The contested state and politics of elite continuity in North Maluku, Indonesia (1998-2008)

Claire Querida Smith

Declaration

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Abstract

The thesis investigates the politics behind the survival of members of the local state-based elite from the New Order regime into the new ‘democratic’ era in North Maluku, Indonesia. The research investigates local politics and sub-national government in a new province on the geographic periphery of the Indonesian state, where mass violence followed the fall of Suharto. The core issue examined is how, through a year-long violent conflict, protracted socio-economic crisis, and significant government and electoral reforms, the local state-based political elite in North Maluku survived, even thrived, during this turbulent period.

Most literature on the Indonesian democratic transition holds that widespread violence in regions like North Maluku was the result of a weak state and/or rising ethnic, religious and communal tensions. However, this case study reveals that elite factional politics played a central role in the conflict. It was far from a spontaneous communal affair and instead closely linked to rising competition between local elites over state positions and resources during the late New Order and the early democratic era. State officials were not weak in the face of a rising society, but rather played central roles in escalating conflict and ‘communal’ violence. Understanding these dynamics is essential to explaining, not only the violence, but also political dynamics before, during and following the conflict.

The thesis considers the political and economic role of state-based elites over a ten-year period and analyses the North Maluku conflict as part of a prolonged political struggle between different factions within the state. The most successful state-based elites maintained their positions through controlling state resources, including ‘post-conflict’ aid funds, in a contracting regional economy. This control enabled them to distribute important resources to a fragile population — maintaining a popular support base — and to build large election campaign war-chests for ensuing democratic elections.
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<th>English equivalent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APBD</td>
<td>Regional Government Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APBN</td>
<td>National Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKORNAS</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Coordinating Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKTI</td>
<td>Eastern Indonesia Knowledge Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPEDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Planning Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>National Development Planning Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Central Statistics Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDI</td>
<td>International Consortium for Refugees and Displaced Persons Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Dana Alokasi Khusus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAK</td>
<td>General Allocation Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAU</td>
<td>Special Allocation Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DinSos</td>
<td>Social Department (Regional branch of the Ministry of Social Welfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Regional Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Central Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>House of Regional Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPPMU</td>
<td>North Maluku Youth Pupil and Student Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDRP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Regional Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemusba</td>
<td>Sultan Babullah’s Younger Generation (Ternate youth affiliated with the Ternate Sultan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Functional Groups Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMI</td>
<td>Muslim Students Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person/People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpres</td>
<td>Presidential Decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kab</td>
<td>Regency or District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepres</td>
<td>Presidential Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORPRI</td>
<td>Organisation of Indonesian Civil Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNIL</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPI</td>
<td>National Committee for Indonesian Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>National Election Commission</td>
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</tbody>
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Map of Indonesia
## Political biographies of major figures in North Maluku (1998-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, local title</th>
<th>Ethnic, religious background</th>
<th>Official occupation/political posts</th>
<th>Main period of local political influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bahar Andili</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic Gorantalo (Sulawesi), Muslim</td>
<td>Central Halmahera district regent</td>
<td>Central Halmahera district regent, Golkar (1999-2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syamsir Andili</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic Gorantalo (Sulawesi), Muslim, younger brother of Bahar Andili</td>
<td>Senior local government bureaucrat (prior to 1999)</td>
<td>Ternate City Mayor, Golkar (1999-2005), re-elected 2005 for second term, Golkar (2005-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdul Gafur</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic Patani (North Maluku), Muslim</td>
<td>Two-time Suharto cabinet minister (1980s); DPP Golkar member</td>
<td>DPR member for North Maluku, Golkar (2004-2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One -
Introduction

Violence generally increases and becomes more salient in situations of rising uncertainty across the boundary. It increases because people respond to threats against weighty social arrangements they have built on such boundaries - arrangements such as...power over local government.

Charles Tilly.1

1.1 The research project

(i) The central issue

Many forms of violence occurred during the official transition to democracy in Indonesia, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Starting in 1999 street riots, large-scale ethnic and religious cleansings, ‘holy’ wars between Christian and Muslim groups, militia clashes and gang attacks all broke out at various stages and continued to flare during the ensuing years of transition. Most of these violent incidents have been collectively described as ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ or ‘communal’ conflicts, in both the media and academic literature. From a macro viewpoint, long-repressed or emergent clashes between religious and ethnic identity groups appeared at the heart of the conflicts wreaking havoc across democratising Indonesia, with the state weakened by thirty years of dictatorship and unable to contain the violence.

Upon close analysis, however, each incident had its own peculiar trajectory and format, and the state was not always too fragile to cope with violent events. Some highly localised inter-ethnic fights escalated rapidly into ‘holy’ wars, which themselves reflected larger negotiations of state-society relations across the country.2 This was not always a spontaneous process: local (and sometimes national) political leaders had a close hand in the escalation of conflict from one form to another, from one locale to another, and between some groups and others. Many apparently spontaneous communal riots and ethnic cleansings bore the hallmark of elite factional politics, with grassroots, militia and other vigilante groups involved in proxy street battles. Far from being too weak to contain - or incapable of managing -

1 Tilly (2003), p.77.
2 On the evolution and meaning of religious violence in Indonesia, see Sidel (2006).
the violence, state officials played a part in many of the conflicts. While religious and ethnic identities were roused, and their mobilisation played critical roles in the conflicts, assuming that 'identity' clashes lay at their causal heart misreads the role and interests of local state officials in both the initiation and escalation of the violence.

In light of this interpretation of the transitional conflicts, the thesis explores the politics behind the survival of members of the local state-based elite from Indonesia's New Order regime through the transition to the new 'democratic' era. The arena of the story is local politics, on the geographic periphery of the nation state, where national reforms played out rather differently than planned. The core issue examined in the thesis is how, through a year-long violent conflict following the official transition to democracy, subsequent socio-economic crisis, and significant government and electoral reforms, the state-based political elite in North Maluku, Eastern Indonesia, survived, even thrived, through this turbulent period.3

The thesis aims to explore and explain the mechanisms behind the political survival of a particular set of factions within the local state elite, and the role that violent conflict played for them.

(ii) The main propositions

The main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the validity of three propositions that emerge through the examination of one regional case study in extensive empirical detail.4 First, an apparently ethnic and religious conflict in North Maluku, taking place during the immediate years of democratic transition in Indonesia, actually reflected a power struggle over the local state between different state-based elites and their affiliated political factions and proxy groups. Second, the main political leaders of the competing factions during the conflict were all located within the state, in one way or another. This means that the conflict did not reflect a weak and collapsing state or the rise of societal over state forces, but rather intense competition over control of the state, which remained central to local political and economic life. Third, one set of local state elites (containing several factions)

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3 Eastern Indonesia refers to the broad island regions of Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Sulawesi, Maluku, Indonesian Papua and East Nusa Tenggara.

4 Section 1.3 outlines the research methodology.
survived the conflict, subsequent socio-economic crises and reforms through maintaining control over state resources.

North Maluku had already experienced a year of economic contraction following the national economic crisis of 1997 and this was prolonged by the conflict, which had several disastrous effects on the regional economy. For several years following the conflict, a significant proportion of state resources – which played a vital role in the regional economy - were derived from ‘post-conflict’ aid budgets, provided mainly by the central government, but also by foreign donors via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As the provincial government controlled these resources, post-conflict assistance funds lay at the heart of the competition in local politics between different state elites. In subsequent elections, despite significant government and electoral reforms, and ongoing socio-economic crises in the wake of conflict, incumbents were able to hold onto their positions as heads of the executive branches of the local state.

The thesis therefore acts as a corrective to several arguments that have been widely-made about the impact of the Indonesian democratic transition in the geographic periphery of the nation state, as well as the dominant explanations for ‘ethno-religious’ violence during the transition. These arguments fall into two main categories. The first suggests that the Indonesian democratic transition showed the inherent weakness of the state, particularly on the peripheries of the country, in the face of rising religious, ethnic and societal (apparently ‘non-state’) political movements. The second posits that Indonesia showed a clear trend towards (or return to) ethnic, religious and ‘traditional’ identity movements in politics and society during the transition era, which had been long-suppressed by the New Order regime. In contrast to these two interpretations, I argue that the Indonesian state was shown to be stronger than many analysts thought. Local elites based within the state held

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5 I highlight the term ‘post-conflict’ here to stress two ambiguities in the use of this term. First, although by July 2000 the conflict in North Maluku was officially over, and the violence had largely subsided, the dynamics of conflict and a final political settlement between the competing parties were not yet concluded. Second, the term ‘post-conflict’ was used widely by government and foreign aid officials to describe both the North Malukan situation following the end to violence and their aid programmes in the region. I use the term from this point without inverted commas, but clarify, where necessary, the sense in which it is used. Using this term does not imply that I interpret the conflict as being ‘resolved’ – in fact, the conflict continued via other means following the subsidence of violence, as the thesis explores.
key advantages over their outside rivals, and access to state resources (and foreign resources channelled through the state) remained the determining factor in local contests for power.

The thesis also speaks to the possible impacts and risks of violence where rapid government and electoral reforms are pursued when democratic rules of behaviour are foreign to strong political elites. At the geographic margins of Indonesia, an enormous and hugely diverse nation-state by global standards, the state looked quite different than it did at the centre. The national planners of decentralisation and electoral reform (and their foreign supporters) had assumed that reforms would make the local state more accountable to the population and would minimise regional concentration of opposition to the central state, thus securing an orderly transition. But changing the rules of the political game by revising government and electoral laws did not produce the anticipated results.

The main argument put forward in the thesis to answer the question of how the state-based elite survived the transition process is the following. Under the New Order, the central state expanded its authority throughout the territory establishing structures of rule – the local state – in the furthest reaches of the country. These were populated by what came to be the local state elite (drawn from both old and new power brokers). Their social and economic position was dependent on access to, and control over, central state resources. These state-based local elites survived the transition – with one particular sub-set accumulating the greatest amount of local power – illustrating the staying power of the state constructed during the New Order period. Other members of the state-based elite, more weakly linked to the local New Order bureaucratic structures, did not survive. This thesis explored the dynamics of this process at the local level through mapping the political architecture of the local state and tracing the sources and dynamics of local power.

After this brief introduction to the central issues and argument explored in the thesis, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The remainder of this first section outlines the iterative research journey behind this project. The second section then situates the thesis in the main literature on conflict and democratic transition in Indonesia – and beyond – in four parts. It is important to do so to show how the
interpretation of the transition period in this thesis differs from much of the literature. The first part presents a summary of the major conflicts in Indonesia during the transition period. The second critiques the main interpretations given for 'ethno-religious' conflict in Indonesia. The third part outlines the argument presented in the thesis – that the so-called 'ethno-religious' conflict was actually a contest within the state elite over state resources – and considers the wider literature on the mechanics behind the political survival of state-based political elites. It then outlines the methodology used in the field research, including a summary of the qualitative case study approach, and the role of political ethnography, key informant interviews and documentary sources. The fourth part presents a roadmap of the thesis, outlining the central themes of each chapter.

(iii) Research background

I set out on this PhD project in 2004 intending to explore and assess the apparent rise and resurgence of so-called 'traditional' and 'ethnic' elites in local politics in Indonesia as a result of the dual processes of democratisation and decentralisation following the fall of Suharto in May 1998. In particular, what interested me was the apparent reclamation of political power by 'tribal', 'ethnic' and 'traditional' leaders in Eastern Indonesia, largely – though not exclusively – through violent means, and the extremely negative socio-economic impacts this appeared to be having in the region. Historically the most diverse and least developed part of the country, at least five regions of Eastern Indonesia experienced severe violence during the transition period, ranging from inter-religious conflict in the Maluku region to ethnic cleansing of migrant groups in parts of Kalimantan.6

The early years of democratisation and decentralisation of local politics and power in many parts of Eastern Indonesia had not matched the expectations of the Jakarta planners and foreign donors. The transition had not led to an immediate blossoming of benign civil society movements, a natural improvement in local government activities and economic development, or the emergence of an active and non-violent generation of liberal activists and non-governmental watch-dogs.7 Instead, the dual

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6 The range of transitional era conflicts in Eastern Indonesia is summarised in Section 1.2.
7 In fact, while this later took place in some of the conflict areas, in North Maluku it came largely during the post-conflict reconstruction period, when foreign donors specifically funded local activist
processes of democratisation and decentralisation in many areas had apparently led
to a reclamation of political and economic power, frequently via violent means, by a
variety of ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ figures. These figures were previously
excluded from, or marginalised by, a highly centralised state under the New Order
and were seizing the moment to (re)gain power. In some areas – such as Central
Kalimantan – local ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ leaders outside the state had the implicit
support of branches of the local government and security forces in their violent
seizure of power. In other areas – such as North Maluku – control of the local state
and its resources was itself the central locus of conflict between state elites. Here
different state factions fought through proxy militia groups across city streets and in
rural areas, each representing a distinctive ‘ethnic’ group.

In 2002, several years prior to starting my PhD fieldwork, and exactly one year after
a large-scale incident of violent ethnic cleansing in the region, I made several field
visits to Central Kalimantan. I was struck by how much of the local economic and
social fabric had been destroyed through waves of apparently communal violence
during the first four years of democratisation and the first year of decentralisation.
The process of ‘reclaiming’ political and economic power (whether directly from the
state or from migrant groups seen to have gained from state policies) by the
indigenous Dayak ethnic group had destroyed large areas of important trading towns,
major roads, markets, ports, homes and sometimes entire hamlets and suburbs.
Important informal sectors of the economy were also devastated by the forced
removal of the ethnic migrant Madurese community who had dominated these
sectors – including essential (but lower-end) parts of the transport sector, such as
motorbike taxis and becak drivers, and manual labour in the logging and port
sectors. This in turn had negatively affected trade and the broader economy. One
year after the conflict, these sectors had not yet recovered, and the infrastructure was
far from repaired. Socially, a great deal of trauma was expressed by members of
different community groups (both indigenous and migrant) who had either
participated in or directly witnessed the violence. From a macro-economic and social

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groups to monitor the local government. Other regions, like Central Sulawesi, had longer histories of
local non-governmental organisations monitoring state activities (see Li 2007).
8 I visited Central Kalimantan whilst working as a researcher on a World Bank/Government of
Indonesia community development project, see Smith (2005).
9 Similar processes took place during conflict in Ambon, see Adam (2008).
perspective, the benefits of democratic transition and government reform were far from obvious.

Yet despite the economic and social costs of conflict, the political benefits accruing to the elite and local leadership from the conflict were striking. Enormous political gains had been made by certain elite groups through the process of ethnic cleansing of the (largely) migrant Madurese by indigenous Dayak. The process of ethnic cleansing had not only raised the social status of indigenous leaders, it had allowed them to (re) assert their claim to political and therefore economic power in the region – both from migrant groups and others who had benefited during the Suharto regime. The relaxing of military and political control through the process of democratisation and decentralisation had enabled these previously marginalised leaders to seize control – at least informally – of political power. The question remained as to whether they would be able to sustain their new claims to power, and if this would translate into electoral success during subsequent elections and increased control of the local state. I was interested to explore whether, and how, increased control of the local state by ‘traditional’, or ‘ethnic’, leaders had impacted society and politics. With these questions in mind, I selected a field site in Eastern Indonesia to study the ‘revived’ role of ‘traditional’ and ‘ethnic’ leaders in, and their impact on, local politics, society and the economy following the democratic transition.

However, following several months of intensive fieldwork in North Maluku – midway through 2005 and during one of Indonesia’s most active local election periods since the transition to democracy – the dynamics I intended to explore were no longer evident. Instead of witnessing and documenting the rise and possible maintenance of power of ‘revived’ (or ‘reinvented’) ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’ leaders in local politics, I was directly observing the machinations behind

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10 Li (2007), pp.258-276, criticises the analysis published in World Bank field reports from this period – including Smith (2005) – as constrained by the World Bank’s neo-liberal epistemological approach. I was concerned that my field study had not focused enough on local politics, in particular the dynamics of power during the conflict and subsequent reconstruction phase. These questions on the political aspects of conflict and reconstruction during the democratic transition led directly to this PhD project.

11 I originally planned a comparative study across two to three conflict regions of Eastern Indonesia, but the logistical and methodological constraints of conducting in-depth qualitative field research – a method these research questions called for – in remote conflict areas, within my PhD budget, eventually limited my focus to one region. See Section 1.3 on methodology.
the political survival of state-based elites. This was despite – or, as it turned out, because of – several serious shocks to the local political, economic and social system. These included regime change and democratisation at the national level, local conflict, and localised economic and social crises following outbreaks of conflict. My research questions were therefore turned on their heads. I began to track why ‘traditional’ or ‘ethnic’ leaders had failed to maintain their momentary rise in politics and seizure of new positions in local politics (which had indeed taken place) and the mechanisms explaining the renewed success of rival state-based elites.12

The overarching theme of the study developed into an exploration of the political continuity of certain branches (or factions) of the local political elite in North Maluku through the processes of democratic reform, conflict and crisis. Within an overall continuity of state-elite power, I also consider reconfiguration within the local political elite and examine which figures or factions were forced out and by what means, and which eventually triumphed. One object of the study is therefore the factional politics of key rivals within the local state, first through the politics of violence and, later, via electoral politics, looking at the rise of certain factions within the state due to greater access to state organisations and capital than their rivals. The central narrative of the thesis is therefore an exploration of the empirical dynamics of, and rationale behind, the process of political continuity, and the subtleties of change within it.

1.2 Situating the thesis in the literature

Here, I set the North Maluku conflict in the national and wider theoretical context in three parts. First, I summarise the ten major conflicts that took place during the first decade of democratic transition in Indonesia. Second, I consider the two dominant explanations for ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ conflicts as presented in the main literature on Indonesia.13 These include both the ‘emergence of societal forces’ and the ‘weak state’ argument. Third, I present an alternative explanation for the North Maluku

12 As it turned out, these ‘traditional’ leaders had been deeply embedded in the state since the colonial era. As such, the local political contest played out between different factions within the state.
13 Sources on conflict in Indonesia during the transition include academic and policy papers. On the methodological and epistemological problems posed by the crossover between policy and academic research on conflict in Indonesia, see Sidel (2006).
conflict, arguing that the conflict was, at its core, a contest between local elites for control of the local and provincial branches of the state.

The alternative explanation I present here forms one of the main original contributions of the thesis: that is, interpreting the North Maluku conflict as a reflection of the strength of local state elites and comparative weakness of 'societal' forces during the transition period. I argue that interpreting the North Maluku violence as a purely ethnic or religious conflict, reflecting either the rising force of identity politics, or the result of a weak state unable to control these social forces – or both – neglects the major dynamics within, and motivations behind, the violence. These included the benefits to certain branches of the local state elite ensuing from violence. This analysis takes off from Van Klinken's (2001) assessment of the role of the state in Maluku prior to conflict, and his (2007) analysis of the role of state elites in mobilising groups during conflict. I then go further, invoking concepts of machine politics to explain the survival of a particular faction of local state-based elites in political power following the conflict, and interpreting the violence as one of several manifestations of intra-state elite competition throughout a decade of transitional politics.

(i) Major conflicts in Indonesia (1996-2005)

Ten major conflicts took place during the ten years of transition from the New Order to democratic regime, nine of them after Suharto's fall in 1998.\textsuperscript{14} Table 1.1 (below) summarises these, outlining the main divisions and conflicting groups.\textsuperscript{15} This table should not be read as an analysis of the causes of these conflicts. Instead, it provides an overview of the main organisational divides between major combatants, whilst recognising that these cleavages may only have been relevant at certain points in time. For example, the apparently local ethnic conflict in North Maluku later evolved into an inter-religious conflict of grave concern to many communities and organisations across Indonesia. Conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi showed

\textsuperscript{14} I include the 1996 conflict in West Kalimantan as a transition conflict as it was so similar to the conflict there in 1999 and in Central Kalimantan in 2001.

\textsuperscript{15} I do not employ the frequently used 'threshold' method for categorising conflicts – as used by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and The University of Maryland's State Failure Project – and I have not included numbers killed during these conflicts due to several problems with the conflict data on Indonesia, discussed in Chapter Four.
similar trends. The main point here is to highlight the sheer number of conflicts in Indonesia during the important transition years – which triggered an outpouring of analysis on the ‘weakness’ of the once apparently strong Indonesian state and the rise of ‘ethno-religious’ violence.

Table 1.1 Major incidents of violent conflict in Indonesia (1996-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Provincial location</th>
<th>Year(s) of conflict</th>
<th>Main divides</th>
<th>Major conflicting groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic Dayak and ethnic Madurese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic Malay and ethnic Madurese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>North Maluku</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Ethnic/religious</td>
<td>Indigenous and local migrant groups; later Muslims and Christians (incl. radical militant groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>1999-2002 (+)</td>
<td>Ethnic/religious</td>
<td>Indigenous and migrant Muslims and local Christians (incl. radical militant groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>2000-2002 (+)</td>
<td>Ethnic/religious</td>
<td>Indigenous and migrant Muslims and local Christians (incl. radical militant groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic Dayak and ethnic Madurese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1975 – 1999</td>
<td>State/separatists</td>
<td>Fretelin (pro-independence organisation); pro-Indonesian militants; Indonesian military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>1873 – 2005</td>
<td>State/separatists</td>
<td>The Free Aceh Movement (GAM); Indonesian military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Papua/West Papua</td>
<td>1961 – ongoing</td>
<td>State/separatists</td>
<td>The Free Papua Movement (OPM); Indonesian military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the ten conflicts in the table, the first seven took place largely between ethnic or religious groups (or both, or in sequence). Six of these occurred in Eastern Indonesia, including the North Maluku case studied here. The Eastern Indonesian conflicts were largely categorised and understood as ‘communal’, ‘ethnic’ or

16 Van Klinken (2003); ICG (2004).
17 The term ‘radical militant groups’ here refers to highly organised and trained religious militant groups with specifically violent aims targeted against another religious group.
18 Indonesia withdrew in 1999 following a referendum on independence. East Timor gained official independence from Indonesia in 2002 becoming the new nation-state of Timor Lorosae.
19 Aceh province was under martial law between 2003 and 2004, followed by a period of civil emergency status. A peace agreement was brokered between GAM and the Indonesian government in 2005, with Aceh remaining part of the Indonesian nation-state under special autonomy status.
20 The Papua/West Papua region gained special autonomy status in 1999, but this was complicated by a 2002 Presidential Instruction dividing the region into separate provinces. The Papua conflict remained unresolved as of April 2009.
'religious' conflicts by the academic literature, media, foreign donors and the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{21}

Before focusing on the debate over the causes of 'ethno-religious' conflicts, I should highlight that the distinction between the three "separatist" conflicts in East Timor, Aceh and Papua/West Papua, and the others is a matter of degree rather than an absolute divide. The Indonesian government officially uses the terms "horizontal" and "vertical" conflict to distinguish conflicts ostensibly between communities from those explicitly targeted against the state.\textsuperscript{22} However, while the primary parties and cleavages in the Aceh, Papua and East Timor conflicts were – and, in 2009, continued to be, in the Papua case – the state and separatist organisations, other socio-economic, ethnic and religious tensions also underlay the violence.\textsuperscript{23} The main differential is in terms of the organisations officially – or publicly – involved in the conflicts: the Indonesian military and armed separatist groups were involved from the outset in these three conflicts. In others they were not officially involved as primary actors, although many argue that they were indirectly involved in various ways, for example in the North Maluku, Maluku and Central Kalimantan conflicts.\textsuperscript{24} Putting this debate over the causal nature of the 'separatist' versus 'ethno-religious' conflicts aside, the following two sections critically explore the dominant explanations for the overtly 'ethnic' and 'religious' conflicts.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} Not all academics took this line. Bertrand (2004), for example, does not analytically separate 'separatist' and 'ethno-religious' conflicts, arguing that they all formed part of a wider re-negotiation of the nation state during the transition.

\textsuperscript{22} This distinction was used, for example, by senior ministerial and military officials at the Conflict Resolution Seminar: Security Sector Reform, British Embassy, Jakarta, 19 March 2002.

\textsuperscript{23} For example, prior to the 2005 peace agreement, much violence in Aceh was linked to logging competition between military and other groups, hidden below the separatist rebellion. See International Crisis Group (2001c), p.10.

\textsuperscript{24} On the role of the military in North Maluku see Tomagola (2000); in central Maluku see Aditjondro (2001). On the role of military deserters in Maluku, see Tempo, June 2002. On the role of the security forces in the Kalimantan violence, see ICG (2001b).

\textsuperscript{25} This thesis uses the terms 'religious' and 'ethnic' violence distinctly. Several of the major authors on 'ethnic' conflict – for example, Horowitz (2000) and Varshney (2002a) – include conflict between religious groups within the broad umbrella of 'ethnic' conflicts. However, in the Indonesian case, as elsewhere, actors in 'religious' conflicts were able to appeal to a much wider range of support and mobilisation mechanisms than purely 'ethnic' conflicts.
(ii) Dominant explanations for 'ethno-religious' conflict in Indonesia

There are two main explanations for ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia. Although each has distinctive elements, they also link closely to one another on several important issues: indeed, it is hard to see how one makes sense without the other. Thus, although I have separated them out for analytical clarity, the two arguments directly inform each other.

(ii.i) The 'rise of society' argument

The first set of explanations for 'ethno-religious' conflicts during the transition understands them as reflecting the emergence (or 're'-emergence) of societal forces and identity politics previously suppressed by the New Order regime. The rise of identity movements – ethnic, religious or other cultural groups – in local politics was seen as a direct challenge to the state by groups marginalised from (or, in some cases, within) the state once the 'lid' of the New Order was lifted. The “rise of society” argument can be looked at using several lenses, taking a cultural, economic or theory of nationalism perspective.

Within the cultural framework, one perspective on the rise of violent conflict between ethnic, religious or other identity groups during the transition uses a psychological argument about “violence as culture” in Indonesia. This perspective focuses on forms of learned or ritualised behaviour, apparently deeply entrenched in Indonesian society. These include the practices of amok, when a person seen as a potential threat to society is killed by a mob, and rampok macan, a fifteenth century Javanese practice, where potentially threatening outsiders were ‘legitimately’ killed in a ritual way. Welsh (2003) points to Columbijin and Lindblad’s (2002) analysis of how both these rituals helped to justify the action of villagers and result in rising cases of mob justice, or keroyokan, during transition. Welsh claims that her surveys demonstrate that ritual and ‘learned’ behaviour encouraged rising mob violence in Indonesia. However, there are major problems with using the cultural

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26 From this point I use the term 'ethno-religious' to describe conflicts where both cleavages took place, during different phases of the conflicts, and the terms separately for incidents where only ethnic or religious divides were relevant.
28 Columbijin and Lindblad (2002).
29 Welsh (2003), pp.18-19.
behaviour argument to explain contemporary conflict in Indonesia, as indeed in other contexts.\textsuperscript{30}

Robinson (1996) has illustrated the flaws in the essentialist cultural arguments for the post-coup massacres in Bali and Java between 1965 and 1966, an earlier but even more violent transition period in Indonesia. These massacres were the most violent incident of conflict in Indonesia's history, where over half a million people were estimated to have died, predominantly in Java and Bali.\textsuperscript{31} A common theme in explanations for the violence at the time was that the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had disrupted harmony, order and the cultural equilibrium of Balinese and Javanese culture, thus triggering a natural response to expel the "intruders".\textsuperscript{32}

There are several logical flaws in this argument, as Robinson highlights, particularly in relation to the absence of analysis of the broader national and international political context, as well as the critical timing of the massacres, neither of which can be explained by a cultural argument. While the methods of violence drew on local traditions – as was also the case in the more recent conflicts during the transition to democracy, for example the use of head-hunting in Kalimantan – cultural factors cannot account for the political or economic motivations driving involvement in, or leadership of, the massacres.\textsuperscript{33} Robinson demonstrates how the interaction of local, national and international politics created an environment where the massacres were made possible. In particular, he emphasizes the role of political and military leaders at the national and local levels in encouraging mass violence for political and economic ends. Robinson's analysis of the Bali and Java massacres in the 1960s influences my interpretation of the contemporary North Maluku conflict, developed further in Section 1.2 (iii) below.

Similar flaws also apply to the cultural arguments used to explain ethno-religious conflicts during the contemporary Indonesian transition. For both periods, it is crucial to understand how 'traditional' or 'revived' cultural practices and norms

\textsuperscript{30} Huntington (1993) presents a classic primordialist, or cultural, account of contemporary global conflict.


\textsuperscript{32} Robinson (1996) refers to Hughes' (1966) and Pauker's (1968) analyses of violence in Bali and Java.

\textsuperscript{33} Robinson (1996), p.121.
related to violence are encouraged and manipulated \textit{at particular times} in order to legitimate acts of violence rooted, for instance, in contemporary political and economic interests.\textsuperscript{34} Moore (1991) has demonstrated more widely that social behaviour cannot be explained in terms of cultural values alone, nor can these values serve as the starting point of sociological explanation, because, \textquotedblleft to do so is to engage in circular reasoning\textquotedblright.\textsuperscript{35} Using a cultural argument makes it very difficult to understand the fact that cultural practices change, emerge and respond to developments in political and economic circumstances. The transitional context was not simply a \textquoteleft lid lifted\textquoteright on long-dormant violent culture, but a highly politicised moment. Political elites and community leaders had a critical role to play in making these political moments important for the various groups involved and then mobilising them.\textsuperscript{36}

A more nuanced version of the culturally based explanation for conflict adds an economic dimension. This argument highlights the dramatic transformation of ethnic composition across the outer islands of Indonesia via migration in the late twentieth century, and links these demographic changes with the transitional conflicts on the periphery. The New Order government, building on Dutch colonial development policies, sponsored the mass transmigration of inner islanders, from Java, Madura and Bali, to the less densely populated outer islands in Eastern Indonesia and Sumatra. This programme, combined with spontaneous migration, was designed to relieve population and resource pressures on the inner islands, but inevitably increased natural resource and employment competition in the Outer Islands.\textsuperscript{37}

While the New Order managed to suppress many of these conflicts, following the economic crisis and the collapse of centralised military government in the late 1990s,

\textsuperscript{34} The 1996, 1999 and 2001 outbreaks of ethnic violence in West and Central Kalimantan were frequently described in the press as the wild acts of head-hunters. See, for example, \textit{Jakarta Post}, 28 June 2001. Head-hunting had not been practiced in the region for decades and such primordialist arguments overlook the social, political and economic logic behind the violence and particular methods used.
\textsuperscript{35} Moore (1991), p.486.
\textsuperscript{36} Wolf (1999) applies a more nuanced analysis of cultural factors behind conflict by concentrating on the role elites play in creating (and sustaining) conceptions of the self and the group, thus showing that conflicts between groups are not inevitable but are always dynamic and related to power structures.
\textsuperscript{37} See Drake (1989) on problems of conflicting land claims because of transmigration, and Garnault and Manning (1974) on employment competition between indigenous and migrant groups in Irian Jaya.
intense competition over local resources, exacerbated by cultural differences, was argued to have led to an explosion of inter-ethnic (and religious) conflicts. The major fault-lines of recent communal violence were thus considered to be between indigenous and ‘outsider’ migrant groups. This argument usefully highlights the role of economic inequalities and resource competition in exacerbating cultural differences between migrant and indigenous groups, which can then lead to conflict. However, it fails to explain why conflict did not break out between groups in other regions with similar socio-economic conditions, where economic competition between culturally distinct groups was also intense. Other factors therefore must also have been involved.

Taking an economic analysis of the rise of violent societal movements in Eastern Indonesia further, other theorists linked increased violence to the impacts of the 1997 national economic crisis. Post-1998 economic conditions led to increased competition for resources, which fuelled local grievances, which in turn led to violent clashes between groups. Acciaoli’s (2001) study of local conflict in Sulawesi, for example, illustrates how post-crisis tensions over long-standing land conflicts exacerbated and fuelled inter-group violence. However, the economic argument cannot adequately account for the rise in conflict in Eastern Indonesia after 1998 without also taking dynamic local factors into account. Due to the higher population densities, most of the poor actually lived on Java and Sumatra following the crisis. Yet these islands were not the sites of most of the violent conflicts following 1998, though they may have experienced increased vigilante and other forms of criminal violence. Although economic tensions certainly fuelled conflict between groups via competition over limited resources, local historical and institutional contexts, and

39 Stewart (2002) emphasizes that the economic basis of ‘communal’ conflict lies in inequality between groups within the same broad class, rather than between different classes, in her theory of horizontal inequalities. However, without considering political and leadership roles in a conflict, this theory is limited in its ability to explain why conflicts break out between certain groups but not others.
40 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that economic incentives drive conflict, but the argument is limited by failing to account for local political and social histories and dynamics. See Nathan's (2005) and Cramer's (2002) critiques of the Collier-Hoeffler model.
41 A World Bank study of vigilantism in Lampung, Southern Sumatra, also argued that higher unemployment among men and increased crime post-crisis has increased clashes between ethnic groups. See Barron and Madden (2004).
43 On vigilantism in West Java see Welsh (2003).
changing political dynamics in relation to these, must also be accounted for in order to explain the rise in violence in certain areas, but not others.44

A third view of the ‘rising society’ argument situates ethno-religious conflict during the transition within the framework of Indonesia’s incomplete process of national integration. The central argument here considers how the boundaries of the Indonesian nation had not yet achieved full legitimacy across the population by the end of the Suharto era. As the major proponent of this argument, Bertrand (2002, 2004) claims that Indonesia entered a consolidation phase of national development during the transition. During this phase, groups mobilised along ethnic lines (in the broad sense) to contest the existing state and its political institutions.45 He argues that ethno-nationalist violence (within which he includes ‘religious’ violence) tends to occur during “consolidation” phases of a society, where agreement on the national form has yet to be reached and the definition of the nation and its boundaries are sufficiently unclear to produce uncertainty about the terms of inclusion for certain ethnic (including religious) groups. If the “national model” does not clearly encompass the full range of ethnic groups living within the nation’s boundaries, then conflicts emerge around forms of political representation, resource allocation and the preservation of cultural identities.

Bertrand (2004) in fact argues that not only the separatist conflicts, but also the ‘communal’ conflicts in Sulawesi, Maluku and Kalimantan were attributable to this overarching problem of incomplete integration in the nation-state. The argument is convincing in the way it highlights issues of regional autonomy, resource allocation and political representation, by demonstrating their relevance across all conflict regions, not only in the separatist conflicts. What limits it is the way it conceptualises each regional conflict as reflecting a localised version of a

44 Von Benda-Beckmann (1999) explains aspects of the Maluku conflict via a more grounded economic and institutional analysis, by linking economic disparities with regional institutional legacies. He argues that the causes of violence lay in economic disenfranchisement caused by traditional systems of land ownership, rather than religious disputes and that similar patterns of economic and political disenfranchisement lie behind conflicts in other areas. A deep level micro analysis of the Maluku socio-economic system, such as this, demonstrates the importance of examining local institutions, and not only statistical data, to understand the relationship between socio-economic disparities and conflict.

nationwide struggle over national identity and ethnic inclusion. The issue of ethnic identity therefore retains the central explanatory role as the driving factor of the transitional conflicts, a position this thesis challenges.

All these versions of the ‘rise of society’ argument portray state-society relations in Eastern Indonesia as dichotomous. They also assume that state actors played a marginal role in the conflicts: that the locus of conflict fell within the societal realm, sometimes in negotiation with the state, but not within it. Both of these assumptions mistake state-centred and elite-driven contests for societal clashes, and overlook the tight competition for state – not simply economic – resources that formed a central part of transitional conflict. This competition was not something state actors neutrally observed: they played a key role in determining its outcome. The ‘rising society’ explanation also mistakenly views the state on the margins of Indonesia as somehow weak, ineffectual or on the verge of collapse amidst the rise of a strong (uncivil) society. Section 1.2 (iii) comes back to these criticisms. But first, I examine the other dominant explanation for conflict in Eastern Indonesia – the idea of state weakness, which is closely linked to the concept of rising societal forces.

(ii.ii) The ‘weak state’ argument
The second main argument for the rise of ‘ethno-religious’ violence in Eastern Indonesia during the transition conceives a weakened Indonesian state following three decades of centralised and ‘corrupted’ rule. By the end of the Suharto era the state was – according to this viewpoint – on the brink of collapse at the contested geographic margins of the country, regions that were never fully incorporated or consolidated into the Indonesian nation state by the New Order, and/or with state institutions improperly equipped to deal with rising violence. This argument draws on several of the variations of the ‘rising society’ argument outlined above – in particular the sense of a contested nation and rising inequalities between ethno-religious groups – and expands it, describing the institutional context in which societal forces were able to rampage so wildly. Without a weakened state, the argument goes, societal tensions and economic resentments would not have exploded in the way they did.
There are two main strands to the ‘weak state’ argument, both related to weak democratic institutions and the risks of regime change. The first considers how during the process of democratisation and government reform, state forms of conflict management remained weak. As the military retreated to the barracks, national systems of law enforcement remained weak and corrupt, thus conflicts between groups broke into violence where before they were suppressed by the centralised security system. Furthermore, the emergent democratic institutions intended to channel political conflict were still weak, whilst ‘traditional’ forms of conflict mediation had been eroded by years of centralising and modernising state government. Given the widening gap between the provision of formal state security and an increase in political action among diverse societal groups, violent conflict therefore almost inevitably broke out on the margins of the state – especially given the range of societal tensions outlined in the previous section. Second, the uncertainty caused by regime change, as well as the opening of new political spaces and the opportunity to conduct politics by new means, also led to revenge attacks, such as those against the ethnic Chinese across Indonesia in 1998. These were perceived as revenge for ethnic Chinese economic success under the Suharto regime.

One problem with the ‘weak state’ argument is that it cannot account for why some regions experienced increased political action in non-violent forms, while in others it was violent. If the state was weakened systematically across the country, this does not explain why certain, but not all, diverse regions of Eastern Indonesia experienced ethno-religious violence. A more nuanced version of this model would need to account for both formal and informal institutions responsible for conflict mediation and management, as the institutional systems for managing

conflict between groups vary widely across different regions. Variations in the degree and legacy of tension between societal groups at the micro level – whether based in political access and representation, economic inequalities, cultural differences, land use inequalities, or otherwise – to explain why some regions experienced violent conflict and others did not, despite similar levels of diversity. However, even these problems are not the major flaw in the argument in relation to the North Maluku case. The North Malukan conflict contained all these features – political and economic inequalities, strong cultural differences, an ineffective state security system, etc. – but it was the presence of other local political dynamics and interests that enabled the escalation of violence towards massive regional conflict, discussed further in Chapter Three.

Several authors have also argued that the decentralisation of political power and the (partial) redistribution of government resources to the local level were key factors in triggering ethno-religious conflict in Eastern Indonesia during the transition. In regions like North Maluku, regional autonomy (otonomi daerah) and re-districting (pemekaran) – two of the major post-Suharto local government reform policies, discussed further in Chapters Two and Three – may have triggered the escalation of conflict between different groups over limited resources. However the root causes of the conflicts and tensions between these identity groups long pre-dated the advent of decentralisation. This means the risks and opportunities posed by decentralisation and re-districting were proximate but not root causes of the ensuing violence. Furthermore, even if the political and governance context had

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51 Varshney (2001, 2002a) argues that 'informal' or non-state associational channels made the difference between scenarios of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence in India. However, Varshney does not account for the role of the state in mobilizing groups towards violence. In contrast, Brass (1997) argues that state actors and the police (among other elites) can construct riots in terms of ethnic violence, intensifying existing tensions and channeling them in violent ways. This thesis uses Brass' analysis by examining the central role of state actors in precipitating violence between ethno-religious groups in North Maluku.

52 See, for example, Von Benda-Beckmann (1999) on legal variations in socio-economic space in the central Maluku region and its effects on levels of land conflict.


54 I translate 'pemekaran' as 'redistricting' – following Aragon (2004) – rather than 'blooming', which is the more direct translation. This phenomenon of local government reform following the 1999 decentralisation laws resulted not only in the creation of more districts but also in the re-organisation of district boundaries. The political sense of 'redistricting' for electoral and financial gain is relevant to the North Maluku case, as elsewhere in Eastern Indonesia. See Booth (2009) for a brief history of decentralisation in Indonesia.
changed, *someone* had to seize the opportunity to make something political of this, but not everyone across Eastern Indonesia chose to do so by violent means.

The ‘weak state’ argument has usefully highlighted the absence of formal state intervention to prevent the escalation of ‘ethno-religious’ conflict. But – and this is one of the critical problems with this literature – why do the authors assume this was a ‘weakness’ of, or omission by, state organisations and actors? The argument assumes that the state (or state actors) failed to intervene to prevent, manage or mitigate conflict because it was (or they were) too weak to do so. However, in the case examined in this thesis, state actors had deep interests and played active roles in, indeed, substantially benefitted from, the outcomes of these conflicts. The following section considers this argument in more detail.

Overall, having considered the two dominant explanations for ‘ethno-religious’ violence and their weaknesses, I should note that certain elements of these explanations resonated with aspects of the North Maluku conflict. At different points, increased activism by, and the mobilising power of, ethno-religious leaders and organisations played a critical role in escalating conflict at both the leadership and grassroots levels. At different stages of the conflict ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ symbols, messages and histories developed by ethno-religious leaders and organisations were strong mobilising tools provoking participation in – and condoning of – violence. Furthermore, under pressure from local state-elites, regional branches of the state security services failed to prevent an escalation of violence. However, my interpretation of conflict takes a different slant on the central cause of violence in North Maluku.

**(iii) Conflict as intra-state elite competition**

In contrast to the two explanations outlined above, in this thesis I interpret the North Maluku conflict as the explosive result of a bitterly fought negotiation over – and articulation of claims to – local and regional political power, based in local and regional branches of the state. My interpretation builds on Van Klinken’s (2001, 55 Some analysts focus on the role of the security sector in escalating apparently ‘communal’ conflict in the Maluku region (see Tomagola 2000; Aditjondro 2001), but less on the role of the local bureaucratic elite, which is my interest here.

56 Chapter Three returns to these dynamics.
2007) studies of conflict in the Maluku region (which covered both north and central Maluku). In his 2001 study, Van Klinken discusses the historical importance of the state in the regional economy under the New Order regime, as well as the problems of stratified access to state benefits, which were based in patronage networks available only to certain privileged ethnic groups. His 2007 study of small town wars in Indonesia returns to discuss the core role of state-based elites in mobilising violence in the context of 'contentious politics' across the Maluku region. Where my approach differs is that this study considers the ten-year period within which the conflict was situated (1998-2008) rather than examining the conflict in isolation. As such, I consider not only local mobilisation by state elites towards violence, but the de-mobilisation of violence and the transition to the post-conflict period, where intra-state elite contest continued, first via internal contests over state resources, and second via (largely) non-violent electoral means. I return to Van Klinken's assessment below.

The alternative explanation of conflict in North Maluku I present here — understanding it as an intra-state elite contest over state power — still acknowledges the important mobilising role of religious and ethnic identities in the escalation of violent conflict (as well, in later stages, in its mitigation). Socially, psychologically and politically, these identities were activated with important effects. Second, this perspective also recognises that the official state bodies responsible for mitigating violence failed to do so, although this was not because they were too weak. Third, it recognises that, for the different groups and individuals involved, the conflict had many roots, meanings and effects — it is simply not possible to discuss them all here. But even recognising these wider dimensions of conflict, based on the empirical evidence presented in the following chapters, my account sees these as contributing, but insufficient, explanatory factors. The defining feature of the conflict was not a clear-cut ethnic or religious divide, or a failing state, but a contest between state-based elites over control of state resources.57

57 Such contests took place in other regions of Eastern Indonesia in non-violent forms: see, for example, Buehler (2008a) on South Sulawesi. It would be interesting to compare such differences in a further study.
North Malukan state officials claimed neutrality during the conflict, but based upon the empirical analysis presented in the subsequent chapters, it is clear they played active roles in determining the course of violence when it was in their direct interest to do so. On religious violence during the Indonesian transition, Sidel (2006) argues - as Keen (1998) and Cramer (2006) argue in relation to several sub-Saharan African cases - that violent conflict should be understood in terms of both its destructive and productive consequences.58 While some North Malukan state-based elites (and their connected communities) suffered enormous losses due to the violence - in personal, social, political or economic terms, or all four at once - others made substantial gains.59

The transition period presented a major opportunity in North Maluku for a range of state-based elites and their affiliated groups to attempt to seize, consolidate and renegotiate power. As such, it is more fruitful here to analyse the politics of conflict during the transition period not as state failure, nor the rise of societal forces, but as reflecting increased competition within the state-based elite during a period of major structural transition and great political uncertainty. The subsequent chapters argue that events during the transition in North Maluku - from transitional alliances, to factional fighting, to mass 'communal' violence and ethno-religious cleansing, to post-conflict reconstruction - reflect a highly contested rather than 'weak' state.

Mann (2005) considers some of the benefits posed by, and opportunities that arise from, conflict for elites during transition periods in his analysis of the Dark Side of Democracy.60 Here, Mann argues that transitional moments provide unique opportunities for political leaders and other elites to contest power, in ways impossible under an authoritarian regime. He shows the devastating effects such power contests, during periods of democratisation, can have on minority groups, or those on the thin edge of elite interests without elite protection. In this vein, and responding to Mann, Neuberger argues:

The process of democratisation can bring about a ‘thin democracy’ which stresses elections and majority rule only, unlike a ‘thick

59 Chapters Four and Five consider the costs and benefits of conflict to various groups.
60 See Breuilly et al (2006) for a critique of Mann’s argument and terminology.
democracy’ which is also based on human rights, the rule of law, limited government, pluralism and a democratic political culture.\footnote{Neuberger, (2006), p.403.}

Democratisation in the post-Suharto era in North Maluku brought about the widening of opportunities and broadening of competition for state-based elites. In this new era, state-based elites not only competed for executive, parliamentary and bureaucratic positions, but could also compete openly in the streets, through electoral and extra-legal processes, namely violent contest. This ‘thin’ form of democracy enabled a situation in which violent conflict became a new forum for political contest within the elite, but without the protections for civilians and restrictions on state actors inherent in ‘thicker’ democracies.\footnote{Snyder’s (2000) study of the links between competitive elections in transitional democracies and increased potential for violence contains similar ideas.}

Referring back to the economic explanations for ethno-religious violence, outlined in Section 1.2 (i), above, certain aspects of it become relevant here, when local analysis of the effects of economic crisis and inter-group inequalities are tied to the particular political and social patterns of the state in a certain region. The stakes over competition for control of the local state in the Maluku region, which played a major role in the local economy under the New Order – as Van Klinken (2001) and Adam (2008) have shown – were greatly raised by the economic tensions and political opportunities posed during the transition period. These tensions and opportunities were exacerbated by the particular, historically embedded, local patronage systems that only enabled access to state positions, employment and other opportunities (e.g. business contracts) for certain groups.

Van Klinken’s (2001) analysis of employment patterns in the Maluku region in the late 1990s demonstrated that the exclusionary patronage networks behind these patterns go far towards explaining underlying local tensions, which then escalated during the transition period. He argues that in Ambon:

\ldots There were a lot of young men... whose one hope for material security in life lay in getting a job in the public service, and who knew that to get one they had to have the right connections. To approach the problem of communal violence from below, we therefore need to... describe the way
in which valuable goods – such as employment in the civil service – are exchanged across Maluku’s social landscape.\(^{63}\)

Van Klinken’s stress lies on how local employment patterns underlay communal tension, but he also shows how these patterns were played upon by political elites. While Van Klinken terms his analysis “bringing society back in”, this description is misleading. What he actually does is bring analysis of the state, and its role in determining societal and economic structures, to bear on the relationship of different groups in Maluku and how this relationship generated violence in the region. He examines how public sector employment in Maluku was historically allocated through patronage networks based on places of residency, religion and social hierarchy.\(^{64}\) Von Benda Beckmann’s (1999) micro-level study outlined similar patterns. These patronage patterns dated to Dutch colonial times and had been perpetuated under subsequent regime periods. In central Maluku, Ambonese Protestants were central to Dutch rule, and survived as the main group in public service through the 1990s. In Ternate, in contrast, the Makian and associated southern ethnic groups had risen within local government by the 1990s, undermining colonial patterns of state dominance by those associated with the Ternate sultanate (from northern ethnic groups). In both cases, Van Klinken argues, such patterns created the potential for high levels of “volatility at moments of regime change”.\(^{65}\)

Building on this analysis, but also going beyond it, it is important to consider in some detail how elite members of historically favoured groups – for example, by the colonial regime – were no longer the sole, or even primary, controllers of local government by the end of the New Order.\(^{66}\) Competing minority groups increasingly held more prominent state positions. Of particular resonance in North Maluku was the intra-state contest between surviving members of the old colonial, or aristocratic, state (representing ‘northern’ ethnic groups under the ‘traditional’ authority of the Ternate Sultan) and other, more modern, state networks, forged under the New Order (representing ‘southern’ ethnic groups). As such, it is necessary to explore local intra-state competition – and its ethnic and historical dimensions – in more detail.


\(^{64}\) I return to his analysis of the role of the state sector in the regional economy, and expand upon it, in Chapters Two and Four.

\(^{65}\) Van Klinken (2001), p.10. My analysis of the North Maluku conflict in Chapter Three returns to discuss these patterns and the local elite’s manipulation of them.

\(^{66}\) Chapter Two returns to examine this point.
Democratic transition was a major opportunity for these competing groups to re-negotiate control over the local state, by seizing, attempting to overthrow, or consolidating power-bases within the state. Violence in this setting can be seen as part of a rational set of actions by state-based elites and their followers to seize or consolidate power. Violence was not therefore a \textit{failure} of the state, but part of a process of contest by political elites, whose elite status was rooted in different regime periods and different parts of the state, over control of the state.\textsuperscript{67}

The literature on violence during transition in Indonesia (and beyond) highlights the dangers posed by democratisation. The opening up of new political and economic opportunities during transition gives rise to both legal and extra-legal, frequently violent, means of seizing these opportunities. Violent conflict does not therefore imply the state is weak, or that a rise in religious and ethnic politics lies at the heart of the dispute. It may even demonstrate that the state is strong, in the sense that fierce competition for control over it is due to its centrality in local political and economic life. It may also demonstrate that ‘religious’ and/or ‘ethnic’ political identities are under threat, rather than rising in power, and hence ethno-religious leaders and organisations attempt to revive or mobilise the power of these identities when faced by the threat of change.\textsuperscript{68} The evidence presented in the subsequent chapters supports such an interpretation.

Overall, however, the literature on violent transition in Indonesia says little about the longer term political consequences of the violence or political dynamics during the immediate transition years: how some elites survived violent episodes, why others were overthrown, and what kind of political system this led to following the end of violence. In light of the underlying tensions between groups over access to state resources in the lead up to conflict in the Maluku region, as demonstrated by Van Klinken (2001), to understand political dynamics after the conflict it is therefore important to analyse the role of the state in the local economy and politics \textit{after} the violence had subsided, to see whether this had changed. In the North Maluku case,

\textsuperscript{67} See Keen (1998) and Cramer (2006) for a variation of this kind of analysis on civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. Mamdani (1996) uses this kind of framework in his analysis of apparently ‘tribal’ political conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

\textsuperscript{68} Sidel (2006) argues that for particular phases of religious violence in Indonesia this reflected the declining (not rising) power of certain Islamic groups and ideologies in relation to the state.
given the state’s historically central role in the regional economy, it is particularly important to explore how the processes of state capture of, and discretionary control over, central state resources were crucial factors in the survival and success of particular factions within the provincial and local state.69

The thesis explores how, while victory in conflict secured the positions of a particular faction of the local state-elite, they then needed to maintain and build on this power base. Given the socio-economic crisis that deepened following the conflict, and the range of government reforms that also followed the transition, it is perhaps surprising that the state-based elite managed to maintain their position of political power.70 I argue that they did so via a form of ‘machine politics’: by maintaining discretionary power over increasingly limited economic resources and capturing state budgets for political uses. Following the conflict, the provincial and local government managed large discretionary budgets flowing from emergency and reconstruction aid, provided largely by the central government, but also by foreign donors. Analysing their control of these resources helps to explain the maintenance and accumulation of power by certain factions within the state-based elite.

It is necessary to clarify here the kind of ‘machine politics’ at play in North Maluku, because of the range of interpretations and applications of the term. Machine politics is a form of political competition and voter mobilisation that is particularistic, revolving around the use of the state for personal patronage and the exchange of money for favours, votes, and so on. It does not necessarily entail a strictly clientelist structure, in a classical sense, with clearly identifiable and consistent patron-client relations throughout the local political system. However, elements of clientelist politics can play a role in this form of politics.71 Whilst certain forms of machine politics involve coherent political organisations with clear hierarchies and structures enduring over time, ‘machine politics’ in a looser sense – the sense used here – can be more fluid. The North Maluku political situation, over the decade examined in this

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69 I use the term ‘state capture’ - rather than ‘corruption’ or ‘misappropriation’ – throughout the thesis. I do so, first, to avoid the normative connotations associated with the other terms. Second, the term ‘capture’ implies a wide-ranging set of state controls and influences, with a variety of positive and negative effects. Subsequent chapters explore the range of affects ‘state capture’ had on the political elite, the wider population, and the regional political economy.

70 Chapters Four and Five examine these dynamics.

71 See Scott (1969, 1972) on political machines and political corruption in Southeast Asia in the 1960s.
thesis, was highly fluid in terms of re-negotiated clientelist relations and changing forms of political organisation.\textsuperscript{72} Electoral patterns, with incumbents and candidates moving rapidly between different parties in successive elections, indicated the fluidity of these relations, and thus did not reflect 'machine politics' in the stricter sense of single party machines controlling branches of the state and state resources. Nevertheless, elements of machine politics played key roles in determining how certain factions within the state-based elite were able to maintain and consolidate their power base, while others were not.\textsuperscript{73}

Several cases of machine politics, in which state-based bureaucratic elites survived political or economic crises in different settings, present useful comparisons for examining the role of state economic power in North Maluku. Chubb's (1982) analysis of urban political machines in post-war Southern Italy highlight several aspects of post-war economic crisis that enabled state-based elites to maintain power via their increased discretionary control of limited state resources. The role of local bureaucratic capture of reconstruction, emergency and other forms of state-aid to the Italian cities analysed by Chubb resembles state-elite practices identified during fieldwork in North Maluku. Chubb also considers the conservative nature of urban electorates in the poor Italian regions that underwent economic crisis and explains why such electorates sustain 'corrupt' state-elites.\textsuperscript{74} This pattern was also resonant in North Maluku, a point Chapter Six returns to.

Erie's (1988) comparative analysis of machine politics in the US, from the late nineteenth to late twentieth century, also highlights several features of machine politics applicable to the North Maluku case. The supply of 'bread' – the provision by political machines of jobs and economic benefits in the US cases – was also a sustaining feature of the state-based political elite in North Maluku and I return to this point in the empirical analysis.

\textsuperscript{72} Chapters Four, Five and Six explore these dynamics.
\textsuperscript{73} Machine politics in North Maluku was more a 'political machine in formation', rather than a cohesive political machine in the Southern Italian or Irish American sense.
\textsuperscript{74} Chapters Four and Six explore similar dynamics to both these features of machine politics in North Maluku.
The political tools used by electoral machines in the US and Italian contexts were of course, different from those that enabled the North Malukan state-based elite to survive, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate. In particular, a single party did not control the state at all levels of government in the North Maluku case throughout the ten year period examined in depth. However, using comparative analysis from these different cases helps shed light on how state-based elites can thrive on the multiple social, economic and political shocks and crises faced during democratic transition, when they control the state’s discretionary resources. This perspective helps explain how incumbent state-elites, based in the executive offices of the local government, held enormous comparative advantages over their rivals during post-conflict elections. Following analysis of the pre-conflict local political history of the state-based elite (Chapter Two), and the conflict itself (Chapter Three), Chapters Four to Six show how state-based elites captured government (and other) resources to maintain their dominant position in politics, and were enabled by the central government to do so.

1.3 Case study research methodology

Begin with an individual, and before you know it you find that you have created a type; begin with a type, and you find that you have created – nothing. That is because we are all queer fish, queerer behind our faces and voices than we want anyone to know or than we know ourselves.

_Fitzgerald._75

This section presents the research methodology used in the thesis. By starting with an individual case – here, a region recovering from supposed ‘ethno-religious’ conflict during democratic transition – I aimed to describe and analyse it in all its idiosyncrasies and particularities. Many of these local sights and insights were not immediately visible and were, to some extent, unknowable, if relying on a macro-level perspective or secondary and statistical data alone.76 I first explain why a qualitative case study approach was the most appropriate research method given the

75 Fitzgerald (2003), p.3.
76 Using one case study, and analysing the meso level of politics, as I do here, the researcher is limited in terms of drawing the broader patterns of transitional politics in Indonesia, which macro level or statistical studies may allow for. However, an inductive case-study approach to the meso level makes it possible to generate hypotheses and explore new areas of theory, which was one of my aims here.

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research topic and issues outlined above. I then consider the main tools used to conduct the case study research and the selection of the main field sites. The final part summarises the three main research tools used to develop the case study: observation, key informant interviews and the collection of documentary sources.

(i) Qualitative case study method

The central objective of this research project evolved during the field research, as it became clear that my initial interest in the ('re-') emergence of 'traditional' and 'ethnic' leaders during the democratic transition — and their role in ethno-religious conflict — was but one part of a dynamic local political situation. As the study evolved I realised the importance of understanding the nature and composition of the local state-based elite more broadly; what was changing and what remained the same, rather than just studying the 'traditional' (colonial) component. It was possible to allow the research focus to evolve in this way because I had selected a qualitative case-study research method, which allowed the flexibility of an iterative approach.

Yin (2003) argues that to construct a good case study as many sources as possible should be used to ensure the researcher can address "a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues" and to develop the strongest convergent lines of enquiry.\(^7\) The findings or conclusions of a case study constructed from multiple sources tend to be more convincing when based on several different sources of evidence. In order to construct the regional case study of local politics in North Maluku during the democratic transition, I covered the reform period — focusing on the conflict and its aftermath — from as many angles as possible. To do so, I used three sources of evidence to “triangulate” on the same research questions: political ethnography (observational data), key informant interviews and documentary sources (primarily from local newspapers and organisational reports).

Conflict is a sensitive topic in many cultures, and Indonesia is no exception. Discussing politics can also be a sensitive issue in Indonesia, even more so in a region where severe violence had caused various social, economic and political

\(^7\) Yin (2003), p.98.
problems. To construct a case study of the politics leading up to, and evolving from, violent conflict required building a certain level of trust with informants. To do this required a relatively open-ended qualitative research methodology that was flexible about the availability of information on, and access to, informants, actors and events. Social science research on ‘ethnic’ conflict (in the broad sense) has been criticised for relying too heavily on national elite and official sources of data, which can be problematic because such sources can only provide partial information about a story that is rarely an elite-only problem. Furthermore, local elites and local communities may have different interests and goals than national elites, and the official elite picture may be different from the patterns that are unofficially revealed, and so forth. Sources from each of these groups will tell a different story about a conflict and its aftermath.

Following the example of Barth (1959), I therefore attempted to construct a political ethnography of the transition period in North Maluku, starting prior to the conflict, running through it and on into the post-conflict period, using informants from as wide a range of groups as possible. I focused on political dynamics in two towns, situated in two different districts in North Maluku, selecting the two most important in political, economic and social terms, and lying at the heart of the 1999-2000 conflict. These were Ternate (a predominantly Muslim city, and the new, temporary, provincial capital) and Tobelo (a majority Christian town serving also as a secondary provincial town). Overall, I focused my research on Ternate, where political control was more fiercely contested at both the city and provincial level of politics. As such, it was where most senior political players, bodies of government, political organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were based.

To understand the broad political and authority system of an area, Barth argues that we need to investigate both the local system and its relationship to the wider one. In this vein, in order to understand the wider system of political change and continuity during the transition – as well as local, regional and national ‘ethno-religious’ dynamics, the historical role of political elites and the evolution of

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79 It later became difficult to include as complete a range of non-elite and elite informants as I had planned, discussed further below.
political authority in North Maluku – I looked at how political elites related to social groups across the national, regional and local political systems. Triangulation of data across different sources on the same topics also enabled me to build up a picture of the conflict and its aftermath, and the role of different authorities in these two periods from multiple perspectives. I considered these issues both within and across different ethnic and religious communities, and from both within and ‘outside’ state organisations. The following section provides more detail on why I selected the North Maluku case and the main research instruments employed.

(ii) Field site selection

North Maluku was an ideal field site for several reasons. Before field research commenced, I interviewed researchers, civil servants and staff of international organisations working in the five major ‘ethno-religious’ conflict areas in Eastern Indonesia in order to establish the feasibility of an extended field research visit in 2005. Maluku province was at this point still too sensitive, with incidents of violence ongoing, though it later stabilised. Central Sulawesi was considered feasible for shorter visits, although this situation later changed. West and Central Kalimantan were both feasible, but as local politics in West Kalimantan was already well researched, and I had already conducted research in Central Kalimantan in a previous role, I was keen to explore a new area.81

North Maluku was a good research location for several other reasons. First, the North Maluku conflict had not attracted extensive involvement of external actors in the violence, whether radical Islamic militant jihad (holy warrior) groups or Christian militants from outside the region. The Indonesian military and police forces also appeared to have been less intimately involved in the North Maluku conflict than in other areas and were thus less likely to have had dramatic effects on the nature of it. As a result, the conflict stayed relatively local in scale, was less protracted, and was not perceived in as highly political and nationally sensitive terms by the central government as the Central Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts. This combination of

81 See Davidson (2003) on the politics of conflict in West Kalimantan. I was concerned that my previous research in Central Kalimantan – with the World Bank/Government of Indonesia – might have hindered my role as an independent academic researcher (see Smith 2005).
factors meant official research access for an extended period was more readily approved than for other conflict regions of Eastern Indonesia at the time.

Second, North Maluku was by far the least researched of the ‘ethno-religious’ conflict sites in Eastern Indonesia. It had also received less media and government attention. In contrast to the conflict in Central Sulawesi, for example, which had been extensively researched by a number of academics, local politics and conflict in North Maluku still contained important unanswered questions for the researcher. Van Klinken (2005) highlighted the importance of elite political mobilisation during the North Maluku conflict, focusing on the role of a reinvigorated Sultan as a challenger to other local political elites. As the previous section outlined, Van Klinken’s studies triggered several of my research questions on the role of local elites and leaders within and outside the state, during and following the conflict. There were several further accounts of the conflict, though not all of them had been published at the time of my fieldwork in 2005. In the field, I identified several locally published accounts of the conflict. As with local newspaper accounts, these accounts tended to take a particular side in the conflict, but they also contained useful local detail, relevant for re-tracing and triangulating the actions of particular political actors. However, understanding post-conflict political dynamics, or the period following the end of violence – on which little had been written – required extensive primary research, which inspired my selection of North Maluku province.

(iii) Political ethnography approach

A major constraint with the political ethnography approach is the time and commitment required to develop personal relationships and establish trust with local informants. In the end, within a seven to eight month time frame, I found it impossible to cover both rural and urban areas, and to interview and observe grassroots and elite level actors, to the same extent. I therefore focused on certain political actors and organisations in the two main towns of the province as it became clear that these places and people were at the heart of political activity during and

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83 Tomagola (2000) focused on the role of the military and the Temate Sultan in escalating the conflict; Duncan (2005a) focused on local motives for and understandings of the violence; Van Klinken (2005, 2007) concentrated on the escalation of violence and mobilisation strategies during conflict; and Wilson (2005, 2008) concentrated on understanding escalation of conflict from ‘ethnic’ to ‘religious’ violence. See Chapter Three for further analysis of these authors.
following the conflict.\textsuperscript{84} Going beyond these towns and a local elite analysis via empirical methods was not logistically possible, though I was able to draw on secondary sources to gain more community level information.\textsuperscript{85} I applied comparative methods \textit{within} the province in two ways: – first, by comparing two towns, whose ethnic and religious composition and dynamics were different; and, second, by considering political dynamics, actors and institutions across different regime periods. The reasons for needing to focus on the elite level of local politics were several.

First, as a foreigner and a stranger to the region – in the wake of recent and traumatic waves of 'ethno-religious' violence, as well as substantive corruption allegations against several senior politicians – it was essential to get to know personally and establish trust with the main political players and their compatriots. To do so required time, presence and extensive travel – both alongside these political elites, and in pursuit of them. Travel alongside these actors was necessary not only to be in the same physical place, but also to show interest and commitment to their activities. Substantial time had to be spent in particular places – primarily political party regional headquarters, city parliament buildings, favoured cafes, the palace grounds, and political campaign offices – in order to be seen, recognised and eventually approached or allowed in. I was lucky in that I arrived in North Maluku just as local election campaigns were in full swing (in May 2005). This meant not only that local politicians, key supporters, and political organisers were present in the regional cities and towns of North Maluku, but also that they were concentrated in particular places at certain times.

\textsuperscript{84} By considering an almost ten year time period, from the 'pre' to 'post' conflict periods, and with an interest in the roles and dynamics of the elite, I ruled out an extensive focus on the community level of politics. Of course, during seven to eight months in North Maluku, I spent substantial time at the community level, talking to non-elites and observing and participating in daily life, but this was largely in urban areas. Barth's political ethnography approach would no doubt require more analysis of rural community dynamics.

\textsuperscript{85} Once I had started studying particular political figures, to have followed others would have jeopardised access to those already selected. Further, to extend my research deeper at the community level would have entailed further time constraints on accessing elite key informants. Non-elite informants were interviewed and observed where possible. As Duncan (2005a) and Wilson (2005, 2008) considered rural community dynamics in some detail, I draw on these sources in my discussion of local society during the conflict, as well as more classical ethnographies of the region, for example Visser (1989).
At more normal times of the year – as I was to discover later in 2005, when the election results were concluded – senior local politicians, bureaucrats and other elites remained in regional cities and towns for short periods only, travelling frequently around the region or to Jakarta, on business, political and social visits. When senior politicians returned to their more usual schedules they were as likely found in Jakarta, as in the provincial capital of Ternate. To observe and interview them therefore involved travel between cities and substantial time coordinating these visits and interview appointments.

‘Local’ politics in North Maluku quickly began to appear less than entirely local. The time local politicians and business associates spent in other regions – in particular the large regional hub in Makassar, the business city of Manado and the capital Jakarta – reflected a regional power network across state and state-affiliated organisations. Those who remained solely in Ternate were, almost by definition, not members of the political elite. The real elite attended meetings, conferences and conducted business, in government, at party conferences, at the national parliament sessions, with firms, at home, regionally and in the capital. Tracking down the ‘local’ elite thus required extensive regional travel, time in the capital, as well as actual ‘local’ research.

(iv) Three main research tools

(iv.i) Political ethnography and observation
Political ethnography entails using the methods of an ethnographer: through observation and through acquiring detailed knowledge of people. Hammersley (1990) argues that the nature of ethnographic work requires focusing on understanding behaviour within an everyday context, rather than controlling the environment within which informants speak, or removing informants from the

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86 For example, in attempting to interview an unsuccessful 2001 gubernatorial candidate, Abdul Gafur, I was called to his home in Ternate, as well as to his parliamentary office in Jakarta at short notice. Air travel between the two cities takes between seven hours and two days, depending on flight availability. Local politicians and senior officials might make this journey twice a month. It was therefore necessary to be flexible in planning formal interviews (and their locations) with such elites.
87 Between May and December 2005, these were some of my primary research activities.
88 My ESRC research budget and time-frame allowed for some travel between Jakarta, Ternate, Tobelo and other regional cities, primarily Ambon and Makassar.
setting in which the research takes place. Primary observation and informal conversation were therefore two key research sources. This style of research also relies heavily on the interpretation of meaning in order to understand the data.\textsuperscript{90} As such, it was necessary to acquire the appropriate language skills and cultural understanding necessary to interpret meaning, and to recognise and understand observations.\textsuperscript{91} Political ethnography in the sense of observing local events as a 'participant’, though also always as a researcher, enabled the development of a Geertz-style “thick description” understanding of local politics.\textsuperscript{92} As outlined above, substantial time was spent at local events, in favourite haunts, at informants’ homes and offices, and travelling with them. Much data was gathered during the waiting and travelling periods, and certainly more than during the more formal interview process alone.

(iv.ii) Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews with elites were useful for several reasons. Firstly, as Yin argues, formal interviews with targeted respondents enabled me to focus directly on the research questions.\textsuperscript{93} City and district level political and business elites had higher educational levels and wider experience of the Indonesian political system than informants at the village and community levels. They were also more likely to be informed about both the impacts of conflict at a ‘meso’ level (the city, district or regional level) and the process of government in the region. I used ‘semi-structured’ interviews with key informants, following “a consistent line of inquiry” whilst also allowing a free-flowing stream of questions.\textsuperscript{94} This approach enhanced my chances of acquiring information from the respondents’ perspective, rather than my own; but it was also an appropriate method for interviewing elites in Indonesia, with whom a certain amount of deference and formality is necessary.\textsuperscript{95} Elite interviewing also

\textsuperscript{90} Hammersley (1990).

\textsuperscript{91} The first stage of fieldwork involved intensive Indonesian language study in Yogyakarta, following preparatory courses in London and Indonesia. I also worked with a local research assistant when interviewing some informants.

\textsuperscript{92} Geertz (2000).

\textsuperscript{93} Yin (2003), p.86.

\textsuperscript{94} As recommended by Yin (2003), p.89.

\textsuperscript{95} While conducting elite level interviews it was necessary to allow the informant to direct the line of enquiry before inserting directed questions into the interview. This was particularly the case for interviews with senior government officials, community leaders and religious figures. As such, an open interview structure made more sense than a formalised interview procedure with these particular informants.
allowed me to gain access to varied business and political networks and enabled introductions to further informants in a 'snow-balling' process.

However, as Yin highlights, there are several dangers with relying on key informant interviews alone.96 First, initial interviews ran the risk of bias on behalf of both the interviewee and interviewer. These interviews were not always useful beyond acting as a formal introduction, as trust was not yet established. Where possible, repeated interviews, especially when conducted in different settings, helped reduce this problem. Second, the more interviews I conducted, the more inaccuracies or contradictions became evident. In fact, the more times I asked a particular question the more confusing the response often became.97 Cross-referencing and triangulating interviews and research sources (for example, contrasting respondents' reports of their actions or views with reports from local newspapers and other local observers on their actions or views) helped to clarify these problems, but they were not always resolved, as is noted at appropriate points in the text. Third, interviewees sometimes responded with the answers they wished me to hear. On the controversial topics of particular actors' roles in corruption and violence this problem was to be expected. Cross-referencing sources (across interview and documentary sources) was essential to build up as broad and accurate a picture of political events and the key actors involved as possible. However, I am not sure that the second and third problems could ever have been completely resolved within an eight month field research time frame, in such a region – if at all.98

96 Yin (2003), p.86.
97 For this reason, I am hesitant about studies where interviews are conducted only once and within very short time spans on issues such as conflict, corruption and political campaigns.
98 For example, one key informant (with whom I spent substantial periods of time) repeatedly denied a direct relationship to the key players in the conflict or direct knowledge of conflict events. Only in a final meeting – having known this informant for eight months – was it revealed that a close family member was one of the main leaders of the Islamic jihad involved in the later phases of the conflict (this was confirmed by other sources). There were many possible reasons for this: embarrassment at family involvement; family loyalty; that family involvement contradicted the informant's main argument that 'outside provocateurs' (not North Malukans) were largely responsible for leading the violence; and/or simply that it had taken eight months to gain sufficient trust for this piece of information to be revealed. Perhaps the fact that I was leaving meant the informant was able to reveal what he knew without fear that I would pursue the issue (or those involved) further. For this reason, the final two weeks of field research were some of the most productive in discussing the most sensitive research themes: violence and corruption.
Documentary sources

Reviewing written documents and archival sources formed an essential – though frustrating and incomplete – part of field research. Written materials enabled (some) analysis of local and national government policy and statistics on the North Maluku region over time – from the pre-conflict period, through the conflict, to the period following the end of violence – without recall problems, which can restrict information available from interviews. Yin (2003) argues that archival resources are especially useful for case study construction as they are stable (can be reviewed repeatedly) as well as broad (covering longer time spans) and exact (precise details of a certain policy or event).99 Yin, however, is describing an ‘ideal type’ of archive, unavailable in a region like North Maluku, which was poorly administered for decades, then devastated by regional conflict, and had new local government administrations established for only one year as of 2005.100 As such, both parliamentary and executive reports were limited and difficult to access. As a newly established province, government records prior to 1999 were also unavailable locally – it was necessary to travel to Ambon (the former regional capital) to locate them, which involved establishing new government acquaintances.101 As a result of this, NGOs were sometimes better sources of legal, government policy and statistical documents than the government bodies themselves. However, their archives were also inconsistent, and their own reports were often interpretations, rather than original copies of, local government policies.

99 Yin (2003), p.86.
100 Researching the early modern and late colonial period through archival sources would be (relatively) simpler, thanks to the careful documentary work of colonial-era and post-colonial historians on the former Spice Islands, for example Andaya (1993). Researching documents produced over the previous twenty years is more challenging, both in terms of identifying written records and actually accessing them. This is in part due to the limited nature of this material but also storage problems. Several local parliamentarians complained about the problems of documenting and archiving local government policies and programmes due to a lack of experienced local personnel. One of the problems of a rapidly decentralising state was that local administrators did not have the training to record and store local government policy documents. For example, to access provincial reports, it was necessary to establish close personal relations with local parliamentarians who then enabled access via their personal copies.
101 Even in Ambon, a more established regional government, accessing government archives for the previous ten years was challenging. Many non-governmental and religious organisations maintained their own small libraries and archives, which were usually more accessible than government records. However, the main university library in Ambon (the largest in the Maluku region) had been burned down (twice) during the conflict, destroying many local archives. The Catholic Church library was protected during the conflict and remained the best archival resource in Maluku in 2005.
In summary, I used four main sources of documentary evidence. Firstly, government reports, where available, covering political, economic and social topics. These included provincial, city and district parliament reports, executive body reports from the provincial and local government levels, statistical reports, electoral reports from regional Elections Commissions, as well as national government reports on North Maluku (accessed from BAPPENAS, the National Development Planning Board). Secondly, local NGO reports – in particular from Ternate and Tobelo organisations. These included reports on the conflict, statements to the local press, reports to their international donors and local newsletters. Thirdly, reports from international agencies with field offices in North Maluku during or following the conflict period. These included reports on specific themes – economic reconstruction, peace-building and so on – and also general progress reports on donor activities in the region. Finally, two local newspapers, the Malut Pos and the Ternate Pos. Archives of these local newspapers were accessible via the editors’ private collections.

Local newspaper articles were useful records of local views during the conflict, as reflected at the time. These views were not repeated or reported in as strong terms by key informants during interviews, taking place five years after the conflict, so the newspapers offered valuable insights to perspectives on and events of the recent past. Coverage of local corruption of post-conflict aid and reconstruction funds was also wide. These articles ranged back to 2000, when aid funds had originally started to flow to the region. As such, local newspaper reports on the topics of conflict and corruption were useful sources. However, one must also be cautious with these reports as they were published in poorly-funded local newspapers, and the local journalists had limited investigative training. Articles were often hard to penetrate and the research involved was sometimes suspect or biased. Nevertheless, they provided a particular insight to local politics over the past ten years, which was unavailable from any other source.

102 UNDP was the main source of officially published reports on the North Maluku region. International NGOs, including the International Consortium for Refugees and Displaced Persons (CARDI), Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF-UK) and World Vision International (WVI), also provided internal data, but which I am unable to cite here.
I did not use national or international media sources on the North Maluku conflict in any detail as they were limited and biased in their coverage (later coverage on elections was better). Duncan (2005a) writes that "despite the pivotal nature of the violence, the North Maluku conflict has received far less attention than the conflict in Ambon." In part, this was due to the less developed media in North Maluku than in Ambon at the time of the conflict. Ternate and Tidore were still only district capitals, and the other major sites of violence – Tobelo, Galela and Malifut – were parts of smaller sub-districts. As such, local newspapers provided only patchy and generally biased coverage. Most national journalists also produced biased coverage, usually researched via secondary sources, not on-site interviews and observations. Local newspapers, despite their problems, proved better sources on local themes.

The overall method described here enabled the reconstruction of local political dynamics over an approximately ten year period (1998-2008). Interviewing and collecting local documentary sources enabled reconstruction of the recent past, and observation enabled insights into the political present. Using both methods meant it was eventually possible to understand how local elites had survived the multiple crises affecting the region, and how and why they campaigned successfully in subsequent local elections. From the triangulation of sources, I could follow their tactics from multiple angles – their own, supporters, detractors, enemies, contractors, business partners, families, communities, etc. From these different perspectives it was then possible to identify and distil overall patterns. I aim to show in the proceeding chapters how this kind of political society had evolved, and how, through a series of deep crises and major reforms, certain political elites survived through and thrived on the economic, social and political turbulence, contrary to expectations.

1.4 Overview of chapters

The final section of this introductory chapter provides a roadmap to the thesis. Chapters Two and Three cover the colonial and post-independence history of North Maluku, moving through to the transition and conflict period up to 2000. Chapter

103 Duncan (2005a), p.54.
104 Duncan (2005a), pp.54-55.
Two presents a political history of North Maluku, from circa 1450 (the arrival of Islam in the region), through the early modern and colonial era, towards the end of the Dutch and early republican periods. It then focuses on the establishment and expansion of the New Order regime between 1966 and its official end in 1998. This chapter draws on the major historical and political works on the region, and Indonesian politics more broadly, but also uses some interview sources. Chapter Three picks up on the late New Order period, giving a more detailed political history of the build up to and process of transition and conflict in the region between 1998 and 2000. This chapter focuses on the role of local political elite in the conflict, and the impact the conflict had on them, in political terms and draws largely on empirical research, with reference to the major scholars and debates on the contemporary North Maluku conflict.

Chapter Four first outlines the regional socio-economic crisis left behind in the wake of conflict, including economic crisis, social disruption and population displacement. This context sets the scene for the arrival of post-conflict emergency and reconstruction aid from the central government, the policies behind it, and its political and economic impacts on the region. The central focus of this discussion is the capture of government aid by the local state elite and how this shore up their political position. Chapter Five then discusses the use, impact and policy behind foreign sources of post-conflict reconstruction aid, channelled largely via the UNDP Recovery Programme for North Maluku, which was run in conjunction with the provincial government. The local politics and capture of these aid funds are examined in both chapters, based on data gathered from observational and interview sources, triangulated with documentary evidence from local newspapers, government and non-governmental reports. The capture of these aid funds by officials in the executive and parliamentary bodies of local government – at both the provincial and local levels – is analysed and compared in the context of central government emergency legislation and local government reform. These two chapters set the scene for the survival of incumbents, and particular factions within the state, in local and provincial elections between 2001 and 2008, which is examined in Chapter Six.

The dynamics of local elections turned out to be heavily influenced by incumbents' access to and control over the aid resources described in Chapters Four and Five. The
concept of machine politics becomes particularly useful here, both in unravelling the results of the 2005 Temate city and 2007 gubernatorial elections, and the role that government funds played in electoral dynamics and the survival of certain factions within the state-based elite. Electoral results support some of the central arguments of the thesis – that unfettered access to post-conflict aid funds and control of the state political machine enabled the success of certain state-based elites in local elections. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, summarising the key findings of each chapter, the over-arching argument, and highlighting several of the wider implications that may be drawn from the thesis.

Overall then, the following chapters present a description and analysis of the survival of certain factions within the local New Order state-based elite through successive opportunities and crises arising from the transition period, which they used to consolidate local political power. The first opportunity came via national level political transition, including the opening up of administrative and local government reform, and the subsequent triggering of – and space for – ‘ethno-religious’ conflict. Each set of local state elites played a key role in, and used, the democratisation moment and subsequent conflict to their political advantage. However, all factions could not ultimately win power, and some were eliminated, thus reconfiguring the local state-based elite. The dramatic socio-economic collapse that followed the conflict and subsequent capture of government and donor reconstruction aid formed the second opportunity, also successfully controlled by a certain faction of state-based elites. Finally, local electoral reform and the capturing of competitive elections by the same set of state-based elites led to their cementing of formal power over the region.
Chapter Two -

The origins of the local political elite: a brief political history of North Maluku (c.1450 – 1998)

Introduction

The central narrative of this thesis explores continuity and reconfiguration within the state-based political elite in North Maluku, starting from the end of the Suharto era and running through the first decade of the new democratic regime. In her study of the bureaucratic elite in Java, Sutherland (1979) demonstrates several continuities in forms of political order and authority between the colonial and post-independence periods. Similarly, in North Maluku, strong patterns of continuity run between the political elite in power in the new democratic era and the New Order past. This chapter shows how local politics in North Maluku at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries – and in particular factional divides within the local political elite – were rooted in the political legacies of the Dutch colonial and more recent New Order regimes.

The core of the thesis, grounded in empirical field research, discusses the major local political events between 1998 and 2008. These include the establishment of the new province of North Maluku in 1999 and the subsequent year-long phase of violent conflict (Chapter Three), the protracted socio-economic crisis and arrival of state and foreign aid that followed (Chapters Four and Five), and the contest for power between different factions of the state-based elite throughout the decade in elections (Chapter Six). To set the events discussed in the subsequent chapters in their historical context, and to demonstrate that intra-elite factional divides in local politics were not something new, but were instead rooted in the influences of different regimes, this chapter outlines the political history of the different branches of the local political elite.

In relating the political history of the North Maluku political elite to post-1998 political dynamics, a key theme emerges – the importance of external sources of regime, or state, authority and legitimacy for the maintenance of local leadership.
External authority played a role in establishing both the Temate Sultan (during the
early modern period) and subsequent state-based elites (during the post-independence period) as the dominant players in local politics in their times. The
contests between the various European powers and the eventual establishment of
Dutch colonial rule deeply affected the role and authority of the North Malukan
sultans, ultimately providing the Temate Sultan with the role of regional leader in the
colonial period. Understanding how Dutch colonial rule influenced the Temate
Sultan’s authority – in particular how it embedded the Sultan within the Dutch
colonial state – helps to illuminate some of the later problems he faced in the late
nineteenth and early twenty-first century, as he attempted to ‘re-claim’ and re-
negotiate local political power against other (newer) forms of state-based elites.

The nature of external state authority and legitimacy, and the Sultan’s relationship to
the state, was transformed by the New Order government, which produced a new
political elite, based in the expansion of the modern bureaucratic state to the Outer
Islands.\(^{105}\) The parallel decline in the political authority of the Temate Sultan – a
process which had started under late colonialism, but was exacerbated in the post-
independence period – as the new ‘modern’ state elite rose in influence, was matched
by the revival of Temate town as a new regional centre under the New Order.
Ternate’s revival was also related to the New Order’s gradual expansion of a
modernised, centralised state system and corresponding economic development
policies on the geographic periphery. These dual processes produced a local
bureaucratic elite rooted not in the old colonial order and its ‘traditional’ sources of
authority, but in authority emanating from the economic and political power of the
modern state. Intra-elite factional divides in the late and post-Suharto eras were thus
embedded in competition between different branches of the local elite, who sprang
from different parts of the state, forged during different regime periods. As such, as
far as is possible, analysis of local politics in North Maluku is related here to changes
in national state dynamics and their effects at the local level.\(^{106}\)

\(^{105}\) This process took place earlier in other parts of Indonesia. Under late Dutch colonial rule, during
the 1920s and 1930s, an indigenous elite emerged in Java, tied to modern state developments, such as
mass education and literacy, and in opposition to colonial and/or aristocratic forms of power. See

\(^{106}\) Here I follow Chubb (1982). She argues, “One of the shortcomings of much research on local
politics has been the assumption that either specific social groups or the local community as a whole
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first considers the main legacies of colonial rule and the early republican periods for the political elite in power at the end of the New Order. It sketches North Maluku's political history over 450 years, from the arrival of European traders in 1511 to the establishment of the New Order in 1966. The main focus here is on, first, the impacts of colonial competition and the rise of the North Malukan sultans under the early period of colonial rule; and, second, how the North Maluku sultans then declined in importance during middle and later colonial rule, and the Ternate Sultan was gradually incorporated into the centre during the early republic.

The second section looks at the establishment of the New Order between 1966 and the late 1980s, covering five inter-related issues: the expansion of the central state; the national and local rise of the Golkar political organisation; the creation of a new local political elite; the incorporation of the Ternate Sultan into central branches of the state and withdrawal from local politics; and the developmental aspects of the New Order state and its effects on the regional economy.

The third section considers the changing dynamics of the late New Order period, from 1990 to 1998, linking national and local political dynamics, and covering three key issues relevant to the official transition to democracy. These were: the beginnings of the attempted 'return' of the Ternate Sultan (starting in the mid-1990s); the rise of the 'southern' ethnic faction in local politics, tied to the rise of modernist Muslim organisations within Golkar; and, the rising power of the southern Makian ethnic group in local government. The fourth section concludes by summarising the main political legacies of these different regime periods for the local elite emerging at the end of the New Order.

2.1 Colonial rule and the early republic (c.1450-1965)

It is one of the ironies of history that the Moluccas – for the possession of which four European nations contended, at the cost of much blood and treasure – have now faded into insignificance.

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can be studied in isolation....[but] it is impossible to understand either the local economy or local politics outside the broader context of national politics and policy.” (p.9)
Holland gained the glittering prize, only to find it turned into dust and ashes in her hands.

*Foster (1967).*

Between the early sixteenth and the late eighteenth centuries, contests to control the spices produced on the tiny islands of Ternate and Tidore and their affiliated regions drove four major European colonial powers – Portugal, Spain, Holland and Britain – into successive wars. The European taste for expensive spices – particularly cloves, nutmeg and mace, which at that time grew only in the Maluku islands – and the colonial race to dominate not only trade in, but production of, these spices, had enormous economic, cultural and political impacts on North Maluku. In particular, the political legacies of colonialism continued to resonate in early twenty-first century politics – 450 years after the first arrival of European colonialists.

By the early twentieth century Maluku was no longer a major concern of the European powers. The Dutch had ruined the economy of the northern parts of the Maluku islands by forcibly destroying indigenous crops and concentrating clove production and trade in Ambon, further south, thereby marginalising the North Malukan sultans. General Macarthur briefly occupied Morotai Island, in the most north-easterly reaches of the Maluku archipelago, and the Japanese part of Halmahera (the largest island in the region) during the Pacific war. Aside from this dramatic interlude on the world stage, following the demise of the North Malukan spice trade in the seventeenth century, no external force had as significant an impact on the north Malukan islands as the Dutch authorities in the early colonial period, until the establishment of Suharto’s New Order regime in the late 1960s. This first section briefly presents North Maluku’s pre-New Order political history, focusing on the main legacies relevant to late twentieth century political dynamics and the political elite dating from the colonial and early Republican periods.

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107 Foster (1967, p.xi). The decline of the northern parts of Maluku under Dutch rule was hardly incidental, as the chapter shows.
(i) Colonial competition and the rise of the sultans

Evil and strife are endemic to Maluku, for the clove though a creation of God, is actually an apple of discord and responsible for more afflictions than gold.

*Barros and Castanheda (c. 1551).*

Before the fourteenth century, the eastern reaches of island Southeast Asia fell outside the main international trade routes and were not regularly visited by foreign traders from Asia or Europe; the cloves, nutmeg and mace from the Spice Islands were traded by local merchants who tapped into regional trade networks. Until the late fifteenth century Muslim traders in Asia dominated the spice trade overland from Melaka (a Malay Muslim kingdom) via Cambay (through Gujurati Muslim traders) to Egypt (through the Muslim Mamluks) and onwards into Europe. It was via the Muslim trading routes that Islam first reached the north Malukan islands, with the conversion of the North Malukan kings to Islam during the mid-fifteenth century.

The rise of the North Malukan sultans into superior local political roles began with their Islamic conversion. Andaya (1993) shows how the arrival of Islam in the northern Malukan islands significantly altered ‘traditional’ concepts of power, with an external source of authority (and therefore power) coming into primacy. This process undermined the role of local lords and more indigenous concepts of power and began the consolidation process of hierarchical rule around the sultanates, which was later strengthened by the European colonialists. Local politics evolved in response and relation to external regimes from the arrival of Islam in the mid-fifteenth century onwards.

Christian Europe eventually sought to end dependence on its religious enemies for spices, by finding a more direct and cheaper source via a sea route to Asia, with...

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108 Barros and Castanheda were official chroniclers of the Portuguese court in the mid sixteenth century. Along with Couto, these three provided the earliest systematic accounts of the spice-producing Malukan islands. See Andaya (1993), pp. 10-14.

109 Amal (2002, pp. 122-131) concludes that the Islamic conversion of the North Malukan sultans took place around the 1430s. Andaya (1993, p. 57) dates the conversion of the Ternate sultan in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. Taylor (2003, p. 66) estimates it at c. 1460.

110 Gibson (2005) discusses the theme of external authority and its impact on local elites with reference to Makassar, in South Sulawesi, arguing that local concepts of authority were successively influenced by external authorities, from the Indic period onwards.

Portugal leading the way. The Portuguese arrived in Maluku in late 1511, marking the beginning of a 450 year history of occupation and bargaining between European powers and Malukans. European colonisation had four significant legacies for contemporary political dynamics that continued to resonate in local politics at the end of the twentieth century.

First, colonialism centralised and concentrated local political power in the 'traditional' sultanates. Second, the process of inter-colonial competition – and eventual alignment with the ascendant Dutch – secured the dominance of the Ternate Sultan above the other three sultanates (with the gradual erosion of two of them). These two legacies were never forgotten by the Ternate Sultan’s family, and the memory of this period of political prowess was called upon during the democratisation process at the turn of the twenty-first century. Third, the sultans increasingly relied on an external mandate and the financial and political support of external sources of power in order to maintain their own local authority. Fourth, the contests between the colonial powers over Ternate and Tidore ensured the creation and maintenance of a north-south political and cultural divide in North Maluku. The third and fourth colonial legacies were also still resonant in late twentieth to early twenty-first century local politics, as subsequent chapters demonstrate.

The broader experience of the North Maluku region was, of course, unexceptional in the almost complete restructuring of the concepts and organisation of local political authority under colonial contest and rule. Pemberton (1994) and Sutherland (1979) document the dramatic impact of Dutch rule on Java, from the early years of intervention by the VOC (Dutch East India Company), to the subsequent establishment of a formal colonial government after 1800 (with a brief interruption of British rule between 1811-1816), until the arrival of the Japanese and collapse of the Dutch East Indies empire after 1942. According to Sutherland, even some of

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112 Andaya (1993), pp.2-5.
113 Andaya (1993) provides the best history of this period. Amal’s (2002, 2003) history is also useful. See also Ricklefs (2001, pp.73-83) on the colonial struggle for hegemony in Eastern Indonesia more generally (c.1630-1800).
114 This process was started under the pre-colonial influence of Islamic culture and conversions, but the focus here is on the colonial impact.
115 On examining Javanese archives in Solo, Pemberton (1994, p.20) writes, "...it was here...that I first began to get a real sense of the extraordinary impact of Dutch rule in Central Java...Traces of Dutch colonial power were, inescapably, everywhere.".
the most prominent twentieth century scholars of Indonesian political culture, including Anderson, underestimated the extent to which the ‘ideal type’ of Javanese state and ‘traditional’ concepts of power embodied in the native bureaucratic elite (themselves a largely colonial construction) were not a pre-colonial but colonial formation.\textsuperscript{116} Outside the Dutch East Indies, similar colonial processes impacted local concepts and structures of authority.

Mamdani (1996) discusses similar processes in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on how the mechanisms of late colonial rule enabled the construction of ‘traditional’ rulers, ethnic and racial elites, which were later viewed as indigenous pre-colonial categories. Meeker (2002) similarly shows how the Turkish ‘aghas’ — an apparently socially embedded, not political or state-based, elite — were not ‘traditional’ at all, but had emerged out of the Ottoman Empire’s \textit{Tanzimat} state reforms of the nineteenth century. The politicisation, strengthening and centralisation of power in the North Malukan sultanates during the early centuries of colonial competition and conquest — and the invention of their ‘traditional’ rule — thus fits into a broader global pattern of colonial impact.\textsuperscript{117}

Dutch rule in Java (at the colonial centre) was generally more concentrated and organised than in the Outer Islands, which were more loosely ruled via the local aristocracy. It was not until the early twentieth century that a more systematic form of bureaucratic control was imposed — for example, in South Sulawesi — but Maluku was different.\textsuperscript{118} The monopoly over Malukan spices was such a central part of the Dutch project in the East Indies that the region was always, as Ellen (1983) notes, a “centre on the periphery”. As such, Dutch rule had a lasting impact on the region.

In the pre-colonial period, Andaya (1993) argues that the North Malukan sultanates held diffuse positions in local society, and their power was balanced by other local leaders and centres of authority. The sultans were only one group of many figures and bodies of ‘traditional’ authority, and not necessarily the most powerful or richest. Andaya shows how the mutual exchange between the European powers and the


\textsuperscript{117} See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the ‘invention’ of tradition.

\textsuperscript{118} See Amal (1992), p.13, on South Sulawesi.
sultanates helped centralise and strengthen the powers of the Tidore and Ternate sultanates during the early colonial period, first via strategic trading deals and later through establishing close relations with the formal Dutch administration after 1800 (when the VOC period ended). Economic and political power over the local population was thereby centralised hierarchically in the sultanates, rather than mediated via other leaders and trading relationships, as it had been previously.\textsuperscript{119} This process was in the sultans' interests, as it raised their position over alternative leaders and provided guaranteed incomes from the Dutch administrators. It was also the only lens through which the Europeans understood local power systems. The decentralised, less hierarchical leadership patterns indigenous to the region were incomprehensible to and incompatible with the interests of the Europeans. They preferred dealing with a central authority figure – akin to their own monarchical systems – ruling over a dependent population via a hierarchy of leaders. This was precisely the system established through interaction between European powers and the sultanates.

The colonial process of centralising power in the sultanates from the sixteenth century onwards thereby embedded the sultanates in an external source of authority. The colonialists required the acquiescence of the sultans to maintain control of the spice trade and the sultans required the colonialists to legitimise and maintain this newly centralised local power structure. The process of external legitimation of local rulers started by the Islamisation of the Malukan 'kings' in the fifteenth century was reinforced by the European concept of kingship. The Europeans' regulation of local society via a hierarchical political system, headed by the sultans, aided their primary goal of control and regulation of the spice trade. The legitimation of local political authority by external sources was reinforced under the Republic of Indonesia from 1949. In all three periods local power holders relied on an external source of authority to maintain their power and legitimacy. This process continued in the contemporary period, where local elites drew their political power from the external authority and resources of the central state (see Chapters Four and Six).

\textsuperscript{119} In interviews, M. Adnam Amal, the North Malukan historian, discussed the 'dualist' system of rule that operated under the Dutch in North Maluku (Interviews, Ternate, May and September 2005). The Sultanate and Dutch governance systems operated in parallel, although 'instructions' came from the resident Dutch administrators. This Dutch residency system was supported by the Ternate Sultanate right up to the Republic (with a brief interlude under Japanese occupation).
Late-sixteenth century contests between the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch also had lasting impacts on the cultural and political dynamics of the region. The Portuguese were expelled by the Ternate Sultan in the late sixteenth century, after which the Spanish invaded in 1606. The Ternateans appealed to the Dutch, who took control of the northern and eastern half of Ternate island. The Spanish retained the southern half of Ternate, as well as Tidore island, as the Tidore Sultan remained a Spanish ally. The important cultural and political divide across Ternate, still clearly identifiable in the early twenty-first century, has its roots in these colonial wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These wars reinforced local differences as partners and alliances were sought, and divides enforced, in order to control as much of the spice trade as possible. Even after the Spanish left in 1663, the northern half of Ternate was treated as a ‘self-ruled entity’ of the Ternate Sultan by the Dutch, while the southern half, along with Tidore, was ruled directly. Immigrant traders mostly settled in the south of the city, including Europeans, Arabs, Chinese and Makassarese.

The Tidore sultanate gradually fell into obsolescence after backing the Spanish against the ascendant Dutch in the seventeenth century. However, the decline of the Tidore sultanate did not end regional cultural and political divides. Three centuries later, the 1998 restoration of the Tidore sultanate still carried symbolic meaning for the local ‘southern’ population. In the nineteenth century the boundary between the Ternate Sultan’s region of influence (in the northern part of Ternate island and the north and western reaches of Halmahera), and the region to the east and south (including the southern part of Ternate, Tidore and the southern half of Halmahera, nominally under the Tidore sultanate) was administratively formalised by dividing Halmahera into northern and southern halves. When Central Halmahera district was created in 1990 it was carved out of North Maluku district, again along North/South boundaries. Although the southern region fell outside the Ternate Sultan’s direct zone of influence, it was periodically ruled indirectly by the Ternate Sultan.

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119 Van Klinken (2007), p.114. The shift of authority from control over people to control over territory was an important one enabled by Dutch colonial rule.
120 Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp.238-239. Linguistic differences dating from this period remained in 2005, with communities in the north still speaking the Ternate language, while those in the south spoke their own ethnic languages.
Sultanate. These historical links and partitions between North Malukan communities, and the Ternate Sultan’s perceived loyalty to particular communities, were still present in the late twentieth century. These colonial-era communal splits were then mobilised by elites and fiercely contested during the conflict of 1999-2000, as Chapter Three demonstrates.

A brief note on the colonial economy is also helpful here because of the continuation of certain forms of colonial economic policy in later periods. First, the Dutch systematically monopolised the spice trade, culminating in the 1652 treaty between the Ternate Sultan Mandar Syah and the VOC, prohibiting the production of cloves anywhere except Ambon and other districts strictly controlled by the Dutch. Ruthless enforcement of the treaty largely destroyed indigenous spice production in the northern islands, though small scale production survived. This was devastating to the local economy and significantly undermined the regional position of the North Maluku sultans, who became of little interest to the Dutch, as well as losing their main source of income. From this point onwards, the North Malukan elite were dependent on external rulers without leverage on their part, with the riches of their islands destroyed by their colonial masters. It was not until the establishment of the New Order, and its extensive rural development policies in the poorest regions of Indonesia (which even reached some of the most remote parts of north Maluku), that an external regime made any attempt to develop the region beyond a subsistence-level economy.

(ii) Late colonialism to the early republic

Four key trends emerged during the late colonial to early republican periods relevant to late twentieth and early twenty-first century North Malukan politics. First, late

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124 Van Klinken (2007), p.114. For example, Makian people from Makian island were formerly under the Sultan of Bacan’s sphere of influence, but this sultanate eventually fell under the Ternate Sultan’s authority. In the contemporary period Makians question this historical affiliation with the Ternate sultanate. Interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, retired judge, 2 June 2005, Ternate.

125 Later, I use the terms ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ as short-hand for ethnic groups from north Ternate and North and West Halmahera (the ‘north’) and those from south Ternate, Tidore, Central Halmahera and related islands (the ‘south’). They are not generally described locally as such, but by their specific ethnic names.


127 Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp.156-158.

128 Section 2.2 returns to this point. See Booth (1992), pp.37-38 and Booth (2003), pp.189-192, on the impacts of the New Order’s extensive rural development policies, largely via the INPRES schemes, in Eastern Indonesia.
colonial rule saw the continued development of Ambon and marginalisation of the north of the Maluku region to a regional hinterland. Second, the Ternate Sultan lost further local authority, with his gradual incorporation into central state organisations. Third, while north Maluku was not directly involved in the regional rebellions of the 1950s, it was geographically close to Ambon and North Sulawesi, and thus was perceived as a political risk for the Republic and denied independent provincial status. Fourth, religious, nationalist and aristocratic political parties, as elsewhere in Indonesia, were popular in the 1950s following independence; however, by 1957, and the beginning of Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ period, the relative freedom of political parties was crushed and channelled into a ‘one-party’ system. This policy was subsequently expanded by the New Order government over the following decades.

Under late colonialism, Ambon continued to expand its regional political and economic position. This was largely due to Dutch concentration of the clove industry and therefore capital and administration in Ambon from the late seventeenth century onwards. However, the concentration of economic power and political authority in Ambon was not the only factor leading to its rise as a regional power; it also benefited from special roles and preferences given to the largely Protestant Ambonese by the Dutch authorities, especially via Ambonese incorporation into the KNIL (Royal Dutch Army) and the educational and bureaucratic promotion of Protestant Ambonese in the local administration. Following the destruction of the indigenous clove industry neither the North Maluku sultans, nor remaining natural resources, served the strategic or economic interests of the Dutch: the north Malukan region declined into peripheral status.

During the early to middle twentieth century the political authority of the Ternate Sultanate continued to wane through various administrative and political upheavals. In 1914, the Sultan was dethroned by the Dutch as part of a modernising

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129 On the development of the clove industry, Dutch army and local bureaucracy in Ambon, see Chauvel (1990) and Taylor (2003). The legacies of this promotion of the Protestant Ambonese within the Dutch administration led both to Ambonese disadvantage under the early phases of the new republic (with the crushing of the pro-Dutch independence movement, the RMS), but also to lasting advantages via promotion in the local civil service. These latent advantages have been argued to be one of the crucial underlying factors behind ethno-religious conflict in the late 1990s in Ambon (see Van Klinken 2001).
administrative policy; he was then restored to power in 1929, following the communist uprising of 1926-27, which persuaded colonial conservatives to maintain 'traditional' authorities in the interests of regional stability. Due to the historical links between the Ternate Sultanate and the Dutch administration, Sultan Iskandar Djabir Mohammad Sjah had an uneasy relationship with the rising Indonesian nationalist movement through the 1930s and 1940s. During World War Two, with the help of the Dutch, the Ternate Sultan and his family were exiled to Australia, a move that did not endear him to the Indonesian nationalists. From the late 1940s to mid 1950s the Ternate Sultan was only a minor figure in regional politics and did not play a leading nationalist, federalist, or separatist role, unlike other Eastern Indonesian political figures.

Unlike Ambon and Manado, Ternate was not a critical centre of resistance to the new Republic during the 1950s regional rebellions. While the RMS (South Maluku Republic) rebellion in Ambon in 1950 and the PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebellion in Manado in 1957 had minor political repercussions in Ternate, they did not cause significant disruptions and the northern part of Maluku was incorporated relatively peacefully into the new Indonesian state. The region briefly struggled to be recognised as a separate administrative province within the Republic, but this movement was quickly suppressed by

130 Van Klinken (2007), p.114. Benda (1966) discusses the changing dynamics of Dutch rule – from greater autonomy for the regions and native administrators, to re-centralisation and the application of a hard-line policy against political freedom from 1927 – in the last decades of the Dutch empire. Sutherland (1979) argues that the retreat from reform in the last decades of Dutch rule actually began in 1918 (pp.86-87).
131 The Indonesian nationalist movement began its rise between the 1920s and 1930s. See Anderson (1983) and Vickers (2005).
133 For a detailed history of Eastern Indonesian politics between the establishment of the State of Eastern Indonesia and its eventual dismantling (1946-1950), including the tensions between federalists, separatists and pro-unitary forces, see Anak Agung (1996). While the Sultan sat in the sixth cabinet of the State of East Indonesia, prior to its incorporation into the (unitary) Republic of Indonesia in August 1950, this role did not appear to have had lasting effects on the politics of the region. See Anak Agung (1996), p.707, 843. Fraassen (1999), pp.57-58 – cited in van Klinken (2007), p.114 – asserts that the Ternate Sultan was placed under house arrest by the new Republic during this period – due to his apparent proximity to the separatist rebels in south Maluku – but Hanna and Alwi (1990) dispute this, and Anak Agung (1996) does not refer to it either.
134 Although the North Malukan region’s geographic proximity to the major sites of regional rebellion in the 1950s meant that it was viewed with some suspicion by the new Republican government, it was a relatively minor and remote region in what later became the wider Maluku province, and was not a centre of resistance. This meant that the military did not have a great presence in the region at this time, or indeed, during the subsequent decades.
Jakarta. The immense geographic area covered by Maluku province under the early Republic – indeed, right up to the end of the New Order, the province stretched from the southern Philippines to the northern tip of Australia – was difficult to administer, but Jakarta prevented any moves towards its break up, viewing it as ‘dangerous localism’.

Van Klinken (2007) goes so far as to argue that, “Rebellion is not a characteristic of the political scene in Ternate.” But the relative passivity of the North Maluku region during the 1950s – compared to other regions of Eastern Indonesia – was directly related to the legacies of several centuries of brutal repression of local warfare and rebellion during the early colonial era. Regional repression was continued by the policy of political and economic marginalisation of the region under Ambonese control during the late colonial era, a policy which survived into the new republic. The political will to create a separate province was not resurrected until the onset of the reform movement in 1997, discussed in Chapter Three.

Aside from the regional rebellions in the 1950s, the new Republic faced other serious political challenges. Feith (1962) demonstrates the central inadequacies of the parliamentary democracy system between 1953 and 1957, where political factionalism rose via an increased role of party politics, as reflected in the 1955 election results. Four parties (PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI) gained substantial votes nationally, but none of them won sufficient for a majority. For their part, North Malukans voted overwhelmingly for religious parties, with (Islamic) Masjumi gaining 45 per cent, and (Protestant) Parkindo 22 per cent. The ‘Guided Democracy’ period which followed this brief experiment in parliamentary democracy re-centralised political authority and crushed (‘unified’) alternative political organisations, which Sukarno viewed as threatening to national unity. The creation of

136 Interviews with retired civil servant, Ibrahim Effendi, and North Maluku DPRD member, Saiful Bahry Ruray, July 2005, Ternate. Both had relatives who were imprisoned for advocating for a separate province in the early republic.
139 In contrast to Ternate, by the late colonial period Ambon was a regional economic centre and political hub, with close links between the Dutch army and Ambonese Protestant elites. Hence Ambon was the site of a furiously contested transition during the independence wars and only eventually incorporated under great duress by the Indonesian Army into the Republic. See Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp.269-271, and Chauvel (1990).
140 Feith (1962), pp.556-578.
Golkar – an ‘umbrella’ political organisation – during the Guided Democracy period was intended to overcome party political divisions by ‘unifying’ a divided electorate. Golkar incorporated some of the nationalist party networks on the Outer Islands – particularly PNI – and Masjumi was later banned, thus changing (again) the emergent political dynamics in the Maluku region.141

The Ternate Sultanate as a source of local political authority was not completely eliminated by the early republic, but the nature of rule – and the Sultan’s role within it – had begun to change dramatically with the gradual establishment of a unitary and centralising Indonesian state. The Dutch had first strengthened, then undermined, the role of the North Malukan sultanates, eventually concentrating regional political and economic power in Ambon and weakening the regional influence and role of the Ternate Sultanate. The post-independence government then consolidated this process, retaining Ambon as the regional hub of Maluku province. It was not, however, until the establishment of Suharto’s New Order, from 1966 onwards, that North Maluku felt the full political and economic impacts of incorporation into the unitary Indonesian state.

2.2 The establishment and expansion of the New Order (1966-1990)

Since the days of the old sultanate Ternate has served as economic, political and cultural centre of the surrounding island world of the North Moluccas....After a long period of decline and disintegration which continued into the first two decades of Indonesian independence, Ternate was able to revive most of its former functions as a “centre on the periphery.”

Kiem (1993).142

The first section of the chapter showed that the Dutch administered colonial authority in North Maluku via indirect rule was concentrated in the Ternate sultanate. The early republic did not dismantle ‘traditional’ (or, colonial) political organisations and authority completely, but instead began to incorporate them into the centrally administered political system. Under the gradual establishment of the New Order

regime, following Suharto’s takeover in 1965 and official inauguration as president in 1966, the Ternate Sultan was then incorporated more forcefully into national state political organisations, especially Golkar. Conversely, local branches of central state and political organisations extended into and assumed greater power at the local level, widening access to political leadership to previously marginalised local ethnic groups, which this section explores.

Economic development – particularly on the geographic periphery of the country – was a central priority of the new government, partly as a means to build a stable unified state. As such, the policies of the New Order began to transform the North Malukan economy and political system from the mid-1960s onwards. The New Order’s economic development strategy in the Maluku province in some ways revived colonial strategies, via the expansion of extractive industries such as logging and mining. However, other aspects of New Order policy in Eastern Indonesia focused specifically on local economic development. The establishment and expansion of the New Order in North Maluku was therefore a continuation of past policies, via the continued process of external rule and the central role of an extractive economic policy, but it also offered something new – via the expansion of infrastructure and other public services into previously remote rural areas. The New Order also aided the rise of non-aristocratic elites, through the growth of educational facilities and civil service employment. Several of the key figures in late twentieth century politics emerged from this period as a result.

The main goal of the New Order regime was to secure political order via a forced ‘national consensus’. Nishihara (1972) observes that while Sukarno had also aimed to achieve this consensus, he had ultimately failed. Following the contentious and

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143 This section draws heavily on Van Klinken (2007) and Kiem (1993) as two of the few sources on North Malukan (particularly, Ternatean) politics and the local economy during the New Order regime. Pannell and Von Benda-Beckmann (1989) also consider some political issues indirectly through their edited volume on resource management in the Maluku region.

144 The Inpres scheme, providing special grants for infrastructure development in the poorest regions of Indonesia, is the main example of the New Order’s regional development policy that had marked impacts at the community level. I do not discuss the nature of such impacts at the community level here, as it goes beyond the scope of the thesis, but note there is disagreement as to the benefits of the New Order’s local development strategies in the poorest regions of the country. Booth (1992, 2003) argues there were measurable improvements via the Inpres scheme in the poorest regions; Leith (1989) presents the negative consequences of New Order development policy in rural areas of north Maluku, mostly via the transmigration scheme; Ellen (1983) argues the New Order had very little influence beyond the semi-urban areas of Maluku.
rebellious early decades of the republic, the New Order's centralising and unifying strategies, policies and organisations – ranging from outright political intimidation to coalition building – meant that by the first general elections of the New Order in 1971, Golkar (an organisation formed by Sukarno but which then became the New Order state’s political vehicle) secured a massive electoral victory.\textsuperscript{145} Just five years into the new regime, Indonesia was already a one-party state, with the ‘orderly’ state finally triumphing over ‘disorderly’ society.\textsuperscript{146}

Whilst the establishment of the New Order regime produced some significant political changes, there were also some important continuities with Sukarno’s ‘Old Order’ during the early republic. At the national level, the early years of the New Order saw a continuation of the Old in terms of political activity, structures and leadership.\textsuperscript{147} What was genuinely new was the extension of centralised, stratified and hierarchic state rule, which could be clearly seen by the 1971 elections, with local elites carving out their own empires within – not against – the military and bureaucratic structure. The key organisations behind this new form of rule were Golkar, the expanding bureaucracy (with its focus on regional economic development), and the military’s territorial command. These central features of the New Order had important political impacts in North Maluku by concentrating local power in branches of the expanding and modernising state. The “old” elites attached to the Ternate Sultanate were therefore pushed outside the mainstream of local politics.

Five issues dominated North Malukan politics during the establishment of the New Order regime and contributed to the direction of local political dynamics in the post-Suharto period. These were the extension of the central state’s presence and controlling mechanisms; the national and local rise of Golkar; the creation of a new local political elite; the incorporation of the Ternate Sultan into central branches of the state, and withdrawal from local politics; and the developmental effects of the New Order on the regional economy.

\textsuperscript{145} Nishihara (1972), p.56.
\textsuperscript{146} Anderson (1966).
\textsuperscript{147} Reeve (1985), pp.263-265. Crouch (1978) also makes a strong case for Old and New Order continuity by showing how the Army leadership of the New Order had been an integral part of the Old Order. Reeve goes further, in his analysis of Golkar’s roots, and argues that the, “concepts of political activity and structures used to implement them were also such an integral part” (p.265).
(i) The expansion of central state organisations

The New Order period saw the extension, transformation and modernisation of the state's political organisations across the country. MacAndrews (1986) argues that the relationship between central government and provincial authorities changed in two significant ways during this period: first, the authority of central government was gradually established throughout Indonesia; and, second, a degree of authority was gradually devolved to provincial governments. Both trends contributed to state stability by encouraging regional development and re-defining relations between central and local authorities. As a state focused on stability and development, the New Order at first pressed for strong central government controls over local government to improve security. But the regime eventually recognised provincial political and economic demands in order to ensure the co-option of, rather than resistance from, local branches of government, giving provincial government a degree of autonomy over regional decision making.148

Under New Order administration, the North Maluku region comprised two districts in the north of Maluku province, geographically far removed from the provincial outpost of the central government in Ambon. The military played a central role in the Ambon provincial government — but in the northern part of the province, they had a lesser presence and it was the extension of the bureaucracy, rather than the military, that was notable during this period. The provincial government in Ambon successively endorsed North Maluku’s two district regents, with minimal recorded political protest at the local level.149 The district capitals of Ternate and Tidore became the local hubs of New Order government and political organisation. Outside these towns, the rural, forested and mountainous territory also saw the expansion of a local state presence, mostly as a result of the expansion of logging, plantations, mining and transmigration in Halmahera in the 1980s.150

150 Spyer (2000) and Leith (1989)'s ethnographies of peripheral regions of Maluku during the late New Order outline the impacts of New Order policies on remote rural communities via — amongst other schemes — regional development programmes, state education, health clinics, resettlement programmes and the imposition of the national language; but these regions were not the focus of my study. On the impact of the state in rural parts of central Maluku, see Von Benda Beckmann (1989). On the impacts of transmigration on remote rural parts of north and central Halmahera see Bubandt (1989) and Leith (1989).
The locally centralised nature of state authority in the district capitals – themselves often several days travel from the next administrative branch of government at the sub-district level – mirrored the centralised and hierarchical nature of state authority in Jakarta. What changed under the New Order regime was that the local elites and the source of their authority were increasingly concentrated in state bureaucracy and Golkar, the state political organisation, as opposed to being linked to the ‘traditional’ (colonial) elite. This process also had an ethnic dimension, with the political decline of the northern Temate ethnic group (linked to the Temate Sultan) and the rise of the southern Makian group (who benefitted from newly opened educational and other public services, explored further in later sections).

Golkar became one of the main vehicles for imposing and maintaining state uniformity and political loyalty during the New Order. The three ‘pillars’ of the New Order – the bureaucracy, military and Golkar – were not wholly separate organisations, but merged into and evolved out of one another, with Golkar as the official ‘political’ organisation. The civil service was also increasingly affiliated to Golkar in the early phase of the New Order, as all civil servants were automatically members of Korpri (Organisation of Indonesian Civil Servants), a senior organisation within the Golkar family. By the mid 1970s, civil servants were ‘urged’ not to join any political party (Golkar membership did not count as party affiliation, even though Golkar ‘competed’ in elections). In this way, the military leadership controlled the bureaucratic sector of government and gained increasing influence over the political sector. For the local elite, climbing the Golkar and bureaucratic ladders was the major route to socio-economic mobility.

151 On the minimal penetration of the state beyond sub-district centres on the periphery of Maluku during the New Order, see Ellen (1997).
152 This process started under late colonial rule on Java, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, with increased indigenous access to education and the bureaucracy (see Vickers 2005 and Taylor 2003). The process started later in North Maluku.
153 In different parts of the country, different pillars played primary roles. In North Maluku, the bureaucracy and Golkar appeared to have played a far greater role in local administration and politics than the military pillar of the New Order regime, which contrasts to Ambon, where the military played a central role, in large part due to the area’s contentious history with the unitary republic.
The local elite were sufficiently embedded in – and suppressed enough – by the political organisations and hierarchy of the New Order to voice only mild resentment of Ambonese provincial control. The district elite (largely indigenous Muslims) carved out their own local niches of control under the senior Ambonese (and therefore largely Protestant) administration, but they still sought their own province. In 1971, President Suharto was persuaded by the local elite to visit Ternate to discuss North Malukan provincial status. During this visit, it was agreed that following the 1971 elections the issue could be pursued, though it was later dropped. Any significant movement to create a new province was subdued until the reformasi era in the late 1990s. According to Van Klinken, the major factor contributing to overall political stability and the absence of much political activity in North Maluku throughout the New Order was the dependence of the regional economy on central government funds – discussed further below. These links between local and central government – and therefore budgetary and other government decisions – were mediated through the civil service and, therefore, Golkar.

(ii) The national rise and role of Golkar as a “political machine”

While usually identified as a New Order creation, as with the other key pillars of the regime, Golkar – the acronym for Golongan Karya, ‘functional groups’ – had its roots in the Sukarno period. Sukarno had encouraged a loose confederation of occupational (‘functional’) groups of all kinds, including civil servants and becak (tricycle taxi) drivers, to forcibly create a ‘unifying’ national force in politics against the competitive electoral politics of the era, which he saw as threatening the unitary state. The idea of parliamentary representation of functional groups was supported by the army as early as 1957, primarily as a counter-balance to the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), but also to exert influence on mass organisations affiliated to other ‘ideological’ political parties. The functional groups gained seats in the DPR

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156 Interview, Khairun University and LIPI researchers, 5 May 2005, Ternate.
157 Apparently, it was agreed that if, after the 1971 elections, the newly elected local government still sought a new province, Jakarta would approve it. However, the incumbent bupati (district government chief) Yacob Mungsu, who had undermined previous attempts to create a new province in the early 1960s, was re-elected and cancelled the plan, apparently with persuasion from Ambon. See Wilson (2008), p.89.
158 Van Klinken (2007), p.109. Chapter One introduced one of the central arguments of the thesis, that as the possibilities for contest over control of these state resources within the state rose in the late 1990s, so this ‘stability’ of the New Order period imploded. Chapter Three returns to discuss this point.
159 Nishihara (1972), p.17.
(National House of Representatives) from 1960 onwards. In October 1964, with the anti-PKI labour federation, SOKSI, at its core, an alliance of occupational groups established a joint secretariat under Army leadership, referred to as Sekber Golkar (the Joint Secretariat of Golkar). Following the 1965 coup, the federation grew into a more unified (though always factional) political organisation designed to unofficially represent the military in elections, but without operating as an official political party.

Political restrictions and intimidation were integral parts of the government’s efforts to build up Golkar’s influence over other political organisations in the late 1960s. Some scholars argue that, in the wake of the 1965-1966 massacres, following the attempted coup and during the transition to the New Order, the emphasis on Golkar’s concern for economic development and its denunciation of ‘party politics’ had popular appeal. Reeve (1985) argues that the urban educated class, including many students, were attracted by the New Order government’s focus on development, which was stressed by Golkar. Further, he argues that following the 1965 coup there was great distrust of ‘politics’ at the village level and Golkar appealed to villagers on the basis of its focus on stability and authority. While this may have been true for some, the overall rise of Golkar was hardly a benign process, and was not only based in populist appeals.

Golkar became a useful vehicle for social mobility of technocrats and intellectuals in the new regime, thus the government’s political wing had the advantages of official channels and facilities. The organisation also grew rapidly as a result of strong support from the Departments of Defence and Security and Home Affairs. As a result of these combined efforts, by the 1971 elections, Golkar secured 63 per cent of the vote. Incorporating key elements of the bureaucracy into Golkar, intimidating and suppressing other political movements, and excluding Muslim political

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160 Soksi (All Indonesia Organisation of Socialist Functionaries) was an anti-PKI labour federation, to which all workers and officials of government-run plantations and industries belonged. Nishihara (1972), p.17.
163 See, for example, Ward (1974) on Golkar’s connections to secret police activities in Java.
organisations (discussed further in Section 2.3), meant that, by 1987, Golkar scored a record 73 per cent of the vote.166

During the New Order’s high period, between the 1970s and 1980s, Golkar acquired many of the features of a political machine, “in that it represents a large scale effort by elite groups to manage the problem of rapidly expanding political participation, while at the same time retaining control over state policy.”167 According to Boileau (1983), political conditions in Indonesia in the late 1970s and early 1980s “required” machine-style incentives aimed at ‘transitional’ populations and emerging local political leaders.168 Golkar may have been ‘officially’ “neutral” towards different identity and ideological groups, but in practice it drew on whichever groups would aid the regime to maintain power, whilst being fervently anti-leftist, and (until the 1990s) anti-Islamic. It maintained and consolidated power by buying off local ‘interests’, a colonial practice that survived into the post-Suharto era169 and providing material incentives, “in the form of contracts and favourable allocations of development projects, in return for support.”170

Nationwide, during the first two decades of the New Order, political power was consolidated and concentrated in the urban elite based in regional towns and cities via several routes. First, the regime either repressed or incorporated alternative political organisations within Golkar.171 Second, Golkar was embedded within the civil service, creating a loyal corps of civil servants during election periods, and for the administration of everyday life. Third, the local elite became dependent on their connections to the state bureaucracy for social and economic mobility. These tactics sank deep into local political culture and the operational mechanisms for both governing and contesting elections. As Golkar retained influence in the bureaucracy and discretion over government funding in the post-New Order period, these political

166 Suryadinata (1989), pp.113-114.
169 Chapter Four explores how the post-Suharto administration in North Maluku continued these practices. See also Van Klinken (2008), Buehler (2008b) and Mietzner (2008) on new versions of this old political strategy in the post-Suharto era.
171 For example, Golkar incorporated Sukarno-era political party networks such as the PNI, which had been popular in the Outer Islands.
tactics continued to influence local politics through to 2005 (and beyond). Chapters Four and Six return to these issues in the post-Suharto era.

(iii) The local rise and role of Golkar

In the 1971 general elections, Golkar successfully contested North Maluku district, though not the rest of Maluku province. Van Klinken (2007) argues that although intimidation and manipulation contributed to Golkar’s success in North Maluku — as with other regions — “the result could not have been achieved without local elite cooperation.” Golkar’s dominance in the regional parliaments in North Maluku grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This reflected the consolidation of the executive (bureaucratic) wing of government and military power over alternative political organisations. Political resistance from PPP (the (Islamic) United Development Party) was ineffective, even in southern Ternate, which strongly identified as a Muslim area from the 1970s onwards. Until the 1990s Golkar crucially managed to incorporate and retain different religious groups in Eastern Indonesia through its various repressive and incentive mechanisms. Section 2.3, on the late New Order, shows how the broad political and religious coalition housed within Golkar gradually began to fall apart in North Maluku, as it did nationally.

In local politics, two senior North Malukan politicians’ career trajectories illustrate the central roles of the New Order state and the Golkar political organisation in the rise of a new local political elite. The first, Abdul Gafur, was born and raised in Ternate, and ethnically Patani (a central Halmahera ethnic group), was perhaps the only North Malukan to reach the top ranks of Golkar and government during the

172 Of the 25 constituencies in 1971, Maluku province contributed the least to the national Golkar victory, with only 32 per cent in Ambon city and an average of 47 per cent in the district areas supporting Golkar. Ambon was the only provincial capital where Golkar did not win. Nishihara cites then mayor of Ambon, M.H. Manuffy, who argued that Golkar lost because there had been no active campaign and candidates were selected from outside the province, who had little familiarity with local conditions. This stood in contrast to Parkindo, the nationalist party, who won the region overall (Nishihara 1972, p.48). This electoral defeat in Ambon, combined with the risks of instability, could explain why Golkar later increased its efforts in the Maluku region, eventually achieving dominance in North Maluku.


175 In 1973 the New Order state forced the amalgamation of various Islamic parties into PPP, along with the fusion of several secular nationalist and Christian parties into PDI. This constrained movements within political Islam and gave Golkar huge political advantages. See Sidel (2006), pp.56-57.
New Order. He started his career with the armed forces, serving as a doctor with the Air Force. In the mid-1960s he was a leading member of a student group challenging Sukarno over his close relations with the PKI, buying him early favour with the Suharto regime.

Gafur then entered national politics in 1972, first becoming a Golkar member of parliament, and later a cabinet minister, where he served twice as Minister of Sport. Later he served as Deputy Speaker in parliament and then Representative for Aceh. He was also a secretary and member of DPP Golkar (the Golkar Executive Board) from 1978-1988, as well as a member of the ‘Daily Board’ of Golkar’s Supervisory Council. His national political career declined in the late 1980s, following accusations of corruption in the Ministry of Sport. His connections to certain factions in the national Golkar political elite served him for two decades in national politics, and later enabled him to raise the financial and political capital to contest the first and second North Maluku gubernatorial elections in 2001 and 2007 (see Chapter Six).

Jusuf Abdulrachman, an ethnic Makian, was from the same political generation as Abdul Gafur. He also grew up in Ternate, though he pursued a local rather than national political career. In 1964 he joined Golkar and between 1967 and 1969 studied in Malang, in East Java, at one of Indonesia’s elite universities. He rose up through local branches of Golkar, eventually becoming vice-chair for North Maluku in 1974. From 1979-1984 he was regional chairman of Golkar, a highly influential local position. Later he became rector of Khairun University – the only state university in North Maluku during the New Order – another powerful local position. During the late New Order, Abdulrahman headed the regional branch of ICMI (the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), an organisation whose rising importance in national politics was mirrored locally. Affiliation with this group was

176 Interviews, Abdul Gafur, 17 October 2005 (Ternate) and 30 November 2005 (DPR-RI, Jakarta).
177 Interview, Saiful Bahry Ruray, Deputy Speaker, DPRD North Maluku, July 2005, Ternate.
178 Interviews, Abdul Gafur, 17 October 2005 (Ternate) and 30 November 2005 (DPR, Jakarta).
180 Interview, Tommi Legowo, CSIS, Jakarta, 20 September 2005.
strategically important for local elites seeking to maintain (or gain) political influence under the late New Order period (discussed further in Section 2.3).\textsuperscript{181}

The career trajectory of these two North Malukan political figures – and the rise of other important ‘southern’ local political leaders in the late New Order period – demonstrates the importance of holding elite positions within Golkar and the bureaucracy in order to achieve national and local political power.\textsuperscript{182} It also shows how members of previously marginalised ethnic groups were able rise to prominence via the routes of education, membership of Golkar, and career trajectories through the bureaucracy, rather than associations with ‘traditional’ authority.\textsuperscript{183} This was a significant change in local politics, previously dominated by the Sultanate’s elite. The incorporation of the Ternate Sultan into Golkar also demonstrated the New Order’s success in co-opting and marginalising potential political alternatives to central state-based power in North Maluku.

\textit{(iv) The co-option of the Ternate Sultan}

The primary concern of the New Order was political stability. A repressive and often ruthless regime with political opponents, the New Order also achieved stability via the co-option and incorporation of other sources of political authority within New Order organisations, rather than eliminating them.\textsuperscript{184} The Ternate Sultanate’s role had already been weakened by late Dutch colonial rule via the move of regional power to Ambon, with the relocation of the clove trade, and, later, the rise of a non-aristocratic elite in government during the early republic. This was followed by the New Order’s policy of ‘incorporating’ and co-opting the old colonial elites.

\textsuperscript{181} Interviews, Jusuf Abdulrahman, 1 June 2005, Ternate; Ariswan, Golkar MP, Ternate City DPRD, 12 July 2005, Ternate.

\textsuperscript{182} Section 2.3 and Chapter Three returns to discuss these three local political figures in more detail.

\textsuperscript{183} Again, this process took place earlier in other regions of Indonesia, where indigenous non-aristocratic elites accessed education and parts of the bureaucracy via the rise of the modern state in the late colonial period. See Anderson (1983); Taylor (2003), pp.279-281; Vickers (2005).

\textsuperscript{184} Van Klinken (2007), p.113, also makes this point. On the subject of New Order brutality, Pemberton (1994, p.7) argues that, at least in Central Java, the Suharto regime’s quarter century of “essentially undisturbed rule” cannot be accounted for only by considering its “forceful means of suppression”. Whilst repressive and occasionally extremely brutal (for example in the occupation of East Timor), the regime strategically incorporated many political alternatives and used more “muted forms of repression” to maintain political stability with a relatively small security force, when compared to the size of the population (Pemberton, 1994, p.7).
Sultan Haji Mudaffar Syah II succeeded his father as Ternate Sultan in 1975. From that point, until the late 1990s, he was a key part of the North Malukan Golkar coalition, but this ‘local’ political role was largely conducted from his base in Jakarta, where the central state kept a close watch over him. The Sultan was periodically flown back to Ternate to appear at election rallies on behalf of Golkar, but did not hold any official position in the local state bureaucracy. The New Order thus managed to tap into the Sultan’s influence as a ‘traditional’ ruler, ensuring his local followers were loyal, by extension, to the state, yet without giving him any official position. District military commanders also cultivated good relations with the Sultan as a means to maintain the support of his subjects.

Golkar’s incorporation of the Ternate Sultan from the 1970s reflected the New Order’s policy of aggressively including, “every possible group and influential local figure” within the organisation, so long as it served the interests of political success and undermined political alternatives. Thus while Golkar was part of the state’s modernising machine, in that it was largely secular and focused on promoting state bureaucratic power, the organisation used ‘traditional’ bodies of authority as a means to ‘neutralise’ political opposition and divisions when it was advantageous to do so. The important issue here is the extent to which the Ternate Sultan’s incorporation within the political organisations of the New Order in the centre weakened his local political authority, which had important effects on his subsequent attempts to ‘return’ to power in North Maluku.

Several observers of North Malukan politics argue that by the middle phase of the New Order, due to the massive exercise in state centralisation and uniformity, the local political authority of the Ternate Sultanate had been destroyed. Fraassen (1984) argues that by the 1980s the customs of the Ternate sultanate ‘survive only in

185 Van Klinken (2007), p.114. This situation was somewhat different to that in other Eastern Indonesian provinces; for example, in South Sulawesi, the local aristocracy was drawn into the local state bureaucracy, thereby saving the local nobility from political marginalisation. See Magenda (1989), p.914.
187 The Sultan of Yogyakarta and a son of the Sultan of Solo were also targeted by this policy. On this, see Reeve (1985), pp.298-299.
188 Boileau (1983), p.120. Boileau (1983, pp.113-114) argues that Golkar, with its unifying, hierarchical structure, and tight relationship to the army, closely resembled a corporatist political organisation, much like the PRI in Mexico.
folklore, not as politically significant elements.'189 Van Klinken (2007) supports this, "the New Order finally swept...(the sultans)...away. In its place came a uniform, centralised administration."190 But these authors over-emphasise unity within both the state administration and Golkar. In fact, Golkar was always highly factionalised — as Tomsa (2009) demonstrates — with multiple elements competing at different levels of the state and political organisation. The Ternate Sultan’s attempted ‘return’ to local politics from 1997 onwards shows that he had managed to survive the New Order as a cultural, even political, figure, though — as Chapters Three and Six demonstrate — his authority had been seriously weakened.

While the local political authority of the Ternate Sultan had waned under the New Order, it had not been completely destroyed. Rather, it was channelled in new ways via his association with Golkar.191 Wilson (2008) argues that, “the Sultan of Ternate was co-opted by the central government, although (...), retained a great deal of cultural influence and...political power.”192 A local observer commented:

It doesn’t make sense to talk about the ‘revival’ of the Ternate Sultanate since reformasi, because it seems like the role and the power of the Sultan never really died out, at least in North Ternate and parts of North Halmahera.193

Over the Maluku region, the New Order administration had not managed to eliminate all alternative sources of political authority on this geographic periphery of the nation state, although it had penetrated further than any previous regime. As highlighted earlier, the New Order state had still only partially penetrated the most remote and rural areas of Maluku. Ellen’s (1997) ethnography of the central Malukan hinterlands demonstrates the shallow nature of New Order administration in the far reaches of the state, where its influence extended only to the urban and trading centres. He argues that in contrast to the social reality and political relations on Java under the New Order, in a province like Maluku:

191 The Sultan’s expulsion from Golkar following the 1999 to 2000 conflict, and his explicit support of Christians during the conflict, eventually destroyed him politically at both the national and local levels.
193 Interview, Tobelo adat leader, 30 May 2005, Ternate.
...vast distances and small populations, histories of local political autonomy with only loose supra-local federations, where the domination of native sultanates and other centres of regional influence have been weak and periodic, and where effective incorporation into the Dutch colonial state (...) came rather late, provides a very different kind of experience.\(^\text{194}\)

In North Maluku, in some of the more remote rural areas, certain northern ethnic communities continued to support the Ternate Sultan culturally, and even politically, into the early twenty-first century. These bases of ‘traditional’ political support proved readily mobilised towards intensive and violent political action during the 1999-2000 conflict, showing that the political influence of the Sultan had survived the New Order in some areas. Although the Sultan eventually failed to achieve regional political success in the transition period, his continued local influence prior to 1999 was palpable. Chapters Three and Six return to this dimension of North Maluku’s political story.

\(\text{(v) State-led economic development}\)

"Politics no, development yes."
- *Golkar slogan, 1979\(^\text{195}\)*

Changes in North Malukan politics during the New Order regime were closely linked to the regime’s economic as well as political strategy. Even though the northern part of the province benefitted less than Ambon, the provincial hub, from economic packages, the impacts were significant after fifteen years of neglect during the early republic.\(^\text{196}\) The memory of New Order development strategies, particularly following the regional economic crisis preceding, and then exacerbated by, the conflict of 1999-2000, continued to play a role during the 2005 elections, with strong local recollections of Golkar’s policy of “filling stomachs”.\(^\text{197}\) North Malukan branches of the party regularly reminded people of New Order economic stability during the 2005 local elections and with local economic crisis still affecting the region in 2005, it was a contributing factor in the popularity and eventual re-election

of several Golkar incumbents.\textsuperscript{198} The main economic policies affecting the North Maluku region during the first twenty five years of the Suharto era were urban development, infrastructure, public service provision, transmigration and logging.\textsuperscript{199}

Under the New Order, improvements in transport links and extensive government investment meant that Maluku province became a net exporter of local products, one of only two Eastern Indonesia provinces to do so.\textsuperscript{200} The development of the fishery and agricultural sectors for export and local consumption also meant that by the mid-1980s regional poverty was relatively low.\textsuperscript{201} In the northern part of Maluku the main driver of economic growth was logging, aided by the establishment of a large plywood processing factory in Sidangoli, west Halmahera, within close reach of Ternate.\textsuperscript{202} By the 1970s these developments meant Ternate moved from being a quiet and neglected town towards, "rapidly becoming a part of Indonesia."\textsuperscript{203} Ternate was by then linked by air and sea to Ambon, Manado, Makassar and Jakarta. Thus, while still on the periphery of the nation state, and continually one of the poorest regions of the country, North Maluku was no longer completely isolated from the economic benefits, infrastructure and state apparatus of the Indonesian government. The Inpres schemes, targeted at the poorest regions of Indonesia, which started in the 1970s, were also crucial for bringing infrastructure development to rural areas across Maluku.\textsuperscript{204}

Despite these important regional economic developments, Kiem (1993) argues that New Order development in Maluku resulted in "modernisation without industrialisation".\textsuperscript{205} Many of the workers needed in the key industrial sectors, such as plywood manufacture and frozen fish exports, were brought in from outside the

\textsuperscript{198} The irony is that it was the same local Golkar figures in power during the conflict and subsequent economic crisis that campaigned on their ability to maintain security and development. This fact was conveniently omitted during local election campaigns. See Chapter Six on this point.

\textsuperscript{199} For more details on the socio-economic impact of transmigration in rural areas of North Maluku, see Leith (1989) and Bubandt (1989). Increased development of the mining sector followed in the late 1990s, with the construction of a highly lucrative goldmine in Halmahera (see Chapter Three).

\textsuperscript{200} Kiem (1993), p.55.

\textsuperscript{201} Meyer and Hardjodimedjo (1989), p.558.


\textsuperscript{204} See Booth (1992, 2003) on the role of Inpres schemes in regional economic development in the poorest areas of Indonesia during the New Order.

\textsuperscript{205} Kiem (1993), p.60.
Aside from infrastructure and public services, economic development was largely extractive in nature and did not directly benefit the local population (as with colonial era policies). However, the New Order differed from previous regimes in that some benefits of its economic and state expansion policy accrued to the local educated elite. According to Van Klinken (2007), economic development and the benefits available to the local state elite were two of the major factors that kept North Maluku stable throughout the New Order period.

By 1990, following expansion in the civil service bureaucracy and public services, local government employed 38 per cent of Ternate residents. With such a large proportion of the population reliant on the state for both employment and social mobility this resulted in almost guaranteed electoral support for Golkar. This reliance of the urban population on state employment continued to have important political effects in the post-New Order period, particularly after regional economic crisis devastated North Maluku, with state-based incumbents holding major advantages in competitive elections (though by this time, they were no longer necessarily associated with Golkar).

A sizeable service sector also developed in Ternate during the New Order period to cater to the local government, as well as regional forestry, mining and other industries. Large numbers of migrants moved to Ternate to work in the burgeoning service and government sectors. Predominantly Muslim, they mostly migrated from Tidore, Makian and other southern North Malukan islands, along with migrants from South Sulawesi. These Muslim migrant groups tended to settle in the southern part of the city, the historical immigrant quarter. Particular groups – including Makian migrants from within the North Maluku region – progressed quickly via access to improved education services into the government bureaucracy and the educated elite. Their rise had important political implications, discussed in section 3.3 on the late New Order period.

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209 See Chapter Four on the local population's post-conflict economic reliance on the local state, and Chapter Six on the factors behind incumbents' success in local elections.
The steady process of urbanisation in Ternate during the New Order produced an urban middle class who were directly dependent on the government for their socio-economic status. Van Klinken (2007) argues that while this pattern was a ‘recurring feature’ of provincial towns off Java, it was particularly strong in the Maluku region. Despite the New Order’s overall goal of ‘unification’, access to government employment was stratified – to a degree – across local ethnic and religious groups, and via membership of particular political organisations, leaders of which preferentially recruited members of their own groups. In Ambon, stratification followed colonial patterns, with the Protestant Ambonese dominating the civil service.\(^{211}\) In North Maluku, the colonial pattern was overturned, with many senior local bureaucrats and Golkar officials coming from the Makian and affiliated ‘southern’ ethnic groups rather than those affiliated with the Ternate Sultanate from the colonial period. While other ethno-religious groups were represented in local government bodies (for example, Tobelo Christians), they did not fill the elite ranks. This range of ethnic groups all formed part of the local elite coalition during the first two decades of the New Order, but, as the opportunities to contest local government rose in the 1990s, cracks within the coalition deepened and widened. Section 2.3 returns to this topic.

During the first twenty-five years of the New Order regime the role of the state in the local economy and political system was therefore gradually transformed in North Maluku. It was not a revolutionary period – regional and local power structures were not completely overhauled – but, nonetheless, significant changes took place. The North Maluku region continued to be marginalised from the regional political and economic hub of Ambon, where the provincial government was dominated by Ambonese Protestants (as under the late colonial period), and many of the centrally extractive economic policies of the colonial era continued (with logging replacing clove production, for example). However, the North Maluku elite managed to carve out their own regional empire and there were significant new benefits for the local educated urban elite from the development process.\(^{212}\)

\(^{211}\) See Taylor (2003), p.289, on the incorporation of Ambonese Protestants into the colonial government from the mid 1800’s onwards.

\(^{212}\) North Maluku was in this way a microcosm of the national political scene during the first decades of the New Order, where the old PNI-affiliated aristocrats took orders from the Christian (Catholic) generals, cabinet ministers and so on, but managed to carve out their own niche.
The Ternate Sultan remained in the political elite via his incorporation into Golkar, but without an official state role. This usefully captured the support of certain groups in North Maluku for the New Order, by tying them to the state via their loyalty to 'traditional' leadership, but also gradually marginalised the Sultan from holding autonomous economic or political power. In the urban centres, elite ranks of the state bureaucracy, particularly in the executive bodies of the state – all affiliated with Golkar – became the predominant 'political' force. A new local educated elite class evolved via employment in the expanding bureaucratic and public service system. The provision of state funds for regional development and the expansion of the civil service cemented the central roles of Golkar and the state bureaucracy in local politics. The New Order regime thus established political control from the centre over the periphery not only via repressive measures, but also by providing economic benefits to the local elite and channelling political activity via Golkar.

However, by the late New Order, several divisions could be seen to be emerging within the local governing coalition in North Maluku. Certain factions, particularly the southern ethnic groups – more closely affiliated with rising 'modernist' Muslim organisations in politics – grew increasingly vocal. Other local ethnic groups also began to lobby for improvements in their position. State economic policies had not benefitted all equally, and the balance between different groups within the governing Golkar coalition became increasingly shaky as the potential for local government restructuring and increased access to state control rose towards the final years of the regime. These local tensions reflected national political conflicts, as the following section explores.

2.3 Rising factional competition under the late New Order (1990-1997)

In the 1990s national political dynamics shifted as a generation of urban Muslim intellectuals, networked into modernist Islamic organisations and intent on raising the economic and political position of Muslims, rose through the national political ranks. Whilst Golkar was firmly established as the dominant political organisation in North Maluku, it was comprised, as elsewhere, of different factions. The rise of
modernist Islamic political movements in Jakarta in turn influenced North Malukan political developments, in particular the growing divides between the ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ factions within the local Golkar coalition.²¹³ By the mid-1990s, political tensions in North Maluku had coalesced around two issues.

First, the ‘northern’ groups – including ethnic Temateans, and groups historically affiliated with the Ternate Sultan – perceived the local government as too dominated by the southern Makian and their affiliates and they sought to (‘re’) assert their historical position. Second, the alternate ‘southern’ faction, affiliated to increasingly powerful ‘modernist’ (or ‘orthodox’) Islamic networks, many of them Makian, feared that the Ternate Sultan (who represented ‘traditional’, non-orthodox Islam) was attempting a grand ‘return’ to local power. Rather than reflecting conflict between two genuinely ideologically opposed Islamic factions within the Golkar coalition, the contest was more importantly centred on which (ethnic) faction could claim greater control over local state offices. The factional split reflected the historical divisions between the old colonial-aristocracy, headed by the Ternate Sultan, and the new class of educated urban elites from the south, deeply embedded in the expansion and development policies of the New Order state.

National political dynamics

To set the rise of political factionalism in North Maluku in context, it is important to remember national political developments during the same period. From the Darul Islam rebellions in the 1950s, Muslim organisations had posed a potential threat to central government attempts to forge a ‘national political consensus’ across multi-religious Indonesia. As an alternative electoral power base, the political power of Muslim organisations continued to worry the central government, and, in particular, the military, through the 1970s, as groups of students and Muslim intellectuals again challenged the government over the role of Islam in politics.²¹⁴ For two decades, the government dealt with this clash through a combination of political exclusion of ostensibly Islamic parties from electoral politics, and attempts to incorporate the

²¹³ The rise of Islam in Jakarta corresponded to the New Order’s overall failure to sufficiently develop economic opportunities for the majority Muslim population, who also resented their domination by the small Christian elite, who were strongly represented in the national wings of the government. Further sections pick up this theme.

main Islamic groups into Golkar. Re-launching Sukarno’s *pancasila* ideology (the official secular state ideology) in 1975 was one such exclusion/incorporation method, with the central government ostensibly encouraging a ‘unifying’ consensus, whilst excluding Islamic parties from the political system.215

Following the 1977 elections – when PPP, the coalition Islamic party, challenged Golkar’s electoral hegemony – the government passed various laws to reduce PPP’s capacity to use an Islamic message to gain votes. By the 1982 elections, Suharto’s legislative exclusion of PPP had increased Golkar’s vote to 64 per cent, with PPP the majority party in Aceh alone.216 But despite this marginalisation of PPP – by this point the only legal Islamic party – and tighter political controls imposed against students and Islamic groups, Golkar still viewed PPP as a threat and stepped up its efforts to ‘de-Islamise’ politics completely by the 1987 elections.217

First the central government forced PPP to accept *pancasila* (the official state ideology) as their sole political ideology, implemented via the ‘Pancasila Bills’ following the 1982 general elections. Nahdatul Ulama (NU) – the largest grassroots Muslim organisation in Indonesia – then left the political umbrella of PPP, undermining PPP’s electoral position further.218 By 1985, even NU and Muhammadiyah, the other major grassroots Islamic organisation (with a more ‘modernist’ or ‘orthodox’ focus), had officially accepted *pancasila* as their ‘sole’ ideology.219 The ‘mass organisations’ bill of 1985 then forbade Islam from being an alternative political ideology to *pancasila*, thus blurring PPP’s distinctive electoral Islamic identity.220

Five general elections into the New Order regime, Golkar appeared to have consolidated itself as the only legitimate political organisation, following successive policies to exclude and repress Islam as a political force.221 But Indonesian society became increasingly Islamic into the 1980s, and some Muslim groups strongly

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221 Repression of Islam as a political force followed on the bloody repression of Communism, an even larger political movement in the mid 1960s See Robinson (1996).
disagreed with Islamic organisations' capitulation over the *pancasila* law.\(^{222}\) The educated urban Muslim community were increasingly frustrated with the exclusion of Islam from politics, particularly when Christians were comparatively well represented in the most strategic arms of government – including the military, cabinet, senior ranks of Golkar and the national parliament (DPR). The economic success of ethnic Chinese conglomerates – who also tended to be Christian – further demonstrated, for many Muslims, the regime's favouritism toward the minority Christian community over the comparatively poor Muslim majority.\(^{223}\)

Suryadinata (1989) correctly predicted that Golkar would eventually have to respond to this rise of Islam in society, especially as many senior Golkar figures were themselves becoming increasingly orthodox in practice and appearance.\(^{224}\) Aware of increasing social frustrations, and concerned by the rising popularity of Islamic groups, the late Suharto regime chose a different tack. This time, the government moved, as Sidel (2006) observes, to “capture and claim for itself much of the attractive power associated with the institutions and idiom of Islam.”\(^{225}\) Several significant changes then took place in the 1990s, with an increasing role for Islamic figures and groups in national politics.\(^{226}\)

One of the first moves by the regime was incorporation of some of the educated urban elite Muslim community at the highest levels of power through supporting the creation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). Established in 1990 by a collection of students from Brawijaya University in East Java and other urban modernist Muslims, ICMI was a lobbying group designed to raise the position and profile of Muslims at the highest levels of business and politics. It won the political support of B.J. Habibie, the powerful Minister of Technology and one of

\(^{226}\) Other national level changes also reflected the rising influence of Islamic groups: for example, leadership changes in the Indonesian military in 1993 saw the rise of Faisal Tanjung, a Muslim general. This demonstrated a major change in Suharto's tactics regarding Islam and the military. See Tomagola (2000).
Suharto’s closest allies, reflecting an important sea-change in national politics and New Order policy.\textsuperscript{227}

By the 1990s, an increasing number of top New Order officials were also graduates of HMI (the Muslim Students Association). The primary organisation for Islamic students on campus since the 1960s, HMI was the main political vehicle for aspiring young politicians favouring the modernist Islamic theme.\textsuperscript{228} Along with a state-based youth organisation, KNPI (the National Committee for Indonesian Youth), HMI produced a large number of top-ranking Golkar figures during this period.\textsuperscript{229} Akbar Tanjung, an HMI graduate and Golkar’s powerful national chairman during the 1990s, ensured that HMI graduates rose through the local ranks of Golkar.\textsuperscript{230} This shift in national political dynamics also changed the opportunity structures for local politicians in North Maluku. Association with ‘modernist’ Muslim organisations – not only the state bureaucracy and Golkar – began to enable entry into local politics. Simultaneously the usefulness of associations with the ‘traditional’ Sultanate waned even further. The two main political factions within the North Maluku elite were therefore increasingly opposed.

\textit{Local political dynamics}

During the last decade of New Order rule, Ternate, the regional capital of North Maluku, was governed by a, “modernising elite, unified in grand coalition under Golkar, symbol of Suharto’s hegemony.”\textsuperscript{231} In 1997, the North Maluku region voted for Golkar by around 85 per cent of the local vote: North Maluku district elected Golkar at 83 per cent, and Central Halmahera district at 87 per cent.\textsuperscript{232} By the end of the New Order, the region had therefore been governed for over 25 years by a local Golkar coalition, with most of the district elite at its heart. But given the shifts in national politics in the 1990s outlined above, and increasing opportunities to contest local political power via the potential for government reform towards the end of the New Order, critical fractures appeared within this local elite coalition. This section

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{227}{Tomagola (2000), pp.6-7. Suharto was also becoming increasingly ‘Islamic’ in appearance and practice during this period.}
\footnotetext{228}{Van Klinken (2007), p.115.}
\footnotetext{229}{Van Klinken (2007), citing Hefner (2000) and Shiraishi (2002).}
\footnotetext{230}{Interviews, Golkar members, Ternate, May-September 2005.}
\footnotetext{231}{Van Klinken (2007), p.108.}
\footnotetext{232}{Van Klinken (2007), p.110.}
\end{footnotes}
considers the roots of the divides between the different factions, linking local tensions to the national dynamics outlined above, during the period leading up to the beginnings of the end of the New Order regime.

(ii) The ‘return’ of the Ternate Sultan

In the mid-1990s, with the rise of the ‘reform’ era, the Ternate Sultan sought to reclaim his family’s historical position in North Malukan politics by manoeuvring to become the lead figure in the ‘northern’ Golkar faction, directly challenging the Makian-dominated state bureaucratic elite. As the previous section explained, the Sultan had not been completely eliminated as a local figure of authority by either the colonial or post-independence regimes, but his position had been marginalised. He also lacked an official role in the local state, which he needed to gain local political power.

The Sultan was, for some groups, still a notable figure of authority, but he also commanded a private militia, the Pasukan Adat, a so-called ‘traditional guard’, which he later expanded via youth groups and used to intimidate political rivals. Throughout the 1990s, the Sultan became more active in seeking a separate province for North Maluku, a popular and unifying local goal, which both the northern and southern faction supported. He also promoted the role of adat (tradition or custom) in politics, which, while popular with his own community, was anathema to the southern faction and their supporting ethnic groups.

In 1995, the Sultan was one of the prime movers behind a national political movement to establish an Indonesian conference of sultans, a forum he used to promote himself nationally and locally. Along with other ‘traditional’ leaders across Indonesia, the Sultan was gradually positioning himself to bring a ‘return’ to ‘traditional’ political authority and customary law in North Maluku. By restoring ‘traditional’ authority within regional government – something gradually undermined through the post-independence period – the Sultan hoped to restore the Ternate

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233 Chapter Three outlines the Sultan’s attempted ‘return’ to local politics.
Sultanate to the heart of political power in the new province. However, as the Sultan remained outside both the local bureaucracy and the rising political wings in Golkar, he was politically weak. He therefore sought to ‘re’-assert his local power base by appealing to the local population as a ‘traditional’ local ruler. Whilst initially, the North Maluku district chief backed the Sultan, his support eventually collapsed as internal divisions within the local Golkar coalition grew increasingly fractious. The following sections highlight these divisions, examined further in Chapter Three in the build up to local conflict in 1999.

(ii) The rise of the ‘southern’ political faction

Kiem (1993) writes that during the 1990s conservative (or orthodox) ‘modernist’ Islam spread widely in North Maluku, particularly in Ternate, following the establishment of Islamic schools and foundations by Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Kiem (1993), p. 107. Under its influence, he argues, many young Muslims in Ternate became increasingly opposed to the ‘traditional’ Islamic practices in the communities connected to the Ternate Sultanate. Kiem (1993), pp. 111-112; p. 116. Resentment against the Sultan’s rising power in local politics was rife among the political elite. The Sultan represented ‘traditional’ communities and religious minorities (including the Protestant population) that the students and newer political elites were excluded from. Whilst the influence of these communities were on the wane, nationally and locally, they were still viewed as threatening, particularly as the nature of the central state came up for debate during the reform period. The student community – many of them with a southern ethnic background – and the ‘southern’ political elite saw new opportunities in the rise of Muslim organisations in national politics. A collection of elite ‘southern’ groups therefore strongly resisted the Ternate Sultan’s resurgence of power in local politics, which became an explosive issue in 1999.

From the 1960s onwards, political culture and authority evolved quite differently in the south of Ternate and the southern regions of North Maluku than in the northern part of the city, Ternate Island and Halmahera. As the first section of the chapter showed, the southern part of Ternate island and Tidore were historically (nominally)

239 See Chapter Three.
under the influence of the Tidore Sultan, whose power waned under Dutch rule. The incumbent Sultan of Tidore died in 1967 and he was not replaced until the conflict in 1999. In contrast, the Ternate Sultan, while politically co-opted via his relocation to Jakarta by the New Order, still remained at the centre of cultural order in his region of influence in the north, including both Christian and Muslim communities, albeit with waning levels of political influence at the local level. In the absence of a Tidore Sultan to counter-balance the Ternate Sultan within the same over-arching cultural and political framework – as had been the case historically – a different cultural (and political) trend evolved in southern Ternate in the late twentieth century.

The new political affiliation in southern Ternate and the southern regions drew on two factors: rising ‘modernist’ Islamic trends and organisations in national politics (which were less salient in the Sultan’s ‘traditional’ heartland) and improved access to state employment. The central themes of the evolving political identity of the educated elite in the southern part of Ternate were middle-class democracy, cosmopolitanism and a more ‘modernist’ practice of Islam. This movement reflected the national trend towards the increasing popularity of a more modernist form of Islam away from ‘traditional’ Muslim leaders, such as the sultans. But it also reflected the rise of a new urban educated class who were not connected to the old ‘aristocratic’ (northern) sources of power. As the Ternate Sultan sought to ‘reclaim’ local power, he faced opposition from a faction that was better connected to the local state – and had no ties to the ‘traditional’ authority of the Sultanate.

In the mid-1990s, the leading southern political figure was Bahar Andili, the regent of the new Central Halmahera district, which had been created out of North Maluku district in 1990. His younger brother, Syamsir Andili, later the Ternate mayor, was also a leading local bureaucrat, rising to greater prominence during the transition

241 See Andaya (1993).
period. Bahar’s experience and senior position in the local bureaucracy gave him a vital source of political authority. Prior to becoming chief of Central Halmahera district, he had directed BAPPEDA, the regional branch of the State Ministry for National Development Planning (BAPPENAS). As the holder of successive senior local bureaucratic positions, he was therefore a well-known and powerful local patron of state resources.

Bahar was not only well-connected in the regional bureaucracy; he was also popular and well-connected via other political groups. He had been a leading member of the regional branch of the National Committee for Indonesian Youth (KNPI) in the 1980s and through this had won great popularity by inviting a famous Indonesian football player to North Maluku – an unusual event in North Maluku that people still remembered in 2005. Rising posts within local bureaucracy gave Bahar extensive control of local government budgets, thereby creating an extensive patronage base and political support both in the civil service and with outside contractors. Given the importance of local government in economic and employment terms in North Maluku, holding senior bureaucratic positions equalled high political status.

Whilst Bahar and the Ternate Sultan were members of the same overarching ruling coalition, embedded within Golkar, each therefore headed quite different political and social factions within the organisation. Van Klinken (2007) and Wilson (2008) argue that Bahar’s many HMI-affiliated supporters, coming predominantly from Ternate’s southern migrant community, as well as southern ethnic groups in Central Halmahera, added to his political strength. Saiful Bahry Ruray – HMI alumnus, and a rising star in local politics in the late 1990s – also reported that HMI alumni were an important influence in the political movement against the Ternate Sultan within local branches of Golkar. Van Klinken (2007) describes this group as the emergent

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244 In the 2005 local elections, Syamsir (the incumbent) successfully ran against Nita, the Sultan’s fifth wife, for Ternate mayor. This election mirrored these earlier political conflicts between Bahar and the Sultan in the late 1990s. Chapters Three and Six discuss these two contests in more detail.
245 Interview, local journalist, June 2005, Ternate.
246 Chapters Four, Five and Six return to expand on this point.
247 Interview, Ternate, 19 October 2005.
'challenger elite' to the political power and 'symbolic primacy' of the Ternate Sultan.248

By the end of the 1990s, the contest between the social and political networks of these two political factions came to a head, and increasingly mapped onto rising 'ethnic' clashes in local politics. The merger of local and elite inter-group contests played a central role in the eventual escalation of the North Maluku conflict of 1999-2000, discussed in Chapter Three. The eventual conflict dynamic forced most key players in local politics behind the anti-Sultan faction, in support of Bahar and the other leading figures in the southern elite. Before Bahar played the conflict to his advantage, however, it was his position as one of the most senior local bureaucratic figures that was his major source of political strength.

(iii) The political rise of the Makian ethnic group

If you want to find Ternate people, go to Gamalama market;  
If you want to find Tidore people, go to Bastiong Market;  
If you want to find Makian people, go to the Governor's office.  
_Ternate saying._249

During the later phase of the New Order in North Maluku, members of the Makian elite become one of the more important groups in local politics. Out of the three 'southern' ethnic groups rising in influence through the 1990s – the Makian, Tidore and Sanana groups – the Makian had the greatest social and political influence, via better representation in the civil service and more senior bureaucratic positions.250 In the 1960s and 1970s many Makian communities had migrated to Ternate to access education facilities unavailable on the more remote North Malukan islands. Ternate

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248 According to Van Klinken (2007, p.116), this grouping was the major oppositional force to the Sultan’s group in the 1990s. See also Kiem (1993), p.103. Tomagola (2000) presents an alternative interpretation of the rival alliances. He argues that in the mid-1990s a group of HMI alumni took control of the local chapter of Golkar and, at first, supported the Sultan by selecting him as regional Golkar chairman. He argues that this strange but strategic Golkar alliance – of the 'modernist' Islamic faction and the Sultan’s followers – held out against Bahar’s faction until the conflict of 1999. In the wake of the eventual defeat of the pro-Sultan (and Christian) forces during the conflict, local elites would have been eager to re-write any initial alliances to the Sultan’s faction, and what was eventually a solid factional divide between those for and against the Ternate Sultan had been more fluid. Tomagola’s analysis could therefore be right. However, the majority of local analysts and informants disagreed with this interpretation.

249 "Cari orang Ternate, di Pasar Gamalama; cari orang Tidore, di Pasar Bastion; cari orang Makian, di Kantor Gubunor" – local saying repeated by Abdul Kahar Lima Tahu, 2 June 2005, Ternate.

residents considered the new migrants 'backward' at the time, due to their lack of education and different culture. However, by the 1990s, the Makian were reportedly the most educated and successful ethnic group in North Maluku. Despite comprising only nine per cent of the local population, Makian MPs constituted 17 per cent of the new provincial parliament in 1999. The first elected governor of North Maluku, Thaib Armain, was Makian, as were many of his senior advisors.

Jusuf Abdulrahman – one of the local elite who had benefitted from the New Order expansion of education – was one of the highest ranking members of the southern elite by the 1990s. As Rector of Khairun University, regional chair of Golkar for a period, as well as chairman of MUI (the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) for North Maluku and a local ICMI leader, he held influence across all the main political organisations. Himself half-Makian, Abdulrahman argued:

Following independence the Makian rose up in power in North Maluku. There are three reasons for this: they study hard, they work hard, and, because they are from a small volcanic island with a high population, they tend to migrate, searching for a better life. All the leading government figures in North Maluku are Makian now, thanks to this.

One of the main reasons for the rising importance of the Makian group in local politics was the way their community prioritised education, which enabled state employment, both of which had expanded under the New Order. The Makian were thereby strongly represented in both Golkar and the local bureaucracy, giving them an advantage in local politics. Another key informant argued that ethnic patronage played a key role in Makian advancement through the civil service, "(the Makian) have very strong clan links and work hard to protect each other's jobs. One of the reasons they dominate politics now is because of this."

By the 1990s, the top leadership of Khairun University and most local government departments were dominated by Makian bureaucrats. Thaib Armain – later the first elected North Maluku Governor – was the district secretary of

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253 Chapters Four and Six discuss Thaib's rising role in local politics from late 1999 onwards.
254 Interview, Jusuf Abdulrahman, 1 June 2005, Ternate.
255 Interview, local NGO staff, Ternate, 5 May 2005.
North Maluku district between 1989 and 1997, giving him a ten year hold over appointments and promotions within the local civil service. He was later appointed provincial secretary (sekretaris daerah) for North Maluku province in 1999, the most senior provincial level bureaucratic post. A decade at the top of the local bureaucracy meant he amassed a wide range of clients and political supporters, placing him in an influential position at the end of the 1990s, when competition over control of the local state increased and the new provincial government was established.256

By the end of the 1990s, conflict had increased between the different political factions based within the local state, located in different wings of the overarching ruling coalition under Golkar, and appealing to different local ethnic groups. The contest for power between these factions was exacerbated not only by the opening up of a new political era at the end of the Suharto regime, and the potential for great changes in national and regional government, but also by the local development of a new goldmine in north Halmahera in 1997. The prospects of greatly increased local government revenues from the mine further added to the economic stakes of conflict between the different factions.257

On one side of the contest was the rising ‘southern’ faction, led by Bahar Andili, Central Halmahera district chief. This faction was linked to HMI, the influential Muslim student group whose graduates had grown increasingly powerful in Golkar, rooted in the top echelons of local bureaucratic power, and fiercely opposed to the Ternate Sultan’s political resurgence. The ‘northern’ faction, headed by the Sultan, stood in opposition. While also contained within Golkar, this faction was more dependent on ‘traditional’ ties, dating back to the colonial era, with communities in the northern parts of Ternate and Halmahera and was less closely linked to the higher branches of the local state bureaucracy. Between 1997 and 1999, these two factions briefly united behind the movement to create a new province in North Maluku, but by late 1999, this coalition had dramatically fallen apart, as Chapter Three explores.

256 Chapters Three, Four and Six explore Thaib’s rise to greater power in local politics due to increased control within the regional bureaucracy.
257 See Chapter Three, Section 3.3, on escalating tensions between different ethnic and political groups from 1998 onwards over access to employment in the goldmine and revenues derived from it.
2.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, I summarise the legacies from each of the three main historical periods outlined in this chapter on the North Malukan political elite, including the creation of strong local factions within the state-based elite. First, the arrival of Islam in the mid-fifteenth century, and subsequent European colonisation between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, left several important legacies for North Malukan politics. This period centralised and concentrated local political power in the sultanates, first via their conversion to Islam and second via their relationship with colonial powers. Colonial competition eventually led to the dominance of the Ternate Sultanate over the other three North Malukan sultanates, as the Dutch emerged as the triumphant colonial power. The Ternate Sultan, from this point onwards, relied on the financial and political support of external sources of power (especially the colonial regime) in order to maintain local political authority. The contests between the colonial powers over Ternate and Tidore also created a 'north-south' political and cultural divide in North Maluku, which continued to be relevant into the late twentieth century.

Second, the late colonial to early republican eras marked the beginning of the decline of the Ternate Sultan – from a position of supreme local authority to a minor regional role, and then towards gradual incorporation into the central state, thereby marginalising the Sultan in local politics. Another important feature of this period was that although North Maluku was not a centre of the 1950s regional rebellions against the new unitary republic, it was geographically close enough that the region was denied independent provincial status. This meant the northern reaches of Maluku continued to be governed from Ambon, as under the late colonial period, proving a source of frustration to the North Malukan elite. Then, during the brief period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, religious and aristocratically-based political parties were popular in North Maluku – as elsewhere in Indonesia – but this was not to last. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy period, and its extension via the establishment of the New Order, led to the triumph of ‘state’ over ‘societal’ political organisations, alongside the dual-policy of exclusion and incorporation of Muslim and aristocratic organisations into state-run politics.
Third, the establishment of the New Order regime had several lasting impacts on North Malukan politics. First, the New Order extended the central state's presence into the region through the expansion of state bureaucracy and public services. Second, the rise of Golkar nationally extended into North Maluku and enabled the creation of a new local political elite connected to the state bureaucracy, and housed within Golkar, rather than local forms of 'traditional' authority in the sultanates. Third, in the context of an expanding and centralising state, and with the rise of Golkar membership as the central mode for political, social and economic mobility, the Ternate Sultan was increasingly drawn into the centre, and away from local politics. Fourth, the New Order state placed a central emphasis on economic development policies in the Outer Islands. This had important modernising effects on the regional economy and social structure of North Maluku, ensuring a revitalisation of Ternate as a "centre on the periphery", and placing access to the state bureaucracy at the centre of local success.

Finally, in the late New Order period, national political dynamics shifted again. A class of educated urban Muslims rose through the national political ranks, and the New Order's anti-Islam policy shifted course. This national shift also changed local political opportunity structures. Within Golkar locally, as nationally, the governing coalition in North Maluku grew increasingly divided as different factions began to compete over control of the local state. In North Maluku, the dominant 'southern' faction was led by Bahar Andili, the district chief of Central Halmahera district. This southern alliance was deeply embedded in the top echelons of local bureaucratic power and with a wide network of elite supporters and patronage loyalties, based in their capacity to access and disburse state resources, had a solid political base. However, they faced a rising challenge from the Ternate Sultan.

The Sultan's re-emergence in local politics reflected a national movement re-claiming a role for 'tradition' in local politics. His group was also networked through Golkar, but was more dependent on 'traditional' communal ties, appealing to the northern ethnic groups, and incorporating the Christian minority. This faction was more weakly linked to the higher branches of the local state bureaucracy. When the Sultan claimed a Golkar parliamentary position in the North Maluku district legislature in 1997, this signalled his official challenge to the southern elite.
Overall, under both Dutch rule and the Suharto regime, local elites were deeply integrated into powerful, authoritarian, external state structures. As this central authority weakened towards 1998, and as factional politics increased locally (as nationally), both factions within the North Maluku political elite saw their chance to gain and consolidate local power. This rising factional contest sets the stage for the violent events that followed the official end to the New Order in May 1998. Chapter Three, which follows, on local political events during the transition period of 1998-1999, and the subsequent year of severe violence, covers these dynamics in detail.
Chapter Three -
From political coalition to ethno-religious violence:

Introduction

The New Order officially ended when B.J. Habibie succeeded Suharto as the third Indonesian President in May 1998. The new government quickly proposed greater regional fiscal and political autonomy as one of its major reform policies to improve local governance and appease growing regional discontent. As Chapter Two showed, at the end of the New Order, the North Malukan political elite was comprised of a collection of factions, united overall within Golkar, but growing increasingly competitive towards the end of the 1990s. For each faction, the transition moment offered a unique opportunity to secede from Maluku and form a new province. By 1998, this historic goal was imbued with the political and economic incentives inherent in the prospect of greater regional autonomy. North Malukan students and activists, the Ternate Sultan, top-ranking state bureaucrats and party bosses all united in the ensuing lobbying effort to create a new province. This introduction briefly summarises the rapid transition from local elite coalition to intra-elite sponsored violence, before the chapter analyses the details of these events.

Two of the most senior political rivals in the North Maluku elite, Mudaffar Syah – the Ternate Sultan and newly appointed chair of the North Maluku district parliament – and Bahar Andili – the powerful and popular district regent of Central Halmahera – worked together throughout 1998, alongside student activists, to advocate for a new province. By October 1999 the elite-student coalition had succeeded: President Habibie signed North Maluku into law as the first new province in the post-New Order period, just before losing office. However, as the lobbying process intensified between 1998 and 1999, intra-elite divides within the local political coalition widened and the two opposing factions sought to shape the composition, location and leadership of the new province around their own interests. Using a combination of electoral and extra-legal means, the Ternate Sultan rapidly amassed local political
positions, becoming chief of the North Maluku branch of Golkar. By the middle of 1999 the Sultan was the leading candidate for the North Maluku governorship, but his rise was vigorously challenged by the ‘southern’ faction.

Tensions between the two elite factions escalated alongside rising inter-ethnic clashes in the north of Halmahera (the largest island in North Maluku). With the prospect of local administrative reorganisation via regional autonomy, the southern elite backed the creation of a new sub-district for a large community of Makian migrants living in the north of Halmahera, on the Ternate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ territory. The Makian group had gained considerable influence in the local state under the New Order, as Chapter Two highlighted, and sought to promote Makian interests at both the elite and local levels. The new sub-district proposal was opposed from the outset by the locally indigenous Kao community – a majority Christian group, historically affiliated with the Ternate Sultan. However, while the Ternate Sultan symbolically protected all North Malukan Christians, including the Kao, this small indigenous group lacked formal political representation and leverage and their (initially) peaceful protests were ignored.

In October 1999, just as the new province was inaugurated, “localised” conflict between the Kao and Makian groups spilled into Ternate with the dramatic arrival of around 10,000 Makian from north Halmahera, forcibly evacuated following Kao attacks in retaliation for the Makian student group supported destruction of several Kao villages. By November, Ternate city had imploded into street riots between pro-Makian (southern) and pro-Kao (northern) groups. The conflict increasingly acquired a religious dynamic as the Kao were associated with Christians, although original fractures were not along religious lines. By the end of November, the entire Christian minority of Ternate and Tidore had been forcibly expelled and evacuated. Under pressure from the political elite, local security forces abandoned attempts to prevent attacks on the Kao and Christian communities. By the end of December – only six months after leading the race to become governor – the Ternate Sultan was...
forcibly evacuated. He never recovered his political position and popular support of this period, as Chapter Six later demonstrates.

From the initiation of localised inter-ethnic violence during the provincial lobbying process in August 1999, to the eventual declaration of a national civil emergency in North Maluku in July 2000, this was the most violent period in the region’s post-independence history. By some accounts the North Maluku conflict caused more deaths than any of the other major incidents of ‘communal’ violence during the ten-year transition period, and almost equalled death rates in the Aceh conflict.261 Between one fifth and one third of the local population of 700,000 was displaced during the conflict, contributing to a severe local socio-economic crisis.262 The later phases of violence in the northern reaches of Halmahera had national political implications, triggering the foundation of Laskar Jihad, and other radical militant Islamic groups, which then launched attacks in several parts of Eastern Indonesia.263

Over five hundred years of trading and colonial history had created a richly multi-ethnic region comprised of tens of different ethnic and religious groups. As Chapter Two outlined, Ternate was a multi-ethnic city long prior to European colonisation, with traders from the Middle East, Southern China and Java resident alongside local ethnic groups from the thirteenth century onwards. But this long history of regional cosmopolitanism was overturned in a matter of weeks. Just one month after the provincial inauguration, the new capital, Ternate, was strictly divided between ethnic Ternateans and their northern kin, in the north, and southern ethnic groups and their affiliates, in the south, with militia barriers between the two zones. The long resident (predominantly Christian) ethnic Chinese were expelled alongside Christian civil servants, business families, religious leaders and ordinary residents, leaving only Muslim residents behind.

261 Varshney et al (2004). While problematic (the Varshney study relied on local newspapers to estimate deaths from communal violence, whose coverage was unreliable), the study’s figures are at least indicative of the conflict’s impact.
262 See Chapter Four on the socio-economic affects of the conflict.
This chapter explores the major political events and phases of conflict escalation between 1998 and 2000, the first two years of democratic transition in North Maluku. It focuses on two central points: first, the role of the state-based political elite in initiating and escalating violence; and, second, the effects of conflict on local elite composition. I explain how the local elite coalition moved so rapidly from collective action, towards creating a new province, to the sponsorship of inter-group violence, with the aim of eliminating factional rivals and accumulating power. I outline the political use of 'ethno-religious' violence by the state-based elite on both sides of the conflict.²⁶⁴ In terms of explaining overall political continuity of the local state-based elite in North Maluku – the central issue of the thesis – I demonstrate that it is also important to account for reconfiguration within the local elite. Finally, and linking back to the literature discussion in Chapter One, I demonstrate that the conflict was ultimately a contest within the state-based elite, and not a contest between ‘state’ and ‘society’.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section One frames the chapter within the literature on the relationship between national democratic reforms and changing dynamics in local politics (linking back to Chapter One), as well as the main scholarly debates on the North Maluku conflict. Section Two covers the gradual fracturing of the local elite coalition over the selection of the provincial capital and governor and increased contest over other potential state resources. Three outlines the initiation of inter-ethnic conflict between the Kao and Makian groups in north Halmahera, a ‘localised’ conflict in which political activists and state elites were closely involved and Four the three subsequent phases of violence, as the conflict escalated towards province-wide religious violence. Section Five concludes with an assessment of the local elite’s role in the conflict and its consequent effects on the composition of the local elite.

²⁶⁴ The conflict, during different phases, appealed to local political activists and community participants, whose goals were sometimes aligned with the political elite’s, but this angle is not my focus here. See Duncan (2005a) on the motivations behind communal participation in the violence. As with ethno-religious violence elsewhere, at key points of the conflict, the goals of the elite, the mob, and other activists overlapped. At these critical junctures, the conflict escalated rapidly. See Brass (1997).
3.1 The North Maluku conflict in context

Those screaming for blood and revenge in the crowd are making use of slogans provided to them as a justification for actions that serve either their interests or those of their political organisations, or for which they are paid, partly in cash and partly by the loot they gain — under the cover provided by the crowds so massed, by the justification given for the violence, and by the near certainty that they will escape prosecution.

Brass (2003). 265

Before turning to the escalation of political conflict to mass violence in North Maluku, at the end of the twentieth century, this section first frames these events within two areas of debate on the transition period in Indonesia. First, I locate the conflict in the wider context of post-1998 national government reforms — in particular how these reforms changed the nature of competition over the local state. The North Malukan conflict does not stand in isolation, but makes sense against a backdrop of shifting terms and parameters of competition for local power within the state. Second, I frame my interpretation of the North Maluku conflict in relation to the positions of the main scholars on the issue. 266 My interpretation differs from previous research in its emphasis and the time period considered. My focus is on the role of the local state-based political elite from the outset — on those providing the slogans, the cover, the motivation and justification for mass violence. I also interpret the conflict as one event in a series of political negotiations within the state-based elite over control of the local state, over a ten-year period, rather than as a discrete event.

(i) The impact of regional autonomy

In 1999 President Habibie’s government passed a series of laws on regional autonomy, transferring the majority of fiscal and political powers to the local (i.e. district and city) levels of government. These reforms were central in creating new opportunities to contest local politics during the transition period. Political pressure to devolve greater power to regional governments, particularly in resource rich regions, had been growing since the mid-1990s, as Bowen (2003) and McCarthy (2004) have described in detail. For the central government planners, regional

265 Brass (2003), p.362, on the role of political elites in Hindu-Muslim violence in India.
266 For details of key events during the conflict, I am reliant on the ample research conducted by other scholars, whilst also drawing on my own fieldwork. See Chapter One on research methodology.
autonomy (also known as decentralisation) was a means to stabilise the democratic transition, following national economic crisis, by making local government more accountable, and transferring government resources more directly, to the local population.\textsuperscript{267} It was also a way to minimise regional rebellions, as power was transferred to the local level of government, rather than more powerful provincial units – conceivably independent units of government.\textsuperscript{268} Districts and cities offered just enough local autonomy to satisfy local demands for greater autonomy, without threatening the central government’s authority.\textsuperscript{269}

The planned transfer of both political authority and fiscal revenue control to local governments, under the 1999 regional autonomy laws (Laws 22 and 25/1999), dramatically changed the nature of – and interest in – sub-national government, by raising the competition stakes at varying levels of the state elite.\textsuperscript{270} For local elites, the reforms were a major opportunity to reconfigure local government in their interests, and to better and more directly access the political and economic resources of the Indonesian state. Regional autonomy reforms triggered an outward and downward shift of political power and competition, later exacerbated by the electoralisation of local state power through the opening up of the party political system from 1999 and the implementation of direct elections from 2005.\textsuperscript{271} Importantly, for North Maluku, regional autonomy also presented the opportunity to revise administrative boundaries and form new regional governments via pemekaran, or re-districting.\textsuperscript{272}

Regional autonomy legislation required that a new district should be created from three or more existing sub-districts. This meant each level of administrative boundary revision had important effects on the standing of political coalitions up and

\textsuperscript{267} Decentralisation and regional autonomy are used interchangeably in the Indonesian context.
\textsuperscript{268} Separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, for example, tended to map onto provincial boundaries.
\textsuperscript{269} Duncan (2007), p.717.
\textsuperscript{270} Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions were later revised, respectively, by Law 32/2004 on Regional Administration and Law 33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regional Government. The initial 1999 laws transferred an unprecedented degree of discretionary political and budgetary powers to the district and city level of government, which directly threatened the traditionally far-reaching powers of the gubernatorial level of government. President Megawati sought to retrench some of the powers awarded to the local level to the gubernatorial level of government through the 2004 revisions.
\textsuperscript{271} Buehler (2008a) considers this process in South Sulawesi.
\textsuperscript{272} Chapter One raised the definitions of pemekaran: I use redistricting, following Aragon (2004).
down the government hierarchy. As Duncan argues, the regional autonomy legislation dramatically, “increased the prestige and profitability of local politics.”

Several of the main analysts of Eastern Indonesian politics link increased local competition over access to and control over new local government resources to the escalation of ethno-religious violence during the transition, as Chapter One discussed. In North Maluku, the prospect of regional autonomy triggered an escalation in competition between different groups over the possibility of newly available government — and other — resources, as this chapter further explores. I argue here, however, that it was the local political elite’s use of the new opportunities for restructuring power, and the manipulation of local grievances towards these elite ends, that formed the driving force behind the dramatic escalation of incidents to mass violence, rather than communal level competition.

(ii) The scholarly debate over the North Maluku conflict

Within the main scholarly analyses, there are several variants on why the principal lines of friction fell as they did during the North Maluku conflict. The debate is less one of outright disagreement, and more a matter of degree — but the nuances are important for understanding the different ways the conflict is understood, and where this thesis stands, in contrast. One area of contention is over who the main organising groups were in the conflict during its peak (November-December 1999). A second point relates to the degree of organisation — or spontaneity — in the rapidly escalating violence and a third is over how ‘local’ the initial phase of ethnic conflict really was.

On the first issue, analysts generally agree that the organisational divide during the first phase of conflict fell between the (migrant) Makian and (indigenous) Kao ethnic

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273 Duncan (2005a), p.59. ‘Regional’ here refers to provincial level government and ‘local’ to city and/or district level government. The two terms are frequently mixed up, especially as ‘regional autonomy’ generally refers to decentralisation to the city/district and not provincial level.

274 See, for example, Bubandt (2004), Aragon (2001), Vel (2001), and International Crisis Group (2003b).

275 I am indebted to the work of the scholars discussed here; my interpretation of the conflict was only possible because of their detailed earlier work.

276 The key authors disagree — to some extent — on the root causes of conflict, but my focus here is on how and why the conflict escalated, rather than its deeper roots. See Chapter One on debates over the transitional conflicts in Eastern Indonesia.
communities in the north of Halmahera. There is some debate over the role of the political elite in enabling this 'local' conflict to escalate, which I come to below. But there are at least four different interpretations of the principal organisational divides at the conflict's peak, when violent incidents rapidly escalated between groups towards the end of 1999. These are divisions through political party competition, the 'modernist'/‘traditionalist' split within the local Muslim community, the historical divide between the Ternate and Tidore sultanates, and an ethnic divide between northern and southern groups. In fact, that all these divides were possible, but sometimes merged, shows that local identities were relatively fluid, depending on the political context of events.

In the first interpretation, Duncan (2005a) emphasises party competition and affiliation at the elite level, arguing that the contest between the pro-Sultan and pro-Bahar factions fell along party/religious lines between Golkar, the secular party for which the Sultan stood, and PPP, the Islamic party, backed by Bahar. However, this interpretation misrepresents party politics in the late New Order. Chapter Two demonstrated how during the New Order, Golkar was less a distinctive party and more an overarching form of political organisation within which political factions competed. Within the North Maluku branch of Golkar, the more ‘modernist' leaning Muslim groups were closer to Bahar Andili's faction, and the more ‘traditionalist’ groups favoured the Sultan, but both fell within the same overall ‘party' organisation. Bahar appealed both to PPP and Golkar supporters, and ‘party' politics was not a critical elite or community division.

The second perspective, reflected in Van Klinken's (2007) analysis, stresses the contest between different factions of the local Muslim political elite. Van Klinken argues that the two main factions drew on the rivalry accumulating through the 1990s

277 When I refer to the ‘Kao' and ‘Makian' ethnic communities I do not assume that they were undifferentiated groups, without social inequalities or complex power structures operating at the micro level. However, my research focused on the meso, not micro level, of local politics, and differentiating within these groups went beyond the scope of this thesis. See Duncan (2005a; 2007), for example, on micro dynamics within the Kao community.

278 Local identities – particularly ethnic and religious identities – grew more fixed as the conflict escalated, thus providing evidence for the argument that conflict creates ‘ethnic' identity, rather than the other way around. As the violence subsided, and conditions ‘normalised', inter-ethnic political dynamics changed again. For example, during the 2007 gubernatorial elections fractures within the 'southern' ethnic groups grew more politically salient than the north/south divide. See Chapter Six.
between the Islamic ‘traditionalists’, connected to the Ternate Sultan, and the Islamic ‘modernists’, supporting Bahar Andili.  

He argues that Bahar’s supporters formed a “challenger elite” to the Ternate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ authority throughout this period, and aligned with a ‘modernist’ interpretation of Islam, which was increasingly influential in Ternate (particularly among migrant groups) from the 1970s onwards, as well as linked locally to the expansion of the New Order state. Van Klinken (2007) describes the increasingly popular modernist version of Islam as the “counter-theme” to the more ‘traditional’ (aristocratic) practices of the Ternate Sultan and his followers.

With hindsight, however, the political significance of this “counter-theme” prior to 1999 – and the creation of the new province – is debatable. Before the reform moment it was not clear that a ‘modernist’/‘traditionalist’ divide was the dominant political fault-line among the local elite, although it played a role in factional competition. It was only when competition over the benefits and resources flowing from the reorganisation of local government – in particular, the creation of the new province – increased that an ‘ideological’ clash moved to the forefront of local politics. Even then it played out largely within the overarching Golkar coalition. The use of ‘religious’ differences as a mobilising tool between Muslim communities played a central role in the escalating violence between pro and anti-Ternate Sultan groups in Ternate city, but it was not an over-riding source of contest prior to this point.

A third interpretation places the historical (cultural or colonial) division between the Ternate and Tidore sultanates at the centre of the conflict. Alhadar (2000) argues that this historic rivalry reappeared during the initial phase of the conflict, when Ternate groups supported the Kao, and Tidore communities supported the Makian, with each seeking to gain influence in their respective areas. Alhadar argues that the Tidore community feared the resurgence of their ‘traditional enemies’ in Ternate. This

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279 ‘Traditional’ here refers to the less-orthodox strand of Islamic practice in Indonesia, linked closely to pre-Islamic history. The ‘modernist’ (‘orthodox’) strand links more closely to Middle Eastern interpretations of Islam.

280 Van Klinken (2007), p.116. ‘Traditional’ here refers to the colonial roots of the Ternate Sultan’s authority. The post-independence New Order regime enabled the rise of local groups not connected to the Sultanate in North Maluku. Chapter Two discusses the colonial roots of ‘traditional’ authority.

281 The International Crisis Group (2000b) also presents this interpretation.
chapter demonstrates, however, that the political ‘restoration’ of the Tidore Sultan by the Ternate Sultan’s main rival, Bahar Andili, in the midst of rising community level conflict was a calculated political move. This counter-restoration (designed to match the Ternate Sultan’s resurgence during the late 1990s) deliberately invoked long-buried local historic symbolism, inspiring the southern ethnic groups to support the anti-Ternate Sultan political faction. History was re-imagined and revived by political leaders, not spontaneously invoked.282 Concerns over ‘ancient’ rivalries between the two Sultanates became relevant only in the face of heightened contest over the benefits that would flow from leadership over the new provincial government.

The fourth interpretation of the main dividing lines within the conflict relates to the contest for power between the northern and southern ethnic groups, which links to (and overlaps with) the previous perspectives. As with the Muslim modernist/traditional and Ternate/Tidore dividing lines, the ethnic clash between northern and southern groups was represented and driven forward by their elite leaders. The Ternate Sultan historically represented the ‘northern’ ethnic groups, and the rival faction was headed by a triumvirate of ‘southern’ leaders, with Bahar Andili at the forefront. Tomagola (2000), Van Klinken (2007) and Wilson (2008) all emphasise this critical dividing line. These ethnic divisions, along with the other dividing lines, became increasingly important during the conflict, acting as a mobilising force, rather than being a characteristic of inherently opposed groups. Given the legacies of both the New Order period – where the Makian and affiliated southern ethnic groups had increasingly benefitted from state jobs and patronage, in contrast to the fading role of the northern groups – and the colonial era – when the Dutch favoured northern groups under the Ternate Sultan’s influence – historical divides between local ethnic groups were some of the easiest for elites to mobilise and ‘activate’ during the conflict period.283 I therefore pay close attention to these ethnic fault-lines in the following discussion of the different phases of local conflict escalation.

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282 See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the re-invention of tradition.
283 Mamdani (2001) makes similar arguments for ethnic conflict in Rwanda.
On the second issue of contention – again a relative point of debate – almost all scholars of the North Maluku conflict agree that the political elite had strong interests in, and played critical roles in organising, the conflict from its outset. Some hold one faction of the elite more responsible than the other: for example, Tomagola (2000) places greater blame on the Ternate Sultan; Nanere (2000), in contrast, holds the southern elite leaders more responsible. Only Bubandt (2001, 2002) regards the escalation of conflict towards province-wide religious violence as a largely spontaneous grassroots process, emphasising crowd and communal response to rumours and provocation in the context of great insecurity arising from changing national and regional dynamics. Whilst the changing national context is a vital part of understanding why the conflict took place, the degree of organisation by opposing sides within the elite, and their deep interests in conflict escalation, disproves these ‘spontaneity’ claims.

Finally, on the third area of contention, Wilson (2005, 2008) views the initial phase of violence between the Kao and Makian groups, as genuinely local in origin, although he recognises the active role of the political elite in perpetuating and escalating later phases of violence between the two groups. He dismisses an elite-level analysis of the first phase of the conflict, arguing that this was related to local land and economic disputes, both historically and geographically situated, rather than elite level conflicts over provincial positions. But Wilson acknowledges that the southern political elite supported the initial outbreak of conflict, through active support of Makian organisations. Their actions show that the political elite cannot be entirely separated from the initial phases of ‘communal’ or ‘local’ violence, even if an elite lens fails to account for the deeper roots of this early phase of the conflict (which is not my task here).

The main difference in my perspective on the conflict, as it relates to the overall thesis, is that I see the conflict period as one of several key events in the decade-long period of democratic transition (from 1998 to 2008) in North Maluku, rather than examining it in isolation, as the above analysts have. If the conflict was part of a longer-run intra-elite contest over local state power, carried out in different forms over the ten year transition period, as this thesis holds, then the crux of my analysis must centre on the actions and motivations of the political elite. Chapter Two
discussed the first phases of this intra-elite contest, with the rise in factional competition within the local Golkar during the late New Order. This chapter outlines the shift from inter-factional contest towards outright violence between proxy groups sponsored by the political elite. Following the end to violence in mid-2000, the contest returned to intra-factional competition over state positions, through election contests, and was largely carried out in non-violent ways (examined in Chapters Four to Six). Only with the elite’s strong interest in aiding the escalation of violence in order to accumulate power and eliminate rivals could it have reached such severe levels. But once the genie of mass violence was out of the bottle, it was hard to contain – as the Ternate Sultan learned to his ultimate political cost.

3.2 From elite allies to enemies (May 1998 – August 1999)

The movement to create a new province temporarily unified the North Malukan political elite towards the same goal, between mid-1998 and mid-1999. But underneath their superficial unity, severe tensions grew between the two main factions, the northern and southern elite. The key points of contention were the location of the future provincial capital and the selection of the first provincial governor, decisions which would determine political and economic power in the new province. Between August and October 1999 intra-elite conflict grew in Ternate, as ‘ethnic’ conflict simultaneously escalated in north Halmahera. The two conflicts quickly and explosively merged, with the elite factions drawing on the localised ethnic conflict and magnifying it to their political advantage. This section covers the three key phases in the evolution from factional alliance towards increasingly hostile and eventually outright conflict.

(i) Unifying elite interests in the new province

Despite the factional nature of the local governing coalition in the late 1990s – as outlined in Chapter Two – the political elite were unified in their desire to gain independence from the Maluku provincial government in Ambon. Both factions sought the greater political prestige that would accrue from creating a new province, as well as the new sources of development funding from the central government that would result. On top of these incentives, the eventual law to establish the new
province was, as Van Klinken puts it, “a building contractor’s dream. Not merely a
slew of new government offices, but an entirely new provincial capital city would
be up for tender.”284 Not only infrastructure contracts, but also new civil service
posts would be created. Both of these would largely be allocated by the governor,
making it a highly lucrative and strongly contested post. A new province also
created scope for establishing new districts, district capitals, and sub-districts, all of
them requiring their own offices and infrastructure and creating employment
opportunities in contracting and the civil service. Until the central government
agreed to a new province, contests over the benefits posed by these new posts were
(partially) submerged in the lobbying process.

In 1997, a North Malukan youth organisation proposed the separation of the North
Maluku region from Maluku province, re-igniting a historic goal of the local elite.
The ‘Maloko Kie Raha Students Association’ organized a symposium on the
proposal, attended by some of the highest ranking local elites – the Ternate Sultan,
Bahar Andili and Syamsir Andili, along with central government representatives.
Then Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina also signalled his support for the creation
of a new province.285 Gaining Ambon and Jakarta’s support for a new province was
essential, so the students focused on lobbying the highest levels of the regional and
national political elite who had an interest in North Maluku.

One of the leading figures in the lobbying group was a popular student leader and
HMI activist, Saiful Bahri Ruray.286 Saiful obtained the backing of Bahar Andili, the
‘southern’ faction’s leader, and his team proposed a new North Maluku province at a
Jakarta conference with Home Affairs Ministry and Senate (MPR) delegates, gaining
national recognition at the time.287 In December 1998, a group called the FPPMU
(North Maluku Youth, Pupil and Student Forum) travelled to Ambon and Jakarta to
lobby members of the provincial government, backed by senior administrators and
parliamentarians from both North Maluku and Central Halmahera districts.288 The
Maluku governor and several provincial parliamentarians agreed to support the

students' goal, reflecting the group's high level support in the regional bureaucracy. Subsequently, two district parliamentary delegations were set up, supported by the two district regents and the newly inaugurated Ternate Mayor, Syamsir Andili. These groups together lobbied Jakarta from January 1999, targeting the national legislators, cabinet ministers and Home Affairs officials who would ultimately decide the province's fate.

President Habibie's government reform agenda (combined with his Eastern Indonesian heritage) posed a unique window of opportunity for the North Malukan elite. But as Habibie's main rival, Megawati, the head of PDI-P, rose in popularity through 1999, the local elite feared their window would close — it looked increasingly likely that Megawati would replace Habibie as president in the October 1999 session of the MPR. When Habibie offered the East Timorese a referendum on their future relationship with Indonesia, in January 1999, the North Malukan activists knew they had to act fast.

Facing forceful opposition from Megawati and PDI-P, Habibie had an electoral interest in creating a new pro-Golkar province, which would lead to him gaining extra seats in the upcoming MPR session. Extra votes would be critical for remaining President. On 23 April 1999, the Justice and Law Enforcement Council, a legal reform board headed by Habibie, agreed to divide Maluku province into two after the June 1999 election. Just a few days before Habibie lost the presidency, he signed Law 46/99, thereby creating the new province of North Maluku on 4 October 1999. By this point, however, the main factions in the apparently unified North Malukan political elite were already in open conflict with each other.

(ii) Mounting local factional tensions
Throughout the lobbying process of 1999, the North Malukan governing coalition clashed over who would lead the new province and the location of the new capital.

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292 In 1999, the president was still elected by the MPR and not directly by popular vote.
293 Van Klinken (2007), observed that students led, "demonstration after demonstration — each time they sensed a hesitation in Jakarta", p.112.
The first North Malukan governor was to be selected by the new provincial parliament, which itself would be set up with members of the existing district parliaments. These district parliaments were about to be contested in the first post-Suharto local elections in June 1999. The two main contenders for the governorship were the Ternate Sultan and Bahar Andili, with Thaib Armain – a senior local bureaucrat from the North Maluku district administration and an ethnic Makian – a third contender. Chapter Two outlined rising factionalism in local politics in the late 1990s. I now return to these developments as they evolved between 1998 and 1999, focusing first on the southern faction, and then on increasingly violent actions by the northern faction.

Supporters of Bahar Andili, the Sultan’s main competitor, fell into several groups. Although Bahar was not an ethnic Makian (his family was from Gorontalo, Sulawesi), he had close personal and political ties with the Makian community, who were the leading ethnic group in local politics. One of the main organisations backing Bahar was the ethnic student association *Makayoa*, formed between ethnic Kayoa and Makian students at Khairun University and STAIN, the Islamic college, both in Ternate. Bahar was also supported by members of the influential HMI and KNPI student groups. Among the wider population, his support base was rooted in the migrants in the south of Ternate city, and across the southern region. His younger brother, Syamsir Andili, the newly inaugurated Ternate mayor, had his own local bureaucratic and Golkar support base, bringing wider support to Bahar’s candidacy.

The other faction within the ‘southern’ political elite was led by Thaib Armain. At this point in the intra-elite contest, Thaib was still less powerful than either of his rivals (by 2002 he had manoeuvred into the lead, see Chapters Four and Six). From 1989 to 1997 Thaib was the regional secretary of North Maluku district, the chief

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295 Van Klinken (2007) and Duncan (2005a) both report that Bahar and Syamsir Andili were Makian, but local informants reported they were ethnically Gorontalo (from Sulawesi). Syamsir’s wife was Makian, and both politicians had developed extensive networks with the Makian community.

296 This organisation was central in lobbying for the creation of a new Makian sub-district on Halmahera, discussed in Section 3.2.

297 Contrary to Wilson’s (2008) analysis, Syamsir did not put himself forward for the provincial governorship against Bahar in 1999. The two brothers were reportedly very close and the younger brother would not have run against his older and well-respected senior sibling (interviews in Ternate 2005; personal correspondence, Ternate researchers, August 2008).
district bureaucratic post after the bupati, or regent. He was then posted to the provincial administration in Ambon (1997-1999) where, as the first provincial assistant, he collected a range of supporters from within the administrative hierarchy, as well as support from migrant groups in the south of Ternate.\textsuperscript{298} His appeal stretched into north Halmahera; until November 1999 he worked closely with Hein Namotemo, a leading Christian bureaucrat from that region.\textsuperscript{299} Thaib’s support network thus broadly fell within the southern group, but his bureaucratic connections across North Maluku district meant his support base drew in some northern communities (‘traditionally’ though not always supporters of the Ternate Sultan).\textsuperscript{300} Nonetheless, the main division between the Ternate Sultan and Bahar Andili’s factions – at this stage of the conflict – fell along largely ethnic lines. This division grew wider as the Ternate Sultan’s faction became increasingly aggressive.

Chapter Two outlined how, during the New Order, the Ternate Sultan was officially removed from a local governing role in the North Maluku region, whilst being incorporated into Golkar at the national level. The Sultan served a useful purpose for the New Order’s military leadership in the Maluku region by guaranteeing local support from his ‘traditional’ followers among the northern ethnic groups. Via his Golkar association, the Sultan accumulated a degree of prestige within the local Golkar hierarchy – but had no official power. In 1997 he launched his campaign to secure a more official role in local politics: part of his plan to ‘restore’ political authority to the Ternate Sultanate. He was first elected to the chairmanship of the North Maluku district parliament, and then accumulated further positions through a variety of official and violent means.\textsuperscript{301}

Throughout 1998, local student groups demonstrated against local government offices. Some of the earlier protests were led by local branches of KNPI and HMI. While both groups were loosely affiliated with the ‘southern’ faction of Golkar, at this

\textsuperscript{298} Thaib also gained military allies during his posting in Ambon, which later proved useful in the 2007 gubernatorial elections (see Chapter Six).

\textsuperscript{299} Interview, Hein Namotemo, Tobelo, 4 July 2005.

\textsuperscript{300} This situation changed as ethnic conflict in north Halmahera escalated, and the northern and southern factions grew increasingly polarised, as later sections discuss. The support of North Halmahera ethnic groups later returned to Thaib during the 2007 gubernatorial election, with Hein as the new North Halmahera district regent (see Chapter Six).

\textsuperscript{301} Interview, Ternate Sultan, July 2005, Ternate; correspondence, local researchers, Ternate, August 2008.
point affiliations were not concrete. Some southern students still regarded the Sultan as an ally against the ‘corrupt’ North Maluku district regent – though they grew increasingly suspicious of his intentions. Several student groups protested frequently against alleged corruption by the North Maluku district regent, retired-colonel Abdullah Assagaf (a senior local Golkar official). In June 1998 demonstrators including members of Gemusba, the Ternate Sultan’s youth support group, went further and occupied and destroyed Assagaf’s Ternate office. No reprisal was made against the activists by local security forces – even when they attacked the top local government officer – which demonstrates that their actions were supported by figures within the governing elite. The Sultan – above all – stood to gain from these attacks.

In December 1998, the Sultan sought the chairmanship of the North Maluku district branch of Golkar. However, another candidate’s selection (Abdul Kahar Limatahu, a retired judge, high-ranking local bureaucrat, and respected clan elder from another leading local family) infuriated the Sultan, who ordered his palace guards to surround and threaten the hall where the election was taking place. The guards were so effective that a ‘correction’ in the Sultan’s favour was issued almost immediately. Limatahu claimed he was harassed and temporarily kidnapped by the Sultan’s militia guard in order to prevent any retaliation. The Sultan’s tactics did not bode well for the approach he would take against his factional rivals in the upcoming gubernatorial contest.

The Sultan’s “youth” – or more aptly, militia – group, Gemusba, grew increasingly powerful in the following months. In the Ternate riots that broke out in late 1999, the Sultan’s guards and Gemusba were grouped under the overall organisation of the ‘Yellow Troops’ (Pasukan Kuning), reflecting the traditional yellow colour of the Ternate Sultanate. According to the Sultan, the group consisted of loyal villagers.

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306 Interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, May 2005, Ternate.
from his heartland in the north of Ternate. However, Van Klinken asserts that the guards and Gemusba groups were neither grassroots nor ‘traditionally’ based in the villages, but were instead closely connected to branches of the local military and the pro-Sultan wings of Golkar youth organisations in Ternate. The group’s impunity from security force action during the ensuing riots – and their defence of the Sultan’s political interests – shows they were far from spontaneously rioting ‘traditional’ villagers.

Already heading the North Maluku district parliament, following his election to district chair of Golkar, the Ternate Sultan was now in a strong position within the local political elite. Holding these two positions meant he would choose who would go forward to the June 1999 elections on the North Maluku district Golkar ticket – these candidates would in turn select the new provincial legislators, who would then, ultimately, select the governorship. Having loyal followers on the ticket would buy the Sultan the best chance of becoming governor. By mid-May 1999, the initial Golkar candidate list for the district elections excluded all the Sultan’s rivals from the alternative coalition.

The Sultan had rapidly moved from a largely symbolic leader of the northern ethnic Ternate, Kao and Tobelo groups, towards claiming the top political post in the new province. Standing for governor, he could place his ethnic supporters at the forefront of the new administration, with all the political and economic benefits this would bring. His rise thus posed a direct challenge to the southern bureaucratic and political elite. The antagonism between the two elite political factions – divided along ethnic lines – grew more intense from this point. With the introduction of his militia into the political process, the Ternate Sultan played a direct role in escalating violence in local politics.

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307 Interview, Ternate Sultan, July 2005, Ternate.
309 Even Saiful Ruray - the lead student activist behind the new province - was excluded from the list. Van Klinken (2007), p.116.
(iii) Local elections and provincial claims

In the midst of the provincial lobbying process, the first local elections since the end of the New Order held a special importance for the local elite. As highlighted above, these elections would determine the composition of the district parliaments, which in turn would select the new provincial parliament: and this new parliament would elect the new governor. In North Maluku district, Golkar, headed by the Ternate Sultan, took 17 out of 40 district parliament seats.\textsuperscript{311} While this was under half Golkar’s previous vote, they still held twice as many seats as the next party (PDI-P won eight), thereby retaining control of North Maluku district for the Sultan. In Central Halmahera district, Golkar also came first, with 11 out of 40 seats, PPP second (with five), and PDI-P third (with four).\textsuperscript{312} While, for the first time in decades, Golkar no longer held a majority in either local parliament, it was still the largest faction in both local legislatures and the dominant local political organisation. With the Ternate Sultan heading the lead faction in the North Maluku district parliament, and Bahar Andili leading the Central Halmahera rival group, competition then escalated further between the two Golkar factions over the provincial capital and governorship.

The Sultan lobbied for the new capital to remain in Ternate, his historical capital. Precisely because of this affiliation, the southern faction wanted to relocate the capital temporarily to Soasio, on Tidore island – the capital of Central Halmahera district – and then permanently to Sofifi, a small village in Central Halmahera. Realising the southern faction would never agree to Ternate, the Sultan eventually proposed Sidangoli, a port in northwest Halmahera (and still within his historical realm of influence). Thaib Armai – in collaboration with Hein Namotemo, the powerful north Halmahera bureaucrat – initially supported locating the capital in Ternate, but then proposed an alternative in the northern part of Halmahera. Bahar and Thaib together opposed the Sultan’s proposal to name the province with the traditional-sounding title \textit{Moloko Kie Raha}.\textsuperscript{313} The Sultan also proposed that the province seek special regional status, known as \textit{Daerah Istimewa}, due to its Sultanate history – but this was also opposed by Bahar and Thaib. Both the Sultan’s key opponents resisted any attempts by him to make political advances based on claims

\textsuperscript{311} Wilson (2008), p.76.
\textsuperscript{312} Wilson (2008), p.76.
\textsuperscript{313} Wilson (2008), p.47.
of ‘traditional’ authority (which they could not assert), rather than bureaucratic or ethnic affiliations (which they could).\textsuperscript{314}

The new provincial law (Law 46/1999) ended up reflecting the interests of both the main factions. The province was eventually named North Maluku (\textit{Maluku Utara}), not the ‘traditional’ Moloko Kie Raha. The capital was to temporarily remain in Ternate, but would eventually relocate to Sofifi in Central Halmahera – within the ‘southern’ area (this move was eventually delayed).\textsuperscript{315} The law stated that a new provincial parliament would be established via special local elections, and that this parliament would in turn elect the new governor.\textsuperscript{316} As a result of the ensuing conflict, these two crucial steps to determine the new governorship and administration of the new province were delayed until 2001.\textsuperscript{317}

While intra-elite contest mounted in Ternate over the leadership and location of the new provincial capital, localised ethnic conflict escalated on Halmahera. This was not an isolated incident and had important connections to elite level rivalry between the northern and southern factions. The inter-ethnic dispute over new territory for the migrant Makian community in north Halmahera did not at first significantly affect elite-level political relations. However, as the elite Makian supported the claims of the migrant Makian group in Halmahera, it was always against the Sultan’s interests to support the new Makian sub-district. The Ternate Sultan was ‘traditionally’ affiliated with the Kao ethnic group and he wanted to prevent further Makian expansion into his ‘traditional’ northern realm. When the entire Makian population – of around 10,000 people – of the Kao-Malifut area was deliberately forced out in October 1999, elite level and ‘localised’ conflicts merged. Factionalism between elite political groups rapidly transformed into inter-group street violence, with the elites mobilising opposing sides. This then escalated into waves of ethnically-targeted attacks – which later became religious attacks, as the conflict spiralled across the province.

\textsuperscript{314} Wilson (2008), pp.47-48. Later, Bahar ‘restored’ the long dormant Tidore Sultan by appointing a distant relative of the Tidore Sultanate’s family as a new Sultan: a shrewd political move to gain him ‘traditional’ votes in the south.

\textsuperscript{315} As of 2008, the capital had not been re-located to Sofifi (reported by M. Syaril Sangaji, as read in \textit{Malut Pos}, August 2008).

\textsuperscript{316} Van Klinken (2007), p.112.

\textsuperscript{317} Chapters Four and Six consider elite dynamics after 2000.
3.3 The merger of elite and local conflicts (August-October 1999)

From the beginnings of conflict between the Kao and Makian migrants in north Halamhera, the Kao were at a political disadvantage. The Kao – majority Protestant, but with a small Muslim minority – historically fell under the ‘traditional’ realm of the Ternate Sultan. But aside from the Sultan’s indirect support, they had almost no representation at the district level, with only one Kao member in the North Maluku district parliament. In contrast, the Makian community was well represented in both Central Halmahera and North Maluku district parliaments, as well as across the regional bureaucracy and they also had links to Makian student activists in Ternate and Ambon. Even though the initial conflict between Kao and Makian in Halmahera appeared to focus solely on local land issues, the Makian elite had a strong interest in ensuring Makian success. Crucially, they also used the situation as leverage against the Ternate Sultan, as this section explores.

(i) Background to Kao-Makian conflict

In 1975, with the threat of volcanic explosion, the Maluku provincial government began the re-location of the entire Makian community from Makian Island, to the Kao region of north Halmahera, some several hundred miles away. The region was apparently chosen for its low population density and perceived land availability. Over the next five years, over 6,000 Makian were relocated from their home island, many of them forcibly. The indigenous population in the Kao area was predominantly ethnic Kao, practicing subsistence farming and fishing, with some small scale copra production. Initially, the Kao reportedly welcomed the Makian migrants, seeing them as victims of an imminent natural disaster, and shared land and gardens with the newcomers.

By 1999, over 16,000 Makian were living in 16 Makian villages in the southern part of Kao sub-district, an area known as Malifut. From the very beginning, the provincial and local government failed to clarify the legal status of the land occupied by the Makian migrants. The Kao believed the Makian were ‘guests’ on their

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318 Protestant community members claimed the Makian group was relocated to north Halmahera in order to prevent Christian expansion in the Maluku region, as well as to assert Makian control over natural resource revenues.

'traditional' lands, without permanent settlement or land-use rights. In contrast, the Makian believed they were official transmigrants, relocated onto government land for their use. The different perceptions of local rights to the use and ownership of the land became a source of great tension when the Makian eventually sought to establish official rights to the land they inhabited and cultivated.\textsuperscript{320} Inter-communal tension was exacerbated in the mid 1990s, when gold was discovered and the NHM goldmine built in the Kao region of north Halmahera.\textsuperscript{321}

Prior to the mine's establishment in 1997, and the re-organisation of local government in the late 1990s, the two communities had lived alongside each other for two decades without major tension, but also without social and political integration. The Makian migrants increasingly resented their position within the Kao sub-district administration, especially without official status on local land. The reformasi era of the late 1990s presented the ideal opportunity for the Malifut-based Makian community to propose the creation of a new Makian sub-district in the Kao region. Makian leaders and activists began to press for the creation of their own administrative sub-district in 1998, with support from the Makian elite. Underlying the local motivation to create a separate sub-district was the search for more secure land tenure as well as the opportunity to claim benefits from the NHM goldmine.\textsuperscript{322}

The NHM goldmine, known as Gosowong, was established in Halmahera in 1997. Prior to the conflict the mine employed between 300-500 local staff, alongside international and other Indonesian technical staff.\textsuperscript{323} The company provided some community schools, health clinics and sports facilities, and also developed a new port and roads across the Kao region. This infrastructure development was primarily

\textsuperscript{320} For a detailed background on Makian relocation to Malifut see Wilson (2008) pp.52-55.
\textsuperscript{321} Exploration by the Australian mining company Newcrest, in conjunction with PT Aneka Tambang, one of the leading Indonesian mining companies during the New Order, led to the discovery of high-grade gold ore deposits in the Kao region in 1996. A joint-project to develop the site as an open-cast mine was signed in April 1997 between Newcrest Singapore (holding 82.5 per cent of the company) and PT Aneka Tambang (holding 17.5 per cent) under the authority of a new company Nusa Halmahera Mineral (NHM). Interviews with NHM staff, Ternate and Tobelo, July 2005. Two open-cast mines were then developed in the Kao area. The site (known collectively as Gosowong) represented the third largest source of revenue to the parent company Newcrest – one of the world’s ten largest mining companies - in 2008. See Newcrest Mining Concise Annual Report (2008), p.63.
\textsuperscript{322} Collier and Hoeffler (2001) would argue that the roots of this ethnic conflict lay in 'greed' over natural resources, but the role of political elites in escalating the search for local revenue towards outright violence also needs to be accounted for.
\textsuperscript{323} Wilson (2008), p.58, reports the mine employed 500 local staff; interviews I conducted reported around 300 (interviews, NHM staff, Ternate and Tobelo, July 2005).
for the mine's benefit, but both the Kao and Makian communities used the local roads. As the Gosowong mine was set up under New Order government policy, mining revenues were transferred directly to Jakarta, with only a small percentage returning to the Maluku government, and even less re-distributed back to local governments. The public facilities and jobs provided by the mine were therefore, the only tangible benefits from the mine to the local community prior to government reform. However, proposed regional autonomy legislation stood to change revenue structures in favour of local governments – and, therefore, in theory, local communities – with a greater percentage of mining revenue due to return directly to the districts in which mines and other extractive industries were located. Thus, the promise of future revenues played into the search for greater local administrative control by the Makian community at both the local and elite levels.

Inter-community tensions were also raised in the late 1990s over the local employment practices of NHM, with over 90 per cent of local staff hired from the Makian community. While local employment in the mine was miniscule compared to the sub-district population – with less than 500 employed from a population of around 44,000 – it was still symbolically important. The combination of the promise of future benefits from the mine and the unevenly spread actual benefits of the late 1990s contributed directly to rising tensions between the two groups. Added to this volatile situation, the southern political elite in Temate and Tidore had strong interests in creating a new Makian sub-district, as this would aid their political and economic negotiating position.

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324 These New Order policies eventually contributed to rising regional resentment of Jakarta by the end of the New Order, as highlighted in Section 3.1.
325 According to Law 33/2004, on Revenue Sharing from Natural Resources, 20 per cent of mining land rents and royalties go to the central government, 16 per cent to the provincial government, 64 and 32 per cent (respectively) to the producing district, and 32 per cent of land rents (only) to the other districts in the the province. See Duncan (2007), p.729. However, following decentralisation, and the establishment of the new district government in North Halmahera in 2004, the full mining revenue shares officially allocated to the producing district government were not transferred. This was due to continued provincial level capture of local government budgets (see Chapters Four and Five).
326 NHM staff reported that while they had originally intended to hire equally from the two local communities, the Makian were more educated and skilled, so they preferred to hire Makian staff. Following the conflict, the mine reportedly enforced a policy of hiring equally from both communities to avoid local tensions (Interviews, NHM staff, Temate and Tobelo, July 2005).
327 In 1999 Kao sub-district had an ethnic Kao population of 26,704 with around 16,000 ethnic Makian, totalling around 43,700: Wilson (2008), pp.53-54, BPS (2001).
(ii) The drive for a new Makian sub-district

Towards the end of 1998, Makian student groups began the lobbying process to forge a new Makian sub-district. As with the larger student group lobbying for a new province, this smaller group also had elite Makian backing. Prominent members of the southern elite – including the leading local politicians, but also figures such as Jusuf Abdurahman, the former rector of Khairun University – sponsored the students’ travel to Jakarta to lobby the Ministry of Home Affairs (the agency responsible for determining new administrative boundaries). A collection of Makian and Kayoa students (an ethnic group culturally close to the Makian) formed the Makayoa ethnic organization, “to defend Makian and Kayoa interests”, including lobbying for the creation of a new Makian sub-district. From the outset, therefore, Makian and other southern political elites were involved in the main source of tension between the two groups, with a direct interest in local Makian success.

In early 1999, following the elite-supported student lobbying efforts, the North Maluku district parliament agreed to support the creation of a new Makian sub-district. The district regent, Abdullah Assagaf, then formally requested central government approval. In May 1999, the “Makian sub-district in Malifut” was created via Law 42/1999 – including all the migrant Makian villages as well as two Kao. District government teams were subsequently sent to inform the Kao, who had not been involved in the formal decision making process, about the new Makian sub-district on their ‘traditional’ homelands.

Leading up to the creation of the new sub-district, tensions rose between the local Kao and Makian communities. Villagers reportedly started to carry machetes for protection and posting guards outside homes and gardens. From April 1999, Makian villagers informed their Temate relatives that they felt under threat from Kao who opposed the new sub-district plan and requested their support. The fact that local Makian received extensive support from Temate relatives and ethnic

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328 This group later played a role in escalating violence during the Kao-Makian clashes. Interviews, student activists, June 2005, Ternate; correspondence, Ternate students, August 2008.
331 Van Klinken (2007), p.117. It was not clear whether this took place among Kao or Makian villagers (or both).
organisations, which were linked closely to the Makian political elite, further demonstrates that the eventual conflict was never a solely 'local' or ethnic affair and that the political elite were involved, at least indirectly, from the outset. In August, Makian groups (some of them based in Ternate) attacked Kao villages: the first major violent incident in the ensuing waves of inter-ethnic and, later, inter-religious conflict.333

The motivation behind southern elite support of the lobbying process to create a new Makian sub-district came from two sources. One was the elite Makian goal to assert greater Makian control over the North Malukan government, from the provincial down to sub-district level. The second, related, concern was the potential increase of revenues to local government from the NHM goldmine, following the implementation of the 1999 decentralisation laws, which they hoped to steer towards Makian interests. The local Makian community in Malifut sought control of their own sub-district in order to secure their land tenure and to enable greater access to future economic opportunities from both the local government and the NHM mine. Their motives were linked to the broader elite Makian goal – from within the southern alliance – to increase control generally over local and regional government, thereby ensuring a greater share of future government revenues for the Makian elite.334

Linking back to the discussion in Chapter One, from this analysis on the beginnings of the North Maluku conflict, it is clear that a 'religious' element was far from being at the forefront of escalating tensions. In contrast, the ethnically organised patronage claims to benefits from the local state were central to the dispute from its outset. Ascribing a religious dimension to the causes of, or motivations behind, the North Maluku conflict in its early stages therefore misinterprets the roots of the problem.

(iii) Escalating inter-ethnic violence
The new Makian sub-district was unsurprisingly rejected by the Kao community for three key reasons. First, the new sub-district was located on what they considered

333 Wilson (2008) claims that the Makaya group were directly involved in this first violent incident, although their members dispute this (correspondence, Ternate students, August – September 2008).
‘traditional’ Kao territory, which they believed the government had no right to redistribute. Second, they also sought a greater share of potential future NHM goldmine revenues for their community, and believed a new Makian sub-district would block this. Third, the proposed sub-district contained two Kao villages, thus splitting the local Kao community in two. However, without elite-level support, Kao efforts to resist the legislation via formal channels were futile and so they took informal grassroots action. This started peacefully, in early 1999, with the Kao blocking the arrival of the Makian sub-district ‘inauguration team’, along with the new sub-district head, thus delaying the official sub-district inauguration. However, when Makian groups responded by razing the two Kao villages, the subsequent fighting left several dead on both sides and hundreds of Kao displaced.\(^3\)\(^5\)

Following the Makian attack on the Kao villages, Kao village leaders spent two months requesting assistance from the North Maluku district parliament, demanding the removal of the Makian community and the re-building of the two razed villages. They also lobbied the Ternate Sultan, but no official response was forthcoming.\(^3\)\(^6\) Without elite representation, the Kao community had little success in approaching the district legislature and local government officials. A top-level Ternate delegation – including the district regent, police chief and Ternate Sultan – eventually visited the Kao region to discuss the problem, but achieved little. The Ternate Sultan – the Kao’s ‘traditional’ leader, or figurehead – was apparently distracted by preparations for the provincial inauguration, and his plans to become governor.\(^3\)\(^7\) Later, this initial phase of conflict worked in the Sultan’s interests by mobilising Kao support behind his own political ambitions, but at this stage he was not actively involved in defending Kao interests. Meanwhile, the district parliament held that as the new sub-district was already authorised by the central government, the Kao would eventually be forced to accept it.\(^3\)\(^8\)

By October 1999, the Kao formed a local militia group to respond directly to the Makian attacks. This Kao “defence group”, led by Benny Bitjara, a prominent local

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\(^3\)\(^5\) Wilson (2008).
\(^3\)\(^6\) For detail on the sub-district’s creation and failed government response to initial attacks on Kao villages, see Wilson (2008), pp.59-64.
\(^3\)\(^7\) Wilson (2008).
\(^3\)\(^8\) Wilson (2008), p.64.
Following a small clash between Makian and Kao villagers over access to local gardens, the Kao militia attacked and razed every Makian village in the area, destroying most buildings – aside from mosques and some schools – and forcing the entire Makian community to flee. The local Makian community totalled around 10,000 people – over one quarter of the total population of North Maluku district – and their forced mass evacuation reportedly overwhelmed local security forces. Rather than intervening and trying to stop the violence, they simply aided the Makian evacuation. Several people died in the clash and the entire infrastructure of the local Makian community was destroyed.

The majority of these Makian villagers fled to Temate via trucks and boats, provided by the local security forces and the Temate city government, under Syamsir Andili’s leadership. The Temate Sultan strongly resisted the relocation of the Makian displaced to Temate – though he could not prevent their arrival – and this was interpreted by the displaced Makian community as proof of collusion with the Kao, even though he had not actively intervened on their side. The Sultan’s decision rallied the northern ethnic groups around him, and further alienated him from the southern groups. The arrival of over ten thousand displaced people placed huge pressure on both the Temate government and the local communities who had to feed and shelter them. With an original population of around 152,000, the city expanded by almost 10 per cent practically overnight. The next phase of the escalating inter-ethnic conflict was set in motion as displaced Makian began to attack Kao properties in Temate.

The Makian arrival in dramatically changed the nature of inter-elite political competition in the city. From a largely non-violent, though increasingly fraught, factional political contest over control of the new province, elite political competition now switched tracks. The political elite increasingly engaged grassroots and other

339 On the significance of traditional lands to the Kao, see Duncan (2005).
340 Makian groups claimed the district security forces defended Kao interests from this early point (correspondence, Ternate students, August-September 2008); however, it is not clear why the security forces would have defended the Kao instead of protecting the better connected Makian community. It is possible that Kao connections to the Temate Sultan dissuaded the security forces from intervening, but this could not be substantiated.
342 BPS (2001), p.73.
organisations into direct physical clashes. Street battles between pro-Makian and Kao
groups were supported by both sides of the political elite, who also prevented
intervention by local branches of the state security forces. The Makian and pro-
Makian members of the elite – Bahar Andili, Syamsir Andili and Thaib Armain –
aided the establishment of Makian ‘support’ groups, ostensibly to help the displaced
community, but which also acted as pro-Makian vigilante groups. On the Ternate
Sultan’s side, while he had at first failed to support the Kao, he eventually realised he
could use the situation to his advantage by mobilising ‘traditional’ supporters behind
him and against the southern faction. Violent actions by the Ternate Sultan’s
‘traditional’ militia and youth support groups therefore escalated rapidly during the
following two months.

Recalling Brass (2003), on the mobilising forces behind “communal” violence in
India, while the elite and community levels may initially hold different interests in
ethnic conflict, under conditions when their goals coalesce, ethnic riots prove their
most deadly and escalate rapidly. The political elite deliberately exploited the
subsequent nine-month period of violence for their own ends, gaining vital political
capital by directly supporting particular sides from the August – but particularly from
the October clashes – onwards. In doing so, both sides won the support of highly
motivated grassroots organisations, and rallied militant factions behind them. The
next section explores how the initial phase of inter-ethnic violence escalated towards
inter-religious violence across the province. The results of the next phase of violent
conflict dramatically – and permanently – reconfigured the political elite.

3.4 Religious violence and elite reconfiguration (November 1999-July 2000)

Following the forced displacement of the Makian community from north Halmahera,
localised ethnic conflict escalated rapidly into inter-religious violence in three main

343 That the local political elite were able to prevent security force intervention reflects that the
balance of power in the local government in North Maluku was weighted towards the bureaucracy.
However, it may also reflect the fact that the military had limited interests in preventing local conflict
from escalating in 1999. See Aditjondro (2001). Under the New Order, there was a tradition of
security forces allowing (or enabling) local conflict to play itself out, only stepping in to mop up
afterwards. This process played a role in securing ‘order’, by boosting the position of the security
forces, and so the central state.

phases across the province. The first phase – in Ternate and Tidore in November 1999 – was initiated almost immediately after the arrival of the displaced Makian. The second phase – simultaneously affecting both Ternate city and the Tobelo/Galela region – ran throughout December 1999. The third, final, and most prolonged, phase – across the north of Halmahera – ran for five months, between February and July 2000. I concentrate here on the first two phases of violence in Ternate and Tidore as they had the greatest effects on the political elite. While more severe, the subsequent phases had less impact on the political elite, which had already been reconfigured by that stage.345

(i) The first wave of religious violence

By October 1999, the new province was established and the elite coalition had fractured openly between the Ternate Sultan and his three leading political opponents from the southern alliance – Bahar Andili, Thaib Armain and Syamsir Andili. As chairman of the North Maluku district parliament, the Ternate Sultan was able to block the provision of government assistance to the displaced Makian in Ternate. This put him in direct conflict with the Ternate Mayor, Syamsir Andili, who had organised the Makian evacuation from Halmahera, and then provided much of the emergency assistance to the displaced population via his city administrative budget. Political coalitions across the northern and southern factions – such as that forged temporarily between the Tobelo leader Hein Namotemo and the Makian bureaucrat Thaib Armain – became impossible from this point.346 Two distinct groups were now clear at both the elite and local levels. The student/youth groups affiliated to the elite factions, Gemusba (pro-Ternate Sultan/northern groups) and Makayoa (pro-Makian/southern groups) increasingly engaged in street battles against each other across the city, along with other ‘grassroots’ organisations.347 Sporadic fighting

345 For a detailed exposition on the waves of religious violence, see Wilson (2008).
346 Hein was later elected the first official district regent of the new North Halmahera district in 2005. In 2007 he supported Thaib’s re-run for the governorship. Chapter Six considers their renewed alliance.
347 Informants in Ternate refuted claims that Makayoa members were involved in organised fighting against either the Kao or Christian groups, arguing that while members may have been involved ‘spontaneously’, they were never an organised militia group. However, Wilson (2008) ascribes a crucial role to Makayoa in the more organised attacks on Kao and Christians from October 1999 onwards. On balance, it is likely that Makayoa was involved in the November and December attacks in some way. However, the group was never a systematic fighting force, unlike the jihad militia, organised from January 2000, which some Makayoa members later joined.
between the opposing groups in Ternate gradually grew more organised, especially as the political elite prevented official security force intervention.

Following their arrival in Ternate, some displaced Makian attacked Kao and Christian homes, shops and churches there. Whilst the Kao were not exclusively Christian (and claimed throughout the conflict that they opposed the Makian for ethno-cultural and not religious reasons), around 90 per cent of them were Protestants. As such, they were easily construed as a ‘Christian’ enemy, and other Christian (non-Kao) communities were quickly painted as Kao-loyalists. Members of the displaced Makian community who launched the early phases of anti-Christian attacks in Ternate were directly encouraged by mid-level Ternate city and North Maluku district politicians. During these first clashes, the Ternate police forces intervened and arrested around 35 pro-Makian rioters.

The southern faction of the political elite reacted immediately to these arrests, demanding their release. Top level political intervention against police action set the tone for the rest of the North Maluku conflict: from here-on the police intervened less and less. Wilson (2008) reports that the delegation demanding the release of the Makian rioters included Thaib Armain (by this point Regional Secretary for North Maluku province, making him the highest ranking local bureaucrat in the new provincial administration), Yunnas Abbas (First Assistant to Thaib, and the second highest ranking local bureaucrat), Syamsir Andili (Ternate Mayor), and other prominent Makian community leaders and mid-ranking officials. The pro-Makian rioters were quickly released by the police.

Pro-Sultan groups also attacked Makian and nominally pro-Makian areas with impunity. As the Makian internally displaced persons (IDPs) rioted and attacked

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348 See Wilson (2008), pp.81-83, on the involvement of mid-level Makian bureaucrats and politicians in encouraging violent action.
349 Wilson (2008), p.82.
350 On several further occasions local security forces prevented acts of violence and intervened to prevent incidents from escalating - each time succeeding. However, political intervention from the local political elite swayed the security forces against further intervention. See Wilson (2008).
351 The Ministry of Home Affairs appointed ‘care-taker’ governors until the first provincial parliament gubernatorial elections, initially scheduled for 2000. These elections were delayed until 2001 due to the conflict, and postponed again to 2002, due to alleged corruption in the first round. See Chapter Six.
Christian homes and property, the Ternate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ guard, or militia, the *Pasukan Adat* (Yellow Troops) rampaged through the centre and north of the city, nominally ‘defending’ Christian and Kao people and property. Security forces also failed to prevent this group’s increasingly violent and intimidating behaviour against ordinary residents. Both Makian IDPs and ordinary Ternate residents – who may ordinarily have viewed the Sultan as a local figure of authority – now felt under threat from the pro-Sultan forces. The security forces failed to prevent escalating violence on either side, despite the fact that at this point, it was only a relatively small (and mostly unarmed) set of groups involved in street clashes. The security forces were either unable to take sides, unsure as to which group was going to succeed as the provincial power holder, or had interests in allowing the conflict to escalate.\(^{353}\) As Brass (2003) argues, once rioting groups know they have political immunity for their actions, they become increasingly violent. ‘Ethno-religious’ conflict escalated, in this case, as a direct result of elite protection of rioters and the failure of security forces to intervene to prevent further clashes.

It was in the midst of the street fighting between the pro-Makian and pro-Ternate Sultan groups, that Bahar Andili, the Central Halmahera regent, “restored” the Tidore sultanate, appointing a distant relative of the long defunct Tidore sultanate’s family as the new Sultan.\(^{354}\) In so doing Bahar enhanced his political position by adding ‘traditional’ legitimacy to his position as leader of the southern faction, and invoking a historical legacy of tension between the Tidore and Ternate sultanates. In the midst of rising street violence between the pro-Makian/southern and pro-Kao/northern groups, this was a provocative move because of its symbolic mobilising power. This kind of elite action during the first phases of the conflict – deliberately designed to rally supporters and increase animosity towards the opposing side – undermines ‘spontaneous’ analyses of inter-religious violence in Ternate and Tidore.\(^{355}\)

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\(^{353}\) It was unclear from field evidence why there was such limited intervention from local security forces, though unwillingness to alienate the potential victors may have contributed to it. See Aditjondro (2001) and Tomagola (2000), who interpret the military’s role in the enabling the Maluku conflicts to escalate as being in their direct political and economic interests.


\(^{355}\) See, for example, Bubandt (2002).
Inter-religious violence then grew in scale and crossed locations when an inflammatory letter was circulated: the so-called ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter, reportedly written by a Protestant minister, defined areas of Ternate for Christians to defend. Declared a forgery at the time by the local Protestant ministry (a claim supported by expert witnesses), it was nonetheless a useful tool for elite level pro-Makian supporters. Pro-Makian parliamentarians and other local leaders deliberately circulated the letter.\textsuperscript{356} The newly appointed regent of North Maluku district, Rusli Andiaco, was reportedly intimidated by members of the local government and parliament and refused to reject the letter. Riots followed on Tidore, during which a Protestant pastor was stabbed to death at a meeting attended by local politicians and bureaucrats. Over 30 other Christian residents of Tidore were killed in the ensuing night of riots, forcing Tidore’s Christian minority to evacuate to Ternate.\textsuperscript{357}

As the displaced Christian population of Tidore arrived in Ternate, the Ternate Sultan’s militia group continued to rampage against the southern migrant community in the city. In escalating street clashes, although the Sultan’s forces momentarily held control of the city centre – including the main port, roads and central markets – they were eventually forced back. By the end of November the Christian population of Ternate was forced to relocate to the north of the city, where they sheltered in the Ternate Sultan’s palace, military barracks and with local residents. Subsequently, the entire Christian population was evacuated from Ternate, mostly to North Sulawesi, with a few travelling to Tobelo, where a substantial North Malukan Christian community lived.\textsuperscript{358} Although the Muslim political elite from all spectrums remained largely intact at this point, the Ternate Sultan was in an increasingly vulnerable position having lost a large group of supporters, and the ‘religious’ element of conflict was now at the forefront, with the Sultan on the losing side. Over the following month, the Ternate Sultan gradually lost both the ‘ethno-religious’ conflict playing out on the streets and the elite political contest. By December 1999, his

\textsuperscript{356} Wilson (2008).
\textsuperscript{357} Wilson (2008), pp.84-88. Six years after the Tidore massacres, in 2005, Christians were still unable to (or chose not to) return to Tidore.
political position – which had appeared so strong in June, when he was the leading gubernatorial candidate – was destroyed.\(^{359}\)

(ii) Escalation of religious violence

Inter-religious violence then escalated rapidly in two different locations simultaneously: Ternate city and the Tobelo/Galela region of north Halmahera. Although sparked by separate incidents, these conflicts were both set in the context of increasingly violent clashes between northern and southern ethnic groups in Ternate and Tidore, and the rapidly escalating religious dimension of the violence. The ensuing violence was particularly devastating in Tobelo and Galela, where extended families contained both Christians and Muslims, and in some cases killed each other.\(^{360}\) By the end of 1999, the entire province was segregated along ethnic and religious lines, and the political elite had been permanently reconfigured.

Through November and into December 1999, attacks grew between what was by this point called the *Pasukan Kuning* (Yellow Troops) – an amalgamation of the Ternate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ guard and pro-Ternate Sultan groups – and the pro-Makian groups. As Ramadan drew to a close, the pro-Makian groups attracted more Tidore and other southern members and began to call themselves the *Pasukan Putih* (White Troops), in reference to their collective Muslim identity.\(^{361}\) The main fracture line in the conflict was at this point still *between* indigenous Muslim groups, despite the anti-Christian attacks in Tidore, with the more ‘traditional’ Muslim community from the northern groups behind the Yellow Troops, and defending Christians, and the more ‘orthodox’ migrant Muslim communities from the south supporting the White Troops.\(^{362}\) Despite the ‘spontaneous riots’ argument put forward by Ternate residents to explain this period of violence, the organisation of the two groups, as well as their immunity from arrest or security force intervention, reflects the close hand of the political elite.\(^{363}\) By December, the atmosphere had deteriorated to such an extent

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\(^{359}\) By 2007 – almost a decade after the incidents described here – the Ternate Sultan was still unable to recover the political position he had reached by mid-1999, and the southern elite continued to dominate most senior political and bureaucratic positions (see Chapter Six).

\(^{360}\) Interviews with victims of the December 1999 massacres, Tobelo, July and December, 2005.

\(^{361}\) Wilson (2008), p.130.

\(^{362}\) Ternate residents recalled this wave of violence as the most traumatic as Muslims had attacked Muslims. Interviews, May-December 2005.

\(^{363}\) Ternate residents - both Makian and Ternate - asserted the conflict was still largely ‘spontaneous’ at this point. But, as highlighted earlier, wider evidence does not support this interpretation. See, also,
that it was relatively easy for political leaders to mass groups into rapid action, with the results frequently blamed on the other side, provoking a cycle of further revenge attacks.

It was not long before the Sultan’s Yellow Troops were overwhelmed. The newly ‘restored’ Tidore Sultan intervened, brokering a temporary ‘cease-fire’ from the White Troops, whilst the Ternate Sultan’s troops surrendered. The symbolism of the (new) Tidore Sultan intervening to restore peace between Ternate and Tidore groups – a leadership role dominated by the Ternate Sultanate for several centuries – held great appeal to the southern migrant groups, a fact that Bahar Andili, the puppet-master of the Tidore Sultan, would have been acutely aware of. The Ternate Sultan subsequently ‘surrendered’ and was evacuated to Manado, in North Sulawesi, ending his political career. Whilst he later attempted to regain local power via electoral means, these attempts all failed, as Chapter Six explores. The White Troops had won, bringing the southern political faction – headed by Bahar, Thaib, and Syamsir – into uncontested regional power.364

With the Ternate Sultan’s evacuation, the elite contest for provincial power between the northern and southern factions was effectively resolved. However, this did not mean the North Maluku conflict was over. By this point, a chain reaction had been set off invoking both ethnic and wider religious identities. Inter-group violence escalated to new levels across the province, first in Tobelo, north Halmahera. After the October attacks by Kao on the Malifut Makian villages, ethnic Tobelo (a majority Christian group) prepared for revenge attacks on Tobelo town by resident Makian and Tidore migrants. The Muslim community was increasingly nervous, for although – at that point – they formed a majority in Tobelo, the town was surrounded by Christian villages, and the Kao forces had not yet disbanded.365 Wilson (2008) demonstrates how preparation for revenge attacks on both sides meant mass Muslim-Christian violence became increasingly inevitable.

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Wilson (2008) p.131-132. Ternate informants, however, reported that from February 2000, with the declaration of *jihad* against North Malukan Christians, the conflict grew more organised, with the outright support of the southern political elite for the *jihad*. Interviews, Ternate, May-December 2005.  
364 Later this triumvirate came apart during the first gubernatorial elections, which Thaib initially contested against Bahar (see Chapter Six).  
As riots escalated between the Yellow and White Troops in Ternate and Tidore, this was no longer a localised Kao/Makian conflict, but instead came to symbolise a wider and deeper religious identity clash. Escalating tensions in Tobelo forced the removal of the local camat (sub-district administrative head), who was viewed by the Christian population as pro-Muslim. A high-level delegation from Ternate – including the interim ‘care-taker’ Governor, Surasmin (appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs); Rusli Andiaco (newly appointed North Maluku district chief); and the Ternate Sultan (this was just prior to his fall) – had travelled to Tobelo in early December to mediate but failed to prevent the escalation of violence over the following few weeks, leading to devastating consequences in the Tobelo and Galela regions.366

The Muslim community launched a ‘preventive’ attack on Tobelo in December, believing a Kao one imminent. Muslim groups held the city for a few days, shocking Christian residents. A counter-attack was then launched by the Kao militia, led by Benny Bitjara (who had led the ethnic cleansing against the Makian in October). Protestant pastors in Tobelo and the surrounding villages blessed weapons and warriors in church services, officially sanctioning violent action for the first time in the conflict.367 During the counter-attack, the Muslim population was forced out of Tobelo and surrounding villages. Several massacres took place in mosques, where hundreds of families took shelter, and many Muslim women and children were attacked by Kao and Tobelo militia.368 Local security forces again failed to intervene. The displaced Muslims who survived fled to Ternate, and the conflict then escalated further north to Galela, where the largely Muslim population of Soasio town was attacked by Kao-Tobelo forces and was again forced to evacuate. During

366 Wilson (2008), p.106. The damage caused by the conflict was still evident in 2005, with many charred buildings remaining in Tobelo (including churches, mosques, homes, plantation buildings, factories etc), inflammatory graffiti still covering walls, and previously mixed communities living in segregated areas.

367 North Halmahera was the original site of Christianity’s arrival in Indonesia, via the mid-fifteenth century Catholic missions, and the region thus held great significance to both the Catholic and Protestant communities. Protestant pastors believed they were defending their community and the birthplace of Christianity in Indonesia. See Wilson (2008). Interviews in Tobelo and Ternate with Catholic leaders also reported this.

368 Stories of atrocities such as beheadings and the eating of human organs abounded at this time. Such attacks were later largely blamed on the ‘Forest Tobelo’, indigenous highland groups from north Halmahera. However, Duncan (2001; 2005a) argues the Forest Tobelo were a useful scapegoat, and were in no position to dispute these claims. Later they actually used the stereotype to help defend their villages against loggers and other unwelcome guests.
these attacks in north Halmahera, ethnic and clan groups divided along religious lines, with family members and hamlet communities attacking each other. As such, the nature of violence in north Halmahera had changed dramatically by late 1999.\textsuperscript{369}

North Halmahera Muslims who survived the Tobelo and Galela attacks were evacuated to Ternate at the end of December, just after the defeat of the Ternate Sultan’s Yellow Troops. At this point, even ethnic Ternate members of the disbanded Yellow Troops – who up to this point had defended ethnic Kao and Ternate Christians – turned their support towards the ‘White Troops’, as family members from North Halmahera reported Christian violence against Muslims. Political and community leaders started to instigate a new form of religious warfare. A large jihad (or Islamic holy war) militia force was recruited and trained by religious and political leaders in Ternate and Tidore, from February 2000 onwards, to respond to the north Halmahera attacks. Outrage at the violence of the attacks on Muslims in north Halmahera in fact led to a nationwide call for jihad against Christians in the Maluku region, with the foundation of radical militant Islamic groups on Java, including Laskar Jihad.\textsuperscript{370}

By the end of December 1999, the North Maluku conflict had become an ‘all-or-nothing’ confrontation, with limited room for ordinary community members to negotiate or escape its consequences, leading to the most extreme forms of religious cleansing and violence. Identity, history, doctrine, ideology – both local and global – fused on each side of the conflict. The conflict was no longer confined to a local intra-elite contest over control of branches of the state, and political actors at the local, regional and national level capitalised on this locally brewed violence and exploited it for their own interests.\textsuperscript{371}

\textsuperscript{369} Interviews, victims of the north Halmahera massacres, July and December 2005, Tobelo. In 2005, the locations of bodies of victims of these massacres were still being identified, via unofficial community processes. Because many of those who knew where bodies were located were potentially implicated in the violence, the identification process had been long delayed because of fears of revenge attacks. I interviewed several men who had only recently discovered the location of their family members’ bodies, five years after the massacres, following assistance from their neighbours.


\textsuperscript{371} Scenes from the north Halmahera massacres later featured in Islamic jihad recruitment videos in Indonesia and further afield, even to Yemen, illustrating the global mobilisation networks involved in religious violence when local, regional and international interests merged (recruitment videos witnessed by author in Ternate and Jakarta, 2005).
The final phase of violence followed the expulsion of the Christian community from Tidore and Ternate, the exile of the Ternate Sultan, and the subsequent arrival in Ternate of displaced Muslims from Tobelo and Galela in December 1999. Student, youth, community and other groups in Ternate and Tidore were then organised into a much larger Islamic militia, or jihad group, still known as the White Troops, with the explicit goal of removing the Christian population from North Maluku province, particularly from the Kao and Galela regions – the historic heartland of Christianity in Maluku. Over 4,000 – and possibly up to 10,000 – jihad fighters were recruited, trained and dispatched in a five-month long wave of clashes between the Muslim militia and Christian villagers in north Halmahera.\footnote{Many reports and informants claimed that radical Islamic militant groups from around Indonesia were involved in the fighting in North Maluku, for example, International Crisis Group (2000a). However, while a few national radical militant figures were recorded at mosques in north Halmahera rallying troops (video evidence attested to this), field evidence did not support the claim that thousands of outside fighters were involved. Instead, the majority of fighters were most likely North Malukan, with locals rejecting the ‘assistance’ of outsiders. Outsiders were later blamed for the violence in order that communities could reconcile with themselves after the atrocities.} Christian villages held out against the White Troops for some months but were eventually defeated, fleeing to Tobelo, the last Christian stronghold in North Maluku. In July 2000 – almost one year after the first clashes on Halmahera – the central government finally ordered Civil Emergency status in North Maluku, closing ports, airports, major roads and dispatching further military support to the provincial government.\footnote{As with the failure of the local security forces to respond effectively to escalating violence, it was unclear why the national level took so long to respond to the conflict with effective military action. It is possible that national elites intended for the conflict to burn out of its own accord, having other, more pressing, conflicts to deal with in East Timor and Aceh. Aditjondro (2001) and Tomagola (2000) argue it was in the military’s direct interests to allow the Maluku conflicts to escalate in order to preserve a central role for the military in the national government, a territorial role to ‘maintain’ order, and to protect their regional financial interests.}

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated how the North Malukan political elite moved from a tenuous, though effective, coalition across different factions within Golkar – advocating for a new province – to the sponsorship of ethno-religious violence against each other in the battle for power in the new province. The contest between elite factions sharpened as the new province approached inauguration, and localised
ethnic clashes escalated towards wider ethnic and, later, religious confrontations, sponsored by the elite factional leaders. The escalation of violence from the local to the provincial level was tied directly to the escalation of political interests of the state-based elite in controlling the new province. Later, the conflict took on its own momentum, as wider issues and problems merged, even after the intra-elite contest was resolved through the elimination of the Ternate Sultan from local politics. The political elite gradually lost control of the increasingly polarised conflict, as other leaders and interest groups – religious, political, even national – became involved.

The configuration of the elite political leadership was dramatically altered by the conflict, with the southern political faction successful, and the northern defeated. This was not a pre-ordained outcome – at several points the northern faction gained significant ground. At the beginning of conflict the Ternate Sultan held a range of powerful local political positions, acting as chair of the North Maluku district parliament and regional head of Golkar. These posts put him in a strong position to lobby to become the first North Maluku Governor, but sponsoring the northern ethnic groups in the conflict, and defending the Christian minority, against superior southern – and militant Muslim – forces, led to his downfall. The southern triumvirate of Bahar Andili, Thaib Armain and Syamsir Andili triumphed.

In light of the competing explanations for the transitional conflicts in Indonesia (outlined in Chapter One), the chapter has shown how the North Maluku conflict was a contest for political power within the state-based elite. The four leading figures in the North Malukan political elite at the end of the New Order were all situated within branches of the local executive and legislative bodies of government. Each sought greater power in local politics by securing leadership over the new provincial branches of the state. The North Maluku conflict did not therefore reflect a political clash between societal rebels and the state, or societal groups against each other, though ethnic alliances played a mobilising and dividing role in violence. At the elite level, it was crucially a political contest between different state factions, created and embedded in different branches of the state bureaucracy during different regime periods, as Chapter Two demonstrated.
The immediate process of democratisation and local government reform in the North Maluku region triggered this bitter inter-elite contest, and the stakes grew higher with the potential of new regional economic resources, and the establishment of the Gosowong goldmine. The contest spiralled into mass violence over several phases of conflict escalation and the political elite’s prevention of security force intervention. Prior to government reforms and the opening up of the local political system after 1998, such a contest would have been inconceivable in local politics. As such, the local government reforms of the democratic transition enabled reconfiguration *within* the state-based political elite, but no societal ‘outsiders’ challenged and entered the formal political sphere at this point – despite initial appearances, with the ‘return’ of the Ternate Sultan to local politics.374

Seeing his opportunity to ‘re-claim’ political power during the transition moment, the Ternate Sultan – nominally representing the ‘northern’ faction in local politics – extended his political reach through 1999, amassing political positions in the North Maluku district parliament and party system. He did so through a variety of means, including intimidation and violence and in doing so, threatened the other elite members of the state coalition, affiliated to the southern communities of North Maluku. Rivalry over the location of the new provincial capital and selection of the first governor reflected elite concerns over which ethnic group would ultimately gain power. Provincial power would determine political and economic patronage for the ensuing years, thus forming a critical fracture line. As tensions mounted over which group would succeed, the Sultan’s increasingly aggressive tactics rallied the southern faction. The forced displacement of ten thousand Makian villagers – an ethnically ‘southern’ group – to the provincial capital cemented inter-group rivalry at both the elite and community levels. This signalled the moment when the southern elite changed track and worked against the Ternate Sultan via their own proxy militia and community groups.

By the end of 1999, intra-elite conflict had therefore mapped onto and merged with ‘communal’ conflict (which, in itself, was never only a ‘local’ problem). This was a

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374 Chapter Two outlined why the ‘sultans’ must be understood as state-embedded figures, not societal elites, due to their reliance on (even creation by) the Dutch colonial regime, and subsequent subordinate incorporation into the New Order regime.

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far from spontaneous process, as the political elite and community and political leaders encouraged their affiliated street and youth groups towards acts of violence against the opposing side. Both sides acted directly to prevent intervention from the local security forces, demonstrating that the rising violence did not reflect state weakness but competing interests within it.375 The elite coalition finally came apart in November 1999, and, by December, religious violence had forced the removal of all Christians from Ternate and Tidore, and the evacuation of the Ternate Sultan from his seat of power. The southern bureaucratic faction had won. Thus, the political leaders who emerged from the conflict in mid-2000, holding the senior political positions and chief bureaucratic posts, were almost the same as those in power before the transitional reforms and prior to the conflict, with one critical exception: the Ternate Sultan had been removed from the local political elite.

In light of the wider debate on ethno-religious conflict, the findings of this chapter support the theses presented by Snyder (2000) and Brass (1997; 2003). Political competition over control of the state during conditions of democratisation played the critical role in enabling the escalation of ethnic and then religious tensions towards outright inter-communal violence.376 Whilst the actors themselves involved in the riots between late 1999 and mid-2000 had many reasons to fight, and as ethnic and religious dimensions of the conflict reached increasingly hardened positions, the elites played an essential role in driving localised tensions to this point. Snyder, in particular, stresses that under conditions where democratic institutions are weak, but the bureaucracy is strong, this kind of 'communal' violence evolves rapidly and forcefully. North Maluku, with its powerful bureaucratic and political elite in contest with each other, but weak democratic institutions to manage such situations during the transition period, serves as a test case of the dangers posed by rapid democratisation and government reform.

375 That the state bureaucratic elite, and not local branches of the military, played the dominant role in local politics during this period could reflect several features of national politics. It is possible that the national elite, including the military, wanted local elites to "fight it out" within the state, thus ensuring the survival of the strongest faction within the state and continued state integrity. It is also possible that the military was so unsure of its position within the new democratic government that regional conflicts were allowed to escalate in order to guarantee the military's role in the new era. Further research would be required to develop this analysis further.

376 See Snyder (2000), p.29 and 32, on the rising chances of war and nationalist conflict during the early stages of democratisation.
Chapter Four -  
Economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival of the bureaucratic elite in post-conflict North Maluku

It is essential to understand who controls the public financing system in conflict areas in Eastern Indonesia because those people drive local politics.

*Regional public finance expert, Makassar.*

Introduction

The impact of the year-long conflict in North Maluku was felt on multiple fronts. Around 3,000 people died and thousands more were seriously injured. Over 150,000 and up to 250,000 people were displaced – between one fifth and one third of the local population – some of them permanently to other regions. Hundreds of villages and large parts of the major towns were burnt down, and areas that were rebuilt were permanently segregated. Hundreds of churches and mosques were also destroyed; and markets, ports, factories, major roads, fishing fleets, plantations and storage facilities damaged by burning and looting. The combined destruction of the infrastructure of the regional economy, the displacement of the local population, and the eventual closure of major roads and ports by the Indonesian military, contributed to regional economic crisis. Communities in urban areas were also overwhelmed by displaced relatives looking for shelter and employment. Rural communities lost their livelihoods and the planting, harvesting and sale of agricultural goods was seriously disrupted for the duration of the conflict.

After almost one year of escalating violence, the central government authorised civil emergency status for North Maluku in June 2000. Until this was lifted in 2003, this decision gave the interim, and then elected, Governors of North Maluku complete authority over the regional government. It also enabled the transfer of emergency and ‘post-conflict’ aid from central to provincial government.  

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377 Interview, Makassar, 4 October 2005.
378 See Section 4.1 on the difficulties of establishing accurate figures on those killed and displaced.
379 While it is unusual to describe internal government resource allocation of emergency or other funds as ‘aid’ – a term normally reserved for international development or humanitarian funds – this is how it was described by the Indonesian government (the official term was *pembantuan*, which translates as...
broad socio-economic affects of the conflict, this chapter explores the national, provincial and local government dynamics behind state capture of central government aid funds. Field research findings indicated that this took place predominantly at the provincial level of government, in the Governor’s office and provincial level agencies under the Governor’s authority.

Arriving in the provincial capital, Ternate, in May 2005 – five years after the imposition of civil emergency status, and two years after it was lifted – several sights and events immediately indicated that state capture of government aid funds (as well as other sources of aid funds) had taken place. Soon after I arrived, I witnessed several protests organised by students and civil society groups against the alleged corrupt use of emergency aid funds intended for IDPs by the Governor’s office. Students from the Muhammidiyah movement, Khairun University and Ternate Islamic University had formed an anti-corruption coalition, claiming that over 54 billion rupiah (approximately six million US dollars) had been illegally appropriated by the Governor’s office. They protested regularly outside the Ternate courts and provincial government offices with coverage in the local press.

Reports in local newspapers between 1999 and 2005 indicated that many protests had taken place over alleged corruption in the use of the emergency and post-conflict government aid funds. Articles from 2004 reported on protests organised by local civil society groups against alleged corruption by the Governor’s office, as well as the slow legal investigation into different corruption cases by the provincial government. When asked about the most popular local news stories, the editor of one local newspaper replied, “Our newspaper has mainly covered corruption issues

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since the conflict. This is because of all the money for the refugees that went missing.” 384

The student and NGO-led anti-corruption demonstrations were not the only indication of state capture of emergency and post-conflict aid funds. There was also the visible problem of conflict-damaged infrastructure, with the charred remains of formerly paved roads, houses, mosques, churches, warehouses and factories in the larger towns and in villages located in the conflict’s various epicentres. Newly built smart villas for senior government officials and their business clients lined the more pleasant streets of Ternate, in sharp contrast to the generally simple housing conditions, and in even starker contrast to the charred building remains in other parts of town. Parades of luxury cars during government sponsored functions were another incongruity in a town where most people travelled by motorbike. One local activist in Ternate commented:

After the conflict the government financed a lot of reconstruction projects. But maybe 40 per cent of the aid for these projects went missing. People say 54 billion went missing from the government projects for public works, reconstruction, IDPs. 385

During further investigations, I visited the squalid pengungsi (IDP) barracks in Ternate – temporary shelters set up in 1999, where thousands still lived in 2005 – and I interviewed relief workers and residents. 386 I also visited pengungsi camps in Tobelo, located around the Catholic Church compound, and the temporary shelters of other IDPs living in and around North Halmahera. The IDP, camp-worker and government officials I interviewed reported a lack of investment in the rehabilitation of IDP communities and indicated that substantial proportions of government aid funds for IDPS had not reached the officially intended ‘beneficiaries’. One member of the Ternate city parliament reported:

The provincial government was responsible for the refugees. There were thousands of households displaced here. But because of all the financial interests of the provincial government in the refugee problem, it is not yet solved. The pengungsi are still here. 387

384 Interview, Editor, Ternate Pos, 28 June 2005, Ternate.
385 Interview, Diahi staff member (local NGO), 3 June 2005, Ternate.
386 In Indonesian the word pengungsi refers to both ‘internally’ displaced people and refugees who have crossed national borders.
387 Interview, Golkar MP, Ternate City DPRD, 22 June 2005, Ternate.
During seven months of fieldwork, the politics and mechanisms behind local government capture of the emergency and post-conflict aid funds gradually emerged, revealing the way local machine politics operated.\textsuperscript{388} It became clear that whilst there were definite winners and losers from the conflict, the result was not only determined by the religious identity of local residents. Local benefits or losses from the conflict also depended on people’s relationships to civil servants in the provincial government. The closer a person was related to – or the higher a person was seated in – the provincial government bureaucracy, the more likely that that person had made political and financial gains from the conflict following its official end. Close connections via family or business relations to members of the provincial government enabled access to the central government emergency and post-conflict aid funds. In the immediate years following the conflict, these funds were one of the primary sources of government revenue to the province. Control over and subsequent capture of these aid funds led to a concentration of economic and political power in the provincial government, the details of which this chapter explores.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview of the socio-economic situation in North Maluku following the conflict, to set the inflow of emergency and reconstruction aid funds in context. The subsequent sections then discuss government activities in response to the crisis at different levels. Section 4.2 explores the dynamics behind the central government’s response to the crisis. It also considers some of the methodological challenges of estimating aid sums to North Maluku (for comparative estimates of these funds, see Annex A). It then outlines the two main phases of the national government’s response, and for each considers the rationale behind why the national government enabled (or ignored) provincial state capture of the emergency and post-conflict funds, a process of which they were aware.

The following two sections consider the provincial and local government responses to the crisis. Section 4.3 explores the provincial mechanisms behind state capture of government aid funds. This section considers three factors concentrating power in

\textsuperscript{388} Fieldwork required prolonged local observations and repeated interviews with provincial, local and central government officials, local journalists, civil society activists, former public servants, provincial parliament members, academics, students and members of local and international non-governmental organisations. See Chapter One on research methodology.
the Governor's office following the conflict: – the impact of emergency legislation; the limited roles of the provincial parliament and other provincial level government and non-governmental bodies; and the technical limitations (or 'limited capacity') of the provincial government. Section 4.4 examines the fragility of local (sub-provincial) government bodies in contrast to the powerful provincial level of government following the conflict, analysing the limitations of the newly established district and city governments. Comparing the national, provincial and local government responses to the conflict and management of aid funds enables a layered picture of the extensive aid capture by the provincial government. Chapter Five, which follows, then considers specific case studies of provincial and local state capture of international aid funds (much of which also flowed through branches of the North Maluku government) to complement the findings here.

4.1 Socio-economic crisis in the wake of conflict

Before analysing the political dynamics behind emergency and post-conflict aid from the central government to North Maluku province, this section summarises both the immediate impacts of and the wider socio-economic context following the year-long conflict. I cover six key areas: – (i) conflict-related deaths and displacements; (ii) ongoing regional economic contraction; (iii) the impact of internal displacement; (iv) agricultural sector decline; (v) regional infrastructure and business destruction; and (vi) the regional employment situation.

(i) Death and displacement figures

As with most incidents of conflict, no conclusive figures are available on the numbers who died during the violence: estimates vary between 2,000 and 3,500 dead. The North Maluku provincial government estimated that 2,004 people died and 1,769 were injured as a result of the conflict between October 1999 and March

389 I refer here to the wider socio-economic 'context' following the conflict, rather than the direct 'impact' of conflict. Local informants – and national analysts, see Swisher et al (2004) - argued that the post-2000 North Maluku economic crisis was a direct result of the conflict. However, without comparative data from similar regions of Eastern Indonesia which did not go through conflict, it is hard to establish the precise causal links between the conflict and its economic effects. Analysing the comparative data is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it would be interesting to do so in further research.
2000.\textsuperscript{390} In 2003, the Provincial Governor’s Office pronounced a final estimate of 2,083 deaths as a result of the conflict.\textsuperscript{391} One UN-sponsored study of collective violence in Indonesia (based on newspaper reports rather than official government figures) calculated that 2,794 people had died.\textsuperscript{392} Wilson (2008) reports between 3,000 and 3,500 deaths too place as a result of the conflict. He argues that the official figures excluded deaths between March and June 2000, when numerous incidents produced large losses of life.\textsuperscript{393} Even using the low estimates means the North Maluku conflict was one of the bloodiest in Indonesia since the 1965-1966 massacres, rivalling death rates in the Aceh and East Timor conflicts.\textsuperscript{394} Figures of those displaced as a result of the conflict are similarly disputed, with the most commonly cited ranging between 150,000 and 250,000. The Governor’s Office estimated approximately 250,000 people were affected, 199,605 displaced within the province, and 48,015 to other provinces.\textsuperscript{395} The UNDP estimated 166,318 were displaced.\textsuperscript{396} With an original population of approximately 780,000, between one third and one fifth were displaced, based on these estimates.\textsuperscript{397} This severe level of local displacement contributed to several of the more severe socio-economic problems North Maluku experienced following the conflict.

\textit{(ii) Overall regional economic contraction}

Prior to the conflict, and following the national economic crisis between 1998 and 1999, the regional economy of North Maluku shrank dramatically, with regional growth rates contracting to almost minus 17 per cent (see Annex A, Table A.1). This followed a decline of eight per cent between 1997 and 1998, in line with the national economic crisis, after three years of steady decline in regional growth. In contrast to the national rebounding of the economy by 2000, however, the North Maluku

\textsuperscript{391} Figure cited in Wilson (2008), p.3.
\textsuperscript{392} Varshney et al (2004).
\textsuperscript{393} Wilson (2008), pp.1-3.
\textsuperscript{394} Van Klinken (2001), p.2.
\textsuperscript{395} Figures cited in Wilson (2008), p.3. Again, the final IDP figures were probably higher as the government compiled these figures before the end of the conflict.
\textsuperscript{396} UNDP (2001).
\textsuperscript{397} North Maluku population figures from BPS (2001).
economy did not begin to recover until 2001. Local informants and external analysts ascribed the continued regional crisis in North Maluku to the conflict.\footnote{398}{See Swisher et al (2004). In interviews with local government officials, parliamentarians and economists, the conflict was cited as the major reason behind the dramatic economic collapse in North Maluku; in contrast the official provincial reports on the economy did not refer to the impact of conflict (see, for example, North Maluku Provincial Government 2002).}

Many different factors played a determining role in the extended contraction of the North Malukan economy. For example, a delayed impact of the national economic crisis is likely to have deepened local recession, along with ongoing contraction in the local building industry.\footnote{399}{Van Klinken (2007), p.110, discusses the effects of the national economic crisis on the building sector in the wider Maluku economy and the potential political effects this had on regional Golkar coalitions, given the dependent relationship between Golkar officials and building sector contractors.} Without regional comparative data from similar but non-conflict regions it is difficult to conclude that conflict was the main driver of regional economic decline.\footnote{400}{Further research to obtain comparative regional economic figures would enable this comparison, but it went beyond the scope of this project.} However, its multiple effects on the local population, infrastructure, business, agricultural and employment situation likely played a contributing role to the regional economic crisis, as the following sections illustrate.

\textbf{(iii) Displacement of the local population}

During the conflict, thousands of displaced North Malukans fled to the major towns, Muslims to Ternate and Christians to Tobelo. Thousands of Christian North Malukans, including most of the local ethnic Chinese population, were also evacuated to neighbouring provinces, in particular North Sulawesi (a majority Christian region).\footnote{401}{See Duncan (2005b) on the displacement of North Malukan Christians to North Sulawesi.} The population of Ternate rose dramatically, to between 152,000 and 180,000, with the arrival of displaced people from across the province, even though around 15,000 fled to Tobelo.\footnote{402}{Wilson (2008), p.3 provides the higher figure; BPS (2001), p.73, the lower estimate.} Shelter and food were immediate priorities, but the provincial and local government later assisted the return or resettlement of many of the displaced population, though thousands remained displaced in 2005. The continued presence of the displaced strained both local government and community resources. Later sections of this chapter discuss the problems of government assistance to the IDP population.
Almost all the local Christian (including ethnic Chinese) population were forced to flee or were evacuated from the province although some remained in Tobelo and surrounding majority Christian areas. Local informants argued that due to the important role of local ethnic Chinese in key sectors of the regional economy, their departure caused major economic problems. One Ternate city official argued:

At the time of the conflict we had two big problems here: so many refugees and no Chinese in the economy. They all fled, but they controlled the distribution and trading networks. Ternate is the centre of port trade and transit for the whole province. So when Ternate was hit by the conflict, everything began to shut down. By the year 2000 the economic problems here were huge and inflation was very high.\(^{403}\)

However, in contrast to this local official's view, it is important not to exaggerate the role of the ethnic Chinese in the North Malukan economy prior to the conflict, especially as the data on this issue are poor. The local ethnic Chinese population was likely to have been relatively small, and other locals would have easily taken over the small-scale trading and distribution businesses run by ethnic Chinese after their departure.\(^{404}\) As one economist observed, following the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in May 1998, when the ethnic Chinese population was held responsible for the economic crisis by many sectors of the population, it was highly unlikely that the departure of 100,000 Chinese could explain the huge increase in the prices of basic goods during the crisis, which was more likely attributable to the dramatic decrease in the value of the Indonesian rupiah.\(^{405}\) Similarly, in North Maluku, it was unlikely that the departure of (what was probably) a small percentage of the fleeing Christian population was a major contributing factor to the regional economic crisis, though it may have contributed to the interruption of trading and distribution networks. In this case, as nationally, it was politically expedient for local politicians, officials and the ordinary population to blame the minority Chinese population for ongoing economic problems, while other factors were likely to have played a more significant role.

\(^{403}\) Interview, Ternate City Government Secretary, 19 October 2005, Ternate.
\(^{404}\) Pre-2000 data on local population ethnic composition is extremely difficult to obtain, making it hard to verify the size of the local ethnic Chinese population prior to the conflict. Discussions with Anne Booth, Indonesian economy expert, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, August 2008.
\(^{405}\) Former Cabinet Minister and economist Kwik Kian Gie, cited in Purdey (2006), p.177. Indonesian ethnic Chinese certainly dominated the private sector of the economy and headed the majority of the top 300 conglomerates in the Indonesian economy prior to the national economic crisis (Backman 2001, pp.84-91), but estimating the extent to which the departure of wealthier ethnic Chinese during the crisis effected the overall economic situation is controversial.
These factors include the overall displacement of the local population and the subsequent disruption of the agricultural sector, as well as the widespread destruction of regional infrastructure.

(iv) **Agricultural sector decline**
Conflict and displacement had severe effects on the agricultural sector. In 2001, agriculture and forestry accounted for 42 per cent of the North Malukan regional product, comprising the single largest sector in the economy.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^6\) As the driver of the regional economy, employing the majority of the regional labour force before and after the conflict, disruption to the agricultural sector during the conflict led to major problems for the rural population.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^7\) Farmers evacuated their homes and abandoned fields and crops during the conflict. Others who did not – or could not – evacuate were unable to sell their produce as local trading networks closed down, and transportation to outside markets was restricted.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^8\) Prices of key local commodities fell drastically as local markets collapsed. For six months following the conflict, copra, cloves and nutmeg (three important local agricultural products) could not be sold locally or shipped due to a combination of fear of travel, transportation restrictions and lack of buyers. Many farmers – like local fishermen – focused on producing goods for subsistence only, not wider sale.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^9\) Food crops, estate crops and the forestry sub-sector were also dramatically affected.\(^4\)\(^1\)\(^0\) North Maluku’s regional economy outside small urban centres was dominated by small businesses, informal trade, farming and fishing – all of these sectors felt the impact of conflict.\(^4\)\(^1\)\(^1\)

(v) **Destruction of regional infrastructure and businesses**
Public buildings (including schools and government offices), markets, roads, ports, fishing boats, plantations, fields, warehouses, private homes and religious buildings were all targeted during the most violent phases of the conflict. According to the Provincial Governor’s Office, over 18,000 houses, almost 100 mosques, over 100

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\(^{407}\) Swisher et al (2004), p.4. I focus on agriculture here as the dominant sector in the regional economy, but other sectors were also impacted by the conflict, including trade (three per cent decline); manufacturing (10.5 per cent decline); banking and business support services (7.6 per cent decline); and fisheries (figure unavailable). See Swisher et al (2004), pp.5-6.
churches and over 100 schools were destroyed during the violence. Many villages were completely burned down. In 2005, whilst many villages, roads and market facilities had been rebuilt, other buildings and infrastructure had not. One of the reasons for the lack of reconstruction in some areas, but speedy recovery in others, was due to the way the emergency and post-conflict reconstruction funds were allocated by the provincial government, as subsequent sections of this chapter, and Chapter Five, explores further.

During the conflict, large and medium sized enterprises were closed, as employees remained at home, fled or were evacuated. Some of the larger and more prominent businesses were attacked and their infrastructure and assets destroyed during the conflict, including PT GAI, a large banana plantation in Galela, North Halmahera district – located in the epicentre of one of the later waves of the conflict. This plantation did not re-open following the conflict, which was a major loss to local employees as well as the overall agriculture sector. Other plantations, fisheries and mines were also attacked and temporarily ceased operations, including the Gosowong goldmine, the largest operation in the province. However, the mining sector renewed operations relatively quickly, due to the remote setting of most and the provision of security by the police and armed forces.

(vi) Post-conflict unemployment

Officially, unemployment was 7.53 per cent in 2004, but interviews and observations indicated that this figure underestimated urban unemployment. Staff at the North Maluku Statistics Bureau suggested that the region may have had one of the highest urban unemployment rates in the country. For example, in Ternate city in 2003, a local government report estimated urban unemployment at 50 per cent. Those who had work were employed mostly in the public sector, followed by small household

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413 Interviews and observations at the plantation site, July 2005. See also Swisher et al (2004), p.5.
414 Swisher et al (2004), p.6. The security sector did not provide this kind of protection to civilians or small scale businesses.
industries, timber processing plants, port industries, hotels, fishing, agriculture and tourism – sectors which recovered somewhat following the conflict.418

Chapter Two outlined the important role of public sector employment in the urban economy of the whole Maluku region during the New Order regime – and the stratified nature of access to the public sector. Van Klinken (2001) estimates that 21.6 per cent of the urban Malukan workforce – more than double the national average – were employed in the civil service in 1998.419 Following the national and regional economic crisis (1997-1999), and with rising unemployment due to the contraction of economic activity in urban areas of Maluku (including building and contracting services), the public sector became an even more critical source of local employment. When the conflict put further stress on the regional economy, urban dependence on public sector employment rose even higher.420

In 2005, at the time of field research, unemployment was particularly high among the urban youth population; large groups of young men idled on almost every street corner in Temate. In interviews, they reported that the most available form of employment was poorly paid work in the informal sector, particularly as motorbike taxi drivers. When jobs were advertised at the Temate police headquarters, long queues of young men far outstretched the availability of jobs. All government-based job advertisements revealed huge local demand.421 These high levels of unemployment and overall dependence on the public sector for both employment and business contracts in urban areas gave the provincial government great influence, as subsequent sections explore.

Overall, North Maluku faced a severe socio-economic situation in the wake of the conflict. Mass population displacement interrupted local agricultural production and trading. Infrastructure and large and small enterprises were targeted during the conflict, and recovery took several years, affecting trading, transport and the mobility

419 Van Klinken (2001), p.11, citing BPS (1998) data. North Maluku was still part of Maluku province at this time, so the Maluku statistics cover both regions.
420 Adam (2008) discusses the impact of conflict on the Ambonese economy and outlines the problematic legacies of stratified access to the informal economy as well as other forms of employment in the city.
of the local population. Unemployment in urban areas soared, partly as a result of the continued contraction of the economy, but also because of increased competition for jobs between IDPs and locals.\textsuperscript{422} The public sector grew even more important as a primary source of employment, business contracts and other forms of socio-economic welfare (for example, the provision of materials and funding for rebuilding houses) in the post-conflict period. The government's role in North Malukan society and the economy increased, as a result of the crisis in the wake of conflict, and also due to deliberate government policies.

4.2 Central government dynamics of aid funding

In the context of regional crisis, this section considers the central government's role in providing emergency and post-conflict aid to North Maluku. The first part estimates the total amount of central government aid funds to the province, and discusses the methodological and political problems in obtaining these data. The second analyses national politics between 1999 and 2002 – the civil emergency period in North Maluku – and outlines the rationale behind central political decisions taken on aid funding during this time. The third looks at the official post-conflict phase between 2003 and 2007. Within each official 'phase', I consider the reasons behind limited monitoring of aid funds by the central government, as well as the implications the terms and conditions attached to the aid funds had on the concentration of power in the new North Maluku Governor's office.

(i) Estimating central government aid

Central government emergency aid to North Maluku flowed in four main waves, reflecting the four official stages of emergency and post-conflict recovery in the region (see Annex A, Table A.2 for details). As a central government official from the Ministry for National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) reported, "The budgets for the IDPs and other post-conflict programmes are very difficult to trace, even for the central government."\textsuperscript{423} Of the different aid budgets to North Maluku,

\textsuperscript{422} Similar patterns marked Ambon following the conflict. See Adam (2008).
\textsuperscript{423} Interview, senior BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta. Subsequent tables also use comparative aid budget data from the North Maluku DPRD.
aid allocated during the military and civil emergency periods (1999-2003) was the hardest to trace for a combination of methodological and political reasons. It would have been necessary to access internal government budget documents from over twenty different ministries, including the Ministry of Finance, BAKORNAS – the central agency responsible for government emergency responses at this time – and the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as the provincial government’s budget records. In 2000 alone, at least four regions of Indonesia were under military and civil emergency status, producing a highly complex and unusual budgetary situation at both the national and provincial levels. As the corrupt use of government aid funds was under investigation in several provinces in 2005, including North Maluku, this also meant such data were highly sensitive at both the national and provincial levels during the field research.

Estimates of the aid budget during the emergency years (1999-2002) were calculated from BAPPENAS figures (see Annex A, Table A.2). BAPPENAS was not the ministry responsible for central government aid funds to North Maluku during the emergency period – they took over management of so-called ‘special’ funds to the region (as nationally) in the post-conflict period. However, they provided data on government aid flows to North Maluku during the emergency years. Where possible, I compared the BAPPENAS data to provincial parliament data, as well as figures from local non-governmental sources. Provincial parliament figures were likely to have been compromised by political interventions, but they served as an official record of provincial aid funds for certain periods. Non-governmental figures were problematic due both to their restricted access to official figures, and because of careless presentation. For the official post-conflict period (2003-2007), BAPPENAS provided data on the aid sums transferred to the provincial government, which varied, however, from the provincial parliament’s data (see Annex A, Table A.5 for comparative estimates).

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424 Obtaining research access to the aid budgets of these different ministries proved impossible.
425 Even with direct access to official data from the emergency period, there was no guarantee the figures would have been recorded accurately.
426 Aid budget data was not available from the North Maluku Governor’s office in 2005.
427 In none of the data provided by local non-governmental organisations was there any discussion of the methods behind how they had acquired the data, nor how they had calculated the total figures of aid and their corruption estimates.
428 I am grateful to the senior BAPPENAS officials who shared aid data and openly disclosed the problems with the post-conflict funds they managed.
The problems of tracing which agencies and line ministries were in charge of which funds, at which stage, and for what size of budget, reflects more than a methodological problem. It also likely reflects a deliberate political strategy to keep this data obscure. It was not only difficult for a foreign researcher to trace these aid funds: it was also hard for the central government agencies in charge of them. This fact indicated the strong likelihood of provincial state capture of the aid funds, as well the lack of control the central government had over the process. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter therefore serves as an illustration of the amount of aid flowing into North Maluku between 2000 and 2007, rather than precise estimates. The main point is to describe and analyse the political mechanisms behind provincial state capture of aid funds as no government agency or non-governmental monitor was able to state exactly how much aid had been transferred and subsequently captured.

To gain a sense of the importance of the overall provincial government budget in the North Maluku regional economy, I compared the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) and overall provincial government budgets across three provinces - North Maluku, West Java and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) - between 2000 and 2004 (see Annex A, Table A.3). When the provincial budgets are converted into percentages of regional economic product (see Annex A, Table A.4) the data show that the regional government budget played a much larger role in North Maluku's post-conflict economy, compared to the other two provinces. In North Maluku, the provincial government budget played a relatively important role as a percentage of GDRP, but it had only a small role in West Java's regional economy during the same period; NTT figures fell in between the two.

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429 Interview, senior official, BAPPENAS, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
430 It is useful to compare North Maluku to West Java because central government budget allocations to Java have tended to be much lower than those to eastern provinces by the New Order and post-New Order governments. This is despite the fact that population sizes are far larger in all the Java provinces, and (though political factors also play an important role in these budgetary allocations) because the domestic products of the Java provinces have always been much higher than in the Eastern provinces, with Java thus appearing to require less overall assistance from the central government. Booth (2003; 2009) discusses the political problems of these large central government allocations to the Eastern provinces when compared with the smaller allocations to Java, given that the poverty affected populations are actually bigger in Java. NTT province serves as a second comparison to North Maluku because of its location in Eastern Indonesia, with a similarly small population and GDRP (when compared to other Indonesian provinces), but which did not experience conflict during the democratic transition and did not therefore receive special aid budgets.
It is then possible to compare North Maluku’s regional domestic product in contrast to the provincial government budget and two estimates of the provincial aid budget, the first from the provincial parliament (DPRD) and the second from BAPPENAS (see Annex A, Table A.5). Further, North Maluku’s total provincial government budget can then also be seen as a percentage of GDRP (see Annex A, Table A.6), with aid budgets as percentages of both the total provincial budgets and GDRP for various years following the conflict. Using provincial parliament figures, the aid budget varied from between 25 and 50 per cent of the total provincial budget. As a percentage of GDRP, it contributed between five and eight per cent. Using the BAPPENAS figures, in contrast, it contributed between five and 27 per cent of the total provincial budget, and between 0.5 and five per cent of regional product. If the provincial parliament’s figures are correct, the aid budget between 2002 and 2004 represented a substantial proportion of the total provincial government budget, forming an important source of provincial income. Even if the lower BAPPENAS estimates are correct, the aid budget still represented a substantial proportion of the provincial government budget in the post-conflict period, averaging between one quarter and one third of the total (with the 2002 exception).

The data on aid funding from both sources were potentially inaccurate due to political manipulation of the figures, but it was still likely that the provincial aid budget formed a significant proportion of the provincial government budgets during the post-conflict period. As the provincial government budget played a substantial role in the overall economy of North Maluku during this period (as it had done during previous periods), it is therefore relatively safe to assume that the aid budgets also played an important role in the North Malukan economy. Control of these funds was concentrated in the Provincial Governor’s office – the politics of the provincial management of these funds is the subject of the following sections.


Towards the end of 1999, as the North Maluku conflict escalated, a state of military emergency was declared in the province. As such, preliminary emergency funds were

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431 It was unclear whether the provincial aid budgets were recorded as part of the total provincial government budget, or separate funds on top of the regular budget (sources contradicted each other), so, following the advice of regional economy experts, I have analysed them as part of overall provincial budgets.
transferred by BAKORNAS (the national emergency and disaster response agency) to SATKORLAK (the provincial branch of this agency, under the Governor’s control). The main wave of emergency funding followed the declaration of a civil emergency in Maluku and North Maluku by President Wahid on 26 June 2000.\footnote{Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000).}

This presidential decision, known as Kepres 88/2000, officially placed the Governors of Maluku and North Maluku in total control over managing the civil emergency in their respective provinces.\footnote{Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000), Paragraph Three.}

Owing to the conflict and post-conflict situation, between 1999 and 2002 the governorship of North Maluku was held by two ‘caretakers’, appointed directly by the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than locally elected. These centrally appointed governors were directly supported by the regional military, police and justice chiefs, and had far greater authority than in non-conflict provinces following the end of the New Order.\footnote{Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000) authorised the following figures to assist the Governors of Maluku and North Maluku provinces: - the Pattimura Region Military Commander (the territorial military commander of the Maluku region), the Maluku and North Maluku Region Police Chiefs, and the Chief Justice of Maluku.}

The burgeoning sense of local political power explored in Chapters Two and Three – which had been resurgent from the end of the Suharto era, risen through the creation of a new province in 1999, and continued throughout the subsequent conflict – was thus officially retrenched back into the hands of the central government, via the Governor’s office.

Yet even with official control of the Governor’s office lying in Jakarta, this did not mean the central government held practical control over its actions. Thaib Armain, one of the main leaders of the southern bureaucratic political elite in North Maluku, was appointed Regional Secretary to the Governor during the conflict. This bureaucratic position ranked him second or third to the Governor in terms of regional political and administrative control, and in terms of local influence, he was even more powerful.\footnote{Different sources reported that as Regional Secretary (or Provincial Chief of Staff) Thaib was the second or third most powerful regional bureaucrat. Most informants agreed he was on the rise.}

To understand why the central government did not directly control how the Governor’s office managed and spent the emergency and post-conflict aid funds, it is
worth recalling several aspects of national politics from the time. When President Wahid declared civil emergency status for the Maluku region, the central government also faced a looming conflict in Central Sulawesi, and ongoing battles with separatist movements in the East Timor, Irian Jaya (later renamed Papua) and Aceh regions. The following year, communal violence broke out in Central Kalimantan, following severe violence in West Kalimantan two years previously. North Maluku was therefore just one of six ongoing conflicts in mid-2000, with three of them manifested largely between Christian and Muslim groups, and three regions threatening to break away from the central state.436 The stability and security of the Indonesian nation state on the eastern and western margins of the country was therefore at a critical juncture.437

While most of the country remained stable and non-violent, these six conflicts put the central government under great strain in political and security terms, and also from an economic perspective. The restoration of foreign investment was a national priority following the monetary crisis of 1997-1998, but investors were discouraged by widespread insecurity. Many foreign and co-owned assets (which provided the central government with a large percentage of its tax revenue) were located in conflict regions: for example, Indonesia’s largest goldmines were situated in Papua, various oil and gas plants in Aceh, and North Maluku contained the small but lucrative NHM goldmine. It was therefore in the interests of central government to quickly restore regional state security in the whole Maluku region amidst what appeared to be civil chaos. Declaring a civil emergency, putting the Maluku and North Maluku Governors in complete charge of their provincial governments (with regional military, police and legal support) and pumping emergency funds into both Governors offices formed the backbone of central government policy in restoring regional government control to these restive areas.

436 See Chapter One (Table 1.1.) for a summary of conflicts during the democratic transition period.
437 This is not to say that the Indonesian nation state faced collapse at this time. Across most provinces the central government was unchallenged. However, the fact that six severe civil and military conflicts were ongoing in 2000 showed that the central state struggled to provide basic levels of security and public services in these regions - key functions of any state. The central government’s response to military and civil emergencies in these areas reflected genuine concern for overall national security. See Bertrand (2004) and Sidel (2006) on the deeper meanings of these conflicts for the composition of the Indonesian nation state.
In contrast to the urgency of restoring regional government control, monitoring regional government management of emergency funds was not a priority. Several central government officials in fact argued that it was in the direct interests of central government to unofficially enable regional government elites’ access to these funds as doing so ‘bought back’ regional government support to the centre at a time of great unrest. Whether intentional or not, central government’s relaxed control of provincial management of the aid funds contributed to a situation ripe for state capture of these funds by provincial government offices. This pattern was echoed across North Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Maluku provinces. As funds authorised under Kepres 88/2000 were outside the regular budget (which required national parliamentary approval) they were also removed from standard central government monitoring procedures at the time.

In summary, two central government actions led to the concentration of economic and political power in the North Maluku Governor’s office. First, during the civil emergency, the central government centralised state power in the Governor’s office and secondly, it failed to monitor its actions, leaving the Governor and his senior staff with great regional political and budgetary discretion. A third central government decision compounded this situation. The devolution of complete provincial control to the Governor’s office coincided with the implementation of nationwide decentralisation in 2001. Alongside the creation of a new provincial executive and legislature in North Maluku, many other new local government offices and parliaments were also being set up. As these local governments were new, ‘caretaker’ regents were put in control until local elections could be held. These regents were appointed by and directly under the Governor’s authority, without autonomy over their local government budgets. The combined effect of central government emergency policy and the implementation of decentralisation thus gave the Governor’s office unprecedented power over the entire government system in the new province – and its budgetary resources. The implications of this concentration of

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439 See Aragon (2007) on the corruption of aid funds in Central Sulawesi; interviews, members of the provincial parliament and civil society organisations, Ambon, October 2005; interviews, non-governmental organisations who had operated in Central Sulawesi and Maluku during the post-conflict period, October-December 2005, Jakarta.
440 Interview, BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
power in the Governor’s office, and how it led to extensive capture of aid funds, is analysed in Section 4.3.

(iii) Post-conflict aid funding (2003-2007)

By 2003, the civil emergency in North Maluku was officially over and the official phase of post-conflict ‘recovery’ began. The crucial legislation on post-conflict aid was issued by President Megawati via Presidential Instruction Number 6/2003 (Inpres 6/2003). This instruction authorised the disbursement of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction funds for the whole Maluku region (covering both Maluku and North Maluku provinces) for a three year ‘intervention’ period. Inpres 6/2003 provided a special source of government budget (Dana Alokasi Khusus), additional to the routine government budget allocations for provincial and local government (Dana Alokasi Umum). At the national level, Inpres 6/2003 funds were reportedly channelled via 20 line ministries on top of their regular central budgets.

Central government funding for Inpres 6/2003 came from two sources: – the Deconcentration (de-konsentrasi) and Contingency Funds (Cadangan Umum). The Deconcentration Fund was dispersed by ministries and central government departments to their provincial level branches, while contingency funding was allocated through the normal budgetary process in the national parliament (DPR), directly to provincial parliaments (DPRD). Due to the strengthening of DPR controls over – and tighter BAPPENAS management of – Inpres funds, these were much more closely monitored than the previous tranche of emergency funds. Nevertheless, as the Inpres 6/2003 funds were substantial for a small province like North Maluku, and represented an important component of the regional budget, access to them was highly contested and their management highly political.

According to BAPPENAS officials, there were several problems with transferring Inpres 6/2003 funds to the provincial governments of Maluku and North Maluku, and ensuring they were spent on planned projects. First, Inpres 6/2003 funds were

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441 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, World Bank, 8 May 2006, Jakarta.  
442 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, 4 October 2005, Makassar.  
443 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, World Bank, 8 May 2006, Jakarta.
delayed by the Presidential Secretariat. This led to subsequent discrepancies between ministerial and departmental planning cycles, so the funds did not come online until the new fiscal year in 2004.\textsuperscript{444} In the interim other ‘transitional’ funds were also used by the North Maluku provincial government for aid programmes. As such, it remains unclear precisely how much was transferred to North Maluku between 2003 and 2004 (see Annex A, Table A.2, for estimates).\textsuperscript{445} Post-conflict recovery projects during this period may also have been financed by the Deconcentration Fund. These funds were allocated via the Social Department and implemented by the provincial government, meaning this tranche of funding was not closely monitored.\textsuperscript{446} In 2004 post-conflict recovery funds allocated via Inpres 6/2003 finally began to flow. However, even then, in BAPPENAS’s view the funds were “not well socialised and less supported by ministries and departments”, meaning they were, “not effectively implemented.” Inpres 6/2003 funds were therefore re-allocated to the 2005-2007 period, although some had already been spent by the provincial government.\textsuperscript{447}

Part of the funding for Inpres 6/2003 came from the Central Reserve Budget, or Contingency Fund. This was a central budget for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction as well as natural disaster recovery. The Central Reserve Budget was a much fought over funding source for regional governments in post-conflict and disaster-affected areas. It was also a sensitive issue for the central government. For example, the fund could be used for IDP resettlement projects, demonstrating that even by 2004 - a general election year, and precisely when it wished to demonstrate successful handling of regional conflicts - the central government had still not resolved regional IDP problems. Then Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Jusuf Kalla stated the final allocations for IDPs would be commissioned by 2005 from the Reserve Budget.\textsuperscript{448} His statement did not mean the IDP problem would be solved by the deadline – but it indicated to provincial governments that this special IDP funding would eventually dry up. Provincial governments then found other

\textsuperscript{444} Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{445} The data was contradictory for allocations to North Maluku between 2003 and 2005. Best estimates are presented in Annex A (Table A.2.).
\textsuperscript{446} Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006. I did not have access to these budgets.
\textsuperscript{447} Interview, BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta; personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006. It unclear whether Inpres 6 funds had been spent on non-Inpres 6 sanctioned activities by the local government in 2004, though this was hinted at.
\textsuperscript{448} Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006.
funding sources – from Inpres 6/2003, as well as parts of their regular budgets – to cover post-conflict activities through to at least 2007.

Of all three streams of government funds to the North Maluku provincial government during the post-conflict period – Inpres 6/2003, the Contingency Fund, and the regular budget – the Inpres fund was the largest. Management of the Inpres funds presented many problems for BAPPENAS officials due to its political nature at both national and provincial levels of government, as well as the difficulties posed in tracking its expenditure (which Section 4.3 returns to). One senior BAPPENAS official commented:

It is very difficult to manage the Inpres 6 funds through the ministries. Although it is very clear in the Inpres 6 statement that the money is for the recovery process, when we try to evaluate what Inpres 6 was used for, we see the budget has been used for all kinds of non-conflict things...You could say the budget goes “out of track.” The local government in North Maluku seems to be looking for another kind of purpose for the fund, for example, building a new government office.

Although BAPPENAS was responsible for coordinating the post-conflict recovery action plan financed by Inpres 6/2003, local government agencies had their own roles to play. The funds were jointly – though not equally – distributed between Maluku and North Maluku. Bargaining over how and where the funds could be spent was a lengthy, complex and highly political process between both provincial governors and BAPPENAS (as well as with local bureaucrats in their respective provinces). The provincial level development planning agency, BAPPEDA, was mandated to coordinate Inpres 6/2003 plans at the provincial level. BAPPEDA officials then undertook extensive negotiations with other provincial authorities, including branches of line ministries and staff in both the provincial governors' offices over the planned allocations of these funds. Plans were then submitted to BAPPENAS in Jakarta, who proposed them to the relevant central government departments and ministries. After this process – all of which involved personal and political interventions – the activities and funding agreed by both provinces and the central government (the so called Inpres 6/2003 Annual Action Plan) was then submitted by

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449 Interview, BAPPENAS official, 6 May 2007, Jakarta. Figures for the other funds were not available.
450 Interview, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
BAPPENAS to the Parliamentary Budgetary Committee, with a copy to the Ministry of Finance, who then approved it.

One BAPPENAS official, in charge of managing the Inpres 6/2003 budget, explained:

You can see that allocation of Inpres Funds is a complex bargaining process across a triangle of the Maluku provinces, the central government—including BAPPENAS, ministries and departments—and the national parliament.451

Determining where central government aid would be spent, and, more importantly, who would spend it, involved complex bargaining processes between central and provincial government authorities, as well as between provincial level agencies under the control of both provincial governors' offices.452 The large budgets of the aid funds allocated for North Maluku—the smallest Indonesian province in terms of GDP and population—just as the region was struggling to emerge from the extended economic crisis meant the provincial and local contest to access these funds was highly contested and deeply political.453 During the civil emergency period, the concentration of power in the Governor's office meant the Provincial Secretary (the most senior provincial civil servant) had the greatest control over these aid funds—determining how and where they would be spent and by whom. Bureaucrats in the Governor's office and provincial agencies had a great deal of discretion over aid expenditures up to end of the civil emergency period in 2003. Once the civil emergency was lifted, activists, local government bodies and the wider population (including IDPs) had more freedom to protest against provincial government actions, as Section 3.4 discusses further.

The accumulation of financial resources (for both personal and political activities), political favours, business clients, and so forth, by those occupying the Governor's office during the emergency and post-conflict period had notable effects on local politics over the subsequent years. Chapter Six discusses the electoral dynamics

451 Personal correspondence, senior official, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006
452 I did not trace the political ramifications of provincial state capture of aid funds in Maluku in the same depth as in North Maluku, but Chapter Five highlights some of the problems faced by Malukan parliamentarians and NGOs who tried to monitor aid funds. BAPPENAS officials also hinted that the patterns of state capture in both provinces were very similar.
following the concentration of power in the Governor’s office from this time – in particular the political entrenchment of Thaib Armain, the chief provincial bureaucrat, as one of the most powerful regional political players. His election to the governorship in 2002 (and re-election in 2008) was closely linked to the position he held in the Governor’s office, and his discretionary control over these aid funds, during the post-conflict period. The next section discusses the provincial dynamics of government aid capture in more detail.

4.3 Aid capture in the Provincial Governor’s office

You have to look at political conflicts to understand what is wrong with the economy here – because the political system is dominant. Political and government interests set the economic agenda here.

_Economics lecturer, Khairun University._

During the emergency period, economic and political power was concentrated in the Provincial Governor’s office by a variety of means with only minimal checks and balances on its operations from the national and local level, state and non-state actors. This section turns to the provincial mechanisms behind state capture of emergency and post-conflict aid and examines several aspects of why the newly established provincial parliament and other provincial level government bodies, together with the non-governmental sector, were ineffective in controlling the provincial government. Three key factors at the provincial level explain why aid capture so readily took place: – the impact of emergency legislation; the constrained role of the provincial parliament, legal and civil society sectors; and, limited ‘technical capacity’ to manage complex emergency funds in the provincial government.

_(i) The impact of emergency legislation_

The Governor still has the most important role in the regional government and controls everything, followed by the Vice Governor and the Sekda (Provincial Chief of Staff). Civil servants and members of parliament have a role but it’s not as important as these three – because they control the budget. The provincial parliament is

454 Interview, 29 September 2005, Ternate
supposed to monitor the government...but in reality they are also involved in the process of corruption.

Local activist, Ternate. 455

During the emergency period (1999-2003), a series of North Maluku Governors – first appointed by the central government and later elected – controlled the provincial government. It was only when President Megawati declared North Maluku a ‘post-conflict’ region, with the issuing of Inpres 6/2003, that the highly centralised management of regional government administration was relaxed. During the four year emergency period, the Governor’s office had tight control over all government emergency expenditures.456 This was despite the implementation of the 2001 decentralisation laws nationwide, which had (in many other non-emergency regions) cut out the provincial level by transferring the majority of sub-national fiscal functions to local governments.457 North Maluku’s special situation – as with other emergency stricken regions – meant the Governor’s office retained the central role in budgetary and political terms.

In some respects, the emergency situation meant the organisation of provincial government looked like a repeat of New Order style sub-national government in Eastern Indonesia: a centrally appointed figurehead officially controlled the provincial government, with all local government positions under the Governor’s direct authority. Even during the first gubernatorial elections, informants reported that the highly militarised atmosphere in Ternate during the 2001 to 2002 gubernatorial election cycle felt more like a New Order-era “election” than a free and open local one.458 But whilst the central government had an interest in controlling the gubernatorial office, and were officially ‘partners’ in the post-conflict reconstruction process, the previous section demonstrated that central control – at least in budgetary terms – was largely superficial. As such, provincial government officers had a great deal of discretion over their political activities and budgets.

As Chapter Three explained, the new Governor’s office was highly contested prior to – indeed, leading to – the conflict, reflecting local elite perceptions that this office

455 Interview, local NGO member, 30 September 2005, Ternate
456 Interview, regional government finance expert, Makassar, 4 October 2005.
457 See Chapter Three for an outline of decentralisation legislation.
458 See Chapter Six.
was the central prize of regional political power.\textsuperscript{459} Whilst emergency legislation temporarily removed the Governorship from 'local' hands, local state elites still controlled the highest levels of bureaucratic office and therefore the aid funds officially 'coordinated' by the Governor's office.\textsuperscript{460} In 2002, Thaib Armain, the provincial chief of staff, and one of the most powerful figures in the provincial administration, was pronounced the first locally elected Governor.\textsuperscript{461} Local informants connected Thaib's success with his unique access to the emergency and post-conflict aid funds (locally known as the \textit{pengungsi} – IDP – funds) during his time in the Governor's office:

The former 'caretaker' Governor Effendi is under investigation for corruption of the \textit{pengungsi} funds. This could also happen to the current Governor because he was \textit{Sekda} (provincial secretary) at that time, and so he had control and authority of the funds. This position meant he would have signed off on all the 'deals' with the temporary Governor of the time – that was when the refugee money was all going missing.\textsuperscript{462}

Members of a local NGO involved in monitoring the provincial government, were dismayed at the extent to which power was centralised in the Governor's office following the conflict, despite national promises of local government reform. These informants reasoned that successive Governors deliberately exploited confusion over the role of different government bodies during the emergency and post-conflict periods to their advantage, leading to extensive provincial corruption of aid funds.\textsuperscript{463} The head of one international organisation, who had worked in North Maluku during the emergency period, reflected on this problem:

When our organisation started operations in North Maluku, we focused on working with IDPs in West Halmahera district, but to do this we had to work with the provincial level. Now, things have

\textsuperscript{459} Chapters Two and Three outlined how with the onset of the reform era, North Malukans in the Jakarta elite 'returned' to contest local politics, including the Ternate Sultan and former New Order Minister Abdul Gafur. Gafur unsuccessfully contested against Thaib in the North Maluku gubernatorial elections in 2001/2002 and again in 2007/2008. See Chapter Six on electoral politics.

\textsuperscript{460} The first provincial governor elections were originally scheduled for 1999, but were then suspended due to the conflict and eventually delayed until 2001. In the meanwhile, two central government figures were appointed temporary ('caretaker') governors by the Ministry of Home Affairs: Surasmin (appointed in 1999), followed by Effendi (appointed in 2000).

\textsuperscript{461} See Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{462} Thaib was the 'current' Governor referred to here. Interview, retired judge, 2 June 2005, Ternate.

\textsuperscript{463} The implication of this statement was that if the organisation had been required to work 'with' the provincial government they would have been exposed to extensive corruption. Interview, members of local NGO, 30 September 2005, Ternate.
changed a bit because of increased autonomy at the district level, but when we started it was still the emergency phase of government and it was very centralised. But at least for us we didn’t have to put money through the provincial government. That would have created even more problems for us.\footnote{464 Interview, Programme Director, International NGO, 31 October 2005, Jakarta.}

A staff member from an organisation managing IDP rehabilitation projects in North Maluku after the conflict ascribed the continued power of provincial government officials \textit{after} the emergency period to their direct access to the emergency funds. This informant argued that the North Maluku political pattern was not unique and was repeated across the three main sites of conflict in Eastern Indonesia due to the concentrated powers in the provincial governments of Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku.\footnote{465 Aragon (2007) also discusses the politics of corruption of emergency aid funds in Central Sulawesi.} Further down the chain of command, he reported that local level officials also benefited from access to these funds:

\begin{quote}
From the Governor down to the district, everyone in the government has gained from the IDP funds. The head of \textit{DinSos} (the Social Department) became an unofficial treasurer for the provincial government, especially for the Governor. In Poso, before the election, the \textit{Bupati} (district chief) was the former head of \textit{DinSos}, and very corrupt. So he had a lot of financing for later elections.\footnote{466 Interview, Regional Programme Manager, International NGO, 1 November 2005, Jakarta.}
\end{quote}

Chapter Six further discusses how local electoral dynamics were influenced by the extensive capture of aid funds by the North Maluku provincial government. Before that, however, I consider the remaining factors enabling extensive provincial government capture of aid funds.

\textit{(ii) The roles of provincial parliament, legal and civil society sectors}

The provincial parliament served only as a limited check on the power of the provincial executive for several reasons in addition to the fact that its independence was weakened by the emergency legislation. One of these was the confusion between various laws on decentralisation and the role of the provincial parliament, another, the strong likelihood of collusion between the parliament and executive offices.

The Deputy Speaker of the North Maluku DPRD commented:
First there was Decentralisation Law 22/99, which meant that the local parliaments could impeach a regent or the governor through the annual report. But then Megawati passed Law 31/04 and this law reduced the powers of the parliament and said they cannot impeach the Governor or the regent... they can only look at the administration in the annual report and nothing else. This has seriously curtailed our power to monitor the Governor.467

One of the main intentions of the 1999 decentralisation laws was the strengthening of parliamentary control over the regional budgeting process, at both the provincial and local levels of government. However, by 2004, the national legislation on balances of power between provincial and local executive and legislative branches of government were in direct conflict, following President Megawati’s approval of several laws which overturned several aspects of the 1999 decentralisation legislation.468 From 2004 onwards it was therefore unclear which body of government held ultimate authority over the budgetary process, although a degree of power appeared to have been returned to the provincial executive.469

An already confusing national legislative situation, in the context of an emergency afflicted and recovering post-conflict region, further enabled the making of deals between the provincial parliament and Governor’s office over the use of aid funds. One local informant reported:

There have been no significant changes since decentralisation here. The local parliaments are not yet strong and they remain subordinate to the executive at each level of government. The local parliament should control the local budget, but it doesn’t. The executive still keeps all the strength over the budgets....There are a few people in parliament who have tried to monitor the executive in the past. These guys monitored the 2004 budget and were sure there had been big corruption because they were not allowed to see the budget reports. But they did not follow through with the police and the courts. So there are many suspicions that deals were made between the parliament and the Governor over the budget.470

This key informant was one of the few civilians in North Maluku closely involved with monitoring the provincial budgeting process during the post-conflict period. He

467 Interview, Deputy Speaker, DPRD, 30 September 2005, Ternate. Chapter Three refers further to the contradictory decentralisation laws.
468 See Chapter Three (footnote no. 270).
469 Personal correspondence, regional public finance expert, Makassar, August 2006.
470 Interview, head of local NGO, 30 September 2005, Ternate.
reported that there had been many indications of corruption between 2004 and 2005 alone, which his organisation was attempting to trace. However, because no NGO could access the official budget reports of the provincial government, it was difficult for NGOs and ordinary residents (including IDPs) to establish how government aid funds had been spent, and to assess how much had potentially gone astray. While the DPRD could theoretically take action against the Governor’s office through the police and judicial system, parliament members failed to pursue these routes. This NGO informant claimed, “We suspect that the Sekda (Provincial Chief of Staff) bought the MPs off after their opposition to the Governor’s office died out.”

On top of collusion between the provincial parliament and the Governor’s office, provincial level legal bodies also appeared to have been involved with capturing aid funds. Local newspapers reported on the problems faced by local NGOs attempting to obtain information on ongoing corruption cases. One local organisation, Gamalama Corruption Watch (GCW), questioned the slow progress of the corruption case against the Governor’s office through the Provincial State Attorney’s office. Apparently there was some confusion between the State Attorney’s office and the Provincial Attorney General’s office over the issuing of investigative proceedings against the Governor’s office. One local newspaper implied that collusion between the State Attorney’s and Governor’s offices had prevented the case from going forward.

Even if the DPRD had monitored the Governor’s office, some informants believed this would still have been an insufficient check on the provincial executive’s use of aid funds. In Ambon, a senior member of the city DPRD reported on similar problems in Maluku:

The government system needs to be sorted out, there are so many interventions from the executive office into the parliamentary system...To prevent this we need to get students, the community and other stakeholders, like NGOs, all involved in the anti-corruption fight because without working together we can’t do it. We (the parliament) can’t work alone to improve the government, all elements of society have to work together.

471 Interview, local NGO member, 30 October 2005, Ternate.
472 Malut Pos, 30 November 2004.
473 Interview, PDIP member, Ambon DPRD, 12 October 2005, Ambon.
Prior to the increase in local political activity from 2003 onwards, following the official transition from 'emergency' status, civil society monitoring of provincial government had been restricted to the activities of a few grassroots and IDP organisations in Ternate. These groups were politically weak and dependent on small sums of international funding to survive, even after the emergency legislation was lifted. The more powerful "civil society" organisations, based in regional branches of national political and religious movements, such as Muhammadiyah, were closely tied to different branches of the local executive, whether for funding or political support. As such they did not act independently and had little interest in acting against the provincial executive.

After emergency status was lifted in 2003, so too were some of the controls on local political activities. From this point, the provincial parliament and NGOs in Ternate grew more actively involved in challenging 'corruption' in the provincial government. The end of emergency status also meant the large number of military personnel stationed in North Maluku was gradually reduced, leaving a large presence only in parts of North and West Halmahera, thus reducing the 'militarised' atmosphere that had followed the conflict. In July 2003, the Governor's office officially handed over regional security from the military to the regional police, reflecting the official end to military backing of the provincial government. Demonstrations against the Governor's office had been rising up to this point and grew thereafter.

In June 2003, just prior to the lifting of civil emergency status, thousands of IDPs rallied at the Governor's office in Ternate in protest over the failed delivery of their long-promised assistance packages and the fact that they still awaited resettlement or assisted return to their original homes. Waves of these demonstrations, led by IDP groups and the NGOs supporting them, continued against the provincial government

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474 Many Ternate-based local NGOs were dependent on UNDP for their funding, which is interesting as UNDP also provided one of the main sources of aid captured by the provincial government, which these NGOs then monitored (see Chapter Five on the role of the UNDP).
475 Interviews, members of religious and local non-government organisations, June to December 2005, Ternate.
476 The sub-district areas of Tobelo, Galela, Kao, Malifut (North Halmahera district) and Jailolo (West Halmahera district) were still considered sensitive enough to warrant a continued military presence at least up until 2005. UNDP (2003), p.2.
through 2004 and into 2005. By December 2004, local journalists were increasingly active in following alleged corruption cases against the Governor's office. The State Prosecutor's office also re-opened a corruption case that had previously been closed by the provincial Attorney General in 2003. A special team was set up to investigate the case but they had failed to present any findings. In response to questions from the local press on their slow investigation, the North Maluku State Prosecutor retorted, "The lamb is not even caught, yet you've already asked for the sate (cooked meat skewers)." Local activists asserted that delays in the court proceedings were the result of collusion between the Prosecutor, Attorney General and Governor's offices, and there were few reasons to suggest they were wrong. The Regional Police Chief promised to pursue the case, but the activists were not hopeful of any progress.

Of course, local NGOs sometimes had their own political interests in challenging the provincial government over corruption charges, whether because they were politically linked to the Governor's competitors, or for other reasons. In 2004, Governor Thaib publicly complained that the 'anti-corruption' demonstrations organised by local activists were a ploy to discredit him to the benefit of their preferred political alternatives. The Governor might have had a point – subsequent investigations in 2005 by the provincial parliament were related to undermining his political support in favour of other candidates. But even if local NGOs supported the Governor's political opponents, this does not disprove his involvement with capturing the aid budget.

By 2005, the local political situation was slowly beginning to change. The provincial parliament had launched an investigation into the expenditure of emergency aid funds by the provincial government. Critical monitoring of the executive by the same parliament members demonstrated a degree of independence in the previously passive DPRD. Actions by anti-Thaib factions in the DPRD were politically located in the run-up to the first direct-gubernatorial elections schedule for 2007, with different party factions attempting to discredit Thaib (representing PDI-P). The Golkar faction, in particular, favoured alternate candidates to Thaib for the 2007

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479 Malut Pos, 22 December 2004.
480 Malut Pos, 21 December 2004.
gubernatorial election. As such, the parliamentary investigation into the Governor’s capture of aid funds reflected a return to factional competition and intra-state elite struggle in local politics. Chapter Six returns to this topic.

(iii) **Limited provincial administrative capacity**

A third possible explanation for why central government aid to the provincial government was readily captured by government staff was that new provincial staff had limited technical expertise in managing such large and complex funds. Both local NGO staff and MPs considered this one of the explanations. However, whilst the technical expertise of the new provincial public servants may have been limited, this does not mean they were politically or financially incapable of managing the aid budget to their own advantage.

As a newly created province, the Governor’s office was largely staffed by previously more junior level officials, rapidly promoted by the Ministry of Home Affairs in order to create a new provincial administration. One regional public expenditure expert commented:

> In North Maluku, before it became a province, the senior civil servants in the city and district offices were mostly posted in from Ambon. This means the capacity of local civil servants in North Maluku is still very low after the conflict. People got promoted too fast without university degrees – so they don’t have the capacity to head the provincial government offices.482

Technical inexperience in monitoring government budgets in the new provincial parliament also meant the executive body could easily exploit its control over the budget. A senior provincial parliament member reported:

> The regional budget was delayed in 2005 because of problems with the Governor’s office. Local economic development is so dependent on the budget, but if the budget is delayed then nothing can be done. Another problem is that over 70 per cent of the provincial budget is used for operational matters – that is, not directly on economic or social development, but just on the salaries and offices and other costs of the officials. Because of these kinds of problems, we have asked for support from university professors. We want them to help with legal drafting in the parliament to monitor the executive. Before, new laws

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482 Interview, regional public expenditure expert, 4 October 2005, Makassar.
used to come from the executive and we would approve them, but now the parliament is responsible.\textsuperscript{483}

That provincial government offices and the DPRD were staffed by relatively inexperienced officials and new parliamentarians, and given the complexity of the aid funds (outlined in Section 4.2), partially explains why the aid funds were easily appropriated by provincial officials. The North Maluku region was a neglected collection of three local government authorities within the larger Maluku province for over three decades under the New Order regime. Becoming a new province promised an improvement in local government. One provincial parliament member explained:

I was one of those lobbying to make North Maluku district part of a new province. I wanted to improve public services that had been so neglected by the Ambon government. We could only do this by becoming a new province.\textsuperscript{484}

In late 1999, with the new provincial government established for only two months and the new parliament not yet organised, the conflict swept away many of the prospects for a new kind of local government administration. Local officials had not held such senior positions before. With the range of post-conflict crises for the new provincial government to manage – the rise in unemployment, destruction of regional infrastructure and services, and decline in agricultural and industrial production – alongside the complications of the ongoing decentralisation process during the emergency period, it is understandable that centrally provided aid funds were not effectively managed. But the local state elites in charge were far from \textit{politically} inexperienced, meaning their capacity to manage provincial and other branches of government should not be underestimated.

Chapter Three demonstrated how political action by local elites led to the creation of the first new province in Indonesia – this was no small political feat during the national democratic transition. Competition between the same political elites over control of the new government was also one of the main drivers of the violence following the creation of the new province. The lengthy political experience of the local political elite during the New Order would have prepared them well for

\textsuperscript{483} Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 19 October, 2005, Ternate.
\textsuperscript{484} Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 30 September 2005, Ternate.
organising new government budgets in ways that were advantageous to them. Denying the capacity of these local state elites to manage government budgets means overlooking their deeply rooted and extensive patronage networks, which extended from the provincial government into the local business community, and also into other levels of government personnel. Despite a lack of technical experience in administering large and complex aid funds, especially during a genuine economic and social crisis, government officials were readily able to exploit systemic weaknesses in the local government system to their personal and political advantage. The next section examines problems in local government, which concentrated power in the Governor’s office even further.

4.4 Constraints on local government

The previous sections have established that the combination of emergency legislation, with simultaneous limitations in the provincial parliamentary and legal systems, and limited civil society monitoring of the provincial government prior to 2003, led to the concentration of regional political and budgetary power in the North Maluku Governor’s office. This gave the Governor’s office almost complete control of the regional budget, enabling extensive state capture of the aid budget with a minimum level of oversight from either national or provincial authorities. Finally, it is important to consider why the local level of government also failed to act as a counter-balance to the provincial government’s power. The 1999 decentralisation laws were intended to empower the local levels of government (including city and district governments) in budgetary and political decision making in the regions. However, as this chapter has argued, the potential this legislation had for increasing the role of local government was undermined by the authorisation of emergency status to North Maluku in 2000. The resultant transitional status of local governments in the region meant that with only a few exceptions, they failed to fulfil an independent government role.

The government budgeting system was in upheaval across Indonesia following the 2001 implementation of decentralisation. According to national legislation, the provincial level of government was no longer mandated to provide public services, or
receive funds for this purpose, but in practice they often did. Regional public expenditure experts reported that almost all provincial governments in Eastern Indonesia (not only those in conflict areas) carried out some public service activities, for example, running local healthcare services.\footnote{Interview, regional public finance expert, 4 October 2005, Makassar.} Across Eastern Indonesia this situation had triggered conflicts between the provincial and local branches of government over resource and revenue sharing procedures. Revenue sharing legislation was further complicated in 2004 when yet more decentralisation laws returned a degree of authority to the provincial level, which had previously been lost to the district level via the 1999 laws, causing confusion between the different levels of government over both their functions and their budgets.\footnote{Interview, regional public finance expert, 4 October, 2005, Makassar.}

Government financing conflicts and confusions affected all of Eastern Indonesia in the post-decentralisation era, but in North Maluku – as in Maluku and Central Sulawesi – they were compounded by the concentration of power in provincial governors’ offices by the emergency legislation. Up to at least 2003 the provincial governments in all three provinces had a huge amount of discretion over government budgets. In North Maluku, the provincial government also benefitted from other sources of regional income, for example, from mining sector revenues. Under normal circumstances these revenues would have been shared across the provincial and local governments.\footnote{It was not only aid funds that failed to reach the local governments. Revenue generated by the NHM goldmine in North Halmahera district was officially meant to be shared across all local district and city governments of North Maluku from 2003 onwards, with a percentage share going to the provincial government. See Chapter Three (Section 3.3 iii) for more details on revenue sharing agreements. The new North Halmahera district government (where the mine was located) regularly issued complaints to the NHM mining company over the reduced revenue share they actually received when compared with what they were promised in the legislation – it was routinely cut by the provincial government. The district government demanded the goldmine send their revenue share directly, but the company was unable to do this as it contravened legal agreements with the central government. Interview, External Affairs manager, PT NHM, Ternate, 29 September 2005. See, also, Duncan (2007) on revenue sharing problems in North Maluku between the local and provincial government.}

In early 2003, five new local government authorities were officially established in North Maluku, taking the total of local governments to eight.\footnote{This followed parliamentary ratification and Presidential approval of a bill to create six new districts and two new city municipalities in North Maluku province on 25 February 2003.} However, it took several more years to make these local government bodies fully operational and
independent of the provincial government. Local newspaper reports, and interviews with local NGOs and international donors indicated that local government offices were largely – if not completely – ineffective from the time of the conflict until well into 2005. This was partly because local government offices were overseen by ‘caretaker’ administrators, who were directly under the control of the Governor’s office. Before local parliamentary elections in 2004 and the first direct local executive elections in 2005, local government bodies were still unable to make or implement policies in the local legislatures and administrative branches of local government independently from the provincial level.

An economic assessment of the post-conflict situation in North Maluku (sponsored by UNDP) found that the ‘transitional nature’ of local government bodies meant they had failed to manage economic reconstruction or recovery programmes in their areas, with the provincial level responsible for most of these activities. One UNDP staff member reported that the transition period had confused the provincial and local government financial system, leading to multiple conflicts over who was responsible for what. The staff member reported, “There are so many problems and conflicts between the provincial, city and district governments. The government system just doesn’t work here.” The provincial government, for their part, claimed that district governments were in “too much disarray” to be usefully involved in the post-conflict reconstruction process.

A combination of the unclear legal and staffing status of local government bodies and their exclusion by the provincial government from decision making over the aid budget, marginalised local governments throughout the emergency period and even into the post-conflict phase. Only the Ternate city administration headed by Mayor Syamsir Andili, a historically and politically well established administration, stood any chance of managing its own local government affairs, given the stronger legal and political position of the Governor’s office. One staff member of an international organisation, who had worked extensively with IDPs in North Maluku following the conflict, commented:

490 Interview, UNDP staff member, 30 May 2005, Ternate.
IDP aid funds would be much better handled by the district or city government, not the province. Their scope of their operations is smaller and they understand better the environment. One of the key problems is that the money goes straight to the province and not directly to the local government. This makes a problem between the local governments and the province because the local government can’t fix the problem—they don’t have the money or the resources to do so if all the money goes to the province.

A related issue further contributed to problems at the local government level. Under the New Order regime, most district and sub-district officials had tended to live in Ternate city, not in the locations of their local government posts. Prior to the creation of the new province and district government offices, local officials benefited from maintaining close proximity to the Ternate-based government offices, for both political and financial reasons. Following the conflict, their interest in staying ‘close’ to Ternate branches of government only increased, as the budget of the new provincial government swelled with aid funds during the regional economic crisis. Financial and political interests in the aid funds thus also played a role in keeping local government actors quiet. One of Indonesia’s most experienced conflict analysts, who had carried out several studies in North Maluku following the conflict, reported:

There is still a very big ‘interest’ to be a government officer in North Maluku—especially during the post-conflict period when there were all the reconstruction funds and development funds to be accessed from the provincial and city government....There were very big problems of corruption of the reconstruction and IDP funds.

While weak, however, the local government did not remain silent forever. The most vocal critic of the provincial government was Syamsir Andili, the Ternate Mayor and formerly one of Thaib Armain’s main bureaucratic allies in the southern elite faction. The Ternate city government was one of only three functioning local government bodies prior to the end of the emergency period in 2003. The other two (the North Maluku and Central Halmahera district governments) had been severely affected by the conflict’s political, social and economic fall-out. Whilst the Ternate

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492 Interview, Project Manager, CARDI-Maluku, 10 October 2005, Ambon.
493 Interview, Arifah Rahmawati, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 4 May 2005.
494 See Chapters Two and Three on the southern alliance.
city government had some discretion over their city government budget, the city’s access to aid funding largely depended on the Governor’s office. Negotiations over city government funding thus took place between Thaib and Syamsir, competing with access to the provincial aid budget.\(^495\)

As one of the leading members of the southern political faction, which was triumphant during the conflict, Syamsir held a degree of political influence far beyond his official position as a head of the city government. This meant his negotiating position with Thaib was stronger than it was for other local government heads, who, heading transitional local government bodies, and without Syamsir’s experience at the head of a local government, did not share his political advantages. Increasing tensions between these two state elites reflected a new intra-elite political contest following the conflict.

By 2004, the Ternate Mayor and members of the city parliament started to openly criticise the Governor’s office over its management of the IDP funds in Ternate.\(^496\)

One strong supporter of Mayor Syamsir, a senior Golkar member of the Ternate city DPRD, stated:

> The district and city government understand the (IDP) problem better than the provincial government because they know the community, but the provincial government won’t let the funding go to lower levels of government because of all the money they get themselves from these funds. For example, the city government was able to rehabilitate the churches in Ternate, but we could not solve the refugee issue. If it were up to me, the Muslim refugees would go home and then the Christians can come back to their houses. But as the money to resettle people is already “eaten up” by the provincial government, there is no way to solve the problem.\(^497\)

Prior to 2003, and the lifting of emergency legislation, the city government staff and members had no clear legal mandate to challenge the provincial government’s activities, though they did so informally. Following provincial parliamentary elections in 2004 and direct elections for local government heads in 2005, however, the local...
government’s challenge to the Governor’s office became much stronger. Ternate Mayor Syamsir’s rivalries with his former ally Governor Thaib were rooted not only in access to aid funds, but also in political clashes between Thaib and the Mayor’s brother – Bahar Andili – who had contested Thaib in the initial candidate selection during the first gubernatorial election in 2001, but later died.

Recalling the analysis of local factional politics in Chapters Two and Three, Thaib, Bahar and Syamsir – the southern elite triumvirate both before and during the conflict – were the biggest players in regional politics. By 2005, the rivalry between the Mayor (Syamsir) and the Governor (Thaib) over local power overlapped with the city government’s frustration with provincial capture of aid funds, which curtailed city funding. The Mayor found willing allies in the city government and parliament to back his campaign against the Governor. Syamsir’s supporters were not only frustrated by corruption in the Governor’s office, but also because unofficial campaigning for the next gubernatorial elections (scheduled for 2007) had started. Intra-elite rivalry between these officials during local and gubernatorial elections is further discussed in Chapter Six.

In conclusion, on problems at the local government level, the main point to highlight is that official changes to the legal status of local governments (in theory giving them more power) was an insufficient means of enabling local governments to challenge the political and financial power of the Governor’s office. Personal and political interests in challenging the Governor’s position were also necessary to enable local challenges to provincial power. The frustrated financial interests of city parliamentarians and bureaucrats finally motivated them to act against the Governor who had so long controlled their budgets. In North Maluku, at least, local government reforms were insufficient tools for challenging entrenched state elites and corrupt governmental processes, especially in an emergency situation.

4.5 Conclusion

The North Maluku conflict left in its wake a socio-economic crisis across many spheres of regional life. Approximately three thousand people died and between one
fifth and one third of the regional population was displaced, causing great social and economic disruption. Following national economic crisis, the regional economy continued to contract after the conflict, and this was likely due to the combined impact of internal displacement, infrastructure and local business destruction, security risks and related restrictions on the agricultural sector, which contributed to high levels of urban unemployment. The combined effects of socio-economic crisis led to increased dependence on the provincial and local government for social welfare and economic reconstruction, for both the large displaced community and the population as a whole.

Emergency and reconstruction aid funds provided by central to provincial government formed a substantial part of the overall provincial government budget in the post-conflict period, which itself formed a substantial part of North Maluku's regional economic product when compared with other regions of Indonesia. With the overall regional economy in crisis, centralised control over substantial aid revenues (with limited monitoring by central government) gave the provincial government unprecedented power. With control over both the political and fiscal aspects of government centralised in the provincial governor's office by emergency legislation, senior officials in the Governor's office turned the post-conflict crisis situation to their advantage.

Central government aid was officially intended to assist conflict-affected populations, in particular the displaced population, but it instead served to strengthen the power, and support the interests, of elites in the executive branch of the provincial government. Extensive provincial government capture of aid funds was enabled by ineffective monitoring and control over the Governor's office from the central, provincial and local government bodies officially mandated to play this role. Officials in the central government reported that controlling provincial state capture of aid funds was not a national priority and it may even have served central government interests in restoring regional security at the time. The provincial parliament was new and did not yet have sufficient legal or political independence to monitor provincial spending. Suspected collusion between the parliament, executive and the legal branches of provincial government compounded this situation. Civil society organisations were also restricted in their capacity to confront provincial state
capture of aid funds given the emergency legislation and an overall atmosphere restricting political activity. The combined ineffectiveness of other branches of government and the civil society sector in restricting the activities of the provincial government led to an entrenchment of power in the hands of senior provincial bureaucrats. Thaib Armain, the provincial chief of staff and later the first locally elected Governor, benefitted most from this situation.

Intra-governmental dynamics in North Maluku began to change in 2004, following the lifting of emergency status in 2003, and with legislative elections finally taking place, giving eight local parliaments (five of them new) independence from the provincial government. Political manoeuvrings preceding the 2005 local executive elections also contributed to a change in atmosphere with increased dissent among various bodies and levels of government. As the local political system evolved, with a general rise in parliamentary and local government activism, fissures appeared between the different levels of government, and within and between political rivals over claims to local authority. This point recalls one of the central issues highlighted in Chapters Two and Three: the importance of understanding the factional nature of local politics in order to interpret local political patterns.

Following the 2005 elections the potential for change in what had been a closed and centralised regional political system since the conflict opened up even further. Direct local elections for city and district heads, known as pilkada, promised to further empower local governments with a direct mandate from the local population. With popularly elected, rather than appointed, leaders in place, city and district governments had started, by the end of 2005, to demand greater controls over their budgets from the provincial government. Intra-elite contest over access to, and control over, state resources subsequently grew fiercer, as Chapter Six further explores.

Overall, the provision of extensive powers to the new provincial government, with provincial officials holding almost unfettered access to the large government aid budget, does not appear to have been an accidental event for the central government.

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498 Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) discuss the varying impacts of and politics of local direct elections.
The fears of further religious radicalisation during the later phases of conflict (when the conflict escalated beyond the control of local political elites), which potentially provoked challenges to state authority, appear to have factored into the central government’s decision not only to concentrate aid funds in the new provincial government but also to allow provincial officials to act as they saw fit with these funds. The central government effectively "bought" back regional government loyalty and state stability through the restoration and centralisation of regional state control in both the political and economic spheres.

Recalling the comparative cases introduced in Chapter One, the North Maluku case echoes similar patterns to the survival of 'machine politics' in other post-crisis contexts. In the post-war Southern Italian cases analysed by Chubb (1982), local government bureaucrats benefited politically from periods of economic depression and social crisis because of their discretionary control over increasingly limited resources. Economic hardships served to strengthen, rather than undermine, the popular support base of the political Christian Democrat machine in Southern Italy, through the discretionary powers held by the party machine over government spending, and the provision of jobs and other patronage benefits in a shrinking economy where government resources were increasingly important to the local population. Similarly, in the urban areas of Ternate, the local population was already long dependent on state-based employment and business contracts. This dependency only increased following the conflict as other sources of revenue and employment were lost due to prolonged agricultural and industrial sector decline. This process underlined, rather than undermined, the power of state-based elites in North Maluku.

This chapter therefore provides one of the answers to the central issue explored by the thesis – the continuity of the local state-based elite in power in the context of reform, conflict and crisis. Certain factions in the local state elite managed not only to hold onto, but to deepen their political power base despite significant socio-economic crisis and complex government reforms. They did so via their centralised control over aid budgets throughout a period of at least five years, if not more. The institutions of patronage established during the New Order years, operating between local government officers at different levels, and their local societal and business clientele, were temporarily shaken by the series of economic and social crises during
and following the conflict. This system was then restored – even strengthened – through the provincial government’s largely unchallenged control of aid funds, which enabled a degree of political continuity and stability among the state-based elite. By 2005, important fissures and contests within the North Maluku state-based elite began to emerge over access to and control over aid funds. As local political structures began to change following the end of the emergency period, intra-state elite rivalry rose again to the fore. The thesis returns to discuss this point in Chapter Six.

This chapter has explored the national, provincial and local dynamics of government aid funding and state capture of this aid in order to understand how the provincial government was so readily able to capture aid funds. Strengthening the dependence of the local state-based political elite on central aid funds following the conflict at the least ensured the guaranteed support of the North Malukan elite for the Indonesian nation-state during a time of great transition and upheaval. In effect, the central government overruled its own reform legislation, and concentrated power in the Governor’s office in order to buy off potential troublemakers and restore state control in a restive region. The following chapter returns to this point, and develops it further, through analysing particular case studies of local state capture of international aid funds channelled through the North Maluku government.
Chapter Five -
Further patterns of state capture in North Maluku:
the use of UNDP ‘Recovery Programme’ funds by state officials

It's the same old corruption story in North Maluku as it is in Ambon. No one monitors the implementation of IDP projects, the government says no more money is left for IDPs...but there are still plenty of IDPs. I would estimate that, at the most, no more than 70 per cent of the actual budget for IDPs was spent on the IDPs. For example, when you visit the IDP camps, the food they have is always less than half of what was budgeted by the local government. It made it worse that the government arranged so many IDP projects through private contractors who were always connected to the government. They were not the right people for the job. But they knew the right people in the government.

*NGO staff member, Jakarta.*

You have to see the links between power and politics in public expenditure – and the government budgeting process. The result of public finance allocations in Maluku is power, after all.

*Regional public finance expert, Makassar.*

Introduction

This chapter expands on the dynamics of provincial state capture of aid funds outlined in Chapter Four, and reiterates the role of state-capture in enhancing the political and financial strength of provincial government officials in North Maluku. The chapter examines several specific cases and overall patterns of collusion and rent-seeking within expenditure of aid funds provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for North Maluku. The UNDP’s ‘recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation’ programme for the Maluku region was appropriated by several parts of the provincial and local governments for projects serving their direct interests, rather than those of the intended ‘beneficiaries’, the IDPs and other communities severely affected by conflict.

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499 Interview, Regional Programme Manager, international NGO, 1 November 2005, Jakarta.
500 Interview (the informant had formerly worked for UNDP Maluku), 4 October 2005, Makassar.
The UNDP’s ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction and recovery programme for Maluku and North Maluku provinces — hereafter the Recovery Programme — consisted of funds of between US$12-19 million.\textsuperscript{501} The Recovery Programme received major contributions from the Dutch, Japanese and British governments (via the Department for International Development (DFID)) and the European Union (EU). As with central government funds, estimating precise figures of UNDP aid funds to the region was problematic — the first section of the chapter discusses this issue.\textsuperscript{502} The Recovery Programme had four official goals (outlined in full in Section 5.1.iii.), including the return of IDPs, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure and public services.\textsuperscript{503} One of the main purposes of this chapter is to highlight the disjuncture between the organisation’s stated policy goals, and actual funding outcomes, following provincial and local state capture of the UNDP’s aid funds in North Maluku.\textsuperscript{504} The chapter also examines some of the benefits of state capture to post-conflict reconstruction, as well as its costs to the local population.

Chapter Two demonstrated how the state played a major role in North Maluku’s regional political economy under the New Order regime; Chapter Four showed how this pattern was repeated in the years following the conflict. Economic and political power was concentrated in the provincial government following the conflict, and the factional elite dominating the Governor’s office held ultimate control of government revenue flowing into the province. This particular political economy proved an ideal setting for enabling the disjuncture between the UNDP’s policy and practice. However, state capture of specific projects, as well as the broader patterns of provincial and local government influence, was overlooked in the official UNDP and donor assessments. This chapter does not analyse the reasons why the UNDP and aid donors overlooked these patterns, as it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but focuses on what happened and its impacts on regional political dynamics.\textsuperscript{505}

\textsuperscript{501} As in Chapter Four, ‘post-conflict’ carries several meanings here. It was used as an official term for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ projects by both the Indonesian government and the UNDP. It also describes the time-period after the North Maluku conflict officially ended.

\textsuperscript{502} I am grateful to the UNDP staff members willing to be interviewed, and the data they provided on the Recovery Programme budget.

\textsuperscript{503} UNDP (2004), p.2.

\textsuperscript{504} In some cases, but not all, state capture of the UNDP aid funds was easy to identify because UNDP and donor logos marked the sites where funds had been spent, even when the UNDP headquarters in Jakarta and donor governments were apparently unaware of some of these projects.

\textsuperscript{505} There are at least four possible reasons why the UNDP and aid donors ‘overlooked’ state capture of aid funds. One, they may simply have failed to observe these patterns due to limited political and
As with central government funds, the provincial government used the UNDP aid funds for many reconstruction and recovery purposes, and allocated certain funds to local government bodies that also carried out reconstruction projects. However, they were also, and sometimes via the same means, used to secure the political and economic power base of state-based political elites in both provincial and local government bodies. This was done via several routes: the extraction of rents via inflated bids, kick-backs to parliamentary and executive officers involved in brokering deals, issuing of contracts based on personal or political connections, and the commissioning of projects serving the interests of state elites – including branches of the military. The intended UNDP ‘beneficiaries’ (the displaced and directly conflict-affected community) sometimes only benefitted incidentally.

Examining patterns of distribution of the UNDP aid funds by the provincial and local government enables a broader understanding of the extensive nature of state capture of aid funds outlined in Chapter Four. As such, this chapter helps to explore the sources of power behind the provincial and local state-elite, and their political machines, and therefore contributes to explaining their continued survival in local politics.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme, estimating overall financing and summarising its main policies. The next two consider how the Recovery Programme ran in practice, analysing specific project examples and comparing project outcomes with stated programme goals. These sections draw on cases from both North Maluku and Maluku provinces, as the UNDP funds were distributed across both provinces simultaneously and similar patterns of state capture took place in each. Section 5.2 examines IDP-related projects; Section 5.3 examples of public infrastructure.
projects. The fourth section then summarises the overall costs and benefits of aid capture for different sectors of the population. The final section summarises the main explanatory factors why UNDP aid funds were so readily captured by the provincial government.

5.1 The UNDP’s Recovery Programme financing and policies

This section has five parts. The first compares North Maluku’s Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) with aid from the central government and UNDP between 2001 and 2004. This comparison provides an indication of the importance of aid funds to the regional economy in the post-conflict period. The second provides overall estimates of UNDP programme funds for North Maluku. The third part summarises the primary objectives of UNDP’s aid programme to the Maluku region. The fourth outlines UNDP’s planned aid interventions and the fifth presents an overview of the use of UNDP aid funds in practice. The following sections then analyse two types of post-conflict project funded by the UNDP Recovery Programme in more detail.

(i) Comparing regional product and aid budgets

UNDP financed the second largest source of emergency and post-conflict aid for North Maluku, following Government of Indonesia (GOI) central aid funds to the region. UNDP aid funds were around one quarter of the size of the central government’s aid package over a comparable four-year period, from 2001-2004 (see Annex B, Table B.1 for details). Whilst representing only just over one per cent of GDRP over this four year period, the Recovery Programme still played an important economic and political role in the context of North Maluku’s small regional economy, especially given that control of these funds was largely in the hands of the provincial and local government.⁵⁰⁶

Prior to the conflict, the North Maluku regional economy had been in gradual decline, before collapsing during the national economic crisis – but it contracted even

⁵⁰⁶ North Maluku had the smallest provincial GDRP of all Indonesian provinces from 2001-2003 (BPS Maluku 2005).
further following the conflict, as Chapter Four outlined. The UNDP's Recovery Programme funds therefore played an important role for the provincial government as one of the few external sources for regional finance.

(ii) Estimating UNDP Recovery Programme financing

As with central government aid data, estimating the UNDP programme budget for North Maluku was difficult: data varied across the official reports and that provided in interviews with UNDP staff often varied from the official documentation. The budgetary data discussed here therefore includes low and high budget estimates, based on a triangulation of data from different sources (see Annex B, Table B.2).\(^{507}\) The Recovery Programme initially focused on conflict impacted areas of Maluku and North Maluku provinces, but later expanded to cover projects in Southeast Sulawesi, where some IDPs from the Maluku region had resettled (see Annex B, Table B.3 for provincial funding estimates for the three regions).

UNDP first started emergency response operations in Maluku province in 1999 and in North Maluku in late 2001. The Indonesian government drafted a 'Master Plan' for post-conflict recovery in North Maluku in February 2001, with the overall aim of 'rehabilitating' the province via both government and non-government aid programmes. In conjunction with the central government, UNDP then developed a three-year programme aiming to, "promote the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and support the basic rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure within the context of reconciliation and peace-building."\(^{508}\) The 'Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit' was established in mid-2001 in UNDP’s Jakarta office to officially oversee and administer the Recovery Programme in both provinces. Actual programme work started in late 2001.

The biggest donor to the overall Recovery Programme was the Dutch government, followed by the EU, the Japanese UN Trust Fund and then DFID, each contributing over US$1 million. Six other donors made contributions under US$1 million (see Annex B, Table B.4). By 30 June 2004, the Recovery Programme had approved 83

\(^{507}\) By triangulating data from different sources - including official, non-governmental and newspaper estimates - I established patterns of state capture, as with Chapter Four.

project activities for Maluku and North Maluku provinces, with a total cost of US$11.1 million. Another US$1.3 million was earmarked in 2004 for projects still officially in development but not yet spent. The total programme budget therefore fell between US$12.34 and US$19.13 million, depending on which period, region and costs were included (these varied across different donor agency reports). In UNDP’s final “progress report” to the Recovery Programme’s donors, the UNDP stated that almost US$7.5 million from the total programme budget had been allocated to North Maluku province (see details in Annex B, Table B.3).

(iii) Official Recovery Programme objectives

Both the structural organisation and main objectives of the Recovery Programme were difficult to interpret from official reports. According to the official documentation, the Recovery Programme was designed as a UN-Government “partnership”:

The Programme is a partnership between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Indonesia. UNDP’s Government counterpart for the Programme is the Ministry of Human Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (KIMPRASWIL). The Programme is implemented in partnership with a range of partners, including Government Departments at the provincial and district levels, UN agencies, international NGOs, Indonesian civil society organisations, Village Councils, and others.

The Recovery Programme was designed by the UNDP to work across different sectors in order to “complement efforts of the Government and civil society to support longer-term peace building and sustainable development” in the Maluku region. The overall objective was to “facilitate the realisation of socially and economically sustainable communities living cooperatively together in freedom from fear and

510 Different figures were reported across the UNDP’s progress reports, donor reviews and during field interviews with UNDP staff. One of the reasons it was difficult to get a definitive figure on programme funds was that key programme staff at UNDP, and the other donor agencies, had either moved on to other countries by the time of field research, or because they were employed as temporary consultants. Another reason for the discrepancies, relating to controversy over the Recovery Programme’s eventual results, is discussed in the following section.
512 UNDP (2004), p.2
violence." This "overall objective" was broken down into four "programme objectives":

1. The return of internally displaced people into key communities in an atmosphere of reconciliation;
2. The basic rehabilitation of community level physical infrastructure and provision of effective public services in key areas;
3. The initiation and growth of social and economic activity with a particular focus on the most vulnerable;
4. The strengthening and formation of good governance capacities at local levels that promote inclusive and accountable institutions for effective decision making and Programme implementation.

What the UNDP-Government "partnership" and the implementation of the stated objectives meant in practice, varied at different levels of government and in different regions of North Maluku. The vagueness of the policy language and objectives quoted above may have been a contributing factor towards the open-ended use of the programme's funds by provincial and local government officials. The following sections return to this issue by identifying some of the relationship patterns and outcomes of the programme at the provincial and local levels of government.

(iv) Planned Recovery Programme operations

In North Maluku, UNDP Jakarta decided to implement the Recovery Programme themselves, via a 'direct execution' approach. Officially, this meant that rather than passing overall authority for programme management and implementation to provincial or local government agencies, or to local NGOs (both of whom were official Recovery Programme 'partners'), the UNDP planned to manage and operate the programme directly. According to UNDP documentation, this decision was taken for two reasons. First, the UNDP viewed the North Maluku government as a party to the conflict and, as such, wanted to avoid working directly through the provincial and local branches of government. Second, the UNDP management decided that local NGOs were too weak to be able to manage programmes alone.

\[513\] UNDP (2004), p.2
\[514\] UNDP (2004), p.2. Perhaps one of the reasons it was difficult for UNDP to fulfil its programme's goals was the vagueness of this policy language, making it difficult for field staff to know precisely what they were meant to implement.
\[515\] National level donor-government relations are beyond the scope of this study.
\[516\] UNDP (2003), p.23. This intention was confirmed in an interview with then chief of the Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP Jakarta Country Office, who had overall responsibility for the Recovery Programme; May 2006, UNDP Country Office, Jakarta.

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The UNDP’s rationale behind ‘direct execution’ of their post-conflict programme was controversial in principle (it also failed in practice, as further sections discuss). First, even if the UNDP believed provincial and local government agencies were direct parties to the conflict, it was not clear why this meant they should therefore not play a role in implementing UNDP’s post-conflict programme, especially as it was meant to be a ‘partnership’ with the government.517 Second, while local NGOs were few in North Maluku, their capacity to manage projects could have been developed by UNDP from the outset (as, in the end, it was, in some cases).518

In practice, UNDP’s ‘direct execution’ approach varied and the following sections explore some of the reasons for this. Some projects were directly implemented and managed by UNDP staff in various district sites; some were managed by provincial or local branches of the North Maluku government and/or international NGOs; others were jointly administered between UNDP provincial and field office staff and different branches of the provincial and local governments; while still others were handed over entirely to local NGOs. Even in cases where the UNDP officially managed certain projects, branches of the provincial or local government remained influential in decision-making over funding allocations, specific project financing, contracting and implementation – for example, over the choice of contractors to build roads, electricity projects and so on. Subsequent sections explore several cases in more detail to illustrate this point.

(v) Assessing overall Recovery Programme outcomes
By mid-2005 some, though certainly not all, IDPs in North Maluku had returned to their original areas of residence (although usually not to their original homes); some infrastructure and public services had been rehabilitated to a basic standard and some small-scale economic activities re-started, although the pre-conflict levels of plantation agriculture, mineral extraction and local-level industrial activity had not been fully restored. The first three of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme goals,

517 See Chapter Three on major parties to the conflict. See Wilson (2005, 2008) and Van Klinken (2007) for detailed discussion of major parties to the conflict at different phases of conflict escalation.
518 Further expansion on these points is not directly relevant here, but they form a crucial part of the debate on the problems of donor-led post-conflict reconstruction and recovery programmes that circumvent local government and non-governmental organisations. See Evans (2008).
outlined above, appeared to have been met, albeit at a basic level. However, establishing precisely what or who enabled these results was complicated.

Establishing clear chains of causality between a donor funded programme and societal or economic changes in a population is always complex – particularly in separating out so-called ‘programme’ and ‘non-programme’ effects – even if sophisticated evaluation procedures are in place (which was not so in this case).519 Where Recovery Programme objectives matched actual changes in the North Maluku region, it was more likely to have been the result of Indonesian government projects active at the time – this is because UNDP funds were widely used by provincial and local government agencies as part of their broader post-conflict project activities. Provincial and local government use of UNDP aid funds took place with and without the explicit consent of the UNDP, depending on the actual project and agency responsible. This fact makes it especially difficult to measure the specific impact of UNDP funds, given that they were blended into other government projects, some of which were also in collaboration with local and international NGOs, and not all of which the UNDP was aware of.

In several of the cases explored in the next two sections, even when UNDP Recovery Programme funds were directly attributed to having funded particular post-conflict rehabilitation or reconstruction projects, the projects were operated quite differently to the planned mechanisms outlined in the UNDP’s policy documents. Projects frequently evolved via unplanned channels. For example, the actual, as opposed to ‘intended’ project beneficiaries (the most vulnerable and conflict-affected communities), were generally members of the local elite, based within or outside branches of the local and provincial government. Extensive capture of the Recovery Programme’s resources by the provincial – and, to a lesser extent, local branches of – government meant large proportions of programme funds were naturally channelled towards projects of interest to these local officials and politicians. Sometimes these projects also happened to match the UNDP’s goals – for example, public service rehabilitation in the main towns – but they were not managed or operated in the way the UNDP had planned.

519 See Rao and Woolcock (2003), for example, on the methodological problems of measuring the impact of development programmes.
The following cases draw on evidence gathered during formal and informal interviews with programme beneficiaries, managers and their peers, at the community, local, provincial and national levels. I also draw on documentary evidence from donor evaluations, local newspapers and local NGO reports. On several issues it was necessary to travel to Ambon, Makassar and Jakarta to interview people who had previously been employed by, or involved with, the UNDP Recovery Programme. As the programme covered both Maluku and North Maluku provinces, some UNDP staff members only travelled to North Maluku occasionally and it was necessary to interview them elsewhere. Also, by 2005, many UNDP and NGO staff involved in the Recovery Programme had found new jobs in other regions. Interview and documentary evidence was triangulated with field observations of project sites in 2005.

The following sections consider two kinds of projects corresponding to two of the main goals of the Recovery Programme: the rehabilitation of IDPs and restoration of public infrastructure. The cases discussed do not cover all the Recovery Programme’s goals, but they are sufficiently illustrative of the broader management behind and results of the Recovery Programme to draw some general conclusions. Each section contrasts the goals and achievements reported in the UNDP’s official programme ‘progress reports’ with outcomes observable in field sites. The disjuncture between intended and actual programme outcomes reflects several important points about the environment in which the Recovery Programme operated. However, the particularities of the region appear to have been largely ignored in the Recovery Programme’s design and management strategy, which the following three sections discuss in more detail.

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520 Unfortunately, little numerical data on Recovery Programme beneficiaries, or statistical measures of programme effects, were available for examination. This reflects an overall data problem with the UNDP’s (and Indonesian government) post-conflict programmes in the Maluku region. Available data on IDPs, for example, was widely reported as inaccurate for technical and political reasons.

521 By 2005, several former senior programme staff had relocated to new programmes in Sudan and Afghanistan, for example. I am grateful to those who responded to my questions via e-mail.

522 Researchers face several challenges in measuring donor project corruption ex-post, especially when agencies responsible for these projects tend not to provide full disclosure of project documents. For further research, it would be possible to request DFID documentation via various public information acts, for example. Accessing UNDP documentation would be much harder.

523 This was despite information available from several UNDP-financed studies of the regional government, societal and economic context in the post-conflict period, for example, Swisher et al (2004).
5.2 The disjuncture between policy and practice in IDP projects

We have to watch the government because they misbehave with the money.

*UNDP field office staff member.*

The primary goal of the Recovery Programme was to assist the return and recovery of IDPs across the Maluku region and several projects were specifically intended to enable this process. In 2004, UNDP reported to the major programme donors:

Programme activities across various sectors (housing, infrastructure, health, education, economic recovery) have contributed directly to this objective through facilitating return of IDPs by reducing constraints that have prevented return.

The UNDP’s final donor ‘progress report’, cited above, outlines projects funded by the Recovery Programme aimed at assisting IDPs. Several of these were implemented by the North Maluku provincial government, “under the discretion of the Governor and SATKORLAK.” As Chapter Four explained, SATKORLAK was the emergency coordination board run by the provincial government for emergency and post-conflict activities. Chapter Four also outlined the extensive capture of government aid projects which fell under the authority of the Governor’s office. Given the centralised authority of government funds in the Governor’s office via emergency legislation, most post-conflict aid projects fell under the Governor’s jurisdiction. Where UNDP funds were channelled through the provincial government, as many of the funds for IDPs were, similar problems of state capture therefore applied to them, as much as to central government aid.

(i) Reported IDP project results

Around 17 per cent of IDPs in North Maluku reportedly received assistance from UNDP-funded activities for housing, infrastructure or shelter, though exact figures were unavailable (see Annex B, Table B.5 for estimates). According to UNDP, one

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524 Interview, 1 July 2005, Tobelo.
525 Programme objectives summarised from UNDP (2004), p.2
528 A substantial number of projects funded by UNDP were run by international NGOs in North Maluku, who worked relatively independently and therefore managed to avoid some of the state capture problems illustrated here. As these projects fell outside the government’s jurisdiction, I have not discussed them here.
third of IDP families involved in UNDP-funded IDP projects in North Maluku were 
aided by SATKORLAK. The other two thirds were supported by the UN Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS), another UN agency through which UNDP channelled aid 
funds. IDP projects organised by UNOPS appeared to have been coordinated by 
provincial government agencies, though this could not be confirmed in the field. The “illustrative indicators” used by UNDP to measure their IDP project success 
used numbers of IDP “families” and “communities” reportedly receiving assistance, 
rather than actual numbers of IDPs. As such, the reported figures cannot 
accurately reflect total numbers of IDPs affected by UNDP-funded projects.

The UNDP also reported the successful housing of IDPs between 2002 and 2003 via 
“provision of housing materials and cash assistance to 530 displaced families to 
facilitate return to their communities of origin in 21 villages in nine sub-districts.”

It was not clear whether these were the same families as those listed in the reports 
cited above. As such, even if the reports were accurate, it is impossible to establish 
from the UNDP’s documentation exactly how many IDP families received assistance 
from the programme. Independent data on the Recovery Programme’s overall results 
with IDPs were unavailable for comparison. The estimate I have presented here – 
17 per cent of total IDPs receiving assistance from UNDP funded projects – is 
therefore a best-guess.

(ii) Evidence of state capture of IDP projects

In practice, IDP projects were among those most open to capture by staff in the 
provincial and local governments in North Maluku. Local and international NGOs

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529 The UNOPS-organized projects were already completed by mid-2005. Information on these 
projects was available only from UNDP project staff in the field at this time and they were unclear as 
to how UNOPS had operated IDP project activities with the provincial government.

530 The UNDP reports did not explain how many people were included (on average) in IDP families. I 
therefore used an average number of five people per family (based on discussions with former IDPs 
and project staff in the Maluku region) in Annex B, Table B.5. UNDP listed beneficiary 
“communities” separately, but again without estimating population size, so these figures were 
excluded. Other indicators used by UNDP included numbers of IDP communities participating in 
“peace-building processes.” It was not clear what these activities were, how many people constituted a 
“community”, or what the outcomes were, so this data was also excluded. Other data showing IDP 
project results was unavailable.

531 As mentioned above, without knowing how many IDPs constitute an IDP community, one cannot 
estimate total numbers reportedly aided by the Recovery Programme.

532 UNDP (2004), p.7

533 Local newspapers and NGOs involved in monitoring emergency and post-conflict aid projects 
focused on government activities.
working in the Maluku region following the conflict reported that IDP housing projects run by the provincial government were highly prone to corruption across both provinces. As already demonstrated, IDP projects were largely coordinated by the Governor’s office through SATKORLAK, the provincial agency headed by the Governor, his deputy or chief-of-staff, depending on provincial government arrangements at the time. The North Maluku provincial chief-of-staff, Thaib Armain (later the first elected Governor) was implicated in several major local corruption cases involving IDP and other aid and government funds from this and later periods.

In 2004 and 2005, local newspapers in North Maluku ran a series of articles on corruption cases involving IDP funds that were unresolved by the provincial legal system. Chapter Four outlined some of these cases, which I expand upon here. The Ternate-based newspaper, the *Malut Pos*, alleged that government-provided building materials intended for IDPs (to enable them to build or repair their houses) had been stolen by officials at all levels of government, from the province to village. Provincial parliamentarians involved in the budget process, and local contractors meant to supply the materials, were also implicated.

One article followed a specific case in Morotai, North Halmahera district, where many IDP funds were reportedly misused by the local government. The *Malut Pos* reported:

> The issues surrounding IDP aid have not yet abated. In fact, the distribution of aid for building materials to 68 IDP families in Tilowo, South Morotai sub-district, is indicated as fictitious. Signatures of IDPs were forged and false fingerprints of the 18 families were used to claim they had received building materials in the village. Aside from this, the received value of aid for building materials by the families was far below the stipulated value.⁵³⁴

Out of the 68 families described in this particular case, in 2005, five years after the official end to the conflict, 50 of them had not received any of the building material funds allocated to them and those that had, found themselves with only one third of the official allocation. During a government hearing on this case, the contractors involved in supplying the building materials and the IDP representatives engaged in bitter rows. Village officials involved in the project then confessed that the building

material aid received by the IDPs was indeed less than one third of the official value and several contractors admitted they had also paid bribes to the provincial level Department of Social Affairs (which had played a large role in ‘implementing’ IDP projects) in order to receive IDP-related building contracts. In the same case, the provincial DPRD was reported as acknowledging that several provincial parliamentarians – who were directly involved in the parliamentary commissions responsible for managing IDP projects – also ran the building companies receiving contracts in connection to these projects. No mention of these kinds of problems appeared anywhere in UNDP’s official project documentation.

According to the UNDP’s official reports, early in the post-conflict recovery process the main impediment to the return of IDPs were security fears and the lack of public services. The UNDP planned to reduce these ‘barriers’ to IDP-return and resettlement:

The Programme’s approach for supporting the return of IDPs has situated the issue within the broader context of community-based socio-economic recovery. This approach has sought to address barriers to return, while providing supports that benefit communities at large.

However, while security fears and public service restrictions may have impaired IDP return between 2000 and 2001, immediately following the official end to violence, the local environment was rather different by 2002. Field evidence suggests that the main factor impeding the return of the majority of IDPs after 2002 was a lack of funds to assist this process, not security issues. By 2005, provincial and local government officials, as well as local NGOs monitoring the government aid budget, reported that government funding for IDPs had already “finished” (as Chapter Four outlined). By 2005, security had been restored to most areas and the majority of public services were running again. While several small groups of IDPs could not return because of ongoing security fears – for example, some Christian families in North Halmahera could not yet return to Ternate or Tidore – for the majority of

remaining IDPs the most significant factor impeding their return or resettlement was a lack of funds.\textsuperscript{538}

From 2003 onwards, an increasingly number of demonstrations against corruption in the use of IDP funds took place in Ternate and elsewhere in North Maluku. IDPs themselves and local NGOs lobbying on their behalf demanded the investigation of provincial and local government corruption of aid funds, with local newspapers reporting on these cases.\textsuperscript{539} Funding problems were related not only to corruption of IDP funds, but problems tracking the IDPs themselves. Several international NGO and UNDP staff raised these problems in relation to IDP projects. One UNDP field staff member reported:

What the IDPs get from the government doesn’t fit with the money – they get less quality than the money available. There are still around 2,000 in barracks in Ternate waiting for money from the central government – but no one knows where the funds are. Many just cannot go back to Tobelo or their home villages without their ‘return’ funds.... The IDP numbers haven’t been updated by Dinas Sosial (the provincial level Social Affairs Department) in 2005, so we are also not sure how many there are now.\textsuperscript{540}

An international NGO staff member working on IDP projects in North Maluku – whose projects were partly financed by UNDP – also reported that IDP funds had been poorly managed by the provincial government. As Chapter Four explained, independent monitoring of government aid funds was limited following the conflict – even by the local press, who were one of the most active groups following government corruption of the aid budget. The NGO staff member reported:

The IDP funds were really badly managed. People who should have got it didn’t get it. People got less than they should have done. It was a general problem across the province. Even people who did get something found it was much smaller than what they were (officially) allocated. Because of the lack of civil society groups here there was little protest at what happened to the IDP funds and....very little pressure on the local government to do something about the missing funds...Even in Ternate, where there are more civil society groups, the

\textsuperscript{538} In contrast, in Maluku province in 2005, security was still an important factor affecting IDP return and resettlement. Even so, funding also remained a key impediment, in particular for IDP resettlement for groups where there was no chance of returning to their original homes or villages.

\textsuperscript{539} Reported, for example, in \textit{Malut Pos}, 30 November 2004; \textit{Malut Pos}, 22 December 2004; \textit{Ternate Pos (date obscured)} 2004; \textit{Ternate Pos}, 27 January 2005; \textit{Mimbar Kieraha}, 26 July 2003.

\textsuperscript{540} Interview, 30 May 2005, Ternate.
local newspapers find it hard to be independent and resist government pressures... The media is fairly toothless in Jakarta, but it’s denture-less here.541

Other international NGO staff members, stationed in North Maluku following the conflict, reported that there had been minimal monitoring of government expenditure on IDP projects. Deals between local government officials and businesses on construction projects related to IDPs were frequently made, with kick-backs to both parties, but dissent was minimal in the post-conflict years. However, as Chapter Four outlined, local political dynamics were changing somewhat through 2005, following the rising criticism of provincial and local government corruption by local media and NGOs and the onset of internal government dissent with upcoming elections.

(iii) Changing local political dynamics in 2005

In both Maluku and North Maluku provinces, by 2005 almost all international NGOs had closed down their post-conflict projects, including those targeted at the remaining IDPs – aside from those funded by the last phases of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme. One local NGO activist in Ambon reported that the large number of remaining IDPs reflected serious political and administrative problems in the provincial and local government:

We watch the government process and give them feedback on the way they allocated their budgets, or when their implementation is not fair, or when corruption or collusion is evident. Every day there are many cases of it in the local newspapers....The provincial government has provided land and houses for the IDPs, and also some other useful things like small loans with local banks and help for schooling of IDP children...But there are three main problems with the IDP funds. There is too much bureaucracy, the funds are taken for other purposes and there is constant mark-up of funds. The community knows about this and there is some local protest, but many are shy to come forward and do not want to complain.542

As with the situation in Ternate, outlined in Chapter Four, whilst NGO and IDP protests against government corruption had increased from 2003 onwards, with the prospect of local elections in 2005 and upcoming gubernatorial elections, internal dissent over government corruption within different branches of the local government and parliaments also rose. In the Ambon city and provincial parliaments,

541 Interview, 4 July 2005, Tobelo.
542 Interview, 13 October 2005, Ambon.
as in the North Maluku provincial parliament, several MPs had set up anti-corruption coalitions. In the Ambon parliament, the anti-corruption group faced entrenched corruption by and collusion between fellow MPs, government officials and senior military staff, who had been actively involved in capture of IDP funds during both the allocation and distribution phases. A founding member of the anti-corruption parliamentary group in Ambon reported:

The IDPs are the first problem that has to be solved. First they need houses, second they need work. For example, the money for the IDPs doesn't go to the IDPs, but to the army and the generals in charge here in Ambon.543

In North Maluku, the major beneficiaries were provincial government officials, followed by provincial parliamentarians, with the regional military generally less extensively involved in state-capture than in Maluku province, though there were some reports of military involvement during the emergency period.544 The establishment of the North Maluku DPRD's 'IDP Investigation Committee', established by the then Deputy Speaker of the DPRD (a dissenting Golkar figure), was part of a similar trend to the 2005 political developments in the Ambon city and Maluku DPRDs. This new pattern of internal monitoring from within the provincial and city governments and parliaments paralleled the opening up of the election process from 2004 onwards, rising particularly through 2005, with the establishment of direct local elections. This trend possibly signalled an improvement in provincial and local parliamentary oversight of government expenditure. It also reflected the use of an 'anti-corruption' agenda to win votes and/or target political enemies during the run up to and during local election campaigns.545

Many mayoral and district regent candidates ran on 'anti-corruption' platforms in the 2005 local elections, even though they themselves were former civil servants or

543 Interview, 12 October 2005, Ambon.
544 The military were smaller political and economic players in North Maluku than in central Maluku, as Chapters Two and Three mentioned. Historically, the military wielded much greater power in the Ambon political economy. Prior to 1999, North Maluku constituted only three remote districts of Maluku province, which were of limited strategic, political or economic importance. Ambon was long viewed suspiciously by Jakarta, dating back to the separatist movement (RMS) active following Indonesian independence (see Chauvel 1990). It was also a bigger city, more economically dynamic than North Maluku, and of greater economic interest to the military than North Maluku. Interviews, provincial and city parliamentarians, Ambon and Ternate, May-October 2005.
545 See Chapter Six on electoral dynamics.
incumbent heads of local government who had been involved with managing IDP and other aid funds. For example, one important former civil servant in North Halmahera district, Hein Namotemo, ran successfully for district chief in the 2005 local elections. Part of his campaign was based on criticising the government’s failure to rebuild and reconstruct North Halmahera after four years of projects organised by the provincial and local government. As a prominent local official, Namotemo had been closely involved with local decision-making and the operation of IDP funds and projects. However, during the 2005 elections he distanced himself from the problems associated with these projects. In interviews, he claimed that ten to 15 per cent of houses destroyed in the conflict in North Halmahera had not yet been rebuilt by 2005 due to corruption in IDP projects run by the government.546

Part of Hein’s local election campaign was based on his promise to complete post-conflict reconstruction and recovery in North Halmahera district that remained unfinished due to “government problems” (meaning corruption). His own involvement in local government was both played up (he claimed he was the most experienced local government candidate) and played down (he minimised his role in local government corruption). Hein’s campaign was therefore very similar to Mayor Syamsir’s 2005 re-election campaign in Ternate, which Chapter Six expands on, both in relation to local candidates’ use of aid funds captured during previous years in office, and the ‘anti-corruption’ platforms that were a popular feature of the 2005 local elections.

In conclusion, while IDP resettlement and re-housing was largely a government sponsored programme in North Maluku (as in Maluku province), the UNDP was closely involved with financing government IDP projects and channelled a substantial proportion of its aid funds through provincial government bodies. The problems of ‘missing’ government IDP funds reported by NGOs and local newspapers – as highlighted here – therefore also reflects problems in projects financed by the UNDP. In 2005, between two and three thousand IDPs remained living in temporary barracks in Ternate; in Maluku province the number was even

546 Interview, 5 July 2005, Tobelo.
higher.\textsuperscript{547} While the provincial government and the UNDP officially claimed the IDP problem had been successfully resolved due to their assistance, the fragile situation of those remaining IDPs told a different story about the use of the UNDP aid funds than was officially reported.

5.3 State capture of public infrastructure projects

The local parliament is also involved in corruption, collusion and nepotism. The MPs charge fees to have something put in the budget. They charge this to the executive. Ten per cent is the usual fee – this is a very common tradition in the budget planning process. Then there is the nepotism between the government and the contractors over the bidding process. Sometimes budgets are marked up to cover this, but it is always done behind closed doors and so it is very hard for us to monitor it.

\textit{Local NGO staff member, Ambon.}\textsuperscript{548}

The reconstruction, or rehabilitation, of public and private infrastructure was another major priority in North Maluku following the conflict. This section considers two kinds of infrastructure rehabilitation project financed by the UNDP, but largely implemented by provincial and local government agencies. The UNDP was involved in a range of public infrastructure rehabilitation projects across the Maluku region; their listings included the reconstruction or rehabilitation of 50 schools, 15 health centres, 23 community halls, four market facilities, 185 water-sanitation projects, 60 village electricity restoration projects, 46 road rehabilitation projects, 37 drainage repair projects, 18 bridge constructions, eight harbour or port rehabilitation projects, and 24 ‘other’ public structures.\textsuperscript{549} The UNDP’s public infrastructure data was not disaggregated, so it was unclear which organisation had carried out specific projects in which location. No individual or sampled evaluation of these 450 or so projects across the two provinces was available from the UNDP or other agencies. However,

\textsuperscript{547} Even more IDPs than this remained in barracks in Maluku province: some observers estimated that over 10,000 IDPs remained in Maluku at the end of 2005. Several international NGO programme staff reported these figures, based on numbers of IDPs remaining in Ambon city and on Seram island.
\textsuperscript{548} Interview, 13 October 2005, Ambon.
\textsuperscript{549} UNDP (2004), pp.8-9. UNDP sourced data on these public infrastructure projects from the following organisations:- in North Maluku, UNOPS (which worked through the provincial government in North Maluku), CARDI (an international NGO), World Vision (another international NGO), and ABP-North Maluku (it is unclear what kind of organisation this was); and, in Maluku, Mercy Corps (an international NGO), the Ambon city government, Muhammidiyah (an Islamic organisation), and Yayasan Kartika (a national NGO).
based on field evidence collected for this research project – from local newspaper sources, field interviews and eye-witness evidence – it was likely that a substantial proportion of these projects underwent state capture in ways similar to IDP projects and other government aid projects in the region.

State capture of aid funds in infrastructure construction or reconstruction projects is often visually observable. Comparisons between the materials used in rehabilitated buildings or roads, with the official budgets and records of materials, as well as the location and function of buildings, can provide indications of collusion, budget skimming, or other state interventions, in the contracting or (re)building process.\textsuperscript{550} In some cases, buildings or other structures financed by the UNDP Recovery Programme were well-constructed, with no obvious deviation from original budgets or skimming from material provision. However, in these observed cases there was a clear rationale and interest behind the careful design and building of these projects for government or military officials, or their business associates. This section considers two cases of school ‘rehabilitation’ in North Halmahera district, and a large scale electricity project in Bacan Island, in the southern part of North Maluku.

(i) School ‘rehabilitation’ projects

The town of Tobelo, the capital of North Halmahera district, was one of the worst affected sites during the 1999-2000 conflict. According to Wilson’s (2005, 2008) analysis, it was particularly hard hit during the second wave of violence. Private dwellings, places of worship and many public buildings were destroyed during the riots in both the town and surrounding villages – their destruction and only partial reconstruction was still evident in 2005. One of the main aims of the Recovery Programme was to restore or rehabilitate conflict-affected public infrastructure. In several areas, Programme funds were used to repair and build schools and other ‘community-level’ public facilities.\textsuperscript{551}

\textsuperscript{550} Olken’s (2007) experimental studies of corruption in community road building projects financed by the Indonesian government measured road materials before and after the construction process to identify where and how budgets were misused, with various approaches tested in measuring the effectiveness of interventions to lower the chances of corruption.

\textsuperscript{551} Several photographs help illustrate Recovery Programme funded school facilities, observed in North Halmahera, showing both well-built and poorly built structures (See Annex C). All photographs taken by the author in Tobelo, North Halmahera, December 2005.
On the northern edge of Tobelo town, a shiny new concrete building sprung up on the district military compound in late 2005, standing out amidst the area’s remaining burned buildings and restored but simple wooden houses (see Annex C, Photographs C.1, C.2 and C.3). This new kindergarten for local elite and military families had been established by the district education authorities with funding from UNDP. The kindergarten was not a conflict-damaged public building in need of repair, but a new facility on the local military compound. The proposal for the kindergarten reportedly came from a collective of local families, although it was not clear that any ordinary local and conflict-affected families had benefited from the project. The families using the facility were either not local (military families) or were local government and business elite. These groups had lobbied to obtain Recovery Programme funds for the new school via the district government’s education offices. At the time of observation (December 2005) the kindergarten was recently built and official project documentation for the site was not yet completed by the UNDP field staff team. No senior staff in UNDP appeared aware of the project — although, according to programme rules, they should have approved it.

Informal interviews with soldiers on the base, and several families in the area whose children reportedly attended the facility, indicated that users were satisfied with the new kindergarten. It was not possible to interview the local government officials directly involved in the project, but general education facilities in Tobelo were poor — this was the smartest looking school building observed during field research. At a minimum, the project appeared to have built positive relations between the military officers on site, local government officials involved in the project, and the UNDP field office staff, who were about to commence the second phase of the Recovery Programme. One academic observer of the North Maluku conflict commented that whilst the military had failed to prevent the conflict escalating, they had played a positive role in reconstruction:

Reconstruction in North Maluku was mostly carried out by the government. But even the military played a big role …They even

552 See Annex C for photographs of the site.
553 UNDP field office staff members were understandably hesitant to discuss the kindergarten project as they knew it fell outside the Recovery Programme’s objectives. During informal interviews — in December 2005 — field staff implied that the project had been pushed forward by local officials and rushed through in the last phase of Programme funding.
delivered aid to the IDPs during the conflict and helped afterwards. It wasn’t like in Ambon, where the police and military were divided between the different communities.\textsuperscript{554}

Though a small project, the kindergarten appeared to have been an expression of goodwill – a returned favour – to the local military from local officials, while at the same time offering elite Tobelo families pre-school education facilities unavailable elsewhere in the district. This particular kindergarten was well constructed using good quality materials.

Despite the range of possible strategic reasons for the UNDP to finance a kindergarten on this military site, especially given the positive relations it appeared to have built between UNDP staff and local officials (whether military or civilian), UNDP staff in Jakarta were apparently unaware of the project. Major donors to the UNDP Recovery Programme also appeared unaware of the project and it was not reported in any official documentation.\textsuperscript{555} Strategically, the kindergarten had served several political goals. Building contractors had also gained from the project (though it was not possible to trace them during fieldwork) thus reflecting further benefits for government-business partners involved in the project. The kindergarten example recalls the quote from the former UNDP staff member, opening this section, whereby ten per cent fees for officials and MPs involved in the bidding and contracting process for government projects were common. In Central Sulawesi, Aragon (2007) reported similar patterns in the state capture of IDP and post-conflict funds.

Another example of a UNDP-supported primary school, this one partially repaired via the Recovery Programme, was located directly across from the UNDP field office in Tobelo (see Annex C, Photographs C.4 and C.5). Local UNDP field staff members did not (or could not) reveal any information about this school project. The school’s head-teacher understood that the funding had come from the government, with support from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme for rehabilitation of the schoolyard

\textsuperscript{554} Interview, Arifah Rahmawati, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Gadja Mada University, Yogyakarta, 5 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{555} It was not possible to interview senior staff from the main donor organisations involved in funding this project, nor other projects in the area, despite repeated attempts to contact them. Senior DFID staff in Jakarta - who were not themselves directly involved with funding the UNDP Recovery Programme - were also unaware of such projects. An earlier draft of this chapter was sent to UNDP and DFID officials connected to post-conflict programming in Indonesia but no comments were received.
and rooftop. The school was not directly damaged by the conflict, but was located in the centre of Tobelo town, in an area extensively damaged during the violence of late 1999 to early 2000. A tour of the building revealed that a new roof and drainage system had been built to a basic standard, but the funds listed by the head-teacher did not match the low quality of materials used.\textsuperscript{556} Evidently, some of the funds had been used for other purposes – whether by the district education officials involved in the project, school staff, or others. The project manager from an international NGO working on school reconstruction in the area reported:

\begin{center}
NGO projects are so much cheaper than government projects here – for example in school rehabilitation. For three classrooms you need 75 million Rupiah (\textit{approximately US$6,800}) – but it is very difficult for the government to imagine doing it at that price. Government projects for three classrooms are always at least 150 million Rupiah (\textit{approximately US$13,600}), which is over twice the price of an NGO-funded school.\textsuperscript{557}
\end{center}

The school rehabilitation project depicted above could be counted as a partial success: the school facilities had been somewhat improved, thus meeting the goal of basic repair of public services. But, as with the kindergarten, the other benefits of the project (to those officials involved in funding the project) and the costs (to the children who lacked a properly rehabilitated school) were not measured or accounted for in the Recovery Programme’s official documentation.

These two examples of school projects in North Halmahera – one of the most conflict affected areas of North Maluku – financed by the Recovery Programme reflect state capture of the funding and building process. In these two cases it was not possible to contact the building contractors involved, but in both cases, it was indicated that they had benefited financially from the projects beyond the official sums involved. Given the usual pattern of business in the region, between the provincial and local government agencies and close business partners, these contracts would have been arranged with the benefits of financial or other contributions to the

\textsuperscript{556} Previous experience monitoring community infrastructure projects in Indonesia enabled me to identify disjunctures between reported budgets and actual spending. A local research assistant accompanying me also found the reported budget inflated well above the cost of the materials used, when local prices for the materials involved were checked.

\textsuperscript{557} Interview, Project Manager responsible for North Maluku and Maluku rehabilitation projects, partially financed by UNDP, International NGO, 10 October 2005, Ambon. Rupiah converted at July 2007 rates.
state officials involved. A former UNDP staff member, who had worked extensively on the Recovery Programme with provincial and local government across the Maluku region, commented:

\[\text{It's very different in regions like Kalimantan, where there are many private sector resources shared by the community. But in Maluku it's not like that, it's just state resources shared out between the elites. To understand the local political economy you have to look at employment and how the business sector is organised and where they (businessmen) get their business from...and then you need to ask, is it (business) from the government or the private sector? Then you can understand how politics is organised.}\]

The next infrastructure 'reconstruction' project, on a larger scale than these small school projects, further illustrates the state capture process behind the allocation and expenditure of Recovery Programme funds.

(ii) Electricity rehabilitation projects

The largest individual infrastructure project funded via the Recovery Programme - with a budget of over US$500,000 – was a mainly EU-funded project to rehabilitate electricity in one of the most remote parts of the North Maluku archipelago on Bacan Island, in the south of the province. This electricity project was one of UNDP's flagship public infrastructure rehabilitation sites in North Maluku. Although the Bacan area had not been greatly affected by the conflict, and was several hundred miles from the conflict’s two epicentres in Ternate and Tobelo, it was one of the poorest in the province and electricity facilities had been reportedly damaged during the conflict. The electricity project became a show-case for the UNDP's programme donors, who were observed travelling with senior officials from the Provincial Governor's office to open the project in May 2005 during field research.

\[\text{The aims of the project were:}\]

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558 Interview, former UNDP staff member, 4 October 2005.
559 Project budget listed as US$508,929 in UNDP (2004), Annex 1, p.28. Although budgets for other "reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation" of public infrastructures projects were bigger - US$3,387,358 was allocated to rebuild community infrastructure - this was the largest sum allocated to an individual infrastructure project (UNDP 2004, p.28).
561 It should be noted here how rarely Jakarta-based donors and UN officials visited their funded projects in North Maluku. During seven months of fieldwork, I only observed one such high-level mission (an EU monitoring mission) to evaluate UNDP-funded projects, in May 2005.
...the rehabilitation of the public electricity system in East Bacan in partnership with the state electricity company PLN, in order to create conditions for enhanced security, public service delivery, and economic development in the Bacan area.\textsuperscript{562}

Evidence of collusion and corruption in contracting for the project were noted by several interviewees, who focused their critique on the role of the state-owned electricity company, PLN, in the project. In itself, PLN’s involvement and provincial government capture of the funds for the project does not mean the project failed. Electricity reportedly functioned on Bacan following the project – an important gain for local residents, government and businesses for local economic and social development.\textsuperscript{563} But the interests in the regional and local governments in this large regional infrastructure project were multiple: – contractual deals between the state company and local officials, between the parliament and officials signing off on the project, sub-contracts to local companies involved in the operations of the project, etc.\textsuperscript{564}

Another example of a PLN-provincial government project funded by the UNDP was the rehabilitation of electricity in North Halmahera district:

The Programme also supported major infrastructure projects including the rehabilitation of the electrical power system destroyed by the conflict, resulting in 93.5 km of new electrical lines in Tobelo Selatan and Galela sub-districts in partnership with the state electricity company (PLN).\textsuperscript{565}

By collaborating with PLN, a percentage of Recovery Programme funding would almost certainly have gone straight into the pockets of both PLN and other government officials. At the same time, a new electricity system was provided to the community in that area, thereby aiding local economic and social recovery following the conflict. One of the main Recovery Programme ‘objectives’ was to promote both social and economic activity and the repair of public infrastructure – the PLN projects promoted both these goals. However, the actors involved in the project were drawn solely from the provincial government and connected contractors. The

\textsuperscript{562} UNDP (2004), p.3.
\textsuperscript{563} Interviews, Bacan residents visiting Ternate, June 2005, Ternate.
\textsuperscript{564} Local electoral politics in Bacan can also be linked to the construction of this electricity project, which connected particular local government elites to elites in the provincial capital. I do not cover this region of North Maluku in any detail, but see Chapter Six on broader regional electoral politics.
\textsuperscript{565} UNDP (2004), pp. 3-4.
provincial government elite had much to gain by repairing electricity in the Bacan and North Halmahera regions – as with other public infrastructure projects – not only in the gains they made by rent-seeking from project funds, but also in terms of political gains in the targeted regions. Thus the UNDP Recovery Programme had assisted post-conflict ‘reconstruction and recovery’, but it did so through enabling the project to be captured by the provincial and local government elite (including both civil servants and parliamentarians) and their contracting partners. This process was not acknowledged by UNDP staff either in official reports or in unofficial discussions.

This section closes with a quote from a senior member of the Ambon city parliament. He observed the making of many “new rich” in the local and provincial government via capture of aid funds. The widespread problems with management of aid funds reported by this informant – in particular, the collusion between provincial parliamentarians and the provincial Social Department officials to capture IDP and reconstruction project funds – were also observed with both UNDP and central government aid budgets provided to Maluku province. As such, state capture in North Maluku fitted into a broader regional pattern.

Commission D in the DPRD (provincial parliament) was investigated over the corruption of IDP funds. This Commission is in charge of the social and IDP issues in the province. Dinsos got the money for IDPs, but other departments and commissions were also involved. For example, the building for IDPs.... well, Public Works, Dinsos, all of them were involved and this makes many problems.... There are already many “new rich” in Dinsos because of the IDP projects. The system has to be better than before reformasi (the reform era), now there’s a performance budget approach, for example...but there is still a lot of collusion between the executive, the parliament and businesses at all levels.566

5.4 Overall assessment of state capture of UNDP aid funds

This penultimate section summarises the overall costs and benefits of provincial and local government state capture of UNDP aid funds. It starts with a summary of the

566 Interview, PDI-P parliamentarian, Ambon city DPRD, 12 October 2005, Ambon. PDI-P held majority control of the city parliament at this time, and this MP did not stand to gain politically from criticising fellow MPs or government officials. As such, I took his observations as genuine.
data problems, and then considers the local and national benefits of state capture to the government. The final part considers the severe costs of aid-fund capture to the remaining IDP population.

Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 highlighted several problems with tracking the use and impact of Recovery Programme funds in North Maluku when relying on UNDP data alone. This was not only because the UNDP's impact measurement data was unclear, but also because many of the real effects of the funds in the field were not included in any official assessment. In a review of the Recovery Programme, the Dutch government – the largest overall donor – argued that the reason there was no UNDP data on whether programme objectives had been met, was because, "the programme's objectives were never fully operationalised by the specification of indicators of achievement for each objective." Previous sections already highlighted how it was impossible to compare actual with planned results because of the lack of baseline and outcome data. As such, the UNDP could only provide, a "description of results at the subproject level." The assessment provided in this chapter was based on triangulated field evidence, compared, where possible, to data presented in the UNDP's official reports.

Based on the field evidence presented here, the patterns of provincial and local state capture of UNDP aid funds were very similar to state capture of central government aid to North Maluku. The cases presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 showed that many projects, including those targeted at IDPs and infrastructure rehabilitation, were run in collaboration with, or directly through, provincial and local government agencies. Provincial and local government officials made the key decisions about which projects would be financed, where and how. As the UNDP ran the Recovery Programme largely through government officials, based in various state agencies, the major projects were designed and managed via the provincial and local governments' usual procedures, using their regular contractors. The Dutch programme review team highlighted some of the risks of providing direct support to government agencies,

569 See Chapter One on research methodology.
though their comments did not appear to have affected programme design or implementation:

In cases where a government agency is a recipient of direct support or capacity building assistance, its roles in leadership and decision-making remains *(sic)* important. However, these roles do not automatically qualify the government agency to carry out the fiduciary role of managing UNDP's funds. Indeed, given the high propensity for rent-seeking within the government, this role for government agencies should be avoided.\(^{570}\)

Rent-seeking from the UNDP's aid funds can be construed in either positive or negative terms, depending on the perspective taken. From the UNDP and major donors' official perspective high levels of rent-seeking in the Recovery Programme was to be avoided. From the perspective of the provincial government, state capture of programme funds was an important and strategic gain given the struggling post-conflict regional economy. Recovery Programme funds enabled the repair and rehabilitation of government buildings, infrastructure and other public services. Even more importantly, the rebuilding and repair process enabled the restoration of a provincial-local 'elite bargain' between officials in different branches of the state, and local businesses reliant on state contracts — a bargain threatened by regional instability during the conflict and in the post-conflict economic crisis period.\(^{571}\) The restoration of the local state as one of the main sources of regional income (and therefore business contracts) restored the pre-conflict state-elite bargain, as well as providing urban employment. At the same time, a range of public services were either restored or improved alongside the state capture process.

State capture of aid funds also had national benefits for the central government, as Chapter Four argued. The central government 'bought back' a restive region into the nation-state bargain by enabling this and the UNDP's aid funds also contributed to this process. The local state-based elite re-built themselves in political terms, capturing aid funds for their personal and political use (as well as serving purposes of local government), thereby positioning themselves strongly for future local elections (explored further in Chapter Six). In some ways, therefore, the state capture of


\(^{571}\) I draw the 'elite bargain' concept from Putzel (2007), drawing on Tilly (2003), Snyder (2006), and Khan and Jomo (2000).
central government and UNDP aid funds enabled the restoration of ‘stability’ and helped to ‘re-build’ the local state – a frequently elusive process in post-conflict situations, and whose importance should not, therefore, be over-looked.

The impacts of state capture of UNDP aid on ordinary (non-elite) North Malukans should also be accounted for. On the positive side, while life for the ordinary North Malukan had not improved in economic terms compared to the pre-conflict situation (the regional economy was still worse off in 2005 than it had been in 1999), in contrast to the conflict year and continued economic crisis, between 1999 and 2001, the local economic situation had greatly improved by 2005. The combined provision of government and UNDP aid had also enabled the restoration of some public services and infrastructure, meaning trade, travel, security and other basic public facilities were functioning again. As a result of directly controlling the aid funds, the provincial and local government was also able to pay civil servant salaries, hire staff, rebuild offices and so on, which had a direct impact on urban employment. Previous chapters have already outlined the importance of government sector employment in the urban economy of North Maluku. With the restoration of basic security and public services, many IDPs were able to return to their original villages, even without the full emergency funding officially allocated to them. Therefore, overall, the economic and social situation in 2005 was an improvement on 2000, immediately following the conflict. The 2004 and 2005 election results reflected a general satisfaction with the provincial and local government in this respect, where a majority of former bureaucrats and some incumbents were returned to power, as Chapter Six further explores.

The benefits from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme funds observed and analysed here were, therefore, predominantly organised via the process of state capture, rather than the UNDP’s stated policy methods of working through community organisations and targeting the most vulnerable. Four main benefits were identified: (1), the restoration of the local state-elite bargain, via the renewed financing of state contracts for construction and other projects; (2), improvement of some elite public educational services, and the restored (if not improved) public services for non-elite families; (3), restored and improved electricity supply in some areas, benefiting the regional economy as a whole, as well as state-elites and contractors on the projects;
and, (4), the overall recovery of state stability and security. There were also, however, many costs from state capture, including the mark-ups on materials used in reconstruction, the personal extraction by officials of rents from projects, and other losses in overall efficiency due to state capture. However, reaching these overall results was nonetheless an important achievement in this remote post-conflict region of Indonesia, which had faced severe socio-economic crisis during and following the conflict of 1999-2000.

An important change to the (relative) independence of local civil society organisations was also made via access to UNDP funding, and this time directly, not via state-captured funds. Several new NGO forums in Ternate and Tobelo worked with women, minority groups and IDP communities, enabling a degree of political inclusion for these groups that had not been previously possible. One NGO member reported that the establishment of an independent local radio – with funding from the UNDP – had encouraged grassroots political discussion in the region, in particular among the youth sector:

In Sulawesi there are at least two big cities, which mean many more opportunities for university education and the growth of local NGOs. But North Maluku doesn’t have that opportunity. One good thing the UNDP did here was fund '68-H'. UNDP funded two local radio stations – one in Ternate and one in Tobelo – and they became part of the 68-H network. This meant local journalists could access training from the central branch of 68-H and get more experience with journalism. 68-H is one of the most independent, open and critical forms of media in Indonesia and this was something really new in North Maluku.572

By 2005, young activists from student, religious, peace and political organisations in Ternate and Tobelo – some of whom had been involved with UNDP-financed organisations – vocally expressed their criticisms of the provincial and local government, during the local elections. The UNDP funding their organisations received had enabled the development of civil society organisations independent of government financing, which was something new in the region.573

572 Interview, 4 July 2005, Tobelo.
573 The biggest and most established student, religious and political ‘civil society’ organisations in Ternate received the majority of their funding from provincial state agencies.
Finally, however, the benefits outlined above must be balanced against the costs of state capture of the UNDP’s aid funds (as with central government aid) for the displaced population, on whom the most significant costs fell. Those who remained displaced as of 2005, for whom there was no funding left and no source for redress, faced a miserable situation. Even those IDPs who had been able to return, and had received some funding from the government to do so, had not regained their pre-conflict livelihood standards. Their small businesses and gardens remained destroyed, education possibilities were still removed, children and relatives had been killed, and their homes and places of worship were yet to be rebuilt. IDPs remaining in 2005 had no political power, and while some NGOs and local MPs claimed to represent their interests, these organisations and individuals had their own political interests to pursue. However, because the UNDP Recovery Programme had never been fully assessed, the state capture of resources officially intended for the restoration of IDP livelihoods, and the costs of this capture to the most vulnerable population in the region, was not acknowledged either by the UNDP or the major project donors.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the patterns behind state capture of the UNDP aid funds to North Maluku and the main benefits and costs this had to the local elite and broader population. In conclusion, I summarise why UNDP aid funds – as with Indonesian government funds – were so readily captured by the provincial and local branches of government. Widespread government reforms following the creation of the new province in 1999, combined with civil emergency legislation in 2000, and the protracted decentralisation and re-districting process from 2001 onwards, meant the UNDP’s relationship with the provincial and local government was complex and constantly changing. However, the UNDP’s post-conflict policy demonstrated an organisational failure to understand the regional political economy of North Maluku, both in historical and contemporary terms.

Given the UNDP’s stated interest in avoiding state control of their aid funds and its intention to minimise corruption, the organisation did not appear to have planned
how they would overcome the risks of operating a large reconstruction and IDP rehabilitation programme in the kind of governance environment they faced in the wider Maluku region. Within the official reports, as well as in interviews, there were few references to the combined difficulties of working with a new provincial administration, rapidly re-districting local government, and a highly centralised Governor’s office. The UNDP’s field team were managed from Jakarta, leaving the field staff with a weak bargaining position from the outset. The combination of channelling aid funds through the provincial and local government, limited government monitoring organisations and powerful local political elites enabled easy state capture of aid resources, just as Chapter Four outlined on the dynamics of government aid capture. Only one donor review cited risks of rent-seeking from the aid programme, and, even then, this was not a central feature of their critical assessment.

One of the core objectives of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme was “improving local governance”. But throughout the official documentation and interviews with programme staff, it was unclear what this actually meant in the North Maluku context. Government intervention in decision-making over project financing, the issuing of patronage-based contracts, the strong elite networks between local businesses and state officials, and so on, were not factors the UNDP accounted for in their design or management of the Recovery Programme. The absence of effective programme monitoring also meant it was relatively easy for their aid funds to be captured, without fear of identification or sanction from either the UNDP or the foreign donors. In contrast to the central government’s (unofficial) view on rent-seeking by the provincial and local government – that it was a necessary cost of rebuilding and stabilising the state following the conflict – the UNDP were apparently unaware of the extent to which local government officials had benefited, both personally and politically, from their aid budget.574

All donor-funded aid and development projects operating in the democratic transition period in Indonesia faced challenges in how to avoid state capture at the national,

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574 This failure to understand the regional political economy did not bode well for the success of the ‘Second Phase’ of the Recovery Programme, which was intended to focus on “improving governance.” See UNDP (2004), p.2.
provincial or local levels of government. In this particular case, the aid programme was run in close collaboration with a powerful set of local state-elites, who had emerged triumphant from the recent conflict. Set in a weak and transitional governance environment, with upcoming local elections, there was a wide range of incentives for appropriation of aid resources by state officials, within an environment enabling uncontrolled state capture. Given North Maluku’s ongoing economic crisis, following the conflict, the incentives for state capture were even higher than in non-conflict regions of Indonesia. In the official documents and in interviews with staff from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme, scant mention is made of these significant state-capture risks.

Towards the end of fieldwork in December 2005, the Recovery Programme was still in operation, with several project activities in the process of completion. ‘Phase One’ of the Recovery Programme – the focus of this study – was winding down and new tranches of donor money were beginning to flow into the UNDP, with new programme staff members arriving in the field offices, and the previous administrators departing. That the major donors had re-commissioned the UNDP to run a second phase of the Programme (presumably) reflected confidence in the Recovery Programme’s overall outcomes. UNDP staff members working on the second phase of the programme indicated that while the major donors had identified several problems with the first phase, they were confident these would be addressed through programme ‘re-design’ in its second phase.

In the official UNDP and donor reviews of the Maluku region Recovery Programme only one review – a report by the Dutch government – identified the problem of rent-seeking and state capture by the local government, and even then, only in a small aside. It is unclear whether the UNDP’s internal review team or the major donors failed to observe rent-seeking and state capture of the Recovery Programme,

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576 The kindergarten project in Tobelo - described in Section 5.2 - had just been completed, for example.
577 Around 2002 there was a political furore in Jakarta between UNDP and the major donors to the Recovery Programme over the progress and management of the Programme. It was not possible to conduct explicit interviews on this topic with related persons in 2005 or 2006.
strategically ignored it for political reasons, or whether other factors were involved in this ‘oversight’. However, analysing the reasons behind the absence of donor and UNDP acknowledgment of rent-seeking and state-capture practices by the provincial and local government falls outside the remit of this thesis.

The North Maluku regional economy faced protracted crisis following the conflict in 2000, with a collapsed agricultural and industrial sector, destroyed regional infrastructure and public services and major unemployment problems. State resources played a significant role in the post-conflict economy, and UNDP aid funds factored into the provincial government's critical pool of resources – raising their post-conflict revenue by another quarter, as Section 5.1 illustrated. Such a situation put provincial and local government officials and politicians in a very powerful economic and political position. On a political level, the UNDP aid programme offered a range of new business and political possibilities for politicians and officials and their business clients. Prestige infrastructure projects funded by the UNDP, including the 'rehabilitation' of electricity to outlying islands, were prime examples of the kind of ventures buying support for, and dependence on, the government officials and parliamentarians in charge of organising and disbursing aid funds in the local business and wider population. Whether based in the North Maluku Governor's office, or serving on provincial or city parliament budget committees, or seated within a local line ministry agency – government officials and their colluding parliamentary colleagues controlled access to vital government resources on which the local population was dependent.

When the time came for local elections in 2004 and 2005 – with all the attendant costs of raising funds to buy a party nomination, run an election campaign, and then organise supporters on election day – state official's access to the North Maluku Recovery Programme funds significantly bolstered the provincial and local government's 'election treasury'. While larger sources of revenue flowed from the central government's aid budget – as outlined in Chapter Four – the UNDP provided

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580 As the introduction noted, exploring the motives behind the UNDP's and donor's 'oversight' of state capture in this case goes somewhat beyond the focus of this thesis and would require further research.

581 It would be interesting to explore and develop this analysis in further research projects.

582 These patterns also applied to Maluku province, but I was unable to follow up the political implications of it within the scope of this study.
another important income stream for the provincial and local government elite. This chapter therefore contributes to the thesis' broader story of how local political elites in North Maluku survived the regional conflict and protracted economic crisis, and entrenched their political positions. The state capture of post-conflict aid funding enriched those in positions of state power, thereby contributing to their electoral success: the subject of the following chapter. While the state capture of aid funds was one of the key mechanisms behind the political survival of the state-based elite, and the operation of their political machines, it was their success in local elections that enabled them to thrive.
Chapter Six -
Rice and circuses: explaining incumbents' success in North Maluku's local and gubernatorial elections

Better a known evil than an unknown good.
_Sicilian proverb._

Introduction

By the end of 2000, the Temate Sultan had been forced into exile, following the end of the most intense wave of violence in Temate. This signalled his defeat in the conflict, which was closely tied to his campaign to become the first governor of North Maluku. The southern political triumvirate – Thaib Armain, by then Provincial Government Chief of Staff; Syamsir Andili, Ternate Mayor; and Bahar Andili, district regent of Central Halamahera – had emerged triumphant, and now occupied the top echelon of the regional bureaucracy. However, as Chapter Four outlined, the unity between these three was only temporary. Even the Sultan’s defeat and exile did not stop him from returning to launch several further election campaigns. Competition between these four figures dominated electoral politics over much of the next decade, with the addition of a further contestant in 2001, former Suharto cabinet minister, Abdul Gafur.

This chapter considers the successes of state-based incumbents in city and gubernatorial elections in North Maluku between 2001 and 2008. The success of incumbents in successive post-conflict, post-New Order elections, contrasts with the failure of the Temate Sultan and other leading non-bureaucratic political figures, including Gafur and _Boki_ Nita Budhi Susanti, the Sultan’s fifth wife, to secure political posts. The chapter focuses on the gubernatorial and city elections as the most important in regional and local political terms; other elections are discussed

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583 The chapter title alludes to Erie’s (1988) analysis of the political tools used by Irish-American political machines in the US, via the provision of ‘bread’ (patronage-based jobs and benefits) and ‘circuses’ (popular community entertainment to rally electoral support). An earlier version of this chapter, focusing on the failed ‘return’ of the Ternate Sultan in the 2005 local elections, was published as Smith (2009).


585 See Political Biographies for his background.

586 _Boki_ is Ternatean for ‘Queen’ – during her election campaigns she was known as _Boki_ Nita.
where relevant. Whilst electoral contests between local and provincial bureaucrats and their competitors were not foregone conclusions, the financial and political power accumulated via years at the top of the local bureaucracy – and related capture of government revenue – was definitely one of the deciding factors in electoral outcomes.

This chapter on electoral politics forms the penultimate chapter of the thesis because only once having analysed the historical roots of local elites, inter-elite conflict dynamics, and the role of state elites in the post-conflict regional political economy, is it possible to make sense of post-1998 electoral dynamics in North Maluku. As Chapters Two to Four outlined, the 1999-2000 conflict had lasting impacts on the local political and economic landscape, which this chapter highlights in relation to parallel and subsequent electoral dynamics. The political and financial concentration of power in the new Provincial Governor’s office and regional bureaucracy, following the conflict, as outlined in Chapter Four and further illustrated in Chapter Five, led to a highly centralised regional, political and economic system. This chapter examines how those occupying senior positions in the provincial government and dependent local government bodies were then able to marshal superior financial and political resources during elections.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses elections between 2001 and 2004, covering the 2001 to 2002 gubernatorial election cycle, and the 2004 national elections, outlining Thaib’s rise to the governorship and the failure of the Ternate Sultan and Gafur. The second concentrates on the first direct local elections in Ternate city in 2005, contrasting the reasons behind the failure of the Sultan’s wife, Nita, against the success of the incumbent, Mayor Syamsir Andili. The third provides a prologue to the 2007 gubernatorial elections. Although in early 2009, the final results were still not concluded, general conclusions can be drawn from the overall electoral process and the provisional outcome announced in 2008. The fourth highlights the broader electoral patterns identified in the city and gubernatorial elections, in contrast to those across Indonesia, drawing on several aspects of machine politics theory to explain the North Maluku situation. The chapter concludes by summarising the patterns in the North Maluku elections between 2001 and 2008 and connecting them to the main argument of the thesis.
6.1 Gubernatorial and national elections (2001-2004)

Before discussing the first North Maluku gubernatorial elections between 2001 and 2002 and the national elections of 2004, this section first briefly summarises the local political situation at the official end of the North Maluku conflict in mid-2000.

The attempted 'return' of the Temate Sultan to local politics from the mid-1990s and his successful accumulation of local political posts (seen in Chapters Two and Three) were stalled by his involvement in the North Maluku conflict. Chapter Three demonstrated how the Sultan lost his rising position in local politics due to his support for the northern and later Christian groups during the conflict, leading to his eventual exile. Despite this misadventure, the Temate Sultan continued to exercise influence over the ethnic Temate community and other northern ethnic groups in 2005. However, to other groups, especially the southern migrant community, the Sultan was seen as the root of regional instability and violence, and, along with his followers, was to be kept out of local politics at all costs.

In contrast to the Ternate Sultan, other senior members of the local state-based political elite remained officially "neutral" during the conflict. Chapter Three demonstrated that while these three figures actually played key roles in aiding the escalation of violence — on behalf of the southern ethnic groups, and, later, in support of the 'Muslim' side — this was done via backroom channels. In subsequent elections, as this chapter later argues, the main southern political leaders were able to use their official "neutrality" during the conflict to their electoral advantage. By mid-2000, at the official end to the violence, the three leading southern figures had not only held onto their senior bureaucratic and executive posts, but forced their main rival, the Sultan, into exile. The contest then began within the local state-based elite for control over the key offices in the new province and local government. Only one important 'outside' contender, Gafur, posed a serious threat, with the Sultan and his wife returning later to pose their own challenge.

(i) The first gubernatorial election

Chapter Four outlined how the first gubernatorial elections in North Maluku was scheduled for 2000, but was then delayed by the Ministry of Home Affairs because of the conflict situation. Between October 1999 (when the region first became a
province) and 2002 (following the first aborted round of gubernatorial elections in 2001) the governorship was held by two ex-military ‘caretakers’, Surasmin (in 1999) and then Effendi (in 2000).\(^{587}\) They were appointed directly by the Ministry of Home Affairs, rather than locally elected, with direct political and administrative support from the regional military, police and justice chiefs, as declared in the Presidential Instruction of July 2000 outlined in Chapter Four. Regional government was therefore centralised in the provincial governor’s office until the region was deemed stable enough to hold elections and re-organise local government from 2003 onwards. Chapter Four showed how the provincial governor and bureaucratic staff therefore held far greater official authority over government budgeting and organisation than other ‘non-emergency’ provinces at this time, with similar situations arising in Maluku and Central Sulawesi.

Despite the limited information available on the first gubernatorial elections – held in several rounds between 2001 and 2002 – they highlight several important features of local elections in North Maluku in the post-Suharto era. First, they showed the rising interest of national political figures in holding provincial government office in this remote eastern region – positions which held very limited political or financial interest in the Suharto period, but which now looked increasingly lucrative. The contest over the North Maluku governorship therefore took place not only between the local state-based elite, but also drew in two other North Malukan figures, Gafur and the Ternate Sultan, both long absent from the region and based in Jakarta. Second, the election followed the New Order electoral style as the central government, supported by the regional military, intervened directly in the election process when the outcome allegedly ran against both the military’s and (then) President Megawati’s interests.\(^{588}\) Other elements of the election process and the final results demonstrate how the Ternate Sultan grew increasingly marginalised from local politics, as well as the importance of holding senior local bureaucratic office for electoral success.

\(^{587}\) It was not possible to uncover details of the local political role of these two figures during field research in 2005 (interviews, as well as local newspaper archives, contained limited information on them). I focus here instead on the activities of Thaib, the Provincial Chief of Staff during this period, who wielded a great deal of provincial government influence and was more widely discussed and reported on in interviews and newspaper archives.

\(^{588}\) Section 6.3 shows that Jakarta still intervened heavily in the outcome of the provincial election process in 2007, though not with direct military activity.
A series of murky disputes took place between Gafur and the Sultan in the run up to the 2001 election, with both attempting to become Golkar's candidate. According to Gafur, after the conflict, he was Golkar's "natural choice":

After the conflict, the Sultan was rejected by the whole community. The national level also rejected him after his role in the conflict – and because he had protected the Christians. Jakarta was fed up with him and Akbar Tanjung (then Golkar party chair) agreed with the local reports. So the Sultan retreated from Golkar and later joined PDK.589

Gafur's comments must be treated with caution – but that the Sultan was rejected by Golkar's national party headquarters (DPP Golkar) implies that the national party leaders believed he had minimal hope of winning. The Sultan did not relinquish his power within Golkar easily; at this point he was still an official in the North Maluku district party branch, though he had lost influence since the conflict. Intervention from DPP Golkar in Gafur's favour, combined with local elite Golkar support for Gafur, prevented the Sultan's selection as the Golkar candidate590 and shortly after this he left the Party.591

Gafur then ran for Golkar against Thaib Armain in the July 2001 election. As a long-standing regional bureaucrat, first holding senior posts in the North Maluku district administration, and later promoted to senior posts in the Ambon provincial administration, Thaib had formerly been a Golkar member, but he switched parties to PDI-P for this election.592 During the first round of the DPRD election (in 2001, gubernatorial posts were not yet directly elected), Gafur won. However, Thaib launched a protest, accusing Gafur of buying parliamentary votes, and thousands of Makian supporters briefly occupied the provincial DPRD building.593 Subsequently, a provincial parliamentarian admitted receiving money from Gafur and the election

589 Interview, Abdul Gafur, North Maluku DPR member, 17 October 2005, Ternate.
590 It is also possible that Gafur had far greater funds to buy the candidacy than the Sultan, thanks to several decades in senior national political positions in the government and Golkar.
591 It was unclear whether the Sultan left Golkar forcibly or voluntarily – local accounts were contradictory.
592 The International Crisis Group (2009, p.3) reported that Thaib was also backed by members of a 'reformist coalition', including PK (Justice Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party) in 2001.
593 Kompas, 7 July 2007.
was annulled. This triggered a long dispute and the election was re-run three times in 2002.

In the next round, held in March 2002, Thaib won, but again the results were annulled, this time on the grounds that insufficient provincial parliamentarians were present for the vote. At the end of April, the DPRD voted for a merger, with Gafur as governor and Thaib as his deputy, but the Minister of Home Affairs again declared that proper procedures had not been followed and the result was annulled once more. On 28 October 2002, the DPRD voted again and Thaib was finally installed as the first elected North Maluku governor.

Several anti-Thaib provincial DPRD and other political informants reported that the central government directly intervened in the 2001 to 2002 election process. According to one source, then President Megawati intended to scupper Gafur’s chances owing to a long-standing feud, which dated back to when her father, then President Sukarno, was ‘betrayed’ by prominent student activists, including Gafur:

Abdul Gafur won the first round of the governor’s election. But Megawati didn’t like Gafur. There is a long story about why she refused to authorise Abdul Gafur’s nomination for governor.... So, in 2002, second elections were held. So many army troops were stationed here at that time, ordered in by Jakarta. It was back to New Order times. Thaib, who used to be the provincial secretary....was set up to be the PDI-P candidate by Mega and the military. Thaib won of course and Gafur lost this second election.

Following the implementation of civil emergency law in North Maluku in mid 2000, enabling greater central government and military control of the province following the conflict, the provincial administration remained closely tied to the military. Close links between Thaib Armain and the two caretaker governors (both of whom were ex-military), particularly in relation to their control of the post-conflict aid

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596 Sinar Harapan, 29 April 2002.
597 Kompas, 29 October 2002.
598 Interviews, June-December 2005, Temate and Jakarta.
599 The story behind Megawati’s apparent dislike of Gafur related to accusations her father faced from student leaders, including Abdul Gafur, who claimed Sukarno was linked to the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1965. Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 30 October 2005, Temate. Gafur also reported this story.
funds (as outlined in Chapter Four), also meant Thaib was the natural choice of both
the Ministry of Home Affairs officials and the military to be the first elected
governor.\textsuperscript{600} Even without Megawati’s possible personal dislike of Gafur, financial
links between various bodies of government meant Thaib was a stronger candidate.

Funds not only flowed from the central to the provincial government during the
post-conflict period, they also flowed back to Jakarta, via Thaib’s control of the
regional budget and closeness to the centrally appointed caretaker-governors.\textsuperscript{601} This
made Thaib the natural military and central government choice for governor, as the
lynch-pin in the circulation of aid funds. Thus, despite central backing from Golkar,
and across the region, Gafur’s lack of control over the provincial bureaucracy and
the important clients of this office – including the military and Ministry of Home
Affairs’ officials meant that he stood little chance of successfully contesting the first
provincial election.

\textbf{(ii) The 2004 national legislative and senate elections}

Following their failure in the first gubernatorial elections, the 2004 elections brought
the ‘outside’ elite candidates – Gafur and the Ternate Sultan – back into play. The
Ternate Sultan and Nita ran for national parliament and senate seats for North
Maluku, respectively, under a PDK (National Democratic Party) banner.\textsuperscript{602} As
expected, the Sultan did particularly well in North Ternate, his ‘traditional’
stronghold (see Annex D, Table D.1, for the results from Ternate’s four sub-districts
covering the three candidates who won the province overall).\textsuperscript{603} In South Ternate,
the centre of anti-Sultan forces during the Ternate phase of the North Maluku
conflict and home of the southern migrant community, the Sultan did less well,
though still not as poorly as might have been expected. Gafur managed to gain more
votes in South Ternate, but the Sultan’s votes in the north were far higher. This

\textsuperscript{600} Thaib was also reportedly close to the military in Maluku province and Jakarta, from his time in
the Maluku government administration, headed by a senior military figure with whom he became
close.

\textsuperscript{601} Reported by various sources, including BAPPENAS officials (interviewed in 2006).

\textsuperscript{602} Prior to this election, Nita had not held an official political position.

\textsuperscript{603} Annex D, Table D.1, shows the Ternate results rather than those for the whole province because
these indicate the Ternate Sultan’s continued presence in Ternate politics, despite his previous set-
backs (the Sultan is candidate No. 6; Abdul Gafur, No. 20). Out of the three successful DPR
candidates shown, Abdul Gani Kasuba later ran as vice-gubernatorial candidate against Thaib and
Gafur in the 2007 gubernatorial elections. The Ternate Sultan, Mudaffar Syah, was eliminated from
the 2007 gubernatorial election contest before the official campaign began.
result shows the Sultan was still not completely eliminated as a local political force. However, this pattern was not repeated in subsequent local elections, as Section 6.2 explains.

Meanwhile, Nita ran for a national senate (DPD) post. Like the Sultan, she succeeded in North Temate. She was also successful in South Temate, competing relatively equally with, if not more successfully than, the other winning candidates in the southern migrant areas (see Annex D, Table D.2 for the Ternate results of the four senators eventually elected from the province).\(^{604}\) The Ternate results for the national senate elections were interesting as it showed that in national elections, the Ternate Sultan and his wife were not viewed as negatively as in subsequent local elections, even by the southern migrant population. Nita was successfully elected to the DPD as one of North Maluku’s two senators in this new national body.\(^{605}\)

The national senate results gave the Ternate Sultan and his wife confidence for the 2005 local elections for regional heads, the *Pemilihan Langsung Kepala Daerah*, known widely as *pilkada*.\(^{606}\) Although Nita had achieved a relatively prestigious national position in the DPD, and the Sultan held a DPR seat, neither position enabled them to hold much influence over local politics – their ultimate goal. The Sultan proposed Nita for the Ternate mayoral elections in 2005, a position he reportedly considered too minor to contest himself. However, his decision to select Nita over other members of the extended family caused internal family rifts that undermined the unity of the local PDK party and Nita’s campaign. The next section returns to these issues and Nita’s other weaknesses in the 2005 elections, when compared with the incumbent, Syamsir’s, greater local political influence and financial capital.

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\(^{604}\) See Annex D, Table D.2 (Nita is candidate No. 4).

\(^{605}\) Antony Sunarjo (candidate No. 12 in Annex D, Table D.2.) also won a DPD seat. He later ran (unsuccessfully) as the PDI-P gubernatorial candidate in 2007.

\(^{606}\) *Pilkada* refers to both gubernatorial and local level government head elections, but in North Maluku only local government heads were directly elected in 2005, with the direct gubernatorial elections following in 2007.
6.2 The 2005 Ternate City Election

In 2005, Nita ran against Syamsir Andili, the long-standing and popular Golkar incumbent, in the contest for the Ternate mayorship. The elections were the first time North Malukans (as with other Indonesians) had the chance to directly elect local mayors and regents, bringing a huge level of interest to the election campaigns. In Ternate, the elections were even more tense than elsewhere in the province as they brought former conflict enemies into direct competition – with Boki Nita (representing the Ternate and northern ethnic groups) competing against the popular ‘local son’, Koh Syamsir (representing the Makian and southern ethnic groups). A third candidate, Sujud Siradjudin, also ran as an ‘alternative’ to the dominant pair, but he lacked a substantive popular support base. Following a fierce campaign on both sides, Nita (and Sujud) eventually lost to Syamsir, who won over 50 per cent of the vote (see Annex D, Table D.3 for the results).

When the preliminary results came through, Nita’s campaign team were shocked to realise that even in North Ternate, their ‘traditional’ stronghold, Syamsir had received almost 5,000 more votes than Nita (see Annex D, Table D.3). In South Ternate, where electoral observers had expected Nita would lose to Syamsir, the incumbent mayor won almost 15,000 more votes than her – around two thirds of the total vote. Nita managed to beat Syamsir in one area only, Ternate Island, but overall she lost by over 20 per cent of the vote, with Syamsir gaining more votes than his two competitors combined. Nita refused to accept the result for some months after the election, accusing Syamsir’s team of corruption and her campaign team mounted various unsuccessful challenges. The following two parts discuss the major factors undermining Nita’s campaign, and the main elements behind Syamsir’s success.

607 During fieldwork between May and December 2005, I closely followed this election with direct observations, interviews and informal discussions with residents, candidates, observers and officials in different parts of Ternate municipality.
608 See Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) on the introduction of direct elections to Indonesian politics.
609 In North Maluku, the term Koh - a term of respect in Chinese dialect among ethnic Chinese men - is also used as a term of warm respect (roughly meaning ‘brother’ or ‘local son’) for non-ethnic Chinese. By using the prefix Koh during the election campaign, Syamsir demonstrated his local roots and his closeness to the local community – to contrast with Nita’s Javanese roots and ‘superiority’ as the Queen.
610 I directly observed the announcement of the preliminary results at Nita’s campaign headquarters, Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Ternate.
(i) Issues undermining Nita's campaign

One important factor undermining Nita was local concern over the role of the Ternate Sultan in local politics. Section 6.1 showed how Ternate residents were content to elect the Sultan and his wife as their representatives to the DPR and DPD, but they were not willing to take the same risks in local politics. The southern migrant community in Ternate had been opposed to the Ternate Sultan since the conflict, and it was expected that Nita would find it hard to win them over. Yet even among the Sultan's own 'traditional' community many voters abandoned Nita for Syamsir. Several issues over the Sultan's legitimacy were at stake. Ternate residents were generally concerned about the Sultan's involvement in the conflict, his defence of the Christian over the Muslim community, and the damage this had wrought on the city. The ethnic Ternate community were also concerned about the role of Nita, who was ethnically Javanese, in undermining ethnic Ternatean culture.\textsuperscript{611} These concerns, combined with the electorate's unwillingness to take unnecessary economic and political risks (an issue explored further below), added to the incumbent's comparative advantage.

Different sectors of the Ternate community expressed fears during the campaign period that conflict would return if Nita won the election and Syamsir's campaign team played to this.\textsuperscript{612} Even ethnic Ternate residents in North Ternate sub-district, the Sultan's heartland, feared greater damage would be done to the Sultan's position if they elected his relatively new Javanese wife. The conflict had already done much damage to the Sultan's position locally and its memory was still fresh in June 2005.\textsuperscript{613} Voters wanted to maintain the relative peace and security secured since the middle of 2000. The incumbent Golkar bureaucrat, who had emerged unscathed from the conflict, better represented these aspirations.

\textsuperscript{611} For the most 'traditional' supporters of the Sultan among the ethnic Ternate community, Nita was not only from the wrong ethnic group, but was also a young woman, both factors that counted against her as a serious political candidate.

\textsuperscript{612} Interviews and observations during the campaign period, May-June 2005, Ternate.

\textsuperscript{613} National politics, on the other hand, was a far removed and abstract idea, the role of which few Ternate villagers understood in detail. Electing the Ternate Sultan as one of North Maluku's national MPs in Jakarta, and his wife as Senator, was a relatively uncomplicated choice. If anything, these positions represented a continuation of the Sultan's 'cultural' leadership role over the last decades. Local politics was a different matter.
The idea of Mayor Syamsir as the bearer of peace and stability was not entirely spontaneous. His campaign team deliberately invoked the memory of the conflict during their campaign rallies to raise emotions and mobilise voters against Nita. In the southern areas of Ternate, the stronghold of the ‘white’ anti-Sultanate Islamic forces during the conflict, Syamsir’s campaign team frequently referred to the conflict during rallies.614 One local NGO member observed:

During the pilkada, Syamsir’s Tim Sukses (his campaign team) used rumours that if Nita’s team won they would implement adat (traditional Ternatean law) in the local government. This looked like a direct threat to democracy and the migrant community from the kraton (Sultan’s palace). It also brought up trauma from before, from the time of the conflict, from the Pasukan Kuning (Yellow Troops), who were the Sultan’s warriors...So the people cannot support or accept Nita to win, if it will be like that again.615

The second factor undermining Nita’s campaign related to her ethnic legitimacy. She was not only not from a local ethnic group, but, being Javanese, she was perceived by some as ‘superior’ and ‘aloof’.616 Nita had also attempted, in her words, to ‘modernise’ and ‘improve’ some of the palace ceremonies and customs with Javanese influences. She did not seem to realise these changes were a serious liability in local politics.617 For example, on several occasions over the year prior to the election, Nita placed the palace dancers in Javanese costumes and re-organised ‘traditional’ events as part of her attempt to ‘revitalise’ the palace. Several of these schemes appealed to youth groups in Ternate, included by Nita in the palace festivals and later used as a central part of her campaign team – she was young and used Jakarta dialect, which had popular youth appeal. But for the older Ternate population who historically supported the Sultan, these moves were heresy. One pro-Nita student observed:

For us, Nita is modern and we don’t have a problem with her. But others, especially the old people, think she is so ambitious, which they don’t like, so they run to Syamsir as a result, because they are afraid of her ambition. She is also too modern for them I suppose. They prefer the old ways.618

614 Interviews, southern Ternate voters, June 2005, Ternate.
615 Interview, May 2005, Ternate.
616 Interviews with local residents, May-June 2005, Ternate.
617 Interview, Nita Budhi Susanti, 11 July 2005, Ternate.
618 Interview, June 2005, Ternate.
The combination of concerns over the role of the Temate Sultan in the conflict and Nita’s attempts to ‘update’ Temate traditions damaged Nita at the polls, even in the Sultan’s heartland. But there were bigger problems for Nita’s campaign team, which lacked the financial and political resources, networks and local party organisation that Syamsir enjoyed.

Nita’s campaign team relied on networks of ‘traditional’ support across the outlying areas of Temate. She was backed by PDK, a relatively small and newly established party, which did not have an extensive regional network and certainly not one that matched Syamsir’s Golkar team. Travelling around the outlying areas of Temate, Golkar’s network was clearly marked by flags, posters, campaign t-shirts and so forth. Nita’s network did not display the same party resources, which became clear as they struggled to set up a single computer to monitor the vote counts on election-day, and shared cellular phones between members, with volunteers tallying results with pencils on scraps of paper.619 Nita was further undermined by internal rifts in her campaign team.

During the selection process for the electoral candidate for mayor, rifts split the Sultan’s palace. The Sultan officially proclaimed his support for Nita over his brother, Ismunandar Syah, the deputy head of the city parliament and head of PDK’s Temate organisation, who had planned to run for mayor for PDK. The Sultan’s sons by his other marriages and younger brothers did not support his choice; dissent was already rife in the palace over Nita’s “modern ways”, her ethnic background, and her interference with palace customs. Even though PDK officially supported Nita’s candidacy, party elites worked against her. According to a member of Peteratu, a youth organisation supporting Nita’s campaign:

Her campaign team consisted of informal people. They organised her campaign, not the PDK elites. So in the elections the PDK’s party machine did not work well for her.

Despite these setbacks, Nita’s campaign team organised several popular electoral ‘circuses’, with huge campaign rallies and festivals on the palace grounds and in local stadiums. But Nita relied too heavily on these few circuses and the support of

619 Observed at the Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Ternate.
the Sultan’s ‘traditional’ community, who ultimately abandoned her at the polls. Her campaign team did not have the financial, organisational or political networks or experience to offer sufficient ‘rice’ to her constituency or to appeal to the wider population.

(ii) Factors enabling Syamsir’s success

Syamsir acts like Tuan Rumah (chief, or wise and respected man). He has already had many years in power so has a lot much money to buy people off. He’s very popular here.

Local businessman, Ternate.620

Aside from the fact that Syamsir campaigned against a candidate with several important disadvantages, four key factors enabled Syamsir’s successful re-election in the Ternate city elections of 2005: a superior patronage network; superior campaign financing due to over six years in city office with control of local aid funds; efficient and strategic local party machine organisation; and, political and economic protection for local businesses.

During the local election campaign, Syamsir and his campaign team promised certain groups in Ternate the continuation of favourable job and contractual arrangements. Local construction and distribution businesses based in Ternate had been some of the main beneficiaries of contracts from the city government during the post-conflict period. State employees in the city government administration – one of the few sources of stable urban employment since the conflict (as Chapter Three showed) were also loyal to Syamsir, as were their families and associates. To the wider population, the possibility of state jobs and contracts was one of the few local routes to economic stability and personal success. Syamsir had headed the Ternate city government for over six years by the 2005 election, and had held several local government positions prior to that. He was seen as far more likely to deliver the social and economic benefits to his major clientele, than a new candidate with no experience in local government and the whiff of conflict about her.

620 Interview, July 2005, Ternate.
Political resources for the campaign were drawn from the tight patronage networks Syamsir’s team had with the local civil service, business community and wider population hoping for future benefits. His campaign team included city parliament members, local businessmen and local Golkar party bosses. Syamsir held the purse strings of local government in terms of both jobs and contracts. In political theory terms, these are what Erie (1998) describes as the “output” dimensions of political machine systems:

The centralised big-city machines organised and linked the “input” and “output” dimensions of the local political system. On the input side, precinct captains mobilised the electorate. Local bosses controlled party caucuses and conventions and thus nominations to local office. By controlling voters and officeholders, the machine could control the output side of politics – patronage jobs, contracts, franchises, and services...The machine sustained itself by exchanging material benefits for political support.621

Ternate city politics was not a political machine in all the senses outlined in Erie’s American machines – for example, personal, not party state connections, mediated through government office, were much more important in the Ternate case than in Erie’s examples. However, Syamsir’s control of both the local administration and local Golkar party meant he could act as dual intermediary for patronage benefits, as in the American cases.622 First, he mediated between local businesses and the opportunity for government contracts and, secondly, between the wider population seeking employment and the opportunity of jobs in either local government or the private sector, which was itself dependent on the state for its income, a situation exacerbated by the conflict. Given Ternate’s fragile economic situation following the conflict, holding the central role as intermediary between local state resources and the population strengthened Syamsir’s electoral position.

Here, it should be noted that the two previous chapters stressed the control wielded by the provincial (not local) government over government resources in the post-conflict period, including the important aid budgets. However, they also highlighted how, under Syamsir’s authority, the Ternate city government held a special position

622 This was not a unique feature of Ternate or North Malukan politics; across Indonesia personal networks rather than party organisations played central roles in the local elections of 2005 (see Mietzner 2006; 2007). However, the Golkar party still played an important role in determining electoral outcomes in Ternate, as further sections discuss.
in relation to the provincial government. Not only had Syamsir been in power long enough that he held a stronger negotiating position with the provincial administration than other local government heads, the city administration was a long-established local body of government from when it was a municipality on the northern margins of Maluku province. The Ternate government was therefore more autonomous – both administratively and politically – than the new local government bodies, established quickly after 2003, but still barely functioning by 2005. As a political figure, Syamsir had also been at the top of the regional bureaucratic elite for many years, in alliance with his influential older brother, Bahar (until his death in 2001). Syamsir’s lobbying position with Thaib, as Governor, was therefore relatively strong compared to other local government heads. By these means, the Ternate city administration had successfully captured post-conflict aid funds, further adding to Syamsir’s extensive patronage network. The 2005 elections followed five years of his control of these funds.623

Glaeser and Goldin (2005) argue that the career costs for ‘corrupt politicians’ are dependent on how willing voters are to vote them out. Corrupt officials are re-elected – they argue – either because the benefits of corruption are funnelled back to voters, or, “because voters are sufficiently cynical (or realistic) that they think that political challengers are likely to be no less corrupt than the incumbent.”624 In Ternate, patronage-based business deals funnelled benefits directly back to state officials, party players in Syamsir’s Golkar network, and local businesses, none of which stood to gain any more from the alternative candidates in 2005. For the wider population, their best chances appeared to lie in Syamsir’s continued control of the city government. Heading the city government, and representing the city branch of Golkar, whose network extended across the regional bureaucracy, Syamsir was therefore in a similar situation to the top officials in the Christian Democrats’ (DC) in post-war Southern Italy. Chubb argues:

...by means of its control of local government, (the DC) has used the bureaucratic powers of licensing and interdiction to weave a network of clientelist bonds linking the party solidly to the leading sector of the

623 Figures on aid funds transferred to the city from the provincial government between 2000 and 2005 were unavailable.
Syamsir’s extensive patronage networks flowing from control of the city government also gave him access to far superior campaign financing than his competitors. In the new system of direct local elections in Indonesia from 2005, substantial financial capital was required for three key phases in the election process: candidate selection, campaigning, and election-day itself. Due to many years at the top of the city administration, Syamsir was able to raise campaign funds far beyond the resources of his competitors. One local NGO member reported:

We know that local businesses are the biggest financiers of political campaigns. There are no real outside investors in North Maluku, so all local businesses are totally dependent on government contracts. Worse, 80 per cent of government contracts go to two local businesses only. There is no real tendering process here. For example, new government buildings, hospitals, roads – all these big projects go to the same two companies run by two big businessmen. When it comes to direct elections, these businesses finance the campaigns of the key people.

Securing medium and long term business contracts was a priority for local businessmen in Temate in 2005, as the local economy was only just recovering five years after the conflict. Syamsir was already a patron of ethnic Chinese and other local businesses in the city. Reportedly, internal disputes within the Ternate Sultan’s extended family during the campaign also discouraged those business supporters who had previously backed the Sultan. Aside from superior patronage networks and campaign financing, Syamsir also had superior local party organisation.

During the Ternate election, Syamsir’s campaign team was not only supported by extensive patronage networks and flush with funds, it was also highly organised via

626 Thanks to Syarif Hidayat (LIPI) for many discussions on electoral financing in Indonesia.
627 Interview, local NGO member, 30 September 2005, Ternate.
628 During the worst phases of violence in Ternate in late 1999 many ethnic Chinese families (who were predominantly Christian) sought protection from the Ternate Sultan, who historically protected the North Malukan Christian minority, and sought refuge near the Sultan’s palace as they prepared to leave the city. However, by 2005, the Sultan could no longer be relied on for protection. Some prominent local businessmen reportedly funded both Syamsir and Nita’s campaigns, in order to buy favour from both candidates as they were not sure who would ultimately win. Others switched solely to backing Syamsir.
629 During the campaign period, rumours over the palace campaign to undermine Nita were rife.
the experienced Golkar party cadre system and local political machinery extending out from the city government. The cadre system ran from hamlet to city level, rallying supporters, handing out cash and encouraging people to vote. Syamsir’s campaign team ran a finely-tuned logistical operation involving fleets of cars, speedboats and trucks, all of which were expensive in North Maluku. The campaign team also distributed satellite phones to its network of party activists across the Ternate archipelago to help them coordinate their activities. In Golkar’s city party headquarters, computer operators ran sophisticated vote-mapping software as predicted results came in. The local Golkar party organisation also called in resources from Jakarta: then Vice President and Golkar national chairman, Jusuf Kalla, flew to Ternate as part of a regional Golkar rally two days before the local elections. At the grassroots level, hamlet-based party members organised local rallies. Syamsir’s patronage network extended right across the local archipelago and favours were also called in during the campaign to support his re-election. In contrast, Nita’s team had only a small and fractured party network behind her.

The fourth factor working in Syamsir’s favour was his capacity to claim that he was the only candidate who could provide protection to local businesses, in both economic and security terms. As Chapter Four outlined, few local businesses had managed to survive the conflict without damage; most were shut down for its duration and sometimes afterwards, due to infrastructure damage and restricted movement in the city and across the province. By 2005 many local businesses had re-opened, but a lot of them were reliant on the local government for contracts. Chapters Four and Five showed how government funds for the reconstruction process and for building new government offices following local government deregulation in 2003 (when civil emergency status was lifted), had provided a lifeline to local businesses, as well as a source of income to state officials and politicians. To protect themselves from future risks, local businesses (re-)established tight links with the local government and political elite. The exchange of material

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630 On the campaign tour around outlying islands in Ternate municipality, I witnessed the distribution of cash-filled envelopes from the campaign team to local Golkar members and sub-district and village officials for “campaign purposes”.

631 Though these were not as expensive as gubernatorial campaigns, which also required hiring helicopters and small planes to take campaign teams to outlying regions of North Maluku - only the best financed contenders could afford such campaign tools.

632 Observed at the Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Ternate.

633 Reported in Ternate, June 2005.
benefits from local branches of the state to the community in Ternate – and the wider North Maluku region – ranged from jobs and contracts to the provision of security.

In a region wracked by social and economic crisis as a result of conflict, the memory of more or less 30 years of relative regional stability under the New Order served as a powerful tool during the 2005 election campaign. As the Golkar candidate, and with New Order experience in local government, Syamsir had the greatest claim to invoke this legacy. The irony in Syamsir’s capture of the ‘security’ and ‘stability’ message was, of course, that he was one of the state-elites in power during the conflict. He had actively prevented security sector intervention to mitigate the violence, and the electorate could have decided to hold him responsible for failing to curtail the damage. However, local voters held the Sultan’s forces more responsible for the violence, a feeling Syamsir’s team played on during the campaign. Southern migrants, particularly from the Makian and Tidore ethnic groups, were keen to select the candidate who had defended their community during the conflict. Capturing the southern ethnic vote by invoking the conflict was an important part of Syamsir’s success.

Several factors had therefore combined to ensure Syamsir’s re-election to the Ternate Mayor’s office. He combined a well-financed and strategic political campaign with years of experience in local government. His party position allowed him to mobilise the Golkar political machine, and his local government one enabled him to draw on political and financial patronage networks across the city – and beyond – to support his campaign. Above all, he offered the best possibilities of continued patronage via government funds for local businesses, state employees, party members and other local elites. To the wider community, he represented economic stability and security above the other candidates, one of whom was a relative unknown and the other a definite risk. During the election campaign, Syamsir was thus able to provide both the ‘circuses’ and the promise of the

634 The southern vote appeared to have become a less important factor by the 2007 gubernatorial elections – perhaps because it longer after the conflict, but also because no candidate directly represented the Ternate Sultanate.
continued provision of ‘rice’, the concrete economic benefits flowing from his control of the local government during the post-conflict period.

6.3 Prologue: the 2007 gubernatorial election

The 2007 North Maluku gubernatorial election – the first direct election for the governorship – was a protracted and controversial affair. The International Crisis Group (2009) described the election as, “one of the most bitterly contested since direct elections for local government heads were introduced in 2005.” The contest pitted the two former rivals from the 2001-2002 elections against each other again: Gafur (running again for Golkar) and Thaib (the incumbent, formerly backed by PDI-P, but now running on a coalition party ticket). According to the initial results, the two candidates won almost equal votes in the November 2007 elections. The final difference was a matter of between 863 votes in Thaib’s favour (according to the recalibrated Provincial Election Commission result, see Annex D, Table D.5) and 2,869 votes in Gafur’s favour (as shown by the initial District Election Commission result, see Annex D, Table D.4).

Following over ten months of legal appeals and deliberation by various national government bodies over the official result, Thaib was inaugurated as second-term Governor in September 2008. However the results still faced legal challenges in March 2009 and awaited a final decision from the Constitutional Court. Final results notwithstanding, several preliminary conclusions can still be made on the overall election process, in line with the electoral patterns observed in the previous sections.

635 I describe this section as a ‘prologue’ because the election came after my fieldwork and is therefore based solely on secondary research, conducted by a local researcher, M. Syahril Sangaji, along with national and local newspaper analysis.
637 See Annex D, Tables D.4 and D.5 for the disputed results.
638 As such, I treat Thaib as the most recently declared winner of the gubernatorial election (as of March 2009).
(i) **Main electoral candidates**

The Ternate Sultan had not yet given up his campaign to become governor. He initially proposed himself as a contender for PDK (who he represented in the DPR), but failed to get support from the national party headquarters and then turned to a coalition of smaller parties. The Sultan's candidacy was then declared ineligible by the KPUD (Provincial Election Commission) as the coalition of small parties behind him failed to meet the official support threshold. Given his age— he would have reached his eighties by the 2012 gubernatorial election— the Ternate Sultan was unlikely to run again for the governorship, meaning his decade long attempt (1997-2007) to achieve official local political power in North Maluku was finally over.

The four main candidate pairings who actually contested the election were as follows. Incumbent Governor Thaib was the lead candidate, standing for a broad party coalition. As previously outlined, Thaib had been the most senior North Maluku bureaucrat over the previous ten years; and had been Governor since 2002. This career history secured him superior funding and patronage networks in the provincial bureaucracy and local business community, thereby enabling him to run the best financed campaign of all the candidates. Thaib’s Makian roots also delivered at least part of the ethnic Makian vote, though it was partially split by Gafur’s selection of a Makian running mate. Thaib’s promotion of fellow Makian into the top echelons of the provincial bureaucracy had triggered resentment from non-Makian groups who were by this point eager to unseat him during the election, a factor which may also have turned some voters towards Gafur— his main rival.

Thaib’s running mate, Abdul Gani Kasuba, came from a Tobelo-Galela ethnic background, aiding his campaign in North Halmahera district. Abdul Gani was an

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640 The election law stated that parties, alone or in coalition, required 15 per cent of parliamentary seats, or 15 per cent of the vote, in order to field a candidate. The coalition of small parties behind the Ternate Sultan and Rusdi Hanafi (the Sultan’s proposed vice-governor) failed to meet this threshold (*Malut Pos*, 24 July 2007). See also, International Crisis Group (2009), p.4.
641 However, it was reported that Nita planned to run for a national parliamentary seat in 2009, signifying that she would continue to carry the political baton on behalf of the Sultan. See International Crisis Group (2009).
642 It was not clear why Thaib left (or failed to secure) the support of PDI-P, who backed the alternative candidate, Antony Sunarjo.
643 See ICG (2009).
ustadz (Islamic priest) and held one of North Maluku’s DPR seats. His combined positions therefore brought Thaib both local Muslim credentials and national parliamentary connections, which would later prove useful during the contentious process to secure Thaib’s victory in Jakarta. Also, importantly for the local campaign, Gani’s brother was the regent in South Halmahera, and Thaib was also supported by the North Halmahera district regent, Hein Namotemo. These two guaranteed Thaib victory in their respective districts.

The second most popular candidate was Gafur, North Maluku DPR member since 2004 and Thaib’s main competitor in the 2001-2002 gubernatorial contest. Gafur was backed by a coalition of Golkar, PAN and PDK. Gafur’s Patani descent – an ethnic group from Central Halmahera – guaranteed him fiercely loyal support from that district, and enabled him to claim ‘local’ status, though he had long lived and worked in Jakarta. His long career in the cabinet with Golkar, and as the Golkar DPR member for North Maluku, ensured financial and political backing from the national branch and leaders of Golkar when Jakarta figures later threatened to award Thaib with victory.

During the election campaign, Gafur’s most important source of support – in logistical, financial and political terms – came from Syamsir, who headed Gafur’s campaign team, acting as local kingmaker. Syamsir’s command over the North Maluku Golkar network and local business connections formed a vital backbone to Gafur’s campaign. Syamsir’s support for Gafur also signalled the final split in the southern political faction (formerly united against the Ternate Sultan), a contest which had been brewing throughout the post-conflict period.

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644 See Annex D, Table D.1.  
645 Hein and Thaib’s political ties went back to the 1999 lobbying process to make North Maluku a new province – as outlined in Chapters Two and Three – when prior to the worst waves of the North Maluku, they had worked together to promote Thaib as the first governor.  
646 PDK abandoned the Ternate Sultan (their North Maluku DPR member) and switched to Gafur. Internal reasons for this decision were unclear, though it is likely because Gafur offered a better chance of winning and greater financial incentives to the party.  
648 Although Gafur was not popular among the newer (more reformist) wings of Golkar nationally, he still commanded respect among the old guard. Interviews, Burhan Magenda and Syarif Hidayat, May 2006, Jakarta. Once he had secured the Golkar candidacy for the election, this also guaranteed him the highest levels of support from Vice President Kalla, which aided his appeal against Thaib’s claim to the governorship at the national level (though this was eventually unsuccessful).
Gafur’s vice-gubernatorial candidate, Abduhrahim Fabayano, a Makian from Tidore, also helped Gafur to split the Makian vote. As head of Muhammadiyah for North Maluku (one of the most powerful religious organisations in the province) and Vice Chair of the North Maluku parliament, Fabayano had widespread social and political networks across the province. His senior position in the provincial parliament also helped Gafur to counter Thaib’s persistent challenges to his (initial) electoral victory, though ultimately it did not secure him the post.

Running against Thaib and Gafur were two other candidates. Antony Sunaijo (PDI-P) was the only Christian candidate. An ethnic Chinese businessman from Tobelo (in North Halmahera), and DPD member since 2004, he was paired with Amin Drakel, a Muslim of Sanana ethnicity (from the Sula region of North Maluku), and PDIP member of the North Maluku parliament. Although Sunaijo competed very strongly in North Halmahera, overall he was not well known and could not match the resources of either Thaib or Gafur during the campaign. The fourth candidate was Irvan Edison, running for a coalition of small parties. A former military advisor to President Yudhoyono, and Muslim convert from Morotai, Edison ran with Ati Ahmad, a Muslim from Tidore, and career civil servant formerly posted in Papua. Again, while Edison had useful national contacts, he had neither the regional popularity nor the resources of the two lead candidates.

It is important to highlight here that all the four leading gubernatorial candidates came from within ‘the state’, in a broad sense: Thaib, as the incumbent; Gafur, as former cabinet minister and DPR member; Sunaijo, as one of North Maluku’s national senators; and Edison, as former military advisor to the President. But it was the candidate’s position within the local state bureaucracy and dominant local party machine that mattered most and it was here that Thaib and Gafur showed their dominance. Thaib held the strongest position in the regional bureaucracy and Gafur had access to the most powerful political machine in local politics – thanks to Syamsir’s support of his candidacy and election campaign. These two candidates therefore commanded the largest election campaign war chests, as well as holding widespread provincial political presence.649

(ii) Controversial election results

The initial election result was tight overall, with Thaib or Gafur winning all eight district and municipal electoral counts. According to the original results, presented by the city and district election commissions, Thaib won North and South Halmahera districts by large majorities, but Gafur won the other six (see Annex D, Table D.4 for the results). However, the West Halmahera district result (one of the closest) was challenged by Thaib’s campaign team, leading to a year-long dispute over the final result.

The West Halmahera District Election Commission declared Gafur the district winner by 5404 votes (see Annex D, Table D.4) leading to him being declared overall winner, by 2869 votes. Thaib’s team challenged this result, alleging that voting irregularities had taken place in three sub-districts of West Halmahera, and that 2507 of Gafur’s votes should have gone to another candidate, Antony Sunarjo. The Provincial Election Commission accepted Thaib’s protest, and overturned the West Halmahera District Election Commission’s result, recalibrating the voting results such that Antony Sunarjo was awarded 2507 of Gafur’s votes (only the West Halmahera voting results were changed, all the rest remained the same: see Annex D, Table D.5). Even though this still left Gafur the winner of West Halmahera district, it meant that overall Thaib had won the province by just 863 votes.

The announcement by the Provincial Election Commission that Thaib was the overall winner based on the West Halmahera recalibration was fiercely disputed by the West Halmahera District Election Commission (KPUD), supported by Gafur’s team. The West Halmahera KPUD subsequently appealed to the National Elections Commission (KPU), asserting malpractice by the Provincial Election Commission. The KPU accepted the District Commission’s results and suspended the provincial result and its team. However, the Provincial Election Commission argued this was unconstitutional and went on to declare Thaib the winner, creating great local confusion. Almost one year of protests, appeals and deliberations between the district, provincial and national level of government ensued.

Appeals were subsequently made to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Supreme Court, controversies within which remained unsettled by the time the whole affair
was turned over to the President’s office for a final decision in mid 2008. Whilst Gafur had the support of Vice President Kalla and various senior Golkar members of the national parliament, his counter-challenge to Thaib was not secured in the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Supreme Court, the main government branches deciding the case. Following a Presidential decision in September 2008, Thaib was declared winner and officially inaugurated as the new Governor. In early 2009, the Constitutional Court had yet to declare on the legality of the case, but it appeared unlikely that the Presidential decision would be overturned.

The close result of – and following appeal process over – the gubernatorial elections highlighted several important features of North Malukan politics, seven years after the conflict. First, Gafur had won half the electoral votes, which indicated a degree of change in local political dynamics – the state-based incumbent finally faced a significant challenge owing to a changing local political mood. Even though Gafur ultimately lost the election, local informants claimed that the size of the vote behind him – and his narrow defeat – indicated the frustration with provincial government corruption and continued dominance of the Makian elite in the provincial bureaucracy, which voters now felt able to express though the electoral process.

However, several features of the local political landscape remained unchanged. The contest for provincial power still took place solely within the state-based elite. Only with the support of the second most powerful local bureaucrat (Syamsir) was the ‘outside’ candidate (Gafur) able to rally such extensive regional support. Even if national level politicians and figures entered the contest, the system remained effectively closed to other ‘outsiders’, especially local level ones. Furthermore, the most significant factor determining the eventual electoral outcome was the holding

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650 It was alleged by sources close to, and campaign team members from, both Gafur and Thaib’s teams that Thaib’s payments to the Minister and senior officials in the Home Affairs Ministry were much larger than Gafur’s. Several sources reported sums upwards of three billion rupiah (almost half a million US$) changing hands multiple times between different officials and the Thaib campaign team. These sources argued that one of the main reasons Gafur failed to secure the Ministry of Home Affairs’ or Supreme Court’s support was because he had paid insufficient ‘fees’. Research conducted by M. Syahril Sangaji, November 2007 - November 2008, North Maluku and Jakarta.

651 Thaib was alleged to have close connections to the Minister of Home Affairs and important figures in the military based on his previous posting in the Ambon government, which, aside from superior ‘contributions’ to these bodies, had helped secure support of both these bodies. Further research would be necessary to substantiate this.


of state office at the regional level, which determined who had the best financing and resource networks to contest the election through to the end.654

6.4 How the incumbents survived the crisis

In a situation of resource scarcity like that of Southern Italy and in the absence of a competing political force that can offer concrete resources to replace those controlled by the machine, most people will continue to support the possibility, however slim, of immediate gain from the machine as opposed to the abstract prospect of long term change. 

Chubb (1982).655

This section sets Syamsir and Thaib’s electoral success – as state incumbents – in the context of the North Malukan political economy following the conflict. Drawing on analysis from studies of enduring political machines in other countries, several comparative points help to explain the North Maluku situation – where state incumbents survived periods of crisis and widespread corruption allegations, and subsequently entrenched their powerful local state positions via popular elections. First, I highlight how these North Maluku electoral patterns may contrast with others identified elsewhere in Indonesia.

In contrast to the North Maluku situation, Mietzner (2006) observed that, across Indonesia, by the 2005 local elections, local government incumbents could no longer rely on their control of state resources to bring them back to power. In an analysis of 50 local elections, he commented:

…Widespread fears that incumbents would storm to office unchallenged did not materialise. Their dominance over government resources and patronage networks was certainly an advantage, but it did not translate into automatic victory at the ballot box, with close to 40 per cent of incumbents standing for re-election losing their jobs....voters paid close attention to the track records of incumbents and did not hesitate to throw out poor performers and reward those who had delivered better public services. Some of the most

654 This mattered even more for national level lobbying, because of the larger costs involved in securing the support of national government figures during the protracted legal case over the election result.
655 Chubb (1982), pp.5-6.
controversial governors who had constantly faced allegations of corruption and mismanagements were removed from office.\textsuperscript{656}

Mietzner (2006) also reported that the Golkar political machine, once strong all over Indonesia, was considerably weakened during the 2005 elections for similar reasons. In contrast, Hadiz (2003) argues that the reorganisation of political power in Indonesia at the local level, following democratisation, has not led to great change in terms of who ultimately wins elections and holds political power. The critical role Hadiz ascribes to officials acting within, and elites connected to, the ‘predatory’ state bears more resemblance to the North Maluku case than the elections Mietzner observed.

Unlike the Indonesian elections Mietzner analysed, in the first direct Ternate city and North Maluku gubernatorial elections, the electorate chose to re-elect incumbents despite widespread corruption allegations, particularly against the incumbent Governor. Furthermore, whilst no longer the New Order vote delivery machine it once was, Golkar still played an important role in North Malukan political dynamics in 2005. The long-standing Golkar bureaucrat won a landslide victory in Ternate, Golkar-backed candidates captured half of the total local executive positions contested in the 2005 local elections in the province, and the Golkar candidate competed strongly in the 2007 gubernatorial elections.\textsuperscript{657} The continued powerful role of the Golkar party machinery, when it was closely linked to control of state resources (as in Syamsir’s case), was evident in the election of Syamsir to the Ternate Mayorship in 2005, and with Syamsir’s almost-successful backing of Gafur for governor in 2007. However, running on the Golkar ticket no longer guaranteed candidates electoral success. Gafur failed in both the 2001-2002 and 2007 gubernatorial elections, though he came a close second in each. Holding the incumbency position therefore mattered more for electoral success than backing from the Golkar party.


\textsuperscript{657} Golkar backed candidates won the Tidore city (Achmad Mahifa - also the incumbent), Sula district (Ahmad Hidayat - the chair of Sula DPRD and a wealthy businessman) and North Halmahera district (Hein Namotemo – prominent local civil servant) elections, giving Golkar four out of eight local government executive positions in 2005. As in Ternate, Golkar formed coalitions with other parties as necessary, but it was the sole party behind the Tidore and North Halmahera candidates. Data sourced from KPUD Maluku Utara, Ternate, 8 December 2005; KPUD Halmahera Barat, 19 December 2005.
The North Maluku conflict had several critical effects on the local political economy. First, the continued contraction of the economy following the conflict’s devastating impact on regional infrastructure and the major economic sectors had increased the local population’s dependence on the resources of the local government. Second, the social and economic impacts of conflict raised fears of further change and instability in the local political system. Third, the conflict led to emergency legislation which concentrated government resources in the hands of a few state officials. This three-fold effect meant senior state officials became even more powerful as patrons than they had been previously. With the collapse in key economic sectors (outlined in Chapter Four), and a historical reliance on civil service employment (discussed in Chapters Two and Four), the local and provincial government – and therefore the officials that ran it – became the sole mediators between the limited economic resources and the population. This put them in a very strong electoral position in 2005 and 2007.

Chubb’s (1982) analysis of post-war local politics in Southern Italy shows similar patterns to post-conflict North Maluku. According to the ‘classical’ model of political machines, economic crisis destabilises entrenched machines because of a reduced flow to their resources. In contrast, Chubb (1982) argues – as does Erie (1988), discussed below – that, contrary to these expectations, during the economic crisis in the Italian post-war period, the Christian Democrat (DC) political machine increased its share of the vote. Patron-client bonds endured during economic depression through the state-based party’s management of resource shortages:

The essence of clientelism lies less in the distribution of plenty than in the skilful manipulation of scarcity. The key to understanding the patron-client bond is that it depends not on a continual stream of benefits, but rather on sustaining the expectation of rewards for the maximum number of people with the minimum payoff in concrete benefits.658

Chubb’s clientelist model shows that neither an exogenous crisis, such as a post-war depression, nor an internal crisis, such as exhaustion of the machine’s resource base via patronage spending, necessarily undermines an entrenched political machine. In certain circumstances, economic hardships serve to strengthen the popular support

base of a state-based political machine. Similar patterns took place in Ternate city and in the provincial government, with state officials (who later ran for office) holding the reins of limited resources.

Also relevant to the North Maluku case, Chubb makes the important point that it is not the quantity of public spending, or provision of actual jobs and other patronage benefits, that matters during elections, but the discretionary powers over these resources. The ability of a political machine to control access to economic resources in the context of economic depression or crisis makes the crucial difference in election periods. Applying Chubb’s analysis to Ternate city politics following the conflict helps explain why the majority of voters were loath to take political and economic risks on alternative candidates. The experience of several major social and economic shocks made further risk highly unappealing, and the incumbent’s main competitor was unpredictable. No one knew how she would deliver economic benefits, which, combined with the possibility of a repeated conflict, persuaded voters against her. As one Ternate student observed:

It’s true that Syamsir was no longer qualified to rule Ternate due to his adverse performance. He was dreadful in organising the city and has a manipulative bureaucracy as well as corruption cases against him. That’s why I chose Nita for Mayor. To me, better to choose a junior devil that could probably be guided to do good things, than a senior devil that has more experience in doing bad things. But others cannot take this risk. They trust Syamsir and they are afraid of more trouble from the Sultan.659

For many voters, the ‘bad things’ the student feared from Syamsir were actually ‘good things’ – the prospects of patronage jobs, preferred contracts, and familiarity with the local government’s ways of distributing resources (i.e. via clientelist networks).

Syamsir’s electoral tactics were based in promising the provision of ‘rice’– that is, concrete economic benefits, based on patronage connections– to the local population. In Erie’s (1988) American case studies, urban political machines strategically chose whether to offer ‘bread’ or ‘circuses’ during elections depending on what they could get away with. Minimal expenditures on circuses were preferable

659 Interview, July 2005, Ternate.
to real expenditures on patronage jobs in the local government or in businesses supported by the government, if this was sufficient to guarantee an election. All the Ternate city election candidates provided 'circuses' - in the form of campaign rallies, with music, singers, actors, comedy shows, banners, and other forms of popular entertainment, but only Syamsir's team, through his control of the local government and extensive party network, could convincingly offer the 'rice'.

For similar reasons, Gafur failed in the 2007 gubernatorial elections because the incumbent, Thaib, commanded far greater financial resources via his long-term control of the provincial government. Eight years in the provincial governor's office, as Chief-of-Staff and then Governor, had given Thaib control over the distribution of the steady inflow of post-conflict aid from Jakarta and he was easily able to capture funds for his own patronage and political purposes. Even though Gafur had national backing from the Golkar party, and Syamsir's influence at the local level, Thaib's resource base was superior, both for the electoral campaign and in the expensive appeal process following the disputed election result.

6.5. Conclusion

I conclude here by summarising the key points of this chapter that explain why state incumbents succeeded in the Ternate mayor and North Maluku governor elections following the conflict. First, by the 2007 gubernatorial elections, there were several indications of changes in local political dynamics. However, these indications of change did not offset the fact that state incumbents had the best chances of winning the most important regional elections due to their superior access to resources and stronger claims to providing 'stability and security'. Third, electoral competition took place within the state-based elite; thus, fourth, while electoral rules had changed, successful candidates were barely different to those under the previous regime. Fifth, contest within the state-based elite showed that this elite was not a seamless whole (indeed, had never been one), but was sharply divided by factional

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660 Other factors also came into play in the 2007 gubernatorial contest, involving national elite dynamics and 'money politics', but further research would be necessary to establish the details of these processes.
politics. Finally, although the state-based elite had first failed to prevent conflict and then captured the reconstruction process, they still appeared the best choice for voters given the North Maluku political economy.

By the gubernatorial election of 2007, more than half the voting population appeared to have had enough of the incumbent. This result indicated that local political dynamics were shifting in North Maluku - the incumbent could no longer rely on his control of state resources to determine election results. The population were reportedly fed up with ethnic Makian dominance of the provincial government and upper echelons of the civil service, as well as the severe levels of corruption reported in the Governor's office. Gafur's success - coming a very close second to Thaib - also showed that the regional divide along north/south ethnic lines was no longer the dominant regional political divide that it had been during the 1999-2000 conflict, reflecting changing ethnic dynamics in politics as the contest shifted at the elite level. Furthermore, the contest between Thaib and Syamsir - the two most powerful regional state figures, at different levels of government - showed that intra state-based elite competition had increased. These were all potentially important signs of political change.

However, these signs of change were not reflected in who eventually won local elections. State incumbents were still the most important mediators between state resources and promised economic 'stability' in a province recovering from conflict. The incumbents positioned themselves as the neutral harbingers of stability and recovery, despite the irony that they were the ones in charge both during the conflict itself and the post-conflict exacerbation of regional economic crisis. The determining factor in their success was superior access to the state's financial resources, which they could then use for political ends. Comparative cases of enduring political machines presented here highlighted similar cases where the discretionary power of state-based political machines over increasingly limited resources, in the context of economic depression, enabled the success of incumbents. The North Maluku case differed from these comparative studies of urban political machines in that holding certain state positions and relative strength of personal networks were more important factors than the role of a party machine in determining electoral outcomes.
Electoral competition in North Maluku between 2001 and 2007 took place solely within the state-based elite – only these figures had sufficient legitimacy and funds to contest the elections. Even candidates emerging from the Ternate Sultanate, the Sultan and Nita, who superficially appeared as figures emerging from within ‘society’, also emerged from the state, just the wrong part of it. The Sultan’s failure to hold a senior bureaucratic position under the New Order contributed to his later downfall, as even though he had gained a local parliamentary and party role in North Maluku district just prior to the conflict, this failed to provide him with sufficient patronage or a strong enough financial resource base. This political weakness then combined with a crisis of legitimacy over his political role during the conflict and his wife’s controversial interventions in local culture. Eventually, the patronage, financial, organisational and popular resources of the incumbents overwhelmed the Sultan’s electoral team in successive gubernatorial and city elections.

The only ‘alternative’ candidate strong enough to compete through to the final round of the gubernatorial election against the incumbent was Gafur, who emerged from the national level of government. From his senior position among the old guard in Golkar, and with his position of influence in the national parliament, he commanded sufficient resources to win the Golkar candidacy for both the 2001 and 2007 gubernatorial elections. He maintained sufficient national level support to support him through successive legal challenges over the 2007 election results, and also the backing of the top local kingmaker in Ternate, Mayor Syamsir. However, these advantages proved insufficient to compete against Thaib’s superior resource and patronage base.

The two incumbents at different levels of regional government – Thaib in the provincial government and Syamsir at the city level – managed to convince large portions of their respective electorates of the benefits of re-electing them, despite several years of protest against their management of government resources (particularly targeted at Thaib and the Governor’s office). Thaib’s successful challenge to Gafur during the 2007 election showed he was capable of buying local, provincial and national support to hold his position following eight years in the Governor’s office. Thaib’s superior campaign war-chest, derived from his capture of
the state budget, combined with a wide range of support from regional businesses, provincial parliamentarians and other lead players in the provincial political economy, therefore determined his electoral success.

The North Maluku situation meant that even when electoral rules changed, with the introduction of open elections in 1999 and direct elections in 2005, those who already held power were in the best position to maintain it. The most senior state bureaucrats from the New Order regime period rose towards the most powerful local political positions in the post-New Order era. Their survival was rooted in particular local conditions linked to the impact of conflict and their ability to act as the sole intermediary between limited state resources and the community. While by 2005 North Malukan residents were better able to freely and directly elect their local leaders, they did not necessarily have better choices available to them, given local socio-economic conditions, the regional political economy, and the resultant limited range of favourable candidates to choose from.

The increased contest between the two leading incumbents and regional government figures also showed that 'the state-based elite' was not a seamless whole. Several different streams emerged within the dominant southern political elite, largely split between the provincial and local government level. Political parties behind the candidates were also not unified forces, containing factions which split during election campaigns and sometimes worked against their official candidates. As such, at the city and provincial level, Golkar was not a unified party machine in control of the state, in the sense of the Irish American or Italian Christian Democrat machines. Instead it was a more factional and personalised organisation. North Malukan politics was more about individual empires built up within the local bureaucracy at different levels of government, and competition within them, than cohesive party machines operating across the state at various levels.

Linking back to the literature discussed in Chapter One, the North Malukan crisis did not herald significant political change or the collapse of the state. The state-based elite maintained control of regional government purse strings, which gave them a powerful role in the regional economy, and their state positions allowed them to maintain and deepen their hold on political power. The incumbents used the social
and economic impacts of conflict to their advantage, combining the effects of their increased control of limited available economic resources with increased risk aversion among the electorate. This political logic meant incumbents succeeded in situations where they might have been expected to fail. While in other parts of Indonesia, local electorates were willing, by 2005, to throw out corrupt mayors and governors, the majority of North Malukan voters preferred the devil they knew to one they did not. The political alternatives did not offer sufficiently clear benefits to the population, and could not guarantee social or economic improvements.
Chapter Seven -

Conclusion

It is a salient feature of the Indonesian experience that the oligarchy and its beneficiaries, the products of the Suharto era, have reconstituted their social and political power within a new democracy...old relations of power may survive, and even find new life, within a range of institutional frameworks very different from those in which they had originally emerged.

Robison and Hadiz (2004). 661

Introduction

The central question examined in the thesis was how, through a year-long violent conflict following the official transition to democracy, subsequent socio-economic crisis and significant government and electoral reforms, the North Maluku state-based elite survived, thrived even, through this turbulent period. As Robison and Hadiz (2004) have argued, the survival of old relations of power, and old members, was a prominent feature of the Indonesian transition to democracy. This thesis has explored and explained the dynamics behind the survival of a particular faction of state-based elites in one conflict-ridden region.

The main argument put forward in the thesis can be summarised as follows: under the New Order, the central state expanded its authority throughout the territory, establishing structures of rule – the local state – in the furthest reaches of the country. These were populated by what came to be the local state elite (drawn from both old and new power brokers). Their social and economic position was dependent on access to, and control over, central state resources. These state-based local elites survived the transition – one sub-set of them in particular – illustrating the staying power of the state constructed during the New Order period. Other members of the state-based elite, more weakly linked to the local New Order bureaucratic structures, did not. This thesis explored the dynamics of this process at the local level through mapping the political architecture of the local state and tracing the sources and dynamics of local power, both historically and in the contemporary period.

Three main research propositions were explored in this thesis to explain both the transitional conflict and the survival of the state-based political elite. The first was that an apparently ethnic and religious conflict in North Maluku, taking place during the immediate years of democratic transition, reflected a power struggle over the local state between different state-based elites and their affiliated factions/proxy groups. The second proposition was that the main political leaders of competing factions during and following the conflict were all located within the state, in one shape or another. The conflict therefore reflected an intense phase of contest within an ongoing process of competition over control of the local state, taking place within the state elite. The third was that one sub-set (or faction) of the local state elite (containing several affiliated groups) survived the conflict and subsequent socio-economic crises through maintaining discretionary control over state resources and therefore the best patronage networks, which positioned them most favourably to contest subsequent competitive elections.

In the North Maluku case considered here – a region with limited economic development outside of the state sector prior to democratic transition and the subsequent conflict – local state elites found their opportunities to capture and control state resources increased following democratic transition. This was due to a combination of their expanded discretionary control over state resources and a conservative political environment following the conflict, which enhanced their appeal to the electorate. To clarify again, by ‘conservative’, I mean the tendency of the local population to fear further political, social or economic change following an intensely destabilising year of violent conflict, social disruption and economic contraction.

The following section summarises the empirical findings in more detail, in relation to the central argument and these central propositions, starting with the pre-1998 political roots of the local state elite, and ending with the 2007 gubernatorial elections. I then return to the alternative explanation presented in the thesis for both the transitional conflict (seeing it as a contest within the state elite) and the survival of the bureaucratic faction of the local state-based elite (understanding this as taking place via their discretionary control of state resources). Finally, I consider several of the wider implications raised by this study.
7.1 The main empirical findings

This section summarises the main empirical findings of the thesis, which I organise here along the core thematic lines presented in the chapters: the political history and origins of the local political elite; the evolution from local state-elite alliance to intra-elite sponsored violence during democratic transition; the post-conflict economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival of the bureaucratic elite; further patterns of state capture explored through examining the ways local state officials used the UNDP donor funds; and finally, the factors behind incumbents' success in the post-conflict local and gubernatorial elections.

(i) Political history and origins of the local political elite

Several different political factions within the contemporary political elite, contesting local power by the end of the New Order, had been created during separate regime periods. Within each faction, external authority had played a central role in legitimising and empowering the local elite in its various forms. Under both Dutch colonial rule and the Suharto regime, local elites were deeply integrated into powerful, authoritarian, external state structures. As this central authority weakened towards 1998, and as factional politics increased locally (and nationally), the main factions within the North Maluku political elite saw their chance to renegotiate, (re)claim and consolidate their local power bases. This rising factional contest set the stage for the violent events that followed the official end of the New Order in May 1998. External sources of authority therefore played an important local political role, not just historically, but into the post-Suharto era, whereby the political faction with the greatest external support was able to maintain power in the post-conflict period.

Four main regime periods shaped the North Malukan political elite in ways relevant to events between 1998 and 2008. The first, from the mid-fifteenth century arrival of Islam to subsequent European colonisation between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, centralised local political power and concentrated it in the four North Malukan sultanates. This took place, first, via their conversion to Islam, and, then, through their relationships with the rising colonial powers. The eventual dominance of the Dutch, over the Portuguese, Spanish and British forces, enabled the rise of the pro-Dutch Ternate Sultanate above the other three. From this point, the Ternate
Sultanate relied on the financial and political legitimacy gained via the Dutch regime to maintain local authority. Without such extensive external support under later regimes, the Ternate Sultan failed to return to the prominence of this period.

During the second regime period, from the late colonial to early republican era, the Ternate Sultan’s role declined, falling first towards a minor regional role, and then being gradually incorporated into the central state, and slowly losing prominence in local politics. The 1950s also saw the outbreak of several regional rebellions against the new unitary republic in Eastern Indonesia. While North Maluku was not directly involved in these rebellions, the region was denied independent provincial status by the central government. This meant the northern part of the greater Maluku province continued to be governed from Ambon, as it had been under the late colonial period, proving a source of frustration to the North Malukan elite, which remained unresolved under the New Order regime. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy period, the policies of which were extended under the New Order, led to the triumph of ‘state’ over ‘societal’ political organisations in North Maluku, alongside the dual-policy of exclusion and incorporation of Muslim and aristocratic organisations into state-run political organisations.

During the third regime period, the establishment of the New Order regime from 1966 to the late 1980s, the central state’s presence was extended across the region through the expansion of the state bureaucracy and public services. This enabled the rise of a ‘new’ local elite, from previously marginalised groups, via improved access to education and civil service employment (something which had taken place earlier in other parts of Indonesia). The expansion of the Golkar political organisation nationally also extended into North Maluku, tying the new local political elite to the state bureaucracy, rather than local forms of ‘traditional’ (colonial) authority. In contrast, the Sultan was increasingly co-opted into the centre. The combination of an expanding state bureaucracy, extensive regional development policies and the rise of the civil service and Golkar as the dominant mode for local mobility, meant the state took on an increasingly important role in the local political economy. Later, the Sultan struggled to reclaim a place in local politics without the local economic and political power base his rivals had accumulated via their roles as local state officials during the New Order.
Finally, during the late New Order period of the 1990s, a class of educated urban Muslims rose through the national political ranks and the New Order shifted its position on Islam. This national shift changed local political opportunity structures. The local Golkar governing coalition grew increasingly divided as different bureaucratic factions competed more openly over control of the local state. The dominant ‘southern’ faction, led by Bahar Andili, the district chief of Central Halmahera district, was deeply embedded in senior ranks of the local bureaucracy. This faction’s wide network of supporters was based in its capacity to disburse central state resources, providing its members with a solid political base. However, another national political shift, whereby ‘traditional’ elites were ‘reclaiming’ political roles across Indonesia, led to a rising challenge from the Temate Sultan. While the Sultan was also networked through Golkar, his faction was less strongly linked to the local bureaucracy and more dependent on ‘traditional’ communal ties to the northern ethnic groups and Christian minority. When the Sultan ‘returned’ to North Maluku, gaining a Golkar parliamentary position in the North Maluku district legislature in 1997, this was his official challenge to the southern bureaucratic elite.

(ii) From local state-elite alliance to intra-elite sponsored violence

Rising competition within the North Maluku political elite at the end of the New Order led directly into regional transitional conflict as Indonesia moved from a one-party military regime to an official multi-party democracy. The increasingly competitive local state-elites were temporarily unified during the lobbying process to establish a new province, which only became possible with the introduction of regional autonomy by Suharto’s successor, President Habibie. Factional conflict then sharpened again as competition over control of the new province intensified. Each of the four leading political figures - all situated within branches of the local executive and legislature by this point - sought greater power by securing leadership over the new provincial branches of the state. The eventually violent conflict between the elite factions did not therefore reflect a political clash between rising societal forces and the state, or societal groups against each other. Instead, it reflected an intra-elite political contest between different factions, with ethnic and religious alliances playing a mobilising and dividing role in the escalating violence.
During the process of conflict escalation, the political elite saw opportunities in localised ethnic conflicts and sponsored clashes between opposing groups. As the contest grew in intensity, these clashes escalated towards wider ethnic and, later, religious confrontations – moving from clashes over ‘soil to God’ (Wilson 2008). Violence thus served a productive function to the political elite, though not all ultimately benefitted from it. The composition of the state-based elite was reconfigured by the eventual outcome of the conflict, with the defeat of the northern faction led by the Sultan. By early 2000, the ‘southern’ triumvirate of three career bureaucrats - Bahar Andili (Central Halmahera district regent), Thaib Armain (rising local bureaucrat) and Syamsir Andili (recently appointed Ternate Mayor) – had triumphed.\textsuperscript{663}

The promise of greater local government autonomy and reform had thus triggered a fierce intra-state elite contest in North Maluku. The stakes involved were high as they entailed securing control of state resources, already important in terms of local power, and which were likely to grow substantially following the creation of a new province, as well the establishment of the Gosowong goldmine in Halmahera. Both promised greater local revenues due to regional autonomy legislation, which would reallocate government resources and mining revenues to provincial and local governments. The process by which intra-elite contest spiralled into mass violence was not a spontaneous response by previously passive communities to ethnically or religiously charged events. Instead, the rapid escalation of violence was deliberately organised by political leaders, as the social and political elite saw the gains to be made by mobilising ethnic and religious supporters in ‘communal’ riots and attacks. Furthermore, by preventing security force intervention, small riots rapidly escalated towards wider conflicts between groups that would otherwise have been contained to small street clashes. Through the manipulation of these events, local elites were able to secure victory against their political opponents.\textsuperscript{664} The theoretical implications of this finding are reviewed further in the following section.

\textsuperscript{663} For further details on these figures, see Chapters Two, Three and Six.
\textsuperscript{664} See Chapter Three for further details on the escalation of smaller scale clashes to full-blown communal riots.
Economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival of the bureaucratic elite

Socio-economic crisis followed the official end of the conflict. While this crisis caused great hardship for many, thus posing a further challenge to state stability, it also led to substantial benefits for those holding state positions. The socio-economic crisis triggered by the conflict exacerbated problems in the already contracting economy in the wake of the 1997 national economic crisis. The displacement of between one third and one fifth of the local population caused widespread social and economic disruption, along with security-related restrictions on travel, trade and transport, which devastated the agricultural sector. The destruction of regional infrastructure and businesses further added to economic crisis and led to high levels of urban unemployment. The urban sector was already highly dependent on state-sector employment, due to the legacies of New Order economic development patterns, and the crisis led to even greater dependence on the provincial and local government for employment and overall welfare, as well as economic and physical reconstruction.

Those in senior positions of the state bureaucracy were well placed after the conflict to benefit from the regional socio-economic crisis because they held the purse-strings to regional recovery. While the opening of the ‘reform’ era heralded big shifts in other regions, in terms of which level of government held fiscal and political power, the civil emergency legislation imposed on North Maluku concentrated power in the new Governor’s office as a means of restoring political control over the region. This legislation thereby temporarily overruled the anticipated decentralisation process, retaining a ‘New Order style’ of regional government, with the provincial government firmly in charge of both political and fiscal activities, to an unprecedented extent, and local governments and the new provincial parliament subordinate to it.

The emergency and reconstruction aid funds, provided by the central government after the conflict, formed a substantial part of the new provincial government budget, which itself constituted a far larger part of regional economic product than in other regions. With the overall regional economy in crisis, centralised and unregulated control over substantial aid revenues gave the provincial government enormous
regional political and fiscal power. Senior officials in the Governor’s office — especially Thaib Armain, by this point the most senior local bureaucrat, and rapidly rising towards the governorship — were thus able to use to their political and personal advantage the funding made available because of the conflict and post-conflict crisis.

Central government aid was officially intended to assist the displaced population and aid reconstruction. However, while some of it was used for this purpose, field evidence showed that the way the aid was organised demonstrated extensive capture by provincial government officials, who held discretionary power over its use. Central government officials reported that allowing the provincial government to capture aid funds served several central government interests. Above all, it restored regional stability and security by ‘buying back in’ central state control of an apparently restive region. This was at a time when at least three other regions of the country were experiencing serious levels of violent conflict and the central government was keen to minimise further troubles in Eastern Indonesia. In effect, the central government overruled its own reform legislation, and concentrated power in the Governor’s office in order to restore central state control.\(^{665}\)

Collusion between the new provincial parliament and the executive and legal branches of the state further enabled the process of state capture at the provincial and local levels. Civil society organisations, who otherwise might have confronted state officials more actively, were also restricted by the 2000-2003 emergency legislation. After reviewing the dynamics of state capture of foreign donor aid, I return to summarise how local political dynamics began to change following the lifting of emergency legislation and the approach of local elections from 2004 onwards.

\(\text{iv) Further patterns of state capture around the UNDP’s aid funds}\)

By following specific projects, as well as outlining more general patterns of state capture (observed by legislators, NGO staff and newspaper reports across North Maluku and Maluku provinces), it was clear that the patterns of provincial and local state capture of UNDP funds repeated the picture of local state capture of government aid funds. The UNDP’s aid funds formed the largest foreign donor aid

\(^{665}\) It also potentially benefitted central government officials (involved in the capture process), though insufficient evidence meant I was unable to develop that line of enquiry further in this study.
programme in the region, and a substantial proportion of them were channelled through, and run in cooperation with, the provincial and local government. There were substantial benefits to the local elite, and both costs and benefits to the broader population, from this state capture process.

The UNDP had a stated interest in avoiding state control and minimising corruption of their aid funds - unlike the central government's (unofficial) interest in enabling this process. However, the organisation did not appear to have planned how it would overcome the likelihood of this happening. Operating a large reconstruction and IDP rehabilitation programme in the North Maluku governance and political environment posed several risks of state capture, but within the official reports, as well as in interviews, there were few references to these. The combined difficulties of working with a new provincial administration, a transitional local government structure complicated by emergency legislation, and a highly centralised Governor's office were not accounted for. The added factors of limited government and UNDP budgetary and programme monitoring structures, with powerful local political elites in charge of aid disbursement, enabled easy state capture of aid resources. In the official reviews, only the Dutch government, one of the major donors to the UNDP aid programme, cited risks of rent-seeking, and only then in a small aside.

Overall, the Recovery Programme's design for North Maluku could not deliver its stated goals via the intended means because it failed to account for the particular regional political economy and political architecture of the local state. In contrast to the central government's (unofficial) view on the benefits of rent-seeking by the provincial and local government - that it was a necessary cost of rebuilding and stabilising the state following the conflict - the UNDP were apparently unaware of the extent to which local government officials had benefited, both personally and politically, from their aid budget.\(^{666}\) I return to consider whether the UNDP might have indirectly enabled regional reconstruction and recovery through enabling the state-capture process in the final section of this chapter.

\(^{666}\) Analysing the reasons behind the absence of donor and UNDP acknowledgment of rent-seeking and state-capture by the provincial and local government fell beyond the scope of this thesis, but it would be interesting to analyse this in further research.
Intra-governmental and local political dynamics, in relation to provincial control and capture of government aid and budgetary resources, had begun to change by 2004. This followed the lifting of emergency status in 2003 and the 2004 legislative elections. These post-emergency elections (unlike the gubernatorial election in 2001) were more open and finally gave the provincial parliament and eight local parliaments (five of them new) a degree of independence from the provincial government. Political manoeuvrings preceding the 2005 local executive elections further added to a change in atmosphere and activism, with increased dissent among various bodies of provincial and local government, and increased activism by local non-governmental groups over 'missing' aid funds. With popularly elected, rather than centrally appointed, leaders in place by the end of 2005, city and district government heads then started to demand greater access to and control over their budgets from the provincial government (which, by this point, they were legally entitled to, but, in practice, did not have).

By the end of the decade examined here (1998-2008), as the local political system evolved, a general rise in parliamentary, local governmental and civil society activism had begun to take place – particularly in relation to disputes over the 'corruption' and 'misuse' of aid funds by the provincial government. Fissures appeared between the different levels of government, and within and between political rivals over claims to local budgets and political authority. This finding underlines one of the central issues of the thesis: that is, the importance of understanding the factional dynamics of local politics within and between different layers and bodies of government in order to interpret local political patterns. I return to this broader finding in the final section.

(v) Incumbents' success in post-conflict local and gubernatorial elections

After analysing regional patterns of aid capture, by the provincial and local government, it was possible to account for local electoral dynamics and the patterns of state-based elite success in the post-conflict period. State-based incumbents had considerable success in the gubernatorial and Ternate city elections, which occurred despite increasingly open intra-elite competition and political activism within the local political system from 2004 onwards. Here, I re-summarise the reasons for state
incumbents' success, why electoral competition took place solely within the state-based elite, and the importance of factional competition within this elite.

State incumbents went into the two key regional elections - for the Ternate mayorship in 2005 and governorship in 2007 – with major advantages over their opponents: superior access to state resources and stronger claims of providing ‘stability and security’ as experienced heads of local government. Five years after the conflict, state incumbents remained important mediators between state resources and the jobs, benefits and contracts flowing from them. In a province still recovering in economic and social terms from conflict, during the 2005 and 2007 elections controlling these positions enabled not only strong patronage networks, but also the promise of future benefits. The incumbents also campaigned as the harbingers of stability and recovery against their rivals - despite the irony that they were the ones in charge during the conflict and post-conflict regional crisis. The discretionary power of these senior bureaucrats over the state budgetary and patronage machine, in the context of economic depression and social crisis, directly enabled the success of incumbents.

Thus, the two incumbents at different levels of regional government – Thaib in the provincial government and Syamsir at the city level – managed to convince large portions of their respective electorates of the benefits of re-electing them. When challenged, they also had the resources to secure victory. Thaib successfully competed against Gafur during the 2007 election, despite Gafur’s extensive backing from the Golkar party at national, regional and local levels, the mobilisation of support from Syamsir’s long-established local network and those disillusioned by extensive corruption exposed during Thaib’s first term. Thaib’s success showed he was capable of maintaining not only local and provincial support due to his control of the provincial government machine, but that he was also able to buy national support. Thaib’s superior campaign war-chest, derived from eight years in provincial government during the post-conflict aid years, and a wide-range of patronage-based support from businesses, parliamentarians and other lead players in the provincial political economy, therefore determined his electoral success.
Despite important electoral reforms towards direct elections for the local executives, electoral competition still took place largely within the state-based elite. Only state-based figures had sufficient funds and standing to contest the elections, but even then this was not enough. The main challengers to the incumbents, emerging from within other branches of the state, could not mobilise the same political and economic resources. The Ternate Sultan, and his wife, Nita, were not senior or long-standing enough within the local state bureaucracy. The Sultan’s failure to gain and retain sufficiently senior bureaucratic positions led to his political downfall, which, combined with a crisis of legitimacy over his role in the conflict and Nita’s Javanese background, discredited his electoral campaigns. Simultaneously, the patronage, financial, organisational and popular resources of the incumbents overwhelmed the Sultan’s electoral team in successive gubernatorial and city elections.

The other ‘alternative’ candidate, Abdul Gafur, was the only one strong enough to contest the gubernatorial election against the incumbent. His senior position among the national old guard in Golkar meant he commanded sufficient resources to win the Golkar candidacy in both the 2001 and 2007 gubernatorial elections. Gafur maintained sufficient national level support to take him through successive legal challenges over the 2007 election results and secured him backing from local kingmaker, Mayor Syamsir. But these advantages still proved insufficient against Thaib’s superior regional resource and patronage base derived from his discretionary control over the provincial budget for eight years.

Overall, then, while electoral rules had changed dramatically by the 2005 and 2007 local elections, with the introduction of direct elections (*pilkada*), the successful candidates remained the same as those elected (via different means) under the previous regime. Those already holding state power were in the best position to maintain it. The most senior state bureaucrats from the New Order regime period therefore rose into the most powerful local political positions in the post-New Order era. Their survival was rooted in the particular local political economy created by conflict and post-conflict crisis and legislation, which provided them with the ability to act as the main intermediaries between state resources and the population.
However, there were several important signs of increased intra-state elite conflict by the 2005 and 2007 elections, when the local political system was beginning to open up. The increased contest between the two leading incumbents, Governor Thaib and Mayor Syamsir, formerly united within the southern political alliance before and during the conflict, showed that the ‘state-based elite’ was far from a seamless whole and that increasingly competitive and open elections could drive it further apart. By the 2007 gubernatorial election, more than half the voting population appeared to have had enough of the incumbent, providing further indication that the incumbent might not be able to rely solely on his control of state resources and regional patronage networks to determine election results in the future. Gafur’s relative success – coming a very close second to Thaib - also showed that the north/south regional ethnic divide (so powerful during the conflict) was no longer the dominant regional political fracture line, reflecting changing local dynamics in politics as the contest shifted at the elite level. These were all important signs of potential political change in the future.

Finally, the North Maluku election processes and outcomes demonstrated that political parties acted as candidate vehicles, rather than unified political organisations controlling access to the local state.\textsuperscript{667} Parties contained factions that split during the candidate selection and campaigning periods and sometimes even worked against their official candidates. At the city and provincial level, there was no unified \textit{party} organising state resources (in the sense of the Irish American or Italian Christian Democrat party political machines). Instead parties were much more factional and personalised organisations. Machine politics in North Maluku was therefore more about individual empires built up within the local bureaucracy, at different levels of government, and competition within and between these personal patronage empires. The following section returns to this analysis of local ‘machine politics’ and re-situates the empirical findings presented here within the literature.

\textsuperscript{667} See Mietzner (2007) on post-Suharto problems in party cohesion in Indonesia.
7.2 An alternative explanation for conflict and political continuity

Here, I link again the main empirical findings of the thesis to the literature on transitional conflicts in Indonesia, the two main arguments of which I find limited in their capacity to explain the North Maluku case. I then reconsider the core issues behind the survival and strengthening of state-based elites through conflict, crisis and reform. To do so, I return to my alternative explanation for local political dynamics, with the conflict seen as part of an ongoing contest within the state-based elite, and the survival of the bureaucratic faction of the state-based elite understood via the lens of 'machine politics'.

(i) Conflict as intra-elite competition
By tracing the roots, roles and factions within the local political elite prior to the conflict, through the conflict, and into the post-conflict era, I showed how the leading local officials in the most senior regional branches of the New Order bureaucracy rose into even more senior positions in the post-New Order era. The empirical evidence showed that they managed to do this not in spite of, but because of conflict, the subsequent socio-economic crises and the stalled and complex government and electoral reform process that took place during and following the emergency period. The state-based bureaucratic elite took advantage of the political opportunities opened up by the national democratic transition - and its related crises - and used them to accumulate power via their control of local state resources.

There are two main arguments put forward in the literature to explain rising violence and political conflict during democratic transition in Indonesia: the 'rising society' and 'weak state' arguments. This literature is hampered in its ability to explain the North Maluku scenario by several problems. First, while 'societal forces' played a role in the violence, this was only possible due to backing from the state-based political elite, which included the Sultan. Second, no genuinely independent societal forces entered the political realm during the conflict and stayed there to contest post-conflict elections. Third, the state-based elite in North Maluku not only survived the conflict and immediate transition period, they also enabled the conflict for their own political interests – this did not reflect a 'weak' state, but a strong state-based elite. When considered over the ten-year democratic transition period, rather than just the
immediate years of reform, neither ‘weakness’ of the state (in terms of its control over elites), nor the ‘strength’ of society, was therefore evident in North Maluku.

The Ternate Sultan led the apparently ‘societal’ or ‘traditional’ challenge to state power in North Maluku during the transition. But historical evidence showed the Sultanate was a colonial creation from the early modern period onwards. The Sultan’s local authority flowed from his relationship with external state authority from the early colonial period, which was first undone when the Dutch moved their regional power base (and economic production centre) from Ternate to Ambon. The situation was then exacerbated by successive post-independence governments, and culminated in the New Order regime’s co-option of the Sultan in Jakarta. Through successive post-independence regimes, the Sultan’s local authority was thereby largely reduced to a cultural role outside the local state, though he maintained a degree of local influence, and an official role in Jakarta. When the Sultan ‘returned’ to North Maluku, at the end of the New Order, seeking to ‘reclaim’ local political power, his challenge thus came not from within local society, but from within an older form of the state.

Other apparently strong and mobilised sectors of society, active during the build up to, and eventual outbreak of conflict – the ethnic and religious student organisations, community and religious militia groups who acted to ‘defend’ their communities during the key periods of conflict escalation – were encouraged, funded and defended throughout by the local political elite. These were not deeply rooted community organisations, but groups quickly created during the most intense periods of conflict. Those groups that did not secure sufficient elite protection and financing were eventually marginalised or defeated. Without protection and support - both political and financial - from the state-based elite, it is unlikely that local organisations would have been able to carry out violent actions to the extent that they did. This is just as Brass (2003) has argued for the Indian case of apparently ‘communal’ riots. Furthermore, these ‘social forces’ largely faded from the political scene after the violence had subsided, and were not sustained into electoral politics, failing to compete for positions in government against the state-based elites. The apparently ‘powerful’ set of competing social actors, whether ethnic or religious, who engaged in mass violence, disappeared as quickly as they had arisen. This
finding supports the alternative argument that these organisations were only active insofar as they were actively supported and protected by the political elite, for as long as it served elite interests.

In this way, mass violence following the official transition to democracy in North Maluku was not a question of state failure or weakness, but the state-elite using violence for productive political ends. This same elite actively prevented security sector intervention to prevent or reduce violence. Those in charge of the security sector also appeared to find it in their interests to let the violence play out, even though they had the ability to have prevented conflict escalation. The triumphant faction within the state elite (the local bureaucrats) then actively captured post-conflict aid resources, and ran relatively sophisticated electoral campaigns, to maintain their power bases. An analysis of conflict viewing violence as a productive (as well as destructive) force, and as part of an elite-centred game over control of the local state and its resources, as I have presented here, therefore sheds greater light on the North Maluku conflict than understanding it as some form of primordial, spontaneous, socially-embedded or state-breakdown process.

Furthermore, in response to the argument that the conflict reflected the rise of long-suppressed or deep-rooted ‘ethno-religious’ divides in North Maluku, the evidence showed that even during the conflict, these divides shifted in response to changing political dynamics. For example, as the conflict escalated from Tobelo sub-district to a province-wide affair, formerly pro-Sultan Muslims from northern ethnic groups (who had backed the northern Kao in the first phase of the conflict), shifted their support to the southern anti-Sultan Muslim groups attacking Christians (including the Kao).668 As Moore (1991) argues, it is impossible to explain such shifts in social behaviour in terms of culture alone, as society reacts to changes in political or economic circumstances: in this case, to the shifting political dynamics of the conflict.

After the violence had subsided, ethno-religious dynamics shifted again, in response to other political and structural changes. At several points during the post-conflict

668 Wilson (2008) explores these shifting dynamics in far greater depth.
years, new and renewed political alliances crossed what had previously appeared to be ‘absolute’ ethnic or religious boundaries. This took place, for example, when various members of the ‘northern’ ethnic faction from north Halmahera, headed by the district regent, allied with the incumbent, Thaib, an ethnic Makian (from the south), in the 2007 gubernatorial elections. Former ‘ethnic’ allies from within the southern alliance also morphed into political rivals when electoral and political circumstances changed – as when Syamsir acted as Gafur’s campaign manager in his campaign against Thaib, also during the 2007 gubernatorial election.

In light of the wider debate on ethno-religious conflict, the findings of this chapter therefore support the theses of Snyder (2000), Mann (2005) and Brass (1997; 2003). Political competition over control of the local state played the critical role in enabling ‘ethno-religious’ tensions to escalate towards mass violence. The political elite played an essential role in escalating localised tensions to the point of mass violence, by actively encouraging group violence and preventing government and security sector intervention. Snyder (2000), in particular, stresses that under conditions where democratic institutions are weak, but the *bureaucracy* is strong, this kind of ‘communal’ violence evolves rapidly and forcefully. This is not to say that the state was weak, but that the democratic rule systems *within* the state were, and could not contain violent actions by the elite. Transitional North Maluku, with its powerful and competing bureaucratic and political elite, and weak democratic institutions to manage such situations, therefore confirms propositions about the dangers posed by rapid democratisation, advanced by Snyder (2000) and Mann (2005).

To explain the political dynamics observed in this study, an alternative interpretation was necessary, one that could account both for the North Maluku transitional conflict (and central role of the state-based political elite in engineering this conflict), and the continued strength of the local state-based elite during post-conflict crisis. The explanation presented in the thesis considered the period of transitional violence not as an anomaly, but as part of a longer-running re-negotiation of state power within the state-based elite. The continuity of the *bureaucratic* faction of the state-based elite beyond the conflict was based on their discretionary control over state resources

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669 This links to the argument that conflict produces religious and ethnic boundaries and group identification, rather than the other way around.
during the post-conflict crisis period. Those that held the greatest control over state resources (in particular, the leading members of the southern bureaucratic elite, Thaib and Syamsir) accumulated and maintained political power, and those without that access (the Ternate Sultan, Nita and Gafur) failed to do so.

(ii) The role of machine politics
In North Maluku, individual empires built up within the regional bureaucracy played a crucial role in political success, rather than the strictly party-based machinery usually associated with machine politics. The North Maluku case did not exactly fit the patterns of machine politics described in regions undergoing economic crisis elsewhere, for example, in Southern Italy (Chubb 1982) or the United States (Erie 1988). Instead, North Maluku displayed its own Indonesian and local variety of machine politics.

Machine politics is broadly about the trading in particularistic benefits, with elections won via the use of patronage, contracts and franchises. In its 'classical' sense, it reflects the early stages of political transition from a 'traditional' to 'modern' political system, with the party organisation becoming the patron (over the 'traditional' notable), and the resources of the state the source of personal economic and social power. But political machines can take different forms, draw on different political structures, and have varying impacts, depending on the local context, and stage of political and state development.

In this thesis, 'machine politics' serves as short-hand for a specific form of political competition and voter mobilisation, revolving around the use of state resources and positions for personal patronage, and the exchange of money and benefits (the 'rice') for votes. Arguing that machine politics provides a useful lens to understand local political dynamics in North Maluku (from 1998 to 2008) does not imply that a specific party political machine occupied and controlled given levels of government – that is, in the sense of a coherent party organisation, with a clear hierarchy and set of embedded political and economic structures enduring over time and imposed

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671 Chubb (1982), p.4. Scott (1969, pp.1145-1148, 1155) argues that political machines arise in "transitional social contexts" where traditional peasant society patron-client relations have broken down, but where 'modern' loyalty systems, based in occupation or class, are not yet established.
consistently over the city or provincial government. Whilst Golkar, under the New Order, took on aspects of such an organisation in North Maluku’s local government bodies, acting as the major conduit for economic and political success, this changed when the New Order ended. Golkar evolved into a much more fluid organisation, reflecting changes in national political and electoral structures, as politics became more personalised and less party-structured.672

Thus, while at the end of the New Order all four major political actors in North Maluku - Thaib, Syamsir, the Sultan, Bahar and Gafur - were embedded within the Golkar party and the state, at different levels, by the 2001 gubernatorial elections they competed for state positions from within different party organisations. More important to their political success than party affiliation was their position within the local state bureaucracy. Whilst, at first, Golkar remained the major party conduit for regional political power this soon changed. By 2001, securing Golkar backing did not automatically lead to securing the gubernatorial election, as Gafur learned to his political cost. By the 2005 and 2007 direct local elections, parties played even less of a role (though the major ones were not irrelevant). Personal networks within the state bureaucracy grew to be a far more important component of machine politics in North Maluku than party-based networks.673

The bureaucratic faction of the local state elite maintained control of regional government purse-strings (at the provincial and local levels of government) during and following the conflict. This gave them powerful roles as major patrons in the regional economy, by which they were able to maintain and deepen their hold on political power. The incumbents therefore used the social and economic impacts of conflict to their advantage, combining their increased control of the limited available regional economic resources with appeals to an increasingly risk-averse mood.

672 This of course reflected the immaturity of Indonesia’s party system, given the constraints imposed upon the evolution of a party system, first by Sukarno, then by Suharto, and further undermined by post-New Order electoral reforms. On the impact of post-New Order electoral reforms on the Indonesian party system, see Buehler and Tan (2007), Mietzner (2007), and Tomsa (2009).
673 My argument here has evolved since Smith (2009), where I argued that the Golkar party was the determining force in the 2005 Temate city elections, due to its control of state resources. Whilst this appeared to be the case at the city level of politics, it was not so in subsequent gubernatorial elections. By broadening my analysis here, to the gubernatorial elections, it became clear that Syamsir’s personal bureaucratic network within and across the state was a more important factor in determining his electoral victory than his party network, though Golkar played a contributing role.
among the electorate. This political logic meant state incumbents succeeded in situations where they might have been expected to fail, given the severe socio-economic impacts of the conflict. By 2005, in other parts of Indonesia, local electorates were willing to throw out corrupt mayors and governors, but the majority of North Malukan voters were not yet willing to take such risks. The political alternatives to the bureaucratic elite failed to offer sufficiently clear benefits to the local population, including the provision of patronage based jobs, contracts and other social and economic goods, which the ‘machine’ politicians, Thaib and Syamsir, offered in abundance.\(^\text{674}\)

Recalling the comparative cases of the survival of state-based political machines during economic depressions from the US and Italy - raised in Chapters One, Four and Six - the North Maluku case echoed similar patterns, but with its own local variations, particularly due to the impact of conflict and changes in party dynamics. For example, in the post-war Southern Italian cases analysed by Chubb (1982), local government bureaucrats - who were embedded within a strong party machine - benefited politically from periods of economic depression and social crisis because of their discretionary control over increasingly limited state resources.\(^\text{675}\) Economic hardships served to strengthen, rather than undermine, the popular support base of the Christian Democrat political machine holding power. This took place via the discretionary power of the party machine over government spending, and the provision of jobs and other patronage benefits in a shrinking economy, where government resources were increasingly important to the local population.

In urban Ternate, as across other urban areas of the Maluku region, by the time of the conflict, the local population was already dependent on state-based employment and business contracts provided by the New Order state.\(^\text{676}\) The dependency of the urban population on the provincial and local government then increased following the conflict, as other sources of revenue and employment dried up due to prolonged agricultural and industrial sector contraction, as well as severe problems in the

\(^{674}\) It would be interesting to examine the North Maluku case comparatively in further research and see what factors explain incumbents’ success in regions of Indonesia unaffected by conflict.

\(^{675}\) See also Erie (1988) on American political machines.

\(^{676}\) As outlined in Van Klinken (2001).
informal sector. This process underlined, rather than undermined, the power of the bureaucratic state-based elite in North Maluku via two means, both of which are captured by the idea of ‘machine politics’. First, it positioned these bureaucratic figures as the primary mediators between the population (looking for state jobs, business contracts and other services) and state resources, providing them with extensive patronage networks. Second, it provided them with an unmatchable source of revenue to finance later electoral campaigns. Their electoral rivals could not compete with such campaign war-chests, even with backing from national sources, such as Gafur’s from the most senior branches of the Golkar party. As such, the machine politics lens has provided a useful way of examining local political dynamics in North Maluku, and understanding the political survival and entrenchment of the bureaucratic faction of the local state elite.

7.3 Broader findings of the thesis

The findings of this thesis have generated three potentially wider implications, which, via additional research, could further contribute to understanding political dynamics in other regions undergoing democratic transitions. First, the factional and contested nature of the state led to a particular democratisation process, centred on intra-state elite contest. Understanding the local architecture of the state and political factions within it could help inform the better design of ‘democratisation’ and government reform programmes. Second, by tracing the local history of the political elite it was possible to see the transitional conflict as part of a longer-run elite contest over control of the local branches of the state, rather than a purely societal or destructive process. Third, the survival of the state-based elite should be interpreted in a positive, rather than morbid, light, given the violent and socio-economically devastating nature of the democratic transition process.

677 See North Maluku Provincial Government (2002); Swisher et al (2004); and Adam (2008), on post-conflict decline in the major economic sectors in the Maluku region.
678 In the run-up to the 2009 national elections, and following defeat in most direct gubernatorial elections, DPP Golkar was determined to gain the North Maluku gubernatorial seat and provided extensive financial and political support to Gafur, from the Vice-President’s office downwards. However, according to several informants, even this was insufficient to unseat the incumbent, Thaib, whose superior campaign war-chest outclassed Golkar’s national party resources. See Chapter Six for more detail.
(i) **Understanding the political architecture of the local state**

The thesis demonstrated the value of analysing the factional nature of the state at the local level in order to understand contemporary political dynamics. It showed how these factional divides within the local state evolved under successive external state regimes imposed on the region, from the early colonial period onwards. These findings raise an important critique of macro-level ‘technical’ approaches to democratic and government reforms, which view ‘the state’ as a homogenous and apolitical entity stretched across a country. The Indonesian state at the regional (provincial and local) level was far from homogenous at the end of the New Order, with both a powerful local state faction created by the Suharto regime, rooted in the local bureaucracy, and another surviving from previous regime periods, most notably Dutch colonial rule, and both claiming local legitimacy. These factions both saw the transition to democracy as their chance to renegotiate and accumulate local power.

The central government applied a technical, rather than political, and nationwide, rather than regionalised, reform approach to (re)building a ‘democratic state’ in Indonesia (with support from major foreign donors). This took place via the nationwide application of decentralisation and electoral reforms from 1999 onwards. But these two policies failed to account for the contestation for power *within* the local state. As Robison and Hadiz (2004) have argued:

> There is something strangely abstracted and timeless in this (the neo-liberal) view of change as a process of institutional engineering driven by far-sighted technocrats and politicians operating above the maelstrom of vested interest. The issue of power seems curiously neglected and abandoned.\(^{680}\)

Changing the rules of local government and electoral procedures without accounting for internal political dynamics of the state proved ineffective at eliminating powerful elites based within the state, or changing the regional political economy such that patronage networks would not affect electoral outcomes. Political power was thus handed to the better resourced faction within the local state elite, empowering one state faction over another, but without significantly opening up the political process.

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679 Chapter Two pointed out that this process began during the pre-colonial Islamic period of North Malukan history, but discussion of that process falls beyond the scope of the thesis.

(ii) Understanding conflict as a contest over control of the state

The thesis also showed the long-lasting effects of external regimes (from the colonial and post-independence periods) on the patterns within and between the local elite, state, and political economy. Taking a longer-term view of local politics therefore helped unravel some of the widespread assumptions about the ‘revival’ of ‘traditional’ culture and ‘society’ in the Maluku region during the democratic transition, and re-situated these phenomena within a contest over the state. It also helped to show how the transitional conflict was part of an ongoing contest within the local state elite. When the violence subsided this did not mean that conflict was over, instead it continued via other means: internal factional fighting and electoral contests. Both these findings showed the conflict was part of a series of ongoing political negotiations about achieving, controlling and maintaining senior positions within the local state, which continued eight years after the end of the violence.

That the contest over control of the state was so fierce, demonstrated the central role the state had played in local political and economic life through different regime periods, from the colonial to New Order period. While studies of regional economies and society in Eastern Indonesia appreciate this, the majority of the literature on the transitional violence does not. In order to understand why political elites acted as they did during the contemporary transition, it is important to understand how the evolution of the local state had affected economic and political life. Much of the analysis of the violence accompanying the Indonesian transition to democracy overlooks these dynamics, as too did foreign donors planning their ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction programmes. However, the central government had a better understanding of these dynamics, leading to its particular approach to post-conflict reconstruction via (quite literally) ‘aiding’ the local state elite.

(iii) Interpreting survival of the bureaucratic elite as a ‘good thing’

The final issue to consider is whether the political survival of the bureaucratic state elite in North Maluku – through the dramatic ten-year period following the official transition to democracy - was a negative or positive outcome in terms of democratic

681 See, for example, Garnaut and Manning’s (1974) study of Papua, which traces colonial and New Order patterns of regional economic development in order to explain the contemporary socio-economic patterns that underlie the region’s particular political dynamics (and much of its conflicts). See Van Klinken (2001) on the Maluku region.
transition. On the transition between the imperial and modern state in Germany, Gramsci wrote:

This crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.\(^{682}\)

On the contemporary democratic transition in Indonesia, Robison and Hadiz (2004) use Gramsci’s image to illustrate their discussion of the deep-rooted nature and survival capacities of oligarchic power through economic crisis and political transition.\(^{683}\) Elsewhere, Hadiz (2003) invokes a similar idea, arguing that no real change could take place in Indonesian politics following the democratic transition as the old state elite had neither given up power nor relinquished the means by which they sustained their powerbase. The idea of a ‘morbid’ interlude between two regime periods – where old elites survive, and new elites cannot emerge – resonates in this thesis, but it is important to reflect on how ‘morbid’ such a situation really was in the North Malukan context.

For some observers, the North Maluku situation between 1998 and 2008 was depressing – local activists and government watchdogs had hoped for more substantial political change ten years after the end of Suharto’s reign. While numerous electoral and local government reforms had been applied, no real political change had taken place – except that the reins of power had been transferred from the Jakarta and Amboinese based state-elite, to the local state elite. There was little room for new leaders from outside the state to enter local politics because the state-based elite was so deeply embedded in the structures of state power that mattered during the crisis of transition. Furthermore, those who had been displaced by the conflict and suffered from violence received no form of justice from those who had wreaked the havoc and benefitted from it.

However, in other ways, the survival of the state-based elite in power enabled a degree of stability and security to return to the region during a highly contested transition period. This process of post-conflict ‘recovery and reconstruction’ was not one the foreign donors appeared to have envisaged, but the central government

\(^{683}\) Robison and Hadiz (2004), p.3.
understood what was necessary. While the long-term effects of this process on local society and the economy cannot yet be known, many features of prolonged violent transition were avoided by the political survival of the state-based bureaucratic elite.

For example, in contrast to situations in other regions emerging from rapid and violent democratic transition, as analysed by Snyder (2000) and Mann (2005), the end to violence in North Maluku and the ‘return’ to state control and stability was relatively fast. When viewed comparatively, even within Indonesia - for example, with the prolonged violence and local devastation in Central Sulawesi - this was no small achievement. The violence did not repeat itself in cycles of revenge and counter attacks; the displaced were largely able to return home; roads, ports, markets, houses, churches and mosques were slowly repaired and rebuilt; the regional economy gradually stabilised and local businesses started to operate again; the military largely retreated; and the militia groups disbanded. In many, comparable, transitional situations, violence, displacement and destruction has endured for decades.

In the final analysis, therefore, the North Maluku situation ten years after the official transition was far from gloomy. By maintaining the political and economic status quo of the bureaucratic wing of the state-based elite, whilst allowing other state elites to be eliminated, political and socio-economic stability was restored following a devastating year of violent conflict. The local state capture of central government and foreign donor aid served to preserve the power base of the state-based elite in ways the foreign donors appeared not to have foreseen. The local state was thus rebuilt, the pre-conflict patronage patterns with the local population were restored, and a semblance of socio-economic recovery enabled. For a region devastated by violent conflict and overwhelmed by dramatic government reforms, having some experienced bureaucratic elites retain power throughout this period was, by this account, no bad thing – though it was far from ideal.

I conclude with a note of cautious optimism. By the 2005 local elections, the local political system was beginning to open up. While the figures holding local power and winning elections were largely the same as those under the late New Order, local political dynamics had begun to change. By the 2005 local elections, although the
city incumbent won by a landslide, the electorate, local political groups, political competitors, local newspapers and other non-governmental organisations were all more vocal in the contest and more dissenting in their opinions than ever before. By 2007, the electorate had grown even more vocal and political groups even more active. Whilst the incumbents still held the reins of power (by controlling and capturing the state budget) it was not clear that they would be able to maintain such unfettered control for long. In this sense, a ten-year analysis of the democratisation process is too short to determine where North Malukan politics may eventually go.
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*Malut Pos*, “GCW has the letter from the Attorney General; but the State Attorney does not”, 30 November 2004.


*Malut Pos*, “Regional Police Chief promises not to put the corruption cases on hold: If I wanted to be rich, it would have happened since Jakarta”, 22 December 2004.


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Annex A  
Data for Chapter Four

Table A.1 National and regional growth rates (1994 – 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>North Maluku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent growth (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.2 Comparative estimates of central government emergency and post-conflict aid budgets to North Maluku province (1999-2007)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of emergency</th>
<th>National agency responsible (official phase)</th>
<th>Provincial coordinating agency</th>
<th>Years covered</th>
<th>North Maluku Aid Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Military emergency</td>
<td>BAKORNAS (Emergency)</td>
<td>SATKORLAK (Governor)</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Civil Emergency</td>
<td>MOHA (Civil Emergency*)</td>
<td>SATKORLAK (Governor)</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Post-conflict (prior to Inpres 6)</td>
<td>BAPPENAS/ other ministries (Reserve budget funds**)</td>
<td>Line ministries to province (Governor)</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Post-conflict (following Inpres 6)</td>
<td>BAPPENAS ('Post-conflict')</td>
<td>Line ministries to province (Governor)</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>1,580,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (in millions Indonesian Rupiah) | 1,840,000 | 1,869,000

Total (in millions US Dollars) | 202 | 206

Sources: North Maluku BAPPEDA and BAPPENAS data (2006); BAPPENAS interviews (May 2006); BAPPENAS personal correspondence (2006).*84

*84 This table uses National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) data to approximate the aid budget allocated for each stage. Data for 1999 to 2003 was imprecise: low and high estimates are presented here. The North Maluku parliament provided different figures for aid between 2002 and 2005, illustrated in Tables A.5 and A.6.

*85 *Unclear whether Civil Emergency funds ended 2002 or 2003 (included as 2002); **BAPPENAS estimated Reserve Budget funds. Conversion rates: IDR 10,000 to US$1.1 (July 2007 rates, actual rates varied).
Table A.3 Comparative Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) and provincial government budgets for North Maluku, West Java and NTT provinces (2000-2004)

*Figures in millions of rupiah at current market prices*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North Maluku</th>
<th>West Java</th>
<th>NTT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDRP</td>
<td>Govt. budget</td>
<td>GDRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,929,802</td>
<td>56,899</td>
<td>193,296,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,986,346</td>
<td>199,353</td>
<td>214,302,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,060,123</td>
<td>339,062</td>
<td>234,450,804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); BAPPENAS (2006).

Table A.4 Comparative provincial government budgets as percentages of GDRP for North Maluku, West Java and NTT provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Provincial government budget as percentage of GDRP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Maluku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); BAPPENAS (2006).

Table A.5 Comparative North Maluku GDRP, provincial government budget and aid budget estimates

*Figures in millions of rupiah at current market prices*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDRP</th>
<th>Provincial govt. budget</th>
<th>DPRD estimate provincial aid budget</th>
<th>BAPPENAS estimate provincial aid budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,929,802</td>
<td>56,899</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,986,346</td>
<td>199,353</td>
<td>90,275</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,060,123</td>
<td>339,062</td>
<td>172,026</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>415,546</td>
<td>103,315</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); North Maluku Provincial Parliament (2005); North Maluku BAPPEDA (2006); BAPPENAS (2006).
Table A.6 Comparative North Maluku GDRP, provincial government budget and aid budget estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Provincial govt. budget as percentage of GDRP (%)</th>
<th>DPRD aid budget data</th>
<th>BAPPENAS aid budget data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>As percentage of provincial govt budget (%)</td>
<td>As percentage of GDRP (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); North Maluku Provincial Parliament (2005); North Maluku BAPPEDA (2006); BAPPENAS (2006).
Annex B –
Data for Chapter Five

Table B.1 Comparative GDRP, GOI and UNDP aid budgets for North Maluku (2001-1004) 686

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rupiah (millions)</th>
<th>US$ (millions)</th>
<th>Aid budget as percentage of GDRP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP)</strong></td>
<td>8,180,000</td>
<td>910.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOI emergency and post-conflict funds</strong></td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP Recovery Programme</strong></td>
<td>82,500</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table B.2 UNDP North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme funds (2001-2005)

*Figures in millions US*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>National agency</th>
<th>Provincial agency</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>UNDP Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Community Recovery Programme*</td>
<td>UNDP Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kei Islands Peace Building Programme*</td>
<td>UNDP Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 North Maluku and Maluku Conflict Prevention and Recovery Programme</td>
<td>UNDP Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) with Ministry of Human Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (KIMPRASWIL)</td>
<td>Provincial, city &amp; district government agencies – with UNDP field offices, UNOPS, INGO &amp; 'local NGO partners'</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>12.00 to 15.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Estimate Total</th>
<th>High Estimate Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.43</td>
<td>19.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: DFID (2003); Royal Netherlands Government (2004); UNDP Jakarta (2006). 687

686 July 2007 Rupiah US$ conversion rate, actual rates varied; North Maluku GDRP from 2004 estimated at 2,204,331 million rupiah, calculated from GDRP of previous year with nominal growth rate of 1.07 (7 per cent growth); high estimate of GOI aid budget from BAPPENAS used here (see Table A.2. for details); for details of UNDP Recovery Programme funds see Tables B.2, B.3 and B.4.

687 DFID reported contributions of UK£1.2 million (US$2.4 million) to UNDP Jakarta in 'central support' and a further UK£3 million (US$5.9 million) towards the Maluku region field programme.
Table B.3 Approved and committed funds for UNDP Recovery Programme projects (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Approved projects</th>
<th>Committed funds</th>
<th>Total project funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Maluku</td>
<td>6,501,770</td>
<td>985,000</td>
<td>7,486,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>3,473,497</td>
<td>340,345</td>
<td>3,813,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sulawesi</td>
<td>1,088,506</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,088,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,063,773</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,325,345</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,389,118</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table B.4 Donor contributions to the UNDP Recovery Programme (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>2,934,704</td>
<td>1,955,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan UN Trust Fund</td>
<td>1,415,529</td>
<td>1,415,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>United Kingdom (DFID)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>896,787</td>
<td>896,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>570,115</td>
<td>570,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>271,440</td>
<td>271,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>257,550</td>
<td>257,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>207,906</td>
<td>207,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,664,033</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,984,520</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from UNDP (2004) donor contributions table.

(DFID 2003) – but UNDP documented other figures, see Table 5.3 below (converted at July 2007 exchange rate). The table uses UNDP figures for DFID contributions to the field programme. The Netherlands government provided US$8 million (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2004) and was the sole funder to the Community Recovery and Kei Islands Programmes. The total project budget was reported as US$12 million by the Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004), while UNDP reported $15.7 million (interview with UNDP Country Office staff, May 2006). According to UNDP staff, the variation in figures was due to the inclusion of different costs in the total figures, the details of which were not available. Low and high budget estimates are therefore included here.

UNDP (2004), p.3. DFID (2003) separately reported a contribution of US$5.4 million to the Maluku field programme, but without further confirmation, I have used the UNDP figure here.
Table B.5 North Maluku IDPs aided by UNDP Recovery Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial ‘implementing’ partner</th>
<th>Reported activity</th>
<th>Reported number IDP beneficiaries (families)</th>
<th>Estimated number of assisted IDPs (family size of five)*</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs (UNDP)</th>
<th>IDPs aided by UNDP funds (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SATKORLAK (Provincial coordinating agency)</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS (UN agency)</td>
<td>Housing/Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9,600</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>166,318</strong></td>
<td><strong>17%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from UNDP (2004). 690 *Estimate based on field interviews (2005).

Annex C -
Photographs of UNDP Recovery Programme funded projects (North Halmahera district, North Maluku)

Photographs C.1 to C.3 (below) illustrate a kindergarten built with UNDP Recovery Programme funding on the northern edge of Tobelo town, North Halmahera district, North Maluku. Photograph C.1 shows the entrance to the site of the Tobelo Banau military compound, home to Infantry Battalion 732, where the kindergarten was located. Photograph C.2 shows two soldiers guarding the new building, beside the donor plaque displaying the nine flags of the major international donors. Photograph C.3 is a close-up of the donor plaque.

Photograph C.1: Soldiers at the entrance to the Infantry Battalion 732/Banau compound (site of the ‘Kartika Jaya’ kindergarten), Wari Village, Tobelo sub-district, North Halmahera

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691 All photographs taken by the author in Tobelo, North Halmahera, December 2005.
692 A DFID civil servant in Jakarta reported that it was not DFID policy to display flags on DFID funded projects, but in this case, the British flag was displayed proudly on the kindergarten.
Photograph C.2: Soldiers at the ‘Kartika Jaya’ kindergarten, TNI compound, Wari Village, Tobelo sub-district, North Halmahera

Photograph C.3: The UNDP plaque, ‘Kartika Jaya’ kindergarten (with flags of the nine major donors), Wari Village, Tobelo sub-district, North Halmahera
Photographs C.4 and C.5 (below) illustrate a schoolyard and building that had been ‘rehabilitated’ with UNDP Recovery Programme funding in the centre of Tobelo town, North Halmahera district, North Maluku.

Photograph C.4: Primary school building ‘rehabilitated’ with UNDP funds, Tobelo, North Halmahera

Photograph C.5: Sign outside the primary school rehabilitated with UNDP funds, Tobelo, North Halmahera
Annex D –
North Maluku national, local and gubernatorial election data

Table D.1 National Parliament (DPR) Election Results for the three successful candidates in Ternate municipality (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cand. No.</th>
<th>Successful DPR candidates (parties)</th>
<th>Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)</th>
<th>Final Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Ternate</td>
<td>North Ternate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mudaffar Syah (PDK)</td>
<td>2,891</td>
<td>9,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Abdul Gani Kasuba (PKS)</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>2,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur (Golkar)</td>
<td>3,266</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Ternate, April 2004.

Table D.2 National Senate (DPD) Election Results in Ternate municipality (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Senate Candidates</th>
<th>Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Ternate</td>
<td>North Ternate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Juanda Bakar</td>
<td>4,171</td>
<td>2,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nita Budhi Susanti</td>
<td>5,701</td>
<td>12,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Djafar Syah</td>
<td>5,636</td>
<td>3,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Anthony Charles Sunarjo</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number of Valid Votes</td>
<td>30,279</td>
<td>30,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Ternate, April 2004.
### Table D.3 Ternate City Local Election Results (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates for Mayor and Vice-Mayor (Parties)</th>
<th>Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)</th>
<th>Final Result</th>
<th>Per cent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Ternate</td>
<td>North Ternate</td>
<td>Ternate Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Syamsir Andili and Amas Dinsie (Golkar, PD, PBR)</td>
<td>18,858</td>
<td>15,610</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sujud Siradjuuddin and Rustam Konoras (PAN, PKPB)</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nita Budhi Susanti and Sidik Dero Siokona (PDK)</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>7,328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Valid Votes 72,608 100%

Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Ternate, December 2005.

### Table D.4 Initial North Maluku 2007 gubernatorial electoral results (District and City Election Commission results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District or Municipality</th>
<th>Antony Sunarjo/ Amin Drakel</th>
<th>Thaib Armain/ Abdul Gani Kasuba</th>
<th>Abdul Gafur/ Abdurahmin Fabayano</th>
<th>Irvan Edison/ Ati Ahmad</th>
<th>Winner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ternate</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>28,318</td>
<td>35,670</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidore</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>17,887</td>
<td>25,955</td>
<td>2,932</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Halmahera</td>
<td>9,124</td>
<td>16,512</td>
<td>21,556</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Halmahera</td>
<td>29,091</td>
<td>32,056</td>
<td>16,248</td>
<td>18,627</td>
<td>Thaib Armain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Halmahera</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>4,342</td>
<td>11,848</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Halmahera</td>
<td>9,734</td>
<td>62,353</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>Thaib Armain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Halmahera</td>
<td>7,119</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>13,179</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sula</td>
<td>11,754</td>
<td>9,396</td>
<td>33,733</td>
<td>9,155</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73,610</td>
<td>179,020</td>
<td>181,889</td>
<td>45,981</td>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ternate Pos, 9 November 2007
Table D.5  Recalibrated North Maluku 2007 gubernatorial electoral results  
(Provincial Election Commission results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District or Municipality</th>
<th>Governor/Vice-Governor Candidates</th>
<th>Winner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antony Sunarjo/ Amin Drakel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thaib Armain/ Abdul Gani Kasuba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Gafur/ Abdurahmin Fabayano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irvan Edison/ Ati Ahmad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Halmahera</td>
<td>11,631</td>
<td>16,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76,117</td>
<td>179,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Ternate Pos, 9 November 2007.*