A Critique of the anthropomorphic conception of the state: The Romanian state as a relational, network and emergent actor

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Declaration

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Abstract

The present thesis is premised on the claim that that there is an inescapable arrangement of the discipline around the concept of the state. IR theories, from rationalist to constructivist ones, dispute to different degrees the ontological and/or analytical utility of the concept. Yet none of them reject the assumptions of corporate agency (based on the assumption of personhood) when discussing the state as an agent internationally. This thesis advances the view that assumptions about the properties of biological kinds, such as unchangeable features, well-determined boundaries and unitary intentionality and agency, cannot be transferred to social kinds such as states. It constitutes a rejection of the essentialising and reifying moves characterising IR theories, while still arguing there are such things as structurally complex actors, and that the state is one of them.

The thesis proposes a conception of the state as a relational, network and emergent actor. It argues that a combination between the relational ontology of networks with the emergent and nonlinear assumptions of complexity science constitute the basis for such a conception of the state. Specifically, the framework can account for the relationship between individual and state agency without collapsing the two analytical and ontological objects. It proposes a view of state agency as differentiated depending on the type of relationships within networks engaged in the constitution of the state. In this light, state agency is regarded as non-unitary and relational.

Based on such a framework, the illustrative cases challenge the manner in which historical data has been put to work to explain the construction of the Romanian state in relation to specific historical events: i.e. the coup and change of regime after 1944; and within a specific period of modernity: i.e. from the 1960s to mid-1980s. The analysis demonstrates that the Romanian state is more than the sum of powerful individuals, yet not a static entity with a clear distinction between its inside and outside. It also shows that, even for the personalistic dictatorship years (1960s – 1980s), overlapping and contradictory social relations and practices simultaneously constitute the state and state agency. This demonstration aims to reinforce the broader claim about the applicability of the framework across a range of types of states (in this case, totalitarian modern states) whilst allowing specific historical analysis of their constitution and agentic potentialities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

General aspects

The present thesis is premised on the claim that that there is an inescapable arrangement of the discipline around the concept of the state. IR theories, from rationalist to constructivist ones, dispute to different degrees the ontological and/or analytical utility of the concept. For instance, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theories emphasise the role of leaders, the elites, the bureaucracies, and interest groups in determining political outcomes. Yet, analyses of international politics come with an assumption that it is states that do the acting internationally.

When attributing ontological and analytical status to the state internationally, such theories treat states as corporate persons. Indeed, Alexander Wendt argued that discussion about international politics would not be possible without the personification of the state and the assumption that its agency is unitary. States as persons and state agency as unitary presupposes a conception of entities as coherent and possessing a well defined inside. The theoretical justification for treating states as persons or like persons has been debated in the last decade in IR, especially after the publication of Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics*. However, systematic analysis of how one can still keep the state as an actor without resorting to reifications and personification of the state are still lacking.

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2 Although FPA is part of the discipline of IR, I differentiate here between IR and FPA texts. This distinction, while debatable, is reflected in the curriculum of politics departments. The courses identify and separate between IR and FPA ‘core thinkers’, although many can be found on the reading lists of both courses.

The thesis examines different theories that treat the state as a sum of individuals, leaders, elites, top bureaucracies and as if states are persons, in order to assess whether their analytical and/or ontological moves provide cogent and coherent understandings and explanations of the state as an actor. The thesis intends to show that these theories are premised on essentialist and reifying assumptions of social entities, spaces and agency. These assumptions create fundamental inconsistencies in these theories and undermine their explanatory potential.

The thesis proposes a conception of the state as a relational, network and emergent actor. It aims to show that a combination between the relational ontology of networks with the emergent and nonlinear assumptions of complexity science constitute the basis for such a conception of the state. Process philosophy and relational sociology, as well as Colin Wight's work on agents and structures will be central to such a move. The thesis proposes a view of state agency as differentiated depending on the type of relationships within networks engaged in the constitution of the state. In this light, it regards state agency as non-unitary and relational. The project also aims to provide an account of the relationship between the individual and the state without collapsing the two analytical and ontological objects.

The thesis puts forward a conceptualisation of the state that allows for differentiation between states according to their historical and contextual specificity. Yet it insists on considering the state as a network as an ontological premise for any historical analysis. From this perspective, totalitarian, highly centralised states, for instance, can also be considered network-like and relational, yet constituted through social relations, practices and institutions that may differ from postmodern states. This
differentiates the argument of this thesis from evolutionist conceptualisations of the state. The latter suggest a relational and processual ontology only in relation to contemporary social entities when they associate, for instance, modern/industrial states with modernity and postmodern ones with informational societies.

The two illustrative cases that I propose in the thesis are intended to demonstrate the manner in which the framework is put to work to explain the construction of the Romanian state in relation to specific historical events: i.e. the coup and change of regime after 1944; and within a specific period of modernity: i.e. the period between the 1960s to mid 1980s. Their rationale and added contribution will be discussed at more length below.

**Methodological considerations**

The processual philosophy and relational sociology literature, network analysis and complexity science writings, and the literature on social and psychological views of the human self, constitute the main sources for the chapters informing the theoretical framework developed in the thesis. The case studies use primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are newspaper articles, archive evidence published in historical journals documenting the policy measures of the Romanian state and the Romanian communist Party for the time in question, reports of meetings between Romanian leaders and other foreign officials and CIA country reports. The political histories written by foreign and Romanian authors, as well as anthropological and economics writings, are the secondary sources for these chapters.

Due to the nature of the topic, immanent critique as a method is essential in demonstrating the inconsistencies and shortcomings of a wide range of IR theories.
The analysis in the case study chapters is based on a reading of historical data through the framework developed in chapters 4 and 5. The appraisal of the explanatory potential of political histories of the time is achieved therefore with a theoretical preference for a concept of the state as relational, network and emergent. I use some of the methodological insights of the network analysis literature to guide my analysis in the empirical chapters. I rely on qualitative analysis to identify the role of different boundaries in the constitution of the state as an actor. The analysis is underpinned by an understanding that the boundary drawing of the social networks relevant to understanding social action is an empirical question rather than a theoretical assumption (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). It involves a negotiation between the observer’s view of where the boundary should be drawn and the participants’ awareness or acknowledgement of these boundaries.

From the variety of IR texts I have chosen those that are both reflective of the different trends in conceptualising the state but also those that make a claim about the potential of their theories to provide an integrated analysis and ontology of the domestic and the international social spaces. In the second chapter I will discuss the works of Krasner, Gourevitch, Putman, Katzenstein and Allison, and Keohane and his co-authors. The writings of Krasner and Keohane et al. combine an IR focus with an FPA one. FPA projects aim to bring the domestic within thinking about international relations and emphasise the role of domestic structures upon foreign policy. Stephen Krasner’s version of realism, and especially his work of deconstructing sovereignty as an ordering principle of the international realm, seem to propose a reconsideration of the international – domestic division. The complex interdependence and world politics paradigms of Keohane and Nye are theoretically

4 Stephen D. Krasner has been frequently described by students of International Relations as ‘a modified’, untypical or ‘sophisticated’ realist with acknowledged influences from both Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism (Philpott, January 2001; Rothstein, Autumn, 1988).
interesting because they combine, for example, a systemic theory of international relations and a pluralist ontology of the international, which includes transnational and transgovernmental relations (Keohane, 1986; Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987). While keeping states as the main units in the system, they make systemic processes the unifying concept between international and domestic politics. Gourevitch's 'second image reversed', Putnam's 'two-level games' and Katzenstein's 'domestic explanation' are the most quoted FPA examples of analytical frameworks that theorise the domestic and international link. I discuss the bureaucratic politics model of Allison because it represents the example of state fragmentation on which Keohane draws and which Krasner argues against. My interest is in how the view of the state relates to the understanding of the international and the domestic social spaces.

I have chosen constructivists such as Wendt and historical sociologists such as Hobson and Sørensen, as well as the postmodern critique of the state, because they explore from different premises the constitution of the state and state agency. These writings integrate more consistently ideational factors such as values, norms, and identities, think more extensively about state agency (Wendt, Hobson), historicise the state (Hobson, Sørensen) and give weight to discursive practices (the postmodern critique). With the exception of Wendt, these IR theorists propose a reconsideration of the ontological and analytical understanding of international and domestic social spaces.

The case studies propose an analysis of regime change, which occurred in Romania following the end of the Second World War between 1944 and 1948, and of Romanian state policies during times of stability; the period of 1960s to mid 1980s. The process of regime change culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and the
declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947. The purpose of having an analysis of regime change, as well as times of stability, is to re-enforce through empirical illustration the theoretical argument, while also having the theoretical argument drive the empirical analysis. In other words, the cases serve two simultaneous and inter-related tasks of ‘theory illustration’ and ‘theory development’ (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 74).

By looking at what was targeted in the process of regime change, I aim to demonstrate that states are neither a sum of individuals nor static entities. Changing the constitution and the agentic possibilities of the Romanian state was not only the result of a process of political exclusion of individuals but also of concomitant processes of re-designing social relations. I consider the stages of regime change as being indicative of the implicit manner in which states, as political entities, are thought to function by human agents. The historical accounts argue that the cause and the agent of change were the Soviet Union and/or Stalin. Stalin’s will, and the coercion by the Red Army, explain the changes in the state in terms of its formal relations and institutions. The first case study intends to reframe the linear explanations, which identify one or two causes directly responsible for regime change, with an account that acknowledges the role of multiple and layered social networks, as well as social relations, in the constitution of the Romanian state.

For the second time frame, the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the historical data and political histories describe a highly centralised state with a strong leader, whose personality cult took on Orwellian dimensions. The Romanian case can constitute empirical data for theories that take a pluralist view (wherein states are their leaders), or a statist view (whereby the state is a highly hierarchical and centralised actor with
well-defined and separate interests and goals). The counter-factual historical data represents, in this case, a challenge to my ontological claims about the constitution of social entities, boundaries and agency in relational network-like and nonlinear ways.

The broader goal of this case study is to demonstrate that, in spite of the formal highly centralised organisational structure, the logic of the social relations underpinning the policies and institutions of the state enabled several types of networks to constitute the state. This illustrative chapter has been chosen to reinforce the broader claim about the applicability of the framework across types of states, such as totalitarian industrialising states, yet allowing for specific historical analysis of their constitution and agental potentialities in the international. This is, in other words, an argument against ideal types or typologies of states, especially when these typologies undermine the meta-theoretical commitments to a relational view of the social world.

When reading the political histories for these time periods, it became more evident that the demonstration was being made difficult by the silent assumptions that informed the historical narratives. Although the historical analyses do not make explicit references to a specific view of the state and state agency, they are underpinned by statist and pluralist ontological assumptions and work with a conception of the state as a person. Often the Romanian state and the leaders such as Ceausescu are considered synonymous, or the Communist Party is equated to the state. Authors speak about the ‘thoughts’ or the ‘state of mind’ of the state or the nation, and so forth. It is at this point that the anthropological and economics writings on communist societies and economies become important in offering more
detailed insights into the social practices that constituted the Romanian state. My argument against a certain type of historical narrative becomes thus part of the endeavour to unveil the explanatory possibilities for understanding the agency of the Romanian state when the focus is on social relations, practices and institutions and the networks of human agents embedded in these social spaces.

**Organisation of the thesis**

The thesis is organised into eight chapters, including the present introduction and the conclusion. The second and third chapters critically engage with some of the propositions put forward by the IR and FPA texts mentioned above regarding the view of the state as an agent in international politics. These chapters provide the themes and the questions that are explored throughout the thesis.

The second chapter, entitled ‘One and the Multiple: The statist and pluralist views of the state’, looks at the differences between the statist approach of Krasner and the pluralist approaches in terms of conceptualising the state and state agency. Pluralist views consider the state as either fragmented or as a redundant concept. Katzenstein and Gourevitch define the state as a conglomerate of interests, which are not necessarily only the interests of specific classes or groups, but neither representative of the public good. Putnam regards the state as the sum of executive decision-makers. Allison’s bureaucratic politics model argues that there is no analytical value in considering the state as a distinct institution from the bureaucratic institutions. The pluralist writers reject the assumption of the state as a unitary actor. The paradigms of complex interdependence and world politics of Keohane and Nye also challenge the view of the state as a unitary actor. They understand the state as a fragmented entity. On the other hand, Krasner’s account proposes a concept of the
state as an autonomous actor possessing a coherent inside and unitary intentionality and agency. The chapter questions the conceptualisation of the state as an autonomous actor or as the sum of individuals or interests, the conceptualisation of social spaces as self-contained and ontologically different in terms of their constitutive features, and the conceptions of agency suggested by these theories. The manner in which the relationship between the international and the domestic is conceived is an important signifier for a certain vision of entities and the sources of state agency. The chapter, for instance, engages at length with Krasner’s argument regarding the emergence of sovereignty and his view of the international – domestic division. It discusses the logical implications of Krasner’s own argument upon understanding the state as an actor, and it questions Krasner’s argument regarding the hypocrisy of state behaviour.

In Chapter 3, I discuss Wendt’s social theory of international politics, the work of historical sociologists such as Hobson and Sørensen, and the postmodern critique of the state. Their analyses incorporate relational and processual ontological assumptions by suggesting, for instance, a structurationist solution to the agency – structure problem. Such a position involves claiming that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, that neither is ontologically prior to the other, that elements are interdependent within the structure and interaction is time and space contingent. The chapter explores the internal tensions and inconsistencies that emerge from the different analytic or ontological moves, such as the bracketing of the domestic, or a strong focus on typologies of states. For instance, the analysis looks at the implications of Wendt’s anthropomorphic view of the state and the methodological bracketing of the domestic for the goals of his theory of international politics to explain change in the international realm. The chapter discusses the postmodern
critique of the state, which is generally sceptical of the possibility for IR theories to avoid the reifications of social spaces and of the state. The section intends to relate the main arguments of the postmodern critique to the general aim of my research project, which is to deconstruct the traditional conceptions of the state in order to reframe its understanding using a relational and processual ontology.

Several questions have emerged from these two chapters as important to the conceptualisation of the state as an actor. They refer to the need to view the state as a unitary and a coherent entity in order to attribute it agency, to the relationship between 'the' international and 'the' domestic, to the relationship between human agents, such as leaders, bureaucrats, and politicians, and the state. They also refer to the conceptual possibilities of multi-causal explanations, as well as to the possibilities for a new language to discuss state agency as practice dependent and constituted by multiple social spaces.

The fourth chapter proposes a shift of the grounds on which conceptualisations of social entities and agency rest: from essentialist or substantialist to processual or relational ones. The aim of this chapter is to offer a more coherent framework that aligns a relational conception of entities with a relational understanding of agency and social spaces. The chapter uses the insights from processual philosophy, relational sociology, social psychology, and Colin Wight's work on agency and structure to reframe the understanding of the state as an actor. The discussion first intends to show that the contradictions and inconsistencies of the IR theories examined earlier are in fact due to the essentialist conceptions underpinning their views of entities, properties and of boundaries. My analysis examines the mismatch between Sørensen's essentialist view of state agency and the relational view of social
spaces proposed by his framework. It also discusses the implications of developing predictable algorithms for each ideal type of state (for instance, associating a type of state with a type of agency internationally). The chapter discusses the concepts of social relations, selves and agency. It places these concepts at the centre of an understanding of the state as a relational and non-unitary actor. It develops the arguments that allow my framework to consider states as actors without the assumption of unitary intentionality. The argument proposes a conceptualisation of the state and state agency that maintains the ontological differentiation between individual and state agency.

Chapter 5 builds upon the conceptualisation of the state as a non-unitary and relational actor developed in chapter 4. It aims to show that the concept of the network is useful in thinking about the state as an entity and about social spaces. The chapter critically reflects on the issue of boundaries in order to consolidate the argument about the non-unitary nature of the state. It also argues for a conceptualisation of the state as a hierarchical network. The chapter uses the network analysis literature to contend that states should be conceptualised as networks regardless of the historical period. It also uses the complexity science concepts of emergence and non-linearity to further the distinction between the state and individuals and between their agential potential. Lastly, the chapter interrogates the conceptual links between agency and power existent in the IR literature and examines which understanding of power should inform the conception of agency developed in this project.

The theoretical propositions are illustrated in the chapters six and seven. Chapter 6 looks at the political processes in Romania in the years before the coup of 1944, and
at the changes occurring after, which culminating with the abolition of the monarchy and declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947. The chapter identifies the networks of social relations constituting the Romanian state formally, illicitly and informally. It illustrates the manner in which different networks of social relations and human agents inform a varied Romanian state agency during the pre-1944 years. The analysis in this chapter is underpinned by an understanding of change as dependent on previous social relations and practices, yet not determined in any clear way. The chapter considers the immediate context equally important for creating the opportunities for some social relations and networks of human agents to become more important than others. The analysis identifies the stages of regime change and discusses their implications for the constitution of the Romanian state. The analysis offers explanations that incorporate factors identified by historians, such as the presence of the Red Army on the Romanian territory, or the interest of the Soviet Allied Commission in the development of a communist regime in Romania, but it incorporates them into a more complex explanation. The chapter intends to offer a more nuanced account of the constitution of the Romanian state at the end of the war that moves away from the deterministic view: the Romanian state and state agency as the epiphenomenon of either the structural division of the world or of Stalin's personal intentions.

The last core chapter is particularly important for making a fundamental point about the relational, network, and emergent character of the Romanian state. The chapter argues that explanations of state action should go beyond identifying the Romanian Communist Party or the leader as the cause for the position of the Romanian state in relation to specific policy goals or other actors. The chapter demonstrates that, in spite of the centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state
institutions and practices, the Romanian state can be conceptualised as a network. This is achieved by looking at several issues: the conceptual and factual differentiation between the party and the state and the effects of the policies of bureaucratic, political, and economic centralisation. The chapter shows why and how the social spaces ordered around social practices in the economic and the political-administrative domains are equally important for understanding the emergent agency of the state. They constitute the Romanian state as a centralised yet network actor, highly coercive yet not able to control outcomes from top-down. The chapter also discusses two closely related foreign policy goals: economic development through industrialisation, and the payment of the national debt. The analysis of these policy goals illustrates the manner in which the boundaries between the inside and the outside are being negotiated in relation to different (or even the same) ‘foreign’ others. My analysis also raises questions about the tenability of claiming a stable self for the Romanian state. This is because for each goal or state action the state constitutes itself at the confluence of social relations, practices, and new contexts. By demonstrating the complexity of the social processes involved in the constitution of the Romanian state as a non-unitary actor, the analysis intends to disprove the IR accounts that identify one main relationship (state-society, for instance) as the cause for the agential potential of the state internationally.

The concluding chapter draws out the main theoretical contributions made by this project and links them to the analyses of the empirical chapters. It also reflects upon the type of social inquiry that the discipline can produce in terms of explanations of past events, and in terms of predicting future outcomes, if the intention is to develop policy relevant analysis. It discusses the implications of the project for understanding
the domestic and the international social spaces, as well as for the boundaries of the discipline.
Chapter 2: One and the Multiple: Statist and pluralist views of the state

*The argument is not about whether we are or are not 'state centric', but what we mean by the state (Halliday, 1987, p. 217).*

This is the first of the two chapters that discuss rationalist and constructivist or statist\(^5\) and pluralist views of the state. The reason behind the choice of authors has been extensively presented under the Methodological consideration in the introduction. The goal of these chapters is two-fold. Firstly, the chapters aim to identify the limitations but also the insights in terms of understanding the constitution of the state and state agency. In order to achieve this, the chapters examine the implicit and explicit statements about the state as an actor. They also look at the manner in which the relationship between the international and the domestic has been framed in the writings. This relationship is an important signifier for a certain vision of entities and for understanding the sources of state agency. Secondly, the aim is to provide a platform for reconsidering the view of the state and state agency.

\(^5\) I will use 'state-centrism' to denote the focus within international politics on the state as the main actor and 'statist' and 'statism' to refer to those theories that regard the state as an autonomous actor. Keohane, for instance, calls state-centric theories those which acknowledge the state as unified and the only actor in politics, while Krasner uses them interchangeably. See also Wagner (Summer, 1974) on the distinction.
Statist and pluralist conceptions of the state refer to those frameworks that acknowledge the state as an independent analytical and/or ontological entity or deny its status by focusing on other objects of analysis. They start from different positions to explain international politics. When reading the opposing accounts it becomes immediately evident that even the pluralist frameworks refer to states as actors internationally. How different are then these approaches from each other in terms of their explanatory potential? What are the conceptions of state agency that are related to their respective views of the state? The present chapter answers these questions by looking at the work of Krasner, Gourevitch, Katzenstein, Putman, Allison⁶ and Keohane and Nye.

2.1. The state as an autonomous actor

In Krasner’s writings the state is portrayed as an independent analytic construct (Krasner, Spring, 1979, p. 96).⁷ This translates into an image of the state as an autonomous, unified actor. It is more than a setting for domestic politics or an epiphenomenon of societal or group bargaining. Krasner’s project is different from that of other neo-realists⁸ (Krasner, 1999, p. 58, Feb., 1992, Spring, 1981) in that it rejects the state as a black box and aims to ‘unpack’ it, i.e. to break it down into identifiable components. It is an inside-outside perspective: the state is still the main actor in the international yet the focus is on its domestic components. The concept aims to fulfil a bridging role between the two dimensions of politics: the

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⁶ I take Allison as the main author of the bureaucratic politics model. He published an article in 1969, which became a book two years later (Allison, 1971). In 1972, Allison co-authored an article with Morton H. Halperin on the same subject (Allison & Halperin, 1972).

⁷ The discussion here refers to the concept of the state as it is theorised or as it can be inferred from his writings. However, his claims are also about the manner in which politics as a social realm is constituted.

⁸ Krasner engaged in his writings more with the Waltzian and the Gilpian versions than with the classical Realist ones (Robert O. Keohane & Krasner, Autumn, 1998).
international and the domestic. According to Krasner, the statist approach is also designed to counter the pluralistic arguments, such as the bureaucratic politics model, which deny any standing to the state as an analytical concept.

A key feature of Krasner’s statist argument refers to the ability of the state to pursue the national interest without interference from pressure groups. This criterion allows Krasner to decide what institutions can be accurately labelled ‘state institutions.’ The state is identified with the ‘central governmental institutions’ and in some cases only with its ‘principal official agency’. Their respective responsibility is to ensure the ‘well-being of the society’ or the general interest of society (Krasner, 1978, Feb., 1992, p. 46, Jan., 1984, p. 228, Spring, 1979, pp. 79-80, 85). Specifically, in his analysis of the US foreign economic policy, the state institutions exclude local governments, at times the White House, elements of different Departments, various congressional committees depending on the degree of connectedness with their respective constituencies or social groups within these constituencies (Krasner, Autumn, 1973, p. 89). Although bargaining is present between the state’s agencies, dissident behaviour against the state’s policies can place an agency outside it.

This statist view raises several issues. First, in terms of the definition of the state; secondly, in terms of the implications of the framework for empirical analysis; lastly, when the analysis acknowledges all the relations on the ground, the empirical findings do not sustain a statist approach, which relies on the state as an autonomous, unitary, and coherent entity.

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9 Krasner writes that ‘[s]tatism is consistent with realism because it justifies the assertion that states can be treated as unified rational actors (…)’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 46).

10 He writes: ‘Executive departments like Agriculture and most congressional committees would not be part of the state — they are explicitly concerned with specific societal interests’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, pp. 46, 47, 89).
The unpacking of the state into identifiable components is not accompanied by any acknowledgement of the social processes and relations that bind it together. The state is autonomous and unitary in character by virtue of the rational and instrumental pursuit of the national interest and the ‘general societal objectives’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 48). The pursuit of the national interest is, in other words, the common ground for stateness for the component institutions. Yet, both interest-formation and the type of bonding relationship based on the national interest are primarily ‘bargaining’ relationships. This makes the “statist state” the same as the state in a pluralist argument: a sum of institutions or sum of interests (Wagner, Summer, 1974).

Secondly, according to the statist assumptions of exogenous interests and insulation of the state from other societal groups, the mere existence of interaction and influence between the society and state would dissolve the state (Wagner, Summer, 1974). Not only is society exemplified narrowly by pressure groups but the existence of the state as an actor is premised on its ability to stay outside constitutive interaction with such groups. Contrary or different opinions arising from other groups are not only deemed less than a national interest but they alter the ‘stateness’ of the institutions that take them on board. Additionally, Krasner’s argument presupposes a taken-for-granted agreement upon what national security entails in terms of policies to follow. He writes, ‘[i]n defending territorial and political integrity [security], there is no obvious reason for intra-national clashes’ (Krasner, Autumn, 1973, p. 496). Krasner’s position presupposes that the concerns and the
understandings of national security are collective, i.e. supported by the entire society, because the impact of security policies is collective.\textsuperscript{11}

Krasner’s theory cannot reconcile the assumption about a collectively representative interest with the statist assumption about the minimalist interaction between the state and society. The assumption of coherence and unity of the state makes this move even more difficult. The assumptions that inform the argument about the state as an autonomous actor have been criticised for their normative implications. Krasner defends his theory by arguing that there is an ethical dimension to it, which does not endorse autocratic rules. He writes: statist theory ‘would not endorse an autocratic regime that pursued interests that disproportionately favoured particular groups in a given society (...)’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 47). Yet, he also argues that ‘statism is sceptical of popular control in a fragmented polity because such control can frustrate the pursuit of the national interest rather than promote it’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 47). The conundrum remains how to keep the state as an actor while also acknowledging the state-society relationship and the interactions between different state institutions.\textsuperscript{12}

Krasner’s empirical findings weaken his statist theoretical contentions with respect to the ability of the state to act unhindered internationally and domestically (Krasner, Spring, 1982a, Spring, 1982b). The empirical findings suggest an important constraining role for private groups both internationally and domestically due to their economic power and domestic institutional arrangements. They can influence and change international economic regimes (Krasner, April, 1991, pp. 343, 356).

\textsuperscript{11} [Security] is the collective good par excellence. It affects all groups in more or less the same way. Only with difficulty can one group within a state enjoy security without providing it to others’ (Krasner, Autumn, 1973, pp. 495-496).

\textsuperscript{12} Krasner himself acknowledges these limits in a co-authored article (Peter J. Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, Autumn, 1998, p. 666).
Krasner also recognises empirically the role of broader social relations in influencing the institutional arrangement and consequently the American state in terms of the decision-making, policy choices, and ability to pursue those interests. However, his conceptual framework takes interests for granted and places them outside interaction with society. This makes Krasner's conceptual tool kit restrictive and unfit for empirical examples that need to understand those interactions—the manner in which the state is informed, shaped and influences, in its turn, the formation of interests.

In his recent writings on sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, p. 43) – to which I will return in the next subsection – the explanatory need for a revised conceptualisation of the state as a separate entity has been avoided through a new focus on 'rulers' and 'specific policy makers'. Interestingly, in spite of the emphasis on individuals as the main ontological givens and agents, this is not an inside-outside type of argument, like the statist one. Rather, the ruler-based approach is integrated within the discussion about the nature of the international realm and state action internationally. Krasner still speaks of states, referring for example to the Westphalian state, and then more specifically to the English and the French state. The argument about the prevalence of the logic of consequence internationally relies on a focus on rulers, i.e. individuals and their instrumental behaviour. It is the ruler's drive to preserve power that informs his/her pursuit of the national interest and common good, with the caveat that domestically, normative constraints (societal norms) may influence the ruler's actions (Krasner, 1999, pp. 7, 9).

13 ‘The starting point for this study, is that the the ontological givens are rulers, specific policy makers, usually but not always the executive head of state. Rulers not states — and not the international system — make choices about policies, rules, and institutions (Krasner, 1999, p. 7).

14 Methodologically, preferences should be taken as given: 'Any actor-oriented approach must start with simple assumptions about the underlying preferences of actors. These preferences must be applicable to all actors across space and time. If the preferences, the underlying interests of actors, are problematic, then the preferences become something to be explained rather than something that can do the explaining.' (Krasner, 1999, p. 7)
One important issue arises from this new focus. This refers to the relationship between the ruler and the state. The fact that the concept of ‘state’ is still present in the analyses implies that rulers speak for states. At the same time, from the manner in which Krasner frames his analysis, it seems that the state is still considered an actor. In fact, one of the key elements of the sovereignty argument rests on the assumption of states as rational unitary actors. If Krasner’s intention is to explain state action by reference to the ruler’s instrumental and power-driven actions, then the concept of the state loses all of the previous meanings developed in the statist approach. This issue of the relationship between individual and the state is a recurrent one in the FPA pluralist theories discussed below.

To conclude, this first section has examined Krasner’s statist argument. It has evaluated the ability of his theoretical framework to offer a different conceptualisation of the state from that of the pluralists and the neo-realists. It concluded that paradoxically, Krasner’s framework ends up with a pluralist argument. It has also argued that the framework’s ability to question and explain the role of broader social processes in shaping the ‘national’ interest and state behaviour is limited. The discussion has also drawn attention to the under-examined relationship between leaders and states as actors in the international system.
2.2. Enhancing the international/domestic divide by
‘deconstructing’ sovereignty

Krasner’s deconstruction of the long-embedded conception of Westphalian sovereignty\(^ {15}\) would suggest at a first glance a theoretical and empirical reconsideration of the international—domestic division. The different understanding of spatialities would in turn allow for a more dynamic framing of the manner in which states are constituted as actors.

Krasner’s view of the relationship between the international and the domestic draws on the classical differentiation. The domestic political community is favourable to ‘lock-in processes’ and the creation of stable institutional forms. The diversity of domestic normative structures does not favour agreement upon the guiding principles at the international level (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, pp. 117, 148-149). ‘Generative grammars’, i.e. institutionalized normative structures that constitute actors, are non-existent internationally (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 145).\(^ {16}\) In Krasner’s language, the international is the realm of the logic of consequences while the domestic is the realm of the logic of appropriateness (Krasner, 1999, p. 6). This translates into a different type of behaviour internationally: instrumental and utility driven. The ruler-based approach discussed above suggests that utilitarian and instrumental reasoning is present in the international realm as well as domestically (Krasner, 1999, pp. 5-6). Krasner argues that sovereignty as an organising principle has emerged because of the utilitarian

\(^{15}\) Krasner’s four types of sovereignty exercised by states are: domestic sovereignty (i.e. control over domestic activities), interdependence sovereignty (authority over transborder movements), international legal sovereignty (authority stemming from ‘formal juridical independence’), and the Westphalian sovereignty (i.e. authority to be the sole ‘arbiter of legitimate behaviour’ within a territorial unit). For an extensive account on the four types of sovereignty, see (Krasner, 1999, pp. 1-42, Winter, 1995-1996, pp. 118-119).

\(^{16}\) ‘[T]he defining characteristic of international politics is anarchy, the absence of authority, not the nature of domestic regimes’ (Krasner, Feb., 1992, p. 48).
choice kings and bureaucracies consciously made in order to legitimate tax collection and consolidate their positions, respectively. Aside from the emphasis on the instrumental behaviour of rulers, this type of argument also emphasises the material causes of sovereignty. Ideas were a function of material interests within the political community of the time and had no generative role (Krasner, 1993, pp. 257, 262). Krasner writes:

In the effort to construct sovereignty, ideas have been used to codify existing practices rather than to initiate new forms of order. Ideas have not made possible alternatives that did not previously exist; they legitimised political practices that were already facts on the ground. Ideas have been one among several instruments that actors have invoked to promote their own, usually mundane, interests (Krasner, 1993, pp. 238, 246).

A second related point Krasner makes refers to the existence of sovereign practices well before the Peace Treaties of Westphalia and, pace most scholars, an unclear, fuzzy transition from feudalism to modernity. The treaties institutionalised already existing material driven practices. For post-Westphalian Europe, he still maintains the role of material interests in determining political action and the role of instrumentally driven behaviour of leaders. He exemplifies his argument with the case of the fall of the Holy Roman Empire.17 Napoleon’s political interests were, according to Krasner, the main drive for the demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and not the works of Bodin, Hobbes, and Vattel (Krasner, 1993, pp. 251 - 252).

While offering a more nuanced historical reading of the Westphalian moment, Krasner’s argument reinstates the realist view of well-defined boundaries between

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17 The pre-Westphalian system was premised, according to historians, on universal institutions: religious (Papacy) and secular (the Roman Empire). The new system came with the rejection of both. Krasner is indecisive about the decline of the institutions of the Holy Empire. He writes ‘the term “the Westphalian system” does accurately capture the fact that the efficacy of universal institutions has been virtually eliminated (...).’ He also writes that ‘The Holy Roman Empire did not, however, disappear either in law or in practice in 1648. (...) While its most important institutions, especially the diet, atrophied during the eighteenth century, others remain robust’ (Krasner, 1993, pp. 236, 247).
the domestic and the international realms. Based on the conventional understanding of sovereignty Krasner implies that states are fixed and exclusively self-generated entities that cannot internalise, for example, normative prescriptions such as human rights law. I argue here that there are nevertheless trends in his analysis that allow a different conclusion: a re-conceptualisation of these social spaces.

Krasner builds his argument against what he calls the 'conventional' understanding of sovereignty as theorised over the years. He claims that there is a false perception of sovereignty and its practice. Both practice over the centuries and recent theories are invoked to buttress his argument. Furthermore, in order to substantiate his claim, Krasner points to the provisions in the treaties of Westphalia, which did not enforce an absolute right of decision of rulers with respect to religion (Krasner, 1993, pp. 242-244). The problem lies thus, as can be inferred from Krasner's argument, in the premises or in the starting definition, for sovereignty is not the exclusive right of control over a specific territory (Krasner, 1993, pp. 235, 237, 240). Paradoxically, this proof has a two-fold effect: it reduces the shocking element of his thesis and secondly, it undermines Krasner's argument about the instrumental as opposed to generative role of the principle of sovereignty. Consequently, the broader argument about the hypocrisy of the system becomes less powerful.

The shocking element of his thesis referred to his exposing of the mismatch between the practice and the rule of sovereignty. This makes states hypocritical. However, if we accept his demonstration that the legal definition of 1648 reflected the blend of central control and intervention existing already, then subsequent state practice represents a reflection of this contradictory rule. State practices were instantiations

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18 The treaty did not recognize 'the right of rulers to change the religious practices within their territories arbitrarily' (Krasner, 1993, pp. 242-244).
of the tension captured in this institutionalising moment. In other words, the contradictory practices after the Peace Treaties were instantiations of the sovereignty principle. Yet, Krasner does not acknowledge the constitutive or generative role of the principle. Instead, he reads the different practices with respect to Human Rights or economic cooperation, for example, as signs of the hypocrisy of the system. Only by being inconsistent in the usage of the definition of sovereignty, can he claim this interpretation. That is, the system is hypocritical because it is judged now according to the ‘conventional’ definition and it is not generative because hypocrisy and inconsistency implies instrumental and utility-oriented action.

Secondly, the argument of a non-generative international structure is built on the exercise of state instrumentality. At the same time, Krasner argues that ‘[t]he assumption that states are independent rational actors can be misleading because it marginalizes many situations in which rulers have, in fact, not been autonomous’ (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 115). This creates another paradoxical position because in theory, if sovereignty is to remain non-generative, rational and instrumental calculation should prevail. Nevertheless, ‘many’ times, this has not happened since ‘autonomous’ behaviour has been trumped due to interventions based on normative justifications (Krasner, Winter, 1995-1996, p. 115). In other words, the lack of autonomous behaviour reinforces the argument about the hypocrisy of the system and at the same time undermines the assumption upon which a non-generative system relies.

The additional claim that ‘no convincing alternative cognitive construct has been presented’(Krasner, Spring, 1982a, p. 509), in spite of sovereignty being contested as

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19 It should also be noted that Krasner attributes the deviations in the behaviour of states to ‘erroneous’ action: ‘in the shorter run (...) states, may err.’ The example he gives is the US’s ideologically-driven foreign policy (Krasner, Feb., 1992).
an organising principle of the international system, in fact supports the argument against the prevalence of the logic of consequence. According to Krasner, a new principle would need to be shown as viable and compensatory for the high ‘sunk costs’, i.e. the political, social, economic costs, of dissolving the present order. This is portrayed as a rational instrumental decision. In this context, one can argue that sovereignty as an enduring reference point creates the possibilities of its deeper institutionalisation and the subsequent possibility to become a ‘generative’ rule.

The idea that norms and principles can be institutionalised in the international system and constitute a feature of the structure comes out of Krasner’s writings on regimes. It is however an unintended consequence of his usage of concepts. Regimes denote cooperative and norm-driven behaviour and action and hierarchical structures. At the same time, he equates, for example, the international economic structure/system with both the neo-liberal economic order and with the international trade structure (Krasner, March 1981, pp. 135, 138). The conceptual difference between specific regimes and the international economic structure is collapsed when he states that the international neo-liberal order is a regime that the Third World would like to change (Krasner, March 1981, p. 121). The weak conceptual link between economic regimes and international structures blurs the understanding of what the Third World is really changing: an ‘intervening variable’/actor within the system (as regimes are labelled) (Krasner, Spring, 1982b), or a structural feature. On the other hand, it means, as mentioned, that the features of international structures are not immutable.

20 Krasner uses the concepts of international structure, system and politics interchangeably. For example, the US has a ‘position of dominance in the international system’, which he labels in some other places a hegemonic international structure (My emphasis). (Krasner, April, 1976, p. 318, Spring, 1981, p. 321).
Finally, Krasner works with a narrow understanding of rationality and politics. This can be inferred from his understanding of the relationship between material and ideational factors. As mentioned, he asserts the prevalence of material over ideational factors in the emergence of sovereignty. However, in his book, Krasner acknowledges in several places that there was a ‘fluid relationship between power [understood as material interests] and ideas’. Krasner argues that ‘[k]ings, popes, and emperors all had intellectual rationales that legitimated their claims to make authoritative decisions’ (Krasner, 1993, p. 256). This means that there was a concomitant revision of the sources of authority, both spiritual and political around the time of the treaty of Westphalia. He also mentions a ‘sense of national identity’ emerging by the end of the fifteenth century in England. In the light of these historical specifications, Krasner’s material embedding and understanding of rationality become questionable. Furthermore, several other authors have demonstrated the role of Enlightenment writings in shaping the political practices of the time (Reus-Smit, 1999; Ruggie, January 1983; Schwoerer, October - December 1990). For instance, ideas such as meritocracy and the rule of law put forward by the Enlightenment literature\(^{21}\) were important for the political practices of the time and informed Napoleon’s political beliefs (Martin, 2001). This means that Krasner’s argument is not only inconsistent on its own terms in providing an explanation of political behaviour but also fails to integrate historical material relevant to the historical period he discusses.

This section has discussed Krasner’s argument regarding the emergence of sovereignty and his view of the international – domestic division. It has shown that his work contains arguments that point to a fundamentally different position that he

\(^{21}\) Such works are Montesquieu’s ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ of 1748 or Rousseau’s ‘The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’ (1762).
has chosen to argue for in his work. The analysis has shown that state practice is not ‘hypocritical’ but reflects the contradictions institutionalised in the Westphalian rule. It has also shown that the idea of the domestic and the international as fundamentally different social spaces is difficult to sustain if one looks at the logical implications of Krasner’s own argument.

### 2.3. Pluralists views: the FPA literature

Pluralists consider the state as either fragmented or as a redundant concept. Katzenstein and Gourevitch define the state as a conglomerate of interests, which are not necessarily only the interests of specific classes or groups, but neither are they representative of the public good (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977). Putnam regards the state as the sum of executive decision-makers (Putnam, 1998, p. 432). Allison’s bureaucratic politics model argues that there is no analytical value in considering the state as a distinct institution from the bureaucratic institutions. The pluralist writers reject the assumption of the state as a unitary actor (Gourevitch, 2002, p. 303). Except for Allison, they also aim to incorporate the domestic dimension of the state into explanations of world politics.

This literature brings into discussion the need for an integrated analysis. Katzenstein’s domestic explanation\(^\text{22}\), Gourevitch’s second image reversed\(^\text{23}\) and

\(^\text{22}\) Katzenstein’s framework focuses on the constraints domestic structures place on the international political process (Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976).

\(^\text{23}\) The second image reversed designates the conceptual endeavour that aims to assess the role of the international state system, which is exemplified by (the state of) war and the distribution of power among states, and of the international economic system in influencing domestic politics (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978).
Putnam’s two-level games\textsuperscript{24} aim to theorise the ‘intertwinement’ or the ‘areas of entanglement’ between the domestic and international politics\textsuperscript{25} (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 911; Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976, p. 2; Putnam, 1998, p. 430). They acknowledge the importance of state - society relations, which they theorise differently. For instance, Putnam’s definition of state’s autonomy is linked to its ability to distance itself from societal ‘pressures’ (Putnam, 1998, pp. 445, 449), which resembles Krasner’s view of the state. They all posit causal relationships between the nature of the state as an institution and that of society (i.e. societal groups).

There is a key theoretical and ontological implication from the empirical writings that none of the authors seem to acknowledge. The analytical move to consider the relationship between the state and society as part of the analysis of international politics informs the examples these writers give. Katzenstein claims for instance that France is a strong state with a weak society while the USA has a weak state and a strong society (Peter J. Katzenstein, Winter 1976, pp. 15 – 42). This relationship influences the implementation of state policies (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977, p. 604). Putnam argues that during international bargaining a dominant state domestically will find itself in a weak bargaining position as it cannot attribute the lack of agreement on an issue or renounce negotiations on the grounds that domestically it cannot implement the decisions (Putnam, 1998, pp. 445, 449). One can infer from the examples that within a specific historical context, a state can be

\textsuperscript{24} It designates a model that looks at the manner in which or whether the domestic politics of different states are connected through international negotiations (diplomacy). The international negotiations for a package of policies to counter the first oil shocks at the Berlin Convention in 1972 illustrate Putnam’s framework (Putnam, 1998).

\textsuperscript{25} For instance, Gourevitch writes: ‘International relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.’ (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 911). These approaches are not systemic explanations like Krasner’s or Keohane’s. Their preference for a comparative politics approach also accounts for the lack of the systemic view. See for instance the Katzenstein et al. discussion on theory and comparative politics (Peter J. Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 10 -11). Also, (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 882).
considered simultaneously weak and strong: strong domestically but weak internationally. Its agential potential becomes differentiated.

Yet, their analytical framework suggests, in spite of the contrary claim, that the state has unitary agency. It is agency based on an assumption of the internal coherence of the state. The state has an identifiable ‘inside’. The focus of the analyses is on the state and society as two distinct entities, whose features are internally determined. These features determine the type of relationship between the two. It is, for instance, because the state is dominant in France that the society is weak. This logic exposes the preference for explanations based on law-like regularities. The explanations identify specific features of the state and society that will lead to a weak or strong position of the state internationally. By this logic, the French and the USA states have pre-determined positions internationally. Such an understanding would create difficulties in explaining whether or why the French or the USA state are not always weak or better off in international negotiations.

Gourevitch's understanding of the relationship between the state and society represents a more interesting option. He posits that state action is a function of the relationship between the society and the state. He then suggests that the properties of the relationship, such as the level of interaction with labour, agriculture and industry societal groups, influence the agential potential of the state. For instance, if there are many links, then the higher the autonomy of the state and its agential potential internationally. At the same time however, it means that Gourevitch’s framework starts with a concept of the state as a sum of interests and ends up with an ‘autonomous’ actor (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 906). He is more explicit on this issue when arguing that the state can impose its preferences over international
organisations (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 894). For example, Gourevitch writes that ‘whenever states assert their views they are able to prevail over international organisations’ (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 894). The state stops being a plural entity and becomes a unitary one.

All of these writers speak of the relationship between the domestic and the international in terms of cause and consequence. This signals that there is an assumption of two separate and autonomous structures. They argue that simultaneous analysis is required due to the interconnectedness of domestic and international politics (Gourevitch, Autumn, 1978, p. 911). Katzenstein, for instance, contends that, in the overall explanation, domestic politics exercises ‘the primary constraints’ (Peter J. Katzenstein, Autumn, 1977, p. 587, Winter 1976, p. 2). While Putnam argues in his example of international negotiations for a package of policies to counter the first oil shocks that his focus is on when and how they are ‘entangled’, suggesting the possibility of separation on other issues (Putnam, 1998, p. 427). Putman does not mention when that can be the case theoretically or empirically. It is nevertheless a limiting assumption about the possibilities of interactions between the two realms. Their view of social spaces is constituted by the classic domestic vs. international division.\(^{26}\) Political interactions take place within the domestic or the international but not across this divide. Transnational and transgovernmental relations do not feature as part of these explanatory frameworks, although both Gourevitch and Putnam explicitly deem them important in order to understand foreign policies and institutional development of states (Gourevitch, 2002, p. 304; Putnam, 1998, p. 459).

\(^{26}\) Overall, the issue of norms and ideas is under-theorised in the FPA literature.
Allison's bureaucratic politics model emphasises the placement of individuals within specific bureaucratic organisations (Allison, 1969). The interactions of individuals in these organisations are the 'determinants of the actions of a government in international politics' (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43). Organisations have conflicting values, interests, and act according to specific organisational patterns (e.g. procedures and routines). Policy goals are the result of bargaining amongst individuals, who have different organisational and personal interests. The bureaucratic process with its focus on the bargaining and compromises between domestic institutions is the direct cause of a state’s action internationally (Allison & Halperin, 1972, pp. 48, 53). The international is considered a platform for already formed internal interests (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 57).

An important issue arises from Allison's weak specification of the relationship between this model and the unitary state model, which works with a conception of the state similar to Krasner's view. Allison suggests that they are equally valid types of models (Wagner, Summer, 1974, p. 448). Allison does not specify whether the models can explain the same thing or different issues, or if there are instances when the state can be considered an instrumental and unitary actor (Bendor & Hammond, Jun., 1992, p. 305). The conceptualisation of the national interest as 'generally accepted' and pre-determined (Freedman, Jul., 1976, p. 441), despite the existence of different organisational interests, makes the bureaucratic politics model similar to the statist one. Critics have also noted that the bureaucratic politics model works with a very narrow definition of politics and context, which is limited to the bureaucratic organisations (Freedman, Jul., 1976, p. 437). This becomes evident when the model is compared to the other pluralist accounts presented above, which
demonstrate the value of the state-society relation for understanding the formation of state interests as well as the role of the international.\textsuperscript{27}

To conclude, this section has examined some of the pluralist conceptualisations of the state. It has assessed the implications of their conceptualisation of the state-society relationship for understanding the state as an actor. The section has argued that although the initial conceptualisations of the state focus on the state as the sum of interests, decision-makers and so forth, these writers work with a conception of the state as an actor. Their conceptualisation of social spaces, such as the international and the domestic, enforces an understanding of the state as a coherent, unitary actor. The discussion of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model has suggested that Allison proposes a limiting understanding of the political process, which is similar to Krasner’s in some key respects. It has also suggested that Allison’s argument does not spell out the relationship between his two different models and their specific roles for explaining state action.

2.4. The state in the interdependence and world politics paradigms

The work of Keohane et al.\textsuperscript{28} explicitly draws on the bureaucratic politics model (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 7; Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 732) but it

\textsuperscript{27}The limitations of the model to explain political action during the Cuban Missile crisis are eloquently exposed in Jutta Weldes book (Weldes, 1999). See also (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

\textsuperscript{28}I include in this analysis also Keohane’s co-authored work. Keohane et al. are interested in the ‘changing nature of the international system’ (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. viii), in institutional theory \textit{(After Hegemony)}, in the relationship between the international structure and international regimes (Robert O. Keohane, 1989, p. 80) and in the conditions of international cooperation, or international law and politics (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, & Slaughter, Summer 2000, pp. 397, 399).
also maintains a systemic dimension (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, p. 730; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 7). The paradigms of complex interdependence and world politics challenge the view of the state as a unitary actor. They understand the state as a fragmented entity. Their emphasis on transnational and transgovernmental relations, pace the pluralist accounts above, supports such an understanding of the state. It also suggests an enlargement of the ontology of the international.

The state is regarded as an organisation whose main purpose is problem solving. Its underlying goal is efficiency. State agency seems at this point enabled by efficiency rather than by any moral, social, or political goals. On the ground, different departments of the government than the main decision-making body can represent the state (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 50).

Human agents are given an important role (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, pp. 4 - 5, 8 - 9). Elites, leaders or statesmen are instrumental in agenda setting and control and ‘state choices’ are more likely to reflect their understanding of what the interests are (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 748 - 749). They distinguish between foreign policy makers and politicians, the latter having narrower interests than ‘foreign policy leaders’ (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 29, 206). Bargaining takes place amongst a variety of groups with more or less influence upon the official agenda setting: ‘national interests will be defined differently on

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29 The world politics paradigm ‘brings together traditional international politics, the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy analysis, and transnational actors (…)’ (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 732). Initially, *transnational relations* denoted ‘a generic category’ for both transnational and transgovernmental interactions. *Transnational interactions* involved interactions between both governmental and other non-governmental actors. They came to reconsider their terminology in the light of Harrison Wagner’s critique (Wagner, Summer, 1974). This section will use the revised terminology. Thus, transnational is restricted only to interactions between non-governmental actors while transgovernmental refers to interactions between governmental sub-units (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 41).
different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units' (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 30). According to Keohane and Nye, the national interest is a shifting category, which reflects the interactions between domestic and international politics (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 7).

Governments\(^{30}\) are both internationally and domestically 'open' rather than hermetic 'decision-making units' (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, Oct., 1974, p. 45). The state is 'multifaceted, even schizophrenic' in its negotiations with foreign governments (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 30). Keohane and Nye write that '[p]olicy conceived as if the world consisted of billiard-ball states guided by philosopher-kings is not very useful' (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 197). This is due to the existence of different preferences within the establishment. State action also includes the actions of governmental sub-units engaged in interactions with other states. Such an interpretation involves a broad working definition of politics and state action (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 730). The argument that transnational and transgovernmental coalitions are possible supports, as mentioned, the non-unitary view of the state. This consequence is important in that it blurs the boundary between the domestic and the international. For Keohane and Nye, international politics extends within the domestic and vice-versa (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 21).

States act internationally in a utilitarian rational way. The state is also the most important rational actor in the international system. In exercising agency, the state is treated at times as a person, it 'reacts' and 'adapts' to transnational and

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\(^{30}\) Keohane does not explicitly differentiate between the concepts of 'state' and 'government'. They are used interchangeably: as in governmental action or state behaviour or (sovereign) governments as actors in world politics (Robert O. Keohane, 1984, pp. 93, 110). Also, in (Robert O Keohane, Spring 1998, p. 93; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 5).
transgovernmental relations and is capable of emotions such as 'ambition' (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 343). The rules of international regimes are 'frequently changed, bent, or broken to meet the exigencies of the moment' (Robert O. Keohane, Spring, 1982, p. 331). Despite the existence of transnational relations, the state is still 'in charge' and all the other actors are subordinated to it (Robert O. Keohane, 1986, p. 193, 1989, p. 8). The international institutions lack the power and autonomy to enforce rules and procedures (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 17). Even the domestic structure, such as group interests, and the international distribution of capabilities, have more impact on the state than the international institutions (Robert O. Keohane, 1989, p. 6). In this light, states have permanent agency despite being at times constrained, while non-state units have only 'occasional' influence upon 'international events.' It is only then that they become 'actors' in international politics (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 330).

Keohane et. al.'s arguments are important because they develop on the manner in which one can keep the state as an actor while considering it fragmented. Keohane et al., however, do not address some key questions. The complex interdependence state is multi-faceted because of the diversity of issues and interests that coagulate in transnational and transgovernmental coalitions. It is, in other words, a multiple-issue and multi-interest state and that is what makes it non-unitary. This is an argument linked to a particular type of modern state inserted in a global economy and social interactions. One question that can be raised is whether their non-unitary view of the state could for instance apply to highly centralised bureaucracies such as those of

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31 They nevertheless make cooperation possible in specific issue areas by organizing the interactions, facilitating institutionalisation of agreements, and constraining the realm of possible actions (Axelrod & Keohane, Oct., 1985, p. 238; Robert O. Keohane, 1984, p. 67; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 17).

32 'An actor is only that entity that can influence the course of international events' (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 330).
totalitarian states. Keohane and Nye concede that states can be considered unitary as well, and this can be decided empirically (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971a, p. 733). In doing so, they imply a change in the ontological premises of the state from a plural entity to a unitary one. It is not clear from the writings on transnational and transgovernmental relations if the world is ontologically different now or whether IR theory has been ignoring an important part of reality (Wagner, Summer, 1974, p. 441). The implications are significant as the argument assumes that there was once a 'traditional' or 'classical' organisation of the world, wherein the state was a unitary actor.

Critics have showed that Keohane et al.'s state is in fact the nation-state (Shaw, 2000). Keohane et al. put forward a similar view to Krasner's on the issue of sovereignty and of the international and the domestic division (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971b, p. 332). This means that Keohane et al. reinforce a conventional understanding of social spaces. The personifying language used to describe state action reflects a view of state agency as person-like. Thus, while the state is non-unitary due to the variety of issues and preferences, state agency is person-like. Keohane and Nye fail to provide an understanding of state agency that would correspond to a non-unitary view of the state.

While Krasner links the foreign policy and the systemic argument through the idea of the state as a rational and unified actor, in Keohane it is the idea of 'systemic process' that aims to bring together the domestic and the international dimensions. Keohane and Nye's process-oriented systemic theory defines the system in terms of power structures and political processes. Process 'refers to the relationship among the formal rules, informal customs and conventions, and the patterns of interactions
among the players' (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, p. 18). The definition Keohane and Nye give for political process is very similar to the one on which the international organisation model is built. International regimes are defined as 'multilevel linkages, norms, and institutions' between different actors (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 47, 51). The overlap between the definitions of regimes and 'political processes' creates difficulty in grasping the specificity of each concept and the manner in which they are put to work. By way of response, Keohane and Nye believe the criticism of poor specification about the difference between regimes and non-regime conditions, for example, can be countered through the focus on formal interstate agreements (Robert O. Keohane, 1989, p. 77). This marks a narrowing of the initial definition of political processes, which involved more than formal rules.

Further inconsistencies in their conceptualisation of the political process are created due to their understanding of the role of ideas and broader social relations in constituting political action. Keohane and Goldstein acknowledge that ideas have 'causal' impact on the policies if the context allows it, that is, if there is a change in the 'underlying conditions' or in the distribution of capabilities among units (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 25). This implies that ideas cannot acquire a concomitant structural and legitimising dimension within the international system. This is a claim that goes against Keohane's initial position on the process-oriented system that includes both capabilities and institutions in its definition.

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33 Haggard and Simmons point out that Keohane is not consistent in acknowledging the institutionalisation of regimes, more specifically of the international oil regime (Haggard & Simmons, Summer, 1987, p. 494).
34 Also, writing about the aim of the book, '(...) I [do not] investigate the effects of ideas and ideals on state behaviour.' (Robert O. Keohane, 1984, p. 6)
The complex interdependence paradigm leaves under-examined the process of emergence of new or conflicting state preferences and new hierarchies of state goals. The framework falls short of acknowledging the constitutive role of broader ideational resources or the constitutive role of multiple social relations and practices. I consider their usage of the bureaucratic politics model to understand domestic politics to be the cause of the limiting explanatory potential of the paradigm. The model works, as discussed above with a narrow understanding of politics as bargaining relations. The over-emphasis on the state as a problem-solving entity and on communication as mere exchange of information to maximize goal-achievement contributes to such an interpretation.

This section has discussed the conceptualisation of the state and state agency that comes out mainly from Keohane and Nye’s writings on complex interdependence but also from Keohane’s other co-authored articles. The understanding of the state as fragmented due to the existence of multiple issues and preferences is important but does not go far enough to allow for a re-framing of social spaces. Their state is still the national state and the divisions between the international and the domestic are similar to Krasner’s conventional understanding. Ideational and broader social relations and practices are not included as enabling sources of state action in Keohane et al.’s view. This is despite their definition of the political process as informed by formal and informal rules and practices.

35 This is Keohane and Nye’s self-confessed shortcoming in the article that revisits the explanatory power of the interdependence paradigm (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 739 - 740).
Conclusion

This chapter has critically engaged with statist and pluralist views of the state. The analysis has identified the internal tensions and limitations of these theories as well as the implications for the conceptualisation of the state as an actor. The discussion of this chapter has revealed that in spite of the different starting points, statist and pluralists accounts of the state end up with similar conceptualisations of the state as an actor.

The first section has shown that Krasner’s definition of state agency is premised on the assumption of unity and coherence and on the ability of the state to implement its interests in isolation from pressures of non-state actors. The analysis has exposed the discrepancies between the theoretical claims and theoretical implications of his empirical analysis. Krasner’s theoretical framework offers limiting tools to approach the empirical examples. The framework cannot reconcile, for instance, a claim about the state as a legitimate actor with the statist assumption about the minimalist interaction between the state and the society. My discussion has suggested that Krasner’s empirical examples indicate a need to re-frame the agency of that state in order to acknowledge the social relations that embed it. The discussion has also shown that Krasner starts with the state as an autonomous agent but ends up with a pluralist argument: the state as a sum of institutions and/or interests.

The second section discusses Krasner’s argument of Westphalian sovereignty and its implications for understanding the state as an actor. Krasner offers a more nuanced historical reading of the Westphalian moment. My argument in this section discloses the inconsistent use of the sovereignty concept in Krasner’s analysis. Understanding
sovereignty as a contradictory practice has important implications for the overall
claims Krasner makes about the nature of interaction within the international and
about the relationship between the two realms of action. The interchangeable use of
the concepts of international structure, system, and politics in the writings on
regimes points also to the necessity to reconsider the understanding of these social
spaces. In the light of this demonstration, Krasner’s view of the state as a unitary and
a coherent actor becomes difficult to sustain.

The third part has engaged with the pluralist views of the state, which emphasise the
fragmentation of the state: the state as a sum of interests (Katzenstein or Gourevitch,
Putman) and the state as bureaucratic institutions (Allison). The pluralist views
seems to offer an alternative view of the manner in which the state is constituted and
exercises agency. However, the conclusion of this section has been that the rejection
of the unitary assumption is not a sufficient ontological move to produce coherent
conceptualisations of the state. The discussion has shown the potential of these
frameworks. For instance, the empirical analyses of Katzenstein and Putman could
support a theoretical argument about the state as a non-unitary entity and an
associated view of agency as varied – i.e. simultaneously weak and strong. At the
same time, the conceptualisation of the state – society relation suggests a view of the
state with a clear and coherent inside that enters interaction with society.

Allison’s bureaucratic politics model makes the case for the importance of the
institutional positioning of individuals within the bureaucratic apparatus. Yet,
Allison works with a narrow definition of politics and context, which focuses on
bargaining relations between individuals. This becomes even more evident when
comparing this model to the other FPA frameworks. Secondly, the lack of
specification of the relationship between this model and the unitary state model, which Allison also outlines, raises questions of whether they are seen as equally valid or whether there is an implicit ontological preference for the former.

There is a systematic leap from the state as a sum of interests, or the negotiator, leader etc, to the state/government as a corporate actor, which is not addressed in either of these writings. Statist and pluralist approaches alike maintain a blurred relationship between two different ontological objects, individuals and the state.36 This blurred relationship favours the translation of human attributes to states, as Chapter 4 will discuss.

The authors discussed in the last section aim to combine the contributions of FPA with a systemic focus in explaining international politics. Keohane and Nye’s process-oriented systemic theory also challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor by focusing on transnational and transgovernmental relations. The section has argued that the potential of a conceptualisation of the state as non-unitary in its agential potential is inconsistently pursued. The section has argued that the framework narrows the sources of state constitution and state action due Keohane and Nye’s understanding of the political process. The focus on bargaining interactions and formal interstate agreements not only involves limiting conceptions of the political process, but it also contradicts their initial understandings of these processes. The analysis has also raised questions of whether the view of the state put forward in the interdependence and world politics paradigm can only be applied to recent modernity, or whether Keohane and Nye aim to make a broader ontological claim about states as actors.

36 On the existence of different ontological objects in IR, see Tony Skillen in (Wight, 2006, p. 177). Also, (Buzan, 1995, pp. 198 -199, 201).
Chapter 3: Social construction and deconstruction in the conceptualisation of the state

The views of the state discussed in this chapter are underpinned by the broader aim to reconsider the ontological and analytical boundaries of social spaces or the relationship between the international and the domestic realm. In doing so, ideational factors are more consistently integrated within these theoretical and empirical works. History becomes an important coordinate to frame understandings of the state and its agency, and discursive practices acquire more weight in thinking about the constitution of the state. This chapter looks at the accounts of Wendt, Hobson, Sørensen, and the postmodernist critique of the state. The aim is to assess these theories in relation to the ones presented in the previous chapter, as well as in terms of their declared explanatory aims, in order to reveal the potential and the limitations of these writings for conceptualising the state.

3.1. The socialised state: the state in the constructivist systemic paradigm (Wendt)

We are not likely to have theories of change without better incorporation of domestic politics into our models (Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, p. 742).
This section discusses Wendt’s account of the state within the context of his social theory. It questions the legitimacy of essentialising the corporate identity of the state and the methodological move of bracketing the domestic in his systemic theory of international politics. It also assesses the implications of these moves for understanding and explaining change and state action internationally.

In developing a social theory of international politics, Wendt’s goal is to ‘predict and make sense of what [is] going on’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 216). The theory is explicitly founded on a number of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. It puts forward a preference for a structural/holistic idealist position, which emphasises the role of ideas besides material forces, in the constitution of structures. Ideas gain ontological status alongside material forces (Wendt, 1999, pp. 1, 81). Ideational structures are generative, constitutive of actors’ identities and interests through practice, and are also causative of action (Wendt, 1999, p. 365). Material forces are both capable of determining action - they have ‘intrinsic powers and dispositions’ - and are a ‘function of ideas’. In other words, both material and ideational factors can be both independent and dependent variables (Wendt, 1999, pp. 94, 96, 98).

Wendtian theory argues for a structurationist position regarding the relationship between agents and structures. A structurationist position involves claiming that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, that neither is ontologically prior to the other, that elements are interdependent within the structure and interaction is time and space contingent (Wendt, Summer, 1987, pp. 338, 356). The theoretical aim is to avoid both reification of the structure and voluntaristic views of agency,  

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37 The structural idealist position is based on Wendt’s reading of scientific realism, which acknowledges the effects of both ideational and material structural on actors.
which underpin conceptions of international politics such as the neorealist and foreign policy ones respectively (Wendt, 1999, p. 146). The instantiations of the social structures are norms, rules and institutions, identities, interests and action (Wendt, Summer, 1987, pp. 351 - 354, 357). The structure is reiterated and reproduced in the agential practices.

Symbolic interactionism informs Wendt's understanding of identity formation. Wendt suggests that identities are both 'auto-genetic' and relational – created through 'self-reflection' and in interaction with others. These types correspond to what Mead calls the 'I' and the 'Me' in symbolic interactionism – 'an agent's sense of self' and social identities respectively (Wendt, 1999, p. 183). Social identities are relational. They emerge out of the process of interaction and intersubjective meanings within the international structure (Wendt, 1999, p. 313).

The starting point of Wendt's social theory of international politics is the commitment to an ontology that focuses on process, intersubjectivity, and co-constitution as just discussed. This represents Wendt's guarantee against a possible reification of structures, identities and interests à la Waltz. Based on such propositions, Wendt contends that his theory of international politics can account for change within the international system (Wendt, Spring 1992, p. 422). The Wendtian systemic theory rests on two other moves: one is the assumption of corporate agency for states and the other is the methodological bracketing of the domestic realm on the basis of the long-embedded ontological assumption about the different nature of the international and the domestic (Wendt, 1999, pp. 13, 193).
The view of the international, which is underpinned by structurationist assumptions, is a relational one. Anarchy is only one of the possible effects of the continuous interaction between states within this structure. Actors have the ability to constitute and transform the international structure through practices. Wendt writes 'social structures exist, not in actors' heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices. Social structures exist only in process' (Wendt, Spring 1992, pp. 394 - 395, Summer, 1995, p. 74). This is the meaning of Wendt's claim that 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, Spring 1992). He argues that social practice and process rather than the anarchical structure create competitive or cooperative international orders (Wendt, Summer, 1995, p. 74).

The state is a structure but it becomes an actor when it is endowed with corporate identity and personhood. States are considered 'actors with more or less human qualities' (Wendt, 1999, p. 10). States can exercise agency because they have a 'sense of Self'38, which is termed corporate identity, and are unitary in their external expression due to their legal personality. The state is unitary in the sense that it is the only legitimate centre of decision-making in the international system, and, at a specific moment in time, action is attributed to only one entity (e.g. 'Germany', 'UK' and so forth). According to Wendt, agency cannot be attributed to a non-unitary entity.

International politics becomes a comprehensible and possible realm of action if states are anthropomorphised and attributed corporate agency. Corporate actorhood properties are essential for making possible 'institutionalized collective action' (Wendt, 1999, pp. 194 - 199, 215). Wendt argues that:

38 States are persons because they possess intentionality, i.e. they are 'purposive actors'; secondly, because they behave like organisms or super-organisms; and thirdly, because they possess collective consciousness (Wendt, 2004, p. 291).
International politics as we know it today would be impossible without attributions of corporate agency, a fact recognized by international law, which explicitly grants legal "personality" to states. The assumption of real corporate agency enables states actively to participate in structural transformations (Wendt, 1999, p. 10).

There are five essential properties that constitute 'the self' of the state or its corporate identity (Wendt, 1999, pp. 202 - 204). These are an institutional-legal order, a monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence, sovereignty, a society, and a territory. These features are not 'historically variable' and are not negotiable in interaction and process (Wendt, 1999, pp. 64, 70, 198). They are 'essential' to the state because they define and delimit the state from other entities. The corporate identity ensures the awareness of the state as a distinct group with specific traits. Wendt writes '[corporate identities] are constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities' (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224 - 225). The group awareness is the result of internal processes of self-organisation and reflexivity (Wendt, 1999, p. 76). The corporate identity is generated within the domestic and is exogenous to the international structure. Since the corporate identity is already formed before interaction within the international, Wendt argues that the state is a 'pre-social' entity, 'ontologically prior to the states system' (Wendt, 1999, p. 198). Change is limited to the interaction within the international and to the 'the boundaries of the Self', which the social identities represent.

Corporate identity creates the conditions of existence for the other types of identities. These are types, roles and collective identities. Role identities and collective
identities are entirely endogenous to the international structure and formed within interaction. Role identities require a 'constitutive other'. They are 'not based on intrinsic properties and as such exist only in relation to Others' (Wendt, 1999, p. 227). Role identities are created and enacted through a process of 'mirroring' or 'reflected appraisals'. This means that a state's perception of how others see it informs its actions (Wendt, 1999, pp. 228, 327). In short, collective identities allow for identification through similarities not only oppositions (Wendt, 1999, p. 229). This latter identity makes possible different types of international structures, such as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian. They are the result of interaction between the collective identities of states (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246 - 312). Type identity is both 'internally constituted' and constituted in interaction with 'others' (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246 - 312). Political legitimacy is dependent on the internal relations between the state and society but also on the state system (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224 - 227). However, Wendt insists that 'the characteristics that underlie type identities are at base intrinsic to actors' (Wendt, 1999, p. 226).41

The international and the domestic have separate constitutive effects on the state. Each realm is characterised by its own internal dynamics (Wendt, 1999, pp. 13, 193), which influence differently the constitution of the state. Furthermore, the political is a separate and autonomous international system from the economic one and it is within this realm mainly that the identities and the interests of states are constituted. Wendt argues, however, that in order to understand how change occurs in the international realm, one would need to look at the state's practices within the

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41 Wendt's emphasis.

is social psychological theory that explains 'group processes and intergroup relations' (Hogg, Terry, & White, December 1995).
international as well as at the changes in the domestic constitution of the state or in its different identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 146).

In the rest of the section, I will discuss the manner in which Wendt’s meta-theoretical position has been incorporated into the theory of international politics. I will address several inter-related issues focusing especially on the implications of Wendt’s anthropomorphic view of the state and the methodological bracketing of the domestic for the goals of his theory of international politics.

The methodological bracketing of the domestic comes with ontological and epistemological consequences. Discussing co-constitutive processes within the international and then co-constitutive processes within the domestic is one of the possibilities of taking a general structurationist position at the meta-theoretical level. Structurationism applied separately to the domestic and the international is what Wendt’s theory proposes as opposed to structurationism applied across social realms. However, Wendt’s discussion of type identities, which link the two realms, suggests that the latter approach has its merits. His claim that change in the international realm can also occur as a result of variation in the properties of states, which constitute the corporate identity, points also to the importance of the domestic social space. Wendt’s methodological move undermines a structurationist position applied across the classical spatial divide, which could reveal how the properties of states change in practice in different historical contexts.

The methodological move of bracketing the domestic is corroborated with the ontological claim that states are like persons, possessing a sense of self or a

42 ‘[I]nternational politics is ...also about the reproduction and transformation – by intersubjective dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels – of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 394).
corporate identity. The fact that the meanings of, and the relationship between, the elements constituting the corporate identity are placed outside practice is at odds with the broad structurationist position taken by Wendt. Contextualisation and process as intrinsic to identity formation are sidelined in relation to this specific form of identity. Furthermore, if Wendt's metatheoretical position links agency, i.e. the ability to do, with constitutive processes, then it becomes difficult to accept his methodological and ontological moves, which leave aside important sources of state agency.

An important implication of such an ontological position is the reification of what is deemed the self (Neumann, 1996, p. 139). The reification of the self further forecloses the possibility of problematising the relationship between the essential elements. Change coming from the change in the relationship between the legal framework, sovereignty, society, and territory is obscured. In other words, some of the important features and functions of the state are less likely to be subject to questioning, dispute or re-consideration.

Explanatory problems arise as a result of the exclusive focus on international practices for explaining the emergence and the reproduction of international security communities and more broadly, of specific types of international structures (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246 - 312). The explanation of the Kantian international structure incorporates only the behaviour or practice in the international that is the commitment to certain international rules. The focus on international practices is also justified by Wendt's treatment of states as like-units, which fulfil the same functions due to their corporate identity. However, if we accept that the domestic

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43 He writes: 'many state interests are constructions of the international system' (Wendt, 1999, p. 243).
incorporation of rules and norms is important, but that it also differentiates states, then the Wendtian bracketing of the domestic becomes problematic. Explaining the efficacy of security communities and their resilience needs to go beyond the focus on international state practices, such as signing treaties, and formal participation in international or regional organisations. Such research questions require the inclusion of type identities, the relationship between the ‘essential’ elements of the corporate identity and the inclusion of the domestic social space more broadly into the theoretical framework. In this context, the assumption that states are like-units because of their corporate identity and legal personality becomes a constraining assumption rather than an enabling one for explanations of international state action.

Wendt also acknowledges that methodology can affect one’s ontology, which is at the core of any substantive theory (Wendt, 1999, pp. 34 - 35). He contends that given interests and identities (a methodological option) can lead to the over-emphasis of the importance of material over ideational factors. According to Wendt, a poor methodology, that is, a methodology that does not have the tools to approach specific concepts such as identity and interests formation, can limit a theory’s research potential. Methodology transforms in that case into a ‘tacit’ ontology: ‘exogeneity [of interests and identities] in theory is tacitly transformed into an assumption of exogeneity in reality’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 35). He further writes that ‘[t]he difference matters for the perceived nature of international politics and for the possibilities of structural change’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 36).

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44 Wendt’s propositions are also difficult to defend if one subscribes also to arguments that demonstrate the importance of the state-society relationship for state agency internationally, although he acknowledges the importance of the ‘state-society complex’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 210). See the discussion in the previous chapter, as well as the discussion of the historical sociologists’ accounts in the second section of the present chapter.
One could conclude that Wendt's overall goal of explaining and understanding the changes occurring in the international system is limited by the methodological and ontological moves explained above. These moves create inconsistencies in his usage of the structurationist assumptions. For instance, the structurationist position would involve making practice central to determining even the relationship between the 'essential' properties of the state. It would also involve a theoretical framework that considers this relationship constituted in different social spaces across the domestic–international divide. This separation between social spaces, international vs. domestic, is the key criterion by which he classifies identities: identities are exogenous or endogenous to the international structure. If the spatial disjunction would be reconsidered, then Wendt's classification of identities would also require re-framing without losing Wendt's insights into the different social processes by which states acquire social identities.

3.2. The sociological state (Sørensen, Hobson)

The second-wave historical sociologists such as Sørensen and Hobson combine the propositions of a constructivist ontology with an integrationist understanding of social spaces. Their aim is to develop a historically informed theory of the state that

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45 This observation touches upon another line of criticism against the Wendtian theory of politics that refers to his limited view of what constitutes the international. For a critique of the limitations of Wendt’s understanding of the international realm, see (Campbell, June, 2001, p. 441).
46 For example, role identities formed by opposition to others will be central also to the process of acquiring a collective identity, which identifies similar others. These two can also constitute type identities, such as political legitimacy.
47 The English School had an important role in introducing historical research to the study of international relations (Buzan & Little, 2002; Halliday, 2002; Hurrell, 2001; Neumann, 2001). Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly are known as first-wave Weberian historical sociologists. They argued for the inclusion of a historical dimension to the study of the state, although their understanding of the state is closer to the neorealist rather than to the constructivist one (Hobson, 2000, pp. 174 - 193; Shaw, 2002, p. 87). Second wave historical sociologists could also be considered more generally constructivists who develop a historically informed understanding of international politics (Barnett, 2002; Reus-Smit, 1999).
48 I am referring to their structurationist and ideationalist metatheoretical positions.
brings domestic and international politics together (Hobson, 2000, p. 204, 2002b, p. 77; Sørensen, 2001, p. 19). Historical analysis is regarded as a method as well as an ontological commitment against the reification and naturalisation of the present (Hobson, 2002c). This section assesses the key contributions of these two writers to the conceptualisation of the state as an actor.

3.2.1. Typologies of state

Sørensen’s definition of the state is comparable to the Wendtian one when he identifies the concepts of territory, government, and population as ‘essential characteristics’ or elements of the state, on which the constitutional independence of the state is predicated. It is a definition that focuses on the state as a ‘historical structure’ that comprises of institutions, material capabilities and ideas (Sørensen, 2004, p. 13).⁴⁹ Constitutional independence is the constitutive or foundational rule of sovereignty. This rule allows Sørensen to consider states as unitary based on their legal status. It is this foundational rule that has remained unaltered since its consolidation in the seventeenth century (Sørensen, 2001, pp. 148 - 149).

Changes have occurred, according to Sørensen, in the practices or regulative rules existing between sovereign states. These rules developed after the emergence of the foundational rules of sovereignty. The regulative rules of sovereignty are, for example, the rules of admission and recognition within the international society of states, as well as the ones that regulate behaviour, such as non-intervention, reciprocity, diplomacy, and international law. Sørensen emphasises the ‘dynamic and changing content of the sovereignty institution’s regulative rules’ (Sørensen,

⁴⁹ He draws on the Coxian view (Cox, 1981).
States equally possess constitutional independence and act according to the regulative sovereignty rules. Additionally, states differentiate themselves through substantial, constitutive statehood or empirical sovereignty. Empirical sovereignty constitutes the second source of change. Empirical sovereignty refers to 'the concrete features of statehood', that is to the structure and content of the government, economy and nation (Sørensen, 2001, p. 151).

By combining regulative and empirical sovereignty, Sørensen identifies three ideal types of states: modern, postcolonial and postmodern (Sørensen, 2001, p. 73). These types point to a specific view of the relationship between the domestic and the international (Sørensen, 2001, p. 152). Sørensen explains the changes in the internal constitution of the state in terms of empirical sovereignty, and the change in the type of relations states develop with other actors as a result of different regulative rules of sovereignty (Sørensen, 2004, pp. 6 - 7).

The modern state, for example, is built upon the division between the domestic and the international at all three levels of statehood. The modern state enjoys constitutional independence. It acts according to the regulative rules of non-intervention and reciprocity, and has a well-demarcated economy, territory and national community, which constitute its substantive statehood (Sørensen, 2001, p. 154).

The second ideal type, the postcolonial state, moves towards a more integrated view of the relationship between the 'domestic' and the 'international'. The 'deficiencies in substantial statehood' of postcolonial states account for the 'integrated' relationship between the two social spaces. Postcolonial states abide by and are
informed only partially by the regulative norms of non-intervention and reciprocity. Dependency on international financing, weak institutions and the lack of national community (substantial statehood) also make them more vulnerable to intervention. This intervention is termed ‘negotiated intervention’ in order to capture the whole array of political, economic, and social conditionalities imposed on these states. A ‘tension’ exists, according to Sørensen, between constitutive sovereignty and the regulative rules and substantial sovereignty (Sørensen, 2001, pp. 155 - 158). The former keeps the domestic and the international segregated, while the latter two propose an ‘associated view’ of the two realms.

Sørensen proposes an ‘integrated’ view of the international – domestic relationship only in relation to the postmodern state. This is because the substantial features of postmodern statehood are ‘integrated’: multilevel governance ‘based on supranational, national, and subnational institutions’ and an economy based on ‘cross-border networks’, where citizens take on layers of supra or sub-national identities (Sørensen, 2001, p. 162). ‘Government and society’ are increasingly ‘denationalised’ and regulative rules, such as ‘regulated intervention’ and ‘cooperative reciprocity’, reflect and enforce this tendency. As in the case of the postcolonial state, there is a tension between constitutive sovereignty, which enforces the international vs. domestic disjunction, and the other two types of sovereignty (Sørensen, 2001, p. 160).

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50 Sørensen’s analysis is not correct in suggesting that the economic underdevelopment of postcolonial states is the only reason these states cannot play by the rules of reciprocity in international trade. He writes that ‘the emergence of development assistance regimes, where economic aid flows from rich, developed countries to poor, underdeveloped countries...is a sharp deviation from the liberal, equal opportunity principle in relations between states (...)’ (Sørensen, 2001, p. 155). For analyses on development and international trade, which point to the need to rethink the trade rules because they put in a disadvantage position developing states, see articles and reports compiled at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/trade/subsidies/index.htm#2008.
Sørensen and Hobson, to which I return below, apply structurationism to both the domestic and the international, that is, to the relationship between the state and the domestic structures (e.g. society), as well as to the relationship between the state and the economic, military, and normative international structures. They consider agents and structures mutually constitutive (Hobson, 2001, p. 411). Their writings propose an integrated image of the international and the domestic as constituting ‘one social system’ (Hobden, 2002, p. 57). The ‘spatial realm’ is ‘co-constitutive’ rather than ‘separate or self-constituting’ (Hobson, 2002a, p. 437), despite the fact that the concept of sovereignty and the consequent idea of jurisdiction inevitably creates these two different spaces (Sørensen, 2001, p. 12).

Sørensen aims to show that under anarchy not all states are or become like-units. Aside from the logic of homogeneity, the logic of heterogeneity is also present in the international realm (Sørensen, 2001, pp. 27 - 30). Economic, politico-military and normative international structures could create sameness within the international (Sørensen, 2001, pp. 1, 11, 13). However, the domestic structure of the state, for instance the manner in which norms are implemented, is as important, and can be an obstacle in the homogenisation of the international.

The existence of two types of logics internationally, and of un-like units, is linked to the existence of different security dilemmas. These security dilemmas are peculiar to each of the type of states: modern, postmodern and postcolonial. Sørensen’s main point is that security dilemmas should be understood as having both domestic and international sources (Sørensen, 2001, p. 95). Different types of states generate particular types of behaviour and commitments internationally, such as cooperation and conflict. Postcolonial states face internal security dilemmas given by intra-state
wars and competition. On the other hand, the concern of postmodern states is
effective and legitimate governance in a globalised world (Sørensen, 2001).
Postmodern states focus on creating 'coordinated security communities' with similar
postmodern states. These communities are intended to undermine the self-help
mentality that characterises the other two types of states (Sørensen, 2001).

Sørensen’s view of the state has a different twist to Wendt’s. The difference lies in
Sørensen’s two-level reference to the state – an initial discussion of defining
ahistorical features or elements, moving on to historically specific combinations
between constitutive elements. The elements of empirical or substantial sovereignty
are practice dependent. Thus, Sorensen acknowledges the fact that the contingent
relationship between so-called ‘essential’ features is salient for explaining and
understanding state constitution and state action.

Sørensen does not explicitly deal with state agency. The aim of Sørensen’s analysis
is to examine the mutual constitution of domestic and international structures rather
than focus on ‘actors or their decision-making’ (Sørensen, 2001, p. 11). The
different types of states developed in his analyses endorse the view of the state as a
structure. One could infer that the structure acquires agential properties through the
government. In terms of its exercise, Sørensen’s ideal types seem to point to varying
degrees of agency domestically, which is linked to the ability to control the means of
legitimate violence. On the issue of international agency, Sørensen’s typologies
illuminate more about the types of priorities or commitments states choose, based on
their domestic structural features and on their relations within the international
military and political, economic and normative structures. Postcolonial states, for

51 Aim of the book: ‘to find out exactly how states are being transformed and what the consequences
are’ (Sørensen, 2004, p. 21).
example, are regarded as ‘weak players in the international system’ as well as ‘peripheral players in the global economy’ (Sørensen, 2001, pp. 57, 63). Sørensen’s analysis does not discuss whether the integrated social processes associated with the postmodern state, such as the existence of supra and subnational sources of citizenship, challenge the unitary aspect of state agency.

Sørensen’s analysis is valuable in discussing sources of state transformation through the notions of substantial and regulative rules of sovereignty. The above typologies and explanations lead to questions about the relationship between analytical moves, i.e. integrated analyses, and ontological claims (the type of units and structures one posits to exist and their constitutive features). It becomes evident that the point of ‘integrated’ analysis is to demonstrate that the domestic and the international are not necessarily ontologically separate and different realms. For instance, Sørensen shows postcolonial states are confronted with internal Hobbesian security dilemmas while postmodern ones can create hierarchical relations within coordinated security communities internationally (Sørensen, 2001, p. 177). However, Sørensen seems to argue that, depending on historical context or geography, one could justify conceptually the idea of the state as a fixed entity with a well-delimited inside, and, therefore, with a fragmented rather than integrated constitution – domestically and internationally. For example, modern states are conceptualised as entities with well-defined boundaries. The national identity creates a coherent community. Interests are internally produced. This suggests that social processes across the international – domestic divide do not contribute to the creation of state interests. The logical conclusion is that the modern state as an ideal type suggests an a priori preference for considering these social spaces as separate. In this respect, Sørensen’s historical
typology is at odds with the meta-theoretical claim about the mutually constitutive relationship between the inside and the outside.

3.2.2. The ‘constitutive’ state

Hobson aims to relate the international agency of the state to the domestic agential power of the state (Hobson, 2000, p. 204). Hobson puts forward the concept of ‘constitutive’ state. Hobson argues that the state is ‘territorially promiscuous’ – it is an agent situated between the domestic and the international structures, while being embedded in both realms (Hobson, 2000). He draws on Mann’s concept of multi-spatiality to define the state as being constituted by ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power’. This is an important move because it suggests a dynamic understanding of social spaces. Such a definition of the state is different from those presented thus far. The definition does not link the state as an actor to a well-defined territory. This means that it allows us to conceptually problematise the relationship between an essential element, such as territory, and the state as an entity.

The nature of the relationship with society and the nature of interactions within different international structures inform the international and domestic agential power of state (Hobson, 2001, p. 411). The state is ‘Janus-faced’ such that it is not only constrained by both realms, but also shapes or constitutes them by playing one off from the other’ (Hobson, 2001, pp. 412-413). While the constitution of the state as an actor is framed in structurationist terms, its exercise is defined in terms of

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52 Mann quoted in (Hobson, 2002c, p. 16).
53 Hobson writes that ‘the state can transform its domestic realm both to enhance its interests externally or overcome international/global structures ..., and to conform to the requirements of such structures (...’ (Hobson, 2001, p. 413). Hobson’s emphasis.
‘freedom from.’ Since the state is viewed as an embedded set of institutions within both ‘domestic and international society’ (Hobson, 2001, p. 413), it is only partially autonomous. The conceptualisation of the state as socially embedded and partially autonomous (Hobson, 2000, pp. 194 - 195) does not take away the conceptual possibilities for the exercise of agency.

Hobson makes the domestic part of the explanatory framework of international politics (Hobson, 2000, pp. 213, 226). He defines the domestic agential power or ‘governing capacity’ of the state as the ‘ability of the state to make domestic or foreign policy’, as well as shape the domestic realm, ‘free of domestic social structural or nonstate actor constraints’ (Hobson, 2000, p. 218, 2001, p. 398). The domestic agential power also refers to the ability of the state to implement decisions (Hobson, 2000, pp. 198 - 199, 207)\textsuperscript{54}, although these decisions are informed by the interaction of the state with society (Halliday, 1987, p. 223; Hobson, 2000, p. 182).

International agential power is defined as the power to overcome the predicaments of the anarchic logic and ‘construct foreign policy free of international structural constraints’ (Hobson, 2000, pp. 198 - 199, 207). The state is an agent because of its ability to cause behaviour or action (Hobson, 2001, pp. 398 - 399). Hobson locates the explanation for international agential power within the domestic state-society relation (Hobson, 2000, p. 225). Hobson argues that the stronger the links with society, the higher the agential power of the state domestically and internationally (Hobson, 2000, p. 199). In his words, ‘strong states go hand in hand with strong societies’ (Hobson, 2000, p. 227). Due to the placement of the state in different international economic and political power structures, its international agential power is varying in degree (Hobson, 2001, pp. 412 - 413). The constitutive state is an

\textsuperscript{54} Mann terms it ‘infrastructural power’ (Mann, 1993, p. 53).
actor that is both constrained and enabled by political and/or economic international structures – therefore not merely responding to the requirements of those international structures. The state can be simultaneously constrained within one structure for instance, in the political but shaping the economic. He writes:

In sum, the significant point is that this structurationist synthesis entails recognizing that states are socially embedded within domestic and international society, while simultaneously having varying degrees of international agential power to reform international structures as well as to mitigate their constraining logic (Hobson, 2001, p. 413).

Hobson’s conceptualisation of the state rests on the existence of multiple social spaces. This view is accompanied by a conceptualisation of the state as an actor with varying agential potential. More broadly, I take the idea of linking the existence of multiple social spaces with explanations of the varying agential potential of the state as a significant one. Hobson’s argument regarding state agency overemphasises the links between state and society as the main causal factors for a certain type of international agential power (high or low). This preference raises questions in relation to Hobson’s actual commitment to keep more than one relationship or social space as constitutive of state agency.

On the other hand, Hobson’s definition of the state as a ‘territorially promiscuous’ actor offers the conceptual possibility to move the conceptualisation of the state away from traditional definitions that emphasise the territory as a condition for the existence of the state. The territory is one of the ‘essential’ elements that have been considered central to defining the state and its sovereignty. Territory has been central to the definition of the state as a legal person, which possesses unitary agency. If the view of social spaces were reconsidered, as can be inferred from Hobson’s account, then the concept of unitary, person-like state agency, which is premised on the legal definition, would also need to be reconsidered.
Problems arise nevertheless from Hobson’s empirical analyses. The state is defined in material terms. The focus is on the financial and tax functions (Reus-Smit, 2002, p. 124), which, according to Hobson, sustain the ability of the state to survive. Thus, the multiple ideational and material social spaces that were at the heart of Hobson’s conceptualisation of the state are sidelined for a definition that is similar to the rationalist conceptions. The focus on material factors, such as the domestic financial or tax system, makes the outside vs. inside distinction more visible (Reus-Smit 2002). According to Martin Shaw, the possibility of multi-spaces is reduced by positing a dualism between ‘a’ domestic and ‘a’ international realm (Shaw, 2000). The dualism also facilitates the focus on one space at a time. For example, Hobson’s empirical study of tariff protectionism and trade regime change contains two methodological moves: first bracketing state-society relations and focusing on international and domestic structures and second, reversing the bracketing by analysing the state-society complex (Hobson, 2002c, pp. 21 - 22).

In spite of Hobson’s specification that ‘social and political change can only be understood through the interaction of multiple forces’, the focus of the just mentioned examples is on causal explanations that privilege material military and economic factors (Hobson, 2002b, p. 80). This is achieved to the detriment of the constitutive analysis that incorporates the ‘social dimension’ of the international structures, resulting from the intersubjective understandings of norms, culture or ideas (Reus-Smit, 2002, pp. 126, 128 - 129). It also suggests that Hobson’s theoretical preference for multi-causal explanation is limited by the focus on material factors, as well as by the reduction of the social spaces that inform state agency.
To conclude, the arguments of the historical sociologists discussed in this section make more evident the limitations of Wendt’s bracketing of the domestic, his reliance on practice in the international realm to explain the emergence of different international structures, and his taken for granted corporate self. The section has argued that both Sørensen and Hobson offer interesting insights for integrating the domestic and the international within an account of state constitution and state agency. Hobson’s account of the state and its varied agential potential represents a departure from the traditional conceptualisations of the state. This is because the account focuses on the state’s ability to act and create effects as a condition of agency rather than on the existence of ‘essential’ elements such as territory. The discussion also pointed to some of the tensions present in these theories and the empirical analyses they develop.

3.3. The state as (academic) discourse and power relations: the postmodern critique of the state

This section engages with the IR postmodern critique of the state. The main difference between these writings and the ones discussed in the previous sections lies within their starting point. Postmodern writers think of reality in discursive terms. Reality is internal to language and it is constituted by it. The analyses of the state are thus carried out by exploring the body of knowledge (i.e. sum of interrelated texts) that create the present possibilities and the parameters for thinking about reality and about the state.

Postmodern writers use the methods of deconstruction and genealogy in their critique of the state. The deconstruction approach is informed by the writings of
Derrida and focuses on the state as a grammar that needs to be deciphered. To deconstruct a concept is, according to Bartelson, 'to demonstrate, that it is contingent upon the text in which it figures' (Bartelson, 1995, p. 239). The second approach, the genealogical method, is linked to the writings of Foucault. This method is employed to reveal the contradictory and plural practices constituting concepts such as the state. By using this method, postmodern writers aim to destabilise the taken for granted and common sense assumptions put forward in IR. Genealogy reflects the view that as concepts have not developed in linear ways, nor should their understanding be thought of as coherent and unitary.

In what follows, I suggest four main and closely related claims that the postmodern critique of the state makes. First, these writings intend to expose the binary oppositions contained by the discourse on the state, oppositions that are inscribed in modern political theory and international political theory. In this understanding the concept of the state is viewed as an encrypted and reified chain of notions – a narrative that needs to be 'decoded' through deconstruction and exposed as being built upon binary oppositions. The strong claim here is that the state is not a self-referential entity outside language (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 153, 164; Walker, 1993, p. 5).

For example, the works of Walker, Bartelson, Ashley show that the concept of the state is built on a series of dichotomies between the inside and outside, order and disorder, hierarchy and anarchy, good life and survival, ‘us’ and ‘them’ etc (Walker, 1993, pp. 32 - 33). These oppositions are simultaneously the outcomes of and the legitimising reiterations for modern political thought, i.e. of disciples such as IR, sociology and political science. This is due to the fact that each of these sciences
takes 'one aspect of [the] duality [inside/outside] as the foundation of its inquiry' (Bartelson, 1995, pp. 238, 239). The 'de-naturalisation’ or ‘de-essentialising’ moves are not discussed by placing the state within a historical context as historical sociologists propose. Rather, the postmodern writers expose the inbuilt biases and the processes by which the state has been transformed in discourse from a stage in human history to the telos of world history itself (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 42 - 43).55

This links in with a second key argument concerning the impossibility of transcending the state-centric discourse about reality. The scepticism is explained by the fact that the state has been both the starting point of any theorising, that is, the representation of political order, as well as its object of analysis (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 5, 27, 34). According to Bartelson, there is an inevitable circularity when attempting to escape the representational space constituted by the state or a state-centric discourse present even in the deconstructivist writings of Ashley and Walker. The state is the result of discursive practice, and it is simultaneously dependent on and originating in, the political community through which the statist discourse is disseminated (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 167 -168). Walker’s identification of the state as the result of the opposition between the particular and the universal ignores, according to Bartelson, that this opposition between the international and the domestic came only with the discourse on the state (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 167 -168).

Thirdly, if one accepts that the international – domestic division has been discursively constructed, postmodernists propose its revision by affirming the ‘contingency’ of the state (Bartelson, 2001, p. 152). That is, the postmodern critique intends to contest the spatial view of modernity, which makes space a

55 'It has been frozen and naturalised as a socially inevitable and eternal condition, being presented as a product of evolution as well as a transhistorical entity' (Bartelson, 2001, pp. 38, 52).
function of time or of history. They aim to contest and contextualise the discourse on the state as one of multiple interpretations of the political order rather than consider it an independent and essentialist one (Walker, 1993, pp. 15, 66 - 67; Weber, 1995). Beside the discursive reframing of the state, Walker argues for an ontological ‘reconsideration’ of the spatial order or of political space (Walker, 1993, p. 13). The academic discourse has reified ‘an historically specific spatial ontology’ and it perpetuates ‘a geopolitics of static fragmentation’ (Walker, 1993, pp. ix, 8). The state in this view, is a ‘historically specific solution’ or form of organisation to a contradictory trend between universality and particularity (Walker, 1993, pp. 1, 10).

In Der Derian’s view, the nation-state was ‘founded on the stasis of a fixed identity and impermeable territory’. The associated discourse of boundaries needs to be deconstructed in the context of a new reality, which increasingly relies on technologies of speed, surveillance and simulation (Der Derian, 1995, p. 369, September 1990).

Lastly, the rethinking of the spatial order, for example, disassociating territory from governance, should be accompanied by a conceptual reconsideration of the social practices associated with the existence of the state. The analyses of postmodern writers disclose the present order as intrinsically violent, based upon the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ representation. They claim that changing the organising principle would also change politics by decreasing the potential of war. In this understanding, the state is not only a sum of discursive practices but also a social phenomenon instituted and reproduced through non-discursive social practices. The discursive and social practices are mutually constituted. For example, foreign policy as a social practice and the discursive practices related to the construction of an ‘us vs. them’ identity (Campbell, 1998) are mutually reinforcing and constituting of the state (Weber,
The state as a social project is, in other words, an ongoing process of discursive identification and social practices rather than an ontological given.

Since the state is regarded as a discursive practice, states per se then do not ‘cause’ action or cooperative behaviour. What a specific discourse on the state can do is enable certain actions and disable others, in other words, it can create the conditions of possibility (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 1999) for both scientific discourse and political action. Individuals are not the locus for power, nor are they mere reproductive agents. In Butler’s words, ‘the subject [individual] is precisely the site of ... [power] reiteration, a reiteration that is never merely mechanical’. 56

The contestation of the inbuilt oppositions within the concept of the state is accompanied, as mentioned, by scepticism that these oppositions could ever be transcendened by theories of IR. From this perspective, the present project of rethinking the conceptualisation of the state in terms of constitution and agency would be a non-starter. The view of the postmodern writers is that theory building of any kind about the state is inevitably reinforcing of state-centric discourses and state-centric social reality. The next chapter will develop on how the postmodern idea of the state being constituted and reiterated through discursive and social practices is, for instance, an important element of the state as an actor argument.

I subscribe to the endeavours undertaken by these writers to de-essentialise the concept of the state and problematise the relationship between social spaces as well as the traditional disjunctions. I also subscribe to those postmodern understandings that acknowledge the existence of a material reality, which is not an epiphenomenon of textual relations — the acknowledgement of social practices that do not necessarily

have an explicit discursive aspect to them.\textsuperscript{57} However, I do not agree with the conclusions reached by some of the postmodern writers that states, as forms of political community, are intrinsically violent. The next two chapters offer more arguments for my claim that it is impossible to predict \textit{or a priori} suggest that other forms are or can be fundamentally more appropriate or less violent in their constitution.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has brought under scrutiny conceptualisations of the state, from Wendt's systemic theory to the historical sociological ones of Sorensen and Hobson and the postmodern critique of the state. Wendt, Sorensen and Hobson put forward in an explicit manner a view of the social world built on both ideational and material factors, in which entities such as the state are socialised rather than given; where agents (i.e. the state) are in constitutive relationship with structures (ideational, material, international and domestic) and identities and interests undergo continuous interaction and constitution.

The first part of the chapter discussed the explanatory and ontological implications of Wendt's bracketing of the domestic and assumed corporate self. The discussion has noted that these two moves make Wendt's argument inconsistent with his metatheoretical structurationist position and more generally undermine the explanatory goals of his theory. For instance, the section has argued that the focus on international state practice becomes a constraining assumption rather than an enabling one for explanations of international state action. The methodological and

\textsuperscript{57}This later aspect will become evident in relation to the illustrative cases.
ontological preferences that justify this focus on the international social space become problematic if one accepts Wendt's metatheoretical argument that links agency to the constitutive processes taking place in more than one social structure.

The second section has examined Sørensen's and Hobson's historically informed accounts of state constitution and state action. Sørensen links the features of the state to specific historical or regional contexts. The main point made in relation to Sørensen's typology of states refers to the unsolved tension between the analytical moves and ontological claims underpinning his ideal types. In this second part, I have also argued that Hobson's understanding of social spaces has important consequences for rethinking the concept of the state and state agency. However, the discussion has claimed that his empirical analysis reverts to an understanding of the state that is similar to the rationalist ones. Furthermore, the theoretical preference for multi-causal explanations is reflected in the empirical illustrations, which focus on the domestic material sources of state constitution.

The last section of this chapter discussed the main ideas coming out of the postmodern critique of the state. The state is, in one understanding, a narrative that needs to be deconstructed and its binary constitutive oppositions such as inside vs. outside and order vs. anarchy exposed. In a complementary understanding, the state is not only discourse but also social practices. This invites, according to postmodern writers, reconsideration of political space and of the practices associated with the state. The section acknowledges the need to develop an understanding of the state that problematises the traditional assumptions on which conceptions of the state as an actor have been built.
Several questions have emerged from these two chapters as important to the conceptualisation of the state as an actor. They refer to the need to view the state as a unitary and a coherent entity in order to attribute it agency, to the relationship between 'the' international and 'the' domestic, to the relationship between human agents, such as leaders, bureaucrats, and politicians and the state. They also refer to the conceptual possibilities of multi-causal explanations as well as to the possibilities of a new language to discuss state agency as practice dependent and constituted by multiple social spaces. These issues will be addressed in the next two chapters.
Chapter 4: From essentialist to relational ontology:
implications for conceptualising the state and state
agency

The analysis has demonstrated thus far that FPA and IR theories contain important internal inconsistencies that compromise their explanatory and ontological goals.\(^{58}\) This chapter aims to show that the contradictions and inconsistencies of these theories are in fact due to the essentialist conceptions underpinning their views of entities, of their properties and of boundaries.\(^{59}\) The chapter proposes a shift in the ground on which conceptualisations of social entities and agency rest: from essentialist or substantialist to processual or relational ones.\(^{60}\) The aim is to offer a more coherent framework that aligns a relational conception of entities with a relational understanding of agency and social spaces. The chapter uses the insights from processual philosophy, relational sociology, social psychology, and Colin Wight’s work on agency and structure to reframe the understanding of the state as an actor.

\(^{58}\) I am referring here to the aims of explaining change, reconsidering the international-domestic relationship and conceptualising the state as a non-unitary actor respectively.

\(^{59}\) It should be noted that the constructivist propositions such as inter-subjectivity, the co-constitution between agents and structures, time and space contingency introduce important non-essentialist relational elements. Yet the conceptualisation of the state and state agency are fundamentally essentialist in character and relational elements are not consistently applied.

\(^{60}\) I use the terms 'processual' and 'relational' ontology as synonymous. They designate the ideas coming from two closely related fields: processual philosophy and relational sociology. Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, on the other hand, differentiate between the two terms (Jackson & Nexon, 1999) to emphasise the focus on both relations and social processes. I take the focus on both social relations and practices to be implicit in the relational or processual ontological positions on which I draw. See for instance (Abbott, 1995; Emirbayer, September 1997; Fuchs, 2001; Rescher, 2002; 2008; White, 1992).
4.1. Essentialism/substantialism in IR: explanatory and ontological consequences

In what follows I will give a brief overview of the main ideas linked to essentialist positions in order to identify the essentialist logic at work in FPA and IR theories discussed in the previous chapters.

Substantialism is a long-standing tradition stemming from philosophical, Christian as well as scientific writings. Essentialist propositions regarding social life have become mainstream although processual philosophy\textsuperscript{61}, which puts forward a different view of social entities, has a similarly long tradition.\textsuperscript{62} This is because the essentialist conceptualisation of social entities has been supported and reinforced by mainstream scientific assumptions about biological entities.\textsuperscript{63} Social entities, such as individuals or other social kinds, have been defined in the same way biological entities are defined. Social entities have intrinsic and immutable essences or substances (Fuchs, 2001) across time and spatial coordinates.\textsuperscript{64} These are termed primary properties (Rescher, 1996, p. 47). Primary properties define the entity as a member of a category. The entity is dependent on its intrinsic qualities in order to exist (Van Brakel, 1992). It exists independent of the environment\textsuperscript{65} by virtue of

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\textsuperscript{61} Process philosophy is a metaphysical endeavour that aims to provide a broad and general account of the nature of reality. The key idea is that ‘natural existence consists in and is best understood in terms of processes rather than things — of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities’ (Rescher, 2001).

\textsuperscript{62} Some of the authors are Aristotle, John Locke, Thomas D'Aquinas and Isaac Newton.

\textsuperscript{63} Findings in psychology also suggest that individuals have a cognitive inclination to assume that entities possess innate features. Psychologists have termed this ‘intuitive essentialism’ (Medin & Ortony, 1989) or ‘psychological essentialism’ (Susan A. Gelman, 2004; S.A. Gelman & Markman, 1986; S.A. Gelman & Wellman, 1991).

\textsuperscript{64} Locke refers also to properties as constituting the essence. See The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, p. 887. In analytical philosophy, essences are termed ‘natural kinds'. Van Brakel writes for instance ‘Natural kinds are those to which terms and classifications refer when they are true and constant in all possible worlds’ (Van Brakel, 1992, p. 225). See also (Fuchs, 2001, p. 12).

\textsuperscript{65} I must mention that a minimum essentialism is unavoidable as a pre-requisite for the development of any discipline. Essentialism in this form is achieved when identifying properties of individuals or
these intrinsic properties. In Rescher's words, the assumption is that 'things remain self identical through time on the basis of their possession of certain essential features or properties that remain changelessly intact across temporal changes' (Rescher, 1996, p. 34).

The accompanying proposition of agency is that agency is located in a coherent entity or within a stable and unchangeable core. Agents are seen as homogenous, unitary and autonomous (Fuchs, 2001, p. 112). Actions or events are regarded as the consequence of the interaction between entities or between their properties. Events are also considered epiphenomena of the self, that is, secondary or variable properties emanating from these substances. In this sense, entities predate everything else existing in the world. Interaction does not change the entities but only potentially their secondary properties. The underlying principle of such an interpretation of the social world is that 'functioning follows upon being' (operari sequitur esse) (Rescher, 2002; 2008). Such assumptions have informed the understanding of human agency. In its turn, human or individual agency has been used as a template to think about the agency of other forms of organisations such as states.

In the rationalist accounts of the second chapter, agents are thought to possess instrumental, goal-oriented rationality. In Krasner's writings for instance, instrumental logic determines the individuals' behaviour (Krasner, 1993). Their motivating goals are preservation of power as well as security and prosperity for internal constituencies. While their tastes and preferences may vary, rational

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other social kinds. However, it does not involve any claims about their intrinsic nature or about the immutable character of the relationship between these features.

66 It must be noted that in liberal theories, the intrinsic qualities are different: individuals are inclined towards cooperation.
reasoning, the methods, and rules to achieve best results, make them like-entities. While the focus on individuals suggests high subjectivity and therefore difference, common essence is what explains action. According to Elster, the assumption that they all rationally assimilate and use information makes possible explanations and predictions of choices for action, strategies and rewards (Elster, 1989, p. 28). Krasner’s view of human agents indicates a substantialist interpretation. Individuals’ behaviour is explained by reference to their intrinsic qualities as rational and instrumental agents. Secondary properties, such as social status or identities, do not play a role in the explanations provided. Krasner’s explanations are based on initial assumptions about the internal properties of actors, which are not dependent on the environment. Pluralist accounts, for instance, work with a concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Keohane, 1984). Bounded rationality acknowledges the occasional constraints of the environment upon decision-making and the exercise of agency. Yet, I have argued that Keohane and Nye’s fundamental understanding of entities is similar to the statist conception. Constructivist writers propose, on the other hand, an understanding of rationality as socially constructed, embedded in symbolic and material structures, when discussing state behaviour internationally. This resembles the relational position, which will be discussed in the second part of the chapter.

States have also acquired immutable or substantial features. In IR, this translated into a claim that sovereignty, territoriality, the nation and the government are primary features of the modern state. The Westphalian moment could be considered what Rescher terms ‘the moment of conception’ of entities alongside their intrinsic features (Rescher, 1996, p. 66). These features would only disappear with the demise of the state. These properties do not alter the ‘core’ or the essence of what defines

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67 I leave aside for the time being the assumptions of personhood on which such a conception of state agency rests.

68 In other fields, substantialism has underpinned conceptions of national identity.
the state as an entity throughout history or in different geographical locations. The theories discussed in the previous two chapters, with the exception of the post-modern ones, work with such assumptions. Wendt’s concept of role identities, that is the state’s social identities, are in substantialist language instantiations of secondary properties. Social identities can be altered according to Wendt but not the sense of self. The latter is not ‘historically variable’ nor negotiable in interaction and process (Wendt, 1999, pp. 64, 70, 198). The assumption regarding states as stable across temporal and spatial dimensions favours treatment of states as like-units. It makes generalisation possible about state behaviour internationally.

Taking goals and interests such as the national interest and the general interest of society as internally produced constitutes another expression of essentialism in IR theory. Statist approaches premise the state as an actor assumption upon the existence of internally defined interests. The national interest is regarded as a commonly agreed interest. The interaction with other actors does not change these interests. Interests deemed contradictory to the generally agreed national interest could place an institution outside ‘the state’, as Krasner argues. This is also the case in the pluralist accounts. My discussion of Katzenstein’s and Putman’s distinction between state and society showed that this differentiation is based on an assumption about the pre-constituted nature of state and societal interests. Goals originate from internal processes associated with the state and/or society respectively. In this sense, they are viewed as existing prior to the interaction. In Keohane and Nye’s work, on the other hand, the view of state interests is more dynamic. The hierarchies between issues related to the state are unstable and negotiable. The national interest for example is not ‘self-evident’ and a fixed goal of the state. It is fluctuating due to the

69 Secondary properties of the state can be the size of the territory, the type of the government, its multi-ethnic components etc.
70 See discussion in Chapter 3.
interaction between elites, governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions within time and context (Nye & Keohane, Summer, 1971, pp. 332, 335). Yet, the interdependence paradigm still suggests, as shown in the second chapter, that interests are internally created within the different bureaucratic organisations. Bargaining occurs based on pre-established and internally produced interests. The argument in Chapter 3 has shown that the constructivist accounts of Wendt and Hobson take either domestic or international goals as already constituted because of the methodological bracketing of these spaces. Sørensen’s focus on types of states is also illustrative of essentialist moves. The analysis assumes for instance, that postmodern states take for granted democratic institutions and practices (Sørensen, 2001), which are placed outside political negotiation. This implies that postmodern states are intrinsically democratic.

Essentialist reasoning underpins the conceptualisations of spaces in the theories of the previous two chapters. Viewing the ‘outside’ or the ‘international’ as fundamentally and irrevocably different is suggestive of an essentialist understanding. The properties associated with these spaces are considered intrinsic to them and unchangeable through time and space. Secondly, conceptualising the international and the domestic as self-contained and autonomous spaces (Emirbayer, September 1997: 285) in spite of the ‘inter-action’ between the two is also an expression of essentialism.

Krasner’s writings on sovereignty and international regimes and the work of Keohane and Nye, Putman, Gourevitch and Katzenstein make essentialist arguments

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71 See also (Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Autumn 1987, pp. 29, 206).
72 Wendt takes the process of domestic goal formation for granted while Hobson takes international state interests as fixed in the discussion about 20th century international institutional change (Hobson, 2002, p. 80). Sørensen sees the state as a structure and goal-framing is not a central issue of his endeavour.
about the two realms. The international is characterised in their writings by anarchy
and lack of normative underpinnings. These are primary properties. In Gourevitch’s
writings for instance, the international is characterised by the potential for war and
the distribution of power among states. Regimes are secondary features of the
international. They constitute a state’s secondary interests and preferences. The
essential interests are the drive for power and survival. In the interdependence and
world politics paradigm of Keohane and Nye, the definition of systemic processes as
patterns of relations between actors, norms and conventions, suggests a focus on the
normative and ideational dimensions as characteristics of the international. The
discussion in the second chapter has demonstrated that Keohane and Nye preserve
nonetheless a similar understanding of the international to the other rationalist
theories. Even when the behaviour of the state leads to the creation of normative
structures, such as regimes, they are not constitutive of the state or of the
international structure. They do not change the structure of the international.

Conversely, constructivist accounts make ideational structures constitutive of the
international by subscribing to the meta-theoretical structural idealist position. As
we have seen, it underpins the understanding of Sørensen’s postcolonial and
postmodern types of states. These types of states propose a less strict distinction
between the features of the international and domestic. Sørensen demonstrates that
states can face internal Hobbesian security dilemmas, which are specific features of
the international in the rationalist accounts. The international can be hierarchical
through the constitution of coordinated security communities. In this sense,
Sørensen’s conceptualisation of the postcolonial and postmodern state does not
sustain the dichotomy between the inside and the outside as an ahistorical and

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73 See also section on Wendt, Chapter 3.
permanent feature of the international. This constitutes the relational aspect of Sørensen's theory.

However, all of the rationalist and constructivist theories discussed sustain and endorse the international-domestic division. This division is either the consequence of an ontological preference of conceptualising spaces as self-contained or the indirect consequence of methodological bracketing of either of the realms. The post-modern IR literature, on the other hand, has challenged the inbuilt dichotomies on which conceptualisations of the state rest (such as the inside-outside).

As mentioned at the beginning of the section, there are two issues involved in the conception of agency on essentialist premises. Firstly, action and behaviour are explained by reference to the primary or secondary properties of entities. They are regarded as the direct cause of specific actions (Emirbayer, September 1997, pp. 285 - 286). Entities possess immutable and measurable features that can interact and produce effects while the entity remains unchanged. The underlying principle is that entities pre-date action.

Statist and pluralist theories of IR make these substantialist propositions evident when claiming that the interaction between states’ capabilities determines the state’s position within the international. These properties explain outcomes. The instrumental and rationally driven behaviour of leaders also explains state actions.

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74 An additional consequence of essentialising the domestic and the international as separate spaces is the reification of material factors. Material capabilities are for instance considered the main or primary cause of state behaviour in the international (Maynard & Wilson, 1980).

75 See also (Emirbayer & Mische, January 1998; Jackson & Nexon, 1999).

76 This reflects the view of structure as 'relations of difference' established between the properties of the entities, that is between the material capabilities of states within an anarchical system. See (Wight, 2006). It is also representative of the understanding of structure as law like regularities in the sense that these laws (anarchy) underpins the interaction of the units as laws underpin in physics the interaction of biological units.
This idea of action as reliant on internal properties of entities is also evident in constructivist theories. According to Wendt, states are ‘pre-social’ entities, ‘ontologically prior to the state system’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 198). Sørensen’s framework also offers examples of explanations of state action that rely on the essential properties of states. The actions of postmodern states are concerned with effective and legitimate governance in a globalised world. Their internal constitution as democratic entities allows for such a focus. On the other hand, the competitive and war-prone institutional features of postcolonial states inform their actions. Nevertheless, the work of Hobson and Sørensen introduces relational elements by arguing that outcomes are reliant on the relationship between the state and society. Yet, by keeping the domestic and the international as distinct, the relationship between the state and society is kept separate from social processes that take place across the inside – outside divide.

Secondly, assumptions about coherent and unitary selves inform the view of agency. Agency denotes unified action and agentic authority and capabilities. Human agency is conceptualised this way in the essentialist accounts. In IR, this view has been used as a template to also think about the agency of other social kinds such as states. The conception of state agency draws on an analogy with individuals: it is internally coherent, unitary, and intentional. The examples above use the rationality or instrumentality of states to explain state action internationally. Rationalist theories use a concept of unitary actor to refer to the state as an agent internationally. This occurs, as I have shown, in spite of the pluralist specification that the state is a non-unitary entity. Wendt draws on the assumptions of personhood more explicitly while Hobson does not question the corporate agency assumption when discussing state agency internationally. Sørensen speaks of states as structures rather than
agents and therefore he does not have an explicit view of state agency. Yet, he refers
to states interacting in the international in the same way pluralist frameworks speak
of states doing the acting internationally. The silent assumption is that of agency
premised on the legal definition of the state. In this sense, the state has corporate
agency. The concept of corporate agency Sørensen uses is similar to Wendt’s.

The goals of the theories discussed in the previous two chapters are to explain state
action, to explain change, to propose a view of the state as non-unitary and to
reconsider the domestic – international divide. My immanent critique of the previous
chapters exposed the internal inconsistencies of these theories. The internal
contradictions account for the limited potential of essentialist accounts to achieve
these goals. In what follows, the aim is to show that the essentialist propositions
underpinning the conceptualisation of entities, agency and spaces are also
responsible for undermining the coherence and aims of these theories. In doing so,
the chapter makes more evident the need to offer a consistent account of the state as
an actor premised on relational terms.

The statist approach posits that states are coherent and unitary entities. The
conceptions of state agency and social spaces are also designed to corroborate such a
view of social entities. However, the empirical analysis undertaken by Krasner
contradicts these initial theoretical assumptions. I have already shown that Krasner’s
work on sovereignty, for instance, can also be used to demonstrate that the
international-domestic distinction does not have intrinsically immutable
characteristics. Furthermore, Krasner himself eloquently demonstrated that the
institutionalising moment of sovereignty did not define sovereignty as the exclusive
or absolute control over a specific territory (Krasner, 1993, pp. 235, 237, 240).
Using this as a starting point, Krasner shows the subsequent variation in the understanding and practice of sovereignty in different contexts. However, he fails to reflect upon the consequences of such historical insights for thinking about the state and state agency. The findings of the historical analysis he undertakes undermine the initial assumptions regarding the international-domestic divide and the claim that states are self-contained entities. I have hinted in Chapter 2 that the insights of Krasner's empirical argument open up the conceptual space to keep the state as an agent, yet conceptualise it as a less coherent, self-constituted entity.

The pluralist accounts offer a conception of the state as a non-unitary actor. The international and the domestic are seen as autonomous, self-contained and having idiosyncratic properties. A silent conception of state agency as unitary and coherent also underwrites, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the explanations of international politics provided by pluralist accounts. While state agency is varied, depending on the type of state-society relation, it is not varied with respect to the same state. These theories do not match the conception of entities with a conception of social spaces and state agency. The essentialist conceptions of social spaces and agency have undermined the aim to conceptualise the state as a non-unitary actor. They reinforce the opposite claim about the state as a unitary and an autonomous actor.

The previous chapter has discussed at length the reasons that make Wendt's theory internally inconsistent. This chapter has shown that these moves reflect an essentialist understanding of the social world. Such expressions of essentialism are, for instance, Wendt's conceptualisation of the state as a coherent, unitary, and self-

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77 This latter conception was possible due to the lack of specification of the relationship between individual and state agency. It allowed for transferring assumptions about human agency to states internationally.
contained entity. The methodological move to bracket the domestic has led to an essentialist view of social spaces: the reification of the inside-outside distinction. These essentialist moves are at odds with Wendt’s meta-theoretical position that emphasises the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures, the relational aspect of meaning production through social practice. When translated to a social theory of international politics, such meta-theoretical assumptions would have allowed explanations of variation and change in the agent’s behaviour. According to Jackson and Nexon, such theories can only explain change as ‘external shocks’ (Jackson & Nexon, 1999). The move to consider social spaces as distinct and autonomous undermines the relational elements. Since Wendt’s theory of international politics has opted for, or led to, the reification of social spaces, and limited interaction to the international, it has also limited the explanations of the sources of change.

Hobson’s view of state agency does not consistently reflect his interpretation of social spaces. Social spaces constitute the state. They are regarded as multiple and over-lapping. Hobson also argues for an understanding of state agency as varied, i.e. the state has different agency in different international structures, political and economic. However, Hobson claims that state agency is high or low depending on the relationship with society. If multiple spaces are informing and enabling state agency as Hobson argues, then the logical consequence would be to claim that state agency is simultaneously informed by its embeddedness in these spaces. Reifying one particular relationship as the main cause for the state agency is a reifying move, which comes at odds with Hobson’s preference for multi-causal explanations.

Moreover, there are not only inconsistencies between the two levels of Wendt’s theorising but also between his definitions of the state. Aside from the definition of the state as an entity given by the relationship between the elements of the legal framework, sovereignty, society and territory, Wendt also defines the state as a superorganism ‘with conceptual rather than physical boundaries’ (Wendt, 2004, p. 315). In my view, this is a better working definition because it places at its centre the role of meanings resulting from social practices. These meanings are the ones that potentially constitute and enable the potential for action of states. Yet, the essentialist conception of entities is the one that informs the conception of state agency.
Additionally, the analysis in the previous chapter has suggested that the empirical analysis of tariff protectionism and trade regime change (Hobson, 2002b, p. 80) privileges the focus on material factors, military and economic, as the main determinants of state action in international politics. Such a take is indicative of the essentialist assumptions underpinning the understanding of the domestic and the international as intrinsically different. This understanding counters or is inconsistent with Hobson’s meta-theoretical claim that both the ideational and the material are constitutive of both realms; and that multiple spaces inform state agency.

As argued earlier, Sørensen’s view of social spaces and the international-domestic contains important non-essentialist elements. The relational elements are evident in the conceptualisation of the international and the domestic in the case of postmodern and postcolonial types of states. At the same time, essentialist assumptions underscore the focus on types or typologies of states.\(^{79}\) The tendency is to make strong claims about the intrinsic properties of each type and the type of action pursued by these states due to these properties. Sørensen also works with a view of state agency similar to Wendt’s. The evident mismatch is between the essentialist view of state agency and the relational view of social spaces proposed by his framework.\(^{80}\) This is because the assumption of corporate agency rests on assumptions of the coherence and unity of the entity and of the domestic realm. It is a diametrically opposed view of the international-domestic relation from Sørensen’s integrationist understanding.

\(^{79}\) ‘Such types cannot be found empirically and they are by no means the expression of empirical averages. Ideal types are analytical constructs which seek to express ‘pure’ forms by accentuating selected aspects of historical reality.’ (Sørensen, 2001, p. 73)

\(^{80}\) See also the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the tensions existing between the relational framework and the assumptions about the modern type of state.
The purpose of ideal types is to create predictable algorithms: to associate a type of state with a type of agency internationally and type of action. Sørensen acknowledges that historically embedded analysis would reveal that no state is exclusively a particular type. In my view, this makes these distinctions valuable only if relegated to the status of possible features of the state and possible scenarios of action. Sørensen’s theory would need to go beyond identifying ideal types of states if the goal to offer a historically embedded analysis of ‘how states are being transformed and what the consequences are’ (Sørensen, 2004, p. 21) is to be achieved. As it stands, there are limits to what the theory can say about the intersections between the features of so-called ideal types of states. For instance, post-modern states are portrayed as stronger than post-colonial states due to their constitutive features. Their security dilemmas or concerns also distinguish them. Their aims are to create ‘coordinated security communities’ between themselves and achieve effective governance. However, if dilemmas regularly associated with postcolonial states, such as immigration, drugs, trafficking, and terrorism, become also constitutive of postmodern states, then the algorithm above cannot say anything about the type of agency such states would have internationally.  

To conclude, this section has pointed to the essentialist premises of the conceptualisation of spaces, agency, and entities on which statist, pluralist, and constructivist theories rely. It has argued that these assumptions account for the discrepancies between the conceptual frameworks and empirical analysis; secondly, that they are responsible for making the theories internally inconsistent since

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82 Postmodern positions have not been discussed here as their aim is to critique rather than construct theories of the state and state agency. They argue, however, against the dichotomies specific to the essentialist positions: inside vs. outside and the normative vs. the material.
conceptualisation of entities, agency and social spaces are shifting between essentialist and relational understandings.

4.2. Social relations, selves and agency

This part proposes a relational conceptualisation of entities, spaces, and agency. It aims to put forward a more coherent understanding of social entities and action. To this end, the analysis uses the insights of process philosophy and relational sociology, social psychology and the work of Wight on agents and structures.

The relational sociological and philosophical view of social life emphasises, as constructivists do, temporal and spatial contextualisation of entities. It makes entities contingent on social practices rather than taking them as ahistorical and invariable. However, postmodernists note that moving the foundations of social entities from essentialist to non-essentialist and historicised ones is confronted by a significant paradox (Bartelson, 2001; Walker, 1993; Weber, 1995). Bartelson contends that making entities dependent on the contingency of practice means acknowledging the potential of the entity to cease existing. Drawing on Nietzsche, he further argues that ‘the premises of intelligibility rest (...) upon tracing some ‘essence’ through time’ (Bartelson, 2001, p. 36). Historicising the state makes ‘explanation with reference to a core impossible’ and transforms the state into ‘a sum of its history’ (Bartelson, 2001, p. 36).

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83 'For a being to be contingent is to have the potential not to be'. Agamben paraphrased in (Bartelson, 2001, p. 152).
84 This explains Bartelson’s scepticism regarding the ability of theories to transcend reifications when developing theories of the state.
I use Abbott’s (Abbott, 1995) and Rescher’s work to argue that by defining social entities as ‘processes and relations’ (Rescher, 1996, p. 52) or as ‘the stability-patterns of variable processes’ (Rescher, 2002; 2008), we can maintain both the idea of repetition and that of contingency, when discussing the constitution of social entities. Such a definition places social relations at the centre of the reproduction and transformation of entities. Reproduction and transformation occurs through social processes or social practices. Making entities reliant on social practices means accepting the idea of stable meanings as well as transformation of the properties of entities depending on their temporal and spatial context. The focus on social practice as time and context bound makes it untenable to apriori decides upon the features of entities or social spaces, such as the domestic or the international. The focus is not so much on the resilience of the property as it is on the meaning it acquires within social contexts. Entities can have a history or multiple histories. These histories are premised on both recurrence and transformation of meanings through practice. Processual philosophy argues that there is no ‘core’ that is insensitive to historical context or to specific relationships with others. A relational ontology also rejects a priori dichotomies (Fuchs, 2001, p. 13) such as normative vs. instrumental or material vs. ideational.

Entities are constituted by and constitute the social relations that underpin social action. By social relations, I understand the negotiation within social practices of

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85 The emphasis on social practice in establishing the meanings of properties comes into effect with making even the ‘primary’ features culturally and socially bound. The feminist critique for instance documented the fact that rationality, as a feature of women is not the result of some biological process of cognitive evolution but rather the consequence of changing societal norms. See also sociological writings (Alexander, January 1992; Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and frequently in the IR literature Onuf, Wendt, Kratochwil, and many others.

86 Such a position is also justified and supported by an epistemological preference for explanations that acknowledge the complex manner in which social action emerges. See the discussion in the next chapter on nonlinearity.
material-symbolic structures. Social relations constitute the material-symbolic structures of social engagement (Wight, 2006) in different historical and spatial contexts. They are constitutive and constraining for a certain area of social life and/or for a group or groups of people. As such, entities can acquire different meanings depending on the type of relations (Emirbayer, September 1997, p. 300) underpinning or enabling their practices. Agency is social because the ability of doing is defined in relation to other actors and involves rules, meanings, events, and so forth (Emirbayer & Mische, January 1998, p. 973). This makes relations constitutive of actors rather than something in which pre-constituted agents engage (Somers, November 1998, p. 766). Rescher's definition of entities as 'processes and relations' is meant to emphasise this specific aspect regarding entities being constituted by and meaningful in social relations.

The social and psychological views of the individual self corroborate this view of entities. There are two main conclusions concerning the constitution of human actors that come out of these writings. First, individuals are social as much as they are independent. They are social due to their embedding within material-ideational relations. Subjectivity and reflexivity make the 'self' particular, i.e. distinguishable from other selves that are engaged in similar relations. While subjectivity and reflexivity play an important part in interpreting experience and engagement within

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87 See Bhaskar on the view of structure as 'internally linked' ideational and material elements. Quoted in (Wendt, Summer, 1987, p. 357). What Giddens' terms 'virtual' is unobservable in the Bhaskarian terminology, at least according to King, Emirbayer and Mische.
88 Wight uses an account of structures as relations.
89 I will take here the view that social relations are structural as far as they are repetitive through routinised practices. Yet, my definition of the state in the last part of this chapter discusses also agential aspects of social relations.
90 Wight makes a similar point by arguing that individuals engage in multiple layers of social practices (Wight, 2006).
91 In IR, agency as a 'social condition' denotes its embeddedness in social contexts. Constructivist theories such as the ones discussed in the third chapter work with such a conception of agency. Vendulka discusses this assumption in relation to a variety of IR theories. See (Vendulka, 2001, pp. 56, 66). Wight also develops a concept of social agency. See (Wight, 2006)
92 See both (Emirbayer, September 1997; Jackson & Nexon, 1999).
social relations, they are themselves socially embedded. Subjectivity and reflexivity are, in this sense, social. Individuals are specific due to their subjective interpretation of social relations and positioning within social contexts. Contingency of action is premised on this latter attribute of human agents as subjective and reflective agents (Harre, 1983). This position is different from the one that differentiates between a self or ‘I’ and social identities or roles because it places both within social contexts. This is why I use social selves and social roles as synonymous. Such language emphasises the fact that all the dimensions of the person are social and constituted in social transactions. The self is not ‘an autonomous psychological entity’ but rather a ‘multifaceted social construct’, whose instantiations are time and context bound (Hogg, Terry, & White, December 1995, p. 256; Howard, 1991, p. 215; Swanson, October 1985, pp. 338 - 342). The second contribution of this literature rejects the idea of the individual as a coherent and unified entity (Goffman, 1959; Howard, 1991; Nurius, 1991; Wiley, 1994). This literature demonstrates that individuals do strive for internal unity. However, they are actually constituted by overlapping selves with contradictory needs, diverse beliefs and cognitive dissonances (Colapietro, November 1990). Unity or coherence are not natural features of individuals. The consequences for understanding human agency are important, as we shall see further below.

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93 Wight also argues that entities are social, that is they are constituted by relations but also by ‘properties outside these relations’ (Wight, 2006, p. 163). The genetic code informing different physical and mental capabilities of human agents independent of social environment would be such an example. However, scientific articles that identify genes as causes for specific diseases or disabilities and so forth often specify that they also need specific social habits, environments and experiences to trigger them. Many of these conditions or diseases often exist as potentialities. This is the assumption underpinning the design of pre-emptive advice and preventive medicine. Therefore, I subscribe to an argument that even such properties of individuals can be and are partially socially conditioned.

94 See also North Whitehead in (Mesle, 2008).

95 This position underpins Wendt’s understanding of the person. In that view, the internal constitution of the individual has to do with ‘structures and processes within the body’, while the external one is the result of social recognition. (Wendt, 2004, p. 293)

96 Some have focused on the self as a result of communication or language exchanges (White, 1992) but I take it to be also the result of ‘doing’ or behavioural acts that are not expressed verbally.

97 Colapietro speaks for instance about the ‘de-centering’ of the self (Colapietro, November 1990).
The following example illustrates the relational and reflexive aspect of human action, which makes individuals social as well as specific. Let us take agent X, who has been socialised in community 1, in which bribing and cheating are common social practices. These practices are common to a variety of social relations related to different domains of activity such as work and study. If agent X ends up in community 2, where cheating and bribing are not general social practices, she/he can continue to bribe. In this instance, one can argue that his/her previous constitution and social relations are still creating effects upon his/her actions. It is likely that the new social relations will also be causally efficacious in imposing penalties. A second scenario can be that she/he stops bribing and cheating. In this case, structure 1 stops creating effects. Alternatively, she/he can occasionally bribe and cheat. The example illustrates that the possibilities for acting are open, even if socially embedded. It also demonstrates the manner in which more than one set of social relations can be constitutive of human action.

The example also raises the question of whether one needs to argue that relations are constitutive (which is the relational view), or just instrumental. In this latter case, the assumption would be of an independent self, which places oneself outside the social context in order to calculate the benefits of each option. The social psychological view would reject such an assumption because reflexivity is social. Aside from this social psychological argument, which claims the social character of the self, I also take the view that social relations are constitutive of instrumental behaviour as they create or set the criteria for future action. The politics of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism illustrates this point. Political actors invoked democratic social practices to be constitutive of local politics. One can argue that the previous
autocratic social practices were still in place and actors were only discursively invoking the democratic ones. They were instrumentally using these democratic practices and the social relations for political gains. However, by acknowledging these sets of relations and practices, political actors set the criteria that the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, and civil society organisations have used to evaluate their political and economic performance. The ‘instrumental’ use of social relations by social actors created the conditions for such social relations and practices to inform future actions.

My position here aims to acknowledge that outcomes are the result of both social relations – regarded as both causative and constitutive of social action – and human agency. The examples illustrate the ways in which social relations are transformative as well as constitutive of social action. The second example also makes the theoretical point that social relations can have effects that are not acknowledged, nor recognised or intended by human actors (Wight, 2006). To use Wight’s language, they can also be termed autonomous and causative of social action (Wight, 2006, p. 143). At the same time, social relations are neither mechanical nor deterministic since action involves the reflexivity and subjectivity of

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98 The relational position of Jackson and Nexon for instance leaves under-specified the role of individuals. In fact, they claim that ‘doers’ are present only in the substantialist understanding (Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 302). I have been arguing thus far that individual agents can be a source of change in spite of minds being social.

99 Following Bhaskar, Wight’s argument about the independent, autonomous, and thus causative role of social relations or structures relies on two main theoretical assumptions. First, Wight makes the point that structures can exist autonomously because they can create effects that are different from the reasons and motives agents give for action. They do not depend on the agent’s recognition to create effects (Wight, 2006, p. 143). Secondly, structures have independent causal efficacy as they pre-date the subject. The example given is that of the institution of marriage, which pre-dates individuals. Bhaskar also writes ‘[t]he relations into which people enter pre-exist the individuals who enter them, and whose activity reproduces or transforms them (...).’ Quoted in (Wight, 2000, p. 427). I read Wight’s position to mean that social relations pre-date specific agents or individuals (agent X, Y) but not individuals as an ontological category.
human agents. This is an argument I will use in the last part of the chapter to frame the agency of structurally complex actors.\textsuperscript{100}

The discussion of social selves and relations has important consequences for understanding and conceptualising agency. Human agency rests on the possession of intentionality, reflexivity, rationality as well as on the ability or potential to produce effects. The argument made here does not reject these premises for human agency. It rather suggests that agency is social, relational, and non-unitary. Human agency as social and relational means regarding agency and the ability to act not only as a premise but also as an outcome of social relations and specific transactions.\textsuperscript{101} The type of properties the individual acquires or activates are informed by the relationships that embed his/her practices (Fuchs, 2001, p. 9). The type of capabilities agents have are dependent on the social relations in which they are embedded (Wight, 2006, p. 152).

Unity is not a natural fact about individuals, as we have seen above. The assumption of coherence and unity as conditions for agency are reconsidered here for individuals and other social kinds alike. For individuals, it means acknowledging the different types of agential potential that they can have in different social roles. The variation in the exercise of agency depends not only on the social relations underpinning social action but also on the reflexivity and subjectivity of these agents. Social selves or roles enable a variety of agentic possibilities for the same individual. Some specific relations would be important for the constitution of individuals as citizens or as parents respectively – with the relations constituting an individual as a citizen being irrelevant to its constitution as a parent.

\textsuperscript{100} This is a term used by Wight. See (Wight, 2004).
\textsuperscript{101} They argue that individuals are the outcome of 'interactional performance not the cause of it' (Goffman, 1959). See also (Collins, March 2003; Fuchs, 2001).
Coherence or unitary intentionality because of collective belief\textsuperscript{102} and a top-down decision-making apparatus are the foundations for corporate agency in Wendt’s theory. Without the existence of unitary intentionality, states would not be efficient in implementing decisions. Ultimately, states are not agents if they are not ‘capable of imposing binding decisions on their members’ (Wendt, 2004, pp. 297, 298). Lacking the ability to produce effects is correlated with decentralised organisation and plural intentionality or intentions, of which groups are an example (Wendt, 2004, p. 298).

The literature on types of states shows that postmodern states are decentralised states yet still efficient actors in pursuing foreign policy goals. This literature provides at first glance an excellent counter example to Wendt’s argument. This means that the IR literature already offers cases that challenge the argument according to which states must be coherent and centralised in order to be actors. The literature on social selves endorses this alternative view. Since it is questionable to treat even individuals as coherent and unified in their agential potential, then it is even more so when conceptualising the state and state agency. However, the literature does not provide a concept of agency that would mirror the decentralised nature of the state. As we have seen, Sørensen’s framework reverts to corporate agency premised on unitary assumptions. This means that new ways of discussing agency are needed that acknowledge the relational and non-unitary features of entities.

To conclude, this section has argued for a conception of social entities as relational and non-unitary in character. In has built upon the insights of relational sociology,

\textsuperscript{102} See also Wight’s critique of Wendt’s claim according to which collective belief is a sufficient condition for the constitution of agents such as the state (Wight, 2006).
processual philosophy, and Wight's work on agents and structures. The analysis offers the foundations that will ground a different conception of the state and state agency.

4.3. States as relational and non-unitary actors

This part discusses the manner in which I use the relational view of social entities and agency to conceptualise structurally complex actors, such as the state. It intends to show that states can be conceptualised as actors. It proposes a concept of state agency which does not rely on the unitary or the personhood assumptions. The conceptualisation of state agency proposed here aims to maintain the ontological differentiation between individual and state agency.

In what follows, I will briefly outline the consequences of a relational view of social entities for understanding the constitution of the state. Drawing on processual philosophy I have argued, in the previous part, that social relations and practices are important concepts with which to frame the understanding of social entities in general. The term 'social relations' denotes the variety of relations characterising human life – socio-cultural, political, and economic, the structures of social engagement in different spatial and historical contexts.

In this sub-section, I will use the term 'social relations' to designate the specific historical and spatial ties constituting socially complex actors that inform and

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103 Wight makes the differentiation between internal and external relations. Internal and external relations constitute entities as 'a form of relation', with 'different powers, properties and liabilities' (Wight, 2006, p. 168). I think my definition of the state reflects such a distinction. However, my discussion in Chapter 5, using the language of networks, will point to the fact that the internal-external relations are a matter of degree than outright distinction.
characterise their practices. I understand these relations or ties to be also simultaneously shaped by those transactions. I define structurally complex actors as social kinds other than individuals, which are described by multiple and overlaying functions; they create and reinstate patterns of interactions to support these functions; and lastly, involve collectivities of agents, who, intentionally or not, reproduce, change or reshape through their practices the boundaries of the entity.

The conceptualisation of the state as social relations dependent on social practices acknowledges the differentiation and specificity of different state forms in time and space. The networks of social practices are constitutive of the roles states take and the type of actions they pursue. It makes both the features and the agential potential of the state negotiable and varied not only through time but also in relation to other actors within a specific historical context. These theoretical moves sustain the proposition that states are social, relational and non-unitary entities.

States are actors for two main reasons. States are commonly attributed agency when discussing politics. They are the 'appropriate subjects for statements referring to certain [political] actions' (Wilmot, 2001, p. 164). This is what Wilmot calls the 'semantic view of corporate agency' (Wilmot, 2001, p. 161). Patrick Jackson makes a similar argument. He contends that states take on agency as a consequence of human agents speaking on behalf of the state and acting on behalf of the state on the basis of their institutional agency (Jackson, 2004, pp. 286 - 287).\textsuperscript{104} I subscribe to this type of logic, to argue that state agency is socially constructed not only through discursive social practices, as Wilmot suggests, but also behaviourally. My argument does not limit the process of construction only to individuals placed in formal

\textsuperscript{104} Jackson draws on Hobbes for his argument.
institutional arrangements, as the discussion on facets of human agency below indicates.\(^{105}\)

Using the same logic exposed above to attribute agency to states, Wendt argues that the state is also a person by social convention (Wendt, 2004, p. 293). The question is whether one can consider the state an agent due to the attribution of agency in politics as above, yet reject the assumption of personhood. The first part of this chapter has already shown that the conception of the person used by Wendt is an essentialist one. The analogy of states with persons serves explanatory purposes for Wendt. However, the conclusion reached in that section was that the explanatory potential of Wendtian theory was in fact undermined by this ontological assumption.\(^ {106}\) The second section of the chapter has offered additional reasons for rejecting the concept of the person that Wendt proposes. The definition of the state makes states, as social entities, exclusively reliant on practice for their existence. The social, relational and non-unitary assumptions are also important for framing state agency.

The potential similarities between persons and the state have been enabled by the legal definition of the state. The existence of an institutional 'memory' through procedures and reports has also prompted analogies with persons (French, 1984; Wilmot, 2001). However, I argue that it is necessary to maintain the ontological difference between the two. Properties such as intentionality and reflexivity associated with persons are dependent on practice, but their existence is not practice dependent. This makes individuals as biological entities fundamentally different

\(^{105}\) Chapter 5 will further contextualise this claim. The language of networks makes it even more evident why referring only to the institutional agency of human agents would be a limiting condition for understanding the agential potential of states.

\(^{106}\) The bracketing of the domestic was the methodological move that accompanied it.
from states, whose existence is exclusively reliant on practice. Wight provides an additional reason by arguing that intentions are individual. It is human agents that express intentions in action (Wight, 2004). States and individuals should differ in the processes, resources, and properties associated with them (Buzan, 1995, p. 201).

The conceptualisation of social relations as constitutive and causal offers the second reason for which states are considered actors. In the previous section, the discussion of the examples of bribing and Eastern European politics illustrated the theoretical point that social relations can be both causative and constitutive of social action. Social relations have transformative and reproductive potential, which relies on human agency. Explanations of outcomes include, on the basis of this understanding, social relations and human agency.  

A view of social relations as causal as well as constitutive is supported by Kurki’s understanding of causation (Kurki, 2006). Kurki defines causality as ‘all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world’ (Kurki, 2006, p. 202). This definition of causality incorporates the ‘efficient cause/pushing and pulling’ conception, whereby human agents act and bring about certain changes. Secondly, it links causation to a ‘constraining and enabling’ moment, which relies upon the incorporation of social structures (Kurki, 2006, p. 204).

Having defined states as specific social relations re-produced and transformed through social practices, one can consider states as having the ability to constitute as well as to cause social action. States as causative entities means that states have the ‘capacity to do’. The state can be an actor if agency is understood as the ability to

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107 It can involve reflexivity and subjectivity of human agents but not always awareness. See Wight’s argument on which I draw in section 2.
108 Following Buzan, Wight defines agency as ‘capacity to do’ and ‘an agent of something’ (Wight, 2004, pp. 275 - 276). Wendt and Hobson also link agency to the ability to create effects. Wight sees
create effects. The above discussion allows us to reframe state agency that can incorporate a constitutive function.

I view state agency as involving a constitutive and behavioural moment. The first one involves the constitution or re-enactment of the entity or its capacity of being. This means the capacity of the state to reconstitute itself as authoritative and legitimate. Taxation relations are one example of relations that maintain this capacity of being and so are discursive-symbolic practices through educational programmes, for instance. States as agents due to their legal status is, in this case, only one of the constitutive processes that enable state agency. Legal personality is a necessary practice-dependent process but not a sufficient one for explaining state action. The second moment, which is inherently linked to the former, refers to the ability or potential to create effects — i.e. pursuing policies or actions such as going to war and so forth. The ability to create effects is dependent on the material-symbolic relations engaged within the construction of the state. It also makes the state as an actor reliant on social practices of human agents rather than an essence outside these practices.

The constitutive practices and the agential potential of the state are linked here by a definition of state agency that incorporates a constitutive and a behavioural moment. Since the networks of constitutive practices may be varied, it also means that the agential potential of the state is differentiated. It supports the argument made in the previous section about the non-unitary nature of agency in general and furthers the
argument that state agency does not need to be reliant on the assumption of unitary intentionality and top-down decision making apparatus.\textsuperscript{109}

The essentialist proposition regarding agency suggests that acting is a consequence of being, while the processual argument claims the reverse: that entities are outcomes of social action. My conceptualisation of state agency put forward here does not prioritise one sequence over the other. For social entities such as states, acting and being are congruous. This avoids the reification of the agent that undertakes action by always considering the constitution of the entity.\textsuperscript{110}

Thus far, I have looked at the justifications for treating states as agents yet not as persons. I have also discussed what state agency entails. The discussion below looks at the relationship between state agency and human agency and its consequences for understanding state actions and goals.

State agency as practice dependent makes state agency reliant on human agency. The possibilities of existence of structurally complex actors rest on the individuals’ engagement in social action. The agency of structurally complex actors is built upon the ability of individuals to sustain, re-enact and transform the networks of meanings informing particular state functions, goals or actions. It is their practices and the expressions of their reflexivity and intentionality that have implications for understanding the goals associated with states. Subjectivities play a role in the interpretation of social relations. They keep the potential for transformation and for different scenarios of action open.

\textsuperscript{109} Chapters 6 and 7 will illustrate the manner in which contradictory practices inform differentiated state agency as well as differentiated state positions/roles internationally.

\textsuperscript{110} This addresses Jackson’s concern about the reification of the structure (Jackson, 2004, pp. 283, 285). I do not agree with Jackson that emergence necessarily means reification. See my discussion in the next chapter.
Human agency can be constitutive, representational, and transformative of social practices and of structurally complex actors. The facets of human agency suggested here can also be taken to reflect the more general claim that the human self is constituted by contradictory and multiple roles, as argued in the previous section. Individuals can participate in the constitution and re-enactment of relations that constitute the social entity as an actor. In this sense, human agents have constitutive agency. One can say that individuals exercise constitutive agency by paying taxes, or fines, which in turn keep taxation as a significant relation constituting the state. Yet, very few of these agents are actually representational agents for the social entity. This is because they do not occupy positions in state institutions that would allow such agential potential. However, individuals also maintain a potential to have transformative agency even if they do not occupy institutional positions. State agency relies not only on the role agents take in formal institutions. State actions such as strategies or policy goals could reflect or not the intentions of some of the human actors involved in the political process. According to Wilmot, state actions could be representative for some individuals, or for none, yet for others they are the ‘lowest common denominator’, or ‘simply chance’ (Wilmot, 2001, p. 163).

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111 Phil Cerny speaks for instance of ‘structure-bound’ and ‘transformational’ actors. See (Cerny, 2000). On the role of individuals in the production and exercise of state agency see also Velasquez in (Wilmot, 2001, p. 162).

112 It should be noted that individuals per se do not reproduce structurally complex actors such as the state: it is rather the relations in which they are implicated that constitute structurally complex actors. Bhaskar, Wight and Joseph make this argument referring to the different properties of structures and individuals (Wight, 2000, p. 428). Also, (Wight, 2006, pp. 144 - 145). For instance, Joseph writes that ‘structures are maintained because human activities are collectively organized into social practices and it is these social practices that contribute to the reproduction of social structures’ (Joseph, November 2003, p. 128).

113 Chapter 5 will show how this can be the case by using the concept of the network to conceptualise social entities.

114 However, in all instances, state actions involve social processes that cannot be traceable to one or all individuals, although leaders could suggest or sanction policies. See the discussion on non-linearity and emergence in the next chapter.
The definition of the state and state agency thus far has kept the distinction between states and human agents as different ontological kinds. The consequences for explaining state action and state goals are important. It means that state action, goals and positions in the international cannot be explained by reference to a particular individual or individuals. The focus on relations implicated in the constitution of the state means that the state is not merely the sum of human agencies (Wight, 2006), although the different facets of human agency above acknowledge the role of human agents. This is an argument that will be furthered by the discussion in the next chapter on the concepts of non-linear social action and emergence.

To conclude, this section has explored the conceptual implications of defining states as relational and non-unitary entities. It argued that states can be considered actors yet not persons. It built on the argument of the second section to question, on the one hand, the conceptions of personhood on which ideas about state agency have relied. On the other, it argued that state agency is social, relational, and non-unitary in character. The section has argued for a conceptualisation of the state and state agency that maintains the ontological differentiation between individual and state agency.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the inconsistencies identified in the analysis of IR and FPA theories are due to an essentialist understanding of social entities, social action, and agency. Relational elements are present, especially in the constructivist and historical sociological theories, but they do not inform these theories consistently. It has been suggested that a shift in the ontological foundations informing the
conceptualisation of social entities and agency is needed in order to overcome the shortcomings identified thus far. Process philosophy and relational sociology, as well as Wight's work on agents and structures, have been central to such a move. The second part discussed the concepts of social relations, social selves, and agency. It maintained that if anti-essentialist propositions apply to individuals then they should also underpin conceptualisations of structurally complex actors. The last section of the chapter has proposed a view of the state as de-centred or non-unitary and without a stable self. It defined the state in terms of historically specific social relations, practices, and meanings. It has argued that it is possible to maintain a concept of agency while rejecting the essentialist personifying assumptions about the state. The chapter also elaborated on the types of human agency on which state agency, in its constitutive and behavioural moments, relies.
Chapter 5: The State as an emergent network actor

This chapter uses the findings and the language of the network literature to construct an argument about the organisational configuration of the state. It intends to show that states can be conceptualised as hierarchical networks. In doing so, it maintains the view developed in the previous chapter of the state as non-unitary and state agency as differentiated and relational. The chapter also argues that states should be conceptualised as networks regardless of the historical period. The definition of the state in the previous chapter, as networks of relations that rely on human agency, has kept the distinction between the two ontological objects. I use the complexity science concepts of emergence and non-linearity to develop further this distinction between the state and individuals and between their agential potential. The discussion in the second part of the chapter critically reflects on the issue of boundaries in order to consolidate the argument about the non-unitary nature of the state. Lastly, the chapter interrogates the conceptual links between agency and power existent in the IR literature. It argues for a notion of structural power, which should inform the understanding of agency developed in this project.

5.1. Integrating the concept of the ‘network’ into the conceptualisation of the state

Using the literature on networks the section intends to argue pace Castells, that hierarchies are a type of network or a feature of networks. It then qualifies states as
hierarchical networks. It also advances the view, against evolutionist accounts of the state, that states should be conceptualised as networks across different historical periods. Finally, the section aims to argue that the concept of the network is suitable to conceptualise states because it enhances the relational understanding of social entities put forward in the previous chapter.

The term ‘network’ is used both formally and metaphorically to designate and analyse social forms (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 11). In the former sense, the concept of the ‘network’ is associated with the set of methods devised by the network analysis literature to study the processes of formalisation of social networks such as social movements, local or regional communities or organisations, and political parties (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 1; Wellman, 1999, p. 16). The models are also used to explain ‘patterns of regularities in relationships among actors’ from marriage patterns, disease spreading patterns to decision-making and societal mobilisation on different issues (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 3).115

The idea of the state as a network is, however, under-explored within the network analysis literature. Usually, the state is conceptualised as a unitary actor with whom social networks such as social movements interact or it is a milieu in which social mobilisation occurs. A more extensive reference to the network state is found in Manuel Castells’ writings on the network society, whose interpretation would qualify as an ontological rather than a methodological view. His writings also

115 The methods are devised to study the structural elements of networks by looking at different features. Some of these features are: the ‘density and clustering of a network’; its cohesion; its size; and the nature of the ties and their numbers (Wellman, 1999, p. 16). One example: density of relations is calculated by dividing the number of effective relations of each individual by the number of potential relations. See for example (Passy, 2003, pp. 41 - 42). Much of network analysis is positive and cumulative and in search of ‘definite conclusions’. Yet, according to their own acknowledgement, conclusions are difficult to reach due to the reliance on quantitative measures (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 12) built around the individual as the main study subject.
introduce the concept of the 'network state' to discuss the historical and material transformations occurring in the contemporary world.\textsuperscript{116}

Castells conceptualises networks as fundamentally different from other forms of social organisation such as hierarchies and markets.\textsuperscript{117} Networks differ from hierarchies in that they do not have a top-down approach to dealing with events or tasks. Hierarchies on the other hand, have an organisational structure specified by charts, which enhances clearly defined hierarchical roles and functions (Castells, 2000). Individual elements within the network have enough freedom to decide upon the manner in which tasks are carried out, although the decisions are informed by the 'network logic' or 'protocol'. The concept of network logic establishes the idea that while there is individual agency, no node can exist by itself or 'impose a diktat'. This is because 'nodes create and define one another through the connections' and therefore what constitutes a node 'is bound up with the particulars of the network', to which it belongs and which it constitutes (Castells, 2000, p. 208). Trust of each actor within the network towards the others is what binds the network together and what makes it qualitatively different from hierarchies. In contrast to networks, hierarchies rely on authority stemming from the formal rules of hierarchical organisation rather than on trust. Placing trust at the foundation of networks introduces a personal dimension to the functioning of networks. Castells considers authority and the ability to act the outcome of the personal position of the individual within the network. The position is dependent on the individual's ties to the others. It is worth noting that this understanding is similar to the Weberian traditional and charismatic types of authority. The impersonal authority of hierarchies, which arises from the role or the institutional position a node occupies, is suggestive of the

\textsuperscript{116} Sociological writings use the concept of 'network' to conceptualise cities as well as societies more broadly. See (Craven & Wellman, 1973; Van Dijk, 1999, 2nd edition 2005).

\textsuperscript{117} In this thesis, only the relation between hierarchies and networks is discussed.
Weberian legal-rational understanding.\textsuperscript{118} Castells argues that networks also represent evolutionary superior forms of organisation, more efficient than the traditional hierarchies (Castells, 2000). In this respect, both Castells and Sørensen, in the previous chapter, propose an alternative to the Wendtian position that emphasises the virtues of the unitary hierarchical entity (Wendt, 2004, p. 297) in exerting agency.

There is an underlying evolutionary perspective in the literature on networks. The network is considered a more appropriate concept to be used when discussing the social reality of the past three decades. Networks are the organisations of the present whereas unitary and homogenous entities are those of modernity. According to Castells, it is the change within the material structure of society that makes the network paradigm relevant (Castells, 2000, pp. 53 - 61).\textsuperscript{119} As we have seen, Keohane and Nye and Sørensen propose similar evolutionary approaches in the conceptualisation of the state. Keohane and Nye talk about the multi-issue state emerging as a consequence of increased economic interdependence. Sørensen’s postmodern state shares the same features as Castells’ network state.

Castells’ hierarchical state model designates a territorially fixed, bounded entity whose power relies on control over territory and resources and whose authority is enforced by the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention (Castells, 2000). Castells names this hierarchical organisation of the nation-state a Russian-doll model, with the central government ruling over the regional and the local. On the other hand, the

\textsuperscript{118} 'Obedience is owed to the impersonal order itself, that is, legitimacy rests on a belief of both the legality and technical competence of claims of authority.' Max Weber quoted in (DeLanda, 2006, p. 258).

\textsuperscript{119} Castells identifies three major factors that contributed to the change in the material structure of the state: the cultural revolutions of the 1960s, which placed individual freedom at their centre; the economic restructuring of the economy after the 1970s economic crises and the development of technology and the genetic revolution.
network state defines a state that loses control over its resources and authority over the other levels – regional and local. Castells’ Weberian influences in terms of ideal types make the ‘network state’ an ideal type (Stalder, 2006). However, he also uses it as a description of reality. Castells’ assumption is that the state has been changing from the sovereign and unitary political actor to a network.\textsuperscript{120}

In what follows, I will use the network analysis literature to argue that the concept of network can incorporate hierarchies. It can involve both personal and impersonal forms of authority. Efficiency, which is generally linked to the ability to create effects, is not an exclusive property of either networks or hierarchies.\textsuperscript{121}

Considering hierarchies and networks as different forms of organisation due to their operating logics is misleading. There is evidence in the literature to support the claim that networks can have hierarchical formal organisation. That is to say, networks can involve impersonal authority and top-down decision making. The reliance on social relations as constitutive of networks means that uneven relations are a possibility. Felix Stadler argues that one of Castells' definitions of networks as 'the set of interconnected nodes' (Stalder, 2006, p. 169) is broad enough to include hierarchical relations as a possibility for the organisation of networks. The network analysis literature has also shown that nodes can have peripheral or central positions depending on the patterns of relations underpinning their interaction and the resources they have access to. The type of ties or relationships underpinning the interactions between nodes can be a source of inequality, conflict and competition

\textsuperscript{120} For Castells, the network is always an ‘informational network.’ Castells maintains the idea that large scale networks are possible due to information technology that makes coordination possible (Stalder, 2006, pp. 181, 201). However, the network analysis literature discusses networks well before information technology made a real impact. See for instance the role of networks in Poland during the Cold War in (Osa, 2003).

\textsuperscript{121} The epistemological position, which does not identify a unique causal relationship between different variables, informs my argument here. See the discussion on non-linearity further below in the chapter.
(Passy, 2003, p. 23). More generally, the literature considers hierarchical networks those networks that display a centralised form of organisation (Osa, 2003, p. 83), in which the central node or nodes have ‘the capacity to issue commands to those located in less centrally located nodes’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 258). A network that has a star-like shape, in which one node in the middle coordinates and links to all the other nodes, is an example of hierarchical network. The literature on formal networks also reaches the conclusion that formal networks function as a result of institutionalised forms of conduct and social norms in order to preserve or sustain network ties (Ibarra, 1997, January 1993; Wellman, 1983).

Furthermore, we can still maintain Castells’ argument about networks as efficient even when they involve organisation according to formal social rules and hierarchical organisational structures. Several studies link efficiency to the existence of institutionalised mechanisms by which decision-making and resource allocation occur. These studies have shown that organisations in which authority is role-related, i.e. impersonal, are also characterised by high levels of trust between their members (Ankersmit & Te Velde, 2004; Huntington, 1975; Warren, 1999).

Conceptualising social organisations as networks is an ontological commitment that allows us, as we have seen, to consider different patterns of relations and acknowledge the flexibility of forms of organisation. I have already argued above that it is possible to consider more broadly networks as hierarchical and impersonal as well as reliant on trust. The literature on networks provides further examples of types of networks such as illicit and informal. Informal networks are those that remain clandestine or stay outside the officially recognised channels of social interaction. Their interactions can be work-related, personal, or social (Ibarra,
January 1993). Illegitimate networks are those networks, whose activities are defined as illegal by society or the formal network. The form the network can take is also dependant on the issue at hand, such as health, security, human rights and so forth. The literature also speaks of network spaces – spaces within which social action is organised, creating a sense of boundaries and fulfilling a socialising function. The multiple social spaces constitute individuals as nodes in different networks – formal, illicit and informal, symbolic-discursive or virtual. At the same time, individuals constitute through practice the boundaries of these spaces and the networks themselves. The focus for instance on network spaces created around issues discards the separation between ‘the international’ and ‘the domestic’ (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996, p. 50) or the distinction between state and society.

The discussion above opens up the conceptual space to consider the network as a fundamental form of organisation of social kinds. I take the network as the ontological premise for understanding and framing the organisation of the state. On this basis, states as networks do not denote a particular type of state specific to the informational age, as Castells and the others argue. Conceptualising the states as network-like does not make networks desirable or evolutionary superior forms of organisation. The network analysis literature illustrates the claim that networks can take different forms and network spaces can be exclusive or restrictive.

States are conceptualised in this project as hierarchical networks. The existence of organisational charts that differentiate between local and central authorities constitute entities as hierarchies, as Castells has pointed out. The structure of

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122 The question of which networks are illegal or illegitimate is related to the issue of who has the power – institutional and in terms of resources – to name them this way. For example, the ANC struggle against apartheid in South Africa was for many years illegal and illegitimate.

123 On virtual spaces, see (Castells, 2000).
electoral systems, the existence of national budgets, armies and so forth also enable hierarchical relations. I consider the institutional arrangement to constitute the formal side of the network. Additionally, hierarchy can be said to be, more broadly, a feature of states because access to resources by different parts of the network, as well as the input into the decision-making process, are uneven.\textsuperscript{124} The literature on elites, interest groups, lobbies, and bureaucracies illustrates this point in relation to a variety of states, Western or non-Western, weak or strong states (Allison & Halperin, 1972; Huntington, 1975; Kochanek, 1983; Steiner, Jun., 1977; Walle, 2001). In short, the state has been defined here as a hierarchical entity due to the formal institutional arrangement and to the uneven access to resources and decision-making.

Conceptualising the state as a network enhances the relational view on social entities argued for in the previous chapter. This is due to the explanatory interest of the network literature in the manner in which social relations are shaped, reshaped and transformed in social transactions. The language of networks proposes an ontology that does not rely on the unitary assumption, even when networks do include hierarchical relations. In this sense, hierarchical networks are different from Wendt’s hierarchical entities, which are conceptualised as possessing unitary intentionality and a coherent inside.

The concepts of network forms and network spaces, as used above, do not reduce the state to a formal network, which is enabled by the institutional arrangement. Empirically, states can be to different degrees a combination of formal and informal, hierarchical, decentralised and, at times, illegitimate networks. When nodes, such as

\textsuperscript{124} The discussion in the last part of the chapter on power will further qualify this claim.
individuals and organisations, fulfil military functions as part of both private militias and the army, then one has a network state that is shaped by formal, informal and illegitimate relations through the practices of human agents. Hamas, as part of the institutional arrangements constituting the Palestinian authority, could count as such an example. A node as an institution constituting the state can be at the same time legitimate or illegitimate, 'democratic' or 'repressive' depending on the type of relations in which it is involved with other nodes. For example, the Iraqi government can be considered legitimate as an institution within the Shi'a community and illegitimate when viewed by the Sunni community (Nasr, Summer 2004).

The possibility of multiple spaces, insides/outsides, fits with and enhances the relational and processual understanding of the constitution of the individual as multifaceted self. Even if the relationships are the ones defining the network, human agency remains important in shaping the form of the network through practices. The emphasis on the ability of nodes to define the network space (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 7) coheres with the social psychological insight that subjectivities and reflexivity introduce indeterminacy and choice.

The facets of human agency discussed in the previous chapter, such as constitutive, representative and transformative, are reflected in the concepts the network literature uses to discuss types of nodes. The potential of individuals as agents is related in the network literature to the roles they fulfil in the network (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 4). Nodes can be, for instance, followers, brokers or hubs. Nodes are termed hubs if they draw on significant material and symbolic resources and they establish a high number of connections (Diani, 2003a, p. 7). A broker is an agent that connects

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125 In the network analysis literature nodes denote individuals, organisations, neighbourhoods, or even elements of speech. See (Diani, 2003a, p. 7).
126 For more on the relationship between different networks of power see (Nasr, Summer 2004).
nodes that are not ‘directly related to each other’ or actors that are ‘reluctant to connect’ (Diani, 2003b, p. 107). The distinctions between types of nodes should be regarded as useful tools for referring to human agents. Since individuals could be nodes in different networks, they can be simultaneously followers and brokers who initiate transformation. The example given above regarding a member of the Hamas as part of the government and the militias also illustrates this point.

This first part has argued that it is possible to think of networks as hierarchical and reliant on impersonal authority. The discussion in this section has questioned the use of the concept of the network to refer only to a historically specific type of state such as the postmodern state or the informational state. It has made the case for the network as an ontological premise for framing the organisation of socially complex actors, of which states are an example.

The section has also pointed to the ways in which the concept of the network allows for the conceptual acknowledgement of the relational view on social entities, as developed in the previous chapter. In terms of the conceptualisation of the state, the concept of the network opens up the space to acknowledge the contingencies of state forms\(^\text{127}\) such as modern, post-modern, weak, or strong, and the shifting ‘outsides’ and ‘insides’. The language of networks offers a more flexible sense of boundaries—multiple spaces, i.e. insides/outsides and roles for nodes. In the light of the discussion in this first part, states as networks denote not only overlapping social relations and practices but also the networks of actors embedded simultaneously in several of these social spaces.

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5.2. The network as an emergent social entity: potentialities and limitations

Within the network literature, authors like Castells have drawn on the contributions of complexity theory to conceptualise networks as complex systems. Conversely, the complexity literature envisions complex systems as being network-like. This section critically uses the insights of complexity to discuss the constitution of networks in general and the state in particular. The section puts into conversation the network analysis and the complexity science literature on the issue of network boundaries. In doing so, it aims to strengthen the argument about the state as a social entity with multiple boundaries. Secondly, the section uses the concepts of emergence and non-linearity to develop further the argument regarding the different ontological status of states and individuals. It also aims to illustrate the importance of keeping the distinction between state and individual agency.

5.2.1. The autopoiesis assumption and the issue of network boundary

The issue of network boundaries comes up in both the network analysis and the complexity literature. The issue of boundaries is linked in complexity to the discussion of networks as autopoietic systems. Complexity uses the term of autopoiesis to define living-systems (Mingers, 1995, p. 10). They are autopoietic...
because they are envisioned as self-organising and self-producing entities. Networks as autopoietic systems are in this view, ‘organisationally closed’ and structurally determined in that ‘the product of their organization is that very organization itself’ (Mingers, 1995, pp. 33, 205). Change is internally determined rather than specified by the environment. There is no ‘outside intervention’ (Marion, 1999, p. 7) nor a ‘central controller’ (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 276) when complex entities change and reorganise.

An autopoietic entity has clear and identifiable boundaries. The boundary is preserved through the ‘preferential interactions of its components’ and constitutes ‘a single organized and dynamic entity’ (Staubmann, 1997, p. 84). The boundaries are identifiable yet they are permeable. According to the complexity literature, the entity is not secluded from the environment but it adapts according to the feedback information it receives from the environment. This is what makes networks ‘open’ systems. The openness of the system does not refer to change in the type of relations defining the structure of the system (Mingers, 1995, p. 33).

In IR, the Wendtian social theory of politics comes closest to this type of understanding. Wendt distinguishes between the self – what in complexity terms would denote the ‘organisationally closed’ structure of the entity – and role identities, which are open to change (Wendt, 2004, pp. 308 - 309). The statist claims in IR are also suggestive of the view of the state as an autopoietic entity. As I have shown, Krasner’s concept of the national interest is conceptualised as the product of an exclusive or stable relation between specific nodes as well as the exclusive outcome of a well-bounded symbolic-discursive and material space.

130 This is a version of autopoiesis developed by Varela to be applied to social systems, although Varela did not develop a social theory.
131 For the second meaning of ‘open’ system, see the discussion below on non-linearity.
In complexity science, the autopoiesis assumption is considered a feature of living systems. When used in IR to conceptualise states, the national interest and so forth, it involves a claim regarding the similarities of boundaries between biological and non-biological entities. The argument in the previous chapter, has already pointed to the inadequacies of translating the properties of biological entities to social kinds, which are practice dependent. I build here on that logic as well as on the discussion of boundaries provided by the network analysis literature in order to make the argument that: in the case of social networks as complex systems, the emphasis should remain on overlapping and multiple spaces. This involves a less strong differentiation between the inside and the environment than made by the notion of autopoiesis.

I subscribe to the complexity idea that boundaries fulfil a socialising function in that the constitution of individual identities are the product of the system and constitute the system in their turn (Price, 1997, p. 10). This interpretation rests on an understanding that the elements and the internal processes are part of the boundary as much as they are the ‘inside’. The boundary is in effect a representation of the social processes that constitute the ‘inside’ (Cilliers, 1998). The network analysis literature makes a similar argument. Degenne and Forsé write that ‘internal processes can also be part of the ‘external relations’ of the nodes with others when pursuing various network goals (Degenne & Forsé, 1999). The same processes of constitution of the network inform the actions of the network in the relations with the others. Such a view is congruent with my understanding of state agency as involving a constitutive and a behavioural moment.
The problem with considering entities as autopoietic and boundaries as clear-cut is that the elements or the individuals are regarded as belonging exclusively to one network. In the previous part, I argued that individuals could be nodes in different networks or network spaces. This makes boundaries dynamic, unstable and contested. Such an understanding acknowledges the diversity of boundaries and the fact that they are not reducible to physical boundaries. Some complexity scientists have also conceded that if space is viewed as a 'dimension of social interaction', then it becomes difficult to draw up the boundaries of networks (Mingers, 1995, p. 125). Thus, while legally the state is unified in time and space, it exists in multiple spaces and times.

The question of what makes an element a node is both ontological and methodological. Terming an element 'a node' is already an act of inclusion within a network. It represents a claim for the existence of a boundary and specific social relations that define the node. The network analysis literature has already noted that the methodological delimitation of the 'boundary' of the network is a challenging and disputed process in itself (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 190; Diani, 2003a, p. 7; Marsden, 2005, p. 10; Osa, 2003, p. 79). They use quantitative methods in order to establish the form of the network and the position of individuals in those networks.\footnote{132 For instance, group cohesion is based on measuring the links of each individual with every individual.}

I agree with Bourdieu's observation that boundary drawing is an empirical question rather than a theoretical assumption (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100). It involves a negotiation between the observer's view on where the boundary should be drawn and the participants' awareness or acknowledgement of these boundaries. I
use some of the methodological insights of the network analysis literature to guide my analysis in the next chapters. I rely however on qualitative analysis to identify the role of different boundaries in the constitution of the state as an actor.

I consider the generic strategies for boundary specification identified by Laumann, Marsden, and Presky valuable for the discussion in the next two chapters (Marsden, 2005, p. 9). These strategies are known as the ‘positional approach’, which creates boundaries according to the nodes’ formal membership criteria or their features; and ‘an event-based approach’ that relies on the participation in a specific activity. Individuals can be considered members of a network if, for instance, they are Romanian citizens or if they are involved in different activities – for instance regime change. The boundaries will be drawn around spaces that are constituted by specific practices: for instance the practice of over-stating production needs or bribing. In this manner, the project will examine more than the role of the formal network to explain the agency of the Romanian state. The focus on social practices transgresses the traditional division between the domestic vs. the international dimensions.

To conclude, this section has interrogated the manner in which complexity science conceptualises boundaries through the concept of autopoiesis. The analysis has argued against a strong differentiation between the inside of the entity and the environment when it comes to social networks. The argument rejected the translation of autopoiesis to non-biological entities based on the theoretical position elaborated in the previous chapter. The conceptualisation of states as networks makes necessary the focus on multiple spaces. It also emphasises the fact that elements can be nodes

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133 Campbell, for instance, speaks about FP as a ‘boundary’ producing and enforcing exercise (Campbell, 1998).
in more than one network. This section has also considered the methodological issue
of boundary identification.

5.2.2. The nonlinearity and emergence assumptions: implications for
understanding state agency

Complexity science argues that networks, as complex systems are non-linear and
emergent entities. The aim of this section is to show that the notions of nonlinearity
and emergence strengthen the argument made in the previous chapter regarding the
ontological difference between individuals and states.

Non-linearity of the social world more broadly assumes a certain degree of
unpredictability or openness in terms of the form social life takes despite the fact that
there are stable features or patterns defined within the relations (Elliott & Kiel, 1997;
Mihata, 1997). The system is open because the possibilities of interaction between
its elements are ‘open’. This is what makes a system complex and not the increasing
number of elements. This means that even when patterns of interactions are present
within social interaction, the manner in which interaction occurs makes it impossible
to trace outcomes to one element alone (Marion, 1999, p. 15).

The propositions of nonlinearity regarding the unpredictability of social life fit well
with the argument developed in the previous chapter about the indeterminacy of
human action. The social psychological understanding of human agents has also
emphasised the idea of contingent action in spite of the social embeddedness of
reflexivity and intentionality. In this respect, the non-linearity assumption
strengthens the argument made thus far in relation to social action.
Incorporating the assumption of non-linearity as a property of networks means also providing explanations of state action that are not premised on linear causation of the ‘A determines/causes B’ type\(^{134}\) (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 262). The argument in the previous chapter on the agential features of social relations relied also on a broader understanding of causality that is not limited to linear or efficient causes. The complexity assumption of nonlinearity favours multi-causality (Casasanto, 1998). Social action does not rely on deterministic patterns or covering laws whereby once the general laws are discovered, they can be equally applied to both the past and the present (Marion, 1999, p. 42). This is what accounts for the unpredictability of interactions. My epistemological preference for multi-causal explanations, which acknowledge the complex manner in which social action emerges, translates also into a rejection of dichotomies such the normative vs. instrumental or material vs. ideational.\(^{135}\) If causes are multiple and interacting in a complex manner, then the role of material or ideational resources becomes entangled in the outcome.

Linear or mono-causal thinking underpins the explanations of state agency in the second and third chapters: a certain relationship between the state and society determines the position of the state internationally. For instance, the state holds a strong position internationally and domestically if it is the dominating actor in the relationship (Katzenstein, 1981). Others make the opposing claim: if societal groups influence the definition of interests, then the state is strong internationally (Gourevitch, Spring, 1996; Hobson, 2000). Another scenario is that of a

\(^{134}\) See Kurki (Kurki, 2006). Also, (Juarrero, 2002).

\(^{135}\) Chapters 6 and 7 show that such dichotomies are difficult to defend in historically informed analysis. Constructivists also make this point. However, when it comes to historical analysis, Hobson for instance focuses on the material over the ideational. The emphasis on material factors allows him to build an explanation that favours linear causality.
domestically autonomous state but one that is weak in international negotiations due to the fact that it cannot resort to the argument of ‘internal coercion’ to reject an international proposal (Putnam, 1998). Making state agency dependent on the state-society relationship is a relational move. Claiming that there is one fundamental relationship, that between the state and society, which determines state agency, and identifying one possible scenario as a result of a specific type of relationship between the two, makes explanations deterministic in character.

The proposition that complex systems display emergent properties supports the non-linearity claim. Emergent properties such as common values, goals, protocols and identity, result out of the interaction between the constitutive elements yet they have different properties that are not traceable to one particular element (Simmel 1922: 133)\textsuperscript{1} nor to all elements. The understanding is that the whole is simultaneously more than the sum of its parts (Marion, 1999, p. 81) as well as less than the sum of its parts (Cilliers, 1998). This means that the processes of interaction between elements result in properties that cannot be found in the elements. In the previous chapter, I have already argued for the need to differentiate between individuals and states as different ontological kinds, the latter being practice dependent. The concept of emergence endorses such a differentiation. The focus on both the elements and the emergent totality (Marion, 1999; Mihata, 1997) that comes with this concept is key to furthering the distinction between the elements and the whole.

Emergence allows for the emergent agentic properties of the entity to be understood both as a function of the relational aspect of the individual nodes to each other but also in relation to the whole. From this perspective, aiming to understand state agency only based on emergent properties is as flawed as taking the opposite view of

\textsuperscript{1} in (Staubmann, 1997, p. 83).
explaining agency by reference to the individual properties of constitutive elements. Mead’s example\textsuperscript{137} of water – as an emergent physical agent of the interactions between oxygen and hydrogen – illustrates the relational and emergent view on agency. Taken separately the chemical components of water would not achieve the same effects such as quenching thirst or extinguishing a fire. It is water as the combination of the two that has those effects. The critique of the theories discussed in the second and third chapters gains here another dimension. It is not only that they are internally inconsistent, but, from the perspective of these ontological commitments, they are also missing on important social processes to account for state action. Statist theories overemphasise the whole, while the pluralist accounts focus on the constitutive elements. These theories leave under-theorised the relationship between the leaders or negotiators and the state. As I have shown in the second chapter, explanations of international state action collapse the two ontological categories: states and leaders are used inter-changeably.\textsuperscript{138}

Complexity science also provides the language to speak of individual actorhood and acknowledges the role of human agents (Price, 1997, p. 14). Revolutionary figures can be examples of what complexity theory terms a ‘catalyst’ – a stimulus that provokes certain changes in the social relations enabling his actions and which transforms itself in the transactions (Marion, 1999, p. 34).

If one takes the case of the Romanian revolution of 1989, Laszlo Tokes, the priest held in house arrest in the city of Timisoara in December 1989 illustrates well the above propositions about the role of human agents as well as about the non-linear

\textsuperscript{137} Mead in (Bertuglia & Vaio, 2005, p. 272).
\textsuperscript{138} More generally, even claims made within an absolutist regime – see the famous expression ‘I am the State’ by Louis XIV – cannot be taken at face value and explain the constitution of France as an actor.
features of social action. While initial protests grew out of solidarity with his stand, this particular individual did not directly cause the fall and the change of regime. The individual agent, in this case Tokes, contested the type of social relations informing material and symbolic practices, such as censured information, reduced access to goods and so forth. These social relations defined both the social space and his possibilities of action. They constituted the constraining and constitutive conditions for the existing type of regime. These conditions shaped and enabled the existence of a specific state form.

Tokes represented a catalyst as his agency changed from ‘reproductive’ to ‘transformative’. Conceptualising the state as a network is useful here for the explanation of change. Tokes had been a broker in the informal networks as well as the illegal networks contesting some of the state policies.\(^{139}\) His roles in these networks were important when he openly challenged the formal network. Identifying the required conditions for the change of social relations that constitute the regime type is an empirical question, i.e. to determine the type of threshold required for fundamental shifts to occur. Similar contestations, which involved significantly larger numbers of human agents, such as the miners’ strike in 1977 or the workers revolts in 1987 had less successful outcomes. In this particular case, it is evident that the changes are dependent not only on the manner in which the elements organise internally, but also on broader contexts such as Cold war politics within Europe for example.

\(^{139}\) For instance, he contributed to the clandestine Hungarian-language Review ‘Counterpoints’. He became known to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was aware of his activity, through informal networks. For more information on his biography, see (Deletant, 1999, pp. 158 - 160).
Such an account also reflects the complexity view that change occurs incrementally (Eve, Horsfall, & Lee, 1997). The contestations of relations in different social network ‘spaces’ were central to understanding and explaining the changes in the constitution of the state occurring in 1989. The new features of the state are framed as emergent from over-lapping and multiple practices of human agents and not the direct cause or intention of one single agent. Similarly, a discussion of state actions and foreign policy goals should also maintain the difference between the intentions of individual leaders and the actions of the state. Underpinning such a distinction is the epistemological preference for non-linear and multi-causal explanations.

To conclude, this part of the chapter linked the literature on networks and that on networks as complex systems. It argued that the language of complexity science is helpful to support the claim that states are distinct social entities from individuals. The analysis also exemplified the role of these concepts for understanding state agency. It also emphasised the role of contextual or empirical-historical analysis for discussing the agentic potentialities of states.

More broadly, this second part of the chapter has critically combined the insights of networks and complexity to further the understanding of the state as an actor. The framework does not take the emergent network to be a self-generating, stable and coherent entity with clear-cut boundaries. The network analysis literature, with its emphasis on network forms and network spaces, has offered the theoretical possibility to acknowledge the differentiated and varied potential of the state. The indeterminacy of human action, as demonstrated by social psychology and re-enforced in this section by the complexity findings, recognises the potential for change of the emergent totality.
5.3. Power, agency and networks

The definitions of power and those of agency often implicate one another. For instance, agency is linked to the ability or the exercise of power (Wight, 2006), while power has been defined as the ability to produce intended effects. Power, however, has also been defined as a feature of social relations. This section addresses the question of the relationship between these two concepts. In doing so, it also reflects upon the implications of the view of power argued for below on earlier arguments in this chapter regarding the features of networks.

Before moving to the actual discussion of the relationship between power and agency, I will briefly review the meanings of power as they have developed in political science and IR. Barnett and Duvall’s framework of power offers a useful introduction to the diversity of conceptualisations of power within the literature.

Barnett and Duvall identify typologies of power based on two main understandings of social relations: social relations of interaction among ‘previously constituted social actors’ and constitutive social relations. The latter interpretation assumes that social relations ‘analytically’ pre-date the subjects which they constitute as social beings ‘with their respective capacities and interests’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, pp. 44, 46). Power premised on the first understanding takes a behavioural form as ‘power over’. Power becomes in this sense ‘almost a property of actors’ and it is ‘rooted in behaviour’. It is a ‘compulsory’ form of power. In the second sense, power is ‘irreducibly social’ and designates ‘power to’ define actors and their
capacities and practices. (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, pp. 45 - 46) This form of power is associated with the structural types.

Compulsory or instrumental power in IR has been defined as the ability to impose one’s interests (Dahl, 1957; Fuchs, 2005). This form of power focuses on successful outcomes or effects. It assumes spatial and temporal proximity (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 47) of the two agents and linear causality (Fuchs, 2005; Guzzini, 2005). It rests on possession of material capabilities. Compulsory power refers, in short to both the ability and the possession of resources. The rationalist literature analysed in Chapter 2 works with such a definition of power as the ability to act, bargain and instrumentally engage in international politics.

Structural power is the power to define the type of social beings actors are (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). As just mentioned, it is underpinned by an understanding of social relations as constitutive of actors’ identities, capacities and interests. It is a type of power that is not ‘possessed or controlled by any single actor’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 44). The literature refers to different types of structural power such as material, discursive or institutional. The (neo) realist

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140 It is also termed in IR the ‘relational’ view on power as it is a feature of a relation between two agents (Diez, 2005, p. 616). Some authors argue that intentionality is an essential condition for power while others reject it. Intentionality and consciousness in the exercise of power are emphasised for instance in the Weberian definitions. Guzzini is also in favour of a definition that emphasises intentionality and awareness of resources in order for actors to be considered powerful (Guzzini, 2005). I subscribe to an understanding of power that does not rely on this condition – power can emanate from unintended behaviour and non-action. Arguments in this direction have been developed by (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005; Cohen, 2000; Lukes, 2005; Strange, Autumn, 1987). In Chapter 7, it will become evident that the practices of human agents in informal and illicit networks had as unintended consequences the subversion of the formal network of the state and more broadly of the social relations legitimising it. This makes these acts expressions of a specific form of power – informal. See discussion below in this section.

141 Some authors differentiate between relational power, which is found in classical realism and behaviourist political science, wherein the focus is on the ability of the actors to impose their interests and power as resources as in the neorealist writings (Schmidt, 2005). Yet, it seems that the two are mutually implicated since the ability of the actors to act in their interest rests on possession of material capabilities (Sterling-Folker & Shinko, 2005, p. 640). For a similar point see also (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 49).
frameworks, for instance, use structural power in the material sense. It denotes the relations between the units’ military and economic capabilities. Krasner, Keohane and Nye, and the pluralist frameworks have used such a definition of power, which favours the material dimensions. On the other hand, discursive power refers to the power of symbolic resources, such as knowledge and discursive practices, to create the meanings of legitimate social action and social roles (Fuchs, 2005; Holzscheiter, 2005). Institutional power places emphasis on organisational rules and procedures, which shape institutions and frame the possibilities of action or nonaction (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). The concept of diffuse and indirect institutional relations replaces the understanding of power as the direct influence of agent A over B in virtue of the possession of resources. Therefore, it is A’s position within the institutional framework that make possible exercise of power over B (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 51). The bureaucratic politics model of Allison and Halperin discussed in the second chapter is the most obvious example of institutional power. The argument of their model rests on the claim that the position in the bureaucratic apparatus determines the position vis-à-vis political events. It is the reflection of the dictum ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.

From the brief discussion of types of power identified and conceptualised by the literature, it becomes evident that some of the definitions of power are almost synonymous with the definitions of agency. My interest is in a definition of power that enhances the relational understanding of social entities argued for in Chapter 4.

142 Although capabilities are a unit level attribute, Waltz argues that it is a structural attribute in that he is most interested in how capabilities are distributed across the international system. Waltz explains that “although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities is not”. Waltz quoted in (Schmidt, 2005, p. 539).
The similarity is noticeable in the definition of instrumental power and agency as they both focus on the ability to create effects. The definition of agency taken in this thesis does include the ability to create effects. However, the ability to create effects has been theorised as social. The institutional understanding of power is more in line with the concept of agency as social, as argued for in the fourth chapter. I take the ability to act and create effects due to institutional arrangements to be a form of power.

My understanding of human agency embedded in different types of networks such as formal, informal, illegal requires an understanding of power that is not only associated with formal institutional roles. From this perspective, the institutional definition of power becomes limiting because the social context, which embeds social action, refers only to the organisational context. This means that it is possible to conceive of cases when the centre does control resources and is hierarchically above in relation to the other node, yet, the potential for agency remains open even for the ‘lower’ nodes. Hierarchically higher nodes within formal institutional structures do not make them de facto the most powerful ones. For instance, the withholding of information or avoidance of paying taxes within the relationship taxpayer and tax collector can signify limited resources on which the central node could draw and limit authority.

I subscribe to those structural understandings of power that equally incorporate symbolic-normative and material resources. An actor may get around its lack of material resources by constituting alliances with others or convincing another influential actor to represent its interests, or by actually having access to knowledge resources (Holzscheiter, 2005, p. 736). The strategy of ‘shaming’ used by NGOs in
relation to states (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 207) is also illustrative of the importance of normative resources (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 50; Diez, 2005).143

The understanding of power as ‘not controlled by any single actor’ makes more evident the assumption on which the existence of networks is premised. The logic of the network is that no single element can survive by itself or impose a decision on the others in virtue of some intrinsic qualities. It frames social action as non-linear in its effects and not dependent on spatial proximity. Furthermore, the understanding of social relations as power-laden (Touraine, 1988, p. 49)144 supports the argument developed in the second part of this chapter that networks can be conceptualised as hierarchical. It means that unevenness in terms of social roles or/and access to resources is a feature of networks.

To conclude, expressions of agency are suggestive of different forms of power – institutional or more broadly structural power. The notions of structural power are taken here as a condition for agency or for the ability to create effects. They inform the reproductive, constitutive and transformative facets of human agency, which have been discussed in Chapter 4. The different forms of power make human agency varied and differentiated. The section has also argued that structural power enforces the view of networks as hierarchical. Human agents reproduce and challenge social relations and consequently, specific forms of power, which constitute states. Such processes of production and transformation inform state agency or the agentic capabilities and potentialities of states in specific contexts or in relation to specific issues.

143 The legal norms can be used by less powerful members of the Security Council to ‘constrain the actions of the powerful’ (Barnett & Duvall, Winter 2005, p. 50).
144 ‘[A]ll social relations include power relations. There is no purely horizontal social relation’ (Touraine, 1988, p. 49).
Finally, I should mention that questions of what it means for states to have power or whether or not or when they are powerful are only addressed in the next two chapters through notions of ‘weak’ or ‘high’ agential power. I subscribe to the dilemmas identified in the power literature over the difficulty of quantifying or settling such issues (Schmidt, 2005). The next two chapters will focus more on illustrating the manner in which the agency of the Romanian state can be conceptualised as non-unitary and differentiated.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the state is a hierarchical network as well as an emergent and non-linear entity. In the first part, the analysis has critically engaged with the literature on networks to argue that hierarchies can also be considered a feature of networks and that states are hierarchical networks. The discussion in this section has questioned the use of the concept of the network to refer only to a historically specific type of state such as the postmodern state or the informational state. It has made the case for the network as an ontological premise for framing the organisation of socially complex actors, of which states are an example.

States as networks denote not only the network of social relations and practices but also the networks of actors embedded simultaneously in several of these social spaces. Informed by empirical analysis, the network analysis literature provides a variety of terms to refer to network forms: for example, formal, informal, illicit, star-like and so forth (Degenne & Forsé, 1999, p. 140). The network analysis literature, with its emphasis on network forms and network spaces, offers the theoretical
possibility to acknowledge the differentiated and varied potential of the state. The section has also argued that the concept of the network is suitable to conceptualise states because it enhances the relational understanding of social entities put forward in the previous chapter.

The second part of the chapter used the insights of complexity to discuss the constitution of networks in general and the state in particular. The first section interrogated the manner in which complexity science conceptualises boundaries through the concept of autopoiesis. It argued against the idea of clear-cut boundaries between the entity and the environment to conceptualise the boundaries of social networks. This line of argument is supported by the conceptualisation of states as networks. This makes necessary the focus upon multiple spaces and upon the potential of elements to be nodes in more than one network. This section also discussed the methodological issue of boundary identification. The second section contended that the notions of nonlinearity and emergence strengthen the argument made in the previous chapter regarding the ontological difference between individuals and states. The findings of complexity acknowledge the indeterminacy of human action and the potential for change of the emergent totality. The analysis also exemplifies the role of these ideas for understanding state agency. It also stresses the role of contextual or empirical-historical analysis for discussing the agentic potentialities of states.

The final part of the chapter offered a discussion of the relationship between power and agency. It contended that these concepts have often been considered synonymous. It argued for a notion of structural power that involved material, symbolic-normative, formal and informal dimensions. The different forms of power
make human agency varied and differentiated. They inform the reproductive, constitutive and transformative facets of human agency, which have been discussed in Chapter 4. The processes of production and transformation of specific forms of power also underpin the understanding of state agency. The discussion in this section reinforced the argument regarding the hierarchical nature of networks.
Chapter 6: State constitution and state agency: Times of change (1944 –1948)

_Time goes by, time comes along/All is old and all is new (…)\[^{145}\]

This chapter challenges the understanding of regime change occurring in Romania following the end of the Second World War between 1944 and 1948. The process of regime change culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947. The historical accounts argue that the cause and the agent of change was the Soviet Union and/or Stalin. Stalin’s will and the coercion by the Red Army explain the changes to the state in terms of its formal relations and institutions.

The broad aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that these changes were the outcome of complex processes. I also intend to show that the Romanian state cannot be conceptualised as a static entity. In doing so, I will reframe the linear explanations, which identify one or two causes directly responsible for regime change, with an account that acknowledges the role of multiple and layered social networks as well as social relations in the constitution of the Romanian state.

The chapter is organised in two main parts: one dealing with the constitution of the state prior to the coup of 1944 and the second part looking at the changes occurring after. The first part identifies the networks of social relations constituting the

\[^{145}\] Eminescu in (Cartianu, 1991).
Romanian state formally, illicitly and informally. The underlying assumption that guides the analysis is that social networks of agents and social relations contain explanations for the possibilities of future state action. Specifically, this part also intends to acknowledge the illicit and informal practices emerging from exclusionary politics, which are usually relegated to the status of 'context'. It also discusses the type of human agency associated with different social networks. This part reflects upon the manner in which the different networks of social relations and human agents informed Romanian state agency during the pre-1944 years.

The analysis in the second part of the chapter intends to show that radical change becomes consequential when social action targets more than particular individuals. Institutions such as bureaucracies, which socialise a larger group of people, and social relations that inform more broadly the social practices within a space or domain need also to be changed. The stages of regime change are indicative of the implicit manner in which human agents think of states as political entities: i.e. states are more than the sum of individuals. By looking at social processes occurring during the regime change in the 1944-48 period, I also aim to demonstrate that boundaries between what was ‘inside’ and what was ‘outside’ the state were blurred.

6.1. Tracing the paths of change

The assumption that previous social relations and practices enable change, even sudden change underpins the discussion in the first part. To paraphrase one of the
authors writing on the Prague Spring, the formal regime change, which took place in December 1947, had started in the years before (Retegan, 2000, p. 147). This does not intend to deny the importance of the immediate context in the constitution of the Romania state as an actor. The analysis acknowledges these relations and practices despite the fact that they are not considered in this chapter directly or uniquely consequential for the changes occurring from 1944 onwards.

Envisioning states as structurally complex actors constituted by layered social relations and practices makes the researcher sensitive to additional historical data, which the political histories consider context. Broadly speaking, in the pre-1944 years the institutions constituting the Romanian state – the parliament, the political parties, the government, the constitutional monarchy, the judiciary, and the bureaucratic apparatus – were tailored after Western ones. The Romanian Constitution of 1923 and various laws such as the electoral law or the law on education, allowed, for example, national minorities rights to political representation in compliance with the Peace Treaties of Trianon and Versailles, which had been signed at the end of World War I. Yet, between the 1938 and 1944, anti-Semitic and xenophobic legislation was passed, which excluded from political life the urban non-Romanian population.

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1 complexity theory argument developed in the previous chapter. The nonlinear aspect of social actions and the non-proportionality principle, i.e. small actions can produce big effects, make such predictions about moments of change impossible.

14 Of official, during 1918 – 1938, Romania was a liberal constitutional monarchy. Historians note however that the only ‘relatively free elections’ were those of 1928 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 16).

146 Minorities made up 20% of the population (Halperin, 2004, p. 162).

150 Parties of different nationalities were created. A Hungarian-ethnic party was created in 1922, a German one in 1929 and a Jewish one in 1931.

151 The great majority of Romanian ethnics did not live in cities. This discriminatory legislation was intended to increase the number of Romanian ethnics living and working in urban areas. For more on this see (Livezeanu, 1998, p. 17).
Formal social and institutional relations, which encouraged practices such as voting and party consultations, were coexisting with illegal and informal practices. Widespread practices of patronage, corruption, nepotism, and bribing were constitutive of the political process of the time (Deletant, 1999b, p. 23). Exclusionary politics and discriminatory social relations and practices created the potential for alternative networks, which coalesced around these practices, to emerge. In the following decades, this tendency would be exacerbated, as will be shown in Chapter 7. For instance, according to the legislation, Jews, Armenian and Greek business people could not participate in the public service. The willingness of the bureaucracy to take bribes attenuated these provisions. Bribes, nepotism and so forth were practices that brought politically marginalised individuals into the formal network. They represented a way to enlarge the social space of the formal networks by informally including agents who would be otherwise excluded due to the formal rules. Individuals as nodes in both social spaces made the link between these types of networks.

These illicit practices were consequential for the constitution of the state. They enabled the emergence of ‘internationalist’ practices in the interwar period. The formal social rules instantiated in the specific legislation and institutional practices mentioned above, increased the disposition of the excluded human agents to subvert and change these relations by getting involved, either as party members or as financers, in alternative social networks. Historians note that national minorities constituted the majority of adherents to the Communist Party and Marxism-

\footnote{It is interesting to note that some of the rhetoric of the time, fascist and communist, associated illicit practices with the bourgeois state. However, Chapter 7 also shows that the process of creating or searching for spaces for action through such illicit practices flourished during communism as well.}
Internationalism (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 83 - 84; C. A. Stoica, 2006; Tismaneanu, 2003, p. 77).\textsuperscript{153}

Marxism-Leninism represented the ideology\textsuperscript{154} that offered these agents the potential for constitutive and transformative agency. It created an alternative space in which these individuals were recognised and acknowledged as legitimate actors. The internationalist agenda of Marxism-Leninism aimed at undermining states as actors by redefining the social relations enabling communities. A first step was to change the capitalist and fascist relations\textsuperscript{155} that constituted the bourgeois state. This would then create the conditions for the dissolution of the state (Braun, 1978, pp. 57 - 58). National ideology as a symbolic resource underpinning the official networks of power of states was viewed as the cause of the annihilation of the ‘international sense of solidarity of the proletariat.’\textsuperscript{156}

Such ideational spaces informed the activity of formal organisations such as the Comintern and Communist Parties. The Comintern, created in March 1919, was to coordinate the achievement of the aims mentioned above across different national networks. The connecting nodes to this transnational organisation were members of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (the SDP), the main leftist democratic party in Romania. It is worth noting that there were differentiated views amongst the members of the SDP regarding the desirability of a state organised formally by Marxist relations (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 10, 11). For instance, the ‘centrists’ and

\textsuperscript{153} Deletant writes for instance that the Communist Party was attractive ‘for the national minorities, dissatisfied with their situation in interwar Romania’ (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 83 - 84).

\textsuperscript{154} I use the concept of ‘ideology’ here to denote the set of ideas regarding social relations, the organisation of society and role of human agents in society.

\textsuperscript{155} There was a change of discourse in the Comintern due to the signature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on 23\textsuperscript{rd} August 1939. Initially, the threats to peace and socialism in Europe were Hitler and Fascism. The enemies changed to the West and states such as Britain and France. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22\textsuperscript{nd} of June, the anti-fascist discourse returned.

\textsuperscript{156} Lenin quoted in (Braun, 1978, p. 57).
‘minimalists’ opted for less radical change in social relations and practices. For them, the internationalist agenda was a complementary space rather than an alternative one. They favoured socialist relations of production but did not intend to challenge the constitutive relations of the political institutions. The maximalists, on the other hand, subscribed to the internationalist agenda of challenging all existing formal relations constituting the state. On October 4, 1922, the maximalist section created the Communist Party from Romania as a section of the Comintern. These different views are also important in understanding the dynamics after the end of the war.

The Romanian communist agenda aimed for instance to equally enlarge and limit the boundaries of the state. The intention to make the Comintern part of the decision-making structure of the state was one way of changing the formal boundaries of the state. Another way was by narrowing the territorial boundaries of the Romanian state to the boundaries prior to the Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) and the Treaty of Trianon (June 1920). The former treaty allowed for the annexation of two regions, Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Romanian state. The latter treaty enlarged the territorial basis of the state by officialising the annexation of Transylvania, Maramures, Crisana, and the Banat regions. The material and ideational resources on which inter-war Romanian communists drew for support were not only institutions such as the Comintern but also other states such as the Soviet Union, and other communist parties in Europe.

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157 This is not an isolated phenomenon. The communist movements were not unitary in their view regarding the role of Marxist social relations in informing all areas of social life. See (Deletant, 1999b, p. 11). The Soviet communist party was itself made up of different factions. These factions coagulated around different ideational and policy preferences into a working class ‘left’ led by Trotsky, a bureaucratic ‘centre’ led by Stalin, and a peasant-oriented ‘right’, whose more prominent representatives were Bukharin and Rykov. See for instance (Alexander, 1981).
The type of decisions politicians of the Liberal and Peasants Parties took during the pre-war years reflect a real concern that the formal social space could change and that the territorial boundaries of the state would be challenged. The concern was also with the potential of the Communist networks to broaden their social basis. In this context, the land reform of 1921 was a measure intended to limit the influence of the internationalist networks and of their propositions about communal property (Deletant, 1999b; C. A. Stoica, 2005). It increased the number of peasants with access to resources. The right to own land was also significant for their identity as peasants. Universal male suffrage established by the Constitution of 1923 also formally empowered peasants. The decision to declare the Communist Party illegal in 1924 constitutes the official recognition of the threat the communist networks and ideas were thought to pose to the formal organisation of the state. By the end of the war, there were fewer than 1,000 members (Colt, 1999).

Historians use the low membership rate to argue for the inconsequential role of the communists in the decision-making process and, following from that, for the constitution of the Romanian state as an actor. It is fair to say that several factors, including the ones mentioned above, worked against the consolidation and integration of these networks within the official or formal networks constituting the Romanian state. My argument is that the relationship between the formal networks and the communist ones was nevertheless constitutive of the state. I use the evidence provided by the same historical accounts in order to support this claim.

158 Small-scale farming was not a moneymaking activity but it secured their means of survival. Not all peasants benefited equally from the land reform. In Transylvania, peasants of Hungarian origin received less land than those of Romanian background (Halperin, 2004, p. 163).
159 Other factors were important to account for their reduced numbers. The numbers of the members decreased from 4,210 to about 1,000 also because of the territorial annexation in 1940 of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union and of Northern Transylvania by Hungary respectively. Deletant also notes that the numbers were low due to the ‘small size of the industrial proletariat’ (Deletant, 1999b, pp. 11, 83 - 84).
Human agents constituted the links between these social spaces. Party financiers, who came from the ranks of the middle class, acted as the nodes in both social networks. Members of the Communist Party were present in politics by entering alliances with the other political parties. I have already mentioned that the Social Democratic Party had internationalist sympathies. Historians also note that communists became members of other political parties such as the Ploughmen’s Front and the Hungarian People’s Union, who had leftist preferences (Veiga, 1993, p. 223). During the 1938 - 1944 period, they were also involved in political life by setting informal alliances with the National Renaissance Front (Pokivailova, March 1997, p. 48), and the Liberal and Peasants parties.

In fact, at different times in the pre-war years, political parties became illegal or officially dissolved. The Communist Party was illegal from 1924 until August 1944. The 1938 Constitution dissolved all political parties, including the Liberal and Peasants’ parties. During the legionary state period, from September 4, 1940 to January 20, 1941, the military and the fascists groups, such as the Iron Guard, occupied the important institutional positions. Then, in January 1941, the military-led government declared the fascist groups illegal. The political alliances of that time excluded the members of the Liberal and the Peasants parties, who refused to be part of the government. While illegal, members of these parties were politically active, as the historical literature points out. Such a shift in the official institutional outlook of the state illustrate the type of negotiations of state boundaries taking place within the

160 By the end of 1939, however, their role in securing funds for the communists diminished. They retained ideological sympathies (Pokivailova, March 1997, pp. 46 - 47).
161 The Legionary Movement and the Iron Guard were openly anti-Semitic and xenophobic. The Iron Guard was an offspring of the legionary movement. It was less formal than the existing political parties. The majority of the supporters came from peasants and students. Its aim was to create an alliance between political or nonpolitical organisations and groups that shared its fascist, anti-semitic, anti-western and anti-communist struggle.
context of the World War 2. Between 1938 and 1944, the Romanian state was proclaimed a monarchical dictatorship and a legionary state. The executive power shifted from the institution of the monarch to the military-led government of General Ion Antonescu. These changes opened up the potential for the communist social networks to create ties with the Liberal and Peasants’ parties, which themselves acted informally during the 1940 - 1944 period. This is because they were equally interested in undermining the centrality of the military networks (Cioroianu, 2005, p. 62).

From the above, it becomes evident that the politics of that time was in fact difficult to contain only to the processes associated with the legal institutions. Politics during the pre-war and war years involved social networks, whose status shifted, as argued above. This made the communist ideational space and the networks constitutive of the state. They became formally constitutive of the agential potential of the state during the events that followed in August 1944.

During this period, political leaders, who occupied top institutional positions within the government, the monarchy, the military, the bureaucratic apparatus across the country, and the politically involved intelligentsia had transformative agency. Most citizens had, in the interwar period, reproductive-constitutive agency. The existing social relations and material resources informed the reproductive agency of this population. According to the 1930 census, 80% of the population was living in villages, illiteracy was high, and the transport and communication infrastructure was

162 See also (Cutler, 2002) (Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, November 2004).
163 Needless to say that the political processes and events taking place during that time period are more complex than described here.
164 For a description of the interwar ideological trends amongst intellectuals and politicians of the time, see (Gallagher, 1999, pp. 23 – 52; Mihaylova, 2001 - 2002).
weakly developed. These material conditions made it difficult for all these individual agents to be actively constituting or challenging the relations enabling the state. It did not require intentional and active reproduction, except for the time of voting. Measures such as the land reform of 1921 secured reproductive rather than transformative human agency.

At the same time, political actors of the Legionary Movement and the Iron Guard attributed transformative agency to peasants and the urban population. The discursive practices constituted these categories as able to create and challenge the social relations that constituted the Romanian state. The unifying feature between these categories was Orthodox Christianity, which emerged in the discursive practices also as a would-be feature of the Romanian state. This type of symbolic-discursive resource was not only potentially empowering to citizens, who otherwise had limited access to material resources. It was also intended to secure the agential potential and of these anti-Semitic and xenophobic networks.

These different types of agential potentialities and capabilities of human agents, which were informed by specific social relations, were consequential for the constitution of the state and state agency. They allow us to explain the variations in the emergent agential potentialities states have within specific historical contexts, in this case, Romanian state agency at the end of World War 2. The Romanian state was, at the end of World War 2, simultaneously agentially weak and strong.

The Romanian state was weak if the focus is on the economic, communication resources constituting human agency, which limited the formal role of the majority of the population in contributing to the political processes that shaped state policies.

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165 This transformative agency was to come at the expense of other minorities' potential for acting.
On the other hand, it was agentially strong if the emphasis is on the fact that the formal networks constituting the state were uncontested by the majority of the peasant and urban population.

The Romanian state was agentially weak in its relations with the West and the Soviet Union if one takes into consideration the xenophobic and anti-Semitic legislation that constrained the agential potentialities of non-Romanian ethnic groups. On the other hand, the position of the Romanian state in its relation to Germany was strengthened by such exclusionary practices.\textsuperscript{166}

At the same time, the politically active networks that supported liberal institutions and political practices informed positively the relationship with the West. It constituted the Romanian state as a potential ally of the Western Allies. However, it placed the Romanian state in an antagonistic position to the USSR. The ‘bourgeois’ networks, Romanian or otherwise, informed by liberal social relations, were considered within the communist networks across Europe as the cause of the World War 2.\textsuperscript{167}

To conclude, this first part has argued that social relations and practices as well as networks of social actors usually regarded as ‘outside’ the state, or labelled context, were in fact important for understanding the agential potential of the state prior to the regime change and at the time of the coup. The discussion identified the agential potential associated with different networks such as communists, peasants, and elite. It used the analysis to illustrate the differentiated agential potential of the Romanian

\textsuperscript{166} It is thought that there was competition between Romanian and Hungarian war efforts so as to secure a better bargaining position with the Germans regarding the Transylvanian matter (i.e. which side was to keep this territory after the war).

\textsuperscript{167} The underpinning logic was that socialist states would not fight each other.
state prior to the 1944 coup. An understanding of change as dependent on previous
social relations and practices, yet not determined in any clear way, has underpinned
the analysis in this part. The immediate context was equally important, as will
become evident next, as a catalyst for making some social relations and networks of
human agents more important than others.

6.2. Times of change: 1944 - 1948

Historical narratives regarding the changes in Romania at the end of the WW2
invoke Stalin’s will and the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe, and the
Yalta agreement between Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt, which reflected
Stalin’s will and intentions for Eastern Europe. The Soviet interference is seen as
synonymous with or accounted for in terms of Stalin’s intentions to create and
enlarge the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of the war. Within this narrative, the
Romanian state is regarded as an object rather than a subject of politics, upon which
change is imposed by this external force. The ‘takeover’ is achieved through the
armistice and through the instrumental use by the Soviets of the Romanian
communists (Deletant, 1999b; Tismaneanu, 2003).

The aim of the rest of the chapter is to offer a more nuanced account of the
constitution of the Romanian state at the end of the war that moves away from the
deterministic view: the Romanian state and state agency – the epiphenomenon of
either the structural division of the world or Stalin’s intentions. In order to construct
my account, I build on the idea of the existence of multiple insides and outsides of
the Romanian state prior to 1944. The discussion of regime change intends to show
not only that the state should be considered a dynamic social entity but also that it is more than the sum of individuals.

6.2.1. The Coup of 23 August 1944: the catalyst for change

The first part of this chapter painted in broad brush the existing networks of social relations constituting formally, informally and illicitly the Romanian state. The coup represented an important catalyst for change in the social relations and practices constituting the Romanian state. It triggered struggles between agents favouring liberal, social-democratic, fascist, and socialist relations and institutional outlooks. After the coup, social relations that would enable conflicting conceptions for its organisation formally constituted the Romanian state. Casting these processes as the struggle of the state vs. other actors such as communists, Stalin or the Soviets, not only involves static conceptions of statehood, but it is also inaccurate from the perspective of the processes constituting the Romanian state.

King Michael, the Liberals, the Peasants Party, and the Social Democratic Party plotted the coup of 23 of August 1944 against the military dictatorship led by Antonescu. The switch of arms against the Axis, which resulted in Romania joining the war alongside the Allies, followed the coup. Members of the Communist Party such as Dej and Patrascanu\(^\text{168}\) also participated and supported such a move. These actions reflect the temporary alliance between liberal and internationalist networks against the fascist ones. As argued above, the years of the military dictatorship,

\(^\text{168}\) Dej would become the leader of the Communist Party while Patrascanu would occupy the position of Minister of Justice between 1944 and 1948.
which traditional political actors also opposed, created the enabling conditions for communists to acquire transformative agency.

The aim of the coup was to change, on the one hand, some of the main political actors in central decision-making positions during the war, such as Antonescu and his pro-German government. On the other hand, the coup aimed to change the extant legislation, especially the Constitution of 1938, which limited the action of state institutions such as political parties and the Parliament. This was done with the inevitability of the Soviet occupation looming ahead. The removal of some of the key human actors, as well as the change in the institutional arrangement from a military to a civilian government, constituted the state as a legitimate negotiating actor in relation to the Allies. This was in spite of the fact that formally the Romanian state was still an enemy of the Allies.

The Romanian communists were not merely the 'outcome' or instruments in the political processes of the time, but they were actively strengthening their position in the struggle over which social relations and practices should become dominant in constituting the Romanian state. In this context, what followed was not a literal 'seizing of power' or taking over of the Romanian state by the Soviets. Generally speaking, political actors were aware of the importance of being hubs in the decision-making process. Multiple spaces and resources embedded their actions. For the traditional actors, the material resources on which they could draw – the formal

169 The Soviet troops entered Bucharest on 30th of August 1944.
170 The situation created after the coup is illustrative of the consequences of the non-unitary nature of state agency. After the coup, the Army became responsible to the King, who ordered the switch of arms against the Germans on the same day. However, parts of the army supported the removed military government. This made the Germans consider the situation still 'reversible'. As a formal armistice was not signed, the Romanian state was officially an enemy of both sides, the Axis and the Allies, yet informally acting as an ally against the Axis. The Soviet Union treated the Romanian state as an enemy until the formal signature of the armistice on September 12, 1944. During this time, the Soviet Army took over 100,000 soldiers as war prisoners (Constantiniu, 1997).
economy – were limited due to the war effort\textsuperscript{171} and the diminished industrial capacity of the economy. They had the support, at least at the level of discourse, of the Western Allies, who were interested in promoting liberal democracies.

Romanian communists were experienced political actors and understood the importance of social networks. The legalisation of the Communist Party represented a significant point in acquiring transformative agency. The cooperation of the Communist Party with the most important peasant party of that period, the Ploughmen’s Front, and one of the traditional parties, the SDP, increased the agential potential of the communists. The Ploughmen’s Front was a political party with left-wing sympathies. The poorest of peasants were its electoral base. Some sources estimate the membership of this party to be around 800,000 and some up to a million (Pokilvailova, November 1995; Ţ Stefan, November 1995).\textsuperscript{172} Together they formed the Bloc or Front of Democratic Parties.

The international context allowed the communists to better position themselves in formal networks. The communists had the political advantage of being able to relate to the Allied High Commission due to their ideological sympathies. Communists used the resources of the Allied High Commission for Romania to increase their ability to act. The Commission was created after the signature of the armistice on September 12, 1944 between the Romanian state and the Allied (Soviet) High Commander on behalf of the Allied Powers. The internationalist agenda was gaining ideational ground against the incumbent formal ones.

\textsuperscript{171} Fighting the war alongside the Axis was costly and income was reduced as the oil resources were sent to Germany without any payment received.

\textsuperscript{172} It should be noted that the later plans of land collectivisation put the two parties into conflict (Cioroianu, 2005, p. 161).
It is fairer to say *pace* the arguments mentioned above focusing on Stalin’s will, that the greater involvement of the Soviets in the Allied High Commission for Romania in the administration of the armistice, could be regarded as the result of international bargaining. Once the Allies, the UK and the USA, marginalised the Soviets’ involvement in the administration of the armistice in Italy and Western Germany, the Soviets used the same logic to negotiate the limited role of the Western Allies in the territories on which the Red Army was present (Gross, 1989, p. 205). It is counterfactual to speculate on whether a greater involvement of the Western Allies in Eastern Europe could have led to a different outcome in terms of the outlook of Eastern European states. If one subscribes to the complexity theory proposition that small events could have greater effects, then it is possible to conceive of such scenarios. For instance, greater involvement of the Allies in the administration of the armistice could have enabled the formalisation of different social relations, such as social-democratic rather than socialist. Such a direction does not seem untenable if one also takes into consideration the fact that the Communist Party was not a homogenous entity but rather made up of different factions, which subscribed to different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This type of logic challenges explanations in terms of Stalin’s intentionality or will to create a socialist Romanian state. It places the political processes occurring in relation to the Romanian state in broader and more complex contexts.

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173 Ana Pauker, the leader of one of the factions, was willing to cooperate with the traditional parties, the Liberals and the Peasants Parties to form the interim government on March 1945. The members of the faction led by Dej refused the cooperation. Dej drew his support from the Allied High Commission for Romania.

174 Deletant notes that the coup pre-empted the Soviets from seizing power immediately (Deletant, 1999b, p. 31). This statement can be read in two ways. It can be taken to suggest that the evolution of the Romanian state towards a socialist republic was an ineluctable path rather than one of the possible outcomes inscribed in the social relations of the time. Or it can be read as a remark made with hindsight. I disagree with the first reading on the basis of the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 5, regarding the non-deterministic view of social action. As for the second reading, this chapter presents the argument against treating the Romanian state as an object of politics.
The coup exposed the contradictory networks of social relations and of agents informing the constitution of the Romanian state. The coup brought about the abolition of the 1938 Constitution and reinstatement of the 1923 legislation and consequently of the constitutional monarchy. The re-instatement of democratic procedures and a non-fascist leadership, which formally made the state a constitutional monarchy, informed positively the relationship with the Western Allies.

The relationship with the USSR was also informed by their previous ‘enemy’ relationship during the war. The ‘bourgeois and fascist’ relations and institutions were considered responsible for informing the actions and interests of the Romanian state during the war and particularly its opposition to the USSR. The Soviets regarded the social relations underpinning the constitution of the Romanian state as the cause for the reluctance of the Romanian state to work with the Allied Soviet High Commission after 1944. The relationship between Romania and the USSR was informed by the understanding that the formal institutional outlook of the Romanian state, the constitutional monarchy, was reproducing the same anti-progressive social relations (i.e. bourgeois and anti-revolutionary social relations) as before the war. However, the presence of the communists in coalitions with the traditional parties constituted the Romanian state as an actor with potential internationalist features. As said, the coup created the political space for members of the Communist party to be involved in the formal decision-making process.

The presence of the Soviet Army on Romanian territory until August 1958 represented a resource that enhanced the agency of the state, from the perspective of the Romanian Communists. This is because it could be used against the ‘counter-
revolutionary, bourgeois-fascists elements’. At the same time, it was limiting the state’s agential potential in international and ‘domestic’ matters from the perspective of the traditional political parties and from the perspective of Western states. In this respect, the Romanian state’s agential power was again difficult to frame as uniquely low.

To conclude, I have suggested in the theoretical chapters that conceptualising the state as a network and non-unitary entity also means acknowledging the different types of ideational, interest, and geographic boundaries constituting the state and state agency. A conception of the state, which can be clearly delimited, informs the narrative of the historical accounts. Explanations, which are framed in terms of the Romanian state vs. the Soviets and/or the Romanian state as submissive to the Soviets, reflect such a view. Explanations that emphasise the ‘highjacking’ of the state by Soviets or local communists are inadequate as they work with a view of the state as an object rather than a dynamic entity.

The analysis has offered explanations that incorporate factors identified by historians, such as the presence of the Red Army on the Romanian territory, or the interest of the Soviet Allied Commission in the development of a communist regime in Romania, but has gone beyond them. The analysis has pointed to a more complex understanding that places the focus on the social processes and relations that constitute the Romanian state as a contradictory social actor. Such processes were changing the position of the Romanian state internationally by changing the relationships with the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.

Deletant describes, for instance, the relationship between the USSR and the eastern European 'satellite states' as a 'master-servant relationship' (Deletant, 1999b, p. 88).
6.2.2. Tendencies towards uniformity

The discussion above has pointed to the manner in which catalytic events and contexts can stimulate change. A fierce struggle to occupy institutional positions opened after the coup. Previously 'marginal' yet constitutive networks such as the communist ones grew to become central to defining institutional practices.

The discussion in this section identifies the measures that enabled regime change. In doing so, it aims to illustrate the point that states are more than the sum of individuals. This section also intends to show that in spite of policies and tendencies towards uniformity, the Romanian state of that time remained constituted by multiple social relations. It also argues that the domestic-international boundary is difficult to settle when looking at the networks of social actors constituting the Romanian state.

Reshaping the agentic potentialities of the state was to be achieved by initially getting access to high-ranking institutional positions and by removing a critical number of potentially challenging agents from institutional positions. By taking charge of key ministerial positions, the Communists of the Romanian Communist Party had more opportunities to promote policies that would boost and simultaneously consolidate their institutional roles. In the interim government formed after the August 1944 coup, members of the Communist Party occupied the ministerial positions of Interior (Home Office), Defence and Justice. Within the existing parliamentary system, occupying cabinet positions was central to initiating policies that could enable actions and practices aimed at making deeper changes in
social relations. The decisional responsibilities of the government were increased since the members of the Parliament were yet to be elected.

The communists kept the same offices in the new government of March 5, 1945. Groza, the leader of the Ploughmen Front, led the government. They also gained an additional portfolio of the Ministry of National Economy. The government was in charge of organising general elections in post-war Romania, which took place on November 9, 1947. Such positions offered the institutional basis, in addition to the ties with the Cominform and the High Commission, that enabled and reproduced their potential to act. Their agency was in fact emergent from their participation as nodes in more than one network.

The actions of the government members were oriented towards devising policies that were to re-shape the agential potentialities of the human agents involved in the process of state constitution and reproduction. The new civil servants were to fulfil reproductive agency of new social practices. As members of the government, the communists suggested several measures that would considerably diminish the number of agents, whose identities and actions were informed by extant social relations. These new agents were described as 'honest, democratic, and capable elements'. For instance, forty-five percent (i.e. 2,851) out of the 6,300 employees of the Ministry of the Interior (Home Office) were placed on reserve while 195,

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176 He had been deputy minister under the provisional/interim government and a trusted politician by the Communists and of the Prosecutor General of the USSR, Andrey Vyshinsky. (Deletant, 1999b, p. 42)
177 Cominform was to replace the former Comintern, which dissolved on May 15, 1943. In the declaration of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, it was stated that 'the solution of the problems of the labour movement of each individual country through the medium of some international centre would meet with insuperable obstacles.' http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/dissolution.htm. Cominform was the new network of communist parties set up in September 1947 as a response to the Marshall Plan. Cominform stands for the Communist Information Bureau. The headquarters of the Cominform were initially in Belgrade. The Cominform was made up of the communist parties of USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, France, Italy and Romania. It had its own newspaper entitled For Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy.
representing around 3%, were sacked. Thousands of magistrates were also sacked in April 1945 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 43).

The policies were aimed not only at replacing high-ranking members of the political, military, and bureaucratic apparatus. They had been designed to secure a critical number of loyal agents, who through their practices would reproduce the new rules of social engagement. The numerical reduction of the armed forces and the police after the armistice, and their infiltration with agents that were sharing the same revolutionary goals, were such examples of measures aimed at enlarging the social basis of the communist network.

The discursive attribution of agency to the 'masses' by the Communist Party needed to be converted into party membership. Party membership signified increased political legitimacy in the struggle over the mechanisms of institutional representation. It meant securing discursively and formally a large basis for reproductive agency. The newly created Guards of Patriotic Defence served as a new instrument of coercion in the urban areas, especially in factories where workers rallied around the constitutional order represented by the constitutional monarchy (Tismaneanu, 2003). The king and the members of the Liberal and the Peasants parties constituted the reference actors enforcing and protecting the constitutional order.178

As discussed in the previous part, the predominantly agrarian population fulfilled reproductive agency. The strategies pursued had to maintain the ties with this

178 For instance, in November 1945, pro-monarchy demonstrations took place in Bucharest. Since the appointment of the new government, in which traditional parties did not occupy governmental positions, the King had refused to counter-sign and pass legislation. The royal strike ended in January 1946, after the Groza's government's agreement to give two Ministerial positions (without portfolio) to the opposition parties.
population while at the same time to re-frame the basis of the relationship. The land reform passed by the Groza government in March 1945 was one such strategy.\textsuperscript{179}

The alliance with Groza’s Ploughmen’s Front provided the Communist party with access to the poor rural population. The communists recruited the members of the legionary movement after 1944, which was well represented locally and skilful in mobilising the agrarian population (C. A. Stoica, 2005, p. 694). The organisational resources and skills of the Iron Guard were put to work to strengthen the ranks of the communist network, although the discursive content changed to reflect the type of social relations the communist favoured. For instance, the discourse did not promote religion anymore as a binding ideational resource, but, rather, social equality. As a result of these moves, the membership of the Communist Party increased from around 1,000 in 1945 to 720,000 by the end of 1946 (C. A. Stoica, 2005, p. 693).

By the end of 1947, when the communists won the elections\textsuperscript{180} of November 9, political practices were intended to create a uniform, self-enclosed, and well-defined inside and a centralised decision-making institutional structure. However, the need for repressive political action is suggestive of the fact that the Romanian state was not constituted as a coherent entity.

As we have seen, policies had targeted until then individuals in high-ranking positions such as politicians, military and magistrates, who had been sacked, marginalised, or imprisoned. The formal social relations and the social institutions had to be aligned in order to inform the practices of a larger number of agents than the ones at the centre of the formal network. The new Constitution of 1948 brought

\textsuperscript{179} The collectivisation of land that followed in 1949 annulled this measure.

\textsuperscript{180} The results were rigged. The UK recognised the outcome of the elections while the USA did not (Deletant, 1999b, p. 57). The limited recognition offered hoped to the pro-monarchy supporters that the change may not be irreversible.
about the de facto de-legitimation of the extant institutional settings as well as of the agents whose practices these relations enabled. Social networks enabled by and supportive of the principles of the constitutional monarchy were marginalised. However, they continued to constitute the Romanian state. By their participation in activities that challenged the new Constitution, they contributed to the constitution of the Romanian state as a contradictory actor. The Liberal and the Peasants parties alongside the monarch were involved in rallying the support from local movements\(^{181}\) and Western states.

Political action in this period is illustrative of the tendency to institutionalise socialist social relations so that they informed all social practices. The measures of the new government targeted all spheres of social life in order to diminish the potential for multiple social relations and practices, such as liberal or social democratic, to constitute the state. The organisation of different domains of activity, such as agriculture, industry, education, economy, law, was officially founded upon ‘internationalist’ Marxist-Leninist principles. Uniformity could be achieved if individuals belonged to only one social space or network. The communists understood, in other words, the value of transnational networks as they themselves were benefiting from such networks. As such, they aimed to limit the possibilities of other social agents to draw on alternative ideational and material resources than those legitimised by the formal space. A new law of Religious Confessions, passed on August 4, 1948, brought religion, an ideational resource that informed the identity of a large part of the population, under state purview. The law placed the Ministry of Cults in charge of giving legal recognition to religious cults. The Greek Catholic church was disbanded and its assets confiscated due to its organisational links to the Papacy. The educational system was also restructuring following the same logic. New

\(^{181}\)On the local opposition, armed and civilian, see (Deletant, 1999a).
textbooks were written in which the message was the inevitability of the change that had occurred. Faculty were dismissed and imprisoned and foreign schools and religious schools were closed. Trade unions were re-organised to secure the allegiance of their members to the newly formalised socialist relations (Deletant, 1999a).

On the other hand, the Constitution acknowledged and guaranteed, for instance, the freedom of speech, press, assembly, public demonstration, worship and the right to own private property. It was also set to guarantee ‘the protection of the person from arbitrary arrest, the inviolability of the home, and the secrecy of the mail’ (S. Stoica, 2007). The constitutional arrangement created at least formally the potential of individuals not only to reproduce but also to challenge social relations by means of demonstration and freedom of speech. It allowed agents to have access to symbolic-material resources. The rights inscribed in the fundamental law of the state created discursively and formally a different type of state – one to which the Western states could relate.

Another set of laws circumscribed these provisions. For example, the right to private ownership of property was guaranteed with the caveat that the means of production, industry, banks and insurance companies could be nationalised when the ‘general interest’ required. The General National Assembly passed a law less than two months after the adoption of the constitution that invoked this exception to nationalise all business. In the same way, demonstrations or public and private organisations that were deemed ‘fascist or anti-democratic’ in character were prohibited. The Secret Police, Securitatea, was given discretionary powers to decide upon such issues.
Such provisions achieved several things. They stripped not only the working class itself, but also other professional categories, of any real formal agential potential to create change or challenge social relations and institutional practices. The goal itself was not different from the pre-war times, yet the logic underpinning this type of agency was poles apart. Limiting access to resources rather than increasing it represented the means by which reproduction of the formal institutions was to be ensured.

I have argued thus far that multiple social relations and practices constituted the Romanian state. The social networks enabled by such relations made the inside-outside distinction difficult to discern. Characterising, for instance, a decision as ‘internal’ may face challenges in the light of the difficulty of settling whether specific agents or even institutions could be considered as being part of the ‘inside’ or the ‘outside’ of the state. If one takes, for instance, the Allied High Commission in Romania, the case can also be made that it was constitutive of the state rather than ‘hijacking’ the state.\textsuperscript{182} The Soviet Councillors appointed by the High Commander of the Allied forces to serve in the ministerial institutions were territorially inside the Romanian state, sharing the ideational space with the Romanian communists and participating in the decision-making process. Similar questions can be raised about the leadership of the Secret Police, which was made up of individuals that were also part of the Soviet security police.

Individuals were nodes in multiple networks. If one looks at the position of the Romanian Communists, in different social networks, the relationship between the

\textsuperscript{182} I have already shown that the view of the Romanian communists as instruments in the hands of the Soviets or as actors outside the state is not supported by the political process prior to and post 1944.
outside and inside becomes even fuzzier. In the case of the Romanian Communist Party members, the difficulty is not removed by their having Romanian citizenship. It is interesting to note that the term ‘Moscow’ that historians use elliptically to refer to the USSR or Stalin or the Soviet Communist Party, could also be used to include members of the Romanian Communist Party with strong affiliations with Moscow. The faction of the party led by Ana Pauker operated from Moscow during the war was dubbed the ‘Moscow Bureau’. She was a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and head of the External Bureau of the Romanian Communist Party and future Foreign Minister of Romania from 1947. Emil Bodnaras is another example. He was a high profile Romanian communist trusted by Dej. He was not only a member of the Political Bureau of the Romanian Communist Party and vice-president of the Council of Ministers and minister of the Military Forces, but also a member of the Soviet Special Military Services (Retegan, 2000, p. 19). These highly ranking political leaders were drawing on resources and networks of power such as the Cominform or the Soviet state that were territorially located outside the geographical boundaries.

To conclude, the processes taking place after the 1947 elections could be taken to suggest tendencies towards the creation of a uniform social space underpinned by socialist relations. Social action was directed to create stable boundaries around what was ‘inside’ and what should stay ‘outside’. All the above social institutions, from schools to factories, theatres, press, bureaucracy, secret service, and so forth were considered important to sustain a certain vision of the state, which was the socialist

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183 Deletant details the type of communist networks that emerged after the coup, which could not be divided by the formal ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ distinction. Pauker of the ‘Soviet’ faction was willing to ally with traditional parties while communists of the ‘home’ faction, such as Dej, draw more extensively upon the ‘external’ networks. Deletant uses this historical data to make an argument regarding the rise to the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party of Gh. Dej (Deletant, 1999a).
state. However, the section has also suggested such practices made evident that alternative social spaces still existed. These spaces coalesced around the values that a constitutional monarchy would promote, such as free elections, separation of powers, and private property. The Liberal and the Peasants parties, and their broader social networks, embodied these relations through their opposition and activities. The section has also argued that a claim regarding the existence of a single “inside” with clear boundaries would be difficult to support in the light of the existence of the different social networks that constituted the state.

Conclusion

The processes taking place during regime change help us illustrate the manner in which states are constituted as actors. Human agents have been salient in such processes in their roles of reproductive, challenging and transformative agents. As this chapter has shown, a swift change in social practices, institutions, and social relations more broadly could have only occurred when human agents that were informing previous social relations were physically annihilated, marginalised, or removed from the state’s constitutive institutions. Once key social institutions constituting the state, such as the governmental ones, were populated with communists, the changes could proceed from the centre of the organisational structure. The new principles shaped agents’ capabilities and potentialities in such ways that only reproductive practices were deemed legitimate. Furthermore, reproductive agency experienced a shift from the pre-war to the post-war years in that, access to resources, as a premise for consent, was replaced by limiting such access in order to secure reproduction.
This chapter has raised questions about the historical interpretations of the events occurring during and after the WW2. The real cause or agent of change, which culminated with the abolition of the monarchy and declaration of the republic on 30 December 1947, was identified in the literature as being the Soviet Union and/or Stalin. The argument made in this chapter suggested that processes prior to 1944 were important for understanding the potential for action after the coup. My argument has shown that other factors, such as international bargaining and the role of communist networks, were also important. From the perspective of the argument made in this chapter, it is difficult to argue for a view of the Romanian state as a static object or entity. State agency was being exercised and changing in the mere act of declaring Romania a republic in 1947. Agents sustaining and defending a liberal parliamentary regime, for example, found themselves confronted with a lack of resources and removed from the social institutions that enabled them as legitimate actors.

The legitimate-illegitimate boundary was blurred depending on whose perceptions were involved. For actors such as the King, the members of the Peasants and Liberal political parties, and for a larger number of agents such as university professors, priests, journalists, and peasants, the new Marxist-Leninist principles were deemed ‘outside’ of what the state was thought to be. It is from this point of view that the historical literature notes that Romania had no ‘independent’ agency to pursue its interests.

There were sufficient internal contradictions in the constitution of the state to consider the actions in relation to the USSR and the neighbouring states as both internal and external to the state, depending on which networks of relations we look
at. The Soviet army can be termed constitutive of the Romanian state as well as an external force. The Red Army was simultaneously limiting and enhancing of state agency. For instance, from the perspective of the West and the members of the Peasants and Liberal parties, the Red army constituted the Romanian state as a weak and dependent actor.

It is of course unlikely that the treaty with the USSR, signed on February 4, 1948, would have been agreed on with the previous political elite still in the main decision-making positions. At the same time, however, one needs to acknowledge that, since the communists gained power, there was a sudden change in the outlook of the state in terms of institutions, social practices and consequently in terms of interests. Other factors discussed above allowed for greater potential of action for the communist networks. The fact there was no consensus on what those interests were only illustrates the point that the state was not constituted in a cohesive manner.

The changes targeted not only individual agents but also more broadly institutions and social relations in which agents were to be embedded. Historians noted that the subservience to the USSR was achieved by destroying internally the ‘existing structures of society’ (Deletant, 1999b, p. 57). If this is the case, the acts of ‘subservience’ were internal to the Romanian state. Creating effects through policies should not be framed as external to the state, but rather as constitutive of the state. This is the meaning of the claim made in the previous chapters about state constitution being part of the definition of state agency.

The regime change occurring in Romania in 1989 also illustrates from a different angle the manner in which states are constituted. It is often the argument in the
‘transitional’ literature that the practices and some of the underlying principles informing state agency are reminiscent of the communist regime. This is another way of saying that over-layered social relations and practices constituted the Romanian state. A sudden regime change did formally occur. However, the removal of some of the main leaders from the state functions, together with the formal change of social relations, was not sufficient to trigger such sudden changes in political practices as it did in the period after 1944. Repression and marginalisation of a considerable number of human agents played an important role in the latter regime change. As such, after 1989 a variety of social relations embedded the actions of human agents. Human agents could be nodes in different social networks. This example also illustrates the network-like character of the state.
Chapter 7: The totalitarian state: a relational, network state: Romania (1965 – 1980s)

This chapter challenges the historical explanations regarding the constitution of the Romanian state and its agential potential internationally. The chapter is particularly important in making a fundamental point about the relational, network, and emergent character of the Romanian state between 1965 to mid 1980s. The example chosen is, as already mentioned in the rationale of the case studies, one that would counter the criteria for a ‘network’ state according to the typologies existent in the literature, such as Sørensen and Castells for instance. The Romanian state of that period is characterised by the historical literature as a highly centralised state with a leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, in control of the key decision-making positions in the state. The policy of economic autarchy and virulent nationalism would also enhance the view of the Romanian state as an entity with a well defined and unitary inside.

The chapter exposes the type of assumptions underpinning the political histories of the period. While these histories are rich in detail about the events of the two decades, the narrative style often exposes ontological and analytic preferences for pluralist or/and statist assumptions. In aiming to illustrate the theoretical points put forward in this thesis, such narratives make the work increasingly difficult. For instance, in some accounts the causality for the same action is attributed to Ceausescu and in others to the Romanian state while in others to the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). In some respects, these chapters have been like a puzzle-solving exercise. I compare different historical accounts and I additionally use the
insights of political anthropology and economics to reveal that the Romanian state was not only hierarchical and highly centralised but also networked and multiple in the agentic instantiations in relation to the same or different state or non-state actors.

7.1. Social processes and totalitarian states: networks of social relations and networks of agents

The aim of this first part is to demonstrate that, in spite of the formal highly centralised organisational structure, the Romanian state was nevertheless constituted as a network of social relations and networks of agents. The first section looks at the centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state institutions and practices. It also reflects on how these tendencies have been used to explain the constitution of the Romanian state as a certain type of actor. The next three subsections make the argument about the network nature of Romanian state. This is achieved by looking at several issues: the conceptual and factual differentiation between the party and the state and the effects of the policies of bureaucratic, political, and economic centralisation. The contributions of political anthropology, particularly the work of Katherine Verdery, which details the social practices in communist Romania, and those of economists who have written on the logic of socialist economies, are extremely useful in supporting my argument in this first part. It must be noted at this point that this section only begins to address the issue of state agency ‘internationally’ with further analysis being developed in the last section. It acts as the foundation for the second part of the chapter.
7.1.1. ‘The Party, Ceausescu, Romania’\textsuperscript{184}: Locating the discussion about Romanian state action

This section exposes the type of explanations and narratives present in the political histories regarding the Romanian state and the relationship between the state, the leader, and the party, between the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s. It also identifies pluralist and statist understandings of politics underpinning these explanations.

The institutional organisation of the Romanian state indicates that there were powerful centralising tendencies constituting the official network of the state. The General National Assembly (GNA), a single-chambered parliament, formally represented the institutional mechanism by which the ‘will’ of the people would be expressed. The GNA was the supreme organ of state power according to the Constitution of 1965 and the 1968 Administrative Laws (Nelson, July 1976, p. 658). It was intended to supervise the organisation of all other institutions. MPs were elected from mass organisations, such as the Social Unity Front\textsuperscript{185}, which was subordinated to the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).\textsuperscript{186} The GNA elected out of its members a State Council. The State Council exercised in effect legislative power throughout the year, as the assembly was not in session for most of the time. The State Council was also the main executive authority. It represented the state in international relations, it established election dates, it supervised the activities of the Council of Ministers and so forth (Verona, July 1989). The president of the State

\textsuperscript{184} This is a line from a popular Communist song.
\textsuperscript{185} The Social Unity Front was an umbrella organisation consisting of labour unions, cooperative farm organisations, youth, women’s, veterans’ and student organisations, cultural and scientific organisations and so forth. In order to be eligible to run in elections, candidates needed the approval of the front. See (Bachman, 1989).
\textsuperscript{186} It should be noted that the RCP has changed its name over the years. In 1945, it changed its name from the Communist Party of Romania to Romanian Communist Party. In 1948, it took the name ‘the Romanian Workers’ Party’. It was renamed RCP in 1965.
Council was also the head of state. The Council of Ministers was considered the main body of the state administration. Its members were appointed by the State Council if the GNA was not in session. With few exceptions, the members of the State Council and the Council of Ministers occupied senior positions in the Central Committee of the RCP. The general prerogatives of the Council of Ministers included the implementation of policies, drafting the state budget and supervising the economic development. However, specific areas of competence for each minister were not set. The creation of the institution of Presidency in 1974 led to a diminishment of prerogatives of the State Council. For instance, the President took over the supervision of the Council of Ministers, and represented the state in international affairs. The President was elected by the GNA and occupied the position of General Secretary of the RCP.

The RCP was also organised hierarchically as the state institutions were, according to the principle known as ‘democratic centralism’(Nelson, 1980). Local Party organisations were accountable to county organisations and the latter to the Central Committee of the Party in Bucharest (Stoica, 2005). According to the party statutes, the party congress, which was made up of county delegates, represented the supreme organ of the RCP. It convened at least once every five years. It elected, for instance, the General Secretary and the Central Committee. When it convened, it also sanctioned the policy proposals coming from the Central Committee. The Central Committee was in charge of setting the overall direction of the party and with policy implementation. It established party sections, which in effect duplicated

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187 Their size varied from a minimum of 3 persons to a maximum of 300 members (Stoica, 2005, p. 705).
188 The Central Committee initially elected the General Secretary of the Party, i.e. the Party leader, but, after 1969, this prerogative was taken by the party congress. This measure was to counter Soviet interference in the election of the party leader. It also made it more difficult for individuals in high-ranking positions, i.e. in the Central Committee, to topple the leader (Stoica, 2005, p. 705).
189 In 1984, the Central Committee had 265 full members.
the government ministries. Sections on agriculture, foreign policy, culture, and so forth were set up. The Central Committee also elected a Secretariat, which was to oversee the implementation of decisions. The Political Executive Committee Permanent Bureau (Politburo) was the most important body, which the Central Committee also elected from amongst the members of the Secretariat, at least according to the party statutes. The leading party members made up the Politburo. Its numbers fluctuated throughout the years from five to fifteen. The General Secretary of the Party was the head of the Secretariat and of the Politburo, and he chaired the latter. The literature notes that the programs and policies of the central organs were 'unconditionally binding on all lower organs and on individual members' (Bachman, 1989; Verona, July 1989).

Additionally, several measures reveal the centralised nature of the Romanian state and the concentration of decision-making in the 'hands of a few' (Braun, 1978, pp. 18 - 19). For instance in July 1965, an amendment to the Party statutes forbade any party member 'to hold more than one full-time post in either the party or state apparatus' (Deletant, 1999b, p. 112). This was to increase the advantage of the incumbent actors in relation to other aspiring or challenging ones. The policy was reversed by the policy of 'leadership unification' in the early 1970s which allowed accumulation of party and state positions by the same person (Bachman, 1989). It signalled a second stage in the consolidation of power by Ceausescu, after ridding himself of the opposition (Deletant, 1999b).

The accumulation of official functions that Ceausescu held is indeed striking. In brief, Ceausescu was the General Secretary of the RCP from 1965 and thus, head of the Politburo and the RCP Secretariat. From 1967 he also occupied the position of
president of the State Council, which made him officially the head of the state (Retegan, 2000, p. 58). He subsequently became President of the Republic in 1974, when the office of the president was formally set up. By 1989, he was also chairperson of the Defence Council, supreme commander of the armed forces and chairperson of the Socialist Unity Front. Another way to enhance his control over the decision-making process was by appointing members of his close and extended family to top party and state positions (Crowther, 1989, p. 211; Deletant, 1999b, p. 118). Linden, amongst others, writes that ‘[b]y the time of the 1969 party congress, Ceausescu had established himself and his own people as the dominant rulers of the party, the state, and society’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 372).

The leadership unification policy was supported by an additional package of laws passed in 1971 and 1972, such as The Law for the Protection of State Secrets and the National Defence Law. These increased the importance of Party organisations in the state decision-making process by moving institutions such as the Ministry of Interior from the purview of the Council of Ministers to the joint control by the Council and the Central Committee of the RCP. The military, for instance, had to implement both “party and state policy” rather than simply ‘state policy’ (Crowther, 1989, p. 212). The overlapping of state and party functions was to reduce, according to party ideologues, the need to negotiate differences that might appear over policies between the party and the state. The policy of ‘cadre rotation’ of 1972 meant that none of the party members or occupants of state positions could establish either enough support or party clientele or enough public support on behalf of the population. ‘[L]ong-term affiliation with any single institution’(Crowther, 1989, p. 210) prevented actors from challenging the Party leadership or from constituting potential political opposition (Deletant, 1999b, p. 119). Officially, the policy was to ‘increase individuals’
experience' with various aspects of administration by rotating them in state and party functions at intervals. This legislation constituted the bureaucratic apparatus as highly centralised and hierarchical. Its role was to reproduce the formal network by implementing the directives coming from high-ranked actors.

When the literature notes the highly hierarchical nature of the decision-making process, it not only provides useful information for understanding the organisational structure of the state, but it also uses this information to embed a certain type of explanatory claim regarding what the state is and what enables agency.

A high degree of centralisation, as well as overlap between state and party responsibilities, make many authors equate the state and the party with the leader, Ceausescu. The historical literature uses the above evidence regarding the organisational structure of the state to argue that the leader had supreme power. This is reflected in explanations of outcomes, from ideological orientations to foreign policy in general, in terms of the leader's intentionality. For instance, Ceausescu was 'the dominant actor in Romanian politics' (Crowther, 1989, pp. 209 - 210), with no opposition to challenge his position (Stoica, 2005, p. 694). The members of the Politburo were his 'yes-men' (Deletant, 1999b, p. 124). The policies of leadership unification and cadres rotation 'consolidated Ceausescu's power' (Deletant, 1999b, p. 119). Also, 'Romania's rapid economic development enabled the party leader to increase his power' (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 348). Tismaneanu writes that '[t]he Communist party was no longer an autonomous body and existed only to implement Ceausescu's most extravagant plans' (Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 86). Sowards suggests that in domestic affairs, 'Ceausescu brought the period of relaxation to an end with his July theses of 1971, in which he demanded a return to rigid ideological

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190 Ilie takes a similar position (Ilie, 1998, p. 58).
orthodoxy and reasserted the leading role of the party' (Sowards, 1996). Deletant and Tismaneanu argue that Ceausescu 'launched' the 'mini-cultural revolution' after his visit to China and North Korea in 1971 and promoted socialist realism in the cultural domain (Deletant, 1999b, p. 121; Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 86). A country study on Romania of the U.S. Library of Congress also reads that: '[a]fter his China trip [1971], Ceausescu removed Premier Maurer and thousands of managers and officials who advocated or implemented the earlier\(^{191}\) economic reform, and he replaced them with his protégés' (Bachman, 1989). Psychological factors are given important explanatory weight. The Romanian position internationally and domestically after 1968, when it opposed the Warsaw Treaty Organisation invasion of Czechoslovakia, is directly linked to Ceausescu's delusional perception of himself as an omniscient, invincible, untouchable and omnipotent leader (Retegan, 2000, p. 111).\(^{192}\) The discourse of the RCP, as well as the media discourse, does enhance such a view. Ceausescu is portrayed as a 'defender of Romania's independence and sovereignty' against the 'Soviet threat'. Discourse analysis of the documents of the time reveals that Ceausescu is given discursively the role of a 'hyper-agent', i.e. an 'initiator of actions', and the rest were agents by virtue of 'performing the action' (Ilie, 1998, p. 68).

The manner in which the evidence concerning the organisational structure of the state is used in the explanatory accounts reflects IR's statist and pluralist assumptions. First, state action is reduced to the interactions between the Party nomenklatura. Explaining state action by reference to the hierarchy of the party

\(^{191}\) My emphasis. I will return to this example below in Section 7.1.3.

\(^{192}\) 'The effect of this praise [of Romanian's FP] was disastrous in the long run, and had a share in projecting into Ceausescu's mind his own image as a strategic genius and a man capable of solving all the problems of humanity. For the simple man which Ceausescu was, all these plaudits coming from Paris, Washington, London, and other capitals might have had unusual effects on him, such as his self-evaluation as a person whose analyses were always infallible, regardless of the field' (Retegan, 2000, p. 111).
and/or the state can also suggest a statist view: the state is well defined and distinguished from the rest of the society. Linden argues for instance that:

the governing dynamics in Romania at the middle of the 1970s were unquestionably top-to-bottom and centre-to-periphery. A relatively closed top party leadership, essentially those around Ceausescu, determined both the country's overall direction and the parameters of its day-to-day activities, and implemented its decisions through the party to the government and through both to the society at large (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 350).

The top-down organisational structure and decision-making process could illustrate Castells' concept of hierarchical entities. According to him, hierarchical entities are fundamentally opposed to networks due to the logic of their organisation, as lower nodes have no agency on deciding the courses of action.

As said, the literature regards the party leadership and the state as synonymous: one often finds them used interchangeably. From this conflation of what should be analytically and ontologically distinct entities, it is only a short step to assume the unitary and person-like condition of the Romanian state. For instance, Retegan writes that: 'Romania's thoughts' needed to be discovered by other states during the events leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Retegan, 2000, p. 98).

There is an assumption of a distinguishable and well-defined inside. The centralised nature of the state and the politics of nationalism constitute the evidence for such an assumption. If the state is centralised, then the state is assumed to be unitary. Romania constitutes, in this case, a good illustration for Sørensen's modern type of state in terms of its constitution and functioning internationally. 193

To conclude, this section has looked at the institutional structure of the Romanian state as well as of the RCP. It has illustrated how the historical literature uses the formal organisational structure to discuss Romanian state action. This section has

193 See section 7.2.1 for an analysis of the explanations of Romanian foreign policy provided by the historical literature.
also showed that statist and pluralist assumptions regarding the nature of the state and state action underpin the arguments of the historical literature.

7.1.2. Assessing the relationship between the state and the Party

This section looks at the party – state relationship and argues that, despite the centralising tendencies inscribed in the organisational set up of state institutions, there is evidence to support the claim that the two should be kept separate. The section also intends to show that the centralising logic of the state policies opened up the social space for informal and illicit social practices. The discussion shows that these practices created the opportunity for individuals to be more than reproductive agents.

Several issues illustrate the claim that the party networks, although central to understanding the politics of the era, maintained their distinct roles from the state. The political practices of the time could be taken as evidence for the significance of occupying positions in both state and party institutions. Access to party and state resources meant that high-ranking political actors enlarged their pool of resources and agential potential, which allowed them to decide on policies. In other words, a high-ranking position in the party needed to be complemented by a high-ranking position in the state institutions. Ousting an opponent from the senior party ranks needed to start with securing their removal from state institutions. This occurred in spite of the fact that the Politburo would often direct the ministers on the desired policy outcomes.
For instance, the position of Ministry of Internal Affairs constituted a key governmental position, due to the attributes associated with the job such as supervision and appointment of servants in the police force. The institutional position in the state hierarchy offered not only formal decision-making powers. It would have also constituted the incumbent as a hub, an individual who could rally support at different local and county party levels as well as within the bureaucratic apparatus. In 1965, the Minister of Interior, Draghici, was first voted out from his ministerial position. According to historians, this measure was intended to 'deny him his power base' (Deletant, 1999b, p. 112). Such acts represent an acknowledgement that an institutional separation between the state and the RCP in terms of responsibilities and agential potential existed.

The state and the party had been discursively constructed as distinct although complementary entities. The state for instance maintained a central role in achieving a communist social order while the party was considered a 'state organ' that 'educated, led, directed, and organised' social life (Braun, 1978, pp. 51, 53). Ceausescu, for instance, claimed that the role of the state would be augmented while the party was assigned the role to take the state into the next stage of development (Ceausescu, September 1965, p. 10). Additionally, the party had been discursively securing its legitimacy for decades by identifying with the working class. Accumulation of state and party functions was, in this light, the manner in which human agents broadened their institutional agency and secured broader ideological legitimacy. During the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1980s, there were indeed

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194 The official name of the republic was changed in 1965 from a 'People's Republic' to a 'Socialist' republic. This change of name was intended to signal the fact that the state has moved into a new stage of development.
attempts to further identify the party with the Romanian state at a discursive level\textsuperscript{195} (Ceausescu, 1982; Radulescu, March 1966, p. 12). Such a discourse was accompanied by the duplication and overlapping of responsibilities, as specified in the first section. The state maintained nevertheless an important role during this period (Braun, 1978, p. 55) in the official discourses.

The Romanian state was distinguishable from the party although it was constitutive of and constituted by the RCP. The differentiation between the state and the party was important to the relationship with the West. For example, foreign policy was a prerogative of the state and communication between the Romanian state and Western states went through state institutions, including, for instance, negotiations of money borrowing from international institutions. On the other hand, the identification between the party and the state was central to the relation with other socialist states. Socialist states also conducted relations such as exchange of diplomatic notes at the party level - through the Politburo of the respective Communist Parties (Retegan, 2000, p. 99). Such practices reproduced both the state and the party as distinct entities in spite of the discursive identification\textsuperscript{196}.

Aside from the issue of the party and state relationship, the first section discussed some of the specific policies of the state and of the party, which were meant to increase the centralisation of the decision-making process. Transformative agency for example within the Romanian state was associated with what is termed the 'centre' or the top bureaucracy, the leadership (Politburo) and the agents in high state positions. They were the ones controlling the decision-making process and the

\textsuperscript{195} Radulescu published in the newspaper of the RCP an article in which he promoted this identification of the party with the state.

\textsuperscript{196} The functioning of the Romanian state after the 1989 revolution and the formal dismantling of the RCP without the state becoming 'a collapsed' or 'failed' state is indicative of the existence of a socially complex entity that was more than the RCP.
allocation of resources. The rest of the bureaucratic apparatus was concerned with the implementation of decisions and management of the allocated resources (Campeanu, 1988, pp. 117 - 118). As mentioned, discourse analyses of the Party publications and Ceausescu's speeches reveal that semantically Ceausescu is given the role of a 'hyper-agent', i.e. an 'initiator of actions' (Ilie, 1998, pp. 63, 68).

However, these policies had more than centralising effects as intended by the centre of the formal network. The policy of cadre rotation signified indeed the formal centralisation of the political process. At the same time, it resulted in a reduction in the available time top bureaucrats in the regional and local administration had to get acquainted with their respective jobs and their institutional environment (Zhong, 2003, p. 119). It translated into a lack of coherence and urgency in the formulation and the implementation of policy and a focus on short-term achievements. Proliferation of illicit practices such as corruption, nepotism, and clientelism was closely linked to these dynamics. Such social practices enabled the discretionary powers of agents.

Discretionary powers were manifested at all levels of the bureaucratic-administrative apparatus. It meant that 'lower nodes' in the bureaucratic network constituted also illegal networks on the basis of which they acquired more agential potential than intended by the centre. Anthropological studies document the discretionary powers enabled within the networks of actors constituting the state (Ciobanu, 2004; Kideckel, May, 1982, p. 323; Sampson, 1984; Verdery, August 1991). Verdery for instance notes that 'local executors of central policy bend and redefine it in accord with their own style of leadership, their capabilities for enforcement, and so on' (Verdery, August 1991, p. 427). Policies that needed to be implemented locally...
can by 'ignored, corrupted, over-executed or otherwise, adulterated' (Verdery, 1991, p. 84).

These centralising tendencies created the potential for action of 'lower' actors. It allowed lower nodes to act and produce effects that were not intended by the 'centre' or the leader. Their practices did not challenge the socialist social relations but meant that the ability to create effects was not exclusively associated with nor explained only by reference to the centre of the formal network. Thus, while the policies and practices initiated at the top level intended to reduce the transformative potential of actors in institutional positions, the effects were not coherent and did not constitute a unitary, uniform 'inside' of the state. In fact, the discussion here shows that the Romanian state was not in practice the hierarchical entity assumed by historical accounts.

To conclude, this section has focused on the conceptual differentiation between the Communist party and the state in order to argue that state action cannot be reduced to party politics. The explanatory consequences are important in that it makes the RCP central to the state yet not synonymous. Explanations of state action should go beyond identifying the party as the cause for the position of the Romanian state in relation to specific policy goals or other actors. Keeping a focus not only on the formal design of the state but also on the informal and illicit social practices reveals an entity constituted by contradictory and overlapping facets or insides. These 'insides' inform its differentiated agential potential, as I will discuss in the second part of the chapter.
7.1.3. The consequences of economic centralisation upon state agency

This section looks at the centralising logic underpinning the economic process and its consequences for understanding the state as an actor. It constitutes a second building block for the broader argument about the network nature of the Romanian state.

Economic practices were intended to mirror and enhance the centralising tendencies of the state and top-down control over decision-making. The centre of the formal network controlled the means of production. It was regarded as a source of power.\textsuperscript{197} This is because it constituted the formal state network as the only allocator of resources. The high-ranking political actors considered the allocative capacity of the state to be relative to that of other actors. This meant that potential or actual networks of organisations had to be prevented from existing and proliferating so that 'no one else could get things done or associate for purposes other than those of the centre' (Verdery, 1991, p. 76). This is what Gross calls, for instance, a 'spoiler state' (Gross, 1989, p. 210).\textsuperscript{198} The strategies were nationalisation of means of production such as land, businesses, banks, and industry, and five-year production plans. Nationalisation prevented other 'foci of production', such as private firms, to constitute themselves as 'an alternative to the central monopoly of goods.' (Verdery, 1991, p. 76) The five-year production plans designed by the top officials in party and state institutions established the economic targets to be achieved.

\textsuperscript{197} The means of production are deemed by Verdery as a source of power (Verdery, 1991). I agree with this. However, in the light of the discussion of Chapter 5, I understand this as a formal source of power, which underpins the actions of the formal network.

\textsuperscript{198} Recall for instance Keohane and Nye's definition of the state as an organisation whose main purpose is problem-solving and its underlying goal is efficiency. States such as the Romanian one would not qualify for this definition.
The historical literature makes the point that the state as the only owner of the means of production and the only employer\textsuperscript{199} were important means of coercion of the population. They ensured the existence of the critical mass of reproductive agents, as the latter were dependent on the allocation of material resources through a top-down process. Secondly, it also enhanced the centralising tendency of the state. Reproductive agency was the basis for the coherence of political space and reproduction of centralised decision-making. It supported the historical arguments that identified the leader as the cause of state action. It supported the arguments that viewed the state as unitary in its exercise of agency.

I use the writings of economists to argue that the economic and political practices of the Romanian state resulted not only in centralisation but also in a weakening of the agential potential of the centre of the formal state network. The analyses in the economics literature unveil the contradictory effects of the centralising economic logic of the state, which was emerging out of the socialist social relations. The Romanian state did not have the same means as capitalist ones to discipline labour by ‘firings, lockouts, unemployment, bankruptcies’ (Verdery, 1991, p. 85). There were no financial penalties for economic units if they did not achieve their targets, or more broadly, for inefficiency. This is what economists call ‘soft budget constrains’, i.e. a reliance on the state institutions such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance to bail out underperforming economic firms (Kornai, July 1979).

Furthermore, the growth targets set in the five-year plans reflected the assumption that an economy underpinned by socialist relations of production can only expand.

\textsuperscript{199} This understanding by the centre came with a policy of over-employment in the state institutions. The over-employment reflected in turn a zero-unemployment target set by the centre. It meant that responsibilities were not only multiplied but also downsized in order to accommodate a larger number of individuals.
The economists Bauer and Kornai argue that the expansionist tendencies of socialist economies are generated not only from the top, through the growth-oriented five-year plans, but also from below (Kornai, July 1979, pp. 801, 814). The expansionist drive from below means that nodes at lower levels of the production process consistently overstate the material and investment needs for production (Kornai, 1992). This is due to several overlapping conditions: firstly, economic managers who were in charge of implementing and achieving the five-year plan were aware of the possible consequences in case of failure to achieve targets (Verdery, 1991, p. 81); and secondly, it was evident that the allocation of resources from the centre was a zero-sum game. That is to say that the pool of resources was limited, and all allocation occurred at the expense of someone else’s access to resources. The focus of individuals in managerial jobs was on inputs or their ability to draw resources rather than outputs or production results. Thirdly, the soft budgetary constraints, which did not allow managers to focus on efficiency, also contributed to the expansionist tendency. The social practices enabling an expansionist economic drive from ‘below’ were also enhancing and being enhanced by the effects of the policies discussed in the previous section regarding the overlapping and the multiplication of responsibilities.

The consequences of the overstatement of material and production needs corroborated by the false reporting of targets are salient for understanding the agential potential of the state. Such processes illustrate the fundamental reliance of the centre of the formal network (central planners) upon the lower nodes for information about the actual costs of production figures in order to devise the next five-year plans (Verdery, 1991, p. 84, August 1991, p. 426). Thus, economic managers and other technocrats may not have had direct control over the policy
plans, yet, their actions and practices have been constitutive of such plans. The state was constituted by contradictory tendencies emerging from the interaction between the top-down centralising practices and the practices of 'lower' nodes in managerial and administrative positions. Such tendencies are important for the constitution of the Romanian state as an actor internationally, as the second part of the chapter discusses. It allows for acknowledgement of the differentiated agential potential of the Romanian state.

In the light of the above, the claim that the goals and policies of the Romanian state could be explained by reference to the leader or the centre becomes untenable. The approach I have suggested allows me to explain the specific agential powers of the Romanian state without simplistically attributing to the leader each single action. By integrating Ceausescu's action\textsuperscript{200} within the analysis undertaken so far in this section, it becomes plausible to make a more complex argument when explaining the firing for instance of 'thousands of managers' responsible for proposing a revision of the centralising policies. The firing of the 'thousands of managers' can be framed as the outcome of potentialities existent in the networks constituting the state. There was a tendency towards reproducing the centralising measures as they enabled practices out of which lower nodes could benefit despite the formal dependent relation on the centre. This met with Ceausescu's preference for even greater control over decision-making and planning activities. The explanations that over-emphasise the leader as the causal agent of economic and political policies such as firing of managers, the over-industrialisation and so forth, miss important processes such as

\textsuperscript{200} This type of argument should not be read as an exoneration of Ceausescu's role in the reproduction of the political regime of the time. I accept that based on such a view of the state, new questions can be asked about the type of responsibility associated with individuals and states. This however constitutes the subject of another thesis altogether.
the ones just mentioned. State agency is thus placed in the practices of networks rather than with one person or a static centre.

This section has discussed the implications that centralising tendencies manifesting themselves in the economic process have for understanding the constitution of the Romanian state as an actor. It showed that overlapping networks of social practices in fact constituted the Romanian state. These practices reproduced the centralising logic of the organisational structure. At the same time, the illegitimate and informal practices countered the effects of that logic. The argument also re-shifted the focus of explanations from the leader or the centre to the networks of social relations constituting the state.

7.1.4. Ideational resources: not top down or nationally bounded

The focus of this section is on symbolic-ideational resources: the national idea and Marxism-Leninism. The aim is to show that the process of creating a unifying identity was not top-down nor confined to ‘national’ boundaries. This section illustrates the relational aspect of meaning production. In doing so, it casts further doubt on explanations framed exclusively in terms of the leader’s role due to his megalomaniac drive.

The national idea, which constituted an important ideational resource before 1945, was temporarily marginalised during the process of exclusion from the formal networks of the political actors such as the Liberals, the Peasants, and the Iron Guard. The discourse on the national idea gained ideational ground in formally
defining the state from the 1960s onwards. This process was the outcome of a synchronisation of processes taking place within different networks.

The discourse aimed at creating a homogenous inside, which was based on affiliation to a common past, traditions and to common ideological ideals and projects such as the communist society. It constituted a resource that the centre of the formal state network could use in order to deter the coagulation of challenging networks to the formal one. Reproductive agency was enabled by such resources rather than by financial incentives (Skinner & Winckler, 1969; Verdery, 1991, pp. 85 - 86). Alongside the bureaucratic and economic centralisation, it was a means to reproduce and maintain a highly centralised decision-making structure. Ideological debates at the party level about the relationship between workers and intellectuals resulted in a change in the party membership policy. It allowed intellectuals, formerly labelled as bourgeois, to become party members (Jowitt, 1987, p. 316; Stoica, 2005, p. 691). Such a measure can be considered an important catalyst in the revival of the discourse on the national idea. This is because it legitimised, at least formally, intellectuals participating in political life, even if many did not become party members.201 It enabled the creation of alliances between factions of the party and cultural elites (Verdery, August 1991, p. 429).

Romanian nationalism, that is, the discourse of independence and emphasis on the national idea, was the result of relational practices. The reconciliation of Marxist ideas about the leading role of the working class, and the nationalistic ones, which based the legitimacy of the state and the party on identification with the entire

201 Verdery draws on Nancy Heer's book (Heer, 1971) to argue that there is no simple dividing line between the party and the scholars. They do not endorse oppositions such as between 'intellectuals' and 'the Party' or between 'government ideologists' and 'dissidents' although Verdery admits that 'on the surface, the politicization of culture makes it look as if those who defend their cultural authority are doing so from a dissident position' (Verdery, 1991, p. 92).
society, was not an exclusively 'internal' process. It did build on tendencies extant for further centralisation. However, it also resonated with changes in the ideational resources constituting to different degrees other Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the USSR (Jowitt, 1987, p. 316). A variety of political processes associated with different states in the region weakened the internationalist Marxist-Leninist arguments, which emphasised the need for homogenous ideational resources and similarity in policies in the socialist bloc. The internationalist ideas that focused on the unity of socialist states were being replaced with an ideological emphasis on regime individuality within the bloc (Jowitt, 1970, p. 38, 1987, p. 315).

Two main directions of the discourse on the national idea were evident: one that differentiated between the party, the nation and the state and a second one that superimposed the three (Verdery, 1991, p. 119). The latter emerged as dominant. Verdery's study on the production of the national idea shows that Ceausescu was not controlling the meanings of the ideational resources. The high-ranking politicians 'struggled to maintain the initiative in the use of this rhetoric' (Verdery, 1991, p. 125). While the leadership 'authorised the language', it did not have the control from the top over the meanings of symbolic production (Verdery, 1991, p. 122). Scholars from within or outside the RCP were better equipped to initiate discussions and thus shape the ideational resources constituting the state (Verdery, 1991, p. 91). Their actions were not only a contest over the authoritative sources of knowledge but also a contest over resource allocation, as the cultural domain was also dependent on the state for funding (Verdery, 1991, p. 96). The competition over the allocation of material resources as discussed previously merged with the production of a type of nationalism, which stepped up the flattery and laudatory comments towards the party.
and its leader. Thus, although the national idea was not caused in any direct way by the drive for material resources, it found favourable ground in economic and social practices. In order to explain the emergence of Romanian nationalism and a specific type of Marxism-Leninism, a mix of ideological and material-based struggles need to be considered. This illustrates the argument made in chapter 4 about the impossibility of disentangling the causative role of material over ideational factors.

The explanation thus far has acknowledged the role of the leader in sanctioning tendencies emerging from the negotiations between networks of actors. The value added for the explanation lies in consolidating the argument about the difficulty of framing meaning production as a linear process with specific individuals or groups as the causal agents or as the result of a top-down process. The second part of the chapter will build on this understanding to discuss the issue of the ‘independent’ foreign policy of the Romanian state.

To conclude, this first part has demonstrated that the logic of the social relations underpinning the policies and institutions of the state allowed both centralising and decentralising tendencies to co-exist. The discussion has showed that managers, bureaucrats, and scholars had a peculiar kind of reproductive agency. ‘Lower’ nodes had a complex mix of reproductive and transformative agency. They did not challenge the deeper social relations and institutions on which the state was premised. However, the informal and illegal practices created effects that were not intended by the centre of the formal network.

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202 The goal of economic development, which will be discussed in the next part, enabled and was enabled by such a discourse.
Thus, in explaining and understanding Romanian state constitution and agency, one must look beyond the ‘formal’ relationships or the organisational structure of the state. The argument acknowledges the role of human agents yet focuses on the non-linearity of human action for constituting the state. In the light of this analysis, accounts that reduce explanation to interactions between the party nomenklatura or as the direct consequence of an omnipotent leader are not tenable.

Contradictory practices constituted the Romanian state as a multi-faceted entity. The homogenous symbolic-ideational space, which was premised on resources such as the national idea and Marxism-Leninism, was only one of the constitutive spaces of state agency. The social spaces ordered around social practices in the economic and the political-administrative domains were equally important for understanding the emergent agency of the state. The argument moves away (pace Wendt) from identifying a common identity, that is, a common ideational space created by the national idea, as the basis for unitary state agency.

This part has also demonstrated that totalitarian states were not constituted only by top down processes, although they were hierarchical in terms of organisation and constraining in terms of the boundaries of meaning production. Network theory maintains that network-like entities are bound together by broader principles termed the ‘logic’ of the network. It also argues that entities are networks if lower nodes have the agency to decide upon the courses of action. This is certainly the case for the Romanian state. The Romanian state was constituted as a centralised yet network actor, highly coercive yet not able to control outcomes from the top-down.
7.2. Re-framing the explanations of Romanian Foreign Policy

The second part of this chapter aims to show that Romanian state agency is emergent from visions and instantiations of multiple 'insides' and 'outsides'. More specifically, it illustrates the network and non-unitary nature of Romanian state agency in terms of actions and positioning in relation to other states and organisations. In doing so, the analysis does not claim to provide new historical insights into the events. It rather proposes a new reading that challenges the existing explanations. The first section briefly analyses the assumptions underpinning the explanations of Romanian foreign policy provided by political histories and assesses their coherence. The second section tackles the important argument about the independence or lack thereof of Romanian foreign policy. The last section of this chapter looks at two closely related foreign policy goals: economic development through industrialisation and the payment of the national debt.

7.2.1. Existing explanations: the Romanian state: unitary, maverick and/or dependent on USSR

This section assesses the historical approaches to Romanian foreign policy. It aims to unveil the internal logic of these explanations and their silent ontological assumptions. Unitary state agency internationally is invoked in all accounts. The formal organisational structure of the state is used to justify implicitly the unitary claim. Additionally, it is supported by the empirical focus on the formal discourse of sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention. The proofs lie, according to the literature, in the formal documents of the era: foreign policy manifestos, and
speeches of political actors (Ceausescu, 1969). These principles emphasising a strong inside-outside distinction are regarded as fundamentally constituting the Romanian state as a territorially and politically bounded entity.

When unitary agency is assumed within the argument about independent state agency vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the supposition is that goals and actions are internally produced and they constitute challenges to the USSR. Several examples of policy goals or state actions, which were not synchronised with the rest of the Eastern bloc or the USSR, are invoked in this context. For instance, the Romanian state recognised West Germany in 1967 and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1976 against position of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It positioned itself against intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. It criticised Israel during the 6 Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1979, while also being the only country from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. The Romanian state supported the Chinese position during the Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s. It undertook economic development through industrialisation when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or the Comecon suggested that Romania should specialise in agricultural production. In the 1970s, it pursued membership in the non-alignment movement (G77), the only other socialist country that was a member was Yugoslavia. Based on this membership, it created voting alliances in the UN with the least developed countries and the Arab world (Weiner, 1984). It was the first Eastern European state to join the International Monetary Fund (1972) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the World Bank. In 1973, it established special ties with the European Economic Community, being the first CMEA country ‘to receive

203 The aim of the CMEA was to achieve economic growth by division of labour between the participant countries.
goals and policies are not only seen as internally produced but they are also causally attributed to the leader(s). Ceausescu initiated and caused all political action. For instance, Tismaneanu writes ‘Ceausescu’s autonomist course in foreign policy (...) ensured the regime a certain authority in international affairs. Unlike other Soviet-bloc leaders, Ceausescu was not perceived as the Kremlin’s puppet, and his initiatives were often praised for their farsightedness’ (Tismaneanu, 1991, p. 85). Other historians focus on the role of material factors and suggest that the independent foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s can be regarded as a consequence of Romania’s energetic independence from the USSR (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 352; Retegan, 2000, p. 31).204 The shift here is from individuals to material explanations for the foreign policy.

On the other hand, often the same explanations place Romanian state agency as an effect of USSR foreign policy, or of Cold war politics. They equally assume unitary agency. The fundamental observation is that in spite of the self-determination discourse, the Romanian state repeatedly renewed its loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Comecon (Braun, 1978, p. xi). The loyalty was maintained discursively not only through speeches but also formally through treaties such as the treaty of friendship and mutual aid between Romania and the USSR signed on July, 8 1970 (Braun, 1978, p. 92). Thus, while states in Eastern Europe signed treaties

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204 'Energy imports in 1975 constituted 15% of Romania’s energy consumption, the lowest in Eastern Europe, and Romania was by far the largest net exporter of oil and natural gas in the region’ (Retegan, 2000, p. 31).
and had diplomatic relations, the aims of the foreign policy ‘were not “theirs”’ (Retegan, 2000, p. 17). The Romanian state seems then an entity fully determined by its environment. The degree of ‘dependence’ varies, with accounts conceding that the Romanian leader (sic!) managed to instrumentally stir political action in an act of balancing against the USSR (Braun, 1978, p. 73).

The first important issue that comes out from the reading of the political histories is the silent preference for pluralist or/statist assumptions in framing political events. Often, the causality for the same action is attributed to Ceausescu, to the Romanian state or to the Communist Party. More often than not, it is attributed to the leader. The interchangeable usage of the concept of the state and the leader comes also with the identification between individual and state instrumentality. The personhood assumption regarding the state is located also in such a move. Historical accounts themselves need to compensate for the lack of historical data. For instance, Braun writes: ‘It is not clear whether the main impetus for such action [tightening domestic control in 1971] was concern by Ceausescu to prevent events from getting out of control205 or whether it was a result of attempts to attenuate Soviet apprehensions (Braun, 1978, p. 12).’ He concludes by emphasising the dependency on USSR and Ceausescu’s role in achieving a balance between the domestic and USSR’s needs (Braun, 1978, p. 73). Such moves suggest that implicit analytical and ontological assumptions about how political action occurs become the organising principles of the available data.

Lastly, there is a central unresolved question regarding the nature of the Romanian state as an actor. On the one hand, the emphasis is on the centralised and hierarchical

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205 By ‘things getting out of control’ he means Ceausescu losing his control over the party and state institutions.
organisational structure and strong national ideology, which work as premises for unitary agency. This emphasis appears in all accounts. Its corollary is the supposition of internally created goals: the Romanian state is in this case a self-generating entity. Authors make the implicit assumption that there are such things as internally created aims. This also resonates with the statist assumptions that Krasner has put forward in his writings. The environment or the ‘outside’ is secondary in the process of goal definition. On the other hand, the emphasis on the dependency of the Romanian state on the USSR suggests that goals are exogenous to the Romanian state. The environment determines in this instance the orientation of foreign policy.

To conclude, this first section has critically reviewed the type of explanations of Romanian foreign policy and suggested the silent inconsistencies present in the texts.

7.2.2. The issue of ‘independent’ foreign policy

This section re-frames the answer provided by the political histories to the question of whether Romanian foreign policy can be termed ‘independent’. It aims to embed the explanation in a relational framework while also pointing to the empirical elements that sustain such an endeavour. It does this by building on previous analysis in the first part of the chapter. The section also raises questions regarding the necessity or the relevance of focusing on independence vs. dependence in explanations of Romanian state action. Based on the analysis of ideational resources in the first part, I argue here that the focus of explanations on independence vs. dependence is misguided.
The independence discourse had a constitutive role in Romanian foreign policy. For the Romanian politicians, terming the foreign policy goals and the policies of the state as ‘independent’ constituted the formal network as legitimate. For instance, the party membership increased after the refusal of the Romanian state to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The ‘USSR as a threat’ to the Romanian state worked as a central discursive resource for the formal network of the state and for the RCP. The RCP was instrumental in reproducing the discourse and keeping the threat alive (Korkut, 2006, p. 149). For the policy makers of other states such a perception was important for shaping the policy goals of their respective states in relation to the Romanian ones. A claim and/or act of ‘independence’ (not necessarily both) by Eastern European states constituted the ‘socialist camp’ as polycentric. These were signs that the Eastern bloc was not monolithic and subordinated to the USSR.

At the same time, there was ideological proximity and affinities between Eastern European states in terms of the socialist relations underpinning their economic and political organisation. The formal documents acknowledge the role of Marxist-Leninist principles in guiding foreign policy. I have already shown that the national idea, i.e. the type of nationalism developed in Romania, was reflective of social processes and tendencies that were not exclusively ‘internal’ to the state. The particularistic foreign policy can be linked to changes in the ideational resources constituting to different degrees other Eastern European states. The internationalist ideas that focused on the unity of socialist states co-existed with the ideological emphasis on regime individuality within the bloc.
While the foreign policy goals were particular to the Romanian state, political processes that transgressed the territorial and the legal inside-outside boundary enabled their emergence. These ideas were as argued emergent from transactions between different networks of social actors – not necessarily the formal centre of decision-making. In this light, the Romanian state did not act ‘against’ the USSR - i.e. not in the sense that there was a pre-constituted problem-solving ‘self’ that reacted to the USSR - since the action was premised on a relational ‘self’.

In 1967, for example, the Romanian state recognised West Germany. It also maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Israel when the USSR and other Eastern European states had severed them as a form of protest against Israel’s Six Days War. Ceausescu, as president, and Gheorghe Maurer, the prime-minister, took turns in criticising the USSR for putting pressure on the socialist states to conform with USSR policies. They also took turns in expressing the friendship that existed between the two states due to the common Marxist-Leninist principles that organised their states. Historians note the close relationship between the two men, Ceausescu and Maurer, and conclude that it is likely that they staged it in order to make ‘less clearly identifiable the target’ against whom the Soviets could have taken action. The Romanian position is explained in terms of the leader’s instrumentality, i.e. in terms of Ceausescu’s desire to maintain power and fear that he would be replaced by other more loyal politicians to the USSR (Braun, 1978, p. 23).

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206 Braun’s phrasing is: ‘Ceausescu appeared vulnerable’ because of these actions (Braun, 1978, p. 23).
207 On May 7, 1967, it was Ceausescu criticising the USSR and on the 8th it was Maurer taking the ‘soft line’. Afterwards, on July 24, in a speech in front of the GNA, Ceausescu expressed the close affiliation between the two states while Maurer criticised the Soviet FP on 25th. See (Braun, 1978, p. 23). Robert S. McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, also recalls a similar instance at the verge of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the relations between the USSR and the USA. McNamara recalls that within the space of an hour, the Soviet administration sent two contradictory messages (both signed ‘Khurshchev’) regarding the consequences of USA action against USSR. One note was threatening and the other reconciliatory. ("The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara," 2003)
These are plausible conditions for action, although documentary evidence for such an explanation is missing. This represents another instance of silent preference for state action in terms of leaders’ actions. The reasons for action invoked above cannot be held as being the necessary nor sufficient factors in explaining Romanian state action in relation to the USSR. This is because one could simultaneously argue that removing two instead of one politician would not have proven a more difficult problem for the USSR.

The two positions instantiated in the speeches of both leaders are however revealing about the extant ideational resources constituting the Romanian state. Nationalism and internationalism informed the formal social space. They enabled opposing reactions and positions of the Romanian state internationally. Leaders sanctioned such meanings but did not control their production as argued in the previous part of the chapter. National ideas and Marxist-Leninist ideas were coexisting and they constituted the formal social space. These ideas informed the agential potential of leaders to act as they did in the example above. In other words, goals and policies, as well as state actions, were emergent from complex processes non-reducible to human agents. Such a conclusion does not reject the role of the leader or negotiator for understanding state action, but provides a deeper understanding of social action. This is pace Putman, Katzenstein, Krasner who suggest that the personal desire for power and the domestic constraints of the party are the key determinants in explaining his/her actions.

Moreover, treating the Soviet state as unitary is also questionable. Although there is no space to explore this in detail, there is evidence in the historical literature to
suggest otherwise. For instance, there were different military options put forward by
the Soviet military, which varied in their attitudes and strategies towards the
Romanian state from interventionist to more ‘laissez-faire’ (Braun, 1978, p. 94).  
These attitudes matched the different ideational interpretations of Marxism-
Internationalism.

In conclusion, explanations regarding the nature of Romanian foreign policy should
aim to integrate broader social processes, which may not be actively invoked by
political actors as reasons for acting. Focusing upon the personal reasons leaders
might have for acting leaves only partially answered the question of what facilitated
and constituted Romanian state agency in relation to ‘foreign’ others.

It must be said that for each of the above positions of the Romanian state
internationally mentioned at the beginning of Part 1, a detailed and thorough analysis
would be needed to appropriately and accurately show the processes behind each of
the stands. In what follows, I will discuss these questions in relation to the goal of
economic development through industrialisation and the goal of debt payment.

7.2.3. Industrialisation and debt payment as ‘independent’ foreign
policy goals

The claim in this section is that the foreign policy goals of the Romanian state were
emergent from the confluence of socialist and capitalist social practices and social
relations, which involved intertwined symbolic-material processes. These social

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208 Braun writes that ‘Romania was faced with both tolerant and intolerant influential Soviet military
leaders.'
spaces constituted the Romanian state as an actor with differentiated agential potential. This section specifically discusses industrialisation as the main foreign policy goal of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s and the debt payment as the goal of the 1980s.

**Economic development through industrialisation**

Economic development through industrialisation was one of the general ‘foreign’ policy goals that the Romanian state pursued during the period in question from the 1960s until the 1980s. This policy goal is regarded by the historical literature as a ‘challenge’ to the USSR mostly because the USSR was the driving engine of the Comecon. The CMEA, the socialist equivalent of a common market, was based on the principle of ‘international division of labour’.\(^{209}\) According to this division of labour, Romania was to become a prime exporter of agricultural products. The goal was also seen as a means for Ceausescu to increase his legitimacy (Linden, Spring 1986).

Industrialisation was one of the corner tenets of socialist principles. It not only meant economic material development but it was also intended to secure the reproduction of a socialist state. The policy strengthened the reproduction of a socialist state because it resulted in an increase in the number of workers.\(^{210}\) This explains the interest of the formal network in pursuing such a goal. Additionally, the emergent nationalism and version of Marxism-Leninism in the 1960s incorporated

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\(^{209}\) Khrushchev launched this plan in 1962 but the plan never achieved implementation.

\(^{210}\) This was important since the working class was formally regarded as the avant-garde force in the process of achieving a communist society.
industrialisation as a matter of social and national development as well as an essential condition for the stability of the socialist bloc.

Industrialisation and increased production in manufactured goods was also a way to increase the pool of material resources that the centre of the formal network could dispose of. This is because manufactured goods offered a better return than agricultural products. The social practices and policies portrayed in the first part, such as overestimation of production and needs, cadre rotation, upward revision of five-year plans by the centre, were fuelling the need to pursue further industrialisation.

Industrialisation, as an independent policy goal against the Comecon suggestions, resulted in a favourable relationship with Western governments and banks. The pursuit of this goal could be regarded as one of the conditions for a positive relationship with the West. During these years, the Romanian state became a member of international financial institutions. At the same time, industrialisation as a foreign policy goal was enabled by other factors such as détente, the West German Ostpolitik and the favourable global economic environment (Braun, 1978). Access to Western financial and technological markets was central to pursing such a goal, as industrialisation required policies of investment of capital and technology. Such trends were enhanced by the social processes and practices discussed above, such as overestimation of needs, upward revision of five-year plans and so forth. Industrialisation was both an outcome of Romanian state action, but also a premise that enabled good relationships with the West, the relationship being central to the pursuit of the goal.
Western capital was forecasted to contribute fourteen percent or 3 billion dollars to the five year investment plan of 1971 – 1975 (Braun, 1978, p. 26). The favourable loans from the World Bank and IMF and the commercial and governmental loans financed the trade deficit\(^\text{211}\) and the investment plans (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 354). The trade with capitalist countries exceeded by 1974 the trade with the countries of the Comecon (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 360). They reflected and produced at the same time the Romanian state as economically strong and as a politically reliable partner.

The circular logic of keeping the balance of trade positive or close to zero, that is, exports at least equal to imports, stimulated industrialisation. Borrowing money in the pursuit of industrialisation meant that exports needed to increase for two reasons: keeping a positive balance of trade and getting the hard currency needed to repay loans. In its turn, export capacity was to be achieved through excessively increasing the oil-refining capacity, which then fed the necessity to import higher quantities of crude oil. More foreign loans were needed to pay for the imports. Since 1970, Romania became a net importer for instance of crude oil from the Arab world and Iran (Braun, 1978, pp. 27 - 28). Each of these conditions was reinforcing each other in feedback loops. In this light, although the decisions to increase oil refinery capacity is attributed to Ceausescu, the logic of economic processes seems to suggest that the Romanian state’s foreign policy goal was emergent out of the relationship between socialist and capitalist social relations and practices. These relations and practices are constitutive social spaces of the Romanian foreign policy goals.

\(^{211}\) By 1978, the trade deficit with the least developed countries was 600 million dollars and 800 million dollars with Western states. (Linden, Spring 1986)
The debt payment – the policy goal of the 1980s

Paying the debt became the new foreign policy goal of the Romanian state from the 1980s onwards. The industrialisation policy, as an expression of economic development, was however, not abandoned (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 362). Paying the debt was a decision attributed to Ceausescu. Ceausescu's perceptions of the Romanian position after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, for instance, were given central stage in explaining the policies. Linden writes that the 'effects of the [1973] crisis were not enough to “shake” Ceausescu' (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 372).

This section looks at the mechanisms that triggered the change in foreign policy goals and the consequences of pursuing such a goal for the position of the Romanian state internationally. In doing so, it challenges the over-emphasis on leaders as well as the over-emphasis on the structure of world economy as exclusive explanations for the position of the Romanian state.

The prognosis of growth in the five-year plan of 1976-80 was dissociated from the economic recession tendencies felt in Western Europe after the first oil shock. The fact that international lenders continued to lend money to the Romanian state and oil suppliers, especially Iran, continued to sell, contributed to the plan of 1976-80.\footnote{Iran was Romania's main oil supplier. The situation changed after 1979, with the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war (1980 - 1988). The immediate and long-term consequence of those events was the reduction of oil exports towards Romania due to inconstant levels of production. The oil from other markets was very expensive (Deletant, 1999b: 125).} Romania had also just received ‘the most favoured nation status’ in 1975 from the USA (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 361). It is worth restating here two things. Firstly, that the plan was the result of more than top-down decision-making, as demonstrated in the first part of the chapter. Secondly, that industrialisation as a goal worth pursing
was not only an outcome of the relationship with the West but also a condition for action. It constituted the Romanian state as a reliable actor that could sustain such development.

Repaying the hard currency loans, which sponsored the industrialisation plans – prior to the decision to make the debt payment central to foreign policy – had not been achievable. Repayment of the loans was dependent on high exports. However, exports were low due to several reasons such as the reduced consumption in the West and least developed countries after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises; the reduced productivity of Romanian labour by the early 1980s (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 362); and the poor quality of Romanian products (Verdery, 1991, p. 82). The quality of the products was due to the reduced investment on behalf of the centre, the concomitant waste of resources in the production process and reduced import of technology from the West. Since exports were low due to these conditions, then imports had to be kept low for the sake of the balance of trade. Keeping imports low exacerbated the problem of production and the quality of products and the ability to obtain hard currency. The manner in which these factors fed back and forward into each other illustrates the non-linear feature of social action.

By 1981, the Romanian state accumulated a foreign debt of 10.5 billion dollars, of which 10 billion dollars were owed in hard currency (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 367). In 1982 and 1983, the Romanian state agreed on rescheduling its loans from foreign banks and governments. The debt repayment had become a formal foreign policy goal. The payment of the debt was to be achieved through the reduction of imports, the reduction of domestic consumption of food, electricity, and petrol, and

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213 The debt had been 3.6 billion dollars in 1977 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 125). From 1981, the Romanian state did not take any commercial loans although it continued to borrow from the IMF and the World Bank until 1983.
redirection of goods previously meant for internal consumption towards exports (Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986).

Several factors enabled the change of the main foreign policy goal. One such factor was the inability of the state to obtain hard currency. This in itself was the result of several other processes as described above. Secondly, defaulting on the debt was not an option the Romanian state considered. Defaulting on a loan was internationally recognised as a sign of substantial weakness on behalf of a state. Such an action would have changed the premises of the relationship between the Romanian state and other states and international organisations.214

The Romanian leadership regarded the payment of the debt as a mechanism that could prevent interference in the economic policy-making of the state (see; Verdery, 1991; Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986). According to the discourse of the leadership, the Romanian state would have maintained its ability to determine internally its policies and course of action as well as its position internationally.

This links in with a third enabling condition for the shift in the policy goal: the construction of the Romanian state as a ‘developing state’. In 1976, Romania’s candidacy to G77 was accepted and it became a formal member. The historical literature identifies Ceausescu as the ‘initiator’ of the Romanian discourse against foreign capital. Linden argues that ‘Ceausescu began to see the Romanian economy as becoming hostage to the very economic forces that had helped it develop’ or ‘Ceausescu began to complain about “new forms of exploitation including those of financial capital”’ (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 375). Without going into the details of

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214 Poland announced that it may default on its foreign debt in March 1981. On the problems arising from a threat of default see (Lowenfeld, March 1988).
the politics of the G77, it is worth noting that this type of discourse was common amongst the G77 member states (Kennedy, 2006, pp. 122 - 128). It is then possible to conceive of the fact that there were more complex processes involved in such a discourse becoming predominant at the time.

Fourthly, the natural disasters of 1980 and 1981 (earthquake and floods) amplified the economic problems. They disrupted industrial production and food production and decreased the quantity exported. These contingent events made more pressing the need to change the foreign policy goal. Lastly, the existence of a critical mass of formally reproductive agents allowed the centre of the formal network to change and pursue the new goal.

After 1984, the Romanian state could have reconsidered the policy of debt payment. This is because funds became more available, especially government credits from the West, the USA included, and increasingly more from commercial banks (Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986). The explanation for the persistence of the goal of debt repayment is unanimously attributed to the leader. A study released by the U.S Department of Commerce noted that ‘part of the continuing decline in the region's [Eastern Europe’s] commercial debt is attributable to a conscious decision by some East European nations to further reduce outstanding debt levels’ (Woods & Oechsler, June 9, 1986).

The explanation provided above regarding the enabling conditions, which led to the change in the foreign policy goal, makes evident the need to see the actions of the state as more than a reflection of Ceausescu’s intentions. The persistence in pursuing the debt repayment goal was indeed sanctioned by the leadership. However, I
consider the broader social networks in which the Romanian political elite participated, such as the G77, as equally important. The relationship that enabled a position of the Romanian state as a reliable actor, which could pay the debt, was also more important to the Romanian leadership. At the same time, one has to recall that the centre of the formal network had never been seriously challenged as most citizens acted formally as reproductive agents of the social relations.

The pursuit of the debt payment goal constituted the Romanian state in two opposite ways in relation to the Western governments and banks: as a still reliable state as well as an oppressive and weak state. The position depended on the type of social relations and practices that became relevant in the relations with foreign others.

The pursuit of the debt payment goal through strategies such as limiting internal consumption and redirecting goods from the internal market towards exports made more evident the fact that the state was weak economically. Paradoxically, it was a reliable economic partner since its repayment commitments were kept. By 1984, the debt was reduced from 10.5 billion dollars to 7.5 billion dollars (Linden, Spring 1986, p. 376). Directing resources towards the payment of the debt meant that the inputs into production were drastically diminished. The allocative capacity of the centre was disrupted and so was the access of lower nodes to such resources. Even loyal networks of party members, bureaucrats and the military found it more difficult to access resources (Crowther, 1989; Stoica, 2006, p. 217). This intensified the practices of over-estimation of needs (Verdery, 1991, p. 100). The non-fulfilment of the five-year production plans brought about more top-down restrictions. For instance, workers were penalised through lower wages (Deletant, 1999b).
Terror as a practice for keeping the formal organisation of the state unchallenged was becoming more visible. Dissent became frequent – the miners strikes from 1977, 1983 and the workers strikes of 1986 and 1987 (Deletant, 1999b, p. 132). Illegal networks, from the perspective of the formal network, which Romanians from within or abroad formed, made more evident the fact that challenging practices had been constitutive of the state.\(^{215}\) The actual numbers of openly challenging actors to the formal social relations, institutions, and practices were not as high as in Poland, or as well organised. However, they were constitutive of the state in at least two ways: by virtue of the coercive and repressive practices that the state had to sustain in order to minimise their influence, and, secondly, by influencing the manner in which Western actors related to the Romanian state. Such practices acquired an important weight in defining the Romanian state and its position internationally within the context of a US foreign policy, for instance, that placed human rights at the centre of their agenda \(^{216}\) (Bachman, 1989; Pilon, June 26, 1985). It constituted the Romanian state as an oppressive state.

To conclude, the discussion of the goal of economic development through industrialisation and payment of debt aimed to provide grounds for an explanation of Romanian foreign policy that avoided the voluntarism and determinism inherent in the historical accounts. This explanation acknowledges the role of human agents and the fact that there were options available. It also acknowledges the role of broader social processes in enabling such goals and the role of contingent events. The discussion has demonstrated the relational nature of the foreign policy goal of debt

\(^{215}\) Free Europe and Voice of America were two formal institutions involved in these networks. Here the inside-outside distinction is difficult to make. These institutions, although part of the establishment of other states, were actually run by the Romanian diaspora and the contributors were often from within Romania.

\(^{216}\) This becomes more predominant during the Carter administration (1977-1981). I am not making here any claim about the coherence of this aspect of US foreign policy in terms of practice.
repayment. The potential to act of the Romanian state in a certain way was enabled by networks of social relations, practices and human agents across the domestic-international divide.

This second part of the chapter has built on the analysis of the first part to discuss the issue of the nature of Romanian foreign policy and the specific goals of industrialisation and debt payment. The first section assessed the explanations put forward by the political histories. It unveiled and questioned the logic of these explanations and their silent ontological assumptions. The second section provided an alternative position on the question of ‘independence’ of foreign policy goals by pointing to the empirical elements that could sustain such an account. The section also debated the necessity or the relevance of focusing on independence vs. dependence in explanations of Romanian state action. The final section discussed the foreign policy goal of industrialisation and the payment of the national debt. It suggested contra the accounts put forward in the literature that state action and state goals were emergent of social spaces across the domestic-international divide. It also illustrated the manner in which such social relations, practices, and specific historical contexts constituted the Romanian state as (a) differentiated actor in terms of agential potential.

Conclusion

During the period 1965 – 1980s, the centralising tendencies of the state increased through a wide range of policies and practices that affected the functioning and design of state institutions. Ideational resources – Marxist-Leninist principles and the national idea – were informing these tendencies. The formal organisational structure
of the state was set to be pyramid-like, with concentration of decision-making at the
top, and lower institutions having only reproductive or implementation functions. In
this respect, the Romanian state would fit the description of Castells' 'modern' state,
as lower nodes had formally no input into the orientation policies would take.

In the first part of the chapter, I have shown that even such states are in fact network-
like in the production of meaning, in the functioning of the administration and in the
production of material resources. In spite of the centralising organisational structure
of the state, the logic of the social relations unpinning the policies and institutions of
the state enabled several types of networks to constitute the state. When all these
aspects were taken into account, the conclusion was that totalitarian states are not
constituted only by top-down processes, even though they are hierarchical in terms
of organisation.

'Lower' nodes had an intricate mix of reproductive-transformative agency. Human
agents were subverting the agentic potentialities associated with a presumably
unified state although not directly challenging the formal network. Such practices
constituted the state as a contradictory actor in terms of agentic potentialities and
capabilities. Such processes would fit Castells' definition of a network state as lower
nodes did have the agency to act within the boundaries of the 'network logic.' A
relational approach to analysing the state broadened the understanding of the
constitution of the Romanian state as an actor internationally. It allowed the
discussion to focus on the networks of actors and relationships emerging through
practice rather than be limited to the formal organisation of the state.
The analysis has shifted the focus from individual leaders as the direct cause of events. It has argued that state actions and goals were emergent out of multiple social processes across the domestic-international divide. They were not pre-constituted in the sense of an objective national goal or one stemming from the leader. In this light, the acts of separate individuals alone could not account for the type of agentic properties the Romanian state had within specific contexts. The discussion throughout illustrated the non-linear aspect of social action. The analysis illustrated the manner in which goals and state action were not the direct consequence of one or more human agents. They were rather the consequence of overlapping social processes and practices that feed back and forward to account for the position of the state. The explanation developed in this chapter illustrates the claim that there should not be an a priori preference for inside-outside or outside-inside causal explanations, as the authors in the first chapters propose.

The understanding of goal formation in the historical accounts is underpinned by a specific understanding of instrumental rational action. A pre-constituted self that rationally takes decisions when faced with a well bounded other in order to promote the national interest and/or in order to accrue the leader’s power. My analysis raises questions also about the tenability of claiming a stable self for the state. This is because for each goal or state action the state constitutes itself at the confluence of social relations, practices, and new contexts. As such, a differentiation between role identities and a stable self (à la Wendt) become becomes difficult to sustain when aiming to explain state action. It also places action and goals as emergent from networks of social relations, practices, and historical contexts. The self, which is epitomised by the leader, the centre, or the elites, does not control nor cause in any direct sense the goals, as the explanations that favour linear causality have implied.
The explanations provided in this chapter avoid the reification of certain type of relations or elements, such as sovereignty, territory, and population while simultaneously acknowledging that practice can be reproductive. Different symbolic-ideational spaces and networks of human agents, which did not follow the legal or territorial inside-outside distinction, informed the agency of the Romanian state. Sovereignty, for instance might offer recognition of the state as an actor internationally, but it does not exclusively nor essentially enable states to act. The analysis showed that agential potential is networked and differentiated depending on the type of relations drawn on during the transactions. In this light, the ‘hypocrisy’ of the state (sic! Krasner) is in fact a way of admitting that state agency is relational: depending on the relations involved in the transactions and contexts in which transactions take place. As such, state agency can be considered non-unitary.

In the case of the Romanian state, labels such as ‘socialist’, ‘maverick’, ‘developing’, ‘dictatorship’, were not mere ‘role’ identities or instrumental ones, which are used in a controlled manner as suggested by some of the historical literature. Rather, they were examples of how the boundaries between the inside and the outside were being negotiated in relation to different or even the same ‘foreign’ others. This is because such state positions involve social relations and practices in a different manner. A focus on the ‘developing’ element would suggest, if we were to follow Sørensen’s typology, a state with low agential potential and a blurry inside-outside distinction due to the reliance on international banks and institutions. Organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, the G77 and other states were important to the process of constitution of the Romanian state. On the other hand, a ‘maverick’ position makes the distinction outside-inside more prominent and
suggests that the inside of the entity has the agency to impose its decisions in spite of the environment (Cold War) or others (USSR). The chapter has argued that even the claims of 'maverick' and independent policy should be reframed in order to acknowledge the relational aspects of state action across the inside-outside divide, despite the discourse of the Romanian state on non-intervention and sovereignty in its foreign policy documents, which emphasised this divide.

The discussion of the goal of debt payment has illustrated the manner in which multiple relations and practices constituted the Romanian state as an actor with differentiated agential potential. The decision of the leadership to pay the debt and continue doing so during the 1980s seems to illustrate the point made by Krasner about the state as an autonomous entity from other social forces, which can internally produce goals. However, the exposition of the mechanisms by which payment of debt became a foreign policy goal has revealed that goal formation was the outcome of relational practices and contingent factors. The goal repayment constituted the Romanian state as a reliable actor internationally. It also constituted the state as weak and oppressive.

By demonstrating the complexity of the social processes involved in the constitution of the Romanian state as a non-unitary actor, the analysis rejects the accounts that identify one main relationship (e.g. state-society for instance) as the cause for the agential potential of the state internationally. The analysis also suggests, pace Sørensen, that one should not associate a type of state with a specific agential potential - for instance, developing states as weak actors internationally and post-modern states as strong. States that are constituted by practices such as the reliance

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217 For instance, Gourevitch and Hobson argue that the more the links with society, the higher the agential potential internationally whereas Krasner argues the opposite.
on international funds are not exclusively weak internationally. My analysis has shown that the Romanian state found itself in both positions at the same time. It also showed that the state was in a good position to negotiate foreign loans because its ‘independent’ relationship to the USSR was also informing the relationship the West had with Romania.

The chapter has also exposed the type of assumptions underpinning the political histories of the period. While these histories are rich in detail about the events of the two decades, the narrative style often exposes ontological and analytic preferences for pluralist and statist assumptions. Thus, while my analysis makes the case indirectly for the role of historically informed analysis, it argues against the type of ontological assumptions that silently inform many historical accounts. Anthropological writings on the communist societies and economics literature have proved central in making the case for the network nature of a totalitarian modern state.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

The thesis started by claiming that the discipline of IR is arranged around the concept of the state even when theories dispute to different degrees the ontological and/or analytical utility of the concept. Postmodern writers such as Bartelson maintain the difficulty of transcending the state-centric discourse about reality. He argues, for instance, that there is an inevitable circularity when aiming to escape the representational space constituted by the state or a state-centric discourse. This is because the state has been both the starting point of any theorising, that is, the representation of political order, as well as its object of analysis. The rationalist and constructivist theories discussed in this thesis propose different working assumptions and starting points for the conceptualisation of the state and of state agency. FPA theories, for instance, emphasise the role of leaders, the elites, the bureaucracies, and interest groups in determining political outcomes. Nonetheless, explanations of international politics come with an assumption that it is states that do the acting internationally. When attributing an ontological or an analytical status to the state internationally, such theories treat states as corporate persons. Systemic theories, such as the Wendtian one, justify the personification of the state and the assumption that its agency is unitary as necessary conditions for explaining international politics. States as persons, and state agency as unitary, presupposes a conception of entities with a coherent and well-defined inside. Furthermore, the everyday language that refers to state action is evocative of such assumptions and legitimises, according to these authors, such theoretical moves. It is not difficult to find reports that resort to personifications – states feel anger, humiliation, etc, or articles that identify the
leaders (such as presidents, prime-ministers, or elites) as the main cause for a
specific action of a state internationally.

The thesis acknowledges the need to still speak of states as actors for explanatory
reasons. Nevertheless, it has posed the question of whether it is justified to explain
state action as if states are the sum of individuals, leaders, elites, top bureaucracies
or as if states are persons. This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to maintain
a concept of agency while rejecting essentialist personifying assumptions about the
state. It has argued for explanations of politics that are premised on recognition of
the different ontological status of states and human agents. It has proposed a
conception of the state as a relational and emergent network actor and a conception
of state agency that is non-unitary, differentiated, and diffused.

The argument has been built in several incremental steps. It started with an
immanent critique of various IR theories. It then suggested that the inconsistencies
identified in these theories are due to their essentialist understandings of social
entities (individuals and socially complex actors) and agency. The thesis rejected the
conceptualisations of the state that rely on translating assumptions about the
properties of biological kinds, such as unchangeable features and well determined
boundaries, to socially complex actors. It also argued against the translation of
human properties, such as unitary intentionality and agency, and emotions, to such
entities. Based on this critique, the project proposed a re-framing of such concepts
using the insights of relational sociology and process philosophy as well as the work
of Wight on agents and structures. The thesis has then contended that the concept of
a network is more appropriate to frame understandings of socially complex actors.
The analysis then showed how the language of networks and of complexity science
could be used to conceptualise the state and state agency. The case studies fulfilled two interrelated purposes. Firstly, they illustrated the manner in which the framework can be put to work to reframe the historical explanations regarding Romanian regime change and the actions of a highly centralised state. Secondly, they reinforced the theoretical claims about the network, relational and emergent features of the state.

In what follows, I will go through the steps just mentioned in order to outline the main points that the thesis has put forward.

The critique of a wide range of IR theories has revealed the internal inconsistencies of these theories as well as the mismatches between their theoretical claims and the empirical analyses of authors such as Krasner, Keohane and Nye, and Hobson. Equally important, the analysis identified the interesting avenues that were worth exploring more systematically when conceptualising the state as an actor.

The discussion has shown that, in spite of the different starting points, statist and pluralist accounts of the state end up with similar conceptualisations of the state and state agency. They also share similar problems when, for instance, they conceptualise the international and the domestic as fundamentally different and self-contained social spaces; or when they emphasise material structures as the main sources of state action. My analysis has shown, for instance, that the FPA writers start with the state as a sum of interests or by identifying the state with the negotiator or leaders, while at the same time working with a silent assumption of the state as a corporate actor. On the other hand, Krasner's statist argument relies on an assumption of states as instrumental and unified actors but his conception of the state
as a unified actor becomes problematic when applied to empirical analysis, as his own empirical analysis reveals. Keohane et al. define the state as a multi-issue entity, which allows for the inclusion of different social spaces, such as the subnational or transnational, within the explanations of state action. However, the analysis argued that the potential of a conceptualisation of the state as non-unitary in its agential potential is inconsistently pursued. For example, Keohane et al.'s understanding of the political process as bargains narrows, for instance, the understanding of the sources of state constitution and state action.

The constructivist ontology that informs the conceptualisations of the state in the third chapter allows for the integration of ideational factors within the theoretical and empirical works. History also becomes an important coordinate to frame the understandings of the state and its agency. The analysis acknowledged the theoretical potential of conceptualisations of the state that discussed state agency as varied and informed by different social spaces and the desirability of multi-causal explanations.

Some important issues have emerged out of the critical discussion of these theories. My discussion questioned, for example, the explanatory payoffs of treating states as persons endowed with a sense of self. It also problematised the analytical focus on ideal types, which enforces the traditional disjunction between the international and the domestic and the classical view of social entities. The analysis also revealed the tensions between the theoretical frameworks and the empirical analyses. It suggested, for instance, that Hobson's theoretical preference for multi-causal explanation is limited by the focus on material factors and by the over-emphasis of the state-society relationship as the main relationship informing state agency.
The analysis then demonstrated that the inconsistencies identified in the analysis of IR and FPA theories are due to an essentialist understanding of social entities, social action, and agency. Relational elements are present especially in the constructivist and historical sociological theories. My analysis showed that essentialist assumptions were responsible for making the theories internally inconsistent, since conceptualisation of entities, agency and social spaces were shifting between essentialist and relational understandings. They also accounted for the discrepancies between the conceptual frameworks and empirical analysis.

For instance, the pluralist accounts offer a conception of the state as a non-unitary actor. At the same time, the international and the domestic are seen as autonomous, self-contained and having idiosyncratic properties. As mentioned, a silent conception of state agency as unitary underwrites the explanations of international politics provided by the pluralist accounts. These two last claims are expressions of essentialist conceptions of social spaces and agency. They reinforce a claim about the state as a unitary and an autonomous actor, which contradicts their initial definition. This means that these theories do not match their conception of entities with their conceptions of social spaces and state agency. Similar scrutiny has been applied to all of the other rationalist and constructivist theories. In some cases, such as Krasner’s, the insights of the empirical argument suggests an understanding of the state as a less coherent actor with interests that are not exclusively internally constituted.

The thesis argued at this point for a shift in the ontological foundations informing the conceptualisation of social entities and agency in order to overcome the
shortcomings identified thus far. Process philosophy and relational sociology, as well as Wight's work on agents and structures, have been central to such a move.

The thesis explored the implications of a relational and processual ontology for thinking about structurally complex actors such as the state. It has discussed the notions of social relations, social selves, and agency. A relational view advocates that the constitution and potential of individuals as agents depends on the type of relations and processes within which they are engaged. Social relations are regarded as constitutive of actors rather than something in which pre-constituted agents engage. The analysis treated the subjectivity and reflexivity of individuals as socially embedded. It also argued that individuals are specific due to their subjective interpretation of social relations and positioning within social contexts. This position is different from the one that differentiates between a self or 'I' and social identities or roles because it places both within social contexts. Using the social and psychological views of the individual self, the argument suggested that unity or coherence are not natural features of individuals. It concluded that if anti-essentialist propositions apply to individuals then they should also underpin conceptualisations of structurally complex actors.

Chapter 4 proposed a view of the state as de-centred or non-unitary and without a stable self. It argued that state agency is social, relational, and non-unitary in character. It defined the state in terms of historically specific social relations, practices, and meanings. It argued that human agents reproduce, change or reshape (intentionally or not) the boundaries of the state through their practices. Social relations, which are existent and emergent through practices, inform different types of agential potential associated with states.
The thesis argued that the concept of the network allows for the conceptual acknowledgement of the relational view of social entities. It showed that the concept offers a more flexible sense of boundaries – multiple spaces (i.e. insides and outsides) and roles, and an understanding of agency that takes them into account. The argument also claimed that the concept opens up the conceptual space to acknowledge the contingencies of state forms, such as modern, post-modern, weak, or strong, and the shifting of ‘outsides’ and ‘insides’. States as networks denoted not only overlapping social relations and practices but also the networks of actors embedded simultaneously in several of these social spaces. Thus, while legally the state is unified in time and space, it exists in multiple spaces and times.

My analysis in Chapter 5 made a case, pace Castells, for states as hierarchical networks, due to the formal institutional arrangement and to the uneven access to resources and decision-making. My discussion of power as present in social relations strengthened the view of networks as hierarchical. I have argued that networks can involve impersonal authority and top-down decision making.

The thesis has contended that the conceptualisation of states as networks makes necessary the focus on multiple spaces. It also involves an understanding of individuals as nodes in more than one network. On this account, the project has argued against a strong differentiation between the inside of the entity and the environment when it comes to social networks. Such a differentiation would be entitled by the literature that considers networks to be complex systems, and, as such, autopoietic entities. The autopoiesis assumption applied to social networks would mean considering networks as self-organising and self-producing. It would
also make change internally determined and not specified by the environment (i.e. by the outside). The analysis pointed to the theoretical implications of this assumption for the reification of relations and spaces in IR theory (for example, the reification of the domestic, of the corporate self, and of the national interest). The argument suggested that the network analysis literature proposed a more adequate conception of social boundaries, focusing on the multiple social spaces constituting the network.

Chapter 6 used this new framing of the state to challenge historical accounts that present or suggest a conception of the Romanian state that can be clearly delimited, such as those that frame the narrative in terms of the Romanian state vs. the Soviets and/or the Romanian state submissive to the Soviets. The chapter on regime change illustrated the networks of social relations constituting the Romanian state formally, illicitly and informally. It identified the agential potential associated with different networks such as communists, peasants, and top politicians. It also argued that the historical information that is usually relegated to the status of ‘context’, such as illicit practices, exclusionary politics and so forth, constituted important social spaces. These social spaces informed the constitution of the state. Based on these multiple insides, the discussion also showed the differentiated agential potential of the Romanian state during the pre-1944 years. The chapter provided an explanation that did not treat the state as a taken-for-granted object, but rather as a dynamic entity.

Chapter 6 has also illustrated the difficulty of settling what constituted the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the Romanian state. The same actors belonged to Romanian as well as ‘Soviet’ institutions and social networks. I argued that characterising a decision as ‘internal’ may face challenges in the light of the difficulty of settling
whether specific agents (or even institutions) could be considered as being part of the ‘inside’ or the ‘outside’ of the state. I used the examples of the Allied High Commission in Romania, as well as of the networks in which Romanian communists were implicated. I argued, for instance, that the Allied High Commission in Romania was constitutive of the Romanian state, rather than ‘hijacking’ the state. The discussion of the issue of ‘independent’ foreign policy in Chapter 7 has made a similar point about the problematic aspect of considering the policies of the Romanian state as internally or externally produced and determined. More generally, it is likely that state action can be deemed simultaneously independent and (inter)dependent, instrumental and normative, and so forth, depending on the type of relations and processes regarded as relevant by the observer or by political actors within a specific political context.\footnote{This means, for instance, that associating ‘interdependence’ as a feature of the ‘international’ in modernity, as Keohane and Nye do, makes sense only if we refer to the intensity of transactions.}

\textit{Pace} the FPA and IR theories discussed in the thesis, I have argued that it is possible to maintain a concept of agency while rejecting essentialist personifying assumptions about the state. These latter assumptions have created internal inconsistencies in the Wendtian theory, for instance, and limited its explanatory potential. The thesis has developed an understanding of state agency that relies on constitutive and behavioural effects rather than on the existence of unitary intentionality. Having defined states as specific social relations re-produced and transformed through social practices, one can consider states as having the ability to constitute as well as to cause social action. States as causative entities means that states have the ‘capacity to do’. I have argued that the state can be an actor if agency is understood as the ability to create effects. The understanding of state agency has been broadened to incorporate a constitutive function as well.
I have argued that the blurred relationship between human agents and states as actors makes the translation of human attributes to states a likely and common move in the theories discussed. The potential similarities between persons and the state have also been enabled by the legal definition of the state. Territory, amongst other elements, has been central to the legal definition of the state as a legal person. Based on such reasoning, state agency has been considered unitary, while states have been considered coherent, person-like entities. The existence of an institutional ‘memory’, through procedures and reports, has also prompted analogies with persons. The thesis argued that, if the essentialist view of social spaces and social entities such as individuals were reconsidered, then the concept of unitary, person-like state agency would also need to be reconsidered. The language to discuss state agency would also need to be changed. As stated earlier, the initial justification for such a conceptual move was related to the explanatory limits and the internal inconsistencies created by treating states as persons, unitary in their agential potential, and in treating social spaces as self-contained and internally determined.

The thesis argued that attribution of agency to the state in virtue of its legal standing is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for understanding state action. State agency is justified aside from the legal provision by provisions that do not necessarily need to involve the same attributes (intentionality, reasoning) as a person, but rather the ability to reconstitute itself and to create effects. State agency, as defined in the thesis, can be exercised without a link between the unitary intentionality enabled by collective beliefs and by a top-down decision-making apparatus. Such a proposition is supported by the literature on types of state, which indicates that network states, informational states, or postmodern states, can indeed
be decentralised in the manner I suggest, yet still be efficient and able to act (for instance, to pursue foreign policy goals). In chapter 7, the argument has established, for instance, that the homogenous symbolic-ideational space premised on resources, such as the national idea and Marxism-Leninism, was only one of the constitutive spaces of Romanian state agency. The conceptualisation of state agency proposed here aims to maintain the ontological differentiation between individual and state agency. I argued, for instance, that state agency is socially constructed through the discursive and behavioural social practices of individual agents. I will return to this issue below.

State agency as practice dependent makes state agency reliant on human agency. Following Wight, the framework acknowledges the role of human intentionality, reflexivity, and action in reproducing and changing the social relations constituting the state and informing particular state functions, goals or actions. The thesis proposes several inter-related facets of human agency on which state agency in its constitutive and behavioural moments relies. Human agency can be constitutive, representational, and transformative of social practices and of structurally complex actors. The facets of human agency suggested in Chapter 4 can also be taken to reflect the more general claim that the human self is relational and non-unitary, i.e. it is constituted by contradictory and multiple roles. I have used the network analysis literature to enhance this understanding of human agency. My discussion in Chapter 5 took the facets of human agency as suggestive of different forms of power – institutional or more broadly structural power. The different forms of power make human agency varied and differentiated. Human agents reproduce and challenge social relations and, consequently, specific forms of power, which constitute states.
Individuals can be nodes in different social networks and, as such, acquire different agential potential. They can be simultaneously followers and brokers, or catalysts in the language of complexity science, who initiate transformation. In this context, I have also argued that individuals maintain a potential to have transformative agency even if they do not occupy formal institutional positions. State agency relies not only on the role agents take in formal institutions. Notions of reproductive, representational and transformative human agency lie at the foundation of state agency.

Both Chapter 6 and 7 have shown the importance of human agents in their roles of constitutive, representational and transformative agents to enable different social practices and relations as constitutive of the Romanians state. For example, in the period after 1944, a swift change in social practices, institutions and social relations more broadly could have not occurred without the removal or marginalisation from institutional positions of a critical mass of human actors. A considerable change in the number of agents reproducing a social-liberal state was aimed at changing the existing social practices and, consequently, enforcing new social relations. The analysis has also pointed to the qualitative changes in these types of agency. For instance, the logic underpinning reproductive agency experienced a shift from the pre-war to the post-war years. Limiting the access to resources rather than increasing it represented the means by which reproduction of the formal institutions was to be ensured. This qualitative shift was central amongst other factors to the proliferation of illicit and illegal practices and to the emergence of a particular form of transformative agency for nodes placed in lower positions in the formal organisational apparatus.
I have argued that the relationship between human agents (such as leaders, bureaucrats, politicians) and the state has remained under-explored in the FPA and IR writing discussed in the thesis. My conceptualisation of the state relies on distinguishing between individual and state agency. Properties such as intentionality and reflexivity associated with persons are dependent on practice but their existence is not practice dependent. This makes individuals as biological entities fundamentally different from states, whose existence is exclusively reliant on practice. This is an argument that was deepened by the discussion of the concept of emergence and the non-linearity of social action.

Conceptualising states as emergent entities allows the framework to consider the properties of states such as common values, goals, social roles, and interests as the result of interaction between the constitutive elements. These properties cannot be traceable to one particular element nor to all elements. This means conceptualising states as more than the sum of human agencies, although the different facets of human agency above acknowledge the role of human agents. The framework suggests that individuals, as basic nodes of a socially complex entity, have different forms of agency in virtue of the emergent whole into which they are plugged, and which they also constitute, represent and transform. Incorporating the assumption of non-linearity as a property of networks means also providing explanations of state action that are not premised on linear causation of the ‘A determines/causes B’ type. It also means acknowledging the impossibility of tracing outcomes (i.e. the manner in which the state acts) to one element alone.

These two assumptions come with a focus on both the elements and the emergent totality.
The critique of the theories discussed in the thesis has gained at this point another dimension. It is not only that these theories are internally inconsistent, but that, from the perspective of these ontological commitments, they are also missing out on important social processes that account for state action. Statist theories overemphasise the whole, while the pluralist accounts focus on the constitutive elements.

Outcomes are understood in the thesis as a function of the relational aspect of the individual nodes to each other but also in relation to the whole. State actions, such as strategies and policy goals, could reflect or not the intentions of some of the human actors involved in the political process. However, state action, goals and positions in the international cannot be explained by reference to a particular individual or individuals. Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the consequences of maintaining the distinction between states and human agents for explaining state action and state goals. For example, the analysis in Chapter 7 shifted the focus from individual leaders, such as Ceausescu, as the direct cause of events to networks of relationships – the confluence of social processes and contexts.\textsuperscript{219} The acts of separate individuals alone could not account for the type of agentic properties the Romanian state had within specific contexts.

The discussion in Chapter 7 illustrated the non-linear aspect of social action. Goals and state action were not the direct consequence of one or more human agents but rather the consequence of overlapping social processes and practices that feed back and forward to account for the position of the state. By showing how goals and

\textsuperscript{219} The type of argument put forward in this thesis should not be taken or read as an exoneration of leaders (i.e. Ceausescu's role in the reproduction of the political regime of the time). I accept that, based on such views of the state, new questions can be asked about the type of responsibility associated with individuals and states. This however can constitute the subject of another thesis altogether.
actions were emergent from networks of social relations, practices and historical contexts, notions of instrumental rational action undertaken by a pre-social self also became problematic.

The thesis claimed that the processes of regime change illustrate as well as reinforce the conceptualisation of the state as an emergent network of social relations and agents. The analysis of Chapter 6 showed that, in order for radical change to become consequential, it must target not only particular individuals but also institutions and social relations that inform more broadly the social practices within a space and/or in different social areas such as economics, law, politics, and culture. The chapter briefly contrasted the regime change occurring in the 1944-1948 period with the regime change taking place in 1989. A sudden regime change did formally occur in 1989. However, the removal of some of the main leaders from the state functions was not sufficient to trigger such sudden changes in the political practices as it did in the period after 1944. This explains the references of the transitional literature to the social relations and practices reminiscent of the communist regime. I have considered these types of arguments as a different illustration of the network-like and emergent features of the Romanian state.

The thesis questioned the use of the concept of the network to refer only to a historically specific type of state, such as the postmodern state or the informational state. Castells’ network state, for instance, is regarded as the organisation of the present, whereas unitary and homogenous entities are those of modernity. I have shown that Keohane and Nye, and Sørensen, propose similar evolutionary approaches in the conceptualisation of the state through their concepts of the multi-issue state, which is the outcome of increased economic interdependence, and the
postmodern state respectively. My analysis has made the case for the network as an ontological premise for framing the organisation of socially complex actors, of which states are an example. It argued that conceptualising social organisations as networks is an ontological commitment that allows us to consider different patterns of relations and acknowledge the flexibility of forms of organisation. My argument suggested a weaker emphasis on typologies of states, especially if they enhance the inside-outside division and the related views on unitary and person-like agency. At the same time, the thesis argued that the conceptualisation of states as network-like actors does not make networks desirable or evolutionary superior forms of organisation. I have used the examples from the network analysis literature to illustrate this claim – for instance, network spaces can be exclusive or restrictive.

Chapter 7 illustrated this argument. The Romanian state between the 1960s and 1980s, as a highly centralised state undergoing industrialisation, fitted *prima facie* the model of the modern state. Network theory maintains that network-like entities are bound together by broader principles, termed the ‘logic’ of the network. It also argues that entities are networks if lower nodes have the agency to decide upon the courses of action. My analysis showed that the Romanian state was network-like in the production of meaning, in the functioning of the administration and in the production of material resources. The chapter demonstrated that the Romanian state was not constituted only by top down processes, although it was hierarchical in terms of organisation, and constraining in terms of the boundaries of meaning production. The chapter demonstrated that the logic of the social relations underpinning the policies and institutions of the state allowed both centralising and decentralising tendencies to co-exist. This reflected in the type of agency managers, bureaucrats, and scholars had. Individuals as ‘lower’ nodes in the formal networks,
as well as nodes in the illicit and informal ones, had an intricate mix of reproductive and transformative agency. These agents did not directly challenge the deeper social relations and institutions on which the state was premised. However, the informal and illegal practices created effects that were not intended by the centre of the formal network.

As mentioned already, the thesis argued that while, legally, the state is unified in time and space, it exists in multiple spaces and times. These social spaces inform differentiated agential potential. The agential potential of states is differentiated depending on the social relations and practices that become dominant in social transactions. The explanations provided in this thesis intended to avoid the reification of a certain type of relation or elements such as sovereignty, territory, and population, by focusing on the relations involved in the transactions and contexts in which transactions take place. Treating state agency as relational was central to strengthening the argument about state agency as non-unitary.

The analysis of regime change in Chapter 6 exposed the contradictory networks of social relations and of agents informing the constitution of the Romanian state. The analysis showed that agential potential is networked and differentiated depending on the type of relations drawn on during the transactions. For instance, after the 1944 coup, the re-instatement of democratic procedures and a non-fascist leadership, which formally made the state a constitutional monarchy, informed positively the relationship with the Western Allies. At the same time, the Soviets regarded the social relations underpinning the constitution of the Romanian state as the cause for the reluctance of the Romanian state to work with the Allied Soviet High Commission after 1944. More broadly, the 'bourgeois' and anti-revolutionary social
relations and institutions were considered responsible for informing the actions and interests of the Romanian state during the war, and particularly its opposition to the USSR. However, the presence of the Romanian communists in coalitions with the traditional Liberal and Peasants’ parties constituted the Romanian state as an actor with potential internationalist features. The discussion also argued that the presence of the Soviet Army on the Romanian territory represented a resource that enhanced the agency of the state, from the perspective of the Romanian Communists and of the USSR. At the same time, it was limiting the state's agential potential in international and 'domestic' matters from the perspective of the traditional political parties and from that of the Western states. One of the conclusions of Chapter 6 was that the agential power of the Romanian state after 1944 would be difficult to frame as uniquely low or high.

Chapter 7 argued for instance that the pursuit of the debt payment goal constituted the Romanian state in two opposite ways in relation to the Western governments and banks: as a still reliable state, which could pay the debt, as well as an oppressive and weak actor. The position depended on the type of social relations and practices that became relevant in the transactions with foreign others. The different roles that the Romanian state took during the 1960s to mid 1980s, such as 'socialist', 'maverick', 'developing', 'dictatorship', suggested the existence of different and overlapping social spaces. These roles informed Romanian state agency internationally. The analysis demonstrated that these roles were not the exclusive outcome of a top-down process or the outcome of the domestic social space. The chapter, for instance, argued that even the claims of 'maverick' and independent policy should be reframed in order to acknowledge the relational aspects of state action across the inside-outside divide. The analysis rejected the accounts that identify one main
relationship (state-society for instance) as the cause for the agential potential of the state internationally. The chapter also strengthened the argument made against typologies of states, which identify, for instance, a type of state (e.g. ‘developing’) with a specific agential potential (e.g. weakness internationally).

The thesis has been informed by an understanding of social action as nonlinear. Nonlinearity of the social world more broadly assumes a certain degree of unpredictability or openness in terms of the form social life takes, despite the fact that there are stable features or patterns defined within the relations. This means that, even when patterns of interactions are present within social interaction, the manner in which interaction occurs makes it impossible to trace outcomes to one element alone. If causes are multiple and interact in a complex manner, it is also difficult to separate, for instance, between exclusively material or ideational causes, as material and ideational resources become entangled in the outcome. The task of producing explanations of the type if ‘a’, then ‘b’ will follow becomes untenable if the transformative potential embedded in human reflexivity is taken into account, as well as the potential of certain events or humans to act as catalysts for fundamental changes. Such a view has important implications for the type of social inquiry that the discipline of IR can produce in terms of explanations of past events; and in terms of predicting future outcomes, if the intention is to develop policy relevant analysis.

The analysis in Chapter 6, for example, has illustrated the importance of social relations, as well as contingent events, leading to the formal change of regime in Romania in December 1947. The immediate context was important as a catalyst for making some social relations (Marxist-Leninist) and networks of human agents

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220 In Chapter 7, a mix of material and ideational factors enabled the emergence of a particular kind of nationalism.
(communists) more important than others (liberal, social democrat, fascist). In Chapter 7, I have shown that the natural disasters of 1980 and 1981 amplified the economic problems of the Romanian state by disrupting the industrial and food production intended for export. Exports were essential for obtaining foreign currency that was used to pay for industrialisation. These contingent events made more pressing the need to change the foreign policy goal from industrialisation to debt repayment. My empirical analysis has been underpinned by an understanding of transformation as path dependent on previous social relations and practices, yet not determined in any clear way.

From the perspective taken in this thesis, policy relevant social inquiry could only identify tendencies and construct scenarios, not predict outcomes. The focus would be on developing contingency plans that can only approximate future outcomes. Bernstein et al. propose a similar direction for policy-relevant social science. They write:

[scenarios] start with the assumption that the future is unpredictable and tell alternative stories of how the future may unfold. Scenarios are generally constructed by distinguishing what we believe is relatively certain from what we think is uncertain. The most important 'certainties' are common to all scenarios that address the same problem or trend, while the most important perceived uncertainties differentiate one scenario from another (Bernstein, Lebow, Stein, & Weber, 2000, p. 54).

The implications for political action of the assumptions that states are not constituted as coherent entities, which possess a coherent inside, are also worth exploring. What are the consequences of reporting or claiming that Serbia’s feelings are hurt by the Kosovo proclamation of independence – i.e. projecting upon an entire political community feelings of anger or frustration? On the other hand, what would be the type of policy approach when the networks of social relations and of human agents that constitute the state are taken into account? Important policy consequences could also come out of explanations that identify the leader (e.g. Mugabe) with the
Zimbabwean state – for instance in terms of the potential and the speed of change of the Zimbabwean state if the leader were removed.

Viewing the state as a network with multiple boundaries and spaces that inform its potential to act also raises questions about the nature of ‘the’ international. It suggests that ‘the international’ is neither a stable space nor concept, against which the state and state agency are constituted. In this light, the thesis advances and subscribes to arguments that intend to reconceptualise ‘the international’. From the perspective of the approach developed in this thesis, the research endeavour does not need to be trapped in the dilemmas of whether explanations we provide are ‘systemic’ or ‘reductionist’. My analysis suggested the need to focus on multiple social relations, institutions and practices, which constitute social spaces, rather than *a priori* decide which social relationships, and, more generally, which social spaces are more important in constituting and explaining state action. The ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ are implicated in one another because the thesis advocates an ontological position that acknowledges the potential of various social networks to be constitutive and causative of social action. It is a matter of finding the appropriate methodology that could be consistent with such a view. My particular analysis used one of the methodologies of network analysis, which suggested that social spaces could be drawn according to the formal membership criteria of individuals, or according to their participation in a specific activity or practice. This allowed me to assess the role

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221 For instance, Hollis and Smith put forward theoretical explanations around several system-unit dyads such as system-state, state-bureaucracy, and bureaucracy-individual, with the first term of the dyad playing the systemic function and the second the unit one (Hollis & Smith, 1991, pp. 7-9). Buzan identifies five ‘spatial’ units of analysis or ontological referents – the individual, the bureaucracies, the state, the region and the system, which could be analysed according to three levels, which are capacity, structure and process (Buzan, 1995, pp. 204 - 205).

222 Katzenstein, Peter J. et al. differentiate between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ research questions (Katzenstein & al, 1996, p. 10).

223 Bernstein et al. develop a seven step methodology for building scenarios, which could be valuable also for framing explanations of past events (Bernstein et al., 2000, p. 55).
of social processes associated with more than one social space, such as the ‘domestic’ or the formal institutions of the Romanian state.

The argument put forward in the thesis made historical analysis central to developing understandings of state action. At the theoretical level, it insisted upon the contingency of human action and the role of social practices in the reproduction and transformation of states as actors. In this respect, it built upon the insights of historical sociologists and postmodernists. My analysis in chapters 6 and 7 has argued, however, against the type of ontological assumptions that silently inform the political histories of the Romanian state. The thesis showed that the political histories work with pluralist or/statist assumptions, which also serve to organise the historical data when detailed or precise information is missing. For instance, state policies are attributed to and explained by reference to the leader.

The thesis makes the case for theoretical frameworks that are sensitive to material from other disciplines, such as cultural studies, history, anthropology, economics, diplomacy, geography, and so forth. The writings of anthropologists and international political economists on communist societies provided my argument with important insights that demonstrated the network nature of the Romanian state and its contradictory and varied agential potential. More generally, the thesis subscribes to those appeals for the enlargement of the boundaries of the discipline, yet it remains critical of how such analysis is framed.


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