The Local Power Effects
of a Global Governance Discourse:
‘Community Participation’
in the Protection of Biodiversity

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The London School of Economics and Political Science
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À Marlène, Pierre & Sébastien

* 

À la mémoire d’Yves
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DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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ABSTRACT

In the international relations literature, two large narratives of power are sustaining a bipolar polemic on global governance, which is either supposed to foster the dynamics of empowerment (emancipatory narrative) or domination (critical narrative). Yet such presentations rarely rely upon detailed empirical work. Remarkably, International Relations (IR) scholars are paying little attention to the local power effects of global discourses.

This research takes issue with a key but under-studied discourse – Community Participation (CP) – in the protection of biodiversity. The first case study is located in the Caribbean island of Saint Lucia and relates to corals. The second is in the Brazilian Pantanal, the world’s largest wetland. Data were collected over four months of fieldwork, using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, focus groups and written material. To capture a broader diversity of power mechanisms, a grid drawn from recent works in IR was mobilised for the first time in this type of study. An analytical framework was also built that allows testable implications to be derived from macro-narratives and compared with micro-data.

Rather than engendering empowerment, it appears that CP has essentially set in motion various containment dynamics affecting local stakeholders. Yet, while our data impressively fit the critical narrative, they also underscore its fragilities and contingency. At local levels, global governance discourses can no longer be seen as “singular and accepted”, but rather as “contested and reinterpreted”. They do not produce either emancipation or domination per se. They are most fruitfully analysed as tools thrown into local arenas which rent-seeking actors scramble to seize and use for their own ends. This significance of local dynamics undermines notions of North-South dependency or global governmentality. Data favour a hegemony model of the exercise of power that works through alliances and compromises amongst global and local groups within what we call “power formations”.

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ACRONYMS

AFD  Agence Française de Développement
     French Development Agency

APA  Areas de Proteção Ambiental
     Environmentally Protected Areas

APANMER  Associação dos Pantaneiros da Margem Esquerda do Rio Aquidauana
          Pantaneiro Association of the Left Bank of the Aquidauana River

APPAN  Associação de Pousadas Pantaneiras
        Association of the Pantanal's Lodges

APPEP  Associação de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da Escola Pantaneira
        Association of Partners, Parents and Teachers for Pantaneira Schools

AVRN  Associação do Vale do Rio Negro
        Association of the Rio Negro Valley

BoD   Board of Directors (SMMA)

CANARI  Caribbean Natural Resources Institute

CIRAD  Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le
développement
        Center for International Cooperation in Agronomic Research for
        Development

CODEMS  Companhia de Desenvolvimento Economico de Mato Grosso do Sul
         Economic Development Company of Mato Grosso do Sul

CP    Community Participation

DFID  UK Department for International Development

DGIB  Directorate-General for External Relations (part of the EU Commission)

EDIBAP  Estudo de Desenvolvimento Integrado da Bacia do Alto Paraguai
        Study of the Integrated Development of the Upper Paraguay Basin

EDP   Economic Demonstration Project

EMBRAPA  Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária
          Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation

ENCORE  Environmental and Coastal Resources (USAID project in the Caribbean)

FADs  Fish Aggregating Devices

FAO   United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation

FEMAP  Fundação Estadual de Meio Ambiente do Pantanal
        State Foundation for the Environment of the Pantanal

FFEM  Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial
       French Fund for the Global Environment

FPNRF  Fédération des Parcs Naturels Régionaux de France
       Federation of France’s Regional Natural Parks
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| FUNAI   | Fundação Nacional do Índio  
*National Indian Foundation* |
| GEF     | Global Environment Facility |
| GTE     | Grupo de Troca de Experiencias  
*Exchange of Experience Group* |
| IBAMA   | Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis  
*Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Resources* |
| IBD     | Instituto Biodinâmico  
*Biodynamic Institute* |
| ICDPs   | Integrated Conservation and Development Projects |
| ICRAN   | International Coral Reef Action Network |
| IMAP    | *Instituto do Meio Ambiente Pantanal* (Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil)  
*Institute for the Environment of the Pantanal* |
| INGOs   | International Non Governmental Organisations |
| INREP   | Projeto INREP - Agenda de Pesquisa para a Bacia do Alto Paraguai e Pantanal  
*INREP Project - Institutions and Research for the Pantanal* |
| IPP     | Instituto do Parque do Pantanal  
*Pantanal Park Institute* |
| IR      | International Relations |
| IUCN    | International Union for the Conservation of Nature |
| MIASL   | Marine Industry Association of St. Lucia |
| NCA     | National Conservation Authority (St. Lucia) |
| NGOs    | Non Governmental Organisations |
| OECS    | Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States |
| OSCIP   | Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público  
*Civil Society Organization of Public Interest* |
| PCBAP   | Plano de Conservação da Bacia do Alto Paraguai  
*Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan* |
| PMA     | Piton Management Area |
| PMAAC   | Piton Management Area Advisory Committee |
| PRP     | Parque Regional do Pantanal  
*Pantanal Regional Park* |
| RPPNs   | Reservas Particulares do Patrimônio Natural  
*Private Natural Heritage Reserves* |
| SANParks| South African National Parks |
| SC      | Social capital |
| SDP     | Soufrière Development Programme |
| SEMA    | Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente (Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil)  
*State Secretariat for the Environment* |
| SIDA    | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| SLP     | St. Lucia Labour Party |
| SMMA    | Soufrière Maritime Management Association (or Area) |
SNUC
Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação
National system of conservation units

SODEPAN
Sociedade de Defesa do Pantanal
Society for the Defense of the Pantanal

SRDF
Soufrière Regional Development Foundation

TAC
Technical Advisory Committee (part of the SMMA 1994 management plan)

TFCAs
Transfrontier Conservation Areas

TNC
The Nature Conservancy

TWG
Technical Working Group (part of the SMMA 1994 management plan)

UFMS
Universidade Federal Mato Grosso do Sul
Federal University of Mato Grosso do Sul

UNDP
United Nations Development Program

UNEP
United Nations Environmental Programme

UNESCO
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNICEF
United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

UNIPAN
Uniao dos Pantaneiros da Nhecolandia
Association of the Pantaneiros of Nhecolândia

UNRISD
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

USAID
United States Agency for International Development

UWP
United Workers' Party (St Lucia)

VITPAN
Projeto do Vitelo do Pantanal
Pantaneiro Calf Project

WCS
Wildlife Conservation Society

WHO
World Health Organisation

WWF
World Wildlife Fund
FOREIGN WORDS

**Comitivas**  Large cattle herds. They move about the Pantanal during the dry season.

**Fazenda(s)**  Farm(s). In the Pantanal context, the word refers to private land properties.

**Fazendeiros**  Farmers. In the Pantanal context, the word refers to landowners.

**Municipios**  Urban or rural districts in Brazil.

**Pantaneiros**  As a noun, the word refers to the people living in the Pantanal.

**Pantaneiro, a**  As an adjective, the word means “from” or “related to” the Pantanal.

**Peons**  Peasants. In the Pantanal context, the word refers to rural employees.

**Pousadas**  Tourist lodges.
Introduction

Today’s world is filled with global discourses that make promises of emancipation and progress. Whether these focus on human rights, gender equality, sustainable development, democracy, good governance, or the fight against poverty, they provide aspirations for mankind that individuals can share in their heart of hearts, that states and civil societies can strive for and that the international community has been promoting in official terms and successive waves since 1945. Although far less constraining than institutional arrangements, discourses do provide significant drivers and components of global coordination phenomena. Thus, global governance as a multi-level process of international co-operation — or rather synchronization — does not only develop through institutions but also through discourses. These cut across borders, mobilise and interact with a large variety of agents and contexts, translate into countless initiatives, projects, events, networks, partnerships, modes of actions, methodologies, etc. They have the ability to inspire myriads of public and private actors in both northern and southern countries. In this sense, “global discourses” are essential to current forms of international collective action — which is increasingly meant to become “hyper-collective”.1

Global discourses are more than cognitive or linguistic phenomena comprising words, ideas and theories. They encompass all kinds of practices, formal and informal, such as work methods, procedures, policy recommendations, advocacy strategies, professional or civil society networks, etc. The interconnection of these practices can “create a story”, “make sense” (Selby, 2007) and emerge as a “power-knowledge structure” competing with others in framing what is legitimate or even merely thinkable in a given issue area. Global discourses may be characterised on the basis of their primary focus; how they identify problems and issues; what kinds of solutions they advocate; what assumptions they make about desirable changes; what community they refer to or how they relate to other discourses. They can also be looked at from a more empirical and impact-oriented viewpoint, exploring how they translate and are implemented on the ground and how they affect the lives of people.

1 Charnoz & Severino, 2008.
This is the line of enquiry that this study primarily follows as it concerns itself with the local power effects of global governance discourses.

**Questioning the power effects of global discourses: bringing large narratives under scrutiny**

Many of today's leading global discourses shaping global governance talk the language of rights, democracy and the rule of law. Although they also encompass other concerns, such as the environment, they seem to draw their inspiration, basic norms and ideals largely from an identifiable strand of philosophical thought: Liberalism. Of course, there are many possible definitions and understandings of this latter notion, but there is also a fairly large agreement among historians, political scientists and philosophers that, since the Enlightenment, a recognisable ethical and political outlook has emerged that stresses the social, economic and political freedoms of individuals, their equal moral dignity and a belief in rationalism and human progress. It is this intellectual tradition that we refer to under the broad (and debatable) heading of “liberalism”, following authors such as Gray (1996, pp.286-287).

Politicians and scholars alike tend to have readily available opinions about how global liberal discourses are impacting the world – or not. Certain observers see in their apparent diffusion a kind of “march of liberty” taking place in History: it helps to free individuals across the world in many different contexts and at many different levels – whether this involves increased political participation or asserting their sexual orientation or environmental rights. For the sake of convenience and clarity, we may refer to this rather celebratory view as the *emancipatory narrative* of global governance discourses.

On the other hand, some observers strongly disagree with such an optimistic view, which they find to be unduly naïve. They rather seek to “unmask, demystify, and expose the real from the apparent”\(^2\) and show *power* at work where *freedom* is said to be prevailing. In so doing, they build upon a well-established intellectual tradition marked by great “Masters of Suspicion”\(^3\) among whom Marx stands prominently. While the emancipatory narrative stresses dynamics of empowerment in global discourses, a range of *critical narratives* underline the phenomena of domination –

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\(^2\) Ricoeur, 1970, p.32.

\(^3\) As Paul Ricoeur refers to Marx, Freud or Nietzsche.
operating through either the dominance of Western countries (building on the concept of dependency), the self-surveillance of individuals through internalised “knowledge” (governmentality) or the alliances of various social forces underpinning a given world order (hegemony). In this type of perspective – one we may broadly call the critical narrative – global governance discourses are seen as fostering hidden forms of social control, strengthening pre-existing power structures and in the end various forms of domination.

Such competing accounts of power are arguably ubiquitous in the work of International Relations (IR) scholars, whether they play out explicitly or implicitly. Yet, as Barnet and Duvall (2005) point out, the issue of power in global governance remains largely under-studied and the same holds true for its global discourses. Such emancipatory or critical narratives are rarely put under direct scientific scrutiny and analysed in empirical terms, and little attention is paid to relevant empirical work done in the context of other academic disciplines. Thus, ready-made views often seem to replace detailed fact-based analysis. Recognising this culprit, some IR scholars have recently called upon their discipline to “interweave new directions in international relations theory with local level case studies [so as to reveal] the usefulness and the weaknesses of meta-narratives” (Duffy, 2004, p.307).

The present study may be included within this research programme. It aims to contribute to assessing the emancipatory and critical narratives of global discourses on the basis of locally gathered empirical data. It does so by taking issue with a key but vastly under-studied discourse of contemporary global governance, namely that of Community Participation (CP). It further looks at its empirical effects in a specific issue area of global policy making – the protection of global biodiversity. This is done through two local case studies, one located in Brazil and one in St. Lucia, a small Caribbean island-state.

In the next few pages, we shed light on the rationale for our three-step case study selection (selecting a discourse, a policy area and two field studies); we explain how we addressed the core methodological challenge of this work (comparing macro narratives to micro field data); we introduce some of the key concepts we use (notably on various forms of power); finally, we provide an overview of the empirical material touched upon as well as some of the main conclusions that emerge from their analysis.

Introduction – 3
The global discourse on "Community Participation": a hard test for the critical narrative

This study's research strategy thus consists of "zooming in" from concerns about global governance discourses in general to their application in particular cases. It first selects and puts under scrutiny a specific global discourse. Second, it focuses on a specific issue area of global policy making. Third, it identifies actual local case studies that allow for fieldwork.

Among the many discourses that can be studied to enquire into the validity of power narratives, one may particularly think of considering Human Rights or Development discourses. They both evidently qualify as strong global discourses that are part and parcel of current forms of global governance, permeating many formal and informal global arrangements, initiatives, organisations, calls for action, etc.

This research, however, chose to focus on the discourse on Community Participation (CP). CP carries a general message in virtually all policy fields to give a more active role to local stakeholders, especially those who have little economic or political power. It bears strong connections with concerns over democracy and is often supported as a tool to achieve "real" democracy. It is also underpinned by more technical or instrumental rationales according to which local policies are better designed, implemented and cost-efficient if affected people are involved from the outset – from design to implementation and evaluation.

The key reason for the choice of CP as our object of enquiry is that it is intimately connected to the emancipatory narrative and calls into question, by its very existence, the validity of the critical narrative. It thus constitutes in itself a hard-case or a hard-test for the critical narrative of global governance discourses, whose validity seems a priori doubtful when applied to a discourse entirely devoted to tackling domination phenomena. CP is indeed illustrative of a range of liberal values linked to talks about individual rights and freedoms, good governance, the need to address inequalities, social injustice and the rest.

Another reason why CP was chosen as our case study is that it is much less in the spotlight of research and public debate than the two aforementioned global discourses. It is also far less acknowledged and documented as an actual and active global discourse. Illustratively, if one types "global discourse on human rights" into Google, one finds over 4,000 hits, 700 for "global discourse on development", but
only one for “global discourse on participation” and one for “global discourse on community participation”.4

CP has nevertheless taken root as a cross-cutting discourse in most areas of global governance. Whether in international health, development aid, poverty reduction, the promotion of gender equality, environmental protection, water management, fair trade or conflict prevention, the call for broader community participation in policy initiatives has been growing fast. Since the early 1970s, this broad-spectrum theme has indeed emerged in global forums. States, multilateral organisations, bilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundations, think tanks, local or global activists as well as the media. The whole world seems to share a common enthusiasm for CP principles, as reflected in an ever-increasing number of comments, work procedures, international declarations and political commitments. CP has imposed itself as a rarely publicly rebutted or contested principle – despite a more critical academic literature.

CP carries and spreads a set of core practices which are part and parcel of this global discourse. They are especially concerned with the mobilisation of local communities, the facilitation of participatory processes and their institutionalisation into dedicated organisations. The first set of practices, related to mobilisation, relies upon a social technology of action-oriented meetings that help “involve” and “engage with” community members – through large-scale public gatherings, smaller workshops and focus groups as well as standing bodies bringing together various stakeholder “representatives”. A second group of practices is concerned with the concept of facilitation whereby an external agent holding no official decision-making authority helps local groups to be more effective and efficient in solving conflicts, planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating. Facilitation is thus largely presented as a neutral and “agendaless” function that does not influence outcomes – something that obviously needs to be questioned. Third and finally, a last set of key operational practices relates to the way CP tends to be institutionalised. Participatory schemes, whatever their policy field, are generally “based on a set of rules and one or more organisations in charge of developing, interpreting and implementing such rules on an on-going basis, as well as responding to varying circumstances and needs” (IUCN, 2004, p.47). What this study is thus enquiring into are the local power effects

4 These were the figures at the end of September 2010.
of such practices and how they help understand, in turn, the nature of the global discourse on CP.

Yet, taking issue with the CP discourse is still too wide an angle to study global governance discourses at work and impacts "on the ground". A policy area needs to be selected. To do so, it seemed especially important to choose one that first and foremost witnessed the development of the CP discourse, one that has been instrumental in extending and developing it on the global stage as well as at the local level. The protection of global biodiversity is certainly one such area. The history of this global governance area dates back at least to the end of the 19th century. It has gone through different waves of practices and has harboured debates over "participation" as early as – or even before – the field of development. Along with the latter, it is the primary global issue area in which CP came to be conceptualised and implemented. In other words, biodiversity protection is a very "mature" field where CP has developed and where learning processes have already taken place: it thus constitutes in its own way another "hard case" and "hard test" for the critical narrative.

discourse already has a long history,

The methodological challenge: comparing macro-narratives with field data on power outcomes

The key methodological challenge faced in this research is to enable a comparison between two macro-narratives of power and a set of micro-empirical data drawn from fieldwork – in other words, from actual CP schemes (or "participatory projects") in biodiversity protection. The link between the macro and the micro, and what renders the comparison possible, are the logical expectations of the large narratives about what is supposed to be occurring on the ground. These are a priori expectations that need to be logically deduced from the nature of the narratives, crossed with a detailed understanding of CP schemes in their various dimensions. If this research is properly done, two contrasting series of empirical expectations may be then drafted and compared with actual field data.
Enabling such a dialogue requires the construction of an analytical framework that helps classify empirical findings in a systematic fashion, so as to compare them with logical expectations from the narratives. To this end, this study develops an original nine-step analytical grid\(^5\) to conceptualise and empirically assess the genesis, implementation and impact of community participation in projects related to biodiversity protection. This framework first questions CP schemes in terms of who created them, who participates (narrow or broad sections of the community), at what stage (from project identification to evaluation), how active participation is (from passive to more active forms) as well as how socio-economic costs and benefits are allocated across stakeholders. Further looking at impacts, it also enquires into the reallocation of local decision-making power, the modification of the balance and mechanisms of social control (how local behaviour is framed), their connection to market forces and how these dynamics interact with the community’s social capital. A wide range of tailor-made concepts and typologies are thus introduced as part of this analytical framework to help identify precise empirical expectations in such a manner that they become readily applicable to field data.

In general terms, as will be argued, the emancipatory narrative expects CP schemes to originate within the local community rather than be imported by external actors, to display active and socially inclusive participatory processes and lead to a relatively balanced allocation of costs and benefits among local groups and individuals. It also expects a relatively balanced form of co-management to take place with public authorities ensuring a significant influence of the local community itself, few exclusionary processes (that we call “containment processes”) affecting minority groups, increased market opportunities for most locals – as well as the strengthening of local social capital, thus enabling even more collective action in the future. Conversely, the critical narrative will tend to expect CP schemes to rather originate from outside the community, be far narrower and elite-centred in their design and governance, be more nominal and passive than active and lead to a more uneven allocations of benefits, favouring dominant actors. From a critical standpoint, CP is also expected to provide non-local actors with significant local influence, turn the

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\(^5\) The nine dimensions of CP schemes under analysis are the following: 1) CP origins; 2) inclusiveness; 3) scope; 4) intensity; 5) allocation of costs and benefits; 6) effects on power formations; 7) effects on social control; 8) effects through marketisation and commodification; 9) interactions with social capital.
“rhetoric” of emancipation into stronger practices of social control weighing upon “cumbersome groups”, enhance inegalitarian market-led phenomena and weaken, on the whole, local social capital. In the critical literature, the CP discourse has been particularly analysed as contributing to the expansion of the global capitalist order (e.g. Marti & Ritchie, 1999; Mohan & Stocke, 2000; Miraftad, 2004; Berner & Phillips, 2005; McCarthy James, 2005; Bosman, 2007).

These two lists of expectations may look like one-sided caricatures that cannot withstand the test of local complexities for even one minute. Do not standard wisdom and experience in empirical research together suggest that the truth will lie somewhere in the middle? Still, these lists flow quite logically from large narratives that are commonly used in macro-debates in IR, so setting them against local empirical data is always a contribution – and a relatively rare one. Moreover, as we shall see, one narrative stands the test of reality much better than the other and the way empirical analysis renders the picture more complex and refined is not merely to say that things are “grey”, or “in the middle” – but to allow a better understanding how things work and what factors catalyse outcomes.

**Understanding the diversity of power mechanisms at work**

Looking at power outcomes at field level, understanding how and why they play out as they do and comparing them with the expectations of large narratives, constitute the central endeavour of this research. However, if we are to understand how outcomes are produced, power mechanisms must also be researched, such as through what channels global discourse impacts local contexts and how the discourse is used, manipulated or contested by various stakeholders. In other words, this research is not only concerned with effects but also with “why” and “how” questions, as these can further a deeper assessment of the two narratives under scrutiny.

Access to data in the study of local power relations is extremely difficult given the subtle social interactions involved, the significance of the stakes, and the consequent reluctance of many actors – both dominating and dominated – to hand over information. There is also a fundamental conceptual challenge in this type of enquiry: power comes in various forms and expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation. Most commonly, the social science literature describes “power” in terms of an actor A directly controlling an actor B. Concentrating just on this form, however, creates blind spots and black holes in the analysis. As Lukes (1975)
pointed out, actors are for instance sometimes silently pushed into abiding by the will of others, while presuming to serve their own interests. One may thus define “subjective interests” as those that “are consciously articulated and observable”, whereas “objective interests” (or “real interests”) are the goals and desires that actors “would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice” (Lukes, 1975, p.34).

As this shows, power requires a very comprehensive analysis that goes far beyond immediately observable interactions. This is especially the case when trying to identify the power channels of a global discourse and how these are utilised by various actors. Drawing on Lukes and Foucault, Barnett and Duvall (2005) provide a suitably comprehensive grid that we use throughout this study. It pulls together complementary conceptions of power. The typology they build is based on a definition of power as “the production of effects that shape the actions or conditions of existence of actors” (p.18). They then identify four forms of such power relations, each requiring to be explored in local case studies. Compulsory power refers to the direct control of an actor A over an actor B, by the use of material and ideational resources to produce incentives or constraints. Institutional power relates to the indirect control of A over B through the mediation of institutions, such as organisations or markets. Structural power provides privileged positions to certain actors through the reinforcement of long-standing binary social relations and categories – for instance land owners vs. rural employees. Finally, productive power grants privileged positions to certain actors through the strengthening of new and emerging discourses that reshape identities and legitimate knowledge.

Selecting local case studies
This research adopts a qualitative approach on local case studies, as this method alone enables the in-depth exploration of local power relations that is required to compare macro-narratives to micro-facts. Data were collected during more than four months of fieldwork (19 weeks), using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, focus groups and a mass of written documents of all kinds. To better capture structural effects of the CP discourse, and so as not to misinterpret or over-generalise singular features, it was also decided to base the empirical enquiry upon two case studies. The following seven criteria led the selection process.

First, we felt that each case study must first and foremost clearly epitomise the CP discourse. This was achieved by focusing on environmental endeavours entirely
embedded in strong and official concern with community participation, leading
notably most technical aspects and institutional practices.

Second, if we are to exemplify a global discourse, a good way to proceed is to select
at least one world famous example of a participatory scheme. This case study should
be widely acknowledged by practitioners, policy makers, academics and various
international actors as providing a good example of a “best practice” and how CP can
be most skilfully applied. This way, we deal with a triply hard case (or test) for the
critical narrative, since not only does the CP discourse in itself contradict the key
claims of this narrative, not only is biodiversity protection one of the most mature
policy fields in terms of CP, but also an officially successful implementation of CP
should be even more difficult to contradict for this narrative. Consequently, if the
latter still proves pertinent for describing this triply hard case, its relevance would be
manifested with even more strength.

Third, not only should we select a famous example of an officially “successful”
participatory scheme, but we should also consider a CP endeavour that turned out to
be less successful or sustainable. It seems indeed important to look at both instances
of so called “success” and “failure” when studying the empirical incarnations of a
global discourse. Critical theorists rightly argue that “failed projects” impact the
world just as much as successful ones. Ferguson (1990), for instance, famously
argues that failed development projects have strong side-effects such as increasing
state bureaucracy or centralising power, which says a lot about the inner nature and
meaning of these interventions. As he explains: “Developers set up projects that
almost systematically ‘fail in their own terms’ but nonetheless have regular and
standard effects that can be identified” (ibid., p.18). Therefore, “important political
effects may be realised almost invisibly alongside with [a] failure” (ibid., p.255).

Following Foucault (1975), Ferguson even calls these side-effects “instrument-
effects” because although they may be officially unintended, they seem to be
“instruments of what turns out to be an exercise of power” (Ferguson, 1990, p.255).
Thus, if one wants to study the final impacts of a global governance discourse in both
its diversity and core coherence, the spectrum of case studies definitely needs
broadening to include examples of recognised failures. Moreover, we also need to
pay attention to differences between narratives in explaining failures. While the
emancipatory narrative may argue that a failed CP scheme was improperly
implemented, the critical outlook may point to more fundamental problems with CP at the outset, and make the case that “failure” was inbuilt from the start. In our case study selection, we thus need to include an example of an “unsuccessful” project which was nevertheless strongly built and carried out on the basis of the CP discourse.

Fourth, in each case study, social processes of participation should have developed and been in existence for a significant period. For this purpose, we have set a rather arbitrary but safe minimum of ten years. This precaution allows for better observation of the sustainability of CP institutions over time, their structural impacts on the community, social capital and connections to markets, as well as the local response to potential frustrations and changing contexts.

Fifth, each case study must relate to a set of natural resources of unquestionable importance for global biodiversity and the international community. This is to ensure that we deal with cases that embody important issues for global governance.

Sixth, the interactions between local stakeholders and the given natural resources should be strong, not weak. In other words, the local socio-economic context should carry significant risks for global biodiversity. This is to make sure that participation does actually relate, in our case studies, to relevant issues of global governance concern.

Last but not least, case studies must offer the practical possibility for an independent researcher to gather the necessary empirical data and to reasonably put into practice the analytical framework we devised – which identifies nine dimensions of CP schemes and four different power forms. This means that we had to make sure beforehand that access to relevant informants and documents would be likely.

On this basis, and after reviewing more than 20 potentially qualifying CP schemes in biodiversity protection in eleven countries, two emerged as especially relevant and offered the prospect of high quality data.

**Caring for the corals? CP in Soufrière, in St. Lucia**

The first case study has to do with community participation in coral reef protection in a small coastal town called Soufrière, on the Caribbean island of Saint Lucia. The project at stake has often been hailed as a leading example of CP at its best, given its supposed ability to reduce conflicts and achieve good environmental impacts. The
United Nations Environmental Programme, for instance, expects it “to continue to serve as a ‘best practice’ example for the region” (UNEP-CEP, 2000, p.5), while the International Coral Reef Action Network praises it as a key example of “success” in the Caribbean (ICRAN, 2003, p.4). It was awarded various international prizes and is widely presented as a “best practice” in environmental policy circles. In a standard practitioner handbook, for instance, the SMMA is unambiguously presented as a “success story” (Salm & Clark, 2000, p.282).

In Soufrière, a rise in tourism and a continuation of fishing activities had resulted, at the end of the 1980s, in a degradation of coral reefs and a series of conflicts over who has the right to use coastal waters; where, when and how. After some disappointing top-down state-led regulations, the CP discourses stepped in. A process of community consultation and participation started in 1991 and a first “participatory consensus” was produced in 1994. This was formalised in the creation of a participatory institution, the SMMA (Soufrière Maritime Management Association) and a zoning map dividing and allocating spaces to various economic actors. Since then, the SMMA is said to have had significant results in terms of both biodiversity protection and economic yield (e.g. FFEM, 2008).

Nevertheless, we shall argue that despite strong acclaims for its “community participation”, the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and allocation of benefits of this participatory scheme all point to the small space left for its primary (and weakest) stakeholders: the coastal fishers. The SMMA has neither been set up by – nor connected to – the wider local community. It rather embodies a “power formation” that handed over local influence to a set of interest groups at the national level, as well as foreign NGOs, experts and donors. Its divorce from coastal fishers – who are nevertheless its prime natural stakeholders – has been fast and their “participation” has totally collapsed. It is not through the ad hoc “participatory institution” that was created (the SMMA) but rather through parallel political strife that the poorer fishers have been able, at some points in time, to make their critical interests heard. The myth of “ongoing institutional dialogue” has been maintained throughout but it does not fit what is observed on the ground and in local history. Nowadays, CP in Soufrière, while still receiving praise from international donors and environmental policy circles, has taken an absolute minimal form with almost no inputs from locals. Strong bursts of compulsory, institutional and productive power
can be identified, which combined to disempower fishers from what was nonetheless labelled an “exemplary” CP scheme.

Thus in Soufrière, the empirical expectations of the critical narrative find themselves largely confirmed. In arguing so, we also take note of the SMMA’s impact on the social fabric of the local community. First, we look at changes in social control, namely the way certain people have seen their behaviour increasingly framed and contained, while others have been left unmonitored and unquestioned. Second, we claim that this new balance of social control has underpinned a continuous process of commodification that has helped transform local spaces — and even people’s behaviour — into more tradable assets on the international tourism market. Third, and finally, we investigate how the CP process has interacted with the social capital of the community. The inability of the lay people to engage with institutions left the poorer parts of the community with little choice but political unrest or psychological withdrawal once “the system” (as many call it) had won and once things started to seem irreversible. Meanwhile, Soufrière’s low social capital also paved the way for the SMMA to be overtaken by non-community actors. In this process, local influence has been transferred to a mixed coalition made up of stronger economic actors, governmental authorities, foreign donors and some conservationists. This alliance, however, does not have the capacity to address current local environmental challenges.

Caring for the wetlands? CP in the Pantanal, Brazil

Our second field study relates to a vast participatory initiative that took place right in the heart of South America – namely the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP or Parque Regional do Pantanal). This park was meant to create a large-scale environmental management scheme with highly inclusive governance based on CP principles. It was designed for the largest freshwater wetland in the world, the Pantanal, and managed by a participatory institution, the Pantanal Park Institute (IPP), which can be seen as the counterpart of the SMMA in our St. Lucian case study.

With technical and financial support from the French government, the European Union and the local Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul, the PRP was conceived as a voluntary association of local landowners (fazendeiros) pledging to follow a common environmental charter. In return, they were to receive the support of a range of partners to help reinforce their “traditional way of life” (based on extensive cattle-
ranching) held to be “environmentally friendly”. Within a few years, however, the PRP experienced growing financial and management problems leading to the closure of all of its operations in the summer of 2005. Having managed large sums of money, the PRP had raised significant hopes and its collapse has left deep wounds.

What appears in the Pantanal experience is a more complex picture than in St. Lucia. Some features are shared, notably the fact that the PRP project was neither originated by nor connected to the wider local community, as it turns out, but rather to a limited set of active and self-interested people. Its origins were rather elite-centred, while the initiative was to a large extent financially supported and conceptually influenced “from outside”, by foreign expertise. However, while in Soufrière the CP discourse resulted in coherent containment dynamics, weighing upon the poorer coastal fishers so as to clear the ground for more modern economic activities, the PRP experience displays multiple and often contradictory processes of containment. It is thus a complex “mille feules containment”\(^6\) that needed to be dissected.

The first “layer” of containment stemmed from the will of the long-established local producers to counter the rising forces of environmental conservationists in the Pantanal, as well as incoming economic actors. These intentions were embodied in the discourse on traditions, exalting the “local community”, which permeated the whole initiative. While “greening” the landowners and making them appear more environment-friendly that they probably were, this rhetoric also reinforced their structural position by presenting them as forming the very core of the “traditional community” – and thus enjoying most of its legitimacy. This provided the second layer of containment observable in this CP scheme, one that pushed other local actors well into the background and deprived them of any important voice: for example, the rural employees as well as the traditional fishers living in the Pantanal for generations.

But matters did not stop there. Still other processes of containment appeared in the course of implementation, this time affecting the landowners themselves. The will of the foreign donors to make civil society more “plural”, the consequent weakening and de-legitimisation of the only locally functioning community organisation, as well as the institutionalisation of CP into a formal organisation (the so-called IPP,

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\(^6\) *Mille feuilles* ("a thousand leaves") is a typical French cake composed of many layers of thin pastry dough. It is often used as a metaphor to depict a system composed of a great many different levels.
managed by full-time staff members and several foreign experts) resulted in the estrangement of the vast majority of the fazendeiros from the whole scheme. Meanwhile, a full-fledged political capture developed under pressure from a few local politicians with unclear agendas but real destabilising effects on the governance of the PRP. This whole scramble resulted in the final collapse of the community project.

Yet, a complete understanding of these multi-layered containment processes requires going beyond the analysis of their power effects and mechanisms, to look for their "catalysts" – in other words, what enabled such disempowering dynamics to play out so strongly. This is where social capital comes in. It is argued that the symbiotic paternalism in which the rural employees have been embedded for generations largely prevented their voice from being heard at any stage of the PRP process. At the same time, the landowners' long-standing social preference for individualism and informalism in their social interactions laid the foundation for their inability to take control of the participatory organisation they were meant to lead.

What took place in the Pantanal, therefore, does surely not underpin the emancipatory narrative. While exemplifying the critical narrative, this experience at the same time challenges it. This narrative is indeed confirmed insofar as participation does turn out to be extremely weakened. Yet, the reasons for this do not particularly fit many potential critical expectations, especially those related to the concepts of dependency and governmentality. It is not because a set of hegemonic actors (such as international agencies or neoliberal forces) wrote the script and predefined what should happen – such as the furthering of “global capitalism”, which not observed in this context. What happened has more to do with the collision of primarily local forces, rent-seeking behaviours, a continuously reinterpreted CP discourse and other local factors (notably the social capital), and with the ensuing shifting balances of power, which are in no way easy to predict. Besides, outcomes are rendered even more dynamic over time by the fact that stakeholders can see their capacity for collective action further strengthened or weakened depending on their own iterative reactions to frustrations. They can either increasingly mobilise or “give up”.

Introduction – 15
Organisation of the study

This study raises concerns about the local power effects of global discourses. The first chapter thus focuses on this latter notion and argues that many such discourses are part and parcel of global governance - just as much as institutions, which have captured nevertheless most of the attention of IR scholars. It also characterises two basic narratives of power that are often used in relation to global governance and widespread discourses - one that emphasises domination and another emphasising the emancipation of affected people. While the critical narrative expects global governance discourses to foster mechanisms of social control and reinforce dominant power structures, the emancipatory narrative believes that they help empower the hitherto disempowered and call into question various power status quos. Various types of critical narratives are also explored, notably those based on concepts of dependency, governmentality and hegemony.

The second chapter brings under scrutiny a specific global discourse, namely that on Community Participation (CP), as well as a specific issue area of global governance, namely the protection of biodiversity. It is argued that CP has now become a global discourse active in virtually all areas of international policy making. It also reviews its historical rise and shows that foreign policy concerns - notably those of the United States - were instrumental to its worldwide diffusion, as a way of engaging with the world’s rural masses in the Cold War context. The chapter further explores the mechanics of the CP discourse by pointing to its system of signification, the way it produces a shared and appealing “common sense”, as well as the concrete policy practices it fosters. Finally, it shows how and on the basis of what concerns and promises community participation entered the biodiversity protection policy discourse. The empirical expectations of power narratives about CP in this field are also presented.

The third chapter builds a detailed framework to assess participatory processes in the field of biodiversity protection in order to formulate the precise empirical expectations of the two power narratives under scrutiny – expectations that are later to be compared to field observations. It also identifies various types of power phenomena that will be traced out in case studies.

The fourth chapter introduces our case study on the Soufrière Maritime Management Association (SMMA), based in St. Lucia. It provides background information on the
Soufrière context to show how tensions around coral reefs had been developing for years. It then analyses the genesis of the SMMA participatory scheme, its originating agents and initial consultation process. It next scrutinises the way the SMMA has been implemented in practice as an institution, its inclusiveness, scope, participatory intensity and allocation of benefits over time.

The fifth chapter follows up the analysis of the SMMA by focusing on its impact on the social fabric of the local community. It first looks at changes in social control, namely the way certain people have seen their behaviour increasingly framed and contained, while others have been left unmonitored and unquestioned. Second, it argues that a continuous process of commodification has taken place, making local spaces and people more tradable assets in the international tourism market. Third, and finally, it investigates how the CP process has interacted with social capital of the community – its fragmentation, the inability of the weaker locals to deal with institutions and their psychological withdrawal from “the system”. On this basis, the fact that the critical narrative finds itself largely confirmed in St. Lucia is acknowledged but some limitations are also pointed out.

The sixth introduces our case study on the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP), in Brazil. It first shows the evolving use of the CP discourse in the Pantanal region reflecting the ongoing tension between principles of conservation vs. economic use of the environment. It then explores the genesis of the PRP project and sheds light on its in-built containment strategy against conservationist NGOs and new economic actors – and thus to attempt to give pre-eminence to long-established local producers. Finally, the chapter analyses the discourse of the PRP initiative itself, which magnifies the position of landowning cattle-ranchers as forming the core of the traditional community. This process took place to the detriment of lower social groups of the Pantanal, who were excluded from the design of the participatory park and, later, from its governance.

The last chapter looks at the implementation, the fate and the impact on the local community of the PRP project and shows that, ironically, CP helped to actually disempower the traditional landowners – contrary to its original strategic intent. It first points to the detrimental effects of the forced “pluralisation” of the local civil society advocated by the foreign donors and experts; namely, it “fabricated pluralism” (in the form of a swift and artificial multiplication of small associations),
fragmented local voices and paved the way for capture of the CP scheme by other forces. The chapter then looks at the deployment of institutional power – above all by local politicians – in the governance of the PRP, which became “politically captured”. It also investigates how the multiple containment processes identified in the PRP project were not only facilitated by the social capital of locals, but also impacted this capital. Finally, we underline the fact that the failure of this participatory scheme stimulated local frustrations that may be feeding a collective learning process. The way in which the critical strand of narratives is both simultaneously underpinned and qualified is also analysed.

The conclusion brings together the insights gained from the analysis of the empirical data and stresses the high empirical relevance of the critical narrative. However, it refutes a monolithic and deterministic view of this narrative by insisting on contingency and undetermined outcomes of various competing interest groups with rent-seeking behaviour. It also makes the case that data favour a view of the exercise of power that fits Gramsci’s concept of hegemony rather than notions of dependency or governmentality. When put into practice at the ground level, global governance discourses can no longer be seen as singular and accepted, but rather as contested and even manipulated by various local actors. Such processes dramatically widen the range of their potential outcomes. Processes of social resistance to containment are also observed, but greatly weakened by the social capital levels of the weakest stakeholders. On this basis, questions are raised about the global democratic impact of the CP discourse and ways for future research are suggested in order to better understand how participation and representation need to be distinguished, bridged or assisted by new processes, yet to be conceived.
Chapter 1 - The Local Power Effects of Global Discourses: a Neglected Research Agenda

This chapter makes the case that the study of global governance in IR currently suffers from a relative lack of emphasis on three significant research angles: power, discourses and micro-data. Power remains indeed a comparatively under-studied issue among global governance scholars, which is a paradoxical situation given the ubiquity of explicit or implicit power narratives in their work. Not only does power rarely constitute the upfront focus of research, but in cases where it does, the notion is rarely comprehensively conceptualised and therefore seldom fully addressed: only a limited set of forms of power are generally brought under scrutiny, leaving significant facts and trends in the dark. Second, when looking at global governance, IR scholars have tended to emphasise its institutional dynamics to the detriment of its discursive analysis: phenomena have been preferentially explored through the lens of institutions, although there is also great need for the lens of discourses. Third, the micro-level of global governance and how it impacts lay people remain relatively neglected in current research: the more macro-levels of global governance still attract most of the scholarly attention, through the analysis of big actors, big organisations, big negotiations and deals, big networks, etc.

We thus argue that a more balanced research agenda needs to be drawn up that puts stronger emphasis on power, discourses and micro-data in the study of global governance. Accordingly, this work’s research question is meant to contribute to addressing this call. By looking at the “local power effects of global discourses”, it brings together at the same time power concerns, discourses and micro-data. It thus hopes to make a useful contribution to redressing current research biases.

In the second half of the chapter, it is argued that, when it comes to global discourses, IR scholars often work and interpret data on the basis of large “power narratives” – which need far more empirical assessment than is currently provided. Narratives are popular syntheses of events that help to give a better understanding of complex
phenomena within the unified framework of a moving “world order”. They bring coherence to observations but also run the risk of over-simplifying or failing to capture the reality of things. While the emancipatory narrative insists upon the empowerment dynamics at work within and inspired by many global discourses, the view of various critical narratives is that mainstream global discourses tend to reinforce a range of pre-existing power structures and foster the “collapse of social emancipation into social control” (Santos, 1999, p.35). Three types of critical narratives are identified – centred on the concepts of dependency, governmentality and hegemony. In engaging with them, and testing their vision of current power dynamics, there is a need to bring in more data about what is actually happening “on the ground”, at the local level and impact point of global discourses. This is what this study aims at contributing to.

1.1. Studying Global Governance: Re-emphasising Discourses, Power & Micro-Data

This section makes the case that discourses, power and micro-level data remain paradoxically under-analysed in the IR literature on “global governance”.7 The gap is both conceptual and empirical, as to date only a few works in this field have tried to grasp power in its many forms and even fewer are underpinned by detailed fieldwork. Studying the local power effects of global governance discourse on the basis of micro-empirical data thus appears to be an essential path towards addressing these various gaps and furthering global governance studies. The last part of this section provides a preliminary approach to analysing global discourses with a view to understanding how they may impact local conditions.

1.1.1. The discursive gap

Most of the scholarship on global governance has been concerned with institutional design. Reflecting on two decades of academic writing on global governance, Hurrel (2005, p.33) notes that it mostly offers “sophisticated accounts of how institutions emerge and how they function; [as well as of] the strategic choices of liberal hegemons and how these choices may work to reinforce institutionalization”. Global

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7 See Appendix 1 for a review of the current use of the concept in the literature.
governance has thus been primarily analysed as a rising institutional system that deals with the management of international collective goods – such as the environment, financial stability or international trade. An institutional diversity is indeed manifest in terms of the levels of publicness (nature of participants), delegation (functions performed by ad hoc organisations) and inclusiveness (level of shared decisional power) of the many governance arrangements in existence (Koenig-Archipbugi, 2003). Scholars have been linking these variations to historical and political economy factors, as well as to the intrinsic characteristics of the collective goods at stake – such as the scope of their externalities (e.g. Kolliker, 2006). Such institutions have been further explored in terms of a dynamic interplay between institutional arrangements, be they “embedded, nested, clustered, overlapping or competing” (Young, 1999).

This strand of analysis – institutional design – is not only called upon to explain the shape of current global governance arrangements; it is also used in problem-solving contexts, as it logically leads to the search for the “optimal institution” in the face of a given issue of collective action. The institutional design approach typically tries to balance and cater for principles of accountability, effectiveness and legitimacy. This perspective is arguably the dominant paradigm of policy makers and scholars alike concerned with global governance, many of whom see their job as trying to “improve” institutions. Illustratively, this mode of thought permeates landmark publications of the United Nations Development Programme on the management of globalisation, which brought to the fore the concepts of “global public goods” or “global public finance” (e.g. Kaul, et al., 1999, 2003, 2006).

In the study of global governance, however, the focus on governance arrangements through institutions needs to be complemented by an equally systematic study of global discourses – such as Human Rights,8 Good Governance, Democracy, Gender, Development, or now Sustainable Development. At first, such discourses may be defined as “sets of concepts, categories, and ideas that provide ways to understand and act in the world, whether or not those who subscribe to them are aware of their existence” (Dryzek, 2006, preface, p.vi). Yet, they should not just be looked at as mere linguistic phenomena made of words, but as larger formations that encompass a

8 We use capital letters (e.g. Good Governance) when referring to well-established “global discourses”.

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whole range of macro and micro “practices”, and not limited to cognitive ones. In that sense, there are bridges between concepts and institutions. This approach entails looking beyond the large visible macro-institutions that are the most studied and discussed, and exploring those that may be stimulated by global discourses but are locally developed - and where a “micro-physics of power” is at work.

Michel Foucault is frequently referred to as the founder of “discourse analysis” but his legacy is too often summarised as a limited outlook on discourses as purely linguistic phenomenon.9 In his view, however, discourses do include theories, ideas and words but only as practices among many others, including very ordinary and concrete practices in micro-interactions. His message is very much that discourses are not primarily made of words but of practices, both formal and informal, related to both macro and micro phenomena. Their interconnections “create a story”, “make sense” (Selby, 2007) and carry “power-knowledge structures” framing what is thought of as legitimate, doable, etc. This approach, which we adopt, calls for an empirical analysis of discourses as “webs of related practices”.

Global discourses may be studied from a range of perspectives. Normative theorists may evaluate the strengths and merits of their explicit or embedded ethical claims, as well as the legitimacy of their procedural, regulatory and distributive outcomes. Rational choice scholars (such as realists or neoliberals) may look at what those discourses mean to individual or collective utility maximisers (such as states, interest groups or individuals): how they may constrain strategies or be used as tools to attain fixed goals, including the production of collective goods. Constructivists and cognitivists – who emphasise knowledge, ideas, socialisation and identities – may explore how actors become socialised into discourses, as well as how, over time, these discourses impact identities and institutional frameworks.

Institutional design and discourse analysis – even the most cognitive type – need not necessarily be opposed, although they need to be distinguished. To start with, attention to discourses is strongly grounded in the IR literature on institutions. One only needs to recall Krasner (1983) pointing to the cognitive nature of “international regimes” when defining them as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge”. Or as

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9 This more restricted view would be closer to Derrida’s claim that “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1967, p.163).
Ruggie (1982) put it: "International regimes are akin to a language – we may think of them as part of the language of state action....We know international regimes not simply by some descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but by their generative grammar, [their] underlying principles of order and meaning" (p.380).

Thus, informal or cognitive elements that are part of a discourse can complement or provide the very flesh of an international regime. Such elements may interact with formal institutions, providing their inter-subjective foundations and favouring some types of institutions over others. Global discourses, for instance, may be studied in terms of the levels of the *publicness, delegation* and *inclusiveness* they tend to promote in related institutional arrangements, whether global or local. These discourses may not readily determine institutional outcomes, since so many other factors apply – such as the nature of the collective good at stake, power relations among actors as well as contextual constraints. Still, cognitive and informal practices that are part of larger discourses can provide incentives towards specific institutional outcomes, based upon peer pressure, social identities or ideological congruence with larger principles or "regimes of truth".10

Nevertheless, cognitive and informal practices of global discourses also have a life of their own within global governance, away from institutional arrangements. In their own fashion, they can influence myriads of centralised or decentralised actors, organisational and individual behaviours, at various levels of governance or private action. Discourses are multi-scale thanks to their "fluid" nature and thus strongly adapted to global governance understood as a dynamic process of multi-scale of coordination. This fluidity can be a great contribution to "hyper-collective action" (Charnoz & Severino, 2009) through which highly heterogeneous actors try to act along somewhat coherent lines. Without any central authority or formal structure, discourses can roughly (and sometimes precisely) co-ordinate behaviours of individuals, grassroots associations, local communities up to multinational companies, nation-states and international organisations. They can prove crucial for the decentralised production of some complex collective goods – such as the

10 The global discourse on Community Participation that we study in this work is very much one such discourse, as it is geared towards the promotion of a very specific type of institutional arrangements: mixed participation (not limited to public stakeholders but inclusive of all stakeholders), high inclusiveness (a significant level of decisional power being shared) and low delegation (at least of legislative power, since ideal participation points towards the ideal of direct democracy).
protection of biodiversity, the harnessing of global energy consumption or the
management of transmissible diseases, areas that all need to involve countless actors
and even modify individual behaviours.

In the same way that prices are central to the functioning of markets (contributing to
the diffusion of information and co-ordination of economic decisions), discourses
may be instrumental to global “synchronizations” as they may lower transaction costs
more efficiently than formal institutions – for instance, if they manage to reshape
identities and socialise people into common norms. Furthermore, just like its
institutional dimension, the discursive dimension of global governance can also be
studied in terms of a dynamic interplay between discursive elements, whether they
are “embedded, nested, clustered, overlapping or competing” – as Young (1999) put
it regarding institutions. On these counts, scholars still have a long way to go to
deepen our understanding of discourses as part of global governance – and it is in this
line of enquiry that the present research has developed.

1.1.2. The power gap

Not only can a “discursive gap be seen in current IR research and policy analysis on
global governance, but a significant “power gap” may also be identified. Indeed,
much of this research has been and still is carried out as if power was a minor
question. Hurrel (2005, p.33-34), for instance, finds that “much of the writing on
governance and order over the past couples of decades has been rationalist in method
and technocratic in character...[which leaves us with] a strikingly apolitical and far
too cosy a view of institutions and of global governance”. Fuchs (2007, p.2) also
finds it “problematic” that “a substantial share of contributions to the global
governance debate, especially early on, failed to pay sufficient attention to the role of
power, the ‘key concept’ in political science”. Drawing on this fact, Barnett and
Duvall (2005) have recently refocused attention on the question of power in global
governance with a landmark publication on the subject. As they argue: “Global
governance without power looks very different from global governance with power...
By using the optics of power, we transform the image of global governance. No
longer is it solely concerned with the creation and maintenance of institutional
arrangements through consensual relations and voluntary choices. It now becomes a
question of how global life is organised, structured and regulated” (p.4-7).

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This “power gap” does not come from nowhere. The study of power has a long tradition in IR and has been largely associated with the realist school. However, even the strictest and most cynical realist approach is no guarantee of capturing the full range of power phenomena at work in the global society. This is because, in the realist view, “power” tends to be seen as “the ability of A to get B to do what it otherwise would not do”. The focus is placed on interactions and on who governs whom, based on material, ideational and institutional resources. Power can nevertheless take many other forms, including relations of constitution shaping identities. Such relations shed light on how actors are defined and formed as social beings, in relation to one another, with their respective interests and goals. The focus is less on who governs but rather on who is defined as governing. There is thus a need to rework power as a wider concept and adopt a broader approach to what it can mean, do and look like.

This conceptual gap has affected the analysis of power made by researchers in global governance studies. It has not been compensated – in fact, much to the contrary – by the outlook adopted by policy makers. Quite expectedly, the latter’s own approach to global governance is what Cox (1981) would call a “problem-solving approach”. It “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action” (p.128). In contrast, Cox defines and calls for a “critical approach” that does “not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (p.129).

The primary characteristic of each and every global governance discourse is very much to define and focus upon a “problem” – such as the “lack” of Human Rights, development or good governance in the world. Meanwhile, as Cox has it, “problems” are symptomatic of the historical and political context which brings them about. The way they are constructed and talked about, as well as the practices they entail, should themselves be the object of an enquiry since, in his view, theories that identify “problems” are created “for someone and for some purpose” (p.128). Critical analysis is about finding for whom and why, thus uncovering hidden power relations. As Foucault would put it, it is about uncovering the “political violence” contained in the working of discourses “which appear to be both neutral and independent” (quoted by
Rabinow, 1984, p.5). It calls to identify the interests, power structures and social forces these discourses reveal, protect or undermine. In this light, global discourses may “define the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a problem” (Hayward, 2000, p.35). They may contribute to delineate “what needs to be governed, who is authorised to govern, what counts as legitimate knowledge and whose voices are marginalised” (Barnett & Duval, 2005, p.22).

A larger critical analysis of power is thus needed in global governance that goes beyond both the realist and the problem-solving approaches. To capture the diversity of power relations, sufficient attention needs to be paid to dominant discourses as well as to relations of constitution. Such a framework will be devised in chapter 3 (section 3.2) drawing on Barnett and Duvall (2005).

1.1.3. The micro-data gap

A third manifest tendency in the current IR literature on global governance is its continuing emphasis upon “macro-levels”. Although vibrant and dynamic, this flow of research displays a focus on the study of large actors, large networks, large deals, large organisations and so on. Yet the more micro-level dynamics and the question of how local contexts and actors (including lay people) are impacted tend to be left out of the analysis when it comes to understanding what global governance is and does. There is no doubt, however, that much can be learnt about these two latter questions by looking at how local conditions are impacted by the components and dynamics of global governance, including global discourses. Studying this more micro-level should in fact be integral to most research agendas surrounding global governance.

This issue is what we suggest calling the “micro-data gap”. To make this term clearer, it is useful to distinguish two levels of reality in global governance, two “stages” where actions take place. The first stage is the “global stage”, the realm of international relations involving states, international organisations, international firms, international NGOs, etc. It is mostly populated by “global actors” working on “global issues” that are not strongly territorialised – as they do not primarily relate to a specific sub-national space and can potentially impact many such spaces. Simultaneously, there is also a “local stage” of global governance, where “local scenes” of world governance are played out, interventions take place and local actors, such as local authorities, communities, civil society actors, etc., are involved or
impacted. To illustrate this point, we may say for instance that G20 negotiations are part of the "global stage", while setting up a protected nature reserve somewhere in the world – involving global NGOs and donors – is much more part of the "local stage". These two stages, however, should be understood as the two extremities of a continuum, as they interact in many ways – for instance, through global discourses.

Indeed, discourses form a primary channel through which global dynamics can impact local contexts. It would be unfair to say that there has been no or even little empirical work done on such global discourses. They have, in fact, attracted a good deal of attention, especially from constructivists IR scholars, who place a strong focus on norm diffusion, socialisation and internalisation processes. Yet, the study of the impacts of global discourses has mobilised far less attention than their diffusion, around which a significant theoretical and empirical literature has developed (e.g. Dobbin, et al., 2007).

Such global discourses relate in concreto to convergence phenomena of varying intensities involving public or civil society actors in countless contexts and countries. In the words of Pollitt (2001), rhetorical convergence takes place when "everybody" begins to talk and write about similar concepts in such a way that a particular idea becomes generalised subject matter. Decisional convergence is when analogous principles become enshrined across borders in laws, regulations, codes of conduct, organisational charters, etc. Practical convergence occurs when people and institutions start working in similar ways, adopting particular organisational forms, policy models, techniques, modes of action, etc. As for results convergence, this may emerge when changes in practice produce their intended and unintended effects but many other factors may influence outcomes. "Global discourses", thus, primarily relate to convergences on words, rules and work methods affecting various policy fields. They are thus to be defined as sets of practices, not simply limited to linguistic ones. Yet, again, the study of their micro-impacts has mobilised far less attention than their diffusion, which is amply studied in the theoretical and empirical literature.11

There is thus a need to re-emphasise the collection and analysis of micro-data to understand the end-nature of global discourses through their actual field-level impact.

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11 See Appendix 2 for a review of this literature.
1.1.4. Analysing “global discourses”: a preliminary approach

Looking at the micro-impacts of global discourses requires a preliminary analysis in order to divide them up into their core identifiable cognitive elements and concrete practices. Once this framework is in place, we are better prepared to systematically screen how discourses come to shape local realities. In this section, we present such a framework, which we then use in the next chapter.

Global discourses – as any other discourse – may be analysed on the basis of their primary concerns; how they define problems and issues; what solutions they advocate and implement; what assumptions they make about desirable changes; and who supports them and how they relate to other discourses (Walters & Williams, 2003). It is critical, however, to realise that what happens in the implementation of a given discourse may be very different from what is intended: end results may be “only ironically or paradoxically related to it” (ibid., p.73). There may be huge variations as to how a global discourse impact local conditions in theory and practices as well as across time and places. Drawing on Milliken (1999), we may suggest the following four-tier framework.

A first level of analysis is to study discourse as a system of significations constructing social realities. Drawing on de Saussure, emphasis is given to the relationships in which things are placed in a sign system – and to relations by which objects are distinguished from one another (de Saussure, 1913). Drawing on Derrida, discourses are expected to be typically structured in terms of binary oppositions, such as educated/ignorant, modern/traditional, Western/Third World, etc. These oppositions, far from being neutral, establish a relation of power: one element in the pair is typically privileged (Derrida, 1972).

Another angle of discourse analysis addresses discourse productivity, namely the fact that discourses are productive (or reproductive) of things defined in the discourses. Beyond giving a language for speaking about phenomena, they privilege certain ways of being and acting while excluding others. As Dryzek (1997) or Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2008) emphasise, discourses are powerful in the way they delimit options for the interpretation of information: they may “facilitate action, while at the same time they can blind their proponents to seeing alternative interpretations and actions” (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008, p.51). Milliken identifies two fundamental levels of discourse productivity.
First is the production of common sense, namely how things are constructed as natural. Weldes (1999) identifies two basic techniques of common sense production: articulation (of the discourse with pre-existing cultural elements) and interpellation (of individuals, specific interest groups or the general public). Articulation means the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of "cultural raw materials" and "linguistic resources" that already make sense within a particular society (ibid., p.154). In combining and recombining existing cultural materials, a discourse can look inherently connected to them and therefore look like a natural and accurate description of reality (ibid., p.154-155). As for interpellation, it refers to how these representations work to "hail" individuals – or support certain interest groups – so that they become personally and emotionally involved and come to accept the representations as natural and accurate. To do so, discourses create subject positions or identities for individuals to identify with and to "speak from" (ibid., p.163).

The production of policy practices is the second issue in discourse productivity. Analysing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying the operationalisation of discursive categories – for instance in the activities of governments, international organisations or local NGOs. Standard procedures, deployed in a variety of settings, may produce "standard effects" (Ferguson, 1990, p.260) that may be quite different from official discourses. For example, a decentralisation policy may consistently although paradoxically increase the influence of the central authorities upon local actors. This type of study is rarely taken up in mainstream International Relations and Milliken suggests that far more should be done. It is precisely within this line of enquiry that the present study is situated.

The last level of analysis is a study of the production and reproduction of discourses. Even hegemonic global discourses are changeable and historically contingent. They need work to be produced and reproduced through a "play of practices" – and such efforts are not necessarily successful. Various methods are used in IR to show the contingency of discourses and how they shape "reality" and neglect alternative views. In the deconstructive method, the contingent nature of a discourse is revealed through an internal textual analysis showing how "realities" that are presented as basic or evident can be actually reversed or displaced. The juxtapositional method points to events and issues that the discourse under analysis fails to acknowledge or address. The next method focuses on subjugated knowledges: it explores alternative discourses
that contradict dominant ones. Finally, in the *genealogical method*, the contingency of discourses is underscored through an historical study of discursive practices.

On this analytical basis, it becomes possible to unfold seemingly unitary discourses into their various cognitive mechanisms and policy suggestions. This process provides us with a richer understanding of what global “mottos” may actually mean – and prepares us for the fieldwork level, in order to trace how these elements play out in practice. Table 1 summarises this proposed preliminary approach.

**Table 1 – Analysing global discourses: a preliminary approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Key concern</th>
<th>Instruments / Methods</th>
</tr>
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| **1. System of significations** | How reality is shaped, how things are defined, labelled and categorised. | • Analysis of language practices, categories and oppositions (notably binary ones)  
• Predicate analysis  
• Metaphor analysis |
| **2. Production of common sense** | How the discourse is made “natural” and “self-evident”. | • *Interpellation* – of various individuals or groups.  
• *Articulation* – with pre-existing and accepted discourses. |
| **3. Production of policy practices** | What are the empirical effects of the discourse when made "operational" in policies? | • Analysis of "standard effects" – both officially intentional or unintentional. |
| **4. Discourse reproduction** | How the discourse hides alternative views. | Contingency can be shown through:  
• Internal deconstruction  
• Juxtaposition of under-analysed facts  
• Study of alternative discourses ("subjugated knowledges")  
• Genealogical analysis |

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1.2. Global Discourses and their Power Effects: Competing Narratives

The fact that discourses and power remain relatively under-analysed in global governance studies, in both theoretical and empirical terms, does not mean however that IR scholars say nothing about the power effects of global discourses. On the contrary, two strands of power narratives are commonly found in scholarly works, whether explicitly or otherwise. The first one is an emancipatory narrative that emphasises the empowering effects of global discourses on the people they affect. The second strand encompasses various critical narratives that underline the effects of domination. As the next section explains, a “narrative” is essentially a “story” that interprets and gives coherence to a set of observations. The notion must be distinguished from that of “discourse”, which refers to a broader set of “practices” that may or may not include cognitive ones such as narratives. In what follows, we reflect on the concept of narrative and then explore a variety of narratives regarding the power effects of global discourses. While the emancipatory narrative stresses the dynamics of empowerment at work thanks to various global discourses, a range of critical narratives emphasise domination phenomena – either through the dominance of Western countries over the South (grounded in the concept of dependency), the self-surveillance of individuals that becomes effective once certain forms of “knowledge” have been internalised (governmentality) or the alliances of various social forces in perpetuating a world order (hegemony).

1.2.1. The concept of ‘narrative’

Narrative is a general term for telling a story. Narrative poetry, for instance, is a kind of poetry that tells a story, while not all poems obviously do so. In recent decades, the concept of narrative has been increasingly used in ever more disciplines including literary analysis, psychology, psychiatry, ethnography, anthropology, socio-linguistic or research area such as the history of science. In the field of International Relations, the word “narrative” is nowadays commonly used to refer to an explanatory framework that applies to one or more aspects of international life. “IR narratives” resemble a “story” in the sense that they provide coherence and bind together a set of sequential, simultaneous or potential events (particular ones) and phenomena (regular...
occurrences). While the conventional view in literary analysis is not to include into the concept of narrative such elements as descriptions or argumentations, it is largely the case in IR narratives.

The IR concept of narrative is much narrower than that of discourse. While narratives are story lines, a cognitive practice of interpretation, discourses are sets of practices that potentially encompass many more and diverse practices. Some IR authors, such as Pochylczuk (2005), further suggest a distinction between “meta-narratives” and “mezzo-narratives”. While the former consist of a very large-scale explanatory grid and over-arching “big stories” recounting the state and evolution of world politics, the latter relate to more limited issues – such as economic development, security or sovereignty. Both types of narratives are nevertheless connected, as meta-narratives set parameters for other narratives.

Among contemporary meta-narratives of the world order, one may surely mention the “end of history” framework put forward by Fukuyama (1989) who proclaimed the “total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism” – principles such as the rule of law, representative democracy and the market economy (p.3). Another prominent meta-narrative is the one elaborated by Huntington (1993, 1996) regarding the “clash of civilisations”: it contends that the world’s ideological divides are being replaced by conflicts between major civilisations, notably the declining West, the rising Sinic world and the unstable Islamic one. A related meta-narrative is that designed by Barber (1996) picturing a struggle between “McWorld” (globalisation and the corporate control of political processes) and “Jihad” (traditional values, nationalisms, religious orthodoxy and theocracy). To date, meta-narratives of the world order largely concern themselves with providing a meaning to globalisation. They have given birth to a range of global perspectives that are not always clear about whether globalisation is something that explains or that needs explanation (Medovoi, 2002). Despite confusion, meta-narratives of globalisation are popular and in high demand in both the academic field and among public opinion, as people need to make sense of the world as it changes.

Although the concept of narrative is used in IR quite differently from the way it is used in literature or psychology, valuable insights can be drawn from the latter fields into what a narrative essentially is. As Cortazzi (1993) points out, the importance of the concept is evident from the range of emphatic epithets often used to describe it.

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Narrative is "a primary act of mind" (Hardy, 1987, p.1); "the primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.11); or "a means by which human beings represent and restructure the world" (Mitchell, 1981, p.8). It is even "a specific cultural system" (Fawcett et al, 1984, p.20), a principle by which "people organise their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world" (Bruner, 1990, p.35). Creating a narrative is "a perceptual activity that organises data into a special pattern which represents and explains experience" (Branigan, 1992, p.3). In short, narratives are overt and essential manifestations of the mind that bring order to human experience of the world.

In literary analysis, the standard definition of a narrative insists on a principle of chronology as its defining criteria (Jannidis, 2003). Prince (1982), for instance, defines it as "the representation of at least two real or fictive events in a time sequence". Others have refuted the pre-eminence of this criterion, pointing to the importance of causality. Richardson (2000, p.168) thus contends that a "narrative is a representation of a causally related series of events". Arguably, however, almost every narrated story displays properties that extend beyond the simple presence of causal or chronological connections. As Adams (1991) underlines, within a narrative, it is rare that chronology and causality establish a sufficiently strong connection between events; the resultant gap is filled by the intentions of characters involved in the story. He thus speaks of "intentional explanations". Finally, authors such as Carroll (2001) have further enriched this analysis by pointing to the fact that some stories are led by a teleological dynamic, a forward-looking perspective pointing to a pre-determined end result. From this brief review one can identify four types of "narrative connections", shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – Four aspects of a narrative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Storyline dimensions</th>
<th>Key concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronology</td>
<td>time line / sequence of events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>causal structure and mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentionality</td>
<td>will of individuals or groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teleology</td>
<td>role of fate, providence or inevitability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Going back to the IR field, it is important to underline the fact that chronology, causality and intentionality may be potentially studied looking at empirical data. Meanwhile, teleological hypotheses are by definition non-testable as they rely on a view of causality that no empirical experience can capture.

1.2.2. Emancipatory vs. critical narratives

Current forms of global governance, including global discourses, are widely analysed by both their critics and supporters as conveying liberal values and ideas, whether they are political, ethical or socio-economic in scope. Here we reflect on “liberalism” as part of the global governance “machine”. We further identify two opposing views regarding the impact of this liberal content. An emancipatory narrative takes an optimistic view of the supposed empowerment of countless actors, from individuals to entire nations; various critical narratives, on the other hand, contend that pre-existing power structures are in fact reinforced.

Liberalism: the spirit in the machine

Reflecting on the current dynamics of global governance, Barnet and Duvall (2005, p.5) put it straightforwardly: “liberalism is the spirit in the machine”. In the IR field, this point is underscored by a vast literature (e.g. Ruggie, 1982; Keohane, 1990; Doyle, 1995; Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999; Dillon & Reid, 2001; Dillon, 2004). Selby (2004), for instance, sees global governance as a definitively liberal project, carrying a pluralistic conception of the world, dispersing power away from hegemonic centres, especially states, fostering liberal democratic values and procedures, and ordering people and things through recourse to reason, knowledge and expertise. For Duffy (2005, p.309), global governance is “no less than a project for rationalising global social relations”. This project wages a war against traditions, including countless local ethical and political practices. One only has to think of Human Rights, Gender Equality, the Rule of Law, Good Governance, the quest for Development or the rising concepts of Humanitarian Duty to intervene to get a sense of the revolutionary nature of this global liberal project. The liberal outlook, emphasising the individual’s freedoms and rights, lies at the core of these discourses. Liberal values present themselves as universal principles of legitimate action and cooperation, both among and within countries. In global fora, they have nurtured a “political correctness” embedded in a range of discourses that is rarely publicly challenged.
Although global governance discourses seem to share broad liberal ethics, there are many definitions of liberalism and a "liberal school of thought" is hard to delineate. Most political theorists refer to a multiplicity of values such as individual freedom, toleration, the private sphere, property, equal rights and opportunities, a commitment to reason, reform, progress, etc. Gray (1996, pp.286-287) boils this list down to four core elements: they are the legacy of the Enlightenment, or what Gray ironically calls the "liberal syndrome". First, is the value of Individualism. This is the belief "that only human beings and their forms of life have ultimate value". Second, Universalism, holds that "there are weighty duties and/or rights that are owed to all human beings". It leads to the belief that a liberal regime is "the best and uniquely right one for all mankind". Third, is Meliorism, the view that "human institutions are open to indefinite improvement by the judicious use of critical reason". As Gray recalls, "no liberalism can do without some idea of progress, however attenuated". Finally, Egalitarianism denies "any natural or political hierarchy between human beings". For liberals, "the human species is a single-status moral community", and monarchy, hierarchy and subordination are practices that are not ethically founded.

Liberalism is by no means a fully coherent doctrine. In the literature, tensions among its values are widely acknowledged; between freedom and equality, toleration and universalism, property and equal rights, etc. These tensions have led to ever increasing attempts at re-defining liberalism and assessing its claim to universality (Raz, 1986; Richardson, 2001; Crowder, 2002; Tassin, 2003). They also explain the diversity of "liberalisms" throughout history (Richardson, 1997). These liberal "doubts" are reinforced by the philosophically convincing contention that liberalism, as an ethical and political ideal, cannot be ultimately grounded in any rational justification (Berlin, 1969; Berlin & Williams, 1994; Gray, 1995; Delsol, 2004). In the end, liberalism appears as an ethical choice grounded within one's consciousness and can difficultly be assumed to be necessarily and universally followed.

Nevertheless, as a category of action and policy practice, global governance discourses have revolved around a rather standard normative consensus close to Gray's description of the "liberal syndrome": the belief that progress is taking place; that institutions can be established to help manage changes; that democracy is an objective in itself; and that states and individuals have a duty to protect individuals, promote universal values and create conditions to encourage political and economic
freedoms. This normative outlook is omnipresent in official talks and discourses on global governance, on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. As Barnett and Duvall (2005, p.6) observe, “the language of interests is often married to the language of values of the ‘international community’, values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and markets” – values that are seen desirable both in themselves and for the peace and prosperity they are assumed to foster.

A key question thus emerges – namely whether such dynamics do in fact provide more emancipation to impacted societies or tend, on the contrary, to reinforce or create further structures of domination.

The optimistic view: the emancipatory narrative

The emancipatory narrative of global discourses underlines their capacity and actual tendency to “empower” people and call into question long-standing power-based status quos. Empowerment may be defined as “the process by which people, particularly the poor and the disadvantaged, gain and retain control over their lives and destinies through information, skills, resources, authority, co-operation and self-esteem” (CANARI, 1999, p.28). Much of the scholarship on global governance takes a positive view on its key discourses, thus adopting the emancipatory narrative explicitly or implicitly. This was notably the case during the 1990s, as exemplified by the debate on the extension of the human rights doctrine. After the end of the Cold War, the global discourse on Human Rights was almost universally praised as a progressive force (e.g. Shaw, 1994) and seen as part of an emerging “cosmopolitan ethics” undermining state power and enhancing individual rights. The process was led by non-state actors, NGOs for the most part, sometimes described as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Few criticisms could be heard against this emerging global discourse. In the academic field, social constructivist frameworks were used to explain its emergence based upon the “power of ideas” and information networks (Risse, et al., 1999). The same occurred with neoliberal economic principles that took hold of governments and international organisations.

We may schematise the emancipatory narrative into three key elements, drawing upon section 1.2.2. First, there is a “chronological scheme”: global governance discourses are developing over time, putting dominant power structures into question and fostering social emancipation. Second is a “causal scheme”: the promoted values, practices and institutions carry empowering effects that lead to an increase in the
autonomy and capacity of action of individuals, groups or nations. Finally there is an “intentionality scheme”: these processes are fuelled by the active will of hitherto disempowered individuals, groups or nations, helped by either benevolent or self-interested actors – including civil society actors but also states or international organisations; intentionality can thus be both “bottom-up” and “top-down”.

The pessimistic view: critical narratives

On the other hand, various critical narratives of global discourses offer a sharp contrast with the emancipatory one. They are driven by radical views on today’s world order as being essentially oppressive despite the advent of a supposedly “emancipatory” liberal framework. Positive outlooks of the “global liberal order” have indeed been tamed by observers who stress the relations of domination inherent to liberal discourses. Alternative readings of “universal claims” regained prominence at the turn of the century, taking up the claim of the well-known German legal theorist Carl Schmitt, according to whom “whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat” (Schmitt, 1996, p.54). In this light, current attempts at fostering a system of global governance are interpreted as a reinforcement of various structures of power playing out in globalisation and global capitalism.

Such narratives draw their core inspiration from critical theory and thus a few words should be said about this. The term “critical theory” was first coined by the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in 1937. It brought together currents of thought such as German idealism, historical materialism, modernism and psychoanalysis, incorporating ideas from authors as diverse as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Weber, Lucas and Gramsci. The school’s mission, as defined by one of its founders, Max Horkheimer (1939), was to explore the dialectics of modern reason (associated with the Enlightenment – or Aufklärung) as both an instrument of emancipation and domination. Critical theorists thus developed a complex relationship with the Enlightenment project itself (which we may also call the “modernisation project” or perhaps, in today’s words, the “liberal project”) – namely the project of rationalising society and emancipating people on the basis of values such as rationality, freedom or equality.

On the one hand, critical thought has been committed to such values, so much so that many authors see it as an emancipatory project in itself. On the other hand, critical thinking is infused with a deep-rooted scepticism about the project itself and the way
modern science and ethical norms have been used to foster an economic, social and political “modernisation”. These analysts thus tend to focus on the “dark side” of universal values such as rationality, freedom, justice, equality, etc. They are inclined to denounce oppressive forces in the light of how such ideologies have played out in real life and human actions (praxis). They are concerned with hegemonic ideas, practice, discourses – and they cast doubt on their emancipatory nature.

When applied to global discourses, we may schematise critical narratives into three basic and common elements. First, there is a “chronological scheme” providing the overall story: global discourses are developing over time, reinforcing dominant power structures and mechanisms of social control. Second is a “causal scheme” according to which the practices and institutions that are promoted carry effects of disempowerment that lead to a decreased autonomy and capacity of action of affected individuals, groups or nations. Finally, there is an “intentionality scheme”: these processes maybe fuelled by the active will of dominant and often external actors (external to the local context) – and to this extent, they are top-down in nature. Another view emphasises the faceless, internalised and delocalised nature of power in processes of global governmentality.

Table 3 contrasts, in general terms, the basic tenets of these two strands of narratives. The next sections explore in greater depth three distinct and significant “species” of critical narratives.
Table 3 – Power narratives of global discourses: contrasti ng components in general terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Emancipatory narrative</strong></th>
<th><strong>Critical narratives</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chronology</strong></td>
<td>The growing diffusion of global governance discourses <em>weakens</em> dominant power structures and <em>increases</em> the autonomy and capacities of action of affected people and groups.</td>
<td>The growing diffusion of global governance discourses <em>reinforces</em> dominant power structures and <em>decreases</em> the autonomy and capacities of action of affected people and groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causality</strong></td>
<td>Practices related to global governance discourses have <em>empowering effects</em>, through a variety of mechanisms.</td>
<td>Practices related to global governance discourses have <em>disempowering effects</em>, through a variety of mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intentionality</strong></td>
<td>Bottom-up and/or top-down. Disempowered actors or some powerful ones may be actively contributing to emancipatory processes.</td>
<td>Top-down or anonymous. Dominant and often external actors are actively leading processes of social control. An alternative view emphasises their facelessness and delocalised nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2.3. "Dependency" as a critical narrative

A first important form of critical narrative applied to global discourses draws upon "dependency theory". This body of literature famously argues that poor nations are impoverished and rich ones strengthened by the way in which the former are integrated into the "world system". Resources flow from a "periphery" of underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states. In pursuing their goal of global dominance, rich nations infiltrate developing countries through lay or religious "missionaries", transnational corporations and global institutions (such as the IMF) to swallow them up into "their" global capitalist order. Cultural and ideological elements are thus studied as forms and means of this subjugation. Such theories have been especially popular in Latin America, concerned with the all-pervasive US influence. Significant dependency analysts include Frank (1967), Dos Santos 1971, Cardoso (2001) or Wallerstein (2004). The analysis that follows draws on the work of Sekhri (2009), who provides a useful update on the current stance of dependency theory.

With the end of the Cold War, the much commented process of globalisation has arguably tended to integrate rather than separate peripheries in the world. The dependency outlook has thus grown less fashionable and the number of studies drawing on this perspective has considerably reduced, with pro-dependency academic works becoming extremely rare. This does not mean, however, that the dependency approach has disappeared. In fact, many of its key terms and conceptual mechanisms remain widely used, notably outside of the academic field by journalists, politicians, policy makers, civil society organisations, etc. In fact, the popular concept of "world system" is largely infused with dependency views.

The core idea of the dependency approach is to emphasise a North-South framework for understanding the world, rather than a Cold War East-West division. Thinkers such as Dos Santos, Faletto, Sunkel, Cardoso, Furtado or Prebisch have all underlined the skewed division of labour within the international system between these two poles. This leads to a "North" with high wages, investment rates and levels of industrialisation, and a "South" suffering from opposite trends. Latin America and

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12 Ghosh's book on dependency is one of the few that has recently focused on this approach (Ghosh, 2001). As Sekhri (2009) points out, it nevertheless presents dependency as an outdated framework.
Africa, in particular, have been analysed in this light, trapped in a pattern of exporting natural commodities and importing manufactured products. André Gunder Frank emerged as one of the key theorists of dependency. Pointing out the impact of foreign investment in the periphery by the centre, he looked at the failure of the import-substitution strategies in Brazil and Chile (Frank, 1967). His vision of the “North actively under-developing the South” has become a central feature of the approach. In Africa, Samir Amin reached similar conclusions: peripheries are regions where the external powers determine the extent and the orientation of the local accumulation processes (Amin, 1970). In his view, local and national powers act under the regulations of the structure of the capitalist world system. Thus, development and underdevelopment constitute a zero sum game and “opposite sides of the same coin” (Randall and Theobald, 1985).

As Dos Santos (1970, p.231) puts it, dependence is “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected”. The fact that there may be a situation of interdependence between the North and South cannot hide the fact that the North is only weakly reliant and not severely constrained by this relation – which is thus deeply asymmetrical. The standard dependency narrative sees these unequal relations as beginning with the colonial era, the impact of which is seen as both lasting and catastrophic for the South: increased misery, the devastation of social and cultural norms, the loss of lands to foreigners, the limitless exploitation of natural resources, etc. When the time of independence came, dependency persisted along the same economic lines. Meanwhile, the core countries of the world system have continued to reinforce their grip through foreign investment, technology transfer, cultural products and direct aid. The dependency narrative strongly focuses on the capitalist nature of the world order. It also emphasises the historical context of countries to explain their current situation.

Although dependency theory has been largely abandoned as a theory, Sekhri (2009) argues that it still stands today as an interesting approach for a number of reasons. To start with, several countries such as Cuba or Iran still make it their official worldview, which thus impacts both their foreign and domestic policies. In many more countries, moreover, local political parties still draw upon a dependency rhetoric. Another point is that many Southern countries have failed to turn into competitive producers in the
world market – and there is still much to say about the potential ability of weak countries to compete on a level playing field in the long run. Finally, the 2008 global financial crisis seems likely to deeply impact Southern countries, which may turn out to be the most affected victims of a crisis that originated in the North.

We may add to this that Development still stands out today as a hotly contested global discourse in terms of its “dependency” effects. As the argument goes, it is a radically ambiguous concept. On the one hand, it means an increase in economic and social well being; on the other hand it refers to the process of transition towards a capitalist industrial economy. This sleight of hand reveals development as an ideology, as it confuses a specific political program, namely capitalism, with a universal value – the improvement of human wellbeing. In the early 1980s, a radical critique of the Development discourse emerged associated with the work of Escobar (1995), Ferguson (1990) and Crush (1995). They see development as a set of rational, managerial prescriptions through which industrialised nations impose their views and models onto the “beneficiaries” of their aid, forcing a deep change in their social, economic and political identities. In this light, development is essentially a knowledge/power regime underpinning the domination of industrial countries. Moreover, while many “neo-dependency” scholars are vocal about denouncing the United States as a “hegemonic” or “imperial power”, some have gone further in conceptualising modern imperialism: claiming (again) the legacy of Foucault, they have left behind any territorial reference and have devised a theory of a “global empire” without an emperor – an approach that partly merges with the narrative based on governmentality.
1.2.4. “Governmentality” as a critical narrative

Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” deeply influenced critical theorists in pointing to modern forms and practices of power. Here we review the roots and meaning of this concept and how it has been applied to the analysis of some key global discourses.

Foucault’s concepts

In Michel Foucault’s view, in the study of power, “we must eschew the model of Leviathan” (1980, p.102). “Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there...Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization” (p.98). Foucault’s approach has arguably some of its roots in a line of thinking that emerged in the second part of the nineteenth century – at a time when fresh critiques had arisen against modern civilisation. These critiques focused on the tensions between individuals and society.

In Nietzsche’s worldview (1887) for instance, contemporary “moral values” repress the “will to power” from which flows the creativity and greatness of the human race; egalitarian and democratic societies come with a loss of individual freedom and self-realisation. Freud (1930) later looked at how civilisation inhibits and frames the individuals’ dual instincts of libido (Eros) and aggressiveness (Thanatos, also referred to as the “death instinct”). This, in his view, is a necessary process that enables human civilisation to grow and live on, but which is nevertheless an unmistakable source of psychological stress and discontent for individuals. As for Max Weber (1921), his well known typology of social action (as instrumental-rational, value-rational, affectual or traditional) led him to suggest that modern science and capitalism are leading the world into a massive “disenchantment”. Rationalisation, bureaucratisation and other such trends of “modernisation” are chasing the gods away and limiting human capacities for acting on the basis of commitment, feeling, passion, charisma, values and even ethics. This, again, comes with great losses of individual freedom and creativity and limits the range of possible social actions. In Weber’s vision, mankind is thus imprisoning itself in an iron cage of its own making: “instrumental rationality”.

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Looking at processes through which individual behaviours are shaped in modern societies, Foucault famously developed the concept of “governmentality” which he defines as the “art of government” but with an idea of government that goes beyond state politics to include a wide range of techniques of social control. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) underline, he looks at processes through which the conduct of a population is governed: institutions, agencies and disciplinary institutions (schools, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, etc.); but also discourses, forms of knowledge, norms and identities, as well as self-regulation, techniques for the disciplining and care of the self. As Rutherford (2007, p.293) states, “governing becomes the construction of certain truths and their circulation via normalising and disciplining techniques, methods, discourses and practices that extend beyond the state”.

Foucault also introduced the concept of biopower that denotes the focus of power upon processes that expand a population’s life – such as concerns over physical and mental health, housing, families, productive efficiency, living standards, etc. Consequently, biopolitics designates a type of exercise of power that encompasses the economic, social, cultural, environmental, territorial spheres – potentially all dimensions of human lives.

Although governmentality has to do with the discipline and regulation of actors, it cannot be reduced to a passive relationship to power. Foucault repeatedly emphasised the productive dimension of governmentality – the creative and voluntary contributions of individuals to bringing about self-discipline and self-regulation. Governmentality thus relates to techniques, procedures, protocols, practices, idioms, rules, routines, etc., through which behaviours are governed partly through external impositions but first and foremost through changes in internal subjectivities. Lives become managed “at a distance” (Foucault, 1984). In this view, power is intentional but non-subjective: while there are goals behind its exercise, they cannot be ascribed to decisions or wishes of particular people. Governmentality carries a vision of power that is faceless, headless, acting through a diverse and decentralised range of internalised practices but still having an overall unity and coherence – or “standard effects” as Ferguson (1990, p.260) puts it. It is this coherence that Foucault refers to as a “discourse”.

Although governmentality applies to various power regimes and historical periods, it is often used (by other scholars and by Foucault himself) when referring to
"neoliberal governmentality", a type of governmentality that characterises advanced liberal democracies based on the predominance of market principles and the limitation of state action. It refers to a situation where power is de-centred and its members play an active role in their own self-government; the produced knowledge allowing for the constitution of “auto-regulated” and “auto-correcting selves”. Discourses become internalised by individuals and “knowledge” is disseminated that leads individuals to govern themselves accordingly.

The literature drawing on governmentality has surged in recent years (Rutherford, 2007). Scholars have applied the concept to colonial rule (Scott, 1999; Howell, 2004), to census and statistics as biopolitics (Brown and Boyle, 2000; Hannah, 2001), to the agricultural sector and how it is controlled through statistics or communities (Murdoch and Ward, 1997; Murdoch, 1997), etc. Yet, recent studies by geographers point out that governmentality can operate at a multiplicity of scales: the subject, territories, the nation, the population and the globe (e.g. Legg, 2005).

The governmentality critique of global discourses
Foucault's arguments were developed within the context of domestic arenas of modern societies, but in recent years a number of IR scholars have argued that the world order progressively displays similar features. This view directly opposes the belief of IR realists that global governance arrangements, despite the emergence of non-state actors, still constitute a manifestation of states’ power (e.g. Waltz, 1999).

This strand of analysis has been notably exemplified by Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2001). These authors contend that the hitherto territorialised and centralised international order is being replaced by a decentralised and de-territorialised one, which they call “Empire”. Empire is a “globalised” (p.40) or “imperial biopolitical machine” (p.61), a global neoliberal governance superseding the state-based international system. In this light the United States, for instance, are no longer viewed in traditional terms of a state-based imperialist power but as a representative of the global power of “Empire”. In this framework, global governance is understood as a biopolitical phenomenon encompassing an ever wider range of human issues, even including human subjectivities.

Global discourses under critical analysis of their governmentality effects have in particular included that on Development and on Human Rights – notably since the
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the reaction of the US administration (Chandler, 2008). Human Rights have been analysed for instance as an expression of a global biopower, as illustrated by the work of Duffield (2007), Jabri (2007) or Douzinas (2007). New global governmental practices are highlighted which are legitimised through individual rights over principles of sovereignty or non-intervention. For Duffield, in the discourse on "failed states" and the merging of "security" and "development", Human Rights create a biopolitical "blank cheque" to override other principles. For Jabri, the recasting of military intervention in terms of these rights undermines the state-based order, constituting a new global biopolitical order. For Douzinas, Human Rights discourses undermine territorial sovereignty and enable a new "super-sovereign" of global hegemonic power.

As for the critique of "Development", the work of Ferguson (1990), who studied Lesotho, became central to this literature and was followed by many scholars, such as Kamat (2004) who analysed India. Famously, in Ferguson's view, the "development machine" has as its key mechanism a process of "depoliticisation". Through the work of experts and agencies, new concepts such as "less developed countries" are discursively created, through a re-construction of social, economic and cultural realities. These new objects call for "action" on the part of "developers". Such countries thus enter an "international disciplining regime" in which political questions are rendered technical, thus taking away freedom of choice from these countries. Ferguson relies heavily on Foucault's methodological approach, which stresses the authorless but intelligible consequences of dominant discourses. He wants to "locate the intelligibility of a series of events and transformations not in the intentions guiding the actions of one or more animating subjects, but in the systematic nature of the social reality which results from those actions" (p.18). In his view, developers set up projects that almost systematically "fail in their own terms" but nonetheless have systematic standard effects, most notably the de-politicisation of political issues by using the mask of a technical discourse.

Ferguson also argues that development projects further the role of the state by increasing the grip of its bureaucracy. This does not seem to hold in the context of "structural adjustment programmes", which are in fact designed to scale down state involvement in society. However, the depoliticising effect of "development" holds good in a neoliberal setting, as neoliberalism presents itself as a technical solution to
technical issues. What is more, although the rise of neoliberalism is often understood as a “retreat” of the state, Barry et al. (1996) point out that it leads rather to a transfer of the operations of government (in Foucault’s extended sense) to non-state entities via “the fabrication of techniques that can produce a degree of ‘autonomisation’ of entities of government from the state” (pp.11-12). Ferguson thus sees the “the outsourcing of the functions of the state to NGOs and other ostensibly non-state agencies [as a] key feature, not only of the operation of national states, but of an emerging system of transnational governmentality” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p.990)

In the critical narrative, the Development discourse is thus seen as a discursive formation whose instruments of control and “cognitive object production” are similar to colonialism. It is said to conceal politics and hide questions about rights, distribution of resources, about how one should live and who should decide, behind technical and expert-led questions of efficiency and sustainability. It is said to remove the agency of external interveners from sight, construct problems as internally generated rather than externally defined, present nature as acted upon by expertise while hiding “instrument effects”. This critical analysis of discourse has also tracked participation in development projects, such as indigenous or community-based management, to reveal domination and control effects where empowerment is nonetheless proclaimed (Escobar 1995, 2004; Kothari, 2001; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mosse 2005a, 2005b).

Governmentality has also been applied to the global discourse on “nature”, which has widely been constructed as something in desperate need of governing (Luke, 1999; Rutherford, 2002). This discourse insists upon manageability: natural resources should be rationalized, indexed, measured, assessed and preserved through various technologies and regulations. The role of expert knowledge is particularly underscored. Meanwhile, others scholars look at how subjectivities are modified to create self-regulation and environmental consciousness (e.g. Agrawal, 2005).
1.2.5. "Hegemony" as a critical narrative monitor

A third strand of critical approaches to global governance and its related discourses flows from Gramsci's well-known concept of *hegemony* (Gramsci, 1971). This notion points to "a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership" (Roger, 1991, p.22). In other words, hegemony is the "organisation of consent", as we shall see, through a dynamic of alliances between various social forces.

*Hegemony and historic bloc*

Gramsci wrote extensively during his imprisonment under the Mussolini regime. Refusing the historical determinism of orthodox Marxism, he was concerned with the nature of capitalist domination working, as he thought, through both force and consent upon the masses. Capitalism keeps the society under control not just through violence or economic and political coercion, but also by ideological means: through a "hegemonic culture" in which the values of the bourgeoisie become the "common sense". A "consensus culture" develops in which people in the working-class identify their own interest with the interest of the bourgeoisie. Gramsci used the term "hegemony" to refer to this phenomenon, although the word was previously used by Lenin to refer to the political dominance of the working-class during a revolution. For Gramsci, the only path to the emancipation of the masses was for the working class develop a culture of its own. This new culture would overthrow the notion that bourgeois values represented "natural" or "normal" values. Whereas Lenin held that culture was secondary to political objectives, Gramsci thought that cultural hegemony was fundamental to the attainment and stability of power.

Another key idea of Gramsci is that a class wishing to dominate has to move beyond its narrow self interests, exert moral leadership, and make compromises and alliances with a variety of social forces. Gramsci calls this union a "historic bloc", an expression taken from the French social philosopher Georges Sorel. This "bloc" provides the necessary basis of consent to a certain social order, which produces (and re-produces) the hegemony of the dominant class through a nexus of institutions, social relations and ideas. In this manner, Gramsci developed a theory that emphasised the importance of the superstructure (cultural and ethical factors) in both maintaining economic domination and fracturing the masses. Much of Gramsci's
attacks against bourgeois hegemonic culture were aimed at religious norms and values, as he was deeply impressed by the power that Roman Catholicism exerted over people’s minds. Quite dialectically, he also thought that hegemonic dominance ultimately relied on coercion, and in times of crisis, the “masks of consent” slip away, revealing the forces at work.

Drawing upon this line of thinking, a harsh critique of popular culture developed in the sixties. Adorno (1966), for instance, analysed how thought can be an instrument of social control, identifying as “real” only what fits dominant concepts, and regarding as “unreal” or “non-existent” things that do not. Adorno for instance developed a critique of popular music: imposed by the “culture industry” (media, advertisers, entertainment firms, etc.), this “culture” manipulates the tastes and aspirations of the masses; it underpins the “reification of political consciousness” and the constitution of a “totally administered society”. Individuality is ruined through the production of false identities and superficial cultural variations within a tightly controlled framework. Marcuse (1964) also denounced consumerism as killing the desire for action and social change, and enabling the “technological elite” (media, advertisers, militaries) to harness the libido of the masses to the reinforcement of capitalism.

**The hegemony approach to international politics**

Gramsci did not say much about the possibility of hegemony extending beyond nations, onto an international level. Authors such as Cox (1981), van der Pijl (1984), Gill (1993) or Murphy and Tooze (1991), however, moved Gramsci into IR, which brought about the so-called “neo-Gramscian turn” in this discipline. As Worth (2010, p.6) clearly explains, “international hegemony” has been thus referred to as “a form of class rule based on consent rather than coercion and on accommodation of subordinate interests rather than on their repression”. This line of work has been developed along two different lines – one emphasising the notion of “world order” and the other focussing on its continuation through the emergence and consolidation of a “transnational capitalist class”. World order, probably Cox’s most influential concept, refers to a specific era led by an alliance of social forces, organised through a combination of ideology, institutions and production structures. The norms and laws they carry are transposed onto the international stage, especially within international institutions – where, for instance, a neoliberal common sense has become
constitutionalised. Cox uses the idea of a “historic bloc” to analyse the development of forms of states and their underlying dominant social forces: while hegemony is initially established by leading social forces within a state, it can project itself outwards on a world scale.

Hegemony is understood as an “opinion-moulding activity” rather than brute force. In Cox’ view, a hegemonic world order is based on values and forms of understandings that permeate its nature (Cox, 1992). Inter-subjective meanings and accepted wisdom about social relations frame reality thus have to be investigated. “Reality” is not only the material surrounding human action but also the ideological and institutional context that frame thoughts and actions (Cox, 1997). Hegemony as devised by Cox filters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, ideology, etc. He thus makes up for the failure of orthodox Marxism to acknowledge forms of domination that are not reducible to class.

Neo-Gramscian analysis such as Cox’s opened the way for a fresh look at global discourses and governance, including concerns about the blurring of public and private authority (Cutler, 1999), the changing forms of sovereignty as a social construct (Rosenberg, 1990), the role of international institutions (Engel, 2006), or the interplay of global elites with counter-hegemonic blocs, including transnational networks of NGOs, women, peace, environment and social movements (Gill, 1995). Cox was particularly concerned with the global projection of the “liberal capitalist state”, a form of hegemony which he called *Pax Americana*. As its product, global institutions such as the World Bank serve to “absorb counter-hegemonic ideas” (Cox, 1996, p.138).

1.2.6. Doubting grand narratives: the need for more fieldwork

Criticisms have developed against large meta-narratives in IR. One of their main themes is to point to the need for far more empirical studies – a need addressed by the present study.

To start with, there has been a series of criticisms raised against grand dependency narratives (Sekhri, 2009). First, they arguably tend to treat South countries as a coherent monolithic unit, although such a view is increasingly untenable in today’s world. Moreover, even if elements of dependency may be found everywhere, its nature and level vary very considerably, as colonial, political, social and cultural
history and structures are so diverse. As for the intellectual propensity of explaining problems of the South by accusing North countries, this is not always convincing and may often appear as attempting to hide various other realities. At a broader level, it seems difficult to argue that relations between centre and periphery are always zero-sum games. Quite evidently, the discourse on the “Western devil” has been used, and still is, as a domestic political tool by local elites to help justify and reinforce their power by drawing on feelings of nationalism and anti-imperialism (Neack et al., 1995) – here, one only has to think of Algeria. Finally, when it comes to policy recommendations, the often suggested “separation from the North” has never been convincingly thought through – regarding what it would mean in detail, who could lead such a change or what its key endeavours would be.

Turning to narratives around “governmentality”, the portrayal of global governance as a global liberal order fostering oppressive mechanisms has also been criticised (Latham, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Duffy, 2005; Selby, 2007; Chandler, 2008). The idea of “global discourses” as coherent “knowledge/power regimes” of political or cultural domination may rely on claims about all-powerful external actors (such as donor agencies or NGOs) which are not necessarily empirically confirmed. It may also tend to assume a strong capacity of coordination on the part of external agents – such as for instance the World Bank, the IMF and other international donors – which is often questionable. Such narratives may also imply a stability and permanence in global discourses that do not fit well with the many policy changes that are regularly observed. The World Bank and the IMF, for instance, have deeply modified and adapted their key discourses over time (Miller-Adams, 1999).

As Rutherford comments (2007, p.300), one of the more troubling aspects with the governmentality literature is that “the programmes, policies, practices and techniques of rule interrogated by many scholars often appear as a completed project... There is a sense that governmentality operates and circulates as it is intended to with very little deviation”. Moreover, this literature often limits its field of enquiry to the abstract working of political rationalities: as O’Malley et al. (1997) contend, it has devalorised the empirical realities of how rule is implemented in practice – and often limits its empirical work to the study of the state. Selby (2004, p.6) further argues that

13 It may be the case, however, that a changing discourse benefits unchanged interest groups.
the "idea of governmentality can be at once too precise about the effects and too vague about the location"; it offers little means for understanding variations in practices and implementation of global discourses. There is a lack of attention to differences.

Here one should recall that Foucault (1984, pp.259-73) warned against any "grand theory" and "the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought", which tries to explain vast chunks of social reality. This is precisely why Foucault distanced himself from Marxism. In his view, critical theory must avoid the temptation to create global theories, given the "inhibiting effects of global, totalitarian theories" and the "tyranny of global discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges". Critical thought must not become one more all-encompassing discourse; it must face its own criticism. It thus needs to be "discontinuous, particular and local". In Foucault's view, the attempt to think in terms of a totality is "a hindrance to research". He does not mean that critical researchers should turn to a "naïve or primitive empiricism", but rather argues that critical analysis should be a "decentralised kind of theoretical production", whose validity should not be dependent on the approval of any established regime of thought, including the critical one itself. Grand theories and general conclusions about the "global liberal order", its "global governance and discourses" should thus be treated with caution by a rigorous critical researcher.

As Duffy (2005, p.310) thoughtfully notes, "global governance as a project is rendered extremely complex when it is applied to specific cases". An examination of what happens to ideas and policies associated with global governance schemes at the local level reveal how irregular implementation and impacts are. "Rather than being a powerful neoliberal project, able to create and fully enforce universal norms and practices, [global governance] needs to be reconceptualised as something more open, opaque or uneven" (ibid., p.323).

This call is underpinned by Latham (1999) who argues that global governance theorists tend to be so preoccupied with governance itself that the forces that might challenge or undermine order are ignored, treated implicitly as undesirable disruptions of their grand theory.
1.3. Conclusion

The present chapter introduced this study’s fundamental concern: the local power effects of global discourses. It based the relevance of this research agenda on the paradoxical but patent lack of attention paid to discourses, power and micro-level empirical data in current global governance studies. This does not mean, however, that IR scholars make no assumption about the local power effects of global discourses. Narratives of power are indeed omnipresent in reflections on global governance, including on hegemonic discourses, although they are rarely put under direct scientific scrutiny. The chapter thus identified two key and opposing strands of power narratives. First, the *emancipatory narrative* that holds the view that active global discourses contribute to reordering human societies along socio-economic and political rights – hence contributing to the emancipation of individuals and communities. Conversely, a range of *critical narratives* – such as *dependency*, *governmentality* and *hegemony* – see global governance discourses as fostering hidden forms of social control and strengthening pre-existing power structures at various levels of society.

The *dependency* approach emphasises the all-pervasive influence of Western countries in enhancing a world capitalist system functioning for their own benefit; the *governmentality* framework stresses the presence of internalised forms of knowledge that produce self-disciplines, auto-regulated and auto-correcting selves. On the other hand, an analysis in terms of *hegemony* looks at how a world order is produced by the institutionalisation of certain norms and practices favouring a leading transnational social class that nevertheless needs to strike alliances and compromises with various social forces. These three types of *critical narratives* thus agree that global discourses foster mechanisms of social control and reinforce dominant power structures; while the *emancipatory narrative* believes these discourses help empower the hitherto disempowered and put into question power *status quos*.

Critiques raised against the use of such “meta-narratives” were presented in order to point to the need for far more empirical work to assess the value of these frameworks as interpretative tools. In order to gain a deep qualitative grasp of the processes at work, this study adopts a case study approach, based on local examples and whose research question runs as follows: *What are the local power effects of global discourses?*
As our Introduction already justified, one global discourse has been selected for examination: the discourse on Community Participation. A specific issue area of global governance has also been chosen given that it is a relatively mature field in which this discourse is forcefully applied: the protection of global biodiversity. The next chapter makes the case that Community Participation is indeed to be regarded as a global discourse that is part and parcel of global governance – an idea that has not yet emerged in the IR literature. It further analyses this discourse’s conceptual mechanics, related policy practices and historical emergence, particularly in the context of biodiversity protection.
Chapter 2 - Community Participation as a Global Governance Discourse

Here, a specific global discourse is brought under scrutiny, namely that on Community Participation (CP), as well as a specific area of global governance – the protection of biodiversity. These choices, the first two steps of our case study selection, were justified in the Introduction. They are specifically meant to provide a “hard test” for the critical narrative.

This chapter first makes the claim that CP has now become a global discourse part of global governance, active in virtually all areas of international policy making, although it is still rarely thought of and analysed in such terms. The historical rise of CP is reviewed to show that foreign policy concerns – especially those of the United States – have played an important role in its worldwide diffusion. CP was indeed promoted by the “free world” to engage with the world’s rural masses in a Cold War context, hoping to contain communist agrarian movements. Following this, the internal mechanics of the CP discourse is analysed on the basis of its system of signification, the way it produces a naturalised common sense, as well as the standard and tangible policy practices it fosters. Ambiguities revolving around emancipation vs. control are again identifiable: they echo those found in the historical emergence of the discourse.

The chapter then moves on to show that up to the mid-1980s, the dominant approach to the preservation of nature was centred on protected areas designed to strictly exclude the human presence. Finally, it explains how and on the basis of what concerns and promises community participation nonetheless entered this field of global policy making. Drawing upon a comprehensive review of current critiques raised against CP, the expectations of power narratives are also identified.
2.1. The Rise of a Global Discourse and its Ambiguous Roots

This section traces the rise of the modern call for Community Participation, paying special attention to its foreign policy content at the time of the Cold War. It then makes the case that CP now works as a global discourse, omnipresent in global rhetoric.

2.1.1. At the root: democratic emancipation or political control?

The concept of participation is based on a legacy of ideas and influences, among which Midgley (1986) identifies three early and salient sources: Western ideologies at large, the professional field of social work and the 1950s movement of "community development". This last source, in turn, is strongly linked to British and US foreign policies of the time (Holdcroft, 1976; Hailey, 2001).

CP first draws upon Western concerns and political theories about democracy, as it argues that ordinary citizens have a right to share in decision-making. However, this inspiration is not based on classical notions of representative democracy but rather on a variant originally known as "neighbourhood democracy" (Dahl & Tufts, 1973; Yates, 1973). Many proponents of CP are indeed sceptical of representative democracy and its capacity to provide meaningful means for the masses to be involved in policy making. Hence the tendency of CP to advocate the creation of small-scale institutions – at the village and urban neighbourhood levels – both in the developed and developing world. The implicit claim is that political aspirations can only be truly realised at this scale. CP is further infused with diffuse notions such as the belief that virtue resides primarily in the “simple people” and that “ordinary folks” tend to be unfairly treated by the more powerful. In that sense, CP has a populist dimension (Midgley, 1986).

The field of social work is arguably a second historical source of the CP discourse. Since the early 20th century, a rising interest had been paid in the US to communities seeking to mobilise and organise their people to improve local amenities and offer various social services (e.g. Lindeman, 1921; Steiner, 1930; Lane, 1939). The notion of "community development" thus emerged in the 1930s to denote the non-government complement to urban planning. Programmes in adult education,
community services and social welfare were initiated in the same decade. These included components of state agricultural extension services, New Deal rural development efforts, as well as other university-related public service activities with the support of sociologists and anthropologists, notably from famous institutions such as the University of Chicago. Philanthropic foundations, like the Ford Foundation, joined the movement and contributed to the mushrooming of community development corporations (CDCs) – local non-profit organisations to which state and municipal governments could channel funds. These ideas originated in the United States but raised interest in Europe too, where they took on a more Marxist flavour. They later gained an audience in the newly independent nations of the Third World. By the mid-1970s, many NGOs had adopted community work methods throughout the world, including radical ones based on an outright class struggle analysis (Marsden & Oakley, 1982).14

Finally, a third source of inspiration for the global CP discourse was the community development movement that appeared at the end of the 1940s and developed well into the 1960s, before losing its audience to the benefit of more top-down industry-led views of development. This early “rise and fall of community development”, as Holdcroft (1976) depicts it, deserves a careful analysis given its foreign policy meaning.

As Midgley (1986) recalls, among the first proponents of the community development movement were missionaries and colonial officers. The combined objectives to “civilise”, exploit resources and establish durable political structures encouraged early forms of community projects in the colonies. For instance, an official 1944 report on mass education led the British government to establish community programmes in many African countries.15 It is in 1948, however, that the term “community development” was first used officially by the British Colonial authorities in a conference in Cambridge where it was advocated to help the British African territories prepare for independence. Shortly thereafter the concept spread to many donor agencies and national governments. Modest community programmes were launched in British territories in Africa around 1950, but the first major one was initiated in India in 1952 with a massive support from the Ford Foundation and the

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14 For instance, the Community Action Movement in Maharashtra, India.
15 Great Britain Colonial Office (1944).
U.S. foreign aid agency. This was soon followed by programmes in the Philippines, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan (Holdcroft, 1976).

During the 1950s, the community development movement enjoyed “phenomenal international growth” (ibid., p. 3) thanks to its active promotion and financial support by the United States. This American promotion took place directly through the US foreign economic assistance agency but also indirectly through various United Nations agencies. A wave of reports was published at that time on community development by UN agencies, the US aid agency and other governments such as India. By 1960, over sixty developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America had launched community development programmes. About half of these were national in scope, while the others were more regional. The Alliance for Progress, initiated in 1961 by President Kennedy, defined a ten-year plan for the American aid to Latin America, including through community approaches. The political rationale was clear:

*Essentially, community development was seen by its free world advocates as the democratic response to totalitarianism. In the "Cold War" era of the 1950's, American leadership believed that the developing nations in the free world were under a two pronged threat from international communism: a) the potential of external military aggression and, b) the possibility of internal revolution growing out of subversion via communist agrarian movements (Holdcroft, 1976, p.12).*

Advocates of community development thus maintained at the time that it was carrying out the major objective of American foreign policy. Community development embodied the promise to secure the collaboration of local populations, and better connect rural communities to national government development plans supported by Western donors. The hope was to build stable local participatory institutions, counteracting any temptation towards more radical political action, but also to bring about improvements in the material conditions of rural people without revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic order (ibid., p.20). This early form of CP thus appealed to the “free world” and developing nation leaders looking for an ideology and technique to “combat the threat of dissident agrarian movements” (ibid., p.19). Thus, in the eyes of Holdcroft, the Community Development discourse of the 1950s and 1960s was essentially an attempt at keeping quiet the rural masses of the developing world, within the context of the Cold War. In other words, while presented as a path of political and material emancipation, its core objective was a form of social and political control – although of a more Foucauldian governmentality type based on consent and self-involvement. Hailey
(2001, p.99) thus wonders "how much participative development owes its genesis to attempts by Western governments ... to limit the power and influence of political dissidents, freedom-fighters or radical Marxists - pointing to historical examples such as the villagification strategies adopted by the British in Malaya in the 1950s, the US "pacification" campaigns in Vietnam in the 1960s or the work of American agencies in India in the 1970s.

Contemporary CP advocates claim that these programmes failed because of their bureaucratic administration and superimposed direction, which ended up perpetuating power structures at both the local and national level: community development is thus said to have failed because of a lack of "true" community participation - a story that is still heard again and again regarding current CP projects today. Following disappointments with their actual results, community programmes started regressing from 1960. By 1965, most had faltered and were thus terminated or severely reduced. Donors such as UN agencies and the United States redirected resources in support of new initiatives such as the "green revolution" and its technological developments.

During the 1970s, however, international interest in the community development movement re-emerged following a shift in development thinking towards social concerns and the need to directly improve the wellbeing of the world's rural poor - a move exemplified by the new themes adopted by the World Bank under the presidency of Robert McNamara, such as the focus on "basic needs". During the 1970s, an emphasis on popular participation formally emerged in UN thinking with the publication of two major documents (UN 1971, 1975a) followed by the creation of a dedicated research programme (UNRISD), still running to date. Resolutions adopted at the World Conference on International Women's Year held in Mexico City (UN, 1975b) further reinforced the idea of CP in both political and development processes. The UN then convened a meeting in 1978 to refine its concept of "popular participation" but a more significant contribution came from UNICEF and the World Health Organisation in their common Declaration on Primary Health Care at the Alma Ata conference (UN, 1978). "Participation in health" featured prominently and has since become a major preoccupation in the field of global health. During the 1970s, CP also attracted attention of the housing and urban development sector (e.g.}
Turner, 1968) and formally entered the World Bank’s policy agenda in 1975. Step by step, CP was becoming a global discourse.

2.1.2. The omnipresence of CP in global policy discourses

Over the past two decades, Community Participation has imposed itself as a coherent and constant theme in the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and international agreements. This dynamic emerged most visibly in the fields of environment and development with the 1992 Rio Declaration, a document widely regarded as the founding charter of sustainable development. It contains a list of 27 principles, 3 of which are dedicated to participation: Principle 10 emphasises that “environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens”; Principle 20 advocates the full participation of women – while Principle 22 refers to indigenous peoples and their communities (UN, 1992a).

The Rio conference also led to the approval of Agenda 21, a comprehensive blueprint of action “for the 21st century” to be taken globally, nationally and locally by UN organisations and the world’s governments. The text of Agenda 21, for which negotiations began in 1989, is a massive 351-page document loaded with references to participation and participatory approaches (UN, 1992b). While the notion of “democracy” is hardly referred to (only 5 occurrences), “participation” is present 195 times.\(^\text{16}\) Not only does the Preamble advocate the “broadest public participation”, but this theme is also central in two out of three of the document’s main sections. Section 2 concerns itself with “conservation and management of resources for development”, with a systematic emphasis on participatory principles. Section 3 focuses on “strengthening the role” of a wide range of groups, with an entire chapter devoted to each of the following: women, children and youth, indigenous people, non-governmental organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, businesses and industries, and scientific communities. What is more, throughout the document numerous references are made to “user groups” and “stakeholders” in general and their need to “participate”. The intention to involve local communities is made very clear throughout, as for instance in forest, water, disaster and waste management, as well as in early warning systems of environmental crisis.

\(^\text{16}\) This comparison includes derivate words such as “democratic” and “participatory".
The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed in 2000 and concerned with the fight against poverty, is another key document of the international community that places CP at the forefront of its message. Right from the start, participation appears in the section devoted to core “values and principles”, under the ambitious heading of “freedom”. Later on, in Section 5 on “democracy, human rights and good governance”, the commitment of signatory states is reaffirmed “to work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all countries”. Among the eight related Millennium Development Goals that the international community pledged to reach before 2015, two directly point to the principle of participation: Objective 2 refers to the empowerment of women while Objective 8 is a plea for a multilevel partnership involving all possible kinds of actors, including local communities.

In the field of education also, international discourses clearly emphasise the importance of CP (Singleton, 2005). Participatory approaches to education were first discussed at Jomtien, at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All (EFA), but since then, they have been increasingly emphasised, notably at the follow up conference in Dakar in 2000, bringing together 1,100 representatives from various governments and organisations. While the Jomtien Declaration briefly mentions possible arrangements involving “local communities” (UNESCO, 1990, p.4), the Dakar Declaration makes CP a fundamental principle, stating for instance that: “at all levels of decision-making, governments must put in place regular mechanisms for dialogue enabling citizens and civil society organizations to contribute to the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation” of educational systems (UNESCO, 2000, art. 53-54). Moreover, an analysis of EFA National Action Plans (UNESCO, 2007) further shows the strong commitment of domestic education policy rhetoric to the same principles. The most critical partners are often said to be those “directly affected by education policies” such as teachers, students, parents, and other members of the community.

Meanwhile, CP had also emerged as a significant principle of global health policies (WHO, 2004, p.44). The 1948 constitution of the WHO already stated that “informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance”, but it was in the early 1970s that the practical benefits of CP in health projects started to attract systematic attention. A range of projects in Guatemala,
Niger and Tanzania suggested at that time that significant population health gains could be made as a result of increased community inputs in shaping programme priorities and by local health workers taking on various responsibilities (Newell, 1975). In 1978, the full participation of the community became one of the pillars of the Health for All movement. In 1986, the Ottawa Charter, signed at the First International Conference on Health Promotion, identified CP as one of its five top priorities (WHO, 1986a). A similar path was followed in the connected field of water and sanitation, where CP became a standard recommendation from the mid-eighties onwards, promoted in the context of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (UNICEF, 1999, p.14).

Turning to international aid flows, the Monterrey Consensus signed in March 2002 confirmed the pre-eminence of participation and placed it together with such fundamental values as justice, equity and democracy (UN, 2002a, section I.9).

As a follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit, 191 governments gathered in September 2002 in Johannesburg for the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The aim was to assess progress since 1992 and reinvigorate global commitment. The result was a 54-page agreement called the “Johannesburg Plan of Implementation” (UN, 2002b) which sets out new commitments and priorities in areas as diverse as poverty eradication, health, trade, education, global finance, debt reduction, technology transfer, scientific research or natural resource management. Again, while “democracy” is only mentioned 7 times, “human rights” 6 times and “empowerment” twice, “participation” is explicitly referred to 34 times – especially regarding “communities”, which are mentioned 41 times.17 Thus, while the Plan of Implementation covers virtually all aspects of global governance, its cross-cutting theme is very much about participation and the “involvement of all stakeholders”, as is also manifested by the 53 occurrences of the word “partnership”.

Beyond international commitments and turning to a more operational level, CP also infuses the official values and work practices of most international organisations. The United Nations funds, programmes and agencies regularly re-commit to CP in their declarations of principles and methodologies, as do the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the

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17 We do not take into account occurrences of the “international community”.

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World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), or the Global Environment Facility (GEF). All GEF projects, for instance, are required to include baseline studies on community participation and institutional strengthening (Gerlak & Parisi, p.641). CP approaches have become so influential that some observers refer to it as the “new orthodoxy” (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001). By the early 1990s every major institution emphasised participatory principles, while the World Bank joined in by the middle of the decade. Its support for CP has translated into the implementation of community-based development (CBD) and community-driven development (CDD) projects – the second type being even more participatory. The number of projects in the Bank’s portfolio that include CBD/CDD components grew from 2% in 1989 to 25% in 2003 (World Bank, 2005).

All these organisations devote resources to monitoring their CP methodologies, as well as making them known to the wider public. CP also seems part of a communication strategy designed to help counter claims that large international organisations are deaf to local voices and demands. Omnipresent UN efforts to promote “local partnerships” in all spheres of policy making also sustain this dynamic. Yet, in addition to applying CP requirements to themselves, such organisations often go much further and tend to impose them upon the governments or partners they support. Risley (2007) shows for instance that the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and a diverse array of international organisations have encouraged CP reforms in Latin America by financing programmes that stipulate citizens’ involvement in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring.

Participation is also a global discourse in the sense that it is widely supported and referred to by non-governmental organisations, large or small, international or local (O’Riordan & Voisey, 1997, 1998). The CP rhetoric is often intrinsic to discourses of local associations as it provides the basis for their inclusion in policy processes and access to financial resources. This can be seen in Africa, Asia or Latin America, where domestic NGOs rely heavily on CP discourses to attract attention from national policy makers as well as international donors. As for international NGOs, their charters and stated principles, as well as their policy recommendations, methodological guidelines and project proposals, increasingly reflect the CP rhetoric.
This is especially the case in the environmental sphere, for instance in policy declarations and project presentations of large organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) or the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). As early as 1980, the IUCN and the WWF together with UNEP – as well as with inputs from the FAO and UNESCO – published a *World Conservation Strategy*, a milestone document for the whole professional field. It notably advocated “greater public participation in planning and decision making concerning living use” (IUCN, *et al.*, 1980, p.15) emphasising that this should “ideally [take place] at all stages from policy making to project formulation and review” (p.46). A decade later, the sequel to this strategy, entitled *Caring for the Earth: A strategy for sustainability* was prepared by the same organisations (IUCN, *et al.*, 1991). It confirmed the need to “[ensure] participation by affected communities in the design and implementation of projects and programmes” (p.84).

In a similar vein, eleven international NGOs (INGOs) involved in human rights, environmental and social development, decided to co-sign in 2006 a common “INGO Accountability Charter” emphasising participation. Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam, Save the Children and Transparency International were among the signatories. This was the first time that organisations of this kind outlined a common set of principles and commitments of accountability and transparency. In this document, a promise is made on participatory and multi-stakeholder engagement since signatories pledge to “seek to work in genuine partnership with local communities”. CP is indeed often explicitly mentioned in codes of conduct of large NGOs working in a wide variety of fields, up to conflict prevention (e.g. International Alert, 2009, Principle A.1; GPPAC, 2007, Guiding Principle no.2).

### 2.1.3. Conclusion

This section has argued that “community participation” is now a global discourse omnipresent in global governance rhetoric and many organisations. It has also shown that CP draws on political ideologies of democratic emancipation, while having been promoted early on by the United States as a foreign policy tool concerned with the political behaviour of the rural masses of the developing world – contributing to the

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containment of communism. This ambiguity between political emancipation and political control underlines the relevance of the two competing narratives under scrutiny in this study, namely the emancipatory and the critical ones. It also makes a critical appraisal of today’s global discourse on CP even more important.
2.2. The Mechanics of a Global Discourse

In this section we explore the "mechanics" of the CP discourse from three angles previously defined in Chapter 1 (cf. section 1.1.4, Table 2). Its "system of meanings" is first analysed as a set of articulated concepts that reveals in-built ambiguities. Secondly, we study the paths through which the CP discourse produces a "shared common sense" appealing to a wide variety of actors and a great many interest groups. Third and finally, we look at the work practices it produces, looking at the operational guidelines associated with CP projects in various policy fields.

2.2.1. A system of meanings: constructing freedom in a restricted framework

As discussed earlier, a prime level of discourse analysis is to identify the network of meanings it puts into place. The discourse on "participation" is based on "system of significations" by which objects are "distinguished from one another", as de Saussure (1913) would have it. It constructs categories and relations among them, as well as action programmes implied as being "natural".

First, let us look at the predicates that characterise participation in a range of international declarations and policy documents (UN 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2002a, 2002b; UNESCO, 1990, 2000, 2007). "Participation" is typically determined by epithets that carry three ranges of meanings. First comes effectiveness, with epithets such as "effective", "active" or "adequate" participation. Second are the concerns over inclusiveness, as participation should be "increasing", "full", "broad-based", "popular", "of all stakeholders", "decentralised" and "at all levels". Third is legitimacy, as participation needs to be "equitable" and "transparent". Participation is thus constructed as embodying the core ideals of modern social life, as effective, inclusive and politically legitimate.

Turning our attention to what areas are said to need "participation", three ranges of issues emerge. First are "economic and social benefits", which shows that participation presents itself as a concern about a wider distribution of social welfare. Second, are "planning", "decision-making", "implementation procedures", "assessment" and "evaluation", which reveals that participation is not only about
benefits but also about the processes producing them. Finally, participation is said to be necessary in "discussions" and "debates", pointing to an ethos of open discussion. In statements of global policies, the word "participation" is in fact always used to stress the importance and urgency of promoting more of it and of a better quality. It is employed with reference to an array of actors of varying nature and sizes. It can be applied to entire countries that need more "say" in the global political economy for instance - such as developing countries in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. But it is even more often used in relation to more limited entities, such as NGOs, local associations, community-based organisations, women's groups, labour unions, private enterprises, indigenous groups and of course individual citizens. Although the list is virtually endless, it is strongly geared towards civil society organisations, especially local ones, and much less towards public authorities which are implicitly those that need to cede more power. Participation is thus essentially a call for including civil society (and local authorities to a lesser extent) in all types of governance schemes or, in other words, to foster a new "alliance between the state and civil society" (Risley, 2007).

Beyond text analysis, there is also a need for a conceptual analysis that helps identify implicit meanings. "Participation" is indeed at the crossroads of two binary combinations in which one term is systematically "preferred" to the other. The first opposition is inclusion vs. exclusion. While inclusion carries a positive connotation in the social realm, exclusion carries an immediately negative tone: it is always good to be "included" and whoever excludes is somehow suspect. The same goes for the second binary opposition of being active against being passive. The positive connotation of activeness is connected to notions such as being energetic and creative, as compared to being lethargic and apathetic. Overall, participation places itself on the right side of these two implicit value scales, which provide it in turn with an immediate positiveness - as being "active and inclusive" rather than "passive and excluding".

Participation creates at least two series of objects: a group of potential participants and something in which to participate. The former are implicitly and a priori constructed as non-participating or under-participating, which creates an immediate concern about the legitimacy or effectiveness of the processes under scrutiny. What is thus really intrinsic to the notion of participation is that something needs to be
changed and fixed for the better, and that someone has a legitimate claim to it. This concern is often supported by the use made by the CP discourse of the concept of “stakeholders”, namely people and groups that are affected by what is being discussed. In the context of liberal Western societies, the stakeholders’ claim to involvement comes as a natural implication of their status of “impacted parties”. This flows, for instance, from the well-known “no harm” principle of John Stuart Mill (1859), who argued that the one fundamental limitation of individual liberty is to not harm others.\footnote{“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. (...) The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others (Mill, 1859, reprinted 1974, p.69).”} This calls for compensation, or involvement in decisions, if harm is being done or more generally if any impact is experienced. In a liberal outlook, “stakeholders” are essentially “rights-holders”.

The CP discourse further tends to picture social relations as a binary relation between “uppers”, who hold resources or power, and “lowers” who are left without. It follows that participation should be about reversing this situation so that “lowers” are “empowered” and “uppers” relatively “disempowered”. Moreover, Kothari (2001, p.140) points to participation as a paradigm whereby “the micro is set against the macro, the margins against the centre, the local against the elite”. In her view, this “almost exclusive focus on the micro-level, on people who are considered powerless and marginal, [reproduces] the simplistic notion that the sites of social power and control are to be found solely at the macro and central levels”. This reading simplifies power relations and neglects them at the local level, notably within communities which are most often not homogeneous themselves.

Finally, turning to what it is that is to be “participated in”, it is interesting to note that in the notion of CP this “thing” stands as pre-existing, giving the feeling that people or groups are to be taken into something that is largely already there – something that merely needs “more participation”. Here the internal ambiguity of the CP notion is manifest. Telling community groups that they deserve to participate sounds as if what they are to participate in is already known, allowing limited room for them to change or shape this thing according to their own preferences and needs. From this specific angle, participation seems partly self-contradictory or even self-defeating.
Thus, the system of signification brought about by participation makes the latter concept naturally positive; it also simplifies potential relations and limits from the start what can be achieved through participation – since what is to be participated in is already pre-defined. These conceptual ambiguities echoed those already found in the genealogy of the CP discourse, which already revolved around concerns over emancipation vs. political control.

2.2.2. The production of a common sense: drawing on ideals, interests and promises of effectiveness

As a globally propelled discourse, CP has managed to produce a shared common sense among a vast range of actors and issues. As we saw in Chapter 1 (section 1.1.4), two fundamental mechanisms may be used within a given discourse to do so (Weldes, 1999): interpellation and articulation. Participation uses both.

1/ With interpellation, a global discourse targets specific people or groups that thus feel involved, immersed, understood and potentially empowered. At a general social level, one may say that CP appeals to people by targeting and making promises to both individuals and social groups with a strong common identity. In doing so, the CP discourse takes advantage of two parallel social trends – namely individualism and communitarianism. Talks about participation help to legitimise the interest and demands of minority groups, a long list of which parallels the list of potential stakeholders (women, indigenous groups, rural workers...) that may appear in any community-based initiative.

2/ Articulation is the second and fundamental mechanism that produces a common-sense vision. It refers to the capacity of a discourse to articulate itself around pre-existing and unquestioned cognitive elements that already “make sense” within a society.

Articulation is a powerful feature of the participatory discourse. Among laypeople, it neatly meets concerns about social justice, democracy or human rights. Arnstein (1969), in her classic article on policy planning, had already insisted that participation was “all about social and political equality”. This commitment is not anarchic or destructive of the social order, since there must remain something to “participate in”. It carries a reformist political outlook advocating increased inclusion of various voices in pre-existing social forms; and in a more radical version, CP
points to new political forms – essentially bottom-up, potentially close to a libertarian vision of direct democracy. It can further be argued that participation is a cornerstone of democratic theory. In fact, it may be looked as one approach among others to democratic decision making or as a deeper and inescapable ontological dimension of democracy.

Thanks to this fluidity, and its associated notion of “empowerment”, participation relates easily to a wide spectrum of Western ideologies, from classical liberalism to neo-Marxism, including social liberalism, social democracy or supporters of Harbemas’ deliberative democracy. This is reflected in the wide political spectrum of proponents of more participation, no matter what this may actually mean in practice. In today’s world, across Western and non-Western democracies, as well as in some “strong regimes” such as Cuba, Venezuela or China, the concept of participation is taken up by virtually all political parties as a key way forward to modernise political life. This extreme diversity shows well enough that participation can carry widely different messages regarding the need, or not, to modify power structures.

Yet, articulation of the CP discourse also takes place within scientific and professional spheres – epistemic communities – concerned with global health, development or the environment among others. For these people, the efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of projects are key concerns around which CP articulates itself.

As Botterill (2002, p.3) explains, socio-economic or environmental programs focussed on CP are ascribed a number of intrinsic merits in the policy and professional literature: alternative top-down approaches have failed, with governments or experts identifying and imposing solutions; CP programs build the capacity of the community to tackle future problems autonomously; involving communities in deciding their future is a good thing in itself. An economic rationale, is also omnipresent – as pointed out by Normann (2006, p.21). Efficient control, monitoring and surveillance systems are expensive and have generally been a governmental responsibility so that transferring some to local communities may decrease their costs to the state budget (e.g. Hersoug & Raanes, 1997; Narayan, 2006).

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20 See for instance the Paulo Freire model of community participation and social learning through awakening and “conscientization” (Freire, 1968). See also Kane (2001) on Latin America.
2002a). CP may be cost-efficient for the state if it leads local groups to do more with more of their own resources (cost-sharing): involving the community marshals more human resources than could be mobilised by the authorities alone. Furthermore, government agencies often lack knowledge of local resources, and the cost of gathering it is high. Local communities and organisations may have a better knowledge of problems and workable solutions, for instance regarding ecological conditions (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Jentoft, 2000).

In the field of global development, articulation of the CP discourse works particularly in comparison with previous development strategies. CP has indeed emerged as a key development discourse whose capacity to appear as “common sense” is readily comparable to previous development paradigms. As Mohan and Stokke (2000, p.252) put it, “[participatory] discourses present [themselves] as commonsensical given the failings of what has preceded [them]”. Paradigm shifts are always constructed as “natural” and CP is no exception. Lindauer and Pritchet (2002) show how this mechanism of “common sense production” has been working for decades – how various development paradigms have been based upon “big facts and big ideas” that seemed to carry “obvious lessons from experience”. Deception with the strong state and top-down strategies were followed by a neoliberal wave advocating market deregulation; disillusions with the latter, led to a shift towards institutional reforms, social concerns in the form of decentralisation and a greater involvement of the civil society. CP is well articulated with the neoliberal attack against state centralisation while not endangering the tenets of free markets – and even providing them with a social and local flavour. The work of Amartya Sen (1985, 1999) was also influential in moving the focus of development professionals from strict material wealth to a broader “capability” approach and strategies to “empower” poor people. This agenda was taken up by many donor organisations as part of their response to critiques of top-down development.

CP is also strongly articulated to key concerns of political scientists about the nature and possibility of collective action. As is well known, typical solutions to the “free rider problem” facing large groups (Olson, 1965) drew attention to involving institutional frameworks to provide an external authority that monitors and sanctions.

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21 In the well-known “free rider problem”, obstacles to co-operation in large groups derive from difficulties that members face in assuring one another that they will not “free ride”.

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But Olson's preferred solution was for the group to reorganise itself as a federated system — that is, as a group of smaller groups where "small" means few enough members that remaining problems of trust become manageable and solutions can be found. Ostrom's (1990) seminal book *Governing the Commons* followed this insight and proposed an approach to communities as particular social organisations able to address problems that cannot be managed by individuals acting alone, markets or governments. She observed that collective action problems faced by large groups may often be broken down into smaller problems that are surmountable given pre-existing trust between some members. This perspective, focusing on the smaller scale rather than the larger scale, has inspired calls for further involvement of local stakeholders through participatory techniques in decision-making in a wide range of areas.

At a more macro level, the call for CP is also underpinned by the changing nature of the challenges faced by the international community — such as climate change, the fight against transmissible diseases or the loss of global biodiversity. These stakes cannot be taken care of by merely harnessing a few key central actors. For instance, biodiversity cannot technically be preserved without simultaneously putting in motion states (international conventions, supporting green efforts of poor countries), private companies (offering or imposing new norms, supporting their upgrading, fostering responsible behaviours), countless local communities (often left to themselves, with no resources but natural ones, possessors of valuable local knowledge), civil society organisations (as agents of awareness-raising, catalysts of good will, a counter-weight to local political decisions), expert communities (producing knowledge, technical solutions, data) as well as individuals (as citizens who vote or consumers who influence market trends). Changing the course of the planet on such an issue requires putting in motion an almost unthinkably large constellation of actors. As argued previously (section 1.1.2), these forms of cooperation are so vast, complex and polycentric that, more than "collective action", it is useful to refer to them as exercises in "hyper-collective action", to emphasise their quantitative and qualitative difference, and whereby the involvement of local communities is increasingly critical.
2.2.3. The production of practices: a participatory ‘social technology’

Beyond the building of a common sense view, the CP discourse also produces a range of operational recommendations meant to shape project design in various fields of international attention. Here, we base our analysis of typical practices from a selection of more than twenty policy documents prepared and published by organisations such as international institutions, bilateral aid agencies, large NGOs or global networks and partnerships that facilitate the emergence of common work standards. All of these documents emphasise CP in their guiding principles for the preparation and implementation of schemes in the following sectors: general development (ADB, 2001; World Bank, 2002); infrastructures (DFID, 2003); water and sanitation (WHO, 1986b; UNICEF, 1999; DFID, 2002); healthcare (CARE, 1999; WHO, 2002); education (USAID, 2001; INEE, 2004; UNESCO, 2001, 2007); the protection of the environment (CANARI, 1999; IUCN, 2004; UNEP-WCMC & KMTNC, 2005; IUCN, 2008); assistance to refugees (UNHCR, 2005; UNESCO, 2006); conflict prevention and peace-building (International Alert, 1998; OECD, 2001; World Bank, 2006; GPPAC, 2007). Although such policy guidelines show variations reflecting the diversity of their issue areas, they share a common discourse which translates into broad sets of “CP recommendations” – or “best practices”. In particular, three emerge regarding the mobilisation of the community, the facilitation of CP and its institutionalisation. These are core practices that we argue are part and parcel of the global discourse.

The first set of practical recommendations relates to a social technology of information or action-oriented meetings that help “involve”, “engage with” and “mobilise” community members. CP is indeed about collaboration and communication amongst diverse stakeholders coming together “to agree on their expectations, share information, discuss ideas, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate” (ADB, 2001, p.27). Most of this collaborative work takes place in the context of meetings that, in turn, come in a variety of shapes and sizes, serving many different purposes. Large-scale public meetings include, for example, conferences, public consultations, town hall meetings and open seminars used for disseminating information and raising interest. Workshops are smaller scale, action-oriented events

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22 Such as for instance the INEE (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies) or GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict).
where diverse stakeholders come to address an issue together; they are used to establish and sustain collaboration with stakeholder groups, from pre-planning to evaluation stages. Focus groups are even smaller and often informal discussion groups. Participants are selected to represent either a cross-section or a specific category of stakeholders. Concerns and views are thus identified through guided discussions. Finally, standing bodies are almost always created to pull together diverse stakeholder representatives— in the form, for example, of project boards, advisory groups, management or steering committees and various task forces (ADB, 2001, p.27). It is generally agreed that such participatory meetings should be built into projects from the outset so that the community can share responsibilities in the assessment of the local situation, the definition of problems, the setting of priorities, decision-making, the planning of action programmes, project implementation, evaluation and potential modification (e.g. WHO, 1996, p.7; CANARI, 1999, p.22; INEE, 2004, p.14). Most policy documents also emphasise the risk of imposing a pre-defined project upon a community, a bias that needs to be “carefully avoided”.

The second group of practical recommendations on CP is concerned with the concept of facilitation and the position of actors that are external to the “community”. Operational guidelines often insist that the mobilisation of the community needs some form of “external facilitator” to help shape the discussion, balance various viewpoints and make sure that all voices are taken into account (e.g. IUCN, 2004, p.80; UNICEF, 1999, p.14; GPPAC, 2008, p.12). In the context of the above-mentioned participatory meetings, facilitation applies “to how a person with no decision-making authority helps the group to be more efficient and effective in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating” (DFID, 2002, p.183). Ideally, “the facilitator does not engage in discussions and does not pass judgement. He/she facilitates discussions and has the prerogative to ask questions but does not intervene as an expert” (ADB, 2001, p.29). Facilitation is thus described as a neutral and “agendaless” function that does not influence outcomes. Facilitators are meant to be mere “catalysts” that help give birth to productive negotiations and leave the community in the “driving seat”. Facilitators should simply help people understand the opportunities they have; they thus should “try to avoid implementing activities themselves, but rather build the capacity of existing local and regional organisations
to be able to plan and implement activities on their own in a sustainable manner” 
(Leijzer, 2002, p.3).

A third important set of operational advice relates to the way CP needs to be institutionalised. A CP scheme is generally “based on a set of rules and one or more organisations in charge of developing, interpreting and implementing such rules on an on-going basis, responding to varying circumstances and needs” (IUCN, 2004, p.47). Such organisations come in all shapes and sizes, with different mandates, regulations and characteristics but are all meant to be as “participatory” as possible. Operational guidelines all insist on the importance of creating well-balanced information, decision and evaluation mechanisms, through which all community voices are fairly represented. Representation “should be inclusive, with the participation of groups and institutions such as local NGOs, religious institutions, traditional leaders, marginalised groups, women, clans, tribes, age groups, etc.” (INEE, 2004, p.16). Most handbooks, however, acknowledge that “there is no fixed formula” for such organisations and that “relationships among the partners may change and evolve as communities become better able to manage their own affairs” (UNICEF, 1999, p.20).

2.2.4. Conclusion

In this section, we have enquired into the mechanics of the global CP discourse: its articulated set of meanings within its ambiguities regarding social emancipation or control; its production of a shared common sense by interpellation of interest groups and articulation with cognitive elements that are widespread in Western culture and professional policy circles; its operational implications on projects and policies – notably its reliance on practices of participatory meetings, facilitators and institutionalised bodies. We now turn to the global field of “biodiversity protection” to show why and how CP as emerged as its dominant policy framework.
2.3. Non-participation: the “fortress” approach to preserving nature

Biodiversity has become a major area of global governance, both de facto and de jure, given the global stakes it carries and the rising number of actors, networks, treaties and funds that are endeavouring to support it worldwide. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a shift in nature conservation from protectionist and socially exclusionary forms (often referred to as the “glass bell” approach or “fortress conservation”) towards more inclusionary and people-oriented forms emphasising CP as well as “sustainable use”. These are variously known as Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM), community-based conservation (CBC), or integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). The CP discourse can only be understood against the backdrop of and in relation to the “fortress conservation” discourse, which is its key counterweight and challenger. For this reason, “fortress conservation” will be the focus of this section.

From its origins at the end of the 19th century, the modern conservation movement has been pursuing the creation of “protected areas” that bar local people – politically, economically and physically – from natural areas. Whether this is in order to keep animals for the purpose of aristocratic hunting in colonial empires, to preserve landscapes in industrial America, to pursue romantic ideals of “pristine wilderness” or to tackle the global extinction currently taking place (cf. Appendix 3), “parks” (a congenial euphemism for “fenced areas”) have captured the attention of conservationists worldwide. Some argue today that, beyond national sovereignties, these areas even require international armed forces to police them (e.g. Terborgh, 1999).

Here we first review the history of these protected areas. Although they are found across the globe throughout history, Western industrial economies were first to generalise large-scale national parks, the environmental impact of which was commensurate with their size. Under Western influences – from colonial rulers to modern NGOs – this “bell-jar model” was swiftly taken up worldwide, even in places where socio-economic systems were non-industrial. We then look at the critiques that developed against the socio-economic impacts and environmental rationale of these parks – and which opened the way for the CP discourse to flourish.
2.3.1. The global spread of a Western misanthropic model

It is often suggested that the very concept of protected areas was first created by North countries at the end of the 19th century. Still, many prior examples can be found in the history of non-Western states (e.g. Assyria, Babylon, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Persia) as well as in smaller-scale societies based on rural communities (e.g. Africa, Alaska, India, New Zealand)\(^\text{23}\). Most societies throughout space and time have indeed developed one form or another of environmental protection. These are arguably learned behaviours, based on past mistakes and periods of over-use (Berkes, 1999). As Gadgil (1996) points out, the scale of conservation efforts of a given society is closely linked to the scale of its resource catchment – and thus to the extent of its impact on nature. For instance, hunter-gatherer, shifting cultivator or horticultural societies developed conservation practices on typically small areas of between 1 and 10 hectares. They were embedded in a religious worship of nature and in sacred locations such as woods, ponds or rivers. Today, sacred groves are still in common use in countries such as India or Madagascar, where they support local communities while providing a safer habitat for local species. Protected areas have since expanded with the growing impact of human societies upon the natural environment. Agrarian societies developed hunting preserves extending over thousands of hectares that only aristocrats were allowed to use – a social inequality that nevertheless limited anthropogenic environmental impact.

Later, industrial economies were the first to create large-scale national parks encompassing hundreds or even thousands of square kilometres. Yellowstone, in the United States, is widely referred to as the first park ever.\(^\text{24}\) It was created in 1872 at a time when much of North America had been devastated by white settlers, many of whom held the shared belief that God had given them a right to exploit the land to the full (Bernard & Young, 1997). Following this model, Australia, Canada and New Zealand created a series of national parks towards the end of the 19th century.

In this setting, a Western conception of protected areas developed built upon a markedly misanthropic foundation. “It assumes that people are destructive of a


\(^{24}\) For instance, the World Database of Protected Areas (WDPA) takes Yellowstones as its starting point.
pristine nature that needs to be protected against human depredation” (McNeely & Ness, 1997, p.1). “Wilderness”, defined as the total absence of humans, became central to the Western understanding of nature – a notion romanticised as “the last preserves of places untouched by the outward expansion of European imperium” (Cosgrove, 1995, p.32). Brockington et al. (2008, p.49) insist at length on the power of “idea of wilderness” that excludes people “both physically and conceptually”. As they contend, parks “embody the ideal of pristine wilderness and seek to impose them on specific landscapes” (p.45).

Step by step, this misanthropic programme of large-scale protected areas became applied to the rest of the world, including non-industrialised nations. It is true that continental Europe and the UK only started creating national parks from the mid-20th century onwards, but their colonial governments (British, French, Dutch or German) developed them earlier in their administered territories in Africa and Asia. In Indonesia, the Dutch established a first rhino reserve in 1921. In 1925, the Parc National Albert was instated in the Belgian Congo. As for the British colonies, aristocratic hunters lobbied for game reserves to be created (Mackenzie, 1998). One of their early successes was the Kruger National Park established in 1926 in South Africa. In India, the first national park was founded in 1936.

This process did not stop with the retreat of colonial empires. Much to the contrary, it continued with post-independence interventionist governments. Parks thus developed all over the world, displaying the same structures based on the exclusion of locals and top-down, state-centred management. The “Western universal” was uniformly applied, setting boundaries around areas and keeping people out as much as possible with fences and fines. Brockington et al. (2008, p.2) underline that the most dramatic growth of protected areas worldwide took place between 1985 and 1995. In South and Central America, as well as in the Caribbean, they particularly flourished in 1980s. Today, according to the World Conservation Monitoring Centre25, there are more than 100,000 delimited areas that benefit from some form of state protection, making up 12% of the world’ land surface, although actual levels of protection are highly variable.

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The “park” approach has been adopted by developing countries either uncritically or following direct pressure from Western actors. Although protected areas were officially established by South governments, they were or still are often designed and run by Western NGOs. Schmidtz (1997) recalls for instance that environmentalist organisations in Europe, Canada and the United States strongly lobbied their own governments to use loan guarantees to pressure developing nations. Meanwhile, the World Bank and other multilateral organisations imposed environmental pre-conditions for countries to access loans (Kolk, 1998). Large NGOs, mostly from the North, have also been extremely influential in propelling the concept of protected parks. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Conservation International (CI) have been especially active in the Americas. In Gabon, the Wildlife Conversation Society (WCS) has been instrumental in the creation of thirteen new national parks encompassing 11% of the country in 2002. In Laos, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) played a significant role in the emergence of a large number of reserves following the damming of the Mekong River. Moreover, such large green NGOs have led campaigns to build public support for global conservation, displaying striking images such as massive fires in the Amazon or other graphic catastrophes.

The misanthropic model was also enshrined, as McElwee (2001) argues, in the reference guidelines for park classification promoted by the IUCN. This system ranks parks on a 1-to-6 scale depending on the degree of human disturbance (IUCN, 1994). Parks allowing for extractive use and residence (category 4 through 6) are described by strict conservationists as less worthy than areas of stricter exclusion (category 1 through 3). Arguably, this classification “oversimplifies the range of landscapes found in diverse areas of the world…and demonises those landscapes that are human-affected” (McElwee, 2001, p.3).

Parks “are the centre of the ways in which most Westerners imagine nature”; yet, their concept also “conceals a great deal” (Brockington et al., 2008, p.45), notably the social changes that are needed for their creation. In fact, waves of critiques have formed against the “fortress approach” to conservation, putting into doubt its socio-economic fairness as well as environmental necessity and opening the way for the emergence of the CP discourse.
2.3.2. Iniquitous violences: the social critique

In *Crimes against Nature*, Karl Jacoby (2001) famously analysed the social injustices associated with the conservation of public lands in the United States, starting with Yellowstone Park. This process redefined the “public interest” by legitimising particular conceptions of nature and criminalising others, particularly those of rural communities. The latter had nevertheless “fashioned a variety of arrangements designed to safeguard the ecological basis of their way of life” (p.193). As Jacoby puts it, the “hidden history of conservation” is one of metropolitan elites imposing their ideas about nature on rural people.

In the rest of the world, the creation of national parks has also led communities to be moved out and excluded from lands and denied access to wildlife resources (Adams & MacShane, 1992; Brockington, 2002). The effects have been largely described as “devastating for the traditional populations – extractivists, fisherfolk, and indigenous peoples” (Diegues, 2000, p.3). Local resentments against parks and reserves, stemming from the restrictions on resources that communities had utilised for generations, have been well documented (Wells & Brandon, 1992). Since colonial times, violence has been a major aspect of state-directed wildlife conservation, notably through displacement, increased vulnerability to natural hazards, and person-to-person brutality (Neumann, 2001). In the post-colonial period, “all categories of violence have increased in frequency and intensity” - for instance with the issuing of shoot-on-sight directives (ibid, p.322). A recent book by Mark Dowe (2009) emphasises that this “hundred-year conflict between global conservation and native peoples” is far from over.

Brockington and Igoe (2006) have put together a massive review of 250 published articles on “conservation displacements” from the 1970s onwards, covering 184 protected areas. They conclude that the available literature is not of high quality and that many gaps exist in the current state of knowledge. For instance, the number of displaced people worldwide is not known at all, as estimates range from less than 1 million to over 14 million (Geisler & de Souza, 2001; Geisler, 2003). Similarly, the number of people living within protected areas today is also unknown, which limits the ability to predict the impact of further park creations. Studies in India, South America, Mongolia and Central Africa suggest nevertheless that there are communities living in 56 to 85% of protected areas. From this vast literature review,
the authors also find that evictions have been most common in Africa, South and Southeast Asia and North America – much less in other parts, such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Australia, Europe or the former Soviet Union.

Looking at the socio-economic impacts of parks upon the local populations, many of the 250 reports reviewed provide no details. But “unsurprisingly, where the consequences of eviction have been well studied they add to the weight of studies which have demonstrated that forced relocation inflicts considerable material and psychological harm” (Brockington & Igoe, p.449). Cernea (2005) has identified eight major impoverishment risks linked to displacement: 1) landlessness (expropriation of land assets and loss of access to land); 2) joblessness (even when the resettlement creates some temporary jobs); 3) homelessness (loss of physical houses, family homes and cultural space); 4) marginalisation (social, psychological and economic downward mobility); 5) food insecurity (malnourishment); 6) increased morbidity and mortality; 7) loss of access to common property (forests, water, wasteland, cultural sites); and 8) social disarticulation (disempowerment, disruption to social institutions).

Very few studies have tried to rigorously assess whether protected areas have a net cost or a net benefit for local communities. Coad et al. (2008) in another massive literature review “found no studies that had directly measured the impact of protected areas on poverty, wealth or other variables that might indicate an individual or community’s wellbeing” (p.27). The rare studies that have considered overall costs and benefits suggest a pattern of local costs and regional or global benefits26. Thus, although protected areas may provide macro benefits, they seem to often have a net cost at the local or national level, with poor countries and the rural poor bearing the larger share.

The negative impacts of coercive anti-poaching policies are also pointed out as they have criminalised practices of traditional hunting (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Although such policies started in colonial times, they now often rely upon alliances between the state, donors and international green NGOs. In some instances, they also lead to human right abuses, as documented by Duffy (2000) in Zimbabwe. Neumann

26 At least six papers have quantified costs and benefits for forest protected areas: three case studies from Madagascar (Kremen et al., 2000; Ferraro, 2002; Carrett & Loyer., 2003), one from Kenya (Norton-Griffiths & Southey, 1995), one from Malaysia (Mohd Shahwahid et al., 1999) and one from Cameroon (Yaron, 2001).
(2004) points out that, since the 1980s, several African governments have issued shoot-on-sight orders for "poachers" found within national parks. War has thus become "a common model and metaphor for conceptualizing and planning biodiversity protection in Africa" (p.813). The author contends that a moral justification for shoot-on-sight and wartime violence cannot be demonstrated within any strand of environmental ethics. Yet they have become taken for granted in Africa. He further shows how popular media have contributed to humanising wild animals while denigrating poachers, including poor peasants searching for small game or fish. Through these discursively reconstructed identities, human rights abuses and deadly violence against humans in the defence of "biodiversity" have become normalised within African national parks.

2.3.3. Doubting sustainability and necessity: the environmental critique

The fortress approach to conservation has not only been criticised for its inbuilt violence, but also for its lack of sustainability as well as environmental necessity, as compared to other types of protection measures.

First, it has been pointed out that the emphasis on parks leads to the neglect of the natural environment that lay outside of the parks. This fragmented vision can be deeply harmful to conservation goals (Cronon, 1995). Looking the species-areas relationships, Rosenzweig (2003) argues that the loss of biodiversity cannot be stopped by "reserving small tracts of wild habitat" (p.194). In his view, the real challenge is to "redesign anthropogenic habitats so that their use is compatible with use by a broad array of other species - something he calls "reconciliation ecology". In a similar move, Adams (1996, p.170) argues that conservation should be designed to involve the whole landscape. Protected areas are just too small to provide adequate species or ecosystem conservation.

Second, there have been suggestions that parks do not function properly even within their boundaries because they cannot operate without local support. Excluding communities living near or within natural areas is said to prove politically and socially unsustainable -- and therefore ineffective (e.g. Lane, 2001; Western, 2001; Barrow & Fabricius, 2002) As Brockington (2004) points out, few observers now seem to doubt this "principal of local support", as he names it, but this does always hold true. Brockington studied for instance the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania.
and concludes that “protected areas do not all have to have the backing of their neighbours in order to survive...Local groups can be ignored by protected areas with impunity; passing over local groups may make no long-term threats to a protected area’s security” (Brockington, 2004, p.412). Opposing communities are often politically weak rural groups facing alliances of local to international actors. Moreover, key individuals or groups of the local elite are often well positioned to take advantage of conservation schemes. In other words, various local power relations may interact to contain resistances (Brockington et al., 2008, p84).

Despite this more cynical reality, the “fortress approach” is still constantly challenged for its ability to hold up itself in the face of local resistances. The literature on the environmental effectiveness of parks is actually not as vast and systematic as one could expect. Not many studies have used large samples of protected areas to gather insights into their actual contribution to biodiversity protection. A few may nevertheless be mentioned. Bruner et al. (2001a) for instance study a set of 93 tropical parks by collecting questionnaires from managers and experts. They found that 40% of the parks have witnessed improvements in vegetation cover, but their approach may be biased as the respondents have vested interests in claiming that parks are working. Naughton-Treves et al. (2005) reviewed 49 studies and found that deforestation was slower inside than outside 32 of 36 protected areas. Using satellite data, DeFries et al. (2005) analysed 198 protected tropical forests and showed that two thirds show significant deforestation within 50 km of their borders but only a quarter are affected by this issue within their boundaries. More recently, Nagendra (2008) found deforestation was slower in parks compared with adjacent areas in 32 of 35 cases and reduced relative to the deforestation that had occurred before their establishment in 9 of 14 cases.

Despite many methodological issues, there is thus some suggestion in the literature that parks are able to minimise unwanted environmental changes (Brooks et al., 2009, p.1451; Brockington et al., 2008, p.65). However, there is a clearly recognised lack of studies on the relative effectiveness of parks as compared to others modes of protection. The few that exist tend to show in fact that parks do not perform especially better than other approaches to conservation and maybe worse. Nepstad et al. (2006) for instance used satellite data between 1997 and 2000 to find that both inhabited parks and indigenous reserves are effective against fire and deforestation in
Brazil. Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) report poor performances in a sample of designated "parks" in South Asia that excluded local management, and better performances of nearby community forests. Hayes (2006), as well as Hayes and Ostrom (2005), compared the vegetation density in 76 legally protected parks with 87 "non-park" forests – and found no statistically significant differences. Rather than the official designation of "protected areas", what seems to influence the state of forests are rather the rules acknowledged by local forest users (such as forest product rules). The ability of the users to contribute to rule-making is also positively correlated with vegetation density.

This type of evidence tends to indicate that what really matters are the local institutions in the broad sense – and that the creation of designated "parks" is only one option, and not necessarily the most environmentally effective.

2.3.4. Conclusion: opening the way for CP

With its exclusionary approach, the "fortress model" of environmental protection has proved indubitably socially destructive while also being based on weak evidence of superiority over other approaches. As the critique goes, the "fences-and-fines" strategy has heightened tensions between park managers and local communities, threatening their livelihoods and causing frustrations and conflicts. Moreover, strict regulations without the means to enforce them have often led to "paper parks" that exist only on maps, leaving all stakeholders unhappy and leading communities to illegally extract resources they had legitimately used for centuries. This fortress model was also supported by a Western positivist scientific paradigm that devalued indigenous knowledge (Kapoor, 2001) and carried the implicit view that local communities are not likely to develop optimal or even rational environmental practices – a view that later came to be hotly contested.
2.4. The rise of CP in biodiversity protection: promises and critiques

With the Rio conference (UN, 1992a), the Agenda 21 agreement on sustainable development (UN, 1992b), the Convention on Biological Diversity (UN, 1992c) as well as the “Aarhus Convention” on public participation and access to information (UNECE, 1998), more and more emphasis has been placed on CP in the environmental sphere. Clearly, community participation “has been on the ascendancy for several decades and plays [today] a leading role in conservation strategies worldwide” (Dressler et al., 2010, p.5). Yet, it has also been challenged by unconvinced scholars and practitioners, some of whom are even asking to go “back to the barriers”. The ability of the CP discourse to deliver on its promises of social justice, economic development and environmental effectiveness has been sharply put into question.

Here, we first review the basis of what hopes and promises CP set itself in the sphere of biodiversity protection. We then explore four strands of criticisms that have emerged and which put into doubt the emancipatory narrative of CP as a tool of local empowerment: 1) the often concomitant expansion of state control; 2) the typical and large influence of a range of international actors within CP schemes; 3) the frequent and increased fragmentation of local communities through heightened inequalities and local tensions; 4) CP’s apparent partnering with a range of capitalist and neoliberal agendas. Finally, we examine the more strictly environmentalist critique of CP that has led some organisations to partly turn away from CP.

2.4.1. The hopes and spread of community approaches

The CP discourse in environmental matters has first benefited from developments in the theory of collective action. The key starting point of this literature is the 1968 article by Garret Hardin, who describes the unavoidable degradation of natural resources in contexts where access is “open to all”. Hardin famously pictured a medieval pasture open to all livestock owners, who thus keep increasing their herd without having to pay for the depreciation of this natural capital. The end result is the so-called “tragedy of the commons” whereby degradation cannot be stopped unless the state takes control of the resource or the resource is privatised so that incentives
emerge for producers to take care of it. Later authors, however, and most notably
Noble prize winner Elinor Ostrom (1990), have since argued that a “third way” can
be found between the state and the market in various “common property regimes”.
These are regimes whereby local users commonly agree to follow certain rules and
restrain their use of the resource in order to preserve it. In this view, “the drama of
the commons does not always play out as a tragedy” (Ostrom et al., 2002, p.5). Much
depends on how rules of access are designed. An abundant literature has been
produced on this specific issue. It shows that robust regimes are typically
characterised by clear rules of exclusion, clear social and spatial boundaries, as well
as active enforcement mechanisms whereby use is monitored and infringements are
punished (Brockington et al., 2008, p.101). The social organisation, the nature of
user groups and the wider social and political environment can also deeply impact
outcomes.27

Accordingly, in the 1980s, research began to point to numerous examples of
community practices and traditional techniques that had proved sustainable (e.g.
Perry & Dixon, 1986; Shiva, 1991; Alcorn, 1993). For instance, shifting cultivation –
a practice involving the clearing, burning and cultivation of forested areas in rotation
– had been frequently banned by colonial and post-colonial governments. Yet,
because it allows the plots left fallow to recover nutrients and vegetation, it has been
shown to enhance biodiversity (Leach & Mearns, 1996). Similarly, traditional
forestry often entails community labour for planting and maintaining trees, and
regulating access to resources with socio-religious rules. This has often proved more
successful for reforestation than state or privately run schemes (Guha, 1989, p.180).
Reviewing twenty-three conservation and development programs worldwide, Wells
and Brandon (1992) argued that the weaknesses of state-centric policy were, in any
case, such that few options existed at this point other than a shift towards
conservation schemes involving a far higher degree of “community participation”.

In economic development programmes, the mainstreaming of CP had started in the
late 1970s, but it was only in the mid-1980s that it took off in environmental
management. A new framework then emerged under the name of “Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects” (ICDPs). This tried to bridge the gap
between conservation and socioeconomic concerns by providing local communities

27 See Agrawal (2003) for a review.
with alternative income opportunities with a reduced impact on the environment (Wells & Brandon, 1992). ICDPs later included wider concerns about CP in project design, implementation and management. The CP approach was firmly stated at the 1982 and 1992 World Congresses on National Parks and Protected Areas (McNeely, 1992). CP was a key element of the concept of “biosphere reserve” promoted by the UNESCO from the late 1970s and many “people and park” projects flourished throughout the world in the late 1980s (Hannah, 1992). Conservationist practitioners re-styled themselves as working for conservation “by the people”, “with the people” or “for the people”, rather than “against the people” (Hutton et al., 2005, p.346).

Launched in 1986 and developed in Zimbabwe, the CAMPFIRE community scheme (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) is one of the first CP schemes ever set up in environmental management. It was used as a model in Africa and elsewhere (Hutton et al., 2005, pp.345).

This participatory approach (also referred to as “collaborative management”, “co-management”, “joint management”) has thus gained recognition in conservation endeavours in recent decades. Originating in local discontents about fenced areas, CP is now promoted on a wide scale by NGOs and governments alike. International organisations such as the World Bank, the World Wide Fund for Nature-International (WWF-International), Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the Africa Wildlife Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation as well as a host of bilateral donor agencies (such as the American USAID, the Swedish SIDA, the Canadian CIDA or the French AFD) have all largely adopted this approach.

CP in environmental management is based upon a range of tenets. It acknowledges the multiplicity of local stakeholders and calls for the decentralisation of decision-making power from government authorities to local and inclusive governance structures. Whereas the fortress approach functions as if reality were objectively one and the same, the CP approach has a more constructivist slant (Kapoor, 2001). It claims to see reality more appropriately as socially created and culturally specific: “truth”, “facts”, “effects” and “causes” are no longer supposed to be revealed through the sole eye of external “experts” but constructed in an inter-subjective and collaborative fashion, bringing together multiple perspectives. Rather than outside managers and authorities imposing ready-made schemes, local stakeholders are
meant to undertake a process of collective learning and consensus-building to design their own rules and programmes, such as the delineation of management zones and the composition of decision boards.

Expectations are high as participation is supposed to simultaneously reconcile nature conservation and social justice. It may also serve as a tool to promote stronger democracies (Wily, 2002 or at least make environmental projects more coherent with “new democracies” — a constraint that conservationists began to feel from the late 1970s (Hutton et al. 2005, p.343). CP is also expected to facilitate a more sustainable use of natural resources, a greater distribution of economic benefits and political power within and among communities and a respect for social and cultural concerns (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). It does not eliminate concerns of environmental effectiveness — which is the core focus of the fortress approach — but the nature of the decision-making process is also considered a key issue. Efficiency “for whom” and “determined by whom” are meant to stand as key questions (Kapoor, 2001).

Still, environmental effectiveness is expected to be strengthened through several channels. First, participation is supposed to expand the information base plugged into programmes and help integrate local knowledge and experience. Second, as CP strives for the widest possible consensus, programmes are expected to accommodate the objectives of most if not all parties. This, in turn, may reduce conflicts, enhance mutual understanding, feelings of local ownership, commitment and accountability, and bring a spirit of team-building and joint problem-solving (Zazueta, 1995). Third, CP is meant to foster communication among groups and address dysfunctional (or undue) power relationships that may have an impact on the environment. Fourth, it is also said to facilitate greater iterative programming through increased feedback leading to reorientations if necessary (Plein, et al., 1998). These various rationales for CP in environmental management are found both in academic works and in the policy documents of countless NGOs, international organisations and donors (e.g. CANARI, 1999, p.13-14; IUCN, 2004, p.12; UNEP-WCMC & KMTNC, 2005, p.14-15).

Yet, some harsh critiques of participation have emerged, notably in the development and environmental fields. Their significance has not been acknowledged in IR

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studies and they remain rarely looked at in the context of global governance. Cooke and Kothari (2001) observe that there have been two levels of critique. The first critique is of a "problem-solving and internal" nature that seeks to overcome "technical limitations" in order to increase CP quality and effectiveness (e.g. Nelson & Wright, 1995; Guijt & Shah, 1998). In some ways, this perspective does not give up on the hopes of the emancipatory narrative of CP. The second level is a more fundamental critique that draws attention to the alienating power effects of participatory discourses – and thus essentially relates to the critical narrative.

2.4.2. Disciplinary participation? From state control to self-surveillance

Looking at the United States, Jacoby (2001) showed how the expansion of strict conservation practices at the end of the 19th century contributed to the formation of the administrative state itself. Conservation also participated in the creation of the modern American countryside with the advent of market relations, wage labour, the precedence of law over custom and the positioning of the state as a powerful manager "standardising and simplifying what had been a dense thicket of particularistic, local approaches toward the natural world" (p.197-198). In the rest of the world too, conservation practices and state-building have often been interlinked. There is evidence in the literature on CP schemes that in many contexts the latter constitutes a means for expanding state control. This can occur through various institutional mechanisms, incentives and social technologies.

Ribot (2006), for instance, argues that decentralisation processes in environmental management are often incomplete or denatured – since the state and its related agencies are generally reluctant to reduce their power or command of revenues. Such was the case, according to Sundar (2000), with the massive Joint Forest Management programme that started in India in 1990 and led to the creation of more than 10,000 local committees. Beyond appearances, this endeavour did not "represent a resurgence of civil society against the state... insofar as the basic agenda of the programme [was] pre-determined" (p.255). As for Risley (2007), she looks at how the global agenda of citizens' participation has been implemented in the sphere of environmental policy making in Latin America, notably Chile and Argentina. She argues that government officials have re-shaped the participatory mandate to achieve a better fit with their own political objectives.
On an even stronger note, Neuman (1997) argues that CP schemes resemble colonial conservation strategies as communities are being asked to actively demonstrate "a conservative, even curative, relationship with nature while risking the loss of their land rights should they fail" (p.566). This process is often implemented though an alliance of "first world conservationists (backed by the power of the state) [such as large NGOs] which determines whether land uses are compatible" (p.565). Looking at "buffer zones" in nine African countries, particularly Tanzania, Neumann contends that they represent a "tremendous territorial expansion of state power" (p.575), an extension of "state authority beyond the boundaries of protected areas and into rural communities" (p.564). They carry "new forms of state intervention and restriction of land use", notably increasing the "policing capacity of the state" (p.565) – through marked and patrolled boundaries, the monitoring of villages and the use of rewards and punishments that create "a climate of land tenure insecurity" (p.577). Similar results were found in CP programmes in Zimbabwe (Hill, 1996), Kalahari (Hitchcock, 1995) or Cameroon (Lance, 1995). Commenting on this literature, Duffy concludes that participatory schemes can make communities "become the eyes and ears of the state in remote locations" (Duffy, 2009, p.69).

This point has also been made about CP in the field of development. In this context, one of the most debated participatory practices has been Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), initially formulated by Chambers (1983). This set of techniques is supposed to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of rural people into the project planning and management. PRA has nevertheless been described as a "practice of surveillance" in which the poor are subjected to the disciplinary eye of external donors without having any reciprocal right to examine or criticise them (Kothari, 2001). It has also been said to wipe out "anything that is messy or does not fit the structured representations implied by participatory tools" while it controls the production of "the norm, the usual and the expected" (p.147). Kapoor (2002) further suggests that there could even be a use of PRA by state organisations to co-opt or monitor groups and communities seen as threatening.

Participatory projects often lead to the creation of "co-management committees" dominated in practice by government officials. Tofa (2007), for instance, analyses

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29 Buffer zones typically entail a 2-10 km wide strip around protected area boundaries – and up to 50km in Zaire.
co-management in New Zealand at the Taranaki National Park. He concludes that the government managed to impose governance entities that it can negotiate with and influence more easily. “Contractual parks” in South Africa also illustrate this point. Developed since the 1980s, these entities are established on private lands with a board comprising representatives of both the landowners and the national conservation authority (SANParks, the South African National Parks). Roe et al. (2009, p.35) emphasise that these joint management boards have “been hampered by the power of SANParks representatives”.

Looking more broadly across Africa, they further conclude: “overall, there remain relatively few cases of communities obtaining formal authority over lands and the natural resources found on those lands. Centralised control over natural resources persists despite the ubiquitous change in the rhetoric” (p.viii).

In many instances, joint boards seem to provide limited opportunities for local stakeholders to take a real hold of the decision making process. As Brockington et al. (2008, p.106) put it:

'It is all very well setting up a joint management board, but what matters is how well it functions. These can be mixes of unequal capacity, with experienced...officials, for whom management boards are their natural habitat, and long-marginalised rural communities who lack the capacity and experience to flourish in these institutional environments.'

Critiques point out that project activities are often already designed before any public meetings takes place to mobilise local people. Moreover, many stakeholder committees end up existing only on paper. In this light, while seemingly adopting an inclusionary ideal, CP works as still another means of pursuing top-down agendas through a sort of “reverse engineering” whereby outcomes are predefined and non-negotiable, the communities being merely asked to implement them.

There is still another path, less directly coercive, through which CP can increase state control over local communities. It is the process of creation of “environmental subjects” – or, in other words, of people who care about the environment. Following a perspective inspired by Foucault, Darier (1996) for instance analyses Canada’s 1990 Green Plan to show its attempt to discipline the population by instilling new norms of environmental conduct and, thus, construct a new subjectivity based on

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30 See also Reid & Turner (2004).
"environmental citizenship". The recourse to CP schemes is interpreted in this light. The Canadian plan notably establishes a "community tree-planting program" whose real intention cannot be reforestation - since it is very expansive and only concerns an insignificant proportion of the country's land mass (less than 0.01 per cent). The real motivation, Darier argues, is to "mobilise environmental groups and local communities into participating in a practical, hands-on environmental exercise designed to train individuals to adopt an environmental conduct. This programme is openly designed to offer to 'all of us the opportunity to think globally, while acting locally'" (p.600).

In Tanzania, Neumann (2001) studies how voluntary community programmes are interlinked with continued threats of state violence to produce "disciplined peasants". As he puts it, "the buffer zone plan serves as the 'discipline-mechanism' to create a different kind of peasant consciousness toward wildlife based on a schema of generalised surveillance" (p.326). Control over the population is achieved "not through force and coercion, but primarily through the ordering and partitioning of space" - with full knowledge, however, "of the ever-present potential for state-violence" (p.327).

Another important scholar who pursued this line of analysis is Agrawal (2005). He documents in Kumanon, India, the passage from a "technology of domination" to a "technology of the self" in the state policing of nature. The Forest Council Rules of 1931 instated community-managed forests and over the next 60 years more than 3,000 new local councils came into being to manage them. According to Agrawal, the local people who became involved in such participatory mechanisms (including monitoring and funding) deeply modified their subjective understanding of their own individual interests to incorporate stricter environmental norms. CP schemes, thus, can change people's beliefs and subjectivity. Sometimes at the cost of significant "internal struggles" (p.174), CP has them "work upon themselves to become environmental subjects" (p.181). According to Agrawal, CP institutions are a "response of the state" (p.169), a "particular technology of power that the colonial state implemented and the post-independence Indian state continued" (p.187). The locals that became involved have internalised a rhetoric that "matches the objectives that the Forest Department began pursuing nearly 150 years ago" (p.169).
Agrawal uses the term "environmentality" to point to "technologies of self and power...involved in the creation of new subjects concerned about the environment" (p.166). He also puts forward the concept of "intimate government" which, contrary to constant oversight and external expertise, works by "dispersing rule, scattering involvement in government more widely and encouraging careful reckoning of environmental practices and their consequences among [local] residents" (p.178). People started pursuing "goals that they imagine are their own and in which they often construct state officials as inefficient, unsupportive or corrupt" (p.179). This "imagined autonomy" hides the leading role of the state in the process but is "crucial" to its success.

2.4.3. Global partners, global networks... local disempowerment?

Another important strand of criticism raised against CP schemes involves their counter-intuitive tendency to render a range of international actors extremely powerful locally. In the development field, Kapoor (2002), Mohan (2001) and others have pulled together a landmark volume called Participation: The New Tyranny? (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). As the title grimly suggests, the emancipatory claims of participation are called seriously into question. Rather than empowering local community members, critiques argue that participation provides alternative methods for incorporating local stakeholders into the ready-made projects of big international actors, who remain unaccountable to those they are supposed to empower. Looking at external agencies, Mose (2001) explains how "local knowledge" is restructured by their bureaucratic goals. Francis (2001, p.80) stigmatises participatory "experts" exorcising like "shamans" the "phantoms of conventional development practice" while retaining the real authority. Mohan (2001) criticises the pervading Eurocentrism of development workers that conceals the power of the Western world under a technical discourse. Hildyard et al. (2001, p.60) explain that CP maintains the commercial exploitation of local resources – and is used as the "the human software through which investments can be made with least local opposition".

Illustratively, a review of eighty-four World Bank projects approved between 1989 and 2003 and labelled as "community-driven" argued that this qualification was rather emphatic and grandiose when compared to what was actually happening on the ground (Uphoff, 2005). These projects were hardly "community-driven": the
project design, what kinds of things could be done, within what time-frame and on what financial terms were all decided unilaterally by Bank staff. The projects themselves were not open to local participatory inputs, only “sub-projects”. The main decisions left to communities were whether or not they would make a proposal to gain access to Bank funds for something they wanted to do (within a non-negotiable framework set by Bank or government personnel) and how they would carry out the work once it was approved. For sure, the projects had in common an aspiration for delegating to communities or their representatives some responsibility for taking the initiative to plan and implement improvements in community services. But, here, “community-driven” only meant community-initiated, implemented or managed within fully externally set parameters.

Such a dominant position of international actors, often partnering with the local state, have led observers to criticise CP projects as mere “participation-washing” that do not do much “beyond engaging in rhetoric on participatory development and developing ‘partnerships’” (Duffy, 2009, p.60; see also Swatuk, 2005). Participatory projects have thus been criticised as typically undergoing a “Weberian process of routinisation” (Mosse, 2001, p.25), a mechanistic transformation that makes them essentially symbolic while fostering traditional top-down management structures. Moreover, and despite the disaffection of the locals, such projects can continue to exist primarily owing to the will of project staff themselves, often in their own interest (Hildyard, et al., 2001).

Mosse (2001; 2004, p.654) further points out that even CP projects are developed within a heavy institutional setting involving national and local governments as well as international aid bureaucracies. All these forces put pressure on project management and personnel to produce timetabled and quantifiable outputs that big organisations can identify as measures of “progress”. They include spending targets and the timely delivery of quantifiable objectives. The whole monitoring structure is often set out within a “logical framework”, which is a management tool that tries to make the key causal chains and goals of a given project explicit. Complex participation is thus contradicted by the need for vertical control and quantifiable indicators. Participation is thus translated into a managerial exercise based on “toolboxes” of procedures and techniques, less concerned with empowerment than “efficiency” (Cleaver, 2001).
One of the most recent trends in the use of CP in natural resource management is the development of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs). They are supposed to manage entire ecosystems across borders while still closely involving local communities. Looking at a range of experiences in Southern Africa, Duffy (2006, p.101) concludes that TFCAs are best analysed as "a means by which global actors can recentralise control over resources and people from the global level and concentrate power in the hands of a narrow network of international NGOs, international financial institutions, global consultants on tourism and community conservation and bilateral donors". She further agrees with Wolmer (2003, p.7) that TFCAs are the latest in a line of top-down environmental interventions by international environmental organisations and aid bureaucracies.

2.4.4. Fragmenting communities further: corporatism and inequities

Since the early 1990s, assessments of CP schemes in biodiversity management have started to report issues relating to inequalities of power and social conflict, not only between communities and external agencies but also within communities (West & Brechin, 1991; Wells & Brandon, 1992; Western & Wright, 1994). Participatory management is by its very nature a process that can become politicised and carries a risk of further fragmenting communities that are typically already divided into interest groups and stratified by class, age or gender.

Accordingly, a range of case studies have confirmed how CP schemes can favour one section of a community over another (Sharpe, 1998; Brown & Rosendo, 2000). Brockington et al. (2008, p.73-74, p.98) thus argue it is difficult to judge their net impact, as these schemes “distribute fortunes and misfortunes at the same time”. Calculating a “net” cost or benefit is difficult, as “the groups benefiting and those suffering are [generally] different”. Moreover, gains and costs are often “not commensurable”: “quite often, costs are experienced in terms of access to natural resources, while benefits usually come in the form of training, technical development projects, and opportunities in the market economies”.

As local groups become embroiled with a range of non-local actors (state agencies, NGOs or donors), there are also dangers of corporatist agreements between self-selected alliances. Private negotiations may emerge between a few interest groups and lead to excluding such or such a group. This risk is a very real one as some form
of “exclusion” is usually present in any environmental scheme, including CP ones. Brockington et al. (2008, p.104) usefully recall that common property regimes that prove sustainable do make an active use of rules of exclusion. As they underline:

Successful regimes are characterised by high levels of surveillance and monitoring, of people checking up on others and disciplining themselves...These are not necessarily pleasant places to live an work. They can deliver effective resource management but they do so by managing and mitigating conflict, not by removing it.

If not properly designed, rules of exclusion may disproportionately affect the poorest as prerogatives may be captured by local or national elites, none of whom are properly accountable to locals. In such cases, CP may resemble a process of “one step forward, two steps backward” (Oyono, 2004) that “masks the application of power” (Neuman, 2001, p.327). Klooster (2000) shows for instance, in the context of community forestry in Mexico, how timber control has been captured by elites and benefits only a few villagers. Lane (2003) demonstrates how decentralisation in Australia can in fact amount to privatising environmental governance and a further exclusion of the poorest. Power may also be passed onto customary authorities that remain largely unaccountable (Igoes & Kelsall, 2005). As for the “stakeholder committees” created in the context of CP schemes, they may be prone to domination by the more powerful components of local communities – and typically by men.

2.4.5. Partnering with neoliberal capitalism

A growing number of critical analysts make the case that capitalist policies, especially neoliberal ones, are steeped in and expanded by current conservation practices. Brockington et al. (2008) underline that the period of most dramatic growth of protected areas worldwide was between 1985 and 1995, which coincides with the dominance of neoliberal policies. In their view, this is no hazard as capitalism and conservation as increasingly “reshaping the world in partnership”. So much so that it becomes “difficult to determine if we are describing conservation with capitalism as its instrument or capitalism with conservation as its instruments” (p.6).

These authors further draw upon Sklair (2001), who argued that corporations and conservationists have colluded worldwide to form a “sustainable development
historical bloc" (p.8). This voluntary coalition also gathers elites from international regulatory bodies and state institutions. As Rutheford (2006, p.84) puts it, the primary aspiration of this bloc is to devise and coordinate policy approaches that help to "ecologically modernise" capitalist institutions so as to preserve them. It aims to offer a solution to the environmental crisis inherent to global consumer capitalism while at the same time strengthening this economic model.

Romero and Andrade (2004), for instance, point out deals between NGOs and timber companies whereby logging concessions are turned into conservation lands after exploitation, both land uses excluding local groups. Chapin (2004, p.17) deems that "as corporate and government money flow into the three big international organizations that dominate the world's conservation agenda [CI, WWF and TNC], their programs have been marked by growing conflicts of interest—and by a disturbing neglect of the indigenous peoples whose land they are in business to protect". Accordingly, Duffy (2009, p.62) speaks of a "counter-intuitive relationship": while NGOs might be expected to contest many World Bank policies, they have in fact developed a very close relationship, "working to achieve common (often neoliberal) goals in the form of economic liberalisation alongside environmental protection". Looking at the environmental discourse of global businesses, Rutheford (2006) similarly identifies an increasing willingness to partner with environmental non-governmental organisations and a proactive approach to shaping the international environmental agenda.

This rapprochement of environmentalist and capitalists lays emphasis on policies that promote market- and trade-oriented approaches. As Duffy (2009, p.61) notes, much of the environmental discussion is now tied up with the idea that conservation will eventually "have to pay its own way" (p.4) as well as with the claim that "developing the market value of nature will 'save it' and equally will provide a pathway out of poverty".

This "eco-capitalist" dynamics is not merely exemplified in the creation of strictly protected parks as forms of "compensation" for large destructive infrastructure projects, but also in the development of CP programmes. As Hutton et al. (2005, p.345) put it, "communities, and rural individuals and households, [are expected to] become micro-entrepreneurs, using the economic values of conservation resources (for tourism, trophy-hunting, medicines, meat and other products) to deliver both
sustainable livelihoods and conservation". The expansion of ecotourism is particularly studied in this light, as being embedded in a neoliberal framework that precludes real respect for community empowerment (Cater, 2006). Duffy (2002, p.10) similarly contends that ecotourism is "locked into notions of green capitalism" so that concerns for profit can only outweigh those for conservation or participation.

Through ecotourism, people see the environment in simplified terms that hide the social, economic and cultural cost of producing the experience they enjoy (Brockington et al., p.145). The "eco-certification" of various products can also be subject to the same critique (p.180-181). A form of "commodity fetishism" is thus affecting environments, landscapes and their related products. It helps integrate them into capitalist consumption while leading eco-consumers to believe that they "do their part" in preserving nature – precisely through consumption. This process of fetishisation is described as the "green box of consumptive nature" (p.189) in reference to Marx’s analysis of "nature" as a "black box" within the capitalist order that helps hide the socio-political relationships involved in production processes.

2.4.6. "Back to barriers": the new environmental critique

Over the past few years, there has been a resurgence of concerns about whether strict conservation is not, in the end, the best form of environmental protection. New calls to scientific rationality have been heard, notably from biologists, that want to relegate CP backstage – forming what Hutton et al. (2005) call the "back-to-the-barriers-movement". For instance, Locke and Dearden (2005, p.1) complain that the "new paradigm…devalues conservation biology, undermines the creation of more strictly protected reserves, inflates the amount of area in reserves and places people at the centre of the protected area agenda at the expense of wild biodiversity". They argue that only the stricter "IUCN categories I–IV should be recognised as protected areas. In doing so, they reactivate a well-established literature that had only favoured strictly protected areas (e.g. Oates, 1995; Redford, 1991; Terborgh, 1999; Brandon et al., 1998).

One important argument is that CP approaches are based on unrealistic ideas. A romanticised view of "indigenous harmony" had indeed developed long ago with the writing of evolution theorists such as Wynne-Edwards (1962), Rappaport (1983) or Meggers (1971). They argued that cultures or populations were the units of natural
selection: groups that devised stable population control mechanisms were thus able to outcompete those who did not. Other studies had pointed out high levels of biodiversity associated with the presence of native peoples (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005). However, there followed a growing disbelief in this view among anthropologists. With Rambo’s *Primitive Polluters* (1985), Diamond’s critique of the “environmentalist myth” (1986) or Redford’s work denouncing the fable of *The Ecologically Noble Savage* (1991), the scientific consensus turned around and, today, vast reviews of the ethnographic literature conclude that “conservation by native peoples is uncommon” (Hames, 2007, p.186; see also Smith & Wishnie 2000).

Building on these findings, the “back-to-barriers” narrative emphasises that conservation may not be important to community members, especially the poorer ones, who are more concerned with improving their livelihoods and feeding their families. Rural communities, the argument goes, often face challenges of poverty, population growth, weak public policies and lack of marketable skills and resources, which makes biodiversity conservation the least of their priorities. Participation may thus lead communities to define goals that work against conservation (Wells & Brandon, 1992). Empowering local groups, therefore, may not always help local authorities achieve domestic or international biodiversity objectives.

Accordingly, various organisations have started to modify their policies, notably the World Bank, the USAID, the DFID, the GEF, the WCS as well as CI (Hutton et al., 2005, p.349-350; Duffy, 2009). New venues for conservation interventions are being explored that leave little room for CP, amongst which are Trans-frontier Conservation Areas, direct payments to communities for conservation results as well as public-private partnerships for strict conservation (e.g. creation of private protected areas, management under contract for state-owned parks, private hunting reserves, etc.). In this context, Duffy (2009, p.61) contends that “commitment to CBNRM is being increasingly downplayed from being an *approach* to conservation to becoming a *component*” — a means simply to legitimise new protected areas.
2.4.7. Conclusion: the empirical expectations of power narratives

As we saw in the first chapter, the power effects of global discourses are often examined within two contrasting narratives. The emancipatory narrative claims that such discourses carry ethical, technical and political principles that help to free people from various constraints. Conversely, a range of critical narrative see these global discourses as fostering various forms of social control and pre-existing power structures. If we are to test such narratives with field data, we need to deduce logically and in detail their empirical expectations – in other words, what they expect to find on the ground when CP principles are applied.

The empirical expectations of the emancipatory narrative regarding the CP discourse are congruent with the promises of the discourse itself – namely increased substantive participatory empowerment. As we emphasised in our Introduction, the global discourse on CP is a priori a hard case for the critical narrative, since it is built entirely around promises of emancipation. Still, the critical narrative has been fostered by a lengthening string of publications that we reviewed here and that shed a more pessimistic light on CP. Rather than empowering communities, CP is expected, in the critical eye, to incorporate local actors into ready-made and externally defined schemes dominated by the state or other non-community actors. Within the community, CP is also expected to favour the interests of the most powerful. Finally, CP is likely to work in “partnership” with neoliberal capitalist forces, at the expense of various other goals.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter first argued that participation is nowadays a key global discourse that is part and parcel of global governance. Analysing its early sources, it underscored the foreign policy dimension of its promotion in the less developed countries under the influence of the United States from the 1950s onwards. In the Cold War context, the United States was concerned with ensuring that the world’s rural masses stay under the guidance of their national governments and adopt the vision of “progress” backed by the “free world”. Later on, the CP discourse slowly but surely spilled over into most areas of global policy, which caused its rhetoric to spread even faster than its
methods. Second, the mechanics of the global CP discourse were analysed to show that its system of meanings simplifies social reality while limiting alternatives to the proposals of what "to participate in". The common sense perspective it produces draws on pre-existing ethical ideals already widespread in the Western world, on technical-rational promises of increased "effectiveness" while also appealing to self-interested groups that claim their "right to be heard". As for the policy practices it entails, these revolve around a social technology based on meetings, facilitators and the social engineering of collaborative institutions.

Third, this section has analysed the orthodox Western "fortress" approach to the protection of biodiversity, which is largely exclusionary of local populations. It has underscored the consequent observed social and environmental costs in developing countries. Against this backdrop, it has exposed how the CP discourse flourished within the environmental policy sphere, pointing out its many promises but also critiques. From there, the empirical expectations of the power narratives of global discourses were formulated. While the emancipatory narrative expects that the promises of CP will materialise, the critical view expects CP to foster a range of power dynamics that limit local empowerment.

The next chapter provides the tools for addressing the core methodological challenge of this research: juxtaposing broad IR macro-narratives with micro-data drawn from fieldwork. It builds an analytical framework that conceptualises "participatory processes" along nine distinct dimensions. This enables us to formulate the empirical expectations of each power narrative in very precise terms. It also renders possible a systematic analysis and classification of empirical data, and thus their comparisons to theoretical expectations.
Chapter 3 - Confronting Narratives with Data: an Analytical Framework

To enable a comparison between broad narratives of power and local empirical facts, a bridge needs to be built: detailed empirical expectations need to be compared with field data. This is the purpose of this chapter.

In order to formulate the field expectations of the two power narratives under scrutiny — the critical and the emancipatory ones — we first need a precise understanding of what CP schemes may look like in real life: what their components and levels of analysis are, what the possible configurations of these elements are and what variations may be observed. This chapter’s first section thus develops a nine-step grid that breaks CP schemes down into nine fundamental dimensions. It also discusses how each dimension may vary towards more social control or more emancipation. This framework allows testable implications to be derived from otherwise somewhat vague narratives. It also facilitates the interpretation and classification of empirical data.

As for the study of power, all too often this latter concept is thought of as a relatively homogeneous type of social interaction. In fact, it can take extremely different forms. The second section of the chapter thus identifies various types of power phenomena, to be traced out in case studies. It offers a typology that will help to gain a more in-depth view of what is taking place within CP schemes.

Finally, the last section provides a discussion of the research methods used, including their advantages and limits. During our field stays, the interaction between these methods led to an increasing volume of material being accumulated: documents led to informants, observations to more focus groups, and interviews to more documents, etc. To deal with such a mass of information, the data analysis has proved to be a long and iterative process in which we continually reviewed material throughout the course of the study.
3.1. Analysing CP Schemes and Narrative Expectations: a Nine-Step Grid

This section devises a nine-step analytical framework to assess the genesis, implementation and impact of environmental projects based on "community participation". A systematic grid is indeed necessary to deduce the precise empirical expectations of the power narratives regarding CP schemes and compare them with field data. This framework will thus help us identify how close actual CP schemes are to the emancipatory and critical narratives. Forms of CP may be questioned in terms of who originated them, who participates (narrow or broad sections of the community), in what they are participating (from project identification to evaluation), how active the participation is (from more passive to more active forms), and how costs and benefits are allocated. Looking at their impact, they can be further questioned on how they re-allocate local influence, what modifications of social control mechanisms they entail, how they connect to market phenomena, and how they interact with a community's social capital. We thus develop here a range of concepts and typologies.

3.1.1. CP origins: who initiates, designs, supports?

To start with, CP schemes may be classified, as Goulet (1989) points out, according to their originating agents. However, this concept seems to us even more useful if we divide it into three sub-categories: Initiators, Supporters and Designers.

- **Initiators** are the originating agents who had the initial impulse for change and the creation of some sort of community project. They are usually direct or indirect stakeholders unsatisfied with the status quo. Their initial idea is not necessarily the one that is eventually implemented, although without their first move nothing would have happened.

- **Supporters** are actors who join initiators at an early stage and support their desire for change with their networks and political, technical or financial resources. They have their own views and motivations, which may differ from the initiators.

- **Designers** are individuals, groups or organisations that took a role in the detailed design of the actual project to be implemented. They are often drawn from
among the initiators and supporters, but can also come from further afield – as in
the case of foreign experts called upon to help conceive a participatory scheme.

The identification of these various originating agents is an important step in any
critical analysis of a CP scheme. The next question is to identify who – if anyone –
secured the greatest influence on the project and with what agenda. Once the
dominant actors are detected, the CP scheme may be further labelled into one of the
four following categories, as characterised by: CP from within, from above, from
outside (of the community) or from multiple sources.31

(1) **CP originated from within.** These are cases where initiators, supporters and
designers are largely drawn from the local community. The latter mobilises
on its own initiative to deal with a given issue or oppose an external policy.
Examples are numerous in times of emergency crises, when community
solidarity networks can emerge or re-emerge. Such home-grown bottom-up
initiatives are often praised in the development literature (e.g. Easterly, 2006,
Chap.10). Self-initiated mobilisation may nevertheless be facilitated by an
enabling framework of support provided by government or NGOs.

(2) **CP originated from above.** In this configuration, initiators, supporters and
designers are largely drawn from public authorities. Participatory schemes at
a local level are sometimes decided and designed from above, by the State or
by political parties who want to reshape certain public policies. This has been
the case, for instance, in Brazil where the federal government under President
Lula fostered participatory reforms such as municipal health councils or
water councils. The Indian state of Kerala is also famous for having
implemented strong decentralisation with a direct involvement of rural
communities. Central governments are indeed in a good position to shape (or
veto) new local governance arrangements: they have in their hands the
legislative instruments that make the legal and policy frameworks; they can
also support (or not) local schemes with training, enforcement systems,
economic incentives, expertise, etc.

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31 Here, we draw upon a vocabulary suggested by Goulet (1989) but we partly change its form and
meaning. Goulet, for instance, has a category called “participation from below”, which suggests a
contrast to “elites” that are located “above”. However, we label it “participation from within” to
underline that originating agents are part of the community itself.
(3) **CP originated from outside.** In such cases, the mix of initiators, supporters and designers shows the predominance of *external agents* – such as non-local NGOs, foreign donors or experts, international organisations, etc. As we have seen, (cf. section 2.2.3), in an ideal CP scheme, outside actors, whether domestic or international, are not supposed to impose their views on any stakeholder: they are solely meant to “facilitate” the inclusion of all affected parties in the process and remain strict catalysts. They should also leave the stage when community stakeholders create their own process. Many observers, however, believe that this ideal often remains theoretical. First, CP principles themselves (starting with decentralisation) are increasingly imposed by foreign donors upon receiving countries through conditionalities linked to financial support for development or environmental policies (Smoke, 2003). In this case, outside influences take on the mask of state-led participation from above. But external influence can be even more direct, as is the case in Latin America, where international NGOs and foundations have often taken a lead in initiating local participatory projects and implementing them on the ground. Although their *agents of change* (field workers, community organisers...) are selected from within local communities, these foreign NGOs impact local processes through their “expert knowledge”, technical assistants and conditional financial support.

(4) **CP originated from balanced sources.** Most CP schemes are initiated by a mix of internal, external and state-related agents, either as initiators, supporters or designers – but they can still be classified in one of the three preceding categories depending on which type of actor is dominant. However, there may be cases where influences on the final shape of the project are relatively balanced between multiples sources. In such cases, it is interesting to wonder what configuration of interests underpinned the consensus – or the battle.

The emancipatory narrative harbours the expectation that the from-within scenario prevails. Even though CP may be externally initiated or supported, the dominant inputs shaping the project are supposed to come from within the community. Goulet (1989, p.171), for instance, insists that CP should be essentially about “non-elite participation” as opposed to “elites”, which are often external to the community,
such as public officials or development experts. Conversely, the critical narrative expects that the origins of the CP scheme will in fact be external to the community, in other words originated from above or outside (e.g. Mosse, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Kapoor 2002; Uphoff, 2005).

3.1.2. CP inclusiveness: who participates?

Another range of issues to consider when analysing a CP scheme is to trace who actually participates. The answer may seem straightforward by definition: the community. But what does this term mean? This seemingly simple notion is far from clear. The coherence, harmony and homogeneity of so-called “communities” are often largely overestimated. Each community is more likely to be “a community of communities”, themselves patterned into subgroups with varying or contradictory interests, status, political affiliations, assets, sometimes religions, etc. Due to its internal diversity, the social preferences of a community may be inconsistent and possibly lead to conflict (Steelman & Ascher, 1997). Moreover, communities also include individuals with self-centred strategies. People do not necessarily experience a shared feeling of “community” as a result of sharing the same human and natural environment. Individuals may (and often do) see one another as a threat to their livelihoods (McCay & Jentoft, 1998, p.23). Social stratification is everywhere. Specific sub-groups, such as fishers or landowners, may themselves be analysed in terms of their elite or non-elite components. This fact has been increasingly acknowledged in recent times within environmentalist circles, starting with Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) seminal work which points out that communities are heterogeneous and often riddled with conflict.

Based on this understanding of what a community is, one can analyse the inclusiveness of community participation along two different axes: 1) the first one has to do with the wide or narrow range of community sub-groups that are significantly involved in the scheme; 2) the second looks across sub-groups and whether participation is directed towards their elite component, their non-elite component or both (socially mixed). In other words, the first axis assesses the diversity of community sub-groups present in the scheme; the second measures the extent to which CP includes or excludes non-elite people across sub-groups.
Table 4 – Assessing CP inclusiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation within community sub-groups</th>
<th>Wide</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socially mixed</td>
<td>1. Wide and socially mixed CP</td>
<td>4. Narrow but socially mixed CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centred on non-elites</td>
<td>2. Wide CP centred on non-elites</td>
<td>5. Narrow CP centred on non-elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centred on elites</td>
<td>3. Wide CP and elite-centred</td>
<td>6. Narrow CP and elite-centred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 thus shows six possible configurations of CP inclusiveness. It ranges from box 1 (a wide and socially mixed CP, the most inclusive configuration, closest to the emancipatory narrative) to box 6 (narrow and elite-centred CP, the least inclusive of all and closest to the critical narrative).

3.1.3. CP scope: participation in what and when?

Another important angle when questioning a CP scheme is to identify where and when community groups insert themselves into its various processes. Drawing on Goulet (1989), seven potential entry points may be identified.

(a) **Need assessment and initial diagnosis.** This is the time when opinions about problems, ideas of improvements and potential goals are expressed.

(b) **Listing and formulation of possible solutions.** This is the moment when possible plans are discussed.

(c) **Selection of a course of action.** Planning ends here and key decisions are taken at this stage.

(d) **Preparing for implementation.** This can take the form of social mobilisation (raising awareness, establishing community organisations, etc.) or training (formal or informal, to enhance important skills for the project).
(e) **Implementation.** Community participants may engage in management activities; contribute with cash, labour or materials to construction, operation, maintenance or monitoring; pay membership or service fees.

(f) **Evaluation and ongoing correction.** This is about contributing to the appraisal of work done during implementation, as well as identifying evolving needs and possible improvements.

(g) **Envisioning the future.** This refers to the ongoing space where the future can be discussed and envisioned – where the merits of further action and change are considered.

Entry points (a), (b), (c) and (d) define an **upstream scope**, while a **downstream scope** refers to (e), (f) and (g). In both policy and academic documents promoting the CP discourse, it is generally argued that participation should start as early as possible for ethical reasons (letting people express their agency) as well as on instrumental grounds (better design). Upstream participation is thus presented as “critical” in producing better outcomes with respect to both effectiveness and social justice (e.g. Hampton, 1999; Petrova, *et al.*, 2002) – and is the general expectation of the emancipatory narrative, since it provides stronger empowerment. Conversely, the critical narrative expects participation to be much narrower and comes (if at all) much further downstream. Crocker (2007), however, insists that the entry point of CP does not automatically determine its quality and reality. In each of these seven participatory channels, various modes of participation may be observed - some more active than others. We review them now.

### 3.1.4. CP intensity: how active is participation?

Identifying how *passive* or *active* CP actually is (in any of its potential entry channels) should be a central concern when analysing a participatory scheme. Accordingly, the literature on environmental management pays particular attention to this issue (e.g. Hall, 1997). A close study of the tangible functioning of institutions (stakeholder meetings, board meetings, lines of responsibility, division of labour...) is key, including questions such as: who sets the agenda or how are issues or options defined, etc. The degree of passivity or involvement of community members depends on formal and informal practices (including simple discussions) that are nevertheless not easy to observe. The “devil” (e.g. elite or external influence) lies in the details (of

(i) **Nominal participation.** In this scenario, group members are formally part of decision-making mechanisms, but they do not attend meetings. This may be because they are unable to come (as is the case with remote and difficult environments); or they can also be unwilling to do so – if they are for instance harassed, unwelcome or do not feel at ease with people they are supposed to meet with. The social capital\(^{32}\) of a community sub-group may also be such that people have trouble interacting with any formal organisation.

(ii) **Passive participation.** Here, group members attend the decision-making meetings, but passively listen to reports about decisions others have made elsewhere. Typically, various types of elites tell community members what is going to be done; at best, the latter ask questions. This may be due to power relations, threats of retaliation, or lack of vision or technical skills on the part of non-elite groups. Passive participation occurs, for instance, when public agencies come into a community to provide information about something that is going to happen or has already started.

(iii) **Consultative participation.** Group members participate by giving information and their opinions (inputs, preferences, proposals). They neither deliberate among themselves nor make decisions. It is others who are the deciders and, while they may listen, they have no obligation to do so. This happens for instance when outside environmental organisations collect local information (desires, opinions, and needs of the people) and a ready-made proposal is then put forward.

(iv) **Bargaining participation.** Group members are part of the decision-making process. They bargain with others using whatever power they have. Self-interest is the primary motivation for each side. Influence on the final “deal” depends on what each party is willing to give up and what concessions they are able to obtain. Some losses may be accepted in the present if future gains are

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\(^{32}\) See section 3.1.7. on social capital.
anticipated. The greater the power of one group, the less influence the others have on the outcome.

(v) **Deliberative participation.** Here, contrary to the preceding situation, bargainers are more partners than adversaries. Group members are involved in a consensus-seeking process where stakeholders review proposals and forge agreements that at least a majority can accept.

As can be seen, this list moves down from passive towards more intensive forms of CP\(^33\) - or in other words from the expectations of the critical narrative to those of the emancipatory one.

### 3.1.5. CP allocation of costs and benefits

Through rules, institutions, accompanying economic projects or other components, CP schemes in natural resource management entail allocating incentives and disincentives aimed at participation, as well as costs and benefits that may be unavoidable for locals even though they do not actively participate. Understanding these processes is central to assessing the political economy of “what is going on” and the final impact of CP schemes.

People may be willing to participate in various components of a CP scheme because they expect short- or long-term benefits, individually or collectively, or direct remuneration or business contracts. Participatory schemes usually try to encourage CP through incentive packages, including compensation for the most affected group. This may take the form of direct cash or kind payments, as for instance, to elderly farmers who are asked to stop using traditional techniques but are unable to train on new ones. Another way of compensating affected people is to identify alternative activities open to them (Leikam, _et al._, 2004). Economic Demonstration Project (EDP) is the usual expression for such endeavours. These pilot projects are officially meant to encourage locals to move to more sustainable activities or to help

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\(^33\) In the literature, there are typologies that may seem more comprehensive than the one we offer since they provide even more categories – such as “petitionary participation”, “implementing participation” (Goulet, 1989) or “independent participation” (Pretty, 1995). However, these further categories do not exactly focus on “participation intensity” as we defined it and their insights are covered in other parts of the analytical framework we develop.
individuals negatively impacted by new regulations to regain lost income through new productive practices, by learning new skills or receiving a starting capital.

However, although EDPs may promise a good living, they do not necessarily interest everyone (Barzetti, 1993). For example, working with visitors in ecotourism may not appeal to everyone and traditional activities may still be preferred for a range of reasons. Setting up a small number of EDPs is generally not enough to satisfy everybody. Such projects seldom solve all of the problems resulting from the loss of rights over natural resources. EDPs may also contradict the local culture, for instance, by bringing tourists into sacred woods. They may disrupt family structures, as new activities often bring about a change of primary income generator, which often prompts reluctance. Smaller and targeted projects for specific families are sometimes developed, for instance through funds enabling each family to seek a grant or loan to start its chosen activity. Environmental sustainability, however, is much less assured using these mechanisms. Finally, with the building of roads, schools, freshwater supplies or other facilities, projects with a broader reach may increase the provision of public services and try to compensate the community as a whole (Gurung, 1995); but they are no guarantee that final benefits will be fairly shared.

Poorer people often fear that the supposed "participatory project" means reduced access to natural resources – which is often the case. The immediate costs of creating new environmental regulations are obvious to them, while the potential benefits are much less apparent: they may take time to appear or never materialise for a given individual, although they may be real for the local or global community as a whole. In practice, protecting biodiversity rarely meets the everyday concerns of the poorer community members, such as feeding the family. Hence, the typical reluctance to give credit to or support something that is seen as undesirable, despite any supposed compensatory measures. When the participatory scheme does bring about some direct, short-term and visible benefits to individuals, the perception of an unfair distribution of work or benefits can also block the involvement of many community members. In fact, people do seem to act as if they have a preference for social fairness, especially when they feel that relative inequalities are increased to their detriment. Issues about equality can lead well beyond a lack of participation, right to boycotts, open conflicts and political strife.

Chapter 3 – 111
Coming back to the expectations of the power narratives of the CP discourse, the emancipatory one assumes naturally that costs and benefits are fairly allocated overall, including through compensatory schemes if required: this is always the official purpose of such CP schemes. Conversely, the critical narrative expects far more unequal social results and a strong tendency for the more powerful actors to seize the bulk of the benefits.

3.1.6. CP effects on power formations

CP in environmental management rarely means that the public authorities leave the picture. There is a range of possible governance arrangements in which the balance of power varies between them and the community. The notion of “co-management” captures this diversity with a continuum of scenarios (ICLARM & IFM, 1998; Leikam, et al., 2004). At the lower end, public authorities may hold all the decision-making power while community members are merely meant to comply (top-down model). At the upper end, all decisions and responsibilities are in the hands of community members (bottom-up model). Between these extremes there is the space of “co-management” proper – which is the space typically occupied by CP schemes in biodiversity protection.

Still, no matter how important the public authorities and the local community are, a participatory scheme usually entails the active involvement of a range of non-local organisations and experts – such as NGOs, foreign experts or funds, which are there to “help” but which may also exert some form of power. In the local implementation of the CP discourse, a pattern may thus emerge whereby the exercise of power becomes more collective and international than before. In this regard, it is particularly interesting to question the distinction between local and non-local actors. Global discourses can indeed cause power positions, authority, and influence to be closely shared by a nexus of domestic and non-domestic actors.

Callaghy et al. (2001) worked out the notion of “trans-boundary formations” to depict such situations, while Duffy (2004) calls them “global formations”. In analysing sub-Saharan Africa, Callaghy et al. (2001) argue that these phenomena play a major role in creating, transforming and destroying forms of order and authority. One example of this “trans-boundary production of order” is the proliferation of networks that create global-local links through humanitarian
interventions, international economic processes, military incursions and development work. The role of such transnational networks are also pointed out by Duffy (2006a) in conservation policy making in Madagascar, and the developing world at large. She refers to Harrison’s concept of “governance states” to point up situations where governments are subject to forms of external management through a politics of “post conditionality” (Harrison, 2004, p.71). As Duffy puts it (2006a, p.740), in such situations, governments “become one partner among a complex array of other actors who operate together to provide specific policy outcomes”.

There is thus a proliferation of sites of authority, with a shift away from a state-based model to one where authority is held by various international and domestic actors. In this context, local authorities rely on external forces to produce order and rule. They share their national territories with other actors ranging from NGOs, transnational corporations, international organisations, etc. This change in the location of authority is also supported, as Duffy (2004, p.306) argues, by a “technisation of problems” that legitimises increased governance from outside the continent.3

Here, we shall define the notion of power formation, as the spatial configuration of actors wielding a significant share of local influence. Such spatial configurations may include local, domestic, regional and global actors. A case in point is the possibility of local-global formations, or in other words, situations in which local influence is shared by interdependent domestic and non-domestic actors. But other configurations may include domestic-regional formations, or local-regional formations.

The emancipatory narrative, just as the CP discourse itself, would expect the power formation accompanying CP to be centred on the community itself, notably in the form of a co-management scheme whereby decisions are largely shared with public authorities. Conversely, the critical narrative would expect a much larger power formation to emerge – a local-global one – that encompasses many more actors such as large NGOs, foreign donors, regional think tanks, foundations, international bodies, etc. According to the emancipatory narrative, these latter actors are supposed to be no more than facilitators providing their support, while in the critical hypothesis they retain a share of real power. The implementation of CP may, in the

34 This “technisation” of problems shares similarities with the anti-political effects of productive discourses pointed out in section 3.3.4.
end, entail the emergence of far wider power formations than just “co-management”, given the host of actors that accompany participatory projects. To some extent, CP may work as an “entry gate” for a range of non-local actors to step into the local picture. This is what we may call the “rebound effect of CP”: while CP provides the local community with more influence, it also diffuses this influence to totally new actors based further away. Beyond this displacement of authority, the critical narrative may also expect such local-global power formations to work against the objective interests of the weakest local groups.

3.1.7. CP effects on social control

According to the emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse, congruent with its official version, CP is expected to empower local actors regarding the rules, decisions or projects that affect them; it is supposed to carry a “dynamics of liberation” that may go as far as reshaping intra-community social relations, far beyond relations with external actors. However, depending on the design and implementation of CP, its effects on social structures may be substantially different from this ideal picture. The supposed emancipatory dynamics may turn into one of social control – which is, as we have seen, the core expectation of the critical narrative (cf. section 1.2.3). Here, social control refers to the active domination of certain social groups as well as the reinforcement of certain privileged groups or hierarchical social categories. In any case, social control reinforces the position of certain people (both within and outside the community) over others (within the community).

For instance, participatory mechanisms may focus attention on certain environmental issues and leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to remain out of reach or avoid taking on duties. Moreover, formal participatory institutions may turn into efficient mechanisms for some stakeholders to gain command of weaker ones, keeping them away from specific spatial, natural, political or financial resources. A majority group may find it easy, for instance, to overwhelm an under-privileged minority in the context of a local “democratic” decision-making process. Similarly, people who are better connected socially, economically and politically may make better use of formal institutions.
Discourses used in CP schemes may also reinforce the apparent legitimacy of unequal social structures, using a variety of cultural, social and environmental rationales. Hierarchical categories that structure the community (e.g. owners vs. employees) may see their authority reinforced rather than challenged. One can easily imagine, for instance, a situation in which the legal owners of large tracks of tropical forest receive international funds for conservation efforts while the rural employees or poorer populations – who rely on these resources for their livelihood – are squeezed out of the financial and managerial picture. Another possible consequence is that the typical reliance of CP biodiversity protection schemes on “scientific” and “expert” knowledge may prevent alternative views from being heard or take into account only “washed-out” versions of local knowledge. All of these dynamics, under the heading of CP, may mean that outright disciplinary instruments of control (including fines, patrols, fences, or more subtle incentives) are put together to control the behaviours of certain groups to the benefit of others.

A critical analysis of CP schemes thus requires a particular attention to the evolution of hierarchies and forms of social control. For this purpose, we suggest using the concept of containment which we define as follows, drawing on Few (2003, p.23, p.32):

*Containment is the management of community participation so as to maintain control over certain target groups and avoid, block or minimise their disruption of other goals.*

Although we rely heavily here on Few, we do not share his view that containment is essentially about “producing and completing protected area plans fundamentally oriented towards biodiversity protection” (p.32). We rather believe that there may be a diversity of other underlying goals targeted by diverse actors: marketisation, commodification or the preservation of various status quos - as we shall see later.35 Containment, in turn, may be carried out using a variety of modes or tactics. Table 5 provides a comprehensive but inexhaustive list. It includes three modes analysed by Few (p.30-31): persuasion, alliance and compromise. But we also identify eight others: biased project design, biased implementation, encirclement, epistemic...

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35 The notions of *marketisation* and *commodification* are explained in the following section.
exclusion, institutionalisation, selective oblivion, misrepresentation and de-legitimisation.

### Table 5 – Possible modes of containment and their definitions

| **Alliance** | Some stakeholder groups with shared interests may form an alliance to increase their legitimacy and bargaining power over target groups. |
| **Biased design** | Participatory schemes may focus attention on certain issues and leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to stay beyond any reach or duty. |
| **Biased implementation** | Monitoring and sanction mechanisms part of the CP scheme may, in practice, function preferentially against defined target groups. |
| **Compromise** | Strategic trade-off of interests meant to provide leverage on target groups on other issues. |
| **Delegitimisation** | The mechanism through which the target group is represented is discredited as non-legitimate. |
| **Encirclement** | Participatory mechanisms may be flooded with interest groups “encircling” target groups. |
| **Epistemic exclusion** | Exclusion of target-groups from the production of legitimate knowledge, views and norms. Dominant discourses reinforce the legitimacy of pre-existing social structures. |
| **Institutionalisation (formalisation)** | Target groups are brought into an institutional / formal framework which, in itself, constitutes an obstacle for them to participate - as they may not be used to institutional / formal / lengthy negotiations. |
| **Misrepresentation** | Target groups are said to be correctly represented in CP mechanisms while in fact they are not. |
| **Persuasion** | Positive affirmation of the benefits of a CP scheme, invoking the interests of the target groups. |
| **Selective oblivion** | Target groups are not even mentioned and thus not brought into any part of the CP process. |

*Source: the author, drawing on Few (2003)*

The critical narrative of the CP discourse will expect some of these containment modes to be operating within in CP schemes, while the emancipatory narrative will expect participatory institutions to precisely prevent the occurrence of active forms of containment. Here again, empirical expectations could not be further apart.
3.1.8. CP effects through marketisation and commodification

A participatory scheme in environmental protection may also be assessed in terms of the extent to which it has increased a community’s dependence on non-community markets, consumers, producers and investors – or in other words, its integration into global capitalism. This process may take two simultaneous forms: marketisation and commodification.

By marketisation, we refer to a process of greater connectedness and thus dependence upon outward-looking markets – including external producers and consumers, whether domestic or international. Global market dependence may be a feature of long-term historical dynamics, as is the case of the Caribbean islands, for instance, where dependence started with sugar during the colonial period, turning later to coconuts, bananas and now international tourism. This dependence may also, however, be strengthened by various policy initiatives. Participatory schemes may have specific economic components – such as Economic Demonstration Projects or other pilot projects – initially designed to compensate certain stakeholders, but which eventually deepen the wider dependence of the local economy. Rather than constituting outcomes of the participatory process, these projects may have inbuilt features promoted from the outset by various originating agents (initiators, designers or supporters).

The dynamics of marketisation are generally sustained by various processes of commodification. An important structural category in any society is the one opposing things that can be sold (in the form of goods and services) to those that are not or cannot be sold, because they are considered to be “sacred”, “natural” or excluded from economic interactions for traditional, familial or ethical reasons. Global discourses – for instance, on the environment, gender relations or human rights – may impact these categories and redefine their scopes. Changes in these dividing lines may have important social, economic or cultural consequences. The notion of commodification\(^{36}\) precisely describes the process by which things that did not have an economic value are now assigned a value and hence become tradable. Through

\(^{36}\) Commodification needs to be distinguished from “commoditisation”. The latter is a neologism that refers to the process by which goods that used to be perceived by consumers as distinguishable (brand or uniqueness) become simple commodities with little or no difference between brands or versions.
commodification, market values replace other social values and a greater number of relationships turn into commercial ones.  

This process can be readily associated with the logical expectations of the critical narrative.

Marx (1867) has famously identified and criticised processes of commodification, pointing to the phenomenon of "commodity fetishism". This refers to both a belief and a process. The belief is that value lies in commodities rather than in the human labour they embody: in the capitalist mode of production and consumption, objects are "de-humanised" and seen as mere objects with an intrinsic value. As for the process of commodity fetishism, this obscures and hides social relationships. The worker only sees his relation to the object he produces, being separated from the people who use it. Similarly, the consumer only sees his relation to the object he uses, unaware of the people who produced it. Commodity fetishism ensures that neither side is fully conscious of the social and political positions they occupy.

Commodification does not just involve material objects. Skills, knowledge, cultural behaviours can also be commodified and marketed - as is the case, for instance, with women's traditional skills in Central America through the development of tourism (Ferguson, 2008). It can also happen to a political idea, as in the example of a call for social change that is subsequently integrated into logos that are themselves marketed, thus reducing a political message to a fashion object. Commodification is generally criticised on the grounds that certain things should not be for sale or treated as if they were tradable. Yet, the emancipatory dimension of commodification should not be underestimated. For example, women are more easily able to free themselves from domestic chores when these are partly commodified. In environmental policy too, when no social norm protects natural resources, attributing an economic value to them may foster their conservation and recognition: commodification is actually central to the notion of "environmental services", which is gaining recognition in global environmental policies.

As we have seen, CP schemes in environmental protection often come with accompanying economic projects, intended to make productive practices more sustainable. In this sense, some processes of marketisation and commodification are logically expected to take place and it is not on this point that the power narratives of

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37 Slavery is an extreme case of commodification.
CP schemes would disagree most. However, the emancipatory narrative will tend to expect these processes to benefit the whole community, providing people with new market opportunities so as to raise their living standards. On the other hand, the critical narrative will expect marketisation and commodification processes to operate at the expense of the weaker community members. This opposition mirrors longstanding debate on the social impact of liberal economic policies and the increasing openness to global markets.

As is well known, neoliberal advocates of open trade believe that such dynamics improve everyone’s living standards in the long run. Although they concede that there are short-term losers and a need for some temporary regulation, they insist that the rising global tide of open markets will eventually lift all national and individual gains. In a best selling book, *The World is Flat*, Friedman (2005) thus argues that the hierarchical North-South divide is being rapidly replaced by a “flat” global entrepreneurial order, a “level playing field” with new “global rules of the game”. The poorest communities need more globalisation, not less, the question being how to ensure that they fully join it. As Bhagwati (2002, p.6) argues, globalisation does not need to be given a “human face” – it already has one. Here, marketisation is seen as an emancipatory dynamic bringing increased inclusiveness of sidelined actors in global markets. Participation in markets is seen as a key source of opportunities for local communities. Conversely, many other authors closer to the critical narrative do not believe that the world is becoming “flat” (e.g. Birdsall, 2006) and that all communities should be exposed to global markets to the same extent. The critical expectation, once again, is about the strongest actors draining off most of the benefits.

3.1.9. CP two-way interactions with social capital

In both the policy and academic literature, participatory schemes are largely defined by both their reliance and expected impact on a community’s *social capital* (SC). One of the most common arguments in favour of CP is that social capital guarantees social cohesion and improves trust among members of the community, thus reducing transaction costs (Isham, 2002). Participatory projects usually expect communities to use their SC to organise themselves and further build this capital as a key collective asset. Here, we briefly introduce the SC concept and how it may be integrated into a
critical analysis of CP. The first sub-section looks at how various forms of social capital can impact participatory schemes. Conversely, the following section looks at how CP may impact SC. In doing so, we do not propose an exhaustive review of the concept of social capital but merely show how it will be used to shed light on our case studies.38

Social Capital impact on CP
The first theory of “social capital” was developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1980)39. He defined it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group” (Bourdieu, 1986, p.244). In the same decade, the sociologist James Coleman (1988) famously proposed his own definitions of the social structures – such as norms, social obligations, information channels, etc. – that facilitate various actions of agents within the structure. Drawing on these two insights (networks and norms), Robert Putnam introduced the concept of social capital into economic literature, defining it as referring to the “the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167).

Much of the scholarship on social capital has argued along the same lines, contending that collective bonds are beneficial for society as a whole: where people share trust, interactions are expected to be easier and more efficient. For example, dense social networks make free-riding difficult because people know each other and interact on a basis of reciprocity of efforts: it may be more difficult to default when everybody knows everybody else, unlike in individualistic societies (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is thus generally said to reduce transaction costs and facilitate information-sharing, decision-making, collective action, etc. This in turn is supposed to lead to higher returns to individual or collective efforts. For instance, the motivation to work together based on a feeling of collective purpose, as well as social, religious or traditional obligations for mutual help and action, may facilitate a participatory process. Conversely, social norms about gender roles provide classical

38 The literature on social capital is huge. For a review, see Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002).
39 Bourdieu’s concept has often been translated in English as “cultural capital”.

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examples of hindrances to CP.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, an individualistic society in which there is little or no sense of community may be an impediment to participation.

However, it has been increasingly acknowledged that in some circumstances, social capital may stimulate free-riding and hold back productive co-operation within a given group. Rubio (1997) for instance calls “perverse social capital” the criminal organisations that promote opportunistic behaviours. Several authors have identified potential counterproductive effects associated with social capital and thus acknowledged its “downside” (Portes & Landholt, 1996) or even “dark side” (Ostrom, 1999). In the same line, as Hawe (2007) points out, although it has become commonplace in development and environmental spheres to believe that strengthening social capital will improve the lot of the poorest segments of society, social capital may equally well drive inequalities – a reading famously put forward by Bourdieu (1980). Members of the elite can access more (information, assistance, advice, connections, etc) and gain further advantages for themselves. Thus, while there is no automatic relationship between social capital and free-riding behaviour, the same holds true for the impact of social capital upon inequalities. The history and norms of collective action within a community are thus crucial to understanding its response to a participatory scheme.

A useful distinction has developed in the literature between bonding social capital, i.e. ties within a group where people have similar main socio-economic characteristics (e.g. family members, neighbours, close friends and work colleagues) – and bridging social capital, i.e. ties to people who do not share the same characteristics (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Narayan, 2002b). A third category has also been suggested: linking social capital (Woolcock, 1999). This refers to ties with people in positions of authority, such as representatives of public institutions (e.g. police, political parties) and private institutions (e.g. banks). While bonding SC is essentially horizontal (connecting people with roughly equal social standing), bridging and linking SC are more vertical.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Agarwal (2001), for instance, identifies gender factors underpinning the exclusion of women from community forestry groups in India and Nepal.

\textsuperscript{41} Krishna and Uphoff (1999) dichotomised Putnam’s concept into two dimensions: structural social capital relates to the various social organisations making up society (e.g. families, social networks, associations, etc.); cultural social capital refers to shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs. However, both of these forms are encompassed in each of three categories: bonding, bridging and linking SC.
The emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse tends to insist on the likely positive contribution of SC to CP schemes; it also tends to underline, for instance, that “rural communities may be seen to have high stocks of social capital” (Strasser, *et al.*, 1999, p.7). It thus harbours expectations akin to the standard CP discourse, namely that CP schemes draw upon SC to build fair and equitable participation. Conversely, the critical narrative is more likely to expect SC to run counter to social justice and pave the way for various forms of power to be exercised upon the weaker community stakeholders.

**CP effects on social capital**

Participatory schemes are not merely meant to build upon a community’s social capital but also to increase its quality and quantity so as to enable more and better collective action in the long run (e.g. Strasser, *et al.*, 1999; Campbell & McLean, 2003). This presupposes that the CP project triggers off a long lasting social reorganisation. However, even the successful ignition of a new type of collective action may not bring about lasting changes. Community members may revert to old habits, hierarchies and networks so that in the end the local capacity for collective action has not been structurally enhanced. Moreover, a participatory project may also produce social discontent among actors who are supposed to be “involved” but feel they are not and thus reduce their willingness to work together even more. As Arnstein underlines:

> Participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the power holders to claim that all sides were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo. (Arnstein, 1969, p.216).

In such cases, participation does not seem to contribute to social capital formation but rather to its destruction, reducing the level of trust among actors and creating long-lasting frustrations. Positive effects of CP schemes upon the local SC are thus far from being definitively secured and beneficial. It is important that these effects be studied because they are an integral part of the CP discourse, which hopes and expects to strengthen the local social capital with participatory initiatives. However, to obtain a comprehensive view of these effects, it is critical to adopt a long-term perspective.
In reality, even frustrations with unsuccessful CP schemes may well nourish new responses and endeavours that, in the end, strengthen social capital. A failed participatory scheme may, in the long run, open new venues for collective action. Local discontents may bring about new political developments, de-legitimise some elites, allow new leaders emerge and "redistribute the cards" in favour of new actors. In other words, it may renovate the local social capital. Reacting to disappointments and perceived injustices, local community members or groups may mobilise themselves for re-defined objectives, claim increased "ownership" of externally driven initiatives, try to re-capture or quit them, or develop parallel projects away from the initial participatory mechanism.

Reactions to frustrations may take the form of political action – something that might be considered the most “participatory” result possible for a CP project. Far from de-politicising actors, which is often observed in expert-led projects, a frustrating CP may lead to a local re-politicisation – and thus to renewed participation from within, which is less elite-centred or involves a challenge by new elites to the more established ones. Social frustrations triggered by unsatisfactory CP initiatives may thus be a key channel through which CP eventually delivers – in the long run – what it was supposed to deliver in the first place, in a consensual and institutionalised fashion: more autonomous, self-organised and empowered community members.

To capture the effects on SC, it is thus essential to analyse the dynamics of the frustrations that CP may entail. In the case of an unsatisfactory participatory process, frustrations may be dealt with in a passive and resigned manner or in a more active and constructive spirit. Drawing on well-known concepts designed by Hirschman (1970), the “EXIT, VOICE and LOYALTY” framework may be usefully called upon to analyse “response strategies” and their political outcomes.

Hirschman developed these notions while studying the strategic options of members of organisations in decline, be it a private firm, an association, a nation or any other collective endeavour. First, members can EXIT the organisation. This can take different forms: actual withdrawal or a more psychological exit, which does not imply actually leaving the organisation but merely ceasing to contribute in any meaningful way. Second, members can VOICE their discontent from within the organisation, or from outside, and try to reform and revamp it with active complaints and proposals. Finally, they can show LOYALTY, abandoning the idea of changing
the organisation while still remaining there, in the name of higher principles such as a common identity, the unity of a community, etc.

EXIT is the classic option in market-based relations where buyers and sellers are free to constantly start or end business relations. However, in other social circumstances, people may not be able to physically exit the organisation but may still wish to exit the system: they thus reduce their participation to the strict minimum. As already suggested, EXIT need not be physical but can be mental or emotional. LOYALTY, on the other hand, is rarely the choice made in market situations, unless the cost of finding a new supplier is far too high. In the context of a CP scheme, LOYALTY has different motives, such as a willingness not to show disunity inside the community. As for VOICE, this option is of a more political nature as it can challenge the status quo and be openly confrontational. In market terms, instead of walking out of the shop, it would mean calling the manager and negotiating a different price or service. In other contexts, it can mean street demonstrations and an eventual re-negotiation of the social contract.

In the end, the strongest effects of a CP scheme on the local social capital may not come to light in the traditional construct and expectations of the participatory narrative. New social forces and actors may well not emerge or fresh social capital built through institutional and project involvement. When CP mechanisms are captured by local elites or the central state, participation may still prove emancipatory if the gap it creates with social expectations triggers social reactions. If this view is correct, VOICE is likely to be the best option for producing new social capital, even though a rather long time-span is necessary in order to assess its effects.

If VOICE is chosen, the end result may differ widely from what was expected by the initial CP scheme. However, the dynamics of people voicing their interests and mobilising to reach self-defined goals can only be approved by the global CP discourse, even if communities might not place the environment at the top of their priority list. However, marginalised people are prone to choose EXIT or LOYALTY responses as they often lack the self-confidence and objective means to influence the course of action.

When anticipating the outcome of a frustrating CP scheme, it is wise to take into account the culture and history of the various groups involved, as well as their existing social capital. Much of what participatory schemes will change in the
community depends on the degree of inertia in social and political habits – as well as on the presence of specific individuals who are able to act as fresh leaders. The choice of EXIT, VOICE or LOYALTY is thus likely to mirror long-standing political trends and social relations. A history of social struggle may stimulate VOICE, while a history of customary elite paternalism may foster LOYALTY or a search for a psychological EXIT. Figure 1 synthesises these various dynamics.

The emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse expects CP to reinforce the local social capital through increased bonding, bridging and linking SC. On the other hand, the critical narrative expects CP to have a neutral or negative impact: a positive effect may take place on the local SC in the long run only, if VOICE is chosen as the response to frustrations (rather than EXIT or LOYALTY).

**Figure 1 – The dynamics of discontent: CP effects on SC according to the critical narrative**

- **CP felt as unsatisfactory**
  - e.g. elite-centred participation, from above and outside, unequal allocation of benefits, etc.

- **Social frustrations**
  - + Increased self-consciousness of various community actors

**Factors influencing the response strategy:**
- History and political habits, pre-existing SC, perceived opportunities and resources

**Response 1**
- **VOICE**
  - Frustrated community actors voice their discontent; increase their mobilisation within or outside new institutions (e.g. political action)
  - Likely outcome 1
    - **RENEWED SOCIAL CAPITAL**
      - New forms and channels of collective action may appear. Some elites may be de-legitimised and new actors emerge. Environmental priority is not guaranteed.

**Response 2**
- **LOYALTY**
  - Frustrated community actors maintain their loyalty to the status quo, refrain from open criticism – e.g. for the sake of community unity.
  - Likely outcome 2
    - **UNCHANGED SOCIAL CAPITAL**
      - Social capital rigidifies, no collective learning or new capacity for collective action is built. The CP scheme formally works as envisioned but frustrations exist.

**Response 3**
- **EXIT**
  - Frustrated stakeholders reduce their involvement to the minimum, leave the participatory scheme or withdraw psychologically.
  - Likely outcome 3
    - **WEAKENED SOCIAL CAPITAL**
      - The participatory scheme slowly loses its substance. Social capital weakens along with capacities for collective action.

*Source: the author*

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3.1.10. The empirical expectations of the power narratives

Chapter 2 concluded that the critical narrative of global governance expects the CP discourse to incorporate community members into ready-made schemes favouring powerful stakeholders and pre-existing power structures. The grid we have just presented enables us to assess this hypothesis in more detail and look at how the various dimensions of a CP scheme may be geared towards domination and emancipation. Based on the above concepts and discussions, Table 6 details the empirical expectations of the two power narratives along nine dimensions.

Appendix 4 provides a table that summarises the concepts and typologies developed in this chapter's first section in order to help keep track of all the potential configurations of CP schemes observed in field data.
Table 6 – Empirical expectations of power narratives on CP schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Expectations of the EMANCIPATORY NARRATIVE</th>
<th>Expectations of the CRITICAL NARRATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENESIS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. CP ORIGINS</td>
<td>CP from within.</td>
<td>CP from outside or above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPLEMENTATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CP INCLUSIVENESS</td>
<td>Wide and socially-mixed CP.</td>
<td>Narrow and elite-centred CP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CP SCOPE</td>
<td>Broad scope (both upstream and downstream)</td>
<td>Restricted scope (mainly downstream), despite rhetoric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CP INTENSITY</td>
<td>Intensive CP (bargaining and deliberations)</td>
<td>Nominal, passive or (at most) consultative CP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CP ALLOCATION OF COSTS &amp; BENEFITS</td>
<td>Fairly even allocation of costs and benefits, compensated if need be through social schemes and economic projects.</td>
<td>Uneven allocation of benefits not corrected (or even reinforced) by compensatory schemes. Powerful actors concentrate most benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPACTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CP EFFECTS ON POWER FORMATIONS</td>
<td>CP entails a limited power formation: namely co-management with public authorities, with a strong influence of the community.</td>
<td>CP entails a much larger power formation, in which a range of non-local actors wield significant local influence. Increased governance from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CP EFFECTS ON SOCIAL CONTROL</td>
<td>The CP scheme prevents the emergence of containment processes.</td>
<td>Emancipatory rhetoric turns into a practice of social control: various forms of containment take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CP EFFECTS THROUGH MARKETISATION &amp; COMMODIFICATION</td>
<td>The weaker local actors benefit from increased market opportunities.</td>
<td>Marketisation and commodification operate at the expense of the weaker local actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CP TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL</td>
<td>- The local SC helps CP to develop. - CP has positive effects on the local SC (increased bonding, reaching and linking capital).</td>
<td>- The weaknesses of SC lay the ground for various forms of power to be exercised on the weaker actors. - CP has neutral or negative effects on CP. Positive effects can take place in the long run if VOICE is chosen as the response to frustrations (rather than EXIT or LOYALTY).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2. Searching for Power Mechanisms

We have now identified in precise terms the empirical expectations of the power narratives under scrutiny; but we still need to understand through what power mechanisms the CP discourse produces its outcomes. In the study of power relations, access to data is extremely difficult given the often subtle nature of social interactions. There is also a fundamental conceptual challenge: power comes in various forms and expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation. Most commonly, the social science literature describes "power" in terms of an actor A directly controlling an actor B. Focusing exclusively on this definition, however, creates analytical blind spots and black holes. Addressing this problem in a landmark work, Lukes (1975) identified "three dimensions of power". The first defines power as being expressed in observable relationships, such as verbal or physical fights between antagonists. The second dimension involves the influence of intentions per se in power relations. In its third dimension, power proves even more "insidious": actors' own interests are shaped by power structures thus creating a gap between their subjective and objective interests. Building on Lukes and Foucault, Barnett and Duvall (2005) have devised a large and coherent grid that pulls together complementary conceptions of power. The typology they build is based on a comprehensive definition of power as "the production of effects that shape the actions or conditions of existence of actors" (p.18). Based on this understanding, they identify four forms of power relations: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. Each requires to be examined when exploring case studies.

The power narratives of global discourses do not inherently reveal what power mechanism need to be at work, empirically speaking, to produce a given outcome. It is nonetheless important to explore this question to gain a better understanding of how outcomes are produced.

3.2.1. Compulsory power: the direct use of coercive resources

The first concept of power, compulsory power, refers to relations where an actor directly shapes the situation or actions of another actor. Typical definitions of power fall under this concept. Dahl (1957, p.202), for instance, defined power as "the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do". Dahl's concept has
several key characteristics. First, there is intentionality: A wants B to alter its actions in a particular direction. Second, there is a conflict of desires: A and B want different outcomes, and B loses. Third, A is successful because it has the material and ideational resources that lead B to modify its actions. Here, at the core of the analysis of power, we find the issue of what resources are controlled and intentionally deployed by an actor A. Barnett and Duval argue, however, that compulsory power does not necessarily need to be connected to intentionality. Compulsory power is present whenever the actions of A control the actions or situation of B, even if unintentionally. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue, power still exists even when those who dominate are not conscious of how their actions produce unintended effects. Gruber (2000), for instance, contends that the powerful may influence the weak even if it is not their intention to do so: he thus defines "go-it alone power" as the ability to influence unilaterally the policy choice of an actor by altering the nature of the status quo that it faces.

Compulsory power is not limited to material resources and can also involve symbolic and normative resources. NGOs, for instance, sometimes manage to mobilise normative resources to force states to alter their policies through a strategy of public shaming. As for international organisations, they are often able to use their authority (moral, technical, expert-led or delegated by other actors) as a resource to compel other actors to adopt certain policies. In the global development discourse, for instance, compulsory power may take the form of policy conditionalities that govern the release of international aid, or of the influence of the frequently foreign technical expertise that shapes projects in specific ways. Thus, an analysis of compulsory power means identifying the range of practices that make one actor able to directly control the conditions of behaviour of another actor – and the way a global discourse contributes to such practices.

3.2.2. Institutional power: influencing through mediating institutions

While compulsory power refers to the direct control of one actor over another, institutional power means the control of one actor over another in indirect ways. This is done through formal and informal institutions that mediate the interaction between the two. In institutional power, actor A frames the conditions of existence and actions of actor B through the rules and procedures enforced by given institutions. While
compulsory power rests on resources owned and deployed by A, institutional power does not rest on A “owning” the institution that shapes the behaviour of B. Institutions that are entirely dominated by a single actor are few and far between. However, the ability to use a given institution is unevenly distributed among actors. Institutions established to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes create (absolute or relative) “winners” and “losers” and institutional power relations may be inferred from there.

In institutional power, the presence of mediating institutions highlights the fact that A and B are socially separated from one another and that they are only indirectly related. This distance can be spatial: central authorities located in a faraway capital city may constrain local communities through various institutions. But distance can also be temporal, or even generational; institutions established at one point in time can subsequently have expected or unintended effects. Long-standing institutions may embody frozen configurations of interests, privileges and biases that continue to impact the situation and choices of actors. In this type of analysis, power is no longer a matter of A’s direct effect upon B, but a matter of extended and diffuse relations through mediating institutions.

Also of relevance to institutional power are the various forms of material dependence between spatially or socially distant actors: market forces, systems of exchange and interdependences create relationships that may limit available choices, especially those of weaker actors. More specifically, one important form of institutional power fostered by a global discourse may be the increased dependence of socially weak groups upon non-community markets. The implementation of a global discourse may lead to certain policies and projects that increase this dependence. Which new stakeholders – whether distinctly identifiable (e.g. a company) or more anonymous and faceless (e.g. a type of industry or consumers) – have gained practical influence over the local context? What mediating mechanisms (e.g. market prices, commercial intermediaries, investment funds) are being used? How have inflows of capital, goods, managerial techniques, norms and standards evolved over time and to the greater benefit of whom?

As we saw in Chapter 1 (cf. section 1.2.3), global discourses may favour some types of institutions over others – and markets are institutions. When it comes to governance arrangements, global discourses may also influence formal or informal
organisations: their level of publicness (nature of participants), delegation (functions performed by ad hoc organisations) or inclusiveness (level of shared decisional power). Thus, a power analysis of a global discourse must look at what type of institutions are created and how power works through them.

3.2.3. Structural power: strengthening long-standing identities

In the two preceding forms of power, compulsory and institutional, power relates to actions of pre-defined and pre-constituted actors towards one another. The identities of A and B are not at stake or even discussed. They are pre-supposed as stable and independent from one another. In these conceptions, power is almost an attribute that an actor owns and that he may use to shape the actions or situation of the others. The focus is placed on interactions and on who governs whom, based on material, ideational and institutional resources.

Another angle on power may be adopted however, namely a focus on relations of constitution (i.e. related to identities) as opposed to relations of interactions (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p.9). Relations of constitution shed light on how actors are defined and formed as social beings, in relation to one another, with their respective identities, capacities, interests and goals. The focus is less on who governs but rather on who is defined as governing. Studying this constitution means examining the production of particular kinds of actors and refusing the view that they are defined ex ante. As Wendt (1998, p.105) puts it: “Constitutive theories...account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”.

Because these social relations generate different social kinds and self-understandings, they have real impacts on an actor’s ability to shape its existence. Constitutive processes may be themselves controlled by specific actors, but tend to be structurally beneficial to some. Constitutive forms of power come in two forms: structural power (that we now explore) and productive power (see next section).

Structural power refers to structural positions, social structures and categories deeply entrenched in society, whereby A exists as such given its relation to B. Classic examples include “masters vs. slaves” in slave societies, “capital vs. labour” in capitalist societies, “landowner vs. agricultural employees” in rural societies, or more generally “local notables vs. the rest of a community”. Such structural roles
contain functional differentiations that come with varying privileges, subjectivities and interests to the occupants of these roles (Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

Structural power typically underlines hierarchical and binary relations of domination that work to the advantage of those structurally empowered, and to the disadvantage of the socially weak. Its analysis can follow at least two paths. First, social structures allocate differential capacities and advantages to different positions: capital-labour and master-slave relations are obvious producers of unequal privileges. Second, not only does the social structure comprise actors, but it also shapes their self-understanding and subjective interests. This sometimes makes the under-privileged willing to accept their role in the existing order contrary to their objective interests (Benton, 1981). This is, for instance, the case in paternalist communities where the lower social class is “fed and protected” by the upper class.

Structural power can thus prevent some actors from recognising their own domination. This helps reproduce rather than resist the status quo. In this way, structural power operates even when there are no instances of A acting to exercise control over B. Barnett and Duval appropriately quote Lukes (1975, p.24) on this point: “Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things?”.

Marxist analyses typically rely on arguments close to this understanding of structural power. Following the Italian social philosopher Gramsci, Gill and Law (1989) argue that while power exists in coercion and institutional arrangements, the relations of production in global capitalism determine the capacities and resources of actors, shape the ideology through which they interpret their own fate, interests and desires. The capitalist and consumerist ideology is seen as hegemonic in the sense that it serves the objective interests of the higher social classes – at the direct expense of the objective interests of the world’s producing classes. This view is also translated to the level of entire nations by world-systems theorists (e.g. Wallerstein, 1996). The claim, then, is that global structures of production generate particular kinds of states, such as core, semi-peripheral and peripheral ones. Positions in this system produce varying sets of interests, capacities and constraints. Countries in the subordinate positions often adopt ideological conceptions that underpin their own domination.
A global discourse may either strengthen or contradict forms of structural power. It is not always easy to identify in what direction situations are evolving. For instance, the discourse on gender equality is openly challenging long-standing social categories, but once integrated into policies, it may turn out to work against its own stated goals (Hakim, 2008). As for the global discourse on decentralisation, its operationalisation may in the end reinforce the grip of central authorities over local operations. These are the type of tortuous expectations that the critical narrative of global governance typically harbours, given its pervasive intuition on the reinforcement of pre-existing power structures.

3.2.4. Productive power: anti-politics, governmentality and the use of “traditions”

*Productive power*, like structural power, focuses on processes that produce the identities and interests of actors. However, while structural power emphasises long-standing binary social structures and categories, productive power looks at other configurations, newer categories in the making or ones that are not necessarily constituted in binary or hierarchical modes. It is concerned with the re-defining the legitimate body of values, knowledge and social categories.

While structural power is *re*-productive of long-standing categories and divisions, and of positions of domination and subordination, productive power is more *productive* of new kinds of norms and identities. These productive categories may constrain both the elite and non-elite alike. They do not automatically mirror social hierarchies: they may challenge them and inspire new social forces. Analysing productive power requires a focus on new discourses that produce new kinds of subjects, meanings and categories, terms of action to shape what is taken for granted.

Productive power works *via* systems of knowledge through which meaning is transformed (Macdonell, 1986). Discourses are understood here not as dialogues among actors or in terms of Habermas’ notion of “communicative action”. Instead, the concept refers to how everyday interactions redefine the body of values and knowledge that can be legitimately referred to. It looks at how “the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal” are defined and “what counts as a problem” (Hayward, 2000, p.35).
In the field of International Relations, productive power has been very largely studied. There have been discussions, for instance, on classificatory concepts such as “civilised”, “rogue”, “unstable”, “Western” or “democratic” states. The theme of the “Other” – how it is defined and linked to permissible and desirable policies – has also been looked at (Neumann & Welsh, 1991). As for the global discourse on Human Rights, this has constructed a world populated by human rights “victims”, “monitors”, “violators” or “prosecutors”. In humanitarian law, the definition of the categories of “civilian” and “combatant” bears consequences for those on the ground – the former deserving help and the latter being legitimate targets for the armed forces. As for the development discourse, it has been widely analysed as a form of knowledge/power regime (e.g. Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995).

Through a redefinition of the legitimate values, categories and knowledge, the exercise of productive power by a global discourse may strengthen new or re-emerging categories and actors. Boli and Thomas (1999) argue for instance that global democratic and rational-legal principles are reinforcing the voices of NGOs as legitimate actors of world politics. In local contexts, foreign donors and experts, and national or international NGOs may thus see their influence increase following the diffusion of a given global discourse. Emerging actors, however, may either challenge or reinforce long-standing local structural power positions: thus, productive and structural power may work either hand in hand or against one another.

Productive power can work at least through three forms that are well identified in the political science literature: 1) anti-politics – a process that renders certain political choices ostensibly “technical” so as to avoid debates; 2) governmentality (in Foucault’s sense) – a process that fosters self-regulation and internalised constraints, as people redefine their identities on the basis of new norms; 3) the redefinition of what is traditional and thus legitimate or in need of extra-care.

**Anti-politics and the weight of “expertise”**

Drawing on Ferguson (1990) who worked on the development discourse, anti-politics can be defined as the transformation of contested political issues into technical issues, so that the power of experts and specialised authorities is significantly increased, while debate considerably restricted or constrained. Nearly
all global discourses actually come with a parallel discourse on the modernisation and rationalisation of human societies that has the potential to legitimate even more expertise. The question is, therefore, whether the use of this “modern knowledge” obscures rather than sheds light on social or political issues that demand political debate and societal choices. The expertise that comes with various global discourses may indeed frame discussions in specific ways, within externally defined parameters, while leaving out contested issues and implicitly reinforcing certain power position – which is a typical expectation of the critical narrative.

Anti-politics and de-politicisation may also have positive sides that should not be overlooked when analysing global discourses and their implementation. An inflow of external expertise may help move forward blocked situations and relieve complex local tensions. When stakeholders’ interests are directly and irremediably opposed, technical discourses may bring a useful perspective, acting as a third party in a confrontation that is leading nowhere. In the field of international security, for instance, this may happen in conflict prevention projects where NGOs working with certain global discourses are able to reinstate a dialogue between parties that have stopped talking to one another, through the deployment of new expertise and ideas. Nevertheless, looking at anti-politics requires making a judgement on whether legitimate options were suppressed from the discussions and the extent to which technical expertise acted as a “neutral” third party – something that some critiques would say is never possible.

**Governmentality as self-regulation**

Certain forms of knowledge can make individuals govern themselves in certain ways. Discourses can become internalised and frame subjectivities and behaviours, while individuals feel autonomous and subjectively free. To describe this power phenomenon, Foucault developed the concept of “neoliberal governmentality”\(^{42}\) – a situation in which power is de-centred so that subjects play an active role in their own governance. The production of knowledge and the “normalisation of conducts” stimulate the constitution of “self-regulated” and “self-correcting selves”.

The concept of “governmentality” was coined by Foucault to refer to government structures that are not limited to state politics and policies but include a range of

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\(^{42}\) See Foucault (1991) on his 1977-1978 lectures at the College de France.
techniques of social control and forms of knowledge that bridge the gap between the macro and the micro levels of power. It points to procedures, protocols, practices, idioms, rules and routines through which lives are governed, managed and regulated “at a distance”, as seen in section 1.2.4. It carries a vision of power that is faceless, headless, acting through decentralised practices, but where power still retains an overall unity. This coherence is referred to as a “discourse” with systematic effects. Although Foucault applies “governmentality” to various power regimes and historical periods, he uses the term particularly with reference to “neoliberal governmentality”. This characterises regimes based on democratic and market principles, the limitation of state action, the entrustment of individuals with self-regulating duties and functions, and the dissemination of risks and responsibilities.

Global discourses often manifest this ideal of self-regulation and neoliberal governmentality: people are meant to “freely behave better”. As the critical narrative would expect, their implementation through policies and projects is likely to exhibit a degree of schizophrenia with a vibrant pledge to unconstrained autonomy while at the same time stating expected and pre-defined results – which may even be monitored by quantified indicators. There is, here, an intrinsic contradiction between the stated goals of enhanced self-regulation and the attainment of standard norms - a tension that is core to neoliberal governmentality and that may characterise many global discourses.

**Defining the “community”, “success” and “traditions”**

Productive power is about shaping identities. Looking at “communities”, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) make the point that “the local and the external...are linked together in ways that it might be difficult to identify the precise [dividing] line” (p.640). “Communities” thus are not *a priori* clearly defined entities: defining them is a process in itself that may be influenced by external actors. Brockington *et al.* (2008, p.90) thus argue that “rural groups engaged in community conservation are increasingly incorporated into new networks of actors, including NGOs, International Financial Institutions, international organisations, bilateral donors and private companies”. All of these actors influence what groups become defined as “the community”, as they are often in a position to “handpick groups of local people to represent the communities with whom they ‘partner’” (p.90). In this line of enquiry, Mosse (2004, p.654) evokes the concept of “interpretative community”. This refers
to a group of people spanning local to international levels, whose role is to make a specific intervention appear as a "success". People that are co-opted at the local level are chosen for their ability to mobilise support. Who exactly is seeking to define a community and "success" and for what purpose thus become important questions.

Another important aspect of productive power is the definition of "traditions". Global discourses may carry widely varying perspectives of traditions, and can impact these in different ways. These effects range from pro- to anti-traditional—providing one acquiesces that there is such a thing as fixed and defined traditions. A global discourse may respect or even be based upon long-standing cultural factors; but it may equally often come with the in-built idea that some established social relations or practices need to be radically changed – such as gender relations, for instance. A discourse can also impact traditions in an even deeper and productive way, by re-delineating what is or is not traditional. Defining traditions is indeed an important stake in local communities, or even in entire nations, as traditions provide unity and legitimacy. English Marxist historians such as Hobsbawn (1983) and Ranger (1983) have long conceived of traditions as something invented and actively created. In the same line of analysis, Anderson (1983) famously devised the notion of "imagined communities", emphasising the on-going re-creation of a collective past.

Appendix 5 synthesises this discussion on forms of power providing their definitions and related research questions.

3.2.5. The conditional expectations of power narratives

The empirical expectations of the power narratives are concerned with the level of emancipation or control to be found in CP schemes. While the emancipatory narrative expects to find emancipatory versions of CP, the critical narrative expects to observe alienating versions. In the previous section (3.1), these two accounts were expressed and translated in terms of detailed empirical expectations along 9 dimensions. Which power mechanisms are actually at work (compulsory, institutional, etc.) in producing a given version of CP, in a given dimension of CP, is for empirical analysis to determine. Power narratives have no definite a priori expectation regarding what power mechanism may be found to be operating.
However, power narratives do have broad views about how various forms of power, if present, should logically impact the functioning of CP schemes. In this sense, we may deduce further empirical expectations, but this does not mean that their actual existence is expected. We can thus define a range of conditional expectations – conditional to the empirical confirmation of the presence of given forms of power.

First are conditional expectations regarding compulsory power. According to the critical narrative, the key strength of a global discourse lies in its capacity to influence actors without open forms of violence, through hidden devices of power. Its logical expectations regarding mechanisms of compulsory power are thus centred on subtle and non-confrontational forms. Compulsory power devices, if found to be present, are thus preferentially expected to come through incentives rather than outright constraints. At first sight, instruments of control may thus look like instruments of emancipation. Conversely, the emancipatory narrative would expect compulsory forms of power to help keep in check the strongest stakeholders from ruling in a business-as-usual scenario.

Second is institutional power. The conditional expectation of the critical narrative is that powerful interest groups and pre-existing social relations will tend to take over newly created institutions and reinforce their position. Institutions that are officially created to emancipate certain categories of actors may thus turn out to work, once again, as mechanisms of social control in the interest of dominant groups. In opposition, the emancipatory narrative would expect institutions – as well as markets recently connected to the community – to empower the hitherto disempowered, providing them with new opportunities to make their voice heard and to develop economically.

Third is structural power. Here, the critical narrative essentially expects the legitimisation and fortification of deep-seated social categories. A global discourse implemented in a local context may well allocate even more resources, benefits, responsibilities and channels of influence to dominant social categories. And even when all parties have gained net benefits, the relative distribution may still have worsened and hardened social divides. On the contrary, the emancipatory narrative will expect such power forms to be little present, given the weakening of inegalitarian social categories and relations.
Finally is productive power – the reworking of identities through new discourses. While the critical narrative will expect such power forms to benefit the most powerful groups, the emancipatory narrative will expect them to benefit the most disempowered.

Table 7 synthesises the conditional expectations of power narratives regarding power forms. Again, this summary table is nothing more than a range of potential observations, all of which are not expected to be present on the ground. The point of the table is to illustrate the diversity of power mechanisms that may be working to produce various outcomes in terms of overall emancipation or social control.
Table 7 – Conditional expectations about the effects of various forms of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of power</th>
<th>Conditional expectations of the EMANCIPATORY narrative</th>
<th>Conditional expectations of the CRITICAL narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Compulsory Power</td>
<td>• Compulsory power forms help keep in check the strongest stakeholders.</td>
<td>• Use of compulsory power preferentially through non-confrontational forms. • Use of incentives rather than outright constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Institutional Power</td>
<td>• Institutions enable weaker stakeholders to exercise significant power. • Weaker stakeholders enjoy new market opportunities.</td>
<td>• Institutions are taken over by already empowered groups and turn into mechanisms of social control over others. • Increased local dependence on global markets to the detriment of the weaker stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Structural Power</td>
<td>• Limited presence of such power forms, given the weakening of inequalitarian social categories and relations.</td>
<td>• Legitimisation and fortification of deep-seated social relations and categories (e.g. hierarchical/binary positions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Productive Power</td>
<td>• Productive power forms benefit the less powerful groups, for instance through anti-political processes, self-regulation or a redefinition of traditions.</td>
<td>• Productive power forms benefit the more powerful groups, for instance through anti-political processes, self-regulation or a redefinition of traditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, it is possible to go one step further in anticipating what power forms and effects might be observed in empirical data, according to the two narratives of CP schemes. **Appendix 6**, focusing on the critical narrative, crosses four forms of power with the 9 dimensions of CP schemes in order to envision a large range of potential empirical observations. The point of this exercise is to give a foretaste of the diversity of power mechanisms that might be found to produce disempowerment in the field. In other words, the statements in the very large table in Appendix 6 do not constitute empirical expectations, but rather potential observations of power at work.
3.3. Research methods

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach based upon four months of fieldwork. Data were collected using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, focus groups and a range of written documents. Here we provide a brief discussion of collection techniques and sample selection. Research methods are further discussed in Appendix 7.

3.3.1. Data collection

**Interviews** were chosen as the primary data collection technique because they make it possible to gain an understanding of an individual’s inner experiences, an understanding which is critical when analysing issues such as participation, socio-political dynamics and power relations. Interviews also provide access to the context and meaning of actors’ behaviour (Seidman, 1998). A total of 110 formal interviews were undertaken for this study, half in Brazil and half in St. Lucia. This number does not include informal conversations and meetings without note-taking. They were conducted in person in the participant’s home or workplace at a time convenient to them. Administering interviews in the participants’ own surroundings enabled the researcher to gain a better sense of their life perspective. Interviews typically lasted between 60 to 90 minutes, with occasional interviews being cut short after 30 minutes (due to the lack of relevant material or good will on the part of the participant) and others lasting several hours (such as with a very charismatic Rasta lady in St. Lucia who gave a detailed account of her incredible life). Interview length very much depended on the responsiveness of the participant, the relevance of the material being provided and the number of new thematic paths that appeared during the discussion.

**Participant observation** was conducted both in everyday contexts and on special occasions, such as important meetings or social gatherings, and these were transcribed into field notes. Some of them resulted from a spontaneous invitation to join in, such as for instance accompanying horse tours in the Pantanal, patrolling the coast with the marine rangers in St Lucia, attending public outreach and community meetings in the town of Soufrière, or joining the annual Fisher feast on St Peter’s day. Other observations resulted from an explicit demand I formulated: for instance
in Campo Grande, to attend the board meeting of APPAN, an association of landowners involved in ecotourism, or to join rural employees in their work with cattle. In St Lucia, I further spent a lot of time in the offices of the participatory structure I studied, the so-called Soufrière Maritime Management Association (SMMA). This allowed me to observe the comings and goings of community members interacting with the institution. I also regularly attended evenings in local bars where quasi-ritual daily meetings take place among a broad section of Soufrière’s population, including businessmen and community leaders.

**Focus groups** were held in St. Lucia in six specific settings and several times in each: with fishers along the shoreline; with fishers again after public events; with marine rangers before, during or after their boat patrols; with project staff members at the office, where I spent a lot of time; and with a group of young locals I often met. In Brazil, however, focus groups were more difficult to arrange, due to both spatial and cultural constraints. The huge territory under scrutiny, the Pantanal, has a very low human density and the *fazendas* I visited are very isolated from one another, making any meeting virtually impossible to organise – this constraint was also felt by the participatory scheme I studied. I managed nevertheless to arrange informal focus groups within some *fazendas* among rural employers (*peons*), but the results were disappointing. It turned out that group discussions between *peons* in the presence of a foreigner led to fewer exchanges rather than more, a fact that has to do, in my view, with their strong community culture and their shy disposition compared to Western standards.

A wide range of **written documents** was also collected. These provided background, complementary or inside information that helped to identify critical issues, triangulate conclusions and increase their reliability, as well as identify important informants. First, project-related documentation was gathered from international donors and local project managers. Second, a range of newspapers and magazine articles relating to the projects or regions under consideration were collected. Third, a host of public policy documentation was pulled together from both the local and national authorities in the two countries. Fourth, written documentation was gathered through direct contact with NGOs, both on their own projects and regional environmental issues. Finally, local academic literature and scientific studies were systemically sought.

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3.3.2. Sample selection

The term “participants” refers to individuals that participated who willingly took part in the study by allowing me to interview them either face-to-face or within a focus group. The selection of participants followed a “purposive sampling” process, meaning that they were selected because they met certain characteristics as well as the specific purpose I had in mind. This approach is popular with qualitative research and when building samples of a limited size (Robson, 1993). Attaining a statistically robust sample of participants was not the intention of this study. Rather, the focus was to achieve a sample that would provide sufficiently diverse and give deep insights into ongoing social and political processes.

My primary concern in building the sample was to obtain a good view of what was typically happening among key “stakeholders”. Stakeholders are individuals, groups or organisations (public or private) who have an interest in or an impact on the environmental schemes under study. Stakeholders with the highest impact and interest formed the core of the sample, while those with high interest and little influence, or high influence and little interest were also integrated. Groups with low interest and low impact were naturally of little relevant to the research. Examples of groups falling into the high interest-low impact category were the poorest fisher groups of Soufrière, or the rural employees in Pantanal, with a high degree of dependence on natural resources for their livelihood but little influence or power over decisions.

For Brazil and St. Lucia, the sampling process started long before the actual fieldwork, based on preliminary research that helped identify likely stakeholders and some specific persons that I contacted beforehand. As for fieldwork, it invariably started by undertaking a review of my stakeholder analysis and purposive sample. In St. Lucia, once I had refined this analysis, I contacted a few key individuals that could act as “gatekeepers” to stakeholders, who could help me devise a first nominative list of people to be interviewed and who could grant me access to them (giving email addresses, phone contacts and above all a recommendation). Such “gatekeepers” notably included the head manager of the SMMA who proved extremely helpful at all stages. In Brazil however, it was not possible for me to identify right at the beginning a central “gatekeeper”, although several appeared along the way.
Once interviews started, I looked for more respondents on an on-going basis. Patton (1990) distinguishes at least sixteen different approaches to purposive sampling of which I combined four in the process of fieldwork to further expand my sample. First is “snowball sampling”: at the end of interviews with most participants, especially enthusiastic ones, I would ask them to suggest other individuals that I should and could contact. This technique identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know people, etc. In many instance it provided for good interview participants. Second is “opportunistic sampling”. By remaining receptive and observant during daily activities as well as interacting with a variety of individuals, I identified and gained access to new participants. For example, while using public transportations I would usually talk either with the driver or some other passenger, sometimes leading to later interviews. In St Lucia, notably, I had to drive my car regularly from Soufrière to Castries and back. This provided many opportunities to pick up hitchhikers along the road, people from all walks of life, age and professional types. These encounters provided access to a diversity of individuals with complementary perspectives. Third is “maximum variation sampling”. It purposefully led me to pick participants at both ends of the socio-economic spectrum, including beggars living in the street up to prominent businessmen at the regional or national level. Fourth is “stratified purposeful sampling”. This led me to identify participants that could illustrate characteristics of particular subgroups of interest or, in other words, that seemed typical of particular social groups, whether they were direct stakeholders or from the larger public (such as young people). Finally, I also enriched my sample with “politically important” participants, notably local politicians. This did carry the risk of attracting unwanted attention to the study but led, notably in St. Lucia, to discovering hot political issues directly linked to the environmental scheme under study.

Figure 2 and 3 provide information regrinding the composition of the interviewee samples in Brazil (53 interviews) and in St. Lucia (57 interviews). They underscore the comprehensive and relatively balanced distribution of interviews among various stakeholder groups.
Figure 2 - St. Lucia: composition of the interview sample

- Business Community: 21%
- Fishers & lay locals: 19%
- Donors & SMMA: 18%
- Local authorities: 16%
- National authorities: 14%
- Others: 12%

Figure 3 - Brazil: composition of the interview sample

- Fazendeiros: 21%
- Researchers: 20%
- NGOs: 19%
- Public authorities: 17%
- Donors: 13%
- Peons & fishers: 10%
3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter we have built a comprehensive analytical framework of CP schemes and power forms - summarised in Appendix 4 and 5. This has enabled us to formulate the specific expectations of the power narratives regarding the CP discourse when implemented through participatory projects. These expectations, in turn, are the bridge that allows a precise comparison of large power narratives with empirical data drawn from local level case studies. The empirical expectations summarised in Table 6 are those that best reflect the emancipatory and critical narratives and help us test them. The conditional expectations (presented in Table 7 and in more detail in Appendix 6) basically invite us to pay careful attention to the diversity of power mechanisms that may be at work in producing more "emancipation" or more "social control".

In the four next chapters, we turn to the empirical fieldwork and findings of our two case studies. As we saw in the Introduction, the first concerns CP in coral reef protection in Soufrière, Saint Lucia often hailed as a model project. The second case study relates to CP in the preservation of the Brazilian Pantanal, the world's largest wetland.
The “Soufrière Maritime Management Association” (SMMA), based in the town of Soufrière, St. Lucia, is “one of the most prestigious examples of participatory environmental management to have taken place in the Caribbean, if not the wider southern hemisphere” (Pugh, 2005, p.308). Among professional environmentalists, the SMMA has largely been deemed a “success story” given its “ability to pacify local conflicts, reach significant environmental results and ensure its own financial sustainability”, as an observer explains [interview 56]. It was created in 1994 after two years of “stakeholder consultation and negotiation” involving resource users and various organisations. Having received many awards and wide international recognition, it is still entrusted to date with the management of eleven kilometres of the most valuable coasts of St. Lucia – a small island whose economy is increasingly dependent on tourism.

This chapter first provides background information on the Soufrière context, to show how tensions around coral reefs had been developing over the years. Then, it analyses the genesis of the SMMA participatory scheme, its originating agents and initial consultation process, reviewing the 1992-1994 period on the basis of archives, interviews and accounts by policy makers, observers and various stakeholders. It next scrutinises the way the SMMA has been implemented in practice as an institution, its inclusiveness, scope, participatory intensity and allocation of benefits over time. This is done in two chronological phases: a) the early functioning of the newly created institution and the ensuing political upheaval on the part of the local fishers (1994-1997); b) the revamping of the SMMA into a supposedly “new SMMA” and its functioning since then. In doing so, we draw on the analytical tools introduced in the preceding chapters.

As we shall see, the empirical and conditional expectations of the critical narrative are largely confirmed in the case of Soufrière project, despite the latter being widely presented as an exemplary case of CP. The origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and allocation of benefits of the scheme all underline the small role or space left to
the fishers, who are its primary stakeholders. Mechanisms of compulsory, institutional and productive power combined together to produce this result.

4.1. Fighting for Coral Reefs: the Soufrière Context

Background information on St. Lucia and Soufrière is provided here to underline a context of mounting human pressure upon natural resources. The rise of open conflicts among resource users is then presented, as well as early governmental attempts at enforcing some rules. From there, we look into the origins of CP ideas in Soufrière and at the nature of the public consultation process that took place over 24 months before the instatement of the SMMA, as a participatory institution in charge of coastal management.

4.1.1. Growing pressures on the coastal environment

St. Lucia is located in the heart of the Caribbean, with Martinique to the north and St. Vincent to the South (cf. Map 1). The island is 43km long and 22km wide – and with 617 square kilometres of valleys and hills, it is the second-largest of the Windward Islands after Dominica. The population is about 160,000, a third of whom live in Castries, the capital on the north-western coast. Nearly 85% of the people are of African ancestry, 10% are mixed (with British and French blood) and 4% of pure European or East Indian descent, making the island highly multicultural (2001 census). The socio-economic context is marked by deep problems such as high unemployment, a high birth-rate among teenagers, a rising drug trade and a declining banana industry – which used to provide the whole country with a livelihood. Meanwhile, St. Lucia boasts a rich and scenic natural environment that makes it a valuable tourist destination. The centre of the island is dominated by mountainous landscapes covered with dense vegetation, with large areas of primary rainforest. Bathed by the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, St. Lucia has a varied marine life, including 90 square kilometres of coral reefs (cf. Map 2).

In recent years, however, these marine resources have been under rising pressure from natural disturbances, such as tropical storms and hurricanes (Burke & Maidens, 2004). Those of 1994 (“Debbie”) and 1999 caused landslides and erosion resulting in

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heavy siltation from runoff. In the meantime, water temperature rose in the Caribbean leading to massive and adverse coral bleaching. Beyond these challenges, the corals are also endangered by the growing coastal population. Related threats include over-fishing, overuse by the tourism industry (yachts, divers, tour operators) as well as pollution and sedimentation from land-based activities: constructions, wastewater discharges from towns and hotels, pollutions from agricultural fertilisers, etc. Map 2 shows that most of the remaining corals are located on the east coast, which is traditionally less populated and economically used. The west coast thus concentrates the bulk of the ecological concerns.

The vicinity of the town called "Soufrière" has been particularly problem-prone, with a high concentration of activities in competition for the use of the coast. Centrally located on the western coast of the island, Soufrière is a picturesque rural town of about 6,000 people, totalling 8,000 when rural communities of the district are taken into account. Photo 1 provides an overview of this site. Although St. Lucia’s capital is Castries, most nationals acknowledge that the soul of the island is based in Soufrière, the former capital during times of French rule. The town is indeed known for its rich natural, cultural and historical heritage. It boasts most of St. Lucia’s key tourism attractions - including the famous Pitons, the twin volcanic peaks that are a national pride, the Diamond waterfall that has attracted famous film directors, one of the world’s rare drive-in volcanoes with open “sulphur springs” (a geothermal field with sulphurous fumaroles), historic mineral baths, an old growth rain forest and a remarkable belt of coral reefs. Coupled with its crystal-clear coastal waters, Soufrière offers an incredible display of natural beauty. Modernisation has been slowed by the town’s physical isolation, recently alleviated by an improved west coast road that has nevertheless reinforced economic concentration on Castries. At the beginning of the 1990s, an explosive situation had emerged.

4.1.2. The social significance of near-shore fishing in Soufrière

The Soufrière district has an estimated population of 8,200 with around 150 registered fishers. Sixty per cent (i.e. 90) of the fisher are full-time, while the rest fish

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44 "Siltation" refers to the accumulation on the coral reefs of various particles (sand, clay, etc.) coming from the land.
on a part-time or seasonal basis (FAO, 2006). Moreover, many locals revert to fishing although not formally registered and owning no boat, so that the fisher community is far larger than these numbers. Slightly over 100 fishing vessels operate from the town, including canoes, pirogues and chaloops, but many owners rent their boat to people according to demand. Moreover, when one takes into account the size of families mainly dependent on fishing for their livelihood, it seems more realistic to assume that the fisher community form at least 10% of the local population – an estimate supported by most interviewees during fieldwork [e.g. interviews 24, 29, 45].

Even this figure, however, does not do justice to the significance of fishing for the local community. Not only is fishing at the core of Soufrière’s traditional identity, but most families in the district have relatives involved in this activity. In addition, the fragile socio-economic level of most of the population makes fishing an important fall-back solution in case of unemployment. So much so that despite being a relatively small community, “fishing” very much governs a large part of Soufrière’s psyche and self-hood.

Approximately eighty tonnes of fish are produced annually, most of which is sold on local markets, the rest going into family-consumption. In Soufrière, the fishing sector has been slow to modernise and follow the trends of the island. Its fishers have indeed remained particularly dependent on near-shore resources, unlike other communities to the east, south, and north of the island, which have gone much more into off-shore fisheries. A key reason for this is Soufrière’s location, which puts it at a disadvantage as it is further than other communities from the migratory routes of valuable ocean species such as tuna, dolphin-fish and kingfish. This greater distance increases operational costs and discourages fishers from investing in gears and vessels required for this type of fishery. Thus, the majority of Soufrière fishers have not made the transition into offshore fishing (George, 1996; Pierre, 2000). Soufrière therefore relies heavily on passing schools of coastal pelagics – such as balaoos, jacks, and sardines – which they catch using “seine nets” on sandy areas. Photo 2 shows the small, open vessels from which the fishers operate, reflecting an artisanal-type of fishing. Seine nets (same photo) are large fishing nets that hang vertically in

\[\text{46 FAO (2006) and the author’s estimates based on interviews [28, 43].}\]

\[\text{47 Pierre-Nathoniel (2003) and the author’s estimates, based on interviews at the fishers’ cooperative.}\]
the water with weights along the bottom edge and floats along the top: they are used as a fence to encircle a school of fish, with the boat driving around in a circle.

Seine-net fishing, however, can only be practised from December to July. Therefore, fishes are also captured directly in coral reefs, were they are numerous throughout the year. This is done using devices such as fish traps (known as "pots" or tombé levé, see Photo 3) or bottom nets. Reef fishing is important for many individuals in the community because it is cheap, easy to practice and always available. It very much functions as an insurance against unemployment or losses of revenues, "when a man has nothing left to feed his family" [interview 33]. Accordingly, several full-time fishers engage in more than one type of fishing activity while most of the part-time fishers specialise in pot fishing.

4.1.3. Rising conflicts: traditional fishing vs. tourism

In the second half of the 1980s, traditional fishing began to be combined with rising activities in tourism requiring access to marine spaces. By the early 1990s, this had led to complex conflicts between coastal users. Competition was becoming intense for limited space and resources and a various discontents emerged. These tensions have been described by various ministerial observers and local actors (George, 1996; SMMA, 1998; Pierre, 2000; Pierre-Nathoniel, 2003).

- Conflicts first arose between seine-net fishers and overnight yachters who increasingly depended on the same deep, protected sandy bays that had become important sites for yachts on their way through the Caribbean. Fishers of coastal pelagics were especially affected. This type of fishing is difficult but can be highly lucrative and thus extremely important for the community. It involves chasing and encircling large groups of fish as they progress through the bay. However, yachters were hardly willing to pull up anchor during dawn or dusk hours to make space for this activity.

- Additional tension crystallised over a new jetty constructed right in the centre of Soufrière Bay (cf. Photo 4) to accommodate inflows of tourist boats coming down from the capital Castries or abroad. This construction further obstructed

48 Bottom nets (or "gillnets") were banned in September 1998 due to their impacts on corals.
seining and deepened the conflict between fishers, yachts and tour operators bringing in visitors from Castries.

- Clashes emerged as pot and bottom net fishers accused visiting divers of deliberately damaging fishing devices found during dive expeditions, “freeing the fish” and negatively impacting coral reefs.

- Fishers accused researchers of taking too many fish and coral reef samples, causing environmental degradation.

- Local laypeople had conflicts over access to beach areas for fishing activity and recreation with local hoteliers, who felt that the presence of “noisy” locals did not suit the taste of foreign tourists who had come here to “look for peace and calm”.

- Tourist boats were also accused by fishers of disturbing fish and damaging fishing gear by passing too close to fishers at work or in the path of fishing nets.

- There were also countless reports of “visitor harassment” by disorganised water taxis trying to sell services to visitors, who were annoying tourists and ruining their overall tourist experience in Soufrière.

- Indiscriminate anchoring on coral reefs by yachtsmen was also often reported, to the dismay of both fishers and environmentalists.

- Entry of boats, divers and snorkelers into this fragile coastal habitat was unregulated, including entry of unauthorised or uncoordinated scientific researchers.

- Solid waste accumulation, such as plastic, as well as incoming untreated wastewater from both the city and hotels were also commonplace.

In the end, the decrease in nearshore fisheries, in water quality, in coastal landscapes and in the general health of marine resources was becoming apparent to all users, each group accusing the other [interviews 12, 20, 21]. Coastal conflicts became thus a structural feature of life in Soufrière and their rising intensity had serious negative impacts on both the tourism and the fishing industries. The unwritten rule of “open access” to marine resources traditionally enjoyed by fishers and increasingly by tourism-related activities was proving no longer sustainable.
4.1.4. From top-down regulation to Community Participation

As early as 1986, the government tried to relieve pressure on coastal resources and alleviate the conflict. The Department of Fisheries, under the Ministry of Agriculture, introduced “Fishing Priority Areas” in key seining locations as well as several Marine Reserves for reef protection. It also tried to bring about a range of regulations to combat coral collection, gear and pot tampering by divers as well as marine pollution [interview 7].

These “solutions”, however, proved short-lived and ill-accepted by locals. Funds were lacking for a proper demarcation and enforcement of priority zone boundaries. Moreover, the design of marine reserves was based on the geographical distribution of resources, setting aside the richest areas for conservation, with little attention paid to the socio-economic consequences upon fishers. Some meetings took place between public agencies and some locals but decisions eventually came from the capital a few days later and did not gain local acceptance. As a fisher recalls:

Some harsh zoning decisions came from Castries after some people sent by ministries came around for a few hours...The government did not want to hear us. Why should we have obeyed? ...This was going nowhere.[interview 23]

The situation in Soufrière deteriorated as people opposed governmental schemes. The feeling thus emerged that a different approach was needed, one that left more room for local collaboration to secure more commitment from locals. At the beginning of the 1990s, in Soufrière as in the rest of the world, the discourse on “community participation” was beginning to burgeon, fed by the disappointments of top-down attempts [interview 15]. The voluntary participation of local stakeholders was thus to be sought in order to design a commonly agreed management plan, including a zoning system defining what activities could be performed and where.

After two years of “public negotiations”, the resulting institutional form, the Soufrière Maritime Management Area, was formally created in 1994. Better known in professional circles as the “SMMA”, it was endorsed by the St. Lucian government as a new kind of not-for-profit organisation led by a multi-stakeholder board, bringing together a range of private and public actors. To date, the SMMA is still responsible for the surveillance, enforcement and potential evolution of the “zoning agreement” that regulates the use of 11 km of coastline between two coves: from Anse Jambon in the north to Anse L’Ivrogne in the south (Map 3).
The SMMA has now been functioning for over fifteen years. It has attracted international acclaim and received a battery of prizes for its CP approach to “pacifying conflicts”. As early as 1997, it won the first World Conservation Union / British Airways Tourism for Tomorrow award for national parks and protected areas, handed over by the well-known environmentalist David Bellamy. The SMMA was later chosen as “demonstration site” by the International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN) – a scientific network dedicated to coral conservation and supported by the United Nations Environmental Programme. It has also been subject to regular evaluations by international donors, leading to largely positive appraisals, including a recent assessment commissioned by a key French donor (FFEM, 2008). In what follows, however, we shall go deeper into the origins and institutional practice of the SMMA to provide a more refined analysis of this “success story”.

Map 1 – St. Lucia: an island-state in the heart of the Caribbean

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Map 2 – St. Lucia, its coral reefs and the location of the SMMA

Source: ANA et al.

Photo 1 – Soufrière town and its famous “Pitons”

Photo 2 – A traditional fisher boat and its seine nets
Photo 3 – Trapping fish with “pots” in Soufrière’s coral reefs

In 1987, to accommodate tourist boats, a jetty was constructed right in the middle of a bay traditionally used by coastal seine fishers.

Photo 4 – The jetty: built in the middle of Soufrière Bay
4.2. The Genesis of a CP Scheme: Elite-Led, Socially Split, Externally-Influenced

Standard accounts of the SMMA found in public or project documents present it as a process “initiated by the local community”, with often little more explanation. This section argues, however, that its origin is to be found in the will and “vision” of the local business elite concerned with promoting Soufrière as a tourism destination. From the start, this business community also partnered with the government (who had been unable to manage the worsening situation in Soufrière), and a regional think tank (with practical experience throughout the Caribbean and donor connections worldwide).

On the basis of this threefold alliance, a “consultation and negotiation process” was indeed launched in Soufrière town. However, after a period of “intense public participation” – with relatively high inclusion, scope and intensity – the process grew more complex: difficult to follow for non-institutional actors, socially split (with a pre-eminence of elites) and heavily influenced by non-community actors. It is this secondary and more opaque process that made decisions on the truly conflictual issues. Despite this, an idealized story of “democratic conflict resolution” was spread by the elites and “experts” involved and speedily “bought” by international donors.

4.2.1. The origins: an alliance with no fishers, influenced by foreign donors

Who made the initial move towards the creation of a “participatory” management institution? Who designed it conceptually and institutionally? Who brought the first money in? Who made the subsequent financial and scientific contributions? Such questions on the origins of the SMMA and the nexus of actors behind the move shed light upon what is really at stake.

The typical account of the creation of the SMMA found in most project and policy documents is brief and elusive. For instance, FFEM (2008, p.5) states that:

*In 1992, a local NGO, the 'Soufrière Regional Development Foundation', supported by several funding agencies - particularly the French funds FAC and FFEM and the USAID - started an independent and participatory planning process.*

Such a succinct wording easily makes the SMMA look like a bottom-up process exemplifying “participation from within” the community: here comes a local NGO
that simply calls upon external donors to help a community set up its “independent” planning process. More specifically, the epithet “independent” gives the impression that the state is far in the background - or even absent from the proceedings.

What actually happened was rather different. The initial idea of the SMMA, as a participatory management institution, came indeed from the so-called “Soufrière Regional Development Foundation” (SRDF) [interviews 11, 17, 26, 38, 41, 48, 50, 52]. But what kind of “NGO” is that? Certainly not one characterised by a community-wide leadership. It was created in 1986 through the personal initiative and involvement of three high-profile local business people. Since then, the SRDF has focused on the promotion of Soufrière as a tourism destination. To finance its activities, and thanks to its founders’ personal connection to the Prime Minister, the SRDF obtained from the government the right to manage Soufrière’s “sulphur springs”, which is a natural site of prime tourist interest, and the responsibility of reinvesting these revenues for the benefit of the local community – hence the name “foundation” taken on by the NGO [interviews 40, 51]. This organisation thus bears little comparison with a typical NGO, given its revenue base and elite leadership.

The first significant project carried out by the SRDF was the creation of the previously mentioned “jetty” [interview 11]. So, to say the least, the SRDF did not enjoy a good relation with local fishers. At the beginning of the 1990s, the SRDF was still led by people with direct stakes in tourism and with a vision of the future centred on this industry. Its Board was disconcerted by the continuing tensions between the tourism and fishing sectors, as well as by the lack of positive results from state intervention. It thus looked for a new approach. A protagonist of the time recalls:

> Who had a vision for the whole Soufrière area, in the absence of any serious local authority? Who had the administrative and political networks to start a process? Who had interests at stake and money to make it happen? The answer is always the same: the business people, those who created the SRDF. The SMMA was their idea. [interview 14]

Although the SRDF was the “initiator” of the SMMA process, it immediately sought help from two other actors to form an initial *alliance* and share the role of “facilitator”. First, the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture was

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49 Two owned large land properties and businesses in tourism: Soufrière’s well known luxury hotel (Anse Chastenet) and the Diamond Botanical Gardens.
happy to find a resolute partner and a possible way forward after years plagued by “paper regulations” that were not enforced [interview 9]. The prospect of sharing the costs of environmental monitoring was appealing to this administration, which thus offered to defend the scheme before the government. Secondly, through personal connections of both the SRDF and the Ministry, a regional think tank working in the Caribbean region and with “expertise” acknowledged by several international donors, was also brought into the picture. The “Caribbean Natural Resources Institute” – better known as CANARI – was certainly instrumental in designing, setting up and running the CP process [interviews 1, 49, 53].

Soufrière’s CP scheme was thus a joint initiative of three partners who formed a mixed “public-private-scientific” alliance, rather than the individual effort of a “local NGO”, as it is often presented. As initiator, the SRDF provided the initial impulse, the local “community” dimension (that would attract donors), high level political linkages and a proved ability to run projects. The Department of Fisheries came in with its authority, legal mandate and ability to lobby the government: it was the main supporter of the scheme at the beginning. Meanwhile, CANARI added to the endeavour its perceived “independence”, “scientific expertise” and “experience”: it later acted as the key designer of the SMMA as an institution, through technical support and responsibility for “facilitating and synthesising” public consultations [interview 1].

In other words, following the typology we built (cf. section 3.1.1), CP in Soufrière originated from “balanced sources” mixing an initiator from within, a supporter from above and a designer from outside. The remarkable characteristic of this process was the total absence of initial will on the part of the fisher community, who was nevertheless a key actor on Soufrière’s coasts. As an informant put it:

*The fishers were to be brought into a new process, to obtain their consent. [Participation] was a way to bend this inflexible community.* [interview 53]

Still, the analysis of the origins of CP in Soufrière cannot stop there, as the originating alliance worked hard to mobilise funds from international donors – and this complexifies the picture. The upstream influence of money coming from abroad cannot be overstated, as the CP scheme was entirely designed to be eligible to such funds [interviews 7, 55]. The consultation and negotiation process leading to the SMMA was financed by the American government through USAID, its international aid agency. Since 1991, USAID had developed an “Environmental and Coastal
Resources” project (known in the Caribbean as the ENCORE project), whose main stated objective was to diffuse and legitimise the CP discourse – or in official words:

*To demonstrate that the collaboration between public, private and community interests can conserve the natural resource base and enhance biodiversity while promoting economic development* (CEHI, 1997, p.7).

The ENCORE project had two components: a regional component in all OECS countries and a “local site” component implemented specifically in St. Lucia. The idea was to allocate grants to local projects fitting the CP philosophy. According to interviewees, there is little doubt that the financial incentive provided by this American scheme was of central importance in choosing CP as the operational mode in Soufrière. Had the SRDF and the central government simply asked for more money to enforce regulations on Soufrière, USAID would not have helped [interviews 1, 9]. The originating alliance was well aware of what kind of scheme would be able to secure support – and CANARI also had experience with donors promoting CP. After a two-year consultation process (analysed in the next section), the French government also joined the scheme, paying for most of SMMA’s set-up costs.50 French eagerness to participate was also solely motivated by the CP component. They based their funding on the reassurance that:

*A local NGO, associating the local population and representatives from various ministries, has already carried out a large public consultation.* (French Republic, 1994, p.24)

In other words, the use of the CP discourse proved critical in securing international funding. Similar conditions were required for subsequent funds from the United Nations Environment Programme/Caribbean Environmental Programme (UNEP/CEP) and the Saint Lucia National Commission for UNESCO. The role of CANARI was critical in that respect as this organisation had the hands-on experience of putting into practice the CP “social technology” expected by donors. Thus, as envisioned by the critical narrative (cf. Appendix 6), and although the scheme was locally initiated, external donors were instrumental in rooting the CP discourse locally through the soft compulsory power of their financial incentives and conditionalities.

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50 USAID provided €50,000, the French “Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération” (FAC) €120,000 and the French Fund for the Global Environment (FFEM) €240,000. A French technical assistant was also provided for 46 months.
4.2.2. From popular consultation to elite negotiation: institutional and productive power

Supported by American funds, a public “consultation and negotiation process” was launched in 1992. It started as a highly inclusive and intense CP process, with a wide upstream scope, but soon changed in nature. As the toughest issues were being identified, this broad-based public consultation slowly turned into a more formal and lengthy process, giving a de facto pre-eminence to organised interest groups [interviews 23, 24, 36, 53]. As the discussion left the informal and public sphere, “institutional power” stepped in and a less transparent elite-centred negotiation took over, driving out weaker groups such as the poorer fishers. The resulting SMMA agreement, in the form of a zoning plan, was indeed a “consensus” as is claimed in most documents, but a consensus among the strongest actors and interest groups. To recall the facts of this period, we relied on various interviews [notably interviews 1, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 25, 27, 37, 51, 57], a set of archives, as well as a detailed account provided a few years later by Renard (1996). The divorce we point out between a broad-based process and an institutional / elite-based one was to deepen even further in the early years of the functioning of the SMMA – as we shall see the next section.

At the beginning of the consultation process, state-of-the-art “best practices” of CP were implemented under the technical guidance of CANARI in order to stimulate a “genuine dialogue” within the community and with other stakeholders. The first step took place on August 27, 1992, when a three-day-long “community consultation meeting” was convened. It brought together more than sixty persons from twenty-five different sectors or institutions, according to recollections. Each interest group was supposed to be represented by several people. Fishers, divers, hotels, restaurants, small and large businesses, diving operators, parent associations and school teachers, taxis, construction companies, etc: every possible group seemed to have attended in one way or another. According to all interviewees, the inclusiveness of the initial CP scheme was thus wide and socially mixed, including people with modest socio-economic backgrounds.51 People had been invited by the SRDF, the Department of Fisheries and CANARI. They were told that “all previous decisions and management

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51 We found no archive documents stating who exactly participated to this first meeting, but interviewees confirmed that attendance was high and socially broad-based.
arrangements were reopened for discussion” (Renard, 1996, p.3). Not only was CP being strongly inclusive, but the scope was also upstream as the diagnosis of problems and any potential solution were opened to debates. During these days, a range of typical CP methods were used to foster group discussion, including the drawing of large coloured maps and multiple workshop sessions. Participants were also taken on boats trips in several groups to map resources, their uses and the location of conflicts [interviews 9, 25].

One may note, however, that during these first days, the originating alliance (the SRDF, the government and CANARI) had its leadership acknowledged and approved right from the start. The SRDF was indeed formally instated as the “lead institution”, while the Department of Fisheries and CANARI were to act as “joint facilitators”. The originating agents thus transformed their initial advantage of being the first movers into an institutional advantage that would last for the rest of the negotiation process.

In November 1992, a second large meeting was convened. Participants were asked to confirm the information on resources and conflict locations established during the first session. The point was to “reach agreement on all areas and issues for which agreement appeared relatively easy to reach”. Meanwhile, the most severe conflicts were identified “with the understanding that they would be addressed after the meeting” (Renard, 1996, p.4). These important issues included the location of marine reserves (around Gros Piton and Anse Chastenet), as well as regulations for land-based activities impacting the coast. Here started, arguably, a splitting process whereby decisions on tough conflicts were postponed and “discussed later” in a completely different setting – which was far more opaque [interviews 28, 53, 56]. This displacement of participation occurred gradually throughout the whole of 1993, after the heat of the initial 1992 “participatory consultations” had cooled off.

The main outcome of the November 1992 meeting had been the idea of a new zoning system specifying the various coastal uses and demarcating their exact boundaries. But how to define this zoning scheme in detail was another matter. Negotiations on conflictual places were transferred to another sphere that was much less public and transparent, through an accumulation of small practical changes and a more technical discourse.
First, decisions were postponed to "other meetings and further discussions". Various "working groups" were created with a more restricted membership and supposedly technical legitimacy. Time also proved an important factor in taming public involvement: the passing months eventually diverted most of the laypeople away from the negotiation, about which they would hear less and less and from an increasing distance [interview 28]. The frequency and attendance of public meetings sharply diminished and the space widened for well-organised interest groups to negotiate directly with the three leading organisations in charge. Unlike what happened with local fishers, the major hotels, dive operators and Anbaglo (St. Lucia’s diving association) held direct talks with the Department of Fisheries. Meanwhile, “key players in the community”, notably “business interests with major stakes in the outcomes of the negotiation process” held numerous discussions with the SRDF (Renard, 1996, p.4).

Another defining characteristic of the 1993 “negotiations”, was the used of written “draft proposals” sent to stakeholders and to which they could only answer in written form. This formalisation of the discussion did not help the fishers contribute and make their voice heard – as these men are often illiterate or do not have a good command of English. Moreover, few fishers can afford to invest their energy in a lengthy and formal dialogue. A form of “institutional power” was thus arguably exercised upon them by the fact that the CP process evolved into an institutional one. The intensity of their participation was thus radically weakened.

In the following extract, Renard (1996) recalls this second phase of the negotiation process. We underline noticeable techniques of formalisation and institutionalisation:

In a meeting of March 1993 the Department of Fisheries presented draft recommendations on zoning and regulations, which were discussed, modified and approved, [save for two decisions]. In conclusion, the meeting mandated a small working group to examine in more detail the outstanding matters, to conduct negotiation and to formulate recommendations. It was further agreed that all recommendations would be contained in an agreement, which would be drafted by one of the facilitators and submitted for final review. [A new draft agreement was thus prepared and circulated]. Several institutions provided written comments, which were integrated in the subsequent versions of the document”. (...) Then the SRDF convened a meeting with a small number of institutions to examine in greater detail the legal and institutional arrangements for the implementation of that agreement. On [this basis], a final section of the agreement was drafted. (Renard, 1996, p.4, underlining ours).

Renard only talks here about “institutions” responding to “proposals”, prepared by other institutions, etc. By this point, laypeople had completely disappeared from the
picture. Meanwhile, “working groups” and proposals drafted by the originating agents led the rest of the “discussion”. The use of working groups deserves special attention as it arguably muted the demands from fishers and thereby enabled potent polluters to avoid being inconvenienced by the SMMA.

The working group on “land-based pollution”, for instance, initially raised concerns about deforestation in the Soufrière district due to construction works (impacting coastal zones through sedimentation), pesticide run-off from large agricultural properties, oil discharge from the gas station near the jetty, caustic waste from the copra factory and sewage and solid waste from yachts and the city of Soufrière itself. These issues, however, were never taken further as the working group did not offer any practical conclusion [interview 19]. Thus, nothing was done to include land-based polluters in the overall SMMA regulatory scheme, although this had been a clear initial demand from fishers. As for the working group on marine reserves, it was soon dominated in practice by environmentalist voices suggesting that the healthiest coral reefs should be set aside for conservation. This view suited divers and large hotels whose snorkelling clients would have access to these resources for a small fee [interview 57].

The need for these working groups was based on the notion that technical negotiations had to involve fewer and more expert people – a discourse that emerged in the middle of the CP process and which gave a “privileged position” to certain actors. This is a telling instance of “productive power” through the use of technical and anti-political discourse, as defined in section 3.2.4.

In conclusion, the initial CP process soon lost its inclusiveness, scope and intensity. It essentially became an elite-centred deliberation with shared objectives among environmentalists and tourism businesses. The everyday fishers were confined to a purely consultative process, mostly held in 1992, the main outcome of which had been the identification of a set of “really difficult issues” – settled through a vastly different process. This shift occurred due to forms of both institutional and productive power.

4.2.3. The “agreement”: excluding fishers from 60% of the coast

After this deployment of “community participation”, a final “agreement” was reached in February 1994 (SRDF, 1994) and submitted to the government for
approval in March by the Minister of Tourism. Its content clearly shows what stakes and interests were primarily taken into account. The Cabinet Conclusion 253/1994 authorised demarcation of the proposed fishing priority areas and marine reserves. It also allowed the collection of fees from yachts and divers to finance the SMMA. The latter was thus created as a multiple-use marine protected area over 11 kilometres of coastline, from the shore to a depth of 75 meters, divided into the following zones:

- **Marine Reserves** are earmarked for the protection of their natural resources. They do not allow any extractive activity to take place. Entry is for a fee and by permit only – whether it is for diving, snorkelling or research.

- **Fishing Priority Areas** are dedicated to fishing activities, taking precedence over any other use.

- **Yacht Mooring Sites** are designated for yachts and pleasure boats, without damaging sea-grass beds and coral reefs. A fee is charged for the use of the moorings that enable boats to stay overnight with minimal impact on the seabed.

- **Recreational Areas** are terrestrial and marine areas, including beaches, reserved for public access and recreation such as swimming and snorkelling. Public access had to be maintained.

- **Multiple-Use Areas** allow fishing, diving, snorkelling and other recreational uses.

Map 3 details this zoning. With its cheerful colours and beach umbrella icon, it nevertheless defines a strict distribution of costal spaces. As Chart 1 shows, in the SMMA scheme, fishers are barred from accessing 60% of the coastal space, whereas previously they had enjoyed use of most of this area. On the other hand, almost half of the coast is set aside for conservation, which allows divers and snorkelers free access, for a small fee. Only 24% of the space theoretically prohibits tourist activity. Map 3 shows that “recreational areas” open to tourists are dovetailed with almost all fishing priority areas.
Map 3 – Allocating user rights: the SMMA zoning map

SMMA Zoning Legend
- Marine Reserve
- Fishing Priority Area
- Yachting Area
- Multipurpose Area
- Recreational Area

Source: SMMA (2008)
In the 1994 agreement, this unbalanced allocation of benefits and access rights to marine resources was not covered by any compensatory schemes – such as Economic Demonstration Project, cash or kind payment or any other type of compensation for the fishers. The overall reaction of the fisher community to this agreement was one of utter shock, given the scale of their exclusion and the size of the marine reserves, but their concerns had been slightly tamed by a discourse that attempted to persuade them that the “reserves will make the fish” – and that more reserves would mean more fish in the end, through a “spill over effect” [interview 29].

4.2.4. Conclusion

This section has shown that neither the origins of the SMMA nor its initial consultation process had a broad community base. The creation of a new coastal management scheme was advocated by an alliance of three actors with little connection to Soufrière’s fishers, but with strong interests in the development of the tourism industry. Meanwhile, the choice of CP as the mode of action was favoured by the financial incentives offered by international donors. As for the preparatory process leading to the SMMA zoning map, this rapidly moved from a broad-based public consultation to an elite-centred negotiation, subject to the influence of several
forms of institutional and productive power. This drove fishers out and protected land-based polluters from any involvement in the SMMA set of "rights and duties". The resulting "agreement" was a "deal" concluded in the virtual absence of most of the fisher community and imposing no constraints on polluters. It basically prevented Soufrière fishers from accessing 60% of the coast. Under such a process, asserting the legitimacy of the SMMA as a community-based, democratic organisation was to prove impossible, as the 1997 events were to demonstrate.
4.3. Early Implementation: the Demise of the CP Ideal, Resistance and Politics

This section demonstrates that the newly created SMMA did not apply its proclaimed participatory philosophy to its practical functioning. First, the implementation of the original “agreement” within a precise “management plan” and institutional design was conceived outside of any real participatory context. Second, the first years of SMMA operations confirmed the limited inclusion of the poorer fishers in key decisions, leading to a growing discontent. Third, failing to institutionalise an ongoing participatory dialogue, the SMMA faced an increasingly politicised resistance: outright politics was eventually chosen as a VOICE strategy against a frustrating CP scheme, a game into which all stakeholders eventually entered in an attempt to gain the upper hand. What was then observed was a refusal of institutional participation – considered as biased by fishers – and recourse to political participation to force a renegotiation of the rules. This process of re-appropriation by the lower end of the community was opposed by waves of “scientific expertise” and lobbying from interest groups with influence in political circles. To support our claim, and re-examine the early years of the SMMA, we gathered and interpreted archives, a range of interviews [9, 13, 18, 19, 25, 27, 37, 48, 53], as well as accounts and analyses provided by Brown (1997), Sanderson and Koester (2000), Pierre-Nathoniel (2003) and Trist (2003).

4.3.1. Institutional design: CP for “experts”, authorities and tourism interests

The February 1994 “agreement” was followed on September 21-23, 1994, by a three-day “implementation workshop” held at a luxury hotel in Soufrière. It led to the adoption of a “Management Plan for the Soufrière Marine Management Area”. This critical meeting was attended by 12 people, but these did not include one single fisher. There were 3 people from the government, 3 French co-operation representatives, 1 American donor, 1 from the SRDF, 1 from CANARI, 1 from the WWF as well as 2 scientists – a marine biologist consultant and a university researcher (SMMA, 1994, Appendix 7). The decisions that followed were thus taken by a group made up of non-community actors, with a strong foreign component –
even though experts, donors and NGOs. This is clear example of “domestic-global power formation”, as defined in section 3.1.6.

The first decision of the resulting management plan was to entrust the SRDF (essentially related to tourism interests as we showed) with the day-to-day running of the SMMA: the latter was even to be “a distinct programme of the Soufrière Foundation” (SMMA, 1994, p.4). The SRDF thus had responsibility to recruit and supervise all staff. Meanwhile, it had to report and work “under the guidance” of a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). This committee was the mechanism supposed to ensure an inclusive and active participation of the community in decision-making, since it was meant to comprise “representatives from all major resource users and monitoring groups” (SMMA, 1994, p.24).

On the TAC, however, fishers were not only weakly represented, but also encircled by a large representation of tourism-related interest groups as well as public authorities, which also gave a strong backing to “modernisation through tourism” [interview 22]. The TAC thus included eleven people who directly represented private interests in the tourism sector, notably large hotel resorts, the St. Lucia Tourist Board, the St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association or the Day Charter Boat Association. A representative from the French donor also sat on the Committee, as well as environmental NGOs such as the St. Lucia National Trust and CANARI.

The only way fishers were ever represented on the TAC was through two people from the Soufrière Fishermen’s Cooperative, namely its president and (sometimes) its vice-president. This co-operative, however, grossly misrepresents the fisher community, which is far more socially diverse [interviews 16, 23, 29]. Its current president, whom we interviewed, was open about this fact explaining that less that 30% of fishers in Soufrière own their boat, while 70% do not and have to rent them [interview 26]. On the other hand, members of the cooperative are all boat owners. “This is not a requirement, but just the situation”, as the president put it. It is however interesting to note that the primary goal of the cooperative is to buy equipment and gas at a cheaper price, which mostly benefits off-shore fishers who own larger boats, compared to near-shore (and poorer) fishers. Moreover, not all boat owners are part of this cooperative and the involvement of the younger generations of fishers is particularly low. This organisation thus brings together a small group of
relatively wealthier fishers, involved in deep-sea fishing and who are not dependent upon near-shore reef resources, unlike the rest of their community. In other words, the larger and poorer fraction of the fisher community had no say whatsoever on the TAC. From the start, institutional power was at work, through two modes of containment: encirclement and misrepresentation, as defined in section 3.1.7, Table 5.

In May 1998, at a ceremony during which the SMMA was awarded an international prize for its "participatory work", its manager gave a speech to thank "all important parties". After the authorities, donors, scientist and other "facilitators" had been acknowledged, the very last person to be thanked was the president of the Soufrière Fishermen’s Cooperative. Here is what the SMMA manager said about him:

*Last but not least, the person who always makes a very special effort...is Mr. Edward Mongroo, president of the Soufrière Fishermen’s Cooperative. Not only has Mr. Mongroo proved to be a very engaged and vibrant TAC member, but he was also expected to fulfill a very difficult task, namely to “sell” the idea of the SMMA to the Soufrière fishermen.* [emphasis added]

These latter words are worth repeating: the president was *expected to sell the idea* to the fishermen. Such a wording acknowledges that the SMMA was surely not an idea of the fishermen, but also that the president of the Cooperative had been *enrolled* into a specific and crucial job.

The SMMA staff also had to report once a month to a "Technical Working Group" (TWG) established by the TAC to "provide technical advice and guidance to the day-to-day implementation of activities" (SMMA, 1994, p.4). The composition of the TWG was even more restricted, comprising the manager of the SMMA, a CANARI representative, one from the Department of Fisheries and "other experts as required" (*ibid.*, p.14.). In these conditions, the CP process was further distanced from the community by a concentrated power formation of conservationist, governmental and tourism interests.

### 4.3.2. Vanishing trust: the first year of operation

In June 1995, the SMMA was formally inaugurated. For 18 months, a volunteer from the French cooperation\(^{52}\) took on the role of SMMA manager, until a permanent appointment was made. The influence of this key donor was thus guaranteed on an

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\(^{52}\) French Mission for Technical Cooperation.
everyday basis [interview 1]. Four marine rangers were hired, trained and assigned the responsibility of fee collection and surveillance through daily boat patrols. Marine reserve dive passes (for divers) and coral conservation fee (for the use of yacht moorings) were established and expected to bring in most of the operating budget.

Barred from 60% of the coast, and embroiled in an institutional process they did not in any way control, many fishers already felt that the “SMMA agreement” was sharply biased towards conservation and tourism. Moreover, soon after its inception, doubts about the collaborative spirit claimed by the SMMA started to grow in the community. It was felt that the Technical Advisory Committee was not properly representing the fishers’ interests. On top of this, more and more decisions began to be made outside the TAC itself, by small groups of people with even less transparency [interviews 24, 25, 32, 36].

To begin with, it was decided, with no apparent discussion, that part of a priority area dedicated to seine fishers was to be shared with yachtsmen, who thus gained the right to anchor in the sandy area on the grounds that access to an adjacent waterfront restaurant needed to be facilitated. This “arrangement” imposed a rotation allowing fishing activities only at certain hours, while permitting yachtsmen to anchor. Not only was this decision made behind closed doors, but rotations are hardly compatible with seine fishing. As one fisherman explained:

*The fish has no watch! Who knows what time it is best for seine fishing? Only the fish!* [interview 23]

Fishers manifested their discontent but interviews confirmed that rotation still holds to date [interviews 23, 28]. This early disagreement was and still is deeply resented by fishers as a breach of the word given. They hoped that the few fishing areas left to them (less than a quarter of the coast) would be at least “sancturised”.

A comparable lack of negotiation characterised another important issue. As fishers were manifesting a growing discontent towards “so many marine reserves”, the SMMA tried to regain the trust of the community by acknowledging the losses of displaced fishers – but only of the elderly ones. The latter’s lack of willingness or inability to take up alternative livelihoods was declared legitimate by the TAC, whereas this was not recognised as such for others. The Technical Working Group thus selected a small number of “old” fishers and gave them access to some sections
of two marine reserves. Four "pots" (reef fish traps, cf. Photo 3) were tagged for each of twelve pot fishers, and one bottom gillnet for each of three gillnet fishers, with a plan to review the arrangement after three months. This selection process, however, did not prove transparent and no discussion was held with the wider fisher community. The selection of "old" fishers was resented as being inaccurate and unfair, and again led to open criticisms [interviews 4, 8].

Meanwhile, the "not so old" fishers were supposed to move to deep-sea rather than near-shore fishing but the capital needed for such a shift far exceeded (a different boat, a good engine, nets and fuel) what most fishers could afford. Moreover, moving to deep-sea fishing meant turning professional, while a large fraction of the Soufrière community had always relied on part-time reef fishing as a complementary source of revenue for their families, especially in difficult times.

In this context, the fishers were feeling increasingly threatened by the marine reserves, which had brought about a sharp and direct decline in fish catches. Proponents of the SMMA zoning had justified reserve areas on the grounds that they would increase fish stocks by allowing regeneration and repopulation — from breeding to fishing grounds. But this spill-over effect was not being observed and fishers blamed the SMMA for unkept promises and betrayal. Disenchantment was high. In the fishers' opinion, their livelihoods were directly compromised with the result that increasing numbers began to violate SMMA regulations, by using fishing gear in reserve areas.

Communication between the TAC and the fishing community had become almost inexistent [interviews 1, 8, 9]. Contrary to what was agreed, those fishers affected were not present when decisions were taken. Poorer fishermen felt confused by the recurrent changes in access rights resulting from meetings they had not attended. Later on, non-attendance and misunderstanding "eventually became effective forms of resistance" (Trist, 2003, p.60).

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53 It was probably unrealistic to have expected an increase in fish stocks within the first few years of establishing marine reserves. Moreover, reef destruction and sedimentation also occurred as a result of heavy rains in 1995 and 1996.
4.3.3. Resistance and politicisation: fishers' VOICE strategy in the second year

Feeling their livelihoods and identity endangered, the poorer fishers (i.e. the overwhelming majority) embarked on a process of active contestation. This emerged through active politics, outside of the SMMA and its governance structure. Faced with a frustrating participatory process, VOICE was chosen as their response strategy.

The widespread feeling that the SMMA had been created for the tourism industry and conservationist policies was backed by the apparent contradiction between the claims that marine reserves were meant to increase fish stocks, and the expectation that reef fishers should find other jobs. Finding new jobs in Soufrière, however, was not a viable option for most given the low levels of education, high unemployment and a lack of economic opportunities [interview 57].

In a spirit of compromise, the SMMA delivered some temporary access permits and interim agreements for short periods to access marine reserves. But these partial responses did not keep discontent under control. Zoning regulations were increasingly violated and non-compliance slowly became the rule. As for the SMMA manager, although he was getting his instructions from the TAC, he was directly held responsible by the locals and subjected to verbal and physical threats [interviews 1, 8]. Marine rangers hired locally by the SMMA found themselves in a similar situation. As a fisher recalls:

This was unfair, as the [SMMA manager and marine rangers] were not the ones taking decisions, but these guys were the only incarnations of the SMMA people could see walking in the street and talk to. [interview 32]

An atmosphere of overt war began to develop among coastal stakeholders. Responding to fishers' breach of marine reserves, divers reverted to their long-standing habit of destroying fishing gear and pot traps found under water. As for yachtsmen, in this rising state of anarchy, they also began to dishonour previous arrangements and to anchor on fishing areas. In what seemed like a retaliation, robberies on yachts became increasingly frequent, so much so that Soufrière became known in the yachting sector as a place to be avoided for safety reasons. The pressure was also raised by the pervasive perception by lay locals that the "rich white tourists" – and their service providers – were the ones who benefited most from the zoning system in practice. It was noted, particularly, that divers and yachtsmen were
inconsistently controlled and even less fined, while fishers were closely monitored. Rare cases of scuba diving gear being confiscated did little to change opinions on this “preferential treatment” [interview 32].

The situation was getting out of control. Initially, some policing efforts were made to enforce rules on fishers but they were soon abandoned, as matters became politicised. This recourse to politics was first started by fishers, who felt this was their last option. They managed to secure strong and open support from an important political figure, who was the representative of the Soufrière District at the St. Lucian Parliament. As national elections were approaching, the perceived injustices experienced by local fishermen turned into an acute national political issue. The SMMA and the Department of Fisheries became increasingly reluctant to confiscate the fishers’ equipment given this politicisation and the attention this was attracting at the national level. The legitimacy and credibility of the SMMA were directly challenged and, by the end of its second year, this unrest had almost destroyed the SMMA [interview 45].

4.3.4. Leaving the CP discourse behind: outright political fights

One of the most contentious issues was the use of the northern part of Soufrière Bay. The SMMA’s original agreement stipulated – as a key concession to fishers – the relocation of an important yacht mooring site from the northern to the southern part of the Bay, near Malgretoute beach (cf. Map 3). However, this transfer unexpectedly resulted in a sharp decline in the number of yachts visiting Soufrière. The new anchorage space was less convenient for yachters and also seemed to leave boats more vulnerable to robberies. The pressure to restore Soufrière as a central yachting destination was mounting up across the whole island. The fishermen, meanwhile, were claiming that this Fishing Priority Area was critical to their continued existence and that any further negotiation on its enforcement was out of the question. The issue became a symbol of their livelihood, the cornerstone of their demands and embodied a last front of resistance “against the inexorable intrusion of tourism” [interview 56].

Nevertheless, the power game was unequal. Following intense lobbying of the yachting industry in the capital Castries, the Prime Minister of St. Lucia personally asked in December 1996 for the cooperation of fishermen, who were subsequently
obliged to abandon their demand. In compensation they obtained a slight modification of some marine reserve boundaries. But the message was clear: high-level political intervention could circumvent “participatory agreements” made within the SMMA. This display of strength on the part of national business interests, as well as the parade of political and administrative connections, further upset local balances of power and put an end to the claim that zoning was being run according to community-consensus.

The fishermen, however, thought they would have their revenge as their situation had been largely debated and publicised during the 1997 general election campaign. While campaigning in Soufrière, the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) candidate used the fishermen’s discontent to build up sizeable support and promised to bring them back lost fishing grounds. In May, following a landslide victory, the SLP returned to power after decades of national leadership under the United Workers’ Party (UWP). The new government, personified in Soufrière by the parliamentary representative, became directly involved in SMMA matters. Since “their” party was now heading the country, fishermen felt that they no longer had to compromise with the SMMA and reverted to fishing in areas they had formerly used. They felt “strong enough to throw out the whole thing” [interview 51].

Matters, however, were not to end here. The new government’s position on Soufrière’s issues remained unclear for several months, as it was intensely lobbied by the same interest groups. To reinstate a working mechanism, several meetings took place over the summer, but the tension had still not reached its peak. The government was showing signs of internal strife. Influenced by the fishers’ view, the Department of Fisheries submitted a proposal to the prime minister to reinstate important sections of two marine reserves as fishing spaces (Gros Piton and Grand Caille). It also pressed for the creation of a “total reserve” where no use whatsoever would be allowed: this was to appease the feeling that only fishers were bearing the cost of marine reserves and that these were “playgrounds for tourism businesses” [interview 31].

The backlash to this proposal, though, was swift and strong. Diving operators announced that they would stop paying entry fees [interview 20]. The French donor warned that it would suspend its financial backing. Pressure from “experts” also intervened, with the emergence of a strict environmentalist discourse in the media.
claiming that fishers had to be kept out. The national press seized on this debate. A furious article published in The Star on August 2 accused the Soufrière parliamentary representative of denying “a tide of scientific opinion”. The SMMA manager was removed and this organisation appeared to be “dead at last”. As Trist (2003, p.63) explains however, this was not the end of the matter. A few months later, after an outpouring of support from a coalition of businesses, environmentalists and researchers, the very same manager was re-appointed. In December 1997, the new government reinstated part of the Grand Caille marine reserve as a fishing area for pot fishing only. It left the Gros Piton reserve intact and agreed to pay financial compensation of EC $400 per month\(^4\) for one year to twenty older fishermen considered to have suffered the most from the loss of fishing space. As for the French donor, it agreed to support a range of initiatives to “modernise” the fishing sector.

Who was the ultimate winner of this political fight? The fishers had secured the modification of some reserve boundaries, one year of financial help for twenty of them and promises of new economic projects. But they had to accept yachts on spaces dedicated to fishing in the original “agreement”.

4.3.5. Conclusion

This section has shown how the implementation of the 1994 agreement had for the most part kept fishers out of decision-making processes. It also pointed up that trust was further lost in the practical running of the SMMA. As a consequence, overt politics was the chosen option of frustrated stakeholders as an active VOICE strategy. As a supposedly “participatory institution”, the SMMA had failed to institutionalise dialogue, negotiation and consensus-building on an ongoing basis. So far the expectations of the critical narratives find themselves largely confirmed, regarding the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and allocation of benefits of the CP scheme. At the beginning of 1998, however, having secured some compensation and promises through political strife, the fishermen seemed ready for a fresh start, while the SMMA renewed its commitment to “community participation”. Would this expectation be realised and politics be unnecessary thereafter?

\(^4\) Approximately 150 US dollars. There were also conditions attached to the stipend to discourage fishers from engaging in fishing activities in the marine reserves.
4.4. The Second Phase: the “New SMMA”, a Change for the Same

Here we show that after intense political strife, the SMMA apparently reached calmer waters, but this was merely on the surface. Although stakeholder “clashes” have not, since then, been on the same scale as the 1997 crisis, the SMMA has not become any more participatory than before, and probably even less. From 1998 to 2001, a lengthy “institutional review” was held to “fix problems identified during the crisis”, which led to the inception of a “new SMMA” – as it called itself. This move, however, turned out to be no more than a “change for the same”, as one informant put it, as no attempt was made to address the frustrations or the institutional and productive power effects of the scheme. Since 2001, the distance between the “new SMMA” and the fishers has been growing, their concerns being rarely mentioned during board meetings.

4.4.1. A new power formation with less rather than more CP

Given the political conflagration that had erupted in the space of a few years, a “comprehensive review” of the SMMA was carried out from November 1997 following a formal request from the TAC in July. The Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI) was chosen once again as “facilitator” to lead its “renewal”, despite the failure of the “first version” of the SMMA, which it had largely designed. The ensuing institutional reworking took almost three years to be completed and approved by the government. This long drawn-out renewal is no proof of a dense participatory process, but rather of the “temporal sinking” of the negotiation process, much like the one that had already led up to the initial “agreement”. A series of stakeholder meetings probably took place over these years (although we found no archive to prove this), but what is certain is that the form they took was not as manifestly participatory as the initial 1992 process. In any case, an observer of the time acknowledged that, basically, “the new Agreement was negotiated among the members of the TAC” (Pierre-Nathaniel, 2003, p.35).

It was only in January 2001 that a “New Agreement to Manage the SMMA” was officially signed by the TAC members. What did this change? Instead of the “Technical Advisory Committee” (TAC), a more compact “Board of Directors” (BoD) was created, reduced from thirteen to eleven members. Second-rank public
agencies were removed leaving governmental authority in the hands of the four ministries already present, to which was added the National Conservation Authority, primarily concerned with strict conservation. The representative of local businesses was removed and replaced by a representative of the Saint Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association – the national lobby of the tourism sector. Moreover, although it had been acknowledged during the “institutional review” that fishermen had not been properly represented on the TAC, no change was introduced to address this issue. Just as in the TAC, fishermen were to have one representative on the Board and this function continued to be occupied by the president of the Fishermen’s cooperative, who, as we have seen, had few connections with the mass of Soufrière’s fishers. Neither the TAC nor the Board has ever envisioned, for instance, working with a representative from the area of Soufrière town that concentrates most of the poorer fishers – the so-called “Baron’s drive” area. Finally, it turned out that in practice even the president of the cooperative did not attend a number of board meetings, leaving this community totally un-represented [interview 24].

The new arrangement also allowed no room for the local business community to be on the board, as their representative was removed. Local owners of small hotels complained to the SMMA manager about this fact [interviews 12, 15]. Yet, there were outstanding issues to be resolved: tensions were appearing between the small hotel owners and cruise ships from the northern part of the island: the ships were disembarking large groups of sunbathers and snorkelers on beaches in the vicinity of hotels, leading to congestion and overuse of the near-shore. However, this lack of representation was never corrected and no proposal was put forward by the Board to address the matter. On the other hand, in 2006, the Board of Directors considered that the yachting industry had become so important that it needed to be brought in. This was done swiftly by adding a representative of the Marine Industry Association of St. Lucia (MIASL).

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55 The Parks and Beaches Commission, the Marine Police Force Division and the Customs and Excise Department.
56 The ministries of Planning, Tourism, Agriculture (department of fisheries) and the St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority.
57 Most of the SMMA revenues came from yachts.
Thus, with the “new SMMA”, fewer rather than more representatives from the local community were invited to take part in decisions. However, although the directing mechanism was becoming smaller, this was to be offset by another provision of the new “agreement”: the creation of a “Stakeholder Committee” in the form of a broad-based advisory body with a large membership to ensure representation of all parties. It was meant to provide an ongoing forum for everyone to express their needs, views and concerns. According to the new institutional arrangement:

*All major proposals for management and development...related to the SMMA, must be presented to the Stakeholder Committee for advice. Issues raised by the Stakeholder Committee must be considered by the Board of Directors.* (SMMA, 2001, p.5)

This committee was meant to meet at least once per quarter but in fact only met three times over the next eight years. In practice, thus, the Stakeholder Committee was nonexistent. Moreover, an analysis of archived agendas of these three meetings shows that they were precisely framed, pre-defined, and primarily made up of speeches by the SMMA management and external scientists from various centers and universities that approved of the marine reserves.

A 2008 evaluation of the SMMA carried out by a specialised consultancy firm on behalf of the FFEM, a French donor, did point out the irregular frequency of the “stakeholder meetings”. Strangely enough, however, this raises little concern in the eyes of evaluators:

*The cooperation among resource users, institutional collaboration, active and enlightened local participation and equitable sharing of benefits and responsibilities among stakeholders is shown by the existence of the SMMA in itself....Even if the stakeholder committee has never been really set up, the board of directors comprises the main stakeholders groups of the area (FFEM, 2008, p.36).*

Arguably, with the revamped SMMA, participation was not so much opened up to the local community as to interest group at the national level or even beyond. Excluding local fishers and local tourism businesses, CP in Soufrière served as a means of re-nationalising local issues within a public/private co-management scheme, while claiming to work with the local community. What took place may have been a form of “co-management” but not between the national authorities and the local community – rather between authorities and economic interest groups that needed to “fix” Soufrière in the “national interest”. Although this may not be necessarily illegitimate, it surely does not fit the narrative of an inclusive community participation, structured around bottom-up initiatives, wide and intense participation and a balanced allocation of benefits. Co-management involving potent public and

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private domestic interests was also mixed with the on-going influence of international donors as well as environmental scientists and organisations.

The “power formation” that was becoming consolidated through the “new SMMA” thus seemed to include almost everybody, except the local community.

4.4.2. Re-allocating benefits with compensations? Helping ... the wealthiest

The political struggle of Soufrière’s fishermen had led to promises of “compensation”. The government and the SMMA thus developed socio-economic schemes with the financial support of the French donor (Pierre, 2000; Sanderson and Koester, 2000; Pierre-Nathoniel, 2003). The central idea was to provide incentives for fishers to move away from the near-shore areas, in an effort to modernise the sector into “deep-sea fishing”. However, as we show, in practice these schemes mostly benefited fishers who had already engaged in deep-sea fishing, instead of helping traditional fishers change their activity. On the whole, they did not provide substantial compensation for the fishers most affected by the SMMA zoning.

First, some training was offered to interested fishers to help them switch to deep-sea fishing, notably on how to construct and operate tuna long-lines. This was primarily aimed at young fishers who were willing and able to engage in a different technique. Sample gear for this type of fishing was made available and a short-term project ran for a few months. A less intensive training also ran for another year. However, capital remained the main constraint on fishers as deep-sea fishing requires buying a new boat and nets, a more powerful engine and regular fuel refills, all of which most people in this community cannot afford [interviews 35, 56].

To make some capital available to fishers, it was decided to buy back gillnets used in reef fishing, in the hope that funds from the sale would be used to invest in equipments for deep-sea fishing. A Board decision was made to prohibit the use of such gillnets from August 1998, while compensating fishers for their equipment. Nineteen gillnets were consequently purchased by the SMMA. Meanwhile, with the support of French money, an investment fund was established in 1999 to assist fishers in obtaining loans to start up deep sea fishing - or tourism activities. Under the project, fishers could be provided with a grant, but this could only cover 20% of
the required funds. A number of fishers submitted projects but the scheme did not prove successful: long delays in the receipt of funds led to a loss of interest [interview 28].

Finally, to encourage near-shore fishers to divert their activity offshore, Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) were built and deployed off the Soufrière’s coast. FADs are floating mechanisms that act as fixed shelters for migrating pelagic fish: small fish congregate around the FADs in search of food which then attracts larger predatory fish, thus reducing the time and cost of hunting for fish offshore. These structures have been used in many places around the world to encourage traditional near-shore fishers to move offshore. The point was also to provide a viable fishing site during the second half of the year when the migratory pelagics are scarce and fishers tend to focus on near-shore areas. However, the initial deployment of FADs in Soufrière was unsuccessful as individuals from outside the community reportedly stole parts of the equipment.

In a nutshell, the financial barrier of the initial start-up capital was never really lifted for fishers, so the goal of moving the community towards deep-sea fishing remained elusive. Meanwhile, the FADs proved useful for the wealthiest fishers, such as the members of the cooperative already engaged in deep-sea fishing [interview 21]. The same can be said of further projects financed by the French cooperation that mostly served the interest of the higher end of the fisher community. This included the construction of a small jetty completed in 1998 near a gasoline station to facilitate fuelling prior to offshore fishing expeditions. The jetty also facilitated off-loading on return from these trips. An ice machine was also provided to the Fishermen’s Cooperative, to ease situations where catches were unpredictably large and avoid unnecessary wastage. Yet, all of these initiatives did nothing to change the lives of the poorer fishers.

4.4.3. Fishermen’s issues: the growing lack of Board interest

Board minutes show that during the years 2001-2008, there were relatively few discussions among SMMA directors about fishermen’s issues. This is striking compared with the central place this community had taken in the early and stormy

58 The grant could not exceed EC$ 6,000 (approximately USD 2,000).
life of the SMMA. However, this does not mean that things were going smoothly for fishers or that they were getting efficient help from the SMMA in adapting to the zoning scheme. Our interpretation is rather that the fishers were no longer able to influence the Board agenda. The only issues they briefly managed to raise were never dealt with in any depth.

The most notable issue was the recurring concern over the functioning of the Fishing Aggregating Devices, which were supposed to divert pressure away from near-shore resources. Vandalism, strong currents and heavy boat traffic gave them a relatively short lifespan. The Board held rare discussions about how to help the fisher community to renew these devices, but a sustainable financing mechanism has never been put into place, so that at the time of fieldwork (summer 2008), no FAD was actually functioning. The fact is that the SMMA Board never envisaged that its revenues (drawn from yacht, diver and snorkeler fees) could be used to invest in the renewal of the FADs.

Second, it was suggested at a 2001 board meeting that the SMMA set up a pension fund for the Soufrière fishermen and that contact with the National Insurance Scheme (St. Lucia’s social security) should be established to discuss possibilities and technicalities. But the proposal was soon dropped and did not reappear on the board agenda in later years.

Finally, a brief tension in 2005 proved that the balance of power had definitely shifted away from the fishers and that politicisation was no longer a winning strategy, even regarding the issues of the marine reserves. During the autumn of that year, a fisherman was reproved by SMMA rangers for setting more than three fish traps in the Grand Caille Marine Reserve – an area that had been reopened to pot fishing since 1997. The fisher alerted the District representative, who questioned the legality of restricting the number of fish traps being set in any area. He noted that no such stipulations had been laid down in the Cabinet conclusion of 1997 granting access to the Grand Caille reserve. Despite this, the Board, and particularly the Department of Fisheries, insisted that the re-opening of the marine reserve for fishing was supposed to accommodate only “a selected group of fishers”, but this specification came in fact “out of the blue”. The Board thus rejected the plea of the cautioned pot fisher and District representative. It was further decided that the Grand Caille Marine Reserve was to “stay clear from pot fishing as far as possible”.

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radical re-writing of the 1997 agreement showed quite clearly where power now was. The notion of a “selected group of fishers” had only been used to set up a financial scheme to compensate the older displaced fishers – something which has thus nothing to do with the reopening of marine reserves. Yet, the Board got away with this shift and the fisher community increasingly lost its will to oppose such manoeuvres [interviews 53, 57].

The fishers’ estrangement from the SMMA was confirmed by direct observation during a “community event” prepared and advertised by the organisation to celebrate both the SMMA’s anniversary and the “International Year of the Coral Reefs”. A half-day meeting to which the whole community was invited was thus set up, boasting a local music group and free food and drinks. As it turned out, however, not one single local attended beyond the SMMA staff, a few board members and some officials from Castries. Witnessing this event, gave us a keen sense of the organisation’s isolation within the community.
4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that despite much talk and celebration of "community participation", the SMMA was neither originated by – nor connected to – a wide section of the local community. It is more the embodiment of a power formation that brings together a set of interest groups at the national level as well as foreign experts, NGOs and donors. Its divorce from the coastal fishers – who are nevertheless its natural and primary stakeholders – has been fast, and the inclusiveness, scope and intensity of their participation has totally collapsed. It was not through a participatory institution but rather through political strife and a VOICE strategy that the poorer fishers were able, at one point in time, to make their critical interests heard. The myth of "ongoing institutional dialogue" has been maintained throughout in project documents, donor evaluations and policy statements, but this does not fit what is observed on the ground and in the project’s history. Nowadays, although CP in Soufrière is still praised by international donors and environmental circles, it has taken on a totally minimal form with almost no input from locals, as is evidenced by the fact that no "stakeholder meetings" are held despite clear written rules.

The SMMA experience thus widely confirms the empirical expectations of the critical narrative of the CP discourse, as summarised in Table 6 of the previous chapter. Not only were the participatory scheme’s origins essentially based "above and outside" the local community, but its inclusiveness was narrow and elite-centered, its scope restricted, its intensity at most "consultative" and the allocation of benefits objectively unbalanced and never significantly compensated.
Chapter 5 - The Effect of CP in Soufrière: Social Control, Commodification and Weaker Social Capital

The previous chapter analysed the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and the allocation of benefits of the SMMA's participatory process. In doing so, it largely confirmed the empirical expectations of the critical narrative on the global CP discourse. To further compare expectations to observations, we now focus on the SMMA's impact on the social fabrics of the local community. First, we look at changes in social control, namely the way certain people have seen their behaviours increasingly framed and contained, while others have been left unmonitored and unquestioned. Second, we argue that this new balance of social control has underpinned a continuous process of commodification making Soufrière’s spaces and people more tradable assets on the international tourism market. Third, and finally, we investigate how the CP process has interacted with the social capital of the community - its fragmentation, the inability of the weaker locals to deal with institutions and their psychological withdrawal from “the system” – or “Babylon”, the “unfair modern world”. We show that although the critical narrative is once more largely corroborated when it comes to expected effects, the mechanisms at work are far more local and less pre-determined than this narrative typically expects.
5.1. Differentiating Social Control: Containing a Group, Sparing Others

In a formal presentation delivered in December 2008, a consultant commissioned by the French donor to evaluate the SMMA somewhat jokingly stated with a smile that "the basic problem of the SMMA was to get the fishers out". When asked to comment on what he had just said, the man was visibly ill at ease. This slip of the tongue provides, we shall argue, an important insight into what the SMMA is essentially about: clearing the ground of fishers and accommodating more "modern" activities. The primary impact of the SMMA has indeed been a change in the balance of social control weighing upon coastal user groups. The pattern that emerged is one of active containment of the poorer fishers and of selective oblivion benefiting tourism-related actors. In section 3.1.7, we defined containment as the management of CP so as to maintain control over certain target groups and avoid, block or minimise their disruption of other goals.\textsuperscript{59} As for selective oblivion, we may define it, in a mirror fashion, as a type of management of CP that leaves certain groups out of reach of regulatory practices and concerns. Containment does not necessarily refer to the conscious will of given actors, but the observable effects of practices at work. The same can be said of selective oblivion. As we shall see, the challenges faced by the SMMA staff over the years have all manifested the effectiveness of this CP scheme in framing spaces and people for tourism development but much less so in securing environmental commitments from large tourism businesses – which seem to operate with impunity.

Here, we first look at the practice of spatial zoning enforced by the SMMA, to point to its imbalances and relentless action to "bring the fishers to order" while paying much less attention to other coastal users. Then we show that the use of both hard and social sciences has underpinned an epistemic exclusion of the poorer fishers from legitimate discourses: "expert views" constantly de-legitimised the fishers' perceptions through the exercise of anti-political productive power. Third and finally, we argue that some interest groups have been exempted de facto from any regulation although they do in fact have a powerful impact the coral reefs. Some

\textsuperscript{59} This definition draws on Few (2003, p.23, p.32).
have even been able to operate while not complying with their financial duties towards the SMMA.

5.1.1. Compulsory power: the increased spatial control of fishers

The containment of fishers has a strong spatial dimension linked to the use of compulsory power – through constraints and incentives.

To start with, the central clause of the SMMA agreement was its zoning map, which defines what actors and activities may access what part of the coast (cf. Map 3, Chapter 4). To use the words of Pugh (2005, p.315), this type of map is a “way of visualising a field to be governed”: not only what is to be considered normal or abnormal, but what is to be improved, monitored, surveyed, etc. It is about setting up barriers and procedures of control, splitting up spaces legally, functionally and symbolically, bringing people into dedicated zones and making sure that “bodies”, as Foucault would have it, are in their correct places. The SMMA is an obvious example of this. As Pugh also formulates, the zoning map “signifies and places bodies in particular positions, partitions, isolates and distributes them, whilst defining the instrumental modes of intervention that they are to be subjected to” (p.315).

The first and most visible sign of containment lies in the fact that the SMMA zoning has been very strictly and consistently enforced upon the fishers, through various material and procedural means, whereas this is much less the case for other actors [interview 19]. In its everyday functioning, the balance of control is tilted towards a greater freedom given to the tourism industry – notably divers, yachts and snorkelers. There are several daily boat patrols whose main task is to check that fishers keep out of the marine reserves and respect the rules of other zones. On the other hand, in what seems to be a case of selective oblivion, the SMMA management plan contains no formal procedures for checking the number of divers in authorised areas – notably in marine reserves (Pugh, 2005). As for yachts, while patrols do collect their entrance fees in the SMMA zone, problems continually arise over their mooring location, leading to ongoing tensions with fishers. This situation was confirmed during fieldwork by many interviewees including the president of the co-operative who acknowledged that the “yachts, divers and tourists are violating the law” [interview 26]. Tourist boats, for instance, still station in fishing priority areas and divers still cut authorised iron pots to let the fish out.
Mechanisms of spatial exclusion are thus resented as deeply unbalanced. A fisherman explains:

_The marine reserves? They are just against us [fishers]. Just to prevent me from doing what my parents did before me [fishing]... In the SMMA, there is always room for yachts and divers. They do what they want. Have you heard of a boat, a diver or a hotel that was fined? Have you heard of a tourist or a researcher that could not go in the marine reserves? Me, no._ [interview 25]

The spatial containment of fishers was also observable in the construction of a “fisher market” by the SMMA in 1998. Although it may seem curious at first, this initiative was not supported by the fishers [interview 43]. Traditionally, the latter sell their fish from push-carts, around the town, on spots chosen on the waterfront or on the roadside. For fishers, a static location means much greater competition with one another. It also means that people wishing to purchase have to go to a specific place, rather than being served at their convenience – which had been the traditional way in Soufrière. This imposed process of spatial concentration led to a great deal of resistance, but the market was built nonetheless. As one fisherman put it:

_[The market] was not done with the fishers, but against them... They did not want to see fishers wandering around selling fishes. It does not look clean to them. They wanted to “clean” the town. The deal was: we build a “clean area”, but we do not want you elsewhere._ [interview 23]

What calls attention in this statement is the repetition of this anonymous “they”. When asked to expand on it, the interviewee referred to a mix of:

_Government and businesses [that] want to fix the town, to make it look like the tourists want!_ [interview 23]

To date, the spatial control of fishers seems to be an unfinished but ongoing process. At the time of the fieldwork, the government had just sold eight hectares of the Malgré Tout beach (cf. Map 3, Chapter 4) to an international group, specialised in the construction and running of vast luxury resorts. Not only had a public beach been sold without any local consultation, but as part of the project, the dismantling of the town’s fisher area (Baron’s Drive) had been discussed: this area, with its prime waterfront location, is now meant to be “cleaned up” and transferred to a new in-land development, north of Soufrière, out of the tourists’ view. Fisher families are extremely upset about this prospect. Beyond their attachment to “their” traditional area, they ask simple questions such as: “where are we going to put our boats?” [interview 32]. Just as with the fisher market, the “deal” that is being imposed upon fishers seems to be “cleaner, safer facilities” in exchange for “fewer fishers in the
streets and on the coast”, as an interviewee bluntly put it. When we left Soufrière, a Northern American consultant had started to work on this urban transfer, causing much emotion in the Baron’s drive community.

5.1.2. Productive power: scientific discourses, anti-politics and epistemic exclusion

*Epistemic exclusion* was defined in section 3.1.7 (Table 5) as a mode of social control through which a certain group is excluded from the production of legitimate knowledge. As for *anti-politics*, this refers to the suppression of legitimate options through the recourse to “expertise” — a form or productive power (cf. 3.2.4). In the SMMA process, the management of knowledge proved an important tool of containment, drawing on both hard and social sciences to de-legitimise claims by poorer fishers: in these discourses, fishing needed to be drastically reduced on social and scientific grounds, whereas tourism did not.

*The use of “hard science”*

As Trist (2003) explains, behind the disputes between tourism and fishing interests were unresolved questions regarding the causes of degradation in the marine environment. Historical data on Soufrière’s fisheries is limited, which means that the interrelation between ecological factors is still not well understood.

At the time of the SMMA preparatory process, and even today, few fishermen accepted that fishing practices were responsible for declining catches or that their traditional gear posed a serious threat to coral reefs. Many think that yacht anchors have done much more damage to coral than fish-pots or gillnets ever have. Many fishermen still consider pot fishing to be relatively benign because of its simple technology and intermittent use [interviews 2, 23]. Trist (2003, p.58) quotes a long-term observer of Soufrière’s fishing industry working for the Organisation of American States, who shares the fishers’ view:

*Pot fishing can't destroy a fishing bank, not the way [fishers] practice it....It has been done the same way for ages.*

Although there was no shortage of scientific evidence pointing to the strong need to control the impact of coastal constructions, as well as of divers and snorkelers on the coral reefs (e.g. Barker & Roberts, 2004), these findings have been much less publicised that those in favour a restriction of fishing activities.
In 1995, a heavy scientific apparatus began to gain a footing in the SMMA with the support of several foreign universities and research groups. One of them was directed by Pr. Callum Roberts, an internationally known biologist and a vocal supporter of marine protected areas. From the start, Roberts wanted to focus on the impact of overfishing in Soufrière. His team claimed that the system of marine reserves could be expected to show benefits to the fishers within two to five years, if "illegal fishing" was kept to a minimum, through a spill-over effect upon fish catches. This scientific take-over of the SMMA was furthered in 2001 when Roberts’ team found a "significant increase in reef catches" (Roberts, et al., 2001). They based their analysis on a comparison between catches in 1995-1996, when the SMMA was just established, with catches five years later. This study was much publicised by the SMMA staff. It notably contends that "interviews with local fishers showed that most felt better off with reserves than without". However, a careful look at their data (p.1922) shows that out of seventy-one fishers interviewed, only a third positively declared that "fisheries improved", while two-thirds did not. Moreover, it is interesting to note that neither the scientific article, nor the opinion piece published by the SMMA manager in a national newspaper, factually quoted any fisher as being happy with the change. Although increases in catches between 1995 and 2001 may be a scientific fact, it could be attributed to many causes, especially as the reefs were recovering from hurricane damage and yachts had stopped anchoring over corals [interview 45].

The use of “social sciences”

Epistemic exclusion can also be observed with the launch of a social survey meant to assess perceptions of the SMMA by “the local community” (SMMA, 2007). This study, based on 186 interviews carried out in Soufrière in 2005 provides a largely favourable picture. However, although its stated objectives include the analysis of “differences of stakeholder perceptions”, little was done to bring to the fore the view of the people most concerned by the SMMA. In fact, the study averages out local perceptions with a large volume of opinions from people who are only distantly concerned with coastal resources. The survey uses few means to assess the socio-economic impact of the SMMA on the poorer part of the fisher population, whose

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60 The Voice, 11 October 2001.
61 Although interviews for the study were carried out in 2005, the report was published in 2007.
voice is diluted and quasi-invisible in the study. Out of 186 interviewees, only 37 were fishers. More importantly, there is no way in the raw data of knowing whether they are boat owners, deep-sea fishers or simple pot fishers. In other words, it is impossible to ascertain exactly who, within the fisher community, is represented in these interviews. The archives we had access to show that the original survey questionnaire had envisioned a full section with details on fishers. However, for unknown reasons, these questions were not asked during data collection [interview 3].

Nevertheless, a look at the raw data reveals the deep gap that still exists in 2005 between the SMMA and the fisher community. Only 54% of fishers declared their familiarity with the SMMA and almost none was able to state the basic functions of its board, providing at best comments such as: “I heard about them but I don’t know them or what they do”. Further comments include: “the SMMA should contribute more to the lives of the fishermen”; “they give the sea to the tourists”; “the SMMA makes too much money and does not spend it in the community”. As far as can be inferred from board minutes, these findings were not discussed in the following board meetings.

Even more disturbing is the direct contradiction between the survey’s raw data and Robert’s 2001 findings on the biological effectiveness of SMMA reserves in improving fish stocks. The data in fact show that the fishers feel that the health of fish has sharply decreased over the previous ten years.62 How can this perception by primary marine resource users be reconciled with Robert’s scientific findings?

Finally, when it comes to identifying the main threats to marine resources, the survey shows that fishers overwhelmingly believe that the principal causes are the unregulated littering and untreated sewage, as well as the impact of yacht anchors. The result is the same in the whole survey sample, showing that the general population does not even place “overfishing” among the five most important threats to the coral reefs.

All of this shows the strong discrepancy between the “scientific discourse” (developed about and by the SMMA) and the perceptions of both the fishers and the wider Soufrière community. This should have raised questions about the relevance of

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62 On a scale from 3 (excellent) to 0 (poor), they evaluate this change from 2,5 to 0,9. A pure collapse, in other words.
making fishers the primary target of Soufrière’s conservation strategy. The fishers we met during fieldwork in 2008 often spoke out against foreigners who “come with their knowledge” and “disregard fishers’ views” [interview 28]. One even had this strikingly philosophical sentence: “knowledge cannot come from one side only” [interview 27].

5.1.3. Structural power: financial and environmental impunity

Most actors related to the tourism industry – hotel resorts, dive operators, boat tour and construction companies – have tried to escape their financial and environmental duties implied by the creation of the SMMA, and often successfully. This has led to much frustration on the part of the SMMA staff, which feels fooled by people who strongly benefited from its work [interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10]. It is not easy, at first, to understand why the actors who stand to benefit from the SMMA’s control of fishers would not play their part to support its operations. But a deeper analysis suggests at least three sets of reasons: 1) a tactic of maintaining pressure and a means of influence on the SMMA due to the latter’s financial dependency; 2) their business identity as profit-makers with tough management practices in which no savings are unimportant; 3) the desire to assert a structurally strong position whereby significant economic players on the island do not have to deal with any form of local authority. All of this, arguably, displays features of structural power whereby economic hierarchies are actively re-affirmed.

Here, we first explore the SMMA’s financial dependency on the tourism industry to show how it has been amplified by a low compliance with the agreed payments. We then argue that despite dedicated efforts, the SMMA staff has never had any impact on the behaviour of land-based polluters.

The financial impunity of tourism businesses

Since its inception in 1994, the SMMA has pursued an objective of financial self-sufficiency but has never firmly reached it [interview 2]. The revenue base of the organisation is made of fees taken from yachts (through a coral conservation fee for the use of special mooring buoys) as well as divers (in the form of daily or yearly permits). From 2001, permits for snorkelers were also created. SMMA income thus closely depends on the number of tourists entering in the SMMA zone – and more
precisely, on tourism businesses (hotels, boat tours...) complying with the compulsory purchase of these permits for their clients.

Since its creation, the SMMA has run a net operational deficit for about half of the time, depending on the year. From 1997 to 2007, available data show an average annual increase of 2% for yachts entering the SMMA and 7% for divers. But these figures hide significant fluctuations, following global trends in the tourism industry and rises in oil prices, making St. Lucia a more expansive destination. To date, financial concerns are still a permanent focus of board discussion, not only because the SMMA has had to live with the ups and downs of the tourism industry, but also because it has encountered a constant reluctance on the part of key hotel resorts and diving and snorkelling operators to pay the agreed fees on time [interviews 2, 4].

The SMMA was supposed to operate on a pre-payment fee-system for all-inclusive hotels, as well as on permit books provided up-front to dive operators, with payment to be collected at a later date. As it turned out, this system was never properly implemented.

First, lengthy delays in payments (relating to diving and snorkelling permits) have been experienced with two large hotel resorts. Although a compensation deal was reached some years ago with one of them, the other still was in 2008 far from willing to pay what it owed. Meetings with the resort owner have been regularly delayed or cancelled, despite numerous letters. As the SMMA accountant explains:

Some hotel resorts have huge sums of money overdue for a long time, with this type of excuses: “call next week and the cheque will be ready”; “oh sorry, the accountant is not in today, call next week”, etc. An important part of my job is to call these resorts and try to get them to pay. It’s exhausting and not effective. [interview 2]

The situation has not proved any better with divers and snorkelers arriving on day charters and boat tours from Castries. Marine rangers have been encountering tremendous problems with the collection of snorkelling fees [interviews 5, 6, 10]. It appears that unless rangers actually check up on boats, the required tickets are generally not issued. The same behaviour is observed among diving operators, which tend to save tickets to re-use for other dives when there are no patrols around. Letters were sent to operators in Castries reminding them about regulations, but these efforts have only led so far to temporary results.

The SMMA staff works hard to ensure tourism is not disrupted in the zone. They thus resent this permanent financial stress as an “unfair humiliation” [interview 8].
Its manager often reported the situation to the Board stating that there is "very little support from the various recreational user groups" in the implementation of regulations [interview 1]. But this has never led to any change. No system of fines was ever adopted to increase pressure on hotels or dive operators. Moreover, no help was ever provided by the board member organisation in this power game.

**The environmental impunity of land-based polluters**

Land-based pollution is an important issue in the Soufrière coastal area. Siltation into the sea is clearly visible after each downpour of rain as tons of coloured sediments enter the bay. This sedimentation, which causes corals to die, is caused by activities that increase natural erosion, such as the construction of hotels and private houses near the shores, sand-mining and deforestation. Moreover, agricultural pollutants and unmanaged liquid wastes from the town, hotels, yachts and a coconut factory also result in ongoing water pollution and in the development of algae that kill corals [interview 1].

This situation had been acknowledged in the SMMA 1992 participatory process from the outset. Early consultation had indeed led to the conclusion that "zoning was not the only [needed] management instrument, [so] much broader measures and solutions [were to be sought]" (Renard, 1996, p.5). Nevertheless, no serious procedure for controlling and acting against land-based pollution was ever designed. As an informant explains:

> This responsibility stayed "up in the air", or more precisely lay with the central ministries, which proved to be about the same. [interview 40]

Zoning was thus the only real SMMA instrument, but one that does little for land-based issues. A space for environmental impunity was thus inherent in the initial SMMA design. Meanwhile, constructions around Soufrière for hotel development increased sharply over the years. For instance, the Anse Chastanet resort undertook works in the Trou Diable area (cf. Map 3, Chapter 4), which has critical sedimentation problems impacting coral reefs. Sediment traps and a drainage system were eventually put into place but they appeared inadequate during heavy rainfalls. Moreover, hills and slopes were being cleared and soil erosion was becoming intense. Concerns also emerged about another large resort, the Jalousie Hilton, which started refurbishment after a hurricane: although strong rains were expected, the contractor did not consider installing siltation mitigation devices. In 2004 and 2005,
there were also reports of a suspected discharge of sewage by Jalousie into the adjacent bay. Another issue that emerged was that of sand mining at beaches and river areas [interview 18]. Rivers play an important role in supplying sand to beaches and the near shore and the removal of sand from river mouths is not thus a sustainable practice. It also impacts seine-net fishermen who consequently sent complaints to the SMMA. Photos were circulated showing mining activities at the Soufrière river mouth and the ravine at a northern beach.

On all these issues, the SMMA has been largely left on its own [interview 1]. It never managed to mobilise effective support from central authorities, such as the National Conservation Authority (NCA). The latter’s extension officer in Soufrière had even granted various permissions to mine sand from beaches and rivers in the area... Left to its own devices, the SMMA tried to negotiate with hotels and construction companies – but more issues were constantly appearing, such as the building on protected lands of private homes by foreigners, who proved almost impossible to contact. The SMMA manager became actively and personally involved in monitoring construction projects around Soufrière, trying to raise awareness and commitment through frequent meetings and warning letters. Marine rangers were also asked to monitor such actions as illegal deforestation between the two Pitons, a UNESCO world heritage site [interview 10].

The SMMA’s powerlessness shows to what extent the structure lacks the political and administrative weight to be heard by economic actors. Several informants also pointed to ongoing corruption issues at higher levels of the state, as well as “friendly connections” between politicians and businessmen. For this reason, and to denounce environmental scandals, the SMMA manager now often reverts to unofficial means of advocacy, such as the circulation of anonymous emails and telling photographs, rather than relying simply of the SMMA’s means and authority [interview 1].

Some people believe that market forces may do the job better than regulations. In August 2006, for instance, after years of infringement of sewage laws, the Jalousie resort installed two 20,000-gallon tanks so that used water could be collected and pumped for irrigation purposes. However, interviews suggested that this outcome was merely due to growing demand of the international market of luxury holidays [interview 22]. Jalousie could no longer run the risk of an environmental scandal,
especially in the UNESCO world heritage site, in which it operates and which is the keystone of its marketing strategy.

5.1.4. Conclusion: multiple modes of containment at work

"Participatory processes are reworked to suit the ends of industry and other powerful groupings – notably that of increasing control over local people". This comment made by Hidlyard et al. (2001, p.60) regarding CP in forest management in India largely mirrors our analysis of the SMMA. The increased social control over fishers in Soufrière has relied upon very diverse modes of containment which Table 8 summarises drawing on the typology defined in section 3.1.7 (Table 5).

Table 8 – Modes of containment in Soufrière

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>in section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance</strong></td>
<td>Interest groups related to tourism partnered with public authorities and environmentalists to set up the SMMA.</td>
<td>4.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biased implementation</strong></td>
<td>The zoning system and monitoring and sanction mechanisms preferentially worked against a target group (fishers) while sparing others.</td>
<td>5.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compromise</strong></td>
<td>Several modifications of the fishing priority areas and of the marine reserves show a capacity for temporary compromise.</td>
<td>4.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encirclement</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of the TAC and the Board has shown that fishers are &quot;encircled&quot; by a variety of other interest groups related to economic development through tourism.</td>
<td>4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemic exclusion</strong></td>
<td>During the initial consultation, certain scientific views rather than others were put forward. More pressure was placed on fishers than on land-based polluters, yachters and divers.</td>
<td>5.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalisation and formalisation</strong></td>
<td>The creation of the SMMA <em>per se</em> was a way of institutionalising conflicts. Use of written drafts. &quot;Temporal sinking&quot; through lengthy negotiation processes.</td>
<td>4.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skewed representation</strong></td>
<td>Over 14 years of SMMA operations, the fishermen were represented on the TAC and the Board only by the president of the Soufrière Fishermen’s Association – to which the overwhelming majority of the fishermen do not belong.</td>
<td>4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective oblivion</strong></td>
<td>The SMMA management plan contains no procedure for controlling water-polluters or divers.</td>
<td>5.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persuasion</strong></td>
<td>A huge effort was deployed to diffuse the view that the marine reserves increase fish stocks.</td>
<td>4.2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2. Marketisation and the Commodification of the Community

In this section we argue that containment takes place because of something — marketisation — and to accommodate something else — commodification. Both concepts were discussed in section 3.1.8. In the St. Lucian context, marketisation refers to the renewed dependency of the island upon global markets — shifting from the agricultural to the tourism sector. Containment is an adaptive response to this, fostering the commodification of local spaces and behaviours into tradable goods more likely to meet client expectations. Here, we first review the tourism-based marketisation of St. Lucia, its neoliberal and neo-colonial overtones and the concomitant resentment felt by many locals in Soufrière towards this industry. We then review how the SMMA has contributed to reframing and commodifying community spaces and behaviours to better suit the observed wishes of foreign clients. Finally, we look at “participatory initiatives” in Soufrière other than the SMMA and show how that they also worked in the same direction — a fact that gives further strength to the interpretation of the SMMA as a commodification apparatus led by a range of local actors forming an alliance.

5.2.1. Tourism dependency and ‘neoliberal neo-colonialism’

Over its history, St. Lucia has been dependent on series of mono-activities starting with sugar-cane in colonial times. After the collapse of sugar prices in the mid-1950s, the banana-growing swiftly took hold of the entire island: it accounted for 85% of the island’s total exports in value in the mid-1960s and still represented 60% in the early 1990s (Reynolds, 2006, p.19). Since 1993, however, the banana sector has gone through a sharp decline following a reduced preferential access to the EU markets and the rising competition of larger producers, notably from Latin America. This cleared the field for another major economic turn, whereby tourism was to become the next “king of St. Lucia” (ibid., p.155). This latter industry provides to date about 10,000 direct and indirect jobs (Renard, 2001; CTO, 2002)

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64 Banana exports fell from its peak of 132,000 tons in 1992 to only 30,000 tons in 2005 (FSF, 2009, p.3).
and a third of the island’s GDP (FSF, 2009). To date, “development” in St. Lucia, as in many other Caribbean societies, has largely come to be equated with *tourism* development.

It is at the end of the 1960s that this industry slowly took off, with jet charter tours from the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the rest of Western Europe. As Duval and Wilkinson (2004) explain, the government’s strategy to promote this sector has been a “hands-off approach” that opened the island to all possible foreign investments with generous tax breaks. This policy started as early as 1959, with the Hotel Aids Ordinance (25/1959), and has consistently been applied since then. It was strongly reaffirmed in 1991 through the Tourism Incentives Act offering fifteen years of income-tax holidays for a range of new constructions, ten years for renovation works as well as exemption from customs duties on building materials. In 1996, a new Act widened these benefits to any “approved tourism project”, a notion that was further extended in 2002 to include projects such as villas, time-share properties, restaurants, etc.

The inflow of foreign investors, however, has resulted in a widespread feeling among lay people of an “island for sale”, especially to foreigners [interviews 42, 45, 56, 57]. The tourism sector is indeed almost entirely controlled by non-domestic actors, notably those who own and operate the large hotel resorts and the cruise boats that capture most of the tourism business. The bulk of the profit is channelled out of the island by pre-paid package tours and the domination of “all-inclusive” hotels, where even foodstuffs are largely imported. Very little money leaks out to local communities (World Bank, 1990). Most clients have a very limited experience of the island, moving directly from the airport to hotels, where they have little incentive to travel further afield – thus avoiding the uncomfortable feeling of seeing scenes of poverty while relaxing in comfortable resorts. The same holds true of cruise passengers, whose number rose from 70,000 in the mid-1970s to over 600,000 in 2008 and who consume imported goods on their “floating palaces” – as an advert puts it. In fact, as Erisman (1983, p.342) points out, foreign companies providing specialised tourist services – including airlines, tour operators, hotel chains and cruise lines – have developed working relationships of formal or informal integration, “the goal being to structure one’s trip so that most of the money spent ends up in [these companies’] pockets”.

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Despite some improvement, economic diversification in St. Lucia has been hindered by potent structural factors. As a result, its economy is as dependent today on tourism as it used to be on bananas or sugar cane. What a local economist argued twenty years ago still holds: “The all round development of the economy has lagged as it is still structurally unbalanced and not capable of self sustaining growth. To put it in the jargon of the economist it is open, vulnerable and dependent” (Venner, 1989, p.81).

Since the 1970s, hostility against externally controlled tourism is an important theme of Caribbean nationalisms (Duval & Wilkinson, 2004, p.62). Influenced by dependency theorists such as Cardoso (1972), Dos Santos (1972) or Frank (1966), they see their islands subservient to the expansion of other economies, notably that of the United States. Although tourism comes with jobs and hard currency earnings and eases the trade deficit, it has been equated in many intellectual works with neo-colonialism (notably Perez, 1975) and more specifically with the “plantation model” (e.g. Hall, 1994; Weaver, 1988; Bianchi, 2002). Popular talk even adds comparisons with “prostitution” or “whorism”. Neo-colonialism, as Crick (1989, p.322) argues, has taken a “hedonistic face” with the happy faces of smiling tourists enjoying sunny playgrounds. Beyond economic subserviency, also lies a fear that the entire social fabric may be affected by norms, ideas and lifestyle arriving from outside, leading some observers to talk about a cultural dependency well beyond the economic one (e.g. Erisman, 1983).

The fact that Soufrière is visibly one the island’s poorest communities, while its local space is the jewel of the country’s tourism industry seems to illustrate the dependency theory. The growth of tourism has certainly not been accompanied by a concomitant and visible enrichment of the lay locals. The blatant paradox of a tourist capital sunk in poverty is often pointed out by St. Lucian intellectuals (e.g. Wulf, 2003, p.32-33). To ordinary people in Soufrière, tourism does carry a strong taste of neo-colonialism. Some jobs are indeed provided by hotels resorts but wages are low and none of the profit made goes to the local community as a whole [interview 30]. Hotels pay their taxes but they flow to the central government and nothing comes

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65 The small size of domestic markets, the high cost of imported inputs, a limited access to regional and international markets, a limited pool of managerial and entrepreneurial skills, credit constraints, etc.
back to Soufrière. Although some resorts sporadically contribute to this or that local event, they have no policy of contributing to the development of local infrastructures. As for the incoming flows of tourists dropping off their boat tours for a few hours in Soufrière, their input to the local economy benefits a handful of local businessmen who have the right networks to sign contracts with tour companies. Most tourists are taken directly from their boats by buses to outlying restaurants and brought back without having spent any money in local shops [interview 13].

The feeling is strong among fishers that they have been marginalised to accommodate “rich, white tourists” who, moreover, do not have a keen interest in the livelihood of locals, as manifested by divers releasing fish found in underwater gear [interview 2]. As for people working in hotels, as well as their families, they often feel they are “subservient to foreign people and badly paid, exactly like in the colonial time”.67

Two informal focus groups held in Soufrière with people from various walks of life68 led to an outpouring of criticisms against local hotels. Participants had much to say about how this industry does not provide decent salaries and “trap[s] people into low paid jobs”. Several described the high turnover of tourism employees, as people get fired on various “pretexts”, especially “when they start complaining or wanting to unionise”. One participant mentioned her mother who works as a cleaning lady in a big resort nearby and who complains about how badly white people treat employees, “although things are getting a bit better now”. Another insisted that these resorts “do not give locals the opportunity to prove and advance themselves by giving them a chance to hold a managing position”. As one person put it, “ninety per cent of interesting positions are held by white people from foreign countries”. Another participant recalled his experience as a steward (kitchen cleaner) for six months in one of these resorts. While around EC$1,000 a month in Soufrière makes for a very basic living, he would be paid EC$250 per two weeks (8 hours a day, 6 days a week). He admitted that longer term employees earn more – with extra money based on

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66 The Town Council is fully appointed by the central government. As an interviewee put it, it is given “pocket money to play with” and cannot go to a bank and raise a loan, since it has no revenue [interview 43].
67 Quotation from a cleaning lady working in a local hotel resort.
68 Two focus groups were held respectively with 7 and 6 participants. They would last for one hour approximately. Participants included people like an accountant, employees from local hotel resorts, a shop keeper, a taxi driver, a hair dresser often working with tourists, as well as unemployed persons regularly involved in reef fishing.
performance – but in his view they would still be low paid while “the bosses are making millions”. The general feeling was expressed by a participant who insisted that:

These people use Soufrière’s poverty and turn it into gold for themselves. They are smart!

Statistics on wages provided by the government (GSL, 2003, p. 28-30) tend to confirm that people in the tourism are relatively low paid when compared to their long work hours. As Jules (2005, p.22) comments, “the data show tourism is among the top sectors with the longest average hours of work, while earnings fall just below mid-range for all sectors reviewed.”

Beyond these criticisms, there is also the disturbing feeling for locals that the “island is for sale” and that foreign investors and clients are left a clear field to act as they please, often in collusion with “corrupted politicians”. As one fisher put it:

The SMMA and the government are taking the sea and selling it to foreigners. [interview 31]

Another added:

This is a Chechen country. Everything is run by money. Politicians are bought off by foreigners. [interview 32]

An apparent illustration of this was recently provided with the construction of a vast new resort on the east coast of the island, in an area supposed to be a strictly protected natural site. This led to an intense political controversy at the national level, but construction nevertheless went ahead, with suspicions of corruption. As a young and articulate fisherman put it:

Here, people enter in politics poor; and they get out rich. [interview 34]

Whether corruption is involved or not, the fact is that the tourism industry is taking hold of the St. Lucian environment and that Soufrière seems no exception, as shown by the process of commodification we now explore.

5.2.2. Turning spaces and behaviours into tradable goods

When a tourist comes to St. Lucia, expectations are high. Caribbean tourism is indeed “vested in the branding and marketing of Paradise” (Sheller, 2004, p.24), “[conjuring] up the idea of 'heaven on earth' or 'a little bit of paradise' in the collective European imagination” (Pattullo, 1996, p.141). This notion dates back a long way. As Grove (1995, p.3) argues, from the seventeenth century onwards, “the
tropical environment was increasingly utilised as the symbolic location for the idealised landscapes and aspirations of the Western imagination". In Soufrière, the market mainly comprises couples: honeymoons are a key “industry” and some resorts even provide a free wedding service. What is expected, thus, is a “romantic desert island”. This fantasy is abundantly sold on websites that bear photos with no trace of local populations, “building on the impression of nothing but sand, sea and sun” (Pattullo, 1996, p.145). To deliver this tourist experience and meet the ideal of a “Garden of Eden before the Fall” – of empty sunny beaches – a good number of local realities must be “fixed” or “hidden”.

The potential for building more hotels in Soufrière is vast but the tourism industry feels the local population as a hindrance. This was the case of a foreign tourism consultant who declared to us:

_There are currently 300 hotels rooms available here, but more than 1,000 could be operated....A big drawback is the community: people here lack education and culture, and quite a few are lazy. They don’t know how to interact with foreigners. Tourists don’t like coming to town and are annoyed on beaches or even on the sea._ [interview 22]

Local spaces and behaviours need to be refined, modified and in the end “commodified” to be more attractive to tourists – a process in which many locals feel the SMMA plays a part.

First, the SMMA became involved in clearing beaches from an “invasion of water taxis”, as a hotel manager recalls [interview 12]. _Water-taxis_ refer to people who own or rent a boat, offering to transport tourists from one bay to the other or to more distant areas of the island. Many of them are former or part-time fishers, often young and from a very modest social background. Given the restrictions on fishing and the lack of job opportunities in town, numerous fisher families started reverting to this activity after the inception of the zoning system [interview 19]. Competing with one another, water taxis came into the vicinity of two important local resorts. Complaints were received by the SMMA from the Jalousie and Anse Chastanet hotels arguing that the situation was “not acceptable anymore” and that “strict measures” were needed “to regain order” [interview 5]. St. Lucia’s laws stipulate that all beaches are public and that free access must be guaranteed, so that hotels are not _legally_ able to bar people from accessing “their” beach. In response, the SMMA instated a system whereby water taxis are assigned extremely limited locations on beaches with no right to walk along to offer services – as “it disturbs tourist tranquillity”. It also
includes a rotation scheme through which people are allocated restricted work hours. In 2002, formal licenses were issued to water taxi operators for the transportation of passengers in the form of a “Soufrière Water Craft Permit”. The process gave satisfaction to hotels but many fisher families regret that, after being ousted from the “marine reserves”, they are now barred from accessing the “tourist reserves”.

Another important contribution of the SMMA to “beach commodification” has been its passivity in enforcing St. Lucia’s law requiring that all beaches be public and freely accessible. The SMMA has proved rather submissive towards large resorts that have all but privatised these spaces de facto [interviews 35, 54]. Hotels and restaurants often complain about the locals’ behaviour (too “noisy” or “agitated”), which is contrary to the “peace” expected by foreigners. Various tactics are thus used to keep locals away, despite their right. One is to ensure that there is no public transportation available from the town to hotel beaches, which makes it difficult for locals to reach them. Anse Chastanet, a large hotel resort with one of the most spectacular bays of the SMMA zone, has not refurbished the access road “because it would enable more cars to get there”, as an employee acknowledged [interview 30]. Another tactic is to make the space look like private property. To get to the beaches of both the Anse Chastanet and the Jalousie resorts, one has to pass through a formal barrier with private uniformed security guards, walk along several administrative buildings to finally arrive at a coastal space taken over by various constructions and rows of fixed and large wooden sunshades. This setting seems entirely controlled and privately run and would impress anybody not aware that this space is public by law. An unwritten agreement seems to have been reached whereby motivated locals can have access to hotel beaches but on specific and limited parts, the bulk of the nicer areas being reserved for tourists. Reportedly, several locals complained over time to the SMMA that access is in practice quite difficult, but little has ever been done to better the situation beyond the exchange of a few letters [interview 4].

Thirdly, the SMMA has also engaged into improving safety, but selectively – namely “tourist safety”, without touching larger safety issues affecting the community, such as the theft of fisher equipment. A feeling thus emerged that the concern of the SMMA within its marine jurisdiction was the protection of tourists, not of the general population. Since 2000, concerns had arisen within the board regarding “yacht break-ins”. Lights were thus set up in the Rachette Point area and the dinghy
jetty to discourage criminals. The SMMA contracted with a security company to provide intervention patrols and emergency services. It also scheduled regular night patrols and proposed the police use its boats to do the same. Safety workshops and training for water taxis were carried out to raise awareness about police procedures. Finally, a strengthened identification system was instated with stickers for licensed boats, official t-shirts and ID cards for water taxis with prior checking by the police of an applicant’s criminal record. After 2005, the SMMA reverted to a new security company and tried to work more closely with the St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority. Although the “tourist safety” issue has not been entirely solved in practice, the fact is that the SMMA proved very responsive on this issue, unlike their reactivity to fisher issues. Commenting on this fact, a bar tender remarked: “You know, it is the yachts’ money that allows the SMMA to live” [interview 36].

Finally, the SMMA has also engaged in fighting the “harassment problem”. Harassment is a negative term used to describe a recurrent behaviours observed in town and on the sea, to “make a quick buck” by pushing petty services or products on tourists. Such behaviour is obvious in the Soufrière area and in St. Lucia in general; it is perceived by the authorities as a significant hindrance to the development of tourism. As a Castries official explained: “to sell St. Lucia to the world, our people need to be educated into understanding certain things” [interview 37]. The SMMA does not have many means of acting on this issue, but nevertheless undertook public information campaigns, including radio spots aired on national media. One such message ran as follows:

There is a right and wrong way to promote your ware. Act responsibly. Provide a positive impression!

In campaigns such as these, people in Soufrière and surrounding communities have been asked to conduct themselves “in an appropriate manner” and bear in mind that the impression provided to visitors is “not one of the individuals encountered, but of the whole island”. In fighting “harassment” thus, direct appeals to patriotism are made but little attention is paid to another side of the problem: some observers regularly contend that harassment is in fact a form of resistance against a mode of tourism development that has excluded the lay people from the benefits of foreigners’ money; more should thus be done to connect locals and foreigners, instead of segregating them.

In a nutshell, foreigners come to St. Lucia to experience a “quiet paradise” and the
SMMA has done all it can, actively and passively, to make the beaches a more tradable good; it has also worked to make locals behave more "properly". All of this reflects a form of productive power whereby spaces and behaviours are reshaped under the pressure of an anonymous mass of tourists and world markets.

5.2.3. Working for commodification: the other CP schemes in Soufrière

The SMMA is not the only scheme in Soufrière based on a strong discourse of community participation. Two others are of particular interest: the Soufrière Regional Development Foundation (SRDF) and the Piton Management Area (PMA). Here, we show how these three CP schemes are interlinked and have all been working to foster the commodification of the community in line with the requirements of international tourism markets. Not only do they share their apparent goals, but there are also similarities in their internal functioning: low levels of CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity, an estrangement from the local people, as well as a dominance of economic interest groups with political connections.

*Beautifying Soufrière through "community participation": the SRDF*

As we have seen (cf. section 4.2.1), the SRDF was created in 1986 by three local notables as a non-governmental organisation intended to promote tourism, initially under the name of the "Soufrière Development Programme" (SDP). Their core objective, shared with the prime minister of the time, was to make Soufrière "a better place for tourists". As a former president of the SMMA board acknowledges:

> The founding idea was to help increase the attractiveness of Soufrière for tourists and the acceptability of tourism among the people here. [interview 9]

Tellingly, the founding blueprint of the SDP was a vast architectural plan for a complete revamping of the city's appearance, to make it eye-catching. Although this plan has never been implemented as such, it is still revered by the local elite as an almost legendary vision of what Soufrière should be like [interview 48]. The SDP eventually engaged into more modest activities, including the employment of "beach boys" (to rid the water front of garbage); an aesthetic upgrade of the waterfront with trees, benches, lampposts; and the construction of jetty in the middle of the bay to welcome tour boats. Later projects have also focused on beautifying the town (repairs to sidewalks and drains, garbage collection, public toilets, taxi stands, etc.), as well as supported events such as the annual carnival and a jazz festival. Work was
also carried out to promote "tourist safety and tranquillity" by hiring six "tourist wardens" to "better manage the residents interaction with foreigners and minimise harassment" [interview 1].

In 1993, the SPD officially became the "Soufrière Regional Development Foundation" (SRDF) with a governance structure mixing the government, national interest groups and more local ones. In practice, however, the SRDF was and still is led by local businessmen involved in tourism and with high political connections. Interviews and focus groups revealed clear feelings in the community that the "Foundation" is barely connected to locals. A shop owner declared for instance:

*This is not a community owned organisation. Most of the people on the board are not from Soufrière. And the Foundation could do much more for the people here with the money it makes.* [interview 16]

A young lady, working as an accountant, added:

*I do not really know what the foundation does. It seems to concentrate on superficial things like lights for Christmas, carnival, the waterfront, etc. I do not see any project to alleviate poverty. I even asked to work there three days at one point, just to understand it, but it did not work out.*

Other comments included:

- It's just a bunch of politically connected people there. [interview 36]
- They are playing with our money, with Soufrière's money, from the Sulphur Springs. [interview 33]

Since 1995, the SRDF has been entrusted with the management of the Sulphur Spring (a natural volcanic attraction of the area) and the use of its revenue "for the benefit of the community". But among locals the general feeling seems to be that:

*The foundation raises a lot of money but is not transparent or accountable....It is not clear to anybody how it is used.* [interview 44]

In fact, the government takes 5% on the revenue and is given a yearly report on the use of the money. So, according to a former SRDF board member:

*There is total accountability on the use of money and the government approves of it.* [interview 11]

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69 Five organisations were originally represented on the SRDF board: the SDP (three representatives), the Soufrière Town Council (a rather hollow structure appointed by the central government), the Ministry of Planning (a powerful ministry), St. Lucia Tourist Board (representing the tourism industry), the National Trust (a large NGO concerned with conservation) and the Mother and Father League (a local NGO that stopped functioning a few years later). It is only in 1997 that more local representatives were included from: the Fishermen's Co-operative, the Taxi Association and the Fonds St Jacques Development Committee (a development initiative from a nearby rural community).
What is clear, however, is that the Foundation has no accountability to the local community. It has no policy, for instance, of making a yearly public and accessible report on its activity in any form. During fieldwork, the strongest feelings of mistrust against the SRDF management were found in the fisher area, Baron’s Drive, as well as among ordinary trades people (shopkeepers, bar tenders, etc.). Suspicions were expressed about a self-interested management and obvious conflicts of interests. Several interviewees recalled, for instance, that the jetty built by the SDP was insured by a company held by a board member – and when the insurance needed to be activated, after damage by storm activity, the contract was not honoured. A British woman, living in Soufrière for 15 years and running a large shop commented:

_The Foundation is managed in the private interest of these [board] people....They are the ones who get the major contracts when the [Foundation] does some construction work or organises something - for instance the visit of Prince Charles and Camilla [in March 2008]. [interview 13]_

In the end, there is little doubt that locals do not feel that the SRDF is their “own thing”. In the available documentation, the SRDF is nevertheless presented as a community organisation with a strong local membership, created by “the concerted efforts of a cross-section of community leaders in Soufrière” (Theodore, 1998, p.69). But even a member of the Taxi Association, which is represented on the SRDF board, declared:

_People in the Foundation want to appear like they give power to the local people, but this is not happening. Who takes final decisions there? A few businessmen._

[interview 21]

The local community and the Foundation grew even further apart when the government decided to take it over without further ceremony. In February 2007, the prime minister sent a letter appointing a whole new board, a move that was contrary to the Foundation’s articles of association. Not only did he appoint people as individuals, not as representatives of any organisation, but he also personally appointed the chairman and deputy chairman, which made elections impossible. The previous board retreated, finding it difficult to defy a prime minister, but some members brought the matter into court. The High Court eventually ruled against the government but the latter still won in its own way: under political pressures, board member organisations of the SRDF regularised the appointments that were made. The “new board” has now amended the articles of associations so that the prime minister can now appoint and revoke people more easily. As a staff member of the
Foundation bitterly commented: “In St. Lucia, the government can get away with such things” [interview 48].

The PMA: safeguarding a World Heritage site... selectively

The Piton Management Area is the third (and newest) significant participatory mechanism set up in Soufrière. It is responsible for the protection of a World Heritage site nominated by UNESCO in 2004. The area comprises 3,000 volcanic hectares including the world-famous Pitons rising from the sea (cf. Photo 1, Chapter 4). Governmental efforts to convince UNESCO started in the early 1990s but were delayed by a controversy over the construction of a hotel resort – Jalousie – right in the middle of the “most sacred site” of the island. Protesters such as the St. Lucian Nobel prize winner Derek Walcott were vocal against an endeavour that compared in their eyes with building “a casino in the Vatican... or a take-away concession inside Stonehenge”.

The government nevertheless gave permission in the name of employment and foreign exchange - so the Jalousie resort opened in 1992. From there, it took time to convince UNESCO that the area could nonetheless be given the status of a World Heritage site.

Once nominated, the site had to comply with a key requirement: develop a strict land management plan, notably to control construction activities since large parts of the area are under private ownership. In 2007, the government entrusted a foreign consulting company with designing the plan, following a “large participatory process”. Stakes are high for local landowners, as half a hectare is worth more than 1,5 million dollars at 2008 market prices. The much awaited report was released in 2008 and suggested a zoning system, with seven distinct policy areas, from “no-build” zones to zones where new constructions are allowed.

The proposal, however, sparked an intense controversy in Soufrière [interviews 1, 47, 49]. Small and medium landowners from local families felt they were being sacrificed to the “no-build” policies, while large hotel resorts were granted the right to extend their constructions, notably Jalousie. Harsh criticisms were levelled at the supposed “participatory process”, which was apparently conducted in haste and with very few public meetings. Several locals even found their names mentioned in the list of people interviewed by the consultants, which they denied. Thus, while more

70 Quoted by McCannell (1992, p.2-3).
than 1,800 families are affected by the zoning scheme, the PMA is resented as “a club of a few”. Discussions with small landowners produced comments such as:

- The consultation was fake... forged [or] flawed.
- Those guys [the consultants] were very selective in carrying out their mandate.
- In the end, it’s all about foreigners helping foreigners.
- Big businesses do not want us to develop alternative hotel options in the area. And they even want to keep the villa business for themselves.

Countering critiques during the public presentation of the plan, the consultants insisted that they had had only a “limited time to carry out consultations”. One participant reportedly gave this applause-winning answer:

"These decisions will affect Soufrière’s families for generations to come. And you tell us that time was a constraint? What are we going to say to our children? That we cannot do anything of our land, because you had not enough time?" [interview 18]

At the time of the fieldwork, the matter was still being debated locally but was in the hands of the government, which was due to make its decision public – and most likely approve the report.

This discussion shows that SMMA, the SRDF and the PMA show strong similarities in their goals and functioning, as well as in feelings they aroused in the local community – from the poorer fishers to potentially rich landowners. Moreover, as seen in Section 4.2.1., the SRDF was an initiator of the SMMA, while the PMA includes both organisations on its advisory committee (called PMAAC). There are now plans to create a single building to host all three organisations [interview 1]. All these linkages are highly obvious to locals. Many fishers for instance, when complaining about the SMMA, refer in their talks to the SRDF indiscriminately [interviews 23, 24]. These three CP organisations are thus largely thought of as a single entity, which is clearly indicated by the language used by lay locals when they refer to an indistinct “they” – pointing to a world of “organisations” separate from the people and connected to businesses and government.

5.2.4. Conclusion: multiple sources of commodification in Soufrière

Many St. Lucians feel that their government’s emphasis on the tourist industry has led to the neglect of domestic problems and turned numbers of people into “second-class citizens” in their own country [interview 6]. In a context where this industry is widely resented as a form of “neoliberal neo-colonialism”, the active
commodification of Soufrière spaces and behaviours has been fostered by three interconnected CP schemes, among which the SMMA has played an important role. The situation has been managed as if “keeping troublesome locals in check” were the guiding motto, whether “troublesome” refers to fishers reluctant to clear the coast, locals reluctant to clear the beaches or small landowners reluctant to leave a profitable business to larger economic investors. The use of the CP discourse in Soufrière does seem to be congruent with the expectations of the critical narrative, according to which marketisation and commodification operate at the relative expense of the weaker local actors. In all cases, it seems clear that the entire community does not equally benefit from the increased “market opportunities”.
5.3. Weaker Social Capital: the Catalysts and Effects of Containment

The ninth step of our analytical framework (defined in Chapter 3) calls for a two-way analysis of the interactions between CP and the local community’s social capital. This is critical because CP schemes are typically meant to build upon and reinforce this social capital. The expectations of the emancipatory narrative are clear: SC is supposed to help CP develop in the first place, while CP is expected to strengthen SC — and thus the community’s capacities for collective action and institutional engagement. Here, however, we show that field data demonstrate the exact opposite.

This section first argues that a low bridging and bonding social capital have undermined the ability of community groups to appropriate the SMMA participatory process. This helps explain why containment and commodification were so successful in Soufrière: social fragmentation within and among groups left locals fully exposed to external power effects.

In a second sub-section we show that the impact of CP on SC, through the dynamics of social frustrations, was not positive after all. For some months in 1997, the fishers’ response strategy was VOICE (cf. section 4.3.3) but, after losing their political support, they reverted to a more silent and psychological EXIT that failed to engage them with institutions or to change them from within. A temporal analysis shows that resistance to outside influences by the Soufrière community has historically taken two radically opposed forms: one of active rebellion and one of complete withdrawal — two models that were both activated by the SMMA experience. A third course of action, one of ongoing involvement, has never come about, reflecting the deep-seated local estrangement from any sort of formal institutions. On the whole, little experience or capacity to engage with institutions has been built through the CP scheme.

5.3.1. Enabling containment and power effects: low bridging and bonding SC

Low levels of bridging SC, trust and solidarity have hindered the emergence of collective action across groups, while a low bonding SC has even prevented some groups from organising themselves and gaining effective representation in various
CP schemes. On the other hand, strong linking SC on the part on some individuals has enabled them to passively resist the SMMA in some instances or actively shape its line of action.

A low bridging SC

Field interviews provided a blunt account of how Soufrière is perceived as divided in the eyes of the locals. A female informant [interview 43], working as a local civil servant, seemed to echo this general feeling by describing a “three-tier society”: 1) the “people who have a lot or who have already achieved something, usually because the family already had capital”; 2) those who “want to make it and try hard”; 3) and those who have very little – some of whom “sit and do nothing” while others “work hard but cannot make a proper living”. It is in this last category that the poorer fishermen as well people with petty jobs related to tourism see themselves; these people are often illiterate (although they had some schooling) and feel estranged from the rest of the society.

Levels of trust and solidarity among groups are extremely low. Interviews in the higher strata of the community (with businessmen, large shop owners, hotel managers, etc.) showed that most expressed a strong distrust of poorer groups - and very often of their own employees [interviews 11, 12, 15, 17]. There seems to be widespread distrust among the wealthier regarding the “laziness of most of Soufrière”, as one shopkeeper put it. Meanwhile, people from poorer groups, such as fishers, waiters, hotel cleaners, modest tourist guides, or beggars express no less mistrust of the higher social classes, describing them as “greedy”, “interested only in their own belly”, and with “little respect for the common people” [interview 35]. Another interviewee added that “to achieve anything in Soufrière, [one] needs to get acquainted with the right people”, which implies “ignoring certain parts of society and keeping a distance” [interview 2].

In Soufrière’s there is no set place or time for communication between various social groups. The culture of “patronage and paternalism” that is typical of many small communities has not developed here. The wealthy people do feel an obligation to help the poor in difficult times, or the community through the construction of public utilities, for example. Some traditional families who own large portions of Soufrière’s land do practice a form of paternalism but only with some of their long-
standing employees: this does not extend to the wider community and is often discontinued by the younger generations [interviews 1, 14].

Each “tier group” follows “its own life and deals with its own problems pretty much alone”, in the words of several interviewees, who insisted on the “rising individualism affecting Soufrière” [interview 6]. This is especially felt at the lowest level of the community, among beggars for instance. One interviewee, John, aged 28, is a street wanderer who takes up small construction or transport jobs whenever possible. Often, he simply opens doors to people entering supermarkets trying to attract their goodwill. When talking about change in the community, he said what most struck him was the increasing privatisation of space:

> People close off their properties more than before. It is more and more difficult to find shelter when my parents want me out. [interview 35]

In John’s eyes, there is less and less solidarity:

> In the old days, windows were left open, people would stand around chatting and one could always ask for a little food at different places. Nowadays, people are locking themselves in and they don’t want to talk to you.

Furthermore, social groups do not have their sights set in same direction. The wealthiest aspire to the capital Castries, to which they are closely connected, sometimes living there full time and only going to Soufrière for business [interview 18]. The small but emerging middle class looks up to the wealthy, while the poor strive to make a living and reject the society in which they find themselves. Illustratively, the annual carnival that takes place in August is supposed to be a moment of “unity” in Soufrière; but interviews and observations showed that it provides more opportunities for conflicts than cohesion, notably among businessmen or urban areas trying to capture revenues.

This lack of bridging social capital has long hindered collective endeavours in the community. One of the rare counter-initiatives was the “Mother and Father’s Group” that was created the Catholic Church to pull people together on educational and other issues, but it eventually dissolved [interview 53]. Low bridging SC has also affected the functioning of the SMMA, as only one or two staff members share some social background with fishers - a disconnect reinforced by the spatial location of the SMMA office, situated far from the fishers’ districts.
**Weak bonding SC**

Soufrière is not only characterised by a low level of *bridging* but also *bonding* social capital — meaning that groups are themselves fragmented. This has further undermined, time and again, the emergence of self-sustaining collective endeavours. Meanwhile, the narrow and higher end of the local economic elite enjoys a high level of *linking* social capital, providing them with open access to the highest political spheres of the country. This combination is the catalyst that enabled power phenomena to develop so strongly in SMMA CP scheme.

Although they are the very soul of the town, Soufrière’s fishers form a fragmented community with deep feelings of competition, mistrust and conflict. Interviews with fishers revealed strong dividing lines and tense feelings among them: the young vs. the old, deep water vs. reef fishers, the main socio-economic gap being between people who own a boat and those who do not [interviews 23, 24, 26, 27, 32]. Certainly, the Soufrière Fishermen’s Co-operative is an achievement for this community as the longest-standing community organisation in town. Registered in January 1977, the “co-op” has grown from 40 to over 100 members. Its activities developed from selling only fuel to providing fishing equipment including baits, seine, fillets, thread, line, rope, cooking gas and ice. It is also responsible for distributing a small government fuel subsidy to fishers and can grant small loans to its members. As we have seen (cf. 5.3.1), however, less than 30% of fishers in Soufrière are boat owners and even less are co-operative members, the involvement of younger fishers being particularly low. Even within the co-operative’s current membership, the capacity for simple coordination is very low. For instance, constant fights occur at sea around the Fishing Aggregating Devices set up with the support of French money\(^{71}\) to buttress deep-sea fishing. What’s more, when it comes to renewing the FADs, which are critical collective goods, there is little capacity for cooperation: the president of the co-operative has often suggested to the fishermen that they make some pooled savings to fund new FADS but no such collective effort has ever materialised [interview 26].

The lack of capacity for collective action was also illustrated with the aborted project for a “water taxi association” aimed at regulating the increasing number of fishermen offering transport services to tourists [interviews 19, 21]. The Water Taxi

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\(^{71}\) As mentioned earlier (cf. 4.4.3), these devices were no longer working at the time of the fieldwork.
Association was formally part of the SMMA board from the start but never actually came into existence due to disagreement over its potential members. This issue was frequently discussed by the SMMA board, which suspected that certain attempts were under way to monopolise the business and make it difficult for new people to obtain a license. At one point, two competing associations even existed: the Soufrière Water Craft Association and the Soufrière Water Taxi Association. In order to resolve this issue, meetings were held with the two associations but a merger proved impossible.

The local business community is also deeply fragmented. First and foremost, there is the divide between expatriates and locals [interviews 15, 18]. Expatriates are by definition not from Soufrière and are usually “white people who own big things” such as large hotel resorts. Some of them have been there for so long that they are now part of the landscape, although still not identified as “locals”. As for the locals, “there are no more than ten important business people” and, importantly, “there is a lot of competition among them” for business opportunities: for instance, who will catch the daily flow of tourists that arrives for lunch or visits. We interviewed several people from this group and they all acknowledged that “what is lacking is a sense of coming together to make the most of business opportunities” [interview 11]. There were attempts to set up a “Soufrière Business Association”, but in the face of too much disagreement it repeatedly collapsed. Even two brothers who were nominated as at the head of the association fought against each another.

On the other hand, Soufrière’s bonding social capital is acutely affected by the polarisation of the island’s political life between its two main parties: the Saint Lucian Labour Party (SLP) and the United Workers’ Party (UWP). This divide runs through all strata of society and leads to high tensions in inter-personal relations, further undermining Soufrière’s poor capacity for collective endeavours. “Politicisation” or “partisan politics” creates mistrust between people based upon

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72 They include: 1) the owner of the gas station (Cool Breeze); 2) the owner of the Excelsior Plaza, the main commercial centre; 3) a couple that owns the La Haut Plantation, an hotel in the hills; 4) the owner of Fonds Doux Estate and of a supermarket; 5) the traditional family (Du Boulay) that owns the Estate Plantation and Du Boulay Construction Supplies; 6) the owner of the Hummingbird resort; 7) the owner of Plantation Estate and the Stonefield Resort; 8) the traditional Devaux family that owns the botanical Gardens and much of the land around Soufrière; 9) the owner of the Beacon Hotel/Restaurant and the Torry Waterfall.

73 For background information on the St. Lucian political system, see Appendix 8.
political affiliations or supposed preferences. It also leads to systematic criticism of whatever proposal is made by the other side. Although the entire island is affected by this type of politics, Soufrière is particularly well-known for this way of managing affairs. Numerous interviewees noted that “it is very black and white here” and “people would not even shake hands with people from the other party” [interviews 41, 46, 51]. Many interviewees were bitter about this situation:

- **What we usually find in our politics is that opposition parties criticise just to oppose, so nothing can be done in a collaborative spirit.** [interview 43]

- **Political witch-hunting is ongoing and everywhere.** [interview 52]

- **Whenever a new administration arrives in Castries, it destroys all the previous work done, so everything always has to start from scratch. And in Soufrière, it is even worse.** [interview 1]

One interviewee added:

*Half of the people tend to be quiet, because when their party is in power, they do not dare criticise.* [interview 36]

This type of partisan politics has plagued the functioning of the rare community organisations, since their board members criticise proposals on the basis of political subtexts. This often happened, for instance, with the Soufrière business association and with SRDF.

### 5.3.2. From VOICE to EXIT: institutional avoidance and psychological withdrawal

Since 2001, the absence of visible political upheaval by the poorer fishers of Soufrière has largely been interpreted by donor-financed project evaluators as a sign of “success” for the SMMA as an “effective” participatory mechanism (e.g. FFEM, 2008). In our view, however, this kind of silence cannot be taken as a proof of community participation – in fact, in the St. Lucian context it mean quite the opposite. Here we make the four following points: 1) the social anger against the SMMA has not disappeared although it has turned more inward and “underground”; 2) the popular culture of resistance in St. Lucia is not used to formally engaging with institutions; it rather takes the form of violent resistance or psychological withdrawal and resignation; 3) a mix of violent talks and political passivity also characterises the Rasta culture that is developing fast among the younger and poorer part of the Soufrière community; 4) all in all, these modes of popular resistances to the SMMA...
do not appear to have contributed to the strengthening of Soufrière social capital—much the contrary.

**The continuing anger of the poorer fishers**

No large-scale conflict has broken out between the SMMA and the fishermen for a long time, especially when compared to the scale of the 1997 upheaval. However, we needed to find out if this meant acceptance of the SMMA. To this end, we undertook a series of highly informative interviews and informal focus groups in the fisher area, Baron’s Drive, which brought to light the continuing social anger felt against the SMMA experience.

Baron’s Drive is without sanitation, plagued by bad smells and busy with small girls carrying water buckets back home. The first time we walked into it, a man in his thirties started asking us inquisitive and relevant questions on our work, as we seemed to be “another white expert”. The man did not want to give his real name and asked us to call him “Spencer”. We were joined by several fishers of varying ages who nodded in agreement and added their own comments. This experience was followed by similar ones in the following weeks, involving other people from the area. All pointed in the same direction: a deep dissatisfaction with the SMMA.

The central critique is that the fishers have been “pushed out from the good fishing spots” and their living conditions are made “much worse for the benefit of the rich white tourists”. When faced with the fact that the SMMA board has a fisher representative, participants made it clear that the person in charge in no way represents them. As they put it, “such people are brainwashed”, “sucked into the system” and “bought off to comply and to pretend we want to comply”. Focus groups further revealed the feeling that, in its efforts to speak to the fishers, the SMMA “only turns to the older generation and not to the younger ones” who generally “have no boat but a lot to say”. People offered further comments such as “we are not happy”, “we feel too alone” or “we cannot take it any longer”.

Another strong feeling is that “nothing is done to help [them]”. Fishers mentioned the tragic case of a 38-year-old man who had been missing for almost 30 days and who had probably drowned because of rusty equipment. There is also resentment against local commercial banks: they do not grant fishers credit, as they require collateral in the form of land, property, stable income, etc. No micro-finance option
is available locally, no loan guarantee from the government either. In their experience, “nothing is done for [them]”. This feeling of unfairness, of “being pushed into a corner” with “no option to make a living”, focuses all the blame onto the SMMA and the SRDF. This is reinforced by the contrasting perception that the latter “has a lot of money” from the Sulphur Springs that “goes nobody knows where”.

Reverting to violence towards institutions: a culture of popular resistance

One of the most striking results of our interviews with poorer social groups in Soufrière (fishers, beggars, seasonal construction workers, etc.) was that they systematically reject formal institutions, which they identify with the “rich and the powerful”. In the face of problems, there seems to be a form of popular resistance and discontent, but those concerned seem unable to institutionalise this or work with institutions. An interviewee explained as much saying that, “poor fishers have no time to attend participatory workshops” [interview 50]; but in our understanding, it is not merely a question of time: it is rather a matter of disconnected mental worlds opposing a “white/ institutional/ English-speaking/ formal/ literate/ modern” framework to another based on French patois, limited literacy, black culture and a deeply ingrained feeling of being the “sons of slaves”.

The SMMA is very much perceived within the lower social classes as part of this “first world”. This organisation has little connection with the lower social classes: it is therefore “not worth investing yourself in it”, as a man in his thirties explained, since it has been “bought off like the rest” [interview 31]. As a civil servant explained to us in Castries:

Throughout the island, there is a rejection of all institutions by the popular classes; but there are also social demands and expectations which are not met and which can turn into violence any time. [interview 38]

There is no need to go far back in the history of St. Lucia to see that this eventuality is real. The quasi-insurrection of the banana farmers in late 1993 is still present in all memories. At the time, the issue was the programmed collapsed of the banana sector following the revision of the ACP agreements with the European Union. The EU left St. Lucian producers with a more difficult access to its markets and in an open competition with cheaper bananas from Central and South America. The fear was intense and degenerated into active strikes and confrontations with the police: fires
were set alight and barricades erected, leaving some farmers dead and policemen injured.

This culture of fierce resistance runs deep in local history and self-identities, especially in Soufrière. Its clearest and most celebrated example of “patriotic violence” is the slave rebellion against British rule at the time of the French Revolution. This took the form of an armed conflict between the British and the rebels, most of whom were hiding in the Soufrière area, and is a source of pride for the local community. Using guerrilla tactics, burning farms, attacking British strongholds and causing as much chaos as possible before hiding in the mountains, these nègres marrons (also know as “brigands”) managed to hold the island for a year, forcing many owners of colonial plantations out of the country.

In the West Indies, there is certainly an “incredible culture of resistance”, as a local university professor put it [interview 56]. People know how to “rise up” and contest the legitimacy of formal institutions. One may wonder whether the current take over of the island by the tourism industry might not also spark off some violent reactions. One could say that the SMMA successfully avoided and neutralised this possibility in Soufrière, but several of our interviewees in the fishers’ area made frequent reference to an upcoming “revolution” or “social struggle” that could erupt at any time – because “this is too much”. They also implied threats of violence, possibly towards hotel resorts or the SMMA manager who is often depicted as being “responsible of everything”. We were also often told to “tell him that we [the fishers] don’t like him”. As two fishermen put it:

One day, we will join together and break the SMMA....If one of us is found guilty, then we are all guilty. [interview 23]

Withdrawal with “talks of fire”: the second face of popular resistance

Despite this tough talk, it is not easy to predict where the tension might lead in Soufrière. Not only has the SMMA been able to neutralise (rather than raise) the voices of these fishers, but popular Caribbean culture is also characterised by a tradition of “violent speeches followed by little action”, as one observer put it [interview 53]. Such strong speeches are sometimes called “talks of fire” by locals who acknowledge that these often lead nowhere. They rather turn into a form of
psychological withdrawal from politics and institutions denounced as “part of the system”.

This type of psychological withdrawal is particularly apparent in the way the “Rasta culture” has been developing in Soufrière. Rastafarianism has attracted an increasing number of young locals, notably from fisher families, with little or no work. They grow their hair long, smoke marijuana, often squat rundown buildings, etc. They have a bad reputation among most people in Soufrière, who see them as potential or actual criminals. Locals often fear that their own children will turn Rasta because, as one informant summarised, “when you are a Rasta, you don’t get a job” [interview 8]. Rastas are largely associated with people sitting and living in the street, drinking, smoking drugs, etc. and employers indeed try to avoid them. At the time of the fieldwork, one of the SMMA marine rangers had recently adopted a Rasta style, but he started to grow his hair only after being recruited. Some of his colleagues were feeling uneasy about it: one declared during an interview that if his son were “to do this”, he would be “asked to leave home immediately”.

To narrow down what being a Rasta means to people in Soufrière, we conducted a range of interviews with people who consider themselves as such. One informant had a large marijuana leaf tattooed on his chest; he used to sell drugs but had stopped because of “too many problems with the police”. Nevertheless, he insisted that Rastas are not criminals. As he explained: “a Rasta is always cool and the basic idea is to not worry”; at the same time, he “cares deeply about social justice”. Another Rasta explained: “we [Rastas] fight for the people, for the poor” – as reflected in the music they continuously listen too: a type of politically engaged Jamaican music. In a striking summary, one informant declared:

Being a Rasta means like ‘you don’t care but in fact you care’. [interview 23]

This peculiar statement seems to embody the spirit of “discontent with no action”, which is increasingly taking hold of the younger members of the Soufrière community. An analysis of several life stories seems to confirm that people turn to Rastafarianism with a social and political awareness often following years of unemployment. This is what happened, for instance, to a well-known local figure.

74 The word *system* is often used by locals. It seems to concentrate feelings of frustration and disempowerment.
75 Mrs. Selunya Charles.
who now runs a professional training programme in Soufrière for children with no
education. Her explanation of Rastafarianism proved particularly illuminating
[interview 53]: Rastas like to "burn fire" – or in other words, to "talk against
vehemently with anger and aggressive speeches". They "like to speak out for equal
rights, love and justice". In her view Rastafarian culture was originally a rebellion
"against cults that are not right, like baptism at a young age", and everything that
prevents freedom of choice. She also explained that the Rastafarian refers to the
world as "Babylon", as the "system", meaning the larger society and the "modern
world, a corrupted one". This type of reaction, however, is essentially "inward" and
does not lead to actually challenging the social order.

5.3.3. Conclusion: no SC gain and a relocation of power

As expected by the critical narrative of the CP discourse, low levels of SC in
Soufrière have paved the ground for the exercise of various forms of power upon
community stakeholders. Social fragmentation in the form of a low bridging and
bonding SC is partly responsible for preventing stakeholders from joining together to
collectively demand a greater say in SMMA CP processes. Disillusioned by their
active VOICE strategy, which had led them to use political unrest to attack this
organisation, the fisher community increasingly reverted to an EXIT response. This
takes the form of a psychological withdrawal, partly illustrated by Rastafarianism,
which parallels their continued epistemic exclusion and skewed representation in
decision-making mechanisms of marine resources management.

All of this evidences and underpins the inability of the lower social classes to involve
themselves in institutional processes. Such people feel deeply uncomfortable when
faced with formal structures and are essentially unable to engage with them. Their
discontent thus shifts from one extreme to the other: from action bordering on
violence to psychological withdrawal, with "talks of fire". In any case, "institutional
implication" is never chosen as the VOICE strategy. The line of action consistently
followed, either through VOICE or EXIT, is to bypass the institutions that are
bypassing them. This behaviour pattern is not conducive to either social and
institutional learning or reinforcement of the local SC. With the SMMA experience,

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76 With the support of CARE, an international NGO.
the latter has arguably remained, at best, unchanged as the level of communication and trust among community groups has become no stronger. The containment tactics of formalising and institutionalising disagreements – through the constitution of the SMMA – seems to have successfully neutralised this community.
5.4. Conclusion

Our analysis of the SMMA experience has confirmed essentially all the empirical expectations of the critical narrative. However, it has also provided a view of why all this happened that is not so readily anticipated by this narrative. Here, we would like to emphasise the following findings.

First, although attempts to promote CP inclusion were significant at some early stages of the SMMA process, its participatory content largely disappeared due to a dual phenomenon: 1) the capture of the emerging organisation by non-local, stronger private or public actors; and 2) the inability of the poorer end of the community to engage with formal institutions. The institutionalisation and formalisation of CP have led the weakest groups towards the exit of the decision-making process, while allowing others to take precedence or avoid the effects of the regulatory scheme.

Second, the SMMA’s environmental effectiveness has been hampered by this power configuration. The CP organisation has not been able to engage with the tourism industry, including its construction component and other land-based polluters that have a critical impact on the coastal resources. It has also failed to obtain the enforcement domestic environmental laws from central ministries and other public agencies. In other words, it has proved unable to address and modify the local power relations that are most critical for the site’s environmental sustainability.

Third, the institutionalisation of CP has fostered an objective process of “containment of locals” that has helped to commodify natural assets and local behaviours to suit the taste of the foreign tourists. In parallel, CP processes operating in Soufrière, other than the SMMA, have all driven this same commodification dynamic, for the sake of a “modernisation” led by the tourism industry.

Fourth, the inability of the lay people to engage with institutions seems to be a long-standing trait of St. Lucian social history. It leaves the poorer parts of the local community with little choice but to resort to political unrest or psychological withdrawal once “the system” wins and things seem irreversible to them. Meanwhile, Soufrière’s low bonding and bridging social capital has paved the way for a takeover of the SMMA by non-community actors.
Fifth, we are not contending that the SMMA staff deliberately sought to favour some actors over others, but rather that a combination of practices, donor expectations and other forms of compulsory, institutional and productive power have set into motion a "containment mode" to the benefit of commodification for tourism. In the process, local influence has been transferred to a mixed "domestic-global power formation" comprising economic actors of national importance, governmental authorities, foreign donors and conservationists. This alliance, however, may prove unsustainable in the future, given Soufrière's ongoing environmental degradation.

Finally, it was shown that disempowerment came about not solely or even primarily through the influence of external forces or actors, but largely through the active will of determined local actors. A local-global "power formation" thus came about, bringing together domestic public and private actors, international donors and a regional NGO. Just like Duffy (2008) showed in the case of ecotourism in Madagascar, a commodification process can receive support from a complex range of interest groups, including part of the local community, international NGOs, the local state, etc. In St. Lucia, commodification through CP cannot be reduced to an externally-led, top-down dynamic. As Brockington et al. (2008) would put it, conservation and capitalism did work here in "partnership".

This was further facilitated by local factors, such as the low level of social capital of some key stakeholders. This is not to say, however, that no resistance was put up, as both the fishers and the tourism industry battled hard to seize the CP discourse and secure the economic rent— namely access to coastal resources. As a result, although the processes at work ultimately produced the outcomes predicted by the critical narrative, they seem less unilaterally global and predetermined than this narrative assumes.
Chapter 6 - CP in Pantanal: A Containment Tool in Changing Hands

In the last two chapters we analysed one of the world’s most famous and supposedly successful CP schemes in environmental management. A close enquiry into its origins, implementation, social impacts and power effects has nevertheless largely confirmed the expectations of the critical narrative of the global CP discourse – namely the transformation of participatory processes into mechanisms of social control and containment. Still, as previously argued, drawing a more complete picture of what a global discourse “is and does” also requires looking at concrete examples deemed “less successful”, “unsuccessful” or outright “failures” by the professional community. Analysis may show, for instance, that both so-called “failures” and “successes” produce similar standard effects, such as power effects, that may be core to the inner nature of this discourse.

For this and other reasons explained in the Introduction, our second case study relates to community participation in the preservation of the Brazilian Pantanal, the world’s largest wetland. The Pantanal covers 3% of the planet’s total wetlands and still boasts a relatively well preserved environment of global significance. For a long time, initiatives in biodiversity conservation in the area by both NGOs and public authorities had relied on an approach excluding local producers. By the mid-1990s, however, the CP discourse had gained momentum in the region. In what was seen as a pioneering initiative, domestic and international donors joined forces to help create the “Pantanal Regional Park” (PRP, or Parque Regional do Pantanal), a new institutional framework potentially covering up to 40% of the region and based on CP principles. In 1998, a “preliminary project” started to foster community involvement, leading to the creation of the actual park in 2002. This initiative had quickly been hailed as a “best practice” and “success”, and credited with some influence on Brazilian policies (Comité 21, 2003, p. 18 ; FPNRF, 2006, p.9). As we shall see, however, the initiative eventually collapsed, plagued by problems of mismanagement and the undue interventionism of political authorities, among other reasons.
During the fieldwork, undertaken in the summer of 2008, information was sometimes difficult to gather as people would often find it difficult to speak about what they see as a disaster for the local community. Some people felt that the present researcher was more of a “police inspector” sent by European donors to enquire into “what happened to the money” than a genuine scholar interested in the nature and impact of CP practices [interview 66]. Three years after the IPP closure in 2005, legal proceedings have been started involving some of the people legally responsible for the PRP, and thus there is still a great deal of tension in the air.\textsuperscript{77}

Here we shall argue that the PRP project was originally designed to benefit traditional landowners and assigned to have certain strategic effects – specially the containment of conservationist NGOs and of non-traditional economic actors operating in the Pantanal. Its implementation, however, turned out to have profoundly different effects: notably and ironically, the containment of the landowners themselves. This is why the present chapter will focus on the PRP’s original intentions, while the next will analyse why and how the containment that occurred was not the one intended\textsuperscript{78}.

This chapter first provides background information on the Pantanal context. It shows that a Brazilian discourse on sovereignty and national development competes with the growing view that the Pantanal is a “global good public” in need of international attention for stricter conservation. The lax enforcement of domestic environmental laws in the pantaneira\textsuperscript{79} region is also emphasised, as well as the evolving use of the CP discourse, reflecting the tension between philosophies of conservation vs. sustainable use of the environment.

Second, the chapter explores the genesis of the PRP project and sheds light on its inbuilt containment strategy. Landowners, the local state and a foreign donor together built an “originating alliance” to thwart incoming actors, such as conservationist NGOs and more environmentally aggressive producers. The goal was to render the region’s environmental agenda more economically friendly. A new

\textsuperscript{77} The IPP management has been accused of tax evasion. There are also rumours of corruption.
\textsuperscript{78} This particular story explains why the presentation of the Pantanal case study has a different structure from the one used for the St. Lucian case study (which first looked at project implementation and then at power effects).
\textsuperscript{79} Pantaneiro and pantaneira mean “from/of the Pantanal”.

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form of CP was thus promoted giving pre-eminence to long-established local producers.

Third and finally, the chapter analyses the discourse of the PRP initiative itself, which amplifies the role of cattle-ranchers as the core of the traditional community. The way “traditions” have been defined and “cattle ranching” constructed as “environmentally friendly” shows a display of structural and productive power. A form of containment also occurred to the detriment of the Pantanal’s lower social groups, who were left out of the design of the participatory park and – later – from its governance. We thus show that, as in Soufrière, CP has functioned (or was meant to function) as a tool of social control over various groups.
6.1. The Pantanal: a Battlefield of Priorities and Discourses

This section first provides background information about the Pantanal region and shows how it has been constructed as a policy object by two rival discourses: one on global biodiversity (emphasising conservation as well as the rights and duties of the international community) and one on domestic development (that stresses economic development and Brazilian sovereignty). Second, it argues that the state-led conservation of the Pantanal is based on protective laws that are rarely enforced on the ground, thus leaving open environmental concerns. Finally, it demonstrates that the CP discourse on environmental issues has long been present in the pantaneira region but that this has changed over time: after the state-led public consultations of the 1970s, CP became more related to private conservation schemes backed by NGOs; it is only recently that CP has begun to recognise local producers as potentially legitimate environmental managers. The novelty and the strategic implications of the PRP initiative can only be identified accurately against this backdrop.

6.1.1. A world wonder ... in a sovereign country

The Pantanal is the largest freshwater ecosystem in the world and arguably has significance for the whole of mankind. It is located, however, in a sovereign country that is keen to safeguard its environmental and economic sovereignty.

With over 200,000 square kilometres (km²), the pantaneira region is about the size of England and Scotland together. Located in the heart of South America (Map 4), it is shared by Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay. Most of its surface, however, lies within Brazilian frontiers (138,000 km²) and is split between the two local states: Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. The Pantanal is essentially a floodplain (coloured in green on Map 5) surrounded by a higher plateau (light brown). Together they form the upper Paraguay River basin, which is criss-crossed by a dense network of powerful tributaries (Chart 2).

Its central location on the continent makes the Pantanal a crossroad and safe haven for threatened species from surrounding ecosystems, notably the Cerrado, the Chaco, the Amazon, and the Atlantic Forest. It thus boasts a remarkable biodiversity, with
over 80 species of mammals, 200 types of fish and 2,000 plant species. Photo 5 provides examples of its easily visible wildlife. Another defining characteristic is its seasonal rainfall and flooding cycles, which also contribute to the region’s high bio-
productivity.\footnote{Bio-productivity can be defined as the amount of organic matter produced per area per year.} With an altitude of less than 150 metres, pantaneiro landscapes are virtually flat so that during the rainy season (from October to March) up to 80% of the territory is inundated. Besides forests and rivers, the Pantanal is made up of complex networks of swamplands, lagoons and man-made drainage channels (Photo 6). As floodwaters expand and recede, aquatic plants and low grassland vegetation grow rapidly. This turnover of organic matter supports numerous food webs and an abundance of wildlife. Tropical wetlands are certainly the most “bio-productive” ecosystems on earth (per unit area) along with rain forests, marine-algae beds and coral reefs. The region is thus commonly dubbed a “biodiversity hotspot”, supporting “flagship” species such as giant anteaters, jaguars or the giant black eagle. It is also known to provide an essential habitat for the migratory cycle of many species of fish and birds across the two American continents.

The Pantanal is further seen as a significant contributor to climate stability, as the world’s wetlands are important reservoirs of carbon, comprising about 15% of terrestrial stocks (Patterson, 1999). On this basis, the pantaneira region has been constructed as an object of global significance by the international community. In 1993, UNESCO declared the Pantanal a Ramsar Site\footnote{In 1971, a treaty was signed in the Iranian city of Ramsar to promote the conservation of wetlands. It was only ratified by Brazil in 1993 after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.} and in 2000 a World Biosphere Reserve and a World Heritage site. Other conventions referring to the Pantanal as an internationally significant wetland include the World Heritage Convention (1972), the Convention on Migratory Species\footnote{Also known as the Bonn Convention.} (1979), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) or the Convention on Climate Change (1992). There is no shortage of reports, articles, policy briefs, press releases and websites by NGOs, think tanks and researchers nurturing this discourse on the Pantanal, also heavily mobilised by NGOs operating in Brazil. The WWF, for instance, has defined the region as “globally outstanding” in terms of biological distinctiveness, “vulnerable” in terms of conservation, and as a “highest priority” for global conservation (Olson, \textit{et al}., 1998).
Such considerations underpin the idea that the whole of mankind has a direct stake in the Pantanal, a right to see it preserved and a duty to make it happen. It thus comes with a notion of “global ownership” or “responsibility”. As an interviewee put it, representing the views of a local NGO:

Brazil should not be allowed to manage this area alone, especially given what it is doing here. [interview 82]

Conversely, a strong Brazilian sensitivity has emerged over the years about its inalienable rights to “environmental sovereignty” [interview 100]. This national reaction developed as Amazonia has attracted immense international and well publicised attention. Countless NGOs, often financed by foreign governments, have poured into a region that is still barely controlled by federal and local authorities, given its challenging size. “International intrusions” have more than irritated Brazilian authorities, which now seldom miss an opportunity to remind the world that they are the only legitimate decision-makers [interview 73]. A tense climate has thus developed around the NGOs and potential foreign interference. Since 2006, there have even been rumours that the American government had plans for the “internationalisation” of Amazonia. Maps showing an amputated Brazil and the Amazon region under an international mandate have been circulating on the Internet [interview 69]. This could have been passed off as a piece of insensitive humour had some Brazilian army officers not made public comments stating that the country would never accept such prospects, thus giving credence to those who consider the documents genuine. This atmosphere was also clearly felt when a federal minister declared in 2007 that if Amazonia was to be a “global public good”, then the nuclear arsenal of the United States should also be declared “international property”, given the high stakes it holds for the whole of mankind. Suspicions are also apparent regarding the Pantanal, as suggested by the comments of some civil servants we interviewed in Brasilia:

- International work in the Pantanal is welcome, as long as NGOs and others do not forget in what country they are. [interview 68]

- The Pantanal is a Brazilian jewel. Brazil will take care of it. [interview 70]

Yet, like the Amazon region, the issue is not merely a matter of sovereignty vs. foreign interferences; it also reflects tensions between the goals of development vs. conservation. Since the mid-1970s, both federal and local authorities have emphasised the need to “domesticate the Pantanal” [interview 98]. The region has
thus been the object of multiple economic programmes designed to make it an "engine of development" (Junk, et al., 2009). However, environmental groups have denounced the negative impacts of human activities such as urbanisation, gold mining, cattle-ranching, electricity production and large transport infrastructures (see Appendix 9 for a summary of these issues).

6.1.2. Protecting the Pantanal: brilliant laws, hollow enforcement

In order to harmonise local legislations, a "National System for Protected Areas" (SNUC) was adopted as federal law in 2000. It reflects the core tension of Brazilian environmental policies by dividing protected areas in two categories:

1. "strictly protected areas", where the preservation of biodiversity is the central objective and human activities are severely restricted;

2. "sustainable use areas" where biodiversity protection is an important but not the sole objective, allowing for a range of economic activities to take place.

Increasingly, local levels of environmental management are those that matter in Brazil. While federal protected areas were predominant during the 1980s, 48% of the nation's protected areas are now under the authority of local states. The latter, however, have emphasised conservation much less than the federal government. As local authorities are more directly dependent on economic actors and less sensitive to international NGOs, they have mostly created sustainable use areas, 70% of which are defined as "environmental protection areas" (APAs). This SNUC category is often criticised by NGOs for "its misleading name", as explained by an interviewee:

APAs are not really protected areas; they are more like a mechanism for land-use management....They constrain human activities with various plans or zoning systems, with some small areas set aside for strict protection...But this mechanism brings little added value on the ground because the small sites that are set aside for strict protection are usually spaces that cannot be put to any other use anyhow.

[interview 86]

83 These programmes included: the Inter-municipal Consortium for the Development of the Pantanal (CIDEPAN); the Program for the Development of the Pantanal (PRODEPAN); the Program for the Development of the Cerrados (POLOCENTRO); the National Alcohol Program (PROALCOOL); the Development Program of the Grande Dourados (PRODEGRAN); the Study of the Integrated Development of the Upper Paraguay Basin (EDIBAP); the Program of the Agro-Environmental Development of the State of Mato Grosso (PRODEAGRO); and the National Environmental Program (PNMA), with its sub-programme known as the Conservation Plan of the Upper Paraguay Basin (PCBAP).

84 In numbers, not total surface area.
In the Pantanal, strict protection applies to 100% of the publicly protected areas, but this figure merely reflects the quasi-absence of any public conservation policy in the region. Until 1999, only two small areas had received official protection, covering 0.6% of the *pantaneiro* territory.

Another aspect of environmental policy in the Pantanal is the enormous amount of "excellent legislation on paper" (Wade, 1999). Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution defines this region as a "national patrimony" and with more 120 active environmental laws, the Pantanal is in theory well protected and monitored. Official regulations include provisions on impact assessments, public reviews, protection of wildlife species, controls on fertilisers, etc. Moreover, federal law requires landowners to preserve native vegetation along river banks (the so-called "permanent reserve"). They must also keep a certain percentage of their property in its natural state (the "legal reserve"). Yet, the story is very different when it comes to implementation. To start with, regulatory authority for the Pantanal is split between two states, which leads to gaps and inconsistencies. Moreover, although there is no lack of federal and state structures in charge of policing and monitoring, their limited human and material resources contrast with the size of the region. Interviewees in federal ministries and agencies suggested a widespread feeling that, as one civil servant put it:

*Whatever we do here, the landowners of the Pantanal are kings in their kingdoms.*

[interim 68]

It is also known that in the high plateaus surrounding the Pantanal the intensive exploitation of the land is encouraged by the state itself, with the result that the rules on the permanent and the legal reserve are frequently violated. Issues of corruption among environmental inspectors might also exist, as several informants implied [interviews 74, 84].

It is in this context that international NGOs started to lobby the federal and local governments at the beginning of the 1990s for a much stricter conservation approach. They promoted the idea of "total reserves" through the creation of further

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85% in Mato Grosso do Sul and 35% in Mato Grosso, compared with 80% in the Amazon region.

86 They include the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Resources (IBAMA) under the federal ministry of the environment and, in Mato Grosso do Sul, the State Secretariat of the Environment (SEMA), the *Instituto do Meio Ambiente Pantanal* (IMAP) and the state Forestry Police.

87 Conservation International, the University of Brasilia and the *Fundação Biodiversitas* were especially active [interviews 85, 103].

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national parks as well as more "private reserves" owned by NGOs, philanthropists or fazendeiros. Between 2001 and 2004, the state of Mato Grosso do Sul thus declared five new protected areas covering 1,400 km². The Federal government, for its part, created the Bodoquena National Park (760 km²). On the whole, however, these lobbying successes have not changed the overall picture of public conservation in the Pantanal: less than 2.5% of the region is under such official protection, and moreover there exist scant means of enforcing it.

6.1.3. The changing faces of CP in the wetlands and their strategic content

The global discourse on CP has taken several forms over the years in the Pantanal. Here we argue that, each time, it has embodied a means of giving certain actors pre-eminence over others in the shaping of the region’s destiny.

The participatory discourse entered the Pantanal in the 1970s, starting with large "strategic planning" exercises led by the local state and involved an astonishing number of actors in public consultations and workshops [interviews 58, 78, 90]. Worthy of mention are: the well-known EDIBAP (Plan for the Integrated Development of the Upper Paraguay River Basin) launched in 1978; the PCBAP (Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan) launched in 1991; the SAP (Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of the Pantanal and the Upper Paraguay River Basin) launched in 1996; and the INREP (Institutions and Research for the Pantanal) launched in 2007 and financed by the European Union (see Appendix 10 for more details). However, as many interviewees bitterly reflected, none has produced much more than voluminous reports [interviews 87, 101, 102, 103]. They seem to have exhausted the hopes and patience of many local stakeholders, who feel that “the state has made [them] speak a lot but without listening” [interview 103]. A researcher humorously described the Pantanal as “the Bermuda triangle of participatory planning” [interview 102].

The second use of the CP discourse in the Pantanal has been geared towards the “participation” of private landowners in strict conservation schemes [interviews 83, 88]. Taking advantage of the fact that Brazilian legislation facilitates the creation of privately protected areas (RPPN, Reservas Particulares do Patrimônio Natural), NGOs such as Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
actively promoted such schemes. While CI supported landowners in building “ecological corridors”, TNC helped a partner foundation (Ecotropica) to purchase 600 km$^2$ of land on the borders of the Pantanal National Park. Under Reservas Particulares, owners benefit from property tax exemptions but land protection is irrevocable (it cannot be subsequently de-classified) and land-use is restricted to ecotourism and research. In the Pantanal, a total of 13 such reserves exist to date covering 2,043 km$^2$ (1.5% of the region). Through these schemes, the use of CP discourse was centred on the collaboration of NGOs with private landowners interested in strict conservation.

However, as 97% of the region is owned by cattle ranchers, certain NGOs increasingly felt that environmental conservation could only emerge through cooperation with local producers and new forms of “participation” that acknowledge, rather than deny, economic activities. This process started among NGOs in the early 2000s [interviews 72, 81]. The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) is one of the first to have tried this path in the Pantanal. Since 2001, it has been training ranchers to better manage their conflicts with wildlife, especially with jaguars (WCS, 2006). Their predation on livestock is a permanent issue: related losses of cattle are around 0.2% per year. This may seem low but it can mean hundreds of lost heads per farmer, which makes the farmers uneasy about the issue and leads to unregulated jaguar hunting.

Slowly moving away from its strict conservation orientation, CI has also been trying to work more with cattle ranchers [interview 83]. In partnership with the Jaguar Conservation Fund (a Brazilian NGO) and a local university (UFMS), it developed a scheme in 2002 to compensate farmers for cattle lost to jaguars on eleven adjacent properties – representing 1,500 km$^2$ of safer jaguar habitat. In return, the fazendeiros have signed an agreement to cease killing jaguars (CI, 2006). The project also supports a social programme that makes free medical and dental assistance available to ranch workers. The WWF started work in 1998 with fisherwomen’s groups to promote local arts and crafts; it also provides help to cattle ranchers on ecotourism and, since 2002, on organic certification [interview 81].

Working with local producers on their economic activities has thus timidly emerged as a third type of CP in the environmental management of the Pantanal. However, NGOs have kept to a rather weak version of “community participation”, with a scope
largely limited to implementation and schemes that merely provide incentives to change certain production practices [interview 104]. This is still a long way from full-fledged participatory projects in which CP impacts all dimensions. Moreover, most NGOs have focused their core efforts on stricter conservation projects – such as buying and fencing lands in private conservation schemes or protecting flagship species like the *Arara-azul grande* (a large blue parrot species seen in Photo 5 and supported by the WWF).

6.1.4. Conclusion: the novelty of the PRP proposal

In this section we showed that the concept of CP has taken various forms over the years in the Pantanal, reflecting the ongoing tension between concurrent visions of the conservation and sustainable use of the environment. Thus, the CP discourse was first embodied in state-led community consultations in a range of planning exercises that gave the state the leading role although little action followed. It then took shape in private conservation efforts, providing NGOs with a key role in supporting and orientating these initiatives. And again, CP has very recently changed face, gradually integrating an approach to environmental management inclusive of local producers: this new generation of CP programmes involves increased power-sharing between NGOs and local producers – but this is still within schemes defined by the NGOs. In other words, although environmental NGOs in the Pantanal sported the global mantra of participation since the 1990s, they implemented weak versions that only provided incentives rather than decision-making power to locals.

A new balance of power was to emerge with the proposal for a “Regional Park”, which is a legal concept imported from France giving local producers much greater power of decision. The idea of a community-led Pantanal Regional Park was radically new and the first project to involve cattle ranchers as a community, enhance their capacity for collective action in environmental and socio-economic areas. It stimulated hopes of seeing the local pantaneira community develop its own self-designed programmes, rather than joining projects pre-defined by NGOs. This vast participatory scheme raised eyebrows within the NGO community, as local landowners (fazendeiros) were still in no way seen as good friends of the environment. Providing them with more power and financial means was resented by many environmentalists as a useless or even dangerous move.
6.2. The PRP Genesis: a Community in Crisis, Searching for Allies

The proposal for a “Pantanal Regional Park” (PRP) was a fundamental step in the participatory discourse in the region. It involved creating a large-scale participatory scheme based on the voluntary membership of private landowners, while supporting rather than barring local productions. Here we track the genesis of this CP project, its originating argents, the strategic meaning of the initiative and the configuration of interests that it underpinned.

We first argue that a will for containment was at the root of the PRP initiative. This came from local landowners who were worried about the rising influence of conservationist NGOs and economic competitors in the Pantanal. Certainly, the increasing presence of these actors was threatening the environmental legitimacy and economic sustainability of traditional fazendeiros. Second, we show that this objective of double containment crossed paths with a foreign actor, the French government, who had a domestic model of environmental management to offer (the “natural regional park”), based on the co-operation of the state with local producers. Created in the 1960s, this model had already been exported to different countries. Third – and consequently – we contend that French experts came to act as the main supporter and designer of the actual PRP project, leaving little room for community participation in the early years.

6.2.1. The crisis of cattle-ranchers and the will to contain competitors and conservationists

At the root of the PRP initiative is an economic and legitimacy crisis experienced by the long-established pantaneira landowning families involved in cattle-ranching [interviews 58, 77, 79, 80]. At the beginning of the 1990s, these farmers increasingly resented two types of threat. The first one stemmed from economic competitors entering the Pantanal with larger capital funds, buying bankrupted properties (fazendas) and importing more intensive modes of production. The second was linked to conservationist NGOs backed by international networks and resources promoting a “bell-jar” approach to conservation that shamed cattle-ranchers for their negative impact. In this tense context, the PRP initiative emerged as a way for
fazendeiros to contain both types of incoming actors, regain an environmental legitimacy and gain some economic support.

**An economic crisis: falling property sizes, lower beef prices and increased competition**

Cattle ranchers in the Pantanal are facing a serious crisis of economic sustainability. This has to do with the size of their land properties, which is decreasing with time and now often falls below the threshold of economic viability. This process is linked to population growth and immigration combined with the deeply ingrained custom of dividing inheritance equally between male heirs [interviews 59, 61, 106].

Land property needs to be large to be economically viable: during the wet season, most of the land is flooded, but sufficient grazing area is still needed. *Fazendas* that are too small can easily run out of business in just one difficult year if floods are too high. At the end of the 19th century, as Wilcox (1992) explains, only a few scattered ranches existed in the Pantanal, which meant that human pressure was very low. During the first half of the 20th century ranching further developed, but the presence of local diseases affecting horses limited its expansion. This constraint was lifted, however, in the 1960s with improvements in animal health – which greatly stimulated the number of immigrants flowing into the Pantanal via family links. In 1920, the Brazilian census counted about a hundred ranches throughout the Pantanal with about 700,000 head of cattle, whereas by the early 1970s there were over 3,500 ranches raising five million head. Since then, ranches have been gradually subdivided as families grew and immigrants settled. While a minimum of 15,000 hectares is generally deemed necessary for a *fazenda* to operate satisfactorily (Bartaburu, 2006, p.50), 70% of land properties were already below 10,000 hectares in 1970, 78% in 1980 and 84% in 1996 (Wilcox, 1992, p. 242; Rodriges Santos, *et al.*, 2003, p.239).

Today, an ever increasing number of ranches are under 6,000 hectares, which is the threshold of absolute survival according to several interviewees [interviews 58, 60, 67]. Consequently, many properties are being sold to external farmers, locally denigrated as “asphalt farmers” (*fazendeiros do asfalto*) [interview 62]. These often come from the higher plateaus surrounding the Pantanal, where they enjoy a much higher productivity. These people thus arrive with more capital and intensive production techniques. This process is bitterly resented by traditional landowning
families, who still form the bulk of landowners and do not have similar capital resources. Interviews with fazendeiros underlined this feeling of “threat” with comments such as:

- *I don’t know of a single fazendeiro [in Pantanal] who is happy with the new guys, although more and more have to sell their lands to them.* [interview 58]

- *The [newer fazendeiros], they do not know anything about us, about our history, about the Pantanal and they don’t want to respect the way we have been living with the Pantanal for generations.* [interview 59]

- *[They] should not be here but the law of the market is king. It is very sad.* [interview 67]

- *How do you want us to compete with people who have several times the capital we have?* [interview 64]

Cattle ranchers of the Pantanal have also been impacted by the fluctuating meat prices on the world markets. Formerly, the original wealth of the industry had been based on the export of salted and dried meat to national and international markets. These exports had maintained high prices until World War II, but these activities went into decline when refrigeration techniques lowered the demand for meat preserves (Junk & de Cunha, 2005). After a difficult post-war period, cattle producers enjoyed two decades of continuous price rises that came to an abrupt end at the start of the 1970s, when a sharp plunge affected world prices (Edelman, 1992, p.195). This phenomenon lasted well into the 1990s and was reinforced in Brazil by regular outbreaks of “foot and mouth disease”, which prevented exportation to many foreign markets, notably the European Union.

_A legitimacy crisis: the environmentalist critique and the fear of been taken over_

Nearly 80% of land in Amazonia that was deforested between 1996 and 2006 is now used for cattle pasture (Greenpeace, 2009). This more than explains the reputation of cattle-ranchers among environmentalist working or interested in Brazil. Although the situation is not the same in the Pantanal, an enduring mistrust exists between NGOs and fazendeiros in the region. For these actors, the notion of working together has only slowly and recently emerged, while strict conservationist views still dominate the operations of large NGOs. All of this means that landowners feel threatened by conservationists, a feeling that was even higher 15 years ago, at the time of the genesis of the PRP project [interviews 62, 66].
Interviews carried out in 2008 still manifested this tension, despite the increasing number of NGO projects that integrated a more collaborative spirit. Several NGOs still openly battle against the idea that cattle-raising is a viable long-term option for the Pantanal. In 2006, for instance, Conservation International released a report (Barcellos Harris, 2006) claiming that deforestation from increased grazing and agriculture had already destroyed 17% of the native vegetation in the Pantanal (25,000 km²). It was further argued that if deforestation continued at the current rate, it would cause all of the region’s original vegetation to disappear within 45 years. Such analyses feed the mistrust that exists between NGOs and the landowners, who have a positive view of their environmental impact. Many fazendeiros openly fear that NGOs will in the long run:

*invade the Pantanal and kick [us] out.* [interview 61]

Outright hostility is sometimes present, as fazendeiros feel that large NGOs in the region are filled with:

*people from abroad, paid 5,000 dollars a month, and who think they can tell [us] what to do* [interview 60]

In this troubled context, the PRP project emerged as a way of enabling landowners to strengthen their position in the face of economic competitors and influential environmentalists. A dual will of containment, thus, lies at the root of the project.

### 6.2.2. Ideal allies: the local state and a foreign government promoting a domestic model

The concerns of the landowners about containing incoming competitors and conservationists encountered those of the local state, which showed itself willing to respond to the anxieties of this large rural constituency. According to several interviewees, the public authorities were also happy to help contain the influence of conservationist forces that were highlighting the “global public good” reading of the Pantanal far more than the need for domestic development [interviews 69, 72, 110]. Moreover, as the NGOs considered the new “asphalt farmers” extremely worrying given their environmental impact, developing a strategy against them was also a way to regain the lead on significant environmental issues [interview 86]. Thus, the momentum for the PRP project was underpinned by the common determination of two key local actors to regain initiative from the increasingly influential incomers.
These concerns also crossed the path of a foreign model of environmental management: the concept of “regional park” originally developed in France. An originating alliance thus emerged between the landowners, the local state and a foreign government interested in exporting a domestic model.

France is proud of its history in environmental management. This is true of water management and waste treatment – two industries in which the country boasts some of the biggest companies in the world. But the same is true of its system of protected areas. One of its unusual aspects lies precisely in the concept of “natural regional park”. These entities are built on a contract between local producers to define and commit to certain environmental norms – and the state, which may provide economic support. France developed this model in the mid-1960s and supported its international diffusion with funding and research programmes in countries including Russia, Poland, Portugal, Belgium, Chile and Vietnam. As for Brazil, the features of a “regional park” fitted squarely with the strategic concerns of the pantaneiro cattle-ranchers: strengthening their production while keeping conservationists at a distance.

The idea of a “regional park” dates back to 1966, when the Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire called upon the French government to create a new integrated instrument for economic, social and environmental management based on the participation of local stakeholders. At the time, rural areas were undergoing a continuous “exodus” and the solution proposed by the authorities was a brand new CP instrument. A decree instituting “Regional Parks” as a legal category was signed by the government in 1967. Over time, this model took roots in many French regions with fragile natural resources and socio-economic contexts. More than 40 such regional parks are now functioning in France. They cover about 10% of the national territory, 4 million hectares, 2,000 communes (rural or urban districts) and around 2.2 million people. Each regional park is built on an institutional entity known as a syndicat mixte (mixed syndicate). It brings together elected representatives as well as representatives from NGOs and professional associations operating in the target area. In the case of the Pantanal Regional Park, a similar association was created in 2001 under the name Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP) – to which we return later.

Mixed syndicates are responsible for determining the operations of the park’s technical teams and the policy orientations set out in a park charter. Every regional park has its own Chatre du territoire (territory charter) defining the principles and
actions to be followed and binding the public and private partners. Charters are thus "contracts" under which partners commit to jointly negotiated principles. They must be approved by the French Ministry of the Environment and result from lengthy negotiations between stakeholders – typically five years. The obligation to comply with the charter is reinforced by the need to secure recurrent funding from the national authorities, and thus to show results on a regular basis. Regional parks also have to obtain a renewed approval of their charter every ten years. There is also an entity that associates French regional parks at national level: the FPNRF (Fédération des Parcs Naturels Régionaux de France). This federation is responsible for managing partnership programmes, exchanges of experience and the capitalisation of knowledge; it also represents the regional parks as a group when negotiating with national authorities in the elaboration of legal texts and public policies.

The "regional park" model was first exported to Brazil through a series of contacts between the French embassy and the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where this management model raised a lot of attention [interviews 75, 79]. In 1996, a formal agreement was signed establishing technical co-operation between the FPNRF and the government of Mato Grosso do Sul. The FPNRF was then entrusted with the responsibility of searching for international funds in order to create the "Pantanal Regional Park" (PRP). In the next section we analyse how the connection with foreign donors was established, as well as the latter's critical weight in project design.

6.2.3. The PRP: a local initiative moulded by foreign experts, resisted by NGOs

Section 3.1.1 suggested that CP projects can usually be classified as dominantly originating "from within, above or outside" the community. However, there are cases where the initial influence comes from an alliance of balanced sources and converging interests. Such was the case with the Parque Regional do Pantanal (PRP).

The initiators of the project were undoubtedly located within the local community. The dynamics leading to its creation was originally sparked off by a local politician, Dr. Mendes Canale, a Federal Senator in search of innovative steps to help the Pantanal’s cattle-ranchers improve their situation and to appease their growing
discontent [interviews 58, 63, 64]. From the mid-1980s on, Dr. Canale met on a regular basis with a group of well-established fazendeiros from the Rio Negro region of the Pantanal. He became strongly associated with the interests of local cattle-raisers, secured the support of the local authorities of Mato Grosso do Sul and started to seek broader support within the Brazilian federation and from possible foreign partners.

It is at this point that foreign influence started to develop. The link that was eventually established with France was not by chance. The state of Mato Grosso do Sul already had a long tradition of contacts between its local authorities and a range of technical experts from France on issues of economic planning [interview 75]. It was quite natural, thus, that Dr. Canal should seek a dialogue with the French embassy in Brasilia which in turn promoted France’s experience in the domain of regional parks. With the help of the ambassador, and the support of the Brazilian embassy in Paris, contacts were made with the FPNRF – already mentioned in the previous section as the French association of regional parks. From 1986 to 1995, technical meetings took place between this organisation and the local state represented by a public foundation (FEMAP, Fundação Estadual de Meio Ambiente do Pantanal). FPNRF technicians came to Brazil, while missions involving this foundation and a range of landowners were sent to Paris [interview 77].

An official demand for technical assistance was made by the state of Mato Grosso do Sul in 1995 and in 1996 an agreement was signed establishing co-operation between the FEMAP (representing state interests) and the FPNRF (acting as a technical body). A French volunteer paid by French co-operation was soon appointed to work full-time on the project. The FPNRF was also entrusted with the responsibility of looking for funding internationally in view of creating a “natural regional park” in the Pantanal. From the start, foreign expertise exerted an immense influence on the actual design of the project: not only had the concept been originally developed in France, but French experts were directly responsible for introducing the endeavour to potential donors [interview 64].

A support project for the creation of the PRP was thus given the name of “Apoio a Criação do Parque Natural Regional do Pantanal”. Not only was this preparatory project mainly planned by foreign experts, but it was also primarily funded by
foreign donors. With a total expected cost of 1,022,550 euros,\(^8\) the project was then submitted to the European Commission and approved in 1998 by the General Directorate for External Relations (DGIB). It secured a contribution from the European Union of 776,000 euros, more than three-quarters of the requested funds. The gap was filled by the local state of Mato Grosso do Sul as well as the French cooperation. In December 1998, the scheme was launched with the signing of a new co-operation agreement whereby the FPNRF was to provide a key expert, a French national, acting as “Principal Technical Advisor”. It is this person who subsequently set up a technical team and was entrusted with overseeing the course of the project. His influence throughout the life of the project was repeatedly underlined by interviewees [interviews 58, 64, 65, 103].

Another factor that furthered increased the foreign influence was the limited inclusiveness of “community participation” in the upstream process: initial diagnosis, formulation of possible solutions and final selection of a course of action (as defined in 3.1.3). In the project design, CP had in fact been restricted to the involvement of a few elite families. Interviews revealed that only a limited number of leading local figures were mobilised in the discussions with the Brazilian and French experts – and for the trips to France [interviews 60, 61, 67]. The missions to Europe were supposed to involve a diversified representation of fazendeiros, but several interviewees recall that, instead, several people from the same family were sent. In the view of an interviewee:

> These [fazendeiros] were just doing family tourism to Europe, while the French were deciding things [interview 61]

Meanwhile, the move towards the creation of a “regional park” was passively resisted and openly criticised by most international NGOs working in the region [interview 87]. Officially, they did not like the fact that this “regional park” did not readily fit into existing Brazilian law, but was meant to impose a new category on national legislation (SNUC). However, according to several interviewees, the real cause of this reluctance was their lack of trust in local fazendeiros as environmental managers. As a former staff member of a local NGO commented:

> Don’t get it wrong. Some NGOs work today with cattle-ranchers, but this does not mean they like them. Although they share a common interest for the Pantanal, it is rooted in very different views....Environmental NGOs do not feel that fazendeiros are

\(^8\) Called “ECU” (European Currency Unit) before January 1999.
their allies, much to the contrary. And it is just the same on the other side. [interview 88]

Or:

Why should NGOs have liked a project that gives new means and voice to the very people they would like to see more controlled or simply out of the landscape?...There is no way [they] could have supported it.[interview 85]

Another interviewee felt that PRP-type projects made NGOs afraid of simply losing their emerging position on the environmental management scene:

Community projecst like the Pantanal Regional Park are meant for the locals. Large environmental NGOs are not part of the community...The PRP was not about giving CI or the WFF more weight in the Pantanal; quite the opposite in fact.[interview 78]

Certainly, it seems highly implausible that environmental NGOs would criticise the PRP initiative on the sole grounds that it was trying to influence legislation, which is something they themselves do continually.

6.2.4. Conclusion

The genesis of the PRP project was thus supported by an originating alliance aggregating the interests of local fazendeiros, the local state and a foreign government. While the initiators of the scheme were located within the community (a set of elite families aided by a local politician and then state authorities), financial supporters and conceptual designers were largely foreign as technical responsibilities for the preparatory project were to a great extent moved to the other side of the Atlantic – especially to a set of French experts. This displacement of “conceptual leadership” is similar to the one observed in the case of the Soufrière Maritime Management Association (SMMA), in St. Lucia. There, the design of the CP scheme was largely influenced by a regional think tank (CANARI). In both cases, a foreign partner became a critical guide in shaping a “community-led” participatory scheme and its subsequent institutional structure. In the case of the PRP, French experts had a ready-made CP model to offer that seemed to fit the concerns of the cattle ranchers and the local state. Not only does the “regional park” model place local producers at the centre of environmental management, in cooperation with the state, but it also comes with the promise of public support to local economic projects.
6.3. "Salvation through Traditions": Intents and Effects of a Containment Discourse

As we have seen, the PRP project was built on a double intent of containment – which can in turn operate in a variety of modes (see section 3.1.7, Table 5). One important mode is epistemic exclusion through the reconstruction of identities and of what is considered “legitimate knowledge”. This form of productive power is identifiable in the discourse on “traditions” that accompanied and informed the proposal for a “regional park”. Its core idea was that, contrary to the environmentalists’ fears, “traditional cattle ranching” had been the guardian of the Pantanal for centuries, given its “low or even positive” impact on the environment, so that its continued presence constituted the guarantee of its future preservation. Traditions were thus presented as the best way forward to save the Pantanal from “destructive changes”. It was even argued that a decrease in cattle-ranching would damage the biodiversity of fallow lands – a view which is the exact opposite of the one held by conservationists, who favour strict “reserves”, whether public or private. This discourse had the strategic advantage of re-positioning the “local community” as the “traditional care-taker” of the environment; it also legitimated economic support in the name of the environment – a critical rationale for securing financial aid from the European donors.

But this is not the whole story. The discourse on “traditions” put forward through the PRP initiative also carried effects of structural power as it re-delineated which actors and practices were to be defined as the core of the “traditional community”. In doing so, the CP discourse relating to the project focused exclusively on cattle ranchers and landowners, leaving aside other important social groups that had been part of the pantaneira landscape for generations, notably fisher communities and rural workers of the fazendas. Although the PRP was to be an exemplary participatory scheme, these local stakeholders attracted no attention from donors. As a result, the strategic discourse on tradition did not only carry containment intents against conservationists and economic competitors, but also direct containment effects on lower local social groups, following an apparent process of selective oblivion.89

89 As defined in section 3.1.7
Here, we first look at the productive power intents of the discourse on the "traditional community", before analysing its structural power effects.

6.3.1. Productive Power: the construction of cattle-ranchers as "protectors" of the Pantanal

Cattle-ranching in Brazil has been consistently denounced by NGOs and scientists alike for extensive environmental degradation it causes throughout the country, as is famously the case in the Amazonia (e.g. Fearnside, 2008). It is curious, as Wilcox (1992, p.233) comments, that the same economic sector should be considered a saviour of the environment in another Brazilian region. This is what happened, nevertheless, with the PRP initiative in the Pantanal. The proposal for the Pantanal Regional Park was precisely based upon a productive discourse taking exactly the opposite view of the one traditionally held by environmentalists pointing to cattle ranchers as prime environmental threats.

It is true that since the end of the 1990s, environmental NGOs working in the Pantanal had come to acknowledge the need to work more with cattle ranchers [interview 97]. Yet, this strategy did not go so far as redefining local fazendeiros as the preferred or even good environmental caretakers, but merely as unavoidable partners since they own most of the land. The climate of suspicion between ranchers and NGOs has never disappeared and readily translated into the NGOs' dissatisfaction with the PRP project.

A discourse on "ranchers as protectors of the environment" was nevertheless propelled by the PRP originating alliance – made up, as we has seen, of elite landowners, local authorities as well as experts from the French co-operation. This discourse presents cattle-ranching as an activity that developed in "harmony" with the environment and poses insignificant problems – with pasturing on open range, little use of fencing, minimal work on the lands, extensive flooding that limits the amount of cattle raised, etc. Consequently, cattle ranching can be promoted as an environmentally sustainable activity in the Pantanal. The strongest supporting argument in favour of this discourse is the notion the new and incoming farmers

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90 As explained in section 3.2.4, an exercise of productive power involves redefining the identity of certain actors to provide them with a more privileged position. Like structural power, it works on the body of knowledge taken for granted.
buying lands from bankrupt landowners, are importing productive practices that are more damaging to the environment.  

The “greening” of traditional cattle ranchers was a fundamental and necessary step for them to qualify for international aid, as both French and EU contributions were being made on environmental grounds. On the French side, we were able to secure project documents that show the extent to which the discourse had been used:

*The traditional activity that has modelled and maintained the characteristic landscapes of the [pantaneira] region during centuries are no longer profitable in the current conditions of production. The regression and transformation of this activity constitutes the principal threat to the continued existence of the pantaneiro ecosystem....The abandonment of lands and the consecutive absence of pasture grazing rapidly lead to an invasion of colonising plant species, a progressive loss of biodiversity both animal and vegetal.* [FPNRF, 2000, p.3]

As we see from this extract, French project managers went much further than merely espousing the thesis of a “low negative” or even “positive impact” of cattle ranching on the environment: they present this activity as a necessary component of the pantaneiro ecosystem itself. Interestingly enough, however, an independent scientific committee – with only a consultative and advisory role for the French donor – did not “swallow” this discourse readily. It expressed the need to receive more information on why the abandonment of lands by cattle ranchers should be considered an environmental problem. As the committee put it:

*More precise elements are needed regarding the reality of the problems raised by the abandonment of the low lands. Elements in our possession do not enable us to discriminate between two hypotheses regarding the abandonment of extensive cattle raising: 1) it does not raise any problem for the conservation of biodiversity, so that the proposed [PRP] project simply aims at maintaining a human population for development reasons; 2) the departure of cattle ranchers will lead to lands let fallow which will raise true problems of conservation (regarding landscapes, animals and plants) of international importance.* [FFEM, 2000, p.1]

Although we secured access to internal donor documents, we found no evidence that this request for more information about the “green rancher” discourse was answered by project managers. In a large-scale empirical study Eaton (2006), however, had compared the aquatic biodiversity of lakes in cattle-free and cattle-exposed sites in

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91 To make smaller properties economically viable, these ranchers increase grazing area by clearcutting native forests, planting exotic grasses and using 6-wire barbed fences that obstruct the movements of animals. NGOs such as Earthwatch (2004) and WCS (2009) vocally denounce these “asphalt farmers”.

92 These documents relate to a PRP component project, launched in 2001 and financed by the FFEM, under the name of “*Projet d'appui à la valorisation de la biodiversité dans le Pantanal du Rio Negro*”.

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the southern Pantanal. Despite the supposedly low intensity of traditional ranching, he observed dramatic differences in species composition, richness, abundance, and biomass for both macro-invertebrates and birds at cattle-exposed sites, leaving little doubt about the deep impact of cattle ranching upon the local biome.

The environmental impact of extensive ranching may be low relative to new and incoming practices in the Pantanal, but it can hardly be labelled “insignificant” – both at the present time and historically. Accounts provided by Wilcox (1992) and Seidl et al. (2001) help appreciate the extent to which the vision of traditional cattle ranching as a low-impact practice is in fact biased.

To start with, ranchers traditionally set fire to the land during the dry season as a land management technique to “clean” the vegetation unused by cattle and to make way for new growth. These fires are initially started in the grassland; but they often spread to savannahs, woodland and forests due to open areas, dry vegetation and winds. This can destroy extensive areas of wildlife habitat. Fire also contributes to the hardening and impoverishment of the soil, as well as to the gradual displacement of indigenous plant species by fire-resistant grasses and woody species. In the long run, these invaders take over from high quality grasses.

Since the early 1970s, ranchers have also cleared lands and planted pastures on the highest grounds available to increase cattle stocking during the wet season. This practice is widespread and is perceived as economically optimal. It has resulted in large deforested areas, increased land erosion, sedimentation of rivers and a decrease in floral and faunal biodiversity.

There is also the issue of the sheer number of animals that graze in a given area. At first view, the size of the Pantanal and the yearly renewal of grasses seemed to ensure that there would be no problem of over-pasturing. However, the Pantanal is not uniform in terrain and human exploitation. Some regions have been overgrazed and are now covered in weeds. The concentration of animals has exhausted large areas, reducing their ability to regenerate after the waters recede, creating problems for local pasture survival.

Finally, exotic plants and animals. The use of artificial pastures had not been significant in the Pantanal up until the 1970s. It was rare in Brazil until the first decade of the 20th century and was not much practised in Mato Grosso until the 1920s. However, where exotic pastures were introduced, they have had important
local influences on the ecosystem – a process now reinforced by the new farmers. Furthermore, the historical presence of cattle ranchers also led to the development of exotic animal species. Feral pigs, introduced in the 1800s, still disturb soil and vegetation and dispute territories and other resources with native animals.

By redefining cattle ranchers as the foremost “protectors” of the Pantanal, international funding for local development could be secured in the name of global biodiversity, the influence of conservationists could be better contained and incoming economic competitors de-legitimised.

6.3.2. Structural Power: the exclusionary delineation of the “traditional community”

The PRP project had as one of its core rationales “to regenerate and support the whole pantaneira community”\textsuperscript{93}, it nevertheless largely ignored some key sub-groups of this community. In the PRP project and its discursive nebula, significant stakeholders living within the Pantanal were barely taken into account or even talked about [interviews 67, 73, 80]. This was especially the case of the fisher communities of the PRP area as well as the rural workers (peons) on the fazendas. Arguably, an exclusionary exercise in structural power took place whereby the “pantaneira community” was identified solely as being the landowners – thus producing a restricted delineation of exactly who is authorised to speak in the name of “tradition”.

Structural power refers to the reinforcement of the privileged social position of certain actors involved in long-standing hierarchical relations (cf. section 3.2.3). In producing social control, it notably works through discourses that wipe out certain stakeholders from given issues or negotiation spaces – following a process of selective oblivion. Within the PRP project, landowners benefited from this process as they managed to position themselves as the core group and legitimate representatives of the whole pantaneira community. They thus captured the advantages that this label offered in the eyes of the local authorities and the foreign donors.

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with a civil servant.
The production of a “common sense” privileging landowners was supported by its articulation with a widely shared feeling among the fazendeiros themselves: the feeling of their “historical legitimacy”, which has become part of their common culture [interview 107]. Several high-profile landowning families have in their ranks well-known historians who have researched, documented and popularised the history of their family in the Pantanal. Consequently, the fazendeiros’ typical claim as to their “special relation” and historical or moral ownership of the Pantanal was extremely present in the interviews we carried out, for example in comments such as:

- *The Pantanal is not just where [we] work and live. It is what we are.* [interview 64]
- *For generations and generations my family was born here and died here. The Pantanal is part of me and I am part of the Pantanal.* [interview 67]
- *There are new farmers coming here buying lands from some impoverished friends. ...I am very concerned about that. These people are not part of the Pantanal, they do not know it, they do not love it, because this takes generations.* [interview 60]

As a matter of fact, many landowning families have a history in the region often going back to the end of the 18th century (see Appendix 11). This long history helps understand the fact the landowners identify themselves as the core of the “traditional community”.

However, this dominant discourse hides important complementary or even alternative views. Its *contingency* appears easily when recalling basic facts that are left un- or under-analysed, as is striking in PRP project documents. A look at the longer-term history of the Pantanal leads to a far more open view about how the “traditional community” may be defined.

To begin with, Junk and de Cunha (2005) recall that the human occupation of the Pantanal dates back about 5,000 years, to a time when the climate was moister and groups of Tupi-Guarani Indians started to colonise the region. When the Europeans arrived, the Pantanal had long been occupied by various indigenous nations but the size of this native population quickly shrank following wars and diseases. Thus, until the 17th century the whole region was an Indian territory. Many of Brazil’s remaining Indians still live in the Pantanal, and face major social, political and economic challenges (Osava, 2009). Still, the PRP project never envisioned working with these populations, although it claimed to be a full exercise in CP applied to the “pantaneira community”.

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94 On these concepts, see section 1.1.4, Table 2
Although the defined boundaries of the PRP were not meant to encompass significant Indian populations (concentrated today in “indigenous reserves” of often limited size), there is a group of stakeholders present within these boundaries who have ancient links with Indians and strong rights that should be considered part and parcel of the Pantanal’s traditional community: the populations of fishers. These are spread throughout the wetlands along the river banks, which are public spaces by law and cannot be legally owned by fazendeiros, even when these cross their properties. Most of these small communities live along major rivers such as Rio Paraguay, Rio Taquari or Rio Negro. These groups are sometimes referred to as “professional fishers”, because they rely upon fishing for their subsistence. Many move from one place to another on a seasonal basis. They fish on an artisanal not industrial scale, which means they have a limited impact on the environment. The volume of their annual fish catch is far below that of the “sport fishing” industry which each year brings a growing number of tourists into the Pantanal. Fishers also rely on limited agricultural activities but cannot run them on a large scale because the lands they work on do not legally belong to them. These populations are largely left unsupported by local public policies – and also left out of typical accounts of the Pantanal’s history [interview 86]. As some of their traditions show, they were originally linked to the Paiaguas Indian tribe, who were expert boatmen. However, the racial composition of these groups has diversified over decades to include an increasing number of mixed-blood people and former agricultural workers who decided to stop working for fazendeiros. Nowadays, these communities do not identify any longer with native Indians and thus form a different population [interview 84].

Secondly, the definition in the PRP context of the “traditional community” as a community of landowners, has excluded from the picture thousands of simple rural employees - the so-called peons [interview 103]. Let us recall that ranches (fazendas) are deeply hierarchical social worlds, composed of two types of people: fazendeiros and their families on the one hand (the owners), and the employees and their families on the other hand. These peons have usually had the same occupation for generations, much like the fazendeiros. It is they who have spawned most of the local folklore, with their traditions and highly coloured oral myths. While fazendeiros often live in cities neighbouring the wetlands, peons live the whole year in the
Pantanal, caring for the cattle. They thus form a very special and key group within the _pantaneira_ community and they are the ones who, arguably, carry a large share of its “soul”. As a matter fact, it is largely the _peon_ “culture and ethos” that were advertised to and by foreign PRP donors to highlight the “harmony of men and nature” in the Pantanal.\(^5\) Given the importance of _peons_ in the _pantaneira_ community, and their near-invisibility in the large CP scheme under study, we shall return to this sub-community in the last chapter. An enquiry into their social capital will help explain why the voice of _peons_ was so little heard in the PRP context.

The discourse on “environmental salvation through the traditional community” was thus constructed in a way that left out key sub-communities. This production of “common sense” was supported by the _interpellation_ of various interests. Material collected in interviews with local observers indeed suggested that this _selective oblivion_ also fitted the interests of the local authorities and the foreign experts involved in the PRP [interviews 86, 87]. First, for the local state, it is always technically difficult if not politically sensitive to deal with and involve the poorer sub-groups of the Pantanal – especially in a scheme under which they could have claimed significant resources. As for foreign experts, the fact that the more fragile sub-groups of the Pantanal were not taken into account made it arguably easier to apply and export their home knowledge and models.

### 6.3.3. Conclusion

In this sub-chapter we have shown that the discourse on the “traditional community” supporting the PRP project neatly fitted the strategic interests of the _fazendeiros_, public authorities and foreign donor part of the originating alliance. Paying greater attention to the long-term environmental and social history of the Pantanal, the contingency of this discourse was also demonstrated – as well as the nature of its power intents and effects.

First, and contrary to the _productive_ discourse on traditions, the historical interaction between cattle-ranching and the environment was surely not a harmonious one. As Wilcox (1992, p.255) argues, ranching is not some “benign partner” that coexists with its environment: the entry of “thousands of voracious herbivores”, and the

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\(^5\) This comment refers to interviews with project managers and the project documentation they provided us with.
economic inputs necessary for their survival, has had a strong impact on the environment, including competition for space with wild animals, the introduction of new diseases, a gradual vegetation change, the disruption of habitat for species, etc. The introduction by humans of fire and fencing, as well as exotic grasses, have taken their toll on local ecosystems. The embellished picture of “traditional fazendeiros” as “guardians of the Pantanal” was nevertheless swiftly accepted by international donors, despite scientific doubts, and propelled by local Brazilian authorities with a stake in enhancing the economic use of the region.

Looking at the structural power effects of the discourse, we showed that members of the originating alliance paid no attention to other “traditional” members of the pantaneira community – especially to the fishers and peons. In the context of the PRP, the traditional community had been successfully equated to the fazendeiros. This winning exercise in structural power helped to reinforce long-standing local social hierarchies. Although fishers and peons have all been living in the Pantanal for generations, they were not called upon to think about the PRP, which was nevertheless promoted in Brazil and internationally as an exemplary CP scheme.

The vested interests behind this move are identifiable. The fazendeiros were to be the prime beneficiaries of the PRP and had no interest in sharing either the benefits or the governance of the upcoming CP structure. In the meantime, local authorities did not have to be concerned with poorer sub-communities that are difficult to reach and may want to raise new political claims. Finally, the French experts could use their technical knowledge on subjects on which they already had experience, dealing with well-defined economic actors to create regional parks.
6.4. Conclusion

This chapter first introduced the competing discourses and related power games that developed in the Pantanal over the divide between conservation and sustainable use in a context of weak law enforcement. It also demonstrated that the CP discourse has been successively used since the late 1970s as a containment tool by various actors, each providing CP with a different strategic meaning and operational content. The CP concept was in fact first used by the state in the form of large public consultations nurturing exercises of participatory planning that mostly led nowhere. More recently, it was used by large NGOs to help contain cattle-ranching activities and promote a stricter view of conservation based on private reserves. Third, it was initially mobilised to provide incentives to local producers to modify some of their production practices. Fourth and finally, the CP discourse was brought into play by landowning families in crisis, in the hope of containing both conservationist forces as well as incoming economic competitors. This move was supported by political authorities anxious about local development, but also by a foreign donor, France, who has long been eager to promote a home-grown model of environmental management internationally – the so-called “regional parks”.

It was further showed that the PRP project has neither been originated by – nor connected to – a wide part of the local community, but rather to a limited set of active people. Socially speaking, the originating process was narrow and elite-centred, as those mainly involved were a few local elite families. Meanwhile, the initiative was to a large extent financially supported and conceptually influenced “from outside”.

Third, we contended that the PRP initiative was built upon a strategic discourse on “traditions” that neatly suited the interests of its originating alliance. By defining cattle ranchers as the foremost “protectors” of the environment, international funding for local development could be secured in the name of the protection of global biodiversity, the influence of conservationists could be better contained and incoming economic competitors de-legitimised. Beyond these productive power effects, the discourse on traditions also carried structural power effects reinforcing the social status quo in the Pantanal. The PRP’s reading of the traditional community narrowly focused on landowners and excluded long-standing local groups such as
rural employees and fishers. This *selective oblivion* reflected these groups’ lack of political weight in their own *pantaneira* community. Consequently, the PRP offered no significant opportunity to actors other than landowners to benefit from the funds flowing into it.

As in St. Lucia, despite a great deal of celebration of “community participation”, CP has been essentially used in the Pantanal as tool of social control – but against a much more complex range of actors: from NGOs to fishers, from “asphalt farmers” to local *peon*. All of these findings again seem to confirm the expectations of the critical narrative of the CP discourse.

*Map 4 – The Brazilian Pantanal: at the heart of South America*

(Source: ANA et al. (2005), p.3)
Map 5 – The Brazilian Pantanal: a floodplain surrounded by higher plateaus

LOCATION
UPPER PARAGUAY RIVER BASIN IN BRAZIL

Source: ANA et al. (2005).
Map 6 – Structuring the Pantanal: the Paraguay River and its tributaries
(Hydrographic network of the Upper Paraguay River Basin in Brazil)

Source: ANA et al. (2005),
Photo 5 – Examples of easily visible wildlife in the Pantanal
Photo 6 – Typical *pantaneiro* landscapes during the rainy season

Source: the author
Photo 7 – Cattle ranching in the Pantanal with Peons at work

Source: the author
Chapter 7 - The Effect of CP in the Pantanal: Social Control, Dispossession and Altered Social Capital

The last chapter analysed the genesis, originating alliance and strategic meaning of the PRP project, intended to help contain the rise of conservationist forces and new economic actors. It also explored the discourse on the *traditional community*, embedded in the PRP project, to show how its productive and structural power dimensions sustained its spirit of *containment* for the preservation of the socio-economic *status quo* of the region. It was further demonstrated that CP had been used in the Pantanal as a containment tool in changing hands since its emergence in the 1970s. These findings largely seemed to fit the empirical expectations of the critical narrative on the nature, use and effect of the CP discourse. In this new chapter, we look at the implementation, fate and impact on the local community of the PRR project to further assess the relevance of these expectations. Ironically, it turns out that CP helped to disempower the landowners themselves.

We first analyse, indeed, how the mantra of *pluralism* turned CP once again into an instrument of social control but this time against the *fazendeiros*. This process started with the four-year “preliminary project” preceding the formal creation of the park in 2002 – an inception phase that soon revealed divergences in the agendas of the main partners. Behind the smiles, the *originating alliance* was cracking. The French experts, in particular, mistrusted the influence of the pre-existing landowner association; they thus emphasised the need to make the local civil society “more plural” and increase the number of local organisations, as a necessary step towards the creation of a “truly participatory park”. Although this “pluralisation” work was conducted in the name of CP, we show that it turned out to be detrimental to the local community itself. *Fabricated pluralism* in the form of a swift and artificial multiplication of small associations fragmented local voices and opened the way for other forces to capture the PRP.

The chapter then looks at the deployment of institutional power during the core implementation phase: the creation of the PRP itself. Although its legal construct reflected the ideal of a CP characterised by high *inclusiveness, scope and intensity*, as
well as co-operation with the local state on an equal footing, the picture soon became very different in practice. To start with, the foreign experts never left the centre stage of the park’s management, although they were officially meant to be mere facilitators and advisors. What is more, a group of local politicians started to employ political interventions and appointments, a process that only amplified with time. From the viewpoint of the landowners, who were meant to be “in the driver’s seat”, the inclusiveness, scope and intensity of CP shrank almost completely. To their frustration, the governance of the PRP disaggregated, leading to an accumulation of financial and technical mismanagement. Eventually, all PRP operations had to close in July 2005 following a financial collapse eventually revealed by the non-payment of major taxes.

Finally, we investigate how the multiple containment processes identified in the PRP project were facilitated by and impacted the local social capital. The bridging SC of the rural workers is characterised by a symbiotic-paternalistic relation to the fazendeiros that was instrumental in depriving the former from having a say in the PRP process. We then show that the bonding SC is characterised by a complex mix of norms (such as individualism and informalism) that contributed to the disempowerment of the fazendeiros themselves and to the final collapse of the PRP. Lastly, we underline that the failure of this participatory scheme stimulated local frustrations and a VOICE response from the fazendeiros, which may feed a collective learning process. In the long run, part of the local social capital may appear to be renewed and enable more collective action.

All of these data emphasize the relevance of the critical narrative in describing the impact of CP insofar as multiple forms of disempowerment are indeed observed. However, the mechanisms and agendas that led to this disempowerment turn out to be far more local and open (rather than pre-defined) than generally implied by this narrative. It is not global capitalism that has been furthered in the case of the Pantanal, but rather various and contradictory rent-seeking behaviours. Their stimulation has led to a fight for dominance. Its conclusion (namely the political capture of the PRP) was not pre-determined, although the allocation of social capital among local stakeholders did skew and structure the battle.
7.1. ‘Fabricated Pluralism’ and its Social Control Effect: the Preliminary Project

In this section we look at the first implementation phase of the PRP and the way in which CP was, once again, transformed into social control. This time, containment affected the fazendeiros themselves, through the weakening of their main pre-existing association by the mantra of pluralism promoted by the foreign partners. The so-called “preliminary project for the creation of PRP” (Apoio a Criação do PRP) was launched in 1998 to “organise and mobilise the local population” [interview 76]. It had two main components: first, the speedy creation of a range of new local organisations, expected to “pluralize” the local civil society; second, the launch of a variety of development projects, de facto functioning as “baits” to attract landowners into these new associations.

As foreign experts were eager to draw on “CP best practices”, they became highly concerned with (and directly involved in) “fixing the local civil society”, “democratising it”, making it “more diverse” [interview 58]. This work was supposed to ensure that the participatory park could be constructed on the “healthy basis” of an inclusive participation [interview 77]. Yet, we argue that it undermined the reality of CP, notably its intensity (i.e. the degree of active participation) by destabilising the only well-established and functioning association of fazendeiros: the SODEPAN. In our view, this organisation was the only one that could have counter-balanced the institutional influence of other actors, which was subsequently to grow – notably that of the foreign experts and the local authorities. In this sense, the artificial and hasty fabrication of pluralism that took place introduced a new form of social control and containment, primarily affecting local elite families but also, through them, the whole community of fazendeiros. This process, we claim, laid the ground for the latter’s institutional disempowerment – which was not long in coming.

Here we first review the productive power effect of the discourse on “pluralism”: this challenged the influence and legitimacy of the pre-existing landowner association, the SODEPAN, with the wilful creation of various new organisations. We then show how this process was fuelled by the use of compulsory power and the expected benefits of “bait projects” which people could reap if they joined one of the new associations. Finally, we look at the containment effect of this fabricated pluralism;
how it lowered the profile and weight of the fazendeiro community within the PRP scheme and how these new structures failed to secure any real lobbying power and to carry the voice of the fazendeiros.

7.1.1. The productive power of “pluralism”: destabilising the landowner association with new ones

The initial implementation phase of the PRP, namely its “preliminary project”, was launched in 1998 and was meant to prepare for the creation of the park within four years. Its first responsibility was to delineate a territory within which landowners would be called upon to voluntarily join the Park. Second, it was to produce the write up of a “park charter”, namely a set of management principles and common objectives to be followed by park members. Third, the legal status, the staff and competences of the management structure to be created needed defining. Fourth, it was also supposed to lobby federal authorities and publicise the concept of “regional park” as a new legal category.

However, the most striking feature was the fact that the “preliminary project” called for a deep reshaping of the local pantaneira civil society [interview 64]. This was in line with the PRP’s foreign partners’ strong discourse on the need to make it “more plural” before the creation of the actual park [interview 76]. According to this methodology, the first and necessary step in creating a participatory park was the “preparation of the civil society”, meaning in this case a complete restructuring of its associative landscape. A form of productive power was thus to be exercised to lower the profile of the main pre-existing landowner organisation.

Before this preparatory work, there was basically one association representing the landowners of the Pantanal: the SODEPAN (Sociedade de Defesa do Pantanal). Created in 1985 in Campo Grande, the SODEPAN had been active in both Mato Grosso and Mato Gross do Sul as the main mechanism through which the fazendeiros could unite for common causes [interviews 61, 63, 109]. Its foundation had been motivated by the problem of illegal poaching of jacares (crocodiles) by outsiders on private lands in the mid-1980s, which had led to a sharp decrease in their population. The SODEPAN gained legitimacy and credibility in this first battle, helped by a change in international regulations prohibiting trade in jacare skins. Later on, its focus widened to encompass a range of development issues within the
Pantanal, with special emphasis on the needs of the cattle ranchers (access to credit, energy, animal health, etc.) Appendix 12 shows the breadth of its concerns, which border on a full-fledged political programme for the region, although little attention is paid to rural employees, fisher groups and Indians.

Over the years, the SODEPAN had heavily lobbied the local state for delivery of better public services such as transport infrastructures or health, although this had given modest results [interview 71]. It had also encouraged research on cattle production in various local universities, as well as promoting public recognition of the "pantaneira culture" through initiatives such as the Dia do Homen Pantaneiro (the day of the pantaneiro man). The SODEPAN also obtained technical support and financial assistance from various Brazilian organisations to test economic alternatives such as the production of honey or ecotourism. Given this background, the organisation was an obvious, if not compulsory partner for the PRP project and it was indeed partly associated to the PRP's early development. The fear had developed among the French partners, however, that the SODEPAN might "take over the whole initiative", as several informants suggested [interviews 58, 66, 67]. The social representativeness of the association was notably called into question. Illustratively, the key French expert in charge the project made no reference to the SODEPAN in a 2004 conference on the PRP experience. He even claimed that before the project "no institution in the territory existed that represented the people".96

Foreign experts considered the pre-eminence of this organisation as "unhealthy", "anti-democratic", "not representative" and "too concentrated", as an observer of the time recalled [interview 58]. Following this logic, the European partners pushed the idea that there should be more pantaneira associations to represent the various sub-regions and groups. As one interviewee suggested, the idea to "increase pluralism" was also supported by local ministries, which seemed happy to challenge SODEPAN's regional influence [interview 74].

Thanks to the work of a technical team led by the same French expert, a series of meetings and discussions took place in various sub-regions of the Pantanal. This process led to the creation of three new regional associations in 1999-2000:

- the UNIPAN (Uniao dos Pantaneiros da Nhecolandia);

- the APANMERA (Associação dos Pantaneiros da Margem Esquerda do Rio Aquidauana);
- and the AVRN (Associação do Vale do Rio Negro).

Two more regional associations were subsequently created:
- one in the region of Rio Verde;
- and one in the region of Taboco.

These five new entities had reached a combined membership of about 250 landowners by 2002, which was deemed an important success (PRP, 2002, p.11).

The process also led to the inception of three sectoral associations:
- one dedicated to the development of educational facilities and cycles adapted to the Pantanal (APPEP, Associação de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da Escola Pantaneira);
- another focused on the development of ecotourism (APPAN, Associação de Poussadas Pantaneiras);
- and the last one dedicated to cattle-ranching (GTE, Grupo de Troca de Experiencias).

Faced with this process, which was non-negotiable in the eyes of the French (who were concerned with "good CP"), the feelings of the fazendeiros were mixed. Recalling this moment, informants made comments such as:

- Many people, like me, did not see the point of more associations. We had the SODEPAN and it was working well for us. We also had a strong attachment to this organisation. [interview 58]
- To find solutions among ourselves, why should we need, 4, 5, 6 associations? This is nonsense, really. [interview 67]
- Fazendeiros can talk to one another any time. They don’t really need or even like formal organisations to do this. Only when they need to talk as one on some problem does this make sense. That was the idea of the SODEPAN. But why divide ourselves into more groups? Wouldn’t this mean only that we lose strength? [interview 64]

For some fazendeiros, however, the leadership of the SODEPAN seemed to reflect too narrow a cross-section of their community group - and the fact of being under the leadership of only a few prominent families - “always the same ones”, as one person put it [interview 60]. There were also concerns that the organisation had become too formal and institutional, while focusing on the wealthier part of the community. A modest landowner declared during an interview:

[The SODEPAN] had become a closed society [with] a philosophy for the 'big ones'. The 'small ones' did not really count....For example, you have to pay a yearly contribution to be part of it and this has been on the rise. We [the small ones] really started to think that these fees were there to exclude us. [interview 61]
Such feelings fed the growing suspicion on the part of the foreign experts that the SODEPAN would want to capture the PRP and "control it from A to Z". However, it should be noted that this preparatory work did not lead to the creation of any form of representation for rural employees and fishers groups – which further continued the selective oblivion.

7.1.2. Fuelling the process with compulsory power: the use of "bait projects"

Compulsory power takes a non-confrontational form when material resources are used to produce incentives for a certain expected behaviour, avoiding the use of outright constraint (cf. section 3.2.1). Certain incentives, however, can be so strong that they almost take the form of a constraint if, for instance, not taking advantage of them becomes a handicap relative to competitors. Here we argue that such a mechanism supported the reshaping of the local civil society within the PRP preliminary project. As soon as the latter started, a set of development projects were launched which proved essential in attracting "volunteers" to the newly created associations. They functioned as "baits", as a former president of the SODEPAN commented [interview 64]. People could only join the various projects on the condition they joined one of the new associations. Yet, being a member of the SODEPAN was not considered relevant for this purpose. Over the years, these "baits" managed to draw over 250 fazendas into the PRP initiative, covering about 2 million hectares FPNRF (2002, p.17).

The Vitelo pantaneiro (VITPAN) was the key project and the most appealing to the landowners [interview 65]. Its core idea was to develop a new line of meat products (pantaneiro veal) with a visible and marketable local identity to be sold at higher than average prices. Here again the concept came from France, mirroring the notion of "produits du terroir" (i.e. products with a strong local identity). This strategy is largely used in French regional parks to pull together local producers and sell their products under a common name with common (and higher) quality standards.

VITPAN involved producing meat from cattle between ten to twelve months old, reaching around 180 kilos and carrying a precise level of fat. These animals would be raised using natural pasture, without antibiotics, limited vaccinations and according to the best European standards of organic agriculture. Commercialisation and
distribution were to be revamped – and labels to be obtained from the government ministry in charge of agriculture, as well as well from a French enterprise. This situation did not please all partners as it was felt that the French were imposing a specific business partner without it being technically necessary [interview 65]. In any case, the hope was that VITPAN would renew the economic use and productivity of the entire region.

To join the project, the fazendeiros had to enrol on one of the new regional associations and pledge to follow its technical guidelines. VITPAN particularly appealed to small landowners (with less than 10,000 hectares) in search of a rapid increase in productivity. With its promise of adding value to cattle-ranching and improving the marketing of locally produced meat, it brandished hopes of saving the small fazendas. By the end of 2002, the pantanetro veal had reached a sale price of 700 Brazilian reais per head, which was more than twice the price of standard cattle. Five percent of the sale price was also paid to the PRP as a contribution to its running costs.

Other projects not directly related to cattle production were developed within an initiative entitled Project of Pilot Actions for the Valorisation of the Biodiversity of the Rio Negro Region of Pantanal. This programme was heavily financed by the French cooperation (58%) and to a lesser extent by the European Union (14%) and various local partners (28%).

The programme’s first dimension was the promotion of ecotourism, presented as an alternative for small landowners. This led to the creation, in February 2001, of a sectoral association, the Associação de Pousadas Pantaneiras (APPAN) initially bringing together 16 fazendas, most of which were already operating lodges. This new organisation was meant to join the forces of pousadas (rural lodges), offer coordinated tourism packages, market the Pantanal destination more widely, train guides and better negotiate with domestic and international tour operators. It also developed some communication actions, including the creation of a website and attendance in professional fairs. In the following years, however, ecotourism did not develop steadily in the Pantanal, due to continued logistical constraints (transportation costs to start with) and sharp variations in American tourism. A number of pousadas have now closed down and membership of the APPAN had diminished by two-thirds by 2008, at the time of the fieldwork [interviews 66].
The second aspect of the programme involved the diversification of meat production beyond cattle, to "commodify" and take advantage of the wildlife. The idea was to capture or raise wild species. With the help of French and Brazilian researchers, the pilot project focused on the production of *porco monteiro* (a wild pig) and soon involved 21 fazendas. It also encompassed other species such as *capivara, cateto, ema* and *jacaré*. Commercial circuits were identified to market these new products. Although not a failure, this project proved to be only mildly successful in the following years. As of 2008, this production is extremely limited and does not extend to many species. An important step was the creation in 2004-2005 of a state-of-the-art multi-species meat treatment facility: the Campo Grande Meat Technology Experimental Station, under the responsibility of the French CIRAD and funded by the French Fund for the Global Environment (FFEM). To date, it is used for both commercial and research purposes but has not led to a steady development of a wildlife meat industry.

The third component of the programme was geared towards lessening the conflict between jaguars, pumas and cattle ranchers – and was thus the only project directly related to the protection of the environment. Various techniques were presented to cattle ranchers to diminish the frequency of this problem. Training was also provided by Zimbabwean professionals to tourist guides on how to better "watch hunt". This project proved useful but limited in time and scope [interview 108]. It did not structurally impact the issue, on which an international NGO, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), is also working (cf. section 6.1.3).

Finally, the "preliminary project" leading to the PRP also engaged in educational actions, building upon an already existing network of *pantaneira* schools that was to be reinforced. This was the most "social" of the bait projects but roused the interest of only a few and already-involved fazendeiros. From the mid-1990s, some landowners had started to create schools within the Pantanal to avoid the departure of their workers’ families when their children reached school-age. All the running costs were borne by fazendeiros, while the state paid only the teachers’ salaries. As we saw, under the influence of the PRP preliminary project and its concern with fostering new associations, an *Associação de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da*

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97 One of the problems is that wildlife “consumption” in Brazil is largely assimilated with illegal hunting.
Escola Pantaneira (APPEP) was created in 1998. Until 2003, with the financial backing of the PRP project, the number of pantaneiro schools increased from 3 to 11, catering for almost 500 children, and their work was awarded several Brazilian distinctions. However, the collapse of the PRP after 2005 drastically affected this process which the local state did not pursue. Most pantaneira schools closed and only a few were running at the time of our fieldwork.

On the whole, the mobilisation of fazendeiros in new associations through “bait projects” was relatively effective. Nonetheless, it did encounter some limitations. Landowners were far less interested in environmental or social concerns than productive ones. As the first president of PRP recalls:

*The VITPAN project was the key project in the minds of the fazendeiros....But when the time came to discuss other questions such as conservation, ecotourism, education, the difficulty of making people meet was much greater. If you had a meeting on VITPAN, you would have 40 or 50 people, but if you had a meeting on education, then only 6 or 8 people would come. And even fewer for ecotourism.*[interview 58]

By 1998, meat prices were entering a new upward trend, with the progressive devaluation of the national currency. This gave ranchers a strong incentive to concentrate on meat production, which further explains the continued focus of the PRP project on beef production and the lack of enthusiasm for more innovative projects.

7.1.3. The containment impact of “delegitimisation”: lowering CP intensity and inclusiveness

In a few years, eight new organisations had thus been created from scratch, drawing together hundreds of landowners – a process hailed at the time as a “success” by the French team. This result indeed looked exceptional when contrasted with the traditional lack of associative behaviour within the fazendeiro community. The creation of the SODEPAN in 1980s had already been an outstanding event in that regard. During the fieldwork, many interviews underlined the typical reluctance found among fazendeiros to team up within formal associations and engage in collective endeavours [interviews 63, 81, 99, 103]. This is not to say, however, that there is no practice of solidarity among them. Traditionally, landowners do help one

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98 The Brazilian currency moved from 1.2 reais per dollar in December 1998, to 3.6 in December 2002. During this period, the price of Brazilian beef approximately doubled in local currency, while its price in dollars fell.

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another but on limited matters, as good neighbours do, as this had been essential to their mode of living in the old days, given the geographical isolation of many fazendas. However, landowners in the Pantanal also have a propensity and desire to feel “master in their own kingdom” and they want to preserve this autonomy. Not only are they reluctant to have any kind of boss, but even equal partners with whom they would have to share decisions [interview 103]. Choices on whatever issue are their own. There is no practice in this community of jointly organising any sizeable project. As one fazendeiro clearly put it:

Any type of co-operative, association or syndicate means that you lose part of your freedom. [interview 64]

The apparition of eight brand-new associations seemed unthinkable in the local mindset. This “associative mania”, as an interviewee put it, was even somewhat suspicious for those who know the local distaste for collective commitments [interview 67]. However, as we have seen, the hundreds of “volunteers” had largely been pressed into these new organisations as for a pre-condition for their joining the VITPAN project, which offered the prospect of rapid gains. But it rapidly became apparent that these volunteers had no genuine desire to become actively involved in any regular meetings or collective movement.

The coming years were to demonstrate that these new “regional associations” functioned poorly, with low and decreasing attendance rates at their rare meetings, unlike the more established SODEPAN. Their function of representation was thus not ensured, neither was their ability to simply coordinate the fazendeiros’ behaviours, despite the attraction of the VITPAN project. None of these associations managed to gain significant influence on any issue, notably when it came to obtaining resources from the state. As informants suggested, each association was “too small and inexperienced” to impose substantive negotiation on any actor within or outside the fazendeiro community [interview 72]. This also proved true of the two sectoral associations, although they were highly focused on specific issues. The APPEP, for instance, had to run its educational programme without securing a significant support from the local authorities – which, for the most part, abandoned the project after 2005. As for the APPAN, it tried to promote ecotourism in the

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99 Roads, cars and modern life in cities (where most landowners now live) have partly changed this.
Pantanal but without obtaining any state support or even a reasonable level of cooperation among its members.

In the end, this fabricated pluralism had hastily created associations that much resembled, as an observer put it, “dwarves or empty shells” [interview 87]. They did not merely prove *ineffective* in mobilising and organising locals on various common causes: arguably, they also proved *damaging* to the *fazendeiro* community as they lowered the profile and legitimacy of their only correctly functioning association, the SODEPAN. Unlike these new associations, the latter “had not been created as a laboratory experiment”\(^{100}\) and was more of a grassroots organisation, although it was led nonetheless by prominent local families.

The wish to avoid the capture of the PRP project by a single community association of limited representativeness was arguably laudable within the CP logic followed by the foreign technicians. Nevertheless, it caused the only well-established community organisation to lose its credentials as “the voice of the landowners”, its ability to carry the full weight of the *fazendeiros* when talking to the state and donors, while failing to create in parallel credible organisations to represent the interests of the community. The containment mode, here, is one of *de-legitimisation*, as defined in section 3.1.7 (Table 5).

With such “representative associations” introduced into the heart of the PRP governance system, CP was to be in practice of a low *intensity* for *fazendeiros*, their participation being more nominal than anything else. It is our contention, as well as the view of several interviewees, that this process laid the ground for the capture of the PRP project by other influential actors – a development that occurred later on, as we see in the next section. The feeling even emerged among some *fazendeiros* that their sidelining had been intended from the start as a “plot”. As one interviewee put it:

> *The politicians needed to weaken the SODEPAN to take control of the park and make it an instrument in their own hands.*[interview 67]

Another observer did not hesitate to add to this “plot” the foreign technicians themselves:

\(^{100}\) Quote from a *fazendeiro*. [interview 62]
The foreigners and the state relied on demagogy to fragment our community....They wanted to marginalise us one way or another, so that they would have a free hand. [interview 66]

Not only did the process of “pluralisation” set the ground for a low level of CP intensity within the participatory park, since it weakened from the start the standing of the fazendeiro voice; but it also endorsed its low inclusiveness already built into the discourse on “traditions” placing fazendeiros at the centre of the “traditional community” and excluding other social groups. This took place despite the claims of project designers that they had recourse to the best CP practices. For instance, commenting on his work, the main French expert in charge of the PRP argued that his team conducted a very large review of who lived and worked in the region, so as to ensure the largest inclusion of social actors in the scheme:

To secure participation it is necessary to know who the people living in the place are and what they do. This was done at the very beginning, during the first phase of the project through an institutional diagnosis to know who were the people living there and what they were doing.101

Yet, the newly created associations left out of the picture were in fact key social groups living and working in the area of the projected park. The rural employees (of the fazendas) and the fishers, particularly, were never mobilised or even consulted so that they could contribute a common vision. The question of their representation was never touched on [interviews 58, 96]. Thus, the restricted range of community groups involved in the pluralisation process transformed the narrow CP inclusiveness (as defined in section 3.1.2) of the discourse on traditions into an institutional practice.

7.1.4. Conclusion: turning CP against itself

Here, we showed that the weight of foreign expertise influenced the preliminary project in a fundamental way that did not necessarily reflect the locals’ demand: a massive emphasis was indeed put on “fixing the local civil society first” and making it “more plural”, instead of building the PRP on already existing community institutions. This may have been praiseworthy within the logic of the global CP discourse; but just as “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”, we argue that this preliminary project turned out to be detrimental to the landowners themselves. It challenged the legitimacy and thus the influence of their only long-standing

101 Delorme (2004, p.6).
association, the SODEPAN, which was the only functioning *fazendeiro* association that could have counter-balanced the influence of other actors. What the "preparatory" work basically did in the short run was to diminish the landowners' leadership and their capacity to stand up to non-community (and predatory) forces in the management of the soon-to-be-created park. Four years had been enough to lower the profile of the SODEPAN but not to bring real life to the associations, which remained without substance. Meanwhile, this fabricated pluralism also endorsed a view of the local community entirely centred on the *fazendeiros*, leaving out other local social groups. All in all, this process made CP a mechanism of social control weighing upon the whole local community, this time including the *fazendeiros* themselves.

As we shall now see, the SODEPAN still managed to keep some influence at the beginning of the park's functioning, since its president was elected as the park's first president; but this did not prevent the *fazendeiros* from swiftly losing control of "their park". The double process of institutional disempowerment and political capture that followed is explored in the next section.
7.2. Dispossessing the Community: Institutional Power at Work

In this section, we look at the deployment of the Pantanal Regional Park to compare the theory and practice of power in the management of the institution created in 2001 – namely the IPP (Instituto do Parque Regional or Regional Park Institute). We analyse this organisation as a *power formation*, that brings together a range of local, domestic and international actors who share decision-making power, albeit unequally. We concentrate on the mechanisms of *institutional power* to study the varying ability of these different actors to make use of the IPP.

It is first shown that the park’s legal construct theoretically created a co-management scheme in which decisions were to be shared by the *fazendeiros* and various levels of Brazilian governance. On paper, the balance of influence clearly favoured the local landowners, as the IPP was supposed to give them the “driver’s seat” and ensure a high level of CP *inclusiveness, scope* and *intensity*. In this sense, the IPP closely mirrored the founding discourse of the *originating alliance*: the one on “salvation through traditions” that gave pre-eminence to development needs in environmental management, and to property-owners in the definition of the *local community*.

Second, we demonstrate that institutional practice in the IPP led both to a displacement of authority away from the *fazendeiros* and to the emergence of a power formation where foreign actors play an important role. We may qualify this process as “passive” rather than “active” because we feel that it was not so much led by an active will to dispossess the locals from their prerogative, as by the organisational inertia of administrative management combined with the institutional weight of foreign experts. Certainly, the governance of the IPP was marked by the continued presence of foreign experts, who never left the centre of the picture, even after the end of the “preliminary project” and the formal creation of the park in 2002. These technicians stayed on, well beyond their role of “facilitators”, and exerted a heavy institutional power given their strong connection to donors.

Third, we identify a parallel process of active *political capture* whose origins we trace back to 1999, soon after the start of the preliminary project. Using the formal and informal channels of state power, a handful of local politicians began to exert a direct influence on the IPP structure. More specifically, through “suggestions”, they
imposed the appointment of a range of people within both the IPP higher management and its technical team. Not only did these new staff members have little duty of accountability towards fazendeiros, but they were also pursuing unclear agendas. This political capture of the IPP led to a variety of management mistakes and irregularities that eventually brought about the collapse of the park.

Finally, we argue that this collapse was hastened rather than delayed by the election, in April 2003, of a new park president – a pantaneiro artist known throughout Brazil whose fame the fazendeiros expected to use to regain control of the situation. This election, in fact, turned on the waterworks of political control and led to the complete disempowerment of the local community.

7.2.1. High CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity: the founding pledge of a co-management scheme

On 29 August, 2002, the state of Mato Grosso do Sul created a new legal category of environmental protection under the name of Area Especial de Proteção Ambiental (AEPA). In the same decree,102 this category was immediately applied with the creation of the Parque Regional do Pantanal. Compared to the Brazilian legal framework – the national system of conservation units (SNUC) – the AEPA category did not base environmental protection on the limitation of human activities, but rather on their promotion. The aim of the PRP was to:

allow the pantaneiro man to continue to produce in the Pantanal, as well as preserve his economic, social and ecological equilibrium; [and] base economic development upon the human and natural heritage of the community.

It gave itself the particular objective to:

prove the sustainability of extensive cattle raising.

The second important feature of the new legal category was its participatory nature:

The Special Area of Environmental Protection [is to be] entirely managed in a democratic and participatory fashion.

The management of the PRP was to be carried out on a shared basis involving the Federal government, the local state and five rural districts (municípios): Aquidauna, Corguinho, Miranda, Rio Negro and Rio Verde. An AEPA was also defined as an entirely voluntary scheme, which landowners could freely join or not. As a result, the

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102 Decree no.10.906, Mato Grosso do Sul.
territory of the PRP would not necessarily be continuous: it would be the mere sum of the land-properties whose owners decided to participate. Some states in the Brazilian federation (e.g. Rondonia) had already tried to push forward new legal categories of conservation, but no state went further than Mato Grosso do Sul in trying to put local producers in the "driver's seat", with the adaptation of the French concept of "regional park" [interviews 99, 103].

On this basis, a "study territory" (territorio de estudo) was defined as the maximum spatial extension of the park. It encompassed four sub-regions of the Pantanal wetland (see Map 6). These choices were made to provide the park with an "ecological coherence and diversity" [interview 76]. They gave the future park a possible extension of five million hectares and a potential population of 14,000 inhabitants, making it possibly one of the largest protected areas in the world. Most of this space (98%) was made up of private properties, ranging from 3,000 to 50,000 hectares, where extensive cattle-raising was the main activity. Not all landowners potentially concerned joined the project, but 250 fazendeiros did eventually participate, providing the PRP with a total surface area of 2 million hectares – nearly 15% of the Pantanal's wetland. This result was considered to be a great success during the initial five years of operation.
On 15 February 2001, one year before the formal creation of the PRP, the park’s management body was created under the name of **Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP)**. The IPP was later recognised\(^\text{103}\) by the local parliament as an “NGO of public interest” (OSCI, *Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público*), making it a sort of public-private construct comparable to the SMMA in Soufrière. Also like the SMMA, the IPP based its structure and legitimacy upon preliminary efforts to mobilise the local population.

The governance of the IPP was structured on several different bodies. It was first under the authority of the park’s **General Assembly** responsible for approving a Charter (*Carta do Parque*) at each year’s opening session; for approving a multi-year development plan; and for checking the coherence of expenses and realisations. The Assembly was supposed to meet three times a year and be composed of the following members: one representative from each of the newly created associations; one SODEPAN representative; all of the individual landowners who joined the park; one representative from each *município* involved; one representative from the government of Mato Grosso do Sul; a Governor’s representative; and finally a

\(^{103}\) In November 2002.
representative from a so-called "regional union of rural workers". The General Assembly thus embodied the PRP's spirit of co-management, although a clear emphasis was placed on private landowners, represented both collectively and individually. Even the rural workers, who until then had never been mentioned in the process, were supposed to be represented in the Assembly according to the PRP statutes. However, it was impossible to confirm the actual existence of this "worker union" during the fieldwork, despite an in-depth enquiry. None of the peons we interviewed knew of its existence and no fazendeiro was able say anything about this organisation either [interviews 58-67, 92-96].

The second governance mechanism of the IPP was its Council of Administration (Conselho de Administração), much closer than the Assembly to the park's management. It was responsible for overseeing and approving the budget, strategy and work-plan of the PRP, as well as ensuring their satisfactory implementation by IPP's higher management. Its membership included one representative from each of the nine "founding associations" of landowners (among which the SODEPAN), two state representatives (FPNRF, 2002, p.17) and a representative from each município. However, provision was no longer made at this level for any representation of the rural workers.

The next step was for the General Assembly to elect IPP's President. This unpaid position came nevertheless with large legal liabilities. Its level of influence over the running of the IPP proved to be largely dependent on the personal managerial style of the president, and whether or not delegation was used.

Finally, the IPP had a Technical Team, comprising various experts, fieldworkers and administrative assistants led by an Executive Secretary in charge of the everyday management. The team also included a French Executive Coordinator, whose responsibilities and hierarchical position were not clearly defined and who turned out to have a major influence.

The governance structure of the IPP was thus created as a space of power sharing between the state government, the rural districts and a local community essentially reduced to the landowners. The General Assembly was specifically in charge of

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104 Originally, the IPP only had an Executive Board (diretoria executiva) meeting once a month. It was soon replaced with a President acting on a permanent basis.
ensuring a high level of CP *inclusiveness* of the local *fazendeiros*, while the responsibilities of the Council of Administration were to enable strong CP *scope* and *intensity*. This closely reflected the founding agreement of the *originating alliance* supporting the PRP, based on the motto of “salvation through traditions” and the need to preserve the traditional landowners.

7.2.2. Institutions in practice: a passive shift of authority and the emergence of a power formation

Whereas the legal construct of the PRP seemed committed to a highly participatory governance, real institutions and people proved to work rather differently.

First, although the entire legitimacy of the IPP derived from its General Assembly, the latter rarely met in practice. Only a limited number of landowners were present at each session and attendance decreased over time [interviews 58, 66]. The Assembly did not play its role of a forum to debate the definition of the park’s Charter, for instance, which was to be the key document embodying the PRP’s vision and the common pledges of its members. As a matter of fact, this Charter was never completed and adopted beyond a working version written during the preliminary project (Gouveia, 2006). The Assembly thus played hardly any role beyond electing the IPP presidents, and even less of a role considering that there was only one declared candidate in each of the two elections of the park’s short history. As for the Assembly’s social inclusiveness, as we mentioned, the existence of the “regional union of rural workers” that supposedly had one representative on the Assembly was not corroborated by fieldwork.

The Council of Administration had a more practical say in the running of the IPP than the Assembly, but it also met less often than planned and with uneven attendance [interview 64]. In practice, the people on the Council had either little time or not enough technical competence to monitor what was happening within the IPP. Over the four years of functioning, the Council in fact relied upon the elected President to oversee operations. As several interviews confirmed, the most the Council could do in case of discontent with the IPP was to talk to its elected president [interviews 67, 72, 73].

As for the park’s Presidency, its institutional practice evolved over time. During the first two years of IPP operations (2001-2003), the post was held by the former
president of the SODEPAN. This *fazendeiro* from a long-established *pantaneira* family took a very active role in the everyday running of the structure. As an informant explains, he “would sign every cheque” [interview 64]. However, tensions in the governance of the IPP soon appeared as this president started to lose management power to the benefit of the foreign experts still present within the scheme.

The IPP’s technical team included several foreign technicians who were running their programmes largely independently from IPP’s higher management [interview 67]. Most notably, the French expert that had been acting during the preliminary project as Principal Technical Advisor had stayed on. During this new phase, he enjoyed the new (and rather ambiguous) title of “executive coordinator” and in practice had a large say in anything taking place within the structure. Sent by the French FPNRF, he exercised throughout significant institutional power due to his direct connection to donors – both current and potential, French and European. For any decision that mattered, although he had no formal obligation to do so, the president always had to negotiate with this executive coordinator, who often opposed his views, as for instance concerning the technicalities of the VITPAN project. Over time, a growing uneasiness developed between the two men. During an interview in 2008, the former IPP president suggested that this tension stemmed from the fact that, in the eyes of the French expert, he was too connected the SODEPAN, the very organisation that had been challenged by the preliminary project [interview 58].

Foreign experts in CP schemes are officially meant to be temporary catalysts; but in the case of the IPP, they never left the centre-stage, staying on well after the preparatory project and directly running some of the PRP programme components. In this sense, the IPP did not actually embody a simple co-management scheme, pulling together landowners, the state and rural districts. The self-inertia of each of its governing bodies (e.g. low attendance), combined with the continued presence of foreign experts turned the IPP into a *power formation* through which a range of local decisions had to be negotiated between local and international actors.

In the following years, the governance of the IPP was to change even further and faster through an active process of *political capture*. Since 1999, the IPP had been

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105 This interpretation was confirmed by several interviewees.
attracting increasing attention from the state. A few local politicians started to “suggest” to the IPP (and in fact impose on it) various people with political connections, who would work there on favourable salary terms. By the end of 2002, the IPP team already employed 21 people, including thirteen engineers, six field technicians and administrative agents as well as two researchers – a rather heavy staff compared to the organisation’s budget. Although the latter was not at the time encountering any financial difficulty, its governance was obviously becoming disarticulated. But things were to get far worse.

7.2.3. The active use of institutional power: political capture for unclear agendas

Step by step, the local state increased its influence over the IPP, which resulted in the Council of Administration and the President losing control. Through state ministries, a small group of influential politicians seemed to be operating in the interest of both their political party and of certain individuals who had useful personal acquaintances. According to several interviewees, this political capture had been well prepared during the 1998-2002 preparatory project [interviews 67, 89]. In retrospect, this seems to have operated first through a move to draw the PRP initiative closer to higher state authorities, arguably to ensure a more direct and personal influence of specific people. Then, when the IPP started to fully function, this slow takeover operated increasingly through the direct imposition of certain persons within the management team – a process that got out of all control and proportion after 2003.

As early as 1999, after a period of indecisiveness, the local government became increasingly interested in the PRP project as it was managing to attract international funds [interview 74]. With respect to state involvement, the project was initially located within the FEMAP, a state foundation entrusted with the implementation of environmental policies defined by the local ministry of the environment (Secretaria de Meio Ambiente). But this was soon judged to be too far-removed from the highest authorities. The official concern was that the institutional positioning of the PRP project did not allow it to “secure the full implication of all ministries” (finances, infrastructure, production, environment) given their “vertical mode of

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106 These people could not be nominatively identified during fieldwork.
functioning”. Consequently, and to ensure “better cooperation of the PRP project with the local state”, a new convention was signed between the Mato Grosso do Sul and the French FPNRF on 28 June, 2000. Responsibility for the PRP was transferred higher up to the Secretaria de Estado de Governo, which has direct authority over all other ministries. Meanwhile, the responsibility for administrative support was also transferred from the FEMAP foundation to an economic development agency under closer political control – the CODEMS (Companhia de Desenvolvimento Economico de Mato Grosso do Sul).

It was thus on the basis of already strong state supervision that the IPP was created in 2001, with the addition of two state representatives to its Council of Administration, including a personal representative of the Governor himself. The IPP was also to be financially supported by the state through a yearly financial subsidy, which gave the public authorities even more power over the structure. As a former employee of the IPP put it, commenting on what he saw happening:

_How could the IPP refuse these instructions and people sent by those financing [us]?_ [interview 65]

During the first two years of IPP operation, its president managed to play a real role in the everyday management. During this tenure, the organisation seems to have functioned relatively smoothly under tight financial control, although the overall budget was still small as more international funds were to be received at a later date [interview 116]. As we have seen, however, the president had started to share his decision-making power with foreign technicians. Yet there was also another internal group of rising influence within the IPP, made up of an increasing number of people appointed through political connections and who acted as if they were unaccountable to the president [interview 63].

By the end of 2003, the president felt that he had lost almost all of his management power and that a “coalition of interests” had emerged against him formed by these two groups: 1) the French experts, who were not at ease with a president drawn from SODEPAN; 2) the staff members sent by state politicians, whose basic interest in

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107 Quotes in this paragraph are drawn from an interview with a former civil servant.
working there was material. Most interviewed fazendeiros were vocal in denouncing this process. As a former vice-president of the IPP claimed:

   *Many of the people sent by the government did not do anything....They were certainly not working, they were only pretending. But they still had to be paid. And paid well.* [interview 64]

Describing the way in which they were appointed, he explained:

   *You know, you have a politician who says: ‘This one will go and work there’ and that is it. What can you say? The same person has power over the ministries on which the IPP depended.*

Other observers added:

   - *They gave positions to friends and people who helped the party.* [interview 86]
   - *It was a distribution of cakes....It was all part of an electoral strategy.* [interview 62]

A university professor, also a fazendeiro, feels that this process was more than nepotism and may have financed political parties through a system of financial “triangulation”. In his view:

   *The government used the IPP structure to ‘triangulate’ resources. It was giving funds to the IPP, but the IPP had in turn to contract certain people, for certain political reasons, affiliations and goals.* [interview 67]

According to this person’s own estimates, between 5 to 6 million Brazilian reais (around 2 million euros) were “triangulated” during the lifetime of the institution. As researchers, we are in no position to make statements about what “really” happened on such issues, as this is for Brazilian justice to determine. We may only note that, as of 2009, a public investigation is underway.

**7.2.4. False hopes of community repossession: hastening the final collapse**

These multiple power games did not prove sustainable for very long. First, political capture did not come with efficient management – quite the contrary – and it was increasingly clear to many observers that the park was not being run satisfactorily. Second, as the governance situation became increasingly intricate, the IPP also began to encounter technical problems in implementing its projects, especially the Vitelo pantaneiro [interview 65]. As we saw, this VITPAN project was the soul of the PRP for most landowners and the one that raised the highest hopes. Its malfunctioning

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108 Such as better salaries or cars. This judgement was provided by two interviewees, including a former IPP vice-president.
spilled over onto the entire community and an atmosphere of discontent had largely spread by the beginning of 2003.

Hoping to fix these governance and technical problems, the General Assembly met to elect a new president on 23 April, 2003. This date proved to be the turning point in the IPP’s short history. The Assembly designated as president Almir Sater, a famous pantaneiro singer known throughout the federation and who also owns a large fazenda in the Pantanal. There were several rationales behind the choice of this highly public figure, which we elucidated with the help of a range of informants [interview 67, 103, 107].

First, the idea behind this election was for the fazendeiros to give a higher profile to the regional park, attract more attention, sympathy and eventually financial resources. The discourse was to “move to a second phase” whereby the project would scale up and blossom. Another important motivation was to use the authority of a well-known name to counter-balance the growing influence of non-community actors. Third, “Almir Sater” also sounded like a “consensual name” to a community that was experiencing divisions over its most cherished project, VITPAN.

But this was not all. This election also had a strategic meaning for the foreign experts and the politically appointed staff members who, paradoxically, also supported Almir Sater. As an interviewee explained:

Not only was the candidacy of Almir Sater one of “consensus” that seemed to maintain unity among fazendeiros; it was also the candidacy preferred by the technical team of IPP, because these people knew that Sater would not work locally, unlike the previous president. More importantly, he would not sign every cheque! [interview 109]

As another interviewee put it:

Everybody was happy with the choice of Sater as president: the fazendeiros were reverting to a sort of “dad” while the people within the IPP knew that he would be an “absent dad”. [interview 66]

As it turned out, the new president did in fact give complete autonomy to the IPP’s technical team from the moment he was elected, as he chose to leave all managerial responsibilities to an executive secretary whom he monitored only rarely. As one fazendeiro commented:

The election of Almir Sater amounted to a total desertion of post, to the benefit of the “technicians”, who included no fazendeiro. [interview 59]

The executive secretary had been formally chosen by Sater but, according to many interviewees, the choice of the person reflected the “strong “advice of a senior
politician [interviews 59, 66, 67]. The appointed Secretary was little known to the fazendeiros and ran the IPP in a way that is now widely judged by locals as “incompetent”, “crooked” or both. Through the Council of Administration, or in informal meetings, fazendeiros did complain to the President on several occasions about the obvious mismanagement of the IPP. Accordingly, Almir Sater twice changed the executive secretary, but to no avail, and the new appointments were also subject to similar influences from politicians. Those appointed to this job position never seemed to enjoy any real trust from the landowners.

Under these political influences, the IPP thus continued to add new staff throughout the period, to reach over 50 permanent members, while its financial resources were growing at a much slower pace. People from various public institutions were integrated on unclear technical grounds, and they were paid better salaries than in local bureaucracies. Two local ministries (production and environment) had frequent recourse to this practice. This proved far too heavy for a new and fragile organisation. As one observer commented:

_At this point, the IPP had turned into a hanger for state jobs. [It had] opened many fronts but none was functioning correctly._ [interview 64]

As suggested by the lawsuits in progress in 2009, financial mismanagement also appeared. To start with, the various executive secretaries regularly paid project expenses with funds from other projects. Some observers also feel that they indulged in a variety of expenses of secondary importance such as trips, meetings and extensive office equipment. Most notably, they “forgot” to pay a range of local and federal taxes, involving huge sums of money. Problems were further exacerbated when the state stopped meeting its financial commitments from 2003 onwards. What’s more, although this does not constitute proof, there are rumours of personal or political misappropriation of funds.

All of this led to the closure of all IPP operations in July 2005. In 2008, at the time of the fieldwork, the IPP still existed as a legal entity but as a heavily indebted one under public investigation. Its outstanding debt (including unpaid taxes and salaries) was close to one million Brazilian reais in mid-2008 (about 400,000 euros).

Feelings of frustration among fazendeiros are running extremely high over the “PRP scandal”, as one called it [interview 66]. The animosity is directed mainly against the state government and politicians whose undue interventions were, in local opinion,
what led to this catastrophe. To a lesser extent, frustration is also expressed against
the foreign influence that “complicated everything”. As of 2009, Almir Sater was
still president of what remains of the IPP and was possibly due to face legal action.
He is now openly criticised, although most fazendeiros still have a great respect for
this public figure who embodies the Pantanal in the eyes of many Brazilians. Many
landowners feel that Sater had just been “too naïve” and “manipulated”. A fazendeiro
summarised the general feeling of injustice regarding the failure of the IPP:

_The debt is now ours, but it should be the government’s._ [interview 67]

### 7.2.5. Conclusion

In this section we enquired into the management and short history of the park: its 36
months of existence, from its creation in August 2002 to the end of its operations in
July 2005. We showed that the institutional practice of community participation
proved biased on several levels. First, it was skewed from the start by the ambiguous
notion of the “local community”, which in the end meant nothing more than the
“landowners”: it thus left aside agricultural employees (peons) as well as other
communities (fishers), well illustrated by the institutional structure of the park.
Second, the heavy presence of foreign experts with no formal rights but substantial
institutional power is another defining characteristic of the whole PRP experience,
from its inception right through to its demise. Third, growing political capture took
over the IPP, through the imposition of state-appointed people with weak
management skills but strong personal connections, political affiliations and private
interests. Overall, these successive processes of productive and institutional power
completely dispossessed the locals – the fazendeiros and others – of all participation
in the running of this “participatory park”.

Chapter 7 – 289
7.3. Understanding Containment: the Weight of and Impact on Social Capital

*Mille feuilles* ("a thousand leaves") is a typical French cake composed of many layers of thin pastry dough and is often used as a metaphor to depict a system comprising a great many different levels. As we have seen, the PRP story offers a similar complex mix of multiple containment dynamics. These include intents against or actual effects produced on conservationist environmentalists, incoming economic actors in the region, rural employees, fisher groups... and the *fazendeiros* themselves. In this section, we question how this *mille feuilles containment* was connected to and impacted the community's social capital. Here, we first explore the Pantanal's rural workers, who were entirely eliminated from all PRP processes: we suggest that this disconnection was catalysed by their symbiotic relationship with the *fazendeiros*’ long-established paternalism and by a resulting social capital estranged from any form of institutional or collective action. Second, we turn to an analysis of the social capital of the crushing majority of the Pantanal’s landowners. We argue that their ingrained habits of individualism and preference for informal modes of communication (as well as other social norms) contributed to their own estrangement from the PRP’s institutional functioning. In turn, this facilitated a rise in the influence of actors more accustomed and more skilful with institutions, such as politicians and technical experts. Finally, we suggest the PRP “failure” may nonetheless have sown the seeds for a renewed local social capital – at least for the *fazendeiros*. It has certainly stimulated self-criticism, and critical thinking about what collective action is and means, what needs to be changed in the way landowners cooperate and what precautions need to be taken regarding state involvement in community endeavours. This process is particularly observable in the way *fazendeiros* shifted from LOYALTY to VOICE as their response strategy to the deterioration of the PRP, even if this came too late to avoid collapse. Collective learning seems to be appearing, as well as a desire for new common initiatives. However, what this may lead to in the future is far from clear given the deep inertia that still characterises the Pantanal.
7.3.1. Symbiotic paternalism: keeping peons away from institutions and collective action

The complete absence of peons (rural workers) from the design and governance of a vast CP project in the Pantanal mirrored the singular social capital and structural position of this sub-community. In section 3.1.9, we defined SC as the collective bonds of a given group both on an internal level and with other groups. In the case of the peons, what seems to be primarily at stake is their bridging SC – namely the way they connect to other groups. Peons are indeed deeply linked to fazendeiros in a structurally dependent way [interview 105]. Accordingly, the incapacity of peons to emerge as an autonomous community actor worth considering and integrating into the PRP project reflects several social traits: the peons' complete absorption into the small world of the fazenda; their structural domination by the landowners through long-established paternalism; their lack of experience (and of apparent capacity) in collective claims and actions; their self-withdrawal from the more “modern and aggressive world” that lies outside the Pantanal; and their subjective feeling of relative freedom and contentment with their life [interviews 92-96].

During the whole PRP process, no attention was paid by the Brazilian or foreign promoters to the inner structure of the traditional pantaneira fazenda, although the PRP project had been designed for their survival. This meant that the entrenched paternalism underlying the age-old social functioning of the fazendas remained untouched and unquestioned. Fazendas are small and closed social universes founded on the hierarchical and binary distinction between the fazendeiros and their families (the owners), and the agricultural employees and their relatives (the peons) [interview 103]. In the life of a peon, paternalism is everywhere. These people work for very modest wages, while in exchange the landowners provide them with modest accommodation for their families, meat and other foodstuffs, as well as assistance in times of hardship – for instance in case of health problems. As mentioned earlier, some fazendeiros even tried to enhance the education services available to children, but with limited results.

To some observers, this may look like a healthy relationship. According to the anthropologists we met, peons have a strong subjective feeling of their own freedom:

*Peons live in the open air with no boss on their shoulders every day. ... And if they are not happy with their condition or employer, they know they can always take their horse and move to the next fazenda.* [interview 104]
This capacity to move from one employer to the other has apparently sustained a feeling of subjective autonomy among *peons* for generations. One may question, however, the extent to which this capacity to change is a real source of autonomy. When they move on to the next *fazenda*, *peons* enter a similar world with the same lack of opportunity for personal growth. Their level of education is usually very low and many of them are barely literate. Although many have learnt basic literacy skills at school, their lifestyle provides them with little writing or reading practice.

Interviews with local anthropologists suggested that *peons* form a society of their own, with its own beliefs, including a strong folklore that populates the Pantanal with mythical characters and spirits [interviews 102, 103, 104]. *Peons* live in a fundamentally different spiritual world from the *fazendeiros*, who are nowadays modern urban people. Interviews with *peons* strongly corroborated this fact: their view of time, for instance, seems circular with little awareness of anything changing around them. It was especially striking to see that during an interview none could articulate a structured or informed discourse on what was going on, rightly or wrongly, within the Pantanal region. While one would suppose them to be the best possible experts of the region, their understanding of it seems severely limited by their lack of general awareness or even desire to know about the “outside world” [e.g. interviews 92, 93].

As for their symbiotic connection, *peons* do not only provide cheap labour to landowners; they also constitute an effective asset for public relations when the *fazendeiros* need attention and support. While most of the latter now live in cities and only visit their property when necessary or during their spare time, the *peons* reside permanently in the wetlands and it is they who are seen on the magnificent pictures known throughout Brazil of “cowboys” riding horses, leading cattle herds (*comitivas*) in the open landscape (see Photo 7) and telling stories from their unique folklore. It is thus the *peon* who emblemsizes for the outside world the *pantaneira* community and who enjoys a favourable reputation and public affection. It is also the *peons* who spread the feeling in public opinion – and in the donors’ headquarters in Europe – that life remained “traditional and in harmony with the environment”. Yet, *peons* were to gain nothing from the the vast PRP project or have any say in its

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109 In this regard, *peons* very much resemble the fishers in St. Lucia, most of whom had some formal but largely forgotten education.
implementation. Their presence was reduced to appearing on leaflets and PowerPoint presentations showing the region’s lifestyle.

Politically speaking, peons are not demanding people. Despite centuries of work on fazendas as a well delineated group with its own identity, they have never organised any form of collective representation to dialogue as a group with the fazendeiros on any issue. All concerns are treated informally and individually. The peons we talked to specifically stated that they did not know of any “worker union” representing their interests – an absence of unionism that is typical of paternalistic societies.

During face-to-face interviews, peons came across as simple and quiet people, markedly shy with an apparently ingrained low profile when discussing with white people. Fazendeiros are indeed typically much “whiter” than peons, who often have Indian blood. Interviewees would only answer our questions briefly and without providing comments beyond what was asked. They all showed a lot of restraint when describing their life, their jobs and their relation to the fazendeiros. The overall impression was one of a typically “peaceful” or even “passive” peon temperament, largely confirmed by various informants.

We left the fieldwork on the fazendas with a diffuse feeling that peons were essentially people who are locked up in a small and circular world which offer them no opportunity to develop. They seem to have little means or desire to free themselves from this “safe but closed world”, as a local put it [interview 88]. Although it is difficult to point to any explicit mode of outright exploitation, fazendas do seem to be autarchic societies that allow cohesiveness and hierarchies to function hand in hand.

In section 3.2, we referred to Lukes’ definition of “subjective interests” as those that “are consciously articulated and observable”, whereas “objective interests” are goals and desires that actors “would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice” (Lukes, 1975, p.34). The world of fazendas seems to us to be a case in point where such concepts may be usefully applied – although this is inescapably a matter of normative judgement rather than positive analysis. The paternalistic relation between peons and landowners is so successfully constitutive of their identities that no desire for change seems to emerge from them. How could a CP scheme successfully involve populations with such a mindset, when structural power is so strong and effective?
7.3.2. Individualism and informalism: the institutional inaptitude of most fazendeiros

The implementation of the PRP process was paralleled, as we have seen, by two powerful containment dynamics that disempowered the fazendeiros themselves. One benefited foreign technicians while the other nurtured the institutional capture of the IPP by a few politicians and well-connected people. Here we argue that these two exercises of institutional power were greatly facilitated, not only by the weakening of the SODEPAN (cf. section 7.1.3), but also by the institutional inaptitude of the vast majority of the fazendeiros. By this concept, we refer to the latter’s difficulty and relative inability to engage with formal collective actions and institutions. This feature led to a chronic lack of institutional monitoring of the PRP’s governance on the part of the landowners; it also generated free-riding behaviours that disarticulated the implementation of important projects.

In the last section we claimed that bridging SC was important to understanding the situation of peons within the PRP scheme. We now contend that bonding SC is what best sheds light on the position and evolution of the fazendeiros within the project. As explained in section 3.1.9, bonding SC refers to the nature and strength of ties within a given group. What seems to have especially mattered in the PRP story was a combination of social norms that together produced: 1) the landowners’ inability to co-operate and co-ordinate on important PRP projects; 2) an inability to engage with formal institutions beyond entrusting one single person with this responsibility.

The lack of co-operative behaviour between fazendeiros seems rooted in their time-long feeling of “being alone on their land” and not being able to count upon anyone but themselves. All interviewed fazendeiros openly acknowledged a strong “individualism”, which they present in a positive light as a desire for “autonomy”. One landowner, however, provided an extra insight:

*No, there is no tradition of associating among us. Associations, co-operatives, etc., all of these things are fragile in the Pantanal. This is because of the following: here, there is a culture of ‘immediatism’: the expectation that things should bring benefits immediately....We do not like acting in groups unless we see results right away.*

[interview 64]

During the IPP’s life-course a number of projects were launched that encountered recurring problems linked to the difficulty to co-ordinate. This was specifically the case with the critical VITPAN project. The issues it ran into did indeed suggest “individualism and immediatism” as strong community features. VITPAN was a
complex scheme that required a fair level of co-operation and good will from producers. Most needed was a rigorous standardisation of meat production to market a collective output under a single label – which had to be reliable for consumers. Disagreements soon appeared over the appropriate production techniques and standards to be used – and even over the transport routes for meat collection that were unequally convenient for various producers. Procedures were little or unevenly applied resulting in an unsatisfactory product quality that caused distributors to lose interest [interview 65].

There was also a growing mistrust among producers due to free-riding behaviours. Each certainly had a personal interest in not respecting the maximum age limit at which the young cattle were to be sent to the slaughter house. The financial incentive was that over-age animals were weightier and thus brought in more money when sold. Their meat, however, would be too fat and spoil the whole production line. During an interview, the first IPP President recalled that, at the end of his term, a “dispute had developed on VITPAN among the fazendeiros who were divided into three or four fighting groups” [interview 58]. These tensions were such that, even after two full years of effort, the IPP was still unable to bring producers into a single co-operative, which was a necessary step to organise this new economic sector.110

According to many, this low capacity for collective action has also prevented fazendeiros from exerting their full influence on the IPP management, as their credibility and moral leadership as reliable partners was diminished. But even without this, the fazendeiros’ influence was hampered by another difficulty: their overall low capacity for institutional involvement and a trait typical of the vast majority of the landowners. To describe this, a local observer suggested the term: “informalism”.111 This first translates into the rare and fragile existence of community organisations (cf. section 7.1.3), but also into the cattle ranchers’ lack of interest and interaction with organisations that try to provide them with services.

Issues faced in the Pantanal by the EMBRAPA, the key public institution in Brazil for agricultural research, are illustrative of this situation. This organisation has been

110 According to a former member of the IPP, the technical team did not adopt a clear stance on technical matters and thus stimulated conflicts.
111 This concept was suggested by a researcher of EMBRAPA in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul [interview 74].
working for decades in the region on numerous technical issues related to production and conservation. Interviews carried out in 2008 in Campo Grande showed that, today, its main concern is not finding more technical solutions for cattle ranchers, but merely implementing and diffusing those that have been long identified. Moving innovations from an institution to pantaneiro producers has proved incredibly challenging [interviews 72, 73, 74].

This dilemma has led the EMBRAPA to channel more resources into researching social dynamics, since locally they seem to prevent the appropriation of both agricultural techniques and research institutions. An increasing attention is paid to the way change occurs among traditional cattle ranchers, involving the sociology of knowledge and information networks. Researchers have been looking at the processes through which technological changes are adopted, ignored or rejected (eg. Cezar, 2000). They showed that formal sources of knowledge and technical advice, such as written information or training opportunities, are largely ignored by the fazendeiros of the Pantanal.

To start with, people do not like to read or have the impression of “being taught”. What is more, the crushing majority of fazendeiros do not feel they have the capacity to participate personally in formal processes – due to lack of time, their often advanced age or the cultural distance that inevitably exist between a traditional rancher and a technical expert – a distance that also characterised the IPP. Although EMBRAPA had developed a policy of making fazendeiros “participate” in its research decisions, its own evaluation review shows that this has largely failed to date. Even its “open door policy” whereby fazendeiros can come anytime and have informal discussions with researchers did not solve the problem: ranchers just do not “push the door” [interview 74].

The EMBRAPA is now looking at developing a participatory system of knowledge and information dissemination that goes beyond people joining formal settings. The fazendeiros prefer to rely upon informal modes of communication. Conversations and direct observation of neighbouring fazendas are the most usual ways of obtaining information. As a result, learning networks are structured around a limited number of “trusted persons” (pessoas de confiança) who act as models for other fazendeiros and somehow become “opinion leaders”. These “trusted persons” typically use a much...
larger information network; they recognise more the usefulness of formal institutions and are better able to use them.

From this discussion, it appears that within the IPP, *fazendeiros* also reverted to *trusted persons* to monitor the institution on their behalf and convey their views and concerns within its governance mechanisms. However, the sole reliance on two successive PRP presidents proved insufficient to counterbalance other forces; it also prevented the Council of Administration from playing its key role of continuous monitoring.

7.3.3. From LOYALTY to VOICE: renewing the local social capital?

For all its shortcomings, and in fact because of them, the PRP project may have induced a process of self-reflection within the *fazendeiro* community about the need to strengthen their capacity for collective action. This is suggested, first, by the way their discontent found evolving modes of expression. In section 3.1.9, we detailed how frustrations subsequent to an unsatisfactory CP scheme may lead to three types of community response: EXIT (material or psychological withdrawal); LOYALTY (silence and resignation, in the name of a higher principle of cohesion); or VOICE (open complaints and actions for change). We then argued that the VOICE strategy can best lead to a renewal of the local social capital enabling more collective action in the future. Here, we argue that the *fazendeiros* have indeed moved from LOYALTY to VOICE faced with the collapse of CP in the PRP project, opening up the possibility of community co-operation on new and more effective terms. However, although the *fazendeiro* community seems to be moving along a positive learning curve, only time will tell whether inertia will eventually win the day.

The choice of LOYALTY

After 2003, given the path taken by the IPP, its collapse was being predicted by many *fazendeiros* [interview 61]. Faced with this prospect and the president’s relative inactivity, the members of the Council of Administration chose LOYALTY rather than VOICE as their response strategy, reflecting an approach to the problem largely shared within the *fazendeiro* community. After a few warning discussions with president Almir Sater, they became resigned to watching an “announced tragedy”, as a protagonist of the time put it [interview 60]. As we saw in section
7.2.4, Almir Sater responded to these concerns by appointing two successive executive secretaries, but each time influenced by political recommendations that did not appease the landowners. As they feared, these changes led to no managerial improvement – quite the opposite.

Council members could have exercised their veto power on the IPP management, but they refrained from doing so as, in the public eye, this would have been equated to disowning Almir Sater. Inter-personal loyalties and friendships arguably took their toll on the IPP governance at this point. As a fazendeiro recalls:

> At one point, we stopped complaining to Almir. Nobody wanted to criticise him too much and put him in a corner....We felt he was not in control anyhow. [interview 64]

As another put it:

> Almir is a childhood friend for many of us. We went to school together....He is the best of us all when our community needs to be heard out there. We cannot harm him. This would be harming ourselves. [interview 67]

This community group was thus placed in a schizophrenic situation whereby they saw disaster looming but would not use the legal recourses they had in their hands to either remove the president or force a new executive secretary upon him. As one fazendeiro further explained:

> The Council of Administration had power over the president, it had enough power to shake up the whole thing. But doing so or not also depends on personal relations. Power is one thing, and people-to-people relations are something else....People on the Council thought: 'I do not want to damage the reputation of the president; I will not use my veto power to remove everybody there; I could but I will not'. [interview 62]

Here, we see how social bonds can prevent checks and balances from working correctly in a community organisation, which leads to the choice of LOYALTY rather than VOICE even if collapse is clearly foreseen. The need for unity, the desire not to diminish the reputation of someone who is close and highly placed, as well as the tacit rule against public conflict within the community, left the IPP with poor regulatory mechanisms. At first, this choice of LOYALTY may seem incoherent with the pervasive individualism of the fazendeiro community, previously analysed. But it is quite possible to imagine a community harbouring strong norms about avoiding overt public conflicts and displays of disunity, while still relying on individualism in more private interactions.
VOICE: opening up the possibility of a collective learning process

Although LOYALTY was the response chosen by the fazendeiros, the PRP collapse was not so “digested” easily and, in the following months, another response began to emerge, which was closer to VOICE – with more open discussions about what went wrong, what should have been done and what could be done next. Interviews certainly suggested that the PRP had raised hopes and expectations that have not disappeared with its collapse [interview 63]. Above all, the “catastrophe” – as it is often referred to – has now led community members to question the pros and cons of their own dual norms of cohesion and individualism. Many fazendeiros seem to acknowledge that individualistic free-riding behaviours have been detrimental to PRP projects and that “things need to change in the future”. As one puts it:

Changes are slow to take place here. Pantaneiros need to organise themselves much more and much better....We need to stop working each in our little corner. We need to add one person to the other....The Park was the best idea for us in years but this opportunity was spoiled.[interview 59]

As for “cohesion at all costs” (in the name of public unity or personal friendships), several informants suggested that this principle is being critically discussed among landowners and that these would be unlikely to resort to this norm as automatically should another dilemma appear. The presence of a collective learning process is also suggested by the fact that the fazendeiros relate differently to the state after the PRP failure. They heavily condemned the political “intrusions and interferences” that took place within the IPP and have grown more wary than ever before about public involvement in their own affairs. Some think, however, that such a political capture was and would still be unavoidable:

In a new IPP, it would be difficult to do much better [regarding the influence of politicians]. A time always comes when you depend either upon municipal, state or federal decisions. Whether this is through taxes or anything else, there are always strong strings attached [so that politicians] can always ruin things whenever they want. [interview 66]

Other fazendeiros believe that political infringements are directly linked to the “corruption of the current government”, “something that may change when a new government comes” [interview 61]. Meanwhile, others feel that state influence could be managed providing that the recourse to public resources in a participatory scheme is absolutely minimal. The prospect of co-managing a joint organisation with the state has now little credibility among landowners, but this is not to say that the idea of the PRP has been abandoned. On the contrary, making the PRP an even more
“community-owned organisation” seems the right way forward to many interviewees. Several fazendeiros we met were actively suggesting to their community that they re-launch the PRP once its debt has been cleared, a process that may take time and might involve the penal responsibility of the last president. As a fazendeiro put it, in a rather poetic tone:

*The IPP is like a baby we love and who is now sleeping. We watch over it with tender eyes and we wait for its awakening.* [interview 64]

**Unwritten future**

On the whole, our fieldwork interviews evidenced a strong sense that a failed participatory scheme can stimulate a process of collective learning and a renewal of local social capital. Illustratively, a recent local Association of Organic Cattle Producers has been growing fast, working exclusively with private funds and with the support of an NGO for organic certification. This co-operative has been doing rather well so far, setting common production standards and organising a commercial network collaboratively. In this endeavour, the fazendeiros have carefully avoided any state funding. To date, 30 fazendas are working on this organic beef scheme, producing around 100,000 heads of cattle a year. This seems very encouraging but there is also no lack of evidence showing that changes do take a long time to emerge in the Pantanal. As one fazendeiro explained:

*When one develops a new system, a new model, there must be a time of investment, a period of transition and often of disappointment. You need to work a lot with your head and your hands. And you need to change mentalities. In Pantanal, this can happen, but it is very slow.... It can take 10 or 15 years to really change anything here.* [interview 66]

Practices of land inheritance provide a good illustration of this. Although most fazendas are struggling simply to survive, social norms on the division of inherited lands are not adapting fast. The tradition of dividing properties between the male heirs has still not significantly altered, even though many properties are falling below the minimum viable size (cf. section 6.2.1). A few of the fazendeiros interviewed allegedly asked their children “not to divide the land and work together”, but this does not appear to be a widely shared and well accepted approach. Such inertia leaves open the question of the capacity of this community group to survive the coming decades.
7.3.4. Conclusion

In this section, we showed how the various containment processes embedded in the PRP project were connected to and impacted the social capital of the community. We first identified how the *bridging SC* of the *peons* is entirely embroiled in a symbiotic and paternalistic relationship with *fazendeiros*, which inevitably prevented them from being given (or trying to obtain) a voice in the PRP process. We then argued that the *bonding SC* of the *fazendeiros* is of a complex nature, mixing elements of *individualism, cohesion, immediatism* and *informalism* that all played a role in the PRP’s collapse. Finally, we suggested that, in the longer term, the frustrating failure of such an ambitious participatory scheme may have stimulated a learning process likely to foster local capacities and new community endeavours. As of 2009, the choice of VOICE as an alternative response strategy to frustrations has stimulated a “community introspection” into the roots of what went wrong – a move that may prove beneficial to its capacity for collective action in the long term.
7.4. Conclusion

From the PRP’s origins to its collapse, several containment processes developed within the Pantanal regional park, which was nevertheless intended to stand as a prime example of a CP scheme. These processes were either simultaneous or successive, some going no further than intentions, others producing real impacts. The first layer of this “mille feuilles containment” was the will of the long-established local producers to counter incoming environmental conservationists and economic actors challenging their economic model. A second layer, grounded in a discourse on “traditions”, deprived the rural employees and fishers groups living in the Pantanal for generations of a voice. A third layer appeared in the course of implementation, this time affecting the fazendeiros themselves through various processes, notably a “political capture” of the PRP by a few local politicians. We also showed that the nature of the local social capital, such as the long-standing preference of fazendeiros for individualism and informalism, paved the way for their own disempowerment.

Even the most supportive proponents of CP will not argue that such schemes always succeed. A critical difference, thus, between the emancipatory and the critical narratives in understanding the PRP story lies in their respective theories about what explains its failure. The emancipatory narrative would surely label it as a case of “implementation failure”, unfortunately captured by crooked politicians. The basic ideas and processes of the CP scheme would nonetheless still be held to be sound and relevant: the failure would be attributed to those in charge for failing to bring the ideas and processes to life properly and to corruption for further destabilising the project. On the other hand, the critical narrative would consider this view as naïve and oblivious to key factors. Its own understanding of the failure would bring structural issues to the fore, such as disparities in social capital, making CP schemes structurally prone to be captured and diverted from their supposed course.

Given these multiple dynamics, what took place in the Pantanal largely illustrates the critical narrative of the global CP discourse. However, it is also noticeable that what unfolded through CP is not a top-down, global agenda set by some powerful external forces. It is rather a fight for influence involving various actors, the outcome of which was not easily predictable. In fact, it is neither neoliberalism nor capitalism that has been promoted through CP in the Pantanal, but rather various conflicting
local rent-seeking behaviours. These included attempts to perpetuate a pre-industrial type of economy characterized by low productivity, as well as the will of parts of the local state to “capture” the scheme. These dynamics proved so dysfunctional that the CP scheme itself eventually collapsed.

These observations significantly amend our understanding of the critical narrative, de-emphasising the causal significance of notions such as “global orders” or “global capitalism” and re-emphasising the role of local politics and contingencies. Although most of the disempowerment effects predicted by the critical narrative are indeed observed on the ground, they did not seem to occur because of reasons expected by this narrative: “global forces and domination mechanisms” seem much less significant than local struggles. As for participatory “conservation”, it can for sure partner with “capitalism” – as exemplified in the St. Lucian case study and as Brockington et al. (2008) strongly argued. Yet it can also partner with a range of other local goals and dynamics.

Finally, we identified emerging forms of resistance on the part of subjugated actors that also qualify the critical narrative. The failure of the PRP does seem to have initiated a process of self-analysis and social learning among the fazendeiros, which may renew their capacity for collective action through formal institutions in years to come.
Conclusion

In the end, what we see from the empirical data collected in Brazil and the Caribbean impressively fits the expectations of the critical narrative of global discourses. Along all of the nine dimensions of the analytical framework we devised, most of the more pessimistic possibilities about the level and quality of community participation have materialised on the ground. The two CP schemes we studied were largely externally designed and led; they displayed low participatory inclusiveness, scope and intensity; they significantly dispersed local decision-making power away from local stakeholders; and they set in motion mechanisms of social control that impaired large sections of the local community – such as traditional fishers, rural workers or even relatively wealthy landowners. It is thus tempting to declare that, in our data, the critical narrative boasts a “KO win” over the emancipatory narrative.

In St. Lucia, the Soufrière Maritime Management Area has been functioning primarily as a way for interest groups connected to the tourism industry to take hold of the local context: “bring Soufrière into line” and keep check of “troublesome locals”. In doing so, it has followed the path of other “participatory” mechanisms created in Soufrière over the past twenty years. Social control and access to natural resources were reframed to the benefit of certain actors left untouched, while others saw their usual practices and identities radically challenged. As for the “participation” of the weaker local stakeholders, this has seen its meaning emptied by a variety of containment tactics that we listed at length, including encirclement, epistemic exclusion or skewed representation. Despite the institutional and psychological withdrawal of key stakeholders, the myth of an ongoing institutionalised “dialogue” has nevertheless been maintained until today.

In the Brazilian Pantanal, over the same period of time, the CP discourse has been used by a variety of actors to help contain others: the state trying to take the lead in regional policy planning or NGOs battling against an economic use of the land. In the case of the Pantanal Regional Park, launched in 1998, a discourse on the “traditional community” was developed by an alliance of actors that primarily suited the interests of cattle ranchers concerned with their economic survival. By defining the latter as “protectors” of the environment and as the core of the “local community”, the influence of conservationist NGOs could be better contained and
incoming economic competitors de-legitimised. At the same time, the definition of the “traditional” narrowly focused on the landowners: it excluded long-standing local stakeholders such as rural employees and itinerant fishers. Through the use of CP, the socio-economic status quo of the region was thus to be preserved from various influences. However, things did not stop there. Still another process of containment emerged, one that affected this time the landowners themselves. It led to their progressive exclusion from the governance of the participatory Park. Not only did the landowners witness the increasing influence of foreign “expertise”, but an outright “political capture” also developed that transformed the park into a mere financial tool in the hands of a few local politicians until its swift collapse in 2005.

While our empirical data largely match the critical narrative, they also bring a fresh understanding about how the latter works on the ground. They underline its relative contingency — rather than inevitability — and points to a range of nuances in its central story.

First, over the years, much of the scholarship critiquing CP had depicted “participatory rhetoric” as essentially enabling, supporting and legitimating a neoliberal type of economic transformation and governance. It has been analysed in this light as contributing to the expansion of the current global capitalist order (e.g. Marti & Ritchie, 1999; Mohan & Stocke, 2000; Miraftad, 2004; Berner & Phillips, 2005; McCarthy James, 2005; Bosman, 2007). In the context of biodiversity protection, Brockington et al. (2008) emphasised a similar view. What we observed in our data, however, is a more complex and less monolithic picture. It is not the unlimited reign of some form of global neoliberalism that emerged through CP in our case studies. In St. Lucia, the marketisation, commodification and creeping privatisation of local space certainly worked hand in hand with the tourism industry operating on global markets. Yet, in the case of the Pantanal, the CP discourse was in fact used against unrestrained competition and more competitive incoming economic actors, and in the hope of safeguarding a long-established form of cattle-ranching — a society based on relatively backward economic and social practices. As for the subsequent political capture of the Park by local politicians, it was certainly not carried out in the name of neoliberalism or the retreat of the state — quite the contrary. Thus, in political economy terms it seems as if the CP discourse may be used for varying ends and can take on different faces and meanings accordingly. It is
not always the forces of capitalism and neoliberal capitalism that seize control of global discourses.

Second, the critical scholarship has also tended to portray CP as giving the lead and most benefits to the already stronger local stakeholders, thus reinforcing or leaving unchanged local hierarchies and social structures (e.g. Cleavers, 2001; Hildyard, et al., 2001; Corbridge & Kumar, 2002). In our data, however, CP does not exactly appear to be such a clear-cut mechanism, leading to pre-defined results. It rather emerges as a containment tool that various actors scramble to make use of. CP is very much like a hammer placed on a table, neither good nor bad in itself, but which people fight to grab and use against others. In this fight, each and every one pursues their own rent-seeking strategies and tries to reinterpret CP to their own advantage. This leads to a profusion of competing meanings attributed to the global discourse at stake. In St. Lucia, for instance, both the fishers and the tourism industry battled to seize the CP tool to promote their role and secure the benefits of an “economic rent”, namely unrestrained access to the key coastal sites of Soufrière. In the Pantanal, the landowners used CP to make the most of an “identity rent” – by redefining themselves as an “eco-friendly traditional community” in need of (legitimate) international support.

An alliance emerged between the latter, the sate and international donors but did not prove sustainable over time. Local politicians, notably, manipulated participatory institutions to use the Park as a “political rent”, as an instrument to dispense material rewards to selected people and organisations. The Park later collapsed under the alliance’s internal contradictions. It cannot be said, however, that politicians “won” over other stakeholders: they did not “checkmate” any of them; what happened was more like a “draw”. Thus, who manages to capture CP and for what agenda very much depends on the outcome of local battles. It is the non-predefined interaction between local rent-seeking strategies that seem critical to an understanding of how the CP discourse impacts local contexts. Global discourses are disputed and reinterpreted by allied and/or competing interest groups – but the strongest ones do not necessarily reach their goals. Competitive dynamics open the possibility for varying outcomes in space and time.

Third, not only does CP not always allow “the strongest to take all”, but forms of resistance do emerge on the part of subjugated actors. The fact that the critical
narrative finds itself essentially confirmed by this work should not hide or minimise the fact that resistance to containment is also observable. Moreover, it seems very difficult to pre-judge the end impact of these different forms of resistance. To help understand them, we provided a dynamic analysis of the response strategies of groups under active containment (Voice, Exit or Loyalty) and their impact on the local social capital. It emphasised the diversity of potential outcomes that processes of resistance may have in the long run. We thus joined our voice to the set of scholars that stress local resistance to global governance (e.g. Crochane, Duffy & Selby, 2004) by adding the notion that the strongest emancipatory content of CP may lie in these response processes. Our fieldwork identified such developments, at times noisy and at times muffled. In the St. Lucian case, resistance was most visible in the violent mid-1990s episodes of political strife in which the coastal fishers voiced their discontent through outright politicisation at the national level. Their Voice strategy came in fact very close to stopping the CP process and winning over the allied forces of conservationists and tourism interests. Similarly, in the Pantanal, the failure of the Regional Park has sparked a process of self-analysis among the landowners that, in the years to come, may renew their capacity for collective action and self-defence against the external capture of CP initiatives.

Finally, social capital has also emerged in the data as a central variable in understanding and predicting the ability of a given sub-group to take advantage of participatory processes. Ironically, while CP brings to the top of its global agenda the necessity to make the weakest actors join decision-making processes, it is precisely these actors who have the lowest social capital and capabilities – and thus tend to be excluded from any realistic means of using the discourse to their advantage. This study thus suggests that there is a particularly strong need to focus on the institutional inaptitude of sub-groups in a socio-historical perspective, taking stock for instance of behavioural norms such as individualism or informalism. Contrary to much of the critical literature on CP, we demonstrated that the concept of social capital need not be viewed as a “highly reductionist approach to political economy” that hides conflicts with a “language of trust, networks and associations” (Mohan & Stocke, 2000, p.255). Even the mainstreamed meaning of “social capital” can shed light on the mechanics of domination, in line with the original intent of the concept (e.g. Bourdieu, 1980).

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Insights on critical theories

The picture of global governance that emerges from this research helps point out the respective merits and limits of three core concepts of critical IR theory: *dependency*, *hegemony* and *governmentality*.

Theories of *dependency* argue that peripheral or semi-peripheral countries are infiltrated by powerful actors and dynamics that maintain a relation of domination to the benefit of core, rich Western countries. In our case studies, many critical commentators would equate these countries' interests with the furthering of capitalism and the extension of global markets. To some extent, this is what we observed in St. Lucia, through the marketisation, commodification and privatisation of coastal spaces. However, the dynamics observed in the Pantanal were radically different, as in this case CP helped maintain a traditional economy. Neoliberal capitalism does not thus seem to be an intrinsic outcome of the CP discourse, but just one among others depending on the imbrications of rent-seeking strategies pursued by local actors. Outcomes, again, do not seem pre-defined but rather the result of the fight to seize CP as strategic tool. Moreover, we did not observe a clear pre-eminence of Western actors in local dynamics, but rather varying coalitions of interests of which they were part without necessarily acting as the leading component or the initiator. Now, if one argues that in the Pantanal and Soufrière, the real “interest” of the rich countries lay in global environmental protection, then in that sense too, their objectives were far from being met. It thus seems difficult to argue that our data gives a strong *dependency* flavour to the critical narrative that emerges. Unlike Mohan (2001) or Hildyard *et al.* (2001), we are not therefore tempted to conclude that CP essentially works to conceal the power of the Western world. Similarly, we do not support the view of Sekhri (2009) that dependency theory still stands as an essential analytical framework. We would rather share the more moderate view — seemingly shared by Gosh (2001) — that dependency *as a phenom menology* still provides useful research questions that highlight certain developments, although one should not rely upon it as a robust explanatory framework or even as a comprehensive descriptive tool.

The concept of *governmentality*, for its part, carries the notion that power is faceless, has no precise location but is nonetheless very specific in its impacts. It is exercised through the globalised procedures, practices, rules and routines through which lives
are governed, managed and regulated “at a distance”. The present research, however, does not easily fit with this outlook as it seems too remote from the actual actors, dynamics and institutions where action takes place and outcomes are determined locally. We are led to join students, such as Cooper & Packard (1997), Gould (2005) or Mosse (2005b), who feel that all-encompassing governmentality approaches conceal “the contingent networks of practice, the diversity of actors, brokers, perspectives and interests behind universal policy models” (Mosse, 2005, p.14). Our data support the contention of Li (1999, p.295) that the emergence of a given discourse owes as much to local interests, understandings and strategies as it does to global forms of disciplinary power. The analysis of global discourses as a form of global governmentality seems empirically fragile. The scaling-up of Foucault’s perspective of power to the study of global orders and discourses tends to generate accounts that overstate their “unity, evenness and indivisibility” (Selby, 2007, p.336). This tendency has been prominently exemplified by Hardt and Negri (2001), who saw the logic of a global “Empire” at work that encompasses “the spatial totality” of the world, with “no territorial boundaries [limiting] its reign” (preface, p.14). Our data suggest that such approaches fall short of providing tools for analysing local incarnations and local uses of global discourses. A more convincing theory of global governmentality would in fact provide ways to understand the variability in practices across local contexts, rather than picturing a single unified and homogeneous dynamic – but such a framework has yet to be developed. Governmentality outlooks over-emphasise the evenness and inevitability of their critical vision and neglect their contingencies. They also stress that subjectivities are modified to create self-regulating and auto-correcting selves, something we barely observed. We would not agree, thus, with Agrawal (2005) in saying that CP schemes manage to produce new types of subjectivities. We would rather agree with Neumann (2001) that these programmes are interlinked with continued threats of violence that help to discipline locals. Just as “buffer zones” served in Tanzania as a “discipline-mechanism”, the zoning plan in St. Lucia operated with people who had full knowledge of the ever-present potential use of force. What is at work here, in our view, is not the creation of new subjectivities but more “old-fashioned” disciplinary mechanisms. Further to this, we also identified many forms of resistance in both St. Lucia and Brazil. Therefore, we agree with Duffield (2001) that global governance discourses simultaneously create the conditions of autonomy and resistance in response to their attempts to
extend their reach. In the end, these discourses highlight pre-existing forms as well as produce novel varieties of resistance, whether passive or active, visible or invisible, silent or vocal (Duffy, 2005, p.311) – often on the part of the less powerful groups. Data are a far cry from a successful internalisation of disciplinary norms.

Third and finally, the concept of *hegemony* offers a model of the exercise of power that works through alliances and compromises among interest groups (in the form of “historic blocs”) that co-operate to dominate by ideological means. Gramsci developed this perspective to elucidate the functioning of “cultures of consensus” at the domestic level, while Robert Cox analysed how these can be projected at the international level, providing a global spread to certain forms of hegemony. Pursuing this path, we conclude that hegemony also needs to be understood in terms of local-global networks of actors. Such networks reflect alliances of interests from diverse horizons – which we called “power formations” and which brought together the “originating agents” of the CP schemes we researched. In both of our case studies, we did observe actors defining together a common discourse that caters for the core interest of each – the tourism industry and environmentalists in Soufrière; and in the Pantanal, the landowners, the local state and a foreign donor. These blocs work to shape local understandings, “local hegemonies”. Yet, they were also shown to be fragile, as their goals sometimes change over time\(^\text{112}\) or emerge in practice as ill-assorted\(^\text{113}\). Moreover, data showed that processes of resistance to such local hegemonic dynamics can also emerge, especially through endogenous processes of frustrations. From there, one can analyse how new blocs and alliances may form over time.

In a nutshell, within the existing variety of critical approaches, those based upon the dialectics of hegemony and historic blocs rank among the most fruitful if we are to grasp the local embodiments of discursive forms of global governance. Nevertheless, we call here for the use in IR of a renewed and expanded concept of hegemony. The concept that has been employed in this field of study has too often been confined to state-centric analysis, being “pre-occupied with understanding how class relations within national blocs and alliances are configured so that they conform to the hegemony instigated by the leading classes *within the dominant state*” (Worth, 2010, 112 For instance the goals of the state in the Pantanal changed over time – from cooperation to capture. 113 For instance, foreign experts imposed to the landowners of the Pantanal a « forced pluralisation ».

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We add our voice to those of scholars such as Worth who advocate for a model of hegemony that allows for variations and contradictions, a concept that is in fact probably closer to the one originally designed by Gramsci in the domestic context, one that looks at hegemony as a multilayered process that needs to be “continually renewed, recreated and defended” (Worth, 2010, p.11).

We also strongly agree with Mann (2008) who emphasises that a Gramscian approach requires an explanation not only of the material fact of hegemony, but also of how it works ideologically, in the world of ideas – something which is rarely consistently undertaken by IR scholars. As Mann put it, a Gramscian outlook “must do more than point out that the ruling bloc is hegemonic and demonstrate the material evidence of its power; it must also explain how and why that hegemony operates in the social life of thought...[within] norms, morality, common sense” (p.336). This is what we did in detail in St. Lucia and Brazil when we looked at how “strategic discourses” had been built by allied actors, partly catering for and drawing upon subordinated interests.

Gramsci is in fact seldom cited in the literature on the political economy of environmental schemes, whereas Foucault is abundantly quoted. The critical approach in terms of hegemony is nonetheless clearly the one most supported by our empirical findings. While dependency and governmentality frameworks give pre-eminence to diffuse global dynamics as well as to non-local actors, hegemony helps us analyse a more locally based and complex picture. We are led to conclude that it is the local conditions that determine the end impact of a global discourse – rather than the other way round. The pattern we identified is not one where global actors step into local contexts and shape local alliances to their own wishes, but rather one where local actors create their own alliances, select and use available global discourses that are useful to their own ends and seek external allies to do so. All of this creates local-global networks (within what we called “power formations”), but ones that are largely locally initiated, that may not be sustainable and that sometimes cater to incoherent goals leading to implosion.
Insights on methodologies in IR

When it comes to studying global discourses, we agree with Dryzek who deplores that “those who do appreciate their role...often treat them as singular and accepted, rather than multiple and contested” (Dryzek, 2006, p.vi). This is true not only at the macro level of global governance but also at the more micro and local level – where there is a huge need for fieldwork by IR scholars, so as to look at how discourses are reinterpreted and used in diverging strategic ways by various actors.

As the reader recalls, this research sprang from the observation that in the study of global governance IR scholars were still giving relatively little attention to the role and impact of global discourses, as well as to the diversity of their power dynamics. These gaps are particularly visible at the local level of global governance, which remains vastly under-analysed, despite the fact that the global still has final impacts on the local. This situation seems paradoxical given the well-known emphasis in the IR field on the question of power, as well as the “discursive turn” that IR research has firmly taken. But this becomes more understandable in the light of disciplinary boundaries. Although the IR discipline has been a prime analyst of global governance as a novel object, it has yet to adapt some of its research methods to the subject. Global governance is still analysed primarily in terms of big actors (states, companies, large NGOs and networks), big institutions, big events, big deals, etc. It is a matter of sheer observation that few local-level case studies using micro-data are carried out to nourish the debates on the meta-narratives of power often called on by IR scholars. A whole continent of realities and analysis on the smaller and more local actors and dynamics are thus left in the shadow.

A small but increasing number of scholars are acknowledging this growing discrepancy between the IR field and global governance as one of its key field of enquiry. They are calling upon students to go to the field, get their boots muddied, cross the traditional boundaries of their discipline and confront their wide narratives to diverse and complex local situations (e.g. Duffield 2001; Jackson, 2004; Duffy 2005; Mosse, 2005). The present work has tried to follow this path, contributing in some way to what might be called the “ethnography of global governance” (Feldman, 2009) – something we believe has a promising future in global governance studies.
To sustain this endeavour, there is a need to bring closer together conceptual innovations in IR and empirical analysis through original frameworks. This is what we tried to do, in two ways. First, in carrying out field enquiries, this research has put into practice a comprehensive grid of power relations drawn from recent works in IR. Its fourfold framework (compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power) had never been used as such in this type of field study before. The result, we believe, was the ability to capture power mechanisms in a broader diversity than is usually the case. This, in turn, underpinned Santos' view that "power is never exercised in pure, exclusive form, but rather as a power formation, that is a constellation of different forms of power combined in specific ways" (Santos, 1995, p.406). This approach also enabled the identification of subtle and sometimes contradictory power dynamics found in local institutions and discourses. Another methodological contribution lies in the fact that this work devised and implemented its own procedure to compare large IR macro-narratives with intricate micro-data. The driving idea was to build a framework that allows testable implications to be derived from otherwise somewhat vague narratives. Brick by brick, a conceptual bridge was put together that identified these narratives' expectations and checked them against empirical observations. This approach may inspire further work among IR scholars when testing large worldviews and alternative theories.

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To conclude, our findings raise doubts about the ethico-political rationale of CP as an emerging principle of global policy-making, given its meagre contribution to enhancing the voice of the poorest and weakest. To make it a more valuable democratic tool, participation may need to be reconceptualised in more politically radical terms, in connection with notions of rights, governance or citizenship (e.g. Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Gaventa, 2004). At the very least, more research needs to be carried out on understanding the difference between the participation of a given group in a CP institution and the proper and effective representation of its interests, instead of equating a priori the two notions. As this study has shown, one of the major difficulties faced by any sincere "participatory institution" is its typical inability to work with people whose information, decision and mobilisation networks as well as modes of expression are informal and ill-adapted to dialogue with structured organisations. This issue is not just a problem; it is also an asset in the
hands of other interest groups that can better capture participatory institutions for their own ends. The challenge is even greater when weak groups are embroiled in social interactions whereby other groups exert strong forms of structural power. Innovative forms of representation of weak interest groups may thus need to be explored, for instance, involving epistemic communities in new ways while avoiding the pitfalls of agenda-ridden "facilitators". Civil society organisations, upon which so many hopes are nowadays placed in so many contexts, might not be sufficient or even appropriate for this task.

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Appendix 1 – Approaching “Global Governance”: actors, mechanism, agendas

Although the term was born in the field of political economy and international relations, global governance is now used in many others including economics, finance, environment, public health, conflict management, etc., as well as in national political debates. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) are often credited for first developing the notion in an effort to understand how a growing number of global issue areas are increasingly impacted by a wider range of actors, networks and systems of rules. The concept then spilled over from academic circles into the world of international policy making. A Commission on Global Governance, chaired by the Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, was appointed for this purpose in 1992 by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Its 1995 report, Our Global Neighborhood, pushed the concept to the fore in the commonly used vocabulary of international organisations and global fora. From there, the notion has taken root in various global policy areas with two fundamental meanings: a descriptive one that emphasises who does what and how; and normative one that questions the legitimacy of the discernible agendas.

The positive meaning of 'global governance': emphasising who and how?

At a first level, “global governance” is used as a descriptive (positive) concept, pointing to the fact that an increasing number of actors are involved in a growing number of topics of global interest. The term refers primarily to the idea that actors other than governments have become important players on the international scene. A significant part of the debate is thus dedicated to identifying which actors are influential internationally, why and how. Susan Strange (1996) and James Rosenau (1995), two founding figures of International Political Economy, were among the first to draw attention to the increasing interactions between governments, multinational corporations, international organisations as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whether local, national or international. Rosenau further highlighted the role of transnational elites, scientific communities and groups of experts. Sub-state groups or regions (e.g. Ohmae, 1996), supra-national organisations as well as intergovernmental groups and a whole range of civil society actors (trade unions, political parties, religious groups, associations, etc.) were all later...
acknowledged as significant players to be brought into the picture (e.g. Higgott, *et al.*, 2000).

Still, the positive use of the concept is not only concerned with *actors*, but also *processes*. In that regard, it has had the tendency to include all new practices that have emerged on the global stage following the rise of these new actors (Müller, 2005). An illustration of this is the definition provided by the Commission on Global Governance (1995, p.7) which defines it as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. This all-encompassing perspective has contributed to strengthening global governance as an identified policy area, but has been criticised because of its weakly defined research programme. As Müller and Lederer (2003, p.5) put it:

> While these actor-centred approaches have convincingly shown that new actors have indeed become relevant agents in global affairs, they nevertheless could not capture in a systematic way what positively defines global governance as a practice.

Among the scholars trying to refocus global governance as a workable and descriptive research programme, Rosenau suggested focusing attention on what he calls “spheres of authority”; namely, spaces of interactions that are able to set norms at various levels and order behaviours. In this more limited perspective, global governance encompasses, “the structures and processes necessary to maintaining a modicum of public order and movement toward the realisation of collective goals” (Rosenau, 1997, p.367). This understanding draws attention to the evolution of new forms of governance in various specialised spheres of international life.

For some scholars, however, there is still a debate over the relevance of global governance as a descriptive concept. Mainstream IR theorists have a fundamental difficulty with global governance because of their view of the international system as essentially anarchic (Jahn, 2000). For many, the discourse on global governance is a simple continuation of the “interdependence literature”\(^\text{114}\) of the 1970s, or of the discussion about “international regimes” in the 1980s, which was very much centred on states. Some of these scholars have nonetheless started to take non-state actors

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\(^{114}\) The notion of “complex interdependence” was developed by Keohane and Nye (1977). It referred to the trans-national interdependencies between states and societies. These authors argued that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other interdependences increase the probability of co-operation among states.
more “seriously”, but many do not look on them as independent agents and define their roles in relation to the nation-state or to intergovernmental systems.

The normative meaning: questioning agendas?

Beyond its descriptive use, “global governance” is often employed to refer to normative projects, agendas that demand action either in favour of, or counter to, a range of current global dynamics. This more political use of the notion can be either explicit or hidden, or somewhere in between.

On the very explicit side, many authors of the political left refer to global governance as an outright political project, either as the global elite project of imposing neoliberalism or as the counter project of taming market forces through international regulations and new democratic institutions. Most commonly, however, these authors set aside the term “global governance” to refer to the counter project seen as the political alternative to neoliberal globalisation (e.g. Brand, et al., 2000). Global governance is thus intrinsically combined with progressive democratic demands and expectations and stands opposed to what is seen as the post-war “compromise of embedded liberalism” – famously defined by Ruggie (1982, p.393) and often equated with globalisation itself, based upon multilateral trade and fostered by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation or the World Bank.

Along these lines, various approaches to democratising globalisation have emerged, which all advocate renewed forms of global governance. A first approach, sometimes labelled “neoconservative”, relies on the call to democratise all the states per se, if necessary by force. Another is cosmopolitan democracy, which aspires to reinvent formal multilateral institutions and make them more powerful and accountable to the people. One of its key theorists is David Held, who has developed a global social democratic framework (Held, 2004). Still another approach to global governance as a democratic response to globalisation is based on the concept of deliberation. This may be labelled “transnational discursive democracy” and argues that democratic global politics may “most fruitfully be sought in the more informal realm of international public sphere and the engagement of discourses they can feature” (Dryzek, 2006, preface, p.vii).
Interestingly enough, rare are the neoliberals or conservatives that use the term “global governance” as a flag to support their global agenda of more open markets and reduced state control. As suggested by Müller (2005), this may be related to their dislike of anything that may sound like an overarching public authority. Nevertheless, it is hardly necessary to read between the lines to see that neoliberals have a clear view of the kind of global rules and regulations they want to see implemented: therefore, they do work with an implicit concept of “global governance”.

The normative use of the concept can also be less explicit and almost go unnoticed. This is the case when global governance is merely and almost “naturally” compared to the notion of “government”, on the basis of their common need to “solve problems”. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) speak for instance of global governance as “governance without government” (p.1). More explicitly, Finkelstein (1995) posits that global governance is about “doing internationally what governments do at home” (p.369). Yokota (2004), for his part, provides an interesting normative definition of global governance, as “the standard by which to judge international organisations and regimes, coalitions of nations or individual states, when they act globally to address issues that emerge beyond national borders” (p.8).

This “problem-solving” use of “global governance” does not openly take any political side, although it essentially harbours the view that some kind of “global public interest” exists and needs to be pursued, which is already in itself a political statement. Quite commonly in academic and professional circles, the normative approach to global governance takes the form of an attempt to identify “problems” and formulate “solutions” of international co-operation and dispute settlements. Although they often look rather technical and depoliticised, such analyses carry normative outlooks, since the identification of any “problem” presupposes some norms and standards: a vision of the common good, of social justice, of a desired state of affairs for the world, of a specific interest to care for, etc. Such policy analysts often speak of ways and means to measure and increase the effectiveness, efficiency, equity and accountability of governance mechanisms, as well as their compliance with various ethical or political principles. However, one must remember that such “problem-solving” approaches can only be infused by political views,
whether social democratic or neoliberal or other. When action is called for, ethics and politics are already there, no matter how technical the discourse is.

As we see, both the positive and normative concepts of global governance emphasise co-ordination as its defining issue, raising questions about its actors, mechanisms and agendas.

The issue behind the issue: the rise and puzzles of "hyper-collective action"

The changing nature of collective action at the international level, and the difficulty of assigning it clear goals and processes, is very much the issue behind the issue of global governance. Today's global issues, such as environmental protection or international health, are less and less "ordinary problems" of international cooperation. Formerly, conventional collective action in international relations typically involved the co-ordination of a limited number of relatively homogeneous actors (for instance, a community of states), gathered in the name of their decision-making power and capacity to act on a given problem. Co-ordination would take place through "governance arrangements" that can be institutionalised through international law, the creation of delegated organisations (such as the IMF) or meetings meant to facilitate decision-making (G8, G20). Not only do these forms of co-ordination have great difficulties in overcoming individual egoisms, but they are also increasingly ineffective technically to tackle a growing range of issues.

What we are witnessing today are new forms of co-operation that bring together a much greater number of more heterogeneous actors. The rising quantity and qualitative diversity of actors involved in emerging regulatory processes is partly linked to technical factors: the complexity of the issues and interactions that need to be engaged; the sheer volume of necessary human and financial resources; the diversity of skills that need to be mobilised and the need to coordinate various levels of action, down to local contexts or even individuals. But this growing profusion of actors also results from political factors such as the common will to make democracy progress in various forms, or ethical choices such as considering local problems (e.g. poverty) as global ethical issues. In these new forms of co-operation, actors are not involved in the name of their supposed capacity to decide, but on the wider basis of their self-involvement as affected stakeholders. An increasing number of actors invite themselves into the legislative sphere (conception, decision-making), the
executive sphere (implementation, evaluation) or the judiciary sphere (conflict resolution, compensation mechanisms...) of international regulation, where states are less and less alone. Even in traditionally sovereign issue areas (such as peacekeeping, trade openness or debt cancellations), new actors are slipping in thanks to their pressures on public opinion, decision-making mechanisms or the services they are able provide in implementation phases. International collective action is thus becoming far more fragmented. This reality is even more apparent when it comes to issue areas that are extremely complex and diffuse to manage, as for instance the promotion of human rights, gender equality, economic and social development of poor countries, or the production of international collective goods such as the fight against transmissible diseases, climate change and the loss of global biodiversity.

To underline this phenomenon, which they see as the defining problematique of global governance, Charnoz and Severino (2009) have coined the notion of “hyper-collective action”. Compared to the conventional type, hyper-collective action concerns a much larger number of more heterogeneous actors. Looking at recent successes in international mobilisation, one sees that the collective action of this constellation of actors has tended to structure itself through forums (such as the World Social Forum or the World Economic Forum), discourses (such as debt relief campaigns or human rights discourses), partnerships (The Global Compact), platforms (the Save Darfur coalition, Interaction, CONCORD or Eurodad), networks (Global Development Network, Development Gateway) and epistemic communities (in the form of thematic journals or think tanks) (Ray & Severino, 2010). Such processes of hyper-collective action draw on multi-scale coordinations whereby even local actors develop international connections. Its co-ordination mechanisms include softer governance structures, such as polycentric networks or discourses liable to guide the actions of widely different actors.

Typical problems of hyper-collective action go well beyond the traditional one of dealing with egoisms; they include the management of various levels of action, cultural and organisational differences, varying individual objectives, as well as the dilution of responsibilities regarding the achievement of common goals. Hyper-collective action is thus not co-operation in the conventional sense of the word: it may not be possible to identify a centre, a defined doctrine or even a clear intentionality. It does however create a movement whose effects are neither tidy nor
guaranteed but that nevertheless may bring many *status quos* into question – and thus raise enmities.

The era of hyper-collective action is unlikely to be that of states’ evanescence, quite the contrary. The global crises of the new century are calling the latter to reposition themselves as the “conductors of a grand polyphonic symphony” (Ray & Severino, 2010, p.16). Their collective task will be to help structure hyper-collective actions into effective global policies that ensure the additionality of every stakeholder’s contribution. But the right paths are still to be found. As Ray and Severino explain, one of the advantages of these new collaborative processes is that, although hypercollective motion needs a critical mass of actors progressing in the same direction, it does not require that every single actor concerned follow suit. While many international negotiations need unanimous backing to yield results, it may be easier to ensure that the median player is comfortable with the direction or that the front-runners are exploring the right innovative paths than convincing the last naysayer that they should join the movement. On the other hand, the downside is that it is probably utopian to hope to fully *co-ordinate* the action of this polycentric group of actors. What may be possible, however, is to provide a flexible framework to orient the direction of this atomized group of players, one that will help make their trajectories converge and *synchronize* more.

The following table summarises some of the key differences between collective and hyper-collective action. On this basis, the next section emphasises the need for a discursive approach to global governance.
Comparing collective and hyper-collective action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Collective Action</th>
<th>Hyper-collective Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Limited / Finite / Closed</td>
<td>Wide / Indefinite / Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grouping principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping of centres of authority</th>
<th>Grouping of stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Scale of coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single (only international actors have international relations)</th>
<th>Multiple (local actors develop self-standing international relations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions or “international regimes”</th>
<th>Complex governance arrangements, networks, partnerships and discourses.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Typical problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual egoism blocks the collective optimum</th>
<th>Articulating scales Dilution of responsibilities Cultural differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: adapted from Charnoz & Severino (2009)
Appendix 2 – The diffusion of global discourses

Political scientists, sociologists and economists have devised “diffusion theories” that seek to shed light on the pattern of diffusion of particular policy discourses – tracing global convergences to either changing ideas or changing incentives. Dobbie, et al. (2007) identify four distinctive outlooks in the social sciences.

To start with, constructivists see the diffusion of global discourses, notably liberal ones, as a matter of ideology in a broad sense. Over the past few centuries, a “world polity” has emerged along with a global political culture that modified the consensus on the appropriate goals, legitimate actors and optimal means of political entities. For constructivists, conventions are socially generated and understanding how public policies become socially accepted is the key to understanding their diffusion. For instance, early studies traced the diffusion of educational and human rights policies from the First to the Third world, showing that most countries changed policies not when they were developmentally ready and able to implement them, but when they were influenced by global norms (Boli-Bennett & Meyer, 1978). According to constructivists, this process of social construction is constrained by bounded rationality: the lack of information and cognitive capacity to assess the costs and benefits of each and every alternative (March & Simon, 1993). Hence, the importance of leading countries, experts, epistemic communities, transnational advocacy and knowledge-based networks (economics, lawyers and scientists), international organisations or “norm entrepreneurs” such as local or international NGOs. Such actors “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatises them” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.897). They act as channels for flows of information, values, ideas but also money and material resources (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Second, coercion theorists depict a world in which a few powerful players exercise disproportionate influence. These can be governments, international organisations or nongovernmental actors such as private firms, think tanks, NGOs, etc. They can operate through physical force (Owen, 2002), the manipulation of economic costs and benefits, and even the monopolisation of information or expertise. Conditionalities attached to financial aid or trade agreements are prime examples of coercion. The EU’s negotiations with Latin American countries over free trade
contained, for instance, a contentious clause on democracy (Sanahuja, 2000). As for human rights, Burton (2005) showed that when countries are promised preferential trade arrangements for human rights enhancement, they are more likely to make concrete improvements. A more pervasive form of coercion operates through hegemonic ideas. Hegemony in the Gramscian sense refers to the control of social life by a group or a class through cultural means (Femia, 1983). Powerful countries with research infrastructure, the critical intellectual mass, and well-developed connections between the policy world and research nodes are unduly influential in the framing of policy discussions (Hira, 1998; Krugman, 1995). Whether through conditionalities or expertise, what unites these different perspectives on coercion is their common focus on the influence of an external source of pressure or ideas. The reasons why powerful actors care about policies or institutions of other countries can be manifold: national security, encouraging the repayment of debts, protecting foreign investments, enhancing international political, economic, financial or environmental stability, etc.

Third, competition theorists, like most coercion theorists, trace policy changes to shifts in external incentives but they describe a very different mechanism: a policy that gives one actor a competitive edge on global markets leads others to follow suit, even if they would have preferred, ex ante, not to adopt the policy. Such processes may involve various rights and labour standards, the protection of children or environmental norms. The typical story that came out of the 1990’s was one of a “race to the bottom” leading to lower standards – as the preferences of global business trumped the preferences of domestic groups. However, new dynamics are now emerging as an increasing number of companies seem to consider “corporate social responsibility” as a competitive asset. In this diffusion model, power plays a role but it is the power of market as a decentralised force rather than the power of defined actors as conventionally understood. It can work both ways. Competition theorists, like most coercion theorists, trace policy changes to shifts in external incentives.

Finally, learning theorists, like constructionists, trace changes in policies and ideas but not through rationally bounded processes of imitation or socialisation – rather through rational cost-benefit analysis. The driving question here is how decision-makers draw lessons from the experiences of other actors.
Appendix 3 – The global extinction crisis

A UN convention defines biodiversity as “the variability among living organisms...which includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems” (UN 1992c, art. 2, § 1). Most scientists agree today that a global mass extinction is taking place (Wilson, 1992; Leakey & Lewin, 1997; O’Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002). Still, the study of “rates of extinction” is particularly difficult. It is never easy to prove that a species does not exist anywhere any longer; moreover, the number of total species in the world is not known. Estimates vary from 7 to 30 million – with only 1.75 currently known. (Mace, 2004; Baillie et al., 2004). A third of all wildlife might have disappeared already over the past thirty-five years (WWF, 2008). Brockington et al. (2008, p.61) note that “the crisis is real but the mandate is not scientific” (p.62). Even if extinction takes place, the cost to humans is indeed hard to quantify given the methodological challenges (Costanza, et al., 1997). Yet, there are grounds for believing that it is high if one admits that biodiversity can be at the same time a local, global, public and private good (Perrings & Gadgil, 2003). From the point of view of the global community, the reduction of biodiversity comes with a shrinking of the world’s gene pool, while the amount of genetic material available works as an “insurance” against unknown threats. It also negatively impacts ecosystems which provide critical global ecological goods and services: ecosystems provide oxygen, clean water, recycle wastes, control soil erosion, pollution and pests, pollinate plants, etc. Human societies often take these contributions for granted, but they would merely “cease to exist in [their] absence” (Kampeng & Zhishi, 2003, p.343). Finally, there are also global ethical issues linked to biodiversity. Humans, as the planet’s dominant species, may have a moral responsibility towards the species and environments nature has produced. Meanwhile, current generations have arguably no right to damage a legacy they inherited and will pass on to their children.
## Appendix 4 – Analysing CP schemes: a summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Main potential forms</th>
<th>Definitions (=) and Warnings (▲)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. CP ORIGINS** | Possible configurations: the CP project may predominantly originate:                  | • *Origins* = what are the “originating agents” (Initiators, Supporters, Designers)  
• *Initiators* = agents who had the original impulse for change. *Supporters* = those who supported this move with resources. *Designers* = those who designed the actual project.  
• *Participation from within* = Home-grown, bottom-up initiative. Origination by local groups, associations or individuals.  
• *Participation from above* = mainly originated by public authorities.  
• *Participation from outside* = mainly originated by external agents (international organisations, foreign governmental agencies, non-local NGOs or foundations, etc).  
• *Participation from balanced sources* = originated in a balanced way by various interest groups (for instance part of an alliance).  |
| Who initiates?   | 1. from within the community  
2. from above  
3. from outside  
4. from balanced sources | ▲  Need to analyse the community and its sub-groups. How they are socially differentiated (status, assets, interests, etc.).                                                                                                                                 |
| **2. CP INCLUSIVENESS** | Six possible configurations along two criteria:  
1. Diversity of community sub-groups involved (*wide* vs. *narrow* inclusion)  
2. Participation within sub-groups (non-elite centered, socially mixed or elite centered) | • *Inclusiveness* = what specific groups or individuals are significantly involved.                                                                                                                                                 |
### 3. CP SCOPE

**Participation in what and when?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential areas of participation (upstream vs. downstream participation)</th>
<th>Initial diagnosis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Listing of potential solutions</td>
<td><strong>Upstream</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Selection of a course of action</td>
<td>( CP )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Preparation of implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Evaluation and on-going correction</td>
<td><strong>Downstream</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Envisioning the future</td>
<td>( CP )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Scope** = areas of participation (i.e. entry-points or channels of participation).
- The question is: what exactly is participated in and when?
- **Initial diagnosis** = who expressed opinions, wishes and desired goals and when?
- **Listing of solutions** = who joined debates about possible plans and when?
- **Selection of a course of actions** = who made key decisions and plans, and when?
- **Preparing for implementation** = who participated in mobilisation, training, etc?
- **Implementation** = who participated in key managing institutions? Who contributed to costs, construction, operation, maintenance, monitoring?
- **Evaluation** = who has a role in on-going appraisal and identification of evolving needs?
- **Envisioning the future** = is there a space to discuss potential changes?

### 4. CP INTENSITY

**How active is participation?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible intensity levels (from inactive to active participation)</th>
<th><strong>Intensity</strong> = degree of active participation and agency of actors involved.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nominal participation.</td>
<td><strong>Nominal</strong> = formal membership but no attendance at meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Passive participation.</td>
<td><strong>Passive</strong> = people attend meetings but listen passively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consultative participation.</td>
<td><strong>Consultative</strong> = people give information and opinions but have no decision-making power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bargaining participation.</td>
<td><strong>Bargaining participation</strong> = people have a say in negotiations; they behave as self-interested deal-seekers; power differentials largely determine outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Deliberative participation.</td>
<td><strong>Deliberative participation</strong> = collective partnership in search of consensus.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

▲ Need to analyse the everyday and practical functioning of participatory mechanisms (e.g. agenda setting; social interactions during meetings, etc.).
### 5. CP ALLOCATION OF COSTS & BENEFITS
Who benefits most?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Things to look at:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Absolute gains and costs (incentives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relative gains and costs (perceived fairness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Feelings of empowerment or disempowerment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Gains and costs = expected short or long-term, individual or collective benefits; related business contracts; social prestige, gains from Economic Demonstration Projects” (EDPs).
- Compensation of most affected groups = cash or in kind payments; EDPs – but generally not enough to satisfy everybody.

### 6. CP EFFECTS ON POWER FORMATIONS
How is local influence distributed among spatially differentiated stakeholders?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In CP schemes, the main configurations include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Community-centered power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CP in co-management with public authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Larger “power formations” with potential “regional” and “global” levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Although they are in theory community-centred, CP schemes in fact may entail the involvement of a wide range of domestic, international public and private actors.
- Power formations = spatial configuration of actors sharing significant local power – through various structures, processes and events. These formations may include local, domestic, regional and global levels.
- Local-global formations = situations where local influence is shared by domestic and non-domestic actors.
- Rebound effect = while CP is supposed to center decision-making on the community, it may work in practice as an “entry gate” for a range of non-domestic actors and thus lead to a wide local-global formation.
7. CP EFFECTS ON SOCIAL CONTROL

Are there identifiable processes of containment?

Social control may functions through various modes of containment:

1. Alliance
2. Biased design
3. Biased implementation
4. Compromise
5. Delegitimisation
6. Encirclement
7. Epistemic exclusion
8. Institutionalisation (formalisation)
9. Skewed representation
10. Omission
11. Persuasion

- **Social control** = refers to the active containment of certain groups and the reinforcement of certain privileged groups or hierarchical social categories.
- **Containment** = refers to the management of CP so as to maintain control over certain target groups and avoid, block or minimise their disruption of other goals.
- **Alliance** = stakeholder groups with shared interests may form an alliance to increase their legitimacy and bargaining power over target groups.
- **Biased design** = participatory schemes may focus attention on certain issues and leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to stay beyond any reach or duty.
- **Biased implementation** = monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms in the CP scheme may, in practice, function preferentially against defined target groups.
- **Compromise** = strategic trade-off of interests meant to provide leverage on target groups on other issues.
- **Delegitimisation** = representatives of the target group are discredited as non-legitimate.
- **Encirclement** = participatory mechanisms may be flooded with interest groups "encircling" target groups.
- **Epistemic exclusion** = exclusion of target-groups from the production of legitimate knowledge, views and norms. Dominant discourses reinforce the legitimacy of pre-existing social structures.
- **Institutionalisation (formalisation)** = target groups are brought into an institutional / formal framework which, in itself, constitutes an obstacle for them to participate - as they may not be used to institutional / formal / lengthy negotiations.
- **Skewed representation** = target groups are said to be correctly represented in CP mechanisms while in fact they are not.
- **Omission** = target groups are not even mentioned and thus not brought into any part of the CP process.
- **Persuasion** = positive affirmation of the benefits of a CP scheme, invoking the interests of the target groups.
8. CP EFFECTS THROUGH MARKETISATION & COMMODIFICATION

Two congruent effects linked to global capitalism:
1. Marketisation
2. Commodification

- **Marketisation** = process of greater connectedness and dependence on non-community producers, consumers and investors, whether domestic or international.
- **Commodification** = process by which things that did not have an economic value are assigned one and thus become tradable goods.

Commodification does not just take place for physical things: skills, knowledge, behaviours and culture can also be commodified and marketed.

---

9. CP TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL

**How does SC strengthen or constrain CP?**

**How does CP strengthen or weaken SC?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key forms of social capital:</th>
<th>Potential responses to frustrating CP and their outcomes on SC:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bonding social capital</td>
<td>1. VOICE → Renewed SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bridging social capital</td>
<td>2. LOYALTY → Unchanged SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Linking social capital</td>
<td>3. EXIT → Weakened SC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Social capital** = collective bonds both within and among groups – in the forms of memberships of groups and networks; as well as social norms and beliefs.
- **Bonding SC** = strengthens ties within groups of people sharing many similar characteristics. **Bridging SC** = connects different types of people. **Linking SC** = connects to people in position of authority.

SC can strengthen or undermine CP. There is no automatic relation between SC and free-riding behaviours or social inequalities. Role of social norms such as individualism, loyalties, political divides, history of collective action, etc.

Social frustrations following unsatisfactory CP may lead to three types of responses: VOICE (complaints and actions for change; SC likely to be renewed); LOYALTY (silent acceptance, SC likely to remain unchanged); EXIT (actual or psychological withdrawal; SC likely to be weakened).
### Appendix 5 – Forms of power of Global Discourses: a summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Power</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Elements to look at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Compulsory Power** | Direct control of an actor A over an actor B, by the use of material and ideational resources to produce incentives or constraints. | • Material, ideological and normative resources to produce incentives or constraints.  
• Intended and unintended power effects.  
• Resistance by B, based on what resources? |
| **2. Institutional Power** | Indirect control of A over B through the mediation of formal or informal institutions. | • Mediating institutions between A and B (notably organisations and markets).  
• Ability of various actors to use the institutions.  
• Winners and losers of institutional processes. Agenda setting processes, biases and omissions. Social, spatial or temporal distances between actors.  
• Analysis of A/B dependence (e.g. through dependence on external markets). |
| **3. Structural Power** | Privileged positions given to certain actors through long-standing binary social categories. | • Hierarchical/binary positions and structural categories, relations of domination.  
• Functional advantages, capacities, self-understanding of each category.  
• Whose objective interests are supported by these categories?  
• Hegemonic ideologies working in the "objective interest" of the upper class.  
• Subjective interests of the lower class underpinning their domination.  
• Discourses keeping out certain stakeholders |
| **4. Productive Power** | Privileged positions given to certain actors through new and emerging discourses. | • Re-definition through discourses of the legitimate body of values and knowledge, of what is taken for granted.  
• Emergence of non-binary / new social categories.  
• Anti-politics (e.g. suppression of legitimate options through "expertise")  
• Governmentality: self-regulation for pre-defined results  
• Re-definition of what is "traditional". |
### Appendix 6 – Potential observations of power mechanisms according to the critical narrative of CP schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of CP schemes</th>
<th>Forms of powers</th>
<th>Compulsory power</th>
<th>Institutional power</th>
<th>Structural Power</th>
<th>Productive Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G E I S E</td>
<td>1. CP ORIGINS</td>
<td>Indirect control of goals by external supporters (e.g. donors) given their financial weight, explicit or implicit conditionalities.</td>
<td>Fund-raising and design processes take initiatives away from locals and pass them to more powerful (and institutional) actors.</td>
<td>Local elites may try to influence CP design to strengthen their privileged structural social position.</td>
<td>Anti-political effects and privileged influence of expert-led and scientific knowledge, often coming from outside the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td>2. CP INCLUSIVENESS</td>
<td>Uneven material, financial and conceptual means among stakeholders resulting in different ability to contribute to CP processes.</td>
<td>The everyday functioning of “participatory mechanisms” in practice leaves little room for weaker community stakeholders.</td>
<td>Social hierarchical categories active in “participatory processes” (not free from on-going power relations).</td>
<td>Anti-political effects of scientific, expert, international and state discourses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td>3. CP SCOPE</td>
<td>Presence of disincentives or low incentives for a range of community actors to join in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td>4. CP INTENSITY</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td>5. CP ALLOCATION OF COSTS &amp; BENEFITS</td>
<td>Stronger stakeholders have material, financial and conceptual means to influence rules and pilot economic projects.</td>
<td>Stronger stakeholders make better use of institutionalised decision processes allocating resources and benefits.</td>
<td>Stronger local stakeholders may develop discourses (e.g. on traditions and the environment) reinforcing their position, legitimising resources given to them.</td>
<td>Stronger local stakeholders may manage to incarnate “modernity”, the “future” or “the way forward”. Weaker ones may be associated with “the past”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td>6. SOCIAL CAPITAL IMPACT ON CP</td>
<td>Low bonding SC leads to unequal sharing of project benefits within the community.</td>
<td>Low bridging and linking SC lead weaker stakeholders to manage their involvement in key participatory institutions inefficiently.</td>
<td>A low bridging SC often underpins dividing structural social categories - that restrict CP possibilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Linking SC of local elites enables them to capture more benefits.</td>
<td>Linking SC of local elites enables them to capture more benefits.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger local stakeholders may develop discourses (e.g. on traditions and the environment) reinforcing their position, legitimising resources given to them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I M E M T A T I</td>
<td></td>
<td>High bonding, reaching and linking SC may enable some groups to develop and impose a new discourse, reinforcing their privileged position.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPACTS</td>
<td>7. CP EFFECTS ON SOCIAL CAPITAL</td>
<td>8. CP EFFECTS ON SOCIAL CONTROL</td>
<td>9. CP EFFECTS THROUGH MARKETISATION &amp; COM-MODIFICATION</td>
<td>10. CP EFFECTS ON POWER FORMATIONS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>VOICE can take the form of direct action (agitation, refusal to comply with the rules...) to force other outcomes.</td>
<td>Compulsory control through surveillance systems, fines and legal sanctions. Range of disciplinary practices.</td>
<td>Increased sensitivity of the economy to external market prices and world demand. World consumers and investors increase their local compulsory power.</td>
<td>Legal, material and financial means of other actors to influence CP an local situations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>VOICE can take a political form (through democratic institutions and representatives).</td>
<td>Participatory institutions turn into mechanisms to oversee and influence weaker social group -- or to benefit certain groups/private interests.</td>
<td>Increased need for local actors to be able to deal with markets as complex &quot;institutions&quot;: need to master marketing and communication tools to reach out to external clients.</td>
<td>The institutionalisation of CP opens channels for and facilitates the influence of other actors.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>VOICE can take the form of a &quot;traditionalist&quot; discourse emphasising the legitimacy and positive social role of weak community actors.</td>
<td>Hierarchical social categories are reinforced rather than challenged by key discourses and participatory mechanisms.</td>
<td>The increased outward looking nature of the local economy favours already strong economic actors who can respond to changing demands and survive shocks. This again favours stronger economic actors.</td>
<td>Competing discourses (traditional and new ones) on the part of various actors strengthen the legitimacy of their local influence. For instance: State discourse on sovereignty; international NGOs and 'global public goods'; community and &quot;participation&quot;.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>VOICE can take the form of new discourses being developed to contest the legitimacy non-community actors and CP outcomes.</td>
<td>- New discourses (e.g. modernity) lead to increased control over certain groups (e.g. through self-regulation or &quot;epistemic control&quot;). Discourses also increase the legitimacy of strong actors.</td>
<td>- Commodification: transformation of local resources into &quot;products&quot; tradable on markets (notably outward looking) and re-adapted to market norms and expectations. Discourses on &quot;modernity&quot; and the &quot;economy&quot; focuses on desirable openness to new/dynamic external markets.</td>
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Appendix 7 – Research methods

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach based upon four months of fieldwork. Data were collected using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, focus groups and a range of written documents\textsuperscript{115}. These elements are briefly discussed here as they played out concretely.

\textbf{A Field Level Qualitative Research}

Several reasons led to the choice of a case-study and qualitative approach. First, as Robson (1993, p.143) suggests, “if your main concern is understanding what is happening in a specific context, and if you can get access to and co-operation from the people involved then do a case study”. Second, the choice of a qualitative research design was also linked to the need to focus on the process and not only the outcomes of the initiatives under study, a point underscored by Creswell (1994). Third, a key strength of case-study research is the opportunity to use multiple methods and sources of data. Yin (1984, p.91) notes that any finding or conclusion is likely to be “more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode”.

Qualitative research has gained recognition as a valuable method to explore life experiences and social processes (Creswell, 2003). It involves conducting research within the everyday setting of people to gain insight through direct interactions and observation. It focuses on understanding ordinary behaviour and enables an evolving process of data collection since the researcher has the ability to modify its work as new opportunities arise during fieldwork. Qualitative research is further based on inductive reasoning where direct observations are used to identify patterns, hypotheses and eventually develop theories. Based on personal experiences and interactions with a diversity of people throughout fieldwork, it is nurtured by interpretations by the researcher and may thus be influenced by his personal values, biases or interests (Van Maanen, \textit{et al.}, 1982). It is thus important to acknowledge that qualitative research does not attempt to separate the researcher from the study to seek “objective results” in the strongest positivist sense. In the course of this work,

\textsuperscript{115} A large share of these primary data is available on the DVD to be found in the Annex.

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although sources were carefully triangulated to identify consistent and genuine social patterns, one cannot escape the fact that all data have eventually been interpreted and processed through the researchers' individual understanding of people's perceptions and thoughts, a cognitive process that has inbuilt limitations.

To complement qualitative data, quantitative information was gathered whenever possible through existing sources such as the population census, economic or environmental assessments and (some rare) public perception studies. They proved useful in understanding some general trends, but such data were of limited relevance to addressing core research questions that have to do with how people feel and interact. The drafting and implementation of two questionnaires was seriously considered as they would have been useful in systematising and quantifying perceptions identified through interviews and focus groups. However, two sets of constraints led the researcher to give up on this idea. In St. Lucia, the political issues raised by participatory schemes were so contentious that relying on a questionnaire was not a discrete enough research method to be fruitfully used. The people and the tense context there made it clear that passing around such a questionnaire would further stress the environment under study and raise further concerns about what was going on, a move that would have jeopardised (an locally politicised) the whole study. In Brazil, a questionnaire would have been useful to gather perceptions of rural employees, the peons, a vast and key social group. However, the massive space in which they are scattered did not allow the researcher, technically or financially, to apply a questionnaire to a sufficient number of people to make it statistically relevant. Another issue was the fact that it is both difficult and very embarrassing for respondents to write down what they think about their work conditions, interpersonal relations and felt power relations. The researcher eventually felt that oral discussion was the only way to properly gather this information.

Interviews
Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique because they allow gaining an understanding of the inner experiences of people, an understanding which is critical when analysing issues such as participation, socio-political dynamics and power relations. Interviews also provide access to the context and meaning of actors' behaviour (Seidman 1998). A total of 110 formal interviews were undertaken for this study, half in Brazil and half in St. Lucia, a number that does not include informal

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conversations and meetings without note-taking. They were conducted in person either in the participant’s home or workplace at a time convenient to them. Administering interviews in the participants’ own surroundings enabled the researcher to gain a better sense of their life perspective. Interviews typically lasted between 60 to 90 minutes, with occasional interviews being cut short after 30 minutes (due to the lack of relevant material or good will on the part of the participant) and some others lasting several hours (such as with a very charismatic Rasta lady in St. Lucia who gave a detailed account of her incredible life). Interview length very much depended on the responsiveness of the participant, the relevance of the material being provided and the number of new thematic paths that would appear during the discussion.

The way interviews are conducted, how questions are constructed and presented, and the answers recorded all impact on the quality and quantity of data collected. The vast majority of my interviews followed a semi-structured format with a discussion guide to direct the conversation. Semi-structured interviews have much of the same flexibility as unstructured interviews but are useful in that they follow a specific agenda to ensure that key questions, either common or tailor-made, are being asked to participants. I tailored in advance these guides for each specific meeting, based upon what I thought were the distinct knowledge and experiences of the person.

During the interviews, both open-ended and direct questions were used. Open questions are useful in the way they provide respondents with considerable room to express themselves, as they exert little control over their responses. Open questions also allow interviewees to answer in a manner that they feel comfortable with, for instance by telling a story. They enable the researcher to identify topics of interest to the participant and ask further relevant questions. Nevertheless, direct questions were also used to ensure that essential information and perceptions were obtained. Within the first few minutes of the interview, I was often able to gauge how participants would respond to a line of questioning. If I perceived that participants were reluctant or unable to expand on their answers, I would focus more on using direct questions, for instance when the respondent kept being rather cold or closed. Conversely, when participants were willing and able to develop their responses, I relied more on open questions.
**Interview sequences**

The majority of interviews were scheduled in advance, so each one would be prepared, as mentioned above, with a set of key questions and themes. I would then try to arrive well in advance in order to avoid giving a first negative impression. At the beginning of each interview, I would introduce myself as a researcher, as well as the purpose of the study. In many instances, however, I found it difficult to reveal the exact outlook of the study and its concern with power relations. As experience showed, this angle does tend to look suspicious to many stakeholders, as they may think they are being judged. After debating at length with myself whether this approach was ethical, I decided most of the time to give a rather general view of my work and of its research question. On the whole, to make things smoother, I thus tended to introduce this work as being “problem-solving” in nature, rather than related to critical social theory and power among actors.

Once presented in this way, I would then collect limited key information from the participants, such as age, marital status, current work and number of children, to gain a rapid understanding of their life situation. After this, I would ask them to reveal their life in their own words, starting with where they were born and following on with studies (if any) and major life and work experiences. I found this way of opening interviews a successful one in manifesting a genuine interest for individual life stories. This process was also useful in easing the atmosphere and facilitating further discussion. To give their own version of their social identity is something I realised people generally want to do, one way or another, during an interview. I thus figured that giving them the opportunity of doing so right at the start of the discussion often made them more comfortable with this rather peculiar process (at least for many respondents) of being interviewed and (often) recorded.

Once this large background information had been collected (a process that could take up to a good third of the interview time) questions would go down the list of themes I had determined beforehand. However, all interviews were fully semi-structured in the sense that I was always eager to diverge from the discussion guide and dig further into some fresh theme or piece of information that was being provided. Most of the time, I would also let the participant tell at length what he had in mind on whatever topic he wanted me to know about. This rather relaxed and flexible interview style
usually led to lengthy interviews, in a stress-free and empathetic atmosphere, yielding rich data and in-depth personal viewpoints.

**Use of a voice recorder**

With systematic and prior consent from the participants, the vast majority of the interviews were recorded using a digital audio device. I felt that recording the exact words was important since this study partly relies on discourse analysis. Recording also allowed me to focus more on the content of the conversation instead of having to concentrate systematically on taking copious notes. Finally, given issues of language and accents, using an audio recorder proved invaluable to listen repeatedly and decipher the most difficult parts of what was said (notably in Portuguese).

In order to maintain an informal atmosphere and considering that participants were sometimes illiterate, I chose not to present them with a written form of consent. Rather I asked for verbal consent prior to presenting the audio recorder or at the very beginning of the actual recording. I would always introduce the issue in the same manner, saying that the audio recording is and only is for my personal use, that data are fully “anonymised” and that I am happy to stop the recording at any point during the interview should the respondent wish so.

Most participants were receptive to the audio-recorder and note-taking. I often felt that they even felt valued to be taken so seriously. However, as experience confirmed, not all participants were comfortable with being audio-recorded. In some instances, I perceived clearly that respondents were suspicious and reluctant from the outset, so I did not dare to introduce the audio recorder and take the risk of deteriorating further the level of trust. In such circumstances, I relied on taking notes, although in even rarer cases, I even avoided doing even this. I must say I sometimes thought about recording interviewees in a hidden way, but I resisted this temptation which I labelled as being a “rogue researcher”…

Each of the 110 formal interviews led to written notes or full transcriptions word for word. All of this material is available in the DVD provided in the Annex. Information that would identify participants has been removed from transcripts.

**Language issues and recourse to a translator**

In Brazil, interviews were conducted in English, French or Portuguese depending on the language participants felt most comfortable with. my command of English and
French raised no technical problems, while Portuguese is far more challenging for us. In some instances, I had to ask for the support of a Brazilian research student I met in Campo Grande. He was interested in my study and agreed to help out as a live translator during interviews. He proved very good to spot the moments I was lost during conversations and he would then briefly sum up what the respondent was saying or translating key sentences. I owe him a great deal.

As for St. Lucia, although English is the official language of the island, most citizens also speak a dialect of French Creole referred to locally as Patois. In the rural areas, or in poor fishing communities, it is more common to hear Patois, especially among the older generations. Although I am myself French, I did not manage to pick up the local Patois, which I found was more remote from my native language than local people would acknowledge. Consequently, the majority of the research was conducted in English with a few exceptions where participants were more comfortable answering in Patois while generally understanding the questions in English. On several occasions, I sought help from a local student with whom I had sympathized and who agreed to help out as a translator. Some of these interviews were very informal and not anticipated, so not all of them were audio-recorded. However, written notes were taken soon afterwards.

Participant observation

Participant observation took place throughout fieldwork in Brazil and St. Lucia. The rationale for this was varied. First, a qualitative approach emphasises getting close to people to understand more authentically their realities and the details of their everyday lives (Oakley and Marsden, 1990). Second, behaviour is significantly influenced by the setting in which it takes place, so one should try to study it in situations where all contextual variables are operating (Gilbert 2001). Third, to capture social and power relations, one should directly observe verbal and non-verbal interactions between people.

Participant observation was conducted both in the everyday context and on special occasions, such as important meetings or social gatherings, and these were transcribed into field notes. Part of them resulted from a spontaneous invitation to join in, such as for instance accompanying horse tours in the Pantanal, patrolling along the coast with the marine rangers in St Lucia, attending public outreach and community meetings in the town of Soufrière, or joining the annual Fisher feast on
St Peter’s days. Other observations resulted from an explicit demand I formulated, for instance to attend in Campo Grande the board meeting of APPAN, an association of landowner involved in ecotourism, or to join rural employees in their work with cattle. In St Lucia, I further spent a lot of time in the offices of the participatory structure I studied, the so-called Soufrière Maritime Management Association (SMMA). This allowed me to observe the comings and goings of community members interacting with the institution. I also regularly attended evenings in local bars where quasi ritual daily meetings take place among the larger Soufrière population, including businessmen and community leaders. It is in this rather sympathetic setting, albeit challenging for a white and foreign researcher, that some key information and perceptions were delivered to us. During all participant observations, my identity as a researcher was made clear to those in attendance, or at least those in direct interaction with us.

Such direct observations played an important role in building trust and reputation as someone genuinely interested and involved with the community. Not only did it contribute to identifying important contacts and sources of information, but it also made me available to those interested in my work. In this way, just as I selected informants, I was myself selected by some people who learnt of my presence and wanted to exchange ideas or share their experience.

**Focus groups**

Focus groups provide an open and flexible forum in which issues of interest can be developed into a collective discussion. Groups I was able to hold were always informal and sometimes totally spontaneous and unplanned, as some of them would start off just by stopping in a street, engaging in conversation with a person and with more people joining in over time. Focus groups proved useful to understanding how and why certain parts of the community felt the way they did. In St. Lucia, they often stimulated a collective voice that really needed to be expressed, or so I felt, as in the case of the poorer fishers in the town of Soufrière. I also felt that focus groups were a more appropriate method than one-to-one interviews when engaging with people whose everyday culture and practice is more based upon public (and loud) conversations across the street rather than soft discussions in an office or in a bar. In some rare instances, I further felt that talking privately to a white foreigner could
prove a problem for a respondent in the eyes of its community, and in such situations collective discussions were more advisable.

Focus groups took place in St. Lucia in six specific settings and several times in each: with fishers along the shoreline; with fishers again after public events; with marine rangers before, during or after their boat patrols; with project staff members at the office, where I spent a lot of time; and with a set of young locals I often met. In Brazil, however, focus groups were more difficult to make happen, due to both spatial and cultural constraints. The huge territory under scrutiny, the Pantanal, has a very low human density and the fazendas I visited are highly isolated from one another, making any meeting virtually impossible to organise, a constraint also felt by the participatory scheme I studied. I managed nevertheless to arrange informal focus groups within some fazendas among rural employers (peons), but results were disappointing. It turned out that collective talks of peons in the presence of a foreigner led to fewer discussion rather than more, a fact that has to do, in my view, with their strong community culture and shy personalities by Western standards.

**Written documents**

Before, throughout and after the fieldwork a wide range of written documents was collected. They provided background, complementary or inside information that helped identify critical issues, triangulate conclusions and increase their reliability as well as identify important informants. First, project-related documentations were gathered from international donors and local project managers, such as original proposals, technical briefs, in-depth studies by related consultants, minutes from public or internal meetings, public statements, evaluation reports and accounting documentation whenever possible. This type of data helped to reconstruct in great detail the history of both participatory projects history, in their various phases and life contingencies.

Second, a range of newspapers and magazine articles related to the projects or regions at stake were collected, relying on local libraries and national archives in St Lucia and on various documentation centres in Brazil, including university libraries and research institutes. This type of documentation helped assess the likely state of public opinion on certain issues at certain points in time, as well as the content of related political discourses.

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Third, a host of public policy documentations was pulled together from both the local and national authorities in the two countries. They include policy statements, reports, development plans and regional assessments. National archives were heavily used for this purpose in St Lucia, while in Brazil this work relied more on specialised libraries such as that in the EMBRAPA research institutes in Campo Grande and Corumbá. This sort of data helped understand the public policy framework, concerns and mindset in which authorities eventually allowed for the development of participatory initiatives. They usefully complemented interviews with civil servants in central and local ministries.

Fourth, written documentation was gathered through direct contact with NGOs, about both their own projects and regional environmental issues. Most were public documents but some were internal ones. Such documents allowed for a better understanding of civil society discourses and practices regarding participatory environmental schemes.

Finally, local academic literature and scientific studies were systemically sought. This endeavour proved fruitful in Brazil where a large range of studies relevant to the Pantanal case was assembled. However it proved unsuccessful in St. Lucia, a small Caribbean island with little scientific production of its own and even less on the specific issues of coastal management in Soufrière. Nevertheless, interesting and relevant local ideas about some key issues were found in the form of pamphlets and history books that I found in libraries or bought in Castries' bookshops. In order to gather and store this huge amount of written documentation while I was moving about and set to fly back to Europe, I used a digital camera and took thousands of pictures.

Field stay
Research was conducted in Brazil in March and April 2008. Some interviews took place in Brasilia, the federal capital, while fieldwork and the remaining interviews were situated in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, in Campo Grande, Corumbá and within the Pantanal nature area itself. Campo Grande, the state capital, is the biggest city nearest to the Pantanal and is home to a range of involved public and private actors. Fieldwork also took place in a range of ranches (fazendas), some of which were close to main roads while others were far remote within the Pantanal. This allowed for a direct observation of "pantaneiro life" and people, as well as interviews
of other stakeholders. Travel between fazendas was difficult and confined to secondary and damaged roads.

In St. Lucia fieldwork took place during June and July 2008. Interviews with national NGOs and public authorities were conducted in Castries, the capital, whereas the rest of work was located in Soufrière, where the participatory scheme under study, the Soufrière Maritime Management Area, unfolded. Soufrière is a town on the Southwest coast of the island with a population of 4,000. It was the former capital of Saint Lucia during times of French rule and is now a rather sleepy fishing port with an emerging tourism industry. It boasts the key tourist attractions of St Lucia, notably the majestic Gros and Petit Pitons (conic volcanic formations raising directly up from the coral reef beds and forming part of a UNESCO World Heritage site) or a "drive-in" volcano featuring open air sources of sulphur. The region is popular for snorkelling and scuba diving.

Conducting research in a foreign culture and country brings a multitude of factors that affect the process. Spending a long time at the research site is a common strategy to acclimatise to the research setting (Creswell 2003) and I decided to proceed that way. Starting from a position with no particular knowledge of Brazil or St. Lucia, and even less of the specific places I studied, it was necessary to first familiarise myself with them. In order to do so, I conducted unstructured observations for the first week or so upon arrival. This initial reconnaissance allowed me to observe the surroundings and gain a rudimentary understanding of it. I began to interact with local people and become familiar with the towns of Soufrière and Campo Grande.

During my initial observations, I also developed a better awareness of the appropriate behaviour in which to conduct myself as a researcher, a foreigner and a white person - given the local histories of slavery and racial tensions. I felt it was extremely important to carry myself in a reserved and respectful manner, so I took care to demonstrate deference towards older people, as well as avoiding riding a car within Soufrière town, the fact of owning a car being quite socially divisive in this community. These precautions enabled me to build, I think, better connections and to gain wider trust.

Regarding living arrangements, any field researcher contemplates the idea of staying a significant amount of time in some stakeholder's personal homes, such as with a fisher family in St Lucia or a rural household in the Pantanal. Such experience
certainly brings a range of insider information and a closeness to the object study that cannot be reached otherwise, including through the development of personal bonds. However a range of constraints and concerns prevented me from adopting this approach in both of my fieldwork areas. First, although my work focused on specific communities, these are not homogeneous and I had to study a range of groups, often conflicting. In politicised and socially divided environments such as in St. Lucia, staying at a local home would have been interpreted as losing neutrality and siding with one party against others, for instance, poor fishers against business groups. This would have harmed my ability to proceed serenely with my research. Second, while I did spend two months in each setting, I believe more time would have been necessary to develop close ties to a local family to arrange such a scheme. Thirdly, there were also material reasons that led me not to ask for such arrangements, including the small size and precariousness of community houses. It would not have been easy for a family to cater for a foreigner, no matter how flexible and adaptable the latter is ready to be. Finally, there was also the issue of my moving about quite a lot in both countries, between Soufriere and Castries in St. Lucia, and between cities and the Pantanal in Brazil. In the end, my living arrangements comprised basic hotels.
Appendix 8 – Notes on St. Lucia politics

The island is an independent parliamentary democratic Commonwealth Realm with Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state. She is represented by a Governor General who has mostly symbolic responsibilities. The Prime minister is the leader of the majority party of the parliament and has most of the actual power. The St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) won the first post-independence elections in July 1979, taking 12 of 17 seats in parliament. But St. Lucia was soon to be dominated by the United Workers’ Party (UWP) which governed the country from 1982 to 1997 with John Compton as premier, a man who had already run the country before independence for fifteen years. In 1996, Compton announced his resignation as prime minister in favour of his chosen successor Vaughan Lewis, former director-general of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The SLP also had a change of leadership with former CARICOM official Dr. Kenny Anthony succeeding businessman Julian Hunte. In elections held in May 1997, the SLP won all but one of the 17 seats in Parliament. It was re-elected in 2001, but in December 2006 the UWP, once again led by Sir John Compton, defeated the SLP. Compton died in September 2007 and was followed by Stephenson King as Prime minister.
Appendix 9 – Human threats to the Pantanal: a summary of concerns

Below we summarise some of the main concerns regarding the human impact on the Pantanal (Earthwatch 2004; Junk & de Cunha, 2005).

The Pantanal is a fragile ecosystem with already high natural-stress factors, such as pronounced floods and dry periods, low nutrient levels and fires. Anthropogenic threats are not only global, like climate change, but also local, since the region is being affected by economic growth inside its borders as well as by side effects from the larger catchment area surrounding the Pantanal, where intensive agriculture is practised.

Traditional actors in the region include cattle ranchers, agricultural employees, Indian communities and federal government agencies. Prior to the 1970s, these actors had a rather limited impact on the Pantanal as they did not have the capacity to cause massive environmental change, such as altering the flood cycle by building dams or affecting water quality via sediment build-up in rivers. However, as economic development proceeded, new stakeholders emerged along with industrialisation, from agriculture, modernised cattle ranching, the transport industry, hydroelectric energy production and mining. Human population increased markedly in the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, which share the Brazilian Pantanal. This was accompanied by a shift towards rapid urban growth in several centres, which affected the area through increased transportation needs and water pollution.

Urbanisation, however, is not the only threat affecting water quality and patterns in the Pantanal. The sources of most rivers that drain into the region are in the surrounding highlands. In these areas, the Brazilian government has been subsidising intensive agricultural operations since the 1970s, as it did throughout the country, including in Amazonia. In several regions around the Pantanal, large portions of the original Cerrado forests have been clear-cut and converted to industrial farming operations for soybean, sugar cane, wheat, corn and cotton cultivation. Millions of square kilometres of savannah have been turned into open fields. According to a 2006 report released by Conservation International (Barcellos Harris, 2006), grazing and agriculture, including the transformation of native pasture to farmland, has destroyed almost 45% of the original vegetation in the Paraguay River basin, which
contains the Pantanal. As of 2004, approximately 44% of the area’s original vegetation had been altered, with some districts losing more than 90% of their natural cover.

Consequently, many river and stream banks have been deforested, increasing downstream sedimentation. Because soils in much of the Cerrado region are relatively poor, and because of the need to sustain fertility and fight pests, there has been extensive use of fungicides, pesticides and fertilisers. Since water management practices are not very advanced, this has resulted in extensive agrochemical runoff and soil erosion, affecting Pantanal farmers. Local hydrological patterns have been profoundly changed, as witnessed for instance with the São Lourenço river. This has made navigation difficult, and has hindered fish migration as well as traditional cattle-raising. The worst case is the Rio Taquari basin, where large sections of the channel have degraded or shifted, inundating 11,000 km² of cattle ranges, and causing a sharp decline in fish stocks. The channel and habitat complexity is reduced dramatically, blocking migratory fish routes, altering flood plain/channel interactions, and causing loss of species.

Another issue is mining and mercury pollution. Since the 1980s, gold mining in the lowlands near the city of Pocone (see Map 5, Chapter 6) has been releasing mercury into the environment, but superficial gold deposits are now exhausted and mining activities have declined during recent years. Nevertheless, extractive operations still have the potential to significantly impact the Pantanal. Direct impacts from iron, manganese and diamond mining in the watershed include destruction of vegetation and habitat, soil erosion and river sedimentation, changes in river-bed topography and water pollution. Gold mining represents a significant environmental and human health risk in parts of the Pantanal. Large amounts of mercury are being used by miners in order to amalgamate gold particles contained in the mined soil and mud slurry. There are to date several documented cases of significantly elevated mercury levels in native fish and birds, particularly in the northern Pantanal.

Turning to electricity production and its ecological impacts, as of 2008 there were nine hydroelectric power plants with a total capacity of 323MW operating in the Pantanal catchment area. A large hydroelectric facility was recently constructed on the Manso River (220MW), a key tributary of the Cuiaba River, under an initiative by the Brazilian federal and state governments. Changes in hydrology caused by the
large Manso River reservoir (387 km²) have begun to affect flora, fauna and also fishers and cattle ranchers inside the Pantanal. In the future, the number of reservoirs may further increase by up to 20, with a total capacity of over 1,000MW. It is expected that the cumulative effect of these projected reservoirs will be to strongly modify the region's hydrological structure (Girard, 2002).

Regarding transportation infrastructure, several large projects were initiated to transport commodities more easily to large metropolitan areas and seaports. These included three waterway, or "hidrovia" projects: the Araguaia-Tocantins; the Paraguay-Paraná Hidrovia; and the Ferronorte railway. Economic pressure is being applied by agro-businesses and the mining industry outside the Pantanal to canalise the Paraguay River so that soybeans and minerals can be more cheaply transported to the Atlantic Ocean. The Paraguay-Paraná Hidrovia project, involving Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina, is of particular concern. Its goal is to straighten and dredge the upper Rio Paraguay to increase its capacity for barge traffic. It is argued by environmental groups that the project would permanently alter flow patterns in the region and drain an estimated 50% of the wetlands, causing a collapse of the most productive food networks in the Pantanal. The original project lost funding and was abandoned based on conclusions from an Environmental Impact Study and an effective public awareness program run by Coalizão Rios Vivos, WWF, Conservation International (CI) and other NGOs. Still, the hidrovia continues to be on the agenda and a series of separate, small-scale hidrovia projects are being initiated along the upper Rio Paraguay.
Appendix 10 – State-led participatory planning in the Pantanal: many reports but little action

As early as 1978, the government of Brazil together with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) conducted a three-year planning process titled “Plan for the Integrated Development of the Upper Paraguay River Basin” (EDIBAP). This exercise resulted in a series of economic development proposals for the Pantanal region, based on the principles of environmental conservation, ecological balance, and the rational use of land. The subsequent strategy recommended specific actions to address social problems and assess the impact of several proposed development projects on the water system of the Paraguay River Basin in Brazil. It included flood-control measures through the construction of reservoirs at several locations, which would also serve to improve river navigation without significantly changing water behaviour downstream. Many hopes were raised by this massive proposal, but little action followed.

In 1991, Brazil’s federal government launched a vast participatory undertaking leading to the creation of the Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan (PCBAP). Conducted by the government of Brazil and the World Bank, this plan relied on an environmental zoning approach to delineate general and site-specific guidelines for the conservation, rehabilitation and preservation of degraded lands. The PCBAP proposed the creation of a real-time flood-warning system designed to prevent negative impacts in urban and rural areas. Again, almost none of the recommendations were implemented.

In 1996, the Brazilian government requested technical and financial assistance from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in order to prepare an integrated management program for the entire basin based on the guidelines of the PCBAB. From 1994 to 2004, 44 studies and a variety of demonstration projects were carried out, resulting in a new Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of the Pantanal and the Upper Paraguay River Basin. More than 250 federal, state, and municipal organisations, NGOs, private companies, international institutions, and organisations from other countries were directly or indirectly involved in project activities, mainly through participation in a series of public events. The work thus entailed the involvement of over 4,500 participants. The main output of this work is a 300-page
report that will (it is hoped) serve the needs of government authorities, decision-makers and others with an interest in the sustainable development of the Pantanal.

Still, the consultation process did not end there. In 2007, the European Union financed a new massive participatory analysis of the Pantanal and its challenges, based on major scientific input and stakeholder consultations. Called the INREP (Institutions and Research for the Pantanal) the project led to several dozen public meetings, a range of new scientific studies and a series of reports meant to define a “research agenda to support policy institutions, legal frameworks and social action” in the Pantanal. The results of the project have been presented in Brazil, Paraguay and to the European Commission in Brussels, but the local people and organisations of the Pantanal have yet to see any results.

Interviews carried out in 2008 made it clear that these often-redundant consultative exercises, generally led by external (and often foreign) facilitators, are producing few results.
Appendix 11 – European presence in the Pantanal: a brief reminder

As Earthwatch (2004) recalls, drawing on Corrêa (1999), European explorers (Jesuit and Spanish priests) entered the Pantanal in the mid-1500s. The Portuguese, who were looking for slaves and precious metals, began exploring the region later, in the 1600s. Gold was discovered near Cuiabá in the north of the Pantanal in 1719, and a number of fort and cities, like Corumbá, Cáceres, Coimbra, Poconé, and Miranda, were founded towards the end of the 18th century. Subsequently, the decline of gold mining forced merchant families to seek land grants and to establish cattle ranches. Loyal to the Portuguese king, they were rewarded with political and economic favours but became victims of anti-Portuguese riots after Independence in 1822. Later, the Paraguay War caused disruption in the region, as Paraguayan and Brazilian troops requisitioned cattle and ranch properties, forcing the population to flee. After the war, the former settlers and their relatives returned to begin anew, rebuilding stocks by introducing new cattle, or rounding up remaining feral steers (Wilcox, 1992). Cattle-ranching was then stimulated by the export of dried meat, which declined after 1945 with refrigeration techniques. Since then, cattle ranchers have been subject to the ups and down of meat prices.
Appendix 12 – A programme for Pantanal: SODEPAN’s vision

Here are the main socio-economic objectives of the SODEPAN for the Pantanal region (SODEPAN, 2009):

**Access to credit.** Reduce red-tape and increase financial support for cattle producers through the FCO (*Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Centro-Oeste*), a public fund that is a key source of financing for fazendeiros.

**Animal health.** Improve animal-health support and protection for the producers. Reorganise the IAGRO (*Agência Estadual de Defesa Sanitária Animal e Vegetal*), the state agency in charge of animal health. Improve guarantees through mechanisms such as the FEFA (*Fundo Emergencial da Febre Aftosa*), an emergency fund to help producers cope with outbreaks of the foot and mouth disease.

**Energy.** Complete the “Light for All” programme in the Pantanal.

**Environment.** Revitalise the Taquari River by containing the sediments coming from the plateaus and creating dikes to stabilise the riverbed. Speeding up procedures for environmental licensing of farming activities. Define precise time periods for controlled fires.

**Research.** Stimulate applied research by institutions such as the EMBRAPA and universities.

**Social policies.** Ensure professionalised basic education within the Pantanal, by obtaining continuous public support for the “Pantaneira schools” in partnership with farmers (payment of professors, building and equipping new classrooms and lodging for pupils). Creation of state agricultural schools (*Escolas Rurais Estaduais*) in key locations within the Pantanal, so as to maximise attendance and offer education up to the level of agricultural technician. Recertification programmes for professional fishers, so they can become, for instance, tourist guides, artisans or environmental assistants.

**Transport and telecommunications.** Installation of telecommunication towers in key locations to ensure complete mobile phone coverage. Development or repair/recovery of various roads, bridges and river transport.

**Tourism.** Creation of an aerial bridge between Foz do Iguaçu and Bonito. Creation of a regional airline operating small aircraft (11-seat, single-engine airplanes) to carry tourists to all requested parts of the region. Creation of new direct bus lines between various points of interest. Paving of the 77km of road between the three tourist centers of Mato Grosso (Porã Tip, Pretty and Corumbá).
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