THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1821-34
Ph.D.

ALEXANDER BITIS
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2000
This dissertation consists of a study of the role of the Russian army in Russo-Turkish relations from the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence to the conclusion of the Mohammed Ali crisis. It focuses primarily on the activities of the Russian Second Army - a force quartered in the southern regions of the Russia and designated to conduct military operations against the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Under the leadership of General P. D. Kiselev, the General Staff of this army conducted a thorough research of previous Russo-Turkish wars (1711-1812) and integrated the lessons of these campaigns into a new strategic and tactical doctrine. Ultimately, this research was to result in the formulation of an innovative new Turkish war plan which proposed that the Russian army, for the first time in its history, cross the Balkan mountain range and march on Constantinople. These issues are examined in the context of the development of Russian military thought and from the wider perspective of their impact on Russia's foreign policy in the East. The dissertation then examines the conduct of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war (in both the Balkan and Caucasian theatres) with particular attention to the reasons behind the failure of the 1828 Balkan campaign and the Russian army's organisation and use of Balkan partisans 1828-29. Following the conclusion of the war in September 1829, peace negotiations are discussed with emphasis on the role military figures played in the negotiation of the Treaty of Adrianople. One of the key terms of the treaty was the Sultan's agreement to the prolonged Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities. This occupation (1829-34) is examined with reference to the important reforms introduced by Kiselev, which aimed at transforming the province into a Russian protectorate. Finally, the work outlines Russia's military preparations and planning during the Mohammed Ali crisis of 1832-33.

This dissertation is based on archival research conducted in the Russian State Military-History Archive (RGVIA) (Moscow), the Russian State History Archive (RGIA) (St Petersburg) and the Public Record Office (Kew, London).
## CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. page 5

A Note on Spellings, Dates and Terms .............................................................................. 6

List of Maps ......................................................................................................................... 7

List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 8

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 10

I THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND, 1801-1821 ............................................................ 22

II INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY AFTER 1815 ......................... 36
    The Politics of the Russian Army ................................................................................. 45

III THE SECOND ARMY AND THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821-22 ............................. 57
    The Origins of Ypsilantis' Revolt, 1820-21 ................................................................. 57
    The Tsarist Reaction, 1821-22 .................................................................................. 60
    The Second Army and the Study of the Greek Revolt .............................................. 67

IV THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SECOND ARMY AND THE ....................... 82
    DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT, 1815-34
        The Impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Russian Military Thought .................. 82
        Kiselev and the Development of the Empirical School ....................................... 87
        The Military Ideas of I. P. Liprandi ................................................................... 91

V WAR PLANNING AND DIPLOMACY, 1819-28 ......................................................... 111
    The Search for Strategy, 1819-28 ............................................................................. 111
    The Greek Question in the Period of Congress Diplomacy, 1822-25 ..................... 120
    The Accession of Nicholas I and the Drift to War, 1826-28 ................................... 124

VI THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1828-29 ................................................................. 151
    Preparations for War: The War Budget, Men and Supplies .................................... 151
    The Balkan Campaign of 1828 .............................................................................. 157
    The Caucasian Campaign of 1828 ....................................................................... 163
    Conclusions on the 1828 Campaign ................................................................... 167
    Political and Military Developments, October 1828 - April 1829 ....................... 169
    The Balkan Campaign of 1829 .......................................................................... 175
    Conclusions on the 1829 Campaign ................................................................... 178
    The Caucasian Campaign of 1829 ....................................................................... 179

VII THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND THE USE OF BALKAN .................... 198
    IRREGULARS
        The Campaign of 1828 ......................................................................................... 200
        Developments over the Winter of 1828-29 ....................................................... 203
        The Campaign of 1829 ..................................................................................... 208
        Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 211
VIII THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES............. 221
   The Execution of Revision of Adrianople........................................ 229

IX THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES: OCCUPATION AND ...................... 239
   REFORM, 1828-34
      Russia and the Principalities: Relations to 1828............................ 239
      The Second Army and the Principalities....................................... 242
      The Wartime Occupation of the Principalities.............................. 247
      Kiselev and the Reform of the Principalities.................................. 251
      Conclusions on Kiselev's Reforms.................................................. 264

X PRESERVING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1830-33................................. 279
   The Russian Response........................................................................ 281
   The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and its Consequences.......................... 286

   Conclusion........................................................................................... 294

   Bibliography......................................................................................... 298
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Janet Hartley and the following institutions: the British Academy, the British Library, the Public Record Office, the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the Library of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, the University of London Library, the Russian State Military-History Archive (Moscow), the Russian State History Archive (St Petersburg), the Russian State Library (Moscow) and the Russian National Library (St Petersburg).
A NOTE ON SPELLINGS, DATES AND TERMS

Russian proper nouns are transliterated according to the modified Library of Congress system, except for surnames of a non-Russian extraction, e.g. Diebitsch not Dibich.

The spelling of proper nouns connected with the Balkans presents more substantial difficulties. There is nation of Romania, Rumania and Roumania, the region of Dobruja, Dobrudja and Dobrutcha, the Danubian fortress of Widin, Widdin and Viddin and the Greek revolutionary leader Ipsilanti, Ypsilanti, Ipsilantis and Ypsilantis. It has been well stated that 'a completely standard and uniform system is an impossibility', B. Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878* (Cambridge, 1984), p. xi. This said, I have chosen to follow the spellings used in the standard work in English on nineteenth-century international relations and the Balkans, M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (London, 1966).

Proper nouns not found in this work are spelt according to their most common form.

Place names in the Russian Caucasus are transliterated from Russian; those in the Ottoman Caucasus are spelt according to Anderson.

Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘rouble’ denotes ‘paper’ roubles (assignatsia) not silver roubles. Where the type of rouble is not specified in the documents, this is taken as paper roubles.

As regards dates, the Julian calendar, then in use throughout the Russian Empire, is denoted by the suffix OS (Old Style). In the nineteenth century this calendar stood twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar of western Europe. Unless suffixed, statements such as ‘in March, Nicholas ordered...’, are used only where the month conforms to both old and new styles.

List of Terms Relating to the Ottoman Empire

Bey: Ottoman provincial ruler
Bulgaria: Black Sea coastal lands situated between the Danube and the Balkan mountain range.
Firman: Ottoman Proclamation
Grand Vizier: First Minister of the Ottoman Empire
Hatti-Sherif: Ottoman Proclamation
Lesser Wallachia: A region situated in the south-western corner of the Principality of Wallachia
Rumelia: Black Sea coastal lands situated between the Balkan mountain range and Constantinople
Pashalik/Pasha: A large territorial sub-division of the Ottoman Empire and its ruler
Reis-Effendi: Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire
Seraskier: Commander of Ottoman forces

The following terms are used interchangeably: ‘Ottoman Empire’, ‘Turkish Empire’, ‘the Porte’, ‘Turkey’.
LIST OF MAPS

A: The Russian Caucasus after 1812.............................................page 320
B: The Balkan Theatre...............................................................321
C: The Caucasian Theatre.......................................................322
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Journals and Documentary Collections

AJPH - Australian Journal of Politics and History
BFSP - British Foreign and State Papers
BI - Balkanske issledovania
BIS - Balkanskii istoricheskii sbornik
BS - Balkan Studies
BSE - Bol'shaia sovetskaiia entsiklopedia
CHJ - Cambridge Historical Journal
CSP - Canadian Slavonic Papers
DNR - Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia
EEQ - East European Quarterly
EHR - English Historical Review
JAMHF - Journal of American Military History Foundation
JCEA - Journal of Central European Affairs
JFOG - Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
JMH - Journal of Modern History
IB - Istorilicheskaia biblioteka
IHR - International History Review
ISSSR - Istoriia SSSR
IV - Istoriicheskii vestnik
IZ - Istoriicheskie zapiski
KA - Krasnyi arkhiv
KN - Krasnaia nov'
KS - Kavkazskii sbornik
MAS - Modern Asian Studies
MES - Middle Eastern Studies
NM - Novy mir
NNI - Novaia i noveishaia istoriia
OI - Otechestvennaia istoriia
OZ - Otechestvennye zapiski
RA - Russkii arkhiv
RDILC - Revue de droit international et de législation comparée
RESEE - Revue des études sud-est Européennes
RI - Russkii invalid
RR - Russian Review
RS - Russkaia starina
RV - Russkii vestnik
SAQ - South Atlantic Quarterly
SEER - Slavonic and East European Review
SIRIO - Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo obshchestva
SO - Syn otechestva
SovS - Soviet Studies
SS - Sovetskoe slavianovedenie
S - Slavianovedenie
SR - Slavic Review
SF - Südost Forschungen
TIGU - Trudy Irkutskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta
TOGU - Trudy Odesskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (seria istorii)
TSGPI - Trudy Sukhumskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo instituta
TTUI - Trudy Tadzhikskogo uchitel'skogo instituta
U - Ural
UZKGU - Uchennye zapiski Kishinevskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (seria istoricheskaia)
UZIGPI - Uchennye zapiski Jaroslavskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo instituta
UZIGPI - Uchennye zapiski Irkutskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo instituta
UZIS - Uchennye zapiski instituta slavianovedeniiia
UZMGU - Uchennye zapiski Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta
UZIFFRGU - Uchenye zapiski istorichesko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta Rostovskogo n/D gosudarstvennogo Universiteta
VE - Vestnik evropy
VI - Voprosy istorii
VNILZ - Voprosy nauki, iskusstva, literatury i zhizni
VPR - Vneshnaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka: Dokumenty rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del, ed. A. L. Narochnitskii et al. (Moscow, 1960-)
VS - Voennyi sbornik
VZ - Voennyi zhurnal
WP - World Politics
WS - War and Society

Archives

BL: The British Library
PRO: Public Record Office, Kew, London
RGIA: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State History Archive], St Petersburg
RGVIA: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Military History Archive], Moscow
RNB-OR: Rossiiiskaia natsional'naia biblioteka - otdel rukopisi [Russian National Library - Department of Manuscripts], St Petersburg

Russian Archive Classifications.

op. - opis'
sv. - sviazka
d. - delo
ch. - chast'
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this work is the examination of the role of the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish military and diplomatic struggle for territory and influence in the Balkans and the Caucasus. This struggle, known to history as the ‘Eastern Question’, had, by the first decades of the nineteenth century, become an established feature of European international relations. Its rise to prominence was caused by the two successful wars conducted by Catherine the Great against the Ottoman Empire (1768-74, 1787-92). These wars permanently altered the balance of power in the East - the Ottoman Empire was doomed to a stubborn, yet inexorable, decline whilst Russia was elevated to the rank of a first-class power.

This revolution was to have great implications for European diplomacy. Concerned with the growth of Russian power and the consequences of a collapse of the Sultan’s empire, the other European Powers became increasingly drawn into the affairs of the Levant. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the doctrine of the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had acquired almost universal acceptance in the Foreign Ministries of Britain and Austria. Though after 1815 Russia had adopted a more conservative policy in the East than in the past, the challenge from the Western powers for influence in this region was clear and thus the foundation was laid for the development of the ‘Eastern Question’ in its modern form.

It is true to say that, whereas in the eighteenth century the various eastern crises were caused from above, by the actions of the governments, in the nineteenth century, crises were caused from below - by the nationalist aspirations of the Balkan Christians and the ambitions of the provincial Muslim rulers of the Ottoman Empire. This is particularly true of the period in question (1821-1834), which was dominated by the Greek War of Independence (1821-29) and the First Mohammed Ali crisis (1832-33). These crises resulted in three noteworthy events in Russo-Turkish relations - the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1828-29) and the signature of the Russo-Turkish treaties of Adrianople (1829) and of Unkvar-Skelessi (1833). The net result of these events was the extension of Russian power in the East and the sharpening of Anglo-Russian rivalry.

Any examination of the role of the Russian army in these events must necessarily focus on the activities of the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps - the two units designated for military operations against the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and in the Caucasus respectively. This dissertation concentrates primarily on the former institution as its role is of greater interest and, indeed, importance. Prominence is given to the
development and execution of the Russian war plan of 1828, which proposed that the Second Army, for the first time in Russian military history, attempt a crossing of the Balkans and an assault on Constantinople (Chapters V-VII). The consequences that such a crossing held for Russian and British strategy in the East is discussed in chapter VIII. Significant space is also awarded to the military reforms conducted by the General Staff of the Second Army during the 1820s (Chapters II and IV). These reforms took two main directions. Firstly, the introduction of progressive measures designed to alleviate the excesses of the 'reactionary' military establishment that had developed in Russia during the first decades of the century. Secondly, to assign the Second Army's General Staff the responsibility of researching and gathering intelligence on the Ottoman Empire and its army. This new role was intended to increase the autonomy of the General Staff and allow it a monopoly on the formulation and execution of war plans against the Ottoman Empire.

Three chapters (I, III and IX) deal with the High Command and officer corps of the Second Army as socio-political organisations. They relate to their attitude to the Greek War of Independence and to the role of P. D. Kiselev (the Head of the General Staff of the Second Army) in the administration and reform of the Danubian Principalities (1828-34). The dissertation ends with a discussion of the army's role in the Mohammed Ali crisis of 1832-33 (Chapter X).

As many of the above issues are barely understandable without reference to the diplomatic context, it has been judged necessary to devote a fair degree of space to the international relations of this period. Certain sections on diplomacy have been expanded to include new documentary evidence that was discovered during the course of research.

The leading military personalities discussed in the work are General (later Field Marshal) I. I. Diebitsch, the Head of the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty; General P. D. Kiselev; Colonel I. P. Liprandi, the Second Army's expert on Ottoman affairs and General (later Field Marshal) I. F. Paskevich, the Commander of the Caucasus Corps.

Specific points of historiographical debate will be fully dealt with in the text. At this stage it is sufficient to outline the main trends in English and Russian historical writings.

**Historiographical Trends in English and in Russian**

(i) The Eastern Question in International Relations

The undoubted spur for the Tsarist academic study of the Eastern Question was the publication in 1871 of N. Ia. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa*. The work was motivated by
the growing public interest in the aims of Russian foreign policy and by a general unease at
the conservative approach taken by Russia towards Balkan affairs in recent times. Known
as the ‘catechism or codex of Slavophilism’(5) Danilevskii’s work argued that history
constituted a struggle between the Slavic/Orthodox and Germano-Romantic/Catholic
civilisations and castigated the Russian Government for failing to fulfill its historical
mission of liberating the Slavs from Ottoman and Austrian rule. Although cloaked in
abstraction, his underlying aim was political - to force the Russian Foreign Ministry to
pursue a more active policy in the Balkans.

Following Danilevskii’s publication there appeared a great number of works tracing
the evolution of Russia’s Eastern policy and the truth of the various legends that had
accrued around it, such as the doctrine of the Third Rome, Peter the Great’s Testament and
the ‘Greek Project’ of Catherine the Great.(6) Most agreed with Danilevskii’s thesis that
the idea of a Russian historical mission to liberate its co-religionists was not a contemporary
invention, but that it stood ‘on firm historical ground’ and could be traced back to the fall of
Constantinople. Moreover, this ‘historical mission’ occupied such an important position in
Russian national life that the ‘study of the Eastern Question is the study of the development
of Russian national self-consciousness’.(7) Whilst the majority of Tsarist writers followed
Danilevskii in stressing religious/cultural elements in Russia’s Eastern policy, some were
able to penetrate the mist of obscurantism and argue that Russo-Turkish relations were
traditionally governed by concrete strategic/economic issues such as the security of the
Russo-Tatar border and the development of Black Sea trade. V. A. Ulianitskii’s
*Dardanelli, Bosfor i chernoе more v XVIII veke* (Moscow, 1883) appears to be the first
Russian work to assume a wholly ‘materialist’ position on the subject. The most original
thesis, however, was that of E. Karnovich who invited the wrath of Russian literary opinion
by arguing that the idea of liberating the Ottoman Christians came from Catholic Europe
and was adopted by Peter the Great only as a means of integrating Russia into the European
family of nations.(8)

Whilst the idea of liberating the Balkan Christians was seen as ‘progressive’ in
Russian society, in Europe it was viewed as nothing other than a cover for Russian
expansionism. In part, this was the fault of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which since the
late 1820s had allowed Europe’s Russophobe publicists to gain the upper hand in the battle
for public opinion by failing to offer any official rebuttal of their extravagant claims.(9)
During the height of the Eastern crisis of 1875-78 a semi-official Russian response was
finally published by F. Martens, an academic attached to the Russian Foreign Ministry.(10)
In essence, Martens' aim was to give a general interpretive account of Russia’s Eastern policy that would placate both Slavophile and Russophobe opinion. His argument was as follows: first, Russian policy in the East represented her ‘rôle historique’ - the quest for ‘l'amélioration du sort des populations chrétiennes', for which Russia had ‘le droit moral et juridique’; second, Russia only ever declared war on the Porte ‘au nom des intérêts de l'humanité' and never possessed any ‘aspirations de conquête'; finally, Russia never followed a unilateral Eastern policy, but acted as ‘le représentant du concert européen’. By way of proof of Russia’s pacific policy, Martens revealed the existence and deliberations of Nicholas I’s Extraordinary Committee of 4 September 1829 OS. Convened at the end of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war when the Russian army was almost at the gates of Constantinople, the committee concluded that the benefits to Russia of the existence of the Ottoman Empire outweighed those of her destruction and that the preservation of her Eastern neighbour should be the aim of Russian policy.

It was against this theoretical background that Tsarist historiography researched and analysed the Eastern Crisis of 1821-33. To writers of a sceptical disposition, Russia’s initial hostility to the Greek revolt and subsequent conservative policy towards it was proof that her alleged historical mission in the East did not exist. It was argued that Russia’s decision to go war with the Porte in 1828 was based on a separate Russo-Turkish diplomatic dispute (the Porte’s infringement of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest) and had nothing to do with the support of the Greek cause. Other writers believed the war was in fact fought for the liberation of Russia’s co-religionists and blamed Russia’s passive Eastern policy on the influence of Metternich and the Holy Alliance. As for the 1829 decision to preserve the Ottoman Empire and then assist the Sultan against his rebellious vassal Mohammed Ali, this was roundly condemned both as a betrayal of the historical mission and as unworkable in practice.

Soviet historiography of the Eastern Question was characterised by the attempt to reconcile two objectives - first, to remain faithful to the views of Marx on Tsarist foreign policy; second, to serve the contemporary interests of the Soviet state. The initial Soviet interpretation of the Eastern Question was constructed by M. N. Pokrovskii. His aim was to lessen the hostility of the European powers towards the Bolshevik revolution by discrediting Tsarism through the exposition of its predatory and imperialistic foreign policy. Pokrovskii argued that Russian policy was fully imperialistic in the Marxist
sense - the Tsars conducted a ‘string of aggressive wars of conquest’ against the Ottoman Empire in order to dominate trade routes and markets. The idea of liberating co-religionists was simply a facade concealing these aims.(16) Pokrovskii’s views were firmly based on those of Marx. The latter had become interested in Tsarist foreign policy during the Crimean War and was immediately gripped by the anti-Russian hysteria that had descended upon Europe. He accused the Russian government of pursuing an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, the root of which was the quest to dominate the main trading route between Europe and Asia (Danube-Black Sea-Caucasus).(17)

Pokrovskii’s unrelenting opposition to all things Tsarist was a model for Soviet historiography until the Second World War during which there emerged a Stalinist rehabilitation of the Tsarist past.(18) This rehabilitation had many causes, but as far as the Eastern Question is concerned, it was undoubtedly prompted by the fact that after 1945 the Soviet Union was committed to an active and expansionist foreign policy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Soviet historians attempted to exploit the latent reservoir of respect for Russia that existed in the Balkan nations which were liberated from Ottoman rule by the Tsars during the nineteenth century. The new historiographical direction was first revealed during the Greek civil war (1946-49). O. V. Shparo published two articles which aimed at destroying the idea that Britain and George Canning were responsible for Greek independence and assigning instead this accomplishment to Russia.(19) More importantly still, Shparo inaugurated the era of the Soviet concept of the ‘objective progressive role’ of Tsarist policy. It was argued that despite its reactionary appearance, the latter ‘objectively’ facilitated the independence of Balkan nations. The enemy of progress was no longer Russia but Britain, who in supporting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire aimed at keeping the Balkan Christians under its despotic rule.(20) Thus, from 1950s onwards, a steady stream of Soviet works appeared devoted to the progressive role of Russia in liberating the Serbs, Rumanians, Greeks and Bulgarians from Ottoman rule.(21)

The historiography of the Eastern Question in English began life as an overtly political movement. Since the celebrated ‘Ochakov debate’ of 1791, the possible dangers of Russia’s expansion in the East had first begun to trouble British ruling circles.(22) Over the next thirty years or so, these fears gained further currency and, in the late 1820s, there appeared the so-called ‘Alarmist’ movement (as it was pejoratively known). It was led by various Russophile publicists whose aim was to expose Russia’s aggressive Eastern policy
and push the British Government onto an anti-Russian orientation. (23) Although many of
their arguments were based on conjecture, they gained added credence after the capture of
certain diplomatic documents from the Russian consulate in Poland during the Revolt of
1830-31. (24) The Russophobe’s main thesis - that Russia aimed to destroy the Ottoman
Empire (and turn Persia into a protectorate) in order to capture the Straits and open up an
invasion route to India dominated British perceptions of Russian foreign policy for many
years. (25) A more balanced interpretation of nineteenth-century Russian policy appeared in
the 1960s following the publication of M. S. Anderson’s Eastern Question and Grimsted’s
pioneering study based on the Russian archives. (26) Recent standard works on Russian
and international history have maintained this line. (27)

(ii) The Russian Army in the 1820s

Tsarist works on the Russian army in the latter years of Alexander I/first years of Nicholas I
essentially fall into two categories - campaign histories of the 1826-28 Russo-Persian war
and 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war (28) and biographies of leading military figures. (29)
Though much of this work was of high quality, important issues such as the administrative
structure of the military establishment, the army’s role in foreign policy and the
development of military thought were largely neglected. (30)

Soviet interest in Tsarist military history dates from the end of the Second World
War. The ideological framework for Soviet research was provided by L. G. Beskovnyi
and E. A. Prokof’ev, who in a string of works, attempted to demonstrate that there existed a
specifically Russian school of military art. This school was said to have been formed
during the reign of Peter the Great and successively developed by P. A. Rumiantsev, A. V.
Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov and the Decembrists. This ‘progressive’ Russian school was held
in opposition to the ‘reactionary’ military system of Europe under the ancien régime. (31)

The leading Soviet work on the Russian army during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s
is undoubtedly A. V. Fadeev’s Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX v. (Moscow,
1958). Its importance rests not on its ‘extensive research’, (32) (for it uses predominantly
the same archival sources as Tsarist works) but in that it gives a structured breakdown of
the various branches of the subject and imposes a strict Soviet interpretation on each. It is
no exaggeration to say that all subsequent Soviet works on this subject are footnotes to
Fadeev. The guiding theme of Fadeev’s work is the struggle between the ‘reactionary’,
Prussified Russian military establishment and the Decembrist officers of the Second Army
and Caucasus Corps, who are deemed the source of all progressive military, political and
social ideas in Russia as well as being proponents of ‘national’ military school. The struggle is bought out in all manner of issues, such as their respective attitudes towards the Greek War of Independence, the formulation of strategy and the debates over the conduct of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war. Subsequent Soviet works expanded on the less developed areas of Fadeev’s work. The 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war received fuller treatment in V. A. Liakhov, *Russkaia armiia i flot v voine s ottomanskoi Turcsei v 1828-1829 godakh* (Iaroslavl’, 1972), whilst Russia’s use of Balkan partisans has been studied by V. D. Konobeev and others. The possible links between the Decembrists and the Greek revolutionary movement *Hetairia* has received substantial treatment in works of G. L. Arsh and I. F. Iovva. The Russian army’s occupation of the Danubian Principalities is covered in V. Ia. Grosul, *Reform v dunaisikh kniazhestvakh i Rossiia (20-30-e gody XIX v.*)* (Moscow, 1966).

Works in English on the Russian army between the Congress of Vienna and the beginning of the Crimean War remain something of a rarity. There is, of course, J. S. Curtiss, *The Russian Army under Nicholas I* (Durham, N.C., 1965), though this work is essentially a compilation of printed Tsarist sources. Two important general surveys of the Russian army have been published, but both are clearly very broad in scope and devote little space to the period in question. This lack of interest is, in part, certainly due to the fact that, until recently, Russian archives were closed to foreign historians. Also important, however, is the general impression (which was reinforced by Curtiss) that the period holds little of interest and that Nicholas I simply left *in situ* the sterile military establishment that had developed during the latter years of Alexander I. This perception has recently undergone significant revision with the publication F. W. Kagan’s excellent monograph, *The Military Reforms of Nicholas I: The Origins of the Russian Army* (London, 1999). This work, which is based on extensive research in the Russian archives, reveals a great deal about Russia’s strategic perceptions in the early years of Nicholas’ reign and highlights the impact of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war on the decision to reform the military establishment. Kagan recasts Nicholas I as an important military reformer and makes the bold claim that, during his reign, Russia acquired a military system that was equal and perhaps even superior to the more famous Prussian/German military system that developed later in the century under H. Moltke.
A Note on Archive Sources

This dissertation is based primarily on the manuscript collections of the Russian State Military-History Archive (RGVIA). The main fond [collection] used is that of the Voeno-uchenyi arkhiv (VUA) [Military-scientific archive]. This collection comprises the former archive of the Tsarist General Staff and the orderly, thematic organisation of the material greatly facilitated its use. For our subject, Russian historians had access to the VUA from the 1870s and, in Soviet times, from Fadeev onwards. Some important VUA documents have been published in the nineteenth-century periodicals Russkaia starina, Russkii arkhiv etc., though a great deal of material has remained undiscovered. Other important collections consulted include those of the General Staff of the Second Army (fond 14057) and of the chancellery of the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army (fond 14058).

Research of a more secondary nature was conducted in the Russian State History Archive (RGIA). The most significant material was found in the private papers of I. P. Liprandi (fond 673). This collection holds Liprandi’s work on military theory and his ground-breaking study of the Ottoman army. The existence of these works has been known for many years and it is unclear why Soviet historians have made no more than a passing reference to them. One suspects ideological reasons, for in the 1830s and 40s Liprandi became one of Nicholas I’s most notorious police agents and it was perhaps considered prudent not to draw too much attention to his pioneering work.

Two important manuscript collections have been discovered in British archives. The Public Record Office collection FO 97/402-04 provides significant material on the Russian occupation and reform of the Danubian Principalities via the reports of E. L. Blutte, the British consul in Bucharest. The British Library contains the papers of Lord Heytesbury (British ambassador to Russia, 1828-32) (Add. MSS 41557-41558). Heytesbury accompanied the Russian army during the 1828 Turkish campaign and left an interesting record of his observations. His acute understanding of Russia’s Eastern policy rivaled that of any foreign diplomat.
(1) I. I. Diebitsch (1785-1831), a Silesian German, entered the Russian service during the reign of Paul I. In 1810 he joined the Quartermaster Staff of His Majesty’s Suite. Two years later he was made General-Quartermaster of General P. Kh. Wittgenstein’s First Corps and in 1813 became General-Quartermaster of the combined Russo-Prussian forces. In 1815, Diebitsch was made Head of the General Staff of the First Army. In 1823 he succeeded P. M. Volkonskii as Head of the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty, at the time the most important non-field position in the Russian army. In 1829 Diebitsch became Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army and led a successful campaign against the Ottoman Empire. He was subsequently promoted to Field Marshal and in 1830 he led the Russian campaign against the Polish Revolt but soon died after contracting cholera.

(2) P. D. Kiselev (1788-1872) was from an influential, if undistinguished, non-aristocratic Muscovite family. Due to his father's connections, in 1806 Kiselev entered the Chevalier-Guards, the most aristocratic and prestigious regiment in the Russian army. From 1807-12 Kiselev saw service in the Napoleonic campaigns. In 1814, he was appointed aide-de-camp to Alexander I and accompanied the Tsar to the Congress of Vienna. For the next four years Kiselev fulfilled a variety of tasks - inspecting the regiments of the Second Army, rooting out corruption in the military establishment and accompanying the Tsar on his journeys. By 1819 Kiselev had achieved the rank of General-Major and in February of that year was appointed as Head of the General Staff of the Second Army. After the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev was appointed President of the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia (the Danubian Principalities) and conducted a thorough reform of the province during the period of Russian occupation. In 1837 Kiselev entered the civilian service as Minister for State Properties. He held the post for twenty years and established himself as one of Russia’s most respected reformers.

(3) I. P. Liprandi (1790-1880) was one of Russia’s foremost experts on espionage techniques, secret societies and the Ottoman Empire. Little is known of his family’s background though it was certainly of foreign (probably Spanish or Italian) extraction. Liprandi fought in the campaigns of 1807-15 and from 1812 served in the Quartermaster Staff of His Majesty’s Suite. In 1813 he began service as an agent in the Russian military police and served in this capacity during the Russian occupation of France. On his return to Russia, Liprandi was attached to the General Staff of the Second Army. Here he began his research on the Ottoman Empire and led various intelligence-gathering missions to Moldavia. During the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, Liprandi established an intelligence network in the Balkans and in 1829 led a corps of partisans. In the 1830s, Liprandi spent much of his time in the Danubian Principalities and wrote up his research on the Ottoman Empire. In 1840 he joined the Ministry of the Interior and became a specialist on Russia’s religious dissenters [raskol’niki]. From the early 1850s onwards, Liprandi devoted himself to the publication of over fifty historical works on various themes.

(4) I. F. Paskevich (1782-1856) was the most decorated soldier of Nicholas I’s reign. He fought as a divisional commander in the 1806-12 Russo-Turkish war and the Napoleonic campaigns of 1812-14. From 1817 to 1822 he served as aide-de-camp to Grand Duke Michael. In 1822-25 Paskevich served as commander of the Guards’ infantry division, during which time he forged his friendship with Grand Duke Nicholas. On becoming Tsar, Nicholas I awarded his favourite the command of the First Infantry Corps and, in August 1826, sent Paskevich to take operational control of the Caucasus Corps in the war against Persia (1826-28). In the Caucasus, Paskevich famously clashed with General A. P. Ermolov and eventual succeeded him to the command of the Caucasus Corps. After leading the Corps to victory in the Persian and then the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war (for which he was promoted to Field Marshal), Paskevich set about preparing a plan to finally subdue the rebellious tribes of the Caucasus. Before the plan could be enacted, Paskevich was in 1831 despatched to Poland to quell the revolt. For his services, Paskevich was made Prince of
Warsaw and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. Many years later Paskevich led the Russian army in the Hungarian campaign of 1849 and the Crimean War (1853-56).


(6) The most important include, F. Uspenskii, Kak vosnik i razvivalsia na Russi vostochnyi vopros (St Petersburg, 1887); D. Bukharov, Rossiia i Turtsiia (St Petersburg, 1878); A. Pypin, 'Slangsianskii vopros po vzgliadam I. Aksakova', VE, 1886, No.8, pp. 769-780; L. Lebedev, 'V kakom smysle osvobozhdenie balkanskih slavian sostavliaet istoricheskuiu zadachu Rossii', Ib, 1878, No. 6, pp. 1-6; S. A. Zhigarev, Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose (St Petersburg, 1896), 2 vols; L. Dobrov, Iuzhnoe slavianstvo, Turtsiia i sopenrichestvo evropeiskikh pravitel'stv na balkanskom poluostrove (St Petersburg, 1879); P. Rovinskii, 'Rossiia i slaviane balkanskogo poluostrova', DNR, 1878, No.2, pp. 145-65; L. A. Kamarovskii, 'Vostochnyi vopros', VNILZ, 1896, No.12, pp. 3-12; S. M. Solov'ev, 'Vostochnyi vopros', in Sobranie sochinenii S. M. Solov'eva (St Petersburg, 1901), pp. 904-47; A. V. Nekliudov, Nachalo snoshenii Rossi i Turtsiei (Moscow, 1883).


(8) E. Karnovich, 'Ob uchastii Rossi i osvobozhdenii kristian ot turetskogo iga', OZ, CCXXXVI, 1878, No.1, pp. 121-57; No.2, pp. 361-418.

(9) In 1829, Professor Evers', the Rector of the University of Dorpat had in fact proposed the publication of Russian diplomatic documents under the title 'Manuel diplomatique Russe, ou recueil des traites de paix, d'amite, de commerce et autres, entre la Russie et les puissances exterieures, formant la base des relations politiques de l'Empire'. Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, agreed but opposed the idea of publishing any documents that had not already been published elsewhere, RNB-OR, fond 595, d.81, ff.18-18v, Lieven (no initial) to Nesselrode, 15 August 1829 OS; ff.19-19v, Nesselrode to Lieven, 13 September 1829 OS. The project was never completed. Russia's official publication of all her treaties with Turkey (and Persia) was not achieved until 1869 in Dogovory Rossii c vostokom (ed. T. Iuzefovich) (St Petersburg, 1869) and the systematic publication of her diplomatic correspondence began only in 1874 in F. Martens' series Sobranie Traktatov i Konventsii, zakluchenkykh Rossiieiu s inostrannymi derzhavami (Recueil de Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie) (St Petersburg, 1874-1909), 15 vols.

(10) 'Etude historique sur la politique Russe dans la question d'orient', RDILC, IX, 1877, pp. 49-77


(13) S. M. Solov'ev, Imperator Aleksandr I. Politika - diplomatia (St Petersburg, 1877; Moscow, 1995 Reprint), pp. 538-637; S. S. Tatishchev, Vneshnaia politika imperatora Nikolaiia I (St Petersburg, 1887), pp. 134-222; F. Martens, Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo tsivilizovannykh narodov (St Petersburg, 1882), I, p. 133.

(14) Zhigarev, Russkaia politika, I, pp. 356-57, 384; N. A. Popov, Rossiia i Serbia (St Petersburg, 1869), II, pp. 319-20.

(15) See his Vneshnaia politika (Moscow, 1918) and Diplomattia i voiny tsarskoi Rossi (Moscow, 1923).

(16) Vneshnaia politika, p. 156.


(18) On this subject, see A. G. Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1971); N. W. Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); S. H. Baron and N. W. Heer (eds), Windows on the Russian Past: Essays on Soviet

(19) ‘Vneshniaia politika Kannina i grecheskii vopros (1822-1827)’, VI, 1947, No.12, pp. 43-61; ‘Rol’ Rossii v bor’be Gretsii za nezavisimost’’, VI, 1949, No.8, pp. 52-73.

(20) Instructive in this sense is a comparison of the first and second editions of the entry on the Eastern Question [vostochnyi vopros] in the Bol’shia sovetskaia entsiklopediia. In the first edition, (which was written by Pokrovskii), the entry highlights the aggressive nature of Tsarist policy and, quoting Marx, argued that the Balkan Slavs had ‘more common interests with Western Europe than with Russia’, BSE, XIII, 1929, pp. 328-29. In the second edition, the entry emphasises the progressive role of Russia and criticizes ‘aggressive English capitalism’ which aimed at keeping the Slavs under Ottoman rule, BSE, IX, 1951, pp. 215-16. The Soviet claim that the idea of the ‘objective progressive role’ of Tsarist policy was held by Marx himself is highly questionable. If anything, it was Britain’s pro-Turkish policy that Marx considered to be ‘progressive’. As he put it, ‘[since 1789] there have been but two powers on the continent of Europe - Russia and absolutism, the Revolution and Democracy...let Russia get possession of Turkey and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause. The maintenance of Turkish independence...is a matter of the highest moment. In this instance, the interests of revolutionary Democracy and of England go hand in hand’, Marx, The Eastern Question, pp. 18-19.

(21) Some of the more noteworthy are I. S. Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros (Moscow, 1972); N. S. Kiniapina, Vneshniaia politika Rossii vioroi poloviny XIX veka (Moscow, 1974); V. Ia. Grosul, Reformy v dunaisskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossii (20-30 gody XIX veka) (Moscow, 1966); V. N. Vinogradov, Rossiia i obedinienie Rumynskikh kniazhestv (Moscow, 1961); E. B. Chertan, Rossiia i bor’ba Rumynii za nezavisimost’ 1859-1875 (Moscow, 1966); O. V. Shparo, Osvobozhdenie Gretsii i Rossiia (1821-1829) (Moscow, 1965); Mezhdunarodnye otnoseniia na Balkanakh (ed. V. N. Vinogradov) (Moscow, 1983); For a full list of Soviet works on the Balkans see V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Sovetskaia poslevoennaia istoriografiia (Moscow, 1990).

(22) Concerned by Russia’s successes in the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-92 and especially by her capture of the Black Sea coastal fortress of Ochakov in 1788, the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, attempted (unsuccessfully) in 1791 to secure Parliament’s consent to the augmentation of the British fleet for possible action against Russia, M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London, 1966; 1991 Reprint), pp. 17-21.

(23) The ‘movement’ was active throughout the nineteenth century, see G. de Lacy Evan On the Designs of Russia (London, 1828); G. de Lacy Evans, On the Practicability of an Invasion of India (London, 1829); Anon., Remarks on the Conduct and Probable Designs of Russia (London, 1832); J. MacNeill Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East (London, 1836); D. Urquhart, The Mystery of the Danube, showing how through Secret Diplomacy that River has been Closed, Exports from Turkey Arrested and the Opening of the Isthmus of the Suez Prevented (London, 1851); H. Rawlinson England and Russia in the East (London, 1875), G. Curzon Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question (London 1889).

(24) They were published in D. Urquhart’s Portfolio, or a Collection of State Papers (London, 1836-37), 6 vols.

(25) E.g., J. A. R. Mariott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford, 1917); C. W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 1821-


(28) Of the many campaign histories written, the best are N. Epanchin, *Ocherk pokoda 1829 g. v Evropeiskoi Turtsii* (St Petersburg, 1905-06), 3 vols and V. A. Potto, *Kavkazskaia voina v otdel'nykh ocherkakh, episodakh, legendakh i biografiiakh* (Tblisi, 1886), III.


(30) One should mention, however, the works of N. P. Glinoetskii, *Russkii general'nyi shtab v tsarstvovanii imperator Aleksandra I* (St Petersburg, 1874); *Istoricheskiy ocherk Nikolaevskoi akademii General'nogo shtaba* (St Petersburg, 1882); *Istoriia russkago general'nogo shtaba* (St Petersburg, 1883-94), 2 vols. The two main Tsarist works charting the general development of Russian military thought are disappointing for the period in question, A. N. Petrov, A. N., *Vliianie turetskifch voin s poloviny proshlego stoletiia na razvitie russkogo voennogo iskusstva* (St Petersburg, 1893-94), 2 vols; G. A. Leer, *Obzor voin Rossii ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei* (St Petersburg, 1885-96), 4 vols.


(33) See Chapter VII.

(34) See Chapter III.


I. THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND, 1801-21

Russia entered the nineteenth century with three more or less distinct approaches to the Eastern Question. (1) The first was of ancient lineage - to expand territorially to the south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. This process could involve unilateral annexations or a partition of the Sultan's dominions in concert with other the other European Powers. This policy, followed with much success by Catherine the Great, had been advocated most recently by Paul I's foreign policy adviser F. V. Rostopchin in 1799, who, in this instance, favoured partition in alliance with France. (2) The second, also of long heritage, consisted of an attempt to gain influence over the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire through the patronage of its Christian population. Russia's self-proclaimed role as patron of Orthodox Europe first met with success in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (3) and reached its apogee a few years later in Catherine's 'Greek Project', which envisaged the final liberation of the Ottoman Christians through the resurrection of an independent Christian or neo-Byzantium Empire. (4) The emergence of the national principle during the French Revolutionary Wars greatly affected this idea and, after 1815, proposals for a unitary or confederate multi-national Balkan state competed with those favouring the creation of independent nation states. Such ideas centred after 1816 around J. Capodistrias who, in that year, became joint Foreign Minister with K. R. Nesselrode. (5) During the course of the nineteenth century these ideas were favoured by the Slavophiles, the Pan Slavicists and generally by all who believed it was Russia's 'historical mission' to liberate its co-religionists.

In opposition to all these approaches to the Eastern Question was the novel proposal by V. P. Kochubei (Russian ambassador to the Porte 1792-98; Interior Minister, 1802-12, 1819-25) in 1802 of the so-called 'weak neighbour' policy. He argued that Russia should formally renounce her previous expansionist designs on Turkey since:

Russia in its present expanse is no longer in need of enlargement, there is no neighbour more obedient than the Turk, and the preservation of this natural enemy of ours should really be in the future the root of our policy. (6)

This idea was supported by others, such as A. R. Vorontsov (Foreign Minister, 1802-05), who considered that even the creation of a 'Greek Empire' in the Balkans would be less advantageous to Russia that the continued existence of the decaying Ottoman Empire. (7)

Ostensibly, the 'weak neighbour' policy was moderate and defensive, especially in the hands of a cautious Foreign Minister. However, the aim of preserving the Ottoman
Empire in a perpetually-weakened state served also as a means of asserting Russian
dominance at Constantinople. Russia would not destroy her neighbour, but in return, the
latter was to do the Tsar's bidding. The two Powers could be friends, even allies, but never
equals. One was to be the protector, the other - the protected. The logical conclusion of
this relationship was that the Ottoman Empire should one day become a Russian
protectorate.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Russia's eastern policy during the first decade or so of Alexander's rule (1801-
1812), was governed mostly by force of circumstance. Devoid of any firm guiding
principle, it contained elements of all the above ideas and was inconsistent in the
extreme.(8) Under the influence of Kochubei, the Tsar's first action was to halt his father's
proposed alliance with France for the partition of the Turkish Empire and defensive treaties
were signed with Britain and Turkey in 1805. Alexander's attempt to reactivate his father's
alliance with the Sultan was, however, doomed to failure. Napoleon's victories at Ulm and
Austerlitz impressed the Turks who subsequently refused to ratify the Russian alliance and
sided with Napoleon instead. Faced with the Sultan's progressive infringement of Russo-
Turkish treaties, Russia was compelled to declare war on its intended ally Turkey in 1806.
In this instance, as Solov'ev argued, the 'weak neighbour' policy failed. The relatively
weak Ottoman Empire had proved just, if not more, likely to fall under the influence of a
rival power, in this case France.(9)

Once at war, Alexander fell under the influence of pro-expansionist foreign policy
advisers such as N. P. Rumiantsev. The Tsar reverted to the grandiose annexationist aims
of Catherine, most conspicuously in the Tilsit agreement of 1807 which raised the
possibility of a partition of the Ottoman Empire with Napoleon. Agreement over the details
of this partition, however, proved more difficult, with Napoleon's intention to give Austria a
share of the spoils and his outright refusal to give Russia Constantinople and the Straits
proving the insurmountable barrier. From this time onwards, Russia understood that a
dismemberment of the Sultan's possessions between the Great Powers would give its rivals
at least as much benefit as herself, whilst the ultimate prize of the Straits would elude her
unless she was willing to fight a general European war. The need, after 1815, to avoid
another costly conflict sealed the demise of the partition policy. During the Eastern Crisis
of the 1820s it was seriously advocated by no one.(10)

The net result of the vacillations of Alexander's early reign and the 1806-12 Russo-
Turkish war was the compromise 1812 Treaty of Bucharest.(11) Though hurriedly
negotiated to free Russian troops for the impending attack of Napoleon, this treaty served as a signpost for the long-term governance of Russo-Turkish relations. In Europe, Russia limited herself to the annexation of Bessarabia (article IV) - her final major encroachment into the Sultan’s European Empire. By contrast, in the Caucasus, Russia made plain her desire for further expansion and by article VI secured important territories. As regards the fate of the Ottoman Christians, Russia continued her quest for an enshrinement in law of the power to act as their defender. By article V, Russia consolidated her influence in the Principalities and for the first time secured rights regarding Serbia, which, since 1804 had been waging its war of independence. Russia had supported the Serbian struggle and by article VIII of Bucharest she secured for Serbia the rights of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire - a precedent for Russia’s eventual policy towards the Greek Revolution.

When we add to these precedents Russian undertakings at Vienna - to support the continuation of Congress diplomacy and maintain the Balance of Power as established by the 1815 territorial settlement - together with Alexander’s quest to uphold the principle of legitimism (as expressed in his idea of the Holy Alliance), the main tenants of Russia’s post-1815 Eastern policy may be established: firstly, schemes of partition and large annexations were to be abandoned. Russia would demand no more territory in Europe, but in the right circumstance could consider the annexation of small though strategically significant ports and provinces in the Caucasus. Secondly, Russia would maintain and extend her influence over the Porte by means of her military and diplomatic power and in her capacity as the self-styled protector of the Ottoman Christians. Thirdly, the Tsar would, however, respect the Sultan as a fellow monarch and not question his ultimate suzerainty over his subject peoples. The political and religious rights already conferred on the Ottoman Christians were to be observed but, in line with Russia’s commitment to Holy Alliance principles, new Balkan revolutionary movements were not to be supported. Fourthly, although Alexander refused the Ottoman Empire’s inclusion in the Vienna system - mainly as a result of the Caucasian border dispute after 1812, Russia nevertheless from 1815 onwards de facto accepted both that the Porte’s western dominions were part of the European Balance of Power and that crises of sufficient magnitude (such as the Greek Revolution) concerned all the Great Powers and could properly be regarded as Congress issues. Finally, as regards the Straits of Constantinople, Russia accepted that their annexation was impossible without a major European war. The next best solution was for Russia to control the Straits by a unilateral agreement with the Porte. If the latter could be persuaded to allow Russian warships to pass the Straits whilst blocking those of other Powers (as had temporarily been secured in the Russo-Turkish treaties of 1799 and 1805)
then Russia would gain a great strategic advantage over her rivals. Unfortunately, such an agreement would inevitably create an irreconcilable rift with Britain. The most realistic solution therefore was for a common agreement by which the warships of all Powers were to be barred from passing the Straits. Such a solution was, in fact, most advantageous to Russia as it protected her exposed southern coastline from the superior navies of Britain and France. Though *de jure* no such collective agreement existed until 1841, Britain had *de facto* succeeded in imposing one on Europe by her 1809 treaty with the Porte. By article XI, the Sultan gave his formal recognition to the ‘ancient regulation’ of the Porte, which stated that whilst she was at peace, the Straits were to be closed to the warships of all foreign powers. Russia understood the benefits of the treaty and after 1815 aimed at the preservation of the 1809 regime.

This, in short, after the trials of 1801-12, became the official policy of Alexander and the Russian Foreign Ministry. In essence, it amounted to the formal adoption of Kochubei’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy. Although, as noted, this policy could contain aggressive implications, in the hands of Nesselrode it remained a largely passive instrument. More than anything, Nesselrode desired the preservation of the unity of European alliance forged during the Napoleonic Wars. His system was founded on the preservation of peace, monarchical rule, the Congress System and the territorial *status quo* established in 1815. To this end, he was happy to forego a forward policy against the Porte and adopted a conciliatory attitude towards her in negotiations. Thus, not without reason, Nesselrode has been named the ‘Spokesman for the Status Quo’.

At home, both in the Russian army and the Foreign Ministry, there was strong opposition to the ‘weak neighbour’ policy. Certain individuals followed the lead of Capodistrias, who opposed it outright and favoured instead ‘expansionist policies in the Balkans’. Others, like Generals A. P. Ermolov (the Commander of the Caucasus Corps 1816-27) and P. D. Kiselev ostensibly believed in the policy, but wished for its more forceful application and a further weakening of the Ottoman Empire. This domestic opposition to Russia’s new policy was brought to the fore by two problems. One was concrete and essentially solvable, the other was entirely unexpected and threatened almost immediately to develop into an international crisis.

The first issue related to a Russo-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the new Caucasian border as fixed by article VI of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest. The
circumstances behind the dispute were that, in early 1812, the Russian forces, though largely unsuccessful in their operations in the Balkans, were in possession of large tracts of territory in the Caucasus. The Russian commander, M. I. Kutuzov, was, however, hard pressed to sign a treaty in order to despatch his forces back to Russia, where they were to fend off Napoleon’s impending attack. Not wishing to return Russia’s hard-earned gains, he countered the Porte’s demand for the status quo ante bellum by phrasing article VI of the treaty thus: that the Russo-Turkish frontier would be ‘restored exactly to that as it was before the war and therefore Russia returns to the Porte...fortresses and castles laying inside this [Russian] border and conquered by His Imperial Majesty’s arms’ [italics added]. Kutuzov interpreted the highlighted phrase as meaning that Russia’s undertaking to return the said points ‘did not at all apply to those possessions and regions which before and during our last war with the Porte voluntarily joined [prisoedinilis] the Russian Empire’. Russia thus declared herself justified in retaining the provinces of Imeretia, Mingrelia, Guria, Abkhazia and the ports Sukhum-Kale, Anakliia and Redut-Kale (Kemkhal) but returning to the Porte Poti, Anapa and Akhalkalakli (see map A).

The Porte naturally disputed this interpretation and so, in 1816, Nesselrode despatched G. A. Stroganov to Constantinople to seek a solution. The Turks were insistent that Russia return the above-mentioned ports, especially Sukhum-Kale. Though Nesselrode believed that the letter of the treaty was on Russia’s side, for the prospect of improving relations with the Porte, he gave Stroganov instructions in 1816 and again in 1820 to return these ports to the Porte with certain preconditions.

This decision was destined to place Nesselrode in conflict with Ermolov. The former was generally keen to find compromise with the Porte where possible, whilst Ermolov adopted a hardline position that reflected the strong anti-Ottoman bias of the Caucasus Corps. During the 1806-12 war, Ermolov’s predecessor General A. P. Tormasov had demanded sweeping territorial annexations and with Russia’s eventual gains falling far short of this, Ermolov was not prepared to yield an inch. In 1818, he outlined his position thus: the possession of Abkhazia had, as yet, brought Russia no benefit whatsoever. Its largely Muslim population was hostile to its weak Christian leader, Georgii Shervashidze, was pro-Turk and undertook no form of economic activity other than trading in slaves. The province itself was very difficult to protect - the only permanent garrison being that of five hundred men stationed in Sukhum-Kale, which could not withstand a Turkish attack. Without Sukhum-Kale the rest of the region could not be defended. Defences could be improved by the building of a fortress at Gagry and occupying the
coastline (which would cut off Abkhazia’s communications with Ottoman-held Anapa and the Circassians) however, this would cost 15,000 silver roubles - a sum that could be recovered only after a long period and based on the assumption that Abkhazia could provide Russia with timber. (27)

Despite all these problems, Abkhazia was, however, not to be returned to the Sultan for three main reasons. The first, that Russian presence was needed to stop the slave trade, was possibly an argument intended to appeal to the Tsar’s conscience, though the fact that slaves were taken from amongst Mingrelian and Imertian Christians did genuinely concern Ermolov. The second was that the Porte supported Georgii’s brother, the Muslim Gassan-Bey, as heir to the throne. The accession of the latter - a man of a ‘savage character’ would mean that ‘the spread of the Christian religion, which is so needed for the softening of the beast-like peoples will completely cease’, and the resulting terror unleashed on Christian converts would damage Russia’s image as defender of the faith. (28) Ermolov seems to have genuinely believed in the civilising power of Christianity and Russia’s responsibility as an Orthodox state and would often return to the subject. His third and most important point was that Russian rule was to a large extent based on prestige and the image of power. Sympathy for the Sultan was still very strong in the Muslim regions of the Caucasus and any sign of weakness or compromise had adverse effects on these peoples. Giving up all or any part of Abkhazia would ‘instil in them distrust of our promises’ (29) and would allow Turk agents to stir up revolts in surrounding provinces. (30) He warned Nesselrode that should it be decided to give up the province, its execution would have to be entrusted to someone else as ‘I would lose much in the general opinion’. (31) Whether this can be counted as a threat of resignation is unclear but of his antipathy to Nesselrode’s system there can be no doubt. He wrote to his close friend A. A. Zakrevskii, ‘I am grateful for Count Nesselrode, he is a most noble man, it grieves me that I must take the offensive against him’. (32)

Nesselrode was, however, determined to reach a negotiated settlement with the Porte. Stroganov’s negotiations thus continued but were to drag on unsuccessfully for some years until finally they were broken off, in unexpected fashion, with the outbreak of Alexander Ypsilantis’ uprising in the Danubian Principalities in the Spring of 1821. The Greek revolt will be dealt with fully later in the text but we may make certain preliminary observations. The Tsar first heard of the revolt during the Congress of Laibach and his first instinct was to castigate Ypsilantis as a revolutionary and support the Sultan’s attempts to quell the revolt. Although the subsequent Turkish reprisals were noted for their outrages
(forcing Stroganov to quit Constantinople in mid-1821), Russian policy remained conservative and unilateral action in favour of the Greeks was forgone. Instead, Russia sought a Congress solution to the crisis in the hope of averting a Russo-Turkish war and the alienation of the other European Powers, especially Austria and Britain, who were most suspicious of Russia's intentions in the Balkans. (33)

Opposition to this cautious policy was strong within the Russian diplomatic corps. It centred around Capodistrias. Greek by birth and in the Russian service since 1809, Capodistrias had always favoured a forceful Russian policy in the Balkans. He had welcomed the Russian protectorate over his homeland Corfu and the other Ionian islands from 1800 to 1807 but was disheartened by what he saw as Russia's retreat from the Balkan peninsula following the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest (which he opposed as being too lenient) and the decision, in 1815, to hand over the Ionian islands to Britain. When the Greek revolution erupted Capodistrias called for it to be supported by Russian military intervention. As a believer in constitutions and the right of national self-determination, Capodistrias had no ideologically objection to the support of the Greek rebels. Indeed, he openly opposed the Holy Alliance principle of legitimism as damaging to Russian interests. After a successful war with the Turks, Russia was to create a Greek state (possibly independent, possibly autonomous, but either way pro-Russian) and annex the Principalities. (34) When war did finally come in 1828 Capodistrias increased his demands, calling for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the creation of a pro-Russian Balkan confederation. (35) Capodistrias' views found strong support amongst other diplomats such as G. A. Stroganov, (36) A. S. Sturdza, Pozzo di Borgo (37) and F. P. Fonton. (38)

The 'opposition party' within the Russian Foreign Ministry was supported by important elements within the army. Here, military intervention was supported out of philhellenic and religious sentiment and, by the Caucasus Corps and Second Army in particular, by the prospect of victory over Russia's traditional foe and the erasing of the memory of the largely unsuccessful 1806-12 war.

When news of the revolt first arrived, P. D. Kiselev, the Head of the General Staff of the Second Army, exclaimed:

In what times do we live in, my dear Zakrevskii? What wonders are being worked and are still to be worked. Ypsilantis, in crossing the frontier, has already given his name to posterity. The Greeks, reading his proclamations, will cry and flock under his banner in jubilation. God help them in their holy deed; to this I would like to add Russia. (39)
Like Capodistrias, Kiselev believed that the principle of legitimism was not applicable to the Ottoman Empire and that the opposition of the European powers should not be allowed to prevent Russian intervention:

One must live here [in Bessarabia] to know in what degradation the subjects of the Turkish government find themselves and of how the so-called rebellion of the Greeks is lawful. We judge as private individuals; the politics of the [European] states judges differently...nevertheless the fate of our coreligionists is worthy of sympathy and, as a man, I sympathise sincerely.(40)

In the following months, Kiselev was to become increasingly disturbed by Russia’s policy of non-intervention:

It appears that, without bayonets, we cannot get by. The Turks take the leniency of the [Russian] government as a sign of the weakening of our nation’s resources...With barbarians, fear alone has power; magnanimity is barely known to them.(41)

Kiselev favoured occupying the Principalities and arming the Serbs, but knew this was opposed by those of a more cautious disposition in St Petersburg. He cast the blame for Russia’s passivity primarily on the pervasive influence of Nesselrode and was irritated by the fact that the Second Army was receiving its instructions regarding the manning of the Russo-Turkish frontier from the Foreign Minister personally and not the relevant military authorities.(42)

Kiselev’s views were echoed by the High Command of the Second Army(43) and Ermolov who wrote that he would ‘grieve together with you [Kiselev] if the Greeks’ flame is extinguished by their own blood’.(44) Ermolov considered war both desirable and inevitable.(45) When, a year later, war had still not come, he wrote:

I am tormented by the lot of the Greeks and it will be bitter if the savage actions of the Turks are not restrained. They [the Turks] will become used to the liberty of disrespecting our demands. I am no great diplomat, but it seems to me that if last year Sabaneev’s corps had headed for the Danube, Moldavia and Wallachia would not have been ravaged.(46)

All hope of a Russian declaration of war subsided for the foreseeable future in 1822 with the Tsar’s decision to convene a Congress over Greece. Ermolov had little faith in such a mechanism as ‘it could well happen that...the [Greek] people will not consider themselves obliged to execute the will of the Congress’.(47) Moreover, he considered the whole idea of a concert approach a British ploy designed to restore Russia’s diplomatic relations with the Porte (which had been broken off in July 1821).(48) Once ensnared in a Congress and negotiations at Constantinople, endless discussions would commit Russia to inactivity,
allow the Turks time to crush the revolt and thus destroy Russian prestige in the Balkans, so leaving ‘the Greeks, who are devoted to us, justly incensed with us’.(49)

Ermolov’s fears proved to be essentially correct, though the truth of this was not to be acknowledged by the Tsar and Nesselrode for many years. Political concerns - primarily the fear of the European Powers’ potentially hostile reaction to a Russian forward policy - had frustrated the aims of the army in 1821. This was a precedent destined to characterise much of Russian policy during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s.


(3) Printed in CTS, XLV, 1969, pp. 349-401. For an account of its negotiation, see E. I. Druzhinina, Kutchuk-Kainardzhiskii mir 1774 goda (Moscow, 1955). The treaty obliged the Porte to allow the freedom of religion and construction of Christian churches in its lands. Russia was awarded the right to defend the privileges and domestic autonomy of the Danubian Principalities, Georgia and Mingrelia as well as a (most controversial) general right (art. VII, XIV) to act as the protector of all the Ottoman Christians, see R. H. Davison, ‘“Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility”; the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji Reconsidered’, SR, XXXV, 1976, pp. 463-83. By the subsequent Russo-Turkish 1792 Treaty of Jassy and various Russian-inspired firmans and Hatti-Sherifs, Russia greatly extended her rights of interference in the Danubian Principalities, see G. S. Grosul, Dunaiskie kniazhestva v politike Rossii, 1772-1806 (Kishinev, 1965).


(5) Capodistrias’ own views of the future political structure of the Balkans remained traditional. Anticipating the commencement of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, he proposed in March 1828 the creation of a federation of five kingdoms to be called ‘Dacia’ (comprising Moldavia and Wallachia), ‘Serbia’ (Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia), ‘Greece’, ‘Macedonia’ (with Phrakia), ‘Epir’ (with Albania), Dostian, Rossiia, p. 297. It will be noted that only two Kingdoms - ‘Greece’ and ‘Dacia’ were based on the national principle. The republican principle was eschewed altogether.

(6) Quoted in Solov’ev, ‘Vostochnyi vopros’, p. 130. Kochubei’s idea of benevolent relations with the Porte had been prefigured some years earlier in Paul I’s 1799 Russo-Turkish treaty. This bound the two Powers in alliance and, for the duration of the war against France, allowed Russian war ships to pass the Straits. The treaty was more than an ad hoc response to French aggression. Paul had for many years opposed war against Turkey (R. E. Jones, ‘Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth Century Russia’, JFGO, XXXII, 1984, pp. 43-44) and in 1798 declared that he hoped to make an alliance with the Porte ‘one of the basic principles of my political system’, V. A. Ulianitskii, ‘Turtsiia, Rossiia i Evropa s tochki zreniia mezhdunarodnogo prava’, RV, 1877, p. 563. For various reasons Paul was forced to retract this idea and towards the end of his life he sought alliance with France and a partition of the Ottoman Empire, Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 28-33.


(8) See Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 31-50; Dostian, Rossiia, pp. 42-79; V. J. Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1951); F. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806-07 (New York, 1931); A. M. Stanislavskaya, Russko-Angliiskie otosheniiia i problemy sredizemnomor’ia (1798-1807 gg.) (Moscow,
1962); Solov’ev, *Aleksandr I*, pp. 3-294; A. Vandal’, *Napoleon i Aleksandr* (St Petersburg, 1910).

(9) ‘Vostochnyi vopros’, p. 130. Solov’ev, like the majority of Tsarist historians, e.g. V. A. Ulianitskii, ‘Turtsiia, Rossiia i Evropa’, p. 564, was *a priori* opposed to the ‘weak neighbour’ policy, believing it damaging to Russia’s true interests. Soviet writers were also hostile to the policy, arguing that it allowed the Ottoman Empire to fall under the influence of Russia’s main rivals, Britain and France, Fadeev, *Krisis*, pp. 365-66.

(10) Possibly the only exception was Diebitsch, the Head of the General Staff of H.I.M, who drew up the following proposal sometime in 1827: ‘Russia - Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, Rumelia; Austria - Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, and [illegible]; Prussia - Austrian Silesia and [illegible]; France - Cyprus; England - Morea, Crete and [illegible]’. Another variation offered was, ‘Russia - Wallachia, Moldavia; Austria - Bosnia and [illegible]; Prussia - Austrian Silesia; France - Cyprus; England - Crete; with the following regions to be ‘under the patronage’ of ‘Austria - Serbia, Albania; France - Morea and [Greek] islands; Russia - Bulgaria and Rumelia.’ RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18228, f.1. It is unclear how committed Diebitsch was to such a partition. When entrusted with the negotiations at Adrianople in 1829 he advocated instead the creation of independent Balkan states under a general European guarantee, see below, p. 221.

(11) Printed in *CTS*, LXII, 1969, pp. 25-32. The most complete account of the 1806-12 war is A. N. Petrov, *Voyna Rossii s Turtsiei, 1806-12* (St Petersburg, 1887), 3 vols. For a brief summary, see Beskrovnyi, *Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo*, pp. 54-78.


(13) Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 47-48; Dostian, *Rossiia*, pp. 126-64; B. Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 16-17. Sober-minded Russian generals accepted the new turn in foreign policy, believing that the grand annexationist schemes of Catherine could no longer be entertained without the almost certain probability of a general European war. General P. A. Zubov, for instance, in his ‘Memoire concernant l’expulsion des turcs de l’Europe et le rétablissement de la grèce’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.729, ff.1-35v, September 1813, concluded that ‘les puissances chrétiennes catholiques ou non conformity sans exception dans toute le plénitude de leur force, [illegible] dirigées par une politique opposée à tout ce qui pouvoit augmenter la prépondérance de la Russie, soit par l’agrandissement de sa territoire [at the expense of Turkey], soit par le rétablissement de l’Empire grec orthodoxe nécessairement attache à la cause de la Russie’.


(15) In reality, this ‘ancient regulation’ had never existed; hitherto, the Sultan allowed warships to pass, as and when, it pleased him. By article XI, Britain imposed limits on the Porte’s sovereignty over the Straits and declared that the ancient rule was to be ‘observed by every Power in time of peace’, J. W. Headlam Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, (London, 1933), pp. 224-25.

(16) *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, pp. 400-01, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 16 November 1829 OS.


(18) *ibid*., p. 264.

(19) M. Pogodin, *A. P. Ermolov. Materialy dlia ego biografii* (Moscow, 1864), Ermolov to D. Davydov, 30 March 1821 OS, p. 310; below, p. 115.
(21) Ibid., p. 83.
(22) Ibid., p. 84; Dostian, Rossiia, p. 87. A despatch of Lord Strangford, the British ambassador to the Porte, confirms Fadeev’s argument: ‘You are aware, Sir, that by the Treaty of Bucharest, Russia engaged to restore to the Porte all the conquests which, during the war, she had made in Asia. It seems that the word conquests continues to be interpreted by Russia as meaning only such places as were obtained by actual force of arms, and not including such fortresses as were acquired by treachery, or by bribing the Ottoman commanders. Were it the Turks who sought to establish this ingenious distinction, I presume there could be but one opinion in Europe...[Russia maintains that] all the places conquered from the Turks have been given up...and [calls] upon the Porte to recognise their right to the possession of all other places, not so given up, and still occupied by them...’. [Emphasis in original] Strangford accurately predicted that the Turks would not agree to this since ‘it involves a distinct violation of one of the first principles of Islamism - the Koran explicitly and repeatedly declaring that no portion of the “Heritage of the Prophet” shall be alienated, until an unsuccessful attempt to defend it by arms’, PRO, FO 65/157, ff.381-82v, Strangford to G. Canning, 25 June 1826.
(23) Stroganov was also charged with forcing the Porte to award to Serbia and the Principalities the rights accorded to them by articles V and VIII of the Bucharest treaty. For details of his mission, see Dostian, Rossiia, pp. 144-77.
(24) In 1816 Nesselrode wrote a report on the subject, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.502, ff.1-8ob, 24 February 1816 OS. It reiterates Strangford’s explanation of Russia’s position. Regarding Sukhumi-Kale, Nesselrode maintained that Abkhazia’s former leader Kalesch Bey had voluntarily accepted Russian patronage in 1803 and thus ‘nous considerons la souverainete d’Abhasie comme ayant passe sous la domination de la Russie sans avoir ete soumise par la force des armes’. Following Kalesch’s death, his son Aslan-Bey turned to the Porte and in 1808 invited Turkish forces to take Sukhumi-Kale. According to Nesselrode, Aslan was not, however, the rightful heir. The true heir Saxir-Ali-Bey converted to Christianity (changing his name to Georgii Shervashidze) and in 1810 requested that Russia recapture Sukhumi-Kale. Ultimately, the legality of Russia’s possession of Sukhumi-Kale and Abkhazia rested upon the legality of Kalesch’s initial decision to secede from the Ottoman Empire in the first place. However, in the absence of anything approaching a constitution in the Ottoman Empire, a judgement is impossible. The ambiguous ties that existed between the Constantinople and certain of its imperial provinces caused no end of similar problems, notably regarding the Circassians after 1829, see below, pp. 223, 233-34 (footnote 16).
(26) Tormasov favoured pushing the Russian border as far west as Trabizond-Erzerum, Fadeev, ‘Bukharestskii mir’, p. 81.
(27) RGIA, fond 1018, op.3, d.151, ff.1-5v, Ermolov to Alexander I, 28 March 1818 OS.
(28) Ibid., ff.6-10, Ermolov to Nesselrode, 16 July 1820 OS.
(29) Ibid., f.5v, Ermolov to Alexander I, 28 March 1818 OS.
(30) Ibid., ff. 7v, 9v, Ermolov to Nesselrode, 16 July 1820 OS.
(31) Ibid., f.10. Ermolov believed that the ‘fear of my very name protects ours borders more strongly than any chains’, G. V. Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii pervoi poloviny XIX veka (Tbilisi, 1950), p. 122, and thus believed that any concession to the Porte would compromise his image. The most complete accounts of Ermolov’s forthright rule in the Caucasus (1816-27) and expeditions against the rebellious indigenous tribes are N. Dubrovin, Istorii voyini i vlyuchestva russkikh na Kavkaze (St Petersburg, 1888), VI; Potto, Kavkazskaia voina, II (1885).
At around the same time Ermolov had come into conflict with Nesselrode over the border in the Eastern Caucasus. As a result of the 1804-13 Russo-Persian war, Russia had gained large territories in the Eastern Caucasus. The Tsar, however, was willing to return certain provinces to Persia for the sake of improved relations and, in 1817, Ermolov was sent on a special mission to Tehran. The latter was opposed all territorial concessions and his negotiations solved very little.

M. Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780-1828* (Minneapolis, 1980), pp. 152-54. Ermolov’s views on Persia may be gathered from a letter to A. A. Zakrevskii, RGIA, fond 660, op.1, d.112, ff.34-35, 27 June 1819 OS. Ermolov was disturbed by the character of the heir to the throne, Abbas Mirza, of whom he wrote, ‘I felt the spite harboured against us by this villain and saw his depraved black soul [in 1817]’.

He continued, ‘Abbas, once Shah, will spend all the accumulated treasures and income of the state on his regular army and on the construction of various establishments. He will invite foreign experts and the fortunes of the Persians will flourish whereas the hateful characteristics of this despicable people ought, by right, to hold it in all kinds of disorder, dispersal and intestine strife. I will be told that with all today’s clever and [illegible] appliances, I have not seen a bear tied up with a pink ribbon instead of an iron chain’. Naturally, Ermolov found himself in opposition to the official policy of cultivating relations with Persia. Again it was Nesselrode who bore the brunt of his criticism. ‘I must admit to you’, he wrote, ‘that I am not one of those who consider Nesselrode a great politician, especially in dealings concerning Persia. These are as familiar to him as Egypt of the Pharaohs is familiar to us’.


See below, Chapter III.

A more general account of Capodistrias’ activities may be found in C. M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria, the Founder of Greek Independence* (London, 1973).


See below, p. 64.


Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev, I*, p.140, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 14 March 1821 OS.

*Ibid.*, p. 146, Kiselev to Zakrevskii, 12 April 1821 OS.


*Ibid.*, p. 149, Kiselev to Zakrevskii, 29 June 1821 OS. Kiselev, for many years hence, would often castigate Nesselrode for his cautious attitude to Eastern affairs, e.g. *ibid.*, I, p. 271, Kiselev to Zakrevskii, 13 January 1828 OS; p. 415, Kiselev to A. F. Orlov, 8 June 1833 OS.

See I. F. Iovva, *Bessarabia i grecheskoe natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe obshchestvo* (Kishinev, 1974), pp. 174-75, for the views of Generals I. V. Sabaneev and A. V. Rudzevich, respectively, of the 6th and 7th Infantry Corps of the Second Army.

Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, p. 27, Ermolov to Kiselev, 30 March 1821 OS.

Russian military force to cross the Pruth into Ottoman territory had war been declared. In their quest to subdue Ypsilantis' revolt, the Turks had occupied and ravaged the Principalities in 1821.

(47) Ibid. f.3.

(48) The condition of Britain and the other powers for mediating in the Turco-Greek conflict was that Russia restore her diplomatic relations with the Porte, Schroeder, *Transformation*, p. 638.

(49) RGIA, fond 660, op.1, d.112, f.120, Ermolov to Zakrevskii, 23 February 1822 OS.
II. INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY AFTER 1815

With the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and its return home from Paris, the Imperial army consisted of twelve infantry and five reserve cavalry corps. Unlike the other European powers, which adopted a system of cadres and reserves, the Russian army remained a huge standing force of over 800,000 men. The main bulk of the active forces were grouped into two armies. The First Army (Infantry Corps I-V), stationed in the west of Russia (with headquarters at Mogilev) was by far the largest single military force and was designed for full-scale action against another European power. The Second Army (Infantry Corps VI-VII) was quartered over a huge area in the southern coastal regions with its headquarters at Tul’chin. It had been created in late 1814 out of its predecessor, the Moldavskaiia armiiia [Moldavian Army], and retained the latter’s strategic function - to fight the Ottoman army in the Balkans. Administration of the Russian army as a whole was carried out by the War Ministry, although, as in most European states of the time, it was concerned primarily with budgets, supplies and the various minutiae of a bureaucratic institution, having no influence on operations or strategic planning. These latter functions were executed by the commanders of the various corps and armies and by a hierarchy of General Staffs, which existed at the divisional, corps and army levels. The supreme decision-making body was the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty (glavnyi shtab E.I.V.). It acted as the sole intermediary between the Tsar and the rest of the military establishment and its authority was sought on all matters of importance.

In line with the conservative foreign policy course adopted after the Congress of Vienna, the Russian army was put on a defensive footing and steps were taken to reduce its cost. The unpopular military colonies were extended, the active army forced to engage in economic activity and, generally, concern for the well-being of the military was overshadowed by the pressing need for domestic reform. The resulting degree of lethargy and complaisance that set in to the military after 1815 is well known. On Nicholas’ tour of the army in 1816 the future Tsar kept a diary of his findings, in which, according to one source, ‘almost all observations related merely to the insignificant external appearances of military service, uniforms...marches and so forth, and did not touch on a single important aspect of the military establishment’. On reading this comment Alexander II wrote, ‘this was not His fault for, from the end of the war in 1815 until His accession to throne, no one else thought of these things either’. The concern with ‘external appearances’ was often taken to obsessive lengths and ultimately resulted in what has been termed ‘paradomania’. This preoccupation with
ceremonial parades was, in part, a result of a desire to cut military expenditure. More fundamentally, however, it was an expression of the mystical conservatism that took possession of Alexander’s mind in the latter years of his life. Fearful of the continued presence of French revolutionary ideas, the Tsar wished to transform the army into a model institution mirroring and reinforcing the hierarchical social structure of Russian autocracy. More than ever, the Russian state demanded discipline and unquestioning obedience from its subjects and these values were to be instilled into the peasant-conscript through constant drill. This would combat the emergence of independent thought and initiative and their inevitable descent into ‘freethinking’ . The Tsar took as his model the Gatchina Guards of Paul I, whose famed abilities for drill and the formalities of military ceremony were held up as examples to the rest of the army. As a result, disheartened generals such as Sabaneev could fairly complain that:

Four years of experience [1816-20] in the command of my [6th Infantry] corps has taught me that...regimental officers, for the most part, are primarily concerned with external appearances: there is much concern for reviews but little for true service.

The picture was not, however, universally bleak, for important experiments were to be found in the forces of the southern regions, the Second Army and Caucasus Corps. Far from the watchful eye of the highest Generals in the capital and Mogilev, both institutions were noted for their commitment to military innovation and the enlightened treatment of their soldiers. As a result, these two units were to become the most popular in all of the Russian Empire. In 1828, the diplomat F. P. Fonton could note that, ‘the general opinion shows especial favouritism towards the Second Army. It commands the same popular appeal that Ermolov does in the Caucasus’. The popularity of the Second Army was said to be due to the ‘striking difference between the Tul’chin and Mogilev General Staffs’. Thus whereas the First Army looked upon its soldiers as ‘instruments for the precise execution of the duties of service’, in the Second Army ‘every man felt himself to be a person and not just a machine’. This dichotomy between the prestigious, Prussified, Gatchina-schooled First Army and that of the more innovative southern forces was very real in its day and bears testament to the reforming abilities of their respective commanders P. D. Kiselev and A. P Ermolov.

P. D. Kiselev was one of the outstanding reformers of post-1815 Russia. A favourite of Alexander I, the young veteran of the Napoleonic wars was destined for a great
career. In February 1819, Kiselev, possibly on the advice of Ermolov, with whom he was close, was made head of the General Staff of the Second Army at the age of thirty-one. Known to history as something of a liberal, Kiselev had earned his progressive credentials as early as 1816 by his proposal to liberate the serfs and he was now keen to introduce reforms into the army. He was immediately assisted in this task by the fact that Field Marshal P. Kh. Wittgenstein, the Commander-in-Chief, was old and infirm, so allowing Kiselev full rein to act as commander in all but name.

On his arrival at the army headquarters at Tul’chin, Kiselev did not find affairs at all to his liking. In a report to the Tsar on the standard of the unit’s twenty-two generals, all of whom were veterans of the late war, Kiselev wrote that only nine were fit for service. His comments on the rest were unsparing:

- Gen-Maj. F...recently graduated cadets know more about the duties entrusted to him. He eats much and drinks even more; Gen-Maj. U...a nonentity. Morally he no longer exists, and were he a soldier he would have been long ago discharged from military service as unfit; Gen-Maj. I...a Colonel and no more...German; Gen-Maj. M...weak of health, weak of mind, weak of action; Gen-Maj. G...studied in the Cadet Corps and thus his stupidity is remarkable.

Kiselev was likewise disturbed with the quality of other commissioned officers, complaining that almost all noblemen of any education avoided the Second Army and entered the Guards or other select units. The NCOs were no better, for as Sabaneev exclaimed, ‘out of every one thousand only one is decent’. As regards the rank and file, Kiselev was concerned by the detrimental effects of harsh discipline and the preoccupation with parade drill. He saw the mutiny of the Semenovskii Guards Regiment in 1820 not as some revolutionary conspiracy but as evidence of their officers’ inability to command the respect of their troops. The root cause of such discontent amongst the soldiery was said to be A. A. Arakcheev, whom Kiselev considered the ‘most harmful man in Russia’. Arakcheev’s military-bureaucratic system of unbending rules and regulations, unquestioning obedience and severe discipline led even, the far from liberal, Sabaneev, to complain that:

Nowhere [are there]...so many papers and ill-thought out forms and reports like there are here. Nothing is conceived with regard to human capabilities and strength. We have soldiers for ammunition as opposed to having ammunition for soldiers. Our soldiers cannot take a single step without the necessary correction.

Sabaneev warned that unless reforms were enacted the ‘black spirit of the Semenovskii regiment will descend upon the whole army’. 
Kiselev was assisted in his quest to introduce far-reaching reforms into his army by the presence of a small, though very talented, group of officers. Drawn from the highest echelons of the Russian aristocracy, these officer-noblemen were captivated by French revolutionary ideas and had, prior to Kiselev’s arrival, already organised themselves into masonic lodges and political debating societies. These organisations were eventually to form the kernel of the Southern Decembrist movement. The main ring leaders were V. F. Raevskii, P. I. Pestel' and M. F. Orlov. All had joined the proto-Decembrist political organisation Soiuz Blagodentstviia in 1818-19 and they established regional divisions in Kishinev and Tul’chin - the main quarters of the Second Army. Kiselev was immediately attracted to these Decembrists and soon filled his General Staff with them. He promoted others, notably Pestel’ and M. F. Orlov to the command of units. Kiselev brushed aside rumours from St Petersburg concerning the suspect political views of certain of his officers, especially Pestel’, declaring to A. A. Zakrevskii in August 1821:

I do not praise the spiritual qualities of Pestel’, only the abilities of his mind and the usefulness which I can extract from it. Of morals I will not say a word.

With their assistance of Pestel’ and others Kiselev embarked on a major programme of reform. His first concern was to address the lack of education and especially the illiteracy of his troops. M. F. Orlov had already experimented with Lancaster schools during his time as Head of the General Staff of the 4th Infantry Corps (1817-19) and following his transfer to the Second Army in 1820, Kiselev proposed that he introduce the system into the 16th Infantry Division. Orlov’s ideas for the school, however, went far beyond the spreading of literacy. He aimed to educate primarily NCOs and the rank and file, teaching them the basics of history and politics in order to spread enlightenment and transform them into citizens. Certain teachers in Orlov’s Lancaster schools, such as V. F. Raevskii, openly used their position to spread political propaganda teaching the soldiers of the need for political rights and a constitution.

As regards the officer-corps, Kiselev based his hopes on the creation of a lycée for the education of Junkers. Established in 1821, probably on the advice of M. F. Orlov, its purpose was to train a new generation of officers. Such a school was certainly required as:

...the sons of the nobility and commissioned officers who serve in army regiments as Junkers, for the most part, seek in this service a means of existence, and due to their lack of education differ little from the recruits in these regiments. This problem is felt even more in Novorossiia where educational institutions are very rare and the number of small landowners and noblemen without land is very high. Since, however,
the source of the replenishment of officers in the regiments comes from Junkers (for the number of cadet graduates [from St Petersburg] is very insufficient), the complete lack of education begins to be sensed once they enter into the command of companies. Later, when they become staff officers, we will have produced people who received insufficient education within the very service itself. (29)

Another other central aspect of Kiselev's reform programme concerned the role and powers of the General Staff of the Second Army. Already dominant over the Commander-in-Chief by the force of his energy and personality, Kiselev wished to institutionalise this relationship. He was assisted in this enterprise by Pestel' who, sometime after 1822, drew up proposals for a restructuring of the General Staff. The existing situation was that all the heads of the various branches of the General Staff were equal in rank to the overall Head of the Staff. All had the power to report to the Commander-in-Chief and receive instructions from him individually. Naturally, this compromised the autonomy and corporate identity of the Staff as a whole, essentially reducing it to the private chancellery of the Commander-in-Chief. Pestel's idea was essentially to unite all these branches under the head of the General Staff, thus greatly increasing the importance of the latter's position ad hopefully the General Staff as an institution. (30) The idea was accepted and, in March 1824, Kiselev duly submitted proposals requesting that all the 'executive branches' of the General Staff - the departments of the intendant-General, artillery and engineers, were all in future to be subordinated to the head of the General Staff, who alone is to report to and receive instructions from, the Commander-in-Chief. (31)

Parallel to these developments, Kiselev planned an ambitious reform of his General Staff's department of Quartermaster Staff [kvatirmeisterskaia chast']. This latter institution had appeared in European armies during the eighteenth century and was traditionally charged with the quartering of troops in the field. Its role gradually increased to include the preparation of maps and the gathering of intelligence on the enemy's fortifications and troop movements. By the nineteenth century it had, in certain armies, acquired a role in the preparation of war plans. (32) Kiselev's idea was to assign to his Quartermaster Staff the functions that are now considered to be the essential characteristics of the modern 'General Staff':

(1) the systematic and extensive collection in time of peace of specific information which may be important to the future conduct of operations... (2) intellectual preparation for the future conduct of operations... through the elaboration of specific plans for war. (33)

Kiselev aimed to transform his General Staff into the acknowledged authority on the Balkan theatre and to monopolise the formulation and execution of war plans against the Ottoman
Empire in this region. Specifically, in 1819, he proposed embarking on an extensive programme of research into the five Russo-Turkish wars fought between 1711 and 1812 and 'extract from previous experience the general lessons for future action'.(34) Research was to provide the necessary topographical, strategic and tactical information required to devise and execute a war plan that would deliver a more decisive victory over the Ottoman forces than had hitherto been possible. Kiselev also acted as patron to Colonel I. P. Liprandi's monumental study *Opyt slovoistolkovatel'sta Ottomanskoj imperii*.(35) which complemented the study on Russo-Turkish wars by providing detailed intelligence on the ethnic, religious and psychological characteristics on the various Ottoman forces.(36)

Kiselev's endeavour to create what amounted to an empirico-historical school of military science was to cause resentment within the military establishment, namely, in the General Staffs of H.I.M. and the First Army. These Staffs (or, more precisely, their Quartermaster Staff divisions) had, under the direction of Baron K. F. Toll,(37) acquired after 1815 a virtual monopoly on the writing of military history (and with it, the implications for tactical and strategic doctrine) and were ready to oppose any institution attempting to challenge their preeminent position. The resulting struggle between these staffs and that of Kiselev's was not, however, purely one of an institutional power struggle, or personal rivalry between their respective heads. It was also a struggle for the theoretical basis of the study of military history and its relationship to military doctrine. The undisputed military authority for Toll, his close associate, the historian D. P. Buturlin and the military establishment generally was the (Swiss-born) French theorist A. H. Jomini. The latter's theory was based on the presumed existence of eternal, *a priori* and rationalistic laws of tactics and strategy. This was overtly threatened by Kiselev's empirical method which stressed the uniqueness of each theatre and of each enemy.(38)

Once accepted that Turkish wars were essentially different from those against European nations, the Second Army could demand greater independence in developing, for example, its own special tactical formations to deal with the unique nature of Ottoman forces - namely their reliance on large numbers of irregular cavalry. As a result of research into the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev's General Staff discovered that an important key to Russia's victories had been the introduction of new tactical formations by the Commander-in-Chief, P. A. Rumiantsev. Hitherto, the army had used 'huge squares', which were akin to 'moving fortresses', to protect itself against Turkish cavalry. Instead of relying on this somewhat passive tactic, Rumiantsev created smaller, more manoeuvrable infantry formations which he used for offensive purposes.(39) The study of the Turkish
campaigns of A. S. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov revealed the use of more innovative tactical formations and battle orders. Many of these were adopted by the Second Army and practised in manoeuvres in 1826 and 1827. (40)

As a result of this study of previous campaigns, the general trend of the tactical ideas of the Second Army (which was largely under the guidance of Pestel') was characterised by a move away from the official doctrine of massing troops in large formations and towards the far greater use of the extended or open order [rassypnoe stroe] and the employment of sharpshooters. (41) This was to cause great unease in the official military establishment which remained committed to tactics of massing troops in large formations. It was denied that exceptions had to be made in Turkish wars and Jomini argued that against Turkish and, indeed all, enemy cavalry the Russian forces should 'form large squares and stand firm in a defensive manner'. (42)

The justification for this massing of troops was Jomini's idea that war was decided by one general and decisive encounter. Victory in battle was decided by the concentration of one's forces at the enemy's 'critical point'. In battle, the army was to repel the enemy's shock troops (usually comprising cavalry), force him to divide his troops and then attack (with concentrated forces) the flank or rear of their infantry. (43) Success in this latter enterprise was dependent upon the ability of one's military units to advance from various locations on the battle field in a coordinated manner and concentrate on the enemy's weak point. One of the reasons Jomini's ideas were so popular amongst the Gatchina school was that they provided the justification for the endless quest for the perfection of drill and blind obedience that such tactical manoeuvres required. Jomini's emphasis on the concentration of firepower likewise allowed the Russian army a reason to oppose the development of light infantry operating in open order as sharpshooters. The problem was that light troops/sharpshooters were effective only if left to fight independently beyond the immediate supervision of their officers. Moreover, the role involved great danger and required qualities not usually associated with the average soldier of the time - personal initiative, commitment and bravery. In the European mercenary armies of the eighteenth century these virtues were almost entirely absent and the use of light infantry led only to desertion. (44) In the Russian army, it was the peasant conscript, usually drafted into service against his will, that the officers distrusted. The fear that, left to their own devices on the battlefield, they would desert or be easily routed proved too great to facilitate the development of proper light infantry. (45)
It should be clear, therefore, that the Second Army’s (specifically Pestel’s) proposal that its entire infantry be trained in the skills of chasseur was most ambitious.\textsuperscript{(46)} It had been possible in the French Revolutionary armies where soldiers fought willingly for a common cause\textsuperscript{(47)} but to introduce it in autocratic Russia was an entirely different proposition. It was only possible if the relationship between officer and soldier was transformed. The traditional one, based on coercion, fear and punishment beatings, was obviously ill-suited to instilling in the soldiery the qualities that the role of chasseur required. Instead, the officers needed to gain the respect of their troops and inspire them through the creation of an esprit de corps. To attempt such a transformation after 1815 was as bold as it was dangerous.\textsuperscript{(48)}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textsuperscript{***************}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Despite a certain uneasiness and, even distrust, in many quarters regarding the activities of the Second Army’s General Staff, the first years of Kiselev’s tenure were to prove highly productive. By 1823, the various research projects were well under way, as was formulation of a war plan against the Ottoman Empire. In October of that year an imperial review of the army was completed with great success, allowing Kiselev the boast that the Second Army now stands ‘in competition with the very best units of the Russian army’.\textsuperscript{(49)} However, one of the primary reasons for this success - the reliance on politically-suspect officers, contained the seeds of future problems.

The first warnings had come as early as 1821 when Sabaneev became increasingly concerned by rumblings in M. F. Orlov’s 16th division. Since his elevation to its command the previous year, Orlov had set himself the task of improving officer-soldier relations. He urged his officers to forgo their predilection for brutal and arbitrary punishments and instead gain the respect of the men by instilling in them ‘soldierly virtues’, giving them an ‘example of activity’ and fostering in them a ‘love for the nation’.\textsuperscript{(50)} Orlov was more than ready to listen to the many grievances lodged by the troops against their officers and threatened the latter with court martial. The effect on the troops was electric and by the end of 1821 ‘all the 16th division was in a state of agitation’. Disturbances broke out in four of its regiments, notably in the Kamchatka regiment in December of that year.\textsuperscript{(51)} Sabaneev was sure these disturbances were also linked to Orlov’s Lancaster schools where V. F. Raevskii was said to be fraternising with the soldiers and spreading revolutionary propaganda. At bottom, Sabaneev believed Orlov’s and Raevskii’s activities were a result of their membership of masonic lodges and allegiance to Jacobinism.\textsuperscript{(52)}
In July 1821 Kiselev, probably on the demand of Sabaneev and St Petersburg, had been forced to introduce a *nadzor* [surveillance] on the 16th division. Within six months enough evidence had been collected against both Raevskii and Orlov. In February 1822, the first was arrested whilst Orlov was suspended indefinitely from duty. Both were charged with the dissemination of political propaganda through the Lancaster schools.

This proved a great blow to the Second Army’s new educational establishments. The Lancaster schools were naturally closed but, more fundamentally, the perceived connection between education and revolutionary activity was further justified and, indeed, strengthened in the mind of the Tsarist establishment. This was to have adverse affect the workings of the *lycée* for Junkers. Alexander had never been entirely comfortable with the idea and though he initially approved of the proposal in 1820, he was keen that the education of young men was to be limited to subjects:

...essential for military knowledge, without entering into politics. In particular, there must be supervision over the teaching of history and geography, so that the teacher does not go into too much detail.

Such preconditions were clearly unsatisfactory, for Kiselev wanted the best Junkers eventually to become staff officers. As members of the General Staff they were to contribute to the study of the Balkan theatre and Ottoman army and thus required a broader education than that envisaged by the Tsar. The *lycée* was nevertheless opened in 1821 but, following the problem with the Lancaster schools, St Petersburg starved the school of funds. Kiselev’s request for an annual grant of 150,000 roubles was ignored and the school operated for only two years with an yearly intake of barely ninety pupils (instead of the envisaged 400).

Moreover, following the disturbances of 1821-22 and continuing rumours about Pestel’, many in the Tsarist establishment began to grow suspicious of Kiselev himself. The latter had dismissed Sabaneev’s reports concerning the existence of masonic lodges in the Second Army. He considered the spread of ‘freethinking’ in the army to be a direct consequence of the abuses of Arakcheev’s military system and blamed the various disturbances in the regiments on overly harsh discipline and the severe punishments meted out by ill-educated officers. During the investigation in the Lancaster schools he had openly defended Orlov, his long-time friend, and from 1819 wrote a number of letters to the Tsar defending Pestel’.

The precise nature of this seemingly very close relationship between Kiselev and the Southern Decembrists has attracted much scholarly attention. It is clear that Pestel’ and his followers cultivated relations with Kiselev in the hope that, following a revolution (which
was to begin with the arrest of Wittgenstein), he would join them and be rewarded with the position of Governor-General of Moscow.(61) It has not been suggested that Kiselev knew of such plans, let alone agreed with them, but it is almost certain that Kiselev knew of the existence of so-called 'secret societies' in his army and allowed them to operate unopposed.(62) The most probable reason for this is that Kiselev considered their activities (which usually consisted of nothing more than the reading of censored material and engaging in political debates) as harmless and certainly not criminal. Moreover, he seems genuinely to have regarded such organisations as the symptom of a deeper cause, namely - Arakcheevshchina. As early as 1822, in a long letter to A. A. Zakrevskii, he concluded that if this system continued, the high command could only 'delay the decisive minute'.(63)

Three years later the decisive moment did indeed arrive and in December 1825 Pestel' and the other Southern Decembrists were arrested on the orders of Diebitsch.(64) Fortunately, Kiselev was himself able to survive the investigation into the origins of Decembrism in the Second Army. This was partly due to the support of his friends in the capital, partly due to the fact that the Eastern crisis was becoming progressively more acute and that was Kiselev needed to fight the coming war. Nevertheless, the trust in the Second Army had been almost irreversibly compromised in the eyes of Nicholas and his entourage and the omens for its eventual disbandment were clear for all to see in 1825/26.

The Politics of the Russian Army

We close our introductory remarks by reiterating the fact that, on many questions of both military and foreign policy, there existed a polarisation of views between, on the one side, the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps and, on the other, the Tsarist establishment as represented by the First Army at Mogilev and the Foreign Ministry under Nesselrode. This division paralleled, to a large degree, the general 'progressive versus conservative' political schism that dominated Russian educated society after 1815.

One of the defining features of the 'progressive' elements within the army was their mixing of enlightened/democratic ideas with Russian nationalism. This was most notable in Ermolov, who traced the existence of conservative and unpopular military and foreign policies to the presence in the Tsar's entourage of non-Russians, especially German careerists such Diebitsch, Nesselrode and the Benckendorffs.(65) This anti-German streak is likewise sensed in the Second Army, which came to the fore during the unsuccessful Turkish campaign of 1828.(66)
Great Russian nationalism was barely concealed in the foreign policy programme of the most 'progressive' elements within the army - Pestel's Southern Decembrist movement. Pestel's programme essentially amounted to Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and, at home, the complete Russification of all foreign elements within the Russian Empire. He thus strongly favoured military intervention in favour of the Greek revolution and welcomed a Russo-Turkish war as an opportunity to destroy the Sultan's European empire. After the war, Russia was to annex Moldavia and replace the Ottoman Empire with a 'Greek Kingdom', which essentially amounted to the traditional idea of creating a pro-Russian neo-Byzantium Empire. In the Caucasus, he favoured the improvement of the existing Russo-Turkish frontier through the annexation of Circassia, Batum and Kars. Regarding the rebellious tribes he advocated Ermolov-style heavy handed tactics; they were to be forcefully resettled into the interior of Russia whilst their own lands were to be settled by Russians. In his ideal state, Pestel' favoured the retention of one of the pillars of autocracy by making 'Greco-Russian Christian Orthodox faith' the state religion. Other religions were to be allowed only if they prove themselves 'not contrary to Russian ecclesiastical and political laws'. His solution to the nationality question within the Russian Empire was to enforce strict Russification - 'all the differing tints are to be poured into a common mass so that the inhabitants of the whole expanse of the Russian [Rossiiskoe] state are all to be Russian [Russkie]. Pestel' was especially antagonistic towards the Jews, whom he accused of having special privileges, engaging in dishonest trading and forming in Russia an imperium in imperio. There is little in any of this which would distinguish Pestel from a Russian nationalist of the traditional 'Throne and Altar' variety.

The opposition emanating from the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps was not lost on the Tsarist establishment. Indeed, in the last year of his life, Alexander had himself drawn up a list of politically suspect officers naming, amongst others, Ermolov, Kiselev and most of the Decembrist-officers of the Second Army. Following the Decembrist revolt in 1825, Nicholas was determined to locate all the sources of the Tsarist opposition and thus in 1826 instructed A. Kh. Benckendorff (the head of the Third Section) to investigate into the political views of the army and of society as a whole. The Tsar's orders resulted in the presentation of annual reports (from 1827 onwards) on 'public opinion' [obshchestvennoe mnienie] in Russia.

Benckendorff's main findings (1827-30) were that there existed in Russian society elements strongly opposed to autocracy and, moreover, that these elements had organised
themselves into a ‘nationalist’ or ‘Russian’ party, in which leading military figures played a prominent role. The party defined itself by its opposition to all things of German origin and, as Benckendorff put it, dreamt of ‘senseless reforms in the Russian spirit’. (76)

Benckendorff revealed that:

The party of Russian patriots...are very strong in terms of the number of their adherents. Their centre is found in Moscow. All the old dignitaries, idle aristocracy and half-educated youth follow their direction, which is made known to them via their club in St Petersburg. There they criticise all the steps of the government...there they grumble about Germans, there with enthusiasm they repeat the proposals and speeches of Mordvinov and the words of their idol Ermolov...they shout at the Germans and would like to see [N. S.] Mordvinov as head of administrative matters and Ermolov and [N. N.] Raevskii as the heads of both armies. (77)

The Russian party was especially strong amongst the younger generation:

Young noblemen aged from 17 to 25, as a whole, comprise the most gangrenous part of the Empire. Amongst this wild rabble we see the germ of Jacobinism, the spirit of revolution and reform, which takes differing forms, but most often hides behind the mask of Russian patriotism. (78)

The source of liberalism, as of nationalism (which Benckendorff considered almost as coterminous) (79) was said to be Moscow and was especially prevalent amongst the officer corps. (80) Some discontented officers had become supporters of Ermolov and N. N. Raevskii, others of Pestel’. (81)

The strength of the Russian party and its influence over large sections of society was mostly clearly revealed over the Eastern Question. The Russian party was keen to pursue Russia’s traditional policy of expansion in the East and it could count on widespread support for a Russo-Turkish war in defence of the Greeks, ‘the fate of whom interests all Russia’. (82) It was widely believed that Russia’s conservative policy towards the Greek revolution was a result of the influence of Metternich and his apparent hold over Nesselrode. (83) The Russian party thus skillfully exploited the idea that Russia was being held back from her national mission in the East by foreigners. With the eventual onset of war in 1828, Benckendorff could thus state that:

Russia wished for war with Turkey not for political considerations but out of national feeling: she wished as much for the liberation of Greece as for its own liberation from the guardianship of Austria, whose policy she finds offensive. (84)

When the 1828 campaign failed in its objective of crossing the Balkans, the Russian party in the army succeeded in casting all blame on the interference of another foreigner -
Diebitsch. As a result, Benckendorff could report that ‘the court, the nobility, Generals, officers...are all accusing Diebitsch of incompetence’. (85) Military failure had caused the whole nation to fall into a state of agitation and ‘the so-called group of patriots has not failed to use this mood in order to criticise everything’. (86) The latter based its hopes on attracting to its side the serfs and the landowners of Southern Russia. The serfs were considered a latent source of nationalistic opposition to autocracy (87) whilst the landowners had been virtually bankrupted by requisitions for the war effort and the continued closure of the Straits (which halted the lucrative export of grain). (88) Benckendorff believed that ‘these are the elements that the Russian patriots consider as possible to use at the right moment in order to incite revolts in favour of a constitution’. (89)

During the winter of 1828-29 some attempts were made by Russia to end the war through a negotiated settlement but, due to the Porte’s unwillingness to treat, they proved unsuccessful. The British ambassador noted that this was of ‘great advantage to what is here called the old Russian party, a party that has ever been opposed to any concession to the Turks’. (90) Another campaign was thus undertaken, with Diebitsch as Commander-in-Chief, causing ‘the patriots’ naturally to cry ‘why don’t they take Ermolov?’. (91) To the surprise of many, Diebitsch’s campaign proved a success, though Benckendorff considered nevertheless that:

Diebitsch could never become the idol of the nation, since there exists a great prejudice against him and it is maintained that he does not like Russians and favours Germans instead. (92)

Nicholas was well aware of the popularity in Russia of wars against Turkey and was not surprised to learn that, in 1829, the nation expected nothing less than the capture of Constantinople. (93) Committed, however, to the continuation of his brother’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy, Nicholas opposed the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and, from the very beginning of the war, took steps to cool nationalist fervour. As Benckendorff commented, ‘the war flared up [in 1828], but to the great surprise of all, the population [narodnaia massa] did not show the expected enthusiasm’. This was primarily due to the wording of the declaration of war, which:

...said nothing to the heart. In it there was not a word about Greece, nothing about the Orthodox faith, nothing about Mother Russia. The whole affair was viewed as a simple dispute between two courts, which was to be settled by the army without the participation of the people. (94)
The conservative Eastern policy of Nicholas and, before him, Alexander, did not, however, go unchallenged by elements within the army, who favoured a more forward and decisive policy. The ideas, aims and preparations of this group form the subject of the next chapter.
1. Kagan, *Military Reforms*, pp. 11, 34-35. The twelve infantry corps consisted of the Guards (stationed in St Petersburg), Grenadiers (at Novgorod), Finnish, (independent) Lithuanian, (independent) Georgian (from 1816 Caucasus) Corps, plus seven regular Infantry Corps numbered I-VII. In the manner of most European armies of the time these corps included cavalry and artillery divisions. In addition, there was the Polish Army, (which, in reality, was only marginally larger than a regular infantry corps) under the personal command of Grand Duke Constantine. The five Reserve Cavalry Corps were stationed in the interior of the country as a strategic reserve, A. A. Kersnovskii, *Istoriia russkoi armii* (Moscow, 1993), II, pp. 16-19.

2. Although *glavnyi shtab* has been translated as both ‘Main Staff’ (Kagan, *Military Reforms*, p. 18) and ‘Capital Staff’ (D. D. Irvine, ‘The Origin of Capital Staffs’, *JMH*, X, 1938, p. 163) the more familiar ‘General Staff’ is used throughout this work.


5. This comment was made by Baron Korf, the biographer of Nicholas I, quoted in N. Epanchin, *Takticheskaia podgotovka russkoi armii pered pokhodom 1828-1829* (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 1.


8. *Ibid*.

9. Epanchin, *Takticheskaia podgotovka russkoi armii pered pokhodom 1828-1829* (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 1. Paul I’s Gatchina Guards were modeled on the well-drilled Prussian infantry regiments of Frederick the Great. For this reason the Soviets term the ‘reactionary’ military system that developed in Russia under Paul and Alexander as the ‘Prussian military school’, Prokof’ev, *Bor’ba*, p. 202. It is also known as ‘Arakcheev’s system’ [Arakcheevshchina] - after the much despised A. A. Aracheev (1769-1834). During the 1790s, the latter served as the inspector of artillery in the Gatchina Guards and assisted Paul in the introduction of Prussian-style reforms into the Russian army. In 1808-10 Aracheev served as War Minister and after 1815 became one of Alexander I’s closest advisers. On his career see M. Jenkins, *Arakcheev: Grand Vizier of the Russian Empire* (London, 1969). The continuation of this system during the reign of Nicholas I is blamed primarily on Generals (later Field Marshals) I. I. Diebitsch and I. F. Paskevich who are presented as vain, glory-seeking martinets committed to ‘reactionary’ western European military doctrines, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 196-97, 204-05, 212-13. In opposition to this, the Soviets herald the Russian native military tradition of P. A. Rumiantsev, A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov that is said to have been continued after 1815 by A. P. Ermolov and the Decembrists, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 220-30; Prokof’ev, *Bor’ba*, pp. 182-299 passim.


12. For reasons of space, discussion of Ermolov’s military ideas must be limited to a few observations. Ermolov was first and foremost a Russian nationalist and saw himself as the continuer of the native Russian tradition in warfare. During the 1812-14 campaigns he
openly criticised Field-Marshal P. Kh. Wittgenstein’s conduct of the war and generally blamed all of Russia’s reverses on the so-called ‘German party’ that surrounded the Tsar, P. Pogodin, *Ermolov*, p. 6. His later experience of colonial warfare against the rebellious tribes of the Caucasus only increased his distrust of non-Russian nationalities, S. Esadze, *Istorcheskaia zapiska ob upravlenii Kavkazom* (Tblisi, 1907), I, p. 35. Utterly opposed to the official, Prussianized, Gatchina-style Russian military establishment, Ermolov used his command of the Caucasus Corps to prepare his forces for combat rather than parades. He formulated new looser tactical formations to suit mountain warfare and he dispensed with the need for harsh military discipline through the creation of a strong *esprit de corps* amongst his men, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 220-30. Under Ermolov, the Caucasus Corps became the hive of freethinking and a centre of opposition to autocracy. Its ranks were filled by ‘superfluous men’ searching for an escape from the boredom of daily existence as well as by convicted criminals, rebellious peasants and political dissidents sent to serve out their sentences in ‘warm Siberia’. Following the Decembrist revolt of 1825 members of the disgraced Guards units were sent *en masse* to the Caucasus and with the subsequent addition of revolutionaries arrested in the Second Army, it is estimated that, by the beginning of 1827, some 2,700 political dissidents were serving in the Caucasus Corps, A. V. Fadeev, *Dekabristy na Donu i na Kavkaze* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 25-26. When witnessed firsthand by more conservative Generals arriving from St Petersburg, the state of the Caucasus Corps proved to be of no little consternation. When Nicholas I’s favourite I. F. Paskevich arrived to take operational command of the Caucasus Corps in 1826, he was shocked by the wretched state of their uniforms, their inability to form standard formations such as column and square and, most of all, by the realisation that ‘blind obedience is not to their liking’, P. I. Vrioni, ‘Ermolov, Dibich i Paskevich’, *RS*, V, 1872, pp. 710-13, 722-23, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 11 December 1826 OS. This latter point also worried Diebitsch who declared in 1826 that ‘the ruinous spirit of freethinking and liberalism is immersing the force’, Fadeev, *Dekabristy*, p. 22. Ermolov’s rule, tolerated by Alexander I due to his successes in pacifying the Caucasian tribes, was never acceptable to Nicholas and his removal from office during the Persian campaign of 1827 surprised no-one. On the precise circumstances, see Vrioni, ‘Ermolov, Dibich i Paskevich’, *RS*, V, pp. 707-26, VI, pp. 39-69, 243-80; Curtiss, *Russian Army*, pp. 24-36.
(21) Bulgakov, 'Kiselev', p. 139. In fact, between 1820 and 1825 there were thirteen recorded cases of disturbances in Russian regiments, Curtiss, *Russian Army*, p. 8. An example of the pedantry of army discipline may be provided by the case of the 'Poor Hussar', an anonymous poem written at the expense of General L. O. Roth during a ball held to mark his promotion in 1823 to the command of the Third Infantry Corps. The poem was sent up the chain of command, eventually reaching Grand Duke Constantine, Diebitsch and finally the Tsar himself. Despite the investigations of the military police the culprit was never discovered. The relevant documents (including the poem) are in RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 18210, ff. 1-13v.


(23) Iovva, *Dekabristy v Moldavii*, pp. 57-60.

(24) For list of names see Prokof'ev, *Bor'ba*, p. 273.

(25) Kiselev was instrumental in securing the command of the 16th Infantry Division for M. F. Orlov in June 1820 and the Viatka Regiment for Pestel (hitherto Wittgenstein' adjutant) in November 1821, A. V. Semenova, 'Iuzhnye dekabristy i P. D. Kiseleva', *IZ*, XCVI, 1975, pp. 131-33.


(27) Ibid., pp. 60-61, 87-116

(28) Ibid., pp. 87-90.

(29) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.764, ff.17-17v, Report of Kiselev, 1820. The Junker curriculum consisted of grammar, Russian history (from Rurik to Paul I), mathematics, world geography and field fortifications, *ibid.*, ff. 37-60v. The standard view, e.g. P. Bobrovskii, 'Ob uchrezhdenii iunkerskikh uchilishch', *VS*, 1864, No.11, p. 92; F. A. Miller, *Dmitri Miliiutin and the Reform Era in Russia* (Charlotte, 1968) that the Junker schools were established in the Russian army only after an 1822-23 proposal by General F. V. Rüdiger is incorrect.


(31) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.11, d.2, ff.41-42v, Report of Kiselev, 11 March 1824 OS. It is clear from a December 1828 report by Diebitsch that these proposals were accepted, transforming Kiselev's General Staff into a very powerful institution, Kagan, *Military Reforms*, p. 115-18.


(33) Ibid., p. 165. It is not suggested, however, that Kiselev's General Staff evolved into a fully modern Staff - the essential characteristic of the latter was the ability to create 'specific plans for war'. Irvine rightly considers that this was possible only in the railway age and thus that the first 'fully developed' General Staff was created by H. Moltke in Prussia between 1857 and 1867. Using an extensive railway network, the Prussians could develop 'comprehensive, detailed, and highly reliable plan[s]', *ibid.*, p. 178. In the 1820s, the Russians obviously did not have such opportunities and thus their war plans, though as 'specific' as could reasonably be expected by the standards of the time, remained somewhat
‘abstract’ when compared to the later Prussian versions. For details of Russian war planning in this period, see Chapters V and VI.

(34) Quoted in Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 207.
(35) [lit.] ‘Experience of a commentator of the Ottoman Empire’.
(36) These studies are discussed in Chapter IV. Kiselev also proposed sending mapping expeditions to the Balkans to improve Russian cartography, see below, pp. 139-40 (footnote 6).

(37) K. F. Toll (1777-1842) began his career as a Quartermaster staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars. In 1812, he became General-Quartermaster of the First Army and, subsequently, of the allied armies of Russia, Prussia and Austria. In 1815-23, Toll served as Quartermaster-General of the General Staff of H.I.M. and, in 1823-29, as Head of the General Staff of the First Army.

(38) Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo general'nogo shtaba, I, pp. 361-68; see also below, Chapter IV.
(39) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1810, f. 642, ‘Pervaia turetskaia voina pri Imperatritse Ekaterine II’, 1827.

(41) Prokof'ev, Bor'ba, pp. 229-37.

(42) Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo general'nogo shtaba, II, p. 23; Epanchin, Takticheskaia podgotovka, pp. 34-35.

(43) N. Medem, Obozrenie izvestneishikh pravil i sistem strategii (St Petersburg, 1836), pp. 32-38; G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkoie voennaia mysV v XIX v. (Moscow, 1973), p. 41.

(44) Prokof'ev, Bor'ba, pp. 232-36.

(45) It is, of course, true that, after 1815, two light infantry [chasseur] regiments were established in every infantry division of the Russian army. However, these ‘chasseurs’ rarely practised operating in open order or sharpshooting and, aside from their uniforms, were indistinguishable from regular infantry, G. A. Leer, Obzor voin Rossii ot Petra Velikogo do nachashikh dnei (St Petersburg, 1898), IV, Book I, p. 309.


(47) Ibid., p. 236.

(48) It appears that Pestel’ was himself able to transform officer-soldier relations within his own regiment and succeeded in winning the genuine devotion of his men. Two years after his arrest (in 1825), the rank and file of the Viatka Regiment still openly defended him. One soldier is reported to have said of one police investigator sent to question the regiment that the latter wanted ‘to force out of us the spirit of Pestel’ but that ‘his own soul will leave him before Pestel’s spirit leaves us’, RGVIA, op.16/183, sv.1038, d.l, ff.2-3, Police report to S. F. Zheltukhin, 11 February 1827 OS. Another report stated that all the NCOs and soldiers of the regiment were devoted to Pestel’ and that they had refused to accept their new commander, ibid., ff. 6-8, Police report to Nicholas I, 16 February 1827 OS.

(49) Quoted in N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Aleksandr pervyi (St Petersburg), IV, p. 285-86.

(50) Lovva, Dekabristy v Moldavii, pp. 83-84.

(51) Ibid., pp. 145-50.

(52) Ibid., pp. 154-68.

(53) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p 157. The surveillance system, originally limited to 16th division was, sometime in 1823, extended to cover the entire Second Army. This was no easy task as the army was quartered over five gubernii. It involved the creation of an elaborate network of informers drawn primary from civilians. The informers bore the general title korrespondenty, and were subdivided into three ranks. The first and lowest was that of ispohnitel’ [executor], who were recruited from a wide source - merchants, priests, state officials, noblemen and doctors. These informers were paid 200 roubles [per annum?] for periodic correspondence. Their watchword (or password) [parol'] was nol'za [use]. The second rank was that of nadziratel’ [supervisor], who were sent written instructions,
for the execution of which they were paid 500 roubles. Their watchword was *zabotlivost* [attention]. The highest rank was *popechitel* [guardian], who read the reports of the other ranks, recruited more informers and executed special missions for which they were paid on an *ad hoc* basis. Their watchword was *doverie* [trust]. In each region where the Second Army was quartered one *ispolnitel* and one *nadziratel* were to be assigned to the main quarters of each battalion, division and corps. This, in total, required the recruitment of 169 agents. RGVIA, fond VUA, d.781, ff.1-3v, 7, ‘Uchrezhdienie sekretnoi korrespondensii’, 1823. Another report states that many agents were recruited from amongst the local Jews and that they operated in the 16th, 18th and 19th Infantry Divisions. Apparently many of their reports were written in Hebrew, *ibid.*, ff.8-9v, Report of anon., 1823. The system was probably, either in whole or in part, invented by Colonel I. P. Liprandi. The latter had, during Russia’s recent occupation of Paris, researched into the workings of Napoleon’s secret police and had become something of an expert on espionage techniques. On his return to Russia he joined the Second Army and was used by Sabaneev in 1821-22 to investigate the causes of the disturbance in the Kamchatka Regiment and organise the *nadzor* on the 16th division, Iovva, *Dekabristy v Moldavii*, p. 148-49. On a more general note, it appears that before the establishment of the Third Section in July 1826 (and probably afterwards as well) the General Staffs played a prominent role in the gathering of intelligence on politically suspect civilian institutions as well as military ones. See, for example, a very interesting report to the General Staff of H.I.M. on the anti-Russian sentiment of young Polish noblemen in the gubernia of Khar’kov and its university, RNB-OR, fond 1000, op.2, d.411, ff.1-5, N. I. Demidov to Diebitsch, 10 April 1826 OS.

(54) For details of their arrest and trial, see Iovva, *Dekabristy v Moldavii*, pp. 169-205.


(56) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.17184, f.184, ‘Otchet ob upravlenii vtoroi armii, 1819-28’.

(57) Iovva, *Dekabristy v Moldavii*, pp. 140.


(59) Iovva, *Dekabristy v Moldavii*, pp. 179-83.

(60) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.703, ff.1-11.


(63) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 163-67, Kiselev to Zakrevskii, 14 April 1822 OS.

(64) On the details of their discovery and arrest see Nechkina, *Dvizhenie dekabristov*, I, pp. 196-214.

(65) Following his comments that the 1812 campaign should have been commanded by Russians not Germans, Ermolov had developed a mutual loathing with Alexander I’s German entourage in St Petersburg and with the Benckendorffs in particular, N. K. Shil’d’er, *Imperator Nikolai pervyi, ego zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie*, (St Petersburg, 1903), II, pp. 29-30. The latter, in turn, saw Ermolov as almost Asiatic in his ways and A. Kh. Benckendorff once complained that Ermolov ruled the Caucasus ‘with all the despotism and improvidence of a Turkish Pasha’, *ibid.*, p. 28.

(66) The failure of the 1828 campaign was blamed by many in the Second Army on the interference of Diebitsch and his German entourage. Fonton, *Vospominanie*, I, pp.165-68, wrote that the blaming of Germans for military failure has happened ‘not for the first and not for the last time’. Lord Heytesbury witnessed firsthand most of the 1828 campaign and stated that ‘the army, I understand, is now split into parties. The Russians lay the fault upon the Germans, and the Germans upon the Russians’, BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.148, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 17 October 1828.
55


(69) Vosstanie dekabristov, VII, Russkaia Pravda, p. 144.

(70) Ibid., p. 205.


(72) Vosstanie dekabristov, VII, Russkaia Pravda, pp. 146-49. The Jews were to submit to russification or leave to form their own state in the Ottoman lands of Asia Minor. Pestel’s dislike of Jews appears to have been passed on to his regiment. During a police investigation into the Viatka Regiment one soldier claimed that, ‘if Pestel’ was with us, then we would have carved up all the Jews’, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.1038, d.1, ff.2-3, Report to S. F. Zheltukhin, 11 February 1827 OS. The report also makes some allusion to an incident in January 1827 involving the confiscation of contraband goods off local Jews by members of this regiment. From another report, it appears that Jewish informers (as mentioned above, footnote 53) played some role in Pestel’s arrest, ibid., ff. 32-32v, Police Report, 1827 (although this is not mentioned in Nechkina’s authoritative Dvizhenie dekabristov, or other relevant works).

(73) The Soviet view on Pestel’s and the Decembrist’s foreign policy is naturally somewhat different. The fullest account is O. V. Orlik, Dekabristy i mneshaia politika Rossii (Moscow, 1984) which argues, pp. 84-178, that the Decembrists were opposed Russian colonial rule in the Caucasus and were motivated solely by a desire to liberate various nationalities and ethnic groups, such as the Balkan Christians and Armenians, from their foreign oppressors. This may have been partly true for some Decembrists (for their movement was a broad church) but not for Pestel’.


(77) Ibid., 1929, No.6, p. 145. N. N. Raevskii was a distinquished General from the days of Alexander. Admiral N. S. Mordvinov favoured the introduction of British-style aristocratic rule into Russia and the tempering of autocracy through the extension of the political and economic rights of the nobility, ibid., pp. 144-45.

(78) Ibid., p. 149-50.

(79) Benckendorff was perhaps justified in this belief for, throughout Nicholas’ long reign, the Russian liberal intelligentsia openly defined itself as an opponent of ‘Germanism’. As late as 1859, A. Herzen could write in his journal KolokoT ‘we ourselves have grown so accustomed to the notion that Russia cannot be governed without the Germans that we cannot imagine the Russian ministries and the Russian army with Nesselrode, Kankrin, Diebitsch, Benckendorff, Adlerberg’, quoted in H. N. Ingle, Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836-44 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), p. 4 (see also, ibid., pp. 24-29).


(81) Ibid., p.151.

(82) Ibid., p. 146.

(83) Ibid., pp. 146-47; 1930, No.1, p. 128.
(84) Ibid., No.6, 1929, p. 157. After 1815, Austria maintained a policy of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and hindering further Russian expansion in the Balkans. After the outbreak of the Greek revolt, Metternich tried desperately to prevent Russian military intervention by playing on Alexander’s fear of revolution, portraying the Greeks as Jacobins, rebelling against their lawful sovereign. The Russian army (especially the Second Army) was incensed by this and came to regard Austria as its premier rival in the Balkans. E. L. Blutte, the British consul in Wallachia, witnessed first-hand the Second Army during its Turkish campaigns of 1828-29 and could speak of ‘the antipathy which I have ever observed to exist on the part of the Russian military to everything that is Austrian’, PRO, FO 97/403, ff.67v-68, Blutte to Lord Cowley (H. Wellesley), 3 December 1830.

(85) Sergeev, ‘Benkendorff’, KA, 1929, No.6, p. 159.

(86) Ibid.

(87) As Benckendorff wrote, ‘[The serfs] know well that in all of Russia only the narod-pobeditel’ [lit. ‘People-Victor’, a term coined after the 1812 campaign] - the Russian peasantry, are found in a state of slavery. All the rest - Finns, Tartars, Estonians, Letts, Mordvins...are free’, ibid., p. 152.

(88) Ibid., pp. 164-65.

(89) Ibid., p. 165.


(92) Ibid., p. 113.

(93) Ibid., 1930, No.1, pp. 113-14.

(94) Ibid., 1929, No.6, p. 157. Emphasis in the original.
III. THE SECOND ARMY AND THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821-22

The Origins of Ypsilantis' Revolt, 1820-21

Whilst the long-term causes of the Greek revolution may be traced to cumulative effects of the spread of French revolutionary ideas, the rise of modern Greek nationalism and the growth of a politically-conscious Greek mercantile class(1), it is nevertheless true that the revolt of 1821 resulted from a series of 'conspiracies and accidents'.(2) The landmark in this respect was the founding of Philiké Hetairia by three Greek merchants in Odessa in 1814. Continuing the work of an earlier organisation founded in Vienna in 1797, this ostensibly philanthropic society aimed by means of a coup d'état to overthrow Ottoman rule in both 'Greece' and the Balkans generally.(3)

The establishment of Hetairia in Novorossiia's leading port was certainly no coincidence. The growing émigré community of Greek seamen acted as the perfect cover for the society's covert activities and allowed it access to the high-ranking Greeks within the Russian service. It was through the latter that Hetairia hoped to win the support of the Tsar and gain the promise of a Russo-Turkish war to assist their enterprise.

Hetairia's initial hopes rested on drawing Capodistrias into their circle. In 1816 a certain Galatis was despatched to St Petersburg to recruit the Foreign Minister. When Capodistrias declined the offer, and advised the society against revolutionary means(4) their attention turned to Alexander Ypsilantis, the head of a distinguished exiled Phanariot family(5) and a General in the Russian army. The latter accepted and was made the leader of Hetairia in April 1820. After two more overtures to Capodistrias were turned down in 1820, Ypsilantis decided to prepare for revolution without him and requested a two-year leave of absence from the Tsar.(6)

In July 1820, Ypsilantis left St Petersburg to meet the various branches of Hetairia in Moscow, Kiev and Odessa. When he reached Izmail in October, Ypsilantis summoned a military council to draw up a concrete plan of revolutionary action. Differences within the council were, however, apparent from the beginning. One party favoured igniting the main revolt in the Peloponnese and Epirus in order to co-ordinate their activities with Ali Pasha - the rebellious Albanian leader who had been at war with the Sultan since the summer of 1820. Serbs, Bulgars, Wallachians and other Balkan Christians were to be drawn into an anti-Ottoman coalition and aid the main revolt through localised uprisings. A rival, more conservative faction, however, favoured beginning the revolt in the Principalities in the belief that the Sultan, in contravention of the Russo-Turkish treaties, would occupy the province so provoking a war with Russia. After some debate the council accepted the
former plan and Ypsilantis left for Kishinev to make some final preparations. For reasons that have never been entirely clear, Ypsilantis changed the Hetairia plan and now decided to begin the revolt in the Principalities. A possible cause was that M. Sutzo, the Hospodar of Moldavia, had joined Hetairia in November, thus making such a venture all the more appealing. The revolt was planned to begin on 15 November 1820 OS, but Ypsilantis fell ill and so again preparations were postponed. The final twist in proceedings came in February 1821 when a Hetairia messenger sent to open communications with Ali Pasha was captured by the Turkish authorities with certain compromising documents on his person. Ypsilantis decided to begin the uprising as soon as possible and on 22 February OS crossed into Moldavia and gave the signal for local Hetairists to join his band.(7)

One of Ypsilantis' main objectives in beginning the revolt in the Principalities was to attract the Turkish forces away from their garrisons in the Morea, thus allowing a general uprising to develop there amongst the Greeks. Whilst this was soon achieved in April, Ypsilantis' aim of attracting other Balkan Christians to his side proved a complete failure. His main hope was based on joining forces with the Wallachian Pandours (a warlike people of Lesser Wallachia) who, under the command of the peasant Tudor Vladimirescu, were, since 23 January OS, already in open revolt. Although the Wallachian uprising had possibly been arranged with Hetairia to coincide with Ypsilantis' venture, Vladimirescu was intent on pursuing his own aims. He declared his revolt to be directed solely against the injustices of the Hospodars, not Ottoman rule, and wished only to make himself ruler of Wallachia. Vladimirescu refused outright to support Hetairia's more far-reaching aims and when he opened negotiations with the Porte in May, Ypsilantis had him executed.(8) The hope for Serbian support was scuppered by the timely intervention of Russia, whilst the other Balkan Slavs were simply too disorganised or too unwilling to fight.(9) The fate of Ypsilantis' final objective - to attract Russian intervention on the side of the Greeks also proved problematic (see below).

The main point of historiographical dispute centres around the extent to which the Tsarist military and civilian authorities knew of, and perhaps even aided, Ypsilantis' revolt. The widely accepted view that the highest Russian political authorities knew nothing of Hetairia's preparations(10) was first challenged in 1971 by I. F. Iovva. The latter presented the controversial thesis that both the Tsar and Capodistrias knew of the existence and aims of Hetairia and allowed Ypsilantis to continue his preparations in Russia 'with [their] silent agreement'.(11) Unfortunately, Iovva's argument is not based on any significant new documentary evidence but largely upon Capodistrias' own account of his
dealings with *Hetairia* which were published over a century ago.\(^{(12)}\) Whilst it is certain that Capodistrias (and probably Alexander) knew that an organisation called *Hetairia* existed, Iovva fails to prove that the Russian Cabinet knew, firstly, that Ypsilantis had become the head of the organisation in April 1820 and, secondly, that Ypsilantis was making concrete plans for revolution from the end of 1820.\(^{(13)}\) Also unconvincing is Iovva’s analysis of why Alexander I disowned Ypsilantis venture at Laibach. The Tsar is said to have refused his support due to the pressure of Britain and Austria and due to Russia’s poor economic situation.\(^{(14)}\) Alexander could have easily foretold that the other Powers would oppose the revolt and this did not in any way preclude Russia aiding Ypsilantis secretly. Alexander did genuinely oppose Ypsilantis’ revolt and took no measures to assist him.\(^{(15)}\)

There is a far stronger case for the argument that certain independently-minded front-line commanders in the South of Russia, to varying degrees, knew of, or supported *Hetairia*’s plans. Much of this stems from Ypsilantis’ personal acquaintance with Kiselev, M. F. Orlov and other officer-Decembrists of the Second Army.\(^{(16)}\) It seems almost certain that Ypsilantis revealed a great deal of his preparations to Orlov during his brief stay in Kishinev in October 1820. At that time Orlov was commander of the 16th Infantry Division and the head of the revolutionary society *Soiuz Blagodenstviia* [lit. ‘Union of Prosperity’]. Some months earlier he had written to A. V. Raevskii:

> They say that Ali Pasha of Jannina in the eightieth year of his life has adopted Christianity and is threatening the Turks with the liberation of Greece. If the 16th division was set free for this liberation it would not be so bad. I have 16,000 men under arms, 36 guns and six Cossack regiments. With these one could have some fun.\(^{(17)}\)

According to one account, Ypsilantis revealed his plans in detail and persuaded Orlov, along with his force, to cross the Pruth into Moldavia with him.\(^{(18)}\) Whilst this version contains certain inconsistencies, more recent research has added credence to it. For following his meetings with Ypsilantis, Orlov, who was on the most radical wing of the Russian revolutionary movement, proposed at a Moscow convention of the *Soiuz Blagodenstviia* (January 1821) that revolution be raised immediately in Russia. His idea was to create an international revolutionary organisation (which was to include *Hetairia*) and, using his own division and the military colonies, to simultaneously begin a Russian and Greek revolution.\(^{(19)}\) In conjunction with this and other evidence, all Soviet writers are unanimous in their agreement that there was some unspecified understanding between the two men, though its exact nature has been open to dispute.\(^{(20)}\)
The evidence against Kiselev is less clear cut. Prior to 1821 he had corresponded freely with Ypsilantis over the possible future liberation of Greece, but whether he knew of any concrete plans to this end is doubtful. A. F. Langerone, the Governor of Novorossiia, was later to recall that during Ypsilantis’ brief stay in Odessa in 1820, the latter had spoken of his quest to ‘resurrect ancient Greece’, but had reported nothing to St Petersburg. Indeed, during the first month of the revolt, Langerone had freely issued passports to the Odessa Greeks wishing to join Ypsilantis. Langerone’s behavior, much like Kiselev’s, may however be explained by their ignorance of the true state of affairs. For it was widely assumed that Ypsilantis acted with the direct or indirect backing of the Tsar. This uncertainty was compounded during the first weeks of the revolt by the delay in the arrival of instructions from the Foreign Ministry.

The failure of the Novorossiia authorities to forewarn of an uprising prepared in their domains attracted the suspicion of St Petersburg. This came as a surprise to many as, somewhat naively, it was assumed that Ypsilantis’ revolt would receive imperial favour as it gave Russia a good pretext for a declaration of war on the Porte. Such a view was mistaken; the Tsar was genuinely attached to the conservative principles of the Holy Alliance. He was in no mood to allow a revolutionary movement to endanger his system of monarchical solidarity.

The Tsarist Reaction, 1821-22

It was unfortunate for Ypsilantis that Alexander was at the Congress of Laibach when the uprising broke out. It had been convened to deal with the recent revolutions in the Italian peninsula and Alexander was in no mood for the antics of another conspiratorial society. The Tsar had just heard of Vladimirescu’s revolt in Wallachia and was convinced that the spirit of Jacobinism was now spreading eastwards. As Nesselrode told his consul in Wallachia:

En Valachie comme à Madrid à Lisbon et à Naples, c’est une poignée de soldats qui a ouverts la [illegible, peine ?] des disordres et qui s’efforce de livrer l’empire [Ottoman] aux mains de l’anarchie.

Thus Alexander’s first instinct on hearing of Ypsilantis’ venture in Moldavia was to openly and unequivocally condemn the revolt. If there was any wavering at all in his mind, it was soon dispelled by Ypsilantis himself. The latter had sent a letter to the Tsar in an attempt to justify his actions. Ypsilantis wrote openly of the existence of his ‘société secrète’ which had for some years been plotting revolution in the Sultan’s domains. His greatly exaggerated claim that the Morea, Serbia, Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia as well as the
Principalities were up in arms served only to alienate further not endear the Tsar to his enterprise.

Alexander thus informed Ypsilantis that he would receive neither ‘direct nor indirect assistance’ from Russia and urged his renegade General to end the revolt. In the meantime Russia would continue the policy adopted in the wake of Vladimirescu’s revolt - namely, that Russia would seek a ‘ligne commune’ with her allies in order to oppose the ‘torrent des revolutions qui menace de bouleverser encore une fois l’Europe’ and restore order to the Ottoman Empire. Although the Porte was not party to the Vienna treaties and thus not entitled to the guarantees offered to signatories, ‘L’Empereur et Ses augustes allies n’en font pas moins résolu de respecter à l’égard de la Turquie, les principes qui forment la base de leurs relations’.

Despite the moderation of Russia’s initial response, the seeds of the future Russo-Turk conflict were nevertheless discernible at Laibach. For although Alexander condemned the rebels, he was adamant that the Turkish authorities were not to be permitted to punish those Greeks who had not taken part in the revolt. Russia would observe a strict neutrality between the warring factions unless, in Capodistrias words, her ‘friendly interference’ was needed ‘to protect the Greeks from the vengeance of the Turks’.

Turkish reprisals against the civilian population of the Principalities had, in fact, begun almost immediately upon the outbreak of the revolt. By March, a flood of refugees had made its way to the Ottoman frontier, seeking protection in Russian Bessarabia. The refugee problem was extremely sensitive as their admittance into Russia was bound to be a cause of friction in Russo-Turkish relations. It is therefore remarkable that for almost a month, the local authorities in Bessarabia, namely its Governor-General, I. N. Inzov and the commanders of the Second Army, decided Russia’s immigration policy without any instructions from the Foreign Ministry or the Tsar.

On 25 February 1821 OS, Sabaneev instructed Inzov to allow refugees to pass the Russian quarantine and ordered some of his military units to move to the Moldavian border. The Commander-in-Chief, P. Kh. Wittgenstein, soon confirmed these orders. Inzov was to admit refugees to save them from ‘a certain death’ and the army was to fend off any Turkish pursuit into Russian territory. Wittgenstein, however, stressed that despite a plea from the Hospodar of Moldavia M. Sutzo, he had no authority to send military units into Moldavia itself.

Only on 26 March OS did Wittgenstein receive instructions from Nesselrode. Alexander agreed that whilst the innocent inhabitants of Moldavia were to be admitted:
All participants in the revolt against the Turkish government are to be refused completely any protection and under no pretext are to be allowed to enter into our territory...[The Tsar] considers all these persons to be subverters of the general order and criminals against their lawful government and therefore wishes that the Turkish leadership takes the most energetic measures to end the revolt and to punish the criminals. [The Tsar has invited the Porte to] take the strictest measures for the execution of this by means of military force.\(^{(40)}\)

The order to refuse the admittance of Ypsilantis’ rebels certainly put Sabaneev and Inzov, who were noted for their sympathy towards the Balkan Christians, in a difficult position.\(^{(41)}\) When the first reported instance of an attempt by rebels to enter Bessarabia arose in April, both did their best to persuade Wittgenstein to admit them. Sabaneev wrote of three armed rebels who were requesting refuge. He accepted that Wittgenstein’s instructions of 26 March OS forbade the acceptance of revolutionaries, but pointed to a supposedly contradictory instruction in the same order by which Balkan refugees were to be accepted ‘in order to save their lives’.\(^{(42)}\) Wittgenstein’s reply was non-committal. It made no mention of the case in hand and gave only an abstract formula. All rebels ‘especially the leading ones and those who are armed’ are not to be accepted but that ‘private persons are to be accepted without discrimination as we have no means of establishing with accuracy which of them participated in the revolt’.\(^{(43)}\) Sabaneev interpreted these instructions as permitting the acceptance of the rebels.\(^{(44)}\) In May, Sabaneev received a further request for sanctuary from 300 rebels. He declared his readiness to grant it in the event of ‘necessity’, that is in order to save their lives. He, however, set down two preconditions; the rebels had to ‘firstly, lay down their weapons and, secondly, submit themselves to our cordon guards and remain there’.\(^{(45)}\) Sabaneev understood that as long as the rebels disarmed and caused no trouble in Russian territory he could justify their admittance on the grounds of saving their lives. Thus of the many thousands of refugees accepted by the Second Army between March and November 1821 there is little doubt that this number included many rebels.\(^{(46)}\)

Whilst the military authorities in Bessarabia were dealing with the practical problems of the influx of refugees, Russia’s diplomats in the capital were deciding the question of war or peace. Alexander’s initial hostility to the Greek revolt had by the end of April been greatly reduced. For following the spread of the revolution from the Principalities to the Morea on 25 March OS, the Porte began exacting reprisals on its Christian population with an ever-increasing barbarity. Its army ravaged the Principalities whilst in the capital the Greek Patriarch Gregory V was executed and many Orthodox
churches were destroyed. (47) Ypsilantis’ revolt had ceased to be merely a localised affair and was rapidly acquiring all the elements of a religious cum national struggle for survival. (48)

G. A. Stroganov reported from Constantinople that his initial policy of giving ‘concours moral’ to the Porte’s attempts to quell the revolt was failing. It was neither allaying the suspicion of the Turks that Russia was implicated in the revolt, nor imparting ‘un esprit de clemence et de pacification’ to the army’s treatment of the Sultan’s Christian subjects. Turkish reprisals were conducted without any distinction between ‘l’innocent’ and ‘le coupable’. (49) Unwisely, the Porte strengthened Russia’s diplomatic hand by openly violating certain articles of the various Russo-Turkish treaties and agreements. Stroganov could, for instance, claim that the attacks on the Orthodox religion constituted a contravention of article VII of the 1774 treaty. (50) In addition, by May, the Porte had begun hindering the passage of commercial ships under the Russian flag through the Straits - a contravention of various articles of a 1783 Russo-Turkish commercial treaty. (51) During its occupation of the Principalities, the Turks contravened Russia’s treaty rights by dismissing the Hospodars and imposing taxes without the latter’s consent. (52) Finally, a Serbian deputation sent to negotiate a territorial dispute arising from the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest had been detained indefinitely in Constantinople. (53) The net result of the Porte’s actions was that Russia gained far surer grounds for a possible declaration of war.

Echoes of Stroganov’s increasing exasperation were soon heard reverberating from St Petersburg. In May, Nesselrode complained of the Turkish army’s devastation of the Principalities and refused a Turkish request to hand over Greek refugees citing the Porte’s unwillingness to distinguish the innocent from the guilty as justification. (54) By June, continued Turkish intransigence had finally exhausted the patience of the Tsar. Alexander now believed that the Turkish authorities were no longer fighting the Greek revolutionaries but conducting a war against the Greek population as a whole and the Orthodox religion. Stroganov was instructed to present the Porte with an ultimatum. Should it be refused he was to quit Constantinople - the traditional prelude to a declaration of war. (55) Stroganov consequently submitted a forceful representation to the Porte on 6 July OS. It demanded an end to Turkish reprisals against innocent civilians, a repair of the damaged churches and a restoration of the rights and prerogatives of the Greek religion as established in the various Russo-Turkish treaties. (56) It, however, received no response and war seemed inevitable. It has been argued that Russia used the Greek crisis merely to justify a declaration of war and further its own ambitions in the East. (57) Whilst this is certainly true of certain Russian
diplomats, Alexander’s own motives for intervention were unselfish. He believed the Porte’s repressive measures were counter-productive and served only to fuel an intractable religious war that was in the interests of no one. If the Sultan would not listen to reason then the use of force had to be considered in order to protect Russia’s co-religionists and to stabilise the region as a whole.

The new turn in Russian foreign policy activated the war party. This faction was not, however, homogeneous and it forwarded differing arguments in favour of military intervention. A common argument used by conservatives was one based upon an appeal to religious affinity and historical parallel. A. S. Sturdza, for instance, argued that the Greek revolt was legitimate and could not be equated with the other European revolutions in Italy and Spain. Rather it was a religious struggle against an infidel which could be equated with Russia’s own struggle against the Mongol yoke.

The outlook of other diplomats, especially the ‘foreign adventurers’ such as Pozzo di Borgo, though cloaked in a feigned and opportunistic rhetoric of Holy Russia’s duty towards its co-religionists, was in fact grounded in the more concrete reality of Russian strategic self-interest. Pozzo argued that the historic and religious differences between Russia and the Porte rendered the existence of the two Empires ‘incompatible’. Should war break out, peace could not be established until ‘the Turks are forced from Europe’. Pozzo favoured the capture of Constantinople and the creation of a neo-Byzantium Empire. The latter was to fall under the patronage of Russia, whilst Constantinople (with the Straits), though nominally made a free city, was to be occupied by Russian garrisons.

A more moderate position was adopted by Capodistrias, the head of the war party. Following Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople on 14 July OS, the Foreign Minister argued for limited military intervention. Unless the Porte withdrew its forces from the Principalities, began to observe Russia’s treaty rights and had ceased its ‘guerre d’extermination’ by 20 September OS, Russia was to occupy the Principalities. Capodistrias parried an idea recently forwarded by Castlereagh that intervention would only aid the European revolutionary movement - it was the Porte’s continued reprisals that endangered European stability.

The High Command of the Second Army fully supported the Greek cause and were eager for war. At the outbreak of revolution Kiselev considered ‘the so-called rebellion [to be] lawful’ and by July, believing war unavoidable, expressed only regret that the Cabinet was ‘dragging its heels’. Since 1819 Kiselev had been in correspondence with Diebitsch over a future war plan against Turkey. The latter had accepted Kiselev’s idea
of a Balkan crossing and a march on Constantinople. Therefore, in July, Diebitsch drew up a war plan which presumed the need for a 100,000-man army for a six-month campaign opening on 1 March OS.\(^{(64)}\) Although of a rudimentary nature and yet to gain official sanction, Diebitsch's plan would have been the basis of any Russian offensive had it been decided to push operations beyond the Danube.\(^{(65)}\) It is also clear that at the time of writing (July) it was already too late to attempt a Balkan crossing for 1821. Diebitsch had, therefore, some time earlier already drafted a compromise war plan.\(^{(66)}\) In 1821 Russia was to content herself with the occupation of the Principalities and possibly push some forces to the Trajans Wall to shorten the width of her operational base and to facilitate the crossing of the Danube the following year. In 1822, the army was to march on the capital capturing \textit{en route} the vital ports of Varna and Burgas which were to act as supply centres.

Diebitsch, however, had significant doubts as to the readiness of the army for such an enterprise. Not only was there a shortage of siege artillery but the Black sea fleet, which was to carry the main bulk of the army's supplies, had a great deficiency in transport ships. It was calculated that the existing cargo capacity was sufficient to supply only 72,000 men with food provisions for only two months. Ironically, this capacity was, in fact, excessive, as the Second Army had only enough provisions to supply 40,000 men for one month and it had insufficient funds in its own budget to obtain them. The purchase of the necessary food supplies, means of transport as well as the establishment of magazines required an unspecified amount of time and money. Kiselev, though favouring war, was also sober enough to realise the difficulties involved. As early as May he had pointed to the lack of an agricultural surplus in Novorossiia which ensured that a 'prompt opening of a [military] campaign cannot be carried out'.\(^{(67)}\) In addition, his opinion that a push to the Trajans Wall in 1821 was 'very difficult' made a Danubian crossing more difficult for the main force in 1822 and thus further complicated a deep offensive into Ottoman territory.\(^{(68)}\)

Despite these presumed difficulties, Stroganov's departure in July forced the Tsar to seriously consider coercive measures against the Porte. Alexander was adamant, however, that no solution, military or otherwise, was possible without the support of his allies,\(^{(69)}\) and brushed aside Capodistrias' view that Russia should act unilaterally.\(^{(70)}\) Unfortunately for the Tsar the allies had their own agenda. It has been well remarked that the other Powers were concerned with the fate of Balkan Christians only insofar as they impinged on Russo-Turkish relations.\(^{(71)}\) The European Powers feared that the sanction of military support to aid the Greeks would end, at best, in a Russian protectorate over Greece, at
worst, in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire - the sole barrier to Russian expansion into
the Balkans and Mediterranean.

Of all the Powers, Austria was the most pro-Turkish. Metternich feared war would
see a Russian annexation of the Principalities and the occupation by Russia of the strategic
point of the Danubian delta so controlling the trade of that waterway. Moreover the support
of the Greeks could encourage nationalist movements in the Balkans and elsewhere and so
threaten the very existence of the Habsburg’s multi-national Empire.  

(72) Castlereagh feared any increase of Russian influence over the Porte and the Straits question, as well as
the spreading of Greek nationalism to the Ionian islands, then under British control.  

(73) Bourbon France, desirous of a foreign adventure to gratify public opinion and reassert her
Great-Power status was however tempted with intervention in the Balkans and it was
therefore natural that she should be the first to be approached (in July) by Alexander with
the offer of an alliance against Turkey.  

(74) The French Prime Minister A. E. Richelieu and
in particular his ambassador in St Petersburg A. de La Ferronays gave some thought to the
proposal but due to the fear of Britain and Austria refused to pursue it or even openly
support a Russian declaration.  

(75) At the same time Alexander inquired as to the position
of Britain and Austria in a possible war, but did not receive a clear answer.  

(76) Fearing war, Castlereagh and Metternich met in Hanover in October 1821 to agree on a joint
strategy. It was agreed that a distinction was to be made between two separate issues - one
concerning a concrete and narrow Russo-Turkish treaty dispute, the other concerning the
wider Greek question. Russia’s quest to restore her contravened treaty rights (such as those
concerning the Principalities) were to be supported, but it was to be denied that Russia had
any right for unilateral action over Greece - the Greek question concerned all Europe and its
solution was to be decided by all the Powers in concert. In addition, Metternich set himself
the task of discouraging Alexander’s growing favour of the Greeks by presenting their
revolt as part of the universal revolutionary conspiracy.  

(78) As Kh. A. Lieven, Russia’s
ambassador in London, correctly reported, the aim of the meeting had been to enforce this
policy on Prussia and France in order to ‘éloigner les chances de la guerre’.

Meanwhile events in the Principalities, amounting essentially to a war scare, added
an urgency to proceedings. In November, Sabaneev reported that there was a 25,000 man
Turkish force in Moldavia and the number was growing daily. It was rumoured that the
Sultan intended to attack and reclaim Bessarabia.  

(80) Although the High Command
remained skeptical of the truth of such reports, Kiselev was nevertheless ordered to put his
forces onto a defensive footing. Rumours of attack, however, continued and therefore
Kiselev left for Bessarabia to make further investigations. This was certainly needed as by December, Inzov reported that over 350,000 Turks were making their way to Danube and preparing for an offensive. Following the winter break, another imminent attack was predicted in March 1822. It was only in April that Kiselev was able to finally dismiss the rumours - they had been spread by the Turks themselves in order to force the Russian army into defensive positions and so avert an attack across the Pruth.

In February 1822, Alexander, convinced of the need for allied support, sent D. P. Tatishchev to Vienna to seek a solution with Metternich. The latter, in keeping with his above-mentioned distinction, proposed that the allies present Russia’s specific treaty demands to the Porte and would support a war should the Sultan refuse them. The Greek question was to be entrusted to a Congress in September. Despite a strong protest from Capodistrias, Alexander accepted Austria’s solution. Following an assurance from Britain in May that the Sultan had accepted these demands, Alexander finally decided against war. The pro-Congress policy associated with Nesselrode had won the day and Capodistrias early retirement from office in the summer of 1822 was an almost inevitable consequence.

There has been some debate as to why Alexander felt compelled to seek an allied solution and forgo unilateral military action over Greece. A popular argument is that, under the spell of Metternich, he feared Russia’s support of the Greeks would spread revolutionary activity throughout Europe. A more cynical argument is that the Tsar was only restrained from war due to the poor state of the Russian economy and army or because he feared the consequences of beginning a war without the sanction of the Great Powers. The most convincing analysis, however, is that Alexander drew back from war in a genuine desire to preserve the unity of the alliance.

With Alexander’s decision in early 1822 to convene a Congress over Greece the spectre of war was averted and so the first round of the diplomatic struggle came to an end. Alexander had been cruelly deceived by his allies, especially Metternich, who sought only to buy the Sultan time to crush the revolt. For the next three years Russian diplomacy was to be bogged down in a never-ending series of conferences, allowing the initiative over the Greek question to pass to Britain and Canning.

The Second Army and the Study of the Greek Revolt

When news of the uprising reached Kiselev, one of his first actions was to send Pestel’ on a mission to investigate its causes. Pestel’ completed three trips to Bessarabia
between March and June 1821 and wrote up his findings in a series of official reports.\(^{(94)}\)

Whilst in his private letters to Kiselev, Pestel’ revealed his sympathy for the rebels and advocacy of Russian military intervention, the reports themselves were objective in tone and did not betray Pestel’’s own opinions.\(^{(95)}\) It is evident even from his first report of 8 March OS that Pestel’ had gained a good understanding of the causes and aims of the revolt.\(^{(96)}\) He fully distinguished between Vladimirescu’s aim of freeing the Principalities from Hospodor misrule and Ypsilantis’ goal of independence for Greece and possibly the Balkans as a whole. He was likewise aware of the flaw in Ypsilantis’ decision to begin the revolt in Moldavia. The local inhabitants did not join his rebels as:

The Moldavians hate the Greeks even more than the Turks for they have always had as the rulers of their province Greek Princes [Hospodars] and therefore ascribe to them, more than to the Turks, all the causes of their unhappiness.

At this time more intelligence was being gathered by Inzov’s agents in Moldavia. The latter, more or less correctly, discovered the origins and development of \textit{Hetairia} as well as their organisational structure. Of special interest is their intelligence on the immediate origins of the revolt.\(^{(97)}\) Apparently, during Ypsilantis’ visit to Odessa\(^{(98)}\) he was given authority from the \textit{Hetairia} Directory to begin preparations for revolution. The initial plan was for Ypsilantis to leave for France ‘to prepare a general, so to speak, uprising of journalists against Turkish despotism’.\(^{(99)}\) This propaganda war was to prepare European public opinion for the coming revolution. Just as Ypsilantis was about to leave however, he received a letter from M. Sutzo, the Hospodar of Moldavia. It claimed that the revolutionary situation had matured and that the Turkish authorities were increasingly suspicious of some revolutionary plot. It was for this reason that Ypsilantis decided to remain in Russia and begin the revolt in Moldavia, presumably with Sutzo’s support. This intelligence, if correct, explains Ypsilantis’ vacillations in late 1820-early 1821 and rests the decision to begin the revolt in Jassy with Sutzo.

Meanwhile Pestel’ was attempting to draw on \textit{Hetairia}’s experience for the development of the revolutionary plans of his own. He was impressed not only by \textit{Hetairia}’s organisational structure\(^{(100)}\), but by their vision for what was to replace the Ottoman Empire in Europe. In one of his reports Pestel’ informed Kiselev that the Hetairists envisaged the creation of a ‘federal republic’ on the model of the United States.\(^{(101)}\) Using this idea as his model,\(^{(102)}\) sometime in early-mid 1821, Pestel’ drew up his \textit{Tsarstvo Grecheskoe} [Greek Kingdom] - a curious document which consists merely of a list of ten Balkan regions and their respective boundaries.\(^{(103)}\)
The origins and significance of this document have aroused much debate. An early interpretation was that it was written as a tempting foreign policy programme, to be presented to the Tsarist authorities to induce it to intervene in the Greek revolt with the aim of destroying Ottoman power and creating a pro-Russian neo-Byzantium state. In deference to Tsarist political principles, Pestel' is said to have eschewed his republican ideals and presented the prospective state as a monarchy or kingdom. This, somewhat unfeasible view, was soon attacked by the acknowledged authority on the Decembrist movement. It was argued that Pestel' would never have proposed the establishment of a monarchy and that the idea was probably passed onto him during his mission to Bessarabia by a Hetairist of a less radical political persuasion. The most convincing case, however, has been presented by Dostian who argued that the document was of joint authorship between Pestel' and some unknown Hetairist.

Whichever version is accepted, all Soviet writers have agreed that Pestel' did genuinely believe in the creation of a 'Greek Kingdom' as part of a revolutionary and 'progressive' foreign policy in which (in his own words) the 'system of conquest' [sistema zavoevatel'naia] of the past was to be replaced with a 'system of patronage' [sistema pokrovitel'stvennaia]. One may, however, certainly question Pestel'’s commitment to such an altruistic programme for, as already mentioned, his ideas on foreign policy were in fact very traditional - the key tenets being expansion and Russification. With regard to the Balkans in particular, the idea of 'patronage' was no departure from Tsarist policy. As a result of his 1821 mission, Pestel' discovered that the idea of Russia's messianic role in the East was, in those parts, widely believed to exist. He informed Kiselev that the Greeks had no faith in assistance from either Austrian or British but that:

Tous les yeux et toutes l'attentions se portent donc vers Russie...[The Greeks] espèrent de voir arriver les armées russes non pour comme venant au secours des insurgés...mais comme venant venger la religion profanée.

Pestel' was likewise impressed by the treaty rights which legitimised Russian involvement in the Balkans:

The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji and the Conventions of Jassy and Bucharest...lays upon Russia the obligation to render patronage to all the Christian subjects of the Sublime Ottoman Porte. Russia may not therefore refuse its patronage to the Greeks without the scorning her sacred duties and without the contravention of the treaties which she has always followed with the utmost precision.
Thus by a ‘system of patronage’, Pestel imagined no more than the traditional Tsarist notion of the willing submission of Balkan peoples to Russia and the sanctification of Russian influence there by treaty right.

Following the receipt of reports from Pestel, Inzov and other military agents Kiselev established his General Staff as the centre for the investigation of the Greek revolt. In early 1822 he informed Inzov of his intention to commission the writing of the first historical account of the revolution. To this end Kiselev outlined the various areas of research that were still required. They related, in particular, to (i) the connection between the first Greek secret society, founded by Rigas Velestinlis in Vienna in 1797 and the Russian Hetairia movement (ii) the role of Napoleon and the French revolutionaries in these societies (iii) the level of coordination between the revolts of Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu (iv) the character of Ypsilantis. This information was to be gathered from the Hetairia refugees who had fled to Bessarabia the previous year.

The resulting work bore the title Obozrenie proizshestvi v Moldavii i Valakhii v techenii 1821 goda [Review of Events in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1821]. First discovered some thirty years ago, it was initially thought to be a private report of Pestel to members of his Southern Society. A later study however has shown it to be indisputably an official work written under the auspices of the General Staff. The still disputed question of authorship is dealt with below.

The opening paragraph sets the tone for the remainder of the work, ‘After three centuries of oppression by Turkish rule, the spirit of freedom was inflamed amongst the descendants of Ancient Greece’. Far from the dry, matter-of-fact language one would expect from an official document, it is written in an emotional and romantic, though not uncritical style, and betrays some sign of literary pretension on the part of the author. The analysis of the origin of revolution is, unusually for the time, not grounded in the religious imagery of the struggle between Islam and Orthodoxy but on the ‘historical right’ of the Greeks for self-government and their ‘desire for a better way of life’.

After a brief allusion to the role of Russo-Turkish wars, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars on the development of Greek national consciousness the work proceeds to the organisational structure of Hetairia, which incorrectly, it cites as being established in Moscow in 1816. It then turns to Hetairia’s preparations for revolution in 1820-21. Generally it confirms Arsh’s summary of these events but departs
on certain points. For example, it suggests that the Porte was informed of the existence of Hetairia in 1820 through the ‘English Ministry’, and that Hetairia knew of the coming Persian attack on Turkey. It confirms that Ypsilantis had initially intended to begin the revolt in the Morea but states that he was talked out of this by a certain Hetairist named Zanto. The latter believed an uprising in the Principalities would deflect Turk forces away from the Morea and allow Hetairia to forge links with the Serbs and Bulgars.

The most interesting aspect of the work however is its evaluation of the character of Ypsilantis. For whilst it is solidly pro-Greek, the work casts much criticism on both Ypsilantis' overall strategy and his own personal bravery. It is especially harsh on Ypsilantis' decision to begin the revolt in Moldavia and then flee to Austria following the defeat of his main forces in May 1829:

Leaving behind his forces he issued an order, by which, in reproaching the Greeks and Moldavians for a lack of spirit and betrayal,...he desired to vindicate his own behavior and lay all the blame for the failure upon his comrades...Neither in general plan nor in his own individual actions did he show either that greatness of thought or the courage and contempt for death which form the basic traits of any personality summoned...to the judgment of history. Not once did he participate in battle and had not sufficient moral strength to endure the alienation of his followers - alienation is incomparably more hurtful than failure itself: for the latter can sometimes signify insufficient luck; the former, however, is always seen as due to a lack of character.

Writing probably sometime in 1822, the author had already witnessed the failure of Ypsilantis' venture. Hence his conclusion in steeped in moral and didactic tones, with Hetairia's experience cited as being a ‘valuable instruction for nations [narody]’. The idea of beginning the revolt in the Principalities failed because Hetairia, in overestimating the degree of political maturity of the people it was attempting to liberate, was unable to attract the support of the local inhabitants:

Nations, like all things living in the world, have their own age...to speed up the transition of a nation from age to another, especially from youth to maturity, cannot be the task of one or several persons, regardless of how great their abilities may be. Force of circumstance,...the striking example of neighbours and the long term direction of minds on a common course - these are the weapons with which the masses are moved and without which it is impossible to inspire them into a quick march.

The author was very harsh on would-be revolutionaries who see revolution as simply a coup d'état, executed by a small band of professional conspirators:

When a whole people feels its own strength and has a firm desire for a better life, personalities appear and the worthy are replaced by the
worthier. In this case there is no failure, for new resources appear at every step...but in the staff of one society, such as Hetairia, the limited number of people and resources are soon exhausted and after a few failures, each of the members is already following his own agenda: one thinks of his own personal escape, another is abandoned to the flow of circumstance, the most resolute seeks a brilliant finale.(123)

Who then is the author of this document? Certainly, the political ideas entertained in the work provide a valuable clue. The author, whilst accepting the progressive idea that self-determination was an essential right of peoples and nations, reserves this right only for those which have reached an advanced stage of historical development. This conservative stance alone rules out Pestel’ as a possible author.(124) This has led Dostian to suggest the authorship of I. G. Burtsov(125) - a young officer in Kiselev’s General Staff, researching Ottoman history. On the moderate wing of the Russian revolutionary movement, Burtsov had refused to join Pestel’ s more radical Southern Society following the break up Soiuz Blagodenstviia in January 1821. By way of analogy, Burtsov’s analysis of Ypsilantis’ revolt, may be regarded as a defence of the reformist wing of the Decembrist movement, who were opposed to the introduction of political rights to Russia by revolutionary means.

Whilst Dostian’s thesis has much merit it is not incontrovertible. There is evidence to suggest that the author was I. P. Liprandi - the Second Army’s expert on both the Ottoman Empire and the workings of secret societies. In 1821, Liprandi was sent to Moldavia to find the causes of the Ypsilantis’ revolt(126) and on his return to Russia organised a surveillance on Hetairists in Russia.(127) As a result, Liprandi had ample opportunity to gather the intelligence needed to write Obozrenie and, indeed, he wrote at least two known works on the 1821 revolt.(128) The opinionated tone of Obozrenie is very characteristic of Liprandi’s writings, as are its political overtones. Liprandi believed that the European revolution after 1815 (in Spain, Naples and Piedmont) were caused, not by popular agitation, but by the actions of a small group of conspirators (predominantly soldiers and veterans ‘deprived of the means of existence’).(129) Clearly in Obozrenie this idea is applied to the Hetairia’s revolt in the Principalities . Finally, the concluding moral of Obozrenie reflected Liprandi’s firm belief that a nation’s political system had to correspond to its level of historical development.(130)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Research into the Greek revolution was only one of the tasks that Kiselev had assigned to his General Staff. Kiselev was also committed to two much larger projects - the
writing of a complete history of previous Russo-Turkish wars and the making of preparations for a possible future one. It is to these subjects that we now turn.

(2) Schroeder, *Transformation*, p. 615.


(4) For Capodistrias’ own account of this and other meetings with Hetairia representatives, see ‘Zapiska grafa Ionna Kapodistrii o ego sluzhebnoi deiatel’nosti’, *SIRIO*, III, 1868, pp. 215-57 passim.

(5) The Phanariots were a Greek or Hellenised Christian aristocracy, loyal to the Sultan and entrusted with the highest posts in the Ottoman civilian administration. Their service was characterised by utter corruption and despotic rule over their Christian subjects. The ultimate goal of many was to become the Hospodar of one of the Danubian Principalities in order to appropriate state taxes and amass a personal fortune, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 329-32. Since the early-mid eighteenth century the Russian government had patronised the caste, the Hospodars in particular, as a source of influence in the Balkans. During the various Russo-Turkish wars many Phanariots openly supported Russia and, as was the case with Constantine Ypsilantis (Alexander’s father), following peace negotiations they had been forced into exile in Russia. The Phanariots, famed for their wiliness, often abused Russian patronage for their own ends. Constantine, for example, as Hospodar of Wallachia, had prompted Russia’s occupation of the Principalities in 1806 by offering to supply their army at his own expense. He hoped to be rewarded by being made the lifetime ruler of the Principalities. Constantine was however unable to supply the army as promised and soon came into conflict with the occupying Russian forces, G. F. Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, 1774-1828: A Study in Imperial Expansion* (Boulder, Colo., 1976), pp. 38-43. Following his removal from office in 1808 and subsequent exile to Russia, Constantine was nevertheless awarded with a large pension and his sons accepted into the elite Chevalier-Guards Regiment. When, in turn, Alexander Ypsilantis also attempted to entangle Russia in the Balkans, the Tsar must have been galled by the ingratitude shown to him by this Phanariot family. On the Ypsilantis family in Russia see G. L. Arsh, ‘Ipsilanti v Rossi’, *VI*, 1985, No.3, pp. 88-101.


(7) Arsh, *Dvizhenie*, pp. 264-91. In a subsequent article, Arsh maintains that the messenger captured in February 1821 was on his way to see the Serbian leader Milosh Obrenovich and that it was only at this late stage that Ypsilantis decided to switch the location of the initial uprising from the Morea to Moldavia, ‘A. Ipsilanti’, p. 224.


(9) *VPR* II/IV, 1980, p. 410, G. A. Stroganov to Milosh Obrenovich, no later 31 December 1821 OS. According to Liprandi, there was never any chance of the Balkan Slavs assisting...
Ypsilantis. Apparently the Slavs disliked the Greeks more than the Turks, blaming their miserable existence on the misrule of Phanariot Greeks such as Ypsilantis' father Constantine, RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.407, f.76, Opyt slovoistolkovatela Ottomanskoi imperii (hereafter Opyt). In contrast, Hetairia's aim of enlisting the support of Ali Pasha and the Albanians was to prove quite successful, although their relations were never particularly cordial. As one British observer reported, 'The policy of the Albanians...during the actual contest of the Greeks with the Porte, though not avowed is, in fact, that of an armed neutrality, secretly counteracting the Turks when they are likely to gain the ascendant and checking the Greeks when they are inclined to encroach upon Albanian interests: for there is undoubtedly a strong [illegible] of jealousy, in the policy of the Albanians towards the Greeks, as well as of suspicion as to the future fortunes of Greece. They are well aware of the superior talents, knowledge and general influence of the Greeks', PRO, FO 352/9B, Report of N. Meyer, 31 March 1824 (no folio numbers were available for this file). On Ali Pasha’s reasons for assisting the Greeks, see G. L. Arsh, Albania i Epir v kontse XVIII-nachale XIX v. (Moscow, 1963), pp. 302-30.

(10) Arsh, Dvizhenie, p. 255.
(11) Iovva, ‘Iz istorii Russko-Greko-Moldavskikh revoliutcionnykh sviazei’, p. 122. Iovva repeats his claims in Bessarabia, pp. 49-56, 166. The idea that Russia assisted Ypsilantis’ revolt is, in fact, of very long standing and has been entertained by, amongst others, Metternich (see Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, p. 254) and Marx, Eastern Question, p. 21

(12) See above, footnote 4.
(15) The controversy between Iovva and Arsh continued for some years. Deprived, however, of any substantial new documentary evidence the argument degenerated into a repetition of established ‘facts’ and even to personal accusations of dishonesty and breaches of academic etiquette, see I. F. Iovva, ‘Russkoe pravitel’stvo’, p. 218; G. L. Arsh, ‘Grecehskii vopros’, p. 154.

(16) Arsh, ‘A. Ipsilanti’, pp. 211-16. After 1815, Ypsilantis had served in St Petersburg with Kiselev as one of Alexander I’s adjutants, and, subsequently, with M. F. Orlov and other Decembrists in the Chevalier-Guards Regiment.

(18) The Greek historian I. Φιλανθρωπος, received the account firsthand from a relative of Ypsilantis, Δοκίμιος ιστορικόν περὶ τῆς Ελληνικῆς Επαναστάσεως (Athens, 1859), I, pp. 87-88, for a commentary, see Arsh, Dvizhenie, pp. 280-84.
(19) Nekhchina, Dvizhenie dekabristov, I, pp. 327, 365; I. S. Dostian, Russkaia obschestvennaia mys’ i Balkanskie narody (Moscow, 1980), p. 256. Orlov's proposal was not accepted and so he withdrew from the organisation.

(20) Iovva, Iz zhnye dekabristy, pp. 85-87, Bessarabia, pp. 228-29; A. V. Fadeev, ‘Gresheskoe natsional’noe osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie i russkoe obschestvo pervykh desiatletii XIX veka’, NNI, 1964, No.3, p. 47; Arsh, Dvizhenie, p. 283. It is not entirely clear why Orlov did not aid Ypsilantis at the beginning of the revolt. Since Ypsilantis’ plans were still evolving between October 1820 and February 1821 it is possible that Orlov was not informed of the changes. What is certain is that Orlov was not in Kishinev at the beginning of the revolt, but in Kiev, Arsh, Dvizhenie, pp. 280-84.

(22) Iovva, Iz zhnye dekabristy, pp. 23-24, however, states that Kiselev did know something of Ypsilantis’ plans but turned a blind eye. Iovva generally exaggerates the complicity of the Second Army in the revolt whereas Arsh (e.g., Dvizhenie, p. 307) plays it down.

(23) Arsh, Dvizhenie, p. 261.
(25) Arsh, Dvizhenie, pp. 304-05. Langerone, for example, was fooled into handing out passports to the Odessa Greeks by a letter from Ypsilantis, (dated 26 February 1821 OS) in which it was claimed that the Tsar knew of and approved of his revolutionary actions, ibid., p. 305.

(26) See below, p. 61. Certain commanders did, however, aid the Hetairists even when knowledge of their Government’s position had been received. General-Major S. A. Tuchkov, the commandant of the Izmail fortress supplied the rebels with arms, Arsh, Dvizhenie, pp. 307-08. Tuchkov was well known for his connections with the Ottoman Christians. During both the 1806-12 and 1828-29 Turkish wars he helped to raise Bulgar partisan units and conduct negotiations with the Cossacks of the Danubian delta, see below, p. 147 (footnote 105), p. 184 (footnote 4), pp. 200-01. Colonel A. G. Nepenin, (commander of the 32nd Chasseurs) probably also supplied Hetairia with arms, Iovva, Dekabristy v Moldavii, p. 122. Generals I. N. Inzov (the Governor-General of Bessarabia) and Sabaneev both attempted to harbour rebels fleeing the Ottoman army, see below, p. 62.


(28) For example, A. V. Rudzevich (the commander of the 7th Corps) wrote to Kiselev on 2 March 1821 OS that 'It is time...for us to take up arms [and] be participants in the resurrection of the Greek Kingdom', Iovva, Iuzhnye dekabristy, p. 25.

(29) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.19, ff.14-17v, Nesselorode to A. Pini, 23 February 1821 OS.


(31) VPR II/IV, 1980, p. 68, Capodistrias to Ypsilantis, 14 March 1821 OS.

(32) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.19, ff.10-13, Nesselrode to G. A. Stroganov, 23 February 1821 OS. Like Metternich, Alexander believed that the Vienna treaties obliged the Great Powers to defend not only the territorial status quo of other Powers but their political system (i.e. monarchy) as well. This idea served as the justification for the intervention of the Powers in the revolutions of Naples, Piedmont and Spain. The main opposition to this interpretation of Vienna came from Britain under Castlereagh and Canning, see C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822 (London, 1925).

(33) VPR II/IV, 1980, p. 68, Capodistrias to R. Edling, 14 March 1821 OS.

(34) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.12-12v, Sabaneev to Inzov, 25 February 1821 OS.

(35) Ibid., ff.25-25v, Wittgenstein to Sabaneev, 26 February 1821 OS; ff.26-26v, Wittgenstein to Inzov, 27 February 1821 OS.

(36) Wittgenstein had adopted the following five-point refugee plan drawn up by Kiselev and Inzov; (i) all inhabitants of Moldavia fearing Turkish reprisals could enter Bessarabia (ii) refugees were to pass through the quarantine system and be placed under surveillance (iii) quarantines were to be established at Frumos and Frishteni (iv) to avoid suspicion that Russia was assisting the rebels, no refugee was to cross the quarantine with arms (v) any Turks pursuing refugees in Russian territory were to be stopped by all means up to and including 'the use of arms but only in the event of absolute necessity', VPR II/IV, 1980, p. 630, Kiselev to Wittgenstein, 9 March 1821 OS. It will be noted that the programme avoided the question of the admittance of rebels, only persons bearing arms were expressly to be denied refuge.

(37) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.20-22, Inzov to Wittgenstein, 25 February 1821 OS; ff.23-24v, A. Pisani to Inzov, 24 February 1821 OS.

(38) Ibid., ff.26-26v, Wittgenstein to Inzov, 27 February 1821 OS.

(39) Ibid., ff.133-34, Wittgenstein to Sabaneev, 26 March 1821 OS. Nesselrode’s instructions (dated 14 March 1821 OS) are in RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.19,
The cause for the delay seems to have been the presence of the Tsar and his entourage in Laibach.

RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.133-34, Wittgenstein to Sabaneev, 26 March 1821 OS. By treaty, Ottoman troops could enter the Principalities only with the consent of Russia. It is clear from this last sentence that Alexander had given his assent to this (this is further confirmed in VPR II/IV, 1980, pp. 113-18, G. A. Stroganov to Nesselrode, 10 April 1821 OS; p. 637, G. A. Stroganov to the Reis-Effendi, 7 April OS). At this stage, the Russian authorities took a number of measure designed to diffuse the situation in the Balkans. One concern was that, once in the Principalities, Ottoman troops could pursue rebels and innocent civilians fleeing to Bessarabia. In order to avert the possibility of a border incident, Wittgenstein was given instructions that any Ottoman troops entering Russian territory were to be disarmed and returned to the Turkish authorities without the force of arms. Force was to be used only if ‘a sustained attack makes this inevitable’, ibid., p. 79, P. M. Volkonskii to Wittgenstein, 25 March 1821 OS. A second major concern was that the Greeks living in Russia’s Black Seas ports would leave to join Ypsilantis’ rebels. Therefore, in March, the Governor of Novorossiia A. F. Langerone was instructed to halt the issuing of passports to them, VPR II/IV, 1980, pp. 68-69, V. P. Kochubei to A. F. Langerone, 15 March 1821 OS. By April, the authorities were confident that these Greeks were suitably impressed by their admonitions and would take no part in the revolt, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.198-98v, Report to Wittgenstein, 5 April 1821 OS.

I. N. Inzov had commanded Bulgar volunteer forces during the 1806-12 Turkish War and in 1818-23 he was in charge of the Bulgarian colonies in Bessarabia. Inzov’s rule was marked by his defense of Bessarabia’s Bulgar settlers against their ‘Romanian’ landlords, Jewsbury, Bessarabia, p. 126. Inzov was keen to use the Greeks as he had the Bulgars to weaken Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Following Ypsilantis’ final defeat he wrote ‘how bravely these Greeks have fought: I am very sad for these people. Although they are not military men they will nevertheless at sometime prove useful to us’, RGIA, fond 958, op.1, d.234, f.6, Inzov to Kiselev, 20 June 1821 OS. According to G. L. Arsh, between March and April 1821 Inzov allowed over 1,000 men to cross from Bessarabia into Moldavia to join Ypsilantis’ uprising, ‘Deiatel’nost’ Filiki Eterii’, pp. 142-43. In early May, Inzov refused to hand over to the Turks a 900-man Hetairia detachment which had been defeated and had retreated into Bessarabia. Inzov subsequently facilitated their escape on boats along the Danube, Arsh, Dvizhenie, p. 320. For Sabaneev’s pro-Greek views see Iovva, Bessarabia, pp. 174-75.

Reports on the numbers of refugees (predominantly Moldavians) entering the Russian Bessarabian quarantine in this period are in RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.281, d.94, ff.32-85 passim and ibid, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.198, 284-84v, 337, 388-90. They give a total of 19,553 refugees. The influx of refugees was spread fairly equally over the year except for July, during which, 8,469 refugees were admitted. Some reports are, however, missing and therefore the actual total will be higher. Iovva, Bessarabia, pp. 148-49, states that 40,000 refugees entered Bessarabia from Moldavia (confirmed in VPR II/V, 1982, p. 50, Inzov to A. N. Golitsin, 20 February 1823 OS) with a further 12,000 (probably Greeks) arriving in Odessa. On the assistance given to this latter group by the Russian government see G. M. Piatigorski, ‘Deiatel’nost’ Odesskoi grecheskoi vspomogatel’noi komissii v 1821-1831gg’, Balkanskie issledovaniia, VIII, 1982, pp. 135-52. On the question of Hetairists, one army report states that following their second and final encounter
with Ottoman forces at Skuliani (17 June 1821 OS) 608 Hetairists ‘escaped to Russian
territory’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.737, f.61v, ‘Obozrenie proizshhestvi v Moldavii i Valakhii
v techenii 1821 goda’, n.d. (for more on this document see below, pp. 70-72). Arsh,
Dvizhenie, p. 331, states that 3,300 Hetairists were officially admitted to Russia in 1821
(following disagreements with the Porte, from May 1821 Alexander refused to return
participants in the revolt to the Turks). It is highly probable that more rebels were accepted
unofficially by Russian military units in Bessarabia.

(47) Dostian, Rossiiia, p. 202. Intelligence from the Second Army confirmed Stroganov’s
complaints. Turkish reprisals in the Principalities continued into 1822, see RGVIA, fond
14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.2, ff.88-89, Intelligence Report, October 1821 OS, ff.88-
89; ff.418-28, Collective note of Boyars, 8 February 1822 OS; ff.717-19, Kiselev to
Volkonski, 8 July 1822 OS. The cost of supporting the occupation of Turkish forces had,
by June 1822, created an almost one million piastres deficit in Moldavia’s budget, ibid,
ff.663-66, Report of anon., 8 June 1822 OS.

(48) Once the Morea broke into revolt, the uprising in the Principalities lost all but a
localised significance. After Hetairia’s first battle with Ottoman troops at Dragatsani on 7
June 1821 OS, Ypsilantis fled to Austria, where he was detained until his death in 1828.
On this period of his life see G. L. Arsh, ‘Tainyi uznik venskogo dvora: Aleksandr Ipsilanti
v avstriiskikh krepostiakh’, NNI, 1987, No.2, pp. 125-45. Ypsilantis’ remaing forces were
finally defeated on 17 June 1821 OS at Skuliani.

(49) VPR II/IV, 1980, pp. 113-18, Stroganov to Nesselrode, 10 April 1821 OS.
(50) Ibid., pp. 118-19, Stroganov to the Porte, 11 April 1821 OS.
(51) Ibid., p. 154, Stroganov to the Porte, 4 May 1821 OS. The partial closure of the
Strait had a devastating effects on Russia’s Black Sea trade. By 1822 Novorossiia’s wheat
exports had been reduced to 50% of their 1819 level, Fadeev, Krisis, pp. 54-55.
(52) VPR II/IV, 1980, p. 112, Stroganov to Nesselrode, 10 April 1821 OS; pp. 203-07,
Stroganov to the Turkish Government, 6 July 1821 OS; pp. 430-38, Nesselrode to Russia’s
ambassadors, 6 February 1822 OS.

(53) Ibid., pp. 176-77, Stroganov to Nesselrode, 5 June 1821 OS. The specific points of
the intended Russo-Serbian negotiations are outlined in ibid., pp. 10-12, Note of Stroganov,
not later 17 February 1821 OS.

(54) Ibid., pp. 149-51, Nesselrode to Stroganov, 1 May 1821 OS.
(55) Ibid., p. 178, Nesselrode to Stroganov, 16 June 1821 OS (two despatches).
(56) Ibid., pp. 203-07, Stroganov to the Turkish Government 6 July 1821 OS.
(57) Crawley, Greek Independence, pp. 18-19.

(58) T. C. Prousis, ‘Aleksandr Sturdza: A Russian Conservative Response to the Greek
Capodistrias, 2 April 1821 OS. Sturdza belonged to an ancient Moldavian Boyar family.
Since the late eighteenth century many such families had emigrated to Russia where they
were used as a source of influence over their peers back home. Whilst in the service of the
Tsars they often pushed for Russian expansion into the Balkans. Sturdza joined the Russian
Foreign Ministry in 1809 as an adviser on the Danubian Principalities, Prousis, ‘Sturdza’,

(59) VPR II/IV, 1980, p. 653, Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, 12 July 1821 OS.
(60) Ibid., pp. 242-45, Capodistrias to Alexander I, 29 July 1821 OS; pp. 256-61,
Capodistrias to Alexander I, 9 August 1821 OS.
(62) Fadeev, Krisis, p. 82.
(63) See below, p. 115.
(64) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 17967, f.1, 7 July 1821 OS.
(65) Outside military circles, such a contingency was, however, never seriously envisaged
during the first years of the Greek crisis. The only military action considered by the Tsar.
and his diplomatic advisers was an occupation of the Principalities, *VPR II/IV*, 1980, pp. 256-61, Capodistrias to Alexander I, 9 August 1821 OS; pp.426-28, Alexander I to D. P. Tatishchev, 5 February 1822 OS.

(66) *RGVIA*, fond VUA, d.18186, ff.1-6, Note of Diebitsch (with comments of Kiselev), 20 June 1821 OS.

(67) *RGVIA*, fond VUA, d.18191, ff.1-2, Note of Kiselev, May 1821.

(68) *RGVIA*, fond VUA, d.18186, f.1v, Note of Diebitsch, 20 June 1821 OS, Kiselev’s comment in margin.

(69) *VPR II/IV*, 1980, p. 191, Circular note of Nesselrode to Russia’s ambassadors, 22 June 1821 OS.


(75) *VPR II/IV*, 1980, p. 197, La Ferronays to Pasquier, 10 July 1821.

(76) *Ibid.*, p. 310, Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, 26 September 1821 OS.


(79) *VPR II/IV*, 1980, p. 335, Kh. A. Lieven to Nesselrode, 21 October 1821 OS.

(80) *RGVIA*, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.2, ff.170-71v, Sabaneev to Wittgenstein, 19 November 1821 OS. See also *ibid.*, ff.251-52v, Lobysevuch (no initial) to Admiral A. S. Greig, 22 November 1821 OS.

(81) *VPR II/IV*, 1980, pp. 386-87, P. M. Volkonskii to Kiselev, 2 December 1821 OS.

(82) *RGVIA*, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.2, f.226, Inzov to Wittgenstein, 7 December 1821 OS.


(84) *Ibid.*, ff. 534-36v, Kiselev to Volkonskii, 9 April 1822 OS.


(86) *VPR II/IV*, 1980, pp. 500-04, Capodistrias to Alexander I, 1 May 1822 OS. The former opposed allied intervention and favoured the occupation of the Principalities. He argued, (correctly as far as Metternich was concerned), that the proposal for a Congress over Greece was designed merely to give the Turks time to crush the revolt.

(87) *Ibid.*, p. 507-10, Alexander I to D. P. Tatishchev, 14 May 1822 OS. The Sultan had agreed to evacuate the Principalities, nominate new Hospodars, resurrect the destroyed Greek churches and restore the freedom of religion to the Greeks, see *ibid.*, p. 506, Nesselrode to C. Bagot, 13 May 1822 OS.


(91) Grimsted, *Foreign Ministers*, p. 264; Schroeder, *Transformation*, p. 621. The latter’s view, *ibid.*, that Alexander was not taken in by Metternich’s assertion that the support of Greece would cause a revolution in Europe is perhaps well founded, see an interesting letter in *VPR II/IV*, 1980, pp. 421-24, Nesselrode to Iu. A. Golovkin, 31 January 1822 OS.

(92) The literature on allied diplomacy over the Greek question in 1821-22 is very large. The ideas of the most important works may, however, be cited. Regarding Russia, Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 5, believes that, under the humanitarian guise of supporting its co-religionists, Russian policy had a ‘definite aim of expansion’ and praises Metternich, pp. 18-19, for restraining her. Grimsted, *Foreign Ministers*, p. 264, criticises Capodistrias in particular for wanting to commit Russia to ‘dangerously expansionist policies in the Balkans’. Both Tsarist and Soviet historiography have denied this, as have
the more recent works in English - Schroeder, *Transformation*, pp. 619-21, and Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 60-61, which are generally sympathetic to Russia. Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, XI, 1895, pp. 323-25, argues that Russia sought neither territory nor influence at Constantinople, only to protect her co-religionists for which she had treaty right. Whilst Tsarist historians e.g. Solov’ev, *Aleksandr I*, pp. 542-43, 574, stressed the religious aspect of the crisis, the Soviets point to the various material factors at play. Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 54-58, cites Russia’s hostility towards the Porte as due to the losses of her Black Sea trade which was manned predominantly by Greek sailors. Although motivated by self-interest, Russia in supporting the Greeks is said to have played the ‘objectively progressive’ role of assisting a war of national liberation, *ibid.*, pp. 368-69.


(93) Metternich boasted that his ploy of ensnaring Russia in Congress diplomacy and dissuading her from war was ‘perhaps the greatest victory that one cabinet has ever gained over another’, Grimsted, *Foreign Ministers*, p. 279.


(95) Dostian, ‘Balkanskii vopros’, p. 158. In contrast, Syroechkovskii, ‘Balkanskaia problema’, p. 206 and Iovva, *Bessarabia*, p. 201, argue that the official reports were written in such a way as to dispel the notion that the Hetairists were part of a European-wide conspiracy and so facilitate Russian intervention.

(96) RGVIA, fond, 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff.30-41 (published in *Documente privind*, I, pp. 343-52).

(97) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.1, ff. 136-38, Report of Inzov, 19 March 1821 OS.


(99) Ypsilantis’ initial idea of visiting France is confirmed in Arsh, *Dvizhenie*, pp. 254-55.


(103) The document is printed in Dostian, *ibid.*, pp. 161-62. The regions named are Wallachia, Bulgaria, ‘Romania’ [whose borders correspond closely to that of Rumelia], Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, Livadia, Morea, Thessaly and Macedonia. It will be noted that many of the regions did not correspond to the territory of an ethnic group and were merely
geographical expressions. Moldavia was not included as Pestel' favoured its annexation by Russia, Dostian, ibid., p. 164.

(108) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.19, ff.82-86v, Pestel’ to Kiselev, 25 May 1821 OS.
(109) Quoted in Syroechkovskii, ‘Balkanskaia problema’, p. 216. It is evident that Pestel' had a generous interpretation of the treaty rights accorded to Russia.
(110) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.6, d.18, ch.2, ff.352-55, Kiselev to Inzov, 18 January 1822 OS.
(111) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.737, n.d.
(112) L. Bol'shakov, Otyskal ia knigu slavnuiu: Poiski i isselodovaniia (Cheliabinsk, 1971), pp. 5, 129; R. Borisov, Review of L. Bol'shakov's ‘Otyskal ia...’, NM, 1972, No.6, p. 284.
(113) Dostian, Russkaia obschestvennaia mys', p. 279. Fragments of the work are printed in ibid., pp. 270-78.
(114) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.737, ff.1v-6v, ‘Obozrenie’. The structure of Hetairia outlined bares some similarity to that mentioned in Arsh, Dvizhenie, pp. 169-176.
(115) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.737, ff.8-19v, ‘Obozrenie’.
(117) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.737, ff.10v-11, ‘Obozrenie’.
(118) Ibid., ff.11v-12.
(119) Ibid., ff.71-72.
(120) Ibid., f.86.
(121) The author correctly understood Hetairia’s goal as being the liberation of the Moldavians, Wallachians and all the Balkan Christians, not just the Greeks, ibid., f.19v.
(122) Ibid., f.88v.
(123) Ibid., ff.90v-91. Although Hetairia failed in the Principalities it did, of course, succeed in its grander objective of igniting a mass uprising in the Morea. The author, however, allows Hetairia little credit for this, arguing that the Greeks fought only out of an ‘instinct of self-preservation’. Due to Turkish reprisals they decided it was ‘better to rise up with the hope of liberation rather than remain defenceless with the assurance of an inevitable and undeserved death’, ibid., f. 89.
(124) Dostian, Mysl’, p. 270. Pestel' firmly believed in the ability of a band of professional revolutionaries to overthrow the Tsarist state, irrespective of the degree of political maturity of the masses.
(126) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.17184, f.103, ‘Otchet ob upravlenii vtoroi armii, 1819-28’.
(129) RGIA, fond 673, op.2, d.407, f.8v, ‘Kratkoe rassuzhgenie o tainoi politsii’, 8 August 1831 OS.
(130) See p. 265.
IV. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SECOND ARMY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT, 1815-34

The main task facing the General Staffs of European armies after 1815 was to establish the lessons of the wars of the Napoleonic era and then determine the degree to which they could, or indeed should, be integrated into existing tactical and strategic doctrine. Potential lessons had been offered, not only by Napoleon himself, but by the response of other states to his aggression. In the case of Russia, the experience of its (largely unsuccessful) Turkish war of 1806-12, acted as a further stimulant in the quest for innovation in military affairs. This chapter traces the development of this process within the Russian army, with particular reference to the search of the Second Army for guidance in a future Russo-Turkish war.

The impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Russian Military Thought

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars heralded not only the modern era of politics, but also that of modern warfare. Their successes served to overthrow the doctrines and conventions of the so-called ‘limited warfare’ of eighteenth-century Europe.(1) The latter arose primarily as the result of the political reforms of Louis XIV, who, in a quest to establish an absolute monarchy, sought to destroy the remnants of the feudal order and greatly increase the power and centralising ability of the state. This allowed for the creation of regular, standing armies, which were more disciplined and reliable than the feudal levies of old. Their main limitations were, however, firstly, their size. A standing army entailed great expense, and so it became common policy for states to create small, professional forces. This latter quality had however a serious drawback; for the time required to train and drill new recruits meant that an army, once lost, could not be recreated in any short space of time. As each state became conscious of its finite military resources, the idea that war was a practical instrument of policy gradually lost ground. Only the brave was ready to risk war, and even then, only the foolhardy prepared to engage in actual combat. Seeking at all cost to avoid the ‘decisive battle’, the attacker was content to occupy an enemy province, the defender content to hinder this enterprise by the construction of fortresses on its borders. War either took the form of a succession of sieges, or, if this proved too troublesome, a series of manoeuvres to cut the enemy’s supply line. War came to resemble a game of chess in which no pieces could be taken; its main purpose was to assist in the negotiations of the diplomat.(2) In short, the means and ends of European war were said to have become ‘limited’, or in contemporary parlance ‘civilised’. (3)
The leading military theorists of the age reflected this conservatism. H. Lloyd (1720-83) believed all strategy to revolve around the ability of each army to defend its supply lines. A. H. D. von Bülow (1757-1807) considered as paramount the position of the army's base and the direction and length of its operational line. Archduke Charles of Austria (1771-1847) based his theory on the unchangeable nature of terrain and the need to occupy its strategic points. The common traits in the works of these theorists are that firstly, none considered the destruction of the enemy's forces as the primary object of war; secondly, all believed military theory to revolve around one overriding principle or factor; and finally, that although ostensibly based on the study of historical experience, all sought to extract from it simplistic ahistorical and rational/geometric laws that existed independently of time and space. Moral, political, social factors were ignored, as were the higher strategic concerns, such as the overall object of the war.(4)

Both the theory and practice of 'limited' warfare were however to be swept away by the Wars of the French Revolution. In the same way that 'limited' warfare was the offspring of the reigning political system - monarchical absolutism, so it was that the new political forces of democracy and nationalism should breed their own revolutionary form of warfare. The defeat of Austria and Prussia and their allies by the French in 1792-99 showed that 'war had again suddenly become an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom considered himself a citizen of the state'.(5)

The revolutionary idea was that universal conscription and promotion by merit would create a people's army to replace the small, aristocratic, professional armies of the old order. War was to be fought not for the selfish interests of the monarch or the cabinet but for the popular and virtuous causes of republicanism and national survival. The material and moral strength on which the Nation at Arms could draw on 'had no longer any definite limits'.(6) This was most apparent regarding the great number of men which the French could put in the field. Heavily out-numbering his opponent, Napoleon was able to seek the destruction of the enemy's forces. For the remainder of the nineteenth-century this new strategic principle was to dominate military thinking.

After 1815 military thinking throughout Europe was dominated by the debate as to what degree the lessons of the 1792-1815 wars were to be accepted. The need for this debate was made particularly pressing by the fact that the major European armies of the old order had themselves, from 1806 onwards, been forced to adopt certain revolutionary principles following their defeats by Napoleon. Universal conscription was introduced in many states, and wars of national liberation were waged by the Prussians, Spanish and Russians.
On the other hand, many wished to avoid the issue altogether. In autocratic states, for example, talk of universal conscription was controversial as it would de facto signify an end to serfdom. The appeal to the cause of nationalism was obviously impossible in the Habsburg Empire, and problematic for the Russian Empire. The conservative reaction after 1815 aimed to consolidate the aristocratic domination of the officer corps and opposed the idea of merit as the primary factor in promotion.

Generally speaking, the conservative political climate of the years of the restoration, the undertakings at Vienna to preserve the European balance of power and the Holy Alliance’s appeal for monarchical solidarity all served to reinforce the trend away from the aggressive tendencies of ‘revolutionary’ warfare and initiated a reversion (of varying degrees) to the methods and doctrines of the period of ‘limited’ war.(7)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In Russia the debate over the question of the Napoleonic legacy was, in official circles, dominated by the military theories of A. H. Jomini (1779-1869). After a number of years service Napoleon’s army, in 1813, Jomini joined the Russian army, having already secured a reputation as one of Europe’s leading theorist following the publication of his *L’art de la guerre* (Paris, 1807). Jomini’s ideas, though ostensibly based on a historical study of the campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great, were essentially a throw-back to the geometric, rationalist tradition of the early Enlightenment. His belief in the existence of *a priori* laws led him to assert that ‘from the most ancient times there has existed fundamental laws upon which the military art is based’, these laws were ‘dependent neither on the type of weapon, nor time, nor space’.(8) Jomini’s originality consisted in accepting that the destruction of the enemy’s forces in the field, not the capture of magazines or fortresses, was the primary aim of combat. To achieve this, the commander had to amass his troops and bring them to bear on the weakest point of the enemy’s force. Success in combat was dependent entirely upon direction of the operational line and the relative number of men on each side. This emphasis on the quantifiable concepts of mass, space and direction allowed Jomini to slip back into the rationalist tradition and construct various geometric models for the correct procedure of combat.(9)

Jomini’s theory dominated the official military doctrine of the Russian army and its General Staffs.(10) In an 1810 edition of the leading military publication *Voennyi zhurnal*, it was said of Jomini’s work:

This is the only theory; if one acts against its rules one cannot expect success other than by blind luck; great commanders have always
followed it...There is no work that...could be of more use to a man preparing himself to take a command.(11)

As already alluded to, the reasons for the wholesale adoption of Jomini’s theory are to be found in the very narrowness of the latter’s ideas themselves. As Jomini sought only mathematically demonstrable eternal laws, his ideas related only to combat; the higher, less tangible realm of strategy was almost entirely ignored. In adopting Jomini’s belief in the primacy of tactics the Russian military establishment could, with justification, continue its Gatchina tradition of strict formations, blind obedience and perfecting drill, as these were the very qualities required to execute Jomini’s geometric models in actual battle. This type of fighting suited smaller, professional units, and therefore avoided the need to discuss controversial issues such as universal conscription or the use of ‘populist’ causes in war such as national pride or religion. Since success was dependent upon executing predetermined rules, the human factor in war could be reduced to a minimum. This avoided the need for initiative, which was considered the first step towards ‘freethinking’.(12) The absence of strategic factors, such as the political object of the war, in the latter’s theory, likewise suited the autocratic state, for, in theory at least, it limited the army’s influence to combat and not politics, which remained the preserve of the Tsar.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The opposition to the official doctrines of the Russian army came predominantly from the future Decembrists and their fellow travellers. In contrast to many ‘progressives’ in other European states, the military ideas of the Decembrists were not, however, simply a repetition of those of the French revolutionaries. Although many revolutionary ideas were adopted, the Decembrists were never prone to the ‘Cult of Napoleon’ that was prominent in Europe at that time. The most important reason for this was the upsurge in nationalist sentiment following Russia’s defeat of Napoleon in 1812. This victory inspired new writings on Russian military history which sought to glorify all things Russian. A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov were said to have been greater commanders than by Napoleon, and that they had invented the latter’s tactical innovations.(13) Consequently Jomini was criticised, not only for the admittedly narrow basis of his work, but also for basing his theories on a study of foreign commanders - Frederick and Napoleon, and not on Russia’s military heroes.

The new nationalist trend in Russian historical writings is primarily associated with F. N. Glinka.(14) In a string of works written after 1815, Glinka attacked the view prevalent in Europe that Russia had not deserved its victory in 1812 and that in general her
military history was not worthy of attention. Russia needed historians who were Russian 'by birth, actions, upbringing, will and spirit' since 'a foreigner with all his good will cannot know Russian history so well as to immerse himself in the spirit of the great forbears of the Russians'. (15) Glinka, in tracing Russia's successes against the Tatars, the Swedes and Napoleon, permeated his works with the idea of that 'national' or 'popular' spirit was the prime factor in victory:

O people of courage, people of renown. Preserve for ever the purity of morals, the greatness of spirit, the passionate love of your cold motherland, be forever Russian and you will be, as you were, first amongst peoples. Centuries will pass...and a new force of all the peoples of the earth will founder upon your strength - a wall which nothing can penetrate. (16)

When Glinka became editor of the official military journal *Voennyi zhurnal* in 1817 he encouraged the publication of military histories of wars from the days of antiquity up to Napoleonic period. Perhaps Glinka's most important decision, however, was to allow the publication of I. G. Burtsov's article 'Mysl' o teorii voennykh znanii' [A Thought on the Theory of Military Knowledge], which was openly anti-Jomini.

Burtsov attacked the scholastic traditions of eighteenth-century military strategy that were so noticeable in Jomini's ideas. Empiricism was held to be the only true approach to the 'science' [nauka] of war, or indeed, of any other subject:

Experience precedes reasoning in man...he observes the objects of his surroundings and using the light of reason discovers their qualities...the uniting of [these] concepts forms knowledge, and their exposition in a systematic order forms science. (17)

Burtsov then criticised Jomini's belief that the study of tactics alone was sufficient for the creation of military science and the training of prospective commandeers:

The reasoning of people who maintain that after the works of Jomini there is nothing left to be decided in military science is entirely false...For the complete training of the commander military knowledge alone is insufficient; all the political sciences which have a bearing on national security...and, on the other side, all the moral [nравственные] factors which command the human heart, must be included in the structure of a general expansive theory. (18)

Burtsov's ideas certainly owed their origin to a study of the Napoleonic wars. However, in contrast to Jomini, who dissected from these campaigns only tactical innovations, Burtsov understood the strategic significance of Napoleon's unification of political and military command, as well as the importance of 'moral' forces, as exhibited in the wars of national liberation waged most notably by the Spanish and the Russian people.
It was against the background of this debate that Kiselev began considering his project for the writing of the histories of previous Russo-Turkish wars. The exact circumstances surrounding the origins of this venture are not entirely clear; it is probable however that Kiselev was influenced by the call of Glinka for works on Russian military history and later, by Burtsov’s complaint that:

The writing up of campaigns, which forms the main activity of contemporary military writers, although having an influence on the general theory of war, this influence is mediocre, weak and practically useless. It is useless because these writers...merely repeat the rules which have already been clearly forwarded in the writings of Jomini and Archduke Charles.

Burtsov’s criticism was directed primarily at the Russian army’s official military historian D. P. Buturlin. As a leading member of the pro-Jomini General Staff of H.I.M. (and subsequently, of the First Army), Buturlin attempted in his writings to apply the Jomini’s principles to previous Russian wars. The result was a turgid collection of facts and figures relating exclusively to battle. Analysis of the political object of the war, the topography of the theatre and intelligence on the forces, tactics and strategy of the Turks was almost entirely absent. Kiselev’s plan was essentially to rectify this type of military history through the adoption of the empirical approach advocated by Burtsov.

Kiselev and the Development of the Empirical School

Kiselev began preparations for his project immediately upon his appointment to head of the General Staff of the Second Army in 1819. Archives were to be searched for materials ‘which could serve as guidance in case of the opening of military action against the Turks’. Thus Kiselev’s study, though historically based, was intended for didactic and not purely theoretical or academic purposes. Writing to A. A. Zakrevskii in 1819 he developed his proposition further:

Previous action ought to serve as instruction for the future: from this the observer can deduce the reasons for success and failure...and will adopt sure principles for his own guidance.

The empirical approach was needed as ‘theory cannot accommodate the multitude of individual factors which can be known solely by the attentive observation of events and places’. A co-ordinated project was needed to gather the relevant documents as they were ‘scattered in different places and in a disorderly fashion mixed up with a huge number of insignificant documents’.
Specifically, Kiselev sought material on Russia's Turkish campaigns, 1711-1812, relating to four issues. Firstly, a detailed description of the 'material sphere' of Turkish wars was needed, that is, an account of the Russian army's supply and magazine network, the construction and placement of artillery depots, hospitals, bridges and the use of the Danubian Principalities as administrative and supply centres. Secondly, a topographical description of the Balkan theatre was to establish the location of waterways, roads, river crossings, Turkish fortresses, mountain passes (25) as well as the effects of the local climate on health of Russian troops. Thirdly, a survey of the various war plans offered by Russian generals and an assessment of the degree to which they were appropriate and successfully executed. (26)

Finally, and somewhat controversially, Kiselev was keen to establish the various political objects of Russia's Turkish wars. He attributed Russia's generally mediocre successes against the Porte to the fact that the political object was often unclearly defined and had little bearing on the formulation and execution of war plans. Kiselev clearly understood the significance of politics for a coherent military strategy and approached the Clausewitzian ideal that 'state policy was the womb in which War is developed'. (27) His idea was controversial in so far as it could be seen to imply the interference of the military in a question traditionally reserved for the Tsar and his foreign policy advisers. (28) Kiselev outlined his ideas thus: Russia had to decide whether its object in a Turkish war was the 'expulsion of the Turks from Europe or the acquisition of specific, particular gains at the conclusion of peace'. The war's political object was to determine the means by, and the manner in which, the war was to be fought:

The first proposition cannot be fulfilled without the mediation of other powers and the use of extensive material means [two acting armies, a fleet, supplies for two campaigns, strong reserves in Europe and Asia]. The second demands the development of less resources, but requires greater surprise and speed so as to act on the spirit [dukh] of the enemy, to force by fear that which the usual methodical action cannot achieve. Therefore in the first case all must be subordinated to the material factor, in the second, all to the moral [nравственый] factor; but in both cases, the wisest use of the resources given by the government is an essential condition, without which success cannot be expected. (29)

Kiselev then reiterated a view that had been gaining currency since the end of the 1806-12 Turkish war, namely, that the ignorance of the Balkan theatre meant that Russia's victories against the Turks came at a huge economic cost which was not recouped in the eventual peace treaty. (30) By way of example Kiselev gave a brief outline of the last Turkish war. (31) This example was particularly apt as Russia's political objects during this
war vacillated wildly between 1806 and 1812, ranging from a possible partition of the
Ottoman domains in Europe with France, to a unilateral annexation of Bessarabia and the
Principalities, to a state of affairs whereby in 1811 Russia was content to sign peace on
almost any terms. The absence of a consistent and coherent war aim in this period had a
disastrous effect on the formulation and execution of Russian war plans.

In his review Kiselev pointed to numerous instances of spumed chances to defeat
the main Turkish forces. The first reason for this was that the strategies adopted by the
Russian generals did not conform to the object of the war. When, for example, in 1810
Russia’s political situation demanded that the Porte be quickly forced to the negotiating
table her generals continued to fight a slow, methodical war of siege warfare, so causing the
military stalemate to drag for two more years. The second reason was attributed to the
slow movement of the Russian army caused by deficiencies in the ‘material factor’, such as
delays in building bridges, the lack of artilllery and supply problems. Although a greater
number of men were used against Turkey than ever before, the insufficient measures taken
against disease caused the army to remain undermanned. By the eventual Treaty of
Bucharest 1812 Russia gained only Bessarabia in Europe which was ‘scant reward for the
great sacrifices made during the six years of war’.

Thus one of the primary motives behind Kiselev’s project was to address and then
rectify the fact that Russia, despite its victories, gained little from Turkish wars, since she,
firstly, did not have a clear idea of the political object of the war and, secondly, failed to
learn the lessons of previous wars by paying insufficient attention to the theatre of war.
What was needed therefore was not some all embracing abstract theory such as Jomini’s
but detailed specific empirical knowledge.

On beginning his project Kiselev sought the opinion of other high-ranking officials
of the Tsarist establishment. Diebitsch and E. F. Kankrin both agreed with the proposal.
Buturlin found it to be ‘fort utile et fort intéressant’. Nesselrode was sufficiently
impressed to grant Kiselev’s request to use the Foreign Ministry’s archives. Aside from
this source, materials were collected up to 1824 in archives of the General Staff of H.I.M.,
the Chancellery of the General-Quartermaster, the Department of the Inspectorate and the
Military-Topographical Department. Many valuable documents were also found in the
Bessarabian fortress of Izmail.

The search for material did not, however, proceed without difficulty. The main
source of resistance came from Baron K. F. Toll and the Quartermaster Staffs (of the
General Staffs of H.I.M. and the First Army), who were suspicious of Kiselev’s intentions.
The principles of the Kiselev’s project were so divergent from the maxims of Jomini that it was seen as a threat to the latter’s institutional wisdom. Toll believed that his staffs had a monopoly on all strategic innovation and viewed Kiselev’s General Staff as overly independent and thus a potential rival. (38)

Toll thus ensured that his Quartermaster Staff refused to send Kiselev certain requested documents on the rather tenuous argument that ‘in the case of an enquiry [from another source] we ourselves will be left with nothing’, and claimed its department was too overworked to make copies for him. (39) Kiselev was requested to send his own aides to make the relevant copies, though it was not until 1822 that they were admitted into the archives. (40) In granting this concession, Toll was nevertheless quick to voice the opinion that the proposed research was unlikely to yield any significant results. Topographical information on the Balkan theatre was said to be already provided in the maps of his own Quartermaster Staff, whilst the military history of the Turkish wars had already been studied in Buturlin’s Istoriia pokhodov Rossii v XVIII stoletii [History of the Campaigns of the Russians in the 18th Century] and the recently completed Opisanie vsekh pokhodov protiv Porty Ottomanskoi s 1769 po 1812 [An Account of all the Campaigns against the Ottoman Porte from 1769 to 1812]. Toll considered that:

These works deserve the attention of all military men, for, without burdening the reader with the details of unimportant events, gives him a full understanding of the course of each campaign...moreover, the writer’s analysis clearly uncovers all the mistakes made during each campaign, so making the work most instructive. (41)

Clearly, Toll did not understand (or rather, did not want to understand) the idea behind Kiselev’s project. Buturlin’s works concentrated entirely on battles - the ‘unimportant events’ which he omitted included the construction of the army’s supply system, the crossing of rivers, the administration of the Principalities and so forth. All of these factors were in fact more important to the outcome of Russo-Turkish wars than battle since, in the field, Russian forces were almost assured of defeating the Turks without great difficulty.

The project faced other problems. The files of some archives were in total disorder and had to be sorted by Kiselev’s aides themselves. (42) By 1822 the lack of funding for the project began to make itself felt. (43) As a result, not all the necessary documents were gathered. (44)

Occupied with his many other duties, Kiselev delegated almost all the tasks connected with the research and writing of the project to certain staff officers, almost all of
whom were either members of, or close to Decembrist circles. Pestel' was assigned the task of buying relevant books and maps in St Petersburg during his visit there in the winter of 1819-20. Burtsov was commissioned to write the chapters concerning the 1806-12 Turkish war and supervised the collection of materials. The progressively minded N. V. Petrov wrote up the wars of Catherine II and was the overall editor of the project.

The project was finally completed towards the end of 1827. It consisted of five parts: (i) the campaigns of Peter I (1711) and Anne I (1736-39); (ii) the first Turkish war of Catherine II (1769-74); (iii) the second Turkish war of Catherine II (1787-91); (iv) campaigns of Alexander I (1806-12); (iv) Obozrenie material'nykh sposobov turetskoi voiny [A Review of the material resources of Turkish wars].

As regards the content of the study, it is clear that Kiselev himself was somewhat disappointed with the fruit of his labours. Due to the unavailability of certain documentary collections and the lack of resources assigned to the project he did not consider the information given in the study either 'complete or sufficient'. It could be argued that the study was actually too factual, at the expense of analysis and a theoretical oversight. Though to a degree warranted, such a criticism misunderstands the principle behind the work. Kiselev was interested in neither military theory nor military history in the academic sense. Unlike many of his contemporaries he sought neither to construct an all-embracing strategic theory, nor glorify the exploits of his predecessors. As a practical man, making preparations for a Turkish war, he was interested in solving the concrete problems Russia had encountered in previous wars. As a result, the study's emphasis on issues such as the location of Balkan mountain passes, or the best place to cross the Danube, or the supply system used by Suvorov, whilst of great use to the commanders of the Second Army, were and are of far less interest to anyone else, including the present-day reader. This is not to say, however, that the project did not have wider implications for the Russian military establishment, for it did. Kiselev did draw certain conclusions regarding Russia's previous Turkish wars which he hoped to use in his quest to increase the power and independence of the Second Army's General Staff. Before outlining Kiselev's ideas on this question we turn to the pioneering work of I. P. Liprandi which ran parallel to that of Kiselev's.

The Military Ideas of I. P. Liprandi

Pushkin's rhetorical question 'who and where is Liprandi?' succinctly expressed the enigmatic status that our subject had acquired in contemporary Russian public life. Though vilified by Herzen and the liberal intelligentsia for his anti-revolutionary espionage work, an
uneasy doubt nevertheless remained that one was dealing with no mere grey and faceless
Tsarist yes-man. Historian, publicist, soldier, strategist, spy - there seemed no end to the
talents of this freethinking reactionary.

Liprandi's abilities first came to the attention of the military command during the
Russian army's occupation of France. Its commander, M. S. Vorontsov, employed
Liprandi's services between 1815 and 1819 to study the techniques of Napoleon's secret
police as well as making him head of the Russian military police. Following the return
of these forces to Russia, Liprandi was transferred to the Second Army, and began service
in the cradle of the Southern Decembrists - M. F. Orlov's 16th Infantry Division. There he
began mixing with the local elite of Kishinev and regularly attended the meetings of
Decembrists at Orlov's house. The question of his political affiliations at this stage have
raised some controversy, and Liprandi has been cited as being both a Decembrist and a
Tsarist agent.

The evidence seems to suggest that, from 1815, Liprandi was certainly a secret
agent but that during the 1820s he was concerned primarily with external espionage and the
gathering of intelligence on the Ottoman Empire. His movement in Decembrist circles
was probably not connected with his espionage activities; he was simply drawn to their
discussion of modern, enlightened ideas. Though a firm believer in Tsarism, Liprandi was
always keen to adopt 'progressive' ideas if they could be used to strengthen the Russian
army and state. This apparent contradiction is clearly revealed in his ideas on the tasks of
the secret military police. Liprandi was convinced by his experience of the Napoleonic
Wars of the primacy of psychological and moral motives in explaining human behaviour.
His favourite and oft-repeated phrase was that 'spirit [dukh] forms the soul of an army'.
He believed that in a well-managed army with good commanders and a esprit de corps
there was no need for a secret police. But in an army in which:

...every soldier sees himself as the last member of his nation
[ootechestvo]...In an army where the officer is a nobody, unprotected
from private and personal persecution and where the high command is
arrogant, unapproachable and deaf to his complaints - in such an army
not only the body dies, but also the vigour of spirit that is the first
quality of any military man.

The standing of the army in the nation at large was also of great importance. In Austria, for
example, 'the soldier is utterly despised by the people and as such is deprived totally of
spirit...This Empire owes its existence solely to [the workings of] its police'. Such
views were hardly those of a traditional reactionary and they implied the same criticism of
the harsh discipline of Russian army as had been levelled by Kiselev.
For the Tsarist authorities, more controversial still were Liprandi's views on the merits of irregular warfare and his representation of the partisan as a model soldier. The latter had been impressed by the fighting spirit of partisans, as exhibited during the Napoleonic wars. Liprandi researched into the history of irregular warfare and concluded that the popular anti-Napoleonic uprisings of 1812-13 constituted the 'formation of a true strategic partisan war' which finally 'appeared in its full glory as an idea and as a science'. Liprandi believed that Europe's greatest modern army was defeated primarily by partisan warfare and not the strategy and tactics of the allied regular armies. As he put it:

...neither the numerical strength nor the organisation of his [Napoleon's] army, neither the ability of his commanders nor his own genius was powerful enough to strangle the hydra of a peoples' war that constantly renewed itself.

These partisans exhibited exactly the type of martial spirit that Liprandi believed all successful armies required:

- Blind executors of commands have a respectable place in the line, but the individual partisan, who is often in action away from the eyes of the commander, ought to have completely different qualities: an enterprising spirit, courage, and a passion for service ought to animate each of them. It is not sufficient for him [the partisan] to execute orders only in such a way as to avoid being called into account [for his actions].

Again the influence of Kiselev and the Second Army's quest for humanising military service are felt in these words.

It was, however, Liprandi's knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and its armed forces that primarily attracted the interest of the military authorities in St Petersburg. In 1832 the Nicholas Military Academy was established and the Tsar was receptive to any new military ideas which could potentially be used as a part of the training programme for the next generation of General Staff officers. In April of that year, the Academy's President, Grand Duke Michael commissioned Liprandi to systemise his research into the Ottoman Empire in an accessible written form, under the working title *Kharaktericheskie svoistva i politicheskie mnenia turetskikh voisk* [The Characteristics and Political Outlook of the Turkish Military Forces]. The original idea for such a work was Liprandi's, who, in his own words, had some years earlier began making preparations for it as a 'private individual'. It seems certain, however, that Liprandi concurred with Kiselev on this matter in order that their two separate studies would complement each other. Liprandi was certainly keen to acknowledge his debt to Kiselev, who acted as his patron and intellectual mentor. Liprandi wrote of his own work:
This important enterprise...could not, of course, with the exception of your Excellency, have been successfully completed by anyone else. As long ago as 1820, whilst in the middle of countless tasks, you laid the first foundation in Russia for the acquisition and collection of topographical and military intelligence on the Eastern [Ottoman] Empire.(71)

Liprandi even proposed adding his study to Kiselev’s own study as ‘no one more than your Excellency has a greater right to my works’. (72)

By 1834, Liprandi’s impressive study was completed. It was entitled Opyt slovoistolkovatelia Ottomanskoi imperii... and, as an aid to clarity, took the form of an encyclopaedia. (73) The tasks of the work were to give a historical analysis of the influence of religious, political and psychological factors on the mentality of the various ethnic groups that comprised the Ottoman armed forces. Especial emphasis was given to the traditional influence of the Koran on the Ottoman martial spirit. (74)

Although Liprandi’s study, much like Kiselev’s, essentially was comprised of a collection of empirical facts on the Ottoman Empire, the former used his material to present a new concept of strategy. Liprandi introduced his strategic ideas by first criticising the work of Jomini, as had now become obligatory for the officers of the Second Army. The belief in the latter’s ‘mathematical strategy’ (as Liprandi put it) was so widespread that in case of war it was considered sufficient merely ‘to apply it to the current circumstances’:

There is [however] another theory, which has nowhere been expounded, and without which all the advantages of lofty strategic considerations and precise tactical calculations are rendered worthless. (75)

This new theory essentially revolved around the detailed study of one’s prospective enemy. A psychological profile of the enemy’s mental strengths and especially weaknesses were to be constructed and, in time of war, exploited for one’s own ends. Liprandi argued that this idea had first been expressed in the Old Testament and the Iliad, and used in practice by the Romans and the Greeks. The latter are said to have understood the concept of strategy as meaning voennye khitrosti [lit. ‘military cunningness’], which in fact largely corresponds to the idea of ‘stratagem’. (76) Alexander, Hannibal and Julius Caesar were all said to have based their warfare on a detailed study of the weaknesses of their foes.

As regards contemporary warfare, Liprandi believed the key to understanding an enemy’s army was to first study the ethnic, regional and national make-up of its troops, and then the corresponding military characteristics of each:

Each European army is composed from peoples of different regions, different origins, morals, habits, spirit and so forth. That which frightens some, excites courage in others; the means successfully used
against an army of one region cannot be used against an army from another.(77)

Some nationalities for instance have an oversensitive fear of artillery, others take no notice, though will 'rout at the whistle of a single bullet'.(78) It was therefore the character of the enemy that was to determine strategic principles:

The qualities of character and political ideas of differing peoples and their armies form the main foundation of military science. It is only upon this foundation that strategic ideas can be based.(79)

Liprandi certainly wrote from experience. Having seen active service in Europe, 1807-15, and the Ottoman Empire, 1828-29, Liprandi had fought with and against a whole array of different nationalities. He was most impressed by the defeat of Napoleon by the Spanish and Russian partisans. This was seen as a victory of the force of the national character and spirit over impersonal tactical mastery.(80) The 1828-29 war was also a formative experience for Liprandi, as he was assigned the task of recruiting Balkan partisans. As these included Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, Greeks, Moldavians and Wallachians he was able at close quarters to observe their respective 'national' idiosyncrasies. On a more abstract level, Liprandi was possibly also influenced by the contemporary Romantic idea of the existence of 'national genius', which expressed itself in all modes of thought and action.

Knowledge of one's enemy was held to be especially important with regard to the forces of the Ottoman Empire:

The most experienced and skilful commander of wars against the French will at every step be dumbfounded when up against the Turk; he will be stopped by trifling obstacles, upset by movements which, in his opinion, are incorrect, and so forth.(81)

It was therefore the insufficient knowledge of the workings of the Turk's mind that accounted for Russia's traditional difficulty in defeating quickly an enemy that was far inferior to Russia in terms of tactical ability and firepower. It was precisely this failure that Liprandi aimed to rectify this by his study.

His main hypothesis regarding the defining characteristic of the Turkish mind was its domination by a religious world-view:

Turks of the fifteenth century are barely indistinguishable from present-day Turks. The Koran serves them not only as their law, but as their primary ecclesiastical, civil and military code.(82)

Thus despite the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826(83) and the subsequent creation of regular troop battalions on the European model, Liprandi believed that religious dogma,
mysticism and superstition, not rational thought, dominated the mind and world view of the Turk. The power of omen was said to be particularly strong:

The least significant event or circumstance - dreams, the flight of birds...the howl of dogs or wolves...the call of an owl...an eclipse of the moon or the sun, the shapes of cloud formations...examples can have a favourable effect, but, for the most part, the reverse is true. [The latter] once noticed by just one of their numerous units...is, in an instant, passed on through all the ranks...then at the appearance of the slightest obstacle or danger this fatal omen creates a general panic.\(^8^4\)

A high-ranking Turkish officer had told Liprandi that the Turkish army arrived at Kulevcha for the fateful battle of June 1829 in the knowledge that it was doomed to defeat. The omens for this were, firstly, that the Grand Vizier had mounted a black horse which had white patches on its legs in the shape of a cross, and secondly, on their march to battle the army had passed two stray cart-horses from the baggage trail of another commander. Knowing well this Turkish idiosyncrasy, the Greeks and Serbs during their wars of independence would litter their enemy's path with purposely-designed 'bad omens'.\(^8^5\)

The Turks believed that victory was achieved neither by the superiority of their forces, their courage, nor the skill of their commander. The will of God alone granted victory, and as a result, the Ottomans had no great respect for even the most successful of their commanders. Defeat, however, was always blamed on the commander. Should that commander be the Grand Vizier then all his army would be routed, and could not be regathered until the following April.\(^8^6\)

Providence also determined the fate of each individual Turk in battle. It was believed that:

Every man has [written] on his forehead the precise minute of his death: this accounts for the fact that Turks wear neither armour nor helmets nor anything that could protect themselves from the blows of their enemy.\(^8^7\)

This being the case, Liprandi was interested as to why this fatalism did not render the Turks as brave and effective in the field as they famously were under siege. He discovered a great number of factors at play. Bravery in the field was limited to certain number of fanatics; the rest of the troops 'serve as mere decoration'.\(^8^8\) It was thus important to attack and destroy these elements first. The Ottoman rank and file drew their courage from the results of their first encounter with specific enemy units:

Defeat during the first engagement with the enemy has an influence on all peoples, but on the Muslim this influence is inexplicable. Turks are
completely convinced that if, during the first encounter,...they deliver
the first blow then their victory is assured.\(^{(89)}\)

In the 1828 Turkish campaign, the significant encounter occurred between the 3rd Hussars Division and Turkish forces at Kozludzhi. The Turks won, and from this time on attacked this division without fear or remorse. Liprandi found a solution to this in the actions of General A. L. Voinov during the 1806-12 war. The latter ordered his strongest regiments to don the uniforms of previously defeated units, so as to entice the usually conservative Turkish forces into battle.\(^{(90)}\)

During battle itself it was important to exploit other Turkish idiosyncrasies. On approaching the field of battle, it was important to create as much noise as possible; the sound of marching, drums, whistling shells could in itself induce a Turkish rout.\(^{(91)}\) The Turks paid almost no attention to gathering intelligence of enemy movements. This was due to the custom whereby Turkish spies were not punished for failing to inform their commander of the nearby presence of enemy troops or their preparation for an impending attack. This was merely taken as a lack of ability; misinformation, however, was immediately punishable by death. As a result, Turkish spies were very cautious about supplying any information at all.\(^{(92)}\) It was thus relatively simple to outmanoeuvre Turkish forces, or, as Baron P. K. Geismar had shown at the battle of Boeleshti in 1828, to attack Turkish encampments at night.\(^{(93)}\)

When attacking, Liprandi considered it paramount to direct one's forces against the Turkish infantry. Turkish cavalry was considerably superior to Russian in both terms of manoeuvrability and sharpshooting.\(^{(94)}\) It weakness was it always acted independently and never assisted its infantry, due to the fear that should the latter be routed they would turn on their own cavalry in order to use their horses as a means of escape.\(^{(95)}\) Turkish infantry would almost certainly be routed if attacked in the rear; their inability to retreat in an orderly fashion meant that such a rout would result in its complete destruction. An interesting ploy in this respect could be learned from the Greeks and Serbs who, during battle, would shout in Turkish 'the infidels are attacking the rear'. This was a traditional Turkish war cry and served as a signal for a certain panic-stricken flight.\(^{(96)}\) Another cunning ruse was to attack the Ottoman musicians since, from the time of the Jannissaries, Turkish forces were prone to rout if their battle music for any reason ceased.\(^{(97)}\)

As regards the Turks noted ability to resist sieges, Liprandi discovered that fortress garrisons, when surrounded with no chance of escape, showed unparalleled bravery. Often unable or unwilling to risk a storm, the Russian army had traditionally allowed its sieges to
develop into prolonged blockades in an attempt to starve out the Turkish garrisons.
Liprandi considered this a great folly as, in contrast to the widely-held view, he discovered that the Turkish army and its fortresses were always extremely well supplied. The reason for this was to be found in the Turks’ unscrupulous attitude towards procuring requisitions from its civilian population:

In general, the means used by the Turks with regard to [securing] food supplies are in complete contrast to those used by enlightened European states. This military power [the Ottoman Empire], not yet possessing solid civilian foundations, does not pay any great attention to the well-being of the population, especially in its European Christian provinces. Therefore, in time of war, it invariably places at its disposal all the property of the inhabitants in the theatre of war, caring little of famine or of the exhaustion of the peasantry.(98)

Liprandi believed that the only solution to the problem of besieging Turkish fortresses was either to not conduct sieges at all or, if a siege were vital, to leave one route of escape open, as the Turks would not be able to resist taking it.(99)

Liprandi’s analysis may be read as an indictment on Russia’s traditional means of warfare against the Turks. The methodical war plans of the past, with their emphasis on the slow and predictable movement of troops to increase the area of the operational base and siege warfare suited the mentality of the Turks. The latter were extremely resilient under siege, and took the methodical movements of regular troops as a sign of passivity and uncertainty on the part of the enemy.(100). Liprandi believed that the Turk’s morale and will to fight could be far more easily defeated by any quick, unexpected, movement and by attacking the Turks in the field whenever possible.(101).

Although Liprandi possibly exaggerated the importance of the specific effects of particular ruses on the Turks, his general aim of seeking to understand the mind of the enemy was certainly important and innovative. No less significant was his research into the ethnic breakdown of Ottoman forces.

Liprandi believed that the best trained Ottoman troops were to be found in the Sultan’s European provinces. The latter had traditionally provided the Porte with its standing army(102); whilst Africa and Asia provided volunteer forces in time of war. Added to the fact that European Turkey contained many ‘military settlements’ [voennoye poseleniia] it was clear that ‘war in European Turkey is incomparably more difficult than in Asiatic [Turkey]’.(103)

The most important source of infantry in Europe was ‘Albania’. (104) Liprandi considered Albanians to be ‘the best irregular infantry in the world’ as they were excellent
shots, able when outnumbered to disperse and then regather and, generally, because of their natural predilection for ‘barbaric cruelty combined with cunning’. As a result they were in high demand, and hired out their services to Egyptians, Serbs and the Hospodars of the Principalities. Their mercenary status, however, proved to be their weakness, for, in Liprandi’s words, the adage ‘no money, no Albanians’ was a constant source of concern to their employers. Ypsilantis, for instance, was said to have ‘based all his hopes’ on having enough funds to hire them. The Sultan’s financial difficulties, as well as his political dispute with the largely autonomous Albanian Pashas meant that during the 1828-29 war only 7,000 Albanians served in the Ottoman army. The other weaknesses of the Albanians were their unreliability, a proneness to bribery, an inability to fight outside forests or mountains and their excessive fear of artillery. (105)

The best cavalry available to the Sultan was found in Bosnia. (106) The Bosnian cavalry comprised Turks who, in former times, had played an important role in the expansion of the Sultan’s domains into Europe. In return for their service they were given lands in Bosnia and in other provincial outposts of Ottoman Europe. Although outstanding cavalymen, Liprandi believed that their utility had declined in recent years. Their transformation from warrior caste to landed aristocracy had, since the middle of the eighteenth century, eroded both their martial spirit and loyalty to the Sultan. Their increasingly strained relations with the Porte meant that they played almost no part in the 1828-29 war. As a result of the Serbian and Greek revolutions the caste was deprived of most of its estates, after which its importance declined rapidly. (107)

Since the greatest weakness of the best Ottoman troops (the Albanians, Bosnians and Janissaries) was their unreliability in time of war, Liprandi believed that the Sultan’s military reforms and the creation of a regular standing army would be very beneficial to the Porte:

The formation of a [regular] Turkish army promises many successes. Their skill in the use of firearms, their innate individual bravery, their religious fanaticism...their half-savage morals and love of freedom, once combined with organisation and regulation, could soon make them one of the finest armies in all Europe. (108)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The conclusion Kiselev reached, as a result of his both his own and Liprandi’s work, was that Russia, in each of its previous Turkish wars, had expended far too much time, resources and men to defeat an essentially inferior enemy. As a result the benefits accrued at the peace negotiations were often negligible compared to the losses incurred by
Russia during the course of the war. The reasons for this were twofold; firstly, due to the lack of knowledge regarding the theatre and forces of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, due to the failure to co-ordinate military strategy with the political object of the war.

Kiselev, using in particular the example of the 1806-12 war, argued that these evils could only be rectified by an institutional restructuring of the Russian army. The great power assigned to the five successive Commanders-in-Chiefs used during the latter war meant that no continuity in the conduct of the war was established and that success or failure depended solely upon the ability, as well as the whims and caprice, of individual commanders. Aside from a few notable exceptions, such as M. I. Kutuzov, these commanders had no real experience of the theatre of war or the enemy and acted as if they were fighting a regular European army. They had shown insufficient knowledge of the scarcity of supplies in the Balkans, the effects of the local climate on the health of the troops, and underestimated both the region’s natural geographical barriers and the extreme difficulty in besieging Turkish fortresses. (109)

The remedy Kiselev proposed was, as Toll had feared, to establish the Second Army’s General Staff as the supreme co-ordinating institution for Turkish wars. The latter was to be given autonomy in the gathering of intelligence on the Ottoman Empire and then in the formulation and execution of Turkish war plans. Since the early 1820s, Kiselev had already begun preparing his General Staff for this new role. His idea was well expressed by Liprandi:

In Russia there must exist for each enemy special tactics and a special institution which has precise and complete knowledge of the theatre, character, habits, means of existence and type of forces [of the enemy].(110)

In other words, the study of each potential enemy was to be institutionalised. Thus one of the main motives behind Kiselev’s and Liprandi’s projects was to establish the study of the Ottoman Empire as the institutional responsibility of the Second Army. Once established in this role, the next step for Kiselev’s General Staff was to monopolise the formulation and execution of Turkish war plans. The former was achieved through Kiselev’s correspondence with Diebitsch (who was close to both Alexander I and Nicholas I).(111) Executing a war plan proved to be more problematic, for this was undoubtedly the preserve of the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, during the 1820s Kiselev introduced two important measures designed to limit to independence of the C.-in-C. and make him more dependent upon his General Staff. The first measure concerned tactical doctrine. Kiselev was concerned that the army had no specific battle formations to counter the Turkish tactics
of attacking with large numbers of irregular cavalry. In previous wars, each individual C.-in-C. had adopted his own tactics which in Kiselev’s opinion were ‘often erroneous’. Based on their study of previous Russo-Turkish wars, Kiselev’s General Staff established new formations and these, as noted, were eventually adopted by the Second Army and practised in manoeuvres in 1826 and 1827. The second measure was the aforementioned 1824 reform of the chain of command between the C.-in-C. and the General Staff. The reform, in effect, prevented the C.-in-C. from issuing orders directly to the individual branches of the General Staff. All orders now had to be directed to the head of the General Staff, so greatly increasing the latter’s role and the autonomy of his institution as a whole.

Whilst Kiselev achieved a great deal in the first half of the 1820s his plans for his General Staff were threatened by the accession of Nicholas I. The new Tsar was, by nature, a great centraliser and in 1826 he established a committee to consider proposals for establishing a new institution which was to standardise official military doctrine and the teaching of tactics and strategy. Jomini’s proposals for the establishment of a central school of strategy in St Petersburg to train all future Staff officers was accepted and, following delays caused by the Persian and Turkish wars, and then the subsequent Polish rebellion (1830-31), a Military Academy was established in 1832.

Nicholas saw the multiplicity of General Staffs then existing in the Russian army as harmful. Not only did they inflate the costs of the military establishment by employing an excessive number of staff officers, but the often ambiguous relationship between the Generals Staffs and their Commander-in-Chiefs proved to be a cause of many problems. Thus in 1832 a major reorganisation was undertaken. The number of military units was reduced allowing for the abolition of many staffs. The staffs that remained, including the General Staff of H.I.M., were deprived of their autonomy and subordinated to the War Ministry. As a result the age of the General Staffs in Russia came to an end and the age of the War Ministry was born.

At a very early stage Kiselev must have sensed the threat to his idea of autonomous General Staffs. He was, however, powerless to prevent change. Once the 1828-29 Turkish war was concluded the Second Army was abolished. Its units were transferred to the First Army and its General Staff abolished outright.

This is not to suggest, however, that the work of Kiselev’s General Staff had no lasting impact on the development of military ideas in Russia. Their ideas concerning the unique nature of Turkish wars, the need for General Staffs to specialise in the study of
prospective enemies and their resources, and the worth of historical/empirical research as true guide to military action all gradually found adherents within the military establishment - especially after the experience of the 1828-29 Turkish war. Indeed, even Jomini himself was forced to concede much ground in his 1833 publication *Analiticheskii obzor glavnikh soobrazhenii voennogo iskusstva i ob otnosheniakh onykh s politikoi gosudarstv* (St Petersburg) (translated from the French edition, *Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre et leur rapports avec la politique des états*, Paris, 1830).

Jomini accepted that there did not exist *a priori* universally applicable rules of warfare:

In forming...a war plan against France, Austria or Russia, it is impossible to base it on the same considerations as for a war against the Turks or any other Eastern people, whose brave though unstructured forces are capable of neither order or of decisive manoeuvres.\(^{(118)}\)

Jomini also accepted that the study of tactics alone was insufficient preparation for war. In addition, an army needed a ‘war policy’ [*voennaia politika*] which he defined as the need to study the finances, defences, national characteristics, military system and talents of the enemy nation as well as the geography of the prospective theatre of war.\(^{(119)}\) He accepted the idea that the main task of the General Staff was to collect and interpret such intelligence:

The archive [of the General Staff] should be supplied with the great number of historical materials relating to previous wars, as well as those relating to statistical, geographical, topographical and strategic matters.\(^{(120)}\)

Jomini acknowledged the degree to which such information could be of vital significance in challenging accepted wisdom. In an obvious reference to Kiselev’s investigations (which during the 1820s established beyond doubt that the Balkans were traversible), he wrote that prior to this:

Almost all military men in Europe had almost the same erroneous knowledge of the Balkan mountains and of the true strength of the Ottoman Porte...It seemed as if an order was issued from Constantinople to consider this mountain range almost insurmountable.\(^{(121)}\)

In his analysis of the 1828-29 Turkish War, Jomini conceded that his own iron rule that a general must never split up his forces could be broken when fighting the Ottoman army.\(^{(122)}\)

Jomini, though granting the above concessions, and generally accepting the need for commanders to have a greater understanding of higher strategic factors, such as the political object of the war, was nevertheless adamant that his own ideas concerning the
primacy of tactics remained central to military theory. He argued that 'war policy', or research into the enemy and the theatre of war, was needed only to formulate the war plan; once war had begun then the 'constant rules of pure military strategy', (by which he meant tactics), take over, and:

...there is already no need to take into account the character or attitude to us of the native population in which the war is being waged, nor the character and qualities of the enemy commander, nor even the theatre of war and its economic means. (123)

Nevertheless, it was Jomini's acceptance of the general need for research that facilitated the establishment of historical sections within the Russian General Staff in 1832. It is doubtless that, as a result of this decision, Liprandi was requested by Nicholas in this year to systemise his writings on the Ottoman Empire. The work of these historical sections, however, took a predominantly academic direction and they failed to establish any great influence over official military doctrine as Liprandi had advocated. Even the appearance of a so-called 'historical school' under N. V. Medem, Professor of Strategy at the Nicholas Military Academy, did little to change matters (124) and as late as 1851 Liprandi was still criticising the army for failing to construct particular strategies and tactical innovations to correspond to the weaknesses of each potential enemy. (125) This was an inevitable consequence of Jomini's opinion that historical research could only assist in the formulation of war plans but was irrelevant to the actual waging of war.

(2) Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 379-84. Clausewitz, p.382, writes, 'War...became a regular game in which Time and Chance shuffled the cards; but in its signification it was only...a more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were substituted for diplomatic notes. To obtain some moderate advantage in order to make use of it in negotiations for peace was the aim even of the most ambitious'.


(4) A good contemporary Russian summary and criticism of these strategies may be found in Medem, *Obozrenie*, pp. 1-128. See also, Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 183-84; A. Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford, 1989). pp. 67-105. A full list of the military writings of Lloyd, Bülow and Archduke Charles may be found in the bibliography.


(7) The great exception to this was found in Prussia, where many of the French revolutionary innovations in warfare were accepted. Following Prussia's defeat at Jena in 1806 and the limitations imposed by Napoleon on the size of its army, Scharnhorst, the 'father' of the German General Staff, conducted a modern reform of the Prussian army. His measures included the introduction short-term service and a Landwehr (which essentially introduced universal conscription), as well as opening the officer ranks to the middle-classes, see G. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (London, New York, 1964), pp. 14-65; Shanahan, *Prussian Military Reforms*; P. Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform* (New York, 1966).

(8) *VZ*, 1817, No.1, p. 4. Quoted from the Russian translation of *L'art de la guerre*. Due to this belief in eternal laws, the Soviets have condemned Jomini's ideas as 'metaphysical', Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 213.

(10) Dostian, ‘Uchastie’, p. 23; Kagan, Reforms, p. 121; Prokof’ev, Bor’ba, p. 179. The latter, p. 182, argues that the Tsarist establishment accepted the ‘fashionable’ theories of Jomini in order to hinder the development of the national ‘Suworov-Kutuzov military school’.

(11) VZ, 1810, No.3, p. 74.

(12) Clausewitz’s criticism of this ‘mathematical’ approach was that ‘instead of leading to the free activity of mind, leads to an Army made like an automation by its rigid formations and orders of battle, which, movable only by the word of command, is intended to unwind its activities like a piece of clockwork’, On War, p. 181. General K. L. Pfuel of Tolstoi’s War and Peace is the classic portrait of a real-life pedant convinced of the existence of ‘geometrically demonstrable tactics’.

(13) Prokof’ev, Bor’ba, pp. 224-26, 258-63.

(14) F. N. Glinka (1786-1880). Veteran of the Napoleonic campaigns 1805-06, 1812-15. Staff officer and historian, editor of Voennyi zhurnal 1817-19 during which time the journal became a tribune for the progressive ideas of future Decembrists. Member of the proto-Decembrist political organisations Soiuz Spaseniia and Soiuz Blagodestviia. Arrested after the revolt of 1825, but released and transferred to civilian service. For a catalogue of his many works see Beskrovnyi, Ocherki, p. 81.


(16) F. N. Glinka, Kratkie nachertanie ‘Voennogo zhurnala’ (St Petersburg, 1816), p.10.


(18) Ibid., p. 63.

(19) According to Glinoetskii, Istoriiia russkogo general’nogo shtaba, I, p. 359, Kiselev first proposed the project in 1816, whereas Prokof’ev, Bor’ba, p. 273 argues that it originated in 1819 following conversations between Kiselev and his staff officers. The project itself has received some treatment in Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 65-66, 107, 206-209; N. P. Glinoetskii, Istoriiia russkogo general’nogo shtaba, I, pp. 359-365; Dostian, ‘Uchastie’, pp. 24-31.

(20) Burtsov, ‘Mysl”, pp. 64-65.

(21) D. P. Buturlin (1790-1849) was a veteran of Napoleon campaigns 1812-14. A Quartermaster Staff officer since 1812, in 1816, he began service in the General Staff of H.I.M. as an adjutant to its head, P. M. Volkonskii. In the same year, Buturlin began collecting materials for Jomini’s project to write a history of the 1812 campaign (the work was never completed). Buturlin is considered to be Russia’s first military historian, Glinoetskii, Istoriiia russkogo general’nogo shtaba, I, p. 368. His early reputation rested on his Relation historique et critique de la guerre Austro-Russe en Italie en 1799 (St Petersburg, 1812) and Voennaia istoriia pokhodov Rossii v XVIII stoletii (St Petersburg, 1819-23), 4 vols. He then established himself as the main rival to Kiselev’s study of Russia’s Turkish wars with the publication of his Opisanie vsekh pokhodov protiv Porty Ottomanskoj s 1769 po 1812 (St Petersburg, 1822) and Kartina voin Rossii s Turtsieiu v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II i imperatora Aleksandra I (St Petersburg, 1829), 2 vols. From 1824 to 1829 Buturlin served as General-Quartermaster of the First Army.
(22) Dostian, 'Uchastie', p. 23.

(23) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.1, f.97, 'Dokladnaia zapiska o shore materialov do voin turetskikh', n.d.. All materials relating to the preparatory arrangements made for Kiselev’s project are located in this delo.

(24) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.3, f.29v-32, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 15 August 1819 OS.

(25) Kiselev, who was already preparing his Turkish war plan, was particularly interested as to whether the Balkan mountains could be crossed by an army, see below pp. 139-40 (footnote 6).


(27) Clausewitz, On War, p. 203.

(28) Almost all the foreign policy advisers to both Alexander and Nicholas on Turkish matters had established their careers in the civilian and not military service. Whilst Nicholas did consider the advice of his leading generals during 1829 Turkish campaign (with regard to annexations), all the members of his important Extraordinary Committee of 4 September 1829 OS were all from the civilian sphere. The committee accepted for consideration the views of certain diplomats but no document outlining the opinion of the military was presented, see VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 278-300 and below, pp. 225-26.


(30) Ibid., f.54. Criticism of Russia’s inability to gain comprehensive victories over the Turks had even found its way into the official periodicals such as Voennyi zhurnal, see ‘Izvestie o deistviiakh Rossiskoi Moldavskoi armii’, pp. 82-83, 1810, No.2, anon.


(32) Ibid., ff.60-63v.


(34) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.1, f.66, ‘Vzgliad’.

(35) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.2, ff.4-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 5 August 1819 OS; ibid., d.652, ch.2, ff.191-94, E. F. Kankrin to Kiselev, 21 August 1819 OS; ibid., d.652, ch.1, ff. 13-14v, Buturlin to Kiselev, 28 October 1819 OS. Dostian’s view, ‘Uchastie’, p. 28, that Buturlin was hostile to Kiselev’s project seems therefore to be incorrect (at least during the early years of the project).

(36) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.2, ff.9-9v, Nesselrode to Kiselev, received 7 October 1819 OS.

(37) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.1, ff.98v-100, Report of Kiselev, n.d. The large number of documents found in Izmail concern Russo-Serbian relations during the 1806-12 war. They are located in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.394.

(38) Glinoetskii, Istoriia russkogo general’nogo shtaba, I, pp. 361-65.

(39) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.2, f.49, Quartermaster Staff to Kiselev, 5 January 1820 OS.

(40) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.2, ff.121-21v, Quartermaster Staff to Kiselev, 26 January 1822 OS.

(41) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.2, ff.123-24, Toll to Kiselev, 26 January 1822 OS. Toll was especially opposed to Kiselev’s proposed study of the Turkish wars of Peter I and Anne I, as he considered them too badly fought to be of any instructive use, ibid.

(42) Ibid., f.157, Pavlishchev (no initial) to Kiselev, 1 March 1822 OS.

(43) Ibid., f.146-48, Kiselev to anon., 1822. The cost of the project to the end of 1823 was around 3,000 roubles, RGVIA, fond 14057, op. 2, d. 13, f.20v, Otchet no kvatirmeisterskomu upravleniu vtoroi armii, 1819-23’, n.d.
(44) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ff.178-182, Pavlishchev to Grigaryevich (no initial), 1 February 1823 OS.
(45) For their names see, Dostian, ‘Uchastie’, p. 24.
(46) Ibid., pp. 26-27, Pestel’ thought Kiselev’s project to be ‘excellent in many respects’. It is unclear why Pestel’ did not participate further in the project. He was probably too preoccupied with his revolutionary activity, and would have disliked working under Burtsov with whom his relations were cool. M. F. Orlov declined Kiselev’s request to join the project was declined, citing his lack of knowledge of Turkish affairs, ibid., p. 26.
(47) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.2, d.13, f. 19v, ‘Otchet’.
(48) Dostian, ‘Uchastie’, p. 29; RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, f. 100v, Report of Kiselev, n.d. Both of N. V. Petrov’s fellow writers N. V. Basargin and Burtsov were arrested after the Decembrist revolt. The former was sentenced to hard labour and the latter sent to the Caucasus. Thus for the final two years of the project it seems Petrov worked on it alone, Dostian, Mysl’, p. 199.
(49) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.23, d.6, ff.1-5v, Kiselev to Wittgenstein, 31 October 1827 OS. Until the publication of Dostian ‘Uchastie’ (1975), it was incorrectly believed that the project was never completed, e.g. Glinoetskii, Istoriia russkogo general’nogo shtaba, I, p. 364, Prokof’ev, Bor’ba, p. 273.
(50) Not four, as stated in Dostian, ‘Uchastie’, p. 29.
(51) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1527. Author unknown.
(52) Ibid., d.1552, by N. V. Basargin.
(53) Ibid., d.1810, by N. V. Petrov.
(54) Ibid., d.2374, by N. V. Petrov.
(55) Ibid., d.2908, by I. G. Burtsov.
(56) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2. Author unknown. This part contains information on supply systems, magazines, river crossings, camp sites, Turkish fortresses and the Russian wartime administration of the Danubian Principalities. In addition, Kiselev’s General Staff drew up detailed maps of the Balkan theatre and plans of the various Turkish fortresses. For a list of these see RGVIA, fond 14057, op.2, d.13, ff. 14-16v, ‘Otchet’. The General Staff also completed a historical study of the battle order and tactics used by previous Russian commanders in Turkish wars, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4586, ff.2-27, Kiselev to Wittgenstein, 30 November 1827 OS.
(57) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, f.102, Report of Kiselev, n.d.
(61) Liprandi’s activities from 1821 were as follows: In 1821 he was sent on a mission to the Danubian Principalities to investigate Ypsilantis’ revolt and gather intelligence on the state of the Turkish Danubian fortresses. This research continued for some time and in 1823 he was commissioned by M. S. Vorontsov (the Governor of Novorossia) to write geographical and historical works on Russia’s southern frontiers and coastal regions. Following the 1825 Decembrist revolt he was arrested and briefly detained but no charges were brought against him. In 1826, with the ever-increasing prospect of a Russo-Turkish war, Liprandi was sent on another mission to the Principalities to establish the best place of crossing the Danube and ascertain the political loyalties of the Cossacks of the Danubian delta. A third mission to the Principalities was completed in 1827, during which time Liprandi established a permanent intelligence network in the province, RNB-OR, fond 608,
op.1, d.2896, ‘Avtobiografiia’, 1819-69, f.1; RGIA, fond 673, op.2, d.6, ff.6-8, ‘Tainye porucheniiia, avgust 1827-avgust 1829, Liprandi, 29 June 1831 OS. After participating in the 1828-29 Turkish war, Liprandi devoted his time to systematising his research on the Ottoman Empire wrote a huge number of works on the histories of Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Bessarabia and the Principalities from the tenth to the nineteenth centuries (these are located in RGIA, fond 673, op.1, dd.1-419 passim. Between 1840 and 1853 Liprandi worked as domestic secret agent. He played an important role in the discovery of the Petrashevskii Circle, and became Russia’s leading expert on the secret societies of Old Believers and other religious dissidents, see Liprandi’s own accounts in RNB-OR, fond 289, d.37; fond 72, d.9; fond 435, d.1. From 1856 to 1878, Liprandi concentrated on publishing his numerous historical works.


(63) Ibid.

(64) Ibid., ff.7-7v.

(65) In the post-1815 years of reaction, Tsarist authorities took a dim view of arming of the civilian population. Partisan units were uncomfortably autonomous, whilst a more general levée en masse had an overly close association with French revolutionary practices.


(67) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.367, ff.5v-6, Liprandi to Diebitsch, 10 January 1829 OS.

(68) Ibid., f.4v.


(70) RGIA, fond 958, op.1, d.315, f.9, Liprandi to Kiselev, 9 April 1833 OS.

(71) Ibid., f.2, Liprandi to Kiselev, 9 April 1833 OS.

(72) Ibid., f.9v.

(73) Liprandi cited his model as being the Konverzatsion Leksikon, ibid., f.11. The work itself, translated as ‘The Experience of an Interpreter of the Ottoman Empire...’, comprises over 4,000 folios. It is located in RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.138-219.

(74) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.407, ff.3-7, Preamble to the first volume of ‘Opyt’, 14 April 1834 OS.

(75) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.405, f.1v, ‘Nekotorye rassuzhdeniiia o voennoi nauke’, Liprandi, 11 March 1832 OS. Liprandi believed that contemporary works on strategy were overly theoretical and, in the main, written by men ‘who have never heard the whistle of an enemy bullet’. He argued that ‘grandiose strategic conceptions in the minds of officers...is reprehensible and harmful’, ibid., d.224, f.42, ‘O partizanskoi voine’.

(76) Ibid., f.2. The English term ‘stratagem’ and its etymological roots (Gr.) στρατηγιημα and (L.) strategema, all convey the idea of employing tricks and ruses against the enemy in war. In a later work, Liprandi defined voennye khitrosti as coterminous with ‘stratagemae’, Osobennosti voin s Turkami (St Petersburg, 1877), p. 25.

(77) Ibid., f.2v.

(78) Ibid.

(79) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.224, f.41, ‘O partizanskoi voine’.

(80) Liprandi believed that if ‘Napoleon had found Russia settled by non-Russian peoples...then, of course, his enterprise would have been successful’, ibid., f. 41.

(81) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.405, f.5v, ‘Nekotorye rassuzhdeniiia’.

(82) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.407, ff.6-6v, Preamble to ‘Opyt’.

(83) The Jannissaries were the traditional elite infantry force of the Ottomans. Until their abolition and massacre in 1826, their great political power and opposition to western
practices prevented the creation of European-style regular military units in the Ottoman army.

(84) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.407, f.74v, volume I of Opyt.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid., f.33v. The custom of the Ottoman Empire was that volunteers would serve only between 23 April and 26 October.
(87) Ibid., f.22v.
(88) Ibid., f.35v.
(89) Ibid., ff.37v-38.
(90) Ibid., f.38.
(91) Ibid., f.41.
(92) Ibid., f.41v.
(93) See below, p. 163.
(94) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.221, ff.34-34v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’.
(95) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.407, f.33, ‘Opyt’.
(96) Ibid., ff.32v-33.
(97) Ibid., f.25v.
(99) Ibid., ff.40-40v.
(100) Ibid., f.37.
(101) Ibid., f.34v.
(102) It was not a standing army in the European sense, for although the soldiers received regular payment from the Government, they were allowed to return home in time in peace, ibid., f.59. These troops, once released from military service, often posed a source of domestic revolt. According to Liprandi, the creation of the Janissaries in 1362 from the children of Christian slaves was designed to establish a military force that had no links with the Turkish population, ibid.
(103) Ibid., f.61. The truth of this proposition is evident from the easy successes of Paskevich in 1828-29, see below, pp. 163-67, 179-81.
(104) That is, the Pashaliks of Jannina and Skodra, (Liprandi used the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ Albania). According to his statistics, ibid, f.62v, their combined male population was 750,000, of which one-third, were, respectively, Turks, Orthodox Slavs and Slavs converted to Islam.
(105) Ibid., ff.62v-65v.
(106) According to Liprandi, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a male population of 850,000, of whom around 100,000 were Turks. One third of the native Slav population had willingly converted to Islam in order to acquire the right to own land. The Slavs of both religions lived side by side; it was not unusual to find within a single family that one brother was a Muslim and the other a Christian, ibid., f.68v.
(107) Ibid., ff.67v-71.
(108) Ibid., ff.78v-79.
(109) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.1, ff.55-66v, ‘Vzgliad’.
(110) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.405, f.5v, ‘Nekotorye rassuzhdeniia’.
(111) See Chapter V.
(112) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.1, f.71. Note of Kiselev, undated.
(113) See above, p. 40.
(114) N. P. Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk Nikolaevskoi akademii general’nogo shtaba (St Petersburg, 1882), pp. 1-6.
(115) This problem was exposed most notably during the 1828 Turkish campaign, see below, pp. 154-55, 173-74.
(116) The idea of reducing the number of units (but increasing their individual strength) was inspired by the ‘inconveniences which were experienced during the Turkish and Polish
campaigns'. During the 1828-29 Turkish war, for instance, infantry regiments (of 3000 men) were often reduced to 800 men, but still retained the same number of staff officers. The 1832 reform reduced the number of infantry divisions (from 28 to 21), brigades (from 84 to 42) and regiments (from 252 to 84). These changes made no difference to the total number of men under arms, PRO, FO 65/207, J. D. Bligh to Palmerston, 9 April 1833 (folio numbers not available for this file). For more details, see Kagan, *Military Reforms*, pp. 246, 328-29.


(118) *Obzor*, p. 12.


(122) *Ibid.*, p. 129. Jomini was referring to Diebitsch's decision, when about to traverse the Balkans in 1829, to leave substantial forces behind him to blockade the fortress of Shumla, see below, p. 177.

(123) Quoted in Medem, *Obozrenie*, pp. 122-23.


V. WAR PLANNING AND DIPLOMACY, 1819-28

The Search for Strategy, 1819-28

One of Kiselev’s first actions on becoming Head of the Second Army’s General Staff in 1819 was to draw up a war plan against the Ottoman Empire. He was assisted in this enterprise by the large body of experience acquired by the Russian army during their five previous Turkish wars fought between 1711 and 1812. This knowledge, though as yet imperfect, helped to establish the main strategic factors involved in these wars, as well as highlighting the peculiar difficulties associated with warfare in the Balkan theatre.

By Kiselev’s time it was already an acknowledged fact that the Balkan theatre greatly assisted the Turks, who, since the middle of the eighteenth century, had consistently adopted a defensive strategy in wars with Russia. The Danube and the Balkan mountain range presented the would-be attacker with two formidable natural barriers. The former was prone to flooding and could only be crossed at specific times and places, whilst the latter was considered by most military authorities to be impassable for a large body of troops. The Turks reinforced these natural barriers with strategically placed fortifications. The Turkish right flank was protected by the smaller fortresses Tultcha, Isachki, Matchin, Hirsovo, as well as the larger Brailov (see Map B). Although these fortresses were not a great hindrance to an invading army, any subsequent progress along the Babadag-Varna road, the main artery of the Turkish right flank, was seriously disrupted by the hostile inhabitants of the Deli-Orman forest and the Dobrudja region. The former contained a substantial indigenous Turkish population, including various Asiatic fanatics, whilst the latter was inhabited by the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy - Cossacks who had fled Russia in the eighteenth century and now periodically served as irregular troops in the Sultan’s army. The partisan warfare conducted by these peoples had in previous wars wreaked havoc on Russia’s lines of supply and communications. The great fortress-port of Varna, unless captured, seriously diminished the threat of Russian naval action on the Ottoman coast.

The Turkish centre was dominated by the three fortresses - Shumla, Silistria and Rustchuk. The first, considered by many the ‘key to the Balkans’, was an imposing edifice. Built on almost inaccessible mountainous terrain and able to house a garrison of over 40,000 men, it served as the traditional resting place of the main Turkish forces. It had never been captured by the Russians. Its importance was such, that the debates over the execution of the 1828-29 war plans largely centred on whether an attempt was to be made...
for its capture. Silistria and Rustchuk were situated on the right bank of the Danube and served to obstruct its crossing by an invading force. They held garrisons of over 20,000 and 10,000 men respectively and had resisted prolonged sieges in the past.

The key to the Turkish left flank was Sophia. Once taken, the Russian army along the Sophia-Adrianople road and march on Constantinople. The two main problems with such an operational line were, firstly, that Russia would have to cross the Danube further upstream between Widdin and Rustchuk. Such an enterprise was considerably more hazardous than a crossing further downstream as the river here was wider, the Turkish flotilla stronger, and the presence of large Turkish garrisons in Widdin and Rustchuk made a Turkish interception of the crossing more likely. The second difficulty with this invasion route was that its distance from Russia's likely operational base - the Danubian Principalities - created exceptional difficulties for the army's supply network.

In addition to particular problems of each Turkish flank, there were also more general difficulties associated with the theatre as a whole; one had to consider the scarcity of roads, the large area of barren or uncultivated land, the lack of clean water and climatic conditions conducive to fever and plague. These conditions wore down the movement of an invading force at every step and exemplified Clausewitz's notion of the 'friction of war'. Much of the region was covered in forests, which assisted the Turk's irregular warfare and obstructed Russia's desire to give battle and destroy the main Turkish forces in the field.(2)

Although a land invasion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe presented substantial difficulties, the two most obvious alternatives, an amphibious landing on the Turkish coast south of the Balkan mountain range (up to and including Constantinople) or, a major offensive through Asiatic Turkey, were considered even more hazardous. The former required complete naval mastery of the Black Sea and a very large fleet to transport the necessary number of men; at best, a naval landing was but an adjunct to operations on land. The latter was thought impossible due to the extreme difficulty in supplying large numbers of troops in such barren terrain. Thus a land invasion through Europe was still regarded as the optimum solution by almost all Russian commanders. The latter had invariably opted for an operational line directed against the very strong Turkish centre - Brailov-Silistria-Shumla.(3) The aim of such operations was to either capture these fortresses or force the Turkish army into the field and defeat it. As the army had only even reached Shumla twice before (1774, 1810),(4) let alone capture it, the idea of a further push south and a Balkan crossing was hardly ever entertained. As shall be shown, the innovation introduced by Kiselev was to direct the main operations against the Turkish right flank (along the Black Sea coast) en route to a Balkan crossing.
In addition to the question of the operational line, the other main strategic quandary centred on the question of which of the Turkish fortresses could and should be besieged. Most generals feared pushing forward while leaving Turkish fortresses in rear. Therefore, following the maxims of 'methodical' warfare, they sought to besiege systematically all fortresses before pushing further into the Sultan's domains. This system was, however, extremely slow and expensive, and even if achieved did not guarantee that the Sultan would sue for peace. Only a defeat of the main Turkish forces or an attack on Constantinople could guarantee this.(5) There were, however, two great weaknesses in the Turkish defensive system. Firstly, certain Balkan passes were both unfortified and passable by a large body of troops. Though a small minority of military men (amongst them A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov) had for some time believed this to be true, it was not however established beyond doubt until Kiselev enquired into the matter in the 1820s.(6) A Balkan crossing offered decisive results, for the army could then march on Adrianople - the sole connection between Constantinople and European Turkey.(7) The capital could then be attacked and Turkish reinforcements be prevented from assisting it.

The second and potentially explosive weakness of the Ottomans was the presence of Balkan Christians in the theatre of war. Aside from the benefits of operating in friendly territory, the Russian army had the option of raising large numbers of partisans. Such a measure would however involve Russia's acceptance of their political demands, so making peace negotiations more problematic and risking the alienating other powers. After 1815, it was considered by the Tsars only as a measure of last resort.

As regards the utility of previous war plans, two notable examples had been offered by A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov. Both these generals, like Kiselev after them, had sought the means for a rapid, decisive victory over the Turks. Suvorov, following a request from Catherine II for a plan to destroy the Ottoman Empire in Europe, presented his proposals in a war plan of 1795.(8) He proposed a two-year campaign in which an army of 150,000 men was to cross the Balkans and march on Constantinople. Like most Russian commanders, Suvorov feared crossing the Balkans until all Turkish forces in the Russian rear had been defeated. Therefore in the first campaign Russia was to besiege and occupy all the Danubian fortresses from Izmail to Rustchuk as well as Varna and Shumla. The march on Constantinople in the second year was to be assisted by the Baltic fleet, which
was to force the Straits, as well as by the raising of a levée en masse amongst the Porte’s Christian subjects.

Admittedly, much of the plan was either impossible in practice or, by Kiselev’s day, politically inadmissible. The 1806-12 war had proved that even a far greater force was unable to occupy all the above-mentioned fortresses in six years let alone one. The probability of the Russian fleet forcing the Straits was negligible. The centrepiece of the plan - to raise a huge army of Balkan partisans was obviously unfeasible following Russia’s post-1815 commitment to preserve the Ottoman Empire as well as the general distaste of the Tsars for populist/nationalist movements. Nevertheless Suworov’s proposals contained the germ of Kiselev’s idea of 1819 in that it, firstly, proposed the crossing of the Balkans, secondly, included a coastal line of operations, with combined land and fleet action and finally, highlighted the idea that a march on Constantinople offered the greatest prospect for a decisive result.

In contrast, Kutuzov had, as a result of his experience of the 1806-12 Turkish war, become fully convinced of the futility of siege warfare. His disagreement with the Commander-in-Chief A. A. Prozorovskii in 1809 - nominally over the planned siege of Brailov - was rooted in differing strategic conceptions. Kutuzov opposed the existing system of ‘methodical’ warfare and favoured a deeper offensive thrust into Ottoman territory. Kutuzov’s ideas culminated in his 1811 war plan. It envisaged the use of three army corps, each acting independently of each other. The first was to head along the Black Sea coast, cross the Balkans and then head for Adrianople and Constantinople. The second was to secure the rear of the first corps by attacking or blockading the main Turkish forces which were always kept in Shumla. A third corps was to march on Sophia via Nikopol to cut off the Sophia-Adrianople road from any Turkish reinforcements rushing to relieve the capital. Kutuzov justified the plan’s departure from the accepted practice (as so forcefully advocated by Jomini) of concentrating one’s forces, thus:

Against the Turks one must not operate as one does against a European army, with all ones forces concentrated....Against the Turks one can safely, with...strong corps, attempt daring ventures, without having any communications between them....Any unexpected or novel movement causes them [the Turks] such confusion that one cannot even contemplate as to what mistakes this will force them into, and as to how great our success will be.

Kutuzov’s plan, more than any other, offered Kiselev the prospect of acting ‘on the spirit of the enemy, to force by the influence of fear that which the usual methodical action cannot achieve’.
Captivated by the strategic possibilities of a Balkan crossing, Kiselev began corresponding with various military authorities on this point in 1819. In August, he informed Diebitsch that the common view regarding the difficulties of this crossing were ‘très faudées’, and that in a future Turkish war:

Je pense qu’une base principale sur la mer, offrirait de plus surs résultats. Wellington m’a en a donné l’exemple. Pourquoi ne serait il point suivi? La saute de Varna et de Burgas conduit à Adrianople. (14)

Kiselev’s advocacy of a coastal operational line, which Diebitsch accepted (15), was intended to facilitate combined land and naval action. (16) Twenty ships of the line were to both supply the 100,000-man army and conduct amphibious assaults of the two above-mentioned ports. In greatly increasing the speed and mobility of the army, this strategy would surprise the Turks who, presumably, would expect the Russians to conduct a ponderous siege of their Danubian fortresses (as occurred during the 1806-12 war). The prospects of a successful assault on Burgas were especially good. This port was situated south of the Balkan mountain chain, and a landing here could act as an *avant-garde* for the main Russian forces who were to cross the Balkans by land.

Over the following year, Kiselev gradually refined his ideas, and in 1820 informed Diebitsch (then the Head of the General Staff of the First Army) of his thoughts. (17) It was paramount that Russia’s military strategy corresponded to the political aim of the war; that is, whether Russia intended to ‘faire la guerre pour obtenir une paix advantageuse ou bien chasser les Turcs du continent Européen’. Reflecting Alexander’s acceptance after 1812 of a conservative Eastern policy, Kiselev maintained that ‘cette dernier hyposition ne sera j’ose le croire jamais le but de notre gouvernement’. This being the case, the best chance of prising an advantageous peace treaty from the Sultan was by a quick, decisive war - specifically a two-year campaign to march on Constantinople.

The adoption of Kutuzov’s idea of dividing the army into independent corps allowed Kiselev to propose the simultaneous conduct of two operational lines, in order to ‘former deux bases, l’une sur la mer par Varna et Burgas - l’autre sur le base Danube par Brailov, Silistria et Shumla’. In the first campaign the army was to secure the Principalities and ‘Bulgaria’ as an operational base by besieging or attempting to ‘bloquer sévèrement’ the three latter fortresses. The objectives of the second operational line were to take Varna (in conjunction with a naval assault) and occupy the Balkan passages. In the second campaign the Balkans were to be crossed, Burgas taken, and a march on Adrianople and, if necessary, Constantinople undertaken. Around 120,000 men were required to execute this
plan, although, controversially, Kiselev favoured the ‘très grande utilité’ of augmenting this force with Balkan partisans.

Kiselev knew that any Russian advance on Constantinople was sure to arouse the consternation of the other European Powers and he was forced to acknowledge the potential threat of British and Austrian intervention. Should the former come to the aid of the Porte and send its fleet into the Black Sea then ‘le mouvement par notre gauche [i.e. along the coast] serait entière paralysée’. In this case Russia would have to attack Adrianople from the west via Sophia. Should Austria declare against Russia then the threat of an Austrian push eastwards into the Principalities would make any attempt at a Balkan crossing extremely hazardous. It followed therefore that the Russian Foreign Ministry acquired the task of keeping these two powers neutral in a future Russo-Turkish war.

Diebitsch accepted the essence of Kiselev’s plan and, following the outbreak of the Greek revolt and Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople, drew up his own version. It differed from Kiselev’s plan in three respects. Firstly, the army was to reach Constantinople in one year not two. Secondly, Diebitsch was adamant that Shumla had to be captured (not just blockaded as Kiselev advocated) before the Balkans could be traversed. Finally it set a rigid timetable to events, with the campaign to begin on 1 March OS and Constantinople to be reached by 1 August OS. The plan, though of a rudimentary nature, illuminates two significant defects in Diebitsch’s military thinking that were to have an adverse effect on the outcome of the eventual war. First, Diebitsch exaggerated the weakness of Turks - events proved that it was an almost impossible task to reach Constantinople in five months. Second, Diebitsch, always fearful for his flank and rear, was not prepared to cross the Balkans before Shumla had been taken. In his 1821 plan he wrote the fateful words ‘the capture of this town is essential and not as difficult as is often stated’. Though, from a love of glory, Diebitsch committed himself to a bold, offensively-minded war plan, his military instincts (especially once in the field) remained true to the conservative traditions of the pre-Napoleonic era. Diebitsch’s cautious approach committed the army in 1828 to the lengthy siege of the Ottomans’ strongest fortresses. What was to have been a quick and decisive war thus turned into a grinding series of sieges.

Throughout the 1820s Kiselev’s ideas dominated military opinion over the question of the course of a future Turkish war. Between 1819 and 1828 there was barely a voice raised against a Balkan crossing. All the ‘establishment’ strategists in St Petersburg, such as Jomini and D. P. Buturlin accepted Kiselev’s ideas. All agreed with Kiselev that the political objectives behind the Turkish war plan had to correspond to Russia’s official ‘weak neighbour’ policy. Buturlin, for instance, in his memoir of 1822, wrote:
L’avantage de la Russie seroit donc de veiller à la conservation de l’empire Ottoman et non de travailler à accélérer sa chute...une puissance asiatique ne soit d’un voisinage plus sûr et plus commode, qu’une puissance européenne ne pourroit jamais l’être. [If the Ottoman Empire is pushed into Asia then this will]...formeront en Asie une puissance respectable par sa concentration et que pourra meme devenir formidable pour nos frontières entre la mer Noire et la mer Caspienne.

Buturlin accepted that Kiselev’s idea for ‘une invasion rigorouse et décisive au de la Balkan’ was designed not to end, but to preserve the existence of the Ottoman Empire. Buturlin believed that if Russia wanted to:

... conserver les Turcs, il ne s’agiroit que de frapper un coup décisif sur Constantinople afin de forcer la Porte à accepter les conditions qu’on lui imposera.

Buturlin, like Langerone, Diebitsch, Kiselev, Sukhtelen and almost all other Russian generals favoured the use of Serbian forces in a Turkish war. He favoured sending a Russian detachment to Sophia ‘pour donner la main aux Serviens et aux autres peuples des slavones de la Herzegovinne et de l’Albanie’. Like Kiselev and Diebitsch, Buturlin gave little significance to the Asiatic theatre. He believed that the problem of supplying a large Caucasian force precluded the possibility of an offensive in Asia. Instead:

La destination du général Ermolov sera moins de faire les conquêtes...que de mettre un combustion d’Anatolie en semant la mesintelligence parmi les pashas et en soutenant aux d’être eux que viservient à l’indépendance.

At the eventual peace negotiations Buturlin favoured the granting of an ‘existence politique’ to Greece, the restoration of Serbian rights and the annexation of the Danubian Principalities and the land between the Phase and Kuban rivers (i.e. Circassia).

Whilst the plans of Buturlin and the other Generals accepted the need for a Balkan crossing there were differences of opinion regarding the timetable. Kiselev’s idea of a two-year campaign was supported by Langerone and Chuikevich but opposed by Diebitsch, Sukhtelen and Buturlin who believed that Constantinople could be reached in under six months. There were also differences over the number of men required for such an enterprise. At one extreme Buturlin demanded 200,000 men whilst, at the other, Chuikevich believed that 100,000 was more than sufficient. These disagreements were, however, more apparent than real for, regardless of the number of men that actually began the campaign, many tens of thousands more lay in reserve and, with proper preparation, could be called upon at any stage. The aspect of the plan which troubled military minds most was, in fact, the question of Shumla. Kiselev did not make the capture of this fortress
a sine qua non but Buturlin, following Diebitsch, was adamant that the Balkans only could be crossed ‘après la défaite de l’armée Ottomane et la prise de Shumla’.(21) Most significantly, this view had the backing of Jomini, who, whilst occupying an ambiguous position in the Russian military hierarchy, nevertheless exercised great influence through his reputation as Europe’s premier strategist.

Jomini first committed his views to paper in a memoir of April 1828.(22) He distinguished between three types of war plan. The first, a ‘guerre méthodique’ involved the occupation of all the Turkish fortresses on the Danube and Bulgaria in the first campaign, with a Balkan crossing attempted in the second. Jomini was against such a plan, for ‘il est plus sûr, mais il n’offre que de minces résultats pour des grandes sacrifices’. The second possibility was a ‘guerre d’invasion’ in which the Balkans would be crossed without making the defeat of the main Turkish forces or an occupation of its main fortresses a sine qua non. Jomini deemed this idea (which was essentially was Kiselev’s) as ‘plus brillant’ but considered that such an enterprise would ‘ne serait pas sans danger’. For once the army began a Balkan crossing the undefeated Turkish forces could ‘se masser contre notre droite’. The final option was to cross the Balkans and march on Constantinople once the main Turkish forces had been defeated. Such a plan:

...serait une application de principes de la guerre et du système de Napoléon, offrant à la fois gloire, sécurité et grands résultats: car c’est aux masses organisées de l’ennemi qu’il faut faire la guerre et non aux points géographique - ceux-ci tombent quand les masses sont battues et désorganisées.

Jomini was, however, faced with an uncomfortable problem. If the Turkish forces, which would almost certainly be encamped at Shumla, offered battle, then Jomini, in keeping with his theory, believed ‘il faudra marcher à eux et les battre complètement’. Should the Turks however remain in Shumla and refuse battle in the open field, what was to be done? A siege could drag on indefinitely thus destroying the main virtue of a ‘guerre d’invasion’, namely speed and surprise. Jomini entertained the idea of leaving large Russian forces to guard Shumla, whilst sending an isolated corps across the Balkans. Suvorov’s operations in Switzerland and Napoleon’s at Saint Bernard suggested ‘très forts que l’opération est faisable’. Jomini was, however, compelled to dismiss this precedent as not applicable to the Balkan theatre. No doubt the fact it contradicted his own maxim that the commander should never split his forces also played on his mind. Jomini hypothesised as to Russia’s predicament should her army cross the Balkans and allow the undefeated Turkish army to leave Shumla and attack Russian forces on the Danube. The Russian army could continue its march on Adrianople as planned, although this ‘serait hardie’. Alternatively, a retreat of
the army from Rumelia back across the Balkans to defend its rear ‘serait plus militaires’ but
would obviously force an unsuccessful end to the campaign. Faced with such a problem
Jomini’s natural conservatism reasserted itself and his final verdict was that:

Tout ceci prouve que stratégiquement parlant il est plus sage de ne point
s’avancer au dela du Balkan sans avoir déposé le gros de l’armée
ennemie de Shumla.

If the Turks refused to leave Shumla and give battle, Russia was not to push on with the
southwards offensive but remain there and either blockade the fortress or try and force out
the garrison by some enveloping movement on its supply line. Fatefully, Jomini considered
this latter operation as ‘hardie sans doute, mais que je ne regarde comme impracticable’.

It is the thesis of this chapter that the successes and failures of the 1828-29
campaigns can be traced back to the debate over the execution of Kiselev’s original war
plans of 1819-20. Kiselev’s ideas were of sufficient promise to convince the military
establishment of the advantages, both politically and militarily, of a Balkan crossing. The
adoption of his plan ultimately delivered the intended political results in the 1829 Treaty of
Adrianople. The war as a whole, however, was marred by the unsuccessful 1828 campaign.
Although there were many individual and specific reasons for its failure, we may point to
the underlying strategic mistake made by the Russian High Command. The dogmatic
insistence on the capture of Shumla in 1828 ensured that the campaign degenerated into a
series of prolonged and pointless sieges and blockades, so repeating the mistakes of the
1806-12 war. It is of some irony that the prime perpetrators of this folly should have been
Jomini and his followers. The self-proclaimed interpreter of Napoleon’s revolutionary type
of warfare was bound by the very logic of his own theory to argue for the siege of Shumla
as the most ardent supporter of ‘la guerre méthodique’. (23)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

If Kiselev had a large degree of success in converting the military establishment to
his war plan, the task of persuading Nesselrode, Alexander and after him, Nicholas, to
adopt his bold military solution proved considerably more troublesome. It was to take
seven long years from the beginning of the Greek revolt before Russia was to finally open
hostilities against its Eastern neighbour and, even then, there was no guarantee that a
Balkan crossing would actually be attempted.
The Greek Question in the Period of Congress Diplomacy, 1822-25

Deprived of allied support for coercive measures against the Porte and not wishing to endanger European unity by unilateral action, in 1822 Alexander agreed to the Anglo-Austrian offer of mediation between Russia and the Porte. The British ambassador Lord Strangford, aided by the Austrian intemuncio, was to secure the Sultan’s assent to Russian demands relating to the specific infringements of existing Russo-Turkish treaties carried out by Turkish authorities during their suppression of the revolt - notably the defamation of Greek churches, the military occupation of the Principalities and the hindering of vessels bearing the Russian flag to pass the Straits. As, however, Russia had no specific treaty right to interfere in the wider question of the fate of the Greek revolt and, indeed, the future political status of the Greeks, these issues was to be entrusted to a European Congress.

When the Congress was finally convened at Verona in late 1822 the Greek question had been eclipsed by more recent revolutionary events in the Iberian peninsula. The Congress was dominated by the potential rift in Allied unity caused by Britain’s refusal to support French intervention in Spain although, as mentioned, Britain and Austria were, in any case, in no hurry to seek a solution over Greece, their aim being merely to secure Russian inactivity through never-ending discussions.

Undaunted, Russian diplomacy for the following three and a half years persevered with its policy of allied co-operation and a collective solution to the Balkan crisis. Why did Russia persist so long over an issue that attracted no positive interest from any other Power? One traditional explanation is that intervention over Greece was merely a cover for expansionism, Russia’s ultimate goal being ‘the end of European Turkey and the shifting of her capital to the Bosphorus’. More recent evidence has shown this view to be untenable. The diplomatic correspondence of the Russian Foreign Ministry reveals that it held the following consistent line: Russia sought an end to the civil war, firstly, for humanitarian reasons - to stop the annihilation of a Christian people, especially following the discovery of Mohammed Ali’s ‘depopulation scheme’ in 1825; secondly, the continuation of the war could lead to further revolutions in Ottoman Europe; thirdly, Greek shipping needed to be protected from Turkish attack as it was vital to Novorossia’s exports; fourthly, that continued Russian passivity would increase the Porte’s intransigence on other Russo-Turkish disputes. Finally, despite Russia’s consistent foreign policy line that she did not seek in the Greek question the gaining of exclusive influence or territory at the Porte’s expense certain ambitions in the East were, nevertheless, secretly held. Though as yet ill-defined in the early 1820s, these ambitions eventually evolved into the war
aim of annexing certain ports and fortresses in the Caucasus, in order to lessen the influence of the Sultan in that region and improve the Russian frontier.

Whilst it is true that certain diplomats, such as Pozzo and G. A. Stroganov, favoured more expansive war aims, their private opinions never became official policy. At no stage was the commitment to a ‘weak neighbour’ policy questioned by either Alexander or Nicholas and their closest advisers. It was acknowledged that, for all the Turks’ stubbornness, Russia, through her treaties, had more exclusive influence over the Balkans and the Straits with the Ottoman Empire in existence. If the latter fell, the Powers would resist, by war if necessary, a Russia occupation of the Straits, whilst the Sultan’s European Empire would be replaced by new independent Balkan states with unknown leaders, uncertain political affiliations and very probably not exclusively bound to, or guaranteed by Russia, but by all or some of the Great Powers.

Thus when in January 1824 Alexander attempted to restore the Greek question to Europe’s diplomatic agenda by offering the first concrete proposal for the political future of ‘Greece’, he envisaged the creation not of a fully independent Greek nation-state, but of three semi-autonomous ‘Principautés’ under the Sultan’s nominal suzerainty. As these Principalities were to have similar status and privileges to their Danubian counterparts and Serbia, the proposal was essentially an extension of Russia’s, by now traditional, policy of making concessions to the Ottoman Christians’ demands for greater political freedom, in order to preserve at least a semblance of the territorial and political integrity of the Sultan’s European Empire. This proposal was however open to the counter that, in H. Temperley’s phrase, the Tsar wished for ‘six meagre and divided Balkan Principalities...[to]...revolve as satellites around the Russian sun’. It was for exactly this reason that Metternich preferred a fully independent Greece and, indeed, was the first to propose it in 1824.

The conferences established to discuss the Russian proposal dragged on intermittently through 1824 and the first half of 1825. From the outset, however, it was clear that chances of reaching a consensus between the allies was nil. The Mémoire itself had been leaked and published on 31 May 1824 in the Constitutionnel. It was rejected immediately by both the Sultan and the Greeks (the latter wanted only full independence). Austria was happy merely to delay any decision, whilst George Canning (who had replaced Castlereagh as Britain’s Foreign Secretary in 1822) refused to join the discussions at all, and was no more ready than Metternich to accede to the Russian demand that the Mémoire be ultimately imposed by force if necessary. The fate of Strangford’s mission was no more pleasing. Having secured the Porte’s nominal assent to rectify certain treaty
contraventions relating to the Principalities and Russia's maritime trade, he quit
Constantinople in the summer of 1824. Russia, however, denied the Porte was executing
her promises and further delayed the restoration of full diplomatic relations (Russia had had
no ambassador at Constantinople since July 1821). Russia also questioned Strangford's
political allegiance, leading to much subsequent mutual recrimination. (39)

The Strangford affair, added Alexander's decision to break off allied negotiations
over Greece in late July, (40) meant that the Anglo-Austrian plan concocted by Metternich
and Castlereagh in 1821 had run its course. Alexander, urged to declare war by his
diplomats, (41) finally relented and on 5 August OS (42) decided to leave for the south of
Russia to supervise the Second Army's preparations for war. (43)

During Alexander's stay in Novorossiia, a leading military official prepared a
**Mémoire** on the attitude of the army as a whole towards a probable conflict. (44) The
unnamed author, (45) in very frank terms, centred his analysis around the general malaise
prevalent throughout the army and Russian society at large, and proposed, by way of
remedy, the invigorating power of war. The well-being of the army was said to be of vital
concern as its conduct served as an example to the rest of the population:

> Votre armée, Sire, dispersée dans les gouvernemens les plus riches de la
monarchie...y exerce la plus inévitable influence sur l'esprit de toute une
population, qui vivant aussi habituellement avec des hommes, qu'elle
respecte comme ses défenseurs et que leur sphère plus étendue lui fait
regarder comme des espices [?] d'oracle, se penètre insensiblement
des opinions professées par ces mêmes hommes.

The rural clergy was of no use as it was failing to fulfil the role of moral teacher and instead
'ne cherche que trop souvent dans le vin et dans la débauche une honteuse compensation à
l'ennui du son isolement social'.

The army itself, especially in the outlying imperial lands, was gripped by 'l'esprit
d'inquiétude' - a phenomenon difficult to combat due to the nature of the officer corps:

> L'officier de la ligne, qu'une première éducation plus que négligée ne
tient si souvent qu'a une très petite distance morale des hommes qui se
trouvent sous ses ordres, perd, par une existence partagée entre l'ennui
et la sommeil.

Boredom exposed the officer corps to political indoctrination and freethinking, with the
numerous military rallies used as opportunities for the discussion and dissemination of
liberal and revolutionary ideas:

> Pendant la longue durée des rassemblemens annuels des différentes
troupes de V.M.I...les officiers s'entretenant de leurs idées mutuelles,
du cruel ennui qui les devore et surtout du [illegible] désolant sous
lequel ils envisagent leur avenir social, ces épanchemens réciproques
The author offered two solutions to the widespread dissatisfaction within the military. One was to isolate army units from the population and indeed each other through the further development of the ‘colonisations militaires’; however this could not be achieved ‘assez promptement pour préserver l’état d’une commotion semblable aux secousses qui étranglent, il y a quelques années, tout le Midi de l’Europe’. This being the case there remained but one answer:

La violence du mal veut un remède plus violent et ce remède extreme mais infallible est celui d’une guerre selon l’esprit et les voeux de Vos peuples, d’une guerre d’extinction contre le fanatisme et la barbarie des féroces Ottomans.

Such a measure was justified by the (somewhat dubious) precedent of certain ‘hommes éclairés du cabinet de Louis XVI’ who sought to ‘dissiper l’orage’ of revolution by ‘quelque guerre conforme à l’esprit national, c’est-à-dire contraire la politique anglaise’. A further justification was found in the policy of Catherine the Great, who sought to ‘refouler l’Islamisme au dela du Bosphore’.

It is clear that, in the tradition of many military men of post-Restoration Europe, the author sought to diffuse the social problems caused by the spread of French revolutionary ideas and the example of revolts in Spain, Naples and elsewhere, by recourse to war, especially those of ‘national unity’. When speaking in abstract of the ‘army’ it is quite possible that the author was thinking primarily of the Second Army. This unit was located in Russia’s provincial backwaters, subject to the boredom and restlessness of such a posting and, under the direction of Pestel’, contained the most radical circle of freethinkers. We cannot be sure whether he possessed concrete information concerning revolutionary activity but certainly felt, like many others, that something was in the air. If so, his instinct proved to be correct; using the opportunity of Alexander’s unexpected death in Taganrog on 19 November 1825 OS, a plot was hatched for revolution.

Whilst the author of the aforementioned Mémoire revealed some cynical though shrewd observations regarding Russia’s domestic problems, the means he proposed to fight a ‘guerre d’extinction’ against the Porte showed him to be nothing but a dreamer. He offered every known cliché connected with Russia’s ‘designs’ in the East and presented a programme so ambitious it would have shocked even D. Urquhart and the other British Russophobe publicists.
Answering the dictum ascribed to Napoleon, that Russia must ‘ou tomber ou s’agrandir’, the author considered that for Russia to progress she needed to increase her commercial strength by becoming ‘une grande puissance maritime’. This was to be achieved by an attack on the Ottoman Empire in support of the Greek revolution. This measure was, ironically, to be justified by the doctrine of the Holy Alliance, which guaranteed ‘toute existence chrétienne et toute existence légitime’. Russia was to do Europe a favour by expelling Islam and give the Sultan just reward for his policy of inciting Russia’s Caucasian subjects against the Tsar - ‘leur légitime souveraine’. Once victorious, Russia, by way of partition, was to receive Constantinople, ‘la grande partie de la Turquie et toute la Grèce’, and become ‘l’arbitre de la balance Européenne’. The author then contemplated a second stage of expansion, in which the Tsar ‘se trouve obligée ou de conquérir l’Inde ou de s’étendre en Europe’ - a course of action that, by giving suitable employment to the army would also ‘prévenir une révolution interieuse’.

Russia had, of course, to contend with the possibility of other powers resisting this scheme. The author believed that Austria could easily be detached from an anti-Russian coalition by the offer of an alliance and the promise of Serbia and other territories. Prussia was seen as a natural Russian ally and may be compensated through acquisitions in Saxony, Poland and on the Rhine. France was considered too weak to be of consequence; since the reign of Louis XVI she has lost all influence in Germany, Italy, Sweden and Poland. The United States, whose possible role in a future general war was increasingly attracting the attention of Russia’s foreign policy makers, was considered the latter’s ‘alliée naturale’ and ‘tous les diplomats regardent une guerre entre les deux puissances comme une guerre absolument impossible’. (50) The attitude of Britain remained problematic, but as she supported the revolted Spanish colonies she had to support the Greek cause and her public opinion would never allow a war in support of despotic Turkey.

Though his ideas are of much interest, there is little need to show how out of tune the author was with official Russian policy. When, in late 1829, the French King Charles X made an official approach regarding an equally fantastic plan (known as the ‘Poliganac Memorandum’) for a complete restructuring of the 1815 settlement the French Ambassador, having read the moderate terms of the Adrianople Treaty, dared not even mention it to the new Tsar, Nicholas I. (51)

The Accession of Nicholas I and the Drift to War, 1826-28

The outcome of the disputed succession following Alexander’s death was to hold international as well as domestic repercussions for Russia. Austria came out clearly in
favour of Grand Duke Constantine, whom they regarded as a guarantor of the Holy Alliance and an opponent of the Greek cause:(52)

The accession of the Grand Duke Nicholas on the other hand is much dreaded. He is stated for some years past to have maintained a regular intercourse with liberals of Berlin, as well as of the younger branches of the Royal Family of Prussia, all of whom are stated to have...opinions inconsistent with the principles of the Holy Alliance.(53)

Other than, in Gentz's words, 'sa passion pour les détails du service ou, pour mieux dire, de l'exercice militaire'(54), the character of the new Tsar was unknown to Europe. The British Government was no less concerned. Nicholas's accession was followed almost immediately by the outbreak of war with Persia, thus seeming to confirm an image of a ruler bent on a 'career of youthful conquest'.(55)

The most pressing question for Nicholas concerned, however, not Persia but Turkey and whether Alexander's decision for war was to be upheld. Much has been written concerning the new Tsar's thinking on the Eastern Question; the simple truth, however, is that Nicholas, being unacquainted with the facts of this complicated matter, deferred to the advice of his Foreign Minister, following his counsel almost to the letter. Nesselrode himself had passed through something of a political conversion since 1821; the spectacle of the succession of failed conferences over Greece had led him, some time in 1825, to discard his previous pro-Austrian, pro-Congress policy (with regard to the Eastern Question) and join the Russian war party. Uneasy, however, of the possible consequences of unilateral Russian action, he hoped to entice Britain into an alliance against the Porte - an idea which Alexander had been toying with since the summer of 1825. In short, Nesselrode, developing the germ of a policy adopted by Alexander in 1825, became the main driving force behind Russia's Eastern policy in the period 1826-29.(56)

Nesselrode outlined his position to the Tsar thus: the allied Powers were conspiring to secure Russian inactivity and forcing her cabinet, 'à renoncer aux principes qu'il avait toujours soutenus et suivis dans les affaires d'Orient, d'y anéantir les bases de ses relations et de son influence'. Nesselrode believed that the failure of Strangford's mission and the revelation of the 'depopulation scheme' made coercive action against the Porte both justified and necessary. Russia was to offer one last ultimatum to the Sultan regarding the various Russo-Turkish treaty contraventions, whilst intervention over Greece was to be secured if possible via a British alliance.(57) The proposal, after a period of uncertainty, was accepted and formed the basis of the Anglo-Russian negotiations when Wellington arrived in St Petersburg a few weeks later.
The origins of the Wellington mission and the resultant Protocol of 4 April 1826 are intricately bound up with the foreign policy of Canning. The tenure of this, the most insular of British foreign secretaries, was marked by hostility to the European Concert and towards Austria and the Holy Alliance in particular. Throughout the nineteenth century his controversial policies, such as the recognition of the revolting Spanish colonies or opposition to French intervention to restore the Spanish throne were taken as a mark of a ‘liberal’ foreign policy. An antithesis was established between Canning’s ‘liberal’ and his predecessor Castlereagh’s ‘reactionary’ policy. This long-held view was eventually overturned in the first decades of this century by the founders of diplomatic history in Britain - C. Webster and H. Temperley. The new orthodoxy was that of a continuity, not a change, in the underlying principle of the two men’s policies. Castlereagh established the precedent that the European Concert was formed solely against external danger - not internal revolution and Canning continued it in practice. (58) Canning, more than once, acknowledged this fact himself:

> [Metternich] contends...that the Alliance was framed against the dangers of internal revolution: he admits, I presume that it was also framed against ambitious aggression from without. We contend that it was framed wholly against the latter danger...I thought that the...declarations of my predecessor...in the confidential memorandum respecting Spain, had set this question entirely at rest. (59)

The main difference between the two men was that Canning was more explicit and indeed proud of his divergence with Europe; this was most evident in dealings with Metternich, with whom Canning was in a thinly-veiled state of animosity:

> I do think it very inadvisable to face into conflict (as Prince Metternich appears resolved to do) the abstract principles of Monarchy and Democracy...[he] seems to think that there is no security for peace between nations, unless every nation is at peace with itself; and that pure Monarchy is the charm on which such internal tranquillity depends...“There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the stars”...but Prince Metternich is of the opinion that all should be alike: he is even for trying his hand upon us - to make our glory as like to that of the sun and moon of the continent...but he had better leave us quiet in our sphere, or we shall make most inharmonious music. (60)

Perhaps the greatest conflict between the two men was over Eastern matters. Canning had refused to attend the allied conferences over Greece and, instead, took several unilateral measures such as the recognition of Greek belligerency in 1823 which served to strengthen his reputation as a ‘liberal’ and now as a philhellene. (61) This view was also overturned by
Temperley; for although Canning took several practical measures necessitated by the \textit{de facto} existence of Greek power, he had no real sympathy for the Greek cause in itself.

Canning’s main object throughout was, ironically enough, exactly the same as Metternich’s - through dilatory action to delay any allied decision over Greece thus, hopefully, restraining Russia from intervention. It was only after Alexander had split from his allies in mid-1825 and news of the ‘depopulation scheme’ arrived in London (December 1825) that Canning, fearing a Russian declaration of war, decided to ally himself with Russia as a means of controlling her. (62)

Though it has been criticised,(63) there is much to recommend the accuracy of Temperley’s thesis; Canning himself acknowledged the underlying unity of Anglo-Austrian aims over Greece:

...we are working in the \textit{sense} of Austria - though not in concert with her - and if not in concert, only because we had reason to believe...that our best chance of success in pursuit of a common object, was to pursue \textit{alone}...Our object, however, is, you may assure Prince Metternich, a \textit{common} object.(64)

A weak link in the thesis, however, is that , firstly, Russia was somehow unwittingly forced into and then shackled by the British alliance; secondly, that as a result of the alliance Russia compromised her commitment to allied unity, so allowing Canning to achieve his aim of destroying the Congress system.(65) For one, the first overture for a separate Anglo-Russian understanding came not, as has been suggested, by Alexander, as a final act of desperation in mid-1825(66) but by Canning himself some six months earlier. Following Alexander’s decision in December 1824 to break off all communications with Britain over Greece,(67) Canning, far from being ‘not at all disturbed’,(68) was sufficiently concerned to use Stratford Canning, currently on a mission to St Petersburg (for the settlement of the disputed American North-West frontier) to raise the Greek question with Nesselrode. During a series of meetings in March 1825 Stratford asked Nesselrode to suspend the conferences on Greece to allow for a ‘frank and unreserved discussion’ on the question between the two Powers.(69) Stratford then expressed Britain’s readiness to offer its mediation ‘upon application...from either of the contending parties’ (Turks or Greeks).(70) Nesselrode was interested but felt Britain’s offer ‘too vague’ and wanted an agreement concerning the option of force, so as not to ‘tie up its [Russia’s] hands’ in the event of it becoming necessary.(71) As Stratford had no authority to concede this, the negotiations ceased; but the groundwork for a separate Anglo-Russian agreement had, nevertheless, been laid. Stradford expressed the hope that ‘at some more favourable
season’ further negotiations would allow for ‘the accomplishment of that important object which the two powers professed equally to have at heart’. (72)

Two months after their last meeting Stratford, unexpectedly and at great haste made his way to Warsaw where Nesselrode was currently residing. Though again no specific agreements were made, Nesselrode considered that Canning was now definitely serious about a separate agreement, the reason being:

...que plus le ministère anglais nous croira résolu d'aborder et de trancher cette grand question sans sa coopération, plus pourrons espérer de le voir se rapprocher graduellement de nos principes et nos voeux.(73)

Nesselrode made it clear that the granting of ‘moyens coercitifs’ against the Porte was a *sine qua non* of any agreement; thus if war broke out, Britain would be forced to adopt ‘une attitude passive’. Finally, Nesselrode was adamant that ‘que pour entendre avec la Grande-Bretagne, nous n’abandonnerons pas nos autres alliés’; if that was the aim of Canning’s overtures, then ‘elles manqueraient nécessairement leur objet’. (74)

In short, Nesselrode had worked out Canning’s plan to the letter. (75) Although Pozzo di Borgo and Kh. A. Lieven had previously voiced their suspicion of Canning, Nesselrode and the Tsar were insistent on a policy of ensnaring Canning. (76) Thus when Madame Lieven, during her visit to St Petersburg (June- August 1825) was commissioned by Alexander to begin a rapprochement with Britain(77) it was already known that Canning himself desired it. (78) Following her return to Britain, Count Lieven and Canning began negotiations whilst Madame Lieven broke off her affair with Metternich and turned her attentions to the man she had earlier deemed a ‘Jacobin Minister’. (79) After an interlude caused by Alexander’s death and the interregnum, this policy was continued under the new Tsar. Nesselrode was the guiding force behind the British alliance and its continuation into the Nicholaevan era. (80)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In order to finalise the Anglo-Russian accord over Greece in a joint declaration Canning despatched Wellington to St Petersburg in the Spring of 1826. Both the aims and execution of this mission have excited much controversy. Expecting to find the new Tsar in belligerent mood over Greece, the Duke instead, reported that Nicholas cared nothing for the Greeks and was concerned only for the rectification of the various Russo-Turkish treaty disputes which has plagued their relations since 1812. (81) Nicholas threatened war unless the Turks responded to one last ultimatum. (82) Wellington eventually accepted this
measure and stated that in the event of a Turkish refusal to negotiate, Britain would not interfere in the resulting Russo-Turkish war, other than through the offering of 'good offices'. (83)

Following the despatch of the ultimatum on 5 March OS and the arrival, four days later of Count Lieven, Nicholas abruptly raised the Greek question. It has been argued that this was all a carefully designed ploy to send the Duke on a 'false trail'. (84) Whilst this version cannot entirely be discounted, a less conspiratorial explanation may be offered. The new Tsar, by Nesselrode's own admission, was not yet well informed on Eastern matters (85) and, in any case, preoccupied by other, more pressing matters:

In the very next room to that in which I received the Duke, the commission was still sitting, charged with the interrogation of those unhappy men, who had taken part in that horrible conspiracy. Was it time to think of other matters? Neither the Protocol, nor subsequent Treaty were acts of mine. (86)

Nicholas, having recently suppressed one uprising in his own nation, seems to have been in no mood to support rebels in another. Moreover, the Tsar was presently being advised on foreign policy matters not by Nesselrode but by Constantine, who was known for his pro-Turkish sympathies. (87) It seems likely therefore that it was only with the arrival of Lieven (possibly with instructions from Canning) that Nicholas understood the significance of an agreement with Britain - Russia's foreign policy aim for some time. Lieven may have also impressed Nicholas to act by tales of the 'depopulation scheme' - one circumstance which, by the Tsar's own admission, would definitely warrant intervention. (88)

In any case, negotiations began and eventually resulted in the Protocol of 4 April 1826. (89) Allied mediation over Greece was proclaimed and justified by a recent Greek request for mediation from Britain. (90) The document pledged the two powers (and any others which wished to join them) to mediate between the two warring factions for the purpose of establishing an semi-autonomous Greek province within the Ottoman Empire (art.I). Subsequent controversy however was to revolve around article III; if the Sultan did not accept allied mediation, then 'quelque soit d'ailleurs l'état des relations de S.M. Impériale avec le Gouvernement Turc', the two Powers would, nevertheless, continue 'soit en commun, soit séparément' to seek reconciliation between the belligerents. In other words, even if Russia declared war on the Porte the Protocol was to remain in force; if Britain procrastinated over her obligations, then Russia could offer her mediation alone.

It has been argued that Wellington either did not know what he was signing, or, was cajoled into doing so by the Russians. (91) Neither view is credible. In his instructions,
Canning had made it clear that the aim of an agreement over Greece was to ‘induce the Emperor of Russia to forego, or at least to suspend an appeal to arms’; (92) Wellington however objected - ‘if war is on any account favourable to them, I don’t think I can prevent it’. (93) Russia, having spent almost five fruitless years trying to persuade its allies that mediation could only work if backed with the threat of force, was not about to conclude an agreement that denied such a measure. The Duke had in fact been set an ‘impossible mission’. (94)

Two Russian proposals for the eventual article III mentioned Russia’s right, in the event of Turkish refusal to accept mediation, for ‘une guerre’ and ‘mesures coercitives’. (95) Wellington substituted these explicit terms for the phrase already mentioned (quelleque soit d’ailleurs l’état…)(96) - a phrase, indeed, so contrived, as to suggest that many hours were laboured upon it in an attempt to give Russia its right to war whilst attempting to allow Britain (albeit unsuccessfully) to save face. Wellington did, however, gain one (nominal) success; a Russian clause denying the aim, in the event of war, of an increase of ‘les possessions de la Russie en Europe’ (97) was substituted by Wellington for a more satisfactory version (the eventual art.V). (98) All this demonstrates that the Duke was in the full possession of his senses and sought only to make the best of an extremely difficult situation.

Which side profited most from the Protocol? Temperley’s idea of a wholesale British victory (99) is untenable. Whilst it is true that Wellington secured a suspension of war, the ultimate price paid was the sanctification of the eventual Russo-Turkish war and the paralysis of Britain opposition to it. Canning did not achieve his aim of hoping ‘to save Greece through the agency of the Russian name upon the fears of Turkey without a war’. (100) The more popular interpretation of a Russian victory is closer to the mark. (101) However, it must be remembered that Russia’s victory in 1826 was as yet nominal; she still had to secure Austria’s consent to coercive measures, or risk her alienation and an Austrian-led anti-Russian coalition. Russia indeed had also to fight and win a Turkish war - an enterprise far more difficult than had as yet been thought.

*******

By 1826, military planning had progressed from the formulation of general strategic principles to the making of concrete preparations. (102) Nicholas’ threat to declare war unless the Porte accepted the aforementioned ultimatum was not idle. In April 1826 the Tsar accepted a plan to occupy the Principalities. (103) Although the subsequent
negotiations at Akkerman (which began in July 1826) postponed its execution, a deadline was set for an agreement (25 September 1826 OS) after which the Second Army would push to the Danube. With war now a distinct possibility, the problem of the settlements of Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy was brought to the fore and the High Command initiated discussions on Russian policy towards them.

Although the Russian and Turkish delegations did eventually come to an agreement at Akkerman, elements within the military remained unimpressed. One report argued that the Turks were only negotiating to win time, allowing Britain to assist them 'à preparer à une defense active'. Austria's friendship was becoming 'plus en plus douteuse' and the threat of an eventual Anglo-Austrian bloc against Russia was seen as a distinct possibility. Fear of Metternich's intentions increased throughout late 1826 and 1827, especially with the receipt of intelligence of Austria's military aid to the Porte. Kiselev added to such worries when he reported various Austrian intrigues in the Principalities. Austria's aim was to force from the Boyars a request for Austrian protection in order to 'légitimer l'occupation de la Wallachia' by its troops. Such a move would effectively block any Russian advance across the Danube. Russia would then either have to back down or declare war against Austria. It was this shadow of Austrian intervention that was to plague Russian foreign and military policy until the very end of the war in 1829.

The threat of an anti-Russian coalition however temporarily subsided following the signature of the Treaty of London in July 1827. This document, which largely repeated the terms of the 1826 Protocol, was important in two respects; first, France was added to the Anglo-Russian alliance over Greece; second, a secret clause added that, should the Porte refuse a request for an armistice, the allies were themselves to enforce it, 'sans toutefois prendre part aux hostilités entre les deux parties contestantes'- another contrived phrase designed to fudge the question of coercive measures. The context of allied intervention, however, was clear enough - to prevent supplies arriving by sea to Ibrahim Pasha and his Egyptian forces in Greece.

The Sultan did refuse and a joint allied naval squadron under the command of the fiery philhelle Admiral E. Codrington was despatched to the Mediterranean in August. Stratford, in his instructions, informed the latter that he was to achieve his mission through peaceful means, though in the last instance 'by cannon shot' (a phrase he later regretted). Ibrahim however remained stubborn and when some of his forces opened fire on the allied fleet, the Battle of Navarino (20 October 1827) began. It ended with the
destruction of almost the entire Turco-Egyptian fleet. Canning, one of the chief architects of allied intervention had died on 8 August and did not live to see it.

Whilst it remains unclear whether Canning would have approved of Codrington’s actions, the Russians were clearly jubilant. In September, Nicholas, suspecting British intransigence, had expressed his intention to enforce the 1827 Treaty unilaterally, through the occupation of the Principalities (though, nominally, in the name of all the allies). Such a measure would of course have been controversial and may even have led to Britain’s withdrawal from the Treaty. Events at Navarino turned such calculations on their head. The Sultan, in his fury, refused all talk of allied mediation so causing the allied ambassadors to quit Constantinople in November. He then issued a proclamation which preached the coming of a Holy war and declared the Convention of Akkerman nullified. These two acts of defiance played into Russia’s hands, for they de facto, if not de jure, sanctified a Russian declaration of war. Certain other European political developments in late 1827 also favoured Russia. Canning’s premiership had been succeeded by the stopgap administration of Lord Goderich, whilst in France the pro-Russian diplomat La Ferronays had become Foreign Secretary. This further reduced the risk of Britain or France opposing Russia’s right to war.

Whilst a declaration of war by Russia seemed to be increasingly probable, the question of the war plan remained very much in the balance. Nicholas considered a Balkan crossing a military and political risk and preferred the more conservative option of a ‘military demonstration’ through the occupation of the Principalities - an option that was also far less likely to incur the wrath of Austria and Britain. Kiselev’s fears that his brainchild was to be discarded were first raised in August 1827 proposals arrived from Diebitsch stating the need to prepare some 160,000 men for action but remaining silent on the question of operational details. In September, Diebitsch ordered the Second Army to push to the Pruth and to be prepared for action in January the following year or even sooner. No mention was made of any concrete plan; only that the Tsar wished for the ‘immediate occupation the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia upon first demand’. With Diebitsch unable, or unwilling, to convince Nicholas of the merits of the more decisive option, it was left to Kiselev to do so:

I would suppose that the aim of the war consists in forcing the Ottoman Porte to agree to the terms made to it. For this, a detached war in the provinces is insufficient; instead the very capital of the state should be threatened. In order to achieve this...the long and drawn-out system of previous wars must be set aside and, by quickly bringing the theatre of war to Rumelia, Constantinople is to be conquered, or an advantageous peace gained under its walls.
Thus Kiselev repeated his idea that a short, sharp offensive on Constantinople should not be seen as a means of destroying the Ottoman Empire, but as the only sure way of forcing the Porte to accept Russian treaty demands. Kiselev proposed dividing the 160,000 man force into one reserve (consisting of one cavalry corps) and two battle groups (of, respectively, one and two infantry corps). The smaller battle group was to secure the Danube and ‘besiege or blockade’ all the Turkish fortresses from Varna to Rustchuk, whilst the larger was to cross the Balkans and besiege Burgas in conjunction with a naval assault. This latter operation was considered ‘the most important...of the war’, for Burgas was to act as a supply depot for the army. Chance had it that the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino in fact made Kiselev’s proposal of combined naval-land operation more feasible than it otherwise would have been. Finally, some battalions were to be sent to raise a Serbian army to distract enemy forces and protect Russia’s right flank.(119)

Fearing a disagreement between the Second Army and St Petersburg, Diebitsch proposed the following solution. Should the Porte’s actions force Russia to cross the Pruth in the autumn/winter of 1827, then:

Our first movement should in no way lead to us to carry the war across the Danube - an action we should do the utmost to avoid due to political considerations and as this is His Majesty’s own wish.(120)

Instead the Principalities were to be occupied to lend force to negotiations.(121) Should, however, the Porte have refused allied demands by the Spring of 1828 then ‘our offensive should be rapid and decisive’. (122) Diebitsch enclosed a plan for a Balkan crossing(123) which essentially followed Kiselev’s above-mentioned plan but, characteristically, explicitly stated the need for the capture of Shumla. With the (unexpected) acceptance of the need to raise Serbian militia units in such a war, Kiselev’s victory seemed almost complete.

A lingering doubt however still existed; for whilst Nicholas and his entourage accepted, as a measure of last resort, the need for a Balkan crossing, they sincerely hoped, for ‘political considerations’, that the Porte would not push Russia that far. Essentially this was due to the unpredictability of Austria’s response. Russia’s desire not to antagonise her Holy Alliance partner was most clearly revealed in Nesselrode’s instructions to Wittgenstein regarding the hypothetical scenario of Austria occupying the Principalities during Russia’s southwards advance. In such an event, Wittgenstein was to request ‘par une simple invitation’ that the Austrians withdraw. If Austrians refused he would have to wait up to twenty days for further instructions to arrive from St Petersburg, leaving the
position of the army ‘très embarassante’. Instead, Wittgenstein argued that such an
Austrian occupation should be treated as ‘l’équivalent d’une déclaration de guerre’.(124)

A compromise solution was found. In the first instance Wittgenstein was to invite
the Austrian commanders ‘à se retirer’, should they refuse the Russian army was to
continue its march. If the Austrians made no attempt to block this advance, they were to be
treated as ‘amis et alliés’, but if they resisted, then Wittgenstein was to repulse ‘la force par
la force’. (125) In order to avoid such an unpleasant situation altogether Nicholas also
proposed the formation of an avant-garde which, with the beginning of hostilities, was to
race to Bucharest and pre-empt an Austrian counter-advance into Wallachia. (126)
Wittgenstein estimated this force (composed of Cossacks) could reach its destination in six
days, whilst both Principalities could be fully occupied in seventeen. (127)

Since it was clear by the end of December that the Turks were not about to invade
the Principalities a final decision had to be made regarding the proposed Balkan crossing
and Russia’s war aims. Nesselrode outlined the position of the Foreign Ministry in a note
of 20 December OS. (128) Nesselrode accepted the need for war to enforce the 1827 July
Treaty but was concerned with the attitude of Austria and especially Britain. Whilst it was
true that with France Prussia and the United States pro-Russian, Britain was unlikely to risk
war, the key to retaining her passivity was by keeping Russia’s war aims very limited.
Russia was to reaffirm her existing treaty rights with the Porte, enforce the allied settlement
on Greece but seek no territory in Europe. Nesselrode argued Russia was territorially
satiated and that conquest, ‘en étendant son territoire, affaibliraient sa puissance’ and, for
all their stubbornness, Russia ‘ne peut avoir de voisins plus commodes que les Turcs’.
Thus Kochubei’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy was reaffirmed. After the war Russia would
become the protector of Greece, Serbia and the Principalities, so greatly increasing her
influence over the Porte - indeed he wrote ‘il sera difficile de créer un gouvernement qui se
trouve plus complètement sous sa [Russia’s] dépendance’. Nesselrode did not yet envisage
the independence of Greece - she was to be granted internal autonomy and turned into an
‘état commercial’ able to handle Russia’s sea trade. He did, however, favour generous
borders for the new ‘state’. (129) Finally, certain acquisitions in the Caucasus were needed
- primarily Anapa and Poti, which were used by the Turks to incite rebellions in Russia’s
Muslim territories. (130)

Nicholas, possibly swayed by Kiselev, accepted that these war aims could only be
achieved by a Balkan crossing and on 25 December 1827 OS Diebitsch duly presented such
a plan. (131) With the first sign of dry weather (estimated to be on 15 March 1828 OS) the
6th and 7th Corps were to occupy the Principalities. The Danube was not to be crossed until around mid-May however due to the lack of animal forage before that date. The above forces were to push south and in June cross the Balkans and occupy Burgas - the army’s supply depot. In the meantime the 3rd Corps was to have almost completed the sieges of Silistria, Brailov and Varna (for some reason the problem of Shumla was not mentioned). Units from the other two corps were to take Adrianople by 20 August OS and reach Constantinople between 15 September and 15 October OS.(132)

As for the question of Austrian intervention, Diebitsch had adopted Wittgenstein’s bellicose tone:

> It is difficult to suppose that this Power will take [illegible] action against us, for she cannot but sense that in deciding to obstruct the flying of our banners in the capital of the Ottomans she will face the danger of seeing them in her very own capital.

If Austria did, however, intervene:

> Then, before crossing the Danube, we must direct our main forces against Austria. The Polish Army combined with the Lithuanian Corps...and supported by parts of the First Army will operate from one direction. Your Army will operate from another by occupying only the Principalities and using your reserves to conquer Bukovina and support action in Galicia.(133)

This seemingly irreversible resolution to act decisively was however rocked by political developments. For following the fall of Goderich’s administration, Wellington was made Prime Minister in January 1828. Slighted by the events of April 1826 and as Turcophile as ever, the Duke was in no mood to allow the Russians another victory. The King’s Speech of 29 January deemed Turkey an ‘ancient ally’, Navarino - an ‘untoward event’ and expressed the ‘confident hope’ there would be no ‘further hostilities’.(134). Nesselrode drew the inference that Britain did not want to enact the July 1827 Treaty and feared that this would spur on the designs of Austria.(135) Suspicion was further raised when, in February, Wellington refused a request from La Ferronays to accept a Russian proposal for its army to occupy the Principalities in the name of the allies.(136) Added to this, Grand Duke Constantine, still opposed to a Turkish war, continued to make spurious claims that Prussia - long-regarded as Russia’s firm ally, was in fact joining Austria. Constantine, who had already interfered with Russia’s war planning by refusing to allow the Polish Army to join the Second Army, reported on 14 February OS that the Prussians were ‘prêts à marcher dans le 24 heures’.(137)
Fearing the political consequences of a Balkan crossing Nicholas had a change of heart. On 20 February OS Diebitsch informed Wittgenstein that the Tsar wished for the Second Army to limit its offensive in the first instance to an occupation of the Principalities. The war plan of 25/31 December 1827 OS was ostensibly still in force but the Danube was not to be crossed until ‘circumstances take a positive turn’. The starting date of hostilities put back to 20 April OS; thus even if a Balkan crossing was to be attempted, the army had a month less to complete it than was originally intended (in the plans of 25/31 December 1827 OS).(138) Privately, Nicholas confided in Constantine his hope that an invasion of the Principalities alone would suffice to achieve Russia’s aims.(139) As a result Milosh Obrenovich was informed that his services were not required and that the Serbs were to remain calm.(140) No doubt this decision was also intended to avoid further antagonising Britain, which had already voiced its concerns regarding a Serbian uprising.(141)

The Second Army was not perturbed by this change in starting date. Kiselev had already proposed 15 April OS due to the severity of the winter.(142) Wittgenstein concurred, adding that this postponement was also needed for reserves to be brought forward.(143) Both, however, were still thinking very much in terms of a Balkan crossing and Diebitsch was forced to lessen their zeal for such an enterprise stating that ‘our political situation does not allow us at present to determine in any certain manner the time when action across the Danube is to begin’. (144)

On 21 March OS Nicholas seems finally to have decided on war.(145) The following day, Diebitsch revealed that ‘our political relations demand...: first the occupation of the Principalities, and then the crossing of the Danube’. Moreover, the opening of hostilities was put back to 25 April OS. The Danube was, in fact, still to be crossed (between 1 May and 1 June OS) but only near its delta in order to advance to the Trajans Wall. This was not an offensive measure but, as stated, merely an adjunct operation to the occupations of the Principalities (in order to shorten the army’s operational base). As part of operations, the fortresses Machin, Isachki, Tultcha, Brailov as well as the towns Babadag and Bucharest, were to be captured. Significantly, it was not stated which operations would follow should these operations prove insufficient to force the Sultan to sue for peace.(146)

The strategy of merely occupying the Principalities, though less likely to offend Europe, had however the following disadvantage - as Diebitsch informed Wittgenstein: ‘Les raisons politiques...nous obligeront plus que jamais de terminer dans une campagne les affaires du Levant et les différences avec le Porte’, otherwise Russia faced ‘la possibilité d’une coalition anglo-autrichienne’.(147) Thus for political reasons, Russia required a
short, sharp war. The surest means of ending the war in one year was not, however, by
occupying the Principalities but by a Balkan crossing. Nicholas, however, would not
authorise such a daring enterprise, fearing that it would be viewed in Europe as an attempt
to conquer Constantinople and destroy the Ottoman Empire. The dilemma thus came to
following; what was more of a risk - a one-year war with a Balkan crossing, or, an
occupation of the Principalities with the danger of this failing to lead to peace and thus
forcing Russia into a possible second campaign? Nicholas clearly favoured the latter
option; considering, however, the traditional stubbornness of the Porte, this strategy was
ultimately based more on hope than on any realistic calculation.

Meanwhile Nesselrode was inquiring into intentions of other Powers and working
on a declaration of war. He now believed that, in all probability, Britain would not in fact
risk a general war with Russia in 1828 as it was damaging to her trade and offered little
gains even in victory. Should however such a war occur, Nesselrode was now certain that
Prussia and France would, at worst, remain neutral. If Austria joined Britain then France
would declare in Russia’s favour. Did this mean Russia was prepared if necessary to
fight a general European war for the sake of Greece? Nesselrode refused to think the
unthinkable and avoided any definite answer. Although generally speaking, Nesselrode was
now more optimistic about the international situation than Constantine, their differing views
on the subject served only to impart more uncertainty to an already complicated situation.

In March, Kiselev arrived in St Petersburg to finalise military preparations and
assist Nesselrode in the wording of the declaration. The latter along with a
‘Manifesto’ were eventually proclaimed on 14 April 1828 OS. Russia declared that
its recourse to war was justified by the Sultan’s contravention of existing Russo-Turkish
treaties and diplomatic practice. These included the irregularities over the Treaty of
Bucharest, the closure of the Straits to Russian shipping, Turkish interference in the Russo-
Persian peace negotiations of 1828 and as a response to the Sultan’s Proclamation of
December 1827 and the annulment of the Convention of Akkerman. The Declaration made
it clear that the reasons for the coming war were not connected with the July 1827 Treaty
but stated tentatively that Russia would ‘ne écartera pas’ from the enactment of this treaty.

The low prominence given to the Greek cause was due primarily to the fact that
whilst Britain and had not actually contested Russia’s right to war she was obviously
far from content at its prospect. For Russia to have declared war in the name of the July
1827 Treaty (and, by implication, in the name of the three allies) would have only
antagonised Britain further. Therefore reference to the Sultan’s treaty contraventions served, in part, as convenient fiction (although the annulment of Akkerman was probably sufficient in itself to cause a war, regardless of the Greeks). It is therefore incorrect to state that Nicholas did not go to war for Greece. (152) Nesselrode corresponded freely with Capodistrias of Russia’s intention to secure by war an ‘administration nationale en Grèce’ (153) and, following the declaration of war, the Greeks were sent 1.5 million roubles in aid and Admiral A. S. Greig instructed to supply them with ammunition and supplies. (154)

It is, however, true that, despite official claims to the contrary, with war now in sight, the temptation for extracting exclusive rights from the Sultan was proving very strong. Russia’s declared war aims were well established and were of no great surprise - various political rights for Greece, Serbia and the Principalities, the annexation of the Caucasian ports Anapa and Poti, a delimitation of the Danube, the destruction of certain Turkish fortresses and a war indemnity. (155) However, in April 1828, a new and controversial (secret) war aim appeared. Russia now sought unrestricted passage through the Bosphorus (but not the Dardanelles) for her ‘bâtiments de guerre’, ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring the unobstructed passage of Russian commercial shipping through the Straits. (156) Unfortunately there is no evidence as to exactly when, and by whom, this aim was first proposed. It had, of course, the backing of the Tsar, and it is likely that Pozzo pushed for its adoption. (157) Thus despite its many claims to the contrary, Russia, in attempting to override the ‘ancient regulation’ of the Straits (as established by the 1809 Anglo-Turkish Treaty), did, in fact, seek ‘exclusive influence’ in the Ottoman Empire as the result of a war over Greece. It is possible that since Russia, of all the allied Powers, was to carry by far the greatest burden of enforcing the July 1827 treaty over Greece, the Tsar believed in some just compensation. Alternatively (and more probably), the quest to dominate the right of passage through the Straits was seen as the final, missing piece of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy.

Whatever the truth, on 25 April 1828 OS, the Second Army, as planned, crossed the Pruth and hostilities commenced. Within days, Nesselrode reported that Austria was preparing for war and believed the sole means of forestalling this was by ‘la rapidité des nos mouvements’ and a quick and successful end to the war. (158) It was thus left to the army to rescue Russia from a predicament, the dangers of which the Foreign Ministry could postpone, but not ultimately avert.
(1) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.885, f.2, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 17 August 1826 OS.
(2) The above commentary is based on RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.223, ff.2-3, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi; Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 174-95.
(3) N. Luk’ianovich, Opisanie Turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov (St Petersburg, 1844), I, p. 242.
(4) Ibid., I, p. 205.
(5) In contemporary parlance, wars could be fought either ‘methodically’/‘systematically’ [metodicheski, sistematicheski] or ‘offensively’/‘decisively’ [nastupatel’no, reshitel’no]. The former roughly corresponded to the precepts of the ‘limited’ warfare of the eighteenth century. The army would only extend its operational line into hostile territory as it extended its own operational base. This entailed the systematic besieging of all the enemy’s fortresses (within one’s intended operational base). Once achieved, the army could continue its advance, safe in the knowledge that it left no enemy forces were left on its flanks or in its rear, and able to use the captured fortresses as supply depots in order to extend its magazine chain. This form of warfare, though extremely slow, suited the political aims in the period of ‘limited warfare’ as it was believed that the fall of each fortress would add to one’s diplomatic leverage and force the enemy to sue for peace. Though such a strategy could work against a European enemy, it could not work against the Turks. The latter held fortresses such as Silistria and Shumla that were so strong that the prospect of conquering them both was negligible. Added to the Sultan’s traditional stubbornness in suing for peace it was clear to many that such ‘methodical’ warfare offered no prospect of a quick, decisive war and an advantageous peace. The 1806-12 war, which was fought ‘methodically’, offered ample evidence to support this view. In contrast, ‘offensive’ warfare involved a deep penetration of the enemy territory. Enemy fortresses were to be left in the rear, and instead, the army was to pursue one of two objects, either (i) to seek out and destroy the enemy’s main forces in the field, or (ii) capture a decisive strategic object such as the enemy capital. This type of warfare was practised, most notably by Napoleon, though, according to Soviet writers, also by A. V. Suworov and M. I. Kutuzov, Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 9-10; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 394-95; V. A. Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i flot v voine s ottomanskoii Turtsiei v 1828-1829 godakh (Iaroslavl’, 1972), p. 300.
(6) As part of his study on previous Russo-Turkish wars, Kiselev placed great emphasis on the gathering of maps and other topographical information relating to the Balkan passes, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.2, d.13, ff.11-16v, ‘Otchet’. This was certainly needed as, he considered that the Balkan theatre is ‘hardly known to us...by legend the Balkan mountains have been represented as an insurmountable barrier, so serving as an excuse for the idleness of the army - but on what is this [representation] based?’, RGIA, fond 450, d.4, ff.4-5v, Note of Kiselev, 1819. Kiselev believed that ‘European Turkey is so little known in terms of its topographical...situation that, during the wars against the Turks, the actions of our armies have always been marked by a certain indecisiveness from which these wars have been prolonged and success has been paid for by great sacrifices’, RGIA, fond VUA, d.18237, ff.1-2, Note of Kiselev, n.d. To rectify this problem, in 1820, Kiselev proposed sending officers from his Quartermaster Staff (disguised as merchants) to the Balkans to gather topographical and other information, ibid. Such a task was, however, impossible to execute without knowledge of the languages of the region. Therefore in the same year Kiselev submitted proposals regarding the teaching of Turkish, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian in the educational institutions of Novorossia. Khar’kov University was to take the lead in the study of these languages and train future teachers and translators, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.11, d.2, ff.55-56v, Note of Kiselev, n.d. Kiselev’s proposals eventually resulted in the sending of a certain Berg (probably Colonel F. F. Berg, the future Field Marshal) on a mission to Bulgaria, RGVIA, fond 450, d.4, ff.1-3v, Diebitsch to Berg, 15 July 1826 OS. From 1826-27, Berg and his colleagues travelled over 2,000 versts, discovering in the process all the major routes from the Danube to Constantinople including
five passes across the Balkans, *ibid.*, d.5, ff.17, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 February 1827 OS. None of these passages were fortified by the Turks, *ibid.*, ff.43-48, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 February 1827 OS. As a result of Berg’s mission, Russian cartography was greatly improved, see a list of maps in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18238. Kiselev did not believe, however, that sufficient intelligence could be gathered from one *ad hoc* mission. Indeed, as early as 1820, he cited the need for Quartermaster Staff officers to be permanently attached to Russian consulates in European Turkey. They were to act as military attachés, providing constant intelligence on the Ottoman army, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.11, d.2, ff.55-56v, Note of Kiselev, n.d. It is clear from a recent study on the origins of military attachés in Russia, G. Persson, ‘The Russian Army and Foreign Wars, 1859-1871’, Ph.D. (London, 1999), pp. 60-67, that Kiselev was ahead of his time in recognising their importance.

(7) Liprandi wrote of Adrianople, that ‘[in all Europe] there can hardly be a strategic point more important than this one’, RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.223, f.2v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’.

(8) ‘Plan, podannyi Grafom Suvorovym na utverzhdenie Eia Velichestvu Russkoi Imperatritse v 1795’, *RA*, 1914, No.6, pp.162-76.

(9) The Dardanelles were, of course, forced by the far superior British fleet in 1807, but only with heavy losses and a fair degree of good fortune, Epanchin, *Ocherk*, III, pp. 183-84.


(11) Epanchin, *Ocherk*, II, p. 10. Kutuzov’s plan was never executed as Napoleon’s impending invasion of Russia forced Alexander to sign peace with the Sultan in 1812.


(13) Quoted above, p. 88.

(14) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.II, ff.4-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 5 August 1819 OS. The first reference to the Balkans in the correspondence of the two generals was, in fact, made some time earlier, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.1-2, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 9 July 1819 OS. Unfortunately the letter is almost entirely illegible. Kiselev also raised the matter with D. P. Buturlin, who replied that ‘Je crois comme vous que nos généraux ont exagiré les difficultés de ce boulevard de la Turquie’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.I, Buturlin to Kiselev, 28 October 1819 OS.

(15) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.7a-7b, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 23 October 1819 OS.

(16) The ‘example’ given to Kiselev by Wellington was the latter’s conduct of the Peninsular War, 1808-14. Wellington used the British fleet as both a means of supply and transport for his army. It is of some irony that Wellington, who of all British statesmen, was one of the most opposed to the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish War, should have (albeit indirectly) contributed to the formulation of the war plan itself.

(17) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.13-18v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 23 July 1820 OS.

(18) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.17967, f.1, Note of Diebitsch, 7 July 1821 OS. Diebitsch’s role regarding the origins of the 1828 war plan have been somewhat exaggerated. It is clear from the documents that Kiselev was the main force behind the idea that a Balkan crossing should be incorporated into war plans against the Ottoman Empire. Kiselev also produced the first such war plan (albeit in embryonic form). Diebitsch’s war plan of 1821 was not the first to propose a Balkan crossing (as suggested by Liakhov, *Armiia*, p. 97; Epanchin, *Ocherk*, II, pp. 11-12; Fadeev, *Krisis*, pp. 196-97), it merely made certain adjustments to Kiselev’s, most notably shortening the duration of the intended campaign from two years to one. Fadeev’s account of the development of Russian war planning, *Krisis*, pp. 196-201, is generally poor. Though there is some truth in the assertion that Diebitsch was schooled in the ‘scholastic’ military tradition of the eighteenth-century, his 1821 plan cannot be described as ‘metaphysical’, *ibid.*, p. 196. The latter aimed at a deep offensive thrust and a rapid, decisive victory - the very opposite of standard eighteenth-century practice. The idea, *ibid.*, p. 201, that a coastal line of operations was adopted so as to avoid the populated
Christian areas and the activisation of national liberation movements is entirely incorrect. The operational line was chosen purely because it was the most direct route to Constantinople and allowed for combined fleet action.

(19) The idea was accepted by, amongst others, Generals A. F. Langerone, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4483, ff.1-12v, ‘Projet d’une guerre offensive contre les turcs’, 6 May 1826 OS; P. K. Sukhtelen, ibid., d.4395, ff.1-6v, ‘Predlozhenie glavnymkh dvizhenii pokhoda protiv Turtssii’, 12 November 1826 OS, and A. P. Chuiveich, ibid., ff.88-104, ‘Operatsionnyi plan voennykh deistvi protiv Porty Os manskoi’, 4 August 1821 OS. Even high-ranking civilian officials, such as the Finance Minister E. F. Kankrin began to offer plans for the crossing of the Balkans, ibid., ff.134-55, June 1821. Later on some claimed they had in fact thought of it first. Prince Eugene of Württemberg, for instance, claimed that Jomini had proposed it in 1821, whilst he himself had offered the first concrete war plan in 1826, see his memoirs, ‘Turetskii pokhod 1828 goda’, RS, XXIX, 1880, p. 49.

(20) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4395, ff.112-18v, ‘Memoire sur le plan d’operations a suivre dans le cas d’une guerre avec la Turquie’, D. P. Buturlin, 22 February 1822 OS.

(21) Ibid., f.115, Buturlin, ‘Memoire’. As the main Turkish forces were almost certain to be encamped in Shumla, these two conditions were, in fact, one and the same thing.

(22) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4586, ff.96-100b, Jomini to Nicholas I, ‘Observations dans la guerre de Turquie’, April 1828.

(23) Instructive in this respect are the views of Berg, who saw firsthand the defences of Shumla. He acknowledged that the fortress was the key strategic point of the theatre; its capture would mean ‘la conquête du pays situé entre la Danube et le Balkan’. The best chance for this would be in the first eight weeks of a war, as it took the Turks that long to assemble their forces there. Should, however, the Russian army miss this opportunity, then Shumla was not to be besieged at all. Instead, one part of the army was to ‘faire une démonstration sur Shumla et Varna, afin de reserver dans ces places la garrison et l’armée turque’, whilst another was to cross the Balkans in 48 hours. The Turkish army at Shumla would then find itself in an impossible position. If it crossed the Balkans to relieve the capital it would be defeated in the field by the Russian army. The whole plan required around 150,000 men, RGVIA, fond 450, d.5, ff.43-48, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 February 1827 OS. Berg’s advice was entirely ignored in 1828, but followed very closely by Diebitsch in 1829.

(24) VPR II/ IV, 1980, pp. 581-83, Nesselrode to Allied representatives, 14 September 1822 OS.

(25) Metternich correctly argued that Russia’s treaty rights with regard to the Greeks were ‘expressly limited to matters of religion’ (the freedom of worship and the inviolability of their churches) and that Russia had no specific right ‘to interfere on behalf of the Greeks at large’, PRO, FO 181/62, Stratford Canning to G. Canning, 30 December 1824 (no folio numbers were available for this file).


(27) Temperley, Canning, p. 73.

(28) Ibid., p. 320.

(29) VPR II/IV, 1980, pp. 149-52, Nesselrode to G. A. Stroganov, 1 May 1821 OS; ibid., pp. 203-07, G. A. Stroganov to the Porte, 6 July 1821 OS; VPR II/V, 1982, pp. 319-321, Nesselrode to Kh. A. Lieven, 9 January 1824 OS; VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 126-31, Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, 4 April 1825 OS; ibid., pp. 229-34, Nesselrode to Russia’s diplomatic representatives, 6 August 1825 OS.

(30) Following Greek successes in 1824, the Sultan called on the Pasha of Egypt - Mohammed Ali for aid. In return, the latter was to be granted possession of the Morea, sending its inhabitants into slavery and repopulating the region with Muslims, Schroeder, Transformation, p. 642.
Throughout the 1820s, the possibility of a Serbian revolution worried Russia greatly and steps were taken to prevent this, e.g. *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 286-87, Nesselrode to Milosh Obrenovich, 8 November 1827 OS.

Steps were taken to prevent his, e.g. *VPR* II/IV, 1980, p. 369, Nesselrode to Lieven 27 November 1821 OS; *VPR* II/VI, p. 84, Protocol of Allied Conference, 1 March 1825 OS.

Stroganov for instance urged Nicholas to pursue ‘une politique strictement nationale et religieuse’ and declare war to raise the ‘l’esprit national’, *VPR* II/VI, 1985, p. 350, Letter of 18 January 1826 OS.

The Principalities were to consist of ‘Eastern’ (Thessaly and Attica) ‘Western’ (Epir) and ‘Southern’ (Morea and possibly Crete) ‘Greece’. The inclusion of Crete (especially in an independent Greek state) remained controversial in Britain. During his reign as Prime Minister (1828-30), Wellington was utterly opposed, fearing it would be used as a Russian naval base, M. Chamberlain, *Lord Aberdeen: A Political Biography* (London, 1983), p. 214.

Temperley, *Canning*, p. 330. It should be noted, however, that the Russian *Mémoire* envisaged the guaranteeing of the three Greek states by all the Powers, not just Russia.


* Ibid.,* p. 36. According to Fadeev, *Krìzis*, p. 94, the leak was the work of George Canning.


For Stangford’s own account of his somewhat tedious negotiations see PRO, FO 181/64, Stangford to Canning, 3 September 1825 (no folio numbers were available for this file); for the Russian view, see *VPR* II/V, 1982, pp. 657-58, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 18 December 1824 OS; *VPR* II/VI, 1985, pp. 259-62, Nesselrode to Russian diplomatic representatives, 4 September 1825 OS; *ibid.,* pp. 205-08, M. Ia. Minciaky to the Porte, 21 June 1825 OS. British historiography, e.g. Webster, *Castlereagh*, p. 354, has generally cast Stangford as ‘violently pro-Turk’, see, however, A. Cunningham’s revisionist account in *Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Age of Revolution* (London, 1993), I, pp. 188-232.

A key document here seems to be *VPR* II/VI, 1985, pp. 190-94, Minciaky to Nesselrode, 8 June 1825 OS. The former (Russia’s *chargé d’affaires* in Constantinople) appears to have been the first in bold terms to state the existence of some Anglo-Austro-Turkish plot to secure Russian passivity in the East and ‘se refuser à tout ce qui pourrait amener un résultat’. Other diplomats supported Minciaky’s call for war, *ibid.,* p. 277, Pozzo to Nesselrode, 4 October 1825 OS; *ibid.,* p. 284, Lieven to Nesselrode, 18 October 1825 OS.

A key document here seems to be *VPR* II/VI, 1985, pp. 190-94, Minciaky to Nesselrode, 8 June 1825 OS. The former (Russia’s *chargé d’affaires* in Constantinople) appears to have been the first in bold terms to state the existence of some Anglo-Austro-Turkish plot to secure Russian passivity in the East and ‘se refuser à tout ce qui pourrait amener un résultat’. Other diplomats supported Minciaky’s call for war, *ibid.,* p. 277, Pozzo to Nesselrode, 4 October 1825 OS; *ibid.,* p. 284, Lieven to Nesselrode, 18 October 1825 OS.

PRO 65/148, ff.209-09v, E. Disbrowe to Canning, 17 August 1825.

Though death deprived him of his chance, following one last ultimatum to the Porte (*VPR* II/VI, 1985, pp. 274-75, Minciaky to the Porte, 1 October 1825 OS), Alexander fully intended to declare war in early 1826, see Diebitsch’s testimony in N. K. Shil’der, ‘Adrianopol’ski mir no razskazy Mikhailovskogo-Danilevskogo’, *RV*, CCIII, No.8, 1889, pp. 9-14; FO 65/157, Strangford to Canning, 17 January 1826 (no folio numbers were available for this file). See, however, below, p. 147 (footnote 103).

RGVIA, fond. VUA, d.18214, ff.1-23, ‘Mémoire tracé pour être présenté à Sa Majesté L’Empereur Alexandre à son retour de Taganrog’, Moscow, 27 October 1825 OS.

The author speaks of his ‘service prolongé dans l’armée’. It was not Kiselev, Wittgenstein or Diebitsch, who were all in the south of Russia at the time.

Another Russian general, Prince Eugene of Württemberg favoured, for example, the use of Polish troops in the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish War. He claimed in his memoirs that this
measure would have prevented the Polish Revolt of 1830-31, 'Turetskii pokhod 1828 goda', RS, XXIX, 1880, p. 51.

(47) The revolt of 14 December 1825 OS was, of course, carried out by the Northern Decembrists in St Petersburg. Pestel' was arrested before he and his organisation had time to act, see Nechkina, Dvizhenie, II, pp. 345-91.

(48) The author was perhaps correct in believing that war was a solution to the problem of low morale and spread of liberal ideas in the army. As A. Kh. Benckendorff noted in 1827, 'it is only natural that the great mass of the army, which, in time of peace, is found in a state of inactivity should fall under the influence of the [liberal] ideas of their compatriots'. He was thus happy to report that 'the [1827] campaign against Persia and the war with Turkey, which is awaited with impatience, is changing the direction of thinking and has greatly assisted the mood of the army. In general, the mood of the army has acquired a very reassuring character', Sergeev, 'Benkendorf', KA, 1929, No.6, p. 151.

(49) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18214, 'Mémoire', ff. 11-23.

(50) This last statement is certainly true, VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 330, Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 20 December 1827 OS.

(51) Schroeder, Transformation, pp. 658-60.

(52) The Austrians were correct, see VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 344-45, Constantine to Nesselrode; 17 January 1826 OS. In his correspondence with his brother, Nicholas always adopted a decidedly cool tone towards the Greek cause, e.g. Nicholas to Constantine, 20 February 1826 OS, 'Periepyiska Imperatova Nikolaia Pavlovicha s velikim kniazem tsesarevichem Konstantinom Pavlovichem, (1825-1829)', SIRIO, CXXI, 1910, p. 56.

(53) PRO, FO 519/47, H. Wellesley to Stratford Canning, n.d., from context early 1826 (no folio numbers were available for this file), see the similar view of Metternich's secretary F. Gentz, Dépêches inédites du chevalier de Gentz (Paris, 1877), publiées par le comte Prokesch-Osten fils, (hereafter, Gentz, Dépêches inédites), III, p. 76.

(54) Ibid., p. 76. Italics in original.

(55) BL, Add. MS 41557, f.56, Lord Aberdeen to Heytesbury, 13 June 1828. The Russo-Persian war 1826-28 began in July 1826 with an unexpected Persian attack into the Russian Caucasus. The immediate cause of the attack was the mistaken belief that Russia had fallen into civil war following the Decembrist revolt. The underlying reason, however, was the Persians' aim of reversing the territorial losses sustained as a result of the 1804-13 Russo-Persian war. According to the Soviet account, Fadeev, Krizis, pp.141-48, Persia was pushed to war by Britain in order to delay a Russian declaration of war against Turkey and buy the Sultan time to reorganise his army. In 1826, the Russians fought a rear-guard action to the intense irritation of the Tsar. Ermolov, already disliked by Nicholas for his suspect political loyalties, was accused of procrastination and was eventually replaced by Paskevich, one of the Tsar's favourites. In 1827, Paskevich led the Caucasus Corps to a relatively easy victory and, in the resulting 1828 Treaty of Turcomanchai, Russia annexed the khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan, so pushing its frontier to the Arax. For the origins and diplomacy of the war, see P. W. Avery, 'An Enquiry into the Outbreak of the Second Russo-Persian War, 1826-28', in C. E. Bosworth (ed.), Iran and Islam (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 17-45; M. Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minnesota, 1980), pp. 145-61; Semenov, Rossiia, pp. 15-141; Balaian, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 1-234. For the campaigns of 1826 and 1827, see 'Materialy k istorii persidskoi voiny 1826-28', KS, XXI-XXX, 1900-1910; Potto, Kavkazskaia voina, III, 1886; Shcherbatov, Paskevich, II-III (1890-91).

(56) The VPR documentary collection casts great doubt on the conventional view of Nesselrode in this period being merely a servant of Metternich; a bureaucrat having no real influence on actual policy; displaying 'no sympathy whatsoever to the Hellenic cause' and 'appalled at the prospect of a war against Turkey' - even when Alexander decided on one in 1825, see Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, pp. 270-71, 285-86. Many of these mistakes are
understandable; many of Nesselrode’s contemporaries were themselves equally unaware of his real views - Lord Strangford (Britain’s ambassador to Russia, 1825-26), for example, considered Nesselrode ‘the only member of [the] Cabinet who is decidedly adverse to hostile measures [against Turkey]’, PRO 65/149, f.230, Strangford to Canning, 9 December 1825; E. Disbrowe (Britain’s Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia) considered that Nesselrode’s ‘political existence depends upon the preservation of peace [with Turkey]’, PRO FO 65/158, f.154, Disbrowe to Canning, 25 July 1826. It is clear from the VPR that from mid-1825 onwards Nesselrode supported war against Turkey (see below, footnote 57). Tsarist and Soviet historiography has been decided hostile to Nesselrode, primarily for his supposedly blindly pro-Austrian views, e.g. Tatischev, Vneshniaia politika, pp. 140, 183; Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 63-64. Interestingly, Austria itself held Nesselrode (along with Lieven and Pozzo) to be primarily responsible for Russia’s active (and therefore anti-Austrian) Eastern policy after 1826. Gentz went so far as to name Nesselrode as one of Austria’s ‘ennemis implacables’, Gentz, Dépêches inédites, pp. 338, 392. For a revisionist account of Nesselrode’s policy (similar to the one entertained in this chapter), see L. Cowles, The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 1825-1827, IHR, XII, 1990, pp. 702-20. As regards Nicholas’ ideas on the Greek Question, in Tsarist times it was argued that Nicholas broke with his brother’s Holy Alliance policy, G. Paleolog and M. Sivinis, Istoricheskii ocherk narodnoi voiny za nezavisimost’ Gretsii (St Petersburg, 1867), I, pp. 25-26, and strove from the very beginning for the full independence of Greece as part of Holy Russia’s liberating mission in the East, Tatischev, Vneshniaia politika, pp. 224, 227-28. Conversely, the common modern view is that Nicholas actually ‘despised the Greeks as rebels’, but intervened in the revolt simply to ‘teach the Turks a lesson’ for their treaty contraventions, and to ‘advance purely Russian goals in the Near East, Schroeder, Transformation, p. 645. Whilst it is true that the Tsar would ideally have preferred the revolution to never have taken place, from the very beginning of his reign he accepted that there could be no solution to the crisis other than the assigning of a political existence to the Greeks. Nicholas restored relations with the then exiled Capodistrias (VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 436, 689, Nesselrode to Capodistrias, 17 March, 23 November 1826 OS) and ultimately worked to secure a more generous settlement for the new Greek state (through loans and the extension of its borders) than that favoured by the other powers. Dostian, Rossiia, pp. 238-39, correctly states that Russia’s Eastern policy under Nicholas was a logical continuation of that of Alexander’s.

(57) VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 393-400, Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 16 February 1826 OS. This document has played an important role in overturning the view that Nesselrode advocated a purely passive Eastern policy, see Saunders, Russia, pp. 173-74; O. V. Orlik, Rossiia v mezhdunarodnykh otmosheniakh, 1815-1829 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 97-99.

(58) Temperley, Canning, p. xiv.

(59) PRO, FO 519/290, Canning to H. Wellesley, 16 September 1823. Emphasis in original (no folio numbers were available for this file). The reference is to Castlereagh’s now-famous State Paper of 5 May 1820 in which it was denied that the European Alliance was formed for ‘the superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States’, see Temperley, Canning, pp. 13-16.

(60) PRO, FO 519/290, Canning to H. Wellesley, 16 September 1823. Canning is referring here to the so-called ‘Cottage Coterie’ - the gathering of a select group of foreign diplomats at George IV’s Court in Windsor. Metternich, through his lover Madame Lieven and ambassador Prince Esterhazy (both of whom had influence over the King), was engaged in a plot from 1823-25 to have Canning removed from office, see Temperley, Canning, pp. 240-54. Metternich was prone to other forms of behaviour inconsistent with British constitutional practice, such as the sending of diplomatic correspondence directly to the King, PRO, FO 519/290, Canning to H. Wellesley, 9 January 1825.
This reputation dominated the nineteenth century image of Canning, e.g. Paleolog and Sivinis, *Istoricheskii ocherk*, I, p. 20.


S. Shwartzberg, 'The Lion and the Phoenix - 1: British Policy toward the 'Greek Question', 1831-32', *MES*, XXIV, 1988, p. 162. The author adheres to the older view that Canning's policy was motivated by a 'sympathy for the Greek nationalist cause'.

PRO, FO 519/290, Canning to H. Wellesley 25 March 1826. Emphasis in original. Canning argued that Mettemich had 'lost his hold on the mind of Emperor Alexander' and that only Britain could inspire the confidence of the Tsar. The 'common object' in question was the restraint of Russia.

S. Shwartzberg, 'The Lion and the Phoenix - 1: British Policy toward the 'Greek Question', 1831-32', *MES*, XXIV, 1988, p. 162. The author adheres to the older view that Canning's policy was motivated by a 'sympathy for the Greek nationalist cause'.

PRO FO 181/67, Stratford to Canning, 5 March 1825 (no folio number were available for this file).

PRO FO 181/67, Stratford to Canning, 2 April 1825 (no folio numbers were available for this file).

PRO FO 65/147, f.217 Memorandum B, enclosed in Stratford to Canning, 2 April 1825 (no folio numbers were available for this file).

PRO FO 181/67, Stratford to Canning, 31 March 1825.

PRO FO 65/147, f.206, Stratford to Canning, 31 March 1825. See also Nesselrode's similar version of the outcome of these meetings, *VPR* II/V, 1985, p. 136, Nesselrode to Lieven, 18 December 1824 OS.

PRO FO 181/67, Stratford to Canning, 31 March 1825.

PRO FO 65/147, f.206, Stratford to Canning, 31 March 1825. See also Nesselrode's similar version of the outcome of these meetings, *VPR* II/V, 1985, p. 136, Nesselrode to Lieven, 18 December 1824 OS.

PRO FO 181/67, Stratford to Canning, 5 March 1825.

This demonstrates that Madame Lieven's 'mission', though important, had not the great significance that Temperley accords to it in 'Protocol'.

For other views critical of Canning and favourable to Nesselrode, see Cowles, 'Greek Question', pp. 691-720; Schroeder, *Transformation*, pp. 643-44.

*VPR* II/V, 1985, pp. 180-86, Nesselrode to Lieven, 2 June 1825 OS. Stratford's arrival was possibly due to the suspicion that the conferences over Greece (which were renewed in June 1825) were about to break down, thus leaving Russia no option other than unilateral action. During Wellington's mission to St Petersburg, Nesselrode forwarded the idea that Canning had sought an alliance ever since Russia had stopped communicating to its allies over Greece in mid-1825, *VPR* II/V, 1985, pp. 422-25, Nesselrode to Minciaky, 5 March 1826 OS.

*VPR* II/V, 1985, pp. 180-86, Nesselrode to Lieven, 2 June 1825 OS.

For other views critical of Canning and favourable to Nesselrode, see Cowles, 'Greek Question', pp. 691-720; Schroeder, *Transformation*, pp. 643-44.

*VPR* II/V, 1985, pp. 161-68, Pozzo to Nesselrode, 4 May 1825 OS; *ibid.*, pp. 172-73, Lieven to Nesselrode, 8 May 1825 OS.


This demonstrates that Madame Lieven's 'mission', though important, had not the great significance that Temperley accords to it in 'Protocol'.

Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 45. In the early 1820s, the Lievens were firm supporters of Metternich and hostile to Canning due to his 'liberal' policy over Spain and Portugal. Relations with Metternich were, however, increasing strained by the latter's continued opposition to the Greek cause. Once Alexander decided to end his search for an allied solution to the Eastern crisis their friendship ceased altogether, see H. Montgomery Hyde, *Princess Lieven* (London, 1938), pp. 127-85; *The Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich, 1820-1826* (ed. P. Quennell) (London, 1937), pp. 259-373 *passim*.

Notwithstanding his view that Russia would not be separated from its allies by Canning, Nesselrode seems to have envisaged that, in the long-term, an Anglo-Russian *entente* could be the natural replacement of the Congress system (or at least be the pivot around which it revolved). He told Lord Strangford, for instance, that Austria's Congress policy was 'worn out and worthless' and suggested that a 'perfect understanding' between
Britain and Russia would serve ‘the interests of peace...not only in the East, but perhaps over the whole world’, PRO, FO 65/149, ff.205-05v, Strangford to Canning, 9 December 1825. After the Protocol was signed Nesselrode outlined Russia’s new policy in the Iberian peninsula, in which it was acknowledged ‘the superior claim of Great Britain to be listened to in what concerns Portugal from proximity and ancient Liaisons...in the same manner as Russia must be allowed to possess a claim in the East’. Nesselrode stated that Russia’s attitude to the Spanish and Portuguese questions would be ‘purement expectative et passive’, PRO FO 65/158, ff.237v-38v, Disbrowe to Canning, 16 August 1826. Some months later, Russia supported Canning’s controversial decision to send British troops to Lisbon in December 1826, Temperley, ‘Protocol’, p. 75. Schroeder’s idea, Transformation, p. 647, that, following the April 1826 Protocol, Russia did not change its ‘anti-British stance on other issues’, is therefore incorrect. Rather, Nesselrode was trying to bargain with Britain for mutually recognised spheres of influence. Nesselrode continued this attempt at a British rapprochement for many years, see Ingle, Nesselrode, pp. 36-171. (81) Duke of Wellington, Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda, in Continuation of the Former Series (1819-32), New Series (London, 1867), (hereafter Despatches), III, pp. 148-50, Wellington to Canning, 5 March 1826. The fullest account of Russia’s pretensions towards the Porte may be found in VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 503-08, Note to M. S. Vorontsov and A. I. Ribbeaupierre, not later than 1 June 1826 OS. They relate primarily to the rights of Serbia, the Russo-Turkish Asiatic frontier, taxation levels in the Principalities and the rights of commercial naval passage through the Straits. (82) Despatches, III, pp. 172-79, Wellington to Canning, 16 March 1826. As noted, the idea of the ultimatum was first proposed by Nesselrode in February. (83) Ibid., pp. 239-40, Memorandum of Wellington, 26 March 1826. The ultimatum is in ibid, pp. 233-36. The Sultan agreed to negotiate; leading to the signing of the Convention of Akkerman, 25 September 1826 OS, printed in VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 631-42. (84) Temperley, Canning, p. 354. (85) Despatches, III, p. 154, Wellington to Canning, 6 March 1826. (86) BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.75v-76, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 11 August 1828. (87) Despatches, III, pp. 154, 194, Wellington to Canning, 6 and 16 March 1826. (88) Ibid., pp. 182-83, Memorandum of Wellington, 11 March 1826. Lieven had recently received information from Canning that the ‘depopulation scheme’ was already being carried out, VPR II/VI, 1985, pp. 334-36, Lieven to Nesselrode, 9 January 1826 OS. During 1825-27, up to 10,000 Greeks were deported to Alexandria, W. D. Wrigley, ‘Fourteen Secret British Documents Concerning Count John Capodistrias’, SF, XLV, p. 118. (89) Printed in Temperley, Canning, pp. 586-87; drafts in Despatches, III, pp. 244-48. (90) It is not clear why intervention was not justified by the ‘depopulation project’; probably Wellington, like Canning, feared that if the scheme was known to the British public opinion, the Government would be forced to take stronger measures against the Porte than it wished, Despatches, III, p. 92, Canning to Wellington, 10 February 1826. (91) Temperley, Canning, pp. 354-55, 515. Temperley, in fact, then contradicts himself by supporting another version that Lieven, on Canning’s instructions, cajoled Wellington into signing the Protocol, ‘Protocol’, p. 74. (92) Despatches, III, p. 86, Canning to Wellington, 10 February 1826. (93) Ibid., p. 113, Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 17 February 1826. (94) Schroeder, Transformation, p. 647. (95) Despatches, III, pp. 244-45, Nesselrode-Lieven drafts of 20 March 1826 OS. (96) Ibid., p. 247, Wellington’s draft of 23 March 1826 OS. The phrase was first written in English and subsequently translated into French for the eventual Protocol. (97) Ibid., p. 246. (98) Ibid., p. 247. The phrase ‘en Europe’ was dropped.
(100) Ibid., p. 71
(102) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.5-19, ‘Zapiska o rasnoriizheniiakh sdelannykh dla privedeniia 2 armii v gotovnosti k dvizheniiu s aprelia 1826 po 1 noiaubria 1827’, enclosed in Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS. It is clear that military preparations closely mirrored political developments. In April 1826, all the Second Army was ready to march; on 24 May OS, 191,000 roubles spent on shells; on 9 September OS, the number of cavalry increased by 600. Following the signature of the Akkerman Convention on 25 September 1826 OS preparations ceased. However, after the Treaty of London, July 1827 (see below) they restarted - 16 August 1827 OS, Admiral A. S. Greig assigned 150,000 roubles to build a transportable bridge and deliver it to Izmail by November; 17 August OS, Kiselev requests 77,040 extra pairs of boots, etc. For more details, see ibid., ff. 33-171v passim. In total, over 3.5 m roubles were sent to the Second Army for war preparations between 1823 and December 1827, ibid., d.4468, ff.26-27v, Report of anon., n.d.
(103) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4471, ff.22-24. The war plan is in fact undated, but has in the margin the comment (in pencil) - ‘Approved April 1826’. It is highly probable that this was the plan that Alexander intended to execute and was merely subsequently confirmed by Nicholas in 1826. This hypothesis has added credence for whilst there is evidence of military planning in late 1825, e.g. ibid., ff.1-4v, General Staff of H.I.M. to War Ministry, 3 November 1825 OS (concerning supplies), no officially sanctioned war plan has ever been discovered. One final point; we know, by Diebitsch’s own admission, that Alexander, had he not died, intended to open hostilities in the Spring of 1826. This means that Wellington would have arrived in St Petersburg before war began (Wellington arrived on 19 February 1826 OS whereas the campaigning season, even following a mild winter, could not begin before 1 March OS). It is thus possible that Alexander, tempted by Wellington’s offer of an agreement over Greece, would have in fact held back from war (albeit temporarily) for the sake of gaining an alliance with her.
(104) VPR II/VI, 1985, p. 576, Nesselrode to M. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Ribbeaufpierre, 15 August 1826 OS. Three days before the deadline Kiselev provided operational details for the occupation of the Principalities. The 6th and 7th Corps of the Second Army (52,000 men, 136 guns) were not only to push to the Danube but also to cross its lower end to occupy Bulgaria as far as the Trajans Wall, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4395, ff.39-49v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 22 September 1826 OS (in this letter Kiselev refers to using a May 1826 plan of Diebitsch as his model; this has not been found, but it probably repeated the aforementioned plan of April 1826). Kiselev justified this important innovation (which Diebitsch himself had considered in a note of 20 June 1821 OS, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18186, ff.1-1v) by the need to capture the port of Kistendji. This measure likewise served to surround a number of Turkish fortresses, reduce the width of Russia’s operational base and isolate the aforementioned Cossacks (the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy) of the Danubian delta and the Dobrudja.
(105) During the negotiations at Akkerman, Diebitsch requested Kiselev’s opinion regarding measures for the Cossacks’ ‘destruction or resettlement into the borders of the Russian Empire’ or, alternatively, means for ‘their detention within their villages’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.885, f.1, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 15 July 1826 OS. Kiselev shared Diebitsch’s concern, citing the raids of the Cossacks as ‘one of the most important reasons for our limited successes in the last [Turkish] war’ (1806-12). He believed, however, that the Cossacks’ raids were explicable not by any great pro-Turk affiliations, but due rather to their natural taste for ‘brigandage’. In the last war, Russia pursued two different strategies; General-Major S. A. Tuchkov had succeeded in resettling some of these Cossacks into Russia, whilst General N. M. Kamenskii preferred instead to rely on punishment raids.
Kiselev believed that either measure could be used, depending upon the circumstances, *ibid.*, f.2, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 17 August 1826 OS. At this stage M. S. Vorontsov (the Governor-General of Novorossiia) intervened in the debate. He disagreed with Diebitsch’s premises, arguing that the Cossacks had in recent times lost their aggressiveness. In addition, they had incurred the Sultan’s wrath by refusing to take up arms against the Greeks, whom they considered as their co-religionists. As a result many of the Cossacks had recently fled to Bessarabia; Vorontsov hoped to use them to persuade their kin to follow their example, *ibid.*, ff.4-5, Vorontsov to Diebitsch, 31 August 1826 OS. In order to gain further information on this subject Liprandi was sent a special mission by Vorontsov to the Cossack settlements, *ibid.*, ff.7-7v, Vorontsov to Diebitsch, 26 October 1826. Due, however, to the willingness of the Turks to negotiate at Akkerman, war was averted and Russia’s contacts with the Cossacks were temporarily halted. In late 1827, contacts were subsequently renewed, see below, pp. 184-85 (footnote 41).

(106) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4484, ff. lv-2v, ‘Memoire sur le moment propre a declarer le guerre aux Turcs’, anon., n.d. (from context late 1826).

(107) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 63-64, Nesselrode to D. P. Tatischev, 27 March 1827 OS. Following intelligence reports from Kiselev, Nicholas agreed to send agents to check Austria’s possible military preparations in Hungary, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff. 52-52v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 26 October 1826 OS.

(108) *Ibid.*, ff.72-72v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 6 November 1827 OS.

(109) France’s Eastern policy in this period was exceedingly tortuous. Canning’s own opinion was that ‘France is evidently playing a double game. On the one hand, she has aided the formation and discipline of the Egyptian army [sent to execute the ‘depopulation project’], and on the other hand, she is encouraging the Greeks to perseverance, by the intrigues of secret emissaries, and by promises of future countenance’, PRO, FO 181/65, Canning to H. Wellesley, 27 September 1825. Events were to demonstrate that, of all the powers, France was probably the least committed to Ottoman territorial integrity. In 1829, she drew up the ‘Polignac Memorandum’ which proposed the partition of European Turkey, whilst another agreement with her ally, Mohammed Ali of Egypt, involved the division of the Sultan’s African provinces, Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 77. Although these plans did not materialise, France was to lead an expedition to Algiers in 1830, whilst her Egyptian ally occupied Syria in the crisis of 1832-33.

(110) The Treaty (with drafts) is printed in Temperley, *Canning*, pp. 595-606. Had not the allies agreed to a clause on coercive measures, Russia would have announced her intention to act unilaterally, citing the terms of article III of the April 1826 Protocol, *VPR* II/VII, 1992, p. 661, Nesselrode to Lieven, 9 January 1827 OS.


(112) For a summary of the events leading up to the battle, see Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 83-92.

(113) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 228-33, Nesselrode to Lieven, 14 September 1827 OS (two letters).

(114) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, p. 304, Protocol of the Allied Representatives, 15 November 1827 OS.


(117) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.1-4, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS. The breakdown was 110,000 infantry, 28, cavalry, 32,000 artillerymen, pioneers, sappers and non-combatants.


(120) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.112-13v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 15 November 1827 OS.

(121) Operational details in *ibid.*, ff.123-126v. It is clear, however, that, by November, Nicholas considered it already too late in the campaigning season to enter the Principalities and by an order of 9 November 1827 OS he allowed such action only as a means of pre-empting a Turkish invasion of these provinces, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, f.14v, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 20 December 1827 OS.

(122) A more precise timetable was subsequently offered - the Principalities were to be occupied sometime between 1 January - 1 March 1828 OS; if no agreement found with the Porte then the army was to cross the Danube in mid-April, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.136-140v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 21 November 1827 OS.


(124) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, ff.4-5, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 26 November 1827 OS.

(125) VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 316-19, Nesselrode to Wittgenstein, 10 December 1827 OS.

(126) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, ff.11-12v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 11 December 1827 OS.


(128) VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 326-35, Nesselrode to Nicholas, 20 December 1827 OS.


(131) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, ff.19-24.

(132) Diebitsch submitted a further plan on 31 December 1827 OS, *ibid.*, ff. 27-29v. Other than a reference to the Tsar's intention of adding the Guards to the aforementioned units, the plan was identical to that of the 25th.


(134) Quoted in Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 100.


(137) Shil'der, *Nikolai*, II, pp. 114-15, 523-24. As a time-saving measure, Nicholas favoured sending the Polish Army to fight in Turkey with the Guards replacing them in Poland. Constantine's refusal meant that the Guards were sent to Turkey instead, but did not arrive until the late summer of 1828.

(138) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, ff.30-31v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 20 February 1828 OS. The new plan for the occupation of the Principalities, dated 21 February OS, is in *ibid.*, ff.32-38v.

(139) Nicholas to Constantine, 17 February 1828 OS, 'Perepiska', SIRIO, CXXXI., p. 209.

(140) VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 438, Nesselrode to Obrenovich, 14 February 1828 OS.


(142) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, ff.41-47v, Kiselev to Wittgenstein, 10 February 1828 OS.


(145) VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 456, Nesselrode to Capodistrias, 21 March 1828 OS. The British ambassador Lord Heytesbury took the view that Nicholas, in part, embarked on war to strengthen his domestic position, as a strong leader was needed to restrain the 'tremendous elements of disorder' that existed in his nation (the latter were due to Russia's 'immense extent, scanty population and backward civilisation'), BL, Add. MS. 41558, 83-83v, 123, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 28 April, 29 June 1829.

(146) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 22 March 1828 OS, ff.198-205v; *ibid.*, d.4442, ff.70-75v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 22 March 1828 OS. Diebitsch
overturned a request from Kiselev to begin the war even later - on 1 May OS, *ibid.*, ff.57-58v, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 10 March 1828 OS with Kiselev’s plan enclosed, ff.62-69v. Paskevich was informed of the new date in *ibid.*, ff.94-95, Diebitsch to Paskevich, 3 April 1828 OS. On the same date, Admiral A. S. Greig was ordered to prepare his Black Sea fleet ‘for the complete clearance of the whole Black Sea’ from Turkish vessels, *ibid.*, ff.92-92v, Diebitsch to Greig, 3 April 1828 OS.


(148) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 456-59, Nesselrode to Lieven, 31 March 1828 OS. Nesselrode often mentioned the trade losses Britain would incur in a war with Russia. In the 1820s the two nations were great trading partners and Britain relied heavily on the import of Russian raw materials, Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 6. This state of affairs changed only in the 1840s.

(149) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, p. 271. Kiselev was in the capital between 19 March and 8 April 1828 OS.


(151) Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 104.

(152) As suggested in *ibid.*, p.113.

(153) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, p.363, Nesselrode to Capodistrias, 7 January 1828 OS.

(154) Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, p.50. During the 1828 campaign, Nesselrode informed Capodistrias on the course of the war and the direction of future offensives. Due to disputes with Britain over the final frontiers of Greece, Nesselrode believed the question would ultimately be decided by the principle of *uti possidetis*, and so urged Capodistrias (since April 1827 head of the Greek Government) to take offensives towards Athens and Western Greece and secure at least footholds in Eubea and Crete, *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 567-79, Nesselrode to Lieven, 3 July 1828 OS.

(155) Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, XI, 1895, p. 378. Russia had conquered Anapa and Poti during the 1806-12 Turkish war but subsequently returned them to the Porte. Aside from their obvious value as ports, Russia sought their annexation as they were used by the Turks to supply the rebellious Muslim tribes with arms, *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 348-49, Nesselrode to Lieven and Pozzo, 25 December 1827 OS.

(156) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 492-97, Nesselrode to Lieven, 17 April 1828 OS (repeated, *ibid.*, p.631, Nesselrode to Russia’s diplomatic representatives and Capodistrias, 3 October 1828 OS); Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, XI, 1895, p. 378. A demand that Russian war ships be allowed to pass the Dardanelles could barely be justified and would have signalled a clear intention of hostility towards Britain. During the second Russian campaign of 1829 the aim of passing the Bosphorus was (for unknown reasons) discarded, see *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, pp. 187-95, Nesselrode to A. F. Orlov, not later than 26 April 1829 OS. There is no documentary evidence of Diebitsch pursuing this war aim at Adrianople in August/September 1829.

(157) Pozzo was always aggressive over the question of the Straits. In September 1829, he was one of the few Russian diplomats who favoured their capture and permanent occupation by Russia, P. A. Thrasher, ‘The Diplomatic Career of Pozzo di Borgo’, Ph.D. (London, 1974), pp. 297-98.

(158) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, pp. 533-34, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 27 April 1828 OS.
VI. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1828-29

Preparations for War: The War Budget, Men and Supplies

Following the arrival of news of the Battle of Navarino, Diebitsch immediately instigated a debate over the size of the war budget for the now almost inevitable war against Turkey. (1) Presuming a one-year campaign and a force of approximately 155,000 men and 45,000 (cavalry and artillery) horses, (2) A. I. Chernyshev (the War Minister) estimated that the army required 16.6 million roubles in food supplies alone. (3) Costs were to keep rising; a problem exacerbated by the poor state of finances in the Second Army. (4) With the addition of war time wages (usually paid in silver roubles) and rations, the increase of artillery stocks and engineering depots, the building of hospitals, the buying of horses and so forth (5) the figure eventually rose to the considerable sum of 71m roubles. (6)

E. F. Kankrin, the Finance Minister, was adamant that Russia could not afford this sum and was prepared to take on the military establishment with his adage that ‘the cheaper we fight, the greater the power of Russia increases’. His argument rested on three premises. (7) First, Russia had no spare capital and it was imprudent to print more paper roubles. (8) Second, since Russia had vowed not to fight a war of conquest, the campaign would be shorter than envisaged and ‘in all probability, important operations will end at the Balkans’. (9) Finally, the army was obviously exaggerating its needs, as between 1808 and 1812 it received a total of 68m roubles (at the current rate) in extraordinary expenses for fighting Turkey.

Kankrin’s own war budget, presuming a six-month war (not a year) offered, in the first instance, 31m roubles. (10) Any deficiency in supplies were to be made good through requisitions from the Principalities and other occupied enemy territory. Chernyshev’s response was forthright. (11) He accused Kankrin of sacrificing the interests of the army to his own. True, previous Turkish wars had been less expensive but this was the ‘very reason for their prolonged continuation’. The system of requisitioning employed during Napoleonic Wars was not possible in the Ottoman Empire - an ‘underdeveloped’ region of ‘sparse population’.

Diebitsch accepted both Chernyshev’s argument and his compromise figure of 56m. (12) Kankrin retorted that the War Ministry already received great peacetime resources for a paper army of 1,296,068 men and 207,828 horses. As this was far in excess of the number actually at arms, the Ministry should therefore have a surplus in its budget. The Finance Minister was, however, defeated (probably on the insistence of the Tsar) and offered 61m roubles. (13) The final war budget was approved by Nicholas on 14 April OS -
the same day as the declaration of war and only some eleven days before the Russian
offensive was due to begin.(14)

Events were to prove all estimates woefully conservative. By the end of the year
over 132m roubles (in extraordinary expenses) had been spent, with a further 125m
budgeted for the 1829 campaign.(15) The financial difficulties the army encountered in
1828 were not, therefore, due to a lack of funds as such, but to certain delays in their
despach caused by inter-ministerial wrangling. The great cost of the war was also to have
implications at the eventual peace negotiations. The Turks could simply not pay the
resulting war indemnity, tempting the Russians to raise the controversial idea of territorial
compensation.(16)

The question of food supplies proved to be far more problematic. Chernyshev’s
doubts over requisitioning were certainly correct and the army was forced to transport
almost all foodstuffs with them, so creating exceptional difficulties for its supply network.
The Russians, however, complicated matters from the outset by the practice of employing
independent contractors to buy and transport supplies to army depots. According to
Liprandi, a closed caste of contractors [podriadchiki] dominated the supply system in all
wars fought between 1806 and 1830. Liprandi deemed them ‘privileged monopolists’ who
‘constitute a special society whose conspiracy is extremely difficult to break’. By the
existing law, these middle-men reserved the right to annul contracts, provided they supplied
as little as ten percent of the agreed goods. As soon as any difficulties arose, they would
assert this right, often leaving the army in an embarrassing position. The other means of
supply used was khoziaistvennoe raspriazhenie [lit. ‘economic command’] - the sending
of military commissioners to purchase supplies from landowners. These transactions were,
however, also dominated by middlemen who took commissions of up to twenty percent.(17)

During the first year of the war, the army was, on paper, adequately supplied. Its
demand for standard foodstuffs, flour (464,532 chetveriki) and groats [krupa] (43,549 ch.)
was met.(18) The main problem was the lack of oats for the horses. The demand for
629,243 ch. could not be even half met and Diebitsch was forced to put all horses on half
rations.(19) In July 1828, there were plans to acquire a further 200,000 ch. from
Novorossiia, but it is most unlikely this was achieved.(20)

Corruption, inefficiency and natural wastage certainly greatly compromised these
figures, but in 1828 the army did not quite starve, though many thousands of horses were
lost through lack of oats, hay and natural forage.(21) A complete disaster was probably
avoided by the capture of the port Kistendji on 12 June OS, which allowed M.S. Vorontsov
to ferry in supplies from Novorossiia. (22) With more time to prepare and with the capture of other Turkish Black Sea ports, the supply problems were eased in 1829.

We turn to the much-debated question of the number of men actually used in the first year of the war. All calculations for expenditure and supplies were based on a force of c. 155,000 men - composed from the 6th and 7th infantry Corps of the Second Army (79,235 men); the 3rd infantry Corps (47,652) and the 10th infantry division (14,332) - both from the First Army; the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps (14,332) and several thousand Pioneers. (23) However, only 115,563 men actually entered the field at the beginning of the war (24) - a figure widely considered insufficient and a main cause of the failure of the 1828 campaign. (25) The reasons for this low number are cited, variously, as being that: Diebitsch considered this number sufficient; (26) certain units were not combat ready; (27) as a conscious signal of Nicholas' commitment not to fight a war of conquest and destroy the Ottoman Empire (28) and that the Tsar believed 'a mere demonstration would suffice to ensure the Sultan's submission'. (29)

Whilst certain of these points have some merit, it must be remembered that roughly one third of the four above-mentioned Corps (roughly 40,000 men) were, as was standard military practice, left outside the theatre of war, as a reserve. (30) They would gradually enter it as the front-line units were destroyed. Nicholas, as noted, also planned to send units from the Polish Army as reinforcements. Thus the problem was not so much the number of men that entered the field at the beginning of the war in April 1828 OS, but the speed by which reinforcements could be brought to join or replace them. As mentioned, Wittgenstein as late as 15 February 1828 OS was voicing his concerns that the reserves were too far from the front and wanted to delay the opening of hostilities. The Polish Army itself was never sent due to the objections of Constantine. Instead the Guards, numbering some 25,000 men, were sent for in March, but arrived in the Balkans only in August 1828. (31) It was subsequently decided in June to bring in Prince Shcherbatov's Second Infantry Corps (40,000 men) to free front-line forces, though again, it could only arrive in September. (32) Thus though, on paper, by the end of 1828, Russia had committed up to 150,000 men to the field (with 50,000 still in reserve), (33) only insufficient numbers were able to reach the theatre at the critical moments, so delaying the conduct of sieges and the southward advance.

Preparations for war were hindered by other significant shortcomings. There was a serious deficiency in siege artillery. Only forty four pieces were taken (34) - enough to besiege only one large fortress at a time. From as early as June this hindered the southward
advance and by August it ceased altogether. For one, the army (the units of the Second Army in particular) was also short of horses. According to Luk’ianovich’s figures, the cavalry and artillery horses were eventually found, but there was certainly a deficiency in transport horses. This, however, came as no surprise and, as early as 1826, a certain Captain Essen was sent to purchase 1,000 camels in the khanates of Central Asia. A camel battalion appears, as was intended, to have actually been formed and used during the second campaign as transporters in mountainous terrain.

Less excusable were the inept preparations for the Danubian crossing. With his researchers having worked on this question for many years, Kiselev should have made a better choice than Satunovo as the place of crossing. The left bank was covered in swamp whilst the right towered one hundred feet above the water level and was presently defended by an encampment of 12,000 Turkish troops. The postponement of the war until the end of April OS served to coincide with the flooding of the Danube. Ultimately it was only with the assistance of the zaporozhtsy boatmen (who had recently come over to the Russian side) and due to a feeble Turkish resistance, that the Danube was crossed in May/June at all.

Another important shortcoming on the eve of war was the ambiguity created in the command structure following the decision of Diebitsch and the Tsar himself, to accompany the army on its campaign. The former, as Head of the General Staff of H.I.M., occupied the most powerful position in the Russian army; however, his role was that of strategic planning not the conduct of operations. Indeed, the Head of Staff had no legal authority whatsoever to interfere in the operational decisions of Commander-in-Chief. Diebitsch, however, could not help interfering in the running of the campaign and he was to increasingly tempted by the prospect of leading the troops himself to a glorious victory. By the middle of 1828 at the latest, he had acquired designs on the very post of the Commander-in-Chief. The latter was held by the passive Wittgenstein, who was widely considered an ‘old woman’. This situation had already allowed Kiselev to dominate the workings of the Second Army and, with the ever-mounting failures of the 1828 campaign, Diebitsch and others entertained ideas of succeeding him. The presence of Nicholas further undermined Wittgenstein’s position in inviting the attentions of all generals who wished to circumvent the nominal command structure and forward their own military plans. The temptation also to catch Tsar’s eye by some great feat greatly spurred on the natural rivalry existing amongst the Russian generalitet.
Lord Heytesbury, who accompanied the Tsar during the second half of 1828 made the following observation:

The presence of the Sovereign at the head of his army can never be a matter of indifference. It is either a great evil, or a great good. If he have the talent of a Frederick, or of a Napoleon, the advantage of the absence of all responsibility except towards himself, is incalculable. If he have no military talent, the disadvantage of his assuming the command is in the same proportion. But of all false propositions, the falsest and most embarrassing is that of a Sovereign accompanying his army in his simple capacity as Sovereign; disclaiming all intention of interfering, yet yielding to the pleasure of doing so at every instant; favouring some movements, censuring others and distributing honours and rewards from his own personal observation....The presence of a Sovereign under such circumstances paralyses everything. We have a proof of this before us, where in consequence of the Emperor’s interference, everybody commands and nobody. The Emperor himself, General Diebitsch, General [K. Kh.?] Benckendorff, the Grand-Duke [Michael], General Kiselev, General [M. S.] Vorontsov, all, in short, except the Commander in Chief. Where there is no unity of will, there can be no unity of action. All falls into confusion - the fault is everywhere and the responsibility nowhere.(46)

Another of Heytesbury’s criticisms was that Nicholas’ imparted a conservative approach to the conduct of the war due to his fear of the international repercussions should the Ottoman Empire actually fall in battle. By the end of the first campaign certain generals were openly complaining that he ‘always allowed political considerations to outweigh the military’. (47) There is some truth to this; for as mentioned Nicholas, fearing the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian intervention, changed to the original war plan of 25/31 December 1827 OS (the Balkan crossing) to one of merely occupying the Principalities. Once hostilities began, Nicholas certainly expected the Turks to sue for peace once the Principalities were occupied. Nicholas thus greatly contributed to the general mood of complacency by presuming that the ‘war’ would, in fact, constitute a simple ‘promenade militaire’, akin to the recent Austrian and French campaigns in the Italian peninsula and Spain. (48) On the other hand, once the campaign opened, the Tsar, by most accounts, was resolute in action and instrumental, for instance, in the crossing of the Danube in May/June. (49) Moreover, by a twist of fate it was, in fact, Nicholas himself who became in 1828 one of the strongest advocates of the more daring plan of a Balkan crossing, whilst his generals were content to advocate more conservative courses of action.
The Turkish preparations for war proved little better than the Russian. The Greek revolt had drained the Sultan's finances and occupied some of his best troops (in particular, Mohammed Ali's Egyptians). Although all Muslim men aged 14 to 60 had been called to arms, the results were disappointing. Of a nominal European force of 150,000 men, probably only two thirds were in the actual theatre of war at any one time. Up to 40,000 of the total were newly-trained regular troops, formed following the massacre of the Janissaries in 1826. Though suffering from lack of combat experience their main defect was a lack of suitable officers (foreigners were debarred from entering the service). The Sultan stationed around half of his available troops in the fortresses of the Danube and Bulgaria. The rest (around 40,000, mostly regulars), forming the main offensive force of the Ottomans, was stationed at Shumla and given to the command, not of the Grand Vizier, Mehmet Selim, (as was tradition), but the Seraskier, Hussein-Aga-Pasha.

When war broke out, the Turks in the Balkan theatre adopted their by now traditional defensive strategy of remaining in their fortresses and avoiding battle in the open field. Events proved this strategy correct; the heat, plague and the friction of war generally could damage the Russians far more than the Turks ever could. Forcing the Russians into long sieges likewise suited the resilient Turks. Moreover, the Turkish Command, whether intuitively or through receipt of intelligence, had made an accurate prediction of Russia's strategy. They divided the Russian war plan into the following periods:

1st. The occupation by the Russians of the Principalities as far as the Danube. 2nd. The passage of that river, and the advance of that army towards the Balkan mountains...3rd. The passage by the Russians of the Balkan mountains and the forward movement to the Capital.

Aware from previous wars of the conservative nature of Russian commanders it was safe for the Turks to presume that phase three would only follow once their large fortresses in Bulgaria had been taken. The Sultan ordered his army to remain on the strategic defensive, avoid large encounters and use its irregular cavalry to conducting partisan-style raids on the Russian supply lines. He hoped that the longer the war progressed, the likelier it was for Britain, Austria and even Persia to join in alliance with him. In any case, it was believed the European powers would never allow Russia to cross the Danube let alone the Balkans. Throughout 1828, Constantinople remained relatively calm, confident that no assault on the capital was forthcoming.

The situation in the Caucasian theatre differed greatly from the Balkans. Here the Turks could constantly augment their forces with irregular troops and had a great numerical
superiority over the Caucasus Corps. If the war could be brought into the Russian Caucasus then there was also the prospect of inciting revolts amongst the Muslim inhabitants. Everything thus pointed to a Turkish offensive and readiness to face the Russians in the field.

The Balkan Campaign of 1828

Following the opening of hostilities on 25 April OS, the first months of the campaign proceeded, certain delays notwithstanding, according to Diebitsch’s final plan of 22 March 1828 OS. As planned, the 6th Corps occupied Wallachia and Bucharest, with a ‘flying unit’ [letuchii otrjad] of Cossacks racing to the Austrian border to pre-empt a possible Austrian intervention. The 7th Corps surrounded Brailov, whilst the 3rd Corps prepared for a crossing of the Danube some time in May. Although, as mentioned, there was a certain delay in traversing this river, most of the intended forces had crossed by the envisaged date of 1 June OS. The siege of Brailov proved somewhat more problematic. Grand Duke Michael ordered a storm on 2 June OS, but the assault failed with the loss of around 2,500 men killed and injured. Impressed however by the severity of the attack the Turks surrendered within days. The news of the capitulation caused the surrender of another three Turkish fortresses on the Danube and in the Dobrudja between 4 and 18 June OS. By 6 June OS, the 3rd Corps had reached Kirasu (on the Trajans Wall), thus completing Diebitsch’s March plan. Nicholas now hoped the Sultan would see reason and sue for peace. The Sultan remained stubborn and only a deeper thrust into Ottoman territory would secure his surrender.

Unfortunately, due to the slow movement of certain units the Russian army was too undermanned to conduct operations much beyond an occupation of the Principalities and the Trajans Wall. Thus although the main striking force - the 3rd Corps - had reached the latter in good time, its further progress was halted. The chasseur brigade of the 7th Infantry Division was still across the Black Sea attacking Anapa; the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps had not yet arrived; many units were still attacking and occupying the minor Danubian fortresses. The intended reinforcement - the 7th Corps - was still at Brailov with all the army’s siege artillery. It was therefore decided to send for the Second Infantry Corps, though it could only arrive in September. As the 3rd Corps had no more than 15,000 men available for action, further offensives were halted.

When the aforementioned units (with the exception of the Second Corps) eventually arrived they assembled at Bazardzhik on 28/29 June OS. Russia now possessed an
offensive force of some 45,000 men, though with units sent to guard communications and supply lines, this figure probably decreased by some 10,000. The plan of ending the war through a mere occupation of the Principalities had failed, though no new war plan had been officially accepted. The remainder of the campaign degenerated into a struggle between those who favoured Kiselev’s original idea of a Balkan crossing and those who preferred the more conservative option of ending the war at Shumla through the defeat of the Seraskier’s main forces there. The picture was also doubly complicated by the Russian lack of manpower, which increasingly allowed force of circumstance to dictate operations. The fate of the 1828 campaign was now to hinge on the crucial decisions taken in early July OS.

Nicholas initially decided to attack Varna. This port previously had no significance in Russo-Turkish wars as Russian commanders had always adopted their offensives against the Turkish centre. Kiselev’s innovation of a coastal line was however accepted as Varna’s capture would allow the import of supplies from Novorossiia and link up the army with the navy. This operational line was also the shortest route to the Balkans. As, however a push, on Varna exposed the army to the danger of a Turkish flank attack from Silistria, it was decided to besiege this latter fortress simultaneously (with the 6th Corps, currently occupying Wallachia).

The situation was however transformed following the receipt of a report from the Russian avant-garde, citing a very heavy concentration of Turkish troops near Shumla - this was the Seraskier’s main force of 40,000 men. As the threat of a Turkish flank attack was considered too great to be ignored, it was decided to postpone temporarily the siege of Varna and head for Shumla. Such an operation was particularly tempting as, should it prove successful, it would entail the destruction of organised Turkish resistance and almost certainly an end to the war. In any case, the planned siege of Varna was now pointless since the fleet had yet to arrive from the current siege of Anapa and as all the siege artillery was still at Brailov.

A Russian strike force of 30,000 men left Bazardzhik on 4 July OS arriving at Enibazar three days later, where a military council was held. It was confirmed that the Turkish army was to be attacked but, disastrously for the Russians, it was also decided that even if the Turks retreated to Shumla, the fortress itself was to be attacked. Due to the very large Turkish garrison and insufficient Russian siege artillery both a siege and a storm were deemed impossible. Instead Shumla was to be ‘surrounded’ by the 3rd and 7th Corps. It is not entirely clear what was initially meant by this, but it eventually developed into an
enveloping manoeuvre designed to impose a blockade - an attempt to induce that fortresses capitulation by severing its supply channel and forcing the garrison to fight in the open field. Simultaneous with this operation, Silistria was to be besieged (with 6th Corps) as well as Varna (when the fleet and Guards eventually arrived).(67)

On 8 July 1828 OS the Russian forces arrived at Shumla. Up to 40,000 Turkish troops were found in the field and it was decided to give battle immediately. The Russians however spurned their chance of defeating the Seraskier. The actual battle lasted but a few hours and the Turks, after minor losses of a few hundred men, retreated to the safety of Shumla.(68)

Following this failure, the plan adopted at Enibazar on 7 July OS was enacted. This was to destroy all chance of ending the war in a single campaign. The Russian forces were ordered to disperse over a large area and thus the Turkish garrisons of the above three fortresses were all larger than each of the respective attacking Russian forces. The siege of Varna was delayed by the late arrival of the fleet from Anapa (22 July OS) and the late arrival of the Guards (28 August OS). Once the artillery arrived (4 September OS), the siege could begin and Varna eventually fell on the 29th OS, though under controversial circumstances. The planned siege of Silistria did not materialise due to the size of the Russian forces (only 10,000 men). By way of reinforcement the 2nd Corps arrived in September, though again the lack of artillery precluded any meaningful operations.(69)

The blockade of Shumla proved disastrous and was the greatest single blunder of 1828. Far from the army magazine chain the Russians soon run out of supplies and especially forage. The attempt to encircle Shumla failed due to regular lightning counter-attacks by Turkish cavalry from Shumla. Such attacks increased progressively in their boldness and severity and following two major assaults on 14 and 27 August OS, Wittgenstein’s 3rd Corps was forced to scale down operations to a mere ‘observance’ of Shumla.(70) At one stage a full retreat was almost necessitated but, on the Tsar’s insistence, the Russians held on (to protect the flank of units besieging Varna) and retained certain units at Shumla almost to the end of the campaign.(71)

It always been unclear who exactly made the decision taken at Enibazar(72) and who subsequently supported it and insisted on its execution. Certain evidence, however, points conclusively to Jomini and Diebitsch.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
As already noted, Jomini based his theory of war on the necessity of destroying the main enemy forces. He had never been converted to the idea of a Balkan crossing per se - this was merely to be a symbolic coup de grâce following a defeat of the Turkish forces at Shumla. From as early as June 1828 Jomini had become convinced of the dangers of such a crossing and did everything in his power to convince the Tsar to end the war at Shumla not Constantinople. Ostensibly, Jomini gave as his reason the lack of troops - a Balkan crossing required an active force of around 80,000 men. The present number (according to Jomini, 50,000-60,000), meant that ‘nos forces ne sont pas sufficintes dans le moment pour mener une invasion au delà du Balkan et garder en même temps la vallée du Danube’. Russia had sufficient men to observe or attack Silistria, Rustchuk, Shumla and Varna, but not enough for ‘une invasion décisive sur Adrianople’.

Though the shortage of men was significant, one suspects that Jomini possessed exaggerated notions of the threat posed to Russia’s position on the Danube and the right flank as a whole. Events were to prove that the Turks’ incompetence in the field made their numerical superiority something of an irrelevance and their threat minimal. The cynic might, however, also point to a more hidden motive behind his opposition to a Balkan crossing - that Jomini was concerned lest such a manoeuvre (without a defeat of the Turks at Shumla) actually led to victory, thus, by consequence, destroying the basis of his theory. He therefore made it perfectly clear to Nicholas that ‘les règles de guerre exigerent qu’on s’attache à combattre et à détruire les masses organisées de l’ennemi’. He therefore proposed an attack on Shumla as well as on Varna and Silistria which also housed significant Turkish forces. These (simultaneous) attacks were to involve sieges if necessary and progress until the fortresses had been ‘ou reduitées ou bloquées’.

Jomini, of course, therefore agreed with the decision taken at Bazardzhik on 30 June OS to march on Shumla. This plan was not in itself so bad; recent Turkish attacks had suggested the Seraskier was willing to fight and the opportunity to face them in the field had to be taken. What was disastrous was the decision taken at Enibazar to proceed with a blockade of that fortress as well as concurrently undertake the siege of Varna and Silistria. Jomini had himself advocated this and therefore must take a good proportion of the blame.

Jomini, however, is deserving of especial criticism because he viewed the war as little more than a showcase for the demonstration of the validity of his theory. He seems to have been as much concerned with proving the latter correct as in actually winning the war. As late as 29 August OS, Jomini was still demanding more attacks on the Shumla garrison
and the simultaneous sieges of Silistria and Varna, as ‘c’est dans la destruction ou la dispersion de ces masses [organisées de l’ennemi] qui consiste toute l’art de la guerre’.(76)

Turning to Diebitsch, the documents show clearly that he fully concurred in Jomini’s fear of a Turkish flank attack from Shumla and worked hard on Nicholas to dissuade him from a Balkan crossing before the latter’s fall. Somewhat surprisingly, the Tsar, by the summer of 1828, had become converted to the idea of a Balkan crossing. Whilst the reasons for this are not entirely clear, it seems that he was very desirous of ending the war in a single campaign, fearing the international repercussions of a second (primarily Anglo-Austrian intervention). Moreover, it was soon obvious that the blockade of Shumla was not working and it was worth considering alternative operations.

Therefore, in August, Nicholas, unhappy with the 3rd Corps’ inactivity at Shumla, proposed sending that unit in conjunction with the Guards when they arrived (via Varna) across the Balkans to Aidos and then pushing to Burgas to join up with the fleet. The plan was to be enacted regardless of whether Varna or Shumla actually fell. Shumla was merely to be observed by the 7th Corps (15,000 men), which was sufficient to defeat the 40,000 man strong Turkish garrison if it entered the field.(77) It was of some irony that the Tsar, previously sceptical about the whole issue of a Balkan crossing, had now become its strong supporter.

Diebitsch, however, was pulling in exactly the opposite direction. He was adamant that the Balkans could not be crossed until both Varna and Shumla had been taken. Diebitsch wanted to strengthen Russia’s position at Shumla by adding the Guards and pushing to Eski-Dzhuma to cut off the garrison’s supplies. This would be either the prelude to the siege and capture of the fortress or a means of forcing the Turkish 40,000-man garrison to come out and fight in the field.(78) This idea was almost certainly inspired by Jomini’s war plan of April 1828.(79)

At Diebitsch’s request, Kiselev drew up the operational details for the blockade.(80) Although in his earlier war plans, Kiselev had allowed for the possibility of a blockade of Shumla, he had envisaged it as a containing measure - to guard the army’s rear during a Balkan crossing. He certainly did not consider its capture as essential prerequisite of a Balkan crossing. Indeed, under the present circumstances, he ruled out entirely any hope of its capture:

In the present state of affairs, it seems that an active continuation of the campaign and, in particular, a strong attack on Shumla, would be very especially advantageous for us. For by September our forces will have inevitably decreased, whilst those of the enemy, doubtless, have increased. On the hand, it is impossible not to confess, that the
resources here available to us are *insufficient for the capture of this fortress if the Turks intend to defend themselves*. *(81)*

Unfortunately, due to the army's lack of men, Kiselev ruled out a Balkan crossing and could think of no viable course of action other than a blockade of Shumla (though what he thought this would achieve is unclear). He believed that even when the Guards and 2nd Corps eventually arrived:

...this will not give a sufficient [numerical] advantage in order, in late autumn, to act decisively and boldly on the other side of the Balkans as, by that time, the Ottoman forces will have increased. Thus the campaign of 1828 will probably end on the peaks of the Balkan mountains, which with capture of Shumla and Varna will give us a firm foundation for the preparation of the army for an early opening of the war in 1829. *(82)*

This was all very different from Diebitsch's position. The latter was *ideologically* opposed to any attempt at a Balkan crossing in 1828 and, as shall be seen, it was not his idea to push for one in 1829. Diebitsch wanted to end the war at Shumla - this corresponded to his conservative instincts in the field and his essential agreement with the ideas of Jomini, whose theory placed the capture of that fortress (and the defeat of the main Turkish forces inside) as the centrepiece of any Turkish war plan. In contrast, Kiselev did genuinely believe in the essential validity of a Balkan crossing, and came to oppose it only for pragmatic and not theoretical reasons.

This said, Kiselev's plan for the blockade was certainly an abject failure and he must take his fair share of criticism. More importantly, however, Kiselev allowed himself to be dominated by this failure and his descent into conservatism was soon to begin. By the end of the campaign he was almost a broken man and was to retract all his previous ideas regarding the Turkish war plan. He came to believe that a Balkan crossing was a unrealisable dream and ultimately had not the courage to advocate one in 1829.

Following his adoption of Kiselev's operational plan of 25 July OS (the blockade of Shumla), Diebitsch proceeded to resist Nicholas' plan to withdraw the 3rd Corps and send it across the Balkans. Ostensibly, Diebitsch cited the effect this withdrawal would have of the morale of the troops and the opportunity this would give the Turks for a counter attack. *(83)* though in fact he believed Balkan crossing was impossible, or at least too great a risk. The case for remaining at Shumla however was becoming progressively weaker, for on 14 August OS the Turks mounted a strong counter-attack forcing Wittgenstein to leave
Eski-Stambul and so destroying the Russian aim of a blockade. Although Wittgenstein earned for this a strong censure from Nicholas(84) the Commander-in-Chief had in fact always been sceptical about the whole idea of a blockade, resisting Diebitsch’s proposal to send the Guards there instead of to Varna.(85) Diebitsch himself was, in fact, far more responsible for the folly at Shumla and he continued to make matters progressively worse by delaying a withdrawal when Russia’s position there was already hopeless.(86) Although Nicholas was eventually forced to admit that ‘nous avons fait beaucoup de sottises à Shumla’(87) he refused to blame his favourite.

When the Guards finally appeared they were despatched, as Nicholas originally favoured, to Varna (they arrived on 28 August OS). Even before the siege actually began Diebitsch came out openly against any Balkan crossing for 1828. He stated that best that could be hoped for was the fall of Varna, though clung to the, by now absurd, idea that Shumla could still be captured.(88) Jomini himself was also still advocating this and perhaps Nicholas was eventually fooled into believing it.(89) In any case, as the siege of Varna continued up to 29 September OS(90) any idea of further meaningful operations became impossible.

Other than the operations at Shumla and Varna the rest of the campaign was unremarkable. The Turks avoided large scale encounters and limited operations to attacks on isolated units and on Russian supply lines. One important exception however was the Battle of Boeleshti, 14 September OS. Around 25,000 Turks (mostly irregular cavalry) had crossed Danube at Widdin and occupied Kalafat. They planned to march on Kraovo, link up with other forces from the Turkish Danubian fortresses, and push the Russians from Bucharest and Wallachia. A small Russian force of 4,200 under General Geismar unexpectedly attacked at night and secured a stunning victory.(91) This was a powerful demonstration of the Russians’ superiority in the field and of the wisdom of the Turkish strategy in generally avoiding such encounters. Alternatively, it also demonstrated how exaggerated were the Russian’s fear of the Turks’ superiority in numbers and of the actual threat of a flank attack from Shumla or Silistria.

**The Caucasian Campaign of 1828**

The role of the Caucasus Corps in a future Turkish war had received almost no attention from Diebitsch and Kiselev during the 1820s. The Balkan theatre was considered to be of paramount importance - the Caucasian, merely an adjunct. Ermolov had however been considering the subject and some time in 1826 submitted the following proposals.(92)
The role of his corps was, by an offensive into Anatolia, to deflect Ottoman forces away from the more important Balkan theatre. An attack was also the best means of defending the Caucasus, as the corps had too few men to hold the frontier at all points against a strong Turkish invading force. A Turkish occupation of the Russian Caucasus would prove disastrous as since there was ‘no trust in the people’ of the region (especially the Muslim population) and their defection to the Turkish side could not be discounted. Thus everything pointed to the a Russian assault on the Pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsykh - this would cut off all roads and passes leading to Russian territory as well as forcing each individual Pasha, first and foremost, to defend his own territory, thus hindering the concentration of Ottoman troops (see Map C). At the time of writing, Ermolov feared a combined Turco-Persian attack and therefore proposed two variations of this plan, dependent upon the arrival of Russian reinforcements. The more defensive was to attack from Akhaltsykh and, if the main Turk forces (which were bound to assemble at Erzerum) were not too great, then to push onto Kars. All route from Persia were to be blocked. The more ambitious was to take Kars and push to Erzerum. A Persian attack was to be halted by a counter flank attack into the Persian khanate of Erevan. Other than these operations Ermolov considered the capture of Anapa vital, as it was used by the Turks for arming the Circassians and other rebellious tribes.

By the time Ermolov’s successor, Paskevich, was forced to consider operations in early 1828, the situation was still unclear as the Persian war was not yet over. In February, Paskevich was informed that war with Turkey was ‘inevitable’ and the following plan offered.\(^{3}\) The Tsar was adamant that due to the weakness of the Russian operational base in the Caucasus, a strong offensive into Anatolia ‘did not correspond to the rules of war’. Only limited operations were to conducted in order to ‘secure the borders of Georgia’ and ‘deflect part of the Turkish forces’ from the Balkans. This entailed the capture of Poti, Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaki. The 20th Infantry and 2nd Uhlan Divisions, sent to reinforce the Caucasus Corps during the Persian war, were to return to Russia, taking Anapa en route. Some days later, Nicholas, increasingly concerned by the unwillingness of the Shah to accept terms and the need to protect the soon-to-be-annexed khanates of Erevan and Nakhichevan from a Turkish attack, concluded that ‘the best means for a defence with small forces against Asiatic peoples is, without doubt, a decisive attack on the latter themselves’. Paskevich was therefore now to push to Kars and then head north to Akhaltsykh and the other aforementioned towns. However the bolder option of pushing further to Erzerum and Trabizond was ruled out completely.\(^{4}\)
Although the situation was ultimately ameliorated through the signing of peace with Persia on 10 February OS, Paskevich accepted the logic of taking Kars. Due however to a lack of men he refused to return the two aforementioned divisions to Russia and was generally unenthusiastic about detaching forces for the capture of Anapa. The latter did not pose a great military threat, rather its importance was political, being as it was the centre of Turkish influence in the Caucasus. Paskevich tried to scupper the Tsar’s plans by claiming his troops could only be freed for an expedition to Anapa in September. Otherwise, Paskevich’s plan was to assemble his forces at Gumri, and follow Nicholas’ plan of 10 February OS.(95)

Paskevich had at his disposal 56 infantry battalions, 11 cavalry squadrons, 17 Cossack regiments and around 150 guns, some 45,000 troops. He chose to commit one third for internal security and over one-third for protecting the Russo-Turkish frontier and the occupation of north-west Persia (to ensure that nation’s neutrality and payment of the war indemnity). This left a strike force of only 15 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry squadrons, 6 Cossack regiments and 68 guns - a total of some 12,000 men.(96) This dispersion has, quite unfairly, been condemned as an over-defensive ‘reactionary cordon strategy’.(97) Paskevich was sufficiently prudent to devote substantial resources to combat the threat of Persian and Turkish-induced rebellions in the Russian Caucasus.(98) If not supressed immediately, the latter could prove far more troublesome than the Ottoman army itself. The Sultan was certain to urge the Circassians and Chechens to conduct raids against the Russians, whilst the local Muslim rulers who ruled with Russian consent remained unreliable.(99) In any case, it is clear that Nicholas sanctioned only limited action in Asiatic Turkey, and, for this, the Russian strike force proved sufficient.

The Russian Caucasian campaign opened on 14 June OS, some six weeks later than the Balkan campaign.(100) The Russian force left Gumri and marched on Kars.(101) Russian intelligence reported a Turkish garrison there of around 10,000. It was due to be reinforced by units from the 30,000 strong main Turkish force at Erzerum. Thus, on reaching Kars, Paskevich wasted no time in ordering a storm. It fell, with heavy Turkish losses, on 23 June OS. The Pasha of Kars, Mahmed-Emin, was captured and, on his person, papers relating to the Turkish war plan were discovered. The Turks had aimed at pushing the war into the Russian Caucasus on three operational lines - Adzaria to Guria, Akhaltsykh to Imeretia and Bayezid to Erevan. The concentration of Russian troops at Gumri however had changed their plans, for the Turkish command feared a Russian attack on Kars and then Erzerum - the main Turkish base in the Caucasus. The Seraskier of
Ottoman Asiatic forces, Kiosa-Mehemt, had therefore in mid-June OS rushed with 15,000 men from Erzerum to reinforce Kars. When the latter fell to the Russians, Kiosa was but one days march away. (102)

With Kars taken and the Turkish operational base cut in two, Paskevich began contemplating further operations. Kiosa had bypassed Kars and pushed to Ardahan, so tempting Paskevich with the prospect of a large scale encounter. However Kiosa soon returned to Erzerum, where with a garrison of over 30,000 he was too strong to be attacked. Paskevich therefore decided to head north and capture Akhalkalaki and then Akhaltsykh. This would not only secure the Russian frontier but allow the local peasantry to return from the mountains. They had been forcibly sent there by the Turks to deprive the Russians of buying and requisitioning their food supplies. After this, there was the option of attacking Batum, Trabizond and even Erzerum. (103) Diebitsch and Nicholas concurred in the plan, though ruled out any attack on Erzerum in 1828. This was to be postponed until 1829 ‘so that [Paskevich’s] operations...will complement our operations across the Balkans if the war does not end in this year’. (104) Instead he favoured a push to Batum and then Trabizond. (105)

Before pushing north Paskevich ordered the forces of General K. F. Hesse at Kutais to capture Poti. This was designed to lessen Turkish influence in Guria, where the much-distrusted Princess Sophia was in dispute with the Russian authorities over her claim to be regent. The port fell on 15 July OS without great resistance. (106) The following day, Paskevich left Kars with 10,000 men. (107) Certain detachments feigned movements towards Erzerum and Akhaltsykh whilst he main force headed for Akhalkalaki. This fooled Kiosa into returning south to Erzerum to resist a bogus Russian attack. (108) Paskevich arrived at Akhalkalaki on 23 July OS and a few cannon shots were sufficient to inflict heavy losses and induce its capitulation. (109) The Russians then marched on Akhaltsykh, capturing Khertvis en route. The former, a lawless outpost of the Ottoman Empire, was the crime and slave-trade capital of the whole Caucasus. Even the Sultan had dared not issue proclamations there announcing the abolition of the Janissaries and the introduction of conscription into the regular army. (110) Just as the Russian force approached the town from the east, Kiosa with a 30,000 man force was arriving from the south. Paskevich gave battle on 9 August OS and secured a famous and comprehensive victory. Akhaltsykh was besieged and captured on 16 August OS and later that month detachments were sent to capture Atskhur and Ardahan. (111)
In September, Paskevich decided not to push to Batum as intended and ended operations for 1828. Though some have sought to deny it, one must be impressed by success of Paskevich’s campaign. The Pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsykh were completely conquered, so securing the Russian frontier and opening up the Borjomi pass for operations in 1829. Despite Turkish intrigues Paskevich was also able to ensure that no general uprising, even amongst the Circassians and Chechens, took place that year, nor indeed the next. Though the former led raids into Russian territory (on the right bank of the Kuban) throughout the summer, subsequent Russian punishment expeditions, involving several thousand of troops, kept the situation under control. Paskevich’s decision to leave behind substantial garrisons for internal security appears therefore to have been largely vindicated.

On the level of strategy, the 1828 Russian campaign was dominated by the quest to capture certain important geographical points - roads, mountain passes and towns. The former two were required for the security of the Russian border, the latter as a source of supplies. It was not Paskevich’s overriding aim to destroy the main Turkish forces, but did so, when Kiossa gave him the opportunity in August. Such victories notwithstanding, it is true that no degree of Russian success in the East could induce the Sultan’s submission and end the war. The Caucasian theatre was of secondary importance and it could not compensate for the failure in Europe.

Conclusions on the 1828 Campaign

The war aim of 1828 - the conclusion of an advantageous peace with the Ottoman Empire, was not achieved due to the failure of the Balkan campaign. This failure resulted from serious deficiencies in resources and strategy. The most important of the former were the lack of siege artillery and the insufficient number of troops in the theatre of war (due to the slow movement of reserves). The Russians were also disadvantaged by the climatic conditions of the Balkans - notably, this resulted in the lack of forage for horses and a severe outbreak of plague.

The above must not, however, be allowed to obscure the real reason for the 1828 failure - the grave strategic errors that transformed the plan for decisive and bold offensive on the capital into a grinding series of sieges and blockades, reminiscent of the worst examples of ‘methodical’ war. The over-exaggerated fear of the operational base, lines of communication and the Russian right flank led to the dispersal of the available forces over a huge area. It was not, however, this dispersion in itself that proved fatal, but the ends to
which this was done.\(118\) Too many troops were left behind to guard the Principalities and
the captured Danubian fortresses, whilst others were committed to secondary objects such
as the sieges of Brailov, Silistria and Anapa.\(119\)

The greatest single blunder was the attempted blockade/siege of Shumla. Whilst
writers have agreed on this point,\(120\) it is the thesis of this chapter that the essential cause
of this error was the underlying, destructive influence of Jomini. Legitimated by the latter’s
theoretical works, his own war plan of April 1828 and subsequent proposals of 15 June and
29 August OS, Russian military doctrine was dominated by the quest to destroy the main
enemy forces. Whilst this doctrine was applicable if the enemy chose to enter the field and
give battle, it was not applicable should it decide to avoid large encounters and remain
entrenched in fortresses such as Shumla. Following the lost opportunity of 8 July OS, it
was the inability the High Command to liberate itself from the confines of this doctrine that
ensured disaster.\(121\)

Underpinning the whole Russian failure was however perhaps one even more basic
flaw - the Russian Command fought the Ottoman forces as if they were a regular European
army. As already noted, as a result of the research projects of the Second Army’s General
Staff, the idea of the uniqueness of Turkish wars was to gradually gain currency within the
military. This process reached its apogee in the works of Liprandi, who, with all the relish
of a somewhat patronising savant, happily passed the remainder of his life publicising the
folly of applying European strategic notions against an Asiatic foe.\(122\) Liprandi thus
gives for instance the obsession in 1828 with a Turkish flank attack short thrift. He points
to the first Russian movements in April OS - following the Danubian crossing, the main
forces, leaving in their rear Brailov, Silistria and a number of other smaller fortresses,
pushed on quickly to Karasu on the Trajans Wall. Why did these garrisons allow the
Russians to cross the Danube in the first place almost unmolested? Why did the garrisons
of Silistria and Shumla, who were but a few days march from Karasu, not mount a flank
attack as soon as the disjointed main Russian forces began arriving there in the first days of
June OS? Why did Brailov, Machin, Tulchta and Hirsovo all capitulate in mid-June OS
after it was clear the main Russian forces had passed them by, and that Brailov had already
resisted a storm by the second line Russian forces (the 7th Infantry Corps)? Though many
Russian commanders were not aware of it, Liprandi argued that the initial Russian offensive
to the Trajans Wall was in fact very risky. It broke all the established ‘mathematical laws’
of warfare and would have been impossible to execute against a European enemy.\(123\)
All this should have alerted the army to the great weakness of the Turks in gathering intelligence on enemy movement and organising counter-attacks. Unfortunately the opposite was true and the Russian Command became progressively more conservative as it pushed its operational line further into Ottoman territory. Still fearing a flank attack ordered the siege of Silistria and blockade of Shumla. For reasons already alluded to this was mistake - the Turks were always resolute in sieges and their garrisons always very well supplied. Sieges and blockades should be avoided as Turkish garrisons only rarely left them for raids and it was sufficient to merely to observe them with cavalry units. Liprandi believed that, due to certain quirks in the Turkish mentality, the surest way to induce their capitulation was simply to leave them behind and push deeper into Ottoman territory (as had been the case with Brailov and the other Danubian fortresses). (124)

Ultimately the 1828 campaign failed because too great a significance was given to protecting its operational line and in seeking the decisive battle with an enemy that was not willing to offer it. This caused the army to fight in a predictable and methodical manner. Whilst such a method was applicable against a European army it was not against the Ottomans:

> In war with Asiatics it is essential to act on the imagination. The surest means for this are speed and surprise....This type of war inevitably spreads fear and confusion in the Turkish army, which is unused to a strict observation and does not employ sufficient means for correct intelligence on the enemy. (125)

Both Kiselev and, before him, Kutuzov had expressed similar ideas, (126) leading both to propose a Balkan crossing. Should this have been attempted in 1828, or was it impractical given the army’s scant resources? Kutuzov believed that against the Turks ‘success depends not upon a great number of men but on the intelligence and vigilance of the commanding General’. (127) Certain contemporaries believed a crossing in 1828 was both necessary and achievable. (128) Their ideas essentially concurred with Nicholas’ plan of 9 August OS - for the 7th Corps to merely observe Shumla, the 6th to observe or siege Silistria and the 3rd to siege Varna. The Balkans could then have been crossed with the arrival of the Guards in late August OS. During the winter months following the close of the campaign it was left for the Russian Command to muse over a possible lost opportunity in 1828 and gather the necessary resolve for an attempt in 1829.

Political and Military Developments, October 1828 - April 1829

The failure to end the war in a single campaign and the Sultan’s continued refusal to treat for peace, greatly complicated matters for Nesselrode and Russia’s diplomatic
relations. In October, the Foreign Minister again raised the spectre of an Anglo-Austrian alliance, maintaining that, whilst in 1828 he could guarantee that Russia 'aurait l'Empire Ottoman seul à combattre, il ne peut maintenant exprimer sous ce rapport que de simples espérances pour la campagne de 1829'. (129) Relations with Britain had certainly deteriorated since the summer. Wellington had completed his victory over the remaining Canningites in his Cabinet, who were forced to leave in May. Nesselrode now feared a return to 'le système du marquis de Londonderry' [Castlereagh] and a closening of relations between London and Vienna. (130)

Since the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war, Wellington had become increasingly suspicious of Russian designs; this manifested itself over three specific issues. The first was a Russo-French proposal for a French expedition to the Morea to expel the forces of Ibrahim. Though utterly opposed, Wellington was forced into retreat and the French forces landed in August 1828. (131) The second issue concerned a Russian demand for belligerent rights in the Mediterranean and the blockade of all vessels bound for Constantinople. Despite Aberdeen's view that this was 'quite impossible', again the Russians had their way. (132) Finally there was the question of the future frontiers of 'Greece'. The Russians, supported by the French, favoured a larger Greece, with the Arta-Volo frontier and the inclusion of Euboea (Negropont), Samos and even Crete. Wellington was opposed to anything beyond the Morea, but again was defeated. (133)

Russia's relations with Austria were even cooler. Throughout 1828 and into 1829 many intelligent reports had accused Vienna of supplying the Turks via the Danube and of the continuing preparations of her army for war. (134)

Nesselrode had, however, overestimated the closeness of Anglo-Austrian relations. Although Metternich had put out feelers for a separate understanding with Britain in 1828, (135) he was rebuffed. Aberdeen, the new British Foreign Secretary, dismissed Austrian policy as 'timid and calculating' and correctly suspected that her apparent preparations for war were merely an exercise in brinkmanship designed to scare the Russians into more moderate war aims. (136)

Following the receipt of more judicious Russian intelligence, Nesselrode eventually became convinced of the non-existence of an Anglo-Austrian combination in the Spring of 1829. A. F. Matouszewic reported from London that the Wellington administration was currently gripped by the question of Catholic Emancipation. The affairs of Greece were considered secondary and he predicted confidently that 'l'Empereur sera l'arbitre des destinées de l'Orient'. (137) In the same month, G. M. Stroganov, who had recently been
sent on a mission to Vienna to assess the readiness of the Austrian army, delivered his verdict. Only Austria’s Italian Corps was ‘sur un vrai pied de guerre’, and the likelihood of any attack in 1829 was negligible.(138) Finally, the signature of the 22 March 1829 Protocol over Greece negated the threat of Britain separating with Russia, so allowing Nesselrode the boast - ‘nous avons acquis une securite complet pour la campagne [of 1829]’. (139) Although certain disputes with Britain remained, (such as the Russian naval blockade of Crete), Nesselrode was sure that a military success in 1829 would make them an irrelevance. As he told Diebitsch, ‘Battez bien les Turcs, mon cher comte, et tous ces petits nuages se dissiperont les unes apres les autres’. (140)

The discussions over the war plan for 1829 proceeded no more smoothly than those for 1828. In the immediate aftermath of the first campaign the High Command had become increasingly pessimistic concerning the feasibility of a Balkan crossing. This was compounded by the acceptance of Nesselrode’s fears (of late Autumn 1828) regarding the threat of an Anglo-Austrian alliance. Diebitsch’s ideas, in particular, were notable for their timidity and indecision. He envisaged two possible plans for 1829; either (i) a landing at Burgas (whether in conjunction with a Balkan crossing or not is not stated), or (ii) remain on the Danube, taking only Silistria and leaving all offensive action to Paskevich who was to push to Trabizond. Diebitsch considered ‘avantages plus certain que le premiere...[et]...en meme temps beaucoup moins de sacrifices et offre moins de risques’. Such a plan also would also keep the Russian army close to the ‘frontieres de l’Austrich, ce qui peut-etre n’est pas une considération à negliger’. The problem, however, was that these forces could not be supplied by sea — only by the Danubian flotilla which was understrength and liable to attack. (141)

Kiselev was barely more positive. He ruled out a Balkan crossing for political reasons. A crossing was now said to necessarily lead to the fall and capture of Constantinople, which was against Russia’s declared war aims. In any case, its capture was not possible ‘by one war and one nation’ and required huge resources which Russia could not collect in time for 1829. Instead, Russia was to siege the remaining Turkish Danubian fortresses and make preparations for a possible third campaign in 1830. Kiselev admitted that ‘a methodical war against the Turks does not promise great results...but at least the army will not be exposed to ruin’. (142) Shamed by the failure of 1828, Kiselev shied away from offering a bolder plan. Throughout the 1820s he had been the greatest opponent of
traditional methodical action and the strongest supporter of a decisive push on Constantinople. In 1827, he had boldly asserted that:

I suppose the aim of the war consists in forcing the Ottoman Porte to the terms made to it. For this a detached war in the provinces is insufficient; instead the very capital of the state is to be threatened...by quickly bringing the theatre of war to Rumelia, Constantinople is to be captured, or an advantageous peace gained under its walls.(143)

By the end of the first campaign Kiselev had retracted his testament. It is unclear whether Kiselev wished he had never proposed the idea of a crossing, or whether he cursed himself for his inability to execute it in 1828. What is certain, is that the reality of war had transformed him, in military terms, into an arch-conservative.

Heeding the advice of his generals, the Tsar, the prime advocate of a Balkan crossing in 1828, became fully convinced of its impossibility. He believed that ‘le bon sens et la prudence exigent impérieusement d’abandonner l’idée d’une invasion au delà des monts’ and instead he had decided to ‘conduit the war across the Danube in a more systematic than offensive manner’. The army was to consolidate its operational base in the Balkans through the sieges of Silistria and Giurgevo, whilst in the Caucasus Paskevich (as Diebitsch had proposed) was to ‘act offensively’ by pushing to Erzerum and then Trabizond. At this stage still fearful of the European reaction to a second campaign, Nicholas maintained that ‘ce plan prouvera à l’universe entier que nous continuons non en conquérants, mais en gens sages et prudents’. Although Wittgenstein had not pleased the Tsar in 1828, due to the modest nature of the intended 1829 war plan, he was retained as Commander-in-Chief.(144)

In November 1828, the situation was, however, transformed with the submission of a memoir by the (now retired) decorated veteran of the Napoleonic wars General I. V. Vasil’chikov.(145) Under the rubric - ‘war with Turkey is a purely administrative matter’, Vasil’chikov blamed the shortage of horses, the problem with reserves and the absence of various supplies in 1828 on the failings of individual generals(146) though predominantly on the general lack of coherence in the Russian command structure. Vasil’chikov even hinted the problems caused by the Tsar’s interference in the campaign, though tempered this criticism by arguing that ‘the Sovereign is occupied by other, more important questions and cannot scrutinise fully the minute details connected with the preparations for a campaign’. Vasil’chikov made it clear, however, that he did not seek to offer solutions of his own, and requested instead the establishment of a special committee to discuss the future 1829 campaign.
On 19 November 1828 OS, Nicholas presided over a committee composed of V. P. Kochubei, A. I. Chernyshev, Baron K. F. Toll and Vasil'chikov himself. The committee reaffirmed Russia's general war aim as being 'ne de renverser le Sultan, mais...forcer la Porte Ottomane à conclure une paix'. Nicholas, recanted his recent decision and accepted that 'une guerre systématique, qui se borneroit simplement à la prise de quelques fortresses sur le Danube' was insufficient for this purpose. More decisive action was needed - a siege of Silistria was to remove the threat to the Russian left flank and allow the army to push south across the Balkans in conjunction with an amphibious assault on Burgas. As regards the vexed problem of Shumla, its capture was not deemed essential to the success of the campaign. A possible attack in early March OS was, however, considered, as Ottoman irregular forces were always disbanded during the winter, hopefully making the fortress poorly defended at this time and its capture a formality. As regards the number of troops needed, a proposal from certain (unnamed) committee members for 170-200,000 men was rejected due to the 'impossibilité de nourrir et d'approvisionner [ces] forces'. Instead, the more modest figure of 100-120,000 men was accepted.

This proved to be the final decision and it was echoed in the plans of other military authorities. After years of dither and hesitation due to the fear the logistical and political hazards of a Balkan crossing, a firm commitment had finally been reached.

As regards the personnel for the next campaign, Nicholas made important changes in February 1829. These changes were essentially the result of a desire to rationalise the command structure. A debate on this issue had been instigated by Vasil'chikov, Diebitsch and Wittgenstein, all of whom had recently submitted memoirs to the Tsar. All agreed that the 1828 campaign was marked by a confusion in the command structure because Wittgenstein, the nominal Commander-in-Chief had had almost all his authority usurped by the presence of the Tsar and the interference of the Heads of Staff, Diebitsch and Kiselev. Clearly, this could not be repeated in 1829 and Nicholas veered towards the solution proposed by Diebitsch. The latter argued that the Commander-in-Chief should be given full, undivided power to conduct the operations of coming campaign as he saw fit. The main hindrance to this was the Head of General Staff of the Second Army, who, in acting as the main, often sole, interface between the Second Army and the Commander-in-Chief (as a result of Kiselev's earlier reforms) was able to use his great power to dominate the C.-in-C. Diebitsch's ultimate solution to this was to abolish the very position of Head of Staff. As, however, it was imprudent to do this half-way through a war, Diebitsch argued for three
changes for 1829; first, the C.-in-C. was to choose his own Head of Staff; second, the Head of Staff should be allowed to request a combat assignment at the first vacancy; third, all correspondence between the General Staff and the Second Army was to be transmitted only via the C.-in-C.. (151) The subtext to Diebitsch’s proposal (dated 10 December 1828 OS) was clear enough. Diebitsch wished to increase enormously the power of the Commander-in-Chief because he himself coveted the post. Though certain that he would eventually be made C.-in-C., Diebitsch felt uneasy at the prospect of having Kiselev as his Head of Staff. The latter knew intimately the workings of the Second Army and, as his relationship with Wittgenstein proved, had a history of seeking to dominate the C.-in-C.. Moreover, Diebitsch believed that having such an able man as Kiselev as his Head of Staff could prove a source of intrigue should the 1829 campaign begin to go wrong. As he put it:

The human mind finds mistakes in others much quicker, though cannot itself always do better; in any case, the sharp eye of subordinates lessens the trust towards the commander and takes from him all moral authority. (152)

Fortunately for Diebitsch, the 1828 campaign had already convinced Kiselev of the futility of working alongside him. In September 1828, Kiselev had requested he be relieved of his staff duties and be assigned the command of a division. (153) Nicholas had, in fact, refused and thus Diebitsch ensured in his December proposals that the right to a combat post was assigned to the Head of Staff.

Nicholas was swayed by Diebitsch’s proposals. Wittgenstein was replaced by Diebitsch as Commander-in-Chief since he was not considered suitable to execute the new bolder war plan of crossing the Balkans. (154) Kiselev was replaced as Head of Staff by Toll, probably on the advice of Vasičkikh. (155) Kiselev himself was allowed to take up a combat post. (156) In addition, Nicholas was attracted by Diebitsch’s idea of eventually abolishing the very post of Head of Staff. Already resolved to end the autonomy of the General Staffs throughout the Russian army and generally centralise the Russian military establishment in the War Ministry, Nicholas decided to end the existence of the Second Army once the Turkish war had been concluded. The Second Army’s General Staff was to be abolished outright and its military units transferred to the First Army. (157) This decision was to complete Kiselev’s fall from grace in military affairs. The plans for his General Staff, the empirical school of strategy, his dream of leading a Balkan crossing had all disappeared. It was left to others to reap the glory of this latter enterprise whilst, almost symbolically, Kiselev spent almost all of the 1829 campaign north of the Danube, guarding Diebitsch’s rear.
The stage was finally set for the 1829 campaign. Diebitsch received the planned reinforcements, so increasing the Russian force to around 125,000 men and 452 guns. The capture of Varna in 1828 had greatly eased the traffic of supplies. By May, Vorontsov had already delivered from Novorossiia two months worth of foodstuffs for 100,000 men and 30,000 horses, with more to arrive. The main inconvenience faced was the prolongation of a severe winter in the Balkans and the flooding of the Danube, which caused the opening of the land campaign to be postponed to around 15 April OS. This deprived the Russians of the opportunity for their envisaged early attack on Shumla and allowed the Turks, now under the command of the new Grand Vizier, Reshid-Pasha, to amass significant forces there. Fearing that Diebitsch would allow this to distract him from his southward advance, Nesselrode urged him, ‘ne regardez ni à droit, ni à gauche, ni en arrière, et pour Dieu! n’admettez pas la possibilité d’une troisième campagne’.

The Balkan Campaign of 1829

Hostilities commenced with the naval assault on Sizopol, which was captured on 16 February OS. As this port was situated south of the Balkan mountain chain, the Russians could now, if necessary, bypass this obstacle and land forces directly in Rumelia. The capture of Burgas was also at first considered, since it had been long considered vital to a Balkan crossing (as supply depot). Diebitsch however opposed its capture in the Spring as should the Turks attempt to retake it, Diebitsch would be forced to open the campaign earlier than he planned and cross the Balkans before the capture of Silistria.

As regards operations on land, Diebitsch proposed diving his forces into three independent corps. Kiselev controlled the right-flank forces (c.25,000 men) in Wallachia, assigned to prevent a Turkish counter-attack into the Principalities. The Russian centre (c.50,000) was stationed near Silistria and commanded by Diebitsch. The remaining forces (c.50,000) formed the left-flank under General L. O. Roth and were in occupation of Bulgaria. Diebitsch’s plan was straightforward - to besiege Silistria and then cross the Balkans leaving an observing force at Shumla. The option of attempting a crossing without first capturing Silistria (as Jomini advocated) was rejected. Ostensibly, this was because this would entail leaving two infantry divisions besieging Silistria, in addition to another five guarding the army’s flank and rear. This would leave only five infantry divisions for action across the Balkans. Diebitsch considered this insufficient. If, however, Silistria and even
Shumla were captured, this would release an extra two divisions. Diebitsch, however, considered even this force unsatisfactory and requested that the reserves be brought into the theatre sooner than was planned. (164)

This was too much for Nicholas to bear. The Tsar informed Diebitsch that after the deployment of defending forces and garrisons, he had seven and two-thirds infantry and four cavalry divisions for offensive action (around 70,000 men). He would, in addition, receive in August OS a further 60 reserve battalions (c.36,000 men). Nicholas reminded Diebitsch that in 1828 the army captured six fortresses and blockaded Shumla with only six infantry and two and a half cavalry divisions. All Diebitsch had to do in 1829 was take Silistria and cross the Balkans. Considering that the Turks had in Europe only 100,000 men, the Tsar wrote, ‘je ne puis ne pas trouver étrange que vous trouviez vos moyens insuffisants! - Veuillez donc ne plus revenir là-dessus’. (165) The fact is that Diebitsch, despite Nesselrode’s admonitions, could not take his eyes off his flank. His 8 January 1829 OS war plan cited the need to capture Silistria due to its proximity to the Russian operational line and base and for similar reasons in his abovementioned letter of 24 March OS even raised the possibility of capturing Shumla and Rustchuk as well.

In any case, on 31 April OS Diebitsch ordered the forces of the Russian centre to march and within a week the siege of Silistria had begun. (166) Meanwhile, Reshid-Pasha, had decided to leave Shumla with 30,000 men (including up to 20,000 regular infantry) and attack the avant-garde of the Russian centre barring the route to Varna and Silistria. On 5 May OS, they clashed at Eski-Arnauflar, where the 16th Infantry Division, though greatly outnumbered, held its ground and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. (167) This proved to be another demonstration of Russian superiority in the field and of the threat a flank Turkish attack from Shumla.

The new Turkish commander’s willingness to give battle played into Russian hands. The Russians had sought a decisive battle throughout 1828 and Nicholas had given strict instructions to continue this quest in 1829. (168) Suspecting that the Vizier would another attempt another attack, in late May Diebitsch took half of his 40,000 besieging force from Silistria and joined Roth’s units near Shumla. (169) Diebitsch proved to be correct. The Vizier intended to mount another flank attack to cut off the Russian forces at Varna and then head north to relieve the besieged forces of Silistria. On 30 May OS the two forces met at Kulevcha. It resulted in the decisive battle that Russia had sought for over a year, and in the utter defeat of Reshid’s 40,000 man army. (170) Diebitsch however remained cautious. He ruled out a Balkan crossing until Silistria fell and, despite Nicholas’ censure,
demanded the speedy arrival of reserve battalions of the 3rd, 6th and 7th Infantry Corps, as well a whole extra infantry division.\(^{(171)}\) Buoyed by the success at Kulevcha, the Tsar consented. Reinforcements were to arrive by 25 July OS.\(^{(172)}\)

When Silistria eventually fell on 18 June OS, Diebitsch was in no rush to begin a crossing. Instead he pushed towards his main offensive forces to Shumla, where the remnants of the Vizier’s army had now returned. The idea was to fool the Reshid into believing that another blockade was to be attempted. Certain units could then be secretly withdrawn and used to cross the Balkans.\(^{(173)}\) Diebitsch was, however, in danger of also fooling himself, for his proximity to Shumla caused the reappearance of his \textit{idée fixe}. For on 5 July OS Diebitsch argued that ‘if the Grand Vizier has not left an overly large garrison in Shumla, then, conducting an energetic siege, we may possibly capture it’. Diebitsch considered its capture important in the event of having to fight a third campaign! He decided to wait another few days for the grouping of his offensive forces and then ‘the great question of the crossing of the Balkans ought to be decided, - either that, or there will be a second battle with the Vizier’.\(^{(174)}\)

Fortunately, Diebitsch decided for a crossing as the Turkish forces were of insufficient strength to prevent it.\(^{(175)}\) General A. I. Krasovskii’s 3rd Corps (c.15,000 men) was moved from Silistria to observe Shumla, whilst the 2nd, 6th and 7th Corps (c.47,000 men) were on 8 July OS ordered to head south.\(^{(176)}\) The mountain range was crossed between 9 and 11 July OS and on the 12th, Burgas, Ahiotu and Misivri were taken so greatly increasing the amount of reinforcements and supplies that could be delivered directly to Rumelia by sea.\(^{(177)}\) The Vizier was taken completely by surprise, believing that the Russians would not attempt a crossing without first taking Shumla. When news of the crossing arrived, the Vizier, in what was one last gamble, twice sent his remaining forces across the Balkans to attack Diebitsch in the rear. The two Turkish expeditions (of c.10,000 and 5,000 men respectively) were, however, easily defeated on 13 and 31 July OS.\(^{(178)}\)

Diebitsch pushed onwards to Adrianople, the second capital of the Ottoman Empire, and occupied it without a fight on 8 August OS. As Turkish plenipotentiaries did not however arrive, Diebitsch believed only further operations could temper the Sultan’s obstinacy. Although the continued spread of plague and the need to leave behind garrison forces meant that Diebitsch could muster only 25,000 men, he nevertheless considered that this ‘seroit bien suffisant pour arriver jusqu’à Constantinople car il n’existe plus pour le moment l’armée Turque’. This force, however, was not considered sufficient actually to
capture the capital (in view of its 600,000 Muslim inhabitants) or even occupy the castles on the Bosphorus. It was therefore proposed to either push units to Lule-Burgas and the Dardanelles, leaving the attack on Constantinople for a third campaign in 1830. Alternatively, Diebitsch could march on the capital in any case and hope that a panic would spread amongst the populations causing them ‘à se soulever contre le gouvernement actuel et à nos livrer la ville’. (179)

Both variants were of course problematic as they entailed the end of the Sultan’s rule (which Nicholas did not wish) and could well precipitate the intervention of Britain and Austria. The Sultan’s last faint remaining hope - the arrival of the forces of the Pasha of Skodra was soon to be checked by Kiselev’s pre-emptive march from Raxova towards Sophia in August. (180) The war was essentially over - only time and the arrival of reinforcements separated Russia from the ultimate prize. Following however the Tsar’s orders, Diebitsch was more concerned with gaining a peace treaty and avoiding the unimaginable consequences of the fall of Constantinople than in delivering the final blow. The fate of the Ottoman Empire was to rest now on the obstinacy of the Sultan and the diplomatic skills of Zabalkanskii.

Conclusions on the 1829 campaign

The judgements on Diebitsch’s campaign have been marked by strong opinion on all sides. The most critical view has been the Soviet, which repeats the accusation that Diebitsch had an excessive fear for his flank and rear and sought always to avoid large encounters. (181) Whilst the first is certainly warranted, the second is completely incorrect. Moltke, who was both learned in military matters and a neutral, was more positive, (182) but had no access to the Russian military correspondence and could not know how obsessed Diebitsch was with Shumla and feared the Balkan crossing. Epanchin is also quite favourable, (183) though again, he overestimated Diebitsch’s role in pushing for the latter. The most favourable view however is that of Luk’ianovich. (184) The author makes the impressive claim that that in splitting his army into three independent corps, one crossing the Balkans, one observing Shumla and one guarding the Sophia-Adrianople road, Diebitsch was guided by the same principles as Kutuzov’s plan of 1811. (185) Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Diebitsch actually knew of the plan (as Luk’ianovich himself admits) and one must not forget the factor of coincidence and good fortune (such as the Vizier’s decision to offer battle at Kulevcha). A better argument is that the 1829 campaign was proof of the value of Kutuzov’s ideas rather than the ability of Zabalkanskii. The former
based his ideas on the value of movement, which the Turks could not cope with. The feigned blockade of Shumla and rapid march across the Balkans in July 1829 fooled a Turkish army used to Russian methods of slow, methodical siege warfare and confident that only the fall of Shumla would lead to a crossing. The Russian march across the Balkans sent the Vizier into a panic and forced him to deploy his remaining forces. Thus it was unexpected movement - a Balkan crossing and a march on Constantinople, that was in fact the best method of forcing the Turkish army into the field and securing a decisive battle. Diebitsch saw things exactly the other way round. For him (as for Jomini) a crossing was not an opportunity, but a hazardous enterprise to be attempted only after the decisive battle had taken place. In 1828 this search for battle had resulted in failed blockade of Shumla. In 1829, the Vizier’s decision to fight at Kulevcha freed Diebitsch’s hands. If the former had remained in Shumla with his 50,000 man garrison then Diebitsch would have been forced back into the quandary of 1828. Left to his own devices, would Diebitsch have had the resolve to bypass Shumla this time and cross the Balkans? We can never know for sure, but all the evidence points to the negative.

The Caucasian Campaign of 1829

The successes of the Caucasus Corps during the first campaign had convinced Paskevich of the offensive potential of his forces, despite its relative numerical weakness. Geography and common sense dictated that any offensive had to begin with the capture of Erzerum - the key to the Turkish position in the Caucasus. What should follow was, however, less obvious and Paskevich offered two plans. The first was a bold strike into the heart of the Anatolian plateau. A push to Sivas would cut most of Constantinople’s communications with its Asiatic provinces and their copper and silver factories - an important source of the Sultan’s income. The main problem revolved around supplying the army far from its operational base as well as protecting its flanks. An elongated magazine chain was considered too prone to attack and the only solution was to be supplied by sea from the port of Samsun. The Russian left flank was to be secured by winning over the independent-minded Kurds whilst, on the right, the Turkish forces at Trabizond were to be kept diverted by Russian naval operations. This ambitious plan was made dependent upon arrival in the summer of 20,000 recruits to augment Paskevich’s already increased offensive force of 16,883 men and 68 guns. Should this not occur then Paskevich favoured the more modest plan of heading for Trabizond. Its capture, (in conjunction with a naval assault), would deprive its Pasha’s forces (composed primarily of the ferocious Laz tribe) of the chance of attacking Erzerum.
Paskevich's ideas were, however, fated not to be realised. Nicholas' acceptance of the decision 19 November 1828 OS committee meant that the Balkan theatre would dominate over the Caucasian. Paskevich's more daring plan was therefore unlikely to receive the resources it required and, indeed, was unnecessary should a Balkan crossing take place. Paskevich's other plan of attacking Trabizond was in fact little more of an afterthought and he himself admitted that 'as a means of exerting political influence on Turkey I do not find its capture important'.(188) Thus although the Tsar was to give Paskevich a large degree of autonomy in fighting the war, everything pointed to the campaign beginning and ending at Erzerum.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Hostilities began on 20 February 1829 OS with an early and unexpected Turkish offensive following the news that the Russian embassy in Tehran had been stormed by a riotous mob and the ambassador A. S. Griboedov murdered.(189) The Sultan, believing that Persia was now about to enter the war on his side, ordered the capture of Akhaltsykh at any cost to open up the Borjomi pass into Russian territory. The 20,000 man Turkish force was however beaten back following a heroic twelve-day defence by General V. I. Bebutov and his two battalions.(190) Around the same time another 8,000-man Ottoman force crossed the border into Guria. Princess Sophia had recently fled to Turkey and in her correspondence to the Gurian aristocracy urged the support of this offensive. A preemptive attack on the Turkish camp on 5 March OS by General Hesse's 2,500 men, however, destroyed this threat.(191)

Throughout the remaining months Spring and into early Summer, Paskevich remained on the defensive as news of Persian preparations for war (ultimately proved to be false) continued arriving from many sources.(192) Finally, in June OS, learning that the new Seraskier Sivas-Hakki had left Erzerum with 40,000 men Paskevich began preparations for an offensive. His force had been recently augmented by four regiments of irregular Azeri cavalry (c.2000 men) collected from Russia's Muslim provinces.(193) Paskevich headed from Kars along the Erzerum road to meet Hakki, who had divided his forces into two corps of 30,000 and 20,000 men respectively. In a series of battles and manoeuvres, 13-20 June OS, Paskevich inflicted a devastating defeat.(194) Erzerum subsequently capitulated without a fight on the 27th OS.

Paskevich now halted his offensive for one month, content merely to beat off the various small scale Ottoman raids along his front-line. The most numerous of these came
from the Kurds on the Russian left-flank. At the beginning of the war Nicholas had given
Paskevich 100,000 chervontsy to win over the Kurds over, and some agreement with them
had been made. According to Paskevich however, due to a rumour that the British and
French ambassadors had announced that they would allow no Russian annexations, the
Kurds, fearing reprisals from the Sultan for their passivity, began their raids.\(^{(195)}\)

In late July OS Paskevich renewed his offensive following reports that a new
Seraskier was gathering Laz troops in the Pashlik of Trabizond. To disrupt this he marched
north and defeated a 12,000 force at Hart on the 27th OS. Paskevich considered then
pushing to Trabizond, but ruled it out, ostensibly due to a lack of troops, but really because
it was irrelevant to the course of the war.\(^{(196)}\) Another Russian detachment was
despatched along the road to Sivas. It has been claimed that these operations were intended
to secure Trabizond as a naval base and then begin a conquest of central Anatolia.\(^{(197)}\)
This is incorrect. Paskevich merely wanted to protect the routes to Erzerum and defend the
fertile areas of the Pashalik, using its supplies for quartering over the winter.\(^{(198)}\)

In another sense Paskevich was merely going through the motions - consolidating
his position and awaiting an end to the war. He had achieved his goals - the defeat of the
Seraskier and the capture of Erzerum. There was also success at home as the Muslim tribes
of the Russian Caucasus again remained relatively calm.\(^{(199)}\) Even the infamous Chechen
warlord, Bei-Bulat, had called for a truce.\(^{(200)}\)

News from Adrianople was, however, painfully slow in arriving and as late as 26
September OS, sporadic fighting continued.\(^{(201)}\) Paskevich was becoming impatient. All
Europe held its breath. As Heytesbury wrote from St Petersburg, ‘the die is already
cast...either a peace is signed, or the Cossacks are bivouacking in the Seraglio’.\(^{(202)}\)
(1) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4468, f.2, Diebitsch to A. I. Chernyshev, 19 October 1827 OS.
(2) Diebitsch and Kiselev had both recently advocated a force of this size, see above, pp. 132-33.
(3) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.20-20v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 29 November 1827 OS. This estimation largely concurred with Wittgenstein’s, who proposed a budget of 24m roubles (for supplies) for a one and a half year war, ibid., ff.10-11, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch.
(4) It was 3m roubles in debt, ibid., ff.3-8v Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 26 October 1827 OS.
(5) See the various reports and budgets in ibid, ff. 26-106, passim.
(6) Ibid., ff.112-15, E. F. Kankrin to Diebitsch, 9 February 1828 OS. This figure denotes extraordinary expenditure above and beyond the normal, peacetime budget of the army which, in the late 1820s, stood at c.160m roubles per annum, Kagan, Military Reforms, p. 97.
(7) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.112-15, Kankrin to Diebitsch, 9 February 1828 OS.
(8) The Persian war had already drained the Treasury by 14.3m roubles.
(9) Ironically Kankrin, who had himself proposed a Balkan crossing some years prior (see p. 141, footnote 19) was now not willing to pay for it.
(10) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.116-27, War Budget of Kankrin, 9 February 1828 OS.
(11) Ibid., ff.165-69v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 14 March 1828 OS.
(12) Ibid., ff.170-70v, Diebitsch to Kankrin, 19 March 1828 OS.
(13) Of which 12.7m was made conditional and 6.5m was to be repaid, ibid., ff.171-80, Kankrin to Diebitsch, 26 March 1828 OS.
(14) Ibid., ff.192-93. The total budget was 62,166,884 r., 72.5 k., of which some 20m was made conditional.
(15) Ibid., ff.229-300, Report of War Ministry, n.d. The expense of the 1828 campaign was, in part, due to the unforeseen calling of the Second Corps to the theatre in June 1828, as well as to the costs of quartering troops in the Balkans over the winter of 1828/29. The exorbitant cost of the war led the Russian Government to seek foreign loans. An attempt to secure credit from the House of Rothschild in 1828 had been thwarted by Metternich, Crawley, Greek Independence, p. 105. Instead 18m guilders was loaned from the Netherlands, with a further 24m in 1829, VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 592, 720, Ukase of 22 July 1828 OS. In June 1829, a certain Moritz Goldsmith, a Rothschild agent, unexpectedly arrived in Odessa, offering to sell Russia a large number of Austrian and Dutch gold coins [ducats/chervontsy]. Such currency was always needed in time of war to pay for supplies in enemy lands (paper money was usually not accepted). Kankrin however was not prepared to pay the proposed rate (1 lr. 18-20k. per coin, instead of the current market price of 1 lr. 8-12k.) and dismissed Goldsmith as a ‘speculator’, see documents in RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.104, d.5, ff.1-7.
(16) See below, pp. 231-32.
(17) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.404, ff.1-5v, ‘O shabzhenii armii prodovol’stvom’, by Liprandi, 1831.
(18) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, f.84, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 20 January 1828 OS; ibid, d.4469, ff.96-107, Report on Supplies sent in 1828, 31 July 1828 OS (one chetverik is equivalent to 15.8 lb/7.11 kg). Aside from the military colonies, which provided one third of the flour, most of the remainder was acquired in the southern gubernii, three of which (plus the Bessarabian and Taurida oblasti) were placed on a war footing [voennoe polozhenie], ibid., d.4445, ff.5-13v, ‘Predlozhenie kakim obrazom prodovol’stvovat’ 2 armii’, n.d., (from context, November 1827). This entailed forced requisitions in lieu of taxation [podat’], Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, p. 45. Wittgenstein initially opposed this requisitioning. He feared it would exhaust the southern guberniias and favoured instead raising taxation and buying supplies, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to
Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS. He subsequently changed his mind, *ibid.*, ff.77-86v, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, received 29 November 1827 OS.

(19) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.105-06, Diebitsch to Kankrin, 2 February 1828 OS.

(20) *Ibid.*, d.4469, ff.96-107, Report on Supplies sent in 1828, 31 July 1828 OS. In the final analysis there were only sufficient oat rations to feed 8,000 horses satisfactorily, Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, p. 403, out of a total of 23,000 cavalry and 6,700 artillery horses used in the first months of the war, Luk'ianovich, *Opisanie*, I, pp. 66-67.


(22) Luk'ianovich, *Opisanie*, I, pp. 45,144. The failure to capture the larger port of Varna until October 1828 did, however, greatly limit the amount of imported supplies.

(23) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4469, f.81, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 20 January 1828 OS. With some minor exceptions, these was the exact forces Diebitsch had proposed five months earlier, *ibid.*, d.4444, ff.1-2, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS.

(24) Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, p. 414. The breakdown was 75,141 infantry, 15,389 cavalry, 4,108 Cossacks, 396 guns. Thus the actual fighting strength was only 94,638 men, the remaining 20,000 being pioneers, sappers and non-combatants. Even then, one should subtract the 6,289 men of the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps who were scheduled to leave after the main forces and arrive at Izmail on 23 May OS, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.198-201v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein,, 22 March 1828 OS. This accepted, H. C. B. Moltke’s claim, *The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829* (London, 1854), p. 26, that Russia began the campaign with only 65,000 combatants still seems impossible.


(26) Fadeev, *Krisis*, p. 206. Fadeev maintains that Diebitsch considered the forces of the Second Army alone sufficient for the task. It is clear from footnote 23 that this is incorrect.


(28) Shroeder, *Transformation*, p. 655; Leer, *Obzor*, part IV, bk.1, p. 309. This excuse was an invention of the Russians themselves, see BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.84, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 19 August 1828; see also below, footnote 57.

(29) BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.84 Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 19 August 1828.

(30) The reserve, under General Witt also included the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps and other units, making a total of 60 infantry battalions and 120 cavalry squadrons (over 50,000 men), Luk’ianovich, *Opisanie*, I, p. 69.

(31) Luk’ianovich, *Opisanie*, II, pp. 1, 5. The Guards’ mobilisation was hindered by a shortage of horses, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4462, ff.19-20v, Report of anon., 31 January 1828 OS.


(33) Of this number at least 8,000, however, were ill and unfit for duty, ‘Imperator Nikolai Pavlovich i gr. Dibich-Zabalkanskii: Perepiska 1828-30’, (hereafter ‘Imperator’), *RS*, XXVII, 1880, pp. 513-14, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 9 August 1828 OS. The formation of Witt’s reserves was generally handled very badly, Shil’der, ‘Voina’, p. 104


(35) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.33-33v, 41, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS; *ibid.*, d.4445, ff.19-19v, Report of anon., November 1827. At the same time the Emperor’s own war-time entourage of dignitaries, foreign diplomats and military observers had some 4,000 horses, Liprandi, *Osobennosti*, p. 57.

(36) The forces used during the 1828 campaign were short of 12,000 horses, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, p. 290. This shortage seems to have been a legacy of a Tsarist decree of 2 April 1823 which reduced the number of horses throughout the imperial army as part of a plan for cutting expenditure on the army by some 18m roubles, PRO, FO 352/9B, C. Bagot to G. Canning, 13 May 1823.
(37) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18002, ff.1-1v, Diebitsch to Ermolov, 13 May 1826; ibid., d.4445, ff.29-29v, Report of anon., 10 November 1827 OS.

(38) 'Imperator', RS, XXXIV, 1882, p. 171, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 18 July 1829 OS, mentions the use of 2,000 camels. In 1829, E. L. Blutte (Britain's consul in Bucharest) reported that 'the means of transport for conveying stores and provisions from the [Black] sea shore to the various points occupied by the Russians in the interior of Rumelia, consist I am told of about 4,000 camels collected in the Crimea and elsewhere, which is said accompanied the army over the Balkan[s]', PRO, FO 97/402, ff.71-71v, Blutte to Lord Cowley (H. Wellesley), 10 August 1829.

(39) The idea was certainly Kiselev's, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.20-32v, 'Obshchee predpolozhenie otnositel'no rasporiazhenii dla dvizhenii a deistviia 2 armii v novom sostave', enclosed in Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS.


(41) In late 1827, with war almost certain, General-Major S. A. Tuchkov led a mission to the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy. He reported that their combined settlements comprised 3,000 families but that only 300 men had joined the Turkish army. The remainder were prepared to make peace with the Tsar. Tuchkov proposed that they receive an Imperial pardon and be resettled back into Russia, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.3, ff.2-3, Tuchkov to Kiselev, 31 October 1827 OS; ibid., sv.96, d.5, ff.15-18v, Report of Tuchkov, 19 April 1828 OS. Nicholas welcomed this news, but, still suspicious of these Cossacks, favoured their resettlement far away from the Turkish Balkan border in the Caucasus, specifically in the Karbada or by the Kura or Arax rivers, ibid., sv.36, d.3, ff.11-13, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 17 December 1827 OS. Tuchkov was, however, opposed, arguing that the Caucasus were too unfamiliar to them and proposed instead Bessarabia as the optimum location, ibid., ff.21-22v, Kiselev to Diebitsch 2 February 1828 OS. This was accepted by Nicholas, but he insisted that resettlement was to begin only once the war had begun so as not to 'arouse the attention and displeasure of the Turkish Government', ibid., ff.24-24v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 23 February 1828 OS. Once the campaign opened, the first appeals for Russian patronage followed almost immediately. In May, a request of one thousand Zaporozhtsy for protection was granted and plans were immediately made to send them to I. N. Inzov, the Head of Colonies in Bessarabia, ibid., ff.37-37v, 46, A. V. Rudzewich to Wittgenstein, 12, 15 May 1828 OS. The Zaporozhtsy repaid the Russians by rendering them vital assistance during the crossing of the Danube on 27-30 May 1828 OS, Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 418; Shil'der, Nikolai, II, pp. 138-39. In June, the Nekrasovtsy took an oath to Nicholas, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.3, ff.60-60v, Diebitsch to Tuchkov, 4 June 1828 OS. By the end of the year, a proposal was accepted to form, under a Colonel Gladkii, a 'Danubian Cossack Regiment' of five hundred Zaporozhtsy. It was proposed that after the war the regiment was to be permanently settled on the Kuban near Anapa, ibid., op.16/183, sv.956, d.10, ff.1-4v, A. I. Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 5 December 1828 OS. Their role was to help defend the Caucasus Line against the raids of the Circassians. However, by the time the unit was formed in early 1830 (ibid., ff.166-67v, Gladkii to Obruchev (no initials), 21 March 1830 OS) Paskevich had already begun his series of expeditions against the Caucasian tribes, and was not in a position to execute the plan. Gladkii himself believed the plan should be abandoned altogether and like Tuchkov preferred Bessarabia as the site of settlement, ibid., 173-73v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 10 April 1830 OS. M. S. Vorontsov, however, remained suspicious, and favoured the 'Anapa' option, or at least settling the Zaporozhtsy further from the Turkish border in Kerch', ibid., ff.181-82v, Vorontsov to Chernyshev, 16 May 1830 OS. Likewise, as regards the Nekrasovtsy, Vorontsov feared that, should they be settled in Bessarabia, their knowledge of the Danubian tributaries would allow them to evade Russia's defence posts and cordon sanitaire. Nicholas agreed that Kerch' was a more suitable location, ibid., sv.944, d.49, ff.22-22v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 17 February 1830 OS. Unfortunately, the ultimate fate
of the Cossacks is unclear, though it appears that, in fact, almost none of them permanently resettled into Russia, *ibid.*, sv.956, d.10, ff.239-40, Gladki to L. O. Roth, 27 May 1830 OS; Shil'der, *Nikolai*, II, p. 139.


(43) Württemberg, *Pokhod*, *RS*, XXVII, 1880, p. 86. Diebitsch was always more attracted to the idea of commanding troops in battle than to the more mundane staff work with which he was formally charged. During the 1826 Persian campaign, Diebitsch, according to one account, was involved in an intrigue with Ermolov which aimed at foiling Paskevich's attempt to gain command of the Caucasus Corps. In return, Ermolov was to grant Diebitsch the opportunity of leading certain units in the 1827 campaign, Shcherbatov, *Paskevich*, II, pp. 201-06. The intrigue, however, came to nothing and thus, in 1828, Diebitsch appears to have been doubly resolved not to let an even greater opportunity for glory to pass him by. It is perhaps not irrelevant to observe also that Diebitsch was descended from an ancient aristocratic Siliesian clan, noted for its martial abilities. His ancestor, Hans von Diebitsch, fought for the defence of Vienna in 1520 against the Ottomans at the height of their power, *'Imperator',* *RS*, XXVII, 1880, p. 95.

(44) BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.10, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 January 1829.

(45) The rivalry between Prince Eugene of Württemberg (Commander of 7th Corps) and Diebitsch was especially strong, see Württemberg, *Pokhod*, *RS*, XXVII, 1880, pp. 86, 527-29; *RA*, *Iz vospominaniia printsa Evgenii Würtembergskogo*, 1878, No.1, pp. 356-58. In 1828, Nicholas was accompanied by some forty five Generals (of all types), including every veteran General of the Napoleonic Wars then still alive. By the end of 1829, death had reduced this number to a more manageable twenty five, Liprandi, *Osobernosti*, pp. 61-63. The problem of overstaffing was not unique to Russia. One of the few Russian sources of intelligence on the British Army (1815-53) is an extract from an 1832 British newspaper article, enquiring as to why His Majesty's army of 100,000 men required the command of 508 Generals and 6 Field Marshals. This was held to be 'adequate to the command of all the armies in the whole world...whether civilised or barbarous', RGVIA, fond 431, d.13, f.13, Report of 16 January 1832 OS.

(46) BL., Add. MS. 41557, ff.147v-48, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 17 October 1828. It is clear from Nicholas's correspondence with Diebitsch ('Imperator', *RS*, XXVII, 1880, pp. 95-110, 510-26, 764-80; *XXVIII*, 1880, pp.409-28; *XXIX*, pp. 891-934) that no major decision was taken in 1828 without the consent of the Tsar.

(47) BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.148, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 17 October 1828


(49) Shil'der, *'Voina',* *RS*, XXX, 1881, p. 101.

(50) It had been the Sultan's intention to raise around 240,000 men, RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.221, ff.3-4v, 'O partizanskoii voine', Liprandi.

(51) V. I. Sheremet, *Turtsiia i Adrianopol'skii mir 1829 g.* (Moscow, 1975), p. 194; Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, pp. 157-162, 417, 421. The Turks retained their traditional dislike of regular service and recruiting sufficient numbers was problematic. The Sultan was ultimately forced to withdraw conscription for this force, RGVIA, fond 450, d.5, ff.74-79, Berg to Nesselrode, 25 February 1827 OS. Berg believed it would take a generation for the Sultan to form a whole regular army of over 100,000 men, *ibid*.

(52) Due to their weakness, the Turks were more adamant than ever before not to give battle, see, RGIA, fond VUA, d.4585, ff.96v-97, 'Istoriia turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov', Lieutenant Kobiakov (no initial), 1830.

(53) PRO FO 519/43, f.234, Cowley to Aberdeen, 3 July 1828.


(55) PRO FO 519/43, f.292, Cowley to Aberdeen, 10 September 1828.
(56) In theory, the Asiatic Pashaliks could raise up to 200,000 men, W. E. D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 23, though in both 1828 and 1829 less than half that number was achieved.

(57) There are a number of campaign histories on the 1828-29 war. The first ever (which was limited to the events of 1828) appears to be that of Berg (possibly the aforementioned), RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4686, ff.1-29, 12 December 1828 OS. His explicit aim was to 'revenir des erreurs qui sement des journaux étrangers mal informés', (the latter had revelled in Russia's failure of 1828). The work makes the most of Russia's limited successes in 1828, blame the Turks for avoiding battle and argues that Nicholas began the campaign with less men than in previous Turkish wars, due to his desire not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, f. 8. The first full campaign history is probably an unpublished official account by Lieutenant Kobiakov, 'Istoriia turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov', 1830, RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4585, ff.47-241v. This file, ff. 258-79 also contains a summary of the Battle of Kulevcha (30 May 1829 OS), by [D. P.?] Buturlin, 28 June 1829 OS. The first published account is the purely factual Iovskii (no initial), *Poslednaia voina s Turtsieiu* (St Petersburg, 1830). Luk'ianovich, *Opisanie* (1844-47), I-IV, is better, though by far the best account is Epanchin, *Ocherk* (1906), I-III, though it concentrates heavily on the 1829 Balkan campaign. The best study of the Asiatic campaigns is A. V. Ushakov, *Istoriia voennykh deistvii v aziatskoi Turtsii v 1828 i 1829 godakh*, I-II (St Petersburg, 1836).

According to Beskrovnyi, *Ocherki*, p. 91, it was written on the orders of Paskevich to glorify his campaigns. Though possibly true, the work is objective in tone, comprehensive on details and contains a good introduction to the region as a whole. In RGVIA, fond VUA d.4643, there is a manuscript entitled 'Obozrenie oblastei Aziatskoi Turtsii, sopredel'nykh Rossiskim vladieniom za kavkazom' n.d. It is of much interest, though it may be a draft of Ushakov's work. Soviet accounts have added much polemic but little to our actual knowledge of events, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 241-73, 285-311; Liakhov, *Armiia*, pp. 101-299.

Of works in other languages, only Moltke, *Russians* (first published in German, 1845), is of real interest.

(58) See above, pp. 136, 149 (footnote 146).

(59) Liprandi believed that the surest means of securing the surrender of Turkish fortresses was by ignoring them and pushing on forwards. By way of example he argued that it was the 3rd Corps push to Karasu that caused the fall of Brailov, Machin, Isakchi, Tul'cha and Kistendjeh, Liprandi, 'Osada Turetskikh krepostei', *RI*, 1855, No.5, p.3.


(68) Luk'ianovich, *Opisanie*, I, 198-203; Epanchin, *Ocherk*, I, p. 421-22. Liprandi, *Osobernosti*, pp. 43-89 passim, claims that the Russian forces could have defeated the Seraskier's army were it not for Diebitsch taking the personal command of the cavalry units nominated to outflank the Turkish centre (comprised mainly of irregular infantry). The latter had been thrown into panic almost upon the very commencement of battle and were soon in retreat. If Diebitsch had attacked them, Liprandi believed a rout would have inevitably followed, but Diebitsch, overly fearful of a counter-attack from the Turkish cavalry, held back. Liprandi's criticism of Diebitsch is but part of his general attack on 'cabinet soldiers' who whilst 'famed in European wars' failed miserably in Turkish ones, *ibid*, p. 80.

(70) Ibid, p. 424.
(71) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVIII, 1880, pp. 412-13, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 27 August 1828 OS.
(72) No documentary record of the meeting has been discovered and all secondary sources are silent on this point.
(73) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4586, ff.78-80v, Jomini to Nicholas I, 15 June 1828 OS.
(74) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 421.
(75) The Enibazar decision was so close to Jomini’s proposal of 15 June 1828 OS that it is possible that it was based precisely on the Frenchman’s ideas. Furthermore, Jomini had already insisted in his war plan of April 1828 that a blockade (or an attack on the supply lines) of Shumla was an essential prerequisite of a Balkan crossing and the best means of forcing the main Turk forces to give battle - ‘Si...l’ennemi tient obstirement a Shumla, il faudra réunir nos efforts autour de cette ville ou bien si l’on redoute les inconvénients d’un blocus, on pourra manoeuvrer par Kazan sur les derrière. Opération hardie sans doute, mais que je ne regarde comme impracticable, et qui déciderait probablement l’ennemie à venir nous livrer bataille lui même en rase campagne; chance que nous devons rechercher avec empressement’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4586, ff.100-100b.
(76) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4685, ff.1-6v, Note of Jomini, 29 August 1828 OS. Jomini also stated that ‘si j’étais à la tête de la armée et maître absolu je préférerai une tentative sur Shumla comme plus conform à mes antécédents et à mon caractère’. Jomini was fortunate in avoiding any criticism for the 1828 campaign. In part this was due to a misunderstanding by contemporaries of his true opinions on the conduct of the war. For instance, both Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp.78-82, and Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, ‘Pokhod’, RS, XXVII, 1880, p. 86, claimed that, in 1828, Jomini was the strongest advocate of a Balkan crossing.
(77) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, 1880, pp. 516-20, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 9 August 1828 OS.
(78) Ibid., pp. 109-10, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 7 August 1828 OS.
(79) See above, footnote 75 and pp. 118-19.
(80) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4684, ff.11-13, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 25 July 1828 OS.
(81) Ibid., ff.5-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 20 July 1828 OS. Emphasis added.
(82) Ibid., f.5v. It should be noted that in his earlier war plans (of July 1820 and September 1827, see above pp. 115-16, 132-33, 148 [footnote 119]), Kiselev had advocated a two-year campaign and seems to have always believed a one-year campaign to be overly ambitious.
(83) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, pp. 775-76, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 19 August 1828 OS.
(84) Ibid., pp. 771, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 21 August 1828 OS.
(85) Ibid., p. 105, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 7 August 1828 OS.
(86) Ibid., pp. 778-80, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 23 August 1828 OS. The verdict of most historians has been to lay the greatest responsibility for the attack on Shumla on Diebitsch who is said alone to have genuinely believed that it could actually be captured. All agree (except Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, p. 267, who is mistaken) that Wittgenstein was opposed to the blockade believing Shumla would never be taken, anon., ‘Cherty iz zhizni tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Nikolaia I’, VS, IX, 1868, p. 162; Zuboltovskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 280; Tatsischev, Nikolai, II, pp. 143-49. As for Kiselev, his biographer absolves him of all responsibility, Zuboltovskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 280.
(87) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVIII, p. 416, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 27 August 1828 OS.
(88) Ibid., XXIX, p. 894, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 2 September 1828 OS. The Russian position at Shumla had recently become even more tenuous following a large Turkish assault on 27 August OS. A potential rout was avoided due to intelligence from Liprandi forewarning of the attack, ibid., XXVIII, pp. 416-20, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 29 August 1828 OS.
In ibid., XXIX, p. 925, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 2 September 1828 OS, the Tsar enclosed a recent note of Jomini which was said to contain ‘quelques bonnes idées’. The note is doubtless that of 29 August 1828 OS (see above, footnote 76), which was written at Varna, where the Tsar himself arrived on 30 August OS. In it, Jomini proposed the simultaneous sieges of Silistria and Varna as well as an attack on Shumla - ‘le point décisif des opérations’.

The official Turkish version (as proclaimed by the Sultan himself) was that Usuf-Pasha, the co-commander of Varna (with Izzet-Pasha) took a bribe from the Russians to secure his garrison’s capitulation in October 1828, Sheremet, Adrianopol’ski mir, p. 47. Tsarist historians, e.g. Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, II, p. 120, admit that Usuf subsequently emigrated to Russia but only in order to avoid the Sultan’s vengeance for the loss of Varna. Soviet writers have always denied any underhand Russian practice, Sheremet, Adrianopol’ski mir, pp. 48, 197-98. The whole affair nevertheless remains suspicious.

The Russians went to great lengths to assist Usuf, persuading the Grand Vizier to hand over Usuf’s property and harem, which were then sent to Odessa, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.62-62v, L. O. Roth to Wittgenstein, 26 December 1828 OS. Moreover, the Russians, as a rule, were certainly not averse to bribery. Following his defeat at Boleshti by Geismar, the Turkish commander - Ibrahim-Pasha, Seraskier of Widdin - fell into dispute with the Sultan. Geismar was ‘in any case, to promise him safe refuge in Russia and a decent maintenance as has been done for Usuf-Pasha’, ibid., d.4722, ff.1-2v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 26 December 1828 OS. Emphasis added.

Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, II, pp. 208-22.


Ibid., d.4329, ff. 30-37, Diebitsch to Paskevich, 28 January 1828 OS.

Ibid., Diebitsch to Paskevich, ff.63-71, 10 February 1828 OS.

Ibid., ff.263-66, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 29 March 1828 OS. Due to Paskevich’s refusal, Anapa was eventually taken in early July 1828 by a combined naval-land operation of the Black sea Fleet and the chasseur brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, Fadeev, Krisis, pp. 253-55; Württemberg, ‘Pokhod’, XXVII, 1880, p. 84. This caused the above forces to be deflected from the Balkan theatre and delayed the siege of Varna.

Ushakov, Istoriia, I, pp. 157-61; RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, f.57-57v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 13 June 1828 OS.

Fadeev, Krisis, p. 232.

RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.41-43v, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 26 May 1828 OS.

Ibid., ff.15-15v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 14 April 1828 OS. Through the interception of certain letters, the Russians believed they had discovered documentary proof of Turkish attempts to incite the Circassians to revolt, ibid., d.921, ff.1-5v, General G. A. Emanuel to Diebitsch, 30 June 1827 OS. The Russians were rightly concerned of the threat posed by a full-scale rebellion by the Circassians and other mountain tribes. Out of a presumed mountain population of 393,800, some 273,600 (which included 203,000 Circassians) were considered ‘completely unsubdued’, ibid., d.6259, ff.244-44v, Report, enclosed in G. V. Rosen to Chernyshev, 12 November 1831 OS.

Paskevich was given full authority to decide when his campaign was to open, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4442, f.94, Diebitsch to Paskevich 3 April 1828 OS. The delay caused by the effects of bad weather of the road to Gumri, ibid., d.4644, f.28-28v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 19 May 1828 OS.

The Russians hoped their advance would be aided by the local Armenian population, RGVIA, d.6230, ff.10-17v, Report of N. M. Sipiagin, the Governor-General of Tbilisi, 29
December 1827 OS. Suspecting this, the Turkish authorities had already deported all the Armenian inhabitants between Gumri and Kars, *ibid.*, d.4464, ff.60-63v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 19 June 1828 OS. All Armenians residing in Ottoman territory were also required to give up any arms on pain of death, *ibid.*, d.6230, ff.60-60v, Report of Sipiagin, 6 February 1828 OS. Due to their traditional attachment to Russia, the Turks appear to have taken every opportunity to commit various outrages against the Armenians in the theatre of war. For example, in Bayezid (which held an Armenian population of '4,000 families'), it was reported that the Turkish inhabitants were 'killing Armenian men, carrying off [their] wives, children and property and converting many to Islam', *ibid.*, d.4644, ff.209v-10, Report of Paskevich, 30 August 1828 OS.

(102) *Ibid.*, ff.72-73, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 30 June 1828 OS. Paskevich argued that his decision to besiege Kars from the south-west, served also to blockade the Erzerum-Kars road, thus hindering Kiosa's arrival by twenty-four hours, *ibid.*, ff.151-57, Report of Paskevich, 10 July 1828 OS.

(103) *Ibid.*, ff.94-95v, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 10 July 1828 OS. Due to the difficulty of extending magazine chains outside the frontier, the Russians had hoped to gain much of their food supplies from the inhabitants of the Pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsykh, *ibid.*, d.4648, ff.3-8v, Report of Sipiagin, 23 March 1828 OS.

(104) *Ibid.*, d.4644, f.93, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 12 August 1828 OS.

(105) *Ibid.*, ff.92-92v, Diebitsch to Paskevich, September 1828 OS.

(106) *Ibid.*, ff.106-07, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 20 July 1828 OS. The political affiliations of Guria were the source of much consternation to the Russians in 1828. The region had fallen under Russian patronage in 1804 but elements of its Muslim aristocracy were never reconciled to this state of affairs. The Porte never accepted its loss of Guria and was keen to conduct a series of intrigues in the region. Matters came to a head in 1826 when Guria's native ruler Prince Mamia Guriel died, leaving behind his wife Princess Sophia and an infant son, Doand. Sophia was never trusted by the Russians and they ensured that a 'Gurian council' was established to administer the region until the son reached adulthood. Sophia viewed the council as nothing other than the first step towards the permanent imposition of rule by Russian officials and demanded that she alone be made regent of Guria. In addition, Sophia increasing fell under the influence of her lover, a certain Prince Machutadze, who began cultivating relations with the Porte. When war broke out in 1828, Paskevich heard rumours that Sophia was planning to invite Turkish forces into Guria and, together with her own forces, attack Imeretia and Georgia. The Russian response was to capture Poti (a Gurian port still under Turkish sovereignty), after which, Nicholas ordered that Sophia be removed from the 'Gurian council'. Just as Paskevich was about to execute this order, he unexpectedly received a letter from Sophia professing her loyalty to Russia and requesting that she be allowed to attack Batum. Unsure what to make of this volte-face, Paskevich decided to call Sophia's bluff - she was ordered to capture Batum within two weeks or be removed from the council. The attack never materialised and Sophia eventually fled to Turkey. As a result, Guria was formally integrated into the Russian empire and administered by Russian officials, *ibid.*, d.4644, ff.76-77, Report of Paskevich, 28 June 1828 OS; ff.216-23, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 8 September 1828 OS; *ibid.*, d.4643, ff.46v-49v, 'Obozrenie aziatskoi Turtsii'.


(112) Due to a new outbreak of plague and heavy rains, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.252-52v, Paskevich to Diebitsch; ibid., ff.276-78, Reports of Paskevich, 8-13 September 1828 OS.

(113) Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 262-71, for instance, ascribes Paskevich’s successes to the actions of exiled Decembrists serving in the Caucasus Corps. The Soviet analysis of Paskevich’s campaign generally, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 202-05, Liakhov, *Armiia*, p. 105, contains many misrepresentations. These include (i) that only Ermolov considered the interrelationship of the Asiatic and Balkan theatres (in fact Nicholas and Diebitsch did also, though, in reality, there could be little co-ordination due to the distances involved); (ii) that Ermolov’s ideas were bolder and superior to those of the cautious Paskevich (in fact Paskevich’s campaign followed quite closely the abovementioned plan of Ermolov himself); (iii) that Paskevich, ‘educated in the reactionary spirit of eighteenth-century West European military doctrine’, avoided large encounters and therefore headed north after Kars instead of west towards the main Turkish forces at Erzerum. In fact Paskevich was expressly forbidden to march on Erzerum by Nicholas. He did not however fear the Turks in the field. After the fall of Kars, Paskevich planned initially to head for Ardahan to confront Kiosa’s 15,000 man force as ‘their dispersal is essential for the security of our future operations’. He would only head for Akhalkalaki if Kiosa returned to Erzerum, RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4644, ff.72-73, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 30 June 1828 OS. Paskevich received intelligence that Kiosa had done exactly this on 9 July OS, ibid., ff.90-90v, Report of Paskevich, and so the following day drew up his plan for an attack via Akhalkalaki to Akhaltsyk. Even then, he was adamant that should Kiosa leave Erzerum to attack Kars, ‘then I will return there, destroy his army and eject it completely from the Pashalik’, ibid., ff.94-95v, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 10 July 1828 OS. Finally, it should be remembered that Ermolov himself did not base his plan on the destruction of the enemy, but on the capture of strategic geographical points, namely, Kars and Erzerum - the greatest source of supplies in the Turkish Caucasus and the gathering point for the Turkish irregular forces.

(114) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.6229, ff.45-46v, Emanuel to Diebitsch, 17 July 1828 OS.

(115) S. Filonov, ‘Kavkazskaia liniia pod upravleniem generala Emanuelia’, *KS*, XV, 1894, p. 367; (continued by V. Tomkeev) XIX, 1898, pp. 120-25.

(116) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.6229, ff.16-16v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 23 May 1828 OS; ibid., ff.28-29v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 1 June 1828; ff.47-49v, Emanuel to Nicholas I, 11 July 1828 OS; ibid., d.4644, ff.288-89v, Report of Paskevich, 28 October 1828 OS; ibid., d.4649, ff.377-77v, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 16 November 1828 OS.

(117) By October 1828, one third of all units were out of commission due to sickness, Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 251. The whole campaign claimed 40,000 lives, of which over half were caused by plague/disease. There was, however, worse to come. As a result of the 1829 campaign and a period of occupation in 1830 a further 96,722 men died from disease, Curtiss, *Russian Army*, pp. 64, 73.

(118) In 1829 Diebitsch again split the Russian forces, though this time with success (see below). As noted, this caused Jomini to retract his own law that a commander should always keep the bulk of his force united.


(121) Due to a dogma of their own, certain Soviet writers have been unable to grasp the essence of the strategic failure of 1828. Their argument is that the failure of 1828 was due primarily to the continued dominance in the Russian army of military doctrines of Lloyd and Bülow. This caused commanders to seek as the object of military action, ‘fortified points and supply bases’ and not the ‘living force of the enemy’ as Suvorov, Kutuzov and the national Russia military tradition taught, Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 246, Liakhov, *Armiia*, p. 300. This is a distortion for, firstly, the leading influence on the Russian army was at this time was
Jomini; secondly, Jomini, of whom the Soviets are so disparaging (e.g. Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 212-13), in fact, based his entire theory precisely upon the destruction of the enemy forces; thirdly, during the 1828 campaign the 'living force of the enemy' was in Shumla. This is precisely why it was attacked and precisely why the campaign ended in failure. Finally, Kutuzov himself did not place overriding emphasis on battle and the destruction of enemy’s forces. He believed instead in the art of manoeuvre as a means of wrongfooting the enemy (as his plan for crossing the Balkans illustrates), Meshcheriakov, *Russkaia voennaia mysl*, pp. 40-45; P. H. C. von Wahle, ‘Military Thought in Imperial Russia’, Ph.D. (Indiana, 1966), p. 39.

(122) The most important works are *Nekotorye zamechaniia po povodu dvukh sochinenii vysshedshikh pod zaglaviem 'malaia voina' (St Petersburg, 1851), ‘Osada’ (1855), Osobennosti (St Petersburg, 1877).


(125) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, ff.3-3v, ‘O partizanskoii voine’, by Liprandi.

(126) See above, p. 88, 114.

(127) Quoted in Guliaev, Soglaev, Kutuzov, p. 247.


(129) *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, p. 15, Nesselrode to Lieven and Pozzo, 14 October 1828 OS.

(130) *VPR* II/VII, 1992, p. 571, Nesselrode to Capodistrias, 3 July 1828 OS. The apparent threat posed by Wellington’s ascendency led in the course of 1828 to the placement of Kronstadt and the various Finnish and Baltic fortresses onto a defensive footing, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1107, ff.71-80, Report of War Ministry, December 1833.


(133) A conference of the representatives of the three allied Powers, established in Poros in September 1828, supported the abovementioned borders in its report of 12 December. Wellington, however, refused to accept this document and a compromise was found in the 22 March 1829 Protocol of London which fixed the borders to Arta-Volo, Eubea and the Cyclades, Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 112, 118-20, 148, 153. Russia was not, as has been suggested, *ibid.*, p. 155, dissatisfied with the Protocol and Nesselrode granted the Anglo-French request to return their ambassadors to Constantinople as there was now no chance of the two Powers imposing their own separate mediation between Russia and Turkey, *VPR* II/VIII, pp. 163-64, Nesselrode to Lieven, 18 April 1829 OS; pp. 166-69, Nesselrode to Nicholas, 19 April 1829 OS. A rare consensus was reached on the future political status of 'Greece' - the Sultan’s overall suzerainty was to be retained, but Greece was to be assigned a monarchical form of government to run its internal affairs. Nicholas was totally opposed to any idea of a republican administration, fearing Greece would become 'the rendezvous of all the unquiet, turbulent spirits from every quarter of the globe' and the 'foyer of revolutionary doctrines'. Apparently, even the prospect of Capodistrias as the (presumably pro-Russian) President of a Greek republic was unsatisfactory to Nicholas, as he believed 'it was rather a dictator, than a man of the Pen, that was wanted at the present crisis', BL, Add. MS. 41557, ff.205-05v, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 27 December 1828.

(134) The most alarming of such reports came from the espionage network of Constantine (which gathered intelligence on Austria and Prussia), RGVIA, fond VUA, d.992, 996, 4470, e.g. d.992, ff.21-21v, Report of 18 August 1828 OS; d.4470, ff.21-27, Report of 12 January 1829 OS.
The former had been despatched to London in 1828 to assist the Lievens who were now barely on speaking terms with Wellington. A Lieven-Wellington friendship had been forged in the early 1820s against Canning, due to the latter's opposition to the Holy Alliance. Canning's willingness to seek a Russian alliance over Greece in 1825 had, however, changed everything and the Lievens now directed their intrigues against the Duke. Their recall in 1829 was a distinct possibility, though narrowly avoided due to the problem of finding suitable employment for the Princess. As Heytesbury reported, 'The husband might very well be placed in one of the Great Charges de Cour, but the lady would never do at St Petersburg either in, or out of place. The influential people here are perfectly aware, that she is not a fish for these waters', BL, Add. MS. 41558, ff.156-156v, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 4 August 1829.

Specifically, Vasil'chikov named Kiselev, F. V. Rudiger (Chief of Cavalry), Mel'gunov (General-Quartermaster) and Baikov (Duty-General).

Its findings are in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4660, ff.136-146v, ‘Mémoire sur les discussions du 19 November 1828’ (printed in Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 24-30).

In informing Kiselev of this decision, Diebitsch made it clear that an attack on Shumla would only be attempted if its garrison was negligible and there existed ‘une chance certaine de l'emporter’, RGVIA, d.672, ff.93-94, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 30 December 1828 OS.

Jomini's proposals for 1829 were very close to the committee’s proposals (which he no doubt knew of) - leave 30,000 men to guard the operational base, 20,000 to siege Silistria, 20,000 to observe Shumla and 50,000 to cross the Balkans (total 120,000 men). Jomini argued that it was acceptable to detach an independent corps to siege Silistria simultaneously as the main forces attempted a Balkan crossing. Although against a European army it would be 'contraire à tous les principes de la stratégie' to push south leaving such a large fortress in one's rear, against the Turks it was 'sans risque'. Thus even Jomini was gradually adapting his doctrines to the realities of Turkish wars. RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4718, ff.1-6v, Jomini to Nicholas, 8 January 1829 OS. As regards Kiselev, he was
not informed of the decision of the November committee until Diebitsch's letter of 30 December OS (see above, footnote 148). He appears, however, not to have received it for some time, for in January, Kiselev was still arguing that as the army did not have sufficient resources for a crossing, only systematic war plans were an option, \textit{ibid.}, d. 4717, ff.2-13v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 11 January 1829 OS. Epanchin, \textit{Ocherk}, II, p. 32, maintains that Kiselev and Wittgenstein were kept in the dark of the committee's decision. Diebitsch made sure his own war plan of 8 January 1829 OS concurred with the committee's decision, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4699, ff.106-110v.

(150) Considering all the vacillations over the war plan between August 1827 and November 1828 one can understand Heytesbury's view that 'we do too much honour to the Government of this country, if we suppose it is guided by any profound system of policy, or deeply calculated plan. It is, on the contrary, the misfortune of the country...that at the present moment it has no policy at all. That it is a Government acting by fits and starts, varying projects from day to day, and guided only by chance or circumstance', BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.9, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 January 1829.


(152) Geisman, 'Shtab', No.4, p. 72, quoted from Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 10 December 1828 OS.


(154) Wittgenstein had, in fact, already offered his resignation as early as 27 August 1828 OS following the Turkish attack on Shumla on the 14th, Shil'der, 'Voina', pp. 94-95. Constantine said of Diebitsch's appointment, 'il aura une double campagne à faire: l'une contre les turcs et l'autre pour regagner la bonne opinion, l'estime et la confiance de son armée'. Public opinion blamed Diebitsch for the failure of 1828 and would have preferred as Commander-in-Chief the darling of Russian society, M. S. Vorontsov, Shil'der, \textit{Nikolai}, II, pp. 206-07, 451. Nicholas was dissuaded (by Constantine in particular) from any idea of accompanying the army in 1829, BL, Add. MS. 41588, f.9v, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 January 1829.

(155) Shil'der, 'Voina', p. 103. Heytesbury was less confident than Vachil'chikov of Toll's abilities, considering him but 'a weaker edition of Diebitsch', BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.10, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 January 1829. For the other changes in personnel in 1829 see Shil'der, \textit{Nikolai}, II, p. 204. Fadeev, \textit{Krizis}, p. 295, emphasises the number of important posts that were given to Germans, which he views as some kind of conspiracy on the part of Diebitsch and Toll. If this is correct, then the victory of the 'German party' was to be short lived. It appears that, as a result of the Polish Revolt of 1830-31, Nicholas began to favour the 'Russian party' in a quest to promote Russian nationalism as the main stabilising force of the empire. In 1833, the year that the so-called theory of 'Official Nationality' was declared, British diplomats began to report on the ever-increasing victories of the Russian party. When, for instance, Admiral Greig was replaced as commander of the Black Sea Fleet by Admiral Lazarev, J. D. Bligh could not 'help looking upon it...as partly the fruits of a system which the strickly speaking Russian party are pursuing, of endeavouring to displace from all posts of importance the foreigners who are in the service of this Government', PRO, FO 65/206, Bligh to Palmerston, 24 August 1833 (no folio numbers were available for this file). When a plan for depriving the German colonists of Russia of their traditional privileges was revealed, Bligh could point to 'the increasing disinclination which pervades this government generally, to encourage any people in the country who are not exclusively Russian', \textit{ibid}, Bligh to Palmerston, 11 September 1833. When Toll was subsequently removed from military service and made Head of the Department of Land and Water Communications, Bligh considered this 'a triumph of the Russian party, since, though it gives him a high station, it removes from active service an officer of foreign extraction, whose military talents would render him, in case of their being called into action,
For an account see, Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 120-21. Although such a dispersion of troops was against the letter of Jomini’s theory, Diebitsch considered it admissible in the present circumstance. Some years earlier he had written ‘the division of forces would be dangerous against another enemy but against the Turks it can be admitted’, RGVLA, fond VUA, f.3v, War Plan of 20 June 1821 OS.


(165) Ibid., pp. 127-28, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 3 April 1829 OS.

(166) For an account see, Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 132-85.

(167) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXII, 1881, p. 299, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 10 May 1829 OS.

(168) Ibid., p. 290, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 23 April 1829 OS.

(169) Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo, p. 203.

(170) The fullest account is in Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 261-83. The Soviet version denies any credit to Diebitsch or Toll for the victory, praising instead the sturdy Russian infantry, Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 299-300. Moltke, Russians, pp. 447-48, is justified in criticising the Vizier’s decision to leave Shumla and in arguing that had he stayed put, Diebitsch may have deemed it too risky to attempt a Balkan crossing at all.

(171) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXII, 1881, pp. 572-73, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 2 June 1829 OS.

(172) Ibid., pp. 707-08, 719, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 9, 26 June 1829 OS. For reasons even the Tsar could not ascertain, the reinforcements were over two weeks late, ibid., XXXVI, 1882, p. 85, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 12 August 1829 OS.

(173) Ibid., XXXIV, 1882, p. 158, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 25 June 1829 OS.

(174) Ibid., pp. 162-63, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 5 July 1829 OS.

(175) Ibid., pp. 163-64, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 9 July OS. Diebitsch’s decision was perhaps not as bold as it seems. For following the Battle of Kulevcha, Diebitsch sent the diplomat F. P. Fonton to sound out the Vizier (at Shumla) on peace terms. The latter’s representatives did not rule out negotiations but required time to receive instructions from the Sultan, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4850, ff.51-52v, Diebitsch to Nicholas, 2 June 1829 OS; ff.53-60v, Report of F. P. Fonton, 7 June 1829 OS. It is possible that Diebitsch’s decision to push forces to Shumla (following the fall of Silistria on 18 June OS), as well as his
extended stay there, was motivated (in part) by a desire to increase the pressure on the Vizier and sign a peace without the need for a Balkan crossing. By July it was obvious the Vizier was not about to negotiate and there was little option other than a Balkan crossing as another blockade of Shumla was bound to be opposed by Nicholas.

(176) Luk’ianovich, *Opisanie*, IV, p. 10.

(177) For an account see Epanchin, *Ocherk*, III, pp. 33-81. Diebitsch was awarded the title Zabalkanskii (presumably following the precedent of Rumiantsev-Zađanaikski), ‘Imperator’, *RS*, XXXIV, 1882, p. 175, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 4 August 1829 OS.

(178) Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 303-04; Beskrovnyi, *Russkoe voennoe Iskusstvo*, p. 205; ‘Imperator’, *RS*, XXXIV, 1882, pp. 169-70, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 18 July 1829 OS; *ibid.* , XXXVI, 1882, pp. 81-84, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 1 August 1829 OS. Following these attacks, Diebitsch became utterly convinced of the need to capture Shumla. Despite Nicholas’ express wishes to the contrary, Diebitsch, almost right up to the very signing of the eventual peace treaty, was still issuing orders for a siege, *ibid.* , XXXIV, 1882, p. 175, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 4 August 1829 OS; XXXVI, 1882, p. 90, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 24 August 1829 OS.

(179) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4850, ff.108-113v, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 13 August 1829 OS.


(184) Luk’ianovich, *Opisanie*, IV, pp. 203-06.

(185) See above, p. 114.

(186) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.297-99v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 21 November 1828 OS.

(187) Not Trabizond, as suggested in Allen, Muratoff, *Battlefields*, p. 31.

(188) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.298-98v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 21 November 1828 OS.


(191) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4809, ff.267v, 272, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 15 March 1829 OS.


(193) *Ibid.*, ff.438-40v, Journal of Paskevich, 4-18 June 1829 OS. Paakevich’s offensive force was thus increased to 18,000 men. A further 12,000 men were designated for internal security and 12,000 more for observing Persia, Luk‘ianovich, *Opisanie*, IV, pp. 142-43. Paskevich considered these latter forces insufficient and therefore in March 1829 announced his decision to raise a Georgian militia of some 6,000 men for internal defence,
Paskevich presumed this measure would cause no problems as Ermolov had raised a similar number of Georgians during the 1826 Persian campaign. Unfortunately, Paskevich made a serious error due to his ignorance of local custom. Ermolov, who possessed a far greater understanding of such matters, likened the traditions of military obligation in the Caucasus to those of Medieval Europe. 'You are without doubt aware' he informed Diebitsch in January 1827, 'that the relationship of the landowner and his vassal [in Medieval Europe] was based on the ceding of a portion of the lands of the former to the latter, who was in turn obliged to serve in war at the side of his landlord'. In both the Christian and Muslim regions of the Caucasus this feudal relationship was still in existence and thus any militia raised was subject to the same limitations as those of Europe's feudal armies. Therefore, peasant militias 'may be gathered two, three or more times a year for short-term service, but they are in no sense able to serve for a whole campaign without upkeep and payment. This is why the militia raised last year was disbanded after about one and a half months. For the 1827 [Persian] campaign, militias will be formed and then disbanded after serving the customary obligation of one to two months'. As a rule, Ermolov was opposed to the payment or permanent enlistment of Caucasian peoples as their attitude to war was quite traditional - they were attracted only by the prospect of plunder and demanded higher wages than Russian soldiers (the Soviet claim, Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 152 that the Georgian militia of 1826 constituted a 'patriotic uprising' [patriotscheskii pods] thus appears to be incorrect). Moreover, Ermolov believed that the Georgians' tradition of irregular warfare made them unaccustomed to the discipline required for regular service. Prophetically, he warned that 'even if a militia is supported on Treasury funds and receives payment, then dishonourable individuals will be found who will propagate the idea that this is merely the first step to the introduction of [compulsory, long-term] conscription. This without fail will make a detrimental impression on the population and could be the cause of certain disturbances', RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4309, ff.7-9v, Ermolov to Diebitsch, 12 January 1827 OS. Unfortunately, Ermolov's argument remained unheeded. In 1829, Paskevich announced that the Georgian militia units were to serve for a six-month period and planned to use Russian officers to teach them rudimentary tactical formations. This led to the spread of rumours amongst the Georgian population that they were to be enlisted into the regular army for twenty five years. In the Spring, disturbances broke out throughout Eastern Georgia, forcing Paskevich was forced to abandon his idea entirely, Khachapuridze, *K istorii Gruzii*, pp. 179-86. Georgian militias were successfully raised during the wars of 1853-56 and 1877-78 but compulsory universal conscription into the regular Russian army was not introduced until 1889, *ibid*. p. 187.

(195) Ushakov, *Istoriia*, II, p. 10; RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.566-67, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 20 August 1829 OS. The Kurds were thus not neutral throughout the war as maintained in Allen, Muratoff, *Battlefields*, p. 44.
(196) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.568-69, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 31 August 1829 OS.
(197) Allen, Muratoff, *Battlefields*, pp. 41,44.
(198) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.566-67, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 20 August 1829 OS.
(200) According to Paskevich, this was due to Russia's capture of Akhaltsykh, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.542-44, Journal of Paskevich, 11 July 1829 OS. There are varying estimations on Paskevich's 1829 campaign. Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 306-11, is very negative, allowing Paskevich no praise for his defeat of the Seraskier in June and critical the decision not to push further west after Erzerum. Alternatively, Ushakov, *Istoriia*, II, is most favourable, as is Allen, Muratoff, *Battlefields*, pp. 31-45. W. Monteith, the somewhat overawed Englishman who accompanied the Russians in 1829, went as far as to speak of the 'genius of Prince Paskiewitch' and considered the 1829 campaign one of the most 'glorious...in the whole of the Russian annals', W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum*,
with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829 (London, 1856), pp. 300-301.

Considering the war as a whole, one must certainly be impressed by the apparent ease at which the numerical inferior Caucasus Corps consistently defeated large Turkish forces and captured their fortresses with no great effort. In part, this was due to the defects in a Turkish military organisation that was in transition from semi-irregular to a regular army, as well as due to its traditional technological weakness in artillery, Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, pp. 38-39. This, however, does not explain why the Russian army had such great problems in the Balkans against a Ottoman army possessing precisely the same defects. The underlying reasons for Paskevich 'amazingly easy' success, ibid., must be sought in the peculiarities of the Caucasian theatre. They are threefold. First, as Liprandi argued, the quality of the Ottoman irregular forces raised in the region was, in the main, of much lower quality than those of Ottoman European. Second, the Turks were determined to adopt the strategic offensive in the Caucasus whilst remaining defensive in Europe. Thus, unlike the commanders of the Second Army who had to force the stubborn Turkish army out from its fortresses, Paskevich was faced by a Seraskier only willing to give battle. This suited Paskevich’s tactically superior forces and allowed him to win a decisive battle in 1829. This led directly to the capitulation of Erzerum and relieved Paskevich of the need of a potentially costly siege. Third, in terms of strategy, war in the Caucasus was more straightforward than in the Balkans. The mountainous terrain was dominated by a certain number of roads and passes limiting Russia’s offensive possibilities to really only two operational lines - a push on Kars from either Gumri or the Borjomi pass. The value of Kars was obvious as a forward base. After this, there were again only two real options - a westwards push to Erzerum or the more conservative northern route to capture the minor Turkish fortresses near the Borjomi pass. The real test of generalship would come only if it was decided after Erzerum to push into Anatolia. Here the number of strategic options increased greatly and there appeared the problem of how the army was to be supplied in distant provinces and how its elongated operational line was to be defended. Paskevich was well aware of these difficulties and for this reason remained at Erzerum. In the final analysis, the 1828-29 Caucasian campaigns were the work, not of genius, but of a safe pair of hands.

(201) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.597-612, Journal of Paskevich, 30 August-2 October 1829 OS. The Seraskier asked for an armistice only on 28 September 1829 OS.
(202) BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.210, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 11 September 1829.
VII. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND THE USE OF BALKAN IRREGULARS, 1828-29

One of the more sensitive questions facing the Tsarist establishment on the eve of war was the prudence of raising irregular or partisan units from amongst the Christian inhabitants of Ottoman Europe. Such a policy, though adopted many times in previous Turkish wars, had, in recent years, become greatly politicised, much to its detriment. After 1815, Russia was greatly prone to the general fear of revolutionary and nationalist movements that dominated European politics of the Restoration Era. This engendered at St Petersburg a deep distrust of all organisations and movements of a populist nature and many balked at any suggestion of the arming of a civilian population. Moreover, Russia was publicly committed to the principle of legitimism and, notwithstanding her support of the Greeks, she had no desire to compromise further the authority of the Sultan through the incitement of more of his subjects to rebellion. The situation in the Balkans had, by 1828, become so tense that it was feared that the use of even limited numbers of partisans could inflame popular anti-Turkish sentiment to the point of revolution. The ability of a small irregular force to create a levée en masse in the Balkans had already been aptly demonstrated by Ypsilantis in 1821. The unleashing of another revolt amongst the Serbs, Bulgars, Moldavians or Wallachians was seen as certain to threaten the very existence of the Ottoman state (to whose continued preservation Russia was committed) and further complicate relations between the Great Powers. Thus, as A. Kh. Benckendorff correctly concluded, Nicholas had done his all to avoid the perception of the Turkish war as an open-ended religious cum ethnic struggle. Instead, the war was presented as 'a simple argument between two courts, which was to be settled by the army without the participation of the people'. Such political considerations thus pointed against a repetition of the practices of the last Turkish War, during which Russia had actively supported Bulgar, Pandour and Serbian irregular units.

The Russian military establishment, however, had a different agenda. Most leading generals for instance favoured the use of Serbian forces, the benefit of which, was thought to have been increased now that Russia intended to cross the Balkans. Such a southwards advance threatened to leave Russia's right flank exposed and an uprising in Serbia was considered the best means to pre-empt a Turkish assault via Widdin into Lesser Wallachia. The use of other nationalities was proposed by Admiral D. N. Seniavin, who had previously fostered military co-operation with the Montenegrins during the Napoleonic Wars. He argued for the creation of an avant-garde composed of the mountain population
of the Adriatic coast. This force of ‘several hundred’ men was to assist the army during the crossing of the Balkans.(7) In a later proposal, the Admiral favoured creating similar units from the inhabitants of the Principalities and Balkan mountains. Seniavin was insistent however that, whilst such units should be commanded by Russian officers, their irregular organisation and status should be retained. Attempts to introduce regular army discipline were to be avoided. Instead, ‘simple treatment, praising of their bravery and certain concessions with regard to plunder will be a more effective means of control than discipline’. Generally, great emphasis was placed on the utility of winning over the local Christian population at large to Russia’s side. This was to be achieved through the intermediary of the Orthodox clergy, which throughout Ottoman Europe was ‘dissatisfied with the Porte’ and could easily ‘be bought’. (8)

To some, the use of Bulgar irregulars appeared the most viable option. For following the end of hostilities with the Porte in 1812 the aforementioned Bulgar zemskoe voisko ['land militia'] was resettled en masse into Bessarabia, so establishing a reservoir of trusted and experienced warriors, ready to volunteer for future service. (9) The most ambitious proposal was that of Lt-Col Serristory. (10) The Bulgars were to be again formed into irregular units and used ‘à être le noyau de guérillas qui s’organiseront en Boulgarie’.

As the main Russian force crossed of the Danube, this irregular force:

...sera lance dans les montagnes pour exciter les habitans leurs compatriots à prendre les armes et balayer des partis ennemis les passages des Balkans, nos communications et nos flancs.

Whilst Serristory aimed at nothing less than the unleashing of a mass Bulgar partisan campaign, A. F. Langerone offered the more moderate proposal of organising the Bessarabian Bulgars into two 500-man cavalry regiments as a means of augmenting Russia’s Cossack regiments. (11)

Whilst such projects found a sympathetic ear at the High Command of the Second Army, the Tsar’s attitude remained one of extreme caution. (12) Nicholas was particularly opposed to Serbian participation in the war. He feared that this would inevitably result in an uncontrollable revolution amongst this, the most organised and warlike of the Balkan nationalities, currently under the leadership of the unpredictable and ambitious Milosh Obrenovich. Throughout 1828, Milosh was repeatedly instructed to ensure his nation’s passivity. (13) The proposals of Serristory and Langerone were also both dismissed and, in February 1828, Nicholas expressly forbade the formation of volunteer forces. (14) A nominal concession was however made in April, following an approach from the
aforementioned Bessarabian Bulgars. Although their request to serve as a independent irregular force was declined, Nicholas allowed them to enlist into the 4th Uhlan division. This decision had in fact little meaning as F. P. Pahlen had already dismissed these ‘volunteers’ as ‘consisting of a rabble of vagrants who would be of more harm than of use’. The Russian Government thus entered the war with no policy and no intention of allowing any formation of irregular or partisan units.

The Campaign of 1828

Fearful of the unpredictable response of the Balkan population to the commencement of hostilities, the Russian campaign opened with a carefully worded proclamation to the inhabitants of Bulgaria. It emphasised that the war was being waged, not for the destruction of Ottoman rule, but to ensure the Sultan’s observance of Russian treaty rights. It assured both the Christian and Muslim inhabitants that they would be protected from violence and urged both to remain calm. Russia's aim was to dispel the idea of a war of conquest and thus prevent both a general uprising amongst the Christian population, and dissuade the large Turkish population of the region from conducting partisan action against the Russian forces. Whilst the proclamation urged the Bulgars to supply the army with provisions, the policy of avoiding the arming of the Christian population remained in force. As the campaign progressed, circumstance and military necessity were however to compromise this decision.

The first steps towards a rethink were prompted following receipt of a report of General-Major S. A. Tuchkov, who, on Wittgenstein’s advice, had been made zemskii komissar ['land commissar'] for ‘Northern Bulgaria’ (the Babadag region) in February 1828. In March, Tuchkov was charged with the gathering of information on Bulgaria, with a view to the optimum means of administering the region following its impending occupation by the Russian army. Tuchkov reported that, in contrast to Serbia and the Principalities, ‘Bulgaria’ was governed as a Pashalik, having no indigenous organs of self-government. Without also the stabilising force of a Bulgar landowning class (the Bulgars knew no aristocracy) there seemed no easy means of averting the chaos that was sure to ensue upon the impending disintegration of local Turkish authority. Tuchkov thus saw no solution other than the direct rule of these lands by Russian officials and the creation of zemskoe poselennoe voisko [lit. ‘land settlement militia’] composed of local Bulgars to maintain internal order and repel Turkish partisan raids. Whilst the name of this force implied an irregular status, Tuchkov had evidently wider ambitions for it. It was to consist
of infantry, cavalry and light artillery units, divided in battalions. The soldiers were to be uniformed and be trained to form line, column and square. (19)

Tuchkov’s proposal soon received the full support of Kiselev, who requested that Tuchkov be despatched sufficient arms and artillery for a one thousand-man force. (20) Somewhat surprisingly, Nicholas agreed. (21) Though the Tsar gave no reason for his decision, it is almost certain that sensing the campaign was not progressing as planned, Nicholas was unwilling to detach more units from his already understrength army for the internal security of occupied lands. Significantly, the army was especially short of Cossacks, who usually performed ‘irregular’ functions such as the policing of occupied land. (22) The Tsar’s agreement however came with the proviso that, after the war, all members of the zemskoe voisko were to be resettled into Russia (as occurred in 1812). Ostensibly, this was to protect them from Turkish retribution, though probably also because Nicholas feared they could act as the nucleus of a future armed Bulgar nationalist movement. On the same date, Nicholas agreed to another of Tuchkov’s plans to form two regiments, one infantry, one cavalry, from the Black Sea Cossack settlements in Bessarabia. They were to assist the zemskoe voisko and man the Danubian flotilla. (23)

Tuchkov’s proposal was however destined never to be enacted, as the Turks had already driven most of the Bulgars of the Babadag region from their homes. Tuchkov’s request to call up the Bessarabian Bulgars instead was not accepted (for reasons unstated). (24) It must however be admitted, that Tuchkov’s ideas, amounting as they did to the creation of a proto-regular Bulgar army, were in any case unrealisable, at least in the short term. The Bulgars had no experience of regular warfare nor of the discipline it required. The plan regarding the Black Sea Cossacks also faced difficulties, with M. S. Vorontsov reporting in July that only insufficient numbers were to be found in Bessarabia. (25)

Whilst the above debates were continuing, Russian commanders on the ground, unbeknown to the High Command, were already employing the services of irregulars. Their use was prompted by the latter themselves who, quite voluntarily, appeared at the army’s forward posts offering their services. The first two units of volunteers appeared at Turtukai in May, as General L. O. Roth’s 6th Corps was preparing to cross on to the right bank of the Danube. They numbered in total around 275 men (composed of Bulgars, Greeks and other Balkan nationalities) and were commanded, respectively, by a certain P. Fokiiano and G. Mamarchev - a veteran of the 1806-12 war and future Bulgar revolutionary. (26) Due to their extensive knowledge of the Balkan theatre, Roth agreed to attach them to his corps.
The Bulgar volunteers accompanied Roth’s forces to Silistria where they participated in a large encounter on 9 June OS and assisted in the subsequent blockade of that fortress. Their presence was however soon discovered by Wittgenstein, who, in accordance with official policy, ordered their immediate expulsion. Fortunately, Roth was able to reverse this decision and the volunteers remained with his force until the end of the campaign. They were charged with various duties, including the manning of a flotilla for the disruption of Silistria’s communications and the clearing of the Silistria-Bazardzhik road from Turkish irregular cavalry. Both leaders were eventually decorated for their services. Two other such volunteer groups were subsequently to appear - a fifty-man force under a certain Aleksei, of whom little is known, and multi-national force of 150-200 men under Milko Petrovich, an ethnic Bulgar, domiciled in Serbia.(27)

The later, by all accounts, was a charismatic though controversial character. He arrived at a Russian outpost in Lesser Wallachia on 11 September OS(28) where he found the beleaguered local commander Baron F. K. Geismar facing an imminent attack from a 26,000 man Turkish force currently encamped at Kalafat.(29) Geismar had been assigned the unenviable task of protecting the Russian extreme right flank with a force of 3,000 men, and throughout 1828 had sought reinforcements by whatever means necessary. In June, contrary to Russian policy, he had augmented his force with 150 local Pandours(30) and was now happy to accept Milko and his band.

On 12 September OS the Turkish force left camp, planning to march on Craiova and then onto Bucharest. Geismar believed his only chance of victory was by a surprise, preemptive counter-attack. One of Milko’s men, K. Sherengaki, infiltrated the base and acquired vital information on the Turkish positions. This allowed Geismar to make a daring night attack, resulting in a famous victory at Boesletsi.(31) For his part in the battle Milko was awarded a golden sabre with the inscription ‘For Bravery’. (32)

Milko’s appearance was however to complicate Geismar’s relations with both the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Serbian leader Milosh Obrenovich. Geismar had already forged a friendship with the latter during the course of the war as a result of their mutual interest in gaining Serbia’s entry into the war. Geismar was in desperate need of more troops whilst Milosh saw Serbian participation in the war as the surest means to further his nation’s (as well as his own) ambitions at the eventual peace negotiations.(33) Milosh sought to increase his use to Russia by furnishing Geismar with reports on Turkish movements near Widdin. In August, he reported, correctly, that 20,000 troops had
assembled there and had begun crossing over to Kalafat in preparation for a flank attack. (34)

A further closening of ties was disrupted by Milosh’s discovery of Milko’s presence in Wallachia. The latter’s very name sent the Serbian leader into veritable rage. Milko was condemned as a man ‘craving for human blood’, and his immediate dismissal was demanded. (35) Ostensibly, Milosh’s argument was that Milko’s presence contradicted Nesselrode’s instructions for Serbians to remain neutral. The subtext however was that Milko was regarded as a potential usurper and a threat to Milosh’s rule in Serbia.

Milko was indeed certainly something of an adventurer. He claimed the title of Kniaz’ [Prince], though Liprandi, who knew him personally, believed him a notorious brigand. (36) We know that Milko had previously served in Karageorge’s elite military force (along with his brother who commanded it). (37) Following Karageorge’s assassination by Milosh’s followers in 1817, a long-running feud had developed between the two clans. (38) It is thus probable that Milko was associated with Milosh’s rivals, hence the latter’s rage. What is certain, is that soon after Boeleshti, Milko made the unexpected offer ‘d’entreprendre dans son pays un armement général’ to assist the Russian war effort. (39) It was obvious to Nesselrode that Milko aimed to gain control of this Russian-sanctioned Serbian force and use it to oust Milosh. The offer was thus refused outright as it would ‘entrainerait indubitablement des fatales conséquences pour le repos de la Servie’. (40)

Either informed of, or suspecting, Milko’s proposal, Milosh was forced into an immediate counter offer. Geismar duly reported Milosh’s claim that ‘Serbia is ready for an uprising’ and his request for the immediate despatch of 12,000 Russian troops and 20,000 muskets to Belgrade. Geismar supported the plan and requested permission to cross the Danube himself. (41) No immediate response was, however, forthcoming from the Tsar. Undaunted, Milosh continued his attempts to win Russian acceptance of a Serbian uprising. He now reported that the hitherto unreliable Pasha of Skodra, had recently agreed to assist the Sultan, and with up to 40,000 men and was preparing to march to Widdin. (42) When this threat failed to materialise, Milosh claimed he himself had averted it through a private agreement with the Pasha. (43)

Developments over the Winter of 1828-29

Whilst the Russian authorities had made certain concessions regarding the use of Balkan irregulars in 1828, the failure of the campaign forced a major review of policy.
Most Russian commanders welcomed this move, viewing the use of such irregulars as a solution to two important problems encountered that year; firstly, to combat Turkish partisan war in Bulgaria, which caused great damage Russian supply network and secondly, to augment Geismar's force and decrease the threat to right flank.

The most pressing question, that of Serbia's possible entry into the war, was discussed by the aforementioned committee of 19 November 1828 OS. It was rejected on three grounds: first, to be effective, the Serbs would have to be supported by around 12,000 Russian troops, which could not be spared; second, their use would incense Austria; finally, their participation would complicate peace negotiation as their political demands were sure to increase 'in proportion to their role in military operations'.(45) This view was subsequently supported by Jomini, who believed that 'une diversion en Servie...comme operation purement militaire ce serait une folie'. The Serbs were to be used only for political reasons - to justify a demand for their independence (should Russia wish this) at the eventual peace negotiations.(46)

Milosh, still unperturbed by the lack of interest in his offer, continued to send more alarming reports to St Petersburg. The new supposed threat was that Abduragman, the Pasha of Bosnia, had agreed to assist the Sultan and was preparing to occupy Serbia. It was as a direct result of this report that Nicholas finally consented to a Serbian uprising, on the grounds that such an occupation was a contravention of Serbia's treaty rights.(47) The Tsar was at this stage probably supported by Diebitsch who, in his recent war plans, had advocated the use of the Serbs.(48) Wittgenstein was thus informed that:

H.I.M. no longer considers himself justified in restraining the Serbs from an uprising and prohibiting them from securing, by force of arms, the satisfaction of the advantages granted to them in treaties by the Porte; it is for the non-fulfillment of treaty rights that Russia herself has declared war...it would be beneficial however not to announce this to the Serbs at present. In the meantime...the weapons, artillery and shells of which the Serbs are in need, are to be immediately prepared and transported to Wallachia in order that they be at hand at the appropriate time.

The weapons included 10,000 'English' muskets from the Kiev arsenal and light artillery taken from the captured Turkish fortresses. Serbian operations were to be designed to coincide with the intended Russian offensives.(49)

Geismar naturally welcomed this unexpected news and sought to justify it further. He had recently received intelligence (probably from Milosh) that the Porte had just concluded an agreement with Austria, by the which the latter, by means of its commercial flotilla, was to supply the Turkish Danubian fortresses with provisions. Geismar thus
proposed using the Serbs to occupy the banks of the Danube upstream from Widdin and ‘cut all [Turkish] communication with Austria’. (50) His efforts however were in vain, as an unexpected reversal of policy was to follow within days of his despatch. On 9 February 1829 OS, the very day he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army, (51) Diebitsch wrote to Nicholas in support of a recent report by Nesselrode objecting to the use of the Serbs. The latter’s opposition was no doubt based on the fear of reprisals from Austria, though why Diebitsch had now reversed his previous position is somewhat unclear. (52) Deferring to his trusted advisers, Nicholas now accepted the ‘disadvantages and inconveniences’ of a Serbian revolt, though, significantly, Diebitsch was awarded full discretionary power to raise the Serbs in the event of ‘extreme circumstances’. (53)

More concrete concessions were forthcoming regarding the use of other irregular forces. In November, M. S. Vorontsov had submitted a plan to form four infantry battalions from volunteers recruited amongst Balkan peoples residing in Odessa, Kishinev, Jassy and Bucharest. According to Vorontsov, previous volunteer units had been of dubious military value due to their aversion to ‘any order and any discipline’ and thus proposed the introduction a regular element to their organisation. They were to be formed on the basis of chasseurs, receive payment and be commanded by Greeks in the Russian military service. The nucleus of each battalion was to be formed from the men of the Greek Balaklava light infantry battalions. Once in the field, more units could be raised using trained recruits as their cadres - a process that could be continued ‘ad infinitum’. (54) Although Diebitsch was in principle in agreement, (55) Vorontsov’s proposal were threatened by a rival plan. As mentioned, Geismar had raised a Pandour force in 1828 and by the end of that campaign had secured the support of Langerone and Wittgenstein to raise more such units for 1829. (56) Fearing a loss of control over the organisation and use of irregular forces, a memoir was submitted attacking Vorontsov’s plan. (57) It stated that volunteers were usually undesirables, often criminals, fleeing their masters or the authorities. They were motivated solely by the quest for war booty and deserted at the first sign of danger. During the 1806-12 Turkish war, when four thousand such volunteers were left unsupervised, they proceeded only to rampage through the Principalities in search of loot, until they were rounded up and disarmed by Russian forces. The author claimed that in all of Southern Russia and the Principalities there were but 200-300 men of Balkan origin who were sufficiently trustworthy and possessed proper experience of mountain warfare. The only reliable source of irregular troops were said to be the Pandours, who in 1807, under General-Major I. I. Isaev, defended Wallachia with minimal support from Russian troops.
At present the Pandours had formed themselves into a 2,000-man militia and were again willing to repeat this task.

Swayed by these arguments, Nicholas consented, with the proviso that the Pandours remained a defensive force and under no circumstances crossed the Danube. Langerone's detailed plan for their organisation was duly accepted. A total of 2,959 officers and men were to be formed into six battalions, each composed of 400 infantry and 40 cavalry men. The Pandours were to be supplied with weapons and provisions from the Russian army and receive 52,800 piastres to buy 264 horses. Their wages totaled 21,020 piastres per month. Overall command was entrusted to the Pandour chieftain Sludoniar Soloman, a veteran of the last Turkish war and noted for his devotion to Russia.

Parallel to these developments, Liprandi had been working on a more ambitious proposal of his own. In January 1829 he submitted a report entitled 'On the necessity of forming a corps of partisans on the right bank of the Danube'. Liprandi cited Turkish partisan raids as main cause of the failure of the 1828 campaign. Russia had paid too much attention to destroying the main enemy forces, allowing its irregular cavalry units and the local Turkish population to attack and destroy Russia's magazine chains and communications. More important than the losses to supplies, these never-ending raids served to 'create depression and despondency in the [Russian] army, destroying along with the body, its spirit'. Only the creation of a Russian partisan corps could protect supplies, ward off night attacks and keep the Muslim population in check. Moreover, these partisans could fulfil an important offensive role through hit and run tactics, which were sure to create havoc due amongst the naturally disorganised Ottoman forces.

As regards the organisation of the partisans, the model of 1812 was considered inapplicable. This irregular war was fought on home soil, predominantly on horse against the supply lines of a regular army, weak in cavalry. In the Balkans, partisans faced a hostile population and large tracts of forest which made cavalry very prone to attack and indeed accounted for the heavy losses of Cossacks in 1828. These partisan units thus had to contain infantry and be supported by regular troops in order to make attacks on Turkish forces. The whole corps was to consist of three battalions of chasseurs, 600 Cossacks, 6 guns and 1,200 volunteers (of which 900 were to be infantrymen). They were to be issued with drums, horns and rockets, the sound of which was said to cause panic amongst the Turks.

Special care was to be taken in hand-picking volunteers with experience rather than 'collecting any old rabble...which brings more harm than good'. Fortunately, the revolt of
Hetairia in 1821 had attracted to the Principalities many adventurers, who combined a hatred of the Turks with the quasi-military experience of men 'raised in brigandage'. They knew well both the local terrain and the psychology of the enemy. Although these men were alien to ideas of strict military discipline, Liprandi took the unconventional, and indeed, somewhat controversial view, that their independent nature was in fact an asset. In order to increase their effectiveness, the partisans were to be separated into units of around thirty men, each acting independently. They were to follow the march of large bodies of regular troops, shielding them from Turkish raids, gathering intelligence and so forth. On discovery of larger enemy forces they were to call in the chasseurs and their artillery for support. This role demanded qualities very different from that of the soldier of the line. It required initiative, self-reliance and an adventurous spirit. Liprandi believed the only means of ensuring the partisans' good conduct was through the prudent selection of their commanders. The leader of each unit was to be elected by the men themselves - a tradition of all armed bands of the Balkans. Overall command had to be entrusted to a man with a deep knowledge of the character of Balkan peoples. He was to recruit all the men personally and be able win their trust and respect. Naturally, Liprandi coveted this position himself.

Impressed by the above arguments, Diebitsch consented to the plan, which was to be executed by Liprandi himself. His only conditions were that, in the first instance, only 200-300 men were to be recruited, drawn solely from the inhabitants of the Principalities. It was feared that recruitment in the Balkans could 'push the Slavic tribes to a general uprising'.

The final plan of note was that of G. I. Shostak, a Captain in the General Staff of H.I.M.. It essence, this ambitious proposal was a development of Tuchkov's earlier idea of forming a Bulgar militia. However, whereas the latter envisaged a 1,000 man force in Bulgaria, Shostak spoke of 'several tens of thousands of muskets' being transported to Varna. Inspiring the local population with 'the prophecy...of the Third Constantinople'[sic] a near army of irregulars was thus to be raised south of the Balkans in Rumelia. At the end of the war they were to be resettled in Bessarabia, forming a 'standing militia' and solving the problem of the underpopulation of southern Russian. Whilst it seemed improbable that Nicholas would ever authorise such a measure, Dibietsch did not dismiss the proposal and forwarded it to Wittgenstein for consideration. The reasons for Diebitsch's interest were to become clear only the following year, as the Russian army prepared to cross the Balkans.
The Campaign of 1829

The recruitment for the Pandour corps progressed well and by the opening of the campaign the intended six battalions had been formed. On 23 March 1829 OS, Geismar requested that the Pandours be permitted to conduct operations, not only in Wallachia, but to cross on to the right bank to the Danube to pre-empt a possible Turkish crossing at Widdin. This however was refused outright by Pahlen who feared that their presence on the Serbian border would lead to a 'revolt amongst the Serbs'. A subsequent request by Kiselev to form an additional corps of 1,500 cavalry Pandours specifically for action on the right bank of the Danube (this time to pre-empt a Turkish crossing at Giurgevo) was likewise refused. The Pandours thus limited their action to the left bank, where they assisted Geismar’s forces in repelling Turkish raids into Wallachia. The largest battles were fought between May and August, against Turkish forces up to 3,000 men strong. Late into the campaign a 7th battalion was created to serve as a garrison in Turno. Due to their good conduct during the previous campaign, Geismar secured Diebitsch’s consent to re-employ the volunteer units of 1828. In April, P. Fokiiano and his band of 120 cavalry men were recruited. Their presence was especially welcome as Geismar was short of Cossacks and 24,000 piastres were secured from the budget of Wallachia (now controlled by Russia) to purchase horses for them. In contrast to 1828, these volunteers were now to be paid - a total 1,190 piastres per month. This expense was probably justified as, according to Liprandi, Fokiiano’s unit was the most able of all the irregulars used in 1828. Gesimar also again used the services of Aleksei and his band of 90 men.

As for Milko, his continued presence in the Russian army was placed in doubt following Nesselrode’s investigations into his past. Milko’s standing in Serbia was said to be negligible and his pretension to Majesty entirely false - his title of Kniaz’, as was Serbian custom, merely denoted the status of a village elder. Geismar was however able to secure Nicholas’ support and prevented Milko’s possible expulsion. To avoid further complications with Milosh, the latter was transferred from Geismar’s force in Wallachia and entered Liprandi’s partisan corps. Reports however soon reached Diebitsch concerning instances of ‘unreliable conduct’ (primarily drunkenness) amongst members of Milko’s 100-man band. They were ordered to return to Geismar’s force and a secret nadzor was placed upon them. There they served for the remainder of the war, though Milko, in somewhat heroic fashion, was killed at Turtukai before its conclusion.
Liprandi’s recruitment of partisans proved more troublesome than expected. Diebitsch had been persuaded to consent to the original request for 1,200 partisans but by the beginning of May only 349 men had been recruited. This was primarily due to Diebitsch’s order to limit recruitment to the Principalities. Local custom dictated that all mercenaries were hired on St George’s day (23 April) and after that date it was difficult gain their services. Moreover, to reduce costs, Liprandi had decided to recruit only those possessing weapons. This proved an impossible limitation as, since 1821, the Turks had undertaken thorough measures to confiscate all the region’s privately-held weapons. Fortunately, the project was salvaged by the appearance of Mamarchev, Milko and another Serbian leader Suliot and their volunteers. The lack of weapons was partially relieved by Diebitsch’s decision to send Liprandi 350 muskets.

By July, a motley collection of 950 brigands, mercenaries and former Hetairists had been collected and were ready by action. In addition, Liprandi was given control of the 8th Chasseur and St Petersburg Uhlan regiments. As Diebitsch had by this time already crossed the Balkans, their role was limited to the conduct of rearguard action. Their primary task was to clear the forest of Deli-Oiman [lit. ‘mad forest’] of Turkish partisans. Covering an area of 12,000 square versts and populated by 60,000 Turks (many of whom were fanatics imported from Asiatic Turkey), the forest was a thorn in Russia’s side throughout 1828. The main road from the Trajans Wall to Bazardzhik and Shumla passed through it and Russian supply convoys were subjected to constant attack. By a combination of force and threats, Liprandi’s partisans were very successful in securing the local Turkish populations passivity and their raids all but ceased. Liprandi’s force subsequently performed a similar mission near Rustchuk.

Whilst, at the opening of the campaign, Diebitsch had consented to the use of limited irregular forces, he was as yet unready to commit himself to the raising of a more general levée. Diebitsch was particularly loath to use the Serbs, becoming as he was, increasingly distrustful of Milosh. Diebitsch, for instance, dismissed continuing reports from the latter of the Pasha of Skodra’s impending entrance into the war ‘as extremely exaggerated’. He believed the Pasha’s forces to be more limited than Milosh claimed and that if the Albanians were to attack, it would be in Bulgaria, and certainly not across the Danube into Wallachia. Diebitsch favoured opening some channel of communication with
the Pasha, possibly through the Montenegrins, ‘but only not through Milosh, whose actions are invariably attended with calculations of his own personal gain’. (86)

Having correctly surmised that the supposed threat to Russian forces in Wallachia was a deft ploy designed to secure Serbia’s participation in the war, Diebitsch all but ruled out exercising his authority to raise a Serbian revolt. Instead, his attention shifted south towards the Bulgars of Rumelia, as a potentially more valuable source of irregular troops. The turning point in this respect proved to be the capture of Sizopol by Admiral A. S. Greig’s fleet on 16 February OS. Local Bulgars were soon found flocking to the port in search of protection and a one-hundred man volunteer force soon appeared. One of its leaders, a M. Staiko, along with Vulkan, a Bulgar emissary, approached the Russian admiral on 10 May OS. Claiming to be representatives of a secret Bulgar organisation, they stated that up to 20,000 Bulgars were ready for an uprising and prepared to take up arms against the Turks. All that was required was a supply of weapons. (87)

At around this time, Diebitsch was busy contemplating the crossing of the Balkans. Concerned, however, by a supposed lack of troops, he made such a crossing dependent upon the arrival of the reserve battalions of the active army as well as an extra infantry division. (88) There was however no certainty of this request being granted as Nicholas had already made plain his belief that Diebitsch possessed sufficient men for the tasks in hand. (89) The very day after Diebitsch above despatch had been sent, news of the Bulgars’ offer arrived from Sizopol. In a somewhat sudden conversion to panslavic ideology, Diebitsch now professed his concern for the Bulgars, a people of ‘common religion, origin and language’ with Russians, now ready to rise up against their Turkish ‘tyrants’ and ‘oppressors’. His real motive however was clear - to arm the Bulgars and ‘in decisive fashion make use of their [present] disposition following the crossing of the Balkans’. Diebitsch understood well that the Rumelian Bulgars, by their very location south of the Balkans, were of greater use to the advancing Russian army than the Serbs could ever be. (90) Knowing well the Tsar’s concern of the international ramifications of any further Balkan revolts, Diebitsch maintained that the ‘European Cabinets...will view this [Bulgar] uprising as much less like a revolution than a similar uprising in Serbia’. (91) Greig fully supported this reasoning and on 26 May OS, Nicholas awarded Diebitsch full discretion to arm and use the Bulgars as he wished. (92)

Diebitsch was however in no hurry to use this authority and for two months the whole matter was left in abeyance. Various interpretations have been forwarded as to why this was so, (93) the simplest, however, is that, following the Battle of Kulevcha, Nicholas
consented to Diebitsch’s request for reinforcements, so greatly reducing his dependency upon a Bulgar uprising.\(^{(94)}\) Thus, whilst following the successful crossing of the Balkans in July, Diebitsch chose to arm a few hundred Bulgar volunteers, he also took the formal decision neither to raise nor arm a Bulgar uprising in 1829. With his sights on a peace treaty, he believed their participation would only complicate negotiations. A general levée (of both the Bulgars and Serbs) was only to be attempted should the Sultan refuse to treat, so forcing Russia in to a third campaign.\(^{(95)}\)

Whilst the Porte’s acceptance to negotiate precluded the need for this drastic measure, the Bulgars, as early as July 1829, had quite independently begun a series of uprisings in many regions of Rumelia. News of the eventual Treaty of Adrianople did nothing to appease them, as they demanded independence or at least the granting of political rights similar to those enjoyed by Serbia and the Principalities. In September 1829, Mamarchev returned to Rumelia to organise this ‘spontaneous and uncoordinated [stikhinyi] national liberation movement’. Russia’s worst fears were realised the following April, when Mamarchev and his 500 volunteers began their insurrection.\(^{(96)}\) Having been dragged into a Turkish war as a result of the actions of small band of revolutionaries in 1821, the Russian authorities were in no mood to allow its repetition in 1830. Diebitsch ordered the insurgents to be disarmed whilst Mamarchev himself was captured and placed under house-arrest in Bucharest.\(^{(97)}\)

**Conclusion**

Russian policy towards the use of Balkan irregulars was subject to great change over the period of the war. Due to Nicholas’ desire to end the war as quickly as possible, the initial intention of avoiding the employment of irregular forces was progressively compromised to a point whereby towards the end of 1829, counting Pandours, Liprandi’s partisans and the Bulgars armed by Diebitsch, around 4,000 irregulars were found in the Russian service. In addition, Diebitsch was given full authority to raise an indefinite number of extra irregulars through the encouragement of revolts amongst the Bulgars and Serbs.

Whilst such developments were welcomed by most Russian commanders, one cannot but be struck by the somewhat contradictory attitude they continued to maintain regarding the irregulars. On the one hand, their undoubted military ability was prized, even admired; on the other, their character and motivation for assisting Russia was often questioned. In many quarters the irregulars were seen as nothing but adventurers, potential revolutionaries and, above all, freebooters. General P. F. Zheltukhin believed, for example,
that even the Pandours - the most experienced and disciplined of Russia's irregular troops, were motivated solely by 'a lust for booty, which they satisfy through the plunder of the enemy's possessions'. Deprived of such an opportunity, he believed the Pandours would think nothing of 'plundering their own lands', as had apparently occurred during the 1806-12 Russo-Turkish war. (98)

This said, the irregulars' conduct were generally good during the 1828-29 campaigns (though, as noted, less so afterwards) with only limited recorded instances of insubordination and desertion. In part, this was due to their genuine hatred of the enemy and affinity with Russian war aims, but primarily due their prudent organisation by the Russian army. The temptation to introduce unaccustomed 'regular'-style discipline was avoided. Instead, a close supervision of the irregulars was achieved through their attachment to regular Russian units. This, combined with the practice of recruiting for quality rather than quantity, allowed for the excesses associated with the irregulars of the 1806-12 war to be avoided.

The most far-reaching consequence of the successful experimentation with irregular troops was that it allowed Russia to implement its official policy of establishing a permanent zemskoe voisko in the Principalities. (99) Thus, in June 1829, Nicholas ordered that the number of Pandour battalions be raised to ten. After the war, these units were to perform the functions of a permanent standing militia. (100) Aside from acting as an internal police force, their role was to bar or at least disrupt any future Turkish occupation of the Principalities and act as an avant-garde for the Russian army in the event of a future war in the Balkans. (101) The existence of this force, which was to be organised by Russian officers, was also to forge the idea of a 'brotherhood- in-arms' between the two states and generally complement Russia's aim of turning the Principalities into a protectorate. At Adrianople, Diebitsch was able to secure the Porte's consent to Nicholas' proposal and legitimised the creation of a 'milice', charged, amongst other things, with the protection of 'la sûreté des frontières'. (102)

The realisation of this scheme was, however, temporarily hindered by the objections of Zheltukhin. He opposed the continued use of Pandours, both on the grounds of their supposed untrustworthiness and of the cost to the Principalities of maintaining such a permanent force. (103) Diebitsch, now somewhat unsure of how to progress, postponed the taking of any final decision. The existing Pandour units were to be retained but Kiselev was ordered to abandon the formation of the four new Pandour battalions in Greater Wallachia, (which was already half-way to completion). (104)
The replacement of Zheltukhin by Kiselev in October 1829 delivered no more clarity to the situation. Though the latter was, in principle, in favour of a Pandour force, deprived of funds and preoccupied with other more pressing matters, he took no positive action. Left in limbo and increasingly starved of supplies, the Pandours began to return to their homes. By December, over 250 had deserted their units. Increasingly concerned of this deteriorating situation, Kiselev sought a final decision from Diebitsch. The latter now ordered one half of the Pandour units to be disbanded, with the other retained, receiving supplies and payment from the budget of the Principalities. This was, in Diebitsch’s words, to be the ‘first step towards the regular organisation of this force’. (105) Influenced by Zheltukin’s fears of the unreliable nature of irregular forces (which probably corresponded to his own instinct), Diebitsch favoured the transformation of this ‘militia’ into a disciplined proto-regular army. In doing so, Diebitsch certainly reflected the opinion of a significant proportion of the Russian command. For it is clear from the proposals already mentioned above, that the introduction of regular elements to irregular forces had indeed been the first instinct of many (though not all) Russians commanders. Now that irregular forces were to be organised as a standing militia, it was difficult for the Russian military establishment to conceive of such a force as being anything other than a regular, or near-regular, ‘army’. The implementation of this ambitious plan, as well as the management of its unforeseen consequences, was left to the care of Kiselev during his tenure as President of the Principalities. (106)


(3) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 224, 232-33; Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 199-200. The situation in the Caucasus was, however, entirely different and during both the 1826-28 Persian war and 1828-29 Turkish war, the Russians raised Armenian, Azeri and Georgian militias, see Ushakov, Istoria, II, p. 294; Z. T. Grigorian, ‘Uchastie Armian v Russko-Persidskih voinakh nachala XIX veka’, VI, 1951, No.4, pp. 16-25; Z. T. Grigorian, Prisoedinenie vostochnoi Armeniia k Rossii v nachale XIX veka (Moscow, 1959), pp. 124-40; M. Ismailov, Ob uchastii azerbaidzhantsc v riadakh russkikh voisk v russko-iranskikh i russko-turetskih voinakh pervoi treti XIX v. (Baku, 1954); G. V. Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii, pp. 178-87. The distinction was that in the Caucasus, Russia had certain expansionist aims and needed local volunteers to supplement the understrength Caucasus Corps. Moreover, raising partisans in the Caucasus was less likely to excite the attention of other powers.


(5) Whilst the Serbian forces fought independently within their own Principality, up to 20,000 partisans/volunteers fought with the Russian army in 1806-12. These were comprised predominantly of Pandours under Tudor Vladimirescu and Bulgars, who, in 1811, were organised into a zemskoe voisko ['land militia'] by M. I. Kutuzov, Grosul, ‘Dobrovol’tsy’, pp. 15-16; Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 226, 234.

(6) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4651, ff.6-10v, Report of Kiselev, received 21 September 1827 OS; ibid., d.4395, Plan of P. K. Sukhtelen, 12 November 1826 OS, ff.1-6v; ibid, ff.112-18v, Plan of Buturlin, February 1822 OS; ibid., d.17967, f.1, Note of Diebitsch, 7 July 1821 OS; ibid., d.4483, ff.1-12v, Plan of Langerone, 6 May 1826 OS.

(7) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4414, ff.2-2v, Seniavin to A. I. Chernyshev, received 25 April 1828 OS. On Seniavin’s contacts with the Montenegrins, see E. Tarle, Ekspeditsii admiralra D. N. Seniavina v sredizemnom more (1805-1807 gg.) (Moscow, 1954).

(8) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4414, ff.3-6, Proposal of Seniavin, received 26 May 1828 OS.


(10) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.8-10v, Project of 17 February 1828 OS.

(11) Ibid., ff.11-12, ‘Note sur les Bulgares’, 29 February 1828 OS.

(12) Thus whilst Diebitsch issued orders from St Petersburg that the Second Army was to ‘refuse decisively’ all requests from volunteers to serve alongside the Russian army, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.20-32v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS, Wittgenstein believed that Russia’s ‘co-religionists’ should be permitted to join the ranks of
the regular army or be formed into independent partisan units and used 'in the outlying regions of enemy territory', *ibid*, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS.


(15) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.5, f.13, Diebitsch to Inzov, April 1828.

(16) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.1-1v, Pahlen to Wittgenstein. Pahlen was temporary acting Governor of Novorossiia and Bessarabia.

(17) VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 491, Proclamation of P. Kh. Wittgenstein, no earlier than 14 April 1828 OS.

(18) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.3, f.25, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 13 February 1828 OS.

(19) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.14-18v, Tuchkov to Kiselev, 22 April 1828 OS (with enclosed report dated 19 April OS).

(20) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.21-21v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, May 1828.

(21) *Ibid.*, ff.22-22v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 14 June 1828 OS.

(22) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 239; RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.11-11v, Langerone to Wittgenstein, 15 November 1828 OS.

(23) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.15, ff.6-6v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 14 June 1828 OS.


(25) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.15, ff.16-17, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 11 July 1828 OS. Sufficient numbers were not gathered until March of 1829, *ibid*, ff.113-114v, Breakdown of Regiments, (616 infantry men, 583 cavalry men). It appears the units were eventually used during the second campaign, *ibid*, ff.125-25v, Vorontsov to Diebitsch, 13 April 1828 OS.

(26) In the Russian documents Mamarchev was known by his pseudonym ‘Buiukli’, Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p.237.


(28) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.2, ff.143-43v, Report of Liprandi, 11 September 1828 OS.


(30) Wittgenstein eventually agreed to this measure, but insisted that the Pandours were not to be formally attached to Russian units, RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.79, d.92, ff.3-3v, Wittgenstein to Borozdin, 14 July 1828 OS. The Pandours, originally of Serbian extract, were a mountain tribe of Lesser Wallachia who had been used by Austria as light infantry in the eighteenth century, A. I. Granit, *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (Moscow, 7th edition), XXXI, p. 95. They were essentially paid mercenaries, not volunteers. For their services to the Russians they received five piastres per month, certain supplies and were exempted from taxation in the Principalities, RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.79, d.92, ff.5-6, Pahlen to Wittgenstein, 27 June 1828 OS. According to Liprandi, Aleksei’s unit also served with Geismar that year, RGVIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, f.16, ‘O partizanskoii voine’. As regards the total number of Balkan irregulars used in 1828, Konobeev’s figure of 550, counting the units of Mamarchev/Fokiiano, Milko, and Aleksei, pp. 243-44, may be exaggerated. Liprandi cites a total of 300, *ibid.*, ff. 14-16. Adding the Pandours gives a total of 450-700. In addition, the Balkan Christians assisted the Russian army through the furnishing of much intelligence on the position of Turkish units, see reports in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.2, *passim*.


(32) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 243. An equally good performance by the Pandours increased the Russians’ faith in them (which had been previously damaged by their
participation in Tudor Vladimirescu's revolt of 1821) and eased the acceptance of subsequent plans to increase their number. They were commanded in 1828 by K. Ghika, a former Junker in the Russian cavalry and the brother of the Wallachian Hospodars Gregory (ruled 1822-28) and Alexander (1834-42), RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.221, f.40, 'O partizanskoi voine', Liprandi.

(33) Aside from the return of the six Serbian provinces granted by the 1812 Bucharest Treaty, these included the right to establish a Serbian militia and the affirmation of Milosh as Serbia's hereditary ruler, VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 54-55, 649, Nesselrode to Milosh, 22 March 1827 OS.

(34) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.1, Geismar to A. F. Langerone (Commander of Russian forces in the Principalities), 14 August 1828 OS (no folio numbers were available for this file).

(35) Ibid., d.4476, ch.3, ff.205-05v, Milosh to Geismar, 10 October 1828 OS.

(36) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, f.14, 'O partizanskoi voine', by Liprandi.


(38) Karageorge (1768-1817) was the leader of the first Serbian revolt of 1804-13 and in 1808 he proclaimed himself ruler of Serbia. Fearing Turkish reprisals after the end of the revolt, Karageorge fled to Austria and then Bessarabia. The Sultan proceeded to proclaim Milosh Obrenovich as ruler of Serbia and when Karageorge returned home in 1817 he was assassinated, Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 48-50.

(39) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.3, ff.197, Nesselrode to Langerone, 12 October 1828 OS.

(40) Ibid., ff.197-97v.

(41) Ibid., ff.182-83v, Langerone to Wittgenstein, 21 October 1828 OS. Geismar's support of Milko was in no way diminished by the arrival of Milosh's proposal. Forced into playing a double game to please both protagonists, Geismar informed Milosh of Milko's dismissal (ibid., f.203, Geismar to Milosh, 2 November 1828 OS) though it is clear that the latter's force had merely been temporarily disbanded and moved away from the Serbian border. Geismar fully intended to use the force in the following campaign and requested that they be paid during the intervening period, ibid., d.4723, Langerone to Diebitsch, 15 November 1828 OS (no folio numbers were available for this file). The men were awarded two chervontsy each and Milko put on captain's pay, ibid., Report on Milko Petrovich, 24 March 1829 OS. According to this document Milko had 100 men, not 150-200 as atated in Konobeev, 'Dvizhenie', p. 243.

(42) Ibid., d.4476, ch.3, f.204, Milosh to Geismar, 16 October 1828 OS.

(43) VPR II/VIII, 1994, p. 565, Milosh to Nesselrode, 5 November 1828 OS.

(44) See above, p. 173.


(46) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4718, ff.1-6v, Jomini to Nicholas I, 8 January 1829 OS. The Tsar himself had no intention of making Serbia independent.

(47) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4723, Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 25 January 1829 OS.

(48) Ibid., d.4699, ff.99-100v, 106-110v, Plans of 26 October 1828 OS and 8 January 1829 OS.

(49) Ibid., d.4723, Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 25 January 1829 OS.

(50) Ibid., Geismar to Kiselev, 6 February 1829 OS. Nesselrode believed that the agreement, if it existed, was signed on the Austrian side by a private company and not the Government. Whatever the case, the interception of these supplies was 'not in contravention of the general rules of war' and therefore permissible, ibid., Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 12 March 1829 OS. It appears that Austrian boats were used to supply the Turkish fortresses in early 1829. They were (unsuccessfully) shelled by Russian artillery, ibid., Geismar to Pahlen, 3 April 1829 OS.

(51) Epanchin, Ocherk, II, p. 81.
(52) Neither Diebitsch' letter nor Nesselrode's report have been discovered, though their existence is clear from RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4723, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 16 February 1829 OS. Diebitsch' opposition was probably due to the fact that as Commander-in-Chief he would be responsible for negotiating the eventual peace treaty and did not want this process complicated by Serbian demands. He was at this time also becoming quite distrustful of Milosh, see above, pp. 209-10.

(53) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4723, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 16 February 1829 OS.

(54) Ibid., d.4731, ff.1-3v, Report of Vorontsov, November 1828.

(55) Ibid., ff.4-4v, Diebitsch to Vorontsov, 19 November 1828 OS.

(56) Ibid., ff.5-5v, Wittgenstein to Nicholas I, 28 November 1828 OS.

(57) Ibid., ff.9-11. The document is anonymous and undated. Judging from its position in the file it was written in December 1828, probably by Wittgenstein.

(58) Ibid., ff.12-12v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 15 January 1829 OS. Vorontsov's plan was discarded.

(59) Ibid., ff.13-16, Diebitsch to A. I. Chernyshev, 20 February 1829 OS.

(60) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.367, ff.1-9, ‘O neobkhodimosti sostavit' korpus partizanov na pravom beregu Dunaia’, 10 January 1829 OS. Liprandi seems to have acquired this idea from a study of the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish war, during which General P. A. Rumiantsev formed ‘flying units’ [letuchie otriady] of Balkan partisans to supplement his small regular force, ibid., f.3; ibid., d.222, f.4, ‘O partizanskoii voine’, by Liprandi.


(62) A total of 4,550 men, ibid., d.367, f.10, Liprandi to Kiselev, 6 February 1829 OS.

(63) See above, p. 93.

(64) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.14, ff.19-19v, Diebitsch to Liprandi, 20 March 1829 OS.

(65) Liprandi, Osobennosti, p. 95.

(66) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.38, d.67, ff.3-7, Plan of 19 September 1828 OS.


(68) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.11/182a, sv.38, d.67, f.2, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 28 November 1828 OS.

(69) The Pandours were supplied with weapons taken from horse-chasseur and dragoon regiments, RGVIA, fond, 14058, op.1/184a, sv.99, d.14, ff.1-2v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 6 January 1830 OS.

(70) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4822, f.36, ‘Military-History Journal of Units in Lesser Wallachia, 1829’. Pahlen had lately been appointed Russia's 'President' [predsedatel'] of the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia and was responsible for the defence of the Principalities.

(71) Ibid., d.4711, ff.3-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 7 April 1829 OS.

(72) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 174-76. Their activity is documented in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4822, ff.28-149 passim, ‘Military-History Journal of Units in Lesser Wallachia, 1829’.

(73) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.126-26v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 23 September 1829 OS.

(74) Ibid., ff.77-78, Geismar to Diebitsch, 7 March 1829 OS; ff.93-93v, P. F. Zheltukhin to Diebitsch, 1 April 1829 OS.
(75) Following the end of the war, Fokiiano joined the Wallachian *zemskoe voisko* created by Kiselev, RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, f. 15v-16, ‘O partizanskoj voine’, Liprandi.


(77) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4723, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 30 January 1829 OS.

(78) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, f. 108, Official Note to Milko, May 1829 OS.

(79) Ibid., ff.67-67v, Langerone to Kiselev, 19 February 1829 OS; ff.112, Milko to Diebitsch, 22 May 1829 OS.

(80) Ibid., sv.801, d.102, ff.1-1v, Police report, 19 June 1829 OS; ff.2-2v, Letter to Milko, 20 June 1829 OS; ff.4-6v, Toll to Kiselev, 20 June 1829 OS.


(82) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, ff. 11-16v, ‘O partizanskoj voine’, Liprandi; RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.14, ff.35-36, Liprandi to Toll, 28 April 1829 OS. The partisans were awarded exemption from taxation in the Principalities but were given no formal payment.

(83) Ibid., ff.50-51v, K. F. Toll to Liprandi, 9 May 1829.

(84) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, f. 13v, 18, ‘O partizanskoj voine’. Liprandi was so adamant that his partisan project should succeed that he spent 3,548 roubles of his own money on their formation. After the war he requested reimbursement from the army, RGIA, fond 673, op.2, d.6, ff.27v-28v, Liprandi ‘Tainye poruchenija, avgust 1827-avgust 1829’, 29 June 1831 OS.

(85) The most detailed account of their activity is in *ibid.*, op.1, d.222, ff. 18v-108v.

Extracts have been published in Liprandi, *Osobennosti*, pp. 91-109, passim.

(86) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.104, d.1a, ff.5-6v, Diebitsch to Nesselrode, 7 March 1829 OS.


(88) ‘Imperator’, *RS*, XXXII, 1881, p. 563, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 16 May 1829 OS.

(89) See above, pp. 176-77.

(90) This explains his earlier interest in Shostak’s proposal.

(91) ‘Imperator’, *RS*, XXXII, 1881, pp. 566-67, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 17 May 1829 OS. At this stage, Diebitsch proposed that all Bulgars who took up arms on the side of Russia were to be resettled in the Dobrudja region at the end of the war (no doubt in place of the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy who were to be resettled in Russia), *ibid.*, p. 567. This plan was never executed and, instead, thousands of Bulgars (including a great many that did not take up arms during the war) were resettled in Bessarabia, see below, pp. 237-38 (footnote 71).


(94) See above, p. 177.


(97) Meshcheriuk, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp.137-38; RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.222, ff. 15-15v, ‘O partizanskoj voine’. Mamarchev subsequently escaped and attempted another insurrection in 1833. He was again captured by the Russians, handed over to the Porte and exiled to Asiatic Turkey, *ibid*.

(98) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.119-121, Zheltukhin to Diebitsch, 19 September 1829 OS. (In early 1829, Zheltukhin replaced Pahlen as President of the Divans and was *de facto* ruler of the Principalities). Sentiments similar to those of Zheltukhin were expressed by foreign observers such as E. L. Blutte, Britain’s consul in Wallachia. He believed that the Pandours, if left unsupervised by the Russians, would have ‘pass[ed] over
to the enemy...allured by the prospect of regular pay', PRO FO 97/402, f.34, Blutte to Cowley, 27 March 1829. Blutte believed the other (non-Pandour) irregulars of 1828-29 were nothing other than ‘banditti’, who had remained in the Principalities after serving with Ypsilantis during his revolt of 1821, ibid., ff.38-38v, Blutte to Cowley, 12 June 1829. Liprandi’s own opinion was that Milko, Mamarchev and other volunteers were, at best mercenaries, at worst brigands, RGVIA, 673, op.1, d.222, ff.13-15v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’ - a view substantiated by the events that followed the close of the war. On 2 December 1829 OS, Liprandi’s partisans were formally disbanded. Subsequently, in March 1830, Kiselev ordered that all former volunteers hand in their weapons to the Russian authorities and either leave the Principalities or join the appropriate estate [soslovie] and take up gainful employment, Grosul, Reformy, pp. 179, 228. This evidently put the volunteers in a difficult position; unwilling to give up their hitherto adventurous lifestyle and settle down as civilians, they turned (probably returned) to a life of crime. Thus, in May 1830, Blutte could report that for some weeks, the roads in Wallachia had been ‘infested by bands of robbers, chiefly runaway Albanians and Bulgarians, heretofore composing the volunteer corps of Colonel Liprandi...they have carried their insolence so far as to approach even the gates of Bucharest, which is said to be the centre of their organisation’, PRO, FO 97/402, f.257v, Blutte to Cowley, 21 May 1830. Fortunately, their activity soon ceased, FO 97/403, f.10, Blutte to Cowley, 23 July 1830. All this evidence casts doubt on Soviet perception of the Balkan irregulars as selfless freedom fighters. The ideas entertained in Konobeev’s ‘Dvizhenie’ are, in this respect, especially forced. In a somewhat crude application of Marx’s theory on the origins of nationalism, Konobeev argues that the volunteers of 1828-29 were somehow an expression of the Bulgaria’s capitalist development and its growing native bourgeoisie. The volunteers of Mamarchev, Fokiiano and Milko are deemed ‘sons of the Bulgar people’, and their participation in the war said to signal the progression of the ‘nationalist movement’ to the stage of the ‘armed struggle’, pp. 224-26, 240, 243. Konobeev’s thesis is open to two major criticisms. First, the volunteer groups were, by Konobeev’s own admission, multi-national in composition, pp. 237-43. Moreover, of their leaders, only Mamarchev was a Bulgar proper. Fokiiano was Moldavian, (RGVIA, 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.79-80, Begidov (no initial) to Geismar, 6 March 1829 OS), and Milko, though Bulgar by birth, was clearly more interested in his adopted homeland of Serbia. There is no evidence that, with the exception of Mamarchev, any of the volunteers considered themselves Bulgarian nationalists. A more convincing argument is that the volunteers were analogous to the Greek Klephti (mountain brigands) fighting for the dual reasons of a genuine hatred of Turkish rule and a quest for booty, probably often seeing no distinction between the two. Secondly, whilst in this period there clearly existed an (albeit underdeveloped) specific Bulgar national consciousness and that certain politically conscious Bulgars translated this into concrete political demands, (see evidence in ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 244-47, 269-70), it is far from certain that such ideas were entertained by the Bulgar population at large. Living side by side with a significant Greek population as well as other Christians of various ethnicity, the Bulgars sense of identity was perhaps grounded more in religious than ethnic or national terms, especially as this served as a common bond, uniting them in opposition to their infidel oppressors. There is evidence for this in the organisation and aims of a secret society discovered by the Russian army in 1831. This revolutionary movement was founded by a number of volunteer-veterans of the 1828-29 war in response to the failure of the treaty of Adrianople to assign political status and rights to the Bulgars and ‘Macedonians’. Its 600 members were of various ethnicity - some were Bulgars, others ‘Macedonians’ and its leader, a certain Grifon Davitskii, appears to have been a Macedonian Serb (‘Macedonia’ was, of course, merely a geographically expression, containing sizeable populations of Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs and other Balkan nationalities, Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 268-69). The movement was essentially panslavic and anti-Islamic. On their banners they inscribed a poem (in Serbian) which
implored Nicholas to ‘free the Christians’ and to ‘deliver us from eternal hell’. Their aim had been to gather 1,000 men at Voznisinskii monastery and attack Shumla in March-April 1830. They may well have had connections with Mamarchev, though the documents are unclear on this point. The society continued operating until at least August 1830, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1072, ff.19-24v, 63-63v, 66-66v, 81-83, 86-89v, 113-117, 123-126, Reports to Kiselev, March-April 1831 OS.

(99) The idea was first forwarded by various Boyars in the early 1820s, Grosul, Reformy, pp. 132-40, passim. It was adopted by Russia in 1826 during the negotiations for the Convention of Akkerman, VPR II/VI, 1985, p. 841, Instructions to M. S. Vorontsov and A. I. Ribbeaufier, 9 June 1826 OS.

(100) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff. 119-21, Zheltukhin to Diebitsch, 19 September 1829 OS. The four new battalions were to be raised in Greater Wallachia and were to consist of a total of 1,600 men and 196 officers, PRO, FO 97/402, ff.54-56v, Blutte to Cowley, 19 July 1829.

(101) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 233-34.

(102) VPR II/VIII, 1994, p. 271, Separate Act relating to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, 2 September 1829 OS.

(103) A ten-battalion force was said to cost 400,000 piastres per annum in wages alone. Moreover, the policy of exempting the families of serving Pandours from taxation would deprive the Principalities’ budget of some 300,000 piastres, RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff. 119-21, Zheltukhin to Diebitsch, 19 September 1829 OS.

(104) Ibid., ff. 126-26v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 23 September 1829 OS; ff.124, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 28 September 1829 OS.

(105) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.148-49, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, December 1829.

(106) This subject is discussed below, pp. 257-62.
VIII. THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Upon the capture of Adrianople, Diebitsch outlined his ideas on further operations. In command of a strike force of only 25,000 men, he considered an assault on Constantinople (with its 600,000 Muslim population) impossible. Thus, instead, he planned to advance to Chorlu and then capture the Dardanelles, whilst the Russian forces north of the Balkans were to attempt to capture as many Danubian fortresses as possible, as well as Shumla. If this had no effect on the Porte then, as noted, preparations were to be made to arm the Serbs and Bulgars for a third campaign the following Spring. For reasons not entirely clear, Diebitsch now believed that as long as Russia did itself not make great annexations, the other Powers would not fear the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In its place, ‘trois ou quatres Royaumes’ were to be created and placed under a general European guarantee.

The preservation of the Sultan’s Empire through conclusion of a peace treaty remained, however, Diebitsch’s primary aim. As early as June 1829, following the Battle of Kulevcha, attempts had been made to begin negotiations. These continued throughout July, with the Russian envoy Prince V. G. Madatov urging the Vizier to treat, adding, significantly, that for the Sultan’s long term security, ‘it was more beneficial to be in a firm and constant alliance with Russia’. The Turks, however, delayed and their plenipotentiaries arrived at Adrianople only on 17 August OS.

Nesselrode had already furnished Diebitsch with Russia’s minimum and maximum demands. The Sultan’s acceptance of the treaties of Akkerman and London (6 July 1827) and the London Protocol of 22 March 1829 was considered a sine qua non of peace, as was a guarantee of the free passage for Russian commercial ships through the Straits and the payment of a trade and war indemnity. In addition, Diebitsch was to secure (in separate acts) demands relating to the political structure of the Principalities and gain for Serbia the territory she had been granted by the Porte in the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest but had never actually received. The maximum demands related almost exclusively to territorial annexations on the Asiatic frontier. These had increased steadily during the war due to the victories in the Caucasus and the forthright demands of Paskevich himself. The obvious inability of the Sultan to pay the full indemnity increased pressure on Nesselrode to accept territory in lieu of part of this sum. The annexation projects ranged from the cession of the Pashalik of Akhalsykh (with the towns of Atskhur, Akhalkalaki, Ardahan and Akhalsykh), Anapa and Poti to a maximum demand of annexing, in addition, Batum, Adzharia (or ‘Turkish Guria’), the Pashalik of Kars and even the Pashalik of Bayezid. There were to
be no annexations in the Balkans, with the possible exception of the Danubian delta, ostensibly for the creation of a cordon sanitaire.

Following the arrival of Diebitsch's diplomatic aides, A. F. Orlov and F. P. Pahlen, the first formal conference with the Turkish negotiators was held on 21 August OS. The main causes of Turkish dissent concerned the war indemnity and the territorial demands in the Caucasus. Diebitsch was willing to compromise on the latter issue since as the Turks considered these provinces, far more than their European, their 'true inheritance', obtaining cessions here would prove very difficult. More fundamentally, however, Diebitsch disagreed with Paskevich over the very principle of expansion in the East. Citing the experience of Rome and Britain, he believed that 'annexations in Asia inevitably lead from one province to the next', thus unnecessarily extending the frontier and forcing Russia to commit more troops for the defence of the region. Paskevich's idea of augmenting his force with large numbers of local Caucasian tribesmen was also opposed by Diebitsch, as the latter's loyalty was deemed questionable in the event of a future unsuccessful campaign. At bottom, one suspects however, that the conflict between Nicholas' two favourites was perhaps less to do with strategy and more to do with their own personal struggle for power and influence. Paskevich had a vested interest in empire-building in the East as this would strengthen the role and importance of the Caucasus Corps and thus of his own institutional power-base. Diebitsch was undoubtedly aware of this and was in no mood to act as accomplice to his own rival.

As regards the war indemnity, Diebitsch was willing to allow its payment in instalments over a number of years, during which period, Russia was, by way of guarantee, to occupy the Danubian Principalities and Silistria. He considered annexing the Principalities outright in return for a reduction in the indemnity but, as he had no explicit authority to do so, he was forced to abandon the idea. As a rule, Diebitsch made it clear that he preferred money to land and refused to seek territorial compensation in Asia unless the Turks offered this themselves (which was most unlikely). Following a second conference on 22 August OS, the Turkish negotiators left for consultations with the Sultan. Diebitsch set 1 September OS as the final date he would accept a response and, in the meantime, was to push units towards the capital and the Dardanelles. This latter measure was supported by the Tsar, who was adamant that 'unwanted guests' should be barred from intervening in the treaty negotiations. Should a foreign fleet attempt to pass the Dardanelles, Diebitsch was authorised to respond 'par des coups de canon'.


The Sultan did, however, consent to the Russian terms and, following more brief negotiations, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed on 2 September 1829 OS. The treaty secured the Porte’s acceptance of the allied treaties regarding the establishment of an autonomous Greece (art.X), the cession to Serbia of the territory granted in 1812 (art. VI) as well as a Separate Act granting extensive rights to the Principalities. In addition, Russian merchants were granted full freedom of trade throughout the Ottoman Empire and, more importantly still, the Straits were opened up to the vessels of all nations trading with Russia (art.VII). This brought to near completion the process, begun in 1774, of internationalising the Black Sea. Before that date the Sultan considered the Euxine his personal possession - a ‘virgin shut up in the harem’, impenetrable to strangers. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, Russia had gained the right for her own commercial vessels to navigate these waters and pass the Straits. This right was gradually awarded to other powers and now, in 1829, it had become the right of all nations. Article VII was silent, for some ominously so, on the question of the passage of war ships. This led to the suspicion that Russia, by means of a secret article or verbal agreement, had acquired the right to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This interpretation has, correctly, been denied. Although in the course of 1828, Russia, as noted, aimed to secure the right for her war ships to pass the Bosphorus (though not the Dardanelles, which had aggressive implications against Britain), this war aim appears to have been dropped the following year - probably for fear of future British reprisals. No document relating to its discussion at Adrianople has ever been discovered. There are really only two possibilities, either a demand was made but refused, or, more probably, the matter was not raised at all.

As regards the Caucasian frontier, Diebitsch secured the Turks’ recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over the provinces annexed during the 1806-12 war and, in addition, gained Poti, Anapa, Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki and Atskhur (art.IV). This served to lessen the Porte’s influence over the Muslim Caucasian tribes as well as securing both entrances of the Borjomi pass. The controversial aspect of the article concerned a passage stating that the East coast of the Black Sea between the Kuban and the port of St Nicholas (populated by the volatile Circassian tribes) ‘demeureront à perpétuité sous la domination de l’Empire de Russie’. Having just resolved one Caucasian border dispute arising from the misleading wording of the Bucharest Treaty, Diebitsch was to create another.

The only territory annexed in the Balkans was the Danubian Delta. Nominally, it was intended for use as a quarantine and could not be fortified (art.II). Far from being a minor acquisition, however, the possession of the delta allowed Russia the potential to
exert great control over the Danube and its commercial traffic. This served to defeat
Austria’s long-held aim of acquiring the delta for itself for the protection of her most valuable
trading route. (18)

The trade and war indemnity were fixed at 1.5m and 10m ducats respectively and the
Principalities and Silistria were to be occupied until they were paid. This occupation allowed
Russia full liberty to reform the administrative system of the Principalities according to its
own wishes. (19)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

At the beginning of September OS, as yet unsure of the outcome of the Adrianople
negotiations, Nicholas and his advisers in St Petersburg were considering their response to
all possible eventualities. Bolstered by diplomatic reports from London that Wellington’s
Cabinet was resigned to the fall of Constantinople, Nicholas was in confident mood. (20) On
1 September OS (the final date which Diebitsch was prepared to await a Turkish response)
Nicholas instructed his General to occupy the Dardanelles and march on the capital if peace
had not been signed. Knowing well that Diebitsch regarded this course of action as
unfeasible, the Tsar urged, ‘ne faites pas attention à votre peu de force numérique, elle est
plus que compensé par votre force morale’. Suspecting that Britain and France were
considering sending part of their fleet to Constantinople, Diebitsch was again instructed to
ensure that this passage through the Dardanelles was not permitted. (21) In fact, unknown to
Nicholas, both Wellington and Polignac had, after some consideration, already refused this
option. However, Sir Robert Gordon, the new Turcophile British ambassador to the Porte
had, quite independently, already brought the British fleet to the mouth of the Dardanelles (it
arrived on 19 August OS). Two days earlier he proposed to the Sultan that it should also pass
the Straits ‘for the preservation of tranquillity’. (22)

Had the Sultan accepted Gordon’s offer and, buttressed by this show of British
support, refused to sign a peace, how great was the possibility of Anglo-Russian hostilities?
A clash at the Straits may certainly be ruled out, as prior to mid-September OS, Diebitsch
was in no position to prevent its passage by the British fleet. (23) The latter would have
arrived at Constantinople unmolested, but what then? Gordon’s idea was to ‘prevent the fall
of this capital’, but was himself unsure how this was to occur:

If the Russians had possession of the Dardanelles and our seven sail of
the line were in the Archipelago, then they might have remained there
without a chance of being able to interfere.
In retrospect, he admitted that the whole plan to have been ‘worse than useless’. (24) Aberdeen, expressed similar sentiments, hypothesising that once in the Sea of Marmora, the British ships would be in a ‘rat trap’, from which it would have been, ‘difficult to extricate themselves without the good pleasure of Zabalkanski’. (25) Thus it seems clear that the British fleet would have remained at Constantinople as a mere demonstration but certainly not have undertaken any hostilities.

The question that has occupied most minds, however, is whether Diebitsch and his 25,000 man force were in fact in a position to capture Constantinople at all. The official Tsarist version is that he undoubtedly could - the implication being that the Sultan was henceforth eternally indebted to the Tsar for the existence of his Empire. (26) The most detailed enquiry on the subject, however, has cast great doubt on Diebitsch’s chances. (27) Diebitsch himself believed that a storming of the capital was impossible and that his only (faint) chance was to bluff an attack on Constantinople in the hope of precipitating a panic-stricken revolution. (28)

Whatever the truth, Russia had to be prepared for any outcome and to this end an Extraordinary Committee was established by Nicholas. Convened on 4 September 1829 OS its members were Counts V. P. Kochubei, P. A. Tolstoi, Nesselrode and A. I. Chernyshev, Prince A. N. Golitsyn and Russia’s foremost expert on Turkish affairs D. V. Dashkov. (29) The committee considered the options available to Russia should Constantinople fall (news of the treaty of Adrianople had not yet arrived). Since Russia did not require more territory, large unilateral annexations as well as a partition were ruled out - the latter being more advantageous to the other Powers than Russia. (30) The creation of a Balkan confederation, tied to Russia through religious and ethnic affinity, seemed the only solution. (31) The dominant issue, however, was not the future political organisation of the Balkan Christians but the ownership of the Straits.

First and foremost Russia required security - that the war ships of no Power could pass the Straits. This, in fact, was the current regime, as affirmed in article XI of the 1809 Anglo-Turkish Treaty. It was believed that as long as it remained in force, the treaty answered Russia’s most basic security interest - to keep the Straits (especially the Bosphorus) closed to Britain, Russia’s most powerful rival. (32) If Russia could gain the unilateral right for her war ships to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles then she would, of course, acquire a great strategic advantage over Britain. However, such a regime had essentially offensive implications and would make Britain Russia’s implacable enemy. This did not worry some Russian diplomats such as M. N. Bulgari, who, in a hawkish report to
the committee, forwarded a number of proposals designed to precipitate ‘la décadence de l’Angleterre’. Constantinople (with the Straits) was be transformed into a free city under Russian patronage. Russia would then use her influence to gain control of the Straits, throw them open to her war ships and, together with an enlarged and pro-Russian Greece, offer a direct challenge to Britain’s naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. The more sober Dashkov, however, was sure that if Russia gained exclusive control over the Straits she would face a war with Europe and thus Bulgari’s idea was rejected by the committee.

An alternative idea of placing the Straits under the control of a newly-created Balkan confederation was also considered by the committee but ultimately rejected. Such a state would not be strong enough to resist the influence of other Powers and, as it would be continually at war with the Asiatic remnants of the Ottoman Empire, there was no guarantee that it hold on to the Straits indefinitely. Transforming Constantinople into a truly independent free city was likewise unsatisfactory as it would become the permanent focus of all the intrigues of the European powers. The final solution was for Russia to annex or assume a protectorate over the Straits by the consent of the other Powers. This was also rejected as their agreement was most unlikely and the price Russia would pay enormous - for Austria, France and Britain would demand as compensation the entire Ottoman Empire in Europe. Unable to find a viable alternative solution, the committee reaffirmed the status quo - as Dashkov argued, the Straits, ‘if not under the Russian sceptre, should remain under the control of the Muslim’. For all the Porte’s stubbornness, the fact remained that Turkey was an ‘Etat faible’, over which Russia could exercise great control and ensure that the 1809 regime remained in force. The final verdict was thus: ‘les avantages du maintien de l’Empire Ottoman en Europe sont supérieurs aux inconvénients qu’il présente’. To this end, Diebitsch was to be ordered to continue to seek negotiation with the Sultan even if he had already fled the capital to Asia Minor. Should this still fail to produce a treaty, a European Congress was to be held in St Petersburg to determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Russia would not seek to determine this question unilaterally as this would almost certainly lead to ‘une guerre générale en Europe’. However, in order to strengthen Russia’s position at the negotiating table, the committee was bold enough to agree that Diebitsch should occupy Constantinople, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus until the powers arrived at a final solution to the crisis.

It should be clear that the decision taken by the September Committee in no sense constituted a ‘new policy’, as Kerner and others believed. Almost thirty years after forming his idea of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy under Alexander I, Kochubei witnessed its
reaffirmation by the new Tsar. Thus when news of the peace of Adrianople arrived in St Petersburg the sense of euphoria was understandable. The treaty - through its strategic annexations and extension of Russia's commercial and political rights - served to weaken the Ottoman Empire whilst preserving its existence, thus complementing perfectly the committee's decision.

As for the consequences of Adrianople for European diplomacy, Heytesbury correctly predicted that 'we must be prepared ere long to see the Emperor of Russia assume the novel character of Friend, Ally, and Protector of the Ottoman Empire'. His reasoning was that:

From all that has occurred during the present war, the Russian Government has acquired the clearest conviction, that under the present circumstances of the world, the conquest of Turkey is impossible. That the attempt would be followed by a war with the whole of Europe, which war [sic] it would be impossible for Russia to sustain...it is evident that the next most advantageous arrangement for Russia must be a state so weak and impotent, as to be entirely in her dependence. This dependence is effectively secured by the Treaty of Adrianople. The Turkish Sultan will probably be as submissive hereafter to the orders of the Czar, as any of the Princes of India to those of the Company, and the Russian Minister be as powerful at Constantinople, as the Russian Minister was at Warsaw before the partition.

In London, Wellington shared Heytesbury's fear that the Ottoman Empire was now a Russian protectorate and would have preferred Diebitsch to have actually taken Constantinople. However, both Europe and the Russian Government itself overestimated Russia's long-term ability to control the Porte. The latter saw compromise and agreement with Russia, both in 1829 and more spectacularly in 1833, as nothing other than a short-term expediency to ensure survival. The key premise of the 'weak neighbour' policy - that Russia could displace permanently Britain as the Sultan's most favoured partner and ally - was in fact highly contentious. F. P. Fonton, one of Diebitsch's diplomatic aides at Adrianople, believed like many that Russia could never achieve this aim, and, as a result, there could be no guarantee of keeping the Straits closed to Britain:

We flatter ourselves with the hope that the Porte will become more obedient and submissive as it becomes weaker. One cannot acquire friendship through fear....Do you think that one can rely on the Porte not to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus if England promises to return her the Crimea?
Fonton’s point had much validity. The 1809 regime only obliged the Porte to keep the Straits closed if she remained neutral. There was nothing to prevent her from joining Britain in alliance against Russia and then opening them.

This flaw in the ‘weak neighbour’ policy had grave implications for Russian military strategy. For the army’s successes in 1828-29 had been made possible only through the absence of Austrian and in particular, British political and military support for the Porte. Gordon had been musing over this very point since his arrival at Constantinople in the summer of 1829. He correctly surmised that, for reasons of supply alone, a Balkan crossing was dependent upon Russia’s naval mastery of the Black Sea (he considered it impossible to stretch a magazine chain across the mountains). The implications this was to have for British strategy were as follows:

In truth it was but the want of a vestige of support that originally disheartened the Turks and opened up the passes of the Balkans. Sir Malcolm [the British admiral] would have with ease passed into the Black Sea and destroyed Greig’s fleet and perhaps occupied Burgas and Sizopol....The communication and supplies with Odessa and in fact with Russia would have been cut off and I am ready to maintain that no foreign army can exist long in Rumelia without communication from the sea....It is my opinion that should England at any time go to war with Russia and the seat of war is to be in Turkey, you ought to take to have a British fleet on this side of the Dardanelles. This alone can save and effectually will save the Porte from utter destruction whilst Russia will be attacked in the only quarter in which She is...vulnerable.(49)

Gordon’s thesis, which so closely prefigured British strategy during the Crimean War, was thus Britain’s answer to Russia’s innovative new strategy of the Balkan crossing.(50) Britain’s counter-strategy came however as no great surprise to the Russians. A year earlier, Pozzo had confidently predicted that in a future war with Britain, the latter would concentrate its attacks on the Crimea and Sevastopol.(51) The obvious means of pre-empting this was by the permanent closure of the Straits. Having rejected the option of the latter’s annexation or internationalisation, the means chosen to achieve this was a perpetual alliance with the Porte. It was presumed that this alliance would be firm enough to preclude the need for future Russo-Turkish hostilities and thus, by consequence, the threat of British intervention. Should an Anglo-Russian war nevertheless break out, Russia’s dominance over its weakened Eastern neighbour would be sufficient to ensure its neutrality and the closure of the Straits. British diplomats disputed both these premises and thus the scene was set for a decades-long Anglo-Russian struggle for influence at Constantinople.
Although Diebitsch had forced upon the Porte the acceptance of the principle of allied mediation in Greek affairs, the precise arrangements regarding the establishment of a Greek state were still to be determined. The first significant development was a call by Wellington to establish a fully independent Greece, as opposed to mere autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. He feared the latter would place Greece under the perpetual patronage of Russia. In return, Greece was to be awarded the less favourable Aspropotamus-Zeitoun border.

Faced with Britain's growing antagonism towards the gradual dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, Nicholas agreed and, in addition, gave Britain first choice on the question of Greece's first sovereign. (52)

Wellington's fears were in fact well founded. In the instructions given to Russia's new diplomatic representative to Greece, L. Pototskii, the aim of transforming Greece into a de facto Russian protectorate was made clear. Russia was to take a leading role in the establishment of the key institutions of the Greek state to secure her own influence there and combat the designs of Britain. An independent Greek national Church was to be established by the assistance of Greek ecclesiastical leaders currently residing in Russia. The new sovereign was to be persuaded to adopt the Greek faith so tempering then severing his possible allegiance to other Powers. These two measures would 'lay and then strengthen the foundation of the religious influence of Russia'. Commercial ties between the two states were to be strengthened by the use of Greek shipping for the transportation of Novorossia's grain exports. In foreign affairs, Russia would act as the patron of Greece in its future disputes with the Porte. (53) Finally, Greeks in the Russian military service were to assist in the formation of Greece's first regular army. (54)

Ultimately, Greece - whether autonomous (as Russia initially favoured) or independent - was, in Sturdza's words, to become Russia's 'useful ally' in the Mediterranean.

Russian attempts to allay British suspicions by accommodating some of her demands, were, however, increasingly disturbed by Capodistrias, who urged Nicholas to adopt an even more forward policy. He requested that Russia demand the inclusion of Crete and Samos into the Greek state and, under the guise of an allied guarantee of these islands, devised a plan to 'légitimer une station navale russe dans l'Archipel'. (55) He opposed Britain's nominee for sovereign, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, deeming him 'l'instrument passif de la politique du cabinet de St James' (56) and schemed successfully to dissuade Leopold from accepting the throne. (57)
A final settlement was however postponed for over two years as the attention of Europe was dominated by the revolutionary events of 1830/31. When the allied conferences over Greece renewed in 1832 the political landscape had changed greatly. The fall of Wellington in November 1830 and the assassination of Capodistrias a year later, had removed the two greatest obstacles to a compromise settlement. The previous proposal of the Arta-Volo boundary was now accepted and by the Convention of London (7 May 1832) the modern Greek state was brought into existence. (58)

It would take but a few years to observe the validity of Wellington’s and Metternich’s thesis that an independent Greece would be less prone to Russian influence. Following Capodistrias’ assassination, the power of the pro-Russian party in Greece became progressively undermined by pro-British and pro-French factions. When it was decided that a regency was to be created for the new seventeen-year-old sovereign, Otto of Bavaria, these latter factions were able to dominate nation’s political and administrative apparatus. Otto’s subsequent refusal to convert to the Orthodox religion was a symbolic assurance of Greece’s future pro-Western orientation. (59)

It was of some irony that the one aspect of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy that really did have validity - that Russian influence in the Balkans was better served by the emerging Balkan nations remaining under Turkish sovereignty - was, with disastrous results, discarded over Greece. Semi-autonomous Balkan states would be more dependent upon Russia, looking to her for assistance in their relations with the Porte. In contrast, fully independent Balkan states would, in Nesselrode’s fateful words, ‘not hesitate to compete with us for power, civilisation, industry and wealth’. (60) Freed from a dependency upon Russia, the latter were also more prone to fall under the influence of other powers. This was especially true with regard to Greece, which by virtue of its geographical position and maritime tradition, invited British influence. This threat was not unnoticed - as Pototskii’s instructions read, ‘Russia would prefer Greece to remain under the Ottoman yoke than be added to the long list of British colonies’. (61) Russia’s unwillingness to resist Wellington’s demand for Greek independence assured that the prophesy was, to a significant degree, fulfilled. This loss of influence and prestige in the Balkans was to be repeated later in the century following the creation of the independent Rumanian and Bulgarian nations. Even Serbia, the supposed influence in the Balkans, was often to find her national interests at odds with those of Russia once independent. (62) The ultimate irony was that Russia, in fulfilling her supposed ‘historical mission’ of liberating the Balkan Christians, succeeded in working against her own true interests. (63)
The Russian attempt to revise the Adrianople Treaty began almost immediately upon its signature. Though pleased by the treaty as a whole, Nicholas was dissatisfied on certain points of detail. These essentially came down to three inter-related issues - the war indemnity, the occupation of Ottoman territory and the Caucasian frontier.

As noted, Nicholas, having accepted Paskevich's argument for more territorial annexations in the Caucasus, sought to secure the possession of Kars, Batum and Adzharia. Conveniently, however, the Sultan was in no position to pay the 10m ducats indemnity, and thus the Tsar proposed lowering the amount by four million in return for the aforementioned territory. To assure the payment of the remaining war indemnity, Diebitsch had secured at Adrianople the Porte's assent to the occupation of the Principalities (which Diebitsch believed would continue for up to ten years). To this Nicholas was utterly opposed, as it would give Europe, Austria in particular, the false impression that Russia wished to eventually annex them. He ordered instead that the Principalities be occupied for a maximum of 18 months; for the long term, the army was to occupy Silistria and the coastal region of Dobrudja (up to the Trajans Wall), and, in the Caucasus, Kars and Bayezid. (64)

Diebitsch was not convinced by these proposals. He believed that by occupying the Black Sea coast, the army would assume a position more 'offensive in character', and thus more likely to arouse the suspicions of the European Powers. In addition, this region had an unhealthy climate, and the quartering troops here would be more expensive than in the Principalities. In contrast, the occupation of the latter would allow Russia to appropriate some of its (not insignificant) income as part of the indemnity. As for the Asiatic border, Diebitsch again opposed annexation and even occupation, citing Kars as insignificant as forward post and Batum useless as a trading port due to its poor harbour. (65)

Diebitsch was, however, overruled, primarily because the occupation of the Principalities would obstruct the mending of relations with Austria. (66) In November A. F. Orlov was despatched to Constantinople to secure Nicholas' proposals. His primary aim was to secure Paskevich's demand for the annexation of the Pashalik of Kars along the border drawn up by the Caucasus Commander himself. Nominally, the region was merely to be occupied for up to ten years, as a guarantee of the war indemnity. However, a secret treaty was to state that should the Turks reneg on payments, the region was to be annexed in return for two million ducats - an eventuality deemed almost inevitable due to the bankruptcy of the Porte. After ten years of occupation the Pashalik 'seroit incorporé tranquillement dans nos provinces, et pendant ce temps là on auroit préparé le system et le
mode de colonisation et fortifications'. The Principalities would only be occupied until the remaining 1m ducats of the trade indemnity was paid (in 18 months). This proposal as well as another aiming at the cession of Adzharia, was, however refused, and Orlov's mission, as Diebitsch predicted, ended in failure.

In the Spring of 1830 negotiations were transferred to St Petersburg. Nesselrode's negotiations however proved no more successful than Orlov's. The resulting St Petersburg Convention of 14 April 1830 OS was a disappointment for Russia. The war indemnity was reduced by two million ducats unconditionally (as Diebitsch had earlier proposed), with a further reduction of one million, under the condition of the Sultan's acceptance of a new allied Protocol (3 February 1830) concerning Greece. The remaining 7m would be paid in annual instalments. As regards the occupation of Ottoman territory, the Russian army was to withdraw to the Danube, and then to the Pruth, following the payment of each half of the remaining one million trade indemnity. Silistria was to be permanently occupied until the full payment of the war indemnity, whilst Russia reserved the right to prolong her occupation of the Principalities if the Sultan failed to keep to the timetable for the repayment of the war indemnity. Although Nesselrode failed to secure the annexation of territory, some benefit to Russia was gained by the mere occupation of Ottoman territory. For one, it allowed the army to organise the resettlement of Ottoman Christians into Russia - the right to which Diebitsch had secured in article XIII of Adrianople. More importantly, the occupation of the Principalities (which continued to 1834) allowed for its political system to be reformed and so ensure that its 'institutions futures' complied with the 'avantages stratégiques de la Russie'. This was to be an important implementation of the 'weak neighbour' policy - to strengthen Russian influence in a strategically important province, whilst retaining the overall sovereignty of the Porte.
233

(1) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4850, ff.108-113v, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 13 August 1829 OS.
(2) Ibid., ff.51-52v, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 2 June 1829 OS.
(3) Ibid., d.4722, ff.87-88, Krasovskii to Diebitsch, 1 August 1829 OS.
(5) VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 187-95, 592-93, Nesselrode to A. F. Orlov, not later 26 April 1829 OS; pp. 244, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 3 August 1829 OS. The fullest account of the Adrianople negotiations and its subsequent revision is in Sheremet, Adrianopol’skii mir, pp. 87-184.
(6) Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 334-35.
(7) Paskevich favoured the maximum demand and during the 1828/29 campaigns he had already begun to cultivate relations with the local Turkish rulers, such as Akhmet-Bek, the ruler of Adzharia (RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.587-92, Journal of Paskevich, 10-30 August 1829 OS), offering them Russian protection and preparing the way for their annexation. In doing so, Paskevich continued the traditional pro-annexationist policy of previous Caucasus Corps commanders, though he fell short of demanding the ultimate frontier in the western Caucasus (Trabizond-Erzerum), as formulated by General A. P. Tormasov in 1809, Fadeev, ‘Bukharestskii mir’, p. 81. Paskevich was especially insistent on the annexation of the Pashalik of Kars, arguing that this would establish a buffer zone protecting Georgia and that its rich lands could be used to support large garrisons and resettle a large Christian population in the region, Ushakov, Istoriiia, II, pp. 296-97. In part, Paskevich justified his annexationist proposals by citing the aim of regathering the ancient lands of the former Georgian Kingdom, Fadeev, Krizis, p. 335. Here again he was following precedent - Tormasov had used this justification in 1809, Fadeev, ‘Bukharestskii mir’, p. 81, though it probably originated as an imperial ideology during the rule of the first Caucasus Commander P. D. Tsitsianov, 1803-06 (a descendent of a Georgian Prince), Atkin, Iran, p. 74.
(9) Tsarist historians have sided with Paskevich over the question of expansion in the East. Diebitsch’s unwillingness to annex Kars is said to have adversely affected Russia’s subsequent Caucasian campaigns in 1855 and 1877, Shil’der, Nikolai, II, p. 260; Shil’der, ‘Adrianopol’skii mir’, p. 573.
(10) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXVI, 1882, pp. 88-89, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 24 August 1829 OS. The idea of ceding the Principalities appears to have come from the Turkish side who, according to Diebitsch, had ceased to regard the province as part of their empire, Shil’der, ‘Mir’, pp. 547-50, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 24 August 1829 OS.
(13) Headlam Morley, Diplomatic History, pp. 216-18. The Black Sea was not, however, fully internationalised as article VII made it clear that foreign commercial vessels were only to pass the Straits for the purpose of transporting goods to and from Russian ports.
(15) The Russian annexations might have been greater had instructions from St Petersburg arrived at Adrianople in time. The Tsar, caught between his two favourites, had sided with Paskevich and now demanded the annexation of Kars and Batum, Shcherbatov, Paskevich, III, p. 225; Shil’der, ‘Adrianopol’skii mir’, pp. 560-61, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 10 September 1829 OS.
(16) Russia interpreted this article as assigning to her not only the Black Sea coast but also sovereignty over the Circassian lands. From the position of international law the Russian position was problematic for it was unclear whether the region was ever under the Sultan’s
sovereignty and thus whether its transfer to Russia by means of a treaty was legal. The Russian position was that by article VI of the 29 December 1791 OS Treaty of Jassy, the Porte obliged herself to prevent the tribes living on the left bank of the Kuban (the Turkish side, which included the Circassians) from conducting raids into Russian territory. The Porte also agreed to compensate Russia for any damage caused by such raids. By these undertakings the Porte clearly signalled its pretension to sovereignty over the Circassians, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.6222, ff.l2-15v, Ermolov to Emmanuel, 15 March 1827 OS. It is true that certain officers, such as General G. A. Emanuel (the Commander of the Caucasus Line) disagreed with the idea that Circassia had ever been part of the Ottoman Empire. This, however, was a purely tactical ploy; for Emanuel proposed taking oaths from the Circassians (to accept Russian patronage) and resettling them on the Russian bank of the Kuban and thus wanted to demonstrate the legality of such measures, *ibid.*, ff.36-39, Emmanuel to Paskevich, 11 March 1827 OS; ff.44-46v, Emmanuel to Ermolov, 18 March 1827 OS. The official position nevertheless remained the same and Paskevich opposed Russian interference in Circassia in 1827 as this would ‘incite a people...against [their] legal authority [zakonnaia vlast']’, *ibid.*, ff. 51-52v, Report of Paskevich (enclosed in Diebitsch to Ermolov, 13 April 1827 OS). The Russians were thus certainly consistent in their argument - they did not suddenly declare that the Circassians had always been part of the Ottoman Empire in September 1829 in order to justify the annexation of their lands by article IV of Adrianople. There was, however, no obvious Russian counter to the Circassians’ own argument that if the Sultan had renounced his sovereignty over them, then they were now independent and could chose their own fate, Shcherbatov, *Paskevich*, III, p. 280. Moreover, as Russia had not subdued these tribes in 1829 (and would not do so for decades) there was an argument for the other European Powers withholding recognition upon the grounds that Russia had not asserted her *de facto* authority there. The whole issue however would probably have remained unnoticed had it not been for D. Urquhart’s propaganda campaign. Urquhart - the famous Russophobe publicist - believed in the existence of an ‘independent Circassia’, now illegally annexed by Russia. Under the somewhat absurd banner of ‘Circassia Defends India’, the British Government was urged to defend a free people whilst at the same time protecting her imperial interests against Russian aggression. The campaign certainly had great successes and during the 1836-37 Vixen affair, Palmerston refused outright to acknowledge Russia’s sovereignty over the Circassians, Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 91-92; Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 350, 366-67; C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. England, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question* (London, 1951), II, pp. 570-76. See also, M. H. Lamb, ‘The Making of a Russophile: David Urquhart - The Formative Years, 1825-35’, *IHR*, III, 1981, pp. 330-57; C. K. Webster, ‘Urquhart, Ponsonby and Palmerston’, *EHR*, LXII, 1947, pp. 327-51.


(19) Shil’der, ‘Adrianopol’skii mir’, p. 557, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 3 September 1829 OS.


(22) Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 163-64.

(23) Russian units did not reach Enos until 26 August OS and, even then, they were fifty miles from the most northern point of the Dardanelles, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 332-33. The order to prevent a foreign fleet passing them by cannon shot (dated 28 August OS) would not have arrived until around 10 September OS.

(24) PRO, FO 519/48, Gordon to Aberdeen, 30 October 1829 (no folio numbers were available for this file).


(26) A. Verigin, *Voennoe obozrenie pokhoda Rossiiskikh voisk v evropeiskoi Turtsii v 1829 godu* (St Petersburg, 1846), pp. 76-77. The Soviets agree, Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 316-17,
Vinogradov, *Mezhdunarodnye otosheniia*, pp. 238-40, though, primarily as a means of 
highlighting the 'Tsar's moderation.
(28) 'Dibich-Zabalkanski', RS, LXX, 1891, pp. 50-52.
(29) The fullest account of the meeting is Dostian, *Rossiia*, pp. 301-26. The relevant 
documents, including the resultant Protocol of 4 September 1829 OS, are in R. J. Kerner, 
'Russia's New Policy in the Near East After the Peace of Adrianople; Including the Text of 
the Protocol of 16 September 1829', *CHJ*, V, 1937, pp. 286-90; *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, pp. 278- 
301. Noteworthy in the committee's composition was the absence of Baltic Germans and the 
dominance of the leading representatives of the Russian aristocracy. It has been argued that 
Nicholas, fearing the same fate as his father Paul I in 1801, was unwilling to take a major 
foreign policy decision without the consultation of this interest group, Vinogradov, 
*Mezhdunarodnye otosheniia*, p. 261. Nicholas' motive, however, was probably the quest 
for advice rather than fear, as the committee members constituted, in Diebitsch's words, the 
'firm foundation of the Throne', 'Dibich-Zabalkanski', RS, LXX, 1891, p. 277. Indeed, 
during Nicholas' absence from St Petersburg in 1828, the nation was governed by a special 
committee composed of P. A. Tolstoi, A. N. Golitsyn and V. P. Kochubei, Shil'der, *Nikolai*, II, 
pp. 118-19.
(30) *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, p. 292, Report of D. V. Dashkov, 4 September 1829 OS.
(31) The committee took as its model Capodistrias' memoir of March 1829 (see above, p. 31, 
footnote 5); see D. V. Dashkov's analysis of the memoir in *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, p. 292-93, 
Report of 4 September 1829 OS.
(32) *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, pp. 400-401, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 16 November 1829 OS.
representative to Capodistrias' provisional Greek government, was known to Britain as a 
troublemaker. He (along with Capodistrias) was accused by the British government of being 
the source of the 'mischievous fabrications' spreading throughout the Ionian islands that they 
were to be incorporated into the new state of Greece, BL, Add. MS 41558, ff.197-198v, 
Aberdeen to Heytesbury, 28 August 1829. For more on this subject, see W. D. Wrigley, 
414-26.
(34) *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, p. 292, Report of Dashkov, 4 September 1829 OS.
(38) *Ibid.*, p. 283, Memorandum of Nesselrode, 4 September 1829 OS.
(41) *Ibid.*, p. 284, Memorandum of Nesselrode, 4 September 1829 OS.
Independence*, p. 160.
(45) Nicholas considered it 'une des plus glorieuses qui jamais eut été conclue', Shil'der, 
'Adrianopol'ski mir', p. 566.
(46) BL, Add. MS. 41558, ff.241-41v, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 30 September 1829.
Wellington's fears were shared by Metternich who believed Adrianople 'fatal to the 
independence of the Turkish Empire' and that the proposed Russian occupation of the 
Principalities was merely a prelude to their eventual annexation, PRO FO 97/402, ff.79v-80, 
Cowley to Aberdeen, 26 September 1829. On the other hand, Gentz believed the treaty to
be very moderate, arguing that Russia could easily have annexed the Principalities, Bulgaria and 'half of Armenia' without any fear of reprisals from the European Powers, Tatishchev, *Vneshnia politika*, pp. 214-15. This argument has some truth to it and it may be used to moderate a widely-held view that Russia had an 'obsession with...territorial expansion', R. Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (Penguin, 1974, 1990 reprint), p. 118 and that 'throughout its history the Russian Empire has expanded when it was militarily or diplomatically possible', Jewsbury, *Bessarabia*, p. 155. In fact, from the early years of Alexander I's reign onwards there was always a significant element within the Russian government that believed, like Nesselrode, that Russia, 'en etendant sa territoire affaibliraient sa puissance', *VPR* II/VII, 1992, p. 331, Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 20 December 1827 OS. Opposition specifically to southward expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire can be dated back even further - to the reign of Catherine II, see Jones, *Opposition to War*, pp. 34-51. As regards the verdict of historiography on Adrianople and the decisions of the September Committee, Tsarist historians have been almost unanimous in their hostility. The 'weak neighbour' policy has been deemed, firstly, a betrayal of Russia's historical mission to liberate the Ottoman Christian and, secondly, a fundamentally flawed means of exerting Russian power in the Balkans - with a weak Turkey held to be more likely to come under the influence of another power rather than Russia; Zhigarev, *Politika*, I, pp. 356-57; Solov'ev, 'Vostochnyi vopros', *DNR*, 1876, No.2, p. 130; S. M. Gorianov, *Ruso i Dardanelli* (St Petersburg, 1907), p. 39; Tatishchev, *Vneshnia politika*, p. 220. The only positive view is that of Martens, 'Étude historique', pp. 49-77, who cited Adrianople and the committee decision as proof of his somewhat spurious thesis that, since 1774, Russia's Eastern policy had been guided solely the principle of 'l'amélioration du sort des populations chrétiennes' and not an increase of influence or territory. As the self-declared aim of Soviet historiography was to dispel the myth of an aggressive Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century, Dostian, *Rossiia*, pp. 331-32, Adrianople is praised for its moderate terms and progressive role in the formation of Balkan nation-states, Fadeev, *Krizis*, pp. 326, 353-58, 368-69; Vinogradov, *Mezhunarodnye otnosheniia*, pp. 288-95. (This position is wholly unmarxist, as Marx himself considered Adrianople proof of Russia's expansionist designs, Marx, *Eastern Question*, pp. 48-53, 201-10). Ironically, the Soviets succumb to Tsarist imperial ideology in arguing that the annexations in the Caucasus were a 'step forward in the matter of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia', Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 346.

(48) For this reason Fonton favoured the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of a neo-Byzantium Empire, *Vospominaniiia*, II, pp. 103-16, letter of August 1829. See also Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 106-07.

(49) PRO FO 519/48, Gordon to Aberdeen, 30 October 1829. Some years earlier Kiselev had admitted that Britain's entry into the war would paralyse his proposed coastal operational line. Although Kiselev argued that the Balkans could instead be crossed via Timovo or Sophia, he gave no details of how the army was to be supplied, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.13-18v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 23 July 180 OS.

(50) The idea that Russia was vulnerable on her Black Sea coastline did not originate with Gordon - it had been already forwarded by Russophobe publicists such as Colonel G. de Lacy Evans in *On the Designs of Russia* (London, 1828), pp. 198-99. However, Gordon appears to have been one of the first to appreciate that an attack in the Black Sea was doubly important now that Russia could cross the Balkans.

(51) Tatishchev, *Vneshnia politika*, p. 192.


(54) *Ibid.*, pp. 492-93, Diebitsch to Capodistrias, 17 March 1830 OS.
(55) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4710, f.1, Capodistrias to Diebitsch, 26 August 1829 OS.
(56) Ibid., ff. 33-33v, Capodistrias to Diebitsch, 25 April 1830 OS.
(59) Tatischev, *Vneshnaia politika*, p. 299-305.
(60) Ibid., pp. 219-20, quoted from a letter of Nesselrode to Constantine, 12 February 1830 OS.
(61) VPR II/VIII, 1994, p. 646, Note of A. [S.] Sturdza, 22 January 1830 OS.
(63) Following the liberation of Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria in 1878, the Russians soon became appalled by the petty rivalries of the new states as well as by their general ingratitude for all that Russia had done for them. In 1885, Alexander III exclaimed, 'The Slavs must now serve us and not we them', *ibid.*, pp. 238-39.
(64) Shil'der, *Adrianopol'skii mir*, pp. 560-62, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 10, 12 September 1829 OS; VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 325-26, 606-07, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 27 September 1829 OS.
(65) Shil'der, *Adrianopol'skii mir*, pp. 569-73, 575-76, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 24 September, 3 October, 1829 OS. Diebitsch and Fonton, *Vospominaniia*, II, pp. 150-56, both argued that if Paskevich had considered Batum so important he should have captured it during the war (by Islamic tradition, the Porte could only to cede territory lost by force of arms). Paskevich had, in fact, himself ruled out its capture in 1828, as it would needlessly extend the front-line with the Turks, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.299-99v, Paskevich to Nicholas I, 21 November 1828 OS.
(66) VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 362-64, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 13 October 1829 OS.
(68) 'Imperator', RS, XXXVII, 1883, pp. 400-01, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 29 October 1829 OS.
(70) Shil'der, *Adrianopol'skii mir*, p. 558, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 3 September 1829 OS.
(71) Specifically Batum and Adzharia, Sheremet, *Adrianopol'skii mir*, p. 180. Some years later in a Russo-Turkish Convention of 17 January 1834 OS, Nesselrode was able to gain some very minor territorial concessions in the Pashalik of Kars. This had been made possible by the fact that the wording of the Treaty of Adrianople had left the precise delimitation of the new Russo-Turkish Caucasian frontier somewhat ambiguous. The Turks eventually agreed to the Russian interpretation, which pushed the existing border some miles to the West, see map in PRO 97/404, ff.169-70 (enclosed in Blutte to F. Lamb, 30 December 1833). In return, Russia agreed to lower the war indemnity and vacate its forces from the Principalities.
(72) Between September 1829 and August 1830 some 70,000 Bulgars and 7,000 Greeks emigrated to Russia. The former settled in Bessarabia as colonists whilst the Greeks settled in the coastal ports of Novorossiia and were employed as sailors in the Russian navy. Russia was certainly in great need of more sailors, for as Heytesbury noted, 'The building of so many [Russian] ships would demand more attention, if there were any possibility of finding sailors to man them, but as Russia has no mercantile navy (and never can have a mercantile navy owing to the interruption of all navigation during six months of the year, which renders it an improfitable concern) she never will have the means of manning on half of the ships she already possesses. This truth begins to be felt at St Petersburg....The case is different with respect to the Black Sea squadron, but even there, the difficulty of finding sailors is very considerable. As no seigneur willingly allows his serfs to become sailors for

(73) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4701, ff.102-02v, Diebitsch to Nesselrode, 18 January 1830 OS. A less-well known benefit of Russia’s occupation of Ottoman territory was the expropriation of ancient artefacts. This idea, first raised by Diebitsch in August 1829, was approved by Nicholas, who immediately despatched his personal librarian Sedzher and the artist Dezamo to the Balkans. A great many items, including the all libraries of Adrianople, were seized and transported to Odessa. These expropriations continued up to August 1830 at least, and were deemed to be advance payments on the war indemnity. See reports in RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183. sv.963, d.91, ff.1-2, 47-47v, 57-59, 72, 98, 103, 201, 205.
IX. THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES: OCCUPATION AND REFORM 1828-34

Russia and the Principalities: Relations to 1828

Russia’s first meaningful contact with the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia was established following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1711. Though Peter the Great had not sought this conflict (it was engineered by Charles XII of Sweden) he was nevertheless attracted by the prospect of defeating the Turks and furthering Russian expansion towards the Black Sea. His interest was doubly increased following an offer of alliance from the Hospodars - the indigenous rulers of the Principalities who sought to break from the Sultan’s suzerainty. Peter instinctively understood the great advantages that close political ties with the Principalities presented to Russia - the latter occupied a highly strategic position on the northern frontier of the Ottoman’s European Empire and, with their great potential in agricultural produce, could serve as both an operational base and supply depot for an invading Russian army. Moreover, due to the semi-independent status, homogeneous population and defined territorial limits of each Principality, they were more readily detachable from the Sultan’s control and transformed into, alternatively, a demilitarised buffer state, a Russian protectorate or incorporated into the Russian Empire outright. (1) Thus, in 1711 a treaty was concluded with the Hospodar of Moldavia (D. Cantemir), by which that Principality was to assume the character of a protectorate and render assistance to the Russian army. Although the Russian forces subsequently crossed the Pruth and entered Jassy, they found themselves heavily outnumbered by the enemy and peace was concluded almost immediately. Despite this military disappointment, Peter had laid the foundation for the development of Russo-Rumanian relations. (2) Under his successors, the Principalities were to become a significant factor in the continuing Russo-Turkish diplomatic and military struggle.

Russia’s major advance in the region came following Catherine II’s first Turkish war of 1768-74. By the terms of Kutchuk-Kainardji Russia not only extended her frontier towards the Principalities, but legitimised a right of interference in their internal affairs. By article XVI, Russia was now able to ‘parler en leur faveur’, with regard to their newly acquired rights of the freedom of religion, restoration of monastery lands and fixing of the tribute to the Porte. Not satisfied with these gains, Catherine schemed with Austria to partition European Turkey. The Empress now envisaged, in addition to the creation of a neo-Byzantium Empire, the unification and independence of the Principalities (to be called ‘Dacia’) and its transformation into a pro-Russian buffer state. With this latter aim in mind, Russia embarked on another Turkish war in 1787. Although the outbreak of the French
Revolution and the declaration of war by Sweden in 1788, made its achievement impossible, Russia was able to annex lands up to the Dniester and for the first time became the neighbour of Moldavia. Catherine’s death in 1796 was, however, ultimately to mark the end to Russia’s ambitious schemes of conquest and policy under her successor, Paul I, was directed towards the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

Alexander I’s policy towards the Principalities was marked by that inconsistency that characterised Russia’s Eastern policy as a whole during the first years of his reign. On one hand, it is clear from his dealings with Napoleon in 1807 that the Tsar considered a return to Catherine’s idea of the partition of Ottoman lands, with Russia annexing the Principalities. This, intermittently, was Russian policy during the 1806-12 Turkish War, though it was often compromised by the increasingly complicated international situation. Somewhat contradictorily, the Tsar was, at the very same time, attracted by his father’s pro-Turkish policy and Kochubei’s idea of preserving Turkey as a weak neighbour. After much vacillation this latter foreign policy course was to emerge victorious. With regard to the Principalities, the ‘weak neighbour’ idea entailed the retention of Ottoman suzerainty but an increase in Russia’s influence over the province’s domestic affairs. This policy was initiated as early as 1802 with the Russian inspired Hatti-Sherif of that year. The guiding principle of this and other important measures such as the introduction of the 1804 finance règlement, was to limit the powers of both the Porte and the Hospodars over the Boyars and their Divans. For following Peter’s campaign of 1711, the Sultan decreed that in future, Hospodars were to be selected from amongst the solidly pro-Turkish Greek Phanariots and not, as previously, from the native Boyars who had demonstrated their disloyalty through scheming with the Russians. The resulting Phanariot period proved to be one of extreme misrule, during which, the Principalities were deprived of many of their ancient privileges and were increasingly exploited by the Hospodars and the Porte alike. Although many Boyars collaborated with the corrupt Phanariot regimes, others resented the usurpation of their former position and looked to Russia for support. It was through the patronage of these Boyars that Russia sought to further its influence in the Principalities. Thus, following the end of the 1806-12 Turkish war and the resulting Treaty of Bucharest, Russia further limited the powers of the Hospodars and consolidated its own influence in the region, especially amongst the Moldavian Boyars, through the annexation of the northern part of their Principality (subsequently called ‘Bessarabia’). Many Boyar lands were now under Russian sovereignty and Bessarabia was to become the centre of the pro-Russian faction of the Moldavian Boyars.
Russia's attempts to control the Principalities' domestic affairs were, however, greatly disrupted by the Hospodars who continued to raise vast sums of revenue through illegal taxation, much of which was embezzled. (9) Thus one of the main points of G. A. Stroganov's mission to the Porte (1816-21) was to ensure the observance of the fiscal constraints of 1802 and 1804 and pass more power over finances to the Divans. Following the outbreak of Vladimirescu's anti-Phanariot revolt in 1821, the Porte made several hasty concessions in this direction in order to appease the insurgents. Any hope of their implementation was, however, scuppered by the subsequent outbreak of Ypsilantis' revolt, in which the Porte suspected a Russian involvement. (10)

The Porte's response to the insurrection was to occupy the Principalities, remove the Hospodars and impose military rule. In an attempt to solve the crisis, in April 1822, the Boyars sent a commission to the Porte requesting that the Phanariot rule be brought to an end and that in future, Hospodars be selected from amongst the native Boyars. As the Sultan had already lost all faith in the Phanariots (M. Sutzo, the Hospodar of Moldavia had supported Ypsilantis in 1821) the request was granted and G. Ghika and I. Sturdza were elevated to the rank of Hospodar. (11) The formal end to the Phanariot era was seen by many Boyars as opening the way for a more general reform of the Principalities and throughout the 1820s a multitude of proposals were drawn up. Though varying in detail, there were many common points - restriction of office-holding to native Boyars, increased power of the Divan, the freeing of internal and external trade and the creation of a national militia. The main disagreements concerned the political and economic rights assigned to each of the respective Boyar classes - with the first-class Boyars seeking to retain and even increase their exclusive powers and privileges and with the second and third-class striving for parity with the former. (12)

Any hope of reform however rested on the mutual consent of Russia and Turkey, but the disputed issue of the Turks' continued occupation of Principalities and other related matters precluded an agreement. In 1822-24, Lord Strangford (the British ambassador at Constantinople) attempted to mediate between the two sides but ultimately it was only after Nicholas' ultimatum of March 1826 that the Porte was forced to agree to Russian demands. This led to the Convention of Akkerman (and Separate Act), (13) which further increased the autonomy of the Principalities and empowered the Hospodars and Divans to begin preparations for the eventual adoption of a 'règlement général' for each Principality. Although the Porte subsequently authorised the establishment of the necessary committees, the unresolved Russo-Turkish disputes over Greece always threatened to derail the whole
process. Events were ultimately to lead in October 1827 to the Battle of Navarino, after which the Sultan disbanded the committees and began preparations for war. (14) This push to war was, however, to hold great advantages for Russia. Taking advantage of the Principalities’ impending occupation by the Second Army, Russia could now dominate the process of reform and restructure the province’s political, economic and military system as it wished.

The Second Army and the Principalities

As the Russian army always intended to use the Principalities as its principal operational base in a future Turkish war, Kiselev had, in the early 1820s, instructed his General Staff to research into previous attempts at the wartime administration of the province. He was predominantly interested in the experience of the 1806-12 war, during which Russian commanders had experimented with a number of methods in order to increase the ability of the Principalities’ rudimentary administrative structure to furnish the Russian army with provisions, wood and other supplies. After some years the study was completed and included into part V of the General Staff’s overall work on the history of Russo-Turkish wars. (15)

The study began by stressing the key importance of supplies in Turkish wars. Unlike other parts of Europe, the Balkans were characterised by a scarcity of population, cultivated land and agricultural surplus. As this precluded an invading force from merely, in an ad hoc manner, gathering supplies along its operational line, the organisation and collection of supplies from all available sources had to be the ‘first task of the government’. The successful management of this task was the ‘truest guarantee’ of any military success. Unfortunately, this had not been achieved in 1806-12, leading to the slow movement of the army and the inconclusive outcome of the war. (16).

The only important source of supplies in Balkan theatre were to be found in the Principalities. Through the purchase and requisition of the population’s produce, as well as through Russia’s appropriation or control of the state budget, the province could make a potentially substantial contribution to the Russian war effort. Russia’s prolonged occupation of the province 1806-12, had, however, revealed great defects in the province’s political, economic and administrative system, all of which greatly diminished its ability to assist the Russian cause.

One of the greatest problems was said to be the ‘unlimited power’ of the Hospodars, who had a vested interest in maintaining the province’s great levels of corruption. They created and raised taxes at will, embezzled state income and sold all
positions in the administrative system. Other state officials likewise used their positions purely for self-gratification, especially the local tax collectors [ispravniki] whose corruptibility was legendary. During the last Turkish war, the latter had been commissioned to conduct requisitions for the army, though for obvious reasons, very few supplies actually reached their intended destination.(17) The Hospodars secured the Boyars’ acceptance of their rule by granting them important privileges. The latter paid no taxes whatsoever and were allowed to employ skutel’niki, Brelashi and poslushniki - various names for peasants who had voluntarily become enserfed to noblemen. These peasants were freed entirely from state taxation, paying instead corvée or rent exclusively to the landholder. All this deprived the Treasury of funds and its ability to subsidise a war effort. Other privileged classes were likewise of limited value to Russia. The monasteries, though extremely rich, were fearful of requisitions and always concealed their produce in time of war. Acquiring supplies through the mercantile class was also problematic as almost all of the Principalities’ trade was in the hands of Austrian merchants, who were hostile to Russia.(18) This state of affairs meant that almost the entire burden of supplying the army fell upon the peasantry. Already exploited by the landowner and the state they were loath to part with any surplus they retained.(19)

During the first phase of the Russian occupation (1806-08), the army operated under the above-mentioned conditions.(20) Assured by the then Hospodar of Wallachia, Constantine Ypsilantis, that the Principalities alone could fully support a 50,000-man force, the Russians took no measures to assert any control over the administrative system. The results were disastrous and in 1808 Ypsilantis was relieved of his post and sent to Russia.(21) He was replaced by a Russian official, S. S. Kushnikov, who, though awarded the title of President of both Divans, remained in fact a prisoner to the local bureaucracy. The Russian Commander-in-Chief A. A. Prozorovskii believed that only the wholesale reform of the Principalities by the President and the introduction of Russian governmental practices, the codification of laws and measures designed to improve the corrupted morals of the population would improve the situation. The Tsar, however, was unready for such measures and restricted the President’s role to the collection of supplies. This task was however impossible without reform and Kushnikov, though introducing certain piecemeal reforms into the administrative structure, failed in his task and was himself replaced in 1810. He was succeeded by V. I. Krasno-Milashevich, who fared no better.(22) Modern research has confirmed the conclusions of Kiselev’s General Staff - ‘the lessons of occupation were clear for all to see. Whether under Ypsilantis or Kushnikov, the Divan
system would serve the will of no master'. (23) It was clear that the army required the 'establishment of a dependable administration' in the province (24) and according to the General Staff's report there was but one solution:

It is essential that both Divans be placed under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief and operate under the instruction of persons appointed by the Russian Government. (25)

Control of the Divans would allow control of the budget. The huge proportion of state income wasted on 'unnecessary expenditure', such as the wages of the bureaucracy, could thus be diverted towards the maintenance of the occupying forces. (26) Russian control over the equally important local state apparatus would limit the amount of gathered supplies lost to corruption and 'save the inhabitants from ruin' by curbing its officials' propensity to exact illegal requisitions. (27) Interestingly, the report also considered, as a means of both winning over the population and increasing their agricultural surplus, the easing of the burden on the peasantry by defining their obligations to state and landlord. (28) This measure was certainly needed, as, in 1809, the Commander-in-Chief P.I. Bagration had noted that the peasantry blamed illegal requisitions not upon their state officials, but the Russians. (29) Both on the question of peasant obligations and with regard to the report's opposition to the institution of skutel' niki et al., 'which brought the land not the slightest benefit' (30) one certainly senses the influence of Kiselev and the germ of his later agrarian reforms in the Principalities (1829-34). He had in fact long believed in the economic advantages of improving the lot of the peasantry and in 1816 had proposed the abolition of serfdom in Russia, primarily on these grounds. (31) His tenure as President of the Divans confirmed his belief and later, as Russia's Minister for State Properties (1836-56), introduced reforms which greatly increased the income derived from the state peasantry. (32) The motivation behind his reforms was thus primarily that of raison d'état rather than philanthropy (though the latter was not entirely absent). In the case of the Principalities, increased production served Russia's interest in the event of their annexation or their use as a source of supplies in a future war.

Overall, the General Staff's report, though calling for greatly increased control over the Divans, fell short of Prozrovskii's demand for its abolition and replacement by a Russian administrative model. There is no doubt that this was the army's preferred option, though as the whole issue was inexorably bound up with Russo-Turkish diplomatic relations, the report avoided discussion of the long-term status of the Principalities - a subject that was properly the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry. Fortunately, the 1826
Convention of Akkerman had already made plain the latter's commitment to the wholesale reform of the province and the interests of the military on this issue were later to be formally secured in 1829 with the entrusting of its execution to Kiselev.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Parallel to the research of the General Staff, Liprandi spent much of the 1820s investigating the Principalities. He first visited Moldavia in 1821 to investigate the origins of the Hetaria revolt(33) and in 1823 was commissioned by M. S. Vorontsov to write historical works on lands bordering the Russo-Turkish frontier.(34) During the negotiations at Akkerman in mid-1826 Liprandi was dispatched to the Danube to ascertain the best place for a crossing and investigate the activities of the Cossack settlements of its delta.(35) In October 1826, following reports that Turkish forces were secretly entering the Principalities,(36) Nicholas ordered Kiselev to dispatch agents there to establish 'l'état actuel de choses'.(37) Though the ratification of Akkerman temporarily allayed Russian fears,(38) soon after the signature of the July 1827 Treaty of London, (which made allied intervention over Greece a distinct possibility) Liprandi was sent on a mission to Moldavia. He was commissioned to gather intelligence and establish links with pro-Russian factions, for which he was assigned 1,000 roubles and 1,000 chervontsy [ducats].(39) Despite two assassination attempts(40) Liprandi was able to create an embryonic intelligence network which amassed a great amount of information on all manner of relevant subjects.(41)

The most interesting reports related to the political affinities of the native Boyars and the level of Russian influence in the province. They were to serve as an indictment on Russian policy towards the Principalities and debunked the belief that Russia had successfully usurped Austro-Turkish influence over the Boyars. There were two main reasons for this - the first concerned Russia's diplomatic representatives in the region:

The transfer of [the Boyars'] allegiance from Russia to Austria began in 1812. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest, Jassy did not have one Russian amongst its consuls. The peraty(42) who occupied these positions, were of a nature completely alien to that of Russians. Almost all of them were born as Turkish subjects and receiving Phanariot-style upbringing, they could not instil in the Boyars an allegiance and gratitude to Russia. Their property, relatives and friends all resided in Constantinople and [thus] their own well-being was dependent upon the well-being of the Turkish Empire.(43)

The same was true in Wallachia. Thus, whilst in 1812 the Russian consuls could be regarded 'the second Prince' of the Principalities, after this date the Austrian mission
increasingly became the most powerful. (44) Austrian influence received a great fillip after 1821 by giving refuge to Boyars fleeing Ypsilantis’ revolt. The latter were given special privileges in Habsburg lands and on their return to the Principalities they formed themselves into a powerful pro-Austrian faction. In addition, due to the economic privileges granted to Austrians by the Porte:

...all the capital of the Boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia is in the hands of Austrian bankers. On the first signal of any trouble all valuables and other moveable possessions are dispatched to Austria. (45)

Austria’s hold over the Moldavian Boyars in particular was further strengthened by Russia’s 1812 annexation of Bessarabia. Far from increasing its influence over the landowners, Russia succeeded only in alienating them by introducing reforms by which the Boyars were ‘deprived of all their barbarous rights and customs over the peasantry [poselements]’. (46) As evidence of this Liprandi submitted a further report on the specific political allegiances of thirty six of the most powerful Moldavian Boyars. Nine were said to be pro-Austrian, seven pro-Turk and twelve were opportunists, not attached to any specific faction. Only eight could be considered solidly pro-Russian. Ion Sturdza, the current Hospodar, was considered ‘timid, self-seeking, unable to maintain a constant train of thought and disliked’. He was devoted to no one but ‘his own interests, which he himself does not understand’. He could easily be ‘seduced and used by us...but due to his character it would be harmful for him to occupy any position’. (47)

The decline of Russian influence after 1812 was however not solely attributable to the character of the Russian mission and Austrian intrigues. It was as much was due to the intrinsically corruptible nature of the Boyars themselves:

Moldavians, generally, are alien to all the noble ideas of enlightened reason and all the precepts of a pure morality; virtue, conscience, honour, embarrassment and praise of others - are for them all words without meaning - only physical fear can restrain their passions. In a word, they have been inured to the spirit of Turkish rule - they love it and they are worthy of it. (48)

Their passion for intrigue had increased since 1822, with the Sultan’s decision (later confirmed at Akkerman) to nominate future Hospodars from amongst the native Boyars. This set in motion a power struggle amongst the first-class Boyars to attain this post and use its powers against their rivals. For example, I. Sturdza, on becoming Hospodar in 1822, sought to curtail the influence of other first-class Boyars through the creation of a rival power base comprised of newly-entitled Boyars. Up to 800 new third-class Boyars were eventually created through the sale of titles for as little as 500 piastres. Moreover, the
continued Russo-Turkish disputes over Greece, which greatly reduced Russian interference in the Principalities’ internal affairs (1821-28), allowed the Boyars free rein to exploit the population as it wished. The majority of them thus hoped for the ‘continuation of the present chaos in the administration’ as any reappearance of the forces of order ‘restricted their arbitrary rule and robbery’. (49)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

It was the above bleak picture that confronted the Russian authorities on the eve of war. It was clear that drastic measures were required both to impose at least a semblance of order into the Principalities for the duration of the war and, in the longer term, introduce more profound reforms in order to restore fully Russia’s influence in the region

The Wartime Occupation of the Principalities, 1828-29

The findings of the Second Army were to have a significant impact on official Russian policy towards the wartime administration of the Principalities. One of the most important suggestions accepted by Nicholas was to remove the current Hospodars and replace them with Russian representatives. (50) The Tsar agreed to place the Divans under the control of the Russian Commander-in-Chief and entrusted the day to day administration of the province to F. P. Pahlen, who received the title ‘President of the Divans’. (51) Pahlen was informed of Russia’s perilous position in the region and sent Liprandi’s reports on the problems of its consuls and the suspect loyalties of the Boyars. (52) As a means of assisting Pahlen’s task of keep the latter’s intrigues in check, (53) Liprandi proposed the establishment of a permanent and expanded intelligence network in the region. At present his existing network of agents and informers (which he called korrespondenty) in Galatz, Bucharest and Fokiian operated in a somewhat haphazard fashion, as there were no permanent Russian military staff to systemise and organise their reports. Once institutionalised, the network could be expanded to gather intelligence in Bulgaria and even Austria. (54) With the backing of Wittgenstein, the proposal was accepted by the Tsar. Liprandi was made head of the intelligence network or ‘external military police’ and awarded a salary of 2,000 roubles p.a. (55)

The main task assigned to Pahlen however was to ensure the efficient collection of provisions and other supplies. (56) Fortunately, only modest expectations were placed on the amount of supplies that could actually be procured from this source. Following its research into the 1806-12 war (57) (later confirmed in Liprandi’s reports) (58), the Second
Army believed that the Principalities alone were in no position to fulfil the army requirements. Instead, the army was to be self-sufficient in almost all supplies (gathered in Russia) and receive only supplementary supplies from the Principalities (predominantly meat and hay). This idea of transporting most supplies into the theatre from Russia was facilitated by the army's research into General N. M. Kamenskii's 1810 experiment with 'mobile magazines'. The army was convinced that, if expanded, this system could handle huge quantities of supplies. In addition, Kiselev's idea of a coastal operational line and insistence on the capture of Varna and Burgas opened the possibility for the ferrying of supplies from Novorossiia directly to the theatre of war. All this served to avoid a repeat of the folly of 1806-08 and greatly increased the mobility of the army.

As regards the precise means of procuring supplies, the military command were keen not to forget the experience of 1806-12, during which the local population had blamed the Russian army for the unrestrained requisitions carried out by the Divan's officials. Liprandi, for instance, was certain that if the army did not this time win the trust of the peasantry, they would flee their villages to the mountains and so deprive the army of all supplies and the hands needed to man the transport and magazine network. Wittgenstein proceeded by imposing a ban on all requisitions, not only to protect the country from the ravages of officialdom but also so as not to 'accustom the army to arbitrary and indisciplined actions [svoevol'ie] from which it will be difficult to protect the local population'. If requisitions proved essential, they were to be organised by the central military authorities with the total amount taken per year not exceeding two years worth of peasantry's obligations [povinnost']. The optimum solution however was to dispense with requisitions altogether and either purchase supplies or procure them in lieu of peasant taxes [podat']. Nicholas fully agreed with the importance of maintaining the goodwill of the population and ordered a strict supervision over both the collection of supplies and the behaviour of the occupying Russian forces.

On the question of the reform or otherwise of the Divan system, Wittgenstein proved to be more conservative than Nicholas, proposing that, whilst the Hospodars were to be removed, the state apparatus was to be retained intact for the duration of the war. The Tsar, however, was not so quick to rule out the possibility of reform. In addition to the power to appoint and dismiss ministers and full control over the budget, Pahlen was informed that 'status quo antebellum de lois, formes de gouvernement et prérogatives des classes pourra et devra même subir certaines modifications essentielles'. As regards the
long-term future of the Principalities, Nicholas made his future intent clear - the wartime occupation was only:

...une transition, un acheminement nécessaire vers le système conservateur qui fixera...leurs rapports permanents avec l’Etat suzerain, ceux qui les uniront avec la puissance protectrice, de même que leur régime intérieur.(67)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Despite all the attempts of the Russian authorities to avoid the problems associated with the occupation of 1806-12, Pahlen’s tenure as President (April 1828-January 1829) was marked by a near complete failure in the gathering of supplies and the development of a strong local opposition to the growing demands for an increasing contribution to the war effort.(68) The initial demands imposed on the province were, in fact, not great. The population was to pay its usual obligations to the state (which were to be used to fund the war effort) and provide, free of charge, both hay and carts.(69) Unfortunately, Pahlen was unable to gather supplies without the use of the ispravniki , who proceeded to exploit and alienate the peasantry. In addition, the Russians succeeded in also alienating the powerful Boyars and monasteries. The latter had traditionally been freed of all obligations to the state and greatly resented Russian demands for supplies.(70)

Demands on the Principalities were to increase greatly following the realisation that Wittgenstein’s aim of ensuring the army’s self-sufficiency in supplies had not been achieved. The initial underfunding of the war, the inability to collect sufficient supplies in Russia,(71) added to the unexpected prolongation of the war and the failure to take Varna until October 1828, all forced the Russians to seek ever greater supplies in the Principalities. The latter were thus requested to contribute sufficient quantities of flour, groats and oats for the supply of a 100,000-man army for three months. This proved to be an impossible burden.(72) Although the peasantry were nominally to be paid for their produce in the form of IOUs [kvitantsii] - they were greatly distrusted as Russia had already failed to pay off previous IOUs issued during the 1806-12 war.(73) Thus eventually requisitions had to be imposed, with the consequences that Liprandi had feared. By the end of the first campaign, the British consul in Wallachia E. L. Blutte could write:

The resources of the Principalities approach rapidly to the state of exhaustion in consequence of the unmitigated military requisitions, for which no payment is made. The greater number of the peasants of Moldavia have already thrown up their leases, refusing any longer to cultivate the ground, and the is little doubt that their example will shortly be followed by those of Wallachia, and that a considerable emigration will take place into Transylvania, and the western part of Bulgaria.(74)
Over the winter of 1828-29, the Russia authorities again turned to the Divans, this time requesting three months of provisions, forage and firewood from the Boyars. This was refused and steps were taken to lodge a formal complaint to the Tsar. As a result, over the winter, part of the army was stranded at Silistria ‘without a bridge, without rusks, without oats, without hay, without anything’. When, in the spring, the Russians redoubled their efforts to prise supplies from the Boyars (in this instance, horses) they were met with strong resistance:

The Boyars, who had looked with great indifference upon the sufferings and ruin of the peasantry, are extremely indignant at this measure, which it seems they were not prepared to expect at the hands of those whom they were fond of calling their liberators.

Pahlen’s rule had thus brought nothing but failure. Whilst the President was correct to attribute part of this failure to forces beyond his control - the ravaging of the Principalities by Turkish troops after 1821, the requisitions made by Turks on the eve of war, the natural disasters that hit the province in 1828 - it was clear that the policy of merely substituting the Hospodars for Russian officials had failed. The state apparatus itself required reform, for it was still the Divan’s officials on the ground who decided the quantity of supplies available, handled their procurement and delivered them to the army. Moreover, the unification of administrative and judicial powers in the Divan system meant that it proved almost impossible to detect corruption amongst the ispravniki.

Although as early as April 1828 Nicholas had authorised change this power was not used until December 1828 when a committee, including Kiselev, Diebitsch, Wittgenstein and Dashkov, was established to consider short-term wartime reforms. Its main proposal was to call for the separation of the Divans’ executive and judicial powers. The former, which supervised the collection of supplies, was to come under the direct control of Russia, thus curbing the arbitrary rule of the ispravniki. In May 1829, the new system was introduced.

As regards the Presidency, it was clear that the refined and mild-mannered Pahlen had not proved up to the task and he was replaced by the fearsome General P. F. Zheltukhin. Having already acquired the epithet Groznyi for his forthright rule as Military-Governor of Kiev, Zheltukhin was the ideal choice for enforcing future compliance with Russian demands.
One of the new President’s main tasks was to force the peasantry to sow their fields and ensure a harvest for 1829. This was to prove most difficult as ‘the Russians...by their improvident method of levying requisitions [in 1828], have not left the peasantry either grain or oxen sufficient to perform this task’. Zheltukhin thus enlisted the assistance of the Boyars who were to supervise the peasants’ work and despatch to those in need grain and animals (from the stores of the Divan). Any Boyars suspected of corruption were subjected to court martials and force was used against peasants still unwilling to work. These measures appear to have met with much success.

In addition to increasing agricultural production Zheltukhin aimed to bolster state finances through the raising of direct taxation. By the end of 1829 state income had been doubled compared to the preceding year. The President expected the Boyars to make a significant contribution to the war effort and those opposing him, or fleeing to Austrian Transylvania, were threatened with exile, removal from state office and confiscation of property.

Kiselev and the Reform of the Principalities, 1829-34

Whilst the stricter measures introduced during the second campaign rectified many of the problems of the state apparatus of the Principalities, the question of the long-term status of the province was still to be answered. For even in 1829 the political system of the Principalities remained highly ambiguous - Phanariot rule had come to an end but no new and stable political order had replaced it. What was clear was that any reform had to serve the interests of Russia, under whose auspices it was to be executed. One of the key issues of any reform - the relationship between Russia and the Principalities, had been decided before the onset of war. Annexation, though favoured by Zheltukhin, Kiselev and probably Diebitsch was ruled out, and instead the idea of protectorate adopted.

Russian officials began work on the precise details of a new règlement or constitution for Principalities sometime in 1828. This resulted in various plans by A. S. Sturdza and D. V. Dashkov, which, though differing in detail, established the general direction of reform - towards the creation of an aristocratic constitution, weighted heavily in favour of the first-class Boyars upon whom Russia hoped to base its influence in the region. The Boyars political power was to be greatly increased through the transformation of the Divan from an advisory body to the Hospodar into a legislative assembly with control over the budget. Nicholas agreed with these ideas and in June 1829 ordered the establishment of two special committees of Boyar representatives (one for each Principality,
both chaired by the Russian diplomat M. L. Minciaky) to begin discussion for the drafting of a new règlement. (88) At Adrianople, Diebitsch secured in article V the Porte’s acquiescence of the reform process and the granting of ‘une administration nationale indépendance’ to the province. (89) The treaty, in legitimising Russia’s occupation of the Principalities, secured her preeminence in the formation of this new administration and transformed the Principalities into a Russian protectorate. (90)

At Nicholas’ own behest, the important task of administering the Principalities and supervising the introduction of reforms and the eventual règlement, was to be entrusted to Kiselev. (91) Though, ostensibly on grounds of health, Kiselev appears to have initially declined the offer, he finally accepted, on condition that he retained the title ‘Commander of the forces of the right flank’ [the occupying Russian forces] in addition to the new one of President of the Divans. (92) Kiselev thus combined in his hands full political and military control within the Principalities.

Whilst many of the precise details of reform were to emanate from St Petersburg, Kiselev’s own influence on its overall character was highly significant. Almost immediately upon his assumption of office, the Principalities were hit by a series of tremendous earthquakes - a sure portent from the Gods of the revolution that awaited them. (93) At root his idea was simple - to conduct, as Prozorovskii had once demanded, a thorough Russification of the province. He hoped that ‘by means of our education and the introduction of our customs and morals’ to make far closer the Principalities’ political, economic, social and military ties with Russia. Thus, without actually annexing the Principalities (which in fact Kiselev favoured), St Petersburg could nevertheless be assured that ‘our border will be on the Danube’. (94) Like Liprandi, Kiselev understood that the greatest barrier to aligning the Principalities to a pro-Russian orientation was the pervasive influence of a Turkish political culture. This imbued the Boyar class with entirely ‘patrimonial’ ideas of government, by which political power existed solely for the self-gratification of the ruling classes and state office-holders. (95) To detach fully the province from its oriental past, the Boyars needed re-education and an introduction to the Russian (or rather European) concepts of statehood and enlightened rule. As for the reforms’ ultimate end, Kiselev declared to the Wallachian Boyars in his inaugural speech to its Assembly in 1831, that the province’s future was to join ‘la grande famille Européenne’. (96) These were certainly no empty words and indeed Kiselev was guided by Russia’s own experience as a nation having itself undergone Westernisation. There is evidence that he perhaps even considered himself as a latter-day Peter the Great. This was to express itself in many ways,
ranging from the enlistment of the Boyars into the Principalities’ new regular-style standing militia to the demand that the latter ‘shave their beards and adopt the European costume’. (97)

Thus far, Kiselev’s ideas were certainly shared in St Petersburg. However, still faithful to the liberal dreams of his youth, Kiselev went further than many in wishing to extend the benefits of Russian patronage to the lower orders, even to the extent of limiting the prerogatives of the ruling classes and imposing upon them a noblesse oblige towards the peasantry. There has even been a long-held view that Kiselev’s primary aim was in fact to win over the peasantry, dismissing the possibility of ever forcing the Boyars away from the old order and the arms of Austria. (98) There is certainly some truth to this. Kiselev was certainly distrustful of the Boyars. In 1827, he had accused them of a plot to invite Austria’s occupation of the province (99) and even towards the end of his rule in 1833 complained bitterly of Boyars continued attachment to the ‘old order’. (100) His sympathy for the toiling masses was certainly sincere; characterising the Phanariot period he wrote:

The Hospodar and a few Boyars who constituted the government, exploited it for their own ends... the middle class and peasantry, enslaved by the corrupt actions of the aristocracy, were dragged down into poverty and ignorance. (101)

Furthermore, in his own account of his rule 1829-34, Kiselev stated that since the Boyars and clergy had a vested interest in the continuation of the old order, he had aimed to ‘win the favour of public opinion [obshchestvennoe mnienie] for the new règlement’. (102) His idea was thus to ensure the longevity of the reforms by making it as popular as possible. (103) He thus fought against the raising of peasant obligations (104) and insisted that dues be paid in money, not in kind (which caused corruption), complaining that ‘I alone must defend these defenceless people against a violent and greedy oligarchy’. (105) Kiselev was, however, neither a radical nor a democrat and did not challenge the political power of the Boyars or aim for a transformation of the province’s social structure. His aim was to enlist all classes in the task of building the new state by demonstrating the benefits of the reform to all - as he stated in his speech to the Wallachian assembly, the reforms were intended to secure ‘le bien-être de leurs habitans en général’. (106) By this means Russia would demonstrate to all classes the benefits of her patronage thus restoring and cementing its influence in the region. This, in turn, would serve Russia well throughout the Balkans as it would ‘give the Eastern Christian peoples a moral demonstration of the magnanimous patronage of Russia and support her influence over them’. (107)
Kiselev’s immediate task upon becoming President was to adopt strict measures to restrict the spread of a recent outbreak of plague which, during the course of 1829, had claimed nearly 25,000 victims in the Principalities. Through the creation of impromptu hospitals and a cordon sanitaire the effects were quickly reduced and by April 1830 it had ceased altogether.\(^{(108)}\) For the remainder of 1830 Kiselev was unable to undertake any serious reforms as he awaited the formulation of a draft project of the new règlement. The committees of Boyar representatives established in 1829 had finished their work in early 1830 and prepared to leave for St Petersburg for consultations.\(^{(109)}\) At this early stage, however, the germ of future disagreements between the Boyars and their Russian patrons was clear for the Russian chairman, Minciaky, had proposed the lessening of peasant obligations and the abolishment of the skultel’niki - the very symbol of the subjugation of state interest to Boyar privilege.\(^{(110)}\)

The Boyars were, of course, furiously opposed and redoubled their conspiratorial contacts with the British consul. Blutte faithfully presented the Boyars case, arguing that the proposal was ‘dictated by a spirit of philanthropy, than as having been studiously calculated’. The lowering of peasant obligations would only encourage the natural laziness of the peasantry, thus ‘reducing to almost nothing the superfluous produce of the Principalities’.\(^{(111)}\) In fact, the Boyars, headed by M. Sturdza were already involved in an anti-Russian plot with Blutte. The former was one of the leading Moldavian Boyars, a member of the reform committee and, from 1834, Hospodar of Moldavia. Sturdza expressed the Boyars’ fears that, instead of receiving true independence, the Principalities were merely to be transformed into a Russian satellite or annexed outright. His idea was for the Boyar committees to send a ‘memorial’ to Nicholas requesting the unification of the Principalities and the creation of an independent Kingdom ruled by ‘one of the dynasties of Europe’. The state was to be guaranteed by all the European Powers. In return for supporting the independence of the Principalities, Europe would gain ‘an additional bulwark for the security of the remainder of European Turkey...on the line of the Danube’. It could ultimately be united in a confederation with Serbia and Bosnia. Sturdza declared his ‘unbounded devotion’ to Britain and hoped she would support this idea. Blutte was most interested but, not having sufficient authority to proceed alone, passed on Sturdza’s request to Heytesbury in St Petersburg.\(^{(112)}\) where, significantly, it was handed to the British ambassador by his Austrian counterpart.\(^{(113)}\) Heytesbury, who was noted for his Russophile views, would however have none of it and lodged a complaint to
Aberdeen. (114) The plot was thus foiled at birth, but the idea of a collective European guarantee of Ottoman's European provinces remained prevalent amongst Russophobe diplomats and was again raised during the Crimean War.

By the beginning of 1831, St Petersburg had agreed on a draft for a règlement and it despatched for review and acceptance by specially created assemblies composed of predominantly first-class Boyars. Discussions began in March 1831 and Kiselev was able to force it through assemblies with only modest amendments. (115) The resulting Règlement organique, especially its political aspects, was closely based on A. S. Sturdza's and D. V. Dashkov's aforementioned projects of 1828 and 1829. It was finally promulgated in Wallachia on 1 July 1831 OS and in Moldavia on 1 January 1832 OS.

Perhaps the règlement's most striking feature was its reform of the political system. In essence, it transplanted to the Principalities some of the most advanced European norms of constitutional practice. The laws were now codified and political power was divided between the mutually-independent agencies of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The Hospodar was now the head of the executive and its ministerial system. The Divan was transformed into a proto-parliament, voting on bills and controlling the budget. In the event of anti-constitutional action by the Hospodars, the legislature could appeal directly to Turkey and Russia, thus guaranteeing the perpetuity of the latter's interference. (116) It is quite correct to state that the Principalities now had a 'Boyar constitution', as the new legislative assemblies, which passed laws and elected the Hospodar, was filled almost wholly by Boyars, with the first-class in predominance. (117) On the other hand, the règlement enshrined principles such as equality before the law and trial by due process, as well as upholding the ban of serfdom - all measures clearly designed for the benefit the population at large. (118) It was perhaps not surprising that the Russian officer-noblemen of the occupying army could only look at these advantages with envy. As Blutte reported:

The Russian officers here have been not a little scandalized at the apparent predilection shown by the government of St Petersburg towards the Wallachians, (in general despised by them) who are to a certain degree assimilated with nations enjoying a constitutional and representative government, while themselves and their countrymen continue to be ruled by an administration of a different character. (119)

The most controversial aspect of the règlement was its definition of peasant obligations. The initial Russian draft incensed the Boyars as it abolished the skutel'niky and did not increase peasant obligations. Boyars demand an increase which Kiselev unsuccessfully opposed. (120) The most detailed investigation of this highly complicated issue has
concluded that the final règlement increased peasant obligations to the Boyars but reduced them to the state. Although, as a result, the peasants’ total obligations were lessened, others measures reducing the amount of land rented out to them, meant that, overall, the peasantry were de jure worse off.\(^{121}\) However, as Kiselev pointed out, the very fact that the obligations were to be paid in money and defined by statute liberated the peasantry from the imposition of additional ad hoc and illegal obligations (as was previously common practice).\(^{122}\) It is thus possible that, de facto, the peasantry’s position was improved.

This certainly seems to have been the initial perception of Blutte:

> The great majority of the Boyards [sic] not in the Russian interest are highly dissatisfied with a reform, which, although calculated for the benefit of the country at large, and of the lower orders in particular, deprives them of the power of increasing their riches, as heretofore, by rapice and extortion.

Blutte even suggested that this ban on Boyar extortion will:

> ...reduce them at no distant period to a state of comparative insignificance, which latter result may have been for its own future views, the principal motive of the Russian Govt. in pressing the measure forward.\(^{123}\)

He thus concluded that:

> [it appears] to be the aim of the protecting power [Russia] to captivate the good will of the peasantry in particular, who form the bulk of the population and for whose almost exclusive benefit the reforms seems to have been calculated.\(^{124}\)

Blutte believed Kiselev to be closely implicated with this policy. Moreover, he also believed in the existence of a Russian plot whereby some pro-Russian Moldavian Boyars, were to offer Kiselev a landed estate in the province, ostensibly as a token of gratitude for the implementation of reforms. Kiselev would thus receive the privilege of naturalisation and be elevated to the rank of a first-class Boyar, gaining him ‘eligibility to the dignity of Hospodar’.\(^{125}\) For Blutte, Russian aims were thus clear - to subjugate the power of the largely anti-Russian Boyars by extending economic privileges to the peasantry and reducing to nil the Boyars’ new political powers by ‘raising General Kiselev to the dignity of Hospodar’.\(^{126}\)

Blutte was, of course, wrong and his views may be taken as a mere repetition of the beliefs of the over-sensitive Boyars themselves. Blutte was later forced to admit that the reform ‘appears to have added rather than taken from the burthen of the lower orders’.\(^{127}\) As already stated, Kiselev hoped to win the peasantry’s support for the reforms but did not
favour them exclusively, as shown by political privileges assigned to the Boyars.
Unfortunately for the Russians, the peasantry shared Blutte’s mistaken beliefs. Following the
publication of the Wallachian règlement in July 1831, its peasantry, who clearly did not read
or understand its terms, rapidly fell into ‘a state of complete insubordination’ believing that
the reform fully liberated them from ‘subjugation to the existing authorities’ and declared that
they would only follow orders from the Tsar himself.(128) Similar to the Russian peasantry,
the Wallachians seem to have had the delusion that their miserable existence was entirely
attributable to the landowning class and that the Tsar, should he discover this state of affairs,
would not hesitate to liberate them.

The peasantry were quick to vent their revenge on the hated Boyars, making use of
the opportunity offered to them in the reform of the appointment in each village of ‘three
sworn men’ or ‘jurats’ - lay judges charged with dealing with minor offences. These
positions were soon filled by peasants (or, in Blutte’s words, ‘illiterate clowns unable to read
or write’) who preceded to use their new magisterial powers to arrest local Boyars. They
were usually charged with making illegal requisitions from the peasantry in order to supply
the Russian army during the war. ‘With fetters of their feet and after a mock trial carried on
at the wine house of the village’, the Boyars were finally sentenced to various punishments,
including ‘decapitation’, amid cries from onlookers of ‘long live the Russians who have made
us Lords and Judges over our former masters’. (129) The reform did indeed provide for the
employment of such judges and Kiselev, after a failed attempt to re-educate the peasants, was
force to retract the measure and return to the pre-reform system of district courts. (130) This
was to be in fact the second time Kiselev’s perhaps idealised notion of the peasantry had been
shattered, the first had come some months earlier, during the recruitment for the new militia.

Kiselev had outlined his proposals for the creation of a ‘land militia’ [zemiskaia
strazha] in the first days of 1830. (131) As the Boyars and local authorities had insufficient
experience in the ‘formation and training of military units and the instilling in them of the
necessary discipline’, these tasks were to be performed by Russian officers. Kiselev thus
proposed that 150 officers from the (now former) Second Army under the direction of
General-Major Starov (the former commander of 33rd Chasseurs) ‘train and clothe’ the
Wallachian force. Major Dobizho (a Moldavian serving in the Bug Uhlans) and twenty five
other officers were to train the Moldavian militia. (132) The Wallachian force was to consist of
three regiments (each consisting of two infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons). The chain of command was to follow standard European practice (colonels for regiments, majors for battalions etc.) and its fighting force consist of 3,378 infantry and 1,111 cavalry men (soldiers and officers). With non-combatants, the total force was 4,677 men. The existing Pandour battalions of Lesser Wallachia (half of whom had already deserted) were to be used as cadres for this force. The Moldavian militia was to consist of only one regiment - a total of 1,564 men. The initial formation of this 6,000 man militia was estimated to cost 3.3m piastres, with an annual upkeep of 3.1m. Due to the financial difficulties of the Principalities all weapons were to be supplied by the Russian army. All the points received imperial approval and in May 1830 the search for recruits began.(133)

It is clear that Kiselev and military authorities in St Petersburg from the very beginning envisaged the 'militia' to be as close to a regular force as possible. This was reflected in the subsequent règlement militaire which governed the functions and conduct of the militia.(134) Recruits were to able to form line, column, square and learn a vast amount of detailed regulations relating to the execution of drill.(135) Their main function was to guard the frontiers, though they were assigned additional tasks such as the manning of the cordon sanitaire, the maintenance of 'bon ordre and repos public' and the collection of taxes.(136) The soldiers were to subjected to the strictest discipline and 'even the impression of obstinacy' was liable to result in a court martial. (137) Military courts were established to administer punishments ranging from the reduction of rations to bread and water, to floggings of up to 300 blows.(138)

As a means of inducing recruitment (which was voluntary), the length of service was fixed at six years and privileges, such as exemption of the recruit's family from state taxation, were awarded.(139) Such inducements notwithstanding, the chances of recruiting sufficient numbers without the need for coercive measures was slim. Aside from the Pandours, there was no tradition of military service in the Principalities and certainly not in a regular-type force. The Moldavians, in particular, were noted for their timidity and, in Bessarabia, the Russian authorities refused to introduce recruitment as they were 'not susceptible to even gradual training'.(140)

In the Principalities, the aim of voluntary recruitment failed almost completely and Kiselev was forced to resort to the services of the press gang. In September 1830 Blutte reported that:

The Wallachians are absolutely averse to the new military service, from which some hundreds, who had been enrolled, have already deserted, recourse is now had to force in order to compel them to enlist.(141)
Later in the month, a revolt broke out in the town of Buseo amongst ‘four to five hundred Wallachian peasants, who had been collected for the purpose of being drafted into the new militia’:

Having armed themselves with clubs and stones they declared...their resolution to have recourse to every extremity rather than become soldiers, accompanying their words with such a commencement of violence as rendered it necessary for the opposite party [of Russians] to take refuge in a house.

Only the arrival of Russian soldiers and the threat to open fire diffused the situation.(142) Forced enlistment continued but, even by November, recruitment was ‘not yet half completed owing to continual desertions’. (143) The success in recruiting Boyars and their sons as officers proved no more satisfactory. Kiselev had hoped that service in the militia would afford them an ‘honourable profession’ and instil in them the idea of service to the state. (144) However, the Boyars, like the peasantry, were ‘unaccustomed to the restraint inseparable from military service’ and were ‘in general disgusted’ with the militia, even though officers served for only three years. (145) Those Boyars who did enlist, did so only ‘with the view of gaining the favour or avoiding the disfavour of their protectors’. (146) Suspecting that the main barrier to recruitment was the local population’s fear that they would be used as troops in a future Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev was eventually forced to declare that no recruit would ever be called ‘into warlike service’ and that the militia’s role was purely ‘the maintenance of the police of this country’. (147) This seems to have had some effect and by mid-December, Kiselev conducted a successful review of 250 infantry and 50 cavalry men. They were immediately called into service alongside the Russian occupying forces, which had dwindled to no more than 7,000 men. (148)

The problems of recruitment in Wallachia were however soon eclipsed by events in Moldavia. In March/April 1831 a revolt broke out amongst the ‘naturalised Hungarians’ of the mountainous regions of Western Moldavia. These disturbances spread to the Moldavian population leading to ‘a state of open insurrection against the measure of enrolment for the new militia’. (149) This revolt could not have come at a worst time for Russia. Many troops had been dispatched to assist Diebitsch in his campaign against the Polish rebels, leaving an ‘exceedingly small’ Russian force in the Principalities. (150) Fearing that the disturbances could spread to Bessarabia(151) Kiselev decided to use force, ordering some Cossacks, already despatched from Silistria to Poland, to quell the revolt en route. (152)
By the time the latter had reached Moldavia in mid-May, up to 9,000 peasants were in revolt. (153) The largest single concentration of rebels gathered in the town of Roman, where 1,500 men had shut themselves up in a local monastery. Attempts at a negotiation failed and eventually the Cossacks opened fire killing 72 and wounding 48. The peasants were thus forced to give up a quota of men and their villages were then 'plundered of every removable article'. (154)

What could have forced the Moldavians, who in Liprandi's words, were so timid that 'did not dare...even with fifty men to attack one robber', to take up arms against the Russian army? (155) The Soviet view is that the revolts, though ostensibly about service in the militia, were in reality anti-Boyar movements. (156) There is insufficient evidence for this. Rok Fukc, one of Liprandi's secret agents, reported that prior to the revolt the Moldavians had sent a deputation to Jassy in protest against enforced enlistment. This, however, had been ignored. (157) The peasantry's aversion to service appears to have based on two main reasons; firstly, they feared 'entering a regular army, whose strictness scared them from the very beginning' (158); secondly, due to 'their not unreasonable belief, that in the event of a future invasion of Turkey by the Russians, their own destination would be to serve as auxiliary troops'. (159) Thus, though the peasantry certainly despised the Boyars, the April-May revolts in Moldavia were nevertheless caused by forced enlistment into the militia and were in fact a continuation of the similar disturbances in Wallachia in 1830. (160)

Fortunately for Kiselev, the use of force had salutary effects. By June all disturbances in Moldavia had ceased (161) and by July 1831, a total of 5,024 men had been gathered and recruitment was declared to be at an end. The following month the militia entered service. (162) The latter history of the militia during the period of Russian rule was unremarkable. It numbers, as well as its annual cost, were subject to only relatively minor fluctuations. (163) In 1833, the Russian authorities entertained the idea of increasing the militia to 10,000 men, to meet the potential threat posed by Mohammed Ali's rebellion. The plan was, however, ultimately discarded due to the problems of finding sufficient recruits, as well as due to the extra cost to the Principalities. (164)

What conclusions can be drawn from the Russian experiment? It has been correctly stated that Russia's foremost aim was to create an 'army' of sufficient size and ability as to disrupt a Turkish attack and offer tangible support to Russian forces in a future Turkish war. (165) This was to account for the two defining characteristics of the militia. The first was its almost complete Russification - the militia's organisation and training was based on
the Russian model, it was instructed by Russian officers, armed with Russian weapons and even clothed in Russian uniforms.\(^{(166)}\) The second defining feature was the instilling of a strong regular element into the force. Though the ‘irregular’ Pandours and the other volunteers of 1828-29 had certainly proved their worth in war, they were never truly trusted by the Russian military authorities. Militarily and indeed politically, a disciplined regular-type force was considered more reliable.\(^{(167)}\) Unfortunately, due to the province’s lack of martial spirit and to aversion to ‘regular’ discipline, recruitment for such a force met with almost insurmountable difficulties. Far from being reliable, the militia was plagued by desertions up to 1832 and, no doubt, beyond.\(^{(168)}\)

One interesting question is why Kiselev, whose reformist credentials were self-evident, did not try to oppose the Gatchina instincts of St Petersburg and adapt the militia’s organisation to suit the ‘irregular’ traditions of the province, or, at least, lessen the emphasis on harsh discipline and drill. Though the evidence is incomplete, one suspects that Kiselev favoured a regular force, not so much for reasons military as political. For the general thrust of Russian reforms were towards the development of statehood and ultimately nationhood in the Principalities. The creation of a ‘national army’ could thus serve the wider role as an institution embodying and promoting the idea of service to the state and even in developing national self-consciousness. The existence of such an aim was perhaps evident in the subsequent awarding to the militia of its own ‘odes, hymns, marches...national flags and orchestral bands’.\(^{(169)}\) There is some evidence that Kiselev was so taken with the idea of the ‘national army’ that he favoured supplementing the militia with a ’Landwehr on the Prussian system...to initiate the greater part of the male population in the practice of bearing arms’.\(^{(170)}\) This system of universal short-term conscription, if successfully executed, may have provided the answer to all his aims. For, firstly, short-term service may have lessened the peasants unwillingness to serve, secondly, the system would have created large number of reservists, thus increasing the support to Russian forces in a future war and, thirdly, universal service may have helped instil in the population at large the idea of service to the nation.

On the other hand, it could be argued that such ideas were naive and idealistic and would have only contributed to the difficulties already encountered in the attempt to introduce European military ideas to a province still accustomed to ‘Asiatic’ ways. This was certainly the view of Liprandi, who, being a great believer in partisan/irregular warfare, was one of the harshest critics of the introduction of western-style regular elements into the militia. Liprandi argued that the Russians succeeded only in creating a force that was
totally alien to a population that feared all ‘new innovations’ and was unaccustomed to strict discipline. He believed that the militia was despised by almost all who served in it and that, as a consequence, Russia’s prestige in the region was greatly compromised. (171)

It is difficult to disagree with this view.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The final aspects of Kiselev’s reforms worthy of attention are those relating to the economy of the Principalities. In contrast to the political reforms, here Kiselev’s influence on policy was very apparent. (172) His underlying aim was to increase the province’s agricultural production through the liberalisation of internal and external trade, the definition of taxation rates and through improvements to the region’s infrastructure, especially its roads and ports. The motives behind these reforms were threefold. First, to improve the ‘well-being of the population’, thus demonstrating the benefits of Russian rule and ensuring the longevity of the overall reform package. (173) Second, to increase the level of trade between the Principalities and Russia. (174) For Kiselev realised at an early stage that, whilst after Adrianople Russia had become politically dominant in the Principalities, economically her influence remained insignificant compared to Austria’s. Kiselev aimed to redress this imbalance by removing the many privileges foreign merchants (who were predominantly Austrian) enjoyed in the province. (175) Finally, an undeniable motive, was to improve the Principalities’ worth as an operational base in a future Turkish war through the increase in its grain production and improvement in its road network.

One of Kiselev’s first actions upon assuming the Presidency was to remove the many ‘feudal’ barriers to domestic trade. He abolished the system of internal customs and tariffs which existed within each Principality, lowered taxes on agricultural products sold in towns, allowed total free trade in salt, replaced the payment of state taxes in kind (a source of great corruption) with fixed levels of tax paid in piastres, stabilised the exchange rate of the local currency by fixing it to the Dutch guilder and banned the circulation of low-grade Turkish currency. (176) An ambitious programme of town improvements was then undertaken, resulting it the building of bridges, creation of a postal system and the laying of (hitherto non-existent) roads. The greatest achievement was perhaps the building of the Jassy-Bucharest-Silistria highway, which, aside from its benefits to the economy, was designed with an eye to a future military use. (177)

With regards to external trade, Kiselev’s primary aim was to wrest its domination by foreign powers and increase the lucrative export of grain. Prior to 1829, the Porte had
regulated all the Principalities’ foreign trade and demanded that all grain be imported to
Ottoman lands at fixed prices. The incentive to produce grain was thus greatly lowered and
most of the Principalities’ traders concentrated on the more profitable export of
livestock.(178) Whilst the aforementioned Separate Act of the Adrianople Treaty had
removed all barriers to the free trade of the Principalities with other Ottoman lands, the
problem of Austria remained. The latter had secured privileges within the Principalities
akin to that of a colonial Power. Her imports were subjected to a paltry three per cent tariff
and she had secured the right to export all goods out of the Principalities free of any
tariff.(179) In order to avoid competition from the Principalities’ own merchants, the
Austrians had persuaded the Hospodars to place high tariffs on their exports to Habsburg
lands.(180) Kiselev thus took a range of measures designed to ‘repel...the influence of
foreigners’. Tariffs were changed to give local traders parity or even advantages over their
foreign counterparts. In addition, the right to export all goods was extended to local traders
in order break up the monopolies of foreign merchants.(181) Such reforms would however
have meant little without the improvement to the Principalities’ transport system. A great
barrier to all trade had been the absence of ports on the Danube. Moldavia had only Galatz
whilst Wallachia had none at all. Kiselev thus turned his attention to transforming Brailov
(returned to Wallachian control at Adrianople) into a premier port. This opened up the
Danube to trade and in the period 1831-33, imports to Brailov increased from 0.57m
piastres to 1.94m and exports from 1m to 9.68m.(182)

The results of Kiselev’s economic reforms were certainly impressive. Despite the
losses to the Treasury resulting from the abolition of many tariffs, Kiselev’s war on
corruption and embezzlement by officials allowed for state income to increase
significantly.(183) The freeing of foreign trade likewise had important results. The total
volume of trade increased from 54.7m piastres in 1831 to 118.8m in 1833 with the trade
balance in favour of the Principalities rising from 11.2m to 23.3m.(184) Trade continued to
expand over the next decade and by 1844 it was worth around 150m piastres.(185) The
defining feature of this new trade was the volume of grain now being exported. Taking
advantage of its communications with the Danube and the Black Sea, as well as the
abolition of the Corn Laws in Britain, by the mid-1840s, the Principalities had become one
of Europe’s largest exporters of grain.(186)
Following the Russo-Turkish Convention of 17 January 1834 OS, Kiselev's forces began their evacuation of Principalities and, within months, the period of Russian occupation had come to a close. Although Kiselev relinquished his post as President, Russia hoped to ensure its continued influence over the province by electing its new Hospodars (after which future Hospodars were to be elected by an extraordinary Boyar assembly). The Russian nominations - A. Ghika for Wallachia and M. Sturdza for Moldavia were duly accepted by the Porte and they entered service that year. The accepted wisdom, both amongst Russian and foreign observers, was that the Hospodars would be 'deprived of all power of self-agency' and be at the command of the Russian consuls who had already 'been invested by the Treaty of Akkerman with nearly dictatorial powers over the Hospodars'. It was even suggested by some that 'Russia had now even a stronger hold of the Provinces than whilst she actually occupied their territory'. Only time would tell the accuracy of such a prediction.

Conclusions on Kiselev's Reforms

The reforms undertaken by Kiselev were inspired by the desire to transform the Principalities into a secure Russian protectorate. This aim, of course, was not new and can indeed be may be traced back to the times of Peter. What was new, however, was the method adopted to achieve this end, as well as the scale of its ambition. Hitherto, Russia had, by incremental steps, extended her influence over the province predominantly by limiting the power of the Porte to interfere in its domestic affairs. Whilst Russia had also attempted some piecemeal, ad hoc, reform of the Principalities' administration - in order limit the power of the pro-Ottoman Phanariot Hospodars and win the favour of the native Boyars - prior to the 1820s, Russia had no concrete plans for the wholesale remodeling of the province's internal administration. In contrast, the reforms of 1829-34 aimed at nothing less than the liquidation of the Divan administrative system and the remnants of the century-old Phanariot regime, as well as the almost complete separation of the Principalities from her Ottoman suzerain.

The role of the Second Army in the origins and development of this new policy direction was of much significance. The investigations of its General Staff in the 1820s had, firstly, amply demonstrated the great potential value the Principalities as a forward base of operations in a future Turkish war. The substantial benefits of such a base, especially as a source of supplies, was, however, hindered by the inefficient and corrupt Divan system and it was considered that only its replacement (under Russian auspices) by a modern, rational, administration could alleviate this state of affairs. Secondly, Liprandi's
research had shown conclusively that despite Russia’s diplomatic activity in the region and her efforts to patronise the Boyars, the latter still looked to Vienna and even Constantinople rather than to St Petersburg.

These conclusions, added to Russia’s natural desire for more influence over the Ottoman Empire, made certain the enactment of a far-reaching reform of the Principalities following the end of the Turkish war in 1829. The guiding principle of reform was to impart to the province the precepts of European statecraft - enlightened rule within a conservative political and social framework, to bring the benefits of civilisation to all classes. In this fashion, the province was to be transformed into a prosperous, half-Westernised statelet and Russia’s prestige assured amongst the whole population.

How successful were the reforms? The historiographical debates have been dominated by the extent to which the reforms corresponded to the interests of the Principalities themselves and assisted their development towards nationhood. Whilst this question has of course much interest,(191) we are primarily interested in another - how successful was Russia in strengthening its influence over its protectorate and, even without annexation, ensuring that, in Kiselev’s words, ‘without revolution in Europe and the expense of maintaining our military forces here, our border will be on the Danube’. (192)

Certain perceptive observers, such as Liprandi, had, even before the withdrawal of Russian forces in 1834, already become exceedingly pessimistic of the durability of the reforms.(193) His argument was that the reforms were overly quixotic in design. They were far too enlightened for the native population and, far from strengthening her influence, Russia succeeded only in alienating every class. The first-class Boyars remained utterly opposed to the destruction of the Phanariot regime and the resulting loss of their means of corruption and exploitation. The second-class Boyars, who were traditionally more pro-Russian, resented the new political system as it was weighted heavily in favour of the first class. Finally, the peasantry, hitherto ‘always devoted to Russia’, feared all new innovations and especially service in the new militia:

Such were the fruits of the imprudent and ill-conceived actions of the administration of the Principalities after the peace of Adrianople; an administration which paid attention neither to the mentality of the population nor future political relations nor to keeping the opinion of at least one class favourable to Russia, which is guided by the purest of intentions towards the well-being of all peoples...In a word, there, where not one class has matured sufficiently to accept any European institution whatsoever, even those of the most salutary of design...in this land...it is almost impossible, without exceptional effort, to introduce such institutions and even more difficult to implant them securely for ever. Does not Greece, which has received the constitution of the educated Swiss, serve as an example to this? (194)
Whilst Liprandi was ultimately proved wrong in his belief that the reforms would last only as long as the Russian occupation, his thesis has much to recommend it. The Boyars, forced into accepting the new règlement in 1831, far from becoming reconciled, proceeded only to 'persist more strongly than ever' in opposing them. Russia appears to have contributed to her own difficulties by the choice of the new Hospodars in 1834. Despite warnings from Liprandi and others that M. Sturdza was an untrustworthy intrigant, for reasons unclear, the latter was nominated as Moldavian Hospodar. Though certainly 'little attached to Russia' Sturdza was nevertheless hated by the Moldavian Boyars and his rule was marked by corruption and continued contacts with other powers. The choice of A. Ghika as Wallachian Hospodar was, on the surface, somewhat better as he was a 'devoted slave to the Russian Government'. Ghika had already been entrusted with the command of the Wallachian militia, 1831-34, and the Russians seemed to have used this period to groom the future Hospodar, transforming him into a Wallachian counterpart of Nicholas I. Blutte could speak of 'his Russian military mania, which induces him to be continually playing at soldiers with his militia, under the inspection of a General Starov, acting as his adjutant-General'. Thus aside from being despised by the Boyars for his subservience to Russia, Ghika's popularity also suffered from his association with the militia and his growing reputation as a martinet. He was deeply unpopular with the peasantry, primarily:

...from a dislike to a military chief: they saying [sic] that they had expected to be at length rid of the Muscovites, whereas they now perceive that they are still destined to be governed by a Russian General.

Thus, as Liprandi had predicted in 1831, the reforms left no one content and Russia's prestige greatly damaged.

The explosion, when it came in 1848, arrived however not from the pre-reform generation of Boyars, as Liprandi believed, but the following one. For, as the Tsarist historian S. S. Tatishchev correctly surmised, the underlying contradiction in the reforms was that Russia, in awarding its protectorate the foundation of Western-style representative government, pushed the province towards the liberal West and away from autocratic Russia. Moreover, in liberating the province from a semi-Asiatic past and awarding it the foundation of statehood, Russia sowed the seeds of Rumanian nationalism. Its development was assisted especially by the younger generation of post-reform Boyars who, far more than their fathers, were fascinated by the political and cultural life of developed
European states. In increasing numbers they travelled to France for their education, where they fell under the spell of the contemporary Romantic nationalism. Increased consciousness of their Latin heritage ultimately led the Boyars to dream of national liberation from not only the Turks but the Russians as well. In 1848, the Principalities joined the forces of revolution and rebelled against their patrons.

Russia’s economic reforms in the Principalities were to prove no more beneficial to her than the political ones. For whilst the reforms greatly expanded the province’s economy, the backwardness of Russian manufacturing meant that Kiselev proved unable to oppose Austrian dominance and failed, as he had hoped, to ‘replace Austrian goods with Russian’. In 1832, (after the abolition of privileges to Austrian merchants), barely six per cent of the Principalities’ trade was conducted with Russia, whilst Austria accounted for nearly forty per cent and Turkey over half. Even more disturbing was the growth of the Principalities’ grain production. Kiselev’s reforms were so successful that by the late 1830s the Principalities came in fact to compete with Novorossiia as exporters of grain to European markets.

Given the ultimately unsuccessful nature of the Russian reforms, one should ask whether there had been any alternative to the destruction of the Phanariot regime and the creation of an autonomous statelet? The most obvious was that of annexation. This was favoured by both Zheltukhin and Kiselev, primarily due to their accurate prediction that the Principalities were a latent competitor to Russia in agricultural exports. In keeping with the anti-annexationist ‘weak neighbour’ policy Nicholas ruled out this option. The outright independence of the Principalities was likewise dismissed, as it would almost certainly have resulted in a reduction of Russian influence and the increase of that of Austria. This left autonomy as the sole remaining option. One could argue, as did Liprandi, that the precise form of autonomy should have been styled less on the European model, or at least introduced in stages, however this would probably have only delayed the problems inherent in the granting of any form of increased independence. For a contradiction in the ‘weak neighbour’ policy was that, in wresting Ottoman control from the European Christian provinces by the granting of domestic autonomy, Russia fostered the development of nationalism. This was as true in the Principalities as it had been in Greece and Serbia. Whilst Balkan nationalism could be advantageous to Russian interests (especially a conservative variety stressing pan-Orthodoxy or pan-Slavicism), the doctrine in its more revolutionary form - stressing national self-determination, was obviously damaging to Russia’s aim of turning the emerging Balkan states into willing protectorates.
For two reasons, Rumanian nationalism was an especially dangerous breed. Firstly, the Rumanians’ Latin origin, though hitherto long forgotten and resurrected only in the 1830s and 1840s in a somewhat contrived manner, weakened any allegiance to Mother Russia. Secondly, the ideas of national self-determination inevitably raised the territorial question and ultimately the quest to gather the historical Rumanian lands - Transylvania from Austria and Bessarabia from Russia. This latent problem was exposed following Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War and the forced cession of Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia in 1856. Russian diplomacy worked ceaselessly to reverse this decision and Bessarabia was destined to remain a key area of dispute in Russo-Rumanian relations well into the twentieth century. Thus, we may repeat our earlier remark that Russia, in fulfilling her ‘historical mission’ and laying the foundation for the national independence of the Ottoman Christians, succeeded in working against her own true interests.
(1) The political history of the Principalities was in many senses unique amongst the Christians of the Ottomans' European Empire. Unlike the lands of the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars and others, the Principalities were never ruled as Turkish Pashaliks. Instead, the ruling Boyar class retained their indigenous organs of government - primarily, the institutions of the Hospodar and the Divan. Whilst their power, especially with regard to foreign policy and military matters, was subjected to Ottoman control, much autonomy over domestic affairs was retained. Despite these concessions, the Boyars were never fully reconciled to Turkish rule and looked to other Powers, primarily Austria and Russia, for patronage and possible liberation, B. Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State*, 1821-1878 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. xi, 1-3.


(5) Printed in *VPR* I/1, 1960, pp.713-15. This Turkish proclamation imposed restrictions on the Porte's and Hospodars' powers to raise *ad hoc* taxes in the Principalities.


(7) Jelavich, *Russia*, p. 3.

(8) Grosul, *Reformy*, p. 137. As shall be shown, Russia's hold over these Boyars was to prove very transitory.

(9) *VPR* II/VI, 1985, p. 504, Nesselrode to M. S. Vorontsov and A. I. Ribeauville, not later 1 June 1826 OS.


(12) Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 132-40. Many of these ideas were incorporated into the eventual *règlements* of 1831/32, see below. In 1739, the Hospodars had reduced the Boyar hierarchy to two categories - the Neamuri (the Great or first-class Boyars) and the Mazili (the Lesser or second and third-class Boyars). The meaning and importance of this distinction lay entirely upon the administrative posts each group was permitted to hold. The Great Boyars could hold all the important posts in the Treasury, Judiciary and ecclesiastical system, whilst the Lesser Boyars competed for the minor positions in the rudimentary state apparatus, Floreescu, 'The Struggle against Russia', p. 13.


(15) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2, 'Chast' V: Opisanie proshedshikh pokhodov Rossii protiv Turok', 1827. Hereafter 'Opisanie'.


(19) For more details on the social and economic structure of the Principalities in this period, see Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 44-126.

(20) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2, f.199, 'Opisanie'.


(24) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2, f.209, 'Opisanie'.


(30) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2, f.191, ‘Opisanie’.
(31) Grosul, Reformy, p. 201.
(32) Saunders, Russia, pp. 130-32. For details of these reforms, see Zablotskii-
Desiatovskii, Kiselev, II; N. M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krestiane i reforma P. D.
Kiseleva (Moscow, 1946-58), 2 vols.
(33) See above, p. 72.
(34) See above, p. 107 (footnote 61). The archive source of this work in cited in Grosul,
Reformy, p. 111.
(35) RGVIA, fond 673, op.2, d.6, f.6, ‘Tainye porucheniia, avgust 1827-avgust 1829’, by
Liprandi, 29 June 1831 OS.
(36) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.673, ff.49-51v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 10 October 1826 OS.
(37) Ibid., ff.52-52v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 26 October 1826 OS.
(38) Ibid., 53-54v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 30 October 1826 OS.
(39) RGVIA, fond 673, op.2, d.6, ff.1-2, ‘Tainye porucheniia’.
(40) Ibid., f.2v.
(41) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, d.1, ch.2, ff.1-161v - contains Liprandi’s reports (6
November 1827-12 March 1828 OS) on Moldavia’s budget, economy, budget, monasteries,
social structure, roads and topography. RGVIA, fond 673, op.1, contains his reports on
Turkish preparations for war (d.318,320); description of Danubian fortresses (d.330); list
of locals willing to serve as Russian spies (d.322).
(42) Greeks employed by Russia as diplomatic officials in the Levant.
(43) RGVIA, fond 673, op.1, d.343, f. 4, ‘O sostojanii umov v Moldavii’, by Liprandi, 31
January 1828 OS.
(44) Ibid., fond 673, op.1, d.231, f. 3v, ‘Kratkoe obozrenie proizshestvi v Moldavii i v
Valakhii, 1812-29’, by Liprandi, n.d.
(45) Ibid., fond 673, op.1, d.343, f.3v, ‘O sostojanii’.
(47) RGVIA, op.1, d.344, ff.1-6, ‘Svoistvo i karakter nekotorykh boiar Moldavii’, 31
January 1828 OS. Grosul’s statement, Reformy, p. 137, that in the 1820s ‘Moldavian
Boyars, on the whole, were Russophiles’, thus appears to be incorrect.
(48) Liprandi reserved these observations ‘ for the Boyars alone’, in contrast, ‘the common
people have far better characteristics. True, they are timid and lazy...but are humble,
patient, gentle and in no way inclined to criminal activity’. Evidence of this was to be
found in Bessarabia, where Moldavian peasants were hardly ever brought to trial, RGVIA,
fond 673, op.1, d.343, f.2v, ‘O sostojanii’.
(49) Ibid., ff. 1-3.
(50) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS.
The removal of the Hospodars I. Sturdza and G. Ghika (who had been selected in 1822
without Russian consent) was almost inevitable. They were correctly suspected of
collaborating with the Porte and Austria, see Gentz’s correspondence with G. Ghika in
Gentz, Dépêches inédites, III. The Russian authorities ensured that neither the Hospodars
nor any Boyars wishing to quit the Principalities, were permitted to leave for Austria, PRO,
(51) VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 386, Nicholas I to Pahlen, 10 February 1828 OS.
(52) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4687, ff.1-12v, Nesselrode to Pahlen, 3 March 1828 OS.
(53) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 154-55.
(54) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.1038, d.5, ff.8-11v, Report of Liprandi, n.d., from
context February 1828.
(55) Ibid., ff.12-12v, 14-15v, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 11 and 22 February 1828 OS;
ff.22-22v, Kiselev to Liprandi, 12 April 1828 OS. Liprandi was assisting in the operation of
his intelligence network by his brother, P. P. Liprandi (1796-1864), Russkii biograficheskii
(56) VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 702, Nicholas I to Wittgenstein, 28 February 1828 OS.
(57) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.22, ch.2, f.28, ‘Opisanie’.
(58) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.103, d.1 ch1, f.6, 11-18v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 9 November 1827 OS.

(59) This placed the army in conflict with the Treasury, which, in order to reduce the cost of the war, believed exactly the opposite, see above, p. 151.
(60) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS; ibid., ff.77-86v, Wittgenstein to Diebitch, n.d., received 29 November 1827 OS.
(61) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.61, d.2, ch.2, ‘Opisanie’, ff.55-59.
(62) See above, p. 115.
(63) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.103, d.1, ch.1, ff.6, 11-18v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 9 November 1827 OS.
(64) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS.
(65) VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 469-74, Nesselrode to Pahlen, 3 April 1828 OS; p. 702, Nicholas I to Wittgenstein, 28 February 1828 OS.
(66) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.77-86v, Wittgenstein to Diebitch, n.d., received 29 November 1827 OS.
(67) VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 469-74, Nesselrode to Pahlen, 3 April 1828 OS. It is perhaps relevant to note that in March 1828 Nicholas had just issued an ukase abolishing Bessarabia’s semi-autonomous status as defined in a Statute of 1818. This essentially transformed Bessarabia into a regular Russian guberniia by removing the local customs and powers of the Moldavian Boyars, Jewsbury, Bessarabia, p. 152-54. Russia’s first-hand experience in Bessarabia of the extent to which Boyar independence and the Divan system formed a great barrier to any rational administration may have convinced Nicholas of the necessity of reforming the Principalities, see ibid., pp. 77-154.
(68) The fullest account of Pahlen’s rule is in Grosul, Reformy, pp. 150-72.
(69) Ibid., p. 153.
(70) Ibid., p. 157. The idea of compelling the Boyars to contribute to the war effort seems to have been first suggested by Liprandi, RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.342, f.1, Liprandi to Kiselev, 19 January 1828 OS. In the course of 1828, Liprandi was informed by a Pandour captain that up to 12 million pud of hay could be found in the rich Boyar and Monastery lands, ibid., d.375, f.1, letter of 1828. (One pud is equivalent to 16.38 kg.).
(71) See above, p. 152.
(72) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 158-59.
(73) Ibid., p. 160.
(74) The Russians were so desperate for supplies that they even forced British subjects (mostly Ionians) to give up grain, forage and use their homes for lodging of Russian soldiers, PRO, FO 97/402, ff.19-20, Blutte to Cowley, 12 September 1828.
(75) PRO, FO 97/402, ff. 21-21v, Blutte to Cowley, 15 September 1828.
(76) Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp. 240-41.
(77) PRO, FO 97/402, ff.33v-34, Blutte to Cowley, 27 March 1829.
(78) Grosul, Reformy, p. 159. On 25 June 1828 Wallachia was hit by a hurricane, destroying much of its corn and causing an estimated 4m piastres worth of damage, PRO, FO 97/402, f.16, Blutte to Cowley, 27 June 1828.
(79) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 164-66. A copy of the plan for the restructuring of the Wallachian Divan may be found in PRO, FO 97/402, ff. 44-45, enclosed in Blutte to Cowley, 15 June 1829.
(80) Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp. 240-44.
(81) Grosul, Reformy, p. 179.
(82) PRO, FO 97/402, ff.33-33v, Blutte to Cowley, 27 March 1829.
(83) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 179-80.
(84) Ibid, pp. 180-82.
Draft proposals had, however, been formed as early as 1826, probably by A. S. Sturdza and D. V. Dashkov, see  *VPR* II/VI, 1985, pp. 833-42, Instructions to M. S. Vorontsov and A. I. Ribbeaupierre (at Akkerman), 9 June 1826 OS.


*VPR* II/VIII, 1994, Treaty of Adrianople, p. 263. In the Separate Act, *ibid.*, pp. 271-72, other advantages were secured for the Principalities. Certain districts on the left bank of the Danube still in Turkish hands such as those surrounding Brailov, Giurgevo and Turno were returned to its control; its tribute to the Porte was fixed, Muslims were barred from residing on its territory and a national militia was created. Following a delimitation of the Danube in March 1830, eighty eight islands, comprising 202,212 desiatiny, were transferred from Turkish to Wallachian control, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.20v, 'Otchet no upravleniu Kniazhestvami...1829-34', Kiselev, n.d. (One desiatina is equivalent to 1.08 hectares/ 2.7 acres)


RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1007, ff.2-2v, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 12 September 1829 OS.

RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff. 116-17, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 12 October 1829 OS. Kiselev justified this demand by arguing that the 'administration in a country occupied by an occupational corps, by its very essence, can be only military', Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 320-21.

PRO, FO 97/402, ff.134-34v, 136, Blutte to Cowley, 26 and 30 November 1829.

Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 339-40, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 20 February 1830 OS.

For discussion of the various definitions of 'patrimonial' rule see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, pp. 22-24. Insofar as the Hospodars treated the Principalities as almost their own private property, their rule can certainly be described as 'patrimonial'. As the post of Hospodar was always bought, the incumbent used his short reign (usually seven years or under) to compensate himself as fully as possible. Kiselev estimated that the Hospodars expropriated up to two-thirds of state income, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f. 36, 'Otchet po upravleniu Kniazhestvami...1829-34', by Kiselev, n.d. (hereafter 'Otchet'). The corrupt nature of the Phanariot-Hospodar period 'dealt a decisive blow' to the morals of the Boyars and other classes, RGIA, op.1, d.230, f.1v, 'Kratkoe obozrenie kniazhestv', by Liprandi, 10 August 1831 OS.

PRO, FO 97/403, ff.95-111v, Speech of 10 March 1831 OS, enclosed in ff.91-93v, Blutte to Cowley, 25 March 1831. Quote from f.95.

*ibid.*, f.200v, Blutte to F. R. Forbes, 3 October 1831.

Tatischev, *Vneshniaia politika*, p. 325. This view is supported by Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, who argues, in addition, that Kiselev, for humanitarian reasons, favoured the lower orders and that he thus found himself in opposition to Russia's official policy of patronising the Boyars, see discussion in Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 290-91. In contrast the Soviet view is that there was no between distinction between the views of St Petersburg and Kiselev. Both are said to have favoured some concessions to the peasantry as they understood that their continued exploitation would have severe consequences for the economy of the Principalities, *ibid.*, pp. 290-92. Grosul maintains that whilst Russia was forced into making 'concessions towards the masses', the overall aim of reform was, nevertheless, the increase in Boyar power and the 'strengthening of the feudal order', p. 381.

RGVIA, d.672, ff.72-72v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 6 November 1827 OS.


RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, 'Otchet', f. 38.

*ibid.*, f.42.
(103) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 384-85, Kiselev to Nesselrode, 8 March 1832 OS.


(106) PRO, FO 97/403, f.98, Speech of 10 March 1831 OS.

(107) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 382-83, Kiselev to Nesselrode, 8 March 1832 OS.

(108) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, ff.9-12, ‘Otchet’.

(109) In order not to give the impression that the reforms were being dictated by a Russian General, Kiselev did not directly interfere in the work of the committees. He did, however, secure some influence over its proceedings (the precise nature of which is unclear) through his private correspondence with Minciaky, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, p. 348.


(111) PRO, FO 97/402, ff.167-68, Blutte to Cowley, 15 February 1830. Blutte’s own characterisation of the (Wallachian) peasant was that he ‘closely resembles that...attributed to the West Indian negro, namely, that he is prone to idleness, revengeful, careless of future or distant evil and having once secured the means of subsistence, cannot be roused except by force to any further exertion’, FO 97/403, f.212v, Blutte to Forbes, 7 November 1831.

(112) PRO, FO 97/402, ff.235-39v, Blutte to Heytesbury, 29 January 1830.


(114) *Ibid.*. The Russians were in fact fully aware of M. Sturdza’s appetite for intrigue, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff. 138-42v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 28 March 1830 OS; RGI, fond 673, op.1, d.230, f.9v, ‘Krakoe obozrenie kniazhestv’, by Liprandi, 10 August 1831 OS.

(115) Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 261-62, 273-76. The Wallachian assembly (which convened between March and May) accepted reforms far more willingly than the Moldavian (May-October). According to Blutte, the latter relented only following the defeat of the Polish Revolt in 1831, PRO, FO 97/403, ff.200-200v, Blutte to Forbes, 3 October 1831.


(119) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.130-30v, Blutte to Cowley, 15 April 1831.


(122) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 384-85, Kiselev to Nesselrode, 8 March 1832 OS.

(123) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.93-93v, Blutte to Cowley, 25 March 1831.


(126) *Ibid.*, ff.183-83v, Blutte to Cowley, 2 June 1831. By this date, Blutte believed that the plot had already been foiled by a counter intrigue of anti-Russian Boyars and that Kiselev was now forced to ‘feign ignorance’ of the whole affair.

(127) *Ibid.*, f.294, Blutte to Forbes, 16 April 1832. As for Kiselev’s alleged plot to become Hospodar, it is true that in May 1831 the special committee of Wallachian Boyars offered Kiselev the rights of citizenship in *Wallachia*. Apparently, Kiselev refused so as not to arouse the suspicion of the European powers, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 421-22. In 1842, Kiselev was eventually awarded Wallachian citizenship, according to one account, as a mark of respect for his reforms, *ibid.*, to another, Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 110, in a (failed) plot to become Hospodar of the province. My own opinion is that it is most unlikely that Kiselev aimed to become Hospodar in 1829-34 and that the Tsar would never
have allowed it for fear of further alienating Austria and Britain. The alleged plot of 1842
requires further research.

(128) PRO, FO 97/403, f.185v, Blutte to Cowley, 16 August 1831.
(129) Ibid., ff.208-08v, Blutte to Forbes, 4 November 1831.
(130) Ibid., f.228, Blutte to Forbes, 13 January 1832. The peasantry, however, continued
their campaign against the Boyars by other means, refusing to gather the harvest or sell their
grain and firewood in the towns, ibid., f.210-10v, Blutte to Forbes, 7 November 1831.
(131) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.99, d.14, ff.1-2v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 6 January
1830 OS and ff.20-22v, supplementary proposals, n.d. This subject has received limited
(132) In May 1830 Dobizho was replaced by Colonel Makarov, RGVIA, fond 438, d.112,
ff.4-5v, ‘Zapiska o formirovaniyii zemskoi strazhi’, anon., December 1831.
(133) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.99, d.14, ff.7-9v, A. I. Chernyshev to Diebitsch,
14 February 1830 OS; ff.45-56, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 31 May 1830 OS.
(134) RGVIA, fond 438, d.15, 46-49; fond VUA, d.17273-74. These règlements were
closely based on those of the Russian army. The main authors were Kiselev, Diebitsch and
A. I. Chernyshev. They were completed in September 1831, Grosul, Reformy, p. 232.
(135) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.17273-74.
(136) RGVIA, fond 438, d.49, f.2. Règlement militaire.
(137) Ibid., d.46, f.25. Règlement militaire.
(138) Ibid., d.15, 1-22v. Règlement militaire.
(139) Grosul, Reformy, p. 231.
(140) Jewsbury, Bessarabia, p. 99. Liprandi attributed the loss of the martial spirit to the
Hospodars’ former practice of employing foreign mercenaries, RGIA, fond 673, op.1,
d.230, f.4v, ‘Kratkoe obozrenie Kniazhest’, 10 August 1831 OS.
(141) PRO, FO 97/403, f.23v, Blutte to Cowley, 10 September 1831.
(142) Ibid., ff.26-26v, Blutte to Cowley, 19 September 1831.
(143) Ibid., f.59v, Blutte to Cowley, 12 November 1830. Many deserters fled to the
mountains with their weapons to ‘form themselves into troops of banditti [sic]’, ibid, f.129,
Blutte to Cowley, 15 April 1831.
(144) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.42, ‘Otchet’.
(145) PRO, FO 97/403, f.59v, Blutte to Cowley, 12 November 1830.
(146) Ibid., f.76, Blutte to Cowley, 17 January 1831.
(147) Ibid., ff.67-67v, Blutte to Cowley, 3 December 1830.
(148) Ibid., ff.70-70v, Blutte to Cowley, 20 December 1830.
(149) Ibid., f.124, Blutte to Cowley, 8 April 1831.
(150) Ibid., f.127, Blutte to Cowley, 15 April 1831.
(151) RGVIA, fond 438, d.112, ff.1b-3, Kiselev to A. I. Chernyshev, 6 May 1831 OS.
(152) PRO, FO 97/403, f.131v, Blutte to Cowley, 15 April 1831.
(153) RGVIA, fond 438, d.112, ff.1b-3, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 6 May 1831 OS.
(154) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.154-55, Blutte to Cowley, 16 May 1831.
(155) RGIA, fond 673, op.2, d.407, ‘O tainoi politsiy’, by Liprandi, 8 August 1831 OS.
(156) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 254, 258.
(157) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.299, f.3, Rok Fuks to Liprandi, 20 May 1831 OS.
(158) Ibid., op.1, d.230, f.14, ‘Kratkoe obozrenie’, 10 August 1831 OS.
(159) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.129-29v, Blutte to Cowley, 15 April 1831.
(160) Whilst it is true that some peasants were revolutionalised by the rebellion and even
proceeded to ‘refuse to acknowledge in the Boyars...any proprietorship in the soil which
they claim as their own’, ibid., f.141v, Blutte to Cowley, 25 April 1831, there is no doubt
that the primary ‘cause’ of the revolt was their opposition to the militia. Kiselev’s own
explanation - that the revolt was caused by rumours of a Turkish attack, Zablotskiy-
Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 365-66, was probably designed to deflect responsibility away
from himself. Interestingly, Kiselev's militia received a far better response from the Hungarians living across the Austrian border in Cronstadt. Here, 'the common soldiery', believing the Russians 'supporters of liberal constitutions', thought the militia offered a career open to talent, with 'the faculty of rising...from the rank of private soldiers to the grade of colonel', ibid., ff.335-35v, Blutte to F. Lamb, 11 June 1832. Blutte was correct to dismiss such beliefs as 'mere delusion' as the officer corps was dominated by the local nobility.

(161) PRO, FO 97/403, f.179, Blutte to Cowley, 13 June 1831.

(162) RGVIA, fond 438, d.112, ff.4-5v, 'Report on the Formation of the Militia', anon., December 1831. The total size of the militia was reduced from 6,000 to 5,000 by reducing the composition of the Moldavian militia to one battalion and one squadron (no doubt as a response to the revolt), RGVIA, d.944, f. 18, 'Otchet'. Though the exact details of its composition remain unclear, the militia certainly contained many Pandours and other volunteers of the 1828-29 war, Grosul, Reformy, pp. 231-32. Judging from the propensity of the (many) deserters from the militia to subsequently form themselves into bands of brigands (armed with weapons stolen from the militia) it seems that many recruits were drawn from the more undesirable sections of society, PRO, FO 97/403, ff.333v-35, Blutte to Lamb, 11 June 1832.

(163) Size of militia in 1832 - 4760 men; 1833 - 5,782; Cost of militia in 1830 - 3.2m piastres, 1831- 3.8m, 1832 - 3.3m, 1833 - no data. RGVIA, fond 438, d.112, ff.4v-5v, 'Zapiska o formirovanni', December 1831; ff.6-8v, 'Report', anon., 1832; ibid, d.22, ff.1-2, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 9 January 1833 OS. Added to the cost of maintaining the occupying Russian forces, at least 40m during 1828-34, Grosul, Reformy, p. 327, it is clear that a very large percentage of the Principalities income (which averaged annually at 11m, 1828-29 and 21m, 1830-33, RGVIA, d.944, fond VUA, f.26, 'Otchet') was expended on the military.

(164) RGVIA, fond 438, d.17, ff.1-1v, 10, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 9 January 1833 OS; ff.3-3v, Chernyshev to Kiselev, 22 November 1832 OS; ibid., d.22, ff.1-8v, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 9 January 1833 OS; ff.27-28, Nesselrode to Chernyshev, 30 January 1833 OS; ff.43-44v, Report of the War Ministry, 21 December 1833 OS. The Mohammed Ali crisis resulted in the despatch of the Russian fleet to Constantinople to protect the Sultan against a possible attack by the Egyptians. As a result, Blutte believed, that 'the Principalities can scarcely be henceforth considered as an object of much interest to the Russians under the point of view of serving as a future base of eventual military operations against Constantinople, a capital which in consequence of recent events, they may at pleasure reach by sea and in a direct line', PRO, FO 97/404, f.201v, Blutte to Lamb, 6 June 1834. Blutte's argument was, however, incorrect. The Russians entered Constantinople only with the express consent of the Sultan. Should Russia and Turkey again go to war, it was highly unlikely that Russia would risk forcing the Bosphorus and thus the value of the Principalities as an operational base remained. For more on this subject, see below, Chapter X.

(165) Grosul, Reformy, p. 234.

(166) Ibid.

(167) As noted, the Pandours had taken part in Vladimirescu's 1821 revolt whilst Marmarchev and other irregulars of the 1828-29 war had organised an uprising in Bulgaria in 1830.

(168) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.333v-35, Blutte to Lamb, 11 June 1832.

(169) Grosul, Reformy, p. 233.

(170) PRO, FO 97/403, ff.218-18v, Blutte to Forbes, 9 December 1831.


(172) On this subject, see Grosul, Reformy, pp. 210-30; Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 339-85, passim; A. L. de Grammont, De l'administration provisoire russe en Valachie
et de se résultats (Bucharest, 1840); P. Eliade, *La Roumanie au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1914), II.

(173) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.22, ‘Otchet’.
(174) Zablotski-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp.339-40, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 20 February 1830 OS.
(175) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.22v, ‘Otchet’.
(176) Ibid., ff. 22, 50; RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.104, d.10, ff.104-05v, Report of Kiselev, 27 April 1830; Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 220-25; Zablotski-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 340-47. In order to maintain the Treasury’s funds, tariffs were still imposed on trade between the Principalities. These were eventually abolished in 1848 with the declaration of a customs union, Jelavich, *Russia*, p. 38.
(177) Grosul, *Reformy*, p. 224-6. This highway was in fact called a ‘military road’ and, in part, was designed to facilitate the rapidity of a future Russian occupation of the province, PRO, FO 97/404, ff.185-86, Blutte to Lamb, 11 April 1834. Unfortunately, travel in the Principalities would remain ‘extremely dangerous...the principal roads being more than ever infested by the banditti [sic]...being deserters from the native militia’, PRO, FO 97/403, f.338, Blutte to F. Lamb, 7 August 1832.
(179) Ibid., p. 222.
(180) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.1/184a, sv.100, d.29, ff.1-4v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 12 March 1830 OS.
(181) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.22v-23, ‘Otchet’. If Blutte is to be believed, Kiselev used the occupying Russian forces and the Principalities’ militia to conduct a campaign of intimidation against Britain’s Ionian subjects. This was to result in something of a diplomatic scandal, see PRO, FO 97/404, ff.4-9, Blutte to Lamb, 15 September 1832, and appended documents, ff.10-33, 41-63. It should be noted that Blutte was generally well known for his anti-Russian tirades. Heytesbury, for instance, complained that ‘Mr Blutte appears to think that he is best serving his country by manifesting a most decided hostility to the Russians upon every occasion - by making an affair of every trifle - and by holding a tone in his official correspondence with the Russian authorities very little justified by common usage, or indeed by common politeness’. Apparently, in 1829, Blutte had a Russian employee flogged for insulting his water-carrier, BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.139, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 20 July 1829. Emphasis in the original.
(182) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.944, f.24, ‘Otchet’.
(183) The combined state income of both Principalities during the period of Russian occupation was as follows: 1828- 7.4m piastres; 1829 - 12.2m; 1830 - 18.3m; 1831 - 20.9m; 1832 - 23.9m; 1833 - 22.3m, Ibid., f.26.
(186) Ibid., pp. 51, 352-53.
(187) Although the Sultan had paid off the trade indemnity by early 1831, his inability to observe the timetable for the payment of the war indemnity caused the occupation to be prolonged (ultimately by three years), PRO, FO 97/403, ff.149-49v, Sir Robert Gordon to Palmerston, 11 May 1831; ibid., FO 97/404, ff.35-37v, Blutte to Palmerston, 26 September 1832. Both Kiselev and Diebitsch were disappointed by the decision to quit the province in 1834, believing that a ten-year occupation was necessary to ensure the successful introduction of the reforms, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.152-53v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 8 August 1830 OS; ibid, f.154-54v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 19 October 1830 OS. Apparently, in 1832, Kiselev had organised a petition from the Boyars requesting that the Tsar extend the period of occupation ‘for the people to become accustomed to the working of the constitution’, PRO, FO 97/404, ff.1-2v, Blutte to Lamb, 1 September 1832. This had, however, no effect on Nicholas who, as noted, believed a prolonged occupation was
damaging to relations with Austria and Britain. Correctly, the Tsar and Nesselrode saw Kiselev's request as an attempt to persuade St Petersburg to annex the province, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 395-96, 415-17. It appears that when the order to leave arrived, the 'Russian troops and their officers...[were] for the most part exceedingly loathe to return into their own country', PRO, FO 97/404, f.200, Blutte to Lamb, 23 May 1834. Silistria remained occupied until the full payment of the Turkish war indemnity. It was finally evacuated in September 1836, *ibid.*, ff. 267-68v, R. Colquhoun to Palmerston, 11 September 1836.

(189) PRO, FO 97/403, f.79, Blutte to Cowley, 28 January 1831.
(190) PRO, FO 97/404, f.211v, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 24 July 1834.
(191) The literature on this subject is very large, for a good summary see Grosul, *Reformy*, pp. 5-33, 380-387. The Soviet view is somewhat inconsistent. Following Marx's own hostility to the reforms, it states that the *règlement* was a 'Boyar constitution' and that Russia aimed for the 'strengthening of the feudal order', *ibid.*, pp. 381, 383. On the other hand, faithful to the (unmarxist) idea of the objective progressive nature of Russian foreign policy, it argues that the reforms resulted in the "decomposition of feudal elements and the birth of capitalist [elements]'*, *ibid.*, p. 6.
(192) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 339-40, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 20 February 1830 OS.
(193) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.230, ff.1-16, 'Kratkoe obozrenie kniazhestv', 10 August 1831 OS.
(194) Following her receipt of autonomy in 1829, Greece descended into civil war. Liprandi's ideas were echoed later in the century by Tatishchev, who condemned the reforms as a 'pure cabinet invention', born within the 'four walls of a chancellery and not springing from the history of the country', *Vneshnaia politika*, p. 324.
(195) PRO, FO 97/404, ff.82-82v, Blutte to Lamb, 6 September 1833.
(196) Ostensibly, the Hospodars were chosen by the Porte from a shortlist compiled by Kiselev, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, p. 420. However, given Russia's dominance over the Porte after 1829, it is almost certain that the Hospodars were in fact chosen by Kiselev himself.
(197) PRO, FO 97/404, ff.219-221v, Blutte to Ponsonby, 15 August 1834.
(199) PRO, FO 97/404, f.183, Blutte to Lamb, 21 March 1834.
(201) PRO, FO 97/404, ff.220, Blutte to Ponsonby, 15 August 1834.
(205) For details of the revolution see *ibid.*, pp. 42-50.
(206) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 339-40, Kiselev to A. A. Zakrevskii, 20 February 1830 OS.
(207) RGIA, fond VUA, d.950, f.17, 'Abrégé de statistique des Principautés Moldavovo-Valaques', anon., 1832.
(208) Grosul, *Reformy*, p.353. The growth of the Principalities export trade proved to be of great concern to the landowners of Novorossiia (as had been predicted in 1828 by de Lacy Evans, *Designs of Russia*, p. 246). In 1832, Blutte reported that the Russian authorities in the Principalities were beginning to hinder the export of the province's grain through the imposition of high taxes, PRO, FO 97/403, f.226-26v, Blutte to Forbes, 6 January 1832. The matter took on a wider dimension in 1836 when Russia extended her quarantine system
to cover the entire Danubian delta (which had been annexed in 1829). This raised fears that Russia intended to use her quarantine laws to hinder and delay the passage of British and Austrian commercial vessels. As result of a propaganda campaign by D. Urquhart the whole issue turned into something of an international scandal and was to dominate much of Great Power diplomacy on the Eastern Question until the Crimean War, see Urquhart, *The Mystery of the Danube*; Marx, *Eastern Question*, pp. 201-10; J. Hugemeister, *Mémoire sur le commerce des ports de la Nouvelle Russie, de la Valachie et de la Moldavie* (Odessa, 1833); V. J. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East* (Stanford, 1935). pp. 132-45.


(210) RGIA, fond 673, op.1, d.230, f.16, ‘Kratkoe obozrenie kniazhestv’.

The policy adopted by the September 1829 Committee seemed clear enough - to support the continued existence of both the Sultan's dynasty and his empire. In one sense, however, the policy proved to be something of an abstraction - a broad aspiration rather than a practical guide for action. Did, for instance, Russia's support entail a guarantee of the territorial integrity, either whole or in part, of Ottoman lands? If so, to what extent and by which means was she prepared to uphold it? How would Russia respond to a Persian attack in Asia Minor, a French expedition to North Africa, or a domestic revolt by a rebellious Pasha? There were no premeditated answers to such quandaries and it would be left for circumstances to impose a policy as and when they developed.

The first months of 1830 were in this respect to provide four noteworthy events. The first was the attempted revolt in Rumelia by Mamarchev. His enterprise was cut short by the speedy intervention of the Russian army and thus the principle was laid that Russia would actively seek to thwart new revolutionary movements amongst the Ottoman Christians. A second potential crisis arose with the planned French expedition to Algiers. Since 1826 at least, France had schemed with the Egyptian Pasha Mohammed Ali to conquer jointly the North African Beys. Fearing French expansion around the Mediterranean Britain strenuously opposed this alliance and ensured that the Franco-Egyptian negotiations broke down in March 1830. France now resolved to attack Algiers alone and enquired as to Russia's position on the matter. Nesselrode agreed; ostensibly French action would suppress the Algerians' appetite for piracy, though the probable underlying Russian motive was in fact to sour Anglo-French relations. Whatever the truth, Nesselrode laid the precedent that Russia did not consider the Ottoman African territories as an inviolable part of the Sultan's domains and was prepared to barter them away if her own interests so dictated. Thus when Wellington's government made successive proposals for a collective guarantee of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian response was predictable. Though committed to preserving this empire, Russia would not undertake to defend her territory in toto. She supported the French expedition and in fact had herself certain territorial ambitions in the Caucasus. In any case, a collective guarantee would interfere in Russo-Turkish relations and compromise the hold Russia had gained over the Porte over the preceding fifty years. As Nesselrode put it, Russia would not enter 'dans une coalition contre nous mêmes'.

The fourth event of importance was the onset of the Sultan's Albanian campaigns in May 1830. Mahmud II, true to his reformist tendencies, had long sought to curtail the
The outbreak of the Greek revolt had temporarily halted this process but now, with peace, the Albanian campaigns could continue. The warlords of southern Albania were, however, determined to preserve their traditional powers and their hastily assembled forces inflicted a defeat on the Vizier in June. The Albanian uprising was of obvious concern to the neighboring Russian forces in occupation of the the Principalities and thus a certain Captain Lambrovich was despatched to Shumla to establish the true state of affairs. There he met the commandant, a Galim-Pasha, who spoke of the perilous position of the Turkish army and enquired as to whether the Russian army would be prepared to assist them in their campaign.

Diebitsch was opposed to any intervention but the matter was forwarded to Nicholas for a final verdict:

His Majesty is, in no event, willing to take an active participation in the internal affairs of Turkey, or, in her disputes with her subjects; therefore, any movement of our army, which has the aim of supporting the actions of the Grand Vizier, is completely forbidden.

The only concession offered was for the Russian forces to occupy temporarily the fortresses of Widdin and Rustchuk, should the Turks wish to use their garrisons in their campaign.

The southern Albanians were eventually overcome but the real challenge lay in the north where the unpredictable Mustapha ruled over the powerful Pashalik of Skodra. Informed in January 1831 that his rule was terminated, Mustapha decided to fight. His idea was to construct a broad alliance of all the Balkan Muslims who opposed the Sultan’s European-style reforms as well as the Serbs, whom he offered the town of Nish as an incentive to fight. The Russian response was again that the revolt of a Pasha was none of their concern and a policy of non-intervention was adopted. Fortunately for the Sultan, outside assistance was not ultimately required and his regular troops scored an decisive victory over Mustapha. The last Albanian Pashalik was liquidated in late 1831.

The great event challenging Russia’s somewhat guarded commitment to the preservation the Ottoman Empire came in 1832-33 with the onset of the Mohammed Ali crisis. The ambitious Pasha of Egypt dreamed of conquering the Middle East to create an Arab Empire and, like Mustapha, sought as his allies Muslims discontented by the Sultan’s reforms. War broke out between the Sultan and his nominal vassal in November 1831. The Egyptian forces, under the impressive leadership of Ibrahim, scored a series of victories and, by the following June, Damascus and much of Syria and Palestine were under their control. In August, their offensive ceased and Mohammed sought a negotiated settlement to legitimise his conquests. The Sultan however refused to treat and sought
assistance from the European Powers. His initial hope rested on Britain, but the new
government of Earl Grey was opposed to any intervention. Unlike the Tories, the Whigs were
at this stage generally uninterested in Turkish affairs and did not consider the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire as damaging to British vital interests. With France supporting Muhammed,
the Sultan had little choice but to turn to Russia.(14)

The Russian Response

The ambitions of Mohammed Ali caused Russia to reverse its previous policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In November 1832 Nesselrode
announced that Russia would be willing to send military assistance upon the Sultan’s
request.(15) This turnaround had two main causes. First, the Russians were suitably
impressed by the prowess of the Egyptian army, especially after Ibrahim’s decisive victory at
Koniah in December 1832. After the battle Russian intelligence reported that ‘the army of
the Sultan already no longer exists’ and that Ibrahim had 50,000 men and is ‘everywhere
gathering new followers’. (16) Russian military opinion now had it that the Egyptian forces
posed a genuine threat to Constantinople.(17) Ibrahim could either take the city outright or
cause a revolt merely by approaching it. Whatever the case, the consequences for the
Ottoman Empire would be fatal as:

The opinion of Muslims in Rumelia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Albania and
throughout European Turkey is totally against the Sultan. Any success of
Ibrahim is awaited with delight and impatience and a revolt could break
out anywhere and cause a general uprising as soon as the capital gives the
example.(18)

Second, the Russians believed that, unless stopped, Mohammed would aim at nothing less
than the ‘conquest of all Asia Minor’ and the establishment of an Arabic or Islamic Empire
rivalling or, even superseding, the Ottoman.(19) Thus instead of current weak southern
neighbour, Russia could be faced with a new and ambitious rival, possessing a dangerous
social and political dynamic to its expansion. According to Russian reports, Ibrahim had
announced that:

...he wants to resurrect the former greatness of the Muslim people,
moreover, he will remove for the Turks the disadvantageous peace
concluded by the Porte with Russia [the Treaty of Adrianople], promising
to gain revenge on the Russians and declares that he will free the people
from the...regular forces of the Sultan.(20)

Mohammed aimed to unite, in a broad alliance, all groups who, for various reasons, opposed
the Sultan’s secularising policy - onetime Jannissaries still in hiding in the outlying imperial
provinces, local chieftains deprived of their ‘feudal’ privileges, clergymen opposed
to European innovations and the lower orders fearing enforced service in the much-despised regular army. At root, Mohammed played on the Ottoman Muslims' humiliation following the unsuccessful 1828-29 war and the independence of Greece and the sense that their empire was doomed to an irreversible decline.(21)

Naturally, the supposed aim of reversing the Adrianople treaty was of no little concern to G. V. Rosen and the Caucasus Corps;(22) the possibility that Mohammed was merely bluffing in order to win popular support was scant consolation:

In all probability, such rumours have been spread by him in order to draw towards him a people imbued with fanaticism and hate towards infidels, especially Russians; however, in order to maintain his influence in the provinces that are being annexed [Syria and Palestine], the Egyptian Pasha will, out of necessity, have to act in accordance with the popular mood.(23)

According to Rosen, the Pasha could pursue two strategies against Russia in the Caucasus. The first was a direct invasion. Lest this be thought too fantastic, Rosen cited the example of the Persian attack of 1826. Though it had no real chance of victory, 'personal ambition and the recklessness of its people enticed the Persian Government towards this ill-conceived enterprise'. It was not impossible that Mohammed would make the same mistake. The second option was for the latter to inflame the anti-Russian sentiment of the Muslim tribes and create a general levée en masse throughout the region. This would result in an:

...invasion into our borders by the frontier tribes - the Kurds, Adzharians, Laz and others; in addition, disturbances could arise in the mountains, in Abkhasia and Dagestan, which are populated, for the most part, by Muslims of the Sunnite sect which dominates in Asia Minor.(24)

Clearly, if the Sultan were to be saved and the Russian Caucasus be protected, resolute measures were required. Three forms of action were envisaged - a naval squadron to the Bosphorus, the reinforcement of land forces in the Balkans and a pre-emptive strike against Ibrahim from the Caucasus. The first had been proposed by Russia as early as November 1832(25) and specific preparations were made the following month. A Black Sea naval squadron was readied to sail to Constantinople upon demand, possibly with a expeditionary land force. As a result, the 3rd brigade of the 26th Infantry Division (currently occupying Bessarabia) was transferred to Odessa.(26) Following news of the defeat at Koniah, the rest of the division was ordered to that port and was replaced in
Bessarabia by the 25th Infantry Division. The latter was to be prepared ‘in the event of extreme necessity’ to cross the Pruth and enter the Principalities.(27)

On 21 January 1833 OS, with Ibrahim’s forces within two hundred miles of his capital, the Sultan made a formal request for Russian assistance.(28) Bolstered by the arrival of a naval squadron on 8 February OS,(29) the Sultan refused a recent Egyptian offer of peace treaty (dependent upon the cession of Syria and Adana) and Ibrahim prepared to continue his march.(30)

Meanwhile, in the Principalities, Kiselev had been ordered on 5 January OS to prepare his forces.(31) Silistria was therefore put on a war footing and the occupying forces readied to march at twenty four hours notice.(32) Kiselev, however, had at his disposal only 12,000 men, (almost half of whom were from the Wallachian and Moldavian militias) - a number considered insufficient for anything beyond the defence of the Principalities’ borders. He planned, therefore, to place half of the Russian infantry in Silistria (c.3000 men), man the Danubian frontier with half of the militia and Cossacks (c.4000), leaving the remaining forces as a reserve in the interior. By way of reinforcements, Kiselev requested the immediate calling of the 25th Infantry Division and the despatch of 8000 muskets and other weapons.(33)

Events were to take a different turn following Kiselev’s receipt on 2 February OS of a letter from A. P. Butenev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, passing on the Sultan’s request for the despatch of 25,000-30,000 troops.(34) Kiselev immediately formulated an operational plan. Russian forces were to march from Silistria to Adrianople, occupying Rustchuk and Shumla en route in order to use these fortresses as supply depots. Due however to the flooding of the Danube in the Spring, this movement could begin only in May and take twenty days to complete. Less understandable was that Kiselev proposed crossing the Balkans with five infantry divisions and 15,000 cavalry - a total of around 65,000 men. No explanation was offered then, or, subsequently; no doubt Kiselev overestimated the strength of the Egyptians.(35)

Nicholas agreed with the occupation of the fortresses (as long as the Sultan gave permission) but neither the proposed size of the force nor the timetable was accepted. The former was to be restricted to the 25th Infantry Division, one brigade of the 17th, the 4th Uhlan Cavalry Division, seven Cossack regiments (subsequently reduced to four), sappers and 44 guns.(36) Nominally, the force comprised 28,200 men,(37) though only 19,200 were soldiers and NCOs.(38) It was to be commanded by Kiselev himself and be ready for action by 1 April OS.(39)
Meanwhile, in the Caucasus, Rosen was formulating his own strategy against Mohammed. As noted, he feared an attack on the Russian Caucasus. In such an event, nothing could be worse than for the Caucasus Corps to adopt a 'totally defensive position', as this would be seen by the local Muslim population as a 'sign of weakness' and spur them to rebellion. Instead, 'it would be better for ourselves to undertake offensive action...in order to maintain the moral superiority which we currently enjoy'. Thus, as soon as the Egyptians advanced to Erzerum, Russia was to take Ardahan and Kars and, with this show of force, enter into communication with Adzharia and the Pashalik of Bayezid. The leaders of these Muslim provinces on the Russian frontier could thus hopefully be persuaded not to join Mohammed.

In this way [our offensive action, will]...secure our present border, maintain in the local tribes an acceptance of our might, keep in check those able to cause disturbances within our borders...and, finally, in the event of the separation of Asia Minor from European Turkey, Kars, Ardahan and Batum may enter into our possession - conquests which my predecessor, the Prince of Warsaw [Paskevich], found essential for our final consolidation beyond the Caucasus.

In addition, Rosen believed that Russia could use the crisis as an opportunity to impose a protectorate over the Pashalik of Bayezid. The region was 'almost the sole form of communication between Asia Minor and Persia and [its control by Russia] would restrict so much of its [Persia's] trade, that our manufacturing would receive a great advantage in the Asiatic markets'.

The Tsar was impressed with Rosen's argument and agreed on all points, with the exception of the request to despatch the 20th Infantry Division for reinforcement. Nicholas believed Rosen could raise 18 battalions from his existing forces - a number considered sufficient for offensive action.

By the end of February OS 1833 preparations for Russian military intervention were well under way. At around this time, Mohammed had just issued the Porte with an ultimatum. Unlike his son Ibrahim, who demanded the cession of much of North Africa, Asia Minor as well as Crete, Mohammed proved to be more cautious and limited his demands to Syria and Adana. The Egyptian Pasha was however still prepared to attack Constantinople in the event of a Turkish refusal. Fearing the consequences of the continuation of the war and with it, the spectre of Russian intervention, France and Britain urged the Sultan to accept the Egyptian terms.
The Porte was, however, not quite yet prepared to concede defeat and on 11 March OS, staff talks held were between the Russian military representative General N. N. Murav’ev and Khozrev-Pasha, the Turkish Seraskier. Murav’ev reported that without Russian assistance, the Turkish army was doomed. It could put, at most, 20,000 troops in the field, though he was ‘almost completely convinced that the total lack of spirit in this army prohibits any successful military action’. The only hope was for a Russian force to arrive at Constantinople and, together with the Turks, attack Ibrahim at Kutiah. If, instead, the Russians remained in a defensive position on the European bank of the capital, the city would fall to an internal revolt ‘upon the first appearance of Ibrahim’. In addition, Murav’ev passed on the Seraskier’s formal request for the despatch of a Russian expeditionary force, by sea, to Constantinople.

Unfortunately for the Turks, Russian assistance could not hope to arrive in time to prevent an assault from Ibrahim, whose force was but 150 miles from Constantinople. The expeditionary force, which departed Odessa on 17 March OS, could only arrive in the first days of April OS whilst Kiselev’s force could leave Silistria only from 1 April OS.

Thus, on 18 March OS, the Porte was forced to open negotiations with Ibrahim. Though a settlement was ultimately reached a month later, the Russians had little faith in Ibrahim’s fidelity to any written agreement and so Paskevich, now the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, formulated the following contingency plan. If the Egyptians resumed their offensive, the Russian expeditionary force and the remnants of the Turkish army were to seek out Ibrahim and give battle, probably at the river Sikaria. Should Ibrahim succeed in causing a general revolt in Asia Minor, Rosen’s plan of capturing Kars and Ardahan was to be accepted. In addition, Russia was to ‘send agents to Persia in order to incite this power to begin a war with the Turks’ - for which they were to be rewarded with the cession of Bagdad. Persia’s entrance into the war would also ‘restrain them from a war with us at a time when we will be occupied with the affairs of Turkey’. If Persia remained as neutral onlooker then ‘the English would surely try to persuade them to use this opportunity against us’. As regards Kiselev’s force, Paskevich proposed it be used to occupy the fortresses of the European bank of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. This would protect the Russian fleet and Constantinople, prevent Ibrahim from crossing over to Europe and bar the entrance of the Egyptian fleet in the Black Sea. If, against all expectation, Ibrahim managed to capture Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the Russian forces were, if possible, to remain in occupation of the Straits.
Paskevich's plan was destined never to be enacted as Mohammed, now under great pressure from France and Britain, was resolved to reach an agreement. The Porte appears to have believed strongly in the chances of a negotiated settlement and, on 19 March OS, wrote to Kiselev requesting the indefinite postponement of the despatch of his force.\(^{(57)}\) It was however impossible to prevent the despatch of other Russian forces as, two days previously, the Russian expeditionary force had already left for Constantinople where it arrived on 24 March OS.\(^{(58)}\) A second such force arrived on 12 April OS\(^{(59)}\) and three days later the Sultan conducted a joint review of all the Russian and Turkish troops in the capital.\(^{(60)}\) The review was attended by various foreign dignitaries, though the British and French ambassadors were conspicuous by their absence.\(^{(61)}\) Their governments, through their indifference to the Porte, had pushed her into the arms of Russia. Increasingly conscious of this error they were now incensed by its consequence - the arrival of Russian forces. Developments over the coming months were to prove no less disturbing.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and its Consequences

In late April, the Russian diplomat A. F. Orlov arrived in Constantinople, carrying with him a draft for a defensive pact with the Porte. Though it remains somewhat unclear which power formally instigated negotiations for an alliance, both clearly sought it\(^{(62)}\) and, on 8 July 1833 NS, a treaty was duly signed.\(^{(63)}\) At first glance, it was a very modest-looking document. It provided, for a period of eight years, mutual assistance in the event of external aggression towards either state (without a guarantee of territory). In a 'secret' article, Russia declared that, if she herself were attacked, she would not request Turkish military aid, only that the Porte close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships. This stipulation did not alter the existing regime of the Straits; it merely reaffirmed the obligation undertaken by the Porte in article XI of the 1809 Anglo-Russian treaty.\(^{(64)}\)

The resulting diplomatic furore was grounded in two issues. The first was Palmerston's (mistaken) idea that now that Russia and Turkey were allies, the Porte might open (or even be obliged to open) the Straits to Russian warships.\(^{(65)}\) The second issue was more abstract - that the treaty transformed Turkey into a Russian vassal and destroyed the European Balance of Power. Palmerston believed that, though in name, defensive, the treaty was 'in essence offensive also and it bears therefore a hostile character as it regards other Powers'. Moreover, it allowed Russia a 'claim to constant interference by means of her military force in the internal affairs...and to confer upon her a kind of protectorate over Turkey'. As a result, the Sultan, in his foreign relations, 'binds himself to adopt the
quarrels of Russia' and, at home, is 'taught to look to the Russian army for the maintenance of his domestic authority'. Britain had always seen the Ottoman Empire as an 'important element of the general Balance of Power' but now it was 'obvious that the Sultan ceases to be independent either at home or abroad'.(66)

Though Palmerston was wrong to consider the treaty 'offensive', he was correct in his conclusion that Russia's aim was to acquire a de facto protectorate over Turkey.(67) This was the logical conclusion of the 'weak neighbour' policy and the fact that this protectorate ultimately proved to be an illusion should not be used to belittle Palmerston's genuine concern in 1833.(68) On a more profound level, Palmerston's declaration that Britain would in future act 'as if the treaty above-mentioned were not in existence'(69) marked a new phase in the Anglo-Russian struggle over the Eastern Question.

In Britain, Unkiar-Skelessi proved to be 'the true turning point in the attitude of English statesmen towards Russia'.(70) The Canningite idea of co-operation with the Tsar was rejected and even the Whigs, long derisive of the Russian bogey, now adopted the traditional Tory policy of resistance to Russia. Whipped into a frenzy by the increasingly jingoistic British press, public opinion also become resolutely anti-Russian. From 1833, Britain, already Russia's premier rival in in Asia Minor,(71) formally replaced Austria as the main antagonist of Russia in European Turkey.(72) Whilst over the following two decades Anglo-Russian relations did not ( as many expected) deteriorate in any progressive and uniform manner, Palmerston's belief that Russia aimed at the 'annexation of large and important portions of the Turkish dominions'(73) contributed greatly to the deeper origins of the Crimean War.

In Russia, Britain's growing displeasure was sensed very acutely and for the remainder of Nicholas' reign the threat of war with Britain (possibly allied with France) was to dominate Russian strategy towards the Eastern Question.(74) In fact, as early as December 1832 (in anticipation of the European powers hostile reaction to Russia's proposed intervention in the Mohammed Ali crisis), Nicholas had drawn up a war plan to counter an Anglo-French coalition. It placed five infantry and four reserve cavalry corps (172 battalions, 416 cavalry squadrons and 792 guns) on a war footing. They were to be readied to march into Europe in two months.(75) A recent analysis of the implications of this plan has concluded that, in committing 350,000 men to a war in Europe (against France), Russia was left with sparse defensive capabilities - two infantry corps holding Poland, one on the Pruth facing Austria and the Ottoman Empire and with no significant forces on the Baltic and Black Sea littorals.(76)
Aware that Russia had insufficient forces to both fight an offensive war in Europe and protect herself against a British amphibious landing, the Russians were forced to adopt a defensive plan in December 1833. Four of her eight infantry corps were now to be committed to the defence of her northern and southern shores, two were to hold Poland, one was to face Austria and one was to be held in reserve. Unfortunately, in attempting to cover her entire European borders, the disjointed Russian army would thereby be threatened by a localised defeat at almost every point. Russia’s problem was not simply that too few of her 850,000-man army could be committed to a European war - it was graver than this. Geography dictated that the naval powers of Britain and France had an inherent strategic advantage over Russia in that they could attack her at any position on her vast coastline. Russia could neither be strong everywhere nor, due to the distances involved, send reinforcements quickly to the theatre of war. Although the threat of war in 1832/33 did not materialise, Nicholas ‘had all the information to enable him to foresee the possibility of a Crimean War and to predict the likeliest result’.

This growing concern at Russia’s military vulnerability placed in turn ever more importance on her diplomacy. Two crucial tasks were placed before the Russian Foreign Ministry. Firstly, to resurrect the Holy Alliance and bring Austria back into the Russian fold - for if Austria joined forces with Britain and France over the Eastern Question, then there could be little hope for Russia. Thus from 1833 onwards Russia began to re-emphasise its common interests with the Habsburgs (the struggle against revolution) and, at Münchengrätz, she swept away the main cause of their antagonism by agreeing to cooperate over Turkish affairs. The second task of Russian diplomacy was to secure and maintain the pro-Russian, or, at least neutral orientation of the Porte - the surest means of barring the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea and thus removing the single greatest military threat to the Russian empire. In 1833 the outlook for such a policy was good, for, by the Treaty of Unkiair-Skelessi, Russia had already secured a pre-eminent position at Constantinople by posing as the friend and ally of the Sultan. Her mission for the foreseeable future was to counter all British attempts to disrupt this, the most unholy of alliances.
(1) See above, p. 211.
(3) VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 502-03, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 28 March 1830 OS.
(4) The Russians, however, were opposed to the establishment of a French colony in Algeria, fearing that this could push Britain and France to war and so unleash the forces of European revolution. In any case, such a colony would be expensive to maintain and constitute a burden rather than an advantage. The truth of this argument was lost on the French, *ibid.*, pp. 652-54, Pozzo to Nesselrode, 12 May 1830 OS; pp. 540-41, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 19 June 1830 OS.
(5) See above, p. 231-32.
(6) VPR II/VIII, 1994, p. 504, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 28 March 1830 OS.
(8) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 1029, ff. 39-41v, Roth to Diebitsch, 5 July 1830 OS.
(9) *Ibid.*, f.38, Diebitsch to Roth, 16 July 1830 OS.
(10) *Ibid.*, ff. 52-52v, A. I. Chernyshev to L. O. Roth, 31 July 1830 OS.
(12) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1039, ff.62-63v, G. V. Rosen to Nesselrode, 18 February 1832 OS.
(13) On the immediate origins and conduct of the conflict, see N. N. Murav'ev, *Turtsia i Egiyet v 1832 i 1833 godakh* (Moscow, 1869), II.
(16) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5309, ff.4-5, Voinikov (no initial) to Rosen, 28 January 1833 OS. Major Voinikov had recently been sent by Rosen (the Caucasus Commander) to Trabizond and Erzerum to gather intelligence, *ibid.*, f.1, Rosen to A. I. Chernyshev, 26 January 1833 OS.
(18) *Ibid.*, d.5307, ff.33-36, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 21 January 1833 OS. Kiselev was most pessimistic about the long-term future of the Ottoman Empire, believing that even if 'European mediation stops the enterprise of the Egyptian Pasha, one can envisage that it will establish, not peace, but a short cease-fire and not instil calm in the population and soon new and more decisive disturbances will break out'. Whilst his opinion was sincere, Kiselev used the crisis to demand a 'firmer military administration' in the Principalities, i.e. justify the continued and perhaps, indefinite, military occupation of the province, *ibid.* He also believed that in return for Russian assistance, the Porte was to award Russia the possession (whether permanent or temporary he did not state) of a fortress on the Bosphorus, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 400-01, Kiselev to Nesselrode, 22 April 1832 OS.
(20) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5309, ff.5-6, Voinikov to Rosen, 28 January 1833 OS.
(21) Though apparently lost on his followers in Asia Minor and elsewhere who saw Mohammed as 'le soutien de l'Islamisme', (RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1039, f.62, Rosen to Nesselrode, 18 February 1832 OS), the Pasha's own rule in Egypt had in fact been marked by enforced secularisation and Westernisation. Most notably, in 1811, he massacred Egypt's 'feudal' warrior class - the Mamelukes - and created a regular army. On his reforms generally, see H. Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad 'Ali* (Cambridge, 1931); on his foreign policy see, M. Sabry, *L'Empire égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et la question d'Orient (1811-1849)* (Paris, 1930); Murav'ev, *Turtsia*, I.
Rosen had replaced Paskevich as the Corps commander in 1831 following the latter’s departure that year to quell the Polish revolt.

RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5309, ff.1-2, Rosen to Chernyshev, 9 February 1833 OS.

Ibid.


RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5313, ff.4-5v, Chernyshev to Sacken, 28 December 1832 OS; ibid., ff.19-21v, Report of Chernyshev, 3 January 1833 OS.

Ibid., ff.14-15, Chernyshev to Saken, 5 January 1833 OS.

Specifically, eight war ships to the Straits and 30,000 men to cross the Balkans to Constantinople, Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 81.

Without the expeditionary force; it had not been explicitly requested by the Sultan. As the 26th Infantry Division could not arrive in Odessa until 12 February OS, at the earliest, it could not have been transported to Constantinople on this squadron in any case, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5313, ff.40-43v, Sacken to Chernyshev, 16 January 1833 OS.


ibid., d.5307, ff.33-36, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 21 January 1833 OS.

ibid., ff.22-22v, Chernyshev to Nesselrode, 25 January 1833 OS.

ibid., ff.33-36, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 21 January 1833 OS and enclosed defensive plan, ff.37-37v. At around this time, some confusion arose as to whether Kiselev favoured increasing the size of the militia. Nicholas believed this to be Kiselev’s firm intention, whereas the latter had merely toyed with the idea, ultimately dismissing it as impracticable, ibid., ff.12-13v, anon. to anon., 25 January 1833 OS; ff.22-22v, Chernyshev to Nesselrode, 25 January 1833 OS. Eventually a plan was drawn up to increase the force from c.5,000 to 10,000 men but, as noted, it was never enacted (see above, p. 260).

RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5307, ff.43-44, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 2 February 1833 OS. Due to the urgency of the situation, Butenev had been awarded full authority to order the despatch of Russian forces upon the Sultan’s request, ibid., d.5313, ff.19-21v, Report of Chernyshev, 3 January 1833 OS.

ibid., d.5307, ff.47-54v, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 2 February 1833 OS. In order to supply the Russian forces, Kiselev began ‘enourmous requisitions’ in Principalities, PRO, FO 97/404, ff.110-10v, Blutte to Lamb, 8 March 1833.

RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5307, ff.55-60, Chernyshev to Kiselev, 12 February 1833 OS. The defences of the Principalities were to be strengthened by the arrival of the 24th Infantry Division.

ibid., ff.122-123v, Kiselev to A. P. Butenev, 21 February 1833 OS.

ibid., ff.176-78v, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 25 March 1833 OS.

ibid.

ibid., d.5309, ff.1-3v, Rosen to Chernyshev, 9 February 1833 OS.

These territorial aims in the Caucasus were long-harboured and reappeared in 1878 during the Russo-Turkish negotiations for the Treaty of San Stefano, Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 203-04.


RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5309, ff.8-9v, Chernyshev to Rosen, 26 February 1833 OS.

The oft-repeated remark that Nicholas made to Fiquelmont that month - ‘I lack the power to life to give life to a corpse, and the Turkish empire is dead’, H. Temperley, *England and the Near East. The Crimea* (London, 1936; 1964 Reprint), p. 67, must thus be treated with caution; as should his statement that the Sultan was still refusing to accept
Russian assistance, *ibid.* The interview with the Austrian ambassador was held on 6 February OS, *ibid.*, p. 412, i.e. almost certainly before the receipt of Kiselev’s despatch (dated 2 February OS, see above, footnote 34), passing on the Sultan’s formal request of 21 January OS for assistance.


(46) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5303, ff.31-35, N. N. Murav’ev to Chernyshev, 12 March 1833 OS. Murav’ev had recently arrived from Alexandria where he had attempted to negotiate a settlement to the crisis with Mohammed Ali, see his own account of his mission in Murav’ev, *Turtsiya*, III, pp. 63-125.

(47) Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 81, 83. The Egyptians were said to have 18,000 men, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5303, ff.81-84, Report of anon., 18 March 1833 OS.

(48) Consisting of the 26th Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade (the 51st and 52nd *Chasseurs*), some light artillery, sappers and 100 Cossacks - a total of 5450 men and officers, *ibid.*, d.5313, ff.69-70v, Report on ‘1st section of the landing force’, n.d. The force was placed under the command of General N. N. Murav’ev.


(50) *Ibid.*, d.5303, ff.36-41v, Murav’ev to Chernyshev, 19 March 1833 OS. The Porte was so desperate for the expeditionary force to arrive that it proposed sending a Turkish steamship to pick them up.


(52) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5305, ff.1-4v, Report of Paskevich, 28 March 1833 OS.

(53) Rosen’s preparations thus continued, but due to a continuing revolt in Dagestan, he could find only eleven and a half spare infantry battalions (7,600 men) for offensive action, not the eighteen Nicholas had demanded, *ibid.*, d.5309, ff.20-21v, Rosen to Chernyshev, 30 March 1833 OS. Rosen also had at his disposal 600 dragoons and 48 guns.

(54) i.e. to reclaim the lands lost as a result of the 1804-13, 1826-28 Russo-Persian wars. Ermolov believed that British agents had played a prominent role in the Persian decision to attack Russia in 1826, Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 145, and Paskevich evidently feared that Britain would again use this tactic to prevent Russian expansion towards Kars.

(55) P. E. Mosley’s speculation, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), pp. 22-23, that the Russians planned to occupy a suitable strongpoint on the Straits (specifically, on the Bosphorus) in 1833 can thus be confirmed beyond doubt.

(56) Some days later, Kiselev received more precise instructions. Situation (a) The Turkish army and population of Constantinople remain faithful to the Sultan. In this case, the capital would be protected by the expeditionary force and so Kiselev was to head for the Dardanelles and occupy the fortresses on the European bank, as well as, one or two on the Asiatic side. Situation (b) Ibrahim crosses to European bank and occupies the Dardanelles. Kiselev to give battle and occupy them himself. Situation (c) Constantinople falls to a domestic revolt which the Russian forces are powerless to prevent - Kiselev to retreat to the port of Sizopol and join up with the expeditionary force, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5307, ff.170-74, Chernyshev to Kiselev, 31 March 1833 OS. According to these instructions, the ostensible aim of the occupation of the Dardanelles was to bar the passage of the Egyptian fleet in the Sea of Marmora. It should be remembered, however, that in 1829 Russian policy, in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was to occupy the Straits until the European powers had decided upon a solution to the crisis, *VPR* II/VIII, 1994, p. 279, Protocol of the Extraordinary Committee, 4 September 1829 OS. It is clear from Paskevich’s aforementioned report (see above, footnote 52) that this policy was again adopted in 1833.

(57) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5307, ff.201-202v, Kiselev to Chernyshev, 8 April 1833 OS. According to one account, the Porte refused Russian assistance due to pressure from France, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Kiselev*, I, pp. 410-11.

(59) Consisting of the 2nd Brigade of the 26th Infantry Division (Liublinskii and Zamostskii regiments) and some light artillery - a total of 4,587 officers and men, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5313, ff.78v-79, List of forces of the ‘2nd section of the landing force’, April 1833 OS.

(60) *Ibid.*, ff.80-83v, Mend to Neighart (no initials), 21 April 1833 OS. On the activities of the Russian forces during their stay in Constantinople, see Murav’ev, *Turtsiia*, IV

(61) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.5320, ff.1-3, Murav’ev to Chernyshev, 16 April 1833 OS.


(64) Temperley, *Near East*, p. 70; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 84. The secret article was communicated to the British government on 16 January 1834, *CTS*, LXXXIV, 1969, p. 6.

(65) Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 85; Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 71, 413-14. Though Nesselrode formally denied the accusation that Unkiar-Skelessi opened the Straits to Russian warships, *ibid.*, p.71, the idea was later revived by the Tsarist historian S. M. Gorianov in *Le Bosphore et les dardanelles* (Paris, 1910), pp. 4-10, 43-44, 87. It was accepted by Western historians e.g. J. A. R. Mariott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford, 1917; 3rd edition, 1924), p. 236, until it was discredited by Mosley, *Russian Diplomacy*, pp. 9-20. Although Gorianov’s spurious thesis had, in fact, never been anything other than ‘a political tract disguised as scholarship’, it was adhered to by the Soviet Union in order to base its demand that control of the Straits should be jointly shared by Russia and Turkey on historical precedent, see J. C. Hurewitz, ‘Russia and the Straits. A Revaluation of the Problem’, *WP*, XIV, 1962, pp. 606, 610, 614. The Soviet argument is presented in B. A. Dranov, *Chernomorskie prolivy: mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 63-67, 93 (there is an oblique reference to it in Fadeev, *Krizis*, p. 363).

(66) PRO, FO 65/208, Palmerston to J. D. Bligh, 13 October 1833, (no folio numbers were available for this file); see also, R. L. Baker, ‘Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi’, *EHR*, XLIII, 1928, pp. 83-89.


(69) PRO, FO 65/208, Palmerston to J. D. Bligh, 13 October 1833.


(71) Anglo-Russian antagonism in the Caucasus and Central Asia increased dramatically as a result of Russia’s victory over Persia in 1828. Wellington and Ellenborough (President of the Board of Control for India) believed that Russia had adopted a systematic plan of extending its influence over the weak Asiatic states separating the Russian Empire from British India. At around the same time, the publication of Colonel de G. de Lacy Evans, *Practicability of an Invasion of British India* (London, 1829) captured the imagination of the British public by raising the spectre of a Russian invasion of India. The British government was sure that such an invasion was impossible but feared that the spread of Russian influence would destabilise Britain’s precarious rule in India. From late 1829, Britain followed a forward policy in the region in search of viable buffer-states (known to history as the ‘Great Game’) and sought to replace its lost ally of Persia (a British semi-protectorate, 1809-28) with Afghanistan. This was eventually to result in the First Afghan War, see E. Ingram, *In Defence of British India* (London, 1984), pp. 7-19, 152-217; J. A. Norris, *The First Afghan War, 1838-42* (London, 1967). On British public opinion, see J. H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); C. W. Crawley, ‘Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40’, *CHJ*, III, 1929, pp. 47-73. Russia’s intentions were not so nearly as hostile as contemporaries was feared and there were never any serious proposals for an invasion of India, M. Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780-1828* (Minnesota, 1980), pp. 165-66; M. A. Yapp, ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to

(72) Metternich had been placated by Russia in September 1833 with the Convention of Münkengrätz (printed in Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, IV, Part 1, 1878, pp. 445-48). In an attempt to detach Austria from Britain and France, Russia now promised to co-operate with Austria over Turkish affairs. In Britain, the convention was wrongly seen as an agreement to partition European Turkey, Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 78-82.


(74) Palmerston’s foreign policy was based on the so-called Liberal *entente* with France (the latter having fallen into the ‘liberal’ camp following the July Revolution of 1830). The overt ideological basis of British policy - the struggle between constitutional and autocratic states - coupled with Palmerston’s obvious distrust of Russia in the East, proved to be a cause of constant worry to Nicholas. The Tsar’s personal animosity towards Louis Philippe (King of France, 1830-48) prevented Russia from creating any lasting rift in the Anglo-French alliance, see Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 59-61; Webster, *Palmerston*, I-II, *passim*.

(75) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1107, ff.1-2, War Plan, December 1832; f.22, War Ministry to General-Quartermaster of the General Staff of H.I.M., December 1832.


(78) In 1832-33, Russia had, on paper, 850,000 men, though, in reality, the actual number was closer to 700,000. Of this figure c.200,000 were deployed either in the regional forces (in the Caucasus, Finland, Orenburg and Siberia) or in the interior of the country. Thus, Russia’s disposable force in a European war amounted to c.500,000 men, *ibid.*, pp. 221-24.

(79) *Ibid.*, p. 229. In his analysis of Russia’s available manpower, Kagan has concluded that even if serfdom was abolished and universal conscription introduced, Russia would still probably not have been able to recruit enough men to reverse her strategic disadvantage. Even if sufficient men were found, the state could not, in any case, support such a greatly enlarged army, *ibid.*, pp. 212-223, 231-36.
CONCLUSION

In essence, this dissertation has focused on two sets of issues. The first consisted of the relationship between war planning, diplomacy and the conduct of military operations during the Eastern Crisis of 1821-33. Whilst there are a number of good books on isolated aspects of the crisis, this work has sought to combine military and diplomatic factors to present a more complete understanding of the period. It has been argued that the key to the period was Kiselev’s decision to integrate the idea of a Balkan crossing into Russian war planning. This gave the army the realistic prospect of abandoning its slow, ‘methodical’ Turkish campaigns of the past and achieving a decisive result in a single campaign by striking directly at Constantinople. This new military strategy did not contradict Russia’s diplomatic strategy (the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘weak neighbour’) but complemented it, for there was no better way of keeping Turkey weak and submissive than the fear that her capital was vulnerable. A submissive Turkey suited Russian interests in two main ways; first, it secured the closure of the straits to the fleets of the naval powers and, second, it allowed Russia to exert and extend her influence in the Balkans through her rights of patronage over the Balkan Christians.

The 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war brought to the fore the important questions concerning the future political status of the Balkan Christians. Russia had to decide whether to pursue the aggrandisement and even independence of Serbia by using her military forces. At the eventual negotiations a decision was needed as to whether to annex the Principalities or make them semi-independent and whether to persuade Britain and France that ‘Greece’ should be large or small, independent or autonomous. It has been shown that, in the 1820s, Russian diplomacy was directed towards keeping the emerging Balkan nations as autonomous regions within the Ottoman Empire. It is for this reason that the idea of using of Balkan partisans was so problematic - it was feared that such policy could lead to more national liberation movements and even the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. In 1828-29 Russia did all she could to prevent levée en masse in the Balkans but, had she been forced into a third campaign, would have probably given the Bulgars and Serbs the signal to rise.

The idea that Russian interests were best served by the Balkan populations receiving only autonomy was put to test by Kiselev and his reform of the Principalities. Russia’s extensive treaty rights meant that this reform could be carried out without the interference of other powers (this would not have been possible if the Principalities were independent). Kiselev’s aim was to turn the province into a Russian protectorate. That such
a reform was administered by a Russian general is not surprising when one considers that for many years the army had viewed the Principalities as nothing other than an operational base for its Turkish campaigns. This base was, however, underdeveloped and Kiselev aimed at rectifying this state of affairs by increasing grain production and creating a militia that would support the Russian forces in future Turkish wars. The problem with the reform was that some of its features were too advanced, the period of occupation too short and that the consequences of certain measures (such as the increase of grain exports) were too dimly perceived. However critical one is of the Russian experiment in the Principalities, it was far superior to the policy adopted over Greece, which saw the granting of independence and the resulting loss of Russian influence.

The second set of issues examined in this dissertation was the impact of the Eastern Question on the military, political and diplomatic ideas of the Russian High Command with reference to the internal divisions that characterised the Russian ruling elite after 1815 - namely, the struggle between ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’ and between ‘Russians’ and ‘foreigners’ (especially Germans). A traditional explanation of Soviet historians was that the ‘progressives’ (by which they essentially meant Decembrists) opposed both Russia’s Prussified military system and passive Eastern policy. Instead, they are said to have favoured the resurrection of the native military school and the pursuit of an anti-Ottoman foreign policy with the aim of liberating the Balkan population. In this they were opposed by Tsarist establishment figures, especially German careerists such as Nesselrode and Diebitsch.

To a degree, this dichotomy is justified. The main opposition to the Gatchina military system was found in the Second Army where the progressively-minded Kiselev filled his General Staff with Decembrist officers. Pestel’, M. F. Orlov and others aimed at humanising military service and introducing reforms gleaned from their knowledge of French revolutionary practices and the more innovative Russian commanders. The Decembrists genuinely opposed Tsarist Eastern policy and had a great sympathy for the Balkan revolutionary movements. This picture, however, is not nearly as simple as has been presented by Soviet writers. The Second Army’s research into previous Russo-Turkish wars was inspired, not by the greatness of the Russian military tradition, but by its relative failure. These wars had taken too long, cost too much and offered in return scant rewards. Its research led not to the glorification of the campaigns of the great commanders, but to the understanding that knowledge of the theatre of war and the enemy’s military forces was the key to success. As a result there developed in Kiselev’s General Staff an
empirical school of military thought. This ‘school’ had, in fact, little connection with the Russian military tradition, for in the eighteenth century this type of staff work was almost unknown. The pioneering nature of Liprandi’s research proves the Soviet contention that all military innovation in the period was the work of Decembrists to be false.

Whilst Soviet writers have correctly exposed the many negative features of Russia’s post-1815 military system, they have misunderstood entirely the attitude of the military establishment at St Petersburg and Mogilev to military theory. The establishment’s strategic outlook was dominated by the ideas of Jomini, who, despite Soviet attempts at misrepresentation, advocated an essentially ‘progressive’ doctrine - to dispense with the precepts of ‘methodical’ war and to seek victory through one general and decisive encounter with the enemy. The problem with Jomini’s theory was that it could not cope with the specific nature of Turkish wars, which were characterised by an inhospitable theatre of war and, in more recent times, by the Turks’ inclination to remain in their imposing fortresses and reluctance to give battle. The 1828 campaign failed, not because of the High Command’s adherence to ‘methodical’ doctrines, but precisely because Diebitsch (following Jomini) refused to push southwards without first defeating the main Ottoman force at Shumla. Had not the Turks chosen to give battle in 1829 then Diebitsch, left to his own devices, would have remained north of the Balkans.

As regards the army’s ideas on Russia’s Eastern foreign policy, it undoubtedly favoured a forward policy. The majority of generals accepted the logic behind the ‘weak neighbour’ policy though favoured a more forceful application of it through the annexation of certain territories (especially in the Caucasus) and through a greater readiness to support Russian demands with military action. There still, however, existed a smaller group of officers who dreamt of a return to the more ambitious days of Catherine the Great. These included Pestel’ and other Decembrists who revived the idea of the Catherine’s ‘Greek Project’. Although the former’s ideas have been presented in Soviet historiography as progressive, it has been shown that his foreign policy programme was in fact very traditional.

As regards the level of influence leading generals acquired over the conduct of diplomacy it has been shown to be of some significance. In the past, Russian commanders had often conducted diplomatic negotiations with both Turkey and Persia and this was true after 1815. Ermolov was fully involved in the diplomacy of the Caucasian border disputes with Turkey and Persia, Paskevich negotiated the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turcomanchai in 1828 and Diebitsch led the negotiations at Adrianople in 1829. The most important impact on foreign policy was, however, made by Kiselev. His progressive reform of the
Principalities resulted, for a time at least, in an almost unparalleled level of Russian influence in Balkans and provided a model for future Russian activity in the region. Moreover, by his plan for a Balkan crossing, Kiselev created the strategic foundation upon which the Tsar and the Foreign Ministry constructed Russia's policy towards the Eastern Question as a whole.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPTS

(i) Rossiskii Gosudarstvenny Voennno-istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA). Moscow

Fond VUA (Voenno-uchennyi arkhiv)
d.342, 502, 652, 661, 667, 671-72, 787, 702-03, 708, 722, 727, 729, 737, 764, 766, 781,
857, 864-1006, 1013, 1018, 1028-29, 1033, 1035, 1039, 1072, 1079, 1094, 1098-1101,
1107, 1116, 1527, 1552, 1810, 2374, 2908, 4291-4337, 4394-95, 4404, 4410, 4414, 4422,
4434, 4442, 4444-45, 4457, 4460, 4462-63, 4468-71, 4475-76, 4479, 4482-85, 4488, 4519,
4585-86, 4642-43, 4648-53, 4660, 4666, 4684-87, 4699, 4701, 4708-12, 4717-18, 4722-23,
4731-32, 4805, 4809, 4822, 4829, 4835, 4841, 4848, 4850-51, 4862-68, 5303-31, 6208,
6222, 6228-30, 6333, 6245, 17184, 17269, 17273-74, 17347-48, 17358-60, 17362, 17365-
66, 17372, 17499, 17967, 18002, 18186, 18191-92, 18196, 18210, 18214, 18228, 18232,
18234-37, 18500, 35784

Fond 431 (Kollektsiia Velikobritaniia)
d.9, 12-13

Fond 438 (Rumyniia)
d.10-50, 71-73, 85, 90, 92-93, 100, 112, 532

Fond 450 (Turtsiia)
d.4-5

Fond 14057 (Moldavskaiia armiiia. Glavnyi shtab)
op.1, d.13, 15, 18
op.2, d.13
op.1/182a, sv.6, d.10, 18-19; sv.11, d.2; sv.18, d.68-71; sv.21, d.4-5; sv.22, d.20d; sv.23,
d.6, 9; sv.36, d.3, 5, 22; sv.38, d.67
op.13/182m, sv.6, d.97
op.16/183, sv.281, d.94; sv.646, d.1-10; sv.721, d.74; sv.801, d.102; sv.849, d.35; sv.850,
d.40; sv.868, d.13-15; sv.944, d.48-53; sv.956, d.10; sv.961, d.54; sv.963, d.91; sv.967,
d.162; sv.1038, d.1-6; sv.1045, d.51

Fond 14058 (Moldavskaiia armiiia. Kantseliariia glavnokomanduiushchego)
opus' 1/184a, sv.61, delo: 22 (ch.1,2); sv.79, d.92; sv.96, d.149, 154; sv.99, d.14; sv.100,
d.29, 48-49; sv.103, d.1, 3; sv.104, d.1a, 5, 10, 12

(ii) Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA). St Petersbourg

Fond 660 (A. A. Zakrevskii)
op.1, d.4, 103, 112-13, 130
Fond 673 (I. P. Liprandi)
op.1, d.138-419
op.2, d.5, 6, 405-07
Fond 958 (P. D. Kiselev)
op.1, d.89, 234, 246, 315, 622-24
Fond 1018 (I. F. Paskevich)
op.2, d.98-137, 158, 396
op.3, d.86-103, 151, 165-66, 204, 233-35
(iii) Rossiskaia NatsionaPnaia Biblioteka. Otdel rukopisi (RNB-OR), St Petersburg

Fond 72 (D. G. Bibikov)
d.9
Fond 289 (D. I. Zavalishin)
d.37
Fond 325 (A. P. Ermolov)
d.33
Fond 379 (F. P. Kornilov)
d.483
Fond 595 (V. A. and D. V. Polenov)
d.81
Fond 608 (I. V. Pomialovskii)
op.1, d.2896
Fond 731 (M. M. Speranskii)
d.880, 888
Fond 836 (A. I. Chernyshev)
d.19
Fond 1000 (Sobranie otdel’nykh postuplenii)
op.2, d.411

(iv) Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London

Foreign Office files.
FO 65 (Russia)/147-59, 152-59, 207-09
FO 97 (Supplements to General Correspondence)/402-04
FO 181 (Russia)/61-71
FO 352 (Stratford Canning Papers)/9A, 9B
FO 519 (Cowley Papers)/43, 47-48, 290

(v) The British Library (BL), London

Heytesbury Papers: Add. MSS 41557-41558

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

(i) Official Military and Diplomatic Correspondence: Treaty Series

‘1829-i god’ (ed. I. O. Ryschkov), RS, XIX, 1877, pp. 157-64
‘Adrianopolski mir 1829 g. Iz perepiski grafa Dibicha’, (ed. N. K. Shil’der), DNR, XV,
1879, pp. 545-76
Akty, sobranne kavkazkoiu arkheograficheskoio komissiei. Arkhiv glavnogo
upravleniia namesstnika Kavkaszkogo, (ed. A. Berzhe) (Tbisi, 1870-78), IV-VII
British Diplomacy 1813-15. Select Documents dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe
(ed. C. K. Webster) (London 1921)
British Foreign and State Papers, 1827-1828 (London, 1829), XV
‘Bumagi grafa Andreja Andrejevicha Zakreveskogo’, (ed. N. Dubrovin), SIRIO, LXXIII,
1890, LXXVIII, 1891
Correspondence Respecting the Organisation of the Danubian Principalities, 1828-1836 (London, 1878)
Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom (ed. T. Iuzefovich) (St Petersburg, 1869)
Donesenia avstriiskogo poslannika pri russkom dvorom Lebtsel’terna za 1816-1826 gg. (published by Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich) (St Petersburg, 1913)
Dvizhenie gortsev severo-vostochnogo Kavkaza v 20-50 gg. XIX. Sbornik dokumentov (ed. G. A. Daniilov) (Makhachkala, 1959)
Fel’dmarshal Kutuzov. Dokumenty, dnevnik, vosprimaniiia (ed. A. M. Val’kovich) (Moscow, 1995)
Kolonial’naiia politika rossiiskogo tsarisma v Azerbaidzhane v 20-60 kh gg. XIX v (ed. I. P. Petrushevskii) (Moscow, Leningrad, 1936), I
Les rapports diplomatiques de Lebzeltern, ministre d’Austriche à la cour de Russie, 1816-1828 (ed. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich) (St Petersburg, 1913)
Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1850 (ed. comte A. de Nesselrode) (Paris, 1907-08), V-VII
Martens, F. F., Sobranie Traktatov i Konventsi, zakliuchennykh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami (Recueil de traités et conventions conclus par la Russie) (St Petersburg, 1874-1909), 15 vols
‘Materialy k istorii persidskoi voiny 1826-28’, KS, XXI-XXX, 1900-1910
‘Materialy k istorii turetskoi voiny 1828-29’, KS, XXXI, 1911
‘Perepiska Imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha s velikim kniazem tsesarevich Konstantinom Pavlovichem, (1825-1829)’, SIRIO, CXXI, 1910
‘Plan, podannyi Grafom Suvorovym na utverzhdenie Eia Velichestvu Russkoi Imperatritse v 1795’, RA, 1914, No.6, pp. 162-76
Prokesch-Osten, A., Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom türkischen Reiche, (Vienna, 1867), III-VI
Recueil de documents relatifs à la Russie (Paris, 1854)
Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902 (ed. D. A. Skalon) (St Petersburg, 1902-14), 13 vols
Svod Zakonov Rossiiiskoi Imperii (St Petersburg, 1832), 15 vols
Voennoe Ministerstvo, Svod voennykh postanovlenii (St Petersburg, 1839), 12 vols
'Voina Rossii s Turktsiei 1828 g.', RS, XVII, 1876, pp. 491-98
'Voina Rossii s Turktsiei v 1829 gody' (ed. N. K. Shil'der), RS, XXX, 1881, pp. 91-104
*Vosstanie dekabristov - materialy* (ed. M. N. Pokrovskii, M. V. Nechkina) (Moscow, 1925-84), 18 vols

Wellington, 1st Duke of, *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda, in Continuation of the Former Series (1819-32)*, New Series (London, 1867), 5 vols

Wrigley, W. D., 'Fourteen Secret British Documents Concerning Count John Capodistrias (February-March 1828)', SF, XLV, 1986, pp. 89-121

(ii) Memoirs, Diaries, Private Correspondence, Travellers' Accounts

'Adrianopol'skii mir po razskazu A. I. Mikhailovskogo-Danilevskogo' (ed. N. K. Shil'der), RV, CCIII, 1889, pp. 3-24

*Arkhiv Kniazia Vorontsova* (ed. P. Bartenev) (Moscow, 1870-1895), XXXVII (1891), LX (1895)

Alexander, J. E., *Travels to the Seat of War in the East through Russia and the Crimea in 1829* (London, 1830) 2 vols


Capodistrias, J., *Correspondence* (Geneva, 1839), 4 vols

*Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven* (ed. E. Jones Parry) (London, 1938-39), 2 vols

*Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey* (ed. G. L. Le Strange) (London, 1890), 3 vols

*Capodistrias: Some Unpublished Documents* (Thessalonika, 1970)

*Old Days in Diplomacy: Recollections of a Closed Century* (London, 1903)

*Dépêches inédites du chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars de Valachie, (Publiées par le comte Prokesch-Osten fils)* (Paris, 1876), 3 vols


*Zapiski* (Moscow, 1864)

'Fel'dmarshal graf Iv. Iv. Dibich-Zabalkanskii v vosposminaniakh, zapisannykh v 1830 g. baronom Tizengauzenom' (ed. N. K. Shil'der), RS, LXIX, pp. 511-36; LXX, 1891, pp. 45-70, 267-304

*Fontanier, V., Voyage en Orient de l' année 1821 à l' année 1829. Evénements politiques de 1827 à 1829* (Paris, 1830)

*Fonton, F. P., Vospominaniia. Iumeristicheskie, politicheskie i voennye pis'ma* (Leipzig, 1862), 2 vols

*Griboedov, A. S., Pis'ma. Dnevnik. Sochineniiia* (Leningrad, 1945)

*Griboedov, A. S., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Petrograd, 1917), III

*Iakushin, I. D., Zapiski, stat'i, pis'ma* (Moscow, 1951)


*Metternich, K., Mémoires, documents et écrits divers* (laisées par le Prince R. de Metternich) (Paris, 1881), III-IV

Slade, A. R., *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece etc., and of a Cruise in the Black Sea with the Captain Pasha in the years 1829, 1830 and 1831* (London, 1833) 2 vols

Sudley, Lord, *The Lieven-Palmerston Correspondence, 1828-1856* (London, 1943)


Tornau, F. F., *Vospominaniia o kampanii 1829 g.* (Moscow, 1867)


Vigel', F. F., *Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1865)

‘Vospominaniia L. I. Rikorda o prebyvanii v Konstantinopole v 1830 g.’, *RS*, XVII, 1876, pp. 499-512


‘Zapiski kniazia Nikolaia Sergeevicha Golitsyna’, *RS*, XXX, 1881, pp. 839-50

**WORKS OF REFERENCE**

Brockhaus and Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (St Petersburg, 1890-1907), 86 vols

Gizetti, A., *Bibliograficheskii ukazatel’ pechatnym na russkom iazyke sochineniiam i stat’iam o voennykh deistviakh russkikh voisk na Kavkaze* (St Petersburg, 1901)

Grimsted, P. G., Kozlov, V. P. (eds), *Arkiv Rossi. Moskva i Sankt-Peterburg* (Moscow, 1997)


Jovanic, V. M., *English Bibliography of the Near Eastern Question* (Belgrade, 1908)


Leer, G., A., *Entsiklopedia voennykh i morsikh nauk* (St Petersburg, 1883-97)


Lyons, M., *The Russian Imperial Army: A Bibliography of Regimental Histories and Related Works* (Stanford, 1968)

Mamyshev, V., *Zhizneopisaniia russkikh voennykh deiatelei* (St Petersburg, 1885-87), 4 vols

Miloradovich, G. A., *Spisok itis Sviy Ih Kh Velichestv s tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Petra L-go po 1886 g.* (Kiev, 1886)

Polovtsov, A. A. (ed.), *Russkii biograficheskii slovar’* (St Petersburg, 1896-1916), 27 vols

Rummel’, V. V., Golubtsov, V. V., *Rodoslovnyi sbornik russkikh dvorianskh famlitii* (St Petersburg, 1886-87), 2 vols

Stavrianos, L. S., *The Balkans since 1453* (New York, 1958)

*Voennaia entsiklopediia* (St Petersburg, 1911-15), 18 vols

CONTEMPORARY WORKS ON MILITARY HISTORY AND THEORY

Bulgarin F., Bronevskii, S., *Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsiei v tsarstvovanie Nikolaia I* (St Petersburg, 1830)


Burtsov, I., G., *'Mysl' o teorii voennykh znanii*, VZ, 1919, No.2, pp. 42-65

Buturlin, D. P., *Relation historique et critique de la guerre Austro-Russe en Italie en 1799* (St Petersburg, 1812)

Buturlin, D. P., *Voennaia istoriia pokhodov Rossiani v XVII stoletii* (St Petersburg, 1819-23), 4 vols

Buturlin, D. P., *Opisanie vsekh pokhodov protiv Forty Umutanskoii s 1769 po 1812* (St Petersburg, 1822)

Buturlin, D. P., *Kartina voin Rossii s Turtsiei v tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra I i imperatora Aleksandra II* (St Petersburg, 1822-30), 2 vols


Charles, Archduke, *Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1799 in Deutschland und in der Schweiz* (Vienna, 1819), 2 vols


Danilevskii, N., *Opisanie slavnoi turetskoi kreposti Varny* (Moscow, 1829)


Glinka, F. N., *'Rassuzhdenie o neobkhodimosti imet' istoriiu Otechestvennoi voiny 1812'* SO, 1816, No.4, pp. 146-62

Glinka, F. N., *Kratkoe nachertanie 'Voennogo zhurnal'ia* (St Petersburg, 1816)

Iovskii, *Posledniaia voina s Turtsiei* (St Petersburg, 1830)


Jomini, A. H., *Précis des évènements de la campagne d'automne de 1813, depuis l'armistice de Parschwitz jusqu'à la bataille de Leipzig* (Paris, 1813)

Jomini, A. H., *'Obshchie pravila voennogo iskusstva'*, VZ, 1817, No.1-3


Jomini, A. H., *Introduction à l'étude des grandes combinaisons de la stratégie et de la tactique* (Paris, 1829)

Jomini, A. H., *Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre et leur rapports avec la politique des états* (Paris, 1830)

Jomini, A. H., *Analiticheskii obzor glavnikh soobrazhenii voennogo iskusstva i ob otnosheniakh onykh s politikoii gosudarstv* (St Petersburg, 1833)

Jomini, A. H., *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinations de la stratégie, de la grand tactique et de la politique militaire...Pour servir de complément des grandes opérations militaires* (Paris, 1837)
Liprandi, I. P., *Nekotorye zamechaniiia po povodu dvukh sochenii vyshedshikh pod zaglaviom 'Malaiia voina'*, (St Petersburg, 1851)

Liprandi, I. P., *'Osada turetskikh krepостей', RI*, 1855, No.5, pp. 1-6

Liprandi, I. P., *Osobennosti voin s turками* (St Petersburg, 1877)


Lloyd, H. H. E., *The History of the War between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her Allies* (London, 1781-84) 2 vols


Luk'ianovich, N., *Opisanie turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov* (St Petersburg, 1844-47) 4 vols

Medem, N., *Obozrenie izvestneishikh pravil i sistem strategii* (St Petersburg, 1836)

Monteith, W., *Kars and Erzeroum; with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch, in 1828 and 1829* (London, 1856)

Ushakov, A. V., *Istoryia voennykh deistvii v aziatskoi Turtsii, v 1828 i 1829 godakh* (St Petersburg, 1836), 2 vols

Verigin, A., *Voennoe obozrenie pokhoda Rossiiskikh voisk v evropeiskoi turtsii v 1829 godu* (St Petersburg, 1846)

*Voennyi zhurnal*, 1810-11, 1817-19

Zubov, P., *Kartinaposledneu voiny s Persieiu 1826-1828* (St Petersburg, 1834)

Zubov, P., *Kartina Kavkazskago Kraia* (St Petersburg, 1834-35) 2 vols

Zubov, P., *Podvigi Russkikh voinov v stranakh Kavkazskikh, s 1800 po 1834* (St Petersburg, 1835-36), 2 vols

Zubov, P., *Persidskaia voina v tsarstvovanii Nikolaia I* (St Petersburg, 1837)

SECONDARY LITERATURE

Abdullaev, F., *Iz istorii russko-iranskikh otnoshenii i angliiskoi politiki v Iran v nachale XIX v.* (Tashkent, 1971)

Abdurakhmanov, A. A., *Azerbaidzhan v russko-iranskikh otnosheniiakh v pervoi polovine XIX veke* (Baku, 1953)

Addington, L. H., *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington, 1986)


Alaverdiants, M. Ia., *Graf Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich-Erivanskii* (St Petersburg, 1912)

Alison Phillips, W., *The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833* (London, 1897)


Allen, W. E. D., Muratoff *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge, 1953)


Arsh, G. L., *Albaniia i Epir v kontse XVIII-nachale XIX v.* (Moscow, 1963)
Arsh, G. L., *Tainoe obshchestvo 'Filiki Eteriia' (Moscow, 1965)
Arsh, G. L., 'Deiatel'nost' 'Filiki Eteriia' v Rossii v period vosstania Ipsilanti', NNI, 1969, No.2, pp. 135-44
Arsh, G. L., *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow, 1970)
Arsh, G. L., *Kapodistria i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 (Moscow, 1976)
Atkin, M., *Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis, 1980)
Avgitidis, K. G., *Progressivnaia grecheskaia emigratsiia (Kiev, 1987)
Balaian, B. P., *Mezhdanarodnye otnoshenia Irana v 1813-28 (Erevan, 1967)
Baron, S. H., and Heer, N. W. (eds), Windows on the Russian Past: Essays on Soviet Historiography since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio, 1977)
Barratt, G., *Russian Shadows on the British Northwest Coast of North America 1810-90 (Vancouver, 1983)
Bazanov, V. G., *Dekabristy v Kishineve (M. F. Orlov i V. F. Raevskii) (Kishinev, 1951)
Beliavskii, N. N., Potto, V. A., *Utverzhdenie russkago vladychestva na Kavkaze (Tblishi, 1901-1902), 12 vols
Berindei, D., *L'année révolutionnaire 1821 dans les pays roumains (Bucharest, 1973)
Bernstein, S. B., 'Stranitsa iz istorii Bolgarskoi immigratsii v Rossii vo vremia ruskoturetskoi voiny 1828-1829 gg', UZIS, 1949, No.1, pp. 327-41
Beshuev, S. K., *Iz istorii vneshnepoliticheskikh otnoshenii v period prisoedinenia Kavkaza k Rossii (Moscow, 1955)
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (ed.), *M. I. Kutuzov (Moscow, 1950-56), 5 vols
Beskrovnyi, L. G., *Ocherk voennoi istoriografii Rossii (Moscow, 1962)
Beskrovnyi, L. G., *Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke (Moscow, 1973)
Beskrovnyi, L. G., *Russkoe voennoe iskustvo XIX v. (Moscow, 1974)
Best, G., *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870 (London, 1982)
Black, J., *European Warfare, 1660-1815 (Yale, 1994)
Bliokh, I. S., *Finansi Rossi XIX stoletiia: Istoria, statistika* (St Petersburg, 1882)
Bobrovskii, P. O., ‘Ob uchrezhdenii iunkerskich uchilishch’, *VS*, 1864, No.11, pp. 92-144
Bol’shakov, L., *Otsykal ia knigu slavnuiu: Poiski i isselodovaniia* (Cheliabinsk, 1971)
Bolsover, G. H., ‘Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey’, *SEER*, XXVII, 1948-49, pp. 115-45
Budovnits, I. Iu. (ed.), *Protiv antimarksistskoi kontseptsii M. H. Pokrovskogo* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1939-40), 2 vols
Bukharov, D., *Rossiia i Turtsiia ot vozniknoveniia politicheskikh mezdu nimi otnoshenii do Londonskogo traktata 1871 goda* (St Petersburg, 1878)
Bulgakov, F. I., ‘Russkii gosudarstvennyi chelovek minuvshikh trekh tsarstvovanii (Graf P. D. Kiselevo)’, *IV, VII*, 1882, pp. 136-49
Butkov, P. G., *Materialy no novoi istorii Kavkaza* (St Petersburg, 1869) 3 vols
Butkovskii, Ia. N., *Sto let avstriiskoipolitild v vostochnom voprose* (St Petersburg, 1888), 2 vols
‘Cherty iz zhizni i tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Nikolaia I-ogo’, *VS*, 1868, No.9, pp. 162-73
Chesney, F. R., *The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829* (London, 1854)
Childs, J., *Arms and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789* (Manchester, 1982)
Ciachir, N., ‘The Adrianople Treaty (1829) and its European Implications’, *RESEE*, XVII, 1979, pp. 695-713
Courville, X., de, *Jomini ou le devin de Napoléon* (Pais, 1935)
Crawley, C. W., ‘Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40’, *CHJ*, III, 1929, pp. 47-73
Crawley, C. W., *The Question of Greek Independence, 1821-1833* (Cambridge, 1930)

Curtiss, J. S., *The Russian Army under Nicholas I* (Durham, N.C., 1965)

Danilevskii, N., *Adrianopol'skii mir. Romanicheskii povesti* (Moscow, 1829)

Danilevskii, N. Ia., *Rossiia i Evropea* (St Petersburg, 1871)

Davison, R., H., “‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility’: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered”, SR, XXXV, 1975, pp. 463-83

Debidur, A., *Diplomaticheskaia istoriia Evropy ot venskogo do berlinskogo kongressa* (1814-1878) (Moscow, 1947), I


Djuvara, T., *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie* (Paris, 1914)

Dobrov, L., *Izooznoe slaviamstvo, Turtsiia i sopernichestvo evropeiskikh pravitel’stv na balkanskom poluostrove* (St Petersburg, 1879)


Dostian, I. S., *Borba serbskogo naroda protiv turetskogo iga XV-nachalo XIX v.* (Moscow, 1958)

Dostian, I. S., *Rossiia i balkanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1972)


Dostian, I. S., ‘Uchastie dekabristov v izuchenii Balkan i russko-turetskikh voin XVIII-nachala XIX v.’, SS, 1975, No.6, pp. 23-35

Dostian, I. S., *Rossiia i balkanskie narody* (Moscow, 1980)

Dostian, I. S. (ed.), *Rossiia i Balkany* (Moscow, 1995)

Dronov, B. A., *Chernomorskie prolivy* (Moscow, 1948)

Driault, E., *La question d’Orient depuis ses origines jusqu’à nos jours* (Paris, 1921)


Druzhinin, N. M., ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskie vzgliady P. D. Kiseleva’, VI, 1946, No.2-3, pp. 36-46

Druzhinin, N. M., *Gosudarstvennya krest’iane i reforma P. D. Kiseleva* (Moscow, 1946-58), 2 vols

Druzhinina, E. I., *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiskii mir 1774 goda* (Moscow, 1955)

Dubrovin, N. F., *Istoriia voiny i vidyaychstva russkih na Kavkaze* (St Petersburg, 1871-88), 6 vols


Eliade, P., *La Roumanie au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1914), II


Epanchin, N., *Takticheskaia podgotovka russkoi armii pered pokhodom 1828-1829 gg.* (St Petersburg, 1904)
Fuller, W., *Strategy and Power in Russia: 1600-1914* (New York, 1992)
Geisman, P., ‘General’nyi shtab v turetskoi voine’, *VS*, 1910, No.3, pp. 73-88; 1910, No.4, pp. 67-88
Glinkoetskii, N. P., *Russkii general’nyi shtab v tsarstvovanii imperator Aleksandra I* (St Petersburg, 1874)
Glinkoetskii, N. P., *Istoriicheskii ocherk Nikolaevskoi akademii general’nogo shtaba* (St Petersburg, 1882)
Glinkoetskii, N. P., *Istoria russkago general’nogo shtaba* (St Petersburg, 1883-94), 2 vols
Goerlitz, W., *History of the German General Staff* (Boulder, Colo., 1985)
Gorianov, S. M., *Bosfor i Dardanell* (St Petersburg, 1907)
Grabar’, V. E., ‘Otzyv o sochinenii S. M. Gorianova: ‘Bosfor i Dardanely’* (St Petersburg, 1910)
Grammont, A. L. de, *De l’administration provisoir russe en Valachie et de ses résultats* (Bucharest, 1840)
Grekov, V., *Istoriicheskii ocherk voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii 1700-1910* (Moscow, 1910)
Grigorian, Z. T., ‘Uchastie armiian v russko-persidskikh voinakh nachala XIX veka’, *VI*, 1951, No.4, pp. 16-25
Grigorian, Z. T., *Prisoedinenie vostochnoi Armenii k Rossii v nachale XIX* (Moscow, 1959)
Grishinskii, A. (ed.), *Istoria russkoi armii i flota* (Moscow, 1911-13) 15 vols
Grosul, V. Ia., *Dunaiskie kniazhestva v politike Rossii, 1772-1806* (Kishinev, 1965)
Grosul, V. Ia., *Reform v dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossii* (20-30-e gody XIX v.) (Moscow, 1966)
Grosul, V. Ia. et al., *Formirovanie granits Rossii s Turtsiei i Iranom XVIII-nachalo XX veka* (Moscow, 1979)
Guliev, A. N. et al (ed.), *Prisoedinenia Azerbaidzhana k Rossii i ego progressivnye posledstviia v oblasti ekonomiki i kul’tury* (Baku, 1955)
Gur’ianov, I., *Vzgliad na turetskuiu imperiitu v teperreshnem ee sostoiannii* (Moscow, 1828)


Hittle, J. D., *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg, Penn., 1944)

Hornung, K., *Scharnhorst: Soldat, Reformer Staatsman* (Munich, 1997)


Hugemeister, J., *Mémoire sur le commerce des ports de la Nouvelle Russie, de la Valachie et de la Moldavie* (Odessa, 1833)


Ian, Kh., ‘Nesselrode i vostochnye krisisy 1828-1833 godov’, *OI*, 1992, No.2, pp. 203-08


Igamberdyev, M. A., *Iran v mezhdunaronykh otnosheniakh pervoi treti XIX v.* (Samarkand, 1961)


Iovva, I. F., *Iuzhnye dekabristy i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* (Kishinev, 1963)

Iovva, I. F., ‘Retsejstva na monografiu G. L. Arsha “Eteristkoe dvizhenie v Rossii”’, *ISSSR*, 1971, No.5, pp. 159-60


Iovva, I. F., ‘Russkoe praviltel'stvo i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie grecheskogo naroda’, *ISSSR*, 1974, No.5, pp. 216-18

Iovva, I. F., *Bessarabia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe obshchestvo* (Kishinev, 1974)

Iovva, I. F., *Dekabristy v Moldavii* (Kishinev, 1975)

Iovva, I. F., *Pereredovaia Rossiia i obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie v Moldavii* (Kishinev, 1986)


Isambert, G., *L'indépendence greque et l'Europe* (Paris, 1900)

Ismailov, M., *Ob uchastii azerbaidzhansev v rjadakh russkikh voisk v russko-iranskikh i russko-turetskikh voinakh pervoi treti XIX v.* (Baku, 1954)

Ivanov, P. A. *Obozrenie sostava i ustroistva reguliarnoi russkoi kavalerii ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei* (St Petersburg, 1864)


Jones, R. E., ‘Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth-Century Russia’, *JFGO*, XXIX, 1984, pp. 34-51


Karnovich, E. P., ‘Ob uchasti Rossi in v osvobozdenii khristian ot turetskogo igla’, *OZ*, CCXXXVI, 1878, No.1, pp. 121-57; No.2, pp. 361-418

Karnovich, E. P., *Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich* (St Petersburg, 1899)


Kersnovskii, A. A., *Istoriia russkoi armii* (Moscow, 1993), II

Khachapuridze, G. V., *K istorii Gruzii pervoi poloviny XIX veka* (Tblish, 1950)

Khashaev, K. O., *Sotsial' naia baza dvizheniia gortsev Vostochnogo Kavkaza v pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow, 1956)


Kiniapina, N. S., *Vneshnaia politika Rossii pervoi poloviny XIX v.* (Moscow, 1963)

Kinross, J. P. D. B., *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York, 1977)


Klokman, Iu. R., *Fe l’dmarnash Rumiantsev v period russko-turetskoi voiny 1768-1774 gg.* (Moscow, 1951)


Kohn, H., *Pan-Slavism. Its History and Ideology* (Indiana, 1953)

Konobeev, V. D., ‘‘Natsional’nno-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Bolgarii’, *UZIS*, XX, 1960, pp. 221-74

Koval’, S., *Dekabrist V. F. Raevskii* (Irkutsk, 1951)


Lalaev, M., *Istoricheskii ocherk voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii podvedomstvennykh* glavnomu ikh upravleniui...1700-1880 (St Petersburg, 1880-82), 2 vols


Lane-Poole, S., *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning* (London, 1888) 2 vols

Lebedev, L. 'V kakom smysle osvobozhdenie balkanskikh slavian sostavliaet istoricheskuu zadachu Rossii', IB, 1878, No.6, pp. 1-6
Lebedev, P. I., Pestel' - ideolog i rukovoditel' dekabristov (Moscow, 1972)
Lecomte, F., Le Général Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits (Paris, 1860)
Leer, G. A., Obzor voin Rossii ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei (St Petersburg, 1885-96), 4 vols
Lehmann, M., Scharnhorst (Leipzig, 1886-87) 2 vols
Ley, F., Alexandre ler et sa Sainte-Alliance (Paris, 1975)
Liakhov, V. A., Russkaia armia i flot v voine s Ottomanskoi Turtsiei v 1828-1829 godakh (Iaroslavl', 1972)
Lieven, D., Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime (New Haven, Conn. and London, 1989)
Lincoln, W. B., 'Count P. D. Kiselev: A Reformer in Imperial Russia', AJPH, XVI, 1970, pp. 177-88
Lincoln, W. B., 'The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Enquiry into their Backgrounds and Service Careers', RR, XXXIV, 1975, pp. 308-23
Lincoln, W. B., 'A Re-examination of some Historical Stereotypes: An Analysis of the Career Patterns and Background of the Decembrists', JFGO, XXIV, 1976, pp. 357-68
Lincoln, W. B., Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias (N. Illinois, 1989)
Lockhart, L., 'The “Political Testament” of Peter the Great', SEER, XIV, 1935-36, pp. 438-41
Mackenzie, D., The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (New York, 1967)
MacNeil, J., Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East (London, 1836)
Markova, O. P., 'O proiskhozhdenii tak nazyvaemogo Grecheskogo Proekta', ISSSR, 1958, No.4, pp. 52-78.
Markova, O. P., Rossiia, Zakavkaz 'e i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniia v XVIII v. (Moscow, 1966)
Marriott, J. A. R., George Canning and his Times (London, 1903)
Martens, F., 'Etude historique sur la politique Russe dans la question d’orient', RDILC, IX, 1877, pp. 49-77
Martens, F., Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo tsivilizovannykh narodov (St Petersburg, 1882-83), 2 vols
Mazour, A., The First Russian Revolution, 1825. The Decembrist Movement (Stanford, 1937)
Mazour, A. G., The Writing of History in the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1971)
Medvedeva, O. V., 'Rossiiskaia diplomatiia i emigratsiiia bolgarskogo naseleniia v 1830-e gody', SS, 1988, No.4, pp. 24-33
Melikhov, V., Opisanie deistvii Chernomorskogo flota v prodolzhenie voiny s Turtsiei v 1828-1829 gg. (St Petersburg, 1850)
Menning, B. W., 'A. I. Chernyshev: A Russian Lycurgus', CSP, XXX, 1988, pp. 192-219


Meshcheriakov, G. P., Russkoe voennaia mys’ v XIX v. (Moscow, 1973)


Meshcheriuk, I. I., Pereselenie bolgar v iuizhnuu Bessarabiu, 1828-1834 (Kishinev, 1965)

Miliutin, D. A., ‘Voennyie reformy imperatora Aleksandra I’, VE, XCIII, 1882, pp. 5-35

Miller, A. F., Mustafa pasha Bairaktar. Ottomanskaia imperiia v nachale XIX veka (Moscow, Leningrad, 1947)

Miller, F. A., Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Charlotte, N.C., 1968)

Molden, E., Metternich’s Orientpolitik, 1812-1833 (Vienna, 1913)

Moltke, H. C. B. von, Der Russisch-Türkischer Feldzug, 1828-1829 (Berlin, 1845)


Montgomery Hyde, H., Princess Lieven (London, 1938)


Mosley, P. E., Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934)

Murav’ev, N. N., Turtsiia i Egipt v 1832 i 1833 godakh (Moscow, 1869), 4 vols

Nadler, V. K., Aleksandr I i ideia Sviashchennogo Soiuza (Riga, 1886-92), 4 vols


Nechkina, M. V., Vosstanie 14-go dekabria 1825 g. (Moscow, 1951)

Nechkina, ‘M. V., Dvizhenie dekabristov (Moscow, 1955) 2 vols

Neelov, N., Ocherk sovremennago sostoianiia strategii (St Petersburg, 1849)

Nekiuudov, A. V., Nachalo snoshenii Rossii s Turtsiei (Moscow, 1883)


Nolde, B., La Formation de I’empire Russe (Paris, 1953), II

Non-Alarmist, A., A Few Words on our Relations with Russia including some Remarks on a Recent Publication by Colonel de Lacy Evans entitled “Designs of Russia” (London, 1828)


Orlik, O. V., Dekabristy i vneshnaia politika Rossii (Moscow, 1984)

Orlik, O. V., Rossiiia v mezhdunarodnykh otmosheniiakh, 1815-1829 (Moscow, 1998)

Otetea, A., Tudor Vladimirescu si revolutia din 1821 (Bucharest, 1971)

Paleolog, G., Sivinis, M., Istorichestkii ocherk narodnoi voiny za nezavisimost’ Gretsii (St Petersburg, 1867), 2 vols

Papacoesta-Danielopou, C., ‘Les pays Roumains vus par le phanariote’, SESEE, XXXI, 1993, pp. 365-70

Paret, P., Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (Princeton, 1966)

Paret, P., Clausewitz and the State (Oxford, 1976)

Paret, P., Craig, G., Gilbert, F. (eds), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford, 1986)


Petrice, C., The Life of George Canning (London, 1946)
Petrov, A. N., *Voina Rossi s Turtsiei, 1806-12* (St Petersburg, 1887), 3 vols

Petrov, A. N., *Vliianie turetskikh voin s poloviny proshlego stoletiia na razvitie russkogo voennogo iskusstva* (St Petersburg, 1893-94), 2 vols

Petrovich, M. B., *The Emergence of Russian Panlavism, 1856-1870* (New York, 1956)


Petershevskii I. P. (ed.), *Kolonial' naia politika Rossiiskogo tsarisma v Azerbaidzhanе*, (Moscow, Leningrad, 1936)


Pokrovskii, M. N., *Vneshniaa politika* (Moscow, 1918)

Pokrovskii, M. N., *Diplomatia i voiny tsarskoi Rossi в XIX stoletii* (Moscow, 1924)


Popov, N. A., *Rossiia i Serbia* (St Petersburg, 1869) 2 vols

Purves, J. G., West, D. A., (eds), *War and Society in the Nineteenth Century Russian Empire* (Toronto, 1972)


Puryear, V. J., *Napoleon and the Dardanelles* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1951)

Pypyin, A., 'Slavianskii vopros po vzgliadamlv. Aksakova', *VE*, 1886, No.8, pp. 769-75


Raeff, M., 'The 150th Anniversary of the Campaign of 1812 in Soviet Historical Writing', *JFGO*, XII, 1964, pp. 247-60

Ragsdale, H., 'Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project', *SEER*, LXVI, 1988, pp. 91-117

Radosavljevic, B., 'Novosti o vojnomosnoj politike Boksa u Donbasu', *SS*, 1985, No.1, pp. 90-111

Rhinelander, A. L. H., Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar (Montreal, 1990)

Riasanovskii, N., *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1967)
Rovinskii, P., ‘Rossiia i slaviane balkanskogo poluostrova’, *DNR*, 1878, No.2, pp. 145-65
Rozen, D. G., *Istoriia Turtsii ot pobedy reform v 1826 g. do Parizhskogo traktata 1856 g.* (St Petersburg, 1872)
Rozhkova, M. K., *Ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva na sredнем vostoke vo vtoroichetvertiXIXvekairoskaiaburzhuazii* (Moscow, 1949)
Sbomik sochinenii ofitserov Nikolaevskoi Akademii General’nago Shtaba (St Petersburg, 1863), 2 vols
Schiemann, Th., *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I* (Berlin, 1904-19), 4 vols
Schroeder, P. W., ‘Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia was Restrained’, *SAQ*, LXXXII, 1983, pp. 1-18
Schwartzberg, S., ‘The Lion and the Phoenix-I: British Policy Toward the ‘Greek Question’, 1831-32’, *MES*, XXIV, 1988, pp. 139-77
Semenov, L. S., *Rossiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na sredнем vostoke v 20e gody XIX v.* (Leningrad, 1963)
Semenova, I. V., *Russko-moldavskoe boevoe sodruzhestvo, 1787-1791* (Kishinev, 1968)
Semenova, I. V., *Rossiia i osvoboditel’naia bor’ba moldavskogo naroda protiv ottomanskogo iga v kontse XVIII v.* (Kishinev, 1970)
Semenova, L. E., ‘Vostanie 1821 g. v Valakhii i Rossiiia’, in *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia na Balkanakh* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 61-70
Semenovskii, M. (ed.), *Graf Arakcheev i voennye poseleniiia, 1809-1831* (St Petersburg, 1871)
Shapiro, A. L., *Admiral D. N. Seniavin* (Moscow, 1958)
Scherbatov, A. P., *General-Feldmarshal Kniaz’ Paskevich, ego zhizn’ i deiatel’nost’* (St Petersburg, 1888-1904), 7 vols
Shcherbinin, M. P. *Biografia General-Feldmarshal Kniazia Mikhaila Semenovicha Vorontsova* (St Petersburg, 1858)
Sheremet, V. I., *Turtsia i Adrianopol’skii mir 1829 g.* (Moscow, 1975)


Wrigley, W. D., ‘The Ionian Islands and the Advent of the Greek State (1827-1833)’, *BS*, XIX, 1978, pp. 414-26


Zablotski-Desiatovskii, A. P., *Graf P. D. Kiselev i ego vremia. Materialy dla istorii imperatorov Aleksandra I, Nikolaia I, i Aleksandra II* (St Petersburg, 1881-82), 4 vols


Zhigarev, S. A., *Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose* (Moscow, 1896) 2 vols

Zidel'man, N. Ia., ‘Gde i Chto Liprandi’, in *Puti v neznaemoe, pisateli rasskazyvaiut o nauke* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 130-44

**DISSERTATIONS**

Adamiyat, F. D., ‘The Diplomatic Relations of Persia with Britain, Turkey, and Russia, 1815-1830’, Ph.D., (London, 1949)


Luxenburg, N., ‘Russian Expansion into the Caucasus and the English Relationship Thereto’, Ph.D., (Michigan, 1957)

Rhinelander, L. H., Jr., ‘The Incorporation of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire: The Case of Georgia, 1801-1854’, (Columbia, 1972)
Tumelty, J. J., ‘The Ionian Islands under British Administration, 1815-1864’ Ph.D. (Cambridge, 1952)
MAP C: THE CAUCASIAN THEATRE

[Map showing the Caucasian Theatre region with place names and the Black Sea.]