Juana I and the Struggle for Power in an Age of Transition (1504-1521)

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Philosophy, London, June 2011
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

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Abstract

The power struggle between the death of Isabel I of Castile and the Comunero uprising of 1520-1521 involved both dynastic rupture and a crisis of legitimacy. While Juana’s titular rights as proprietary sovereign were always recognised, her husband, father and son opposed her right to govern.

The thesis challenges deeply-embedded views about Juana’s political indifference, while also questioning the recent, influential contention that Juana sacrificed her rights to protect dynastic interests. Juana might have suffered intermittently from mental health problems, but was a key player, and the history of the period cannot be understood without taking her queenship, and question of her right to influence government policy, fully into account. Juana saw herself, above all, as Isabel’s daughter, and a Trastámara, and her successes, failures and changing political strategies are seen in this light. Despite her notions of filial obedience, at a time when her father, Fernando II of Aragon, who had co-reigned with Isabel, remained active and ambitious to govern Castile, Juana engaged with, and greatly influenced, major events between 1504-1507. Again, in 1520, her role during the Comunero revolution, when she came to the defence not only of her son, Charles V, but, more especially, of the principle of royal authority, proved crucially significant.

The thesis explores political and cultural concepts of the time to show how they were applied to the manner in which Juana was seen, such as the development of a Queen’s ‘party’ based on the knightly ideology of honour and loyalty; the application of the notion of ‘shadow’ monarch to attempts to marginalise her from power in 1506-1507, and the essentially gender-based topoi of jealousy and hysteria that informed views about the last Trastámara monarch’s unfitness to govern.
Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to Professor María-José Rodríguez-Salgado, Professor of History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for her invaluable expertise, insight, encouragement, patience and time since I began this thesis. I have benefited from the generosity and help of Isabel Aguirre, and the staff of the Archivo General de Simancas (Valladolid), as well as from that of the Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Zaragoza, Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid), Archives du Département du Nord (Lille), Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (Venice) and British Library, among others. I wish to thank Miguel-Ángel Zalama and María Concepción Porras Gil of the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of the University of Valladolid for the opportunity to participate in the Congreso Internacional Juana I, held at Tordesillas (Valladolid) in 2010. Among individuals whose friendship, help and hospitality have been fundamental, Blanca Tera, Soledad García and Elvira Lamuedra introduced me to the wonders of Castile and its history. Roger Fleming, John Nicholls and Robert Edwards have been unfailing in their encouragement. Ann Walker has provided indispensable support throughout work on this thesis, which is dedicated to her and to the memory of Peggy Fleming and Lynda Climpson.
GLOSSARY

adelantado chief military governor of a Castilian frontier region
alcabala tax on sales and purchases levied by Crown
alcaide fortress governor
alguacil constable
aposentador official responsible for preparing royal lodgings
asistente Crown-appointed city official with powers similar to, but usually fewer than a corregidor’s
ayuda de costa living expenses or special payments
bandos rival affinities or political groupings
brazos (los cuatro) estates forming Corts (Cort) of Aragon
caballerizo mayor chief master of horse
camarero mayor head chamberlain
capirote comprehensive form of headdress also covering head, shoulders and back
cédula real concise form of royal order, usually bearing monarch’s signature with royal secretary’s counter-signature
cartas de poder (poderes) documents with which cities with votes in the Cortes accredited their representatives or procuradores
cerero mayor chief candle-lighter; official in charge of various functions, technically answerable to mayordomo mayor
clavero key-bearer or castellan; third-ranking officer of military religious order
comendador mayor second highest ranking officer of military religious order
contador mayor chief royal accountant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>contino</td>
<td>permanent servant performing variety of functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corregidor</td>
<td>chief Crown-appointed city official sent to cities under royal jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ciudades de realengo) for specific period to secure order and justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cortes/Cort/Corts</td>
<td>Cortes (Castilian); Cort/Corts (Aragonese) Parliament or assembly of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives convoked (usually) convoked by monarch to swear oath of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>allegiance to new monarch or heir, discuss and agree measures; vote taxes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criado</td>
<td>personal servant and/or dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuadrilla</td>
<td>basic unit of town/city council militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curaduría</td>
<td>guardianship of a person beyond stage of tutoría (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diputación provincial</td>
<td>assembly of (provincial) representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispensero mayor</td>
<td>chief butler, whose deputy (teniente) and officials collaborate with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deputy mayordomo and veedor (auditor) in purchase of provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fuero</td>
<td>charter of privileges, rights or exemptions awarded to a pueblo, town, city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jurado</td>
<td>municipal officer, citizen representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juramento</td>
<td>contractual ceremony in which monarchs and their heirs swore to uphold the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rights and privileges of their subjects and in turn received their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juros</td>
<td>instrument of public debt; privileges sold by monarchs as means of raising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juros de heredad</td>
<td>privileges conceded by monarch as reward or favour, but not sold and bought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justicia Mayor</td>
<td>chief justice officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aragon)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letrado</td>
<td>professional administrators, councillors, assessors with legal training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maestrazgo</td>
<td>mastership, and highest ranking officer, of religious military order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maestresala</td>
<td>official presiding ceremonially over table and with oversight of pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>mayordomo mayor</td>
<td>chief steward and head of household; technically responsible for payment of officials, provisions, lighting, stables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mercedes</td>
<td>awards, gifts, privileges conceded by monarch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monteros de Espinosa</td>
<td>special service of guards responsible for security of royal persons, including night watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oidor</td>
<td>judge of high court, sometimes also used to refer to members of Royal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patronato regio</td>
<td>royal prerogative ceded by the Holy See to Spanish monarchs (with the 1486 bull <em>Orthodoxae fidei</em>), allowing them to nominate or 'present' candidates to ecclesiastical posts on Spanish territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procurador</td>
<td>until relatively recently, term given to representatives participating in a Cortes or Corts</td>
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<tr>
<td>provision real</td>
<td>royal document, here mainly used to describe acts of government issued by Royal Council in name of sovereign but usually not requiring monarch's signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regidor</td>
<td>city councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repostero</td>
<td>attendant specialising in different departments, eg. bedchamber, domestic animals (<em>-de camas</em>); silverware (<em>-de plata</em>); soft furnishings (<em>-de estrado</em>); chapel (<em>-de capilla</em>), etc.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residencia</td>
<td>term of office of corregidor (in principle two years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retrete</td>
<td>private, inner chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>servicio</td>
<td>tax in form of subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sobrecarta</td>
<td>document expedited by Royal Chancery to urge implementation of a former document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tercias</td>
<td>tithes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tocas</td>
<td>close-fitting under-headdress of light material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tutoría</td>
<td>guardianship of a minor (in the case of a widowed mother, involving renunciation of a new marriage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vara</td>
<td>wand or staff of office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
veinticuatro ('twenty-four'), regidor belonging to a town or city council

NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS

Translations from source languages into English are mine. Some extracts are given in the source languages themselves (either in the text or in footnotes) where deemed sufficiently important for the argument, or not excessively long. Translations into Spanish from the Latin (as in, for example, the case of Pietro Martire de Anghiera, Juan Maldonado or Álvar Gómez de Castro, who wrote in Latin) are those of the Spanish editions indicated.
Juana I and the struggle for power in an age of transition (1504-1521)

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Juana I and the struggle for power in an age of transition (1504–1521)

1. Introduction: ‘A golden sorrow’

1.1. Juana’s image in the secondary literature

Third child and second daughter of the Spanish monarchs, Isabel I of Castile and Fernando II of Aragon, Juana I of Castile and Aragon was born in Toledo on 6 November 1479. In 1496 and 1497 respectively she and her brother, Prince Juan, the monarchs’ only son (figure 2), were married into the Habsburg dynasty. But Juan’s death, and a series of others, demolished the monarchs’ careful matrimonial structure; Juana and her husband, Philip, emerged from the debris to become the heirs to Castile and Aragon. Isabel named Juana ‘proprietary’ heir, but Juana was in Brabant, and her father ruled Castile in her name, until Philip ousted him from the governorship. When Philip died suddenly, Fernando returned and imprisoned his daughter. Her son Charles seized the crown in 1516, subjecting his mother to a prison regime of yet greater rigour. This ended only with her death in 1555, shortly before Charles’ own.

Juana’s titular legitimacy was never in question. Leaving aside the titles she acquired from marriage, or those acquired from Fernando in 1516, the tranche left by Isabel comprised the realms of Castile, León, Granada, Seville, Córdoba, Murcia, Jaén, the Algarves, Algeciras, Gibraltar, the Canary Islands and the ‘Indies and terra firma of the Ocean Sea’. The Crown of Castile, on which this study focuses, greatly exceeded that of Aragon in territorial size, wealth and population, and Juana’s dazzling Castilian inheritance attracted husband, father and son. It might have been of Juana that, in his play Henry VIII, Shakespeare has Anne Boleyn exclaim of Juana’s youngest sister, Katherine:
Figure 2. Fernando (in the foreground), Isabel, their son and heir, Prince Juan, and the Infantas Isabel and Juana kneel, in the company of Cardinal Mendoza, at the feet of the Virgen de la Misericordia. When Prince Juan was born in 1478, his elder sister, formerly the Princess Isabel, lost her position as heir and here assumes a position in the background, beside Juana. (Burgos, Monasterio Real de las Huelgas. Detail)
... verily
I swear, 'tis better to be lowly born,
And range with humble livers in content,
Than to be perk'd up in a glist'ring grief
And wear a golden sorrow.'

In Juana’s case the ‘golden sorrow’ she wore is inextricably linked to the question of her ability to govern, raised in Isabel’s will of 1504. Isabel, who had serious concerns about the succession, laid out two criteria for a Juana government: her ability and her willingness, or desire, to govern. Juana’s ‘ability’ was quickly interpreted to mean ‘capability’. In other words, the essential ambiguity of Isabel’s phrase ‘no poder’ (not able), which could refer equally to external circumstances as to a mental hindrance, was interpreted strictly to mean the latter, with many believing, then and since, that although Juana’s succession was legitimate, she was unfit to rule.

Fitness to rule, variously but never fully defined, but an issue with which many women rulers over the centuries have had to deal, became the burning issue around which the succession crisis revolved. Between 1504-1506 Juana’s father and husband twisted and turned in their approach to the question, both arguing at different times for and against it, until coming to a short-lived agreement (secretly repudiated by Fernando) that Juana’s ‘passions’ would inevitably lead to a tyranny were she to seize the reins of government. But Fernando later justified his exercise of power in Castile on the grounds of Juana’s unwillingness and inability to rule in her own right. Subsequently, Charles resorted to the same argument. Thus, any study of the struggle for power between 1504-1521 and of Juana as queen, must address the question of Juana’s capability from the outset.¹

For centuries a consensus seems to have prevailed that Juana was ‘mad’ in the way described by Augustinian monk Fray Enrique Flórez. In his Memorias de las reinas católicos (1761) Flórez asserts that she was popularly called Juana ‘the Mad’ because, after Philip’s death, grief aggravated a loss of reason.² The

¹ The question of willingness and ability to rule, as raised in Isabel’s will, is further discussed in Chapter 2, and subsequently.
² ‘se la oscurció más el uso de la razón, por lo que vulgarmente es llamada doña Juana la Loca ...’ Cited in Josemi Lorenzo Arribas, Juana I de Castilla y Aragón (1497-1555), Biblioteca de Mujeres 64, ed., Cristina Segura Grañó (Madrid, 2004): 82. Arribas also cites the affectionate old song, still sometimes sung or recited: ‘Reina Juana por qué lloras/si es tu pena la mejor/porque no fue un mal cariño/que fue locura de amor ...’
polemical modern historiography in respect of Juana I may be said only to begin with East Prussian historian, Gustave Adolf Bergenroth (1813-1869), former bureaucrat, revolutionary, explorer and forty-niner. On 28 November 1867 he wrote in excitement from the General Archive of Simancas (Valladolid) to Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls: ‘No respectable historian has ever admitted a doubt about [Juana’s] insanity ... Now, I find in the papers which formerly were not accessible to me, that she was never mad ... that the stories of her madness were invented by her mother, her father, her husband, and at a later period, by her son, to serve their own purposes ...’

In 1868 Bergenroth published several volumes of state papers on Anglo-Spanish relations from Simancas, including a supplementary volume on Juana and Katherine. In this he expanded on his earlier comments: ‘... the madness of Queen Juana was, as it were, the foundation stone of the political edifice of Ferdinand and of Charles, which would have immediately crumbled to pieces if she had been permitted to exercise her hereditary right’. Her life he described as ‘a succession of attempts at rebellion which, however, collapsed as soon as she was called upon to vindicate her independence by active measures’. Himsell Protestant, he concluded that Juana’s ‘heretical’ religious views explained her marginalisation and imprisonment. She had developed a ‘disbelief in Roman orthodoxy’ and, in other circumstances, might have favoured Lutheranism.

Bergenroth’s claims caused a stir in France, Germany and England, where, as French-born, Belgium-based historian and archivist Louis-Prosper Gachard (1800-1885) noted, they were variously interpreted. In February 1869, Bergenroth died of typhus fever, contracted at Simancas, before being able to develop his ideas and projects further. While defending Bergenroth’s ‘scrupulous’ scholarship Gachard argued, in two articles, against the way he had interpreted fragmentary evidence. Various manifestations of indifference by Juana to religious practices were, Gachard believed, the result of mental ‘aberration’. He highlighted her conduct after Philip’s death: her repeated orders

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3 W. C. Cartwright, Gustave Bergenroth: A Memorial Sketch (Edinburgh, 1870): 171
5 CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana): x, xxv, xxxi
6 CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana): bxvii
to open the coffin so that she could ‘kiss’ the body; her refusal to eat when thwarted; incidents of violence against her entourage; neglect of personal hygiene and appearance; a refusal to sign documents of any kind. Gachard defended Charles against Bergenroth’s charges of cruelty towards his mother.7

Spanish historian António Rodríguez Villa (1843-1912) gave a romantic turn to the debate. Largely on the basis of a letter ostensibly written by Juana to Philip’s ambassador in Spain, Philibert (‘La Mouche’) de Veyré, in which she defends Philip’s right to rule Castile and refers to a ‘jealousy’ from which, as in her mother’s case, she hopes to recover, he concluded that Juana was not clinically mad but maddened by a love that made her forgetful of religious practices, political interests, social conventions, royal dignity, even maternal feeling.8 In 1885 German historian Constantin R. von Höfler, who transcribed the despatches of Vincenzo Querini, Venetian ambassador to the court of Philip and Juana, wrote a short biography of a tragic but passive Juana, active only when seeking to embarrass her husband.9 In 1892 Rodríguez Villa returned to the subject with a major study, richly documented. Making much use of Aragonese historian, Jerónimo Zurita, he offered a more complex and positive portrait than, for example, Höfler, while providing a scholarly foundation for the romantic Juana of so many artistic and literary, or semi-literary, creations.10

With the twentieth century, and new focus on psychiatry, Gachard’s mental ‘aberrations’ were given new terms. In 1930, in an influential work translated from German into Spanish in 1932, Ludwig Pfandl identified Juana as a schizophrenic, who inherited and passed on her condition.11 Other twentieth-century preoccupations, nationalism and Marxism, are reflected in a contrasting view by Ukrainian historian Michael Prawdin, almost a decade later. Prawdin saw Juana as a tragic heroine who defended a crown she did not covet against a

8 António Rodríguez Villa, Bosquejo biográfico de la reina Doña Juana (Madrid, 1874)
10 Rodríguez Villa, La Reina Doña Juana (Madrid, 1892)
11 Ludwig Pfandl, Johanna die Wahnsinnige: Ihr Leben, Ihre Zeit, Ihre Schuld (Freiburg im Bresgau, 1930): 94-95
man who meant everything to her. During the Comunero uprising, her inability to betray her class and side with the ‘bourgeoisie’ brought about her own ruin, along with that of her would-be liberators.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1940 Dutch Hispanist Johan Brouwer published a study in which Juana remains an essentially enigmatic figure, to be treated with caution. Juana always has the capacity to surprise; actions that appear one moment to show evidence of clouded mental powers can be seen the next as evidence of sober-minded deliberation.\textsuperscript{13} Brouwer analyses the views of Bergenroth, Gachard, Rodríguez Villa and Pfandl, concluding that it is possible only to glimpse, rather than understand, Juana in her entirety and that, to quote historian Raymond Fagel when discussing Brouwer’s work: ‘The tragic life of Juana is an example of how, at the deepest level of our being, we remain unknown one to the other’.\textsuperscript{14} Fagel remarks on a renewed interest in Juana, but one that has not yet resulted in a new image of the queen.\textsuperscript{15}

By the twenty-first century Juana as ‘the Mad’ was beginning to disappear from scholarly studies, with ‘madness’ too vague, unstable and politically charged a notion to retain any useful meaning. Even where biographers still used the term, their studies reflected reservations. Manuel Fernández Álvarez’ popular biography, first published in 2000, and running into many editions, tends to see Juana as suffering from depression, although he refers to her ‘mad’ obsession with Philip, and ‘invincible repugnance to affairs of State’.\textsuperscript{16} Much of his material derives from the correspondence between Charles and Juana’s gaolers, the Denias. In his depiction are valuable insights but also yawning gaps.

In 1998 American historian Bethany Aram published a landmark paper on Juana’s signature. Having examined a large number of documents bearing her signature, and having compared it to the above-mentioned letter to Veyré – long

\textsuperscript{12} Michael Prawdin, \textit{Johanna die Wahnsinnige} (Vienna, 1938)
\textsuperscript{13} Johan Brouwer, \textit{Johanna de Waanzinnige: een tragisch leven in een bewogen tijd} (Amsterdam, 1940)
\textsuperscript{14} Raymond Fagel, ‘Juana de Castilla y los Países Bajos. La historiografía neerlandesa sobre la reina’, in Zalama, ed., \textit{Juana I de Castilla, 1504-1555: De su reclusión en Tordesillas al olvido de la Historia} (Valladolid, 2006): 89
\textsuperscript{15} Fagel, ‘Juana de Castilla y los Países Bajos’: 106
\textsuperscript{16} Manuel Fernández Álvarez, \textit{Juana La Loca: La Cautiva de Tordesillas} (Madrid, 2002): 184
considered suspect by some historians – Aram argues that it was a forgery.\textsuperscript{17} Aram subsequently published in Spanish, and then in English, a highly influential biography, placing Juana within the context of piety and dynasty. Given the recent influence of \textit{Juana the Mad}, this and other work by Aram has been examined as closely as possible within the essentially limited framework of this thesis.\textsuperscript{18}

Aram’s well-documented biography covers Juana’s entire life and is the fruit of over a decade of work in archives in Spain, Italy, Belgium, France, Portugal, the UK and the USA. It is particularly informative with regard to her early years in the Low Countries and the problems she encountered in governing, or failing to govern, her shifting households, about which Aram has also written elsewhere.\textsuperscript{19} Her expressed intention is to examine the nature of royal authority and ‘Renaissance queenship’ by drawing both on new material and recent scholarship in four theoretical areas: ‘Spanish constitutional thought, female sovereignty, princely courts and households, and cultural understandings of madness’.\textsuperscript{20} With respect to the latter area, she ‘draws upon scholarship that considers madness a socially constructed discursive category rather than an objective transhistorical condition’.\textsuperscript{21} With reason she maintains that: ‘The queen’s “incapacity” emerges as her failure to comply with the wishes and conform to the expectations of the actors surrounding her’.\textsuperscript{22}

But it is her exploration of Juana as a secluded, pious, yet passionate ‘Renaissance’ queen that has drawn most attention. Aram concludes her biographical study, which attributes serious political intent to the Queen, by stating that Juana showed an ‘inability or unwillingness to rule’. This is linked

\textsuperscript{17} Bethany Aram, ‘Juana the Mad’s Signature: The Problem of Invoking Royal Authority, 1505-1507’, \textit{Sixteenth Century Journal}, 29, 2 (1998): 331-358; \textit{La reina Juana: Gobierno, piedad y dinastía} (Madrid, 2001); (in English) \textit{Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe} (Baltimore/London, 2005)

\textsuperscript{18} Historians who reflect the influence of Aram’s views include António-Miguel Bernal, \textit{Monarquía y imperio}, ‘Historia de España’ series (Barcelona, 2007); Julio Valdeón Baruque, ‘La Reina y sus Planteamientos Políticos’, in FRP, \textit{Doña Juana, Reina de Castilla} (Madrid/Barcelona, 2006); María Isabel Del Val Valdivieso, \textit{Isabel la Católica y su Tiempo} (Granada, 2005); Julia Fox, \textit{Sister Queens: Katherine of Aragon and Juana, Queen of Castile} (London, 2011)

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Aram, ‘La Casa de la Reina Juana, 1496-1556’ in FRP, \textit{Doña Juana: 99-118

\textsuperscript{20} Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad: 2

\textsuperscript{21} Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad: 9

\textsuperscript{22} Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad: 67

less to considerations of mental health than to her belief that Juana sacrificed herself on the altar of dynastic interests and withdraw into a state of spiritual contemplation (*recogimiento*). Aram argues that instances of this can be seen in Juana’s renunciation of her proprietary rights at the Cortes of Valladolid (1506); her funeral journey of 1506-1507, in which elaborate obsequies publicised her immortal bond to Philip and legacy to Charles; her refusal to remarry, again in order to protect her children’s interests; and her refusal, in 1520, to support the Comuneros, thus affirming ‘the overriding corporate interests of the Habsburgs’ and sanctioning ‘the de facto disjunction between her titular rights and actual authority’. Moreover, by retiring into a life of spiritual contemplation (*recogimiento*), Juana facilitated a ‘shift towards a more corporate and familial, less territorial or individual, idea of royal authority in early Habsburg Spain’.

In a subsequent essay Aram returns to some of these themes, asserting that, after Philip’s death her two political aims were to ward off marriage and secure her children’s inheritance. In order to achieve these aims she became one of the authors of her own legend: ‘My own work suggests that a sixteenth-century emphasis on the passions and belief in female debility colored a legend that Juana projected in order to protect her children’s inheritance’. 

Aram’s argument that Juana meant deliberately to project, colour or exploit a legend of devotion, ‘however degrading’, is not supported by concrete evidence and, I would argue, lends disproportionate weight to the view that Juana controlled her own destiny. The same criticism may be made of Aram’s argument that Juana was influenced by the *devotio moderna*, a significant current of contemplative, interior spirituality originating in the Low Countries. Aram argues that, while living there, Juana became influenced by religious practices consistent with those of previous duchesses of Burgundy, such as Isabel of Portugal and Margaret of York, who were drawn to Franciscanism and the *devotia moderna* and that she ‘may have adopted Queen (later Saint) Isabel of Portugal (1271-1336) as another devotional model’.

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23 Aram, *Juana the Mad*: 164-165
25 Aram, ‘Queen Juana’: 37-38
Aram founds her argument for Juana’s contemplative spiritual withdrawal on a variety of indirect indicators, such as her cultivation of ties with Franciscan nuns in the Low Countries and Castile and an asceticism expressed in the shabbiness of her attire and neglect of her person at Arcos and Tordesillas, together with fasting and night vigils. But, while Aram’s suggestion that Juana was interested in the devoto moderna is plausible, she does not produce concrete data to show how she grew interested in the practices of previous Burgundian duchesses, or in Saint Isabel, or how her own spiritual outlook and practices might have differed (except in degree of seclusion) from her mother’s or, indeed, from those of her adviser, chief chaplain and master of theology, Diego Ramírez de Villaescusa, whose influence upon Juana is known to have been considerable. Moreover, Franciscan influence was evident in Juana from an early age.²⁶

Such considerations apart, there are other ways to interpret the ‘ascetic’ aspects of Juana’s conduct which, as I will argue, can be seen in terms of her imprisonment and powerlessness, and in the fact that Juana herself believed that her prison conditions actually hindered her spiritual life.²⁷ In other words, Aram has not resolved the question as to whether Juana’s long years at Tordesillas were enforced or voluntary. Indeed, she refers confusingly to ‘her voluntary and enforced inaccessibility’.²⁸ The question is fundamental – not least because it travels to the very heart of the question of Juana’s willingness and ability.

In 2003 art historian Miguel Ángel Zalama re-issued a study first published in 2000, covering the period of almost fifty years Juana spent at Tordesillas. In his second edition Zalama attacks misjudged but deeply-rooted clichés about Juana, while criticising Aram for insisting on Juana’s spiritual ‘recogimiento’ in the face of evidence which Aram herself has used.²⁹ Zalama fully accepts Pfandl’s view of a schizophrenic princess and queen: ‘We can conclude that doña Juana suffered from an illness that annulled coordination

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²⁶ AGS PR 27, f. 70, ‘Carta de hermandad de la Orden de San Francisco a favor de la Infanta Doña Juana de Aragón y Castilla’, 19 August 1485
²⁷ See Chapters 7 and 9
²⁸ Juana the Mad: 169. As Arribas comments: ‘… es indiscutible que el aislamiento de la reina fue una estrategia de Estado, consciente y perpetuada sistemáticamente por tres generaciones de gobernantes durante medio siglo (Felipe, Fernando, Carlos). Ahora bien, así las cosas, ¿dobló Juana esa imposición con su deseo propio de recogimiento? A la vista de los datos de que hoy disponemos, no me parece una presunción demostrable’. (Juana I: 58)
²⁹ Miguel Ángel Zalama, Vida cotidiana y arte en el Palacio de la Reina Juana I en Tordesillas (Valladolid, 2003): 12
between thought and feeling and even eliminated any kind of social sense, leading her to scorn conventional practices ...’ In line with this, and again contrary to Aram, he argues that Juana lacked any interest in her children.  

Despite a trenchantly negative opinion of Juana, his belief that the cruelty of her family towards her should be exposed, the ‘law of silence’ around her broken, and remembrance of her recovered, has led him to organise a number of events, lectures and conferences, most recently the Congreso Internacional Juana I of February 2010.  

In a finely illustrated new work Zalama insists that because Juana never governed, ‘not even for a day’, any biography or study of her as queen, focusing on the events of which, to a greater or lesser degree, she was the protagonist, is a nonsense, and can be done only ‘in the negative’. Juana, as queen, was ‘never the principle personage of the story. Moreover, if at some moment she seemed to be, this was despite herself and, above all, at the margin of her own interests. She never governed on her own account and from the beginning was a puppet in the hands of her close relatives who thought for her, acted in her name and usurped her legitimate power, leaving her the title of queen only nominally’.  

With respect to biographers of other historical figures related to Juana, the amount of primary sources that mention her unfitness can lead to a certain tendency, even amongst the most ‘scientific’ of historians, to take it more or less for granted in their own works. Hermann Wiesflecker’s magisterial work on Juana’s father-in-law, Maximilian I, is no different from many others in this respect. Like Pfandl’s, Wiesflecker’s Juana lacks political agency. The whole wellspring of her being is mental illness, in the form of a morbid, jealous sexuality that grows into a ‘passionate love-hatred’. She is not secluded by Philip during the second Spanish journey because of political conflict but because an indecorous combination of pregnancy with mental illness enforces  

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30 Zalama, Juana I: Arte, poder y cultura en torno a una reina que no gobernó (Madrid, 2010): 166  
32 Zalama, Juana I: 11  
33 For discussion of primary sources, see section 1.3. (‘Juana’s vital trail’).  
34 Hermann Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich an der Wende zur Neuzeit (Vienna, 1971-1986)  
35 ‘Ihre krankhafte, gewiß nicht unbegründete Eifersucht gegen Philipp steigerte sich in leidenschaftliche Haßliebe. Immer wider gab es Streit’ (Maximilian, III: 270)
the need to keep her away from the public gaze.\textsuperscript{36} Juana responds to the devastating consequences of the Treaty of Villafáfila with a crazed rage. After Philip’s death, she becomes utterly demented, swaying between outbreaks of boundless grief and complete indifference to affairs.\textsuperscript{37} Among authorities cited by Wiesflecker are some discussed below, such as the humanist cleric, courtier and chronicler Pietro Martire de Anghiera; the Venetian ambassador, Vincenzo Querini; the anonymous chronicler of Philip’s second journey to Spain, published in the first volume of Gachard’s multi-volume work, Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas;\textsuperscript{38} and Philip’s military chief, Count Wolfgang von Fürstenberg.\textsuperscript{39}

Like Rogelio Pérez Bustamente and José Manuel Calderón Ortega, whose biography of Philip was published eight years before, Jean-Marie Cauchies shows Philip in a positive, sympathetic light, while generally retaining a negative view of Juana as obstructive, vindictive, jealous and politically indifferent.\textsuperscript{40} Isabel’s biographer, Peggy Liss, similarly sees Juana as an obstacle or problem. She had ‘little interest in government’, with a ‘good deal of disregard for religious matters of any sort’, as well as for public opinion, disdaining ‘much of what Isabel valued most highly’. After Philip’ death, she ‘retired to Tordesillas’.\textsuperscript{41} Studies of Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo, who assumed primary political significance after Philip’s death in 1506 and again after Fernando’s death in 1516, also represent Juana as an obstacle with which he had to deal, rather than as a queen who herself faced obstruction. Nevertheless, there has been little or no analysis of relations between Juana and Cisneros. In his seventeenth-century biography of Cisneros Valentin Esprit de Fléchier, Bishop of Nîmes, omits Juana from the outset when explaining that his history is linked with that of the monarchs Fernando and Isabel, with Philip their son-in-law and Charles, their grandson.\textsuperscript{42} One of Cisneros’ most recent

\textsuperscript{36} Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian, III: 298
\textsuperscript{37} Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian, III: 303
\textsuperscript{38} Gachard, ed., Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas, I (Brussels, 1876). For the above-mentioned chronicler, see Chapters 4 and 5.
\textsuperscript{39} He is referred to by his editor as Wolfgang zu Fürstenberg (below).
\textsuperscript{40} Rogelio Pérez Bustamente/José Manuel Calderón Ortega, Felipe I, 1506 (Palencia, 1995); Jean-Marie Cauchies, Philipe le Beau, le dernier duc de Bourgogne (Turnhout, 2003)
\textsuperscript{41} Peggy Liss, Isabel the Queen (Pennsylvania, 2004): 388, 405
\textsuperscript{42} Valentin Esprit Fléchier, Histoire du Cardinal Ximenes (Amsterdam, 1693)
biographers, José García Oro, barely touches upon relations between Cisneros and the ‘mentally incapacitated’ Juana.\textsuperscript{42}

Works devoted to Charles refer to Juana only fleetingly as the mad mother who bequeathed him the Spanish inheritance. Charles’ 1516 proclamation as king – described, notably, by Pérez as a ‘coup d’état’ – is widely accepted as inevitable in treatments of the subject. These come dangerously close to breaking what Antony Beevor, in a different context, calls ‘that informal yet important rule that nothing in history is inevitable, except perhaps in hindsight’.\textsuperscript{43}

Karl Brandi’s classic work on Charles accepts the traditional view that Juana’s ‘madness and consequent inability to rule’ justified the pre-eminence of Cisneros as regent, paving the way for ‘the coming of his absent King’ from as early as 1506.\textsuperscript{44} For Belgian/Flemish historian Wim Blockmans the death of Fernando and incapacity of Juana meant that Charles was ‘obliged to take possession of the considerable heritage of the Spanish kingdoms and south of Italy’ – a view also advanced by Fernández Álvarez in a biography of Charles published in 1976.\textsuperscript{45}

This sense of inevitability throws a smokescreen over the real drama of the period, and although Brandi refers to a series of ‘shattering crises’ his narrative – admittedly only a fragment of a much broader (and influential) picture – does little to explain them.\textsuperscript{46}

The systematic neglect of the Queen as a political figure has made it almost inevitable that the conflict of 1504-1506 should be depicted as a two-way struggle between Fernando and Philip, and this is how German historian Konrad Häbler treats it in his late nineteenth-century account.\textsuperscript{47} More recent analyses of this struggle, including one by French historian Joseph Pérez, have kept the focus

\textsuperscript{42} José García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal reformista en el trono de España (1436-1517) (Madrid, 2005): 130
\textsuperscript{44} Karl Brandi, Kaiser Karl V (Munich, 1937); (in English) The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-Empire (1970): 62, 71
\textsuperscript{46} Brandi, The Emperor: 62
\textsuperscript{47} Konrad Häbler, Der Streit Ferdinand’s des Katholischen und Philipp’s I um die Regierung von Castilien, 1504-1506 (Dresden, 1882)
on the kings.\textsuperscript{49} Juana's marginalisation, and the turbulence of the period, have also contributed to a singularly confused 'periodisation'. As David Alonso García comments, 'every historian has projected onto [the period] a different chronology'.\textsuperscript{50} Just as traditional histories portray the conflict of 1505-1506 as a duel between kings, so they often omit any reference to the reign of Juana, either with regard to the entire reign of 1504-1555 or to what one may call her effective reign of 1506-1507. The \textit{Atlas Histórico de España I} skips from the Catholic monarchs (1474-1516) to Charles V, without any reference to the sovereign queen of Castile and Aragon.\textsuperscript{51} Some refer either to the 'reign' or 'regency' of Philip I before shifting to the 'first Cisneros regency'. This becomes the 'second Fernando regency' with his return to Castile in August 1507, while following his death in 1516 the period before Charles' arrival in Spain becomes the 'second Cisneros regency', followed by the reign of Charles.

Yet use of the term 'reign' does not generally depend on the competence of the titular head of government, and Juana never abdicated, always remaining proprietary sovereign. Josemi Lorenzo Arribas criticises the term 'first Cisneros regency' on the grounds that: 'there was a queen who was fully adult, who had neither renounced the throne nor delegated her authority', and who went on to take important decisions.\textsuperscript{52} Coyness about a Juana reign is not only at odds with normal historical practice, but generates confusion. Luis Suárez Fernández is among those who have referred both to a Cisneros regency and a Juana reign. 'Between 25 September 1506 and 29 August 1507 we should speak of an effective Juana reign', writes Suárez, clearly aware of such confusion.\textsuperscript{53} Slowly, the word 'reign' in relation to Juana has begun to be used: 'The reign of Juana I of Castile', writes Miguel-Ángel Ladero Quesada, 'was one of the longest in Spanish history ... although she never personally exercised power'.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{49} Joseph Pérez, 'El desconocido reina el de la Hermosa y de Juana 1 La Loca', \textit{Torre de los Lujanes} (TL), 39, June 1999: 135-146. Despite the title, this focuses on Philip and Fernando. Similarly, Pérez, 'Juana La Loca y los Comuneros', in FRP, \textit{Doña Juana: 69-81}
\textsuperscript{50} David Alonso García, \textit{El Erario del Reino} (Valladolid, 2007): 349
\textsuperscript{51} Enrique Martínez Ruiz, Consuelo Maqueda, eds., \textit{Atlas Histórico de España} (Madrid, 2003), I
\textsuperscript{52} 'El cardenal Cisneros ... se encargó de la mal llamada Primera Regencia cisneriana, mal llamada porque había reina, en plenitud de edad, que ni había renunciado al trono ni había delegado formalmente'. (Arribas, \textit{Juana I: 36})
\textsuperscript{53} Luis Suárez Fernández, 'Coyuntura Europea en el Reino de Juana' in FRP, \textit{Doña Juana: 66}
\textsuperscript{54} Miguel-Ángel Ladero Quesada, 'Doña Juana, Infanta y Princesa', in FRP, \textit{Doña Juana: 13}
The writing out of history of a proprietary monarch whose reign spanned fifty-one years clearly springs from an *a priori* acceptance of her ‘madness’. The real possibility that Juana, like many other monarchs and heads of state, suffered from mental health problems has justified the failure to deal seriously with her as queen and to largely accept at face value the propaganda emanating from the succession crisis of 1505-1506. In his study of Henry VII (1999), StanleyChrimes comments on the lack of a critical approach to the ‘very successful propaganda put out by her ruthless and unscrupulous father and son’. He believes it ‘probable that Henry VII knew or suspected the truth, which oddly appears largely to have evaded the serious consideration of modern historians’. He counts the eminent American historian, Garrett Mattingly, among these for failing to pay inadequate attention to Bergenroth’s evidence in his 1942 biography, *Catherine of Aragon*. Mattingly, indeed, allows himself much poetic licence with ‘Juana’s fantastic story’.

William Prescott, J. H. Elliott, Henry Kamen and Eamon Duffy are among those to have dismissed Juana as crazy or demented. Spanish-language historians have been similarly dismissive. Ernest Belenguer’s 1999 biography of Fernando refers not only to Juana’s ‘torrid love’ and ‘uncontrollable jealousy’, but to an internal ‘aridity’ (curiously resuscitating the medieval doctrine of humours). Perhaps most completely damning is J. M. Doussinague, whose praise for Fernando is inversely proportionate to his contempt for Juana. Doussinague considers her ‘abnormal’ for her attitude to her children; her malicious torment of Philip (in which he concurs, among others, with Höfler and Pfandl); her lack of conscience towards her regal obligations; her ‘hatred of women of all social classes, constant and violent aggressions’; etc.

The writing out has been accompanied by a brushing out. Juana features in Maximilian’s exuberant, dynastic visual projects, but strictly in terms of the legacy her marriage brought the Habsburgs. For his part glorified by Titian, Charles had no interest in portraying a mother he kept invisible, although her name had to be associated with his on official documents. In her iconographic

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58 J. M. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y Germana de Foix* (Madrid, 1944): 86
study of the University of Salamanca, Paulette Gabaudan indicates the problem of identifying the medallion opposite that of Charles on the old university’s façade (figure 4). Given, she argues, that Juana remained ‘queen of Spain’ and was associated with her son on documentation and coinage, the Salamanca medallion should represent her. It is, however, normally seen as representing Charles’ consort, the Empress. ‘What criteria have therefore been followed? Isabel or Juana?’ asks Gabaudan. ‘We remain in doubt’.59

According to Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Charles’ need to legitimate his authority is reflected in the large medallion portraying Isabel and Fernando on the same façade, and famous for showing the monarchs as ‘tantamount’ to one another (figure 3). He points out that, ‘although symmetry and equipollency were typical of the portraits of the Catholic monarchs in their own lifetime, Ferdinand is here slightly more prominent than his wife, not for reasons of realism, but to legitimate Charles V’s superior authority over his mother ...’60

Juana is clearly depicted as ‘Regina’, with a sceptre and even imperial crown, in the last of a series of drawings of the monarchs of Castile and Leon commissioned by Philip II as guidance for a sculptural project for the alcázar of Segovia (figure 5). But this exception proves the rule.61 In the nineteenth century she became a heroine of the popular romantic theme of locura de amor. Pierre-Raymond Monvoisin (1833), Eduardo Rosales (1860), Lorenzo Vallés (1866) and Francisco Pradilla Ortiz (1877) exhibited mad Juanas with acclaim (see figures 6, 27, 28). But in nineteenth-century depictions of Charles she is hard to find. Albrecht de Vriendt’s depiction of Charles’ birth gives Philip and Charles’ godmother, the dowager Duchess of Burgundy, Margaret of York, the most prominent places beside Charles’ cradle (figure 7).

This brief summary shows how Juana’s historical role has been seen only in relation to the problems she caused, the dynastic legacy she bequeathed or the ‘madness’ she developed, with paintings, plays, poems, operas, novels and films

59 Paulette Gabaudan, Iconografia Renacentista de la Universidad de Salamanca (Salamanca, 2005): 24
61 BL, Cotton Vespasian, Cxii, 2, f. 52, ‘Retratos, letteros, e ynsignias reales de los Reyes de Oviedo, León y Castilla de la Sala Real de los Alcáceres de Segovia ordenados por mandato del católico rey Don Felipe Segundo nuestro señor’
Figures 3 and 4. Renaissance medallions from the old façade of the University of Salamanca. Executed in the time of Charles V, Fernando is shown in a slightly more prominent position than Isabel (top, figure 3). Figure 4 (below) shows either Juana or Isabel. Continuing confusion about the true identity of the head in figure 4 stems from the treatment of a queen whose family kept her out of sight.
Figure 5. 'Johanna Regina'. This image of Juana wearing an imperial crown is the last of forty full-length pencil portraits of the sovereign kings and queens of Oviedo, León and Castile from Froila II onwards, said to have been prepared for the royal hall of the Alcázar of Segovia, by order of Philip II. BL, Cotton Vespasian, xii, f. 52
**Figure 6.** ‘Juana La Loca ante el féretro de Felipe el Hermoso’. Eduardo Rosales, 1860. This sketch of Juana weeping over Philip’s coffin is one of several nineteenth-century representations of Juana’s ‘mad’ grief in the Prado’s collection. (Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid)
Figure 7. ‘Huldebetoon aan de jeugige Karel V’. Albrecht de Vriendt, 1886. One of several paintings by Vriendt of a similar subject, Philip and Margaret of York, dowager Duchess of Burgundy, are depicted in a prominent position beside Charles’ cradle. But viewers would be hard pressed to identify among those present Charles own mother, Juana, who bequeathed him his great Spanish inheritance. (Koninklijke Musea voor Schone Kunsten, Brussels. Detail)
flourishing in the gaps of serious historical analysis. Examples of good sense have been explained away as ‘moments of lucidity’. This approach brings to mind the question asked by the supposedly mad movie star, whose husband is seeking to confine her, in James Lee Burke’s Louisiana thriller, Purple Cane Road: ‘How does one accused of being mentally impaired prove she is not mentally impaired? It’s like trying to prove a negative’. Once the historian is convinced of Juana’s madness, or mental fragility, whatever she did or did not do (her fears and sorrows before setting sail from Laredo in 1496; her failure to weep in public at Philip’s death in 1506; her refusal to sign government documents in 1506-1507 or 1520; her ability to survive the nightmarish years of imprisonment and intense surveillance) is interpreted in this light. The figure of ‘La Loca’ seems to render such remarks irresistibile, where elsewhere they might seem gratuitous.

Currently, however, there are signs of growing interest in Juana as a political figure. In the above-mentioned The Changing Face of Empire, a seminal study on the crucial transition period of the 1550s when the Habsburg empire seemed on the verge of collapse, María José Rodríguez-Salgado was the first to insist on the importance of Juana’s survival in terms of Charles V’s policies, particularly with regard to the continuing fundamental nature of Juana’s title as reina proprietaria and the matter of the succession.62 Julio Valdeón Baruque indicates that: ‘... the image that Juana offered was not as negative as has traditionally been believed’; she was a woman of ‘undoubted character’, sane, if sometimes prone to depression.63 Some recent essays have raised the possibility that Juana was willing to co-govern. In one essay of 2002, Fernández Álvarez shifts away from his previous conviction about her repugnance to affairs of state by concluding that ‘it was not that Juana did not want to govern, but simply that she needed time ... What she wanted was to govern with the advice of her father ...’. In a more recent article he re-asserted this view, in both cases citing a little

62 María José Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559 (Cambridge, 1988): 33-34
63 Valdeón Baruque, ‘La Reina y sus Planteamientos Políticos’, in FRP, Doña Juana: 49
known letter of 10 February 1511 from Juana’s gaoler, Luis Ferrer, to Fernando, which has not been discussed in the work of Aram or Zalama.\footnote{Fernández Álvarez, 'La crisis sucesoria a finales del reinado de Isabel la Católica', in Valdeón Baruque, ed., Sociedad y Economía en Tiempos de Isabel la Católica (Valladolid, 2002): 258; 'La Cautiva de Tordesillas', in FRP, Doña Juana: 83-95. The letter mentioned above (Z. ADP 787. 77, 10 August 1511) was published in Ángel Canelas, ed., Fuentes de Zurita, IV (Zaragoza, 1969): 155-159. Fernández Álvarez quotes only brief, if important, extracts from this long letter.}

In 2004 an acute, if brief, analysis by medieval historian Josemi Lorenzo Arribas, placed Juana within the gendered context of the problems faced by other Spanish queens. His study rejects the charge of ‘madness’, detecting, rather, a pattern in which Juana’s more extreme conduct or actions arose invariably from deprivation of freedom of movement. As queen, she did not show an appetite for power – or not, at any rate, ‘de la manera desmesurada que la Historia muestra que tienen los candidates a gobernantes’; this, in itself, notes Arribas, was seen as a kind of madness.\footnote{Arribas, Juana I: 65-66}

Discussing Juana’s actions in 1506, including her signature on the Treaty of Windsor, Isabel Del Val Valdivieso thought that Juana, nevertheless, wished to govern: ‘Her conduct then suggested that Juana wanted to govern, but with her father’s support, which is what she must have understood as the responsible exercise of her new commitment’.\footnote{Del Val Valdivieso, Isabel la Católica: 185} Such considerations, not examined in detail, point to the continuing need for a serious study of Juana’s political role.

1.2. An impossible thesis?

As mentioned above, one of Juana’s most notable recent biographers, Zalama, remains categorical about the impossibility of producing a study of Juana’s queenship ‘except in the negative’. Not only does this remain, in my view, arguable, but also raises the question as to how ‘negativity’ may be understood. How, too, did Juana see herself? What mattered to her? How did other princes, nobles, ambassadors, procurators and people in general see her? What of that period in her life, her brief effective reign between 1506-1507, when she seemed to have the best opportunity yet to exercise power, and what were the consequences of the failure to immediately implement her major initiatives in December 1506? How significant was she as a political figure between 1504-
1521, not only in terms of what she did and did not do, but as the personification of an idea, and whether active and seen, passive and unseen?

In order to answer such questions I gathered much primary material, both documentary and published, known, overlooked and forgotten, and also reviewed a wide range of secondary sources. By analysing Juana’s role and significance during the crises of 1504-1521, which were fundamentally crises of legitimacy, I have restored her to the political role she once had, without re-inventing Juana as a dynamic would-be ruler.

As mentioned above, Aram has carried out particularly detailed work on Juana’s period in the Low Countries, her households and issues connected with use of Juana’s signature, while Zalama has worked in detail on Juana’s incarceration at Tordesillas. Neither has focused to the same depth or detail on the period of Juana’s brief effective reign, which lies at the core of this thesis, and for which I have included material absent from the above-mentioned studies. Apart from taking a closer look than usual at well-known sources such as Querini, I had recourse to other, less familiar and overlooked material in Guevara; Naturel; Corner; Stile; the memorial by the Constable’s nephew; the letters for 1506 contained in the anonymous ‘Relación de las Comunidades’; the royal provisions for 1507 and the above-mentioned letter to Fernando from Luis Ferrer, which casts light on Juana’s own thoughts about the earlier period, as well as about her situation at Tordesillas in 1511, and which I have treated for the first time in detail.

Juana was trapped within two double identities: as daughter, yet sovereign queen, and as Trastámara monarch, yet Habsburg wife and mother. As such Juana faced unique problems. Without denying the essential importance of her experience as wife and mother, the study examines Juana’s changing strategies. An introductory Chapter 2 describes events leading to Isabel’s will of 1504 and Juana’s proclamation as Queen. Adopting the view that the succession crisis took the form of a three-way conflict, Chapters 3 and 4 examine the different strategies of Fernando and Philip as well as of Juana between 1504-1506. Chapter 4 follows the formation of a Queen’s ‘party’ during the course of the second journey to Spain. Chapter 5 analyses the problems faced by Juana in the immediate aftermath of Philip’s death, and the way in which she sought to resolve them. Chapter 6 looks at the relations between Queen and Royal Council
through a series of small case studies. Chapter 7 analyses the deterioration in
relations between Juana and Fernando and the thoughts and situation of Juana as
described in the above-mentioned, neglected letter of Ferrer’s. It also looks at
the widespread unrest that broke out after Fernando’s death and at Charles’ bid
for the kingship of Castile and Aragon and Juana’s struggles with her gaolers.
Chapter 8 assesses her role, and views about her, in the Comunero uprising.
While aware of the unique characteristics of the period, this study also sets Juana
within the wider context of persisting medieval notions vis-à-vis the monarchy,
connected with honour; the practice of seizure or abduction of the person of the
monarch; tyranny; ‘uselessness’ and the ‘mystic’ body.

Juana endured another thirty-four years of captivity, during which other
matters, not least her irregular religious practices, assumed increasing importance
to those around her. But it is the earlier period, covered here, that provides the
criteria by which she has been judged. This study asks whether the period
leading up to the revolutionary situation of 1520-1522 can properly be
understood without consideration of her political impact both as sole vehicle of
legitimate power and as a queen who, contrary to the prevailing view, used her
power and influence to obtain certain outcomes, irrespective of their success or
failure when judged by her own terms.

Before venturing further, I should clarify the notions in the thesis title:
‘struggle for power’; ‘age of transition’. To take the last phrase first, there is
evidently a sense in which all ages can be termed transitional. But here the word
‘transition’ takes on the sense of something unique. The period dealt with is,
firstly, one of dynastic rupture. The dynastic crisis that begins with Juan’s death
in 1497 does not end until after the Comunero period. Secondly, the power
struggle of 1504-1506, in effect, between Trastámaras and Habsburgs, brought in
its wake a wider crisis that touched the nature of government itself. As Alonso
García indicates in his study of the fiscal situation in Castile between 1504-1525,
these two decades formed a ‘unique cycle’ in Spanish history. Despite the
continuing potency of traditional, medieval concepts of monarchy as they
affected Juana, neither the years preceding Isabel’s death, nor those following the
end of the Comunero period were governed by the same criteria as those that
applied then. Nor, as he has argued elsewhere, did the ‘crisis’ in question necessarily lead to a ‘decline’, but had its own political characteristics. It should, of course, be noted that many of Juana’s contemporaries saw Isabel’s reign as a beacon in a sea of darkness. One commentator, among others, accused Fernando of deviating from Isabel’s radiant model of probity to resuscitate old problems. At the same time, crises are not always, or not only, a symptom of malaise but also of health and vigour.

As for the term ‘power struggle’, what is meant here by ‘power’? In her work on early medieval English queens, Pauline Stafford reminds us of a range of definitions. Firstly: ‘It is the ability or chance to realise our own will, if necessary against the resistance of others. It is efficacy, that is, the ability to act effectively, to produce effects, with some definitions concerning coercion, threat and force’. But some feminist anthropologists have made other definitions, and ‘concerned with this overemphasis on coercion and force, prefer to stress that power is the ability to have and follow a strategy, to be a social actor, to have long and short-term aims and to be able to follow them – with the emphasis on strategy and pursuit rather than primarily on successful outcome’.

In his classic study of power, Steven Lukes has argued that ‘negative’ actions or failures ‘can sometimes properly be seen as actions with consequences’. In the analysis of power, positive actions have no special significance; there are times when to act can, in reality, be a sign of weakness. In this sense, a ‘negative’ portrayal of Juana may be as important as a ‘positive’ one. When assessing Juana’s role in the struggles of 1504-1521 I have, therefore, seen power as process, strategy and aim, as well as coercion and force, and in terms of ‘negative’ strength as well as ‘positive’ strength – or weakness.

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67 Alonso García, El Erario: 349
69 ‘... después de la muerte de [Isabel], el Rey católico Fernando se desvió en diferentes cosas del modo y forma de gobierno que había guardado su mujer [y] algunos inconvenientes renacieron ...’ Fernández Álvarez, ed., Corpus Documental de Carlos V, I, ‘Cisneros a Adriano VI’, X: 64-69 [1517?]. Fernández Álvarez casts doubt on the traditional attribution to Cisneros of this letter.
70 Pauline Stafford, ‘Emma: The Powers of the Queen’ in Anne Duggan, ed., Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe (Woodbridge, 2002): 11
71 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Hampshire/New York, 2005)
The power ‘struggle’ referred to is, more accurately, a succession of struggles between 1504-1521. They took place in a theatre of power, built on, and enmeshed with, fictional constructs designed to create illusions or deceits. Juana I always retained her proprietary status and, until her death (but especially until the end of the Comunero uprising), those who wielded power in Juana’s name had to walk a tightrope between her titular authority and actual invisibility. This could involve elaborate processes of pretence and deception, not only vis-à-vis Juana herself, but her subjects and some who governed in her name.

Throughout I have borne in mind what has been surprisingly lost from view: the consequences of the fact that, from beginning to end of the period studied (not just from 1509) Juana was a prisoner or hostage, her movements always restricted and subjected to intense scrutiny. This was so even of the period immediately after Philip’s death, when her captivity was not so evident, but when her margin for manoeuvre remained very small. Most historians have accepted that Juana was confined because of passions and infirmities already entrenched, and ignore the effect of imprisonment on her actions, or failure to act. How, this study asks, did the fact of her imprisonment affect her strategies and attitudes throughout this entire period?

1.3. Juana’s vital trail

One windy day, a Peninsular War survivor told Bergenroth, he saw French soldiers at Simancas throwing bundles of documents from a balcony so that the ‘neighbouring field looked as though it were covered with snow’. Other problems were caused, Bergenroth believed, by those he darkly calls ‘private persons’, who ‘carried away some interesting letters’. Whether some related to Juana we do not know. But anyone tracing her footprint is faced with a huge difficulty: the limited and fragmentary nature of the sources, notably those emanating from Juana herself.

How, as former director of the Archivo General de Simancas, José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, has asked, ‘is it possible to follow the vital trail of a person

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72 Cartwright, Gustave Bergenroth: 60
isolated and marginalised, on whom silence and confinement were imposed? This problem of Juana’s documentary footprint was compounded by her own perceptions about the traps and fictions that beset her life in captivity. In one instance, Denia responded to Juana’s curiosity about Maximilian, of whose death she was not informed, by encouraging her to write to him. Juana, wary, told him to do so himself. Inversely, Denia refused to allow Juana to write, as she wished, to the grandees. Nevertheless, the dearth of material in Juana’s earlier years surprised Jerónimo Zurita, who refers to the bafflement of those who ‘knew that the Queen wrote letters with such facility and ease that few of the kings of Castile and Aragon, her antecedents, could write better’. Juana wrote letters as Archduchess, Princess and Queen and signed orders or cédulas. Many such documents have not survived or remain unaccounted for. Katherine, for instance, tells Isabel that ‘although the Archduchess had written that [Isabel’s] daily attacks of ague and the fever which followed upon the ague, had disappeared’, she [Katherine] could not be satisfied or cheerful until she heard news from Isabel herself. The letters Juana wrote to Fernando in 1505 and 1506 were intercepted and reportedly destroyed on Philip’s orders, or by his hands. As regards orders Juana signed in 1507 I have, so far, been unable to trace one to which Zurita refers, relating to the Ponferrada crisis, while most held at Simancas relate to household payments for 1506-1507. After Fernando’s return to Castile Juana ceased to use her signature altogether. During the Comunero period Juana, effectively a hostage, refused to put pen to paper. The only direct political statement by Juana is to be found in her major law of December 1506. Two other documents that probably approach Juana’s views are contained in the above-mentioned letter from her gaoler, Luis Ferrer, to Fernando, and the record of her speech to the procurators in 1520.

This paucity of documentation from Juana inevitably shifts attention to other, less direct sources, including Royal Council provisions, private

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74 See Chapter 8
75 Jerónimo Zurita, Historia del Rey Hernando el Católico: De las Empresas y ligas de Italia, ed. Ángel Canellas López (Zaragoza, 1994), IV: 156
76 CSP. Sp. 1, 413, 26 November 1504 (the day of Isabel’s death)
77 See Chapter 5. 3
78 Z. ADP 787. 77, 10 August 1511: 155-159; AGS, PR, CC 4, f. 75, September 1520
correspondence, diplomatic despatches, key Cortes and Junta proceedings, as well as histories and chronicles. Much of this material can be found in the incomparable manuscript collection in the General Archive of Simancas. In Madrid I consulted the manuscript collection of Luis Salazar y Castro at the Royal Academia de la Historia, as well as that of the Biblioteca Nacional, Biblioteca Real and Archivo Histórico Nacional (Toledo). I visited the Archives du Département du Nord (Lille), which houses the accounts of the Burgundian court but also a rich collection of correspondence from the crucial period of 1506, and the collection of Venetian despatches in the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (Venice). At the British Library I consulted, inter alia, the manuscript collection of Pascual de Gayangos, which comprises a wide and miscellaneous range of original manuscripts as well as transcriptions and copies of others. The National Archive at Kew (London) contains a variety of diplomatic material for the period. The great nineteenth-century compilers and transcribers of manuscripts, such as Bergenroth, Gachard and Manuel Danvila y Collado, were essential reading.79

If the primary sources are fragmentary they are also partial and in almost no case emanate from an official employed directly by Juana, who might, therefore, owe her loyalty. Envoys and ambassadors were not necessarily more detached than other observers. They were affected not only by their own cultural mindsets and foreign policy briefs, but by the views and rumours passed on by their (inevitably partisan) contacts. Moreover, diplomats were only extremely rarely granted access to Juana, whereas they enjoyed constant access to her husband, father or son, and were thus unable to form an independent opinion over time. Nonetheless, some of the information conveyed by envoys and ambassadors is invaluable, not least because it is frequently the only source for a particular event or expression of opinion. This study relies much on diplomatic despatches as it relies on other sources in Spanish, Italian, English, French and German — some better known than others.

Of great value for understanding Juana’s situation in the Low Countries is the published correspondence of Spanish ambassador, soldier and knight commander of Membrilla, Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida, who represented

79 Gachard, ed., Collection, I; Manuel Davila, Historia Crítica y Documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla (Madrid, 1897-1899)
Isabel and Fernando, then Fernando alone, in the Holy Roman Empire, England and the Low Countries between 1496-1509. His despatches reveal the escalating problems in Juana’s and Philip’s marriage and subsequently cast light on the embittered marriage negotiations between Fernando and Henry VII with respect to Juana. Just as importantly, Fuensalida’s earlier correspondence reveals the intimidatory pressures that led him, in 1505, to the verge of shifting his loyalties from Fernando to Philip, and describes a growing atmosphere of paranoia, and even terror at the Coudenberg Palace, Brussels, prior to the second journey to Spain.  

In his study of Renaissance diplomacy Garrett Mattingly refers to Fuensalida as generally quarrelsome with his diplomatic colleagues, adding that if Fernando had trusted his representatives more, his diplomatic service would have worked with less friction and greater efficiency. Fuensalida’s ‘quarrelling’ at Brussels in 1505 is, however, understandable in the light of the fact that, for example, another of Fernando’s ambassadors, the extremely able Juan Manuel, had already switched his loyalties to Philip, becoming one of his most important advisers. Although Fuensalida never followed Manuel in this, there are instances in which, between 1504-1505, Fuensalida signed joint letters that are clearly sympathetic to Philip and critical of Juana, and which seek to justify the failure to pass Fernando’s letters on to his daughter.

To what extent this may be attributable to Juana’s own failings or to Philip’s policy of deliberately isolating Juana is problematic. Fuensalida’s correspondence shows a striking change in his attitude to Juana between 1500 and 1505. During 1500 and until the end of 1501, when Juana and Philip undertook their first journey to Spain together, relations between Fuensalida and the Archduchess and Princess were excellent. But after Juana’s return to the Low Countries (where Fuensalida had remained) they underwent a quick and serious deterioration, as he, like most Spaniards, lost all direct contact with the Queen.

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80 Duque de Berwick y de Alba, ed., Correspondencia de Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida, embajador en Alemania, Flandes e Inglaterra (1496-1509), (Madrid, 1907)
82 Fuensalida, as Aram asserts, ‘failed to accord Juana the respect due to her as proprietary heiress’ (Juana the Mad: 78).
Fuensalida also showed a greater tendency than before to sympathise with Philip's predicament with respect to Juana. \(^{83}\)

The despatches of Vincenzo Querini (Quirini) to Doge Loredano Loredan offer outstanding testimony for the crucial period between 1505-1506. According to Rawdon Brown, who translated his despatches from Germany, the Low Countries and Spain into English, Querini was born in the same year as Juana. He belonged to a prominent Venetian family, studied at Padua and became interested in church reform. He was appointed ambassador to Maximilian and subsequently to Philip and Juana, but returned to Venice in October 1506, before setting out again for Germany. In 1511 he entered the Benedictine order of Eremites at Carnaldoli under the name of 'Piero', for reasons Brown describes as unclear, and later reportedly rejected a cardinal's hat. He died young, in 1514. \(^{84}\)

On 28 April 1505 Querini wrote that 'it was to her [Juana] especially that your Serenity appointed me ambassador'. The reason can probably be found in the general context of Venice's foreign policy at the time. France's conquest of Naples in 1494 and its destabilising effects on the peninsula had stirred Venice into signing up to the Holy League in 1495, 'designed', in Chrimes' words, 'to restrain Charles VIII's aggrandizements'. \(^{85}\) After the creation of this political and military alliance Venice sent special ambassadors to its allies, following them with the establishment of permanent diplomatic representation through 'residents'. Although Charles decided to return to France after the League's formation (by Venice, the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire, Milan, Spain, with England joining later) he was soon succeeded by Louis XII, a Visconti on his mother's side, with dynastic claims to Milan. As Louis prepared his own invasion of Italy, the League broke up, foundering, among other things, on a quarrel between Venice and Milan over Pisa and a new papal alliance with Louis. \(^{86}\) With the advent of a new Pope, Julius II, suspicious of Venice's expansionist policies, the Republic faced a new enemy. By the autumn of 1504 Julius had managed to bring Louis and Maximilian into an alliance against

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\(^{83}\) The problem is addressed in Chapter 3.

\(^{84}\) TNA, PRO 31/14.1, Rawdon Brown, ed., 'Transcripts and Translations from the Despatches and Reports of Vincenzo Querini, 1505-1506' (1872)

\(^{85}\) Chrimes, *Henry VII*: 278

Venice (Treaty of Blois, 22 September 1504). But the succession crisis that followed the death of Isabel of Castile eventually led to a new rift between Louis on one side and Maximilian and Philip on the other, and a corresponding *rapprochement* between Louis and Fernando. Querini’s despatches from the Low Countries, England and Castile show his impatience with Philip’s ‘malignant’ pro-French – or anti-*fernandino* – advisers and their procrastination in leaving for Spain and attempts to undermine any chance of a quick and peaceful reconciliation between the new monarchs of Castile and the ‘King of Spain’.

On arriving at the Burgundian court Querini undoubtedly hoped and expected to be able to talk and consult from time to time with the daughter and heir of the Catholic monarchs, whose powerful political status as proprietary Queen of Castile should have been further enhanced by the fact that she was now the mother of several children, including a male heir. He might also have expected that, combined with Maximilian’s, Juana’s influence over Philip, as queen in her own right, and as his wife and mother of his children, would effectively counteract Philip’s pro-French ‘maligni’. Nevertheless, for reasons that will be addressed, Querini records only one meeting with Juana, in 1505 during the whole time he spent at Philip’s court. His description of Juana’s character and position, or positions, in 1505-1506, while by no means hostile, was, thus, based almost entirely on partial sources caught up in a power struggle. He cultivated an acquaintance with Fernando’s ambassadors and officials, as well as with Philip himself and with close advisers of differing opinions such as Juan Manuel and Philip’s master of horse, Claude de Bouton, and later with Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo. In other words, the Venetian diligently reported a variety of views from those who served both Philip and Fernando, as well as from the relatively few, like Juana’s secretary, Sebastián de Olano, who remained loyal to the Queen.

Querini has been selectively and at times inaccurately reported by those seeking to lay the emphasis on Juana’s unfitness to govern. A close reading of the original despatches shows, however, that Querini does not express a direct personal view about Juana’s capacity to govern. Certainly his (second-hand) view of Juana seems to change over time, although not necessarily for the precise reasons that Fuensalida’s view of Juana changes. After his only audience with her, Juana struck Querini as a ‘very prudent’ woman. He describes her elsewhere
as motivated by a desire to seek harmony between her father and husband, and
damming of the greed and ambition that motivated some of Philip’s chief advisers
and negotiators. But, apparently particularly perplexed by her hostility to a
female entourage, he attributes this to her ‘jealousy’, the conventional wisdom at
the Burgundian court. He also describes Juana’s attempt to flee Philip’s court in
1506 as unqueenly, although he describes her in his end-of-term relazione to the
Venetian Senate of October 1506 as ‘servando quella gravità que a regina se
conviene’.

In this same report he remarks that Philip’s death had deprived him of his
main subject, a statement implying that, by then, and perhaps, especially after the
Cortes of Valladolid, he no longer expected Juana to emerge from seclusion and
exercise power. He looks back on Philip as ‘così grande e nobile e così virtuoso’,
naturally good, intelligent, liberal, affable and benign, if also irresolute, slow to
respond and over-dependent on his council. This ‘poor and unhappy’ prince had
to contend with the all-consuming jealousy of his wife; yet, he adds, he had
himself found Juana to be intelligent, of quick understanding and suitably grave
and regal in her manner and bearing.\footnote{Querini, ‘Relazione di Borgogna, con aggiunta de alcuni particolari intorno i regni
d’Inghilterra e di Castiglìa, letta in pregadi da Vincenzo Quirini l’anno 1506’, in Eugenio Albéri, ed.,
Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato (Florence, 1839), Series I, 1, 2: 4-6. Querini
does not mention here the episode at Benavente, or Juana’s power struggle with Philip.}

The particular value of his despatches to the Venetian Senate lies in the
fact that he never loses sight of her importance. Rawdon Brown, himself
convinced of Juana’s ‘madness’, comments of Querini’s despatches that: ‘the
reader [will not] consider it unworthy of notice that, on more than one occasion,
the victor in this political duel [between Philip and Fernando] was very nearly
outwitted by his demented consort, who single-handedly did her utmost to thwart
him on every occasion’.\footnote{TNA, PRO 31/14.1, f. 8 (introduction)} I would, however, emphasise that, rather than a duel,
Querini’s despatches point to an essentially three-way conflict. From his
interpretation of events, Juana emerges as a far from passive figure, angry and
politically committed, who, while not always behaving as she should, pursued a
strategy, or strategies, aimed at reconciliation with Fernando, of which, as
Venetian orator, he approved.
Querini’s despatches exist in sixteenth-century copies bequeathed by Girolamo Contarini to the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice in 1843.\textsuperscript{89} They were published in the original Italian by Constantin von Höfler in 1884.\textsuperscript{90} Some omissions were filled by the earlier English-language transcriptions of Rawdon Brown, available at the National Archive, Kew and including Querini’s despatches from the court of Maximilian I.\textsuperscript{91} Other Venetian despatches used here include those of Querini’s colleague in Germany in 1504-1505, Francesco Cappello, and, in greater detail, those of Francesco Corner, ambassador to Fernando’s court in 1508-1509. Like Querini, Corner records his frustrated attempts to visit Juana, as well as Fernando’s ‘travaglio’ when imprisoning the Queen at Tordesillas and the political discontentment of prominent figures like the Constable of Castile, Bernardino Fernández de Velasco y Mendoza and his friend, the ‘Great Captain’, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba. His testimony for the period between 1508-1509 is, thus, of much value to this study.\textsuperscript{92}

Diego de Guevara-Jouvelle, whom Philip sent to Fernando’s court, offers revealing testimony about the crisis in 1506, adding to a vital understanding of Juana’s part in that crisis. Guevara, who later became well known as a patron and art collector, and is the subject of a splendid portrait by Michael Sittow (figure 21), belonged to a family of Spanish origin long resident in the Low Countries. His father, Ladrón de Guevara, had carried out various diplomatic assignments on behalf of Maximilian I; his uncle, also called Diego, had worked both for Fernando and Maximilian. The younger Diego had been a page to Philip’s grandfather, Charles the ‘Bold’, and remained at court as Philip’s adviser and special envoy.\textsuperscript{93} At the time of Philip’s death he led an abortive attempt to abduct the Infante Fernando from Simancas, and after returning in haste to the Low Countries, with a number of other servants of Philip, continued to serve Margaret and Charles.

\textsuperscript{89} Vincenzo Querini, ‘Despacci, Spagna, 1504-1506’, BNMVe, VII, cod. 1129 (7452)
\textsuperscript{90} Constantin R. von Höfler, ed., \textit{Depeschen des venetianischen Botschaft bei Erzherzog Philipp, Dr Vincenzo Quirino, 1505-1506} (Vienna, 1884)
\textsuperscript{91} TNA, PRO 31/14.1
\textsuperscript{92} Francesco Corner, ‘Dispacci, Spagna’, BNM (Venice), IT. VII. 1108 (7448)
\textsuperscript{93} Miguel-Ángel Ochoa Brun, \textit{Historia de la Diplomacia Española}, IV, ‘Los Reyes Católicos’ (Madrid, 2003): 307-308
Although Guevara was the Queen’s maître d’hôtel in 1506, the post was awarded not by Juana but Philip, in keeping with his consistent and longstanding policy to retain complete control over all appointments to his wife’s household. Guevara, thus, owed exclusive loyalty to Philip. The importance of his testimony lies in the letters and in the advice he wrote to Philip in June and July 1506, after being sent to investigate the situation in Fernando’s court. Apart from showing the growing importance of Juana as a political figure in the summer of 1506 his letters also reflect changes in viewpoint (his own, but also that of others) during a rapidly developing chain of events. These despatches, held in the Archives du Département du Nord (Lille), were published in the appendix to Gachard’s above-mentioned first volume of his Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas.94 But these are not always complete, and, when comparing Gachard’s published transcriptions with the documents archived at Lille, I found that a fragment throwing further light on the development of a Queen’s ‘party’ in 1506 had been omitted (see Chapter 4).

Philip’s representatives in Rome included the Provost of Utrecht, Burgundian-born Philibert Proudhomme, better known as Naturel, or Naturelli, and two who had formerly served the Catholic monarchs – the humanist scholar and erstwhile papal candidate, Bernardino López de Carvajal, Cardinal of Santa Cruz, and the no less flamboyant and formidable António de Acuña, later Bishop of Zamora and Comunero leader. Like Guevara’s, Naturel’s despatches to Philip (also to be found in the Archives du Département du Nord at Lille) testify, inter alia, to Juana’s crucial significance in 1506 and to the bitter quarrels over the relative status and importance of Juana, Fernando and Philip that divided Philip’s envoys in Rome at least as much as they divided Fernando’s in Brussels in 1504-1505.95

Wieslecker describes Maximilian’s Cremonese ambassador, Andrea da Borgo, one of several Italians who worked for the Emperor, as ‘undoubtedly one of the Emperor’s most capable diplomats’, closely allied with Matthias Lang and Mercurino Gattinara.96 Ambassadors could possess full powers to negotiate and conclude treaties and, if the situation immediately after Philip’s death is anything

94 Gachard, Collection, I: 341-385
95 See Chapter 4
96 Wieslecker, Kaiser Maximilian, V: 485
to go by, could even participate, as a ruler’s representative, in running affairs. Borgo was one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Salamanca (1505). He was present at the meeting between Philip and Fernando at Remesal and later, at Renedo de Esgueva, in 1506. After Philip’s death he and Veyré joined Cisneros and various Castilian grandees as provisional arbiters of ‘all differences and dissensions’ – testimony in itself to the extraordinary atmosphere of crisis that prevailed – and witnessed Juana’s departure from Burgos that December. He was intensively active, on Maximilian’s behalf, in attempts to prevent Fernando’s return to Castile and to set up a regency council favourable to the interests of Maximilian and Charles, pending their heralded arrival in Castile. An interesting letter from Borgo, in the context of a campaign to pave the way for a Caroline regency, was published in Rodríguez Villa’s above-mentioned Bosquejo biográfico de la Reina Juana, and the archives at Lille contain some letters to Maximilian’s daughter Margaret, then Regent of the Low Countries, in which Borgo informs her of his meetings with nobles favourable to Charles, like the Marquis of Villena and Duke of Nájera, and begs for funds.  

Borgo’s experience reminds us of the dangers of the diplomatic vocation, at a time when various envoys were drowned, imprisoned or attacked by robbers on lonely roads. Expelled from Spain by Fernando in 1507, sent by Maximilian to England and effectively deported from Laredo after an attempted re-entry into Castile, he was thereafter sent to France, where, on one occasion he narrowly escaped burial in an Alpine avalanche.

In his dissertation on the 1504-1506 power struggle Hábler notes that information from Borgo was tantalisingly hard to come by. Given the extent of his protagonism, his eventful life and his close contacts with some Castilian nobles at a crucial time in 1506-1507 I regret that I have not, to date, unearthed more correspondence from Borgo for this period and the matter clearly needs further attention. Among Maximilian’s other sources of information for this period, I have consulted the letters of Philip’s German infantry captain and

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97 See Chapters 6 and 7  
98 Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian, V: 488-489  
99 Hábler, Der Streit Ferdinands: 17. A similar comment may be made about the papal nuncio, Giovanni Ruffo dei Teodoli, a friend of Martire, and the other ‘triumvirs’, who acted on behalf of Talavera during the judicial inquiry in Rome into Talavera’s alleged heresies (see Chapter 6).
chamberlain, Count Wolfgang von Fürstenberg. A longstanding servant of Maximilian, the Emperor-Elect had entrusted him with the task of protecting and advising his son during the second Spanish journey. His letters to Maximilian seem to have helped inform some of the woodcuts in the Emperor’s Weiß Kunig. Indeed, his view of the Spanish journey is, like these, black and white. Philip is portrayed with enthusiasm, as noble and gracious. On the other hand, aware of the dangers besetting Philip in a Spain where he feels that both the King of Aragon and Queen of Castile are pitted against his charge, Fürstenberg’s attitude to both Fernando and Juana is one of outright hostility.

One of Europe’s most astute monarchs, Henry VII was always well informed about events on the continent. Indeed, according to one recent study, the depth of his understanding of Italian politics astounded Italian diplomats at his court. His awareness of the importance of intelligence stems, undoubtedly, from his extraordinary background prior to accession in 1485. Henry, long exiled in Brittany and France, and dynastically insecure, was a virtual nonentity on the international scene. But he worked to strengthen his position, to eliminate the capacity of Scotland, France, Spain and the Low Countries to profit from Yorkist pretenders and claimants, to extinguish once and for all the dynastic threat of the ‘White Rose’, and to cement international alliances through marriage. His envoys’ reports offer fascinating and informative accounts of the situation in Castile, whether at Medina del Campo in 1489, Toro in 1505 or Valladolid in 1509, although the latter reports have hitherto been neglected in studies of Fernando and Juana. The succession crisis of 1504-1506 led Henry to re-evaluate his relations with Fernando and in 1505 he sent envoys specifically to probe the situation following Isabel’s death. Henry seems to have concluded that if Fernando were forced to relinquish power in Castile the fortunes of Aragon would sink drastically. That he set great store by his relations with the new monarchs of Castile is reflected not only by his lavish hospitality towards them

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101 Currin, ‘Henry VII, France and the Holy League’: 526-527

102 Chrimes, Henry VII: 276-277

103 See Chapter 3
in 1506 but by the huge sums of money he lent Philip in 1505 – £108,000 on 25 April and another £30,000 on 27 September.\textsuperscript{104}

One of his envoys, John Stile, became Henry's first resident ambassador to a secular court in 1505 and remained there until 1510, with another stay between 1512-1517. A number of his letters are to be found in published collections.\textsuperscript{105} The assessment that Mattingly makes of various diplomats in his study of Renaissance diplomacy can be withering, and he describes Stile as 'without wealth or breeding or court graces and, apparently, neither learned nor intelligent'.\textsuperscript{106} Yet Stile's network of contacts was large and, if as Fernando's ambassador, Fuensalida, suspected, he collected malicious rumours and spread disinformation (or information damaging to Fernando), his comments can be apposite and perceptive, and are always interesting. I have had recourse to him wherever possible.

A French perspective has been harder to obtain. Mattingly points out that, France was 'a laggard in diplomacy as she was forward in war'. As the biggest power in Europe, populous and relatively stable, with regular revenues and a large standing army, France's very security militated against a sense of the importance of diplomatic relations compared to that being developed by her weaker neighbours.\textsuperscript{107} Louis XII sent envoys to the Low Countries and Spain, but neither he nor, in his earlier years, François I, had any resident ambassadors outside Italy – the focal point of France's foreign adventures. Louis did send ephemeral delegations to the Low Countries and Spain, including one to Philip's court in November 1505, in an attempt to dissuade Philip from the second Spanish journey, or at the least to encourage him to travel through France and not by sea. He also sent an embassy to Spain at the time of the Cortes of Valladolid. Juana herself received an envoy from Louis at the end of 1506, with instructions to ascertain her attitude to Fernando.\textsuperscript{108} But the lack of a French resident in either country makes it harder to ascertain the diplomatic view in relation to Juana.

\textsuperscript{104} Chrimes, \textit{Henry VII}: 287-290

\textsuperscript{105} Stile's published letters are to be found in James Gairdner, ed., \textit{Memorials of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh} (London, 1858); A. F. Pollard, ed., \textit{The reign of Henry VII from Contemporary Sources} (London, 1913); John Sherren Brewer, ed., \textit{Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII} (London, 1920)

\textsuperscript{106} Mattingly, \textit{Renaissance Diplomacy}: 152

\textsuperscript{107} Mattingly, \textit{Renaissance Diplomacy}: 126-127

\textsuperscript{108} See Chapter 5
Some indications of the French reaction to events can, however, be found in various collections of diplomatic correspondence, such as the despatches edited by Giuseppe Canestrini and published by Abel Desjardins, and others by André Joseph Ghislain Le Glay, which include despatches from Philip’s ambassador, Jean de Courteville.\textsuperscript{109}

Other foreign observers were not necessarily more detached than ambassadors. The *Opus Epistolarum* of Pietro Martire de Anghiera, an Italian humanist resident in Spain, is a well-known and important collection of letters to monarchs, prelates, nobles and other political figures, first published five years after his death in 1526.\textsuperscript{110} His biographer, French historian J.-H. Mariéjol, who took Martire as the subject of his doctoral thesis in 1887, tells us that Martire, named after the martyred Dominican inquisitor, was born in Milan around 1457, and spent some time in Rome before his fateful meeting with the Spanish nobleman and later Alhambra governor, Inigo López de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla, whom, in 1487, he accompanied on his return to Spain. In Granada he entered the church but, aspiring to life at court, also took on the post of tutor to sons of the nobility. In 1492 Isabel appointed him a *continu*. Later he became a chaplain, and in 1501 was sent as envoy to Egypt.\textsuperscript{111} After Isabel’s death and Fernando’s enforced expulsion from Castile, the King of Aragon asked him to keep a close watch on Juana, and report back to him confidentially.\textsuperscript{112} Clearly, after Philip died, Martire supported Fernando’s return. During the Comunero period he helped Adrian as interpreter and adviser and sought advancement both from Adrian and Charles V, who appointed him to the Consejo de las Indias in 1518, at Martire’s request, and made him royal chronicler in March 1520.\textsuperscript{113} In his study of official histories of the period, Richard Kagan points out that Martire shared with his friend and correspondent, Charles’ grand chancellor Mercurino


\textsuperscript{110} Pietro Martire de Anghiera (Pedro Mártir de Anglería), *Epistolario*, ed., José López de Toro, in Documentos inéditos para la historia de España (Madrid, 1953), VIII-XI


\textsuperscript{112} Martire, X, 310: 144, 7 July 1506

\textsuperscript{113} Mariéjol, *Un Lettré*: 155
Arborio de Gattinara, a ‘messianic vision of Charles as an emperor whose destiny was to rule the world’.\textsuperscript{114}

Martire is generally treated as a reliable and detached source. Mariéjol describes the \textit{Opus} as his most important work, a ‘bouquet of diverse flowers’, reflecting an avid curiosity, at times prone to exaggeration and mistakes, but marked by charm and sincerity.\textsuperscript{115} Like all commentators, however, Martire had his prejudices. His attitude to Cisneros emerges as wary at best. Mariéjol describes it as consistently hostile. He notes that Martire cannot resist mocking Cisneros, in regard, for example, to the Archbishop’s African adventures, and believes that his barbs were sometimes unjustified.\textsuperscript{116} However, Mariéjol refutes criticism from some quarters that Martire was too harsh towards Juana. Rather, he tended to smile at the Queen’s extravagances, and noted for what they were ‘les manies, les inconstances, les fureurs, comme les instants de lucidité et de jugement pénétrant et ferme’.\textsuperscript{117}

Martire seems to have been able to observe Juana at different times between 1505-1508 and his letters form the single most influential source for the deeply-rooted view of Juana’s incurable melancholic apathy, just as they form the basis for the myth that her brother died of love. His comments are invaluable, and often incisive. They are also satirical and exaggerated. Their rhetorical devices play to a house of fellow humanists and are meant to entertain. Mariéjol dismisses the view that the original letters were amended after the event. A consensus has, nonetheless, grown that, in the absence of the originals, the published versions were manipulated both by Martire and posthumously. The chronology can be puzzling. Teresa Jiménez Calvente is among those to have noted numerous contradictions and errors of dating.\textsuperscript{118} As Mariéjol was aware, aspects of the correspondence also perplexed the eminent historian Leopold Ranke, who found it, as an edited work, vitiated by a conflation of cause and

\textsuperscript{115} Mariéjol, \textit{Un Lettré}: 173
\textsuperscript{116} Mariéjol, \textit{Un Lettré}: 110-111
\textsuperscript{117} Mariéjol, \textit{Un Lettré}: 92. Juana was not the only daughter of the Catholic monarchs to receive acid treatment from Martire’s pen, as can be seen from some remarks about their eldest daughter, Isabel.
\textsuperscript{118} Teresa Jiménez Calvente, ed., \textit{Un Siciliano en la España de los Reyes Católicos} (Alcalá, 2001): 101
effect, as well as by chronological error and warned that, as a diplomatic source, it should be approached with care.\(^{119}\)

While referring much to Martire, I have followed Ranke’s warning. Martire’s mirror cannot be escaped. It is a highly valuable yet distorting one, and his treatment of Juana can suffer from the conflation that Ranke noted. It must also be remembered that, far from being a detached foreign observer, Martire was an ambitious court official, who expected rewards for his services, and these he received not from Juana but Isabel, Fernando and Charles.\(^{120}\) All the same, one senses in a small number of Martire’s letters dating from 1507, when he was probably closer to her than at any other time, a genuine surprise that Juana, clearly gifted and politically aware, showed so little ambition on her own account, and such filial obedience.\(^{121}\)

Martire’s letters may be placed alongside the writings of two contemporaries. Pedro Alcocer belonged to the ‘family’ of Fernando’s staunch ally, Toledan procurador, Pedro (Pero) López de Padilla, and reflects, in colourful and simple language, his partisan support for Fernando and later, for Charles.\(^{122}\) As a criado of Padilla, clearly present at events, his testimony is particularly useful to this study in its coverage of the feverish summer of 1506, running parallel to and supplementing as it does Querini’s despatches – for example, where he focuses on Padilla as the leader, among Cortes representatives, of the movement in support of Juana’s rights as legitimate proprietary queen. However, unlike his master, or his master’s son, later Comunero leader Juan de Padilla, Alcocer himself does not sympathise with or support Juana, justifying both her imprisonment in 1509 and Charles’ seizure of power in 1516 on grounds of her ‘defecto de juicio’.

A negative view of Juana prevails in other contemporary sources relating to the Comunero period, and the years that immediately preceded the uprising. The exact identity of Juan Maldonado, a humanist, Burgos-based cleric, remains disputed. He wrote a singular, authoritative, relatively balanced and immensely readable account of the Comunero period, which he dedicated to Prince Philip

\(^{119}\) Leopold Ranke, \textit{Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber} (Leipzig, 1874): 101-114

\(^{120}\) See, for example, AGS, E.26, f. 144, payments to Martire

\(^{121}\) See Chapters 6 and 7 for his comments.

\(^{122}\) Alcocer, \textit{Relación}
in 1540, but which was translated from the Latin by Escorial librarian José Quevado only in the nineteenth century. His work adopts the form of a round-table discussion between a Frenchman, German, Toledan and the author, enabling him both to distance himself from, and include, the Toledan’s views, sympathetic to the Comunero cause. Juana does not overall feature positively in his account. She is mentioned seldom. Her imprisonment in Tordesillas, and Charles’ coup is glossed over. Nevertheless Juana’s political significance, and the hopes obstinately invested in her, emerge clearly from the narrative.¹²³

The same is true of the anonymous chronicle ‘Relación de las Comunidades’, a manuscript copy of which exists in the British Library, and which I have used here.¹²⁴ This version differs in spelling, syntax and, sometimes, in wording, from the copy beautifully edited by Ana Díez Medina and published in Spain under the title Relación del discurso de las Comunidades. The anonymous writer of the ‘Relación’, who claims to have been a former criado of Isabel’s, provides a particularly detailed and apparently eye-witness account of events in Toledo. The volume includes letters dating from 1506, which former studies of Juana have overlooked, although the contemporary chronicler, Alonso de Santa Cruz, seems to have been aware of them. The anonymous author clearly supports Charles and his view of Juana is as dismissive as his attitude to the Comuneros is hostile.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the Queen’s political significance emerges both from the engaging and sometimes dramatic narrative and the documents it incorporates, both for 1506 and 1520. These documents are important because they provide details of the concerns of Juana’s interlocutors, both grandees and procurators, and rare accounts of the way in which the Queen responded in the various exchanges between them.¹²⁶

Juana’s effective reign was too brief to allow for chroniclers of her own, who could rely on her favours. The official or semi-official chroniclers of the period examined here accepted a priori Juana’s inability to rule; to do anything else would have been tantamount to criticising the grounds on which the

¹²³ Maldonado, La revolución
¹²⁴ BL, Egerton 309, ‘Relación de las Comunidades y de lo que acaeció en la Ciudad de Toledo’; Relación del discurso de las Comunidades, ed., Ana Díez Medina (Valladolid, 2003)
¹²⁵ ‘En la Reyna no hay que hablar, porque siempre fue de la manera que es aora, ni ai para qué contra sus desatinos ni son por su culpa, sino por la falta de juicio’, BL Egerton 309, ‘Relación’, fs 9-9v.
¹²⁶ See Chapters 5 and 8
powerful rulers who governed in her place came to power. The particular importance for any monarch of a chronicler embedded in the royal entourage has been highlighted by Richard L. Kagan in his study of the official histories of Spanish monarchs between medieval times and the mid-eighteenth century. Kagan notes that, as monarchs who attached importance to the writing of history and left little to chance, Isabel and Fernando oversaw and coordinated their chroniclers. Chroniclers who, like Alonso de Palencia, became highly critical of Isabel, were soon dismissed. 127 These men were expected to act as temporal evangelists, immortalising the *fama* of their employers and sharing their goals. In the circumstances, and given that Juana was, throughout her reign, the prisoner of kings and emperors who exercised power in her stead, it is hardly surprising that, as Miguel-Ángel Ladero Quesada has noted, chroniclers and other writers contemporary with Juana paid her ‘relatively scant attention’, whether in her youth or subsequently. 128 This is, evidently, their main weakness for any study of Juana. Even so they offer glimpses of the Queen and remain essential for a wider understanding of the period.

Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal (1472-1525) was a longstanding royal councillor and royal chronicler. As Fernando’s Latin secretary and loyal supporter Galíndez de Carvajal was employed to ‘correct’ and rewrite a number of earlier chronicles. Later he also worked for Charles. He was, writes Kagan, ‘deeply imbued with the traditional Castilian idea that the true measure of a monarch was the extent to which he fought, like a crusader, to further the Christian faith’. 129 His *Anales breves del reinado de los Reyes Católicos* are exactly that – generally dry and brief. Despite his key position in the Royal Council during Juana’s effective reign, and the Council’s crucial role during that time, his annals offer regrettabably little information about it, although he gives a relatively detailed account on other matters, including the Council’s role during Charles’ bid for the kingship of Castile in 1516, which he evidently considered of much importance. His neatly crystallised expression of opinion about Cisneros

127 Kagan notes that, prior to Isabel’s accession, Diego Enríquez de Castillo, who dared to write a chronicle praising Enrique IV, had many of his papers confiscated by supporters of Isabel’s brother, Prince Alfonso (*Clio*: 38)
129 Kagan, *Clio*: 56
and his opinions on other royal councillors, provided in a separate document of advice to Charles, make the dryness of his Anales all the more disappointing.  

Royal cosmographer, astronomer and explorer Alonso de Santa Cruz (c. 1505-1567) wrote a chronicle about the Catholic monarchs that covers the period of Juana’s effective reign, and subsequently wrote a separate chronicle of Charles. In the process he recovered some of the earlier, lost chronicles of royal chronicler António de Guevara, relative of Diego de Guevara, who had, in turn, succeeded Martire.  

Where this study is concerned, the strength of Santa Cruz’ chronicle lies in the attention he pays to the period immediately after Philip’s death, and the access he clearly has to letters of the period. He also offers some details for the Comunero period that cannot be found elsewhere.

Among unofficial chroniclers one must include Andrés Bernáldez (c. 1450-1513), who, in one early passage, explains how he came to write history as an act of remembrance and to inform and give pleasure to those who rarely read the works of the royal chroniclers, however accomplished. Selecting events where there was ‘true information’, or ‘those that I saw, or which were well-known ... so that their memory lives’, his work has a real sense of immediacy.  

Chaplain to Diego de Deza, Archbishop of Seville, and a personal friend of Columbus, whose papers he used for his chronicle, he shares the common bias of the age against Jews and Muslims, while at the same time reflecting a particularly sensitivity to the poverty and sufferings of Andalucia and a particular interest in events there. A devotee of Isabel, and strongly supportive of Fernando, his attitude to Juana differs from that of the royal chroniclers and he does not raise the question of incapability. Insofar as he sees Juana’s interests and Fernando’s as one, he makes no reference to any conflict between them and

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130 Lorenzo Galindo de Carvajal, Anales breves del reinado de los Reyes Católicos, ed. Rafael Floranes Robles y Encinas, in CODIOIN, XVIII, ed. Miguel Salvá, Pedro Sainz de Baranda (Madrid, 1787): 227-536
131 Alonso de Santa Cruz, BL, Additional Ms. 20816, ‘Chronica de los Reyes Don Fernando i Doña Ysabel”; Crónica de los Reyes Católicos, ed., Juan de Mata Carriazo (Seville, 1955)
132 Hearing him reading a memorial of his grandfather’s, his widowed grandmother exclaims: ‘hijo, y tú por que no escribes así las cosas de ahora como están esas? pues no hayas pereza de escribir las cosas buenas que en tu día acaecieron porque las sepan los que después vinieren, y maravillándose desque las lean, dén gracias a Dios. Y desde aquel día propuse hacerlo así ...’ Andrés Bernáldez, Historia de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Andaluces (Seville, 1869), I: 27. I have also referred to another edition of Bernáldez, edited by M. Gómez Moreno and Juan de M. Carriazo, Memorias del reinado de los Reyes Católicos (Madrid, 1962).
passes over her imprisonment. But, unusually, he attributes a clear political basis to Juana’s struggle with Philip in 1506, referring to her agitation and anger at her deliberate removal from affairs of state.\textsuperscript{133}

As its title indicates, the \textit{Crónica de Felipe I llamado el Hermoso} of Lorenzo de Padilla (b. 1485) is very different in motivation, and an attempt to illuminate what he perceived as the neglect of Philip by most Spanish chroniclers of the period between the last decade of the fifteenth century until the outset of the reign of Charles V, whom he later also served as chronicler. This objective, together with the fact that Padilla’s chronicle contains many of Philip’s letters and material that may have been gathered at first hand, is its great strength and it is, thus, a pity that, although he covers in some detail Juana’s first journey to the Low Countries, there is relatively scanty information about her. Padilla tends to treat Juana mainly as a consort whose failings Philip copes with as best he can. Like Bernáldez, Padilla shows particular sensitivity to the problems of Andalucia, and appears to share the concerns of chronicler and soldier Gonzalo de Ayora.\textsuperscript{134} He laments the fact that much of Ayora’s chronicle was destroyed – probably on account of his Comunero sympathies.\textsuperscript{135}

I have found the later royal chronicler, Fray Prudencio de Sandoval (1553-1620) of particular value for the period between 1516-1521. A Benedictine cleric who became Bishop of Tuy in 1608, and subsequently of Pamplona, his monumental work on the life and deeds of Charles V was, in the words of Richard Kagan, the ‘first truly official history of the emperor to appear in print’, and is a particularly rich source for the period.\textsuperscript{136} Like that of Santa Cruz, it derives material from earlier, unfinished chronicles and primary documents, on much of which he does not comment; but its greatest strengths are the sheer wealth of documentation it contains, inserted at length, the wealth of detail and the attempt at balance. He differs little from other royal chroniclers in accepting that Juana was unable to rule after Philip’s death, either from mental illness or a widow’s grief, and glosses over her incarceration at Tordesillas, her place of ‘retirement’, where the Marquis of Denia served her loyally and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{133}{Bernáldez, \textit{Historia}, II: 280}
\footnotetext{134}{Lorenzo Padilla, \textit{Crónica de Felipe I}, CODOIN, VIII (Madrid, 1846)}
\footnotetext{135}{Padilla, \textit{Crónica}: 122}
\footnotetext{136}{Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, \textit{Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V}, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 80-82 (Madrid, 1955-1956); Kagan, \textit{Clio}: 93}
\end{footnotes}
faithfully. However, like Jerónimo Zurita, he shows positive facets of her character while always careful to remind his readers that she was ill.

The chronicler and historian to whom this study is most indebted for the period of Juana’s effective reign between 1506-1507 is Zaragoza-born historian Jerónimo Zurita (1512-1580). The noble son of a medico de cámara of Charles’ court, he studied at the university of Alcalá de Henares and later undertook a series of official appointments under Philip II, including that of secretary to the Council of the Inquisition. He was nominated official chronicler in 1548. Generally regarded as Spain’s first modern historian for his relatively ‘scientific’ approach to documentary sources, his monumental Anales de la Corona de Aragón, of which the Historia del Rey Hernando forms the latter part, trace Aragonese history between 711 and Fernando’s death in 1516, but also deal in detail with Castile. The first volume appeared in 1563, and subsequent volumes in 1577 and 1578. Philip II granted Zurita the rare privilege of access to Simancas, which he also helped establish by collecting, at Philip’s wish, documents relating to Aragon and Spain’s Italian dependencies and depositing them there. In the process he visited archives in Sicily, Barcelona, Tarragona, Valencia and elsewhere. However, he rarely attributes the sources he uses and if much of his work can be corroborated by those still extant, much else available to Zurita has been lost. The material stored in the Diputación Provincial de Zaragoza perished in flames in 1809; only a small fraction of Zurita’s original ‘Alacena’ remains. His view is strongly supportive of Fernando and, as a royal chronicler, he is committed to the notion of Juana’s ‘dementia’, on which Fernando based his governorship of Castile. Despite this, he credits Juana with important political actions and his coverage of her effective reign is thoughtful, nuanced and exceptional in its wealth of detail. It is, thus, indispensable.

Among those who continued Zurita’s work on the Anales was historian and poet Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola (1562-1631). Argensola studied at Salamanca, where he met Fray Luis de León, and later also became acquainted

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137 ‘Dicen que el sumo dolor y continuas lagrimas le estragan el juicio ... La reina doña Juana, o por dolor o falta de juicio, viéndose sin marido, no quiso reinar’, Historia: 28-29. Sandoval’s positive opinion of the Marquis of Denia may be connected to his family relationship with a descendant of Denia’s, Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, Duke of Lerma, who helped him gain the post of chronicler.

with Cervantes and Lope de Vega. He was chaplain to Juana’s granddaughter, the Empress María, in the last two years of her life. This may partly explain why Argensola’s commentary, of particular interest for the aftermath of Fernando’s death, shows an unusual degree of sensitivity towards Juana.¹³⁹

The letters of main players, particularly Fernando, Philip and Charles, are of evident importance, as are those of Cisneros and his secretaries, and of Juana’s gaolers, Luis Ferrer, and the Denias. The Denias’ letters, held in Simancas, are well known, but Aram’s biography includes interesting and less familiar letters from the Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli, difficult to access during my own period of research. Rodríguez de Diego has recently published several interesting early letters, not hitherto accessible because undergoing restoration, and which cast light, in particular, on some members of Juana’s early female entourage.¹⁴⁰

In conclusion, as Brouwer noted, anyone seeking to get to grips with a figure as elusive as Juana is obliged to construct, with the remaining fragments, a narrative that can never hope to be more than flawed and partial. But, as Brouwer was also well aware, those same shreds of evidence warn against the discovery of a single truth. In the words of John H. Arnold, the idea of a single true story is ‘tremendously attractive, and hence tremendously dangerous’.¹⁴¹ Despite the fact that the vast bulk of the historiography has ‘disappeared’ Juana, except as the madwoman in the attic or the slave in the kitchen of history, these fragments tell us that another story is possible. That story is about Juana as queen, and deserves to be told.

¹³⁹ Bartholomé Leonardo de Argensola, Primera Parte de los Anales de Aragón (Zaragoza, 1630)
2. An ambiguous legacy

2.1. Between Spain and the Low Countries (1496-1502)

On 22 August 1496, with Spain at war with France, an armada set sail from Laredo (Cantabria) under the command of Fadrique Enríquez, Admiral of Castile. Its purpose was to carry to their respective destinations the brides of a dual marriage engineered to strengthen dynastic ties between the houses of Habsburg and Trastámara. After sixteen-year-old Juana arrived in the Low Countries, Margaret embarked for Spain.

Juana’s Dominican tutor, Fray Andrés de Miranda, who accompanied her in 1496, later reminded her of her fear on that first voyage.¹ But if Juana was a novice sailor, she was well-travelled and accustomed to political conflict. Her childhood had been dominated by the final stages of the Christian ‘Reconquista’ (1481-1492) that did most to bind the monarchs to one another and their subjects, and win them glory. Isabel and Fernando had countered accusations of illegitimacy and usurpation in a world of particularism, only loosely and personally united and dependent on collaboration, by projecting themselves as the restorers of order and moral renewal.² Isabel, in particular, forged her image as a foil to that of her half-brother, Enrique IV, whom her chroniclers maligned. Diego de Valera and Martín de Córdoba were among those to propagate the providential view of Isabel as divinely-sanctioned reformer, restorer and liberator of her kingdoms. Especially after the conquest of Granada in 1492, Isabel became internationally known as the sword-wielding warrior queen, just as Juana was to see her in one of the tableaux vivants staged during her joyous entry into Brussels in 1496.³

Juana would have been at least broadly familiar with her parents’ deeds and seems to have taken with her to the Low Countries a great pride in being their daughter. Apart from their conquest of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada

¹ AGS, E 1-2, f. 366, 1 September 1498, to Juana
² Ana Isabel Carrasco Manchado, Isabel I de Castilla y la sombra de la ilegitimidad (Madrid, 2006)
Fernando and Isabel are, of course, remembered, *inter alia*, for their new foundation of the Inquisition in the Crowns of Castile and Aragon; their expulsions of the Jews and Muslims; their series of religious reforms and their expansion west to the New World. They also consolidated, and placed on a systematic footing, a number of governmental institutions. Juana had been born on the eve of the Cortes of Toledo (1480), which Carretero Zamora describes as ‘one of the most transcendent moments in the reign of the Catholic monarchs’ (as they became in December 1496). The Cortes provided the main legal foundation for the regime.

One of its achievements – of later relevance to Juana during her brief effective reign – was to convert the Royal Council into the central organ of government, providing it with a professional core, and setting out in detail the Council’s organisation and functions, judicial as well as consultative and governmental.

Another outcome of later relevance to Juana was the establishment, on a systematic and definitive footing, of the institution of the *corregimiento*, which came under the Council’s competence.

But perhaps her parents were particularly fondly remembered among their Spanish contemporaries for the constant journeys of their younger years, when they lived in the saddle, traversing the well-beaten system of earth tracks that were the legacy of Reconquest. In his *Cancionero*, dedicated to Juana in 1502, Pedro Marcuello sees Isabel and Fernando as perpetual travellers, sleeplessly and in snow, wind and rain, riding the roads of their kingdoms on affairs of state.

Admiral Enríquez refers to this same restless and caring transhumance and devotion to care and duty in a letter dating from the Comunero era. They were ‘the monarchs of these kingdoms alone; they were of our language, born and bred among us, they knew us all, they raised their children among us … those who died in their service believed that in them they left parents to their children; they knew whom to reward and who merited it … they travelled their kingdoms, and were known by great and small, available to all …

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6 See Chapters 3 and 6.

7 Pedro Marcuello, *Cancionero* (Zaragoza, 1987), f. 82
there was not the estrangement of now, or the armed troops devouring the pueblos …\textsuperscript{8}

As a child, and in the company of other family members, Juana had periodically joined Fernando at the front and experienced its dangers. He had been targeted by assassins and almost lost his life in Barcelona in 1493, a crisis that united the family in anguish.\textsuperscript{9} For the infantas, the close family bonds created by such dramas were perhaps given greater edge and intensity by the fact that, from the earliest age, they were destined to marry into foreign houses.

A contemporary ballad about Juana’s marriage to Philip, son of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria, refers to the visit of a Burgundian embassy, when a bejewelled and resplendent Juana, in scarlet and crimson, ‘lit up the dark night’.\textsuperscript{10} Roger Machado’s account of celebrations at Medina del Campo in 1489, in connection with the betrothal of Juana’s youngest sister to Arthur, Prince of Wales, affords a vivid glimpse of the family before marriage and death dispersed and diminished it. Machado shows both monarchs as gifted choreographers, using contrasts of light and darkness to dramatic effect; mixing splendour, ceremony and strict hierarchy with warmth, informality and generosity. Isabel is shown at her most splendid, charming, maternal and ‘virile’. The envoys note how the openings in her black surcoat were subtly designed to reveal glimpses of cloth of gold. Part Lancastrian by descent, she wore a gold necklace strung with red and white roses to honour the house of Tudor, and a bejewelled belt of white leather ‘like the belt a man wears’. The envoys watched the elder children dance, including nine-year-old Juana, in grey cloth of gold and abundant ‘good and rich’ jewels. At a juego de cañas, a game of mounted pursuit with reed spears, it was ‘lovely to see how the Queen carried her youngest daughter [Catalina, and later Katherine] on her shoulder’.\textsuperscript{11}

Close to their mother, and aware, as it were, of her white belt, her daughters knew that queens were capable of ruling — in conjunction, at least, with cooperative husbands. From their earliest years, they witnessed the power she

\textsuperscript{8} BL, Egerton 2081, f. 104, ‘Carta del Almirante de Castilla para el Emperador sobre el gobierno destos Reynos’

\textsuperscript{9} J. Ángel Sesma Muñoz, Los Idus de diciembre de Fernando II (Zaragoza, 2006): 91, 94

\textsuperscript{10} BN, Ms6/12935/36, ‘Coplas fechas a los altos estados d’los reyes nuestros señores’

\textsuperscript{11} ‘Journals of Roger Machado: Embassy to Spain and Portugal’, in James Gairdner, ed., Memorials of Henry the Seventh (London, 1858). María is mentioned here, not Juana, but Juana is intended, since she is described as ‘mariée ou espousée au duc Philippe d’Austriche …’
exercised over much of government, and her own household and theirs. The
authority she exerted; the obedience and respect she inspired; the belief in her
‘virile’ contribution to a fully working partnership – at least until Juan’s death in
1497 – are reflected in Juana’s later conviction that she too must be able to
govern her household and appoint and dismiss her officials; and, moreover, that
women could rule within the context of a sympathetically shared dual enterprise.

Historians widely agree that Juana was well-educated and conversant in
courtly skills. According to German humanist Hieronymus Münzer, she was, at
fourteen, ‘very scholarly for her age and sex’.¹² Luis Vives refers to her ability to
extemporise in Latin when responding to the welcomes given new princes during
joyous entries.¹³ Juana’s passion for music is frequently noted. She danced, rode,
hawked and hunted and seems to have shared her mother’s artistic inclinations.¹⁴
What, as sovereign queen, Isabel could not transmit to her daughters was a
personal experience of royal exogamy. In John Carmi Parsons’ words, royal
princesses were ‘not only consigned to new families upon marriage; they had to
negotiate loyalties to natal and affinal families in often forbiddingly politicised
contexts, and they had to adjust to new languages and customs’.¹⁵ Mothers used
the international experience gained in this way to train their daughters for
cultural difference, derived from their own ‘unique multicultural perspectives’.¹⁶

Contemporary chroniclers dwell on Isabel’s emotion during the parting.¹⁷
But Ladero Quesada has noted that, traumatic for both, it must have been
particularly so for Juana. She was embarking for the unknown, doubtless
abandoning forever family, home and country for a foreign land and a
chessboard of complicated diplomatic games she could hardly understand. Her
one clear objective would be difficult to fulfil: ‘to remain politically faithful and
personally loving both to the unknown husband she was on her way to meet and

¹³ Vives’ remark, from De Institutione christianae foeminae, is fully quoted by Ladero Quesada,
‘Doña Juana, Infanta y Princesa’, in FRP, Doña Juana: 18
¹⁴ Fernando Checa, Tapissières flamandes pour les ducs de Bourgogne (cat., 2009): 72-84; María
del Cristo González Marreño, La Casa de Isabel la Católica (Ávila, 2005)
¹⁵ John Carmi Parsons, ‘Never was a body buried in England with such solemnity and honour’,
in Duggan, ed., Queens and Queenship: 329
¹⁶ Carmi Parsons, ‘Mothers, Daughters, Marriage, Power’, in Carmi Parsons, ed., Medieval
Queenship (Stroud, 1994): 63-78
¹⁷ BN, Mss/12935/36, ‘Coplas’; Padilla, Crónica: 37; Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 139v.
to the parents she had left behind and, with them, everything that had been her life'.

Juana’s marriage had political, diplomatic and religious intent, although unconnected to the massive significance it later assumed. As noted earlier, Charles VIII’s 1495 invasion of Naples, in Aragonese hands since 1443, had inspired a counter-alliance, including Spain, the Habsburg empire, the Holy See, Milan and Venice, later joined by England. Whereas France had been Castile’s ally, Fernando, with his Mediterranean territories and ambitions, shared Maximilian’s fears about the dramatic growth in France’s power. Since marrying the daughter and successor of Charles the ‘Bold’, Mary of Burgundy, in 1477, Maximilian saw her inheritance as a Habsburg concern, always threatened by France, which annexed the Duchy of Burgundy after the death in battle of Charles ‘the Bold’ in 1477. France also threatened Italian territories that Maximilian considered vital to his wider goals – to follow in the path of former Frankish and Holy Roman emperors by travelling to Rome to be crowned by the Pope (Romzug) – as prelude to the reconquest of Jerusalem. The double marriage of Trastámaras with Habsburgs was seen as a cementing-in of this ‘holy’ alliance and, in a wider context, as a mechanism both of defence and expansion of the Christian faith. It was, evidently, only with hindsight that its full import was recognised, and diplomatic historian Ochoa Brun able to call the marriage of Juana and Philip ‘the most transcendent event in the relationship of Spain with Europe in the whole of the modern era’.

Suárez points out that Juana was not received with the warmth extended to Katherine in England. While Mary and Maximilian had maintained good relations with Castile and Aragon, Maximilian was largely engaged with his own territories and Mary’s early death meant Juana did not benefit from the protection of an authoritative female figure and ally. Mary’s former chief dame d’honneur, Jeanne de Commines-Halewyn, whom Philip appointed to head Juana’s household, was thought insufficiently pro-Spanish by Juana’s parents. They also distrusted Margaret of York, dowager Duchess of Burgundy, who

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18 Ladero Quesada, ‘Doña Juana, Infanta y Princesa’: 28
19 Ochoa Brun, Historia: 186
20 Luis Suárez, Fernando el Católico (Barcelona, 2004): 362
21 AGS, PR, 52, f. 116; CSP. Sp. I, 231, Matienzo to Spanish monarchs, 15 January 1499; Fuensalida: 113-114, 5 May 1500, Catholic monarchs to Fuensalida
lived in semi-retirement at Malines/Mechelen, plotting against Henry VII as 'usurper' of the Yorkist kings.\textsuperscript{22}

For Maximilian (as for the Spanish monarchs) Philip was a Habsburg crown prince.\textsuperscript{23} But, born and bred in the Low Countries he was also a Valois, aware of the controversial nature of Mary’s marriage. While it brought the Low Countries greater security against France, they now risked being swallowed by the Empire. When, in 1482, Mary died after a riding accident, Maximilian assumed the regency and tensions and rebellions grew. Philip was convinced of the need for peace with France. Although he had succumbed to pressure from Maximilian with respect to a Spanish marriage, many in his council felt that an alliance with territories then at war with France could jeopardise their relations with Louis XII.

As Cauchies notes, Philip’s advisers were broadly split into a powerful pro-French grouping led by his Luxembourgeois tutor and chief adviser, François de Busleyden, Archbishop of Besançon, and a pro-English/Spanish grouping, led by Henri de Berghes, Bishop of Cambray.\textsuperscript{24} Philip’s delay in returning from the Diet of Lindau to meet his bride may be seen within the context of serious differences over foreign policy. Philip’s biographer, Calderón, attributes the delay to a towering row between Busleyden and Maximilian, who resented his influence over Philip. The row did not augur well for Juana, converting her into the ‘target of his anger with his father’.\textsuperscript{25} Perhaps to play down his absence or compensate for the dishonour, a woodcut in Maximilian’s \textit{Weiβ Kunig}, shows seventeen-year-old Philip greeting Juana as she disembarks at Arnemuiden (figure 8). It is, however, pure fiction.

Juana had reached Arnemuiden by 10 September. For several weeks after disembarkation she and her glittering but poignant retinue, with its two kettle-drummers, six trumpeters and king-of-arms, ‘Granada’, rode through Flanders in the absence of most of the leading figures in the Low Countries. Margaret of Austria and Margaret of York eventually met Juana at Antwerp, where, on 19 September, riding bare-headed among her ladies in Spanish gold and jewels, and

\textsuperscript{22} See, for example, \textit{Ann Wroe, Perkin: A Story of Deception} (London, 2003); Luc Hommel, \textit{Marguerite d’York, ou la Duchesse Junon} (Brussels, 2003); Chrimes, \textit{Henry VII}.
\textsuperscript{23} Cauchies, \textit{Philippe}: 86
\textsuperscript{24} Cauchies, \textit{Philippe}: 59-69
\textsuperscript{25} José Manuel Calderón, \textit{Felipe el Hermoso} (Madrid, 2001): 31
Figure 8. An example of early sixteenth-century spin. Philip receives Juana on her arrival in the Low Countries. In reality he was, at the time, very far from Juana’s point of disembarkation. From *Der Weiß Kunig: Eine Erzehlung von der Thaten Kaiser Maximilian des Ersten* (Vienna, 1775 edition). Personally supervised by Maximilian I, with his adviser Dr Konrad Peutinger, artistic production was mostly divided between Hans Burgkmair and Leonhard Beck. Hans Springinklee and Hans Schäufelein also contributed.
with her ‘beautiful carriage and gracious manner’, she at last made a splendid entrée joyeuse that impressed the chronicler Jean Molinet.26

Philip did not arrive in Lier (Brabant) until almost a month later, on 17 October. He and Juana were married in ceremonies that took place on 18 and 20 October, with Juana’s chief chaplain and theology master, Diego Ramírez de Villaescusa, Dean of Jaén and Henri de Berghes, Bishop of Cambray, respectively presiding. Although royal marriages were fundamentally political, Isabel and her children formed deep attachments to their spouses, and Philip seems to have felt a genuine affection for Juana. Padilla, who favoured Philip, later wrote of him that he did not harbour grudges and ‘loved the Queen very much’ but had to work hard to compensate for her shortcomings in matters of government.27

Rumours of Juana’s shortcomings, or rather, perhaps, of the influence upon her of the Burgundian court, had begun to arrive in Spain with the return from the Low Countries of many members of Juana’s retinue, including her Dominican ‘maestro’, Miranda, shocked by what he perceived as the dissoluteness of a court culture in many ways different from that of Isabel and Fernando. In September 1498 Miranda wrote to his former pupil, warning of reports that ‘you live with those drunks from Paris’ and had given ‘one of those friars who live in Paris’ thirty florins ‘to make good cheer’. Attributing her silence to anger at his desertion, he explains it as a bid to save his soul.28

In 1498 another Dominican friar, Tomás de Matienzo, was sent to the Low Countries to advise and observe Juana. Early contacts between them were riddled with suspicion on both sides. Juana was ‘somewhat troubled’ (‘mostró tener alguna turbación’) because she felt her reputation was being affected by the rumours arriving in or coming out of Spain.29 Matienzo, who does not specify what these were, attributed Juana’s cold reception of him on another occasion to

26 Jean Molinet, Chroniques de Jean Molinet, eds., Georges Doutrepont, Omer Jodogne (Brussels, 1935), II: 429
27 In his description of the visit of Philip and Juana to England in 1506, Francis Bacon, sixteenth-century English scholar and first biographer of Henry VII, claims that Juana loved Philip ‘dearly well’ and that Juana ‘was no less beloved of him – howsoever her father, to make Philip ill-beloved of the people of Spain, gave out that Philip used her not well . . . ’ Bacon is among those to believe that Juana’s ‘infirmity’ was connected with ‘the grief of [Philip’s] decease’. (See Bacon, The History of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh [London, 1971]: 222)
28 AGS, E 1-2, f. 366, 1 September 1498
29 CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana), August 1498
reports she had received from her former lady, the Countess of Camiña, who ‘wrote to her from Bilbao that I came as her confessor’ – rumours ‘so public that we found in England two letters about it …’ In the same letter he tells the Spanish monarchs that he has assured Juana that he had not come, as rumoured, to pry (‘facer inquisición sobre su vida’), while going on to report her lack of devotion and failure to go to confession on the day of Assumption. In a subsequent letter, however, he reassures them that in her household ‘there is as much religion as in a strict convent. In this respect she is very vigilant and deserves praise … She has the qualities of a good Christian…’

Matienzo also reports her reaction to his reproach, or accusation, that she was hard-hearted (‘tenía hun corazón duro y crudo’) – presumably for not writing home sufficiently or appearing not to show sufficient interest in her parents or in those she had known in Spain – to which Juana protested that, on the contrary, she was too soft-hearted and ‘could never think how far she was from [Isabel] without weeping to think she was separated from her for ever.’ Juana’s treasurer, Martín de Mújica, confirmed the emotional hold over Juana of her parents. In 1501 he asked them to send someone to visit Juana before she gave birth (for the third time). It would be ‘a great relief to her, and I dare ask this because if a few days pass without her hearing from your highnesses, she is the most distressed woman in the world’.

Juana’s homesickness was, perhaps, accentuated by correspondence from various Spanish women to whom she had been close. In 1496 ‘Doña Teresa’ (probably her aya, Teresa Manrique) reproached Juana for lack of news: ‘… since not seeing you, I realise I do not live’. Mencía Manuel begged God to grant her the wish she most desired in the world – to see Juana again soon. A racier letter came from María Manrique Chacón de Acuña Fajardo – daughter of Juan Chacón, son of Isabel’s chief steward, Gutierre, and adelantado mayor of

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30 CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana), 16 August 1498. Matienzo had come to the Low Countries from the English court.
31 AGS, PR 52, f. 116, 15 January 1499
32 AGS, PR 52, f. 116, 15 January 1499
34 AGS, CSR 402 bis, 20 December 1496, Doña Teresa [Manrique?] to Juana, in Rodríguez de Diego, ‘La huella’: 41-42
35 AGS, CSR 402 bis [1496-1501], Doña Mencía Manuel to Juana, in ‘La huella’: 44
Murcia – who calls herself Juana’s ‘loca’, her ‘mad’ friend, and may literally have been her buffoon. María tells Juana that, since she left she had acquired a little bitch called Zaragoçita, who kisses Juana’s ‘salvonor’ (her ‘backside’). She laments that Juana ‘does not remember her very dear friend doña María, who was made ill by the toasted chickpeas she gave her’. Mújica (then in Spain) ‘is being very naughty here … we cannot eat at table for all the crazy things he is saying about your highness being married over there … Let your highness send a little chest for me to put my madnesses in, for I cannot contain them, they are spilling everywhere; I shall not write any more crazy things so as not to annoy you …’

Although Juana rejected Matienzo’s criticism of hard-heartedness, these correspondents complained, with surprise, about the lack of letters home. This cannot simply be attributed to laziness, since Matienzo mentions that ‘she wrote a great number of letters’. Juana seems, in part, to have been inhibited by the realisation that her beloved, ‘mad’ friend María was not alone in sitting down to a table that buzzed with gossip about life at the Burgundian court. Juana had arrived with a personal entourage of about two hundred, many of whom had their own retinues. But Aram calculates that, by March 1497, in the course of an operation designed by Philip to reorganise her household along Burgundian lines, only sixteen Spaniards remained with the Archduchess, while seventy new Flemish and Burgundian servants were appointed.

The loss of an original household was not uncommon; in Margaret’s case, too, many went home ‘because they do not want to stay …’ The English court later created ‘great difficulties’ over Katherine’s Spanish servants, insisting that ‘as small a number of Spanish servants [accompany] the Princess as possible’. But while Philip dismissed most of Juana’s original staff, the Archduchess may

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36 AGS, PR 402 bis, 16 May [1501], cited by Rodríguez de Diego, ‘La huella’: 42-43. Mújica’s name is also often given as Mojica.
38 Ladero Quesada, La armada: 92
39 Aram, Juana the Mad: 41
40 Joseph Chmel, ed., Urkunden, Briefe und Achtenstücke zur Geschichte Maximilian I und seiner Zeit (Stuttgart, 1845), CLXVIII: 193-194, 29 June 1497, Gaspar de Lupian to Maximilian
41 CSP. Sp. 1, 282, 29 June 1499, Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida to Spanish monarchs
also have sent some home. Others had never intended to stay, or felt unable, like Miranda, to cope with the high living costs, cultural differences and different, reportedly lax, religious customs of a highly sophisticated court. Her awareness that this could reflect badly on her reputation in Spain may have reduced the prickly young Archduchess to the silence Miranda and others mention.

Matienzo reported that Juana’s staff were poorly paid. Unlike Isabel, she could not exert full control over her household and appoint her own friends or favourites to her service. A fundamental problem lay in the fact, that while much of her own costly trousseau had disappeared on the sand banks of Walcheren shortly before disembarkation, Philip’s administration failed to honour the direct payment to Juana of an agreed annual sum of twenty thousand gold escudos as part of the marriage settlement. Successive Spanish envoys failed to persuade Philip and Maximilian to pay this sum to Juana – a fact that was still troubling her in 1511. Maximilian’s ambassador to Spain, Gaspar de Lupian, relayed her parents’ protests, in which Margaret (who regularly received a corresponding sum) joined.

Aram has shown how Juana’s inability to secure financial, and with it, political, independence, meant that Spanish officials remaining in the Low Countries fell under Philip’s influence. This became particularly worrying after the death of Juan, without surviving children, in the autumn of 1497, and the death in childbirth of his successor, Juana’s elder sister, Isabel, a year later. Princess Isabel left an heir, but Miguel de la Paz was frail. Isabel and Fernando turned to the Low Countries, demanding information about the ‘health and affairs of the Archduke and Archduchess’, insisting that no messengers should return to Spain without letters from Juana and Philip.

If Juan’s death toppled the monarchs’ matrimonial structure it also opened a breach in the providential mindcast of the time. Why had God

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42 ‘... no fue contenta de mi ...’, AGS, CSR, 402 bis, 11 October [1498], Countess of Camiña to Juana, in Rodríguez de Diego, ‘La huella’: 42
43 See Chapter 7
44 Chmel, ed., Urkunden, CLXIX: 195-197, 20 August 1497
45 Aram, Juana the Mad: 41-50
46 RB, II/2205, f. 1, 18 March 1498; II/2205, f. 2, 10 April 1498, Cédulas to Diego Ramírez de Villaescusa
withdrawn his favour from Castile and Aragon? The question occurred to many, although historians have overlooked the effect on Juana of this deep undercurrent of political, religious and psychological anxiety. Isabel succumbed increasingly to illness and depression, and from 1498 virtually ceased to take government decisions. An Aragonese ‘party’, described by Fernández Albadalejo as a ‘series of operations designed to oust from their places unconditional supporters of the Queen’, developed within Castile. Among those affected were Isabel’s former highly influential confessor and first Archbishop of Granada, Fernando de Talavera, and the once mighty royal secretary, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, ‘whose viewpoints on policy did not coincide with those Fernando wished to impose.’ José Luis Villacañas Berlanga has also connected the Prince’s death with a propitiatory sacrifice of conversos formerly close to Isabel. Everything and everyone came under review. In 1499 Talavera’s relatively sensitive methods of converting Granada’s Muslims were abandoned for aggressive proselytising, and his most brilliant protégés came under the spotlight. These included Villaescusa. Matienzo’s arrival in the Low Countries coincided with, and was possibly linked to, Villaescusa’s (temporary) recall to Spain, providing a clue to the unease about Matienzo first felt by Juana, whose trust in Villaescusa is well documented. Commenting later on this recall in 1498, Villaescusa wrote that: ‘... since the first day I began to serve the queen [Juana], I was zealous in her service, and so ... Queen Doña Isabel held me in suspicion ...’

Juana’s difficulties as daughter of demanding monarchs and wife of a prince whose chief advisers resented the Spanish marriage illustrate the problems of exogamy to which Carmi Parsons refers. They have also overshadowed Juana’s record as consort. Reports suggest that she took her responsibilities seriously and could be perceptive and measured in her advice and conduct. On the diplomatic front she had successes, and her attempts to protect Spanish interests are illustrated by her use of Villaescusa as her envoy to Henry VII, prior

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47 José Martínez Millán, ‘De la muerte del príncipe Juan al fallecimiento de Felipe el Hermoso (1497-1506)’, in Martínez Millán, ed., La Corte de Carlos V (Madrid, 2000), 1: 53
48 Fernández Albadalejo, Fragmentos: 29
49 José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, La Monarquía Hispánica (1284-1516), (Madrid, 2008): 730
50 ‘Instrucción del Obispo de Málaga a Don António su sobrino’, in Félix González Olmedo, Diego Ramírez Villaescusa (1495-1537), (Madrid, 1944): 114
to a meeting between Philip and the English monarch at Calais in 1500. But she was unable to prevent Philip from running counter to the interests of the Trastámara-Habsburg alliance when he signed the 1498 Treaty of Paris with Louis XII, formally recognising his position as Louis’ vassal. According to Suárez, Fernando, informed about Juana’s refusal to accept French vasallage as Philip’s wife and of her defence of her parents’ interests, hoped she could yet exercise a benevolent interest over Philip, but lack of financial independence mitigated against it.52

On the dynastic level Juana was remarkably successful, giving birth, between 1498-1507 to six healthy children: Éléonore (1498); Charles (1500); Isabelle (1501); Fernando (1503); Marie (1505); Catalina (1507). She travelled continually through Flanders and Brabant and participated in festivities.53 She took part in court activities, including balls (figure 9) and communal readings.54 Among the most lavish banquets she presided and organised was one at Bruges on 3 May 1501 for Margaret, who had returned, widowed, from Spain the year before.55 She helped the Grey Sisters of Brussels to obtain a papal bull, issued in 1501, authorising reform of their order in accordance with the rule of St Clare.56 She took her children to religious communities, like the Cloître des Pieds Deschaux.57 There were recreational outings, including one, in Ghent, when she hired a little boat ‘to play on the water’.58 Although Juana lacked control over important household decisions, accounts for her hôtel between 1497-1501 show her with her children constantly.59 In May 1501 Mújica described Juana’s care for her children. Her greatest pastime was keeping company with her daughter,

51 CSP. Sp. 1, 268, 16 June 1500, Dr Rodrigo Gonzales de Puebla to Spanish monarchs; Gillian Beatrice Fleming, ‘La Visita a Inglaterra de Juana I (enero-abril de 1506)’, in Zalama, ed., Juana I en Tordesillas
52 Suárez, Fernando: 339
53 ADN, B 3455 (1497); 3456 (1498); 3457 (1499-1500); 3459 (1501), États journaliers de la dépense de l’hôtel de Jeanne
55 ADN, B 3459, États journaliers, Monday, 3 May 1501
57 ADN. B 3459, 17 April 1501 (dépenses de l’écurie)
58 ADN, B 3459, 16 February 1501
59 ADN, B 3457 (1499-1500) - B. 3459 (1501)
**Figure 9.** Juana and Philip performing a torch dance.
Tapestry at Villa Hügel, Essen-Brede, Germany (from Mary Kay Duggan, ‘Queen Joanna and her Musicians’). As a child Juana danced for the English envoys at Medina del Campo. With Philip she danced the great Pavane de Bourgogne in Brussels in 1496 and at Blois, in December 1501, famously danced alone à la mode espagnole before Louis XII and Anne of Brittany.
Eléonore, 'the prettiest and most gracious creature in the world'. Because Charles had been suffering from fever, Juana spent fifteen days longer in Brussels than intended.60

Charles was born on 24 February 1500, at the Prinsenhof/Ten Walle, Ghent, and baptised by Villaescusa during spectacular celebrations. Male heirs were desired as much in Spain as in the Low Countries. A delighted Philip lavished attention on Juana; their son could expect to inherit a glorious legacy across a massive empire. With the death of Juana’s nephew, Miguel, just five months later came a major realignment in European forces. As Juana became heir to the crowns of Castile and Aragon, Spain’s focus shifted uneasily from union with Portugal towards the great, sprawling territories of the Habsburgs.

But there was unease in the Low Countries too. Many feared that Philip might leave his native lands indefinitely, detaching himself from a policy of peace with France. While the Catholic monarchs called on Juana and Philip to attend the traditional ceremonies of juramento as heirs to the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, Philip’s ministers, helped indirectly by Juana’s third pregnancy, prevaricated. Busleyden proposed a preparatory embassy to Spain, headed by himself. In reality, reported Spanish ambassador Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida, many at court had no more desire to go to Spain ‘than to go to hell’.61

Fuensalida had arrived in Brussels in 1500 to help Juana promote Spanish interests. He also probed her relations with Villaescusa and Matienzo. Juana defended both as indispensable, adding that if, at some point, she were called upon to govern, she would need Villaescusa’s advice.62 During 1500-1501 Villaescusa and Fuensalida acted jointly in their dealings with Philip, advised by Juana, who was well-informed. Juana sometimes discussed with them at length the best strategy to adopt with Philip and his council. But, inhibited by what she described as Philip’s lack of discretion, she felt unable to ‘confide certain things which seemed to her it would be reasonable to say and do’.63 The first signs of political conflict between the couple occurred between November 1500 and March 1501. Juana advised her parents how best to receive and deal with

60 AGS, CRS 402 bis, 16 May [1501], cited by Rodríguez de Diego, ‘La huella’, in Zalama, ed., Juana I en Tordesillas: 43
61 Fuensalida: 181, 22 March 1501
62 Fuensalida: 142, 6 August 1500
63 Fuensalida: 139, 6 August 1500
Busleyden. But collision came when she (initially) refused to sign and seal a letter authorising Busleyden to discuss certain matters with the monarchs. This, she felt, exceeded his instructions and ‘would not please the King and Queen’.

Busleyden’s visit took place, but Juana again withheld signature and seal over plans to marry Charles to Claude, daughter of Louis and Anne of Brittany, on grounds of insufficient consultation with Spain. Fuensalida reported Philip’s words to Juana as, on one occasion, Juana relayed them: ‘Your signature and seal were requested not because they were needed, since in this affair I can ensure that you’ll do what I want, but because your honour required it’. Honour would become a keyword in subsequent bitter exchanges between Juana and Philip over the issue of Juana’s household, with its wider political ramifications.

Juana impressed Fuensalida. In November 1500 he remarked that, since he did not know how to praise her enough, he would say only that ‘she is the daughter of your highnesses in everything and that, for her age, she is incomparable’. Later he commented: ‘If she did not possess such virtues she would be unable to suffer what she sees; but I do not think I have ever seen such prudence (cordura) in one so young’. When a new Spanish envoy, Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, Bishop of Córdoba, arrived in Brussels on 9 July 1501, he too became aware of the problems she faced. She was, he wrote, widely known for being ‘very sensible (cuerda) and very level-headed (asentada)’. Although some believed she could have done more to promote Spanish interests at court, others felt that ‘by wanting to do more, she would do greater harm and achieve less’. But Fonseca added, in what seems a tacit criticism of Fuensalida, Villaescusa and Matienzo, among others, ‘She has no living soul to help her with a single word’.

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64 Fuensalida: 139-144, 6 August 1500; 157-162, 5 November 1500; 163-167, 22 November 1500
65 Fuensalida: 163-167, 22 November 1500
66 Fuensalida: 176, 22 March 1501
67 Fuensalida: 162, 5 November 1500
68 Fuensalida: 182, 22 March 1501
69 RAH, Salazar, A-9: 132, 12 August 1501, to Miguel Pérez de Almazán
2. 2. 'Infanta, worthy of kingdoms’ (1502)

Philip and Juana eventually left for Spain on 4 November 1501. En route, Juana continued to make joyous entries into cities she had not visited before, including Mons and Valenciennes. The sense of split identity this must have given her as she attended celebrations and accepted gifts as Countess of Flanders and Duchess of Burgundy was exacerbated by the visit to the French monarchs at Blois. As Philip’s consort, she was the wife of Louis’ vassal; as heir to the Spanish kingdoms, she was Louis’ foe. Flemish courtier Antoine de Lalaing-Montigny shows Juana and her ladies emphasising their Spanish identity by wearing ‘cloth of gold in the Spanish fashion’ and dancing Spanish dances, including a performance by Juana of a solitary baile before the French court. Padilla and Santa Cruz note the Epiphany contretemps between Juana and Anne when Juana – according to Fléchier, ‘so attentive and circumspect’ with regard to ‘marks of submission and recognition’ – refused to make an offering with money Anne sent her on the grounds that this was the act of a vassal and that ‘she never made an offering on another’s behalf’.71

Juana and Philip crossed the Castilian border at Fuenterrabia in January 1502. Here celebrations arranged by the monarchs stressed the princes’ equality in status. When Juana and Philip visited the royal monastery of Santa María la Real de las Huelgas (Burgos), two ‘equal’ seats awaited them before the great altar, where they kissed the relics. The princes progressed through the city together by torchlight, under the golden canopy.72 A cédula ordered the Council of Madrid to cover both princes with a double canopy of brocade, because they must ‘come together’.73

The complex ceremonial representation of power and status – what Molinet calls the ‘mystères’ – was important. Aram, and others, have suggested that Fernando showed his daughter disrespect when, during the princes’ entry into Toledo on 7 May, he walked with Philip under the pallium, leaving Juana to

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70 Antoine de Lalaing, ‘Voyage de Philippe le Beau en Espagne en 1501’, in Gachard, ed., Collection, I: 129
71 Fléchier, Histoire, I: 173; Padilla, Crónica: 83
72 Padilla, Crónica: 166
73 Álvaro Fernández de Córdova Miralles, La Corte de Isabel I (Madrid, 2002): 313
walk behind. It is, however, improbable that on so carefully orchestrated an occasion as the royal entry into Toledo, climax of the princes' visit to Castile, Philip’s significance would have been emphasised at the expense of the proprietary heir’s, especially given the meticulous instructions issued about shared use of the canopy. Philip himself writes that Fernando rode between them as they approached the city. Upon entering, he and Fernando embarked upon a ceremonial struggle. Fernando drew Juana and himself beneath the canopy, while Philip often tried to fall to the rear, out of respect for Fernando, and Fernando ‘ne cessoit ... nous retirer et approcher de luy’.

Philip’s dynamic version of this episode argues for a view of historical events of greater fluidity than the frozen shots often provided by chroniclers and historians.

As they approached the cathedral, Toledo thundered and shook with bells, trumpets and artillery. After ‘humbling themselves’ before the cross at the cathedral’s Puerta del Perdón, the princes prayed beneath separate brocade canopies on two separate platforms placed before the great altar. After mass, led by Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo, they met Isabel, whom Lalain places among her women, dressed in crimson and furs. When she saw Philip Isabel stood and walked part way down the hall towards him. Philip tried to kiss her hand, which she kept respectfully withdrawn before embracing her daughter. For Molinet, Philip’s first encounter with Isabel contained further ‘mysteries’. Philip’s persistent efforts to kiss Isabel’s hand, even ‘when she was no longer thinking about it’, caused an outburst of laughter (‘une grande risée’) among the Castilians, breaking the tension.

On 22 May, after mass at the cathedral, the Cortes formally recognised Juana’s political pre-eminence. The procurators swore her allegiance as princess, first-born heir and legitimate successor to the kingdoms of Castile, León and Granada before recognising Philip as prince in his capacity as her ‘legitimate husband’ (figure 10). Juana’s willing acceptance of her new status is suggested

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74 Aram, *Juana the Mad*: 62
75 Gachard, ed., *Collection*, I: 379, 11 May 1502, extract from a letter from Philip to the governors of the Low Countries
76 Juan de Vallejo, *Memorial de la Vida de Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros*, ed., António de la Torre y del Cerro (Madrid, 1913): 54-55
77 Lalain, ‘Voyage’: 174-176
78 Molinet, *Chroniques*, II: 514-515
**Figure 10.** Although Philip was relegated to the role of consort and it was to Juana that Pedro Marcuello dedicated his *Cancionero*, Philip is shown here holding the orb and stretching out his hand to receive Marcuello’s book. Beside him a king-of-arms holds the sword. The heirs to Castile and Aragon are depicted in Burgundian dress, while a separate miniature of the same scene shows them in Spanish costume. The Burgundian dog dozes quietly, while in the other miniature two Spanish dogs play and yap noisily – a possible humorous comment on the silence of much Burgundian ceremonial that so struck the Spaniards in 1502.
by her commission of the famous *paños de oro*, a series of stunning tapestries, full of gold and silver thread, and devoted to the life of the Virgin, which she ‘commissioned and bought ... for her use and pleasure’ on 10 August 1502.  

Fernando Checa notes the existence of about sixty tapestries acquired by Juana before her imprisonment at Tordesillas – a ‘remarkable number in view of the brevity of her “political” career.’ In the golden tapestries art historians have seen a deliberate attempt to connect central episodes of the Virgin’s life with events in the secondary panels depicting scenes from the Trastámara-Habsburg double marriage. The lower left secondary panel of the *Coronation of the Virgin* (frontispiece) depicts a woman, accompanied by a man, in the act of crowning a younger woman. The coronation was, of course, meant allegorically. Under the Trastámara coronations had been definitively replaced by ceremonies of *juramento* and proclamation, accompanied by the raising of the new royal standard. But it seems more than coincidence that Juana took delivery of these tapestries at the time she became heir to Castile and with the Cortes of Toledo still in progress. Juana would have understood the *juramento* as a ritual both sacred and contractual. Her ‘coronation’ was followed, on 27 October, by a similar ceremony before the Cort of Zaragoza, when she became the first and only woman to be proclaimed heir to the Crown of Aragon by virtue of an exceptional formal pact, made void if Fernando produced another son.

To judge from the despatches of English envoys to Castile in 1503, Juana, as Isabel’s daughter, was popular. Some, like Aragonese official and courtier, Pedro Marcuello, expressed expectations. His *Cancionero*, dedicated to her in 1502, celebrates her as the ‘infanta, worthy of kingdoms’, the ‘golden infanta’ who follows in the path of the ‘great shining’ Queen (figure 11). Marcuello saw Juana’s mission as a continuation of the war against the infidels, razing the *moreras* and *juderías*; tending the faithful in camp hospitals like that

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80 Checa, *Tapisseries flamandes*: 76
83 See Chapter 3
84 Marcuello, *Cancionero*, f. 75, 101, 75v.
established by Isabel during the siege of Granada, with its pure water, herbs and spices, violet juleps, rosewaters and other medical brews. But because Juana’s right to succeed was not greeted without reservation by procurators, either in Castile or Aragon, it is necessary, at this point, to summarise the problematic background with regard to women rulers in the kingdoms she inherited.

Isabel’s early struggle for recognition and authority was hard fought on various fronts, and against the background of a general gender bias. Sovereign queens were rare across Europe. Catalan Francesc Eiximenis thought women, who were weak and ‘care for useless things’, made bad governors. ‘The passions in women’, wrote seventeenth-century Aragonese Jesuit Baltasar Gracián (who, while approving of Isabel as ‘virile’, expressed a common view) ‘generally reign to such an extent that they do not allow for advice, patience or prudence, essential qualities of government, and in power, their tyranny increases’. His use of the word ‘tyranny’ in this female context is significant. Like others, he effectively associates it with the topos of the furor uterinis, or roving womb, exciting passion, lust and illness and rendering her incapable of bringing peace and prosperity to her subjects.

Although all queens were expected to marry and procreate, a queen regnant’s subjects feared not only the effects of supposed female instability but of rule, or co-rule, by a foreign consort. In words Pulgar attributes to Isabel, he might ‘appropriate to himself the governments of these realms, and other people of his nation who are not Castilian would seize control of the fortresses and royal patrimony, so that the kingdom would fall into the hands of a foreign house, and this would be a great burden on our consciences, and disservice to God and to the great detriment of our descendants and our subjects and countrymen’.

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85 Marcuello, Cancionero, f. 84v.
86 Cited in Aram, Juana the Mad: 6
87 Baltasar Gracían, El político Don Fernando el Católico (Zaragoza, 1985): 186-187
88 Ian Maclean’s The Renaissance Notion of Woman (Cambridge, 1980) examines the concept of hysteria in scholasticism and medical science.
89 Fernando de Pulgar, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos (Madrid, 1943), 1: 72-73
Figure 11. Juana with Pedro Marcuello and his daughter, Isabel, whom he was anxious to place in Juana's household. In his Canticero he portrays Juana as their semi-sacred protector, towering over them as the Virgin of Mercy (Misericordia) towers over the royal family in Figure 2, covering them with her mantle. All three figures wear traditional Spanish dress.
In recognition of this problem Portugal had introduced the Laws of Lamego (1181), barring a female sovereign from marrying a foreigner.\(^90\) Had similar laws existed in Castile they might have been used to prevent Isabel’s marriage with Aragonese Fernando, then King of Sicily. In their absence, he challenged Isabel’s right to govern, claiming his right was greater. Isabel’s advisers sought guidance from the *Siete Partidas* (Seven Divisions), a compendium of codes and doctrinal texts elaborated between 1256-1265, which established, in *Partida* II, that women could inherit the proprietary title in the absence of male heirs in the direct line. Examples of precedent were also sought among women who had either borne the proprietary title, or ruled as regents, including Urraca I and Berenguela I.\(^91\)

Both queens, who pre-date the *Partidas*, are particularly significant to a study of Juana’s queenship. The daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile and Eleonor Plantagenet, Berenguela was recognised as proprietary queen by the Cortes of Valladolid when her younger brother died in 1217. But, during the Cortes, she abdicated in favour of her son, Fernando III, while continuing to rule as regent and queen mother. For some historians, Berenguela (sister of French queen and regent, Blanche of Castile) ‘did not want to reign’; her main aim was to defend her son against other claimants and bring about the union of Castile and Leon.\(^92\) For others, the Cortes obliged her to abdicate because, under Roman law, women were incapacitated from governing.\(^93\) When, in 1520, Juana I described herself before the Cortes procurators at Tordesillas as the ‘second or third proprietary queen’ of Castile, her uncertainty was understandable. Was Berenguela a proprietary queen if she renounced the title in the same moment she received it?

Urraca was the daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile and Constance of Burgundy, and the only proprietary queen to rule as such until Isabel’s accession. Modern biographers have shown how Urraca showed extraordinary determination in defending her sovereignty against challenges from all sides. Without male heirs, Alfonso VI had bequeathed Castile and Leon to Urraca, then widowed, on condition that she agree to marry Alfonso I of Aragon. Instead of

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91 Fernando de Pulgar, *Crónica*, 1: 70-74
93 Córdova Miralles, *La Corte*: 44-45
bringing unity, the marriage tore her kingdoms apart. Her second marriage
annulled, Urraca ruled Castile and Leon, in association with her son and daughter
from her first marriage, until her death in 1126. Alfonso of Aragon continued,
however, to claim his right to Castile and some cities and fortresses remained in
his hands. Often regarded by chroniclers as ‘unfit to rule’, modern biographers
have highlighted Urraca’s gender-based difficulties as queen.94

Whether Isabel I could have ruled without Fernando’s support, provided
after early misgivings, remains arguable. Under the Concordat of Segovia (15
January 1475) Isabel accepted joint rule of Castile by Fernando, although never
more than Fernando’s consort in Aragon. No legal concept of *salicité* existed in
Aragon, as in France. But the will of Petronila, who inherited Aragon in the
twelfth century, established the precedent of female exclusion from the
succession. Strong queen-lieutenants had ruled parts of Aragon – María de Luna
(1396-1406); María de Castilla (1416-1458); Fernando’s mother, Juana Enríquez
(1458-1468).95 Occasionally kings without direct male heirs tried to breach
tradition to preserve the dynastic line, as was notably the case of Pedro IV, who
attempted, in vain, to leave Aragon to his daughter, Constanza.96 After the death
of Prince Juan, Fernando struggled to secure Aragon’s acceptance as heir of
Juana’s elder sister, and tortuous negotiations were continuing when she died.

In view of the problems associated with sovereign queenship it is
unsurprising that some procurators to the Cortes of 1502-1503 should have
approached the Catholic monarchs with reservations about Juana’s *juramento* as
wife of a foreign prince. In her will of 12 October 1504 Isabel refers to these
concerns when stating that, after her death, Fernando should govern if Juana
were ‘not in my kingdoms, or having come to them, has at some point to leave
them again and remain away from them, or if, while being in them she does not
wish or is unable to govern’.97 Isabel explains that, ‘having spoken to some

94 Carmen del María Pallares, Ermelindo Portelo, *La Reina Urraca* (Donostia/San Sebastian,
2006)
95 Theresa Earenfight, *The King’s Other Body* (Philadelphia, 2010)
96 Villacañas Berlanga, *La Monarquía*: 197-211
97 ‘Otroso, por quanto puede acaecer que al tiempo que Nuestro Señor me llevare, la dicha
princesa mi hija, no este en mis reynos, o despues que a ellos veniere, en algun tiempo aya de yr
e estar fuera dellos, o estando en ellos no quiera o no pueda entender en la governacion dellos ...’
(AGS, PR 30-2, f. 5v.). This is repeated later in the same clause, except that it is given in the
conditional (‘no quisiere o no podiere’).
prelates and grandees of my kingdoms and lordly domains all were agreed that, in any of these said cases, the king my lord should govern and administer my kingdoms and lordly domains on behalf of the princess my daughter.\footnote{AGS, PR 30-2, f. 5v., Testamento de Isabel la Católica} She also mentions the procurators’ pleas in a letter to Fuensalida.\footnote{Fuensalida: 250-251, 6 July 1504}

Isabel does not specify what lay behind these concerns. Aram has plausibly suggested that the procurators’ main concern in 1502-1503 was not Juana but Philip.\footnote{Aram, ‘La Reina Juana entre Trastámaras y Austrias’, in Nieto Soria, López Cortezo, eds., \textit{Gobernar en tiempos de crisis} (Madrid, 2008): 33} Busleyden’s death at Toledo on 24 August had unnerved, even panicked Philip.\footnote{Philip ‘does not eat until the archbishop of Besançon tells him to’, reported Fuensalida (166, 22 November 1500).} Violence flared between Spanish subjects and his retinue. Serious disagreements erupted within his council and, despite joint representations from Isabel and Juana, he sent home his pro-Spanish councillors, led by the Berghes brothers.\footnote{Lalaing, ‘Voyage’: 190-191, 197, 242} The princes’ journey to Aragon was overshadowed by rumours that Philip would leave Spain immediately the ceremonies were over. Indeed, this is what Philip had told the governors he had left in the Low Countries.\footnote{‘Nous sommes, Dieu mercy, deslogiez de Thoulette, et à petites journées tirrons vers Sarraogosse où, selon les nouvelles que avons du roy, nous espérons estre receuz, incontinent à nostre arrivée, es royaulmes d’Arragon, Cecille et autres seigneuries quy en dependent. Et, ce fait, ne cesserons que n’ayons nostre congé pour nostre retour de par delà’, in Gachard, \textit{Collection}, f. 381, extract of undated letter from Philip to Low Countries.} While Juana remained in Zaragoza, Philip returned to Madrid, where the monarchs tried to persuade him not to leave.\footnote{Lalaing, ‘Voyage’: 242; Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 141} Their appeal reflects that made by the Castilian procurators, who argued that it mattered less that he had been granted safe conduct to cross France in wartime than that he would be seen as a traitor – an astonishing situation for a newly-sworn prince, as they point out in a letter to him. Philip was placing himself at the mercy of his enemies, while endangering Juana’s life: ‘God save her highness for the lives of pregnant women can be endangered by very small causes’. For the Prince to act like this would undermine not only the monarchs’ position but
the interests and honour of ‘all Spain’, causing ‘very great agitation’. Aragonese procurators also appealed to Philip.

Nevertheless, some modern historians have linked procurators’ concerns explicitly with Juana’s mental state: ‘The fact is’, writes Carretero Zamora, ‘that the procurators gathered in 1502 raised serious doubts about the heir’s capacity to rule’ and their pleas did not refer to Philip. That Juana should be the procurators’ focal point during the Cortes, which continued into 1503, undoubtedly stems from the fact that Juana was the proprietary heir and thus, as Fernando later told Fuensalida, ‘the everything’ (‘el todo’). It was she who, upon accession, would bring the ‘advent ... of a monarch foreign to Castile, a question that was not well received among some procurators in the Cortes of Toledo of 1502’.

Carretero Zamora backs his view that Juana was intellectually incapable with references to Martire’s letters of 20 September 1502 and 10 March 1503. But the first letter expresses most concern about Philip: his feet were itching; ‘his blood boils ... and he can settle nowhere’. Reiterating the views of both monarchs and procurators, Martire adds that this represented a danger for Juana, who could miscarry. Philip’s obstinacy was hard for Isabel and even harder for Juana ‘who is a simple woman ... she trembles and does nothing but weep’. The second letter, dated after Philip’s departure, is, indeed, extraordinarily damning of Juana as Martire casts around for enough words to convey his disgust. She is obstinately saturnine, mutely desperate; she is rotten fruit and failed harvest; she betrays no shred of ‘royalty or courage’, poisoning Isabel’s entrails, as daily Isabel mourns Juan’s death and worries over the succession.

Ironically, Martire’s letter of 10 March is dated on the day Juana gave birth to the Infante Fernando – the future Ferdinand I – an event that caused much joy at court. In contrast to Martire, Villaescusa, preaching at his baptism, described Juana in glowing terms. He recalled the armada that had carried her to

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105 RAH, Salazar, A-11, f. 354 [Undated copy; 1502/1503]
106 Zurita, III: 44
107 Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora: Cortes: 200-201
108 See Chapter 3
109 Alonso García: El Erario: 204
110 Martire, X, 250: 35, 20 September 1502
111 Martire, X, 255: 47-49, 10 March 1503
Flanders in 1496, praised her marital contentment, fertility and Marian virtues; her gaiety, laughter and light-heartedness through the travails of childbirth.\footnote{Sandoval, Historia: 22} Liss is surely right to describe this sermon as ‘a dexterous attempt to present the princess as divinely chosen to rule’.\footnote{Liss, Isabel: 386} But Sandoval, with no such agenda, vividly describes the revels surrounding the baptism, when Isabel and Juana together welcomed the procession back to the palace with ‘great delight and pleasure’.\footnote{Sandoval, Historia: 23} Sandoval is not alone in suggesting that Juana was not merely (or not always) the wreck Martíre describes. Some Aragonese testimonies of 1516 describe her in Zaragoza in 1502 as ‘very sensible (discreta), prudent (cuerda) and with excellent natural gifts’.\footnote{Argensola, Primera Parte, 4: 39-40}

2. 3. Unwilling? Unable? (1503-1504)

During the Spanish journey Juana had conscientiously fulfilled her role as patron and heir. She had brought holy relics to Spain.\footnote{Aram, Juana the Mad: 58} She had accompanied Isabel on numerous occasions and, with her, tried to protect the Berghes. She had presided the Cort of Zaragoza, conducting ‘some business’ there before being ordered back to Madrid. Her return itinerary included a visit to La Muela to support the Christian community for the feast of St Catherine.\footnote{Lalain, ‘Voyage’: 242} In January 1503, after Philip’s departure, she visited the Clarisan convent of Rejas, outside Madrid, which she had already visited several times between 1502-1503, suggesting a bond of patronage.\footnote{Aram, Juana the Mad: 64} She had made donations to other Franciscan foundations.\footnote{AGS, CSR, 402 bis, 24 April [1502-1504], ‘Carta de Fray Francisco Segarra a doña Juana agradeciendo un beneficio recibido’, in Rodríguez de Diego, ‘La huella’, in Zalama, ed., Juana I en Tordesillas: 44} Above all, in Alcalá de Henares she gave birth to a son, whom she agreed to leave in Spain as Manoel had agreed to leave Miguel.

But as tensions with Isabel grew Cisneros attempted mediation. García Oro describes him as ‘omnipresent’ at court in the last years of Isabel’s life.\footnote{García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 118} A remarkable patron of learning, close collaborator with Isabel in programmes of
enforced baptism and the revival of earlier practices of piety, he had become Isabel’s confessor in 1492, and Archbishop of Toledo in 1495, and remained one of the Queen’s most influential advisers. Gómez de Castro describes a meeting during which: ‘... before the mother, [Cisneros] excused Juana’s love for her husband, which [Isabel] found excessive: for there is no excessive love between spouses who love one another. And he was not at all surprised that jealousy should at times seriously upset [Juana] because women, in particular, suffer from that illness ...’ Juana must allow the ‘cruel wound’ of separation to heal pending her departure. Isabel had to remember ‘she had been destined to carry out the functions of a man’. García Oro suggests that Cisneros’ withdrawal to Toledo during the last months of Isabel’s life may have been linked to a depression exacerbated by Isabel’s illness and Juana’s ‘emotional fluctuations’, as well as by other matters.

Torn between the love and respect for her mother to which Padilla refers, and her love and duties as wife and mother, Juana’s ‘fluctuations’ might well have been related to news that Philip, vulnerable to feverish illnesses, had fallen dangerously ill at Lyon. Isabel’s doctors advised that she and Juana be separated. Juana was ‘sleeping badly, eating little, and sometimes nothing, and is very sad and weak. Sometimes she does not want to speak ...’ The cure, they added, was ‘love and entreaty, or fear’, but her reaction to the use of force was so great that they advised against it. One anonymous contemporary later recalled family gossip: ‘I heard my father say that when [Juana and Philip] were in Alcalá de Henares in 1502, she was already ill, and that the Queen her mother asked Doctor [Nicolás] de Soto, one of her doctors, by what remedy the Princess could be cured, and the doctor said: ‘The only remedy is a beating’, and the Queen got angry with him and said: “You must not talk in that way about royal persons.”

Isabel had faced marital problems with other daughters. Years later, as Isabel wondered whether to bring her youngest daughter back to Spain after Arthur’s death, memories of her eldest came flooding back: ‘No other Princess

121 Gómez de Castro, De las hazañas: 133-134
122 García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 118-119
123 Lalain, ‘Voyage’: 290, 293; Padilla, Crónica: 92
124 RAH, Salazar, A-11, f. 380v.-381, 20 June [1503], Doctors de Soto, Julián and de la Reyna to Fernando
125 BL, Ms. Egerton 309, ‘Relación de las Comunidades’, f. 9v
ever endured more grief ... or had such a sad life and such a bitter life on account of the death of her husband as she did’. There are other examples. But clearly, none compared in severity with the problem constituted by Juana, since Isabel’s struggle to keep her in Castile was a struggle for the very future of her kingdoms. As such, it is unnecessary to argue that Isabel was primarily concerned about an intrinsic incapacity to govern on Juana’s part. Nor is there concrete evidence to support it.

Juana may have sensed deceit and dissimulation on Isabel’s part. She, Padilla writes, concealed Philip’s arrival in the Low Countries ‘because, in truth, she did not want her daughter to return to Flanders, since she felt very unwell with the illness from which she died.’ Hearing that Philip had eventually reached home, Juana ‘frequently begged the queen her mother for permission to rejoin him’. She began to suspect, with some reason, that her parents were trying deliberately to separate them. In August she assured Philip, who had sent a series of messengers and letters demanding her return, that she and Isabel were heading for Burgos, that she was preparing to leave, that the Infante was well. Some time afterwards, Juana left Isabel and continued north.

Juana’s residence in the mighty stronghold of La Mota (figure 16) remains something of a mystery. Rearing from its hill on the edge of Medina del Campo, the red brick fortress with its triple line of fire, massive quadrilinear keep and rounded bartizan towers, was Castile’s arsenal and still served as an occasional prison. Although it also served as a courtly residence, Isabel habitually resided at the palace in town, where she lived throughout 1504. The only likely explanation is that a deterioration of trust on both sides had persuaded Isabel that Juana must be held securely. Juana seems to have felt overwhelmed by the sense that her own mother had imprisoned her at La Mota.

By early September the monarchs feared Juana would take matters into her hands. A ship’s captain told Fernando he had received an order from Juana to

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126 CSP, Sp. I, 343, 10 August 1502. Tarcisio de Azcona refers to problems between Isabel and Maria prior to the latter’s departure for Portugal, in Juana de Castilla, mal llamada La Beltraneja (Madrid, 2007): 219-220.
127 Padilla, Crónica: 114-115
128 Gachard, ed., Collection, I: 383, 15 August 1503, Philip to Nassau and Maigny
129 Cesare Borgia was imprisoned there in 1504. Venetian ambassador Querini describes him flying falcons from a balcony (Sanudo, Diarii, 6: 282).
await her at Bilbao.\textsuperscript{130} On 12 September Isabel wrote to her daughter: ‘I do not think, or expect, and so cannot believe you are leaving, for although there are many necessary reasons for your departure, greater problems may follow if you leave like this.’\textsuperscript{131} Her letter may have caused Juana to hesitate and delay, but in late November she came under renewed pressure from Philip. An emotional appeal from Charles, which, writes Belenguer, was ‘clearly inspired, if not dictated by Philip’, and which begged her to return, may have been decisive.\textsuperscript{132}

In Isabel’s well-known description of events at La Mota her distress as queen and mother is almost palpable. Juana, she told Fuensalida, planned to ‘walk through the streets and mud to the \textit{posada} where the horses were kept …’ When Juana realised that Isabel had ordered Rodríguez de Fonseca to shut the gates she was overcome with anger and ‘remained in the outer precinct of the house all evening and all night and all the next day until the second hour in the humidity and night dew and without either hat or coat, during one of the coldest nights of the year so far, and not for a moment would she return to her room’.\textsuperscript{133}

Isabel worried that, if Juana left the fortress, she could become a public spectacle, risking authority and reputation at a time when the great international fair of Medina was in progress. Since none of her emissaries, including Cisneros, could persuade Juana to return to her apartments, Isabel was forced to come in person to Medina ‘with more effort and haste and making longer days of it than I knew was good for my health’. Juana then ‘spoke to me so heatedly and with words so disrespectful and so far beyond what a daughter should say to a mother that had I not seen the state she was in I would not have tolerated it for one moment’.\textsuperscript{134}

According to Padilla’s slightly different version, Juana tried, but failed, to regain control of the situation before involving Isabel. Realising that Fonseca was determined to report the situation to the Queen, she sent one of her servants, Miguel de Ferrera, to call him back. Vexed by Fonseca’s refusal to obey, she

\textsuperscript{130} RAH, Salazar, A-9, f. 227, , 6 September 1503, Hugo de Urries to Fernando
\textsuperscript{131} BL, Additional Ms. 28572, f. 43, Isabel to Juana
\textsuperscript{132} Belenguer, \textit{Fernando}: 238
\textsuperscript{133} Fuensalida: 197 [1504]
\textsuperscript{134} ibidem
stayed ‘between the gates in some garita (lodge or cabin), where they made up a bed’.  

In the event, Juana remained with her parents until March 1504. Fearing she might embark for the Low Countries in adverse weather, Isabel asked Philip, who had been goading Juana to leave, to ensure that Halewyn (who had become the Infante’s godmother, and whom Isabel now clearly trusted) and Juana’s chevalier d’honneur, Hugues de Melun, were authorised to ‘restrain’ and ‘keep [her] in check.’ Both Isabel and Philip interpreted Juana’s conduct at La Mota in terms of her ‘passions’. Shaking his head hypocritically over Juana’s conduct, Philip told Fuensalida it was caused by her ‘great love’ for him: ‘she is hot-headed and often says what she wishes afterwards she had not said’.

Zurita thought events at La Mota affected the monarchs almost as much as Juan’s death; they ‘revealed the indisposition and dementia of the Princess, which was not formerly public knowledge’. Historians since have taken a similar line. According to Suárez: ‘... since that stormy night of November 1503 in La Mota of Medina del Campo, her parents ... had not the slightest doubt that [Juana] suffered from a mental disturbance so great that it could prevent her from assuming her functions. This is a fact proven by the documentation and we must take it into account if we want to understand events’.  

Yet documentation can be interpreted in different ways. Prawdin concludes that Juana had decided on an emotional, political, even religious rupture with ‘all Spain’. For Aram: ‘It was clear that Juana was willing to use her health and compromise her status to obtain what she wanted and that was not to reign over Castile’. As is often the case, the reality may be more nuanced. Juana’s later actions and reports suggest that she regretted returning to the Low Countries when she did and continued to care for her kingdoms a great deal.

Certainly the Juana who, at Blois, had worn Spanish cloth of gold and danced ‘à l’espagnole’, and who had commissioned and purchased the golden

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135 Padilla, Crónica: 114-115
136 Fuensalida: 198 [1504]
137 Fuensalida: 210, 10 February 1504
138 Zurita, III: 215
139 Suárez, ‘Coyuntura europea en el Reinado de Juana’: 55
140 Prawdin writes of a: ‘Bruch ... mit ihrer Kindheit, mit ihren Eltern, mit der Kirche ihrer Eltern, mit ganz Spanien ...’ Johanna: 93
141 Aram, ‘La Reina Juana entre Trastamaras y Austrias’: 34
tapestries, was not the same Juana who bade farewell to Philip that December, dressed in ‘grant deuil’. Like the mourning worn years later by royal councillors after their arrest by Comunero leaders, Juana’s full mourning is likely to have reflected a political as well as personal rebuke. We do not know what discussions Juana had with her parents after reunion with them at Medina del Campo in the winter and early spring of 1504, but they may have been important. Juana might have concluded that Philip no longer wanted to share with her in the Spanish adventure and that a new dual monarchy could not follow seamlessly upon Isabel’s and Fernando’s. Had she decided to stay in Spain indefinitely it is possible that, with Fernando’s help, she could have ensured a successful transition. But since she did not wish to annul her marriage or separate from Philip, she had probably already decided that Fernando should govern in her place, unless Philip could be persuaded to come to an accommodation. She might also have been encouraged to think that way.

Whatever the truth, Juana’s departure from Spain and subsequent situation in Brussels showed Isabel that inheritance of a proprietary title did not protect a queen and country from over-ambitious or feckless foreign consorts. In her will she confirmed Juana as ‘universal heir of all my realms and lands and lordly domains and all my landed property’. Her subjects were to receive her as ‘true queen and native-born sovereign lady’ and to give and show her all the fidelity, loyalty, obedience, reverence and so forth that, as her subjects and native-born vassals, they were obliged to do.142

Isabel then set out the conditions under which Fernando might govern on Juana’s behalf, adding that if Charles were twenty by the time of Fernando’s death, and Juana remained ‘unwilling or unable to govern’, Charles should succeed as governor. But if Juana were willing and able, Isabel begged and ordered Juana and Philip to ‘always be very obedient and subject to the king … and follow his orders and advice … in such a way that, in everything that touches

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142 ‘... e le den e presten e exibian e fagan dar y prestar e exhibir toda la fidelidad e lealtad e obediencia e reverencia e subjecion e vasallage que como sus subditos e naturales vasallos le deven e son obligados a le dar e prestar ...’AGS, PR 30-2, f. 4v., ‘Testamento de Isabel la Católica’
his lordship, *it were as if I were still alive* (my emphasis).\(^{143}\) A codicil was signed on 23 November, with a letter patent nominating Fernando Governor General under the conditions laid out in the will.\(^{144}\) ‘We have no idea’, writes Suárez, ‘what part the king played in the drafting of the codicil, which he presented as a unilateral decision of the queen’.\(^{145}\) This doubtless refers also to the letter patent.

As John Edwards observes, Isabel’s will shows how troubled she was by the prospect that Philip would seize power in Castile at the expense both of Juana and Fernando.\(^{146}\) The will bans foreigners, ignorant of the ‘laws and *fueros* and rights and usages and customs of my realms’ from taking any civil and ecclesiastical posts. It warns: ‘... the prince my son is of another nation and language’; if he and Juana did not govern by these laws, rights and customs ‘they will not be obeyed and served as they should, and from this some outrage could result, and they would not be loved as I wish them to be’.

The ambiguous phraseology of the succession clause on the governorship is often interpreted as a sign of Isabel’s far-sightedness. But depressed and in poor health, Isabel had ceded much government control to Fernando since 1498, and in his perceptive ‘biographical sketch’ of the Queen, medieval historian José Enrique Ruiz-Domèneç argues that her decision to tie Fernando’s governorship to the question of Juana’s willingness and ability is explicable only in terms of the confusion and pain wrought by illness.\(^{147}\) Certainly, Fernando’s message urging Juana and Philip to return to Spain to see Isabel before she died, as well as other clauses of the will and codicil, placing certain courses of action before Juana and Philip when in government, suggest that Isabel did not want to give up on Juana.\(^{148}\) Doubts must also persist about the extent to which the wording of the key phrases was the result of pressure or continuing indecision. As Zalama notes, the original document (figure 12) shows that the key words *o no pueda* (or is unable) and again, this time in the conditional, *o no podiere*, were inserted.

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\(^{143}\) AGS, PR 30-2, f. 6, ‘Testamento de Isabel la Católica’; AGS, PR 56, f. 17, ‘Clausula del testamento de Isabel la Católica, encargando a la Princesa Juana el respeto debido al Rey Fernando, su padre’

\(^{144}\) AGS, PR 56, f. 18, 23 November 1504, ‘Carta patente’

\(^{145}\) Suárez, Fernando: 393


\(^{147}\) José Enrique Ruiz-Domèneç, *Isabel la Católica o el yugo del poder* (Barcelona, 2004): 146

\(^{148}\) Fuensalida: 286-287, 26 September 1504, Fernando to ambassadors
above the line and between the phrases no quiere or no quisiere (does not wish) and entender en la governación (govern).\textsuperscript{149} Fernando later denied allegations that he had pressured Isabel to phrase the will as she had done.\textsuperscript{150} But, unless the between-line insertions were later additions, they suggest that Isabel was torn between her desire to do her duty by her daughter, and, in Bernal’s words, ‘to slam the door on the solitary rule in Castile of her son-in-law’.\textsuperscript{151}

Furthermore, Isabel’s decision to conditionally grant Fernando the governorship seems not to have been made until late in the day and was not the direct outcome of Juana’s conduct at La Mota. In July 1504 Isabel categorically denied that she ‘had made the grandees and procurators of the kingdom swear an oath that, after my death, the King my lord would govern these realms during his lifetime’. This was ‘a great and malicious falsehood on the part of whoever wrote it; this was never done … and not only was it not done, but … [although] many begged that the oath be sworn as it had been done for Prince Juan, the King and I refused to consent – quite the contrary, in no way would we hear of it – and the Prince and Princess our children were sworn in unconditionally, as freely and entirely and fully as any prince was ever sworn in …’.\textsuperscript{152} Unless Isabel was being duplicitous, what had happened to change her mind between July-October 1504?

The answer appears to lie both in Philip’s apparent lack of commitment to Spanish interests and in news of an imploding marriage. On 22 September 1504, with Maximilian’s authority, Philip ratified the Treaty of Blois, which recognised Louis as Duke of Milan and agreed a joint strategy vis-à-vis Venice. This, notes Suárez, tilted France and the Habsburgs into an alliance that left Fernando vulnerable.\textsuperscript{153} Two days before Isabel’s death, Fernando told

\textsuperscript{150} Fuensalida: 403 [undated], ‘Lo que dixo Mose de Vere al Rey ... y lo que le respondiese que escrivisese el Rey Don Fernando’
\textsuperscript{151} Bernal, ‘Monarquía’: 64
\textsuperscript{152} Fuensalida: 250, 6 July 1504
\textsuperscript{153} Suárez, ‘La Monarquía Hispana y Europa en torno a 1505’, in Benjamín González Alonso, ed., Las Cortes de Toro y las Leyes de Toro de 1505 (Cortes de Castilla y León, 2006): 129-139
Fuensalida that Philip had acted both 'against us and against himself; it is something so unheard of and so much against nature that [the] very walls shake with anger and are scandalised to hear them'.

Yet more dramatic were reports about marital conflict and violence. In July Philip sent to Medina, via Mújica, a report about Juana’s conduct, compiled, as Philip later put it, to ‘protect my rights’ following charges of ill-treating his wife. No longer extant, it catalogued extravagances allegedly committed by Juana after her return to Brussels. Martire describes with evident relish her discovery of an adulterous relationship with her husband: ‘Her face vomiting flames, her teeth clenched, she rained blows on one of her women – whom she suspected to be the lover – and ordered that they cut her blond hair …’

Fernando later retorted that Philip had only himself to blame for the phraseology of the will and that ‘wanting to justify your desire to place the queen, her daughter, in a fortress, you sent [Isabel] a long document signed by your own hand, which contained so much detail about [Juana’s] illness that this, above all, beyond what she herself had seen and known, moved the queen … to order in her will what she did’. This remark seems to substantiate the traditional view that the wording was motivated by Isabel’s knowledge about Juana’s ‘passions’, combined with Philip’s new allegations about her ‘illness’. Yet if Fernando milked the dossier for his own purposes while later rejecting it as implausible, it is equally unlikely that Isabel accepted it unquestioningly and that Philip’s action and motives did not affect Isabel at least as much as the dossier itself. In the above-mentioned letter Martire mentions Isabel’s fury over Philip’s conduct towards the delicately-raised but ‘rather obstinate’ Juana, adding that if both monarchs were upset, ‘The indignation of the Queen – who bore her in her womb – has been the greater, and she suffers much, astonished by the northerner’s violent reaction’. On 19 July he reported that both monarchs remained baffled by Philip’s conduct.

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154 Fuensalida: 309, 24 November 1504
155 Martire, X, 272: 83-84, 26 June 1504
156 ‘... queriendo dar razón porque queríades poner en una fortaleza a la Reyna, su hija, enbiastes a la Reyna ... una escritura larga firmada de vuestra mano, en que se contienen tantas cosas de su enfermedad, que aquello principalmente, allendo de lo que ella misma vido y supo, movió a la Reyna ... a hordenar por su testamento lo que hordenó ...’ Fuensalida: 401-404, ‘Lo que dixo Mose de Vere’
157 See Chapter 3
towards Juana. Subsequently he offered several explanations for reports that Isabel’s will did not mention Philip positively or by name: his refusal to follow her advice; his violence to Juana; his unfitness to ‘govern such numerous dominions’; his Flemish upbringing ‘so different from the Spanish’; his francophile tastes. Like ‘foaming wild boars’, the nobles were only waiting for Philip in order to pounce.

In these circumstances, the monarchs could only agree with Fuensalida’s words to Almazán: ‘matters between the Prince and Princess are such that unless God miraculously deprives her of her caprices (fantasía) and does not bestow on him a different temperament, it will be impossible for them ever to agree. If a house is in such disorder as theirs is now, how can so many and such great realms as those to which they are to succeed ever work in harmony?’

158 Martire, X, 273: 84-85, 19 July 1504
159 Martire, X, 277: 86-89, 19 November 1504
160 Fuensalida: 303-304, 1 November 1504
Figure 12. Extract from Isabel's will of 12 October 1504 (Archivo General de Simancas), showing the insertion of the words 'o no podiere' above the third line.
3. Three strategies

3. 1. Fernando’s challenge (1504–1505)

Because the conflict of 1505-1506 is seen almost exclusively as a struggle between two kings, the strategy and influence on events of the proprietary monarch have been largely ignored. By analysing the activities of each of the main protagonists, this chapter aims to show how, even when invisible, Juana’s status and use of power had a profound effect on the course of what was, in reality, a three-way struggle.

After Isabel’s death Fernando was tempted to ‘take the royal road’ on dynastic and moral grounds.¹ His father, Juan II of Aragon, a Castilian-born infante of the Castilian branch of the Trastámara, had expected his son to play the major governing role in Castile, even succeeding Isabel in due course.² Fernando also claimed a moral right, habitually referring to the labours with which he and Isabel achieved peace and justice after years of strife, robbery and poor government.³ The military victories of 1472-1479 and 1481-1492 were essentially Castilian triumphs, but Fernando’s contribution to them had brought personal and moral prestige.

The influence of sixteenth-century Italian commentators has obscured a third strand in Fernando’s thinking. For Machiavelli he is the ‘prudent’ prince, who ‘never preaches anything except peace and good faith; and he is an enemy of both one and the other, and if he had ever honoured either of them he would have lost either his standing or his state many times over’.⁴ If, Guicciardini notes, ‘he had been constant in his promises he could not easily have undertaken anything …’⁵ But, as José António Maravall points out when remarking on Fernando’s reluctance to accept imminent death, and tenacious belief in the prophetic visions of the Beata del Barco de Avila, who foretold triumphal

¹ Zurita, III: 332
² Carrasco Manchado, Isabel I: 64, 263-264n.
³ An example is his 1506 rallying cry to Castile in Rodríguez Villa, La Reina: 149-153
⁴ Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Harmondsworth, 1973), 101-102. Machiavelli’s reference to ‘a certain contemporary ruler, whom it is better not to name’ has been universally accepted as a reference to Fernando.
⁵ Francesco Guicciardini, Della Storia d’Italia (Freiburg, 1775-1776), III: 182
conquests to come, Fernando was no simple technocrat of power, but shared the spiritual preoccupations and prophetism of his age. Fernández-Armesto shows him ‘trying to live out the millenarian expectations with which prophetic utterance endowed him – the “promised prince” who would raise his banner in Jerusalem and rule the world until its appointed end …’ Millenarian expectations apart, Doussinague stresses Fernando’s role as idealistic Christian prince, determined to extend Christendom by dominion over the western Mediterranean, with the conquest of the ports along the African coast and incursions into the north African mainland. At home as well, and at a time when politics and religion were so closely enmeshed, a strong Christian devotion in both Fernando and Isabel had coloured much, if not all, of their political and religious endeavours. Both had taken a personal and active role in monastic and ecclesiastical reform, as well as in the establishment throughout their territories of the new Inquisition. Fernando’s attitude to the Castilian inheritance was determined not only, or even mainly, by personal ambition and thoughts of gain, but by a sincere belief in his protective religious and political mission.

Fernando had bowed to Isabel’s determination that their children preceed him in the line of Castilian succession; it had been the price for political parity with Isabel and essential to present a united front against Portugal’s claims during the war of succession, when such questions arose. But he never lost sight of the importance, for Aragon, of retaining power in Castile. Naples, the main jewel in the Crown of Aragon, had been won with Castilian revenues, gradually supplemented by a new flow of wealth from the Indies, and guarded against France by a Castilian army. In her will Isabel had left Fernando the mighty revenues from the three military orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Alcántara, brought under royal control since Enrique IV’s death, and half the revenues from the Indies. These Castilian revenues, as English envoy John Stile later pointed

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6 José António Maravall, *Pensamiento político, política internacional y religiosa de Fernando el Católico* (Zaragoza, 1956): 22-23
7 Fernández-Armesto, ‘The Improbable Empire’ in Carr, ed., *Spain*: 122-123
8 Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid, 1944): 12, 509
out, provided the main support for ‘al hys reamys and hys estate’. If he did not retain control of these he risked losing control not only of Castile but Aragon.

But, in reality, Fernando’s claims to the governorship were based on little else but an arguable interpretation of Isabel’s will. The Aragonese ‘party’, which included his closest confidant, royal secretary Miguel Pérez de Almazán, was unpopular. Edwards notes that: ‘Complaints were beginning to be made publicly about the quality of some who received Crown appointments, and the royal secretaries were being blamed’. Suárez, too, refers to Castilian concerns about domination by Aragonese secretaries, together with resentment that Castilian resources were being drained to fund military campaigns seen as fundamentally Aragonese, like the campaigns in the Pyrenees. Declining standards in city administration caused unease. A series of dismal harvests hiked food prices. In the last decade of Isabel’s reign (when Fernando had assumed greater control), ‘administrative corruption and financial fraud had soared’. Separated from Juana, Fernando was unsure of the degree and efficacy of her support. This uncertainty was reflected abroad. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, Antonio Giustinian, remarked on confusion at the papal court about the relations between Spain and the Habsburg territories, ‘glossed differently according to the appetite of each’. Some said Philip would now unite with Fernando, and do what the latter wanted; others claimed ‘the Archduke would convert the Spaniard to his will’.

Evidently, Fernando concluded that he lacked backing to ‘take the royal road’. But, Suárez observes, he used Juana’s ‘incapacity’ to pursue sole power well into 1506. Fernando’s first move was to demonstrate obedience to Isabel. Stepping onto a platform in Medina del Campo, he ordered Fadrique de Toledo, Duke of Alba, to raise the royal standard for Juana I, Queen of Castile. Padilla claims that, he took Isabel’s standard, ‘which was there’. Divesting himself of

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10 LP, 1, 162: 84, 9 September 1509
11 John Edwards, Ferdinand and Isabella (Harlow, 2005): 163
12 Suárez, Fernando: 398
13 Liss, Isabel: 398
14 Antonio Giustinian, in Pasquale Villari, ed., Dispacci di Antonio Giustinian (Florence, 1876), III, 1101: 359-360, 6 January 1505
15 Suárez, Fernando: 396
16 Padilla, Crónica: 121. I take this to mean that Isabel’s standard being there, he re-used it as Juana’s.
the title of King of Castile, held since 1474, he ordered all cities and towns to proclaim Juana, but recognise him as governor and administrator in her name. He distinguished between Juana, whose name headed acts of government, and her consort, Philip – a foreigner who should not be recognised as king until he had returned to Castile to swear allegiance to its laws. This meant, Fernando added, that Philip must swear not to place foreigners in government.

Belenguer likens the Cortes of Toro, which opened on 11 January 1505, to the starting pistol that set him off on his long marathon in pursuit of power. Isabel’s will was shown to the procurators, and the most relevant succession clauses proclaimed. The procurators asked that the letter patent also be shown and read out. Juana was confirmed as true, legitimate queen and natural and proprietary mistress of Castile, Granada and León, together with Philip as her ‘legitimate husband’. Fernando was sworn in as governor.

However, Carretero Zamora mentions that some procurators were surprised at the interpretation given to Isabel’s will, demanding more information. This suggests that by no means all procurators had seen Juana as the main concern for the succession during the Cortes of Toledo. In view of their bafflement, a decision was taken to reveal hitherto secret documents. On 23 January Cortes president Garcilaso de la Vega ordered royal secretary Bartolomé Ruiz de Castañeda to read out a specially prepared declaration, according to which, long before Isabel’s death, she had become aware of an ‘illness and passion’ in Juana. But, for reasons of discretion (comendimiento), decency (honestidad) and the ‘great and deeply-rooted grief’ that this caused her, she could not bring herself to refer to the unfitness (impedimiento) of her daughter except by the general phrase no poder (unable). A report from Brussels, as well as troubling diplomatic despatches, had confirmed Isabel’s suspicions that Juana was unable to govern. After binding the procurators to an oath of secrecy, the

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17 See, for example, AGS, PR 7: 248, De como Jaén alço pendones por la Reina Doña Juana
18 Querini, 14: 75-77, 11 April 1505; Zurita, III: 333-334
19 Belenguer, Fernando: 239
20 Zurita, III: 350-352
21 AGS, PR 69: 34, ‘Resumen de algunos actos de las Cortes de Toro’
president ordered that Mújica’s report be read out. After further discussion Fernando’s governorship was confirmed according to the conditions set out in the will. The procurators seem to have agreed to the interpretation of the phrase ‘unable’ most favourable to Fernando – namely, that Juana was incapacitated by ‘illness and passion’ rather than absence or imprisonment. There is no reference to Juana’s willingness or wish to rule, possibly because, in the circumstances, these were thought irrelevant.

Yet, when expedient, Fernando disassociated himself from the interpretation settled at Toro. In May 1505 he told Fuensalida that Philip must take responsibility for the procurators’ decision, adding: ‘God only knows what I felt in my heart and soul when I read [Mújica’s report] and never did I believe it, nor, please God, shall I … I shall work to the utmost to bring [Juana] to these kingdoms, even if I have to go there myself to fetch her …’ He also criticised Philip for abusing the word querer. In a letter to the ‘Great Captain’, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, who led the army in Italy, he complained that Philip, a creature of the French, had sent signed documents purporting to show Juana was ‘mad’. She was being held prisoner, allowed only food served by Flemings, and her life ‘is not without great danger’. In his later appeal to the grandees of Castile Fernando argued that Philip was able to justify his ill-treatment of Juana by stating that she ‘is not willing (no quiere) and that is her condition …’

The absence from the Cortes of many nobles, notably Pedro Manrique de Lara, Duke of Nájera, signalled their opposition to Fernando. Nájera was joined, among others, by Enrique de Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sidonia; Alonso Pimentel, Count of Benavente, Diego López Pacheco, Marquis of Villena. According to Zurita, these, nursing grievances about loss of lands, estates and titles, and looking to Philip to restore their claims, grant rewards and allow them greater political influence, successfully spread rumours against Fernando, stirring unrest. He had ‘always planned and wished to reign over Castile for life’; placed

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23 Zurita, III: 354-356
24 AGS, PR 69, f. 34, ‘Resumen de algunos actos’
25 Zurita, III: 355-356
26 Fuensalida: 368, 16 May 1505
27 Rodríguez Villa, ed., Crónicas del Gran Capitán (Madrid, 1903), Carta 32: xli-xlii, 5 May 1505
28 Rodríguez Villa, La Reina Juana: 152
29 Zurita, III: 357
Isabel under intolerable pressure to change the dispositions of her will; pushed Juana’s ‘impediment’ to ‘usurp’ Castile for himself.\footnote{Zurita, III: 402-403}

Nájera’s marked hostility to Fernando included attacks on his authority with respect to the institution of the corregimiento. This instrument of central control, whereby royal ‘correcters’ or co-rulers’ with wide judicial, administrative and political powers were despatched to towns and cities to subdue unrest and impose the will and authority of the Crown, had been placed on a permanent and systematic footing by the Catholic monarchs. There had, however, always been some resistance from areas where the nature and degree of royal sovereignty remained in dispute. In the context of a 1455 campaign to ‘correct abuses’, under Enrique IV, chroniclers like Diego de Valera and Alfonso de Palencia had attacked the practice as contrary to the laws and liberties of Castile.\footnote{Edwards, The Spain: 55-56} Decades later, in the 1490s, the corregidores faced growing challenges to their authority. For this there were various reasons, generally described by Marvin Lunenfeld, in his book on the subject, as ‘grievances accumulating from late in Isabella’s rule’, with a corresponding resurgence in the influence of the upper nobility.\footnote{Marvin Lunenfeld, Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of Castile (1474-1504), (Cambridge, 1987): 171; Ladero Quesada, La España: 196; Edwards, The Spain: 54-61. The subject is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.} After Isabel’s death Fernando’s opponents were able to seize upon the authority of the legitimate but absent Queen. The Duke of Nájera, with territories in the province of Burgos and in Álava, Palencia and La Rioja, lost no time in doing so, declaring that he would ignore the provisions ordered by the corregidores and other justice officials unless they could demonstrate that their measures had been authorised by Juana.\footnote{Zurita, III: 376}

Ironically, given efforts at Toro to incapacitate Juana, Fernando still required her bestowal of legitimacy on his government. He sent a secretary, Lope de Conchillos, nephew of Almazán, to join Rodríguez de Fonseca in Brussels. Padilla claims Fernando wanted Fonseca and Conchillos to ‘prevent secretly and publicly’ the arrival in Spain of the new monarchs while obtaining Juana’s signed endorsement of his governorship ‘for as long as he lived.’\footnote{Padilla, Crónica: 125}
Fernando explored other means of reinforcing power. One, already mooted before Isabel’s death, was to cede Naples to Philip in exchange for Charles. Guardianship of Charles would bring Fernando invaluable prestige, possibly obviating the need for Juana and Philip to leave the Low Countries. Fuensalida’s description of his own ideal scenario may have reflected Fernando’s: Juana should grant Fernando authority to govern Castile for life; Maximilian should be crowned Holy Roman Emperor with Philip becoming King of the Romans (and drawn thereby away from Spain towards his paternal inheritance). Having received Naples in exchange for Charles, Philip should bequeath it to his younger son, who would replace Charles in the Low Countries. But Philip’s advisers shied away from such proposals.\textsuperscript{35}

Maximilian, too, was keen for Philip to pursue his Spanish inheritance. On 6 April 1505, at Hagenau, Maximilian, Philip and Louis (through Georges d’Amboise) strengthened the Valois-Habsburg alliance by ratifying the Treaty of Blois of 1504. Fearing attack on the Spanish kingdoms, including Naples, by the combined forces of Louis, Philip and Maximilian, Fernando reinforced the frontiers of Roussillon and Navarre. He began to think the unthinkable – suing for peace with France through remarriage, which could open up new options for the Aragonese succession. Negotiations for the hand of Louis’ niece, Ursula Germaine de Foix, began in May 1505 and continued until the second Treaty of Blois of 12 October 1505 between France and Spain.

Philip’s ambassador in Rome, Philibert Naturel, subsequently referred to reports that Castilians had resumed mourning for Isabel, as a hated re-marriage created momentum for Philip.\textsuperscript{36} Fernando was evidently aware of the risks for his position in Castile as well as for the fragile unity of the Spanish kingdoms. Negotiations were secret. Three English envoys, in Segovia from July 1505, were told Fernando would only remarry if Philip dealt ‘unkindly’ with him.\textsuperscript{37} But on 19 October 1505 Fernando and Germaine married by proxy.

Henry VII had sent his envoys to investigate Fernando’s intentions.

Francis Marsin, James Braybrooke and John Stile found a smiling, ‘lusty’, if

\textsuperscript{35} Fuensalida: 317-318, 12 December 1504  
\textsuperscript{36} ADN, B 18846. 29621, 14 May 1506, to Veyrè and Lachaulx  
\textsuperscript{37} TNA, E 36/192, ‘Instructions to ambassadors to make enquiries concerning the king of Aragon, the governance of Aragon and Castile ... with answers of the ambassadors to the articles (1505)’; \textit{Memorials of Henry VII}, ed., Gairdner (Rolls Series, London, 1858): 240-281
somewhat solitary, king. They spoke mostly to Almázan, of whom they wrote: ‘... we cannot hear, see or know that [Fernando] hath any man so near of his most secret counsel as is ... his secretary’. Almazán was forthright about Fernando’s appetites and abilities, favourably comparing his sole governorship with the dual monarchy: ‘... after the decesse of the quyne, everiche of the grete lordes of this land thoughte in his herte for to rule and to be as a kynge’. But Fernando ‘hathe so provided that he may destroye them all in a daye, and that they do welle knowe’. He could intervene more effectively in their señoríos ‘than ever was done in the life of the quyn’.  

Avoiding any reference to Juana’s ‘unfitness’, and to the essentially conditional nature of Fernando’s governorship, Almazán maintained that Fernando was legally entitled to govern Castile for life:

‘the Kyng my lord ys fully determined for to order and rewle thyse reame of Castille for the terme of hys life, and not for to menyssh nor lese therein of his onor and profite the valewe of a ben accordyng unto the quyne’s laste wil and testament, for ther be two thyngs that helpe hys highness that he shuld do so: oon ys the quyne’s wille, and a nother, the lawe of thys land gevithe that every kyng after the decesse of the quyne by whom the land movithe haveynge childer by hire, the kyng shall governe the land for the terme of his life. And so wolde the kyng my lord do; and so hit ys most beneficiai unto thyse reame that he shuld do so’.

Almazán boasted that, although Fernando had resisted pressures to retain his regal title, he ruled and was obeyed as though he truly were Castile’s monarch. He:

‘resayvithe and persayvithe all the revenews and profits of the said reames of Castell and Lions and Granada unto his awne proper use and profite and ys at no composecion or at any apoyntemement with the archduke nor with the quyne his wife therefore; nor he intends not for to render or to gyve unto thym any account of the revenews and profettis of that land for duereynge the terme of his life, nor said kyngge suffirith nor wille not suffer any juge or other officer to be made nor putt within the said reames by the kyngge archduke’.

Almazán added that Fernando would accept Juana and Philip as rulers only if they agreed to be governed by his advice. Fernando was reportedly displeased with Philip: ‘For the kyngge will lose no thing of hys onor, and the

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38 TNA, E 36/192, f. 44
39 TNA, E 36/192, f. 22
40 TNA, E 36/192, f. 17-18
kynge is grely displesid that the kynge archeduke ys so uche inclined unto 
Frenschemen and that he ys so muche rylyd by Franche counsaill’. He also 
‘grevis gretely’ that Philip ‘on kindly intretithe the quyne his wife and not delithe 
with hir as a nobill estate shuld be delayd withall …’

In their report the English envoys note opposition to Fernando among 
both nobles and commons. Nájera was ‘a man of grete coraje’, whose foremost 
allegiance was to Juana: ‘… he sends and wretes un to the kynge that he is and 
wilbe trewe and fast un to hym and to the quyn donia Joana. But he wille not 
come at the corte un to the tyme that she come’. Villena, whose marquisate had 
been confiscated after the succession war with Portugal, was more timid: ‘he ys 
gretely dessyros of the comeynge of the archeduke and of the quyne his wife for 
as much as at hir laste beynge there she promsyed to hym that yef ever she were 
quyne of Castell that he schuld have hys land ayen; notwithstanding, he hath 
byn with the Kynge Don Fernando sithen the dethe of the quyne more for fere 
than for love’.

Juana, as the ‘natural heir prince’, was the figure to whom the 
‘commons’ looked, and support for Philip depended on Juana:

‘… some saied that the Quyn was grete with childe, wherfore she myghte not 
come, and that the kynge wold come with owte hire, wherewith the Spaynards 
be not plesid in case that he so will do, for they dissire more for to have the 
Quyn then the Kynge, for the common sayenge ys that in case that the Kynge 
and the Quyn bothe jointly come togethers, yet never shall Flemeynge nor 
Burgonyne have any office kepeynge of any towne or castell within the landes 
of Spayne’.

Thus, Philip would have the ‘hartes of the most parte of the estats and of 
the comons of the land’ only if Juana came in alliance with him, for ‘the estats 
and comons of thys land make more solemnyte and rekonynge of the quyne then 
of hir fader the Kynge’. Fernando was a ‘noble’ king to whom God had given 
victories against the infidel. But his time was over:

‘… the said our kynge hathe byn ever sore and chargeabille unto us in 
causeynge us for to paye many taskes and talages in the life of the quyne our 
naturall lady … and wer fere that in case that the kynge schuld conteneually 
reyne on us, that he wold dayly putte us unto suche charges. Wherfore we be 
dessiros that the Quyne donya Joana and her husband the Kynge Archeduke

41 TNA, E 36/192, f. 23
42 TNA, E 36/192, f. 11-12
shuld come, for as much as that all the land of Granada is conquered and this
land is in rest and peas; so that we trust that hereafter we shall not nede for to be
charged for to paye any more taske or talages, wherby this land ys made veray
pore'.

Such views, together with later reports of dissension between Juana and
Philip because of Juana’s support for her father, help us to understand
Fernando’s shifting portrayal of the Queen in 1505, when the image of the ‘unfit’
Juana became, according to Zurita, one of a queen of ‘great capacity’ (‘gran
entendimiento’) for whose cause the King of Aragon was ready to fight.

3. 2. Philip in the labyrinth (1505)

Bernal points out that ‘whether Philip would become mere king consort or, on
the contrary, effective sovereign king according to European tradition ... was not
addressed or clarified or made unequivocally explicit in the years between 1500-
1504’. Although Isabel designated Philip king in his capacity as ‘legitimate
husband’, it is, for Bernal, this lack of clarity about Philip’s role that underlies
the complexity in relations between the Spanish monarchs and their heirs, owing
‘less to the signs of mental instability shown by the Castilian infanta than to the
fundamental political issue at stake’.

But, as Suárez points out, Philip ‘wanted to firmly establish that, as the
husband, all rights were his ...’ On 14 January 1505 the obsequies for Isabel at
St Gudula, Brussels, became a defiant response to Fernando’s proclamation of
Juana. Although Juana was present, and proclaimed alongside Philip, Molinet’s
description focuses on Philip as king-of-arms Toison d’Or approaches him with
sword unsheathed and, in ringing tones, declares: ‘Sire, this sword belongs to
you to maintain justice, to defend your kingdoms and subjects’. Philip kneels,
facing the altar, rises and takes the sword by the hilt, to a fanfare of trumpets.

43 TNA, E 36/192, f. 6-7
44 Zurita, III: 441
45 Bernal, Monarquía: 57
46 Suárez, ‘Política Internacional de los Reyes Católicos’, in Ernest Belenguer, ed., De la Unión
de Coronas al Imperio de Carlos V (Madrid, 2001): 312-313
47 Molinet, Chroniques, II: 538-541
Habsburg court iconography similarly emphasises Philip as dominant ruler of the whole Spanish inheritance, and Juana as donor to the houses of Austria and Burgundy. The importance of Philip’s Spanish inheritance was portrayed in woodcuts for Maximilian’s Arch of Honour and Triumphal Procession (c. 1517-1518), by Albrecht Dürer, Hans Burgkmair and others. For these woodcuts Maximilian personally, and with zest, gave the most detailed instructions. In Figures 13 and 14 Philip is shown standing behind a crowned shield, pairing Austrian and Burgundian arms and receiving from Juana the arms of Castile, Aragon and the other Spanish kingdoms, among which Maximilian did not forget ‘1500 islands’. 48

Contemporaries were struck by Philip’s charm, affability and malleability rather than by the possibly less evident but highly ambitious side of his nature. Characteristic is the depiction of him by Venice’s ambassador to Maximilian, Francesco Cappello, who shows him at Hagenau in mourning black for Isabel, amiably chatting in the midst of a group of ambassadors as he praises his mother-in-law. 49 The dukes of Burgundy had dreamt of kingly crowns and Philip grasped at the one held out to him, even setting out to learn about Spanish history. 50 But his first duty was to his native lands. Speaking in the voice of the Low Countries, Erasmus told Philip: ‘Spain crowned you but I bore you’. 51 Philip’s modern biographer, Cauchies, points out that his ambitions were ‘centred above all on the Burgundian inheritance ...’. 52 Very probably, it was the restoration of that lost inheritance that roused such eagerness in Philip to lay hands on Castile’s revenues. But there was much opposition to a new departure, and Philip – in part for sound, pragmatic reasons – veered this way and that in his attitude towards Fernando. Philip recognised that Castile would require some sort of governor apart from himself: ‘for it is certain that I cannot be in Castile for ever, nor even

48 Stanley Appelbaum, The Triumph of Maximilian I (New York, 1964)
49 Francesco Cappello, ‘Dispacci al Senato, 1504-1505’, BNMVe, VII, 991 (9583): 122r-123r., 1 April 1505
Figure 13. Right, woodcut from Arch of Honour (workshop of Albrecht Dürer). Maximilian watches as Juana offers Philip ‘sechs Königreich mit hohem preys’ (see inscription above).

Figure 14. Below, an anonymous German copy, after Albrecht Altdorfer and Georg Lemberger, c. 1606, also shows Juana presenting the arms of Castile and Aragon. (Detail).
for a long time, without having to leave to deal with the other affairs that I have, which are weighty ones, here and in Germany'.

Fuensalida told Venetian ambassador Querini that Philip’s councillors will ‘ruin this pliant king, and leave him with a handful of flies’ – perhaps a deliberate pun on the sobriquet ‘La Mouche’ with which Philibert de Veyrè, Burgundian-born envoy and specialist in Spanish affairs, signed letters. Querini had been sent to the Low Countries in 1505 with instructions to ‘keep King Philip on terms with his father-in-law, in proof of the good friendship between the Signoria and their majesties, and to do likewise in conversation with the Queen’. He blamed some of Philip’s chief advisers for poor relations with Fernando. He noted two main pressure groups. One believed in rapprochement with Fernando; the other in dispensing with him altogether. Querini learned that once Philip had secured Castile, his advisers would each receive Spanish domains and benefices, ‘which are many and opulent’. If Fernando proved difficult, France could be called upon to help.

Juan Manuel de Belmonte de Campos y de Cebrico de la Torre, of royal descent from the Infante Don Manuel, son of San Fernando, had emerged as a powerful leader of the latter grouping. He had conducted missions for the Spanish monarchs in Flanders, Genoa and England before being sent to Maximilian’s court. Cappello noted that, by early spring of 1505, Manuel ‘no longer wanted to obey many of [Fernando’s] letters’ and had transferred allegiance to Philip. Even before Isabel’s death Fernando suspected his ambassadors were deserting him. He scolded them for failing to keep Juana informed of Isabel’s health and of Isabel’s wish to see Juana and Philip again before she died. But the extent of Juana’s isolation is shown by the fact that Fernando’s ambassadors concealed this wish from Juana on Philip’s orders; he feared ‘many difficulties’ would flow from Juana accompanying him back to

53 Fuensalida: 357, 15 May 1505
54 Querini, 36: 118-121, 25 June 1505
55 Querini, 39: 124-125, 7 July 1505
56 Querini, 28: 103, 26 May 1505
57 Querini, 25: 96, 19 May 1505
58 Cappello, ‘Dispacci’, f. 121v., 31 March 1505
59 Fuensalida: 286-287, 26 September 1504
Spain, where she could weaken his authority.\textsuperscript{60} Fernando’s response was scathing. Their failure to inform Juana was a ‘great mistake’. She was the heir, ‘the everything’.\textsuperscript{61} He recalled Manuel and the Bishop of Catania, but Philip did not allow Manuel to leave.\textsuperscript{62}

As Suárez notes, Manuel, with his many contacts in Spain, built support for Philip by exploiting the disenchantment with Fernando of Castilian nobles.\textsuperscript{63} That January Philip appointed Manuel to the powerful contadurías of Hacienda and Cuentas, posts bringing administrative control over the royal revenues of Castile, at least in theory – the complicating factor being that parallel contadurías existed in Spain.\textsuperscript{64} Another close collaborator of Philip’s was Charles de Poupet-Lachaulx. With Guillaume de Croÿ-Chievres and Philibert Naturel these sought to profit from the delay in travelling to Spain caused by war in Guelders; by Juana’s new pregnancy and by financial constraints, to build a felipista party in Spain. Querini began to call this group the ‘malignants’ (li maligni) because they fomented strife between Philip and Fernando.\textsuperscript{65}

In the rival group, which favoured cooperation, Querini placed Flemings Jean de Luxembourg-Ville, his elder brother, Jacques de Luxembourg-Fiennes and the Burgundian Claude de Bouton, Philip’s master of horse and close confidant. To these Querini added Conchilos and Fuensalida, whom he did not rate highly: ‘If they were more diligent than they are, I think they might easily persuade the king to do all they wish, but they are very lukewarm in their actions, whereas the others are very alert and experienced …’\textsuperscript{66}

The first grouping sought French backing to oust Fernando from Castile. At Hagenau in 1505, Philip and Maximilian, without consulting Fernando, had accepted Louis’ investiture as Duke of Milan. In exchange they received Louis’ undertaking to respect Maximilian as King of the Romans, and extracted generous terms with regard to the proposed marriage of Charles with Claude and support for Philip against Fernando. On 15 April 1505, confident of this support,

\textsuperscript{60} Fuensalida: 295, 16 October 1504, from Juan Manuel, Bishop of Catania, Fuensalida
\textsuperscript{61} Fuensalida: 307, 11 November 1504
\textsuperscript{62} Fuensalida: 309-310, 24 November 1504
\textsuperscript{63} Suárez, Fernando: 359
\textsuperscript{64} Alonso García, El Erario: 167
\textsuperscript{65} Fuensalida: 220, 10 April 1504
\textsuperscript{66} Querini, 28: 103, 26 May 1505
Philip signed his first document as King of Castile, ordering suspension of the Cortes of Toro until he arrived in Spain.\textsuperscript{67} He sent ambassadors to France, Spain and Rome. He demonstrated his sovereignty over Castile by minting gold and silver coins in the name of ‘Philipus et Iohana Dei Gracia Rex et Regina, Castelle Legionis et Archiduces Austria’. By placing his name before Juana’s, but the Castilian titles before his native ones, Philip showed apparent conformity with the terms of the Concordat of Segovia of 1475.\textsuperscript{68} A ‘secret’ seal, used for the Treaty of Windsor of 1506, and bearing the crowned arms of the kingdoms of Castile, also proclaims Philip and Juana its monarchs, in that order, by the grace of God (figure 15). Minting of coins was combined with a sustained letter-writing campaign. At least forty Castilian nobles, prelates and government officials were targeted for support.\textsuperscript{69}

The instructions Philip gave his envoy to the ‘Great Captain’ – whom, like Fernando, he was trying to court – usefully summarise Philip’s position through 1505. Since Isabel’s death, Fernando had done his utmost to ‘usurp and maintain control’ of Castile, depriving Philip, Juana and their children of their God-given inheritance. He had relinquished the royal title only to seize control in perpetuity of Castile’s government. At Toro he had won support by use and abuse of Isabel’s will, which Philip had still not seen. Fernando disposed of everything as though king (the same point positively interpreted by Almazán). He proclaimed Juana’s name while treating himself, Philip, as a nullity. He reinforced power over nobles and people by claiming that Juana was ‘folle’ and imprisoned. He poured opprobrium on Philip, with the aim of depriving ‘the lord king and his children’ of the succession. This Fernando intended to do by marrying into France – the ‘perpetual’ enemies of the crowns of Aragon and Castile – without the consent of the King of Castile.\textsuperscript{70}

Yet it was not Fernando but Juana who proved the greatest obstacle for Philip. In April 1505, while away from Brussels, he intercepted a letter from Juana to Fernando, underwriting his governorship, and ordered that she be placed

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\textsuperscript{67} Suárez, Fernando: 403
\textsuperscript{68} Francisco Olmos, ‘Estudio documental’ in Revista General, 12, 2 (2002): 315
\textsuperscript{69} Padilla, Crónica: 317-318, 320
\textsuperscript{70} ‘Instructions pour Jehan de Hesdin, escuyer et maréchal des logis’, in Le Glay, ed., Négociations diplomatiques, I: 200
\end{flushright}
Figure 15. Seal of Philip and Juana as monarchs of Castile, used in Treaty of Windsor, 1506. The National Archives, Kew (SC 13/H81B)
Incommunicado. On 23 April Conchillos, suspected of encouraging her to support Fernando, was imprisoned and reportedly tortured, while Fonseca hurried back to Spain. Philip’s advisers meanwhile tried to persuade Juana that Fernando, no loving father, had published claims that she was mad. Trusted members of her depleted staff, including her musical instructor, Juan de Ancheta, who had joined Juana in 1504 or 1505, and often sang with her, were asked to fill her with doubts about Fernando, whom Ancheta clearly disliked. Philip also tried to ‘soften’ her by bringing the children to see her. Fuensalida comments that Juana behaved graciously when one such reunion was staged before the court, but, although she kissed the children, did not seem to enjoy them much and later wanted them sent away. Zalama follows Pfandl in asserting that this was ‘perhaps the definitive proof of Juana’s dementia’. It is more likely that Juana, who invariably compared her situation to Isabel’s, disliked Philip’s exploitation of the children in their power struggles, especially when he alone decided when she could see them – a situation inconceivable in Isabel’s court – and obliged her to take part in the charade of a public ceremony of reconciliation with her husband.

Evidently it was not in Philip’s interests to acknowledge political motives for Juana’s actions or confinement. He responded to Fernando’s accusations of ill-treatment by arguing that her isolation, caused by jealousy, was self-imposed. The emphasis he placed on the purely personal nature of Juana’s actions, linked to her female physicality, found wide acceptance within the gendered views of the time. In her study of later Habsburg women Magdalena Sánchez observes that men often excused women’s political opinions ‘by claiming that the women were ill (often melancholic) and therefore could not be held responsible for their words or actions’. Jealousy was seen as part of the melancholic illness, and ‘illness (and pregnancy) was often associated with women’s frail bodies and was

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71 Padilla, Crónica: 127-128
72 Fuensalida: 337, 26 March 1505; Tess Knighton, Música y Músicos en la Corte de Fernando el Católico (1474-1516), (Zaragoza, 2001): 323
73 Fuensalida: 297-301, 1 November 1504
74 Zalama, Juana I: 166
75 Magdalena S. Sánchez, The Empress, the Queen and the Nun (Baltimore/ London, 1998): 158
used as possible grounds to exclude them from any share in public power’. As Rodríguez-Salgado remarks, women themselves sometimes used the device of ‘madness’, as Juana’s daughter, Mary of Hungary, did, ‘to present unwelcome or unpleasant propositions and resistance to a superior while showing due subservience and respect’. Although Juana rejected any notion of subservience to Philip, she herself used her ‘illnesses’ as a means of postponing action.

Philip linked Juana’s ‘jealousy’ to illness and her new pregnancy. When, in July, Juana tried to dismiss Mújica for disloyalty, in connection with the report about her conduct which he presented to the Catholic monarchs, Philip refused to accept the dismissal on grounds of Juana’s alleged hysteria: her ‘pregnancies sometimes make her take offence without cause’. Philip used Juana’s difficult fifth pregnancy to refuse Querini access to the Queen. Querini logged repeated attempts to present his credentials to Juana, ‘since’, he told Doge Loredano, ‘it was to her especially that your Serenity had appointed me ambassador’. Philip explained that she had to ‘stay in bed almost all the time’. Querini became sceptical, suspecting that, since Philip’s ministers ‘do their utmost to keep her in the background, without allowing her to speak to any one’, she had not been told of his arrival. He consulted a Venetian doctor, Maestro Liberal de Treveris, who visited her daily, and who confirmed that Juana was indisposed with her pregnancy. Nevertheless, Philip and Manuel worried about Querini’s suspicions. A few days later Manuel bestowed unusually gracious attentions upon him, as he begged him to assure the Senate that Juana’s ‘bad disposition’ was the only reason an audience could not be granted. But, Querini reported, Fuensalida, in a similar predicament, had told him: ‘even if the Queen is lying at death’s door her father’s ambassador should not be denied the right to be able to speak to her’.

Where Juana was concerned, Philip, like Fernando, dealt in partial truths. Juana was jealous; her pregnancy was difficult. But, evidently, Philip never

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76 Sánchez, *The Empress*: 6
78 Padilla, *Crónica*: 314–315, 30 July 1505, Philip to Mújica
79 Querini, 20: 87, 28 April 1505
80 Querini, 22: 91, 13 May 1505
81 Querini, 23: 93, 16 May 1505
82 Querini, 36: 119, 25 June 1505
referred to Juana’s principled opposition to Manuel’s group of ministers. In the famous letter of 3 May, ostensibly written by Juana to Veyré, she expresses total support for Philip, asking him to intercede with Fernando to dismiss rumours that she was ‘mentally disturbed’ and claiming that any indiscretions were attributable solely to jealousy. The letter draws a comparison between herself and Isabel, whose youthful fits of jealousy were well-known, and indirectly criticises Fernando’s action at Toro:

‘I am well aware that [Philip] wrote ... to justify himself by complaining about me in some way, but this was a matter that should not have gone beyond parents and children, particularly in view of the fact that if in anything I acted with passion and fell short of the state proper to my dignity, it is well known that this was from no other cause than jealousy, and such a passion is not mine alone, but the Queen my lady ... was also jealous, but with time God cured Her Highness, as it will please God to cure me’.  

The letter stresses that Juana would never deprive her husband of the government of her kingdoms; nor would she deny him authority, ‘as much from the love I bear him as from what I know of [Fernando] ...’ Philip said she refused to sign the letter five times, characteristically adding that she had objected, in particular, to the reference to her ‘love’ for him. In the end, however, she signed it ‘as it was’. Fernando complained to Veyré that it read as though Juana felt that, even in her own lifetime, her realms belonged not to herself but to Philip and their children and descendants, warning that ‘in her life she must not utter or mention’ any such thing. Some modern historians have expressed strong doubts about the authenticity of the signature, as well as the inappropriateness of the destinee, and in her important study of Juana’s signature, Aram argues convincingly – not least by comparison with other authentic signatures – that it is false.

Philip told Fernando he had done everything possible to protect Juana’s status and ensure she was honourably served. He was maintaining her hotel (although one far smaller than his own). Her kitchen had been moved to her

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83 Fernández Álvarez, Juana La Loca: 132-133
84 Fuensalida: 355-363, 15 May 1505
85 Fuensalida: 357, 369, 16 May 1505
86 Aram, ‘Juana “the Mad’s” Signature’
87 ADN, B 3462 shows salaries for Juana’s hôtel in 1505 amounting to 42 livres, 11 sols, compared to 308 livres, 18 sols, 7 deniers for Philip’s.
apartments because she was pregnant and could eat what and when she liked. If Spaniards had been arrested or removed this was because, responding to her ‘many questions’, they had mischievously misinformed her.\textsuperscript{88}

Although Philip broadcast Juana’s jealousy, he had to distinguish it from any hints of ‘madness’ that might endanger his position. He claimed Fernando had deliberately misinterpreted Mújica. Warning her parents about some aspects of Juana’s conduct ‘did not mean that the Queen is mad as Fernando says, nor is there one word in the whole report to suggest it’. Fuensalida writes that when one of his advisers commented that it had not been ‘well done’ to compile and send the report, Philip replied that he had ‘to protect my rights’. Agitated, he added: ‘Sane or mad, I’ll have what belongs to her and me and I shall govern, and will die for it if the King, my father-in-law, doesn’t agree’.\textsuperscript{89} In a separate letter of the same date Fuensalida refers to an audience with Philip in the presence of Ville, Manuel and Lachauux, in which Philip again stressed his goodwill towards Juana. He had often invited her, in vain, to go hunting or hawking with him, or to attend and take part in council meetings.\textsuperscript{90}

Philip’s comment suggests an inner conflict between sunny affability and those darker qualities that had surfaced at Toledo in the summer of 1502. Personally fond of Juana, he longed for her political support and collaboration. But, his ambitions stoked by Manuel, in particular, he insisted on her secondary status. Isabel’s will, he told Querini in May, laid down that ‘no one could govern [Castile] without my will and consent, and that of the queen my consort’.\textsuperscript{91} In the absence of Juana’s own consent he had to maintain the fiction of her acquiescence, while cessation of hostilities in Guelders freed him to prepare the Spanish journey. He raised huge amounts of money, with long-term consequences for levels of government debt in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{92} He sold ducal domains and offices and turned to Henry VII of England for help.\textsuperscript{93} Henry granted him £108,000 – as David Starkey notes, an ‘immense sum’.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{88} Fuensalida: 355, 15 May 1505
\textsuperscript{89} Fuensalida: 357, 15 May 1505
\textsuperscript{90} Fuensalida: 364, 15 May 1505
\textsuperscript{91} Querini, 27: 100, 21 May 1505
\textsuperscript{92} Cauchies, Philippe: 177-178
\textsuperscript{93} Zurita, III: 429
\textsuperscript{94} David Starkey, Six Wives: The Queens of Henry VIII (London, 2003): 89
Philip meanwhile stepped up his offensive against Fernando, offering more important grants to Castilian nobles. Addressing the clergy, nobles and governors of the castles and fortresses, and the Royal Council and Royal Chanceries of Valladolid and Granada, he set out his quarrel with Fernando and ‘beseeched’ and ‘ordered’ them to refuse to obey him. These attempts to undermine Fernando were sent in Juana’s name as well as his own.\(^{95}\)

But as momentum built for the Spanish journey, Philip received the devastating news about Fernando’s new alliance with Louis. This cut the web of ties with France on which his foreign policy had so long been based. Now assuming the role of intermediary between Philip and Fernando, Louis urged Philip to reach a friendly accommodation with Fernando.\(^{96}\)

Maximilian’s visit to Brussels between August-September 1505 provides another illustration of the currents tugging at Philip. Maximilian, like Juana, wanted Philip to mend bridges with Fernando, but Philip’s advisers insisted he mend differences with France first. ‘This poor king’, as Querini had taken to calling Philip, ‘finds himself torn one way by paternal love and the other by the credit and faith he places in his advisers, and really I think that his majesty sometimes sees himself lost in a great labyrinth’.\(^{97}\) In the end, Louis’ volte-face pushed Philip towards the rapprochement that Louis and Maximilian and Fernando desired. With France and Spain allied, Philip’s outright defiance of Fernando seemed unsustainable, and at Salamanca, on 24 November, Fernando concluded a treaty with Veyrè and Maximilian’s Cremonese envoy, Andrea da Borgo, who also acted for Philip.

This was radically different from the Concordat of Segovia that had settled political relations between Isabel and Fernando. Under the Concordat all royal provisions and Chancery documents bore Fernando’s name before Isabel’s, while Isabel alone received the allegiance of royal fortress governors. Both monarchs had use of the royal revenues, but it was Isabel’s prerogative to appoint all Castilian treasury officials and grants of cash and rents and appointments to offices were Isabel’s to make. She also retained control over the

\(^{95}\) AGS, CC Cédulas 11, 31-32; 35-36. These copies lack signatures. Full texts in Padilla, \textit{Crónica}: 324-332

\(^{96}\) Cauchies, \textit{Philippe}: 150-151; Zurita, III: 426-427

\(^{97}\) Querini, 57: 148, 31 August 1505
maestrazgos of the military orders and senior church posts. Both monarchs had
powers over justice administration, but Isabel alone could nominate the royal city
governors, the corregidores.98

By contrast, the Treaty of Salamanca awarded no specific powers to
Juana. Formally, she remained proprietary sovereign with Philip king in his
capacity as ‘legitimate husband’. But Fernando was governor, his right to half
the income from the Indies and maestrazgos of the military orders, and to other
public revenues, upheld. Castile was to be jointly administered by Fernando,
Philip and Juana. Official letters and provisions were to be signed with
Fernando’s name, followed by Philip’s, and only in third place by the proprietary
sovereign’s. But the treaty also exploited the wording of Isabel’s will by agreeing
that, if Juana were unwilling or unable to take part in government, Fernando and
Philip would rule without her, one substituting for the other where necessary.
Thus, although her right to govern was formally recognised, the introduction of
the question of incapacitation, or potential incapacitation, meant that Juana was
effectively relegated to a position subordinate to, and dependent upon, the good
will of father and husband.99

It was, in Cauchies’ view, to ‘convince the hesitant’ that, on 26
December, Fernando awarded pensions to a number of Philip’s team, including
Veyré, Naturel, Borgo, Luxembourg, Lachaulx and Manuel.100 But the
agreement could not satisfy those, like Manuel, who wanted to remove Fernando
and Juana from power altogether. Nor was there anything to stop Juana’s
supporters claiming that she was willing and able to govern. Aram states that
Juana refused to sign the treaty.101 One must wonder whether she was offered the
opportunity. While it was being agreed she was on her way to Zeeland, where
Philip’s fleet was gathering. On 9 February 1506, when putting his signature to
the treaty, Philip promised to do everything possible to obtain Juana’s, while

98 Edwards, Ferdinand and Isabella: 11-12
99 AGS, PR 56, f. 19, 24 November 1505, ‘Cédulas del Rey Fernando el Católico a los reyes
Felipe y Juana, y acuerdo firmado por Filiberto de Veyrè
100 Cauchies, Philipp: 170
101 Aram, Juana the Mad: 207n.
adding it was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{102} Juana’s endorsement would, after all, have strengthened a treaty that Manuel was already preparing to dismantle.

Immediately after the agreement, Florence’s ambassador to France, Francesco Pandolfini, noted a last-ditch attempt by Louis to persuade Philip against departure. Pandolfini estimated that Philip, who had reluctantly settled on a sea voyage, had assembled a fleet of sixty vessels, including two carracks.\textsuperscript{103} A French embargo on the movement of some ships out of its harbours in Honfleur and Brittany may have reduced that number to the forty-three voiles that actually set out.\textsuperscript{104} Soldiers were withdrawn from the Guelders garrison to join companies of German infantry and Swiss pikemen and up to two thousand placed under the command of one of Maximilian’s military chiefs, Oberster Hauptmann Count Wolfgang zu Fürstenberg.\textsuperscript{105} The second journey to Spain had assumed a distinctly military flavour.

3.3. Juana’s strategy (1505)

One of Juana’s books of hours, dated between 1496-1506, and rich in the satirical, grotesque and beautiful marginalia common to the most luxurious of these, has some unusual features, including an ‘exceedingly rare’ Office of a Guardian Angel and a half-page miniature of a speculum conscientiae. The ‘mirror of conscience’ (figure 17) is unusual in depicting the reflection of a skull from the viewer’s standpoint.\textsuperscript{106} Apart from the evident injunction to contemplate her mortality, its location above the text of the Decalogue enjoins Juana to ‘Honour thy father and thy mother’ (my emphasis). The theme of conscience, particularly, filial obligation, is a marked characteristic of Juana’s queenship, whether or not it was strengthened by remorse at her fateful decision to leave Spain in 1504.

\textsuperscript{102} AGS, PR 56, f. 22, ‘Cédula del Rey Felipe I ratificando la capitulación que hicieron el y la Reina Juana con el Rey Fernando el Católico’, 9 February 1506
\textsuperscript{103} Canestrini, ed., Négociations, II, XXI: 149-151, 25 November 1505
\textsuperscript{104} ADN, B 3463, 1506, hôtel de Philippe
\textsuperscript{105} Fürstenberg, ‘Briefe’, 1: 132, 17 September 1505, Maximilian’s commission to Fürstenberg; Cauchies, Philippe: 181
\textsuperscript{106} BL, Additional Ms. 18852, Book of Hours. This bears the arms of Juana and Philip and their respective mottoes: Philip’s ‘Qui volutra?’ with Juana’s reply: ‘Je le veus’; Elizabeth Morrison, in Thomas Kren, Scot McKendrick, eds, Illuminating the Renaissance (cat., 2003), 114: 385
Figures 16, 17: Above, figure 16, part of inner precinct of castle of La Mota (Medina del Campo), scene of Juana’s act of disobedience to her parents. (Author’s picture).
Right, figure 17, detail of mirror of conscience from book of hours of Juana of Castile (BL, Additional 18852, Master of the David Scenes in the Grimani Breviary and Workshop, f. 15). The scalloped mirror, on a grey brick wall, is set in a gilt frame and bordered with flowers, snails, butterflies and strawberries and a red rubric leads into the text of the Ten Commandments. Opposite a full-page miniature in an architectural border, depicts the Temptation of Adam and Eve and their flight from the Garden of Eden.
On her return to the Low Countries Juana had been the toast of Brussels and ‘taken much pleasure in the company of her husband and children’. In a panegyric for Epiphany 1505, Erasmus joined paeans to Philip to others for Juana, who had ‘brought to the marriage bed such love, such purity, such modesty, such prudence that … she seems worthy not just of equaling the heroines of antiquity but of outclassing them’. Much later, in an address to Juana’s daughter, Mary of Hungary, then regent of the Low Countries, Erasmus refers to Juana as the ‘true image’ of Isabel in her ‘exceptional love for religion’ and exemplary chastity.

Juana’s return seemed to reinforce her solidarity with Philip. During her 1496 entry into Brussels, representations of the Nine Female Worthies, heroic female figures of classical and biblical mythology, had exhorted Juana to be strong in defence of her new husband and people. Now her supporting role was celebrated in a play by Jan Smeken, which likens her to the Trojan Palladium, the sacred image on which Troy’s safety depended. As Samuel Mareel points out, the inhabitants of Brussels and Brabant had every reason, after Isabel’s death, to fear that Juana and Philip, or Charles, might abandon the Low Countries indefinitely, thereby transferring these lands from the centre to the periphery of the Burgundian-Habsburg empire. Smeken’s spatial allegory, linking Juana to the Palladium and Brussels to the ‘garden of Troy’, argues for Juana, Philip and Charles to stay home together.

Modern historians have overwhelmingly accepted Philip’s insistence that Juana showed no interest in politics. According to Höfler, she roused herself from passivity only to embarrass Philip. She was, states Zalama, consistent only in her excessive jealousy, lacking a will of her own; she did not care in the slightest who governed Castile. ‘Politics did not interest Doña Juana’, writes Perez; ‘what preoccupied her was her private life, her personal relations with her

107 Fuensalida: 248, 4 June 1504, from Manuel, Mota, Fuensalida
110 Thought to have been written and possibly staged in 1505, it was later entitled Spel op hertoge Karle ons keyser nu es.
112 ‘Donna Juana war eine passive Natur, die aktiv nur wurde, wenn es sich darum handelte, ihren Gemal Verlegenheiten zu bereiten …’, Höfler, Donna Juana: 395
113 Zalama, Vida cotidiana: 49; Juana I: 353
husband'. Among the few who grant Juana a political role there appears little consensus. For Aram, Juana ‘supported Ferdinand, rather than Philip, as ruler of Castile until her son, Charles, reached his majority’. Bernal, however, claims that Juana’s later support for Charles was already apparent in support for Philip: ‘Juana would always be a firm and loyal defender of her husband Philip, and as such, a solid ally of the interests of the Habsburg dynasty in Hispanic disputes, as she would have occasion to demonstrate years later when Queen of Castile’. Elena Gascón Vera believes that: ‘After the death of her mother, despite some doubts, Juana accepted her husband’s intentions to rule Castile in her name’.

These latter claims may be based on acceptance as genuine of the above-mentioned letter to Veyré, but fly in the face of everything we know about Juana’s first regnal year. Philip’s bitterly controversial departure from Spain in December 1502 had, I have argued, pre-disposed Juana to accept that Fernando must continue to rule either as king or governor. The question lies less in which dynasty she supported than in the extent of her filial support.

Before analysing Juana’s strategy it is worth briefly comparing her circumstances with those of Isabel when proclaimed queen. Although Isabel faced serious difficulties when seizing power she enjoyed far greater freedom of manoeuvre than Juana. The deaths of Isabel’s father and younger brother; the confinement of her mother and political weakness of her half-brother, Enrique IV; the opportune deaths of certain suitors and revolutionary situation in the second part of Enrique’s reign, all combined to open up broad avenues of opportunity. In seizing those opportunities, she showed ruthlessness and ambition. Ultimately, she was able to thwart Enrique’s marriage plans for her and, while professing obedience, to rebel. The stormy beginnings of her marriage with Fernando threatened to bring about an early rupture between them. That they were able to retreat from the abyss and reach an understanding may be attributed, on Isabel’s side, to the fact that, born, bred and resident in Castile, she had around her an entourage of able advisers and a power base secure enough to induce Fernando to accept the Concordat of Segovia.

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114 Pérez, ‘El desconocido reinado de Felipe I El Hermoso y de Juana I La Loca’: 139
115 Aram, ‘Queen Juana: Legend and History’: 35
116 Bernal, *Monarquia*: 56
Juana's radically different situation stemmed from a variety of factors. Above all, of course, was the question of her fitness to rule, facilitated by Isabel's will and cultivated at Toro, and which interested parties exploited to their own ends. There were other factors, too, over which she had no control: her foreign marriage; her husband's conduct towards her and Castile; her father's determination to milk her domains either in his own interests or in pursuit of wider ideals. But her very different situation also stemmed from her decision to leave Spain in 1504. By returning voluntarily to her husband's court she became its hostage. Upon accession, she had no means of asserting regal authority and no access to independent sources of information and advice. Fernando even advised Philip that, owing to her pregnancy, she should not be told about Isabel's death. In conversation with Tordesillas town officials years later, Juana significantly dated the time of her captivity and imprisonment from 1505.

Several periods and degrees of confinement, including outright imprisonment, can be distinguished. In the summer of 1504 her clash with Philip over his mistress, the disputes over the women he tried to impose on her, and his insistence that her slaves be dismissed, led to her withdrawal from the public spaces of the court. Philip took seriously reports that, regretting her decision to leave Isabel, Juana planned to escape to a convent 'with the aim of leaving there in secret for some seaport and embarking for Spain'. He therefore placed her incommunicado. This was succeeded by a six-week period of mourning seclusion between January-February 1505. Her mourning followed the dictates of Burgundian protocol, on which her dame d'honneur, Aliénor de Poitiers, Vicomtesse de Furnes, who had served former duchesses of Burgundy, was an authority. Between April-August 1505, after trying to legitimate Fernando's governorship, Juana was placed incommunicado a second time, in a situation that became terrifying both for herself and her officials.

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118 Cited by Carretero Zamora, 'Las Cortes de Toro', in González Alonso, ed., Las Cortes: 293, 14 December 1504, Fernando to Philip
119 See Chapter 8
120 Fuenasilla: 299, 1 November 1504. As Zalama says (Juana I:166) this was no empty threat.
121 Aliénor de Poitiers, 'Les Honneurs de la Cour', in La Curne de Sainte-Pelaye, Mémoires sur l'ancienne chevalerie, ed. Charles Nodier (Paris, 1826), 11: 135-216; Rafael Domínguez Casas, 'Exequias burgosinas en tiempos de Juana I de Castilla', in Zalama, ed., Juana I en Tordesillas: 258-286. Poitiers, who had lived at court since the age of seven, and whose grandfather fought at Agincourt, is thought to have written this guide between 1484-1491. Juana continued to wear mourning for Isabel long after the six-week seclusion period, as did Philip.
Throughout Juana remained loyal to Fernando, bonded to him by the memory of a beloved mother, who had begged her to obey Fernando 'as if I were still alive'. Fidelity to her parents, emphasised by Marcuello in his Cancionero (figure 18), is the kernel of her strategy. Fernando was her father but also her mother's husband, as she stressed to the Holy Junta procurators in 1520. The notion that a daughter could replace a still living father (let alone one with Fernando's fama) clearly troubled Juana, who told them Fernando's life was 'more necessary than mine.' Juana professed obedience to him as father and co-monarch - 'lequel elle tient Roy comme elle', as Philip's ambassador to Rome, Philibert Naturel, later wrote. A letter signed and reportedly initiated by Juana, but discovered and destroyed by Philip, conferred governmental authority on Fernando, who had laboured for years to bring peace and victory to Castile. This continued to need the 'good justice' he could best provide.

Like Philip, Juana had not seen Isabel's will, but Fernando's ardent supporters, Fonseca and Conchillos, are likely to have stressed Isabel's wish that Fernando should govern and Querini refers to her determination to follow Isabel's 'volunta'. In April, echoing the findings of the English envoys, Conchillos told Querini that Philip could win the grandees' support only if he were on good terms with Juana. But Juana 'wishes her father to govern these realms, not her husband, who is so pliant and good-natured that he depends on his ministers rather being their master'. Like Isabel, Juana insisted on a distinction between wifely obedience and political status and duty. According to Conchillos, Juana was highly discontented with Philip's advisers:

'...the belief being that, on their account alone, her husband treats her in the worst possible way; and so she always lives in seclusion, and never gives audience to anyone; yet she is an intelligent woman, of great spirit (de gran core) and very proud and has a melancholy and haughty nature. She is also jealous of her husband, and told me recently that she had made him a sacred oath that she would do the very reverse of what the king her husband ordered, and meant to keep it, not because she did not wish to obey him as wife, but because she knows it is not he but his advisers who govern and these are more wretched (tristl) than good'.

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122 See Chapter 8
123 See Chapter 4
124 Zurita, III: 377
125 Querini, 69: 166, 6 October 1505
126 Querini, 17: 82-83, 22 April 1505
Figure 18. Marcuello’s Cancionero emphasises a link of fidelity and continuity between Juana and her parents. At Juana’s feet, a dog, symbol of fidelity, turns his head to gaze in the direction of Juana and Isabel, who both return his look.
Similarly, her secretary, Sebastiano de Olano, told Fuensalida that Juana was determined that Fernando should ‘reign and govern’; that ‘God would never want me to be disobedient’ and allow ‘ruffians to govern my realms’.\footnote{127}

Höfler refers to Juana’s ‘first act of government’ as an act of abdication.\footnote{128} Certainly Juana tried to cede authority to Fernando in a letter, which, with all copies, was destroyed.\footnote{129} There is, however, no evidence that she wanted to relinquish sovereignty rather than use it to influence events. Nor was her opposition to Philip necessarily absolute. In May 1506 Querini thought Juana ‘not very remote from her original wish for union between husband and father’.\footnote{130} But, for Juana, this would have been possible only if Philip rid himself of advisers like Manuel.

A second probable disagreement between Juana and Philip in 1504-1505 concerned Charles’ future. In 1501 Juana had told Isabel she wanted a Spanish governess for the children who was ‘orderly and measured (concertada) and sensible (cuerda) and devoid of all affectation (fantasya) ...’\footnote{131} No such governess seems to have been appointed and by 1504-1505 Juana may have thought the only way of securing a Spanish education for Charles was to support Fernando’s proposal to exchange him for Naples. Charles’ reposter de camas, Juan de Sepúlveda, was among other Spanish servants dismissed by Philip between July and November 1504. These included Juana’s slaves, a Valencian dueña called el ama; her Dominican confessor, Tomás de Salazar, and her first chaplain and almoner, Juan Iníguez de Gallereta. Philip hoped, writes Fuensalida, that by separating them from Juana he would restore marital harmony.\footnote{132} Of Sepúlveda’s dismissal Aram comments: ‘The extradition [sic] of individuals serving Juana as well as Charles hints at a possible failed conspiracy to send Juana’s eldest son to Spain’.\footnote{133} It is plausible that Juana had discussed the matter with household staff and if, as Philip suspected, and as seems likely,

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127 Fuensalida: 343, 7 April 1505
128 Höfler, Dona Juana: 331
129 Fuensalida tells Fernando that he burned all copies (355-363, 15 May 1505).
130 Querini, 109: 222, 27 May 1506
131 Fuensalida: 171-175, 8 February 1501
132 Fuensalida: 304-305, 10 November 1504; ADN, B 2186. 73342, 3 July 1504; B 2189. 73659, ‘à Thomas de Salezar ... un don de 40 livres pour s’en retourner en Espagne’; ADN, B 2186. 73343, 3 November 1504, ‘à Jean Yriguez de Gallareta ... don de 50 livres pour ses services’.
133 Aram, Juana the Mad: 203n.
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Juana had nurtured plans of returning in person to Spain, she might have considered a similar plan with regard to Charles. This might explain Fuensalida’s later mysterious comment that Philip had ordered Juana’s servants to report every development regarding herself ‘or the children’.134

But in the absence of concrete evidence what is clear is that any public expression by Juana of support for Fernando’s governorship, or Charles’ departure for Spain, would damage Philip’s goal, perhaps fatally. In these circumstances, he could hardly afford to let her speak to whom she chose, while his professed invitations to her to attend council meetings were probably conditional upon some compromise on Juana’s part and could have been used as evidence of her wish to collaborate.

Juana’s desire to retain her sovereign power is clearly reflected in the disputes between herself and Philip about control of her female entourage. While simply Philip’s consort, Juana seems to have accepted Philip’s interventions. But from the moment she became Isabel’s heir the question of her female entourage, in particular, became problematic for the very reason that it was central to her royal dignity.

Juana had herself dismissed, or wanted to dismiss, some female Spanish staff. Although the letters she received from Spain in the first years of her marriage show that she had loving and affectionate ties with other women, she was prickly and temperamental. In 1500 she had asked Isabel for a Spanish woman ‘... who, when she thinks her [Juana] out of order, knows how to say so as an aide and adviser and not as an equal, because, even if her advice were good, if couched in disrespectful terms it would provoke more anger in she to whom it was given than it would bring about a correction’.135 In 1501, when asking Isabel for a sensible Spanish governess, she again showed her aversion to high-ranking ladies who might oppose her on various matters.136

This characteristic of Juana’s should not detract from the true nature of her dispute with Philip. Historians have invariably accepted Philip’s contention that Juana’s antagonism to the women he appointed stemmed from personal ‘jealousy’. As mentioned above, Maximilian’s biographer, Wiesflecker, is one of

134 Fuensalida: 391, 5 July 1505
135 Fuensalida: 142, 6 August 1500
136 Fuensalida: 171-175, 8 February 1501
many to see this jealousy assuming a pathological form, in a terrible ‘Haßliebe’. Significant, Isabel’s ‘jealousy’ has been interpreted differently. Remarking on Pulgar’s comment about Isabel’s ‘excessive jealousy’, Ladero Quesada points out that this had a political component, ‘since the affront of adultery was not made only to the wife but to the dignity of the queen …’. Juana did not have Isabel’s power to dismiss women from court. But her response to the discovery of Philip’s mistress should be seen in similar terms – as an affront not only to herself as his wife but to Isabel’s daughter and heir. Juana felt similarly dishonoured by Philip’s decision to send Mújica with a dossier containing allegations that could only have been gleaned with help from a female entourage dependent on and loyal to others. Both her parents had kept and controlled their own households after marriage. Her father had shared Castilian officials with Isabel, while retaining his Aragonese officials. Her mother had kept autonomy over her own staff and her children’s. When referring to Isabel’s female entourage, Ladero Quesada points out that, as sovereign, she ‘needed to construct a human entourage … formed by women who would not obstruct but support her political actions’. These were ‘like an extension of the queen, in their feminine condition and in their capacity to govern their households, together with their husbands, as Isabel governed hers. In this respect, deviations were particularly damaging’. He quotes Bernáldez’ observation that Isabel was ‘very ferocious and the enemy of bad women’.

Following Isabel’s biographer, Tarsicio de Azcona, Cauchies refers to the ‘difficult exchanges between mother and daughter [that] formed a complex knot of affection, perplexity and suspicion’. But after Isabel’s death, the knot unravelled, at least in part, and Isabel became, more than ever, Juana’s compass point. Juana knew that, if she were to govern, take part in government, or play an influential political role, she needed her women to be her allies. When, in 1506, the procurators asked if she would accept women beside her, they were raising the whole question of her ability to govern. Juana reportedly replied that the

139 ibidem
140 Cauchies, Philippe: 233
matter was non-negotiable, ‘knowing’ as she did ‘the nature of her husband’. Her response reinforces the view of her jealousy. But it is also evident that the struggle between Juana and Philip was about their political relationship. For Philip, Juana was never more than his consort. For Juana, on the contrary, her status in Spain was above his. Her dilemma lay in the fact that, while only the highest noblewomen could reflect honour and authority upon her, these had, she believed, to be appointed by, and answerable only to, herself.

In the summer of 1504, Philip had not only dismissed several Spanish members of Juana’s staff but replaced Halewyn with Poitiers, probably because he saw Halewyn, who had gained Isabel’s trust between 1502-1504, as no longer politically reliable. Juana opposed the replacement. She probably hoped a rapprochement between Fernando and Philip would resolve this fundamental problem of her staff and authority. Responding to accusations about her jealousy, Fernando placed it in terms of different cultures, when he told Fuensalida in May 1505, that ‘when she [Juana] governs and makes orders, while being here [in Spain], she can be certain that no woman will dare to make trouble between her and her husband, and her jealousy will be cured’.

Meanwhile she was forced to occasional compromise. Although she did not call on the services of noblewomen during most of that year, she ensured she was properly accompanied during the Brussels obsequies for Isabel, when Poitiers held her train, and over thirteen other Flemish and Burgundian noblewomen formed part of her entourage. She also let Poitiers organise mourning procedures for Isabel within the Coudenberg in January and February 1505. When she left the Low Countries, she agreed to a very restricted number of such women. After Philip’s death one of Juana’s first actions was to invite a small number of Spanish noblewomen to keep her company, presumably pending the appointment of a more extensive entourage.

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141 Querini, 121: 242, 11 July 1506
142 ADN. B 2188. 73487, ‘quittance par Jeanne de Commines, dame d’Hallewyn, 3 July 1504, dame d’honneur de Jeanne; B. 2190. 73846, 3 July 1504, ‘quittance par Jeanne de Commines ... pour arriére de pension’; B 2192. 73934, 8 January 1505, ‘remboursement à Mme Hallewyn, précédemment dame d’honneur’; Aram., Juana the Mad: 78
143 Fuensalida: 369, 16 May 1505
145 See Chapter 5
Diplomats had difficulty distinguishing the point at which access was denied by others and that at which an angry and suspicious Juana herself restricted access. In 1504, Manuel cast aside Fernando’s criticism of the envoys’ conduct towards Juana; ‘short of breaking down the doors ... we cannot ... tell her what she should know ... her highness is the doorkeeper.’ Much as they wanted to see her, ‘since it would give us authority’, she refused point blank to see them; she felt ‘mala de la cabeza’.146 This does not, however, seem a permanent or consistent condition. Fuensalida earlier reported that Juana had agreed to talk with the envoys as long as the conversation was about ‘España’.147 Philip later admitted she was anxious for news; that he was denying Spanish subjects access because their replies to her battery of questions misinformed and agitated her.148

Nonetheless, it was clear there had been a breakdown in relations between Juana and Fuensalida, excellent until her departure for Spain in 1501. Fuensalida suspected this was linked to reports that it was he who had ‘written to your highnesses that she was unfit’.149 He had, indeed, expressed support for Mújica when the latter took his dossier to Spain.150 Later Fuensalida reported that, when told that Fernando had received and publicised the dossier (but not that Philip had initiated and sent it) Juana reacted with fury and incredulity, exclaiming to Philip: ‘Is there no-one who will punish this, not the king my father, not you?’151

Because Fuensalida could not see Juana, he could no longer, as he acknowledged, form a real picture of her. He seems to have connected her ‘falta’ – either ‘falta de entendimiento’ (lack of involvement or, possibly, lack of understanding) or ‘falta de seso’ (mental incapacitation) – to Juana’s suspicions about him. When telling Fernando, in March, that her ‘illness had hardened,’ Fuensalida places it within the context less of budding madness than of

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146 Fuensalida: 312, 3 December 1504, Manuel and Fuensalida to Fernando
147 ‘... que no le hablaremos de las cosas de entre su alteza y el príncipe salvo sy queríamos hablarle en cosas despanya y algo ...’, Fuensalida: 299, 1 November 1504
148 Fuensalida: 363-366, 15 May 1505
149 Fuensalida: 361, 15 May 1505
150 Fuensalida: 256-258, 6 July 1504. The monarchs also supported Mújica, asking Fuensalida to intervene with Juana if necessary (250-251, 6 July 1504)
151 Fuensalida: 355-363, 15 May 1505
intrigence, inflexibility and the deep-rooted nature of these same suspicions about his role in undermining her reputation.\footnote{152}

In 1505 Fuensalida’s comments, which veer between attempts to justify Philip’s conduct, and his own, and outbursts of rage at the indignity of his situation, must be understood in the context of the reign of the terror that had descended on the Coudenburg. Unable to turn her, Philip now placed Juana and her officials in an impossible situation, while his advisers openly attacked her: ‘The king’s close allies’, wrote Fuensalida, ‘do not want to hear from anyone that the queen is incapacitated. Lachaux told me not two days ago that no-one should believe reports about the queen’s incapacitation’. Lachaux’ own view was that ‘nobody in the world had been born with so bad a disposition and what she did was from pure malice’.\footnote{153}

Until early April 1505 Juana managed to hold meetings with Fonseca, Conchillos, Olano and Mújica. Suspicious, Philip ordered Mújica and Olano to reveal any action on her part, including letters she had written. Juana’s response shows sensitivity to any slight to her regal authority. She ordered them ‘not to go and to write to the king that this was on her highness’ orders, but if it was necessary in order to carry out business that affected them both, the king must inform the queen and she would then order them to go’. Mújica obeyed Philip, while Olano obeyed Juana. Olano was arrested and briefly detained. When Fonseca and Fuensalida pleaded for his release, they were told that people had to know who was in command ‘without it being said that “I have to tell the Queen” or “the Queen does not want this to be done”’.\footnote{154} On 7 April Fuensalida reported:

‘… no Castilians can enter the palace, even if the Queen sends for them; and … only a chaplain can enter to say mass, but after derobing he has to leave the room without speaking to the Queen, even if Her Highness should call him, and they put ten to twelve bowmen on guard within the antechamber, at the door of the Queen’s room, and thus keep her imprisoned and under guard. That night, 4 April, they reportedly transferred the Queen’s kitchen to a room adjoining hers, where she normally hears mass, and there cook for her. That same night they ordered that the Queen’s horses be made ready, and at four in the morning the chief justice official and governors of the town came to the palace and there was a big meeting with the people who have charge of the Queen. So far I have been unable to discover the cause of all this, nor what their intention is, but one person told me that he had seen the Queen leave [her room] weeping and saying: “Am I such a bad woman, what are these guards they have imposed on me?”

\footnote{152} Fuensalida: 338, 26 March 1505
\footnote{153} Fuensalida: 338-339, 26 March 1505
\footnote{154} Fuensalida: 333, 5 March 1505
And she returned to her room saying: “What a wretched situation to be in!” (“O malaventurada de mí!”) She said this several times.\(^1\)

Fuensalida gathered there had been an altercation between Juana and Prince Charles de Croÿ-Chimay, who headed her household. The confrontation occurred after the Queen questioned an altar boy, learning that Chimay and Veyrè's father-in-law, Fresnoy, had ordered that no one enter her apartments.\(^2\) Understandably furious at being treated like a felon, Juana summoned Chimay and Fresnoy. After a brief exchange Chimay fled as, wielding a poker in an incandescent display of royal wrath, Juana advanced. ‘Get out, you old traitor, get out!’ she shouted at Fresnoy, who took the force of the blow in his hands. After knocking down the doorkeeper she was heard to say: ‘I swear by this cross that I’ll kill you all!’\(^3\)

Fuensalida asked permission of Chimay and Fresnoy before passing Juana letters from Fernando. This was declined.\(^4\) Mújica and Olano were told they could only continue to serve Juana if they informed Philip, or the guards, about everything she said, every order she made, every other development affecting herself or the children: ‘Sebastián [Olano] has told me this by a third person because they have forbidden him to communicate with me. Sebastián has let me know that he will refuse point blank to abide by this condition, but Mújica will …’ Subsequently, Ville summoned all the Queen’s servants, including the Spanish chaplain and altar boys, and made them swear not to take any letter or message from Juana to anyone, and that they must report it if she tried to do so.\(^5\) Envoys from grandees faced similar obstacles, including threats of imprisonment, if they tried to approach Juana: ‘I am told, and it is true’, Fuensalida reported, ‘that a messenger came from the Count of Ureña, who is called Byrones, saying he has letters for the Queen, and they told him he could not deliver them or speak to her unless he first spoke to the King; and one day he went to the palace and entered the chapel where the Queen heard mass, and the Queen heard it from a window, and this Byrones went to stand in front of the window and saw the Queen and he either had the intention of reaching the Queen

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\(^1\) Fuensalida: 341, 7 April 1505
\(^2\) Fuensalida: 365-366, 15 May 1505
\(^3\) Fuensalida: 342-343, 7 April 1505
\(^4\) Fuensalida: 344, 18 April 1505
\(^5\) Fuensalida: 351-352, 2 May 1505
after mass or some other plan ...’ The Queen eventually saw him, but not recognising or understanding his intentions, left without speaking. Her guards at once threatened him with imprisonment.\(^{160}\)

In this terrible climate even Margaret was discouraged from visiting Juana. Margaret told Fuensalida she was treated as if she were a Castilian and Philip had not accepted her offer to mediate between himself and Fernando. About to be married to Filiberto, Duke of Savoy, Margaret decided to return to her estates because, she said, she felt unable to suffer what was going on in Brussels without saying something, and that might tell against her. She had not spoken to Juana because ‘they’ did not want it. Manuel apparently asked: ‘Why does [Margaret] want to speak to a stone?’\(^161\) Later, hearing she had halted on the ‘King’s territory’, Fuensalida concluded that Margaret had had second thoughts, and wanted to turn back to see Juana, as well as her nephew and nieces.\(^{162}\)

At the end of June, Fuensalida wrote one of his last despatches:

‘When I left no one could see the queen, and if anyone did, they were surrounded by such security they could say nothing to her, or receive from her any order that was not first relayed to those who have the custody of her; thus, according to her confessor, there is no improvement. Others say she is cheerful and fat and spends her time sorting out her wardrobe and is occupied only with moving stones and pearls and adornments from one outfit to another, and making and unmaking rings and buying sables and silks and, every day, new clothes. She is alone all the time; they say she sings a lot; there is no-one to serve her; she does everything for herself, whether dressing or undressing ... she pays attention neither to kingdoms and affairs of state nor to the children ... Some attendants, who enter with her dresses, report that what she says she says well. With those to whom she speaks she is always sharp, very bitter, pathetic. This is all hearsay. I do not know because I have not seen her. All the Spanish servants are sons of Judas; no one has stayed faithful; everyone tries to court favour with the king; no one pays attention to the queen ... Moxica and Olano do keep faith but ... do not dare show it ... Sebastian is the one who keeps it most. It is very dangerous swimming in this sea. I swear by my faith I believe there is no man who would not tremble to hear what they say to me daily; there are few days when they do not condemn me to death’.\(^{163}\)

Juana’s ill-treatment; the intense surveillance to which she, and any would-be interlocutors, were subjected; the amount of time spent on trying to turn her and obtain her signature, give the lie to the view that no-one paid her attention, even though she was not obeyed. It was Juana’s ‘passion’ and the fear

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\(^{160}\) Fuensalida: 391, 5 July 1505

\(^{161}\) Fuensalida: 384, 15 June 1505

\(^{162}\) Fuensalida: 394, 15 July 1505

\(^{163}\) Fuensalida: 388-389, 29 June 1505
of its consequences that, Zurita believed, led Philip and Maximilian, when at Hagenau, to hasten to seal their alliance with France in order to ease the way for the second journey.\textsuperscript{164} Juana’s loyal and courageous support for Fernando, and defence of her right to control her household, represented a real danger to Philip’s ambitions. This increased as the Spanish journey loomed and the task of concealing Juana’s animosity to a Spain controlled by ‘Flemings’ became harder. Philip’s power in Castile depended on the belief that Juana supported him.

She reappeared in public after Maximilian’s low-key arrival in Brussels on 24 August. That Maximilian had entered Brussels at all – a city he had always shunned as an ally of Bruges, where he had been imprisoned in 1488 – was a measure of the importance he attached to the resolution of differences between Juana and Philip prior to their departure for Spain. His longstanding concern about them surfaces in a despatch from Cappello. In April Maximilian had told Cappello he was worried that Juana had not been seen in public for three months, and needed to ‘comfort her’.\textsuperscript{165}

During Maximilian’s visit ambassadors could speak with Juana, but not freely. Querini met her, with Maximilian, on 4 September 1505. A week from giving birth, she was dressed in black velvet, and looked well – considering, he added, perhaps slyly, her recent illness. ‘Although it was night, she struck me as very beautiful and seemed a wise and prudent woman’. She responded affably to his address, tailored to the ‘time and place where we were’. Afterwards, Juana joined Maximilian for a torchlit joust in which, appearing incognito, he shattered three lances against Philip. Maximilian’s mission, Querini added, had exhausted him: ‘He has spent almost all his time with the Queen, and almost continually accompanied her in pageants and entertainments’. Since ‘all her ailments proceeded from melancholy’, he had done everything to draw her back into the public arena after a six-month period during which ‘she has been seen by no more than ten people’.\textsuperscript{166}

Juana gave birth to Marie – the later Mary of Hungary – on 15 September. Maximilian, meanwhile, joined Philip in urging Juana to co-sign letters with Philip. But Juana could not be induced to any move against

\textsuperscript{164} Zurita, III: 378
\textsuperscript{165} Capello, ‘Disparci’, f. 139r.
\textsuperscript{166} Querini, 59: 149-151, 5 September 1505
Fernando: “The more she was pressed to sign [the letters]”, Zurita claimed, “the more firmly she said she would do nothing to harm her father. And with much anger and vexation she let the letters drop from her hand.”167 She “continues publicly”, Querini wrote, “to tell all who speak to her, that God forbid she should thwart her mother’s wishes (‘volunta’), or that as long as her father lives, any but he should govern Castile; and that if he has taken a wife he has done well, in order to live as a Christian, but this does not prevent her from being certain that never did a father love a daughter so dearly as he loves her”.168

On 7 November he noted that Philip planned visits to Malines [Mechelen] and Antwerp and that Juana was “also leaving today for Taramua [Dendermonde], and from there goes to Ghent and Bruges and then Zeeland and has had all the children brought from Malines and takes them with her to enjoy their company until leaving for Spain …”169 In the event, her route took her through Waesmunster [Waasmunster] and Calvaire [Kalve], and she arrived at Middelburg on 14 November.170 She was, Querini thought, so glad at the prospect of never returning that she finally decided not to go to Ghent nor Bruges, “as she had promised, but took the straightest and shortest road she could”.171

One must doubt whether this is entirely true. Any gladness was surely tempered by Juana’s feelings as a mother about to be separated indefinitely from her children, while Philip may have wished to keep her apart from discussion of the agreement that Veyré and Borgo were thrashing out with Fernando. Philip also managed to prevent an audience between Juana and a new envoy, whom Fernando had sent to talk to her, and who, as far as we know, was not sent to Zeeland. As for the change of itinerary, Zurita attributes this to Philip’s fear that the truculent people of Ghent and Bruges would hold Juana hostage, owing to popular resistance to the journey.172 Thus, the Palladium’s journey out of the garden of Troy passed relatively unnoticed.

167 Zurita, III: 417
168 Querini, 69: 166, 6 October 1506
169 Querini, 75: 173, 7 November 1505
170 ADN, B 3462, 1505, hôtel de Jeanne
171 Querini, 76: 174, 12 November 1505
172 Zurita, III: 441
4. The Queen’s party

4. 1. The winding roads (January-June 1506)

Philip and Fernando were aware that if Juana were to publicly espouse the cause of one she could fatally damage the chances of the other. The notion that a grouping might emerge in support of Juana herself does not seem to have been seriously considered by either king until the early summer of 1506, and historians have largely overlooked the existence of such a ‘party’.

Belenguer’s account of the second Spanish journey barely mentions Juana. Suárez is largely dismissive: owing to declining health, to ‘incapacitate her seemed relatively easy’. Philip’s biographers agree about Juana’s political apathy. Zalama attributes Juana’s insistent refusal to act before meeting her father to absence of will or volition. Aram’s positive biography deals only fleetingly with the spring and summer of 1506, and to examine Juana’s position and role I refer mainly to primary sources.

On 10 January 1506, four days after leaving port, Philip’s fleet was scattered by a massive storm, ‘sparkled, some to Rye, Winchester, Dartmouth, Falmouth and Wales’. Court steward Hildebrand Fuchs told Maximilian’s chamberlain that his own vessel had blown into Falmouth, where they feared to break up against the shore. For nine days contact with Philip was lost, while the carrack, Julienne, carrying the new King and Queen of Castile, stood out to sea. Accounts of the sovereigns’ reactions to the storm, portrayed in Weiß Kunig (figure 19), divide roughly along Spanish and Flemish/Burgundian lines, while some modern historians have interpreted Juana’s ‘intrepid’ conduct, praised by

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1 Belenguer, Fernando: 251-254; Suárez, Fernando: 407
2 Rogelio Pérez-Bustamente, José Manuel Calderón, Felipe I; Cauchies, Philippe: 234
3 Zalama, Vida cotidiana: 45
4 ‘A Narrative of the Reception of Philip, King of Castile, in England in 1506’, in Gairdner, ed., Memorials: 282; the original account, in BL, Ms. Cotton Vespasian C, xii, fo. 236-249, is attributed to Richmond King-of-Arms. Accounts of the storm are also to be found in the appendices in Gachard, Collection, I, including an account by Philip himself (498-499) and a particularly vivid description attributed to the Sr de Boussut (501-503).
Figure 19. Maximilian's Weiß Kunig shows Juana and Philip on the Julienne (right foreground). Scholar and physician Ludovico Mariani, who accompanied them, told Maximilian that tears sprang to his eyes when he remembered the young monarchs embracing in the face of death. Sandoval reports that Juana showed a 'virile spirit', dressing in her finest clothes and jewellery so that, if found, she would be recognised and buried.
some contemporaries, as a symptom of mental alienation.\textsuperscript{6}

On 16 January, \textit{Julienne} was driven into Melcombe Regis (Dorset), in the lee of the Isle of Portland. Philip sent his secretary, Antoine Le Flameng, from ‘Mileconregiz’ to the English court.\textsuperscript{7} He and Juana had to wade waist-high through crashing waves to reach land.\textsuperscript{8} Thomas Trenchard, a local dignitary, escorted them to Wolfetón, Charminster, where he and his wife, Elizabeth Strangways, entertained them pending news from Henry. On 28 January they arrived at Winchester, and from there Philip continued to Windsor with a small party, excluding Juana. Philip told an unknown addressee that the Queen was following him, without explaining where she was or why she had not accompanied him, while the anonymous chronicler of the journey claims she was ‘travaillée de la mer’.\textsuperscript{9} Philip might, however, have wished to keep Juana’s presence at court to a minimum, concerned not only that the absence of a female entourage around Juana reflected dishonour on them both but that Juana might make her disagreements with him known, or conspire with Katherine in Fernando’s favour.\textsuperscript{10}

From Falmouth Querini heard that a discouraged Philip wanted to go home ‘because he understands that as the queen is the real mistress it is she who will govern’. Philip’s advisers persuaded him to send Lachaulx to Spain to renegotiate that part of the Treaty of Salamanca allowing Juana to intervene in government as a third party, and her demotion to consort.\textsuperscript{11} ‘They are now saying’, Querini added, ‘that they have discovered and recognised that she is not fit or able to rule over such a government’.\textsuperscript{12} But, behind the manoeuvring, lay self-interest. If not marginalised, she could inspire insurrection among a ‘bestial’

\textsuperscript{6} Fuchs, ‘Briefe’, 3: 135-136; Querini, 88: 191, 30 January 1506; Sandoval, \textit{Historia}: 28; Sáuarez, \textit{Fernando}: 407

\textsuperscript{7} Gachard, \textit{Collection}, 1: 499, extract of letter from Philip to Low Countries

\textsuperscript{8} Summary of Philip’s letter to Maximilian of 8 February 1506 in Sanuto, \textit{Diarii}, 6: 295

\textsuperscript{9} ‘Or, vous devés savoir que la Royne, travaillée de la mer, devint aucunement pesante, et demoura à [gap in text] jusques à ce que le Roy la mande querir ...’ in ‘Relation du Deuxième Voyage de Philippe le Beau en 1506, par un Anonyme’, Gachard, \textit{Collection}, 1: 389-489 (423-424)


\textsuperscript{11} Querini, 92: 197, 30 March 1506

\textsuperscript{12} ‘ma al presente dicono haverla scoperta et cognoscuta que la non e apta ne capace per un tal governo’. Querini is clearly reporting others’ remarks, not his own, as sometimes reported.
people who, combined with the grandees, could rise up and proclaim her the ‘true domina’. And if ‘... the queen, who really hates [Philip’s advisers] assumes authority in Spain she would not only try to deprive them of the favour and power the king grants them but they would lose their Castilian pensions ...’ Querini noted that Veyré drew an annuity of three thousand ducats from Castile, and the next vacant bishopric had been granted to a brother. Lachaulx enjoyed a pension of a thousand ducats. All hoped Philip would provide for sons, nephews and more distant relatives.13

A London merchant told a friend that Juana was expected in Windsor with a large retinue.14 While Philip arrived on 30 January, the account attributed to the English king-of-arms dates Juana’s arrival as Tuesday, 10 February. Despite Philip’s protestations that he should not take the trouble, Henry, accompanied by Katherine, his younger daughter, Mary, and their ladies, met Juana at the foot of a staircase at the back of the castle. The party went to Henry’s apartments. Next day Katherine and Mary left for Richmond, while, according to the English chronicler of the visit, Juana and Philip stayed at Windsor until the Saturday. Before Juana’s arrival Henry and Philip signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, pledging Henry, inter alia, to help Philip against Fernando where necessary.15 On 12 February Juana signed, with Philip, what appears to be a truncated form of the Treaty of Windsor which, blandly worded, promises English aid and friendship to her descendants.16 Philip then went ‘hawkinge and hontynge’ to Richmond, while Juana took the ‘riche lytteres and cheares’ of the late Elizabeth of York on her return journey west.17 There is as yet no clear explanation for Katherine’s early departure and Juana’s return west after what must have been a brief but poignant encounter. Juana ‘rejects all blandishments, seeking the darkness ...’ Martire surmised.18

13 Querini, 93: 198-200, 4 April 1506
14 Gairdner, ed., The Paston Letters, A. D. 1422-1509, VI, 1078: 172-174, Saturday, 17 January 1506, William Makefyr to Darcy and Alynngton. The date given does not coincide with other reports.
15 TNA, E 30: 701, 9 February 1506
16 TNA, E 30: 1082, 12 February 1506, ‘Undertaking by Joan, Queen of Castile’
18 Martire, X, 300: 129, 4 April 1506
Aram suggests that Juana wanted to greet ships Fernando was sending to Falmouth. But, according to Querini, she awaited Philip at Exeter. Starkey’s more likely explanation is that Philip, who had earlier snubbed Katherine, feared she might influence Juana. Although Juana did not need Katherine’s persuasion, we know that, in September 1506, Philip ordered the Constable and his wife, Juana of Aragon, to vacate the Casa del Cordón so that Juana could not discuss affairs with, or reveal complaints to, her half sister.

What is certain is that, at Windsor, Juana and Philip had so serious an altercation that it nearly sparked a diplomatic incident. To this Katherine refers obliquely in a subsequent autograph letter. She tells Juana of her joy at seeing her ‘and the distress which filled my heart, a few hours afterwards, on account of your sudden and hasty departure’. Henry’s council had thought it advisable ‘not to interfere between husband and wife. On which account, and for other secret causes (‘mysterios’) with which I was very well acquainted, he concealed the feelings occasioned by the departure of your highness, although it is very certain that it weighed much upon his heart. The great affection he has felt, and still feels, towards your royal highness from then until now, is well known.’

If Philip and his council feared Juana’s arrival in Spain, Martire, who supported Fernando, held a similar view. Philip would have had to go home, or face war, ‘were Juana not in between, although useless, because of her unfitness ...’ Juana showed her understanding both of the problem her presence might cause and the offensive nature of Philip’s expedition when asking Fernando’s envoy, Pedro de Ayala, whether Fernando ‘loved them [herself and Philip] so little’. Querini tells us that, at Falmouth Ayala, allowed a brief and extremely rare interview with the newly-pregnant Queen, told Querini that:

‘... Don Juan Manuel, who accompanied him [to Juana’s door] warned him that he would oblige the king by not lingering ... when he entered the queen was extremely amiable; she did not allow him to kiss hands and insisted he sit down, and asked him many questions. In particular she asked him very tenderly how

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19 Aram, *Juana the Mad*: 83
20 Querini, 90: 193-194, 17 March 1506
21 Starkey, *Six Wives*: 92-93
22 Zurita, IV: 74
24 AGS, PR 5 f. 43; CSP, Sp (Queen Juana), 23, 25 October 1507, ‘Tratados con Inglaterra’
25 Martire, X, 309: 141-142, 30 June 1506
her father was, since it was six months since she had news of him; whether it was true that he wished her as much harm as she had been told, and whether, as a result of their fortunes he had announced that she and her husband wanted to return to Flanders and not pursue their journey; and finally, she asked whether her journey to Spain displeased him so much. The ... ambassador replied that none of this was true ...26

Ayala thought Philip's advisers were trying to sow discord between Juana and Fernando so that, from their first meeting, misunderstanding and dissension would facilitate Juana's removal from government.27

Philip and his advisers postponed this meeting as long as possible. Rodrigo Enríquez Osorio, Count of Lemos, helped persuade them of the danger of disembarking in ports loyal to Fernando, such as Laredo, where a reception party awaited.28 If they landed at such a port, they would appear 'supplicants', their 'honour' and 'fame' sapped by a king for whom Philip was no match in astuteness.29 Writing to Maximilian, Fürstenberg avoids any reference to deliberate evasion of Fernando, but reveals these underlying fears by attributing the arrival at La Coruña to winds of fate blowing them from the place where Philip could have been 'betrayed, sold, taken prisoner and perhaps even killed' 30 Maximilian, by contrast, congratulated Philip for deciding to 'vous conduire envers notre frère le roy d’Arragon ... comme bon filz'.31

According to Querini, Juana adamantly opposed the decision to avoid Laredo. Dismayed by Philip's advisers, who intended trouble 'where she sought only harmony', she strove to drive a wedge between them and her husband. Her refusal to swear to uphold La Coruña's rights and privileges in Fernando's absence, declaring that 'now was not the time', was aimed at stirring discontent, he added, since 'she feels that, in this way, she is avenging herself and showing her husband that his councillors did not counsel well, and that it would have been better to have landed at Vizcaya'.32 Later he noted that she '... appears not very

26 Querini, 93: 199-200, 4 April 1506
27 ibidem
28 AGS, E 4: 66 [1517]. Lemos refers to this episode in a letter to Charles.
29 Querini, 100: 207-208, 2 May 1506
30 Fürstenberg, 'Briefe', 7: 143, 12 May 1506
31 Lettres inédites de Maximilian, duc d'Auàtriche, roi des Romains et empereur, sur les affaires des Pays-Bas, de 1478 à 1508, Compte Rendu des séances de la Commission Royale d'Histoire, Deuxième Série, III (Brussels, 1852), CXXV: 304, June 1506
32 Querini, 100: 207-208, 2 May 1506
remote from her original wish for union between her husband and father. May the Almighty make peace between them for the welfare of Christendom'.  

Where Querini saw a queen with objectives both vengeful and reconciliatory, Fürstenberg saw pure iniquity. Echoing Lachaulx, he told Maximilian: ‘The worst enemy of my lord of Castile, apart from the King of Aragon, is the Queen, who is more malicious (böser) than I can describe to your Imperial Majesty’.  

Inversely, he praised Philip’s warmth and humanity, which had brought him many allies, reinforcing his might. Fürstenberg’s testimony is reflected in Weiß Kunig, which shows Philip swearing, on 30 April, to uphold the city’s rights and privileges (figure 20). The woodcut suggests nothing of the near ‘desperation’ felt by citizens who imagined, in Juana’s rebuff, her wish to hand over to Alonso Pimentel, Count of Benavente, the city he coveted. But, Querini added, Philip was also blamed for Juana’s conduct. Philip, in turn, blamed Fernando’s envoy, Ayala, for encouraging her – a charge Ayala denied.

For Pfandl, Juana’s ‘irresponsible’ refusal to swear La Coruña’s privileges made her position public for the first time: Juana wanted to be queen but not govern. Philip had to calm the Galicians who saw in Juana only contempt for their old kingdom. Cauchies attributes Juana’s conduct to incoherent ‘political caprices’, within the context of an evident illness. But Querini attributes more serious motives to Juana and a correspondent of Pedro Fernández de Córdoba, Marquis of Priego, shows her making a principled stand: ‘Her Highness repeats to the king and [gap in text] that she will carry out no act of government until she sees ... her lord and father’. Bernáldez also refers to a political ‘struggle between husband and wife over the government and control of the kingdoms; for the queen and her affinity and those who loved her well, wanted her to govern and sign jointly with the king, as the queen doña Isabel ...

33 Querini, 109: 221-223, 27 May 1506
34 Fürstenberg, ‘Briefe’, 7: 146, 12 May 1506
35 Fürstenberg, ‘Briefe’, 7: 144, 12 May 1506
36 Querini, 100: 207-208, 2 May 1506
37 ‘Sie soll König sein, aber nicht regieren. Sie will kein Schriftstück unterzeichnen, keinen Eid schwören, für nichts verantwortlich sein’. Pfandl, Johanna: 69
38 Cauchies, Philippe: 235
Figure 20. Fürstenberg’s reports to Maximilian refer to the rapturous reception given Philip at La Coruña. In this optimistic spirit, Weiβ Kunig shows him swearing, alone, to uphold the city’s rights and privileges. Juana refused to commit herself to any political act in her father’s absence, thereby hoping to persuade Philip to agree that they should meet Fernando as quickly as possible.
did with the king don Fernando ...”40 Philibert Naturel, Philip’s envoy to the Vatican, reported rumours from Rome and Naples that Juana had refused to confirm the ‘privileges of Galicia’ (including those of Santiago de Compostela) because she ‘wants to wait for ... Fernando, whom she sees as monarch, like herself’. While Philip sought to prevent Fernando approaching Galicia, ‘the queen has written ... the complete contrary, and ordered him to come’. She was so unhappy about the grandees’ support for Philip, ‘without King Fernando’, that ‘she has not wanted to see or meet them’. 41

This and similar references to Juana’s position, including Olano’s earlier comment that she wanted Fernando to ‘reign or govern’, suggests that her support extended further than consent to his governorship; she believed his power was (or should be) equal to hers, a position that would explain her refusal to accept Philip as legitimate king consort until a clarifying agreement with Fernando could be reached.

As contemporaries debated Juana’s motivations, a groundswell in her favour began to form. Priego’s correspondent maintained she had been prevented from speaking to Fernando’s envoys: ‘So far what they are saying is that they have not allowed the queen ... to speak to those who have come here [Fernando de Vega and Ramón de Cardona], and even less to the ones sent [to Fernando]. Don Pedro de Ayala is the only one to have seen her highness, and apparently just once, since they arrived in Coruña.”42 Ayala told Manuel that what caused ‘most surprise and scandal’ was that Philip held Juana in his custody.43 Philip responded by persuading Juana to attend a ceremony of ‘besamanos’ on 14 May. She spoke to nobody, wrote Querini, and after the ceremony withdrew.44 This was variously interpreted. One fernandino criticised Philip for imprisoning Juana because she wanted to associate Fernando with her rule. His felipista correspondent replied that, although Juana was ‘somewhat retiring’ by nature, she had welcomed the grandees with great pleasure and ‘last Thursday the

40 ‘... habia habido contienda entre marido y muger sobre regir y mandar los Reynos; que la Reyna y sus parientes, y quien bien la querian, querian que mandase y firmase juntamente con el Rey, ansi como hacia la Reyna Doña Isabel ... con el Rey Don Fernando, su padre ...’ Bernáldez, Historia, II: 280
41 ADN, B 18826. 24222, 19 June 1506
42 Paz y Melia, ed., Serie de Documentos, 1: 121-122
43 Zúñiga, IV: 8
44 Querini, 106: 217, 15 May 1506
Marquis of Villena and Count of Benavente and all who came with them kissed her hand’. He expected Philip and Juana to become ‘so Catholic and prudent that the one will not wish for what is not reasonable and the other will not cease to offer due obedience’.\(^{45}\)

Martire applied to Juana’s conduct the topos of female hysteria; she was ‘led in her pregnancy like an invalid; she keeps silent as though she had no tongue’.\(^{46}\) But Querini thought Juana used her isolation, and public silence, as a tool in pursuit of an overall objective: to make Philip think twice, to drive him towards peace talks with Fernando. Querini thought she might succeed: ‘The malignants seize the opportunity to make as much mischief as they can, but there is hope that, if these monarchs can soon meet, as [Fernando] writes it is his intention that they should, matters will take a positive turn, especially as the king of Castile has the counterweight of the queen his wife, the most important person in Spain’.\(^{47}\) Lachaulx and Veyré, who had negotiated the Treaty of Salamanca, were also pushing for an accommodation. Querini thought they and Ville detected ‘insolence’ in the attitude towards Fernando of his Castilian opponents.\(^{48}\) Indeed, a split was growing between these advisers, and Fernando’s Castilian opponents, led by Manuel, whom Querini shows whispering to Philip that he would make him sole monarch of Castile. Philip, that ‘povero re’, amiably granted audiences to all, but ‘does not know what to do’.\(^{49}\)

Zurita, by contrast, describes impatience among nobles who felt insufficiently rewarded for switching to Philip and had been left to cool their heels in the corridors and cloisters of the monastery of Santo Domingo. Querini’s Philip, available to all, becomes, in Zurita’s account, an evasive monarch, hunting in secret, eating in private, secluded with his favourites.\(^{50}\) Although one must always bear in mind Zurita’s pro-Fernando agenda, Fürstenberg seems to bear this out in some respects when, clearly worried about security, he assured Maximilian that Philip ate food only cooked in his, Fürstenberg’s, kitchen.\(^{51}\)

\(^{45}\) Fuensalida: 594-596, letters [May 1506] from the archive of the Duke of Alba
\(^{46}\) Martire, X, 305: 134, 15 May 1506
\(^{47}\) Querini, 104: 212-214, 12 May 1506
\(^{48}\) Querini, 106: 216, 15 May 1506
\(^{49}\) Querini, 106: 216, 15 May 1506
\(^{50}\) Zurita, III: 489-490
\(^{51}\) Fürstenberg, ‘Briefe’, 7: 149, 12 May 1506
Fernando allowed Martire to try to coax Philip into an accommodation with him. There was, Martire felt, no prince more affable, beautiful or of more manly virtue. But, remembering the room where he and Philip talked, with its ‘chimneys blazing’, he feared he was being drawn into the fire.\textsuperscript{52} Manuel told Fernando he must negotiate not with Philip, who ‘did not expect to handle Castilian matters as well as [Manuel] did’, but with himself. Fernando could not count on Juana’s backing, ‘because they knew where that would end’.\textsuperscript{53}

In the view of Pérez-Bustamante and Calderón it was Manuel’s robust warning that spurred Fernando to write a circular letter calling upon nobles, prelates and soldiers to rally to Juana’s cause, which he identified with his own.\textsuperscript{54} He depicted a wronged queen, whose efforts to communicate with him had been obstructed; whose Spanish staff, women and men, and all those in whom she confided had been removed; whose imprisonment continued in Castile as in Flanders and whose orders had been consistently thwarted on the grounds that ‘ella no quiere’.\textsuperscript{55}

Fernando’s approach north-westwards alarmed Philip. His resident ambassador in France, Burgundian Jean de Courteville, warned that Fernando was recruiting troops in Cataluña.\textsuperscript{56} Philip’s envoy to Fernando, Diego de Guevara-Jonvelle, confirmed news of belligerent moves; some three thousand experienced foot soldiers, under the command of Pedro Navarro, had recently returned to Andalucia from Naples. Fernando was recruiting these, and also preparing to remove artillery from the arsenal in Medina del Campo.\textsuperscript{57} By the end of May Philip’s court had moved to Santiago de Compostela, where Philip faced renewed pressure to show Juana, but ‘only with great effort was she taken to mass in the church of Santiago to satisfy these people who, out of respect for her mother, have great affection for her’. Querini thought she would lose that affection if she did not change her ways.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, Juana’s popularity was

\textsuperscript{52} Martire, X, 306: 135-136, 31 May 1506
\textsuperscript{53} Zurita, III: 482-483
\textsuperscript{54} Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, \textit{Felipe I}: 195
\textsuperscript{55} Zurita, IV: 13-16
\textsuperscript{56} ADN, B 18825. 24185, 1-2 June 1506
\textsuperscript{57} ADN, B 18825. 24185, 1-2 June 1506
\textsuperscript{58} Querini, 110: 223-224, 31 May 1506
precisely why Philip’s court thought it a ‘great setback that she could not be persuaded to conform to her husband’s will’. 59

Fernando’s duplicity is particularly striking with regard to Juana. In June he drafted his rallying cry for Juana while authorising Cisneros to negotiate terms with Philip that would sacrifice Juana’s interests if necessary. Anxious to reassure Philip he would not join with Juana against him, Fernando permitted Cisneros to ‘assent and promise on all that, according to God and [your] good conscience, you see fit to assent and promise for Me and in my name …’ 60

Cisneros seems to have been acceptable to both Philip and Fernando (albeit, on Fernando’s side, with reservations) as an apparently impartial figure of authority, as well as one of great wealth, willing to provide credit. Philip welcomed him enthusiastically. 61 Throughout the following days Cisneros worked hard to secure advantageous terms for Fernando, while aligning himself with Philip as a rival to Manuel. García Oro suggests that Cisneros became Philip’s ‘legitimater’ in Castile, lending moral support to his justification for Juana’s marginalisation. This prominence, which did not go unrewarded, encouraged him to ‘maintain and reinforce his role as necessary arbiter’. 62

Juana’s significance at a time of wavering loyalties was not, meanwhile, forgotten and emerges clearly from Guevara’s despatches. 63 In early summer Guevara (figure 21) followed Fernando between Villafranca del Bierzo to Asturianos through Orense, Matilla, Santa María and Rionegro. He talked regularly with him and members of his entourage, including the Duke of Alba, Constable and Admiral. Covering a crucial period of flux in early June, Guevara’s letters reflect growing concern that Philip’s treatment of Juana could rebound on him. They also show that a group favouring her and led by the Constable had emerged by early June, weeks before the Treaty of Villafáila.

59 Zurita, III: 491
60 AGS, PR 7, f. 76, 2 June 1506, ‘Cédula de Fernando el Católico al Arzobispo de Toledo’; CODOIN, 14: 307-308, 2 June 1506, ‘Minuta de poder que el Rey D. Fernando dió al Arzobispo de Toledo sobre cierto artículo que toca á excluir de la gobernación de los reinos á la Reina Doña Juana’
61 ADN, B 18825. 24203, 10 June 1506, Philip to Fernando; Perez-Bustamente, Calderón, Felipe I: 1506 (Palencia, 1995): 202
62 García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 125-126
63 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 62, 1 June 1506, ‘Carta de creencia’ from Philip, in Santiago de Compostela, to Fernando
Figure 21. Diego de Guevara, by Michael Sittow, c. 1514-1515. Member of a family long resident in the Low Countries, Guevara was appointed Juana’s maître d’hôtel in 1506 before Philip sent him on a mission to Fernando. His letters stress that Philip must not ignore Juana’s significance. After failing to abduct the Infante Fernando after Philip’s death he returned, with many other courtiers, to the Low Countries. Oil on wood. Detail from diptych with virgin and child. (National Gallery of Art, Washington)
On 1 June Guevara told Philip about his first audience with Fernando, whom he found full of curiosity about Juana’s situation and state of mind: ‘He asked me how the queen his daughter was. I said, Very well. He asked what ladies she had with her. I said she had none, except one camarera, which you much regretted.’ Then he asked me if the ladies who came from Flanders were en route; I said Yes. He also asked me many little details about her, to which I replied the best I could.”

Guevara had found the nobles around Fernando ‘singing the same ballad’ about the need to prevent civil war. On 1 June the Constable asked Guevara rhetorically – and, Guevara thought, irascibly – ‘To whom do these Spanish realms belong?’ ‘To the queen doña Juana and to the king don Philippe’, Guevara replied. ‘That’, said Velasco, ‘is also my understanding, so … why to you want to destroy [Castile] by making war?’ Guevara interpreted the Constable as meaning that Philip’s ‘difficulties’ with Juana made it the more urgent to negotiate with Fernando. Those who advised Philip, Velasco argued, did so neither to his ‘honour or his profit’.

But Velasco was spitting in the wind. Reluctant to leave Naples undefended and wary of pressures he might face in Castile, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the ‘Great Captain’, had not responded to Fernando’s repeated requests to return – a fact that caused him increasing anger. The foot soldiers in Andalucia were demanding payment before they made a move. Guevara told Philip that Fernando’s household was unimpressive; a hundred continuos travelled four leagues behind him and only bore light arms’. By 9 June Guevara was confident that Fernando would submit to Philip. As they sheltered from the heat in wayside pueblos, playing cards, Fernando’s magic can be seen working on the envoy, as it had worked on Veyré and Lachaux. Guevara begged Philip not to make difficulties over a meeting: ‘… think’, he wrote, ‘that you are the prince of

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64 At Falmouth Juana and Philip had again clashed over this matter.
65 ADN, B 18825. 24186, 1 June 1506
66 ADN, B 18825. 24186, 1 June 1506
67 ADN, B 18846. 29621, 14 May 1506, Philibert Naturel to Lachaux and Veyré. The Great Captain was reported as saying that: ‘… while the King of Aragon slept he was keeping watch, and at the risk of his life. Often without bread, without money …’ See also Fernando’s letters in Rodríguez-Villa, ed., Crónicas del Gran Capitán, 38: xlv [1505], to Great Captain; 40, 41: xlv, 24 April 1506 and 9 June 1506, to Rojas
68 ADN, B 18825. 24206/24207, 12 June 1506
69 ADN, B 18825. 24198/24199 [letter 24198 in cipher]; B. 18846. 29628, 9 June 1506
Aragon and he your father-in-law'.\textsuperscript{70} As Pérez-Bustamante and Calderón point out, Fernando’s military and political weakness meant he could defend neither Juana nor his remaining allies. The question was no longer about civil war, but a solution that allowed him the most honourable possible exit from Castile.\textsuperscript{71}

Contrary to the traditional view, nobles who deserted Fernando in the first half of June were not simply transferring their loyalty to Philip. Guevara judged they were either placing their hopes in a joint Juana/Philip administration or looking primarily to Juana. By the beginning of June those who claimed to serve Philip had ‘gone much colder, for the vast majority have told me that if there is a dispute between you and your father-in-law they will do what the queen doña Juana commands them when they see her at liberty’. He added: ‘Sire, do not deceive yourself … the great lords who are here will not come over to you unless you and the queen rule together’.\textsuperscript{72} To ‘be heard’ Philip must show Juana to the people, even if she must not speak. Philip should also permit Cisneros to talk with Juana if necessary, despite opposition to his doing so.\textsuperscript{73} It was then that the Constable emerged as de facto leader of a Queen’s ‘party’.

4. 2. The Constable’s move (June 1506)

The defection of the man Marsin had called the ‘greteiste lorde of that londe’ was a great blow to Fernando. Bernardino Fernández de Velasco y Mendoza, first Duke of Frías, Constable of Castile, was his son-in-law as well as father-in-law of Alonso Pimentel, Count of Benavente. In 1502 he had married Fernando’s illegitimate daughter, Juana of Aragon. His nephew, Pedro Fernández de Velasco, later himself Constable, describes him as a courageous man who had distinguished himself very young during the Granadan wars. He was tall, good-looking, gracious in manners and speech and with beautiful hands. He was a womaniser and over-influenced by some of his household, and ‘although he did not directly harm the interests of his vassals he did not listen to them much’.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} ADN, B 18826. 24211, 15 June 1506
\textsuperscript{71} Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, \textit{Felipe I}: 201
\textsuperscript{72} ADN, B 18825: 24185, 1-2 June 1506
\textsuperscript{73} Gachard, ed., \textit{Collection}, I: 519-520 [6 June 1506], undated letter from Guevara to Philip
\textsuperscript{74} BN, Ms. 3238, ‘Origen de la Ylustrísima Casa de Velasco por D. Pedro Fernández de Velasco’ (BN transcription)
Guevara’s correspondence reveals that within a fortnight of presenting himself as Fernando’s supporter, Velasco had left Fernando, ostensibly to visit his daughter at Benavente, but en route for Philip’s camp. According to Pérez-Bustamante and Calderón, Velasco became the leader, with Garcilaso de la Vega, of a new party that offered to solve all existing problems, thereby sidelining Cisneros from negotiations. But, while it is plausible that Velasco wanted to marginalise Cisneros, believing he could not be relied upon to support the interests of the Castilian nobility, Garcilaso de la Vega was far more closely allied to Philip than was Velasco. As Bergenroth has pointed out: ‘A third party was in the course of formation, with the Constable of Castile at its head’, but focused not on Philip but Juana. Bergenroth cites a letter from Almazán to Cisneros of 7 June 1506, warning that this party’s intention was to ‘drive both rivals out of the country, and set up Juana as their rightful Queen’.

On 1 July Almazán returned to the matter in a letter to Rojas: ‘What I believe is that, after we’re gone, when they judge the time right, the grandees who now detain her will take up her cause against king Felipe, and others will take up his, so that he will be obliged to divide up the Royal Crown, and if God does not miraculously provide otherwise, Castile will be hopelessly lost and destroyed and the saying will be accomplished: “year seven leave Spain and go”...’ Almazán advised Rojas to secure his assets against civil war.

Guevara’s correspondence shows that the development of a Queen’s ‘party’ was already under way by at least the second week of June. He told Philip that the Admiral also planned to visit Philip, not least to keep an eye on Velasco’s ambitions – a constant preoccupation of the Admiral’s in 1506-1507. In a hitherto unpublished fragment of his letter he wrote:

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75 ADN, B 18846. 29630, 10 June 1506
76 Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 202
77 CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana): xxxiv; see also Hähler, Der Streit: 121-122
78 Almazán’s warning to Rojas is cited in Ladero Quesada, La España, as follows: ‘Lo que yo creo es que después que seamos idos, cuando vieron que sea tiempo, los Grandes que agora la prender [a Juana] tomarán después la querella por ella contra el rey Felipe, e otros por él, para ponerle en necesidad de repartirse la Corona Real, que si Dios no lo provee milagrosamente, Castilla se perderá e destrocerá sin remedio, e comprirse ha lo que dicen: el año siete deixa a España y vete...’ (454). Almazán here quotes a version of the well-known saying: ‘año quinientos y siete, toma tu capa y vete’. His citation of it in 1506 implies that the saying was prophetic.
'Sire, I spoke to the admiral at about seven o’clock this evening. He told me that, desiring as he does your service and welfare, you really must not allow the constable to speak to the queen until he himself has arrived at your court, so that he can tell [Velasco] in your presence what he has [already] told him in the presence of right-thinking people. By this he means that the constable has told him that he and others will absolutely refuse to allow the two kings to come to an agreement together against the queen, because, he says, she is the sovereign lady and he will do nothing unless it be at her command; and the admiral has told me that the said constable asked for his support in this matter, and since to him, who is hardly his friend, he has said such things, you can imagine what things he has said to the people who are his friends. The lord king your father-in-law, has spoken to me in the same vein …' 

Certainly Fernando did not want to see a Queen’s party any more than to see Philip in sole command of Castile, since both options endangered his objectives. Only days before, Fernando had presented himself as his daughter’s champion. Now he described Velasco’s support for her as an affront both to Philip and himself:

‘The constable said and did many things here, working to get other grandees and knights to join and swear with him to obstruct an agreement between myself and the king my son, and, in case that could not be done, to join together to adopt the cause of the queen against the king my son and against me. Certainly I can hardly believe it, and mention it now only so that the archbishop [Cisneros] might be vigilant. I am persuaded that the constable will achieve more easily there what he has tried to achieve here because he will find more persons to follow him there.’

Knowing, or suspecting that, Cisneros had Fernando’s authority to sacrifice Juana, and fearing he would not hesitate to sideline her, Velasco seems to have believed that if Fernando were expelled from Castile, Juana would be the only hope for those who could exploit her undisputed legitimacy and general popularity as Isabel’s daughter either to resist the implantation in Castile of a hostile Habsburg regime, or temper Philip’s attitude to the native Castilian elite.

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79 ‘... Sire, j’ay parlé à l’almirante environ sept heures après midi, qu’il m’a dit pour autant qu’il désire votre service et votre bien, que vous ne laissiez en façon du monde parler le connétable à la Royne jusques a ce que l’almirante soit envers vous, pour luy dire devant vous ce qu’il luy a dit en présence des gens de bien. C’est que le connétable luy a dit que luy et autres ne consentiront point que les deux roys s’accordent ensemble contre la royné car il disoit que elle est la souveraine dame, et qu’il ne fera autre chose fors ce qu’elle luy commandera et m’a dit le almirante que le dit connétable luy a requis de luy estre amy de ceste affaire, et puisque a luy qui n’est point son ami il a dit telles choses vous pouvez penser quelles choses il a dit à ceux qui sont amis. Le sr Roy beau père m’a pareillement dit le même, vous aurez regard sur toutes ces choses’. ADN, B 18826, 24211, 14 June 1506

80 AGS, PR 56, f. 24, June 1506, ‘Despacho del Rey ... a uno de sus embajadores sobre la oposicion de algunos a su union con los reyes ... para gobernar los Reinos de España’
Padilla, indeed, thought most grandees and nobles were ‘on the side of the queen doña Juana …’\(^{81}\)

Cisneros tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade a suspicious Fernando to retreat to Toledo on the grounds that civil war seemed inevitable. The cities and villages had become restive, resenting the depredations of foreign troops. Early in June riots broke out, so serious that Philip himself had to intervene. ‘The Archbishop affirmed that this, combined with the fact that the pueblos did not see the queen, who was very secluded and not accompanied by the pomp and state necessary to such a queen, newly come to reign, meant they were losing their liking for the king her husband and the King Don Fernando would profit’\(^ {82}\).

Debates about the status and positions of the respective monarchs were not confined to north-west Spain. From Rome Naturel reported dissent between Bernardino López de Carvajal, Cardinal of Santa Cruz, and another of Philip’s envoys, António de Acuña. When Carvajal remarked that Fernando and Juana would treat Philip ‘like an animal’ he was asked to explain. The Cardinal replied that Philip ‘… lacked advice and will never amount to much …’\(^ {83}\).

A former papal envoy of the Spanish monarchs, and aspirant to the papal throne, Carvajal had shifted allegiance to Philip after Isabel’s death, but distrusted Philip’s advisers. It was to Carvajal that Martire had vividly described events at La Mota in 1503. However, the Cardinal expressed whole-hearted support for Juana, while seeking papal permission to return to his see and play a direct part in Castile’s affairs. Acuña argued that Philip did not need Carvajal’s advice, and could not return without his agreement, to which the Cardinal archly replied ‘it would be sufficient to have the permission of the Queen, sovereign of those kingdoms, whom he wished to serve to the death’. Nevertheless, Carvajal was obstructed from reaching Castile.\(^ {84}\).

The Great Captain was another uncertain quantity. Naturel reported that, although the military leader had considered returning to Castile, he would never surrender the Neapolitan fortresses but ‘guard them as well as he could, and to

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\(^ {81}\) Padilla, \textit{Crónica}: 143
\(^ {82}\) Zurita, IV: 23. Zurita adds that Fernando, suspicious of Cisneros’ ‘strange’ letter, ignored it.
\(^ {83}\) ADN, B 18826. 24222, 19 June 1506, to Philip
\(^ {84}\) ADN, B 18826. 24241, 28 June 1506
the death, for Queen Juana and her children’. However, he had received reports of discord between Juana and Philip; that Juana was unhappy with the grandees who supported Philip, had ordered Fernando to Santiago and considered Fernando to be ‘the monarch like herself’. Afraid the Great Captain might abandon Philip for Juana, Naturel blamed Fernando’s ambassador in Rome, António de Rojas, for circulating misinformation: ‘Grachillas [Garcilaso de la Vega] spoke to the Queen for a good hour, and from that quarter all was well’. Naturel then confronted Rojas directly. Rojas denied he had spread rumours about Juana’s letters but said he ‘had certainly heard them about Rome’. Naturel told Philip that the Pope had received letters from some Valencian merchants who claimed that Fernando and Juana were ‘très-bien d’accord sans vous’. Philip was also concerned by the delay of Royal Council president Juan Daza, and the councillors in paying homage, and about the cities with votes in the Cortes. Procurators had been summoned to ratify the Treaty of Salamanca, but proceedings had been paralysed by the delay in the monarchs’ arrival and Philip’s reservations about the treaty. Guevara warned that the procurators’ assemblies prejudiced his interests and advised him either to meet them or send them home. Philip replied that he had asked them to meet him in Puebla de Sanabria. He asked Guevara to sound them out urgently and secretly, suspecting them of loyalty to Fernando.

In June Philip’s court pursued their journey through Ribadavia and Lemos to Puebla de la Sanabria, struggling, in Martire’s words, ‘though fissures in almost impassable mountains’ in order to avoid Fernando. The chronicler of the second journey describes a chaotic odyssey, with baggage lost or stolen, muleteers fleeing, and many of Philip’s entourage forced to negotiate the mountains on foot. Like Martire, Querini noted the desire to avoid Fernando. The exasperated young Venetian refers to interminable rocks and mountains, and the death of two hundred horses and mules, including two of his own. They had

85 ADN, B. 18826. 29621, 14 May 1506, to Veyré and Lachault
86 ADN, B 18846. 24222, 19 June 1506
87 ADN, B 18825. 24194, 7 June 1506, to Guevara
88 ADN, B 18825. 24185, 1-2 June 1506
89 Gachard, ed., *Collection*, 1: 517-518 [4 June 1506], Undated minute
90 Martire, X, 308: 139, 20 June 1506
91 ‘Deuxième Voyage’: 435
not ‘come to any place containing more than fifteen or twenty houses, the average being five or six straw hovels without any conveniences, and often these counts, marquises and dukes have had to sleep under the stars’.  

Cisneros arranged a meeting between Fernando and Philip’s representatives on 14 June. Philip also sent Manuel and Luxembourg-Ville for last-minute talks with Fernando between 18-19 June. Details are unknown, but evidently Fernando felt obliged to bow to force majeure. Next day Philip and Fernando met briefly and somewhat bitterly at Remesal (Zamora). A contemporary depiction of the encounter shows Fernando’s little party facing the massed ranks of Philip’s soldiers and pikemen (figure 22). On 27 and 28 June Fernando and Philip signed the treaty of Villafáfila-Benavente, of which Cisneros was the ‘main artisan’. This obliged Fernando to renounce all claims as governor while stipulating that, if Juana fell ‘gravely ill’, did not wish to govern, could not govern, or died, the government would be Philip’s alone ‘for now and evermore’. Yet Fernando was able to salvage much, including his right to the maestrazgos of the military orders and half the income from, and rights over, the Indies, and annual compensation of ten million maravedís on the sales taxes from the military orders. ‘The Catholic King remains great’, Louis XII’s adviser, Georges d’Amboise, told Pandolfini, adding that, although Philip had taken the political title, the financial settlement meant Fernando ‘is rich, and the other poor’. Fernando’s ambassador in France sent a warning shot across Philip’s bows: ‘Let the old dog sleep; one day he’ll wake up’.  

The main treaty maintained the conditional basis of desire and ability on which Juana might act as sovereign. But a second, extraordinary provision stripped her even of this. It was, Calderón observes, the price Fernando had to pay for the benefits he obtained. Rather, it was the price Juana paid for him.

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92 Querini, 113: 228, 17 June 1506
93 García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 124
94 Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 204
95 Cauchies, Philippe: 193
96 AGS, PR 56, f. 28, 27 June 1506; PR 56, f. 29, 28 June 1506
97 Canestrini, ed., Négociations, II, XXXVII: 175-176, 12 July 1506
98 Le Glay, ed., Négociations, XLVII: 168, 26 July 1506, Courteville to Philip
99 Calderón, ‘Felipe el Hermoso, Fernando el Católico y la instauración de la Casa de Austria en Castilla’, in Alfredo Alvar, ed., Fernando I: 1503-1564 (Madrid, 2004): 148. Although the second provision is described as ‘secret’ it became quickly known.
**Figures 22, 23, 24.** Scenes from the extraordinary summer of 1506. Top, the encounter at Remesal (Zamora) on 20 June between Fernando’s sober little party and Philip’s army. Fernando was about to lose Castile, but his brilliant *coup de théâtre* and mordant irony on this occasion were much admired. Figure 23 shows a *corrida* celebrating the Treaty of Villafáfila of 27-28 June at Benavente. In Figure 24, the people of Valladolid crowd the roofs to watch a *juego de cañas*. Philip, who loved the sport, is shown centre in rich tunic and black cap. Attributed to Jacob van Laethem. Oil on wood panels. (Château de la Follie, Écaussines, Belgium).
The provision’s wording reflects concern about the development, since early June, of a Queen’s ‘party’. Asserting that Juana had no wish to govern, it nevertheless bound Fernando to ally with Philip against her if necessary. If ‘either on her own initiative or induced by any person of whatever estate or condition’, she tried to govern she ‘would bring about the total destruction and perdition of these kingdoms, owing to her illnesses and passions’.\(^{100}\) This was to write off any in advance any government of Juana’s as a female ‘tyranny’ of the kind later described by Gracián.\(^{101}\)

When Louis XII asked Courteville to read him the text of the treaty, he ‘s’émerveilla assés du traitié fait pour la reyne vostre compaigne’.\(^{102}\) Like Louis, the grandees were ‘filled with stupefaction’.\(^{103}\) These included the Constable and Admiral, momentarily united.\(^{104}\) In the salt marshes of Villafáfila, Fernando did what was not infrequently done with regard to controversial treaties, and secretly and immediately repudiated it. No sooner had he signed the treaty than he called witnesses – Thomas Malferit, president of the Chancery of Aragon; his camarero, Juan Cabrero, and Almazán – and drew up a statement describing the intimidatory climate in which he had been forced to agree to the treaty against his ‘free and spontaneous will’. This, Fernando acknowledged, was to Juana’s ‘massive detriment’ as well as, ‘in many respects’, to his own right as governor and administrator.\(^{105}\)

4. 3. The concept of honour (June-August 1506)

When Juana was told about the meeting at Remesal she ‘showed such pain at not having known about it’, Querini wrote, ‘that she could bear no more’. She turned on Benavente, then Villena, accusing them of betraying her for encouraging

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100 ‘... la serenissima Reyna ... en ninguna manera se quiere ocupar ny entender en ningun negocio de regimiento ni governación ni otra cosa y aunque lo quisiese fazer seria total destrucción y perdimiento destos Reynos según sus enfermedades y pasiones ...’, AGS, PR 56, f. 21.1, 27 June 1506; AGS, PR 56, f. 27.2, 28 June 1506
101 The medieval concept of tyranny is addressed further in Chapter 5.
102 Le Glay, ed., Négociations, XLIII: 155, 10 July 1506, Courteville to Philip
103 Perez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 211
104 Zurita, IV: 40. According to the anonymous chronicler of the second Spanish journey, the Admiral was waiting for Philip at Monterey; ‘y arriva en bien petit nombre de gens, comme messagier ou homme incongneu ...’. (Relation du Deuxième Voyage: 436)
105 AGS, PR 56, f. 30, 27 June 1506, ‘Protesta del Rey Fernando de la capitulación ajustada con el Rey Felipe sobre el gobierno de los Reinos de España’
Philip to meet Fernando without the knowledge of ‘she who was queen of Castile’. She was heard shouting at length with Philip and shunned revels (such as the corrida in figure 23).\(^{106}\)

If news of Remesal shocked her, the treaty of Villafáfila-Benavente left her stunned and traumatised. When, on 28 June, after signing the treaty, Philip informed her about it, she appeared at first, Querini commented, ‘not to care much’. However, after dinner, she expressed a wish to see Benavente’s gardens, with their exotic animals – a famous tourist attraction of the time, separated from the castle by a bridge spanning a tributary of the Órbiga – then spurred her horse away, eventually dismounting at a woman’s house from which she refused to move. Querini understood she was demanding to see Fernando – ‘although, to be honest, I do not know the cause because the house is surrounded by many gentlemen and guards, and no-one enters but the king, who is having to work hard to calm her down, and I do not know how he will do it’.\(^{107}\)

Alcocer tells a similar story. Juana had gone to the ‘wood of the peacocks’, accompanied by Villena and Benavente. After lingering there, she galloped towards the house of a woman ‘who baked cakes’, and could not be persuaded back to the fortress. She was motivated either by ‘caprice’ (buen espíritu), or because ‘someone had warned her that the king intended to leave her in Benavente to govern alone’. She spent the rest of the day, the night and following day at the house, guarded by hundreds of Fürstenberg’s infantry.\(^{108}\)

Whether motivated by the need to apply pressure to Philip or escape him, Juana was clearly desperate. Although the sight of the legitimate ruler of Castile surrounded by German soldiers must have raised eyebrows about Philip as well as Juana, the incident provided the opportunity to openly question Juana’s mental stability. Querini thought she ‘certainly seemed a woman who had lost her senses’.\(^{109}\) Doubtless hoping to persuade Fernando to agree to Juana’s imprisonment, Philip brought the incident to his attention. However, as Pérez-Bustamente and Calderón point out, these questions ‘were difficult to resolve because they concealed a political trap …’ Fernando pointedly expressed regret

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\(^{106}\) Querini, 116: 234, 25 June 1506
\(^{107}\) Querini, 118: 237, 29 June 1506
\(^{108}\) Alcocer, Relación: 12-13
\(^{109}\) Querini, 119: 237-238, 4 July 1506
for Philip’s conjugal problems but refused to comment after so long without seeing her.\footnote{Pérez-Bustamente, Calderón, \textit{Felipe I}: 213}

Philip summoned the procurators. He had, he said, been aware for months that Juana was not equal to the burden of government, but for the sake of her honour and their children’s, he had suffered patiently, keeping the matter as secret as possible while hoping she would recover her senses. Now everyone had seen just how unfit Juana was to assume her responsibilities. What should he do in the kingdom’s interests? According to Querini and Alcocer the response was not unanimous. Some, wrote Querini, argued that the Queen, kept prisoner, should be restored to liberty; then each procurator could talk to her before reaching a decision. But, fearing that ‘if acknowledged by the people [Juana] might some day or other in a transport of rage, take her revenge on the nobility’, the lords and bishops persuaded the procurators to report Juana’s conduct to their councils, asking whether they should express allegiance to Philip alone.\footnote{Alcocer, \textit{Relacion}: 13; Querini, 119: 237-238, 4 July 1506}

But Louis XII, who followed events, and whose envoys had recently returned from a mission to Philip’s court, shared the opinion of Lorenzo de Padilla – a chronicler sympathetic to Philip – that the grandees were uneasy: ‘None of the greatest princes of Castile’, Louis told him, ‘are in much agreement with you’.\footnote{Le Glay, ed., \textit{Négociations}: XLVI: 165-166, 23 July 1506} The procurators were uneasy too. Querini mentions a ceremony of ‘besamanos’ on 24 June, in which the Basque delegation refused to pay allegiance to Philip without firstly doing so to Juana.\footnote{Querini, 116: 232-234, 25 June 1506} Alcocer describes how, exploiting a tradition by which Burgos and Toledo vied for the honour of being first to kiss hands, Pedro López de Padilla caused uproar by ostentatiously arriving last. According to Alcocer ‘twelve or fifteen procurators ate with him and they all followed Toledo as regards the Queen’s oppression’. The procurators were divided over Juana’s detention: ‘Burgos and León, half of Granada and some other cities were in conformity with the king’s will but Toledo opposed this proposal … and with it were Guadalajara, Madrid,
Salamanca and many other cities and towns’. Philip’s Spanish biographers describe Padilla’s campaign as ‘very well orchestrated’.

Seville’s delegates, Pedro Ortíz and Fernando Santillán, advised the city council to place Juana ‘where she is served and accompanied as her estate and person demand and ... in accordance with the requirements of her illness’. For this, they added – no doubt perceiving the advantages to their city of having so important a figure in their power – Seville was best suited. But Seville vehemently rebuffed the proposal: the procurators must refuse point blank to swear allegiance to Philip alone, unless that was what Juana commanded, and obey her in everything, unconditionally. Their representatives must acknowledge her pre-eminence, swearing allegiance to Juana first. Other cities, like Toledo, also ordered their representatives to recognise Juana as true and legitimate successor and natural proprietary mistress of Castile, Leon and Granada, and acknowledge Philip only in second place as king and ‘legitimate husband’. The procurators, Querini notes, were ‘unexpectedly’ told that ‘no pact must be made without the will of the queen, whom all must obey, nor part an iota from her orders, for they recognise no other lord than her and thus intend that she receive first the oaths of allegiance ...’

As Alcocer notes, the procurators from Granada were divided. On 14 July one of Martire’s chief correspondents, Íñigo López de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla, governor of the Alhambra, told his son, Luis, a procurator, that he must agree to Philip’s solitary rule, given that ‘the queen is not disposed to do anything’. He based his argument on precedent: when Isabel had been ill, ‘and even when she was well’, Granada had obeyed orders signed only by Fernando. Juana must be grieved for, but if she were ‘unwilling or unable to govern and administer her kingdoms, who else can do so but her husband?’ Without leaving Granada, Tendilla assured Philip of his obedience. On 16 July he again told his son, and fellow procurator Gómez de Santillán, to offer obedience to Philip. Past orders lacking Isabel’s signature had, he repeated, been obeyed and the Treaty of

114 Alcocer, Relación: 9; 11-12; 13-14
115 Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 216
116 Rodríguez-Villa, La Reina: 170n.
117 AGS, Camara de Castilla (Pueblos) 20, f. 245, ‘Carta del poder de la ciudad de Toledo’ [1506]; AGS, PR. 69, f. 40, 4 July 1506, ‘Carta de poder de la ciudad de Sevilla’
118 Querini, 121: 241, 11 July 1506
Villafáfila ‘clearly admits to the queen’s indisposition and lack of will to govern these realms and lordly domains’. But Tendilla’s instructions arrived too late for the crucial session of 12 July, when the oaths of allegiance were made, and Gómez de Santillán supported Juana.

On 5 July Philip met Fernando at Renedo de Esgueva to discuss issues of governance, and probably to elicit last-minute approval for Juana’s incarceration. The kings spoke in the church sacristy for an hour and a half before Cisneros and others joined them. According to Alcocer, Cisneros, Manuel, and Maximilian’s ambassador, Borgo, swore to Fernando that Juana ‘estaba loca’ (was then mad). It is not certain what Alcocer (who elsewhere refers to the view that Juana ‘era loca’) exactly meant, or thought that Cisneros and his allies meant when, or if, they used the word. But according to a later remark of Cisneros to Querini, Fernando seems, on this occasion, to have understood it to mean ‘jealousy’. Recommending that Philip take a leaf out of his own book, he pressed him to support Juana, ‘even if the queen his daughter were indisposed … just as he had supported Queen Isabel her mother, who in her youth was in an even worse state than his daughter is now, but with his help she had returned to herself and was the queen that all the world remembers …’

Santa Cruz tells us that Fernando asked (again) to see Juana, but was refused, and on leaving, ‘wept so much that no one could bear to look at him’. Once in Zaragoza, he appointed his steward, Luis Ferrer, as Aragonese ambassador to Philip and Juana, thus giving diplomatic expression to the new division between the two kingdoms. Philip, he instructed Ferrer, must cultivate a better understanding with Juana, whose restoration to health depended on gentle

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119 M. A. Moreno Trujillo, M. J. Osorio Pérez, eds., Epistolario del Conde de Tendilla (1504-1506), (Granada, 1996): 741, 14 July 1506; ‘Instrucción que se envió a los procuradores de Cortes’: 750-751, 16 July 1506
120 AGS, PR 56, f. 31, 5 July 1506, ‘Nota del Rey Fernando sobre una entrevista celebrada con el Rey Felipe en Renedo’
121 Alcocer, Relación: 16
122 At least two humanist clerics and royal chroniclers, Pietro Martire and António de Guevara, later applied the words ‘loca’ and ‘locura’ to María Pacheco, wife of Comunero leader Juan de Padilla, and subsequently widowed leader of the continuing resistance movement in Toledo after the executions at Villalar (See Chapter 8).
123 ‘… il recoymdo la reyzina sua fiola pregandole che se ben l’era indisposta la volessse suportar come lia hava suporata la reyzina Ysabella sua madre la qual im zoventu per ziorxio se trovo im assay pezor termene che al presente non si atrova questa sua fiola. tamen, suportata da lui ritorno en si: et fu la reyzina che tuto el mundo ha cognoscuto …’ Querini, 120: 239, 7 July 1506
124 Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 238
measures. He could not sanction imprisonment in a fortress; it ‘would be a most
imprudent proceeding, and utterly defeat the end in view’.

Juana made a last effort to contact Fernando: ‘It was discovered the other
day’, wrote Querini, ‘that her majesty had sent the Bishop of Málaga ... to her
father with letters of credence, and he confessed that he was under orders to
plead and beg his Catholic majesty on the Queen’s behalf not to leave Castile
without first talking to her. But the letters were destroyed and the Bishop ... could face imprisonment.’ Villaescusa, who had rejoined Juana and Philip in
1506, wrote his own cryptic account of the incident, perhaps tailored to its
audience, since he includes it in the memorandum he later drew up for Charles’
benefit. Villaescusa portrays himself as Philip’s subject as well as Juana’s: ‘... The Queen ... ordered me to give a letter she had written to her father, and to
speak to him, and for [seeking to] agree it with her husband ... Philip suspected
me and expelled me from court’.

Uncertain of the cities, Manuel and Cisneros decided to circulate a
petition calling for Juana’s reclusion. In a later retraction, signed at Portillo,
Benavente described the climate of fear: ‘I did not sign or agree to it of my own
free will, but because the king ... was present and ordered me to do so, and out
of respect and reverence and obedience to him’, but also ‘because it was not ...
safe to do the contrary.’ A handful of magnates, however, refused. Although a
longstanding feud divided the Constable and Nájera, they both publicly declared
they would not betray the Queen. They would neither sign the paper nor take the
oath of allegiance.

The Constable’s nephew later described the tensions and perils for even
the most powerful lords at that key moment in the summer of 1506 in a little-
known episode worth quoting in full:

‘... the king and many grandees agreed to put [Juana] in a fortress and to sign a
paper ... Alerted to this, the duke of Nájera went to Valladolid, for the king was
already nearby, in a place called Mucientes, and [Nájera] contacted the
constable, don Bernardino, who was on his estate, near Mucientes, called
Cigales. And [the Constable], accompanied only by don Íñigo de Velasco, his
brother, and don Diego de Mendoza, count of Castro, went to Mucientes, and ...

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125 CSP, Sp. (Henry VII), 470, 29 June 1506
126 Querini, 121: 241-243, 11 July 1506
127 González Olmedo, Diego Ramírez Villaescusa: 112, ‘Instrucción’
128 AHN, Osuna C. 420, D. 1-4, 18 August 1506, ‘Declaración que hizo el señor Conde’
129 Querini, 121: 241, 11 July 1506
found the king’s guard of a thousand Germans assembled there, and he passed through their midst and entered the palace where the king was gathered with all the grandees above-mentioned ... And [Philip] handed him the paper, saying that he could see how all the grandees had agreed to place the queen in a fortress, and asked him to sign it too. The constable begged the king not to order him to do so and [the king] snatched the paper angrily back and said: “How is it that you refuse to sign what all these other grandees have signed?” The constable replied that, unlike the others, he had not the opportunity to communicate with the queen. And the king went into his room and the constable returned to Cigales, and although he knew that a plan was afoot to arrest and kill him, he did not once retract his words, and thus the king was unable to place the queen in a fortress.\footnote{BN Ms. 3238: 32-33, ‘Origen’}

The wording implies that Juana’s salvation depended almost entirely on Velasco. Although Nájera is given a significant role in alerting him to the danger, Enríquez, who played so prominent a part in defending Juana at the opening of the Cortes of Valladolid less than a month later, is notably absent from his account. At this point one should look more closely at some leading ‘refusés’.

As the Count of Lemos later reminded Charles: ‘The Spanish are accustomed to receiving favours from their kings and to being rewarded for their services’.\footnote{AGS, E 4, f. 66 [1517]} Many writers, then and now, have seen the grandees’ actions only in the light of self-interest. Calderón argues that Enríquez was no more disinterested a magnate than most of his peers: ‘There is no doubt that his action was guided not by altruistic motives such as the good of the kingdom, but much more prosaic ones, in which resentment played a prominent part’.\footnote{Juan Manuel Calderón Ortega, El Almirantazgo de Castilla (Alcalá, 2003): 140} Writing soon after events, Alcocer suggests that the Constable’s desertion of Fernando stemmed from personal resentment that Fernando’s ‘secrets were with the Duke of Alba’.\footnote{Alcocer, Relación: 5} Concepción María Quintanilla Raso asserts that Benavente’s ‘true motives’ for retracting support of Philip as lone monarch, and expressing support for Juana, which he did in August 1506, were rooted in frustrated ambition, although they should also be seen in the context of a ‘clear disappointment with respect to felipista policies, based on government by fear, and rooted in illegality, such as the separation of Juana from government’.\footnote{Concepción María Quintanilla Raso, ‘Fórmulas y Prácticas de la Cultura Política nobiliaria: los Grandes en la crisis dinástica castellana (1498-1507)’, in Nieto Soria, ed., Gobernar: 199-220} Rosa María Montero Tejada argues that Nájera used various political arguments to justify his
opposition to Fernando and hide his political and economic ambition. Most grandees had received rewards and recognition from Philip. But, it has been argued, as Montero Tejada argues in the case of Nájera, these grandees were not granted the political protagonism they expected. ‘For this reason it is not surprising that the Duke and some other prominent members of the nobility, like the Admiral and the Constable, refused to accept that the Queen should be declared incapable to govern and imprisoned … because this would have meant handing [Philip] absolute power’.  

What seems clear is that self-interest cannot account entirely for the attitude of grandees. Juana was in no position to reward services; support for her meant only further political marginalisation, and perhaps worse and the argument of self-interest alone ignores an important part of aristocratic ideology with respect to loyalty to the God-given monarch. The Constable, banned from council meetings, lost political influence. Velasco’s subsequent conduct towards the Queen suggests that his words to Enríquez had a basis in sincerity; he did indeed feel that it would be dishonourable to support Philip and Fernando against the legitimate monarch.

The case of Nájera, Manuel’s brother-in-law, and with Villena, godfather to the Infante Fernando, is more nuanced. The English envoys at Segovia had described him as a man of ‘grete corage’, who refused to attend court until Juana returned to Castile. Widely seen as Philip’s supporter, he was, more accurately, Fernando’s opponent. His refusal to agree to Juana’s imprisonment, and formal marginalisation from government, shows that previous references to his loyalty to Juana, described by sources as distinct as Marsin and Zurita, were not purely hot air. Unlike Velasco, Manrique de Lara does not seem to have been immediately disadvantaged by his stand, owing perhaps to his close connection with Manuel. Nonetheless, his willingness to join Velasco in supporting the Queen seems to have been based on more than personal resentment.

Fernando’s first cousin, the Admiral, was threatened with the confiscation of various fortresses if he persisted in crossing Philip. Enríquez is one of the

136 Zurita, IV: 66
137 See Chapter 5
most intelligent and interesting figures of the era – intellectually curious, highly cultivated, a poet, an indefatigable communicator and an eloquent and naturally gifted negotiator. Isabel had imprisoned and exiled him in his youth after a violent dispute with another noble over a question of family honour. In Sicily, he was influenced by humanist ideas, bringing Luis Marineo Siculo back to Spain with him. His marriage to Ana de Cabrera, proprietary heir to the richissime county of Modica (Sicily), with estates in Catalonia, was childless but apparently happy. He had inherited the almirantazgo of Castile in 1485 and, restored to favour, led the Flanders armada of 1496. He had thus come to know Juana well. In 1506 he was probably, with Velasco, the most influential figure among the nobles, just as, during the Comunero uprising, the ‘old fox’, as Pérez calls him, became the most feared and respected of the three governors or viceroys designated by Charles.

Enriquez describes his position in a subsequent letter to the Comunero Junta of Valladolid:

‘... The king being in Mucientes, they called me to vote and I refused. And on the way back to Valladolid, on the Mucientes road I met the procurators, and among them recognised Don Rodrigo Mexía, who represented Jaén, and I said to him: “Señor Don Rodrigo, the reason they’re calling for you is to vote for the imprisonment of the Queen our lady. Ask yourselves, for mercy’s sake, if it has ever seemed to you that the kingdom has done anything so ugly”. He replied: “If we were to find a grandee to support us we wouldn’t vote for it” ... I said to those gentlemen that I would join with them to prevent it: and I would give my word of honour (‘mi fe’) to die in the attempt, if necessary, with all and every one’.[138]

The extent to which the discourse of honour emerges from the feverish summer of 1506 has never been examined in depth and there is insufficient space here to do more than show how, in 1506, it became particularly striking. Alba told Guevara on 1 June that it would not have been honourable for Fernando to meet Philip at Coruña if he were not allowed to see Juana. Guevara told Philip that, according to Velasco, his advisers did not advise him to his ‘honour or profit or to the good of the kingdoms’.[139] A remark of Alba’s to the Constable, while they shared a dish of mazzard cherries, has often been repeated without being placed in the wider discourse. Alcoce, who claimed to hear it while serving at table, shows Alba reproaching Velasco for intending to desert

[138] Danvila, Historia Crítica, II: 547-548
[139] ADN, B 18825: 24186, 1 June 1506
Fernando with the words: ‘I tell you I did not think you possessed honour until now that I see you losing it’.\textsuperscript{140}

Inextricably bound with this concept was that of loyalty, fidelity and ‘service to the death’. The Admiral speaks of dying, if necessary, in the Queen’s service, while ‘service to the death’ arises in the exchange between Acuña and Carvajal, and words of the Great Captain, as reported by Naturel, each time in relation to Juana. The Constable’s nephew refers to the mortal dangers faced by his uncle when confronting Philip. When, in August 1506, Benavente retracted support for Philip’s lone rule, he stressed his lineage’s imperative as ‘loyal subject and vassal of my queen and native-born mistress to whom these realms belong’, and to whose service he committed his person, life and estates.\textsuperscript{141} Grandees were not alone in appealing to this concept. In his account of López de Padilla’s defence of the Queen, Alcocer writes that he ‘was ready to die for his loyalty’ to Juana.\textsuperscript{142} In 1507 the procurator for Granada, Rodrigo de Bazán, threatened to kill Maximilian’s envoy, Borgo, if he dared attempt anything contrary to the Queen’s honour.\textsuperscript{143}

The values expressed by these men did more than hide baser instincts. Knightly ideology – in particular, the notion of loyalty to the legitimate, divinely appointed, sovereign – enshrined a concept of royal power that José Manuel Nieto Soria terms the ideology of ‘realeza caballeresca’, or ‘chivalrous royalty’. According to this notion, the knightly class, including the nobility, was granted a privileged place beside the monarch, whose divine origin converted him, or her, into a creador (creator or nurturer) of nobles and knights par excellence. The monarch’s very legitimacy was drawn from this function of protective care, which included the granting of rewards and privileges, and which, in turn, required that nobles and knights be loyal to their sovereign and seek the ‘common good’.\textsuperscript{144}

Such concepts were not, of course, peculiar to Spain. A noble in Baldesar Castiglione’s \textit{Book of the Courtier} observes that a courtier must follow his

\textsuperscript{140} Alcocer, \textit{Relación}: 5
\textsuperscript{141} AHN, Osuna, C, 420, D. 1-4, 18 August 1506, ‘Declaración’
\textsuperscript{142} Alcocer, \textit{Relación}: 14-15
\textsuperscript{143} See Chapter 6
forebears in showing ‘complete loyalty’ to whom he serves. Keith Thomas defines the code of honour among early modern nobility and gentry as an ‘amalgam of chivalric ideas of loyalty, generosity, and physical courage with classically defined notions about the duty to seek praise and fame in virtuous public service’. Honour, thus defined, overrode all other considerations, but could not simply be inherited; it had constantly to be reasserted and guarded. The code was flexible; it meant different things at different times. But it was real. Writing about a Spain, which, by the mid-sixteenth century, had changed much, Rodriguez-Salgado describes the tenacity of such values, and the importance of honour in a dominant culture that (still) ‘associated virtue and nobility with arms’.

It is, thus, no coincidence that notions of honour and loyalty to the sovereign, and ‘service to the death’, formed the political ideology underlying the formation of a party of juanistas, whatever their individual grievances against Fernando and Philip in the summer and early autumn of 1506. In this period of extreme uncertainty, and in the face of intimidation and violence against a defenceless but legitimate monarch, such concepts were bound to come to the fore and to play a particularly vital role. As an army of Germans approached the interior, and the old certainties of the Castilian ruling class evaporated, Alba’s stinging rebuke to Velasco provides a vivid illustration of the way in which honour, and conflicting loyalties, pulled men apart.

4. 4. Breaking the silence (July 1506)

That summer a comet caused much speculation. For some, noted Gómez de Castro, ‘it presaged disorder in the state; others a civil war, and others, the death of Philip’. Eyewitnesses were impressed: ‘It was so bright’, wrote Alcocer, ‘that the king came to Valladolid [from Tudela de Duero] by its light’. Martire thought that, from Tudela, it seemed to fall straight upon Mucientes.

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145 Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier: I, 54, 57, 58
147 Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face: 25-31
148 Gómez de Castro, De las hazañas: 179
149 Alcocer, Relación: 18
150 Martire, X, 310: 144, 7 July 1506
When, at Mucientes, Enríquez insisted on talking to Juana and assessing for himself her state of mind before deciding whether to sign Philip’s petition, Philip reluctantly capitulated. The Admiral had met Fernando at Renedo the day after Fernando’s encounter with Philip, and it is probable that his talks with Juana – which, according to Zurita, lasted for ten hours, spaced over two days, and were attended by his close ally and deudo, Benavente – took place between 7-8 July. For these talks we have Zurita’s account, together with a fragment of further evidence from a letter, dated 1506, in ‘Relación de las Comunidades’. Juana was, as usual, closely guarded:

‘... at the door of the room where the queen was they found Garcilaso, and inside was the archbishop of Toledo, and [Juana] was alone in a dark room, sitting at a window and dressed in black, wearing capirotes that almost covered her face. She rose for the admiral, paying him the same courtesy that her mother would have done, except that she remained standing, and asked him if he came from the king her father, and how he had left him, and he replied that ... he was very well, that he was leaving for his kingdoms of Aragon, and she said “God protect him” and how much she had longed to see him’.  

Enríquez later recalled that Juana had spoken then about her fears for Castile. She described the influx of ‘Germans’; the ‘manner of governing of the Flemings, so different in language and discourse’ and the perilous consequences if Philip ruled. Enríquez tried to persuade her of the damage that would result if she did not decide to rule jointly with Philip, as a mitigating force. She had to accept that Fernando was gone; ‘everything was hers’. Afterwards, Enríquez told Philip that, throughout those two days of talks, Juana had shown no sign of the mental incapacity alleged. Because the city was ‘very agitated’, Philip had to enter Valladolid with her; to separate Juana from his side a finger’s breadth would foment turbulence throughout Castile.

Clearly, the Queen’s ‘party’ did not consist only of grandees. Toledan procurator, Padilla, who had brought with him his small son, Juan, the future Comunero leader, was one of her most stubborn supporters. Alcocer comments that Cisneros and Manuel took him into the tower of the church of Mucientes. Swearing that Juana was mad, they promised him grants and favours, but also threatened him. Like Enríquez, Padilla insisted on seeing Juana. Nothing is

151 Zurita, IV: 54-55  
152 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, f. 153v.-155 [1506], ‘Carta del Almirante’  
153 Zurita, IV: 54-55
known of their conversation. According to Alcocer, the Queen spoke sensibly until, embarked on more detailed matters, her remarks became bewildering. A stressed and tearful Padilla, nonetheless, insisted on Juana’s full right to govern. Expelled, like Villaescusa, from court, he accompanied Fernando to the frontier with Aragon. 

The pressure on Juana continued remorselessly, but Querini shows how Juana continued to see Isabel as her compass point:

‘... perhaps warned by the lords themselves, who seek nothing but discord, she proved difficult to placate, saying she wanted the oaths of allegiance to be sworn to her first as queen and mistress of Castile, in the same way as they were sworn to her mother, and that [Philip] should afterwards be recognised as king in his capacity as her husband, and not otherwise. The king and queen discussed this for a while. However, she then pretended to give in to all the king’s wishes until finally she was escorted to the place where all the ... procurators were gathered, ready to take the oath, and whom she summoned to her; and she asked them if they recognised her and accepted that she was Juana the first, legitimate daughter and heir of the dead queen Isabel. They all answered that they did. Then she continued: “Since you know me for who I am, I order all of you to go on to Toledo, and await me there, because it is there that I intend to be solemnly sworn in as queen of Castile, and to observe all your laws and constitutions”. 

No-one, Querini wrote, dared raise their head or speak. The oath-taking was postponed. Around the same time Philip sent a message to Maximilian, admitting to a ‘petit regret’ not to be hunting chamois with him, and adding: ‘I am still only beginning to get involved in the affairs of my kingdoms and as in all things the beginnings are always the most difficult ...’

Procurators followed a discouraged and melancholic Philip to a monastery where he had sought refuge, and perhaps consolation, to ask whether he wanted them to obtain further clarification from Juana. Philip assented.

According to Santa Cruz, who supposes Juana had accepted Valladolid as the site

154 Alcocer, Relación: 14-15
155 Alcocer, Relación: 17
156 ‘ley veramente advertita forsi de quanto era seguito da li signori istessi che altro no cerchano che discordia, se monstro difficile ad volersi acquietar dicendo che lera disposta voler esser zurata prima ley regina et signora di Castiglia ne la manera istessa che fu zurata sua madre et che da poi lui fusse zurato re como marito et non altramente. stetono il re e rezzina su questo contrastro un pezo. tandem la rezzina simuló volle far tutto quello piaceva al re fin che la conduxeno dove erano tuti li procuratori sopra nominati presti per farli il zuramento, li qual ley fece chiamar a si: et li dimando se la cognoscevano et se li pareva che la fusse Joanna prima et legittima fiola et herede de la quondam rezzina Yxabella morta. respoxeno tuti che si. subjunge lei poi che me cognoscete io vi comando che ve ne andati tuti in Tollego: et li me expetate perche delibero in quel loco esser solene mente zurata rezzina de Castigliah: et d’osservar tute le leze et constitutione vostre’. Querini, 121: 241-242, 11 July 1506
157 ADN, B 18826: 24293 [early July 1506]
of the Cortes, they ‘begged her to do certain things with regard to the
government of the kingdom and state of her house and she said that, when she
came to Valladolid, she would settle everything’.\textsuperscript{158} Querini, at Mucientes, is
more specific. The procurators asked three questions: did she intend to govern
Castile alone now that her father had gone? Did she want her husband to govern
with her? Was she willing to dress in Spanish style and receive women into her
entourage? ‘She replied that she did not think it either decent (honesto) or
appropriate (conveniente) for the realms of Castile to be governed by Flemings.
For the same reason, it was not customary for them to be governed by a
Fleming’s wife, and she had therefore wanted her father to govern until her son
came of age’. As regards the women, she said the procurators should hold their
tongue; she would not have women in her household, knowing the nature of her
husband, but was perfectly happy to dress in Spanish style.\textsuperscript{159}

These answers have reinforced the belief that Juana could not think
rationally. Having one moment demanded, and received, confirmation of her
identity as Juana I, and declared herself ready for juramento as queen, she
appears the next to relinquish all rights and responsibilities, and Philip’s with
them. Pérez-Bustamante and Calderón comment that ‘if any doubt remained
about the incapacity of the Queen to govern it was finally cast aside’. Similarly,
for Zalama her answers showed ‘not only a lack of sense but intelligence’.\textsuperscript{160}

In the absence of corroborating evidence, we do not know whether
Querini is summarising her answers, omitting parts, or reporting them in full;
whether he heard them in person or by hearsay. But even supposing he gives
them verbatim, they are logical if understood in their wider context. When
responding that it was inappropriate for ‘Flemings’ to govern Castile, or for a
‘Fleming’s’ wife to do so, Juana was explaining a position she seems to have
held consistently from as early as the end of 1502. But, throughout 1506, Juana
seems to have hoped – as Philip’s ‘malign’ advisers feared – that, reunion
between Philip, herself and Fernando could pave the way for an agreement that
either sanctioned Fernando’s governorship or a form of shared monarchy. But

\textsuperscript{158} Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 239v.
\textsuperscript{159} Querini, 121: 242, 11 July 1506; Sanuto (Diarii, 6: 387) refers to two questions – one on
‘donna’, or young, unmarried women; the other on costume.
\textsuperscript{160} Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 220; Zalama, Vida cotidiana: 52
Fernando was gone. Charles was still an infant. If her responses to the procurators’ questions are combined with her arguments with Philip about pre-eminence, and her public declaration, Juana appears to be saying that, in Fernando’s absence, and despite her misgivings (‘it is not customary …’) she fully expected to be recognised as sovereign in Toledo and to assume her responsibilities. This argument is reinforced by the circumstances in which Juana later rode through Valladolid and her insistence on examining in person the procurators’ powers (as Philip, without Castilian, could not).161

After her discussions with Enríquez, Benavente and Padilla Juana knew she had many supporters and her choice of Castile’s first city was not arbitrary. According to Querini, Philip had also wanted to be ‘crowned’ in Toledo.162 Cisneros’ companion, Fray Francisco Ruiz, later remarked that the grandeur and authority of Toledo made it more suitable for a Cortes than any other city.163 It is unclear when or why Philip changed his mind, but it was, perhaps, for the same reasons that Juana still wished to hold the Cortes there. Place of her birth and recognition as Isabel’s heir, Toledo remained the key city of the Castilian interior and the spiritual heartland of Castile. Of all cities, it was the one where she could be expected to feel safest and strongest, and where Flemings and Burgundians might, on the contrary, feel most vulnerable.

Cisneros, in his role as mediator, tried to restore harmony, writes Querini. This meant, in practice, that now Fernando had ‘abandoned’ her, Juana might be persuaded that there was no alternative but to cede Philip the government and submit to all his wishes.164 Although she was not told of plans to hold the Cortes in Valladolid, Juana agreed to appear with Philip during the royal entry into Valladolid on 10 July. Alcocer reports that they were received with ‘great solemnity’, under a brocade pallium.165 But Zurita shows Juana persisting in a display of pre-eminence. Upon entering the city, she ordered that Philip’s standard be removed and rode beneath the pallium, behind the remaining

161 Zurita, IV: 59
162 Querini, 104: 212-214, 12 May 1506
163 Vicente de la Fuente, ed., *Cartas de los secretarios del cardenal don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros durante su regencia en los años 1516 y 1517* (Madrid, 1875), XXIX: 147-156, 30 September 1517
164 Querini: 242, 11 July 1506
165 Alcocer, *Relación*: 18
standard, on a grey harnessed with trimmings of black velvet. She was ‘dressed in black, her face covered; and although the town was festively adorned to receive her, with many revels, she did not stop to watch them, and arriving at the cathedral, dismounted, removing her veil, and she went to the house of Ifígo López [de Mendoza] and the King to the Marquis of Astorga’s. Many had gathered for this entry, all were armed … and it lacked the lustre of a Cortes but seemed like something else not altogether understood’ (figure 24). \(^{166}\)

Juana’s entry was, however, clear in its symbolism. White represented ‘sovereignty’ and ‘absolute pre-eminence’, as Carrasco Manchado points out with respect to the horse on which, Bernáldez tells us, Isabel rode through Seville for the presentation of Prince Juan in 1478. \(^{167}\) At the same time Juana’s apparent refusal to acknowledge the revellers was doubtless meant to convey her deep disapproval of Fernando’s expulsion from Castile.

But Juana was riding into a trap, unaware of the change of location of the Cortes. This gave her no time for further public manifestations of sovereign pre-eminence on which to build support prior to an act of juramento at Toledo. Through the medium of Cortes president, Garcilaso de la Vega, Philip still hoped to persuade the procurators to vote Juana unfit to govern. On 12 July, at the monastery of San Benito, there was tense debate. The bulk of procurators, led by those of Toledo, Salamanca, Madrid and Guadalajara, and supported by key grandes – the Constable, Admiral and Duke of Nájera – refused to marginalise Juana. The juramento took place the same day. After dinner, writes Querini, Philip, ‘with many hypocritical caresses’, led Juana into a room crowded with procurators. Juana asked them in astonishment what they were doing there, and by whose orders. At first she insisted on a postponement of the juramento. But, ‘so many were the prayers and exhortations of the aforesaid procurators, combined with her husband’s, that she finally agreed to allow them to kiss hands and swear her in first as queen of Castile …’ \(^{168}\) She and Philip, placing their right

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\(^{166}\) Zurita, IV: 59

\(^{167}\) Carrasco Manchado, Isabel I: 337. In a well-known passage of his Historia, Bernáldez writes that Isabel: ‘iba... cabalgando en un tronon blanco’, accompanied by the Duchess of Villahermosa ‘y no otra dueña ni doncella’ (I: 97). Arribas rightly points out that the entry into Valladolid was: ‘toda una afirmación como reina titular, y toda un homenaje a su madre’. However, he believes she acted not from personal ambition but in opposition to the ambition of those around her (Juana I: 35).

\(^{168}\) Querini, 122: 244-245, 16 July 1506
hands on the cross and gospels, swore to conserve the royal patrimony and laws, *fueros* and rights. Regrettably, as Carretero Zamora has indicated, there is no direct testimony of the debates that took place in Mucientes and Valladolid; these were passed over in the official record. From this we only know that Juana was granted full rights and capacity to govern. The procurators confirmed Philip’s status as king in his capacity as consort, but did not award him specific powers of governorship. Charles was recognised as legitimate heir, but only as proprietary monarch after Juana’s death.

The Cortes, as again Carretero Zamora notes, showed it was capable of rising to events and protecting the rights of both queen and kingdom. But, although the Cortes did not grant Philip the authority to rule alone or with complete freedom to do as he wished, it does not seem to have laid down, or been able to lay down, the precise limitations of his mandate. This, and the interpretation placed on the outcome by Philip and his entourage, may explain why Querini reported that Philip had been sworn in after Charles, ‘per re y governator di questi regni’ – a statement that conflicts with the wording of the actual *juramento*. Nevertheless, Philip was able to present the outcome as a personal triumph and that is how Maximilian imagined it – as a fantastical ‘Kronung’, which Fernando benevolently attends in Juana’s absence (figure 25).

According to Aram, testimony from the Cortes in the Lille archives shows that Philip was recognised as ‘proprietary ruler’, giving Philip ‘the right to dispose of Castile and Leon as he wished’. She suggests that: ‘In the end, Juana may have decided to compromise with Philippe and relinquish the title of proprietary ruler in order to secure their son’s subsequent rights to the throne’. The outcome of the 1506 Cortes could, she adds, have been influenced by the precedent of Berenguela, who ceded sovereignty to her son immediately after becoming proprietary queen in 1217. This seems highly unlikely. Philip was not recognised in Castile either as governor or proprietary ruler, while Juana insisted, to the end, on her pre-eminence, remaining adamant that a ‘Flemish’

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169 Carretero Zamora, *Cortes*: 207
170 AGR, PR 7, f. 74, 12 July 1506, ‘Juramento de los procuradores de Cortes a Doña Juana y Don Felipe’; Carretero Zamora, *Cortes*: 208
171 Carretero Zamora, *Cortes*: 206
172 Querini, 122: 244-245, 16 July 1506
173 Aram, *Juana the Mad*: 87
government should not rule Castile, and turning her entry into Valladolid into the homage to her mother that Arribas describes. Although one cannot exclude the possibility that, as a ‘Fleming’s wife’, she had considered the precedent of Berenguela when planning to cede authority to her father, it remains a poor one, since Berenguela continued to govern as regent. Nor did Juana need to make sacrifices to defend Charles, whose eventual succession was not at issue.

To conclude, the Cortes left Juana, in her second regnal year, with a theoretical triumph but a practical defeat. She had failed to separate Philip from his ‘malignants’, to contact Fernando or to make any immediate use of her unique proprietary status. ‘She is not spoken of’, wrote Quirini. But he added that, despite the peace, the grandees were ‘murmering’. Juana’s situation was connected with these murmerings, and as troops gathered on the northern border, funds dried up and the Queen’s ‘party’ grew, Castile teetered on the verge of rebellion, even civil war.

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174 Querini, 123: 246, 23 July 1506
Figure 25. Maximilian's *Weiβ Kunig* includes this 'coronation' of Philip at the Cortes of Valladolid (1506). From the right Fernando (or possibly Maximilian himself) looks approvingly on. There is no sign of the proprietary queen. The left-hand column shows the stamp of the Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid), from which these *Weiβ Kunig* illustrations are taken.
5. Ninety days

5. 1. Death of a king (August-September 1506)

A prominent member of Philip’s chapel, singer and composer Alexander Agricola, died suddenly in mid-August. The extraordinary, haunting motet inspired by his death and attributed by Tess Knighton to Anchieta and Villaescusa — *Música, quid defles?* — describes Agricola’s death as the result of a ‘fierce fever’, casting an ‘ominous shadow’ over later events.¹

Querini reported all peaceful after the Cortes, but heard ‘people … beginning to murmur about unrest among the grandees’.² As noted in the previous chapter, Almazán thought these would split into two camps, supporting Juana or Philip, with Castile hopelessly lost. Zurita describes a divide between those who believed Juana was ‘ill and could not govern’, and others who believed she ‘could govern better than the foreigners’.³

With Juana again secluded, information about her is lacking. But, as Carretero Zamora indicates, the respective use of plural and singular in exchanges between procurators and president shows Philip’s intentions. The procurators addressed their petitions to *Sus Altezas* (your highnesses); the replies came in the singular (*Su Alteza lo mandará proveer …*). ‘For the Cortes Doña Juana (together with her husband) must exercise power; for the Archduke, as subsequently for Fernando the Catholic, the political disqualification of the Queen was a fact, and power corresponded to him alone’.⁴ The Queen’s name is absent from various royal provisions and orders issued in 1506, with Philip signing alone as ‘Yo el Rey’.⁵ In a royal provision of September, Juana’s name has even been crossed out.⁶ Attributing the absence of Juana’s signature on documents to a deliberate policy on the part of Philip’s council, arising out of the

² Querini, 122; 244-245, 16 July 1506
³ Zurita, IV; 65
⁴ Carretero Zamora, *Cortes*: 209
⁵ AHN (Osuna) C, 516, D, 4, f. 13, 7 June 1506, Cédula; Ramón Carrilero Martínez, ed., *Colección Documental Albacetense de la Reina Doña Juana (1505-1519)*, (Albacete, 2002): 50
⁶ AGS, RGS-9, 1506, f. 317
Treaty of Villafafila-Benavente, Bernáldez speculates as whether it originated with Philip himself, his advisers, and those who had flocked to receive him, or was the result of pressure upon Philip that some, who should have known better, did not dare contradict. In any case, since the kingdoms belonged to the Queen, and were her patrimony, Philip’s sole rule ‘caused her no little agitation and anger’. The later letters of the procurators for Seville show that the fact that she ‘was not signing’ was well known, creating a ready basis for dissent.

Castilian offices and revenues were meanwhile distributed among Flemings and Burgundians. While retaining some royal councillors, Philip dismissed others, including president Daza. Fernando’s supporters were removed from control of the fortresses; Manuel received Segovia, Burgos and others. Philip responded to Cortes demands that government and ecclesiastical posts remain in Spanish hands by issuing naturalisation papers to several of his closest allies, including Ville, Veyré and Lachaulx. Between July and September sixty-four new corregidores were appointed, generating conflict in the cities. Villaescusa later told his nephew that Philip’s practice of awarding posts in government administration and justice, and changing fortress tenures before they fell vacant had made him ‘unpopular throughout the kingdom’.

Martire watched the advance of the ‘filipenses’ as they passed haughtily through the ‘orphaned kingdom’. The ‘advisers divide up between them what money there is ... [Philip] has already sold many things without consulting his wife, and they are dowry possessions’. Philip’s parlous finances meant officials and troops went unpaid. He struggled to recover Louis’ friendship, stressing Fernando’s ‘amicable’ departure from Castile. But Fernando hoped Louis, who

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7. ... y el Rey Don Philippe, y los de su Consejo, y los que mucho se adelantaron á lo recibir, parece que consintieron en aquel Consejo que la Reyna no firmase, ó viendo el Rey aquella opinión, de la cual le debieran quitar, no lo quisieron contradecir, ó por algunos de ellos habían sido en lo poner en aquel siniestro, y esto se vino á purificar y acabar en Benavente, y quedó que la Reyna Doña Juana no entendiese ni firmase en los negocios del regir, salvo el Rey tan solamente, puesto caso que los reynos eran de la Reyna, é de su Patrimonio, é no del Rey Don Philippe, é así se fizo ese poco de tiempo que el Rey vivió, de donde no poca turbación y enojo a la Reyna se siguio ...’ Bernáldez, Historia, II: 280
8. See section 5.5
9. AGS, PR 70, f. 4, ‘Capítulos de las Cortes de Valladolid sobre diversos asuntos’
10. Calderón, Felipe el Hermoso: 153
12. Martire, X, 312: 146-147, 7 September 1506
13. ADN. B 18826: 24298 [copy], July 1506
feared Philip's accumulation of power, would cause the King of Castile headaches in his patrimonial lands. Louis offered support to the Duke of Guelders against Philip, and renewed hostilities drained resources, leaving Guillaume de Croÿ-Chièvres, lieutenant-general of the Low Countries, short of funds. 'If our affairs here were not so great', Philip wrote, 'we would help you as much as we could, but they are still [great] this year because of our recent arrival, the drought in the country that has lasted four or five years now and because the king our father-in-law, before his deslogement, took almost everything ...'

Some, Querini reported, thought Castile too hot to handle. As French troops amassed on the frontier, Philip faced the problem of growing support for Juana. By late summer her 'party' had spread into Andalucia, where some nobles, erstwhile allies of Philip - the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Marquis of Priego, Counts of Ureña, Cabra and others - formed an alliance demanding that Juana be freed to 'govern like the queen her mother.' Rumours flourished that Philip would imprison her at Segovia when Manuel had ousted the Moyas from the fortress Isabel had granted them. Philip dragged an unwilling Juana towards Segovia, but news of the Moyas' surrender came while they were still en route. Juana, writes Martire, had refused to enter Cogeces de Iscar. She 'flung herself from her mount, suspecting that that they wanted to leave her in a fort somewhere ... And so she spent the night riding to and fro on muleback through the fields ... persuasions and threats did not suffice'. She had developed a second sense in this respect, like quarry, constantly testing the wind.

As noted earlier, Benavente now offered Juana allegiance. The timing is significant, for it shows that opposition to Philip's lone rule was growing even among those who had seemed his strongest supporters. The focus on Juana, was not, in the view of Pérez-Bustamante and Calderón, 'sufficiently strong or coordinated to constitute a threat'. But it was strong enough to prompt reprisals. Under pressure to surrender a fortress as proof of goodwill, Enríquez sought, and received, the backing of Benavente, Nájera and Villena. Philip, he

14 Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 201
15 ADN, B 18846: 29656-29659, 31 August 1506
16 Querini, 123: 246, 23 July 1506
17 Zurita, IV: 66
18 Martire, X, 312: 147, 7 September 1506; Santa Cruz, 'Chronica', f. 240
19 Pérez-Bustamante, Calderón, Felipe I: 247
told Manuel, ‘could not force him to surrender any of his fortresses, but if the queen requested it, when she was at liberty, he would obey’. Manuel’s response was unequivocal: Philip would ‘destroy’ him.\(^{20}\)

Enríquez describes his martial preparations on the eve of Philip’s death: ‘With [the Cortes] concluded, and given that the queen … had not been freed, I left my house at the time that the king … died and went to my town of Palenzuela with the aim of demanding her highness’ freedom, and I called for knights to assist, and they willingly responded’. If not for Philip’s death, he wrote, he would have fought for Juana’s liberation ‘even though I saw that I was risking my life and estate’.\(^{21}\) The Admiral’s words date from the Comunero period, when he was trying to convince the Junta of Valladolid of his good faith. Nevertheless, the evidence from 1506 suggests they tell the story as it was.

On 7 September, the monarchs entered Burgos. On 14 September (Exaltation of the Cross) they visited San Pablo and, in the presence of the great pastoral Bishop of Burgos, Fray Pascual de la Fuente de Ampudia, Princess Isabel’s former tutor, the heads of twelve virgin martyrs were offered to the church.\(^{22}\) On 16 September Philip rode in triumph, banqueted and played tennis. Hours later he fell ill.\(^{23}\) Reports of earlier fever-related illnesses, notably at Lyon in 1503 and Reading in 1506, suggest a chronic vulnerability, but the cause has not been satisfactorily explained.

On 24 September, as Philip’s condition deteriorated, some courtiers tried to abduct the Infante Fernando. In June the three-year-old had been moved from Arévalo to Valladolid to see his parents.\(^{24}\) When they left for Burgos, he was transferred to Simancas (Valladolid). Alerted to the crisis, the governor of the Infante’s household, Pedro Núñez de Guzmán, reinforced walls and gates and armed the citizens, fearing the Infante could be used by Juana’s opponents as Isabel’s brother, Alfonso, had been used against Enrique IV in the famous ‘farsa

\(^{20}\) Zurita, IV: 74

\(^{21}\) Danvilla, Historia crítica, II: 336-344, to Junta of Tordesillas

\(^{22}\) Galíndez de Carvajal, Anales breves: 316. Aram connects Juana specifically to this act of patronage (Juana the Mad: 87).

\(^{23}\) CODOIN, VIII: 394-397, 11 October 1506, Dr Parra to Fernando

\(^{24}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 64, 21 June 1506
Early on Friday, 25 September Diego de Guevara led armed men to Simancas, but his plan was foiled and the Infante taken for safety to Valladolid.  

Philip died the same day. Juana remained beside him until five in the afternoon, when the body was removed for lying-in-state and embalming. The heart was sent for burial beside his mother’s remains in Bruges. In his will of 26 December 1505 and 2 January 1506 Philip had asked, should he die in Spain, to be buried beside Isabel in Granada, which had effectively become the royal pantheon. He requested sixty thousand high and low masses, with two masses daily at his place of interment – a requiem mass ‘for my soul’ and a low mass ‘for myself and my predecessors’. He ‘desired and ordered’ that Juana be given her dower (donaire), or what she was owed by the marriage settlement. The wording does not specify whether this should include back payments of the annual sum of twenty thousand gold escudos agreed upon as part of the marriage settlement but never paid.

Royal doctor Juan de la Parra thought Juana’s conduct during Philip’s illness remarkable: ‘In the five hours I was there’, he told Fernando, ‘I saw the queen … continually ordering what was to be done and doing it and speaking to the king and to us and treating the king with the best manner and care and bearing and grace that I have ever seen in a woman, of whatever estate’.

Juana seems to have followed the same six-week Franco-Burgundian mourning protocol as for her mother (figure 26). Her first documented appearance in public, a visit to Miraflores, tallies with the end of this period. Contemporary poet Pedro Gratia Dey places the Queen in a trajectory of perpetual loss:

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25 Zurita, IV: 81  
26 CODOIN, VIII: 400-406, ‘Testimonio de Convenio celebrado entre los vecinos de la villa de Simancas y los señores de la chancillería de Valladolid’; Zurita, IV: 84  
27 ‘… soixante mille messes, tant à notes que basses, assavoir de Nostre Dame, de la Croix et de requiem, avec de saïnt Philippe, de saïnt George et de saïntce Anne, en divers lieux et monastères … je veull et ordonne que, au lieu de ma sépulture … soit fondée une messe chaque jour, à note, de requiem, pour le salut de mon âme, et une autre messe basse pour moy et mes prédécesseurs …’ Gachard, ed., Collection, I: 493-496, ‘Testament de Philippe le Beau’, 26 December 1505 (Bruges), 2 January 1506 (Middelburg)  
28 Gachard, ed., Collection, I: 495  
29 CODOIN, VIII: 397, Parra to Fernando
Figure 26. Juana (left), distinctively dressed in red and white, trimmed with black mourning ribbon, watches Philip’s funeral procession leave the Casa del Cordón. Not shown here are the brocade-covered chariot-d’armes, the spectators lining the roofs or the woman accompanying the Queen – either Juana of Aragon or María de Ulloa. When taken together with the other three panels this series inevitably becomes a comment on theatrical spectacle, and the vanity of life. Attributed to van Laetham. (Château de la Follie, Écaussines, Belgium. Detail).
‘Where could you find
any one more unfortunate?
I lost my mother,
My brother was taken from me,
by my father I’m forgotten …’

Gratia Dey echoes popular criticism about Fernando’s abandonment of his daughter, while Sancho Cota’s poem, ‘Esclamación a España’, sees her unique concern as standing vigil, weeping, over the body: ‘My powers I do not want them/Only to be present here’.

Suárez, among many, claims that Juana started to neglect her appearance and hygiene, with ‘moments of lucidity’ becoming shorter. But there is no concrete evidence for a breakdown in 1506-1507. Juana’s visits to the Charterhouse in November and December 1506 are suggestive less of a weeping wreck than a widow presiding over protocol. According to the anonymous chronicler, she ‘had mourning dress prepared … and daily wore new clothes, some like a nun’s, others of another kind, à son bon plaisir’. Juana told a delegation that officials could implement his will and release funds by selling his possessions, but she would ‘assume responsibility for interceding for her husband with God’.

5. 2. Shadow queen (September–December 1506)

The first eleven months after Philip’s death have received little close analysis. They are generally kaleidoscopied into a single interlude, the ‘first Cisneros regency’, during which the Archbishop eclipses a grieving, incapacitated queen by holding Castile together until Fernando’s return. But if the period is seen as the effective reign of Juana I two distinct phases become apparent: a first stage, dominated by an illegal, quasi-government, and a second, during which the Royal Council, under Juana, began to reassert its traditional role.

30 RB II/617, f. 135v., ‘A la Reyna doña Juana’
31 Sancho Cota, Memorias, ed., Hayward Kenniston (Cambridge, Mass., 1964): 91-93
32 Suárez, Fernando: 417
33 ‘Relation du Deuxième Voyage’: 461-462
34 Zurita, IV: 96
On 24 September, with Philip’s death hours away, Cisneros called an emergency meeting to appoint a caretaker government. Juana’s ‘party’, never a coherent, discrete grouping, lost target and momentum as the focus swung back to Fernando, Maximilian and Charles. Juana’s failure to seize what has been widely perceived as one of her best opportunities yet to act decisively may be ascribed to a number of factors, none necessarily connected to an intrinsic inability to govern. As mentioned above, it was by no means unknown for bereaved monarchs to withdraw into prolonged periods of private mourning after the death of a spouse. But, in Juana’s case, Philip’s death and her mourning seclusion, combined with a lack of driving ambition, a continuing loyalty to Fernando, and probably a fear of taking any step that might be construed as disadvantageous to her father, meant that powerful figures who had proffered their support to Juana during the summer looked for provisional alternatives. Teetering on the edge of a power vacuum, and anxious to retain power and influence, her three most prominent supporters of the summer, the Constable, Admiral and Duke of Nájera, joined the Duke of Infantado and envoys Borgo and Veyré as arbiters of ‘all differences and dissensions’, under Cisneros, until a new Cortes could open. But, in the process, as will be shown below, they joined to prevent Juana from taking independent action over a three-month period.

A monarch’s death was always a time to flag up grievances and settle scores. According to Querini’s end-of-mission report to the Senate of 10 October 1506 it was ‘customary for all these lords to be divided, and upon each new succession of a king they create new parties and new divisions and are never together united at the will of their lord’. Although technically a mere consort, and not proprietary ruler, Philip’s death was no different. ‘There was no grandee’, wrote Alcocer, ‘who did not think of increasing his estate. In the cities the old bandos were resuscitated, and people died’. The situation was also uniquely complicated by the proliferation of parallel administrations. Operating

35 A six-week period of mourning seclusion appears to have been widely followed. Henry VII, for example, shut himself away for six weeks after the death of Elizabeth of York. But, according to Thomas Penn in Winter King (London, 2011), it was not altogether controlled. Grief-stricken, Henry collapsed and fell seriously ill.
36 Querini, ‘Relazione di Borgogna (1506)’, Series I: 2, Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato (Florence, 1840)
37 Alcocer, Relación: 20
in Juana’s name, they had been in practice accountable either to Philip or Fernando, with both sides still seeking and demanding obedience.

Against this restive background the Royal Council, whose composition reflected these parallel affinities, supported Cisneros’ initiative but, in García Oro’s view, ‘without conviction’. It was presided by an appointee of Philip’s, Alonso Suárez de la Fuente del Sauce, Bishop of Jaén, who begged Juana to sign the letters convoking a Cortes, as required by law. Carretero Zamora believes the ‘majority of the court’ felt a Cortes necessary to ‘develop the range of political options that the disappearance of the proprietary queen would open up’, while Juana’s ‘only card’ was to play for time until Fernando returned. Suárez thinks that, by summoning a Cortes, Cisneros hoped to win legitimacy for his ‘small regency council’ and dispense with Juana, but convocation of a Cortes was a mistake, and Juana saved the day by refusing to support it. For Ladero Quesada her refusal belonged to ‘an interval of lucidity’.

Already prominent in political life, and with huge resources at his disposal, the Archbishop of Toledo emerged in the autumn of 1506 as a towering figure, reinforced by his role as key negotiator earlier that summer. Seen to be above party faction, but proudly Castilian, he pursued the role of arbitration he had assumed earlier. García Oro refers to his ultimate ‘crusading and missionary’ objectives, utopian military and religious ideals, dreams of a Christian Mediterranean, a ‘new Granadan Christianity’, a ‘pentecostal Indies’. Castile provided the means to achieve them – a peaceful Castile, that is, whose (authoritative) monarchs were obeyed, whose armies were efficient and mobile, whose Christianity was orthodox. Zurita mentions his ambition to govern, his obsession with holy war.

At Philip’s court Cisneros had played a double game, as Fernando’s representative and increasingly, as Philip’s adviser. He had been both negotiator and portero, guarding access to Juana at Mucientes; forbidding Manuel access to the sacristy where Philip and Fernando met with the words: ‘I shall be the

38 García Oro, Cisneros: El Cardenal de España (Barcelona, 2002): 167
39 Carretero Zamora, Cortes: 213-214
40 Suárez, Fernando: 423
41 Ladero Quesada, La España de los Reyes: 456
42 García Oro, Cisneros: 318-319
43 Zurita, IV: 97
doorkeeper’.\textsuperscript{44} Now Cisneros again showed, as García Oro describes it, a
‘notable dose of opportunism’.\textsuperscript{45} While publicly declaring it was time for
Castilians to rule themselves, he ordered Vallejo to lock the door before writing,
on 1 October, to implore Fernando to return to Castile and called a second
meeting of grandees, ambassadors and royal councillors.\textsuperscript{46} He brokered a ninety-
day truce between political groupings, during which a Cortes would assemble.
Existing militias were dissolved and new ones banned, while he recruited troops
to ensure the survival of his provisional government.\textsuperscript{47} The signatories to the
agreement pledged, on behalf of themselves and all, to refrain from seizing
control of the Queen or Infante Fernando. The agreement also forbade them to:
\textit{‘carry out or plan harmful action by the hand of her highness … or obtain from
the queen … any letter or order detrimental to another [party] unless their
highnesses were entirely in possession of their freedom and will …’} (my
emphasis).\textsuperscript{48}

In his study of Cisneros Luís Fernández de Retana notes a historical
failure to explain the prelate’s attitude to Juana: ‘Never has it been possible to
clarify why Cisneros, whether at the Cortes of 1506 or in later moments of
government, consistently supported the Queen’s reclusion’. Apparently
unconvinced by Zurita’s view that Cisneros wanted to marginalise Juana so as to
freely pursue his own projects, Retana concludes that, for ‘patriotic’ Cisneros,
the ‘ravings of this poor lady, united with the superstitious respect of the people
for their proprietary monarchs, were a terrible drawback for any government
enterprise’. Her ‘ravings’ could, that is, combine with popular dementia to
explode the ship of state.\textsuperscript{49}

The attitude to the young Queen of a prelate conscious of the importance
of his mission, can, I believe, only be understood against the church’s wider
historical role in the political crises and conflicts of the medieval period, and
bestowal and withdrawal of royal legitimacy. A classic precedent, described by

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{44} Vallejo, \textit{Memorial}: 101
\textsuperscript{45} García Oro, \textit{Cisneros: un cardenal}: 128
\textsuperscript{46} Vallejo, \textit{Memorial}: 112-121
\textsuperscript{47} Suárez, \textit{Fernando}: 422
\textsuperscript{48} Zurita, IV: 79; García Oro, \textit{Cisneros, un cardenal}: 128-129
\textsuperscript{49} Luís Fernández de Retana, ed., \textit{Estudio histórico de la vida y actuación pública del Cardenal
D. Fray Ximenéz de Cisneros} (Madrid, 1929), I: 373; Zurita, IV: 97
\end{footnotesize}
Edward Peters, and close to the Spanish context, is that of Sancho II of Portugal, whose deposition as rex inutilis was ordered by Pope Innocent IV, in his decretal, Grandi (1245), on grounds of inadequacy and negligence. When removed from government, and replaced by his brother as curator and administrator, Sancho retained (as Juana would) his legitimate royal dignitas as monarch.  

Nieto Soria refers to the church’s involvement in the ‘de-legitimisation’ crisis of 1366-1369 that ended the reign of Pedro I – seen by his adversaries and Trastámara successors as the ‘malo tirano’ whose decisions and actions destroyed Castile. He describes Alfonso Carrillo, Archbishop of Toledo, as ‘master of ceremonies’ at the public act of deposition in effigy of Juana’s uncle, Enrique IV, in 1465 (the ‘Farsa de Ávila’) and the significant episcopal rivalry between Carrillo and Pedro González de Mendoza, then Bishop of Sigüenza, in the succession conflict of 1468-1474 that opposed Isabel to her niece, Juana of Castile. But neither Peters nor Nieto Soria refer to the problems strong religious leaders could cause women rulers. From a Spanish viewpoint, this is most apparent in the case of Urraca I, whom Cisneros and the Council unfavourably remembered as ‘unfit’ during the ‘coup d’État’ of 1516, and whose relations with the powerful Archbishop of Santiago, Diego Gelmirez (major supporter of her son, later Alfonso VII), were of almost permanent antagonism.

As arbiter between Isabel and Juana, and one of Isabel’s unsuccessful emissaries to La Mota in 1503, Cisneros may have become convinced of Juana’s inability to control her female ‘passions’, and consequent unsuitability for royal office. She, on the other hand, had witnessed his transformation into a key ally of Manuel, helping promote Philip to a position for which she believed Philip unsuited. As she would also have been aware, Cisneros had played a key role in attempts to imprison her and had crucially helped oust Fernando from a kingdom to which he now urged his return. Zurita lays the stress on Cisneros’ fear of Juana: ‘the queen abhorred him much and said he was mad, and he did not love

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52 For a fascinating examination of such relations see J. Nelson, ‘Queens as Jezebels: Brunhild and Balthild in Merovingian History’, *Medieval Women* (Oxford, 1978): 31-77
her and feared her greatly’. Cisneros feared that Juana could remarry, igniting new political conflicts.\(^{54}\) He feared her hostility to Philip’s former collaborators and beneficiaries, whose reconciliation with Fernando he sought. He saw her unstable ‘passions’ as inimical to peace, or his view of peace; a queen, who, though useless, or rendered useless, refused to surrender power. As Fernández Albadalejo puts it, ‘despite her total lack of aptitude for participating in tasks of government she could … not be parted from it’\(^{55}\). Cisneros feared that, if she acted independently, she would spark a conflagration he could not douse, proving fatal to his overall objective: peace at home as the springboard for holy war abroad.

García Oro’s remark of Cisneros in 1506, that he ‘would apply the Law and only the Law’, conflicts with Retana’s view that his ‘regency’ rose above ‘conventions, laws, formalisms’,\(^{56}\) and also, to an extent, with that of Cisneros’ colleague, royal councillor Galindez de Carvajal. While describing Cisneros as a ‘high-minded man of great spirit, well-intentioned in public affairs’, he adds that these affairs could go astray when Cisneros ‘did not adopt the right means (no iba por medios derechos), indeed, once he settled upon something it had to be that way …’\(^{57}\)

The autumn crisis throws into relief this overpowering, obsessional, almost elemental facet of the prelate’s character. Although royal councillors were empowered to sign royal provisions, the convocation of a Cortes was an exclusively royal prerogative; to convoke one in the teeth of royal opposition was treasonable. When effectively urging the transfer of legitimidad de ejercicio from the Queen to the cities with votes in the Cortes as guarantors of the common good, Cisneros did not make the ‘mistake’ Suárez mentions so much as consciously adapt medieval canon law, and a body of Castilian thought on ‘tyranny’, to a monarch perceived by many as a rex inutilis. His decision, that October, to deprive her of her right to act was part of a longer process in her marginalisation, which had assumed its clearest expression in the second

\(^{54}\) Zurita, IV: 97
\(^{55}\) Fernández Albadalejo, Fragmentos: 31
\(^{56}\) Retana, Estudio histórico: 381
\(^{57}\) García Oro, Cisneros: 159; Galindez de Carvajal, Anales breves: 418
provision of the Treaty of Villafáfila-Benavente, but had roots in times of turmoil of which Cisneros, born in 1436, doubtless retained vivid personal memories.

That Juana was compared, at least in some respects, to her uncle, Enrique IV, is suggested by the reference to the ‘Farsa de Ávila’ during the attempted abduction of the Infante. Carretero Zamora suggests that, between 1506-1508, Juana was indeed seen as a rex inutilis. In his study of this notion in medieval law and literature, Peters refers to Marlowe’s rhetorical question about Edward II – ‘But what are kings when regiment is gone/ But perfect shadows in a sunshine day?’ – when placing Juana among several ‘ineffective’, ‘failed’ or ‘shadow’ rulers, whose mental or physical incapacities were thought dangerous to their kingdoms in ways not dissimilar to those of ‘tyrants’. However, when, on 6 October, the convocation letters were sent out with the royal councillors’ signatures replacing the Queen’s, Cisneros unwittingly set the precedent for the Holy Junta of 1520.

If Juana and Cisneros represented two deeply stubborn forces in collision, relations between Fernando and Cisneros were cautious rather than congenial. Apart from the question of Cisneros’ switch of loyalties in 1506, and later differences over war in Africa, and who should wage it, Cisneros detested Fernando’s ‘Aragonisation’ of Castile and, after 1516, dismissed Aragonese officials – including the Ferrer brothers, Luis and Jaime – from key Castilian posts. This did not prevent king and archbishop from esteeming one another’s talents and, at this crucial juncture, from recognising a mutual, if grudging, indispensability. Although Cisneros struck an outwardly favourable attitude to former felipistas, he saw Fernando’s return, in the words of Doussinague, as an ‘ineluctable necessity’ for restoring law and order. Suárez agrees there was no alternative. Fernando rewarded Cisneros by appointing him Inquisitor General of Castile (5 June 1507), by securing him a cardinal’s hat (17 May 1507) and by

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59. Referring to this quotation, Peters defines ‘regiment’ as ‘control of power’.
60. Apart from being Juana’s gaoler, Luis Ferrer was governor of Tordesillas; his brother, Jaime, corregidor of Toledo.
61. Doussinague, *La política internacional*: 32
62. Suárez, *Fernando*: 417
granting a church for his nephew and companion, Fray Francisco Ruíz. For García Oro, Cisneros’ promotion as prince of the church was ‘the price for a political loyalty well proven and still necessary to the Catholic Monarch if his position in the problematic Government of Castile were to be guaranteed’.  

Fernando authorised Cisneros to administer affairs jointly with the Royal Council. But, following Zurita, García Oro notes this did not satisfy Cisneros. Since Fernando’s authority was dubious, he turned to Juana, asking her to sign a royal provision conceding him absolute powers on the grounds that peace and security, notably in the south, must be restored. Suspicious, Juana refused.

Tensions were heightened by lack of certainty about Fernando’s return. ‘Fernando had no doubts about his own exclusive rights as governor of the kingdom in the name of Doña Juana’, writes Ochoa Brun. But to interrupt his journey to Naples would have been provocative. However, he intervened actively in Castilian affairs. Vallejo records that Fernando and Cisneros corresponded daily. Fernando also corresponded with the Council, and other key players. He told Ferrer that staging-posts were being set up between Burgos and Naples to accelerate despatches, ‘suitable provisions’ and news of Juana’s health. As in the immediate aftermath of Isabel’s death, he resorted to his dynastic and moral rights. In a circular letter of 6 November to nobles, cities and prelates, he ordered that Juana, who had, he maintained, insistently requested his return, be obeyed. Although as King of Aragon he had great and arduous affairs outside Castile, and the governorship would be burdensome, he was of the blood and royal house of Castile and had spent most of his life working for it. God, his conscience and his right obliged him to return. In February 1507 Louis

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63 Zurita, IV: 100  
64 García Oro, Cisneros: 170  
65 Salustiano de Dios, El Consejo Real de Castilla (1385-1522), (Madrid, 1982): 156  
66 García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 130  
67 Zurita, IV: 122; García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 129  
68 Ochoa Brun, Historia: 319  
69 García Oro, Cisneros: 160  
70 Vallejo, Memorial: 118-119  
71 Belenguer, Fernando: 274  
72 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 152-152v., 1 November 1506  
73 Zurita, IV: 89  
74 Alcocer, Relación: 23-24
and his treasurer, Florimond Robertet, told Pandolfini that Fernado was
determined to see down opposition and govern Castile.\textsuperscript{75}

Unfettered by agreements like that of Segovia, Fernado promised grants
and awards to former felipista leaders as well as outright supporters. He told
Katherine that Juana ‘does not involve herself in affairs because she is in
seclusion and I am absent …’ He was the sole means, after God, of preventing
Castile’s loss and destruction.\textsuperscript{76} Although he had ordered, in his 6 November
circular, that Juana be obeyed, his envoy, Luis Ferrer, told Murcia that Juana did
not wish to act on her own account: ‘… all is one, and serving the queen,
gentlemen, you do what the king wishes, for the wishes of both are in such
conformity that whoever serves one serves the other’. Juana, he added, was
‘informed about everything by me. Her Highness does not wish to involve
herself in affairs or involve herself in anything at all, while awaiting the king
…’\textsuperscript{77} Meanwhile, the mission to Maximilian of Fernado’s envoy, Bartolomé
Samper, was of ‘considerable importance’ for Fernado, writes Ochoa Brun, in
trying to elicit the Emperor’s agreement to his governorship of Castile.\textsuperscript{78}

5. 3. The ninety-day trap (October–December 1506)

Among perpetuators of the traditional and prevailing view that Juana was unfit to
govern there are shades of difference. Doubtless influenced by Lorenzo Vallés’
painting (figure 27), Retana describes her ‘submerged in a mute, dry-eyed grief’,
‘wandering uncertainly through the corridors’.\textsuperscript{79} If later historians shed some of
this nonsense, they retain the essence of the argument. Juana ‘had her
opportunity’ in the aftermath of Philip’s death, writes Zalama: ‘If anyone still
doubted her incapacity, her actions on becoming widowed convinced them of the
need to govern for her …’\textsuperscript{80} Like Zalama, Carretero Zamora believes Juana’s
‘unfitness’ was longstanding and incontrovertible; in 1502 the procurators had

\textsuperscript{75} Canestrini, ed., \textit{Négociations}, II, L, 21 December 1506, 197-199; LV, 8 February 1507: 215-219
\textsuperscript{76} CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana), 13, 15 March 1507: 85-90
\textsuperscript{77} António Gomariz Marín, ed., \textit{Documentos de Juana I (1505-1510)}, (Murcia, 2006): 256, 12
November 1506
\textsuperscript{78} Ochoa Brun, \textit{Historia}: 313-314
\textsuperscript{79} Retana, ed., \textit{Estudio histórico}: 386
\textsuperscript{80} Zalama, ‘Recuperar la memoria’, in Zalama, ed., \textit{Juana I de Castilla (1505-1555)}, (Valladolid,
2006): 32
questioned her ‘true intellectual capability’. Suárez, however, distinguishes between intellect and will; although she ‘often understood the problems very well, she felt incapable of taking decisions ...’ Still, he admits that she later took crucial ones affecting the country’s future.

Cisneros’ earliest biographer has set the tone for later histories. Gómez de Castro pondered the enigma of a queen whose responses to the grandees were ‘very pertinent and prudent’, but who refused to underwrite documents: ‘Those who ventured most deeply into an analysis of this phenomenon said that women are naturally suspicious, but that the queen, tormented by a fit of madness, and utter irrationality, was driven more especially towards this propensity ...’ Although, he adds, ‘she possessed much imaginative power and a great memory, she lacked aptitude for the matters put to her, which require a healthy mind and one enlightened by experience.

Seeing Juana as a daughter to be rescued, rather than queen to be served, Fernando’s most committed supporters, like Conchillos and Diego Fernández de Córdoba, Alcaide de los Doneces, put themselves not at Juana’s orders, but Ferrer’s. Writing virtually identical letters to Fernando on 10 December 1506, they begged Fernando to return before Castile ignited. By contrast, Martire, another fernandino, told the Count of Tendilla that an equilibrium between fear and hope had brought ‘a prolonged regime of peace’. According to Alcocer, some looked to Maximilian, more to Fernando. But, as Martire points out, many Castilian nobles turned to Juana. Maldonado, too, notes that after Philip’s death there were ‘great hopes that Juana would rival her mother as the most prudent mother of the country’. Some spoke purely of ‘service to the Queen’. Others offered conditional support. Enríquez urged Juana to govern, but opposed the notion of a Juana-Velasco government, which he thought not only possible but imminent, and damaging to Fernando’s chances. He also felt Fernando would

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81 Carretero Zamora, ‘Crisis sucesoria’ in Foronda, ed., Coupes d’État?: 579
82 Suárez, Fernando: 422. For these actions, see below.
83 Gómez, De las hazañas: 196
84 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 79, 10 October 1510, Conchillos to Fernando; RAH, Salazar, A-12, fs. 86-87, 10 October 1506, Alcaide de los Doneces to Fernando
85 Martire, X, 320: 159, 19 December 1506
86 Alcocer, Relación: 23
87 Martire, X, 320: 158-159, 19 December 1506
88 Maldonado, La revolución: 44
have a tricky job co-governing with Juana if he did not first win over erstwhile opponents. Some former *feliipistas* wanted a regency council that, in Charles' name, preserved positions and privileges they were loathe to lose. Nájera wanted to win control of Charles while keeping both Fernando and Maximilian at bay, but did not exclude Juana from an administration in which grandees played a major role. Villena, too, urged Juana to govern but argued that Fernando's marriage to Germaine imperilled the prospects both of Juana and Charles and that Juana should send for her eldest son. Others favoured intervention by Manoel of Portugal, married to Juana's sister, María. Velasco was Juana's main supporter among the grandees. But, anxious to influence events, he cooperated, to a degree, with Cisneros and the Council. This annoyed Juana who, like Fadrique de Toledo, Duke of Alba, refused to do either. But Alba agreed with Velasco that Fernando should not 'scandalise the queen' and antagonise the people by offering rewards to Philip's erstwhile supporters.

Juana encouraged uncertainty by declaring she would act – later. It is unclear whether Martire had access to the Casa del Cordón when writing that, pregnant, widowed and inexperienced, she 'drags out a wretched life, rejoicing in obscurity and withdrawal, with hand on chin, her mouth as tight shut as if dumb. She will not communicate with anyone, let alone women, whom she hates and keeps at a distance, as she did when her husband was alive, and she cannot be persuaded to write her signature or dictate a line in the interests of the government of the State'. But Martire also refers to her promising future consultations. According to Maldonado 'she promised with great earnestness ('*gustíssima*') that she would try, with all her heart, to ensure that nothing lacked in the administration of government, but begged ... that if at times her illnesses prevented her governing, affairs should be carried out in her name'.

Juana's procrastination and obstructionism has been linked to her refusal to cooperate with the Council. Its longstanding secretary, Ruiz de Castañeda, describes the standoff between Queen and Council on 26 September, just a day

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89 Zurita, IV: 163
90 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, 'Relación', f. 155v.-157, 'Carta'
91 Zurita, IV: 141-142
92 Martire, X, 318: 155-156, 29 November 1506; 320: 159, 19 December 1506
93 Martire, X, 320: 159, 19 December 1506
94 Maldonado, *La revolución*: 44
after Philip’s death, providing an almost farcical scenario of successively closed and opened doors, windows and grilles. When the Council president and Licentiates Tello and Mújica went to the Casa del Cordón, Juana herself (and this was extraordinary) opened the door. But she immediately closed it again, calling for an attendant, Espinosa, who told them Juana would see them that afternoon. They returned at about four, but were told she could not see them, upon which they determinedly entered the chamber: ‘Her highness then shut the other door of another chamber so that they could not see or speak …’ The Bishop and his colleagues next entered the chapel, where a grille communicated with the Queen’s apartments. Through it Licentiate Luis González Polanco, appealing to her ‘royal conscience’, shouted that the ‘cities and towns were rising and there was no rule of law’. An attendant again came to tell them Juana had ‘paused to listen …’ The Bishop went to the grille. Repeating Polanco’s words, he added that she must sign various documents. Again Juana’s attendant returned: she had heard all they said, but could not receive them that day. Finally, Cisneros, with councillors, nobles and city officials made a third assault on the Casa del Cordón.\footnote{BN, Ms. 18761, 26 September 1506, ‘Noticia de lo que al presidente y oidores del consejo real les pasó con la reina doña Juana’} Castañeda’s report ends here, but presumably Juana did not respond.

Later Martire reported that Juana listened to Cisneros and others through a ‘little window’.\footnote{Martire, X, 317: 153-154, 22 November 1506} But, while she acknowledged periodic ‘illnesses’ it might not have been apathy, inaptitude, or grief that lay at the root of Juana’s non-cooperation so much as her antagonism towards an illegally constituted government. Genuine scruples about her own inexperience were combined with distrust of those who had taken charge of the government. Juana refused, for example, to sanction a list of proposed candidates to vacant episcopal sees – her right under the terms of the Real Patronato, under which the Spanish monarchs could present such candidates for nomination by the Pope. Martire and Gómez de Castro both refer to an exchange on the matter between Juana and Cisneros. According to Gómez de Castro, who gives a slightly fuller account, Juana agreed it was necessary but, referring to her inexperience, said she preferred to consult her father on his return. When Cisneros and some grandees pointed out that the matter was urgent and serious, since the absence of shepherds helped generate a
'certain corruption of customs and various errors in matters of religion', she retorted: 'It would be even more serious if I chose shepherds who were unworthy or useless, since any one of you could have friendships you might wish to favour'.

Juana’s resentment of those who attempted to govern for her emerges clearly from this account. As Aram notes, her actions reflect less a refusal to rule than ‘an unwillingess to let others rule on her behalf’. Doubtless Juana refused to sign the government documents brought to her for the same reason she had refused to sign Philip’s: she was not a free agent. The terms of the October truce bound its signatories to withhold obedience from her unless she were possessed of her ‘entire freedom and will’ – an obscure phrase. To sign the convocation of a Cortes, and authorise a regency by signing such documents, while being prevented from taking any measures of her own, would make her a hostage to fortune, possibly complicit in her own deposition.

Historians, including her biographers, have overlooked the significance of the agreement to ban independent initiatives by Juana, and its effect on her. Prawdin, an exception, briefly describes it as an ‘... oath meaning in practice that no-one would help Juana recover the government’. It placed her in a straitjacket, depriving her of any freedom of manoeuvre. If Juana were as politically apathetic as generally claimed the measures would hardly have been necessary. But Cisneros and his allies, including Ferrer – who trusted in, and broadcast, Juana’s inactivity – feared precisely the opposite: that she would try to govern on her own account. Velasco, an original signatory, understood this perfectly. When Cisneros tried to extend the agreement, Velasco argued it was prejudicial to her honour, since it meant that no-one needed to obey provisions issued by Juana.

Although Juana was entitled to override an agreement with no legal basis, she was, in effect, Velasco’s hostage, trapped within the Casa del Cordón. This,

97 'Sería más grave todavía si yo escogiera pastores ineptos o inútiles pues puede suceder que cada uno de vosotros tenga algunas amistades a quienes quiera favorecer'. (Cited in Gómez de Castro, De las hazahas: 195). Martíre offers a similar, but slightly briefer, account to Almazán. Juana, he wrote, said Fernando knew better than she ‘los meritos y la vida de las personas’. (X, 318: 155, 29 November 1506)
98 Aram, Juana the Mad: 88
99 Prawdin, Johanna: 169
100 Zurita, IV: 153
it could be argued, meant that her wishes could be ignored. While Cisneros’ chief military aide, Venetian sea-captain Geronimo Vianello, daily marched his forces into the outlying fields to the sound of drum and fife, Cisneros placed a guard of a hundred infantrymen around the Queen: ‘Every day and night, his squads guard her highness, with their corselets and halberds …’ wrote Vallejo.\footnote{Vallejos, \textit{Memorial}: 118-19; García Oro, \textit{Cisneros}: 160} Alcocer multiplies the numbers: ‘The Archbishop of Toledo seized hold of the Queen and set two thousand men to guard her person’.\footnote{Alcocer, \textit{Relación}: 20}

Alcocer exaggerates. Still, this was a suffocating position for Juana. She was also entangled by filial loyalty and inhibited by the loyalty others showed to Fernando. Four years later Juana recalled that ‘when the king her husband died in Burgos the grandees there were all minded to serve and obey her, and daily pressed her to govern and carry out affairs of state. But, out of respect for [Fernando], and as an obedient daughter, she had always intended to wait for [him] so that he could help her and her children and kingdoms’. She also blamed her hesitations on the desire of many around her to see Fernando return.\footnote{Z. ADP. 787, 77, Ferrer to Fernando, 10 August 1511}

These hesitations failed to convince supporters of Fernando or of Maximilian and Charles that Juana might not resort to the charismatic weapon of her signature, thereby dashing their hopes. Some time before the end of December Enríquez warned Fernando that Velasco might encourage her to act: ‘I daily expect some change in the question of the signature’ (my emphasis).\footnote{Zurita, IV: 162-163} Yet in an audience on 6 December he urged her to act: ‘Your highness must think how you will put [your kingdoms] to rights, and in my opinion you have two options: either your highness governs them yourself or you call on your father to come and help you govern’.\footnote{BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’ f. 154}

As Aram comments: ‘… despite repeated supplications, Juana never summoned her father to help her govern Castile’.\footnote{Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad}: 92} Although she repeated her support for his return like a mantra, she refused to commit to it in writing, or to specify in what political capacity he should return, referring only to the help she hoped he would bring. This probably explains Aram’s statement that: ‘With
Philip’s death … Juana moderated her support for Fernando’s regency and her father’s return in defence of the rights of her son. It must, however, be stressed that Juana categorically rejected a Habsburg solution to Castile’s problems, at least in the short term: ‘He’s too young to be involved in such matters’, she dryly remarked of Charles when the Marquis of Villena urged her to ‘give orders about the government’ and call Maximilian or Charles to Spain. Although, in different circumstances, she had probably wanted Charles in Spain, she saw no reason to embroil an infant in Castile’s current power struggles. She also argued against the Emperor’s advent: ‘the emperor … cannot abandon the vast mass of his empire, especially now that he has to deal with the administration of his son’s patrimony’. But even if he were able and willing, ‘he would not know how to govern my kingdoms, while, on the other hand, they are only too well known to my father’ – who, she added, perhaps rather pointedly, had ‘in part bequeathed them to her at the cost of much labour and vigilance …’ This reply, Martire commented, was ‘discretion itself’, although it was futile to try to persuade her to sign documents.

In general, Juana’s pronouncements seem crafted to protect her own interests. She refers to ‘my kingdoms’; Fernando’s political legacy to her. Fernando is seen as facilitator or assistant. Ferrer’s above-mentioned letter makes it clear that, inter alia, she expected him to help assure her financial independence and a properly regal household. She sweeps Charles and Maximilian out of the picture, while it is impossible not to sense a guardedness in her attitude towards Fernando. Juana’s comments to the Admiral on 6 December seem also to address Fernando’s November circular, which she might have seen, and which mentions re-assuming the ‘burden’ of governorship, impelled by Juana’s insistent pleadings.

Juana told Enríquez she did not want Fernando to rush: ‘… it would be an act of great disrespect for me to beg him to abandon the affairs on which he is engaged in his own realms … to come to work in mine’. Enríquez assured Juana that Fernando was ready to return. Three times Juana asked if this were true, again expressing the hope he would come ‘as soon as I have need of him’. The

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107 Aram, ‘La Reina Juana entre Trastámaras y Austria’ in Nieto Soria, Gobernar: 39
108 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’ f. 156, ‘Carta’
109 Martire, X, 323: 162, 21 December 1506
Admiral offered to become her personal messenger. Juana prevaricated: ‘it would be insulting for him and trouble for me; but if he delayed, she would appreciate my going’.

Enriquez continued to probe: ‘They are saying here that the king of the Romans is coming. Your highness knows what you told me in Muñcenties about the dangers involved in the Germans coming to these realms and Flemish methods of government, given they are so different in language and discourse. At that time your highness believed that, with [Philip] king, in his capacity as your husband, the arrival of these people would be dangerous. What do you think now?’ Juana’s reply was diplomatic. Maximilian and Fernando were both her fathers, but Fernando’s place was ‘in my kingdoms’. She would not take action before his return. ‘This, señor, is how it is with her highness, who clearly looks forward to her father’s arrival; and in this, I believe, does her duty …’

The text reflects a cautious dance between Queen and Admiral. Her words, favourable to Fernando, and uttered in the presence of ladies committed to him, nonetheless show signs of the inner struggle to which she later referred.111 In his end-of-mission relazione, Querini reported that Juana envisaged a government composed of different groupings.112 For Rodríguez Villa, Juana’s audiences with opposing groups reflect a temperamental suggestibility: ‘… although of an energetic and tenacious character, she sometimes allowed herself, according to her state of mind, to be carried away by the suggestions of the various opposing groupings, inclining to one and to another, or else she opposed all’.113

It is more probable that Juana was playing one side off against the other at a time when each planned to seize control of the Queen, much as Guevara had tried to seize possession of the Infante, and as, in the past, nobles of various affinities had seized, or tried to seize, possession of monarchs and princes, (including her grandfather, Juan II, and uncle, Enrique IV).114 Held by Juan

110 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’ f. 153v.-155. The letter’s destinee is not given.
111 Z. ADP, 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando
112 CSP. Ven. 1. 890: 326
113 Rodríguez Villa, La reina: 210
Velásquez (son of the former custodian of Juana’s maternal grandmother, Isabel de Avis), Arévalo was the place of choice for Fernando’s allies while Villena wanted to move her to his territory of Escalona. Cisneros fretted about her meetings with Borgo, Veyré and Villena, suspecting they instilled apprehension about Fernando’s return with Germaine. The Habsburg ‘party’ worried about, and felt diminished (‘amanado’) by, her discussions with Velasco and Enriquez. In reality, her willingness to meet the representatives of contrary forces, even if she rejected their proposals, helped winkle out a small margin for manoeuvre for herself.

As the end of the ninety-day period approached, Juana embarked on the first phase of what she subsequently called a means of ‘separating herself’ from Cisneros. In early December she moved to Velasco’s hunting lodge of La Vega at Gamonal, outside Burgos, which Maldonado calls ‘deliciosissima’. Martire thought this an attempt to avoid ‘the commerce of men’. However, she held audiences there and doubtless saw her move as part of a larger bid to safeguard her freedom and independence before the ninety-day term could be renewed and childbirth force her back into seclusion. At La Vega, on 18 December, she carried out her first and boldest political act with a law revoking all Philip’s grants and privileges. This, combined with a proposal to return the fortresses and military posts to their former allegiances, on which Zurita claims she was ‘very bent’, shows that, contrary to expectations, Juana was poised to rip out and re-lay the political and military fabric.

Juana’s pragmatic law was fundamental, sweeping and controversial. It could not have done more to justify Cisneros’ fears. It was also reminiscent of Isabel’s desire, as expressed in her will, to recover the mercedes, or grants of royal resources – towns, villages, lands, and so forth – that she and Fernando, like their predecessors, had made to secure support, especially in their early years, and uses terms very similar to those of Isabel’s pragmatic law of 21 November

115 Zurita, IV: 102, 135
117 Z. ADP.787: 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando
118 Maldonado, La revolución: 108
119 Martire, X, 320: 158-159, 19 December 1506
120 Zurita, IV: 164: ‘la reina estaba muy puesta en revocar también los privilegios de las fortalezas y oficios y se lo había estorbado.’
1504. This dealt with the abuse of indirect taxes (*alcabalas*), collection and retention of which by nobles, knights and others had been ‘tacitly tolerated’, thereby contributing to a diversion of revenues into private hands. The practice, which Edwards describes as a ‘major admission of failure’, had much preoccupied the Queen in her last days.121 Addressing the Royal Chancery and all nobles, *regidores* and municipal and fiscal officers, Juana’s pragmatic was her response to demands that she act according to her royal conscience, and she specifically invested it with ‘the force and vigour of law, as if it were approved and promulgated by the Cortes’. It ‘revoked, stopped, annulled and considered void and without force and validity’ all privileges and grants awarded in *juros*, revenues and jurisdictions made by Philip since Isabel’s death.122 Philip’s measures, Juana argued, had been taken ‘without my knowledge’ and ‘to the great prejudice and impoverishment of my royal patrimony and the public good of these my kingdoms’. Like Isabel, Juana stated that it ‘would be a great burden on my conscience’, and ‘detrimental to the whole country’ if Philip’s measures on grants were not revoked. Isabel’s law, too, had been undersigned by Lazárraga and various councillors.123

The law targeted Philip’s most important collaborators. Manuel was deprived of income from a raft of grants and posts. Among important nobles affected, Nájera lost income granted by Philip from the indirect sales taxes raised on the *merindad* of Nájera. Fernando de Andrade, Count of Caserta, was also deprived of income from *juros* and *alcabalas*. Villena’s brother, Alonso Tellez Girón, was deprived of a large sum from grants. Villena himself, and Benavente and Béjar saw the promises made by Philip evaporate before them.

On a deeper level, the law challenged Cisneros’ attempt to deprive Juana of legitimacy, signalling that she alone could dispense honours, grants and privileges. By attempting to restore the royal patrimony, it not only honoured Isabel’s will but addressed the main concerns of the Cortes of Salamanca-

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121 Edwards, Ferdinand and Isabella: 160
122 *Juros perpetuos or de heredar*, as opposed to *juros al quitar*, were grants conceded by monarchs to individuals, not purchased by them as instruments of public debt.
123 AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Diversos, 1.12.10, 18 December 1506, inserted in ‘Sobrecarta de la Reina Doña Juana, en que revocó y anuló todas las gracas y mercedes y alcabalas, tercias y otras rentas Reales que su esposo el Rey Don Felipe había concedido a los Grandes, caballeros y otras personas de estos Reinos’, Palencia, 30 July 1507; BL, Additional 15568, ‘Como el Rey’, f. 119-121, 21 November 1504, pragmatic law with covering letter signed by Fernando and addressed, among others, to Juana and Philip.
Valladolid. Her warning of the harm that would come to Castile if she did not act has a prophetic ring, given subsequent Comunero grievances and the persistent demand that the awards of posts to foreigners be revoked.\textsuperscript{124}

Modern historians differ on the law’s significance. In Zalama’s opinion: ‘They were surprising decisions that, far from improving government, aroused the discontent of those affected ...’\textsuperscript{125} But for Ruiz-Doménecc they constituted a rare attempt to ‘recuperate the lost bon ton in Castilian politics’.\textsuperscript{126} Calderón describes the law as having ‘enormous subsequent repercussions’.\textsuperscript{127} For García Oro, it was ‘revolutionary’.\textsuperscript{128} For Prescott, this ‘severe blow’ to sycophancy ‘electrified her husband’s adherents’.\textsuperscript{129} Aram describes this ‘bold’ measure to restore the royal patrimony as Juana’s ‘first attempt to rule’, adding: ‘The widowed queen appeared determined to exercise royal authority’.\textsuperscript{130}

To overturned the grants and rewards bestowed by a previous administration was not unprecedented. But, at a time when Fernando was promising much to Philip’s former collaborators, including Manuel, the political context gave Juana’s action particular resonance. In a later letter to Almazán, soldier, royal chronicler and future Comunero Gonzalo de Ayora warned of the huge expectations Fernando’s return aroused; there was such hunger for rewards that, in return for supporting Fernando in difficult times, ‘the smallest aposentador or alguazil ... thinks ... he should be awarded a ‘maestrado’ (maestrazgo) or archbishopric and can kill and rob whoever he wants with impunity’.\textsuperscript{131} Although Juana’s law targeted Philip’s actions, Fernando’s right to bestow favours was implicitly denied by this assertion of her royal prerogative, threatening to capsize his plans.

Did Juana act under Velasco’s influence, as Enríquez feared she might? Juana later, rightly, stated that Velasco, like Cisneros, had interfered in her

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} CODOIN, I: 272-283, ‘Capítulos de los que ordenaban de pedir los de la Junta’ also included the revocation of fortress tenures
\item \textsuperscript{125} Zalama, Juana I: 212-213
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ruiz-Doménecc, Isabel: 148
\item \textsuperscript{127} Calderón, Felipe: 192
\item \textsuperscript{128} García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 131
\item \textsuperscript{129} Prescott, History: 636
\item \textsuperscript{130} Aram, Juana the Mad: 88-89
\item \textsuperscript{131} RAH, Salazar, A-12: 154v.-155, 16 July 1507, Ayora to Almazán
\end{itemize}
affairs.\textsuperscript{132} Yet she saw Velasco frequently, and named him godfather to her
daughter, born in January 1507.\textsuperscript{133} He had initiated the movement in her support
and allied with her against a Cortes and the renewal of the ninety-day ‘truce’, in
both cases citing Juana’s interests, and vigorously urging implementation of her
law. Other influences, too, might have been at work. Her adviser and chaplain,
Villaescusa – Catalina’s other godfather – was also critical of Philip’s measures.

According to Zurita, Juana ordered Juan López de Lazárraga, royal
secretary and accountant, and Juana’s primary link to the Royal Council, to draw
up the law, while also ordering that councillors appointed through Manuel be
removed from their posts and replaced by those he had earlier dismissed.\textsuperscript{134} As
executor of, and expert on, Isabel’s will, he could be relied upon to agree, in
principle, with Juana’s proposals, but was anxious to defer them pending
consultation with Fernando.\textsuperscript{135} Aram attributes the Council’s procrastination in
implementing the law to a probable ‘reluctance to relinquish ill-gotten gains,
including those of their friends and clients’.\textsuperscript{136} In fact, half the Council were
Manuel’s appointees, while those who supported Fernando doubtless feared that
immediate implementation would alienate those whose support he was trying to
attract. Nor did the Council have sufficient military back-up to quell any
resistance to its provisions, while the ninety-day agreement, although about to
expire, was still operational when the law was drafted.

Aware that the law damaged some councillors’ interests, Juana, who had
not enjoyed the benefits of her brother’s princely apprenticeship, asked
Lazárraga whom she could trust with government and justice affairs. Lazárraga
suggested a number of strong fernandinos, of whom Juana chose four.\textsuperscript{137}
Scrupulous, very close to Isabel, Dr Pedro de Oropesa, an expert on canon and
civil law, had reportedly turned down the archbishopric of Toledo, allowing for
Cisneros’ ascension, and was a witness of Isabel’s will. Bartolomé de las Casas
believed Dr Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal to be an exceptional jurist, ‘estimated

\textsuperscript{132} Z. ADP. 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando
\textsuperscript{133} Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 258-259v.
\textsuperscript{134} Zurita, IV: 156
\textsuperscript{135} Zurita, IV: 155
\textsuperscript{136} Aram, ‘Juana the “Mad’s” Signature’: 341
\textsuperscript{137} Zurita, IV: 156; Santa Cruz mentions these names in ‘Chronica’: 252v.-253.
for that above all others.\textsuperscript{138} Licentiate Luis González Polanco and Dr García Yáñez de Mújica, brother of Juana’s former treasurer, Martín, were also highly experienced. These endorsed the new law. According to Zurita, they also seized the opportunity to chide Juana for dereliction of duty (presumably meant in terms of her refusal to sign other acts of government) and begged her to let them write to Fernando in her name, urging his return.\textsuperscript{139} But, despite her repeated insistence on implementation, this, together with her law on fortress tenancies, remained on ice until Fernando returned to Spain.

\textbf{5. 4. The court of Juana I}

The evidence proves that, despite apparent inactivity between September and December, Juana received in audience, argued, weighed options and formed the embryo not only of a royal household but a court in the traditional sense, by which I mean that, within certain restrictions, nobles and other subjects had access to the sovereign. Here, Juana was visited, and, indeed courted.\textsuperscript{140} She met an envoy of Louis XII, to whom she reportedly reaffirmed her support for Fernando.\textsuperscript{141} On 4 December 1506 she received a Portuguese envoy, Enrique, Bishop of Ceuta, who, while offering condolences, also discussed with her questions of future governance.\textsuperscript{142} Grandees who gained access found they could keep their hats on, as Castilian protocol allowed. Under Burgundian protocol, the nobles had been obliged, or had agreed, to stand bareheaded in Philip’s presence, but immediately after his death the practice of cubrición returned, at least until the advent of Charles.\textsuperscript{143} This was more than a gesture, symbolising Juana’s readiness (and later Fernando’s) to fulfil the traditional role of creador of her noble Castilian ‘cousins’.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{138} Eloy Bullón y Fernández, \textit{El doctor Palacios Rubio y sus obras} (Madrid, 1927): 7
\textsuperscript{139} Zurita, IV: 155-156
\textsuperscript{140} The difficulty of properly defining the term ‘court’ has been examined by Rodríguez-Salgado in ‘The Court of Philip II of Spain’, in Ronald G. Asch, Adolf M. Birke, eds., \textit{Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility} (London/Oxford, 1991): 205-244. On this question, I must disagree with Aram’s statement that: ‘Juana had a household but never a court of her own (Juana the Maid: 8).
\textsuperscript{141} Zurita, IV: 113
\textsuperscript{142} Azcona, \textit{Juana de Castilla, mal llamada La Beltraneja}: 246
\end{flushleft}
Despite their poor relations, or perhaps because of them, Juana invited Cisneros to live at court—not, Zurita adds, because she wanted him to govern but ‘for his company’.\footnote{Zurita, IV: 96} This might have constituted an attempt by an ever-wary queen to keep an eye on his activities, or could have been a conciliatory gesture, since she was apparently on good terms with his nephew and companion, Fray Francisco de Ruíz, who later told Almazán she had always showed him (Ruíz) ‘much love’.\footnote{RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 130} But it also meant that, by accepting Juana’s invitation, Cisneros formed part of her court rather than a separate one.

If, however, Juana sought rapprochement, or hoped to confine Cisneros to pastoral duties, she failed. Cisneros became embroiled in a struggle for control of her household. Using Fernando’s authority, he ordered the royal accountants to release funds for various purposes, including payment of some members of her household, and her commission of royal councillors.\footnote{AGR, CSR. 14, I, f. 46, ‘Orden de pago a Gonçalo de Salcedo’, 24 October 1506; Dios (El Consejo Real: 287n.), notes that in 1506 Cisneros ordered the royal accountants to pay 100,000 maravedís for ayuda de costa to Oropesa, Mújica, Carvajal and Polanco — those chosen by Juan to take the lead in government. On 25 December 1507 Fernando issued a similar order.} He tried to dismiss her camarero, Diego Ribera, whom he suspected of facilitating audiences with Fernando’s opponents—especially Villena.\footnote{Zurita, IV: 121} Infuriated by his encroachments on royal territory, Juana later ordered Cisneros and his servants out of the Cordón, together with some of Fernando’s—a move suggesting that Juana also resented Fernando’s meddling.\footnote{Zurita, IV: 119; García Oro, Cisneros: un cardenal: 129} The Constable and Juana of Aragon managed to placate her. But she insisted she alone had the right to obtain and allocate funds from the contadores mayores; they could release monies on her signed authority only.\footnote{Zurita, IV: 119}

Those, meanwhile, who sought access to Juana and managed to penetrate an outer ring of guards faced an inner circle of women—a fact Martíre ignores when asserting she kept all women at a distance. In fact, far from being concerned about the absence of women, nobles seeking access to Juana were concerned by what they perceived to be their perceived obstructionism and partisanship. Juana’s half-sister, Juana of Aragon, Duchess of Frías and wife of
the Constable, tried to restrict the Queen’s audiences to their father’s supporters; after her return to the Casa del Cordón, the visits of Veyré, Burgo and Nájera became less frequent.\textsuperscript{150} Enríquez, no friend of Velasco, complained he had come three times to Burgos to kiss hands and been turned away.\textsuperscript{151} An anonymous letter of 8 December 1506 echoes complaints that access to Juana had got harder, reporting that Villena could only see her when, hearing his voice, she personally intervened.\textsuperscript{152} Villena complained to Juana about the influence of the Duchess, to which she replied: ‘You know she’s my sister, and it’s [natural] for me to enjoy some relaxation with her in particular, and with the criadas of the Queen my lady [Isabel]; all the more so in that I have no other company, as you’re aware’.\textsuperscript{153}

Several of the key women around Juana after Philip’s death formed part of her court rather than household, in the sense that they held no specific post, but had coalesced unofficially around her. They were all related or allied to the Constable, and loyal fernandinas, who had been attached to Isabel’s court. Juana asked María de Ulloa to join her at about the time of Philip’s death.\textsuperscript{154} Described by Zurita as a ‘great favourite’, Ulloa was to formally become her camarera mayor and remain in that post until 1516.\textsuperscript{155} Like Juana, she was a widow with a small son. Her father, Rodrigo de Ulloa, had been Isabel’s contador mayor; her father-in-law, Diego López de Sarmiento, Count of Salinas, Isabel’s reposter mayor, had married Marina de Villandrado, also present in Burgos. The Velascos and their vassals, the Sarmentos, were closely knit, between them controlling all the passes above the Ebro and much of the territory around it. The Salinas widows were well known to Juana of Aragon, whom the Queen received ‘warmly’ after Philip’s death and asked to stay.\textsuperscript{156}

The Queen’s cousin, Francisca Enríquez, Marchioness of Denia, wife of one of Fernando’s greatest supporters, Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas, and María Fernández de Velasco, Duchess of Roa, elder sister of the Constable, were

\textsuperscript{150} Zurita, IV: 110-111
\textsuperscript{151} BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 153v.-155
\textsuperscript{152} BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 155-157
\textsuperscript{153} BL, Egerton, Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 156v.
\textsuperscript{154} AGS, E 4, f. 77, 29 April 1517, Charles to Cisneros
\textsuperscript{155} Zurita, IV: 157
\textsuperscript{156} Zurita, IV: 110-111
closely connected to this group, but, according to Conchillos, 'not to the taste of her highness.\textsuperscript{157} When later writing to Fernando, Ferrer describes the ferocity with which Juana recalled the 'late señora Doña María', who had 'expected to control her whole household'. This 'Doña María', who died in 1506 or 1507, may have been the Constable's sister.\textsuperscript{158}

Judging from various royal orders signed by the Queen between 1506-1507, and from other primary sources, her household was small at that time, consisting of approximately a hundred staff. Regarding key male household members, Juana showed the same wish to surround herself with those who had formerly served Isabel, or whom Isabel had formerly appointed to Juana's household, although she also retained a number of Flemish and Burgundian servants, both male and female.\textsuperscript{159} As mayordomo mayor Juana re-appointed Diego de Cárdenas, since 1492 Adelantado of Granada. Cárdenas was the son of Gutierre, Isabel's chief steward, and of her close friend, Teresa Enríquez, whose religious devotions had earned her the sobriquet 'Loca del Sacramento'.

Cárdenas was thus the Admiral's nephew, and a blood relation of Juana's. She had first approved him as her majordomo following his father's death at Alcalá de Henares in 1503.\textsuperscript{160} Like Juana's female company, the appointment shows how intensely political royal household posts could be. The 'Flemish' party was dismayed. Villena, for whom Juana retained a soft spot, felt the post was rightfully his since it traditionally belonged within the Pacheco family. But just as Isabel had broken with tradition by appointing Gutierre, so Juana stood firm with regard to his son. Her parents, she told Villena, 'had granted that post to the Adelantado, and [she] had confirmed it; and for this reason had ordered him to serve her'. She added that the situation could be reviewed on her father's return, but it was her wish, for now, to have Cárdenas.\textsuperscript{161} According to Vallejo, Cisneros made Cárdenas 'captain of the Queen's guard'.\textsuperscript{162} But Juana is unlikely to have appointed this powerful military figure, who held the governorship of La Mota in

\textsuperscript{157} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 127-129, 7 March 1507, to Almazán
\textsuperscript{158} Z. ADP. 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando
\textsuperscript{159} For a detailed analysis of these, see Raymond Fagel, 'Juana y Cornelia: Flamencos en la corte de Juana La Loca en Tordesillas', \textit{El tratado de Tordesillas y su época: Congreso Internacional de Historia} (Valladolid, 1995): 1855-1866
\textsuperscript{160} Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, \textit{Libro de la Cámara del Príncipe Juan} (Madrid, 1870): 7
\textsuperscript{161} BL, Egerton Ms. 309, 'Relación', f. 155v.-156
\textsuperscript{162} Vallejo, \textit{Memorial}: 8-119
Medina del Campo, where Castile’s arsenal was stored, if she believed he was conspiring with Cisneros to restrict her movements. On the contrary, her choice may have been an attempt to counterbalance Cisneros’ power and private army.

Juana’s reliance on Basque noble López de Lazárraga has already been noted. Doussinague singles out the Basque secretaries who served the Spanish monarchs and their descendents, including Lazárraga, for their ‘loyalty and competence’. Lazárraga had not been afraid to remonstrate with Fernando the previous year when, as one of Isabel’s trustees, he reproached him about his failure to pay Katherine’s dowry. His candour and indignation were, perhaps, tolerated because he did not lose sight of Fernando’s interests. Described by Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo as a man of great integrity, on whom, after Isabel’s death, ‘almost all the affairs of most importance depended’, Lazárraga was mocked as Juana’s one true supporter: “There is no-one, great or small, who does not say that she is not ruined, and has not lost her mind, except for Joan [Juan] López, who says that she is saner than her mother”, wrote Conchillos scornfully, with a string of negatives. Along with her treasurer, Ochoa de Landa, another kinsman of the Admiral, Conchillos blamed Lazárraga for aiding and abetting Juana’s departure from Burgos in December 1506.

Other important household posts reflect her attachment to men who had served her since 1496, including Diego and Alonso Ribera and Sebastián de Olano, *alcaldes* of Azcoitia. Special significance attaches to her head chaplain, Ramírez de Villaescusa, who describes himself as ‘chief chaplain and adviser’. In his 1516 memorial he told Charles with evident pride: ‘I am the oldest *criado* of your parents’ house, and was the first to hold you in my arms when you were born, and later served you all the time I was there, together with your sisters … when the three of you were still very young … When [Philip] died, Doña Juana sent for me, and I returned to serve her as before and try to ensure that she was

163 Doussinague, *La política internacional*: 163
164 CSP. Sp. I (Henry VII), 484: 397-398, 28 August 1506
166 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 86-87, to Almazán
167 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 86-87
168 Doussinague, *La política internacional*: 163
well served and treated by her entourage.¹⁶⁹ Other survivors of Flemish days were Matienzo, who had remained as Juana’s confessor since 1498, and her musical instructor, the composer and cantor, Juan de Anchieta.

Juana’s decision to maintain Philip’s northern chapel was highly important in terms of the strengthening of bonds between Flemish/Burgundian and Spanish musical traditions. Juana’s care for her musicians’ welfare has overwhelmingly been seen as a symptom of her obsessive nature. Certainly, as Martire mentions, she took great pleasure in music.¹⁷⁰ But, by prioritising payments to these musicians and composers she was merely continuing Philip’s practice. What is remarkable is the amount she paid. Annual salaries were more than half again what the highest paid singers were receiving in Fernando’s chapel.¹⁷¹ They were also paid up to three months in advance. The pay lists signed by Juana in 1506 and 1507 show her promotion to the post of ‘first chaplain’ of the great Flemish composer Pierre de la Rue, then probably at the height of his powers and who, like his colleague, Agricola, who had died earlier that year, was known for his extraordinary voice. With Anchieta, ‘Pierrochon’ graces the top of the list with payments of over twenty thousand maravedis each for the period between June and September 1507. The list of eighteen musicians includes other composers of polyphonic music, such as Guillem Reingot, Rogier Herben and Nicolas Champion, author of the superb four-voice motet, De profundis clamavi.¹⁷²

Juana’s love of music apart, this unprecedented amount of pay and patronage may reflect special circumstances, such as her desire to maintain the northern chapel under conditions that must have been trying for its members. Some had returned to Flanders in the exodus that followed Philip’s death, but a significant proportion remained with Juana. The high payments may also reflect commissions for special work. Although it is notoriously difficult to pinpoint the exact dates at which compositions of the era were written, it would be surprising if no creative work were to have emerged from this period, given the calibre of the chapel at Juana’s disposal. Pierre de la Rue’s motet, Delicta juventutis, and

his requiem mass, with its dense chromatic textures, dates from this prolonged period of mourning.\textsuperscript{173}

Juana’s payments to her chapel, and various other household payments made between October and December 1506, show that she was perfectly able to sign documents when she wanted to. Her efforts to build up a royal household of her own, to prevent Cisneros taking control of it, and to seize the initiative from a faltering coalition as it approached the end of the ninety-day agreement with no Cortes yet in sight, also demonstrate that, to the surprise of some, she could be a force to be reckoned with.

5.5. The Cortes that never was (November-December 1506)

On 1 November (All Saints Day) Juana left Burgos to visit Miraflores. After a requiem mass, sung by northern and Spanish chapels together, she stayed for lunch.\textsuperscript{174} Possibly owing to rumours that Philip’s body had been returned to Flanders, she ordered that the coffin be opened and inspected. But her visit had dynastic as well as personal significance.\textsuperscript{175} Her grandfather, Juan II, had founded the monastery in 1441. Isabel had her parents buried there. Juana had several times made visits, both before and after Philip’s death, and, according to Romero, had shared ‘matters of conscience’ with him.\textsuperscript{176} Juana bestowed money on the monastery, as well as ‘very fine’ pieces of brocade to adorn the sepulchre.\textsuperscript{177} Zurita notes that, on the Miraflores road, people flocked around her, and she took petitions from them. Popular rejoicing checked those grandees who were starting to leave her out of their calculations. Arguments against a Cortes gained ground.\textsuperscript{178}

Alba had consistently opposed it. Without Juana’s support, or Fernando’s presence, it would, he argued, lack validity and could damage royal interests. Juan Rodríguez Portocarrero, Alba’s emissary to a city he considered disloyal

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{173} Knighton, \textit{Música y Músicos}: 141. The motet, an intense plea for Philip’s soul, begins: ‘Remember not the sins of his youth or his transgressions, my Lord …’
\textsuperscript{174} Sanuto, \textit{Diario}, 6: 506, 1 November 1506
\textsuperscript{175} António Colinas, \textit{Viaje a los Monasterios de España} (León, 2003): 85
\textsuperscript{176} AGS, E. 42, f. 145.1, 6 November 1538, Charles to Denia; Aram, ‘Juana the “Mad”’
\textsuperscript{177} Signature’: 344n.
\textsuperscript{178} Zurita, IV: 115
\textsuperscript{178} Zurita, IV: 114-115}
and refused to enter, objected that the warlike atmosphere in Burgos was not conducive to a Cortes. Protesting about the number of armed men, and the menaces the procurators faced, he declared that any Cortes had to be held in the customary way and ‘in the court of the Queen our lady’.\textsuperscript{179} Some argued that, if as seemed likely, it resorted to ‘scandalous’ measures to remove the Queen, it would hardly bring peace but stir already agitated cities.\textsuperscript{180} Having agreed to a Cortes, Velasco was, by November or December, vehemently opposed to it, declaring to procurators that a Cortes held without Juana’s consent would constitute treason; if, for the moment, she did not wish to govern, she might later change her mind.\textsuperscript{181}

Opposition also came from Andalucian and Galician nobles. On 6 November Diego de Deza, Archbishop of Seville and Inquisitor General, combined with four prominent nobles who had expressed support for Juana before Philip’s death: the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the Marquis of Priego, and the Counts of Cabra and Ureña. These declared that nobody should govern but Juana; to convoke a Cortes without the monarch’s signature was not ‘in the service of God and the Queen’.\textsuperscript{182} ‘They urged Juana to govern ‘in her royal person’, promising to abide by her letters if signed with her own name, or if signed by royal councillors who could show they worked ‘in the service of Her Highness’ – rather, that is, than in that of Cisneros or Velasco.\textsuperscript{183}

That Deza should join forces with anti-fernandinos like Priego may seem, at first glance, curious. Although Philip had suspended him as Inquisitor General in 1505, Deza had returned to his post after Philip’s death, apparently continuing to back the zealous prosecution by Córdoba inquisitor Diego Rodríguez Lucero, of alleged members of a Judaising movement spread across Castile by prophetesses in the city. In the context of the fierce controversy generated by Lucero’s actions, Deza had come into conflict with nobles like the Marquis of Priego and Count of Cabra, acting as representatives of Córdoba.\textsuperscript{184} Deza’s

\textsuperscript{179} AGS PR 7, f. 72, Instructions of Duke of Alba
\textsuperscript{180} Zurita, IV: 115-118
\textsuperscript{181} Zurita, IV: 125
\textsuperscript{182} Zurita, IV: 106-107
\textsuperscript{183} AHN, Osuna, 1523, f. 1, 6 November 1506, ‘Escritura de compromiso’; Santa Cruz, \textit{Crónica}: 247-247v.
\textsuperscript{184} See Chapters 6 and 7 for further details.
decision to join with Priego and others in support of Juana against the provisional government in Burgos might, however, be related to his loathing of Cisneros, who was soon to replace him as chief inquisitor for Castile. The claims on Gibraltar of Juan de Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sidonia, pitted him too against Cisneros and the Council. Clearly, by claiming to act as Juana’s champions, those who wished, for whatever reason, to defy orders from a dubious central authority, could honourably do so on the grounds that Juana was held captive. Similar action was taken in Galicia, where a gathering at Samos, including Rodrigo Enríquez de Osorio, Count of Lemos, and Fernando de Andrade, Count of Caserta, declared opposition to a Cortes that lacked the ‘true signature and true command of the queen our lady’. These nobles engaged in a series of defensive pacts with the cities of Santiago, La Coruña, Betanzos, Lugo, Orense, Mondoñedo and others, based on service only to Juana.

Even cities that responded to the call were on their guard. According to Carretero Zamora, procurators arriving in Burgos in mid-November repeatedly begged Juana to approve it. But to judge from the letters of Seville’s procurators, veinticuatro Guillén de Casaus and jurado Juan Serrano, this is not entirely true. Their correspondence with Seville reflects frustrations stemming mainly from confusion about Juana’s wishes. How, they wondered, to approach her – en masse or in a small deputation? Procurators finally agreed to send Casaus and Serrano, together with the Madrid representative, Licentiate Francisco de Vargas, to ask Juana of Aragon to help arrange an audience. She ‘promised us to work hard to do this, given that in arranging it, she would meet with much difficulty, but she would work for it nonetheless, because it was to the benefit of Her Highness as well as ourselves’.

When Juana moved to La Vega, she left at dawn but failed to avoid procurators lodged at posadas along the route. What, they pleaded, did she want

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186 AGS, Cámara-Pueblos (La Coruña), 6, f. 340, ‘Alianza de las ciudades de La Coruña y Betanzos con Don Fernando de Andrade’
188 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’ f. 135, 18 December 1506, ‘Carta de los procuradores de Sevilla al cabildo de ella’
them to do? Juana said she ‘did not need them for now’. Some, not hearing her low voice, repeated their pleas. ‘Leave me now, you offend me’, the Queen answered, turning her back on them. ‘There hasn’t been time to reply to you’.

But later she sent Cárdenas with a more emollient message: ‘The Queen says you should retire to rest and she will send me to tell you what you’re to do’.  

Cold-shouldered by the Queen, flummoxed by her pythic remarks, alternately threatened and cajoled by Cisneros and the Council, lectured to and insulted (but also occasionally helped) by the Constable, life was not easy for the procurators. Some decided to get Cortes secretaries to accompany them to Juana’s door and convey a message to her through the doorkeeper. If Juana would not see them, her refusal must be notarised – a decision that irritated the Constable and foreshadows the events of the Comunidades of 1520. According to the procurators’ letter, Velasco, when dining with Pedro Velez, procurator for Guadalajara, exclaimed: ‘What sort of testimony do you expect to take from the Queen? I’d like to see you take it somewhere with a dozen poplars where a dozen procurators can be strung up as a reminder!’ But the Council admonished and threatened the procurators for not acting: ‘What are you doing? Why are you not acting to stop the harm being done day by day?’ If the procurators did not act they would face serious repercussions: ‘... you have the power ... you can clearly see that her highness does not want to get involved in anything, or express her wishes ...’  

Pressures on the procurators included threats to their city. Upon arrival in Burgos Casaus and Serrano were warned of a Council plan to demolish the walls of Seville and remove its privileges and ‘loyal’ status for failing to support the military campaign against Guzmán’s seizure of Gibraltar. Casaus and Serrano continued, nonetheless, to appeal to the legitimacy invested in Juana. On 18 December they describe a meeting with the Council president and others. After gaining an assurance that Seville’s city status was safe, they complained that Andrade, whom Philip had appointed asistente of Seville, was planning to assume his post, despite Seville’s opposition, and appealed to Juana’s authority. Seville, they claimed, was the best-administered city in Castile; it did not need an asistente, who would, besides, cost a fortune. Nor was his appointment valid.

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189 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’ f. 135v.
190 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 137-138, 18 December 1506
since it was ‘well known’ that Juana had not supported it, any more than she had supported others Philip made. Yes, her signature was on the order appointing him, but it was false; they knew that ‘at that time she was not signing’. The Council’s reply was evasive: they could not prevent Andrade going, but would advise him not to go.  

At a meeting with Juana at Miraflores, facilitated by Velasco, one procurator, accompanied by a Cortes secretary, again begged her to clarify her position on the Cortes and on Fernando. To this Juana gave her formulaic reply: ‘As regards the Cortes, I shall let you know. As regards the king’s return … there is no-one who wants this more than I do, if only for my consolation’. But, the procurator insisted, what was her wish about the Cortes? ‘I shall let you know sooner than you think’, she replied. According to Casaus and Serrano, this mysterious response delighted many colleagues, clearly seizing at straws. On another occasion Juana told them: ‘I have ordered the Council members to tell you what I want and what you want; leave me now …’ After mass she again spoke to them: ‘Go to the Council members and tell them what you want, and they will tell me, and then I’ll tell you what to do’. 

Villacañas describes her words as ‘terrible’. The Council was ‘encouraging them to hold a Cortes and the queen took for granted that this was what the procurators wanted. It seems that the Council was mediating in a vicious circle …’ If Juana was indeed referring to a Cortes her words would not only have been terrible but nonsensical. Aram, however, suggests that by referring to ‘what I want and what you want’ Juana was applying pressure to the Council to publish her new measures. This is plausible, since we know that Juana was arguing hard with the Council to get her law implemented.

In semi-secrecy Juana prepared to leave Burgos. On the eve of her departure she signed a series of orders for payment of household officials and translation of Philip’s body. Some of these again reflect her concern that funds be released only into her hands, as well as her intention to keep scrupulously to the arrangement whereby Fernando should continue to receive half the revenues

191 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 139-140
192 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 142-146, 21 December 1506, ‘Carta de los procuradores de Cortes Guillén de Casaus y Juan Serrano’
193 Villacañas, La Monarquia: 748
194 Aram, ‘Juana the “Mad’s” Signature’: 341
from the Indies. In a signed order of 15 December she told the Casa de la Contratación in Seville: ‘I was pleased to receive the good news you sent me about the abundance of gold that Our Lord has been pleased to provide in those islands ... do not pay out my half [Fernando’s was the other] without receiving my signature, and as for the eight thousand pesos of gold and pearls which, in your letter, you told me have now arrived, and the six thousand pesos newly brought by the ship la Garça, I order you to give and pay the half of the one and of the other that belongs to me to Ochoa de Landa’.\textsuperscript{195} Zalama comments of this order: ‘It is curious to note that the queen, who washed her hands of the government of Castile, was inquisitive to know when money arrived from America and wanted to keep control of it at all times ....'\textsuperscript{196} It is, perhaps, less curious if one considers that Juana was highly jealous of her proprietary status and had not renounced the notion of governing Castile, but was still promising to do so. For this, and for her own protection, and journey, she needed funds.

As the ninety-day term drew to an end Cisneros and Council continued to struggle for a Cortes. On 21 December Casaus and Serrano describe a meeting in which Cisneros appealed to Fernando’s authority, declaring it was ‘the king our lord’ who had ordered the convocation. The procurators had seen Juana’s response to their pleas: ‘ ... she ‘does not [govern] or say what she wants. You must now express your wishes to the Council, as Her Highness has ordered. And it could be that she provides for these to be fulfilled. And if not, that she gives permission for a Cortes to be held. And if not, then you must do it to preserve the kingdom and prevent the spread of more evils than already exist.'\textsuperscript{197}

Significantly, Cisneros made no reference to Juana’s law. To have done so would have been to undermine his argument that ‘she does not govern or say what she wants’. But although her six-week seclusion was comprehensible in terms of her obligations and needs as a widow, and she was more active in the first three months after Philip’s death than generally recognised, Juana’s evident wish to retain her proprietary rights and pre-eminence, and hostility to the moves of Cisneros and the Council, meant that she needed to clarify her wishes to the

\textsuperscript{195} AGS, CSR, 14, f. 1.31, 15 December, Cédula
\textsuperscript{196} Zalama, \textit{Juana I}: 214
\textsuperscript{197} BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 142-146, 21 December 1506
procurators. As she later realised, the emphasis she placed on her filial loyalty dealt a fatal blow to her political survival.

Yet many worked to obstruct Juana. The ninety-day ‘truce’ aimed to tie her hands and silence her, encouraging disobedience to a lawful monarch who was effectively still a hostage. When Juana broke free from Burgos and initiated a crucial law it was resisted, hushed up and delayed. Juana was a skilled procrastinator. But, as regards the 18 December law, the procrastination was clearly the Council’s. To the partisans of a ‘regency’ government under Fernando, Cisneros or even Maximilian, the ability of the Queen to govern meant, in reality, her willingness to extend support to the interests of others.
6. The Queen’s government

6.1. Flight of a funeral cortège (December 1506–March 1507)

On 20 December 1506, a day before Cisneros met the procurators, Juana summoned them, together with the bishops of Jaén, Málaga, Mondoñedo and Burgos; the papal nuncio, Giovanni Ruffo dei Teodoli, Bishop of Bertinoro, and Fernando’s and Maximilian’s ambassadors, Ferrer and Burgo. She ordered the procurators to go home and declared she was taking Philip’s body to Granada, brusquely brushing aside objections that canon law forbade the removal of a body within six months of interment. The coffin was covered with silk and cloth of silver and gold and placed on a cart transformed into a chariot d’armes, pulled by four black Friesian horses, in conformity with the fourfold symbolism of the journeys of mourning of the princes of Burgundy. After a delay, caused by the need to find a stronger cart, the cortège left Burgos in a foggy dusk.

Juana’s dismissal of the procurators and unexpected departure caused disarray. Conchillos told Almazán of an angry moment between Enríquez and Lazárraga, when Enríquez chided him for lending Juana money for the journey: ‘You’re doing more harm than you think’. Lazárraga ‘replied not a word’ and Enríquez ‘went home desperate’. Another ‘desperate’ man, Cárdenas, told him: ‘Look what a life I lead for the sake of our master!’ His remark reveals the fault line running through Juana’s household; some key personnel saw Juana’s authority as essentially provisional.

Apart from her household, the Queen’s retinue included the Council president, who provisionally left the other councillors with Cisneros in Burgos; Ferrer; the Bishops of Málaga, Mondoñedo and Burgos, and

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1 Martire, X, 324: 164, 24 December 1506
3 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 86-87, 23 December 1506
various nobles. Fray Pedro Romero, prior of Miraflores, and one or more Carthusian monks, as well as monks of other orders, joined the cortege. Informed that the Duke of Nájera and the Constable were awaiting the cortege by the bridge leading out of Burgos, Juana ordered a detour, concerned they would block her departure. Shortly afterwards Velasco—who, according to his nephew, accompanied her ‘continually’—joined the cortege. But Conchillos thought that if Juana crossed the passes south of the Guadarrama Velasco would turn back. Conchillos described Juana’s departure as ‘nonsensical’ and ‘very damaging for everyone, and we who serve her father are not less shocked by the fact that Doña Joana [of Aragon] remains behind … she did everything possible to go with her, but in vain.’

Maldonado commented, perhaps spitefully, that Juana’s departure meant she intended ‘to dedicate herself exclusively to the honouring of her husband’s ashes’. She followed close behind the ‘spirited horses’, accompanied by people of every class: ‘It was truly astonishing to see how many notables, including the most distinguished of illustrious men, accompanied the Queen, attending with care to her allusive comments, when she, content only with her husband’s coffin, had abandoned all other responsibilities.’

The procession chanted its way into the uplands of the Palentine Cerrato, reaching Santa María de Torquemada on 23 December. Martire stresses its unprecedented nature: ‘In my opinion, no epoch has witnessed a body being taken from its tomb to be carried off by a team of four horses, surrounded by funereal pomp and a swarm of clerics intoning the Office of the Dead. As in triumph, from the city of Burgos, in a carriage pulled by four horses, in nightly stages, we brought it and here watch over it.’

His comment should be contextualised. His earlier description of the translation of Isabel’s body from Medina del Campo to Granada in November 1504, could not have conveyed more tragedy or drama: ‘Do you think we travelled by land? It seemed that sea storms swept us along …’

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4 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 86-87
5 BN, Ms. 3238, ‘Orígen’: 33
6 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 86-87
7 Maldonado, La revolución: 44-45
8 Martire, X, 332: 173-174, 26 February 1507
The cortège ‘almost swam’ through the valleys and across the plains. It tottered across the sierra tops, shedding baggage in the rocks. Nothing so ‘horrible’ had ever happened to him. ‘Ay, how many wretched bodies, how many mules swept away in the torrents!’ The cortège, nevertheless must have moved rapidly – ‘soaking up the leagues and drinking the wind’, in Azcona’s words – to get from Medina to Granada in twenty-one days.\footnote{Martire, X, 280: 92-94, 25 December 1504}

Perpetuators of Juana’s ‘black legend’ – a demented funeral journey, led by a queen obsessed with guarding her husband’s body – point to the ban on women near the body; the repeated orders to open the coffin; the nocturnal stages of the journey (as shown by Pradilla in figure 28). Both Prawdin and Aram have dealt sensibly with some of these aspects.\footnote{Tarcisio de Azcona, Isabel la Católica: Vida y Reinado (Madrid, 2002): 604} More debatable is the link made by Aram between the night journeys and Juana’s wish to display ‘the image of Philip as king and father of their future sovereign’.\footnote{All women, apart from monarchs, were and remain excluded from the presence of Carthusians. Aram (Juana the Mad: 170) has plausibly argued that it was the Carthusian presence that motivated Juana’s withdrawal of the bier from the convent of Santa María de Escobar, inhabited by Bernardine nuns, in April 1507.} Martire thought Juana more concerned about the proprieties of widowhood than about impressing those en route. She did not think it proper ‘for a widow to travel through embellished cities or magnificent plazas’.\footnote{Aram, Juana the Mad: 97} This suggests that Juana, who was steering a narrow path between her obligations, as widow, to the ‘ritual performance of remembering’, and her rejection of Philip’s political legacy, feared the funeral journey could become a joyous entry, and that celebrations springing from the natural desire to welcome Isabel’s daughter could entail a proportionate disrespect to the body and memory of a controversial foreign king.

I would argue that Juana, generally, followed ritual procedures, in which she was well-versed, and that her various orders to open the coffin and formally inspect the body were connected with longstanding royal ceremonies of identification. Royal and ducal funeral journeys were frequently nocturnal, carrying bodies exhumed from temporary burial places.

over long distances, sometimes for months. In his study of the 'rhythms of etiquette' of royal death rituals Javier Varela notes that royal funeral journeys in Spain, from place of death to place of burial, began at sunset, when life had ebbed away, and ended with the first rays of the resurrecting sun. These journeys placed a 'metaphorical stress on the transitions in the otherworldly journey of the king: body and soul, night and day, death and resurrection'.\textsuperscript{15} Only in 1818 did this practice change.

One aspect of the cortège that impressed witnesses was its sheer foreign-ness. The Burgundian custom of post-mortem conservation clashed with Trastámara practice. Juana's body was embalmed in 1555, but in 1506 many Spaniards thought it 'ugly' to cut and dismember a corpse.\textsuperscript{16} Again, the black horses and chariot d'armes that so impressed Maldonado and Martire were a staple of Burgundian funerary rites for the high nobility. Striking in another way were the two continuing daily masses requested in Philip's will. It was not their duration that singled them out, since these liturgical ceremonies would have continued at Miraflores and elsewhere, but their surroundings and makeshift quality. The true uniqueness of the cortège consisted in the status and gender of the chief mourner, presiding over protocol with the eye of a hawk, combined with the fact she was in flight.

Although some biographers have recognised Juana's desire to escape pressure, her own explanation has been overlooked. Juana told Ferrer in 1511 that she left Burgos when she did 'purely to get away from Doña María [possibly the Duchess of Roa] and the Archbishop', whose political interference she resented intensely. These two, Juana implied, were working together.\textsuperscript{17} Although she saw Philip's burial in Granada as a personal obligation, the timing and location of the funerary rites made it harder to entrap or control her.

\textsuperscript{15} Javier Varela, \textit{La Muerte del Rey: El Ceremonial Funerario de la Monarquía Española (1500-1885)}, (Madrid, 1990): 88
\textsuperscript{16} Varela, \textit{La Muerte del Rey}: 18
\textsuperscript{17} Z. ADP 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando
Figure 27 (top). 'Demencia de doña Juana de Castilla'. Lorenzo Vallés, 1866. The belief that Juana thought Philip would arise from the dead appears to derive from a mischievous letter by Martire of 13 January 1507, in which he makes fun of a Carthusian monk. In turn, Vallés' painting undoubtedly influenced Fernández de Retana's description of Juana, wandering 'finge to lips' through the Casa del Cordón. (Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid).

Figure 28 (below). 'Doña Juana La Loca'. Francisco Pradilla, 1877. Ironically, given Juana’s order that no woman should approach the coffin, almost certainly owing to the presence of Carthusian monks, Pradilla, in his famous depiction, has placed members of Juana’s female entourage in close proximity. (Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid).
If the cortège was a vehicle of flight, Juana’s decision to escape Burgos in an advanced state of pregnancy seems more rational than critics have believed. Her condition lent her negotiating power. Martíre and Santa Cruz note that when she ordered the exhumation of Philip’s body, nobles and prelates did not prevent it, ‘if only’, wrote Martíre, ‘because a fit of rage could cause her to abort the creature in her womb’.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the unborn child and Philip’s body both became securities against imprisonment at a time when the ninety-day agreement, due to expire, could have been renewed or replaced by another detrimental to her interests.

Juana had planned the halt at Torquemada, familiar from previous visits.\textsuperscript{19} North of Palencia, at the confluence of the Pisuerga and Arlanzón rivers, it afforded relief from the tensions of Burgos. Martíre coaxed Ruffo to join them with evocations of riverbanks, ilex woods, flowery meadows and thickets full of violets.\textsuperscript{20}

Whether it was significant that Torquemada, as Martíre notes, was a \textit{behetria}, governed by its inhabitants rather than by an overlord, is unclear. Juana resided at a priest’s house by the Roman bridge.\textsuperscript{21} Martíre was among those guarding Philip’s bier in the adjacent church of Santa Eulalia, where she had organised a strict rota: ‘The constant smoke from the lighted torches has given us the colour of Ethiopians …’\textsuperscript{22}

At dawn on Thursday, 14 January 1507, Juana gave birth to a daughter, whom she named for her youngest sister.\textsuperscript{23} As her pregnancy with Mary showed, childbirth had become more difficult for Juana. Catalina was born healthy, but Juana’s life was momentarily at risk.\textsuperscript{24} She paid for a polychromed wood interior for the font at which Cisneros baptised the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{18} Martíre, X, 324: 164, 24 December 1506
\item\textsuperscript{19} Prior to departure she had signed a payment of eighty ducados for wax and other journey costs as far as Torquemada (AGS, CSR 53, f. 447, 19 December 1506).
\item\textsuperscript{20} Martíre, X, 326: 167-168, 12 January 1507
\item\textsuperscript{21} Galíndez de Carvajal, \textit{Anales breves}: 317
\item\textsuperscript{22} Martíre, X, 325: 167, 8 January 1507
\item\textsuperscript{23} Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 258-259v.
\item\textsuperscript{24} Zurita, IV: 182
\end{itemize}
baby. She also offered twenty gold ducados at the end of her period of
purpureal quarantine and churching on 4 March.

Martire’s lyricism about his surroundings proved short-lived. On 18
January he warned Ruffo that the plague had struck, killing one of Juana’s
maidservants and eight servants of Villaescusa. In addition to the heat and
light of the bodywatch, with its flaming torches, fires were lit to cauterise
infected areas. ‘Desde Torre – por la peste – quemada’, wrote Martire,
punning on the town’s name, torris cremata (burned tower). The terrible
year into which Catalina was born is the subject of a refrain earlier
mentioned by Almazán: ‘Año quinientos y siete/Toma tu capa y vete’ (Year
1507, put on your cape and go). Torrential rains in the winter of 1504-
1505 had prevented the sowing of wheat. Hunger and plague followed and
in 1506 the harvest failed almost completely while an unusually warm
winter helped incubate disease. In Alcocer’s well-known words: ‘you could
truthfully say of that year 1507 that it unleashed the three rabid she-wolves
of hunger, war and pestilence ...’. Throughout Castile, writes Bernáldez,
‘they died at the wayside and in the hills and fields, and there was no one to
bury them. People fled from one another, the living from the dead, and the
living from one another’. In early January, after expiry of the ninety-day agreement, former
felipistas tried to seize the initiative. Nájera led a militia into Torquemada to
‘free’ Juana. Pedro Girón, Count of Ureña, who had supported Juana
against a Cortes, and had arrived in Torquemada unarmed, persuaded her to
intervene. Juana called for assistance on councillors who, together with
Ferrer, Villena and Ureña, negotiated the removal of Nájera’s men. Martire, however, stressed Juana’s indifference to events while in

25 Ricardo de Bustos Rojo, Doña Catalina de Austria (Palencia, 2007): 61
26 AGS, E 1.2, f. 477, Cédula
27 Martire, X, 335: 178-179, 12 March 1507
28 Martire, X, 332: 175, 26 February 1507
29 See Chapter 4
30 Alcocer, Relación: 22
31 Bernáldez, Memorias del Reinado de los Reyes Católicos, eds., M. Gómez Moreno, Juan
de M. Carrazzo (Madrid, 1962): 518
32 Martire, X, 331: 172-173, 21 January 1507
33 Zurita, IV: 188; Santa Cruz, ‘Chronica’, f. 89
quarantine. She ‘does not care in the slightest whether her kingdoms prosper or perish ... Saturn has her so tightly in his grip that she does not know how to move about or get up, even when, once seated, she wishes to.’

Juana attended her churching with Velasco and Villena, after which she appeared frequently in public. Even then Martire emphasised her futility. She ‘does nothing’, he reported, ‘but walk to and from the church, where people flock to see and speak to her. She deals amiably with some, sadly with others. The former withdraw satisfied and full of joy, the latter heads down, eyes fixed on the earth, and frowning. But the result is the same’. Martire was singing the old refrain, to which he added a new verse: a Carthusian monk, ‘lighter than a dry leaf’, curried favour with Juana by telling her that ‘a certain king arose from his tomb fourteen years after his death. Persuaded by the infantile words of this chatterbox, the queen awaits the return to life of her husband the king’.

For a different Juana one must turn to other sources, such as Lazárraga, Ferrer and Conchillos. Lazárraga remarked to a cousin that he and Juana had much work to do, of which Juana gave him the major part. But, he stressed, ‘I want what she wants’. Although he did not specify what he and Juana were striving for, the fact he was royal secretary implies it related to political rather than spiritual work. On 7 March Conchillos reported that Ferrer had found Juana engaged on ‘the king’s affairs, in which she daily improves’, and noted the arrival of ‘Nicolás, maestro de la Cámara’, possibly Dr Nicolás Tello, royal accountant and councillor, who had been attached to the Chancery of Granada since 1505. After his departure, Juana ordered Lazárraga to obtain more funds. Conchillos commented that: ‘for the first time [she] signed a cédula, then another four, I don’t know what about’ and that various books were being taken into her. Although he thought it unlikely she would stick at the work, he assumed she was using them as a basis for her orders.

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34 Martire, X, 332, 26 February 1507: 173-174
35 Martire, X, 335, 12 March 1507: 178-179, 12 March 1507
36 Martire, X, 327: 169, 13 January 1507
37 AGS, CSR 12.7, f. 292, 28 January 1507, to Diego Martínez
38 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 127, to Almazán. In fact Juana had signed a series of cédulas in December 1506
Like Lazárraga’s, Conchillos’ observation implies she was dealing with political matters beyond the household domain, although about thirty cédulas in the archives of Simancas, dated between January-July 1507 and signed by Juana, are almost entirely concerned with household payments, journey costs and payments to individuals such as her former ‘maestro’, Miranda.\(^{39}\) Juana had treasure, but little or no ready cash. Several times she turned to the Casa de Contratación de las Indias, noting the arrival of gold and pearls from the Indies, and ordering that her half of the proceeds be paid to her only, on receipt of her signed and sealed mandate. In one such order Juana expresses her ‘very great pleasure’ that the plague had receded from Seville.\(^{40}\) In another she refers to the return of two ships from Española — possibly the two mentioned by Vianello as part of the expedition that had found the coastal mouth of a great river, with serpents, dragons, and a king and his retinue wearing gold masks.\(^{41}\)

Juana was keen to leave Torquemada, Conchillos wrote, ‘but they do not know where to go, because everywhere is as insalubrious as here’.\(^{42}\) Zalama believes she intended to await Fernando there.\(^{43}\) But Zurita’s claim that she wanted to continue to Granada tallies with Ferrer’s later comment that she was thinking of heading for plague-free Toledo (through which Isabel’s body had passed en route for Granada).\(^{44}\) According to Zurita, some grandes with estates in Andalucia begged Cisneros to stop her. Her parents, it was argued, had appointed viceroy as deputies when travelling from one part of their kingdoms to another; it was essential, in these troubled times, for Juana at least to nominate a governor before continuing.\(^{45}\) Zurita does not say whether Cisneros responded to these requests, which seem linked to the ‘desperation’ of Fernando’s supporters when Juana left Burgos. If her way was indeed blocked, or hampered, by Cisneros, this was crucial.

Fernando was unpopular in Andalucia. Had she managed to reach it without

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\(^{39}\) AGS, CRS 14.1, f. 11; 14.2, f. 76  
\(^{40}\) AGS, CRS 14.1, f. 29-30, 23 June, 1507  
\(^{41}\) AGS, CRS 14.1, f. 31, 21 June 1507; Sanuto, Diarii: 539-540, 23 December 1506  
\(^{42}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 127, to Almazán  
\(^{43}\) Zalama, Juana I: 221  
\(^{44}\) AGS, E 2-1, f. 32, 4 July 1507, ‘Negocios de Galicia’  
\(^{45}\) Zurita, IV: 182
delegating powers, bury Philip’s body at the Alhambra and make direct contact with juanista nobles (inevitable in the circumstances), it could have been more difficult to marginalise her.

In the event plague forced her to leave Torquemada. Hornillos de Cerrato is a mere two-hour walk across the paramera; it was, therefore, less a move than a shift of position. Nevertheless, for the village it meant cataclysm. In July the church of San Miguel Arcángel almost burned to the ground. The women of the village were unable to make offerings, owing to the Queen’s order that none approach Philip’s bier. A Royal Council investigator went to Hornillos at the end of July to investigate compensation claims for razed elm groves, slaughtered chickens and pigeons, stripped orchards, wheat fields, dove-cotes, apiaries and vineyards.46

6. 2. Whose royal authority? (December 1506-June 1507)

Tarsicio de Azcona compares ‘Juana and her counsellors’ to ‘disorientated walkers in an entangled landscape’. After Philip’s death, ‘chaos and disorder truly descended on [the] kingdom, governed by an infirm woman obsessed by accompanying the decomposing body of her husband across the frozen Castilian meseta, while the nobility took advantage of the situation to plot their disloyal machinations’.47 For Prescott, once the period of the provisional government had expired, Castile, ‘without even the shadow of protection afforded by its cortes, and with no other guide but its crazy sovereign, was left to drift at random amidst the winds and waves of faction’.48

How true is this picture of the first months of 1507? As already noted, traditional references to the ‘first Cisneros regency’ overlook the shift in power away from Cisneros in the first part of 1507. Salustiano de Dios refers to the difficulty of ‘pinpointing who governed Castile and by

46 AGS, Cámara de Castilla-Pueblos 9, f. 179-181
47 Tarsicio de Azcona, La Elección y Reforma del Episcopado Español (Madrid, 1960): 179
48 Prescott, History: 636
what right’ between Philip’s death and Fernando’s return. García Oro mentions ‘manifest splits’ between Cisneros and the Council, whose members distrusted the power and political ambition of the ‘regent’ and whose struggles with him set the pattern for future years. The nobility, too, were wary. While wanting him to arbitrate, they distrusted his military entourage and were reluctant to accept his leadership. According to Zurita, the Council objected that, while other militias had been banned, Cisneros had recruited his own, and his attempts to block royal provisions he thought controversial were resented. With the truce over and the procurators dismissed, the councillors ‘went about their business without taking much account of him’.

Until March, when it was indefinitely disbanded, Cisneros had clung to the hope that a Cortes could legitimate a regency government. According to Zurita, he had in mind the precedent created by the situation in the minority of Enrique III (r. 1390-1406), when a Cortes was asked to decide if Castile should be governed by individuals or by a regency council. Cisneros and Velasco continued to issue government measures, such as one offering Benavente the military command and town of Castrotorafe in exchange for his loyalty to Juana and Fernando. Such measures, incorporating Fernando’s name, show how closely he was associated with government in his absence and how, despite his championship of Juana, Velasco partially cooperated with Cisneros. Although Castrotorafe was an encomienda belonging to the Order of Santiago, of which Fernando was master, and thus strictly within his authority to bestow, it is not certain that decisions to couple Juana’s name with Fernando’s in this way were taken with Juana’s knowledge and consent. As late as June 1507 Martire told Tendilla that ‘supreme government’ was in the hands of the Archbishop and ‘Great Constable’.

49 Dios, El Consejo Real: 156
50 García Oro, Cisneros: 164-165
51 Zurita, IV: 190
52 Zurita, IV: 223
53 AHN, Nobleza (Osuna), C. 4201, D1, 12 May 1507, ‘Carta de segura’. Alcocer mentions that Fernando gave Castrotorafe to Benavente to ‘placate’ him (Relación: 24)
54 Martire, X, 350: 199-200, 28 June 1507
they were also opposed on key points, such as a Cortes and extension of the truce. The Council, too, anxious to retain royal authority, worried that a regency council could undermine it. Maldonado seems, thus, more accurate than Martíre when commenting that, after Juana’s arrival in Torquemada, ‘the kingdom was governed by the Royal Council, to whom the Archbishop of Toledo ... and Bernardino de Velasco ... lent support and resources ...’. But, as will be seen, during 1507 there was also a shift in relations between Council and Queen.

Dios argues that Juana’s ‘incapacity’ meant the Council had to assume ‘extraordinary functions of government’. An anonymous sixteenth-century Spanish chronicler gives a similarly heroic picture of the Council’s lonely endeavours in 1507, pointing out that the biblical book, Maccabees (1, 8) describes three hundred and twenty Roman councillors deliberating daily on affairs. If this was the case of Rome should not the mere ten or eleven men of Spain’s Royal Council who ‘governed alone’ for ten months and a few days, be held in yet greater esteem? Despite being ‘ill-treated by some grandees’, they worked intensively, ‘continually dripping with sweat’, to punish disobedience and villainy.

For Dios, the Council resumed its normal work after Fernando’s return. This begs the question as to what normality meant. Traditionally the Council oversaw the vast mass of government activity and affairs of justice, most of which did not require the royal signature. Nor was it unprecedented for royal councillors to work intensively during crises, including periods during the dual monarchy. In terms of output the royal provisions issued are broadly comparable. For June 1502, for example, the Registro General de Sellos at the General Archive of Simancas contains over three hundred provisions, compared to over four hundred in June 1507.

The exceptional number of almost nine hundred in October 1506 (compared to the already busy month of September 1506, when almost seven hundred were issued) may partly reflect the agitated political aftermath of Philip’s

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55 Zurita, IV: 222-223
56 Maldonado, La revolución: 45
57 Dios, El Consejo Real: 156
58 BL, Additional Ms. 15568, ‘Como el Rey’, f. 23-24v.
59 Dios, El Consejo Real: 156
death. In January 1507 the number drops to two hundred and sixty six, while in February 1507 it rises to almost six hundred, and in March, to almost seven, slightly diminishing again in the months between May and August 1507.

The wide range of issues covered in 1506-1507 shows a Council not solely engaged in crisis management. It dealt, for example, with repairs to the bridge at Tordesillas; outstanding monies owed Juana’s sister, María, Queen of Portugal; the distribution of bread in Granada; the Count of Salvatierra’s ill-treatment of persons involved in suits against him; financial support for university students; perennial questions of moneda forera – the tribute paid to the monarch every seven years in recognition of royal dominion, etc. The Council worked on Isabel’s will in conjunction with Lazárraga, an acknowledged expert on its contents and implementation. The chanceries, too, appear to have functioned, and on 5 February a cédula from Juana in respect of justice administration in Vizcaya was incorporated in the Chancery ordinances.

Evidently, there were numerous challenges to the Council. Zurita believes its task was aggravated by the intermittent nature of Juana’s interventions. Her refusal to act (to sign) on a systematic basis helped confer apparent legitimacy on Fernando’s opponents, who spoke of ‘service to the Queen’. On the other hand, the fact that Juana did sometimes act meant the Council ‘feared to deal with matters with authority and vigour because it did not know if Juana would take contrary actions’.

But if Juana’s intermittency of action created confusion, her general attitude was clear. A more serious dilemma for the Council arose from differences of approach to Philip’s former allies and officials, with Juana, Alba and Velasco on the hawkish side of the argument (despite Velasco’s apparent moderation in respect of his son-in-law, Benavente and other deudos) and Fernando, Cisneros and Enríquez on the other. The refusal to publish Juana’s December law meant royal councillors were obliged to act as if it did not exist; yet details might have leaked out and, as the Seville

60 AGS, RGS-1507, 1-7
61 Order of 5 February 1507 (Palencia), included in AGS Ordenanzas, lib.1, tit. 4, f. 51
62 Zurita, IV: 233
procurators show, Juana’s opposition to the acts of Philip’s administration was well known. Thus, various royal provisions not only failed to reflect Juana’s wishes, but were widely seen not to reflect them, adding to unrest.

One of the Council’s key tasks was to intervene in the nomination of corregidores and to carry out tomas de residencia, by sending royal officials (jueces de residencia or pesquisadores) to examine any outstanding claims of malpractice in the royal cities. A pragmatic law of 1500 had attempted to respond to allegations of malpractice, including absenteeism, dereliction of duty, excessive salaries and improper influence over local interests, with a series of reforming measures. According to the law, a corregidor had to be entirely and exclusively devoted to the Crown and his salary limited to a specified sum. Local magistrates (often magnates) were to be suspended during the corregidor’s term of office, and replaced by officials brought in from outside, paid and answerable only to the corregidor – who, although empowered to change municipal laws, could only do so with the consent of the regidores. The corregidor was required to remain in his former jurisdiction fifty days after the end of his term of office – in principle no longer than two years – to respond to claims against him.63

Nevertheless, Lunenfeld refers to a downward spiral in the authority of the corregimiento between 1504-1516, underscored by ‘unstable dynastic fortunes which permitted the aristocracy to dig deeper into urban life by tearing away at the prestige of the crown’s representatives’.64 In his own study of the role of corregidores in the political conflicts of Castile’s cities at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Máximo Diago Hernando notes that the Catholic monarchs had not succeeded in consolidating their reforms to the point at which they had become irreversible. The political struggles between 1504-1521 threw into relief the fact that wide sectors of urban society had never fully accepted the reforms carried out by the monarchs in this area. Some, distrustful of royal centralising tendencies and the diminution of the political independence of the cities, or critical of continuing aristocratic domination, corrupt practices, apparent lack of impartiality, and so forth, sought other models of local government, such as

63 Edwards, The Spain: 57-58
64 Lunenfeld, Keepers: 167
those based on oral tradition. Indeed, Diago Hernando reminds us that for
certain groups the period between 1504-1521 did not represent chaos and
disorder so much as a chance to experiment with alternative methods of
local government.\textsuperscript{65}

While, as Diago Hernando points out, there had always been unrest
among the city elites, and as Lunenfeld shows, and the views of outspoken
urban officials like García Sarmiento and Gonzalo de Ayora indicate,
grievances had accumulated from at least the last decade of Isabel’s rule, the
situation was exacerbated further by Philip’s struggle with Fernando for
control of Castile. After Philip’s death and during Juana’s effective reign the
troubled situation in many royal cities between groupings with different
political allegiances arose partly from the hangover of that struggle. Philip’s
insensitivity in appointing corregidores lay, as Villaescusa had pointed out,
at the root of his widespread unpopularity. Moreover, the Council’s clashes
with royal cities over corregidor appointments between the end of 1506 and
early 1507 show how, by defying Juana’s wishes and by trying to mollify
former felipistas, it helped fan the flames it had hoped to douse.
Specifically, we have seen how the Seville procurators argued that
Andrade’s appointment to that city as asistente was invalid because not
supported by Juana. According to Andrade’s biographer, García Oro, the
fact that this Galician noble never reached the city may have been connected
to Juana’s December law, even though it was not promulgated until later.\textsuperscript{66}
If so, Andrade’s experience suggests it could have had a cooling rather than
inflammatory effect on Castile in general.

At the end of 1506 Casaus and Serrano reminded the Council that it
had ‘sent the Count of Valencia to Asturias and he was not received, and
others who had been sent to other cities had also been rejected …’\textsuperscript{67} This

\textsuperscript{65} Máximo Diago Hernando, ‘El papel de los corregidores en los conflictos políticos en las
ciudades castellanas a comienzos del siglo XVI’, \textit{En la España Medieval}, 2004, 27: 195-
223. Diago Hernando points out that: ‘… el periodo comprendido entre los años 1504-
1521 presenta un indiscutible interés, porque fue entonces cuando por ultima vez se planteó
la posibilidad de buscar una alternativa para dicha institución, bien mediante la
recuperación o potenciación de figuras tradicionales, como eran las de los oficiales de la
justicia foreros, o bien mediante la instauración de otras nuevas, que no llegaron a quedar
suficientemente perfiladas’. (197)
\textsuperscript{66} García Oro, \textit{Don Fernando de Andrade}: 87
\textsuperscript{67} BL, Egerton Ms., ‘Relación’, f. 140
was a somewhat euphemistic way of describing violent and sometimes fatal incidents. In the situation of Oviedo (Asturias) to which the Seville procurators refer, Philip had appointed Enrique de Acuña, Count of Valencia de Don Juan, before the previous corregidor had completed his term of office. On 7 January 1507 the Count entered Oviedo in secret but faced prolonged armed resistance. The situation was not resolved until March, when the Council appointed a fresh corregidor, Licentiate Francisco de Cuéllar.68 In Murcia, a group of regidores snatched the wands of office (varas) from the officials of Philip’s corregidor Garci Tello, and handed them to the Adelantado of Murcia, Pedro Fajardo. On 14 October the Council, speaking as Juana, claimed it was ‘my pleasure and will’ that Philip’s appointment be upheld – a fiction surely recognised for what it was.69 As in Cartagena and Lorca, reprisals were threatened if the regidores did not comply.70

In respect of Cuenca the Council again acted against the spirit of the December law. When, in 1506, Aragonese corregidor Mosén Fernando de Rebolledo left Cuenca to join Fernando, guardamayor Diego Hurtado de Mendoza stepped into the vacuum, claiming the officials Rebolledo had left were governing badly. After the appointment of Philip’s corregidor, Martín Vázquez de Acuña, a large sector of the Conquense political elite refused to obey his orders. The Council insisted it was Juana’s ‘will’ that Philip’s corregidor be obeyed.71 Faced with armed resistance, the Council sought military help, but could not dislodge Hurtado de Mendoza, who projected himself as the true upholder of Castilian interests, nominating administrators to rule in Juana’s name.72 The Council’s action on Cuenca was, Zurita comments, ‘very dangerous at a time when weapons could do more than laws’, and when the Council lacked adequate military backing.73 Ironically, unable to impose order, the Council wrote to Juana to ask what they should

68 Diago Hernando, ‘El papel’: 213
70 op. cit., 164: 250-251; 167: 253-255
71 AGS, RGS 2-1507, f. 336 (Cuenca)
72 Juan de Mariana, Historia general de España (Madrid, 1849), 3: 95
73 Zurita, IV: 190
do.74 Her reply, if any, is unknown. For Diago Hernando the situation in Cuenca in 1507 illustrates the extent to which ‘the representatives of monarchical authority were unable to gain respect or obedience in those first difficult months of 1507’.75 For this, a Council that preferred to maintain the fiction of representing Juana rather than carry out her known wishes must be largely responsible.

Similar problems arose when nobles took advantage of Philip’s death to seize fortresses like Gibraltar, Segovia and Ponferrada. Segovia provides a striking example of the way in which Queen and Council were at odds. When Philip appointed Manuel governor, ousting the Moyas, they set siege to it. On 30 March the Council ordered the Moyas’ son, Fernando de Bobadilla, to withdraw his forces.76 According to Zurita, it was only Cisneros’ intervention that prevented the Council from going as far as to declare the Moyas ‘rebels’ and confiscate all their assets.77 In the event, the Moyas regained the fortress on 15 May. A large procession of nobles, military captains, soldiers, municipal officers and local inhabitants wound through the streets and the royal pennant was raised to the cries of ‘Castilla, Castilla, for Queen Doña Juana!’

The Segovia conflict, pitting Manuel against Isabel’s oldest friends and allies, provides the clearest illustration of the way in which the royal authority invested in the Council could conflict with the royal authority of the young queen. The Moyas’ rule was harsh and highly controversial.78 But for Zurita the Council’s provisions were as ‘dangerous’ and ‘prejudicial’ as those on Cuenca.79 As in Cuenca, the outcome seemed to wrongfoot the Council, which must have been aware of Juana’s delight at the Moyas’ victory – ‘the most welcome event of her reign so far’, Zurita comments, although noting that she did not overrule the Council’s measures.80

74 Zurita, IV: 178
75 Diago Hernando, ‘El papel’: 211-212
76 AGS, RG3 3-1507 (Segovia)
77 Zurita, IV: 190
79 Zurita, IV: 190
80 Zurita, IV: 177, 230
But, as Zurita himself indicates, Juana had been thwarted by the Council’s decision to block the second crucial measure he attributes to her—a reversal of Philip’s appointments of fortress governors that would have restored the alcazar to the Moyas.\textsuperscript{81} It is, at any rate, clear that, once settled in Hornillos, she sought to inject drive and coherence into the Council. ‘She summoned the councillors from Palencia, where most reside’, Martire wrote. ‘She retained those she knew, chosen in former times by her parents; she dismissed the ones chosen by her husband and ordered everyone to find lodgings. Neither pleas nor warnings could persuade her to modify her intention by permitting some of the new ones to remain. She entrusted those she chose with the task of governing until her father’s arrival. So, here we stay with her, in the hovels and military-style tents put up for us. The others returned to Palencia’.\textsuperscript{82}

As noted above, in December 1506 Juana had made her first attempt to get to grips with government administration by appointing four councillors to lead government affairs while trying to oust Manuel’s appointees. Nothing, however, seems to have happened until she made her second attempt early in May 1507.

The tables below show the changes made by Juana in December 1506 and May 1507. Table 1 shows the Council’s resident \textit{letrados} at the end of 1506. The separate columns do not necessarily reflect a radical political divide, and several councillors held other government-related posts, such as Dr Juan López Palacios Rubios, who served as \textit{teniente} in Manuel’s \textit{contaduría}. Table 1 does, however, reflect a situation of competing and overlapping loyalties, contributing to the sense of drift between September 1506-April 1507. The role of the presidency had grown during the reign of Isabel and Fernando. The Bishop of Jaén, with whom Philip had replaced Juan Daza, Bishop of Córdoba, exerted an important influence as the voice of the Crown, and seems to have largely supported Cisneros in his attempts to hold these competing loyalties together and, in effect, to maintain the status quo in terms of the measures that Philip’s ephemeral government had introduced. Table 2 shows a Council re-structured by Juana.

\textsuperscript{81} Zurita, IV: 164
\textsuperscript{82} Martire, X, 339: 184-185, 1 May 1507
*Table 1: Royal Council showing Philip's appointees and those who retained their posts*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philip</th>
<th>Isabel and Fernando</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bishop of Jaén (president)</td>
<td>Dr Lorenzo Galindez de Carvajal*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Francisco de Ávila</td>
<td>Dr Pedro de Oropesa*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Alonso de Castilla</td>
<td>Dr Juan López Palacios Rubios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate Miguel Guerrero</td>
<td>Licentiate Luis González de Polanco*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate Fortún Ibañez de Aguirre</td>
<td>Licentiate Toribio Gómez de Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate Francisco de Sosa</td>
<td>Dr Fernando Tello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr García Yáñez de Mújica*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Letrados* Juana chose in December 1506 to take a lead in the administration of government and justice

*Table 2: Royal councillors under Juana*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Presidency vacant, provisionally filled by oldest councillor</em></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Martín Fernández de Angulo†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Lorenzo Galindez de Carvajal*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Pedro de Oropesa*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Juan López Palacios Rubios</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licentiate Luis González de Polanco*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licentiate Toribio Gómez de Santiago</td>
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<td>Dr Fernando Tello</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr García Yáñez de Mújica†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate Francisco de Vargas†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate Luis Zapata†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Quorum of four selected by Juana in December 1506*
†Royal councillors re-admitted by Juana in May 1507

While the president withdrew, Juana dismissed Philip's other appointees on 5 May. She also put an end to the third *contaduría mayor* by dismissing Manuel together with his *tenientes*, Francisco de Ávila, Palacios Rubios (who remained a royal councillor), Pedro de Laguna and Martín Sánchez de Araiz. The *contadurías* under Juan Velásquez de Cuéllar and António de Fonseca continued to function.83

83 In 1516 Cisneros was advised to reinstate the third *contaduria* under Manuel, who had left Spain in 1507 and whose old 'passions' had reportedly cooled in adversity (AGS, Câmara de Castilla, 4, f. 127, 9 June, 'notas remitidos desde Flandes al Cardenal Ximenez de Cisneros'). However, Manuel became Charles' ambassador in Rome.
Although not unprecedented, such moves were seen as radical. Royal councillors, at least, were theoretically appointed for life.\textsuperscript{84} Zurita describes a lengthy discussion between Juana and the dismissed councillors in the presence of Villena, Ureña and the Constable. ‘Who appointed you to the Council?’ the Queen asked. She herself, the councillors replied, in an order signed with her name. Juana argued that they had not served her honourably, at one point, turning sharply on Villena to retort that he, with his agudezas, had dishonoured her as they had. She ordered them to return to their pre-Council posts ‘because she wanted all to return to the state in which it had been before she disembarked in Spain …’.\textsuperscript{85}

Alonso de Castilla, a noble councillor who had been appointed by Philip on 21 August 1506, requested a second audience. According to Zurita, she asked him where he had lived before joining the Council. When he replied: ‘In Salamanca’, she told him drily to return to his studies.\textsuperscript{86} ‘It seemed’, Zurita comments, ‘such a pertinent and sensible remark … because of his poor reputation as a letrado.’\textsuperscript{87} This opinion may have originated with Galíndez de Carvajal who later reported to Charles that he was noble, but no scholar.\textsuperscript{88} Eloy Bullón y Fernández describes Juana’s dismissal of Castilla as occurring in an ‘interval of lucidity’ and showing ‘great proof of sanity’.\textsuperscript{89} For Prescott, the dismissal of Castilla reflected one of her ‘partial gleams of intelligence, directed in this peculiar way’.\textsuperscript{90} Castilla was, however, reappointed to the Council on 26 September 1516.\textsuperscript{91}

Juana reinstated three councillors whom Philip and Manuel had dismissed, asking them to ‘serve me’ as they had served Isabel.\textsuperscript{92} Dr Fernández de Angulo, native of Córdoba, Archdeacon of Talavera, doctor of

\textsuperscript{84} Dios, \textit{El Consejo Real}: 282
\textsuperscript{85} Zurita, IV: 226
\textsuperscript{86} According to Martinez Millán (\textit{La Corte de Carlos V}, III) Castilla had been a disciple of Luis Marineo Siculo, at Salamanca.
\textsuperscript{87} Zurita, IV: 226
\textsuperscript{88} CODOIN, I: 122-127 ‘Informe que Lorenzo Galíndez Carvajal dió al Emperador Carlos I sobre los que componían el Consejo Real de Su Majestad’
\textsuperscript{89} Eloy Bullón y Fernández, \textit{El doctor Palacios Rubios y sus obras} (Madrid, 1927): 99
\textsuperscript{90} Prescott, \textit{History}: 636
\textsuperscript{91} Dios, \textit{El Consejo Real}: 155n. See also AGS, Cámara de Castilla, 4, fs. 27-28. Cisneros was advised by Brussels to reappoint Castilla as a ‘buena persona y ... bien estimado en las cosas de Ytalía’.
\textsuperscript{92} Zurita, IV: 226
canon and civil law, former prominent royal councillor, Cortes _asistente_, ecclesiastical expert and bibliophile, was a friend of Marineo Sículo, who describes his outlook and conduct as ‘humanissimus’. Highly influential with Isabel, Angulo had been a witness to her will and, with Múgica and Zapata, had overseen Prince Juan’s political education at Almazán. Galíndez de Carvajal describes Zapata as highly experienced, ‘honest’, an ‘old Christian’ of ‘clean’ blood, but not very scholarly. He and Carvajal are the councillors with whom Cisneros, during his 1516-1517 regency, was advised to consult weekly on the examination and despatch of petitions.

Galíndez de Carvajal’s view of Vargas was less complimentary; he was self-regarding, self-interested and ‘extremely covetous’. Conchillos, too, described him as having his ‘hands in the dough’. Vargas had served under Isabel and Fernando. As procurator for Madrid in 1506, he had been among the delegates chosen to approach Juana in Burgos. He became a formidable financial operator and, with Zapata, a Comunero target. Zurita highlights the vigorous effect of Juana’s reinstatement of Vargas, noting that, by August, and in conjunction with Juan Velázquez, he was already exerting an influence on the public finances. The signatures of Vargas, Angulo and Zapata start to appear in May, as, for example, on a provision ordering Andrade to withdraw the unauthorised presence of his men from the rural settlements of Ontoria, Zazuán and Fresnillo, _beherías_ close to Aranda. In May the Council also launched a judicial investigation into allegations that García Sarmiento, _corregidor_ of Medina del Campo, had publicly referred to Fernando as ‘having done nothing but rob’ Castile and to Isabel as being in hell for her bad and oppressive rule.

Juana’s moves show her determination to imprint her wishes on government, and end the differing affinities in the political and financial

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93 Lynn, _A College Professor_: 152
94 CODOIN, I, ‘Informe’: 123-124
95 AGS, CCA 8, f. 107, ‘Memorial’ [1516]
96 CODOIN, I, ‘Informe’: 122-127
97 RAH, Salazar, A-12: 86v. Conchillos uses the expression ‘trae las manos en la masa’.
98 Zurita, IV: 250-251
99 AGS, RGS 5-1507, f. 07
100 AGS, E 1-2, f. 192, 17 May 1507, ‘Pesquisa contra algunos que hablaron mal de la Reyna Católica y su marido’
structures of Castile. But they were challenged both by Fernando’s supporters, anxious to prevent unrest, or maintain the notion of the Queen’s incapacitation, and by his detractors. Martire notes the ‘pleas and warnings’; Zurita mentions Cisneros’ and Velasco’s opposition.\textsuperscript{101} Juana stood fast. The signatures of Guerrero, Ávila and Sosa are absent from royal provisions in June 1507, although the names of Sosa and Aguirre reappear among Fernando’s nominations for 1508.\textsuperscript{102}

At a time when any action by Juana was freighted with significance, former felipistas were now forced to recognise she was never going to favour a ‘Habsburg’ solution. According to Zurita, the dismissed councillors met Manuel in Burgos and, with Borgo and Nájera, attempted again to set up parallel administrative structures with their own accountants, chancery and so forth, issuing independent provisions in Juana’s name.\textsuperscript{103} Borgo had been circulating letters – ‘false bulls’, Conchillos calls them – in the name of seven-year-old Charles.\textsuperscript{104} These, Zurita claims, were distributed secretly in case the Queen was provoked into ‘signing’ if she discovered them.\textsuperscript{105} Martire reported that Veyré and Borgo were promising ‘great things’, fuelling sedition; Borgo told Martire he had to ‘obey orders’ to oppose Fernando in every way possible.\textsuperscript{106} Conchillos describes Borgo at Torquemada, ‘bull’ in hand, inviting procurators back to Burgos to discuss the themes of ‘juramento’ and ‘tutoría’ as the basis for a future regency government. But Borgo’s overtures led to violent clashes; Granada’s representative, Rodrigo de Bazán, threatened to kill the ambassador.\textsuperscript{107} Zurita has Bazán exclaiming that ‘if he, who was the least of the Queen’s vassals felt that anything contrary to her service and honour was being done, he would take [Borgo’s] life’.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{101} Zurita, IV: 225. Elsewhere Castilla is referred to as a former criado of Cisneros (AGS, Cámara de Castilla, 4, f. 28, 9 June [1516/1517].
\textsuperscript{102} Dios, El Consejo Real: 155n.
\textsuperscript{103} Zurita, IV: 235
\textsuperscript{104} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 127-129, 7 March 1507, to Almazán
\textsuperscript{105} Zurita, IV: 131
\textsuperscript{106} Martire, X, 335: 179, 12 March 1507
\textsuperscript{107} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 127-129 (postscript)
\textsuperscript{108} Zurita, IV: 191
When referring to Borgo, Martire does not clarify whether Maximilian or Margaret, who had assumed the regency of the Low Countries on 22 April 1507, lay behind the ‘bulls’. Certainly both worried that, if returned to power in Castile, Fernando could undermine Charles’ right to the Castilian inheritance by promoting the cause of his younger grandson, or a future son of his own. While maintaining diplomatic relations with Fernando, Maximilian had sent Borgo to England in December 1506 to secure funds and troops from Henry VII for an invasion of Castile, and promised to arrive imminently. He tried to rouse resistance to Fernando among Castilian nobles, cloaking them in Juana’s authority. The Queen, he told Querini in Strasbourg, had withdrawn to Granada to mourn beside the bodies of Philip and Isabel, wishing to leave matters to certain grandees. As regards Fernando, Juana had not, at first, wanted to ‘believe that he could have behaved so badly and with so little love and charity towards her and her husband’, and she was now reluctant to nominate him governor.109

Meanwhile, Borgo’s letters to Margaret from Hornillos in April and June 1507 refer to his meetings with grandees like Nájera and Villena, and the need to keep them sweet.110 Another of his letters, dated 6 May 1507, and sent from Torquemada to Galician noble Pedro Bermudez, shows how the Cremonese was trying to stir agitation. Identifying Charles’ rights and interests with Juana’s, it expresses Charles’ readiness to pay Bermudez for former services to Juana and Philip, and tells him to prepare for his arrival in Spain that spring, when he will take Bermudez’ sons and kin into his household. Borgo’s letter was accompanied by a message in Charles’ name, bearing the earlier date of 7 February, and asking Bermudez to discuss with Borgo various matters concerning ‘the service of God, the Queen our lady and myself … for the good of these kingdoms’. The signature, ‘El Príncipe’, is followed by the formula ‘by order of the prince with the authority of the emperor, grandfather and father of his highness’.111

But although Manuel remained intransigent, others had begun to succumb to Fernando’s sweeteners. On 11 May 1507 Benavente swore

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109 TNA, PRO 31/14. 2, 8: 5, 31 March 1507, Querini transcripts
110 ADN, B. 244495; 24496; 24497; 24576, to Margaret
111 In Rodríguez Villa, Bosquejo: xxiv-xxvii
loyalty both to Juana and her father, after receiving promises from Fernando. At Hornillos, on 19 June, Villena declared his service to the Queen, and Charles as her heir, on the grounds that, although Fernando maintained that it was Juana’s will that he return as governor, he, Villena, Juana’s servant, had ‘neither heard nor seen that the queen … had said this in writing or by word of mouth’. But just two days later, on 21 June, as Ferrer conjured the mirage of the restoration of his marquisate, Villena capitulated to Fernando.

6.3. The south (April–June 1507)

While Borgo plotted with Manuel, and Fernando bought support for his return, Juana’s administration faced other problems. The turmoil in Andalucía was discussed at Cavia in November 1506, when Cisneros, Velasco and Enríquez promised to examine allegations of inquisitorial abuse. But in the spring, the Royal Council decided to act, and were supported by some of the closest members of Juana’s clerical entourage.

Almost thirty years after the systematic establishment of the Inquisition under royal control (figure 29), Andalucía was still suffering the aftershocks. In 1498 Fray Diego de Deza, formerly Prince Juan’s Dominican tutor and chaplain, was appointed Inquisitor General of Castile and Aragon. In 1504 Deza also became Archbishop of Seville, and, with Fernando, offered full support to Córdoba’s deeply controversial inquisitor, Diego Rodríguez Lucero (Martínez’s ‘Tenebrero’). Urged on by Fernando, Lucero launched a series of inquiries into claims that a network of secret synagogues and visionaries, apostates and messianic prophets were subverting Catholicism. Between 1501 and 1504 hundreds of persons and

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112 AGS, PR 7, f. 102, ‘Juramento de fidelidad’
113 AHN (Nobleza), Frias, 18, f. 149, ‘Protesta de Diego Pacheco, Marqués de Villena’
114 AGS, CCA 11, f. 12, ‘Escritura otorgada por D. Diego López Pacheco, Marqués de Villena’
115 Zurita, IV: 122
Figure 29. ‘Virgen de los Reyes Católicos’, also known as ‘Virgen de la Inquisición’. Fray Pedro de Salamanca [?], c. 1497. Saint Thomas Aquinas and (far left) a figure thought to be Inquisitor General Fray Tomás de Torquemada, accompany Fernando and Juan. On the right, with Isabel and the Infanta Isabel, are Domingo de Guzmán, founder of the Dominican order, and (far right) Pedro de Verona. During Juana’s effective reign a number of prisoners persecuted by inquisitor Diego Rodríguez Lucero were released after a Royal Council investigation. Formerly in the Convento de Santo Tomás de Ávila. (Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid)
effigies were burned. Hundreds more were imprisoned in the Inquisition’s headquarters in the alcázar, including nobles and clerics. Immediately after Isabel’s death, Lucero turned his eye upon former chief officials of Isabel’s administration, like royal secretary Fernández Álvarez de Toledo and royal treasurer Gonzalo de Baeza. He also arrested close family members and associates of Talavera, seeking papal permission to initiate proceedings against him on charges of instigating secret synagogues. On 9 June 1506 Fernando told Rojas, his ambassador in Rome, that he believed Talavera to be guilty. The papal inquiry into Lucero’s allegations against Talavera was confided to Ruffo on 30 November 1506, while the Bishop of Burgos assumed Talavera’s defence in Rome. Ruffo subsequently exculpated Talavera and his relatives.

Many in Castile, as in Aragonese realms like Sicily, where Fernando’s imposition of the Spanish Inquisition was hugely unpopular, placed their hopes in Philip and Juana. On 30 September 1505, although confirming monarchical support for the Inquisition as such, Philip ordered, in his and Juana’s name, suspension of the Inquisition’s activities pending their arrival in Castile. Philip may have been primarily concerned to remove powerful supporters of Fernando, like Deza, from key positions in Andalucía’s political and ecclesiastical hierarchy. Naturel thought most of Lucero’s arrests were aimed at Philip’s supporters with the Inquisition as a political vehicle for Fernando.

Philip had chosen the Bishop of Catania to replace Deza. But after Philip’s death Deza returned as inquisitor-general, although with no specific permission from Juana. In Edwards’ words there was by now a ‘full-blown social and economic, as well as political and religious crisis’. In October 1506 the Marquis of Priego and Count of Cabra, acting ‘in the service of the

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118 See Chapter 7 for further details about the situation in Sicily.
119 CODOI N, VIII: 337-342, Philip and Juana to Inquisitor General and Consejo de la Suprema
120 ADN, B 18846. 29621, 14 May 1506, to Lachaux and Veyré
121 Edwards, *Torquemada*: 48
Queen', seized the wands of office from the officials of Philip’s absent corregidor, marched into the alcázar, where the tribunal was based, and freed the Inquisition’s prisoners. Lucero fled the city, disguised.\textsuperscript{122}

Córdoban municipal and church authorities wanted action from Juana as their ‘native-born mistress’. They claimed to have substantiated allegations that Lucero used torture, threats and extortion to extract false confessions. He and Deza had brought ‘infamy’ to Córdoba and offended Juana’s royal person by arresting the city’s emissary to Juana, Alonso de Toro, on the royal road to Burgos. Juana was urged to order Deza to place judicial proceedings against the ‘heretics’ in the hands of bishops or judges of integrity and to persuade Rome to replace Deza as inquisitor general. In a hint of revolutionary days to come, city and church authorities warned Juana that, pending a royal remedy, it would confederate with other cities (such as Seville) to resist the inquisitors if necessary.\textsuperscript{123}

Córdoba’s second delegation to Juana included non-resident veinticuatro Ayora, whom Edwards describes as a ‘major campaigner against Lucero’s activities in his native city’.\textsuperscript{124} On 17 July 1507, Ayora reminded Almazán how, years before, he had warned that the misery of the south was ‘such that any neighbouring prince’, let alone Philip, could have thrown Fernando out.\textsuperscript{125} He urged greater distribution of wealth and fiscal reform, as well as reform of the Inquisition, to bring it within the rule of law, adding that poor administration of affairs in Burgos in the autumn and winter of 1506 had caused delays in his mission.\textsuperscript{126}

Córdoba’s was not the only appeal to Juana. Relatives of Inquisition prisoners at Jaén begged her to block judicial proceedings.\textsuperscript{127} On 14 May 1507, the day before he died, Talavera appealed to Juana to ‘defend the honour of God’. His appeal, also addressed to her Council, to Fernando, as ‘governor-in-waiting’, and to all grandees and prelates, claimed that Lucero and his associates did not want conversos in the kingdom, and were acting

\textsuperscript{122} Armando Cotarelo y Valeedor, \textit{Fray Diego de Deza}: 219; Zurita, IV: 176
\textsuperscript{123} AGS, PR, 28, f. 40, ‘Memorial de la ciudad de Córdoba a la Reina’ [undated]
\textsuperscript{124} Edwards, \textit{Ferdinand and Isabella}: 167
\textsuperscript{125} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 153, 16 July 1507, to Almazán
\textsuperscript{126} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 152-156v.
\textsuperscript{127} AGS, PR, 28, f. 39 (Inquisición)
against the holy Catholic church, ‘which did not seek a distinction between Jew and Greek’.  

For some Inquisition historians, Juana’s ‘madness’ meant she had no interest in its affairs or abuses. The Queen, claims Lea, was ‘keeping herself secluded with the corpse of her husband and was refusing to govern.’

Friends and relatives of some prisoners at Jaén had made a ‘last despairing appeal’ to her, begging her to suspend an auto de fè pending an impartial inquiry. But ‘Juana was in no condition to respond to this agonized prayer, and we may safely assume that greed and cruelty claimed their victims.’

In his essay on Ayora, E. Cat similarly blames Juana’s ‘madness’ for Ayora’s claim that the poor administration of affairs (combined with the spreading plague) had brought delays to examination of Córdoba’s case.

However, when assessing royal figures, one must examine not only the monarchs themselves but their advisers and administrations.

At this time Juana was surrounded by a remarkable group of prelates and clerics. She had travelled to Torquemada with the Bishop of Burgos, with whom she had pastoral links, but who had left shortly afterwards to defend Talavera in Rome. Two bishops and advisers and their friend, Martire – the ‘triumvirate’, as Martire calls them – remained with her: Villaescusa, ‘researcher of the secrets of the skies’; Muros, ‘more acute than Mercury’, and himself.

‘The intellectual importance of this group’, notes Martínez Millán, ‘... became clearly apparent in its early interest in acquiring news about the works of Erasmus ...’ He also mentions its interest in Lutheran reform, although by then the group had long disbanded.

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130 op.cit., 213
132 Ampudia ‘regaló ... para la ermita de Alconada, un portapaz y un cálix, ambos de plata sobredorada, amén de una rica casulla y unas dalmáticas de brocado, en cumplimiento de un voto que había hecho a la reina doña Juana I de Castilla ...’. Luis J. Peña Castrillo, ‘Ampudianos distinguidos’, PITT, 74 (Palencia, 2003): 288
133 Martire, X, 327: 169, 13 January 1507
134 Martínez Millán, La Corte de Carlos V, III: 48
the ‘triumvirate’ González Novalín claims it was highly influential in the
birth and development of Spanish humanism, adding that, in Torquemada
and Hornillos, they ‘alone spoke with [Juana] of pending affairs, especially
those relating to the Church’. These included church vacancies, papal
politics, the plague, the Inquisition.¹³⁵ His claim is, perhaps, based on
Martire’s letters, including one to Tendilla in July: ‘She has much ability
and a very good memory, this sovereign of ours. She penetrates acutely not
only into women’s affairs but into those of great men’. However, she did
not explain herself or take the initiative. No sooner did she give hope of
‘recovery’ than she dispelled it again.¹³⁶

Villaescusa’s ascendancy over Juana has been noted. He and Martire
were close associates of Talavera.¹³⁷ Muros’ name is associated with that of
Bernardino López de Carvajal, Cardinal of Santa Cruz, resident ambassador
in Rome, an ally of Talavera’s and correspondent of Martire, with whom he
later fell out. In 1494 Muros had been made Dean of Santiago de
Compostela, and in 1507 was at court, among other things, to try to recover
diocesan property from local nobles.¹³⁸

The ‘triumvirs’ shared similar literary, religious, political and
educational interests and endeavours. Juan’s death had inspired theologians
like Muros, Villaescusa and Carvajal to write treatises, which, in the case of
Carvajal, laid out the argument for the right of women to inherit the crowns
of Castile and Aragon. Villaescusa’s *Dialogi Quatuor* is, perhaps, most
remarkable for its vivid dialogue between Isabel and Death, and for the
complex arguments placed in the mouths of Isabel and Fernando with
respect to divine predestination and free will.¹³⁹ Another of Villaescusa’s
works, *De Christiana Religione*, probably written between 1502-1503,
argues for a more rigorous definition of heresy. This, he maintains, should
not be confounded with error, such as ritual practices with Jewish elements,

¹³⁵ José Luis González Novalín, ‘Pedro Mártir y sus “Triunviros” (1506-1522)’, *Hispania
Sacra*, 32 (March 1981), 67: 160
¹³⁶ Martire, X, 351: 200, 5 July 1507
¹³⁷ Martire, X, 335: 178, 12 March 1507
¹³⁸ García Oro, *Diego de Muros III y la Cultura Gallega del siglo XV* (Vigo, 1976)
¹³⁹ Tomás González Rolán, Pilar Saquero Suárez-Somonte, ‘Un importante texto politico-
González Olmedo, *Diego Ramírez de Villaescusa*: 239-296
performed inadequately, in ignorance, or under the dominance of others.\textsuperscript{140} Significantly, when Jorge de Torres, spokesman for the cathedral chapter of Granada, was charged with writing a defence plea to Rome on Talavera’s behalf, he asked that Villaescusa be listed among those to whom the case might be transferred.\textsuperscript{141}

Did Villaescusa’s views on inquisitional good practice affect Juana’s? Villacañas detects Juana’s hostility to the very name of the Inquisition in her frosty reception of the Dominican, Matienzo, in 1498.\textsuperscript{142} This possibly showed irritation with her parents’ interference in household matters rather than with the Inquisition as such. Given, however, the extent of Villaescusa’s influence upon her, it is scarcely credible that she was unaffected by his views on this, as on other matters.

On 1 May Martire told Tendilla that he, Villaescusa and Muros were ‘the only people whom the Queen allows to be seated in her presence …’\textsuperscript{143} In June he told the Duke of Infantado that he could not leave court because Juana ‘does not consent that anyone beyond us three … should take part with her in the ceremonies … She does not tolerate the presence of any cleric, apart from ourselves, except for the cantors’.\textsuperscript{144}

Martire does not explain why he and his friends should be so favoured. But the ‘triumvirs’ had been protégés of Talavera, or associated with him. Martire describes her favours towards them, which inevitably conferred prestige upon them at a time when inquiries into Lucero’s allegations were at their height.

That Juana, whose destination was Granada, shared the sympathies of her ‘triumvirs’ must, in the absence of concrete evidence, remain speculative. Nevertheless, it was in her court that moves were made to stop Lucero. The papers of the inquiry into Talavera’s alleged heresies have been

\textsuperscript{141} Azcona, La Elección: 260
\textsuperscript{142} Villacañas, La Monarquía: 741
\textsuperscript{143} Martire, X, 339: 184, 1 May 1507
\textsuperscript{144} Martire, X, 349: 197, 17 June 1507
lost or destroyed. But Martire records his collaboration with Talavera’s envoy to the court, canon Gonzalo Cabezas, and defence of Talavera before the inquisitorial judges, many sympathetic, in March 1507. Through his letters we know of Villaescusa’s initiative in providing a home for members of Talavera’s persecuted family, left destitute upon his death.

Juana’s councillors shared this sympathy to Talavera. Martire relates a conversation in a crowded Council chamber about news of his posthumous miracle-working, brought by a merchant. Tello exclaimed he was not surprised; Vargas compared him to St Jerome and the hermit Hilarion. This exchange occurred when the Córdoba crisis threatened to spill well beyond Andalucia. Juana and her Council, writes Azcona, summoned Deza to Toro, where he did not impress. Protonotary apostolic Martín de Azpeitia reported to the Congregation of Burgos in 1508 that, in Palencia, ‘with great application they [the royal councillors] completed examination of all the witnesses who had been brought from Córdoba, and also inquired into events in Toro’. According to Galindez de Carvajal, the Council intervened to calm the political turbulence the inquisitors were generating, and ‘acted with all possible diligence’ until June 1507. Declared innocent, the prisoners were released on the eve of the feast of St John (23-24 June). Thus, we cannot ‘safely assume’ with Lea that, under Juana, ‘greed and cruelty claimed their victims’ – not, at least, if the implication is that this was especially so of Juana’s brief effective reign. After a slow start, her Council responded ‘diligently’ to Córdoba’s appeals. The attitude and actions of her ‘triumvirs’ and Council in Talavera’s case contrast with that of Fernando who realised he could not sustain his support for Deza and

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145 Martire, X, 333: 175, 7 March 1507; 334: 176-177, 7 March 1507
146 ‘Tenías en Granada una casa adquirida con tu propio dinero. Se la regalaste a la hermana y sobrinas, por parte de ella, del primer Arzobispo granatense ... Tú las pusiste a cubierto, no bajo esteras ni chozas, sino en una cómoda casa ...’ Martire, X, 457: 360, 6 July 1511
147 Martire, X, 345: 193, 31 May 1507
148 Azcona, La Elección: 261
149 Azcona, ‘La Inquisición española’: 134, document of 1 June 1508
150 Azcona, ‘La Inquisición española’: 146
Lucero. But, even after Cisneros became Inquisitor General in Castile, no real overhaul of inquisitional practice took place.

6. 4. The north-west (April-August 1507)

While the cases of Cuenca and Segovia illustrate the problems faced by a Council unwilling to implement Juana’s wishes, that of the episcopal see of Zamora demonstrates three interlocking problems: the Queen’s failure to use her prerogative on episcopal nominations as enshrined in the *patronato real*; the opposition of Pope, King and Archbishop to the Council’s defence of royal authority as invested in Juana, and Fernando’s active pursuit of Castile’s governorship, in alliance with Cisneros.

As noted above, Juana had refused to sanction a list of proposed replacements to vacant sees for submission to the Vatican, arguing that she needed to consult Fernando before doing so. Whether Cisneros’ list included António de Acuña, then Archdeacon of Valpuesta, is unclear.

Although Acuña had deserted Fernando to work as Philip’s representative in Rome Fernando wanted to regain the support of this formidable priest, with his network of former *felipista* allies, and sent him to Rome to congratulate the Pope on the success of a military expedition to Bologna in 1506. On 15 December 1506 Fernando asked Cisneros to receive ‘my chaplain’, who could help regain Villena’s support. Fernando also wrote to Villena, asking him to welcome Acuña. His intervention infuriated Velasco, who drew a line between the Crown’s interests and Fernando’s. Velasco argued that Acuña was ‘the greatest enemy he had’ and that Fernando had no right to ‘act to the prejudice of the Crown, since the Queen had revoked the benefits made by Don Philip’.

Pope Julius told Juana he was nominating Acuña to the bishopric in early January. The Council informed Fernando it was lodging an appeal against the decision because it had been made without Juana’s ‘presentation or supplication’. It argued that, pending outcome of the appeal, Acuña must

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151 Ochoa Brun, *Historia*: 315
152 In Alfonso Franco Silva, *Entre la Derrota y la Esperanza* (Cádiz, 2005): 176
153 Zúñiga, IV: 183
154 Azcona, *La Elección*: 184
not receive any revenues from the see; the Dean and Chapter of Zamora must exercise jurisdiction and the fortress governors of the area pay homage to the Queen. The Council asked Fernando to urge the Pope to ‘conserve the Queen’s pre-eminence and patronazgo real’ in respect of Zamora.\textsuperscript{155}

Eager for Acuña’s support, Fernando failed to oblige.\textsuperscript{156} But the Council persevered, sending judge Rodrigo Ronquillo to Zamora on a mission of investigation and reprisal, extended on 6 April for forty days. The clash between the ‘terrible judge’ and the ‘unbending bishop’ was the first of several between these famous figures.\textsuperscript{157} After Acuña, having encircled Ronquillo’s posada and set fire to it, imprisoned the judge and his alguacil, Juan de Castroverde, at Fermoselle, the Council sent Fernando de Bobadilla to free them. But Bobadilla’s group were ambushed, disarmed and stripped. In the teeth of this insult to royal authority, the Council sent in the cavalry with a fresh judge, Fernán Gómez de Herrera.\textsuperscript{158} It urged the city of Salamanca, the Duke of Alba and other nobles to help Herrera free the royal officials and demolish a fortress Acuña was building in Fuentesaúco.\textsuperscript{159} It ordered the confiscation of the bishopric’s assets.\textsuperscript{160} On 2 May the Council set out Juana’s case against Acuña to Zamora and other cities and towns: Juana’s right of ‘presentation’ was an ancient custom; Acuña had procured the bishopric by taking advantage of the fact that ‘after the death of the King my lord I was secluded and did not deal with any government affairs’, but, in defence of her pre-eminence and patronazgo real, she was now ordering the Dean and Chapter, the city council and other councils of the area, to withdraw support for Acuña or be held traitors, with consequent loss of assets, posts and favours, and destruction of property.\textsuperscript{161}

Although Ronquillo and Castroverde were freed, Acuña could count on Benavente and Villena, as well as on Cisneros, and held out in

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{155 op. cit., 357}
\footnote{156 José de Castro Lorenzo, Don António de Acuña y su época (Valladolid, 2007): 54}
\footnote{157 Azcona, La Elección: 185}
\footnote{158 AGS, RGS 4-1507, f. 226, 20 April; f. 63, 23 April (Zamora)}
\footnote{159 AGS, RGS 4-1507: f3. 54; 55; 60; 62 (Zamora)}
\footnote{160 AGS, RGS 4-1507, f. 59 (Zamora)}
\footnote{161 AGS, RGS 5-1507, f. 240 (Zamora)}
\end{footnotes}
Fuentesaúco until 1508, when Fernando ceded him the bishopric. The Zamora case reflects the difficulties faced by a monarch and government with no independent military force at their command. It also throws into relief the wider power struggle that engulfed Juana and her government in April and May 1507. Nonetheless, the Council took a resolutely independent position in defence of royal authority.

As noted above, Juana had not yet managed to implement either her law on grants or her second law recovering the fortresses, much to the anger of herself and Velasco. It was not until 30 July, after Fernando had disembarked in Valencia, that sobrecartas were issued to the chanceries of Valladolid and Granada, and Galician authorities, promulgating her 18 December measures, and implementing her law on fortresses. But, while this helped Fernando recover the castle of Burgos, its implementation came too late to help with the crisis arising when Rodrigo Osorio, Count of Lemos, seized control of the fortress of Ponferrada in May 1507.

It was not the first time the counts of Lemos had seized Ponferrada, lost to them in a legal dispute, regained by force in the spring of 1485, surrendered in 1486. Opposed to Fernando, Lemos had turned to Philip and, after Philip’s death, declared he would maintain peace in Galicia ‘in the service of the Queen’. Lemos thus maintained he was not rebelling against the legitimate queen but defending her interests. Forces were mobilised against him not only in Galicia – where the men mustered by Fernando, Infante of Granada, governor of Galicia, combined with those of other nobles, cities and episcopates – but with armed forces from cities throughout Castile. At one point the crisis risked assuming international dimensions. The Duke of Braganza moved troops to the Galician frontier with the aim of helping Lemos, but the King of Portugal, married to Juana’s

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162 Castro Lorenzo, Don António: 61
163 ‘Y porque estuviese ya proveído por la reina, entendió luego que convenía a la paz y sosiego del reino, en mandar cobrar todas las fortalezas quien en tiempo del rey don Felipe se quitaron a los que las tenían’, Zurita, IV: 164. Philip had not granted Ponferrada to Lemos, but the law’s aim was clearly to preserve the royal patrimony.
164 RACV, Secretaría del Acuerdo, Caja 1.10, ‘Sobrecarta del Consejo ... conteniendo una carta de la reina Juana, dada el 18.12.1506’, 30 July 1507 (Palencia); Zurita, IV: 261
165 AGS, Camara de Castilla-Pueblos (La Coruña) 6, f. 340
sister, María, was reluctant to back Lemos' claims, or support Braganza, urging that Lemos make peace with the crown.  

The Council appealed to Lemos on grounds of duty of fidelity and loyalty to Juana as native-born sovereign mistress, as well as to previous oaths of loyalty made to her parents after the previous seizure of Ponferrada. It specifically based its appeal on Juana’s widowhood, as it had done when addressing the authorities of Zamora on 2 May. A provision of 15 June 1507 reprimands Lemos for taking advantage of the ‘sad death of the king … leaving me a widow and my kingdoms in much danger’. Whether Juana supported the Council’s recourse to the theme of the perils of widowhood and seclusion is unknown. Like the concept of ‘service’, the theme of vulnerable widowhood emerges as a pattern of argument that could as easily be exploited by one side as another. The January and February agreements between Osorio and Andrade similarly founded their alliance with the surrounding cities and towns on the perils of Juana’s widowhood, and on the ‘anguish and sorrow’ of the Queen, who, for this reason ‘does not wish to govern … nor has wished or wishes to delegate government to any person or persons …’ The same theme of defenceless widowhood was exploited by Juana’s capable and energetic camarera mayor, Ulloa, when later begging Cisneros to restore her regular payments, blocked by Adrian, for past services to Juana.

Yet the Ponferrada crisis reflects Juana’s involvement more clearly than other episodes. At the height of the crisis, she ordered Pedro Núñez de Gúzman to bring the Infante Fernando to Hornillos. The order, signed on 3 June, shows he had been in her thoughts, since she refers to a previous order not followed through because of uncertainty about the plague’s direction. She now sent Cárdenas to escort the Infante and his household, instructing them to come ‘by the places and paths that are most salubrious, so that, with

166 García Oro/María José Portela Silva, ‘Galicia y el Bierzo en el s.XV’, Annuario Brigantino, (2006), 29: 105-131
167 AGS, E. 1-2, f. 341, June 1507, ‘Provisión del Infante de Granada’; AGS, RGS, 6-1507, f. 05, to Lemos; RGS, 6-1507, f. 359, to Medina del Campo; RGS, 6-1507, f. 360, to Lemos, among others.
168 AGS, RGS 6-1507, f. 05 (Ponferrada)
169 García Oro, Don Fernando de Andrade: 278
170 AGS, E. 1-2, f. 287, April 1516, María de Ulloa to Cisneros
the help of our lord there is no detrimental effect on his health'. Since Juana's reunion with one of her male heirs had been anticipated for a while, no special political meaning can be read into its timing. But, combined with her actions vis-à-vis royal councillors and accountants, it was widely interpreted in terms of a reinforcement of her authority and, with Fernando on the point of returning, as a signal that she 'wished and was able to make orders and govern'.

On Ponferrada, Zurita claims she was influenced by two of Lemos' advocates and kinsmen - Enríquez and Cárdenas. Enríquez tried to dissuade Lemos from taking the fortress, but, after the event, declared before Queen and Council that Lemos had acted in good faith, and in Juana's name, and it was better to negotiate than fight. To Cárdenas Zurita attributes the use of 'certain stratagems' for instilling fear in Juana that 'the matter of Ponferrada would overturn the kingdom'. He and Enríquez doubtless knew how to exploit Juana's sensitivity to her rights, status and honour by raising fears about the true intentions of Lemos' adversaries, Benavente and Alba; by playing to her deep resentment about Cisneros' involvement in her affairs, and by presenting Lemos as someone who, concerned to protect the royal patrimony from rivals, had refused to agree to a Cortes without her permission. At all events, Juana seems to have wished to soft-pedal. Zurita records that she sent her quorum of four (Oropesa, Múxica, Polanco and Carvajal) to negotiate Lemos' withdrawal on her behalf, ordering them not to consult Cisneros. But, hearing of the royal mission, he sent other councillors. In response, Juana signed an order summoning her representatives back.

Since this order has not been unearthed we do not know exactly in what context it was issued and dated. Nevertheless, the circumstances illustrate intense distrust between queen and primate; Juana's concern about his 'meddling' and possible tensions between councillors. In mid-June Cisneros and Benavente met at Reinoso with Alba, Velasco, Ferrer and

171 AGS, CSR 12, 10, f. 438. This copy records Juana's signature ('Yo la Reyna') alongside that of her secretary, Juan López; Zurita (IV: 252) refers to Juana's signature on this order.
172 Zurita, IV: 252
173 ibidem
Council members before transferring to Hornillos when agreement could not be reached. Since Reinoso is close to Hornillos, it is difficult to see why the meeting should not have been held at Hornillos from the outset, unless there were fears that Juana would oppose Cisneros on the matter. Finally, however, the decision was taken to appoint Benavente and Alba captains general of the Queen. The appointments were confirmed in a royal provision of 16 June, signed in Magaz, and an additional order of 22 June, signed in Benavente.174

A message of 4 July from Ferrer to the Council offers a rare glimpse of communication between Queen and Council, and of Juana’s impatience with attempts to thwart her endeavours. Ferrer is shown acting as intermediary which, if habitual, means Fernando would have had constant privileged access to such communications. ‘It being Sunday’, Ferrer writes, ‘I was unable to speak to Her Highness until after mass. I told her what your worshipes wrote me, and with letter in hand in case she wanted to see it. Her Highness would like you to send whomever you think best to come here today. I told her I did not know whether it would be possible to get here today because of the distance involved. She said if it could not be today it should be tomorrow’.175

Juana wanted the councillors beside her, arguing there was plague in Palencia. They had, Ferrer replied, left Magaz for Palencia because Magaz had the plague. Juana’s reaction was terse: ‘She said she knew perfectly well what she was talking about, told me to be quiet and accept the order as she gave it’. Ferrer felt the councillors should not delay. Juana was speaking ‘very boldly about leaving here, and from what we can interpret this would be for the frontier with Aragon or kingdom of Toledo’. He does not say whether this was why Juana wanted to see the councillors. But, possibly suspecting that Juana wanted something to the contrary, he begged the Council ‘for the love of God’ to pursue their objectives on Ponferrada (Lemos’ surrender).176

174 AHN, Osuna, C. 420, D. 1. 2, ‘Provisión de la Reina Juana’
175 AGS, E 2-1, f. 32, 4 July 1507, ‘Negocios de Galicia’
176 AGS, E 2-1, f. 32, 4 July 1507
In the event these proved successful. Ponferrada, writes Bernáldez, ‘was besieged by order of the queen and her council, until he surrendered the fortress’.\textsuperscript{177} This happened on 30 July, when the Count handed it to his old ally, the Marquis of Astorga. Juana then ordered that the castle be returned to the safekeeping of its former Crown officer, Torres.\textsuperscript{178}

Fernando told Katherine that if he had not arrived when he did, ‘the patrimony of the Crown would undoubtedly have been lost’.\textsuperscript{179} After arriving at Valencia on 20 July Fernando contacted Lemos without consulting Juana. Zurita blames this on Juana’s refusal to move. Fernando ‘tried, with great cautiousness, to get the queen to approach the border so that he could start the sooner to provide in her presence for the tranquility and peace of the country …’ However, ‘as he could not persuade her to leave that hamlet of Hornillos … the king wrote from … Valencia to the count of Lemos to order him to restore things to their first state …’\textsuperscript{180}

However, Zurita’s account conflicts directly with a letter from Martíre, who for once abandons his passive image of Juana to convey the idea of an almost dynamic queen: ‘When she heard that her father had arrived, the queen would have rushed to the frontiers that separate Aragon from Castile if her father had not forbidden it in his letters’.\textsuperscript{181}

On disembarking, Fernando received Angulo, Zapata and Tello, whom Juana had sent to welcome him.\textsuperscript{182} On 17 August the Council explained to nobles and dignitaries that Juana had summoned some councillors and ordered them to inform the country of Fernando’s arrival, and set out to receive him, adding that ‘because the land is damaged [by plague] the people you take with you should be for your accompaniment and from healthy areas’.\textsuperscript{183} From Zaragoza Conchillos provides more details. Juana sent for Oropesa, Múgica and Polanco and asked them ‘how to proceed in such cases’. Her parents, they said, had usually dealt with such

\textsuperscript{177} Bernáldez, Memorias: 514n.
\textsuperscript{178} Zurita, IV: 255
\textsuperscript{179} CSP, Sp. (Henry VII), 554, November 1507
\textsuperscript{180} Zurita, IV: 258
\textsuperscript{181} Martíre, X, 359: 208, 25 August 1507
\textsuperscript{182} Zurita, IV: 256
\textsuperscript{183} RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 166, 18 August 1507, ‘Órdenes de la Reina Juana’
matters without the Council’s intervention. Juana, however, replied that ‘as she was not signing they must write to the grandees on her behalf that these would serve her by going to receive his highness, and serving him, as they would serve her person, and more. There was no need to send her alcaldes de corte because Fernando could make his own orders wherever he went.\(^{184}\)

When considering this report we must remember that Conchillos, Fernando’s secretary and ardent supporter, had earlier reported Juana signing a number of orders, but his assertion that ‘she was not signing’ fits the mould of incapacitation on which Fernando’s second prospective governorship was based. Clearly, Juana had decided to lay the emphasis on filial deference, referring to Fernando as ‘the king my lord and father of these kingdoms’.\(^{185}\) Conchillos reports that Velasco and Cisneros ‘regretted’ the orders. As Castilians, they doubtless felt that the terms of the welcome were too generous, even subservient. It was, however, a measure of the way the balance of power had already shifted towards Fernando that they felt powerless to prevent them.\(^{186}\)

Juana’s later bitterness about Fernando’s treatment suggests that her generosity was motivated less by the wish to cast sovereignty aside than by filial sentiments of trust and affection. That she also felt curiosity is suggested by a letter of 17 August, in which Conchillos tells Almazán that she asked Juana of Aragon, who had recently rejoined her, ‘what people the king is bringing with him, and \textit{inter alia} whether he was bringing the duke of Calabria’.\(^{187}\) Fernando of Aragon, Duke of Calabria, eldest son of Ferrante I of Naples, Fernando’s hostage since 1501, was later to marry Fernando’s widow, Germaine. Among different marriage plans for Juana then circulating, she had evidently heard the name of the young Neapolitan prince she had met in 1502.

Shortly afterwards Juana and her children set out for Tórtolos de Esgueva, travelling through the heat of the night, behind the \textit{chariot d’armes} and its black steeds. Before leaving Hornillos she went to the

\(^{184}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 167, 20 August 1507, to Almazán

\(^{185}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12: 166, ‘Órdenes’

\(^{186}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 167

\(^{187}\) RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 255, 17 August 1507, to Almazán
burned and battered church of the Archangel Michael and, according to the anonymous Spanish chronicler, ‘ordered that the canticle of St Ambrosio and St Augustine, Te Deum Laudamus, be sung’. As she listened, the twenty seven-year-old queen may have reflected on the mixed record of her first and only months as effective monarch. Rather than the ‘disorientated walker’ to whom Azcona refers, she was, like certain forbears, a monarch in flight from powerful subjects. Nor is it exact that she left Castile to the ‘winds and waves of faction’. Although Cisneros and Velasco continued, with Fernando’s blessing, to ‘meddle’ in her affairs, she had triumphed over Cisneros in preventing a Cortes. She had done much to end the paralysis engendered by competing political agendas within the Royal Council and contadurias. Her actions and Cisneros’ between them, albeit uncoordinated, had resulted, as Suárez notes, in the dismantling of the ‘Flemish’ party.

In Zurita’s judgment, her measures vis-à-vis the Council were of ‘much importance’ in bestowing authority on Fernando’s supporters. Yet Juana’s political instincts had sometimes clashed with Fernando’s and, while the Council showed that it could act independently of Fernando to protect royal authority and impose justice, it feared to defer to her wishes on crucial issues, even at the risk of further disorder and confusion.

In conclusion, Juana was less a ‘reina que no reinó’, unable or unwilling to govern, than one who rose to, and, to some extent, overcame, the challenge to her right to act independently. Nonetheless, she lacked sufficient authority and means to push through her objectives, and seems not to have resolved in her own mind the tortuous problem of her political relationship with Fernando. Although her laws on grants and fortresses were published at the end of her effective reign, her later imprisonment and resulting failure to oversee their implementation had resounding long-term consequences.

188 BL, Additional Ms. 15568, ‘Como el Rey’, f. 25
189 Suárez, Fernando: 422
190 Zurita, IV: 226
7. Dispossession and dissent

7. 1. Burgos or Granada? (1507-1508)

Some saw Fernando’s return in explicitly biblical terms. Inverting the roles of Juana and Fernando, an anonymous Spanish chronicler compared Fernando to Solomon, under whom Castile reassumed the ‘prosperous felicity’ only possible under male rule, while Juana became the foreign visitor, the Queen of Sheba, ‘who came from afar to see [him] in the place called Tórtoles’.¹ For Alcocer Fernando’s return was a ‘miracle’. Faction ceased, rain fell and 1508 became the ‘green year’.² Ayora, too, welcomed Fernando’s ‘necessary’ return to Spain, but reminded Almazán that Fernando was not Castile’s monarch. Already glorious and wealthy in kingdoms, he should not take Juana’s responsibilities upon himself, but look instead to his health and soul and to long-neglected reforms.³ Ayora did not want to see Fernando entangled in a legitimacy crisis deflecting him from a programme of fundamental reform, which, unimplemented, could end in armed rebellion. But, while the later Comunero uprising had multiple social, economic and political causes, the length and depth of the unrest between Isabel’s death and the events of 1520-1521 can be understood only when related to the slow-burning fuse that led from Toro and Tórtoles to Tordesillas.

Juana and Fernando met on 29 August 1507. Fernando ‘doffed his bonnet’, writes Zurita, ‘and the Queen’, accompanied by Juana of Aragon and the Marchioness of Denia, ‘flung back her capirote, which she wore on her head in mourning in the French manner, revealing her white tocas’. She threw herself at the king’s feet while Fernando bent his knee to the ground, ‘and they remained for a while in one another’s arms, and went hand in hand into the palace’.⁴ Juana ‘revealed her soul a little in those moments of joy. They conversed well into the night …’ Martire writes.⁵

¹ Bl., Additional Ms. 15568, ‘Como el Rey’, f.s. 26, 25
² Alcocer, Relación; 25
³ ‘... que los descargos de la Reyna ... que no les tome sy ...’, RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 153v., to Almazán
⁴ Zurita, IV: 258-259
⁵ Martire, X, 363: 213, 5 September 1507. Santa Cruz describes a similar scene, in which Fernando shed tears of joy.
Almazán, absent, placed the reunion in Hornillos when telling Jaime de Albión, ambassador in France, that Juana had publicly declared, amid general rejoicing, that she would leave ‘all in [Fernando’s] hands’. More cautiously, Zurita reports that as Fernando emerged ‘very cheerful and pleased’ from a two-hour conversation with Juana, ‘it was understood that she wished to honour him in all things and was of greater judgment and intelligence than was published’, and that she had ceded him the right to govern. Fernando assured Katherine that, after long discussion with Juana, he ‘had done whatever seemed requisite for the administration of justice, and for the peace and security of the kingdom, whereat the people were greatly rejoiced’.

This crucial process was described by Aragonese officials and by Fernando’s supporters. No official document confirms Juana’s desires or intentions and there was no rush, now, to convoke a Cortes. Years later, at the height of a new succession crisis, Ulloa relayed to Cisneros the words of an unspecified opponent of the Cardinal’s, who told her she ‘knew very well how, being in Tórtoles the day of the disturbances (ruído) some were saying “Long live the queen!” and others “Long live the cardinal!” and this with the king at the door …’ Is Ulloa referring here to a moment of Castilian dissension, unrecorded by the chronicles? What does seem indisputable is that, despite Ayora’s warning, Fernando ‘kept in their entirety his rights as a monarch’.

Four main steps can be distinguished by which Fernando assumed control of Castile. Firstly, the transfer of political control is reflected in the disappearance of Juana’s signature from even the most mundane documents (figure 30). Secondly, Juana’s household was brought under the control of Fernando’s former steward, Ferrer, while some key Castilian staff were incorporated into his own household. Fernando took possession of his grandson, the Infante, and Juana was surrounded by heavy security at Arcos de la Llana (Burgos), pending definitive imprisonment at Tordesillas (Valladolid).

On 4 September the court moved to Santa María del Campo. A first crack in the display of unity between father and daughter appeared in respect of

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6 In Aram., Juana the Mad: 95
7 Zurita, IV: 259
8 CSP, Sp. 1, 554, November 1507
9 AGS, E 3, f. 113 [Undated; February 1516], ‘Relación de María de Ulloa’
10 Martíre, X, 363: 214, 5 September 1507
Figure 30: Above, order to treasurer Ochoa de Landa of 20 December 1506, with Juana’s signature. Below, order to same, with Fernando’s, September 1507, when Juana ceased to sign her name. Royal secretary Juan López de Lazárraga, countersigned both. Archivo General de Simancas.
Cisneros when Juana insisted that Cisneros’ investiture as Cardinal of Santa Balbina, scheduled for 23 September, and just two days before the first anniversary of Philip’s death, be held in another church.\(^{11}\) The investiture, at Mahamud, is one of the last recorded examples of implementation of an order or desire of the Queen’s.

A solemn high mass marked the end of the formal year of mourning for Philip. Fernando told Puebla this freed him to approach Juana about re-marriage. Unknown to her, Henry VII had opened marriage negotiations with Fernando, who told Katherine that Juana did not seem, in principle, opposed to marriage, but: ‘... I know that she might incline towards something else, very contrary to this, and there is no one but myself who, in such a case, could dissuade her from the one and incline her to the other’.\(^{12}\)

The court left for Arcos on 8 October. Two days later Fernando went to Burgos. He returned to Arcos on 23 October, departing next day.\(^{13}\) Juana refused, wrote Venetian agent Andrea Rossi, to accompany him into ‘the territory where her husband died’.\(^{14}\) According to Martire, the Queen never again wanted to visit Burgos ‘where she had been deprived of her husband’.\(^{15}\) But to enter Burgos would have been to accept Philip’s reburial at Miraflores, and, in effect, admit that the cortège she had presided had been a nonsense. A papal brief that released Juana from her vow to bury Philip’s body in Granada could not persuade her.\(^{16}\) By remaining at Arcos Juana demonstrated the limits of her filial obedience. Rossi thought Fernando still hoped to bring Juana to Burgos; he went to Arcos two or three days a week to ‘court’ her.\(^{17}\) ‘When it is a matter of business we have meetings in both courts (curias)’, wrote Martire to a theological friend in early December 1507.\(^{18}\)

In reality, Juana no longer had a court. Although acting in her name, the Royal Council transferred its allegiance entirely to Fernando, who began to reshape Juana’s house, absorbing many of her former staff, including secretary

\(^{11}\) Martire, X, 364: 214-215, 3 October 1507; Gómez de Castro, De las hazañas: 203

\(^{12}\) CSP, Sp. I, 502, 15 March 1507

\(^{13}\) António Rumeu de Armas, Itinerario de los Reyes Católicos (Madrid, 1974)

\(^{14}\) Sanuto, Diarii, 7: 180, 31 October 1507

\(^{15}\) Martire, X, 367: 217, 12 October 1507

\(^{16}\) AGS, PR 2. 7, f. 52, 21 September 1507, papal brief

\(^{17}\) Sanuto, Diarii, 7: 225-226, 3 November 1507

\(^{18}\) Martire, X, 374: 223, 3 December 1507
Lazárraga. Cárdenas asked her doctor, Soto, to support his departure on medical grounds. Although Juana granted permission, Cárdenas ‘did not dare’ take leave in person in case she resisted. Before leaving, Cárdenas told staff to obey Ferrer in everything concerning his office. Muros and Villaescusa remained with Juana, attending the second commemoration of Philip’s death. A member of Muros’ household reported in July 1508 that: ‘The Bishop [of Mondoñedo] daily receives many guests to eat and sleep’.  

Pay lists for November 1507 show that Juana’s household numbered about one hundred and twenty, not all of whom were necessarily present at once. While Cárdenas formally remained mayor, Ferrer assumed effective control as cerero mayor. Later, Fernando granted Ferrer absolute power ‘in respect of everything relating to our service and the governance of [Juana’s] royal person and house and administration ...’, as can be seen from several orders to his contadores mayores, reluctant to obey Ferrer’s orders. Compared to the eighty or so women in Isabel’s household in 1504, there are extraordinarily few for the household of a sovereign queen. As Juana complained in 1511, she had only two dueñas (María de Ulloa and Beatriz de Mendoza). The lists are dominated by forty-two members of different armed units – if one lumps together the monteros, the escuderos de pie, the mozos de espuelas, the two ballesteros de maza, and the two reyes d’armas, or heralds, who later disappear altogether from the household lists. This number of armed officers, numbering forty-seven by September 1508, may reflect Fernando’s concerns about security. 

He tried hard to subdue Castile. Stile subsequently remarked to Henry VIII that Fernando ‘entendythe not, dureyng his lyfe natural, for to absent hym self from the governacyon of thys reame of Castyl, for as much as that the same ys the pryncypal susstentacyon of al his reamys and his astate’. In November 1507 Piedmontese diplomat Mercurino Gattinara told Margaret that, according to

19 RAH, Salazar, A-12, f. 208, Ferrer to Fernando [undated]  
20 González Novalín, ‘El déan de Santiago, don Diego de Muros’, Anthology Annu. 22-23 (Rome, 1975-1976): 75  
21 AGS, CSR 15. 7, f. 648, 25 July 1514, Ferrero to contadores mayores; CSR, 53, f. 21  
[1514]; Ferrero to contadores mayores; CSR, 12, 11, f. 441-442, July 1514, Ferrero to Ferrer  
22 Z. ADP 77. 787, 10 August 1511, Ferrero to Fernando  
23 AGS, CRS 55, f. 14-18, 5 November 1507, ‘Oficiales de la casa de la Reyna’  
24 LP, I, 162: 84, 9 September 1509
Borgo, "the King of Aragon does all he wants in Castile". Fernando earned 'much love', Rossi noted, by bestowing thousands of ducados on Castilian lords, 'some his friends and some his enemies'. He felt confident enough to summon Germaine, whom he had left in Valencia as lieutenant-general of Aragon. But she did not enter Burgos under the golden pallium, noted one observer, 'because here Queen Doña Juana, the king's daughter, is the only monarch who is recognised'.

In February 1508 Venetian senator Marino Sanuto (Marin Sanudo) included in his diary an extract of a letter from Rossi: 'The queen ... has had heated words with the king; and this [arose] because she herself beat certain pages who were sleeping in her highness’ antechamber, and she ordered that they be beaten for hardly any reason, and the king did not agree; and big words followed, in which she said: "This kingdom is mine", etc.' Sanuto does not clarify what provoked the Queen’s anger, reminiscent of her response when she discovered that Philip had placed bowmen around her in Brussels. But the 'big words' suggest Juana's growing unease as she became isolated from the court, suspicious of Fernando's intentions.

News of tension between them started to trickle through European courts. Stile fed so many details back to Henry about the discontent of Queen and grandees that Fuensalida could not believe Castile was not riven by aristocratic rebellion. There is fragmentary evidence that Juana did not agree with her father on aspects of foreign policy. Juana had asked to meet Germaine, whom she may have remembered from her visit to Blois in the winter of 1501. But, despite her courtesy, she seems to have harboured suspicions about her political influence and in 1520 hinted that Germaine (heavily pregnant in 1509) might have been involved in the decision to imprison her. Juana seems not only to have shared Maximilian's fears of the consequences of a new male heir to

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25 Le Glay, ed., Négociations, LXII: 205-215, 10 November 1507
26 Sanuto, Diarii, 7: 180, 31 October 1507
27 Fernández de Cordova Miralles, La Corte: 313
28 Sanuto, Diarii, 7: 371, February 1508
29 Fuensalida: 430, 21 March 1508
30 'La Reina Juana ha pedido a su padre le presente a su esposa - su madastra - para conocerla. La trajono y tuvieron una entrevista, durante la cual ella se levantó como ante su propia madre, le pidió la mano para besarl y la recibió con el respecto que conviene a una hija'. Martíre, X, 368, 5 November 1507: 218.
31 AGS, PR CC 4, f. 75, address to procurators, 1520
Aragon, born and raised in Castile, but of the wider consequences for
Maximilian and her children of Fernando’s alliance with France. In December
1507 Maximilian and Henry VII forged a pact, concerned that Fernando would
help Louis invade the Low Countries. Fuensalida alluded to English reports that
grandees had risen up ‘because [Fernando] wanted to send troops to the king of
France against the king of the Romans, and because the queen had said she
would not agree to troops leaving her kingdoms to fight her children’s
grandfather; and because of this your highness had secluded her ...’ 32

The question of Juana’s remarriage embittered relations between
Fernando and Henry: ‘... it was an amazing thing to see how beside himself
[Henry] was in this’, Zurita remarks, ‘and in order to conclude [the marriage] he
neglected everything else’. 33 She ‘made a very good impression on me when I
saw her’, Henry VII told Fuensalida in June 1508, referring to the meeting in
February 1506. ‘She struck me as having a fine bearing and manner and spoke
with restraint and complete authority; and although her husband and those who
came with him implied she was mad, she struck me, on the contrary, as sane’. 34

For Fernando, Henry’s obsession was a nuisance rather than opportunity,
raising a potential new challenge to Fernando’s governorship. Aram believes that
Fernando opposed Philip’s burial in Granada, not only because the place of
honour beside Isabel’s body was his, but because he ‘wanted to bury the memory
of Philippe as king by interring his corpse as far north as possible.’ She also
argues that: ‘Both Fernando and Juana saw Philippe’s uninterred corpse as an
obstacle to the queen’s remarriage and used it to ward off eager suitors ...’ 35 It is,
however, unlikely that Fernando and Juana agreed on this. The only evidence
that Juana rejected burial lies in Fernando’s exchanges with Henry, which
conflict with Juana’s former, publicly declared wish to conform to Philip’s will,
and attempt to reach Granada.

Fernando stresses only Juana’s irrationality: ‘... to obtain anything from
her requires great long detours, and even then scarcely anything can be obtained

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32. ‘Memorial touchant les affaires de France, de Castile, d’Arragon, de Flandres et autres
(Brussels, 1712): 61-63; Fuensalida: 443, 27 April 1508
33. Zurita, IV: 122
34. Fuensalida: 461, 5 July 1508
35. Aram, Juana the Mad: 97
... One can only approach her by degrees. I have done everything possible to persuade the queen ... to bury the body ... and have not succeeded; each time she tells me "Not yet". If it were done against her will, she would bring down the sky with her hands. It would utterly destroy her health. Henry retorted that Juana was not insane but unfree. Were Juana insane he would not want to marry her - 'not for her three kingdoms'. But Fernando wanted to 'keep her this way ... so he can seize everything for himself'. Later Henry returned to the attack. While Fernando and Germaine enjoyed festivities and jousts in Burgos, Juana 'is always where and how she is; although most people say that her illness is a fiction and others say it is not, I tend to the opinion of the former'.

In the spring of 1508 Stile met Juana. Unfortunately, Fernando's version is the only one we have for this meeting. Juana, he told Fuensalida, wished to see no-one, but, as proof of friendship, had allowed Stile a lone audience with her, so that Stile could present Henry's letters. Juana seems to have allowed him to speak freely, but made no commitment. Henry brushed this aside as meaningless; Juana, a prisoner, had been rehearsed. Stile later claimed what Henry already suspected: Fernando was using the unburied body for propaganda purposes. On 26 April 1509, two months after Juana's imprisonment at Tordesillas, and five days after Henry's death, Stile, as yet unaware of his demise, commented on: 'hym late kynge cors e not beyng beryed, by cause that the peppyle maye derecct [detect] the les dysereschyon [discretion] in the sayd qwyn, thys land now beyng perforce fully obedient unto the kynge of Aragon ...' Viewed from Stile's perspective, the quarrel between Juana and Fernando assumes the full-blown dimensions of a Sophoclean tragedy. Like Creon, Fernando's foremost concern was to impose obedience to himself, and respect for the rule of law. But his interests clashed with those of mad Antigone,

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36 Fuensalida: 437, 18 April 1508
37 Fuensalida: 442, 27 April 1508
38 Fuensalida: 460-461, 5 July 1508
39 Fuensalida: 469-470, 26 July 1508
40 Zurita, IV: 286
41 Fuensalida: 437, 18 April 1508
42 Fuensalida: 453, 17 June 1508
ultimately imprisoned for clinging to the fulfilment of a vow, regardless of the consequences.

7.2. Breakdown (1508)

Early in 1508 Venice sent Francesco Corner to negotiate new terms of friendship with Spain. Like Querini, Corner was embarrassed by his failure to meet Juana. When once in March he saw Germaine with Fernando at mass, he shunned a face-to-face encounter because he had ‘not yet visited the Catholic Queen ...’

When he reminded Fernando of his commission to make ‘riverentia’ to Juana, Fernando was evasive: he would ask her, but she ‘had not been visited by any ambassador’.

Fernando told Corner he was preparing to launch, from Granada, ‘a fine expedition to Barbary’. But first he must pacify the south. As Rodríguez-Salgado has noted, he was ‘never again to feel secure in the regency of Castile’. Despite his widespread purchase of support, various nobles remained cool, even hostile.

According to Bernáldez, Fernando was much exercised by reports that the Marquis of Priego, Count of Ureña, Duke of Medina Sidonia and Count of Cabra (the same nobles who had allied in favour of Juana against Philip) were making known their antipathy to Fernando’s governorship. In Córdoba the Marquis of Priego who, as alcalde mayor, had pitted himself against the authority of Philip’s corregidor in 1506, confronted Deza over the activities of Lucero, and joined forces against Cisneros’ provisional government after Philip’s death, was now involved in an outright challenge, not to the Crown, as symbolised by Juana, but to the authority of Fernando. Following Bernáldez, Edwards points out that Priego belonged to the party, or parcialidad, of Juan

44 Corner, ‘Dispacci, Spagna’, BNM (Venice), IT. VII. 1108 (7448), f. 322, to Senate, 18 March 1508
45 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 324v., 29 March 1508
46 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, fs. 339-339v, 29 June 1508
47 Rodríguez-Salgado, ‘La Granada, El León, El Águila y La Rosa’, in Belenguer, ed., De la unión de coronas al Imperio de Carlos V, III (Barcelona, 2000): 324
48 CSP, Sp.1, 586, July 1508
49 Bernáldez, Historia, II: 321
Daza, Bishop of Córdoba. A significant political and religious figure in the region, interested in the ideas of Francisco de Paula, Daza was to play a key role in the foundation there of a convent of the Order of Minims, and had been prominently involved in the campaign against Lucero’s abuses. President of the Royal Council at the time of Philip’s second arrival in Spain, he was thought to have been slow in coming forward to pay homage to the new king. Philip replaced him with Suárez de la Fuente del Sauce, Bishop of Jaén, whom Juana subsequently dismissed.

If Priego was an ally of Daza’s, he was also an Aguilar, closely related to the ‘Great Captain’, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, who had himself failed to rush to Fernando’s side in the summer of 1506, and was, in turn, closely allied to the powerful Constable. All Priego’s challenges – against lone rule by Philip; against Deza and Lucero; against Cisneros’ provisional government; against Fernando – seem to have been carried out in Juana’s name, although the extent to which this could be construed as a gesture of genuine support for the Queen, or one of simple opportunism, remains unclear. On 25 August 1507 – the month of Fernando’s return to Castile – Priego challenged his authority by expelling from the council chamber the officials of corregidor Diego Osorio when Osorio failed to present himself in the council chamber for the reading of a document extending his term of office. As in a number of cases outlined in the previous chapter, and as in that, too, of the failed convocation of the Cortes of Burgos, Priego declared that he would only concur if commanded to do so by Juana, ‘by her letter patent, signed with her royal name …’

Priego ruled the city with his brother, the Count of Cabra, until, in December 1507, a former corregidor, Diego López Dávalos, returned there to take up the post he had previously abandoned. Matters came to a head in 1508, when trouble broke out between members of Daza’s household and supporters of Dávalos. Fernando sent a court alcalde to investigate. Priego responded by

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50 Edwards, Christian Córdoba: The City and its Regions in the late Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1982): 159
51 Edwards, Christian Córdoba: 158. ‘This’, Edwards notes, ‘he must surely have known was impossible because of her insanity’. However, such actions can also be seen as a way of applying pressure on Fernando to take political account of the Queen, who had signed documents when a relatively free agent, but whose signature ceased altogether after Fernando’s return.
arresting him and taking him to the castle of Montilla.\textsuperscript{52} The Marquis, Corner notes, was supported by other nobles, and agitation was spreading throughout Andalucia.\textsuperscript{53} Although Priego quickly released the alcalde, Fernando felt he could not afford to turn the other cheek. Announcing that he was heading south to restore order, he refused to accept the Great Captain’s attempts at reconciliation. ‘The military expedition’, as Edwards remarks, ‘was therefore punitive in character and not aimed at restoring order’.\textsuperscript{54} But, if Fernando felt the need to re-assert his personal authority, he also shared Cisneros’ belief that security at home was an essential pre-requisite for holy war. The turbulent south was vulnerable to Muslim and piratical attack, while combined English, Flemish and imperial troops might also land in Andalucia.

When, in July, he announced that he would travel to Córdoba, he decided that Juana should be moved to the old royal palace of Tordesillas — logistically central but hard to breach, as Charles’ troops were to discover during the Comunero uprising. It was out of the question to take her (with Philip’s body) on a journey meant both as a military put-down of those who spoke and acted in her name, and a triumphal progress. How much he told her of his plans is not known, but Fernando stayed with her between 6-15 July, trying to persuade her to leave Arcos and meet him in Mahamud. Juana seems to have suspected a trap. He arrived at Mahamud on 17 July, waiting six days with mounting impatience.\textsuperscript{55} According to Corner, either one of the children was unwell or, as some said, ‘the Queen does not want to go’. She had started out, then turned back, saying: ‘We’ll go another day’.\textsuperscript{56} On 22 July, Fernando returned to Arcos, seized the Infante and encircled the place with troops, while the Admiral, Constable and Duke of Alba were ordered to remain on standby should help be needed.\textsuperscript{57}

On 30 July Fernando responded to Juana’s protests about his departure without her and seizure of the Infante: ‘God is witness to the regret that I feel in separating, Lady, from the place where you are, because there is nothing I like


\textsuperscript{53} Alcocer, \textit{Relación}: 26; Corner, ‘Dispacci’, fs. 340-341, 28 June 1508; 343v., 6 July 1508

\textsuperscript{54} Edwards, \textit{Christian Córdoba}: 159

\textsuperscript{55} Galíndez de Carvajal, \textit{Anales breves}: 321

\textsuperscript{56} Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 346v., 16 [July] 1508

\textsuperscript{57} Zurita, IV: 315
better than to be near you and to see you sometimes'. But God would be most offended if action were not taken to preserve ‘your justice’. He, Fernando, had felt obliged to remove the Infante from Arcos on health grounds. But she should not mind her aged father having the pleasure of ‘seeing [the Infante] while I cannot see you. For you know there is no-one I love as I love you and those of my own blood’.  

Fernando and Almazán knew that separating Juana from her son was controversial. Fuensalida reported that Stile and his agents were fomenting unrest: ‘It is not certain with whom [they deal], but they are continually quizzing the grandees, and asking who is who and what is their affinity, and [Stile] has written that you have taken the Infante away from the Queen, and that the Queen and grandees are unhappy…’ Almazán responded that the opposite was true, referring obliquely to the great propaganda value for Fernando of having the Infante, who had been taken ‘on St Magdalene’s Day’ (22 July), because grandees and people ‘liked to see the descendants of the King and late Queen’. Almazán portrayed Juana as a terrible mother, who had ‘shut him up … without allowing him to leave the room; he was unwell and his health and life were in great danger’.  

But Juana no longer controlled either her own household or the Infante’s. Other considerations doubtless predominated. That the value of the Infante for Fernando was largely strategic does not diminish the affection he felt for his grandson. Giovanni Corsi, a Florentine envoy at Fernando’s court, later wrote that: ‘The extreme love that this sovereign bears to the infante forces him day and night to think and imagine how best to establish him’.  

Juana’s enforced separation from the Infante (figure 31) caused her ‘great emotion and grief’, Zurita writes. Álvaro de Osorio, his chaplain, confirms Juana’s protests. Ferrer describes the onset of what, in Tordesillas, became a nocturnal pattern of conduct, according to which a highly agitated queen

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59 Fuensalida: 463, 5 July 1508  
60 Fuensalida: 475, 9 August 1508  
62 Zurita, IV: 314  
63 Rudolf, ‘Yo el Infante’: 50
repeatedly roused him from sleep to complain, question and demand. She wanted Fernando to return to Arcos urgently and to know the whereabouts of the Infante, to which Ferrer replied in vague terms – ‘he’s well’.

Letters from Fray Francisco Ruiz and Dr Parra, dating from well after the Infante’s removal from Arcos, reflect concern about the boy’s persistent fevers. As Karl Friedrich Rudolf points out, Juana had good reason to be worried. But the Infante’s well-being was not, perhaps, her sole concern. His abduction confirmed that Fernando was not prepared to respect her politically.

In August Ferrer dismissed Juana’s northern chapel. Expensive, it might also have provided Juana with a channel of information to the Low Countries and Maximilian. Ancheta remained with her, as did Alonso de Alva, whom Duggan describes as a ‘skilled contrapuntalist’ and ‘one of Spain’s best composers’. Still, the loss of her chapel, numerically small but musically highly significant, and of such importance to Juana, was another blow.

On 9 October 1508 Villaescusa informed Fernando that he had received reports about a breakdown in her health. She had not washed or changed since the Infante’s departure, sleeping and eating on the floor and often missing mass because her meal times were so irregular. Zurita reports that in December Juana fell ill. The loss of her son and crumbling of illusions about her father had traumatised the Queen, bringing about the collapse invariably, but mistakenly, associated with Philip’s death.

Fernando arrived in Córdoba on 5 September 1508 with a formidable armed force, outraging the grandees. As in the summer of 1506, nobles found themselves walking a tightrope between respect for his authority and the demands of honour. The Council’s audacity in opening an investigation into the conduct of Priego, a nobleman, let alone in finding him guilty of lease maiestatis crimen, which carried the death penalty, re-ignited old resentments about the legitimacy of Fernando’s position, which no new Cortes had agreed. Relations

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64 RAH, Salazar, A-8, f. 120-122 [undated; probably July 1508], to Fernando
65 RAH, Salazar, A-13, f. 115, 13 May 1510, Ruiz to Almazán; Rudolf, ‘Yo el Infante’: 51-52
66 AGS, CSR 14, 3, f. 172, August 1508, ‘Lista de la capilla flamenca despedida’
67 Duggan, ‘Queen Joanna’: 89, 92
68 RAH, Salazar, A12, f. 262, 9 October 1508, to Fernando
69 Zurita, IV: 355
between Fernando and Velasco were cool.\(^{70}\) When Fernando reproached him for subordinating the Queen’s service, and his, to other interests, the Constable questioned the whole foundation on which Fernando based his governorship: that his and Juana’s interests were one. Some things he could pass over, Velasco retorted, ‘but to say he subordinated the service of the Queen to particular interests’ was like accusing him of treason and affected his honour so deeply that he would rather leave the kingdom ‘honestly’, like a good soldier. Fernando was shaken by the cold, sharp distinction Velasco drew between father and daughter. To serve Fernando was ‘a matter of discretion (gracia); to serve the queen was a matter of natural justice (razón natural) and necessity (premia)’.\(^{71}\)

Always the consummate politician, Fernando mixed clemency with \textit{ira regis}. While flogging and hanging some of Priego’s associates he spared Priego’s life, but banished him from Andalucía in perpetuity, deprived him of all royal offices and demolished his castles, including Montilla, spiritual home of the Aguilar clan.\(^{72}\) Edwards attributes Fernando’s severity to the fact, signalled above, that ‘many Andalusian magnates, including the marquis of Priego and the count of Cabra, were anxious that Fernando should not govern Castile’.\(^{73}\)

Fernando’s tenuous position was not helped by a row with Portugal, when, on 23 July 1508, Castilian forces seized the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, in the course of pirate-‘cleansing’ operations along the southern coast. In origin a territorial dispute, it quickly escalated into one over legitimacy. Claiming that the occupation of the Peñón constituted a breach of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which parcelled out the zones of influence and conquest between Castile and Portugal, Manoel sent Queen María’s secretary, Ochoa de Isasaga, for talks. In January 1509 Fernando broke off negotiations, complaining that Manoel ‘had expressed doubts about the legitimacy of the right he had to the government of Castile’, and insisting that he held Castile ‘by divine and common right’.\(^{74}\)

\(^{70}\) Rodríguez Villa, ed., \textit{Crónicas del Gran Capitán}: Iv, 456
\(^{71}\) Zurita, IV: 320-321
\(^{72}\) Alcocer, \textit{Relación}: 27; Zurita, IV: 320
\(^{73}\) Edwards, \textit{Christian Córdoa}: 160. However, as Edwards points out, the Córdoban nobility were not seriously affected in the long run.
\(^{74}\) Doussinague, \textit{La política internacional}: 158. An agreement was eventually reached in September 1509.
Evidently, Fernando still enjoyed support, especially among ‘Old Christians’. On 28 October he made a triumphant entry into Seville. Corner describes ‘universal jubilation’ at Medina del Campo, particularly among the ‘peasants’, and a warm welcome at Valladolid, where images of emperors of antiquity lined the route. Internationally, Fernando’s position drew strength from the Treaty of Cambray of 10 December 1508, which, in the context of a formal alliance against the Ottomans and, effectively, an alliance against Venice, agreed a suspension of the quarrel between Maximilian and Fernando over Fernando’s government of Castile and confirmed Charles’ right to the succession. Cambray was followed by the (third) Treaty of Blois of December 1509, setting out the mechanism for Castile’s governance, and a diplomatic triumph for Fernando. Even if Juana died, and he and Germaine had a male heir, his position was assured until Charles reached not twenty, as formerly agreed, but twenty-five. Fernando agreed, _inter alia_, to send the Infante to the Emperor, and to measures of financial compensation, settling Juana’s marriage settlement (which she had never received) upon the maintenance of Charles’ and his sisters’ households in the Low Countries.

Aram argues that, although excluded from negotiations, the ‘posture’ of Juana, who had ‘adopted ascetic practices’, favoured the outcome and that this paralleled her sacrifice of the right to rule in order to confirm Charles’ succession during the Cortes of 1506. But Juana never sacrificed that right and later criticised Fernando’s lack of diligence with respect to her interests, including her dower. Nor can it be argued that the Treaty of Blois particularly favoured Charles, since it extended Fernando’s rule and confirmed former Cortes decisions that Charles must never become king in Juana’s lifetime.

With his position stabilised internationally, Juana remained the sole major obstacle for a king who could only fight in Africa with Castile at peace.

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75 Corner, ‘Disacci’, f. 355v., 27 January 1508 [1509]. Alcocer reports the legend on one arch spanning a Seville street: ‘VOS, GRAN REY, SIEMPRE LO FUISTEIS É AHORA NO LO SOIS MENOS. PACE A ESTOS REINOS!’ (Relación: 30), See also Bernáldez, Historia, II: 322.
78 Aram, _Juana the Mad_: 103
79 Z. APD 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando. See also section 7.3.
80 Alcocer, Relación: 31
Although Henry VII’s death on 21 April 1509 removed an embarrassment, the question of Philip’s burial was just one of various fundamental disputes between Fernando and a sovereign he was stripping of power. At Mucientes in 1506 Philip had acceded to Enríquez’ argument that sight of Juana would pacify discontented nobles and cities. But Fernando shared Cisneros’ diametrically opposite view that Juana must be made invisible. Martire refers to the threats and persuasion with which Fernando tore her from ‘the doomed climate’ of Arcos, ‘as if she had been a tall elm tree with roots stretching to the very centre of the earth’.  

Corner describes Fernando’s single-minded concentration on the task. At Castroverde de Cerrato Fernando told him he hoped to be at Valladolid within a couple of days, but mentioned his ‘travaglio’; it cost him more trouble to escort Juana to Tordesillas than to ‘convey the whole of the artillery of the King of France, the Signoria of Venice and my own combined …’.  

Some, reported Corner, thought Fernando still meant to bury Philip at Mirafl ores. Others thought he planned to take Juana to Madrigal de las Altas Torres, where two illegitimate daughters were enclosed as nuns. But, Corner added, ‘most people say they will go to Tordesillas until His Highness feels the time is right for them to go on to Granada’ (my emphasis). Since ‘without the body the Queen would not go’, they would ride to Tordesillas by night behind the bier.  

Corner’s comment suggests that Fernando might have baited Juana with the argument that Tordesillas was just a stop on the Granada road. Perhaps Fernando had not yet determined that Tordesillas should become Juana’s permanent residence. In a royal order of 7 February 1511, underwritten by Juan Ruíz de Calcena, Fernando ordered Villaescusa to prepare for a change of Juana’s place of residence every six months, according to the recommendation of one of his officials, Francisco de Soria. Whether Ferrer received a similar order is unknown, and nothing came of it, but the order’s existence implies that Fernando had not fully decided how best to organise Juana’s captivity.

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81 Martire, X, 410: 275: 7 March 1509
82 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 363, Valladolid, 25 February 1508 [1509]
83 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 358v, 17 February 1508 [1509]
84 RB, II/2205, f. 13, Cédula, 7 February 1511
On 15 February 1509 Juana and Fernando set out for Tordesillas, travelling behind Philip’s bier. There were, Zurita writes, ‘many in Arcos who had come from Burgos and from elsewhere to see the Queen, because it was so long since she had been seen that many suspected she was dead’. Among those who came to kiss hands were the Constable and Duke of Alba. The cortege travelled through Villahoz, Castroverde and Renedo. Here Fernando left Juana for Valladolid, where, in the presence of the papal nuncio and various ambassadors, he ratified the Treaty of Cambray. The cortege then bypassed Valladolid to the south, via Simancas.

By enclosing Juana in Tordesillas, Zurita wrote, ‘an infinite number of evils and scandals were miraculously avoided’. Some associated Germaine’s pregnancy with Juana’s illness: ‘The deliverance of the quwn of Arragon of child ... ys ourely lo[kyd] for to be’, wrote Stile, ‘and of a swerty the qwyn of Castyl ys sore seke and yn grete jober[dy of] hyr lyf’. Just two days before the birth and death of the only child of Fernando and Germaine, Juan of Aragon, the Great Captain expressed a similar belief to Corner, who informed the Council of Ten that ‘... he told me that Queen Juana of Castile was very ill and not expected to live many months more ...’

Álvarez-Ossorio notes that, in saying that Juana might die, the Great Captain shared the ‘suspicions or desires’ of the ‘great malcontents’. He and his allies ‘perhaps hoped the death of the queen would weaken the position of the father as governor of Castile, and ... precipitate the arrival in Castile of Charles of Austria’. But Fernández de Córdoba might well have meant that the birth of a male heir could endanger the position of Juana and her children, or just that Fernando was an unscrupulous usurper.

This last, long, clandestine meeting with Corner took place in a ‘remote part’ of the church of San Francisco, Valladolid. The great military leader, closely allied to the Constable, told Corner that Fernando had never rewarded

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85 Zurita, IV: 355
86 Martire, X, 410: 275-276, 7 March 1509
87 Zurita, IV: 356
88 Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII, 34: 150, 26 April 1509
89 Corner, ‘Dispaici’, f. 373, 1 May 1509
him for his services, acting, instead, against his very blood. Now he offered himself unequivocally to Venice.91 His plans were thwarted only days later by the crushing defeat of Venice at the battle of Agnadello. But, aware of the political instability in Spain and Fernando’s deep unpopularity in Castile,Gattinara was still hoping, by late 1510, that the Great Captain might lead an uprising to proclaim Charles king.92 Although the Treaty of Blois, subsequently confirmed by the Madrid Cortes of 1510, had confirmed Charles as Juana’s heir, Carretero Zamora notes that the heir’s imprecise political role caused concern in Brussels.93

Corner, meanwhile, experienced Fernando’s political guile for himself. Encouraged by Fernando’s former affability, and reports of continuing good will, he rode to Tordesillas in driving wind and rain, in the hope that he might still be able to patch up some agreement. When at last he was ushered into the monarch’s presence he was shocked by the transformation in his appearance. Gone was the ‘jocund aspect’; Fernando was cold, even hostile. Corner pleaded in vain to be allowed to remain at least until the Signoria had granted him the customary permission to leave. He realised that Fernando had been dissembling for months while his Neapolitan army prepared to attack the Venetian possession of Apulia.

Paradoxically, it was at the very moment of departure that Corner found himself closest to being able, finally, to present his credentials to Juana. Although he wondered if the Great Captain’s words about her illness were exaggerated, he added: ‘it is true enough that, being at Tordesillas the other day, she had a fever, according to what was said, and was better and had accepted the visit of a doctor; that, until then, she had not wanted to see anyone’.94

But Corner was never to meet her. When unceremoniously shown the door, he had to face the fact that his mission was over.

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91 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 372-373v., 1 May 1509
92 Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, Gattinara: Carlos V y el sueño del Imperio (Madrid, 2005): 48
93 Carretero Zamora, ‘Crisis sucesoria’ in Foronda, ed., Coups d’État?: 586
94 Corner, ‘Dispacci’, f. 373, 1 May 1509
Figure 31. Portrait thought to be of the Infante Fernando (later King of the Romans and Emperor Ferdinand I). Master of South of Germany or Austria, c. 1520 (copy of c. 1515 original). He was a lovely and amusing child, writes Sandoval, with big and beautiful eyes. ‘He enjoyed listening to locos and to see and possess various birds and fierce animals’. (Kunsthistorische Museum, Palace of Ambras Portrait Gallery, Vienna)
7. 3. Those sleepless nights of summer (1508–1511)

Fernández Álvarez has rightly placed the imprisonment of Juana I in a gendered context: ‘Would the same thing have happened if it had been the son, that Juan who died in 1497? Would Fernando have dared? Would the Cortes of Castile have allowed it? But it was not a case of Juan but of Juana …’

In various cultures female confinement was thought necessary and desirable. Mary Perry observes that, for Spanish writers of the early modern age, ‘women by nature were less suited to exercise power than men’ and ‘required special protective enclosure’. She describes the enforced enclosure of widows of independent means, and the emparedamientos or walled-up houses that, since the thirteenth century, had provided absolute seclusion. In 1502 Lalaing noted how the practice of female seclusion brought a special intensity to the appearance of young, unmarried, women at court. Royal women were secluded too; in Charles’ many absences the Empress Isabel’s court was compared to a strict monastery. Fernando’s solution was to create a monastic environment for Juana within a royal palace – the same palace, as it happened, where her grandfather, Juan II, had been imprisoned almost ninety years earlier, before escaping during a hunt. In 1516 Ferrer told Cisneros that: ‘during the seven or eight years in which I have been the governor of this royal household and court, it has, God be thanked, been governed like a monastery and order of most honest friars …’

Chroniclers claimed Juana had freely submitted to seclusion. In 1513 Martire wrote, in somewhat contradictory phrasing, that Juana was ‘secluded of her own accord and always will be while she lives’. Her frequent rejection of food and luxuries had nothing to do with stoicism or disdain for temporal power; she might not care for riches or kingdoms, but did care for bagatelles.

Zurita, who knew Martire’s letters, takes a similar line. Her seclusion was ‘so suitable for the health and life of the queen that she lived in that house without hardly ever leaving it … so far removed from occupying herself with any

95 Fernández Álvarez, Juana la Loca: 174
96 Mary Perry, Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville (Princeton, 1990): 7: 9
97 Lalaing, ‘Voyage’: 179–180
99 AGS, E 1–2, f. 298, 6 March 1516
100 Martire, XI, 516: 103–104, 17 January 1513
kind of government business ... that she could be counted for dead'. She
‘abhorrred the name of the kingdom as if it were death ...’\textsuperscript{101} According to
Maldonado: ‘Queen Juana lived in Tordesillas, where Fernando had deposited
her with a truly regal entourage, but with no care for government (imperio),
dedicated to the education of her daughter and to domestic duties, and
surprisingly concerned with the repetion of funeral ceremonies for Philip,
whose burial she had not yet ordered’.\textsuperscript{102}

But seclusion was one thing, political imprisonment another. Stile
believed that she would be imprisoned ‘for the terme of hyr life’. She was
‘contynwethe wythe a smal company of servantys abowte hyr excepte Mo[sen]
Ferrer and such Arragonesys as hyt plesythe the kynge hyr fader, and the
bysschop of Malaga and the bysschop of Mondonedo; the wych byschoppys be
there for a countenance, but they speke not wythe the qwyn, nor to any man
except Monsen [Mosen] Ferrer’.\textsuperscript{103}

Later Stile reported the link being made between Juana’s irregular
attendance at mass, and hunger and thirst strikes, with a form of infantile
regression: ‘the Qwyn of Castyl ys of no sadnys nor wisdom more then a yonge
childe, and ys very febyl, for sche etetyhe nor drinkthe not some tyme yn twoo
or thre days, and hyrethe no mas some tyme yn ayzghte days, nor myndeythefhyt
not, but as a child having non order’.\textsuperscript{104} Guicciardini ascribed her condition ‘not
so much to female imbécility (‘la imbécilita del sesso’) as to melancholia and
humours’.\textsuperscript{105} Melancholy was a catch-all term to describe a condition that dwelt
on the ever shifting boundary between ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’, its symptoms
varying from vague sadness and introspection to a heated imagination, fomenting
restlessness and rebellion, and spreading like infection among those forcibly
confined, as Teresa of Ávila later noted.\textsuperscript{106} But as Pérez points out, Juana found
herself in a vicious circle, according to which new manifestations of ill-temper

\textsuperscript{101} Zurita, IV: 356
\textsuperscript{102} Maldonado, \textit{La revolución: 46-47
\textsuperscript{103} Pollard, \textit{The Reign of Henry VII}, 34: 148, 26 April 1509
\textsuperscript{104} LP, I, 162: 86-87, 9 September 1509
\textsuperscript{105} Guicciardini, \textit{Della Storia}, II, 7: 134
\textsuperscript{106} Carmelo Lisón Toledano, \textit{La España Mental: Demonios y Exorcismos en Los Siglos de Oro}
(Madrid, 1990): 126-129
towards her entourage, aggravated by imprisonment, were used to justify captivity.\footnote{Pérez, \textit{La revolución}; 77}

In some respects Juana’s situation was unique.\footnote{The conditions of captivity of Mary Stuart, for example, are not fully comparable. According to John Guy (\textit{My Heart is My Own}), she was, for much of her captivity, treated as an exiled ruler and guest, and had (variable) privileges, involving outdoor recreation and excursions. But Mary’s illnesses were exacerbated by ‘inactivity, stress and depression’ and she had an amethyst ring ‘contre la melancholie’.\footnote{Stuart Grassian, ‘Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement’, \textit{American Journal of Psychiatry} (1983); Sharon Schaler, ‘Sourcebook on solitary confinement’, Mannheim Centre for Criminology (2008). Both describe the effects of social isolation (or small group isolation) as well as solitary confinement.}} In others, it resembles that of many prisoners held either in solitary confinement or long-term social isolation in small groups. Deprived of sympathetic social contact, such prisoners are known to experience apathy; obsession; anxiety; aggression; surges of panic and rage; dreams of revenge; impulses to suicide; dirtiness and dishevelment; a sense of being in a fog; an inability to concentrate; disturbed sleeping patterns, like an inability to rest at night or resist bed during the day.\footnote{See \textit{Z. ADP} 787. 77, below} Juana exhibited these symptoms at various times. She could, nonetheless, collect herself before the outside world. When she expected visitors, or wished to attend mass at the nearby convent of Santa Clara, as permitted between 1509-1516 (and again in 1520), she washed, dressed and recovered her regal manner.\footnote{AGS, E 3, f. 113 [February, 1516], ‘Relación’} When trying, in 1516, to explain to Cisneros why Juana had been told about her father’s death, Ulloa mentions that, if she thought that people were coming to see her, she would wash, dress and wear shoes.\footnote{Zurita, V: 121-122}

Aware of the fact, Fernando once exploited it. On 12 November 1510 Madrid he took a group of ambassadors, prelates and grandees, including the Constable, Admiral and Duke of Alba, to Tordesillas. Fernando first visited her alone. Noting her unkempt appearance, and without informing her about the company with him, he brought them to see her. All were duly ‘amazed’. Zurita explains Fernando’s action as stemming from a desire that the ‘shame’ (‘empacho’) of being thus confronted, and by so many, would shock her into improving her habits of dress and conduct.\footnote{It is more likely, as Fernández...}
Álvarez has pointed out, that Juana’s captivity still generated controversy.\footnote{Fernández Álvarez, \textit{Juana La Loca}: 169} Although the Cortes of Madrid had assented to the Treaty of Blois, mutterings continued and Fernando may have wished to reassure important political players about the hopelessness of Juana’s state before he left Spain, as he planned, to fight in Africa. The significance of Fernando’s action was not lost on Juana: ‘The queen was greatly affronted’, Zurita reported, and tried to recoup prestige by pressing for changes in her female entourage. Unhappy with those Fernando named, she demanded others of greater ‘authority’, such as Isabel’s former ladies, Inés Manrique, the ‘old’ Countess Paredes and Violante de Albión.\footnote{Zurita, V: 122}

In an eight-page letter to Fernando, dated 10 August 1511, Ferrer describes Juana’s thoughts and conduct on the night of Friday, 8 August. This study has already referred to the letter, which has been completely overlooked by almost all Juana’s biographers, but reveals significant information about her life and concerns, the attitude of others towards her, and the relations between Ferrer and Fernando.\footnote{Z. ADP 787. 77, 10 August 1511, Ferrer to Fernando}

Ferrer begins by describing Juana’s life after a recent visit by Fernando. This was to ‘lie undressed in bed, and when she got up to throw a basquiña (a kind of skirt) around herself, then return to bed; and this for eight to ten days ... for many days she did not have her hair combed and had head lice ...’ Later she made a point of staying up and dressed, ‘for everything she does is by extremes and laziness ...’ On the evening of Friday, 8 August, she summoned Cornelia to help her wash prior to visiting Santa Clara. As she went downstairs, accompanied by Ferrer, she saw her dueña, Beatriz de Mendoza, standing in the patio. Since María de Ulloa usually waited with Mendoza, Juana asked her whereabouts: ‘I played the innocent’, writes Ferrer. Juana turned to her master of horse, Diego de Castilla, who said he did not know either. She ordered a montero to go to Ulloa’s posada. The montero, ‘as agreed’, replied that Ulloa was absent on necessary business. As the Queen became angry Ferrer intervened in Ulloa’s defence: persons with houses, children and land had sometimes to go home to attend to affairs ‘after so many years’. Juana retorted that Doña María went off
daily without leave. Doña María had more affairs than Fernando, and more still in the offering, while she (Juana), with only two dueñas, was now reduced to one.

Juana returned at about two in the morning. Retaining only Ferrer, she asked him about Fernando’s health and the route he had taken. She then:

‘... began so long a story ... that I thought I would not get out of there alive; and this was that when the king her husband died in Burgos the grandees there were all minded to serve and obey her and daily urged her to deal with government matters ... and that she, out of respect for your highness, and as an obedient daughter, intended always to wait for your highness so that he would assist her and her children and kingdoms, and this, she said, I knew very well because I had always been present, and still the archbishop [Cisneros] by which she means the cardinal, but never calls him cardinal, and the constable and the late lady doña María [possibly the Duchess of Roa] wanted to meddle in her affairs ...

And having named the lady doña María she began to complain that, because of the plans she had to take charge of her whole household she left Burgos purely to get away from her and the archbishop and that when your highness came from Naples she expected, with your highness’ favour, to govern all Castile, and that doña María de Ulloa was very much under her influence and also intended to claim her part.116

Was the late ‘Doña María’ that ‘aquella’ who, not content with trying to govern Juana’s household, dreamt of governing her kingdoms? Was Juana referring to herself, as Fernández Álvarez claims?117 Quoting some extracts from the letter, Fernández Álvarez argues that this phrase, in particular, shows that Juana wished and intended to govern, or co-govern. Language structure and context create an ambiguity here. But the possibility that Juana was criticising someone else’s ambitions does not invalidate the general argument about the Queen’s own expectations, which emerge from other passages of the letter and from many other statements. As Gómez de Castro states: ‘Sometimes she

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116 ‘y de aqy empezó huna istoria tan larga tomando el agua de tan lexos que yo pensé no salir de ally vyo fue/que quando el rey su marido murio en Burgos que los grandes que alli estaban/que todos estaban de proposito de la servir y obedecer/que ellos cadal día la importunaban para que entendiese en las cosas del reyno/que probeyese en ellas/ y en todo lo que dezia aprobaba con mygo/que ella por acatamiento de V. Al./y como fija obediente/que syempre tubo fin de esperar a V. Al. para que V. Al. remediase a ella/ a sus fijos/ y a sus reynos/ y esto dizyendo que byen lo sabia yo que en todo fuy presente/ y queahun el arçobispo/diziendo del cardenal que no le nombra cardenal/ el condestable y la señora doña Maria que aya gloria se le quysieron entender de sus cosas... y en aber nombrado a la señora doña María empezó de dar querrella que como pensó aquella de mandarla ya toda su casa/y como se fue solo por aquello de Burgos/por apartarse de ella/y del arçobispo/ y que quando V. Al. vyno de Napoles/que aquella pensó/ que con el favor de V. Al. abia de mandar toda Castiay que doña Maria/era mucho suya y que tanbyen pensó demandar su parte...’ Z. ADP 787. 77, fs. 2v.-3
complained about being deprived of the reins of government and being shut up in that prison’.  

Juana told Ferrer that Fernando treated her abysmally, as he treated the children; ‘she wished they were all dead, she and them (querya que todos fuesen muertos/ella/y ellos)’. Catalina had a cough; the Infante was being neglected in the care of ‘that woman’, Isabel de Carvajal, and the ayo, Núñez de Gúzman, and went about in rags. Returning to the events of 1506-1507, Juana regretted that her filial obedience had prevented her seizing the initiative. She could have turned for help to Maximilian, about whom she said ‘a thousand good things’, praising his ‘dignity’, ‘lineage’ and ‘valour’. Juana regretted she had not acted differently with the Castilian grandees. Their loyalty to Fernando had inhibited her from showing them she was their Queen, but if they had accompanied her into Tordesillas, they would return to take her out again. About this she said a ‘hundred thousand mad things’.

Fernando, she stressed, ‘had brought her here by force …’ Otherwise she would have had a household of ‘honourable women and all the other things’. But because he had forcibly imprisoned her at Tordesillas she had never been able to concern herself with her own matters or discharge her responsibilities. He ‘had ceased to pursue the matter of her dower in Flanders … and treated her like a dog, not like a daughter, not like a slave, for even slaves were treated with more consideration’. She linked her close confinement to her poor spiritual state:

‘… she should have taken the view that the day she was married her obligation to obey him had ceased and she was not obliged to obey, but free, especially with regard to her conscience and her soul, and for so many years she had not gone to confession or received communion because your Highness prevented it by holding her with these women against her will; and God would pay your Highness for the evil you do her …’

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118 Gómez de Castro, De las hazañas: 429  
119 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 4  
120 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 4 - 4v.  
121 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 4  
122 ‘y en fin, que por trayerla aqui V. Al. avia dexado de demandar la azyenda que tyene en Flandes de sus dotes/mas que tenia muchos fijos y que estava en poder de quien se la guardaria/y que V. Al. la trataba como a hun perro/y no como a fija/ny como esclava/que ahun de las esclavas se fazia mas quenta/y que deverya de pensar/que el dia que la caso salyo de su obedyencia/y que no era obligada a obedecer/que liberta era/mayormente en lo que tocaba a su consciencia/y a su anima que abia tantos afios que no abia confessado o comulgado en culpa de V. Al/ que se lo estorbaba con tenerla estas mugeres contra su voluntad/y que dyos pagaria a V. Al. segun el mal que le aze …’ Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 4v.
These comments give the lie to reports that Juana had resigned herself to captivity. Ferrer describes a woman raging against imprisonment, tormented and cruelly affected by it, brooding over past events, bitterly repenting her mistakes, cursing her father, worrying about her children, venting her spleen on those she saw enjoying the freedom of movement they denied to her. It seems likely that she had often retraced in her mind the road from Brussels to Burgos and from Burgos via Renedo to Tordesillas, pondering alternative scenarios.

Juana seems to have seen freedom not only as the right to leave Tordesillas at will but as the ability to reform her household and perform her spiritual duties in accordance with her status. Reform of her household – a demand of successive Cortes gatherings – was of primary political significance. It involved access to her subjects and resources; seeing and doing as she saw fit; meeting the grandees; being financially independent. Her remarks about her ‘conscience and soul’ show that, far from plunged into the childlike innocence Stile mentions, she was tormented by an apparent inability to confess to a priest or take communion. This she blamed on the fact and conditions of her imprisonment. Fernando ‘obstructed’ her by appointing women who ‘obstructed’ her in turn. She does not specify how they did this, although the letter implies that women watched her at all times, doubtless aware of her constant threats to commit the sin of suicide. Her hostility towards them, almost certainly, sprang from motivations similar to those that had driven her before: they were not answerable to her, but guards, as Ferrer and Ulloa point out in their respective letters to Cisneros in 1516.122 ‘All her enmity’, wrote Ferrer, ‘is focused on those serving her’.123 Her bitterness about Ulloa stemmed from her having taken leave without Juana’s permission, and answering to others – whether Fernando or Cisneros. It was to these figures that Ulloa, inevitably, looked to protect her family’s assets, estates and lineage.124

If apparently excessive, the Queen’s suspicions about Ulloa are understandable, especially since we know where her camarera mayor was at the moment that Juana was asking for her. Ulloa’s ‘affairs’ were largely taken up

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122 AGS, E: 113, Ulloa, ‘Relación’; E. 1-2: 298, 6 March 1516, Ferrer to Cisneros
123 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 5
124 See AGS, E. 1-2, f. 287 [1516], in which Ulloa protests to Cisneros that various payments for services to Juana had been suspended, and Charles’ reinstatement of these payments, E. 4, f. 77 [1517]
with the guardianship (tutoría) of her young son, Diego Gómez Sarmiento de Villandrando, third Count of Salinas. Writing on 22 July 1511 to Diego López de Ayala, just a few days before the Ferrer letter, Cisneros wrote: ‘... I am determined, God willing, to be in Burgos for the eve of Our Lady of August, and as you wrote me that the old Countess will be in the house of the Count of Salinas, and María de Ulloa will be there too, and the whole house will be full, I have agreed not to move my lodgings’. In a letter of 13 August, on the same theme, he added: ‘...’ and everyone will be fine there [in Burgos], and it has particularly pleased me that the lord Infante will be very well accommodated in the house of the Count of Salinas’.126 In other words, Ulloa would play hostess to Juana’s son, whom Juana herself could not see.

Juana’s remarks about her female entourage made ‘your hair stand on end’, Ferrer wrote, but were hilarious too, including accusations of lack of propriety and chastity. It was enough to make one ‘die laughing’ to see her casting around for enough adjectives. He had agreed, he told Fernando, to ask him, on her behalf, to dismiss the women and ‘to restore her to freedom’ (my emphasis). Juana told him that she wanted to substitute these women with others ‘suited to her estate’, but only after the current ones had gone, so that the incoming women would not be infected by contact with the rest.127

When in this agitated state, Ferrer found it best to let Juana continue ‘complaining about your highness and talking big and threatening that [Fernando] has to do a thousand things’ — then let it blow over. That night Juana ordered that her bed be made, and ate. Next Saturday she went to Santa Clara and remained silent about the matters they had discussed. He was trying, meanwhile, to ensure that the women ‘do not say or do anything more than I tell them.’ But, being women, and therefore imprudent, this was not always possible.

‘These words of hers are very malicious’, Ferrer concluded, ‘but have no foundation; everything is madness and raving’. Fernando could be assured he would do all that was necessary in his service: ‘And if you should see the queen at this moment, after rising, you would see her looking very well and very humble and not weak; but certainly with the great heat of the last few days, she

126 Gayangos, de la Fuente, ed., Cartas del Cardenal Don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros (Madrid, 1875), Carta XXXI: 69; Carta XXXIV: 72
127 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 5v.
gets even more troubled and blustery, and she quarrelled with Anastasia, who is very pregnant, and smacked her ...' Ferrer added that: 'since she is not sane, she is nothing, and whatever she says or can do amounts to nothing.' In a postscript he added: 'it is close to midnight [and] they have come to tell me that the queen is already at the bottom of the stairs with her mantle and capirote, to leave for the church. And if she gives us these bad nights too often we shall lack the health to go on serving her.'

Important as Ferrer's letter is in revealing Juana's state of mind in 1511, it also reveals much about himself and Fernando and the web of deceit woven around her. Ferrer, like the Denias later, links Juana's health to humility and obedience; the humbler and more obedient, the less ill she is. His report casts himself in the role of partner in a wider enterprise: 'I played the innocent'; 'she had me dead from being two hours on my knees'; 'she is nothing ...' etc. Ferrer writes as though he knows Fernando will only concur. Yet the mockery he feels free to use when describing such episodes is, possibly, the most surprising element of the letter. Fernando's evident tolerance of, and even complicity with, servants who felt able to express themselves in so disrespectful a manner about his own daughter – whatever her condition – is, quite simply, stunning.

7. 4. 'Pacific and eternal king': the Brussels coup (1516)

One of Sanuto's diary entries shows that the myth that Juana was awaiting Philip's earthly resurrection was taking root by 1515. While an 'apoplectic and tremulous' and highly unpopular Fernando shunned government affairs for cards at which he always lost, Juana was considered 'mad, and the king says so. She expects her husband to come to life again, and carries his body around with her in a coffin. She says his resurrection will take place at the end of ten years, of which only three remain ... She visits the houses of citizens, saying she chooses to remain there, and with difficulty is taken back to her own residence ...'  

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127 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 7v.
128 Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 8
129 The quotation derives from the title of a papal bull of 1517, reproduced in Carretero Zamora's detailed study of the succession crisis of 1516, 'Crisis sucesoria', in Foronda, ed., Coups d'État?: 575-593. Pérez refers to Charles' actions in 1516 as a 'coup d'état' in La revolución: 115
130 CSP. Sp. 2, 564, 13 January 1515
Yet, while Juana’s name on government documents remained a legal necessity in Castile, with Fernando’s secretaries, like Almazán and Conchillos, acting also in Juana’s name, it conveyed the impression of an active, receptive monarch. Even after Fernando’s death the Doge and Senate were asking their ambassador to press Cisneros to obtain from Juana a safe conduct for their vessels, as if she were sitting at her desk, reading and signing documents. A series of royal orders from 1515 conjure a queen concerned by disturbances arising from the fashion of wearing masks. As with many such documents, the salutatio is Doña Juana’s with all her titles. The signature below is Fernando’s, and the counter-signature adopts the formula: ‘I, Lope Conchillos, secretary of the Queen my lady, had this written by order of the King her father’.

According to Alonso García, ‘Juana retained the power to send her own representatives to the court of Henry VIII’. In practice, Juana had no such power. During Fernando’s marriage discussions with Henry VII, Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester, and a key figure of Henry’s government, had asked Fuensalida whether Juana had her own ambassador, to which he answered that the practice was to ‘write to the ambassadors in the name of both king and queen, but that the letters bore only the king’s signature’. Subsequently, Fernando applied a complex solution to the question of Castilian diplomatic representation at the Lateran Councils of 1512-1517, instructing his ambassador to England, Luis Carroz, to tell Henry that he would send two ambassadors to represent Castile. One, Fernando’s, would concede precedence to the English ambassador. The other would be the queen’s, ‘and ... I could not allow that she would lose pre-eminence’. He added that one solution would be for one ambassador to represent both Castilian and English interests by mutual agreement. In other words, he was protecting the status of the Castilian crown by ensuring that no precedence was set that could undermine it abroad.

In January 1516, while passing through Madrigalejo (Cáceres), Fernando fell mortally ill. Describing his death, Galindez de Carvajal, who was present, writes of Fernando’s hopes that his younger grandchild, the Infante Fernando,

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132 CSP. Ven. 2, 754, 2 August 1516
133 AGS, CC Personas 16, f. 2, ‘Máscaras’. My thanks to Isabel Aguirre for pointing out these orders.
134 Alonso García, El Erario: 251
135 BL, Additional Ms. 28572, f. 100-102v. [Undated; copy]
would succeed him as Castile’s governor. But Galíndez de Carvajal, Zapata and Vargas conjured the prospect of civil war, ‘with the Prince absent and the Queen Doña Juana alive’, urging him to accept Charles’ nomination as governor general in Juana’s lifetime. Fernando complied, although ‘almost weeping’. He reluctantly accepted that Cisneros should become temporary governor of Castile: ‘it ... did not seem that the king had taken the nomination well and he said quickly “You know his condition”, and there was a pause before anyone replied ...’.136

Fernando died on 23 January. His will named Juana ‘universal heir’ to the Crown of Aragon – a purely titular bequest, since ‘according to everything we have, in our life, been able to know of her she is very separated from the governing and administering of kingdoms, nor is disposed to do so’. He assigned the temporary governorship of Aragon to his illegitimate son, Juana’s half-brother, Alfonso of Aragon, Archbishop of Zaragoza. He acknowledged no political debt to Juana – nor, perhaps, could have done without raising awkward questions.137 Fernando’s body was dressed in a Dominican habit and accompanied to Granada by prelates and knights, where it joined that of Isabel in the church of San Francisco in the Alhambra. Throughout the long journey solemn obsequies were held. In Córdoba the cortege was received, among others, by the former rebels against Fernando, Priego and Cabra, who had, by then, been allowed back into Andalucia. These and other nobles walked on foot, ‘with much lighted wax’, bearing the coffin on their shoulders.138

According to Argensola, Ferrer and his staff were ordered, after Fernando’s death, to tell Juana nothing of the news, despite its massive importance to her.139 In Castile Cisneros seized possession of the Infante and assumed government in uneasy tandem with Adrian (Adrien Florizoon Boeyens) of Utrecht, Dean of Louvain and Charles’ former tutor, who had been despatched

136 BN, Ms. 1778: 1-22 (2v.), ‘Memorial y suma de algunas cosas que sucedieron después de la muerte del Rey Católico que fue en Madrigalejo a 23 de enero de 1516’, fs. 1-22 (2v.); see also Anales breves: 341-347
138 Sandoval, Historia, 80: 71
139 ‘Ordenose que a la Reyna Doña Juana ... no se le diese noticia de aquella grande novedad, con pertenercle por naturaleza tanto; y quedar, por su muerte, heredera de tantos y tan floridos Reynos ...’ Argensola, Primera Parte: 19-20
from Brussels on the eve of Fernando’s death to assure Charles’ inheritance. Although Charles accepted Cisneros’ provisional governorship, Adrian co-signed many acts of government as ambassador extraordinary. Cisneros and his council were also often at loggerheads with the Royal Council as well as with the parallel council around Charles in Brussels.

At seventeen, Charles relied heavily on chief adviser and former tutor, Guillaume de Croÿ-Chièvres, who, when Charles came of age on 5 January 1515, took charge of the governing council. Chièvres rehabilitated and compensated Juan Manuel, whom Margaret had imprisoned and then assigné à residence (a form of administrative detention) in 1513. Margaret was publicly humiliated before the États généraux and removed from power.\textsuperscript{140}

On 4 March 1516, aware that Chièvres planned to have Charles proclaimed monarch of Castile and Aragon, Cisneros and the Royal Council wrote in defence of Juana’s unique royal dignitas and the settlement established at Blois, arguing that, in Castile, Fernando’s death did not confer on Charles a greater right than before, since this had not been in Fernando’s gift. For Charles to title himself king in the legitimate monarch’s lifetime would diminish the ‘honour and reverence that divine and human law owes to the queen our lady, your mother …’ To split the monarchy would create division. Some would exploit the situation, ‘under the pretext of fidelity to your highness, others to the very illustrious queen … as one knows from experience of past times …’ Charles should be satisfied to administer rather than reign. His claim would seem the more unreasonable, warned the Council, in that Juana was not born incapacitated (‘no nació impedida del todo’). It urged that: ‘for the love of God and the honour a son owes a mother it would be well to leave her the title in its entirety …’\textsuperscript{141}

Nevertheless, at the obsequies for Fernando in Brussels on 14 March, Charles was proclaimed king. Charles’ backers repudiated the Council’s arguments on the grounds that the authority of the title would enable him to tackle more effectively the constant threat of France in Italy and elsewhere. On 21 March Charles declared that his decision to adopt the regal title was based on

\textsuperscript{140} Jean-Pierre Soisson, \textit{Marguerite, Princesse de Bourgogne} (Paris, 2002): 140

\textsuperscript{141} BN Ms.1778, fs. 7-8, ‘Memorial’
considerations of law and order within the various kingdoms as well as the advice of Emperor, Pope and others.\textsuperscript{142}

Cisneros played a vital role in ensuring that acceptance of Charles’ coup was forced through in Castile, lending all his weight to the Habsburg cause, while conferring on the last Trastámara monarch the qualities of incompetence and female incapability.\textsuperscript{143} He and the Council scrambled to assemble the arguments they had, shortly before, found so markedly lacking. Galíndez de Carvajal unearthed evidence about sons who had reigned in their parents’ lifetime – some by consent, as in the case of Berenguela; others owing to the parent’s ‘unfitness’, as in Urraca’s. Galíndez de Carvajal also raised the case of Empress Helena who had ‘reigned jointly with Constantine, her son, for two years, although afterwards he threw her out and reigned alone for seven years, and she returned to throw him out and had his eyes gouged out’ – a hardly encouraging precedent.\textsuperscript{144} He argued before councillors and grandees that Charles had been obliged to bow to arguments both imperial and papal, adding that even if Juana were in full possession of her faculties, ‘the extension of our empire, its size and multitude of regions … are such that you would find yourselves obliged to deliberate, and to doubt, whether the resolution of such great problems could be confided to any woman, however capable’.\textsuperscript{145}

The Admiral and Duke of Alba replied that the dramatic growth in Spain’s empire did not mean their fundamental laws must be changed or rights violated. It set a bad precedent for a new ruler to begin by annulling laws long recognised as sacrosanct.\textsuperscript{146} Elsewhere Enriquez expressed himself more vividly: to concede Charles the title was to declare ‘the living queen dead’.\textsuperscript{147} In a letter written years later to the Comunero Junta of Tordesillas, explained his position:

‘When the letters came in which the king called himself king and the grandees were called to Madrid to discuss [the matter], the platforms had been erected,

\textsuperscript{142} Jerónimo López de Ayala, ed., \textit{El Cardenal Cisneros, Gobernador del Reino} (Madrid, 1921-1928), II: 114-115, 21 March 1516, Charles to Royal Council

\textsuperscript{143} See Peters (\textit{The Shadow King}: 23) for discussion of the wider historical pattern in the ‘complex process’ of substitution of dynasties by use of the argument that individual members of the old were unfit to rule.

\textsuperscript{144} BN, Ms. 1778, f. 8, ‘Memorial’; Carvajal, \textit{Anales breves}: 370-377

\textsuperscript{145} Gómez de Castro, \textit{De las hazañas}: 389-390

\textsuperscript{146} Ibidem

\textsuperscript{147} In Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad}: 113, Francisco Pacheco to his brother, Priego
the trumpets were at the door ... and I thought, what a strange novelty, such a thing should not be done without thought and without the whole kingdom being informed. I resisted until there was no grandee or city left that did not call him king, and, in that realisation, I took the same path, but not post- haste ... and they wrote from Flanders to complain ... 148

Carvajal reports that an irritated Cisneros cut argument short by summoning the Madrid corregidor, Pedro Castilla, and ordering the raising of standards for Charles. 149 In sharp contrast to his action in 1506, Cisneros refused to convocate a Cortes and, in their 3 April order to all Castilian cities to raise standards, he and Adrian cast Charles in the role of dutiful son. Although, they claimed, the Pope, Emperor, and other monarchs, had advised Charles to reign alone, Charles had decided, in reverence to God and his mother, to place her title before his in striving to ‘help her bear the burden and labour of government ...’ 150 This was to change after his coronation as Holy Roman Emperor. On 5 September 1519, in his and Juana’s name, Charles ordered that his imperial title must precede regal titles on acts of government. 151

In Zaragoza, meanwhile, Aragonese justice officials questioned the authority of Fernando’s will. Juan de Lanuza, justicia mayor, refused to recognise Juana’s status as heir, arguing that the juramento of 1502 had been annulled by the birth, on 3 May 1509, of Juan of Aragon, despite his death the same day. This, in turn, had implications for Charles’ claim. The Diputación of Aragon argued that Fernando’s will should be followed, but established an inquiry into Juana’s state of health before deciding to appoint a governor. Although, according to Argensola, many ‘believed the judgment of the Queen was not defective but sleeping’, three influential witnesses unfavourably contrasted Juana’s conduct in 1502 and in 1508. In 1502, in Zaragoza, she was ‘very sensible (discreta), prudent (cuerda) and with excellent natural gifts’. But when visiting Arcos and Tordesillas they had seen her dishevelled and wild, in garments unfit for a queen. 152

It is unclear whether the witnesses had spoken to Juana or merely observed her from a distance, without her knowledge. But although their

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148 Danvila, Historia critica, II: 338, October 1520, Admiral to Junta
149 Galíndez de Carvajal, Anales breves: 374
150 López de Ayala, El Cardenal Cisneros, II, LXVIII: 136-137, 3 April 1516
151 Danvila, Historia critica, I: 241
152 Argensola, Primera Parte: 39-40
opinions carried the day, Alfonso, in a divided Aragon, had problems receiving recognition as provisional curador of Juana. Charles and Chièvres were suspicious and Alfonso’s juramento was left in the air. He struggled on, nonetheless, as regent of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Roussillon and Sardinia and as curador, while Germaine, then living in Castile, also remained technically regent, or lieutenant-general. The question of Charles’ recognition as king was left in abeyance until he arrived in Aragon, while in Sicily moves were made to oust the unpopular viceroy, Hugo de Moncada, a firm supporter of Fernando’s fiercely controversial fiscal and religious policies. On 6 March an uprising in Palermo forced Moncada to flee to Messina – like Burgos, a mercantile city with Flemish links, naturally favourable to Charles. There Moncada was further isolated by the refusal of the viceroy of Naples, Ramón Folc de Cardona, to accept Charles’ ‘coronation’ as legitimate. While Moncada acted in Charles’ name, standards in Palermo and much of Sicily were raised only for Juana, and a new, Palermo-based ‘princes’ parliament’, led by high-ranking nobles Simone Ventimiglia, Marquis of Geraci, and Matteo Santapau, Marquis of Licodia, claimed to represent all Sicily in Juana’s name.\(^{152}\)

Dissent, caution and confusion with respect to the true locus of royal authority are reflected in the correspondence coming out of Naples and Sicily. Moncada told Cisneros in March that although Juana was Fernando’s sworn heir, her ‘disposition’ rendered her effectively ‘dead’.\(^{153}\) But Cardona continued to treat Juana as an active agent, reproaching her for failing to inform him of Fernando’s demise; the news had come, he exclaimed, from France.\(^{154}\) Once trumpeted into Moncada’s deserted palace, Geraci and Licodia informed the ‘very high and mighty Queen’ that the Sicilian parliament would continue acting in her name until she ordered them to refrain.\(^{155}\) They also decided to send


\(^{153}\) ‘... ya que la Reina ... la cual fue jurada, era en número de muerta por estar en la dispusición que estaba ...’, CODON, XXIV: 137, Messina, 22 March 1516, Moncada to Cisneros

\(^{154}\) In Rodríguez Villa, Doña Juana: 496, 31 April 1516, Cardona to Juana

\(^{155}\) CODON, XXIV: 172-178, 15 May 1516, Palermo, Geraci and Licodia to Juana. Later in 1516 the presidents were lured to Naples, where Cardona effectively kept them hostage pending appointment of a new viceroy in Sicily.
envoys both to Juana and the ‘Prince’.\textsuperscript{157} Aware of the sensitivity of his position as representative of a ‘king’ to whom no act of allegiance had yet been made, and whose subjects needed first to be pacified, Charles’ troubleshooting envoy, Diego del Águila, wrote separately to both Juana and Charles. After Charles’ appointment of a replacement for Moncada failed to stem the unrest, Águila told Juana: ‘Since I know you have been informed of all these matters, as it appears from the instructions and letters of credence from your highness brought by the Bishop of Zaragoza, it has seemed to me appropriate to mention them again here, so that … your highness knows the causes and reasons given for these riots by this and all the other cities of the kingdom …’\textsuperscript{158}

Although Cisneros drove through Charles’ ‘coup’ in Castile, there are signs that he and Alfonso of Aragon worked to prevent a possible Sicilian secession by using Juana as a recourse against clumsy moves from Brussels. Fole de Cardona and Águila assisted by keeping their distance from Moncada. Juan Gines de Sepúlveda relates that Águila was recalled to Brussels for proving too sympathetic to Moncada’s opponents.\textsuperscript{159} Perhaps, too, Charles did not take kindly to his envoy appealing over his head to Juana. Whether or to what extent high officials like Cardona and Águila – or, indeed, the parliament’s presidents – were fully aware of Juana’s situation remains unclear, but, unlike Moncada, they chose to address her as a live sovereign who heard complaints, pored over despatches and intervened directly in Sicilian affairs, reportedly sending Ramón de Centelles, Bishop of Siracusa, to Palermo with careful instructions to soothe the rebels and even to praise their actions, thereby attracting them ‘con el buen modo y prudencia’.\textsuperscript{160}

It was against this background, with unrest in Castile and Aragon and a fresh revolt brewing in Sicily in 1517, that a worried Maximilian obtained Pope Leo X’s endorsement of Charles as ‘Catholic King’. Leo’s bull of 1 April 1517 (\textit{Pacificus et aeternus rex}) appeared to snub Juana by awarding Charles, and

\textsuperscript{157} CODOIN, XXIV: 184-187, Palermo, 10 June 1516, Ribaltas to Ruiz de Calcen
\textsuperscript{158} CODOIN, XXIV: 248, Palermo, 31 August 1516, ‘Carta de Diego del Águila … en que le refiere las alteraciones de Sicilia desde la muerte del Rey …’
\textsuperscript{159} Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, ‘Historia de Carlos V’ in \textit{Obras Completas} (Pozoblanco, 1995), I: 32-33
\textsuperscript{160} Simona Giurato, \textit{La Sicilia di Ferdinando il Cattolico: Tradizioni politiche e conflitto tra Quattrocento e Cinquecento} (1468-1523), (Messina, 2003): 298-299
Charles’ posterity, the right to inherit the title from his maternal grandparents while making no reference to Juana (whom many, including Corner, habitually referred to as ‘Catholic’). Leo termed Charles Carolus Hispaniarum rex as well as ‘Catholic monarch’, sweeping aside the mechanism for the succession so patiently (and painfully) built by Isabel and Fernando in their attempt to stave off voracious Habsburg appetites. This conferred on Charles’ claim to all territories under Spanish control what Carretero Zamora calls an ‘incontestable’ political legitimacy’.\(^{160}\) Many, however, were indeed to contest it.

7. 5. ‘The Queen! Liberty!’ (1516-1517)

‘As the King’s coming was repeatedly postponed’, writes Karl Brandi of Charles, ‘two flames of discontent flared up into a single blaze. There is always a smoulder of unrest when a foreign ruler ascends a throne; but in Spain another fire was piled on this and with it a draught to fan the flames, for doubts were soon raised as to who was really ruling – the native regent or foreigners’.

Again, the struggle is seen as one between two forces, obscuring the significance of the third force, and thus overlooking the true nature of the crisis of legitimacy.

On 16 February 1516 Charles sent Juana commiserations on Fernando’s death. Cisneros and Adrian blocked his letter.\(^{162}\) Cisneros knew Juana was not reliably incapable. He and Adrian did not underestimate the danger that, once Juana had confirmation of Fernando’s death, she might obstruct the transition to Charles. On 2 February, Adrian forbad the Council of Tordesillas to ‘allow into this said town any grandee or troops who could cause disturbance without my special licence and order’.\(^{163}\) He and Cisneros also reinforced security around the Infante, whose dashed expectations caused him ‘very bad fevers from pure melancholy’.

\(^{160}\) Carretero Zamora, ‘Crisis sucesoria’, in Foronda, *Coups d’État?*: 587

\(^{161}\) Brandi, *The Emperor*: 73

\(^{162}\) Zalama, *Juana I*: 274

\(^{163}\) In Pérez, *La revolución*: 77n.

\(^{164}\) P. de Gayangos, V. de la Fuente, eds., *Cartas del Cardenal, Don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros*, Carta LXII: 103-106 [Undated; 1516]; Sandoval, *Historia*: 83
Valladolid’s *regidores* begged Charles to ‘come [to Spain] as quickly as
he can’.\(^{165}\) Jorge de Mesa, its *corregidor*, was so convinced Charles would
be there by September 1516 that he ordered that facades and windows be plastered
and whitewashed and stone pillars replace the wooden posts around the plaza.\(^{166}\)
The impatience of city officials arose from the hope that Charles’ arrival would
palliate unrest. From Valladolid, Villaescusa, since 1514 president of the
Chancery, repeatedly warned Cisneros, Chièvres and Charles about ‘scandalous’
sermons and demands that the imprisoned Queen be brought to the city.\(^{167}\)

Although, in 1520, Enríquez emphasised his single-handed resistance to
Charles’ seizure of the royal title in 1516, he was not alone. The Marquis of
Priego was among recipients of Charles’ letters. Referring to him as the ‘prince’,
Priego noted the lack of consultation: ‘In my view ... the grandees should have
been informed [beforehand] ...’\(^{168}\) Many thought the same. ‘While everyone
complied, their hearts did not’, observes Sandoval.\(^{169}\) Several cities only
belatedly raised standards for Charles. The Ayuntamiento of Jerez de la Frontera
told Cisneros it felt bound to record that, while its officers had obeyed the orders
of the governors, Council and Chancery of Granada, there had been none from
Juana.\(^{170}\) Standards were only raised in Zamora on 18 May, after much insistence
from Cisneros and its *corregidor*.\(^{171}\)

When Alfonso wrote to welcome Cisneros’ appointment as Castile’s
governor, he referred to ‘murmurings’ by leading nobles who claimed Cisneros
lacked authority for his actions.\(^{172}\) Stile commented that nobles, prelates and
letrados were particularly concerned that Cisneros (so anxious to convocate one in
1506) had bowed to pressure from Brussels not to convocate a Cortes on so crucial
a matter:

\(^{165}\) AGS, E 8: 14 [1516], Regidores de Valladolid to Charles
\(^{166}\) AGS, E 1-2, f. 277, 20 July 1516, Jorge de Mesa to Bartolomé Ruiz de Castañeda
\(^{167}\) AGS, E 1-2, f. 296, 23 December 1516, Villaescusa to Cisneros; AGS, E 4, f. 65, 20 January
1517, to Cisneros; AGS E 5, f. 30, 20 April 1518, to Chièvres; AGS, E 5, f. 80, 15 May 1518, to
Charles
\(^{169}\) Sandoval, *Historia*: 83
\(^{170}\) AGS, E 3, f. 24, ‘Actas de la Ayuntamiento de Jerez de la Frontera’
\(^{171}\) Pérez, *La revolución*: 79n.
\(^{172}\) AGS, E 3, f. 26, 8 July 1516, to Cisneros
‘... in no wyse thay could not [sic] agree that the Prynce shuld be proclamyd Kyng, the Quwn hys moder beyng alyve, onles that the Prynce were her personally. And the astatys here have and do take grete dyspleasure and dysdayne that the Flemyngs have proclaymeyd thayr prynce Kyng of Castyl with oute the aset of the astatys of Castyl ...’

Cisneros struggled to keep the lid on a boiling pot. In the streets, reported one of his secretaries, even the children were threatening to send the ‘Flemings’ to the devil. Chief justice officer Juan de Ribera warned Cisneros about ‘division and tumult’ in Seville. Málaga rose in arms against the fiscal policies of the Admiral, whose jurisdiction had been extended to the city by Fernando and Isabel. His gallows were dismantled and the city briefly declared autonomous. In Baza (Granada), a group of ‘new Christians’ warned Cisneros that the whole kingdom could ignite ‘as some of us, from experience, have seen in past times’. Disturbances erupted in Toledo, Guadalupe and Burgos and former royal cities like Huescar, which had been given by Fernando to the Duke of Alba, and Arévalo, given by Charles to that ‘turbulent woman’, Germaine.

For such towns and cities, jealous of their royal status, Juana’s name become a rallying cry. According to a morisco from Baza: ‘Last Friday ... Don Rodrigo Manrique, Comendador of Yeste, entered Huesca [sic] at midnight with twenty-five cavalrymen and twenty five infantrymen ... crying “The Queen! Liberty!” They went to the fortress, or rather, fort, and took it and with ropes threw the fortress governor out of the window ... and another day ordered the arming of all the moriscos ...’ On 18 February, the alcalde of Baeza (Jaén), Licentiate Francisco Cano, told Cisneros there were always ‘diversidad y quistyones’ and urged him to investigate whether the Queen should not be ‘better served’, and temporary reinforcements sent to Baeza. Cisneros’ secretary, Diego López de Ayala, describes a dispute over the priorate of San Juan (Toledo), in which Brussels supported the candidacy of António de Zúñiga, brother of the Duke of Bejar, and Rhodes – seat of the Order of St John –

173 LP. I, 1732: 486, 3 April 1516
174 De la Fuente, ed., Cartas de los Secretarios, I: 18-19, 23 August 1516, Jorge Varacaldo to López de Ayala
175 AGS, E 3, f. 29, Juan de Ribera to Cisneros, 26 June 1516
176 Ayala, ed., El Cardenal Cisneros, II: 8-9, 4 February 1516, López de Ayala to Cisneros
177 Gómez de Castro, De las hazañas: 427
178 Paz y Melia, Series de Documentos, I: 108, António de la Cueva to Priego [Undated; 1516]
179 Ayala, ed., El Cardenal Cisneros, II: 48-51
supported Diego de Toledo, son of the Duke of Alba. Ayala told Cisneros that: ‘everyone is up in arms about it, and all these places clamour for the Queen’.\footnote{Gayangos, ed., Cartas del Cardenal: 252-255, 3 September 1516, Francisco de Ruiz, Bishop of Ávila, to López de Ayala}

From Palermo, meanwhile, the presidents of the new parliament, having ousted the viceroy, assured Juana of Sicily’s loyalty to her, ‘under whom all aspire to live and die’\footnote{CODON, 24: 176, ‘Carta de los marqueses de Irache y de Licodia á la Reina Doña Juana’, Palermo, 15 May 1516}.

But Tordesillas itself represented, perhaps, the greatest challenge. As mentioned above, Cisneros and Adrian had decided that Juana must not be told of her father’s death, very possibly because they could not be sure that she would not attempt to take action on her own account. Certainly, Juana later told a group of procurators, who had assembled to inform her of their complaints, that if she had been informed of Fernando’s death, she would have done all she could to remedy matters.\footnote{See Chapter 8} However that may be, the commotion that inevitably accompanied news of his death created special difficulties in the palace. Ulloa told Cisneros about the arrival from Valladolid of a regidor, anxious to transfer Juana to the city’s protection, ostensibly with Cisneros’ backing, while the corregidor and council of Tordesillas, together with Diego de Castilla, Juana’s master of horse, planned to seize the Queen and bar the gates to all-comers. But they faced a divided palace and when Juana’s halberdiers rushed the stairs to her apartments they were blocked by the monteros de Espinosa.

Closely allied to Cisneros, Ulloa warned him of the fears of Juana’s staff and supporters – aware of the animosity between Queen and Cardinal – about moves he might make against her. Conscious of the uproar, and suspecting the reasons behind it, Juana managed to extract news of her father’s death from her confessor, Juan de Ávila. She then demanded to see Cisneros and Ulloa, while asking which grandees had been with Fernando. Exculpating herself of any blame for the leak, Ulloa reassured Cisneros of Juana’s goodwill and described her own efforts to keep peace in the palace. It is unclear when and how Juana was told that Fernando had not died after all, but staff were ordered not to approach her.\footnote{AGS, E 3, f. 133 [1516], ‘Relación’}
In several respects events at Tordesillas set the pattern for Comunero episodes, not least with regard to attempts to ‘cure’ Juana’s melancholic humours. Villaescusa was among those to link Juana’s ‘illness’ with cruel and degrading treatment. In his memorial for his nephew, Pedro Ramírez, who was preparing to seek patronage in Brussels, he wrote: ‘The queen is weak and ill and [Charles] must ensure she is served and treated because she is unable and unwilling to govern and cannot advise him about it’. He, Villaescusa, had been dismissed from Juana’s service by Fernando in 1514 because he had opposed her ill-treatment. Without specifying further, he adds:

‘Since, after king don Fernando returned from Naples, I managed to serve her with the same faithfulness as before and see that she was well served and treated by her entourage, I became suspect for the same reason as before, and therefore I left to visit my church and reside [in my see], and, in view of this, king don Fernando summoned me and made me president of this chancery ...’

Villaescusa saw the interests of mother and son as identical:

‘You will tell [Charles] that, as I consider that the queen’s affairs ... and his are one and the same, he should know that the queen ... has been badly served and not well treated, that his highness must order that her health requires that she be well served and treated ...’

Stile reports that, in late February, a deputation of ‘certain persons’ from Tordesillas begged Cisneros, and a group of other prelates and nobles, to permit them to embark upon a three-month course of treatment – probably involving exorcism. Stile names her physician, Dr Soto, among those who undertook to ‘forfeit their lives’ to cure the Queen of ‘sprites’:

‘... the Qwyn of Castyl ys as yet as that she was yn the lyfe of the late kyng hyr fader, and as reson ys hyr subjectys wold be glad that sche were amendyd of hyr dyseas, for the honore, confort, and weal of al hyr landys; and for that entente upon a thre or fowr days passyd, hether ys come seren persons to the Cardynal and to the lordys and Counsayl from the town of Tordeselyas ... ; and these sayd persons have browzghte testemonyalyss and wryteynys that there be seren persons, prystes, feseconys, and other, amongys the which one ys the Doctrw Soto, the sayd Qwyns fesecony, the whyche he and the other prystys, with clergy and fesyke, apone payne of theyr lyvys, haveynge licence, wyl undertake for to remedy the Qwyn of hyr dyseas wythyn the space of thre months, seyeing that sche ys cumberdy with spretyys by wycchecrafte’.

184 González Olmedo, Diego Ramírez Villaescusa: 114, ‘Instrucción’
185 ibidem
186 LP, II, [no]: 450, 1 March 1516
So far, he reported, they had received no reply from Cisneros or other prelates. Juana’s partisans in the palace, led by Diego de Castilla, took matters into their own hands and summoned what Ulloa calls a ‘sorcerer’. Surrounded by moneros, and positioned out of earshot and sight of Juana, he stared towards her while making ‘spells’. Although scathing of the episode, Ulloa told Cisneros to get rid of Ferrer: ‘by the life of my children, if he stays, our lordship will see a thousand revolts and vexations’.  

Cisneros avoided Juana, but appointed former ambassador Hernán Duque de Estrada y de Guzmán, Prince Juan’s former maestresala, to replace Ferrer. On 6 March Ferrer defended himself to Cisneros in a letter from which the derisive tone he had adopted freely with Fernando is completely absent. From it we learn that Cisneros sent Rodriguez Sánchez de Mercado, Bishop of Mallorca, to investigate conditions at Tordesillas. Ferrer begged Cisneros to honour and reward him; he had only obeyed orders. He, Fernando and Cisneros were perfectly aware of Juana’s incurability; if he and Fernando had given her ‘the rope’ it was to save her life (through force-feeding). Ferrer ended by reiterating the loyalty he had shown in serving Fernando, and his loyalty to Charles ‘who takes his place’. Ulloa writes of ‘tethering’ or ‘trussing up’ when, in her report to Cisneros, she mentions fears by his opponents that, after Fernando’s death, the Cardinal, ‘who loved [the Queen] so little’, would want to ‘tether her’ and move her to a fortress.

Villaescusa’s hopes that Juana might fare better with Charles were soon dashed. On 30 April 1516 Ruiz de la Mota, Bishop of Catania, told Cisneros that Charles’ priority was ‘the custody of the Queen which, on account of the diversity of opinions, is very necessary … while she is to be treated well, she [is to] be so well guarded and watched that any persons endeavouring to counteract my good intentions must be prevented from doing so. In this respect great vigilance is necessary’. Charles wanted to introduce a governor from the Low Countries. López de Ayala, Cisneros’ emissary in Brussels, argued in favour of retaining Duque de Estrada on the grounds that Juana’s health had improved

187 AGS, E 3: 133
188 AGS, E 1-2, f. 298, Ferrer to Cisneros
189 AGS, E 1-2, f. 298
190 AGS, E 3, f. 113, Ulloa, ‘Relación’
191 CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 26, 30 April 1516
since he had taken charge. But, he discovered, this was the last thing Charles and his advisers wanted: ‘Thinking to render a service to Hernán Duque, I am now ruining him’, he told Cisneros. ‘For according to what I see they speak here *propter formam* of her health, and that not because they wish for it. They are very dangerous people, and one must hold one’s tongue here’.\(^{192}\)

\(^{192}\) CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 27, 12 July 1516
8. Freedom and the Queen

8.1. The hole behind the tapestry (1517-1519)

Given the traditional view about Juana’s passivity, it is unsurprising that little attention has been paid to her role in the Comunero revolution or that there is no unanimity about it. Prawdin is, possibly, unique in believing that the struggle between Comunero leaders and Castile’s governors to win over the Queen was of greater transcendence for Spain than any battles waged outside Tordesillas. For Prawdin, her tragedy, and Spain’s, was that, while only a revolutionary act could save her, it meant a betrayal of everything she believed in. In his magisterial work on the Comuneros, published in Spain in 1977, Pérez believes Juana’s confused ‘stubbornness’ and incapacity saved Charles; she was in no position to reign; the comuneros who desired most ardently to confer power upon her had to renounce their wish. Is that not the best proof of the queen’s incapacity? Perhaps, in view of this, he dedicates little space to her dealings with the Junta. Haliczer sees a ‘convalescent’ queen, ‘eager to play a part in the kingdom’s affairs once again’, and whose refusal to sign Comunero documents showed a recovery of sanity. Among Juana’s most recent biographers, Zalama believes her conduct showed ‘she was a person incapacitated to govern the fate of a kingdom and even her own’, while Aram emphasises Juana’s disillusionment with the Comuneros, and ‘apparent support for the imperialist cause’. In a recent study, published in 2009, which challenges the historiography of imperial decline and sees the outcome of the Comunero revolt as the forging of a ‘constitutional commonwealth, an empire of autonomous cities and towns’, Aurelio Espinosa views Juana as sympathetic to Comunero grievances without questioning her ‘insanity’: Castilian cities and towns, he states, decided in 1520 that ‘an insane queen could provide better justice than a

1 Prawdin, Johanna: 296
2 Pérez, La revolución: 195. In ‘Juana la Loca y los Comuneros’ (FRP, Doña Juana: 78) he repeats that, by refusing to sign, Juana ‘no pudo o no quiso usar de la libertad y del poder que le daban los comuneros’.
4 Zalama, Juana 1: 293; Aram, Juana the Mad: 128
corrupt king...’ Juana, however, ‘confounded both the royalists and the comuneros’, refusing to confer her signature on either side.⁵ Amid these contrasting assessments, this chapter explores events at Tordesillas in order to gauge just how significant the Queen’s role was.

Charles and Éléonore disembarked near Villaviciosa (Asturias) on 19 September 1517, arriving at Tordesillas on 4 November. Martire reports that Juana, delighted, wore clean clothes and gave them gifts.⁶ Laurent Vital offers a hearsay account of the first of probably several meetings between Juana and her elder children. It was brief, formal, played out before many courtiers unknown to the Queen. Within these constraints, Juana showed warmth, courtesy and dignity, refusing the ‘besamanos’, embracing her children, listening to their rehearsed speeches in silence, nodding, with her hands in theirs. She expressed the natural astonishment of a mother confronted with strangers who are yet her own children: ‘Mais êtes-vous mes enfants?’ This was rhetorical, Vital adds, since she knew perfectly well who they were.⁷

Vital revelled in the tapestries Juana had allocated to her children’s rooms and that of Chièvres, carefully noting which went where. It is tempting, if rash, to see in the position given to the Coronation of the Virgin, in Charles’ inner chamber, a reminder of Juana’s regal pre-eminence. Denia would always be careful to refer to Charles as ‘Prince’ in Juana’s company. Both Argensola and Sandoval comment that Juana rebuked those she heard referring to Charles as ‘el Rey’. She ‘felt it deeply’, writes Argensola, ‘not as one who is irrational but with clear awareness. And whenever anyone in her presence called him king, she would say: “I am the queen, my son Charles is no more than prince” ... and when there was any delay in news from Flanders (and on other occasions) she asked after him, saying: “What have you heard of the prince?”’⁸ Describing how ‘devilish’ efforts had been made to turn Juana against Charles, Sandoval

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⁵ Aurelio Espinosa, The Empire of the Cities: Emperor Charles V, the Comunero Revolt and the Transformation of the Spanish System (Leiden/Boston, 2009): 73-74. Espinosa, however, mistakenly believes that Juana signed documents during Fernando’s governorship between 1507-1516.
⁶ Martire, XI, 602: 286, 10 November 1517
⁸ Argensola, Primera Parte: 186
mentions a similar reaction when a montero told her of the arrival in Spain of ‘King Don Carlos’. 9

Danvila reports that, in private conversation with Chièvres, Juana agreed to his proposal that Charles govern for her. 10 But Vital does not say whether Chièvres approached the key matter of Fernando’s death, about which Juana was not officially told until 1520 – only that much conversation revolved around memories of the Low Countries, which animated Juana, ‘for she loved and loves her children’, and liked to reminisce. 11 Whether the conversations between Juana and Chièvres reached the outcome Chièvres desired must remain in doubt. Clearly, however, the visit to Tordesillas (during which came news of Cisneros’ death at Roa de Duero on 8 November) was designed to bolster Charles’ claim to the crown on the eve of the Cortes of Valladolid of 1518.

The procurators accommodated Charles with reservations. Assembling on 4 January, they agreed that ‘whether it was suitable to recognise the prince as king in the lifetime of Queen Doña Juana, proprietary mistress of these kingdoms’ depended on his consent to their demands, the first of which was that Juana must ‘have the house and establishment owed to her royal majesty as queen and mistress of these realms’. 12 She should, in other words, be accessible to her subjects, whether or not in good health, and Charles must relinquish power to her if she recovered it.

Although apparently acquiescing, Charles’ concept of the ‘establishment owed to her royal majesty’ did not tally with that of the Cortes. He could only wield power effectively if Juana were made invisible. Catalina became the unwitting means of reinforcing that invisibility. Vital reports that the elder siblings’ concern for Catalina’s welfare prompted them to plan her secret removal from Tordesillas. 13 But, as Rodríguez-Salgado has noted, Charles was determined to wrest control of Catalina for use in marital diplomacy. 14 Juana’s aposentador, Fromont, was ordered to cut a hole in the wall behind the tapestry in Catalina’s bedroom so that Juana would not notice the abduction. On the night

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9 Sandoval, Historia: 83
10 Danvila, Historia Crítica, I: 78
11 Vital, ‘Premier Voyage’: 134
12 AGS, PR 70, f. 52, 5 January 1518, ‘Capítulos de Cortes’
13 Vital, ‘Premier Voyage’: 237-246
of 13 March 1518 Catalina was told she must either leave or 'disobey the king'. She ‘began to cry because of her love for the queen’, but was eventually encouraged through the hole into the outer corridor.  

The story of Catalina’s appearance at court, her leather chamarée cast aside for violet and gold satin, has all the ingredients of a fairy tale. More important here is the tissue of deceit that the tapestry symbolises in Vital’s narrative. When Juana peers behind the tapestry and discovers the hole, Fromont, like Ferrer, plays the innocent. When he tries to reassure her, Juana replies: ‘Alas, Bertrand, I have every reason to be aggrieved, with my daughter stolen from me’. ‘Stolen, Madame?’ Fromont asks in surprise. Juana shows him the hole, at which Fromont affects astonishment. But he begs her to eat; he is sure everything will turn out all right. ‘Ha, Bertrand!’ exclaims the Queen. ‘Don’t talk to me … about eating and drinking … my heart is too choked with grief …’

Vital’s tone is melodramatic, but Juana was in earnest. She went on thirst strike and, after two days, Fromont had to sound the alarm. Obliged to capitulate, Charles ‘was not pleased’. In the speech that, according to Vital, he addresses to his mother, informing her of the changes he needs to make to her household and in Catalina’s estate, there is an unmistakably steely tone. That same day, 15 March, Charles replaced Duque de Estrada with Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas, Marquis of Denia, who became governor and administrator of both palace and town, and who, like Ferrer, had been one of Fernando’s strongest allies.

Under Denia’s regime, Catalina’s conditions improved, while Juana’s worsened. No ‘bagatelle’, to use Martire’s word, her expeditions to Santa Clara, of which she was now deprived, had allowed her a limited contact with the outside world; a measure of sensory stimulus; a modicum of control, which she had used, among other things, for the bestowal of patronage. Denia’s letters to Charles between 1518-1520 chart her repeated demands to visit the convent, see the grandees, be reunited with the Infante.

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15 Vital, ‘Premier Voyage’: 239
16 Vital, ‘Premier Voyage’: 243-246
17 AGS, E 33, f. 112, 15 March 1518, Charles to Denia. Ulloa seems to have retired, or been retired, about this time. Juana’s master of horse, Diego de Castilla, and his wife, Beatriz de Mendoza, were also dismissed.
18 Aram; Juana the Mad: 105-106
19 AGS, E 5, f. 311 [1518]; E. 5, f. 286, 20 April 1519; E. 5, f. 302, 27 May 1519
At times Denia was startled by her freshly washed outdoor clothes, and by the quickness, ingenuity and eloquence of her arguments (‘tantas buenas palabras’).\(^{20}\) Charles warned Denia to ensure his exchanges with Juana took place out of earshot of others, and that Denia confide his letters only to reliable messengers, ‘because the case is so delicate and concerns me so much’.\(^{21}\) In propagating alarmist stories about the plague, Denia was fully backed by Charles, who even suggested that processions of priests with crosses pass to and fro in front of the palace, and that her women fill her with ‘fear’.\(^{22}\) Such proposals were not far removed from the ‘consort of madmen’ paraded in front of Juana’s Italian cousin, Giovanna d’Aragona, in John Webster’s drama *The Duchess of Malfi*. Charles also wrote to Catalina, urging her to obey Denia and his wife in all matters.\(^{23}\)

Denia’s letters to Charles demonstrate that, contrary to the view that Juana lacked curiosity about the outside world, she was avid for news.\(^{24}\) Between 1518-1520 battles of wits between Juana and Denia could last hours. Faced with Juana’s intense curiosity about family members, and well-founded suspicions about what she was being told, he found himself entangled in his own web of lies, from which he tried occasionally to cut himself with a curt reminder that Fernando, or Charles, was in charge, not herself. When doing this, Denia upheld two overarching fictions: Fernando was alive and busy in Málaga; and both Fernando and Charles had proprietary control, including over the finances.

Juana demanded, in vain, to visit Valladolid. If denied a request, or order to see someone apart from Denia and his entourage, such as her longstanding chief steward, Fernando de Arzeo; her doctor, Soto; her treasurer, Landa, she fought back with a hunger strike. Denia might then be obliged to brief them before the meeting. Anxious that Juana might ask Soto if he were still receiving the *ayuda de costa* that Isabel had given him, but that Charles had not authorised, Denia told the doctor to assure her everything was in order. Juana duly asked him

\(^{20}\) AGS, E 5, f. 311 [1518]

\(^{21}\) AGS, E 5, f. 294, 19 April 1518


\(^{23}\) AGS, E 5, f. 294, 19 April 1518

\(^{24}\) In *Vida Cotidiana*: 220, Zalama states: ‘Si desde la muerte de su esposo no quiso saber nada del mundo, a medida que pasaron los años en Tordesillas esta actitud se agudizó’.
if he was getting these payments: ‘Your Highness may believe’, Denia told
Charles, ‘that if [Juana] knew the contrary she would be extremely upset ...’ \textsuperscript{25} In
the autumn of 1519 Juana wanted to obtain funds from her treasurer. When
Denia refused Landa a visit, Juana stopped eating. \textsuperscript{26}

Juana longed to see the Infante. But, despite the demand of the Cortes of
Valladolid of 1518 that Charles keep Fernando beside him until Charles had
children, the Infante was forced to leave hurriedly for Flanders on 26 May,
following a series of measures designed to neutralise support for him. \textsuperscript{27} Fernando
had met Charles and Éléonore for the first time on 8 November 1517.
Swallowing anger and emotion at his treatment, he had sworn allegiance to
Charles at the opening of the Cortes. Before leaving, but with Tordesillas barred
to him, the Infante was assured that Juana was ‘better treated than she used to
be’. Denia told Charles he had said this because ‘it seemed to me to be in your
Highness’ service that in these realms, and everywhere, it is known that this
improvement in her royal person is owing to you ... but even if [Fernando] were
to stay here a hundred years I should never have written or told him what is
happening here’. \textsuperscript{28}

Juana never ceased to fret about her younger son. Informed of his
departure, she constantly urged his return. When Maximilian died on 19 January
1519, Denia told her he had abdicated in Charles’ favour. Juana at once replied
that, if this were so, the Infante could return, and she ‘very much wanted to see
him’. Denia rushed to repair the damage: Maximilian was old and tired, and
needed the Infante’s company. ‘That’s good’, the Queen replied and ‘remained a
long time thinking without saying a word’. \textsuperscript{29}

Another constant, connected, demand was to see the grandees. Whenever
Juana was told about the movements of the ‘prince’, as Denia was careful to call
Charles in her presence, or the (invented) actions of her father, she asked how
many grandees were with them, and whether any remained nearby: ‘... her words

\textsuperscript{25} AGS, E 6, f. 18, 6 June 1519
\textsuperscript{26} AGS, E 5, f. 337, 26 September 1519; AGS, E. 5: 323 [undated; October 1519]; AGS, E, f.
340-341 [undated; October 1519]
\textsuperscript{27} De la Fuente, ed., Cartas de los Secretarios, I, XXVI: 135-141, 23 September 1517, Ruiz to
López de Ayala; Gálindez de Carvajal, Anales breves: 413
\textsuperscript{28} AGS, E 5, f. 290, 27 April 1518
\textsuperscript{29} AGS, E 5, f. 340-341 [undated; October 1519]
would lift stones’, Denia told Charles after one of these prolonged attempts by Juana to keep informed about the outside world and to insist that attention be brought to her plight. ‘[But] nobody knows this and nobody must …’

Towards the end of 1519 Juana ordered Denia to tell her father that ‘she cannot bear the life she leads, that she has been so long a prisoner, that … even if, as his daughter, she had to respect him, he should treat her better, that she should be where she could engage with her affairs (saber de sus cosas), should she wish it, as many grandees had advised …’ Again she expressed anxiety about the Infante; ‘although he was’, she said bitterly, ‘in a better land than this, she wanted to have her son where she could see him’. Again, she demanded to go to Valladolid, to see the grandees. When Denia objected that Tordesillas was the best place for her she retorted that she would go where she liked. She would go where convenient, Denia snapped back, at which ‘she remained silent’. She had, he added, been feverish and had asked for a doctor, but he had not thought it necessary. She constantly asked for Catalina, threatening that, if she were taken away, as the Infante had been, she would ‘throw herself out of the window or stab herself to death’.

8. 2. The appeal to Juana I (1520)

After leaving Valladolid, Charles faced stormy arguments at Zaragoza. The estates (brazos) had met on 20 February 1516 to forge a means of reconciling loyalty to Juana with the claims of Charles, including a recommendation that he be recognised and sworn in only as prince in Juana’s lifetime. The agreement eventually allowing the juramento of 29 July 1518 salvaged an acknowledgment of Juana as queen, ‘co-regnant’ with Charles, who then left for Barcelona. News of Maximilian’s death reached him on 19 January 1519, cutting short his tour.

On 28 June 1519 Charles was elected King of the Romans, prior to coronation as Holy Roman Emperor. Thus, only shortly after arriving in Spain, his attention was deflected from its needs and demands. Unable to gather sufficient funds from Aragon, Charles and Chièvres turned again to Castile. A new Cortes was

30 AGS, E 5, f. 340-341
31 AGS, E 5, f. 343 [undated; end 1519]
32 Enrique Solano Camón, ‘Las Cortes de Aragón: de Fernando el Católico a Carlos V (1490-1530)’, in Belenguer, ed., De la unión, I: 387-410
convoked to obtain a fresh *servicio*. The choice of location, Coruña and Santiago, convenient for a hasty departure from Spain but without direct representation in the Cortes, broke with time-honoured tradition and shocked Castilians.

When Charles left in May 1520, he entrusted Castile to Adrian (now Cardinal of Tortosa), a foreigner with little authority and no affinity there. Charles had tied his hands by insisting that important decisions be referred back to him. Yet Castile was in ferment. Toledo and Salamanca had not attended the 1520 Cortes, while other cities believed their representatives had betrayed their interests by capitulating to Charles. Ten days after his departure, the Segovian procurator was lynched for approving the *servicio*. On 27 June Florentine agent Thomas Spinelly reported to Cardinal Wolsey that the ‘commons’ had ‘insurrexed’ against the Segovia procurators and those of Zamora and Madrid had fled. If, wrote Spinelly, discontent was mainly confined to the ‘commons’, some nobles, harbouring long-term grudges against the monarchy, were not unhappy. The cities with votes in the Cortes were demanding that foreigners be excluded from posts and rewards; that gold and silver be retained within Castile; that there be due diligence in legal proceedings and a reform of the *alcabalas*. 33

‘Just and reasonable as these [cities’] demands are’, Spinelly observed, ‘the Emperor would not consent’. 34 From Valladolid, Fernando’s former doctor, Francisco López de Villalobos, saw the ‘republic of Spain’ turned topsy-turvy with defendants sentencing judges and lords serving their vassals. Even the most ruinous villages were giving themselves airs. 35

Villaescusa had long warned about ‘scandalous’ sermons. Before accompanying the Infante to Flanders, Vital saw ‘libelles’ on Valladolid church portals, according to which Castile was accursed for allowing its ‘children, friends and neighbours’ to be daily murdered with impunity; allowing government by those with no love for it, and letting the Infante go. 36 Before

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33 As noted earlier, Isabel had requested, in her will, the revocation of grants and concessions to nobles, knights and others with respect to the collection and retention of these taxes on sales and purchases. This practice alienated funds from the royal treasury and was wide open to abuse. Isabel had also been concerned about excessive pricing of *alcabalas*.
34 LP 3 (1), 169: 317
35 Francisco de Villalobos, *Epistolario* (Madrid, 1886), XIII, 7 June 1520
36 Vital, ‘Premier Voyage’: 234
1520, most propagandists had blamed foreign advisers and nobles, but respected Charles. Now there was a perceptible shift.37

The controversial outing of the Cofradía de la Caridad in Toledo occurred amid prayers that Charles be given better understanding and advice.38 Franciscan and Dominican friars thundered from the pulpit that Charles’ choice of Galicia for the Cortes had been prophesied by Saint Isidore as marking the beginning of the end of Castile.39 Some sermons were based on rapidly-spreading prophecies and beliefs: Charles was a usurper and tyrant; he had been born not of Juana, but a slave, and Juana’s rightful heir was the Infante.40 In July 1520 a pro-Comunero friar from Valladolid was imprisoned for preaching that Charles had bought an empire his heirs must not inherit.41 Some preachers linked Juana directly with the Comunero cause. A friar of Burgos, opposing government preparations to punish Segovia for lynching procurator Rodrigo de Tordesillas, told Adrian that ‘since the Queen and hereditary lady of the kingdom lives’ the Junta had rightly appealed to him to join them where she resided.42 In September 1520 the influential Fray Alonso de Medina assured his flock in Valladolid that Juana was issuing orders in the interests of the realm.42

At Valladolid, between 4-5 March, reports that Charles was to steal Juana from the country brought hundreds to the streets.44 Denia reported that in Valladolid, Medina and elsewhere, people demanded Juana’s freedom and transfer to Valladolid or another city.45 In Toledo men in disguise and with lanterns, went by night around the houses of political leaders, ‘persuading them to liberty’, while, according to Maldonado, Juan de Padilla, captain of militia, declared publicly that Charles reigned unjustly while Juana lived.46 Describing

37 Ramón Alba, Acerca de algunas particularidades de las Comunidades de Castilla (Madrid, 1975): 111
40 Danvila, Historia crítica, IV: 26-31, 23 May 1521, Adrian to Charles
41 Danvila, Historia crítica, I: 438, 24 July 1520, Adrian to Charles
42 Sandoval, Historia: 229-232. The same friar warned the Junta against women inheriting the crown, thus making Castile vulnerable to foreign rule.
43 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 470, 1 November 1520, Adrian to Charles
44 Sandoval, Historia: 199-120
45 AGS, E 5, f. 287 [undated; spring 1520]
46 BL, Ms. Egerton 309, ‘Relación’, f. 35v; Maldonado, La revolución: 71
riots in Burgos, Maldonado noted that ‘everyone looked to the reign of
democracy in the Queen’s lifetime’.\(^{47}\) Adrian told Charles that, according to ‘los
sabios’, a successful appeal to Juana would strengthen the cities’ morale,
encouraging them to defend their demands in blood. He and his allies were
therefore trying to divide the cities by offering protection to those who came to
Valladolid and made ‘supplication’ to Charles.\(^{48}\) A day later, on 29 July,
representatives from Toledo, Segovia, Salamanca, Toro and (briefly) Zamora
gathered in Ávila in an extraordinary meeting of the Cortes. This became the
core of a revolutionary government. It recognised the authority neither of Adrian
nor the Royal Council, but did continue to recognise the Royal Chancery under
Villaescusa’s presidency.\(^{49}\)

Juana remained unaware of these momentous events, but when told that
Charles was leaving Spain, again urged Denia to tell her truthfully whether
Fernando was dead, and again demanded the Infante’s return. She wanted to
know which grandees were leaving with Charles and why they had not come to
see her first, adding ruefully: ‘Since they have not been here for so long it is no
wonder they go without my leave. I’d like to write to them to ask them here
because I need to speak with them on various matters’. Denia objected; she could
hardly write to them if she had not first written to Fernando and Charles.\(^{50}\)

These surreal conversations were facilitated by a hand-picked entourage.
According to Comunero sources, many palace staff claimed Denia ‘keeps her
highness in captivity and serves her very badly’. When the Comuneros
established an inquiry into the Denias’ treatment of Juana, these staff swore
under oath that the Denias’ expulsion was in the interests of Queen and
kingdom.\(^{51}\) Adrian reported: ‘... the criados and servants of the Queen say she
has been ill-treated and forcefully detained ... as if not in her right mind, but she
is of sound mind and as prudent as at the outset of her marriage’.\(^{52}\) In another
letter he added that her servants thought her as willing and ready to govern as

\(^{47}\) Maldonado, *La revolución*: 109

\(^{48}\) AGS, E 8: 113 [deciphered fragment]. This reappears in Danvila, f: 444-445, as part of a letter
of 28 July 1520 from Adrian to Charles

\(^{49}\) Pérez, *La revolución*: 174

\(^{50}\) AGS, E 5, f. 288 [undated; 1520]

\(^{51}\) Danvila, *Historia crítica*, II: 51 [undated; September 1520]

\(^{52}\) AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 18, to Charles, 4 September 1520
Isabel.\textsuperscript{53} Denia later told Charles that key household members, like despensero mayor, Fernando de Arzeo, chief reposter de la plata Juan de Carquijano, and Carquijano’s son, had been instrumental in calling on the militia captains and deputies to march on Tordesillas.\textsuperscript{54} Her longstanding camarero, Diego de Ribera, also supported Juana.

Ironically, however, the first direct approach to her was made by Adrian and Royal Council president, António de Rojas, Archbishop of Granada. Sandoval claims that these, mindful that the Junta claimed to act in Juana’s service, and faced with a situation slipping out of control, decided to pre-empt their opponents by obtaining Juana’s signed authority for crushing the Segovian ‘rebels’.\textsuperscript{55} It is unlikely that they did not realise the implications of this decision, which was, effectively, to accept that Juana could govern, in the sense of underwriting acts of government. They may have felt that, with the situation back to normal, any risk for Charles would evaporate but it was difficult to keep such a move secret, and they almost certainly drew further attention to the possibility of using the Queen’s authority.

When Rojas led his little delegation to Tordesillas in August it was no longer possible to conceal Fernando’s death. Overwhelmed, Juana declared she had been lied to and ill-treated for fifteen years, and, turning to Denia, said he was foremost of the culprits. Falling to his knees, Denia protested he had only lied to ‘remove her passions’. Like Calderón’s captive prince in \textit{La vida es sueño}, Juana told Rojas: ‘Bishop, believe me, all I’m seeing and being told seems like a dream.’ Rojas pleaded passionately with her to sign the measures he and Adrian had prepared against Segovia: ‘Lady, in your hands, after God’s, lies the remedy of these realms. By signing you would be performing a greater miracle even than those of St Francis’. But Juana was not prepared to approve the measures immediately – nor, perhaps, to be put to sleep again so soon. Next day she presided a secret six-hour meeting, but remained wary.\textsuperscript{56} Most

\begin{footnotes}
\item[53] AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 20, to Charles, 14 September 1520
\item[54] Danvila, \textit{Historia critica}, III: 555-557, 2 April 1521; CSP Sp. 96, 25 January 1522
\item[55] Sandoval, \textit{Historia}: 271-272
\item[56] ibidem
\end{footnotes}
councillors had not approved the measures, believing that by punishing Segovia they would be helping Toledo.\textsuperscript{57} Juana wanted full consultation before signing.\textsuperscript{58}

But on 21 August, before this could happen, or the Royal Council convene in Tordesillas, much of Medina del Campo was destroyed by fire when Caroline troops tried to retrieve artillery from the arsenal. Widespread fury at Medina’s destruction fuelled the establishment of further ‘comunidades’ beyond Castile’s heartland, including Extremadura and Andalucia – \textit{communities}, which, by 1520, had become identified with uprisings of citizens with specific political demands and goals, inspired, in various cases, by the Italian example of the autonomous city states or republics.\textsuperscript{59} Valladolid’s great bells clanged as armed men filled the streets, suspect procurators’ houses were ransacked and destroyed and a ‘comunidad’ formed there too. Some royal councillors fled. So, too, did Rojas, while Tordesillas’ inhabitants rose on 23 August, clamouring to ‘see their Queen’. Denia could not prevent a meeting between Juana, \textit{corregidor} Bernaldino de Castro, and the \textit{regidores}, whose version of events contrasted with those of Denia and Rojas. According to an official account, Juana asked Landa to summon Villaescusa and royal councillors Polanco, Aguirre and Zapata.\textsuperscript{60} Both Martire and the anonymous author of the ‘Relación de las Comunidades’ mention that talks with Juana occurred. Martire adds that nothing much was achieved.\textsuperscript{61} It is not, however, unreasonable to suppose that she wanted to talk to some she trusted, and discuss ways of calming the situation. Shortly afterwards, Villaescusa sought Adrian’s and Rojas’ permission to try to persuade the Community of Valladolid that far from seeking the destruction of Medina, it had greatly distressed them. Subsequently he made a last-ditch attempt, on ‘royal

\textsuperscript{57} Santa Cruz, \textit{Crónica ... Carlos V}, (Madrid, 1920), 1: 239-241
\textsuperscript{58} Sandoval, \textit{Historia}: 271-172
\textsuperscript{59} According to José António Maravall, by 1520 ‘comunidad quiere decir un levantamiento con predominio del estamento ciudadano ...’ (Las \textit{Comunidades de Castilla: una primera revolución moderna} [Madrid, 1963]: 88-89). María Asenjo González describes how the ‘común’, a stable urban-based grouping of \textit{pecheros}, was seen to provide a political response to urban oligarchical power as represented by the \textit{regimiento}, while gradually becoming part of it. The rising power of the urban \textit{comunidades} was, however, checked ‘drastically’ by the urban reforms of the Catholic monarchs. (El Pueblo Urbano: El “Común”, in Ladero Quesada, ed., \textit{El Mundo Social de Isabel la Católica a finales del siglo XV} [Madrid, 2004]: 181-194).
\textsuperscript{60} AGS, PR 3, f. 20, ‘Cartas de Alonso Martín de Balboa para el Obispo de Cuenca y los licenciados Zapata, Polanco y Aguirre’, 23 August 1520; Danvila, 1: 467-469, ‘Testimonio de la entrevista que el teniente corregidor, Alonso Saravia ... tuvo con la Reina Doña Juana el 23 de agosto de 1520’
\textsuperscript{61} Martire, XII, 684: 50-52, 29 August 1520; BL, Egerton 390, ‘Relación’ f. 120
authority’, to reconcile the two sides at Villabrágima – an effort that cost him the suspicions of the ultimate victors.\textsuperscript{62}

News came meanwhile of an uprising in Jaén, ‘and what is worse’, reported Adrian, ‘they are appealing in everything to the authority of the Queen …’ He added ruefully, and correctly, that they could hardly be called rebels while claiming to obey Juana.\textsuperscript{63} From Medina’s smoking ruins, Juan de Padilla, with captains Juan Bravo of Segovia, and Juan Zapata of Madrid, discussed with members of the newly-established Community of Tordesillas and other residents, and then with the Junta of Ávila, the overwhelming advantages to their cause of receiving Juana’s direct support by securing her ‘freedom’.\textsuperscript{64} The moderate Infante of Granada, descendent of the last Nasrid kings of Granada and leader of the Community of Valladolid, was among those to approve the march on Tordesillas.\textsuperscript{65} As Padilla told his city, the combined militias of Toledo, Segovia and Madrid entered Tordesillas on 29 August:

‘Her highness went to one of the corridors that overlook the plaza between the palaces and the river and ordered the whole army to pass before her, and Her Highness stayed watching for two hours, looking at all the infantry and cavalry … and as I passed with these general captains of Segovia and Madrid before Her Highness, and made the reverence due to Her Majesty, Her Highness ordered us to come up. And not content with that, she summoned us with a gesture of the hand, although we could not hear her words over the great hubbub of people …’

Juana received them with ‘incrediblé alegria’. Padilla spoke to her first alone about the evils that had beset the country since Fernando’s death, realising that she had been unaware of ‘all the deceptions that had been practiced on her until now …’ He begged her to ‘visit and console the cities’, order reform, receive good advice. Juana said she welcomed his. She spoke to him at length, he wrote, adding: ‘as regards all that her highness said I have never heard anything better or more considered (que no ay cosa de quantas Su Alteza dixo que no es la más bien dicha e más bien ponderada)’. Bravo, Zapata and the other captains also spoke to Juana, and after them ‘all our captains and their people’. To each she

\textsuperscript{62} Martíre, XII, 705: 107, 11 December 1520. Villaescusa features in an undated list of ‘bad’ bishops, friars, clerics, etc. At number two, under Acuña (‘el peor de todo el Reyno’), he is described as ‘no tan malo pero pecó por liviandad’, AGS, E 8, f. 171, ‘Memorial de los malos, así eclesiásticos y religiosos como cavalleros y letrados y otras personas’

\textsuperscript{63} Danvilla, Historia crítica, II: 10, 4 September 1520

\textsuperscript{64} Pedro Mejía, Relación de las Comunidades de Castilla (Madrid, 1852): 379-380

\textsuperscript{65} Danvilla, I: 509
‘said something in particular, and spoke so well that there was no-one without
tears in his eyes’. Juana’s servants and ladies looked ‘the most glad and delighted
in the world … they need no longer be deceived or imprisoned’.66

Various versions of the meeting mention that when Padilla mentioned
previous attempts to abduct Catalina from Tordesillas, Juana’s expression
clouded and she showed ‘great emotion’. Padilla thought she was ‘astonished’ by
the things he told her.67 She met the captains again for two hours on 1
September, together with the corregidor and others. She refused requests to
append her signature to the order approving the transfer to Tordesillas of the
Junta of Ávila.68 But, according to the Portuguese ambassador, João Rodrigues, it
was she who suggested that notaries record her approval. Thereafter, two notaries
attested all Junta documents issued in her name.

The Junta interpreted Juana’s encouraging words – ‘Let them come here,
I want that’, and again, ‘Yes, let them come’ – as authorisation to call itself the
Cortes and General Junta of Tordesillas.69 Comunero documents presented the
Cortes deputies as having gathered on the Queen’s express order.70 As
preparations were made for the move to Tordesillas a three-man inquiry into the
Denias’ treatment of Juana agreed the Denias must be dismissed. They were
forced out on 20 September, and replaced by Alonso de Quintanilla, a former
servant of Juana’s brother, Juan, and knight of Medina del Campo, and his wife,
Catalina de Figueroa. On 24 September representatives gathered at Tordesillas
from thirteen of the eighteen cities of the Castilian Cortes. The Salamanca deputy
and university professor, Dr Alonso de Zúñiga, begged Juana to inaugurate her
personal reign, and not to abandon her subjects and compatriots, ready to die for
her. His address elicited a poignant response. After Isabel’s death, Juana replied,
she had always obeyed and honoured her father, whose life had been more

66 66... E a todos hizo grande acogimiento e con todos se holgó e habló, diciendo a cada uno
alguna cosa en particular. Todo tan bien dicho que no huvo ojos sin lágrimas de todos quantos
allí nos hallamos. E todos los criados de Su Magestad e las dueñas de su servicio quedaron los
más alegres e los más regocijados del mundo, diciendo a bozes todos que ya eran remedados de
parte de vuestras señorías y de estos señores capitanes generales, e que ya no avian de estar más
engañados ni en prisiones como hasta aquí”. BL, Ms. Egerton 309, ‘Relacion’, f. 59v.-61, Padilla
to the city of Toledo, 1 September 1520
67 67Sandoval, Historia: 273
68 68In Pérez, La revolución: 181, 19 September 1520
69 69‘... y vengan aquí que yo huiego dello’; ‘si, vengan’. AGS, PR, CC 4, f. 73, 1 September 1520
70 70Carretero Zamora, ‘Las Cortes en el Programa Comunero: Reforma institucional o propuesta
revolucionaria?’, in Martínez Gil, ed., En Torno: 249
necessary than hers. Had she been informed about his death, she could have put matters to rights. Using the language of unity, she declared she had ‘a love for all people’, but had been in ‘bad company’ and lied to and deceived; she had been unable to act because Fernando had ‘put me here’. She did not know if her imprisonment had been connected to Germaine (‘she who had come in the place of the Queen my lady’). Identifying herself with the common good, she said she was grieved to learn of the influx of foreigners and astonished that those present had not acted to avenge ill-doing, since whoever ‘wishes should be able’ (quien quiera lo pudieran hacer). Without further clarifying her meaning, Juana said she had not done more for fear of repercussions to her children, whether in Spain or abroad. She asked the procurators to nominate four of their number to consult with her regularly. When her confessor, Fray Juan de Ávila, suggested that the meetings take place once a week Juana said she would hold them whenever necessary, if need be, every day.\footnote{AGS, PR, CC 4, f. 75, 24 September 1520, ‘De lo que pasó con la Reina nuestra señora’}

From this and from Padilla’s letter – an extremely rare example of what one might term juanista (as well as Comunero) propaganda – the emerging picture is of a cautious but sympathetic monarch, who welcomes the Comuneros as assistants in a reform process she intends to encourage to the best of her ability (figure 32). According to the author of the ‘Relación de las Comunidades’ Padilla’s letter was used by the Comuneros as a template on which to found their ‘diabolic and disloyal attempt to tyrannise the kingdom’.\footnote{BL, Ms. Egerton 309, ‘Relación’ f. 61v.-62} Some, too, have queried whether Juana’s above-mentioned speech is her own. However, the general tone and register of the speech; the personal detail; the simplicity; the fact that, here and there, words seem only half-heard, give it the ring of authenticity. If the Junta had fabricated the speech, it would probably have conformed more exactly to a coherent political text. Moreover, Juana’s public appearances during much of this period showed the Queen to be startlingly different from expectation.
8.3. The question of sovereignty (1520)

Foremost among the issues dividing Junta and Comuneros generally was Juana’s status relative to Charles’ and, more widely, the legitimacy and aims of the Cortes and Junta with respect to the monarchy. As in the autumn of 1506, Juana’s refusal to sign the convocation of the Junta as Cortes (despite early expressions of support), raised questions of legitimacy and sovereignty for the body which now tried to govern.

The eight letters drafted by the Community of Jaén after joining the Junta reflect confusion about who was in charge. One, addressed to Juana, notified her about the procurators’ nomination, requesting that she meet them and confirm their powers. There were also letters to Juana’s chaplain, the Archdeacon of Jaén, the Junta, the procurators of Toledo and Valladolid, and Chancery president, Villaescusa. A seventh was addressed to Charles, lamenting his absence and failure to visit Andalusia and hear its grievances, while the eighth asked Adrian (as well as Juana) to approve the procurators’ nomination.73

Arguments about use of the Queen’s authority split the Junta and some Communities from others. On 23 September Adrian reported that the Junta was deliberating whether orders should be issued in the name of Juana and Charles, or in Juana’s name only.74 Next day, the proctor for Salamanca addressed Juana as ‘the most powerful Queen and mistress of the world’, and Charles as ‘Prince’. But Junta documents of 25 and 26 September called Charles King, although his name followed Juana’s, and his imperial title was omitted. Comunero leaders in Toledo, Madrid and Segovia led a majority urging use only of Juana’s name. More doubtful, the Community of Valladolid asked a commission of jurists to clarify, inter alia, whether Juana’s authority sufficed without resorting to Charles. On 8 October, the Burgos city élite, traditionally pro-Flemish, and now breaking away from the wider movement, questioned whether Juana’s authority should be used at all; Charles had the right to appoint whom he wished to govern in his absence, since the ‘government is his’.75 From beginning to end of the uprising attitudes to Juana varied. Many saw her as a

73 Pedro A. Porras Arboledo, *La Ciudad de Jaén y la Revolución de las Comunidades de Castilla (1500-1523)*, (Jaén, 1993): 60, 78
74 CSP Sp. 2, 60, 23 September 1520, to Charles
75 Sandoval, *Historia*: 323
resource to be called upon when necessary. Describing Acuña’s bid for the archbishopric of Toledo in March-April 1521, Maldonado comments on the popular view among Toledans that if Charles and the Pope refused Acuña the post, ‘the Queen Doña Juana [and] the holy junta, united with the votes of the clergy and people, would suffice to confirm him in the archbishopric’.\(^{76}\)

But Juana stoutly defended Charles. One anti-Comunero source is particularly explicit: ‘no-one’, Juana declared, ‘turns me against my son, and everything I have is his’.\(^{77}\) According to another, she told the Junta that ‘when the proprietary queens of the kingdom became widows their eldest sons had always called themselves kings of Castile’, citing the cases of Alfonso, son of Urraca, and Fernando, son of Berenguera, both of whom, she said, had become kings in their mother’s lifetime.\(^{78}\) The detailed nature of this response prompts the suspicion that words that could have come straight from Council jurists were being put into Juana’s mouth. But Juana (who always privately referred to Charles as ‘the Prince’) was elsewhere recorded as fending off attacks on him by asserting that his claim to the title of monarch was in line with Castilian precedent.\(^{79}\)

‘Everything leads one to suppose’, writes Valdeón Barue, ‘that Juana, while understanding the motives that led to the Comunero uprising, had no wish to harm her beloved son Charles’.\(^{80}\) Aram, too, states that by refusing to sanction the Comunero programme she endorsed Charles’ succession.\(^{81}\) While these statements are evidently true, there is slippage as regards Juana herself. What of the Queen’s own freedom to govern? Was her refusal to sanction the Comunero programme linked purely to a wish to protect Charles? A distinction should be drawn between Juana’s support for Charles as heir and successor, and support for her own rights. As in the past, she promised to sign later in order to negotiate greater room for manoeuvre for herself and household. This was not, however,

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\(^{76}\) Maldonado, *La revolución*: 198

\(^{77}\) AGS, PR, CC 2, f. 36, Lope Hurtado to Charles. A year before Juana had complained to Denia that she had little to give her younger son. She had nothing to give him, Denia retorted, because everything belonged to ‘the Prince’. AGS, E 5, f. 343 [undated; 1519].

\(^{78}\) BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 55

\(^{79}\) Danvila, *Historia crítica*, II: 688, 10 December 1520, Lope Hurtado to Charles

\(^{80}\) Valdeón Barue, ‘La Reina y sus planteamientos’: 52-53

\(^{81}\) Aram, *Juana the Mad*: 128, 132
merely a question of divesting herself of the Denias and some hated women, but concerned her own status and right to act.

To what extent was the Queen aware of the revolutionary demands of the Junta? She may not have known of the proposal in one Comunero document to dispense with the right to female succession, but she did clash with the Junta over the position of the Royal Council.82 Under Rojas' intemperate presidency the Council had become a target of hatred, seen to corruptly intrigue with Charles' foreign advisers, and drive the repression of just demands. At least on this question grandees were in agreement with Comuneros. Rojas wanted only to 'slash and burn', the Constable wrote, while the Admiral claimed the Council had 'destroyed the kingdom'.83

As Sanuto's diary notes, the Comuneros 'will make a [new] Council and a new State and in all these realms will change the King's councillors, powers, governors and chamberlains and make a new world'.84 The Comuneros saw the Royal Council, which had been closely enmeshed with the Cortes since at least 1500, as an obstacle on the path to power of the 'Cortes and General Junta'. The Community of Valladolid had suggested that two councillors go to Tordesillas to thrash out an agreement with the Junta. But the plan founder and on 26 September, just two days after Juana's meeting with the procurators, the Junta published a manifesto allocating to itself sole responsibility for government, thereby dispossessing the Council of its functions and effectively demoting royal authority. On 30 September the Junta sent a delegation to Valladolid to arrest the remaining royal councillors, of whom seven were captured. Bound for Tordesillas, they entered Simancas in carts, wearing 'sombreros' draped in black. The captains with them carried the royal seal, with which the Junta would issue acts of government in the Queen's name.85 The councillors were released about a league from Tordesillas on condition that they did not resume their posts.86

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82 CODON, VIII: 272. According to the 'Capítulos de lo que ordenaban de pedir los de la Junta', no woman should succeed after the Queen, although the right of males to succeed through the female line would be upheld. The proposal was doubtless aimed at preventing the seizure of power by foreign consorts.
83 Danvila, Historia crítica, I: 386, 24 June 1520, to Charles
84 Sanuto, Diarii, 24: 290, 7 September 1520
85 Manuel Bachiller, Antigüedades y sucesos memorables sucedidos en esta noble y antigua villa de Simancas (1580), CODON, I: 542
86 Pedro Mexía, Historia de Carlos Quinto (New York/Paris, 1918): 170
The arrest and dispersal of royal councillors was followed by another revolutionary move. On 20 October, exasperated by Juana’s refusal to underwrite their measures and perhaps also driven by the precedent set by Cisneros in relation to the (failed) Cortes of Burgos of 1506, the Junta drew up a document envisaging a Cortes with authority drawn not from the monarch but realm. The Cortes cities would assemble at least every three years, in perpetuity, without requiring the monarch’s permission or presence, and its administration would be completely independent of the Royal Council’s, and thus, of the monarch’s. The cities would define their means and terms of access to representation in the Cortes, which would determine taxation and act as a check and balance on government activity and administration.87

While Prawdin argues that, fully conscious of the dangerous implications that Comunero measures had for royal authority, Juana was concerned to protect the status quo ante, Pérez believes that Juana would have had only a confused sense of the Junta’s revolutionary actions.88 But, judging from a report attributed to Fray Francisco de León, Prawdin’s view seems plausible. Penned by a cleric whose name Charles’ envoy, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, asked him to keep confidential, the report shows Juana reading, or having read to her, the papers she was being asked to sign, and confirms that she had retained her personal knowledge of government procedures from 1506-1507.89

‘The defence of royal power’, writes Dios, in his book on the Council, ‘basically involved the untouchability of the social and political order established in the reign of the Catholic kings’.90 Such a defence was precisely what Juana undertook. Her insistence that the Royal Council remain the backbone of government emerges clearly from León’s account, enclosed with a letter from Adrian for Charles’ eyes only, dated 13 November 1520. León shows Juana on her estrado, talking a ‘very long time’ with the procurators and listening to them read ‘all their documents’. She insisted (correctly) that before she could sign them, such royal orders had to be signed on the back by the councillors. The procurators replied that the councillors had been ‘burning down’ Castile, and

87 Carretero Zamora, ‘Las Cortes’ in Martínez Gil, ed., En Torno: 245-256
88 ‘... ihr ganzes Leben lang nur eins gewünscht hatte: daß alle so bleibe, wie es zu Lebzeiten ihrer Mutter gewesen war ...’ Prawdin, Johanna: 296; Pérez, La revolución: 195
89 AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 166; CSP (Queen Juana), 67 [November 1520]
90 Dios, El Consejo: 204
were now hiding with Adrian. But, said Juana, she understood Adrian to be a
good man of moderate habits. As for Council and Cardinal joining with grandees
like the Constable, this again could not be bad, since the Constable had always
been among grandees most loyal to her parents. Informed that the Constable was
not Bernardino Fernández de Velasco (who had defended Juana at crucial times)
but his brother, Iñigo, Juana replied that this should make no difference.\textsuperscript{91} With
regard to the councillors, they:

‘dated from the time of the Catholic king. They could not be bad, or at least
there must be some who were good, and that was why she wanted to speak and
communicate with them, because they were experienced people and knew the
form of good government from the time of the Catholic monarchs, and if there
were some who were bad, her highness would order their punishment’.

This, the procurators objected, was unnecessary. Here, at Tordesillas,
were \textit{letrados} who knew perfectly well how to govern. Juana replied that she had
personally summoned the councillors to Tordesillas, insisting they were en route,
then broke off discussion on grounds of tiredness.\textsuperscript{92} Repeatedly the procurators
returned to the fray, following her from room to room. Repeatedly Juana
responded from the standpoint of strict precedent.

Fray León’s report shows that Juana’s refusal to accept Comunero
documents as acts of government cannot be ascribed simply to alienation,
icapacitation or support for Charles. She was defending the whole principle of
royal authority by insisting that it was \textit{her} prerogative to decide on matters
connected with the Royal Council and its composition. It might be argued that,
during the autumn of 1506, the Council too had faced the Queen’s resistance or
procrastination, and that some nobles were to face the same attitude after her
‘liberation’ in December 1520. This can plausibly be attributed to the fact that
Juana knew she remained a hostage. Although moved by early Comunero pleas
and overtures, Juana suspected the Junta was treating her much as the Council
had done after Philip’s death. She was being courted, cajoled and threatened for

\textsuperscript{91} AGS, PR, CC, 2-1, f. 166 [November 1520], Fray Francisco de León to Adrian. Bernardino
Fernández de Velasco had died very suddenly, in disputed circumstances, in February 1512
(CODOIN, XIV: 15)

\textsuperscript{92} Juana had indeed sent a messenger, but, according to León, he did not go (AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f.
166).
her signature while her own arguments and orders, notably in respect of
government, were circumvented and disobeyed.

Juana was also encouraged to withhold her signature by León, and her
confessor, Juan de Ávila, under instructions from Adrian to ‘procure and secretly
advise the Queen never to put her signature to paper ...’93 León told Adrian: ‘... Where it has been possible there has not been wanting one who has advised her for her good according to what your Lordship commanded and the same will be done henceforward’.94 Adrian attributed Juana’s ‘prudence’ to her advisers: ‘... Your Majesty may be assured that if some persons had not warned Her Highness of the difficulties which might follow if she signed, she would have done so long ago’, adding in cipher, ‘[and] all the kingdoms would have mutinied’ (my emphasis).95 Adrian thought Juana would have ended by signing documents had it not been for the contrary advice of a handful of ‘good people’. Others thought to be restraining Juana include Ochoa de Landa and María de Cartama, a maid of whom she was very fond. According to the Constable, Cartama and Ávila were ousted from the palace, together with Fernando de Hellín, as a means of punishing Juana, but probably because they were relaying messages from Adrian.96 But León’s account shows, too, that seasoned by her interminable conflicts with Ferrer and Denia, Juana fielded pleas and demands with caution, skill and subterfuge, as well as with repeated attempts at dialogue, and that underlying all was the core question of royal authority. The Junta agreed to talk to royal councillors as individuals, while objecting to Juana’s attempt to summon them as a body, herself discuss matters with them and herself decide who among them to keep and discard. The deputy for Toro, Fernando de Ulloa, had warned Padilla not to allow her to see royal councillors.97 Toledan regidor and Cortes deputy Pedro Laso de la Vega did likewise.

Thus, if a first distinction should be drawn between Juana’s defence of Charles as heir and support for her rights as proprietary monarch, a second must be made between the Comuneros’ wish to exploit her authority and grant her real power. Juana was not being offered the freedom of manoeuvre Pérez mentions,

92 AGS, PR, CC 2.1, f. 20; see also AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 17, 14 September 1520, to Charles
93 AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 166
94 AGS, PR, CC 2-1, f. 169
95 Sandoval, Historia: 363, 30 November 1520, to Charles
96 Danvila, Historia critica, II: 51
or Prawdin envisages when referring to their offer of ‘Freiheit, Reich und Krone’. Although she had expressed support for the Junta’s aim of returning to the ‘good government’ of her parents and positively wanted the restoration of her royal dignitas this, for Juana, meant Comuneros assisting in, not dictating, that process. It was, of course, as she may have realised, an impossible demand. Had the Comuneros capitulated to her desire to allow for the restoration of the Royal Council as the superior institution of government, and the recall of key players familiar to her – notably the grandees – they would have surrendered virtually everything.

The struggle between Queen and Junta continued until 5 December, when anti-Comunero forces gathered outside Tordesillas. The last order she apparently made to the Junta was ‘Open the gates to them and let them in!’ To the Comuneros, it must have seemed ungrateful, malicious, even inspired by the demons that many believed were tormenting her.

8. 4. Queen and corpus mysticum (1520)

After Juana’s encounter with Padilla, his fellow captains and the Junta were euphoric. ‘The people’, wrote Sandoval, ‘thought it a miracle that the Queen, after so many years of imprisonment, so far removed from government affairs that she was seen by almost no-one, should sally forth at this moment of such need, with such lucidity and clarity of judgment, to govern these realms …’ Some, however, suspected the Junta of falsifying the evidence and that Juana was incurable.

This incurability had been an article of faith for Fernando’s supporters, as it became for supporters of Charles. In 1506 Conchillos had been among those to identify Juana’s ‘nonsensical’ departure from Burgos with the kingdom’s ruin. Such comments linked Juana to the notion of rex inutilis, as well as to its literary counterparts in familiar tales like that of the Grail’s Fisher King, whose wound, or mysterious lethargy, was linked to the wasting of the land. But whereas, for

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98 Prawdin, Johanna: 296
99 AGS, PR, CC 2, f. 36, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles, 10 December 1520; Martire, XII, 709: 114, 27 December 1520
100 Sandoval, Historia: 279
Fernando’s or Charles’ supporters, the solution lay not in the curing of the Queen’s ‘wound’ or ‘langour’, but in her effective deposition and substitution, Comuneros supporting Juana saw the destinies of queen and kingdom as inseparably entwined. Her ‘illnesses’, or ‘passions’ were freighted with political meaning, reflecting the transgressions of the body politic. In 1516 Dr Soto and others had tried to convince Cisneros that the restoration of Juana’s health was essential to Castile’s. Like Soto and Villaescusa, the Junta, popularly called ‘holy’, and comprising both laymen and clerics, linked her ill-health not to some pathological condition but to neglect and ill-treatment.¹⁰¹ In the opening lines of its September manifesto it placed the question at centre stage, proclaiming that the ‘root and first cause of all the evils and injuries’ of Castile were Juana’s ill-health and Charles’ youth.¹⁰² By stressing the urgent need to ‘cure’ Juana they would be ‘curing’ her people and realms.

The development of a ‘political theology’ deriving from the ecclesiastical concept of the *corpus mysticum*, to be found in early Church exegesis, and notably in the writings of St Paul,¹⁰³ had been less developed in Spain than in France and England, where kingship had a more directly thaumaturgical basis.¹⁰⁴ But adaptations of the ecclesiastical theory of Christ’s body to the body politic, and the monarch’s two bodies (personal and political), exist in medieval Castilian writings.¹⁰⁵ Martín de Córdoba’s *Jardín de las nobles doncellas*, dedicated to Isabel between 1468–69, is one of many writings to describe the kingdom as a mystic body with king as head and justice as spirit. As a headless body has no sense, so a kingdom without a king who exercises justice is dead.¹⁰⁶ Isabel had lived out the concept in her own person. Pulgar describes her galloping through pouring rain to the castle of Simancas, a property of the Admiral, to secure his agreement to the punishment of his eldest son, Fadrique,

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¹⁰³ ‘For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being man, are one body: so also is Christ.’ 1 Corinthians 12, v. 12 (The Bible, Authorized King James Version). Paul’s symbolism is further developed in the same chapter.

¹⁰⁴ A major historian of the theory, Ernst H. Kantorowicz, published *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, in 1957.

¹⁰⁵ Paul Kleber Monod, *The Power of Kings* (Yale, 1999): 43. One might add that the incorporation of the concept in the *Siéte Partidas*, II, provides a notable example.

¹⁰⁶ Martín de Córdoba, *Jardín de las nobles doncellas* (North Carolina, 1974), II: x
for a misdemeanour. Believing the incident had affected the health of her realms, Isabel became indisposed: ‘My body suffers from the blows that Don Fadrique delivered yesterday against my guarantee’. Isabel only managed to secure justice through the mediation of the Constable. Once dealt with, by imprisonment and temporary exile, Isabel recovered.\textsuperscript{106}

Aram’s biography of Juana applies the theory of the two bodies, as set out by Ernst H. Kantorowicz, to Juana’s situation as a proprietary queen who ‘never ruled’, and whose withdrawal from the political scene into a more or less willing reclusion enabled a living split between her ‘individual’ and ‘corporate’ persons that allowed others to rule in her name. In this connection Aram adds that: ‘the queen’s contemporaries asserted that her personal sins threatened the health of her realms. By the same transitive principle, the queen could personally undertake penitence or suffer retribution for transgressions committed within her realms.’\textsuperscript{107}

The notion of penitence and retribution is of a piece with Aram’s conviction that Juana devoted herself to ascetic practices and \textit{recogimiento}. However, as I suggest above, this application of the theory of the two bodies seems less immediately identifiable to those who, in 1520, wanted Juana to exercise power as their sovereign mistress than does the concept of a natural \textit{sympathy} between her personal body and the body politic. Junta members did not see a personally ‘sinful’ queen but, on the contrary, a queen who suffered in herself the evils and injuries done to Castile by others, in much the same way as Isabel suffered in her person the disobedience of noblemen. At the other end of the century, supporters of the last Valois monarch, Henri III, perceived the royal body as ‘sympathetically tied to the welfare of the whole people, so that the king’s lack of physical health was mirrored in the deterioration of the Republic’.\textsuperscript{108}

In their efforts to ‘cure’ Juana so that she could cooperate in the Comunero project the Junta extended the sympathetic equation between monarch and kingdom to the kingdom’s component parts. It announced the creation of a ‘perpetual union and brotherhood’ of confederated cities and towns, joined in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{106} Pulgar, \textit{Crónica}, I: 441-444.
\item\textsuperscript{107} Aram, \textit{Juana the Mad}; 9
\item\textsuperscript{108} Monod, \textit{The Power}; 34-35
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
self-defence. If one town or city were attacked the rest had to contribute to its ‘remedy’ with force of arms. The notion that the towns of Castile formed an organic whole is vividly present in a letter written by the Community of Segovia to Medina del Campo on 24 August 1520 (figure 34), immediately after this key feria town’s devastation: ‘Let our Lord God be witness that, as the houses of that town [Medina] were set alight, so our own entrails burned ... But, gentlemen, be assured that, as Medina perished for Segovia, so the memory of Segovia will either perish or Segovia will avenge Medina ...’ In a later letter to Burgos, about to break away from the Comunero federation, the Junta was more specific. It recalled the views of Athenian statesman and legal reformer Herodotus Solon, hero of ancient Greek democrats: ‘Solon said that the city or the kingdom was a body, and thus that when one member of the body hurts, so do all.’

The cause of Isabel’s above-mentioned wrath, Admiral Fadrique Enríquez argued in the same terms: ‘Compare the realms to a man, remove the head and you will see what happens to the limbs’. On 9 September Charles had appointed Enríquez one of three governors, or viceroyos, the others being Adrian and the Constable. Although Enríquez did not immediately assume this position, feeling freer to act as unofficial mediator, he nonetheless acted to all intents and purposes as Charles’ representative. The head of the body politic could only be the King, he argued in his dialogues with the Comuneros: ‘... you must consider the indisposition of the queen ... her poor health, and that, in such circumstances the vassals are obliged to sustain their kings and protect and defend them, not let them perish’. He reminded the Community of Valladolid that the Queen was ‘mortal, as are we all’. Who would reign in a loyal Spain but her sons?

Nevertheless, until its defeat at Tordesillas in December 1520, the Junta persisted with endeavours, begun in 1516, to ‘cure’ Juana. By 1520 her illness had still not been defined or agreed. A key component of successive power struggles, diagnosis had been further complicated by the fact that for years she had been ‘maltreated’ (her word), imprisoned and entangled in a web of deceit.

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109 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 76-81, ‘Alianza y hermandad jurada que las ciudades y villas del Reino realizaron en Tordesillas el 25 de septiembre de 1520’
110 Sandoval, Historia: 249
111 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 366, 30 October 1520. For discussion of the ‘mystical body’ as an urban idea, see also Maravall: 48-49
112 In Santa Cruz, Crónica: 341-342, 31 October 1520
and misinformation. From the outset, Comunero leaders were keenly aware of the demand of the Cortes of Valladolid of 1518 that Charles relinquish the throne if his mother’s health were restored. The first of the ‘Capítulos’ presented by the Community of Valladolid to the Junta urged an inquiry into ‘whether the illness of the Queen ... could be cured’, adding that ‘the Communities must take charge of her royal person’. The Junta’s 26 September manifesto declared a threefold remedy, to be achieved by ‘humane’ means. The Denias’ expulsion had been the first step. This was accompanied by a call to all the ‘most distinguished and excellent’ doctors in the realm to advise the Junta. Thirdly, the Junta would ask priests throughout the realm to hold processions and pray for her health.

‘The queen’, Martire wrote on 30 August, ‘continues to live crushed by the weight of Saturn, reacting with horror to affairs of any kind. They mean as much to her as the sky falling in or the birth of new stars’. While Adrian attributed her refusal to sign to the influence of advisers, Martire, and many Comuneros, attributed it, as before, to illness. On 13 September he wrote: ‘Since her primitive health is destroyed she does nothing and refuses to put a hand to any paper presented to her’. An anonymous contemporary believed: ‘... Her Highness was not disposed to deal with them on anything’. The view was widely disseminated. On 6 November English prelate and diplomat Cuthbert Turnstall, told Wolsey, from Cologne, of Comunero disillusionment: ‘... the queen of Spain ... hath not such use of reason as they had [been told], so that by her they might have colored and supported their said rebellion as they intend[ed], now begin to repent of their folly’.

A more complex picture emerges from Tordesillas itself. As mentioned earlier, Fernando and staff members had long been aware that Juana responded to external stimulation. Juana was ‘much seen and visited, especially by one of those letrados they [the Junta] had here, to the extent that every day and every

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113 BL, Egerton 309, ‘Relación’, f. 122
114 Martire, XII, 684: 51, 30 August 1520
115 Martire, XII, 685: 54, 13 September 1520
116 ‘Relación sumaria del comienzo y suceso de las guerras civiles que llamaron las Comunidades de Castilla’ (anon.), in Rodríguez Villa, ed., Artículo Históricos (Madrid, 1913): 60
117 LP 3 (1), 1043: 384
hour they wanted to talk to her Highness ...’ On 19 September the Portuguese ambassador reported that it was the ‘greatest novelty’ to ‘see what the Queen does’. She was listening to a lot of people and her responses were ‘not altogether beside the point’. Her rooms were clean and well appointed; she had ordered new clothes and headgear. She had become accessible, wrote a Venetian agent, ‘and they say she is in good form’. But on 8 October Adrian reported from Valladolid that Juana was ‘never as bad as now’. She no longer ate or slept, but remained constantly on guard, surrounded by plates of cold and rotting food. Yet on 13 November the Cardinal was reiterating an earlier report, writing that ‘... in many respects her Highness speaks very sensibly ...’ On 14 November the Junta wrote to the area of the Merindades, encouraging visits to Tordesillas and proclaiming that Juana’s health had much improved. On 16 November, just under three weeks before the Junta’s experiment with Juana came to a dramatic end, Adrian wrote that she was wearing fine clothes, and dressing the Infanta well, so that Catalina could accompany her to Santa Clara. Venetian secretary Geronimo Dedo reported hopeful rumours from Naples that Juana had written to the viceroy and city ‘come lei vuol essere Raina’. She was allowing the cities control over their own government and revenues, and Aragon had called on her to visit Valencia.

This chronology, and the contradictory reports and rumours, suggest not a steady deterioration in health, but the intermittent nature of Juana’s ‘illness’ or ‘illnesses’; she functioned at times effectively, at others not. It is also possible that Juana used ‘illness’ strategically, as various female descendants would do. Although Adrian, who had not met her, declared her incurability as an article of faith, both his letters and the letter attributed to León indicate the possibility that, unable to control matters or exert authority, Juana used ‘tiredness’ and ‘illness’, as well as the charismatic weapon of her signature, in a tactical sense, adapting

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119 AGS, E 8, f. 32, Licenciate Polanco to Charles, 17 January 1521
120 Pérez, La revolución: 194
121 Sanuto, Diarii, 24: 290, 7 September 1520
122 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 246, to Charles
123 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 480, to Charles
124 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 588
125 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 500, to Charles
126 Sanuto, Diarii, 24: 406, 3 November 1520
the wits and ingenuity evident in her interminable tussles with Denia to a drawout strategy of evasion, alternately raising and dashing hopes.

Her lapse in mid-October was probably linked, in part, to external causes. Adrian associated it with the departure from Tordesillas on 20 September of the Denias and most female attendants. But Juana loathed Denia, and had demanded the women’s dismissal, in exchange for which ‘she would sign’ within four days (a characteristic deception on Juana’s part). By contrast, the Junta’s dismissal of Padilla as captain-general of Comunero forces, and his consequent return to Toledo on 11 October seems to have genuinely affected her. Alcocer describes Juana’s personal liking for Padilla, who had accompanied his father, Toledan procurator Pedro López de Padilla, to the Cortes of Valladolid in 1506 and whose wife, María Pacheco, was the daughter of the Count of Tendilla and niece of the Marquis of Villena, an old favourite of Juana’s. When Juana met Padilla, writes Alcocer, she would ask him to escort her to a window recess, where they talked. Aware of her affection for, and trust in him, the Junta had asked Juana’s thirteen-year-old daughter, Catalina, to write to Padilla to beg him to return – a request to which the Infanta acceded, and which angered Charles.

Juana’s dejection and refusal to eat coincided not only with Padilla’s departure but with a difficult moment for the Comuneros, riven by conflict with the disaffected leaders of Burgos, and Community of Valladolid. Amid chaotic and highly stressful conditions at Tordesillas, the deputies seem to have been applying to Juana what the Cardinal called a policy of ‘fear and flattery’. Fear, almost certainly, would have been instilled in Juana by various rumoured schemes. Two involved marriage plans: Catalina’s marriage to João, heir to the Portuguese crown (eventually organised by Charles), and the marriage of Juana herself to the Duke of Calabria – a plan rumoured years before, in 1506-1507. Procurators also allegedly exploited Juana’s fear of fortresses by warning her that

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126 Danvila, Historia crítica II: 246, to Charles
127 ibidem
128 Alcocer, Relación: 46
129 AGS, E 8, f. 123, 19 August 1521, Catalina to Charles
130 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 29, 23 September 1520, to Charles
if Caroline forces reoccupied Tordesillas they would shut her up at Benavente (from which she had tried to flee in 1506).

According to Alcocer: ‘Everyone affirmed that, if Juan de Padilla, when he entered Tordesillas, had taken the Queen to Toledo or Valladolid, events would not have ended in tragedy, as they did’. Juana was wary of such plans. The Constable was confident she would never leave willingly: ‘I have always thought that, if Her Highness wanted to leave Tordesillas there is no one to stop her’. Since Juana was a virtual hostage, and had no independent household, his remark is somewhat disingenuous. Apart from the major logistical undertaking involved in any transfer of the Queen at a time of civil war, the Junta would never have allowed their most precious asset to travel beyond territory they felt was secure, and their city of preference, Toledo, would have placed her yet more securely in Comunero hands.

It might also have placed her in close contact not only with Juan de Padilla but with his wife, María Pacheco, who, like Juana herself, was alleged to be in the grip of some devilish enchantment. As stated above, Padilla had married a Mendoza, daughter of the Count of Tendilla and niece of Villena. As a widow, she was to continue to lead Comunero resistance in the city before fleeing to Portugal in 1522 to escape a death sentence. In 1520 Martire told Mercurino de Gattinara that María Pacheco was the ‘husband of her husband’ and, later, that ‘she continues in her obstinacy, searching popularity in her locura ... They say ... she is possessed by a demon ...’. Similarly, referring to rumours that she practiced necromancy, Fray Guevara warned Juan de Padilla that his wife ‘se infierne’ and, in a letter to Pacheco herself, told her he had heard that a ‘mad’ slave of hers, a ‘great witch’, had beguiled her with the prophecy that she and Padilla would succeed to the crowns of Juana and Charles. Guevara, who declared that, unlike men, women must not only be virtuous but seen to be virtuous, believed that Pacheco had betrayed her noble blood and that

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132 Danvila, *Historia critica*, II: 480, 13 November 1520, Adrian to Charles; CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 77, 15 December 1520, Adrian to Charles
133 Alcocer, *Relación*: 47
134 AGS, PR, CC 1-2, f. 166
135 Danvila, *Historia critica*, II: 287, 29 October 1520, to Charles
136 Martire, XII, 680: 42, 23 July 1520; 727, 27 July 1521
137 António de Guevara, *Epístolas familiares*, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 13 (Madrid, 1872), XLV, to Juan de Padilla; XLVII, to María Pacheco
this was an aggravating factor in her behaviour. In this context, ‘madness’ is used in close juxtaposition with political disobedience, unseemly ambition and disregard for the conventions, as well as with subversion of the natural order of marriage.

If Pacheco’s alleged domination of her husband, and political ambitions, were seen by many as the signs of an evil enchantment, so a number of Juana’s supporters continued to ask, as in 1516, whether Juana’s very different symptoms were the work of sorcery. Apart from calling for the best medical attention, and prayers and processions, the Junta appointed a commission to examine Juana’s ‘illness’. Comprising Toledan deputy Pedro de Ayala; canon Juan de Benavente of León, and dean of Soria, Fernán Díaz of Morales, it appeared to confirm that Juana was bewitched. This diagnosis must be understood within the context of the witchcraft debates of the time. If, in 1520, she became aware of the attempts at exorcism, they may well have added to her depressive state in mid-October 1520. The commission sent for a well-known Aragonese exorcist. But, to the Junta’s confusion, he concluded that Juana was not bewitched, and ‘wanted to leave because for what she was suffering there was no remedy’.  

Despite this setback, Juana was subjected to exorcisms throughout the remainder of the Junta’s period in Tordesillas. To the end the Comuneros persisted in their belief that restoration of the Queen’s health was essential to the functioning of the body politic. Although they remained uncertain about the cause of her illness, they linked it to her refusal to underwrite their revolutionary programme, just as Adrian and other partisans of Charles, saw her incurability as an article of faith.

8. 5. Two monarchs in Castile? (1520-1521)

Shaken by the Denias’ dismissal, Charles described it as the thing that had most upset him.  
Compounded by the dismissal of other allies within Juana’s entourage, it raised the prospect that, at any moment, her resistance would crumble, to catastrophic effect for his tenuous hold on power. The priority of all

137 Alba, Acerca: 122-123, 28 October 1520, from Portuguese ambassador
138 Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 246, 7 October 1520, to Adrian
three governors was to win back the Queen, although only two of them – Adrian and the Constable – were happy to restore her to the Denias’ control.

During the time of the Junta Juana had been guarded by several hundred warrior priests, loyal to the charismatic Acuña, Bishop of Zamora, who had caused one of the major crises of Juana’s 1507 government. During the passionately-fought battle for Tordesillas, on 5-6 December, Diego de Guevara’s nephew, Fray António, claimed to have seen one of Acuña’s priests shoot eleven men dead from behind a battlement while blessing them with the sign of the cross.139 Ferocious hand-to-hand fighting lasted several hours, amid clanging bells and raging fires. Pillage followed. Defeated, the people ‘were overwhelmed with sadness’, writes Maldonado.140

This was no exaggeration; Maldonado is referring to a disastrous psychological blow. Despite a quick deterioration in relations between Junta and Queen, her importance for both sides had remained central: ‘The most important thing of all’, as the author of the ‘Relación de las Comunidades’ commented, ‘is to have her’.141 For both sides, ‘having’ the Queen meant ‘liberating’ her. Restored to his former position as captain-general, and greeted like a star wherever he went, Padilla saw the Queen’s ‘liberation’ as his priority and pondered the best way to penetrate the formidable defences of Tordesillas.142 In January 1521 Pedro Laso de la Vega issued an ultimatum ordering the governors of Castile to show loyalty and obedience to Juana and to immediately free Queen and Infanta, or ‘the Queen and King, or us in their name, will make war on you as delinquents ...’143 The Comuneros of Salamanca demanded: ‘Above all things, the liberation of the Queen, so that everyone may visit and consult with her, given that, after all, she is the only legitimate sovereign’.144 On 9 April a

139 António de Guevara, Epístolas Familiares, in Manuel Rivadeneyra, ed., BAE, XIII (Madrid, 1850), Carta XLIII, 20 December 1520
140 Maldonado, La revolución: 177
141 BL, Egerton Ms. 309, ‘Relación’, f. 83v.
142 Santa Cruz, Crónica: 421
144 ‘Carta de credencia a Francisco Maldonado’, in Pérez, La revolución: 164-165, 25 January 1521
Figure 32 (top). ‘Reunión de los Comuneros con Doña Juana I de Castilla, 1520’, as represented by Eugenio Oliva (1863-1917). Although disillusionment quickly set in between Queen and Comuneros, many were devastated by losing possession of Juana after their defeat at Tordesillas in December 1520, and morale plummeted. (Diputación Provincial de Palencia)

Figure 33. Detail from the well-known painting of the execution of Comuneros Juan Bravo, Juan de Padilla and Francisco Maldonado, ‘Los comuneros en el patibulo’, by António Gisbert (1860). Pedro Alcocer relates that Juana, who personally liked Padilla (centre), would ask him to accompany her to a window recess where they would talk. (Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid)
cuadrilla in Valladolid voted for peace with Charles only on condition that the royal councillors were dismissed and Juana granted ‘all her liberty’.\textsuperscript{145} For the ‘good and loyal knights of Spain’, Guevara gloated to Acuña, victory also meant a return to the natural order: ‘For us and for our friends, we want no other God but Christ, nor any other law but the Gospel, nor any other King but Don Carlos’.\textsuperscript{146} But the Caroline coalition was an uneasy one. The landed nobility had risked much by taking sides. Many had done so only after a revolt at Dueñas against the lord of Buendia, on 1 September 1520, had sparked widespread rebellion in the countryside against aristocratic power.\textsuperscript{147} Until 3 January 1521 the Admiral had refused to formally assume the post of governor on two grounds: he had not yet received an answer from Charles to his series of (unpublished) preconditions, and he felt freer to negotiate without the title and powers that Comuneros deemed provocative and illegal. Like other nobles, he also worried about his estates. When his cautious approach was compared unfavourably to the Constable’s, he retorted that he was ‘nearer the fire’.\textsuperscript{148} Although the nobles, including the sixty-year-old Admiral, proved their mettle in the battle of Tordesillas, there was substance in the Queen’s amicable reproach that they were all rather late.\textsuperscript{149}

Juana loved the bustle around her.\textsuperscript{150} It is difficult to gauge the level of interest of various nobles in Juana’s fate since the Cortes of Madrid of 1510 had agreed to the succession settlement contained in the Treaty of Blois. But many had resented Charles ‘coup’ of 1516, and while present in large numbers at the Cortes of Valladolid of 1518 their alliance to Charles was shifting and inconstant, especially now Juana could provide an alternative source of royal authority. Some of Charles’ strongest supporters, such as Adrian and Rojas, had been themselves involved in an initiative which, given a different timescale, could have strengthened Juana’s authority.

\textsuperscript{145} AGS, PR, CC 3, f. 138, 9 April 1521, ‘Voto particular de una de las cuadrillas de Valladolid’
\textsuperscript{146} Guevara, Epístolas, XLIII, 20 December 1521
\textsuperscript{147} Juan Ignacio Gutiérrez Nieto, Las Comunidades como movimiento antisenorial (Barcelona, 1973)
\textsuperscript{148} Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 501-502, 16 November 1520, Adrian to Charles
\textsuperscript{149} Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 634, Hernando de Vega to Charles
\textsuperscript{150} AGS, PR, E 8, f. 32, Licentiate Polanco to Charles
From Medina de Rioseco and Tordesillas respectively Adrian and Lope Hurtado praised her conduct to Charles. He owed a ‘great debt’ to his mother, Adrian told him, for her defence of his ‘person and succession’, and for ‘other things’ which he did not enlarge upon.\(^{152}\) While never relinquishing her rights, Juana may have believed she had done enough for Charles, holding out under massive, sustained pressure, to win the right to effective recognition of her status, greater freedom and the political contacts to which she was again accustomed. Denia later reported she had been spoilt by the attention and become haughty ‘in consequence of the offers made her’ so that ‘there is no man who does not have great difficulty with her’.\(^{153}\) Clearly, for some nobles, assembled to kiss hands and tell her of their military exploits, Juana’s ‘liberation’ did not necessarily imply her political liquidation. The loss and sacking of Tordesillas had fuelled Comunero wrath against the nobility, who lived in heightened fear of reprisals. When Juana told Enríquez, angry about the targeting of his estates of Medina de Rioseco, Torrelobatón and Castromonte, that she had always insisted that the Comuneros avoid bloodshed and disband their troops, he persuaded her to repeat her words before a ‘great many knights’, ordering they be recorded – a measure some thought ‘superfluous’\(^{154}\). Enríquez, however, believed that Juana’s appeal to moderation could be converted into royal measures.\(^{155}\)

At this stage he was not alone. In the immediate aftermath of the battle of Tordesillas, Góméz de Santillán, veinticuatro for Granada (who had supported Juana at the Cortes of Valladolid of 1506), reported that he had witnessed Juana’s orders to Pedro Girón, Padilla’s replacement as general captain of Comunero troops, and to Comunero cities, to disband and refrain from acts of violence. Santillán thought these measures, transcribed by two notaries in the presence of a gathering of great lords and nobles, could work.\(^{156}\) But Fernando de Vega, comendador mayor of Castile, managed to prevent them reaching their destination. The move, he told the Constable, was very damaging. While understandable, the Admiral’s action had amounted to approval of Comunero methods. Most importantly, he was basing his action on the Queen’s authority,

\(^{152}\) Danvila, Historia crítica, II: 667, 688
\(^{153}\) CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 96, 25 January 1521, to Charles
\(^{154}\) CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 72, December 1520, Haro to Constable
\(^{155}\) AGS, PR, CC 3, f. 96, undated, unsigned letter to Charles [1520]
\(^{156}\) AGS, PR, CC 3, f. 40, 9 December 1520, to Adrian
which was to acknowledge the existence in Castile of two monarchs – the ‘worst thing that can happen in a realm’, the Royal Council had warned Charles in 1516 in the context of the coup. Vega’s subsequent letter to Charles shifted the emphasis, replacing what he had described to the Constable as the crux of the matter with a stress on Juana’s unfitness to rule ‘in any capacity whatsoever’. A bald reference to the dangers of a dual monarchy was probably thought impolitic.\textsuperscript{157}

The consternation of Charles’ most loyal servants is a measure of the importance of the issue at stake. To exploit Juana’s authority was to uphold her sanity and, thus, to undermine Charles’ legitimacy. Despite heated opposition Enríquez, desperate to restore order, as well as to prevent harm to his family and damage to his lands, remained obdurate. Juana, however, while willing to give verbal orders and have them notarised, still refused to sign, although she told the Count of Benavente she would do so once she left Tordesillas.\textsuperscript{158}

This could be seen as another delaying tactic. But, if so, why? During 1506-1507, when her freedom of movement, although restricted, had been greater, Juana had signed documents, initiated by herself or trusted secretaries. When speaking to Benavente in 1520 she seems to have been linking her departure from Tordesillas with her liberation, as she had done in conversation with Ferrer in 1511, and her liberation with use of her signature. Denia mentioned this objective when boasting that only he could prevent her from carrying out her desire to ‘travel the kingdom, sign and govern’ (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{159} In the meantime, the Admiral persisted in trying to confer authority on Juana. Thwarted by Vega, he became wrathful – something he did ‘a thousand times a day’ – reiterating his formerly expressed belief that Juana was sane.\textsuperscript{160}

On 22 January 1521 Adrian reassured Charles that no use had been made of Juana’s orders. The question of her signature had, however, been discussed at length, both as regards ‘what has happened and what will happen’.\textsuperscript{161} In other words, there was still no unanimity among the nobles at Tordesillas about her

\textsuperscript{157} Danvila, \textit{Historia crítica}, II: 636, 8 December 1520

\textsuperscript{158} CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 78, December 1520, Lope Hurtado to Charles

\textsuperscript{159} Danvila, \textit{Historia crítica}, IV: 295, 28 July 1521

\textsuperscript{160} AGS, PR, CC 3, f. 96 [undated, unsigned]; CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 79, attributed to Lope Hurtado, December 1520

\textsuperscript{161} CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 81, 22 January 1521
role. On 22 February 1521 an exasperated Denia told Charles that: ‘Four days ago the Admiral went in to the Queen our Lady and asked Her Highness to sign or the kingdom would be lost ... I told him before the Cardinal that he must not beg Her Highness to sign because he knows what a disservice it would be to God and His Majesty. He answered, “I’m not asking the Queen of Fez to sign, but my Queen!”’\textsuperscript{161} I said that if Her Highness were disposed to it we would all do it and work for it and the King our Lord would beg us to do so, but being as she is, it’s not worth even thinking about it. What he then said I cite the Cardinal as my witness. Believe me, Your Majesty, your servants have more trouble enduring the Admiral and repairing what he does to the detriment of our undertaking than fighting the traitors twenty times over ...’\textsuperscript{162}

During discussions with the Comuneros in October and November 1520, Enríquez had referred to Juana’s ‘indisposition’ while promoting Charles. But by February 1521 the Comuneros remained a formidable force and Adrian and Enríquez were working hard for a settlement. Enríquez now seems to have believed this could incorporate a role for Juana in government. At the very least, she should be given a more bearable and dignified position within her own household, greater visibility and access to the wider world. As Santiago Fernández Conti points out in his study of the Admiral, Enríquez’ declaration of Juana’s capacity to rule constituted a ‘golden’ opportunity for his own ambitions.\textsuperscript{163} Such ambitions were well known and often resented by those around him. Lope Hurtado complained that, although Enríquez had not yet formally accepted his position as governor, in practice he ‘commanded more as if he were the king’.\textsuperscript{164} However, as argued earlier, Enríquez’ political actions were not motivated entirely by self-interest. Nor should his sense of honour be underestimated.

His support for Juana did not stop him calling for Charles’ return. His prominence in the suppression of the uprising; the importance of his town of

\textsuperscript{161} According to Martíre (XI, 668: 23-24, 28 April 1520), the Queen of Fez had fled her husband with the help of a freed slave. Baptised a Christian on 27 April 1520, Charles and Germaine de Foix were her godparents.
\textsuperscript{162} AGS, PR 3, f. 39
\textsuperscript{163} Santiago Fernández Conti, ‘Carlos V y la alta nobleza castellana: el almirante don Fabrique Enríquez’, in Martínez Millán, ed., \textit{Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-58)}, (Madrid, 2001), II: 29-51
\textsuperscript{164} CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 78, 16 December 1520
Medina de Rioseco as a refuge for anti-Comunero forces, and as a military base, and the fact that this subtle political player had been the Comuneros’ most feared opponent (as much for his understanding of, and sympathy with, their aims as for his opposition to their means), seems to have led him to believe not only that he might be well rewarded by the Emperor, but that he might play an important part in a future regime. But Charles, in need of him while the uprising lasted, understandably distrusted him. This self-styled ‘free man of Spain’ was, like his equally formidable adversary, Acuña, an opponent of absolutism, who believed that a monarch’s role should be limited to ‘keeping the peace, administering justice, and, why not, granting rewards’, and that absolutism broke the bond between monarch and realm.\(^{165}\)

In December Juana spent hours in conversation with Enríquez and Benavente.\(^{166}\) As she again felt the walls closing in, reports circulated that she ‘did not like being in the power of the Constable’ (or his son, Haro), who were closely allied to Denia.\(^{167}\) It was probably with her approval that Enríquez launched a campaign to remove the Denias from Tordesillas on security grounds, and appoint his own people to key positions in Juana’s household. This amounted to a bid for control of the palace and extension of his power base from Medina to Tordesillas. He and Adrian removed seventy-two Junta-appointed continos from the household.\(^{168}\) With Adrian’s approval, he nominated his own mayordomo, Gaspar de Villarroel, to replace chief steward Arzco, who had been with Juana since 1496 and who, like many palace staff, was seen as an outright Comunero activist. Polanco, the Admiral’s ally and fellow negotiator, also nominated one of his servants as aposentador.

Denia systematically resisted these moves on the grounds that he was awaiting a cédula from Charles allowing him to vet household appointments.\(^{169}\) This led to bitter exchanges between Denia and Enríquez, exacerbated by the Admiral’s and Cardinal’s decision to release from prison the ringleaders of the palace revolt against Denia, and to reinstate Juan Carquijano’s son. After

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165 Gutiérrez Nieto, *Las Comunidades*: 294-297
166 CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 78, 16 December 1520, Lope Hurtado to Charles
167 Sanuto, *Diario*, 24: 540, 2 January 1521, from Alvise Marin (Milan)
168 AGS, PR, CC 3, f. 156. The list contains well-known names, including Juan de Mendoza, fiercely Comunero son of Isabel’s ‘inseparable’ Cardinal Mendoza.
169 CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 96, 25 January 1522, Denia to Charles
formally assuming his position of governor, Enriquez overwhelmed Charles with advice and criticism, while pursuing a visceral conflict with Denia over Juana’s household and other matters. Adrian was caught in the crossfire. The conflict embraced Enriquez’ own kin, the Marchioness of Denia, whom he accused, with Denia, of cruelty towards the Infanta. The Marchioness intimated to Charles that Juana harboured Comunero sympathies, an accusation Charles directed back at Catalina. The Denias resented Enriquez’ influence over Juana and the many hours they spent together, and Denia scoffed about plans to ‘raise Lazarus from the dead again’. Ultimately Charles backed Denia on all counts. He praised him for obstructing moves to use the Queen’s signature and urged him to continue to do so. Nothing was more likely to guarantee Denia victory over his opponents than his assertion that he alone could be trusted to prevent her travelling the kingdom, signing and governing.

A major factor in Denia’s success was the level of continuing agitation in Castile. If Villalar became a metonym for the revolution’s end, when cavalry charges in the torrential rain of 23-24 April 1521 crushed it into the mud, and if the executions of Padilla, Bravo and Francisco Maldonado closed the first main revolutionary cycle (figures 33, 35, 36), another began. Valladolid became radically Comunero; Tordesillas itself, warned Adrian, was ‘pure Community’. Acuña and his priests streamed across the Tierra del Campo with their guns and breviaries. Friars identified Charles with the ‘Antichrist’, the ‘Tyrant’ who held Juana in a tower, under an evil spell. María de Pacheco, branded ‘mad’ by Martire, Guevara and others, and even accused of witchcraft, seized the Alcázar of Toledo. With the Germanias, rebellion spread through the realms of Aragon – which, although distinct, had Comunero links – and in Sicily a third uprising was crushed with a bloody ferocity explicable only in terms of

171 Danvila, Historia crítica, III: 220, 21 February 1521, Adrian to Charles
172 AGS, PR, CC 5, f. 360-61, 5 July 1521, ‘Instrucciones a Sancho Martinez de Leyva’
173 CPS Sp. (Queen Juana), 92, Marchioness of Denia to Charles, 30 July 1521; AGS, E 8, f. 122, ‘Memorial’ of Catalina to Charles [undated; 1521]
174 Danvila, Historia crítica, III: 224-229, 21 February 1521, to Charles
175 ‘... no es bien que se suplique. Pues no aprovecha cosa ninguna vos hezistes bien en estorvarlo, y asy lo hazed’, CSP Sp. (Queen Juana), 84 [March 1521?]
176 AGS, PR, CC 5, f. 407, to Charles
177 Alba, Acerca: 206
Spanish events. 177 ‘This accursed sect of liberty’, Enriquez warned Charles, ‘is very much imprinted on the people’s hearts and it will take a long time and many good works to bring forgetfulness’. 178

In the end it was not the defeat of the ‘sect of liberty’ that sealed Juana’s fate but the gradual desertion and, indeed, betrayal, of grandees and royal councillors. Polanco reported, on 17 January 1521, that Juana was no longer visited by grandees and other knights, ‘since that is most suitable from various points of view’, and he had not kissed her hand ‘because it seemed unnecessary’. Polanco shared Denia’s view that the many visits she had received had made her ‘very importunate’. Over the last four days she had stopped eating – perhaps a reaction to the abandonment. 179 Enriquez’ departure was the final blow. If the Comuneros had opened a window, it was Enriquez who had fought tenaciously to keep it ajar. But while Enriquez appealed to Charles’ good sense, or humanity, Denia, appealing to his fear, was bound to win. The Admiral’s vanquishmet meant Juana’s final disappearance from public view, if not from public memory. Her clear desire to influence affairs, combined with other factors – the support expressed by a magnate of the calibre and prestige of Enriquez; her continuing importance for the Comuneros; the fear that attached to any thought of the uprising, or possibility of another; the fact that Juana’s various public appearances had thrown into question the extent of her ‘incapacitation’ or ‘incurability’; her rumoured Comunero sympathies – ensured that, to borrow Denia’s biblical allusion, there would be no resurrection.

177 For Sicily in revolt, see Giurato, La Sicilia di Ferdinando: 289-324. Enriquez was a direct beneficiary of the execution of Sicilian ‘conspirator’ Federico Abbatellis, Count of Cammarata, who had claims on Modica, inheritance of the Admiral’s wife.
178 Danvila, Historia crítica, IV: 18, 11 May 1521, ‘Creencia que el Almirante confió a Angelo de Bursa’
179 AGS, E 8, f. 32, 17 January 1521, Polanco to Charles
Querido D. Fabrique, esta rebelión comunera tiene más migas. Los rebeldes pertenecen a la burguesía urbana, pecheros todos ellos. Creo que estas revueltas presagian profundos cambios sociales.

Señores, no es momento para la filosofía ni para los vaticinios, sino para las decisiones militares.

No se preocupe. Su ilustrísima, la reina doña Juana y Tordesillas están ya en nuestro poder. Puedo asegurarme que el ejército imperial acabará con los comuneros en Villalar. Hágase cuenta de que los capitanes rebeldes Padilla, Bravo y Maldonado son carne de verdugo.

Figures 34, 35, 36. Top, right (figure 34). Plaque in Segovia expressing grief for the catastrophic arson attack on Medina del Campo in 1520. Below, right (figure 35) monument commemorating the executions at Villalar de los Comuneros. Left (figure 36), extract from a children's comic, in which Enriquez assures Adrian that Juana is again in their power and victory will be theirs. From Crónica de Medina de Rioseco, by Miguel Gómez Andrea, Francisco Javier Machota, Eduardo de la Torre (Ayuntamiento de Medina de Rioseco, May 1999).
9. The political tragedy of Juana I

Juana I was rarely celebrated in paint or, for that matter, any other medium. Nor was she included in portrayals of family groups. Maximilian’s exuberant dynastic woodcuts and tomb sculptures provide an exception. Another is a rather interesting early seventeenth-century copy of a lost original portrait of Juana, attributed to Juan Pantoja de la Cruz (figure 38). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, however unwittingly, a great artist may be said to have crystallised in paint the situation facing Juana after the end of the Comunero uprising.

Velázquez painted two versions of a woman in a turban, standing behind a kitchen table, one of which is sometimes called *The Kitchen Maid with Christ at Emmaus* (figure 37). Behind the servant, or slave, a hatch or window looks into another room where the tiny figures of Christ and his disciples are gathered, as Christ reveals to them the glory of his resurrection. As art historian Norman Bryson comments in his essay on still life and ‘feminine’ space, we cannot tell whether the woman has bent her head to listen; whether she is lost in a reverie, among her own women’s things, oblivious to the momentous event taking place in the room beyond, or simply exhausted.¹

Bryson reflects on the way in which the spaces in which women lived were imagined through the values of the ‘greater’ existence from which they were excluded. Of the *Kitchen Maid with Christ* he writes that Velázquez: ‘expresses here the suppression and confinement of those outside the charmed circle of history and greatness’. The image of the woman with the objects around her – the *rhyparos* or debris of everyday life – are ‘thought’ through to an ‘inevitable and bitter conclusion: just as these objects are treated as articles of use, just as they are part of an endless round of need and drudgery, just as they are never truly seen, so is she’.²

Velázquez’ kitchen maid, or slave, tells us something about the queen of many kingdoms, who declared she was treated like a dog and worse than a slave and of whom Ferrer wrote ‘she is nothing ... nothing’.³ Denia later emphasised

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² ibidem
³ Z. ADP 787. 77, f. 7v., 10 August 1511, to Fernando
the importance of confining Juana I within her feminine space. In 1532 he assured Charles that he took care to engage her ‘in nothing more than what it belonged to women to do’. By then, Juana had been imprisoned at Tordesillas for twenty-three years – just half her life sentence. Her fate was to be confined among her ‘women’s things’ while the great events of the epoch took place out of earshot and sight.

**Figure 37.** ‘The Kitchen Maid with Christ at Emmaus’. Diego Velázquez (c. 1618). (National Gallery of Art, Dublin)

Some of these, like the conquest of the Aztec empire, and Magellan’s circumnavigation of the globe, began on the eve of the Comunero revolution and developed in parallel. But, despite his title, the Admiral of Castile and Granada did not seem enthralled by the prospect of broadening horizons. Focusing on Castile, his crepuscular *Epistola moral* depicts a formerly prosperous land gone to waste in the space of a few years, and associates royal deaths, prolonged royal absence, and the collapse of a former honourable order of values with ‘many and

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4 AGS, E 24, f. 290, 20 March 1532
massive famines and almost continuous plagues’ and ‘horrible earthquakes’.

Enriquez was describing the end of a disturbing transition – not purely dynastic in nature, but, as he suggests, multi-faceted. It was also inextricably connected with Juana I.

In its inimitable way the Admiral’s Epístola Moral expresses what became a common view – that the achievements of the joint monarchy were jeopardised by the succession crisis, or crises, that followed Isabel’s death. Yet, Juana’s chances of succeeding Isabel in practice, not just in theory, were also affected by the very limitations and fragility of that dual monarchy. In the last decade of the reign, Isabel’s participation in government declined significantly. Although the consequent ‘Aragonisation’ of the higher echelons of the Castilian administration helped foment Fernando’s unpopularity among Castilians, and bred ill-will, it can also be argued that such ‘Aragonisation’ inevitably favoured Fernando at the expense of Isabel’s heir, Juana I of Castile. With respect to the aristocracy, Isabel, in her will, demonstrates her uneasy awareness of an only partially subdued nobility, which remained jealous of its powers and traditions and sought every opportunity to regain lost ground. Although some of the most powerful magnates supported Juana in 1506, and did so for reasons that cannot be attributed solely to self-interest, Philip’s and Fernando’s campaigns to establish, or re-establish, their power base in Castile showed how dependent monarchs remained on the purchase of aristocratic support, and how fickle that support could be. At the time of Philip’s death, some nobles, regretting their lost power, looked back with nostalgia to the reign of Enrique IV. Others, fearful of the rent in the fragile fabric of unity and consensus that had been woven by the joint monarchy, were convinced of the need for the might and authority of a male monarch or governor like Fernando. In the cities, rising unrest and violence between different bandos was widely seen as the response to a disputed succession and a vacuum of power, but much agitation also arose out of a long-standing resentment at the attempt to impose restrictions on perceived rights and liberties, and, more specifically, out of malpractice, or perceived malpractice, by corregidores and inquisitors during the period of the joint monarchy.

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5 BN, Ms. 7075, ‘Epístola moral que el Sr Almirante de Castilla embió a un hombre docto, con su respuesta escrita en el año 1524’
The practice of securing matrimonial alliances with foreign princes in the absence of a legal means of protecting the Spanish kingdoms from their ambitions, backfired spectacularly in the case of Juana’s marriage to Philip. After Isabel’s death, Fernando’s conviction that he could not secure his power base in Castile except by marrying into an alliance with France placed the union of the two Crowns at risk and cast a shadow over Juana and Philip and their children.

Juana’s experience must also be understood within the context of late medieval attitudes to monarchy that had survived the reign of Isabel and Fernando. Successive attempts by family members, prelates, nobles and procurators to seize possession of Juana were founded on traditions of monarchical or princely hostage-taking that remained very much alive at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the twilight days of the Trastámara dynasty, I have argued, the useful device of Juana’s ‘madness’ and female uselessness became inseparable from wider notions of female ‘tyranny’. Conscious of historical precedent, influenced by scholastic notions of female passion and instability, Cisneros tried to adapt a corpus of thought on resistance to ‘tyranny’, including the notion of resistance to a shadow monarch, or rex inutilis, to the situation facing Castile after Philip’s death and to bypass and ignore the legitimate queen’s right to act. Again, in 1516, his role in forcing through Charles’ coup can be seen within the context of a longstanding practice, continued well beyond Juana’s time and kingdoms, by which the monarchs of a dying dynasty were deemed ‘unfit’.

It is worth repeating that Juana’s story involves a double entrapment. She was a sovereign queen, but remained a daughter. She was a Trastámara as well as the founding mother of the Spanish Habsburg dynasty. The first crucial years of her reign were marked by attempts to flee imprisonment as well as by politically incapacitating rites of passage. The ambiguous wording of Isabel’s will – toxic residue of pain and confusion or of intense, unresolved argument – dogged Juana throughout the first years of her reign, with Fernando and Philip (and later Charles) seeking to exploit it for their own ends. Highly ambitious, Philip marginalised her not because she was ‘jealous’, ‘mad’ or ‘incapable’ but because her conviction that he did not have Castile’s interests at heart threatened to undermine his claim on her kingdoms. Nevertheless, Juana was widely believed, then and since, to have been driven by her ‘passions’ beyond the boundaries of
the regally acceptable, whether in terms of reckless insubordination to her mother or malicious disobedience to her husband.

An over-reliance on this view has led to a failure to take account of the political dimensions of Juana’s actions, including her valiant and lonely (if not always necessarily wise) resistance to the pressures imposed on her to turn her against her father. Endowed with the iron will characteristic of other family members, Juana pursued and adapted political strategies with this resistance at its core. During the second Spanish journey she tried to draw an impressionable Philip away from his advisers, particularly Manuel, and towards an accommodation with Fernando and herself. But after the Treaty of Villafáfila-Benavente, and Fernando’s departure from Castile, she adopted a radically different approach. Before the Cortes of Valladolid of 1506 she presented herself as the sole proprietary sovereign – ‘Juana I’. Her pre-eminence was upheld by the Cortes and ignored by Philip’s government advisers. But Philip’s solitary rule was too short-lived to allow for a considered assessment of the consequences of his determination to ignore Cortes demands and decisions. It is possible that, had he lived, and as the Queen’s ‘party’ grew, civil war (or what later become known as the war, uprising or revolution of the Comunidades) would have broken out not in 1520 but in or around 1506.

This real possibility is a measure of Juana’s evident popularity as Isabel’s daughter and heir, and of the expectations that her return to Castile aroused, despite the challenges she clearly faced. Use and abuse of the question of ‘willingness’ and ‘ability’ seem to have left broad swathes of opinion in Castile unmoved, and a ‘party’ in her support had emerged in the summer of 1506. But, however paradoxically, Philip’s death deprived it of momentum. Juana’s mourning seclusion, and her decision to rely on her father to help her claim her rights and interests, and those of her children, left her supporters with little alternative but to do the same or turn elsewhere. Claims to ‘serve’ Juana gave some the opportunity to reclaim traditional interests and privileges. Others identified the ailments of the body politic with Juana’s depressive illnesses or, in her name, expressed revolutionary demands for self-government.

Yet the evidence I have examined and analysed here does not sustain the view that Juana was politically apathetic, or unwilling or unable to govern, or that she voluntarily sacrificed her rights. During the power struggles of 1504-
1521, she was a key political player. Although intervening only briefly in
government, she was, in a manner of speaking, a gifted resistance fighter. She
wielded power by exerting her will to achieve specific political objectives. Often
unseen, but neither apathetic nor insignificant, she was always feared.

Given the obstacles she faced, Juana’s ‘passivity’ is less remarkable than
her achievements. Most evidently, Juana was a dynastic success – the mother of
six children who all became kings, emperors and queens. In cultural terms, her
legacy is reflected in the links between the Burgundian and Spanish musical
tradition and in the golden tapestries that remain one of the greatest treasures of
the Spanish state. Her connection with various religious – particularly Franciscan
– establishments shows her awareness of the importance of royal patronage. But,
most importantly for this study, she showed she could exercise powers of
sovereign queenship. If being willing and able to govern is understood as the
desire and ability to shape a government, influence its decisions, fight for crucial
measures and bring about a reconfiguration of political forces, then Juana I, ‘the
queen who did not govern’, began to do precisely that between 1506-1507.

In 1506 she started building her own household and court in parallel to
the illegal provisional government presided by Cisneros. Towards the end of a
three-month ban on independent action by the Queen, she made a significant
attempt to restore the royal patrimony and appoint a commission of royal
councillors to lead on matters of government and justice. During a short period
of relative freedom – but one still hedged about with significant restrictions – she
started to draw up and sign royal orders. Her second attempt to restructure the
Royal Council was successful in the face of entrenched opposition. She brought
an end to the diverging allegiances that plagued and paralysed Castilian
administration between 1505-1506, as they did again from at least 1516. Her
resistance to the convocation of a new Cortes, summoned to marginalise her, and
her protection of Fernando, proved successful.

But at the end of 1506 her embryonic household was essentially
*fernandina*. It is doubtful whether, even with greater human and material
resources than those available, she could have overcome her allegiance to
Fernando. Juana’s poor relations with Cisneros, although probably inevitable,
worked to her detriment. Her failure to reach Granada in 1507 meant she was
still encumbered by the problem of Philip’s burial when Fernando returned.
Yet his position in Castile was never secure. His real and continuing fear of the power invested in Juana and of what she might do were she allowed the freedom to act on her own account, lay behind his decision to imprison her, appropriating her legitimacy by projecting himself as its protector. Contrary to almost universal belief, Juana did not collapse after Philip’s death, but in 1508, when Fernando ceased, in effect, to take her into account. Nor, for a moment, did she seek to dedicate her life to pious seclusion, as Aram and others maintain. We come closest to understanding Juana’s bitterness, even despair, by reference to Ferrer’s letter of 1511, which shows her brooding over her mistakes and contemplating suicide. Above all, she regretted that, after marrying Philip, she had failed to strike an independent course as a ‘free woman’. Her imprisonment, and the extraordinary fictional web woven around her, cannot be disassociated from her unique significance as the source of legitimacy.

This study has shown that Juana did not in any way accept confinement at Tordesillas. On the contrary, she was fully aware of its destructive effect on her psyche and, she believed, on the welfare of her children. Ferrer’s letter – the only detailed document that testifies to Juana’s thoughts after 1509 – shows her railing against her imprisonment, and demanding her freedom, with all that this implied, together with a role and household commensurate with her status, and the restitution of large sums of money outstanding from her marriage settlement. She also felt that, far from favouring a spiritual life, or protecting her children and their legacy, her imprisonment at Tordesillas actually hindered the resolution of these fundamental matters.

In 1520 she emerged again as a key player. Sympathetic to Comunero complaints, she rejected the Junta’s claims to represent an alternative legitimacy. Juana knew that Comunero leaders wanted her signature, not her independence. They offered concessions, not opportunities to wield independent royal power. In my view, the fact that Juana was not a free agent from Isabel’s death onwards, and did not see herself as such, informed her refusal to sign documents (whether Comunero or anti-Comunero) prepared by those whose hostage or prisoner she considered herself to be.

Bouts of ‘illness’ or discouragement during the Comunero uprising did not prevent Juana from longing to be informed and party to events. In 1520 she engaged in an obstinate defence not only of Charles but of the principle of royal
authority as she knew it. But if this was an essentially conservative defence, her moderating role also tells us something about her. Her wariness of Rojas and insistence on further consultations with the full Council showed caution and prevented repression in the short term, and in her name. Far from portraying a queen in spiritual retreat, or sunk in apathy, León’s testimony, and that of Santillán, shows her actively calling for calm, counselling against bloodshed, seeking to temper criticism. Her attempt to bring the Royal Council to the Junta, however impracticable, suggests a desire to talk the uprising through to a peaceful solution. The advisers she summoned in early September, notably Villaescusa and Polanco, inclined to moderation – possibly a coincidence but worth noting. Among the grandees, the Queen was amenable to the gifted negotiator, Fadrique Enríquez. Had he succeeded in exploiting Juana’s authority, and bringing her household under his influence, the outcome of the uprising, as well as Juana’s future, might have been different.

But the stalemate between Queen and Comuneros in the autumn of 1520; the crushing of the uprising and the subsequent triumph of Denia over Enríquez, helped bring about not only the triumph of Charles as sole ruler and rex Hispaniorum, but ensured that Juana and – in the view of many, her kingdoms – would not be freed. Although Juana defended Charles from public criticism as resolutely as she had defended her father, her insistent demands for reunion with the Infante suggest that, with Charles crowned Emperor, and absent from Spain, she envisaged a role for her younger son in Castile’s government. Nonetheless, Juana’s persistent desire to meet her grandees and engage with her domains conflicts with the view that she wished to cede all power to her Habsburg descendants while she lived. Far from supporting the ‘imperialist cause’ or reaffirming ‘the overriding corporate interests of the Habsburgs’, as Aram maintains, Juana stayed true to the vision she associated with a revered Trastámara mother. Her relations with Isabel were, as Azcona and Cauchies have noted, complicated. They were loving, challenging, underscored by a certain resentment, by mutual suspicions, but also by a grievous sense of loss. Despite, but also, perhaps, because of her desertion of her mother in 1504, Isabel always remained Juana’s compass point.
Isabel’s will, and Comunero demands to be granted access to it, link the beginning with the end of this period. Political turbulence sprang from a deep-rooted belief that Isabel’s legacy to Juana, not least her request that she should be provided with all that was necessary to rule, had not been honoured. This study has focused on the fateful ambiguity of the succession clauses, but a striking feature both of will and codicil is the political manifesto that Isabel urges Juana to follow, and which includes, among much else, the need for probity in government and the delivery of justice to ‘grandes’ and ‘chicos’ alike. In the brief time available to her, Juana took seriously Isabel’s instructions to ban foreigners from public office and preserve the royal patrimony. Yet her mother’s desire to control her beyond the grave – her dying demand that Juana obey Fernando ‘as if I were still alive’ – cast a shadow that Juana could never shake off, and seems to have seriously inhibited her ability to think and act independently.

One element of Juana’s dispossessament, imprisonment and isolation, and the web of unreality spun around her, was, as she knew, her inability to exert any influence over the destinies of her children. When, in January 1525, at the age of eighteen, Catalina left Tordesillas to join her new husband, João III of Portugal, Charles and Eléonore called upon the brooding Admiral and his wife, Ana, Countess of Modica, to perform the impossible task of calming and comforting Juana, whom no-one had dared prepare for the loss. Four years or so before, Catalina had tried to protect her mother from the Denias’ vindictiveness on their return to Tordesillas at the end of the Comunero uprising. In a spirited memorial of 19 August 1521 Catalina had reproached the Emperor for treating her ‘more severely than I deserved’, when blaming her for contact with various Junta members whom she could hardly have escaped. She described the nightmarish world of post-Comunero Tordesillas: the Denias, ‘angry with everyone’, trying to prevent her from speaking to her mother’s servants; the Marchioness wanting to ‘tear out her eyes’ for corresponding with Ana de Cabrera, Countess of Modica. The Denias, Catalina claimed, ill-treated Juana’s trusted confessor, Ávila; they wanted to drive him away, although he was virtually her mother’s only consolation, and she often called for him. She urged Charles ‘for the love of

6 ‘Les ha sido entregado el testamento de la reina Isabel que pedían con grandes voces ...’
Maldonado, La revolución: 136
God’ to let the Queen take recreation in the corridor by the river. The
Marchioness and her daughters and servants were preventing Juana from
entering not only the river corridors but her own reception room, and ‘shut her in
her chamber, which has no light whatsoever but candlelight…’

Evidently, these female guards wanted to prevent her calling for help to
the people in the street and plaza below. Denia told Charles about these cries for
help, while also informing him that ‘… she often tells me to call the grandees so
as to be informed of the kingdom’s affairs and engage with them’. Given what
had happened, ‘and will happen given the opportunity’, it was advisable to move
her to the strongly fortified town of Arévalo, as Adrian also advocated.

In the event Juana was held at Tordesillas, except for a period between
1533-1534, when plague forced an exit. Obliged to borrow one of Denia’s mules,
the Queen was escorted, under cover of darkness, to Geria, Tudela de Duero and
Mojados, places well away from the main urban centres. This imperative of
invisibility shows Charles’ continuing fear that sight of Juana could ignite
dormant popular passions, just as the Comunero revolution itself casts light on
his and his supporters’ extreme anxiety and determination to prevent her
participating in events.

What, then, does this study conclude with respect to Juana’s character,
actions and capability – the cornerstone on which others based their claim to rule
on her behalf? In his recent biography of Mary I, Juana’s niece and England’s
first sovereign queen, Edwards justly indicates ‘the difficulties of reaching into
any historical character, however high and mighty’. Despite these difficulties, I
have found that the documentary evidence allows for a more complex
interpretation of Juana’s character and first years of queenship than has been
generally allowed.

In my introduction I briefly summarised the views of a number of her
contemporaries as well as those of many distinguished modern historians.
Gachard, Höfler, Pfandl, Brandi, Wiesflecker, Pérez, Cauchies and Zalama are
among those who agree that the evidence points all one way: to Juana having no

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7 AGS, E 8, f. 122, 19 August 1521, ‘Memorial de la Señora Infanta [Catalina]’. In January 1525,
Catalina left Tordesillas as Queen of Portugal, and never saw her mother again.
8 AGS, PR, CC 5, f. 293; CSP. Sp. (Queen Juana), 96, 25 January 1522
9 Edwards, Mary I: England’s Catholic Queen (New Haven/London 2011)
interest whatsoever in affairs of state and no ability to govern. Aram, who swims against the mainstream, nonetheless concludes that Juana showed an ‘inability or unwillingness to rule’. Although Aram provides evidence that, in many respects, Juana was capable, and exerted some influence, she insists that her sacrifice of her right to govern is what most defines her as queen.

I have found that the primary sources point in different ways, and to a great deal more than an incapacitation to govern. The Juana who emerges from them is wary, difficult and extraordinarily tenacious. She has a fiery temper and a quick, caustic wit. She is perceptive, valiant, conscientious and fiercely loyal, yet also doubtless as ‘malicious’ as Lachaux and Fürstenberg claimed. She is inhibited by inexperience, illness, pregnancy, indecisiveness and filial obedience. But she also shows moments of audacity.

In his end-of-term relazione of October 1506 Querini describes her as a woman consumed by jealousy, who spoke with few people and favoured none, shunned women of any class or age or nationality, ‘loved solitude and fled festivities’. But she was also ‘an intelligent woman, and easily apprehends what is being told her, and the few words she replies are spoken well and with grace (con buona maniera e con buona forma) and with that gravity proper to a queen’. Conchillos had told him that she was held to be jealous and melancholic but also intelligent, very spirited (de gran core) and proud. Querini and Sandoval describe respectively her ‘intrepid’ and ‘virile’ conduct on board the Julienne. That acute observer, Henry VII, was, like Querini, struck by her dignity and fine bearing and manner, and told Fuensalida that she had spoken to him with restraint and complete authority. However, he noted that Philip’s courtiers treated her as though she were mad – a factor that might well have helped encourage her to keep to her rooms. Bernáldez refers to her anger at being excluded from government. When living in close proximity to her in 1507, Martire, who once called her a ‘simple woman’, noted her penetrating intelligence, which he saw in virile terms, and her remarkably good memory, as well as her failure to ‘give explanations’ or ‘take initiatives’. Cisneros’ first biographer, Gómez de Castro, who knew some of Cisneros’ secretaries and had read Martire’s letters, refers to her great imaginative power and memory, as well as to a lack of ‘aptitude for the matters put to her, which require a healthy mind and one enlightened by experience’. Maldonado refers to the Queen’s earnest promises that she would do
her best to ensure that nothing lacked in the administration of government, but asked that ‘if at times her illnesses prevented her governing, affairs should be carried out in her name’. As a historian, Zurita was perplexed by the absence of letters from the Queen to Fernando between 1506-1507, even though there were those who ‘knew that the Queen wrote letters with such facility and ease that few of the kings of Castile and Aragon, her antecedents, could write better’.

Political affiliations clearly and strikingly affected opinions about Juana. Luis Ferrer referred to her, in 1511, as a ‘nothing’, sometimes hilarious in her bitterness, always a nuisance. Comunero leaders were to become frustrated and baffled by her failure to cooperate with their demands. But if the letter written to the city of Toledo by Juan de Padilla about his first encounter with Juana in 1520 became the template mentioned by the author of the ‘Relación de las Comunidades’, it is also remarkable for its underlying emotion, and for its depiction of the grace, dignity and poise with which the Queen conducted herself. Clearly deeply affected, Juana found ‘something in particular’ to say to every one of the many who crowded around her, and the way in which she spoke to them moved them to tears.

In many of these reports, Juana’s flaws appear alongside real abilities, showing the complexity of her character. They also often show puzzlement. Why did she so often say No, when what was wanted was a Yes? Why, their authors wondered, did she not support her husband, underwrite Cisneros’ initiatives, appeal in person to her father to govern, or seize the initiative herself? Yet her experience of Cisneros and the Council at the end of 1506, as of the Junta in 1520, shows that they sought not independent initiatives but the authority of her signature on their own documents. Juana’s big political initiative at the end of December 1506 was passed over in silence, both by Cisneros and the Council and by commentators like Martire. Talking later to Ferrer of the situation in 1506-1507, Juana referred to the pressures on her to deal with government affairs. She also implied she had been inhibited by the amount of support for her father, to whom she had herself expressed loyalty, as well as sympathy and anger for the way he had been expelled from Castile. It seems that she could not break out of this vicious circle. In the event Fernando, like Philip, Cisneros and Charles, could use to his advantage the fact that she had failed to build and maintain a stable power base and lacked the ruthlessness, single-mindedness,
self-belief and hunger for power that could have helped her overcome her
dependence upon him.

This is not to underestimate the real difficulties she faced. Nor does it
argue against Juana’s willingness to govern, or co-govern, which she showed on
numerous occasions. Juana’s household appointments and radical moves in the
winter of 1506 and spring of 1507 show that she was not prepared simply to sit
and wait for her father to return. Nevertheless, Juana came to see her loyalty to
Fernando as a weakness, and possibly the most terrible mistake of her life.

Juana’s ‘illnesses’ feature often in the primary reports, but have never
been satisfactorily identified, and after more than five hundred years may never
be. Vivian Green rejects the common diagnosis of schizophrenia, believing it
‘more probable that she was subject to depression which left her at the last a
chronic manic depressive’, or perhaps, in current terms, a victim of a form of
bipolar disorder.10 Certainly Juana disconcerted those around her by emerging
from periods of seclusion, or lethargy, with electrifying displays of political
action. But, since her effective reign was marked by grief and prayer, by rituals
of mourning, remembrance and childbirth, as well as by standoffs and clashes
with Cisneros and some royal councillors, it is difficult to ascertain where such
considerations end and ‘bipolar’ mood swings might begin. Furthermore,
although Juana was a stickler for protocol, attacks on her reputation were
facilitated by her perceived transgression of the social conventions that affected
women especially, such as those attached to filial and wisely obedience and to
the sense of decorum expected of women of noble blood.

In the end it is impossible to disassociate considerations of mental health
from her lack of freedom — her condition as a hostage and prisoner between
1503-1506 and again between the end of 1507 and 1555. In his brief examination
of the Queen, Arribas concludes, I believe rightly, that manifestations of
‘extreme’ conduct always occurred when Juana was impeded in her freedom of
movement or action by ‘encierro’ or imprisonment. It has often been thought that
Juana suffered from a paralysis of the will. Yet, for Arribas, the ‘cruel leitmotif’
in her life was the negation of her will by others. Juana responded, as many

10 Vivian Green, The Madness of Kings (Stroud, 2005): 105
powerless women have done, and do, by taking it out on herself, through hunger strikes or personal neglect.\textsuperscript{11}

One of the distinctive aspects of this thesis is the argument that the attributes of ‘melancholy’, as they relate to Juana, are associated with long years of confinement and extreme isolation and deprivation of sympathetic company, the effects of which are understood much better now by those working in the field than just a decade ago. Juana was, indeed, a ‘melancholic’ in that she suffered anguish and dejection, experienced powerful emotions of distrust, suspicion and anxiety and often expressed the wish to die. But the hellish conditions of her confinement – especially after 1509, but even, at times, as early as 1505 – have made it very hard to distinguish cause from effect.\textsuperscript{12}

Apart from arguing that the evidence allows for a willing and able, if complex, Juana, this thesis contends that her significance as the symbol of legitimacy and continuity was much greater than generally understood. Her fundamental importance was, of course, an accepted fact for the key players around her. It determined all their actions and is reflected in the attempt, at Villafáfila, to prevent the full emergence of a ‘party’ of juanistas. But, as mentioned in Chapter 4, after the Cortes of Valladolid turned this treaty on its head, the prediction made by Almazán of an outbreak of civil war between supporters of Philip and supporters of Juana, at Fernando’s expense, may well only have been prevented by Philip’s death. In 1508-1509 it was less Juana’s ‘unfitness’ than her continuing potential power to undermine Fernando (her insistence on Granada as Philip’s burial place; their possible differences on foreign policy; their increasingly bitter arguments, not least about possession of the Infante; the possibility that Juana might one day remarry, but perhaps, above all, the real and present threat that powerful and disaffected magnates like the Constable and ‘Great Captain’ could use her against him) that convinced Fernando that Tordesillas was the best solution from his point of view. Indeed, as earlier noted, Zurita accepts this when claiming that Juana’s imprisonment ‘miraculously’ prevented ‘an infinite number of evils and scandals’.

\textsuperscript{11} Arribas, Juana I: 65
\textsuperscript{12} Arribas made a similar point when suggesting that the measures of surveillance to which she was subjected produced effects similar to those produced by modern maximum security prisons: ‘desresponsabilidad, desubicación, dependencia ... en suma, desvertebración en casi todos los registros de la personalidad’. (Juana I: 56)
Yet, in reality, the opposite is true. The Queen’s disappearance from the political landscape, and the unstable and unpopular ‘regencies’ that followed, helped fuel the crises that rocked Castile and reverberated through the kingdoms of Aragon, not least in Sicily. In 1516 the royal councillors warned Charles, anxious to proclaim himself king, that Juana ‘was not born incapacitated’.

Indeed, many in Castile and Aragon believed, to varying degrees, that Juana’s illness was incomplete, sporadic, or temporary, if it existed at all, and the thought of her curability excited many. Some of those who, at one time or another, knew her best – men like Villaescusa, her chaplain and adviser; Soto, her doctor; Castilla, her master of horse; Ribera, her chamberlain or camarero; Arzeo, her despensero mayor, and many other members of her entourage – continued to place their hope in a change of attitude to the Queen from above after Fernando’s death. Across her kingdoms officials like Francisco Cano, alcalde of Baeza, pressed for Juana to be ‘better served’, showing in the process that, years after her confinement at Tordesillas, these men still had their proprietary mistress in mind. This was strikingly the case of Juan de Padilla who, as a boy, had accompanied his father, as procurator for Toledo, to the Cortes of Valladolid, and was at Mucientes when Pedro López came under great pressure to abandon his support for Juana. By 1520 his son was already well known for his publicly expressed view that Charles reigned unjustly while Juana lived. Thus, his decision and that of the other Comunero captains, meeting in the ruins of Medina del Campo, to march on the royal palace across the plain and ‘liberate’ the Queen cannot be attributed simply to an inspiration of the moment. By refusing to grant a role to the proprietary sovereign, by shutting her away among the rhyparos of history’s kitchen, each of Juana’s guardians or governors tried and failed to staunch a bloody unrest inseparable from the continuing crisis of legitimacy. At its heart was Juana’s right, in Denia’s words, to ‘travel her kingdoms, sign and govern’.

Since this study does not cover the remainder of Juana’s life, it does not deal with two other major issues concerning Juana herself that troubled her family in later years, raising as they did issues about the extent of an incapacitation on which Charles based his kingship: whether Juana should leave a will and whether she would be damned by irregular religious practices and expressions of despair. Suffice it to say that there was discussion about a will in
1534, when Juana was seriously ill. According to the ambassador of the Infante Fernando, Martin de Salinas, Charles had said he favoured a will, but it is unclear that Juana ever wrote one. No trace of such a document, which would have amounted to evidence of her capacity, her voluntad, has been found. If it existed, it was almost certainly destroyed. As regards Juana’s religious practices, suffice it, again, to say that, after Catalina’s departure, the demons entered Tordesillas.

As ‘melancholy’ took a firm hold of the captive queen, so did many of the attributes associated with it: a confusion between working and sleeping states, apparitions, black thoughts, suicidal tendencies – already apparent – and unbearable sounds.

As I have stressed above, and mentioned frequently in this study, Juana herself linked her irregular religious practices to the circumstances of her imprisonment. Constant close surveillance developed in her an obsession with the evil eye. The women guards around her, she told Ferrer in 1511, were ‘eslizeras’ – sorceresses. On various occasions during mass, when she believed she was being malignly watched, Juana interrupted it, sometimes violently.

Juana’s exact contemporary, Pedro Ciruelo, refers to forms of bewitchment known as aojamientos, a form of which involved the infliction of harm through the gaze. As Stuart Clark expresses it in his study of the power of vision in early modern Europe, ‘seeing always came between sin and the heart and innocence was always compromised by sight’.

Despite occasional family visits, the Queen was never less than a political prisoner, existing in conditions of security so rigorous they can barely be imagined. They were designed to enclose and keep secret the whole matter of her incapacity. For the rest of Juana’s life, Charles’ claim on the kingship of Spain remained legally dubious. As Rodríguez-Salgado has pointed out, he was essentially ‘a mere guardian of his mother’s possessions while she was incapacitated’. From 1516 onwards, this was what had made the question of the Queen’s incapacity again so crucially important, and so important to believe. But Charles’ role as guardian-king, not proprietor-king, gave him no leeway to

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13 Rodríguez Villa, ed., El emperador Carlos V y su corte según las cartas de Don Martín de Salinas, embajador del Infante Don Fernando (1522-1539), (Madrid, 1903-1905), II, 247: 565
14 Pedro Ciruelo, Reprobación de las supersticiones y hechizas (Valencia, 1878): 94-95
dispose of her territorial (as opposed to her private and material) possessions as he wished, leaving the succession open. It meant that, if Charles were to die in his mother’s lifetime, which was, after all, very possible, conflict over the guardianship would inevitably ensure between her younger son, Fernando, and her grandson, Philip.\textsuperscript{16} In this sense there was no living split, as Aram has maintained, between the ‘king’s two bodies’.

Juana survived far longer than anyone could have expected or wished, virtually the sole survivor of the turbulent, fascinating, experimental epoch associated with her name. Unable for decades to take exercise, and immobile for at least a year, Juana developed sores which became gangrenous when scalding water re-opened them. She died at 6.30 a.m. on Good Friday, 12 April 1555. It was a natural death, wrote Venice’s ambassador to England, Giovanni Michiel, ‘though of another, which is accidental, she may be said to have died many years ago’.\textsuperscript{17} Her body was placed at Santa Clara where Philip’s had been before Denia took it to Granada in 1525.\textsuperscript{18} No family members attended the obsequies at Tordesillas, although her granddaughter, Princess Juana, attended those at San Benito in Valladolid and ordered funeral ceremonies throughout Spain. These also took place across Europe in some magnificence, including the London of England’s first sovereign queen, her niece, Mary I.\textsuperscript{19}

Juana’s body remained at Tordesillas until, between December 1573 and February 1574, Philip II decided on a complex translation of royal remains to the Escorial. In snow and rain three different processions intersected in, as it were, a dynastic congress of the dead. The bodies of Philip’s mother, Isabel of Portugal, his first wife, María of Portugal, and his brothers, Juan and Fernando, were translated from Granada to the monastery of Yuste (Extremadura), where Charles’ body was united with them. At Yuste the cortege met with a second, bringing from Mérida the body of Eléonore. A third, from Valladolid, with the body of Mary of Hungary, stopped en route at Tordesillas to collect Juana’s.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face: 34, 39
\textsuperscript{17} CSP. Ven., 89, 21 May 1555
\textsuperscript{18} AGS, E 2, f. 167, 17 November 1525, Denia to Charles,
\textsuperscript{20} Varela, La Muerte del Rey: 28
Ferrer once wrote of Juana that she ‘does everything by extremes’; even in death, this seemed true. On 7 February her cortege arrived at the Escorial in a ferocious storm. The tabernacle prepared for the coffins of Juana and her daughter, Mary, was torn to shreds: ‘... no-one dared go out for fear of losing their lives, so that much brocade was lost; and so it was said that the oaks of the Herrería sprouted flowers of brocade ... When the storm ceased, the bodies of Queen Juana and Doña María were brought to the above-mentioned tabernacle, which was stripped and bare and without adornment of any kind, and their reception was not as it should have been ...’ Two days later Juana’s remains were transported from the Escorial to Granada, joining those of her parents, husband and little nephew, Miguel, on 28 February 1574.

As mentioned above, Juana’s death removed the dubious legality of Charles’ claim on the Trastámara inheritance. It was only upon her death that the immortal soul of sovereignty, as it were, migrated to Charles and, given his October 1555 abdication, almost immediately afterwards to Philip II. Down the generations she was not forgotten, but she was de-politicised. The stuff of legend, her name was appropriated by things as diverse as funeral carriages, rock groups and tapas bars. It has been left largely to Zalama to recall the ‘law of silence’ that surrounded her; the sheer ‘barbarism’ of her dispossession, imprisonment and solitude and the nature of a ‘mental and physical punishment’ amounting to torture. Zalama describes a personal tragedy, perpetrated for political motives. My research into, and interpretation of, the material suggests that there are sound reasons for asking whether it was not also a political tragedy.

If Juana had exercised the power that was properly hers, even if intermittently, what might have changed? Might there not have been a more single-minded effort to address the important points of government reform in Isabel’s will and, in the words of Ruiz-Domènec, to pursue Juana’s ‘intento de recuperar el perdido bon ton en la política castellana?’ Might the younger, ‘Spanish’ son not have played an important role in the government of her kingdoms? Would Castilian resources have been drained as drastically as they

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21 CODOIN, VII (Mor): 112, ‘Entrada del cuerpo de la Reina Doña Juana nuestra señora en Sant Lorencio, para dende allí llevarle á Granada’ (Memorias de Fray Juan de San Geronimo)
22 Zalama, Vida cotidiana: 422-423
were in a series of imperial wars? To wonder about such things, whether to dismiss them, doubt them or take them seriously, is, of course, to enter the domain of counterfactuals. But, as Vivian Green remarks, ‘European history might have followed a very different course’.  

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23 This is a point on which Green speculates in *The Madness*: 105
24 ibidem
Figure 38. Juana I. (Copy of a lost original). Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, 1607. Oil on canvas. (Instituto Valencia de Don Juan, Madrid)
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