AUTHOR DECLARATION

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Tsering Topgyal

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Word Count: 115, 000

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Abstract

Noting the inadequacies of existing IR theories to explain the security policies of states in the global south and the frequent intra-state conflicts there, this research demonstrates the analytical capacity of the insecurity dilemma as an alternative framework. The research develops the insecurity dilemma first and then applies it on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict. Over sixty years of violence and dialogue has brought the Chinese and the Tibetans no closer to a resolution of their conflict. The insecurity dilemma provides a nuanced understanding of the underlying reasons for this protracted conflict. This research argues that, conscious of its weakness as a state, which has implications for state, regime and ‘national’ security, China has pursued state-building through its policies on religion, language, education and economy in Tibet. Beijing has also denied the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ and rejected a number of Tibetan proposals for autonomy out of fears that they threaten their state-building project in Tibet. Conversely, Tibetan identity insecurity, generated by the Chinese policies, migration and cultural influences inside Tibet, explains both the Dalai Lama’s unpopular decision to give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his steadfast demands for autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Identity insecurity also drives the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both inside Tibet and in the diaspora. Although the intentions of both Beijing and the Tibetans are to increase their respective securities identified above, the outcome is greater insecurity for both, plunging them into dilemmatic cycles of state-building and hardening of policies on the Chinese side and strengthening of identity and resistance on the Tibetan side. This study gives play to a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on both sides and examines the feed-back effect that exists between the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the regional and global political strategic and ideological competitions.
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Map 2: Tibetan autonomous jurisdictions. This map shows that the 13 Tibetan autonomous areas (the Tibetan Autonomous Region and 12 autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces), as defined by the Chinese political system, are contiguous, are coterminous with the Tibetan plateau, and represent where Tibetans live.

Source: Tsering Wangyal Shawa, Princeton University, 2008

[Note: map uses Tibetan place names. Conversion is as follows (Tibetan-Chinese, where they differ): Tsojong = Haibei; Tsoho = Hainan; Malho = Huangnan; Golog = Gouliu; Tsonub = Haixi; Pari = Tianshu; Ngawa = Aba; Katsa = Gansu; Dechen = Deqin]
Chapter 1
The Missing Link: Security and the Sino-Tibetan Conflict

Questions and the Central Argument
Since 1949, when the Chinese communists began to incorporate the Tibetan regions into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Tibetans and the Chinese have been locked in a conflict in which both sides have used violence in various forms to overpower the other side as well as subtler hearts-and-minds approaches to win over the other side and dialogue to resolve their differences peacefully. However, sixty years of violent conflicts and peaceful efforts have brought the two sides no closer to a resolution of their differences. This is in spite of the fact that in the post-Mao era, constituencies for a negotiated settlement have existed on both sides of the Sino-Tibetan divide.\(^1\) Even if their influence fluctuated with political currents in China and calculations in exile, they continue to perceive mutual incentives in a peaceful settlement during the lifetime of the current Dalai Lama.

For Beijing, an agreement would improve social and political stability and satisfy its craving for domestic and international legitimacy for its rule over Tibet with the Dalai Lama’s signature for the first time in history. It would remove an irritant in bilateral relations with India, the United States and Western European countries. More significantly, China can remove a weak-spot that could be exploited by hostile powers in a future conflict, which has recurrent precedents in the history of the Sino-Tibetan relations. Furthermore, a reasonable approach to Tibet may have a positive influence on Taiwanese attitude toward re-unification with China.\(^2\) In the context of Beijing’s ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’ strategy, an agreement with the Tibetans would enhance China’s international image around the world, especially in its wary neighbourhood. As the Economist observed, ‘[T]alking to the Dalai Lama about the future of his homeland [and giving more democracy to Hong Kong], would do more to impress China's

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neighbors than a decade's worth of state visits and free-trade agreements. Clearly, Beijing would profit from settling the Tibetan problem while the current Dalai Lama is alive to sell the deal to the apprehensive Tibetans.

It goes without saying that most Tibetans would welcome an agreement that allows a degree of political and cultural autonomy for their homeland, especially given their constant fears for the survival of their identity under the prevailing regime of Chinese policies, which explains Dharamsala’s diligent and sometimes desperate pursuit of negotiations. Yet, the conflict rages on as strongly as ever.

This gives rise to the main research question of this research: how can we use theoretical resources from international relations, security studies and area studies (Chinese studies and Tibetan studies) to better understand the reasons for the intractability of the Sino-Tibetan conflict? A more specific set of empirical questions have to be asked to make this big question more manageable for this research. Why does Beijing deny even the existence of a ‘Tibet issue’, offering only to talk about the Dalai Lama’s return after saddling it with difficult preconditions? Why does Beijing persist in its hard-line policies in Tibet, despite the widespread Tibetan protests and riots and international opprobrium? Conversely, why does Dharamsala insist upon political autonomy for a unified Tibet even as Beijing calls these the greatest obstacles? Why do the Tibetans inside Tibet regularly risk life, limb and livelihood by challenging the might of the Chinese state? In sum, what explains the protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan conflict?

To answer these questions, this dissertation frames the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the threat perceptions of the Chinese Party-state and the insecurities of the Tibetan nation. These insecurities do not exist as isolated islands; they have feed-back effects in shaping each other’s policies and behaviours. They are both structurally generated and inter-subjectively shaped. This dissertation will demonstrate the resultant character of the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a cyclical action-reaction process, understood in terms of Chinese state building policies and practices and the Tibetan resistance against them. This cyclical metaphor will be developed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, this chapter will explain that

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3 Ibid.
4 Dharamsala is the seat of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile.
5 Lhakpa Phuntsok, ‘The Dalai Lama’s Demands are Obstacles to Talks,’ Reuters, 26 May, 2006.
this security-based analysis is a novel approach to the study of this conflict which has bedevilled the reconciliation efforts of Beijing and Dharamsala. Overall, it will be shown that the Sino-Tibetan conflict is a complex case that has both unique characteristics as well as generally applicable lessons for the study of other intra-state (ethnic) conflicts.

The following review of the existing literature on the conflict and the subsequent introduction of the analytical framework and methodology used in this research develop the above argument and approach. The methodology section is followed by the definition some key concepts—weak states, state-building and identity—that constitute the insecurity dilemma and contextualisation of their usage in this research. It is also necessary to justify the application of the concept of weak state to a rising power like China. It then puts into perspective the role of the non-Chinese frontier nations in Chinese security agenda. After explaining the geographical interpretation of Tibet, the chapter finally outlines the structure of this dissertation. The reader is requested to anticipate the review of the relevant theoretical literature in Chapter Two.

Overview of the Literature on the Sino-Tibetan Conflict

The social scientific study of Tibet reached critical mass only in the 1980s, arguably because of increased access to research opportunities and materials inside Tibet, internationalization of the Tibetan issue and the frequent pro-independence demonstrations between 1987 and 1993 in Tibet. Comparatively, the academic literature on Tibet is considerable today. Janet Gyatso’s Presidential Address during the 10th Conference of the International Association of Tibetan Studies (IATS) held at Oxford University in 2003, reveals the growing strength of Tibetological research:

But just a glimpse at the program for our current seminar will tell you how much we have advanced even further since then [1989]: from an almost exclusive focus upon history, philology, and philosophy, to now a very hefty body of critical work in art history and ethnomusicology, not to mention literary theory, history of science, cultural criticism, feminist criticism, and of course, information technology.6

However, Gyatso’s address reveals another aspect of Tibetology: the dearth of political science research on Tibet, especially on the political aspects of the conflict. This is puzzling given the

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level of popular, media and political interest it generates. Consequently, the existing academic analyses of the conflict have been conducted largely by anthropologists, historians and Buddhologists.

Of course, the existing scholarship on the conflict is broad and high quality. Part of the literature is holistic, attempting to rope in multiple aspects of the conflict in one analytical effort. Others focus on specific issues germane to their own expertise: Chinese policy, Tibetan exile movement, dialogue, legal status, history of both specific episodes and longer epochs, and its use for contemporary political contestation, Chinese economic policy in Tibet, Chinese education policy in Tibet, Buddhism and Tibetan identity in contemporary Tibet, the politics of modern Tibetan music, and western perceptions and representations of Tibet.


Rabgey and Sharlho 2004.


Tibet and the Tibetans and how they influence the nature of the conflict. Collectively, they advance more complex understandings of the events, personalities, places and issues that are otherwise presented in black and white polemics in certain quarters. Yet, there are significant shortcomings which this dissertation seeks to address.

In *Geopolitical Exotica*, Dibyesh Anand, perhaps the only international relations (IR) scholar on Tibet, observed that ‘Tibet rarely figures in the international politics literature.’ He is spot on and Tibetology bears part of the blame. IR specialists in the community of Tibetologists are rare and there is little analysis of the conflict employing theoretical tools from international politics. As Gyatso observed, Tibetology is dominated by anthropologists, Buddhologists and historians. Not surprisingly, at least two senior Tibetologists have conveyed to the author their disapproval of political science and IR approaches to the study of Tibet. The reasons for this deplorable situation are multiple, ranging from the understandable unfamiliarity of these scholars to IR’s theoretical maze, especially its cutting-edge developments, to their consequent inability to engage with its theories and the state-of-the-art insights. Another major impediment is the state-centrism of traditional IR, which drives Tibetologists away from it and influences their analysis of the Sino-Tibetan conflict.

This is exacerbated by a form of self-censorship that is created by the political sensitivity of the Tibet issue in Beijing and Lhasa and the limited research opportunities on political aspects of the conflict in Tibet and China, unless of course the researcher holds unambiguously pro-Chinese views. Accordingly, most aspiring Tibetologists make the pragmatic choice of

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specialising on less politically sensitive topics. Some of them make analytical forays into the conflict from the safety of their less controversial disciplines, sticking to issues germane to their research interests. While the interdisciplinary effort no doubt enriches the analysis and certainly brings valuable insights to the table, the literature is poorer for its lack of cutting-edge IR insights. Concepts such as *realpolitik* and nationalism are employed in underdeveloped and dated forms, bereft of the theoretical complexity that contemporary IR brings to bear on them. These raise a number of problems in the existing analyses of the conflict.

First, the literature misses the inter-subjectivity and mutuality characteristic of the conflict. The existing scholarship analyses either Chinese policies without adequate consideration of how Tibetan diplomatic positions in exile and activities within Tibet influence and shape those policies or the Tibetan struggle in isolation from the Chinese policies and practices. Those that do examine the policies and practices on both sides fail to recognize and demonstrate analytically the mutuality and interactivity of the conflict. To the extent that mutual influence and causation is examined, it is often unidirectional: They either explicate how Chinese policies are shaped by the Tibetans and their supporters or how Chinese policies and

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24 Carlson 2004: 2 argues that the fundamental driver of Beijing’s Tibet Policy has been its ‘concerns about defending Chinese sovereignty—[specifically] jurisdictional sovereignty—over the region.’ He Baogang, ‘The Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Model: A One-Sided Wish?’ in Sautman and Dreyer, 2006: 67-84. He attributes Chinese policy towards Tibet and its definition of autonomy to Marxism and a Dengist form of economic determinism.


26 Smith 1996, for instance, identifies the resurgence and persistence of Tibetan nationalism to the Chinese invasion and subsequent policies, but attributes those Chinese policies to the traditional Chinese security practice of cultural assimilation, modern Chinese nationalism, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, colonialism and insecurity, without much attention on the influence of Tibetan positions and behaviour. Rabgey and Sharlho 2004 document the twists and turns of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue in the post-Mao era, but do not chart clearly the mutuality of the policies and practices of the two sides. Sperling 2004 and Powers 2004 examine how the Chinese and the Tibetans have deployed militating interpretations of history to buttress their current political goals, but fail to point out and explore the mutuality underlying these adversarial rhetorical exercises. Norbu 2001 chronicles the tumultuous history of Sino-Tibetan relations from the strategic rivalry between the Tang and Tibetan empires down to the contemporary conflict, but fails to analytically and consciously examine the mutuality, interactivity and inter-subjectivity.

practices fuel Tibetan nationalism.\(^{28}\) Goldstein’s *The Snow Lion and the Dragon* is exceptional, in that he posits the adverse effects of Chinese policies in the mid-1980s as fuelling the Tibetan grievances which exploded in the form of the 1987-1993 protests in Lhasa and elsewhere.\(^{29}\) He also explains how the protests in Tibet and Dharamsala’s positions and activities contributed to the hard-line policy shift in 1989.\(^{30}\) However, Goldstein is silent on how Chinese security practices shape Dharamsala’s diplomatic positions and behaviour. In fact, Goldstein attributes Tibetan demands for autonomy and unification and dissidence inside Tibet to an irrational form of Tibetan nationalism, which represents another major flaw in the literature.

Inadequate attention on the social and inter-subjective nature of the conflict leads to internal contradictions. Goldstein, for instance, dismisses human rights violations—‘such as abusing prisoners or arresting monks for peaceful demonstration’—as irrelevant to the ‘heart of the problem.’\(^{31}\) Yet, he documents how the arrest of peacefully demonstrating monks on 1 October 1987 sparked off the riots that rocked Lhasa.\(^ {32}\) As he further argues that these riots contributed to the 1989 hard-line shift in Beijing’s policy, he unwittingly shows that human rights violations are just as consequential. The 2008 riots also began when ordinary Tibetans reacted to the beatings and arrests of monks and nuns demonstrating peacefully. Hence, human rights abuses and the perception of how the Chinese and their Tibetan collaborators treat ordinary Tibetans and view Tibetan identity do have important feedback effects on the severity of the conflict. Dismissing the role of human rights abuses, Goldstein asserts that the ‘heart of the problem’—a nationalistic conflict over territory—predated the establishment of the PRC. Smith also uses a primordialist approach in his account of Tibetan nationhood and nationalism.\(^ {33}\) Such attribution of primordial and static quality to the conflict acknowledges neither the structural and discursive evolutions nor the underlying inter-subjectivity and mutuality. This

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Grunfeld entirely ignores the implications of Chinese policies and practices on Dharamsa’s positions and how they exacerbate both the incidence and aggressiveness of Tibetan uprisings.

\(^{28}\) Schwartz 1994; Smith 1996.

\(^{29}\) Goldstein 1997: 84-85.

\(^{30}\) Ibid: 87-93.

\(^{31}\) Ibid: x.

\(^{32}\) Ibid: 79.

dissertation introduces a more social, inter-subjective and evolutionary approach, while acknowledging the structural factors at work, thereby promoting an alternative understanding of the conflict.

Second, the existing literature treats Tibetan positions and activities as nationalistic and the Chinese policies and practices as security-driven. The archetypal academic work that displays this tendency is Goldstein’s *Snow Lion and the Dragon*, arguably the most influential work on the conflict. He contends that the Dalai Lama and Dharamsala hold ‘deeply nationalistic convictions’ that are ‘not favourable to the kinds of major concessions by which the Dalai Lama could resolve the current impasse.’ In fact, he opens his book thus: ‘The Tibet Question, the long-standing conflict over the political status of Tibet in relation to China, is a conflict about nationalism—an emotion-laden debate over whether political units should directly parallel ethnic units.’ Of course, he is referring to Tibetan nationalism.

However, Goldstein views Chinese policies and practices in Tibet through the lens of state and regime security. Beijing’s refusal to entertain political autonomy for Tibet in the 1980s is attributed to security considerations: ‘It was looking to enhance its stability and security in Tibet, not lessen it by turning over political control of Tibet to its “enemies” in Dharamsala, let alone give them control over a greater Tibet.’ He referred to Beijing’s hard-line policies inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama after 1989 as a ‘strategy to enhance their security in Tibet.’

The juxtaposition of Chinese security and Tibetan nationalism is even more apparent when he argues that for the ‘long term security and goodwill China wants...Tibetan’s deep-seated ethnic sensitivities must...be addressed.’ Goldstein is not alone in such proclivities, as mentioned above. However, IR’s tradition of rampant state-centrism is partly responsible for perpetuating such academic and intellectual practices.

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37 Ibid: ix.
38 Ibid: 74.
40 Ibid: 95.
41 Ibid: 130-31.
Dominated by neorealism and neoliberalism, traditional IR operated under the assumption that states are the only actors that matter in international politics. Some theories are dismissive even of states that are not ‘great powers’. For the most part, they deny the agency of supranational and sub-state actors. Some variants of constructivism are also state-centrist. As a sub-field of IR, some security theories also exhibit such state-centrist tendencies.

As alluded to above, a latent version of this state-centrism filters into the thinking of Tibet scholars from other disciplines and influences their analyses of the conflict. Consequently, they find it difficult to even accommodate the notion that Tibetan agendas could be security-driven. They simply lack the language and conceptual apparatus to articulate such a notion. If security-provision is a fundamental duty, raison d’être, of states, then non-state groups like the Tibetans cannot have security fears, needs and agency; they can only have nationalistic impulses. The Party-state’s security agendas could be threatened by the nationalistic Tibetans and their external masterminds, never the other way round. Ethno-nationalism is a familiar and convenient frame for interpreting the Tibetan aspirations and actions. However, IR and security studies have evolved theoretically to acknowledge the significant agency of non-state actors such as transnational civil society and terrorist groups, diasporas, multinational companies, ethnic,


religious and linguistic groups and supra-national organisations such as the European Union. After all, most of the wars fought after the Cold War have been intra-state, inter-ethnic and/or religious. The biggest security threat of late to the world’s sole super-power has not been a state, but a transnational terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda. This dissertation reflects these positive shifts in IR theory.

The above-mentioned discrepancy in the depiction of the two sides’ policies and practices leads to perceptual, discursive and representational imbalances. Security is considered a public good and its provision a fundamental duty, hence *raison d’être*, of states; it appears natural, rational and incumbent upon states to pursue security. Nationalism, however, has an image problem: it is perceived as emotional, irrational and threatening. Furthermore, while one’s own nationalism is ‘patriotism,’ desirable and positive, others’ nationalism is ‘dangerously irrational, surplus and alien,’ which is worsened by the popular tendency to associate nationalism with its most extreme manifestations such as Fascism and ethnic-cleansing. Predictably, the Chinese attribute Tibetan aspirations to ‘separatism’, ‘local nationalism’ and increasingly to ‘ethnic cleansing’ by top officials. This dissertation imputes security rationales to both Chinese policies and Tibetan demands for autonomy and administrative unification. Chapter Seven discusses the link between popular Chinese nationalism and Beijing’s policies, demonstrating that security and nationalist imperatives operate in both camps.

Thirdly, the existing scholarship either uncritically valorises Tibetan protests and riots in Tibet, failing to subject those episodes to due scrutiny as to the costs and benefits in terms of core Tibetan interests, or reject them outright as machinations of Dharamsala and ‘hostile’ foreign forces and invariably harmful to the Tibetans inside Tibet. In *Circle of Protest*, the definitive book on the 1987-1993 Tibetan uprising, Schwartz writes, ‘If there is one thing that this book illustrates, it is the capacity for resistance—and plain stubbornness—that Tibetans

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49 Ibid.
50 Zhao 2004: 165-208.
continue to display in their response to Chinese political control in Tibet.\(^{52}\) In view of the reservations expressed by some leading Tibetans, including the 10\(^{th}\) Panchen Lama\(^{53}\) and other intellectuals on those protests, a more balanced assessment of the necessity and timing of Tibetan protests is in order. The insecurity dilemma provides the strategic and dispassionate logic for such an evaluative task.

Finally, although security motives have often been invoked, one struggles to find systematic and theoretically informed scholarship on the linkage between Chinese threat perception and policy towards Tibet,\(^ {54}\) let alone integrate Tibetan insecurities into such a framework. Despite the discourses of vulnerabilities and threats in Beijing and Dharamsala, scholarship on the conflict treats the security dimension only partially in both senses of the word. Security is the missing link in the study of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The following section sketches the framework of the insecurity dilemma which will position the concept of security at the centre of any analytical effort in relation to the conflict.

**The Analytical Contributions of this Dissertation**

To perform the tasks set up above, we need a framework that integrates structural, ideational and inter-subjective factors into a coherent analysis in the context of a society that subsumes the Tibetans, Chinese and other transnational and international actors. Most established IR and security theories are inadequate to the task at hand. There is a gaping mismatch between the empirical reality of contemporary international relations and the traditional IR and security theories. Indeed, in the contemporary world, sovereign states do not have a monopoly over international political and security affairs. In other words, international relations has become much more crowded with a whole host of non-state actors. The contemporary security agenda transcends the traditional political and military concerns to include a whole spectrum of economic, ideational and environmental values. Consequently, brutal and protracted intra-state

\(^{52}\) Schwartz 1994: 8.

\(^{54}\) Suisheng Zhao. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004a: 165-208 is a rare exception where he attributes security instrumentality to China’s nationality policy, including its Tibet policy. However, characteristically, he views Tibetan aspirations as ethno-nationalistic, rather than having any security motivations.
conflicts have replaced inter-state conflicts in both frequency and severity. Most of these conflicts take place in the so-called global south or the Third World. Hence, traditional theories that were developed in at a particular phase of European or Western historical context and purpose fail to engage meaningfully with the world problems of a radically transformed world. As Ayoob pointed out, neorealism and neoliberalism fail to ‘explain adequately the behaviour of the primary units constituting the international system [by ignoring the historical experience and contemporary security practice of states in the global south]’ and ‘fail to explain sufficiently the origins, both as beginnings and causes, of the majority of conflicts in the international system today.’\(^{55}\) However, the efforts of Ayoob and Job to introduce an alternative framework has been criticised for being state-centrist and neglecting the security practice of the non-state actors.\(^{56}\) Barnett asked, ‘why cling to a state-centric definition of the discipline that seems to provide little explanatory value?’ This research is the answer to Barnett’s question.

This research applies the insecurity dilemma to the Sino-Tibetan conflict described as a dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the insecurities of the Tibetan nation and the Chinese Party-state. The insecurity dilemma means that when an insecure state, owing to a sense of state weakness, engages in state-building to mitigate its perceived insecurities, weaker ethno-national, racial, religious, linguistic and ideological groups within that state feel that the state’s policies threaten their identities, and retaliate in ways that are almost as multi-faceted as the arsenal of statecraft.\(^{57}\) An important caveat is in order: while the possibilities in terms of the adversarial non-state groups are numerous as mentioned above, this dissertation will focus on ethno-national groups. Although the state and its domestic adversary or adversaries begin with the goals of security-maximisation, the outcome is greater insecurity for both. This plunges them into


counter-productive action-reaction cycles of state-building and resistance. Additionally, uncertainty being a central feature of the strategic situation facing the two adversaries, they face irresolvable dilemmas about how to interpret each other’s behaviour and how to fashion the appropriate responses. The insecurity dilemma synthesizes insights from existing perspectives to produce a coherent, policy-relevant analysis and explains the specific positions of the two principal parties, but also integrates the transnational and international dimensions into that analysis.58

This dissertation examines the links between Beijing’s security-driven state-building programme and its religious, linguistic, educational and economic policies in Tibet. It will explore the security imperatives behind Beijing’s hard-line position of denying the existence of a larger ‘Tibetan Issue’ and talking only about the Dalai Lama’s return. It also reveals the security rationale behind Beijing’s negative responses to Dharamsala’s autonomy proposals and its preconditions such as the Dalai Lama’s declaration of Tibet as a historically integral part of China. Insecurity and uncertainty expose state policies to the vagaries of worse-case calculations, which is indeed the case with Beijing’s Tibet policy.

Conversely, this dissertation will examine how Chinese policies, migration and cultural practices in Tibet generate insecurities among the Tibetans, not the least identity insecurity. It also analyses reasons behind the Dalai Lama’s unpopular concessions and his refusal to compromise further or to give in to the Chinese preconditions. Tibetan identity insecurity will be presented as the chief cause of the largely peaceful and occasionally violent protests and riots and other subtle forms of resistance inside Tibet. Indeed, security or rather insecurity will be shown to have an all-pervasive role in Tibetan thinking and behaviour towards China.

Employing the insecurity dilemma, this dissertation begins with the structural root: China as an insecure multi-national empire behaving like a state, whose power and influence is rising. However, the analysis goes beyond the simple narrative of power-imbalance by examining the inter-subjectivity of identities and interests and the mutuality of behaviour between the Chinese Party-state and the Tibetan nation. The result is a security-driven analysis that takes into account

58 Chapter Two develops this framework in detail.
the interactive or social nature of the conflict. This reveals a cyclical pattern in the hardening of Chinese policies and Tibetan uprisings. Michael Davis puts this rather nicely:

China’s military occupation and CCP rule have spawned a cycle of resistance and further repression. Repression over the years has meant not only armed invasion and crackdowns but also the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries during the Cultural Revolution, the suppression of religion, the imprisonment and coerced “re-education” of dissidents, as well as the forced relocation of rural dwellers to less remote and more urbanized areas. Tibetan resistance has occasionally involved open popular dissent and rebellion, but more often has been a matter of smaller-scale resistance by monks, nuns, and others against Chinese rule and its methods.  

Breaking this mutually detrimental cycle is imperative for any Sino-Tibetan rapprochement.

However, this dissertation does not treat the Tibetans and the Chinese as monolithically unified actors and examines a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on both sides of the dispute. Moreover, the Tibetans and the Chinese are not duelling in isolation from the rest of the world. The Sino-Tibetan conflict is nested within the larger regional and international political and strategic dynamics and the insecurity dilemma allows the examination of how this feed-back effect operates between the two apparently separate levels of analysis. This dissertation ropes in all these various aspects into a coherent analysis.

The Methodological Approach

To achieve these objectives, this research will use a number of methods within qualitative methodology. Specifically, it will employ an empirical, holistic single-case-study methodology in the sense of both intrinsic case studies to get deeper understanding of particular cases as well as instrumental case studies to provide insights into broader phenomena using particular cases.  

Within these broad parameters, I will employ different strategies to meet different research objectives. I will use historical analysis to study the history of Sino-Tibetan relations before and after the Communist invasion. This research analyses the agency of various non-state actors (unit-level actors and factors), not just systemic factors. Methodologically, therefore, it

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constitutes a ‘thick description’. A ‘thick description’ of Tibetan-Chinese relations produces a detailed account of the historical, social, political and strategic contexts within which policies and positions are formulated, articulated and implemented on both sides. As such, thick description of a case study provides others with a ‘database for making judgements about the possible transferability of findings to other milieu.’ In other words, it provides generalisations for analysing intrastate conflicts, ethnic conflicts and Third World security. A caveat is in order: the claim to ‘thick description’ here is akin to the way some neo-classical realists use it to ‘provide a richer portrait of the dynamism and complexity’ of the insecurity dilemma and its Sino-Tibetan instance. Thick description requires the researcher to gain ‘deep cultural immersion and understanding of a subject.’ In that sense, this author is particularly well-placed as he himself is a product of the Sino-Tibetan conflict.

Having been born during the Cultural Revolution in Tibet where he lived and directly experienced Chinese policies. As a teenager, he left his parents and family behind for educational opportunities in India, where he became part of the Tibetan refugee community. Subsequently, having studied and lived in America and the United Kingdom, the author has become part of the global Tibetan diaspora and observed closely how the Sino-Tibetan conflict plays out in the transnational and international arenas. Furthermore, having always been in touch with parents, family and friends still in Tibet, the author has a unique sense of intimacy with the local issues there. The author’s understanding of the issues germane to the conflict is a cumulative product of keen observation since high school days and more recent academic work. This background has enhanced the research conducted for this dissertation.

In addition, whenever possible, this research will use the method of triangulation, ‘using multiple perceptions [and datasets] to clarify meanings…or…interpretations… [and to] clarify

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meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen.”

As such, I will cross-reference data from materials ranging from primary and secondary sources in Tibetan and English, government documents, Think Tank, NGO and conference reports, personal interviews and conversations, translations of Chinese language documents, books and online sources, English and Tibetan language audio-visual materials from Tibet and outside, and media reports from Tibet, China, India and the West. The combination of these sources allows an in-depth examination of the conflict.

However, given the objectives set out above, namely to focus on both sides of the conflict, the author’s background is a liability. Frankly, it has been a challenge at times to write this dissertation precisely because of my particular circumstances. However, the author has had a wholesome training in political science and social scientific research in America and the LSE, where he was socialised into the virtues of healthy scepticism, balance and objectivity and the pit-falls of bias in research. While it would be humanly impossible to observe absolute balance and objectivity even in scientific research, the author hopes that the above-mentioned training and acculturation have moderated any egregious prejudices in this dissertation. Furthermore, the author’s excellent dissertation supervisor should be trusted to have weeded out grave instances of partiality. In any case, laying bare my background is an effort at intellectual transparency so that the reader is forewarned of any biases.

Practically, the research methodology will work with a two-pronged strategy. First, the above-mentioned sources will be examined to get a first-cut understanding of the conflict. Secondly, insights from these sources will be corroborated through additional research to confirm or qualify the preliminary insights gleaned from the first reading of the primary and secondary texts and other types of sources. Field work was conducted in India, which is home to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile and the largest Tibetan community outside of Tibet. The field work took the form of primarily elite-led, key informant interviews, supplemented by informal discussions with other stake-holders for deeper understanding of the relevant issues. However, because of repeated unrests in Tibet and Chinese travel restrictions to Tibet, especially to Tibet Autonomous Region for Tibetan exiles, the author had to shelf

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65 Stake 2000: 443-444.
advanced plans for field work in Tibet and China. This entails a weak point in this dissertation, but the author has attempted to rectify this shortcoming in four main ways.

First, an eagle eye was kept on the coverage of Tibet in the English language Chinese media, both print and online, which are used by the Party-state to propagate their policies and positions. Secondly, the English language publications of official documents and statements by the Chinese government and its agents on Tibet are consulted extensively. Third, BBC’s World Wide Monitoring (formerly known as Summary of World Broadcasts), which contains an exhaustive and up-to-date archive of English language media stories on China and Tibet, including Chinese publications in that language, and crucially translations of Chinese language media stories and official statements on all aspects of culture, society, economics and politics. Finally, the active, albeit repeatedly closed down, Tibetan blogosphere in Chinese and Tibetan language inside Tibet, and the contents of literary magazines and other forms of popular culture such as pop and folk music, were closely monitored to get a full sense of the situation inside Tibet and the collective psyche of the Tibetans there. It goes without saying that every effort has been made to speak with Tibetans who have recently left Tibet either for asylum, educational and academic purposes.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the Chinese-Tibetan dispute could be considered a tough test for the insecurity dilemma because on the one hand, the Tibetans are widely held to be pacifists, including in their national struggle, and on the other hand, China is one of the strongest powers in the world today with one of the most draconian internal security machineries. On the face of it, one would not expect a protracted conflict there, but this dissertation demonstrates that the insecurity dilemma operates just as brutally in Sino-Tibetan relations.

Key Concepts and Definitions
Before introducing the chapters, the key concepts constituting the insecurity dilemma—weak states, state-building and identity—need to be defined and contextualised. However, the purpose here is not to engage in a critical analysis or a comprehensive literature review.

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**Weak States**

As the introduction of the insecurity dilemma above referred to (and as Chapter Two will develop), the insecurity dilemma is a phenomenon that preys upon weak, insecure states. If state weakness is fundamental to the insecurity dilemma, how do we understand the reality of weak states? What causes state-weakness?

State weakness has a number of causes. For some scholars, state-weakness is a legacy of colonial cartography of both capitalist and communist powers and late entry into the state system and an indication of their early-stage of state-making or state-building. For them, state-weakness equals underdevelopment at the early phase of state-building. Former multi-national empires attempting to construct modern nation-states after expanding into the homelands of other peoples could also exhibit the same symptoms of weakness. For Christopher Clapham and Jeffrey Herbst, state-weakness is the result of ‘misplaced forms of sovereignty’: conferring sovereignty on ‘post-colonial entities with no history and experience of performing as or organising a state.’ Robert Jackson makes a similar argument with his concept of ‘quasi-states’ by which he means ‘Ramshackle states…not allowed to disappear juridically, even if for all intents and purposes they have either fallen or been pulled down already.’ For Nelson Kasfir, state-failure is caused by the absence of a ‘controlling authority’ or anarchy which creates the right conditions for the toxic mix of security-motivated security dilemmas and the greed-driven predation. Van de Walle argues that state-failure is a function of how a weak state manages its economic troubles. But how can one tell a weak state from a strong one?

Many scholars have attempted classifications of states along a weak-strong continuum. Caroline Thomas uses institutional capacity, represented by despotic power and infrastructural power as the criteria. Joel Migdal uses ‘state capacities’ defined as ‘the ability of state leaders...
to use the agencies of the state to get people in the state to do what they want them to do.'

Keith Jaggers defines state-building as ‘the state’s ability to accumulate power’ and differentiates states in terms of power as national capability, political capacity and institutional coherence.

While each of these capability-based approaches advance the understanding of state-building, they suffer from lack of attention to legitimacy and the failure to appreciate the role of the despotic/military variable in propping up apparently strong institutions, which may not survive as soon as the military support is removed. Buzan argues that ‘[a]rmed forces might sustain [institutions]…but institutions without mass support are much more precariously positioned than those with it.’ Erin Jenne and Rotberg call this condition ‘the seemingly strong case’ of weak states.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia illustrate dramatically the weaknesses of the above power-centred approaches. As Joseph Nye wrote, ‘politics is not merely a struggle for physical power, but also a contest of over legitimacy.’

Fundamental to regime legitimacy and state cohesion are not just concentration of coercive power in the centre and performance in the provision of public goods, but also shared identities and values. Without shared identity or values among the people living in a state, the legitimacy of the regime and the existence of the state would be constantly challenged from inside. This would also compromise the international legitimacy of the state and make it vulnerable to encroachment by foreign actors. As such, the degrees of socio-political homogeneity or polarity are as important as the concentration of power and institutional effectiveness for the strength of a state. Hence, an approach that synthesises the materialist, institutionalist and ideational approaches is necessary.

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Barry Buzan provided just such a framework for understanding state-weakness and the national and international security implications. Critiquing the ‘politico-territorial billiard-ball’ or ‘like-unit’ model of the state in traditional international relations as too restrictive, Buzan produces a broader conception of the state consisting not just of the established territorial and institutional variables, but also a third factor—socio-political cohesion. He argues that states differ from each other not just in terms of material power or institutional capacity, but also socio-political cohesion. Accordingly, he posits the state as a triadic entity consisting of (1) an ‘idea’ or identity, (2) institutions and (3) a ‘physical base’ (territory and population). Naturally, the varying degrees of these three components determine the condition of the state itself with consequent implications for security. With these ideas, Buzan develops a typology of strong and weak states and distinguishes strong/weak states from strong/weak powers. As he writes,

Strength as a state neither depends on, nor correlates with, power. Weak powers, like Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Singapore are all strong states, while quite substantial powers like Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan are all rather weak as states. Even major powers, like China and the Soviet Union, have serious weaknesses as states.

The variable of socio-political cohesion is the pivot around which the distinction between state strength and state power turns. While state power is a function of the material capabilities, socio-political cohesion determines state strength or weakness.

Buzan is not alone in going beyond material power and institutional capacity as metrics of state-strength to include ideational variables. Muthiah Alagappa argued that in addition to material capabilities, states ‘vary widely on…the capacity for self-government, monopoly over the legitimate use of force and internal pacification, cohesiveness as a political community, capacity for international interaction, and participation in the regional and global economies.’ Edward Azhar and Chung-in Moon also advanced similar ideas with their concepts of political

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80 Ibid: 60-4.
82 Ibid: 96.
84 Ibid: 98.
‘hardware’ (physical capabilities) and ‘software’ (legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity).\textsuperscript{86}

This dissertation adopts this broader understanding of the state. Buzan’s distinction of weak/strong \textit{states} centred on ‘socio-political cohesion’ from weak/strong \textit{powers}, which is determined by the relative military and economic capabilities of states, is especially useful.\textsuperscript{87} The triadic conception of the state is also useful from the stand-point of security analysis as it enables a more comprehensive understanding of the logics of vulnerability and threats.\textsuperscript{88}

Next, the insecurity dilemma theorists tell us that states attempt to break-out of their weaknesses and insecurity through active state-building. It is necessary to clarify the meaning and nature of state-building as employed in this dissertation.

\textbf{State-Building}

Just as the state is an essentially contested concept, state-building also reflects the various theories of the state. In brief, there are institutionalist, realist power-based, post-colonial, taxonomist and ideational approaches to the study of both state-weakness and state-building. Francis Fukuyama identified four ‘aspects of stateness’: organizational design and management, political system design, basis of legitimation and cultural and structural factors.\textsuperscript{89} He defined state building as ‘the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.’\textsuperscript{90} Fukuyama is primarily interested in state building from the angle of economic development and how external actors can design and export state institutions,\textsuperscript{91} but he ignores the agency, aspirations and predilections of the domestic non-state actors. The fact that most weak states have national, ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological conflicts that destroy state institutions at birth or prevent them from maturing is lost to Fukuyama.\textsuperscript{92}

Combining realist and institutionalist perspectives, Keith Jaggers defined state-building as the state’s ability to augment its own power—power as national capabilities, political capacity

\textsuperscript{86} Azar and Moon, ‘Legitimacy, Integration and Political Capacity: the “software” side of Third World national security,’ in Azar and Moon (Eds.) 1988.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid: 97.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid: 69-96.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid : ix.
\textsuperscript{92} Rotberg 2004: 30.
and institutional coherence. Mohamed Ayoob developed another perspective that married realist and post-colonial ideas, which he aptly called ‘sub-altern realism’. Based mainly on Charles Tilly’s conception of state functions but also informed by Jaggers and Azar and Moon, Ayoob defined state-building as strengthening war-making, policing and taxation capacities. War making refers to expansion and consolidation of territory and population and imposition of order in contested regions, policing to maintain order at home, and taxation to extract resources from the territory and population at home to support the first two activities. Ayoob contends that the ability of the state to perform these three activities depends upon the coercive powers at its disposal. He finds a negative relationship between the stage of state-building and the level of domestic violence used by the state, and posits a positive relationship between security and the level of state-building.

Other scholars have focused on the causes and indicators of state-weakness to produce a taxonomy of states. Rotberg and his colleagues studied 41 countries and categorised them into four groups according to the severity of their deficiencies: weak, failing, failed and collapsed states. They prescribe a number of specific steps to build or rebuild the states from their various stages of weakness: designing and introducing an enforceable system of rule of law with courts, police and prison services; training of police, judges, bureaucrats and politicians; restructuring and reorienting the armed forces; building the transportation and communications and financial infrastructures. In short restoring legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens through, legal, economic and political performance constitutes the task of state-building.

Buzan’s conception of the state as consisting of an identity, institutions and physical base provides another set of ideas into state-building that consciously incorporates an ideational element into state-building. Securing the idea of the state involves nation-building and ideological homogenisation. Institutional capacity-building for mobilisational, penetrative and extractive effectiveness is also important. However, Buzan’s idea of the ‘physical base’ does not lend itself well for state-building purposes, except to mean population build-up and territorial

93 Jackson1990: 29.
95 Ibid: 20-23.
96 Rotberg 2004.
expansion—not always desirable or controversial at least. This dissertation will be guided by a notion of state-building that includes nation-building and ideological propaganda to fortify the idea of the state or state identity, consolidating the institutions, and economic development as represented by infrastructure-building. The ultimate objective of these aspects of state-building is to reinforce the socio-political integrity of the state.

Identity

As proposed above, the insecurity dilemma is the mitigating relationship between state-building and the identity insecurity of non-state groups. It is also important to define identity and the sense in which this dissertation uses it. As the debate between the so-called Copenhagen School and McSweeney on the alleged ‘reification’ and ‘objectification’ of identity illustrates, identity is a controversial concept in security studies and IR.\(^97\) The rationalists/positivists (realists and liberals) consider identity as objectively given \(a\) \(p\)\(r\)\(i\)\(o\)\(r\)\(i\)\(i\)\(a\) priori and indeed that all the constituent units, namely states, have the common identity of being self-interested actors while post-positivists treat identity as possessing no objective quality and subject to social construction and constant negotiation.\(^98\)

The split in IR mirrors the debate in the literature on national identity and nationalism, where ‘primordialists’ and ‘perennialists’ treat national identity as ‘culturally given’, historically ‘continuous’, and ethnically ‘fixed’.\(^99\) ‘Modernists’ on the other hand contend that nations have been socially constructed creatures of modern processes and phenomena such as technology (the


print press for instance), capitalism, industrialisation, public education, social communication and state elites. Benedict Anderson argued that the nation is an ‘imagined community’ that was made possible by the onset of print technology. Ernest Gellner wrote that the nations are modern day inventions made possible by mass education and literacy. Eric Hobsbawm called the nation an ‘invented tradition’ involving primary education, public ceremonies, and ‘mass production of public monuments.” Karl Deutsch attributed nation-formation to the intensity and ‘complementarity of social communication’ which is aided by modern processes such as industrialism and the market economy and the pressures these processes put on individuals to identify with a national group. The ethnic conflict literature is also split on identity along similar lines.

Rogers Brubaker and Fred Cooper summarises the above insights:

Identity can be understood as a ground or basis for social or political action, a collective phenomenon denoting some degree of sameness among members of a group or category, a core aspect of individual or collective ‘selfhood’, a product of social or political action, or the product of multiple and competing discourses.

Notwithstanding the debates on the novelty or antiquity of national identity and its modes of emergence, this dissertation will adhere to the understanding that at any given time, identity is constituted by ideas, practices and symbols that help individuals identify themselves as members of one community and different from other groups. Chapter Two explains why and how identity can be used for analytical purposes and its role in the insecurity dilemma.

China as a Strong Power, Weak State: Since the hype and reality of China’s rise militates against the application of the weak state label on China, it is important to explain this analytical decision. The PRC is indeed a complex case.

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100 Ibid: 26-117.
When Chairman Mao declared the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China became a Leninist totalitarian state.\textsuperscript{107} China started strong in terms of ideological legitimacy, territorial defence, monopoly over coercive resources, and mobilisational and penetrative powers over society, but its totalitarian apparatus concealed a number of weaknesses. These weaknesses were not just reflective of the nature of totalitarian regimes, but also constitute the legacy of two and a half decades of Mao’s erratic policies such as the collectivisation of agriculture (1958-1978), the anti-rightist campaign (1957-1958), Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).\textsuperscript{108} These national disasters combined with numerous regional ones claimed the lives of 40-55 million people, according to conservative Western estimates.\textsuperscript{109} The China scholar Frederick C. Teiwes sums up the state of the Chinese state by the death of Mao in 1976:

Mao Zedong left a difficult legacy for the post-Mao state: a fractured and grievance riddled society, a party-state with reduced legitimacy and weakened dominance over society, faction-infested institutions, ambiguous official norms, and a divided top leadership.\textsuperscript{110}

After the ouster of the Gang of Four and Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping met these challenges by ushering in the so-called Reform Era (Gaike Kaifang), a period of economic reforms and rapid growth and limited political reforms.\textsuperscript{111}

However, as the pro-democracy protests of 1989 demonstrated, the post-Mao state in the 1980s was beset by the related problems of rampant corruption, institutional deficiencies and lack of legitimacy of the regime.\textsuperscript{112} In effect, the post-1978 reforms had failed to resolve the socio-political problems that Mao bequeathed to his successors. As the editors of The Tiananmen Papers found from official Chinese documents, inflation, corruption in the political system, “crisis of faith” among the intellectuals’, rising crime, ideological decay, disaffected youth and students, and most crucially a divided leadership at the top echelons of the party-state hierarchy,

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  \item \textsuperscript{109} David Shambaugh, ‘After 50 Years of Communism,’ The Independent, 1 October, 1999; Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004: 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid: 159.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Fairbanks and Goldman 1998: 406-425.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid: 424-25; Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (Eds.), The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force against Their Own People—In Their Own Words, New York: Public Affairs, 2001: 3-18.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
were the primary ‘seeds of the crisis.’ The harsh military crackdown on 4 June, 1989 and the subsequent arrests and exile of the leaders and participants in the protests, strong and continued economic growth and the heavy programme of nationalistic political education have ensured the survival of the CCP, but the fundamental contradictions of rapid economic and social transformation and political authoritarianism continue to afflict the Chinese state to this day.

About 100,000 mass unrests were recorded in China in 2010, rising year on year from only 8,700 in 1993. Discontented groups include factory workers agitating for better wages and working conditions, college students protesting fake degrees, demobilised soldiers angry about joblessness, taxi-drivers protesting new regulations, rural residents angered by inadequate compensation for confiscated land, minorities demanding greater autonomy or protesting Chinese encroachment into their ancestral lands. The environment is a mess and its mine-safety record is the worst in the world. The list is endless. On the other hand, China completed the Three Gorges Dam and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, sent an astronaut into space, shot a satellite in space with a missile, and hosted the 2008 Olympics, all monumental if controversial achievements. China’s economic miracle is continuing unabated, its military is modernising fast, and its diplomatic muscle is increasing in equal proportion. China’s roaring economic growth, 2.3 million strong and modernising army and growing diplomatic assertiveness are also causing disquiet in various foreign capitals. A parallel public and academic ‘Chinese threat’ discourse has gained currency, especially in America, replacing an earlier China collapse theory. The

113 Nathan and Link 2001: 3-18.
European Council of Foreign Relations’ report *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations* is a European version of this China threat theory.\(^{118}\)

To assuage the fears of China’s rising power, the Chinese have had to heavily propagate their concepts of ‘peaceful rise’ (*heping jueqi*)\(^{119}\) and ‘peaceful development’ (*heping fazhan*\(^{120}\) in recognition of their new-found stature.\(^{121}\) A more confident nationalism has developed at home too.\(^{122}\) Abroad, a more confident and sophisticated diplomacy has forestalled, at least temporarily, a balancing coalition in its periphery while cementing its economic position in Africa and Latin America.\(^{123}\) At home and abroad, China’s rise is shaping how people think and speak about and behave towards China.

So what should one make of these contradictory signs from China? Using the metric of socio-political cohesion and exploiting Buzan’s dichotomy between strong/weak powers and strong/weak states, this dissertation posits China as a strong power with some significant weaknesses as a state.

Scholars have focused as much on China’s state-weakness as on its rising power. Minxin Pei observed, ‘The only thing rising faster than China is the hype about China.’\(^{124}\) He warns, ‘Advocates of engagement and containment both assume China’s rise as a given, and their differing policy prescriptions focus on projected Chinese strength, rather than in its weaknesses.’\(^{125}\) Pei calls China an ‘incapacitated’ state because of its poor record of providing public services—public safety, education, health, environmental protection, law enforcement and

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120 Hu Jintao, Yale University, 21 April, 2006.
regulation, rural public finance and jobs—and the CCP’s weakening mobilisation capacity, internal corruption, state-society tensions and institutional breakdown.\textsuperscript{126} China, he writes, is unable to fully honour its international commitments or perform critical functions such as ‘environmental protection, non-proliferation, anti-narcotics, migration, control of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and poverty alleviation.’\textsuperscript{127}

Shaoguang Wang declared China ‘weak’ overall based on six criteria that he deems essential to govern effectively: monopoly of force, resource extraction, national identity and mobilisation, regulation of society and economy, institutional coherence and resource redistribution.\textsuperscript{128} He attributes this weakness to the intrusiveness of the Chinese state, lawlessness and crime rate, public finance problems, unresolved national identity issues, and inadequate regulatory capacity. Peter Navarro fears that China’s implosion due to inhuman labour conditions, rural poverty, dispossession of land and homes for industrial development, heavy tax burden, corruption, population aging, poor, unequal access to public services, environmental disasters, AIDS crisis and ethnic separatism, could be more “sudden, wrenching, and violent.”\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers} examines the various problems posed by non-Chinese nationalities in China.\textsuperscript{130} Summarising the implications of these various constraints, Susan Shirk characterised contemporary China as a ‘fragile super-power’—economically dynamic and internationally secure and confident, but domestically fragile and insecure.\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, the burgeoning literatures on China’s state-society relations, governance, democratisation and national minorities portray the PRC as a ‘struggling giant’,\textsuperscript{132} or a ‘fragile super-power’, confirming Buzan’s observation that ‘even major powers, like China…have serious weaknesses as states.’\textsuperscript{133} These confirm the soundness of the analytical decision to classify China as a strong power and weak state.

\textsuperscript{126} Pei 2006: 167-205.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid: 214.
\textsuperscript{131} Shirk 2007.
\textsuperscript{133} Buzan 1991: 98.
As major protests in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia in 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively demonstrate, one such weakness is a “[n]ational identity [that] is not a fully resolved issue,” especially in the multi-ethnic frontier regions. The non-Chinese nationalities, especially the Tibetans, Uighurs (Xinjiang Autonomous Region) and Mongols (Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region) present socio-political challenges to China’s self-identification as a modern unitary ‘nation-state’. Indeed, the socio-political challenges that the Party-state faces from these nations constitute the basis for this dissertation. The next section provides an overview of the security challenges that they pose to China with a view only to provide a broader analytical context for the subsequent chapters on Tibet.

**Frontier Nationalities, Chinese Nationality Policy and Security**

Security concerns or perceived threats to security more than anything else shape China’s nationality policy. Li Ruihuan, former Politburo member was clear on this during a forum organised by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission in 1994. Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia present the most serious threats from among the 55 minority nationalities. The latest incarnation of the ‘three evils’ in Chinese official-speak (terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism) that threaten the ‘territorial integrity and security of states, as well as their political, economic and social stability’ are clearly enunciated with Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia in mind. Why do these minorities, who are numerically insignificant in comparison to the 1.214 billion Han Chinese, pose such threats to rising China? The answer to this question is multi-faceted, touching upon sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, Marxist and nationalist ideologies, the Leninist political system and state institutions, national identity, national image (or face; Ch. mianzi) and regime survival. In this overview, China’s security

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135 SWB, ‘Forum on National Unity; Li Ruihuan Tells Forum Minority Areas Must Exploit Their Resources,’ 28 September, 1994: FE/2112/G.
concerns are organised in terms of political, military and societal security, suggesting that Beijing’s calculations go beyond traditional security issues.

**Political Security:** The disputes with the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols always touch a raw nerve in China because fundamentally at stake from Beijing’s perspective is Chinese sovereignty. Adhering to a Westphalian notion of sovereignty and no doubt influenced by China’s recent history of victimisation by imperialist powers, Beijing is sensitive to the slightest sense of violation of its sovereignty. Its behaviour is a textbook case of fetishisation of sovereignty and its indivisibility. The perceived threats to Chinese sovereignty originate from domestic actors, in this case ethnic nationalities demanding complete freedom or greater autonomy, and their supporters in foreign states who are perceived to be trying to contain or sabotage China’s rise. The current trend in international relations is to speak about sovereignty as a bundle of rights and responsibilities. When it comes to national minorities and their homelands, Beijing has preserved its static and conservative interpretation of all elements of sovereignty, even as it has relaxed its economic authority practices in China itself. In short, a clear sense of threat to Chinese sovereignty prevails in China’s academic and official circles.

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Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols also threaten China’s territorial integrity. Loss of territory and the associated resources and strategic advantages weigh heavily on Beijing’s calculus. The religious and cultural underpinnings of Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian nationalism also threaten or obstruct the dominant ideology (formerly communism, now increasingly Chinese nationalism), which provides the ordering and legitimating principles of the Party-state. The Leninist political system and its institutional structure that keeps the CCP in power, especially the Regional National Autonomy Law which allows China to control the restive non-Chinese nationalities, are also threatened by the latter’s nationalist and separatist activities. In the Tibetan case, democratic aspiration is problematic for a regime that relies upon the Leninist political system for survival and views democracy as a western tool to undermine China’s rise.

The legitimacy of China’s rule and policies in minority regions and its international image are constantly put into disrepute, to the great consternation of the Chinese, by the combination of local uprisings, international campaigns of the diasporas and criticism of foreign governments and international institutions. Politics is also a ‘contest of over legitimacy’ and denial of legitimacy is a familiar strategy of weaker actors. The Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols question the legitimacy not just of current policies, but also of Chinese sovereignty over their regions, which is tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the contemporary Chinese state. The Party’s loss of control over ideology, erosion of institutional integrity and the deficit of legitimacy has direct bearing on regime survival.

Regime survival is an over-riding consideration for the Party and its leaders. Shirk argues that China’s ‘communist leaders have a deep sense of domestic insecurity…. Chinese leaders are haunted by the fear that their days in power are numbered.’ She finds that ‘ethnic unrest’ is one of the threats confronting Beijing. The threat to regime security from the

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144 Nye 1993: 142.

145 Shirk 2007; Pei 2006.


147 Ibid: 58.
Tibetans and Uighurs operates through the ubiquitous practice of deliberately conflating regime, state and societal securities of the dominant nation in authoritarian states like China. Regime security in the PRC could be analytically broken up into three levels: the survival interests of the Chinese Communist Party, the bureaucratic interests of the institutions especially invested in minority affairs, such as the United Front Department, and the survival interests and privileges of the local elites, including the Tibetans and Uighurs who have been co-opted into the ruling regime.

Secessionism and irredentism are obvious threats to state, regime and national security, but internal, non-secessionist aspirations for greater rights and autonomy by any one of the minority problems are worrisome for the Party, especially in the contexts of both the ultra-nationalistic atmosphere in China and the uncertainties underlying state-minority relations. The domino-effect of Beijing’s accommodation of one ethnic group’s aspirations setting off similar demands from other minorities is interpreted as a threat to national unity and state security, with obvious implications for regime security. The anticipation of adverse reaction by Chinese nationalists to concessions to minorities weighs heavily on Beijing’s security assessments.

**Military Security**

In Xinjiang, Chinese military strategists have concerns about Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic subversion, while in Tibet, indigenous separatism and the domestic and international popularity of the Dalai Lama are security risks. Indian influence in Tibet via the exile administration is seen with great suspicion. Western ideological and strategic designs to undermine China’s rise through the Tibetan Trojan horse is a familiar narrative in official and intellectual circles. In Inner Mongolia, Pan-Mongolism and local discontent have been causes of concern. Direct foreign military interventions, Kosovo and Iraq style, and gradual ‘peaceful evolution’ strategies to change China’s political system and undermine CCP rule have been raised repeatedly in

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official, military and intellectual discourses. The fears of domestic separatism and foreign intervention are connected with the fears of the loss of the strategic advantage that Tibet and Xinjiang confer on the PLA and the natural resources that are critical for the resource-hungry Chinese economy. As the People’s Liberation Army is the Party’s army, the threat perception of the military officers concerns not just the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state but also the Party’s survival. Furthermore, a part of China’s military resources and investments are tied up in these remote regions populated by strongly anti-Chinese natives to forestall any contingencies involving either the locals and/or adjoining powers, whose future relations with China are clouded by uncertainty. Also the imperatives of economic development, Beijing’s strategy of choice to foster loyalty in these remote regions, eat up resources that could otherwise be devoted to its military modernisation program to challenge America and its allies. It is clear from the above that there are significant overlaps between political and military security.

**Societal Security**

National identity is the main referent object of societal security. The existence of separate Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian identities present the greatest threat to the unitary self-image of the Chinese state. Li Dezhu, former Minister, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, warned against the threat from non-Han identities when he said that ‘blind, excessive or even destructive development of ethnic culture must be guarded against’, while calling for the exploitation of ethnic culture for tourism ‘under the condition that it is properly protected.’ Li Rihuan, the former politburo members, was more explicit:

> The minority population in China, which is close to 100m, is scattered throughout the country. Autonomous minority regions account for 64 per cent of the country's total area. Therefore, we take unity among various nationalities as the basis of discussion on people's unity, territorial integrity and

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152 Ibid; Rihuan 28 September, 1994: FE/2112/G.
national unity. In the absence of unity among various nationalities, China will lapse into turmoil and fragmentation and will no longer be what it is today.\textsuperscript{158}

Given such fears, the party-state does its best to neutralise the threat through the promotion of what Zhao calls ‘state-led nationalism.’\textsuperscript{159} While the means employed have varied, the assimilationist logic of rendering the nation congruent to the state—state-led nation building—has been a constant feature of Chinese nationality policy throughout the life of the PRC.\textsuperscript{160}

Hence, because of their separate identities, geography and histories and transnational and international linkages, the frontier nations present a security challenge to China that is more serious than the simple demographic numbers suggest.\textsuperscript{161} As Goldstein wrote:

What is distinctive about China’s multi-ethnic composition…and what makes it relevant to thinking strategically about its rising power is the concentration of minority people in vast border regions (especially Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia) [over 60 per cent of its landmass]…. The security challenge is complicated by a long-standing potential for separatist movements, abetted by culturally similar or politically sympathetic foreigners just across the border, that could fragment the Chinese state.\textsuperscript{162}

Non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, drugs and criminal organisations are also relevant, especially with the potential for collusion between these organisations and separatist movements. How then has China dealt with these vulnerabilities and threats?

It is not surprising given these security challenges that China’s nationality policy has always had a security rationale with regime security, state security and societal security components.\textsuperscript{163} Chapter Five of this dissertation examines how China has addressed these threats and vulnerabilities through various policy instruments with state-building goals in Tibet.

Regional National Autonomy (RNA) has been the most prominent instrument in the arsenal of China’s nationality policy. Beijing has used a variety of other instruments ranging from violent military operations to positive inducements such as the state-sponsored nationality identification program, the United Front, affirmative action and economic development. Maoist-
style political campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution, Strike-Hard Campaigns, the Spiritual Civilization Campaign and the Patriotic Education Campaign—with overwhelming ethnic dimensions in minority regions—have been employed in the ‘nation-state’ construction project. In Tibet, a vicious anti-Dalai Lama campaign has been on-going since 1994. The ethnic identification project, RNA and the United Front approach were conceived before 1949, while affirmative action and economic development were deployed after 1978. The various political-ideological campaigns have been conducted throughout the existence of the PRC.¹⁶⁴

This overview of the security challenges from the frontier nations provides a broader context in which the subsequent empirical chapters on Tibet should be understood. This dissertation examines how these policy instruments and their implementation relate to Beijing’s state-building ambitions, how they are interpreted and countered by the Tibetans, giving rise to a cyclical action-reaction dynamic.

Which Tibet?

It is important to define Tibet geographically. Tibet means different things to different people, not least to the Tibetans and the Chinese. The geographical definition of Tibet is a matter of dispute not just between Beijing and Dharamsala, but also among academic Tibetologists. In fact, the geographical demarcation of Tibet is arguably the biggest stumbling block in the Chinese-Tibetan dialogue. Beijing considers only Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as Tibet, while Dharamsala and most Tibetans claim most of the Tibetan plateau, which includes the Tibetan inhabited areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces.

For analytical reasons, this dissertation will adhere to the larger geographical definition of Tibet. Since this issue is integral to the contemporary Sino-Tibetan dispute and dialogue, the analytical reasons will be explained in Chapter Five. Let it suffice to say here that the Eastern Tibetans, both in Tibet and exile, are actively involved in every aspect of the Tibetan resistance against China. Furthermore, most Eastern Tibetans are remarkably articulate and dogged in their assertion of their homelands as an integral part of Tibet. As the Eastern Tibetans and their

homelands are discursively and practically ensconced in the Sino-Tibetan conflict, it makes no analytical sense to airbrush them out of the conflict as scholars like Melvyn Goldstein do.

When this dissertation refers to Eastern Tibet, it means the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. For the Tibetans, Eastern Tibet is further divided into ‘provinces’ [ཐོང་ཁག]: Kham [ཁམས] or Doto [དོ་ཐོས] (parts of Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan and TAR) and Amdo [ལྷོ་མོ] or Dome [དོ་མོ་] (parts of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan). Central and Western Tibet or Utsang [ཐོང་ཁག] corresponds roughly to the current boundaries of TAR. The reader is referred to Map 2 (page vi) for a better sense of the geographical location and administrative division of the Tibetan plateau.

Organisation of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of eight chapters divided into four parts. Part I (Chapters One and Two) introduces and contextualises the empirical and theoretical issues that constitute the core of this dissertation. Part II (Chapters Three and Four) puts the dissertation in the context of the longer historical relations between China and Tibet. Part III (Chapters Five to Seven) picks up the historical thread from Chapter Four, but examines with greater analytical depth the cyclical core of the insecurity dilemma, its transnational and international dimensions and its role in the Tibetan uprising in 2008. Part IV (Chapter Nine) concludes the dissertation with a summary of the main findings and contributions, and sketches the possible future scenarios of the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the insecurity dilemma.

Chapter Two critiques and develops the original version of the insecurity dilemma or what this dissertation refer to as classical insecurity dilemma to enable it to better explicate the security practices of weak and insecure states and the dynamics of intra-state conflicts in such states. Brian L. Job came up with the concept of the insecurity dilemma. Mohamed Ayoob’s ‘security predicament’ contains the same structural features and insights as Job’s insecurity dilemma, although Ayoob accords more prominence to external actors. The chapter notes the

166 Ayoob 1995.
intellectual parallel between John Herz’s ‘security dilemma’¹⁶⁷ and Herbert Butterfield’s ‘security predicament’¹⁶⁸ on the one hand and Job’s ‘insecurity dilemma’ and Ayoob’s ‘security predicament’ on the other hand. The chapter first differentiates the insecurity dilemma from the security dilemma and then develops the insecurity dilemma to address the flaws in its classical versions so as to equip it better to handle the tasks of explaining the security practices and conflicts within weak states. Thus, the insecurity dilemma is reconceptualised to guide the subsequent chapters dealing with the Sino-Tibetan conflict. It is important to reiterate that the action-reaction dynamic between the state and its adversaries takes the shape of cycles of state-building and ethno-national resistance. The chapter also considers ways to mitigate or resolve the insecurity dilemma.

Chapter Three gives a fresh perspective on the history of Sino-Tibetan relations through the prism of the insecurity dilemma. The chapter particularly focuses on the political and cultural practices of pre-PRC foreign overlords in Tibet and the Tibetan responses. Specifically, it examines the correlation between Tibetan tolerance or rebellion against foreign rulers and the latter’s attitudes and practices towards Tibetan identity and autonomy. Doing so, the chapter traces the evolution of the Tibetan-Chinese relations towards the insecurity dilemma, spanning the long period between the imperial rivalries in the 7-9th century to the PRC’s annexation in 1949-1950.

Chapter Four continues the historical narrative and chronicles the unleashing of the insecurity dilemma from the moment of Communist China’s incorporation of Tibet up to the imposition of martial law in 1989. In short, China’s state-building program with its nation-building, institution-building and infrastructure-building dimensions and the resultant Tibetan uprisings was detailed to demonstrate in stark fashion the insecurity dilemma that was let loose upon the Tibetan plateau. The imposition or steps towards the imposition of direct Chinese rule and the accompanying existential threats that Tibetan identity felt from Chinese policies and practices will be shown to have caused the 1987-1993 Tibetan uprising.

Chapter Five commences the deeper analysis of the insecurity dilemma after 1989. Guided by the theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two, it examines the threat perception

and state-building impetus behind the hardening of Beijing’s Tibet policy after 1989. It also gives an overview of the security concerns that drive China’s state-building project in Tibet. This chapter constitutes the first half of the cycle of the insecurity dilemma in the reform period.

Chapter Six picks up the analytical thread and completes the cycle by examining how these policies, migration and cultural influences for strengthening the Party-state’s position in Tibet generate greater societal insecurity among the Tibetans. Next, the positions and strategies that the Tibetans have used to address their societal insecurity will be analysed. The chapter then closes by pointing out how these Tibetan identity security measures heighten the Chinese political, military and societal security concerns discussed in the previous chapter; thus completing the cycle of the insecurity dilemma.

One of the key features of the reconceptualised insecurity dilemma is the salience of diasporas and external forces in the domestic conflict. One of the Tibetan strategies to confront Beijing has been for the diaspora to actively internationalise the Tibet issue. Because of Tibetan advocacy and normative, ideological and geopolitical reasons beyond the Tibet issue, the Sino-Tibetan conflict has acquired transnational and international dimensions. Chapter Seven isolates and examines how these dimensions contribute to the insecurity dilemma by positing a three-way feed-back effect among the Tibetans, Chinese and the international community. Specifically, the chapter investigates how the Tibet issue impinges on China’s relations with America, India, Europe and Taiwan and, potentially, Russia in the future. This chapter explores how Tibetan Buddhism, with adherents in various parts of the world, has been an asset for the Tibetans in their political struggle.

This external dimension and indeed the dynamic Sino-Tibetan core of the insecurity dilemma were on full display during and after the 2008 uprising, which this dissertation posits is a more spectacular and pent up Tibetan response to the hardening Chinese policies since 1989. Chapter Eight examines the identity insecurity at the heart of the Tibetan grievances which boiled over into the most serious challenge to Chinese rule since the 1959. Tibetan insecurity, the chapter shows, is a product of the hard-line policies pursued by the Chinese after 1989. The chapter also notes the hardening of Chinese policies in response to the uprising, and the insecurity and identity strengthening that this is already provoking in the Tibetan regions.
Conditions are being created for another Tibetan upheaval, bringing the insecurity dilemma full-circle.

How can this mutually detrimental cycle of repressive policies and uprisings be broken? Chapter Nine summarises the main findings and contributions towards scholarship in security studies, international relations and the conflict. It concludes by sketching the likely future scenarios for the conflict and examining the prospects for reconciliation and the insecurity dilemma’s place in those scenarios.

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the relevant scholarship, the research questions, the central argument and the analytical framework used in this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation will show that mutual insecurities drive the action-reaction process of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The insecurity dilemma allows a more social and inter-subjective analysis of the conflict and addresses the shortcomings of the existing analyses of the conflict. After explaining the methodology, the key terms were defined and contextualised and the rationale for using the weak state concept in the context of China was explained as were the security challenges posed by the frontier nations. After outlining the geographical definition of Tibet, the final section introduced the structure of this dissertation. The next chapter develops the insecurity dilemma as an analytical framework and sets up the analysis of the Sino-Tibetan conflict.
In the previous chapter, I asked the empirical question of what explains the intractability of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Some more specific questions relevant to the Tibetans and Beijing were also raised. In answer, the Sino-Tibetan conflict was posited as a dilemmatic interplay of the mutual insecurities of the Tibetan nation and the Chinese Party-State. The insecurity dilemma was introduced as the theoretical framework to address those questions in order to make sense of the protracted nature of the conflict. However, the insecurity dilemma as originally conceived by scholars of Third World security like Job and Ayoob, which this research calls the classical insecurity dilemma, is really a framework to explicate the security practices of insecure states in the global south. It is not adequately equipped to handle the analysis of intra-state conflicts in these states and exhibits a number of flaws. This chapter develops the insecurity dilemma by addressing these flaws to enhance its analytical power.

The chapter begins by mapping the conceptual origins of the insecurity dilemma by discussing the traditional notion of security dilemma, the various ways in which this concept has been adapted to analyse intra-state conflicts. Then, the insecurity dilemma is distinguished from the security dilemma and developed in a number of ways. First, the concept of societal security or identity security is incorporated to allow for a more adequate analysis of the security practices of adversarial non-state groups, including their transnational and international relations. Second, more play is given to transnational and international actors in the insecurity dilemma. To demonstrate the role of transnational and international factors in the insecurity dilemma, the agency of diasporas on the side of both the state and the aggrieved ethno-national group will be examined. Third, the interactive role that historical and contemporary experience and future uncertainty play in the arousal and perpetuation of insecurities and mutual threat perceptions is explicated. The insecurity dilemma, thus reconceptualised, illuminates the security practices of both the state and the rival sub-state political communities—national, ethnic, religious, racial and ideological.1 The chapter then

1 Although the possibilities are many, this research will focus on ethno-national groups.
demonstrates the cyclical dynamics of the strategic interaction between the state and its domestic adversaries, giving due attention to the state, sub-state and external actors. Finally, the chapter will consider how the insecurity dilemma could be alleviated, and concludes by summarising the key findings.

Anarchy and the Security Dilemma

The security dilemma has become one of the most important theoretical tools for understanding and explaining international politics. As the most recent authoritative work contends, ‘the security dilemma gets to the very heart of politics among nations.’ John Hertz coined the term ‘security dilemma’ in 1950, which he defined thus:

Wherever such anarchic society [groups living “alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity”] has existed... groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.  

Around the same time, Herbert Butterfield described a similar structure-induced dynamic, which he described as the ‘absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma.’

Later scholars have remained largely faithful to the definition of the security dilemma that Hertz and Butterfield advanced. Describing the structural condition of the international system, anarchy essentially means the absence of a legitimate authority to referee disputes among states with the capabilities to enforce international law, i.e. punishing errant states and protecting law-abiding ones. In Kenneth Waltz’s words, absence of a government with ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ in the international arena fosters self-help behaviour among states. Self-help behaviour under uncertainty over the intentions and capabilities of other states puts a premium on worst case calculations, driving the security

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6 Waltz 1979: 105-07. Emphasis in the original.
dilemma. However, Booth and Wheeler put forward an insightful restatement of the security dilemma in 2008.\(^7\)

Exploiting the semantic difference between a paradox and a dilemma, Booth and Wheeler reconceptualise the security dilemma as a ‘two-level strategic predicament’:

The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding.\(^8\)

The outcome of insecurity contrary to prior expectations of security when states and other actors take defensive-minded actions is merely a paradox, a perverse outcome, not a dilemma.\(^9\) The dilemma, at one level, is a product of uncertainty about the adversary’s intentions and capabilities, and at a ‘derivative’ level, how to respond appropriately to the other’s moves. Booth and Wheeler argue that the security dilemma can be overcome, not just mitigated as even some realists allow for, through the force of norms, institutions, cooperation and the cultivation of trust and what they call the ‘security dilemma sensibility.’\(^10\) This is a significant departure from the dominant realist view which mostly portrays the security dilemma as an inescapable prison or an irresolvable tragedy. While the security dilemma remains a theory mainly for the analysis of inter-state relations, it has been adapted by a number of scholars to explain intra-state conflicts.

**Ethnic and Societal: Intra-state Security Dilemmas**

Barry Posen was the first scholar to use the security dilemma to explain domestic conflicts.\(^11\) As he puts it, ‘when imperial order breaks down’ in a multi-ethnic country, an ‘emerging anarchy’ takes hold and an intense security dilemma ensues.\(^12\) Domestic politics begin to resemble the anarchic international system, complete with the tragic quality of inter-group competitions. Posen’s unmodified use of the security dilemma to explain domestic conflicts has met with scathing criticism.

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\(^7\) Booth and Wheeler 2008.
\(^8\) Ibid: 4. Emphasis in the original.
\(^10\) Ibid: 7. Security dilemma sensibility is the awareness of the tragic quality of inter-group politics. It is the recognition that one’s own actions, even if defence-motivated, contribute to the fear-driven behaviour of others and the capacity for empathy and the willingness to act upon it.
\(^12\) Ibid: 27.
Lapid and Kratochwil argued that ‘without an explicit theoretical treatment of group differentiation, which, in turn, generates the “anarchical environment”, structural arguments [such as Posen’s] do not explain conflict, but merely re-describe it.’\textsuperscript{13} Paul Roe added that Posen weakens his argument by claiming that ‘…there were plenty of signals of malign intent,’ which takes away the tragic quality since ‘signals of malign intent’ imply real threats, not imagined products of uncertainty. What Posen describes as a security dilemma could therefore be merely a security problem.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the complete collapse of imperial regimes or central governments is a rare occurrence. As Rotberg finds, a collapsed state—‘a vacuum of authority’—is ‘a rare and extreme version of a failed state.’\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, the utility of Posen’s version of the security dilemma to explain intra-state conflicts is limited. Relatedly, the total absence of the state that the security dilemma implies is problematic. Posen’s characteristic privileging of structural variables and disregarding the role of identity in intra-state conflicts also fly in the face of the ethnic, racial, religious, national and civilisational provenance of many of these conflicts.\textsuperscript{16} As Lapid and Kratochwil argued, Posen’s neglect of identity renders his structural approach incapable of explaining ethno-national intra-state conflicts.

Contrary to Posen’s silence, identity is at the heart of Paul Roe’s ‘inter-societal security dilemma’ or ‘societal security dilemma.’\textsuperscript{17} He incorporates the concept of societal security as conceived by Buzan and his Copenhagen School colleagues into the security dilemma. Identity is for inter-societal security dilemma what sovereignty is for its inter-state security dilemma. Identity, he argues, is not just a referent object of security, but also a defensive or offensive weapon, a source of security for one group and insecurity for adversaries. Here Roe is engaging with insights such as Buzan’s:

For threatened societies, one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{13} Yosef and Kratochwil 1996: 115.  
\textsuperscript{15} Rotberg 2003: 9.  
\textsuperscript{16} Giannakos 1998.  
\end{flushright}
Identity-based security dilemmas can be set off inasmuch as ‘the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its own identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the end, decreases the first society’s own societal security.’\textsuperscript{19} In fact, both societies become more insecure at the end of this action-reaction process. Some instances of nationalism and ethno-nationalism could be manifestations of such identity wars.\textsuperscript{20} Yet, societal or identity security can also be threatened or defended with military, economic and political and bureaucratic instruments.\textsuperscript{21}

However, like Posen, Roe ignores the state in his security dilemma. The state stays silently in the background or completely out of the picture. In reality, the state is a significant actor and frameworks attempting to understand intra-state conflicts should factor in the role of the state unless it is one of the rare cases where the state and its institutions have completely collapsed.

Stephen Saideman rectifies this in his ‘ethnic security dilemma’ by bringing the state back into the analysis. He argues that ‘[t]o understand ethnic security dilemmas, we must consider the role of the state in mediating or influencing the competition by ethnic groups for security.’\textsuperscript{22} For him the distinguishing feature of ethnic security dilemmas is the role of the state as, with its resources, the state ‘can be an ethnic group’s greatest ally or adversary.’\textsuperscript{23} States matter because between the extremes of anarchy and the ideal-type nation-state where one homogenous nation enjoys perfect security, ‘states exist and shape the course of ethnic politics.’\textsuperscript{24} Here Saideman is articulating the widespread reality in which the state and its resources and institutions are captured by one group, to the detriment of all other groups:

In many political systems, the state may be biased toward or against particular ethnicities, so competition among the different ethnic groups for control of the state. If my group does not capture the state, someone else’s will, and then we will be at the mercy of the state….If the state cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to control the state or secede so that they can control their own state, decreasing other group’s security and decreasing the state’s ability to provide security for any group.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{19} Roe 1999: 194.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
In such an environment, certain anarchy-driven features of international politics play out in the domestic arena.\textsuperscript{26} However, the excessively materialist ontology of his security dilemma has no place for identity and cultural factors. For Saideman, access or alienation from the resources of the state, which determine the economic, physical and political security of the ethnic groups, is the difference between a united and cohesive state and one with warring groups attempting to capture the state or to secede from it to build their own states.\textsuperscript{27} This is an opportune time to introduce the insecurity dilemma inasmuch as it, at least, acknowledges the role of adversarial ethno-national groups and their identity, even though they are used as mere stage-props in the state-centrist analysis of the security policies of the Third World states.

**State-Building and Classical Insecurity Dilemma**

In the annals of the insecurity dilemma, Brian Job’s *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* and Mohamed Ayoob’s *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* stand out as foundational texts. In fact, in the intellectual development of the insecurity dilemma, Job and Ayoob occupy positions analogous to the primacy of Hertz and Butterfield in the conceptualisation of the security dilemma. Job and Ayoob did for Third World security with the ‘insecurity dilemma’ and ‘security predicament’ respectively, what Hertz and Butterfield did for international security with the ‘security dilemma’ and ‘security predicament.’ Writing contemporaneously, both pairs arrived at broadly similar insights and conclusions about international and Third World security, albeit with some differences.

**Brian Job’s Insecurity Dilemma**

For Job, the tenets of the security dilemma as derived from realism do not fit the empirical reality of security practices in the Third World. That is because (1) the states do not coincide with a single, united nation, i.e. they are not *nation-states*; (2) the regimes in power lack popular legitimacy; (3) the states lack institutional capacity to provide equal security for all their citizens; and (4) threat perception is domestically-orientated rather than externally-

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
directed to the international system.\textsuperscript{28} Job locates the dilemma in the security competition between the states and various national and ethnic groups, who do not share the interests of the states and the identities of the groups which dominate the powers, institutions and resources of the state.\textsuperscript{29}

Job defines the insecurity dilemma in terms of the paradoxical nature of the state-group strategic interaction that ensues when a weak and insecure state attempts to increase its security through state-building. State-building threatens groups with identities and interests distinct from the group in control of the state and provokes resistance movements to secure their identities. The security competition thus unleashed is characterised by two ‘contrasting conditions’ relating to the domestic and international contexts:

\begin{quote}
[F]irst, an internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state; and second, a resulting paradox regarding the external security environment.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

The domestic paradox refers to the self-defeating nature of the security competition between the state and its internal adversaries, which results in less ‘effective security’ for all, less ‘effective state-capacity’ to provide security and increased vulnerabilities to foreign encroachments.\textsuperscript{31} This domestic predicament is rooted in state weakness:

The weakness of the state…hinges upon the paradox that the more the regime attempts or needs to exercise the coercive machinery of the state, the more directly repressive the regime’s actions against its competitors in the internal security arena, the more obvious is its ‘weakness.’\textsuperscript{32}

The implication is that the more repressive the state building policies and practices are, the more resistance they provoke from their domestic adversaries. Job associates the insecurity dilemma with weak states, a ubiquitous condition in the Third World, which he attributes to the adverse consequences of decolonisation, under- and unequal economic development, multi-ethnic societies and authoritarian regimes. He argues that most of the Third World countries were born into insecurity at the time of decolonisation.

However, another paradox operates at the interface between the domestic and the international: the state is protected from external threats by the norms of the international community such as the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, even when the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[29] Ibid.
\item[30] Ibid.
\item[31] Ibid: 20.
\item[32] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
internal competitions have weakened and incapacitated the states to deal with foreign encroachments.\textsuperscript{33} Job recognises a limited degree of interaction between the state and the international society by way of regional security pacts and arms-trade.\textsuperscript{34} Beyond that, he denies the agency of external actors in the exacerbation or alleviation of the insecurity dilemma. Of course, he is deafeningly silent on the complex transnational and international linkages of the adversarial groups.

A number of symptoms reveal the insecurity dilemma in the Third World states: militarization, repression and state terror, diversionary tactics, and regional security pacts among conservative ruling elites to help each other suppress domestic forces of change and liberalization.\textsuperscript{35} ‘[L]eadership personality cults, extreme militarism and heightened forms of nationalism’ are extreme symptoms of state-weakness.\textsuperscript{36} Job’s insecurity dilemma is certainly an improvement over the unmodified application of the security dilemma to intra-state conflicts.

It relaxes the requirement of anarchy, which is experienced only in conditions where the state has collapsed completely which Rotberg finds extremely rare.\textsuperscript{37} The insecurity dilemma explains a larger universe of intra-state conflicts where the state is still active and anarchy has not necessarily set in. Extending the empirical scope expands the explanatory strength of a theory.\textsuperscript{38} As Roe commends, ‘Job’s work widens the utility of the security dilemma at the intra-state level by concentrating not on disintegrating states as such, but “weak” ones.’\textsuperscript{39} The exploitation of the weak/strong state conceptual apparatus is analytically profitable. Therefore, unlike the security dilemma, Job accords due importance to the state in the analysis of intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, Job recognises the role of non-state actors and identity in intra-state conflicts, although he stops short of theorising their security practices.

However, Job’s insecurity dilemma is problematic for three main reasons. First, Job overstates the argument that the primary security threats to the weak states come from domestic forces and that externally, the prevailing international norms protect their

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{34} Ibid: 30.
  \item\textsuperscript{35} Ibid: 28-30.
  \item\textsuperscript{36} Ibid: 31.
  \item\textsuperscript{37} Rotberg 2003: 9.
  \item\textsuperscript{38} King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 19-23.
  \item\textsuperscript{39} Roe 1999: 197.
\end{itemize}
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Job posits that the internal-external nexus exists only to the extent to which a particular regime becomes militarily dependent upon external arms suppliers or participate in regional security pacts. In doing so, he underestimates the involvement of transnational and international actors in the insecurity dilemma. As explained later in this chapter, a feed-back effect exists between the domestic conflict and its transnational and international environment.

Second, the under-development of the security practices of non-state security actors including their external relations is equally problematic. Job glosses over them as ‘contending forces’ or ‘various forces’ and leaves it unclear what values they seek to secure from what threats and how. Although Job places himself in the context of a broadened security agenda, which renounces the centrality of the state and its political and military securities, he relegates the role of these non-state challengers to the state—‘ethnic, religious, or national communities’—to a theoretical limbo. Their existence is acknowledged, but only as props in a state-centrist analysis. Their security requirements are lumped into a vague category of ‘irreconcilable demands,’ and not explored satisfactorily. Consequently, Job ignores the transnational and international linkages and activities of these actors too.

Third, Booth and Wheeler’s critique of security dilemma theorists of conflating the paradoxical and dilemmatic elements also applies to Job’s insecurity dilemma. He is silent on the dilemmas of interpretation and response, concentrated as he is on the paradoxical outcome. This follows from his disregard for the role of uncertainty. Despite these problems, Job has furnished the foundations for a framework that serves the dual purpose of explicating the security policies of insecure states in its basic form and studying intra-state conflicts after some development.

Mohammed Ayoob’s ‘Security Predicament’

Although Job came up with the term ‘insecurity dilemma,’ Ayoob was contemporaneously engaging with the same theoretical ideas under the rubric of the ‘security predicament’ in

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Third World countries.\footnote{Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?’ \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 60, No. 1, Winter 1983-84; Ayoob 1995.} In point of fact, Ayoob’s treatment of the theoretical and empirical ideas is considerably more sustained, substantive and coherent than Job’s edited volume. Ayoob has emerged as the standard bearer of the theoretical insights that constitute the insecurity dilemma under the more recent nomenclature of ‘subaltern realism’.\footnote{Ayoob 1998: 31-54; Ayoob 2002: 27-48.}

Like Job, Ayoob begins by critiquing the deficiencies of the traditional Western-centric security theories to make sense of security practices in the non-Western world. For him traditional approaches, primarily realism and idealism [liberalism], are too preoccupied with military security and threats from outside the sovereign state.\footnote{Ayoob 1995: 4-6.} These tendencies are endogenous to the particular Western historical experience and the advanced stage of statehood in most Western countries.\footnote{Ibid: 5-6.} Such a conception of security is problematic in the parlance of the Third World

...because the three major characteristics of the concept of state security as developed in the Western literature—namely, its external orientation, its strong link with systemic security, and its binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs during the Cold War—have been so thoroughly diluted in the Third World that the explanatory power of the concept has been vastly reduced when applied to Third World contexts.\footnote{Ibid: 6.}

Thus, Ayoob proposes a primarily political conception of security that is intimately connected with state-building, ‘a major enterprise in which Third World countries have been engaged since decolonization.’\footnote{Ibid: 8.} Ayoob then defines ‘security-insecurity...in relation to vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.’\footnote{Ibid: 9.} Guided by this definition, he characterises the Third World, including powerful countries like India, China and Brazil, as ‘weak, vulnerable and insecure’ on account of a number of shared characteristics:

Lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both great economic and social disparities and major ethnic and regional fissures; lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and governing elites; easy susceptibility to internal and inter-state conflicts; distorted and dependent development, both economically and socially; marginalisation, especially in relation to the

\footnote{Ibid: 6.}
\footnote{Ibid: 8.}
\footnote{Ibid: 9.}
dominant international security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by external actors, be they more developed states, international institutions, or transnational corporations.  

Consequently, the Third World teeters between the conflict-prone conditions of weak or quasi-states and failed states.  

Ayoob’s main point of departure, just like Job’s, is that security and state-building in the Third World cannot be understood in isolation from each other; they are mutually constitutive and informative practices.  

[T]he internal dimension of security, which is inextricably intertwined with the process of state-making, is the core variable that determines the Third World state’s security problematic.... a solid grasp of the state-building process in the Third World is analogous to the beginning of wisdom for students and scholars of Third World security.  

The pressures of late state-making, late entry into the modern state-system and the distortions of colonialism produce a ‘security predicament’ that deviates substantially from the contemporary experience of most Western states—‘a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence as regimes are challenged and react with brutal force.’ He elaborates on the security predicament in terms similar to Job’s insecurity dilemma:

However, Ayoob allows far more agency for external factors in the security predicament through trade and economic dependence, proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and international interventions. He devoted separate chapters to explicate the ‘internal dimension’ and ‘external dimension’ of the security predicament.  

Internal insecurity fundamentally determine the security predicament. These insecurities, in turn, are intimately related to the on-going process of state-building in post-colonial societies. They are manifested through the state’s attempts to impose its version of political order, often by force, and through the equally frequent violent resistance to such imposition by substantial segments of the Third World’s population.  

However, Ayoob allows far more agency for external factors in the security predicament through trade and economic dependence, proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and international interventions. He devoted separate chapters to explicate the ‘internal dimension’ and ‘external dimension’ of the security predicament.  

External variables,’ he writes, ‘have tremendous influence in determining the outcome of specific attempts at state building. These external pressures emanate from both the regional and the

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48 Ibid: 15.  
50 Ibid: xiii.  
52 Ibid: 41.  
53 Ibid: 42. Emphasis mine.  
54 Ibid: 139-63.  
55 Ibid.
global environments in which Third World states operate.\textsuperscript{56} This is the chief distinguishing feature between Job’s insecurity dilemma and Ayoob’s security predicament.

Raimo Vayrynen critiqued that this allowance for external variables detracts from his basic position that internal threats to the stability of Third World states are dominant.\textsuperscript{57} This is a misreading of Ayoob’s security predicament since he does not privilege domestic threats over external ones; unlike Job, he treats them as equally significant. Furthermore, this is a frivolous criticism as an either-or selection between internal and external factors is self-limiting and flies in the face of the overwhelming empirical evidence of fusion between the domestic and the international patterns of enmity and amity. A ‘theory should be just as complicated [or parsimonious] as all our evidence suggests.’\textsuperscript{58} Capturing the internal-external interplay contributes to the theoretical sophistication of the insecurity dilemma.

However, Ayoob’s security predicament shares some flaws associated with Job’s insecurity dilemma. Firstly, it is unabashedly state-centric. Michael Barnett charges that Ayoob’s corpus engages in a ‘fetishization of sovereignty’ and that his scholarship is state-centric to the point of defending genocidal authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{59} Secondly, as a consequence of the above, he ignores the security practices of non-state groups. As Barnett writes:

His framework highlights the concerns of regimes that find themselves beset by security challenges and marginalises the societal groups that are now constructed as a “threat”…. [I]f, according to Ayoob, IR theory should be explaining the “large majority of conflicts” that occur at any time and if those conflicts are not interstate but rather intrastate, then why cling to a state-centric definition of the discipline that seems to provide little explanatory value?\textsuperscript{60}

Indeed, for both Job and Ayoob, the under-theorisation of the nature and security practices of these internal challengers to the state is a strange omission for they attribute the insecurity dilemma to the persistent identities and resistance of these groups, which the state and the regime deem as existential threats. Finally, both Job and Ayoob are silent on the role of uncertainty in his security predicament and ignore the relevance of identity for the most

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid: 42.
\textsuperscript{58} King, Keohane and Verbal 1994: 20.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid: 56-59.
We will come back to these themes in the next section, but first an overview of other attempts to develop and apply the insecurity dilemma to various empirical problematiques is in order.

To date, there has been one attempt at developing the insecurity dilemma as a theory and two applications of the framework to explain empirical and historical cases. Georg Sorensen argues that since international conflicts have receded in frequency and severity at the same time as the increasing occurrence and brutality of intrastate conflicts, the security dilemma has given way to the insecurity dilemma. He claims that the promotion of liberal values or democracy as a solution for the insecurity dilemma throws up a ‘liberal value dilemma’, which he defined as ‘the fact that attempts to promote liberal values risk leading to illiberal outcomes both in the short and in the longer term.’ He illustrates the ‘value dilemma’ with the Danish cartoon affair in September 2005, which involved a Danish newspaper publishing cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. Sorensen then demonstrates this value dilemma in the American National Security Agenda (2006), in which democracy promotion has been clearly identified as an element of US security strategy. In short, Sorensen observes a perverse relationship between the liberal intentions behind democracy promotion and the illiberal outcomes in target societies. However, Sorensen jumps the gun by analysing the liberal solution before understanding the insecurity dilemma properly and addressing its shortcomings. Apart from conflating the paradox with the dilemma, Sorensen fails to overcome the state-centrism of the earlier scholars.

Glenn applies Job’s insecurity dilemma on the conflicts plaguing ‘Southern’ and post-communist ‘quasi-states’. Hong has used the insecurity dilemma to argue that the former South Korean President Syngman Ree’s repeated declaration of his willingness to militarily attack North Korea between 1953 to 1960 was not just reflective of his desire to reunify Korea, but was also a bargaining tactic to extract stronger American security guarantees, and

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61 Ibid: 53.
63 Glenn 1997; Hong 1999.
64 Ibid: 369.
65 Ibid: 372-75.
66 Jackson 1990.
most crucially to secure his own authoritarian regime from the growing domestic opposition.67

Ronnie Lipschutz has developed a post-Cold War version of the insecurity dilemma which differs from the Hobbesian realist notion of the security dilemma in that anarchy is not required. Lipschutz’s insecurity dilemma ‘arises out of uncertainty, out of a never fully predictable world.’68 What Lipschutz demonstrates here is that uncertainty does not necessarily require anarchy, but difference of identity: ‘the insecurity dilemma arises not from threats but from difference.’69 In other words, uncertainty of identity, the difficulty of picking ‘us’ from ‘them’ when the over-arching enemies of the Cold War have disappeared, has led policy makers and analysts to imagine all sorts of enemies, engendering deep insecurities.70 Uncertainty and identity will occupy prominent places in the revised insecurity dilemma developed below.

However, thus far the insecurity dilemma has been largely about the security practices of weak and insecure states. It is not well-equipped to illuminate the messier affairs of intra-state conflicts. Since the security practices of the states in these domestic conflicts have been discussed above under classical insecurity dilemma, that of the state’s ethno-national opponents need to be developed further. To pick up the theatrical metaphor, the non-state groups should be liberated from the ignominy of being used as mere stage props. They should be endowed with character and agency in the insecurity dilemma. For this purpose, a framework that explicates the security practices of the state’s domestic challengers, describes the strategic dynamics of the state-group interaction and pays equal attention to the external factors is necessary. The rest of this chapter is devoted to addressing these themes with a view to developing a framework that elucidates the complexities of intra-state conflicts with special attention on ethno-national conflicts, and which is equally attentive to the state, ethnic groups and external players.

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67 Hong 2000.
69 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
70 Ibid: 48-51.
Societal Security and Domestic Adversaries of the State

The insecurity dilemma reconceptualised in this section preserves and builds upon some of the basic ideas advanced by Job and Ayoob: the internally-directed threat perceptions of weak and/or insecure states, mutually constitutive and informative relationship between the security policies and state-building in such states, and the perverse outcomes of the security-seeking behaviour of states and their domestic adversaries, i.e. enhanced insecurity for both sides. However, I develop the framework in four crucial areas in the following pages. First, the concept of societal security is deployed to explicate the security practices of ethno-national groups. Secondly, as a consequence of examining the security practices of both the state and its internal security competitors, a clearer picture of the internal dynamics of the strategic interaction emerges, especially when the concept of uncertainty is drafted into the mix. Third, it clarifies the role played by external actors and integrates diasporas into the framework. The insecurity dilemma thus conceptualised becomes a cyclical, action-reaction process, driven by regime, state and societal security.

Societal security was conceived in response to the violent ethnic conflicts that ravaged Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s. It is defined as ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.’ Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community.... Defined in these terms, societal security highlights the importance of the ‘essential character’ or identity in the practice and analysis of security.

Indeed, identity has made a strong come-back in international relations and security studies. [C]ulture and cultural identities...are shaping the patterns of cohesion,
disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world,’ declared Samuel Huntington.\(^{76}\) He controversially wrote on civilizational identity. Identities of the ethnic and national varieties have also received attention in security studies and international relations in the post-Cold War world.\(^{77}\) This ‘return’ of identity in international relations has a strong basis in the empirical reality of the post-Cold War global politics. An overwhelming majority of the wars since the Second World War, more so after the Cold War, have been intra-state wars along ethnic and religious lines.\(^{78}\) Accordingly, security studies went through a ‘widening and deepening’ turn that challenged the traditional military- and state-centrist agenda of the field, opening it up to other actors and values including identity.\(^{79}\) It was in these contexts that societal security emerged as a distinct analytical framework within security studies.\(^{80}\)

Societal security has found its strongest champion in the Copenhagen School (CS),\(^{81}\) but it was originally conceived by Buzan as one of a five-dimensional state security agenda consisting of military, political, economic, societal and environmental security.\(^{82}\) The reconceptualisation of societal security in the course of Buzan’s participation in CS’s research program freed it from the state- and military-centrism of Buzan’s earlier works. CS, with Buzan and Waever at the core, argued that since the state and society are rarely coterminous and represent two different entities, they also constitute separate referent objects of security that generate different logics of threats and vulnerabilities.\(^{83}\) Although Buzan’s original thesis that societal security is a dimension of state security is not entirely thrown out of the window, the crucial dividing line between state and societal security is that while

\(^{76}\) Huntington 2002: 20.


\(^{81}\) Waever et al 1993; Buzan et al 1998; Buzan and Waever 1997.

\(^{82}\) Buzan 1983.

sovereignty serves as the ultimate value in state security, identity is the core value and the organisational principle for societal security.\footnote{84} As the Copenhagen School argues:

Definitionally, societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are empirically varies in both time and space.\footnote{85}

It should be emphasised that the Copenhagen School’s innovation is not so much to completely decouple societal security from state security, inasmuch as it could still be a component of the multi-sectoral agenda of state security, as to conceive of a duality of state and societal security that may overlap with each other at times, but also function as distinct analytical frameworks. As Buzan and Hansen point out:

[Society security] opened up for the study of ‘identity security’ and pointed to cases where state and societies\footnote{86} did not align, for instance when national minorities were threatened by ‘their’ state, or where the state, or other political actors, mobilised society to confront internal or external threats.\footnote{87}

Roe also noted, ‘Societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it is also a referent object of security in its own right.’\footnote{88} As such, societal security illuminates both some aspects of the security policies of states and the resistance movements of specific minority groups in those states. As the Copenhagen School writes, ‘In instances, where state and nation do not line up, the minority nation will be the point of reference for actors ranging from a counter-elite trying to achieve secession or independence…to groups defending the cultural identity of the minority.’\footnote{89} Roe, for instance, employs his societal security dilemma to analyse the adversarial relations between the Croatian proto-state (i.e. before its formal independence, but when it behaved like one in the period February-August 1990) and the Serbian minority in Krajina and the newly democratic Romanian state and its Hungarian minority.\footnote{90} As such, societal security captures the reality that many states are home to multiple societies, contrary to traditional IR’s neat assumption that the state and national identity are coterminous.

Inasmuch as identity is the primary value and organising principle, societal security is synonymous with ‘identity security.’\(^{91}\) In these identity conflicts, groups marshal as much material hard power and cultural soft-power as possible to defend and promote their own identity, often at the perceived expense of rival groups. The battles for territory and political and economic resources are conducted to win the overarching war to protect and promote group identities. In the face of perceived threats, the groups also respond by strengthening their own identities. Some instances of nationalism or ethno-nationalism, and religious and ideological fundamentalisms are extreme reactions to perceived identity threats. In some instances, the security of one’s identity requires the construction and denigration of an ‘other,’ leading to what Elisabeth Le called ‘spirals of anti-other rhetoric.’\(^{92}\) Rhetoric is another means of attacking and defending identity, which fuels the ‘action-reaction process…of escalating nationalisms.’\(^{93}\) Societal security or identity security captures these themes and dynamics.\(^{94}\)

Although this is not the place to respond to Lapid and Kratochwil’s call for a theory of ‘group differentiation’ or identity, it suffices to mention that identity is constituted by ideas and practices that help individuals identify themselves as members of one community and differentiate themselves from other groups. It enables ‘the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members’ of that community.\(^{95}\) What then are the acceptable referents of societal security? How does identity come into being? How can it be threatened and defended? The next section addresses these questions.

**The Logics of Vulnerabilities and Threats**

The Copenhagen School identifies ‘tribes, clans, nations (and nation-like ethnic units…), civilizations, religions and race’ as referent objects of societal security.\(^{96}\) This research will focus on ethno-national societies as referent objects of security. The issue of deciding what constitutes a viable society or identity group is subject to the debates about whether identity

\(^{91}\) Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213.


\(^{93}\) Roe 2004: 62; 69.


\(^{95}\) Ibid: 119.

\(^{96}\) Ibid: 123.
is objective, fixed and pre-existing (primordialist and/or perennialists) or invented/imagined and instrumentalist (modernists and social constructivists), as discussed below. It is also subject to the criticism of reifying identity. The Copenhagen School resolves this problem by arguing that while they subscribe to the constructivist notion of identity formation, there comes a ‘point where identities have become fortified to such an extent that they function as fixed in security discourse.’

Buzan and Hansen contend that this separation of identity construction from the phase when it becomes fixed and objective ‘social facts’ and conducive to scientific analysis is a legitimate analytical decision. Having established the referent objects of societal security and by implication the relevant security actors, we consider below the logics of vulnerability and threats in relation to societal security.

Insofar as identity is the chief value that a society seeks to secure, it perceives the vulnerability of and threats to its identity from three main sources: migration, horizontal competitions (cultural imperialism) and vertical competitions (assimilationist state policies or separatist movements). These are analytically distinct but practically overlapping phenomena that operate on a spectrum ranging from ‘intentional, programmatic and political at one end to unintended and structural at the other.’ Threats to identity can be both explicit programs of assimilation and suppression and interference in the reproduction of that identity across generations through migration and cultural influences.

First, large scale migration of people with different cultures would change the objective composition of the population and the cultural landscape of one’s homeland, raising fears of dilution of identity and assimilation. The Copenhagen School illustrates this with examples of Chinese migration to Tibet and Russian migration to Estonia, but the fears of many Americans over the threat of Hispanic immigration to American identity and the European fears of a Muslim exodus in the event of Turkey’s membership in the EU are emblematic of the insecurities that migration provokes even in apparently stable societies. Second, horizontal competition in the form of overriding cultural influences from other societies could also threaten identity. The fears of American popular culture expressed in

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98 Roe 1999: 47.
100 Buzan et al 1998: 121
101 Ibid.
various parts of the world and the fears of the English language in France are examples of perceived horizontal competition or ‘cultural imperialism.’

Third, vertical competitions in the form of assimilationist/integrationist projects conducted by the state or secessionist movements could set off identity insecurities among disgruntled minorities and the state/dominant groups respectively. Examples of the former are Tibetan interpretations of Chinese policies in Tibet, the Russians in Estonia and other Baltic states and the Quebecois in Anglophone Canada, while Quebec, Catalonia and Basque and Kurdistan exemplify how secessionist movements could render insecure the national identities of Canada, Spain and Turkey respectively. Finally, in certain circumstances, depopulation in the form of forced-sterilisation and ethnic cleansing can also become a societal security issue. In practice, these types of threats can be expressed and perceived in various combinations. For instance, the threat is magnified when migration and cultural imperialism are interpreted as deliberate programs of state policy.

However, the introduction of society as security referent objects, which entails the salience of non-state actors and identity, has been controversial. Neo-realists consider that unless they have military and political security implications, identity and sub-state actors do not fall under the purview of security studies. According to such analysts, it just obfuscates the clarity of the concept of security. From the other end of the theoretical divide—critical IR theory—William McSweeny charges that societal security is an intellectual fad and that the Copenhagen School’s treatment of identity is too ‘objectivist’ and ‘reifies’ society and identity. Buzan and team agree that identity is socially constructed, but they add that it is a case of ‘sedimentation’ which allows it to be treated more or less like an ‘object’ in the positivist sense. Michael Williams points out the Schmittian realist roots of CS—especially Schmitt’s politics of enmity and the concept of ‘the political’—and argues that McSweeny’s concerns about society and identity are largely misplaced. Smith maintains that the CS’s

103 John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, London and New York: Continuum, 1991. Note that cultural imperialism does not have to be directly expressed by and conducted through state policies.
107 Buzan and Waever 1997: 244.
innovations of societal security and securitisation are still state-centric and limits the understanding of developments such as September 11.\textsuperscript{109} In fairness to CS:

The Copenhagen School explicitly constituted this [societal security] as a middle position between traditionalist state-centrism [and the fixity and objectiveness of identity] on the one hand and equally traditional Peace Research’s and Critical Security Studies’ calls for individual or global security [and extreme fluidity of identity] on the other.\textsuperscript{110}

In any case, the analytical utility of the concept outweighs its residual state-centrism.

Indeed, the benefits of the analytical move of untying society from the state in security analysis is obvious from the empirical observation that (1) many politically significant societies do not have their own states (e.g. Palestinians, Kurds, Kashmiris, Sri Lankan Tamils, Tibetans and Uighurs), (2) oftentimes, the state is the chief threat to the security of large groups of people, especially in the recurrent context of one group controlling the resources and instruments of the state, (3) the emergence of sub-state, transnational and supra-national loci of loyalties at a time of eroding state-sovereignty.\textsuperscript{111}

However, one major shortcoming of societal security is its underdevelopment of the methods and instruments that societies wield to defend their identity. In relation to this, it might also be charged that it neglects the role of external players in the domestic societal security competitions. The following section considers this theme briefly.

\textit{Responding to Societal Insecurity}

The Copenhagen School writes that societal insecurity can be addressed through action taken by the society itself or by relying on the state to confront the perceived threats.\textsuperscript{112} Placing the onus of protecting identity on the state’s agenda through political legislation and regulation, of migration for instance, and military action is only possible if the ethno-national group in question controls the state or if the state is uniformly responsive to the interests of all ethnic groups within its territory. As mentioned above, more frequently than not, the state is the main source of threat to societal security, especially in the global south and multi-ethnic and multi-cultural countries. Hence, ethno-national groups have to provide their own security by trying to dominate the existing government, forming their own government, or through self-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Smith 2005: 32-33.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213; Roe 1999: 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Dannreuther 2007: 129-35; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213; Roe 1999: 43-44.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Buzan \textit{et al} 1998: 122.
\end{itemize}
reliance. Some insecure groups choose secession to set up their own state as the best guarantee of identity security. Thus societies pursue both domestic power-sharing and/or separatist goals to protect identities. In both their domestic and separatist efforts, these groups try to harness transnational and international forces to augment their options and resources against the state.

Roe also ponders the means and instruments that ethnic groups employ to achieve identity security. The means of defence depends on the nature of the threat. Quoting Robert Hayden’s insight that besides the dramatic cases of ethnic cleansing, legal and bureaucratic means could also be employed to ‘to bring about the same end: the elimination of the minority,’ Roe argues that ‘the countervailing measures are also likely to be non-military in nature.’ He adds that in the same way that defensive military postures could be interpreted as hostile by others in traditional security dilemma, the non-military defensive measures could be ambiguous enough to set off insecurities in other groups. What specifically are these non-military measures?

The Copenhagen School and Roe agree that one counter-measure against threats to one’s identity is cultural. This is neither a new phenomenon nor the exclusive insight of the Copenhagen School. Edward Said wrote that during colonialism, ‘Along with armed resistance in places as diverse as nineteenth century Algeria, Ireland and Indonesia, there also went considerable efforts in cultural resistance almost everywhere…’. This is also what cultural nationalism means: ‘the moral regeneration of the historic community…recreation of their distinctive civilisation’ and rejection of foreign practices. The Copenhagen School puts it more concretely. Culture can be defended with culture: ‘[i]f one’s identity seems threatened…the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes a security policy.’ However, societal security can be defended through conventional means too.

113 Ibid.
Ethnic and political nationalists, unlike cultural nationalists, seek to protect their identity not just through cultural regeneration, but also through control of an exclusive territory and state institutions.\footnote{Roe 1999: 64; Hutchinson 1994: 59-60.} Identity can also be defended through violence ranging from stone-pelting riots and demonstrations to terrorism to military action.\footnote{Roe 1999.} What the Copenhagen School and Roe ignore, however, is that ethnic groups can also engage in formal and informal alliances with a variety of transnational and international actors to secure their identities, as will be shown below.\footnote{Jenne 2007. Ayoob 1995: 50-51; Horowitz 1985: 230; Ayoob 1995: 50-51; Saideman 1998: 131; Saideman 1997: 721-53; Saideman 2002: 93-105; Lake and Rothschild 1998; Walter and Snyder 1999; Carment, David. “The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concept, Indicators and Theory,” \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1993.: 137-50; Smith, Koufa and Suppan 1991.}

Having used societal security to explicate the security practice of the internal ethno-national challengers to the state, the next section conceptualises the cyclical strategic dynamics--the core of the insecurity dilemma—through which it interacts with the state’s security practice.

\textbf{The Cyclical (Core) Dynamics of the Insecurity Dilemma}


As shown earlier, state-building by an insecure state sets off the insecurity dilemma by threatening the societal security interests of ethno-national groups. The insecurity of the state and the regime is attributable to the peculiar characteristics of states in the global south: state-weakness. Weak states are insecure as a legacy of colonialism, both capitalist and communist, due to their early-stage of state-making or state-building, and late entry into the state system.\footnote{Ayoob, 1983:84; Ayoob 1995; Buzan 1991; Glenn 1997; Job 1992.} Multi-cultural and multi-ethnic states are prone to existential insecurities. State-
Weakness and insecurity could also be self-induced in the case of empires that aspire to become nation-states after expanding into the homelands of other peoples. But what is distinctive about most weak states is that state-building replicates the European experience—hence, there are some similarities such as primitive despotism—but in a highly circumscribed environment and accelerated process. Consequently, as Buzan notes, ‘domestic violence is endemic in such states.’ As Ayoob, Weiner, Job and others contend, state-building in the global south is characterised by ‘hegemonic’ rather than ‘accommodative’ ethnic policies wielded by one dominant group for its own interests. As Ayoob noted:

> Most separatist movements arise from the fact that whereas Third World societies are overwhelmingly multi-ethnic in their composition, many Third World state elites deny this reality and attempt to construct mono-ethnic states…that are dominated by a single ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious group….

Hence, ‘[T]he character of many third world states encourages ethnic separatism.’ Myron Weiner concurs:

> Hegemonic rather than accommodative ethnic politics characterize the new states. In country after country, a single ethnic group has taken control over the state and used its power to exercise control over others…. In retrospect, there has been far less ‘nation-building’ than many analysts had expected or hoped, for the process of state-building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power and influence.

Job adds that ‘the regime in power…usually lacks the support of some significant component of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or social sector, or of an economic or military elite.’ The nature of state-building in these states is conducive of the insecurity dilemma as state and regime practices provoke insecurities in groups that do not share either the identity or the interests of the state. The resistance of these groups heightens the insecurity of the states, strengthening their state-building impetus. This cyclical action-reaction process of state-building and resistance is the dominant pattern of domestic politics in these countries.

As figure 1 shows state-building and societal response in the insecurity dilemma are not processually and temporally detached from each other. One side’s defensive action (state-
building or ethnic resistance) and the other side’s interpretation of these acts as threatening are processually simultaneous and mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, inasmuch as societal security is also a sector of state security (where the state, dominated by one ethnic group, mobilises that ethnic society to confront external and internal threats) and some groups seek to secede and establish their own states—this can be considered an early phase of ‘state-building’—state-building and societal response are not mutually exclusive provinces of the state and ethnic groups respectively. Thus, both in process and agency, state-building and societal security merge into each other at some level, but they can also be analytically separated to study their distinctive roles in the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. The key point to note here is that the dilemmatic mutuality between the state and adversarial ethnic groups keeps the insecurity dilemma cycling on.

A final question of critical import still remains. What generates the ‘dilemma’ in insecurity dilemma, if not anarchy? In other words, what mediates or conditions the tragic processing of threats and generation of insecurities between the state and its opponents? The answer is acute uncertainties about each other’s current and future intentions (which fosters fears for the future), which is tempered by historical experiences. Booth and Wheeler emphasise the ‘importance of the shadow of the past as well as future uncertainty in shaping how actors manage their dilemmas of interpretation and response….’ Lake and Rothchild agree:

...when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and, indeed, fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture.132

Vesna Pesic was more concise: ethnic strife is the product of the ‘fear of the future, lived through the past.’ Indeed, historical experience can either alleviate or exacerbate the fears that uncertainty produces.134

The distinguishing feature of the insecurity dilemma is that uncertainty is not necessarily generated by anarchy. Uncertainty or paucity of reliable information can also prey upon hierarchic structures. This has been abundantly documented in the literature on the

131 Booth and Wheeler 2008: 77-79.
134 Booth and Wheeler 2008: 77-78.
Principal-Agent (P-A) problem or ‘agency dilemma’ that deals with problems such as moral hazard, conflicts of interest, hidden action and hidden information and the so-called Madison’s dilemma between the principal (who hires) and the agent (who is paid to pursue the principal’s interests) under conditions of incomplete or asymmetric information in all manners of hierarchical relations in the domestic, transnational and international contexts. If formally contracted and mutually beneficial relations such as the P-A relationship are victims of mutual uncertainty, so will it prey upon conflictual ethnic relations in which a compact is either non-existent or has broken down. This is a salient point because the lack of attention on uncertainty in Job’s and Ayoob’s versions leads them to conflate the paradox for the dilemma. The real dilemma is in the inability of the state and adversarial groups to interpret each other’s current and future intentions and capabilities and to respond to each other’s security-driven actions. Insecure and unsure, worst-case calculations shape their policies and practices, hardens their positions and heighten the dilemma. This engenders credible commitment problems and the need for credible security guarantees. Even though structural conditions are different, the insecurity dilemma shares the tragic quality of the security dilemma through uncertainty. Theoretically, more benign options exist for both the state and its adversarial ethnic groups, but uncertainty compels them to play their tragic roles.

135 Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (eds.) Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Mark A. Pollack, ‘Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red Herrings, Theoretical Clarifications, and Empirical Disputes’ Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Delegating Sovereignty, Duke University, 3-4 March 2006; Jen-Erik Lane, Comparative Politics: the Principal-Agent Perspective, New York and Abingdon: New York, 2008; Robert W. Rauchhaus, ‘Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2009: 871–88; Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Krep, ‘Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,’ International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 11, 2010: 1–18. Built into the PA relationship is the propensity of the agent to maximise his/her interests through opportunistic use of ‘private information’ and the consequent potential of the principal to suffer so-called ‘agency losses’ and to incur further agency costs in undertaking efforts to mitigate agency losses’ some of which could be prohibitively high. As Kiewiet and McCubbins write, ‘In a wide variety of agency relationships, the agent possesses or acquires information that is either unavailable to the principal or prohibitively costly to obtain. The agent has incentives to use this information strategically or to simply keep it hidden…Another type of information that agents often have and principals do not is the agent’s type…. Situations in which agents acquire information that is not available to the principal pervade public policy making.’ D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991: 22-37.

The nature of state-building and the manner of societal response determine the severity of the insecurity dilemma. As figure 2 shows, theoretically, the state and its opponents are not restricted to hegemonic and assimilationist forms of state-building and resistance respectively. State-building can be inclusive and ethnic response tolerant. In practice, the nature of state-building and the manner of ethnic response would be anywhere on the spectrums bounded by these ideal-type behaviours. Yet, uncertainty and the worst-case thinking that it spawns push them towards imperial forms of state-building and resistance (fourth box in figure 2). The notations in the upper right corners in each box represent the outcomes for the state and the notations in the lower left corners stand for the outcomes for the ethnic groups.
Figure 2: Choices and Outcomes in the insecurity dilemma

External Factors in the Insecurity Dilemma

However, the above outcomes are rarely down only to the state and adversarial ethnic groups; external factors are frequently involved. Although Job’s conception of the insecurity dilemma underplays the role of external factors, in reality, they play strong roles in many internal conflicts.  

Erin Jenne has developed a theory of ‘triadic’ ethnic bargaining based on the fluid interactions among disgruntled minorities, host governments (which are often dominated by a majority ethnic group) and external patrons, whom she calls ‘lobby actors.’

As such, international actors (as in foreign states) and transnational actors (as in individuals, organisations and groups operating across state borders) have to be factored into the insecurity dilemma.

Indeed, just as states and regimes find allies in neighbouring regimes in regional security pacts to counter domestic opponents, the latter also forge links with other states, international organisations, norm entrepreneurs and ethnic kin, including diasporas, for economic, political, military and cultural support. Some scholars characterise ‘ethnic linkages


among people across state boundaries as functionally equivalent to alliances between two states.\footnote{Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, ‘Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy,’ in Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 89–103.} As such both the state and its internal rivals engage in balance of power strategies by seeking formal alliances and informal associations with external forces. The ability of non-state groups to forge links with foreign states and organisations depends upon the existence of sympathetic overseas ethnic kin and the quality of relations between the state in question and other states. Weak states with underdeveloped state identities or unstable institutions, regardless of their material capabilities, are vulnerable to external interventions, not just domestic subversion.\footnote{Buzan 1991: 113.} External vulnerabilities drive states to suppress internal opposition to begin with, but that creates more incentives for these groups to seek external support.

The salience of external forces in the insecurity dilemma also weakens Job’s contention that international norms protect the juridical sovereignty of weak states. Jackson also finds that ‘quasi-states…. often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities.’\footnote{Jackson 1990: 5.} While the legal sovereignty of states may sometimes be preserved by the material interests of other states, not just by prevailing international norms, all aspects of state sovereignty are routinely violated by both internal and external forces.\footnote{Stephen Krasner, \textit{Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999: 3-42.} Stephen Krasner wrote ‘that the principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always been violated….Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best understood as examples of organized hypocrisy.’\footnote{Ibid: 24.} Empirical confirmations of the violation of sovereignty are plentiful in world politics.

The extent of the domestic-international nexus in ethnic conflicts is evident from the research programs on their spread and impact on foreign policies and international security, and the propriety, timing and strategies of international interventions. While Ayoob is far more expansive than Job regarding the involvement of foreign states in internal conflicts, his state-centrist agenda crowds out the agency of non-state actors. Diasporas are one of these non-state transnational phenomena. Since other non-state actors such as the networks of transnational terrorist groups, norm entrepreneurs and civil society groups have received

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\footnote{Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, ‘Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy,’ in Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 89–103.}
\footnote{Buzan 1991: 113.}
\footnote{Jackson 1990: 5.}
\footnote{Ibid: 24.}
considerable attention, it is important to establish the links between diasporas and the insecurity dilemma.

### Diasporas in the Insecurity Dilemma

While diasporas have received significant interdisciplinary attention over the years, as demonstrated by the existence of a journal dedicated to its study—*Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*—international relations scholarship on the subject is sparse.\(^{147}\) The broader literature on diasporas is sharply divided on the definition and formation.\(^{148}\) The definitional schism centres on whether its categories should be outside the historical (Jewish) paradigm or should include a more comprehensive ‘vocabulary of transnationalism’.\(^{149}\) This dissertation adopts for working purposes Adamson and Demetriou’s definition:

> A diaspora can be defined as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links.\(^{150}\)

This definition transcends the orthodoxy of the Jewish paradigm, but also contains sufficient specifications to protect the concept from obfuscation. In sum, transnational ties of solidarity and loyalty to a parent-nation and homeland and the development of internal cohesion and organisational framework are central to the meaning of contemporary diasporas.

There is also a vigorous disagreement on the origins of diasporas centring on primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist theories.\(^{151}\) These contestations notwithstanding, what is important here is to examine how diasporas are relevant to the insecurity dilemma, which involves interrogating the relationship between diasporas and other collectivities such as states and nations and the conflicts that erupt at the borders of these competing loci of identity and loyalty.

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\(^{147}\) Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 503.


\(^{150}\) Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 497.

Indeed, diasporas are the quintessential ‘inter-mestic’ phenomena that serve as a conveyor belt between domestic and international politics. By definition and by virtue of their organisational and spatial logics, diasporas have one foot in their homeland through shared identity, economic and political influence, citizenship and political representation, and another foot in their host states through citizenship or residency status. This transnational location, buttressed by the forces of globalisation, has encouraged both non-state political entrepreneurs and state elites to engage in ‘coalition-building and political action…across national borders on a global, as well as a national and local, stage.’ The political salience of the diaspora in international relations is a result of complex interactions among the diaspora-sending (home) state and/or ethno-national groups within that state, diaspora-receiving (host) states, and the diasporas.

First, diasporas could be instruments in the foreign policies of host states. The spread of liberal-democratic values through interaction between diasporas and their homelands, conducting propaganda in shared language and appointing them to formal positions (in embassies, for instance) to deal directly with the government and citizens of their homeland in pursuit of the host-state’s interests are some of the ways in which the thesis of diasporas-as-foreign-policy-instruments works. Barack Obama’s appointment of Gary Locke as American ambassador to China and the use of Chinese journalists to broadcast news and analysis through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are illustrative. Second, home-state elites also use diasporas for economic and foreign policy purposes; hence, they try to strengthen and appeal to the shared identities with the diasporas. For instance, the Indian government’s celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Day of the Indians Abroad) and granting dual citizenship to Indians abroad in select countries in the 1990s are motivated by the economic benefits and security instrumentality of the Indian diaspora. In his inaugural speech on Pravasi Bharatiya Diya, then-Prime Minister Atal Behari Bajpayee acknowledged the Indian state’s ‘parental obligations’ towards the Indians abroad, praised their contribution to India’s growth, and recognised their ‘tireless championing of [India’s] cause’ whenever

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152 Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 498.
154 Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 491; Varadarajan 2010; Sheffer 2003.
‘India faced a threat to its security or territorial integrity.’ However, as King and Melvin show in their study of the ‘bleached diasporas’ of Russians, Ukrainians and Kazaks, who ended up in the wrong state after the collapse of the Soviet Union, home states face constraints in their ability to mobilise and use diasporas for foreign policy purposes. These constraints include the lack of domestic consensus over the utility of maintaining relations with the diasporas, competing foreign policy priorities within the home state, and the economic resources at its disposal to court the diaspora, the level of cultural and national solidarity and attachment to the homeland within the diaspora. The host-state also faces similar constraints. Third, diasporas maintain relations with the home states because of material interests or nationalist solidarity. This is not always a given as the level of ties differ from one case to another.

Here, we are talking about what Sheffer calls ‘state-linked diasporas’ whose homelands happen to be sovereign states controlled by parent-nations from which the diaspora became dispersed. Conversely, ‘state-less diasporas’ maintain cultural, political and economic ties with trans-border co-nationals whose homeland may be occupied and dominated by another state or ended up in the wrong state as result of colonialist cartography or other historical contingencies. These patterns of diaspora-state interaction provide clues to the agency of diasporas in foreign policy and international security, which has relevance to the insecurity dilemma.

Stephen Van Evera has hypothesized that war is more likely when states see diasporas and the territories that they live in as foreign policy issues. Kalevi Holsti argued that in the context of cultural and religious ties between elites and communities living across state borders, ‘reasons of affinity and sentiment rather than power…and hard-headed cost-benefit analyses’ determine state decisions on war and peace. This is especially the case when

155 Quoted in Varadarajan 2010: 108.
158 Ibid; Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 491.
violence between a co-ethnic/national or co-religious minority and the majority and/or dominant group in another state has broken out.\textsuperscript{161} Since the prevailing trend in much of the non-Western world is for one dominant ethnic/national group to monopolise the state and try to assimilate other groups, this condition is realised more often than not.\textsuperscript{162} Such identity-based cross-border ‘alliances’ and ‘state-sponsored irredentism’ render many multi-ethnic/national states insecure.

Diasporas are not passive and hapless victims or beneficiaries though. They are ‘independent actors’ in the security arena, actively campaigning as ‘ethnic lobbies’ and ‘advocates of multi-cultural foreign policy’ in the host-state, and to ‘democratize authoritarian homeland regimes’.\textsuperscript{163} Diasporas could be ‘advocators of peace processes’ or spoilers: ‘a major source of violence and instability in their homeland.’\textsuperscript{164} As such, diasporas play active roles in the insecurity dilemma by buttressing state-building in their home-state, supporting disgruntled co-nationals through material contribution domestically and lobbying and public relations efforts internationally. The case for external agency in domestic conflicts is strong indeed. The next logical question is whether and how the insecurity dilemma can be resolved or mitigated. The final section of this chapter ponders this important question.

**Can the Insecurity Dilemma be Resolved?**

A number of ways to alleviate ethnic conflicts have been prescribed in the burgeoning literature in this sub-field of international politics. They include (1) outright victory of one side, usually the state, (2) physical separation: secession and partition (3) democratisation, (4) third-party intervention and mediation and (5) power-sharing arrangements.

**Decisive Victory**


\textsuperscript{162} Brubaker 1996.

\textsuperscript{163} Shain and Barth 2003: 450-51.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
The decisive victory of one side results in the annihilation of the defeated side as a viable security actor. This mode of ending conflicts has been described as the historical norm and prescribed by reputable scholars.\(^{165}\) This is also the logic underlying Ayoob’s argument that the Third World states should be allowed to consolidate their state-making or state-building process, unencumbered by human, minority and self-determination norms.\(^{166}\) The implication is that the states should be allowed to militarily rout, politically neutralise and culturally assimilate adversarial groups to become coherent, stable and legitimate entities capable of effectively discharging their domestic and international obligations. Buzan also concludes that ‘the creation of stronger states is a necessary condition for both individual and national security… [even though it] may have negative consequences for the security of many individuals and groups caught up in the process.’\(^{167}\) For these analysts, domestic opponents of the state have to be sacrificed in the interests of stronger states, betraying the state-centrism of their scholarship.

The appeal of decisive victory is that it has been the historical norm and that it is longer lasting than negotiated settlements.\(^{168}\) Yet, apart from being normatively questionable for its neglect of human and collective rights, the outright victory premise is problematic on practical/empirical grounds. Left alone, internal wars drag on for decades, far longer than inter-state wars, with huge costs not just to the active combatants but also to innocent civilians.\(^{169}\) According to the Correlates of War (COW) database, internal conflicts last almost twice as long as inter-state wars.\(^{170}\) As Toft finds,

> [T]he combination of the proliferation of weak states, refinements in insurgency strategy, and the wide distribution of small arms has made it relatively more difficult for even well-supplied and well-led combatants to achieve victory. Meanwhile, the damage from civil wars has become more difficult to contain, as guns and fighters flow across borders and disrupt trade and the domestic politics of neighboring states.\(^{171}\)


\(^{166}\) Ayoob 1995.

\(^{167}\) Buzan 1991: 106.

\(^{168}\) Crocker *et al*, 2006: 127.

\(^{169}\) Jenne 2007: 1.


\(^{171}\) Toft 2010: 8.
Indeed, wars frequently spread internationally with dire consequences for regional and international security, instead of ending with one side’s quick and decisive victory.\(^{172}\) In any case, in today’s globalised and inter-dependent world, turning a blind eye to the ravages of internal conflicts until one side is completely defeated is not an easy option any more.

**Secession and Partition**

Another set of solutions that focus on physically separating the adversarial groups is partitioning of the groups into territorially defensible enclaves or even separate states (secession).\(^{173}\) Arguing that other measures do not address the ‘fundamental security dilemmas’, Chaim Kaufmann prescribed that the ‘international community should endorse separation as a remedy for at least some communal conflicts; otherwise the processes of war will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost.’\(^{174}\) Like outright victory, separation is also seen as a more lasting solution. However, separation and partition have bad images in the age of the state, especially in the face of the historical record of partition in places like India, Palestine, Ireland and Cyprus. There are three main reasons for this: (1) separation and violence creates more violence and suffering for innocent civilians. (2) They spawn new conflicts, which spread internationally. (3) They result in culturally insular ‘rump states’ with autocratic governments.\(^{175}\) Fearon argued that separation and partitioning through international intervention only encourage other separatist movements and that the norm of partition will make all the states insecure with destabilising implications for the state-system.\(^{176}\) Since outright victories and separation are too costly, practically difficult and potentially counter-productive, political agreements and institutional solutions have been increasingly pursued.

**Democratisation**

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\(^{172}\) Lake and Rothchild 1998.


\(^{174}\) Kaufmann 1999: 223.

\(^{175}\) Ibid: 223-24.

\(^{176}\) Fearon 2004: 394.
Democratisation or political liberalisation has become a popular response to internal conflicts, especially after the Cold War.\textsuperscript{177} This is a variant of the democratic peace thesis of international relations, which posits that democratic states do not fight other democracies, although they are as likely to go to war with authoritarian states as the latter are with democracies and other autocratic states.\textsuperscript{178} The pacific nature of democracies is attributed to (1) the norms and cultures of peaceful dispute resolution through dialogue, compromise, cooperation, tolerance and reciprocity, (2) the institutional and structural constraints such as the requirement to mobilise broad-based support of the citizenry to legitimise the war, the requirement of vertical and horizontal accountabilities and checks and balances, and (3) the knowledge and perception of the leaders that other democracies are subject to the same norms and constraints.\textsuperscript{179} The domestic version of the democratic peace theory states sees democracies as more internally peaceful because ‘social conflicts that might become violent are resolved through voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation.’\textsuperscript{180}

However, democracy has also been seen as part of the problem, if not the problem, in ethnic conflicts. Jack Snyder argued that elites threatened by democratic transition and ethnic entrepreneurs could exploit ethnic differences and conflicts to stay in power and protect their privileges, especially in the early phase of democratisation.\textsuperscript{181} Democracy could also exacerbate old social cleavages and open up new ones in multi-ethnic/cultural societies because of its emphasis on competition and freedom of expression, especially when existing institutions are not able to handle new societal demands.\textsuperscript{182} This is especially likely when the crucial democratic institutions such as political parties and civil society are organised along

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid: 30-40.
\textsuperscript{180} R. J. Rummel quoted in Paris 1997: 60.
\textsuperscript{182} Paris 1997: 74-75.
narrow tribal, caste, ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. One scholar went so far as to argue that ‘murderous [ethnic] cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of democracy.’ His specific thesis is that both liberal and socialist ideals of democracy have brought about instances of ‘murderous cleansing’ because the demos have become associated with ethnicity and the proletariat respectively. This makes minority ethnicities and classes victims of genocidal pogroms. As democratization could sometimes exacerbate the insecurity dilemma rather than resolve it, its utility in resolving ethnic conflicts is ambiguous to say the least. Yet, democracy does provide various options for the institutionalisation of power-sharing principles, as discussed below, to mitigate the insecurity dilemma.

**Third Party Mediation**

Third party mediation and credible power-sharing arrangements require neither the annihilation of one side nor the break-up of an existing state, but they target head on the uncertainties and mutual insecurities by providing information and security guarantees to both combatants. As Rothchild and Lake argued:

> Where ethnic groups possess effective safeguards, share pacific expectations, and feel secure in their relationship with the state and each other, intergroup competition tends to be constructive. Ethnic leaders are not fearful for their group’s future and can operate within existing political institutions to maximise group interests…. But where safeguards, shared norms, and pragmatic perceptions are absent, the prevailing incentive structure may encourage ethnic leaders to adopt damaging courses of action.

Germane to this argument is the credible commitment problem. Under conditions of uncertainty, groups cannot commit to a negotiated settlement or adhere to a signed agreement because they fear deception and post-settlement exploitation—‘defection’ in the language of the prisoner’s dilemma—and annihilation as a political community. To overcome these

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185 Ibid: 3.
187 Rothchild and Lake in Lake and Rothchild 1999: 204.
fears, designing credible security guarantees against such threats is paramount, with particular attention to ‘the needs of those who feel vulnerable to the majority-backed state.’\(^{189}\) The challenge ‘is to keep the minority/ies from losing.’\(^{190}\) Third party mediation and power-sharing institutional adaptation are the most commonly prescribed security guarantees.

Third party mediation can reassure the groups that they will be ‘protected, violations detected, and promises kept’ through verification and punitive use of countervailing force, or ‘a package of carrots and sticks.’\(^{191}\) In addition, third parties can help mitigate uncertainty by providing information that the adversaries would otherwise have incentives to conceal from each other.\(^{192}\) However, international mediation is not always possible and effective or even desirable, but power-sharing agreements could serve similar purposes.

**Power-Sharing: Consociationalism, Federalism and Autonomy**

Power-sharing and power division arrangements instil confidence and a sense of self-direction in terms of interests and identity, which is crucial for mitigating insecurities. Power-sharing and power division can be both horizontal in the sense of proportional representation and distribution of administrative power in consensus or consociational democracy,\(^{193}\) and vertical in the sense of centre-periphery division and sharing of power in federal and autonomous set-ups.\(^{194}\) Power-sharing is achievable in democratic as well as authoritarian contexts and institutional adaptation is crucial in both. Institutionally, there is a scholarly consensus in the democratisation literature that divided societies are more stable and peaceful if (1) power is decentralised or devolved, (2) the political system is parliamentary rather than presidential—within parliamentary systems, proportional representation is preferable to the Westminster system—and (3) there are adequate checks and balances to ensure both

\(^{189}\) Rothchild and Lake 1999: 205.  
\(^{191}\) Walters 2002: 26; Walters in Walters and Snyder 1999: 46; Rothchild and Lake 1998: 222.  
\(^{192}\) Lake and Rothchild 1999: 11-13. Some cases of third party mediation include the mediations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Yugoslavia.  
\(^{194}\) Walters 1999: 46-47; Rothchild and Lake 1998: 207-211; Zartman in Lake and rothchild 1999: 324
horizontal and vertical accountability.\textsuperscript{195} The cumulative effect of these various security guarantees is ‘injecting an important degree of predictability and structure to the competitive process.’\textsuperscript{196} The upshot is that these measures mitigate the insecurities arising from uncertainty and help overcome the mistrust generated by historical experience. For these reasons, power-sharing will be central to my discussion of the possible ways out of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma.

Conclusion
This chapter began by mapping the conceptual terrain of the insecurity dilemma, beginning with the traditional notion of the security dilemma. After discussing the various ways in which it has been adapted to analyse intra-state conflicts and the associated problems, the insecurity dilemma was introduced and developed as a theoretical framework for analysing intra-state conflicts with special attention on ethnic conflicts. The resultant analysis of the mutually-directed security practices of the state and its internal adversaries reveals a cyclical, action-reaction conceptualisation of the insecurity dilemma. Finally, the chapter considered some ways to alleviate the insecurity dilemma. The next chapter traces the origins of the insecurity dilemma in Tibet to the nationalist Chinese re-imagining and aspiration to construct a modern Chinese ‘nation-state’ out of the Qing Empire, and its legacy right up to the founding of the PRC in 1949.


\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
Chapter 3

The Long (Historical) March to the Insecurity Dilemma

This dissertation postulated the contemporary Sino-Tibetan conflict as an insecurity dilemma. However, Sino-Tibetan relations date back to the 7th century. Is this history relevant to the present? At what point in this history did the insecurity dilemma emerge? This chapter will show that Sino-Tibetan relations since the 13th Century was more complicated than Beijing and Dharamsala would like to admit. History is highly contested and politically mobilised wherever nations and states are in conflict. The history of the Sino-Tibetan relations is no exception. Beijing claims: ‘For more than 700 years the central government of China has continuously exercised sovereignty over Tibet, and Tibet has never been an independent state.’ Tibetan independence was a mere ‘fiction of the imperialists.’ Some Chinese accounts assert Chinese control over Tibet since the 7th century and characterise embassies of the Tibetan emperors visiting the Chinese courts as tribute missions. Dharamsala counters that when Communist Chinese forces ‘invaded’ Tibetan areas in 1949, ‘Tibet was an independent state in fact and at law.’ The Tibetans argue that after the disintegration of the Tibetan empire, Tibetan regions came under varying degrees and durations of control by Mongols, Gorkhas of Nepal, Manchus and British India, but the association of Tibetan rulers with the Mongols and Manchus ‘was personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with, or into, a Chinese state.’ These divergent interpretations of history have significant bearing on contemporary affairs.

A sticking point in the currently floundering Sino-Tibetan dialogue is Beijing’s precondition that the Dalai Lama should publicly announce that Tibet has been historically an integral and inalienable part of China. The Dalai Lama has resisted such a step, claiming that re-writing Tibetan history for current politics is tantamount to lying. Since history casts such

1 Sperling 2004; Powers 2004.
3 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
a long shadow over Tibet’s present and future, it is crucial to get a proper perspective into it. The insecurity dilemma will be the organising frame of this history.

Due to space constraints, this abridged history will begin with the Mongol conquest of Tibet and China in the 13th century. To be sure, between 618 to 843 AD, the Tibetan Yarlung Dynasty and the Chinese Tang Dynasty actively competed for territorial expansion, strategic superiority, imperial prestige and civilizational parity, resulting in ‘almost constant conflict and periodic attempts at peace-making’ through warfare, diplomacy and matrimonial and balancing alliances.7 In total 15 military conflicts, 7 ‘sworn treaties’ and two matrimonial alliances were conducted between the two empire.8 Yihong Pan noted that the treaties of 783 and 821/822 resemble a ‘modern day treaty concluded between sovereign equals.’9 In 842, when the last Tibetan emperor was assassinated by a Buddhist monk, Tibet entered into what is called the ‘time of fragmentation (ཁྲ་སྤྲད་ཁྲེན་པོའི་)’ or fragmentation (ཁྲ་སྤྲད་ཁྲེན་པོ།),10 lasting from 869 to 1264. In China, the Song Dynasty (960-1260) replaced the Tang. In both fragmented Tibet and Song China, cultural flowering in religion, philosophy, art, literature, medicine and scientific achievements replaced military conquest and the two peoples were politically isolated from each other.11 In any case, Song China was a ‘diplomatic peer’ of Vietnam, Nanzhao, Tibet, Xixia, and the Qidian Liao.12 As such the insecurity dilemma is not relevant to this period.

**Tibet and China in the Mongol Empire**

However, when Tibet and China were enjoying periods of cultural advancement, deep in the steppes of Mongolia, a force of unprecedented strength was gathering pace. By 1206, Chinggis Khan had unified the perennially warring Mongol tribes and begun to expand in all

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9 Pan 1992: 152.
directions. His four sons and grandsons divided his sprawling empire into four khanates corresponding to Persia, Southern Russia, Central Asia and East Asia. The East Asian part of the empire passed into the hands of Ginggis’ third son, Ogodei (1229-1241), his son Mongke (1251-1259) and Khubilai (1260-1294) until the Ming Dynasty drove the Mongols out of China. Ogodei conquered the Jin Dynasty in 1234. Khubilai Khan, arguably Ginggis’ most able grandson, declared himself emperor of China in 1271, taking the dynastic title of Yuan, although it took him until 1279 to conquer the Chinese Song Dynasty. This was the first time in history when the relationship between Tibet and a regime in Beijing became structurally possible for a process like the insecurity dilemma to take root.

Beijing claims that Tibet became an integral part of China during the Yuan Dynasty. Dharamsala, as noted above, deny that relations with the Mongols integrated Tibet into a Chinese state. A TGIE publication on Mongol-Tibetan relations, which they characterise as a Patron-Priest Relationship (PPR) or Cho-Yon (チョヨン), asserts:

This unique central Asian symbiosis entailed the protection and making of offerings by the secular patron to his spiritual teacher and master, in return for religious teachings and the bestowal of spiritual protection and blessings by the lama to his patron. This was in no way a relationship between a ruler and his subject.

Dharamsala questions the Chineseness of the Mongols, and argues that Tibetan-Mongol relations predated the Mongol conquest of China, and that Tibetan-Mongol PPR was unique among the relationships that the Mongols maintained with their conquered domains.

Tibetan princes and lamas pledged to pay annual tributes to Ginggis Khan in 1207 and Tibet was spared from military invasion and the consequent destruction that many other countries suffered at the hands of the marauding Mongol hordes. Having come across Tibetan Buddhists in the kingdom of Xixia, Kotan Khan, a Mongol ruler in present day Gansu province, invited Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltse, the most famous Tibetan Buddhist teacher of the day, to his court in 1244. Sakya Pandita arrived at Kotan’s court with two young nephews in 1246 and died there in 1251. Kapstein posits that Tibet was incorporated into the Mongol empire in 1252, when Mongke Khan, who became the Great Khan or supreme

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid: 121.
18 DIIR 1996b: 19.
19 DIIR 1996b.
21 Ibid.
lord of the entire Mongol empire, dispatched a military expedition into Tibet. By that time, various Mongols princes were allying with different Tibetan Buddhist sects, with a view to gaining spiritual influence in exchange for military protection.

One of Sakya Pandita’s nephews, Dogon Choegal Phagpa, was appointed Khubilai Khan’s Imperial Preceptor and made the ruler of Tibet in 1264 after Khubilai himself became Great Khan in 1260. This grant was made in return for Phagpa’s tantric Buddhist teachings to the imperial family and other services such as inventing a new script for use with the Mongolian language and for imperial bureaucracy. Although luminaries from other the sects of Tibetan Buddhism were still being courted by other Mongol princes, the Sakya sect emerged dominant by virtue of Phagpa’s role and Khubilai’s patronage.

The peculiar relationship that evolved between Khubilai and Phagpa came to be known in Tibetan sources as Cho-Yon (Priest-Patron) or Yon-Cho (Patron-Priest) relationship. This is an important concept as a similar relationship later developed between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors. Some Tibetan and Mongol lamas also participated in a limited form of PPR with Nationalist China. PPR became a distinct Tibetan political ideology that informed their relations with foreign powers for centuries.

Dharamsala’s denials notwithstanding, Mongol-Tibetan relationship did have an element of political subordination. As Powers observed, ‘it was a relationship of dependence and subordination.’ This is evidenced by the administrative reforms introduced by the Mongols in Sakya-ruled Tibet. TGIE interprets these administrative interventions as ‘part of the protection and assistance which the patron offered to the priest. It did not entail or imply Mongol rule of Tibet.’ PPRs were actually more complicated than such Tibetan contentions or the rival Chinese assertions of sovereignty (imputing modern Western political concepts back to medieval Asian relations). There were times when PPRs entailed political subordination, but also times when there was no political substance. Moreover, PPRs also developed between specific monasteries and teachers and lay Tibetan rulers or wealthy families without any political content.

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22 Ibid: 111.
23 Ibid; DIIR 1996b: 10.
24 Ibid: 112.
25 Ibid.
26 Sperling 2004: 30.
28 Kapstein 2006: 114.
29 DIIR 1996b: 19.
With the declining Mongol power in China, the fortunes of Sakya as a power centre in Tibet also suffered and in 1350, one of the governors, Changchup Gyaltse, overthrew Sakya/Mongol rule and established the Phagmodrupa Dynasty in Central and Western Tibet, roughly equivalent to modern day TAR.\textsuperscript{31}

Does the political subordination of Tibet to the Yuan Dynasty mean that Tibet became an integral part of China, as the Chinese assert? Tibet was a ‘vassal state,’ a ‘separate subjugated country’ of the Mongol empire enjoying ‘full...autonomy or self-rule,’ but not an integral part of China.\textsuperscript{32} The basis for this conclusion is (1) that Tibet was simply not included as part of China in the official dynastic records of the Yuan Dynasty, (2) and the vagueness and inconsistencies in modern Chinese sources, official and otherwise, on the date and circumstances of Tibet’s and China’s incorporation into the Mongol empire and the nature of Mongol rule over Tibet.\textsuperscript{33} Tibet was ruled through the Sakya Tibetan clerics much like Korea, Burma, Vietnam and other vassals were ruled by native kings while China and other conquered countries were ruled directly by the Mongols. When the historians of the succeeding Ming dynasty wrote the dynastic history of the Yuan, as was the practice in imperial China, they excluded Tibet from Chinese territory.\textsuperscript{34}

Another feature of Mongol-Tibetan relations of that time is that far from posing an existential threat to Tibetan culture, the Mongols allowed Tibetans to govern themselves according to their traditions, patronised Tibetan Buddhism and appointed Tibetans to the post of Imperial Preceptor, which was advantageous for the propagation of Tibetan Buddhism. As such, the Tibetans tolerated Mongol/Yuan over-lordship and valued the imperial patronage for their culture. Jangchup Gyaltse’s rebellion in 1350 was more an internal Tibetan sectarian ouster, inasmuch as he supported the Kagyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism and Mongol influence in Tibet by then was only nominal.

Eighteen years after the Tibetans, the Chinese drove out the Mongols and established the native Ming Dynasty.\textsuperscript{35} Ming-Tibetan relations were even more tenuous and Sino-Tibetan relations after the Yuan dynasty reverted back to the mutual isolation of the Song era. In much of Tibet, the Phagmodrupa dynasty ruled until 1434. The next one hundred years were characterised by internecine warfare between power centres based in Lhasa and Tsang, which

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\textsuperscript{31} Norbu 2001: 56.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Sperling 2004: 25. The map of Ming China at its zenith in Fairbank and Goldman 1999: 131 attests to this point.
\textsuperscript{35} Fairbank and Goldman 1999: 128.
patronised the Geluk and Kagyu sects respectively.\textsuperscript{36} Eventually, the Geluk and Kagyu forces reached out to Mongol adherents of their sects to militarily resolve the stalemate. This conflict dragged on until 1642, when the 5\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama and his Qoshot Mongol ally, Gushri Khan, emerged victorious over the Kagyu and Chogthu Mongols.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus another period of PPR between a Tibetan Lama and a Mongol ruler began. Eastern Tibet maintained tribute-cum-trade relations with the Ming but were politically governed by Tibetan lamas and native chieftains.\textsuperscript{38} Ming China and Central Tibet remained politically isolated from each other, although spiritual relations developed between some lamas and Ming emperors.

To be sure, the Ming dynasty pretended to have inherited Yuan ‘rule’ over Tibet, creating offices ostensibly to administer Tibet and granting titles to Tibetan lamas.\textsuperscript{39} However, the writ of these offices was confined to the Tibetan periphery and they were not ‘part of the political power structure of Tibet.’\textsuperscript{40} The titles were not meant to confer prestige, recognition or political authority as the lamas were already highly regarded and did not require Ming recognition. Tsongkapha, the most famous lama of the day repeatedly turned down Emperor Chengzu’s invitations. The Ming interest in Tibetan lamas was also predicated upon the need to manage the still formidable and Buddhist Mongol tribes from threatening China.\textsuperscript{41} In short, Tibet was not part of Ming China. As Sperling contends, ‘[t]here was no Ming political authority over Tibet—no ordinances, laws, taxes etc., imposed inside Tibet by the Ming.’\textsuperscript{42} The Ming Dynasty eventually succumbed to a combination of internal demoralisation and the Manchu onslaught giving way to the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Tibet and China in the Manchu Empire}

The next crucial phase in Sino-Tibetan relations, more appropriately Qing-Tibetan relations, was more chequered from the perspective of political and cultural practices: early Qing-Tibetan relations resembled the symbiotic arrangement characteristic of Yuan-Tibetan relations, while the late Qing policies became more politically integrationist and culturally

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Norbu 2001: 57.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid: 65-6.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Smith 2008: 7.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Sperling 2004: 27.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Fairbank and Goldman 1999: 143-5.
\end{itemize}
assimilationist, provoking violent Tibetan resistance and nationalism, in both Lhasa and eastern Tibet.

Manchu-Tibetan relations predated the Manchu takeover of Beijing in 1644. The pre-dynastic Manchu rulers, Nurhaci and Abahai had converted to Tibetan Buddhism, specifically the Sakya sect, and patronised it decades before conquering China.\(^{44}\) The Manchus had come under the influence of Tibetan Buddhism as an externality of the religious-political exchanges between Tibetans and Chahar Mongols whose homeland bordered Manchuria. Nurhaci and Abahai appointed Tibetan Buddhists of Mongol ancestry as royal teachers and advisors.\(^{45}\) Shortly after the Manchus captured Beijing, the 5\(^{th}\) Dalai Lama established PPR with the Qing dynasty and visited Beijing in 1652-1653, meeting emperor Shunzhi.\(^{46}\)

Dharamsala asserts that Qing-Tibetan PPR did not connote political subordination of Tibet to China.\(^{47}\) Beijing on the other hand claims that the Qing inherited unbroken ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet from the Yuan and Ming dynasties.\(^{48}\) Tibet’s status during the Qing was more ambiguous than either representation.

At the height of its power, the Qing dynasty exerted considerable administrative and political control over Tibet, clearly proving political subordination. The Qing gained political leverage in Tibet during the interregnum between the deposition and death of the 6\(^{th}\) Dalai Lama, who disappointed the Tibetan and Mongol elite with his bohemian life-style, and the installation of the 7\(^{th}\) Dalai Lama in 1720 with Manchu backing. The young 7\(^{th}\) Dalai Lama was escorted to Lhasa by a Manchu army, the first of a number of Manchu military and administrative interventions in Tibet. Around 1725, Tibet’s administration was reformed whereby the Regent (ས་དག) was replaced by the Council of Ministers or Kashag ( IURO) under the supervision of the Dalai Lama. A Qing representative known as the Amban was also posted in Lhasa.\(^{49}\) When Tibet was invaded by Nepal in 1792-94, a Qing army marched into Tibet for the second time to help dislodge the invaders, leading to another round of


\(^{49}\) Norbu 2001: 76; Smith 2008: 7; The Ambans and Assistant Ambans had always been a Manchu or Mongol until the early 20\(^{th}\) century when the balance of bureaucratic power shifted in favour of the Chinese.
administrative and political adjustments: Tibet’s border defence and foreign relations were to be handled by the *Amban* and the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to be chosen by drawing lots from a golden urn. These reforms were promulgated as ‘Regulations for Resolving Tibetan Matters’ in 1793. From this peak, Qing influence and Tibetan observance of the regulations waned to the point of irrelevance. The golden urn fell into disuse and the Tibetans rejected Qing interference in Tibetan foreign affairs.

As such, Tibet was neither an integral part of China as PRC officials and Chinese historians assert nor completely independent. Tibet’s status vis-à-vis the Qing is better described as a vassal or protectorate, neither an integral part of China nor its political equal. Britain’s characterisation of China’s position in Tibet at that time as ‘suzerain’ and Tibet’s status as an ‘autonomous State’ with control over its own foreign and defence matters reflects this ambiguity. Yet, studying the evolution of that relationship over time is instructive in terms of the relevance of the insecurity dilemma.

The first half of the Qing period was characterised by friendship, mutual respect and benefit for both polities. Even before the Qing conquest of Beijing, the Qing emperors showered Tibetan Lamas and monastic communities with reverence, patronage and protection. When the 5th Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1652-1653, he was received with great imperial ceremony and honour which was unique among the many Qing vassals of that time. As Tuttle wrote:

Qing imperial support for (and attempts to control) Dge lugs pa [Gelukpa] Tibetan Buddhism in Central Tibet, Amdo, Khams, Mongolia, and localities such as Wutaishan (Tib. Rib o tse lnga) and Jehol led to an unprecedented expansion of Tibetan Buddhism outside the confines of the Tibetan cultural region.

Far from undermining Tibetan identity, the Qing Dynasty put in place rules and practices to protect it from Chinese and other cultures. The Qing also provided Tibet security from external dangers as the above-mentioned response to the Nepalese invasion demonstrates. However, the level of Qing patronage ‘waned and vanished’ as the dynasty weakened in the

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51 Smith 2008: 8.
52 Sperling 2004: 30; Smith 2008: 8; Norbu 2001: 78-80.
56 Tutte 2006: 84.
57 For details, see Ibid: 32-3.
19th century.\textsuperscript{58} Ironically, Qing weakness also gave rise to more coercive practices and assimilationist policies towards the Tibetans.

\textit{Han Ascendance, Assimilationism and Rebellion}

This turn of events happened in the context of the rise of Han Chinese in the Qing bureaucracy including on Tibetan affairs,\textsuperscript{59} and their adoption of Western political ideas such as nationalism, territoriality, statehood and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{60} The Great Game in Tibet between British-India and Czarist Russia, which resulted in the British invasion of Tibet in 1904 and the first exile of the 13th Dalai Lama to Mongolia, engendered insecurities in Beijing and gave an external stimuli for the increasingly hard-line approach towards the Tibetans.\textsuperscript{61} A combination of insecurity and ideological shifts and internal and external structural transformations gave rise to more assimilationist policies towards Tibet during the dying decades of the Qing dynasty.

The British invasion, described as an ‘inglorious chapter’\textsuperscript{62} and a ‘Pyrrhic victory’\textsuperscript{63} provoked deep insecurities in Beijing.\textsuperscript{64} The Han Chinese governor of Sichuan province said: ‘Tibet is a buttress in our national frontiers—the hand, as it were, which protects the face—and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China.’\textsuperscript{65} The Qing dynasty, increasingly fronted by nationalistic Chinese officials, took drastic last-gasp measures to integrate Tibet administratively and culturally with China.\textsuperscript{66}

In 1903, the governor of Sichuan petitioned the Qing court for permission to bring in Chinese colonists to develop the mining and agricultural industries in the Tibetan regions of Sichuan (Kham). When the British invaded Central Tibet, the above program was quickly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid: 84.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Fairbank and Goldman 1999: 198-233; Jonathan D. Spence, \textit{The Search for Modern China}, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990: 143-238; Hsiao-Ting Lin, \textit{Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethno-Politics}, Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006: 8. Specific events contributing to the Manchu decline included incursions by the imperialist Treaty Powers\textsuperscript{59} and Opium War (1839-1842),\textsuperscript{59} the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), the Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901) and defeat by Japan in 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Spence 1990: 230-8; Tuttle 2005: 43-7; Norbu 2001: 91-4. The Chinese nationalists re-imagined the Qing Empire as a territorial and sovereign nation-state in the Westphalian sense and began to reorder the relationship between Tibet and China in that image.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Kapstein 2006: 170.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Goldstein 1989: 46.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid: 46-7; Powers 2004: 83-4; Tuttle 2005: 43-4; Norbu 2001: 164.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Quoted in Tuttle 2005: 44; Norbu 2001: 164 quotes the Sichuan governors as warning that ‘Tibet...is like the backdoor to a house. If the door is opened wide, robbers will flock into the apartment.’ Another Chinese official compared Tibet and China to the lips and the teeth respectively: ‘the teeth will feel cold when the lips have gone.’
\item \textsuperscript{66} Lin 2006: 9; Tuttle 2005: 43-7.
\end{itemize}
expanded all over Kham, whereby the autonomy of the traditional Tibetan rulers was abolished and direct Chinese rule established, the number of monks in monasteries reduced and the recruitment of monks banned for 25 years, and land was granted for French Catholic missions in Batang. The Tibetans rose up in violent resistance in which the Chinese official responsible for these policies, Feng Chuan, and his entourage and two French missionaries were killed. After a bloody suppression of the rebellion and the destruction of the Batang monastery, Zhao Erfeng was appointed to carry on the task of pacifying and integrating Kham into China.

The integrationist design is clear from Zhao’s enforcement of a set of regulations in Kham, starting in Batang. According to these regulations, (1) all inhabitants of Batang were subjects of the Chinese Emperor and subject to Chinese magistrates, (2) all taxes were to be paid to the Chinese, (3) traditional taxes to Tibetan rulers were abolished and (4) the Tibetans there were subject to Chinese laws. In addition to these political and legal measures, he gave

...protection and assistance to Chinese settlers...promoted [Chinese] education to change Tibetan customs and regulated those customs that differed from the customs of China, from marriage and funeral arrangements to sexual relations, clothing and hygiene.

Zhao placed the control of Tibetan monasteries in the hands of Chinese officials and curtailed the building of new monasteries. In another manifestation of the ideological influence of the West on Chinese elites, Zhao modelled his policies and practices on the colonial ventures of Western countries and Japan.

In central Tibet, the Ambans and their deputies had always been Manchus or Mongols in the past. However, by the time of the British invasion, Han Chinese Ambans and assistants were posted in Lhasa. These Chinese nationalists not only desired to put all of Tibet under direct Chinese rule, but also attempted to sinicise Tibet’s administration and culture. One Amban, Chang Yintang, who came to Tibet in 1906, was called ‘nosey Amban’ (擤鼻).

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69 Communique from Goffe to the British minister in China, dated 29 December, 1906, cited in Goldstein 1989: 47.
70 Tuttle 2005: 46.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid: 46.
74 Tuttle 2005: 43; McKay 1997: 33.
because of his intrusiveness in Tibetan politics. In 1908, Zhao Erfeng, then governor of Sichuan was appointed *Amban* in Lhasa to replicate his programs of administrative integration and cultural assimilation all over Tibet. Although his appointment was withdrawn in 1909, the *Ambans* in Lhasa took advantage of the absence of the Dalai Lama, who was in exile following the British invasion, to attempt similar measures in Central Tibet.

They planned to raise and train a large army (separately from the Tibetan army), secularise the Tibetan government, build road and telegraph lines and exploit resources. A Chinese school and a military college were also opened in Lhasa in 1907 and 1908 respectively. In 1909 the Dalai Lama reached Beijing and had audiences with the Emperor and Empress Dowager, where he was given an unprecedentedly demeaning title ‘Our Loyal and Submissive Vice-Regent,’ and was instructed to ‘obey the laws of the Sovereign State China’ and to ‘follow the established custom of memorializing us, through the Imperial *Amban*, and respectfully await our will.’

The policies and practices of the Chinese officials on the ground, even as the Dalai Lama was returning to Lhasa from Beijing, contradicted the assurances of continued patronage of Tibetan Buddhism and better treatment of Tibetans, which he thought the Manchu Emperor and Dowager had given him. On his way to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama learned that Chinese troops were advancing towards Lhasa and once safely inside Tibet, he wrote letters to Britain, Russia, France and Japan to ‘cause the withdrawal of the Chinese troops.’ He also wrote to the Manchu Emperor that ‘big worms are eating little worms... Please recall the Chinese officer and troops who recently arrived in Kham. If you do not do so, there will be trouble.’ When The Dalai Lama reached Lhasa on 25 December, 1909, he was reassured by the *Amban* that the Chinese force was only a small contingent for patrolling the trade marts. The Dalai Lama learned that he had been duped when a much larger Chinese forced entered Lhasa. He fled again, this time to India, and lived in exile in Darjeeling from

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76 Goldstein 1989: 47.
77 Ibid.
78 Teichman 1922: 14-15.
80 Goldstein 1989: 49.
1910 to 1912. The Qing court responded by deposing him again from both his spiritual and political offices.\(^{82}\)

The late Qing policies, husbanded by Chinese nationalists such as Zhao Erfeng, clearly fall under the rubric of state-building: ‘modern China’s first state building attempt in its south-west border regions.’ \(^{83}\) The state-building impetus was aroused by the insecurities emanating from Tibet, not the least on account of the 1904 British invasion. China’s insecurities and state-building impetus were shaped by western political ideas and the rise of the Chinese in the Qing officialdom. The most salient features of the state-building programme were attempts to replace the institutional and cultural contexts which worked well for Yuan-Tibetan and early Qing-Tibetan relations: abrogating Tibetan autonomy and attempting cultural assimilation, ‘the end of indirect rule.’ \(^{84}\) Tuttle ponders the former institutional mechanism and its breakdown:

As long as the interests of the ethnic elite in Tibet were served by cooperating with the neighbouring ethnic elite of the Manchu Qing empire, these ethnically different elites formed a stable, mutually supportive community that dominated the vertically integrated Tibetan Buddhist cultural world. However, with the rise of Chinese nationalism and efforts at modernizing the Qing empire along the lines of a European nation-state, the lateral relations were weakened and the vertical identification became stronger.... During most of the Qing dynasty’s reign the Tibetan and Manchu elites were able to cooperate because neither made an effort to spread its culture or political system where such was not welcome.\(^{85}\)

In short, these reforms turned an age-old tradition that ‘allowed imperial rule to rest lightly on top of the Tibetan cultural and political world’ into a state-building project that envisioned transforming Tibet into a ‘firmly integrated territory of the nascent nation-state.’ \(^{86}\) The cultural component of Qing state-building was even more consequential: ‘Whenever Tibetan Buddhist institutions have been threatened, Tibetan elites have responded defensively; whenever they have been supported, the Tibetan elites have cooperated.’ \(^{87}\) While the Yuan and early Qing policies patronised Tibetan Buddhism and insulated Tibetan identity from both vertical and horizontal threats, the late Qing became hostile towards Tibetan identity and autonomy. The Tibetan response to Qing state-building was predictably violent and symptomatic of the insecurity dilemma.

\(^{82}\) Imperial Decree on 25 February 1910, translated by Teichman 1922: 16-17 from the Chinese Government Gazette.

\(^{83}\) Lin 2006: 9.

\(^{84}\) Norbu 2001: 90 writes, ‘Whenever the Chinese acted through the institution or person of the Dalai Lama, there was no anti-Chinese reaction or revolt against their indirect rule. But whenever the emperor or Amban took direct political action, bypassing the indigenous instruments of indirect rule the Tibetan people (or more accurately, the people of Lhasa) tended to revolt against the Chinese.’

\(^{85}\) Tuttle 2005: 16-17.

\(^{86}\) Ibid: 15, 46.

\(^{87}\) Tuttle 2005: 15, 47.
The Tibetans of Kham responded with a violent uprising in April 1905, killing the mastermind of the reforms and his entourage and two Catholic priests. The brutality of the crackdown at the hands of General Ma Weiqi and Zhao Erfeng only provoked a fiercer rebellion towards the end of 1905, which took until the summer of 1906 to suppress. When Zhao was appointed Amban in Lhasa and his younger brother Zhao Erhsun, the Viceroy of Sichuan, in 1908 to bring the whole of Tibet under direct Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in Lhasa also responded nationally.

As Tuttle wrote, ‘These Chinese attempts to colonise Tibetan areas made a nationalist of the Dalai Lama.’ And, as Lin suggests, China’s state-building programme ‘propelled the Tibetans to engage in their own state-building efforts in order to free themselves from the upsurge in Han Chinese influence and pressure.’ Correspondence between the 13th Dalai Lama and the Qing court during his exile in India and the Republican government subsequently reveal the depth of the animosity engendered by the Chinese practices. Eight months after deposing the Dalai Lama, the Qing court confronted the almost insurmountable hurdle of replacing a living Dalai Lama and offered to reinstate him to his spiritual office, but not to his political role. The Dalai Lama responded that he had ‘lost confidence in China’ and that Tibet and China cannot have the same relationship as before. Upon the abdication of the Qing emperor on 12 February, 1912, Yuan Shikai, President of the new Republic of China wrote to the Dalai Lama apologising for past excesses and ‘restoring’ him to his office and titles. The Dalai Lama replied that he did not require any rank or title from Beijing and declared his intention to ‘exercise both temporal and ecclesiastic rule in Tibet.’ Provocatively, he traced the source of his authority to the Buddha’s teachings from India. As Goldstein notes, ‘[H]e cut even the symbolic tie with China.’ From India, the Dalai Lama organised a secret War Department, started a rebellion inside Tibet and expelled the Qing forces via India in April 1912. He returned to Lhasa in January 1913 and declared Tibet’s independence.

91 Lin 2006: 205.
92 Goldstein 1989: 54.
94 Teichman 1922: 17-18.
95 Bell 1946: 135.
96 Goldstein 1989: 60.
The threat to Buddhism was central to the Tibetan resistance. In Kham, Qing measures against the monasteries and the clergy and patronage for Christian missionaries were most provocative. When Chinese troops advanced towards Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama wrote to ‘Great Britain and all the Ministers of Europe’ that the Chinese forces ‘wish to abolish our religion.’\textsuperscript{98} He wrote to the Qing court that he escaped to India to avoid the destruction of religious institutions akin to the Muslim invasion of India.\textsuperscript{99} Once back in Tibet, he exhorted the Tibetans ‘to preserve all Buddhist institutions in Tibet.’\textsuperscript{100} Furthermore, there was an international dimension to this nascent insecurity dilemma too.

Confirming the Europeanisation of Chinese political world view, Chinese officials in the turn of the 20th century went on a diplomatic offensive to claim ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet as opposed to mere suzerainty as the British conceded.\textsuperscript{101} The Tibetans responded by replacing Beijing with New Delhi and London as sources of protection.\textsuperscript{102} As such, China’s state-building efforts compelled the Tibetans to actively engage with the international community. The Dalai Lama sought British, Russian, French and Japanese support against China in his letters written on 7 November, 1909.

In short, the disruption of the time-tested institutional format of Beijing-Lhasa relations and introduction of assimilationist Chinese policies wrecked Sino-Tibetan relations at the twilight of the Qing Dynasty, which collapsed in February 1912. Tibet was given a new lease of life, but how did the Tibetans use this second chance? How did the new regime in China deal with Tibet?

\textit{Tibet and Nationalist China (1912-1949)}

The Tibetan regions under the rule of Lhasa escaped Chinese rule and exercised \textit{de facto} independence. The 13th Dalai Lama, who had learnt the hard way how vulnerable Tibet was and the necessity of a strong and efficient army and bureaucracy, introduced various modernisation reforms to create a centralised nation-state. Eastern Tibet, on the other hand, remained in a perpetual state of flux contested by Lhasa and Beijing, ruled sometimes by Chinese warlords, sometimes by Lhasa officials or by local Tibetan chieftains or Lamas. However, the eastern Tibetans were spared the sort of policies that the late-Qing authorities imposed there, as the Chinese were engaged in bloody conflicts among warlords, the civil

\textsuperscript{98} The Tibetan Blue Book of 1910, quoted in Goldstein 1989: 51.
\textsuperscript{99} Shakabpa 1967: 236.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid: 246.
\textsuperscript{101} Norbu 2001: 93; Tuttle 2005: 43-44.
\textsuperscript{102} Shakabpa 1967: 237.
war between the Nationalists and the Communists and the war against Japanese occupation. Republican China, though incapable of taking practical measures to incorporate Tibet into China, nevertheless continued to claim Tibet as a part of China. China’s state building in Tibet, therefore, was conducted through ideology and propaganda and remained practically divorced from Tibetan society.

The above-mentioned exchange between Yuan Shikai and the Dalai Lama just after the collapse of the Qing dynasty set the tone for Sino-Tibetan relations during the Republican and Nationalist eras. Lhasa was not just determined to be independent from China but also to reclaim the whole of eastern Tibet.\footnote{103} As the Dalai Lama told the Tibetans in his declaration of independence, ‘...I am now in the process of driving out the remnants of Chinese troops in Do Kham in eastern Tibet.’\footnote{104} However, by 1913, Chinese forces had regrouped and retaken most of eastern Tibet, which unnerved Lhasa in the light of its recent experiences. To face this threat, the Dalai Lama embarked on a series of reforms, beginning with increasing the size of the Tibetan army and upgrading its weaponry and training. By 1914, a reorganised and bigger Tibetan army under the Command of Kalon Jampa Tendhar was dispatched to Kham, where he recruited local militias and drove out the Chinese forces from some Tibetan areas.\footnote{105} This was taking place at the same time as a tripartite conference organised in Simla, India, between the British, Tibetans and the Chinese, which came to be known as the Simla Convention (October 1913-July 1914). The delegates discussed the demarcation of the border between Tibet and China and split Tibet into ‘Inner Tibet’ and ‘Outer Tibet’ with different levels of authorities to be exercised by Beijing and Lhasa in each segment.\footnote{106}

Although the Chinese representative initialled the Agreement, Beijing immediately repudiated the agreement. Hostilities resumed in Eastern Tibet and escalated to a full-scale war in 1917-1918, when a disgruntled Chinese General attempted to repeat Zhao Erfeng’s invasion of Tibet.\footnote{107} The beleaguered Chinese forces sued for peace and requested British mediation. Eric Teichman, a diplomat in the British Consulate in Chengdu, travelled to the battle zone and negotiated a peace settlement.\footnote{108} This conflict sensitised the Lhasa authorities to the need for further strengthening of the army in terms of numbers, weapons and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{103} Again, Eastern Tibet consisted of the Tibetan regions of present day Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan.}\footnote{104} Shakabpa 1967: 246.\footnote{105} Goldstein 1989: 67.\footnote{106} Alastair Lamb, \textit{Tibet, China and India 1914-1950: A Historical Imperial Diplomacy}, Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1989: 10-11. For excerpts of the relevant portions of the Tibetan and Chinese position papers, see Goldstein 1989: 68-73. For complete texts of the Simla Convention and accompanying “Note” see Goldstein, Appendix C: 832-41.\footnote{107} Teichman 1922: 47-58.\footnote{108} Teichman 1922 is an account of his travel to the Tibetan regions for this diplomatic purpose.
organisation. The consequent efforts to extract tax and resources from the aristocratic and monastic estates sparked a disastrous conflict between the Tibetan government and the estate of the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), who protested that the new taxes were unprecedented and invalid. The conflict forced him to flee to China in 1923, where he eventually died.\(^{109}\) The strengthened military also provoked a debilitating power struggle between the westernised military officers and their aristocratic supporters, and the conservative monastic faction and its aristocratic allies.\(^{110}\) Amidst rumours of a military coup attempt, the monastic and conservative factions won over the Dalai Lama to abort his entire modernisation program.\(^{111}\)

The death of the Dalai Lama on 17 December, 1933 plunged Tibet immediately into a power-struggle followed by a brief civil war between two Regents, providing for the first time since 1913 a small opening for China to send a ‘condolence’ mission to Lhasa.\(^{112}\) Although, General Huang Musong was unsuccessful in his political mission to persuade the Tibetans to integrate with China, he left behind two officials with a wireless set in Lhasa, who were expelled in 1949.\(^{113}\) One of the last Nationalist Representatives in Tibet, Shen Tsung-Lien, wrote perhaps the most compelling testimony for Tibet’s independence: ‘since 1911 Tibet has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence. It has its own currency and customs; it runs its own telegraph and postal service; it maintains a civil service different from any other part of China; it even keeps its own army.’\(^{114}\) Lien was of course referring only to Lhasa-controlled regions of Tibet.

Indeed, from 1911 to 1950, Tibetan autonomy and identity did not face an existential threat as the Chinese were pre-occupied with their own civil war and with overthrowing the Japanese occupation. Nationalist claims of sovereignty over central Tibet were purely ‘rhetorical grandstanding’ to ‘maintain its Nationalist facade and political legitimacy.’\(^{115}\) In eastern Tibet where the Nationalists maintained nominal rule through a combination of Chinese (Han and Hui) warlords and native Tibetan rulers, Tibetan identity did not experience the sort of existential threats that late Qing policies presented. In fact, the

\(^{109}\) Goldstein 1989: 110-20. The 9th Panchen Lama’s flight and death in China left a legacy that may have influenced the 10th Panchen’s decision to stay in Tibet (at great personal suffering during and before the Cultural Revolution) when the 14th Dalai Lama escaped to India in 1959), and the current dispute between the Dalai Lama and Beijing regarding the 11th Panchen Lama.

\(^{110}\) Ibid: 89-138.


\(^{113}\) The British responded by opening their mission in Lhasa, which became the Indian mission in 1947.


\(^{115}\) Lin 2006: blurb and 13.
Nationalists rediscovered the value of Tibetan Buddhism for their state-building ambitions in Tibet and Mongolia. A limited and modern version of PPR was conceived, although the Chinese intention was to integrate Tibet into the modern Chinese state, not to hold an empire together.

The expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese mission in 1949 proved a pyrrhic victory as Maoist Communists, wedded to very different values, especially their aversion towards religion and traditional cultures, and unencumbered by civil wars and foreign occupation, came to power in China that same year and invaded Central Tibet in 1950. However, the Communists had been active in China since the 1920s and it is instructive to examine the CCP’s positions towards the Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols during this period. The security instrumentality of the CCP’s practice of Regional National Autonomy in the minority regions is obvious from how the Party changed its tune on nationality policy depending upon its own security position in China before and after the conclusion of the Chinese civil war.

To enlist the support of national minorities in the Chinese civil war and the anti-Japanese war, the Communists promised self-determination, including the right to secede from China, to non-Han nationalities. As early as 1920, Mao wrote to Cai Hesen: ‘we must…assist Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Qinghai to achieve self-government (zizhi) and self-determination (zijue).’ The 1922 Manifesto of the Second Congress of the CCP proposed that Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet would become autonomous, self-governing regions in a Chinese federal republic, while the Third Congress of 1923 resolved that Tibet, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Qinghai shall always be affiliated with China, but they may exercise the right of national self-determination. After falling out with the Nationalists in 1928, the CCP began to support the right to secession of these nationalities. A 1930 meeting in Shanghai, for instance, recognised the right to secede. Article 14 of the 1931 Resolution of the First All-China Congress of Soviets on Question of National Minorities stated that ‘the Chinese Soviet Republic categorically and unconditionally recognises the right of national minorities to self-determination.’ It also promised the ‘toiling masses’ of ‘Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guizhou, and others, where the majority of the population belong to non-Chinese nationalities…the right to determine for themselves whether they wish to leave the

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118 Cai Hesen was a founding leader of the CCP.
121 Smith 1996: 337.
Chinese Soviet Republic and create their own independent state, or whether they wish to join the Union of Soviet Republics, or form an autonomous area inside the Chinese Republic.”

However, as soon as the second anti-Japanese alignment with the Nationalists was formed in the late 1930s, the CCP ceased mentioning the right to secede, promising only a Chinese federation, with which the non-Chinese nationalities had the freedom to join. Mao told Edgar Snow in 1936, ‘When the people’s revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples likewise will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation.’ By 1938, the rhetoric had shifted to equality vis-à-vis the Han and establishing a unified state with the Han, although occasional promises of federation persisted until 1947. In his address to the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the sixth Central Committee in 1938, Mao said that the CCP would ‘allow the Mongol, Hui, Tibet, Miao, Yi, and Fan nationalities to have equal rights with the Han’ and ‘the right to manage their own affairs and establish a unified state with the Han people.’ The scene was set for the about-turn that the CCP took on its nationality position once it came to power in 1949.

Article 50 of the Common Program of the first CPPCC on 29 September, 1949 epitomised this U-turn; national equality, unity and cooperation to ‘oppose imperialism and their own public enemies… nationalism and Han chauvinism’ were emphasised. Federalism and self-determination had disappeared; instead, regional autonomy was promised to national minorities (Article 51). With the overthrow of imperialism and the Nationalists, the CCP justified its about-face by arguing that self-determination had been achieved for everyone, including non-Han nationalities. Self-determination was interpreted as a right for the Chinese to forge a unified and sovereign nation-state. Since Han chauvinism of the feudal and nationalist past had been supposedly invalidated and eliminated, there was no reason for the minorities to secede from China. Ethnic unrest in the first few years of

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123 Snow was an American journalist who Mao befriended.
124 Quoted in Zhao 2004: 175.
125 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
126 Quoted in Zhao 2004: 341.
128 Ibid.
129 Zhao 2004: 175.
Communist rule was also attributed to residual Han chauvinism owing to lack of ‘Marxist education’ and grasp of ‘the nationality policy of the Central Committee.’

**Conclusion:**

History is integral to the substance of the Sino-Tibetan conflict as both Dharamsala and Beijing advance radically different histories of their centuries old relations. Beijing asserts unbroken China sovereignty over Tibet since the Yuan dynasty and that the notion of Tibetan independence is an imperialist plot against China. Dharamsala questions the Chineseness of the Mongols and Manchus and argues that relations between the Tibetan Lamas and Mongol and Manchu emperors were personal in nature, i.e. between a priest and a patron, and did not entail political subordination of Tibet to either the Yuan or Qing empires. These are not just rhetorical contestations over the past, but also entwined with current agendas on both sides. Beijing stipulates as a precondition for negotiations that the Dalai Lama publicly declare Tibet as a historically integral and inalienable part of China. The Dalai Lama has so far refused to ‘re-write’ the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. History, he said, should be left to academic historians and lawyers to adjudicate. Charting a middle-way between the duelling extremes, this chapter provided an abridged version of a long history that tracks the genesis of the insecurity dilemma in Sino-Tibetan relations.

Analysis of the Yuan and Qing relations with Tibet reveal that respect for Tibetan culture and political autonomy were crucial determinants for Tibetan cooperation or rebellion against foreign overlords. The Tibetans as a nation remained divided under different jurisdictions and the hidebound and corruption-ridden Lhasa government failed to capitalise on the Chinese problems during the Nationalist era to consolidate its international status, conduct domestic reforms and make adequate defence preparations. Tibet paid the steepest price that any state could pay: death at the hands of Mao’s PRC in 1950. The next chapter examines how the insecurity dilemma ravaged Sino-Tibetan relations during the first three decades of PRC’s direct rule over the Tibetans.

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Chapter 4
The Insecurity Dilemma in Communist Tibet (1950-1989)

This chapter picks up the historical narrative from Chapter Three. Crucially, it demonstrates the workings of the insecurity dilemma in the historical period between the Chinese take-over of Tibet (1949-50) and the imposition of martial law in 1989. This analytical history details China’s state-building efforts and the stubborn Tibetan resistance at a time when the full force of the insecurity dilemma was unleashed on the Tibetan plateau.

On 1 October, 1949, Chairman Mao declared the founding of the PRC and quickly reasserted control over eastern Tibet. Radio broadcasts announced plans afoot to ‘liberate’ the rest of Tibet and Taiwan.¹ The Tibetan government conducted a spurt of military and political reforms at home and diplomatic activity to seek international support, but it proved too little, too late.² On 7 October, 1950, the PLA invaded the town of Chamdo, defeating the Tibetan army through sheer speed and numbers.³ A panicky and paralysed Lhasa asked the 15 year old Dalai Lama to assume full religious and political authority; an enthronement ceremony was held on 17 November, 1950.⁴ Beijing demanded that the Tibetan government sent its representatives to Beijing to negotiate the ‘peaceful liberation of Tibet,’ failing which the PLA threatened to march to Lhasa. When armed defence failed and concrete international support was not forthcoming,⁵ Lhasa dispatched a delegation headed by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme to Beijing for negotiations. Confronting thinly veiled threats of further military action and acting against the express instruction from the Tibetan government ‘The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’ (17-Point Agreement, hereafter) was signed and Tibet’s independence came to an abrupt end.⁶

The history of PRC’s incorporation and rule over Tibet could be analysed in four phases: grudging coexistence under the 17 Point Agreement (1951-1959); Democratic

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¹ [Takla Phuntsok Tashi] (Hereafter, Takla), [Tibetan and Tibetan History] [An Account of My Life Vol. 2], [The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives], 1995: 13.
² Shakya 1999: 12-32.
³ Ibid: 43.
Reforms (1959-1965) and Cultural Revolution (1965-1976); reform and cultural revival, uprising and martial law (1978-1989); and integration, development and uprising (1989-present). Since the post-1989 period is detailed in chapters 5, 6, and 8, this chapter will examine the first three periods and chronicle the forceful advent of the insecurity dilemma.

The 17 Point Agreement and Grudging Coexistence (1951-1959)
The 17-Point Agreement became the basis of a ten year attempt at co-existence. The full text of the Agreement is given in appendix 1, but the key terms state that the Tibetans would return to the ‘family of the motherland’ and assist the PLA’s arrival in Tibet, Beijing would handle Tibet’s external affairs and institute a ‘military and administrative committee’ and a ‘military division headquarter’ in Lhasa. In exchange, Tibet’s traditional socio-political system including the economic base of the monasteries and the ‘status, functions and powers’ of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama would be preserved, and that reforms will be conducted only after consultation with, and agreement of, and under the leadership of the Tibetan government and elite. Religious belief and the development of written and spoken Tibetan language will be upheld.

Lhasa was initially shocked by the terms of the Agreement, particularly the renunciation of Tibet’s independence and the deployment of PLA in Tibet, but under the circumstances, accepted the Agreement. For some of the Tibetan elite, the Agreement provided enough safeguards for Tibet’s cultural, social and political autonomy. Most importantly, the Agreement appeared to protect the power and privileges of the ruling elite and to uphold religious freedom in Tibet. On the other hand, the Chinese believed that the Tibetans had accepted Chinese sovereignty and communist reforms in principle. Shakya wrote, ‘Each party saw what they wanted in the agreement.’ Thus, the 17-Point Agreement was doomed from the start, as the following account of the implementation bears out.

Insecurity, State-Building and Co-existence
By the end of 1951, the population of Lhasa had doubled with the arrival of the Chinese troops and officials. Once China acquired control over Tibet, it faced the task of defending and securing their conquest, which it immediately began through a variety of state-building

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7 Shakya 1999: 70-1, 89-91.
8 Ibid: 90.
10 Ibid: 93.
measures. The insecurity underlying the state-building project is clear from Mao’s instructions in 1952 to the Chinese cadres working in Tibet. He identified the lack of the PLA’s ‘material base,’ absence of Chinese settlers (unlike Xinjiang), and the favourable balance of ‘social influence’ of the ‘Dalai clique’ in Tibet as the chief challenges.\(^1\) He advised the cadres to concentrate on ‘production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work.’ These were nation-building, institution-building and infrastructure-building projects.

First, the Chinese took a number of steps geared towards nation-building. Under strict orders to observe a code of conduct that was designed to dispel Tibetan fears and create a good image of the Chinese and the PLA in particular, propaganda teams visited remote areas showing films and performing songs and dances, publicising the 17-Point Agreement, and providing free medical care to rural Tibetans. However, ordinary Tibetans proved far more impervious to the Chinese advances than sections of the ruling elite.\(^2\) The Chinese also took steps to win over the ecclesiastical community. During the Monlam Festival in February 1951, the Chinese included the monastic heads in the decision-making process and distributed alms and money to the monks following traditional Tibetan and Qing practices.\(^3\) Trips were organised for influential Tibetans for educational and inspection tours to industrial cities in China with a view to impressing them with China’s modernisation and industrial might and to use them for international propaganda.\(^4\) In 1955, the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama and other leading Tibetans visited Beijing and other Chinese cities and participated in the National People’s Congress sessions, a major propaganda coup showing ‘Tibetan acquiescence to Chinese rule.’\(^5\)

At the same time, the Chinese exploited traditional divisions and fomented new cleavages within Tibetan society. The exclusion of eastern Tibetan regions from the 17 Point Agreement was based on the legalistic fact that they were not politically under the control of Lhasa at the time of the invasion. The Chinese also exploited the long-standing rift between the Tibetan government and the Panchen Lama’s estate.\(^6\) Central Tibet was divided into three rival regional blocs: the Tibetan Government in Lhasa headed by the Dalai Lama, the

\(^{12}\) Shakya 1999: 98.
\(^{13}\) Ibid: 101.
\(^{15}\) Ibid: 123.
\(^{16}\) Ibid: 111-13, 127-29.
Panchen Lama estate and Chamdo Liberation Committee (CLC).\textsuperscript{17} To be sure, traditional Tibetan divisions lent a helping hand to these Chinese tactics, but the Chinese took this divide and rule strategy one step further by upgrading numerically insignificant groups within Tibet as separate nationalities. This was part of the larger state-sponsored Nationality Identification Programme in the 1950s through which many new nationalities were ‘invented’ from the Chinese and other nationalities.\textsuperscript{18} The intention behind this Programme was to counter the nationalisms of the frontier nations by including ‘many small internal nationalities’ to ‘trivialize the definition of ethnicity “to the detriment of the frontier nations”’.\textsuperscript{19} Katherine Kaup found the ‘invention’ of the Zhuang by the Communists designed to help incorporate the south-west into the Chinese state.\textsuperscript{20} G.F. Hudson, a scholar on the Zhuang nationality wrote that ‘the communist state granted the Zhuang the status of ethnic minority in order to obfuscate the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia and to send message to Uighurs, Tibetans, and Mongols that they were not in a position to demand more recognition.’\textsuperscript{21} 

In Tibet, Monpas, Lhobas and Sherpas were raised to the status of separate nationalities by ‘ethnographers’ using Stalin’s definition of nationhood. Fischer argues that the construction of nationalities ‘occurred due to very specific local political reasons, dictated primarily by the state.’\textsuperscript{22} He finds in the Chinese discourse on ethnic groups in Tibet a line of reasoning that goes like this: ‘Tibetans are not the only ethnic group in the TAR, and it is therefore unreasonable for them to be making special claims for themselves.’\textsuperscript{23} In short, China worked hard at nation-building in both the positive sense of attracting the Tibetans to identify themselves as Chinese and the negative sense of undermining the integrity of the Tibetan nation.

Simultaneously, the Chinese created a rash of official and quasi-official institutions, including the Education Committee and sub-committees, the Grain Procurement Board to solve the problem of PLA food shortages,\textsuperscript{24} the Tibetan Military District Headquarters (TMDHQ) and the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR). The Youth Association and Women’s Association were semi-official bodies charged with

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid: 127. The Panchen Lama’s estate was based in Shigatse city, Tsang. CLC was an entirely new Chinese construct and created soon after the PLA occupied Chamdo in 1950.

\textsuperscript{18} Zhao 2004: 183.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{21} Cited Zhao 2004: 183.

\textsuperscript{22} Fischer in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 155.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid: 154.

\textsuperscript{24} Shakya 1999: 117.
propaganda work such as showing movies and organising trips to China.\textsuperscript{25} Tibetan lamas were co-opted into the Chinese Buddhist Association and given high positions.\textsuperscript{26} The most significant military-political institutions were TMDHQ and the PCART.

On 10 February 1952, TMDHQ was inaugurated with great pomp and fanfare lasting three days.\textsuperscript{27} Composed of eight Chinese and two Tibetan officers, including a Chinese Commander and Tibetan Deputy Commander, TMDHQ was ‘seen as a key to establishing effective Chinese rule in Tibet.’\textsuperscript{28} TMDHQ was also aimed at gaining control over the Tibetan army, reducing intra-Chinese conflicts between the Military Regions, and to incorporate Tibet into China’s military-administrative apparatus.\textsuperscript{29} Predictably, the Chinese demanded that the Tibetan army be incorporated into the PLA, because as primitive as it was, the remnants of the Tibetan army constituted a threat to the Chinese objectives in Tibet.

TMDHQ was a compromise over a Military Administration Commission (MAC) that the Chinese forced upon the Tibetan delegates during the ‘negotiation’ of the 17-Point Agreement with threats of further military action in Tibet. It was meant to implement the Agreement and ‘decide’ all important political and military issues.\textsuperscript{30} Because the Tibetans strongly opposed its creation, Mao postponed it until the PLA’s ‘material base’ and ‘social influence’ in Tibet had improved considerably to ‘go over the offensive in the future.’\textsuperscript{31} This strategic logic guided the entirety of the ‘gradualist’ policy that Beijing practised outside eastern Tibet in the 1950s.

PCTAR’s establishment was even more consequential. The Chinese allowed the traditional Tibetan government to exist, but they wanted to establish a parallel administrative structure, which would initiate and run new projects and reforms, with the goal of gradually rendering the ‘traditional government structure...redundant.’\textsuperscript{32} PCTAR was established during the Dalai Lama’s trip to Beijing in 1955 and inaugurated on 22 April 1956 with great fan-fare in Lhasa with an 800-strong delegation from Beijing. PCTAR was described as ‘an authoritative body for consultation and planning during the transitional period before the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet.’\textsuperscript{33} For the Chinese, PCART was instrumental in speeding up reforms and integrating Tibet within PRC’s administrative

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid: 118.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid: 101.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid: 99.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid: 100.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid: 67.
\textsuperscript{31} Mao 1977: 73-76.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid: 98-9.
\textsuperscript{33} Union Research Institute (URI), Tibet, 1950-1967, Hong Kong, 1968: 171.
structure. The Dalai Lama was appointed Chairman, but Zhang Guohua, Deputy Chairman, was in charge of the Committee.\textsuperscript{34} PCART became the main centre of power and the Tibetan government had neither the power nor the resources to challenge its supremacy.\textsuperscript{35} As Shakya wrote, ‘Clearly, the organisational structure of the PCART had reduced the traditional power and status of the Tibetan government.’\textsuperscript{36} On paper, the establishment of PCART was a triumph of Chinese diplomacy and pragmatism, but it proved a pyrrhic victory as it provoked strong opposition from the Tibetan masses.\textsuperscript{37}

The ordinary Tibetans, who saw the Dalai Lama as their supreme leader, were seriously disturbed by his loss of prestige and power and that of the Tibetan government. Their anger was directed as much to the Chinese as to the elite, who they felt had betrayed their leader and government by working for PCART or escaping abroad with their wealth.\textsuperscript{38} The erstwhile apolitical Tibetan masses became politicised. Their animosity against the Chinese was exacerbated by the seeming ubiquity of the Chinese in a land where seeing one was a rarity before 1952. This was a direct result of the establishment of PCART as the mushrooming of institutions under its umbrella was accompanied by a flood of Chinese civilian and military personnel.\textsuperscript{39} These cadres often appeared culturally insensitive and intrusive. Most Tibetans viewed them with suspicion and hostility.\textsuperscript{40} The Tibetans interpreted these developments as violation of the 17-Point Agreement.\textsuperscript{41} As we shall see, PCART and associated institutions contributed considerably to the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the breakdown of the 17-Point Agreement. The Chinese also realised the importance of building infrastructure to integrate Tibet closer to China.

By the end of 1955, the Qinghai-Tibet road and the Dartsedo (Ch. Kangding)-Lhasa road had been constructed. This was achieved by employing some 30,000 Tibetan nomads and farmers on road construction projects who received wages. However, by the mid-1950s, the Chinese had to cut costs and asked the Tibetans to provide free labour for ‘construction of the motherland.’\textsuperscript{42} The Chinese claimed that the roads reflected the ‘concern and care which the CCP and Chairman Mao have for the Tibetan people.’\textsuperscript{43} There were other reasons though.

\textsuperscript{34} Shakya 1999: 129.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid: 130.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid: 133.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid: 124-134.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid: 134.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid: 162-211; Gyatso 1990: 117.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid: 121, 136.
\textsuperscript{43} URI 1968, Op. Cit.
Roads made it easier to mobilise and propagandise the Tibetan masses, transport supplies faster for the PLA, lessened the dependence of the Tibetan economy on India, and generally to establish firmer control over Tibet.\textsuperscript{44} It addressed some of the Chinese security concerns.

Internationally, China also achieved a major victory in the form of the ‘India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’ signed on 29 April, 1954, in which India accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet.\textsuperscript{45} Although America had been interested in the Tibet issue since the late 1940s,\textsuperscript{46} India’s acquiescence to the Chinese position made it difficult for Washington to support Tibet. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government could not reciprocate the American advances without credible commitment from them to deliver substantial diplomatic and military assistance. Chinese state-building in Tibet and assertion of sovereignty over Tibet went hand in hand.

\textbf{The Storm from the East}

Despite this triumph in international relations, a storm was brewing much closer to home in eastern Tibet. Unbound by the 17-Point Agreement, the Chinese policy and practices in eastern Tibet were considerably different from the ones in Central Tibet. Eastern Tibetans were treated as Chinese and subjected to radical communist reforms beginning around 1954.\textsuperscript{47}

Immediately after the Communists overran eastern Tibet in 1949, they started building the administrative and Party structures there. By 1956, Eastern Tibet was organised into Tibetan autonomous districts.\textsuperscript{48} By 1953, the Communists started land reforms targeting the monasteries and local elites, classifying people into different class groups, confiscating weapons and forcibly settling nomads, beginning in Gyalthang, Kham (Yunnan).\textsuperscript{49} The officials and PLA travelled from village to village confiscating land and property from landlords and traditional leaders and redistributing these with great ‘propaganda and fanfare’ to the poor, albeit after taking the best of everything for themselves, including land and livestock.\textsuperscript{50} Land and property redistribution was accompanied by persecution of landowners and traditional leaders through ‘struggle sessions’ (झग्दा की गतिविधि), public humiliations, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Shakya 1999: 122.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Goldstein 2007: 114-137.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Norbu 2001: 215; Shakya 1999:136-37 makes the same argument.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Shakya 1999: 137.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid: 138.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Ibid: 37.
\end{itemize}
arrests in order to eliminate any potential leadership for resistance. However, many of these social, political, and religious leaders were not regarded as class exploiters even by the lower-class Tibetans, but as respected and revered figures representing Tibetan cultural, religious and national identity. The communist reforms went beyond taking away the autonomy of the local elite to humiliating and persecuting them in public.

The Chinese call these ‘Democratic Reforms’ to abolish ‘serfdom, a grim and backward feudal system’ and claim that it was the ‘yearning of the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people.’ However, they were also a ruse to ‘expose and eliminate all Tibetan opponents to Chinese rule...facilitating not only Chinese control over Tibet but social control as well.’ The Chinese pushed on with the reforms despite popular opposition and appeals of the Dalai Lama and local Tibetan elites like Geshe Sherab Gyatso. The Eastern Tibetans saw the reforms first and foremost as an attack on their value system and identity.

Tibetans of all classes and regions were united by a common culture and their faith in Buddhism and deeply resented the reforms that threatened the existence of their religious institutions. Consequently, the Tibetan regions of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan rose up in violent rebellions attacking Chinese civilian and military personnel in their localities. When Tibetan villagers resisted land reforms, the ensuing fighting forced them to seek sanctuary in local monasteries, which the PLA besieged and bombed from the air. Hundreds of Khampas and Amdowas fled to central Tibet bringing news of the persecution of monks and religion in their homelands. As the fighting continued in the east, the number of refugees in and around Lhasa increased to about 58,000 families, according to one estimate.

Far from winning over the lower classes, Democratic Reforms ignited a broad-based Tibetan resistance. The persecution of the local elites ‘was more successful in creating resistance to the Chinese than it was in creating “proletarian class consciousness.”’ While the United Front was able to co-opt some members of the upper class, they failed to anticipate the nationalistic reaction engendered by their persecution of the non-cooperative elements. The Tibetans simply saw the collaborators as traitors and the rebellious ones as

52 Smith 2008: 36.
53 Shakya 1999: 143-44.
54 Ibid; 143; Norbu 2001: 216.
55 Ibid; 143.
56 Ibid; 139.
57 Ibid; 140-41.
58 Ibid; 142; Norbu 2001: 221.
59 Ibid; 38.
national heroes. In retrospect, treating more than half the Tibetan population that lived outside Lhasa’s rule as Chinese and conducting radical communist reforms was a fundamentally flawed policy.\(^\text{60}\) It added more fuel to the powder-keg that the Chinese-Tibetan relations were fast turning into in Lhasa.

**Growing resistance in Central Tibet**

Although the need to win over the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elite and the terms of the 17-Point Agreement lubricated Sino-Tibetan relations well enough to avoid open conflict in Central Tibet, the relations were always on a knife-edge. Tibetan resistance in Lhasa took the form of civil disobedience and peaceful protests and petitions.

The first opposition came from the two Prime Ministers, Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi. They refused to sell grain to the starving PLA, to integrate the Tibetan army into the PLA, rejected Chinese demands for the Tibetan army to march with the Chinese flag instead of the Tibetan one, prevented direct communication between the young Dalai Lama and the Chinese officials, and demanded the return of Chamdo to the authority of the Tibetan government before discussions on how to implement the 17 Point Agreement could take place.\(^\text{61}\) The prime ministers’ open challenge to the Chinese became nationalistic folk-lore among the ordinary Tibetans.\(^\text{62}\)

Simultaneously, the Chinese also attracted opposition from the common Tibetans.\(^\text{63}\) As early as 1951, posters denouncing the Chinese as ‘enemies of the faith’ ( langs gnyen ), calling for their withdrawal and the restoration of the Dalai Lama’s powers were pasted on the walls of Lhasa during festivals.\(^\text{64}\) Popular groups calling themselves ‘People’s Representatives’ ( snying rgyal ye shes brtan ) or ‘Lhasa People’s Great Organisation’ ( sde dge dgon par bstan chen po ) organised various anti-Chinese activities in Lhasa, including the criticism of Chinese policies and their presence in posters and petitions and blockading the offices of the Chinese officials.\(^\text{65}\) With considerable difficulty the Chinese managed to pressure the Dalai Lama to dismiss the Prime Ministers and the Tibetan government to break up the People’s Representatives in 1952.\(^\text{66}\) In 1954, another popular group ‘People’s Assembly’ ( sde dge dgon dbyer ba ) came into being.

\(^{\text{62}}\) Ibid: 97-98.
\(^{\text{64}}\) Shakya 1999: 102.
\(^{\text{65}}\) Ibid: 102-11.
principally to dissuade the Dalai Lama from visiting China.\textsuperscript{67} Although his 1954-1955 trip to Beijing and talks with Mao brought a brief respite from the tensions, the escalating fighting in eastern Tibet spilled over into Central Tibet. PCART’s establishment revived popular opposition in Lhasa.

The above mentioned ‘People’s Assembly’ re-emerged in 1956 to put up posters in Lhasa calling for the Chinese to leave Tibet. The People’s Assembly ‘represented the culmination of Tibetan resentment against...the erosion of the authority of the Dalai Lama.’\textsuperscript{68} As noted above, the people’s ire was directed as much against the Chinese ‘invaders’ as to the Tibetan elite for abandoning the Dalai Lama. The ‘People’s Assembly’ was created by private traders and low-level officials who had lost confidence in the senior officials to defend the Dalai Lama and Tibetan interests.\textsuperscript{69} Under Chinese pressure, three leaders of the People’s Assembly were arrested by the Tibetan government, one of whom died in detention. The other two were released under pressure from the public and monasteries. Under these circumstances, the Dalai Lama visited India in 1956 and considered seeking asylum there, but returned to Tibet after the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai reassured him that ‘Democratic Reforms’ would be postponed for ten years if necessary.\textsuperscript{70} Indian Prime Minister Nehru also persuaded him to return.

However, the Dalai Lama returned to a tense Lhasa with hundreds more refugees from eastern Tibet arriving with fresh news of persecution and destruction of monasteries and camping around Lhasa. Outwardly, relations improved slightly owing to the postponement of reforms for reasons ranging from the desire to win over the increasingly suspicious Dalai Lama and popular opposition to waning revolutionary zeal and economic problems in China itself.\textsuperscript{71} Not only did the Chinese postpone reforms in central Tibet, they also relaxed the pace of reforms in eastern Tibet and attempted to win over leading figures from that area.\textsuperscript{72} However, the destruction of monasteries and persecution of respected figures had damaged the relations between the Chinese and eastern Tibetans beyond repair.\textsuperscript{73} There was nothing the Chinese could do to stop the rebellion spreading as the eastern Tibetans escaped and moved around with relative freedom in Central Tibet.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid: 144.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid: 145.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid: 148-59.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid: 160.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid: 161-62.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid: 162.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid: 142-4.
Around the same time, the Tibetans exploited their common culture to stiffen opposition to the Chinese. Led by merchants from the east with the notion that the Dalai Lama’s well-being and Tibetan fortunes could be safeguarded through Buddhist rituals, they conducted long-life rituals for the Dalai Lama and offered him a throne of gold funded by donations from all over Tibet in May 1957. Shakya writes:

The ceremony had serious political and social implications. For the first time all Tibetan people were united in common purpose and shared values, which helped to identify the common enemy. The Chinese were labelled Tendra (brtan dgra) “the enemy of the faith” and the Khampa resistance groups were seen as the “fidei defensor [defender of the faith].”

This was undoubtedly Tibetan nation-building in the face of Chinese threats. Tibetan opposition also appeared in an unlikely place: Beijing, the heart of political China. There, Tibetan students organised a group called ‘Defence against Invasion’ (tibBa/tibTsa/tibNa/tibTsek/tibRa_Ga/tib.Naro/tibLa/tibTsek), which denounced the 17-Point Agreement and PCART, quarrelled with Chinese lecturers about Tibetan history and even criticised Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for suggesting that Tibetans should follow the Manchus and adopt Chinese culture.

Emboldened by Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign, such Tibetan opposition induced a degree of soul searching and policy debate among the Chinese officials. Reflecting the sharp divisions between the South-West and North-West Military Regions, officials from the two groups blamed each other’s Han Chauvinism for Tibetan grievances. As China lurched towards the Great Leap Forward and the introduction of the commune system, policy implementation in Tibetan areas also became increasingly hard-line. The cycle of rebellions and suppression escalated in the east, which in turn had a direct bearing on the stability of central Tibet. In the most significant development in 1958, the eastern Tibetan warriors who had been driven from their homelands, regrouped in central Tibet and formed a unified outfit known as Four Rivers, Six Ranges (tibCha_Shapkyu/tibTsek/tibBa/tibZha/tib.Gigu/tibTsek/tibGa/tibNga/tibSa/tibTsek/tibDa_Rata_Shapkyu/tibGa/tibTsek) or the Volunteer Force for Defence of the Faith (tibSa_Ta/tibNa/tibTsek/tibSa_Rata_Shapkyu/tibNga/tibTsek/tibDa/tibNga/tibTsek/tibLa/tibNga/tibTsek/tibDa/tibMa/tibGa/tibTsek/tibMa/tib.Gigu/tibTsek). Their numbers swelled into tens of thousands and constituted a formidable challenge for the PLA in Tibet, albeit being poorly armed and having an ambiguous relationship with the Tibetan government.

Transnational and International Developments

Ibid: 165.
Ibid: 164.
See Tibet 1950-1967, URI: 222-34 for Fan Ming of the North-West Military Region; Shakya 1999: 112 for Zhang Guohua of the South-West Military Region; Goldstein, Sherap, and Siebenchuh 2004: 166-167, 169-70 and 220-221 for Phunwang, the only Tibetan member of the Tibet Work Committee and South-West Military Region in those years.
The Chinese invasion and the uncertain politics of co-existence had driven many religious and political figures from both eastern and central Tibet into exile in India. The former Prime Minister and two of the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers topped a sizable diaspora based in the town of Kalimpong. The formation of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ was welcomed with joy there.

The revolt in the east, the formation of the guerrilla organisation and the diaspora in Kalimpong provided an opening for America to provide covert support to the Tibetans. Select groups of Tibetans were trained in guerrilla warfare in American military bases and air-dropped inside Tibet. Supplemented by American arms-drops, the guerrillas inflicted considerable casualties on the PLA. While the American objective was merely to destabilise China rather than restore Tibetan independence, in the eyes of the Chinese, the American intervention represented an anti-CCP ‘international conspiracy’ and ‘a direct threat to China’s security.’ This explains the ferocity with which the PLA suppressed the rebellion in eastern Tibet and its pressure on the Tibetan government to use its army to quell the guerrillas in central Tibet.

The Tibetan government prevaricated and astutely asked the Chinese to enlarge and equip the Tibetan army with better weapons, which was the last thing the Chinese desired. The Chinese also allowed the re-activation of some of the institutions of the Tibetan government, such as the cabinet and National Assembly, which they had previously stopped from convening, so that these bodies would be blamed for the unpopular act of cracking down on Tibetan rebels. In the end, under Chinese pressure and the approach of the Dalai Lama’s final public examination for the Tibetan monastic equivalent of a PhD in early March 1959, the Tibetan government sent an official delegation to ask the rebel headquarters in Southern Tibet to halt the fighting against the Chinese. The members of the delegation, however, joined the rebels. The Tibetan army was not used because the Lhasa officials suspected that the Chinese were trying to instigate a civil war among the Tibetans and because the guerrillas enjoyed the sympathy of many Tibetan officials and the masses. The PLA could not fight the rebels directly as that would be counterproductive to their long-

82 Ibid: 181.
standing strategy of winning over the central Tibetans. Amidst this three-way stalemate, Lhasa erupted against Chinese rule on 10 March, 1959.

The 10 March, 1959 Uprising is one of the most written-about topics in recent Tibetan history and consideration of space rules out a detailed examination here. In March 1959, Lhasa was crowded with pilgrims from all corners of the Tibetan plateau and beyond to attend the Monlam Festival. The Chinese officials tendered an innocuous, retrospectively speaking, but conspiratorially worded, ill-timed and generally mishandled invitation for the Dalai Lama to attend a theatrical performance at the Chinese military camp. Although the venue and date of attendance were suggested by the Dalai Lama himself, a mixture of facts and rumours circulating in Lhasa planted fears in Tibetan minds that the Chinese planned to kidnap the Dalai Lama.

The Chinese kept the invitation secret from even the Tibetan cabinet ministers until the day before, 9 March, 1959. They told the Commander of the Dalai Lama’s body-guard regiment that the Lama should come without his Tibetan body-guards, contrary to normal practice, and that they should be posted two miles away from the PLA camp.

For international propaganda in the face of the open revolt in eastern Tibet, the Chinese had been pressuring the Dalai Lama to attend the 1959 NPC session in Beijing. Rumours circulated in Lhasa that a number of Chinese planes had landed in Damzhung airport outside Lhasa. Reports from eastern Tibet about the abduction of lamas and leaders during social events exacerbated Tibetan fears. The Dalai Lama dismissed the notion of a Chinese kidnap plan, but the rumour spread through Lhasa like a prairie-fire during the night of 9 March. Tens of thousands of Tibetans gathered outside the Dalai Lama’s palace in

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87 Shakya 1999: 190; Smith 1996: 445. Smith finds that the Chinese officials in Lhasa had already told Beijing that the Dalai Lama would attend the NPC meeting and the latter’s refusal put the Chinese in Lhasa in a difficult situation. His Holiness the Dalai Lama (HHDL), My Land and My People: The Original Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, New York: Warner Books, 1997: 138-9. The Dalai Lama differs slightly from Smith in that he had not refused outright to attend the NPC, but merely that he had not given a definite answer. However, he adds that Beijing had already announced his attendance without consulting him. This seems to confirm Smith’s assertion that the local Chinese officials had jumped the gun and reported to Beijing that the Dalai Lama would be attending the NPC when the latter had not in fact decided to do so.
the morning of 10 March, 1959 to ‘protect’ him by preventing him from visiting the Chinese camp.⁹¹ They laid siege, curtailing the movement of the officials into and out of the palace.

The crowd shouted both anti-Chinese and anti-aristocratic slogans and physically assaulted Tibetan officials seen to be collaborating closely with the Chinese regime.⁹² One official who was especially close to the Chinese met with a violent death as the crowd attacked him with stones, sticks and swords and horsemen dragged his body around the city.⁹³ To avoid open conflict and the inevitable Chinese crackdown, the Dalai Lama reassured the crowd that he would ‘never’ visit the PLA camp.⁹⁴ Although this persuaded most of the crowd to end the blockade they marched to other parts of the city to hold anti-Chinese protests. A meeting of the Tibetan officials was held in the afternoon of 10 March and a sharp division emerged between those who supported the protestors and those who believed that the protests endangered the security of the Dalai Lama.⁹⁵ The officials in support of the protests mobilised the Tibetans of Lhasa and held demonstrations and rallies denouncing the Chinese and the 17-Point Agreement and called for Tibetan independence.⁹⁶

For the next seven days, while the ordinary Tibetans protested continuously, the Dalai Lama and his cabinet had become isolated from the events outside, unable to control the protestors or to gain the trust of the Chinese. By 13 March, the Tibetan government authorised the distribution of arms to the rebels and fierce fighting broke out in Lhasa with high Tibetan casualties. For the Tibetan cabinet, the security of the Dalai Lama was paramount and the only way to ensure that was to whisk him out of Lhasa. In the evening of 17 March, the Dalai Lama escaped, dressed as a common Tibetan soldier.⁹⁷ The Chinese had taken over and hoisted the Five Star flag over Potala and Norbu Lingka palaces by 23 March and the Tibetan rebellion lost steam.⁹⁸ En route to the Indian border, the Dalai Lama repudiated the 17-Point Agreement. On 28 March, Zhou Enlai dissolved the Tibetan government, replacing it with PCART and appointed the Panchen Lama as acting Chairman in the Dalai Lama’s absence.⁹⁹ Two days later, the Dalai Lama and his entourage crossed the Indian border, signifying the end of co-existence and the 17-Point Agreement——the beginning

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⁹⁵ Shakya 1999: 197.
⁹⁸ The eastern Tibetan guerrillas roaming around southern and eastern Tibet were largely unaware of the rebellion in Lhasa. Their participation would have made a material difference to the outcome of the rebellion.
⁹⁹ URI, ‘Order of the State Council of the Chinese People’s Republic,’ 1968: 357-8. The Chinese believed that the Dalai Lama was abducted against his wishes.
of a new epoch. From the above account, it is clear that the insecurity dilemma was at work, complete with Chinese state-building policies targeting Tibetan autonomy and identity and the predictable Tibetan response in the form of diplomacy, non-cooperation, armed rebellion and international advocacy. Consistent with the insecurity dilemma, defense of Tibetan identity was the principal cause of the uprising in 1959.\textsuperscript{100} As Shakya wrote, ‘The revolt was essentially in defence of the value system of the ordinary men and women, to which the Dalai Lama was central.’\textsuperscript{101} The following section outlines the consequent hardening of Chinese policies in all of Tibet, especially with regard to Tibetan identity.

\textbf{Democratic Reforms and the Cultural Revolution (1959-1976)}

While the Dalai Lama and his entourage formed an administrative structure (TGIE)\textsuperscript{102} to look after the tens of thousands of Tibetans who followed him into exile, PCART became all-powerful in Tibet. No longer constrained by the 17-Point Agreement or the necessity to win over the Tibetan elite, the Chinese suppressed the pockets of resistance and rolled out Democratic Reforms in all Tibetan regions.\textsuperscript{103} The Tibetans describe the next two decades as ‘hell on earth’ thrusting the Tibetans to ‘depths of suffering and hardship’\textsuperscript{104} while the Chinese claim to have ‘emancipated’ one million ‘serfs and slaves’ to become masters of their ‘country [China], as well as Tibet.’\textsuperscript{105} To be sure, following the armed revolt of the Tibetans and international criticism, and the leftist turn in Maoist China, Chinese policies in those decades were the harshest from the perspectives of Tibetan identity and autonomy.

The Panchen Lama’s criticism of Chinese policies in the early 1960s is perhaps the most persuasive, given that it was the Chinese communists who compelled the Tibetan government to recognize him as the genuine reincarnation and to allow him to return to his traditional seat during the discussion of the 17-Point Agreement. Moreover, unlike the Dalai Lama, he chose cooperation with the Chinese over exile in India and has never publicly supported Tibetan independence. The Chinese also groomed him up as a possible alternative and/or counter to the Dalai Lama and continue to call him a ‘patriotic’ Lama. Unexpectedly for the Chinese and against the advice of his attendant and advisor, the Panchen Lama

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{100} Shakya 1999: 209-10; Norbu 2001: 210-27.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Shakya 1999: 210.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Nehru and his government were initially resistant to the idea of a Tibetan government-in-exile on Indian soil.
\item \textsuperscript{103} For detailed examinations of the so-called Democratic Reforms, see Smith 2008: 36-39 and 51-119; Shakya 1999: 236-313.
\item \textsuperscript{104} The Dalai Lama, ‘March 10\textsuperscript{th} Statement of H.H. the Dalai Lama,’ 10 March, 2009; available at http://www.dalailama.com/news.350.htm.
\item \textsuperscript{105} State Council, \textit{White Paper on Democratic Reform in Tibet}, 3 March, 2009.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
submitted a petition to the central authorities on 18 May, 1962 based on his observations. Written in Chinese, this became famous as the ‘70, 000 Character Petition.’

He wrote that Chinese reforms and policies in Tibetan areas since the 1950s had placed the Tibetan nationality on the verge of extinction because ‘Tibetan language, costume and customs and other important characteristics’ were disappearing. The Tibetan language, he wrote, ‘has been taken by those foxes who called themselves lions, and toyed with at will and for no reason.’ He decried the destruction of 97% of monasteries and 93% reduction in the number of monks in central and western Tibet alone. He added that ‘I and 90% of the Tibetans cannot endure’ the ‘elimination of Buddhism’ through neglect of study, practice and transmission. He criticised the Chinese officials of short-sightedness and narrow-mindedness for using their political power and ‘many different methods to vigorously, publicly and unscrupulously’ coerce the Tibetans to destroy their own monasteries, statues and stupas, and ‘unscrupulously’ insulting Buddhism by using religious scriptures and pictures of the Buddhas as fertiliser and shoe-soles. He assailed the Chinese claim that the Tibetans destroyed their own cultural sites because of ideological awakening as ‘sheer nonsense’ arising from the ‘complete lack of understanding of the actual situation in Tibet.’

Furthermore, he attacked the Chinese cadres of ‘falsely accusing and slandering’ Tibetans in areas where rebellions did not take place, just so that they can oppress them, of suppressing and attacking Tibetans as counter-revolutionaries for the mere act of chanting scriptures for the happiness of mankind, and carrying out ‘bloody suppression and attacks’ without investigation and believing in groundless rumours of rebellion. He described these practices as ‘absolutely preposterous and extremely clumsy’ and called the Chinese Party Secretaries as ‘propitiation secretaries’ for being too scared to report the truth to the central authorities. The above discussion puts paid to the general perception that cultural destruction in Tibet took place only during the Cultural Revolution.

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106 TIN, A Poisoned Arrow: The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama, London, 1997. This contains both the Chinese original and TIN’s English translation. Of course, the Panchen Lama was not the only Tibetan to criticise Chinese policies in those days. Geshe Sherap Gyatso, another Tibetan lama who supported the CCP from the beginning also attacked the policy towards Tibetan Buddhism and the disproportionate manner of the suppression of the rebellion in Tibetan regions. Shakya 1999: 270-1.


108 Ibid: 69. He was referring to the arbitrary changes made to written and spoken Tibetan language in the 1950s in eastern Tibet during the democratic reforms. The same changes were enforced in central Tibet in the 1960s and 1970s.


111 Ibid: 51.

The Panchen Lama’s petition is the boldest and most extensive criticism of Maoist policies made by an official in the whole of China, not to mention by another minority official.\textsuperscript{113} The Party itself declared that the Panchen Lama’s petition exceeded Peng Dehui’s 10,000-character criticism of Mao’s policies written in 1959.\textsuperscript{114} On 28 March, 1987, the rehabilitated Panchen revealed that he actually understated the figures in the Petition out of fear. Predictably, the Panchen Lama was labelled an enemy of the party, people and socialism in 1964, persecuted with violent public ‘struggle-sessions’ and incarcerated for 14 years in prisons and house-detentions.\textsuperscript{115} However, worse was in store as two years after the Panchen Lama’s incarceration, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) engulfed Tibet and China.

The establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965 did nothing to cushion the violent destruction that awaited Tibet. Autonomy was an Orwellian farce. As Shakya writes, ‘In reality, the creation of the TAR brought Tibet even closer to China. It legally buried the 17-Point Agreement...by confirming that Tibet was no longer a “unique area” within the PRC.’\textsuperscript{116} As Smith argued, ‘Institutions of Tibetan political “autonomy” formed a facade of Tibetan leadership and popular political participation behind which the Chinese continued to exercise all real political power.’\textsuperscript{117} The Sinologist George Mosely wrote that regional autonomy meant just the opposite: ‘regional detention.’\textsuperscript{118} Even this pretence of autonomy was assailed during the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{119} With the enforcement of the commune system, which ‘meant an unprecedented degree of centralized control,’ even the autonomy of individuals and families to make day-to-day decisions was taken away. As Wang writes:

If a Commune member wanted to get half a kilo of butter he had to report to his production team in advance and then work his way through a series of procedures involving team leaders, accountants and warehouse keepers. The remaining private elements of the economy were almost totally wiped out.\textsuperscript{120}

In this totalitarian context, Tibetan culture was reduced to rubbles in the ensuing campaigns against ‘The Four Olds’ during the Cultural Revolution.

Under Mao’s injunction to destroy the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits), Chinese and Tibetan Red Guards rampaged against Tibetan culture.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid: xi; Shakya 1999: 274.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid: xx-xxi; Shakya 1999: 290-301.
\textsuperscript{116} Shakya 1999: 306.
\textsuperscript{117} Smith 1996: 537.
Whatever the nature of the Cultural Revolution in China itself and whatever the original intentions of the authorities, every aspect of Tibetan culture was destroyed, ‘reformed’ or banned. As Shakya contends, ‘The effect was to destroy Tibet’s separate identity. The Chinese now propagated a policy of total assimilation and Tibetan identity was reduced to the language alone, although...even this had come under attack.’

Goldstein concurs: “The Chinese Communist Party….placed Tibetan traditional culture and religion under severe attack.”

However, the Party Central lost control of the campaign, which dissolved into brutal factional fighting all over China between rival groups of Red Guards divided along class lines. In Tibet, the factional conflict played out between the Nyam-drel or United Front (ブン・サ) and Gyen-log or Rebel (ブン・サ) groups. Consistent with the logic of the insecurity dilemma, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans exploited the factional anarchy to fight for their culture and identity.

The most well-known example is the Nyemo Revolt of 1969. Beginning in 1968, Tibetans in Nyemo County (west of Lhasa), led by Trinley Chodon, a nun claiming to be possessed by the spirit of Gongmey Gyalmo [ブン・サ], the celestial aunt and advisor of Gesar, the mythical king in the Tibetan epic, Gesar of Ling [ブン・サ], rose up in a violent rebellion that spread to eighteen counties. Her fame spread far and wide because of her presumed prophetic and healing powers. Trinley and her supporters allied with Gyenlog because of its anti-establishment crusade against the Nyamdrel faction. Nyamdrel were associated with the destruction of Tibetan culture, the brutal suppression of the 1959 uprising and the enforcement of democratic reforms and most recently the commune system. With her charismatic leadership, she inspired the rural Tibetans to attack the Chinese officials and

122 Shakya 1999: 322.
123 Goldstein 1997: 59.
125 Shakya 1999: 343-47; 2002: 39-40; Smith 2008: 128; Goldstein 2009; Wang 2002: 98. There is a debate about whether it was primarily a nationalist revolt or an economic struggle against the introduction of the commune system in central Tibet, with Goldstein and Wang privileging the economic rationale and others espousing the nationalist argument, but all of them agree that there was, at least, an ethnic dimension to the brutal conflicts of 1969. Goldstein 2009: 170.
126 Goldstein 2009: 1 and 82; Shakya 1999: 345. Gesar is believed to be the longest epic in the world. In the epic, Gesar descends from heaven to subdue the demons that were destroying Buddhism in Tibet. Gongmey Gyalmo stays in heaven, but helps Gesar in his mission in Tibet through prophecies. Although there is little information on how the rebellion manifested in the other counties, Goldstein provides an account of what happened in the nomadic area of Phala, Ngamring County. There, achieving religious and economic freedoms were the main agenda of the nomads who took part in the rebellion. Goldstein 2009: 174-81.
Tibetan collaborators, often with extreme brutality. Her success inspired other Tibetans to claim to be mediums of one or another of Gesar’s warrior-ministers, all claiming to be working for the restoration of Buddhism in Tibet. The revolt culminated in attacks on the PLA in a village named Bagor, where twenty PLA soldiers and cadres were killed, and attacks on the headquarters of Nyemo County. A huge contingent of PLA soldiers with reinforcements from other counties had to be deployed to subdue the rebels. The operation resulted in the death of many of the rebels and the arrest of the nun and her colleagues and a Lama who had performed the ritual, Opening the Nerve Door (Opening the Nerve Door), to spiritually prepare her for possession by Gongmey Gyalmo. They were all executed in Lhasa in 1970.

Although economic reasons definitely played some role and it was entwined with the tumultuous factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, the Nyemo Revolt was primarily a ‘cultural response’ which was ‘inspired by the Tibetan’s desire to regain some measure of social, psychological and cultural freedom.’ It was provoked by ‘the constant attack on their culture by the Chinese.... The total negation of traditional Tibetan cultural and religious authority elicited an extreme response from the Tibetans.’ The violent and relentless socialist nation-building met an equally violent millenarian cultural response. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, the insecurity dilemma found violent expression.

The Cultural Revolution ended when Mao died in 1976. Tibetans emerged from the Cultural Revolution demoralised and anomic. All the monasteries had been reduced to ruins or ransacked off their religious contents. The ubiquitous monks had disappeared and any expression of Tibetan identity was banned, except their language whose grammatical rules and vocabulary had also been changed to suit the new ideology. On the surface, the Chinese appeared to have succeeded in assimilating the Tibetans and ‘Tibet ceased to have any distinctive characteristics.’ The Panchen Lama’s assessment is compelling again.

Persecution and incarceration had neither broken his spirits nor dampened the force of his criticism. On 28 March 1987, he told the TAR Standing Committee of the NPC in Beijing that he stood by his criticisms in 1962, adding that Chinese policies in the previous two

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127 Shakya 1999: 345. Gyenlog and the nun had a symbiotic relationship. While Gyenlog acquired thousands of rural Tibetan members because of her charismatic authority, the nun and her entourage found increasing space, at least temporarily, to revive some of Tibet’s traditions and to fight for the restoration of Buddhism in Tibet.  
128 Goldstein 2009: 98-99. Of course, occasionally, they asserted rhetorical affiliation with Mao’s leadership, which was a tactical ploy given the broader political state of affairs.  
130 Ibid: 144-161.  
131 Ibid: 154. In total, 34 members of her group including herself were executed.  
133 Ibid.  
134 Shakya 1999: 349.
decades ‘have been detrimental’ to the Tibetan nationality. He criticised the large number of Chinese officials in Tibet for their corruption, Chinese immigration and the neglect of education, especially Tibetan language education.\textsuperscript{135} In 1988, he said in his address to a meeting of Chinese Tibetologists, ‘Before 1959, there were 5000 monasteries in the Tibetan areas,... 99.98 per cent of them were destroyed. Only seven or eight survived.’\textsuperscript{136} Even the surviving ones were in various states of disrepair. On 23 January, 1989, he told a meeting of government and religious leaders at Tashi Lhunpo that Tibet had lost far more than it had gained from Chinese rule in the preceding three decades.\textsuperscript{137} The following day, at a meeting of monastic heads and reincarnate lamas, he detailed the destruction that Buddhism had endured since the 1950s.\textsuperscript{138} The Panchen Lama’s criticisms are borne out by independent scholars.\textsuperscript{139} Goldstein writes:

\begin{quote}
Between the rebellions, food shortages, and struggle sessions against “class enemies”... [t]he full loss of life is not clearly known, but the damage to Tibet’s culture was substantial..... [I]n the period after the 1959 uprising, Buddhism was destroyed and Tibetans were forced to abandon deeply held values and customs that went to the core of their cultural identity.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

Deng Xiaoping’s ushering in of the Reform Era (Gāigé kāifàng) in 1978 brought about liberalisation on a number of fronts, not least on culture and economy in Tibet. Would these reforms attenuate or worsen the insecurity dilemma?

\textbf{Reform, Resistance and Martial Law (1978-1989)}

Deng’s liberalisation, including the initiation of dialogue with the exiled Dalai Lama gave a sense of optimism to the bewildered Tibetans. Chinese-Tibetan relations in the post-Mao era began on a cautiously positive note. China began by releasing and rehabilitating a number of Tibetans who had taken part in the March 1959 rebellion and some officials of the former Tibetan government who had been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. The 10th Panchen Lama was also released on 10 October, 1977 and politically rehabilitated in 1978,\textsuperscript{141} followed by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal.\textsuperscript{142} Over 2300 Tibetans who were wrongly accused and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} DIIR 2003: 75-76.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid: 194; Shakya 1999: 429.
\item \textsuperscript{138} DIIR 2003: 79-88.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Goldstein 1997: 59-60; Shakya 1999: 348-49.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Goldstein 1997: 59-60.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Hilton 1999: 173.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Goldstein, Siebenschuh, Sherap and Siebenschuh 2004.
\end{itemize}
incarcerated during the Cultural Revolution were also given monetary compensation. Travel restrictions were relaxed, enabling some Tibetans in exile to visit Tibet and those in Tibet to travel to India and Nepal for family visits, pilgrimage and religious teachings. Beijing also initiated contact with the Hong Kong-based elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Gyalpo Dhondup, resulting in his meeting with Deng in Beijing in 1979. Deng reportedly told Dhondup:

The basic question is whether Tibet is part of China or not. This should be kept as the criteria for testing the truth…. So long as it is not accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about.

Tibetan exile officials and western scholars have interpreted this as meaning that apart from independence, all other issues could be discussed. This rather ambivalent statement became the basis of a dialogue process that lasted until 1993. Deng also invited the Dalai Lama to send fact-finding delegations to inspect the local situation inside Tibet, leading to four fact-finding delegations and two exploratory talks between 1979 and 1985. A mix of objective realities, pragmatic imperatives and confidence in the Tibetans’ ideological loyalty to Beijing accounted for the relaxation of policy and initiation of dialogue, including allowing the exile fact-finding missions.

First, the CCP abandoned the Cultural Revolution-era policy of violent assimilation and returned to the traditional Chinese belief that the frontier-barbarians would voluntarily adopt the ‘superior’ and ‘advanced’ culture of the Chinese. This was also compatible with the Marxist idea of the eventual withering away of national and religious identities in favour of proletarian identity in the course of revolution. However, conditions should be created conducive for such a process of ‘acculturation’ to work even if that meant giving ground temporarily. A broader set of incentives was necessary to win Tibetan hearts and minds.

When the post-Mao Chinese leaders realised the failure of repressive and violent socialist transformation to flatten national identities, indeed confronted its counter-productivity, the search for a new strategy ensued culminating in a National Frontier Defense Work Conference in April 1979. The new strategy of affirmative action to win over minority nationalities was unveiled. The scope of the affirmative action policy is three-fold: political representation for groups, social welfare for individuals and economic development of their regions.

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143 Shakya 1999: 373.
144 Quoted in Norbu 2001: 316.
First, the Autonomy Law specified that one or both of the chairman and vice-chairman of the standing committees of the People’s Congress of an autonomous entity must come from the nationality exercising autonomy in that area. Similarly, the chairman of an autonomous region, prefect of an autonomous prefecture and head of an autonomous county must be a member of the titular nationality. Other posts in the government should be occupied by members of national minorities resident in that autonomous region. Cadres working for the organs of self-government should be recruited from the nationalities resident in that autonomous area. This aspect of the affirmative action policy also included recruiting national minority elites to symbolic positions at the national level. An electoral law passed during the 1982 NPC meeting required that the proportion of national minority delegates should be around 12 per cent, almost twice the proportion of their population at 6.7 per cent. In practice, these local, regional and national posts are personally remunerative and prestigious, but they are ceremonial ‘positions without power’ as one Tibetan put it. The next chapter examines the quality of administrative autonomy and representation the Tibetans enjoy. Suffice to say here that independent scholars have pointed out these provisions as lacking in practical substance in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.

The second set of inducement policy, aimed at the social welfare of individual members of national minorities, include more relaxed birth control measures and quotas and lower entrance requirements for minority college students. The third component of affirmative action is the economic development of minority regions. Economic development was seen as an instrument to dampen ethnic nationalism, the argument being that ‘ethnic minorities want to gain economic benefits through the autonomous system. They will not make trouble if their economic problems are solved.’ The Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984 in Beijing ushered in economic development as the cornerstone of Beijing’s Tibet policy—‘to get rich as soon as possible’ was the slogan. The idea that national minorities will

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147 Anonymous from Tibet, [Call-In Discussion], Radio Free Asia (Tibetan Service), 16 October, 2007.
150 Lang Weiwei, ‘Lun Deng Xiaoping minzu quyu zizhi de shijian yu sixiang,’ [Practice and thought of Deng Xiaoping on nationality autonomy], Minzu yanjiu (Nationality Studies), No. 1, 1999: 6; quoted in Zhao, 196; Fei Xiaotong, Pluralistic Integration of the Chinese Nationality, (Zhongua Minzu duoyuan yitihua geju), Beijing: Press of Central Nationality Institute, (1989), 35, quoted in Guobin and Lingyuan, 46.
stop being problematic when economic development makes them wealthy seems to be prevalent in the minds of Chinese officials and intellectuals. The inducement policy as a whole had the security purpose of containing ethno-nationalism and creating a unitary ‘Han-dominated’ nation-state:

The [inducement] policy was not based on any desire to celebrate differences. Although the CCP vowed to develop ethnic minority regions, this goal was inextricably linked to its ability to maintain a unitary Chinese nation-state…. As opposed to empowering minorities, the inducement policy was meant to create a peaceful, unified, and essentially Han-dominated multinational state. 

As such, the affirmative action policies have a mix of nation-building, institution-building and infrastructure building missions.

All these apparently positive developments were in line with the overall opening up strategy that Deng and his liberal heir Hu Yaobang had for China itself. Beijing’s overtures were partly fuelled by its confidence, based on erroneous reports from its local officials, that the Tibetans had been ideologically transformed from their subservience to feudal elites and superstitious religious beliefs. Ren Rong, the Han Chinese Party Secretary in TAR had been reporting to Beijing that the political situation in Tibet was such that the Tibetans solidly backed the party and the motherland. Nothing could be farther from the truth as the reception given to the exile delegations robustly demonstrated.

Apparently, even the Dalai Lama and the exile government were not sure how the Tibetans inside Tibet were feeling about the Dalai Lama and Chinese-Tibetan relations broadly, especially given the Chinese propaganda that the Tibetans were happy and the reports that China had managed to ‘indoctrinate’ the younger generation of Tibetans. When the delegations visited Tibetan areas in TAR and other provinces, they were mobbed by thousands of emotionally-charged Tibetans who recounted terrible tragedies that they had suffered, much to the embarrassment of the Chinese officials. When the first delegation including an elder brother of the Dalai Lama visited the Tibetan regions of Qinghai province (Amdo), they were given a rapturous welcome by the local Tibetans. Embarrassed, Beijing called Lhasa up to ask what was likely to happen if the delegation was allowed to visit Lhasa. Party Secretary Rong reassured Beijing that the Lhasa Tibetans were more ideologically advanced than the farmers and nomads of Amdo and supported the party unambiguously. The scenes in Amdo would not be repeated in Lhasa. Before the arrival of the delegation,

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152 Zhao 2004: 204.
neighbourhood meetings were organised all over Lhasa to advise the Tibetans to not allow their resentment of the ‘old society’ to get out of control and not to spit and throw stones at the exile delegation. In Lhasa, the emotional reception the delegation received surpassed anything they had witnessed in six months of touring. As Goldstein writes,

Thousands upon thousands of Lhasans mobbed the delegation. Many cried and prostrated, others offered ceremonial scarves, fighting to touch the Dalai Lama’s brother, and a few shouted Tibetan nationalist slogans such as “Tibet is independent” and “Han go home.”

The tragedies and continuing suffering were laid bare. Despite Beijing’s objective of using economic development to wean the Tibetans away from the Dalai Lama and repeated proclamations of success on this front, the Tibetans have left no doubt that they were squarely behind the Dalai Lama.

However, in its dialogue with the Dalai Lama, even Hu Yaobang had taken a stance that was unacceptable to Dharamsala. During a meeting with Gyalo Dhondup, Hu presented a five-point agenda for negotiations, which essentially treated the ‘Tibet Question’ as one between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s personal future and denied the existence of any other issues beyond that. The main points of his proposal were that the Dalai Lama had to recognise that China ‘has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and’ and unity among the nationalities; the Dalai Lama and his representatives should be ‘frank and sincere’ and stop ‘quibbling over the events in 1959; the Dalai Lama was welcome to return and would be reinstated to the same political status and privileges that he enjoyed in the 1950s, but he would have to live in Beijing and not hold any posts in Tibet. This proposal had no space for the Tibetan aspirations for greater political autonomy or the unification of all Tibetan areas, let alone one that rejected the supremacy of the Communist Party. Dharamsala rejected Hu’s proposal as trying to reduce the issue of 6 million Tibetans to one concerning the personal status of the Dalai Lama. In 1982, another exile delegation was dispatched ‘to tackle the real business.’ The delegation proposed the unification of all Tibetan regions into a single administrative region which should be given the same status that Beijing was offering to Taiwan and Hong Kong, namely ‘One Country, Two System’. Beijing immediately rejected this proposal, arguing that unlike Taiwan and Hong Kong, Tibet had already been liberated and enjoyed socialism, and that Hu’s five-point proposal was the only basis for negotiations. Officially, Beijing has consistently maintained this position ever since, even as Dharamsala packaged its two central demands differently.

over the decades. This deadlock would later cause the dialogue process to falter after four exile fact-finding missions and two exploratory talks took place between 1979 and 1985.

Emboldened by Hu Yaobang’s limited liberalisation of policy, the Tibetans demanded greater religious and linguistic rights and Tibetanisation of the administration, among others, and the top leadership was quite willing to accommodate some of these demands as long as they did not lead to the CCP’s loss of power and demands for Tibetan independence. In May 1980, General Secretary Hu Yaobang led his own fact-finding mission to TAR, where he found the conditions far more appalling than he expected. He proclaimed a six-point reform package for Tibet, which contains:

(1) An ethnic dimension—making the Tibet Autonomous Region more Tibetan in overall character by fostering a revitalisation of Tibetan culture and religion, including more extensive use of Tibetan language, and by withdrawing large numbers of Chinese cadre and replacing them with Tibetans; and
(2) an economic dimension—rapidly improving the standard of living of individual Tibetans by temporarily eliminating taxes and “below market” quota sales, and developing infrastructure to allow Tibet to grow economically in the years ahead.

Hu was scathing in his criticism of the local officials in internal reports and speeches, accusing them of throwing the millions of Yuan in Central subsidies into the Kyichu River.

Yet, Hu’s liberal reforms met an immediate backlash within the bureaucracy and after some initial steps such as the withdrawal of some Chinese cadres and the recruitment of Tibetan officials, suffered set-backs or were negated by other policy decisions. First, his criticism was deeply resented by the entrenched Chinese cadres who felt that their sacrifices for the party and the motherland were being treated as a failure. They complained to the Central Committee. Secondly, the cadre withdrawal program came to a screeching halt as the Chinese regions where they came from could not re-absorb them. In any case, this well-intentioned effort to ‘Tibetanise’ Tibet was more than cancelled out by the decision taken during the Second Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing (27 February—6 March, 1984) to open up Tibet for business and trade by the ethnic Chinese. This opened a flood-gate of Chinese migration into Tibet, the consequences of which have been far-ranging for Tibetans and their relationship with China.

More to the point, a faction within the bureaucracy, including some sinicised Tibetans, felt threatened by these linguistic and administrative demands of the Tibetans and the apparent concessions by the government. When it was announced on 19th July, 1986 that Tibetan would be established as the main language of administration on a trial basis, a faction

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161 Shakya 1999: 381-82.
of Chinese and leftist Tibetan cadres feared the consequent loss of their domination in Tibet to Tibetan cadres who were more conversant with that language, while others feared the destabilising potential of empowering the linguistic pillar of Tibetan identity. Leftist Tibetan cadres raised objections because they were functionally illiterate in the Tibetan language. As Shakya wrote, “[T]he resistance came not only from the Chinese cadres but the Tibetans who were threatened by the younger and better educated cadres.” A local incarnation of regime insecurity was at play here. The prospect of the return of the Dalai Lama and a new regime similarly threatened those regional and national cadres and institutions whose careers and raison d’être depended upon the maintenance of the status quo in Tibet.

Relaxation in the religious sphere was even more sensitive. Despite the initial opening, considerable restrictions remained on religious freedom since the monasteries were seen as the nerve-centres of Tibetan nationalism and the biggest challenge to Chinese rule. Although the Party was resigned to allowing some role for religion in Tibet, albeit wary of inflaming separatism, it could not hide its true agenda with regard to religion in Tibet. In 1983, the Party had reiterated the ultimate withering away of religion as a matter of ideological and policy objectives. As some scholars put it, the limited official tolerance of religion in Tibet was ‘purely strategic.’ Yet, it was not entirely up to the CCP. The spurt of religious revival in the early 1980s took everyone by surprise, rattling the Chinese officials. Arjia Rinpoche, who was a high-ranking official within the Buddhist bureaucracy in China before escaping in 1998 wrote that much of this revival, including the renovation of monasteries and recognition of reincarnations happened largely outside the official framework. Only when the scale of the revival became obvious, and the religious bureaucracy risked becoming irrelevant did the State Administration for Religious Affairs of the PRC bring in regulations for monastic restoration and the recognition of reincarnate Lamas. The CCP’s loss of control in Tibet, if not of China’s, was genuinely feared as an

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163 Ibid.
164 Goldstein 1997: 85; Shakya 1999: 419.
165 Ibid: 419.
167 Blondeau, in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 161; Kapstein 2004: 242
170 Ibid.
outcome of a separatist movement organised along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. Thus state security and regime securities were seen to be at stake.

These domestic challenges were enhanced by a number of external events. When it became apparent that dialogue was going nowhere, what with Beijing’s hard-line on even the definition of the Tibet Question, and fearful of becoming irrelevant, TGIE unleashed an international campaign to wrest back initiative and to address the asymmetry in power.¹⁷¹ Consequently, the Dalai Lama gave a high-profile political address before the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September, 1987. The talk was received favourably in the US Congress, which took a series of legislative and practical measures to support the Tibetans.¹⁷² While in the past the Dalai Lama always avoided political issues during his travels outside India to avoid inconveniencing his hosts, the Indians, Chinese and Americans knew that this trip would be qualitatively different.¹⁷³ The Indian government withdrew its ‘minder’ who always accompanied the Dalai Lama on his foreign trips in the past, ostensibly to avoid complicity. The Chinese pressured the Americans to stop the Dalai Lama’s ‘anti-Chinese political activities’, to which the Americans responded that the Dalai Lama is visiting on his ‘private capacity’.¹⁷⁴ The nature of the Dalai Lama’s visit and choice of venue revived Chinese fears of the pre-1974 Tibetan-Indian-American covert alignment against Communist China. This was accompanied by similar interests and support in Western Europe as early as 1986, arousing fears of a broader Western conspiracy against China and the CCP.¹⁷⁵

Beijing responded by protesting internationally and intimidating the Tibetan population at home. The Chinese propaganda apparatus sprang into action with the Party-controlled media accusing the US of interfering in China’s internal affairs and the Dalai Lama of trying to split the mother-land.¹⁷⁶ A clip of the Dalai Lama being feted in the US Congress overlaid with a text denouncing his visit was shown on state TV, which only inspired the Tibetans. On 24 September, 1987, fifteen thousand Tibetans were assembled in a stadium in Lhasa to a mass sentencing of eleven Tibetans for ‘criminal offences’, including two death sentences. It was widely believed that some of the Tibetans were political

¹⁷¹ Blondeau, in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 75; Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 9.
¹⁷² Ibid: 77-78.
¹⁷⁴ Ibid.
prisoners. 

Attended by leading Party officials, the Tibetans were lectured in strident ideological terms to ‘preserve unity and stability’ and to abide by the ‘Four Cardinal Principles.’ 

Beijing’s concerns about transnational Tibetan activism and foreign entanglement became exacerbated when Lhasa was rocked by a series of pro-independence protests and riots beginning on 27 September, 1987, a week after the Dalai Lama’s address in the US Congress. 138 separate protests and riots are known to have taken place between September 1987 and August 1992.

In the midst of these tumultuous events in Tibet, the Dalai Lama delivered a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June, 1988, which developed the issues he had raised in the US Congress a year earlier. This statement has come to be known as the ‘Strasbourg Proposal.’ He proposed that Beijing could handle Tibet’s foreign affairs and defence, but Tibet could pursue its foreign relations in all other areas through a ‘Foreign Affairs Bureau’ on top of managing its own internal affairs; the three traditional ‘provinces’ should be unified into one administrative unit; this unified entity should be allowed to practice a liberal democratic political system complete with a ‘popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system’; China could maintain a limited military presence in Tibet for defence purposes, but regional consultations should be conducted to declare Tibet a ‘zone of peace.’ This was the first time that the Dalai Lama had publicly declared his willingness to give up Tibetan independence in exchange for political autonomy. Not surprisingly, The Strasbourg Proposal was not just rejected by Beijing but also proved to be very controversial among the exile community, inviting charges of betrayal and buckling under foreign pressure.

The Strasbourg Proposal became the basis of the Middle Way approach that the Dalai Lama and TGIE follow to this day in their search for a negotiated solution with Beijing. As the next chapter explains, Dharamsala has modified the key components of the Middle Way approach since then, but greater political autonomy and unification of all Tibetans within one administration would

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178 Lhasa Xizang Regional Service in Mandarin, 24 September, 1987. in Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 1 October, 1987: 27. The Four Cardinal Principles were CCP’s leadership, Socialism, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Dictatorship of the Proletariat.
remain constant, albeit in slightly revised forms. However, despite repeated communications, Sino-Tibetan dialogue had more or less collapsed under the weight of the strong divergence between the two sides on the core issues.

In any case, by March 1989, repeated protests and riots rendered the situation serious enough for Beijing to impose martial law in Lhasa on 8 March, 1989.\textsuperscript{183} The death of the Panchen Lama previously on 28 January, 1989, left Beijing without a respected Tibetan intermediary to steer the Tibetans away from protests and riots against Chinese rule. The announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize for the Dalai Lama on 5 October, 1989 heightened suspicion and fears in Beijing of a concerted Western interventionism to contain China’s development and rise.\textsuperscript{184} As Rabgey and Sharlho observed, ‘With Chinese suspicions of Western motives reaching new heights, Beijing’s distrust of the Dalai Lama grew along with its perception of his increasing alignment with the West.’\textsuperscript{185} Happening around the same time as the Tiananmen Square events and the collapse of communism in Europe and reforms in the Soviet Union, Beijing feared that China would fall victim to the same dynamics of ethnic conflicts, loss of Communist power and dismemberment of the state.

How did Chinese-Tibetans relations go from the optimism of the late 1970s and early 1980s to the riots and martial law in 1989? To make sense of this radical break-down in relations, it is necessary to appreciate how events both internal and external to Tibet and China exacerbated the PRC’s existing insecurities on Tibet and to understand the nature and pace of the reforms and how they were perceived by the Tibetans.

First, the 1989 policy-shift was a response to certain regional, domestic, transnational and international events that accentuated the existing insecurities. It was not a sudden development, but rather the culmination of years of struggle between liberal and conservative elements in Lhasa and Beijing on the issue of how to address the security challenges.\textsuperscript{186} Specifically, China’s pre-existing insecurities over Tibet were heightened by the contemporary demands of increasingly assertive and restive Tibetans at home, the international campaigns of the exiles, particularly the activities of the Dalai Lama, difficulties with India and fears of Western intervention or intrigue in Tibet. Given an added ring of gravity and immediacy by the changes in the Soviet Union and the domino-like collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, these perceived threats pushed China’s

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid: 160.
\textsuperscript{184} Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 15.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid: 16.
\textsuperscript{186} Shakya 1999: 408.
Tibet policy into the hard-line mode, which persists to this day.\textsuperscript{187} Indeed, security was central to Chinese calculations in Tibet in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{188} As Schwartz wrote,

Tibet retains enormous strategic importance for China as a border area and potential arena for conflict. Security is always a serious concern. Thus, no policies can be implemented in Tibet without the approval of the military, which retains close links to the TAR administration.\textsuperscript{189}

And as Barnett observed, security issues or stability in the official lexicon was the primary focus in those years.\textsuperscript{190} The hard-line policy shift was a reaction to a number of insecurity-generating developments both internally and externally.

**Conclusion**

Maoist China not only took away the autonomy of eastern Tibetan rulers, but also persecuted them in the 1950s. In addition, treating eastern Tibetans as Chinese, radical communist reforms targeting the traditional elite and Tibetan identity were conducted, provoking a broad-based armed revolt which spread into central Tibet. Although central and western Tibet enjoyed the gradualist terms of 17-Point Agreement, the unmistakable state-building policies provoked a massive uprising in 1959 in Lhasa, resulting in the escape of the Dalai Lama to India and repudiation of the 17-Point Agreement. The Tibetans saw the Chinese practices as undermining the authorities of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government and targeting Tibetan identity. They resented the economic pressures on the local economy from the increasing Chinese population. The eastern Tibetan refugees and the harrowing stories of religious and political persecution in their homelands confirmed their suspicions of what the Chinese intended to do: depose the Dalai Lama and eradicate Tibetan identity. The insecurity dilemma was back with a vengeance in Sino-Tibetan relations.

As the Dalai Lama busied himself with building up the exile institutions, the Tibetans inside Tibet were subjected to democratic reforms and the Cultural Revolution, which all but annihilated Tibetan identity. Even during the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans in various parts of Tibet rose up in violent revolt between 1968 and 1969, confirming the tenacity of the insecurity dilemma to manifest even during times of utter terror and repression. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping ushered in more liberal policies on a number of fronts, but a number of domestic and external set-backs reinforced the complex of threats that had worried Beijing over its incorporation of Tibet: concerns about separatism and the fears of the loss of


\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} Barnett 2003: 229.
sovereignty, territory, and CCP or factional power as well as institutional integrity, and ideological and national identity threats led to the hard-line shift in Beijing’s Tibet policy and dialogue with Dharamsala in 1989.

Chapters Five and Six examine how these hard-line policies were implemented and received by the Tibetans. Would the insecurity dilemma loosen its stranglehold? Chapter Five picks up the historical narrative from here to begin drawing the cyclical dynamic of the insecurity dilemma in a more analytical sense, focusing on the post-1989 era. From here, the chapters will be more analytical, although to the extent that analytical requirements permit, a sense of chronology would still be observed.
Chapter 5

Security, State-Building and Beijing’s Tibet Policy

Having set the historical context in the two previous chapters, we now turn to the specifics of the recent and contemporary Sino-Tibetan encounter, with analytical focus on the post-1989 period. It examines the dynamic interplay of the mutual insecurities of the Chinese Party-State and the Tibetan nation through the transmission belt of China’s Tibet policy. The theoretical insights from security studies outlined in Chapter Two will be applied, representing a significant departure from the existing literature on the conflict. This chapter will demonstrate that Beijing’s Tibet policy is designed to meet the Party-State’s security challenges in Tibet.

First, the various Chinese policies and instruments deployed towards the Tibetans after 1989 in the pursuit of state-building will be examined. Next, the basic Chinese security interests and concerns arising from the Tibetan goals and strategies, which drive Beijing’s Tibet policy, will be studied in a more coherent manner. To demonstrate the cyclical dynamics and interactive mutuality of the insecurity dilemma (i.e. between Chinese state-building and Tibetan resistance)—indicating the processual simultaneity of the Chinese and Tibetan security thinking and actions—mutual signposts will be given at appropriate places in this and the next chapter.


As mentioned in the introductory chapter, China’s security concerns in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia involve fears over sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, organising ideology, the Leninist political system and state institutions, national identity and image and regime survival. Zhang Qingli, former Party Secretary of TAR, clearly reveals Tibet’s import for China’s security:

Tibet’s strategic position is extremely important; it is an important security screen in China’s southwest. Tibet’s special features in history, current state, environment, and geography determine that its development and stability are always closely linked to national sovereignty and security. Tibet is a focal point in our struggle with international anti-China forces. The desire of hostile forces to finish us is still alive, their desire to throw us into chaos, has not changed, and they have all along tried to make use of the so-called Tibet question to contain and split China. Supported by international anti-China forces, the Dalai clique has continually changed its methods, frequently caused incidents, damaged social stability, and plotted so-called Tibet
independence... Our struggle against the Dalai clique and the western hostile forces supporting it is long term, sharp, intense and complex.¹

Coming straight from the horse’s mouth, as it were, Zhang’s statement is both informative and representative of the Chinese security thinking over Tibet. Zhang hints at Beijing’s military-strategic and political security interests in Tibet, but societal security from the Chinese perspective is also relevant. Various policy instruments have been employed after 1989 to realise these security objectives. The threat and use of coercive force to meet ideological, political and military objectives in Tibet has been an enduring and well-documented feature of Chinese rule in Tibet from the beginning.² Yet, it will be shown that a variety of subtler instruments have also been used.

Picking up from the previous chapter, in response to the pro-independence demonstrations and riots Tibet, Wu Jinghua, the liberal Yi minority Party Secretary of TAR, was replaced by Hu Jintao on 12 January, 1989. Beijing ordered the imposition of martial law in Lhasa on 7 March, 1989, effective from 8 March. Due to a number of reasons discussed in the previous chapter, a Politburo meeting in Beijing unveiled on 19 October, 1989, the hard-line policy of rejecting political liberalisation, repressive enforcement of stability and rapid economic development inside Tibet and the side-lining the Dalai Lama.³ It reflected a loss of faith in the liberal policies of the Hu Yaobang and Wu Jinghua to win Tibetan loyalty. In fact, they were seen as increasing nationalistic sentiments, leading to ethnic riots. It was also indicative of the loss of faith in the Dalai Lama to ‘play a constructive role in Tibet.’⁴ In broad terms, the new policy came to be known as ‘grasping with both hands’, involving accelerated economic development through massive state subsidies and investment and ruthless enforcement of stability in Tibet through the use of the police, military and other security agencies.⁵ A third element of the hard-line policy was a continuation of the Maoist-style political campaigns of mass mobilisation and ideological indoctrination.⁶ Shakya is most suggestive of the implications for the insecurity dilemma of the new policy:

³ Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 15.
⁴ Ibid.
⁶ Shakya 1999: 433; 196.
The new policy would emphasise those factors which engendered greater integration of the region with the rest of China, and which would avoid laying any stress on Tibet’s separate identity. The monasteries and other institutions would be tamed and made to follow stricter guidelines laid down by Beijing.7

China’s Tibet policy in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century adhered closely to the broad parameters of coercive stabilisation, economic development and political-ideological campaigns. A number of different policy instruments have been used to achieve the political, military and societal security objectives of nation- and state-building. Introduced at various historical junctures since the incorporation of the Tibetan regions into the PRC, all these instruments predate the policy-shift in 1989. Although the prominence of some instruments may have waned over time in the overall repertoire, the Chinese continue to draw from them every now and then.

The Nationality Identification Programme is illustrative. Although the main work of identification was done in the 1950s by ‘ethnographers’ using Stalin’s definition of nationhood, the Chinese continue to exploit the security instrumentality of that project. In the wake of the Tibetan protests in 2008, Zhu Xiaoming, Deputy-Director of Beijing-based China Tibetology Research Center and former official in the United Front Department, criticised the Tibetan demands for administrative unification with this argument: ‘Besides, the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is actually a multi-ethnic region. Apart from Tibetans, there are more than 10 ethnic groups living on the plateau for generations, such as Han, Hui, Mongolian, Tu, Monba and Lhoba.’8 This confirms Zhao’s argument that Beijing’s aim behind the Nationality Identification Project was to ‘obfuscate’ and negate the aspirations of the non-Chinese minorities.9 Similarly, the affirmative action policies that were introduced as a result of the National Frontier Defense Work Conference in 1979 continue to this day and feature prominently in both the official and popular Chinese discourses on Tibet and the Tibetans.10

Chinese officials and people frequently remind the Tibetans of the preferential treatments they receive and accuse them of being ungrateful, and advertise these when confronted by criticism from third parties. However, the instruments that most defined Beijing’s Tibet policy after 1989 have been its reliance on the coercive forces (PLA, PAP, PSB and police and the wider surveillance apparatus), economic development, political campaigns and the United Front. Connections will also be identified between these policies and the nation-building and institutional and infrastructural dimensions of state-building. However, these

7 Ibid: 432.
9 Zhao 2004: 180.
instruments are deployed within the broader legal and political context of the Regional National Autonomy system. Different sections of this chapter will demonstrate the widened gap between the legal provisions of autonomy and the reality of its practice in Tibet in the functional areas of administration and political representation, culture (religion and language), education and economy. All these areas fell under the axe of the hard-line shift in policies. However, for Hu Jintao, the newly appointed Party Secretary, the immediate order of business was to quell the Tibetan uprising through martial law.

**Stabilising Tibet through Martial Law**

Securing the situation—stopping the frequent Tibetan protests and riots in Lhasa even under martial law—occupied the attention of the Chinese authorities well into the early 1990s. A number of coercive steps had to be taken ranging from a massive show of PLA force, arrests and sentencing of participants in the uprising, introduction of an identity card system (Ch. shengfenzheng), a wide-spread drive to identify anti-Chinese elements, including in the Party and government, a political campaign known as ‘screening and investigation’ [जनगणज्ञानविषयक शिल्पीकरण]

and expulsion of monks and nuns from their monasteries and nunneries and foreigners from Tibet. Under martial law, Major-General Zhang Shaosong, Political Commissar of the Tibet Military District, was in charge of stabilising Tibet. The PLA presence in Lhasa was beefed up with reinforcement from other parts of Tibet and China under the Chengdu Military Region, who subjected the Tibetans to frequent demonstrations of military power. As Schwartz wrote:

> On 10 March…forty truckloads of soldiers were positioned around the Jokhang, each truck equipped with a mounted machine gun. Also deployed were trucks fitted with multiple rocket launchers, with the rockets pointed towards the Jokhang temple. Other such trucks were positioned along Dekyi Sharlam near the Potala, with rockets pointed at the palace…. [I]t was an assertion of Chinese power directed at the symbols of Tibetan national identity.

Although martial law was lifted on 2 May, 1990, the threat and use of state-violence has been ever present.

Military intimidation was accompanied by the trial and sentencing of participants in the protests and riots for a range of violent and non-violent political offences, with the latter

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11 Barnett noted a phased approach to dismantling Hu Yaobang’s liberal policies of the 1980s in the 1990s with security issues or stability as the focus in the 1987-1990 period; ‘economics as control’ from 1990-1995; and ‘religious and cultural control’ from 1995 to 2000. Barnett 2003: 229-239.
13 Ibid.
14 Shakya 1999: 433. At least 14, 000 additional soldiers were moved into Tibet, perhaps from other areas under the jurisdiction of the Chengdu Military Region. Barnett 2008: 326.
group receiving stiffer sentences.\textsuperscript{16} Between 1987 and 1991, over 3000 Tibetans were held under detention without trial and 179 Tibetans received prison sentences.\textsuperscript{17} Chinese court documents attested to the participation and incarceration of state employees and party members for involvement in the protests.\textsuperscript{18} Simultaneously, a vigorous two-stage campaign of ‘screening and investigation’ involving work units, government departments and neighbourhood committees to ferret out ‘those who plan behind the scenes to cause disturbances’, ‘those who command the organisations’, and the ring-leaders and principal members of secret counter-revolutionary organisations’, and ‘instigators of evil counter-revolutionary propaganda’—in short, anti-Chinese protestors and sympathisers within the state and party hierarchy and beyond.\textsuperscript{19} The monasteries and nunneries in and around Lhasa, besieged by armed PLA soldiers since the imposition of martial law, were also subjected to ‘screening and investigation’. By April 1990, 200 monks and nuns were expelled from their religious institutions and prohibited from performing religious duties outside of their homes, forcing many of them to escape to Nepal and India.\textsuperscript{20} Perceiving that the presence of foreign tourists and journalists emboldened the Tibetans and to prevent information about the crackdown from getting out, they were expelled, some of them under gun-point, and prohibited from entering Tibet.\textsuperscript{21} These measures constituted what the Chinese authorities of the time referred to as a move from ‘passive’ or reactive policing to ‘active’ or pre-emptive policing.\textsuperscript{22} Collectively, these steps were successful in stemming major protests by the time Chen Kuiyen replaced Hu Jintao as TAR Party Secretary in March 1992. As altitude sickness forced him to spend about five months each year in Beijing, Hu Jintao ‘left no lasting impact

\textsuperscript{17} Barnett 2008: 319.
\textsuperscript{18} Schwartz 1994: 169-70.
on Tibet. Chen Kuiyen, reputed for his hard-line views, inherited the policy of ‘grasping with both hands’ which he implemented with notorious harshness towards Tibetan identity and aspirations. This shows that while policies are formulated in Beijing, Party Secretaries have considerable scope for personalising the implementation of policies with either positive or negative implications for the Tibetans.

**Chen Kuiyen, Third Tibet Work Forum and Economic Development**

Economic development has always been part of the policy mix since the reform era began. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984 made economic development the cornerstone of Beijing’s Tibet policy—‘to get rich as soon as possible’ was the slogan. Hu Jintao had also arrived with a programme of investment and commodity market expansion in Tibet. Under the more stable conditions, Chen Kuiyen was able to focus attention on economic development, buoyed by Deng’s famous Southern Tour to promote economic reforms in early 1992 and the availability of growing economic resources to spend in Tibet. However, what was different about the push for economic development this time was its explicit linkage with security: ‘raising standard of living…as a way to dilute Tibetan nationalism’. This was no doubt influenced by the Marxist economic-determinist thought that held that ethno-national identity and religious belief are features of a pre-modern stage of socio-economic development that will wither away in the course of modernisation.

Chen proved to be a staunch believer in economics as the panacea against Tibetan nationalism. He said in Chamdo:

> Only with economic development and improvement or prestige of the country, and with people getting rich and tired of splittist groups can they finally make correct judgements and give up their purpose of splitting the country…. If the economy develops well, the spiritual civilisation will find a solid ground, and long-term stability within Tibet will be based on very reliable and solid ground…. With economic development their confidence in the country will be greatly increased, and the trend of unification and loving the central government will be enhanced.

Economic backwardness, he added, made the Tibetans succumb to their ‘religious illusion’ and strengthened their ‘splittist’ ideas. Chen’s ideas were entirely in sync with the prevailing attitude in Beijing as the outcome of the Third Tibet Work Forum demonstrated.

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The Party’s Central Committee organised the Third Work Forum in Beijing in July 1994 to formulate the work programme in Tibet for the next five years. It was presided by Premier Li Peng and attended by General Security Jiang Zemin, Chairman Li Rihuan, Hu Jintao and Chen Kuiyen, among other national and regional officials. The Forum set out two main goals for the next five years. First on the card was rapid economic development by achieving 10% economic growth per year and doubling of Tibet’s GDP by 2000. Sixty two developmental projects worth 2.38 billion RMB (US $270 million) were unveiled. The first stock exchange in Lhasa was opened to expand TAR’s market economy. There was also a visible shift in emphasis from agricultural development to energy and light industry and infrastructure. The second element of the Third Work Forum was the strict enforcement of stability which called for a wide-ranging effort against Tibetan nationalism. This included ‘resolute opposition’ against separatists and the purging of cadres in the state and party hierarchy who had shown the slightest signs of ‘local nationalism’ and a renewed campaign against the Dalai Lama’s spiritual and political authority. Cognizant of the foundational role of culture in Tibetan nationalism, there was also a vigorous effort to chip away at the distinctiveness of Tibetan identity. As Jiang Zemin put it in his address, ‘it is also necessary [for the Tibetans] to absorb the fine cultures of other nationalities in order to integrate the fine traditional cultures with the fruits of modern culture.’ The cultural element will be treated at length in the following section. Here it is important to remind ourselves of the security instrumentality of economic development in China’s Tibet policy.

The issue of Chinese migration into Tibetan areas, which has been an integral element of the economic development strategy, is illustrative in this regard. The decision to open Tibet for business and economic activities by Han and Hui Chinese was taken deliberately during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984, despite opposition from Tibetan officials. Since then Beijing has consistently refused to regulate and restrict, let alone terminate, the

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30 Ibid; Xizang Ribao, “Regional Party Committee transmits Third Tibet Work Forum guidelines to party cadres at and above county (department) level and cadres of Armed Police at regimental and above level in Lhasa area; and calls on cadres and masses in the autonomous region to seriously study, heighten spirit, accelerate development, and maintain stability” (in Chinese), 2 August 1994, published in translation as ‘propagation of guidelines; Raidi, Gyaincain Norbu summarize Tibet forum conclusions’, BBC SWB, 22 August, 1994: FE/2080/S1.
31 SWB, 28 July, 1994: FE/2059/G.
33 SWB, 28 July, 1994: FE/2059/G.
flow of non-Tibetans.\textsuperscript{35} As a result, a large number of legal and illegal Han and Hui migrants have since flooded and dominated economic life in the major urban centres of Tibet.\textsuperscript{36} The Qinghai-Tibet railway line has only stacked the demographic odds further against the Tibetans. The policy of deliberate settlement and encourage or enabled migration is consistent with the security and nation-building rationale of packing in as many nationalities and ideally Han Chinese as possible in any one autonomous entity. As Goldstein argued,

Beijing’s reluctance to terminate this influx is, of course, also politically and strategically motivated. The large number of non-Tibetans living and working in Tibet provides Beijing a new and formidable pro-China “constituency” that increases its security there. One can easily imagine that if China’s control over Tibet became seriously threatened by militant violence, not only would more troops be rushed in, but new laws could be promulgated to make the large Han presence permanent by offering attractive perks to induce the “floating population” to accept permanent status in Tibet.\textsuperscript{37}

He noted further that Beijing is banking on a ‘process of acculturation in which the more “advanced” Han will open up Tibetans to new ideas and attitudes and create a new, “modern” Tibetan in the process who will not be so influenced by religion and lamas.’\textsuperscript{38} This is consistent with the frequent call by the Chinese leaders for the Tibetans to ‘absorb the fine cultures of other nationalities’ or to engage in ‘cultural exchanges between Tibet and the mainland’, a euphemism for the Tibetans adopting Chinese traditions.\textsuperscript{39} At the same time, Chinese migration curtails the Tibetans ability to practise regional autonomy in the economic field when better-educated, better-skilled, and better-connected Chinese dominate the centres of economic and political power in Tibet. As Fischer contends:

[T]he current development strategies pursued over the last decade in the Tibetan areas, while producing rapid, albeit polarising growth, have engendered an ethnically exclusionary dynamic in both rural and urban areas…. [A]mong those who do experience exclusion in the Tibetan areas, most tend to be Tibetan.\textsuperscript{40}

Security was also the central rationale behind the Western Development Campaign (Ch. Xībù Dàkāifā), the flag-ship project of Beijing’s economic development strategy in Western China, which was officially launched in 2000. The Western Development Campaign (WDC) is an extension of the existing economic development strategy with higher levels of urgency, investment and wider participation base including other Chinese provinces.\textsuperscript{41} As Fischer and

\begin{itemize}
  \item Goldstein 1997: 95.
  \item Shakya 1999: 404-06; Goldstein 1997: 94.
  \item Goldstein 1997: 95-96.
  \item Goldstein 1997: 96.
  \item SWB, ‘Vice-President Discusses Western Development with Tibet Deputies,’ March 2000: FE/D3784/G 09.
\end{itemize}
others have shown, WDC has a programmatic bias towards ‘hard’ or physical infrastructure building at the expense of developing human resources or soft infrastructure.\textsuperscript{42}

Chinese officials and scholars have openly confirmed that security considerations were central to the inception and implementation of WDC in Tibet.\textsuperscript{43} Jiang Zemin told a Tibet Work meeting that Tibet’s development is important for ‘national unity and social stability, to the unification and security of the motherland, and to our national image and international struggle.’\textsuperscript{44} Independent observers also underline the security imperatives behind WDC in Tibet.\textsuperscript{45} In fact, the subsidisation and infrastructure-heavy economic development model, which predates WDC, belies ‘strategic and military/security concerns’ which ‘are reflected in the main drivers of economic growth in the TAR over the past decade.’\textsuperscript{46} As Fischer argued, Subsidisation policies of the Chinese government, especially in the TAR are more likely guided by strategic and security/military concerns. The past five decades of subsidisation of the Tibetan areas have been part of an effort to secure their integration into China and to build up the infrastructure necessary for maintaining control over both the local population and the remote borderland areas. In particular, military interests in the TAR cannot be underestimated…\textsuperscript{47}

As such, responding to security fears in its western periphery, WDC was a state-building project, a 21\textsuperscript{st} century avatar of the traditional \textit{mission civilatrice} that the Han Chinese practised towards neighbouring ‘barbarians.’\textsuperscript{48}

The policy of ‘grasping with two hands’ with emphasis on economic development and political repression was extended during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing from 25-27 June, 2001.\textsuperscript{49} Jiang Zemin identified ‘two major issues’ to be ‘resolved’ in his speech: ‘The first issue is to accelerate development and the tasks relating to economic and social development remain arduous. The second issue is to promote stability.’\textsuperscript{50} He was clear about the security rationale:

\textsuperscript{42} Fischer 2005: 33-58; Goodman 2004.
\textsuperscript{43} SWB, March 2000: FE/D3784/G; Li 15 June 2000; Rongji, Xinhua, 5 March, 2000; Wang and Bai 1991;
\textsuperscript{44} WWM, ‘Chinese President, Premier Address Tibet Work Meeting in Beijing,’ 2 August, 2001.
\textsuperscript{47} Fischer 2008: 251.
\textsuperscript{49} Xinhua news agency domestic service, Beijing, in Chinese, 29 June 2001.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
Development, stability and security were also the central themes in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing in January 2010. Calling Tibet a ‘special contradiction’ with relevance to national unity, social stability, national security and foreign relations, President Hu Jintao said: ‘the theme of the work of Tibet must be the promotion of development by leaps and bounds and long-term stability.’ The new Party Secretary of TAR, Chen Guoquan, began his term in September 2011 by vowing to pursue economic development and stability (euphemism for security). It is clear that economic development has been the centre-piece of China’s Tibet policy throughout the post-Mao period. Unsurprisingly, Beijing invokes economic development as the main legitimising factor in its rule over Tibet.

Indeed, in statistical terms, rapid progress has been made and the living standards of the Tibetans have been visibly raised. TAR’s GDP increased from 91.18 million RMB in 1998 to 138.73 million RMB in 2001 with an annual growth rate of 17.4%. After posting negative growth until 1995, the annual percentage change in real per capita GDP grew 8.7% in 1996 and registered double digit growth ever since with 16.3% in 2001. In 2007, TAR’s GDP was 34.22 billion RMB with a growth rate of 14% over the previous year. As admirable as these statistics are, they also mask some unsavoury realities.

TAR’s economy is so heavily and increasingly dependent upon subsidies from Beijing that some Chinese economists have dubbed it ‘blood-transfusion economy.’ By the mid-1990s the rate of subsidization was around 45% of TAR’s GDP, rising to 71% in 2001 and almost 75% in 2003. Hence, the main source of the scintillating GDP growth in TAR is direct subsidies from the Centre and government spending. Government officials and Chinese

51 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Associated Press, ‘China’s new Tibet boss makes no mention of struggle with Dalai Lama in first public comments’, 2 September, 2011.
56 Fischer 2005: 23.
nationalists make much of these subsidies, but such high levels of subsidies perpetuate inefficiencies and distortions with grave implications for long-term growth prospects. More government spending in TAR goes towards capital construction and government administration, including a large portion for the internal security apparatus, and less towards education, health and agriculture, relative to national spending on these sectors. In 2001, 33.3% of government expenditure in TAR went towards infrastructure-building such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, 14% to government administration and only 8.5% to education, compared to the national figures of 12.5%, 9% and 15.5% respectively. At the least, these spending priorities foster the perception that Beijing is more interested in controlling Tibet than improving the conditions of the Tibetans.

Furthermore, because most of the subsidy and government spending go into capital construction and administration, the investment makes its way back to China in the form of contracts for Chinese-owned or state-owned construction companies or as wages for labourers from China. Fischer, therefore, calls Beijing’s economic support to Tibetan areas ‘Boomerang Aid.’ Moreover, most of the development is concentrated in the urban centres of Tibet where the majority of the Chinese migrants reside and away from the rural areas where 85 per cent of the Tibetans live. For these reasons, economic development has been part of the problem in Tibet rather than the solution that Beijing is still banking upon.

Tibetan Buddhism, Language and Education

However, as mentioned above, Beijing’s security strategy in Tibet has always included a cultural component, i.e. either cultural revolution-style destruction or more or less subtle attempts at mission civilatrice. In the post-1989 era, the assault against Tibetan culture was noticeably reinforced under Chen Kuiyen around the mid-1990s. Barnett wrote that ‘the decision to attack Tibetan religion or culture per se was unprecedented in the post reform era.’ This section examines how this ‘cultural control’ was implemented in the illustrative areas of Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan language and education, and points out the implications for the insecurity dilemma.

60 Wang and Bai 1991.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid: 240.
The Constitution and Autonomy Law provide the right to believe or not to believe in any religion and guarantees state protection of ‘normal religious practices.’\textsuperscript{66} Compared to the nightmarish periods of ‘Democratic Reforms’\textsuperscript{67} (1950-1965) and Cultural Revolution (1965-1976), religious policy in the post-1978 era has been more relaxed. The relaxed environment of the 1980s enabled a revival of Tibetan Buddhism in all Tibetan areas, especially in Kham and Amdo, where, as parts of neighbouring Chinese provinces, Tibetans also enjoyed more religious freedom.\textsuperscript{68} Many monasteries and temples that survived the Cultural Revolution were renovated and opened for worship and many that sustained damage were rebuilt.\textsuperscript{69} Most of the renovation and rebuilding was made possible by the ‘vigorou’ faith of the Tibetans ‘who gave their time and money, and also with the funds collected by Tibetans in exile.’\textsuperscript{70} However, some touristy sites like Potala and Norbu Lingka Palaces and Jokhang Temple in Lhasa received substantial state funding for renovation.\textsuperscript{71} Rituals and various devotional activities such as pilgrimage, prostrations and prayer flags were permitted and religious scriptures were printed and openly circulated. Some lamas from exile travelled to Tibet to teach or direct renovation work, while others like the 10\textsuperscript{th} Panchen Lama, who stayed in Tibet and became victims during the Cultural Revolution, were rehabilitated and resumed some of their traditional roles.\textsuperscript{72}

However, ‘liberalisation was intended to provide an opportunity for the last vestiges of superstitious belief to quietly wither away.’\textsuperscript{73} As Blondeau puts it, liberalisation was ‘purely strategic’. As mentioned earlier, in 1983, the Party established ‘the natural withering of religion’ through socio-economic transformation as the long term goal of its religious

\textsuperscript{67} Ideological euphemism for Communist Reforms.
\textsuperscript{68} Kapstein 2004: 239-45.
\textsuperscript{69} Blondeau in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 165-169.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid: 165-66. The latest White Paper on Tibetan culture claims that by the year 2000, 300 million Yuan were spent by the Chinese government to renovate 1,400 monasteries, and to conduct scientific excavations of Neolithic sites. State Council, Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture, Beijing, 25 September, 2008. Hereafter cited as White Paper on Tibetan Culture. Well-known monasteries outside TAR, such as Kumbum, Qinghai, also received state funding, but the overwhelming majority of monasteries were renovated and rebuilt either with the offerings of Tibetan devotees or donations from Chinese (Mainland China, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and foreign disciples of Tibetan Lamas. Blondeau and Buffetrille 208: 166.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Shakya 1999: 372-3. The Panchen Lama re-emerged in public in March 1978 for the first time since 1964. There are no available figures for the total number of monks, nuns or Lamas rehabilitated. Former Tibetan government officials imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution were also rehabilitated in late 1978. In January 1979, compensation was announced to former aristocrats and land-lords that were wrongly accused and lost property during the Cultural Revolution. 2300 people shared 7 million Yuan in compensation. Some prisoners involved in the 1959 uprising were also freed, although not given compensations.
\textsuperscript{73} Kapstein 2004: 242.
Since the 1990s, China has put increasing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism in all Tibetan regions. Chen Kuiyen, then TAR Party Secretary, made his intentions clear when he wrote to Beijing in 1994:

> The continuous expansion of temples and Buddhist monks and nuns should be contained. We shall not allow religion to be used by the Dalai clique as a tool for their splitist activities. This is an outstanding and key issue concerning party construction in Tibet. Under the precondition that we shall rely on education, we shall also take some forceful measures to stop this perverse trend.

Several instances show the fall-out of the vice-like control on religion that Chen and his subordinates oversaw in the Tibetan regions. Two high ranking lamas, Arjia Rinpoche and the Karmapa, escaped into exile due to the continuing restrictions on religious study and practice and the requirements to criticise the Dalai Lama and legitimise the Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama. In February 1998, Arjia Rinpoche, who held high offices in the Chinese Buddhist Association and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, escaped ‘the repressive climate’ which included being ‘coerced into publicly supporting China’s increasingly anti-Tibet agenda, including taking part in carefully orchestrated rituals engineered to undermine the authority of the Dalai Lama.’ The Karmapa escaped in 2000 citing restrictions on religion and the fear of being used by the Chinese to serve their anti-Tibetan agenda. The demolitions in 2007 of the statues of an eighth century Indian saint

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74 Shakya 1999: 420.
75 Goldstein 1997: 79-87. For a detailed analysis of the protests and riots during this period, see Schwartz, 1994.
76 Chen Kuiyen, ‘The Situation of Tibet and the Problems We Request the Central Authorities to Solve’, *Xizang de Jiaobu (Tibet Steps)*, February 1994: 134-136.
77 Ibid: 244. Karmapa is the highest Lama of the Kagyu sect and considered the third most important Lama in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. His defection gained added significance because he is the only Lama to be recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.
78 Rinpoche (Arjia) 2010.
79 141
Padmasambhava in Samye (funded by Chinese Buddhists from the Mainland) and Ngari testify to the continuing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism. On 18 July, 2007, Beijing announced ‘Order No. 5,’ a regulation essentially prohibiting Tibetan lamas from reincarnating without prior approval from the Chinese government. Clearly, Beijing has the selection of the next Dalai Lama in mind, inflaming Tibetan resentment. Eastern Tibet has also come under increasing restrictions since the 1990s, exemplified by the fates of Serta Larungar Institute and Yachen Institute.

Serta Institute in Kham (Sichuan), started by the charismatic abbot Jigme Phuntsok in 1980 with 100 Tibetan students, grew into a monastic town with 9300 resident disciples, including about 1000 Mainland and overseas Chinese. In June 2001, officials from Beijing came to Serta to reduce the number of monks and nuns to 1000 and 400 respectively, which led to the demolition of some 2000 dwellings. The same fate befell Yachen Institute in Sichuan, just months after the crackdown in Serta. A Chinese student, a middle-aged medical doctor, who joined Yachen after expulsion from Serta, summed up the rationale of fear behind the patriotic education campaign in Tibetan Buddhist institutes:

The [Chinese] authorities told teachers from Larung Gar and Yachen that they were forbidden to teach Vajrayana [referring to Tibetan Buddhism] to Chinese or to travel to China to teach. And they said that Chinese are forbidden to follow or receive Buddhist talks from Tibetan lamas. So many Chinese are coming to these areas where Tibetans usually live, but really the authorities don’t want us to have connections with any lamas here. The Chinese government knows that the more people believe in the Buddha the more those people will respect the Dalai Lama. So it is a threat to the government’s idea of unity if either Tibetans or Chinese believe in the Buddha.

The death sentence later commuted to life in prison of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, another popular reincarnate Lama, on allegations of masterminding a series of bomb-blasts in Chengdu is another illustration. The common thread in all these cases is that the CCP and the government sensed rival power-centres with local and national dimensions. Such fear has prompted the repression of Tibetan Buddhism at the slightest sign of threat to the Party-State.

Kapstein captures Beijing’s dilemma with regard to its policy on Tibetan Buddhism:

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80 ICT, ‘Demolition of giant Buddha statue at Tibetan monastery confirmed by China’ 14 June, 2007; ICT, ‘Rare Protest as Tibetans Attempt to Save Buddhist Statue from Demolition’, 1 November, 2007.
83 ICT, ‘When the Sky Fell to Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in Tibet,’ 2004: 66. There is clear evidence from Western scholars who visited these Centres that large numbers of disciples had indeed congregated there. David Germano (University of Virginia) and Mathew Kapstein (University of Chicago) spent time doing research at Serta.
84 Ibid: 69.
By suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan resentment and hence the longing for freedom are increased; but by adopting a liberal policy, the very cultural system that most encourages the Tibetans to identify themselves apart from China continues to flourish.  

Beijing has adopted a policy of allowing limited religious practice but undermining the whole edifice of Buddhism by promoting materialism and atheism, as expounded by the Party’s racial theoretician Li Dezhu, who until recently was the director of the State Nationality Affairs Commission. Addressing the ideological and political threats from Tibetan Buddhism is a major concern for Chinese leaders. Initiated by Chen Kuiyen, Tibetan Buddhism has been a special target for his successors, not the least for Zhang Qingli, who described the Central Party Committee as the real Buddha for the Tibetans and enforced existing restrictions on religion ever more strongly.  

The Tibetan language also fell victim to the hardening policy regime under Chen and his successors. The right to use and develop the spoken and written languages of the nationalities is also provided in the Constitution and Autonomy Law. A White Paper on Tibetan culture claims that the TAR government ‘has paid great attention to maintaining and safeguarding the Tibetan people's right to study, use and develop their spoken and written language.’ While it is true that Tibetan language fonts have been devised for Internet communication, independent Tibetan blogs and websites and books, where the fonts should find application, are closely monitored and closed down or banned for carrying political content. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of other policies, the abandonment of positive developments in the early 1980s, and the privileging of Mandarin Chinese in education and public life are undermining the place of Tibetan language in Tibet. One Western scholar lamented that ‘maintaining and improving Tibetan language education is proving to be a difficult uphill struggle.’ This represents a worsening situation even in comparison to the early to mid-1980s.

In 1987, the Panchen Lama and Ngaboe Ngawang Jigme pushed the TAR People’s Congress to draft a major policy document, ‘The Provisions on the Study, Use and

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86 Kapstein 1998: 149.
Development of Spoken and Written Tibetan’ which laid out the modalities for implementing Tibetan language education in schools and its use in public life. Both Tibetan and Chinese languages were to be taught, but Tibetan was to take centre-stage as the medium of instruction through secondary schools and beyond. The White Paper on Tibetan Culture claims that the aforementioned policy document was ‘implemented’ and that it ‘put the work related to the study, use and development of spoken and written Tibetan language on a legal track.’ In reality, it never went beyond a trial period. Although the students who participated in the trial produced much stronger results in all subjects including Chinese language than their counterparts who were taught in Chinese, the project was abandoned altogether in 1996. Tibetan medium instruction is available only up to primary schools in TAR now. Around the same time as the shelving of the Tibetan language education trial, the Tibetan translation offices were downgraded, Tibet University was ordered to stop admitting new students for two years and a number of renowned Tibetan scholars were asked to retire early. In 2010, authorities in Qinghai province, where the freedom and quality of Tibetan language education has been greater, proposed using Chinese as the medium of instruction in all schools, provoking thousands of Tibetan students in a number of different places to protest openly.

As in the case of Tibetan Buddhism, hostility towards Tibetan medium instruction arises from its association with ‘separatism’. Merely talking about Tibetan language education could get one into political trouble. Some Tibetan officials and scholars had argued that the neglect and hostility towards Tibetan language instruction actually exacerbated separatist sentiments and recommended that a satisfactory implementation of Tibetan medium instruction will go a long way towards resolving the nationalist problems in Tibet. The centrality of language and Buddhism in Tibetan national identity, which sits uncomfortably with Beijing’s security and state-led, Han-supremacist nationalism, invites the

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95 Ibid.
96 Ibid; Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 234-236.
98 Ibid; Heller and Blondeau in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 235.
102 Phunwang 2007.
hostility of regional and central authorities. As Bass observed, the strong connection between
the Tibetan language and national identity has invited violent attacks during leftist periods in
the past.\textsuperscript{104} Chinese nationalists today are using more subtle methods than their Cultural
Revolution predecessors. For Chen and his bosses, Tibetan nationalism was rooted in Tibetan
religion, which is rooted in Tibetan culture and language, as he is known to have stated in an
internal meeting in 1997.\textsuperscript{105} No wonder, he suggested that Tibetan children in Tibet should be
taught more Chinese language to raise ‘the cultural quality of the Tibetan nationality’.\textsuperscript{106}

Other aspects of Tibetan culture also came under attack. Chen and his subordinates
sought to control the form and content of intellectual and artistic life in Tibet.\textsuperscript{107} For Chen,
‘Tibetan intellectual endeavour was...a threat to security, and thus in need of control.’\textsuperscript{108} In
an infamous speech he gave in July 1997, which reveals the ideological and theoretical ideas
guiding his policy and practices, he called Buddhism ‘foreign’ to Tibetan culture and
instructed Tibetan scholars and intellectuals to reflect this in their work and to stop eulogising
the 17\textsuperscript{th} century Tibetan politician and intellectual Sangay Gyatso and the 14\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama.
Instead, he advised them to praise the Communist Chinese ‘revolutionary heroes’ who have
contributed to ‘safeguarding the unification and territorial integrity of the motherland’ and
‘their lofty ideas, creative activities, spiritual values, and moral character’ in their works.\textsuperscript{109}
Chen even lectured the Tibetan dancers, musicians and filmmakers on the flaws of traditional
Tibetan performance arts and urged them to perform more communist propaganda pieces
from the 1950s and 1960s and create more such works.\textsuperscript{110} He called upon Tibetan
intellectuals and artists to engage in ‘exchanges and merging with cultures of other
nationalities’, which is a euphemism for adopting Chinese cultural traditions. These are not
the views of a lone Chinese chauvinistic official, but are widespread across the
officialdom.\textsuperscript{111} After Chen’s transfer to Henan province in 2000, his successors continue to
enforce these measures against Tibetan culture. To be sure, the Tibetans and the Chinese
authorities are playing a cat-and-mouse game with each other, with the latter trying to
undermine or change as much of Tibetan culture as possible and the former using all
available space and opportunity to resist these measures by reasserting their cultural identity.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid: 229.
\textsuperscript{105} Barnett 2003: 237.
\textsuperscript{106} SWB, 5 August, 1997: FE/D2989/G.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid: 236-238.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid: 237.
\textsuperscript{109} Chen Kuiyuan, Xizang Ribao, 16th July 1997 pp. 1,4; published in translation by the BBC
SWB as ‘Tibet party secretary Chen Kuiyuan speaks on literature, art’, 1st August 1997: FE/D3078/CNS.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Li in FBIS, 15 June 2000; Zhu, 16 March, 2000.

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Political Campaigns and Nation Building

As mentioned in the previous section, Tibetan culture, especially as it relates to Tibetan Buddhism is seen as the basis of Tibetan nationalism and a security threat. The Dalai Lama and what the Chinese call the ‘Dalai clique’ abroad and ‘separatists’ in Tibet were singled out for particular hostility. As Chen Kuiyen said in a speech to important non-Party personalities in Tibet:

Outside the region, there are the Dalai clique and its Western supporters; within the region, there are splittists and their behind-the-scenes sympathizers. They will seize every opportunity to make trouble. It is obvious to all that class struggle is far from being over in Tibet.112

To combat these domestic and exile enemies, the Chinese also subjected the Tibetans to a number of political campaigns, especially beginning in the mid-1990s.

State-sponsored mass political campaigns have been recurrent features of Chinese politics since 1949. These campaigns invariably assume ethnic dimensions in minority regions. Patriotic Education Campaigns, Strike Hard Campaigns, Spiritual Civilisation Campaigns and the anti-Dalai Lama Campaign and have been conducted continuously since the mid-1990s. In Tibet, without exception, they evolve into campaigns against the Dalai Lama and components of Tibetan identity in the cloak of anti-separatism.113 The case of PEC in Tibet is instructive.114 As Smith writes, ‘In Tibet, the purpose of the campaign was to transform Tibetan national identity into Chinese identity, to eradicate Tibetans’ loyalty to the Dalai Lama, and to cultivate Tibetan loyalty to China instead.’115 The nation-building and state-building objectives are apparent.

Patriotic Education Campaign was initially conducted all over China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. It ‘represented a state-led effort to rebuild the legitimacy of the [CCP]…on the basis of non-Communist ideology rather than Marxism or anti-traditional

112 Kuiyen 9 November 1997, BBC SWB: FE/D3078/CNS. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and their premiers have made similar comments demonising the Dalai Lama and separatists at home as their addresses during the Tibet Work Forums show.
114 For a detailed examination of PEC in Tibet, see Smith 2008: 170-82.
Two dominant themes of the campaign were [Han] Chinese tradition and history (especially of the CCP and its achievements) and national unity and territorial integrity.

In Tibet, when the campaign was first launched in 1996, monks and nuns were special targets because of the centrality of religion to Tibetan national identity. The main goals of PEC in Tibet have been to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama, teach the Chinese version of Tibet’s history to the Tibetans, and to promote atheism and materialist values to control Tibetan Buddhism and undermine Tibetan traditions. This is clear from the study materials and regulations issued by Chinese government offices. Tibetan students, officials and others were also subjected to PEC. Party and government cadres in TAR have also been targeted for education. Cadres and students are prohibited from visiting monasteries or demonstrating religious faith, such as taking religious objects to work, and taking part in religious festivals. In 1998 and 2000, Tibetan cadres were told to withdraw their children from Tibetan exile schools or lose their jobs and pension, so that they will not be corrupted with separatist thoughts. Although, PEC has been declared officially over in 2000, it is being actively conducted in the Tibetan regions.

To complement PEC in the nation-building project, Spiritual Civilisation Campaign was launched in the mid-1990s to create a modern economy and socialist spiritual civilisation and to eradicate ‘feudal thinking, superstition and out-dated conventions and bad habits’ i.e. Tibetan culture and traditions and Strike Hard Campaigns against ‘separatists and serious criminals.’ An additional anti-Dalai Lama campaign was launched officially in January 1995, ‘when vitriolic attacks on the Dalai Lama inside Tibet reached levels unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution.’ In Tibet, all such campaigns boil down to attacks on the Dalai Lama and Tibetan traditions under the guise of fighting separatism and crime.

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118 See foot-note 111 above for a sampling of such propaganda materials.
119 SWB, 19 October, 1993: FE/1823/G.
120 SWB, 5 April, 1999: FE/D3500/G.
124 SWB, 31 May, 1996: EE/D2627/G.
125 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 17.
Regional National Autonomy: Institutional Integration and Nation Building

To reiterate, Beijing has wielded the above instruments within the broader policy framework of the Regional National Autonomy (RNA). As mentioned in the previous chapter, RNA has been the most prominent element of China’s nationality policy. RNA derives its legal strength from the Regional National Autonomy Law (Autonomy Law), as per Article Four of the PRC Constitution of the PRC.\(^{126}\) Article Four provides that

> Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.\(^{127}\)

The Tibetan areas are divided into one Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAP), and 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TAC). The Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo were organised into TAPs and TACs in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces by 1956.\(^{128}\) TAR, corresponding to the areas under the rule of the Dalai Lama before 1950 (Central and Western Tibet), was formally established on 1 September 1965.

The Party-State’s security is the raison d’être of the RNA system. A White Paper on autonomy in TAR claims: ‘To institute regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet is the natural requirement for safeguarding national unification and national solidarity, and for the equal development and common prosperity of the Tibetan people and people of other ethnic groups in China.’\(^{129}\) Since the other areas covered by the Autonomy Law have been discussed separately in the above sections, we will discuss here briefly the written and practical realities of autonomy as experienced by the Tibetans in administration and representation.

Administration Autonomy and Political Representation

The Constitution and the Autonomy Law specify that the People’s Congresses and Governments are the organs of autonomy with the power to enact autonomy regulations and specific regulations consonant with the local political, economic and cultural characteristics.

\(^{126}\) ‘People's Republic of China Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,’ issued by the Second Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress on May 31, 1984 (effective October 1, 1984) and amended in accordance with the ‘Decision on Revising the People’s Republic of China Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law’ made at the 12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on February 28, 2001.


of the nationality or nationalities in that jurisdiction. Since TAR was established in 1965, the number of Tibetan cadres has steadily increased as the following table shows.\(^{130}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Tibetan Cadres</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7508</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>20,023</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29,406</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49,752</td>
<td>73.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of Tibetans in the Party increased from 7 in June 1956, 3000 in 1963 and 40,000 in 1988 to 57,000 in 1991.\(^{131}\) Government employment is certainly remunerative for the individual cadres and their families, but increases in their numbers do not translate into greater self-rule for the Tibetans as a group. Although Beijing brandishes these figures as proof that Tibetans enjoy genuine autonomy,\(^{132}\) they are problematic for a number of reasons.

First, the official claim is ‘highly problematic as most high-ranking Tibetan cadres wield only titular power. Candidates for the chairpersons of the TAR are chosen by Central leaders, while TAR Party Secretaries are appointed by central Party leaders and are non-Tibetans…. Only regional government leaders are Tibetans….’\(^{133}\) Second, the Tibetans are better-represented in cultural and religious institutions with less power and less well-represented in the most powerful Party and state institutions such as the Tibetan Party Committee, People’s Congress and government.\(^{134}\) Third, the centrality of security, with emphasis on open-ended themes like stability and anti-separatism and the disproportionate influence of the PLA and internal security agencies are curtailing Tibetan autonomy. Tibetan officials complain that even demanding Tibetan language education and its use in public life invites accusations of separatism.\(^{135}\) In his letters to Hu Jintao, Phunwang, the veteran Tibetan revolutionary denounced this obsession with stability and anti-separatism as ‘residual

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\(^{131}\) Baogang 2005: 76.


\(^{133}\) Baogang 2005: 76; Dodin 2008: 195-197.

\(^{134}\) Ibid: 77. A Tibetan member of the state-run Lhasa Songs and Dances Troupe also told TIN, for instance, that while Tibetans cannot participate meaningfully in any political decision making—the Tibetan leaders of TAR are not invited to Beijing to deliberate in political meetings on Tibet, but are told by phone how to implement policies made in Beijing, he said—Tibetans are always present in “art competitions.” Quoted in TIN, Unity and Discord: Music and Politics in Contemporary Tibet, London: TIN, June 2004: 134.

leftist opportunism.’ Consequently, anti-separatism and anti-Dalai Lamaism has become a ‘money-earning tree’ for some departments to keep on asking for funds from the Central Government.’ On the other hand, Tibetan cadres cannot articulate Tibetan interests publicly for fear of being branded ‘separatists’ or associated with the ‘Dalai clique.’

The quantity of laws and regulations passed in the local People’s Congresses are as misleading as the number of Tibetan cadres. Although official sources claim that as of 2005, 120 local laws and regulations have been enacted by TAR, these laws and regulations are only formalistic repetitions of national or provincial laws, not separate legislations by the autonomous organs. In fact, not a single piece of separate autonomous legislation has been passed successfully in any of the five autonomous regions of China. This is perhaps because of the requirement of approval by higher executive and legislative bodies, which are dominated and controlled by Han Chinese, for local legislations to become laws, and the asymmetric state-versus-nationality conflicts of interest build into the RNA system.

When the TAR Regional People’s Congress in Lhasa legislated a basic law for TAR in the 1980s, as the Constitution and Autonomy Law provide for, fifteen draft versions were rejected by the NPC Standing Committee in Beijing before it was abandoned. The unitary self-image of the party-state and its unilateral practices frequently trump Tibetan autonomy.

Perhaps, the most symbolically telling statistic is that a Tibetan has never been appointed TAR Party Secretary, the most powerful regional position. Tibetans have been appointed heads of the regional government, but they play second fiddle to the Party Secretary who supervises all ‘political and administrative work’ in Tibet and is accountable only to Beijing. This has implications for the insecurity dilemma because all but one TAR Party Secretary have been Han Chinese, with a reputation of hostility towards the Tibetans’ separate identity and interests. As one analyst puts it, this renders autonomy ‘only theoretical’. Wu Jinghua (1985-88), an ethnic Yi, was exceptional in winning Tibetan

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136 Phunwang 2007: 78.
137 Ibid.
138 Baogang 2005: 76.
139 Heberer 1990: 52.
140 Davis 2007: 161.
143 Dodin 2008: 195.
approval for his relatively more liberal attitude and respect for Tibetan culture.\textsuperscript{144} In minority regions, the ethnicity of the Party Secretary makes both perceptual and practical differences.

The institutional context of making Tibet policy, over and above the regional government and its ‘autonomous’ organs, clearly reveals the salience of security as the key driver of Beijing’s policy towards Tibet. In the post-Mao era, the United Front Department has been the nominal manager of China’s policy towards the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles.\textsuperscript{145} However, decision-making has been much more crowded with the involvement of the PLA, Public Security Bureau, Ministry of National Security, Foreign Ministry and the State Council.\textsuperscript{146} Above the United Front, a ‘Leading Small Group’ has been instituted to give overall direction and coordination to Tibet policy-making at the highest level. Headed by the chairperson of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Leading Group includes the head of the United Front Department, Minister of Public Security and the Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{147} The perpetual involvement of the PLA and the internal security apparatus in Tibet has been seen as an impediment to the exercise of autonomy in Tibet.\textsuperscript{148} Possibly, it contributes to the hard-line positions in the dialogue process as the military has increasingly taken tougher stances on key issues than the government.\textsuperscript{149} Above the Leading Small Group, the general policy direction is set during Tibet Work Forums through which the Party General Secretary, President and Prime Minister exercise overall control.

In short, these institutional hurdles, concentration of power in the Party and Centre, the obsession with unitary statehood and the political climate of fear and suspicion makes Tibetan autonomy into an Orwellian exercise. Chinese security fears perpetuate this empirical condition. This observation extends to all functional areas of autonomy in Tibet. The patriarch Deng Xiaoping emphasised the overriding primacy of stability i.e. security over ethnic interests, leading one Chinese scholar to argue that the Dengist model of autonomy ‘may override the need to protect some rights of autonomy.’\textsuperscript{150} Accordingly, two analysts noticed that ‘there is less autonomy in Tibet than there is in any other region or province of

\textsuperscript{144} Shakya 1999: 402; Goldstein 1997: 74. The previous Panchen Lama described him as ‘one of the best officials in Tibet.’ Speech by the Panchen Lama to the TAR Standing Committee Meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, 28 March, 1987.
\textsuperscript{145} Namlo Yak, ‘Beijing’s Policy towards Exile Tibetans,’ \textit{China Rights Forum,} No. 4, 2006: 72-73.
\textsuperscript{146} Rabgey and Sharlho: 2004, 33.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Shakya 1999: 392.
\textsuperscript{150} Baogang 2005: 74.
So far, our attention has focused on the instruments of state-building to counter the perceived threats within Tibet itself. However, Beijing also has a strategy to deal with Dharamsala.

**The United Front and Beijing’s Dialogue with Dharamsala**

While China’s policies in the Tibetan regions are designed for state-building, Beijing’s diplomacy towards the Dalai Lama and exile Tibetans is designed to protect its state-building gains made in the last six decades. The Party-State’s security apprehensions over meeting Tibetan demands—reversals in the parlance of Beijing’s linear logic of state-building and its unitary self-image as a state—largely drive Beijing’s positions towards the Dalai Lama and TGIE. This is clear from its hard-line position on the Tibet issue, uncompromising responses to Dharamsala’s proposals, and its institutional context of policy-making on Tibet. As discussed before, events in the late 1980s aggravated Beijing’s siege mentality and hardened its policies towards the Tibetans. The following discussion examines the fall-out on the dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala.

As we learnt in the previous chapter, Sino-Tibetan dialogue commenced in 1979 when Deng Xiaoping met Gyalo Dhondup, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, in Beijing and told him that apart from independence all matters could be discussed and problems resolved. The hard-line policy shift also extended to the flailing dialogue process, although talks did not break down completely even in the poisoned atmosphere of repeated Tibetan protests and hardening Chinese policies under martial law. Beijing and Dharamsala communicated through Hong Kong-based Gyalo Dhondup. Yet, because of the CCP’s compromised position in China after the Tiananmen Square events and its fears of a perceived alignment between the Dalai Lama and the West on account of the latter’s felicitation of the former and their criticism of Chinese policies, Beijing was in no mood to reciprocate Dharamsala’s gestures to ease the stalemate. The internationalisation strategy of the exiles and the rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made the Chinese even more loath to engaging the Tibetans in any meaningful sense. On 23 May, 1993, 1000 Tibetans took to the streets of Lhasa in the largest Tibetan demonstration since the lifting of martial law. Although it started as a protest against rising food prices, the demonstration soon turned into shouts for Tibetan independence. It spread to a number of

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151 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 39.
152 Ibid: 3 and n2; Goldstein 1997: 61; Norbu 2001: 316.
153 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 16.
154 Ibid: 16.
rural areas in Central Tibet and Southern Qinghai, where the influx of Chinese migrants and their increasing control of the Tibetan economy became targets of the protestors. Faced with international opprobrium and clear demonstrations of local Tibetan disapproval of Chinese policies, Beijing organised the Third Tibet Work Forum in July 1994, which heralded a more hostile attitude towards the Dalai Lama, seeing him as insincere and as acting as an agent of hostile Western states.

Beijing’s approach towards the Dalai Lama worsened considerably when their complicated effort to collaborate in the selection of the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama failed, culminating in the Dalai Lama’s pre-emptive declaration of a six year old boy, Gedun Choky Nyima, as the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995. Interpreting this as an ‘aggressive political act’ and a sign of bad faith, Beijing unleashed the series of political campaigns discussed above to malign him, not least the anti-Dalai Lama campaign. Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family have been held incommunicado to this day and another boy named Gyaltsen Norbu was installed as the 11th Panchen Lama.

Curiously, even as vitriolic campaigns against the Dalai Lama were taking place in Tibet, Beijing did not completely cut off relations with him. This was partly driven by the realisation of its serious lack of legitimacy among the Tibetans and partly because of the frequent mention of Tibet by Western leaders and indeed because of the headway the Tibetans were making in acquiring some types of support from the American government in the 1990s (More detail in Chapter Seven). During a televised press conference during the summit between President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin in 1998, the latter surprised both the domestic population and the international community when he said, ‘Actually, we are having several channels of communications with the Dalai Lama.’ Apparently, formal contact had been re-established in early 1997 and three rounds of exploratory talks had taken place. The excitement generated among the Tibetans was quickly dashed as the CCP ‘mouth-piece’ Xinhua published an article that claimed that Jiang Zemin accused the Dalai Lama of trying to ‘deceive public opinion’. This was closely followed by the Dalai Lama’s declaration that all formal channels for communication with Beijing had broken down. Rabgey and Sharlho argued that lack of consensus in Beijing

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156 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 18.
among the top leaders accounted for the failure of the short-lived initiative.\footnote{Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 19.} Whatever the reasons, the dialogue process was dead even before it took off.

However, a four-member Tibetan delegation suddenly travelled to Beijing in September 2002, beginning a new process of dialogue. At the time of finishing this dissertation (2011), this dialogue process is still active—officially at least—after nine rounds of talks by February 2010. However, the two sides are nowhere closer to beginning serious negotiations, let alone resolving the outstanding issues. The following section examines the Chinese behaviour in their dialogue with Dharamsala.

\textit{State of Denial and Rejectionism in Dialogue}

Despite that apparently liberal opening, Chinese approach to the dialogue has been hard-line and rejectionist. First, Beijing’s formal position on Sino-Tibetan dialogue still conforms to the Hu Yaobang’s five-point proposal of 28 July, 1981,\footnote{SWB, ‘Five Point Policy towards Dalai Lama Made Public,’ 29 November, 1984: FE/7813/BII/1. Beijing made the proposal public only in 1984.} which dismissed the existence of a Tibetan issue and offered to talk only about the Dalai Lama’s return.\footnote{Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 35. A statement of this position appeared in an article in \textit{China’s Tibet} that was quoted in Hua Zi, ‘What is the real intention of the United States [sic],’ Xinhua, 9 June, 2003.} Zhang Qingli, the former Party Secretary of TAR, told the German daily \textit{Spiegel}: ‘The current contacts merely involve a few individuals from his immediate surroundings. The talks revolve around his personal future.’\footnote{Zhang Qingli, ‘Dalai Lama “Deceived his Motherland,” \textit{Spiegel}, 17 August, 2006; available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,431922,00.html. Emphasis added.} Even talks about the Dalai Lama’s return have been saddled with pre-conditions. During a televised news conference, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said:

\begin{quote}
Our policy towards the Dalai Lama is explicit and consistent. That is to say, as long as the Dalai Lama recognizes that Tibet is an inalienable part of China’s territory, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and as long as he abandons separatist activities, then we can conduct dialogues with him over his personal career.\footnote{WWM, ‘Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao Holds News Conference at Closing of Congress Session [Wen Jiabao Conference],’ 16 March, 2007.} 
\end{quote}

Perhaps, these public statements are part of Beijing’s diplomatic strategy,\footnote{Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 35.} but the security concerns weigh heavily on such an uncompromising line. Acknowledging the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ destroys the neat ideologically constructed edifice of liberation, equality, unity, legitimacy, stability and Tibetan contentment, and the sense of closure that Beijing has propagated in front of the Chinese and international publics. It would revive a host of uncomfortable historical, legal, political, territorial and moral questions surrounding China’s invasion and occupation of Tibet that Beijing thinks it has left behind long ago. Most
importantly, it would require Beijing to address the demands put forward by Dharamsala, which are perceived to have security implications for the Party-State. To sustain its ‘No Tibet Issue’ position, it is necessary to keep refuting the Dalai Lama’s proposals pertaining to the Tibetan interests and Tibet’s political status. Commentaries in China’s official press, recycling the same content under different authors and titles, dismiss the Dalai Lama’s proposals as negating the PRC constitution, being ‘independence in disguise’, as demanding the withdrawal of the PLA and Chinese settlers, and as ‘ethnic cleansing’.

A 2006 commentary criticising the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach that was widely propagated in the official media is illustrative. It observed that the Dalai Lama (1) refuses to accept Tibet as a part of China; (2) attempts to destroy the current political system; (3) is trying to create a ‘large Tibetan areas [Greater Tibet]”; and (4) distorts the ‘meaning of the autonomous region’ [through his argument that the provisions of the Autonomy Law are not being implemented sincerely]. It goes on to charge that the Dalai Lama (1) seeks to create a peace zone in Tibet which requires China to violate its own national defence and sovereignty by withdrawing troops from Tibet; (2) wants to discriminate against and purge Tibet of non-Tibetans; (3) is under the influence of western anti-China forces; (4) pursues a ‘swindle’ and really aims for Tibetan independence in the disguise of ‘high level autonomy’; (5) and changes his attitude according to prevailing international conditions. In front of the world’s media, Wen Jiabao also accused the Dalai Lama of demanding the withdrawal of the PLA and Chinese settlers in the Tibetan regions. Whether intentionally as diplomatic strategy or due to out-dated information about Dharamsala’s evolving positions (the next chapter discusses this), the above critique concerns the Dalai Lama’s proposals in the 1980s, much of which Dharamsala has taken off its agenda. Samdong Rinpoche confirmed that Dharamsala no longer demands demilitarisation and has only called for stopping the official policy of population transfer or regulation of Chinese migration, never the withdrawal of Chinese settlers. Beijing’s concerns over the security implications of acknowledging the existence of the ‘Tibet Issue’ and addressing the Dalai Lama’s remaining and modified demands are clear from the following analysis.

166 Ibid.
169 [Tibet Times], [No Such Thing was Said], 20 March, 2007.
The next chapter chronicles the compromises and modifications of Dharamsala’s positions since 1979, but two demands have remained consistent throughout: ‘genuine autonomy’ and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Dharamsala has defined autonomy and unification slightly differently over the recent decades to placate Beijing, but Beijing has invariably spurned its overtures, labelling them as separatist plots to achieve independence, revive feudalism, theocracy and as ethnic cleansing.

When the Tibetans asked for Hong Kong-style ‘one country, two systems’ or Special Administrative Region (SAR) status in 1982, Beijing rebuffed them saying that unlike Hong Kong and Taiwan, Tibet had already been liberated and enjoyed the socialist economic system like China.\textsuperscript{170} Beijing has subsequently repeatedly rejected SAR status for Tibet with that same argument and charged that the Dalai Lama is trying to restore ‘feudal serfdom’ \textsuperscript{171} and seeking a ‘back door route to independence.’\textsuperscript{172} Next, when the Dalai Lama demanded a liberal democratic, internally autonomous Tibet, with foreign affairs and defence in Beijing’s hands at Strasbourg (1988) Beijing rejected this outright as ‘independence in disguise’ or ‘two countries, two systems.’\textsuperscript{173} Dharamsala’s new post-2002 formulation of ‘meaningful autonomy’ within the framework of the PRC’s Constitution and Autonomy Law, which represents important modifications from how autonomy and unification were defined in the 1980s, not to mention from its clearly pro-independence stance before that, has not fared any better in China.\textsuperscript{174} Beijing has rejected this too, arguing that the Dalai Lama’s ‘high degree autonomy’ really seeks to overthrow China’s social system, meaning socialism and the CCP.\textsuperscript{175} In 2006, Yedor contended that ‘nothing stands between his [Dalai Lama’s] “high-level autonomy” and “Tibetan independence.”’ Dharamsala’s most recent proposal for Tibetan autonomy, ‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for The Tibetan People’, which was submitted to Beijing in 2008, was summarily dismissed as a separatist plot as well. However Dharamsala defined autonomy and however much it foreswore independence, Beijing has unfailingly branded them as separatist plots.

\textsuperscript{170} Norbu 2001: 320; Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 38.
\textsuperscript{171} Yedor 26 July, 2006.
\textsuperscript{172} People’s Daily, “‘Middle Way’ Does not Hold Water,’ 22 July, 2003.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid; Phuntsok, 26 May, 2006. Dharamsala was initially secretive about the content of the talks in deference to Chinese sensitivities, but also to avoid negative public opinion in exile. Lhakpa Phuntsok, Secretary-General of the China Tibetology Research Center, Beijing, leaked this to western journalists. Lhakpa Phuntsok, ‘Dalai Lama’s Demands Are Obstacles to Talks: China,’ Reuters, 26 May, 2006.
\textsuperscript{175} Hua Zi, ‘Dalai Lama’s high-degree autonomy for Tibet means overthrowing China’s social system,’ Xinhua, 5 October, 2007.
Beijing has also rejected Dharamsala’s demand for unification as requiring ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘illegal’ border adjustments and as a plot to ‘eventually seeking Tibetan independence.’ To be sure, China has adjusted provincial borders elsewhere taking into account economic, administrative and security factors.

Beijing’s oft-cited justification for rejecting the Dalai Lama’s proposals is that the two key demands violate the Chinese constitution, Autonomy Law and the socialist political system and threaten China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unification. In short, they are considered as separatist threats to the Party-State’s security and control over Tibet. The charge that the Dalai Lama is plotting ‘Tibetan independence’ is likely motivated by Chinese insecurities regarding how future generations of Tibetans will think and behave, especially in the context of a weakened and embattled China. Beijing’s rejection of Dharamsala’s proposals also reveals institutional vulnerability and regime insecurity in Tibet.

In any case, Beijing’s unyielding stance during the nine rounds of talks between September 2002 and February 2010 took its toll on Dharamsala. In 2008, the Dalai Lama said that he was losing faith in the Chinese government’s commitment to finding a solution. On 10 March, 2010, he said, ‘Judging by the attitude of the present Chinese leadership, there is little hope that a result will be achieved soon.’ Unless Beijing makes a dramatically positive gesture, this dialogue process appears to be heading towards a collapse.

How do the Tibetans perceive the state-building policies and practices examined above? The next chapter opens by examining the identity insecurity generated among the Tibetans by these Chinese policies and how they have been implemented in Tibet. The Tibetan identity insecurity will be discussed in terms of vertical state policies, horizontal cultural influences and Chinese migration. But first, if security concerns weigh so heavily on Beijing’s policy in Tibet and dialogue with the Dalai Lama, a more coherent understanding of the security threats that Beijing and local officials perceive in Tibet is necessary. The next section is dedicated for this purpose.

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177 Hua 5 October, 2007; Yedor, 26 July, 2006.  
178 Phayul, ‘Dalai Lama says he is losing faith in talks with China’, 26 August, 2008.  
Threat Perceptions in Beijing and Lhasa

It is true that some people in the Dalai clique wish to work for the "Tibet independence". But they know that the balance of forces and the situation do not allow them to do so. Once they believe the situation is advantageous to them, clearly, they will do whatever they please.

Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee; Chief Interlocutor in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue.

Insights from the security studies literature dealing with non-western states tell us that states are concerned or ‘obsessed,’ in the words of Ayoob, with both state and regime security. In fact, state and regime security are deliberately entwined by rulers in these states to legitimise their selfish ends. State security is a loaded concept that encompasses a variety of material and ideational interests and values ranging from sovereignty, territorial integrity, institutional structure, ideology, national identity, legitimacy and national image. Both internal challenges (secessionism or autonomy movements by ethno-national, religious, linguistic and ideological minority groups, revolutions, coups etc.) and external military interventions and peaceful evolution strategies threaten these interests. This is clearly the case with respect to China’s security practice in Tibet.

Wu Xinbo argues that in the post-Mao Chinese security practice, state and regime are the ‘key referents of security’ and that ethnic groups, mainly the Tibetans, Uyghur and Mongols, constitute one of the chief threats to state and regime security because they identify neither with the state nor with the regime. The minorities’ security goals clash with those of the nationalising Party-State. Wu also contends that China’s post-Mao security practices are a continuation of Mao’s obsession with state and regime securities, but the scope of security has broadened from military and political dimensions to include ‘social, economic, scientific and technological elements.’ Wu identifies five broad goals of China’s contemporary security policy: economic growth, preserving territorial integrity, consolidating regime security, maintaining a favourable strategic balance and expanding international influence. Yizhou Wang compiled a similar list of objectives: managing great power relations, settling the Taiwan issue and containing other separatist hot-spots, stabilising sovereignty disputes around its coastal and land borders, protecting Chinese interests abroad,

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183 Ibid; Ayoob 1995: 9 and 11.
185 Ibid: 123.
186 Ibid: 127.
and taking international responsibilities befitting a great power.\textsuperscript{187} Regime security is absent because Wang’s focus is state security in the ‘period of peaceful development,’ but it is central to Beijing’s security calculus.\textsuperscript{188} Relevant official documents corroborate these points.

Article 4 (1) of \textit{The State Security Law of the PRC} reveals three broad referent objects for China’s state security: the government and the Party leadership, the political system and state.\textsuperscript{189} Article 23 identifies external ‘organisations, groups and individuals’ working alone or through internal ‘organisations, groups and individuals’ as threats to China’s national security. The \textit{State Security Department of Tibet Autonomous Region} (TAR) elaborates on the referents, perceived threats and the internal-external linkages:

State security means…a country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity [from being] threatened or invaded by foreign forces…that the country’s political and economic systems will not be overturned; economic progress, national harmony and social stability are not threatened; that state secrets are not stolen; that state functionaries will not be incited to rebellion; and that state bodies are not infiltrated…. The work of safeguarding state security covers…national defence, foreign affairs, struggle on the covert front…public security, ideology, culture, economics, science and technology.\textsuperscript{190}

These documents confirm that in countries like China, the line between state and regime security is blurred\textsuperscript{191} and that domestic and international conflicts, or ‘class struggles’ as the Chinese documents sometimes refer to, are inter-connected.\textsuperscript{192} In short, the Tibetans and their perceived foreign ‘patrons’ are seen as threatening the material and ideational values that underpin the security of the Party-State.\textsuperscript{193} Wu captures the insecurity dilemma in Tibet (Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia):

Central government policies that tighten control over minority areas are perceived by these groups as threats to their political autonomy and cultural traditions; the central government, for its part, views some of these groups’ activities as threats to national unity.\textsuperscript{194}

In the following section, Chinese security concerns in Tibet will be discussed in terms of three analytically separate, but practically overlapping categories: political security, societal security and military security.

\textsuperscript{189} National People's Congress Standing Committee, \textit{State Security Law of the People's Republic of China}, 22 February, 1993. The exact phrasing is ‘plotting to subvert the government, dismember the state and overthrow the socialist system.’
\textsuperscript{191} Hence, this dissertation uses the term ‘Party-State’ to represent this security complex.
\textsuperscript{192} Phuntsok 16 December, 1993.
\textsuperscript{193} Rabgey and Sharlo 2004: 29.
\textsuperscript{194} Wu 1998: 124.
Political Security Concerns

Political security challenges include the threat of Tibetan secessionism to sovereignty, territory and resources, and Tibetan Buddhism’s challenge to the official ideologies. The Tibetans’ democratic agenda and alternative institutional recommendations threaten the state institutions and laws underpinning the Leninist political system, the most important of which are the Constitution, the Autonomy Law and the RNA system through which China controls Tibet. The Fear of peaceful evolution (heping yanbian) strategy to change China politically by smuggling in Western ideas is a recurrent theme in the official discourses. The legitimacy of Chinese policies and its rule over Tibet is constantly assailed through a combination of Tibetan protests and international criticism. The centrality of the Dalai Lama to all of China’s insecurities in Tibet, owing to his historical role and current stature inside Tibet and international popularity, is apparent.

Regime survival, sovereignty and territorial integrity top Beijing’s priority in Tibet.\textsuperscript{195} Chinese officials routinely contend that the Tibet issue concerns ‘China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and anti-splittist undertakings.’\textsuperscript{196} In the wake of the 2008 Tibetan uprising, President Hu Jintao defended the violent crackdown by arguing that sovereignty is at stake: ‘It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.’\textsuperscript{197} Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said during a press conference that the Tibet issue ‘concern the issues of China's reunification, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.’\textsuperscript{198} Accordingly, Chinese authorities brand dissident views inside Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s autonomy proposals as separatism, hence violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zhu Weiqun, executive vice minister of the United Front Work Department and one of the chief interlocutors in the dialogue process, assailed Dharamsala’s Middle Way approach: ‘By denying China's sovereignty over Tibet, the Dalai Lama is seeking a legal basis for his activities of ‘Tibet independence’, ‘semi-independence’ and ‘independence in a disguised form.’\textsuperscript{199} Sita, Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department and another interlocutor on the Chinese side said during a press Conference in Washington DC that the Tibet ‘issue involves China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.’\textsuperscript{200} Beijing’s consistent rejection of the Tibetan demand

\textsuperscript{195} Carlson 2004; Wu 1998: 130.
\textsuperscript{198} WWM, “Chinese premier answers CNN reporter's questions on Tibet, Taiwan,” 18 March, 2008.
\textsuperscript{199} Xinhua 10 November, 2008.
\textsuperscript{200} China Tibet Information Center, “Foreign pressure on Tibet opposed,” 11 December, 2008.
for unifying all Tibetans under one administrative is partly calculated to minimise the loss of territory in the event of successful Tibetan separatism in the future. This demonstrates that concerns over sovereignty and territory are heavily influenced by Chinese uncertainties about future intentions of the Tibetans. Beijing’s response to the Dalai Lama’s demands for meaningful autonomy and unification is characteristic of the worst-case assumption of actors caught in the insecurity dilemma. Historical experience from the Chinese perspective also exacerbated the worst-case calculation. Accounting for Beijing’s intransigence in the early 1980s, Goldstein wrote:

On the Chinese side, opponents of Hu Yaobang’s Tibet moderation policy….explicitly saw this [Dharamsala’s criticism on human rights and prevarication in dialogue] as *déjà vu*—a replay of what they considered the duplicitous behaviour of the Dalai Lama and his government in the 1950s.

Hard-liners in the 1990s and thereafter could similarly argue that Hu Yaobang’s liberal policies in the 1980s only led to protests and riots in Lhasa and justify their policies in Tibet. Overtures made to the Dalai Lama, such as inviting his delegations for talks, inviting him personally to Beijing to officiate the Panchen Lama’s funeral rites and involving him in the search for Panchen Lama’s reincarnation were not reciprocated, in Beijing’s view, with appropriate behaviour and reasonable demands. This memory of the past is likely to colour present expectations of future Tibetan intentions and actions.

No wonder then that a People’s Daily commentary characterised the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach as a blue-print for achieving Tibetan independence in two stages: ‘His so-called “middle way” equates with the “high-level autonomy”– the first stage of his seeking the independence of Tibet, a circumstance the central government will never accept.’ Another critique of MWA asserted that ‘all people with a sober mind can see that what the Dalai Lama does is his plan to dish out his “Tibetan independence” when conditions ripen again according to his own standards.’ A commentary carried by many official mouthpieces in 2006 dismissed the Tibetan demand for unification as driven by the ‘ulterior motive’ of ‘eventually seeking Tibetan independence.’ As Zhu Weiqun said above, ‘Once they believe the situation is advantageous to them, they [Tibetans] will do whatever they

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202 Goldstein 1997: 73.
please [seek independence].’ Beijing’s insistence on the Dalai Lama to publicly declare that Tibet and Taiwan have been historically inalienable parts of China is designed to weaken the moral and legal force of future secessionist movements.\textsuperscript{206} Wang Lixiong brings out clearly the security imperatives, the uncertainties and worst-case calculations guiding Beijing’s policies and positions on Tibet.\textsuperscript{207}

While the Dalai Lama per se might be sincere, \textit{as to whether he can control coming developments, and as to how those who come after him will act, he has no control}. So when considering the future prospects of the Tibet matter, we have to see Tibetan independence as a possibility that will always exist, rather than holding simplistically that \textit{just because the Dalai Lama says that he is not seeking independence, there will be no further Tibetan independence matter}. As to the Tibetan independence matter, even if we do not consider it from the perspective of values such as “a righteous national cause,” we at least have a bottom line that no country in today’s world should overlook: \textit{national security}. In the world’s political shifts, anything could happen. To cope with such a world, \textit{we need to govern our country from the perspective of the worst possibility, not placing our hopes on the best one}.\textsuperscript{208}

This is more representative of the currently prevailing official viewpoint than anything resembling Wang Lixiong’s liberal, Tibet-friendly views today.\textsuperscript{209}

In May 2006, Lhakpa Phuntsok of China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) gave another reason for rejecting the Tibetan demands of ‘meaningful autonomy’ and unification: it requires changing the Chinese constitution and nationality autonomy laws.\textsuperscript{210} In the commentary mentioned above, Yedor charged that the Dalai Lama’s demands for genuine autonomy or ‘one country, two systems’ are threats to the CCP rule, socialist political system and state institutions:

In a nutshell, the CPC leadership, the socialist system, the people's congress system and the national regional autonomy in Tibet, which have been in place in Tibet for decades in accordance with the PRC Constitution, should all be refuted, and a whole new system introduced according to what he says “real autonomy.”\textsuperscript{211}

A more recent article reveals the same concern for the survival of the existing political system and state institutions and by implication the CCP.\textsuperscript{212} This particular concern has become a permanent feature of virtually every major critique of Middle Way approach. The upshot is that Beijing perceives threats to the political system and state institutions and laws that bind Tibet to China, allows China to control Tibetan activities and keeps the CCP in

\textsuperscript{206} For discussions of the dispute over history, see Sperling 2004; Powers 2004.
\textsuperscript{207} SWB, 18 May, 1999, FE/D3537/G.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid. Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{209} The analysis and prescriptions contained in this essay are far removed from his 2008 op-ed: ‘The Cry of Tibet,’ \textit{Wall Street Journal}, 28 March, 2008. He wrote, for instance, ‘The most efficient route to peace in Tibet is through the Dalai Lama, whose return to Tibet would immediately alleviate a number of problems.... I am a supporter of the Dalai Lama’s “middle way,” meaning autonomy for Tibet in all matters except foreign affairs and national defense.’ Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{210} Phuntsok 26 May, 2006.
\textsuperscript{211} Yedor 6 July 2006.
\textsuperscript{212} Hua 5 October, 2007.
power in China. Any erosion of the force of RNA, the Autonomy Law and the Constitution as currently designed and practised is seen as undermining CCP rule and Chinese control over Tibet. This explains the dogged resistance against the Dalai Lama’s proposals, which require at least some revisions if not a fundamental re-writing and redesigning of these laws and institutions.

The Tibetans also pose ideological challenges to Beijing. Tibetan Buddhism was a formidable challenge to communism during the Maoist years. Buddhism is a principal pillar of Tibetan identity and source of national pride. As Goldstein writes, ‘Tibetans saw religion [Buddhism] as a symbol of their country’s identity and of the superiority of their civilisation.’ Naturally, defence of faith was the rallying cry of the Tibetan guerrillas when they rose up in revolt against the Chinese communists between the mid-1950s and 1974. Their armed group Four Rivers, Six Ranges was also called the Volunteer Force for Defence of the Faith. Monks and nuns were at the forefront of the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa between 1987 and 2011. Monasteries and nunneries in Tibet are hotbeds of Tibetan nationalism. The 2008 uprising began with peaceful demonstrations of monks and nuns in Lhasa. Because it underpins contemporary Tibetan nationalism, Tibetan Buddhism clashes with Chinese nationalistic goals in Tibet.

Moreover, it is not lost to the Chinese analysts and leaders that when the Mongols conquered much of Asia including Tibet, Tibetan lamas converted the Mongol Khans and their subjects to Tibetan Buddhism. When the Manchus overran China, the Tibetans had

already converted the Qing Emperors to Tibetan Buddhism. As such, Beijing’s hostility toward Tibetan Buddhism even as it promotes Buddhism as a home-grown religion that promotes harmony and stability is not surprising. Beijing’s domestic and international media strategy of portraying Tibetan monks, including the Dalai Lama, as violent and riotous criminals and ‘terrorists’ in the wake of the recent uprising can be understood as moves to prevent the growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism in China from becoming a stronger ideological challenge against the CCP. The same is intended to neutralise the Dalai Lama’s and Tibetan Buddhism’s international appeal, which poses political and diplomatic challenges for Beijing.

Another ideological challenge, possibly to a lesser degree, is the Tibetan vision of a liberal democratic future for Tibet. One of the Dalai Lama’s key demands in the *Five Point Peace Plan* and the *Strasbourg Proposal* was the introduction of a democratic political system in Tibet, until recently a major component of the *Middle Way Approach*. Although democracy no longer appears to be a formal demand in the talks, the Dalai Lama makes no secret of his admiration for democracy. In his last 10th March statement, the Dalai Lama urged China to ‘follow the modern trend in terms of developing a more open society, free press and policy transparency.’ These sentiments have found concrete practice in the incremental democratisation of the exile government culminating in the Dalai Lama’s devolution of all his political powers to elected officials in 2011. Norbu argues that ideological conservatives in Beijing object to the democratic aspirations of the Tibetans because the ‘Western capitalist political system’ negates the ‘superior socialist system in Tibet.’ Predictably, Beijing seeks to undermine the democratic credentials of the exile government. An article on Xinhua noted that the ‘Dalai clique had been using every opportunity to talking its [sic] democratic achievements for years, while some Western forces...

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225 Ann Frechette, ‘Democracy and Democratization among Tibetans in Exile,’ *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2007: 97-127. The Tibetan exile political structure was until recently akin to a constitutional monarchy with the Dalai Lama serving as a figure-head (albeit with far more internal political influence than the British Queen or the Japanese Emperor), a directly-elected Prime Minister or Kalon Tripa (ဗိုလ်ထောင်) who nominates his colleagues for confirmation by the legislature (ဗိုးရပ်), which is elected on the basis of a mixture of regional (region of ancestry in Tibet), sectarian and place of residence in exile. A separate judiciary exists to settle disputes within the Tibetan community, but subordinate to the laws and judicial system of India. Frechette also identified some constraints to Tibetan democratisation posed by the circumstances of exile. Lobsang Sangay, ‘Tibet: Exiles’ Journey,’ *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, Number 3, July 2003: 119-130.
have also been trying to portrait Dalai as the symbol of democracy (sic). It concluded, ‘[A]nyone who knows the Dalai clique would be able to tell that it is an autocratic theocracy that is anything but democracy (sic).’ Wen Jiabao made the same point to Fareed Zakaria. To be sure, painting the Dalai Lama, Tibetan exiles and monks in Tibet in a negative light is a response to the cultural diplomacy of the Tibetans inside and outside China to reduce the international appeal of the Tibetan cause (more on this later in Chapters Six and Seven).

Although it is hard to establish how widespread democratic thoughts are in Tibet, there is some evidence that Tibetans in Tibet desire democracy and its associated rights. As early as 1988 monks distributed copies of ‘The Meaning of the Precious Democratic Constitution of Tibet,’ portrayed as a liberal democratic constitution for a free Tibet. They were given lengthy prison sentences. Schwartz notes:

The severity of the sentences, intensely ideological denunciation of the “crimes,” and the public spectacle of a mass sentencing rally indicate how seriously the Chinese government perceives the threat posed by the ideas of the Drepung monks.

All three post-Mao leaders have made it clear that western-style democracy has no place in China and Tibetan aspirations for democracy militate against CCP rule in Tibet and the Leninist political system there. Furthermore, in the Tibetan demand for democracy, Beijing perceives the designs of Western countries to topple the CCP and undermine China’s rise. The spectre of ‘peaceful evolution’ haunts the CCP elite and Tibetan demands for democracy are seen as a Trojan horse of hostile countries. A critique of the Dalai Lama’s positions in Beijing Review assails the demand for democracy in exactly these terms: ‘By such sentiments, the Dalai Lama is attempting to sing the praises of the Western capitalist system and negate socialism.’

Furthermore, if Tibet is given greater autonomy or democracy, Beijing fears that Uyghurs and Mongols will demand the same causing a ‘chain reaction among other minority ethnic groups.’ Rex Li argues, ‘To grant more independence to Tibet, Chinese leaders fear, would encourage other regions to break away from the centre, thus jeopardizing China’s  

228 Wen Jiabao, Interview with Fareed Zakaria, CNN, 28 September, 2008.
231 Ibid: 125.
234 SWB, 18 May, 1999: FE/D3537/G.
“national unity and territorial integrity.” Moreover, in today’s highly nationalistic context in China, any loosening of Chinese rule in Tibet would undermine the CCP’s own position in China. Hence, Beijing always dismisses the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way with the argument that it requires changing the apparently sacrosanct Chinese constitution and autonomy laws. In Beijing’s view, tampering with these institutions is a slippery slope and represents a reversal of the state-building gains that it believes it has achieved in Tibet since 1949.

In fact, allegations of collusion between Tibetans and hostile forces are made on the entirety of the Tibetan agenda, not just its democratic component. Phuntsok of TAR State Security Department concluded his report on state security:

Domestic and international class struggles are always linked together. International hostile forces always try every possible way to cultivate similar forces on the domestic front as their “internal responsive forces” to subvert the socialist system, whereas domestic hostile forces always regard their foreign counterparts as their patrons and draw support from them.

Zhang Qingli, TAR Party Secretary, accused the Dalai Lama of travelling world-wide to ‘form alliances with anti-Chinese forces.’ Concerns about a nexus between Tibetan ‘separatists’ and foreign rivals are not entirely unfounded given the presence of Tibet lobbies in Washington, Brussels, London and Berlin. More importantly, in the 1950s and 1960s, America gave covert military support to Tibetan guerrillas fighting the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Tibet is a problem in US-China relations, Sino-Indian, Canadian-US and Sino-European relations. The next chapter examines the role that Tibet plays in each of these important bilateral relations. Suffice it to say here that some Chinese analysts and specialists in foreign affairs see Tibet as a serious ‘weak link in China’s political system.... vulnerable to manipulation by hostile forces’.

If ‘politics is...also a contest over legitimacy,’ as Nye argued, then China’s Tibet policy, if not its rule, is vulnerable to Tibetan protests and campaigning and international condemnation. As Smith argues, ‘The legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty [over Tibet] is so sensitive for China that it cannot be flexible on any issue relevant to that legitimacy,

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236 Yedor 26 July 2006; Phuntsok 26 May 2006.
237 Phuntsok 6 December, 1993.
238 Zhang 17 August 2006.
240 Wang 5-6 May, 2006
242 Nye 1993: 142.
including the nature of Tibetan autonomy within the Chinese State.\textsuperscript{243} Zhu Feng also senses a relevance to regime legitimacy: ‘competing national allegiances within China and an inefficient state apparatus...undermine leadership legitimacy and stability.’\textsuperscript{244} In this contest for legitimacy, historical representations and symbols have come to play prominent roles.\textsuperscript{245} The conflict over legitimacy is not just about history and sovereignty, but also about the very idea of China as constructed and propagated by the CCP.\textsuperscript{246} As Sperling contends:

\begin{quote}
Indeed, to question the legitimacy of Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC is to question the legitimacy of the idea of the Chinese state as constructed by the Chinese Communist Party; it is to raise questions against the cultural and political nationalism that has been fostered within the PRC and that has taken root both inside and outside official party and governmental circles...Tibet’s history has become a fundamental and existential issue, one that has significant bearing on the modern identity of China.\textsuperscript{247}
\end{quote}

Such being the case, Beijing’s frequent accusation that the Dalai Lama is seeking Tibetan independence based on his refusal to accept that Tibet has always been an integral part of China speaks to the insecurity of historical legitimacy.\textsuperscript{248} This anxiety over legitimacy also explains the ubiquitous genitive such as in ‘China’s Tibet,’ ‘Tibet, China’ or ‘Tibet of China’ in Chinese websites, books, magazines and exhibitions that simultaneously reveals the possessiveness and insecurity over Tibet.\textsuperscript{249}

\paragraph{Societal Security Concerns}

Furthermore, societal insecurity is set off by expressions of Tibetan nationalism and assertion of identity. The ‘national’ identity of an over-arching Chinese ‘nation’ (\textit{zhonghua minzu}) consisting of the 56 nationalities that the CCP and previous Chinese nationalists have been trying to construct is frustrated by the persistence of a strong Tibetan identity.\textsuperscript{250} As noted above, questioning China’s historical claim over Tibet and incorporation of Tibet also questions contemporary Chinese national identity.

\textsuperscript{243} Smith 2008: ix.
\textsuperscript{245} Sperling 2004: 4; Powers 2004.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid: 5.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{249} Smith 2008: ix-x. An academic in Canada who blogs at \textit{High Peaks, Pure Earth} also mused over this issue in “China and the Recurring Genitive,” 26 October, 2008. He wrote: “There must be a psychological condition that describes an anxiety so acute that there is an overwhelming need to constantly state and re-state that something belongs to you - that you own something. Where does this need come from? How does it start? How can it be cured?”
\textsuperscript{250} Power 2004: 102-110; Sperling 2004: 5; Tuttle 2005: 43-47.
The assertion of Tibetan identity and the growing Chinese interest in Tibetan Buddhism pose a challenge to Chinese civilisation, whether it is construed as Confucianist or socialist. Furthermore, Tibetan nationalism militates against Chinese nationalism in both its state-led and Han-supremacist varieties. Tibetan nationalism also negates both the traditional Chinese practice of frontier security through cultural assimilation and the Marxist expectation of national differences and religious beliefs to wither away in the process of socialist transformation. As Buzan and Hansen wrote societal security is relevant ‘where the state, or other political actors, mobilised society to confront internal or external threats.’

Military-Strategic Concerns
In view of the fact that the PLA is the Party’s army charged with defending both the Party and state, the above political security themes are relevant to military security too. In addition, Tibetan secessionism or any autonomy arrangement that curtails the presence and scope of PLA activities in Tibet threatens the strategic advantage that the Tibetan plateau proffers from a military point of view and the consequent vulnerability of the Chinese heartland. This threat to strategic interests could arise from potential Tibetan insurrections as well as from external adversaries such as India. The security of Chinese migrants in Tibetan areas is an unstated military security remit in the same way that the armies of European empires provided security to western colonists, traders and missionaries in the colonies.

The Dalai Lama’s demand in the 1980s for demilitarisation of Tibet fed fears of future Tibetan insurrections as well as Indian military threats. Demilitarisation and declaration of Tibet as a zone of peace is no longer on the exile’s agenda, but Beijing continues to dwell on these issues as obstacles to dialogue. A demilitarised Tibet will become easier for Tibetan nationalists to renew their armed insurrection and easier for India to regain a foothold in Tibet. The 10,000 Tibetans soldiers of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Indian army, who played critical roles in the Indo-Pakistan wars and domestic crises, compounds these concerns. Wang Lixiong brought out most clearly the military-strategic logic of Beijing’s security fears, arguing that a non-Chinese Tibet would inevitably be pulled into

252 Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213.
255 SWB, 18 May, 1999: FE/D3537/G.
256 Xinhua 10 November, 2008.
India’s embrace and the Indian army will have free run on the Tibetan plateau making the Chinese heartland easy targets for Indian troops and missiles. He wrote that ‘preparing for a possible future conflict with India is the bottom line as to why the…Central Government cannot retreat or compromise on the demands for Tibetan independence or covert independence.’  

As pervasive as such calculation is to the Chinese officialdom today, it predates the formation of the PRC. Republican Chinese officials in the 1910s expressed similar assessments: ‘Tibet is a buttress on our national frontiers—the hand, as it were, which protects the face—and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China.’ Such statements leave no doubts as to the military-strategic value of Tibet for China and help explain the active role the PLA and other security forces play in Tibet policy making. For Beijing, it seems immaterial whether Tibetans are demanding independence or autonomy; autonomy is just another stage to independence. Indeed, as the Tibetan proverb goes, the Tibetans are betrayed by their hopefulness, the Chinese by their suspiciousness.

Inasmuch as the Dalai Lama is the most potent symbol of Tibet’s separateness from China—he was the temporal and spiritual head of Tibet before the Chinese invasion—he is somehow relevant to all the insecurities discussed above. Henry Kissinger described Konrad Adenauer, the post-World War II German Chancellor, as endowed with a ‘serenity which was startling in the leader of an occupied country’ and credits him for ‘restoring self-respect to his occupied, demoralised, and divided society.’ The Dalai Lama has played a similar role for the Tibetans in far more difficult circumstances, but he has transcended his traditional role to become a celebrated global moral leader.

In a survey ‘World Leaders’ conducted for France-24 and International Herald Tribune by Harris Interactive, the Dalai Lama was voted the most respected world leader by Western Europeans and Americans. The loyalty of most Tibetans to the Dalai Lama and his international stature constitutes a dilemma for Beijing: whether to meet his minimal demands and risk a nationalist upsurge in Tibet around his leadership or to wait him out, hoping that the Tibetan movement will fizzle out after his

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258 SWB, 18 May, 1999: FE/D3537/G. Emphasis mine. Again, Wang has moved on from such worst-case, zero-sum thinking, but much of the Chinese officialdom is stuck in this hyper-realist worldview.

259 Quoted in Tuttle, 2005: 44.


death, and risk inevitably more Tibetan resentment without a unified Tibetan leadership to deal with. Since 1994, an anti-Dalai Lama campaign has been going on in the monasteries, nunneries, workplaces, schools and colleges.\textsuperscript{264} He is \textit{persona non grata} in Tibet and the target of virtually all the political campaigns in Tibet. Beijing is also conducting a campaign of isolation and denial of political space for the Tibetans on the international arena, cajoling, pressuring and bullying leaders of foreign governments from meeting and engaging with the Dalai Lama.

Yet, he remains as popular as ever among most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet.\textsuperscript{265} Wang described the Dalai Lama’s power:

\begin{quote}
Unfortunately for Beijing, a Dalai Lama exists among the exiled Tibetans. He cannot be vilified or forgotten; to all Tibetans, he is a “Bodhisattva” who gives meaning to life and significance to the pursuit of human life. In the face of such a Bodhisattva, secular power, armed force, and political schemes seem to be no match.
\end{quote}

Wang may have been a bit carried away here, but many in China, particularly the United Front Department, hope that the Tibet issue will disappear when he passes away.\textsuperscript{266}

In summing up this section, China’s perception of security threats concerning Tibet cut across the divides between the so-called traditional and new security issues, encompassing both material and ideational concerns. It is to remove these threats and insecurities that Beijing has deployed the state-building policies analysed in the first section of this chapter. It will also be these pre-existing threats and insecurities that would be heightened as a result of the Tibetan positions and activities that will be analysed in the next chapter.

\section*{Conclusion}

China’s Nationality Policy is driven by insecurity and geared towards mitigating that insecurity through state-building. Beijing’s Tibet Policy too is dictated by and designed to address her security challenges in Tibet through state-building in its institutional-, infrastructure- and nation-building dimensions, while its policy towards the Dalai Lama has been designed to protect the apparent gains in state-building achieved since 1959.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{264}Goldstein 1998: 48-50.
\item \textsuperscript{266}Rabgey and Sharlho, 2004: 29.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In the late 1980s, a number of domestic, transnational and global events conspired to heighten Beijing’s Tibet insecurities enough for it to impose martial law and adopt a hard-line assimilationist policy in 1989. China’s security fears in Tibet relate to sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, Marxist and nationalist ideologies, the Leninist political system and state institutions, national identity and image and regime survival in the context of perceived alliances between Tibetan separatists and hostile foreign forces. These political, societal and military fears arise both from uncertainty about the future Tibetan intentions and past experience in dealing with the Tibetans. The distinction between security challenges to the state, nation and regime emanating from Tibet are blurred because the CCP practically owns the state and its leaders and apparatchiks are essentially Chinese nationalists.

A variety of state-building instruments ranging from violent force to softer hearts-and-minds approaches have been deployed: military invasion, Nationality Identification Project, RNA, economic development, political campaigns and the United Front. Reducing Chinese insecurities in Tibet through infrastructure-, institution-, and nation-building are the key objectives of these policy instruments. In its dialogue with Dharamsala, Beijing has simply resorted to stone-walling and extracting maximum concessions from the aging Dalai Lama and his desperate flock. This is clear from Beijing’s consistent refusal to acknowledge even the existence of a Tibet issue and rejecting proposal after proposal from Dharamsala. The security implications of recognising and addressing Dharamsala’s demands explain this conservative behaviour as much as its confidence in its rising power.

The next chapter looks at Tibetan identity insecurity bred by the above mentioned policies implemented by Beijing and its local officials. It also examines the various strategies and instruments that the Tibetans have used both inside and outside Tibet to reduce their insecurity.
Chapter 6

Identity Insecurity and the Tibetan National Struggle

In the previous chapter, we examined the links between Chinese insecurities and the post-1989 policies of rejecting political liberalisation, ruthless enforcement of stability and rapid economic development inside Tibet and the side-lining of the Dalai Lama—the so-called ‘grasping with both hands’ approach brought in by Hu Jintao—and the various policy-instruments employed to achieve Beijing’s state-building objectives. The chapter also attempted a more detailed and coherent exposition of the Chinese insecurities or perceived security challenges in relation to Tibet.

This chapter will first examine the Tibetan identity insecurity created by the Chinese policies, practices and externalities examined in the previous chapter in terms of three overlapping sources: ‘assimilationist’ state policies, migration and cultural imperialism. The chapter then examines how the Tibetans have responded to that identity insecurity. To that end, the various strategies and instruments used by the Tibetans, both inside and outside Tibet, to counter the threats from Chinese policies, migration and cultural practices will be examined. This analysis will reveal the political divisions among the Tibetans in terms of the objectives that they seek to achieve, although united by their common fears for identity and loyalty to the Dalai Lama. In the end, this chapter will link back to Chapter Five by explaining how the Tibetan strategies and activities heighten the Chinese sense of the security challenges examined in the previous chapter and the policy implications, thereby completing the cycle of the insecurity dilemma.

Tibetan Societal Insecurity

As explained before, the concept of societal security is deployed to understand Tibetan identity insecurity. To recapitulate, societal security is about identity just as state security is
about sovereignty. Societal insecurity develops when a group defines a particular ‘development or potentiality’ as a threat to its identity, i.e. survival as a distinct community. The threats perceived by members of that group fall into three analytically distinct but practically intertwined themes of vertical assimilationist state policies, migration and horizontally homogenising cultural imperialism. Depopulation is relevant when the identity of the group is targeted. As the Copenhagen School posits, these threats range from ‘intentional, programmatic and political...to unintended and structural.’¹ The Dalai Lama often complains that Tibetan culture faces threats from ‘intentional’ state policies and practices and unintentional socio-economic consequences of these policies.² For most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, survival and protection of their national identity has become the core objective of their struggle. In his 10 March, 2008 address on the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama said:

"As a result of their policy of population transfer the non-Tibetan population has increased many times, reducing native Tibetans to an insignificant minority in their own country. Moreover, the language, customs and traditions of Tibet, which reflect the true nature and identity of the Tibetan people, are gradually fading away. As a consequence, Tibetans are increasingly being assimilated into the larger Chinese population."³

He accuses the Chinese government of conducting ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet,⁴ by which he means the erosion of Tibetan identity as a result of both assimilationist policies and unintended structural and socio-economic consequences.⁵

This fear for Tibetan identity is shared by most Tibetans inside Tibet. Germano observed a ‘deep, abiding cultural depression among...the educated youth and religious elite to nomads and villagers.’⁶ Tibetans lament ‘that their religious and intellectual as well as political situation is hopeless, given the continuing Chinese cultural and political onslaught.’⁷ One gets an appreciation of this anxiety about identity from Tibetan language blogs, literary

¹ Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 33.
² The Dalai Lama, Interview with Ann Currie, Nightly News. NBC, 12 April, 2008.
⁵ Interview with Ann Currie, 12 April, 2008.
⁷ Ibid.
magazines and popular media emerging from Tibet. The case of Kartze TAP in Sichuan is illustrative of the outcome of these pressures on Tibetan identity. Derong Tsering Dhondup, a Tibetan official and intellectual from Kartze, carried out an investigation of 6,044 Tibetan cadres in the Karze (Ch. Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and found that

Only 991 cadres, 16.4% of the total, knew the Tibetan written language. In Kanding it was 3.1%, Bathang 5.3%, Lithang 9.9%, Ganzi 21.6%, Xinlong 9.5%, Derge 38.7%, Baiyu [Palyul] 13.2%, Serxu 30.7% and Serta 15%. He also carried out an investigation involving 25 Tibetan students at a Middle School in Kangding (Tib. Dhartse mdo) and found that

...5 of them, ie., 20%, could make fluent conversation in the Tibetan language for any occasion; 4 people, ie., 16%, could only make conversation in Tibetan for ordinary occasions; 9 people (36%) could understand Tibetan language but could only speak it for everyday use; and 7 people (28%) could understand it but could not even speak in Tibetan for everyday use.

Dhondup laments that the 'rich, fine language and literature' of Tibet will disappear in a generation. He attributes this state of affairs to (1) ‘the mistaken idea of speeding up the fusion of nationalities’, (2) ‘The erroneous view that there is “no use for the written Tibetan language”’ and (3) ‘the lack of self-respect and pride amongst Tibetans.’ How do these Tibetan fears for the survival of their identity manifest in concrete terms?

‘Assimilationist’ Policies and Vertical Threats
In the previous chapter, I argued that Beijing seeks to reduce its insecurity in Tibet through a policy that consists of the manipulation of ethnic identity, affirmative action, economic development, political campaigns, the United Front and RNA. Tibetans feel that these

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8 [Tibetan Blogs] can be accessed at http://www.tibeta. 9 [Lamp] is accessible at http://www.tibetcm.com/blog/index.asp. These two Tibetan language blogs are frequently closed by the authorities for carrying political content and during sensitive periods. The Chinese language blog of the famous Tibetan writer, Tsering Woens, available at http://woeser.middle-way.net/ represents many other Chinese language blogs maintained by Tibetans, which provides a sampling of Tibetan viewpoints. The booming pop music industry in Tibet with its mass production of audio tapes, CDs and VCDs and distribution through the internet provide valuable materials to gauge public opinion in Tibet. Unlike literary magazines and blogs, popular music by definition is enjoyed by Tibetans of all walks of life.


10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid
instruments directly threaten the core pillars of Tibetan identity. These state policies and practices also exacerbate Tibetan fears of Chinese migration and cultural imperialism.  

Tibetans see RNA as a charade in which the key positions of power are held by Han Chinese and Tibetans are powerless. An official publication of TGIE argues:

Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. All the decisions of the administration are taken by the Chinese Communist Party through its Regional CCP. Tibetan people's participation in the government is only to rubber stamp Communist Party decisions. Tibetans on the plateau do not hold any key positions— even within the “TAR” Communist Party. The Secretary of the “TAR” Communist Party is the most powerful position in the “TAR” and this post has been held by Chinese since 1959. The population of half of Tibet—living in eastern regions now merged into neighbouring Chinese provinces—are completely deprived of their political identity and labelled an insignificant minority nationality in their own land.

Further, Tibetans argue that the division of Tibetans into separate nominally autonomous prefectures, counties and TAR has ‘contributed to the weakening and erosion of [the Tibetan] nationality’s unique identity and characteristics, as well as its ability to grow and develop.’

When the NPC passed the law on regional autonomy in May 1984, the Tibetans in Tibet dismissed it as ‘thunder that does not bring any rain’ because of the various obstacles identified in the previous chapter. Phunwang characterised Beijing’s existing policy in Tibet as ‘assimilationist’ and endorsed the Dalai Lama’s demand for meaningful autonomy for all Tibetans under one administration. In short, the Tibetans view both the level and design of autonomy as inimical to the meaningful expression and reproduction of Tibetan identity.

Economic development has been an important element of China’s Tibet policy since the early 1980s, but became a core component along with coercive enforcement of stability in

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15 Ibid.
17 Shakya 1999: 391.
19 Phunwang 2007: 66-76.
Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, Beijing’s economic policy in Tibet has always had a strong security rationale.

Nevertheless, the Tibetans do acknowledge the economic development that has taken place on the Tibetan plateau. The Dalai Lama said on 10 March, 2005, ‘There has been a great deal of economic progress along with development in basic infrastructure.’

However, they criticise the economic development, specifically Western Development Campaign, for focusing excessively on hard infrastructure such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, fertiliser plants, natural gas pipelines and hydro-electric plants constructed by imported labour from China on lands ‘forcibly’ taken from local Tibetans and neglecting soft infrastructure such as health, education and local human capacity-building. They contend that this form of development is fostering the social exclusion of Tibetans in their own country, destroying Tibet’s ‘fragile’ environment, encouraging Chinese immigration into Tibet, increasing the economic marginalisation of Tibetans, all of which contributes to hastening the erosion of Tibetan identity.

Essentially, the Tibetans see in China’s modernisation and development in Tibet a colonial project to exploit Tibetan resources and ‘civilise’ the Tibetans by undermining their religion, language and customs. Hence, a leading Tibetan NGO in exile saw the Railway as ‘a tool of cultural genocide.’ ICT, another influential organisation blamed the Railway for bringing about a ‘second invasion’ of Tibet by accelerating the influx of Chinese and endangering ‘Tibet’s culture and religion, which is integral to Tibetan identity.’ Woeser wrote in an essay on the Railway: ‘Regrettably, violence of various degrees—hard, soft and in-between—prevails in the vast land of Tibet, and all of it bears the standard of development

\[\text{\footnotesize Reference List:}\]

20 Goldstein 1997: 63 and 93.
21 The Dalai Lama, [Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the Forty-Sixth Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day], 10 March, 2005.
and in the name of modernization works its impact on the senses and hearts of the people.‘

As such, there is a wide-spread feeling among the Tibetans that economic development, while enriching a small percentage of Tibetans, has marginalised most Tibetans and is having a debilitating impact on Tibetan identity.

The various political campaigns conducted in the Tibetan society, which invariably morph into campaigns against ‘separatism’, the Dalai Lama and Tibetan traditions are perceived as ultimately targeting Tibetan national identity. Finally, the Tibetans see the United Front to deal with the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles as a counterproductive strategy to divide the Tibetan exile community, a perception exacerbated by the fact that the United Front Department, an institution with conservative positions and vested interests in thwarting a solution to the Tibet issue and the return of the Dalai Lama, is in charge of managing Tibetan affairs.

**Chinese Migration: Demographic, Political and Cultural Implications**

The migration of Han and Hui Chinese into TAR was made possible through a conscious policy decision during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984. In Eastern Tibet, immigration of non-Tibetans began in the 18th century when the Qing Dynasty annexed these regions. Immigration in the reform era began with an economic development rationale, but was aided by infrastructure building, especially in the transportation sector. The Tibetan concerns about the Railway’s abetting of the influx of Chinese into Tibet is illustrative of their sense that Chinese policies contribute indirectly, if not directly, to the problem of Chinese immigration into Tibet.

Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet consider Chinese immigration as a grave threat to Tibetan identity. The Dalai Lama, for instance, raised fears of a Chinese plan to resettle...
million Chinese in TAR after the Beijing Olympics.\textsuperscript{34} Migration is not just a simple numbers game because it has social, cultural and political implications.\textsuperscript{35} The question of Chinese migration is controversial because Tibetan and Chinese positions diverge considerably.

Tibetans base their figures on population structures in all areas recognised as Tibetan autonomous regions and argue that Beijing is implementing a policy of population transfer that has resulted in the Tibetans being reduced to a minority of six million against a Chinese population of 7.5 million.\textsuperscript{36} Beijing claims that only TAR is Tibet and, even there, excludes the large military presence and unregistered Chinese migrants, the so-called ‘floating population’, arguing that Tibetans constitute 92.8% of Tibet’s population.\textsuperscript{37} Han Chinese already outnumber Tibetans in Tsochang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Tsonub (Haixi) Mongolian and TAP, Tsolho (Hainan) TAP and Haidong Prefecture in Qinghai and live in large numbers in Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture and Kanlho (Gannan) TAP.\textsuperscript{38} According to the 1990 census, Tibetans were still dominant in Kardze (Ganzi) TAP, and Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. In TAR, although the countryside is predominantly Tibetan, as in the neighbouring provinces (over 85% of Tibetans live in rural areas in TAR),\textsuperscript{39} Han Chinese now outnumber Tibetans in Lhasa and Shigatse, the two biggest cities of TAR.\textsuperscript{40}

Chinese immigration into Tibetan regions is the result of a combination of state policy and voluntary migration of Han and Hui Chinese to take advantage of the economic opportunities opened up by Beijing’s investment in Tibet. A portion of the Chinese population in Tibet is temporary and seasonal, but the Tibetans fear it will increase over time. Moreover, Beijing could legalise their residency in Tibet whenever the security situation

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Ann Curry, 12 April, 2008.
\textsuperscript{36} The Office of Tibet, ‘Tibet at a Glance’; available at \url{http://www.tibet.com/glance.html}.
\textsuperscript{38} Ashild Kolas and Monika P. Thowsen, \textit{On the Margins of Tibet: Cultural Survival on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier}, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005: 185-190. These figures are based on the 1990 census and official Chinese statistics understated the true extent of Chinese settlement in Tibetan areas. Moreover, the situation may have changed dramatically in the 18 years that have elapsed.
\textsuperscript{39} Fischer 2005: xvi.
\textsuperscript{40} Dreyer in Sautman and Dreyer 2006: 139.
\textsuperscript{41} Sheridan, 23 March, 2008.
The perception of Han and Hui Chinese swamping the Tibetans is accentuated by their pattern of migration to and dominance of politics and economics in Tibet’s urban centres.

Tibetans see the increasing number of Chinese, coupled with the policies of privileging Mandarin Chinese in education and public life and the greater freedom of cultural expression of the Chinese, as threatening to Tibetan identity. Immigration is a sensitive issue even in secure nations as evidenced by the contentious debates in America and Europe, but the demographic imbalance between the Tibetans and the Chinese exacerbates Tibetan vulnerabilities. Tibetans fear that their future would be akin to the present state of the Manchus, once a proud people that conquered and ruled China, now thoroughly sinicised. The Manchu language is hanging on the last eighteen tongues. Consequently, as quoted above, the Dalai Lama made an explicit connection between Chinese migration and erosion of Tibetan identity in his 10 March, 2008 address. This is also the basis of his frequent charge that the Chinese policies in Tibet are causing ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet.

Chinese migration also changes the physical characteristics of the places where they settle, constantly reminding Tibetans of the vulnerability of their identity. Through official fiat or selling rights to Chinese property developers, many traditional parts of Lhasa were knocked down and contemporary Chinese-style houses built. Street signs and business names are written in bold Chinese characters with barely visible Tibetan characters. The Tibetan writer, Woeser, decried the ‘ugly construction’ taking place in Tibetan cities, where once traditional Tibetan architecture was prevalent. She also deplored the visibly Chinese appearance of Lhasa during Tibetan New Year, complete with Chinese-style lanterns everywhere.

As in most ethnic conflicts, Tibetan fears for their identity mix with fears of political and economic marginalisation. They fear that the situation in Inner Mongolia—the Mongols have become such a minority in their own land that even the so-called ‘organs of autonomy’,

43 Fischer 2004: 15.
45 The Dalai Lama, 10 March, 2008.
47 http://woeser.middle-way.net.
48 Ibid.
the Regional People’s Congress and Government, are dominated by the Han Chinese—will be replicated in Tibet soon.

Economic grievances interact with cultural and political fears to constitute a witch’s brew of a conflict. Fischer finds that in Tibetan areas, economic inequality manifests not just across the urban-rural spatial divide as in the rest of China, but also across the urban ethnic divide whereby Tibetans are distinctly disadvantaged.49 He writes that ‘competition in urban economic opportunities underlies the controversy of Chinese migration into the Tibetan areas.’50 This plays out in two ways.

One, educated Tibetans have to compete for jobs and other opportunities in Chinese language with Han and Hui Chinese, who are better qualified and better connected in the corruption- and guanxi-ridden system. Lustgarten met a trilingual Tibetan entrepreneur ‘educated at one of Beijing’s best universities’ who was struggling to make it in the new economy, while a tour guide lost his licence when the police required annual exams in Mandarin.51 A businessman was compelled to change the name of his business after a Chinese entrepreneur chose the same name for his shop.52 Even educated and enterprising Tibetans are finding it hard to succeed, giving rise to anti-Chinese feelings right across the Tibetan population.

Second, rural Tibetans migrating to Tibetan urban centres have to compete not only with the established Tibetan and Chinese urban elites, they also have to fight over the residual spoils of economic development with the increasing number of Chinese migrants, who have an edge simply by virtue of their native proficiency in the Chinese language.53 Hence, in TAR, population swamping ‘can be seen as a reactive lens through which locals interpret their experience of exclusion within urban growth.’54 In eastern Tibet, the overall demographic balance has shifted in favour of the Chinese, although most Tibetans live separately in rural and nomadic areas.

49 Fischer 2005: xviii.
50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
54 Ibid: 2.
Demographic shifts, actual or potential, often give rise to conflicts and wars in multi-ethnic societies and the Sino-Tibetan conflict is being fuelled partly by the increasing number of Chinese migrants in Tibet.

**Cultural Imperialism and Horizontal Threats**

Horizontal cultural threats or cultural imperialism take place because of the ‘overriding cultural and linguistic influence from [a] neighbouring culture.’\(^{55}\) Due to the state’s ownership and control of the vehicles of cultural production, propagation and transmission—the media and communications infrastructure and public education, etc.—coupled with Chinese immigration, Tibetans feel that the onslaught of Chinese culture is gradually undermining Tibetan identity.\(^{56}\) The design of RNA, which gerrymanders autonomous regions to include as many nationality groups, preferably Han Chinese, within these autonomous units presents horizontal challenges to Tibetan identity. The economic development strategy of encouraging Chinese immigration and the emphasis on infrastructure building abets cultural imperialism. Finally, the materials used for the various political campaigns denigrate and undermine Tibetan identity. The following pages bear out these points.

Wang Lixiong wrote that ‘today imperialism manifests itself more often through those aspects of life termed as culture’ and that Tibet is facing two types of imperialism.\(^{57}\) First, suppression of Tibetan national ‘self-articulation’ renders the remnants of Tibetan traditions culturally meaningless, as they can only be used to ‘re-iterate the voice of the ruling empire’ and not the true feelings of the Tibetan nation. Arguing that cultural preservation is not just about ‘repeating [nation’s] history or acting out its traditions,’ but more importantly about expressing the ‘true feeling of the nation, he writes:

> From such a perspective, the damage and suppression that Chinese rule has inflicted on to Tibetan culture becomes apparent. No matter how much it has tried to achieve benefits, it has categorically suppressed Tibetan self-expression. The empire wants to control expression of any kind; any breakthrough invites punishment.”\(^{58}\)

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\(^{55}\) Buzan et al. 1998: 121.


\(^{58}\) Ibid: 101-102.
Secondly, Wang contends, ‘Political imperialism has been extended and transformed into cultural imperialism, an egotistic sense of cultural superiority that permeates all levels of the Chinese presence in Tibet—officials, rickshaw drivers, fruit vendors, construction labourers. They all look down upon the Tibetans as ‘lazy, conservative, short of or low in cultural qualities’ and ‘exaggerate their own achievements in forcing the locals’ to reform themselves. He recounts specific examples of Chinese cadres, writers and artists in Tibet displaying various kinds of condescension towards Tibetans that reveal their imperial sense of superiority and civilizing mission. As a physical manifestation of this cultural chauvinism, he gives the example of the “Taizhou Plaza” an “aid Tibet project” that shows typical characteristics of cultural imperialism. He condemns the plaza as ‘a symbol of naked cultural violence and occupation. The speech on literature, arts and culture to Tibetan professionals and cadres given by Chen Kuiyen is typical of the attitude that Wang described. Another illustration of ‘cultural violence’ is the requirement for Tibetan newsreaders and TV personalities to go to China for ‘modern’ voice coaching in how to speak Tibetan language!

Tibetans are fearful that because of the official policies, preponderance of material power and greater freedom of cultural expression of the Han Chinese and the climate of fear, Tibetan culture will lose out gradually in a cultural war of attrition. Pragmatic and materialist pressures could also hasten the process. Some Tibetan families send their children to Chinese language schools at the expense of Tibetan language education because they see that as the only way they can have better futures. The feeling that there is no use for Tibetan language compels some Tibetan parents to privilege Chinese language education for their children. The lack of self-respect makes some Tibetans, especially the young and impressionable ones, to speak the language of their ‘colonial’ rulers. Not all Tibetan regions have reached the deplorable situation described by Derong in Kartze TAP above, but the Tibetans fear that it is

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
64 Dodin 2008: 200.
65 Tsering Shakya, personal communication.
just a matter of time if the current Chinese policies and practices persist. Popular media such as songs and blogs from inside Tibet are littered with expressions of fear of Tibetan identity generally. It was in the context of such identity insecurity and anomie arising from powerlessness in the face of ‘hostile’ Chinese policies that the Tibetan uprising in 2008 took place. As chapter eight demonstrates, while the economic and externalist (transnational Tibetan instigation and American Tibet policy) rationales played some role, the chief cause of the Tibetan uprising was identity insecurity in the context of their powerlessness to determine the future of their own identity.

If the Tibetans feel identity insecurity so acutely, what have they done to mitigate it? The next section examines the various strategies and instruments that the Tibetans have used to address their insecurity in both Tibet and exile.

**Politics in Diaspora, Resistance at Home**

First as the preceding historical chapters demonstrated, the Tibetans have used both military and non-military strategies and instruments in their six-decade struggle against China. Non-military means included both cultural and conventional diplomacy and alignment with sympathetic international forces. While the violent dimension of the Tibetan struggle ended, when the CIA-backed Tibetan guerrilla base in Nepal was closed in 1974, sporadic violence in the form of riots continues to break out in Tibet. In the face of perceived Chinese inflexibility, violence is still being considered by some Tibetans in Tibet and exile. Yet, the Tibetan movement as represented by the Dalai Lama and TGIE has adhered to non-violence in their struggle. Tibetans are exploring both autonomy (through the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach) and secessionism (independence as pursued by the critics of the Middle

67 A short sample of songs expressing Tibetan identity pride and fears include: Dube’s ‘Tibetan Life Essence’ and ‘Divine Bird Gong-mo’; Dolma Kyab’s ‘Tibetan’; Sherten’s ‘Destiny’, ‘The Sun, Moon and Stars’ and ‘Divine White Bird of Peace’. Kunga Phuntsok’s ‘Saddening’ and ‘Remembering Kindness’; Truth-Revealing Mirror; Namkha’s ‘Tsanpo’s Messenger’. All the music videos associated with these songs can be viewed on Youtube.


Way). The Middle Way arguably enjoys the support of most Tibetans. The Tibetans, especially in exile, have also actively sought the intercession of the international community on their behalf, in which their Tibetan Buddhist culture and the Dalai Lama’s leadership have been of some help. This section elaborates on all the above strategies, as pertains to activities and links between the Tibetans inside Tibet and their diasporic brethren, leaving the international dimension for the next chapter.

The Tibetan struggle against Chinese rule has evolved in both goal and strategy. However, it would be misleading to posit a monolithic movement, because these shifts in goal and strategy have happened in the context of heated contestations that continue in the Tibetan Diaspora in the form of the split between the Dalai Lama’s (and TGIE’s) position of seeking autonomy and that of the independence activists. In addition to sparring over goals and strategies, the Middle Way Approach has also come under fire from some Tibetans for appeasing Beijing without anything concrete to show for it, as will become clear in subsequent chapters. For instance, when dialogue resumed in September 2002, TGIE repeatedly appealed to Tibetan exiles and supporters around the world to refrain from protesting against visiting Chinese leaders and on sensitive anniversaries, with the goal of ‘creating a conducive environment’ for the talks. Independence activists and organisations assailed these appeals as infractions of their democratic rights to protest and as futile acts of appeasement. Middle Way advocates accuse their critics of irresponsibility and conducting activities that harm the dialogue process and by implication Tibetan interests. What follows is a detailed examination of the dynamic politics of the Tibetan struggle against China, identifying relevant linkages with the Tibetan population inside Tibet.

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In the last five decades since the Dalai Lama and 80,000 Tibetans escaped to India in 1959, the Tibetan national struggle has gone through fundamental shifts in both goal and strategy. The transformations are obvious from the Dalai Lama’s annual statements to commemorate the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa on 10 March, 1959, which can be described as a ‘State of the Struggle’ address. On the third anniversary in 1962, he began by saying:

On the 10th of March 1959 the Tibetan people reasserted their independence, suffering almost nine years of foreign domination. Foreign rule, alas, still continues in Tibet but I am proud to know that the spirit of our people remains uncrushed and unshaken in their resolve to fight on till independence is regained. I know that the struggle, which began a few years ago is still being waged in Tibet against the invader….74

He appealed to the UN General Assembly to ‘…help restore the independence of Tibet’ and advised the Tibetan refugees in South Asia to ‘prepare…to…return…and build a happier and greater independent Tibet.’75 The goal back then was unambiguously to regain political independence. As he was speaking, violent resistance was raging inside Tibet, covertly supported by America.76 Fast-forward to 10 March, 2007, the same Dalai Lama said:

The most important reason behind my proposal to have genuine national regional autonomy for all Tibetans is to achieve genuine equality and unity between the Tibetans and Chinese by eliminating big Han chauvinism and local nationalism. This will contribute to the country’s [China’s] stability through mutual help, trust and friendship between the two nationalities….77

On various other occasions the Dalai Lama and TGIE has clearly renounced independence and separatism.78 During the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal by the US Congress in October 2007, he sought to dispel any Chinese doubts about his sincerity: ‘I am not seeking independence. I am seeking a meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people within the People’s Republic of China.’ The objective of the Tibetan struggle from the point of view of Dharamsala has changed from restoring independence to securing autonomy and unification within China.

75 Ibid.
78 Lawrence Brahm, ‘Conciliatory Dalai Lama Expounds on Winds of Change,’ South China Morning Post, 14 March, 2005; Samdhong Rinpoche, '[The Environment for Dialogue has been Compromised], [The Environment for Dialogue has been Compromised], [Tibet Times], 10 March, 2007.
As we remember from the last chapter, there was a transitional phase in the 1980s when the Dalai Lama demanded a different form of autonomy consisting of all three traditional Tibetan provinces or Chol kha sum (བོད་ལྗོངས་།), a democratic political system and demilitarisation of Tibet into a zone of peace. Before 1991, Dharamsala has been demanding the unification of the territories of the three provinces. However, faced with Beijing’s stone-wall, the Dalai Lama formally withdrew the Strasbourg Proposal on 10 March 1991, saying:

My proposals have not elicited any official response from the Chinese leadership... If in the near future there are no new initiatives from the Chinese I will consider myself free of any obligation to the proposal made in the Strasbourg Address.

Yet, in both public statements and private correspondence with Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the Dalai Lama reiterated his commitment to finding a solution within the parameters of Tibetan autonomy inside PRC and not seeking independence. Beyond that, the clarity of the Strasbourg Proposal was missing until dialogue formally resumed in September 2002.

Since 2002, Dharamsala has been asking for ‘meaningful autonomy,’ which requires implementing the provisions of the Chinese constitution and Autonomy Law in letter and spirit. Dharamsala has also demanded the administrative unification of TAR and areas of Kham and Amdo in the neighbouring provinces where the Tibetan nationality is still in majority. This is different from the strictly territorial definition of unification in the Strasbourg Proposal. According to some exile parliamentarians, TGIE has even banned the use of Chol kha sum from its official publications.

However, when presenting the official position to the exile community, Dharamsala has at times been ambiguous about its bottom-line and the status of its other demands in the 1980s, presumably to blunt criticism by Tibetans and foreign supporters of conceding too

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82 The Dalai Lama 10 March 2007; Gyari, Brookings Institution, 14 November, 2006; Rinpoche (Samdhong), 10 March, 2007.
83 Interviews with Tibetan MPs, Dharamsala, August 2007.
much. This confuses both the Tibetans and the Chinese, drawing accusations from Beijing that the Dalai Lama is demanding the withdrawal of the PLA and Chinese migrants. Dharamsala appears to have taken these off the formal agenda after 2002. The Tibetan demand for meaningful autonomy is a product of their acute identity insecurity. Their insecurity, caused by past and current Chinese policies and practices and their externalities, is reinforced by the uncertainty with respect to future Chinese intentions and fears of radical policy changes in the future after the Tibetans will have let down their guard. The latest Tibetans proposal Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, submitted to Beijing in 2008, makes this clear:

The Tibetan people's culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans themselves and not by any others. Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other provinces and regions of the PRC.

Tibetans see autonomy as a security guarantee against uncertain and adverse shifts in Chinese policies and practices in the future with regard to Tibetan identity. In the language of international relations, Tibetan autonomy is a search for security in the face of historical ordeals, current threats and uncertainty about Chinese intentions in the future. Autonomy is an insurance against hostile policy shifts in the future.

Therefore, The Memorandum calls for ‘clear divisions of powers and responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region’ and demands autonomous decision making powers in the issue areas of language, culture, religion, education, environment, natural resources, economic development and trade, public health, public security, regulation of migration, cultural, educational and religious exchanges with other countries. The foreign and defence affairs should be handled by the Central

84 Editorial, दृष्टि-परिपक्वता के लिए उल्लिखित अन्तर्विद में [Do We Need High Level Autonomy?] 20 March, 2005; अद्वितीय शेज्हा कथा [Sonam Topgyal], भूकंप में धर्मशास्त्र की शक्ति [Sino-Tibetan relations has reached its nadir], दृष्टि-परिपक्वता 31 May, 2008.
87 "Memorandum for a Meaningful Autonomy for all Tibetans”, शेज्हा [Shejha], Vo. 15, Issue 12, November 2008. ‘The Memorandum’ hereafter.
Government. *The Memorandum* considers as a ‘crucial element’ ‘the guarantee’ that ‘the Constitution or other laws provide that powers and responsibilities allocated to the autonomous region cannot be *unilaterally abrogated or changed*. It is clear that the Tibetans view ‘meaningful autonomy’ as a security guarantee to protect Tibetan identity and interests in the long run. Seeing Tibetan demands as products of their insecurity is a significant departure from the current academic, official and popular discourses that sees the Tibetan proposals through the prism of nationalism, which appears threatening to and evokes less empathy from the Chinese people.

Dharamsala’s second demand is the unification of all Tibetans into one administrative unit.88 This is a controversial demand as the Lhasa government was not in political control of the Tibetan areas outside of present-day TAR at the time of the invasion in 1950. These areas that Tibetans call Kham and Amdo or Eastern Tibet were annexed by the Qing Empire in the 18th century. For the Tibetans, unification under a single administration is a necessary step to protect their identity. The latest *Memorandum* makes this point amply clear:

*In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity. The current administrative divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic identity.*89

Some Western analysts argue that the demand for unification is a major obstacle to rapprochement.90 They further argue that this demand is significant because eastern Tibetans constitute a sizable portion of the exile community and play prominent roles in the exile political structure.91 It is true that Eastern Tibetans hold important positions in TGIE, but as explained below, there are more compelling historical and political reasons for making this demand. While Dharamsala’s focus in the 1980s was on *territorial unification*, now it is stressing the *unification of the Tibetan nationality*, down-playing the importance of traditional Tibetan territories that have a majority non-Tibetan population today.92 This is not just pragmatism in the face of Chinese intransigence, but necessitated by the need to avoid

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91 Ibid.
92 Interview with Dawa Tsering (Joint Secretary, China Desk, TGIE), Dharamsala, August, 2007.
the demographic fate of Inner Mongolia. Under Ulan Fu, the Mongol Revolutionary and
Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia, the region regained ancestral Mongol territories in the
1960s, but practically committed demographic suicide because the territories came with an
overwhelming majority of Chinese settlers. Today ethnic Mongols constitute only 18 per cent
of the population of Inner Mongolia.

The unification of all Tibetans under one administration is not a demand conjured up
anew by exiled Tibetans, as even some scholars seem to believe. In the 20th century, some
Eastern Tibetans considered resurrecting a united Tibetan state through force and revolution
against Lhasa. In October 1946, Eastern Tibetan communist revolutionaries like Phuntsok
Wangyal and Ngawang Kalsang established the Eastern Tibet People’s Autonomous Alliance
and plotted to establish a Khampa Autonomous Region and then to ‘over-throw the rest of Tibet or force the Tibetan government to accept
democratic reforms.’ Because they could not establish a strong base even in their native
regions let alone in other Tibetan regions, the anti-communist vigilance of the Lhasa
government and the failure to win support from Moscow and the Indian communists, the
Tibetan communists had to collaborate with the Chinese communist party. Tibetans from
both the Lhasa polity and Eastern Tibet proposed unification in the 1950s and some Chinese
officials, such as Vice-Premier Chen Yi, agreed with the suggestions in principle. These
ideas became casualties of the tumultuous events in Tibet and the leftist turn of politics in
China in the late 1950s. In 1980, Tibetan cadres from Qinghai and Gansu proposed
consolidating the various Tibetan regions under one administration and Tibetan intellectuals
attributed Tibet’s political fragmentation to an ill-conceived Chinese strategy of divide-and-
rule. The 10th Panchen Lama also endorsed the unification push. Most Chinese authorities
were ill-disposed to the unification of the Tibetan regions irrespective of whether the
proposals came from Dharamsala or from Tibetans working for the Party and the Chinese

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93 Goldstein 1997: 71.
Tibet People’s Autonomous Alliance,’ see p. 319-24.
government. As recently as 2004, Phunwang warned Hu Jintao of the ‘grave mistake’ of implementing different policies on the same nationality.\textsuperscript{97} He wrote:

> The Tibetans living in Qinghai, Kham and on the Tibetan plateau are a nationality sharing the same language, traditions, economic structure, common spiritual wellbeing and are geographically linked and they have the same faith in the religion that has lasted for thousands of years.\textsuperscript{98}

A cursory observation of contemporary popular media from Tibet also reveals a strong integrationist sentiment in all Tibetan regions. Moreover, the fact that most of the 2008 protests took place in Eastern Tibet show that most Tibetans all over the plateau share the same political aspirations. However the Chinese gerrymander their homeland, the Tibetans think they are from one Tibet, \textit{Bod [བོད]} or \textit{Gangjong [gang-jong]} in Tibetan. Some of the most popular songs that emerged from Tibetan regions outside TAR in recent years, among hundreds of similar political songs, are titled \textit{Ganjong Lungpa [gang-jong lung-pa]} Tibet or literally, the land of Snows, \textit{Gangchenpa [gang-chen-pa]} Tibetans or literally denizens of the Land of Snows.\textsuperscript{99} The upshot is that a high level of convergence exists between the integrationist aspirations of the Tibetans inside Tibet and outside Tibet.\textsuperscript{100} Most Tibetans view this push for unification in the context of autonomy within PRC, not for an independent Tibet.\textsuperscript{101}

As such, a solution that excludes more than half of the Tibetan population will not be sustainable. There is a historical precedence, as we learned in Chapter Four for such a failure in the collapse of the 17 Point Agreement in 1959. After the Chinese take-over in 1950, Beijing practised two sets of policies based on the legal distinction of whether a particular area fell under Lhasa rule or not.\textsuperscript{102} Those under the Lhasa administration enjoyed the gradualist terms of the 17 Point Agreement. Those that fell outside were subjected to radical communist reforms where a violent rebellion spread to Lhasa itself, culminating there on 10

\textsuperscript{97} Phunwang 2007: 64.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} These songs can be viewed on the video file sharing site Youtube.
\textsuperscript{100} Rabgey and Sharlho 2004.
\textsuperscript{101} "[Tibet Times], 10 March, 2007; Samdhong Rinpoche, ‘Closing Remarks,’ \textit{Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting}, Gurgaon, India, 1 December, 2008. Rinpoche even told international supporters that TGIE cannot work with support groups that do not endorse the unification aspiration of the Tibetans.
\textsuperscript{102} Norbu 2001: 215.
March, 1959. The Dalai Lama had to escape and the 17-Point Agreement collapsed. As Norbu argued:

...[W]ith regard to ethnic Tibet (Kham and Amdo) the Chinese policy was based on a rigid legality and lack of realism: treat ethnic Tibetans living in China-twice as numerous as those under the Dalai Lama—as both de jure and de facto Chinese, since they were not under the jurisdiction of Lhasa. This was one of fundamental flaws of Chinese policy in Tibet and a basic cause of the revolt....For the fact was, that in the 1950s, no matter how far these Eastern Tibetans were away from Lhasa or even how relatively close they were to the Chinese provinces, they behaved and acted like any other Tibetan. And this social fact should have been taken into consideration.  

Hence, an agreement that excludes the Eastern Tibetans risks prolonging the vexing problem of Tibet into the future. Renewed bickering could break out on the Tibetan plateau in the form of peaceful protests, riots and even large-scale organised violence.

However, Dharamsala’s pursuit of autonomy and unification could be more consistent and coherent in the interests of the Tibetans and their supporters, the Chinese interlocutors and third parties. Dharamsala should avoid what Rabghey and Sharlho called its ‘uneven commitment to engagement’ in the 1980s and 1990s. It could also be more coherent in its articulation of its positions. On the creation of Tibet as a zone of peace (and withdrawal of PLA from Tibet) and democratisation of Tibet—these were once part of the Tibetan proposals in the 1980s, but dropped from the dialogue agenda after 2002—clarity is still in question, as the Dalai Lama, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Envoys sometimes make mutually dissonant remarks and statements on these issues.

While the Memorandum does not make any mention of zone of peace and democratisation, the Tibetan exile parliament published its own version of the Middle Way approach in 2009 in which electoral democracy endowed with an independent judiciary and the aspirations for a zone of peace are included as ‘important’ elements of the Middle Way. The explanation of the Middle Way on the Dalai Lama’s own website also contains democracy and the zone of peace as ‘Important Components.’ The Dalai Lama also makes approving comments about democracy that sits uncomfortably with Dharamsala’s acceptance of the current political system and role of the CCP in Tibet. Such incoherent policy

103 Ibid.
104 Rabghey and Sharlho 2004: VIII and 17.
105 [Executive Committee of the Tibetan Parliament], Ḥī ṣī ḍa ṭhārd na ṭam ṭag ṭag ṭag [Positions on the Resolution of the Tibetan Issue], 14 April, 2009.
statements confuse the Tibetans and third parties and no doubt contribute to the suspicions about Tibetan intentions that abound in Beijing and Lhasa. Hence, Rabgey and Sharlho’s observation that Dharamsala has ‘pursued the goal of dialogue with discipline and tenacity’ is only partly correct, while their recommendation to articulate a coherent intellectual argument for dialogue is sound. In short, Dharamsala has some work to do in the pursuit of meaningful negotiations too.

Meanwhile, parallel to the Dalai Lama’s efforts for autonomy, many Tibetans are working within the constraints of the Chinese system to work for Tibetan rights. Barnett finds that many Tibetan cadres working for the Chinese government practise ‘strategic deception,’ i.e. concealing their true objectives and loyalties, and use the limited and transitory ‘public space’ to work for Tibetan rights and identity.107 The late 10th Panchen Lama is exemplary in this regard. In a similar vein, Kapstein refers to Tibetans as adopting a ‘dimorphism of values by adhering publicly to the official culture while masking their true sentiments.’108 Furthermore, there is a high level of convergence between the Dalai Lama’s demands for autonomy and unification and the aspirations of most Tibetans inside Tibet, including many Chinese-educated Tibetans in Tibet.109

However, an active constituency for complete independence exists both inside and outside Tibet, which challenges the Dalai Lama’s autonomy agenda and occasionally his commitment to non-violence.110 The pro-independence activists argue that the Middle Way approach is undemocratic since it does not represent the genuine wishes of most Tibetans, especially the ones struggling inside Tibet, that it is naive and futile to expect autonomy from an apparently insincere and intransigent China, and most seriously that it is selling out Tibetan interests.111 They further reason that even if an autonomy settlement is reached, it

110 བཞི་གཉིས་ [Do We Really Need Independence?], 10 February, 2007.
111 བཞི་གཉིས་ [Rabsal], གངས་ཀྱི་ཞི་བཞི་ [Is Tibet a Commodity for Sale?], གངས་ཀྱི་ཞི་བཞི་ [The Middle Way Approach is not the People’s Aspiration], 20 August, 2005; Godruk Kalsang Phuntsok in interview with གངས་ཀྱི་ཞི་བཞི་ [Is Tibet a Commodity for Sale?], གངས་ཀྱི་ཞི་བཞི་, 10 August, 2006; Godruk was the president of the Tibetan Youth Congress at the time.
would be unsustainable.\footnote{112 Tibet Youth Congress (TYC), http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/aboutus.html, (cited on 24 March, 2008).} The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) provides the most significant platform in exile for independence-activism. TYC describes itself as a ‘worldwide Organisation of Tibetans united in our common struggle for the restoration of complete independence for the whole of Tibet, which includes the three traditional provinces of U-Tsang [Central and Western Tibet], Do-toe [Kham], and Do-med [Amo].\footnote{113 Ibid.} It is a non-ideological, non-sectarian and non-regional organisation claiming to have more than 30,000 members worldwide.\footnote{114 Ibid.} TYC swears loyalty to the Dalai Lama as the supreme leader of Tibet, but forswears his proposals for autonomy and disapproves of his dialogue-oriented approach to dealing with China. Instead, TYC has a tradition of carrying out more action-oriented activities such as fasts-unto-death and storming of Chinese embassies and consulates in India. Occasionally, TYC members threaten China with violence, although the only acts that would qualify as violence has been the throwing of Molotov cocktails into the embassy in Delhi in the 1970s and occasionally gate-crashing and graffiti-painting its walls.

Guchusum [‘Nine, Ten, and Three’ representing the months in which pro-independence demonstrations broke out in Lhasa in 1987 and 1988] also works for independence. It is an organisation formed by former political prisoners who took part in demonstrations on September 27, 1987, October 1, 1987, and March 5, 1988.\footnote{115 Ibid.} Guchusum carries some weight in the exile community since its members are former political prisoners who spent time in Chinese prisons for demanding independence.\footnote{116 Ibid.} The Tibetan organisations are reinforced by some Indian and foreign support groups which actively campaign for Tibetan independence. Friends of Tibet India\footnote{117 Friends of Tibet India; http://www.friendsoftibet.org/, (cited on 24 March, 2008).} and, the New York based, Students for a Free Tibet\footnote{118 http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/} are vocal supporters of Tibetan independence.

Important individuals within the exile community have been long-standing advocates of Tibetan independence. Two of the Dalai Lama’s brothers, late Thupten Jigme Norbu

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(Taktse Rinpoche) and Ngari Rinpoche, have publicly criticised their brother for selling out the Tibetans’ legitimate right to national self-determination. The award winning writer-activists Jamyang Norbu and Tenzin Tsundue, film-maker Tenzing Sonam, Karma Chophel, former speaker of the Parliament-in-exile, and Sonam Topgyal, former chairperson of the Cabinet-in-exile, are vocal promoters of independence. In terms of strategy, despite the common tendency to equate the independence activists with violence, most of these fervent critics of autonomy are also committed pacifists. Only one firebrand, Lhasang Tsering, has been outspoken about the need for violence. Recently, he called for a ‘mosquito strategy’ of undermining Chinese governance and economics with stealthy civil disobedience and a pestering campaign of asymmetric warfare to achieve Tibetan independence.

Although the independence camp is fragmented into different organisations and individuals with strong personalities, they constitute an articulate and influential group. In May 2007, the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN), which is charged with coordinating the activities of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) worldwide, organised the 5th International TSG Conference in Brussels with the goal of galvanising support for the Dalai Lama’s autonomy efforts. Organisations like Friends of Tibet, India, not only refused to participate, but held a rival ‘Conference for an Independent Tibet.’

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123 གཞན་བཞུགས་བཅུགས་[Sonam Topgyal], རྡིང་གི་གཙུག་གི་དབང་པོ་སྐེེ་ལྗེབས་དཀའ་ལྡན་པ་གྱི་[Sino-Tibetan relations has reached its nadir]. གཞན་བཞུགས་བཅས་[Tibet Times], 31 May, 2008.
126 Ibid; Available at http://www.cipa.emory.edu/pdf/TibetanResearch_Dharan.pdf. Lhasang Tsering is a former president of TYC.
127 Jamyang Norbu,
Lhasang Tsering and Tenzin Tsundue and Indian and foreign supporters held a boisterous conference on Tibetan independence.

The Tibetan struggle has evolved in a strategic sense too. Contrary to popular perception in the West, there was a violent dimension to the Tibetan struggle during the Cold War, as discussed before.128 Armed resistance started in Eastern Tibet, where the Chinese conducted harsh communist reforms in the mid-1950s.129 As the PLA suppressed the resistance in the East, the guerrillas moved first to Central Tibet, and then relocated to Mustang, Nepal from where, with US, Nepalese and Indian assistance, they conducted raids across the border against the Chinese troops. This armed resistance ended in 1974 due to a number of reasons ranging from internal feuding, Nepalese objections and most importantly the freezing of American aid and the Dalai Lama’s personal request to disband.130 Non-violence has been a sacred principle for the Dalai Lama for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. Most of those Tibetans clamouring for independence also remain wedded to peace, although given the lack of progress in Sino-Tibetan negotiations, the debate about the relative efficacy of non-violence and more militant tactics rumbles on in both Tibet and exile. The above analysis demonstrates that the Tibetan exiles are not united under one political banner and takes issue with the caricature that they have always been peaceful.131

However, it is unhelpful to exaggerate the depth of the autonomy versus independence divide in the Tibetan community as the international media is sensationalising and the propensity of the independence advocates for violence.132 Those Tibetans who are

130 Ibid: 358-63.
struggling for independence have the same level of devotion and respect for the Dalai Lama as their critics. The very first objective of TYC, for instance, is to serve Tibet and the Tibetans ‘under the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Spiritual and Temporal Ruler of Tibet.’\(^{133}\) Hence, even if any organisation in exile veers towards violence, there is little doubt that the Dalai Lama would be able to rein it in. Many hunger-strikes-undo-death that TYC organised in the past had to be called off when the Dalai Lama intervened. As noted, the Tibetan guerrilla campaign against China was ended in 1974 when the Dalai Lama personally asked the fighters to give up their armed struggle. The important question is what will happen once the Dalai Lama passes away in the future.

Meanwhile, as events in 2008 demonstrated, there is also a sizable number of Tibetans inside Tibet who aspire for an independent Tibet. Because they directly experience China’s repressive policies, some of them also rioted violently in Lhasa and other regions on 14-16\(^{th}\) March, 2008. Were they acting on their own or were they being egged on and masterminded from exile? The question of how much communication and coordination there has been between the Tibetans inside and outside Tibet is interesting in light of Beijing’s categorical accusation that the Dalai Lama masterminded the protests and riots that took place in Tibet in March 2008.\(^{134}\) [Chapter Eight will address this question.]

Despite these disagreements on goals and strategy, the Tibetan struggle is ultimately about Tibet’s identity. Whether they are struggling for independence or autonomy through non-violence and dialogue or violent intifada, the Tibetans are ultimately driven by their identity insecurity. At the peak of the 2008 uprising in Tibet, the Dalai Lama told the international media that he ‘is seeking autonomy necessary to safeguard its [Tibet’s] heritage.’\(^{135}\) TYC lists the protection of Tibetan identity as the first objective of its struggle against China.\(^{136}\) As Jamyang Norbu wrote in his obituary for Taktser Rinpoche, ‘Rimpoche was convinced that Tibet needed independence not for some exalted ideological reason but as a fundamental condition, an essential requisite for the survival of the people, their language,'

\(^{135}\) CNN, 17 March, 2008.
their culture and even their religion.’¹³⁷ Lhasang Tsering, one of the most forceful advocates of independence in exile, said in a documentary film, ‘Our struggle is not for a piece of land. It is for a way of life. It is for a culture. It is for a civilisation….’¹³⁸ In short, the concern for Tibetan identity and loyalty to the Dalai Lama and his commitment to non-violence unite the Tibetan Diaspora and the Tibetans inside Tibet.

The next section examines the nature of the general nexus between the Tibetan exiles and their brethren inside Tibet.

Tibet and its Diaspora

Beijing points its finger at the Dalai Lama or the ‘Dalai clique’ whenever protests flare up in Tibet, sometimes concurrently portraying him as being irrelevant and without support in Tibet.¹³⁹ In 2005, when the Chinese were conducting strident anti-Dalai Lama and Patriotic Education campaigns in Tibet, the Chairman of the TAR government claimed that the Tibetans ‘did not support any of the Dalai Lama’s schemes to upset [Tibet’s] stability.’¹⁴⁰ Beijing’s reaction to the Tibetan protests and riots in 2008 followed this familiar script. This is not a new development however. The Chinese blamed the Dalai Lama for instigating and engineering the protests in the late 1980s.¹⁴¹ As Beijing has not produced any credible evidence, it is hard to establish ‘whether there was a direct connection between the demonstrators and the exiled group.’¹⁴² In any case, some Chinese officials subsequently admitted that ‘ultra-leftist’ policies implemented improperly by local officials were to blame for the protests and riots in the 1980s.¹⁴³

Some analysts also argue that the pro-independence protests that rocked Lhasa in the late 1980s were inspired by the Dalai Lama’s activities abroad, especially when he gave his

¹³⁸ Lhasang Tsering in Tom Piziot, Director, Tibet: The Cry of the Snow Lion, 2002. Emphasis is mine.
¹³⁹ Smith 2008: 208.
first political speech in America on 21 September, 1987. However, they do not go as far as the Chinese officials in accusing the ‘Dalai clique’ of directly orchestrating protests in Tibet. Even then, such analyses overestimate the ability of the exiles to mobilise Tibetans inside Tibet living under restrictive conditions, downplaying in the process the degree of local Tibetan insecurity generated by Chinese policies and practices. Schwartz acknowledges a ‘feed-back effect’ between Tibetan protests and international attention, but argues that the ‘protest is generated from indigenous sources’ because protests also occurred in rural areas without any external access and continued long after Tibet was closed to exiles and foreigners. A similar argument was made about the outbreak of unrest in 2008. A research report brought out by Gongmeng Law Research Center, Beijing, also recognised some external influence, but apportioned most of the blame on Beijing’s policy-failures for the 2008 unrests in Tibet.

However, it is undeniable that there has been increasing communication, hence mutual influence in a host of areas, most significantly culture and politics, between local Tibetans and exile Tibetans. This began when Tibetans were allowed to travel in and out of Tibet relatively freely after 1978. These transnational contacts grew in step with the development of information technology and the onset of cross-border movement of goods and information. Websites, blogs, music videos, radio programs and increasing cross-border physical mobility provide crucial platforms for information exchange between the Tibetan communities. Political literature and other materials authored in exile do make their way into Tibet, where they are clandestinely distributed and consumed. The reverse is also true. All these linkages and exchanges are fundamental to diasporism.

The institutions and activisms of the exiles have always inspired the Tibetans inside Tibet. One former political prisoner writes in his memoir about the arrival of the Dalai Lama’s delegations in Tibet:

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[W]hen Tibetans who had been living under Chinese rule heard from the exile delegation about the activities of His Holiness and the situation of the exile government it gave them new hope and strengthened their resolve, and even those few who had believed the Chinese propaganda regained some confidence in their own people, changed their tune, and started to repent their views.149

When the exiles went to the polls to elect their parliamentarians and ‘Kalon Tripa’ (Prime Minister), after the Dalai Lama devolved his political authorities to them in 2011, the Tibetans inside Tibet participated actively in the process short of voting—discussions on blogs and in call-in radio programmes, singing songs and dramatisations, which were recorded on video and surreptitiously distributed inside Tibet and smuggled abroad.150 For instance, on the day the results of the Kalon Tripa election was announced, many Tibetans called in to Tibetan language programmes in exile to congratulate the winner Lobsang Sangay and some Tibetans organised an ‘underground’ conference involving Tibetans from various Tibetan regions, which was broadcast on Radio Free Asia.151

As the Tibetans inside Tibet are influenced by the activities of their compatriots in exile, the reverse is no less true. When the Sino-Tibetan dialogue started in 1978 and Dharamsala was allowed to send fact-finding delegations, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government were not sure what the Tibetans inside Tibet were thinking about the Dalai Lama and Chinese-Tibetan relations broadly, especially given Chinese propaganda that Tibetans were happy and reports that China had managed to indoctrinate young Tibetans.152 As we saw earlier, when the delegations visited Tibetan areas in TAR and other provinces, they were mobbed by thousands of emotionally-charged Tibetans who recounted terrible tragedies that they had suffered, much to the embarrassment of Beijing and its local officials.153 In Lhasa, the reception they received surpassed anything they had witnessed in six months of touring. The tragedies and continuing suffering were laid bare. As Shakya observed,

150 [The Soothsayer of Hope] is a short movie dramatized by the Tibetans of Golok TAP; available for viewing at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4hn2Aewq88. [Hope and Prayers in White] is a music video by Kunga Dolma from Golok TAP released on the day of the announcement of the results of the Prime Ministerial election; the music video and an interview with Dolma is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4zfd6LjIXq4.
151 [Tibetans from Lhasa Congratulate the New Kalon Tripa], 30 April, 2011.
The enthusiastic reception had a profound effect on Dharamsala. Any doubts were wiped away; they could now confidently rebuff any Chinese claims about social progress in Tibet. The visits had shown that there was popular support for the Dalai Lama and that the people’s religious faith remained uncontaminated by twenty years of Communism.154

Goldstein concurred, ‘The... delegations...bolstered the confidence of the exiles at a difficult time in their history.’155 Despite Beijing’s objectives of using economic development to wean the Tibetans away from the Dalai Lama and repeated proclamations of success on this front, the Tibetans showed that they were behind the Dalai Lama and his exile administration. Such periodic endorsement from the Tibetans inside Tibet is a necessary fillip for the exile establishment, whose relevance is constantly challenged.

There is no denying that transnational cross-fertilisation of Tibetan political activism is increasing with the growth of information technology and cross-border mobility of information and people, in spite of China’s considerable apparatus of censorship and surveillance. During the 2008 unrests and thereafter, despite China’s media black-out and censorship of the internet, Tibetans were able to email pictures of Tibetans apparently shot by the security forces, and use mobile phones to conduct live conversations, sometimes in the thick of protests and crackdowns with Tibetan language radio programmes in India and America.156 They were able to counter Chinese claims that no lethal force was used on Tibetans. In this TGIE and various NGOs in exile acted as intermediaries between the Tibetans inside Tibet and the international community.

In short, without any formal mechanisms, Tibetans inside and outside Tibet have used various informal channels of communication to coordinate their activities and formulate positions towards Chinese rule. This raises interesting questions about how this will evolve when the septuagenarian Dalai Lama passes away. After all, he remains the single-most important institution and leader that binds the two communities together. Only time will tell.

In addition to the various political and diplomatic strategies and instruments described above, Tibetan culture has proved useful in gaining the support of sections of Chinese and Western publics.

156 For a transcribed sample of such conversations, see Radio Free Asia, ‘What Witnesses are Saying,’ 15 March, 2008; available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/2008/03/15/tibet_interviews/
Cultural Revival and Strengthening of Identity

True to the logic of the insecurity dilemma, Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet have also worked hard for cultural survival and revival. In exile, led by the Dalai Lama and other religious and secular leaders, the Tibetans have managed to preserve the key elements of their culture within the limits of refugee life in a foreign, albeit tolerant country. The key monasteries of Tibet have been replicated in India and Nepal and 77 schools (excluding pre-primary schools) educate Tibetan children in exile in the Tibetan language.157 In the words of a Tibet scholar, the Dalai Lama has successfully created a ‘cultural nation’ in exile.158 A specific program for strengthening culture involves the Dalai Lama’s teaching of Buddhism to Tibetan high school and college students in exile.159 A leading abbot told the *Tibet Times* about this program, ‘Generally, there are two ways to save a nation: through culture and politics. For the long-term survival and strength of a nation, I think, culture is the more important means of protecting the nation.’160 The Tibetans have not only used culture to construct a unified national identity that transcends the traditional regional and sectarian cleavages, but also deployed it to galvanise international support for their cause. The spread of Tibetan Buddhism in America and Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s contributed to the positive reception of the Dalai Lama’s international campaign in the late 1980s and still accounts partly for the popular support for the Tibetan cause in the West.161

More will be said in the next chapter on the utility of Tibetan Buddhism for the Tibetan international campaigns, but this deployment of Tibetan Buddhism also extends to the overseas, Singaporean, Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese.162 The Dalai Lama, Karmapa and other lamas attract many Chinese students to India and other countries that they visit. For

157 For detailed information on the education of the Tibetan exiles, visit the website of the Education Ministry of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile: http://www.tcewf.org/schools/index.html
160 [Ju Tenkyong], [It is important to protect this nation through culture], 31 May, 2007.
instance, 400 Chinese came all the way from Mainland China in January 2006 to attend a Buddhist sermon which the Dalai Lama gave in a remote Indian town.\textsuperscript{163} Because the Dalai Lama is \textit{persona non grata} in China, Chinese Buddhists travel to neighbouring countries such as Japan where he gives religious sermons or public talks on social, political, religious and environmental issues.\textsuperscript{164} There is a growing fascination with Tibet and its culture among some Chinese, which has contributed to a degree of receptivity to Tibetan Buddhism.\textsuperscript{165} Casting Buddhism as one of the complicating factors in the future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict, Rabgey and Sharlho writes, ‘By the late 1990s, wealthy Chinese tycoons and members of the emerging middle-class began to gather around charismatic Tibetan lamas for spiritual instruction.’\textsuperscript{166} As discussed earlier, the charismatic lama Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok had over one thousand resident Chinese disciples in his institute, which was not surprisingly a target of a crackdown in 2001. In fact, a Chinese source revealed that the Dalai Lama’s request for a pilgrimage to Wu Taishan in 1998 was turned down because Jiang Zemin was worried that the Lama’s charisma might have ‘unpredictable effects’ on not just the Tibetans but also on ethnic Chinese people.\textsuperscript{167}

Tibetans inside Tibet have also worked hard to revive their culture in both the sense of artefacts and living practices. Tibetans have used the limited liberalisation in the post-Cultural Revolution era, especially in the 1980s, to revive Tibetan Buddhism and other elements of the Tibetan identity, such as literature, arts and music. Goldstein traces the tortuous revival of monastic Buddhism and the growth of political activism with the case study of Drepung monastery near Lhasa.\textsuperscript{168} Germano analyses the \textit{gter} (treasure) movement as revived principally by the late Khenpo Jikphun, the charismatic lama from Sichuan, whom we encountered earlier, and its significance for the revival of Tibetan identity.\textsuperscript{169} Kapstein

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\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid: 31.
\textsuperscript{169} Gemano 1998: 53-94. The \textit{gter} (\textit{Ter}) Movement is an example of visionary movements unique to Tibetan Buddhism. \textit{Ter} literally means treasure or mineral, but in religious terms, it means spiritual treasures such as are contained in the bodies of the Tibetans and the geographical body of Tibet itself hidden by the saints of the Tibetan imperial era for the benefit of future generations. Examples of treasures include ‘Buddha bodies in statuary and paintings, associated ritual items ...and the literary corpus of Buddhism.’ The discoverers and
explores the links between the revival of the Tibetan tradition of pilgrimage [pilgrimage] and
the (re)formation of Tibetan national identity with his first-hand observation of Drigung Phowa Chenmo in Drikung, TAR. Epstein and Wenbin examine a lay folk religious ritual called musical festivity in Repkong, Qinghai, and how such folk events ‘foster a pan-Tibetan identity.’ Kapstein also considers the comparative ‘revival and…vicissitudes’ of Tibetan Buddhism in both TAR and Eastern Tibet up to the early 2000s.

Arguing that Tibetan national identity today is expressed not only through Buddhism, but also through secular traditions—epic literature and folk beliefs such as the mountain cult—Karmay examines the revival of the reading, recitation and singing of the epic of King Gesar, arguably the longest epic in the world, and the practice of ‘mountain cult’ or the secular worship of mountain deities, as a reassertion of Tibetan identity. Stoddard found that besides translating the ‘entire body of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist doctrine’, Chinese official documents and traditional Chinese and some Western classics into Tibetan language, Tibetan intellectuals in Tibet were busy republishing traditional Tibetan classics in history, arts, literature and religious cannons, and producing new scholarship and literature and text books in Tibetan after the Cultural Revolution. She argues that language, literature and religion become the focus of national expression in response to the attempts of Marxist societies that reject tradition as backward, superstitious and feudalistic to eliminate national differences. This multi-pronged reassertion of Tibetan culture is a direct reaction to

excavators of these treasures, [Terton], are considered ‘mysteriously appointed reincarnations of [Padmasambhava’s] dynastic period disciples’. Padmasambhava, an Indian saint who was instrumental in the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet during the Tibetan empire in the eighth century, is the key figure in the Ter cult for the Nyingma sect of Tibetan Buddhism. 170 Kapstein 1998: 95-119. Drikung phowa Chenmo is a festival consisting of an element of pilgrimage (from all over Tibet) and a series of teachings by respected Lamas culminating in the instruction of phowa (transference of consciousness from this life to the next at the time of death) called Jag-zug-ma (Planting the Stalk). It takes place every twelve years. The festival was banned by the communist authorities between 1958 and 1992, 171 Epstein and Wenbin 1998: 120-138.
173 Karmay 1994: 112-120.
175 Ibid.
Chinese attempts to undermine and annihilate (during the Cultural Revolution) Tibetan identity. As Karmay wrote:

The greater the repression of his culture and identity, the more articulate he becomes.... This very concrete experience [destruction of Tibetan culture], which was and perhaps still is intended mainly to extirpate national sentiments and erase Tibet’s national identity, has in fact taught the Tibetans to be more aware of their culture than ever before.  

Cultural revival strengthens national identity across the Tibetan regions.

The 10th Panchen Lama advised that protecting the traditional culture of a nation is key to developing the educational level of that nation. Beijing-based Woeser is most articulate in making this case. She expresses pride in Tibetan culture: ‘In fact, we should be full of confidence, because our cultural tradition remains illuminating after so many hardships and stormy struggles.’ Advocating the conscious observance of Tibetan traditions, she makes the case for using Tibetan culture to defend their identity:

However, there is no dominating power which cannot be resisted. This power of resistance actually exists in our traditional culture.... Since in history the iron hoofs of the Mongolian army trampled a large part of the world, so China—such a big country—was defeated, changing the whole era then, how come Tibetans, instead of being defeated and eliminated, became the religious masters of the Mongolians and have remained their brothers to this day? If our traditional culture could tame the Mongolians, then why can’t the Chinese of today be tamed? ...In fact, the migrant Han Chinese in Lhasa are often seen worshipping and making their offerings in monasteries, while the elite among the Han Chinese are beginning to feel a need for this kind of religious belief.

Such talk could be dismissed as punching above their weight and that the modern Chinese are not medieval Mongols, but there is evidence that Buddhism has infiltrated even the Chinese hierarchy of power. When Zhao Ziyang, the former Premier and CCP General Secretary

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177 Panchen Lama, 10th Panchen Lama’s Speeches at the Lhasa Teacher Training School, 22 January, 1986, [Speeches of the Great Omniscient 10th Panchen-Vol. 2], Bylakuppe, India: [Central Association for H.H. the Panchen Lama], 2007: 147.
178 Woeser, ‘In Memory of this Day in History, Let’s Stick to Our Culture,’ in Unlocking Tibet, Switzerland, 2005: 67-70. Woeser was an editor for the Chinese language Tibetan Literature (Xizang Wenxue), the journal of the Literature Association of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, when she published ‘Notes on Tibet’ (Xizang Biji) in Guangzhou in 2003. ‘Notes on Tibet’ was banned for ‘serious political mistakes,’ including praising the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa and Buddhism. Woeser was removed from her post, deprived of her salary and medical and retirement insurance, her housing was confiscated and she was disqualified from acquiring a passport.
179 Ibid: 70.
purged by Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, was on his deathbed in January 2005, he requested the Dalai Lama to conduct Buddhist rituals for him. His children reported that the Dalai Lama was literally the last word on his lips when he passed away. Zhao was a disgraced official, but Woeser revealed that her late half-Chinese, half-Tibetan father, a top ranking PLA Commander, had been a ‘closet Buddhist’ all along. It is believed that many Chinese officials and their families practise some form of religion. Furthermore, as pointed out above, Tibetan Buddhism has become appealing to the new Chinese middle-class. Jianglin Li, the Chinese writer on Tibetan issues said that China does not want the Dalai Lama back because there is a trend of Tibetan culture, especially Tibetan Buddhism becoming more and more popular among the Chinese: ‘large groups of Chinese will pop up as his followers. That is a huge threat to the Chinese government.’ The point here is to demonstrate that the Tibetans are using culture to protect their identity. This is consistent with Joseph Nye’s insight that an attractive culture is a chief source of soft-power.

The revival of Tibetan culture, albeit under the constraints of exile and Chinese rule, has had important implications for the Tibetans. For the exiles, their common culture has been the main unifying factor, which the Dalai Lama has used to forge a cultural nation outside its homeland. Calling the Tibetan exiles as ‘the most successful’ among ‘refugee histories’, Barnett attributes their success to the Dalai Lama’s leadership and his use of Tibetan culture to construct the Tibetan diaspora: ‘A refugee community that leaves its country in sizeable numbers and that becomes stronger over 50 years rather than disintegrating.’ Clearly, to the extent to which the diaspora is a force in the larger Tibetan struggle against China as discussed above, the continued reproduction and development of Tibetan culture has implications for the future of Chinese-Tibetan relations. The stronger and

181 Lodi Gyari, Interview with Claude Arpi, The Rediff Interview, Rediff India Abroad, 3 April, 2006; Atsok Lukhar Jam, [Discussing a Ritual between Beijing and Dharamsala], Hindustan Times, 31 March, 2005; Pawan Sharma, ‘Dalai Lama’s spiritualism softening Chinese hearts,’ Hindustan Times, 16 May, 2005.
182 Gyari 3 April, 2006.
186 Barnett, Interview with Dan Rather, 9 October, 2008.
more vibrant the Tibetan culture becomes, more cohesive the Tibetan diaspora will be and stronger its role in the future of the conflict. For Tibetans inside Tibet, cultural revival after the traumatic decades (1950-mid-1970s) has been partial and precarious, and achieved at great sacrifice and hard-work by the Tibetans themselves in spite of Chinese policies. Chinese policies, they complain, have in fact been on a relentless mission to undermine their culture and identity. Whatever remains in terms of culture is precious and constantly threatened by Chinese policies—a siege mentality has set in among the Tibetans. For both the Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, cultural revival is not just desirable in itself, but also instrumental for their larger goal of protecting Tibetan identity and political interests. For China, the revival and assertion of Tibetan culture is ‘a thorn in the dragon’s side.’

The significance of the analysis in this chapter is the reinforcement of the insecurity dilemma through the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both local and diasporic and the consequent heightening of the threats that the Chinese perceive in Tibet as discussed in the previous chapter. Dharamsala’s autonomy and unification demands, not to mention the aspirations of the pro-independence camp, feed the security concerns of the Chinese officials inasmuch as the Tibetans believe and the Chinese fear that these measures would strengthen Tibetan identity, not to mention the territorial, sovereignty, institutional, ideological and regime security considerations. The international campaigns of the exiles constantly put a question mark on the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet and their policies in Tibet. The issue of ‘face’ or national image on account of local Tibetan protests, diasporic public relations and international opprobrium is no less relevant to the thesis of this research. The aspirations of most Tibetans on the plateau, which also centre on culture, identity and


political rights\textsuperscript{189} bear upon those security concerns even more intensely. Collectively, the strategies and instruments that the Tibetans have used in their struggle to achieve these goals, as examined in this chapter, have had a feed-back effect on Chinese policies through the threat perceptions outlined above. The perception of cooperation between Tibetan ‘separatists’ and ‘hostile’ transnational and international forces working against Chinese interests in Tibet further magnifies the vulnerabilities that Beijing and local officials feel along the lines outlined in Chapter Five.

**Conclusion:** This chapter first picked up the analysis from the preceding chapter by examining the Tibetan identity insecurity generated by the Chinese policies directly or indirectly through socio-economic externalities. Tibetan insecurity was shown to arise from three broad and overlapping sources: state policies (vertical threats), migration and cultural imperialism (horizontal threats).

Next, the evolving and diverging goals, political strategies and diplomatic positions of the Tibetans in their effort to address the identity insecurity were examined. The Tibetans had used violence in the past, but since the 1974, they have eschewed any organised violence against China, although violent riots have occasionally convulsed a number of Tibetan regions as recently as 2008. The mainstay of the Tibetan strategy since 1974 has been to simultaneously engage Beijing in dialogue, non-violent direct action campaigns targeting China’s legitimacy and image abroad, and seeking support from foreign governments, public and rights organisations around the world. The mainstream Tibetan goal, championed by the Dalai Lama, is to find an internal solution which would allow Tibet autonomy within PRC. Other Tibetans both inside and outside articulate and pursue a more conventional nationalist agenda of resurrecting a Tibetan state. Tibetans have also used their Buddhist culture in China, albeit under considerable restrictions, and abroad with some success. How this is being done inside Tibet and China was discussed here, but how Tibetan Buddhism has helped the Tibetan cause in the West is one of the topics in the next chapter.

The chapter then linked up to the analysis in the previous chapter by explaining that the Tibetan goals, strategies and actions examined here heighten Beijing’s overlapping political security, societal security and military-strategic security challenges. Those security

\textsuperscript{189} 189 [Lhaden] 2011; Shogdung 2010; [Theurang] 2009.
fears, exacerbated by Tibetan activism at home and international relations abroad, strengthen the hands of the hard-line faction of the Chinese bureaucracy and drive Beijing’s policies towards Tibet. In turn, this feeds back into Tibetan identity insecurity, stiffening up their resistance. The analytical cycle of the insecurity dilemma is thus completed and the empirical cycle is demonstrated to be perpetuated.

As indicated in Chapter Five, Beijing’s vulnerabilities over Tibet are aggravated by fears of foreign intervention and peaceful evolution through their Tibetan Trojan horse. In the next chapter, the external dimension of the insecurity dilemma will be isolated and analysed in detail. The transnational elements will also be developed beyond the homeland-diaspora connection that this chapter examined here.
Chapter 7

Transnational and International Dimensions of the Sino-Tibetan Conflict

The Dalai Lama frequently advises the Tibetans to ‘hope for the best, but prepare for the worst’ [བསྟན་པ་བ་མ་ལ་གཞི་གཏིང་དྲུག་ཅིང་ཉེས་ཞུའི་ལོ་]. Accordingly, the Tibetan diaspora has been preparing for a long-drawn out struggle by deepening the democratisation of their political institutions and strengthening identity at the same time as searching for a negotiated settlement through dialogue with Beijing. Seeking support from foreign governments and the global civil societies and publics to confront Beijing’s hard-line and to address the power imbalance vis-à-vis Beijing and strengthening relations with peoples who share ethnic, cultural and religious ties with Tibet are integral to that preparation. It has been noted in previous chapters that the Tibetans have purposefully internationalised their cause to win the support of foreign governments, civil societies, publics and international organisations and that the Chinese government has reciprocated with its strategy of isolating and denying political space for the Tibetan exiles, using its considerable military, diplomatic and economic muscle.

These are aspects of the external dimension of the insecurity dilemma. In Chapter Two, it was posited that both the state and its domestic ethno-national adversaries forge economic, political and military links with other states and their publics, norm entrepreneurs, civil society groups and ethnic, cultural and religious kin in their competition for security. It also noted that vulnerabilities to external intervention drive states to suppress internal opposition, which creates more incentives for these groups to seek greater external support. Hence, the insecurity dilemma plays out within the larger contexts of regional and international politics. Interactively or in isolation, interests, norms and ethics play roles in the intrusion of the international system into the affairs of its constituent member states. This chapter examines the external dimensions of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma in greater detail. Specifically, this chapter examines the place of the Tibet issue in China’s foreign relations with America, India, and smaller states in Asia and the larger international arena.

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India, Europe, Taiwan, and Russia. It also considers the transnational forces at work in the conflict above and beyond the homeland-diaspora connexion discussed in Chapter Six. Specifically, the role of the transnational Tibetan Buddhist community in the Indian and Nepalese Himalayas, Mongolia, the Russian Buddhist Republics and the West in Sino-Tibetan politics will be examined here.

Like the domestic dimension, this chapter will demonstrate that the international aspects of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma assume a cyclical form. Chinese hard-line policies in Tibet and inflexible positions in dialogue compelled the Dharamsala to internationalise the Tibet issue in the late 1980s.\(^2\) However, the involvement of foreigners increased fears of Western regime change strategies through peaceful evolution, as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and even military intervention as in Saddam’s Iraq and Yugoslavia.\(^3\) Such security concerns harden Beijing’s intransigence in both policy and practice.\(^4\) The toughening of Beijing’s stance only enhances the Tibetans’ need for more international support to influence Beijing. As the Dalai Lama told the Mayor and officials of the city of Nantes during his 2008 visit to France:

> We gave our right hand to the Chinese government and the left hand to our supporters in the free world for help to solve our problem, but the right hand is empty and even burning without getting anything. So it is natural we ask help from supporters like the mayor and you all.\(^5\)

However, greater international scrutiny and criticism increases the security threats that the Chinese perceive, or at least, gives the hard-liners in Lhasa and Beijing an excuse for political inflexibility. Hence, it feeds back into Chinese policy and diplomacy, completing the cycle of Beijing’s hard-line and Tibetan international efforts.

First, the next section examines the strategic, institutional and resource issues underpinning the Tibetan international strategy. It will become apparent that the Tibetan international efforts rely mainly on soft power resources: Tibetan Buddhism and culture, the Dalai Lama’s leadership and promotion of universal values such as non-violence, interdependence, democracy, religious harmony, universal responsibility, secular ethics and democratic practices in exile. The Tibetans have the resources neither to conduct Taiwan’s check-book diplomacy nor the Palestinians’ rocket-lobbing hard power, but they have

\(^4\) Goldstein 1989: 123.
\(^5\) The Dalai Lama, ‘Update on His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s France Visit,’ *TibetFlash*, 20 August, 2008; Available at http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/3834.
managed to stay afloat in the competing sea of priorities in the international media and politics.

Institutions, Strategies and Resources in Diaspora

Observing that the Tibetan exiles have ‘established a state-like polity in exile’ complete with de facto sovereign practices, Fiona McConnell argues that TGIE engages in ‘paradiplomacy,’ a form of foreign relations usually attributed to sub-national governments. These diplomatic activities are targeted at individuals, NGOs, International NGOs, international organisations and national and regional governments of various states around the world. Internally organised as a hierarchically-instituted democracy, the Tibetan diaspora conducts their international relations through a complex network of political Tibet Support Groups (TSGs), Tibetan Buddhist Centres and cultural institutions around the world that pay direct institutional or indirect sentimental allegiance to TGIE, sometimes through the institution and person of the Dalai Lama. These organisations radiate out from the central TGIE structure in Dharamsala.

At the centre of the exile’s international strategy has always been the Dalai Lama’s charismatic leadership. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that he single-handedly raised the international profile of the Tibet issue to the current level from near-irrelevance in the 1970s and early 1980s. Whenever the Dalai Lama travels abroad, the Tibet issue gets a burst of media coverage and attention from government leaders who, willingly or under public pressure, meet him to discuss the Tibet issue. Hence the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama sits at the top of the institutional apparatus of their international strategy and manages the Dalai Lama’s mix of political advocacy and spiritual mission around the world.

In March 2011, the Dalai Lama devolved all his political authorities to the popularly elected officials such as the Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister), Parliament and Supreme Justice Commission, thereby deepening the democratic processes, institutions and culture in exile. While in institutional form, the Dalai Lama and his office have been separated from TGIE, practically and substantially, not much has changed in terms of the Dalai Lama’s leadership on the Tibet issue. After all, the current TGIE political leadership has staunchly adopted the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach to relations with Beijing, continues to refer to the Dalai

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Lama as our ‘supreme leader’ and fulfilling his visions as their central tasks. On his part, the Dalai Lama has vowed to work for the Tibetan people until his last breath.

Behind the Dalai Lama’s spectacular and personal diplomacy, the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), which is considered a Ministry within TGIE, conducts much of the groundwork for public and international relations. DIIR is charged with providing information on the ‘political, human rights and environmental conditions in Tibet’ to the international community and instilling ‘political, human rights and environmental consciousness among the Tibetans.’

DIIR is divided into Information, International Relations, Administrative and Branch sections, but the first two are most relevant and important. The Information section consists of a Print Media and Website division, which handles the development and dissemination of the materials for the print and web-based public diplomacy. The International Relations division oversees 10 Offices of Tibet (de facto Embassies) in New Delhi, New York, Geneva, Tokyo, London, Canberra, Paris, Moscow, Pretoria and Taipei, 1 Liaison Office for Latin America in New York, 1 EU Coordination Office in Brussels and 1 Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu. They are charged with conducting TGIE’s international relations and UN initiatives, including establishing ‘contacts with governments, parliamentarians, Tibet Support Groups, non-governmental organisations and human rights groups and keep them posted on recent developments in Tibet’ and coordinating the ‘exchange of information between individuals and organisations working for the welfare of the Tibetan people.’

The Offices of Tibet serve as bridges between 54 Tibetan Community Associations in various countries and TGIE. These Associations not only tie individual Tibetans to TGIE, but they also conduct their own political campaigns for Tibet in their countries of residence. The Tibetan Community in Britain (TCB) consists of two campaign managers who organise political events to publicise the Tibetan cause in collaboration with TSGs and the Office of Tibet or independently.

The International Relations Department also consists of ‘Desks’ for ‘Tibet Support Groups’ (TSGs), ‘Environment and Development,’ ‘China,’ ‘UN, EU, and Human Rights’ and ‘Protocol.’ The TSG Desk liaises with TSGs around the world. The Environment and Develop Desk monitors, analyses and reports on the environmental situation inside Tibet and

promotes environmentalism within the exile community. The China Desk does outreach work in relation to overseas Chinese. The UN, EU and Human Rights Desk monitors and publicises the human rights violations in Tibet and provides information to the UN and EU bodies and rights groups, governments, parliaments and individuals around the world. Finally, the ‘Protocol Section’ officially receives and facilitates the programs of diplomats, government officials, parliamentarians, members of media and human rights groups and NGOs, researchers, Tibet and China watchers, and interested individuals who visit the Tibetan settlements in India.

The TSG desk is especially significant as Tibet Support Groups constitute a major force for advocacy on Tibet’s behalf in the corridors of power in their respective countries. TSGs are non-governmental organizations formed by individuals who support the Tibetan cause through various non-violent means. According to the DIIR, there are 268 TSGS in various parts of the world, of which 180 are members of the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN), an umbrella organisation that describes itself as ‘a global coalition of Tibet-related non-governmental organisations. Its purpose is to maximise the effectiveness of the worldwide Tibet movement’ through campaigning, coordination and capacity building projects. Although, these organisations recognise Tibet as an occupied country, TGIE as the legitimate government of the Tibetan people, and non-violence as a fundamental principle, they are financially and operationally independent from TGIE. They also mirror the split in the Tibetan community between the advocates of independence and the Middle Way. As we saw in the last chapter, the Middle Way-Independence divide in the exile community is reflected in both the Tibetan NGO and TSG worlds. NGOs like TYC, Guchusum and Chushi Gangdruk and pro-independence intellectuals share the objective of Tibetan independence with TSGs like the Students for a Free Tibet, International Tibet Independence Movement (ITIM), and Friends of Tibet India. Many others, of course, comply with TGIE’s Middle Way Approach. The upshot is that Beijing considers the TSGs inconvenient enough to attempt to frustrate ITSN’s meetings and in 2007 succeeded in pressuring the Belgian government to ask the Dalai Lama to cancel his long-planned visit to Brussels to address ITSN’s meeting.

14 ‘Worldwide Tibet Movement.’
16 Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) claims to have 650 chapters in more than 30 countries. See ‘About US’: available at http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/section.php?id=40.
17 ITIM’s website is available at http://www.rangzen.com/.
The Parliament and the other Ministries of TGIE—Education, Health, Religion and Culture, Home and Security—also conduct international relations within the purview of their functional areas. For instance, the Parliament engages parliamentarians from independent and autonomous nations to seek their support for the Tibetan cause, resulting in the formation of ‘Parliamentary Groups for Tibet’ within regional, national and European parliaments. These parliamentary groups hold conventions to ‘review and discuss the developments’ inside Tibet and discuss strategies for supporting the Tibetans. For instance, 133 parliamentarians from various countries attended the Fourth World Parliamentarians’ Convention on Tibet, hosted by members of the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh in November 2005.\(^\text{19}\) Most significantly, the Department of Religion and Culture ‘maintains close contact with the Buddhist centres throughout the world.’\(^\text{20}\) According to Professor Janice Williams, there were 554 Tibetan Buddhist centres in North America in 2003 and projected the number to increase to 700 centres by 2008.\(^\text{21}\) A similar number of Tibetan Buddhist centres exist across Europe.

Tibetan Buddhism has proved useful for the Tibetans in their political struggle, irrespective of whether they are deliberately exploiting it or not. This nexus between culture and politics is not unique to the Tibetan case. Nye attributes soft-power to an attractive culture, universally appealing political values and foreign policies perceived to enjoy legal and moral authority.\(^\text{22}\) In this vein, Roberts and Roberts write about the political salience of Tibetan Buddhist culture:

Dharma Centers like Wangyal’s became the means of introducing Westerners to Tibet’s rich culture, sources of fundraising, and bases from which to host travel by Tibetan lamas, including the Dalai Lama. These centers spawned the next generation of leaders in the movement to free Tibet.\(^\text{23}\)

Norbu too wrote that during the drugs and free-sex era of the 1960s and 1970s,

Tibetan lamas proved themselves to be timely and valuable counsellors, helping many American youth to refrain from drugs, giving them a “new” sense of purpose and meaning in life, encouraging them to get back to their professions, advising them to be kind and respectful to their parents. This went beyond Tibetan mysticism and was much appreciated by both the parents and

\(^{22}\) Nye 2004: 11.
Norbu’s ‘two events’ refer to the Tiananmen Square events and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, which raised the international profile of the Tibetan issue. The 1987-1992 Tibetan pro-independence protests and the violent suppression in full view of Western tourists in Lhasa were also consequential. The entire mystique around Tibet, dubbed the ‘Shangri-La Myth’ after James Hilton’s 1933 novel *Lost Horizon*, has attracted the fascination of Westerners for centuries as a sort of repository of pristine knowledge that had been lost to the rest of the world. An open letter written by the French writer Antonin Artaud to the 13th Dalai Lama is instructive, ‘O Grand Lama, give us, grace us with your illuminations in a language our contaminated European minds can understand, and if need be, transform our Minds….’ As Shakya observed, Tibet gets ‘disproportionately more attention in Western media and popular culture, from comic books to video games’ than Xinjiang, China’s other minority region that poses similar strategic and political challenges to China. Uradyn Bulag laments the obscurity of the troubles in his homeland, Inner Mongolia, relative to the Tibetans and Uighurs. Although the Shangri-laist brand of fascination with Tibet and Tibetan culture entails certain risks and constraints, it has bestowed a level of soft power to a people bereft of any hard power, and this is reflected in the following examination of the Tibet issue in international politics. As Jan Magnusson writes,

> If Nye is correct in his assumptions [about soft power], the attractiveness of the Shangri-la version can be a useful power resource in influencing the global agenda of the Tibet issue. The power becomes even stronger when Tibetan cultural and ideological expressions, promoted by supporters among the celebrities from the cinema and music, catch on and become icons of globalised popular culture.

International celebrities do actively promote the Tibetan cause and as Shakya, above, and the academic literature on the Shangri-La Myth show, Tibetan cultural elements have entered the arena of popular culture in the West and Taiwan.

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26 Lopez 1998; Schell 2000; Dodin and Rather 2001; Bishop 1993; Magnusson 2002. The Shangri-La myth has spawned a scholarly cottage industry of which this is only a partial list.
27 Quoted in Bishop 1993: 15.
30 Magnusson 2002: 204.
31 Ibid: 204-5.
Additionally, the organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA), Guchusum, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights & Democracy (TCHRD) and Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement (TEAM) conduct their own independent international relations to promote their own political objectives. TYC, Chushi Gangdruk and Guchusum advocate complete independence whereas TWA supports the Middle Way Approach. TCHRD and TEAM are politically neutral and focus on monitoring, analysing and publicising the human rights and environmental conditions inside Tibet. TYC and the TWA have not only regional branches in many countries, but are also informally allied with TSGs in India and Western countries that share their political ideals.

Individual Tibetans and some non-Tibetan supporters make their own personal contributions. Without promises of material remunerations, undaunted by the seeming invincibility of the Chinese juggernaut and their apparently Sisyphean task, and working around their own personal and family obligations of setting new roots in foreign lands, most Tibetans have stayed loyal to and pay annual ‘voluntary dues’, effectively a form of tax, to TGIE’s coffer and participate in campaigning and lobbying activities. Some foreign supporters also spend long hours and hard-earned money to help Tibetan individuals, organisations and the government-in-exile in their political struggle as well for educational, health, religious and cultural undertakings.

The outcome of this inter-connected institutional network and transnational activism is to endow the Tibet issue with a degree of visibility in the international agenda. How the governments of individual states deal with the Tibet issue vary and the rest of this chapter examines the Tibet factor in some of China’s important foreign relations. The purpose of this chapter is to bring into sharper focus the transnational and international dimensions of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. In that sense, this adds to the examination in the previous chapter of the transnational ties regulating the aspirations and activities of the Tibetans in Tibet and exile. The following discussion will show that the international politics of the Tibet issue owes as much to norms and ethics as to the national interests of the states involved.

Tibet in US-China Relations: Interests, Norms and Domestic Politics

Tibet is an obstacle in Sino-American relations, although its strategic heft does not compare with Taiwan, North Korea and trade relations. There is a long historical context to this.

The first American contact with Tibet of any political significance took place when President Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) mission to seek Tibetan permission to use Southern Tibet as a route to carry military supplies to the beleaguered Nationalist Chinese fighting the Japanese during World War II. The Tibetan government refused, claiming neutrality in the war, but allowed non-military goods to be taken across Tibet. After America ‘lost’ China to Communism, Tibet’s strategic importance grew. The Tibetans quickly became hostage to America’s changing valuations of China as either an ideological-strategic threat or an ally in the strategic triangle to balance Soviet power. There is a perceptible correlation between American perceptions of threat from China, whether ideological or strategic, and the degree of American interest in the Tibet issue. When America saw the PRC as a menacing cork in the apparently monolithic Communist bloc, it courted the Dalai Lama and provided covert military assistance through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When America decided to exploit the Sino-Soviet split to undermine the Soviet Union, it ended the covert military support for the Tibetan guerrillas.

However, after the demise of the Soviet Union when American discomfort with a potential Chinese superpower took root, Tibet re-emerged to inconvenience Sino-American relations, through a combination of normative public pressure through the Congress and the administration’s realpolitik calculation. Tibet has political utility for the Americans beyond its human rights concerns. The normative dimension took off when the Tibetan exiles internationalised their struggle around 1985 after human rights became part of the American foreign policy agenda during the Carter administration and Tibetan Buddhism had become established in America. The Dalai Lama’s charismatic leadership made things easier. The realpolitik dimension is a resumption of the American interest before the Nixon-Reagan deep freeze: in 1950-1974, it was the fear of communist ideology; after the Cold War, China’s

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34 Knaus 1999: 5-18.
36 Norbu 2001: 266.
37 Ibid: 265.
strategic challenge keeps America interested in the Tibet-card. Revealingly, Samuel Huntington assigns a proxy role to the Tibetans in a future Sino-Western clash of civilisations.\(^{39}\)

During the Cold War, Tibet policy was the secret domain of the US administration, the CIA to be precise.\(^{40}\) The American public and the Congress were kept completely in the dark during the CIA’s operations with the Tibetan guerrillas. After the Cold War, public opinion and Congressional activism compelled a reluctant administration to take various steps in support of Tibet. Congressional activism has primarily been in support of the Dalai Lama’s attempts to find a peacefully negotiated settlement with Beijing. However, the making of US Tibet policy was not free of institutional tension. Tibet policy has been subject to low-intensity conflicts between the Congress and the White House and State Department. However, executive resistance to Congressional support for Tibet has eased over-time.

Bruce W. Jentleson argues that presidential-congressional relations in American foreign policy making are characterised by four patterns: cooperation, constructive compromise, institutional competition and confrontation.\(^{41}\) On Tibet, there has been a shift from low-intensity confrontation in the 1980s (institutional inertia of the 1970s deep-freeze and currency of the Cold War) to constructive compromise in the 1990s and beyond.

Initially, the administration was somewhat critical of the Congressional support for Tibet.\(^{42}\) The Reagan Administration stayed out of the Congressional attacks on Chinese policies in Tibet. When the Dalai Lama addressed the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September, 1987, the State Department made its disapproval known and reiterated its position that Tibet was a part of China. At the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on human rights in Tibet in October 1987, the State Department Spokesman, Stapleton Roy, criticised the Dalai Lama for conducting political activities in contravention of his religious profile, distancing the Department from the content of his speech to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus.\(^{43}\) Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte’s statement before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee’s hearing on Tibet on 23 April, 2008, reflects the transformation in the US administration’s handling of the Tibet issue:

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\(^{39}\) Huntington 1996: 315.  
\(^{42}\) Norbu 2001: 276; Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 10.  
\(^{43}\) Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 10.
The President’s meetings with the Dalai Lama in both of his terms in office and his attendance at the Congressional Gold Medal ceremony honoring the Dalai Lama last fall are important demonstrations of support at the highest levels of the U.S. government. The Tibetans have legitimate grievances, stemming from years of repression and Chinese policies that have adversely impacted Tibetan religion, culture and livelihoods.\footnote{John D. Negroponte, ‘Statement by John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,’ Washington D.C., 23 April, 2008; available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/NegroponteTestimony080423p.pdf: 4-5.}

Although the Administration has become more supportive of mainstream Tibetan positions,\footnote{By mainstream, I mean the positions of the Dalai Lama and TGIE, who enjoy the support of most Tibetans, arguably speaking.} the consistency of Congressional leadership on Tibet has been crucial for that.

On 24 July, 1985, 91 members of the Congress sent a letter to PRC President Li Xiannian, calling for direct talks with the Dalai Lama and ‘to grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration.’\footnote{Ibid: 274.}


The FRAA for fiscal year 1992-1993 (Public Law 102-138), for instance, declared:

Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles of international law; (2) Tibet’s true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile as recognised by the Tibetan people...; (7) numerous United States declarations since the Chinese invasion have recognized Tibet’s right to self-determination and the illegality of China’s occupation of Tibet.

\footnote{In 1987, the Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 called upon the United States Government to ‘urge the Government of the People’s Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama’s efforts to establish a constructive dialogue on the future of Tibet.’ Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646).}
This sort of language is satisfying or inflammatory depending upon whether one is working in Dharamsala or Beijing, respectively, reinforcing the insecurity dilemma.

Working through Congress, the Tibetans have managed not just to raise the profile of their struggle, but also to compel an initially reluctant, even hostile, US administration to provide some material and institutional support for the Tibetans. George H.W. Bush became the first American president to meet the Dalai Lama in 1991. Bill Clinton met the Dalai Lama several times, albeit as ‘drop-ins’. Former President George W. Bush also met the Dalai Lama a number of times, including once publicly during the awarding of the Congressional Gold medal to the latter. President Barack Obama also welcomed the Dalai Lama twice to the White House, despite coming under strong Chinese pressure against meeting him. These meetings help raise the profile of the Tibetan struggle and hold symbolic significance for the Tibetans.

Congressional support also resulted in some indispensable material assistance from the American government. The Clinton administration created a Tibetan language service in the Voice of America in 1990. This was followed by the creation of Radio Free Asia under provisions of the 1994 International Broadcasting Act (P.L. 103-236) with eight broadcasting hours per day in Tibetan. Public Law (PL) P.L. 104-319 provided scholarships for 15 Tibetans under the Fulbright scholarship programme to pursue post-graduate studies in American universities, which the Tibetans have stretched to allow 30 students to pursue a range of degree and non-degree programs. In November 1990, $500,000 was allocated for humanitarian assistance (PL 101-513), which increased to $1.5 million in October 1992 (PL 102-391) to $2 million for the fiscal year (FY) 2003 (P.L. 107-228). A separate Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance for non-governmental organizations who support and preserve the Tibetan environment and culture and promote sustainable development was earmarked at $1 million in FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), averaging $4 million per year through FY2006 (P.L. 109-102). The 110th Congress earmarked $5 million (P.L. 110-161) for ESF for Tibet. In total, for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, for instance, Congress authorised $6,000,000 and

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52 Radio Free Asia, History; available at http://www.rfa.org/english/about/history.html
53 Subsequently, the scholarship program was named Ngawang Chonphel Exchange Program (PL 106-113) and was allocated no less than $500,000 a year for the fiscal years 2000, 2001 and 2003.
$8,000,000 respectively for Tibet. Congress also compelled the Administration to make some procedural and institutional adjustments to strengthen support for Tibet.

In 1994, Congressional supporters of Tibet commenced legislation to create the position of a ‘Special Envoy for Tibet’ with ambassadorial rank. The Clinton Administration compromised by appointing a ‘Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues’ on October 31, 1997 to promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Although without the ambassadorial rank that Congress originally envisaged, it signalled more focused attention on Tibetan issues. All these legislative initiatives culminated in the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 30, 2002, as part of Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646). As Rabgey and Sharlho write, ‘The Act represents a milestone in the institutionalization of US political support for Sino-Tibetan dialogue.’

The central objective of American Tibet policy is to ‘to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.’ Section 613, ‘Tibet Negotiations’ requires the President and Secretary of State to encourage the Chinese government to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Tibetan issue and to ensure compliance after an agreement has been reached. It also established a presidential reporting mechanism whereby the President and Secretary of State are required to report annually to Congress on steps taken by the two offices to facilitate dialogue and negotiation between the two parties. In addition, every report on China brought out by the Administration should have a separate Tibet section. Section 616 outlines the ways and means of supporting ‘economic development, cultural preservation, health care, and education and environmental sustainability for Tibetans inside Tibet.’ Section 618 requires the Secretary of State to do his/her best to open a US ‘Branch Office’ (Consulate) in Lhasa, Tibet. Most significantly, Section 621 established the position of the ‘Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues’ in the State Department, charged with the central objective of promoting ‘substantive dialogue between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives.’ Specifically, the position is charged with coordinating US initiatives in support of Tibet.

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57 Dumbaugh 2008: 18.
59 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: n. 45 and n. 52.
programs on Tibet and vigorously promoting the protection of ‘the distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and national identity of Tibet...and human rights’ among six others. After the 2008 uprising in Tibet, then-holder of this position, Paula Dobriansky, publicly criticised China’s repression of Tibetan religion, culture and freedoms and called for ‘serious and direct dialogues’ with the Dalai Lama as the only way to resolve the Tibetan problem.\(^{60}\) The capstone of Congressional support was the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in 2007.\(^{61}\) As the following chapter on events since the uprising in 2008 shows, both the Administration and Congress stepped up their criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet.

This crescendo of high level American attention on Tibet was unimaginable only a couple of decades ago. In the late 1980s, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy to America could only meet low-level State Department officials ‘in some coffee shop that was as far away as possible from Foggy Bottom.’\(^{62}\) Tibetans have come a long way since then. Yet, American support for Tibet has had only mixed results. While the central objective of bringing about a negotiated settlement or changing Chinese policies in Tibet have not been realised, American policy has had the positive effect of building Tibetan capacity, keeping Tibetan hopes alive and moderating their agendas.

American Tibet policy has not been successful in bringing about negotiations in the face of widely divergent agenda of the two sides.\(^{63}\) Some analysts argue that it has actually driven Dharamsala and Beijing further apart and worsened conditions inside Tibet.\(^{64}\) Their logic is that Tibetans inside Tibet oppose Chinese rule because they believe that America will intervene and force China to make concessions to the Dalai Lama.\(^{65}\) As mentioned in the introduction, American interference provokes fears and strengthens the hard-liners in Lhasa and Beijing, fuelling the insecurity dilemma. To the extent that American diplomatic and material assistance helps maintain the exile apparatus and strengthens Tibetan identity and resolve, Beijing’s concerns are justified, but its own intransigence drives the Tibetans to Washington DC. However, to contend that Tibetans in Tibet oppose Chinese rule because of the belief that America will coerce China to free Tibet is problematic.

\(^{60}\) Paula J. Dobriansky, ‘The Way Forward in Tibet,’ *Washington Post*, 21 April, 2008. Dobriansky was concurrently the Undersecretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs in the State Department.


\(^{63}\) Norbu 2001: 278; Goldstein 1997: 122.


\(^{65}\) Ibid.
First, it assumes that if the Dalai Lama dealt directly with China without foreign involvement, Beijing would be less suspicious, more benign and magnanimous towards the Tibetans. History does not support such a conclusion.

The Dalai Lama’s near-exclusive engagement with the Chinese between 1951 and 1959 under the terms of the 17 Point Agreement was not rewarded with more enlightened Chinese policies in the Tibetan regions. Rather it left the Tibetans frustrated and insecure with increasingly radical and violent communist reforms in Eastern Tibet and increasingly integrationist policies in Central Tibet. Indeed, these so-called reforms and policies engendered violent rebellions in the East, while in Lhasa, grass-roots Tibetan opposition to ‘self-interested’ and ‘traitorous’ aristocrats and Chinese rule began to gain strength. The Dalai Lama’s position became untenable and he decided to escape to exile. Similarly, from 1978-1987, the Dalai Lama dealt exclusively with the Chinese government in the hopes of negotiating an autonomous status for Tibet. Dialogue collapsed in the late 1980s under the weight of Beijing’s hard-line despite the Tibetan concessions outlined in the previous chapter. As Goldstein wrote, ‘Beijing wanted rapprochement, but did not want to enter into a genuine give-and-take with the exiles over the issue of changes in political control of the Tibet Autonomous Region.’ It was precisely because of Beijing’s intransigence that Dharamsala internationalised the Tibet issue. The Tibetans have preferred to deal directly with Beijing, but the absence of international involvement has made no positive difference to the prospect for a resolution or the conditions inside Tibet.

Furthermore, the argument that Tibetans oppose Chinese rule because of the belief of American intervention assumes that the Tibetans are uninformed naïves willing to risk lives and limbs for an illusion. The most authoritative and influential proponent of this argument, Goldstein wrote:

US pressure has not been simply harmless—it has had serious negative consequences, for America’s token actions have led many Tibetans to believe that it supports the Dalai Lama’s wish for democracy in Tibet and encouraged them to continue opposing China. I remember vividly a twelve-year old monk arguing with me about this once when I was doing research in Drepung monastery near Lhasa. He came up to me and asked, in a whisper, when the United States was going to push China out of Tibet and help the Dalai Lama return. When I tried to explain that China is a powerful country and the United States is not likely to do anything concrete, he refused to listen, saying emphatically, “No, no, I know that the U.S. is more powerful than China and is going to help us.”

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He relies on the words of a twelve-year old to paint all Tibetans as naïves who believe that America will actually intervene militarily to support Tibet. Furthermore, Goldstein attributes this naivety to the inability of the Tibetans, who have lived under Chinese totalitarianism, to appreciate that congressional positions are distinct from those of the Administration’s. However, in the same paragraph, he portrays the Tibetans in the 1980s to be well-informed sophisticates resourceful enough to learn about events in the West through BBC and Voice of America radio broadcasts in Chinese language. The assumption of Tibetan monks and nuns being literate enough in Mandarin Chinese in the 1980s to listen to VOA and BBC is debatable in itself. More to the point, if the Tibetans are rising up only because of the illusion of American intervention, one wonders whose support encourages the more than 100,000 protests and riots in China itself. This author submits that the chief causes of the protests and riots in Tibet or China are the intolerability of the local situations, especially in the realms of culture and identity. External factors could either mitigate or reinforce these local pressures.

However, American involvement has had some positive outcomes from the Tibetan perspective, while it has also moderated Tibetan expectations and demands from Beijing. First, American attention on Tibet has had the effect of keeping Tibetan hopes alive and strengthening their struggle. As Norbu wrote, ‘Above all a Tibetan language broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia not only sustains the hopes and aspirations of the Tibetan people but also beaming across the Tibetan plateau new messages of human rights, freedom and democracy in the post-Communist context.’ Second, the limited Western support strengthens the hands of moderate leaders like the Dalai Lama within the Tibetan community. The Dalai Lama and TGIE officials frequently attribute the international support


71 Goldstein 1997: 83.


73 In 2004, over 74,000 cases of riots and protests took place in China. See Shirk 2007: 57. Harriet Evans of the University of Westminster said that 86,000 incidents of mass unrest took place in 2006. As noted earlier, by 2009, over 100,000 ‘mass incidents’ were taking place annually.

74 Norbu 2001: 279.
for Tibet to the ‘peaceful’ struggle and moderate aspirations of the Tibetan leadership. If the Tibetans adopt violent methods and demand independence, they counsel, the Tibetan struggle will either lose its appeal to many supporters or make it inconvenient for many organisations and governments to support the Tibetans. In his appeal to the Tibetans all over the world in the aftermath of the violent riots in Lhasa (14 March, 2008) and elsewhere, the Dalai Lama said:

> We should not engage in any action that could be even remotely interpreted as violent. Even under the most provocative of situations we must not allow our most precious and deeply held values to be compromised. I firmly believe that we will achieve success through our non-violent path. We must be wise to understand where the unprecedented affection and support for our cause stems from.\(^75\)

Additionally, Tibetan government functionaries frequently respond to the calls of more radical elements to reinstate complete independence as the central goal of the Tibetan movement by reminding them that such a move would diminish the willingness and ability of states such as America to support the Tibetans. They have larger interests in China and officially accept Tibet as a part of China. Indeed, American strategic and economic interests have always been the final arbiters in American policies and practices on the Tibet issue. In that sense, America’s material assistance, which the Tibetans value highly, gives America diplomatic levers to control Tibetan positions and behaviour in the future. Inasmuch as American national interest is the bottom line for America’s policy, having this handle on the Tibet movement would be useful in the future.

It is clear from the above account of America’s Tibet policy that it dovetails with the societal security agenda of the Tibetans. The central objective of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 is ‘to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.’\(^76\) Inasmuch as American diplomatic and material assistance helps the Tibetans to preserve and strengthen their identity and institutions in exile, builds their capacity and keep their political hopes alive in Tibet and exile, it is relevant to the insecurity dilemma.

Whether by design or happenstance, there is a degree of mutuality between mainstream Tibetan positions and American Tibet policy. The Tibetan approach to America was necessary to address the stark asymmetry in power,\(^77\) while America is concerned about

\(^{75}\) The Dalai Lama, ‘Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,’ 6 April, 2008, at http://www.tibet.net/en/prelease/2008/060408.html. Emphasis added. This is a translation from the Tibetan original at http://www.tibetonline.tv/


\(^{77}\) Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 9.
human rights and democracy, but is also interested in Tibet as a means for ‘regulating its relations with China.’\textsuperscript{78} The effect is to fuel the insecurity dilemma.

**Victim of Moralistic Idealism and New Realism: Tibet, China and India\textsuperscript{79}**

Tibet impinges more directly on Sino-Indian relations than on any of China’s other bilateral relations. As Norbu observes: ‘The crux of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry is this: if the Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important to China, the Indian counterparts think it is equally vital to Indian national security.’\textsuperscript{80} Independent India’s Tibet policy was defined by Nehru’s dreams of a Sino-Indian anti-imperialist, non-aligned Asian alternative to the Soviet and American superpowers. The 1962 border war with China changed India’s practice, if not policy, towards the Tibetan refugees. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1989 brought about a thaw in relations and a return to India’s China-friendly policy statements on Tibet before 1962, although there have been no discernible practical fall-outs on the Tibetan exiles. This is, perhaps, in keeping with the new realism and confidence in the post-Cold War Indian foreign policy, tempering the ‘idealism in its foreign policy with a strong dose of realism,’ as C. Raja Mohan put it.\textsuperscript{81} Mohan writes, “Facing its own acute vulnerabilities in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East, [India] was unwilling to confront China on the issue. At the same time, India refused to bend by reducing or suspending its support to the Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India.”\textsuperscript{82} Eventually though, as one Indian analyst counselled, India will need ‘a more sophisticated policy that goes beyond simply curbing the Dalai Lama’s activities,’\textsuperscript{83} remaining in a state of denial, or restating its acceptance of Tibet as a part of China. This is because at some point Beijing will demand that India should dissolve the TGIE and India would have to have a smarter response.

Be that as it may be, there are four major issues that feed both the Sino-Tibetan geo-strategic rivalry and the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma: the status of Tibet, Chinese unease

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\textsuperscript{78} Norbu 2001: 278.

\textsuperscript{79} A portion of this section has been published as Tsering Topgyal, ‘Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino–Indian Border Dispute,’ *China Report*, Vol. 47, Issue 2, May 2011: 115-131.

\textsuperscript{80} Norbu 2001: 297.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid: 169.

\textsuperscript{83} Phuntsok Stobdan, ‘Fifty Years and Counting,’ *The Times of India*, 13 March, 2009.
with the activities of Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama, Indian fears over the Chinese military presence on the Tibetan plateau and the long-standing border dispute.\textsuperscript{84}

First, India’s position on the status of Tibet has changed from the British policy of recognising the \textit{de facto} independence of Tibet—‘completely Autonomous State’—under a vague form of Chinese suzerainty (1947-1951)\textsuperscript{85} to accepting Tibet as a part of China in 1954.\textsuperscript{86} On 29 April, 1954, India relented to Chinese insistence on referring to Tibet as ‘Tibet Region of China’.\textsuperscript{87} After the 1962 border war, India merely used ‘Tibet’ until the 1988 visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when the ‘Sino-Indian Joint Press Communiqué’ referred to Tibet as ‘an autonomous region of China’.\textsuperscript{88} In 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a Declaration which recognised ‘that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.’\textsuperscript{89} This position was reiterated in the Joint Statement during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in 2005.\textsuperscript{90} These formulations led an Indian scholar to observe that India’s acceptance of Tibet as a part of China is conditional upon Tibet’s enjoyment of autonomy.\textsuperscript{91} China, therefore, demands stronger and more unambiguous statements from New Delhi on China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which India has resisted so far.\textsuperscript{92}

Second, India’s official policy has been consistently to disallow anti-Chinese activities by Tibetan refugees on Indian soil. In practice, India has allowed the Tibetans to run a government-in-exile, registered as the Central Tibetan Administration, given material assistance for the running of various projects under its aegis, and facilitated the international political activities of the Dalai Lama. India has so far refused to bend to Chinese pressure for ‘reducing or suspending its support to Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India.’\textsuperscript{93} A relevant question is whether India will revise this policy after the demise of the current Dalai Lama. One Indian scholar argues that India will continue to support Tibetan exiles because it

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\item\textsuperscript{85} FO371/35755, \textit{British Foreign Office minute on “Tibet and the Question of Chinese Suzerainty,”} 10 April, 1943. Goldstein 1989: 634.
\item\textsuperscript{86} Shakya 1999: 119.
\item\textsuperscript{88} ‘Sino-Indian Joint Press Communiqué,’ 23 December 1988.
\item\textsuperscript{89} ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India,’ 25 June, 2003.
\item\textsuperscript{90} ‘Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,’ 11 April, 2005.
\item\textsuperscript{91} Bharat Karnad, Interview, Centre for Policy Studies, New Delhi, 10 August, 2007.
\item\textsuperscript{92} Mohan 2003: 168.
\item\textsuperscript{93} Ibid: 169.
\end{enumerate}
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is in India’s national interest.\textsuperscript{94} Another proposes that India should take upon itself the responsibility to nurture Tibetan language and culture as it faces ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet.\textsuperscript{95} For the foreseeable future, India’s tolerance and facilitating role for the Tibetan struggle looks set to continue. This is a sore point for China.\textsuperscript{96} The Chinese complain that ‘such open encouragement and support given by the Indian government to the Tibetan rebel bandits in their traitorous activities constitutes interference in China’s internal affairs’ and harms the progress of Sino-Indian relations.\textsuperscript{97} Cohen argues that in the minds of the Chinese elite, ‘India’s gravest threat to China resides in Tibet’ because of the sanctuary that India provides to over 100,000 Tibetans and the goal of some Indian elite to resurrect Tibet as a buffer zone between China and India.\textsuperscript{98} Wu Xinbo also writes, ‘So long as the exiled community exists, Tibetan separatism will remain a major concern for PRC leaders.’\textsuperscript{99}

Third, Indian’s have their reciprocal fears arising from Chinese military presence on the Tibetan plateau, from the historical memory of perceived Chinese betrayal and humiliation during the 1962 war and from uncertainties about Chinese intentions now and in the future. The true extent of China’s military presence in Tibet is not clear, given the secrecy surrounding military information, but rough estimates are available.\textsuperscript{100} Margolis notes that in the early 1990s, China had deployed around 500,000 troops on the Tibetan plateau with some of the best weaponry.\textsuperscript{101} Norbu estimates, however, that the likely size of the PLA in Tibet is around 150,000 in Eastern Tibet and 40,000 on the border between India and TAR.\textsuperscript{102} The presence of Chinese strategic forces on the Tibetan plateau adds another dimension to India’s China threat perception.\textsuperscript{103} Not lost on the Indian elite are the several airbases and tactical airstrips and the network of roads that China has built, criss-crossing the Tibetan plateau right up to the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders with Tibet and Xinjiang, and the expanding railway network.\textsuperscript{104} China’s management of water resources

\textsuperscript{94} Chellaney, Interview, Centre for Policy Studies, New Delhi, 10 August, 2007.
\textsuperscript{96} Cohen 2001: 259.
\textsuperscript{98} Cohen 2001: 259.
\textsuperscript{99} Wu 1998: 130.
\textsuperscript{100} Norbu 2001: 228-59; Margolis 2002: 266.
\textsuperscript{101} Margolis 2002: 266.
\textsuperscript{102} Norbu 2001: 239. His lower figure takes into account the disengagement that took place in October-November, 1995 following an agreement during the eighth session of the Joint Working Group (consisting of Indian and Chinese representatives tasked to find a resolution to the border dispute) in August, 1995.
\textsuperscript{104} Norbu 2001: 231-8; Margolis 2002: 266-7.
emanating from Tibet, which feed the Indian subcontinent, also features in Indian security conceptions.\textsuperscript{105} In sum, the ‘ghosts of 1962,’ as one Indian strategic analyst referred to the combination of historical memory, humiliation and sense of betrayal from the war in 1962, casts a long shadow over Indian perceptions of China today.\textsuperscript{106} Essentially, the host of mutually conflicting security concerns germane to Tibet reinforce the larger strategic rivalry between these two Asian giants.

Finally, the border dispute between India and China continues to elude a resolution ever since they acquired a common border when China incorporated Tibet in 1950.\textsuperscript{107} The two countries came to share 2,520 miles of border which has not been delimited by a treaty. Specifically, India claims that China is occupying 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai Chin in the North-Eastern corner of Jammu and Kashmir, which China occupied after the war in 1962. India also claims that Beijing is holding 5,180 square kilometres of land in Kashmir that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963. On their part, the Chinese claim 90,000 square kilometres in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.\textsuperscript{108} The border row remains a major obstacle to further improvement in Sino-Indian relations.\textsuperscript{109}

It is noteworthy that although China has resolved territorial disputes with Russia, Vietnam, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan,\textsuperscript{110} the border with India continues to bedevil bilateral relations with New Delhi.\textsuperscript{111} In 1987, India and China almost went to war in the North-Eastern frontier region of Sumdorung Chu.\textsuperscript{112}

There was some optimism after the signing of the ‘Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question’ during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005. Since then not only has the prospect for a resolution dimmed, the border has become more contentious.\textsuperscript{113} A week before Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, Sun Yuxi, raised

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{105} Chellaney 2006: 38.
\bibitem{108} Malik 9 October, 2007.
\bibitem{111} Sudha Ramachandran, ‘China Toys with India’s Border,’ \textit{Asia Times}, 27 June, 2008.
\bibitem{112} Subrahmanyan 2005: 216-228.
\bibitem{113} Malik 9 October, 2007.
\end{thebibliography}
temperatures in India when he said, ‘In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that.’ In May 2007, China refused to give a visa to an Indian Administrative Service Officer from Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, arguing that he did not require a visa in his own country. India responded by allowing then Taiwanese presidential candidate Ma Yingjeou to visit Delhi and to hold talks with senior Indian officials in June 2007. Not long after that, Indian media reported border incursions by Chinese soldiers and supply of small arms to separatist insurgents in India’s violence-torn North-East. Reports of Chinese military incursions into Sikkim, another bone of contention, in June 2008 reveal the volatility of the border issue. Some of these incursions seem to arise from the fact that the two countries have not even managed to demarcate a mutually agreed-upon line of control, although officially they refer to it as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

On account of these factors, India is considered one of the ‘hostile forces’ exploiting the Tibet issue against China’s interests. Fears of Indian entanglement in Tibet and loss of strategic advantage to India are long-standing. Even when there were very few Indians in Tibet, Mao told Khrushchev in 1959: ‘The Hindus [Indians] acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them.’ Although, successive Indian governments have been extremely wary of rattling the Chinese on Tibet and despite the overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations, Beijing continues to suspect India of bad intentions in Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama and TGIE in India provide the basis for these Chinese fears and suspicions. History also impinges on the present and the future. As Norbu wrote, ‘If India dominates Tibet (as the British Raj had done until 1947), the Chinese feel insecure and threatened.’ Wang warned ominously: ‘Preparing for a possible future conflict with India is the bottom line as to why the Central Government cannot allow Tibetan independence [or ‘covert independence’ meaning

115 Goswami 2010: 2.
116 Indian Express, ‘China Incursion to Be Raised, Sikkim is a Closed Chapter: India,’ 20 June, 2008.
119 Mao Zedong, Discussion between N.S. Khruschev and Mao Zedong, Cold War International History Project, 10 March, 1959.
120 Norbu 2001: 297.
autonomy]. Zhao identified three areas of Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry: Sino-Pakistan alignment, Tibet and the 2,500 kilometres long border dispute.

In short, the apparently flourishing exile cultural and political apparatus in India, Tibet’s closer civilisational links to India, the history of British-Indian policy towards Tibet, the contemporary Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, and uncertainties over Indian intentions contribute to the range of Chinese insecurities identified in Chapter Five. As quoted in the previous chapter, Wang eloquently describes how India gives rise to the worst-case calculations driving Beijing’s Tibet policy.

Yet, there are analysts in both China and India, who counsel that a resolution of the Tibet issue, one way or the other, holds the key to not just solving the border row, but easing the larger strategic rivalry. Chellaney wrote, ‘A genuine China-India rapprochemen fundamentally demands a resolution of the Tibet issue through a process of reconciliation and healing initiated by Beijing with its Tibetan minority.’ Malik opines that until Tibet has been totally ‘pacified’ and ‘sinicised as Inner Mongolia’, China would prefer an undefined border as a bargaining chip because of its belief that India prefers an independent Tibet and aids Tibetan separatists. Norbu argues that ‘Tibet has shaped the informal and invisible dynamics of Sino-Indian relations and politics from 1950 to the present.... Tibet is the legal foundation on which both India’s and China’s border claims rest.’ India is reluctant to countenance Chellaney’s advice that India should condition any final border delineation between China and India to an agreement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, so as to push Sino-Tibetan reconciliation forward. This does not bode well for the resolution of the oftentimes Sino-Indian border dispute as the Tibet issue is neither close to a resolution nor are the Tibetans supine enough for assimilation any time soon. Some Chinese scholars also advised Beijing in 2001 that resolving the Tibet issue with the Dalai Lama would ‘reduce China’s strategic risks in the volatile region of the Indian sub-continent.’ The hard-liners undercut their advice and nothing came of it as the current dead-lock in dialogue shows. Hence, the

121 Wang, SWB, 18 May, 1999: FE/D3537/G.
123 Ibid: 181; Chellaney 2006: 263.
124 Chellaney 2006: 263.
127 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 29.
Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma is intimately entwined in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry.\textsuperscript{128}

Tibet also impinges on some of China’s other important foreign relations, especially with Europe and Taiwan. If history is any guide, the apparently friendly, but fundamentally competitive Russo-Chinese relationship may also see a role for Tibet.

\textbf{Europe and Tibet: Venus and Her Normative Imperatives}

Historically, apart from Great Britain, other European states did not have diplomatic relations with Tibet. After the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1950, Europe was largely silent on Tibet. Great Britain, which had the most extensive diplomatic relations with Tibet,\textsuperscript{129} washed its hands off it after the Chinese invasion, choosing to expect India to take the lead.\textsuperscript{130} In fact, Britain did its best to stifle Tibetan diplomacy during the dying moments of the Tibetan state and at the United Nations when Tibet was debated in the General Assembly in 1959 and the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{131} Buried within a carefully worded statement released on October 2008 through an obscure channel called ‘Ministerial Written Statement’, Britain effectively changed its policy on Tibet to recognise Chinese sovereignty for the first time, describing its formal position of accepting Chinese suzerainty as an ‘anachronism’ and ‘suzerainty’ as ‘an outdated concept.’\textsuperscript{132} The timing of the statement, happening in the thick of the global financial crisis, has led Barnett to ask: ‘Did Britain just sell Tibet?’ \textsuperscript{133} He argued that Britain’s economic troubles and the need for Chinese investment led to the shift in policy. Perhaps, Britain has performed the last act of what Tibetologists call Tibet’s “‘bad friend syndrome”—Western powers professing friendship for Tibet but refusing to support it in its fundamental objective of political independence while actually bolstering China's claim of real ownership.’\textsuperscript{134} To be fair, the statement also abhorred the human rights condition in Tibet, recognised the Dalai Lama’s peaceful leadership, expressed support for the dialogue process and the necessity of Tibetan autonomy for a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Despite this ambiguity of the British response, major European countries such as Germany and France, not known

\textsuperscript{128} For details see Topgyal 2011.
\textsuperscript{129} On the British involvement with Tibet, see Alex McKay, \textit{Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre 1904-1947}, Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1997; Goldstein 1989; Goldstein 2007; Shakya 1999.
\textsuperscript{130} Goldstein 1989: 714-19.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid; Goldstein 2007: 64-67; Shakya 1999: 16-26, 53-61 and 212-236.
\textsuperscript{134} Goldstein 1997: 34, 123.
traditionally for supporting Tibet, became more vocal in their criticism of Chinese policies towards Tibet.

On 23 September, 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a historic meeting with the Dalai Lama, despite the objections of her coalition partner and predictably Beijing’s. Mercer’s personal commitment to human rights and religious freedom, the likely reason for her meeting with the Dalai Lama, could be attributed to her experiences under Communist rule in East Germany. The meeting not only opened a diplomatic spat with China, but also provoked criticism within Germany, especially from the Chancellor’s coalition partner, the Social Democrats, and German business groups. We shall see in the next chapter that Franco-Chinese relations also took a battering on account of the Tibet issue in the aftermath of the Tibetan uprising in 2008. In addition, some Warsaw Pact countries that became free in the late 1980s actively supported the Tibetans. Two factors explain the new European interest in Tibet.

First, with the end of the Cold War, many countries who had either been Soviet satellites ruled by Stalinist Communist Parties, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, or parts of the Soviet Union, such as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, became independent and democratic countries. The peoples and governments of these newly democratic countries, arising from their own experiences of living under Communist rule and being subjugated by a neighbouring great power, have expressed great solidarity with the plight of the Tibetan people. In fact, the Dalai Lama became the first foreign leader to address the Lithuanian Parliament after it regained independence in 1991. This explains the high level of political support from the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic.

Secondly, the self-image of Europe as a normative power as opposed to authoritarian states like Russia and China or unilateralist America—‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’ as Robert Kagan puts it—could explain the rising criticism of European states on Tibet. Ian Manners makes it clear in his seminal article on the European Union as a normative actor: ‘democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ are ‘at the centre of its relations with its Member States... and the

The Tibetan struggle, due to its overall peaceful nature and moderate demands of the Dalai Lama, is a proper candidate for European support. For as Nancy Pelosi put it if the West does not confront China on Tibet, ‘we have lost all moral authority to speak out on human rights.’ The failure to support the non-violent and moderate demands of the Tibetans would render Europe’s rhetoric and self-image as the defender and propagator of human rights and freedoms ring hollow.

The new European activism must be qualified that ultimately national interests prevail over the normative concerns over Tibetan human rights and self-determination. No European country will go beyond symbolic acts of support, such as honouring the Dalai Lama with prizes, awards and meetings, expressions of solidarity and calls for dialogue, to put biting sanctions on Beijing. In that sense, Europe’s policy and practice are no different from that of America’s. In addition, there are active leftist groups in Europe that still support China over in Tibet out of what can only described as ‘ideological fundamentalism…which assigns enemy [or friend] status because of what the other is—its political identity—rather than how it actually behaves.’

Yet, European expressions of support and solidarity encourage the Tibetans in both Tibet and exile. This in itself is inimical from Beijing’s point of view. Moreover, the Chinese government sees in the European support for Tibet not so much the probability of military intervention as the depredations of peaceful evolution. It plays on China’s residual fears of broader Western designs on China, informed as it is by the memories of the colonial experience that still resonates strongly in Chinese nationalism. To that extent, European involvement, even if limited, reinforces the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma.

Taiwan: Nationalist Interest and Solidarity
Unlike most of Europe, Taiwanese engagement with Tibet goes back farther into history. The Nationalist regime in Mainland China and in Taiwan after 1949 influenced American policy towards Tibet to a significant degree. The Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) Party, having

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142 Norbu 2001: 264.
fled from China and locked in a competition with Communist China for recognition as the legitimate government of China, continued to claim Tibet and Mongolia as integral parts of China. The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC), a Ministry-level body within the Taiwanese government, is a relic of Nationalist China’s dreams of incorporating Tibet and Mongolia into China. Even as it claimed sovereignty over Tibet, the Nationalists sought to use the Tibetans against their communist adversaries for both propaganda and military purposes from the late 1940s to 1974 in collaboration with CIA’s Tibet operations. Right up to the 1990s, relations between Taiwan and the TGIE remained rancorous because of Taiwan’s refusal to acknowledge Tibetan independence and its clandestine and disruptive activities within the Tibetan communities in Nepal and India. As a result, TGIE doggedly refused to open formal relations until Taiwan changed its policy and behaviour towards the Tibetans.

As democracy took root and pro-independence forces gained strength in Taiwan in the 1990s and externally the balance of power shifted towards Mainland China, a gradual change also became apparent in Taiwan’s Tibet policy. Taiwan dropped its disruptive activities within the exile Tibetan community in South Asia and improved relations with Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama visited Taiwan for the first time in January 1997 and again in 2001 when he met then-Presidents Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian. While TMAC as a constitutional body persists, a vigorous debate took place in Taiwan regarding its mandate and future. Its function has evolved from the explicitly political one to running cultural, social and educational programmes in Tibet, Mongolia and the Tibetan exile communities in South Asia and Taiwan. During his 1997 visit, the Dalai Lama and Lee Teng-Hui opened a representative office in Taipei, diplomatically named ‘Tibet Religious Foundation of His

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143 Tenzin Namgyal Tethong, *Tibet and Taiwan: Past History and Future Prospects*, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, 27 December, 2005: 61.
146 In 1994, Chen Shui-bian was elected Mayor of Taipei City with 43.6% of votes against the KMT candidate’s 25.8%. In 1997, the DPP defeated the Kuomintang Party in local elections for county magistrates and municipal mayors winning 12 seats against KMT’s 8 seats. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected President of Taiwan. On 9 July, 1999 then President Lee Teng-Hui surprised the world when he told the German Radio Station Deutsche Welle that the relations between China and Taiwan should be defined as ‘between two countries (guojia), at least a special relations between two countries.’ This became known as the ‘Two State’ theory. See Sheng Lijun, *China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001: 210-31.
Holiness the Dalai Lama, followed by the Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation, formally inaugurated by then-President Chen and ‘charged with handling relations with the Tibetan government-in-exile.’ Tethong has interpreted this to mean that as a matter of fundamental policy, the Taiwanese government and MTAC have recognised the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination on the basis of international law, but there has been no formal legislation or statement to reflect such a shift in policy.

The perceptibly positive transformation of Taiwan-TGIE relations happened in the context of growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism, which predated the changes in Taiwanese politics. In fact, this interest in Tibetan Buddhism had roots in the pre-1949 Nationalist China’s patronage of Tibetan Buddhism for political purposes and the proselytisation of famous Tibetan Lamas such as the 9th and 10th Panchen Lamas (the latter’s estate switched allegiance to the CCP during the final years of the Chinese civil war), and Changkya Rolpe Dorje (who escaped to Taiwan with the KMT). As in America and Europe, Tibetan Buddhism appears to have been useful, albeit unintentionally, in preparing the ground for subsequent Tibetan political activism and diplomatic work in Taiwan.

However, Taiwan’s democratization and policy-shift on Tibet paralleled the rise of China’s power. Taiwan was looking for a strategy to ensure its survival in the face of the steady rise of its arch-rival across the Straits and democratisation was as much a survival strategy as a function of domestic demands for it. Improving relations with Dharamsala could also be seen in this light. In the words of one Taiwanese analyst, the Dalai Lama’s high profile visits to Taiwan ‘did not simply project Taiwan’s international image, but one which was as distinct as Tibet, one that was fighting for democracy and freedom just like the Tibet leader, and one that was fighting against being reunified by the Beijing government.’ It is tantamount to piggy-bagging on the Dalai Lama’s international appeal to supplement Taiwan’s considerable military and economic assets. However, the dependence is not unidirectional. As Norbu writes, ‘A Taipei-Dharamsala united front would enormously enhance their collective bargaining power against Beijing in their negotiation for peaceful

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150 http://www.tibet.org.tw/
153 Ibid: 68.
154 Tuttle 2005.
For the Tibetans, Taiwan, with its common language and culture as China’s, is also a back-door to influencing public opinion in Mainland China on the Tibet issue. The Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been running a Chinese language radio program in cooperation with the Broadcasting Corporation of China, Taiwan. Again, a mix of national interests, domestic political imperatives, commitments to freedom, human rights and democracy and interest in Tibetan Buddhism accounted for Taiwan’s improvement of relations with Dharamsala.

However, with the election of a China-friendly KMT to the presidency and majority in the Parliament, Tibetans wonder whether Taiwanese policy towards Tibet will revert to the old nationalist claims and divisive activities in the Tibetan community. The non-partisan nature of commitment to democracy and interest in Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan will cushion Taiwan-Dharamsala relations against complete deterioration. However, Taiwanese interests will ultimately prevail over principles. Just as the Dalai Lama turned down an invitation by Chen Shui-bian to attend his inauguration ceremony upon being elected as Taiwan’s president in 2000 so as not to damage the secretive Beijing-Dharamsala dialogue underway, Taiwan will also implement a Tibet policy guided by its view of its own interests vis-à-vis China. Hence, in 2008, the Ma Yingjeou government refused to give a visa to the Dalai Lama when his followers invited him to Taiwan, saying the timing was not right. Taiwan only reluctantly issued a visa to him in 2009 when he was invited by the leaders of seven local governments in Southern Taiwan to console and pray for the victims and survivors of Typhoon Morakot in 2009.

Beyond the question of ‘collective bargaining power,’ the democratic self-identities of both Taiwan and the exile government could be interpreted as a threat to the CCP. The possibility of Taiwan becoming a major conduit for influencing Han Chinese public opinion on Tibet should also concern Beijing. This nexus between two ‘separatist’ forces was disturbing enough for China to attempt to frustrate it. Soon after the Dalai Lama’s first trip to Taiwan, which drew huge crowds, Beijing added another precondition for Sino-Tibetan

158 Norbu 2001: 312.
159 [Editorial in Tibet Times], [The Future of Tibetan-Taiwanese Relations], 30 September, 2005.
dialogue to resume: the Dalai Lama should declare publicly that Taiwan is a province of China.\textsuperscript{162}

\textbf{Russia: Could History Repeat Itself?}

On the face of it, dragging Russia into Chinese-Tibetan affairs might sound like stretching the imagination. After all, Russo-Chinese relations have been on the upswing since the conclusion of the Cold War. Russia and China are leading members in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, enjoy growing economic complementarities and friendly relations at the elite level,\textsuperscript{163} and share the common strategic goal of balancing American power. The resolution of the long-standing border dispute is proof of the improved relations between these erstwhile communist adversaries.\textsuperscript{164}

Yet, it is also true that Sino-Russian relations are based on fragile fundamentals. As Yu Bin writes, ‘Current leaders in Moscow and Beijing are “still sleeping in different beds and dreaming different dreams.”\textsuperscript{165}’ Behind the facade of elite-level bonhomie lie mutual uncertainties and suspicion as evidenced by Russia’s ambivalence on whether to construct an oil pipe-line from Angarsk (Russia) to Daqing (China) as desired by China or from Angarsk to Nakhodka, a Russian coastal city. The Russians are concerned by the apparently unstoppable rise of China.\textsuperscript{166} Not surprisingly, the Russian military vetoed the Angarsk-Daqing route because ‘it would give China access to Russia’s strategic fuel stocks.’\textsuperscript{167} It is also noteworthy that Russia still refuses to sell its most advanced weaponry to China, even those that it sells to India, which enjoys the same formal relationship with Russia as China, i.e. ‘strategic partnership.’\textsuperscript{168} Russian fears are compounded by the immigration of Chinese into the Russian Far East, where the local population has been declining.\textsuperscript{169} Moreover,
beyond a vague preference for multi-polarity, the relationship is not based on shared ideological or international strategic visions to guide the two powers safely in the long run.\textsuperscript{170}

In that context, it is plausible to ask if Russia will seek to play a role in the Tibet issue in the future. Russian-Tibetan relations go back to the late 19\textsuperscript{th} to early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, when the 13\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama, sought to engage the Czar in diplomatic relations for protection against the Chinese and the British.\textsuperscript{171} A Buryat Tibetan Buddhist monk, Agvan Dorjiev, who became a close confidante of the 13\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama intermediated between the two courts to establish a Russo-Tibetan Patron-Priest relationship. Weakened by her defeat by Japan and preoccupied with internal problems, Russia demurred, but the British felt threatened enough to launch the Younghusband Expedition in 1904,\textsuperscript{172} which, in turn ignited Chinese insecurities.\textsuperscript{173} A long hiatus punctuated Russian-Tibetan contacts after the Communist Revolution in Russia and the Sino-Soviet honeymoon from 1949 to 1964.

Stalin’s death and Kruschev’s attack on Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ threw Sino-Soviet relations on a downward spiral, culminating in the 1969 border clash.\textsuperscript{174} As America under Nixon and Kissinger coaxed China out of the Soviet embrace and Jimmy Carter normalised relations with Beijing in 1979, Moscow scrambled to strengthen existing ties with India and seek new relations with the Tibetans. In 1964, encouraged by then-Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union, T.N. Kaul, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo Dhondup, met with a group of KGB officials who claimed to have been sent specifically to meet him by Alexander Paniushkin, the head of the First Directorate of the KGB.\textsuperscript{175} They offered a sceptical Dhondup ‘everything’ in support—money, arms and training for Tibetan guerrillas and transportation into Tibet for fighting with the Chinese army.\textsuperscript{176} However, when the Soviet agents refused to support Tibet’s cause in international institutions such as the United Nations, Dhondup severed connections with the Soviet agents in 1967. Soviet-Tibetan dealings did not end completely. The Dalai Lama visited the Soviet Union and Mongolia for the first time in 1979.

\textsuperscript{170} Dittmer 2004: 221.
\textsuperscript{173} Goldstein 1989: 46.
\textsuperscript{174} Tyler 1999: 47-103.
\textsuperscript{175} Knaus 1999: 289.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid: 289-90.
Russian interest in and verbal support of Tibet continued well into the 1980s. In May 1980, the Soviet Union openly declared its support for the Tibetan cause if the Dalai Lama requested it.\textsuperscript{177} The Tibetans were cautious enough not to avail of the Soviet offer and nothing came of this advance. The Soviet interest in Tibet was motivated purely by the strategic imperative of balancing China, but it contributed to China’s opening of dialogue with the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{178} Given this history, Russia could revive its interest in the Tibet issue in the event of deterioration in Sino-Russian relations. It will be easier for Russia in the future. First, Moscow has allowed Dharamsala to open a representative office in Moscow through which relations could be activated without going through third parties.\textsuperscript{179} Moreover, thanks to the post-Soviet revival of Buddhism, Tibetans have ready allies and intermediaries in the ethnic Mongols of the Russian Republics of Tuva, Buryatia and Kalmykia, who practise Tibetan Buddhism and consider the Dalai Lama their pre-eminent teacher. Traditional religious ties between Tibetans and Mongols have been revived with Mongols coming to study Buddhism in Tibetan monasteries in India and Tibetan teachers, including the Dalai Lama, teaching in these Russian Republics.\textsuperscript{180} These Russian Mongols express high levels of solidarity with the Tibetans\textsuperscript{181} and revere the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{182} So the potential for a Russian role in Chinese-Tibetan relations in the future exists, although it is by no means inevitable.

\textbf{Mobilising Cultural Kin and Co-Religionists:} This brings us to another group of people whose support the Tibetans are starting to mobilise: people in various countries that have traditional religious, cultural and ethnic ties with Tibet.\textsuperscript{183} These include the Ladakhis, Kinnauris (Himachal Pradesh), Sikkimise and Monpas (Arunachal Pradesh) from Northern India, the Bhutanese, the various ethnic groups of Northern Nepal (Chum, Dolpo, Gyalsumdo, Manang, Nupri, Mustang, Sherpa, Tamang, Thakali, Walung and Yolmo), Mongols from independent Mongolia and the Russian Republics of Tuva, Buryatia and Kalmykia, and Chinese and Western Buddhists. On January 7, 2008, the Dalai Lama gave a speech to Ladakhi, Kinnauri, Monpa and Bhutanese Buddhists, who had come to South India

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Times of India, 1 May, 1980; cited in Norbu 2001: 294.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Norbu 2001: 294.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} The website of the office, which is officially called Tibet Culture & Information Centre, is http://www.savetibet.ru/.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Geraldine Fagan, ‘Russia: When will Dalai Lama next visit Tuva?’ \textit{Forum 18}, August 02, 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Julia Jironkina, ‘Russians and Buddhist Republic supporters hold pro-Tibet protest in Moscow,’ \textit{Phayul.com}, 5 April, 2008.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Telo Rinpoche (The Head Lama of Kalmykia) on the Dalai Lama at http://www.dalailamaphilly.net/TeloRinpoche.html [Accessed on 3 August, 2008].
  \item \textsuperscript{183} Tenzing Sonam, ‘South Asian Tibet,’ \textit{Himal}, Vol. 21, No. 8, August, 2008.
\end{itemize}
especially to hear his teachings. He appreciated the past efforts of the Himalayan Buddhists in keeping Tibetan Buddhism alive in exile by enrolling in large numbers in the Tibetan monasteries in India, and reminded them of their future responsibilities: ‘Should the culture and the people of Tibet, the Land of Snows, face a catastrophe, then the responsibility of preserving, at any cost, this world heritage, this pristine spiritual lineage of Tibet, which is in the tradition of the ancient university of Nalanda, will rest with you, the trans-Himalayan people living in free countries.’ The people of the Himalayan regions of India are increasingly active in voicing and organising support for Tibet.

The Tibetan Buddhists of Nepal are also coalescing around their common religious and cultural identity and the goal of establishing a united Himali Autonomous State along Nepal’s border with Tibet. In the midst of Nepal’s heavy-handed crackdown on the almost daily Tibetan protests in Kathmandu, in deference to Beijing, an elected Sherpa legislator wrote in the official newspaper:

We, the people of Himalayan region of Nepal such as Sherpa, Tamang, Lhopa, Yolmo, Manang, Dolpo, Lemi, Mukumpa, Gyasumdo, Tsuma etc share with the Tibetans a common religion, culture, spiritual teacher, costumes, habits, language, ultimate wish for enlightenment and seek refuge in the same three gems. Although geographically and politically we are citizens of different countries but we all belong to the same Bhotia [Tibetan] race and nobody can separate us.... Survival of Tibetan Buddhism will depend on the survival of rich cultural heritage of Tibet. It is absolutely necessary to strive for the preservation of this rich cultural heritage of Tibet, which is based on Buddhist philosophy, if we are aspiring for peace and stability in China, Tibet, India, our country Nepal and the world.

She summed up by asking of ‘all the Nepali citizens of Himalayan region who share the same religion and culture with the Tibetans, Isn't it time that we all stood up with the Tibetans in solidarity?’ She warned of ‘unprecedented sectarian violence’ if the Nepalese police continued to conduct arbitrary arrests of Buddhist monks and nuns. Again, on 7 August, 2008, Nepalese police tore a piece out of a portrait of the Dalai Lama and tore down prayer flags in the midst of cracking down on Tibetans and Nepalese Buddhists protesting against China. In a statement released to the press, The Nepal Buddhist Federation (NBF) condemned the ‘vilification of our spiritual master,’ demanded an apology from the police and warned the government of ‘ugly sectarian communal violence.’ The statement referred to historical and contemporary cultural ties:

185 Their website in the Nepalese language is http://www.himaliautonomousstate.org/inquiry.php.
186 Ang Dawa Sherpa, ‘Nepali citizens: Isn't it time that we all stood with the Tibetans in solidarity?’ Gorkhapatra Daily, 18 May, 2008.
187 Ibid.
Ever since the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet in the 7th century, Himalayan Buddhists of India, Nepal and Bhutan used to go to Tibet for studies in the various monasteries and after the closing of the northern border in 1959, Himalayan Buddhists continue to go to monastic educational institutions in India and return to their respective countries after graduation to serve their communities. The unbroken close spiritual bond between the Dalai Lamas and the Buddhist followers of the Himalayan regions began 363 years ago during the great 5th Dalai Lama and is continued even today. The Dalai Lama is our root Guru.189

Because the Dalai Lama is not allowed to visit Nepal, Nepalese Buddhists travel to India for his teachings. During his most recent visit to America, Nepalese Buddhists in America requested the Dalai Lama to give a separate teaching for them, when he called them ‘twin brothers and sisters’ of the Tibetans.190 In short, there is a growing sense of solidarity among the Nepalese Buddhists for the Tibetan situation.191 This is consistent with the literature on diasporas that examine the political significance of ties between co-ethnics and co-religionists across state-borders.

As mentioned above, the Mongols of Mongolia and Russia also support the Tibetan cause and could potentially play the role of intermediaries in Russia. Telo Tulku Rinpoche, the spiritual head of the Kalmyk Russians, wrote in his promotion of the Dalai Lama’s teachings to the Kalmyk people in Philadelphia on 16 July, 2008, “He is my hero, our nation’s hero and modern world hero because of his tremendous contribution to the well-being of the world at large....”192 In 2006, the Kalmyk Republic awarded its White Lotus Order to the Dalai Lama, when the President Kirsan Nikolayevich Ilyumzhinov said, ‘At a time when our long shared cultural and spiritual values are endangered by hostile factors, there is an urgent need to come together hand in hand to preserve and promote them.’ In 2008, White Russians and Mongols carried out a pro-Tibetan protest despite severe obstacles placed upon them by the Russian state.193 The Dalai Lama also visits majority Tibetan Buddhist Mongolia where he is warmly received and Mongolian monks come to study

189 Ibid.
191 [Whether we are loyal adherents of Tibetan culture, believers in human rights, freedom and fairness or blood-and-bone relatives, we have always supported our Tibetan brothers and sisters and we pledge deep in our hearts to stand in solidarity with you in the future] Nyima Gyalpo Sherpa (Every One Supports Tibet’s Truth), न्यिमा खंडा [Khada] 16 March, 2009.
192 Telo Rinpoche on the Dalai Lama.
193 Jironkina 5 April, 2008.
Buddhism in Tibetan monasteries in India. Historical ties are thus revived and strengthened through contemporary exchanges.

Tibetans are also trying to mobilise the support of Western Tibetan Buddhists. The Office of Tibet in New York organized the first ever conference of Tibetan Buddhist Centres in the Americas in New York in September, 2003. In his welcome address Dr. Nawang Rabgyal, Representative of the Dalai Lama and the organiser of the conference thanked Western Buddhists and Centres for the ‘direct and indirect contributions toward creating awareness about Tibet and its civilization’ and called upon them to shoulder their ‘moral responsibility to work for [the] happiness and freedom in the land of snow.’ He continued, ‘[H]aving seen the benefit of the Buddha Dharma as practiced in the Tibetan tradition, Dharma students should naturally be concerned about the situation of Tibet, a country that had nourished and developed this rich tradition of Buddhism.’ Although it is not clear how politically inclined the Western adherents of Tibetan Buddhism are, it is a growing source of potential support for the Tibetan cause. Indeed, as mentioned above, the spread of Tibetan Buddhism in America in the 1960s and 1970s was instrumental in the post-Cold War popularity of the Tibetan cause in America and elsewhere.

The significance of these Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in the future politics of Tibet cannot be underestimated. The current Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that his reincarnation, i.e. the 15th Dalai Lama, will be born in a free country outside of China to continue his predecessor’s work. Since the 4th Dalai Lama was a Mongol and the 6th Dalai Lama a Monpa from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, the 15th Dalai Lama could be selected from any of these various groups of Tibetan Buddhists. In a TV programme titled ‘Succession of the Dalai Lama’ broadcast by the Tibetan language service of VOA, Lodi Gyari said that Tibetan Buddhists all over the world including Westerners should have a say

198 Sonam August, 2008. Of course, Beijing will appoint its own 15th Dalai Lama, but he will be largely illegitimate in the eyes of most Tibetans. The current Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama is not even able to reside in the traditional seat of Tashi Lhunpo monastery, Shigatse, because of opposition by local monks. Many Tibetans refer to him as ‘Panchen Zuma (fake Panchen)’ or the ‘Chinese Panchen’. 

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in the selection of the next Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{199} This means, at least, that the politics of Tibetan Buddhism will be more crowded than Beijing would like it to be.

**Conclusion:** This chapter developed the theme of Tibetans seeking international allies to face the threats to their identity from Chinese political domination and cultural imperialism. Tibetans have found their Tibetan Buddhist culture helpful in this effort. Owing to a host of geopolitical, normative, historical and cultural-religious factors and successful Tibetan lobbying, the Tibetan issue has affected China’s bilateral relations with America, India, Europe, Taiwan, and potentially Russia in the future. Due to ethnic and cultural ties, the Tibetan Buddhists of India, Nepal, Mongolia, Russia and the West are becoming increasingly relevant to the Sino-Tibetan dispute. The chapter examined how interests, norms, culture, personalities and domestic politics shape the role that Tibet plays in each of these bilateral relations.

American, Indian and Taiwanese reasons for engaging with the Tibet issue include rational interests, domestic politics and humanitarian considerations, and in the case of India, also civilizational ties. While the limited European support for the Tibetans stem from normative imperatives, Moscow’s fleeting dealings with Tibet have come exclusively from rational strategic interests. Although the factors at play in each of these cases are different, the two constants are the patient and persistent Tibetan efforts and the utility of Tibetan Buddhism in breaking the ground for mobilising public support in these countries. The Tibetan Buddhist culture can be seen as a source of soft power, which according to Nye ‘is relevant to the realisation of “milieu goals.”’\textsuperscript{200} Shaping an environment conducive to political mobilisation is an example of a milieu goal. This is how the transnational Tibetan Buddhist world is relevant to the Chinese-Tibetan insecurity dilemma, inasmuch as it increases the number of stake-holders in the Tibet issue, thereby complicating Beijing’s efforts to at least render Tibetan Buddhism and culture compatible to the interests of the Party-State, if not undermine its very existence.


\textsuperscript{200} Nye 2004: 16-7.
Chapter 8

The Insecurity Dilemma and the Tibetan Uprising in 2008

In March 2008, Tibetans on the Tibetan plateau rose up in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since the 1950s. The Chinese government claimed that 18 civilians and one policeman died and 382 civilians were injured on 14 March, 2008. The Tibetan Government-in-exile (TGIE) and rights groups claim that 220 Tibetans were killed, 5600 arrested or detained, 1,294 injured and 290 sentenced and over 1,000 disappeared in the ensuing crackdown. The consequences were far reaching. Not only did the uprising widen the chasm between Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama and TGIE, and Beijing, it temporarily disrupted some of China’s key foreign relations. While the Tibetans were awarded the “Media Tenor Special Award for Agenda Setting” for breaking “through the awareness threshold of almost all TV-news”, China’s international image took a tumble. China’s brutal crackdown made the tour of the Beijing Olympics a magnet for solidarity protests by Tibetans and supporters around the world. This provoked counter-protests by overseas Chinese who accused the Western-media of anti-Chinese bias.

Beijing claimed that it had ‘plenty of evidence’ proving that uprising was ‘organized, premeditated, masterminded and incited by the Dalai Lama clique,’ while the Tibetans attributed the protests to ‘deep-rooted resentment of the Tibetan people’ under China’s

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1 A version of this chapter was published as Tsering Topgyal, ‘Insecurity Dilemma and the Tibetan Uprising in 2008,’ Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 69, March, 2011: 183-204.
2 The geographical spread of the uprising included not just the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), but also the Tibetan areas incorporated into the neighbouring provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan.
flawed and repressive policies.’ Amidst these claims and counter-claims, talking heads also speculated on the causes of the uprising, providing a variety of explanations.

Straight up, this thesis will argue that Tibetan identity insecurity was the principal cause of the uprising and that the uprising and its continuing aftermath is the latest cycle of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The uprising was a direct response to the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies. Peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate the societal insecurities they feel on account of ‘assimilationist’ Chinese policies, Chinese migration and cultural imperialism. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing’s policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This chapter also examines the heightening of Chinese nationalism in response to the Tibetan uprising and the policy implications. The 2008 Tibetan uprising is the most recent episode in the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. However, other analysts have provided a range of causal explanations that span from the fantastical to the plausible, mostly in the popular media.

After surveying the various explanations suggested by other analysts, this chapter will first attempt a provisional reconstruction of the events of spring 2008 in Tibet. Next, reflecting the cyclical action-reaction process of the insecurity dilemma, Tibetan identity insecurity before and during the uprising will be revealed as the underlying cause of the uprising. Then, the insecurities behind China’s crackdown and hardening policy will be discussed with particular reference to how popular Chinese nationalism interacts with state policy and practice. Due attention is also given to the bitterness and insecurity that hardline policy and practices are generating in the Tibetan psyche, foreshadowing a potential Tibetan upheaval in the future. In short, this chapter will demonstrate the workings of the insecurity dilemma with a compacted cycle of Chinese state-building and Tibetan defensive retaliations.

Analytical Overview
Some analysts saw the Tibetan protests and riots through the prism of Western, principally American, anti-China designs executed through the ‘Dalai clique.’ William Engdahl was more specific, arguing that the American government, specifically the US State Department,
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the ‘CIA’s Freedom House’ and Trace
Foundation, run by George Soros’ daughter, orchestrated an ‘ultra-high risk geopolitical
game with Beijing by fanning the flames of violence in Tibet’ through Tibetan NGOs in
exile.\textsuperscript{11} Reproducing Goldstein’s analysis of the 1987 protests in Lhasa, Patrick French
contended that ‘American politics provided an important spark for the demonstrations.’\textsuperscript{12}
Specifically, he argued that the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama
emboldened the Tibetans to protest. Calling Engdahl’s assertions ‘insinuations’ and
‘simplistic arguments based on “guilt by association,”’ Shakya pointed to Chinese policies
failures instead.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, most of the better-informed analyses coalesced around policy
failures. In the orgy of policy analysis, both Dharamsala and Beijing were put under the
microscope.

French described the Dalai Lama as ‘a poor and poorly advised political strategist’
who should have closed the ‘Hollywood strategy’ a decade ago and renounced the demand
for ‘a so-called Greater Tibet.’\textsuperscript{14} Others raised questions about the Dalai Lama’s authority in
among the Tibetans in Tibet and exile.\textsuperscript{15} However, the spot-light was overwhelmingly on
China’s Tibet policy.

Robbie Barnett wrote that the monks from Drepung Monastery who initiated the
protests on 10 March 2008 had ‘several reasons to be antagonized about China’s policies in
Tibet [centring around] restrictions on religion and culture introduced in 1994 in order to
erode the suspected sources of Tibetan nationalism.’\textsuperscript{16} In an unprecedented open letter, 29
Chinese intellectuals living and working in China put the blame squarely on ‘serious mistakes
in the work that has been done with regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments
must conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and fundamentally

\textsuperscript{11} William Engdahl, ‘Why Washington plays “Tibet Roulette” with China,’ \textit{China Daily}, 16 April, 2008. This
article was originally posted on the website of the Canadian Think Tank \textit{Centre for Research on Globalisation}
(CRG). Immediately, it was splashed all over the Chinese media. Well-known Chinese journalist Ching Cheong
peddled this argument, almost verbatim in ‘The crimson revolution’s true colours,’ \textit{Straits Times}, (22 April,
2008). Engdahl’s original piece had since been taken off both his personal and CRG’s websites, possibly due to
Tsering Shakya’s detailed refutation in ‘The Gulf between Tibet and Its Exiles,’ \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}
(\textit{FEER}), 2 May, 2008a.

\textsuperscript{12} Patrick French, ‘He May Be a God, but He’s No Politician,’ \textit{New York Times}, 22 March, 2008; Goldstein
1997: 83. Curiously French neither credited Goldstein for his insights nor reflected his more nuanced analysis.

\textsuperscript{13} Shakya 2008a.

\textsuperscript{14} French 22 March, 2008.

are losing power over young,’ \textit{Times Online}, 19 March, 2008; Somini Sengupta, ‘Some Tibetan Exiles Reject
“Middle Way.”’ \textit{New York Times}, 21 March, 2008. This is just a sampling of such opinions.

change the failed nationality policies.'\(^{17}\) Wang Lixiong made the same argument in his writings.\(^{18}\) While the above perspectives are concerned mainly with Chinese policies on autonomy, religion, culture and the Dalai Lama, others have put forward more materialist arguments concerning economic marginalisation and exclusionary modernisation. Ben Hillman blamed ‘unequal development’ and ‘economic marginalisation’ for the uprising.\(^{19}\) Pankaj Mishra fingered the ravages of ‘internal colonialism’—Chinese migration, coercive and exclusionary modernisation and cultural imperialism, and the Tibetan fears for their ‘threatened identity’ and their place in the new economy and the fragile ecology of their homeland.\(^{20}\) While all these perspectives captured slices of a complex process, they suffer from the trade-off between coherence and complexity. While economic marginalisation is coherent, it denies many other issues that are equally if not more relevant. Mishra is more comprehensive, but he fails to integrate the various issues into a coherent explanation as there is neither prioritisation nor an attempt to examine the linkages among the various factors that he identified. The insecurity dilemma provides a coherent yet inclusive framework for explaining and understanding the Tibetan and Chinese actions since 10 March, 2008. After all, identity is not just a value to be secured, but also a powerful instrument of mobilisation, defensive weapon, an organising principle or a lens into the world, all rolled into one.

**10 March 2008 and the Aftermath**

On 10 March, in the evening according to some sources, a number of monks from Drepung Monastery marched towards the centre of Lhasa.\(^{21}\) Security forces stopped the monks at the main road into the city, where they carried out a sit-in protest, reciting a long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama and another prayer for Tibet’s well-being composed by the Dalai Lama

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\(^{20}\) Pankaj Mishra, ‘At war with the utopia of modernity,’ The Guardian, 22 March 2008. Mishra leaves the misleading impression that Tibetans are incurable traditionalists dead-set against modernity and capitalism.

\(^{21}\) Xinhua, ‘Spokesman: Lhasa violence part of Dalai clique's “uprising”’ 1 April, 2008; Tsering Woeser, ‘Tibet Update with Translation’; English translation available at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/03/tibet-update-with-translation/. The Chinese original is available on her blog http://woeser.middle-way.net. Woeser, the banned Tibetan writer and blogger living in Beijing is married to the Chinese writer, Wang Lixiong, who has written a series of books and essays criticising Chinese policies on Tibet. ICT 2008: 15-85; TCHRD 2008: 9-100. The numbers differ according to sources. Woeser writes that 500 Drepung monks marched out of their monastery, while 14 Sera monks protested outside Jokhang temple. ICT reported 300 Drepung monks and 14 Sera monks, while TCHRD reports 300 and 15 respectively. Xinhua merely mentions ‘a group of monks from the Zhaibung and Sera monasteries.’
himself. The monks called for the release of their colleagues who were arrested in October 2007, when they attempted to celebrate the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama. Eyewitnesses reported that they also shouted pro-independence slogans and unfurled a homemade version of the banned Tibetan flag. After a tense stand-off, about 15 monks were arrested and Drepung Monastery was shut down by People’s Armed Police (PAP).

However, about 14-15 monks from Sera Monastery, about 3 miles north of the Central Lhasa, reached Jokhang Temple around six in the evening where they shouted pro-independence slogans, waving the Tibetan flag. Two European tourists, who witnessed the incident, blogged that the lay Tibetan pilgrims and passers-by joined the protest and formed ‘a strong, silent, peaceful circle around the police who keep the middle of the square open.’ Police reinforcements dispersed the crowd, beating and arresting the protesters, including about 6 monks. Sera Monastery was blockaded by the security forces and tour agents were instructed to inform clients that ‘the monasteries were closed for renovation.’ But protests also took place in at least three places in Amdo (Tibetan regions of Qinghai and Gansu provinces) and one place in Kham (Tibetan region in Sichuan province) in places like Bayankhar, Mangra, Sangchu and Zoge. That the Tibetans scattered across four different administrative divisions chose 10 March to express their grievances is historically and politically significant.

10 March is the anniversary of the fateful Tibetan uprising in 1959, which resulted in the flight of the Dalai Lama and the dissolution of the Tibetan government by Communist China. Tibetans in exile commemorate this day as the National Uprising Day and the Dalai Lama unfailingly gives a ‘State of the Struggle’ address. On 10 March, 2008, he said that ‘on the fundamental issue [of autonomy and unification of Tibetans], there has been no concrete result at all [from dialogue]. And during the past few years, Tibet has witnessed increased repression and brutality.’

The Dalai Lama was referring to the dialogue that his representatives had been holding with the Chinese government. Inside Tibet, although...
Tibetans may have privately commemorated the day, it was never observed with large-scale protests even in Lhasa. In the past, protests and rebellions have been, at least initially, about local issues, and even when they involved larger Tibetan issues, they were isolated by issues, space and time. In 2008, not only did the Tibetans protest on the same day, they were united in their concern for Tibetan identity, rights and the Dalai Lama’s exile.

In the three following days, there were more protests around Lhasa, led by the monks of Sera and Gaden Monasteries and Chubsang nunnery. They met the same fate: beatings, tear-gas and arrests. Around mid-day on 14 March, some monks from Ramoche Temple located in the city centre and close to the Tibetan quarters protested outside their temple. Their protest, which began peacefully, turned into one of the most explosive clashes between the Tibetans and their Chinese rulers. Unlike the previous protests, the beatings and arrests of the monks took place in a populated area where many Tibetans lived or worshipped as pilgrims from all parts of the Tibetan plateau. Incensed by the sight of police and PAP beating the monks and the conspicuous presence of plainclothes police among the crowd, the lay Tibetans attacked the security forces with rocks. A 19 year-old Canadian back-packer, John Kenwood, joined the crowd shouting ‘Free Tibet.’ What happened next shocked him: ‘There was no more crowd to be part of. It looked like they [the rioters] were turning on everybody.’ After the security forces retreated, the euphoric crowd split up into groups, gathering rocks and pulling out knives, and turned on other symbols of Chinese rule: government buildings, banks, police vehicles and Chinese migrants and their businesses. James Miles of the Economist magazine, who was the only accredited foreign journalist in Lhasa that week, told CNN, ‘It was an extraordinary outpouring of ethnic violence of a most unpleasant nature to watch, which surprised some Tibetans watching it.’ According to Chinese state media, 18 civilians including one Tibetan girl died from fire or beatings and estimated the ‘direct economic losses’ on that day at 250 million RMB.

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29 ICT 2008: 43; Woeser, ‘Tibet Update 1.’
31 Ironically, Ramoche was built by the 7th century Chinese princess, Wencheng Kongjo, who was reluctantly offered in marriage to the Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo by the Tang emperor. The Chinese hold her as a symbol of Chinese-Tibetan unity, although the Tang emperor was more or less coerced into giving her hand in marriage to the Tibetan emperor.
32 Barnett, ‘Thunder from Tibet’; Shakya 2008b; Woeser, ‘Tibet Update 1.’
What intrigued many analysts was why the security forces took so long to take control of the streets. In fact, Miles reported that it was not until mid-day on 15 March that the security forces came out in force to reclaim the streets. The Chinese intellectuals mentioned above blamed the Chinese authorities of ‘dereliction of duty’ for doing nothing even as they claimed to have ‘sufficient evidence’ to prove the ‘Dalai clique’s hand in the violence. One can only surmise that image considerations before the Beijing Olympics paralysed the authorities momentarily.

When the security forces did move in, it was a full-scale military operation by the PAP and PLA troops. Chinese officials resisted declaring martial law, denied deploying any regular soldiers and rejected the death of any Tibetans. Miles reported that Lhasa was effectively under martial law and reported seeing ‘numerous…military vehicles, military looking vehicles with tell-tale license plates covered up or removed. And also many troops there whose uniforms were distinctly lacking in the usual insignia of either the police or the riot police. So my very, very strong suspicion is that the army is out there and is in control in Lhasa.’ Andrei Chang, a defense analyst confirmed: ‘T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.’ He also observed that the soldiers were ‘all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations’ of the 149th Division.

In Lhasa, a number of Tibetans were killed by the security forces. But large scale protests also took place in various other Tibetan areas on 14 March: Toelung Dechen and Chushul, Samye and Shigatse in Utsang (TAR), Sangchu (Gansu) and Dzoge (Sichuan) in Amdo and Lithang and Sershul in Kham (Sichuan). On 16 March, prisoners were paraded through the streets of Lhasa in military vehicles. Despite the heavy military presence, protesters lingered on in and around Lhasa and the death toll mounted on the Tibetan side. TGIE claims that over 80 Tibetans died on 14 March and 160 by the end of March in Lhasa. Using police photos and the ubiquitous surveillance cameras, the authorities began to issue

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37 CDT 22 March, 2008.
40 Kanwa Defence monitors and analyses defence and security affairs in Asia.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid; Barnett 29 May, 2008; Shakya 2008b. For details on the Tibetan deaths in March, see ICT 2008: 24-29.
43 ICT 2008: 19-23.
44 TGIE, ‘Fact Sheet.’
daily ‘Most Wanted Lists’ and text messages were sent to all mobile users in Tibet directing them to inform on protestors. However, in the following days and weeks, the most vigorous protests continued in Eastern Tibet.

The bloodiest protests took place in Tongkhor, Lithang and Tehor, Kartze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and Kirti Monastery, Ngawa TAP in Sichuan, and Labrang, Machu, Luchu, Chone and Tsoe, Kaniho TAP in Gansu. In Kaniho alone, Xinhua reported that there were “serious protests” at the administrative buildings of some 105 county-level or city-level work units, 113 town-level work units and 22 village committees. In the days following March 14, Tibetans carried out ninety-six protests in Eastern Tibet and Chinese internal reports projected that about 30,000 Tibetans participated in those protests. TGIE estimated that 23 Tibetans were killed in Ngawa on 16 March and 3 Tibetans in Dabpa County, Kartze TAP, on 11 March. ICT estimated that 4 other Tibetans were shot dead on 18 March in Kartze, while Woeser claimed 7 Tibetans died there. 8 more Tibetans were killed in Tongkhor, Kartze, on 3 April when monks led the local Tibetans in a protest demanding independence and the return of the Dalai Lama. Death tolls in the Tibetan sources vary, while the Chinese officials admitted to shooting, but not killing any Tibetans in Sichuan. By the time the Chinese forces were able to enforce a sulking calm before the Beijing Olympics, 130 confirmed cases of largely peaceful protests had broken out in Tibetan areas. Figure 3 and 4 show the geographical extent of the protests from March to August 2008. By April 2009, 160 confirmed cases of protests had taken place. Considering that during the previous major unrest in Tibet, 144 protests and riots rocked Lhasa and its vicinity within the span of 7 years (1987—1993), it is notable that 130 protests took place within a few months in 2008. In short, the geographical and social spread of the protests in 2008 was unprecedented since the 1950s. Monks and nuns, farmers, nomads, schoolchildren, university students in Chinese cities, intellectuals, urban professionals and party members took some part in the uprising.
On 16 March, students in the Machu Tibetan Language Primary School and Middle School, Kanlho TAP (Gansu) led a protest of monks and local Tibetans which turned into a riotous destruction of non-Tibetan businesses and government offices.\footnote{Woeser, ‘Tibet Update 1.’} Students of Tsoe Teacher’s College, Kanlho, Qinghai Teacher’s College and other Tibetan schools in Kartze and Ngawa also protested on that day. In the same evening, 500 Tibetan students at Northwest University for Nationalities in Lanzhou, Gansu, staged a silent vigil on campus and posted posters expressing solidarity with the protesters in Tibet. On 17 March, students in the Tsoe Medical School and Mewa Tibetan Middle School, Ngawa, also came out to protest. Hundreds of Tibetan students in the Central University for Nationalities in Beijing and South-Western University for Nationalities in Chengdu staged silent vigils in their campuses lasting several hours. In the evening of 18 March, Tibetan students of Qinghai Institute for Nationalities held a silent vigil.

Intellectuals and public figures were involved and suffered in the process. Under house-arrest in Beijing with her husband Wang, Woeser communicated with other Tibetans from the affected regions and maintained a frequently updated blog, which was closed down and hacked into several times, serving as the sole source of information for the outside world, especially after China closed down all Tibetans regions to foreign tourists and journalists. Jamyang Kyi, a prominent Tibetan TV personality, singer/song-writer, blogger and women’s rights activist, was detained without charge on 1 April 2008.\footnote{International PEN, ‘Tibetan internet writer Jamyang Kyi detained without charges,’ 23 April, 2008.} Jamyang’s friend and writer Norzin Wangmo was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for communicating with people abroad.\footnote{Rebecca Noviz, ‘Calling Tibet? Please Hang Up and Try Again,’ Huffington Post, 13 January, 2009.} Other intellectuals like Arig Dolma Kyab, Golog Palchen Gyal and Go Sherab Gyatso were arrested for their roles one way or the other in the uprising.\footnote{[Jamyang Kyi’s Blog], 25 July, 2008; available at http://www.tibetabc.cn/user1/jamyangkyi/archives/2008/2008731215020.html} Apart from Jamyang Kyi, who was subsequently released, they are all serving prison sentences of varying lengths. Two years on, China has extended its assault on Tibetan society beyond those openly protesting against Chinese rule and those who abet them, to public figures who have assiduously avoided politics and concentrated on today’s quintessential Chinese pursuit of ‘getting rich.’

On 24 June 2010, Karma Samdup, antiques dealer, philanthropist and environmentalist, who was previously celebrated as a model Tibetan on Chinese national TV
and media and in a book for his philanthropy and social services, was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of grave–robbing in Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{59} Apparently, this charge was dropped by the police in 1998 because Karma produced his license to deal in antiques and denied knowing that items he bought in Xinjiang came from graves.\textsuperscript{60} The real reason for reviving the charge appears to be his defence of his two brothers, Jigme Namgyal and Rinchen Samdrup, who were arrested on charges of inciting ‘separatism’ and harming ‘national security’.\textsuperscript{61} They were incarcerated because they accused a local official of poaching endangered animals in a nature reserve.\textsuperscript{62} Then on June 26, 2010, Dorje Tashi, another Tibetan tycoon, philanthropist and CCP member was sentenced to life apparently for offering money to the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{63} The crackdown, it appears, is not over yet.

\textbf{Map 3: Protests as of 12 April, 2008.} Barnett, ‘Thunder from Tibet.’

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid; BBC, ‘China jails Tibet environmentalist Karma Samdrup,’ 5 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
**Olympics, New Year Boycott and Renewed Protests**

By the time of the devastating 12 May earthquake in Ngawa, Sichuan, which claimed 87,000 lives and left 5 million homeless, Tibetans in nearby Kartze were still protesting, but the earthquake stole all the media coverage. Tibetans in Nepal, who have been holding daily protests in Kathmandu since March, suspended their protests in solidarity with the earthquake victims. Many of the same monasteries whose monks led protests against Chinese rule performed prayers for the earthquake victims. The monks of Kirti Monastery, Ngawa, which was under heavy security blockade since the massive protests which resulted in the death of at least ten Tibetans, dictated a message of reconciliation on phone to Tibetan exiles, requesting the freedom to minister to the spiritual needs of the victims of the earthquake. By the time of the Beijing Olympics, through a combination of heavy military presence, domestic anti-Tibetan propaganda and censorship of the media, arrests and detentions, and the shutting down of telecommunications infrastructure in the Tibetan regions, an uneasy

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66 ICT acquired a copy of the message and translated it into English in ICT 2008: 77-79.
quiet had been restored in Tibet. Protests resumed in eastern Tibet after the Olympics though.  

Around that time, Tibetans came up with a different form of protest against Chinese policies and to mourn the death of Tibetans in the 2008 crackdown. It was a form of civil disobedience, refusing to celebrate the Tibetan New Year. The Chinese authorities tried compel the Tibetans to celebrate New Year through a combination of threats and inducements such as money and fireworks. In the end, the Tibetans largely boycotted the festivities, while the officials orchestrated celebrations that were extensively publicised in the state media. At the time of writing this paper in April 2009, a farming boycott is also going on in Kartze. Tibetans and Chinese soldiers clashed in Machu, Kanlho. The Voice of Tibet radio program reported a protest in Nyagrong, Kartze, on 15 April, 2009, leading to security forces firing into the crowd and injuring seven Tibetans and arresting nine others. The uprising in Tibet, happening as it did in the year of the Beijing Olympics, attracted a lot of attention from the international media and governments.

The World Responds to Events in Tibet

American Responds

In the wake of the 10 March, 2008 Tibetan uprising, both the American Administration and Congress stepped up their criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet and called for substantive dialogue. The House of Representatives passed a Resolution and the Senate held a hearing,
both of which expressed support for Tibetan aspirations, criticised Chinese policies and pressured the US administration to take specific steps in support of the Tibetans. Proinent American legislators asked key figures in the Bush Administration to take specific measures on Tibet. Congressional support for Tibetan aspirations is truly bipartisan, compelling the administration to take some steps. In further evidence of the resonance of the Tibet issue in American domestic politics, the presidential candidates condemned China and called for serious dialogue with the aim of settling the Tibetan issue.

John McCain, the Republican Party nominee said, rather opportunistically, that Tibet is one of the first things he would address as president. Barack Obama wrote to Bush that the situation in Tibet is ‘deeply disturbing’ and that he should prevail upon the Chinese authorities to negotiate the return of the Dalai Lama and the exercise of genuine autonomy in Tibet. He urged Bush ‘to speak out forcefully and publicly to disabuse [Beijing] of the notion that they can...escape international censure’ if the Chinese take ‘private diplomacy as a license for inaction or continued repression.’

McCain met the Dalai Lama on 25 July, 2008 and expressed his support for the Tibetans, drawing criticism from Beijing. Not to be outdone, Obama wrote to the Dalai Lama on 24 July to express regret for not being able to meet due to their ‘respective travel schedules’ and pledged to ‘continue to support you and the rights of the Tibetans.’

However, American support for Tibet is substantively confined to cultural preservation, human rights and dialogue for autonomy and limited by larger national interests. While Bush raised the Tibet issue with senior Chinese leaders and called for meaningful dialogue, he resisted domestic pressures to boycott the opening ceremony of the

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Beijing Olympics. Especially with the onset of the financial crisis that started in America, senior Bush Administration officials were increasingly reticent on Tibet. The young Obama administration has adhered closely to the script of subordinating the moral and normative concerns over Tibet to the larger strategic and economic interests of America. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remark ahead of her first official visit to China is illustrative: ‘But our pressing on those issues [Tibet, Taiwan and human rights] can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.’ National interests trumped normative concerns and Tibet did not have the strategic heft to overturn the priority or fuse the two.

**The European Response**

Quite unexpectedly, Europe was more vociferous in supporting the Tibetans than their traditional patrons, India and America. While Bush never wavered from his decision to attend the Olympics opening ceremony, the Polish president Donald Tusk, Czech president Vaclav Klaus, German chancellor Angela Merkel, European Parliament Speaker Hans-Gert Pöttering and, in a reluctant about-turn, Gordon Brown decided to stay away. French President Nicolas Sarkozy also conditioned his attendance during the Olympics to progress in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but in the end he reconsidered, revealing the tight-rope that leaders of even major states have to walk in the face of China’s growing clout. Sarkozy also equivocated on meeting the Dalai Lama by sending his wife and Foreign Minister when the Dalai Lama visited France in August 2008. The two leaders finally met in the Czech Republic, but Sarkozy’s diplomacy mollified neither the Chinese government nor the public.

**The Origins of the 2008 Uprising**

The 2008 uprising was a Tibetan response to the perceived threats to their identity originating from Chinese policies, migration and cultural influences. As Shakya told the *New Left Review*, ‘...I do not think the demonstrations were principally to do with economic disparities or disadvantages suffered by Tibetans. Rather, *I think these were defensive protests,*

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84 Ibid.
85 Ian Traynor and Jonattan Watts, ‘Merkel says she will not attend opening of Beijing Olympics,’ 29 March, 2008.
concerning questions of national identity.’ 88 Indeed, the protests were Tibetan attempts to halt, if not reverse, the tidal waves that they perceived to be eroding their treasured identity.

Indeed, the Tibetan sense of threats to their identity was clearly palpable before the uprising. In 2004, the veteran Tibetan communist revolutionary, Phuntsok Wangyal, expressed his fears to Hu Jintao in very diplomatic terms of ‘potential controversies hidden deep beneath’ such as ‘the critical trend of sinocisation in all aspects of day-to-day life in society, especially the replacement of the Tibetan language by the Chinese language....’ 89 On 10 March, 2005, Woeser wrote ‘In Memory of this Day in History, Let’s Stick to Our Culture’ in which she bemoaned the grave threats to Tibetan identity from Chinese ‘occupation’ policies, migration and cultural imperialism, while proposing the use of Tibetan culture to defend their identity. 90 In August 2006, she described the train to Lhasa as a ‘one-way road to destruction’ of Tibetan culture and environment because of Chinese immigration and cultural imperialism. 91 The role of identity insecurity was also obvious during the protests in 2008, as expressed in blogs, 92 literary magazines 93 and documentaries.

On 22 March, 2008, an educated Tibetan from Lhasa wrote a letter in which he refuted the Chinese allegations against the Dalai Lama and explained five ‘main causes that contribute to the dissatisfaction and unrest in the Tibetan community.’ 94 ‘Han immigration’, ‘lack of religious freedom’, ‘dilution of Tibetan culture and identity’, ‘provocative propaganda in the media’ and ‘unrestricted exploitation of the natural resources of Tibet’ dammed up Tibetan anger that exploded in the streets of Lhasa and elsewhere.

In the magazine Shar-Dungri, Zursuma [笔名:三角] wrote that ‘this year’s bloody [這次的流血] ethnic conflict in Amdo, Utsang and Kham [阿摩多，上塘和康] was a struggle [奮鬥] for national survival…the ability of a nation to develop without losing its unique characteristics.’ Chinese policies, he argued, not only give few freedoms for the Tibetans to preserve, manage and develop their language and culture, but in fact gravely

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89 Phunwang 2007: 77.
93 Eastern Snow M/Conch Mountain], No. 21, 2008; 藍蓮華/長壽賀/ [Pen name: Triangular]: 57-80; 藍蓮華/長壽賀/ [Pen name: Alive]: 81-85; 藍蓮華/長壽賀/ [Pen name: Pen-wielding Fool]: 86-92
threaten Tibetan identity.\textsuperscript{95} In ‘Leaving Fear Behind’ \cite{95}, a documentary made by two Tibetans who secretly interviewed other Tibetans about the Beijing Olympics and Sino-Tibetan relations, also contains similar expressions of identity insecurity.\textsuperscript{96} Jigme Gyatso, a monk of Labrang Monastery, Gansu, who made a video-testimony of his ordeal of arrest and torture in prison after the protests of 2008, expressed the same fears for Tibetan identity.\textsuperscript{97} Chapter Six contains a more detailed examination of the general Tibetan vulnerabilities, but the above discussion demonstrates the deep societal insecurity gripping the collective Tibetan psyche immediately preceding and during the uprising. Not surprisingly, consistent with the logic of the insecurity dilemma, the uprising drew a harsh Chinese crackdown.

\textbf{‘Safe-guarding National Unity or Splitting the Motherland’: The Crackdown}

The Chinese response to the Tibetan uprising went beyond the military actions mentioned above, and had domestic, transnational and international dimensions. Unlike in the past, the state did not have a monopoly in responding to the Tibetan protests; many ordinary Chinese both at home and abroad rallied behind the Chinese government in a dramatic upsurge of Chinese nationalism. Equally unprecedentedly, a number of Chinese, especially intellectuals, lawyers and artists criticised its handling of the protests and the general policy background. The measures taken by the Chinese addressed perceived threats to sovereignty, legitimacy, national identity and national image from the Tibetan protests, but regime security was paramount.

After the Tibetan uprising Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao, and analysts have declared that Tibet is a core national security interest at par with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{98} Noting that China has recently been actively articulating Taiwan, Tibet, South China Seas and Yellow Seas as ‘national core issues’, Da Wei, a Research Fellow at the China Institute

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid: 63-80.
\item \textsuperscript{96} \cite{95} [Leaving Fear Behind] was smuggled out of China during the Olympic Games and is available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8048230761996582635#.
\item \textsuperscript{97} An English translation of Jigme’s testimony is available at http://www.highpeakspureearth.com/2008/09/voa-video-testimony-of-labrang-monk.html. The video is available at http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=Lama+Jigme+Labrang&emb=0#. It can also be viewed on Youtube under the tags ‘Jigme’s Testimony’ and ‘Jigme’s Testimony 2.’ As \textit{Times Online} reported, following this testimony and months of hiding in the mountains, Jigme was re-arrested on 4 November, 2008; Jane Macartney, ‘Jigme, the Tibetan monk who spoke against Chinese police, is arrested,’ \textit{Times Online}, 4 November, 2008. According to Woeser’s blog, he was released on 2 May, 2009; Macartney, ‘Lawyers secure release of Tibetan monk after six months without charge,’ \textit{Times Online}, 6 May, 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Da Wei, ‘A clear signal of ‘core interests’ to the world,’ China Daily, 2 August, 2010; Xinhua, ‘Properly handling Taiwan, Tibet issues key to Sino-U.S. relations,’ 2 April, 2010; Xinhua, ‘Chinese, U.S. officials discuss ties after disruption,’ 24 March, 2010; Xinhua, ‘China FM says Sino-U.S. ties disrupted, urges moves to mend ties,’ 7 March, 2010.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, observed that it ‘is a gesture, which combines defensive and offensive strategies.’ Western analysts have also noticed that the rank order of security issues for the Chinese leaders today is Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, while in the past, it has been the reverse. As Michael J. Green said:

In the leadership discussions now, when the orders come down, the security concerns are number one Tibet, number two Xinjiang and number three Taiwan, which I think reflects some of Beijing’s confidence about how cross-straits issues are going, but also their intense worries about Tibet as a security problem.

Timothy Garton Ash also wrote that Chinese officials are worried about ‘two Ts’ that could jeopardise Sino-Western relations: trade and Tibet. The security concerns are obvious from the statements of Chinese leaders, the military response to largely peaceful protests and the near-total lock-down and information black-out on Tibet.

Hu Jintao described the Chinese-Tibetan conflict as ‘a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.’ Wen Jiabao told Fareed Zakaria the same thing on CNN. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also told a European journalist that the Tibet issue, which he termed as a ‘Dalai issue,’ concerns ‘China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is not a religious or ethnic issue.’ When the Chinese media started to cover the riots in Lhasa, in a decidedly one-sided propaganda, Chinese netizens commented on Strong Nation Forum, a discussion-forum hosted by People's Daily, from which the BBC Worldwide Monitoring carried ‘a sample of the postings.’ The discussion clearly revealed that many ordinary Chinese also interpreted the Tibetan uprising as a threat to ‘national security.’

The uprising exposed not just the security concerns of the Chinese, but also a well-spring of jingoistic anti-Tibetan nationalism. Beijing adroitly tapped into this nationalism to face the Tibetan challenge and mobilise public support for the CCP. We will return to this theme later, but first, specifically, how did the Chinese behave in Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama?

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99 Ibid.
100 Michael J. Green, ‘The Strategic Importance of Tibet,’ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 26 March, 2006; the video of this panel discussion is available at http://www.aei.org/video/101069.
101 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Only a strategic partnership with China will keep this new dawn bright,’ The Guardian, 27 November, 2008.
102 WWM, ‘China urges EU not to take “dual standard” on Tibet issue,’ 28 March, 2008.
103 China Daily 12 April, 2008.
As mentioned above, all Tibetan regions, except Dechen TAP (Yunnan), were shut down to foreign visitors and journalists and the PAP and PLA were deployed in force, even in Dechen where protests did not take place.\footnote{The Economist, ‘Lhasa under siege,’ 17 March, 2008; Edward Wong, ‘50 Years after Revolt, Clampdown on Tibetans,’ 4 March, 2009; ‘On Foot in the Mountains of Mystical Yunnan,’ 5 April, 2009.} Monasteries were blockaded and Beijing’s Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) and anti-Dalai Lama Campaigns were stepped up in all Tibetan regions, requiring the Tibetans to denounce the Dalai Lama, the most heart-breaking thing for most Tibetans to do, and the reading and statement of many other topics as detailed in subsequent chapters) that Tibetans greatly detest. Leading an official delegation to Lhasa in 23-24 March, the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, told members of the management committees of the Lhasa monasteries that the Dalai Lama is ‘unfit to be a true follower of Buddhism’ and called for broader ‘patriotic education’ in TAR.\footnote{Maureen Fan, ‘“Patriotic Education” Campaign: China Moves to Tighten Control over Religion in Tibet,’ Washington Post, 26 March, 2008; ICT, ‘Mass detentions of monks, suicides and despair as enforced condemnation of Dalai Lama provokes dissent,’ 29 April, 2008.} A Regulation publicised on 18 July, 2008 in Kartze TAP (Sichuan), ‘Order No. 2 of the People’s Government of Kartze TAP’ threatened the entire monastic hierarchy with a range of reprisals for any anti-Chinese disturbances.\footnote{CECC, ‘Party, Government Launch New Security Program, Patriotic Education, in Tibetan Area,’ 5 may, 2008; available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.php?showsingle=102948. CECC’s translation of the Kartze Daily article is available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.php?showsingle=103001.} Monks and nuns who protest and refuse to ‘conform’ and submit to PEC will be expelled and their residence demolished. Tulkus and senior monks could be ‘stripped of the right to hold the reincarnation lineage’ for communicating with foreigners or engaging in anti-China protests. Monasteries and nunneries where a specific percentage of monks or nuns have engaged in dissident activities will be banned from performing Buddhist rituals. And senior Buddhist teachers could face public ‘rectification’ or imprisonment if they ‘tolerated’ any protest activity, peaceful or otherwise. Students in many Tibetan regions were also subjected to PEC sessions.\footnote{ICT 2008: 73-5.} PEC was vigorously conducted in the eastern Tibetan regions of Gansu and Qinghai too, where ordinary Tibetans were forced under threats of imprisonment to denounce the Dalai Lama and declare loyalty and gratitude to the Party.\footnote{Woeser’s updates and testimonies by actual}
participants/witnesses show that in many cases Tibetan protests were provoked by PEC sessions.\footnote{Woeser 6 May, 2008.}

On 1 April, the authorities conducted PEC inside Za Wonpo Monastery, Zachukha County, Kartze, ordering the monks to criticize and denounce the Dalai Lama and provoked a monk-led protest.\footnote{Woeser, ‘Tibet Update (2)’; Gyatso, Jigme. \textit{Leaving Fear Behind}.} On 2 April, PEC was initiated in Ba Chode Monastery, Batang County, Kartze, resulting in clashes and arrests of monks, including the abbot and disciplinarian.\footnote{Ibid.}

On 3 April, PAP and a PEC work unit ransacked Tongkor monastery, Kartze, confiscating mobile phones and throwing the photographs of the Dalai Lama and the monastery’s abbot to the ground, and ordered the monks to ‘curse’ the Dalai Lama. The monks started a protest joined by lay Tibetans from that area, reportedly resulting in many fatalities.\footnote{Woeser, ‘Tibet Update (2).’} Monks of Pada Sangdruling Monastery in Dzachukha, Kartze, refused to cooperate in a PEC session on 26 April.\footnote{Ibid.} PEC was intensified in other Tibetan regions fomenting great resentment.\footnote{The Economist 17 March, 2008; Wong 4 March, 2009; Wong 5 April, 2009.}

The anti-Dalai Lama rhetoric heated up both at the official and popular levels among the Chinese. Wen Jiabao accused the ‘Dalai clique’ of planning and instigating the unrests.\footnote{Fan 26 March, 2008; ICT 29 April, 2008.}

On 2 April, 2008, the Chinese authorities and media began to publish ‘evidences of Dalai clique's masterminding of riots,’\footnote{China Tibet Information Centre, ‘China publishes evidences of Dalai clique's masterminding of riots,’ 2 April, 2008; available at http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200804/t20080402_374467.htm.} which the Los Angeles Times described as ‘little more than a schedule of international meetings by foreign Tibet activists—what would pass for normal political activity in most countries.’\footnote{Mark Magnier, ‘Its classic tactics – restricting the press and blaming the Dalai Lama – sit poorly with the outside world and a more informed citizenry,’ \textit{Los Angeles Times}, 6 April, 2008.} State media labelled the Dalai Lama a ‘terrorist’ colluding with ‘Muslim terrorists’ to sabotage the Beijing Olympics.\footnote{China Daily, ‘TYC “hand in glove” with Dalai Lama group,’ 5 May, 2008; Xinhua, ““Tibetan Youth Congress” is pure terrorist organization.” 10 April, 2008; Jane Macartney, ‘China accuses Dalai Lama of being a terrorist,’ \textit{Times Online}, 24 March, 2008; Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Dalai Lama a terrorist: China,’ 3 April, 2008.}
battle with the Dalai clique, a life-and-death battle between us and the enemy.'  

He called the CCP a parent to the Tibetans and that ‘The Central Party Committee is the real Buddha for Tibetans.’ Security personnel conducted raids in monasteries and private homes all over Tibet, often trampling and disfiguring the photographs of the Dalai Lama. Jigme, the Labrang monk, who made the video-testimony, talked about the trauma of seeing the Dalai Lama’s photographs being abused by Chinese security forces:

Right in front of our eyes, they stamp with their feet on the picture of the Precious One [the Dalai Lama], break the picture frames with butts of guns, shred the pictures into pieces and burn them in the fire. We, being Tibetans and Buddhists, when we see the picture of our object of refuge being trodden under foot, and torn into pieces, we view these as irreparable acts. When Tibetans break a few windowpanes, they say that such acts caused hundreds of millions of Yuan worth of damage. How do you measure the damage caused to our hearts by seeing our most revered One's picture trampled underfoot?

As mentioned above, such behaviour on the part of the security forces provoked great resentment among the Tibetans. There is no doubt that the enmity generated by such acts and the hardening policy environment is turning the wheel of the insecurity dilemma inexorably towards the next Tibetan uprising. Indeed the uprising and the ensuing crackdown has set off an unprecedentedly conscious strengthening Tibetan identity as the ल्हाङ [Lhakar] movement demonstrates. Tibetan resistance also rumbles on most tragically in the form of self-immolations. Five monks from eastern Tibet have either died or got seriously burnt from their self-immolation attempts in 2011. These are desperate tactics and one can only guess where this lead to next.

The Chinese government amplified its offensive against the Dalai Lama by controlling the media coverage of the uprising and its aftermath both domestically and internationally and restricting the flow of information and people from inside and outside Tibet. The communication infrastructure in the Tibetan regions were shut down to prevent the uprising from spreading further and to stop news about the suppression from reaching the exile community and indeed the international community. After initially keeping out foreign journalists, the Chinese authorities began to organise guided foreign media and diplomatic tours to some of the worst-hit Tibetan areas. Two of these managed-tours flopped spectacularly when Tibetan monks disrupted the official programmes and expressed their

124 Miles of The Economist was in Lhasa since 12 March. Since he was expelled on 19 March, no other foreign, including Hong Kong, journalists were allowed into Tibetan areas.
support for the Dalai Lama and complained about the lack of freedom and human rights and the restrictions that had been put in place to quell the uprising.125

Furthermore, to shape the popular Chinese perception of the uprising, images and description of the Tibetan rioters attacking Chinese civilians and burning destroying Chinese and state properties were played round the clock on national TV and filled up the pages of domestic print media. Consequently, as Barnett wrote, ‘For most people in China, the story of the Tibet uprising starts and ends with what is now called “the 3/14 incident”—what has been portrayed there as the brutal beating and killing of Chinese civilians by rabid Tibetan nationalists.’126 There was however ‘little or no mention of the Tibetan shop-workers who died in the same fires [nor, later of any Tibetans killed or injured by security forces].’127 There was no soul-searching on the grievances that drove the Tibetans to riot, and no mention of the more than a hundred other peaceful protests that had happened all over Tibet. Many of these stories were relayed on overseas Chinese media outlets. Partly out of nationalistic anger, but also because of the state’s media manipulation, Chinese netizens, both at home and overseas, spewed vitriol on the Dalai Lama and branded ‘TYC, associated with the Dalai clique...a terrorist organisation’ in websites, blogs and video-sharing sites.128 Influenced by the portrayal of Tibetans and their protests in the official media and private channels, Tibetans and Uyghurs became targets of official surveillance and public discrimination in the Chinese areas.129 Tibetans complained frequently of racial profiling in their own homeland: the security forces stop Tibetans for identity check, letting the Chinese go un-accosted.

The rally-behind-the-flag behaviour of many Chinese proved useful for Beijing when the Olympic torch made its way around the world. To use the Olympics glare and in solidarity with the Tibetans inside Tibet, overseas Tibetans and supporters assailed the Olympic torch as it travelled through London, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Seoul and

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Sydney. In London and Paris, protestors attempted to wrest the torch away from the hands of the torch-bearers, including a wheel-chair bound Chinese para-olympian in Paris. Such scenes provoked a Chinese nationalist back-lash, which the Chinese embassies and consulates used to mobilise and facilitate the transnational Chinese community to organise counter-protests, occasionally turning into physical attacks on Tibetans and supporters as in Seoul, and online campaigns against alleged Western media-bias in the coverage of the Tibetan uprising.\textsuperscript{130}

The nationalist mood also led to witch-hunts against Chinese individuals who expressed pro-Tibetan sentiments or stayed neutral through a phenomenon known as ‘human flesh search engine’ (\textit{renrou sousuo yinqing}).\textsuperscript{131} Grace Wang, a Duke University student from Qingdao, got between rival rallies representing Chinese students and Tibet supporters on the campus and called for dialogue rather than emotional shouting matches. She was immediately castigated as a ‘traitor’ and given the complete ‘human flesh search engine’ treatment.\textsuperscript{132} Grace’s photograph, ‘Traitor to her country’ written across her forehead, her parents’ ID numbers and detailed directions to their home were posted on the internet.\textsuperscript{133} Netizens were egged on to teach ‘this shameless dog’ a lesson. Her parents in Qingdao went into hiding and a bucketful of human faeces was dumped on their doo-step.

However, it is also possible that the upsurge of popular Chinese nationalism also constrained Beijing’s options in quelling the uprising and its diplomacy towards Dharamsala. As Allen Carlson said during a panel discussion on Tibet after the uprising, Beijing was ‘squeezed’ into a policy ‘quandary’: wanting to appear as a responsible power on the one hand and pursuing ‘totalising’ domestic and foreign policies under the influence of the ‘extreme’ and ‘hate-full’ outpouring of Chinese nationalism in March and April 2008.\textsuperscript{134}

Indeed, the genie that the CCP created after the 1989 Tiananmen Square events to re-legitimise its own rule had now begun to control its master. The nationalistic response to the uprising could also be understood in terms of societal security or ontological security

\textsuperscript{130} Smith 2010: 139-207. For comprehensive and balanced media coverage of these events, see the archive of China Digital Times available at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/.
\textsuperscript{131} ‘Human Flesh Search Engine’ involves netizens banding together to dig up private details on a victim, from work-place and identity number to the addresses of parents to physically locate and abuse the victim and his/her family. Shakya also mentions that at the peak of the Olympic Torch melee, a Tibetan student at Harvard University spoke in nuanced terms about the Sino-Tibetan conflict on American television and her family was berated by Tibetan nationalists.
\textsuperscript{133} Grace Wang, ‘My China, My Tibet: Caught in the Middle, Called a Traitor,’ \textit{Washington Post}, 20 April, 2008.
\textsuperscript{134} Allen Carlson, ‘China’s Tibet Policy in the Aftermath of Last Spring’s Unrest,’ \textit{Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars}, 27 October, 2008.
reaction. As Smith has written, ‘When some Tibetans reveal a lack of gratitude [for the perceived Chinese economic benevolence, cultural upliftment and political liberation of the Tibetans], it upsets this Chinese narrative and poses an existential threat to the Chinese people’s conception of themselves.’

Responding to the chorus of concerns from Western governments and Japan and the Dalai Lama’s visits to Western capitals, the Chinese government stepped up its efforts to deny international political space to the Tibetans. Perhaps reflecting the realist principles underlying its foreign relations, Beijing’s efforts were especially strong in divided Europe and less powerful states such as Canada and South Africa, while America escaped the full brunt of its ire. When Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in Poland, while holding the EU presidency, Beijing cancelled a long scheduled EU-China Summit that was to be held on 1 December, 2008. A peace conference associated with the football World Cup in South Africa had to be cancelled, when the South African government, apparently under Chinese pressure, denied a visa to the Dalai Lama. Beijing also stated its routine objection to a meeting between Barack Obama and the Dalai Lama when the latter visited America in October 2009. Obama did not to meet the Dalai Lama in advance of his schedule visit to China in November 2009, inviting the criticism of many rights organisations and the media in America, but their subsequent meeting in February 2010, drew a sharp rebuke from Beijing and worsening the already strained US-Chinese relations.

Beijing’s hardening stance also extended to the flailing Sino-Tibetan dialogue that resumed in September 2002. After seven rounds of unproductive talks, the dialogue became hostage to the general atmosphere of mutual recrimination. After a brief meeting on 4 May 2008 in the Chinese city of Shenzhen, which Dharamsala characterised as an ‘informal...meeting of principals without aides’ to find ways of stabilising riot-torn Tibet and to discuss the ‘seventh’ round of talks, the two sides met again in Beijing from 30 June-3 July, 2008, without any substantive outcomes. When the Dalai Lama’s representatives met

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135 Smith 2010: 264.
136 Ash 27 November, 2008; Fox and Godemet April 2009.
138 Gillian Wong, ‘China Against Obama, Dalai Lama Meeting,’ Time, 23 April, 2009.
141 Symptomatic of the gulf between the two sides, they could not even agree on the description of these meetings. While the Chinese considered the Shenzhen meeting as a continuation of the dialogue process and called it the seventh round of talks, Dharamsala treated it as a special meeting apart from the dialogue process.
Chinese officials again November 4-5, 2008, they submitted a ‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People’ [འབྲི་ཐོབ་བདེ་བཞི་བཤད་པའི་ཟིང་གི་ོང་།]. The Dalai Lama refused to recognize Tibet as a ‘part of China since ancient times,’ he is ‘scheming for a “Greater Tibet”’ and attempting to ‘overthrow the current social and political system’ in TAR, calling for the ‘withdrawal of the PLA from “Greater Tibet”,’ and attempting to drive away ‘other ethnic groups from the area of “Greater Tibet.”’ Commentaries in China's official press, recycling the same content with different authors and titles, were supplemented by robust diplomatic trips to Western capitals, led by Zhu Weiqun and invariably comprising some Tibetans. As mentioned above, this robust intransigence on Beijing’s part was buttressed by the virulent popular nationalism, which on one hand strengthened Beijing’s hand, but on the other hand, restricted Beijing’s policy options out of regime security concerns.

However, not everyone on the Chinese side followed the hard-line official script or the ultra-nationalist hysteria. The above-mentioned, Duke University student, Grace Wang is part of the unprecedented phenomenon of a number of Chinese individuals, especially intellectuals, artists and writers, who have openly supported the Dalai Lama’s moderate positions and criticised the Chinese policies and its handling of the protests and riots in 2008. 338 Chinese intellectuals, writers, artists and other professionals in China published ‘Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation’ and called for a fundamental rethink and reform of the failed nationality policy, an end to the ‘one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media’ and an end to the violence on both sides, declared support for the ‘Dalai Lama’s appeal for peace’ and challenged Beijing to produce evidence of the ‘Dalai cliques’ premeditated

As a knock-on effect, Dharamsala and Beijing designated the 30 June-3 July Beijing talks the seventh and eighth round of talks, respectively.


143 Xinhua 10 November, 2008.
orchestration of the riots, which it claimed to possess. After the authorities arrested over 5000 Tibetan protestors and rioters, a group of 18 Chinese lawyers offered to defend the Tibetans at great peril to their own livelihoods and lives. Many other Chinese individuals criticised Beijing’s hard-line policies in Tibet in their writings and statements. This shows the complexity inherent in a rapidly transforming contemporary Chinese society.

While most Tibetans are heartened by such enlightened support from these Chinese individuals, the harsh crackdown and continuing repression has fuelled great resentment and insecurity among the Tibetans. Furthermore, the jingoistic Chinese nationalism had the effect of confirming the existing Tibetan images of the Chinese and hardening their anti-Chinese feelings. The duelling nationalisms thus strengthened continue to reinforce the insecurity dilemma. The insecurity dilemma has not finished its tragic run and it seems just a matter of time before the Tibetans vent their pent up fury again. This chapter has demonstrated that the Tibetan uprising and the Chinese responses, both governmental and popular, reinforced the decades-old insecurity dilemma.

**Conclusion**

This chapter used the 2008 Tibetan uprising to demonstrate the Chinese-Tibetan insecurity dilemma in action. It argues that the Tibetan perception of threats to their identity was the chief cause of the uprising. Following a survey of the various explanations offered by analysts of various stripes, it provides a preliminary reconstruction of the widespread protests that rocked Tibet and the transnational and international developments in its aftermath. The chapter then developed a provisional etiology of the uprising with special focus on the Tibetan fears for their identity. While acknowledging the role of economic forces and external—transnational and international—factors, identity fears, more than anything else, animated the Tibetan uprising in 2008. To illustrate this point, the chapter examined the Tibetan political mood immediately preceding and during the uprising.

Security fears were no less salient for the Chinese and the chapter examined the security and nationalist bases of the Chinese responses, both statist and popular, to the Tibetan challenge. The chapter also dwelt upon the resentment and fears that the crackdown and nationalist backlash has already provoked among the Tibetans, prompting this question:

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Is a Tibetan reaction already on the anvil? The tragic history appears certain to repeat itself, unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to escape from the insecurity dilemma.

The next chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising the key findings and contributions and asks whether the insecurity dilemma could be resolved in the Sino-Tibetan encounter.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This research began by asking what accounts for the protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan conflict? The starting point of this research was to turn the analytical focus on understanding how security and the lack thereof, i.e. insecurity, affect the course of the conflict. This is a novel perspective in the analysis of the conflict. As such, this research posited the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a dilemmatic interplay of the insecurities or threat perceptions of the Chinese party-state and the Tibetan nation and adopted the insecurity dilemma and developed it as a theoretical framework not just for this research, but also generally applicable to other ethnic conflicts around the world. This decision enabled a comprehensive analysis of not just the dynamic historical and contemporary interplay between the policies and practices of the Chinese and the Tibetans, but also the feed-back effect operating between the conflict and the transnational and international environment within which it is embedded.

This concluding chapter first recapitulates the main theoretical contributions and empirical findings of this research. The chapter then considers three main scenarios for the future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the implications on the relevance of the insecurity dilemma. Finally, it looks at some of the limitations of this dissertation, which becomes the basis for identifying avenues for future research.

Key Analytical Contributions

First, this research raised a number of issues with theoretical or empirical significance. Six main issues will be singled out for discussion in this section.

Theoretical Development of the Insecurity Dilemma: First, while noting its theoretical potential and advantages of over other theories to shed light on the security practices of weak, insecure states, and the ethnic conflicts therein, Chapter Two developed the insecurity dilemma to address a number of problems identified with the classical versions advanced by Job and Ayoob.

Incorporating the societal security
By incorporating societal security or identity security, the insecurity dilemma was equipped not just to explicate the security policies and practices of weak and insecure states, mostly but not exclusively in the global south (which the classical versions do well), but also to analyse the intra-state conflicts in these states by enabling the close study of the internal composition.
and security practices of the adversarial ethnic groups. Societal security opens up space for and provides the conceptual tools for explicating the role of identity in the insecurity dilemma and security studies and international relations broadly. The analytical move to integrate societal security into the insecurity dilemma moderated the stifling state-centrism in the first generation of scholarship on the insecurity dilemma by giving play not just to the adversarial ethnic groups, but also their constituent units and non-state transnational actors complicit in the conflicts. Diasporas, co-religionists and elements of the global civil society are exemplary in this respect.

**Relevance of external actors**

Such openness to external actors, especially non-state actors, is contrary to the classical insecurity dilemma where the internal-external nexus is limited to state-to-state arms trade or security pacts. Indeed, this research argued and demonstrated that the connexion between the domestic and the external in most of these conflicts far exceeds such a parsimonious depiction. This research showed that both the state and its ethnic adversary forge and maintain transnational and international relations, chiefly but not restricted to the political, military, economic and cultural realms, with other states, diasporas (of various types) and other transnational organisations of various stripes (global civil society and norm entrepreneurs, multi-national corporations, triads, terror groups and so on). The possibilities in terms of the areas of cooperation and the types of partners are endless. This reconceptualization of the insecurity dilemma has broader theoretical implications for security studies and IR.

**Uncertainty**

The concept of uncertainty was enlisted into the insecurity dilemma to do part of the analytical heavy-lifting to avoid conflating the paradox with the dilemma. Uncertainty was used as a complement to historical experience as a source of insecurity in the spirit of Booth and Wheeler’s emphasis, in relation to ethnic conflicts, on ‘the importance of the shadow of the past as well as future uncertainty in shaping how actors manage their dilemmas of interpretation and response….’¹ Uncertainty forces the actors to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s future intentions and prevents them from making difficult concessions today. It deserves pointing out that the use of uncertainty in the insecurity

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¹ Booth and Wheeler 2008: 77.
The action-reaction cycle

The drafting in of societal security and uncertainty produced a richer account of the strategic dynamics between the state and its ethno-national adversary. Pitting the security practice of the state (explicated by classical insecurity dilemma) against that of the ethno-national challenger (guided by societal security), the strategic dynamic of the insecurity dilemma was reconceptualised as an action-reaction cycle of state-building and ethno-national resistance. They are bridged by mutual threat perceptions and insecurities generated by the ‘shadow of the past’ and uncertainty about each other’s future intentions.

Since much of the debates raging within security studies resonate with or draw upon theoretical debates within IR, these refinements have broader theoretical significance for International relations and Security Studies. This dissertation questions the state-centrism of IR theory by demonstrating that non-state actors, whether domestic, transnational or global (ethno-national groups, diasporas and global civil society) play consequential roles in international politics. Unit-level factors interact with transnational and systemic forces. The Sino-Tibetan conflict also illuminates the increasingly transnational nature of global politics. Finally, with the relevance of identity, culture, nationalism, legitimacy and image as discussed in the pages of this dissertation, the ultra-materialist ontology and rationalist epistemology of traditional international relations are challenged here. However, the dissertation recognises the continued relevance of the state and military and political security issues. States and sub-state actors and external actors, materialist and ideational factors and the domestic and external dimensions interact in complex ways which can be analysed by adopting a case-specific methodology. Indeed, over the last two decades, the rise of social constructivism as a theoretical approach in IR has been occasioned by the rationalist criticism that constructivism is not amenable to an empirically-driven research agenda. In this sense, this research contributes to the constructivist research programme by augmenting its empirical record of studying non-state actors and non-materialist values in IR and security studies.

Furthermore, this research began by noting that traditional IR and security theories that derive their core assumptions and categories from a Eurocentric or Western historical
experience are inadequate for understanding contemporary security and international relations and conflicts especially in the global south. By developing and applying the insecurity dilemma on the Sino-Tibetan conflict, this research promoted an alternative theoretical framework, backed up by a sustained empirical application. The reconceptualization of the insecurity dilemma in the above terms provided the conceptual tools for studying various aspects of the Sino-Tibetan conflict in ways that problematise the existing analyses of the conflict. As such, the following key empirical points were raised by this research.

**Security and Nationalism in the Conflict**

Examining the Sino-Tibetan conflict from the security angle is a novel departure from the existing scholarship on the conflict. This research addressed the state-centrism pervading the existing analyses of the conflict and the consequent discursive and representational practice of describing the conflict in terms of Tibetan nationalism versus Chinese security. This research imputes security rationale to the Tibetan positions, demands and activities for which societal security provides the conceptual tool. At the same time, Beijing’s security practice was analysed systematically, unlike the cursory manner in which the existing literature treats the security motivations behind China’s Tibet policy. Societal security was helpful in establishing the significance of Chinese nationalism, popularly expressed in the Chinese cyberspace and streets and exploited by the party-state, in the relational dynamics of the insecurity dilemma. Chapter Eight reveals the opportunities and constraints that Chinese nationalism presented to Beijing in the wake of the Tibetan uprising in spring 2008. This demonstrated that societal security is also relevant to the overall security agenda of the state and dominant group. In short, it demonstrated that threat perceptions and insecurities push the Chinese and the Tibetans into acting out their tragic roles in the insecurity dilemma.

**The Insecurity Dilemma as History**

The insecurity dilemma allowed an alternative reading of the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. The pre-communist history demonstrated that conflict was not always inevitable between Tibetans and foreign (Mongol or Manchu) regimes in Beijing. Tibetans have not always turned against foreign overlords, not even when they exercised considerable administrative control from Beijing. Chapters Three and Four showed that the crucial determinants for Tibetan toleration or hostility towards Beijing-based rulers are two-fold: (1) whether they were inimically or positively disposed towards Tibetan identity, and (2) whether
they allowed an adequate level of Tibetan autonomy. These two criteria accounted for the Tibetan cooperation with the Mongol Yuan and early Qing dynasties as well as their violent uprisings and non-violent resistance against the late Qing Empire and Communist China. The historical perspective produced in these chapters demonstrates that over the decades, the conflict has transformed itself both structurally and discursively, contrary to the picture of static primordiality and discursive and structural stability that the existing literature implies across the historical periods.

State-building, resistance and the core of the insecurity dilemma

The insecurity dilemma enabled a more inter-subjective or social analysis of the conflict in comparison to the existing scholarship, while acknowledging the structural parameters such as the considerable material power-asymmetry between the Tibetans and the Chinese and the present reality of Tibet as a part of the multi-national Chinese state. As such, the examination of the policies and practices of both the Chinese and the Tibetans revealed a dynamic cycle of action and reaction, which is determined not just by changing material and structural conditions, but also animated by ideational concerns such as identity, nationalism, legitimacy and image or ‘face’. Chapters Five and Six showed this cycle in action in the post-1989 period. Chapter Five drew upon insights from the classical insecurity dilemma and portrayed China’s policies towards the Tibetans (on administration, religion, language, economy and dialogue) in terms of three components of state-building, namely nation-building, institution-building and infrastructure-building. These state-building efforts are designed to address Beijing’s vulnerabilities in terms of state, regime and societal security that are also outlined in the second half of Chapter Five. The manner in which the Tibetans receive these policies has a determining effect on the severity of the insecurity dilemma.

The first part of Chapter Six then examined the Tibetan identity insecurity generated directly by the Chinese policies and indirectly through Chinese migration and cultural imperialism. In other words, the Tibetans perceive Chinese state-building in their homeland as ‘hegemonic’ and ‘assimilationist’ rather than ‘accommodating’ and inclusive. To counter these perceived threats to identity, the Tibetans have used a variety of strategies and instruments to resist what they call ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet, as outlined in the second half of Chapter Six. These Tibetan actions, however, heighten China’s pre-existing vulnerabilities which feed back into hardening policies and practices. The cycle of the insecurity dilemma is thus kept going on and on. While Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six demonstrated the cyclical and social dynamic in the Sino-Tibetan core of the conflict over the longue durée,
Chapter Eight showed the same process working in the shorter time-frame of the 2008 uprising and its aftermath.

External Actors in the Conflict

This dissertation challenged Job’s understatement of the role of transnational and international actors in reinforcing or mitigating the insecurity dilemma. In reality, external actors play strong roles in many domestic conflicts and both the state and its ethno-national opponents forge transnational and international relationships against each other. Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven, Beijing fears foreign intervention and peaceful evolution strategies through the Tibetans in exile and Tibet. The chapter explored the complex ways in which strategic and economic interests, normative principles, domestic politics, culture and leadership interacted to shape the ups-and-downs of the Tibet issue in the harsh realities of international politics. The role that the Tibet issue did or could play in US-Chinese, Sino-Indian, Euro-Chinese, Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Russian relations and the transnational Tibetan Buddhist world in the future was considered. It was not just states, but also other transnational actors that play important roles in the conflict. In Chapters Six and Seven, the roles of the global Tibetan diaspora and the network of global Tibet Support Groups are considered. The Tibetans also work hard to maintain the support of international rights advocacy groups around the world or norm entrepreneurs. In the rough and tumble of international politics, Tibetans have so far weathered the shifting realpolitik and normative landscapes with patient and persistent lobbying efforts, using the appeal of Tibetan culture, especially Buddhism, and the Dalai Lama’s leadership. Predictably, China has always sought to reduce diplomatic space for the Tibetan exiles and undermine the appeal of Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama’s following on the international arena. As Chapter Eight showed in the context of the demonstrations around the world by Tibetans and supporters and human rights campaigners targeting the Olympic Torch relay, the Chinese government also mobilised the overseas Chinese community, mostly students, to organise counter-demonstrations in its support. In short, this dissertation demonstrated the agency of external actors in an apparently domestic conflict.

Tibetans and Diaspora Theories: The Tibetan diaspora plays a crucial role in the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Through the pages of this research, the Tibetan diaspora has been shown to possess unique characteristics that have theoretical implications for diaspora studies in terms of definition, emergence, organisational and spatial logics and political agency. Firstly,
because the Tibetan diaspora is diverse in its migration history, distance (both temporally and experientially) from traumatic events, attachment to Tibetan culture, nostalgia for Tibet as a homeland and commitment to the political project of the Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE), the Tibetan case cries out for a redefinition that avoids the Charybdis of traumatic original dispersion and the Scylla of treating diaspora as a catch-all concept. A redefinition of the diaspora has to relax the strict requirement of traumatic original dispersion, while protecting its conceptual clarity by excluding certain categories from it.

The Tibetan diaspora is also complex in terms of its emergence and continued existence, which problematises the instrumentalist, constructivist and primordialist theories of diaspora-formation. Again, the Tibetans force us to rethink the perception of diasporas as rootless and mindless stooges of state elites and ethnic entrepreneurs (instrumentalists), out-of-the-blue ‘inventions’ (social constructivists) or un-evolved ancient creatures (primordialists). An ethno-symbolist approach provides the theoretical repertoire for capturing this complexity by challenging and bridging the above theories.

Secondly, with regard to the strict dichotomies in the literature between hierarchically-organised states vs. network-based diasporas and territorial states vs. de-territorialised diasporas, the Tibetan case suggests more nuanced understandings of their organisational and spatial logics. Institutionally, the Tibetan diaspora is organised hierarchically with TGIE or the Central Tibetan Administration (complete with a popularly elected སྐྱེ་བོད་ (Sikyong) or Prime Minister and ‘Ministries’, Parliament and Judiciary headquartered in Dharamsala, India, with local offices and de facto embassies around the world). This challenges the notion that diasporas operate only through horizontal networks. On territoriality, there is a cognitive dissonance in the literature. On the one hand, diasporas are treated as de-territorialised entities, on the other hand, some diasporas are supposed to inhabit ‘sacred’ territories valued by themselves and coveted by both host-states and neighbouring states ruled by co-nationals, causing the spread of ethnic conflicts and interstate wars. The Tibetan case calls for clarity on this contradiction in the literature. While the Tibetans from Tibet proper are certainly de-territorialised, what about Monpas, for instance, who are culturally Tibetan and whose homeland, Tawang, was historically part of Tibet. All over the Indian and Nepalese Himalayas, there are many other people like the Monpas. Are they part of the Tibetan diaspora or not? What the Tibetan case suggests at the least is a distinction between ‘territorial’ and ‘de-territorialised’ diasporas and analysis of their
respective behaviour to improve our knowledge of diasporas in relation to international conflicts.

Thirdly, the Tibetan diaspora also indicates that it is possible to develop a fuller account of diasporic political agency than the existing IR scholarship shows. Policy agency is arguably the most important reason for studying diasporas within IR as the political, economic and ideational services that they provide to co-nationals, homelands and host-states implicate them in domestic and international conflicts. Unsurprisingly, a rich tapestry of diaspora political agency has already been created in the literature, which helps understand the Tibetan diasporic practices. However, the Tibetan diaspora adds something unique to this tapestry: not only is it organised hierarchically like state institutions and perform similar functions, it has also democratised, just like an Ancien Régime transforming itself into a democracy. As noted earlier, the Dalai Lama has given up all his political authorities to popularly elected officials. For the Tibetans, democratisation is not only desirable for its intrinsic benefits for internal governance and conflict-resolution, but also for its external instrumentality (vis-à-vis China) in the same way as states see foreign policy and security benefits behind democratisation and democracy promotion. The examination of Tibetan diasporic democratisation also challenges state-centrism in the democratisation literature which requires and inevitably assumes statehood. Clearly, the Tibetan diaspora plays a crucial role in the protracted Sino-Tibetan conflict and democratisation should be seen partly in the context of diasporic agency in this conflict. It is beyond the scope of this research to develop these important themes.

Future Scenarios and the Insecurity Dilemma
The future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict can be envisioned in terms of three scenarios with different implications for the relevance of the insecurity dilemma. First, China could pursue a policy of utter repression to score a swift and outright victory and finish off the Tibetans as a viable opponent. This could be accompanied by a policy of massive settlement of Chinese in Tibet as an additional security measure. In retaliation, the Tibetans could reinstate complete independence as the official goal and/or even adopt organised violence as a strategy. This would turn the Tibetan plateau into a zone of unmitigated bloodshed. Secondly, Beijing and the Tibetans could find a way to resolve the conflict while the current Dalai Lama is still leading the Tibetan people. Finally, hoping to exploit the anticipated post-Dalai Lama disarray among the Tibetans, the Chinese government could play the waiting game by simply continuing with its hard-line policies in Tibet and engaging in dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s
representatives to mute international criticism. Conversely, the Tibetans could play their own waiting game with the CCP’s demise, while demanding political autonomy for a unified Tibet. This would drive the conflict into an indefinite stalemate with cycles of hardening Chinese policies and Tibetan uprisings.

**Utter Repression, Tibetan Violence**

There is a theoretical possibility that Beijing could pursue a policy of massive repression to physically eliminate or politically neuter the Tibetan nation, akin to Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This scenario is more likely in the context of a Beijing government that may come under the strong influence or control of Chinese hyper-nationalists. The PLA, PAP and Chinese nationalistic vigilantes would be pressed into service in genocidal pogroms against the Tibetans. Ethnic cleansing could be accompanied by a policy of ‘population swamping’ through an accelerated process of Chinese settlement in Tibet. Such a development could be motivated by, even justified, by the purported virtues of one side’s decisive victory to end the conflict once and for all. While ethnic cleansing remains only at the rhetorical realm of Chinese nationalistic cyberspace and private conversations,\(^2\) encouraging Chinese migration as a security measure is already underway to some degree.\(^3\) However, Beijing is unlikely to pursue such drastic measures in Tibet not just because of the costs involved, but also because it is confident that the policies already being implemented in Tibet would produce the same ends in the long run. An even more compelling restraint is the consequently inevitable radicalisation of the Tibetan resistance. As the insecurity dilemma suggests, Tibetans could respond by reinstating independence as their goal and/or even with organised and large-scale violence.

As we saw in Chapter Six, there is a vocal bloc among the Tibetans who believe that the Dalai Lama should not have given up independence in 1987. They argue that he and TGIE should reinstate independence as the goal of the national struggle, especially since China has repeatedly rebuffed their conciliatory proposals. Many delegates attending the Special Meeting in Dharamsala in November 2008 recommended that, in view of China’s intransigence, TGIE should ‘stop sending envoys and pursue complete independence or self-determination.’\(^4\) Reinstating independence as a goal will no doubt inject greater coherence

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\(^3\) Goldstein 1997: 95-96.
\(^4\) CTA, [Recommendations of the First Special General Meeting Convened Under Article 59 of the]
and unity to the Tibetan struggle and it will be psychologically satisfying to many Tibetans. Restoring the goal of independence would also be the Tibetan answer to Beijing’s waiting game. Just as Beijing is playing a waiting game with the Dalai Lama, some Tibetans are envisaging dealing with a post-CCP democratic China. One of the most articulate proponents of independence wrote that since Beijing has categorically rejected the Middle Way approach and the *Memorandum* in November 2008 after ‘leading Dharamsala up the garden path of promised negotiations,’ TGIE should put independence back as the goal of the struggle and persist in a ‘Baltic solution.’ He continued:

And in some distant future, when the Communist Party of China no longer holds power, these measures would also do much to prepare the ground for real negotiations, and for the possibility of either complete independence or genuine autonomy in its true sense.

However, such a notion not only ignores the grave threats to Tibetan identity that exist on the ground, and the inevitability of the Chinese hardening their positions and accelerating the implementation of their assimilationist policies in response. Equally significantly, in view of the fact that no government, not even those sympathetic to Dharamsala’s aspirations, recognises the independence of Tibet, there will be adverse implications on the limited financial and moral support that they do provide to the Tibetans.

Even more devastating will be a Tibetan turn towards violence out of ‘nationalistic emotions coupled with desperation and anger.’ Although the Tibetans have the potential to give a bloody nose to China and seriously destabilise its economy, especially if they take the fight to the soft targets in the Chinese cities, they cannot hope to prevail in a violent confrontation with China. As the Dalai Lama says, it will be a suicidal move. It will bring so much misery and destruction upon the Tibetans inside Tibet and make India inhospitable to the Tibetan refugees and their institutions. It will also reduce the public support that the Tibetan cause enjoys in many parts of the world. The only context in which the Tibetans have any hope of success with violence is an embattled China in the throes of a civil war or a violent clash with another great power. Even then, success is not guaranteed and the price of failure will be steep.

Although the outcome of this scenario is quite predictable, i.e. utter devastation of the Tibetans as a viable political community, descend of the Tibetan plateau into open violence

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5 Sonam May 2009.

6 Ibid.

7 Goldstein 1997: 116.
and bloodshed will not just be a highly destabilising and costly contingency for China, it would also be difficult to respond and manage for countries like India, Nepal and America. For all these reasons, it is hard to imagine that the above scenario of utter Chinese repression and a violent Tibetan reaction will be empirically realised.

**Reconciliation**

If the unmitigated violence of the previous scenario is unlikely, current trends do not offer optimism for a resolution of the conflict in the near future either. Yet, there are constituencies in both the Chinese and Tibetan camps for resolving this conflict. Furthermore, the on-again, off-again dialogue between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s emissaries suggest that these constituencies overlap with the officialdom in both camps. Therefore, it is proper to explore what the broad outlines of a settlement for the Sino-Tibetan conflict should look like from the perspective of the insecurity dilemma.

First and foremost, any solution that will endure must address the security concerns on both sides. Secondly, this solution must be based on the recognition of some fundamental realities by both parties and the consideration of long-term interests rather than short-term balances of power and moral or legal entitlements.

Beijing must recognise that Tibetan national identity has survived the ‘Democratic Reforms’ and the Cultural Revolution and it will be difficult to erase it altogether. Beijing must disabuse itself of the illusion of copying the colonial-era destruction of native Indians in the Americas or repeating the imperial-era assimilation of China’s other minorities. The Tibetans differ considerably from the American Indians and other minorities in China in terms of the depth, integrity and resilience of their national identity. Moreover, trying to assimilate an entire people in the age of globalisation and internet and a world with a normative context far different from the might-makes-right rules of the past will prove immensely costly, even if possible. The researchers of the *Gongmeng Consultancy* pointed out that Chinese policies over the last five decades have only strengthened the sense of Tibetan national identity among the younger Tibetans who grew up in ‘liberated’ Tibet compared to the older generation.8 Beijing would do well to heed the advice of Fan Ming, one of its top officials in Tibet in the 1950s. He compared Han chauvinism to a spear and

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Tibetan nationalism to a shield, reflecting the logic of the insecurity dilemma, and counselled that ‘the one who held the spear must lay it down before the one who carried the shield was required to lay down his weapon.’

Tibetans need to recognise that their historical memory of independence and the sense of entitlement to national self-determination notwithstanding, Tibet and the Tibetans have become deeply embedded in the national identity of a 1.2 billion strong Chinese nation and the state identity of an economic super-power with nuclear weapons. Blame it on propaganda or Chinese imperialism, but no amount of historical and moral argumentations, barring a geopolitical tectonic shift in Asia, will change this reality. A clear-eyed understanding of the widening imbalance of capabilities should induce a sobering distinction between realistic aspirations and unrealistic historical or legal entitlements.

Real Tibetan autonomy and continued primacy of the CCP in Tibet, albeit through Tibetan party members, could be the basis of a solution that would address most of the fears on both sides. Anything short of real autonomy in the sense of institutionalised division of power between Beijing and the local Tibetan polity will not address Tibetan insecurities. As discussed in Chapter Three, history bears witness to this assertion. As we saw in Chapter Six, the latest Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People asked for ‘clear divisions of power and responsibilities’ between Beijing and the Tibetan authorities and the ‘guarantee’ that the powers and responsibilities allocated to the Tibetans ‘cannot be unilaterally abrogated or changed’. The working of uncertainty and credible commitment problems is unmistakable here.

This autonomy arrangement should be extended to a unified Tibet, failing which any agreement will be unsustainable. Chapter Six explained the historical, cultural and political reasons behind this observation and Dharamsala’s signals for flexibility on where the actual borders should be drawn, taking into account the demographic and political implications of regaining territory with heavy settlement of Han and Hui Chinese. It only remains to be added that identity insecurity and problems of uncertainty and credible commitment are just as relevant to the eastern Tibetans. In fact, being closer to the Chinese cultural areas, they feel even more insecure, which explains why they have always been more aggressive in challenging Chinese rule.

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9 URI, Tibet 1950-1967: 222-34.
10 Sperling 2004: 5.
However, just as importantly, any agreement that leaves the slightest doubts as to Chinese rule over Tibet and the CCP’s primacy in Tibet will fall by the wayside. The Dalai Lama and Dharamsala are sensitive to this reality. The Tibetan Memorandum, for instance, forswears ‘separation or independence’ and repeatedly expresses the objective of and confidence in seeking an autonomy solution ‘compatible with the principles on autonomy in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).’ The Dalai Lama’s signature on the agreement, his public recognition of Chinese sovereignty and his counsel to the Tibetan people to accept Tibet’s place inside China will be the strongest guarantee against Tibetan independence. This will be unacceptable to some Tibetans, but most Tibetans would follow the Dalai Lama’s pragmatic course. As the Dalai Lama told Fareed Zakaria, the CCP should continue to rule Tibet and the democratisation of Tibet could be left contingent on the pace of political liberalisation in China itself. However, Tibet should be governed by Tibetan members of the Party, a compromise between Chinese leaders who are seen as colonialists by the Tibetans and the ‘Dalai clique’ who are seen as anti-Chinese and anti-CCP by Beijing. The Dalai Lama has also repeatedly stated since the 1980s that he would forsake all his political responsibilities and dissolve TGIE and associated institutions once an agreement is reached. The 2008 Memorandum also concludes with these pledges.

In short, Tibetan autonomy and unification and Chinese sovereignty and CCP rule through Tibetan communists could form the broad outlines of a negotiated settlement. Beijing should take a longer-term perspective and demonstrate political will and wisdom to exploit the opportunity to find a lasting solution while the Dalai Lama is alive. On its part, Dharamsala needs to approach the dialogue process more coherently and consistently. While the clear understanding of the dynamics of the insecurity dilemma by all parties involved in the conflict will prove helpful when a progressive atmosphere opens up, especially in Beijing, current trends do not hold much hope for a resolution in the foreseeable future. Instead, a stalemate in the form of continued hard-line Chinese policies and Tibetan resistance will be the likely scenario. The insecurity dilemma seems set to persist for the foreseeable future.

**Stalemate and the Insecurity Dilemma**

The hard-line faction in Beijing and Lhasa has been pushing for a unilateral solution to the Tibet issue by remorselessly persisting with the policies that in time, they hope, will render the Tibetans demographically and politically insignificant in Tibet and by side-lining the Dalai Lama whose death could be the beginning of the end of the Tibetan struggle. In fact, this has been Beijing’s strategy since the mid-1980s. While there has been no let-up in the
rigid policies in Tibet, engagement with the Dalai Lama also appears dead-locked. The latest Tibetan Memorandum, which was submitted to the Chinese officials during the seventh round of talks in October-November 2008, was rejected and publicly criticised by the Chinese officials as ‘independence in disguise’ and violating China’s constitution and autonomy law. The apparent trajectory of Beijing’s approach appears to be more of the hard-line and development-focused policies.

From Beijing’s point of view, the advantages of this approach outweigh any negative fall outs. This would forestall the danger of the domino-effect in other minority regions and minimise the fears of the Tibetans using greater autonomy over the Tibetan plateau as a stepping stone towards complete independence in the future. Furthermore, this would avoid both the unpredictable outcomes of the return of the Dalai Lama and the probable Han Chinese nationalist backlash against the CCP for giving in to Tibetan ‘separatist’ demands. Finally, Beijing hopes that the combination of its development-focused policies (and externalities), Chinese migration and cultural influence and the death of the septuagenarian Dalai Lama will take care of the Tibet issue. In short, they calculate that time is on China’s side and that the Dalai Lama’s presence would be more a powder-keg than an asset. From the perspective of institutions such as the United Front Department and certain local Tibetan and Chinese leaders, their institutional turf, powers and privileges would be protected from the vagaries of new local and national regimes for running Tibetan affairs.

The Tibetan side has also made it clear that they have reached their bottom-line in the dialogue process on the two core issues of genuine autonomy and the uniform administration for all Tibetans. Lodi Gyari, the Special Representative of the Dalai Lama to America and the chief Tibetan interlocutor in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue revealed that genuine autonomy has always been the Tibetan bottom-line. As noted before, Samdhong Rinpoche, the incumbent Prime Minister of TGIE told the conference of the International Tibet Support Network that the demand for unified administration of all Tibetans is so crucial that the TGIE will not work with Tibet Support Groups that deviate from that position. Another indication that a resolution is not in sight from the Tibetan perspective is the frequent declaration by the Dalai Lama ever since Beijing’s rejection of Dharamsala’s Memorandum that his faith in the

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Chinese government in the dialogue is getting ‘thinner and thinner.’ Furthermore, a frequent theme in the Dalai Lama’s speeches to the Tibetans is to ‘hope for the best, but prepare for the worst’ by strengthening the Tibetan movement for a lengthy struggle. As events from Tibet testify, the hard-line policies, migration and cultural imperialism would provoke more unrest in the future, especially when and after the Dalai Lama passes away. The trends in both Beijing and the Tibetan camp indicate that the cycle of the insecurity dilemma will go on for the foreseeable future.

**Abetting and Countervailing Factors**

A number of factors will come into play in determining which of these scenarios would materialise. First, the direction of China’s political development would have major repercussions. Whether China democratises or persists in its Leninist authoritarianism will have a marked difference on the prospects for reconciliation or stalemate. Democratisation could open up more space and instil confidence in mutual accommodation, but it is just as possible that democratic politicians would be held hostage by their hyper-nationalistic constituencies to adopt hard-line positions. Relatedly, the outcome of the struggle between liberals and hyper-nationalists over the soul of China will have a direct bearing on whether a basis of co-existence between the Tibetans and the Chinese could be crafted or whether stalemate or even utter repression becomes the reality. For instance, a loose coalition of first generation Tibetan communist officials, retired senior military officials of the 18th Army, liberal intellectuals, security analysts and foreign policy specialists had pushed the benefits of a resolution of the Tibetan issue with the current Dalai Lama. The ascendance of these groups relative to the nationalistic—conservative forces would make constructive engagement with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans more likely. The institutional environment for managing Tibetan affairs in Beijing—how crowded, bureaucratic and professionalised it is and the personnel turnovers—and the dialogue process in Dharamsala will also have a bearing on the course of the dialogue process.

Second, the increasing interest in Tibetan Buddhism among the wealthy and middle-class Chinese is a wild card. The place of religion in general in Chinese society and

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13 Al Jazeera, ‘Dalai Lama admits Tibet failure: Exiled spiritual leader says he has lost faith in China as situation in Tibet worsens,’ 3 November, 2008. The Dalai Lama is careful to add however that his faith in the Chinese people remains undiminished and that his outreach effort has indeed been increasing.
16 Ibid: 31-35.
Buddhism’s relationship with the Party and state will determine how the growing prestige of Tibetan Buddhism will influence the state of Chinese-Tibetan relations.

Third, the level of instability in Tibet and the associated economic costs for Beijing of keeping the Tibetan plateau on a tight leash is another factor. As noted before, Beijing is all but subsidising the Tibetan economy on top of the costs of maintaining a substantial military presence, internal security and propaganda and civilian administrative apparatus. This ‘blood transfusion’ economy is not just a huge drain on the resources; it is riddled with distortions, inefficiencies and destabilising ethnic disparities. At some point, Beijing’s policy of ruthless control and economic development could unravel under the weight of these weaknesses and increasing obligations. Either Beijing would initiate constructive negotiations with the Dalai Lama to ease the pressures or the pent-up stress could boil over into instability. If China’s economy continues to sustain the costs of the hard-line policies, the cycle of the insecurity dilemma would also persist.

Fourth, as the Sino-Tibetan conflict is entwined with broader regional and global political and strategic affairs, the direction of the conflict would also depend upon the state of relations between China and key states such as India, America and Russia. The nature of the emerging regional strategic balance, especially in the context of the growing US-India ties, would have a material impact on Beijing’s handling of the Tibetan issue. Usually dismissive of India as a rival and its great power aspirations, Beijing ‘must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state.’ The fluid India-America-China triangular balance has the potential to affect China’s Tibet policy. As Norbu argued, ‘...India’s threat [to use the Tibet card] becomes credible only when Beijing perceives it to be acting in close cooperation with great powers.’ Beijing’s decision to open dialogue with the Dalai Lama is partly the result of international criticism. Whether the Tibetans will be able to maintain or increase the level of international interest in Tibet or Beijing will be successful in reducing diplomatic space for the Tibetans through its growing economic, diplomatic and military clout will be a relevant factor.

Finally, how the Tibetans will fare after the demise of the 14th Dalai Lama will have a determining effect on the course of the conflict. No wonder, many Chinese expect the Tibetan struggle to fade away with the Dalai Lama. There is also a lot of international interest on how the Tibetans and the Chinese will handle the selection of the 15th Dalai Lama, and how the

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17 Ibid: 27.
18 Cohen 2001: 259.
Tibetans, especially in exile, would cope in the post-Dalai Lama period. The Chinese and the Tibetans are preparing for that eventuality. In 2007, the Chinese State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) passed ‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas [reincarnates] in Tibetan Buddhism’ or ‘Order No. 5’, which requires all Tibetan Lamas to petition the State for permission to ‘reincarnate’ and be approved by the appropriate state bodies. In 2010, China passed ‘Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhism’ barring any foreign forces from interfering in Tibetan monasteries, temples and other religious sites. Beijing is undoubtedly putting these measures in place to undercut the Dalai Lama’s influence and crucially in anticipation of the selection of his reincarnation.

The Tibetan exiles have also been busy. The Dalai Lama has categorically stated that his reincarnation will be born outside Chinese control to carry on his work, and has also floated a number of ways, both traditional and novel, to select his reincarnation. He has suggested choosing his reincarnation before death, a Roman Catholic style conclave of senior Tibetan Lamas, a female Dalai Lama, and the traditional method of searching for a child after his death. Other senior Tibetans have also recommended mobilising the non-Tibetan Tibetan Buddhists across the world in the selection process to maximise legitimacy and to protect the Dalai Lama institution. To ensure the survival of the Tibetan struggle and TGIE, the Dalai Lama has retired from his temporal and administrative duties to empower other Tibetans to take leadership positions and to consolidate the exile democracy. These are all measures in the spirit of his advice to ‘hope for the best and prepare for the worst.’ In summary, how the Tibetans will conduct themselves in the post-Dalai Lama scenario would have a decisive effect on the course of the conflict.

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Research Limitation and Future Research Avenues

This research needs development in one key area: getting a more nuanced understanding of the insecurity dilemma as it manifests at the local and regional levels by consulting more Chinese language documents and conducting field research in Tibet and China.

This research posited the conflict as a dynamic interplay of Chinese and Tibetan insecurities and policy responses. However, the respective insecurities and remedial policies and practices could be examined only at the macro-levels, i.e. at the national and regional levels on the Chinese side and at the level of Tibetans as a national group. In addition, this author could not gain a satisfactory understanding of the nuances within the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus on their perceptions of the Tibetan issue and prescribed policy response. Due to restrictions on travel to Tibetan areas in the past few years, and the sensitivity of the issue at hand in China, this author has been unable to conduct research on the ground to understand how state and regime insecurities, policies and implementation manifest in the local and regional contexts and how insecurities across the regional and sectarian divisions in the Tibetan society and the bureaucratic terrain of the Party-State.

This is significant because some China scholars have contended that the national, regional and local agents of the Chinese Party-state have slightly different interests, concerns and react differently to problems and threats. They argue that despite the Communist Party’s assertion of ‘unified leadership’ and the common perception of total power and control enforced by the Party and Central government, Beijing’s ability to unilaterally impose its will throughout China is more limited than that. China’s authoritarian regime lacks the capacity to implement decisions uniformly throughout its vast polity. Even when Beijing issues more categorical commands, local compliance is far from certain. The ancient Chinese proverb ‘The Mountains are high and the emperor is far’ is still relevant to some extent. Although, this line of thinking is more applicable to issue areas like the economy and environment than to Party-State security, and to Han Chinese provinces than to sensitive frontier regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, there is some evidence even in Tibetan affairs of disconnect between local and national authorities and significant variations even among the Tibetan regions.

On the Tibetan side, there are many traditional divisions that are based on religious and regional affiliations. The traditional government of Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama was a theocratic regime monopolised by the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism. However, there are three other main sects of Buddhism and Bon, the pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet. Arguably, the various sects feel different levels of loyalty to the Dalai Lama, hence, different levels of political activism. I would like to confirm if this is indeed the case, in which case, the
implication is that the Chinese authorities feel different levels of insecurity and implement state policies differently across the sectarian divides in Tibetan society. Similarly, in the post-Mao period, Eastern Tibetan areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces had, at times, relatively more freedom than in Tibet Autonomous Region. One speculation is that because these Eastern Tibetan regions have been heavily settled by Chinese migrants, the authorities feel more secure and feels more confident to allow more freedom there. Since the late 1990s and especially after the spring 2008 protests and riots in these regions, the situation has become more homogenous.

Accordingly, a future project would be to conduct additional research, preferably in the field in the Tibetan regions to examine if the insecurity dilemma adapts in severity to these divisions in the Party-State and Tibetan society. In the same vein, more focused research projects examining how the insecurity dilemma works on particular issue areas such as Tibetan Buddhism, language, education, economy, folk traditions, to name a few could branch off from this dissertation.

A related topic for potential refinement is whether the threat perception and security policy for addressing China’s vulnerabilities in Tibet are homogenous or heterogeneous within the Chinese officialdom. Engaging with the factional approach to studying Chinese politics, some Tibet scholars have argued that there are liberal and conservative camps within the Chinese government who have different understandings of the Tibet issue and propose conciliatory and assimilationist policies, respectively. However, no one has studied the dynamics of this bureaucratic divide and the relative strength of each faction in detail. An understanding of the factional politics on Tibet issues will produce a more nuanced picture of the insecurity dilemma too. More research is needed to confirm or rule out the hypothesised factional split on dealing with the problems in Tibet and how it affects the insecurity dilemma. More field work within China and consultation of more documents and materials to refine, develop and update the general arguments about Chinese policies and practices that I advance here would be beneficial.

**Conclusion:** This chapter first discussed the key analytical issues raised by this research. It considered how the insecurity dilemma was developed theoretically and how its application problematizes the existing accounts of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Next, the chapter sketched three possible scenarios for the future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The first scenario envisioned a highly nationalistic China engaging in a policy of utter repression, including attempts at ethnic cleansing and population swamping, to bring about a quick and decisive
end to their Tibetan problem. It also envisaged a desperate Tibetan counter-measure including organised violence and terrorism. It was concluded that this scenario is highly unlikely to materialise. Second, the probability of a resolution of the conflict and the broad shape it would take was considered. Based on the current trends in both China and Tibet and Dharamsala, it is hard to envision a resolution of the conflict in the foreseeable future. Instead, those trends point towards China’s reliance on the present policy of harsh control and economic development in Tibet, irrespective of the Tibetan interpretations of the motivations and effects of these policies. The Tibetans are likely to resist these through a range of strategies and instruments encompassing subtle, within-the-system efforts, peaceful demonstrations, violent uprisings and external diplomatic efforts, relying on cultural and moral resources. The implication of this stalemate is that the cycle of the insecurity dilemma would persist well into the future.

Following that, it outlined the key factors that would either abet or countervail the intensity or duration of the insecurity dilemma. Some factors involve China’s domestic context, such as the prospects for democratization or authoritarian resilience in China, the relative influence and growth of nationalist forces on the one hand and liberal, pro-engagement forces and Chinese Tibetan Buddhist adherents on the other hand, and the institutional mechanisms for managing Tibetan affairs and dialogue in Beijing. The state of the evolving China-India-America strategic triangle, the cohesion of the Tibetan exile community and TGIE, and China’s ability to undermine the exile community and deny international political space for the Tibetans will operate at the transnational and international levels. These factors would largely determine the course of Sino-Tibetan relations in the future, but this research concludes, projecting from current trends, that for the foreseeable future, the insecurity dilemma will continue into the foreseeable future.

Finally, the chapter discussed a key limitation of this research in need of redress through additional research.

In conclusion, noting the inadequacies of existing IR theories to explain the security policies of states in the global south and the frequent intra-state conflicts there, this research demonstrated the analytical capacity of the insecurity dilemma as an alternative framework by developing it and applying it on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict. This research argued that, conscious of its weakness as a state, which has implications for state, regime and ‘national’ security, China has pursued state-building through its policies on religion, language, education and economy in Tibet. Beijing also denies the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ and rejects the various Tibetan proposals for autonomy because of the perceived threats to their
state-building project in Tibet, especially in the uncertain future. Conversely, Tibetan identity insecurity, generated by these state policies, Chinese migration and cultural influences inside Tibet, historical experiences and future uncertainties, explains both the Dalai Lama’s unpopular decision to give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his steadfast demands for autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration, albeit within the framework of the Chinese constitution. Identity insecurity also drives the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance inside Tibet. Although the intentions of both Beijing and the Tibetans are to increase their respective securities as mentioned above, the outcome has been greater insecurity for both, plunging them into dilemmatic cycles of state-building and hardening of policies on the Chinese side and strengthening of identity and resistance on the Tibetan side. This study gave play to a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on both sides and examined the feed-back effect that exists between the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the regional and global political, strategic and ideological competitions. The most significant conclusion is that despite the existence of some unpredictable reinforcing or mitigating variables, the current trends point towards the continued relevance of the insecurity dilemma as the defining feature of Sino-Tibetan relations for the foreseeable future. It would test the wisdom of the Tibetan and Chinese leaders to the maximum with potentially bloody repercussions in the years to come.
Appendix 1

THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET

23 MAY, 1951

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disharmony among the Tibetan people. The Local Government of Tibet did not oppose imperialist deception and provocations, but adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering.

In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary government—was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China may become one big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within this big family of nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, and the Central People's Government will assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of the higher levels of People's Governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people may be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the Central Authorities to hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with full powers from the Local Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates of the Local Government of Tibet. The result of the talks is that both parties have agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland—the People's Republic of China.

2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries.

8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies and will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the name list is to be prepared after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central
People's Government and various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central People's Government for approval.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers:
Chief Delegate: Li Weihan (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs);

Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:
Chief Delegate: Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme
Delegates: Khemey Sonam Wangdu, Lhawutara Thupten Tenthar, Thupten Lekmon Rimshi, Sampo Tenzin Thondup.
Appendix 2

ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET—DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

6 April, 1952

The Central Committee essentially approves the instructions which the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Area cabled on April 2 to the Working Committee and Military Area in Tibet. It holds that the basic policies (except the point about reorganizing the Tibetan troops) and the various specific steps set forth in the telegram are correct. Only by following them can our army establish itself in an invulnerable position in Tibet.

Conditions in Tibet are different from those in Sinkiang. Tibet compares poorly with Sinkiang, whether politically or economically. But even in Sinkiang, the first thing the army units under Wang Chen did when they got there was to pay the utmost attention to strict budgeting, self-reliance and production for their own needs. They have now gained a firm foothold and won the warm support of the minority nationalities. They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and will proceed to agrarian reform this winter, and by then we can be sure of even greater support from the masses. Sinkiang is well connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and this is of great help in improving the material welfare of the minority nationalities. As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years. While several hundred thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area. We depend solely on two basic policies to win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable position. The first is strict budgeting coupled with production for the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence on the masses; this is the key link. Even when highways are built, we cannot count on moving large quantities of grain over them. India will probably agree to send grain and other goods to Tibet on the basis of exchange, but the stand we must take is that our army should be able to carry on even if India stops sending them some day. We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years; on the other hand, we must be prepared for the eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army could still carry on and hold out in Tibet. It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's own needs. Only with this fundamental policy as the cornerstone of our work can we achieve our aim. The second policy, which can and must be put into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with the heartland of our country and to attain a general balance in supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the Tibetan people will in no way fall because of our army's presence but will improve through our efforts. If we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad elements will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting the backward elements among the people and the Tibetan troops to oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few will become ineffectual and fail.

Of all the views set forth in the Southwest Bureau's telegram of April 2 there is only one that calls for further consideration; what I refer to is the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Tibetan troops and setting up a military and administrative commission fairly soon. It is our opinion that the Tibetan troops should not be reorganized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a military and administrative commission be established. For the time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation drag on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now. In the meantime there are two possibilities. One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements, thinking we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in rebellion and that our army will counter-attack in self-defence and deal them telling blows. Either will be favourable for us. As
the top echelon in Tibet sees it, there is no sufficient reason now for implementing the [17-Point] Agreement in its entirety or for reorganizing the Tibetan troops. But things will be different in a few years. By then they will probably and that they have no choice but to carry out the Agreement to the full and to reorganize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebellions and are repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Apparently not only the two Silons [Prime Ministers] but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we don't have a material base for fully implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. To force its implementation will do more harm than good. Since they are unwilling to put the Agreement into effect, well then, we can leave it for the time being and wait. The longer the delay, the stronger will be our position and the weaker theirs. Delay will not do us much harm; on the contrary, it may be to our advantage. Let them go on with their insensate atrocities against the people, while we on our part concentrate on good deeds—production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work (unity with the majority and patient education) so as to win over the masses and bide our time before taking up the question of the full implementation of the Agreement. If they are not in favour of the setting up of primary schools, that can stop too.

The recent demonstration in Lhasa should be viewed not merely as the work of the two Silons and other bad elements but as a signal to us from the majority of the Dalai clique. Their petition is very tactful because it indicates not a wish for a break with us but only a wish for concessions from us. One of the terms gives the hint that the practice of the Ching Dynasty should be restored, in other words, that no Liberation Army units should be stationed in Tibet, but this is not what they are really after. They know full well that this is impossible; their attempt is to trade this term for other terms. The Fourteenth Dalai is criticized in the petition so as to absolve him from any political responsibility for the demonstration. They pose as protectors of the interests of the Tibetan nationality, being aware that while they are inferior to us in military strength, they have an advantage over us in social influence. We should accept this petition in substance (not in form) and put off the full implementation of the Agreement. The timing of the demonstration to take place before the Panchen's arrival in Lhasa was deliberate. After his arrival they will probably go all out to work on him to join their clique. If on our part we do our work well and the Panchen does not fall into their trap but reaches Shigatse safe and sound, the situation will then become more favourable to us. Nevertheless, since neither our lack of a material base nor their advantage over us in social influence will change for the time being, neither will the unwillingness of the Dalai clique to carry out the Agreement fully. At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe. What are your views? Please consider and wire your reply.
Appendix 3

HU YAOBANG’S 5 POINTS REGARDING THE DALAI LAMA’S RETURN

28 July, 1981

1. The Dalai Lama should recognise that China has now entered a new period of stability and economic change. If he doubts the reforms, he should observe the changes for the next few years.

2. The Dalai Lama should not raise the history of repression that followed the suppression of the 1959 rebellion.

3. The Chinese government sincerely welcomes the Dalai Lama and his followers to return to the motherland. China hopes that the Dalai Lama would contribute to upholding China’s unity and promote solidarity between Han and Tibetan nationalities.

4. The Dalai Lama would have the same status as he had enjoyed before 1959. He may be appointed Vice-Chairman of the NPC. But it would be necessary that he should not live in Tibet or hold any position in Tibet as there are younger Tibetans who have taken office and are doing their jobs well. He may visit Tibet as often as he likes.

5. When the Dalai Lama returns he may make press statements, and arrangements would be made to receive him by a suitable minister.
We are living today in a very interdependent world. One nation's problems can no longer be solved by itself. Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger. I have, therefore, always believed in the need for better understanding, closer cooperation and greater respect among the various nations of the world. The European Parliament is an inspiring example. Out of the chaos of war, those who were once enemies have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist and to co-operate. I am, therefore, particularly pleased and honored to address this gathering at the European Parliament.

As you know, my country—Tibet—is undergoing a very difficult period. The Tibetans--particularly those who live under Chinese occupation--yearn for freedom and justice and a self-determined future, so that they are able to fully preserve their unique identity and live in peace with their neighbors.

For over a thousand years we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and environmental values in order to maintain the delicate balance of life across the high plateau on which we live. Inspired by the Buddha's message of non-violence and compassion and protected by our mountains, we sought to respect every form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of national policy.

Our history, dating back more than two thousand years, has been one of independence. At no time, since the founding of our nation in 127 B.C., have we Tibetans conceded our sovereignty to a foreign power. As with all nations, Tibet experienced periods in which our neighbors - Mongol, Manchu, Chinese, British and the Gorkhas of Nepal - sought to establish influence over us. These eras have been brief and the Tibetan people have never accepted them as constituting a loss of our national sovereignty. In fact, there have been occasions when Tibetan rulers conquered vast areas of China and other neighboring states. This, however, does not mean that we Tibetans can lay claim to these territories.

In 1949 the People's Republic of China forcibly invaded Tibet. Since that time, Tibet has endured the darkest period in its history. More than a million of our people have died as a result of the occupation. Thousands of monasteries were reduced to ruins. A generation has grown up deprived of education, economic opportunity and a sense of its own national character. Though the current China leadership has implemented certain reforms, it is also promoting a massive population transfer onto the Tibetan plateau. This policy has already reduced the six million Tibetans to a minority. Speaking for all Tibetans, I must sadly inform you, our tragedy continues.

I have always urged my people not to resort to violence in their efforts to redress their suffering. Yet I believe all people have the moral right to peacefully protest injustice. Unfortunately, the demonstrations in Tibet have been violently suppressed by the Chinese police and military. I will continue to counsel for non-violence, but unless China forsakes the brutal methods it employs, Tibetans cannot be responsible for a further deterioration in the situation. Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full restoration of our nation's independence. Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives and our whole nation has suffered in this struggle. Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely sacrificed their lives to achieve this precious goal. On the other hand, the Chinese totally fail to recognize the Tibetan people's aspirations and continue to pursue a policy of brutal suppression.

I have thought for a long time on how to achieve a realistic solution to my nation's plight. My Cabinet and I solicited the opinions of many friends and concerned persons. As a result, on September 21, 1987, at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, D.C., I announced a Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet. In it I called for the conversion of Tibet into a zone of peace, a sanctuary in which humanity and nature can live together in harmony. I also called for respect for human rights and democratic ideals, environmental protection and a halt to the Chinese population transfer into Tibet.
The fifth point of the Peace Plan called for earnest negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese. We have, therefore, taken the initiative to formulate some thoughts which, we hope, may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the distinguished gathering here of the main points of our thinking.

The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People’s Republic of China.

The Government of the People’s Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned with such activities.

The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, social justice and protection of the environment. This means that the Government of Tibet will have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans.

As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society’s development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet’s national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet’s rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice.

The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa.

The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population.

The Government of Tibet would pass strict laws to protect wildlife and plant life. The exploitation of natural resources would be carefully regulated. The manufacture, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as well as the use of nuclear power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of Tibet’s goal to transform Tibet into our planet’s largest natural preserve.

A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defence purposes.

In order to create an atmosphere of trust conducive to fruitful negotiations, the Chinese Government should cease its human rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet.¹

These are the thoughts we have in mind. I am aware that many Tibetans will be disappointed by the moderate stand they represent. Undoubtedly, there will be much discussion in the coming months within our own community, both in Tibet and in exile. This, however, is an essential and invaluable part of any process of change. I believe these thoughts represent the most realistic means by which to re-establish Tibet’s separate identity and restore the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people while accommodating China’s own interests. I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum.

I would like to take this opportunity to state that I do not wish to take any active part in the Government of Tibet. Nevertheless, I will continue to work as much as I can for the well-being and happiness of the Tibetan people as long as it is necessary.

¹ Italics added.
We are ready to present a proposal to the Government of the People's Republic of China based on the thoughts I have presented. A negotiating team representing the Tibetan Government has been selected. We are prepared to meet with the Chinese to discuss details of such a proposal aimed at achieving an equitable solution.

We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of governments and political leaders, including former President Jimmy Carter of the United States. We are also encouraged by the recent changes in China which have brought about a new group of leadership, more pragmatic and liberal.

We urge the Chinese Government and leadership to give serious and substantive consideration to the ideas I have described. Only dialogue and a willingness to look with honesty and clarity at the reality of Tibet can lead to a viable solution. We wish to conduct discussions with the Chinese Government bearing in mind the larger interests of humanity. Our proposal will therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation and we hope that the Chinese will respond accordingly.

My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage renders it ideally suited for fulfilling the role of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia. Its historic status as a neutral buffer state, contributing to the stability of the entire continent, can be restored. Peace and security for Asia as well as for the world at large can be enhanced. In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied land, oppressed by force, unproductive and scarred by suffering. It can become a free haven where humanity and nature live in harmonious balance; a creative model for the resolution of tensions afflicting many areas throughout the world.

The Chinese leadership needs to realize that colonial rule over occupied territories is today anachronistic. A genuine union or association can only come about voluntarily, when there is satisfactory benefit to all the parties concerned. The European Community is a clear example of this. On the other hand, even one country or community can break into two or more entities when there is a lack of trust or benefit, and when force is used as the principal means of rule.

I would like to end by making a special appeal to the honorable members of the European Parliament and through them to their respective constituencies to extend their support to our efforts. A resolution of the Tibetan problem within the framework that we propose will not only be for the mutual benefit of the Tibetan and Chinese people but will also contribute to regional and global peace and stability. I thank you for providing me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you.
MEMORANDUM ON GENUINE AUTONOMY FOR THE TIBETAN PEOPLE

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the renewal of direct contact with the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2002, extensive discussions have been held between the envoys of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and representatives of the Central Government. In these discussions we have put forth clearly the aspirations of Tibetans. The essence of the Middle Way Approach is to secure genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC. This is of mutual benefit and based on the long-term interest of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. We remain firmly committed not to seek separation or independence. We are seeking a solution to the Tibetan problem through genuine autonomy, which is compatible with the principles on autonomy in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The protection and development of the unique Tibetan identity in all its aspects serves the larger interest of humanity in general and those of the Tibetan and Chinese people in particular.

During the seventh round of talks in Beijing on 1 and 2 July 2008, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Minister of the Central United Front Work Department, Mr. Du Qinglin, explicitly invited suggestions from His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the stability and development of Tibet. The Executive Vice Minister of the Central United Front Work Department, Mr. Zhu Weiqun, further said they would like to hear our views on the degree or form of autonomy we are seeking as well as on all aspects of regional autonomy within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC.

Accordingly, this memorandum puts forth our position on genuine autonomy and how the specific needs of the Tibetan nationality for autonomy and self-government can be met through application of the principles on autonomy of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, as we understand them. On this basis, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is confident that the basic needs of the Tibetan nationality can be met through genuine autonomy within the PRC.

The PRC is a multi-national state, and as in many other parts of the world, it seeks to resolve the nationality question through autonomy and the self-government of the minority nationalities. The Constitution of the PRC contains fundamental principles on autonomy and self-government whose objectives are compatible with the needs and aspirations of the Tibetans. Regional national autonomy is aimed at opposing both the oppression and the separation of nationalities by rejecting both Han Chauvinism and local nationalism. It is intended to ensure the protection of the culture and the identity of minority nationalities by powering them to become masters of their own affairs.

To a very considerable extent Tibetan needs can be met within the constitutional principles on autonomy, as we understand them. On several points, the Constitution gives significant discretionary powers to state organs in the decision-making and on the operation of the system of autonomy. These discretionary powers can be exercised to facilitate genuine autonomy for Tibetans in ways that would respond to the uniqueness of the Tibetan situation. In implementing these principles, legislation relevant to autonomy may consequently need to be reviewed or amended to respond to the specific characteristics and needs of the Tibetan nationality. Given good will on both sides, outstanding problems can be resolved within the constitutional principles on autonomy. In this way national unity and stability and harmonious relations between the Tibetan and other nationalities will be established.

II. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY

Tibetans belong to one minority nationality regardless of the current administrative division. The integrity of the Tibetan nationality must be respected. That is the spirit, the intent and the principle underlying the constitutional concept of national regional autonomy as well as the principle of equality of nationalities.
There is no dispute about the fact that Tibetans share the same language, culture, spiritual tradition, core values and customs, that they belong to the same ethnic group and that they have a strong sense of common identity. Tibetans share a common history and despite periods of political or administrative divisions, Tibetans continuously remained united by their religion, culture, education, language, way of life and by their unique high plateau environment.

The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles of national regional autonomy Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan plateau.

On account of the above reasons, the PRC has recognised the Tibetan nationality as one of the 55 minority nationalities.

III. TIBETAN ASPIRATIONS

Tibetans have a rich and distinct history, culture and spiritual tradition all of which form valuable parts of the heritage of humanity. Not only do Tibetans wish to preserve their own heritage, which they cherish, but equally they wish to further develop their culture and spiritual life and knowledge in ways that are particularly suited to the needs and conditions of humanity in the 21st century.

As a part of the multi-national state of the PRC, Tibetans can benefit greatly from the rapid economic and scientific development the country is experiencing. While wanting to actively participate and contribute to this development, we want to ensure that this happens without the people losing their Tibetan identity, culture and core values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of the Tibetan plateau, to which Tibetans are indigenous, at risk.

The uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been reflected in the terms of the ‘17 Point Agreement’ and in statements and policies of successive leaders of the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics and needs of minority nationalities.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s commitment to seek a solution for the Tibetan people within the PRC is clear and unambiguous. This position is in full compliance and agreement with paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s statement in which he emphasised that except for independence all other issues could be resolved through dialogue. Whereas, we are committed, therefore, to fully respect the territorial integrity of the PRC, we expect the Central Government to recognise and fully respect the integrity of the Tibetan nationality and its right to exercise genuine autonomy within the PRC. We believe that this is the basis for resolving the differences between us and promoting unity, stability and harmony among nationalities.

For Tibetans to advance as a distinct nationality within the PRC, they need to continue to progress and develop economically, socially and politically in ways that correspond to the development of the PRC and the world as a whole while respecting and nurturing the Tibetan characteristics of such development. For this to happen, it is imperative that the right of Tibetans to govern themselves be recognised and implemented throughout the region where they live in compact communities in the PRC, in accordance with the Tibetan nationality’s own needs, priorities and characteristics.

The Tibetan people’s culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans themselves and not by any others. Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other provinces and regions of the PRC.
IV. BASIC NEEDS OF TIBETANS

Subject Matters of Self-government

1. Language

Language is the most important attribute of the Tibetan people’s identity. Tibetan is the primary means of communication, the language in which their literature, their spiritual texts and historical as well as scientific works are written. The Tibetan language is not only at the same high level as that of Sanskrit in terms of grammar, but is also the only one that has the capability of translating from Sanskrit without an iota of error. Therefore, Tibetan language has not only the richest and best-translated literatures, many scholars even contend that it has also the richest and largest number of literary compositions. The Constitution of the PRC, in Article 4, guarantees the freedom of all nationalities “to use and develop their own spoken and written languages ....”.

In order for Tibetans to use and develop their own language, Tibetan must be respected as the main spoken and written language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous areas needs to be Tibetan.

This principle is broadly recognised in the Constitution in Article 121, which states, “the organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or language in common use in the locality.” Article 10 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) provides that these organs “shall guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and develop their own spoken and written languages....”

Consistent with the principle of recognition of Tibetan as the main language in Tibetan areas, the LRNA (Article 36) also allows the autonomous government authorities to decide on “the language used in instruction and enrolment procedures” with regard to education. This implies recognition of the principle that the principal medium of education be Tibetan.

2. Culture

The concept of national regional autonomy is primarily for the purpose of preservation of the culture of minority nationalities. Consequently, the constitution of PRC contains references to cultural preservation in Articles 22, 47 and 119 as also in Article 38 of the LRNA. To Tibetans, Tibetan culture is closely connected to our religion, tradition, language and identity, which are facing threats at various levels. Since Tibetans live within the multinational state of the PRC, this distinct Tibetan cultural heritage needs protection through appropriate constitutional provisions.

3. Religion

Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to their identity. We recognise the importance of separation of church and state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of believers. It is impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom without the freedom of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution recognises the importance of religion and protects the right to profess it. Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious belief. No one can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any religion. Discrimination on the basis of religion is forbidden.

An interpretation of the constitutional principle in light of international standard would also cover the freedom of the manner of belief or worship. The freedom covers the right of monasteries to be organised and run according to Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to enroll any number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules. The normal practice to hold public teachings and the empowerment of large gatherings is covered by this freedom and the state should not interfere in religious practices and traditions, such as the relationship between a teacher and his disciple, management of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations.

4. Education

The desire of Tibetans to develop and administer their own education system in cooperation and in coordination with the central government's ministry of education is supported by the principles contained in the Constitution with regard to education. So is the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the
development of science and technology. We note the increasing recognition in international scientific
development of the contribution which Buddhist psychology, metaphysics, cosmology and the
understanding of the mind is making to modern science.

Whereas, under Article 19 of the Constitution the state takes on the overall responsibility to provide
education for its citizens, Article 119 recognises the principle that “[T]he organs of self-government of
the national autonomous areas independently administer educational .... affairs in their respective areas...”
This principle is also reflected in Article 36 of the LRNA.

Since the degree of autonomy in decision-making is unclear, the point to be emphasised is that the
Tibetan need to exercise genuine autonomy with regard to its own nationality’s education and this is
supported by the principles of the constitution on autonomy.

As for the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the development of scientific knowledge and
technology, the Constitution (Article 119) and the LRNA (Article 39) clearly recognise the right of
autonomous areas to develop scientific knowledge and technology.

5. Environment Protection
Tibet is the prime source of Asia's great rivers. It also has the earth's loftiest mountains as well as the
world's most extensive and highest plateau, rich in mineral resources, ancient forests, and many deep
valleys untouched by human disturbances.

This environmental protection practice was enhanced by the Tibetan people's traditional respect for all
forms of life, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Tibet used to
be an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment.

Today, Tibet's traditional environment is suffering irreparable damage. The effects of this are especially
notable on the grasslands, the croplands, the forests, the water resources and the wildlife.

In view of this, according to Articles 45 and 66 of the LNRA, the Tibetan people should be given the
right over the environment and allow them to follow their traditional conservation practices.

6. Utilisation of Natural Resources
With respect to the protection and management of the natural environment and the utilisation of natural
resources the Constitution and the LRNA only acknowledge a limited role for the organs of self-
government of the autonomous areas (see LRNA Articles 27, 28, 45, 66, and Article 118 of the
Constitution, which pledges that the state “shall give due consideration to the interests of [the national
autonomous areas]]”. The LRNA recognises the importance for the autonomous areas to protect and
develop forests and grasslands (Article 27) and to “give priority to the rational exploitation and utilization
of the natural resources that the local authorities are entitled to develop”, but only within the limits of
state plans and legal stipulations. In fact, the central role of the State in these matters is reflected in the
Constitution (Article 9).

The principles of autonomy enunciated in the Constitution cannot, in our view, truly lead to Tibetans
becoming masters of their own destiny if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-making on
utilisation of natural resources such as mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, etc.

The ownership of land is the foundation on which the development of natural resources, taxes and
revenues of an economy are based. Therefore, it is essential that only the nationality of the autonomous
region shall have the legal authority to transfer or lease land, except land owned by the state. In the same
manner, the autonomous region must have the independent authority to formulate and implement
developmental plans concurrent to the state plans.

7. Economic Development and Trade
Economic Development in Tibet is welcome and much needed. The Tibetan people remain one of the
most economically backward regions within the PRC.
The Constitution recognises the principle that the autonomous authorities have an important role to play in the economic development of their areas in view of local characteristics and needs (Article 118 of the Constitution, also reflected in LRNA Article 25). The Constitution also recognises the principle of autonomy in the administration and management of finances (Article 117, and LRNA Article 32). At the same time, the Constitution also recognises the importance of providing State funding and assistance to the autonomous areas to accelerate development (Article 122, LRNA Article 22).

Similarly, Article 31 of the LRNA recognises the competence of autonomous areas, especially those such as Tibet, adjoining foreign countries, to conduct border trade as well as trade with foreign countries. The recognition of these principles is important to the Tibetan nationality given the region’s proximity to foreign countries with which the people have cultural, religious, ethnic and economic affinities.

The assistance rendered by the Central Government and the provinces has temporary benefits, but in the long run if the Tibetan people are not self-reliant and become dependent on others it has greater harm. Therefore, an important objective of autonomy is to make the Tibetan people economically self-reliant.

8. Public health
The Constitution enunciates the responsibility of the State to provide health and medical services (Article 21). Article 119 recognises that this is an area of responsibility of the autonomous areas. The LRNA (Article 40) also recognises the right of organs of self-government of the autonomous areas to “make independent decisions on plans for developing local medical and health services and for advancing both modern and the traditional medicine of the nationalities.”

The existing health system fails to adequately cover the needs of the rural Tibetan population. According to the principles of the above-mentioned laws, the regional autonomous organs need to have the competencies and resources to cover the health need of the entire Tibetan population. They also need the competencies to promote the traditional Tibetan medical and astro system strictly according to traditional practice.

9. Public Security
In matters of public security it is important that the majority of security personnel consists of members of the local nationality who understand and respect local customs and traditions.

What is lacking in Tibetan areas is absence of decision-making authority in the hands of local Tibetan officials.

An important aspect of autonomy and self-government is the responsibility for the internal public order and security of the autonomous areas. The Constitution (Article 120) and LRNA (Article 24) recognise the importance of local involvement and authorise autonomous areas to organise their security within "the military system of the State and practical needs and with the approval of the State Council."

10. Regulation on population migration
The fundamental objective of national regional autonomy and self-government is the preservation of the identity, culture, language and so forth of the minority nationality and to ensure that it is the master of its own affairs. When applied to a particular territory in which the minority nationality lives in a concentrated community or communities, the very principle and purpose of national regional autonomy is disregarded if large scale migration and settlement of the majority Han nationality and other nationalities is encouraged and allowed. Major demographic changes that result from such migration will have the effect of assimilating rather than integrating the Tibetan nationality into the Han nationality and gradually extinguishing the distinct culture and identity of the Tibetan nationality. Also, the influx of large numbers of Han and other nationalities into Tibetan areas will fundamentally change the conditions necessary for the exercise of regional autonomy since the constitutional criteria for the exercise of autonomy, namely that the minority nationality “live in compact communities” in a particular territory is changed and undermined by the population movements and transfers. If such migrations and settlements continue uncontrolled, Tibetans will no longer live in a compact community or communities and will consequently
no longer be entitled, under the Constitution, to national regional autonomy. This would effectively violate the very principles of the Constitution in its approach to the nationalities issue.

There is precedent in the PRC for restriction on the movement or residence of citizens. There is only a very limited recognition of the right of autonomous areas to work out measures to control “the transient population” in those areas. To us it would be vital that the autonomous organs of self-government have the authority to regulate the residence, settlement and employment or economic activities of persons who wish to move to Tibetan areas from other parts of the PRC in order to ensure respect for and the realisation of the objectives of the principle of autonomy.

It is not our intention to expel the non-Tibetans who have permanently settled in Tibet and have lived there and grown up there for a considerable time. Our concern is the induced massive movement of primarily Han but also some other nationalities into many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing communities, marginalising the Tibetan population there and threatening the fragile natural environment.

11. Cultural, educational and religious exchanges with other countries
Besides the importance of exchanges and cooperation between the Tibetan nationality and other nationalities, provinces, and regions of the PRC in the subject matters of autonomy, such as culture, art, education, science, public health, sports, religion, environment, economy and so forth, the power of autonomous areas to conduct such exchanges with foreign countries in these areas is also recognised in the LRNA (Article 42).

V. APPLICATION OF A SINGLE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY IN THE PRC
In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity. The current administrative divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic identity. Rather than respecting the integrity of the nationality, this policy promotes its fragmentation and disregards the spirit of autonomy. Whereas the other major minority nationalities such as the Uighurs and Mongols govern themselves almost entirely within their respective single autonomous regions, Tibetans remain as if they were several minority nationalities instead of one.

Bringing all the Tibetans currently living in designated Tibetan autonomous areas within a single autonomous administrative unit is entirely in accordance with the constitutional principle contained in Article 4, also reflected in the LRNA (Article 2), that “regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.” The LRNA describes regional national autonomy as the “basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for the solution of the national question in China” and explains its meaning and intent in its Preface:

the minority nationalities, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in concentrated communities and set up organs of self-government for the exercise of the power of autonomy. Regional national autonomy embodies the state’s full respect for and guarantee of the right of the minority nationalities to administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of equality, unity and common prosperity of all nationalities.

It is clear that the Tibetan nationality within the PRC will be able to exercise its right to govern itself and administer its internal affairs effectively only once it can do so through an organ of self-government that has jurisdiction over the Tibetan nationality as a whole.

The LRNA recognises the principle that boundaries of national autonomous areas may need to be modified. The need for the application of the fundamental principles of the Constitution on regional
autonomy through respect of the integrity of the Tibetan nationality is not only totally legitimate, but the administrative changes that may be required to achieve this in no way violate constitutional principles. There are several precedents where this has been actually done.

VI. THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AUTONOMY

The extent to which the right to self-government and self-administration can be exercised on the preceding subject matters largely determines the genuine character of Tibetan autonomy. The task at hand is therefore to look into the manner in which autonomy can be regulated and exercised for it to effectively respond to the unique situation and basic needs of the Tibetan nationality.

The exercise of genuine autonomy would include the right of Tibetans to create their own regional government and government institutions and processes that are best suited to their needs and characteristics. It would require that the People’s Congress of the autonomous region have the power to legislate on all matters within the competencies of the region (that is the subject matters referred to above) and that other organs of the autonomous government have the power to execute and administer decisions autonomously. Autonomy also entails representation and meaningful participation in national decision-making in the Central Government. Processes for effective consultation and close cooperation or joint decision-making between the Central Government and the regional government on areas of common interest also need to be in place for the autonomy to be effective.

A crucial element of genuine autonomy is the guarantee the Constitution or other laws provide that powers and responsibilities allocated to the autonomous region cannot be unilaterally abrogated or changed. This means that neither the Central Government nor the autonomous region’s government should be able, without the consent of the other, to change the basic features of the autonomy.

The parameters and specifics of such genuine autonomy for Tibet that respond to the unique needs and conditions of the Tibetan people and region should be set out in some detail in regulations on the exercise of autonomy, as provided for in Article 116 of the Constitution (enacted in LRNA Article 19) or, if it is found to be more appropriate, in a separate set of laws or regulations adopted for that purpose. The Constitution, including Article 31, provides the flexibility to adopt special laws to respond to unique situations such as the Tibetan one, while respecting the established social, economic and political system of the country.

The Constitution in Section VI provides for organs of self-government of national autonomous regions and acknowledges their power to legislate. Thus Article 116 (enacted in Article 19 of the LRNA) refers to their power to enact “separate regulations in light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned.” Similarly, the Constitution recognises the power of autonomous administration in a number of areas (Article 117-120) as well as the power of autonomous governments to apply flexibility in implementing the laws and policies of the Central Government and higher state organs to suit the conditions of the autonomous area concerned (Article 115).

The above-mentioned legal provisions do contain significant limitations to the decision-making authority of the autonomous organs of government. But the Constitution nevertheless recognises the principle that organs of self-government make laws and policy decisions that address local needs and that these may be different from those adopted elsewhere, including by the Central Government.

Although the needs of the Tibetans are broadly consistent with the principles on autonomy contained in the Constitution, as we have shown, their realisation is impeded because of the existence of a number of problems, which makes the implementation of those principles today difficult or ineffective.

Implementation of genuine autonomy, for example, requires clear divisions of powers and responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region with respect to subject matter competency. Currently there is no such clarity and the scope of legislative powers of autonomous regions is both uncertain and severely restricted. Thus, whereas the Constitution intends to recognise the special need for autonomous regions to legislate on many matters that affect them, the requirements of Article 116 for prior approval at the highest level of the Central Government - by the Standing
Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) - inhibit the implementation of this principle of autonomy. In reality, it is only autonomous regional congresses that expressly require such approval, while the congresses of ordinary (not autonomous) provinces of the PRC do not need prior permission and merely report the passage of regulations to the Standing Committee of the NPC “for the record” (Article 100).

The exercise of autonomy is further subject to a considerable number of laws and regulations, according to Article 115 of the Constitution. Certain laws effectively restrict the autonomy of the autonomous region, while others are not always consistent with one another. The result is that the exact scope of the autonomy is unclear and is not fixed, since it is unilaterally changed with the enactment of laws and regulations are higher levels of the state, and even by changes in policy. There is also no adequate process for consultation or for settling differences that arise between the organs of the Central Government and of the regional government with respect to the scope and exercise of autonomy. In practice, the resulting uncertainty limits the initiative of regional authorities and impedes the exercise of genuine autonomy by Tibetans today.

We do not at this stage wish to enter into details regarding these and other impediments to the exercise of genuine autonomy today by Tibetans, but mention them by way of example so that these may be addressed in the appropriate manner in our dialogue in the future. We will continue to study the Constitution and other relevant legal provisions and, when appropriate, will be pleased to provide further analysis of these issues, as we understand them.

VII. THE WAY FORWARD
As stated at the beginning of this memorandum, our intention is to explore how the needs of the Tibetan nationality can be met within the framework of PRC since we believe these needs are consistent with the principles of the Constitution on autonomy. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on a number of occasions, we have no hidden agenda. We have no intention at all of using any agreement on genuine autonomy as stepping stone for separation from the PRC.

The objective of the Tibetan Government in Exile is to represent the interests of the Tibetan people and to speak on their behalf. Therefore, it will no longer be needed and will be dissolved once an agreement is reached between us. In fact, His Holiness has reiterated his decision not to accept any political office in Tibet at any time in the future. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, nevertheless, plans to use all his personal influence to ensure such an agreement would have the legitimacy necessary to obtain the support of the Tibetan people.

Given these strong commitments, we propose that the next step in this process be the agreement to start serious discussions on the points raised in this memorandum. For this purpose we propose that we discuss and agree on a mutually agreeable mechanism or mechanisms and a timetable to do so effectively.
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