority of mahallas did not organize a hashar between 2000-2002 (Interview with Farrukh Tyuryaev, General Director, Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia, on 27 June, 2002 in Khojand)
The Karategin Valley VOs appeared to carry out little advocacy. According to MSDSP's vision "in the future as new opportunities arise and local capacities are built up, MSDSP will want the VOs to take on more service delivery roles" (VO Charter 2001: 19). Yet MSDSP was less certain about how VOs could engage in lobbying. According to MSDSP, the VOs' advocacy potential was limited by their poor leadership – since during the Soviet Union "lack of elections procedures [in the Soviet village level institutions] led to the selection of poorly qualified people," who had low levels of skills or experience. This argument goes against Roy (2000, 2002) and Humphrey's (1998) findings, which suggest that village level leaders had a large amount of autonomy and were generally successful in transferring substantial services, resources, and attention to their communities. What is possible is that Karategin Valley VOs in fact advocated for their community through traditional solidarity networks, using informal means, which were difficult to quantify by MSDSP or in the policy sphere.

III.c Comparison between Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO activities and tactics

The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs are examples of communal civil society organizations whose main aim was to ensure that all members of the community had the necessary means for survival. Through their activities they successfully provided "self help" in the absence of state provision of public goods including social services, infrastructure, personal and social security. As predicted by Roy (2002: 124) the immediate post-war challenge for the two CBOs was to compensate for the weakness of the post-communist state. Once return was accomplished, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ reverted back to many of its pre-war tactics, attempting to mobilize the community to participate in decision-making, and project implementation. In 2000 the Karategin Valley VOs continued with activities that the mahalla and aksakals had carried out in the past. Rather than starting new innovative projects, similar to the ones implemented by the NGOs and described in the last chapter, the CBOs tended to focus on what they knew best, especially community infrastructure development and maintenance. However the environment in which they were working had changed dramatically since 1992, and the resources that had been provided through the kolkhoz or state structures were no longer available.
To a degree not assumed in the literature on communal civil society, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was engaged in advocacy in addition to its service provision tasks. With regards to minority return it took a strong role in agenda setting, policy development, and policy implementation. In the last chapter we employed Roche’s (1999: 192) definition of advocacy as “the pursuit of change in policy and practice for the benefit of specific individuals or groups of people.” While we found that our NGO case studies were more likely to be engaged in a form of advocacy that “strengthened the basis for citizens’ potential action” (Covey 1998), in the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ case advocacy clearly signified both strengthening popular participation and influencing policy change. Thus the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could be defined as a “policy entrepreneur” (Najam, 1999). The extent to which the Karategin Valley VOs engaged in policy-related advocacy appeared to be much lower. Thus, based on the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VO cases, we can agree with Roy’s (2002: 131) statement that communal civil society “offers a shield against state coercion […] and also] against the economic ravages stemming from the collapse of the Soviet social security nets.” However the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ example demonstrates that Roy’s argument that “what this type of society does not do is provide political actors” is inapplicable to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs both fit into Carroll’s (1992: 11) definition of “primary grass-roots organizations” or “the smallest aggregation of individual or households that regularly engage in some joint development action as an expression of collective interest.” Carroll predicted that the scope, level, complexity and function of the two groups would be relatively limited. For example where Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) find that most peace/conflict resolution groups utilize more than one strategy or tactic in their work, the Karategin Valley VOs were almost uniquely involved in service provision. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, however was engaged in service provision, bridging and lobbying. Korten’s generational model (1990) is also inadequate in predicting the two CBOs’ capacities to further expand the scope and depth of their activities. It can be argued that by 1996-1997 the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had reached the “fourth generation” in Korten’s model (1990) when it was cooperating with groups of displaced from throughout the former Yugoslavia, and advocating for the right of
minority return for all. After return was successfully implemented however it refocused on “first generation tasks:” the provision of relief and welfare.

IV. Linkages of the case study CBOs

IV.a Sevarlije MZ linkages:

The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ was deeply embedded in the Sevarlije community, but its success in sustaining the return process was also a consequence of the extensive web of linkages it developed with local and international authorities. Its relations were more intensive with partners in the Doboj area, and its contacts with more distant actors – international organizations and NGOs based in Sarajevo or outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federation or RS governmental authorities – were much weaker. As in the NGO cases described in the previous chapter, the majority of the contacts that the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ leadership had with governmental authorities and representatives of international organizations were based on personal relations rather than institutional or legal commitments.

During the war the head of the Sevarlije MZ in exile had strong connections with the Doboj Municipality in Exile, Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and SDA but these did not provide the foundations for strong cooperation during or after the return process. In interviews Aziz, Sabrija, Hamdija and Uzeir strongly denied having obtaining political assistance from Bosniak governmental authorities to facilitate return. Instead Sabrija (21.10.2001) claimed, “our conclusion was that we had to work for ourselves, and in the end that was the proper decision. I think that at that time we had waited for our leaders we would still not be back.” What linkages existed between the Sevarlije Board for Return and Federation authorities were less a function of politics than personal contacts based on kin and place of origin. In Sevarlije’s case kinship may have influenced decisions on the allocation of aid from Federation authorities. For example the Federation official who allocated grants to the Sevarlije MZ in 1998 and 2000 had a daughter who married into a Sevarlije family.51

51 The Ministry of Work, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Doboj-Zenica Canton (Federation) provided Sevarlije returnees in 1998 with 20,000 DM and in 2001 with 200,000 DM. Miralem Galijasevic, who was the head of the Ministry in 1998 and Deputy Minister in 2000 and granted this aid had a daughter who married into a family from Sevarlije.
Ideology rather than institutional arrangements determined the nature of Sevarlije Board for Return MZ relations with the Doboj municipal authorities. Until Fall 1997, when the first post-war municipal elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Doboj municipal government was dominated by nationalist members of the SDS with whom Sevarlije representatives had no ties. After the Fall 1997 elections when the SDS’s monopoly on power was broken in the municipal assembly and 21 seats out of 69 went to Federation based parties, the relationship began to improve. Aziz, the President of the Sevarlije MZ, served as a municipal counselor in Doboj at this time (Aziz, 1.12.01). After the 2000 municipal elections, when the SDS won over 44% of the vote, the political environment shifted again. Aziz lost his seat in municipal government and had difficulties even to arrange a meeting with the Doboj Mayor to discuss village infrastructure (Aziz, 08.09.02). It can thus be argued that the connections that existed between the Sevarlije MZ and the Doboj municipality were dependent on the political composition of government, rather than institutionalized within a broader structure of local self-government. This was also possible because legislation on local self-governance was vague on municipal authorities’ responsibilities to MZs.

In past studies (OSCE 2002) MZs have been found to have close contacts with political parties and provide political elites with a channel to manipulate the community for political gain. For example, it was found that in many cases, “Boards are not elected in accordance with local statutes but appointed by political parties. This ‘cronyism’ involves the potential for MZ Boards to become the tools of municipal parties rather than a vehicle for representing the needs and interests of ordinary citizens” (OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002: 2). The World Bank survey on local level institutions (2002: 75) also noted that informants complained that political parties controlled MZs. They also believed that MZ boards’

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52 Leaders of the SDS in Doboj has been accused of being personally involved in the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from the Doboj area and other acts of extreme violence (Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, December, 1996).
53 “OSCE Releases Preliminary Results for 37 Municipalities” elections results published by OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 12 April 2000 (15:00 CET).
54 For example nothing in the legislation on local self-government indicated that Municipalities were under the obligation to consult MZs, share information with them on municipal budgets or plans, include them in hearings or committee meetings, or offer them training or technical help.
achievements depended largely on the MZ President's political affiliations. In Sevarlije persons interviewed stated that political parties played no role in the MZ elections process or in MZ decision-making. Yet especially before 2000, the Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return had links with political parties. Aziz was elected on a SDA ticket. In 1998 members of the Citizens' Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica founded their own political party: The Party for the Return of Displaced and Refugees to the Doboj Municipality. They joined the SDP list for the 1998 Elections; and the Citizens' Association nominated twenty-eight out of the 39 SDP candidates for the RS House of People (Ramiz, 24.10.01). Nevertheless when it came to return, Board for Return/ MZ members (Samir, 23.10.01, Uzeir, 4.08.01) underlined that the process was made possible because the CBO relied on its own resources rather than waiting for political parties to come to an agreement amongst each other. In 2001 Sabrija (22.10.01) exclaimed "if at that time we had waited for the SDA party leaders, we would still not be back to Sevarlije now."

Especially before the return process began, the Sevarlije Board for Return and the Citizens' Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica that preceded it, had extensive contacts within a Yugoslav-wide network of refugee and displaced persons associations. Through its' contacts with the Coalition for Return and Let's Live Together, the Citizens' Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica entered a dialogue with representatives of the international community, with Doboj-based Serb NGOs, and with governmental authorities in Zenica and Doboj. The intra-communal Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return thus demonstrated a capacity to bridge differences based on nationality and ethnicity, and to cooperate with liberal forms of civil society.

Several large international organizations working on return related issues in the Doboj area, including the UNHCR, USAID, and Mercy Corps, worked closely with the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ even before it was registered. These partnerships were partially based on the personalities of those involved. For example, in 1997-1998 the Sevarlije Board for Return cooperated closely with the UNHCR Doboj Branch Office. The Sevarlije representatives interviewed all underlined the significance of the contribution of the head of office at the time. He was personally committed to assisting the return process, and considered the representatives of the Sevarlije Board for Return, as well as those of the Serb Pridjel and
Potocani MZ, as serious partners. The head of office’s assistant in 1997-1998 remembered that “we were not supposed to negotiate return – but we did not want people’s lives to be threatened so we decided to go through this painful process of negotiating at the grass roots level” (Rado, 08.11.01). The UNHCR head of office was thus not following a programming directive from his superiors. The Sevarlije Board for Return personally trusted their UNHCR counterpart and as Sabrija (22.10) described “we did not make any protests or moves without his approval.” The ad hoc and innovative relationship between UNHCR and the local community groups was a determining factor in the success of the return process.

Though the Sevarlije Board for Return did not have any contacts with Serb or international security forces before the return to Sevarlije, the UNHCR, with whom it was closely linked, did. As has been pointed out by others, successful minority return depended greatly on coordination amongst the major international organizations (Cousens, 2002: 549). UNHCR cooperated with the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to encourage Doboj municipal police to provide necessary and adequate security. As Rado (08.11.01) recalled, this cooperation between Sevarlije Board for Return, UNHCR, IPTF and the Doboj police was particularly effective, because “the pressure on the local police to comply and perform their duties was in a way stronger and harder than it was on civil authorities.” In this case inclusion of law enforcement forces was essential. A large SFOR base was also located at the foot of Sevarlije, and soldiers could intervene to secure peace should confrontations develop. Rather than relying on SFOR, UNHCR felt that the military should maintain a low profile, and that confidence building should be the outcome of reconciliation and dialogue, with security guaranteed by police rather than military forces. In 2001 Doboj police continued to visit Sevarlije occasionally and to check with the MZ that no security problems existed.

IV. b Karategin VO linkages:

The Karategin Valley VOs were deeply embedded in the communities in which they were located but it was difficult to ascertain what types of linkages they had beyond the village borders. Contacts with groups outside Tajikistan and with bodies based in Dushanbe seemed weak. However to state that the village organizations had no outside linkages would be to argue that they did not fit within Tajikistan’s dense system of social networks.
based on kin and regional/village origin. As described above the VOs were clearly integrated into these links of solidarity.

The VOs were part of a homogenous tight knit social network based in the Karategin Valley. In some parts of Tajikistan (Kurgan Tuppe, Dushanbe) the war became a conflict between people from different regions, in which for example people were killed because they were from the Karategin Valley, but with little regard to whether or not they supported the opposition. However the Karategin Valley was considered largely homogenous and no such “regional” based violence occurred there. The harassment and killings that happened did not follow any obvious ethnic, religious, parochial, family or political lines. In the Karategin Valley a UTO field commander may have had a brother working in the government administration. In the post-war period, a former field commander, now heading an MSDSP district office, noted (25.07.02) that if there were problems in and around Kurgan Tuppe that did not exist in the Karategin Valley this was because “here we live alone. There are no Kulyabis or any other groups. And alone we have to continue to live and make our future.”

As we saw in Chapter 2, field commanders continued to exert substantial influence in the region in 2002. Yet all six VOs Presidents interviewed claimed that they had no contacts with them. According to the head of the Shulmak VO, by 2002 most field commanders had either migrated (generally to Russia for employment) or been re-integrated into civilian life. However other statements suggested that the field commanders continued to play an influential role due to the power they had gained during the conflict. A young woman interviewed in Shulmak, described how UTO fighters have been very strong in the village. Until Fall 2001 they banned any singing or dancing at weddings. They did not allow girls to attend school after the 9th grade, and insisted that women stay inside their homes. Even in 2002 this informant considered that former field commanders had more influence than the VOs President because they had the ability to physically threaten him (interview in Shulmak on 30.07.02). The VOs ability to influence field commanders' behavior will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But here we can note that though the VOs stated that it had no ties with former fighters and opposition this was highly unlikely in the cohesive environments in which they co-habited.
Official contacts between the VOs and the government were even less frequent than they were in the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ case. Semi-official links existed between the VO and the Jamoat (the lowest level of government) which in general provided a one-way information flow from the VO to the Jamoat. All six Karategin Valley VO leaders interviewed explained that their main reason for contacting the jamoat was to “obtain authorization” to start new projects. This was done in particular when projects involved areas outside the VO’s territory. Jamoat representatives also chose on occasion to attend the VO meetings – especially when they needed the village’s help. The district and the jamoat were not a-priori concerned with reacting to village level problems. The VOs did not appear to lobby government structures through official institutionalized channels, though it is highly likely that solidarity networks based on kin and territory made possible “informal” advocacy. For inhabitants of the Karategin Valley in 2002 the ability to lobby in this manner with higher level government officials was nevertheless limited by the small presence of Karategin-natives in central government.

The main linkages that the VOs had were with MSDSP staff. In addition to funding (see next section), MSDSP provided them with material support, training and moral guidance. According to the VO Charter (2001: 16), MSDSP also sought to facilitate the development of links between VOs, the state, market institutions and other civil society actors. In 2002 in the Karategin Valley this process had not yet begun. VO leaders did not lobby or advocate with MSDSP staff as the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ did. Yet a fundamental difference existed in the nature of the relationship between community-based organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While in Bosnia-Herzegovina most decision-makers in IOs were expatriates, MSDSPs’ policy was to put Tajiks in leadership roles. MSDPS staff in the district offices was originally from the Karategin Valley and included former

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55 In one village organization meeting observed a (female) member of the district (hukumat) government participated (when no other women were present) and came to request that VO members prepare their village for the visit of the President Rakhmonov.

56 The Karategin Valley was also dis-empowered by its position within the overall Tajik governmental structure. The Republic of Tajikistan consists of the Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Region (GBAR), the regions of Sogd (former Leninabad) and Khatlon, the capital city of Dushanbe and thirteen districts directly subordinate to the central government. The districts of the Karategin Valley were thus all directly subordinate to the central government in Dushanbe. They were not united administratively and did not have their own authorities above the district level. (Abdullaev, 2002b)
governmental officials, scientists, technical experts, field commanders, and other community leaders. Thus they tended to be highly respected in the VOs with whom they worked not only because they represented a large organization with funds and resources, but also because they had a status that pre-dated their engagement with MSDSP. MSDSP’s staff positions in the complex kin and territorial networks also undoubtedly affected how VO leaders collaborated with them.

IVc Comparing Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO linkages:
It could be assumed that the history of close cooperation between communal civil society and the state in Yugoslavia and Soviet Tajikistan would guarantee that the MZs’ and VOs’ linkages with local government would be better than those described in Chapter 4 between the state and NGOs. Yet the two CBO cases had few contacts with local government. During the communist era in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between governmental authorities and local self-government institutions were carefully regulated, and provided the latter with resources, information and clear responsibilities. In the post war period in both countries legislation on local self-governance had changed: while the Sevarlije MZ could still consider itself to be a formal institution of local self-governance, in Tajikistan there was a void below the jamoat and no structures carried out local self-governance at the village level. Thus the VO had no official relationship with governmental authorities, and the Sevarlije MZ had only a weak one. In both cases whatever ties existed were based largely on personal relationships rather than being formally institutionalized.

While the Karategin Valley VOs had few or no contacts with Tajik liberal civil society organizations, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ cooperated with various communal and liberal forms of civil society, especially before the return process began. Though an intra-communal organization, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had ties with Serb and Croat groups involved in the Coalition for Return and other Yugoslav-wide refugee/displaced persons’ initiatives. Regardless of their ethnic or ideological background, these groups shared the interest of insuring that the right to return was guaranteed. Significantly though the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had contacts with political parties, ultimately they did depend on them to assure return, deciding to advocate independently. Once Sevarlije’s inhabitants began to regain their pre-war homes, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ’s
contacts with other civil society groups waned, with the possible exception of the Serb displaced persons community in Pridjel and Potocani.

Both the *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* and the *Karategin Valley village organizations* had linkages that were deeply grounded in the local community, but they did not consider these bonds as significant sources of political influence to be employed cooperatively with other CBOs. The *Karategin Valley VOs* seemed to operate with few contacts outside the district and with few contacts with neighboring *VOs*. The *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* developed close ties with the *Pridjel and Potocani MZ* because of the years they spent dialoguing about return, but *a-priori* they did not cooperate to obtain better services, or lobby more effectively with the government. Aziz had occasional contacts with other MZs at municipal meetings. But in general his feeling after meeting MZ representatives was that “when I heard how they were complaining then I decided that it was not necessary for me to say anything. We organized our lives in the way that we thought was best for us” (08.09.02). Similarly in the Karategin Valley, when queried about cooperation with other *VOs* the head of Shulmak’s group replied, only partly in jest, that “between different *VOs* we are competing to see who can accomplish more” (Rakhimov, 30.07.03). *VOs* tended to meet in MSDSP organised training sessions, but did not have an understanding of how to employ limited resources co-operatively. In the longer term MSDSP hoped to develop interactions between “clusters of VOs” (MSDSP 2002a: 20) but in 2002 this had not yet commenced. The *VOs* like the *MZs* could thus be considered as having little consciousness of the common interests that could bind them with their neighbors, and of their ability to have a greater impact on change through cooperation, and “strength in numbers.”

Previous studies of international organizations’ civil society development programs (Pugh, 1998; Duffield, 1999; Roy, 2003) have criticized external actors for bypassing communal civil society and partnering predominantly with NGOs. Yet the *Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ* and the *Karategin Valley VOs* benefited from significant levels of cooperation with international organizations. This may reveal a shifting of donor priorities and strategy, and a new openness to working with communal civil society. In the Sevarlije case in particular, the CBO was considered not only as being an aid recipient but also a partner in decision-making. Compared to the NGOs described in the last chapter, the *Sevarlije Board*
for Return/MZ was also more deeply involved in directly lobbying international organizations to affect change.

IV. Structures and funding of the case study CBOs

I.V.a Structure of the Sevarlije MZ:
The structure of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was formal from its inception because the existence of legal provisions governing MZ’s creation, responsibilities and working mechanisms. In the Sevarlije case, the MZ structures and tasks were regulated by the Doboj Municipal Statute, Section 6: Participation of Citizens in Local Self-Government, “On Creation of MZs and Elections to MZ Councils” (Art. 33-47), the RS Law on Local Self-Government, and the attached “Instruction on Forming MZs”. The MZ competencies defined by legislation at the Entity and Municipal level were vast, sometimes contradictory and unclear (OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002: 1).

The registration of the Sevarlije MZ’s in November 2000 was not only an administrative but also a highly political step in the context of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the Sevarlije Board for Return tried to register in 1999, the Doboj authorities refused to consider the request. They argued that Sevarlije residents had to procure RS ID cards in order to be considered as RS citizens with the right to register an organization. Subsequently some 70-80 Sevarlije residents obtained RS ID cards, and in March 2000, after much lobbying by Sevarlije representatives, Doboj Municipal authorities accepted the re-activation of the Sevarlije MZ. By registering in the RS, the Sevarlije MZ sent a clear political message that it accepted the rule of governing authorities in Doboj and Banja Luka, and its position within the RS. It was a significant shift for the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ’s leadership, especially when compared with its war time position which considered regaining control of Sevarlije to be a military task.

Sevarlije’s leadership’s main mission in registering their organization as an MZ was to gain an official status within the Doboj municipal system of government, which they considered would provide them with greater leverage than they had as a Board for Return or an NGO.

"As an instrument of local government, MZs have extra powers, to participate in the work
of the Municipality," noted Uzeir (20.10.2001). The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ's commitment to re-activating the pre-war MZ was also linked to an emotional desire to return to a pre-war way of life. As seen above, the MZ status did not in fact provide Sevarlije with better access to services, or a greater say in government affairs. The MZ registration points to the strength of historical and cultural modes of action; even when MZs were devoid of many of their official powers, the institutional value remained fixed in the psyche of local citizens.

The MZ Board is elected at a citizen assembly (zbor gradjana) meeting, with elections to be held every two years (Doboj Municipal Statute, Art. 45). The MZ was thus a form of representative democracy in which the 9 member Board had executive authority and represented local citizens. MZ Boards could however be elected with little more than 1/10th of the MZ citizens present. Hypothetically a situation could develop in which MZ Board members were not approved by a majority of MZ inhabitants, or even families. This posed particular problems in ethnically “mixed” villages – and led to the creation of “double” or “parallel” MZs and the further fragmentation of institutional structures at the local level (OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002). In Sevarlije, in November 2000 one woman and eight men were elected to the Board out of 13 candidates. Some 130-140 people (70% men, 30% women) participated (Aziz 08.09.02).

As described above, a committed, experienced and educated leadership was essential to the successful return of the Sevarlije community. Centralized leadership was a key characteristic of MZ structures, and legislation provided for the election of a President with the power to “represent the MZ in all relations and affairs with third parties” (Sevarlije Statute, Art. 4). With such influence the MZ President risked falling prey to relationships of patronage, and being pressurized to favor certain groups over others. As has been found in other studies (Eade, 1997: 178-179), especially with the advent of significant resources, existing biases in favoring families from a particular political faction, clan or ethnic group

57 And Canton level in the Federation

58 The OSCE argued that “the composition of MZ Boards does not always reflect the ethnic composition of the MZ. In addition the composition needs to ‘anticipate’ potential future returns (taking trends into account). The Law on Local Self Governance should state that quotas are used in these MZs, which would prevent the bitter conflicts that this issue may raise in mixed MZs.” (OSCE, 2002: 2)
were at risk of intensifying. Though difficult to verify, this may have been the case in Sevarlije. Presidential accountability to MZ members was dependent on the organization of bi-annual elections and regular MZ board meetings. However elections were not required to be multi-candidate, and during the 2000 Sevarlije MZ elections only one person ran for the MZ President position. Aziz’s experience, knowledge and contacts may have made him a logical MZ President in 2000. However two years later when the next round of elections were due to be held according to the Doboj Municipal Statute (Art. 45), Aziz’s readiness to possibly hand over power would be tested. In addition to guarantee more equitable power sharing, Aziz explained that he generally organized a meeting of the MZ Board once a month (08.09.2001). To increase accountability, once a year he presented a report and work plan of the MZ activities that was discussed at a general citizens’ assembly meeting.

Local self-government legally aims to facilitate the active participation of citizens in local decision-making. As the Sevarlije MZ charter states, “citizens in the MZ give initiatives, suggestions, opinions, participate and decide...” (Art. 6). To ensure accountability and transparency MZ Councils are required to organize citizens’ assembly meetings or referenda when deciding on issues relating to the MZ’s functioning. The Sevarlije MZ did not organize any referendum in 2000 or 2001. However it did call for citizen’s assembly meetings. According to Aziz (08.09.2002), “every time we initiate a significant activity in the village, when we have an issue to discuss with the people, we gather all of them to hear their opinion, pass on the information and make decisions concerning the action.” Issues addressed in 2002 included: de-mining, the organization of municipal elections, and power distribution.

Nevertheless, as the reconstruction process advanced, MZ members’ trust in their leadership began to decrease, active participation waned, and divisions within the MZ became more apparent. Husein Hadzic, the head of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ and one of the leaders of the Sevarlije Board for Return, passed away. From 1998 to 2002 three different MZ secretaries were appointed: Sabrija, Hamdija and Edin Hodzic. Even though Sabrija and Hamdija were actively involved in the return process and in the pre-war MZ, trust in them diminished after 1998 and Aziz felt compelled to dismiss them (08.09.2002). Aziz himself resigned in 2001 (but shortly afterwards was reinstated). As will be described
below, much of the community's disappointment in the MZ leadership was linked to its inability to amass sufficient resources to finance the reconstruction of all homes.

In ways similar to the NGO case studies in the last chapter, over time the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ progressively formalized its organizational practices and structures. The Sevarlije MZ's leaders’ enthusiasm, ambition and ability to work long hours began to decrease in 2001 as their immediate goal to return to Sevarlije was fulfilled. Like in the Zene Zenama case, the gradual consolidation of peace affected the Sevarlije MZ as popular modes of thinking shifted to longer-term concerns. Another example of the Sevarlije MZ's steps towards formalization was a shift in 2002 in its hiring practices. The first two MZ Secretaries were appointed by the MZ President without any formal selection process, based on friendship ties and their past experience. When the third Secretary in two years had to be chosen, the MZ organized a formal application procedure. Aziz (08.09.02) explained that “this time we advertised the post because we thought that it would be more democratic to give everyone who was interested in supporting the MZ the opportunity to apply.” Clear qualifications were sought out – including a technical degree, and the ability to be highly communicative and innovative. Five persons applied and the MZ Board selected a person who met the criteria and was relatively young.

I.V.b Sevarlije MZ resources and financing:
The pre-war Sevarlije MZ financed most of its community capital improvements through self-contribution, but in the post-war period came to rely on international organizations for the donation of materials and other inputs. Between 1999-2002 the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ carried out fundraising with international organizations to finance additional expenditures related to community rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Some 90% dependent on international donors in 1998-2000, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ took advantage of international policy makers’ decision to prioritize support to minority communities when 1998 was declared the “Year of Return.” Through the use of targeted aid – making assistance conditional on the return of minorities – the international community tried to encourage local authorities to enforce the right to minority return (Vandiver, 2002, Cousens, 2002). Projects implemented to meet this goal included the
“Open Cities” program (UNHCR), the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF, by UNHCR and OHR), and bilateral assistance such as $22 million provided by the Dutch and $58 million by the US Governments in 2000-2001 (ICG, 2000: 17). Within this broader aid context, the Sevarlije MZ received its first funding from the UNHCR who provided in-kind assistance, as well as funds for the reconstruction of sixty four houses in support of the Summer 1998 return. In 1999 the Sevarlije MZ reconstructed another 17 UNHCR houses, and 40 houses through Mercy Corps Europe/Scottish European Aid. In 1999-2000 the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ also benefited from $1,248,950 from USAID for infrastructure rehabilitation, including the reconstruction of the primary school, the health facility/community center, the water supply system and the electrical supply system. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ lobbied to obtain this support, and as Hamdija (22.10.01) recalled, “we did not want to wait, so we went around and begged and asked. We knew one or two persons in each of the international organizations that worked here before. So we regularly would call them up.”

The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ’s reliance on foreign funding made it highly sensitive to changing international priorities. In 2000 international organizations faced a large-scale funding gap due to the rapid rise in minority returns throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICG, 2000). One of the largest shortfalls was in the housing sector. Though the Sevarlije MZ continued to approach international organizations in 2000 and 2001 to fund the reconstruction of the approximately 300 destroyed houses remaining in the village it was largely unsuccessful. In 2000 according to Rado (08.11.01) it was evident that while there

59 Letter from UNHCR Doboj Head of Office Mr. Oliver Burch to the Mayor of Doboj, Mr. Mirko Stojcinovic, dated 7 September, 1998.
62 The 67,447 registered minority returns (refugees and displaced persons) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000 represented a 64% increase from 1999 (USCR 2001: 4).
63 In 2000 the UNHCR estimated that 23,000 houses needed to be rebuilt but that 4,700 were financed and planned with 3,000 being reconstructed at the time. (UNHCR 2001: 191)
64 Based on the monthly RRTF Information Sheets (created by OHR RRTF Doboj) from July 2000 to October 2001, no donors financed reconstruction of properties in Sevarlije until May 2001 when World Vision proposed to offer loans for the reconstruction of 7 or 8 houses.
were many new returns to Sevarlije, international agencies wished to “invest in new areas.”

Though the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could no longer depend on large voluntary contributions, it sought to obtain some financial support from citizens’ in particular to pay for community services. Local inhabitants’ revenues had significantly decreased in the post-war era. For example the local whitewash quarry which had provided a significant percentage of the “self-contributions” in the 1980s by collecting them from workers’ salaries, no longer functioned after 1992. From 2000 onwards, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ attempted to collect 2 DM ($1.2) per month as MZ membership fees to finance a small stipend for the MZ Secretary, MZ phone and electricity charges. In 2000 part of the members’ contributions financed the salary of a second elementary school teacher. According to Aziz (1.12.2001) the Sevarlije MZ was often successful in collecting the fees: “we try to ensure that people pay. We use the fact that people sometimes need the services provided by the MZ and we use those opportunities to remind them that they should pay. If someone is unable to we can bend the rules but that is the exception.” The MZ also gathered revenue through water user charges for maintenance of the water supply system. The Sevarlije MZ’s ability to garner funds when citizens had no legal obligation to pay was impressive even if insufficient to finance capital improvement.

When the Sevarlije MZ was unable to provide assistance for additional housing reconstruction it began to lose trust and respect within the Sevarlije community. A rumor spread in Sevarlije that the international community had placed an “embargo” on the

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65 The ICG (2000: 9) also took note of the funding shortage in Sevarlije. It stated that “In the Doboj region, RRTF officials estimate that as of 12 May 2000, international assistance to returnees meets about 10% of requirements. […] Although 123 homes have been reconstructed in the village of Sevarlije, 300 more families await funding, while an additional 50 families live under plastic sheeting or in the rubble of their homes.”

66 In a detailed study carried out by the European Stability Initiative (ESI, 2002: 10) on the municipality of Kalesija another example of how an MZ raised funds is provided. In the case of MZ Tjsici the municipality of Kalesija had transferred the right to rent certain buildings. The MZ amassed an annual income of approximately DM 100,000 that it spent on maintaining the local football club and in contributions to local road and water projects. In another example three MZs in Kalesija collected money from their citizens, hired a construction company and rebuilt and extended their local telephone network in 1997. Of the total cost of DM 601,200, an ordinary family paid DM 590 for connection, together with a tax of DM 154 to the PTT. The success of this project attracted the interest of other local communities and the municipality. In the second phase, another 1,377 new connections and 888 reconnections were completed, at a total cost of DM 878,340. (ESI, 2002: 13)
village. Signs of the decrease in legitimacy of the Sevarlije MZ leadership were noted by Aziz, and visible to his closest international counterparts. For the first time since the return process began, in 2001 a group of Sevarlije returnees approached Mercy Corps Europe/Scottish European Aid independently of the Sevarlije MZ seeking housing reconstruction and complaining that the MZ leadership was not doing enough (interview with Marko Nisandzic, 7.11.2001). The MZs' reliance on international assistance, and diminishing citizens' financial participation in MZ work, thus contributed to the de-legitimization of the MZ and its leadership.

The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ also sought resources from governmental authorities. In the pre-war system when MZs were considered to be a part of government, they could rely on governmental support to cover their administrative costs. In 1998-2002 the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was unable to obtain more than 500 DM from the Doboj municipal government. Queried on why support from the Doboj municipality was so limited, Aziz (08.09.2002) answered “I don't know why. Maybe it's because of the current weakness of the municipality, or because we are a Bosniak MZ. It could be either.” However, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was considerably more successful in obtaining funds from Federation authorities. Some 20,000 DM was provided by the Zenica-Doboj Canton in 1998,67 and in 2001 thirteen returnee families in Sevarlije received materials worth 200,000 DM to winterize their homes.68 A study (ESI, 2002) carried out on the Kalesija Municipality (Federation) concluded that “to overcome the chronic underdevelopment typical of rural regions in Bosnia, municipalities must learn to use their resources to generate capital investment in the infrastructure and local services” in close cooperation with MZs. The cases described in the ESI study show positive potential, but due to its weak linkages with the Doboj Municipality the Sevarlije MZ was unable to obtain a sufficient collaboration with municipal authorities to follow such examples.

67 Requests for assistance from Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica to the Zenica-Doboj Canton, Ministry of Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (2.07.1998); letter of support from the Zenica-Doboj Canton, Ministry of Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (15.09.98); receipts from the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica to the Zenica-Doboj Canton, Ministry of Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (16.09.98 and 23.10.98).
IV.c Karategin Valley VO structures:

Karategin Valley VO structures were institutionalized in a way that the community based organizations that preceded them had never been in Soviet times. Unlike in the Sevarlije MZ case, it was not the State but MSDSP which defined the governing of village organizations. Provisions governing the VO’s creation, responsibilities, working mechanisms and external linkages were elaborated in the VO Charter, which was developed in 2001. The Charter was based on discussions with MSDSP management and VO leaders. The Charter aimed to serve as a “generalized framework” (MSDSP 2001: Introduction) but in practice it was followed virtually to the letter by the Karategin Valley VO leaders interviewed. According to it VOs are representative bodies of households living in a given geographic locality who voluntarily come together to make decisions and undertake activities to advance common interests and improve the livelihoods of community members (MSDSP 2001, Art. 1).

Arguably the VO Charter helped fill a gap in Tajik legislation, as by 2002 no official text comprehensively regulated the work of local self-government bodies at the village level. Partly this was due to the slow pace of reform in Tajikistan. The Constitution of the Republic, passed in November 1994 and a series of subsequent laws lay the foundations for the country’s higher state bodies. A Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages existed since 1994, according to which local self-governance is described as “the system of organizing public activities to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion.” (Preamble) However while providing jamoats with duties, the law did not elaborate on the competencies or working mechanisms of village level bodies (Ilolov and Khudoiyev, 2002: 610; also UNDP 2000: 57, Freizer 2004a).69 The Presidential Office established a committee to work on new legislation on institutions of local self-governance in 2002 to fill this void.70 Thus Karategin Valley VOs operated in a legal vacuum.

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68 “Sevarlije returnees receive aid in construction material,” 21 November 2001, ONASA report. Yet as we mentioned previously this donation was just as likely to reflect the importance of kinship as other forms of solidarity.

69 In 2002 356 jamoats functioned on the territory of Tajikistan. On average jamoats tended to represent some 6-12,000 inhabitants.

70 According Rahmatillo Zoir, Legal Advisor to the President of the RT (until July 2003), the draft would include several significant changes, amongst them mahallas would be for the first time included as institutional forms of local self-government (interview with Zoir, 15.07.02).
Karategin Valley VOs were unsatisfied with their status and sought the means by which they could regulate it more officially. Consequently in 2002 several VO leaders planned to register with the Ministry of Justice according to the 1998 Law on Public Associations.\(^7\) Registration according to this law did not provide groups with a status within the system of government; but rather clearly identified them as non-governmental. VO leaders considering this option were therefore moving in the opposite direction from the Sevarlije MZ leaders'. In interviews however it seemed evident that Karategin Valley VO leaders were muddled in their understanding of the differences between non-governmental and self-government groups, for-profit and not-for-profit bodies. They did not understand their registration as a means of joining a broader Tajik non-governmental sector.\(^2\)

Karategin Valley VOs understood registration as a way to formalize their status, broaden their contacts with international organizations, and obtain more funds. As the VO leader from Kalai-Sur explained, “When we are registered we will be able to cooperate with other donors and NGOs. We hope that 3-4 people from our organization will be able to get salaries. Our main concern now is to increase our funds, to be able to accomplish more” (Hokimov, 29.07.02). For the VOs registration was also a means to assert their independence. “Registration will allow us to be independent of the hukumat and the jamoat and to accomplish more,” according to VO leader Ibrohimov (25.07.02). Unlike the leadership of the Sevarlije MZ, the Karategin Valley VO Presidents did not aim to register to increase their political leverage on government.

The election of the VO leadership, as stipulated by the VO Charter exposed the Karategin Valley villages to a process of participatory democracy, though often without women’s participation. As defined in the VO Charter, the VO leadership - usually including a chair, deputy, bookkeeper and the head of the women’s organization - was selected through elections, with the participation of at least 80% of households living on the village’s

\(^7\) According to this law (Art. 5-6) “a public association is a voluntary, self-governing, non-commercial formation, created at the initiative of citizens [...] to fulfil and protect the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms of citizens (ICNL 1998).”
Chapter five

territory. His/her mandate was for two years. Candidates for VO leadership positions were obliged to work as volunteers (MSDSP 2001, VO Charter, 4.1.1-4.1.6). The VO Charter (4.1.2) indicated characteristics that VO leaders should have, including: the ability to put the interest of the village before self-interest, the belief in volunteerism, trustworthiness, honesty, inter-personal skills, and the trust of the people and village elders (MSDSP 2001).

In the six Karategin Valley VOs studied the elections were held soon after the decision to create a VO was taken. They took place in the chakhana mosque, the main village community gathering point. However, holding the elections in this location meant that in three out of the six Karategin Valley VOs no women participated. In these cases separate women’s meetings occurred during which the head of the women’s organization was selected. There appear to have been few conflicts concerning the selection of leadership. According to the VO Charter (4.1.3) “the purpose of the elections is not to cause divisions in the village. The purpose of the election is to have good leadership” (MSDSP 2001). The only fragmentation that occurred at the village level was thus between men and women, included and excluded in the process, rather than between families.

The VO structure aimed to reduce opportunities for private gain by VO leaders, and increase public accountability of elected officials through the organization of regular village meetings. The leadership of the VO was not authorized to execute decisions without consulting the village organization as a whole. As stated in the VO Charter (4.1.8), “it is this holding of leaders accountable that is the essence of a participatory organization, where the leaders know that they are accountable not to outsiders but to insiders” (MSDSP 2001). By mentioning the role of “outsiders” the VO Charter inherently recognized that where there are donor funds a shifting of accountability from beneficiaries to donors may occur.

The holding of regular VO meetings could potentially serve as an exercise in participatory and deliberative democracy. At the monthly general gatherings 80% of households were

72 In summer 2002 no VOs in the Karategin Valley had officially registered though several were in the process of preparing the necessary documents. In GBAO, however, 6 or 7 had registered according to MSDSP Program Officer Mark Whitton (interview 13.07.02)

73 Significantly Tajikistan has no tradition of elections of local governmental authorities. There is a clear vertical chain of command in the Tajik governmental system. The President (whose last election in 2000 was not considered free or fair by the OSCE) appoints the heads of the provincial and district governments, in turn district authorities nominate the head of Jamoats. The VO leadership thus has a unique elected mandate.
required to be present. Such participatory decision-making and direct forms of democracy were possible because village organizations represented between 500 and 50 households living in a relatively small territory. The general gathering was considered to be the legitimate entity representing the community, through which citizens carried out self-management. In the Karategin Valley VO meetings were held monthly with between 70-200 participants (depending on size of village and time of year). At the meeting local needs, and projects to satisfy them, were discussed and agreed upon. The extent to which decision-making was the product of actual debate was unclear. The VO leadership could also make decisions prior to the meeting and have them rubber stamped at the monthly gathering. At one VO meeting I observed there was an active discussion on the need to refurbish the local school, on members’ insufficient membership fee contributions, and the VO head was openly accused of misusing funds. The debate was lively but largely monopolized by a handful of VO members and ultimately inconclusive. It showed that for community meetings to be truly participatory necessitates more than the establishment of formal structures, but a mentality change based on a greater understanding of individual rights and responsibilities. It requires the initiation of new forms of dialogue, based on active listening and consensus building.

Ensuring the participation of women, youth and the poorest was a problem in the VO structure. According to the VO Charter (Art. 2) “from each household at least one woman should be a member of the Women’s Group of the VO,” but interviews revealed that this did not occur. In three out of the six Karategin VOs observed women and men held separate monthly meetings. Inevitably women discussed “women’s problems,” or the projects that benefited them directly such as micro-credit for women. Less frequently they talked about community issues such as infrastructure development or social service provision. Even when they did, no mechanism to feed their discussions and conclusions into the (male) village meeting existed. Participation by persons under 17 was not authorized and the level of active involvement of young males – many who spent several months a year working in Russia – appeared low.

74 “In principle, MSDSP only recognizes the general body of the VO as a legitimate entity, and its development partner at the village level.” (MSDPS 2001, VO Charter 4.1.8)
75 Shul monthly VO meeting (24.07.02)
IV.d Karategin Valley VO resources and financing:

Village level organizations financed the construction of community social and physical infrastructure in the 1980s through the voluntary contribution of funds, materials and labor, obtaining some additional support from the kolkhoz. However, after Tajik independence and the ensuing civil war, this system collapsed and many village level organizations became dormant. As the Loyova VO head (Eshanov, 22.07.02) explained “when there is no money you don’t feel like doing anything, even talking.” VOs were often set up in reaction to this. “Because many people were poor in the village, we saw the creation of the VO as a way to get assistance from MSDSP. We had observed how MSDSP worked in other villages so we decided to go to them to ask for help (Piramavdov, 26.07.02).” Though village level organizations had existed for centuries, their re-activation and transformation into VOs was thus largely dependent on the availability of foreign funding. When I asked interviewees to explain to me the difference between the VO and the mahalla the vast majority responded that there was little distinction between the two but that the former had funds while the latter did not.

Like the Sevarlije MZ, the Karategin Valley VOs were heavily dependent on international donor funding, and took advantage of an aid context which privileged community development in the Karategin Valley. By 2001-2002, when most of the Karategin Valley VOs were formed, the international donor community in Tajikistan had clearly shifted their focus from relief to development (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003). Amongst the main multilateral donors and international organizations operating in Tajikistan a new interest in supporting community based organizations had surfaced. The World Bank (2002b) argued that the strengthening of community based organizations (community-driven development), “is an approach that can bring a sense of empowerment and real opportunities back into the communities, especially the poor.” Until 2001 international agencies had been wary of engaging in the Karategin Valley because of security concerns.

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76 International programs that had a community development approach included: the UNDP Tajikistan Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Program (RRDP) which set up Jamoat Development Committees (JDC), the USAID funded “Peaceful Communities Initiative” implemented by *Mercy Corps International*, the USAID “Community Action Investment Program,” the *Counterpart Consortium*
However large-scale donors including USAID, GTZ and European Commission earmarked greater funds for the region in 2002. The funding available to Karetegin Valley VOs was nevertheless a fraction of what the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ benefited from.

The Karategin Valley VOs essentially relied on a single donor: MSDSP. Only the Loyova VO President lobbied other international organizations for funding in the same way that the Sevarlije MZ leadership did. The others either claimed that they needed to register beforehand, or seemed to be concerned that MSDSP may misconstrue their cooperation with other donors as disloyalty. As the Karashahr VO leader (Piramavdov, 26.07.02) pointed out “all international organizations want to work with their own people.” There was no guarantee that other international organizations would recognize the VO authority. This was a problem that MSDPS staff was conscious of and according to Mark Whitton (13.07.02), “one of the key capabilities we want to judge ourselves on is the capacity and ability of the village organizations to access resources from other parties. We want them to go out to other people and get resources.” But this also engaged MSDSP and signified that they had to coordinate and cooperate with other international organizations/donors to ensure that they understood the VO concept.

Heavy reliance on MSDSP risked making Karategin Valley VOs’ initiatives donor driven. Most activities and projects carried out by the Karategin Valley VO focused on food production, physical infrastructure development, and income generation. The overriding strategy of MSDSP’s program to support the development of VOs was to “build the capacity of the community to analyze village resources, plan together as a group, access resources, implement planned activities, assess the success of implemented activities” (2002a: 17). This implied that VOs should determine community needs and how to meet them. Nevertheless, as the Shulmak VO head (Rakhimov, 30.07.02) explained, “when we have a VO meeting people decide what they want. But MSDSP and other IOs have their

“Community Outreach Program” and the Swiss-funded Peace “Promotion Program for northern Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan.”

77 In June 2002 USAID allocated $4 million to the Community Action Investment Program (CAIP) for Tajikistan, but focusing on the Karategin Valley. (Abdurahim Muhodiv, 14.10.02).

78 While the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ obtained infrastructure rehabilitation support worth $1.248.950 in 1998-1999 (for six projects, USAID, Municipal Infrastructure Services Management Information System,
own criteria which it was necessary to meet.” Thus the projects that the VO proposed tended to be ones that they knew MSDSP was interested in funding. Two of the VO leaders (Kalai-Surh and Shulmak) interviewed talked about how young people requested to obtain VO assistance. But this had not been discussed at the VO meeting and the projects were not shared with MSDSP because the VO Presidents considered that they were not within MSDSP’s field of interest. Women in several VO(s) stated that, though they were pleased with the micro-credit they were obtaining through MSDSP, they were eager to obtain medical equipment or kindergartens (Kobilova and Jobirova, 31.07.02; Ismoilova, 25.07.02, Mamadjonova, 26.07.02). Thus even though MSDSP was conscious that “VOs should be careful that they do not become just the ‘delivery mechanism’ for other agencies; that they do not turn themselves into ‘clients’” (VO 2001), this was exactly what VO(s) tended to do in practice.

MSDSP prioritized food production, infrastructure and income generation projects when the VO may have had a different concept of local needs. Karategin Valley VO(s) did not obtain funding for medical projects, information dissemination (access to newspapers, media sources, books), legal assistance, conflict resolution, educational, sports or cultural activities. One MSDSP staff member related his reaction during an initial village meeting, when a VO requested funding to re-stock its library. As he explained, “The fact is that they were starving, or they would be starving without humanitarian assistance [...] They wanted to have a library. What library? Don’t you think that it’s a problem that your village receives 5 to 10 tons of humanitarian assistance?” (Whitton, 13.07.02). MSDSP did not always trust or agree with the VO(s)’ identification of needs. In addition the donors funding MSDSP often earmarked their funding. For example USAID funding to MSDSP was for infrastructure development. Thus even though the Kalai-Sur and Karashahr VO(s) clearly identified school renovation as their priority need in 2001, MSDSP had no donor to finance the work at the time (Piramavdov, 26.07.03; Hokimov, 29.07.02). Inevitably with so many

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Progress Sheet w/status by Municipality, 21 November, 2001), the entire USAID grant to MSDSP for its operations in the Karategin Valley (i.e. in 72 villages) was $562,800 in 2002.

Meshcheryakov found the same phenomenon in Siberia (Tunka Valley) where he observed that “villagers are buying luxuries (prestige goods, things for pleasure), even though they lack basic household utensils and means of transport. He attributes this to the ‘habitude produced by the Soviet regime that the population would be supplied with the means of production from above, while the task of people themselves is the organization of leisure according to their own ideas.’” (Meshcheryakov 1996 in Humphrey 1998: 460)
organizations involved, the donors' priorities often preempted those of MSDSP and of the VO.

Even though the Karategin Valley VOs could not depend on voluntary contributions as they had in the past, they continued to collect membership fees and to organize community work activities according to the hashar principle. Membership fees tended to range between 20 diram – 1 somoni per person ($1 = 3 somoni). The poorest contributed in kind. However in all Karategin Valley VOs wealthy VO members or persons working abroad contributed more, especially during community celebrations, hashar, or to finance the purchase of specific public goods (a carpet for the chaihana/mosque for example). The Loyova VO leader (Eshanov, 22.07.02) claimed to have written to those persons originally from Loyova now living in Russia to inform them of the creation of a “serious organization” in the village and to request their support. According to MSDSP statistics the six VOs under study had collected 4493.6 somoni (3 somoni = $1) since the day of their foundation in membership dues. It is possible however that the VO’s collected more for village activities but did not include this in the “official” statistics presented to MSDPS.

The Karategin Valley VOs were encouraged by MSDSP to increase private contributions to the VO in the form of cash and labor. MSDSP aimed to break with communist era practices whereby the state was generous in the allocation of benefits and financial support. Its strategy fits the liberal project of rolling back the state described in Chapter 1. Though MSDSP generally financed infrastructure renewal through grants, the majority of the other projects were supported in the form of credits to be paid back in cash or kind. The rationale behind the credit system was, “We do not give anything to anyone for free. We want people to learn how to work, to earn money for the bread themselves. Now farmers start understanding that in order to have something they have to work” (Saidov, 31.07.02). The contributions of VO members to project implementation generally ranged from 30-70% of total project costs. While MSDSP’s financial injection to the six Karategin Valley village

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80 MSDSP Rasht Program Budget for 2002.
81 Qalai Surkh had 1205.4; Loyova: 327; Shulmak: 834; Khuja Ainee: 1459; Tagikobod: 291.2 and Qarashahr: 377 somoni. MSDSP, Information about the Saving of VOs of the Rasht Valley, 30.06.02.
82 As indicated above VO Presidents often helped with the organization of weddings and funerals. The funds that he raised for this endeavor may not have been included in the MSDSP statistics for example.
organizations under study was of 10,419 somoni in the first seven month of 2002, the VO’s contribution exceeded it by more than double, totaling 24,639 somoni.\(^8\)

The *Karategin Valley VOs* were even less likely to turn to the government for financial support than the *Sevarlife MZ* was. None of the *Karategin Valley VOs* claimed to have obtained any state financial support since their formation. This could not be linked to a deliberate decision by the government to withhold funds to the *VOs*, as may be the case with the *Sevarlife MZs*. Rather it was more likely to be due to the weakness of local government and its own funding deficits.\(^8\)

**IV.e Comparison between MZ and VO structures and financing:**

Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina shared similarities as post-communist states that faced the challenge of establishing mechanisms to ensure good governance, decentralization and increased accountability of governmental authorities. In 2003 though legislation has been passed on institutions of local government in both countries (*Law on Local Self-Government in Towns and Villages* in Tajikistan, the *Law on Self-Government* in the RS) many uncertainties remained regarding the responsibilities, structures and financing of institutions of local self-government. In Tajikistan local self-government was understood as existing at the *jamoat* level and not the village or *mahalla* one. Thus a gap below the *jamoat* existed. In Bosnia-Herzegovina *mjesne zajednice* continued to function but with much less financial or legal authority than previously. Roy (2000: 89) argues that during Soviet times communal civil society in the *kolkhoz* was strong because the countryside was under-administered by the state. A similar governmental under-administration of local communities appears to have developed in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The *Sevarlife MZ* and the *Karategin Valley VOs*’ experiences demonstrate how this void in governance could provide communal civil society with an opportunity for increased innovation, decision making, and independent initiative. However in this context the

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\(^8\) Qalai Surkh: 4156; Loyova: 3324.4; Shulmak: 3679.5; Khuja Ainee: 982; Tagikobad: 8482; Qarashahr: 4016. (MSDSP, Projects of VOs of Rasht Valley approved in 2002, 05.07.02).

\(^8\) State budgeting is a complex issue in Tajikistan though according to Ilolov and Khudoiyev, “all statistics confirm the reduction of real opportunities for local governments to invest in social, cultural, and economic development.” (2002: 625).
development of effective synergies between higher authorities and community based groups was also limited.

The cases of the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs reveal the difficulty of clearly conceptualizing community-based organizations in post-communist environments as governmental, non-governmental, or self-governing. This points to the challenge of standardizing institutions and concepts of self-government across country contexts. While the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ chose to register as a means to link more closely with government, the Karategin Valley VOs wished to gain more independence from local authorities and sought to register as “public associations”. In practice the legal status of the organization may even be somewhat irrelevant to any discussions on the links between civil society and the state. Due to the political culture in Tajikistan the government was likely to exercise more control over “public associations” than the state did over MZs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs had less flexibility in defining their structures than did the NGOs described in the last chapter because the VOs were bound by MSDSP regulations, and the Sevarlije MZ by the Doboj municipal statute. Participation, accountability and oversight mechanisms were more clearly defined than they were for the NGOs. The CBOs’ representatives were elected, and citizens called upon to actively participate in all decision making. The VO and the MZ leadership was held accountable to the organizations’ membership at regular village organization meetings. However like in the NGO cases, strong, charismatic and trusted leadership was crucial to the success of the CBOs.

Community participation in decision making could be considered to be more effectively guaranteed in the CBOs than in the NGOs studied, yet in both the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs full and equal participation of women was not achieved. In the Tajik case VO leaders evoked “shyness” and tradition to explain why women did not join mixed public meetings. Studies in other contexts (Eade, 1997: 112, 177-178) have found that tradition is frequently invoked as a form of resistance to external forces which are seen as morally decadent or culturally threatening by those in position of power, including male
traditional leaders. In several instances the head of the women’s groups in the VOs explained that women were encouraged to be active in the Soviet era, and that they participated more at that time (Ms. Hokimov, 29.07.02; Ismoilova, 25.07.02). Even in the case of the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ, which was much less patriarchal than the Karategin Valley VOs, women played a small part in the organization’s leadership. Men were valued more highly as social leaders. War time harassment and violence may also have undermined women’s self-confidence and self-respect (Kaufman, 1997: 155-157). Under these conditions several of the Karategin Valley VOs choose to have women-only meetings, in Sevarlije women created their NGO Stublicanka as a sort of parallel women’s organization.

The CBOs were as highly dependent on foreign funds as the NGOs Zene Zenama and Ghamkhori. To a large degree international funds replaced pre-war citizens’ self-contributions and state subsidies. When citizens provided private funds to the CBOs it was usually to pay for a specific service, such as the provision of water, or the salary of a teacher. While it might be assumed that international funding of CBOs would be inferior to funding of NGOs, the resources that Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ obtained for its beneficiaries and members dwarfed Zene Zenama’s budget. While the Karategin Valley VOs operated in an environment in which there was substantially less external funding available than in the Doboj municipality, the VOs relied extensively on international patrons. Most notably perhaps, even though the Karategin Valley VOs were receiving insignificant foreign funding in comparison with the other cases, they appeared to be even more susceptible to “donor driven projects” and “upwards accountability.”

Conclusions:
This chapter described how the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs organized in their respective post-war environments, and explained why the inhabitants in the two localities formed CBOs, which fit within a communal definition of civil society. In both the Bosnian and Tajik cases local communities reverted back to organizational types that existed before the war when they chose to formalize their modes of interaction. They set up mjesne zajednice, and village organizations that had a great deal
in common with the former *mahallas*. This points to the virulence of traditional forms of organizing.

This chapter provided some understanding of the challenges that post-communist states face in their definition of new structures and practices to fill the void left by the disintegration of communist era forms of local self-governance. In both countries comprehensive and complex systems of local self-governance existed previously. Our findings from the Karategin Valley seem to support Roy's (1999, 2000, 2002) argument concerning the "recasting of former solidarity groups into a 'socialist' system (2002: 127)."

In this sense the values and power relations of traditional communal groups largely defined Soviet village level institutions. In the post-war era there is nothing to suggest that the same will not occur with the *VO* structures. In the Bosnian case, at least in Sevarlije, the reverse seems to have happened, as traditional forms of community solidarity adopted Yugoslav ideals and integrated into the official local self-government structure. Paradoxically, though Sevarlije had been more dependent upon and integrated into the state, its leadership remained self-motivated and organized during the war. Karategin Valley village leaders were apparently more passive. This may have less to do with the nature of former government-civil society relations than with the level of economic development, access to communication links and infrastructure, and closeness to urban centers, which also affected sentiments of greed and grievance in the community. It is likely that pre-war grievances were much higher in Karategin Valley communities than in rapidly industrializing villages around Doboj.

As with the NGO cases described in the last chapter, the success of the *Karategin Valley VO* and the *Sevarlije MZ* was highly dependant on their experienced and charismatic leadership, system of values, ability to build trust within the community, understanding of donor relations, and linkages. For the CBOs, as for the NGOs, foreign funding was essential for survival. As we saw in the last chapter organizations benefit most from foreign funding when the alliance is based on common values and agreement about long-term objectives. Arguably the *Sevarlije MZ* initially had a good funding relationship with international partners because it developed out of a joint effort to promote minority return. Nevertheless, the *Sevarlije MZ* case also demonstrates the negative impact of large-scale
reliance on foreign donors. Once their priorities began to shift away from Sevarlije, funding shortfalls caused MZ members to question its leadership’s effectiveness and to seek alternative modes of organizing.

Several of the findings in this chapter contradict assumptions on communal civil society presented in Chapter 1. In several instances, the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin Valley VOs behaved in ways, which theoretically seem more suited to liberal forms of civil society. Through its’ lobbying and advocacy efforts to make return to Sevarlije possible, the Board for Return openly affected policy formulation and political decision-making. The electoral system set up to elect MZ and VO heads promoted public participation in decision-making and the accountability of local leadership. Perhaps more than the NGOs in the last chapter, the CBOs contributed to a privatisation of state welfare provision. This was the case in Sevarlije where funds were collected from citizens for the use of a range of services and reinvested directly into the community with little or not intervention from municipal authorities. Similarly, in the Karategin Valley, VOs private resources were put into MSDSP funded projects. Like the NGOs described previously, the CBOs were highly dependent on foreign funds, and perhaps even more prone to upwards accountability. Somewhat surprisingly, considering their Soviet era linkages with government, we find no evidence that the CBOs benefited from greater co-operation with government officials than our case study NGOs did.

A key finding of this chapter is that homogeneity facilitates community organization, the provision of social welfare and services, and the development of communal civil society. The Bosnian and Tajik communities studied were characterized by ethnic, religious, and political homogeneity, as well as relative economic equity. They were “intra-communal” (Varshney, 2003: 3), and “bonding social capital” (Coletta and Cullen, 2000) insured cohesion. Leaders of the CBOs were tied to their communities by strong loyalties and interests including those based on family, neighborhood, village, ethnicity, religion, and political preference. A World Bank study (2002b: 6) on community development in Central Asia argues, “in addition to socio-economic differences, ethnic heterogeneity has shown to make participatory engagement very difficult and can have an adverse affect on project effectiveness.” The homogeneity of the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin Valley VOs may thus
in part explain their strength. One important difference to note between the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin Valley VOs is that the former cooperated with “other” communal CBOs, mainly Serb displaced communities, while the later did not, and functioned largely autonomously. It was when return had been accomplished, and the Sevarlije MZ had less reason to cooperate with Serb groups along inter-communal lines, that tensions and divisions began to appear within its own structure.
Chapter Six:

Civil society organizations' affect on peace consolidation in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction:

Having considered civil society organizations' characteristics in postwar post communist contexts through four case studies I now return to the original question posed at the start of this dissertation, “what type of civil society is most likely to affect peace?” More specifically, I will try to determine, whether communal or liberal forms of civil society have made positive contributions to peace consolidation. As described in Chapter 2 four of the main approaches to peace consolidation present different theoretical answers to this question. Institution building approaches to peace building consider that NGOs can support the strengthening of democratic institutions, economic liberalization, and the privatization of social service delivery. Conflict resolution proponents argue that both CBOs and NGOs can improve contacts and trust between former warring sides; modify values and modes of dialogue; and increase group cohesion and the initiation of common action. Political economists are less convinced about the impact that civil society organizations can have on the juxtaposition of greed and grievance that makes the use of armed violence more likely. They tend to favor CBOs as the agent most likely to reduce grievances. The human rights based approach contends that a specific form of liberal civil society - tolerant, activist and committed to the protection of human rights – can contribute to peace. In the following chapter we will determine to what extent these assumptions about civil society organizations’ ability to positively affect peace consolidation are verifiable in the Tajik and Bosnian context, where five years after the end of war peace was being consolidated, albeit to different degrees depending on which approach to peace is favored.

I. Civil society organizations' affect on institution building.

As we saw in Chapter 2, Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to face institutional peace consolidation challenges five years after the end of war. Peace agreements in both
countries laid the framework for new democratic governments. A series of elections, which partly met international standards, had been held. For the first time since independence, a coalition of non-nationalist parties had won majorities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in several lower level races in 2000. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the challenge of establishing a functioning “unified” government remained nevertheless largely unfulfilled as many of the institutions of a centralized state – an army, supreme court, common ministries – were weak or non-existent. In Tajikistan the government and the opposition had agreed upon and implemented a power-sharing agreement, and the president had effectively centralized many state powers. As the executive was increasingly dominating the political system, institutions and mechanisms for public participation remained weak (ICG, 2003: 10-11). In both countries the extent to which the state should be centralized or decentralized remained a point of contention. Efficient revenue collection and delivery of public services were problematic. Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina were publicly committed to liberalizing their economies, yet little sustainable macro-economic development had occurred.

I.a Civil society organizations’ contribution to democratic institution building
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from war as new states challenged by the task of establishing effective democratic political institutions. At first glance the CBOs and NGOs we observed appear to have had little impact on this process. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the responsibilities and relationships of state bodies were defined in the Constitution (Annex 4 of the GFAP), drafted in the US to which few Bosnian elites or citizens, let alone civil society contributed (Cox, 2003: 253). In Tajikistan a parallel Inter-Tajik Dialogue with civil society activists to some degree contributed to the official negotiation process leading to the 1997 General Agreement. Four Dialogue participants became part of the Commission on National Reconciliation in charge of the agreement’s implementation and drafting new legislation. Nevertheless the number of civil society actors engaged was limited, and the extent and nature of their influence on political decision making during and after the war difficult to determine (Saunders, 1999: 147-170; Slim and Saunders, 2001: 46-47).
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Though the organizations we studied did not bring about changes within regional or national level institutions or decision-making, it can be argued that they affected local level governance, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Amongst the four organizations observed, only Zhene Zhenama had contacts with federal state officials, and these were of a personal nature rather than institutionalized. However, all four had a degree of contact with municipal level authorities. At the municipal level, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, had a particularly important impact, by contributing directly to the (re)unification of municipal governmental structures. Aziz served simultaneously at one time as the MZ President and as a delegate in the Doboj Municipality Assembly. Rather than boycotting or obstructing a municipal body, which was part of the Serb Republic system of government, the head of the MZ, and the Bosniak community he represented, chose to actively participate in policy making. When it registered as an MZ in the RS, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ countered fragmentation of lower government along national lines. The Sevarlije Board for Return MZ also strengthened its members' citizenship ties to the RS by encouraging them to take RS ID cards, register as RS residents, and receive RS pensions. Thus the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ defied the fragmentation of formal Bosnian institutions, and contributed to the building of more effective municipal level bodies. The leadership of Zhene Zhenama was not directly involved in local government but several persons who benefited from its programs were elected to local office. This was particularly noteworthy in Brecko where the election of eight women of different national/ethnic background, who had previously participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions, strengthened the multinational character of the town authority.

We find even more evidence to argue that CBOs, such as those studied in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, can facilitate decentralization and the strengthening of local self-government. The Karategin Valley VOs and Sevarlije MZ were influenced by their past experiences as institutions of local self-government in Soviet/Yugoslav times, and sought to regain capacities to fill voids in local level governance after the war. An institutional interpretation of the Tajik and Bosnian wars - where the conflict was largely seen as the outcome of a competition for control over state institutions/resources after the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia - underlines the importance of decentralization. While the system of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina was highly decentralized – at least
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until the cantonal level – in Tajikistan it was the opposite. Whether centralization or decentralization is more likely to positively affect peace remains an issue of debate. As has been shown in other cases (Kaufman, 1997: 13) decentralization’s positive aspects are often reduced when the state is unable to balance demands among competing groups; local government resources are weak; and political, ethnic, regional and gender polarization threatens community cohesion. In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina tensions existed in the post-war period between the need for decentralization to promote more responsive government and greater popular participation in public affairs, and the equally critical need to ensure that the state remained unified with functioning institutions.

The case study CBOs were critical not only in promoting decentralization per se, but also in increasing the democratic foundation of local self-government. As Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2003: 300) demonstrates in her study of decentralization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, comparing the situation in Mostar with that of Tuzla, “decentralization by itself is not sufficient in fostering democratic processes conducive to conflict management.” She argues that institutions of local self-governance must be shepherded by democratic values, and be politically and socially inclusive, for them to positively affect peace. All my case study organizations promoted the institutionalization of elections as a mode of selecting community leaders. Due to the nature of communism in the Soviet Union, in Tajikistan, citizens’ experience with direct democracy and multi-candidate electoral politics was weaker than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet the Karategin Valley VOs implemented a system by which village organization officials were selected through open suffrage rather than by appointment by higher state bodies. Ghamkhori also encouraged mahalla committees to elect their officials rather than acquiesce to their top down appointment. As will be described subsequently, however, a lack of women’s full inclusion in the Karategin Valley VOs was a significant problem which arguably limited the positive benefit of decentralization.

As institutions of local self-government the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs also promoted greater participation in local decision-making. Regular meetings of MZ and VO members and staff were accompanied by debates on the prioritization of needs and the means to address them. The two CBOs were in a position to
provide information on local needs and to represent the interests of their communities vis-
à-vis domestic authorities and international agencies. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2003: 2) thus contended that institutions of local self-government “can be
utilized as interest groups, providing a forum for particular community interests at higher
levels of government [....] In addition, given the population size of most municipalities,
particularly in rural areas, the MZs are an effective method of incorporating greater citizens
participation.” The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs appears to
corroborate these assumptions by contributing to increasing citizens’ participation in local
affairs.

Beyond the local and municipal level, the civil society organizations we studied enhanced
formerly disenfranchised citizens’ public participation in electoral politics. The Sevarlije
Board for Return/MZ encouraged Bosniaks to take part in RS level elections in 2000. By
providing confidence and support to women, as well as skill development and training, Zhene Zhenama increased women’s participation as candidates, voters and members of
government at the national and local level. The NGOs’ affect on elections was
institutionalized in 1998 when Bosnian electoral rules and regulations were modified to
increase the number of women on candidate lists. Zhene Zhenama also helped produce new
leaders at the local level, for example in Brcko where women who had previously
participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions obtained positions in the city government
in 2001. The Tajik case studies were not similarly active in the 1999-2000 election process.
In 2002 it was early to tell what their influence might be on the scheduled February 2005
parliamentary suffrage. Karategin Valley VO leaders denied having any interest in party
politics; yet in 2002 Ghamkhori was beginning to consider what role it could play to
increase participation in the elections, especially for women. Amongst my four case
studies, I did not observe any formal relations between civil society organizations and
political parties, linkages between activists in the two types of groups were weak. The
organizations had little or no influence on candidates, political party platforms or party
decision-making.

Three out of four of the civil society organizations influenced policy formulation and
implementation with regard to issues of direct relevance to post-conflict peace
consolidation through their educational and information dissemination activities. Zhene Zhenama affected government agenda setting, policy development and policy implementation with regards to women’s rights protection, increasing the number of women in public office, trafficking and domestic violence prevention. The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ and the refugee/DP organizations with which it networked were highly effective in maintaining minority return as a pressing political issue among domestic and international political bodies. By 2002 Ghamkhori had also initiated a dialogue with municipal authorities on issues related to women’s health and rights. It had begun to contribute to policy formulation on domestic violence and primary health care.

I.b Civil society organizations' support of economic liberalization and the privatization of social service provision

I find no evidence that the civil society organizations observed in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina had any influence on macro-economic trends in the post-war period. They played little or no role in transforming wartime economies to market orientated ones or in the privatization process. However it can be argued that they had an affect on community level physical and social infrastructure maintenance and development. In post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where social institutions and social policy were weakened by the substantial economic, social and political transformations that accompanied the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, civil society organizations stepped in to help fill the void.

During the war and in the immediate post war period, international humanitarian and development agencies encouraged a privatization of welfare assistance by working mainly with local NGOs to implement a host of programs in food sustainability, health and education. The groups with which they cooperated became known as “service delivery NGOs” (Stubbs, 2000). They were financed to provide a range of services to vulnerable groups which otherwise may not have been offered, or would have been provided by the state sector in pre-war times. Some critics (Smillie 1996; Stubbs 2000, 2001) who analyzed the Bosnian situation have argued that in doing so international agencies promoted a Western-style liberal model of social service provision, which incidentally also fit within their liberal peace building project. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stubbs (2001: 132)
argues that in the post-war period there was not only a “liberalization” of social policy but also an “ethnicization.” This was due to post-Dayton structures of government and the ethnic allegiances of many civil society organizations where “separate ethnicized claims and loyalties are legitimized, leading to three separate welfare regimes underpinned by a social vision which limits reciprocal relations.”

Evidence from my case studies rejects the strongest criticisms of civil society involvement in social service provision. Rather than serving as an alternative to the state, the NGOs and CBOs complemented governmental initiatives, filling crucial gaps. As one Bosnian activist (Mevlida Kunosic, 19.03.01) explained government officials were learning that there are “some programmes that they can implement better with NGOs than alone.” For example Ghamkhori provided training to nurses on home birthing methods, as some 80% of rural women no longer went to state clinics to give birth; and hygiene courses in villages where water sources had become contaminated. The Sevarlije MZ re-started the local school, collected money to pay for a teacher’s salary, and through its women’s group, ran a kindergarten. The NGOs and CBOs we observed targeted populations that tended to remain excluded from state assistance schemes, and engaged in activities which the state often deemed non essential. They supported hard to reach mountain inhabitants – as existed in Tajikistan – as well as other disenfranchised groups including women, minorities, former combatants and youth. As we saw in the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO cases, community based organizations also mobilized to meet social needs which carry highly symbolic and personal meanings – such as marriages or funerals – but would otherwise not be considered as high priorities for community survival. NGOs in particular could address un-popular, sensitive problems, such as post-trauma stress disorder, domestic violence and trafficking which for mainly political reasons governmental bodies tended to discount as nonexistent or unimportant.

Civil society organizations further contributed to service provision by diminishing tensions between citizens and the state with regard to the allocation of services. Of relevance to Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina it has been found that “the Communist system left a double legacy: individuals are likely to have a high degree of trust in their immediate social network, and a high degree of distrust in the formal institutions of the state (WB 2002a:
In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens' trust in the effectiveness, honesty and neutrality of state institutions decreased in the 1990s (UNDP 2001, WB 2002a). The state was caught in a vicious circle where government collected low levels of tax-based revenue, which provided little to finance social services, which created greater public discontent as well as incentives for corruption and a decreased willingness to pay taxes.

In this environment the civil society organizations I studied served as mediators to improve trust. Thus Ghamkhori's lawyers working with victims of domestic violence succeeded in encouraging women to address local courts with their grievances. Due to its privileged access to rural women, and its knowledge about their needs, the NGO also served as a useful information source for state authorities, increasing their awareness, and influencing them to change their response mechanisms. In the RS, the Sevarlije MZ was an intermediary between the returnee Bosniak community, international organizations and local Serb authorities, building trust on all sides. This was essential as "municipal leaders had significant decision-making power over the distribution of social benefits and community services, from access to humanitarian assistance to medical care, education and pensions (Cousens, 2001: 81)." The Sevarlije MZ liaised directly with municipal authorities, provided them with information on needs, advocated for assistance and to some decree succeeded in re-establishing trust vis-à-vis the state within its community. Working closely with international organizations and MZ members, it also contributed to reducing some of the tensions that tend to arise within communities over the distribution of external aid. Based on their knowledge of needs civil society organizations were in a position to establish fairer and more transparent criteria concerning aid allocation. Thus our case study organizations provided select services while also encouraging the communities they worked with to rely on coping mechanisms that supported state legitimacy and capacity. They played a unique role as "bridging organizations" (Brown, 1998: 230) and "brokers" (Smith, 1998: 217).

Rather than exacerbating an "ethnicization" of social service provision (Stubbs, 2001: 132) three of the case study organizations counteracted the fragmentation of state assistance. The Sevarlije MZ was the most clear in this regard when it accepted in its Bosniak community RS provided services such as the RS school curriculum, policing by Doboj law
enforcement officers, and a RS based medical professional in its village clinic. To gain access to these services the MZ lobbied authorities in Doboj and Banja Luka. NGOs like Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were one of the few institutions in the post-war period who provided service regardless of ethnicity/regional background and purposely sought out persons who had been excluded based on their identity. They also encouraged their beneficiaries to have recourse to official institutions regardless of their ethnicity: thus for example Ghamkhori bolstered Garmi women’s confidence to visit medical and legal professionals regardless of whether they were Garmi or not.

Our case studies show the potential for civil society organizations to contribute to more effective service provision by recommending new methodologies and tailoring them to local realities. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori thus piloted innovative approaches to address new problems, providing amongst other services, psychosocial assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and free legal aid in Tajikistan. The Karategin Valley VOs managed revolving funds – a credit concept that had never been formalized in the country previously. Faced with sharply rising cases of typhoid and malaria, and a breakdown in state health care provision, Ghamkhori taught alternative medicine and traditional disease prevention rather than employing treatments highly reliant on costly imported medication. They claimed (Bahodur and Mikhail, 14.06.02) that their methods “saved lives and welfare” and that the Department of Health credited them with reducing by 2-3 times the number of typhoid cases in the villages in which they worked (Mikhail, 24.05.02). Ghamkhori staff used previously unknown interactive teaching methods, and trained rural teachers in similar methodologies. Ultimately the leaders of the case study organizations hoped that their innovative methods would be adopted amongst state bodies and professionals working in the public sector.

Studies of social developments in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union describe how community based organizations played a role in physical infrastructure development (Lockwood 1975; Roy 2000). In the 1980s, in both countries, community based groups facilitated capital gains projects by mobilizing community resources and implementing works. My case study CBOs continued to organize community actions to contribute to the rehabilitation of destroyed social and physical infrastructure. They could no longer rely on
state bodies to assist them with finance or machinery, and community members no longer possessed the same financial resources as they did before the war. Yet even in a context of declining wealth, the CBOs succeeded in collecting rare community resources which were supplemented by foreign aid. Where government had assisted previously in the post-war post communist context, foreign financing was providing the necessary structures through which to mobilize community self-help and mutual aid. The CBOs provided capacity to build and maintain village infrastructure; they also collected user fees.

Lastly the cases demonstrate how civil society groups can positively affect economic development in the “employment marketplace” by providing jobs to middle class professionals and minorities whose skills would often otherwise remain dormant, or who would choose the immigration route. Positively Goodhand and Chamberlain (2000: 1000) note that in this way the organizations “may also be producing an important resource: a cadre of ‘organic intellectuals’ with community-mobilizing skills.” Other observers (Roy 2002: 143; Stubbs, 2000) have argued that this trend creates distortions in the local labor market as the non-governmental sector supported by outside funding diverts scarce human resources from the public sector. However Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori in particular hired medical, legal and educational professionals who were part of national minorities and who were likely to remain unemployed or under-employed in governmental jobs generally controlled by nationalist elites. They also operated in a high-unemployment environment where the lack of human capital was not (yet) a problem.

My evidence suggests that civil society organizations can have a positive affect on the consolidation of institution building but in less explicit ways than suggested in the literature. I find that civil society organizations have a role to play in strengthening linkages between citizens and local government, thus inherently increasing state legitimacy and capacity; by supporting decentralization, increased public participation, and the definition of policies that responded to minority concerns, in particular those of women. One of my key findings is that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan CBOs are just as likely, if not more, than NGOs to positively affect institution building. In particular CBOs demonstrate an ability to support improvements in public participation in community decision-making, public service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and development. The Karategin Valley...
VOs failed nevertheless to ensure full inclusion in decision-making for women. Our findings tend to support conclusions drawn by Kaufman and Alfonso (1997: 12-13) based on a six country comparative study of community-based organizations. They argue that CBOs have the potential of serving as guarantors of popular participation at the community level and in relation to national politics and decision-making; of harnessing untapped economic and human resources; of assisting in the provision of social services; and of providing community self-defense. In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina I also found CBOs making an impact in all these areas – except in the crucial task of influencing national politics and decision-making, where the case study NGOs were equally weak.

II. Civil society organizations’ affect on conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution proponents argue that peace is fundamentally dependent on changes in human relationships. “Until relationships are changed, deep-rooted human conflicts are not likely to be resolved (Saunders, 1999: 30).” Analyzing relationships for an external observer is a particularly difficult exercise. Recalling some of the discussion in Chapter III on the problems of conducting research in post-conflict environments, it is important to note that long term engagement in a war-torn country can provide a better framework for analysis. Thus for this writer – with experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina dating back to 1993 – by 2000 it was evident that personal relationships between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks had altered since the war years. In addition physical changes were visible: citizens traveled from one part of the country to the other regardless of what “ethnic” territory they crossed; the media no longer spewed viscous hate messages; cross-entity initiatives in a host of fields were commencing; “minority” religious institutions were being re-built in both entities...

In Tajikistan in 2002 on the surface there was little or no public expression of hate or anger among people from different regions. The peace building project appeared to have overcome the desire for revenge. Yet in 2002 government and administration continued to be dominated by officials from the President’s Kuliob region and dissatisfaction remained amongst regional elites who felt excluded from power. Poor transport links insured a lack of contacts between people from different regions. Especially in areas where people from one regional group were perceived to have committed atrocities against others during the
war, animosities remained. In a village outside Kurgan Tuppe visited in 2002, mothers described how they would not let their (Garmi/Karategin Valley) daughters go to school because on the way they had to pass a section of the hamlet where people originally from Kuliob lived. There “they may be attacked by Kuliobi boys” the women claimed (2.06.02).

Throughout this study one crosscutting question that has repeatedly arisen is “to what extent does civil society have to be inter-communal to positively affect peace consolidation?” Findings from past studies come to conflicting conclusions. Coletta and Cullen argue that reconstruction efforts should build on existing forms of bonding social capital, while seeking opportunities to strengthen nascent bridging social capital to spur social cohesion and peace. They hypothesize (2000: 122) that bonding and bridging social capital are complementary as “resilient communities rely on all forms of responsibility and social capital: bonding primary ties for protection and survival in times of crisis; bridging links for action and development in times of hope.” In Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life Varshney comes to the opposite conclusion stating (2002: 46) “Intercommunal engagement leads to the formation of what might be called institutionalized peace systems. Engagement, if only intracommunal, is often associated with what Paul Brass calls institutionalized riot systems.” Varshney’s argument is thus that intra-communal organizations and bonding social capital’s affect on peace should be the reverse of inter-communal groups’ and bridging social capital’s contribution.

This debate is particularly relevant to this study because the case studies can be considered as representing forms of bonding and bridging social capital. The NGOs that we studied were multi-ethnic, committed to values of tolerance, and to working with citizens across national, educational, and gender, divides. On the other hand, ethnic, religious, political homogeneity, as well as relative economic equity characterized the CBOs we observed.

II.a Civil society organizations and the strengthening of contacts and trust between former warring parties.

All four of the case study organizations played a direct role in promoting contacts within local communities, and building inter-group trust. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return maintained high levels of community confidence in the MZ leadership, and cohesion
amongst the displaced, successfully rallying them around a common vision of return to their pre-war homes. Similarly Zhene Zhenama offered a forum for women of different backgrounds to come together, treat each other with mutual respect and confidence. The Ghamkhori Women’s Center was another example of a “space” that provided interaction, and the opportunity for dialogue, in a “civil” environment. According to Ghamkhori staff, traditionally women were discouraged from relating their problems openly to others within their rural communities (staff, 24.05.02). Thus the environments that the Tajik and Bosnian NGO created were unique spaces within highly polarized, intolerant, and closed post-war environments. Through its community development support activities, the Tajik NGO also re-unified mahalla communities that had largely remained dormant since the breakup of the Soviet kolkhoz system. The Karategin Valley VOs provided an opportunity to institutionalize what were previously informal relations and interactions at the village level.

Yet within these “unique spaces” it was mainly the NGOs that provided their members, staff and beneficiaries with sufficient self-confidence and skills to engage in public life and openly formulate their interests. After the disintegration of the socialist systems of governance in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and years of internal war, citizens in both countries tended to be publicly passive, and less ready to engage in political debate. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both provided workplaces for multi-national staff to gain confidence. The NGOs nurtured a cadre of new leaders. They also gave confidence to new community activists – among previously disenfranchised groups such as women, displaced persons, and poor rural citizens - who over time could potentially lead local political processes or exert pressure from below on higher level authorities.

Three out of four of the organizations that we observed contributed to opening communication channels between members of former warring parties – thus beginning a process of transformation of their antagonistic relationship. The Sevarlife MZ/ Board for Return built contacts with Serb displaced persons and the Doboj municipality – before return was achieved it participated in 77 meetings with Serb representatives and members of international organizations. Overtime the tone of the meetings changed from one of open hostility to one of cooperation. As one observer remembers “the process of negotiation in a way crystallized the pattern of how return should be done (Rado, 08.11.01).” This supports
Saunders hypothesis that "sustained dialogue is the instrument that citizens outside government use for addressing the human dimension of conflict to change their relationships (Saunders, 1999: xxiii)." Such dialogue is likely to produce "shared problem definitions" which in turn are powerful incentives for further contact (Brown, 1998: 234). Similarly Zhene Zhenama organized a host of activities bringing together women from different national groups throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. One example of this was the Brcko roundtable described in Chapter 4 where, after two and a half years of regular meetings, Bosniak, Serb, and Croat women developed sufficient trust to establish a common women's group. Though Ghamkhori was less focused on promoting international/ethnic ties than were the two case studies from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also worked with antagonistic Garmi and Kuliobi groups. As described in Chapter 4, through its community development efforts in mixed villages such as Chapaev, Ghamkhori bred cooperation and trust between Garmis and Kuliobis.

II. b Transforming values and modes of dialogue:
Conflict resolution theorists emphasize the cultural and psychological aspects of peace consolidation. The conflict resolution project thus seeks in-depth transformations in society – paraphrasing Vaclav Havel, Saunders argues that "'We should fundamentally change how we behave' […] That different way of relating is the foundation for a peaceful society (Saunders 1999: 243)." Changing behavior inherently signifies forgiving and accepting the "other". Ways to change behavior include transforming the language, images, and modes of dialogue employed by post-war societies. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 214-215) found that civil society organizations contributed significantly to this process in three post-conflict settings. Civil society groups were successful through "their ability to create cultural images and symbols that provided new and novel frames for the definition and resolution of the conflicts. Once these new frames were accepted more broadly into public discourse, they provided powerful alternative models on how to think about, respond to, and resolve the conflict."

Three of the organizations studied dared to take the first step towards reconciliation; legitimizing contact and dialogue between different national groups; undermining wartime fears, prejudices, and hatreds; and creating a momentum that other citizens could follow.
Zhene Zhenama’s leaders were part of the first activists to travel to the RS and Herzegovina to meet with women “from the other side.” When they did so in 1995 they broke a paralyzing taboo created by a nationalist media. They were part of a broader movement in which, according to one analyst (Lejla Somun, 24.03.01), “NGOs’ main peace-building role was forming ties between people […] NGOs were channels for information which created conditions for reconciliation.” Dialoging with Serb authorities, and increasingly cooperating with them, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ similarly showed that Bosniak return to the RS was a real option. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ steps gave impetus to other Bosniak returnee groups to organize similarly. UNHCR officers recognized the significance of disseminating the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ’s experience to other groups of displaced persons. In several instances UNHCR facilitated meetings between the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the leaders of other displaced communities so that they could describe how the negotiation process had succeeded. Working in mixed villages Ghamkhori also encouraged people of different regional backgrounds to meet for the first time since the end of the war.

In the post-war period changing the language, images and symbols popularly used to think about the conflict was of particular importance. Ignatieff (1997: 70-71) argued that even the most virulent nationalist in the Bosnian war could be transformed into “something decent and human, if only he could read a newspaper or listen to a television broadcast that didn’t poison him with hate and lies […] that addressed him as a rational human being.” From its creation Zhene Zhenama’s leadership was committed to helping its beneficiaries see the “source of creativity as being in the diversity of relationships among human beings (Nuna, 14.11.01).” A multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina was promoted as the foundation of peace and stability rather than as a threat. While ultra-nationalists controlled the media, the NGOs could do little to change the public discourse. However, when traveling to Eastern RS in 1996-1998, Zhene Zhenama staff brought newspapers from the Federation to give their Serb beneficiaries an alternative discourse on the war and its aftermath. Gradually Zhene Zhenama succeeded in insuring that the media adopted some of its language, by going on the air to broadcast stories on women’s issues and inter-ethnic reconciliation, thus increasing the likelihood that its ideas would gain currency in the wider public. On the other hand for several months the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ refused to allow its
members to speak with journalists fearful that they would publicly distort the image of return before it was firmly secured. Only after return was well underway did the Sevarilje Board for Return/MZ's invite the media to publicize its message that for Bosniaks to live in the RS was possible. In its strategy to diminish violence against women, Ghamkhori also actively disseminated through the media information on gender issues. Like the organizations studied by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 205), our cases were able to transform modes of dialogue, and define new frames to describe the conflict and its solutions, through judicious cooperation with the media. Or as one Bosnian activist (Bulic, 21.03.01) explained, our cases played a significant role, because in post war situations "when normal values are discredited, civil society is the one which should bring normal values back."

The NGOs also contributed to the conflict resolution process of forgiveness "transforming certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other that open the possibility of new beneficial relations (Long and Brecke, 2003:23)." To transform negative images of "the other" Zhene Zhenama advanced novel methods to talk about guilt, pain, and trust, based on its experience with Western psycho-social and conflict resolution approaches. It taught its staff and members to be critical and think independently firstly about themselves, than about their self-perceived enemies.

II. c Civil society organizations' affect on building group cohesion and the initiation of common actions.

In Tajikistan, building group cohesion towards peace consolidation signified encouraging community members to take control over their own lives and to agree on a common vision about what they wanted their community to look like.1 The Tajik case studies thus assisted different groups within single communities to come together, publicly discuss interests, make decisions on the allocation of scarce resources, and divide tasks to carry out common actions. In monthly VO meetings the Karategin Valley VO's facilitated the development of a

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1 Participants in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue process which began in 1993 and continued in 2002 found in 1996 that "one of the main obstacles to peace is lack of common vision about what kind of country the Tajikistani people want. . . . A common vision shared by the citizens of the country is the necessary foundation for a negotiated peace agreement" (quoted in Saunders 1999: 165).
unified discourse on community interests – which at least in the public forum of the VO appeared to transcend personal interests, though not gender divides. Community members who contributed their own financial and in-kind resources to projects (funded by MSDSP) appeared to feel greater ownership, responsibility and pride over project outcomes. Ghamkhori’s mission was to help communities help themselves and through the establishment of mahalla committees it encouraged citizens to take responsibility with regard to the collection and allocation of scarce resources. Through its community development activities Ghamkhori assisted communities carry out essential work such as physical infrastructure maintenance, and implement new efforts such as Street Day in Chapaev, which promoted the image of a unified, proud and productive village.

The Sevarlije case provides a good example of how a CBO’s efforts could gradually build trust between two hostile communities, leading to the definition of common interests and the implementation of collective actions. Within their ethnically homogenous communities, the Bosniak and Serb MZ leaders first gained their MZ members’ trust, based on their national affiliation, wartime experiences, and political positions. After months of regular negotiations, the confidence they benefited from improved the CBO leaders’ abilities to persuade their communities to accept difficult compromises.² Serb and Bosniak MZ representatives reached agreement on the return issue when, through sustained dialogue, return no longer presented itself as a threat to Serb interests. Instead after the first Bosniak returns to Sevarlije in 1998, Serb DPs began to assist them in house reconstruction. When Serb DPs began to return to their own villages in the Federation, the Bosniak and Serb MZ members were further bonded by a mutual interest in return. Sevarlije MZ representatives assisted them in developing relationships with IOs and obtaining building materials. Ultimately in May 2000 the Sevarlije Board for Return organized the exhumation and re-burying of persons killed in Sevarlije at the start of the war, or later when they were displaced. At the time some 5000 people attended the ceremony, including law enforcement from Doboj who assured security. The Bosniak and Serb communities had

² For example speaking about the Serb head of the Pridjel MZ community who came to agreements with the Sevarlije Board for Return in 1998, the UNHCR program officer explained, “he was very exposed and blamed by the radicals. It was maybe only because he was a radical as well that he passed relatively safely through all that. He always publicly appeared to be a radical person, but privately we achieved things with him.” (Rado, November, 2001).
reached what Ignatieff (1997: 190) terms “the last dimension of reconciliation – the mourning of the dead,” when the desire for revenge had been replaced by “rituals in which communities once at war learn to mourn their dead together.”

It is useful to return to the issue of decentralization of local governance and decision-making to assess whether it can affect reconciliation. As noted in previous chapters, Seroka and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) have argued that devolution of decision-making to the local level was instrumental to the reduction of conflict and factionalism within local communities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s. On one hand devolution provides groups with the opportunity to organize along national lines. On the other hand it makes it easier for intra or inter-communal associations to cooperate to resolve common problems. In the Sevarlije case devolution made direct discussions between the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return, Serb displaced persons and municipal authorities possible. None of the partners had to wait for agreements to be made at higher levels of government. International organizations could negotiate with the MZs without any intermediaries. Decisions taken between the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return, Serb displaced persons and international authorities could be immediately implemented. When decision making is devolved the chance for opposition groups to identity and act upon common interests is greater.

The case studies confirm conflict resolution literature hypotheses concerning civil society organizations’ ability to transform hostile relationships. Overall in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan the NGO case studies appear to have advanced conflict resolution as much, if not more, than the CBOs. Compared with the Bosnian cases, the two Tajik groups were less effective at transcending divisions based on region, ideology or gender. The Karategin Valley VOs’ did not appear to have any affect on reconciliation between different communities, in particular between antagonists from different Tajik regions. The Karategin Valley VOs’ limited impact could be due to the weakness of their formal linkages outside their village, their lack of common interests and shared wartime experience with other regional communities, more than their intra-communal nature. The VOs’ main contribution appeared to be the strengthening of intra-community cohesion. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where reconciliation was clearly progressing five years after the end of the war, civil
Chapter six

society organizations were affecting the process more than in Tajikistan, where the degree of reconciliation achieved was ambiguous.

Our findings also support Colletta and Cullen’s arguments concerning the ability of communities where there is strong bonding social capital to positively affect bridging social capital and peace. The Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return case is an example of a tightly bonded intra-communal organization that maintained community cohesion amongst the displaced, sought to assure the protection of its members (even with military force), and was ethnically homogenous. Through its contacts with governmental authorities in Doboj and the Federation, international organizations, and Serb DPs, the Sevarlije MZ helped breed new forms of bridging capital and inter-ethnic links. The Sevarlije case is an example of how bonding social capital can gradually promote the creation of bridging social capital. It was able to positively contribute to reconciliation because it shared with its Serb neighbors a common experience with wartime displacement, interest in return, and a willingness to trust. A WB study on Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002: 29) describes a similar case in Klanac, a suburb of Brcko, where a Serb and Bosniak MZ met regularly and signed an agreement to facilitate minority return.

III. Civil society organizations' affect on greed and grievance:

In Bosnia-Herzegovina as in Tajikistan, monopoly on violence and control of informal economic activity had guaranteed political and military leaders from all warring sides an effective means to satisfy economic and political greed. Five years after the war, in Bosnia-Herzegovina nationalists attempted to maintain war-like conditions - ethnic separation, popular fear, breakdown in rule of law - on which their ability to satisfy their greed depended (ESI, 1999: 2). However, arrests of war criminals, and undermining of some of their economic levers of power, had begun to weaken their position. Similarly in Tajikistan, while warlords had maintained an insecure environment in the Karategin Valley until 2001, by 2002 the central government had regained a degree of control, with roads open to free movement and local government bodies carrying out their legal duties. In Tajikistan as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, five years after the signing of peace agreements, many former war profiteers had turned from war fighting to smuggling drugs, weapons, fuel, and people to satisfy their greed.
Less progress had been made in addressing the causes of grievance. In Tajikistan macroeconomic figures demonstrated that “extreme poverty” was a substantial threat to the country’s development, while a tiny minority of the population lived in opulence. The country’s geographic location on the border of Afghanistan and along the ancient Silk Road, which had become one of the main drug routes to Europe, offered large-scale opportunities to satisfy greed, and grievance, through illicit and sometimes violent activities. Throughout the country “a growing number benefit[ed] from drug money and other aspects of a shadow economy (ICG, 2003: 1).”\(^3\) The official level of unemployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2001 was 40% (UNDP 2001: 35), and though there was no “extreme” poverty as in Tajikistan (UNDP 2002b: 50), disparities between the wealthy and the poor seemed to be growing, as the middle class was contracting. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in Tajikistan, youth was especially vulnerable to feelings of grievance as economic standards declined, access to social activities decreased, and opportunities for employment appeared increasingly elusive. They were the main actors in 2000 when Bosnian Serb high school students in the Breko district engaged in a week long protest in support of Karadzic and Mladic, and against sharing school buildings with Bosniak students and the concept of a multi-ethnic district (ICG, 2000b: 8).

Those who apply a political economy approach consider that systematic transformations that focus on the economic dimension of conflict are necessary to consolidate peace. Peace implies eliminating opportunities for satisfying greed and reducing grievance. Diminishing greed signifies decreasing the economic benefits of employing violence and the legal/moral impunity that warmongers act under. Reducing grievance includes effecting “employment, recognition, security, belonging and a sense of control (Skelt quoted in Keene 2000: 40).” As argued by de Waal “the power relations that exist in any society, and particularly so during wartime, present a huge obstacle to any sort of civic mobilisation for peace” (2000: 1). Political economists claim that if the institutions set up by peace building efforts solidify the unequal power relations that developed during and before the conflict, rather

\(^{3}\) According to a survey conducted in 2000 by the Open Society Institute in Tajikistan, 98% of respondents answered that the desire to make money was either the primary reason or a main reason why people trafficked drugs; 96.8% answered that unemployment was the greatest cause or a significant one; 94.4% pointed to difficult material circumstances. OSI, *Women and Drugs*, Dushanbe, 2000: 12.
than countering them, then peace will likewise be unstable. Peace consolidation is thus most effectively seen as "a realignment of political interests and a readjustment of economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, or from repression to democracy (Keen, 2000: 38-39).

Practitioners implementing civil society development programs in Tajikistan have argued that such projects can provide livelihoods and infrastructure to help guarantee normalization and reduce the attractiveness of participation in illicit activities such as trafficking, drug smuggling, and terrorism (Muhidov, 13.10.02). The UN (2001: 7) requested priority funding for reintegration of former combatants because "rendering assistance to those groups of the population would have a stabilizing affect and would prevent jobless, dissatisfied and socially un-protected ex-combatants from engaging in criminal activities and joining armed gangs and irregular paramilitary formations." According to this argument civil society's role would consist of reducing the economic benefits of violence. Yet as demonstrated above I find no evidence that civil society organizations could impact macro-economic trends to reduce poverty, increase employment or reduce economic incentives to take part in illicit activities.

However civil society organizations had a role to play in effecting community level developments. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return and the Karategin Valley VOs attempted to decrease feelings of grievance through the implementation of small income generation programs to increase employment. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return benefited from a 45000 DM grant to start a credit fund to support local farmers in 1999, which by 2001 had increased in value to 74000 DM. In 2001 out of the 215 families that had returned to Sevarlije, some 60 took out micro-credits (Hamdija, 22.10.01). The MZ facilitated contacts with a local food processing plant that provided seeds to Sevarlije in exchange for a percentage of the harvest. Similarly the Karategin Valley VOs were heavily engaged in providing agricultural inputs, targeting average and small farmers, rather than those who controlled the largest plots of land (Saidov, 31.07.02). In Tadjikabad the MSDSP district manager estimated that some 40% of the beneficiaries of the agriculture support programs were former combatants; most of the other former fighters who did not benefit were either integrated into the government army or had migrated to Russia.
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(Sharipov, 25.07.02). He himself a former opposition commander, Sharipov (25.07.02) emphasized the importance of including demobilized soldiers, quoting a Tajik idiom, “a hungry person will even go and fight with lions.” Thus the CBOs’ projects began to meet political economists’ calls for job creation and micro-economic development to curtail political entrepreneurs’ ability to enlist disenfranchised men into violent activities.

The Tajik and Bosnian civil society case studies played a role in increasing local communities’ sense of economic and social security. As described above they provided select social services, improving the effectiveness and equity of state provision. The two CBOs strengthened local coping mechanisms. Based on ties of kinship and territorial proximity, they sustained mutual support networks through which the most severely disenfranchised could make claims on fellow community members for aid. Throughout Central Asia existed a tradition for private transfers to reflect good neighborliness and in particular the ties of kinship (Coudouel, et all, 1997: 119; Falkingham 2000b: iv). Similarly in Bosnia-Herzegovina persons in need tended to turn first to their family, then to their neighbors for assistance (WB 2002a, UNDP 2001). With their links to international donor agencies the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return and the Karategin Valley VOs contributed additional financial and in-kind resources to strengthen these traditional communal coping mechanisms.

The Bosnian and Tajik cases study organizations strengthened previously disenfranchised groups’ sense of belonging, recognition and control. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return gave former displaced control again over their place of residence in the RS, Federation or abroad. In doing so it reduced Sevarlije inhabitants’ grievances vis-à-vis their Serb neighbors which may have led to a resumption of armed conflict. Back in their homes, the formally displaced felt a sense of belonging which explained their eagerness to rehabilitate their village’s physical and social infrastructure. By providing them with even limited financial resources to engage in capital improvement projects, the Karategin Valley VOs also rekindled villagers’ sense of control, thus explaining their willingness to contribute to large scale volunteer actions (hashar). In the immediate post-war period, communities who had been unable to control the tide of events as fighting raged, were often passive, distrustful of their ability to affect change. Yet the successful
completion of a community project demonstrated to local groups their capacity to succeed and served as a powerful motivator for them to plan additional works. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori also assisted women in regaining a sense of control over their lives.

As community cohesiveness increased, civil society organizations could place greater moral and social pressure on wartime elites to reduce their illicit activities. My case studies suggest that the CBOs could serve as a way to reconnect “greedy” entrepreneurs to their community. They could strengthen integrative links – re-uniting warlords to their families and neighbors by encouraging their participation in “civil” community activities. However, civil society organizations’ programs to reconvert former warlords, and the leaders of armed groups, into farming or other legal employment, while able to affect grievance, was less likely to transform greed when there were substantially more profits to be gained from illicit business and trade.4

Youth was one crucial population of disenfranchised that the Karategin Valley VOs in particular, but also the Sevarlije MZ, worked with insufficiently. The VO Charter indicated that persons under 17 years of age could not participate. Young people (between 17 and 25) did not appear to be well represented in VO meetings, perhaps partly because in the Karategin Valley large numbers of young males served as migrant workers in Russia. Karategin Valley VO heads who were approached by youth with requests for funds for projects, spoke of their inability to obtain MSDSP support. Several (Hokimov, 29.07.02; Mirzoev, 25.07.02; Sharipov, 25.07.02) regretted that youth were not more involved in the VO’s activities, and that the VO could not do more in the fields of education and sport. The NGO cases more successfully targeted young people, in particular providing them access to information and awareness on the negative effects of violence.

For civil society organizations to have a positive affect on grievance, it is essential for them to reduce, rather than deepen inequalities. Thus the provision of aid should promote

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4 The Tajik government seemed well aware of this and chose to integrate some of the most “greedy” opposition field commanders in its own structures. A former commander from Garm was named the head of the Ministry of Interior Unit Against Organized Crime (in Garm), a commander from Jirgital became head of the Jirgital-Kyrgyzstan border forces, and a Tadjikobod commander the head of a collective farm. These positions could give the men sufficient means to satisfy their greed without having to resort to violence (Abduallaev and Freizer, 2003: 27).
equitable provision and access. Some of our CBO cases at times appeared to prioritize beneficiaries based on influences/ linkages, rather than need, contributing to deepening inequalities. This problem was especially likely to surface when CBO leaders served as intermediaries between international donors and community members in deciding how more “valuable” goods should be distributed. In two of the Karategin Valley VOs it seemed evident that the head of the VO had benefited disproportionately from MSDSP’s aid: one constructed a drinking water line to this personal property, another placed a chicken incubator meant for the community in his garage. When community based organizations are linked to clan and family structures, the potential exists for them to firstly satisfy family, then community, needs. This is the possible negative affect when “at the social level, clan networks have become increasingly active in the villages, and have largely usurped both the interest-aggregation role of parties, and the role of the state in distributing resources, jobs and social benefits” (Collins, 2002: 148). It is also more likely to occur when a CBO is dominated by one key figure (ex: VO head) whose motivations, position in the community, skills and linkages are considered by the rest of the community as essential to the “bringing in” of new resources.

In the CBOs, the village meeting or the zbor gradjana offered a mechanism to reconcile differences over the distribution of resources, and to guarantee leaders’ accountability to members. The public, formalized and participatory nature of these meetings was key to breaking the more discreet workings of traditional patronage networks. One difference underlined by several (Hokimov, 29.07.02, Sharipov, 25.07.02) as existing between traditional mahallas and the VO was formal accounting and reporting on activities. The technical aspect of VO decision-making, implementation, reporting and planning had the potential of improving transparency, participation, and interest aggregation. Yet the lack of full and equal participation of women and youth in the VO meetings also decreased the VO leadership’s sense of accountability to all its members.

Land reform was an area that was not affected in our case studies, but in Tajikistan especially was essential to alleviate pressures of greed and grievance, to increase food production, and reduce poverty. Land ownership was of great significance in a country where some 65% of the population was dependent on agriculture for its economic survival
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and was competing for 4% of the land suitable for cultivation. Five years after the end of the war, privatization of state farms was well underway (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 31). However, much of the private land was going to the chairmen and management staff of the former kolkhoz, or in some case to former field commanders (ICG 2003: 3). Reorganization of state farms tended to increase disparities between land owning and landless farmers – exacerbating grievances rather than reducing them. The Tajik case studies did not engage in the land privatization process before 2002, though at the time they were beginning to consider how they could contribute to ensure a fairer distribution of land through the promotion of public awareness on land rights. However, amongst the six VOs studied, one VO President was the sovkhoz director before privatization and had become the largest private landowner in the village, and the other five VO Presidents were formerly part of the kolkhoz technical staff. It was thus unlikely that they would be the leaders to push for more equitable land distribution.

Decentralization had the potential of diminishing opportunities for greed and causes for grievance in local communities through the efforts of CBOs and NGOs. As argued above effective decentralization is premised on the establishment of democratic rules of procedure, and respect of values of tolerance and justice. Pickvance notes that “after socialism local government becomes in many respects a more active mediating institution and control over its functions becomes a highly contested issue in local politics. [...] The central questions are how far it gains autonomy from former economic and political centers of power, and how far it is subordinate to new sources of economic and political power.” (1997: 306) Alfonso (1997: 185) goes further to consider that decentralization’s ultimate goal “must be to allow the re-appropriation of power by concrete and diverse individuals and their collectivities. A real process of popular empowerment will convert the ordinary citizen from a passive political consumer into an active political producer.” Thus decentralization is likely to reduce the ability of a small group of power and money hungry leaders to monopolize decision-making and influence, and to offer an opportunity for persons with grievances to gain a public voice. This was particularly important in Tajikistan where five years after the end of war “one clan’s monopoly of political power

5 According to a survey carried out by MSDSP in 2002 in the Karategin Valley, 8.57% of families were landowners, 36.7% were renting and 98.86% had kitchen gardens. Land Reform and Land Tenure in the
and thus of economic prizes has spurred the disaffection of the other clans from the regime and has fueled a civil conflict that has persisted despite the 1997 peace agreement.” (Collins, 2002: 147)

Political economists are less optimistic than conflict resolution or peace building proponents with regards to the positive impact that civil society may have on peace. Our findings tend to concur that civil society organizations can offer little to reduce greed. On the other hand CBOs appear able to diminish grievance by providing disenfranchised populations with a greater sense of economic and social control over their lives. By formalizing decision-making procedures, and increasing public participation, CBOs may also serve as a check on greedy entrepreneurs’ ability to use community resources for personal gain. One area where NGOs were more successful in addressing grievance than the CBOs was in working with women and youth.

IV. Civil society organizations’ affect on the rights-based peace project:
Five years after the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan decommissioning and disarmament had been fully implemented, though the rule of law based on the effective functioning of courts and law enforcement was only partially secured. By March 2000, 4,498 UTO fighters had been integrated into the Tajik army or security forces, and 6000 ex-combatants were amnestied (UNDP, 2000: 28; ICG 2001: 16). In Bosnia-Herzegovina where there had been 430,000 people under arms in 1995, there were 22,000 in 2002. Police, who had been manipulated by extremist nationalists since 1991, were increasingly willing to cooperate across ethnic lines and work on crime prevention (Ashdown, 2002b). In both countries the monopoly on the use of violence was being consolidated in the hands of the state. However access to justice and the rule of law were not guaranteed (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 28, 35-36; Ashdown, 2002a, ICG, 2003: 11-10). In some post-conflict situations civil society organizations have played a role in decommissioning and the rehabilitation of former combatants (Kaldor, 1999b: 136), in others they have contributed to truth commissions or international tribunals. The organizations in this study did not engage in these tasks. Civil society was rarely called to


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cooperate with international law enforcement bodies as part of the initial effort to establish security and basic human rights protection (Chinkin and Paradine, 2001; 176-177).

War had left Bosnian and Tajik communities fragmented and prone to violence. In Tajikistan though fragmentation along regional lines may not have affected most citizens' daily lives, other divisions, such as those between men and women, warlords and citizens, different clans or family networks, did. Rights based analyses view society's capacities to manage tensions without violence as the most significant factor for successful peace consolidation (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000). In Tajikistan, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at all levels of society violence and the use of force had become acceptable and effective means to defend self-interests during the war. In the post-war period it was essential to ensure that conflicts were no longer solved through the use of force but through dialogue or formal institutions.

We find that in at least three of our four case studies civil society groups contributed to the strengthening of the rule of law, by encouraging citizens to satisfy their grievances through state bodies and legal mechanisms rather than "taking justice in their own hands." The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return cooperated with all law enforcement forces that had jurisdiction on its territory, including Doboj municipality police even though trust between the police and returnees was extremely low in 1998. Rather than creating its own alternative militia, or calling for assistance from Federation security forces, the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return opened a dialogue with the Doboj police, informing them of any village problems or needs. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return demanded that returnees behave lawfully vis-à-vis their Serb neighbors and encouraged them to trust Doboj municipal law enforcement officials. As described above Ghamkhori also assisted victims gain retribution through the courts – rather than for example starting family vendettas. In some instances Ghamkhori cooperated with community police officers providing them with information on crimes to investigate and prosecute them more effectively. Civil society organizations thus positively affected peace consolidation by encouraging their members and beneficiaries to trust state structures to ensure security and justice.
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At the community level, the civil society organizations helped guarantee peace and stability by serving as referees in local disputes. As was the practice in the Yugoslav era, the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return organized a peace council to deal with low level and personal conflicts. In the Karategin Valley, VO heads described how community members would address them regarding small disputes over land, money, livestock, and other civil matters. Most citizens appealed to MZ or VO heads to mediate with regards to inter-family, inter-neighbor and non-criminal conflicts. Ghamkhori field staff, and latter the elected mahalla leadership they helped set up, also recounted incidents where local inhabitants come to them for help and advice with regards to local disputes.

Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama furthermore educated citizens about their rights, and cooperated with law enforcement bodies to improve their capacities to react to rights violations. This was in particular the case with regards to incidents of domestic violence which both NGOs identified as a growing problem in the post-war context (Swiss, 2000; Zhene Zhenama, 2000a). Ghamkhori recognized a deep lack of knowledge about domestic violence among medical, legal, judicial, psychological religious and other professionals. Through PROVAW the NGO thus started a multi-faceted awareness-building project on violence against women with state and religious institutions (Swiss, 2000). Similarly Zhene Zhenama carried out projects to educate potential victims about domestic violence. The NGO also trained law enforcement bodies on domestic abuse. Inherently by engaging law enforcement officials, and lobbying them to act when violations happened, our NGO case studies also pressured the police and courts to fulfil their responsibilities as preservers of the rule of law.

In addressing violence between men and women, the CBOs under study were distinctly less influential than the NGOs. This was especially the case in Tajikistan where female participation in decision-making within the Karategin Valley VOs was never fully secured. Thus in Shulmak five years after the end of the war the community had regained sufficient cohesion to commence communal infrastructure development activities. Yet this sense of solidarity did not extend to male/female relations. Intense divisions, suspicions and hatred remained. During summer 2002 one young woman, who worked as a school teacher, was viscously murdered by six other villagers who alleged that she was not behaving properly
according to Islamic law and custom. The six were never prosecuted. Other women in the village spoke of living in fear. Our case studies thus support Eade’s argument that “traditional organizations [...] may have the authority and capacity to mobilize along village, clan, religious, ethnic, age or gender lines. They may be a powerful force for social cohesion and a focus for collective identity. However while conferring privileges on some, they may also severely constrain the rights of others (Eade, 1997: 112).” Thus as women’s full and equal participation with men was not insured in the VOs, the CBO’s ability to positive affect rights-based peace consolidation was significantly constrained.

Three of the case study organizations also played a role in providing alternatives to exclusionary politics at a time when part of the political elite was still intent on maintaining power on the basis of a particular identity. As explained in the section on civil society’s contribution to conflict resolution Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori and the Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return helped transform values and modes of dialogue. By the composition of their staff the two NGOs showed that people belonging to different ethnic, regional, or national groups could cooperate to affect change. They helped victims of violence understand that individuals and not entire identity groups were responsible for wartime atrocities. In Tajikistan Ghamkhori encouraged its beneficiaries to re-think the causes of war through the application of a multiple step process, which concluded with the recognition that individual members of the “opposite side” did not necessarily bear collective guilt for wartime crimes. According to Bahodur “our work brings people together, makes them closer, so the boundaries of nationalism disappear during our lessons and people forget that they have different origins.” Through its cooperation with Serb displaced persons, the Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return showed that not all Serbs were war criminals, but rather, that they could also be victims of forced displacement.

The two Bosnian civil society groups, and the Tajik NGO, also contributed to the creation of a community of citizens that shared similar worldviews – or at a minimum understood each other sufficiently to forge alliances to engage in debates. Zhene Zhenama was particularly successful in constructing and advancing the vision of an alternative social order, which emphasized reconciliation, tolerance, equal rights for women, and non-violence. It found that other civil society groups could relate to this discourse. The Sevarlije
MZ/Board for Return were able to make cross-ethnic/national alliances based on common interests in return that defied national differences. According to Muric Bulic (20.03.01), Director of the Center for Civil Initiatives, civil society organizations in this regard accomplished what few other Bosnian institutions could do. "Civil society’s role in peace-building was to [...] create different citizens alliances [...]. We managed to do something that the Presidency is not succeeding in doing... We built political and non-political alliances around ideas and not national identity." Bosnian civil society groups thus contributed to a re-launching of political debate by helping citizens conceptualize of their interests as more than nationality-based.

As predicted by rights-based analysis of peace consolidation, the Bosnian case studies were able to take advantage of contacts within international human rights and women’s rights networks to affect change in Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond. Our Bosnian NGO case thus increased awareness about trafficking of women to Bosnia-Herzegovina by working through a network of international and non-governmental organizations (RING network). In cooperation with women from throughout the former Yugoslavia, Zhene Zhenama contributed to ensure greater female participation in the EU sponsored Stability Pact for South East Europe (Chinkin and Paradine, 2001: 172). Through its international contacts with women activists, Zhene Zhenama engaged in efforts to support women victims of violence in Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. Cooperation with international organizations and networks of refugees and displaced, provided moral and political support to the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return as it advocated for return. With it international networks and contacts Zhene Zhenama actively informed and lobbied women’s groups around the world about post war developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus contributing to an enlargement of the debate and discussion on Bosnia to the global scene. Among our case studies Zhene Zhenama was the only civil society organizations with the necessary linkages to transform global debates. Yet as an example it demonstrates civil society groups’ capacities to extend dialogue on conflict and reconciliation beyond their own nation-states.

However due to geographic distance, ineffective communication and transportation links, our Tajik cases were unable to take advantage of the resources, information, and space for dialogue provided by international civil society and take steps comparable to those made by
our Bosnian cases. We may ask if more fortunate elements of international civil society did not have the responsibility to facilitate inclusion of Tajik partners to promote security and development?

Proponents of a rights based approach tend to consider that tolerant and activist forms of civil society, which fit a liberal definition, are most likely to positively contribute to peace consolidation. Amongst our cases, Zhene Zhenama with its clear political mission, multi-ethnic staff, links to international women’s networks, commitment to non-violence and experience in women’s rights advocacy, most closely fits this organizational model. Ghamkhori was less likely to consider itself as a potential opposition to the centers of political and economic power, though it shared many of Zhene Zhenama’s ideological preferences. The Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return also did not see its role as “oppositional” nor did it emphasize the promotion of tolerance and equality as its key aims. Nevertheless as we have seen in this section all three organizations provided alternatives to exclusionary politics, assisted in human rights protection, and supported the strengthening of the rule of law and trust in justice.

Conclusion:
Beyond the scope of this thesis is the debate on the extent to which the various concepts of peace complement and rival each other in theory and in practice. The four approaches to peace consolidation introduced define distinct causes for war, and interpret the evolution, goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. Thus they may come into conflict. By positively contributing to economic liberalization, civil society organizations may be increasing grievance; by supporting community cohesion at the local level civil society may be working against centralized democratic institution building. Other studies have begun to compare different peace consolidation theories and approaches (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2001). However, more analysis is needed to determine how the assigning of different peace consolidation strategies affects democratization, economic development, social cohesion and equality.
Conclusion

CONCLUSION:

THEORETICAL AND POLICY RELATED FINDINGS

Introduction:
Five years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and Tajikistan (1997) peace was being consolidated, and civil society organizations were contributing to the process. Democratic state institution building and economic liberalization were gradually being promoted in the two countries. Similarly the transformation of modes of dialogue, building of contacts, and the development of common projects between former warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina was being accomplished step by step. In Tajikistan community cohesion appeared to be strengthening as nation building replaced calls for revenge in the public discourse. The attractiveness of addressing grievance through armed conflict was reduced, while respect for the rule of law and human rights protection was increasing in both countries. Civil society organizations were one of the many actors that supported this process making multidimensional contributions to peace.

Theoretical literature on the concept of civil society -- which was reinvented in the mid-1980s due to political changes in East and Central Europe, and more broadly redefined in the mid-1990s through the influences of globalization -- divides civil society groups into ideal types to help the observer understand the empirical manifestations of civil society appearing in various country contexts, and to appreciate the different roles civil society can play in effecting change. At the start of this dissertation I chose to rely on one such typology – where a communal view of civil society is distinguished from a liberal one. Based on a historical analysis of the evolution of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan I identified the existence of both types in the two countries under study. At times liberal and communal forms of civil society have operated in harmony and at times in conflict. When war broke out in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, there was a sharp divide between liberal and communal forms of civil society, which may partly explain why civil society was unable to play a significant conflict prevention role. This
study has focused on the post-war period and found that civil society contributed to peace consolidation. This seems to suggest that the communal/ liberal civil society dichotomy was less relevant in the post-war period.

**Civil society in post-communist, post-war contexts:**

In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan -- where based on the literature we could have expected significant differences in how and why communal and liberal civil society organizations behave as they do -- we on the contrary identified numerous commonalties. We found that the groups under study responded in similar ways to many of the constraints and opportunities they faced in the post-war post-communist contexts they operated in. In all four of our cases, experienced and charismatic leadership, clear missions, ability to build trust within local communities, understanding of donor relations, and well-developed linkages were essential for success. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there was large international donor effort to support the peace process, as in Tajikistan, where external funds were more limited, the NGOs and CBOs were highly dependent on foreign assistance. Contrary to assumptions made in the literature on civil society we find that CBOs, which fit a communal understanding of civil society, can be as active in advocacy as NGOs representing liberal civil society. In comparison with the NGOs, the CBOs also contributed as much, if not more, to the privatization of social service provision. However our four civil society case studies' were overall more engaged in "gap filling" and "selective collaboration" (Lewis: 2001: 150) between local communities and the state, than in censure or rolling back the state in the political or economic sphere.

Based on the comparative aspect of this study, I would thus like to highlight five findings, that apply to the CBOs and NGOs observed. These can help us better understand the characteristics and organizational attributes of civil society organizations that have the capacity to positively effect peace consolidation in post-communist, post-conflict settings.

The local community is the main source of inspiration and of strength for CBOs, as well as for NGOs. While *Zhena Zhenama* aimed primarily to help women -- an interest community -- the other three case studies focused their assistance on geographic communities, promoting mutual aid. The NGOs served as self-help groups for their members but also for
their beneficiaries and the communities they belonged to. The literature on civil society argues that communal, rather than liberal, forms of civil society seek to build relations within society, to facilitate the development of community expressions of solidarity. Yet we find that NGOs as much as CBOs are concerned with connecting individuals, building trust, encouraging reciprocity, and facilitating exchanges of view on matters of public concern. Liberal representations of civil society were not absorbed by state-society issues but rather by society-society problems. The NGOs were embedded in the communities in which they operated, and the norms and values they expressed emerged out of a deep understanding of local experiences. Even though they may have had a more progressive understanding of political and social developments, working at the community level the NGOs presented their values in ways that would be accepted in more traditional and isolated environments.

Social service provision, rather than advocacy, is the main activity carried out by CBOs and NGOs. Between liberal and communal civil society groups, there was thus little difference in the nature of their programs and activities. In difficult post-war and post-socialist contexts, in the absence of state provision of public goods — including personal, material and social security — both types of organizations increased citizens’ ability to engage in collective action and self-help. Compared with communal civil society, liberal civil society was no more successful in undertaking political projects, which promoted public participation in decision-making, good governance, and democratization. It was not the NGOs’ “lack of maturity,” along a Kortenien (1990) generational model of organizational development, which can explain Zhena Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s reluctance to engage more forcefully in advocacy or political action. Rather their choice of programs was based on the post-war post-communist environment opportunities and needs. The case studies rarely succeeded in influencing state-level decision-making due to their lack of linkages with governmental officials. When the groups did achieve something through lobbying, they did so based on their close ties to their members and beneficiaries. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was the most effective policy entrepreneur, advocating for minority return, while Zhena Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s had some success lobbying for women’s rights protection.
Conclusion

Geographic location has a greater effect on civil society organizations' ability to build linkages, especially with international civil society, than their belonging to a liberal or communal ideal type. Due to better access to communication and transportation links, groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina could build ties with organizations' and media with similar interests throughout the world. Neither the Tajik NGO nor the CBO had this possibility. All our case studies initially faced difficulties making contacts with governmental authorities and establishing their credibility beyond the municipal level. Whatever ties existed were based largely on personal relations rather than formally institutionalized. They had few formal links with political parties.

External funding plays a key role in the development of all groups – whether they are part of communal or liberal civil society. Though the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina operated in environments where there was substantially more international funding available than in Tajikistan, the Tajik organizations were as dependent on foreign donors as the Bosnians were. Though much has been written about NGOs negative tendency of over-relying on international funds for their survival – in our cases the CBOs were as reliant on external aid as NGOs. The CBOs were able to collect small volunteer contributions and membership fees -- while the NGOs were not – but this did not significantly affect their funding base. Neither group obtained a budget from the government. Due to their dependency on external donors, the CBOs like the NGOs were forced into short-term projects that may not have met what they perceived as being their primary needs. Innovative and non-material projects - whose outputs could not be measure quantitatively – were rarely carried out by the CBOs for lack of resources. All the groups struggled with the challenge of dual accountability: to the donors and to the community. They found that their missions and values were less likely to be compromised when the funders they cooperated with shared their values and missions – the promotion of the rights of women, refugees, or rural development. They were also more likely to benefit when they were engaged in a regular dialogue with donors over projects’ objectives and strategies.

Charismatic leadership is essential for organizations to be effective in affecting change, whether they are of a communal or liberal type. In our cases one or two central figures provided the impetus behind the definition of the ‘organizations' goals and the activities.
The literature on communal civil society described the existence of communal forms of civil society that are not created deliberately, are based on informal communal ties, and made up of loose organizational structures. However from their re-appearance in the post-war period, the CBOs we examined were highly formal organizations, either due to their legal character or to their links with an international donor. The NGOs also adopted hierarchical and structured decision-making mechanisms with centralized leadership. Even though the NGOs tried to establish oversight bodies such as boards, to hold the leadership accountable, they found it difficult to mobilize enthusiastic volunteers to participate. CBOs were more effective in this regard on the surface, organizing regular village meetings, but it is questionable to what extent based on these gatherings the leaders were held accountable and decision-making was the product of actual debate. Rather leaders were guaranteed a significant amount of authority and autonomy due to their position in the community.

However as the literature on civil society predicted, there were some significant differences in the nature of the communal and liberal organizations studied. CBOs served as vehicles for rural based political elites, while NGOs empowered middle class professionals in urban settings. One may have expected these two groups to represent two rival fractions of the political class, yet interestingly this was not the case in post war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. War and economic transition affected both social groups in similar ways, undermining their previously influential and respected positions. Even in rural Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina those who managed the CBOs could generally be considered to be “professionals,” economically “middle class;” in the post-war context, they often became unemployed, victims of a shrinking public sector which through communism had extended to rural areas. In the post-war period the position of former Tajik and Bosnian elites from the urban areas, as well as from the rural ones, was often undermined by new strong men -- warlords, field commanders, extreme nationalists -- who gained from the war and acted as “spoilers” (Stedman, 1997) resisting peace and normalization at all costs. Thus unlike in the pre-war period, the leadership of communal and liberal civil society groups may have found common interests in cooperating after the war to overcome these new rivals operating in rural and urban settings.
Conclusion

A more significant variation between our case studies – especially in Tajikistan – concerned the opportunities communal and liberal groups gave to social actors who had gained new skills, experiences and strengths during the war, especially women, to take on new leadership roles. The NGOs we studied provided an opportunity for women and minorities to become politically engaged; while the CBOs tended to strengthen pre-existing power relations. They gave leadership position to those middle aged men who already had moral status and authority in the pre-war period, based on their skills, activism, or family ties. The NGOs were made up of individuals brought together by friendship and professional interests; while the CBOs were kinship-based. The NGOs nurtured a new cadre of civic leaders where CBOs relied on pre-war elites.

This brings us to an underlying question that has not yet been addressed throughout this study: to what extent does civil society have to be normatively based to positively affect peace consolidation? This is a particularly challenging query because I am arguing that by definition all forms of civil society do not necessarily have to be “good.” In Chapter 1 I defined communal civil society and noted that it can be a place where the few pursue their own interests, and where associations are organized along national, ethnic or religious lines. In the historical account of civil society development in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina I included exclusionary groups such as Bosnian national humanitarian organizations – Merhamet, Caritas and Dobrotvor – and Tajik organizations that promoted Tajik nationalism such as Rastokhez. Due to the non-normative character of communal civil society, arguably many of the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan that were at the forefront of wartime atrocities can be understood as belonging to civil society. If we accept this proposition, do we find that exclusionary civil society can affect peace positively?

The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ example suggests that even exclusionary civil society, organizations that once considered that their goals could best be met by the use of violence and armed force, can transform into effective peace consolidation influences after peace agreements are signed. When we compare the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ with the Karategin Valley VOs, who did not demonstrate a similar engagement to promoting reconciliation or human rights protection, we can distinguish three factors that may
improve the chances that even formerly violent or intra-communal groups may contribute to peace. The first relates to internal structures. Though the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and its Serbian counterpart might have been initially exclusionary vis-a-vis persons belonging to other ethnic groups, it seemed that inside their own communities there was little exclusion. Decision-making within the MZ was transparent, all members of the community were allowed to participate, and there was full and equal representation. Secondly when the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ met with the Serb DP leaders they were placed on equal standing, and over time were able to recognize common interests. Lastly the two groups functioned in an environment where the GFAP gave both the Bosniak and the Bosnian Serb communities equal rights, and where pre-war co-existence provided models of inter-communal associational life.

Whereas tensions between communal and liberal forms of civil society are seen as considering an important political problem in many countries (Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin, 2004), we find that in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan opportunities for bridging between both types of groups existed. Partly this is due to the fact that the CBOs and NGOs were no longer such different creatures - their missions, programs, linkages and structures had a great deal in common. Furthermore the NGOs understood the importance of cooperating with community-based groups. Zhena Zhenama and Ghamkhori for example worked closely with rural grass roots associations, closing the gap between communal and liberal civil society, to bring ordinary citizens, women in particular, closer to the political process. Thanks to these links the NGOs were able to develop close contacts with rural communities, understand grass roots level needs, and avoid becoming elitist or ineffectual. Where such bridging between NGOs and CBOs, liberal and communal civil society, occurred, civil society organizations' capacities to positively affect peace consolidation appeared to be greatest.

Policy issues:
During the first five years of the peace process, international funding agents and policy-makers tended to exclude communal civil society from their peace building efforts in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They often considered them to be intolerant or untrustworthy. Consequently "organizations promoting a rather different view of
democracy rooted in grass-roots realities and local traditions, or which are simply at variance with the dominant liberal paradigm (Hearn and Robinson, 2000: 257-258),” were often sidelined. This thesis supports the conclusion that for external support to have a positive affect, it must clearly understand the social-historical context in which it acts, and employ a wide definition of civil society which goes beyond the liberal one and its focus on NGOs. Even in post-conflict situations, external actors should not bypass or duplicate existing civil society. They should consider how to cooperate with civil society groups that do not consistently share their values – such as tolerance, commitment to democracy, gender equality, secularism – but may be deeply embedded in society and have widespread legitimacy. Working with them, adopting a sensitive approach, may offer an opportunity to gradually encourage communal forms of civil society to adopt more participatory and inclusive modes of decision-making which in turn will improve their ability to contribute to peace.

On the eve of the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikstan communal and liberal civil society was deeply divided. This may in part explain why extremist forces were able to successfully mobilize supporters through communal groups, and why civil society’s ability to engage in affect conflict prevention was limited. The cases analyzed in this dissertation are examples of bridging between communal and liberal forms of civil society, between CBOs and NGOs. Our conclusion is that for civil society actors to affect change they must be willing and able to close the gap between communal and liberal forms of civil society. A sustainable relationship between the two should be based on shared values, missions and strategies; not founded on unequal power relations such as develop when NGOs serve uniquely to fund CBOs. It is a bridging process that international organizations should support through information dissemination, skills development, the provision of communications equipment, and project funding.

In the past ten years lessons have been learned about international policy makers’ and donors’ ability to strengthen civil society groups through external funding and capacity building (Burnell, 2000; Ottoway and Carothers, 2000; van Rooy, 1998). As we have seen, by providing mainly financial assistance, international donors risk negatively affecting local civil society groups’ definition of priorities and needs, and ultimately undermining
their popular credibility. For international intervention to successfully strengthen local
groups, the partnership should be based on common values and agreement about long-term
objectives. In addition it should be multi-dimensional: not only financially based but also
politically orientated. The cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina were adept at using international
links to disseminate their views and lobby for their interests – women’s rights protection or
minority returns. International organizations working in Tajikistan should consider these
examples to assist Tajik groups extend their ties with international forms of civil society in
order to have a stronger voice to advocate their concerns.

When Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan were selected as comparative cases, I assumed
that the different levels of international financial engagement and government
centralization in the two countries would affect civil society organizations’ contributions to
peace. The case studies do not support this hypothesis. International funds and the
weakness of the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not provide civil society with a greater role
in peace consolidation than in Tajikistan. However I find that geography and the countries’
level of integration into global networks is significant. Groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
to a much greater extent able to use to their advantage far-reaching links with international
civil society than their counterparts in Tajikistan were.

Conclusion:
The main finding of this dissertation is that both communal and liberal civil society may
positively contribute to peace consolidation. Practitioners and scholars have previously
argued that civil society can support peace, but they have tended to emphasize NGOs as the
main actor of change. One of the unexpected findings of this study is that CBOs seem
especially well suited to contribute to institution building and NGOs to reconciliation. In
both the Bosnian and Tajik cases local NGOs were most successful in affecting trust,
transformations in modes of dialogue, reconciliation and the initiation of common action
among former warring sides. CBOs, which were forms of local self-government, appeared
to have had a greater impact on improving public participation in community decision-
making, public service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and development. If we
consider CBOs in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be organizational representations
of communal civil society, and NGOs of liberal civil society, this finding challenges
preliminary hypotheses on civil society’s affect laid out in Chapters 1 and 2. Based on existing literature on civil society and peace we expected that communal civil society organizations would contribute mainly to conflict resolution and liberal civil society groups to institution building.

My conclusions tend to support political economists’ assumptions about NGOs’ limited ability to significantly affect greed and grievance. Yet I find that CBOs can make important contributions to the reduction of grievances that can induce disenfranchised groups to turn to violence. They can provide disenfranchised populations with a greater sense of control over their social and economic lives, as well as means for communities to hold greedy elites accountable. The cases demonstrate that not only organizational representations of liberal civil society, which have an activist and tolerant ideology, can meet rights-based peace consolidation challenges. Forms of communal civil society may also help re-launch political debate and support the re-establishment of the rule of law.

This dissertation demonstrates how in the post-war post communist contexts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, amongst the most well-developed and organizationally sound representations of civil society, differences between communal and liberal types were diminishing rather than growing. Close ties between communal, liberal and international forms of civil society were increasing groups’ ability to affect change, in particular to have an impact on peace consolidation. Thus we found that although at least two ideal types of civil society organizations existed, groups’ ability to contribute to peace consolidation was strengthened when they had extensive links between each other. In post war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan it is too early to consider that the communal/ liberal civil society dichotomy has vanished. But we can suggest that ultimately a clearer consolidation of the two forms of civil society may bring the two countries closer to peace.
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Bahodur Toshmatov, Director on 30.05.02
Bahodur Toshmatov, Director on 11.06.02
Bahodur Toshmatov and Mikhail Fedorov on 11.06.02
Bahodur Toshmatov and Mikhail Fedorov on 14.06.02
Boymahmad Azizov, Instructor, KWHP on 08.06.02
Chris Buckley, Country Director, ACT Central Asia, email communication on 21.05.03
Colette Harris, Founder, Ghamkhori, email communication on 21.05.03
Colette Harris, Founder, Ghamkhori, in London on 28.06.03
Dilarom Markhamova, Supervisor, PRO WAV on 30.05.02
Ghamkhori Staff on (31.07.02)
Hoorsheh Bobojev, Supervisor, KWHP on 01.06.02
Kalongul Marzumova, Instructor, PRO WAV on 08.06.02
Malika Sobirionova, Supervisor, KWHP on 09.05.02
Mavjuda Sharipova, Director, Women’s Center on 30.05.02
Mavjuda Sharipova, Director, Women’s Center on 11.06.02
Mikhail Fedorov, Director, Medical Program on 24.05.02
Mikhail Fedorov, Director, Medical Program on 25.05.02
Mikhail Fedorov, Director, Medical Program on 11.06.02
Mikhail Fedorov, Director, Medical Program on 14.06.02
Sharbatali, Adbulloev, Instructor, KWHP on 01.06.02
Women’s Center staff, including Mavjuda Sharipova and others on 30.05.02

Karategin Valley VOs (all interviews conducted in VOs):
Bobokhojaev, Balajon. District Manager, Garm MSDSP district office on 24.07.02
Eshanov, Dilovarsho. Head, Loyova VO on 22.07.02
Gazoev, Saifullo. Head, Khuja Ainee VO on 23.07.02.
Hokimov, Davlatjon. Head, Kalai Sur VO on 29.07.02
Hokimova. Head of VO women’s group, Kalai Sur VO on 29.07.02
Ibrohimov, Nizomiddin. Head, Tadjikabad VO on 25.07.02
Isnoilova, Mahbuba. Head of VO women’s group, Tadjikabad VO on 25.07.02
Jobirova, Robija. Deputy head of VO agriculture committee, Loyova VO on 31.07.02
Kobilova, Majoni. Head of VO women’s group, Loyova VO on 31.07.02
Mahmadali Saidov, Regional Manager. Garm MSDSP Regional Office on 31.07.02
Mamadjonova, Kibrio. Deputy head of VO women’s group, Karashahr VO on 26.07.02
Mirzoev, Sherali. Agronomist, Tadjikabad MSDSP district office on 25.07.02
Piramavdov, Pavlatmurod. Deputy head, Karashahr VO on 26.07.02
Rakhimov, Alimordhon. Head, Shulmak VO on 30.07.02.
Rukhshona. Member, Shulmak VO on 30.07.02
Sharipov, Mahmadi. District Manager, Tadjikabad MSDSP district office on 25.07.02.
Whitton, Mark. MSDSP Program consultant in Khorog on 13.07.02
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ (all in Sevarlije):
Abdullah Mehmutovic, president of the MZ Farmer’s Association on 23.10.01
Alma Canic, member MZ women’s association Stublicanka on 24.10.01
Ankica Altumbasic, Office Manager, USAID Tuzla on 07.11.2001
Aziz Ibrakovic, President of the MZ Assembly on 08.09.02
Aziz Ibrakovic, President of the MZ Assembly on 22.10.01
Aziz Ibrakovic, President of the MZ Assembly on 07.11.02
Aziz Ibrakovic, President of the MZ Assembly on 1.12.2001
Hamdija Mehinovic, Secretary of Sevarlije MZ on 22.10.01
Hamdija Mehinovic, Secretary of Sevarlije MZ on 08.11.01
Imam of Sevarlije on 24.10.01
(former) Imam of Sevarlije (24.10.2001).
Marko Nisandzic, Director of Operations, Mercy Corps Tuzla on 7.11.01
Nevzeta Hodzic, MZ Member on 23.10.2001
Rado Đurđević, Senior field officer, UNHCR Doboj on 08.11.01
Ramiz Fetic, MZ member on 24.10.01
Ramiza Huseinbasic, MZ member on 22.10.2001
Sabrija Mujkic, former Secretary of Sevarlije MZ on 21.10.2001
Samir Hadzic, MZ member on 23.10
School teacher, Sevarlije MZ school on 24.10.01.
Uzer Hadzic, MZ member on 4.08.03.
Uzer Hadic, MZ member on 20.10.01
Zahid Kremic, President of the Association of Citizens of Doboj in Zenica and head of the
office of urbanism in Doboj Municipality on 25.10.01

Zene Zenam (all in Sarajevo):
Danijela Dugandzic, Office Administrator on 14.11.01
Jadranka Milicevic, Management Team on 14.11.01
Jadranka Milicevic, Management Team on 27.11.01
Milica Kajevic, Program Manager, Women Studies on 13.11.01
Miriana Music, Head, Psycho Team and DRA Trainer on 21.11.01
Mirzeta Arnautovic, Women’s Association “Roundtable Brcko” on 26.03.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 14.11.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 23.11.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 27.11.01
Radmila Manojlovic-Zarkovic, Project Assistant, Women’s Studies on 13.11
Sefika Krdzalic, Office Administrator on 20.11.01
Selma Hadzihalilovic, Management Team on 15.11.01
Snezana Ler, Supervisor, Psycho Team on 19.11.01
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- Kuvatova, Alla. Sociologist, *Slavonic University* on 21.10.02 in Dushanbe
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- Tyurryaev, Farrukh. General Director, *Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia (ASTI)* on 27.06.02 in Khojand
- Zoir, Rakhmatillo. Senior Advisor to the President on Legal Issues, on 15.07.02.
ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Name of interviewee: ____________________________
Interviewee title: _______________________________
Date of interview: _______________________________
Place of interview: _______________________________

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH NGO AND CBO STAFF

I. ORIGINS OF ORGANIZATION AND EARLY INVOLVEMENT OF STAFF:

I.1 Early involvement of the staff:
1. (S)he was part of the organization when it was founded □ yes □ no
2. Form of earliest involvement □ staff, date……… □ beneficiary □ volunteer
3. Why at that time did you come to the organization?
4. What did you think was the goal of the organization when you joined?
5. How were you involved in the initial development of the organization?

I.2 Personal characteristics of interviewee:
1. What is your level of education?
2. What was your pre-war employment
3. Were you active in any communist time social organizations?
4. Do you have children, how many?
5. Where did you live before the war?
6. Where did you live during the war?
7. (For returnees) When did you return? Where you able to move back into your home?
8. (If applicable) What is your nationality?

I.3 NGO employment:
1. Is this your only job?
2. Why did you leave your former job, and take this one instead?
3. What rewards do you get from your job here?
II. **STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN PROGRAMMING:**

II.1 **Functioning of the programme within the NGO:**

1. What programme(s) within the organizations are you/ or have you been involved in?
2. What needs did the programme aim to meet?
3. Activities:
4. Number, type, location of beneficiaries:
5. Budget of the programme?
6. Funding sources?
7. Responsibilities of Management Team:
8. Responsibilities of your coordinator and programme:

II.2 **Impact of the programme:**

1. What were the main issues that women brought up through this programme?
2. What do you consider to have been the greatest 3 successes of the programme?
3. What do you consider to have the greatest failures of the programme?
4. Is the programme still needed? For how long do you think that it will be needed?
5. Are other institutions involved in similar programmes:
   
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<td>Yes, still works</td>
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II.3 **Programme outreach:**

1. Is your program active in the regions: Y/N Locations: ..............................................
2. Majority population in each region ..............................................................
3. Reactions there:
4. Reactions here:

III. **Relationships and linkages:**

III.1 **Contacts with governmental officials:**
### III.2 Contacts with political parties:

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<th>Who</th>
<th>Mahalla</th>
<th>Jamoat</th>
<th>Rayon</th>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Republic</th>
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### III.3 Contacts with media:

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### III.4 Contacts with international organizations:

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### IV. 5 Contacts with other local groups:

1. Which organizations?
2. How often:
3. Reasons for contacts:

### III.6 Contacts with population at large:

1. Familiarity of people with organization: □ bad □ vague □ good
2. Popular opinion of organization: □ negative □ neutral □ positive
3. Attempts to inform people of organization's work:
5. Attempts to include people in the work of the organization:

IV. Impact of programmes:

IV.1 Organization's effect on DP/refugee return:
1. Form of assistance to DPs:
   □ material aid □ information □ moral support
   □ advocacy support □ other services

IV.2 Did your programme have any effect on reconciliation and diminishing local conflicts?

IV.3 Did you programme have any effect on policy? Did it include any form of advocacy?
1. Last policy effected:
2. When:
3. Level of government lobbied:
4. Strategy applied:
5. Difference with past efforts:

IV.4 Did your programme in any way address elections related issues?

IV.5 Did your programme have any effect on public participation, and encourage local communities to find ways to resolve their own problems?

V. View of socio-political situation in region:

1. Most critical issue resolved since 1995:
   □ end of fighting □ restoration of security □ return of DPs
   □ re-start of the economy □ employment
   □ punishment of war criminals □ other ....................

2. Resolved by: ....................

3. Three critical issues for the future.
   □ security □ multi-party democracy □ gender equality
   □ economic development □ end of corruption
   □ a multi-national state □ refugee return □ other ....................
Annex 2: GLOSSARY

Aksakal also aqsaqal (T): 1. chief or elder (literally “white beard” in Tajik); 2. Administrator of a city or village. 3. Head of a craftsman shop. (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh, 2002: 15)

Apparatchik (R): member of the governmental administration

Avlod (T): Extended family, patriarchal extended family. Pillar of social structure in Tajikistan and institution of traditional authority. (A. and A., 21)

Brigade (R): work unit on a collective farm

Chaïhana (T): teahouse, also often served as a mosque, community center and inn for travelers.

Dom-Kom (R): housing Committee

Enaf (S-C): guild, corporation

Hashar (T): communal labor or cooperative work. Collective effort by volunteers to assist a person in need in the community. (A. and A., 86)


Imam (T): leader of prayer at a mosque


Islamska Zajednica (S-C): Islamic Community


Jadid/jadidist/jadidism (T): Linked with a reformist movement imported to Central Asia by Tartar Jadids who promoted educational reformist ideas. Reformist ideas about Islam and education penetrated the region through modernist newspapers from Egypt, India and Turkey. Especially well developed in the Bukhara Emirate. Eradicated in the 1920s by the Soviets. (A. and A., 102)

Jamoat (T): institution of local self-governance in Tajikistan. Chairs are appointed by the head of the city or the region.

Kolkhoz (R): collective farm.

Komsiluk (S-C): Daily system of coexistence between different communities

Komsomol (R): youth committee. Youth aged 14-28 joined following the approval of a local Komsomol committee. Was present in schools, army institutions, and enterprises. Disbanded in 1991. (A. and A., 121)

Madrasa (T) (medrese, S-C): religious school

Mahalla (T) (mahala; S-C): neighborhoods often run by local elders. All traditional ceremonies and feasts (weddings, funerals, mutual assistance, etc.) are usually organized on the mahalla level under the active leadership of local elders and members of the mahalla committee. (A. and A., 129)

Maraka (T): community gathering usually accompanied by food.

and cities, in which citizens achieved self-management to carry out those activities which directly satisfy their needs and the needs of their families (Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 110).

Millet system: Religious communities that provided a large measure of internal autonomy to non-Muslim populations living in the Ottoman Empire. Each religious group traditionally provided its own schools, welfare system, courts and other public services. (Pinson, 1993: 58)

Mirovni vijece (S-C): peace council
Mullah also mullo (T): 1. A clerical graduate of a madrasa; 2. Clergyman serving in a mosque; 3. Teacher or educator. (A. and A., 148)
Murid (T): A disciple of a Sufi murshid/pir/ishan, the murid renounces worldly ties and follows the example and the word of his chosen master. (A. and A., 149)


Radne akcije (S-C): voluntary community work
Rohbar (T): informal village leader
Raion (R): administrative division (district)
Sadoka also Sadaqa (T): community giving to those in need
Samodoprinos (S-C): self-contribution
Samoupravna interesna zajednica (S-C): self-management interest community
Somoni (T): Tajik currency
Soviet (R): Council
Sovkhoz (R): state farm. Unlike in kolkhoz, sovkhoz property did not belong to the sovkhoz members but to the state.
Subotnik (R): Voluntary community work (often carried out on Saturdays – thus linked to the word Subota)

Udruzenja gradjana (S-C): citizens’ associations

Vakuf (S-C) (vaqf, T): religious endowments, lands and estates donated to religious institutions.

Veloyat (T): Tajikistan word meaning territory or province, veloyat replaced the Russian word oblast in the 1994 Constitution. Since 1999 three veloyats exist in Tajikistan. Heads are appointed by the President.

Zadruga (S-C): extended family household
Zajednica (S-C): community
Zbor (S-C): meeting
zbor gradjana (S-C): citizens’ assembly meeting
Zhensoyuz (R): Women’s Committee

Index key:
S-C: Serbo-Croatian T: Tajik R: Russian
A. and A.: Abdullev and Akbarzadeh, 2002