The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s (24-27 August 1572) and the Sack of Antwerp (4-7 November 1576): print and political responses in Elizabethan England

Catherine Buchanan

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract:

The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) and the Sack of Antwerp (1576), two of the most notorious massacres of the 1570s, were of international consequence in a confessionally-divided Europe. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of the Elizabethan political and print responses to both atrocities, evaluating to what extent and in what ways each shaped the increasingly Protestant political character of the period. It compares strands of argument aired by Elizabethan councillors, courtiers, military commanders and clerics, in contrast with the content of contemporary news pamphlets, to establish whether there was any overlap between the parameters of political debate and topical print. It investigates whether, and on what occasions, statesmen or figures associated with the court may have sought to confessionalise public opinion via the production of printed news.

Analysing often overlooked printed sources, the thesis focuses on aspects of content and contexts of production. It considers the kinds of comment expressed on the massacres per se and in relation to: the nature of the wars in France and the Low Countries; Elizabeth’s foreign and domestic agendas; the compound significance of her gender, the unresolved succession and her realm's vulnerability to foreign invasion; and providential discourses concerning God’s favour and protection. These lines of enquiry throw up some insights into changing English attitudes towards the Catholic crowns of France and Spain and key figures abroad. Finally, the thesis reaches some broader conclusions regarding the development of an increasingly militant Anglo-Protestant nationalism in the mid-Elizabethan period.
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Bibliography
Abbreviations and acronyms


**BL** British Library

**Bod** Bodleian Library, University of Oxford

**Cecil Papers** H.M.C. *Calendar of the manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Salisbury ... preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* (24 vols.; London, 1883-1976)

**CP** Cecil papers (manuscripts) at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire

**CSPD** Green, M. A. E. and Lemon, R. (eds.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth I and James I* (12 vols.; London, 1856-72)


**CSPV** Brown, R. *et al* (eds.), *State papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of Northern Italy* (37 vols.; London, 1864-1947)


**Digges** Digges, D., *The Compleat Ambassador* (London, 1655)


**DU/Vol.** Dudley Papers held at Longleat House

**ESTC** *English Short Title Catalogue Online database* at www.estc.bl.uk

**Fénélon** Teulet, J. B. A. T. (ed.), *Correspondance diplomatique de Betrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon* (7 vols.; Paris, 1838-40)

**IHR** Institute of Historical Research, London

**KL, RP** Lettenhove, M. C. Baron Kervyn de., *Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de l'Angleterre sous le règne de Philippe II* (11 vols.; Brussels, 1882-1900)


**PC** Abbreviation for Elizabethan privy council used in footnotes


**TH/Vol.** Papers of Sir John Thynne held at Longleat House

**TNA, SP** State Papers held at the National Archives, Kew
Introduction

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s (24-27 August 1572) and the Sack of Antwerp (4-7 November 1576), two of the most notorious European massacres of the 1570s, shocked their contemporaries in a confessionally-divided Europe.¹ This poses some key questions for historians: what significance did each massacre hold for Elizabeth’s ‘Protestant’ realm and how did her subjects react? Surprisingly, few have engaged with these questions – despite a wealth of comment on Elizabeth’s reign in general. Although there is an extensive historiography which sheds light on the 1572 massacre’s domestic and international dimensions,² there has been no comparative analysis of English political debates and print comment in its wake.³ Similarly, there has been little examination of the English pamphlet responses to either the first major phase of revolt in the Low Countries (1568-76), or the 1576 Sack of Antwerp in particular, one of its most sensational atrocities.⁴

This thesis offers a comparative analysis of Elizabethan print and political responses to both the 1572 and 1576 massacres. It looks at how perceptions of the wider wars in France and the Low Countries – the seventeen provinces of the Habsburg Netherlands, as ruled over by Philip II – shifted and evolved over the course of the 1570s. It also analyses the scope and heterogeneity of contemporary printed comment – including news pamphlets, published sermons, prayers, proclamations, tracts and ballads – in which various Protestant positions were outlined. The personal responses of key councillors, courtiers, military and political personnel, are looked at to establish whether there was any overlap – in terms of language or ideas – with the printed comment. This thesis also seeks to uncover links between elements close to Elizabeth’s court and members of the print industry, and highlights several instances when second tier ‘men of business’ or figures associated with the court played an active role in producing news pamphlets. This thesis also highlights occasions where there were considerable disconnects between the print and political discourses: demonstrating that, in keeping with recent findings, there were multiple spheres for political debate in Elizabethan England.

¹ The term ‘confessional’ denoting the ideological and geopolitical divisions that ruptured Europe following the Reformation. For a fuller discussion, see B. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge MA, 2007), pp. 28-34, 37.
³ A. G. Dickens’s article “The Elizabethans and St. Bartholomew” in A. Soman (ed.), The massacre of St. Bartholomew: reappraisals and documents (The Hague, 1974), pp.52-70 examines some, but not all, of the print and political responses.
⁴ Indispensable, but dated, coverage of the 1576 sack is to be found in P. Génard’s La furie espagnole, Documents pour servier à l’histoire du sac d’Anvers en 1576 (Antwerp, 1876). Modern historians have shied away from setting the atrocity in an international context, although G. Parker notes its broader European significance in The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977), p. 178; Idem., The army of Flanders (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 155, 173.
My conclusion reviews the links between Elizabethan pamphleteering and politics in the 1570s and offers some thoughts on the evolution of English Protestant nationalism. Specifically, it considers whether the 1572 or 1576 massacres were, in fact, major turning points in Elizabethan policy, and to what extent either exerted a lasting legacy over the print discourses of the era. I also evaluate to what extent historians might claim to see a distinctly anti-Spanish ‘Black Legend’ – the term “la leyenda negra”, as coined by Julián Juderías – emerging in English topical print of the 1570s. Following Juderías, I take this to refer to a style of heavily-politicized, historical writing that vilifies Spain and its rulers.5

1. Structure of thesis

This thesis is dually comparative, focusing on both the comparative impact of the two massacres and on the contemporary print record related to them. The political chapters, which take as their source material the correspondence, memoranda and papers of Elizabethan statesmen and their contacts, serve to contextualise and cross-reference the claims presented in print. Although I decided I needed to treat the two sectors separately, in order to preserve the chronological coherence of the whole thesis, my distinction between the ‘popular’ print and political discourse is somewhat blurred. My frequent cross-referencing between the two sectors illustrates my central contention that the two were, if by no means exactly synchronous, closely related.

Although part 1 may be considered a relatively long preamble to the events of August 1572, it is essential. At a very early stage in my research, I realised that I would have to delve more deeply than I had expected into the source material of the late 1560s and early 1570s in order to evaluate the relative impact of the 1572 massacre. This tranche of research has allowed me to pose questions regarding the novelty or otherwise of the later developments, and to trace continuities as well as changes. For example, analysing the run up to Elizabeth’s decision to confirm an alliance with France in April 1572 – and what its consequences were for both Anglo-French and Anglo-Spanish relations of that decade – has proved crucial with respect to understanding her reaction to St. Bartholomew’s and reluctance to adopt an explicitly confessionalised foreign policy. My research into the first fourteen years of the reign has also revealed that there was an interesting degree of continuity in terms of themes and personnel involved in the publication of ‘Dutch’ and French tracts in English.

Parts two and four focus on determining whether St. Bartholomew’s and/or the Sack of Antwerp exerted any lasting influence in Elizabethan print and political culture. Part three, a key hinge, 5

highlights the ongoing importance of the revolt in the Low Countries to English political discourse: also stressing that, despite its patchy historiographical coverage, news of the revolt was a thriving part of Elizabethan print culture. I demonstrate that the usual historiographical split between Anglo-French and Anglo-‘Dutch’ politics is contrary to the lived reality of the period. Part four considers both the court-centred Elizabethan response to the Sack of Antwerp and its wider repercussions, examining the rise of an “alarum” genre from 1576-78 and its increasingly, but not solely, anti-Spanish accent. My coda briefly examines the developments of 1579, when Elizabeth seriously considered marrying Francis, Duke of Anjou. The print and political controversy the proposed match inspired has been closely examined by other historians and, as such, marks a fitting closure to this thesis. I leave it to my conclusion to draw together some broader threads, evaluating the English impact of both massacres, and the wars of which they formed a part, in the print and political debates of the 1570s.

The first three appendices of this thesis list my main print sources by their primary geographic focus: e.g. those concerning France from 1572-76; the Low Countries from 1572-76; and forms of comment on both countries from 1577-79 (although many of these works cross-reference events in both realms). Appendix 4 lists Elizabethan military treatises by year of publication, evidencing the apparent growth in this genre. Appendices 5-14 are reproductions of some interesting visual and print sources of the period, to which I refer in turn.

2. Methodology and sources

(A) Topical print

- Historiography

As Joad Raymond and Tessa Watts have noted, early English pamphlets attracted a broad readership as “documents of controversial times,” seeking to shape public opinion much as modern newspapers do. A new picture is now emerging of a thriving, multifaceted print market populated by opportunistic purveyors and discriminating readers. Research into 17th century England has shown that pamphlets and shorter printed works worked as bearers of often sophisticated ideological messages, circulating both within and outwith London. Whether or not this re-evaluation fits the

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paradigm of Jürgen Habermas’s “public sphere”, it seems that a significant proportion of England’s 17th century population was able to participate in print culture.12

To what extent did Elizabeth’s reign witness the rise of a prototypical “public sphere”, attributable in part to a boom in topical news print? Although the archetypical Habermasian formulation holds that non-parliamentary circles of debate, and concomitant print comment, can only have emerged far later, some historians have modified his theory to fit earlier social conditions.13 Alexandra Halasz has argued that an “unsituated” public sphere, closely associated with an expanding marketplace of print, enabled Elizabethans to share and debate the news of the day.14 Natalie Mears has advanced this idea by showing that Elizabethan pamphlets – which traversed the increasingly porous boundaries of “elite” and “popular” culture15 – were part of a vibrant, increasingly politicised, news-sharing culture,16 interacting with forms of oral and manuscript news transmission to produce multiple, overlapping spheres of “public discourse.”17 In their recent collection of essays on the English “public sphere”, the historians Peter Lake and Steven Pincus have proposed a post-revisionist view.18 In one essay, Lake suggests that a burgeoning press output, coupled with intensifying fears over “papist” plots and the unsettled succession led inexorably, from 1579 onwards, to a more open discussion of matters of state.19

Notwithstanding these key findings, many early Elizabethan news pamphlets, especially those translated from French or Dutch language originals, remain unstudied.20 This is despite the fact that military news from France attracted more coverage in Elizabethan print than that of any other nation, with the Low Countries coming a close second. According to Matthias Shaaber’s count, which my

14 A. Halasz, The marketplace of print (Cambridge, 1997) largely follows Calhoun’s imprecise definition of the public sphere as a “field of discursive connections.”
16 N. Mears, Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms (Cambridge, 2005), Ch.. 5.
17 Mears analyses the findings of Habermas and his followers in Queenship, pp. 6, 10-11, 23-27, 28, 30-1, 142-3, 203-4, 208-9, 211.
18 P. Lake and S. Pincus (eds), The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England (Manchester, 2007). See Introduction.
19 Ibid., Ch. 2. P. Lake, “The Politics of ‘Popularity’ and the Public Sphere: the ‘Monarchical Republic’ of Elizabeth I Defends Itselfol.”
20 S. Clark, The Elizabethan Pamphleteers: Popular Moralistic Pamphlets, 1580-1640 (London, 1983); Halasz, The marketplace of print; Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering; and Watt, Cheap print; all cover the 1570s but do not focus on the domestic political context of many foreign news items.
research supports, at least three quarters of all news titles published in Elizabethan England originated from either France or the Low Countries combined. This thesis sets out to discover: what political and ideological messages did these titles convey? How did the early coverage on St. Bartholomew’s and the Sack of Antwerp seek to explain their complex causation, and illuminate their political – as well as religious and ideological – underpinnings? What strategies did the authors and translators of pamphlets employ, and were they analogous to those used by the purveyors of other news genres (e.g. in ballads, printed sermons, martyrologies and murder narratives)? What were the personal and cliental networks that abetted the publication of these items, and what role – if any – did Elizabeth’s privy councillors play in their production? In one sense my thesis marks an attempt to relate ideas to realities: comparing the representation of “what happened” articulated in topical print with that propounded by the more ‘official’ political sources, and vice versa.

- Methodology

My approach has entailed a re-examination and a close reading of pamphlets that are reasonably well-catalogued in the bibliographic record yet generally overlooked by historians. I began by consulting the revised edition of the STC, identifying what was published and who published it. Allusions to many titles, including those that are no longer extant or perhaps were never issued, appear in Edward Arber’s indispensable *Transcripts of the registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554-1640* (excepting the years 1571-76, for which no entries survive). Other reference works, including Ronald McKerrow’s *A Dictionary of Printers and Booksellers in England, Scotland and Ireland* (London, 1910), and various editions of the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, provided me with invaluable information on the careers of many printers and booksellers, occasionally referring to their international contacts.

Having drawn up an initial list of sources and having established who were the most active printers on the wars in France and the Low Countries, I consulted all surviving materials held at major British repositories for the period 1558-1580 (most, but not all of which, were listed in the STC). I found twenty-seven Elizabethan pamphlets or sermons that were of particular significance for the period before 1572: my readings of which provided the basis for my findings in chapter 2. In the period following the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, I noted forty-five prose tracts or verse ballads of central

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import to this study: fourteen pamphlets or tracts (including two Latin editions of Hotman’s *De furoribus Gallicis*) relating to St. Bartholomew’s, published before 1576; eleven titles, mostly short pamphlets, relating to the wars in the Low Countries from 1571-76; and twenty-three other titles published in the late 1570s which reference either the massacre of 1572 and/or the sack of 1576, or which evoke an image of foreign massacre. 24 Besides these, there were numerous other tracts, treatises, sermons and pamphlets, which I used to extend my lines of enquiry into features of mid-Elizabethan print culture.

Once I had read all the pamphlets – most held by by the British Library, Lambeth Palace Library, and Oxford and Cambridge college libraries – I began to cross-reference the Elizabethan pamphlets (most issued in English, with some others in French or Latin) with those “Ür-texts” held in repositories abroad. Beyond those works known to have been printed in London, I also investigated foreign language works – primarily in French and Latin, but also some in Spanish and Dutch – that covered the wars of the 1570s. 25 I note in my appendices whenever I have identified a foreign language original that was used as the basis for an English title.

To establish the provenance of several pamphlets concerning the French wars and St. Bartholomew’s, I consulted a variety of secondary authorities. 26 Robert Kingdon’s *Myths about the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres, 1572-1576* (Harvard, 1988), which has a short chapter on the English pamphlet response, offered up some useful information on the French, German and Swiss pamphlet responses. For the provenance of pamphlets concerning the revolt in the Low Countries, I consulted the ubiquitous *Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek*, ed. W. Knuttel (10 vols. Utrecht, 1978). Copies of all the Knuttel pamphlets are stored on microfiche in the BL. I also used TEMPO [The Early Modern Pamphlets Online database] and the STCN [the Netherlands Short Title Catalogue] to access some digital copies of these works. Jan Machielsen of Oxford University, who researches Dutch language pamphleteering c. 1576-78, offered guidance on the Knuttel system and helped corroborate the provenance of two English pamphlets from the later 1570s. 27 Laura Vroonen provided me with translation assistance for two of the earlier Dutch tracts.

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24 Listed, respectively, in appendices 1-3 of this thesis.
25 Databases such as *Europeana* and *Gallica Bibliothèque Numérique* contain references to a wide range of print material that was produced in France, Spain, Germany, the Low Countries and England.
26 R. Lindsay and J. Neu, *French Political Pamphlets, 1547-1648* (Madison, 1969) proved to be a useful starting point, providing brief notes on a pamphlet’s author, title and place of publication, although I found P. Renouard’s *Répertoire des imprimeurs parisiens... depuis l’introduction de l’imprimerie à Paris (1470) jusqu’à la fin du seizième siècle* (Paris, 1965) to be more useful on the Parisian print market. Likewise, P. Chaix’s *Les livres imprimés à Genève de 1500 à 1600* (Geneva, 1966) and FOL. Gardy’s *Bibliographie des oeuvres théologiques, littéraires, etc... de Théodore de Bèze* (3 vols; Geneva, 1960) provided key information on the pamphlet trade in Geneva and La Rochelle.
27 Respectively, *The advice and answer of my lord ye prince of Orange...* (London, 1577; STC 25710.15) and *A Request presented to the King of Spayn...* (Edinburgh, 1578; STC 18445).
(B) Political correspondence and papers

- Historiography

There is a vast, and ever-expanding, historiography on the political culture of Elizabeth’s reign – which limitations of space preclude me from addressing here. I offer a synthesis of the most important findings and perspectives in chapter 1, linked to my discussion of the character and foreign policy developments of the early Elizabethan regime.

Suffice to say here that 20th century studies of the period, at least those following Sir John Neale, were broadly concerned with the institutional mechanisms of government and gave only passing consideration to the personal and collective ideologies of the people driving these processes. However, research conducted over the past few decades has started to shed light on this area, with historians integrating analyses of ideology and language into their studies of policy and political culture. In a similar vein, this thesis attempts to analyse the various strands of the political and print source material, examining the complex intersections between language, ideology, politics and religion.

- Methodology

The more I sought to contextualise my interpretations of Elizabethan pamphlets and topical print, the more I realised I needed to highlight any overlap with the concerns expressed by the political élite – to ascertain how far both were sui generis or, in any sense, interconnected. What were the views of those with political influence in the wake of both atrocities? I quickly found that, besides some direct comment on both, the nature of the responses was much more diverse than I had thought.

I began my research by consulting the Calendars of State Papers (Domestic, Foreign, Scotland, Simancas and Venice), the major aristocratic collections of manuscript sources, royal proclamations, and some near-contemporary histories of Elizabeth’s reign. Moving on from the calendars, which can be cursory and/or inaccurate in their summarisations, I used the new

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29 Notably, the studies of Stephen Alford, Simon Adams, Patrick Collinson, Natalie Mears and David Trim, referenced elsewhere in this thesis.
Gale/Cengage *State Papers Online* and digitised *Cecil Papers* to search through the many thousands of papers potentially relevant to this study before examining relevant manuscripts at length.\(^{33}\)

These latter included both councillors’ personal memoranda and wider correspondence, offering insights into how Elizabeth’s closest advisors interacted with a wider network of agents, informers and political facilitators.\(^{34}\) I consulted papers held at the National Archives and the British Library, including those in the Cotton, Harleian, Lansdowne and Yelverton collections; some of the Talbot papers held at Lambeth Palace Library; and microfilm copies of some papers held at Hatfield House, Longleat House and Penshurst Place – including the Cecil, Dudley and Sir John Thynne papers. Unfortunately, Leicester’s papers were dispersed posthumously and there are large lacunae for the 1570s, although I have been able to consult some of his correspondence in the Vespasian division of the Cotton collection.\(^{35}\) I have also consulted the parliamentary journals of the Lords and Commons, and other materials relevant to the activities of parliament and the opinions of its members (where this exists).\(^{36}\) The privy council’s registers offered me basic secretarial information, such as dates of meetings, names of attendees, simple minutes and summaries of correspondence. Occasionally, they offered more detailed lists of committees and committee members with records of their accompanying papers, entered at length or in abstract.\(^{37}\)

Finally, I found the works of John Strype and Dudley Digges to be useful supplements to the rich but incomplete manuscript record.\(^{38}\) Digges’s *Compleat Ambassador* (London, 1641), the first published account of Elizabeth’s marital negotiations with the dukes of Anjou and Alençon, includes much correspondence that is now lost.\(^{39}\) I also consulted the diplomatic correspondence of the main foreign ambassadors and agents at Elizabeth’s court (e.g. Fénélon, Feria and Spes) and the documents

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\(^{33}\) *State Papers Online: The Tudors, 1509-1603* (respectively: *State Papers Domestic; Foreign; Ireland; Scotland; Borders and APC*), at [http://gale.cengage.co.uk/state-papers-online-15091714.aspx](http://gale.cengage.co.uk/state-papers-online-15091714.aspx). Many entries offer high-resolution images of manuscripts from both the *State Papers Domestic* and *Cecil Papers*, supplied courtesy of Hatfield House Archives and ProQuest. Accessed via the BL, Sept. 2008 to July 2011. I also accessed the *Calendar of Cecil Papers* available at [www.british-history.ac.uk](http://www.british-history.ac.uk).


\(^{36}\) *Journal of the House of Commons, 1542-1625* (vol. 1), *Journal of the House of Lords, 1509-77* (vol. 1) and *Journal of the House of Lords, 1577-1614* (vol. 2), online at [www.british-history.ac.uk](http://www.british-history.ac.uk), provide the official minute books of each house. Also, T. E. Hartley (ed), *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I* (Leicester, 1981; 3 vols), which includes parliamentary diaries.


\(^{39}\) D. Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador: or Two Treatises of the Intended Marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious Memory* (London, 1655).
transcribed by M. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove concerning relations between England and the Low Countries. These source collections – coloured by a host of biases and inaccuracies – nonetheless proved useful in situating English developments within their all-important international context.

(C) Notes on terminology and key definitions

I have made every effort to use contemporary terms to identify particular individuals, religious groups and geographic locations. Hence, instead of the term “Dutch Revolt” – commonly, but misleadingly, applied by historians to denote the first phase of the rebellion in the Low Countries (1567-79) – I refer to the rebellion or revolt in the Low Countries, which is more in keeping with contemporary practice. I employ the term Low Countries in its 16th century sense, taken to denote all seventeen provinces of Philip II’s Burgundian inheritance (excluding Franche-Comté), stretching from Luxembourg and the largely Walloon Catholic provinces in the South, to the Dutch and High German speaking provinces in the North. “Dutch” as a signifier refers solely to the language used (predominantly by residents of Holland and Zeeland) in several of these provinces and to the pamphlets printed in this tongue.

I appreciate that the term “Protestant” is not monolithic and I note, where space allows, the various ideological and political positions of German Lutherans, French Huguenots, Swiss and Scots Calvinists, English Protestants, the Elizabethan authorities etc. Despite the arguments of modern social scientists, who have challenged whether one can ever rigidly demarcate Protestant denominations, it is clear that the distinctions between the various groupings carried great weight with contemporary Protestants. I briefly define the terms “puritan” and “Huguenot” in chapter 1. Owing to word constraints, however, I have not defined the terms Calvinist and Lutheran, given that commonly accepted definitions may be found elsewhere.

With respect to the print material of the era, I define a pamphlet in chapter 2. My analysis of topical print comment also includes shorter news titles and tracts, which also work to shed light on the attitudes of the period. I follow standard dictionary definitions of the terms ballad and broadside: the first denoting a short narrative in verse, printed on a single sheet of paper, and the second, either the sheet itself or a large poster-sized publication with text.

40 J. B. A. T. Teulet (ed.), Correspondance diplomatique de Betrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon (1840; 7 vols). The dispatches of the Spanish ambassadors are mostly to be found in CSPSpan. M. C. Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de l’Angleterre sous la règne de Philippe II (11 vols.; Brussels, 1882-1900).
**Notes on conventions**

All English dates cited in manuscript are given as written, excepting that the year given in square brackets for the months of January-March has been changed to conform to modern practice (since the Elizabethan New Year began on 25 March). In other words, allusions to an English source dated 20 January 1571 would be referred to as 20 Jan. [1572] in my footnotes. A question mark within square brackets – such as [Aug. 1572?] – refers to the likely, but not definitive, date of an undated document. During Elizabeth’s reign, parts of Europe employed the new Gregorian calendar or New Style dating system, which ran ten days later than that of the Julian or Old Style system still used by England. All New Style dates used by foreign correspondents are left as they were originally recorded – i.e. with the date gap of 10 days intact, and marked ‘NS.’

I have left the spelling of all manuscript and published sources unmodernised, although I have silently expanded contractions. The brackets <> denote a manuscript writer’s insertions – usually above the line. All quotations taken from print sources have been transcribed faithfully – with only u/v/w and i/j/y modernised. Capitalisations and italics have been retained to give a flavour of the text’s appearance. Unless otherwise stated, the font of the printed sources may be assumed to be gothic. The only translations used in this thesis are where I quote directly from Guaras’s correspondence, culled from the summaries in the Calendar of State Papers, Simancas.

The foliation in manuscript sources is often confusing: while many papers in both the British Library and National Archives have been refoliated, sometimes more than once, others lack any form of numbering. Where more than one number is supplied, I have adopted the style of foliation given by the Gale/Cengage database (usually, for many of the State Papers, the typed numbers in the top right hand of the folio leaf).

Wherever possible, I have given page references to printed sources as signature numbers. Recto is silently assumed, unless verso is specified. However, in many of the pamphlets signature numbers often disappear or are so erratic they do not help a reader trace a citation. In these cases I have referred to page numbers as supplied by the printer. When a pamphlet or printed source is first cited, its title is supplied in the main text, and its date, place of publication, name of printer and (2nd edition) STC number is given in a footnote. Thereafter it is referred to in the text by its short title and in the footnotes by its STC number alone, with a full reference in the bibliography.

Full titles and other publication information can be cross-referenced in the first three appendices for pamphlets published in England (c.1571-79) concerning events in France and the Low Countries, or in the bibliography for works outside of this range. The entries in the appendices are arranged...
chronologically by month and year date of publication (where known) and, within this, alphabetically by author (where known). I highlight in my analysis any attributions which remain controversial.

I allude to individuals who possessed more than one title – for example William Cecil, who was elevated to the peerage as Lord Burghley in 1571; Robert Dudley, who was invested with the earldom of Leicester in 1562; or Francis, Duke of Alençon, who was given the appanage of Anjou in May 1576 – by their title at the time described. Where two persons shared the same title over the period covered by this study, I refer to each by their first name and their title to avoid confusion. Thus: Henry, Duke of Anjou (later Henry III, d.1589) and Francis, Duke of Anjou (d. 1584), and Francis, Duke of Guise (d.1563) and Henry, Duke of Guise (d.1588), are distinguished.
Part 1: The Background to 1572 – politics and print

Chapter 1. Elizabethan foreign policy (1558-72)

1. Background to 1558

For most of the 16th century, the English crown cultivated amity with the rulers of Spain and the Low Countries, largely because of an enduring enmity with those of France and Scotland.\textsuperscript{42} Despite Henry VIII’s controversial divorce from Catherine of Aragon and his break with Rome in 1534, which threatened to alienate Charles V (r.1519-56), the two rulers were allied anew in 1543 in an offensive war against France. With the proposed betrothal of Henry’s heir, Edward, to the young Catholic queen Mary of Scots, the policy of Henry’s declining years (1544-47) adopted a conspicuously anti-French stance in which religious concerns remained secondary to considerations of state.\textsuperscript{43}

Following Henry’s death, Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, uncle of the radically Protestant boy-king Edward VI (r.1547-53), resumed war with the Scots partly on the grounds of Protestant unification.\textsuperscript{44} Yet a disastrous English invasion only worked to precipitate Mary Stewart’s removal to the French court and the entrenchment of a French Catholic regency in Scotland under her mother, Mary of Lorraine (r.1548-60). After Somerset’s downfall, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, assumed direction of policy, initiating peace with France and neutralising the threat of war with Scotland, until Edward’s death in 1553.

With Mary Tudor’s accession (r.1553-58) following Northumberland’s abortive attempt to seat his Protestant daughter-in-law Lady Jane Grey on the throne, the Anglo-Spanish alliance was revived once more. Protestants were quick to associate Mary’s conservative, Roman Catholic rule with the zealous ideals of the Counter Reformation and blamed her marriage to Philip II of Spain (r. 1556-98) for her realm’s involvement in the Valois-Habsburg conflict.\textsuperscript{45} Although England contributed comparatively little to the war effort, the loss of English-held Calais in January 1558 – captured by Francis of Lorraine, Duke of Guise – was of national significance.\textsuperscript{46} Henry II of France (r.1547-59) subsequently expedited the marriage of Guise’s niece, Mary Stewart, to his son, the dauphin Francis.

\textsuperscript{44} D. M. MacCulloch, The Boy King (Berkeley, 2002).
\textsuperscript{46} M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire (Cambridge, 2008), covers England’s loss of Calais on pp. 179-83.
The union saw Mary cede her claims to rule England and Scotland – as inherited from her grandmother, Margaret Tudor – to her husband, should she die childless.\(^{47}\)

Mary Stewart’s claim to the English throne was deemed, by many Catholics, to strengthen considerably upon Mary Tudor’s death in November 1558. Nonetheless, Mary Tudor’s Protestant half-sister, crowned as Elizabeth I (r.1558-1603), continued to enjoy the support of Philip II, who was himself determined to prevent Henry II from extending French geoterritorial influence into England.\(^{48}\)

2. **The character of the Elizabethan regime (1558-72)**

Before discussing the background of English foreign policy prior to the events of August 1572, it is necessary to outline the key features of the early Elizabethan regime which contributed to the evolution of a distinctly Anglo-Protestant position from 1558-72.

i. **Religion**

Religion was central to virtually all aspects of Elizabethan governance, although historians have disputed how far policy was driven by the queen’s own religious beliefs. While Susan Doran has seen evidence of a strong Protestant commitment in Elizabeth’s personal letters, Patrick Collinson has argued that her clerical appointments and private behaviour suggest she was a conservative.\(^{49}\) The rest of this chapter will highlight how evidence of the queen’s religion – and its impact upon her political decisions – remains ambiguous. Although she was clearly committed to restoring Protestantism at the start of her reign, the 1559 acts of uniformity and supremacy – dubbed “a Nicodemite settlement” and a “skeleton” by historians\(^{50}\) – were compromise measures that underwent considerable alterations.\(^{51}\) As English Catholics and Protestants of all hues challenged the notion that a woman could stand as “Supreme Head” of the English Church, Elizabeth’s title was diluted down to “Supreme Governor.” Meanwhile, Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical appointments seem to have reflected a conservative sentiment – neither her first Archbishop of Canterbury, Matthew Parker, nor her Dean of the Chapel Royal, George Carew, were zealous reformists.\(^{52}\)

\(^{48}\) Rodríguez-Salgado, *Changing Face of Empire*, pp. 334-35.
Elizabeth’s legislative programme of 1559 did not religiously unify the realm. Catholics maintained a sizeable, if covert, presence – especially in the Northern counties – with some amongst the nobility advocating for their freedom of conscience.\(^{53}\) Although there were initially modest fines for lay nonattendance at church, penalties hardened over the 1570s.\(^{54}\)

Meanwhile, the vexed process of English reformation continued in fits and starts, with clerics using their sermons to continually press for further reforms.\(^{55}\) In 1562-63, Parker led a project in Convocation to adopt alterations that would have revived Edward VI’s more Calvinist-inspired ecclesiastical policy.\(^{56}\) Although Elizabeth checked this attempt, clerics tried again in 1566 via a series of parliamentary bills; many later divided over the Vestinarian controversy and the matter of clerical dress. Elizabeth’s decision to promulgate the Thirty-Nine Articles in 1571 may well have been an attempt to divorce her church from its more radical, Edwardian predecessor, even as committed Protestants continued to exert an influence on the mainstream.\(^{57}\) Patrick Collison has argued that, despite the use of pejorative terms such “puritan,” “precisian” and “sectary” at this stage, there was still common ground between many Protestant disputants.\(^{58}\)

### ii. Parliament

Parliamentary sessions of Elizabeth’s early reign remained both a locus of religious debate and an opportunity for controversial pamphleteering. Although Neale’s thesis of an organised “Puritan choir” has been justly challenged,\(^{59}\) there were clearly some MPs who sought to redirect the form of English worship.\(^{60}\) However, many of these were far from anti-establishment figures: as Michael Graves has shown, the pamphleteer and parliamentary manager Thomas Norton worked closely with the queen’s chief advisor, Sir William Cecil, throughout his career.\(^{61}\)

Debates over religious nonconformism were clearly influenced by both domestic developments and by news of unrest in Scotland, France and the Low Countries. The 1563 session – held from 11 January to 10 April, at the height of Elizabeth’s intervention in the French wars – made defence of


\(^{54}\) Upon a first offence, the non-attender of church was to pay a weekly twelve penny fine levied by wardens of the parish. Non-payment could result in imprisonment, as was also the case for those who attended private masses.


papal authority a crime of *praemunire*. These concerns intensified in the wake of the Northern Rebellion of 1569 and the queen’s papal excommunication of 1570. Although Elizabeth vetoed a piece of anti-Catholic legislation introduced in the session of 2 April to 29 May 1571, a fear of Catholic plotting ensured that the Lords passed several bills outlawing unlicensed travel and the exportation of money to religious exiles. The session also extended treason statutes to encompass any who denied the queen’s royal titles, accused her of heresy, or sought her death or injury.

Despite its heated religious concerns, and excepting its debates over Mary Stewart in the 1572 session, Parliament played a minor role with regard to foreign policy in the 1570s. This was both because the conduct of policy was still held to be the monarch’s prerogative and because its sessions were so infrequent and short: that of 2 April 1571 was dissolved on 29 May; that of 8 May 1572 adjourned on 13 June; and that of 18 February 1576 prorogued on 15 March.

### iii. The court

Early studies by Sir John Neale and Conyers Read characterised Elizabeth’s court as inherently factional. More recently, Simon Adams, John Guy and Paul Hammer have stressed that elements of disharmony did not set in before the 1580s, following the rise of the divisive Earl of Essex and Archbishop Whitgift of Canterbury (translated in August 1583).

Notwithstanding the corporate nature of Elizabethan policy-making, several courtiers and privy councillors clearly exerted exceptional influence. William Cecil (d. 1598), *primus inter pares*, had enjoyed political influence over several prior reigns. Rising from Somerset’s service to the secretaryship under Edward, he had managed to retain a series of lesser offices under Mary – including the surveyorship of Elizabeth’s estates – while colluding in the activities of Protestant dissidents on one of his estates. Acting as Elizabeth’s Principal Secretary from 1558-72, his

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62 Act of Parl.: 5Eliz.c.23.
64 Later exceptions include the debates concerning a formal declaration of war with Spain (in 1589 and 1593).
67 Ibid., pp. 50-64; 66-67. John Day’s press had been set up in the Lincolnshire village of Barholm, possibly with Cecil’s permission.
ennoblement as Lord Burghley, the Lord Treasurer, exemplified the trust in which he was held by the queen.  

Likewise, Dudley (elevated to the earldom of Leicester in 1562) was exceptionally influential. Famously cast by Read as a “hot” reformist who opposed Cecil, it has since been suggested that their rivalry was grounded in political, rather than personal, differences of the 1560s. Adams has also shown that Dudley exerted considerable influence as a leading landowner, parliamentary and ecclesiastical patron. As the son of the executed Earl of Warwick (d.1554), he had inherited an extended affinity in his own right, the heads of which included his elder brother Ambrose; his brother-in-law, Sir Henry Sidney; and Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford (d.1585).

Notwithstanding the considerable influence of her leading councillors, it is clear that Elizabeth herself remained central to the daily political process: as indicated by the number of emendations and trefoils which pepper the state papers. Her fluency in Latin, French and Italian, and some knowledge of Spanish, saw her converse directly with a kaleidoscope of foreign ambassadors at her court. She also sought counsel from individuals on an ad hoc, probouleutic basis – including men such as Thomas Randolph, Henry Killigrew, Sir Ralph Sadler and Nicholas Throckmorton – suggesting a flexible, and proactive, approach to policy making.

### iv. The privy council

Whilst there was considerable overlap in personnel between the Elizabethan court and privy council, the latter was a complex entity in its own right. Beyond domestic administration, its function was to advise the monarch on key policy issues: although the queen did not attend its meetings, she was briefed on any decision it had reached. To what extent this encouraged conciliar consensus or division has attracted debate. In his study of the privy council in the 1570s, Michael Pulman has suggested that conciliar conducted debate with an eye to achieving a unanimous decision which could then be presented to the queen. Mears has observed that, since ten out of seventeen Elizabethan conciliar meetings for which memoranda exist do not ‘map on’ to those recorded in the registers, it is likely that

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70 Adams, “A godly peer? Leicester and the Puritans”, Ch. 11 in *Leicester and the Court*.  
71 Adams, “The Dudley clientele, 1553-63” and “The Dudley clientele and the House of Commons, 1559-86”, Chs. 8 and 10 in *Leicester and the Court*.  
the latter were conducted elsewhere and not attended by exactly the same personnel. This would imply that the queen selected a smaller cluster of advisors to discuss sensitive matters in a committee-like setting, ensuring that there were several (albeit interconnected) layers to her policy-making.

Elizabeth’s apparent reluctance to adopt an overtly confessionalised policy was reflected in her earliest conciliar selections. Excising Marian councillors known for their Catholic piety and the ailing Sir William Paget, her retentions included the Catholics Henry Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel; Lord Edward Clinton, Earl of Lincoln; and Henry Herbert, Earl of Pembroke; as well as the earls of Derby and Shrewsbury. Elizabeth also retained Sir John Mason, Sir Nicholas Wotton and Sir William Petre, who had all shown her friendship in the past. This traditionalist core was balanced by her new appointments: Cecil; his brother-in-law Sir Nicholas Bacon, appointed Lord Keeper of the Great Seal; Sir Thomas Parry; Sir William Parr, Marquess of Northampton; the committed Protestant Sir Francis Knollys; and William Paulet, Marquess of Winchester.

The deaths of members allowed for others’ admittance on a rolling basis, namely: Leicester and Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk (both in 1562); Sir Walter Mildmay and Sir Ralph Sadler (in 1567); Sir James Croft and Thomas Radclyffe, Earl of Sussex (in 1570); Sir Thomas Smith (in 1572); Leicester’s brother Warwick, Sir Henry Sidney and Sir Francis Walsingham (all in 1573); and Elizabeth’s cousin Sir Henry Carey, Baron Hunsdon, and Sir Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor (in 1577). Numerically, Elizabeth’s privy council remained relatively stable until 1582, with its numbers fluctuating from 21 in 1558, to 15 in 1568, and 18 by 1578.

With regard to the 1570s, its composition may be loosely subdivided into three categories: the Henrician appointments (Bedford; Sadler; Northampton and Winchester), who varied in their religious views; the Marian lords and members of the religiously conservative nobility (i.e. Norfolk, Arundel, Lincoln and Lord Howard of Effingham (d.1573)); and an inner core of new appointments (Cecil, Knollys, Leicester, Mildmay, Smith and Warwick), who shared strong Protestant convictions. Despite its lack of clerical representation, the council became ever more stridently Protestant as men such as Knollys, Mildmay, Sidney, Walsingham and Warwick rose to influence. Only Croft, Sussex, Hunsdon and Hatton appeared more “ambiguous” in their religious beliefs. Like the four secretaries of state who served in the 1570s (Cecil, Walsingham, Smith and Dr. Thomas Wilson), two of the longest-serving clerks – Edmund Tremayne and Sir Robert Beale, sworn in on 3 May 1571 and 8 July 1572.

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76 Ibid., pp. 61-63; 65.
78 Appendix I of Pulman, Privy Council, gives a list of councillors from 1568-82.
79 Ibid., p. 43.
80 Adams, Leicester and the Court, p. 33.
1572 – were reformists.81 The increasingly, but not entirely, Protestantised composition of the council raises several questions with respect to this thesis: to what extent was the body an active political agent in Elizabeth’s reign? And what links may it – or its members – have had with the press output of the period, with respect to the advancement of the Protestant cause?

v. Ideology and politics

Although most historians have shied away from examining the pamphlet literature of queen’s early to middle reign, recent studies have begun to examine the links between the ideologies and court politics of this period. Patrick Collinson and Richard Helgerson have argued that a Protestant élite promoted notions of religiously-defined national identity,82 which Markku Peltonen has seen as intersecting with ideals of classical humanism.83 Stephen Alford has shown that Cecil, who came close to defining a notion of Protestant citizenship in order to resolve the succession and effect an Anglo-Scottish alliance, employed Ciceronian logic and a rhetoric of crisis in his personal memoranda.84 Evridiki Kouri has suggested that Elizabeth herself, led by ideological as much as geopolitical imperatives, prioritised religion as a key factor in her diplomatic relations with the German Lutherans.85

Other ideologically-engaged studies have revealed that the parliamentary debates of the first two decades were shaped by acute fears over the queen’s marriage and the succession.86 These twinned concerns dominated the agenda of the 1559, 1563 and 1566-67 sessions. The privy council also pushed their mistress to diminish the threat posed by Mary Stewart, by either marrying a powerful foreign prince or by formally designating a Protestant heir. Notwithstanding Elizabeth’s intense affection for Dudley,87 her marriage remained principally a matter of state. Her Protestant suitors included Eric XIV of Sweden, the dukes of Holstein and Saxony, and the Earl of Arran, and her Catholic ones: Philip II (until 1559), the Habsburg archdukes Charles II and Ferdinand II (at least from 1563-67).88 She later engaged in a series of negotiations regarding marriage to the Catholic

81 Beale was Walsingham’s son-in-law. The other longest standing clerks of the council during the 1570s were Thomas Wilkes and Henry Cheke, both sworn in on 18 July 1576. See Pulman, Privy council, p. 157.
82 Collinson, Birthpangs of Protestant England and R. Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood.
83 M. Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English political thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge, 1995).
85 E. Kouri, England and the attempts to form a Protestant alliance in the late 1560s (Helsinki, 1981).
86 Aspects of the succession question are addressed by M. Levine, The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 1558–1568 (Stanford, 1966) and Alford, Early Elizabethan Polity.
87 Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony, pp. 40-72. Dudley’s first wife, Amy Robsart, died in Sept. 1560 under mysterious circumstances.
88 Ibid., pp. 73-98.
Valois prince, Henry, Duke of Anjou (from 1571-72), and subsequently his younger brother Francis (from 1578-79), in which religion played a crucial role in shaping the responses of her subjects.89

3. The development of early Elizabethan foreign policy (1558-72)

What role did religion play in shaping early Elizabethan foreign policy? It is clear that the first two decades of Elizabeth’s reign resulted in the development of a distinctively Protestant position, but not necessarily an overriding confessional one. Evaluating the queen’s policy, historical judgements have ranged from the hostile – accusing her of caprice and inconsistency90 – to the near-hagiographical – attributing the successes of the reign, in the face of a bulwark of hostile Catholic powers, largely to her prudence and perspicacity.91 As Pauline Croft has argued, the teleological view of the “inevitability” of a war with Catholic Spain – presupposing that the grounds for conflict were overwhelmingly confessional – has shaped much scholarship of the period. As she notes, even the revisionist Richard Wernham, who praised Elizabeth for working within cautious parameters, implied that her “quarrels” with Spain in the 1560s were part of an inexorable diplomatic decline.92

In a similar vein, Wallace MacCaffrey stressed that Elizabeth’s foreign policy objectives were inextricably bound up with aspects of religion and domestic governance, with the queen ever-concerned to limit her realm’s exposure to peril abroad.93 Nonetheless, he concluded that the queen’s actions often demonstrated a strongly interventionist, and distinctly Protestant, commitment.94 Recent studies have adopted and extended this line of argument: while Simon Adams and Susan Doran have characterised Elizabeth as an opportunistic politique as well as a committed Protestant, ever alert to the strategic opportunities inherent in war-making,95 Trim has concluded that her foreign policy was,
primarily, confessionally-driven.\textsuperscript{96} To test these views it is necessary to examine the key developments of the early reign, which set out the complex background to the massacres of the 1570s.

\textbf{i. Intervention in Scotland (1559-60)}

Notwithstanding the Habsburg-Valois peace begun in 1558-59, England’s loss of Calais and ongoing fears of French invasion dogged the early Elizabethan regime. In 1558, the courtier Armigill Waad summarised his concerns in his advice paper, \textit{The Distresses of the Commonwealth} as: “The Queen poor. The realme exhausted... Warres w't fraunce, and Scotland. The ffrench king bestryding the Realme having one foote in Callais and thother in Scotland.”\textsuperscript{97} Diplomatic reports suggested that Elizabeth’s hold on power was uncertain: in June 1559, an escutcheon was “made for the dolphin” with the royal arms of England and Scotland prominently quartered.\textsuperscript{98} With crown debts nearing £300,000, the queen was not in a strong position to counter a visible threat from France.

Yet Philip II remained her most powerful ally. Compelled to convey some disapproval of her religious reforms, the king merely replaced his high-ranking ambassador in England, the Count of Feria, with the Bishop of Quadra (in post 1559-63).\textsuperscript{99} Philip also offered to marry his ex-sister-in-law (before his own marriage to Elizabeth of Valois) and blocked efforts by Pope Paul IV and the English seminary at Louvain to have her excommunicated – motivated, it would appear, by his fear of French expansionism.\textsuperscript{100} In turn, Elizabeth relied on Habsburg diplomacy and the threat of Spanish arms to press for Calais’ return under the Treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis (signed 2 April 1559).\textsuperscript{101}

Despite the formal cessation of hostilities, Elizabeth’s council remained preoccupied by the extension of French influence in Scotland.\textsuperscript{102} By late 1558, elements close to Cecil – including the Calvinist Cuthbert Vaughan – were liaising with malcontent Protestant Scots,\textsuperscript{103} who then rose to demand religious concessions the following spring.\textsuperscript{104} Although Elizabeth was quick to condemn these “lords of the congregation” as rebels, Cecil used the opportunity to revive his old agenda of an Anglo-Scottish alliance, arguing that “the best worldly felicity that Scotland can have is either to continue in

\begin{itemize}
\item[97] TNA: PRO, SP 12/1 fol.152. “The Distresses of the Commonwealth” [1558?].
\item[98] TNA: PRO, SP 70/5 fol.31. PC to Throckmorton, 13 June 1559.
\item[99] Rodríguez-Salgado, \textit{Changing Face of Empire}, pp. 330-31.
\item[100] CSPS, XIV, pp. 22-23. Philip to Feria, 10 Jan. 1559.
\item[101] Rodríguez-Salgado, \textit{Changing Face of Empire}, p. 330. This established that France was to retain the town for eight years before either restoring it or paying an indemnity of 500,000 crowns.
\item[102] Wernham, \textit{Before the Armada}, p. 247.
\item[104] MacCaffrey, \textit{Shaping of the regime}, p. 70.
\end{itemize}
a perpetual peace with England or to be made one monarchy with it.”

Proposing military intervention on behalf of the Protestant Scots, Cecil faced opposition from colleagues such as Winchester and Wotton, who feared the consequences of another war with France. Other councillors, including Arundel and Bacon, argued that Elizabeth should strengthen her friendship with Philip II, mindful of reports that the king would not “for your quarrel... breake his peace with France.”

Cecil’s supporters – including Pembroke, Clinton and Howard – responded by using time-worn arguments about French aggression: working to persuade their doubtful colleagues of the need to take military action. Throckmorton wrote that the marquis d’Albœuf, a Guisian kinsman and cavalry commander, had boasted of the “comoditie and advauntage they had nowe for [landing troops in Scotland] ... and how they should be hable thereby to prosecute [the English claim of the Scots queen], when tyme was for the purpose.”

By late 1559, all Elizabeth’s privy councillors bar Arundel supported plans for a land campaign: while the final prompt may have been Cecil’s request to be removed from affairs, it is likely that Henry II’s death in April removed fear of French retaliation. Henry’s demise also presaged an unstable period in French politics as his successor, the teenage Francis II (r. 1559-60), was deemed susceptible to Guisian influence.

In this new context, Elizabeth herself appears to have been swayed by arguments proposing intervention. By the end of the year, she had agreed to send a naval force to attack the French-held garrison at Edinburgh castle, while Norfolk (who had pushed for an anti-French alliance with Philip) was ordered to mobilise troops in the north.

Although the queen baulked at adopting Cecil’s nakedly confessional manifesto – her petition to the Scots issued in November 1559 omitting any mention of religious brotherhood – her military appointments lent the campaign a decidedly confessional accent. Soon after news reached England in late December that French forces had reached Leith, she authorised the departure of an expeditionary land force (Norfolk remaining behind in Berwick) under the de facto command of the staunchly Protestant Lord Grey de Wilton. As Trim has shown, many of the 1,200 horse and 6,000 foot commanded by Grey would later fight for William of Orange and French Protestant armies. At this time, Cecil’s friends worked to reiterate the threat posed by the French. Killigrew and Jones passed on Marshal St. André’s comment that Elizabeth’s

105 CSPF, I, 1297. “Memorial upon the affairs of Scotland,” 31 Aug. 1559, in Cecil’s hand.
106 BL Cotton MS Galba C/I, fol.73’ Chaloner to Cecil, reporting a conversation with Arras, 6 Dec 1559.
107 TNA: PRO, SP 70/8, fol.88’. Throckmorton to Cecil, 25 October 1559, portions in cipher. See also CSPF, II, 130, 146 and 211. Dispatches from Croftes, Randolph and Sadler, Winter 1559-1560.
108 Cf.: BL Lansdowne MS, 102, fo.1’. Alford, Elizabethan polity, pp. 69-70.
109 Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers, pp. 190-91.
111 Instructions for Norfolk.
title “aperteigned” to the French queen and reported that Francis II “minds to send shortly to the new Pope for renewing the league between the late Pope, the Spanish king and himself, for suppressing religion.” ¹¹³ Fears of a Catholic League were therein yoked, for the first time, to arguments reifying Elizabeth as a fidei defensor. Yet Elizabeth, wary of alienating her powerful Habsburg ally, hastened to reassure Philip II that her actions were merely defensive: claiming the Guises had “entered upon the invasion of England by meanes of Scotland.” ¹¹⁴

Despite a less than effective English war action, Mary of Guise’s death in June and the outbreak of civil war in France ensured that the war in Scotland was not to last long. Elizabeth dispatched Cecil and Wotton to conclude the Treaty of Edinburgh (signed 6 July 1560), in which representatives of the French crown – constrained by Mary of Guise’s and Henry’s deaths and facing religious unrest back home – promised to confirm Elizabeth’s titles as queen. Even in this late hour, however, she sought to squeeze territorial gains from the peace: instructing Cecil to suspend negotiations until the French delegates had promised to return Calais and to pay the 500,000 crown indemnity agreed at Câteau-Cambrésis (an order which Cecil claimed was defunct in light of the provisional agreements he had already signed). ¹¹⁵

The whole pattern of the English intervention in Scotland reveals how, as Penry Williams has noted, Elizabethan policy was made not just by the queen, but by the corporate activity and ideological agenda of her leading statesmen. ¹¹⁶ As it became apparent that the queen was reluctant to employ overtly religious rhetoric to legitimate her warfare, advocates of a more confessionalised politics were forced to rely on more traditional inducements to persuade her to war (i.e. fear of France) and, perhaps, topical print. ¹¹⁷ The wake of the war in Scotland did not mean, of course, that their fears of religious warfare in the British Isles had abated. The following year saw Cecil’s party bolstered in their conviction that exiled English clergy were actively involved in seditious activities, prompting further crackdowns on Catholics at home. Indeed, the activities of papal emissaries in Ireland – including men such as Nicholas Sander and David Wolfe – were cited as evidence of the imminent threat posed by fifth-columnist “papists.” ¹¹⁸

¹¹³ TNA: PRO, SP 70/10, fol.11r. Killigrew and Jones to Elizabeth, 6 Jan. 1560.
¹¹⁴ TNA: PRO, SP 70/10, fol.79r. Instructions for Montague and Chamberlain, [23] Jan. 1560.
¹¹⁶ Williams, Later Tudors, p. 240.
¹¹⁷ Discussed in Ch. 2, ii of this thesis.
ii. Intervention in France (1562-64)

The outbreak of war in France raised new dilemmas for Elizabeth’s fledgling regime. The prelude to hostilities occurred when some Calvinist nobles attempted to seize Francis II near the château of Amboise in March 1560, an attempt for which the Guises held Elizabeth responsible.\(^{119}\) Shortly afterwards, the Bourbon King Anthony of Navarre (who later changed sides to lead the more radical Catholic party), and his Calvinist brother, Louis of Condé, mobilised paramilitary units against the crown to gain religious concessions for Protestants. French Catholics now dubbed their opponents “Huguenots,” possibly in reference to Genevan separatists who had won their independence by allying with the Calvinist Swiss.\(^{120}\) Elizabeth and her councillors, who knew that a hybrid of political and religious factors lay behind the conflict, feared that it would trigger the formation of pan-European leagues built ostensibly along religious lines.\(^{121}\)

The situation was soon internationalised – and more radically confessionalised – with Francis II’s death in December 1560. On the royalist side there ensued a struggle for the regency between Catherine de’ Medici, the now Catholic Anthony of Navarre, and the Guise brothers, all of whom were convinced that their opponents would be insufficiently protective of a French Catholic monarchy. Over the course of 1561, it was reported that the Guisian-led ‘Triumvirate’, led by Navarre, had approached Philip, the papacy and the Catholic Swiss cantons for aid.\(^{122}\) When Condé and Coligny heard that Henry of Guise’s retinue had attacked Calvinist worshippers at Vassy on 1 March 1562 – leaving around seventy-four Huguenots dead – they requested aid from Elizabeth and the German Lutheran princes even before they had asked it of the Huguenot churches.\(^{123}\) At around this same time, the attack at Vassy was being identified as a mass murder in English print, and a “massacre” by Calvinist pamphleteers.\(^{124}\)

Even before the queen had agreed the terms of despatch for her army, Cecil and other Protestant privy councillors conspired in the despatch of a volunter force, numbering around 500-600 men.\(^{125}\) By April, the Triumvirate had received papal funds to hire German and Swiss mercenaries; soon after, Philip dispatched 1,000 men to fight in Guyenne.\(^{126}\) Condé’s supporters, attempting to justify their

\(^{119}\) Read, Cecil, pp. 240-41 notes that even if Elizabeth had known of the plot, it was unlikely that she had sufficient information to be accounted a ringleader. Throckmorton, on the other hand, may have backed it.


\(^{122}\) Sutherland, Massacre, p. 15.

\(^{123}\) Knecht, Civil Wars, p. 86 notes that the Huguenots had already militarised and used the massacre as a catalyst to engage in hostilities.


\(^{126}\) Holt, Wars of Religion, p. 56. Philip’s troops were encamped in Guyenne by 11 August.
own mobilisation, claimed that Philip’s actions served his own political interests by insulating the Low Countries from French aggression and by keeping French armies out of England and Scotland.\textsuperscript{127}

Several of Elizabeth’s advisors now began peddling an explicitly confessional agenda. Throckmorton stressed that “Her Ma... must aby her selfe with the protestants yn every contry throrowghe the bond and contract off relygion.”\textsuperscript{128} Dudley asserted that she was doing precisely this: that she “doth not so much measure comon pollycie as she doth <way> the prosperytie of trowe Religion.”\textsuperscript{129} The Huguenots Robert de la Haye and the Vidame of Chartres arrived at Elizabeth’s court in June: initially seeking a loan of 100,000 crowns, they formally requested troops in July, when Condé’s German levy looked to be in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{130} Under the terms of the Hampton Court Treaty, Elizabeth granted a loan of 140,000 crowns and agreed to send 6,000 troops in return for her retention of either Le Havre (‘Newhaven’) or Dieppe as security for Calais.\textsuperscript{131} In late September, Cecil drafted three copies of a declaration outlining justifications for an invasion of Normandy,\textsuperscript{132} writing to the queen’s ambassadors in Germany that unless “comfort” be given to Condé, Catholic armies would “vanquish all other nations professyng ye Gospell.”\textsuperscript{133}

Just as she had done in Scotland, however, Elizabeth formally played down the confessional aspects of her intervention. In a letter to Charles IX (r.1560-74), Francis’s successor, she maintained that she desired only that religious matters “reste in indifferent tearms” and that control of policy should be taken “out of the hands of the ... Guise.”\textsuperscript{134} She also scapegoated Mary’s uncles in her letters to Philip as “the <very> parties that evicted Callis from this crowne” and who had fomented war in Scotland, a claim echoed in her proclamation of 24 September.\textsuperscript{135} From the early 1560s onwards, English news print would rehearse similar claims, suggesting that fear of Guisian hegemony became a trope of both the political and pamphlet discourse.\textsuperscript{136}

By the end of September, Elizabeth had sent 3,000 men to garrison the forts of Le Havre and Dieppe, commanded by Robert Dudley’s zealously Protestant brother, Ambrose, Earl of Warwick, and 3,000

\textsuperscript{127} Sutherland, \textit{Massacre}, pp. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{128} TNA: PRO, SP 70/37 fol.15’. Throckmorton to Cecil, 2 May, 1562.
\textsuperscript{129} TNA: PRO, SP 70/37, fol.54’. Dudley to Throckmorton, 8 May, 1562.
\textsuperscript{131} TNA: PRO, SP 70/40 fol.242’. Haye to Condé, 29 Aug. 1562: “La tante est en fort bonne volonte de secourir son neveu.” TNA: PRO: SP 70/41 fol.146’. Articles between Elizabeth and Condé, 19 Sept. 1562.
\textsuperscript{132} TNA: PRO, SP 70/41, fol. 193’, 198’, 203’. All dated 20 September, 1562 and entitled “Why the Queen puts her subjects in arms.” The first is in a draft by Cecil’s hand, the last two corrected and endorsed by him.
\textsuperscript{133} TNA: PRO, SP 70/42, fol.174’. Draft of letter from Elizabeth to Knolles and Mundt, in Cecil’s hand, 11 Oct. 1562.
\textsuperscript{134} TNA: PRO, SP 70/41, fol.3’. Instructions to Smith, 1 Sept. 1562.
\textsuperscript{135} TNA: PRO, SP 70/41, fol.240’. Elizabeth to Philip, 22 Sept. 1562.
\textsuperscript{136} STC 11312. STC 13847, fol. xxxiv-v. See also the titles of ballads entered into \textit{Stationers Registers}, I, pp. 202, 203, 208 from 22 July 1562-22 July 1563.
more to assist Condé. Despite the queen’s assertions of religious neutrality, it is clear that the English army had a markedly confessional character: Warwick’s clerk, Thomas Wood, had been a Protestant exile under Mary Tudor, and his chaplain, William Whittingham, was known as an enthusiast.\textsuperscript{137} There was also a wider religio-political aspect to these selections: while Dudley clients featured prominently, most officers had been veterans of the Edwardian garrison at Boulogne.\textsuperscript{138} As Adams has noted, many survivors of the expedition would later join Sir Henry Sidney’s Irish campaign of 1565-66, suggesting a drive to support Leicester in his factional dispute with Sussex.\textsuperscript{139}

The evidence suggests that, as Alford has suggested, this was an extremely fraught time domestically for the privy council.\textsuperscript{140} Cecil wrote in October: “these varieties of the affairs in France... have so burned ourselves and our Council here into so many shapes from time to time,” stressing that an international Protestant league was needed in order to defend the “common cause of the religion... against common confederacy of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{141} English news print of the period – including contemporary sermons dedicated to Leicester and Warwick – adumbrated similar fears.\textsuperscript{142} Only a month after the Newhaven expedition had set out, Elizabeth contracted smallpox. Although she survived, it raised the terrifying prospect of her death at a time when the succession remained unresolved.\textsuperscript{143} Hence, the following March, a new succession bill was debated which would have set out a clear line of succession and, even more radically, established emergency powers for the privy council and parliament in the event of the queen’s untimely death. Cecil’s authorship of the bill – proposing, in effect, a form of temporary aristocratic government – was born of great Protestant anxiety.\textsuperscript{144} Although the bill failed to pass the Lords, it marked a key moment in the articulation of clashing agendas between Elizabeth and her leading ministers.

From the time of Warwick’s departure in September 1562, the queen’s own behaviour suggested a desire to dodge the banner of Protestant protectrix: a reticence born of pragmatic necessity that would mark her policy even in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s. She had formally backed away from signing a defensive Protestant league with the German Lutherans and French Calvinists by December 1562.\textsuperscript{145} Her refusal to aid the beleaguered Huguenots at Rouen ultimately contributed to their defeat, with the

\textsuperscript{137} Leicester and Warwick employed a pool of officers, lawyers and ‘men of business’ from their own clientele. See Adams “The Dudley Clientèle”, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{138} Read, Cecil, p. 260.
\textsuperscript{139} Adams “Dudley Clientèle”, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{140} Alford, Burghley, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{141} BL Cott. Vespasian MS, C7, fols224\textsuperscript{r}-225\textsuperscript{r}. Cecil to [Thomas Chaloner], 11 Oct. 1562.
\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Ch. 2, ii of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{143} BL Lansdowne MS, fol.102, fol. 35\textsuperscript{r}-37\textsuperscript{v}. Cecil to Smith, 29 Oct. 1562.
\textsuperscript{144} Alford, Early Elizabethan polity, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{145} TNA: PRO, SP 70/42, fol.157\textsuperscript{r}, Frederic of Saxony to Elizabeth, 10 Oct. 1562; TNA: PRO, SP 70/46, fol. 182\textsuperscript{r}, Knollys and Mundt to the PC, 14 Dec. 1562.
city falling to Triumvirate forces at the end of October.\textsuperscript{146} The rebel leadership was now terminally divided: as a captured Condé began negotiations with the French crown in late January, the military commander Odet de Coligny (Gaspard’s brother) failed to secure emergency aid from Elizabeth in the name of “la liberté du roi et celle de son royaume, la liberté des consciences, mais aussi et principalement le service de Dieu.”\textsuperscript{147}

Elizabeth’s overriding desire clearly remained the recovery of Calais,\textsuperscript{148} which she might exchange for Le Havre (“Newhaven” in English sources). This was something of a vain hope if the English could not retain the latter, beset by plague and with “all the power of France ... bent to Newhaven with haste and fury.”\textsuperscript{149} Soon abandoned by Condé and her former allies, who had signed a ceasefire with the French crown, it became clear that Elizabeth had lost an expensive gamble. The Treaty of Troyes, signed in April 1564, saw her army removed from France and confirmed her loss of Calais in return for only 120,000 crowns – less than the total sum she had loaned to Condé and well below what she had disbursed on her own troops.\textsuperscript{150} Her dishonour was glossed over in a proclamation that England and France could now live “by mutual intercourse and trade... as becometh good neighbours and friends.”\textsuperscript{151} Conspicuously, no mention was made of religion. Elizabeth, aware of foreign Catholic support for her own Catholic subjects, clearly wished to avoid the charge that her own intervention was religiously-motivated – and, by extension, that she had legitimated taking hostile action against a neighbouring realm in support of its ‘oppressed’ religious minority.

Henceforth, it is unsurprising that Elizabeth declined to intervene openly in France, despite the appeals of an active Huguenot lobby in her realm. Throckmorton’s replacement as her ambassador in France, Sir Henry Norris (1566-70), pushed in vain for aid to be sent to the remnants of Coligny’s army.\textsuperscript{152} Yet it should also be stressed that the English remained far from impartial observers. Elizabeth sanctioned forms of covert intervention in the second (Sept. 1567-March 1568) and third (Aug. 1568-1570) wars – offering useful, if modest, loans of money and weaponry to the Protestant side. More importantly, many of her subjects took an active role in furnishing Huguenot exiles with a steady supply of men and munitions. To this end, Condé and Navarre liaised with Cecil and Leicester via the offices of Gaspard de Coligny and the Vidame of Chartres.\textsuperscript{153} As chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis will show, Elizabeth’s chief councillors and their men remained actively committed to the cause of

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\textsuperscript{146} Read,\textit{ Cecil}, p. 256.  \\
\textsuperscript{147} TNA: PRO, SP 70/49, fol. 131\textsuperscript{r}, Coligny to Elizabeth, 24 Jan. 1563.  \\
\textsuperscript{148} TNA: PRO, SP 70/56, fol. 23\textsuperscript{r}, Elizabeth to Warwick, 3 May 1563.  \\
\textsuperscript{149} TNA: PRO, SP 70/56, fol. 25\textsuperscript{r}, Smith to Cecil, 3 May 1563. Largely in cipher. Cf.\textit{ CSPF}, VI, 699.  \\
\textsuperscript{150} Hammer,\textit{ Elizabeth’s Wars}, p. 66.  \\
\textsuperscript{151} Eliz. proc. (London, 1564; STC 7973), Kinney,\textit{ Elizabethan Backgrounds} (Hamden, 1975), pp. 86-87.  \\
\textsuperscript{152} Read,\textit{ Cecil}, pp. 390-393, 395, 418, on Norris’s dealings.  \\
\end{flushright}
supporting the Huguenot cause throughout the 1560s and 1570s – even, it would appear, using topical print as a means of encouraging public support.

**iii. Renewed rebellion in Scotland (1565-67)**

In the wake of the Newhaven disaster, the focus of Elizabeth’s council returned to Scotland, which Mary Stewart had returned to rule in 1561. As Alford has shown, Cecil was behind proposals that Elizabeth ally with the Lords of the Congregation to establish a Protestant, Anglophile regime. But it would appear that Elizabeth again adopted a more conservative stance, grounded in her respect for sovereign prerogative. Between the summers of 1563-65 protracted negotiations saw her attempt to wed Dudley to the Scottish queen – an extraordinary proposition, which would have prevented Mary from marrying outside the British isles. MacCaffrey has seen this as a rare occasion when English state policy and Elizabeth’s personal feelings chimed closely together, offering a means of achieving a harmonious solution to the succession crisis.

However, the Marian-Leicester marriage scheme was ultimately to fail: the Scots queen refused to accept the new earl without first obtaining formal confirmation of her English claim and, in July 1565, she married Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley, a young English Catholic with his own distant claim to the English succession. Alienated by the favour shown to Darnley, and the complete overthrow of their cause, Mary’s half-brother the Earl of Moray now took up arms with the Protestant Earl of Argyll. Despite covert dealings with Cecil and other members of Elizabeth’s privy council, the Scots lords were defeated in battle, and forced to retreat into England. News that Mary Stewart had given birth to a son saw Elizabeth’s parliament again press the matter of the queen’s marriage and the succession – with a delegation presenting a petition to this end at Whitehall in November 1566. Although Elizabeth attempted to quell the debate, Cecil himself intervened. The preamble to the new subsidy bill – citing “the deadly hatred and malice of the papists” – which Cecil altered, was clearly an attempt to hold Elizabeth to her vague promise of marriage. As chapters 2, 4 and 6 will show, this was not the first time that attempts were made (and expressed in print) to scare-monger Elizabeth into a more robust line of action, citing the threat posed by her Catholic enemies.

Following a spate of conspiracies – which saw Mary’s personal secretary murdered, her new husband assassinated, and the Scottish queen marry Darnley’s suspected murderer, Lord Bothwell – Scottish civil war erupted anew and loomed large in English debates. The bitter war between the pro-Marian

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156 TNA: PRO, SP 52/11, fol. 171r. Elizabeth to Randolph concerning her interview with Moray, 29 Oct. 1565.
Hamiltons and Mary’s Protestant opponents began in February 1567, leading to her abdication and imprisonment in Lochleven in July. Her infant son, crowned James VI, was now taken into the guardianship of Moray’s Protestant regency – a scenario which most of Elizabeth’s Protestant councillors supported.\footnote{MacCaffrey, *Shaping of the regime*, pp. 150-51.} In contrast, Elizabeth – who sought Mary’s freedom on terms that would guarantee her dependence – expressed her anger with those ‘rebels’ who had dethroned her cousin,\footnote{CSPF, VIII.1415, 1478 and 1479: Leicester to Throckmorton, 8 July 1567; Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 20 July, 1567; Elizabeth to Bedford, 20 July, 1567.} and congratulated Mary upon her escape in May 1568.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 53/1, fol. 3i, Elizabeth to Mary, 17 May 1568.} Yet she remained wary of her rival and concerned that English Catholics might rally to her standard. Thus, upon Mary’s second defeat and flight into England, she had her imprisoned.\footnote{Ibid. 2214, 2281, 2310 and 2496. Instructions respecting Mary’s imprisonment at Carlisle and Bolton.}

\textbf{iv. The outbreak of the revolt in the Low Countries (1567-68)}

Although the Protestant cause was now doing well in Scotland, Cecil was driven to lament: “the poore protestants in Flanders ar brought to worldly desperation and must trust only to myracles.”\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 63/20 fol.144r. Cecil to Sidney, 23 Apr. 1567.} Although the seventeen provinces over which Philip II reigned were indisputably part of his inheritance, the heterogeneous religion of his subjects had aggravated longstanding disputes over their governance. As in France, social unrest catalysed by severe famines and the impact of trade embargos; the rise of noble aggression; and the advent of religious reform, all fuelled the growth of dissent and the upsurge of revolt.\footnote{On its origins, see: Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (London, 1977) and A. C. Duke, *Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries* (London, 1990); P. M. Crew explores the influence of Calvinist preaching in “The Wonder Year”, J. Obelkevich (ed.) *Religion and the people* (Chapel Hill, 1979); H. G. Koenigsberger addresses “The organization of revolutionary parties” in *Estates and Revolutions* (Ithaca,1979).}

When Philip left to rule from Castile in 1559, noble malcontents harried the government of his regent, Margaret of Parma (r.1559-67). William, Prince of Orange (d. 1584) and Lamoral, Count of Egmont, led a league pressing for the revocation of anti-Protestant statutes and the departure of Cardinal Granvelle, Margaret’s chief advisor.\footnote{Kaplan, *Divided by faith*, p. 108.} Having achieved partial success (Philip recalled Granvelle in March 1564), a confederation of lesser nobles pressed for further concessions in 1565. Although not all of the confederates were Calvinist, their demands contravened Philip’s desire for religious orthodoxy. When leading councillors refused to enforce the anti-Protestant placards, Margaret was compelled to suspend them.\footnote{Crew, *Calvinist Preaching*, p. 1.} Many exiles – accompanied by their English and German supporters – now began to return to their homeland.\footnote{Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, pp. 63-68, on the implementation of Charles V’s heresy laws.} Their impassioned preachings inspired the “Wonderyear” of
1566-67, an outbreak of preaching and iconoclasm in which at least twenty Englishmen participated, joining in attacks on churches and the insurrection in Brabant.\textsuperscript{168}

As Croft has demonstrated, this unrest threatened to have serious consequences for English trade.\textsuperscript{169} By the late 1560s around 65% of the cloth staple was marketed in Antwerp, where an English House stood as a visual symbol of the “auncient amity” contracted in 1496.\textsuperscript{170} The smooth running of the bilateral trade, and by extension the customs revenues and credit lines of the English crown, depended upon the services of agents such as Sir Thomas Gresham, and his factor, Richard Clough. Gresham enjoyed a hybrid economic and representative function, entertaining royal creditors at this house in the city; liaising with representatives of all political hues, including Orange; and maintaining contacts with the central government.\textsuperscript{171} His covert activities included gathering intelligence; disseminating rumours in Elizabeth’s interest; and purchasing munitions.\textsuperscript{172}

As trade had only recently been re-established following a protracted tariff dispute (1563-65), Elizabeth remained wary of seeming to abet the upsurge of dissent.\textsuperscript{173} It was clearly not the time to antagonise Philip, given that the first English Catholic seminary was set to open at Douai, and that direct trade with Spain was growing (by Croft’s estimate: providing around 11% of imports to, and around 10% of cloth exports from, London).\textsuperscript{174} Elizabeth’s fears only grew when the Spanish king sent the skilled military leader Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba, at the head of an army to quell the unrest. Alba’s appointment as governor-general gave rise to suspicions that he might redeploy his forces either against her realm or France.\textsuperscript{175}

Those opposed to Alba’s regime began to cast his governorship as “tyrannous”: a concept that would gain increasing currency in news print of the 1570s.\textsuperscript{176} As part 3 of this thesis will show, Alba’s repressive policies adopted over the winter of 1568/69, and sustained for many years, alienated moderates and engendered a deep-rooted opposition to his regime.\textsuperscript{177} Pamphlets translated into

\textsuperscript{170}G. D. Ramsay, \textit{The Queen’s merchants and the revolt of the Netherlands} (Manchester, 1986), p.3.
\textsuperscript{171}\textit{CSPF}, I, 178-81. All instructions for Gresham in Antwerp, Dec.1558. TNA: PRO, SP 70/86, fol. 15r. 8 Sept. 1566, alludes to dining with Orange and being given news of the “proceedings of this town.”
\textsuperscript{172}TNA: PRO, SP 70/14, fol. 43r. Gresham to Cecil, 7 May 1560.
\textsuperscript{173}Ramsay, \textit{Queen’s merchants}, pp. 12-14.
\textsuperscript{174}Croft, “English Commerce,” op. cit.
\textsuperscript{176}Cf. Chs. 2, 4 and 6 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{177}W. S. Maliby, \textit{Alba: A biography} (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 156-57, 264.
English openly condemned the duke’s levying of additional taxes; his implementation of Tridentine decrees; and the convention of the Council of Troubles (1567-76), a court charged with punishing those involved in the unrest. The execution of two leading nobles, whose relatives had appealed to Elizabeth to secure their pardon, was accounted particularly shameful. But the rebellion continued. By late 1567, Orange had emerged as the leader of the “patriotic” rebels, commanding an army of predominantly German mercenaries with an eye to driving Alba from Brussels.

As contemporary print evidence suggests, Englishmen were closely involved in subsequent developments. Following Orange’s crippling defeats in 1568, English and French volunteers began participating in a guerrilla war fought by the Bosgeuzen (“Wood Beggars”) in western Flanders. Orange’s party also strengthened their ties with the Calvinist churches in England, France and Germany, representing the first large-scale attempt at simultaneous international mobilisation. By August 1568, Condé, Coligny and Orange had agreed to launch a combined invasion of the Low Countries, with news of their manoeuvres sent to Cecil and Leicester.

v. The crucial developments of 1568-72

Over the four years prior to St. Bartholomew’s there were some indications that Elizabeth was prepared to assist Orange’s ‘Protestant’ cause. Following the revival of the revolt in 1568, she had allowed the Walloon privateer, Count Lumey de la Marck, to anchor his fleet of Watergeuzen (“Sea Beggars”) in her ports. Unofficial cooperation was set to continue throughout the late 1560s and early 1570s, with hundreds of English volunteers fighting alongside Calvinist émigrés recruited by the Watergeuzen and the corsairs of La Rochelle. Cecil was supplied with military news from the nephew of Elizabeth’s vice-admiral, who was himself acting as Condé’s lieutenant.

As the aims of various Protestant leaderships became closely aligned, some of Elizabeth’s councillors called for her to abandon any idea of a Habsburg alliance; to execute Mary Stewart; and to intervene militarily in the Low Countries: all claims that were also made in print. Although many historians,

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178 Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 106-8.
179 TNA: PRO, SP 70/96, fol. 143. Dowager Countess of Horn to Elizabeth, 10 Feb. 1568. TNA: PRO, SP 70/98, fol. 52. Bosel to Cecil, 18 May, 1568.
180 TNA: PRO, SP 70/101, fol. 16. Arthur Hall to Cecil, 7 Aug. 1568. Hall noted that news of the executions “was so taken of the papistes [in Rome], as they cried out shame of King Philip & the duke.”
181 Cf. Chs. 6 and 8.
182 Trim, “Protestant refugees”, p. 69. See extensive list of sources cited in fn. 8.
183 TNA: PRO, SP 70/101, fol.47, Lord Windsor to Cecil, 14 Aug. 1568. TNA: PRO, SP 70/101, fol. 75, Norris to Leicester, 20 Aug. 1568.
185 CSPF, VIII, 911 and 2647; IX, 99, Chamerawne to Cecil, 26 Jan. 1567, 28 Nov. 1568 and 6 Feb. 1569.
186 Cf.: MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, Pts. 4 and 5, and Wernham, Before the Armada, Chs. 22 and 23. Cf. Chs. 2, 4 and 6 of this thesis.
in the wake of Read, have overstated the dichotomy between so-called “peace” and “war” parties on Elizabeth’s council, it is apparent that those most in favour of military intervention – principally, Leicester and Walsingham – were persuaded that a diplomatic solution could not be negotiated.\(^{187}\) As Throckmorton put it, England was not long to escape the wars ravaging other realms, concluding “yff hyr Majestie suffer the Low-Contrees and Fraunce” to fall to Catholic domination, “I se no other thyng can happyn, but a more grevos acident to us shortly.”\(^{188}\) It is likely that such arguments resonated strongly with Elizabeth for, although she remained formally concerned for her cousin’s restoration, she neither pressed the Scottish lords nor took steps to authorise her repatriation.\(^{189}\)

1568 was also to witness a crucial downturn in the uncertain status of Anglo-Spanish relations. As a third civil war broke out in France (1568-70), a diplomatic rupture was catalysed by the expulsion of Dr. Man, Elizabeth’s last resident ambassador in Madrid, accused of calling the Pope “a canting little monk.”\(^{190}\) News had also reached London in August that Sir John Hawkins’s privateering fleet had been attacked by Spanish vessels at San Juan de Ulúa. The situation was set to worsen as, in November, four Spanish coasters and one larger vessel carrying £85,000 of funds to pay Alba’s army in the Low Countries, were forced to dock in Plymouth and Southampton to avoid a storm in the Channel.\(^{191}\) The Spanish ambassador in England, Guerau de Spes, claimed that Elizabeth had promised to provide a naval escort to convey the gold to Antwerp or transport it by land to Dover.\(^{192}\) But while English sources attested that the Spanish captains had wished the coin brought ashore for safekeeping, the latter maintained that it was unloaded against their wishes.\(^{193}\) Spes advised Alba to retaliate by sequestering English merchant goods and shipping on 3 January 1569, prompting Elizabeth’s council to order Spanish and Flemish goods to be seized in turn and leading to yet another trade embargo.\(^{194}\)

There is evidence to suggest that English privy councillors were divided over the monies’ seizure, implying that ideas of a strongly confessional politics were always of paramount concern. Cecil authored a memorandum detailing all those who had approved the act: seven of the ten were staunch

\(^{187}\) Cf. Read, Cecil and Idem., Walsingham.
\(^{188}\) Haynes & Murdin, I, p. 471. Throckmorton to Cecil, 18 Sept. 1568.
\(^{189}\) MacCaffrey, Shaping of the regime, p. 172; Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 276.
\(^{192}\) CSPSp, II, 60 and 61. Spes to Philip II, 6 and 29 Nov. 1568.
\(^{193}\) Ibid., 62-68; 69-76. Letters from Spes to Alba and Philip regarding the treasure ships, Dec. 1568 and Jan. 1569. See also, KL, RP, V, 253.
\(^{194}\) CSPSp, II, 65 and 82. Spes to Alba, 21 Dec. 1568; 29 Feb. 1569.
Protestants (i.e. Bedford, Leicester, Clinton, Knollys, Cecil, Sadler and Mildmay). Alba’s envoy, Christophe d’Assonleville, received a rather sharp welcome from the queen in February 1569, in which she berated Philip for his decision to “break and violate” their friendship by condoning Alba’s seizures. It was not until 15 July, after protracted talks, that the portion of the coin supplied by Genoese bankers was formally transferred to Elizabeth as a loan, and the queen issued a proclamation confirming Anglo-Spanish friendship.

The aftermath of the near-crisis saw Elizabeth’s councillors consider the security of the realm and the threat of war with Spain, many expressing their belief in an international Catholic league aimed at deposing Elizabeth and reversing her Protestant settlement. There were fears that Ireland would act as a launch-pad for a papal or Spanish-backed “empresa”: Gaelic insurrections, partly financed by the papacy, had occurred in 1569 and 1570, and there were also extended phases of rebellion in the southwest Irish provinces (from 1568-73). Although it was not until the 1580s that Philip II himself took formal steps to support Irish Catholic insurgency, his backing for this earlier unrest was widely assumed. These ideas were crucial in encouraging Elizabeth’s government to seek out a new defensive alliance with another foreign power.

Several privy councillors, including Knollys and Mildmay, now sought to pre-empt a Spanish military and naval threat via an alliance with all the German Protestant princes – a proposal which the queen ultimately rejected, although she would pursue it anew in the wake of the 1576 Sack of Antwerp. Another group, led by Arundel, Norfolk and Pembroke, and probably including Leicester and Northampton, blamed what they saw as a diplomatic crisis on Cecil’s mismanagement, calling for an immediate détente with Spain and for Mary’s release. Self-interest may have played a role in influencing Cecil’s antagonists: while Leicester sought Philip’s support for his suit to marry Elizabeth, Pembroke (a patron of the Merchant Adventurers) stood to benefit from friendship with Spain. Yet Elizabeth soon intervened to halt demands for Cecil’s fall, showing the trust she placed in him, and by February the secretary had taken charge of negotiations to resume bilateral trade with the Low Countries.

197 Eliz. I proc. 15 July 1569 (STC 8005).
200 Kouri, England and attempts to form a Protestant alliance, pp. 165-81. Cf. Ch. 7 of this thesis.
201 Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 309-10.
202 Sil, Tudor Placemen, p. 171.
203 Read, Cecil, pp. 431-32.
In other areas, support for Mary Stewart was still riding high. Catholic aristocrats in the north discussed an armed uprising to free her, and Norfolk proposed a scheme whereby he would marry Mary and encourage Elizabeth to confirm her cousin’s title to the English throne. Leicester seems to have expressed some support for the match and Norfolk secured the agreement of the privy council in August 1569. However, when Elizabeth discovered and forbade Norfolk the marriage in September, the duke fled from court and was arrested on his return. This did not deter Mary’s northern partisans from action. Part-invoking the Pilgrimage of Grace, and part-representing a conservative backlash against the elevation of new men at court, the northern earls Northumberland and Westmorland, and their ally Lord Dacre, rose in the name of an indigenous Catholicism. The attempt was brutally suppressed, with thousands of rebels summarily executed, and their leaders forced into exile.

Despite the fact that many of the northern gentry did not rise, and that international support for the rebellion was weak, the uprising confirmed Cecil and others’ fears of a “papist” league bent on Protestant extermination, with the secretary criticising the “overmuch Boldnes growne in the Multitude of hir [Catholic] Subjects by her Majesties soft and remis Government.” It is likely that Cecil now masterminded a propaganda campaign to defame and discredit the Scottish queen. Two editions of a pamphlet written by someone at or close to the centre of events, entitled *A Discourse touching the pretended Matche betwene the Duke of Norfolke and the Quene of Scottes*, pilloried Mary as an inveterate enemy of Protestantism, of “nation... inclination... [and] allyance,” indissolubly “joyned with the confederate enemieys of the Gospell by the name of the holy league.” In contrast, Elizabeth’s proclamation issued in the wake of the rebellion – entitled *A Declaration of the Quenes Proceedings* – eschewed all mention of religion, attributing the uprising to “externall Incytements” and the “secret Practices of other malicious Persons” to “stirr our People to withdrawe their naturall Dutyes from us.” As with her proclamation issued to confirm the Treaty of Troyes in 1564, it would appear that the queen did not wish to see arguments of religious difference used to ignite civil war.

Other events only exacerbated fears that Elizabeth’s Catholic enemies were conspiring to depose her. Pope Pius V (r.1566-72), who had urged Alba to invade England on 3 November 1569, promulgated the bull *Regnans in Excelsis* the following February, excommunicating Elizabeth and all those who acknowledged her as queen. Although Philip II had in fact opposed the bull and had been dissuaded

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205 M. E. James, “The concept of order and the Northern Rising,” *Past and Present*, 60 (1973), pp. 49-83.
from military action by Alba, there was widespread fear that the king would now invade England.\footnote{Fénélon, V, pp. 225, 248.} With an eye to securing Habsburg friendship, the queen sent William Brooke, Lord Cobham, to promote her courtship with Charles of Austria. Although this embassy was unsuccessful, Walsingham’s own mission to Paris bore greater fruit. He returned in September 1570 to see the Anjou courtship revived by Châtillon and the Vidame of Chartres, seemingly at the instigation of the Catholic queen mother, Catherine de’ Medici, and the Protestant Admiral, Gaspard de Coligny.\footnote{Read, Walsingham, I, pp. 80-101.}

Elizabeth herself now seemed keen to use the Anjou courtship to further the project of an Anglo-French treaty. The recently established French peace had ceded the Huguenot leadership four cautionary towns and granted their coreligionists unprecedentedly broad rights to worship. This went some way towards meeting Huguenot demands for full toleration and may account for the fact that only a few of the queen’s councillors, notably Walsingham’s brother-in-law Mildmay, voiced any opposition to her proposed marriage to Anjou. Mildmay argued that Elizabeth’s “yelding in that point of religion will offend god, and surely [im]perill her Ma\textsuperscript{tie}\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 12/81, fol. 6r. Mildmay to Burghley, 3 Sept. 1571.} But Walsingham himself noted that, in light of the papal excommunication, the queen would be “in great daynger w\textsuperscript{out} marrying.”\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/117, fol. 156r. Walsingham to Burghley, 28 April 1571.} Leicester may also have favoured the courtship: Henry, Duke of Montmorency, relayed Charles IX’s satisfaction with the earl’s good offices in June.\footnote{DU/Vol.III/3, fol. 7r, Montmorency to Leicester, 19 June 1571.} It would thus seem that, before 1572 at least, securing the succession and neutralising the threat posed by Mary Stewart and English Catholics mattered more than the religion of the queen’s husband: a position that was also expressed in contemporary print.\footnote{Cf. Ch. 2 of this thesis.}

Reports of a new conspiracy emerged in early 1571 may have helped garner even more support for an Anjou match. The queen wrote in obvious frustration to Walsingham, complaining of the Catholic exile Sir Thomas Stukeley (d.1578), and other “savage rebels, given to bestiality,” who were now preparing for the “enterprise” of Ireland.\footnote{Wright, Elizabeth and her times, I, pp. 389-90. Eliz. to Walsingham, 11 Feb. 1571.} The following month saw the capture of Charles Bailly, a Flemish-Scottish agent employed to deliver letters to Mary’s agent John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, leading Burghley to uncover a pro-Marian plot led by the Florentine banker and papal agent Roberto di Pagnozzo Ridolfi (previously implicated, although freed, in the rebellion of 1569). As chapter 2 of this thesis will demonstrate, news of the plot was heavily publicised and given a heavily anti-Spanish
cast: despite the fact that, although plans for Elizabeth’s deposition had been discussed by the Spanish Council of State on 7 July 1571, neither Alba nor Philip were wholly committed to military action.\(^{217}\)

A new English Parliament, called in April 1571 to procure a subsidy for the queen, saw new demands for church reform linked to rising concerns about the secular loyalties of those who refused to attend church.\(^{218}\) By mid-summer, Burghley knew that with Pius V’s backing, and the tentative support of Alba and Philip II, Ridolphi had solicited English Catholic support to assist simultaneous attacks against Elizabeth’s regime. Burghley’s investigations – which saw a servant of Norfolk’s caught in the act of transmitting money to Mary’s Scottish supporters – led to the duke’s reimprisonment in September and, ultimately, to his execution the following June. Ambassador Spes was expelled in January 1572 for his role in the enterprise.\(^{219}\) The revelation of the Ridolphi plot and the punishments it elicited also coincided with the capture, trial and execution of a famous exile, the Catholic exile John Storey, whose abduction from Bergen in Brabant the previous year had occasioned the publication of “many burlesque [printed] verses” in London. Storey suffered the full horrors of a traitor’s execution on 1 June 1572, observed by many of Elizabeth’s chief ministers.\(^{220}\)

There were, nonetheless, considerable hindrances to the proposed Anglo-French marriage. Anjou, who was uncertain about wedding an older woman, was reluctant to yield over the matter of his religion. It had also become apparent that the queen herself favoured a non-marital alliance, drawing on the protection of France without having to accept a Catholic husband. Notwithstanding these hindrances, Burghley and Walsingham were bolstered by a proposal to marry Anjou’s sister, the Catholic Margaret of Valois, to the Protestant king, Henry of Navarre.\(^{221}\)

Concern with developments in the Low Countries and Scotland may also have done much to strengthen Elizabeth and her councillors’ desire that an Anglo-French alliance be forged. News of the murder of the Scots regent Lennox in September added impetus to calls that the queen employ more robust means to defend her realm. A letter of 6 July, bearing news of “la forme et ordre qui se tiendra dorenvant sur le gouvernement et fait de justice ... en cette ville d’Anvers” was endorsed by Burghley: “these be the new orders by the D. of Alva, quite over throwing all former privileges and charters and leaving no government in manner to them at all.”\(^{222}\) English and Spanish sources suggest that several of the queen’s councillors, conspicuously Leicester and Walsingham, now supported the


\(^{219}\) MacCaffrey, *Shaping of the regime*, pp. 399-453.


\(^{221}\) BL Cotton MS Vespasian fol. 6'. Burghley to Walsingham, 4 April 1572.

possibility of a combined invasion of the Low Countries.\footnote{CSPSp, II, 331 and 384.} On 12 August, Walsingham wrote of Louis of Nassau’s proposal to partition the Spanish-held provinces between Elizabeth, Charles IX, and the prince of Orange.\footnote{Digges, p.123. Walsingham to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1571.} Walsingham cast the need for a military offensive in starkly providential terms: “the proud Spaniard (who God hath long used for the rod of his wrath) I see great hope that he will now cast him into the fire.”\footnote{Digges, pp. 120,123. Walsingham to Burghley, 3 and 12 Aug. 1571. Quotation from the latter.}

The Valois marriage negotiations reopened in the late autumn, with Walsingham sending reports that the match would bridle Spanish aggression against England.\footnote{CSPF, IX, 538, 551–2, 557–8. Walsingham to the PC, [Dec.] 1571. Cf. Read, Walsingham, I, pp. 172-73, which notes that Walsingham’s private views are difficult to discern.} Many councillors were indeed growing concerned with the activities of Catholic fifth-columnists, believing that Don John of Austria’s victory at Lepanto (in October 1571) now freed Philip to crush Protestantism in Europe.\footnote{Thorp, “Catholic Conspiracy”, p. 448.} Fénélon reported in February 1572 that English commissioners had been sent to Scotland and that, given the ongoing uncertainties of Anglo-Spanish relations, Burghley and Leicester remained the leading advocates of a French marriage.\footnote{Fénélon, IV, pp. 306–12. 10 Dec. 1571; Ibid., pp. 372-76. 13 Feb. 1572.} Yet the queen’s own actions suggest she remained reluctant to simply alienate Philip. In March 1572, she expelled the Watergeuzen from her ports: an act which resulted in Lumey de la Marck’s seizure of Brill near the island of Walcheren and the extension of Orange’s control over the coastline of Holland and Zeeland – a crucial turning point in the Dutch Revolt. Although historians have questioned whether Elizabeth could have foreseen the outcome of this expulsion,\footnote{N. M. Sutherland, “Queen Elizabeth, the Sea Beggars and the Capture of Brill,” in Idem., Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-89 (London, 1984).} there were sound diplomatic reasons for her to make pacifying gestures towards Philip.\footnote{APC, 44-47, 49, 67, 69. KL, RP, VI, 184-5. Horsey to Burghley, 20 Oct. 1571.}

Representing a convergence, rather than a complete coincidence, of Anglo-French interests, the Treaty of Blois (signed 19 April 1572) nonetheless represented a crucial turning point in English policy. It provided for mutual Anglo-French defence against a hostile third party and for a joint commission to restore the peace in Scotland. In a private memo, entitled “Whether it may stand with good policy for her majesty to join [in battle] with Spain in the enterprise of Burgundy,” Walsingham worked through the implications of renouncing England’s traditional pro-Spanish/Burgundian stance.\footnote{BL Harley 168, fols 54r-57v, undated memo. Several MS copies exist, presumably derived from a lost original. Read does not discuss this treatise in his study of Walsingham. The ODNB addresses its attribution to Walsingham and not Burghley, based on the similarity of language to the former’s official correspondence.} He concluded that war with Spain was inevitable, and that Elizabeth needed to seize the
initiative by striking first: albeit persuading her would not be easy “for that her majesty being by sex fearful, cannot but be irresolute... a thing most dangerous in martial affairs, where opportunities offered are to be taken at first rebound.” If Elizabeth could be convinced that an expedition to the Low Countries would be successful, “then fear giving place, reason” – defined as male – “shall have his full course to direct her majesty to be resolute.”

The alliance signed at Blois did not provide for an offensive alliance against Spain or for a marriage between Elizabeth and Anjou, owing to the former’s ambivalent attitude and the latter’s refusal to compromise over his religion. Nonetheless, Smith in Paris optimistically relayed Charles IX’s comments that “he accompteth the peace making with his sujectes, the mariage of his sister to the prince of Navarre, and this league of streighter amitie and mutuall defence with the Queenes maistie to be the thre happines which hath com to him for the establishment of his crowne.” Smith also promoted the idea of Elizabeth marrying Alençon: a proposal which Catherine de’ Medici had first mooted back in July 1571, claiming Francis “ne sera pas si difficile” in terms of religious matters as his elder brother. When the ambassadors Montmorency and Foix came to England to ratify the new treaty in May, they were instructed to offer Elizabeth the young duke’s hand in lieu of Anjou’s.

Sent by the queen to ratify the new treaty, Lincoln’s commission has been read as an indicator of Elizabeth’s lukewarm feelings towards marriage. But by far the largest portion of the earl’s instructions concerned Mary Stewart and Scotland: including claims that a ciphered letter proved that Mary “doth wholly give her self to the Duke of Alva, and to the King of Spain.” Significantly, Lincoln’s retinue included many Protestants who took the opportunity to cultivate close links with the Huguenot élite, including: Arthur Champernowne; Sir Edward Hastings, a son of the Earl of Huntingdon; Leicester’s client Sir Jerome Bowes (who later translated a pamphlet on the religious situation in France); and Sir Henry Middlemore, who had been employed at Throckmorton’s embassy (where he also translated an item of Calvinist polemic).

Burghley now headed a group of Elizabeth’s councillors who pressed for their mistress to take violent action against Mary Stewart. In preparation for the opening of parliament in May, Burghley drew up an account of the Ridolphi plot, complaining to Walsingham that the queen “thinks that she is more

233 DU/Vol.II/27a, fol. 104r. Smith (at Paris) to Dudley, 8 May 1572.
234 Read, Walsingham, I, p. 176. Sutherland, Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, p. 190.
235 Doran, Monarchy and matrimony, pp. 132-33.
237 Respectively, STCs 11742 and 24565. Middlemore’s pamphlet is discussed in Ch. 2 and Bowes’s in Ch. 9 of this thesis.
beloved in doing herself harm” by pardoning, rather than punishing, the offenders. Bacon’s opening speech stressed the new session’s purpose was to “devise laws for the safety of the Queen’s Majesty.” Evidence points to Burghley’s particularly close management of his parliamentary clients, including the House of Commons’ speaker, Robert Bell, and the MPs Thomas Dannett, Thomas Digges, and Thomas Norton, and to his involvement in a raft of drafting and amending bills to exclude Mary from the succession. Although Elizabeth bowed to parliamentary pressure to execute Norfolk, she infuriated Burghley by deferring the passage of Mary’s attainder, subsequently proroguing parliament to halt the passage of a second bill striking her from the succession.

Against this backdrop of domestic uncertainty, Anglo-Spanish relations remained fraught. The late spring inspired a new surge of English volunteers to fight in the Low Countries, with Guaras reporting that “some Englishmen go amongst [these exile Walloons], although it is to be believed not by orders of the Queen and Council, but rather as people led astray by our rebels.” Whether these volunteer were motivated more by religious conviction or economic inducement remains uncertain, but it would appear that the English crown was aware of their departure. On the same day that Louis of Nassau and Huguenot forces took Mons, Guaras reported that one Thomas Morgan had mustered 300 men to fight on campaign in the pay of Flemish exiles: “all this” being “done so publicly, that one is bound to believe that the Queen and Council willingly shut their eyes to it.” Providing one of the only contemporary allusions to the impact of an Orangist pamphlet in English, Guaras added that the “traitorous manifesto of that rogue Orange has been sent here,” being printed and “sold publicly with great noise and rejoicing” with the effect of “increasing the help sent.” Guaras was likely alluding to the first English edition of Orange’s 1570 manifesto, the Libellus supplex – published by John Day, with royal privilege, as A defence and true declaration of the thinges lately done in the lowe countrey. The Welshman Walter Morgan’s company was mobilised sometime in 1572, while a company of 1,000 men was sent to Flushing under Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s command in July.

Although it is clear from English sources that Flemish exiles in England had financed Orange’s cause (contributing, by one estimate, around £1,400 towards rebel garrisons), to what extent Elizabeth or her

238 Digges, p. 164. Burghley to Walsingham, Mar. 1572. SP 12/51/6 is an account of the plot in Cecil’s handwriting.
241 Digges, p. 218. Burghley to Walsingham, June 1572.
243 Ibid., 330. Guaras to Alba, 24 May 1572, for this and following.
The Welsh commander Roger Williams (d. 1595) was to recall the queen’s presence at a Greenwich muster in the late spring, a company which “was the first that served the Netherlanders.” There is also evidence to suggest that the Spanish crown believed that she was responsible for inciting the violence. In June, one of Burghley’s agents in Madrid wrote that Philip was “informed that if it had not been for the Queen of England, Flanders would not have rebelled against the Duke of Alba.” Meanwhile, a Spanish agent in London reported that the volunteer bands “are raised secretly by Burghley’s orders” and claimed that Bedford, Burghley and Leicester had all backed an Anglo-French invasion of the Low Countries. Although this was something of an oversimplification – Leicester and Walsingham were in favour of the scheme, while Burghley preferred an alliance with the German princes or Calvinist Scots – the evidence as a whole confirms that there was strong conciliar support for military intervention. Around this time, Walsingham acknowledged in his memo “whether it may stand with good policy for her majesty to join [enter into war] with Spain in the enterprise of Burgundy,” that the queen had to exploit the opportunity afforded by the turmoil in the Low Countries and take the initiative against Spain – her inveterate. Facing “the ruin of her selfe and her state” if she did nothing, he stressed that it would nonetheless be difficult to persuade her to take military action: “for that her Ma tie being by sexe fearful, cannot but be irresolute... a thing most daungerous in martial affaires where opportunities offered are to be taken at the first rebound.”

Yet the queen and Burghley were clearly loath to adopt such an outright confessionalised stance. Their outlook was shaped by geostrategic factors, and both were just as concerned with French occupation of the Low Countries as with the re-imposition of Spanish control. Burghley wrote to Walsingham in May that if Orange did not take the initiative afforded by the Watergeuzen seizures, “his case will never be recoverable hereafter” – and the maritime provinces either returned to Spain or, worse, lost to France. He stressed the latter scenario far more starkly to the queen, claiming that if a French force took Holland and Zeeland: “not only the traffic into those parts... but our sovereignty upon the narrow seas will be abridged with danger and dishonour.” In another memo, he outlined a proposal that she should even assist Alba if the French looked to start expanding their positions along

248 Cecil Papers, II, 64. Anon. to Burghley, 24 June 1572.
250 Cf. Ch. 5, 1.
251 BL Harley, 168, fols 54r-57v. Unsigned and undated. See ODNB for attribution to Walsingham.
252 BL Cotton MS, Vespasian, FOL.VI, fol. 64r. Burghley to Walsingham, 21 May, 1572.
the maritime coast: thus acknowledging that there was no overriding confessional directive for her to follow.254

Overall, an analysis of events from 1558 to 1572 suggests that Elizabeth’s foreign policy and diplomatic wrangling frustrated many of her ‘hot’ Protestant councillors, who saw in her approach to the religious wars abroad both a failure to follow a clear confessional directive and to take advantage of a God-given opportunity for the protection of her private and public interests. On the other hand, to maintain that Elizabeth followed a strictly pragmatic foreign policy, is to downplay her Protestant faith. Judging from the events of the late 1560s and 1571-72, both her and her Lord Treasurer’s confessional commitment clearly remained strong: she tolerated (on a de facto basis) the establishment of a Protestant regime in Scotland, while Cecil sought a religiously unified Britain. The failure of an early intervention in France – attributable to English military weakness and a unified French counter-attack – did not preclude the queen from employing covert means to involve herself in its future wars nor, indeed, those of the Low Countries.255 The French peace allowing for freedom of Protestant worship of 1572, and the Treaty of Blois signed in its wake, opening up possibilities for both the queen and her councillors. Walsingham and Leicester, amongst others, were persuaded that – alongside the renewed possibility of intervention in the Low Countries, the adoption of an openly anti-Marian, and increasingly anti-Spanish stance – the queen’s foreign policy would now follow a more cleanly confessional line.

Yet even these councillors who criticised the queen for her martial passivity, could not maintain a strongly confessionalised line without compromising – as shown in their early support of the Anjou match. While the formal negotiations for a marriage between Elizabeth and Anjou were characterised by faint personal interest, they evidence the strengthening Anglo-Protestant and French Catholic ties forged on the very eve of St. Bartholomew’s. It is clear that, prior to the events of August 1572, the sheer complexity of the European political situation hindered even radical Protestants from taking a clear-cut confessionalised stance.

255 Trim, “Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”, op. cit.
1. **News print and political pamphleteering prior to Elizabeth’s accession**

Before examining the kinds of political positions adopted in early Elizabethan news print, it is necessary to outline some key features of the mid-Tudor news market. Research suggests that, aided by a rise in urban literacy and reading activity, ballads, broadsides, published sermons and news pamphlets had emerged as both an economic and political commodity by the 1550s. The commercial success of cheap print may also be attributed to the rising literacy and purchasing power of buoyant social groups such as apprentices, tradesmen and booksellers. Estimates of cost (which range from between two and nine pence for a pamphlet, and half a penny for single-folio verse ballads and the larger verse broadsides), suggest these items were relatively affordable by the standards of the age, and able to attract both “élite” and “popular” readerships. Though commonly regarded as ephemeral and untrustworthy – denigrated by one Jacobean detractor as “idle booke and raffe raffes” – it is clear that all forms of cheap print offered an important mode of information and commentary on the military and political developments of their day.

How far were Elizabeth’s royal forebears involved in the production of topical print? The evidence suggests that, to a greater or lesser extent, her father, brother and sister all strove to suppress oppositional print and to disseminate their own propaganda. In 1542, Henry VIII ruled that any English printed work (including ballads) should display the name of its author, printer and date of publication on its title-page. The press was also used to gain support for the king’s political ends: with printed propaganda used to promote both his break with Rome and his claims of supremacy over Scotland. As master of requests during Somerset’s protectorate, Cecil played an instrumental role in the publication of more explicitly confessionally, Edwardian propaganda. Having recorded his

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4. J. Luiten van Zanden has calculated that, on average, a carpenter could expect to earn 11.4d per day, and a labourer, 8.6d. London wages were higher: 14d and 10d respectively. See “Wages and the cost of living in Southern England (London), 1450-1700”, published online at http://www.isg.nl/hpw/dover.php.
8. *A proclamation concerning the Kynges style* (1542; STC 7792); *A declaration, conteynyng the just causes ... of this present warre...[and the] title, that the king... hath to the souerayntie of Scotlant* (1542; STC 9179).
experiences as part of the Scottish invasion force of 1547, Cecil’s campaign diary was used as the basis for a pamphlet which promoted Protestant British unity. This and other texts marked an attempt to confessionalise English foreign policy, as elements close to the crown proclaimed an ideological bond with England’s ancient foes. Upon his promotion to the royal secretariat, Cecil also used his office to help reward personal clients, procuring an individual license to print psalters and primers for his “servant”, the Protestant enthusiast William Seres, on 4 March 1553.

Research suggests that the evolution of English copyright and censorship proceeded in fits and starts throughout the period. Although there was a measure of royal control under Henry and Edward, it was not until 1557 that the London-based Stationers Company was formally invested with a royal charter, granting it a corporate status. Its range of guild-like privileges included: the right to own property and to self-regulate; the freedom to keep apprentices; and the right to engage in searches to protect the trade from poor workmanship and the incursions of “straungers” (i.e. non-members as well as foreigners). Unusually for the period, the charter also endowed holders with exclusive rights to print works for sale or export; stationers were supposed to procure separate, formal authorisation to print works of a religious or a political nature. Works thus checked by the authorities were occasionally designated cum privilegio – a form of copyright, denoting royal privilege, which conferred additional benefits.

Notwithstanding this system of press control (the success of which will be discussed in due course), the output of foreign Protestant presses could be vehemently critical of the crown. During Mary Tudor’s reign, in which many philo-Spanish and pro-Catholic works also appeared in print, Protestant exiles produced many works denigrating the queen. By December 1555, seditious literature – much of it anti-Spanish – circulated clandestinely in England. Elizabeth’s Italian tutor, Giovanni Battista Castiglione, and her governess, Kat Ashley, were arrested for possessing a cache of prohibited books, likely transported by Kat’s husband John, an exile in Padua. John Foxe’s Actes and Monuments of Matters happening in the Church, commonly called the Book of Martyrs (1st edn. Strasbourg; 1554) offered a heavily providentialist view of English history. Other titles, including the

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9 William Patten, The expedicion into Scotlande of... Edward, duke of Soomerset, uncle unto our ... sovereign lord ... Edward the VI (London, 1548; STC 19476.5). For a fuller discussion, see Alford, Early Elizabeth polity, pp. 46-47.
10 J. Strype, A Survey of the Cities of London and Westminster (London, 1720), II, pp. 221, 223. Although Seres lost this licence when Mary I succeeded her brother, he regained it under Elizabeth in 1560.
12 See Clegg, Press censorship, pp. 8-11, 139 and 176 for a fuller discussion of this term.
vituperative *The Lamentacion of England*, cited Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain as grounds to
denigrate her rule.\(^5\) Glossing its nakedly anti-Spanish tone, much of this criticism had a heavily
congessional cast; Mary, it said, “hath such a hate against honest men, that professe the gospel ... and
be not off her wicked religion.”\(^6\)

Calvinist exiles such as Christopher Goodman and the Scotsman John Knox moved to develop a
binary model of kingship in which Catholic women rulers were cast as abominations to godly and
natural order, and Protestant leaderships proclaimed as architects of reformation.\(^7\) Knox’s *The first
blast of the Trumpet against the Monstruous Regiment of Women*,\(^8\) and Foxe’s denunciation of the
doctrinal lapses experienced under Edward VI, interpreted the succession of the “cursed Jezebel”
Mary Tudor as a visitation of divine wrath.\(^9\) The religious accent of much of this literature should be
stressed: while Mary Tudor’s marriage was criticised in a wave of Protestant polemics, authors were
predominantly motivated by a desire to undermine her Catholic settlement.\(^10\)

2. Elizabethan topical print prior to the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s (1572)
   i) Historiographical overview

What form did late 16\(^{th}\) century pamphlets take and what data exists for Elizabeth’s early reign?

Historians’ definitions of a pamphlet have tended to encompass both considerations of its form – i.e.
between one and twelve sheets of paper, comprising eight to ninety-six pages in total, generally issued
in quarto – and its content, which Joad Raymond has argued was innately topical and scandalous by
the time of the Martin Marprelate controversy in the 1580s.\(^11\) I concur with Mears that Raymond’s
definition is too narrow, especially given that many pamphlets of the early reign cannot readily be
categorised as works of topical calumny.\(^12\) My findings are also in line with Mears’s calculations that
there was a substantial amount of pamphleteering prior to the upsurge in the 1580s: while at least 80
short and 151 longer Elizabethan tracts predate 1598; a further 140 titles for works of unknown length
are recorded in the Stationers Registers for the years 1558-86.\(^13\) As Watt notes, single-folio broadsides

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15 ([Germany?], 1557; STC 10014). See also: *The Lamentacion of England* (Germany?, 1558; STC 10015)
which is another issue of STC 10014 replacing Cranmer’s declaration with an addition about the loss of Calais,
16 STC 10015, sigs. B-B5.
19 Ibid., pp. 25-27.
20 Anon., *A supplicacyon to the Quenes Majestie* (place of pub. stated to be London, but likely published abroad;
1555), Anon., *A Warnynge for Englane, conteyning the horrible practises of the Kyng of Spayne in the
Kyngdome of Naples*... (London?, 1555) and Anon., *Letter sent to... the Erles of Arundel, Darbie, Shrewsburye
and Penbroke, declaring the nature of Spaniardes* (London?, 1556?).
22 Mears, *Queenship*, pp. 148-49.
23 Ibid., p. 149.
and ballads were more ephemeral and do not survive in large quantities: of an estimated 3,000 broadsides published during the reign, only 250 or so survive.24

I would, however, expand the definition of English news titles to include published ballads, sermons, domestic polemics, and shorter tracts featuring old information dressed up as new. Much of this landscape of print was of political and religious relevance. It was no coincidence that the nerve centre of Elizabethan print was closely affiliated with a platform for Protestant polemic: pamphlets and broadsides detailing news of foreign wars were sold from stalls in St. Paul’s Churchyard, only yards from the city’s main public pulpit. Throughout the reign, many Paul’s Cross sermons would be issued as pamphlets soon after they were preached, often by printers who sold tracts condemning the crowns of France and Spain for the rebellions in their domains.25 It is possible that many of these pamphlet versions sought to reach beyond the bounds of argument and audience outlined in the original. Dedicating a copy of his sermon to Burghley in 1571 (who may have backed its publication), John Bridges noted: “I durste presume to clayme patronage of your honour to this my Pamphlet, for Sermon will I not call it, since it hath exceeded a sermons boundes.”26

How widely did shorter printed titles disseminate? It is clear that all works of topical print were intended to be produced and disseminated quickly, and aimed at as wide a readership as possible. In consequence, the quality of print and typesetting was not high – even for skilled workmen such as John Day, who used an identical Garamond font for some of his own autographed works and for those “grubby” anti-Marian pamphlets published pseudonymously.27 It is also generally accepted that Elizabethan news print remained only one strand of a larger matrix of information about foreign events, much of it skewed and unreliable, in which spoken and manuscript sources still dominated.28 While cheaper titles circulated amongst gentry, courtly and aristocratic circles, pamphlets and ballads were also read to or sung by non-literate audiences.29

24 Watt, Cheap print, pp. 11-37, 40-2.
25 Examples from the 1570s include A Sermon Preached at Pawles Crosse on Sunday the ninth of December. 1576, by T. W. (London: Francis Coldocke, 1578; STC 25405); A Sermon Preached at Pauls Crosse by John Walsal. 5. October. 1578 (London: Henry Middleton for George Byshop, 1578; STC 24995); and John Stockwood’s A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse on Barthelmew day, being the 24. Of August. 1578 (London: Henry Bynneman, 1578; STC 23284).
26 J. Bridges, A sermon, preached at Paules Crosse on the Monday in Whitsone weeke... 1571... (London: 1571; STC 3736), sig. A3v.
ii) Elizabethan news print and pamphleteering, c. 1558-68

From the outset of Elizabeth’s reign, the notion of a univocal, reformed polity was central to the way the queen was represented in print. En route to her coronation, London pageants extolled her as:

“Deborah, with her estates consulting for the good government of Israel,” urging that “she might … be put in remembrance to consult for the worthy government of her people.”

Other commentators addressed the conundrum posed by a second queen regnant. In his printed riposte to Knox, John Aylmer upheld the divine mysteries of the succession, noting that if God had placed on the throne:

“a woman weak in nature, feeble in body, soft in courage... not terrible to the enemy, no shield to the friend,” it must be for some “secret purpose.”

The first English edition of Foxe’s Actes and Monuments enshrined Elizabeth as a godly princess, plucked from “fear and peril” during Mary’s reign to enjoy God’s protection in her own. Arguments along the lines of Aylmer’s and Foxe’s were taken up by Protestants in parliament, who published similarly providential arguments in the 1563, 1566 and 1572 sessions to press for domestic church reform.

Elizabeth’s government took some pre-emptive action to control controversial press output – whether of a Protestant or Catholic nature. At the start of her reign, the queen renewed the Marian stationers’ charter and issued a new set of ecclesiastical injunctions, specifying that a High Commission would henceforth assume responsibility for licensing all works of print. The 1559 Act of Supremacy also included an article encompassing the crimes of treasonous and seditious print. Evidence suggests that English diplomats monitored foreign popular print as a matter of political interest. As Throckmorton wrote to Cecil in August 1559, he “hath gotten a whole [French] book full of news and discourses containing the Continuation of the Commentaries of these last wars,” which he sent “by the bearer, a stationer in Pauls Churchyard.”

Claiming that he had “not redde all the booke, and therefore cannot see farre into it: yet have I happeined upon some places, to be laughed at, and others

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32 John Aylmer, An harborowe for faithfull and trewe subjectes, agaynst the late blowne blaste, concerninge the government of wemen (London: John Day, 1559; STC 1005).
35 T. Cartwright, An Admonition to the Parliament (Hemel Hempstead: John Stroud?, 1572; STC 10848) and A Second Admonition (Hemel Hempstead: John Stroud?, 1572; STC 4713).
37 The 1559 Act of Supremacy, Eliz. c.1. Cf. the 1581 Act against Seditious Words and Rumours uttered against the queens most excellent Majesty, 23 Eliz., c.2.
38 TNA: PRO, SP 70/6, fol. 72. Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 Aug. 1559.
declaring thignorance of the foolish wryter,” he picked out one particular passage “among others, in the 165th leaf” that Cecil should read to consider whether or not it should “be shewed to the quenes Ma[jesty].”\(^{39}\) The book was François de Rabutin’s *Continuation des Commentaires des dernières Guerres en la Gaule Belgique*, published in Paris, which contained disparaging references to members of the Elizabethan régime.\(^{40}\) Throckmorton’s comments are of interest, confirming that not only were foreign books passed between English officials, but that English stationers were used as transmitters prior to the rise of court-centred facilitators such as Gabriel Harvey in the 1580s.\(^{41}\)

Elizabethan privy councillors were also closely involved in the production of pamphlets written to shape the confessional politics of the new regime – with Cecil, in particular, sponsoring the publication of titles promoting Anglo-Scottish unity and attacking Mary Stewart. In 1560, Cecil’s associate Thomas Norton produced an anonymous translation of the *Orations of Arsanes against Philip the Trecherous Kyng of Macedone*, a moralising tract which condemned the eponymous classical ruler who had set out to destroy Christendom – here identified, none too subtly, with Philip II.\(^{42}\) Its closing prayer urged Elizabeth to “destroy the rod of foreine and Popish tyrannye” and to prevent “the thraldom of Mariane crueltie”: likely referring to the persecution of English Protestants under Mary Tudor, when married to the Spanish Catholic king, but also hinting at the threat posed to Scottish Protestants on the eve of their French Catholic queen’s return from France.\(^{43}\) The text’s striking peroration suggests that it may well have been published to back Cecil’s push for a religiously-motivated intervention in Scotland.

There are other layers of suggestion which suggest that the *Orations* may have been published to advance a confessionalised view of English politics grounded in the idea of a mixed polity – a notion shared by many leading Protestant nobles. One passage concerning the dissemination of histories amongst the “common weale” read: “the maner of applying of histories in consultation should be layd abroad for an example to the wise” and as a “warnyng and advise [to] the other.”\(^{44}\) This comment encapsulated an idea that Englishmen endowed with humanist education and Protestant virtue should

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39 TNA: PRO, SP 70/6, fol. 72v. Cf. *Continuation des Commentaires*: the passage on p.265\(^{v}\) relays rumours of Elizabeth’s marital plans – specifically, her intentions to marry either Philip II or one of the Habsburg Archdukes – and reports that she had promised never to marry a foreign prince at her coronation.

40 Renouard, *Répertoire des imprimeurs parisiens*, p. 130. The ESTC has no record of this work in English translation: unsurprising given its controversial nature.


43 STC 785, sig. A6\(^{v}\)-A7.

44 Ibid., sig. A4\(^{v}\).
be encouraged to consult printed histories as an exercise in moral improvement. It evidences the ideological faultlines over which Elizabeth presided: would she stand on a conservative imperial prerogative like her father and sister, or might she be persuaded to advance a more radical mixed polity as initiated under her brother? It should be recalled here that many of the queen’s leading privy councilors were alumni of the Edwardian council, a body which had striven to promote a radically different model of kingship in the early 1550s.

In a similar vein to the *Orations of Arsanes*, the anonymous *A Dialogue against the Tyrannye of the Papistses* was published around the time of the Le Havre expedition in late 1562/early 1563, seeking to drum up popular support. Dated ‘17 September 1562’, its initialled title-page and typography suggest that it came from the press of William Seres, Cecil’s client. Written as a dialogue between “Aulus Cecinna” and “Cneus Helvidius”, who narrate acts of Catholic cruelty to Protestants, the text warns readers of the threat posed to England by the outbreak of religious warfare in France. While both names evoke eminent Republicans (the 2nd century BC orator Aulus Caecina and the notable 1st century Stoic Helvidius Priscus), the addition of the praenomen “Cneus” recalls, in turn, the famed Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey). Although the correspondence of these identities with individual Elizabethan statesmen is inexact, they appear to impart status to those in Elizabeth’s council who promoted an aggressively Protestant agenda. In the text, Helvidius claims that, unless pre-emptive action is taken immediately, all Protestant realms will be overthrown, warning: “(Thou chieflye O Englande) ... take diligent heede, for besides the common quarrel of Relygion, thou hast certain Popysh Prynces, dwelling at the nexte doore ... that be ... sworn & fully bent to doe thee a mischiefe.” The allusion to Mary Stewart, Philip II and the Guisian-dominated regency government of Charles IX, supports allusions made elsewhere in the text to the dangerous complacency inherent in Elizabeth’s “merciful” rule, proposing that she adopt a more zealous approach towards Catholics abroad and at home. It also echoes the assertions and political criticisms made by Cecil, Dudley and Throckmorton in 1562 (examined in chapter 1), which insisted that the queen’s motives in intervening in France were – and should be – overridingly confessional.

45 Alford, *Early Elizabethan polity*, p. 38 notes that Elizabeth defined herself as an imperial sovereign irrespective of her gender.
46 (London: W. Seres, 1562; STC 19176). The ESTC identifies the author of the work as Walter Haddon, and the translator as Seres.
47 See ESTC entry for STC 19176.
48 I think it unlikely that the allusion to ‘Helvidius’ refers to the 4th century Church Father of the same name who denied Mary’s virginity, and was subsequently attacked by Jerome.
49 STC 19176, sigs. B4, [B7r].
50 Ibid. 19176, sigs. A4r-A5.
The wording of other tracts issued by English Protestant networks in the 1560s suggest the beginnings of an attempt to revive a native martial genius – a project conjoining aspects of manly ‘virtus’ and Protestant commitment which would become even more pronounced in the wake of the 1572 and 1576 massacres. The Marian exile Lawrence Humfrey’s 1563 work on *The original nature, dutyes, right, and Christian Institution* of the English nobility, advised Elizabeth to “counsayle al [her] Nobles … to further, cherishe, defende, and mayntayne unstained, religion with theyr councell, authoritye, might, and force.” Humfrey, a client of Leicester’s and president of Oxford University’s increasingly radical Magdalen College, thereby stressed not only the obligation of the nobility to defend true religion but for the queen herself to endow them with that honour. He also advised Elizabeth to persevere in the defence and reform of her true church, despite her womanly frailty: “Proceed O most noble Quene, with this your noble trayne, in settyne like rooffe and enede to your beginnings... Though alone, though a woman.”

Supporting this wider push for a more militantly Protestant stance at home and abroad, a body of Huguenot pamphlets were disseminated in English from the earliest years of the religious wars. *The destruction and sacke cruelly committed by the Duke of Guyse and his company, in ... Vassy*, a 1562 title translated from the original issued at La Rochelle, represented Francis, Duke of Guise (d.1563) as a pitiless butcher and his men as a thuggish rabble “of meaner degree.” Both duke and ducal retinue had supposedly relished the attack they had visited upon a band of Huguenots gathered to worship in a barn near Guise’s dynastic seat at Joinville. The pamphlet, which was likely issued with *A declaration made by the Prynce of Conde* in an attempt to harness outrage at the massacre into support for Condé’s principled rebellion, ignored the complex nature of the violence and, indeed, Guise’s involvement. As the historian Stuart Carroll has demonstrated, it is unlikely that the duke supported – or indeed premeditated – the assault. He openly blamed his retinue for ignoring due customs of social hierarchy by taking matters into their own hands, conveying as much to

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52 Cf. Ch. 8, section 2, iii of this thesis, which analyses works in this vein published in the later 1570s.
54 See *ODNB*: Lawrence Humfrey or Humphrey (d.1590). Humfrey played a central role in the Vestinarian controversy of the 1560s, for which Parker sought to deprive him of office. Nonetheless, Leicester and the council’s support ensured that he was not deprived and, even, that he was later selected to preach at Paul’s Cross without vestments.
59 (London: E. Sutton, 1562; STC 16849).
60 Stationers Registers, I, 74 records that Edward Sutton entered both tracts at the same time, c. 22-24 July 1562.
Throckmorton in person on 23 March. As Mundt’s letter to Cecil suggests, even foreign Protestants were loath to attribute the violence solely to Guisian sadism and religious extremism.

Yet the pamphlet published in English portrayed Guise unambiguously as an extremist and as a dynast obsessed by considerations of blood vengeance: establishing a crucial precedent for the portrayal of his son and heir, Henry, as a vengeful sadist driven to murder Gaspard de Coligny in 1572. The 1562 pamphlet encouraged its readers to think about the violence at Vassy within overly narrow parameters, associating the triggers for confessional conflict with those of Catholic sadism and Guisian ambition. Vassy was thus established, in both English and Calvinist print, as an archetypical ‘religious’ massacre triggered by perpetrators with politically self-interested motives. However, it should be noted that neither the French nor English editions employed the term “massacre” to describe what had happened, suggesting that the term was not in widespread use prior to 1572. Despite one allusion to the “executions” of Vassy in a Latin letter from one of Burghley’s German contacts, I have found no evidence of the term “massacre” being employed in English correspondence or print until several years later – with words such as “outrage,” “spectacle,” and even the generic “murder” being used instead.

Another early Elizabethan work of French news, bound separately from the two discussed above, took the opportunity to condemn Guise as the prime architect of the religious disorder in France. The anonymous pamphlet entitled *The verye trueth of the conference betwixt the Queene mother, and the Prince of Conde*, claimed that Condé had been moved to rebel against the crown of France: “for the quietnes of the commen wealth... beynge ... moved onelye by zeale of religion” to maintain the last peace edict, which the Guises had “by their private aucthoritie ... broken.” Its language could not have been more aptly worded to impress upon Englishmen the necessity of checking the ambitions of Francis of Guise, with the strong implication that he had sought to depose Elizabeth and subjugate her realm (a suggestion that was, perhaps, also made in the ballad “a Warnynge to Englonde herein to advaunce by the Cruell tyranny of the Guyse late of France.”) Another tract, entitled *An answere to the examination... of one ... John de Poltrot... upon the death of the late Duke of Guyse by the Lord of*

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62 Ibid., p. 19, citing Guise’s interview with Throckmorton on 23 March 1562.
63 TNA: PRO, SP 70/37, fol. 17r, Mundt to Cecil, 2 May, 1562.
64 Cf. Ch. 4, section 3 of this thesis.
66 The term “massacre” was first printed in a French lampoon of 1556 entitled *Histoire mémorable de la persécution et saccagement du peuple de Méridol et Cabrières et autres circonvoisins appelez Vaudois*, which reported the mass murders of the Vaudois of Provence in 1545. See D. El Kenz, “Massacre,” *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, accessed 29 July 2010. Cf. Ch. 3, section 4 and Ch. 4, section 3:i) of this thesis, where terminology is discussed at greater length.
67 (London: W. Seres?, 1562; STC 4813.4), sigs. A2v and A4r.
68 Whether or not this ballad was ever published is uncertain, since no copy now survives. See Stationers Registers, I, 88. Ballad entered for publication between 22 July 1562-22 July 1563.
Chastillon, vehemently denied Gaspard de Coligny’s involvement in the duke’s assassination. The circumstances of this pamphlet’s translation may reflect an effort on the part of pro-Huguenot lobbyists to affirm the justness of their cause in England, at a time when their leaders were busily negotiating with ‘the enemy’ (i.e. the French crown) and poised to abandon their alliance with Elizabeth.

Some titles disseminated more explicitly confessionalised messages. One such, an item of imported Huguenot polemic published by John Day in 1564 and dedicated to Anne, the wife of Nicholas Throckmorton, was translated by the latter’s cousin, Sir Henry Middlemore. Entitled *A letter written by a Frenche Gentilwoman ... upon the death of ... Elenor ... Princes of Conde, contaynyng her last wyll and Testament*, the narrative adopted a leitmotif common in contemporary English Protestant and Calvinist matyrologies – that of God testing the righteous to advertise the justness of their cause. Referring to the onset of sectarian violence in 1560, it narrated how the pregnant Princess of Condé had been set upon by a band of peasants carrying: “staves, stones, crosses, and banners... without any occasion geven, but that there was a malicious & naughty priest amongst them, who [incited the band] for the hatred that he bore to the religion.” The text records that “thys furor and populous rage” had caused the princess to deliver her twin sons prematurely. The shock of her husband’s second imprisonment caused her to die soon after.

Both Middlemore’s personal circumstances and political career serve to shed light on his involvement with this tract and, more generally, on English Protestant networks involved in the translation and dissemination of Huguenot print. Given that he had a Catholic recusant brother, Middlemore’s involvement in the transmission and translation of Huguenot print might have served as an attempt to defend his family name from the taint of recusancy. Moreover, having served as Throckmorton’s personal steward while the latter was in France, and before his own appointment to Elizabeth’s privy chamber, Middlemore was clearly ear-marked as a young Protestant courtier on the rise. He was sent

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69 Anon., *An answere to the examination ... made of one named John de Poltrot... upon the death of the late Duke of Guyse by the lord of Chastillon admyrall of Fraunce, and others ... At Caen. 1562* (London: E. Sutton, 1563; STC 5553). For an examination of Coligny’s involvement, see N. M. Sutherland, “The Assassination of François Duc de Guise, Feb. 1563” *Historical Journal*, 24.2 (June 1981), pp. 279-95.
70 J. E. Neale, “Sir Nicholas Throckmorton’s advice to Queen Elizabeth on her accession to the throne”, *English Historical Review*, 65 (1950), 91-98, p. 91.
71 I. D.V., *The translation of a letter written by a Frenche gentilwoman to ... her frind, vpon the death of the most ... vertous ladye, Elenor of Roye, Princes of Conde... Doone by Henry Myddelmore gentylman at the request of the Ladye Anne Throkmorton.* (London, 1564; STC 24565). I have not been able to discover ‘I. D. V.’ may have been.
72 Cf. Ch. 4:3 of this thesis for an analysis of pamphlets published in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s.
to consult with Mary Stewart and Moray over the Scots queen’s involvement in Darnley’s murder in 1566. He was listed by Cecil in 1567 as one of nineteen gentlemen affiliated with Leicester and likely to be a recipient of the earl’s favour, highlighting a personal, and perhaps ideological, connection with the earl. These links suggest that *A Letter... upon the death of... [the] princes of Conde* might be read as an early providentialist narrative published to shore up the interests of the ailing Huguenot lobby in England.

It was not the only published title dedicated to a leading English Protestant patron, championing the honour of those who wished to defend the cause of the ‘godly’ in France. Another item, John Shoute’s translation of the Swiss Protestant Viret’s *The firste parte of the Christian Instruction*, was published in 1565 and dedicated to Leicester. Its preface explicitly associated the projects of martial prowess abroad with moral reform at home, stating that “it were good, not onely for the parties them selves, but also for all Christian common wealthes, if they whiche are calld to serve in warres, were well instructed in the knowledge & feare of God.”

Although this chapter has concentrated on works of Protestant news print, it should be noted that several pro-Catholic news titles were also imported into England in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. Catholic polemics on the growing unrest in the Low Countries included Peter Frarin’s illustrated *Oration against the unlawful insurrections of the Protestants* (Antwerp, 1566), which featured grisly woodcuts of Protestant-on-Catholic murders. There is evidence to suggest that these titles might not necessarily have attracted a solely Catholic readership. One English-language pamphlet printed at Ghent – a refuge and printing centre for English Catholic exiles – celebrated the resounding defeat of a Turkish fleet that had unleashed a series of naval bombardments and land assaults against Malta over the summer of 1565. While the tract, entitled *Certayn and tru good nues, from the siege of the isle [of] Malta*, praised both Malta’s knightly order and Philip II for his part in aiding their cause (having sent 600 or so troops to help defend the island), it criticised Elizabeth and other princes for spurning the chance to support this most “Christian” of campaigns against the “Saracens.” In the copy of the text held by Lambeth Palace Library, the words “ye Turkes” have been repeatedly crossed out, and replaced in a contemporary hand with the words “ye papistes.” This suggests that the imported tract could well have been read by an English Protestant

77 (London: John Day, 1565; STC 24777), preface: sigs. A2r-A3r.
78 STCs 11333 and 11334.
79 Anon, *Certayn and tru good nues, from the siege of the isle [of] Malta, with the goodly victories, wyche the Christenmne... have they latlye obtayned, against the Turks* (Ghent, 1565), sigs. A-A2.
80 Ibid.. Lambeth Palace shelf mark (ZZ) 1565.04.01, references to ‘ye papists’ scattered throughout the text.
contemporary, who crudely doctored its pro-Catholic rhetoric to fit with his own, distinctly confessionised worldview: analogising the ‘heathen’ Ottomans to ungodly ‘papists’ and, by extension, the Protestant island kingdom of England to the beleaguered fortress of Malta.

iii) *Elizabethan news print and pamphleteering, c.1568–72*

The fact that Elizabeth’s privy council periodically took steps to suppress works of oppositional print suggests that the crown feared their political implications. In July 1568, one William Roper testified to “having relieved with money certain persons who have departed out of the realm and who... have printed books against the Queen’s supremacy and government.” 81 On 1 March 1569, the council issued a proclamation against books made or translated by Elizabeth’s subjects “for the more part remaining on the other syde of the sea ... containing sundry matters repugnaunt to trueth ... and stirring and nourishing sedition in this Realme.” 82 A catalogue of illegal books later found in the possession of the Catholic John Stowe included the tract *A Discourse of the trowbles in Fraunce*, translated by the gentleman “Thomas Jeney ... and dedicated to the French Queen [Elizabeth of Valois].” A letter from the searchers to Cecil specified that: “We have only taken a note of such bokes as have been lately putt furth in this realme of beyond the seas for Defense of papistrye.” 83

The combination of a burgeoning press and loose censorship laws arguably made the English print market difficult to regulate. Historians have debated the efficacy of press control under Elizabeth, arguing that forms of censorship were not systematic, uniform, or securely centralised: in contrast to Siebert, Clegg has shown that ecclesiastical licensing regulations were neither stringently nor universally enforced. 84 Despite the High Commission’s existence, few titles obtained any form of authorisation prior to publication: of over 1,600 entries in the Stationers Registers spanning 1558–71, only 15 ecclesiastical licences were awarded during the 1560s. 85 It would appear that, although the High Commission was authorized to fine and imprison, its censorship article lacked teeth. 86 This contention is supported by evidence that the Lord Mayor in London and the lords lieutenant in the provinces, acting to enforce licensing restrictions, did not always succeed in suppressing the most controversial material. Elizabeth was forced to intervene directly to suppress a tract offensive to Alba,

81 CSPD, VII, 7, 8 July 1568, submission of William Roper before the PC.
82 Proc. Eliz. 1 Mar. 1569 (London; STC 8014.3).
85 Stationers Registers, I; Cf. Clegg, *Press censorship*, pp. 43-44 and W. W. Greg, “Entrance, Licence and Publication”, *The Library*, 4th series, 25 (1944), pp. 1-22, p. 8. Greg records that from 1557-71, only about 15 ecclesiastical licenses were awarded. Addressing the same question, Clegg stresses the initially slow but then rapid growth in the percentage of entries licensed: 3% of entries for the 1560s; 7% for the 1570s; and 42% for the 1580s. Clegg also notes that the majority of these licensed works (namely, 72% in the 1560s and 60% in the 1570s) were religious, political or foreign texts.
perhaps *A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge agaynst the false sclaunders* (subsequently translated by Arthur Golding), and issued a proclamation on 1 July 1570 “against seditious and trayterous Books, Billes, and Writings.”

While the English crown attempted to prevent the importation and dissemination of Catholic titles, it seems that few measures were taken against Calvinist tracts of French or Dutch origin. It is unclear just how tightly policed the registration system was: while one historian has estimated that between 60% and 70% of works printed had been registered, another has argued that – for the late 1560s and 1570s – the two figures were roughly proportionate. The range of titles listed in the registers for 1568-69, many of which concern the burgeoning unrest in the Low Countries, suggests that titles with a distinctly Protestant flavour were freely entered for publication. Besides an English translation of the Spanish Protestant González de Montes’s tract *A discovery ... of sundry subtil practises of the Holy Inquisition of Spayne*, the registers of 1568 record Henry Denham’s licence to issue a work urging Elizabeth to enter into a pan-European Protestant league. This latter exhorted “each English wight / Both high and low” to defend “your sacred faith / And countrie’s soil” against “the froward boasting bragges” of “forraine foes.” That same year, John Day published an English edition of Orange’s manifesto, denying the revolutionary character of the prince’s actions – namely, his invasion of Brabant with an army of German mercenaries – by claiming that he was only defending his country from tyrannical rule. Linked back to allegations of papal iniquity, the charge of Spanish bloodlust resounded heavily throughout the pamphlet, as the text fulminated against Granvelle’s “horrible practices” and Alba’s “bloud thirsty rabble.” Specifically, it charged that Alba had sought to destroy Orange and undermine royal authority “through the intolerable Inquisition... put forth, with the unmercifull placards.”

It is likely that these highly emotive statements, suggesting the destruction likely to be visited on England in the event of a Catholic invasion, distorted English perceptions of Spanish Habsburg rule in

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87 Loades, *Politics, Censorship*, p. 106. See also ESTC entry for *Justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge agaynst the false sclaunders, wherewith his ilwillers ... charge him* (London, 1575; STC 25712).
88 Hughes and Larkin (eds), *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, II. Eliz. Proc. 1 July 1570.
89 Cf. ‘A list of English pamphlets concerning the Dutch Revolt (c.1566-87)” was compiled by A. Duke and H. Dunthorne, omitting all works published before 1566 and the religious works of Catholics and nonconformists. Viewed online at www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucrabjk/Hist/EnglishTracts1566-87.doc, 2 June 2009.
93 Ibid., stanza XII.
94 Anon., *A declaration and publication of the... Prince of Orange, containing the cause of his necessary defence against the Duke of Alba* (London: J. Day; STC 25708). Dated 20 July 1568.
95 STC 25708, sig. A2v. See also sigs. A4, [A8], B1.
96 Ibid., sig. A3v. For Alba’s crimes against Orange personally, see sigs. A2v, A6v and A7.
the Low Countries. The allegations of inquisitorial tyranny were not factually grounded: Charles V and the papacy had first introduced an apostolic inquisition to the Low Countries in 1522, which was subsequently expanded and reorganized in 1546 (i.e. well before Granvelle’s, let alone Alba’s, tenures). ⁹⁷ Although the rising tide of heresy after 1559 had prompted a surge in the numbers of inquisitorial trials (more than 600 in 1562 in Flanders alone), the actual number of executions was far lower than popularly believed. ⁹⁸ With Granvelle’s departure in 1564 it is clear that heresy trials and executions did decline, but this does not support the Declaration’s charge that he had encouraged them: as Geoffrey Parker contends, under Margaret of Parma’s governorship, the laws against heresy may have become progressively more difficult to apply. ⁹⁹

Other topical news titles published in English suggested that Catholic regimes were inherently persecutory. Only a few entries below that of Denham’s work, the Stationers’ Registers for 1568-69 record Lucas Haryson’s licence to publish a work condemning the Cardinal of Lorraine for destroying peace in France. ¹⁰⁰ The text of this tract offered a summary of the outrages reportedly committed by “sworne enemies” of the Protestant faith, including “they which toke the Cardinall of Loraine and the King of Spaynes parte.” ¹⁰¹ Its simple conflation of Lorraine’s and Philip’s agendas presupposed the existence of a post-Tridentine league, realised in the armies of the Triumvirate, who had “conspired ... with the Spanyarde” at Bayonne to exterminate Protestantism. ¹⁰² The growth in pro-Calvinist and Orangist tracts published during these years suggests that, by the late 1560s at least, English readers were confronted by claims that the crown of Spain was now as much a threat to their religious freedoms as the crown of France (although it is still a stretch to argue that Spain must have now appeared as England’s “prime national enemy.”) ¹⁰³ Of over twenty English language pamphlets of an explicitly anti-Triumvirate or anti-Guisian nature, blaming the violence in France on the personal ambition of zealously Catholic noblemen, there survive only a handful of an explicitly pro-Orangist and implicitly anti-Philippine nature published before 1571/72.

As Peter McCullough has shown, and as I have noted above, printed sermons were also used as a mouthpiece for political sentiments, and should be included in any analysis of the topical print of the

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⁹⁷ Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 61-63 for this and following.
⁹⁸ Ibid., Table 4: persecution of heresy in Flanders, 1521-66. In the case of Flanders, 45 of the 600 quoted above were executed in 1562.
⁹⁹ Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 64.
¹⁰⁰ Anon., A short discourse of the meanes that the Cardinal of Loraine useth, to ... to move new troubles in Fraunce. (London: Bynneman for Haryson, 1568; STC 5011); Stationers Registers, I. 379.
¹⁰¹ STC 5011, sigs. A3v, D7.
¹⁰² Ibid., A4.
¹⁰³ Wernham, Before the Armada, p.290.
erą. My research suggests this was often in light of the perceived “ungodly” persecutions of Protestants abroad. A mood of fear and uncertainty was evoked in the published text of Thomas Drant’s address to the queen at Windsor on 8 January 1570, which began by condemning the narcissism and moral laxity of courtiers. The exposition of Drant’s sermon soon segued into an appeal for a militant politics, stressing – as much with respect to contemporary as to biblical precedents – that “if some warres be Gods warres, then all warres are not forbidden.” Employing a startlingly bold analogy, Drant concluded that “David destroyed all Gods enemies: her Majesty hath destroyed none of Gods enemies.”

The transcription of another of Drant’s court sermons preached during Easter week 1572, and dedicated to the stridently Protestant Knollys, Treasurer of the Household, intimated that Elizabeth’s policy was dangerously complacent. Apostrophising the realm as auditor, one passage read: “What ... neighbours hast thou [England]? Fraunce and Flaunders. The one thou canst not retayne in frendshyp ... The other is thyn enemy most subtill... and able to doe thee hurt.” Drant’s published text urged its readers to aid their coreligionists – to “cast thy bread uppon the face of the water” – implying that their sovereign remained deaf to obvious forewarnings of evil: “alas, therefore, poore blynd countrie, for thou wilt not see, deafe countryf for thou wilt not heare, senceles, for thou wilt not feele.” The blindness of the nation may have been a subtle metaphor for Elizabeth’s own regal intransigence (being a pun on her motto: video et taceo). It is likely that the underlying message resonated powerfully with Knollys, who – only two months or so later – would witness the queen stifle a parliamentary bill he had supported calling for more stringent church reforms.

Similarly, the published sermons of the Protestant divine William Fulke – a fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge, and Leicester’s personal chaplain – articulated an apocalyptic vision of cosmic struggle between Christ and Antichrist. Dedicated to Warwick, the commander of the Le Havre

105 Thomas Drant, Two sermons preached, the one at S. Maries Spittle on Tuesday in Easter weeke, 1570. and the other at the court at Windsor ... the viii. of January... in the yeare 1569 (London: John Day, [1570]; STC 7172). For an analysis of this tract as evidence that Elizabeth sustained an uneasy relationship with her preachers, see M. Christian, “Elizabeth’s Preachers and the Government of Women”, Sixteenth Century Journal, 24:3 (1993), pp. 561-76.
106 STC 7172, sig. [I6]. See also sig. [I8].
107 Ibid., sig. K.
109 STC 7166, sig. [D6].
110 Ibid., sig. [D8].
111 ODNB entry for Knollys, citing Wright, Queen Elizabeth, II, pp. 74-6. The letter was sent in 1578.
112 See entry in J. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses, (10 vols., Cambridge, 1922-58) and R. Bauckham’s ODNB entry for William Fulke (d.1589).
expedition, the text of Fulke’s Sermon preached at Hampton Court, on ... the. 12. day of November... 1570. Wherein is... proued Babylon to be Rome, took as its subject Rome’s “decay and overthrow,” contrasting this with “the flourishing and prosperous estate of Jerusalem, which is the Church of God.” The publication of the sermon so soon after it had been preached – only two months after the revival of Elizabeth’s negotiations to marry Henry of Anjou, as noted in chapter 1 – suggests that it was of political significance. Its reissuance in several editions throughout the 1570s also confirms that members of Leicester’s circle played a key role in disseminating anti-Catholic sentiments among both the court and wider reading public.

Anti-Catholic sentiments were heavily elaborated in print in the wake of the Northern Rebellion. Popular ballads, such as Northomberland newes and The sodaine fall, of rebels that thought to devower us all began to demarcate a neat confessional line between (Catholic) conspirator and (Protestant) loyalist. John Philip’s pamphlet A Frendly Larum... to the true harted Subjectes of England, dedicated to the piously Protestant Duchess of Suffolk, decried the ingratitude of English “papistes” and portrayed a lupine Pope Pius V “greedly” assuaging his thirst with “martyrs bloud.” Although the author invoked Elizabeth as a ruler whose “mercie, [even] the verie obstinate and blinde” would acknowledge, his praise was barbed: God had intended to “rayse a Debora” to punish the enemies of his church at home and abroad, just as he sent “a valiant Judith” to defend his elect from the “blodye sworde.”

A tract published the following year, entitled Salutem in Christo and initialled “R. G.”, also implied that the queen should adopt a more punitive attitude towards Catholics at home and abroad. Its author may well have been Richard Grafton, an ex-Edwardian polemicist and one of Cecil’s men. The tract accused Norfolk, Mary Stewart and her agent John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, of conspiring to depose Elizabeth, claiming that the first two had sent letters of credit to Pius V and Philip II to secure aid for their conspiracies. As far as I have been able to discern, this marks the first instance in Elizabethan print in which France was not represented as inherently Anglophobic but, rather, as a potential ally against a rabidly Catholic, hispano-papal axis.

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113 (London: 1570; STC 11449.5), sigs. A2 and A3v.
114 Cf. Ch. 1 of this thesis, p. 35.
115 STCs 11449.5, 11450, 11451, 11452 and 11453. Cf. S. Adams, Leicester and the Court, Ch. 11, p. 230. Adams argues that the moderate Puritanism of Leicester’s circle promoted the dissemination of reformist sentiments from the 1560s onwards.
116 Both published in 1570. STCs 7554 and 1326.
117 (London, 1570; STC 19870), sigs. A5, [C6v]-[C7].
119 STC 11506, sig. A5v.
A similar message, concerned with conflating lines of anti-Habsburg and anti-Marian sentiment, was disseminated in a work of topical news print published soon after the discovery of the Ridolphi plot. On 12 October, several privy councillors sitting in Star Chamber briefed William Fleetwood, the recorder of London, six aldermen and six leading citizens, on matters pertaining to the queen’s safety – and concerning only such matter which she had “by her own mouth... given them in charge to publish.” Fleetwood was instructed to inform an assembly of London’s leading citizens at Westminster Hall on 16 October of the punishment of those “traytors and rebels” who “had conspired with the Queenes foraine enemies the Pope [Pius V] and the Duke of Alva... to have forraine ayde that shoulde have landed at some place neare to the Citie.” The text of Fleetwood’s speech, from which I have quoted, was published soon after. While there is no evidence to suggest that Cecil – now Lord Burghley – drafted Fleetwood’s speech, contextual factors suggest he remained closely involved beyond the initial meeting in Star Chamber. Firstly, both Salutem in Christo and Fleetwood’s Declaration condemn Mary Stewart’s claim to Elizabeth’s throne as the axis around which all English treason would turn – a premise implicit in Burghley’s 1569 anti-Marian memo, “A Short Memoryall.”

There were also personal links between the new Lord Treasurer and the authors of both tracts: while Grafton was Burghley’s friend, Fleetwood probably owed his parliamentary election of 1563 for Lancaster Borough to him, secured via the auspices of Burghley’s client Sir Ambrose Cave, Chancellor of the duchy of Lancashire. Burghley also appears to have shielded Fleetwood from an earlier investigation into a controversial pamphlet that had been written to confirm the surviving Grey sisters’ claim to the English succession.

Can one infer, from this at least, the outlines of an anti-Marian, and increasingly anti-Spanish, propaganda campaign directed by Burghley on the eve of St. Bartholomew’s? The evidence, although largely circumstantial, is highly suggestive. There are clear associations between the pamphlet content and the ideas expressed in Cecil’s, Leicester’s and Walsingham’s correspondence of the period (which, displaying a near pathological concern with the “Hispanized” Mary Stewart, claimed a congruence of interest between her predicament, Philip II’s policy, and Alba’s objectives in the Low Countries.) Likewise, the pamphlet literature of 1571 onwards, primarily focussed on the Norfolk match and the Northern Rebellion, triggered a news genre of works vilifying Mary as a murderess and inveterate “Philipian.” Whilst in Paris negotiating the Anglo-French alliance, Killigrew contacted

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122 Levine, Elizabethan Succession, pp. 78-79, fn.†.
123 Ibid., p. 79. The tract was authored by John Hales.
124 Digges, pp. 206-11, 218, Walsingham to Leicester, 12 Aug. 1571; Burghley to Walsingham, June 1572.
Burghley to arrange the dissemination of copies of “Mr. Beles pamphlet” about the court. Although a copy of clerk Robert Beale’s work no longer survives, an idea of its contents may be gleaned from his statement in a letter to Burghley of 3 December 1571 that he had always thought Mary to be “a pernicious & viperous enemy to the Q ma” and that it would behove Elizabeth for the safety of her “person & realme... to disgrace her … and to induce the frenshe king to ioyne wth her Ma in good league & amitye.”

As requested by Burghley, Killigrew disseminated Anglo-Scots and Latin editions of George Buchanan’s *Ane detectioun of the duinges of Marie Quene of Scottes*, which included transcriptions of the incriminating casket letters. The English edition of this tract, in an awkwardly Gaelicised dialect – which the ESTC suggests was rendered by Wilson – concluded with a string of invectives urging Elizabeth to execute Mary: “Quhile your Quenis enemy liveth, hir dangir continueth... O ambitioun fed with prosperitie, strengthened with indulgence… not to be neglected, trusted, nor pardouned.”

Killigrew recommended that some of Buchanan’s “little Latin bookes” should be presented to Charles IX and his courtiers, as they would serve to better disgrace Mary. Political correspondence of the period also suggests that Latin copies of *Ane detection* were passed to Cavannes and Foix – French statesmen negotiating the Treaty of Blois with Smith – and to “one Montagne of montpellier, that wrytethe the universall story of our tyme.” When he ran out of texts, Killigrew a master copy of the work to be re-printed in England, and with the copies returned to him for distribution in France.

The controversy these publications caused may be gleaned from the contents of a subsequent work, *The copie of a letter written by one in London to his frend concernyng the ... late ... detection of the doynges of the Ladie Marie of Scotland*, which proclaimed Mary’s guilt and sought God to “graunt her Majestie, and those that be in authoritie under her, an earnest will... to remove the groundes of her peril.” Despite Elizabeth’s denials that *Ane detectioun* had been published in England, the first Latin and English translations were issued by John Day, and reappeared in numerous later editions. See I. D. McFarlane, *Buchanan* (London, 1981), pp. 511-12 for information on later editions of the tract.
the diplomatic and the published sources thus suggest an organised attempt by Cecil’s network to sway French opinion through the use of libellous, distinctly anti-Marian, propaganda.\[135\]

Yet one should be wary of reading these polemical works as evidence of a univocal ‘Protestant’ viewpoint. The controversy they elicited was almost unparalleled in Elizabethan print, provoking both a Catholic response in kind\[136\] and counter-accusations that the queen was being misled by her chief councillors.\[137\] Although Elizabeth’s court was not seriously ruptured by factionalism at this stage, as Adams has shown, it was still quite variegated in terms of its confessional and political hues.\[138\] Hence, perhaps, the need for Protestant statesmen and men of high political standing to resort to the uncertain enterprise of pamphleteering, precisely in order to express a simpler, more reductive confessional politics than the reality in fact warranted.

Overall, my findings suggest that the domestic and international political developments of the years 1558-72 engendered a Protestantised print culture in which appeals for solidarity with persecuted co-religionists abroad were tied to appeals for military and spiritual reform at home. But the evidence works to challenge Edmund Campos’s assertion that “the subterranean workings” of the anti-Spanish Black Legend which had emerged in England by the 1580s can be securely traced back to English tracts of the early Elizabethan period.\[139\] The print evidence from the 1560s (and indeed, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, the 1570s) suggests that the English harboured complicated attitudes towards both war and the perceived Spanish threat well into the second decade of Elizabeth’s reign.

Indeed, prior to the events of August 1572, charges levelled in English print against the kings of both France and Spain remained distinctly circumspect: with Catholic figureheads such as Guise and Alba held primarily culpable for the political and religious turmoil in France and the Low Countries. Fleetwood’s speech of October 1571 – which did not shy from naming both Alba and Pius V as the queen’s enemies – only dared to hint at Philip II as also being backer of the Norfolk marriage and the Ridolphi plot. This discretion mirrored a wider continental tradition in which royal officials were

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\[135\] Kingdon makes a similar point in *Myths*, p. 133, but ignores Killigrew’s and Beale’s role in the enterprise, limiting his analysis to the production and dissemination of the various editions of Buchanan’s tract.


\[137\] M. C. Questier, “Elizabeth and the Catholics” in Shagan (ed.), *Catholics and the ‘Protestant nation’*, pp. 77-84 for a review of other works in the ‘evil counsellor’ genre. An analysis of this genre is also found in Adams, “Favourites and Factions at the Elizabethan Court.”


scapegoated to preserve royal honour, even as their proxies were vilified for a catalogue of crimes. It also pointed up the divide – as I have noted in chapter 1 – between the queen’s conception of her foreign policy as being driven along a mixture of pragmatic and religious lines, and the more militantly confessional aspirations of some of her councillors. I turn now to look at the impact of the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre on both the political correspondence and politicised print of Elizabeth’s realm.

Part II

Chapter 3. The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre and English political debates (1572-76)

1. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s (Aug. 1572)

The massacre of St. Bartholomew’s which broke out in Paris from 24-27 August 1572, and subsequently elsewhere in France, shattered the newly signed domestic peace. The number of its victims dramatically exceeded those of recent French atrocities,\(^1\) with one source claiming that around 10,000 people of all ages and stations had been killed.\(^2\) Historians have since estimated that between 5,000 and 30,000 died, with at least 2,000 of these killed in the French capital.\(^3\) Beyond Paris, there were large-scale massacres in twelve other cities – including La Charité, Lyon, Meaux, Orléans and Rouen – and violent incidents in at least eight more.\(^4\) Questions about the catalysts for the violence remain vexed, although it has been noted that many of the communities involved had a prominent Huguenot bourgeois population.\(^5\) The nature of the violence, as depicted in contemporary illustrations,\(^6\) was horrifying: Huguenot children mock-baptised in the blood of their parents; booksellers immolated on pyres of their wares; and corpses dismembered and exposed like traitors.\(^7\) Yet, notwithstanding the fact that many Catholic civilians participated in the killings, others sheltered their Huguenot friends, neighbours and relatives.\(^8\)

The focus of most contemporary comment and scholarship has remained the events in Paris.\(^9\) The timing of the massacre here was significant: many Huguenot nobles – conspicuous in their black garb – had gathered to attend the marriage of the king’s sister to Henry of Navarre, solemnized with a high mass on 18 August. On 21 August, Walsingham had joined other dignitaries in attending a celebratory

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\(^1\) Other examples include the massacre of Huguenots at Vassy in March 1562. The massacre of Nîmes or the ‘Michelade’, which precipitated the outbreak of the second civil war, had seen twenty four Catholic priests killed by Huguenot bands on 29 Sept. 1567. See Kelley, “Martyrs, Myths, and the Massacre”, pp. 1323-30.

\(^2\) N. Barnaud, Dialogue auquel sont traitées plusieurs choses avées aux Lutheriens et Huguenots de la France (Basle, 1573) [originally pub. with a second dialogue as Le Réveille-matin des François], pp. 64-65.


\(^6\) Cf. appendix 5 of this thesis.

\(^7\) As narrated in S. Goulart, Mémoires de l’estat de France sous Charles neufïesme... (Geneva: 3 vols., 1576).


\(^9\) B. Diefendorf, “La Saint-Barthélemy et la bourgeoisie parisienne”, Histoire, Économie et Société, 17 (1998); Idem., Beneath the Cross, Ch. 6; Estèbe, Tocsin, Ch. 12.
mock naval battle, at which the Spanish ambassador was absent – whether in disgust at the Navarre marriage, or at his enforced proximity to Protestant dignitaries, is unclear.\textsuperscript{10}

The events which followed signalled escalating political tensions: on Friday 22 August, Coligny was shot and seriously wounded by an assailant – later identified as one M. Maurevert – hidden in a house on the rue de Béthisy. Reporting on the incident, an English news writer identified the dukes of Aumale and Guise as “som stirrers in the matter.”\textsuperscript{11} Other commentators blamed Catherine de’ Medici for the attempt, although the historian Nicola Sutherland has demonstrated that it could well have been planned by any of the admiral’s enemies, including Anjou, the Count of Retz, the Duke of Savoy, and the young Henry, Duke of Guise (d.1588).\textsuperscript{12} It was widely thought by contemporaries that the Guise family, who still blamed Coligny for the assassination of Francis, Duke of Guise, in 1563, may have sought revenge in their ongoing personal vendetta.

What happened next is unclear. One account reported that while the admiral’s associates called for the king to punish his attacker, servants of Lorraine and Guise busied themselves in mustering the city constabulary.\textsuperscript{13} Another argued that a privy council meeting, held at the Tuileries on Saturday 23 August, saw Catherine pressed the king to assassinate the heads of the Huguenot leadership in a series of lightening assassinations.\textsuperscript{14} An English correspondent dated Catherine’s intervention to the afternoon of Sunday 24, claiming that servants of Aumale and Guise had broken into Coligny’s residence and murdered him with her permission.\textsuperscript{15} What is certain is that, following Coligny’s murder on the night of the 24 August, a general massacre of Huguenots began in which forces of the city constabulary, loosely-organised Catholic bands, and ordinary civilians participated.\textsuperscript{16} The dead included many of the Huguenot leadership, including the comte de la Rochfoucault and Charles de Téligny, as well as some prominent Catholics, including Francis, Duke of Montmorency, and grand-maitre Biron, both Malcontents who had backed a policy of religious toleration. While Navarre and Condé were sheltered at court, they were forced to abjure their faith on 29 September.\textsuperscript{17}

What motivated the wave of civilian killings? Roused during the night of 24-25 August by the tocsin of St. Germain l’Auxerrois, fear of Huguenot retaliation, a sense of duty to the king, and/or a desire

\textsuperscript{11} TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 119v. Advertisements from France, dated 22 Aug. 1572.
\textsuperscript{12} Sutherland, \textit{St. Bartholomew}, p. 312.
\textsuperscript{13} Jean de Serres, \textit{The three Partes of Commentaries...} (1574; STC 22241.5), X, fol. 12.
\textsuperscript{14} [FOL. Hotman], \textit{A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of Fraunce} (STC 13847), fol. xlix. Discussed in Ch.4.3, ii of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{15} TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 50v. “Report of St. Bartholomew’s”, Sept. 1572.
\textsuperscript{16} Sutherland, \textit{St Bartholomew}, pp. 313-17.
for spoil may have incited Catholics of all stations to murder their Protestant neighbours. The three motives were not necessarily incompatible: as Natalie Zemon Davis has argued, the massacre was not the first instance of opportunistic mass violence sparked by religious hatreds. Months earlier, there had been riots over the removal of the Gastines’ cross, a landmark commemorating the lynching of two wealthy Huguenot lawyers. Calvinist sources claimed that members of the Gastines family were among the first to be targeted on 24 August, with one girl immersed “stark naked in the blood of her massacred mother and father, with horrible threats that, if she ever became a Huguenot, the same would happen to her.”

In contrast to Zemon Davis’s research into the ritual dynamics of the violence, other historians have argued that widespread crop failure, an ongoing fear of Protestant pyromania, and the comparative affluence of many Huguenots, may have worked to heighten Catholic anger. Janine Estèbe contends that social antagonisms were at work, with embittered Catholics drawn to harm wealthier Huguenot neighbours in ways symbolic of their craft: prompting the burning of books and booksellers on the rue Saint Jacques, and the executions of skilled labourers around the mercantile centres of the Palais, Pont-aux-Changes and Pont-Notre-Dame. These atrocities were detailed in Jehan Crespin’s Calvinist martyrologies and Simon Goulart’s Mémoires de l’Estat de France sous Charles neufiesme.

Perceptions of the French crown’s involvement were muddied by the fact that the king at first denied involvement, before conceding that he had been constrained to order a series of political assassinations against certain traitorous subjects. Much debate has since centred on claims that Charles, backed by Catherine, used Margaret’s wedding as a pretext to corral all the Huguenot leadership into Paris in order to exterminate them. Yet, as Sutherland has demonstrated, the evidence is highly circumstantial and partial. Most historians now accept a modified version of Sutherland’s thesis that ultra-Catholic elements close to the crown sought Coligny’s death. This was

20 Kingdon, Myths, pp. 39-41.
21 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, pp. 100-2.
23 P. Roberts, “Fire in French Cities” in Fear in early modern society (Manchester, 1997), Ch.1, p. 23.
25 Cf. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, pp. 100-2.
26 Sutherland, St. Bartholomew, pp. 315, 340-342.
28 Sutherland, St. Bartholomew, esp. pp. 312-346. See p. 338 on Anjou and Retz’s culpability.
likely done to bridle Coligny’s war plans in the Low Countries, a scheme which would have led, inevitably, to a debilitating war with Spain.  

2. **Responses by western European powers**

European rulers and religious figureheads reacted in various ways to news of the massacre. Some were delighted: Philip II congratulated Charles on the success of his new “système” against the ‘heretics.’ Alba – who, along with the ducal general Medinaceli had been frantically besieging Mons as Orange advanced towards him – interpreted the massacre as a miracle. Pius V’s successor, Gregory XIII (r.1572-85), commissioned a set of frescoes to decorate the Sala Regia and issued a medallion inscribed “Ugonottorum strages. 1572.” An example can be seen in the British Museum today, its reverse decorated with a sword-bearing angel slaughtering a host of Huguenots.

In contrast, Protestant figureheads adopted a variety of responses. Beza, who would author several tracts depicting Coligny as a martyr and Charles as a tyrant, wrote to Bullinger in Zurich that he now thought more of death than of life. Elizabeth made her own symbolic statement, refusing to grant an audience to Charles’s ambassador, François de Salignac de La Mothe Fénélon. She finally received him on 8 September, surrounded by her courtiers “touz en grand silence.” But drawing Fénélon aside, Elizabeth mollified her froideur – remaining “triste et sévère, mais toujours fort humayne.” Two surviving reports of the interview – one signed by Burghley, Leicester, Knollys, Smith and Croft, and sent to Walsingham, the other by Fénélon – hold that the ambassador rushed to offer excuses for this “so miserable and lamentable an accident” (“ung extrême et bien lamentable accident”), which he cast as a pre-emptive strike against a coup d’état.

Despite Elizabeth’s professed abhorrence that royal justice should be meted out “with the bloody swords of murtherers,” she professed her intention to maintain amity with France, subject to reassurances that Charles would grant his subjects freedom of worship (as articled in the recent peace) and declare the cause of his actions. But she stressed the dishonour inherent in extra-judicial murder, adding that the crimes imputed to Coligny were far graver than any she had heard of.

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30 Sutherland, *St. Bartholomew*, p. 344.
32 Ibid., pp. 27-30, 38. The most important of these was *Du droit du magistrats sur leurs sujets*, issued in French at least ten times over the period 1574-81.
34 Fénélon, V, p. 122, Fénélon to Charles IX, 14 Sept. 1572.
35 An account of the audience (BL Vespasian MS, V. VI, fol 157-60) is found in Digges, pp. 246-250, Lords of the PC to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1572; Cf. Fénélon, V, pp. 120-31.
36 Digges, pp. 247-48; Fénélon, V, p. 126.
council’s report of Fénélon’s audience added that, in the absence of “due information” from Charles, the queen was honour-bound not to “pronounce any evil judgment” upon him.  

The English privy councillors who had dispatched a report of the interview to Walsingham noted that Fénélon professed himself “ashamed to be counted a Frenchman,” adding that without Elizabeth’s support, Charles would “lean more to the counsels of the persons that were authors and executioners of this murther.” Unsurprisingly, Fénélon’s own dispatch to Charles lacked this explication, though he suggested that his master might escape censure for the killings if he claimed foreigners were to blame, since Englishmen believed that: “ce ayt esté le Pape et le Roy d’Espaigne qui on rallumé ce feu en vostre royaulme, pour ne laysser trop embrasser celluy de Flandres.” As the rest of this chapter and the following will demonstrate, there is only limited evidence to support Fénélon’s claims: although a few of Elizabeth’s subjects suggested that agents of Philip, Alba and the Pope may have played a role, most ascribed events to the malice of the Guises and the Machiavellian self-interest of the French crown.

3. **Walsingham’s dispatches (August 1572)**

Walsingham remained a crucial source of information for Elizabeth’s advisors in the massacre’s wake. On 27 August, he reported that only three English lives were lost, and that thanks to the assistance of the Duke of Nevers: “not only ... me, but also... divers of our English Gentlemen” had been saved. Other sources confirm that Charles had sent a guard to protect his residence in the suburb of San Marceau on 24 August, where Walsingham had offered sanctuary to “many strangers then in peril” (including Leicester’s nephew, Philip Sidney, Philip II’s godson, and Coligny’s ally, the Sr. de Briquemault).

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39 Ibid., p. 247.
40 Fénélon, V. p. 121.
41 Louis de Gonzague, duc de Nevers (d. 1595), ‘gouverneur’ of Champagne and Brie.
42 Digges, p. 239, Walsingham to Smith, 27 Aug. 1572. I have found no other references to these victims, suggesting they were servants or of low station.
44 Walsingham’s actions were referenced in the dedicatory epistle to T. Bright’s abridgement of Foxe’s *Actes and Monuments* (London, 1589; STC 11229). Cf. Read, *Walsingham*, p. 221. There is some evidence to suggest that Sidney was one of those protected: in a letter of 9 Sept., the PC acknowledged Walsingham’s “care of” certain gentlemen “that were in Paris at the time of the ... murther”, including “Lord Wharton and Mr. Philip Sidney.” See Digges, p. 250. See also Languet’s letter to Sidney cited in fn. 170 below. There is evidence that Walsingham attempted to shelter prominent Huguenots as well as English Protestants: Sassetti’s account also records Briquemault’s (‘Bricamore’) plea for sanctuary. See Tedeschi, “Sassetti’s account”, p. 143.
On 27 August, Walsingham wrote to the privy council that he had sent his secretary to thank Charles and Catherine for “the particular care they took of him, and of all the English, during the last tumult.” He passed on the report that his man had been warmly received and that the king and queen mother wished to preserve their alliance with Elizabeth (“which they said, they did, as tending to the preservation of the good amity between the two crowns.”) Probably fearing that his mail was being monitored, he dispatched a courier with a full verbal report of the massacre on 3 September. This channel was clearly not water-tight: Leicester complained to Walsingham the following January that the courier’s intelligence had been “in open talk within ten hours after we had [heard] it.” On 1 September, Walsingham heard both Charles and Catherine attempt to justify the massacre as self-defence. Although a second interview on 10 September saw the queen mother reiterate these assertions, latent doubts surfaced when the ambassador was called for a third audience on 14 September. In response to Catherine’s assertion that “the [Anglo-French] league was made with the King, and not the Admiral,” just as others had been under Henry VIII and Edward VI, Walsingham replied that “the time was now altered, for [previously] there was no general league made at Trent, or at Bayonne generally against those of the Religion.” Catherine’s response to Walsingham’s comments was twofold: she strenuously denied that any agreement had been reached at either Bayonne or Trent for the extermination of Protestantism, and she showed Walsingham a memorandum in Coligny’s hand which instructed Charles to “keep the Queen, your mistress, and the King of Spain as low as he could.” Catherine then insisted that her son would remain Elizabeth’s true ally, honouring his oath to aid her in the event of any attack by Spain.

In the weeks that followed, Walsingham gave vent to his mounting suspicion of the French, including those – such as Condé and Navarre, now reconverted to Catholicism – whom he had previously accounted to be his religious brethren. His oft-cited letter of 24 September to the privy council, which stated “I think [it] less peril to live with them as enemies than as friends,” clearly marked a break with his assurances of the past. On 30 October, he wrote to Burghley that “such as are parties [to the massacre]... beare greatest swaye” at court and “care not what becomes of their prynce and realm,” adding that “none is so myche threatened as poore Englande.” Acknowledging that Burghley had

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45 BL Harley MS 260, fol.292, Walsingham to PC, 27 Aug. 1572.
46 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol.2, Walsingham to Burghley, 3 Sept. 1572.
47 Digges, pp. 322-23, Leicester to Walsingham, Jan. 1573.
48 BL Cotton MS, Vespasian F vi, fol. 163, Walsingham to Smith, 2 Sept. 1572.
49 Digges, p. 243, Walsingham to Smith, 14 Sept. 1572 (recounting the 10 Sept. audience).
50 Ibid., p. 241, Walsingham’s account is confirmed by Catherine’s letter to Fénélon, VII, p. 347.
51 Walsingham received the PC’s letter of 9 Sept. regarding Fénélon’s audience on 19 Sept. and enquiring about the mobilisation of Admiral Strozzi’s fleet. See Digges, p. 245.
52 Digges, p.241, Walsingham to Smith, 14 Sept. 1572.
54 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol.76, Walsingham to Burghley, 30 Oct. 1572.
“earnestly ... dealt for my retourne,” he regretted that this might be postponed “in her Maie servyce.” He had likely received Leicester’s letter noting that the queen was reluctant to replace him with Dr. Valentine Dale, because she believed the French would not “deale [as] franklie with him as with you” over the Alençon match.

Walsingham’s pessimistic outlook seems to have been partly reversed by news that La Rochelle, in Huguenot hands, had risen in November. He later sent a report to Leicester celebrating the rebels’ success in capturing the Ile de Rhé at the harbour mouth, noting the distress this had caused in Paris. His obvious delight at the Huguenots’ revival – “whereby it may appear the blood of his Saints to be dear unto [God]” – evidenced his desire that the massacre should be avenged by military means.

4. Other conciliar comment (1572-73)

Other of the queen’s councillors – including Burghley, Leicester and Smith – apparently shared Walsingham’s disgust yet appreciated the political capital that could be gained by news of the atrocity. Their terminology is significant: there no English reference to the “massacre” per se until the dispatches of Walsingham’s successor, Dale, dated 20 May and 7 July 1573 – although it was being referred to as such by French correspondents at least as early as December 1572. Perhaps adopting his usage from Dale’s, Burghley’s first recorded reference to “the late massacre in France” occurred in September 1573, in the context of his list of “obstacles” to the match with Alençon. The relative novelty of this term to English speakers may also be gleaned from the fact that Killigrew wrote to Hatton in June 1574 of “the massacre of the Admirall,” suggesting that it was initially applied to any particularly heinous individual murder. As the pamphlet literature also suggests, the term was not in common use in contemporary English print until, at the earliest, November 1576 (in the wake of the Sack of Antwerp).
Notwithstanding this, Elizabeth’s advisors clearly responded to the killings as a crime apart. Burghley wrote to Walsingham that the “devil” must have been responsible for the deaths of so many innocents and that such an obvious sign of God’s displeasure should “call us to repentance.” His assessment of the massacre’s causation was also strongly secularist, for he noted that “such trayterous attempts” – i.e. the assassination of Coligny by the Guises – should make the queen more “vigilant” towards her own defence. Burghley was also able to acknowledge certain opportunities inherent in the situation, noting “now... the French will not be so lordly” in their diplomatic dealings.

Probably in late October, Burghley drafted a loosely columned tally, categorising the French nobility by political and religious affiliation. The list may have been drawn up not long after a series of epitaphs on Coligny, Briquemaut and Cavannes, transcribed from a Calvinist pamphlet, were sent to the privy council. The Catholic dukes (e.g. “Guyse”, “Neymours” and “Nevers”) top the left-hand column, next to a shorter list of those of more moderate religious persuasion (e.g. “Cha[n]celleur hospital,” “D[uc de] Mo[n]pensier” and “Mo[n]tmorency.”) Prominent Huguenots are listed on the right-hand side, with the names of the deceased underlined (e.g. “du Condi,” “Card. Chastillio[n]” and “Andelot.”) Burghley seems to have added a cross to signify those Huguenots killed in the massacre (i.e. as for “Amyrall”, “Rochfoucault”, “Teligny” and “Beauvois”), and those executed in its aftermath (e.g. “Briqu[e]mault” and “Cavagnes.”) No cross accompanies the names of the “vidam de cartres” or the Count of Montgomery (who had both escaped), suggesting that the list was not simply a tally of the known dead. Rather, it may have been intended to serve as a stark warning: suggesting looser ties between Elizabeth’s government and the French élite, it gave substance to Walsingham’s claims that the two realms could no longer find common ground.

Besides Burghley, other statesmen were also quick to express their views. From Woodstock, Leicester wrote to Mary Stewart’s custodian, the Earl of Shrewsbury, that the Huguenots “have byn used with

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66 Digges, p. 251, Burghley to Walsingham, 19 Sept. 1572.
67 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 145, a list of “Names of Fr[ench] Gent.[lemen]. 1572” in Burghley’s hand. Since Briquemaut and Cavaignes were not executed until October, the given date of August must refer to the time of the massacre and not the date of writing.
68 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 121-130, verses on the death of the queen of Navarre and Coligny, [Aug.] 1572. These were transcribed (amongst others in Greek, Latin and French) in the anonymous Epicedia illustri heroi Caspari Colignio... beato Christi martyri [n.p.: La Rochelle?, 1572].
69 Jacques de Savoie, Duke of Nemours, married the widow of François, Duke of Guise (d. 1563).
70 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 145. Strangely, the ‘Card. de Guise’ is also on this list, perhaps an acknowledgement of his role in the Colloquy of Poissy of 1561.
71 Presumably, Louis, Prince of Condé (d. 1569).
72 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 145. Briquemaut and Cavaignes were executed on 27 Oct. 1572 for participating in the “conspiracy made by the late Gaspard de Coligny.” A copy of the sentence is found in Cecil Papers, II, 78.
73 For a providentialist interpretation of their escape see Goulart’s Mémoires, I, p. 313.
[such] crueltye that I think no Christian synce the heathen tyme hath heard of the lyke.”

Leicester’s earliest surviving letter to Walsingham in the massacre’s wake — largely overlooked by English political historians — is starkly providentialist, and avoids use of the term ‘massacre’. Although Leicester echoed Burghley in stating that “our sinnes doo deserve this and more,” he used far more militant language to condemn the murders as a mass martyrdom: “the bloud of [God’s] Saints to be innocently spilt, even for his mercies sake, lett him turne it tene fold upon their heades, that they triumph not over much.” While his calls for reprisal were directed at God, he wrote that the queen would willingly send 20,000 “of her best subjectes” to assist Charles against enemies of the Protestant faith — suggesting that he hoped for some form of military retaliation. Leicester’s comment that Elizabeth would never weight considerations of policy as seriously as she did dictates of conscience echoed his sentiments to Throckmorton in 1562 (during the English occupation of Newhaven), and in his statement to Walsingham, almost twenty-three years later, that “religion… is a sufficient cause for all true Christians to adventure their lives for.”

Sir Thomas Smith — newly promoted to the office of Personal Secretary — voiced an acute sense of shock, terming the massacre “this fire in France … so strange and beyond all expectation.” He thanked Walsingham for forwarding him a “book of the last troubles in France,” confirming that the ambassador (as Throckmorton had been before him) was involved in the exportation of French print. Smith then voiced a snobbish disdain both for the “raging populace” and for the weak king who could not control them: having learnt of the mass murder of Huguenots at Rouen, he enquired “what warrant can the French make now”? In another letter dated 27 September, he reiterated what he believed to be the irreligious nature of the killings, informing Walsingham of the arrival of Philibert du Croc, an envoy sent to justify Charles’s actions. Noting that the king’s excuses should be “sharply and severely answered,” Smith rued that “princes...are [nonetheless] acquainted with nothing but douceur, so must be handled with douceur”: perhaps implying a criticism of the courtesies Elizabeth had shown Croc.

74 Talbot Papers MS.3198, fols.296r, Leicester to Shrewsbury, 8 Sept. 1572.
75 BL Harleian MS 260 fol.313r-14v; Digges, pp. 251-52, Leicester to Walsingham, 11 Sept. 1572. Read fails to mention this document in his biography of Walsingham, and MacCaffrey asserts that the earl “used almost the same language” as Burghley. Cf. Read, Walsingham; MacCaffrey, Making of policy, p. 171.
76 BL Harleian MS 260 fol.313r-14v.
77 TNA: PRO, SP 70/37, fol.54v, Dudley to Throckmorton, 8 May, 1562. Cf. Ch. 1 of this thesis.
78 Leicester to Walsingham, 28 Aug. 1585. Cited in Adams, Leicester and the Court, p. 147.
79 J. Strype, The life of ... Sir Thomas Smith, pp. 119-21, Smith to Walsingham, 12 Sept. 1572.
80 Digges, p. 253. I have been unable to identify this book. Given that Walsingham and Smith were writing so soon after the massacre, it may have been a piece of royal propaganda: perhaps Charles’s own Declaration du roy, de la cause et occasion de la mort de l’admiral, autres ses adherens & complices, dernièrement advenue en... Paris le xiii. iour du present moys d’Aoust (Paris: I. Dallier, 1572). Alternatively, it may have been any of a number of epitaphs published shortly after the atrocity, such as the anonymous Epicedia illustri heroi Caspári Colignio... beato Christi martyri (n.p.; 1572?).
81 Strype, Thomas Smith, pp. 121-22, Smith to Walsingham, [Sept.] 1572.
82 Digges, p. 263, Smith to Walsingham, 27 Sept. 1572.
Despite the tendency of Elizabeth’s councillors to interpret the massacre in starkly providential terms, the source record supports Burghley’s claim that the privy council itself was “much perplexed with variety of reports.”

One newswriter insisted that a Guisian client had hired an assassin to shoot Coligny on 22 August, and that the king had played no part in this attempt. The agent William Faunt confirmed that the admiral had been “traitorously streken withe a harkyabous” from a house on the rue de Béthisy. The council also consulted a copy of Charles’s proclamation of 28 August, which attributed both Coligny’s death and “the late commotion and slaughter” to the former’s factional struggle with the Duke of Guise. In contrast, an edict of 22 September declared that the king’s forces had only sought to punish those “who have been guilty of the late conspiracy against the king’s person”; a supposition confirmed when the Paris Parlement passed a posthumous sentence of high treason on Coligny in October.

Much of the other intelligence on which the privy council relied was intrinsically hostile to the French crown. One report demonised Charles IX as a sadistic killer, who could have had no rational motive for murder (“it is impossible to staye his thyrst to quench the same in innocent blod.”) The writer also blamed Catherine for masterminding both Coligny’s assassination and the popular massacre, appointing “M. de Guise... as a butcher for the slaughter.” Among other “inventors of this monstrous blodshedding” were said to have been Anjou, Nevers, and Gaspard de Saulx, maréchal de Tavannes – all believed to be members of the Italo-papal party at court and inveterate enemies of Coligny. These claims were not without some factual grounds: besides Nevers, influential Italians at the French court included the chancellor, the Milanese René de Birague, and the Florentine comte (or ‘Gondi’) de Retz, both of whom shared conservative religious views. However, the extent to which these formed a united pro-Spanish coalition, who harboured murderous intentions towards Coligny – as many contemporary pamphlets suggested – is purely speculative. It is worth stressing here, moreover, that Alençon was largely absolved of responsibility for the massacre: despite claims later made in English print that he was guilty by association.

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83 Digges, p. 250, Burghley to Walsingham, 19 Sept. 1572.
84 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol.119r, Advertisements from France, 22 Aug. 1572.
85 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 133r, Faunt to Burghley, 22 Aug. 1572.
86 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 140r, Proclamation by Matignon, lieutenant-general in Normandy, 28 Aug. 1572.
87 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 20r, edict by Charles IX (in French), 22 Sept. 1572; SP 70/125, fol. 73r, the judgment of the Paris parlement against Coligny, dated 28 Oct. 1572.
89 René de Birague, ‘gouverneur’ of Lyonnais, Forez and Beaujolais. Appointed chancellor in 1573 and cardinal in 1578.
90 Cf. Ch. 4, section 3 of this thesis.
91 Cf. coda of this thesis.
To what extent did Elizabeth and her advisors share such views? There is no evidence of any comment of this nature by the queen. As noted earlier, Fénélon claimed that certain lords of the council had told him that the French had only done what the Italians and the Spanish had in their minds to do (“lequel les Italiens, ny les Espagnolz, encore que bien passionnés, n’avoient garde de le louer en leur cueur”) but this is not securely corroborated by English sources. Comments indicating a casual Italophobia may, however, be found: including Leicester’s request of 22 September that Walsingham might vouch for the character of one M. Morret, the servant of a murdered Huguenot. Wishing to employ Morret as a rider, Leicester voiced some suspicions as “whether, as he is an Italian, his hand be free from this last action or no.” Another exchange related to the employment of the Florentine Tomasso Sassetti, an émigré whom Leicester had already saved from hanging for the murder of an English yeoman. Acknowledging Sassetti’s “imperfections” and noting that those of his nation “were much inclined to treason,” Walsingham suggested that he should be employed in the queen’s service for no other purpose than “in respect of the harm he may [otherwise] do.”

Claims of this nature were to reappear in state correspondence throughout the 1570s. In 1575, Dale wrote from Paris that “one Bougran” had informed him that “certain were gone into England to poyson” the queen, including one “named Joseph an Italian.” Similarly, Burghley’s contact Edward Chester wrote that “an Italian, [who was one of the] appointed instruments” had informed on his accomplices planning a Protestant massacre in Antwerp in 1575. It was reported in 1576 that Paul Buys, Orange’s associate, would have approached Burghley directly to intercede with the queen, were it not that he wished to avoid the Spanish ambassador, who had hired Italian assassins to kill him.

These offhand allusions do not provide concrete evidence of élite English Italophobia beyond the widespread, casual xenophobia harboured by many Elizabethans. Yet they suggest that English considerations of blame for the massacre remained amorphous – playing as much on traditional, and largely secular, constructions of ‘Italian’ perfidy and wickedness, as on still ill-defined constructions of confessional hatreds. As will be noted in the next chapter, anti-Italian, and specifically anti-Florentine and anti-Machiavellian, sentiments were also routinely expressed in the contemporary

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92 Fénélon, V, 128, dispatch to Charles IX, dated 14 Sept. 1572. This relates to his comment of 11 Sept., noted above, that the PC believed that the papacy and Philip II had initiated the massacre.
93 Digges, pp. 264-65. Leicester to Walsingham, 22 Sept. 1572.
95 Digges, pp. 270-71. Walsingham to Leicester, 8 Oct. 1572.
96 TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 176, Dale to [Burghley?], 3 July, 1575.
97 TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 195, Chester to Burghley, 8 July, 1575.
98 TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 205, Herle to Burghley, 11 March, [1576].
99 Collinson, Birthpangs of Protestant England, p. 16.
pamphlet literature, suggesting an overlap between the views expressed by English statesmen and those found in popular print.\textsuperscript{100}

5. **Calls for an Anglo-Scottish Protestant league and aid for Orange (1572-73)**

Beyond Elizabeth’s court, many officials used news of the massacre to press the queen to take better defence of her own realm. On 18 September Thomas Gargrave, Vice-President of the Council of the North, informed Burghley that “The people here are... like others in other parts of the realm: one sort is pleased with the late affront in France; another sort ... are appalled at it.” Gargrave seemed particularly fearful of those religious “dissemblers” and “indifferent[s]” who rendered the region unstable. His disdain for Elizabeth’s merciful rule was highlighted in his comment that while Henry VIII had used “bloody laws” to bridle his people, “ours are too gentle” to prevent “cruel bloodshed.”\textsuperscript{101}

Yet Gargrave’s report was comparatively even-handed when compared to other advices addressed to Elizabeth’s councillors. One “discourse” on the murders in France and the dangers of a Catholic reaction at home – endorsed by Burghley “what peril may come to England” – concluded in favour of Mary Stewart’s immediate execution.\textsuperscript{102} Another long invective dated 6 September urged its recipient (probably Burghley or Leicester) for “zeale of religion,” to press Elizabeth into a similar course of action, so excusing herself from “a dreadfull charge of ... doing too little... for feare of trobling [her] / present affection of mercie.”\textsuperscript{103} The language here echoes that of certain Protestant clerics (e.g. Thomas Drant and William Fulke), who also accused their “merciful” queen of martial and spiritual passivity.\textsuperscript{104} Another anonymous advice sent to Burghley reiterated that there had always been a compact to “extyrpe” the Protestant faith, and that an alliance with the Protestant Scots should now be forged. But the author questioned the wisdom of unduly antagonising Spain, asking: “Is it nedefull to resist the K. of Sp to hold a force abrode[?]: / he is in relygion but as others be he hath no ancyent quarrell or title he hath ancient amitye [with England]; / The traficke is recyproke[ly] good for prynces and people / The lacke therof is ... felte presently.” The correspondent appeared to conclude

\textsuperscript{100} See Ch. 4: 3, v of this thesis for the heavily anti-Italian slant of much contemporary print coverage.
\textsuperscript{101} CSPD, 1566-79 Addenda, 21, 86, Gargrave to Burghley, 18 Sept. 1572. On 23 August, Gargrave had reported to Burghley that the Earl of Northumberland “contynued obstynate in Relygyon.” See BL Cotton MS Caligula C/III, fol. 402\textsuperscript{r}.
\textsuperscript{102} Cecil Papers, XIII, 391, anon. “A discourse of the great murder in Paris ... in August 1572.”
\textsuperscript{103} BL Cotton MS, Caligula C.III, fols452\textsuperscript{r}-54\textsuperscript{r}, advice dated 6 Sept. 1572.
\textsuperscript{104} See especially STCs 7266, 7172 and 11449.5-11453, discussed in Ch.2 of this thesis.
that England’s defence should be secured by renewing her mercantile intercourse and political amity with Spain and the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{105}

There is evidence to suggest that Elizabeth’s bishops were concerned with the problem of Mary Stewart and with the religious unification of England. On 5 September, Sandys of London bewailed the massacre as an act of “barbarous treacherie”, noting that “the citizens of London in these dangerous daies had need prudentilie to be dealt with all.” He trusted that God would “delyver us out of the mouthe of the roaring lyon,” enjoining Burghley “to counsel [the queen] to his glorie.” Yet Sandys also offered some hard-nosed political advice, noting that the current crop of St. Paul’s Cross preachers – “but yonge men, unskilfull in matters politcall” – were “so carried with zeale” that they might say something prejudicial to the Anglo-French alliance: “howe that will be liked of I dowte.”\textsuperscript{106}

Having proposed that he and the Dean of St. Paul’s would “direct [these men] so well as I can”, Sandys advised that the queen “forthwith ... cutte of the Scottishe Queen’s heade”; to imprison those “chiefe Papistes of this realme” in the Tower; and to make a “firme league” with the boy king James VI and his Protestant advisors, as the best means of avoiding similar calamity in England.\textsuperscript{107}

Parker, Archbishop of Canterbury also repudiated what he saw to be widespread religious hypocrisy. Although his revised form of common prayer, distributed in October, represented a conservative attempt to unite the realm in prayer following two parliamentary attempts at religious reform,\textsuperscript{108} he expressed far more radical views in his correspondence with Burghley. In one letter, professing himself bound to serve Elizabeth out of familial duty (having served as Anne Boleyn’s chaplain), he accused the queen of constructing a religiously “neutral,” “Machiavel” government.\textsuperscript{109} In another, he noted that God’s “wrath [would be] deserved” if a similar massacre were to befall England, and that Elizabeth’s councillors should now strive to “harden her heart to work his purpose” – by, as Sandys had advised, executing Mary Stewart.\textsuperscript{110} This call was taken up by English noblemen as well as clergymen: the zealously Protestant Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton, replied to a missive from Burghley to express his grief at “the late horrible and tirannicall deelings in France.” In a telling choice of words – appearing to suggest that Burghley’s thoughts tended in the same direction – he wished “with

\textsuperscript{105} BL Cotton MS Caligula C.III, fol.446'. 7 Sept, 1572, indorsed “notes of matters to be consydered of apon the knolege of the murther of y’ Protestants in France.”
\textsuperscript{106} BL Lansdowne MS, 15, fol.79’, Sandys to Burghley, 5 Sept. 1572.
\textsuperscript{107} List enclosed with above (fol. 80’), entitled “The saftie of our Quene and Realme, yf god will.”
\textsuperscript{108} Cf. Ch. 4, section 1 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{109} Strype, \textit{Parker}, II, pp. 120-21, Parker to Burghley, [Sept] 1572.
\textsuperscript{110} BL Lansdowne Vol. 15, fol. 82’”, Parker to Burghley, 16 Sept. 1572.
your Lordship... that her Majestie maye have the wisdome to follow, and magnitude to execute, the things that may diverst the same from hence.”

To what extent Elizabeth was swayed by such appeals is uncertain. Burghley prepared a memorandum concerning things to be done to prepare the realm for an invasion, and the privy council issued certificates of muster in October. Even if he did not succeed in securing Mary Stewart’s immediate execution, the Lord Treasurer capitalised on news of the massacre to revive his agenda of a Protestant alliance with Scotland. Instructions sent to Killigrew in the northern kingdom stated that the massacre was “premeditate & minded of longe time before”, it being “concluded amongst [the papacy, Philip II and other princes of Italy] to eradicate ... all such as make profession of the true religion.”

Burghley also proposed backing calls to return Mary to her kingdom for execution, but only “if it might be wrought that they themselves would ... [offer] good assurance to deal with her by way of justice... Otherwise, the Council of England will never assent.” In response, Killigrew noted that James VI’s party were no longer accepting French pensions, since “the newes of France ... alienates their mynds from that king.” Another of Burghley’s correspondents, the Protestant commander William Drury, took advantage of the news to reverse the pro-French loyalties of the pro-Marian Catholic lords Lethington and Grange. Walsingham joined the campaign to win over Scottish hearts and minds, writing to Mar in October: “let us not deceive ourselves but assuredly think that the two great monarchs of Europe together with the rest of the Papists do mean shortly to put in execution that which in the aforesaid assemblies [of Trent] was concluded.”

Leicester also took steps to promote a religiously-grounded, Anglo-Scots alliance. James Douglas, Earl of Morton, thanked him for sending such “petiful and lamentable” news of the massacre, proposing that their two nations might now be united against France and Spain. That both Burghley and Leicester were acting in concert is further acknowledged in Killigrew’s letter of 29 September, which noted that although Morton and Mar were still circumspect in their dealings, “every” Scots noble “creyth owt” that it is high time to join in “som strayter league” with England, “unless it be

112 TNA: PRO, SP 12/89, fol.89r. 29? Sept. 1572.
114 BL Harleian MS 289, fol. 149r, entitled “Instructions given to Henry Killegrew touching the Troubles in Scotland; being sent theither immediately after the greate Murdres in France”, Aug. 1572.
116 TNA: PRO, SP 52/23/2, fol. 183r, Killigrew to Burghley, 14 Sept. 1572.
117 TNA: PRO, SP 52/23/2, fol. 185r, Drury to Burghley, 15 Sept. 1572.
118 CSPScot, IV, 453; BL, Additional MS. 33531, fol. 111r. Walsingham to Mar, 7 Oct. 1572.
119 TNA: PRO, SP 52/23/2, fol. 188r, Morton to Leicester, 22 Sept. 1572.
Atholl and some of [Edinburgh] Castell ...[who] trust or fear France.”\textsuperscript{120} The same day, Burghley and Leicester wrote from Windsor urging that the “speciall matter” committed to Killigrew’s charge would be “ernestly” and “secretly” pursued.\textsuperscript{121} A Scots ballad of the period suggests that a printed propaganda campaign may well have been waged simultaneously to win popular support for what was likely to prove a controversial, confessionally-grounded alliance.\textsuperscript{122}

However, when Regent Mar died suddenly on 29 October, his successor Morton, who had negotiated peace with the Catholic Hamiltons and Gordons, rejected both Burghley’s scheme to repatriate Mary Stewart and his proposals for an English alliance. As noted in chapter 2, the pamphlet literature of this period associated with Burghley suggests that he already believed that Mary’s hopes of liberation had turned to Spain;\textsuperscript{122} he may also have picked up on Guaras’s reports that Elizabeth was deliberately instigating the unrest in Flanders.\textsuperscript{124}

To Elizabeth’s ministers and probably the queen herself, England’s deteriorating relations with Spain and the failure to establish an Anglo-Scots alliance may well have reiterated the need to maintain her amity with the Catholic crown of France. In November, the queen confirmed that Walsingham would be replaced in his post by Dale.\textsuperscript{125} Fénélon, who had been mired in disfavour at Elizabeth’s court since September, was invited to dine with Leicester on Christmas day – a gesture of the earl’s renewed support for a French alliance.\textsuperscript{126} Elizabeth herself agreed to stand as godmother to Charles IX’s baby daughter and sent an embassy under the Catholic Earl of Worcester to convey her good wishes (although she took occasion to condemn “those cruel murthers of such innocents” recently killed.)\textsuperscript{127}

However, there are other indications that the queen may have, simultaneously, become involved in attempts to revive the Huguenot political cause. One scheme centred on the person of M. Maisonfleur, a servant of Alençon’s who had close links with heads of the Huguenot leadership. During a visit to London in November, Maisonfleur outlined a proposal in which Alençon – possibly joined by Navarre and Condé – would escape to England and marry the queen.\textsuperscript{128} As MacCaffrey has noted, it is impossible to confirm whether Elizabeth or any of her councillors seriously countenanced this plan.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{120} TNA: PRO, SP 52/23/2, fol. 192\textsuperscript{v}, Killigrew to Burghley and Leicester, 29 Sept. 1572. On the political links between Leicester and Killigrew see MacCaffrey, \textit{Making of Policy}, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{121} BL. Cotton Caligula MS. C.III, fol.417\textsuperscript{r}, Burghley and Leicester to Killigrew, 29 Sept. 1572.
\textsuperscript{122} See Ch. 4, 4 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{123} Cf. Ch.2, section 3, ii of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{124} Cf. Ch.1, section 3, iv of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{125} Dale was not dispatched until March 1573.
\textsuperscript{126} Fénélon, V, 25 Dec. 1572.
\textsuperscript{127} Digges, pp. 297-99, Elizabeth to Walsingham, [Dec] 1572.
\textsuperscript{129} MacCaffrey, \textit{Making of Policy}, p. 175.
and Leicester seemed dubious. Notwithstanding this, the earl was to report that his mistress remained receptive to a match with Alençon, leading to the revival of an Anglo-Huguenot axis.

6. Anglo-Huguenot cooperation, the revival of the Alençon marriage and a hardening of English attitudes (1573-74)

There was considerable unease excited lower down the social order by the arrival of large numbers of Huguenot refugees who had fled to the Channel Islands and the settlements of southern England. While it is difficult to calculate just how many there were, approximately 20,000 Protestant émigrés (including thousands from the Low Countries) were settled in England by the mid-1570s. Some Huguenots would have passed on news of the massacre as they settled into their host communities, although others may have been too traumatized or unable to recall events. As London swelled with an influx of refugees, the stranger churches helped succour the dislocated communities.

English state papers contain evidence of personal recommendations and requests for bona fide from Elizabeth’s councillors, who frequently offered positions of service to those “being driven at this present to abandon [their] countreye for religion.” The queen herself intervened to obtain a pardon from Charles IX for the vidame de Chartres, who had previously tried to procure letters of naturalisation for a Huguenot woman “come over to England to avoid persecution.” The stories of other émigrés hint at strong contacts maintained between the English and Huguenot élites: Elizabeth’s childhood French tutor, Antoine Rodolphe Chevalier – a prebendary of Canterbury who had been on leave to visit his French emoluments in 1572 – escaped to Guernsey, where he died in October. Gabriel de Lorges, Count of Montgomery – the nobleman responsible for wounding Henry II in his fatal jousting accident – chose to settle on Jersey, from where he conducted ongoing negotiations with Elizabeth’s privy council. His success in recruiting English and Welshmen to accompany his expeditions to Normandy testifies to the spirit of co-operative enterprise engendered by the massacre.

As Brett Usher and David Trim have shown, Montgomery’s last campaign of 1574 to Normandy,

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130 Haynes & Murdin, II, p. 230. Leicester to Burghley, 4 Nov. 1572. See postscript. Also: Ibid., II, p. 232. Same to same, 4 Nov. 1572 which suggests that the postscript in Maisonfleur’s letter is not in the duke’s hand.
131 BL Harleian MS 260, fol. 156. Leicester to Walsingham, 7 Dec. 1572.
134 On relations between the immigrants and their host communities, see P. Collinson, “Protestant strangers and the English Reformation” in From strangers to citizens, p. 63.
136 Digges, pp. 263-64, Elizabeth to Charles IX, 28 Sept. 1572; TNA: PRO, SP 70/109, fol.14’, Chartres to Cecil, 21 Nov. 1569.
137 See ODNB entry for Anthony Rodolph Chevallier (d.1572).
138 Kingdon, Myths, pp. 126-27.
staffed by English volunteers and members of the French and Dutch stranger churches, was co-funded
by English sympathisers and by Huguenot congregations in Southampton.139

There is also evidence of the queen’s direct involvement in assisting the Huguenot military cause. In
January 1573, Fénélon reported that she had agreed to send munitions to the besieged Rochellois.140
In April, she may also have endorsed the departure of Montgomery’s expeditionary force.141
Elizabeth’s councillors clearly used news of the developments in France to engage her in Scotland:
Smith claimed that with “the French [army] being thoroughly occupied” at La Rochelle, it was the
“best tyme” to send her “peace makers” (cannon) to aid Morton in his attempt on Edinburgh castle.142
Shortly thereafter, Elizabeth instructed Drury’s force to assist Morton’s siege, leading to the
garrison’s surrender on 28 May.143 One of Alba’s informants noted that following this victory, the
privy council ordered “Montgomeri and his fleet to join the pirates in the Channel, and, together with
Orange’s fleet, try to defeat that of Count Bossu”144 and relieve Haarlem.145 Both English and
Venetian sources confirm the claim that Montgomery subsequently left La Rochelle to aid Orange’s
forces, although there is no evidence to confirm this was at the privy council’s orders.146

On the other hand, by the spring of 1573, the queen had clearly resolved to accept Charles’s
justification for the massacre and to formally revive negotiations for her marriage to Alençon. This
dual approach would tend to suggest that, in Elizabeth’s eyes at least, she could not adopt an overtly
confessionalised foreign policy: notwithstanding her sympathy for the plight of French Protestants.
Burghley informed Walsingham in March that, despite his suspicion that the French were “disposed
against” Elizabeth, he could “see the imminent perils to this State” if the succession remained
unresolved and so forced himself “to pursue [the Alençon marriage negotiations] with desire.”147
Dale, in Paris, reported that Lorraine “is muche made of at the Court,” and that courtiers “do make
very great reioycing” upon occasion of Henry of Anjou’s election as King of Poland (r.1573-74).148 In
contrast, one of Leicester’s correspondents in Frankfurt passed on the report that “the Prince Palatine

139 B. Usher, “Backing Protestantism: the London godly, the Exchequer and the Foxe Circle” in D. Loades (ed.),
140 Fénélon, V, 29 Nov. 1572, 15 and 22 Jan, 16 and 21 Feb. [1573]; TNA: PRO, SP 70/126, fol. 70r,
Walsingham to Burghley, 12 Feb. [1573], which passes on Catherine de Medici’s complain that certain ships
were being readied in England by French rebels.
141 Fénélon, V, 17 April and 8 May 1573.
142 Wright, II, p. 459-60, Smith to Burghley, 12 Feb. [1573]. See also letters dated 14 and 19 Feb.
143 Cecil Papers, II, 128, newsletter written by a messenger from the defenders of the castle.
144 One of Philip’s naval commanders.
145 CSP Spain (Simancas), II, 386. [BL Cotton MS, Galba, C. IV. Original draft.] Anon. to Alba, 9 June 1573.
146 Roger Williams, The actions of the Low Countries in J. X. Evans (ed), The works of Sir Roger Williams, p.
148 TNA: PRO, SP 70/127, fol. 109r, Dale to Burghley, 26 May. 1573.
will not lege [league] with the Frenche murderer,” beseeching the earl “to buyld with bothe handes the chirche of God in England to the rooting out of all tirannya.

In June 1573, Elizabeth sent the military commander Edward Horsey to Paris to advance the marriage negotiations. Horsey’s appointment was significant: a noted anti-Spaniard and friend to Leicester, he had been involved in the seizure of the Spanish bullion back in 1568. Although the massacre itself was not otherwise mentioned, Horsey was instructed to claim that Alençon, in command of the king’s army besieging La Rochelle, would not be welcomed “come to sue for marryage w’ any arme or a sword imbrued w’ the blod of them that professe the same Religion.” In September, the king sent Giles de Laval, marshal de Retz, to England (reportedly as a substitute for Alençon who was too ill to travel). Although, as Doran notes, Retz’s suspected involvement in the massacre rendered his choice somewhat insensitive, Elizabeth interrupted her summer progress to welcome him in person: an instance of the royal “douceur” that Smith had earlier critiqued.

The resulting discussions did little to advance the uncertain status of Anglo-French diplomacy: the queen pushed in vain for an acknowledgement that Charles IX would not interfere in Mary Stewart’s cause and that he would honour his own promise to grant the Huguenots freedom of worship. Moreover, her councillors informed Retz that the match was unlikely to be agreed unless it could be made to appear advantageous to Englishmen: either the duke should drop his demands to practice his faith openly, or else some substantial concession should be offered in lieu (e.g. the restoration of Calais). As previously noted, it is around this time that Burghley’s first recorded reference to “the late massacre in France” appeared, cited as one of the many obstacles to the match, and that Walsingham drew up a list of women and children “massacrets” during St. Bartholomew’s. It is hard to determine whether either councillor used these strategies to hinder the marriage negotiations – although it is perhaps telling that, on the first anniversary of the massacre, Elizabeth agreed to grant Alençon a safe-conduct to visit England, provided his retinue contained “none who had been persecutors.”

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149 DU/Vol.II/43, fol.154, William Rowe to Leicester, 20 Mar. [1573].
150 As noted in Ch.1 of this thesis. See CSPF, X, 389. An undated memorandum on the “Spanish money brought to the Tower” [May 1572?] notes that Horsey supervised the transport of £11,331 and 5 ounces of gold.
151 TNA: PRO, SP 70/127 fol.229, Horsey’s instructions, [June] 1573.
153 Cf. Doran, Monarchy and matrimony, p. 141; Gouart, Mémoires (1574), II, fols 299v-302; Kingdon, Myths, p. 128. As Doran notes, both Gouart and Kingdon misdate Retz’s stay in England to April-May.
154 BL Cotton MS, Caligula E vi., fol.197*. For this and following.
156 BL Yelverton MS 141, 21, fol. 102 (in French), endorsed by Beale “14 Sept. 1573, Mr. Sec. Walsingham.”
The attitudes of Elizabeth’s councillors with respect to any form of French alliance were set to harden over the winter of 1573-74. As noted by MacCaffrey, this was arguably due to the growing influence of new Protestant personnel at court: while Walsingham was promoted to second Principal Secretary on 20 December, and admitted to the privy council the following day, the rise of the diplomats Dale, Horsey, Randolph and Thomas Wilkes also points to the promotion of a militantly anti-Catholic interest. Aspects of Elizabeth’s policy also suggest that Protestant influence was riding high: in February, Leicester reported to Fénélon that the queen was now set against meeting Alençon, on the grounds that if it had “not the effect which they hope for [i.e. a marriage], then, in place of the present friendship ... between the two crowns, there will ensure dislike and discontent.” The spring saw her allow the departure of volunteer forces to renew rebellion in Normandy, outfitting a fleet either to assist Montmorency’s invasion force (as Fénélon thought) or to take preventative measures against a Spanish fleet set to sail for Flanders (as Elizabeth claimed). Both developments suggest that the queen’s Protestant councillors were playing adroitly on her fears of a rising French Catholic interest.

The hatching of further Anglo-Huguenot schemes over the coming months belied Elizabeth’s formal professions of impartiality. The context for these schemes was that of renewed rebellion, as the Montmorencis, the Huguenot leadership, and many Catholic malcontents formed a coalition around Alençon in support of religious toleration. Their failed attempts in February and April 1574 led to the arrest of the duke, Navarre, and two marshals. Imprisoned at Vincennes, Alençon and Navarre became involved in an abortive plot to flee to Sedan, possibly with the backing of Elizabeth’s Council. Montgomery wrote to Burghley on 23 March that the memory of St. Bartholomew was too fresh (“la memoire est si fraiche... du Jour de Sainct Berthelemy”) for him and his allies to ever again trust in Charles’s promises.

Throughout March, Dale reported to Burghley and Walsingham that memories of the massacre had galvanised even Gallican traditionalists into taking action against the Guises.

Burghley clearly feared that Charles’s promises of peace would prove fleeting in the event of his death, and wrote feelingly to Walsingham of “yᵉ tyran yᵉ shall com from polenia.” The language of other statesmen is also revealing of a general hardening of attitudes that had occurred in the

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158 APC, VIII, 169; MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, p. 189.
159 Cecil Papers, II, no. 185, Leicester to the French Ambassador, 1 Feb. [1574].
160 Fénélon, VI. 2, 6, 19 and 24 Apr. 1574.
161 See Ch. 4 of this thesis for a discussion of these events from an Anglo-Spanish perspective.
162 Sutherland, Huguenot Struggle, pp. 219-28. The marshals were Cossé and Montmorency.
163 MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, pp. 178-81.
164 TNA: PRO, SP 70/130, fol. 136, Montgomery to Burghley, 23 March, 1574.
166 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 67, Burghley to Walsingham, 26 May, 1574.
massacre’s wake but which had been glossed over by the professions of amity in 1573. It became clear by May 1574 that the tubercoloi Charles was on his deathbed, inspiring English claims that God would now wreck punishment on all those involved in the massacre. Dale reported to Sussex that the “Marschal Tavanes [had] died ex morbo pediculari, which is much noted... because he was one of the greatest persecutors at the massacre.” Morbus pedicularis (also known as phthiriasis or pediculosis, denoting an infestation of lice) seems to have been accounted a suitably shameful death. Similarly, it was noted by one news writer that “Besme, who in the last massacre at Paris slew the Admiral” had failed to survive having “his thigh stricken quyte of w’ a canon” during the siege of La Rochelle. These comments were both the projection of a sense of providentialist justice – as Hubert Languet, a Protestant diplomat at the Imperial court, would write to Philip Sidney: “I feel that souls stained by the monstrous crime of which you and I were spectators are tormented by madness and are driven to destroy themselves and others” – and the focus of a rising fear that Anjou’s succession would trigger a new massacre. Burghley’s branding of the duke as a “tyrant” evidenced a martyrological association of Catholic kingship with heartless repression. In the wake of Charles’s death on 31 May, Dale’s dispatches also conveyed a sense of deep foreboding, aggravated by more reports of Spanish naval preparations.

7. *Henry III’s accession and early rule (early 1572-4)*

Despite the initial declaration of goodwill which Henry III (r. 1574-89) made to Elizabeth, her councillors immediately launched into negotiations about the direction her policy should take. Although English statesmen referred to the massacre *per se* far less over the course of 1574-75, their personal and official correspondence was freighted with claims of Catholic cruelty and Marian-Guisian conspiracy. From Paris, Dale reported that the only foreign representatives now promoting peace were the ambassadors of the Count Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Protestant Swiss cantons. He enclosed with his dispatch of 11 September certain articles proposed by the Palatinate ambassador, which included a demand for the free exercise of Calvinism, and a guarantee that the new king would not permit any further religious violence. In October, Elizabeth dispatched one of

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169 TNA: PRO, SP 70/127, fol. 114r. Advertisements from France, 30 May 1573.
171 Ibid. 1442, 1444, 1449, 1450, Dale to Burghley, Smith, Walsingham and others, June, 1574; Wright (ed.), II, pp. 500-3, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, 7 July, 1574.
172 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 110r, Henry of Poland to Elizabeth, 15 June, 1574.
173 Fénélon, VI, dispatches dated 29 May, 3 July and 13 Aug. 1574.
174 TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 22r, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, 11 Sept. 1574.
175 List of articles forwarded with the above.
Leicester’s friends, Lord North, to congratulate Henry III on his accession and to urge the resolution of a lasting religious settlement in France.\(^{176}\)

At this point the concerns of Elizabeth’s closest advisors seem to have diverged in degree, if not in kind.\(^{177}\) While Burghley’s network continued to focus on the threat posed by Mary Stewart to Elizabeth’s estate, Leicester and Walsingham seemed set on the pursuit of a virulently anti-Catholic – and specifically, anti-Spanish – league, of which Orange and Elizabeth would be the chief pillars. Burghley received intelligence from Champernowne that a “confederacy” of six English gentlemen was resolved to form a pro-Marian league which would seize the crown in the event of Elizabeth’s sudden death.\(^{178}\) Dale wrote that the French “in wordes ... doe make faire weather w\(^{182}\)th us until their owne stormes be past,”\(^ {179}\) and informed Walsingham that Henry III had promised the Bishop of Ross to deal earnestly with Elizabeth for Mary Stewart’s release.\(^{180}\) He later noted that North’s commission, which was well liked by Henry, “might work som good effect” in the face of Ross’s “<pestilent> persuasions.”\(^{181}\)

In contrast, Walsingham’s network interpreted the outcome of North’s embassy more pessimistically: Wilkes reported that the king was ruled in all things by the “pestiferous consaill” of his mother, and that his courtiers had laughed at the negotiations “in their sleves.”\(^{182}\) In a private memorial, Walsingham instructed North to approach only those French councillors “not poysioned with Spanish pensions” such as Mauvissière – whom, the secretary believed, had encouraged Charles IX to maintain his amity with Elizabeth in 1572.\(^{183}\) North was to “enduce” Mauvissière to believe him to be “more ffrench than Spanish, for that the french man is a good fellowe, frank of nature and most agreable to ... an Englishman: whereas the Spaniard is proud disdainfull and so insolent as naturally [we] abhore him.”\(^{184}\) Walsingham’s terms of expression are echoed in other political correspondence,\(^{185}\) and in contemporary English pamphlets on the Dutch wars,\(^{186}\) both of which

\(^{176}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 69\(^ r\), instructions for North, 5 Oct. 1574.

\(^{177}\) North’s embassy is examined by C. Read in Walsingham, pp. 287-88: which addresses the negative assessments of the mission but ignores Dale’s interpretation.

\(^{178}\) Cecil Papers, II, 197, Champernowne to Burghley, 15 June 1574.

\(^{179}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 40\(^ r\), Dale to Burghley, 29 Sept. 1574.

\(^{180}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 47\(^ r\), Dale to Walsingham, 29 Sept. 1574.

\(^{181}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 94\(^ r\), Dale to Walsingham, 3 Nov. 1574.

\(^{182}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 99\(^ r\), Wilkes to Walsingham, 4 Nov. 1574.

\(^{183}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 70\(^ r\), private memorial to Lord North touching his charge, 5 Oct. 1574. Cf. BL Harleian MS 260, fol. 387\(^ r\), Walsingham to Smith, 25 Dec. 1572.

\(^{184}\) E.g. CP 7/74, anon. “Objections for the consultation of the United Provinces” [1572?]. CP 7/126. Woodshawe to Burghley, 26 Jan. 1575; KL, RP, IX, 221, Wilson to Elizabeth, 1577, quoting Champagny’s opinion that Don John was “a man of smale discourse and little experience,” likened to Spaniards “who seeme to knowe moche by their pryde and stowtenesse, and yet are verie ignorant in political government”; CP 9/104, Paulet to Burghley, 10 Mar. 1578.
framed the Spanish as insufferably proud and disdainful. Walsingham’s instructions also conflated strands of anti-Italian and anti-Spanish prejudice found in print coverage on the massacre, when he argued that “those princes of Italy” who had more regard for the repose of Italy than that of France would, with “the practice and privitie of Spayne,” persuade Henry to wage further religious wars.\textsuperscript{187}

Although there is no evidence of English conciliar debates of this nature, there also seems to have been an effort in English print to encourage Elizabeth to break her alliance with France and to send aid to Henry’s enemies. Noting the arrival at the English court of Charles, Count of Meru, the youngest of the Montmorency brothers, accompanied by an agent of the Elector Palatine and a representative from La Rochelle, Fénélon suspected there was a plot to levy German mercenaries to fight in France or Flanders.\textsuperscript{188} Meru had returned to London by January to convey news of an alliance between moderate Catholics and the Huguenot leadership, and to appeal for Elizabeth’s intercession in freeing his brother Henry, Duke of Montmorency, Alençon and Navarre. Meru informed Elizabeth that his allies sought only limited constitutional reforms, including guarantees of religious toleration and the restitution of the common weal (“bien publique”); to secure this, he requested a loan of £100,000 thalers (£30,000) to finance their manoeuvres.\textsuperscript{189}

The publication of an English edition of Montmorency’s manifesto may well have reflected a strengthening Protestant influence over Elizabeth’s policy,\textsuperscript{190} and/or a growing fear of French military activity in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{191} Dale wrote to Burghley on 7 March concerning how “the Queen may reasonably avoid the confirmation of the league with the French King, [and] how far she is bound.” In outlining arguments against any particular obligations to honour the earlier treaty, he noted “it is evident that if the case had been put at the making of [it] that the massacre should have followed, and all the edicts and pacifications broken, the Queen would never have passed [it] with the King that dead is, much less with his successor.”\textsuperscript{192} Dale’s charges echoed those expressed in contemporary print: namely that Henry of Anjou, as much as Charles, had been the massacre’s primary architect.\textsuperscript{193}

The fact that Elizabeth renewed the French alliance in April is evidence of her reluctance to adopt an

\textsuperscript{186} E.g. Certein letters wherin is set forth a discourse of the peace that was attempted ... by the lords and states of Holland and Zelande in ... 1574 (London: Thomas Marsh, 1576), sig. A5. G. Gascoigne, The Spoyle of Antwerpe (London, 1577: STC 11644), STC sig. C3\textsuperscript{v}: stresses that the Spanish were famed for their “obstinate pride and argaconie.” See analysis of news pamphlets on the Dutch Revolt in Ch. 6, 3: iv of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{187} TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 70r. See Ch. 4, 3:v of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{188} TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 83r, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, 23 Oct. 1574; Cf. Fénélon, VI, dispatches dated 10, 15 and 19 Sept, and 5 Oct. 1574.

\textsuperscript{189} TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 14r, Meru to Elizabeth, 8 Sept. 1574.

\textsuperscript{190} As noted by MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, p. 184: although he does not comment on the significance of Montmorency’s manifesto. Cf. My discussion in Ch.4, section 4 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{191} See Ch. 5, 3 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{192} TNA: PRO, SP 70/128, fol. 12r, Dale to Burghley, 7 Mar. [1575].

\textsuperscript{193} See Ch. 4, 3: ii of this thesis.
overtly hostile policy towards France: especially since the opening of talks at Breda appeared to augur peace in the Low Countries and, by extension, the freeing up of Philip II’s army in Europe.\(^{194}\)

But with Alençon’s escape from the French court on 15 September 1575 (NS), there arose new opportunities to manipulate Elizabeth’s policy and English public opinion in the name of Protestant unity. A French manifesto issued on 17 September (NS) under Alençon’s rubric of “Gouverneur General pour le Roy et protecteur de la liberté et bien publique de France,” was translated into English and published by the London Stationer, the Huguenot exile Thomas Vautrollier.\(^{195}\) The tract, which incorporated a Huguenot petition calling for freedom of worship, stressed the duke’s pledge to “reconcyle the heartes of naturall Frenchmen,” and to permit all Huguenots to practice their religion. It framed Alençon’s objectives as an attempt to oppose the ultra-Catholic “tyrannie” spear-headed by the Guises, therein cast as self-interested dynasts and perfidious pawns of the pope. Alençon’s appeal to “all Kinges, Quenes, Princes, and Potentates” to aid him in his “holy and laudable enterprise” sounded as an alarum for a religious crusade, stressing the dual threat posed by the Guises and the ultra-Catholic party not only to peace in France, but to the freedom of Protestant worship across Europe.\(^{196}\) The translation of Alençon’s manifesto into English was likely intended to bolster the Valois duke’s formal appeals (via his secretary) to solicit Elizabeth’s support.\(^{197}\)

Towards the end of 1575, it appeared that France was again descending into chaos. In the wake of the short-lived truce of Champigny, Alençon, Condé and the Montmorenci brothers resorted to arms, and Meru and John Casimir (1543-92) raised an invasion force along the Rhine.\(^{198}\) In January 1576, Dale reported news of a Catholic League formed by Chancellor Birague, and the dukes of Guise, Nemours and Nevers, standing against “all that would have any peace, and if it should be made, to begin a sharp war afresh.”\(^{199}\) Open war threatened to erupt in February, with Navarre’s escape from court and the arrival of Condé’s invasion force. In April, Randolph was sent as Elizabeth’s envoy to offer her mediatory services and, secretly, to keep Alençon firm in his alliance with Condé and Casimir. The Edict of Beaulieu (dubbed ‘the Peace of Monsieur’) formalized on 6 May 1576 was a royal capitulation of sorts, under which unprecedented liberties of worship were granted to the Huguenots and Alençon received the powerful apanage of Anjou.\(^{200}\)

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\(^{194}\) See Ch. 5, 3 for my analysis of the peace talks at Breda.

\(^{195}\) Anon., *The Protestation of ... Fravncis, bothe sonne and brother of King, Duke of Allenson... protector of the libertie of the Crowne of Frauncse, oppressed by the straungers* (London [Vautrollier?]: 1575; STC 11311). Judging by the year date, this must have been printed between Oct. 1575 and Mar. 1576.

\(^{196}\) Ibid., pp. 4-5, 10, 11.

\(^{197}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/136, fol. 73\(^{1}\), instructions for Porte sent by Anjou, 27 Nov. 1575.

\(^{198}\) Casimir had been raised at the French court and had backed the Huguenot cause since 1568.

\(^{199}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 40\(^{1}\). 24 Jan. [1576], Dale [to Smith and Walsingham].

Notwithstanding this apparent triumph for the Protestant cause, fears of a second St. Bartholomew’s were quick to emerge, as Elizabeth’s councillors received reports of violent confrontations in Paris the following autumn.\(^{201}\) Dale and his successor as ambassador, Sir Amias Paulet, reported in October 1576 that a Parisian Catholic mob of around 1,500 “of the common people” had rained “insolencies” upon a crowd of Huguenots returning from a prayer meeting, throwing stones at them from the city ramparts. The mob had also carried women to a Catholic church, where they were “there constrained to kneele to images, and [made to] renounce their religion.” Although no lives were lost, there had been a moment of great “peril” when the portcullis of the city had closed, trapping the Huguenots on the bridge, whereby “they looked assuredly for a second massacre, and ... made their prayers to God.” Although the portcullis was raised at the insistence of the provost of merchants, this was said to have been “done so coldely that the furie of the people was ... emboldened to committ the like outrage at some other tyme.”\(^{202}\) By December 1576, English agents were negotiating a Protestant league with delegates of Navarre, Condé, and the Rochellois; William of Orange; the Swiss confederation; and the Elector Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse and other German princes.\(^{203}\)

To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this thesis, we might ask: what lasting impact did the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s have on English political culture and on the formation of Elizabeth’s foreign policy? Forms of official and unofficial Elizabethan correspondence suggest that the atrocity was seen by some of the queen’s most senior councillors as a harbinger of apocalypse in their own realm – a warning of what might happen if God’s wrath were not swiftly appeased. Lines of argument varied with respect to the secular and spiritual defences Elizabeth should adopt: while Mary Stewart’s execution was widely desired, opinions varied as to whether the queen should reform the English church, pursue an alliance with the Calvinist Scots, German Lutherans, or maintain her traditional friendship with Spain. Few, if any, appeared to place much trust in the maintenance of amity with France.

For her part, Elizabeth’s policy objectives appear to have been little swayed by the advices forwarded to her councillors, and she clearly ignored calls for Mary Stewart’s execution. To what extent she was persuaded by the various appeals for armed intervention abroad is impossible to answer. Although she considered pursuing a Scottish alliance in 1573 and abandoning the French alliance in 1574, the former ended with the collapse of Mar’s Anglophilic regency and the French amity was ultimately renewed. Nonetheless, Elizabeth retained a sense of Protestant solidarity: she aided the besieged Rochellois in a logistical and military capacity and, in the aftermath of the fourth civil war, promoted

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\(^{201}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/143, fol. 10\(^r\), copy of the exercise of religion in France. Oct. 1576.
\(^{202}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 35\(^r\), Dale and Paulet to Elizabeth, 13 Oct. 1576.
a coalition between the moderate Catholics, Huguenot leaders, William of Orange and the Elector Palatine. To a degree, she was aided by international circumstance: so long as the crown of France sought English amity (or at best, neutrality) to offset Spanish intervention, she could operate a Janus-faced policy of overt neutrality and covert engagement in both France and the Low Countries. Indeed, as chapters 5 and 7 will demonstrate, the St. Bartholomew’s day massacre clearly did not prompt the queen to simply abandon all thoughts of intervention in the latter.

What of the psychological impact of St. Bartholomew’s in the minds of English contemporaries? The responses of those with political and religious influence indicate that fears of massacre and mass violence – understood in starkly confessionalised terms, contributing to a sharply confessionalised worldview – shaped both élite attitudes to warfare abroad and perceptions of how the queen should defend her own realm. I turn now to address what forms of comment were expressed in the pamphlet literature of the period, both to draw some inferences about the means used to shape the wider, popular response and to assess whether there was any overlap or links with the tropes of the political correspondence outlined above.
Chapter 4. Coverage of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in Elizabethan print (1572-76)

How was the massacre represented in contemporary print? While French Huguenot émigrés and Swiss Calvinists commemorated the murdered as “les vrais Chrestiens,”¹ Catholic positions ranged from the condemnatory to the justificatory.² The chronicler François de Belleforest inspired particular controversy by arguing that the appearance of a spectacular supernova was the manifestation of divine pleasure at the deaths of “heretiques.”³

Just like the French, English contemporaries probably wondered: was the massacre an act of God or did its victims’ martyr-like suffering sanctify the Protestant cause? Many of Elizabeth’s subjects would have gained knowledge of the massacre from word of mouth directly or indirectly from Huguenot émigrés, and/or by reading early published accounts. Unfortunately, as Mark Greengrass has noted, there is little evidence of oral comment, which may be attributed to the fact that Huguenots survivors were either too traumatized to speak or unable to recall what had occurred (having been forced into hiding at the time).⁴ In contrast, there is a wealth of English print output in the massacre’s wake, although its historiographical coverage is patchy: while Sutherland’s book on the massacre remains one of the best studies of bias in European print, it does not evaluate the English pamphlet response.⁵ Dickens’s article on the Elizabethans and St. Bartholomew, with its declared focus on “the tastes and reactions of the middling groups of society,” pays little attention to the court-centric political significance of many items.⁶ More recently, Kingdon’s book has stressed the myth-making enterprise of the Calvinist propaganda, but includes only a short chapter on English works and their domestic significance.⁷

This chapter will address the following questions: what were the lines of argument put forth in English print, most (but not all) translated from Calvinist Ür-texts? Did they reflect any accurate understanding of what had actually occurred? Do their forms of language and ideological content correspond with those of the queen’s councillors? What may be inferred from the fact that several of

¹ Jean Ricaud [J. R. D. L.], Discours du massacre de ceux de la religion reformee, fait à Lyon, par les Catholiques Romains ... l’aïn 1572 (1574), sig. A3.
⁴ Greengrass, “Hidden transcripts.”
⁵ Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, Ch. XVII.
⁷ Kingdon, Myths about the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres.
the most controversial Calvinist tracts were not, apparently, translated into English? Can we trace direct links between the publications and the court – specifically, amongst Leicester’s circle?

1. The English polemical response (1572)

Elizabethan church leaders, and their Puritan detractors, both issued responses to the massacre in print, which they framed as a providential act of God sent to blazon the wickedness of his enemies and to highlight the need for Protestant spiritual reform (of one kind or another). Such rhetoric was shaped by ongoing ecclesiastical debates: following a push for reforms by the MP William Strickland in the parliament of 1571, another bill concerning rites and ceremonies had appeared in Elizabeth’s parliament of 1572. This proposed that English ministers, with episcopal approval, should be granted leave to ignore whole sections of the prayer book that they found offensive, but that the authorities might be allowed to persecute Catholics who deviated from it. Despite strong support from leading councillors such as Knollys, who urged its amendment in order not to incite the queen’s anger, Elizabeth halted the bill’s passage, claiming that she alone was responsible for defending the good Protestants of her church.

In light of this recent controversy, Parker’s revised form of common prayer, issued on 27 October, marked an attempt to unite the realm in prayer, warning that God had only temporarily “stayed” or spared England a similar fate to that of the massacred Huguenots. The text condemned those Catholic ‘heathens’ who had “laid Jerusalem in ruins”, calling upon the Lord to “inflict on our neighbors seven fold the disgrace they inflicted on you.” Such sentiments reiterated the need for English Protestant solidarity, echoing the forms of expression used by several statesmen in the massacre’s wake. But the text’s martial flavour also suggested a subtle divergence between Elizabeth’s ‘pacifying’ settlement and the more militant sympathies of some of her leading subjects. Significantly, the service included an allusion to the “Collect of the Letanie in the tyme of warre”, first issued in 1562 upon the outbreak of war with France around the time the queen survived a bout of smallpox. The Collect extolled Elizabeth as a most “peacable princesse... [whom God has] very often miraculoussly saved ... from sundry great perilles and daungers... wherewith nations rounde about us ... be moste greevoussly afflicted.” Its reappearance in 1572 arguably sought to analogise the situation with that of 1562 – framing Elizabeth as a princess favoured by God, but one who was also distinctly vulnerable to attack

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10 Church of England, *A fourme of common prayer to be used, and so commaundyd by auctoritie of the Queenes Maiestie, and necessarie for the present tyme and state*. 1572. 27. Octob. (London, Richard Jugg [1572]; STC 16511). The quotation from psalm 79 (Asaph’s psalm) is taken from the Bishops’ Bible of 1568 (STC 2099.2).
11 Cf. Ch. 3 of this thesis. Digges, p. 251, Leicester to Walsingham, 11 Sept. 1572; Digges, p. 262, Smith to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1572.
(i.e. that God’s favour was subject to withdrawal). The back-handed compliment was reinforced by the emblem of a pelican feeding its young (an allegory of the Passion), and flanked by classical figures of Prudence and Justice. The Collect’s ambivalent wording and uncertain tone may have worked to imply that, since reform of her church and a resolution to the unresolved succession was still necessary, it was only by God’s grace that Elizabeth’s realm would be saved from the afflictions of France.

Elizabeth’s ministers may have sought to reinforce this message to her subjects in other, more visual, ways. Gold and silver medals, struck around this time, were embossed on the reverse with the motto: “si dues nobiscum quia contra nos” [If God be with us, who be against us?]. The iconography of the medals’ design – referring to an episode in which St Paul threw a serpent into the fire after surviving a shipwreck – has traditionally been read as commemorating Elizabeth’s ‘miraculous’ recovery from the smallpox, suggesting that she suffered as little from the disease as St. Paul did from the venom of the snake. Yet the international context of the medals’ issuance in late 1572 is surely significant: appearing around the time that news of St. Bartholomew’s reached England, they would also have worked to promote a sense of Protestant solidarity amongst Englishmen.

Other of Elizabeth’s subjects used the fact of the massacre to justify their doubts about the resilience of the English church and to appeal for more radical religious reforms. Again, understanding the domestic background of these appeals is crucial with respect to evaluating the substance of their arguments. The evangelical manifesto, An admonition to the Parliament, was first printed before the close of the last session on 30 June 1572, calling for the eradication of quasi-Catholic abuses along Genevan lines. Despite the bishops’ best efforts, An admonition was published three times and spawned at least two sequels, furthering its appeals. Its suspected authors – John Field and Thomas Wilcox – were imprisoned in Newgate on 7 July, where they admitted planning to distribute the tract “in parliament time, which should be a time of speaking and writing freely, justly craving redress and reformation of many abuses.” Having attempted to refute the charges put forth by the Admonition in

14 Cf. my analysis of Thomas Drant’s sermons (STC 7172 and STC 7166) in Ch.2 of this thesis.
15 See appendix 14 of this thesis for a digital image of one of these gold medals struck in 1572.
17 Frere and Douglas (eds), Puritan Manifestoes, pp. xvii-xviii.
18 Field and Wilcox denied on 11 September that they had written the pamphlet in consultation with the Archbishop’s chaplain. However they had at this point been imprisoned for over two months in Newgate jail and were likely angling for release. See Hughes and Larkin (eds), Tudor royal proclamations, II, p. 375, fn. 2.
their own treatise (*A Viewe of the Churche*), the bishops’ response had prompted the publication of a new polemic containing a loaded reference to St. Bartholomew’s, discussed below.19

The concluding passage of this rejoinder, entitled *Certaine Articles collected and taken... by the Byshops ... with an answere to the same* (later incorporated into *A second admonition to the parliament* of 1572), demanded that Elizabeth’s church now join with its persecuted counterparts in opposing the “beast... of Rome.”20 It read: “Our brethren... stand so stoutly with their brethren,” sharing a “hatred of Antichriste, in this overfowling of the bloude of our brethren in Fraunce, which... lieth uppon the face of ... that cursed land.” Making common cause with the murdered Huguenots, the pamphlet suggested that Elizabeth’s bishops – and even the queen – were blind to divine will: “Geve them heartes O Lord, that they may forsee the day of their destruction, nayoure destruction... pluckle of [sic] the vaile of their understanding, that they be not taken in their sin, and we with them bee cutte of in thy displeasure.”21 Adopting the voice of the godly clergy – a universalised “we” – the text rebuked the English church for its faintly Romish practices and spiritual complacency. Unsurprisingly, both the *Certaine Articles*, *A second admonition*, and a subsequent polemic entitled *Exhortation to the byshops*, were banned by royal proclamation for working to incite “controversies, schisms, and other dissentions” at a time of profound political undercertainty.22

Yet there is evidence to suggest that the producers of these tracts had, at the very least, sympathisers at Elizabeth’s court. Despite the High Commission’s best efforts, it took over two years to track down the offending press, prompting Parker to complain to Burghley that London’s mayor and aldermen “are not willing to disclose this matter.”23 Field and Wilcox had petitioned leading privy councillors in order to secure their release: while interest was made on their behalf by Leicester, they also addressed an appeal to Burghley to ameliorate their condition.24 One or other may have championed their cause: although the two men were sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for breaching the licensing provision of the Act of Uniformity, their confinement was lenient.25 Moreover, when they had served only six months of their sentence, the privy council instructed Sandys to “bring them to conformity and thereupon to show them more favour,” before discharging them to the care of an archdeacon.26 Field and Wilcox subsequently petitioned both the privy council and Leicester to secure their final

19 There is no extant copy of *A Viewe of the Churche*. For the text of the *Certaine Articles collected and taken... by the Byshops out of a little Boke entituled An Admonition to the Parliament with an answere to the same* see Frere and Douglas (eds), *Puritan Manifestoes*, pp. 135-48.
20 ([Hemel Hempstead], 1572; STC 4713. See *Puritan Manifestoes*, p. 147 for this and following.
21 Ibid., p. 148.
22 (Hemel Hempstead, 1572); STC 10392). Hughes and Larkin (eds), *Tudor royal proclamations*, II, no. 597. Issued at Greenwich, 11 June 1573.
25 *Puritan Manifestoes*, xix.
26 *APC*, VIII, p. 90; *Puritan Manifestoes*, xix.
discharge, and before the close of 1573 were again at large and producing works of Protestant polemic.  

2. **Data on translated French tracts on St. Bartholomew’s and personnel involved in their English publication**

Besides the two domestic references to St. Bartholomew’s discussed above, a spate of pamphlets and longer works concerning the situation in France (and translated from French originals) were published in London in the wake of the massacre. My research has found that twenty-one titles from the period 1572-80 (fifteen from 1572-76; and six more from 1579-80) which refer to it in some way, although the fact that there are no surviving Stationers Registers for from July 1571 to July 1576, makes any tally relatively uncertain. Only four of the works published in England from 1572-76 appeared under a licensing rubric – i.e. “seene and allowed” or “cum privilegio” – indicating that press output was loosely regulated.

Of the fifteen editions of the thirteen separate works published between 1572-76, seven were English translations of French works; four were English translations of Latin originals; two were French-language Calvinist polemics; and two more were Latin editions of Hotman’s *De furoribus Gallicis*. The length of these texts varies considerably: from the eleven-page *Protestation* attributed to Francis, Duke of Anjou, to Jean de Serres’s more substantial 500-page *Commentaries*, a history of the wars in France and the Low Countries which drew heavily on pre-existing pamphlet sources. They may be loosely categorised as popular biographies, histories, polemical tracts, noble ‘defences’ and royal proclamations, with all demonstrating markedly Calvinist sympathies or working to induce support for the Huguenot cause. Those which address controversial aspects of Elizabeth’s rule tend to be more polemical in tone and contain more prefatory comment than the shorter political documents and manifestos (of around 6-28 pages). The underrepresentation of political documents (there being only

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27 Ibid., p. xx.
28 Cf. Dickens, “The Elizabethans and St. Bartholomew’s,” p. 54, which states that – including religious polemics with little or no direct coverage of the massacre itself – 38 works on France were published in England in the 1570s. Dickens’s tally, which includes religious works by Calvin and Beza, found 31 titles published on France generally in the 1560s and 38 in the 1570s, rising to 118 in the 1580s and falling to 64 in the 1590s.
29 STCs 13091, 22241, 22241.5, 22243. It should be noted that the last three of these were editions of weighty Serres’s *Commentaries* so, in effect, only two of the twenty-three print sources were formally approved for publication.
30 Titles and publication information in appendix 1 of this thesis.
31 STCs 7368, 7369, 13847, 13847.5, 13844, 13846, 10550, 22248, 10551.5. Note that most of these are multiple editions of the same text. In his article, “The Elizabethans and St. Bartholomew’s”, p. 56 Dickens largely overlooks the political/polemical distinction, dismissing the political works as an “ad nauseam” list of “historical documents.”
32 STCs 5039, 11311, 13091 and 18051.7 in Table 1. STC 11266 is the longer tract.
four published between 1572 and 1576)\textsuperscript{33} is in fact atypical for the period – by far the largest portion of works translated from French originals published over the period 1560-99 as a whole were translations of royal documents, particularly those of the later reign.\textsuperscript{34} Acknowledging that gaps in the source record may have skewed my data, I would nonetheless contend that print coverage on France in the 1570s was anomalous, with the more sensational works attracting the most interest.

- \textit{Absences in the Elizabethan print record}

There are absences in the English print record which suggest something of the vagaries of pamphlet preservation and/or the ideological skew of the record itself. Coligny’s “arrêt” of September 1569, was issued by the Paris parlement in 1572 and 1574, and published in eight languages, including Dutch (“Flament”), English and Scottish – suggesting that it was, at least in part, targeted at Protestant readerships. It proclaimed Coligny “giltie of traison,” and a “distourber and breaker of peace... and tranquilitie of the commonwealth: the Captain... of the rebellion, conspiracie and faction that hath bin made against the King and his State.”\textsuperscript{35} No traces of this publication survive in the Elizabethan record, which would tend to indicate that it was not widely read in English.

On the other hand, there is also a striking absence of zealously Calvinist “monarchomach” texts. Works of this genre, written by jurists and theorists, developed extreme theories of popular sovereignty, including justifications for royal deposition and regicide.\textsuperscript{36} They included Hotman’s spirited polemic, the \textit{Francogallia} of 1573/4; Théodore Beza’s, \textit{Du droit des magistrats} – an appeal for popular sovereignty so radical it was even censored in Geneva;\textsuperscript{37} and the compendia of materials associated with Simon Goulart (e.g. his 1576 \textit{Mémoires de l’Estat de France sous Charles neufiesme}). Internal evidence might help explain why the works, although anti-Marian and clearly part-aimed at an English readership, did not enjoy wide distribution in England.\textsuperscript{38} Two of the most famous, entitled

\textsuperscript{33} Appendix 1 of this thesis shows that four expressly political documents were published in the years 1572-76, including the anonymous \textit{A declaration of the needfulnesse of peace} (STC 11266); Anville’s declaration of 1575 (STC 18051.7); the defence of Francis, Duke of Alençon, for taking up arms (STC 11311); and Henry III’s peace edict of 1576 (STC 13091).

\textsuperscript{34} I have estimated that around 60-70\% of titles concerning France entered into the Stationers Registers were political documents of various natures.

\textsuperscript{35} Anon., \textit{Arrest de la Court de Parlement contre Gaspard de Colligny...} (Paris, 1569; repr. 1574) in Lindsay and Neu, \textit{French Political Pamphlets}, nos. 652, 653, 754.

\textsuperscript{36} The term was first used by the Englishman William Barclay in 1586, when Jean Hotman released a revised version of his father’s \textit{Francogallia} – which was, ironically, of a more conservative hue. See R. E. Giesey (ed.) and J. H. M. Salmon (trans.), \textit{Francogallia} (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 113, 115.

\textsuperscript{37} Théodore de Bèze, \textit{Du droit des magistrats sur leurs subjets, traité très nécessaire en ce temps, pour advertir de leur devoir, tant les magistrats que les subjets} (1575).

and the famous *Le Reveille matin des François*, included scabrous denunciations of the Elizabethan Church. Likewise, Goulart’s *Mémoires de l’Etat de France* also incorporated the *Reveille-matin*’s critique. Notwithstanding this, members of Leicester’s circle may have been familiar with such works, and William Camden was later to annotate a first edition of Hotman’s *Francogallia*.

- Protestant personnel involved in publication

While most tracts concerning France and St. Bartholomew’s were anonymously rendered into English, named translators included Thomas Timme, the Suffolk clergyman [Jean de Serres’s *Commentaries* (1574)]; Sir George Hart [Innocent Gentillet’s *A Declaration concerning the needfulnesse of peace to be made in France* (London, [1575])]; and Arthur Golding, uncle to the Earl of Oxford [The Lyfe of the most godly, valiant and noble Captaine ... Colignie Shatilion (1576)]. All of these men were committed Protestants, as exemplified in the wording of Hart’s preface to Gentillet’s work. Expressing a concern to “delight” his father Sir Percival, whom he wrote had “a special inclination to heare and reade the discourses of the frenche affayres,” Hart articulated a spirit of fledgling Protestant nationalism reflected in his father’s “earnest zeale towards all wise, worthy and virtuous proceedynges... to encrease... Gods glory & the profit of your countrey.”

Points of connection may be drawn between those personnel involved in the publication of French tracts, those involved in the enterprise of Dutch news, and Leicester’s circle (further explored below and in chapter 6 of this thesis). Hart, the son of a middle-ranking courtier, was brother-in-law to Sir Jerome Bowes, a servant of Leicester’s who would himself translate a work by Innocent Gentillet in 1579. Hart’s pamphlet was issued by Henry Bynneman, the printer of at least three editions of Hotman’s controversial *De furoribus Gallicis*, who also had links with Leicester and, perhaps by

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39 [Nicholas Barnaud], *Dialogue, auquel sont traitees plusieurs choses avenues aux Lutheriens & Huguenots de la France, ensemble certains points & aduis necessaires d’estre sceuz & suyuiz* (Basle, 1573). BL c.150. d16.
42 Discussed below, section 4.
43 BL shelfmark C.134.a.11, copy of the first Latin edition published in Cologne, featuring annotations in Camden’s hand.
44 As also noted by Dickens, “The Elizabethans and St. Bartholomew”, p. 55. Respectively, STCs 11271, 22242 and 22248.
45 STC 11266; unpaginated preface.
46 See: Ch. 6, section 2.
47 I. Gentillet, *An apology or defence for the Christians of Frau[n]ce which are of the eva[n]gelicall or reformed religion, for the satisfiting of such as wil not live in peace and concord with them* (London, 1579; STC 11742).
extension, Hotman père et fils. Bynneman produced two Latin editions of *De furoribus Gallicis* in 1573: while one is autographed as his own, the other (typographically identical) work appears under the false imprint of ‘Edinburgi.’ Aside from the anonymous French and English versions of the *De furoribus* (entitled *Discours simple & veritable des rages exercées, par la France* and *A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of Fraunce*), a third Latin edition was also incorporated into Bynneman’s 1576 edition of Jean de Serres’s *Commentaries*, a work which was granted royal privilege. Occasionally, works concerning the French wars directly referenced and/or were bound up works concerning the revolt in the Low Countries. For example, the 1576 English edition of Jean de Serres’s, *The fourth parte of Comentaries of the ciuill warres in Fraunce, and of the love countrie of Flaunders*, translated by Timme, was issued with an English translation of William of Orange’s *A supplication to the Kinges Maiestie of Spayne* (first published in English in 1573), dedicated to Warwick.

3. **Features of Elizabethan tracts on France (1572-76)**

   i) **Nomenclature**

   The forms of language Elizabethan pamphlets and tracts used to describe the bloody events of August 1572 is highly significant. Appearing shortly after a report of the Huguenot scholar Hugues Sureau’s abjuration – which included a statement that God had ordained the killings in order to punish all Protestants – the most popular account of the 1570s was Hotman’s tract on the “furious outrages of France.” Published in numerous editions over the decade (and incorporated into the fourth part of Jean de Serres’ *Commentaries*), it cast the killings in Paris as the explosive outcome of both evil policy-makers at the French court and simmering undercurrents of popular savagery. This and other accounts, which tend to refer to massacre as a ‘cruel’ or ‘savage’ ‘spectacle’, demonstrate little concrete understanding of how and why such a large range of victims were targeted.

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48 Discussed below, 3: vi.
49 Kingdon, *Myths*, index of published sources. As Kingdon notes, the vernacular editions of Hotman’s work typically cited false addresses. STC 13844 is a Latin edition, most likely the work of T. Guérin in Basle (although it bears an Edinburgh imprint). Another Latin edition of 1573 (STC 13845) which cites Edinburgh as the place of publication is most likely Bynneman’s. A still later version (STC 13846) has A1-8 reprinted and O2 reimposed to omit mention of Bynneman on its title-page and colophon.
50 See McKerrow (ed.) *A Dictionary of Printers and Booksellers*, pp. 59-60. STC #s for the many editions of Hotman’s works are 13845, 13646 and 13847; STC 22243 is a translation of the fourth part of Jean de Serres’s *Commentaries*.
52 Anon., *A lamentable discourse of the fall of Hughe Sureau*, STC 7369.
53 STC 13846, 13847 and 13847.5.
54 Jean de Serres, *Commentaries* (STC 22242), sigs. H2* refers directly to Hotman’s tract.
55 Cf. section 3. iv of this thesis below.
The earliest English printed reference to a “massacre” dates to late 1576, with the publication of an account of the Sack of Antwerp. But its earliest attribution to events in Paris dates to 1578, with the Scottish chronicler Robert Lindsay’s allusion to “the grytt murther and messecar of Paris.” This lack of consensus over nomenclature is in line with political correspondence of the period which – notwithstanding early usage of the term “massacre” by French-speaking politicians such as Burghley and Dale – suggest that little was understood of the dynamics of religiously-motivated mass murder. Greater emphasis was thus placed on the causative role played by powerful individuals who – it was thought – must have used their authority to compel others to commit widespread slaughter. All of the Elizabethan pamphlets claim that the massacre was, in one way or another, premeditated. This sets the English print record apart from that of other nations – specifically Germany and Italy – which saw some pamphleteers deny this was the case.

ii) Establishing causation: the massacre as factional power–struggle, assisted by Spain

Prior to the publication of Hotman’s *De furoribus Gallicis*, the French crown had largely escaped censure in English print: with blame for the realm’s wars falling on the ultramontane nobility, notably the Guises, in works such as *A true report of all the doynges at the assembly at Poyssy* (London, 1561?) and *The destruction and sackle cruely committed by the Duke of Guyse and his company, in ...Vassy* (London, 1562). These and other works stated that Francis of Guise (1519-63) had mustered troops to invade Scotland in 1543; that he and his brother had counselled Henry II to exploit England’s internal weakness; that the two had dominated Francis II’s council (r.1558-1560) during the young king’s minority; and that the Guisians were continually seeking to advance their niece, Mary Stewart, to the throne of England; all with the express purpose of advancing their own dynasty. Charges of self-aggrandisement were, of course, in line with a tradition of blaming statesmen for acts which shamed a sovereign: as noted earlier, Henry III would later censured his ministers for his own dishonourable acts. But the prominence of the Guises in Elizabethan print is significant, and did not just originate with Charles IX’s proclamation of 28 August declaring their causative role in the massacre (a charge which the king, in any case, later retracted: as Hotman made

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56 [George Gascoigne], *The Spyole of Antwerpe* (STC 11644), Sig. A3’. Discussed in Ch. 7 of this thesis.
58 See Ch. 3, 3 of this thesis.
60 STC 11312.
61 MacCaffrey, *Before the Armada*, pp. 152, 168, 173, 190 and 196 on Guisian opportunism; pp. 250, 255-56, 262, 264-67, 309, 316 and 322 on their influence over François II; the duke’s assassination and their subsequent collapse; and renewed influence under Charles IX.
explicitly clear in his account of the atrocity). The weight of English anti-Guisian material — including lost ballads such as *Ho Guyse the chefe of that gredy garyson; A Warnynge to Englonde*; and *A Complante agaynste the barberus tyranny executed in Fraunce*— suggests that Elizabethans already had a particularly well-established literary tradition of this sort in the 1560s, well before the massacre itself.

This anti-Guisian undercurrent, now cross-cut with new charges of cruelty and self-interest levelled against the royal family, only strengthened in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s. The various editions of Hotman’s account insisted upon the culpability of a Guisian-led, ultra-Catholic faction at court, claiming that the Cardinal of Lorraine “was the very forger of all the former warres” and, that he and his brother should be held accountable for the bloody events that followed. The text also mis-attributed the cause of the Bourbon/Châtillon-Guise vendetta to the old duke’s plans to exercise joint sovereignty of Sicily and Naples with Henry II, a proposal which it claims triggered the Franco-Spanish war of the 1550s.

Hotman’s condemnation was also directed against a pro-Spanish clique, “well known to have ben at all times most affectionate to the Kyng of Spayne,” who demonstrated their “traitorous infidelitie” by accepting pensions from Philip’s ambassador (a situation of which the English privy council was well aware). The nucleus of this pro-Spanish clique – including Retz, Anjou, Gonzague and Tavannes – were held to have met at the Tuileries palace on the afternoon of Saturday 23 August, where, under Catherine de’ Medici’s instruction, they planned a Protestant massacre. The pamphlet records Catherine’s rousing speech as follows:

> Those whome they had long bene in waite for, were nowe sure in hold, and the Admirall lay in his bed maimed ... and could not stirre, the King of Navarre and Prince of Conde were fast lodged in the castle ... the captaines thus taken, it was not to be feared that any of the Religion woulde from thenceforth stirre any more. Now was a notable opportunitie (said she) offred to dispatch the matter.

While the parenthetical comment evoked the immediacy of an eyewitness account, the author’s terse comment that “the Queenes opinion was allowed” implied that the king himself consented to the killing of every Huguenot in Paris. Catherine is shown to have claimed that only sufficient opportunity (i.e. to entrap those whom “they had long bene in waite for”) had prevented it from

63 See king’s letters to governor of Burgundy of 24 August, and his retraction of 28 August, appended to STCs 13844, 13846 and 13847.
65 STC 13846, fol. xxv. STC 13847, fol. xxvii.
66 STC 13847, fols xv-xvi. Cf. TNA: PRO, SP 70/132, fol. 70r. Private memorial to North touching his charge, 5 Oct. 1574, discussed in Ch. 3.
67 Cf. Sutherland, *Massacre of St. Bartholomew*, p. 314, which notes that rumours of this Tuileries meeting have since formed the basis for most arguments involving premeditation.
68 STC 13847, fol. xlix.
occurring sooner. This belief in an “entrapment” was clearly shared by some in Burghley’s network – with Killigrew having reported that the Huguenots in Paris had been deliberately “attrapped and murdered.”⁶⁹ The premeditation idea was clearly influential for, following Hotman, Camden wrote that the massacre was premeditated as far back as 1565,⁷⁰ writing in his history of Elizabeth’s reign that “Alva in the Netherlands and the Guises in France had begun to put into execution their designs laid at Bayonne for the extirpation of the Protestant religion.”⁷¹ Although Catherine and Alba’s interview at Bayonne had not in fact resulted in any agreement to eliminate Protestantism, it clearly assumed mythic proportions in the minds of Protestant commentators.⁷²

Likewise, the 1575 pamphlet *A Mervaylous discourse upon the lyfe, deedes and behaviours of Katherine de Medicis* cast Catherine in the role of arch-villain. The text stated that – despite having visited the wounded Coligny on 23 August to offer him comfort – she had “causeth him to bee killed outright [the following day], and not him onely, but so many more of the Protestantes” who had been “enrowled” in the vicinity for this purpose.⁷³ This assertion of Catherine’s guilt endorsed Hotman’s claim that Huguenot lords had been been corralled into the quartier of Coligny’s lodgings in order to murder them.⁷⁴ Quite how Catherine triggered the popular massacre is not specified and the description of the massacre itself barely covers three pages: it reads as a rushed summary by one who did not witness events and whose main purpose was to condemn and vilify the queen mother.⁷⁵

In contrast to Hotman’s pamphlet, *A Mervaylous discourse* exonerated the Duke of Guise of all involvement in the massacre, in line with the claims of one English informant that “Guise himself [was] not so bloody, neither did he kill any man himself, but saved divers.”⁷⁶ Although the text did not state directly that Guise saved lives, it claimed that he had remonstrated with Charles IX to let him duel honourably with Coligny (a means to resolve the blood feud initiated by the assassination of his father). Guise was also portrayed as having been aware of the massacre’s true cause, seeing that “religion was no longer the occasion” but rather, Catherine de’ Medici’s overweening ambition, which sought “to bring the whole [French] nobilitie to destruction.”⁷⁷

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⁶⁹ BL Harleian MS 289, fol. 149r. “Instructions given to Henry Killegrew touching the Troubles in Scotland; being sent theither immediately after the greate Murdres in France”, Aug. 1572.
⁷³ Cf. STC 13847, fols xlvii-xlvi.
⁷⁴ Ibid., fols 100-103.
⁷⁵ Ibid., fols 134-135.
⁷⁶ TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 50r, “Report of St. Bartholomew’s”, Sept. 1572.
⁷⁷ Ibid., fols 134-135.
Later pamphlets published in English continued to rehearse charges that Catherine, and her cronies in the pay of the papacy and the crown of Spain, were responsible for the massacre. These include *A Declaration of the Protestation of ... Mareschal d’Anville*, a manifesto published in 1575 aimed at raising English Protestant and German Lutheran support for the Huguenot army, and *The lyfe of... Colignie* (1576), a hagiographic portrait of the admiral likely inspired by similar motives. The wording of *A Declaration* – which denied that the massacre had been inspired in any way by Catholic religious convictions – repeatedly referred to France’s internal collapse following Henry II’s death, when “strangers” who had “possessed” both Charles IX and Henry III, managed to provoke popular turmoil through “the pretense and controversie of Religion.” These unnamed foreigners were accused of a list of indiscriminate crimes, including “raysings of tumults ... defilinges of women... burninges, sackings, and other haynous doynges,” and “that cruel barbarous, and unnatural murder of the more part of the nobilitie of Fraunce.” Through his avoidance of confessional language, the author of the pamphlet managed to imply that the massacre was the outcome of political usurpation. Yet he still concluded his tract with the powerful Calvinist apostrophe that “the blood of our brethren crieth out of the earth” – suggesting that the Lutheran, English and Calvinist churches were ideologically unified and committed to defending one another’s interests. *The lyfe of... Colignie* scapegoated the Guises, specifically, for their “secret practises, too stirre up the commons of Paris” against the Huguenots and for their secret dealings with Alba and Philip II. Coligny was said to have told Charles IX “a strawe can scarce be stirred in your secret counsel, nor any voice bee uttered there, but it is by and by caryed too the Duke of Alva.”

### iii) Representations of Coligny’s death: the massacre as Protestant martyrdom

Many of the Elizabethan pamphlets concerning the massacre attributed almost as much significance to the manner of Coligny’s death as to the fact of the massacre itself. Some readers were no doubt already aware of the admiral’s factional quarrel with Guise: as early as the winter of 1571 it had been rumoured in London that the duke and his brother were amassing their own troops to regain control over the crown and to jeopardise Coligny’s invasion plan for the Low Countries. Hotman’s tract attempted to defend Coligny from the dishonourable charge of warmongering, claiming that, persuaded by the king’s party, “the Admirall suffered him selfe to be drawne to the sayd purposes for the low countrey, although ... he used to say... that he greatly suspected the rolling wit of that woman

78 (London, 1575; STC 10851.7), sigs. A², A²v.  
79 Ibid., sigs. A¹-A². See also A³ and A⁴, where similar charges are repeated.  
80 Ibid., sig. B3.  
81 STC 22248, sigs. C3 and G4, italics in original.  
82 A variety of tracts focussed on Coligny’s death were published in Latin, German, French and Italian. These proved particularly popular with German Lutherans and Swiss Calvinists, see Kingdon, *Myths about the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres*.  
83 Ibid., pp. 193-94; Cf. STC 13847, fol. xiii.
[the queen mother]. For (said he) so soon as she hath brought us into that preparation against the
lowe country, she will leave us in the midst.\textsuperscript{84} Although the invasion scheme was thus associated
with Catherine de’ Medici, the text elsewhere claimed that Charles IX had fomented the idea.\textsuperscript{85} As
Nicola Sutherland has shown, this attempt to distance Coligny from the war was woefully inaccurate,
serving to whitewash the admiral from all responsibility and to present him as a dutiful subject.\textsuperscript{86}

Nonetheless, such claims allowed Calvinist pamphleteers to represent Coligny’s death as both an
unjustified murder and a form of martyrdom. \textit{The lyfe of the most godly... Colignie}, which drew on the
testimony of Coligny’s personal chaplain, Merlin, to expand the account of his sufferings offered in \textit{A
true and plaine report}, took pains to edify its subject.\textsuperscript{87} Coligny was shown to have amazed
contemporaries with his “stayednesse, mildnesse and wonderfull zelowsenesse in following the
religion”\textsuperscript{88} – a “stayednesse” which he demonstrated while enduring, on 22 August, three attempts to
sever his “broozed finger” with blunt scissors and lance the sides of his arm. (These claims are partly
borne out by Faunt’s newsletter to Burghley, which noted that the admiral had borne his sufferings
with “a reasonable good countenance.”)\textsuperscript{89} Hotman’s description of the admiral’s exceptional serenity
sought to bear witness to the justice of his cause as, following the brutal amputation of his finger, he
was recorded as claiming: God had “voutsafed ... to lay somme crosse upon mee for his moste holie
names sake.”\textsuperscript{90} Suggesting striking parallels between Coligny’s sufferings and Christ’s own,\textsuperscript{91} the text
drew obvious martyrological parallels with the victims of ‘papist’ persecutions described in Coverdale
and Foxe’s works.\textsuperscript{92}

Other descriptions of Coligny’s murder, including Hotman’s account, stressed that the admiral’s party
put up little or no resistance to their fate (a contention also borne out by eyewitness accounts.)\textsuperscript{93} This
would have worked to imply that their beliefs rendered them even more accepting of “martyrdom”:
seen as a mimesis of Christ’s own suffering.\textsuperscript{94} \textit{A true and plaine report} cast Coligny’s death in this
vein, noting: “he sayd that he was readie with most willing hearte to render into the hands of God...

\textsuperscript{84} STC 13847, fol. xviii-xix.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., fol. xiii.
\textsuperscript{86} Sutherland, \textit{Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s}, ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{87} STC 22248, sigs. H5\textsuperscript{v} and H8\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., sig. H3\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{89} TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 133\textsuperscript{r}. Faunt to Burghley, 22 Aug. 1572.
\textsuperscript{90} STC 22248, sig. G.
\textsuperscript{92} Miles Coverdale, \textit{Certain most godly, fruitful, and comfortable letters of such true saints and holy martyrs of
God...} (London: J. Day, 1564; STC 3886); John Foxe, \textit{The First Volume of the Ecclesiastical History
contaeyning the Acts and Monuments of thynge passed in every kynge time in this Realme} (London, 1563;
1570 and 1576). Hereafter: \textit{A&M}.
\textsuperscript{93} STC 13847, fol. xxv-xxvii; A. Dufour “Discourse dedicated to S. Giorgio Aldonbrandini”, Ch. 6 in Soman
\textsuperscript{94} The former contention is made by Koenigsberger in the introduction to Soman (ed.), \textit{St. Bartholomew}, p. 10. On
martyrdom as a form of “imitatio Christi” see Kelley, “Martyrs, Myths and Massacre”, p. 1328.
the spirit that he had lent him to use for a time,” adding that “this violent crueltie was prepared not so much for his destruction, as for the dishonoring of Christ and the tormenting of so many Churches.”

The text later claimed that the admiral’s body was defenestrated upon Guise’s orders and exposed as a martyr’s of old: after the head had been severed (and purportedly sent to Rome “preserved with spices”), the hands and genitals were torn off by the raging mob.

The fact that Foxe would recount these very depredations in his *Actes and Monuments* (including the comment that “the savadge people raging ... cut of his armes and privy members”) testifies to the abiding influence of Hotman’s text. But it was not the only one. Jean de Serres’ *Commentaries* was also clearly influential as it, too, extolled the dead as martyrs (“by warre, and by other meanes, [the Huguenots] have become true martyrs, and by the fraude and deceyte of the Antichristian Guyses, are dayly martyred.”) It is significant that Timme, who translated Serres’ tract, may have had links with Foxe: Timme’s dedicatory epistle commended Foxe as “oure Countrey man, (whose godly labour hath deserved great commendation).” Foxe would later cite Timme’s translation of the *Commentaries*, repeating the claim that over 30,000 Huguenots had been slain in the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, and including a treatment of the abuses inflicted on Coligny’s corpse. Both borrowings confirm that Foxe consulted both Hotman’s and Timme’s accounts, and that there was an ongoing overlap between Calvinist pamphleteering and English martyrrological literature.

The humiliating exposure of Coligny’s body to rot and ridicule was also a central feature of at least two English pamphlets. While *A true and plaine report* recorded that his remains were displayed at Montfaucon – “the Admirals body ... hanged up by the heeles uppon the common gallowes of Paris” – *A Mervaylous discourse* claimed that Catherine had exclaimed: “what a beautifull spectacle this was, for so noble princes to behould.” This concern with murder as “spectacle” worked to reiterate the martyrrological status of Coligny and other victims, and to entirely discredit the French Catholic cause. *A true and plaine report* recorded that Catherine had led her sons and Navarre to witness the humiliating “spectacle” of Briquemault and Cavaigne’s executions, before which the two lords were ordered to request pardon from the king. An uncontrite Briquemault was then hanged beside an effigy of Coligny, “after a preposterous order of lawe, wherby the Admirall was first

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95 See STC 13847, liii-lv.
96 Ibid., lv-lviii.
97 *A&M* (1583), XII, p. 2152.
99 Ibid., sig. A2.
100 *A&M* (1583), XII, fol. 2152, marginal notation.
101 Ibid., fol. 2151.
102 STC 13847, lxxvii.
103 STC 10550, p. 102.
104 STC 13847, lxxx.
slayne.” Such charges were clearly intended to leave English readers with a sense of moral outrage, comparable to that shared by members of Elizabeth’s privy council. As noted in chapter 3, Cecil had recorded a copy of Briquevaught and Cavaigne’s sentences in his own papers and the privy council had been sent verse reports of their deaths transcribed from the polemic Epicedia illustri heroi Caspari Colignio... beato Christi martyri.

**iv) Representations of the wider massacre: the massacre as mob violence**

References to the targets, motives and nature of popular violence committed during the massacre appeared in all Elizabethan accounts published between 1572 and 1576. But those tracts published before 1576 typically did not dwell on the most gruesome acts (beyond noting the near-bestial savagery of the mob). This raises certain questions: how detailed was the information reaching English readers, and what might the content of such accounts reveal about representations of the massacre in general and the purpose of the publications?

In a rare allusion to the civilian participants in the massacre, A Mervaylous discourse referred to the motives of the “rascalls of the citie, moved partly by ... those, who cryed that the Protestantes would have murdered the Kinge & his brethren” and partly by “hope of the spoyle.” This supports Hotman’s assertion that “common labourers and porters, and other of the most rascals of the people and desperate villaines, to have the spoile of their clothes, striped the dead bodies starke naked & threw them into the river of Seane.” Both allusions to opportunistic “rascals” may endorse the historian Janine Estèbe’s claim that participants in Paris were mostly plebeian, contradicting Natalie Zamon Davis’s argument that a cross-section of urban society was involved. Alternatively, they may evidence a rather chauvinist desire by the learned Hotman to reduce all participants to the status of natural criminals – an allegation no doubt in keeping with contemporary English ideas about the base motivations of common murderers.

Seeming to support Estèbe’s thesis that social antagonisms were at work, the text of A true and plaine report implied that social tensions were to blame. Claiming that the popular massacre stemmed from the savage impulses of the lower orders, rather than from long-simmering social or religious
tensions, it highlighted the unusually chaotic nature of the killings, repeatedly referring to the indiscriminate violence of the “mob” or “multitude.” It also claimed that even those “zelously given” to Catholicism “detest[ed] that crueltie, and judged that not men but outrageous savage beastes in shape of men” were responsible.\footnote{STC 13847, lix; lxxxii.} Similarly, \textit{A Mervaylous discourse} downplayed religious ideology as a causative factor by claiming that perpetrators showed no regard for the “nature, age, qualitie, vocation, or religion” of their victims.\footnote{STC 10550, p. 103.} The text noted that the killers were motivated by various triggers, being stirred “partly by the example of those, who cryed that the Protestantes would have murdered the kinge & his brethren, partly also by hope of the spoyle.”\footnote{Compare this passage with STC 13847, lix.} This assertion is supported by Barbara Diefendorf’s findings that many participants genuinely believed that Charles IX had commanded the destruction of his enemies: Guise’s declaration when leaving Coligny’s lodgings that “it is the King’s command” was therefore interpreted as an injunction to kill all the Huguenots in France.\footnote{Diefendorf, \textit{Beneath the Cross}, p. 99.} \textit{A Mervaylous discourse} was also accurate in informing readers that victims included noblemen of both faiths, including the lords of Villemaur and Rouaillart, “well known for earnest Catholickes, although enemies to all crueltie.”\footnote{STC 10550, p. 103.}

On the other hand, Hotman’s text supplied a passing reflection on specific ideological tensions that may have fuelled the violence:

\begin{quote}
For in as much as the same towne is above all other given to superstitions and is with seditious preachings of Monks and Friers dayly enflamed to crueltie, it is hard to expresse how bitterly they hated the Admirall and the professors of that Religion. Wherto was added a griefe of their mind conceived certain dayes before, by reason of ... [the] Gastignes crosse, whiche the Admirall with great earnest sute obtayned of the King to be overthrowne... [as] \textit{a monumente of civill dissention}.\footnote{Ibid., xxix-xxx. Italics in original.}
\end{quote}

This passage telescopes time, referring to the outrage sparked “certain dayes before” over the removal of the Gastines cross, which had in fact occurred back in December 1571.\footnote{Diefendorf, \textit{Beneath the Cross}, pp. 85-88.} But the author’s allusion to the “seditious preachings of Monks and Friers” accurately invoked the incendiary sermons of pastors such as Simon Vigor, who had criticized Charles’s official policy of toleration, and who had disseminated confessional hatred among the wider populace.\footnote{Diefendorf, “Prologue to a massacre, popular unrest in Paris, 1559-1572”, \textit{op. cit.; Idem., “Simon Vigor, a Radical Preacher in Sixteenth-Century Paris”, Sixteenth Century Journal,} 18 (1987), 399-410; \textit{Idem., Beneath the Cross,} Ch. 6.}

It would seem that, far from presenting a coherent view of the causes of the popular massacre, Elizabethan pamphlets presented a number of contradictory interpretations, in which religion was an
important, but not necessarily the primary, factor. This is in accord with the general confusion expressed by those higher up the political order, as Burghley had indicated in his reference to a “variety of reports” produced in the massacre’s immediate aftermath, which appeared to point to factional, political, as well as religious motives for the atrocity. Yet it also indicates an attempt by French pamphleteers and their translators to appeal for English Protestant support on broadly moral, as much as strictly confessional, grounds: a consideration that was also put forth in the translated Dutch pamphleteering of the period (discussed in chapter 6).

v) Catherine de’ Medici and the Italians: the massacre as Machiavellian conspiracy

Besides their obvious martyrological subtext, the pamphlets on the massacre reveal strands of distinctly anti-Italian, anti-Florentine, and specifically anti-Machiavellian sentiments, largely in line with those xenophobic comments shared by the English élite. In printed form, much of these comments centre on the dealings of Catherine de’ Medici, cast as the figurehead of a group of “Italogalles” who had shattered natural order in France.

Acting as a kind of thematic Ür-text, Hotman’s *A true and plaine report* called attention to the Catholic, and largely Italian, leadership of the royal militia, highlighting an association between its Italian commander “Gonzague” – Gonzaga of Mantua – and the queen mother. Disapproving of the indulgent celebrations held in the wake of the Valois marriage, cast as “madnesses of the Court,” the author noted that since Catherine’s arrival in France “many doe commonly call [the realm] Fraunce-Italian... some ... a Colonie, and some a common sincke of Italie.” Hotman was perhaps motivated by personal grievance: in his letters he complained of ill-treatment at the hands of the *fuorusciti* (the exiled “Frenchified Italians”) who monopolised lucrative offices such as tax collection. Nonetheless, within an English context, the condemnatory tone of his pamphlet doubtlessly helped to strengthen English perceptions of Catherine (the niece of a pope) and her Italian officers as moral degenerates.

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121 Digges, p. 250. Burghley to Walsingham, 19 Sept. 1572.
122 See Ch. 3, section 3 of this thesis.
123 Besides *A true and plaine report* (STC 13847) and the anonymous *A Mervaylous discourse* (STC 10550), discussed below, an anti-Italian prejudice is more fully articulated in Hotman’s *Francogallia* (Cologne, 1574) which attacks the established Italian theory of French origins. There is no evidence that this was published in English translation until 1711. Other Calvinist pamphlets such as *Le Reveille-Matin des François, et de leurs voisins* (1574); Innocent Gentillet’s *Brieve remonstrance à la noblesse de France* and *Anti-Machiavel* (1576); and the anonymous *La France-Turquie* (1576), reiterated the argument that France’s troubles were to be blamed on Catherine’s Italian councillors.
124 STC 13847, fols xxxvii, xxxix.
Specifically, Hotman’s pamphlet called attention to the callousness of the Lyonnais Catholics, here represented as either Italians or Italianized Frenchmen. Attacking the city governor and townsmen for their sadistic behaviour, the text analogised the latter in terms of cruelty to “the Italians, of whom by reason of the marte there is great store” who “did such spites as they could to these heapes of [Protestant] carcases.” It then condemned the “abominable crueltie” of certain butchers who extracted fat from the most corpulent victims, which was sold to apothecaries “to make certaine special medicines of mans greace.” This charge carries a strong suggestion of diabolism and echoes a belief in plague-spreading shared by many in 16th century Geneva, where Hotman had taken refuge. Indeed, the author’s reference to ungents made from human lipids is particularly redolent of the kind supposedly used by Swiss engraisseurs. Although the Lyonnais apothecaries were not explicitly identified as Italian, the pamphlet elided a distinction between these and other desecrations committed by nameless “strangers” in Lyons. This association is strengthened by the fact that the maleficent apothecary’s craft was elsewhere linked to one prominent Italian: the queen mother’s perfumer, René Bianchi, ‘le Florentin’, being accused of killing the Protestant queen Joan of Navarre by means of some poisoned gloves (“dressed by ... Renat the Kings Apothicarie an Italian.”)

Elizabethan tracts of 1575-76 which reference the massacre also reworked Hotman’s charge that Italians were to blame for France’s civil wars. Besides allusions to foreigners who have destroyed the country’s wealth and stability, the text of *A declaration of the protestation of Monseigneur the Mareschal d’Anuille* specifically condemned Chancellor “Birague, a Millanois” for abetting many “murders, slaughters, and traitorous outrages” by means of his position. Although the pamphlet also mentioned foreign mercenaries (“Suyssers, Reitters, and Piedmontois”) employed by the crown, it reserved particular scorn for Franco-Italian courtiers and favourites such as the “Mareschal of Gondy, a straunger” (Albert de Gondi, comte de Retz) in command of the king’s army in Provence. Likewise, the 1576 *The Lyfe of... Colignie* betrays an Italophobic bias. This account of Coligny’s political career records the sacking of his family seat at Châtillon by Martinengo, a courtier sent to arrest him for treason in September 1569. The author recounted that at the end of the third war in 1570, Coligny warned Charles IX to beware the “Cardinalls and Italians, which bare too much sway in his court” for such “straungers” would never rue the miseries of native Frenchmen. Other

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126 The author had lived in Lyons from 1547-48 and likely maintained contacts there. See entry for François Hotman in H. Chisholm (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (London, 1911).
127 STC 13847, fol. lxxxiii.
128 Ibid., fol. lxxxi.
130 STC 13847, fol. xxxv. ‘Renat’ is also accused of having attempted to poison Condé upon Catherine’s orders, a claim that reappeared in *A Mervaylous discourse*, p. 104.
131 STC 18051.7, sig. [A4'].
132 Ibid., sig. B2'.
references to the “extreme... madness of the Italians... about the King” stressed the influence of a favoured clique, who advised Charles to premeditate the murder of “two hundred thousand” Huguenots. Even the language used – the clinical allusion to “dispatching” the victims – recalled the phrasing Hotman attributed to the queen mother, thereby portraying the massacre as Medician assassination on a grand scale.

Coverage of the massacre may well have exaggerated a latent anti-Florentine bias in English culture. The 1575 tract *A Mervaylous discourse* contends that the queen mother’s kinsman, Pope Clement VII, boasted of having “given to the French such a wife, as should sooner procure troble unto their own estate.” Likewise, it also claimed that Leo X verified “[Machiavelli’s] aphorisme, that he must pretend virtue and meane nothing lesse” to secure papal election, suggesting that Catherine had used a “vizerd” and “maske of religion” to disguise her true aim of exterminating the French nobility. The pamphlet noted that she had used the massacre to fuel dynastic discord between the Montmorencis and the Guises: another “practise” she had learned of “Machiavellistes.” These sensational charges were clearly deemed a step too far for the French ambassador was ordered to file an official complaint in Geneva. But there is no evidence that anything was done to repress the tract in England, where it attracted the attention of the Earl of Bedford.

English pamphlets of 1572-76 thus seem to have disseminated a libellous portrait of Catherine de’ Medici amongst Elizabethan readers, notwithstanding the fact that there was little evidence to suggest that she was the massacre’s primary architect. For their part, French Catholic sources emphasized the loyalty of those Italian courtiers – including Birague and Retz – throughout years of civil upheaval. Yet the tone of the Elizabethan pamphlets was almost uniformly condemnatory – unsurprising given that Machiavelli, from at least 1576 onwards, was attacked in English print and held to exemplify all that was wrong with the tyrannous, personal ambition of the French court.

133 STC 22248, sig. E4r-E6v.
134 Cf. STC 13847, fol. xlix.
135 STC 10550, pp. 12-13; p. 25.
136 STC 10550, pp. 10-12, 131.
137 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
139 St. Clare Byrne and Thomson (eds), “My Lord’s Books”, Inventory, pp. 12-21. “Ye liefe and deeds of Katheren de Medicis Q. mother” was listed between “A dialogue between a gent. & a popish priest” (STC 1039) and “A confession of ye faythe by consent of many divers reformed churches” (STC 23554).
4. Appeals in print for Elizabeth to act as Fidei Defensor: the Leicester connection

From 1572 to 1576, there was at least one Scottish text and four English works which, by means of their wording and context of publication, suggest an Elizabethan court-backed drive to raise support for a confessionally-grounded military alliance with Scotland and for military intervention on behalf of foreign Protestants.

As argued in chapter 3, there was a push to promote an Anglo-Scottish Protestant alliance in the autumn of 1572 led by Burghley and Leicester’s networks. Calls for an alliance were also expressed in a Scots ballad dated 1572, supposedly “set out by ane Fugitive Scottisman [the Calvinist Robert Sempill] that fled out of Paris at this lait Murther” and printed by Robert Lekprevik in St. Andrews. Lekprevik had been appointed King’s Printer on 14 January 1568. Although he seems to have lost his official status by 30 July 1572, he maintained links with both the new Protestant regime and its English contacts (issuing a proclamation made in James VI’s name on 30 October at St. Andrews; another by the English commander Sir William Drury soon after; and a copy of the Scots National Covenant of 1581). The text of his 1572 ballad demonised Catherine de’ Medici and all Italians as “Tyrannis, and tressonabill Tratoris,” repeatedly praising Elizabeth and calling for God’s protection upon her. One passage apostrophised “wyse Quene Elizabeth,” exhorting her to “luik to your self” by rejecting all friendship with Catholic states and reviving her military defences: “Dispite them, and wryte thame, ane bill of defiance, / The papistis and Spanyards... Beleve thay to land heir, and get us fornocht, / will ye do as we do, it salbe deir bocht.”

Like the Scots ballad, which may have been circulated in England, there were also calls in English print for the queen to confessionally foreign policy. The preface to the 1573 English edition of Hotman’s De furoribus Gallicis (entitled A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of Fraunce) presented the massacre as a dire forewarning, stressing that Elizabeth must sustain aid to fellow Protestants – in particular, the Scottish Calvinists – if she was to obtain their “succor” in return – by implication, should Mary Stuart conspire to dethrone her. The anonymous preface-writer’s disparaging allusions to contemporary chroniclers – including the Italian humanist Paolo Giovio; the historiographer François de Belleforest; and the unidentifiable “Pardine” – were weakly justified by the excuse that their works “contain matter expressly to the sclander of state and princes.” Although Elizabeth was here extolled as “the chiefe staye of Gods Churches” she was also held to the workings

\[143\] See Ch. 3, section 5 of this thesis.
\[144\] Robert Sempill, *Ane new ballet set out be ane fugitive Scottisman that fled out of Paris at this lait murther* (St. Andrew’s: R. Lekprivik, 1572; STC 22203).
\[146\] STC 22203.
\[147\] STC 13847, sigs. A1v-A2.
of Providence in the face of a “common peril.” These claims clearly attempted to frame the translation of Hotman’s tract not only as an opportunity to assist the Protestant cause but also to reverse England’s decline into military and spiritual passivity.

With no named translator and a dubious reference to “Striveling” (Stirling) as its place of publication, the tract’s backers seemed keen to cover their tracks. Typographical evidence suggests that it originated from the press of Henry Bynneman, a London Stationer (fl.1566-83), who had already issued two Latin editions of the tract. Contextual evidence also suggests that a member of Leicester or Warwick’s circle may have backed its publication and taken the opportunity to gloss the text with a politicized preface. Bynneman clearly solicited court connections with an eye to advance in a competitive market: one entry in the Stationer’s Register for 1569-70 notes six Latin titles licensed to “bynnyman”, including several by Terence and Cato, suggesting a measure of court backing. He also issued a later edition of Jean de Serres’ *The fourth parte of Comentaries* dedicated by its translator, Tymme, to Warwick. The preface carried political overtones, noting that the earl’s “noble courage” displayed in past “martiall affaires” rendered him, along with the book’s argument, a “fitte patron” to read of the “valiant acts, done by divers courageous persons, in these last civill warres” in both France and the Low Countries. Although Bynneman never received any notable privilege – such as the Almanacs or Catechisms – he enjoyed an active and successful career, publishing learned works by Gabriel Harvey and Theodore Beza. His associations with Leicester and Hatton also procured him the exclusive right to publish “all dictionaries and chronicles whatsoever” in 1584.

It should be noted that, by the 1580s at least, Leicester, Henry and Philip Sidney had developed close personal links to François Hotman, author of *De furoribus Gallicis*. Leicester’s client Christopher Featherstone – who dedicated Calvin’s *Commentary upon John* to the earl in 1584 – would translate Hotman’s satirical refutation of the papal bull issued against Henry of Navarre in support of his patron’s 1586 campaign in the Low Countries. Moreover, Hotman’s son Jean, Sieur de Villiers St

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148 Ibid., sig. A2.
149 See ESTC entry for STC 13847.
150 (London: 1576; STC 22243), sig. ¶2v.
151 G. Harvey, *Musarum lachrymae* (London, 1578; STC 12905). Beza’s text, a copy of which no longer survives, was entered into the registers on 23 Aug. 1578 as “a Displaie of popishe practises wherein is clered ye soueraigne truthe of GODs eternall predestinacon”, translated by William Hopkinson. See *Stationers Registers*, II, 151.
Paul (1552-1636), resided at Leicester House in 1581 – from where he made Camden’s acquaintance – and acted as the earl’s personal secretary during his 1586 campaign. Alternatively referred to as “Dr. Ottymane” and “Attaman” in Leicester’s accounts, Villiers St Paul was one of two chaplains at the earl’s funeral in 1588. As Simon Adams has noted, Hotman’s papers contain “a considerable body” of Leicester’s own from the 1580s (a collection which is now dispersed in several repositories in Paris and in the Teyler Museum in Haarlem). Leicester’s correspondence with Hotman père et fils in the 1580s may also be related to his activities as the patron of an English Protestant coterie with broad intellectual and theological interests. Although the evidence is not definitive, there are enough connections to suggest that some in the earl’s circle were in the first shoots of a Calvinist propaganda campaign in the 1570s, securing the English publication of works by Hotman and Serres with an eye to cultivating pro-interventionist public opinion.

If so, Leicester’s network may also have played a part in securing the publication of the French-language edition of Hotman’s De furoribus Gallicis [Discours simple & veritable], which incorporated the copy of a letter from a Huguenot jurist to a servant of the Duke of Savoy, and a filleted version of Sebastian Münster’s account of the siege of Stockholm in November 1520 – an attempt by Christian II of Denmark to claim his right to the Swedish crown. The epistle, written under Hotman’s pseudonym of “Jean Gr.”, despaired of “le deshonneur & Ignominie” accrued by the French crown’s “Tyrannie ouverte.” Bizarrely, the preface-writer claimed to have considered Münster’s account of the siege of Stockholm to be an apt parallel for St. Bartholomew’s, ensuring that “le monde debuoit ester adverti dy prendre garde & noz Souveraine incitze dy penser.” While this passage may have been intended to make the work more engaging to a Swiss or German readership already familiar with Münster’s text, it would also have reinforced the “tyranny” of Charles’s regime to French-readers in Elizabeth’s realm: suggesting that Charles, like Christian of Denmark, cared more about achieving his personal ambitions than the wellbeing of his subjects.

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154 Hotman also stayed at ‘Mr. Fountain’s’ house in Blackfriars, the home of Robert le Maçon, Sieur de la Fontaine, one of the ministers of the French Reformed Church in London (c.1574-1611). See: Woudhuysen, Leicester’s Literary Patronage, p. 62, n. 2. Citing BN MS Fonds Dupuys 8586, fols 239v, 244v, 251v, 257v.
156 Adams, Household accounts, p. 448, on Leicester’s funeral proceedings of 1587.
158 Woudhuysen, Leicester’s Literary Patronage, ch. 2: iv. This fleshes out in greater detail the earl’s links to an intellectual coterie at Oxford University and at Leicester House in London, whose members included Jean Hotman, Antonio Corro and Philip Sidney.
159 Included in S. Münster, Cosmographiae Universalis (Basel: H. Petri, 1550).
160 STC 13847.5, sig. T1v.
161 Ibid., sig. T2v.
162 Kingdon, Myths, p. 118-19. Kingdon does not comment on the significance of this extract, arguing only that the existence of a German edition suggests the work was primarily aimed at a German readership.
Another text to solicit Elizabethan aid for Protestants abroad was the English translation of a 1575 manifesto distributed by Henry, Duke of Montmorency – who then held most of Languedoc in arms. The manifesto analogized the French Protestant rebels’ situation to that of the covenanted Scots in 1559-60: i.e. as a principled stand against the twinned forces of Catholic tyranny and Guisian oppression.\(^{163}\) The text called “to our succor and ayde all kinges Princes, and Potentates of Christendome, frendes and confederates of this Crowne.”\(^{164}\) Lending it even stronger polemical overtones, the Genevan edition had been accompanied by a “protestation” from the reformed French churches, recently assembled at “Millau en Rouvergue.”\(^{165}\) The English edition was published shortly thereafter, without the attached protestation, by the Huguenot émigré and London Stationer Thomas Vautrollier\(^{166}\) upon occasion of Meru’s visit to court – an occasion which saw a renewed attempt to win Elizabeth’s overt support for the rebel cause.\(^{167}\)

Vautrollier clearly had a degree of court backing: besides gaining his printer’s licence in 1573, the Stationers Registers record his having received a lucrative ten-year patent on 19 June 1574 to print works of divinity and classical learning. The patent was addressed in the queen’s name to “our well-beloved subjecte Thomas Vautrollier, typographus Londinensis in claustro vulgo Blackfriars commorans” and was renewed more than once.\(^{168}\) It is worth re-stressing the printer’s connection with Leicester’s circle: Vautrollier published Two treatises against the papistes written by William Fulke, the earl’s chaplain, in 1577, besides two early translations of Eusebius of Caesarea’s Auncient ecclesiasticall histories (in 1576 and 1585), the second of which was dedicated to Leicester.\(^{169}\) He also published two editions of Leicester’s friend Lord North’s translation of Plutarch’s Lives (in 1579).\(^{170}\) It is possible that members of Leicester or Warwick’s circle assisted Vautrollier’s publication of Montmorency’s manifesto and, in turn, Alençon’s Protestation of 17 September, as both tracts fitted in well with the Dudley brothers’ respective political positions in the 1570s.\(^{171}\)

Other connections between the enterprise of radical Huguenot print and Leicester’s circle are worth mentioning. Of the key works of Huguenot resistance theory published abroad in the wake of the

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\(^{163}\) STC 18051.7, sigs. A3-A4.\(^{v}\)

\(^{164}\) Ibid., sig. B3’.

\(^{165}\) See Lindsay and Neu, French political pamphlets, no. 864.

\(^{166}\) [Anon.], A declaration of the protestation of Monseigneur the Mareschal d’Anuille [London: s.n., 1575; STC 18051.7]. The identity of the printer is not acknowledged by the ESTC, but certain features of the type face, font, etc. are similar to those of other French tracts published by Vautrollier, particularly STC 11311, also issued in 1575.

\(^{167}\) See Ch. 3, 6 of this thesis.

\(^{168}\) Stationers Registers, II, 776. Vautrollier’s patent covered treatises by Ovid, Tully, Plutarch and Ramus.

\(^{169}\) W. Fulke, Two treatises against the papistes (London: T. Vautrollier; STC 11459). The second translation of Eusebius was published as: M. Hanmer (trans.), The Auncient Ecclesiasticall Histories of the first Six Hundred Years after Christ, written in the Greek Tongue ... (London: 1585; STC 10573).

\(^{170}\) STCs 20065 and 20066.

\(^{171}\) STC 11311. Discussed in Ch. 3, 6 of this thesis.
massacre – such as the *Francogallia* (1573), Théodore Béza’s *Du droit des magistrats sur leurs sujets* (1574), and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, attributed to Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (Basel, 1579) – only the fourth part of the *Vindiciae* which would appear in English in support of a 1588 armed intervention in the Low Countries.\(^\text{172}\) The *Vindiciae* – a work delegitimizing the rule of tyrannical monarchs and justifying their deposition – was either the work of Plessis-Mornay or of Hubert Languet, both of whom were attached to the Leicester-Sidney circle.\(^\text{173}\) A variety of Leicester’s clients clearly had access to works of resistance theory. John Case of St. John’s College, Oxford, wrote a *Rebellionis Vindiciae* which Anthony à Wood had seen in manuscript; another of Leicester’s men, Robert Dowe, owned a copy of the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*; and his friend John Hammond cited texts such as the *Francogallia* and *Réveille-Matin* in his legal judgments.\(^\text{174}\)

Without further evidence of links between the Stationers Bynneman and Vautrollier, and Protestant councillors such as Leicester and Warwick, it is impossible to definitively associate any of these tracts with individual court backers. However, the prefaxes to *A true and plaine report* and *The fourth parte of comentaries*, besides the obviously politicized content of Montmorency’s manifesto, offer the impression of an pro-interventionist Protestant lobby at Elizabeth’s court, closely affiliated with both a Protestant print industry and Calvinist contacts abroad.\(^\text{175}\) Not disputing Robert Kingdon’s claim that such texts should be read as evidence of an organised, Genevan-backed propaganda campaign to inspire support for the Huguenot cause, I would also contend that the above pamphlets were specifically framed to appeal to an English readership by nobles with a keen personal interest in promoting military intervention in both France and the Low Countries.\(^\text{176}\) The concerns expressed in most translated titles clearly implied that the massacre was only the latest salvo in an ongoing international campaign to exterminate the “true faith” across Europe: a contention that focussed as much animosity upon Spain and the Italo-papal states, as on the Catholic crown of France.

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\(^{172}\) Parmelee, *Good Newes*, p. 82.


\(^{175}\) Discussed at greater length in Ch. 1 of this thesis.

Part III

Chapter 5. English political debates regarding the Low Countries (1572-76)

My findings in the previous two chapters suggest that, to understand the complex and apparently contradictory strands of Elizabeth’s policy towards France in the mid-1570s, it is necessary to understand what was occurring in the Low Countries. As this chapter will show, the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s had as much, if not a greater impact, on the queen’s policy towards the Low Countries than on her relations with the French crown, with whom she remained allied.

The historiography of this period is conflicted, with some historians focusing on the shortcomings of Elizabeth’s approach vis-a-vis Orange’s revolt. Recent interpretations have tended to be more even-handed: seeing her many political reversals as evidence of clever opportunism, and noting that her tacit endorsement of the departure of English volunteer forces enabled her to limit both French and Spanish domination of the Maritime Provinces. Adams has argued that Elizabeth may not have been ideologically disinclined to the aid the rebels at all, noting her honourable treatment of Orange’s embassies from 1575 onwards.

In light of these recent findings, this chapter will address the following questions: what were the views of English agents, councillors and commanders concerning the wars in the Low Countries, and what forms of expression did they use? How did they respond to the key events of 1572-76 (including the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, the initial success of Alba’s military reconquest, and the offer of sovereignty over Holland and Zeeland made to Elizabeth in the winter of 1575/76)? In addressing these questions, I will focus on the language used by key figures, highlighting several tropes that echo those used in contemporary print. Was there a distinctly Protestant line of argument, and are there evidence of links between the ideas or materials of politics and print used in the case of France and the Low Countries?

1. The summer of 1572

Elizabeth clearly feared the extension of French influence over the rebel provinces in the summer of 1572. Alarming developments included news of Charles IX’s and Coligny’s war scheme and the

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1 C. Wilson, *Queen Elizabeth and the revolt of the Netherlands* (London, 1970).
extension of conflict to the river Scheldt (which threatened to block English merchant traffic to Antwerp). Alba’s project of a speedy reconquest now looked to be in jeopardy following two invasions: the first led by Louis of Nassau, in command of a French largely Protestant force, which had seized Mons in May, and the second by Orange himself, who had crossed the Rhine with 24,000 German mercenaries in July. In addition to the small French force which now garrisoned Flushing, a larger, confessionally-mixed, French army was massed along the southern border: prompting Burghley to fret that they would become “to potent neyghbors for us.”

In the face of this threat, Burghley berated the English ‘volunteer’ commander, Sir Humphrey Gilbert (a half-brother of Walter Raleigh), for leading guerrilla missions into Flanders and South Beveland, allowing a French contingent to occupy Flushing in his absence. Gilbert was ordered to employ “all the good pollecie that can be to prevent that peril” and to win back the town by earning the goodwill of its inhabitants, “by assuring of them that his intention is wholie to helpe them to their ancient libertyes.” Gilbert was told to bring reports “by some good meanes” to “Alba’s knowledge” that his forces had departed “without either licence or knowledge of Her Majestie;” being there only “to releve the native people from theire oppression” and to prevent “others, that shall seeke ... to depriue the king of any parcell of his countries.”

In contrast to the studiedly a-confessional wording of Burghley’s instructions for Alba’s consumption, Gilbert framed the purpose of his mission with a nationalist, Protestant zeal: professing himself bound to disregard his life in “the servys of Her Majeste and countre” and ready “to taecke any thynge in hande wth gedion’s fayethe.” In alluding to the weak force of Gideon, the Old Testament warrior whose faith in God had ensured the defeat of the Midianites and the liberation of the Israelites, Gilbert compared his situation to that of a David-versus-Goliath conflict. He also expressed traditionally Francophobic suspicions, which cut across his confessional loyalties. Reporting the arrival of six ensigns, comprising 100 captains and their men, and several galleys “sente by the Admerall of Franse” (i.e. Coligny, a Protestant), Gilbert commented that “thys Frense practys” would see his men “seure to be murderyd.” He sought Elizabeth’s or Burghley’s permission to provoke a quarrel between the townsfolk and the new arrivals, in which his men would “dy for ytt ... exsepte we wyll cut al the Freynsse in pesses and the Governor also.” In sum, Gilbert seems to have carried a strongly providentialist – even faintly martyrological – sense of his own mission, focussed as much on the

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5 Ramsey, *Queen’s Merchants*, p. 174.
6 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 7, “Memorial for Flanders”, dated 3 June 1572.
7 KL, RP, VI, 483-86, Burghley to Gilbert, 8 Aug. 1572.
8 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 116, Gilbert to Burghley, 13 Aug. 1572.
9 Bishops Bible: Judges, 6-8.
10 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 115c, Gilbert to Burghley, 13 Aug. 1572.
activities of the (confessionally-mixed, although Protestant led) French army, as on the manoeuvres of Alba’s nationally and confessionally-mixed forces.\footnote{G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge, 2004), appendices A, B and C. Cf. Ch. 6, section 3, iv for data and further discussion of the composition of Philip II’s army in the Low Countries.}

English agents used different arguments in their attempts to sway the queen to aid Orange’s rebels. On 23 August, Thomas Cotton wrote to Burghley that a sizeable army could secure Flushing harbour (situated between the mouth of the Scheldt and the North Sea) for England, allowing a profitable staple to be established at Walcheren or Middleburg.\footnote{BL, Cotton MS Galba/IV, fol. 268\textsuperscript{r}, Cotton to Burghley, 23 Aug. 1572.} Elizabeth would then wield absolute control of the narrow seas, effectively severing Spanish maritime routes to Flanders. Like Burghley (who only a day earlier had written to Walsingham that Flushing’s governor “is corrupted and tourned Spanish”),\footnote{BL, Harley MS 260, fol. 291\textsuperscript{r}, Burghley to Walsingham, 22 Aug. 1572.} Cotton’s letter blurred political and ideological arguments: noting that he would be “loathe Spain should range in tyranny there were Her Majesty hath so good footing,” or that necessity should force the men of Flanders to turn to France as “their only patron.”\footnote{BL, Cotton MS Galba/IV, fol. 268\textsuperscript{r}, Cotton to Burghley, 23 Aug. 1572.} Cotton justified his allusion to Spanish “tyranny” by rehearsing the advice allegedly offered by Cardinal Granvelle to both Charles V and Philip II: namely, that they should abrogate provincial “privileges”; introduce the “Spanish Inquisition”; and impose unlawful taxation – bringing “the whole country into the forme of a ... Nova-Spania.” The overlap between Cotton’s lines of argument and those of contemporary Dutch polemicists suggests that the agent was familiar with Orangist propaganda – particularly those works with a heavily hispanophobic accent.\footnote{Such as: K. 189: Belgicae liberandae ab Hispanis Hypodexis, Ad. P.P.D. Gvlielmum Gvlich50èassavium... MD. LXXI. (1571); K. 192: Het Avijs, Der ijnquizicie Van Spaengien bewijsinghe dat in alle de Nederlanden... (1571); K. 194: D. Gvlielmii Nassavi Principis Avrantii etc... 15.72 16 Junij. (1572), discussed in P. A. M. Geurts, De Nederlandse Opstand in de Pamfletten, 1566-1584 (Nijmegen, 1956), pp. 42-43. Charges that Spanish rule in the Low Countries was inevitably tyrannous also appeared in the 1571 English edition of Orange’s A defence and true declaration: see Gelderen, Political thought of the Dutch Revolt, pp. 25-31.} In early September, Gilbert seconded Cotton’s argument, stressing that his men could wrest Flushing from French control provided that more English troops and ships were dispatched.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol.14\textsuperscript{r}, Gilbert to Burghley, 7 Sept. 1572.}

Reports of this nature, in addition to the correspondence that Burghley received from the Welsh captain Walter Morgan, expose the lie that Elizabethan volunteer bands were not acting under any official aegis.\footnote{For front-line dispatches from Morgan to Burghley, see TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 19\textsuperscript{r} 16 June 1572; SP 70/128, fol. 93\textsuperscript{r}, 16 Aug. 1573; SP 70/128, fol. 140\textsuperscript{r}, 12 Sept. 1573; and SP 70/128, fol. 142\textsuperscript{r}, 13 Sept. 1573.} Notwithstanding his promotion as Lord Treasurer, Burghley clearly remained at the helm of the queen’s government and concerned himself directly with Low Countries affairs (being credited with supplying “vitaels and many other thyngs” that Gilbert’s troops so desperately

\footnote{BL, Cotton MS Galba/IV, fol. 268\textsuperscript{r}, Cotton to Burghley, 23 Aug. 1572.}
needed.) Burghley also maintained a network of informants across Europe – including men such as John Lee, a shadowy figure who reported on the doings of English Catholics at Louvain. When Lee was arrested on Alba’s orders in October 1572, his release the following April was secured only by Leicester’s personal intercession with the duke, and by both Burghley and Leicester’s dealings with Antonio de Guarás, a Spanish merchant resident in London acting unofficially as Alba’s agent.

2. The aftermath of the St. Bartholomew’s day massacre in the Low Countries (late 1572)

St. Bartholomew’s was of enormous significance to military manoeuvres in the Low Countries, sounding the death-knell for Orange’s hopes of succour from France. News of the atrocity immediately paralysed both the French and English high command, as an expedition commanded by Gilbert to relieve the garrison of Mons (comprising a force of 1,400 Englishmen, 600 Rochellos, and 400 Flemings and Walloons) was hastily called off. Orange, whose forces were defeated on 12 September, lamented to Nassau, who had surrendered Mons nine days later, that if the massacre had not occurred they would have crushed Alba and been able to dictate terms. Alba drew much the same conclusion, terming the killings “admirables et vrayement significatives ... pour la conservation de la Sainte Foy... et après tout cela... les affaires du Roy nostre maistre.”

Over the autumn of 1572, Englishmen in the Low Countries used news of the massacre to appeal for Elizabeth’s aid. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, commander of a volunteer force in Flushing, feared that the massacre prefigured “la tragique ruine de tous les protestants dedans Europe.” On 8 October, Arthur Champernowne wrote to the queen: “of one side your highness may see Flushing, the Flemmyngs, and germans in good labour, on the other side Rochell and persequted frenchemen, at hard point... we be made up with them in one band together... with them to stande in strength.”

Elizabeth’s financial agent, Thomas Cotton, reported that the Flushingers now referred to her as “the only Pillor for ther refuge.” The protestations of these and other correspondents cast the massacre as the first salvo in an

18 TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 116v. Gilbert to Burghley, 13 Aug. 1572.
19 Caldecott-Baird, Expedition in Holland, p. 5. See also: TNA: PRO SP 70/125, fol. 170r, Lee to [Burghley]; TNA: PRO, SP 70/124, fol. 95r, Lee to Burghley, 27 July 1572; SP 70/130, fol. 101r, [Unknown] to Lee, 3 Mar. 1574.
20 Caldecott-Baird, Expedition in Holland, p. 5.
21 Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 138.
23 G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou correspondence inédite de la maison d’Orange-B1glyph50èassau, 1567-72 (1836), 505. Orange to count John, 21 Sept. 1572. Cited in Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 139.
24 Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels (Algemeen Rijksarchief), 1728/9, fol. 77, Alba to Bossu, 29 Aug. 1572. Cited in Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 139.
25 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 12r, Gilbert to Burghley, 6 Sept. 1572. Possibly a copy of a lost letter Gilbert had sent to Montgomery, given that it is written in French. See below, fn. 28.
27 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 16v. Cotton to Burghley, 13 Sept. 1572.
apocalyptic battle between Christ and Antichrist, thereby placing great moral pressure on the queen to take military action.

Elizabethan commanders also used news of the massacre to conflate the French and Spanish armies into one homogenous “papist” threat. On 6 September, Gilbert wrote to Montgomery from his camp at Tergoes, arguing that that news of the massacre should be taken as “un signe infallible que Dieu a volu révéler aux aultres pour se defender contre la trahison de ces meschants et misérables Papistees.” He advised the count not only to raise the matter of the killings directly with Elizabeth, but to stress “le périll que attent tumber promptement sure sa teste, si elle ne regarde plus près à la revenche de ces villenies.” Without Protestant rulers taking immediate military action, presumably in both France and the Low Countries, he foresaw the growth in strength of their enemies precipitating “la tragique ruine de tous les Protestants dedans Europe.” In a more optimistic postscript, Gilbert added that “tout le cas de la religion se porteroit bien” should Elizabeth militarily succour Orange. He considered it would still be easy for a reasonably well-equipped force to “ruiner du tout le Duk d’Alve, et par consequent tous les autres ennemis de la cause chrestienne.”

In a letter to Burghley dated the following day, the commander reinforced his appeal for more soldiers, noting that his men had now begun to fear their French counterparts: “whom for thes laet murders we are growen to mystruste.” As further incentive, he reiterated that an expanded English force could easily take Walcheren, as well as Zierickesee and the strategically important peninsula of South Beveland.

Protestant diplomats across Europe raised a hue and cry for more military aid in the name of a “common cause” – eliding all distinctions between the Calvinist, Lutheran and English Protestant churches. The Elector Palatine’s agent, the scholar Johannes Junius de Jonge, wrote to Burghley and Killigrew to advise that Elizabeth immediately send an army to assist Orange. In his eyes, the killings proved that the Catholic powers of the Holy League (i.e. those who paid homage to “la paliarde Babilonie” – a common trope of Calvinist polemic) intended to exterminate all Protestants, which could now only be thwarted by the formation of a pan-European Protestant league. However, Jonge was forced to admit that personal differences could undermine even the strongest of ideological unities: noting that Gilbert and Morgan had fallen into a disagreement at Tergoes over the former’s military mismanagement. Other supporters of Orange also wrote to Burghley to request that, given

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28 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 12r, Gilbert to Montgomery or Burghley, 6 Sept. 1572.
29 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 14r, Gilbert to Burghley, 7 Sept. 1572.
30 TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 30r, Junius de Jonge to Henry Killigrew, 25 Sept. 1572. For this and following.
31 The Great Whore of Babylon is described as “la grande Babylone, mere des paillardises & abominations de la terre” in J. R. D. L., Discours du massacre de ceux de la religion reformee, fait à Lyon (1574), sig. A7v.
the rush of Huguenot refugees to England, that the foreign churches be permitted to select those best able to serve ("qui sont propres a porter les armes") in the Low Countries.\footnote{33}{TNA: PRO, SP 70/125, fol. 36\textsuperscript{r}, M. Haultain and others to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1572.}

Elizabeth’s council would receive other reports from foreign agents concerning attempted mass killings on a scale to rival St. Bartholomew’s. On 30 September, one wrote from Flushing: “here is talk of an other new murder that should have been done in Fraunce and how certain englisshe merchants should be slayne at Rouen. They say also their was the lik practise at Andverwp for the murdering of the protestants as was in Fraunce.”\footnote{34}{KL, \textit{RP}, VI, 534, Avis des Pays-Bas-Flushing, 30 Sept. 1572; See also: TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 195\textsuperscript{r}, Chester to Burghley, 8 Jul. 1575 which, three years later, referred to “the lyke murther” planned to being committed in Antwerp “on all such as were suspected to affecte the prince or Religion as was in parys.”}

Underlying such comment was a fear that Alba’s reconquest – which had prompted the surrender of all territory south of the Maas river, including the Brabant towns of Oudenaarde, Dendermonde, Dies and Tongeren – would witness civilian massacres on a comparable scale.\footnote{35}{Parker, \textit{Dutch Revolt}, p. 141.} Such fears were apparently confirmed by the sack of Mechelen in Flanders (1-4 October), and the destruction of Zutphen and Naarden (in November and December). Although the latter had surrendered without resistance and contained many Catholics, many of its citizenry were killed, prompting a flurry of north-eastern cities to come to terms with Alba.\footnote{36}{Ibid., p. 142.}

It was widely felt that, in the words of the Florentine ambassador Cavriana, “le prince d’Orange a perdu tout credit.”\footnote{37}{KL, \textit{RP}, VI, 538, Cavriana. 19 Oct. 1572.}

From a Protestant perspective, the compound effect of both the St. Bartholomew’s massacre and its apparent aftershocks were considerable. With Alba’s capture of Mons, garrisoned by Orange’s forces, Protestants believed that the survival of their cause was now in terminal jeopardy. Noting that St. Bartholomew’s had disabused him of “l’espoir de la guerre de France contre l’Espaignol,” Boisot of the \textit{Watergeuzen} outlined to Leicester certain considerations which he felt should drive Elizabeth to declare war against Philip.\footnote{38}{Ibid., 535\textsuperscript{r}, Boisot to Leicester, [Oct] 1572.} Stressing the malice of their puissant Catholic neighbours (“la mauvaise volonté des Roys voisins”), he added that the queen’s conscience would remain clear in the eyes of God, her own subjects, and other Protestant princes, who all desired only “la gloire de Dieu, et ... leur [propre] seurté.” Letters such as Boisot’s suggest that by as early as October 1572, Leicester stood at the vanguard of a strongly confessionised, pro-interventionist party at Elizabeth’s court. It also suggests that Leicester’s circle were developing arguments justifying Elizabeth entering the war against Philip II’s army despite the fact that she had no formal grounds to do so: arguments that were also being developed in contemporary print.\footnote{39}{Other evidence – Leicester’s cool reaction to Champagny’s mission in 1575 and the militant connotations of his entertainments at Kenilworth – is discussed below.}
3. An Anglo–Spanish rapprochement (1573-74)

Although news of St. Bartholomew’s undoubtedly inspired a fervent Protestant support base for Orange’s cause in England, it also worked to catalyse the resumption of Anglo-Spanish relations. On 15 March 1573, Burghley and Guaras finalized the terms of an agreement to restore diplomatic and commercial exchange between England, Spain and the Low Countries. Under the provisions of the ratified Convention of Nijmegen – formalised in August 1574 as the Treaty of Bristol – both crowns agreed to offer compensation for the other’s merchant losses sustained during the 1568-69 seizures, and to deny aid or sanctuary to one other’s rebels.

Soon after, Alba wrote to Elizabeth to express his pleasure at “this good and fraternal friendship,” avowing that it would once more “bring peace and prosperity” to both her and his master’s realms; to which the queen replied, confirming her commitment to the treaty with “our good brother [Philip].” Her proclamation of 30 April which announced the resumption of Anglo-Spanish commerce – an increasingly lucrative traffic – vaguely attributed the cause of the three-year intermission to “certayne stayes and arrestes.” It is unlikely that the queen nor her council felt assured that all dimensions of the dispute were fully resolved, given the ongoing fear that England would be drawn into a broader European conflict centred on the Low Countries. Although English ships began exporting new draperies and other commodities to Dutch marts, Antwerp would never again be the primary mart for English cloth. Indeed, in December 1573, the Merchant Adventurers received little assurance that the queen would intervene in protection of their economic or religious liberties. Having failed to establish a secure overland route, the company became increasingly reliant upon the Hamburg mart, the strengthening Iberian trade links, and other colonial markets.

Meanwhile, claims of Spanish cruelty and perfidy in English print grew ever more strident and shrill. Contemporaries professed themselves horrified by the disproportionate violence meted out to the garrison of Haarlem which, besieged from December 1572 by Fadrique Álvarez de Toledo (Alba’s son), surrendered on composition on 12 July 1573. Although Álvarez respected his earlier assurances not to harm the citizenry, he executed around forty of the town’s burghers and almost its entire

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40 For an assessment of the role played by the merchants adventurers in the protection and the revival of trade between 1572-76, see Ramsay, Queen’s merchants, pp. 174-84.
41 TNA: PRO, SP 70/126, fol. 178r, draft treaty on the renewal of traffic between England, Spain and Low Countries with corrections in Burghley’s handwriting, March 1573.
42 BMO, I, 46, Alba to Elizabeth, 15 April 1573. Trans. by M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado.
43 Steele, Proclamations, I, 686, 30 Apr. 1573.
44 TNA: PRO, SP 70/129A, fol. 109r, complaints of English merchants trading to Antwerp, 17 Dec. 1573. Marginal notes recorded that the PC determined on postponing these considerations.
garrison of 1,800 soldiers (including English, Scottish and Huguenot mercenaries and volunteers). Only the German mercenaries were spared.\textsuperscript{46} Focussing on the brutality of the punishment, an anonymous agent in Delft reported to the privy council that “Il ny a ville en Hollande, qui [n’a pas] entendu la perfidie et cruauté de l’Espagne.” He added that, following the executions at Haarlem, few rebel-occupied towns now trusted in the promises made by Philip’s commanders, while many other non-aligned towns were driven to accept an Orangist garrison for fear of assault.\textsuperscript{47} Similar claims were made in the English pamphlet literature of the period, suggesting that Anglo-Dutch news channels sought to disseminate this information.\textsuperscript{48} A month later, the English military commander Sir Henry Neville commented in detail on the cruelty of “Alba” at Haarlem: passing on reports that there had been a great battle in which “mayny of our Inglyshemen [were] slayn,” many by dishonourable “Spanishe” means.\textsuperscript{49} Orange himself, newly converted to Calvinism and appointed \textit{Stadthouder} by the estates of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, had now officially affiliated his cause with that of the Calvinist minority.\textsuperscript{50} Struggling with poor health and undermined by his detractors in Madrid, Alba was replaced as governor-general by Don Luis de Zúñiga y Requesens (who, though appointed on 30 January, did not arrive in Brussels until 17 November). This was a clear indication that, contrary to the reports of zealous Protestants cited above, Philip II still wished to pursue a form of negotiated settlement with his rebels.

As noted in chapter 3, it was at this juncture that Walsingham (newly returned from Paris and promoted to second Principal Secretary) assumed a leading role in the conduct of Elizabethan diplomacy, pressing the queen to intervene in the Low Countries largely for confessional reasons. The secretary’s correspondence with Orange was openly friendly: in November, the prince forewarned him of the activities of some Italian exiles in England (who purportedly sought “armer et équiper quelques bateaux pour le service du roy d’Espaigne”) and praised him for “l’affectation et entier zèle que je sçay vous portez à l’advancement de la cause commune.”\textsuperscript{51} This allusion to “la common cause” reinforces the impression that Walsingham, alongside Leicester, now steered the project of Anglo-Dutch Protestant cooperation. One should note here that, from 1572 onwards, and particularly in the wake of the key developments of 1575-76, allusions to the “common cause,” “common weale” and

\textsuperscript{46} Parker, \textit{Dutch revolt}, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{47} TNA: PRO, SP 70/128, fol. 49, advices from Delft, 19 Jul. 1573.
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Ch. 6, 3, iv of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{49} TH/Vol.IV/1, fol.3. Henry Neville to Sir John Thynne, 12 Aug. 1573. Quotation from: TH/Vol.IV/1, fol.7. Same to same, 24 Aug. 1573.
\textsuperscript{50} The office of \textit{stadthouder} or provincial governor acted as the sovereign’s proxy. Philip had appointed Orange \textit{stadthouder} of Holland in 1559; Orange had resigned the title in 1567.
\textsuperscript{51} KL, \textit{RP}, V1, 838-39, Orange to Walsingham, 12 Nov. 1573.
“public cause” were becoming increasingly prominent in both English print and court-centric political discourse.52

Leicester also continued to play an active role in the reception of political news, suggesting he may have been centrally responsible for the transmission of foreign printed items and their translation into England. Sidney – who had left France to travel and study in the HRE – wrote to his uncle from Frankfurt on 18 March, referring to “the woorkes [the bearer] dothe cary into Englande” – presumably pro-Orangist news and/or Calvinist polemics.53 Five days later, Sidney reported his interview with “Counte Lodovik, the Prince of Orenges seconde brother,” in which he had met “one Shambourg [Schomberg], an Allmaine, withe him, a gentleman whom I knew in the cowtre of Fraunce” who was “allways very affectionnate to the kinges [Charles IX’s] service.” Sidney added “I dowte not but that [Schomberg] assaiethe to draw the Counte to serve the kinge, but I hope he laboureth in vaine”, stressing the Leceister-Sidney circle fear of French military involvement in the Low Countries.54 The evidence for Leicester’s personal involvement in Orange’s cause is sketchy, but there is some indication that he – along with Burghley – mediated the negotiations between the prince’s military command and the English volunteer forces discharged from the prince’s service in 1573.55

Subsequent developments in the Low Countries seemed to favour Orange’s cause: the second mutiny of Philip II’s army in November, followed by their attack on rebel-held Utrecht on 17 December, was deemed to be a disastrous setback to Requesens’ counter-offensive and a temporary deliverance to the rebels. One French pamphlet, later translated into English, noted that “this dissention and disorder was even the verye mightie work of God, considering the great commoditie, benefit and gaine that redounded to these countries hereby.”56 Late December saw Elizabeth consider articles for the formation of a defensive league with the German Lutherans, under which she proposed disbursing £20,000 in the cause of common defense. This was a clear indication that, in line with the hardening of attitudes at her court, she was being pushed to adopt a more overtly confessionalised policy.57

52 Cf. Ch. 6 for print comment. TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 14’, memorandum concerning Holland and Zeeland, dated 12 Jan. 1576, in Burghley’s hand. Article 20 states: “What is the monthly levy wch is gathered by contribution of the contries / to the publick cause ... and who / are the treasurers thereof(?)” Cf.: Allusions to the “common cause” in: TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 205’, Herle to Burghley, 11 March, [1576]; TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 220’, Herle to Burghley, 14 March, [1576]. Allusion to the “publique weale” from Sidney to Walsingham, 22 March 1577 in Feuillerat, III, pp. 105-8.
53 DU/Vol.II/41a, fol.148, Sidney to Leicester, 18 Mar. [1573].
54 DU/Vol.II/41b, fol.152, Sidney to Leicester, 23 Mar. [1573].
55 TNA: PRO, SP 70/129A, fol. 18’, Richard Bingham to Ralph Lane, 15 Oct. 1573; TNA: PRO, SP 70/129A, fol. 63’, Morgan to Burghley, 12 Nov. 1573.
56 A. Henricpetri, A tragicall historie of the troubles and ciuile warres of the lowe Countries, otherwise called Flanders... Translated ... into Englishe, by T[homas] S[tocker] (London: J. Kingston [and T. Dawson] for T. Smith:1583), fol. 100’.
57 TNA: PRO, SP 70/129A, fols 112’; 121’, articles for a proposed league between Eliz.and German Protestant princes, 18 and 21 Dec. 1573. Cf. Ch. 4, section 6 of this thesis.
The early months of 1574 brought news that Philip II’s fleet had been defeated in the Scheldt River and that the stronghold of Middleburg had fallen to rebel forces.\(^{58}\) There were other signs by the spring that the king’s army was not faring well: although Nassau was killed (along with Orange’s younger brother Henry, and Christopher, son of the Elector Palatine), and his army routed at Mookerheyde on 14 April, the tercios mutinied shortly thereafter.\(^{59}\) This obvious upheaval may have encouraged Elizabeth to ignore Philip’s demands that she recall Edward Chester and other of her subjects fighting in Orange’s ranks.\(^{60}\) In May, Orange wrote to his brother that several thousand English, Welsh and Scots foot (alongside numerous Walloons and Flemings) now comprised around 71 companies of his troops.\(^{61}\)

By the late spring, intelligence had reached England that Philip was assembling and victualing a new fleet in his northern Spanish ports to sail with reinforcements for Flanders or England (apparently corroborated when the king requested Elizabeth’s permission to dock in her ports).\(^{62}\) By June, Elizabeth had issued orders to mobilise her navy and to take other defensive measures: while Bedford was dispatched to organize the West Country defences and to raise 1,000 troops to fight in Ireland, fire-signalling stations were erected along the coast.\(^{63}\) Allied to an English fear of Spanish invasion was the threat of French cooperation: following Charles IX’s death in late May, there was a belief among some English commentators that the zealously Catholic Henry III would implement a hostile policy against neighbouring Protestant powers, especially England.\(^{64}\) Dale issued dispatches from Paris, expressing his fears of Henry III’s intentions and relaying rumours of Spanish naval invasion.\(^{65}\)

Meanwhile, Roger Bodenham, one of Burghley’s informants in Spain, reported that the navy was indeed destined for England, and that the king had been incited by Spanish clerics who “doo hate this estate of ynglande mortally.” Bodenham (an English Catholic with a Spanish wife and children) alluded to the existence of an Iberian spy network in London – “a neste of spaniardes” – who were...

\(^{58}\) Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, p. 184. TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 104r. Burghley’s copy of the Estates of Flanders remonstrance to the king, dated 11 June 1574. Marginalia in Burghley’s hand note the need for immediate payment of the king’s troops.

\(^{59}\) The sum of the ransom was equivalent to the troops’ outstanding wage arrears, paid in full on 30 May.

\(^{60}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/130, fol. 103r, notes on the treaty with Spain, 5 Mar. 1574.

\(^{61}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 22r, Orange to John of Nassau, 7 May 1574. His critique of the English, French and German leaderships, however, sheds some doubt on their successful cooperation.

\(^{62}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fols 43r and 45r, Dale to Walsingham, 17 May 1574; SP 70/131, fol. 71r, Thomas Wilkes to Walsingham, 31 May 1574. Wilkes reported that 200 Spanish ships were ready to sail.

\(^{63}\) TNA: PRO, SP 12/95 fol. 189r, Burghley to Walsingham, 4 May 1574; TNA: PRO, SP 12/97, Elizabeth’s instructions to Bedford, [1] June, 1574. BL Harleian MS. 6991, fol. 80r, Walsingham to Burghley “of the Resolutions of the Admiralty as to the Number of Men to furnish the Queen’s Fleet,” 10 June 1574.

\(^{64}\) Cf. Ch. 3: 7 of this thesis.

\(^{65}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fols 91r, 94r, 100r, 102r, 119r, 121r, 123r, 128r, 131r, Dale to Burghley, Smith, Walsingham and others, June, 1574; Wright (ed.), II, pp. 500-3, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, 7 July, 1574.
conspiring with certain of the queen’s subjects to spread rumours that her realm would “lightly be overcome [by foreign invasion].” Like Cotton and Gilbert, Bodenham’s language rehearsed many of the animal metaphors used in Orangist print to denigrate Spanish military forces as parasites and predators – perhaps an attempt to assure Burghley of his personal loyalty to the queen and the truth of his intelligence. (In May 1577, Bodenham would be appointed as consul or “principal officer”, resident in Spain, of the newly formed Spanish Company, notwithstanding that he was disliked by most of the mercantile community abroad.)

How Burghley responded to Bodenham’s report is uncertain, although he soon after began drafting justifications of the rebellion as a principled revolt and an act of provincial self-determination, suggesting that he was developing the lines of argument necessary to legitimate English intervention. When annotating a copy of the Estates of Flanders’ remonstrance to Philip, the Lord Treasurer outlined as abuses the maintenance of “foreign” garrisons [in Burghley’s phrase: “milites externi”]; excessive taxation and other depredations of the king’s governors [“gravis ceraetio trebut et depredatio subdetour”]; and the suppression of the states’ ancient privileges [“privilegia antique.”]

The strident tone of contemporary Orangist propaganda also suggests that there was a growing Protestant interest in the Low Countries as a site for English intervention. One pamphlet urged Elizabeth to embrace the opportunity the times afforded to raise her sword in the defence of “the good and innocent, and to punish the wicked and ungodly” oppressors of the Low Countries. Another pamphlet on the surrender of Middleburg to Orange’s forces (which fell in February 1574, and an English account of which was published in April) included similar sentiments. It contained a manuscript annotation / postscript by an Englishman who clearly had access to sources of information on Philip’s massing fleet.

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66 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 111r, Roger Bodenham to Burghley, 17 June 1574.
67 E.g. STCs 540, 5182, and 17865. This pamphlet literature is analysed in Ch. 6.
68 APC, IX, 254. Cf. Croft, Spanish Company, pp. xiii, xxi, which notes that Bodenham’s opponents pushed hard to get him dismissed and that he “proved useless as a consul” before his return to England in 1586. Allowing for the rising diplomatic tensions which emerged over the late 1570s and 1580s, it would appear that Bodenham’s principal loyalties lay with the privy council and not with the merchant community whose interests he was supposedly championing.
69 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 104r-v [marginalia], Burghley’s copy of the Estates of Flanders remonstrance to the king, annotated in his own hand, dated 11 June 1574.
70 Anon., Certayne newses of the whole discription, ayde, and helpe of the Christian princes ... for the comfort and deliueraunce of the poore Christians in the low Countries are gathered together... with their armies in the fielde (London: 1574, STC 5182), fols 4-5.
71 Anon., Middleborow. A briefe rehersall of the accorde and agreement have made, in yelding the[m]selves to the right high and excellent prince, the Lorde William Prince of Orange (London: Richard Jones, 1574; STC 17865). Lambeth Palace Library shelf-mark: 1572.1.13.
Drawn in a hasty italic hand which resembles Bedford’s, the notes outline the provisions of “the kinge of Spaines Navie.” It would not be surprising if this was indeed written by the earl: Bedford owned numerous items of rebel propaganda, including a pamphlet supposedly written in response to a letter from Alba. Stating that the navy was commanded by “Don Pedro Maliendes “(i.e. Don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés), the annotator calculates the navy to be comprised of forty large galleys and an additional ten galleasses supplied by the “ayde or assistance” of the Portuguese king, with the whole fleet victualled for 18 months. I have found that claims of this nature were rehearsed by other statesmen: over in Paris, Dale strove to reassure Burghley that Philip could not use any Portuguese ships which were “over great” in the Channel, implying that the matter of Portuguese assistance had been mooted. In April, Burghley had been informed that Avilés had been created “Captain General of the Canal of Flanders” and that the outfitting of ships was underway – with falcons, falconets, engines and crossbars and numerous other things being cast in Bilbao. In August, Bedford himself would inform Burghley that he believed the king’s fleet to be ready to depart at a moment’s notice (opening with the statement that “the k. of Spayne navie is now <ready to come to> the sea”), and that it would sail under Menendez’s command. Quite why an English news pamphlet was used to record comments on the Spanish navy’s movements is uncertain: even if it was simply the nearest blank paper to hand, it suggests that those with access to political intelligence were reading and consulting supposedly “populist” pamphlets.

Guaras’s intercepted dispatches provide further evidence of English conciliar anxiety, as the agent reported to an unknown correspondent that Vice-Admiral Winter and the privateer John Hawkins were preparing defences in Ireland. On 22 June, he noted that Burghley and Elizabeth continued their preparations, which some of the privy council opposed as showing too much suspicion of Philip (“como monstrar sospecha al Rey de españa”) and on account of the great expense involved.
amounting to “30 m. libras.”

Although there is little evidence of conciliar opposition in the English source record, Guaras may well have been referring to men such as Croft, perceived to be pro-Spaniard, and Sussex, who later voiced strong arguments against breaking with Philip.

Although there is little English source evidence to support Guaras’s other claims that Elizabeth was funnelling large funds to Orange in exchange for promises of Dutch sovereignty, his remark that her councillors were terrified of a Spanish invasion rings true. Walsingham’s fears, at least, were not assuaged by Philip’s decision to send a high-ranking Spanish nobleman, Bernardino de Mendoza, on embassy to London in July, prompting the secretary’s complaint that all “men of good judgment, thinke that the cheefe end of his commyng is to interteyne us with Spanyshe complymentes to lulle us a sleepe for the tyme.” Burghley was less overtly cynical, writing: “ther is good commendation made of this Mendoza, as on gyven to make peace, I pray god his peace may be as much in his hart as in his lippe.” Walsingham’s suspicions as to the objectives of the Spanish fleet were also quickened by news that Sir Thomas Stukeley (the English fortune-hunter, deemed a zealous Catholic) and his comrade Lord Morley were aboard. In Paris, Dale passed on a remark supposedly made by another English exile, Egremont Ratcliff, that “the k. of spaynes navie w[ch] is in Biscaye is [still] appointed towards flandres, they in Galicia towards Irelande, and the rest either towards England or Scotland.”

Such reports may well have worked to undermine any assurances Mendoza made. Despite Ratcliff’s claims that he, Morley and Westmorland had all “broken with” Stukeley, the queen ignored Ratcliff’s plea for a pardon and instructed Bacon, Burghley and Sadler to remain in London over the summer. What followed suggests a degree of irresolution: Walsingham wrote to Burghley on 8 July “of the Queen’s not being resolved to send her Fleet out to meet the Spaniards.” A week later, Elizabeth issued a warrant under privy signet ordering the removal of her vessels from the Medway to the Thames, to be laid “as neere the bullwarkes besydes Gravesend as the place will serve.” Although she also welcomed the Spanish ambassador most cordially and responded favourably to Philip II’s petition for safe entry into English ports, her councillors continued to send and receive reports concerning the nation’s defences. Shrewsbury wrote on 3 August, enclosing a certificate of musters

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80 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 124v, Guaras to [?], 22 June 1574.
81 Cf. ol. Ch. 7, section 5 of this thesis.
82 CSPSp, II, 400, substance of letters from Guaras, [Aug.] 1574.
83 BL, Harleian MS. 6991, fol. 92v, Walsingham to Burghley, 18 July 1574.
84 TNA: PRO, SP 12/97, fol.33r, Burghley to Walsingham, 14 July 1574.
85 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fol. 137r, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, 7 July 1574.
86 BL, Cotton MS. Titus Bii, fol. 295r, Burghley to Sussex, 15 July 1574.
87 BL, Harley MS. 6991, fol. 84, Walsingham to Burghley, 8 July 1574.
taken in Derbyshire, “they think that I have delte very strely with them.” It was not until late August, and the formal conclusion of the Treaty of Bristol, that defence preparations were finally stepped down and, in September, that Philip finally ordered the dissolution of his still incomplete fleet. Notwithstanding the treaty, the problems posed by fugitives on both sides remained unaddressed – particularly those of the English exiles, who had attached their hopes to the success of Philip’s 1574 armada.

Certain of Elizabeth’s councillors remained convinced of the imminent threat of Spanish invasion and, largely owing to this fear, were firmly opposed to any political rapprochement. By the end of 1574, items of conciliar correspondence confirm that Philip’s army in the Low Countries – routinely dubbed “tyrants” and “the Spaniards” in English print – was being openly vilified. In September, the merchant John Bradley petitioned Burghley and Leicester for assistance in regaining his confiscated land and goods, seized in retaliation for his role in repatriating Storey. Noting that his wife had been harshly questioned by Franciscus Sonnius, Bishop of Antwerp on account of her faith, Bradley blamed the arrival of a regiment of “Spanish” soldiers, who had treated his family so appallingly that they “rather ... wished a fair death then so to live amonge suche ungodly and tyrannous people.” Bradley’s decision to express such overtly anti-Spanish sentiments to two of Elizabeth’s leading advisors implies an absolute confidence in their shared antipathy.

4. Developments in Dutch affairs and Leicester’s pro-interventionism (1575)

A series of developments over the course of 1575 and 1576 threatened to churn up a diplomatic storm, again suggesting that the wars in the Low Countries had come to dominate English political thinking on the status of Elizabeth’s alliances with foreign powers. 1575 opened with rumours that figureheads in Brussels remained sympathetic to Mary Stewart’s cause and that they continued to abet English rebels. Wilson – on embassy to procure passage for the Merchant Adventurers up the Scheldt; to press for the expulsion of Catholic exiles, including “Thomasso Stewkeley”; and to propose Elizabeth’s mediation once more – informed Burghley of certain “lewd libels” circulating freely. The substance of these libels suggested that “your Lordship onlie is the chiefest cause [of Mary’s imprisonment]... and worketh most against her.” The cause of pro-Marian print and the trend of Catholic conspiracy were, Wilson stressed, closely interlinked, as he reported that “false craftie foxes” both in England

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90 Talbot Papers MS.3204, fol.21, a certificate of the light horsemen within the county of Derbyshire, taken 9 and 20 July 16 Elizabeth [1574]; fol.29. Shrewsbury to PC, 3 Aug. 1574.
91 TNA: PRO, SP 70/131, fols 168, 170, 174, all copies of the ‘Treaty at Bristol,’ 21 Aug. 1574.
93 E.g. STC 5182, fols 2-6.
94 CP 8/7. Bradley to Leicester and Burghley, [Sept.] 1574. DU/Vol.II/26c, fol.108, Bradley’s petition to Leicester seeking compensation for losses sustained while conveying Story to England [undated].
95 Read, Burghley, p. 159.
and in Brussels now conspired to effect Mary’s “enlargement.” The business of the privy council in both 1575 and 1576 suggests that it was occupied with similar concerns, with one set of minutes stating: “sithe the late trobles happened in the Lowe Countries many of her Majesties Lewde and evill disposed subjectes, which heretofore remained at Lovaine and Dowaie, are secretly cum over bringing with them diverse Popishe bookes and tromperies.”

These rumours would have been deemed particularly harmful to Elizabeth’s prestige in the spring of 1575, with peace talks between Philip’s and the rebels’ representatives set to open at Breda. The queen now pushed hard for a mediated settlement that included constitutional guarantees for the religious and civil freedoms of Protestants in the Low Countries, dispatching Sir Henry Cobham to Madrid to promote a brokered peace between the antagonists and to point out the danger of French interference. As Pauline Croft has noted, Cobham was also ordered to discuss the general treatment of English factors and merchants in Spain, including the summary confiscation of their goods by the Inquisition; the dealings of English Catholic émigrés; and the possible resurrection of a permanent English embassy, closed in 1568. Cobham was successful, at least, in securing an improvement in the conditions of the resident merchants: with a provison that no-one who fell within is category would be mistreated, or have their goods stayed, unless they had offended the Inquisition. But with respect to his primary commission, Cobham had the rather thankless task of convincing Philip of Elizabeth’s untrammelled fidelity; of “how often and earnestly ... wee have been sollicited [in vain] to have had committed to owr handes and possession his contries of holland and zeland,” so that Philip might say he had not had “such a friend ... as wee have been.” In fact, as Adams has noted, Elizabeth did not want peace at any cost: her preferred outcome was that the Low Countries should remain under Philip’s rule while maintaining their traditional liberties (including a native governor); being free from foreign troops; and enjoying liberty of conscience.

Unsurprisingly given the hardening of attitudes on both sides, the negotiations at Breda did not fare well, rendering Elizabeth’s offer of mediation obsolete: although the rebels had only ever in theory opposed the tyranny and cruelty of the “Spanish” soldiery and Philip’s governor-generals, they were

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96 BL, Harley MS 6991, fol. 118; Wright, II, pp. 3-6, Wilson to Burghley, 14 Feb. 1575.
97 TNA: PRO, PC 2/10 fol.390, [Meeting] at Windsor, 26 Oct. 1575. One minute concerned the importation of seditious books.
99 Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 167. Although Parker notes that the goals of the two sides were “fundamentally incompatible”; others have stressed that the peace-making attempts were buttressed by an enduring tradition of noble fealty to the crown. See V. Soen, “Between Dissent and Peacemaking. The Dutch Nobility on the Eve of the Revolt (1564-1576)”, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, 86, 2008, pp. 735-58.
101 TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 157, instructions for Cobham, 1 July 1575.
102 Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands”, p. 315. Adam notes that this was little different from Orange’s position up until the negotiations at Breda.
in practice unwilling to drop their demands for Calvinist worship. Seeking what he understood to be a viable compromise, Philip was prepared to concede the withdrawal of his forces and perhaps freedom of conscience, but would in no way grant universal Calvinist worship. In lieu, Requesens was instructed to offer the rebels a full pardon and to permit the emigration of those who would not comply with the settlement. When Orange’s party (aware that the siege of Leiden was a huge drain on the government’s resources) refused these terms, Requesens was forced to suspend the talks in July.

One of Burghley’s informants now revived the spectre of St. Bartholomew’s and the threat posed by an anti-Protestant axis of Catholic powers. Chester, writing from the Low Countries, informed the Lord Treasurer that “the lyke murther should have bene comytted [in Antwerp] on all such as were suspected to affecte the prince or Religion as was in parys,” had news of the planned massacre not been exposed to the authorities by one of the conspirators. Noting that Requesens had proposed a ceasefire “till Hallowtide,” Chester predicted that if peace were not concluded, then the rebels would “defye the king as a tyrant & seeke their relief where they may best obtaine it” – alluding, quite directly, to the threat of French intervention. He thus reiterated the necessity of Elizabeth’s sending immediate and substantial military aid, arguing that he had “put them [i.e. the rebel leadership] now in good hope of her Ma’s favor & care of their weale,” so that “once againe it may rest in her Ma to accept or refuse their offers.”

Chester was well-informed of the States’ intentions: not long after the Breda talks, the provinces of Holland and Zeeland duly renounced Philip’s sovereignty, claiming a natural right to rebel in defence of their “ancient” liberties. Requesens immediately attempted to sever the two provinces from each other by capturing the strategic towns of Oudewater and Schoonhaven, and by laying siege to Zierikzee (which held out until 2 July 1576). Orange’s party now began to debate the relative merits of the three foreign princes who might afford them protection: Elizabeth, Henry III, and Maximilian II, the Holy Roman Emperor. As Adams notes, although it was felt that the English queen could offer both religious kinship and naval aid (besides being a distant descendent of the Hainault royal dynasty), Orange appears to have vested more faith in the superior might of France.

103 TNA: PRO, SP 70/133, fol. 164r, declaration by Orange and the Estates of Holland and Zeeland, [14] Mar. [1575]. Until at least 1575, Orange’s supporters and those publishing in his name repeatedly contended that they were not seeking to undermine the king’s sovereignty. Cf. this thesis, Ch.6.3, ii of this thesis.
104 TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 199r, Chester to Elizabeth, 9 July, 1575.
105 TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 195v, Chester to Burghley, 8 July, 1575.
106 Kossmann and Mellink (eds), Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 15; Gelderen (ed.), pp. 130-33.
107 Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands”, pp. 313-14. Adams suggests Orange may have supported the embassy to England in order to remove all further opposition to his seeking French protection should it fail.
At this point, Leicester redoubled his personal efforts to promote Orange’s cause before the queen, using a variety of media to disseminate his message. The historian Elizabeth Goldring, who has researched the festivities at Kenilworth held before the queen on progress, has found that the earl displayed various allegorical pictures and staged a series of dramatic interludes promoting military engagement (one of which would have seen him vanquishing the forces of “Sir Bruse sauns pittie,” connoting Spain, in defence of the virtuous Lady of the Lake, representing the Low Countries). Writing of the cancelled “Sir Bruse” interlude, the soldier-poet George Gascoigne recorded that, having scattered Sir Bruse’s band, Leicester’s captain “should have come to her Majestie at [Kenilworth’s] Castell window, and have declared more plainly the distresse of his Mistresse... and that thereupon he should have besought hyr Majestie to succour his Mistresse.” The royal visit to Kenilworth was clearly a political platform: notables attending the celebrations included the earls of Warwick, Sussex, Northumberland, Derby, Rutland and Hertford; the barons Burghley, North, Buckhurst, Hunsdon and Lumley; and the courtiers Knollys, Croft, Sir Henry Lee, Walsingham and Philip Sidney. Although largely Protestant (all except Derby and Croft), this group featured those wary of military intervention (i.e. Burghley and Sussex), and at least one in favour of an alliance with Spain (Croft).

Advocates of military intervention were likely bolstered by news of the Spanish crown’s fiscal collapse in the autumn. On 1 September, Philip suspended interest payments on his Castilian public debt (this divesting himself of any means of financing his army in Flanders by asiento.) As a consequence of the pay suspension, only his troops around Zierickzee remained at their posts. When the States of Holland subsequently proposed sovereignty to Henry III in return for his protection, English agents pressed harder for Elizabeth’s involvement. Rogers informed Walsingham of his “colloquy” with Boissot and his audience with Orange, in which the latter claimed that neither he nor the States of Holland would again acknowledge Philip as sovereign. Orange had remarked that even if the king revoked “his spanyards and [left us] our privileges” they would “allwayes have been in feare of a massacre of pariss,” seconding Chester’s claim that his cause was irrefutably the same as that of the Huguenots. Rogers also reported Orange’s claim that if the queen “should not harken to them, [they] should be compelled to seek other ayde” or be “at the last overcome.”

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110 Goldring, “Portraiture, Patronage, and the Progresses”, p. 171.
112 TNA: PRO, SP 70/135, fol. 258r, Rogers to Walsingham, 19 Oct. 1575.
113 Cf. TNA: PRO, SP 70/134, fol. 195v, Chester to Burghley, 8 Jul. 1575.
114 TNA: PRO, SP 70/135, fol. 258v.
5. Dutch offers of sovereignty to Elizabeth (spring 1576)

The winter of 1575-76 stood as something of a critical watershed in the development of Elizabeth’s relations with regard to the powers at play in the Low Countries. Two rival embassies were dispatched to Elizabeth’s court in early 1576: the first, promoting Orange’s cause, arrived in early January, led by Paul Buys, landsadvocaat of Holland and Philip de Marnix, Sieur de St. Aldegonde. A contemporary painting delineates the kind of royal reception the ambassadors might have received.\(^\text{115}\) Theirs was an extraordinary mission: Buys and St. Aldengonde, representatives of Orange, carried instructions to offer Elizabeth the countship of Holland (and by extension, sovereignty over Zeeland) in return for her military protection.\(^\text{116}\) If she declined this, they were to press for a loan of £100,000 in order to finance a levy of German mercenary forces.\(^\text{117}\) This was likely not a surprise offer: as Rogers had written to Burghley on 9 October “the prince [of Orange] altogether is bent towards ffrance... [yet] the Estates have small likinge of the ffrenche ayde, and gladly would submitte them selves to her Ma[ie] as Countesse of Holland and Zelande... if she should take the offer.”\(^\text{118}\)Burghley had clearly considered the problem of the queen “not aydyng and mayntaining of y[e] prynce of Orandg,” writing that if the rebel provinces by conquest or their own submission should return to Philip’s sovereignty, “England, shall be neighboured by such a nation, as will take advantage many ways to ... attempt for y[e] cause of Relligion ... to make an alteration or rather a subversion of this estate.”\(^\text{119}\) Yet he must also have been aware of what any overt English intervention would entail: namely, war with Spain.

Several of Elizabeth’s councillors now openly favoured her acceptance of the countship and war with Spain. Walsingham prepared a paper which countered all the queen’s likely objections: noting that Orange’s rebels were only patriots defending native freedoms, he pushed for his mistress to acknowledge Philip as her inveterate, natural enemy.\(^\text{120}\) Burghley was more circumspect, recognising that although it worked in Elizabeth’s interest to aid the rebels, there was no overwhelming need for immediate action. He thus afforded a rather ambivalent response to Requesens’s envoy, Frederique de Perrenot, Sieur de Champagny (Granvelle’s brother and governor of Antwerp), who had been sent to hinder the sending of aid to Orange.\(^\text{121}\) Although Burghley and Sussex attempted to allay Champagny’s concerns respecting the queen’s intentions, Walsingham appears to have offered no

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\(^{115}\) See appendix 13 of this thesis. The portrait is undated but the dress of the queen and her courtiers suggests it depicts events in the 1570s.

\(^{116}\) See Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands”, p. 309. Holland and Zeeland were united under the countship of Holland in 1323.

\(^{117}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 205r, Herle to Burghley, 11 Mar. 1576.

\(^{118}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/135, fol. 230v, Rogers to Burghley, 9 Oct. 1575.

\(^{119}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/135, fols 256r, 257r, memorandum entitled “Affairs in the Low Countries”, 17 Oct. 1575.

\(^{120}\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/136, fol. 461, undated and unsigned document. See Read, Walsingham, I, p. 317, fn. 1.

\(^{121}\) Champagny later changed sides following the Sack of Antwerp. Cf. Ch. 7 of this thesis.
such reassurances. Walsingham may even have raised objections to Champagny’s admittance at court: although the latter arrived on 24 January, he did obtain an audience until 5 February, a delay for which there is no obvious explanation.

In this interim, Elizabeth evidently decided to put the matter of military intervention directly to her councillors. Guaras reported that “a committee” met on or before 9 January 1576 to discuss the envoys’ requests for aid, at which Bacon, Burghley, Leicester and Walsingham were present. Some sort of select gathering was evidently held on or before 15 January 1576, for which Bacon drafted a discourse on “the prudence of openly breaking with Spain.” This opposed an open breach on the grounds of England’s infirmity in financial, military and naval resources, recommending instead that Orange should be succoured covertly. Burghley drew up notes proposing peace negotiations, while still providing forms of aid for Orange, alluding to the French danger that if a “good ende of these troubles” could not be reached, “England shall be in a perpetuall danger of war by ... them wch should possess y’ sayd low countries.” Although he could not prove it, Champagny left England guessing that some form of aid – in terms of money or munitions – was already being sent to Orange.

For her part, Elizabeth informed Orange’s envoys that she would decline their offer of the countship – which would be tantamount to her provoking “a war with the kyng of Spayne” – but acknowledged that there was “appearance of reason in their defending themselves and seeking aid” given that they had been “so hardly treated.” Nonetheless, she held back over the matter of the £100,000 loan they had requested, quashing parliamentary debate on the matter in March. Other sources suggest that there may have been further disincentives for Elizabeth to accept the countship. Since 1574, she had taken serious offence with Orange following ongoing piracies committed by the Sea Beggars, prompting the prince to issue a denial that he had issued them any commission to arrest English

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123 Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands,” pp. 314-15. Adams notes that preparations for the parliamentary session may well have contributed to the delay.
124 CSPSp II, 518-19, Guaras to [Zayas?], 9 Jan. 1576; Mears, Queenship, p. 37, n. 27. As Mears notes, the fact that the attendees Guaras identified do not tally with those in Burghley’s memoranda, suggest either that the Spanish ambassador was incorrect or that there was more than one meeting.
125 TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fols 25v-26r, memo entitled “To be answered to them of Holland.” Quoted in Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands”, pp. 311, 314; Mears, Queenship, p. 37; and discussed in MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, pp. 200-204. Copy also found in: BL, Galba MS, C.V, 29. 15 Jan. [1576].
126 TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 32r, “Things to be considered by the Queen of England touching Holland”, dated 21 Jan. [1576]. Draft in Burghley’s hand.
127 KL, RP, VIII. 157, Champagny to Requesens, 5 Feb. [1576].
128 TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 25r.
129 KL, RP, VIII. 245, Champagny to Requesens, 10 Mar. 1576.
Yet Boissot still appealed to Elizabeth as a Protestant “protectrix,” arguing that, although necessity had compelled his forces to seize commercial traffic, her subjects must have exaggerated their complaints.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/133, fol. 201\textsuperscript{r}, Wilson to Boissot, 27 Mar. 1575 [in Italian].} By 5 March, it was heard in London that an English ship carrying the Portuguese ambassador’s fiancée had been seized off Dover and taken to Flushing: an incident which, as Adams has noted, probably had more impact on the failure of the ‘Dutch’ embassy than Champagny’s blandishments.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/136, fol. 105\textsuperscript{r}, Boissot to Elizabeth, 10 Dec. 1575.} From Redcross street in the city of London, Burghley’s Protestant agent William Herle complained to his master that “respect of ye common caurse [should] move rather their amendment” than any retaliations from Elizabeth.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 205\textsuperscript{r}, Herle to Burghley, 11 March, [1576].} Three days later – with a clearer hand and, perhaps, a more ordered mind – he wrote again to argue that Orange was only “fayne to tolerate many things w\textsuperscript{th} [the Sea Beggars], contrary to equity ... for y\textsuperscript{e} cause & tyme sake,” and that the queen should continue sending aid to the prince, notwithstanding the doings of his piratical allies.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 220\textsuperscript{r}, Herle to Burghley, 14 Mar. [1576].} Herle, who could offer only flimsy justification for the raids, thus attempted to persuade Burghley that the Sea Beggars’ depredations were a lesser evil than that of their mutual Catholic enemies.

When Orange still had not made restitution for the Sea Beggars’ attacks over a month later, Walsingham fretted to Burghley that the prince’s cause with the queen had now grown “to declynation,” rendering him “of necessitie... a preye eyther to Spaine or Fraunce.” Walsingham feared that “wordes wyll not helpe” – Elizabeth having dispatched Davison to intercede for peace with the States General – signifying that she “meane th not to be a dealer” in the war. He dolefully concluded that some good might have been brought to pass if Elizabeth’s true intentions had only “bene held in suspense” a while longer.\footnote{BL, Harley MS, 6992, fol. 45\textsuperscript{r}, Walsingham to Burghley, 12 Apr. 1576.} Four days later, Burghley, Sussex, Leicester and Walsingham, again citing the “cause commune de la Religion,” complained to Orange of the Flushingers’ abuses. The councillors’ language was highly condemnatory: calling the people of Flushing disordered and barbarous [“desordez et barbarez”], they noted that the attacks could not tend to anything but the total collapse of the Protestant cause in the Low Countries.\footnote{TNA: PRO, SP 70/138, fol. 44\textsuperscript{r}, Burghley, Sussex, Leicester and Walsingham to Orange, 16 Apr. 1576.}
Notwithstanding the Flushingers’ piracies, Elizabeth’s decision to decline the countship proved deeply unpopular with Orange’s sympathisers in London, who sought to scapegoat Burghley for his mistress’ reticence. Herle passed on rumours in March that “yo’ L. hath bin y⁰ only let & overthrowe of this Holland service, dissuading her M⁰ from that enterprise, where otherwise the Erells of Leicester & Sussex were earnest favourers & furtherers of yt.” Prizing Walsingham as a friend to the Hollanders, Herle’s letter also identified a mood of popular disquiet regarding Elizabeth’s policy in general:

This unworT/thy proceeding they say w⁰ in forein nations does make us y⁰ hated of / men in y⁰ world, & to be condempned ... as those yt do / put on Religion, pietye, & justice for a cloke, to serve humours <withal> ... while polycye only is made bothe Justice, Religion, & / God with us.¹³⁹

The acerbic tone of Herle’s comments echo those made by many of the queen’s subjects in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s, disseminating a distinctly critical assessment of royal authority. In this sense, Herle’s comments are comparable to those of Parker, who had condemned Elizabeth’s “machiavel” government; and Sandys, who had bewailed what he saw as the strengthening of Catholic influence within the realm, due to the queen’s ‘merciful’ laxness in punishing idolaters.¹⁴⁰ Herle’s own standpoint was far from neutral: he was himself a friend to Orange’s ambassadors – remaining in close contact with Buys, whom he met only four days prior to his communication of 14 March – and was set to become more closely linked to Leicester and Walsingham over the course of the 1580s.¹⁴¹

Herle was not alone in criticizing aspects of the queen’s policy, and doing so in such a way as to imply that her entitlement to rule was distinctly conditional. In April 1576, the military commander John Grey wrote to Burghley to express his consternation, claiming that Elizabeth should accept sovereignty of Holland and Zeeland at least for “the defence of her own country, for then she will be able to beat all prynces out of her seas at her pleasure.”¹⁴² He proceeded:

> There is a thowsand tymes more <danger> / in makinge this peace nowe betwyne the prynce / of Orange and the spanyards then in maintayning / the warres. The Inquisition of Spayne hath / a longe taile, and where you weare wont to / deale w⁰ the States ... you / shall have now to deale w⁰ the taile of the / Inquisition... [you] ought to seke to / destroy Idolatry and further the gospell, and w⁰ such / fryndeship ought to be kept, and not wyth turks / & Idolaters w⁰ ar blude suckers... the Spanyards now understandinge the / great wealth of the Countrey and the nature of the people ... will seeke but warres, and afterwards levie / suche great sums of money [with which] they would weary all the world.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 220rv, Herle to Burghley, 14 Mar. [1576]. This is the only allusion I have come across which references Sussex as a proponent of military intervention.
¹³⁹ TNA: PRO, SP 70/137, fol. 220v.
¹⁴⁰ See Chap. 3, section 4 of this thesis.
¹⁴² TNA: PRO, SP 70/138, fol. 72⁵, Grey to Burghley, 22 Apr. 1576.
¹⁴³ TNA: PRO, SP 70/138, fol. 72⁶-73v.
Grey’s stridently animalistic language echoed tropes found in contemporary Orangist pamphlets: namely, of a bestial inquisition set to infiltrate and ensnare the Low Countries, and of a Spanish crown resolved upon universal hegemony. His conflation of religious and racial identities – comparing the Spanish to heathen “Turks” and “bloodsuckers” – deployed a polemical *topos* of mapping distinctions between Catholics and Protestants onto notions of ethno-racial difference.\(^{144}\) It is telling, however, that he left his strongest argument – the threat of French impatronisation – until last, noting that “if the ffrench once get into it theye will trouble all England / & Spayne to get them owt agayne.”\(^ {145}\)

Claims such as Grey’s and Herle’s that the continuance of Elizabeth’s reign and the very survival of Protestantism were contiguous with the success of Orange’s cause, reflect a militant Protestant drift in Elizabethan high politics. Figures higher up in the establishment voiced similar sentiments to “second tier” men of affairs such as Cotton and Herle, and hawks such as Grey. In February, Mildmay appealed to the Commons for a subsidy “to put in order and maintain [the queen’s] forces by land and by sea to answer any thing that shall be attempted against her and us.”\(^ {146}\) Elizabeth’s benevolence had placed her kingdom in danger of retaliatory attacks: “for that this Realm is also a merciful Sanctuary for such poor Christians as fly hither for succour; so as now one of the most principal cares that we ought to [have]... is both to consider aforehand the dangers that may come by the malice of Enemies, and to provide in time how to resist them.” Both on this and other occasions, Mildmay implied that the queen should acknowledge her religious obligation to intervene on Orange’s behalf, uniting all Protestants against the “bondage of Rome.”\(^ {147}\) In response, the puritan MP Peter Wentworth intimated that the queen’s failure to yield to “sound counsel” and execute Mary Stewart had roused God to unleash his “great indignation” upon her realm. Elizabeth’s tendency to commit “dangerous faults,” he thundered, now threatened to destroy her status as Christ’s earthly lieutenant.\(^ {148}\) Wentworth’s declaration that the continuation of the queen’s reign rested on her commitment to extirpate her Catholic enemies and idolatry at home, as well as spear-heading the cause of foreign Protestants, evidenced an increasingly fine line between constructive counsel and monarchic reproof.\(^ {149}\)

By the early spring of 1576, it was known that Requesens’ death had thrown the political situation in the Low Countries into further chaos. On 7 March, Rogers informed Burghley of the governor-general’s death, adding that although the king’s party were inclined towards peace, “the country goes

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144 Just as French Italians were demonised as parasitical imposters in contemporary Huguenot print and, increasingly, English political discourse. See Chs. 2 and 3 of this thesis.
145 TNA: PRO, SP 70/138, fol. 73r.
146 *The Journals of all the Parliaments during the reign of Queen Elizabeth* (1682), pp. 236-251. Mildmay’s speech to the Commons on 10 Feb. 1576.
147 See *ODNB* entry for Walter Mildmay (London, 1885-1900), p. 389, which cites BL Cotton. MS. Calig. C. ix. 49.
more and more to ruin" and “there is great fear here lest some sedition arise amongst the soldiers with respect to their [unpaid] stipends.” Sir John Smith also wrote to Sir John Thynne of the uncertain situation, which he summarised as “nether pease nor war, nor good agreement.”

The Low Countries were, indeed, in a chaotic state. Although the Council of State at Brussels remained officially in charge of the Spanish-controlled provinces, the leaderships of Flanders, Hainault and Brabant now sought accommodation with the rebel provinces of Holland and Zeeland. Representatives from all five provinces professed to share common goals: namely, the withdrawal of all “strangers” from their lands; a confirmation of their traditional rights and privileges, including the role of the States General in self-governance; and the acceptance of Calvinist worship. For her part, Elizabeth’s attitude seems to have grown more bellicose. In June 1576, she dispatched Winter to negotiate a ceasefire between Orange and the king’s army, with instructions to stress that her “forces and meanes of defence ... are not, thankes be to god, so weak or feeble but that she shalbe able to defend hir selfe against [Philip] or anie other prince that shall ... attempt anie thinge againyst her.”

Yet, in the face of a series of Spanish victories – including the surrender of Zierikzee on 2 July – she subsequently resolved to offer only financial support to the rebels.

To what extent, therefore, did the years 1572 to 1576 mark a key in the development of Elizabeth’s policy towards the Low Countries? My analysis of events from 1572 to 1576 suggests that with the military revival of Orange’s revolt in the spring of 1572, a variety of factors threatened to precipitate the queen’s military intervention. This was initially discouraged by news of St. Bartholomew’s (which removed the threat of French intervention), and by Orange’s defeats and Alba’s military reconquest, after which the queen resolved to maintain a formally nonaligned status in which she could resume stable relations with both the Low Countries and Spain.

An analysis of Elizabethan political correspondence over the course of summer 1572 to summer 1576 also throws up some significant findings. It would appear that, while St. Bartholomew’s was regarded by privy councillors such as Leicester, and military commanders such as Gilbert, as a major setback to what they claimed to see as a universal Protestant cause, it also exerted a profound psychological hold over those who feared copy-cat style massacres in the Low Countries. Mendoza’s embassy to England in 1574 elicited much cynical comment from privy councillors, including Burghley and Walsingham. ‘Anti-Spanish’ suspicions were shared further down the social scale and it is worth noting the strongly
hispanophobic comments made by Protestant commanders such as Cotton and Gilbert, and the merchant Bradley, as well as Cecil’s Catholic informant Bodenham.

The queen’s policy remained dictated by a mixture of confessional and secular concerns. Despite the increasingly Protestant character of the privy council, it is clear that the risk of provoking war with Spain and of encouraging French territorial expansion influenced her to reject calls to openly intervene in the revolt. Arguably, this drive became imperative following Charles IX’s death and the succession of Henry III – believed to be far more antagonistic to Elizabeth’s regime than his late brother – and following what was considered to be a possible Spanish invasion in 1574. Yet there were other complicating factors which influenced the queen’s policy and which also prevented her from adopting a strictly confessionalised position. As Adams has argued, when the countship over Holland and Zeeland was offered to her in 1575/76, Elizabeth’s decision to decline it may be attributed as much to her anger at Dutch piratical attacks as to her unwillingness to alienate Spain.\(^\text{154}\)

Nonetheless, Elizabeth continued to assist co-operative Protestant attempts to furnish the Dutch rebels with naval and military supplies.\(^\text{155}\) This problematizes assessments such as Wilson’s that Elizabeth instinctively recoiled from aiding rebels, and that her policy up until 1585 was marred by inconsistency and indecisiveness – a claim also made by many of her councillors.\(^\text{156}\) In the same vein, MacCaffrey’s judgment that Elizabeth manifested a “distaste for aiding other princes’ rebels” and a “cold indifference to their religious views” should also be questioned.\(^\text{157}\) On the other hand, it is still uncertain whether the queen’s flexible approach to constantly changing circumstances constituted an unambiguously “Protestant foreign policy” in which religious solidarity was the \textit{sine qua non}, as Trim avers.\(^\text{158}\) Acknowledging that her personal views may have been ambiguous, it is certainly what many of her leading ministers pushed for, and believed they might induce her to accept. While Leicester remained a staunch advocate of military intervention in the Low Countries, Secretary Walsingham had clearly emerged as a leading backer of the Dutch Protestant cause by 1574.

Having outlined the political correspondence of the period, it should be noted that a diverse range of pamphlet literature concerning the revolt in the Low Countries appeared in English print from 1572-76. The next chapter will examine the features of these tracts, highlighting occasions where there was a marked overlap with the tone, style or content of the political correspondence – evidencing a rising pressure from radical Protestants concerning English intervention in the Low Countries.

\(^{154}\) Adams, “Sovereignty of the Netherlands,” p. 316.
\(^{156}\) C. Wilson, \textit{Elizabeth and the revolt of the Netherlands} (The Hague, 1979).
Chapter 6. Coverage of the revolt in the Low Countries in Elizabethan print (1572-76)

The first broader phase of the revolt in the Low Countries (1567-78), much like the French wars with which it was loosely contemporaneous, was as much a war of words as of deeds. Philip’s opponents were quick to promote their cause as a principled, patriotic defence of the “vaderland.”¹ From 1567 onwards, much comment concerned the nature of provincial privileges – customarily renewed under the terms of the sovereign’s “Joyeuse entrée”² – which proceeded to develop into lines of resistance theory. Under the aegis of Orange’s chief advisor, Jacob van Wesenbeke (d.1577), the States of Holland and Zeeland issued tracts aimed at inspiring concerted action by all seventeen provinces from 1570 onwards.³ The impact of these works in their domestic context should not be underestimated: prior to 1573, many were suppressed and their authors severely punished by the authorities.⁴ They were also the primary means by which Orange’s advisors Jacob van Wesenbeke and Philippe Marnix van St. Aldegonde solicited forms of international aid.⁵

This begs the question: which of these works reached Elizabethan England, and what representations of the revolt did they disseminate? As with the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s, manuscript reports – which are another means of assessing contemporary attitudes – are unfortunately scarce: besides an English translation of Marnix van St. Aldegonde’s A True Narrative... of things Happened, in the Base Countries touching the cause of religione the yeare of our Lord, 1566, there exists only one handwritten record of military news: Walter Morgan’s beautifully illustrated chronicle (c.1572-74), presented directly to Burghley in 1574.⁶ In contrast, there survives much contemporary print from the initial stages of the conflict – rich with attendant military, political and religious detail – which has received virtually no attention.⁷ Historians may have been deterred by the fact that, as Paul Hoftijzer has observed of the 17th century, evidence for Anglo-Dutch print networks remains scant, problematising questions of printed works’ dissemination and reception.⁸
Yet other key questions may usefully be asked of this material, namely: what forms of comment appeared in English print from 1572-76? What overlap, if any, did these pamphlets have with contemporaneous political debates about intervention? How were key figures such as Orange, Philip II and Alba represented? And in what sense was 1572 (the year of St. Bartholomew’s, the revolt’s revival, and the beginnings of Alba’s counter-offensive), or 1575/76, significant turning points? My analysis will consider aspects of form as well as content, considering whether the production of specific pamphlets may ever have been stimulated by ‘sui generis’ Elizabethan political interests.

1. Data on imported news translated into English

Dunthorne has established that of over 10,000 pamphlets and books published in the Low Countries over the course of the Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648), about 120 titles were translated into English and published, mostly in London, for an English readership. My own research into the scale and content of tracts published from 1568-76 (prior to the Sack of Antwerp) suggests that news on the Low Countries remained second only to news on France in terms of popularity. In addition, it is clear that Elizabethan readers were exposed to an overwhelmingly Orangist interpretation of the revolt: of thirteen translated works (including two multiple editions), ten may be classified as political propaganda. Of the total number, five are shorter than twenty pages; while eight are considerably longer: as much as 176 pages. Only two tracts of 1573 are specifically Protestant in concern, referring primarily to the international cause of the Reformed faith. While most of the tracts in English print were drawn from Dutch language originals, three offer a more uncertain provenance, with no verification for their claims to have been translated from Dutch or French originals. In addition, a growing number of original English accounts of events in the Low Countries were published from 1576 onwards – including personal accounts of military endeavours on the part of ex-soldiers and commanders.

9 Dunthorne, “Anglo-Dutch publishing... (1568-1648)”, p. 109.
10 STCs 540; 5182 (and 5182.2); 5787; 15527; 17865; 18441; 25708; 25710; 25712. See appendix 2 of this thesis for full titles.
11 STCs 5182, 5182.2, 13570, 13578, 17865.
12 Including Arthur Golding’s impressive A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge agaynst the false sclaunders, wherewith his ilwillers goe about to charge him wrongfully (London: 1575; STC 25712).
13 Namely, A brief and true rehersall of the noble victory ... which (by the grace of God) the Protestantes of the north partes... had against the Duke of Alba... October 1573 (London: 1573; STC 13570). A true rehersall of the honorable & tryu[tm]phant victory: which the defenders of the trueth haue had againste the tyranical ... heape of ye Albanists... withoute ... Harlam in Holland... Marche. 1573. (London, 1573; STC 13578).
14 Anon. [tr. T. W.], An answer and true discourse to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba ... to those of Amsterdam... Set forth by certayn true louers of their native country... (London, 1573; STC 540); Middleborow. A briefe rehersall of the accorde and agreement... (London, 1574; STC 17865); Certein letters wherein is set forth a Discourse of the peace... (London, 1576; STC 15527).
15 Such as Thomas Churchyard, Thomas Morgan and Sir Roger Williams, all of whom served for extended periods in the Low Countries. Cf. Ch. 8.
Interestingly, the chronology of these items of news seems to have been more jumbled than those which originated in France: the first English edition of *A justification or clearing of the prince of Orendge against the false sclaunderes wherewith his ilwillers goe about to charge him* appeared in 1575, seven years after its issuance in Dutch. Similarly, *Certain letters wherein is set forth a Discourse of the peace that was attempted ... by the Lords and States of Holland and Zelande in... 1574* was not issued until 1576, a good two years after its original publication. Other works were published on multiple occasions, often several years apart. There were two editions of Orange’s formal manifesto *A defence and true declaration of the things lately done in the lowe countrey*: one issued in 1571/72 and another in 1580. Since there is no evidence to suggest that these works were reissues of earlier editions, one might conclude that printing news items on the revolt was not only, or even primarily, driven by considerations of topicality. Reviewing the domestic context of these works, besides their thematic and structural features, will thus help to establish their particular resonance to contemporary readers.

2. *Printers, purveyors and translators*

There must have been extensive trade contacts between printers in the Low Countries and English printers and booksellers but little hard evidence of these contacts has been preserved. It has been noted that John Day, by far the most prolific Elizabethan publisher of news tracts on events in the Low Countries, employed a range of exiled journeymen, typefounders and printers at his shop in Aldersgate. The extent to which he relied on these Dutch Protestant émigrés is suggested by John Foxe’s request to Cecil, dated 6 July 1568, that the privy council waive a regulation limiting the number of strangers employed by any print shop so that Foxe’s “Martyrology might be sooner printed.” Day, a client of Burghley, Leicester and Parker, also exploited close links with exiled journeymen to secure certain market advantages, having purchased a new stock of type from the émigré Anthony de Solemne (who, following his arrival into Norwich in 1567, issued a Dutch-language edition of Calvinist psalms by Petrus Dathenus). The fact that Day would later publish two English editions of the *Libellus Supplex* [Eng: *A defence and true declaration of the things lately done in the low country*], a hugely influential, anti-Spanish account of the revolt’s origins by Dathenus, and a 1575 pamphlet translated by Arthur Golding – *A justification or cleering of the prince of Orenge*

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16 Knuttel 163.
17 STCs 25712 and 15527.
18 [Anon. trans.], *A defen[ce] and true declaration off the[ ] thinges lately done in the lowe countrey, whereby may easelie be seen to whom all the beginning and cause of the late troubles... is to be imputed...* (London: John Day, 1571; STC 18441).
(London; STC 25712)– suggests close Anglo-Dutch channels of transmission.\textsuperscript{21} Day had operated presses in both London and Antwerp under the reign of Mary Tudor, and his location in Norfolk at the time of his arrest in October 1554 suggests an ongoing link between East Anglian and Flemish print networks.\textsuperscript{22}

Besides Day, the leading English printers of news on the revolt of the Low Countries were stationers of experience, if not the highest standing: namely, Henry Bynneman, Thomas Marsh, Henry Middleton and Richard Jones (with Jones often issuing works under John Charlwood’s imprint). At least five of these also printed political tracts relating to French wars – to wit, Bynneman, Middleton, Charlwood, Christopher Barker, and William Williamson\textsuperscript{23} – suggesting that the enterprises of Dutch and French news were closely linked, if not congruent. Williamson, for example, who printed the French edition of Hotman’s \textit{De furoribus Gallicis [Discours simple & veritable]},\textsuperscript{24} issued a tract the following year on the efforts of Protestant princes to aid their coreligionists, entitled \textit{Certayne newes of the ... helpe of the Christian princes and nobles ... for ... the poore Christians in the low Countries}.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, émigrés such as George Bishop and Francis Coldocke – Calvinists from the Low Countries who were to publish tracts on the wars in their homelands – gained a foothold in the English print trade.\textsuperscript{26} Confessional sympathies and commercial imperatives may have motivated the activities of these men in equal measure: having nosed into the industry by publishing short, cheaper titles on the French wars, younger stationers such as Bynneman and Middleton may have issued news from the Low Countries to secure their niche in an increasingly competitive market (not having, at this stage, an established patron to support them). Such shorter items, deliberately selected to appeal to popular interests, could be financed and issued on a bookseller’s own initiative.

Information on translators is comparatively scarce. Excepting Arthur Golding, who autographed his work, most translations were issued anonymously. The translator “T. W.” who translated two Dutch pamphlets for Henry Middleton in 1573 (and who, judging by his initialling of subsequent works, 

\textsuperscript{21} Anon., \textit{A defence and true declaration of the thinges lately done in the lowe countrey} (London, STC 18441); the second edition is not recorded by the ESTC. Although subsequent research has argued, not entirely convincingly, for different authorship: see T. Ruys, \textit{Petrus Dathenus} (Utrecht, 1919), pp. 265-67 for Dathenus’s authorship, and D. Nauta’s “Marnix auteur van de Libellus Supplex aan de rijksdag van Spiers (1570)”\textit{, Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis,} 55 (1975), pp. 151-70, for Marnix’s. M. van Gelderen points out that Nauta’s argument is rather flimsily predicated on the similarity between a letter by Marnix and various editions of the Libellux Supplex- see: \textit{The political thought of the Dutch Revolt,} p. vx, fn.12.

\textsuperscript{22} Loades, \textit{Politics, Censorship}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{23} Rafe Newbery also produced texts (for Bynneman) and Francis Coldocke (for Bynneman and Middleton). See Appendices 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{24} STC 13847.5.

\textsuperscript{25} (London, 1574?; STC 5182.2).

\textsuperscript{26} Respectively: \textit{A lamentable discourse of the fall of Hughe Sureau} (London, 1573; STC 7369) and \textit{A supplication exhibited to the moste mightie Prince Philip king of Spain} (London, 1577; STC 5791). Both printers were admitted as Freemen of the Stationers Company in 1562; see \textit{Stationers Registers}, I, 77-78.
went on to enjoy an active career until 1595) may have been a foreign agent who supplied the printer with news copy as well as accurate translations. Martin van Gelderen, who suggested the Magdalene college, Cambridge university graduate Elias Newcomen (1550-1614) as the translator of Orange’s *Libellus Supplicium* [Eng: A defence and true declaration of thinges lately done in the lowe countrey], seems to imply that young scholars – well-situated to receive news of the wars via the channel ports of East Anglia – played a role in translating several Latin Ür-texts.27

3. **Themes and features of early Elizabethan news regarding the Low Countries (1572-76)**

The form and content of early English news on the revolt in the Low Countries varies considerably, reflecting the heterogeneity of interests amongst the coalition of forces who opposed Philip, as well as those of the wider reading public (including foreigners) to whom they were directly or indirectly addressed. Prior to 1575, the quality of print and typesetting appears to have been poor, suggesting that the early materials had a relatively low-level of prestige.28 Only two of the works I have consulted bear any form of illustration: Orange’s coat of arms appears only on the title pages of *A supplication to the Kings Majestie of Spayne, made by the Prince of Orange* (1573) and *A brief and true rhearsall... of the noble victory and overthrow... [which] the Protestants of the north partes of Holland had against the Duke of Alba* (1573). This is not entirely atypical: many early news accounts published in French and Dutch lacked images,29 although the propaganda of both sides became increasingly well-illustrated as the wars progressed.30 But the general absence of any form of illustration across the years 1572-76 also implies that this specific bracket of foreign news fell towards the cheaper end of the market. This supposition is in keeping with the heavy typesetting of many of these works, most of which appear in a dark and dated gothic font.31

Notwithstanding their rather cheap feel, some important themes emerge from an analysis of their contents. Tropes include: the use of providential rhetoric to sanctify the “Protestant” cause and to attract foreign, princely aid; political justifications for the revolt as an act of principled opposition; the persistent demonization of Phillip II’s ministers and royal proxies (allowing, for a time at least, the maintenance of monarchic prestige); and charges of cruelty and dishonour levelled against the ‘Spanish’ army (especially their pride, cruelty and bloodlust). Although this chapter will examine

28 Discussed in this chapter below, section 4.
30 See D. R. Horst, *Propagandaprenten uit de Nederlandse Opstand 1566-1584* (Zutphen, 2003) which includes a lot of images from the late 1570s onwards. The digital collections of Leiden University (http://disc.leidenuniv.nl), also include a range of prints from ‘Dutch Revolt’ literature of the 1580s and 1590s.
31 E.gs: STCs 540; 5182; 5182.2; 13570; 13578; 17865.

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each topos in turn, it should be noted that pamphleteers’ lines of argument were often closely interlinked.

**i) Direct appeals to God and to contemporary readers**

Only a few translated pamphlets concerning the revolt in the Low Countries appealed directly to the reader by means of a preface or second person address. These included *A declaration and publication of the most worthy Prince of Orange, contayning the cause of his necessary defence against the Duke of Alba* and Golding’s translation of *A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge agaynst the false sclaunders, wherewith his ilwillers goe about to charge him wrongfully*. The majority simply reproduced documents as they would have appeared in their original context – so that Orange’s *A supplication to the Kinges Maiestie of Spayne*, published in 1573, and a copy of the 1576 Pacification of Ghent, entitled *A treatise of the peace made and concluded between the states of the lowe Countries... and the Prince of Orenge...* were issued as unglossed sources of information (i.e. without prefaces, marginalia, appendices, etc.). While the lack of analytical or explanatory comment may well have functioned to legitimate these works as “faithful” news, it also suggests that Elizabethan commentators were somewhat bemused by events abroad and/or that they shied away from directly endorsing them. This is unsurprising: the implications of promoting literature which justified rebellion placed printers and publishers in a sensitive domestic situation, given that they were published at a time when Elizabeth was professing a policy of official neutrality.

The vast majority of these tracts feature entreaties to God on their title-pages – conveying an unambiguous sense that Orange’s supporters were ‘on the right side.’ *A defence and true declaration of the thinges lately done in the lowe countrey* opened with the following appeal from Psalm 43: “Give sentence with me ... and defend my cause against the ungodly people: O deliver me from the deceitful and wicked man.” The title-page of the 1573 *A Supplication to the Kinges Maiestie of Spayne* sounded a note of even humbler supplication, drawn from Psalm 82: “Defend the poore and fatherlesse... Deliver the outcast and poore, save them from the hande of the ungodly.” *A Supplication* proceeded to argue that Phillip’s subjects expected him to act as a godly magistrate – i.e. respecting “the dutifull office of a kinge, whom the almightie God, the kinge of all kinges, hath placed and ordeyned as a protector of the righteous.” Such appeals echoed the calls made by the rebels for Philip to be a father to his people, seeming to supplant the king’s authority with that of an even sterner patriarch.

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32 (London: J. Day; STC 25708) and (London, 1575; STC 25710).
33 (London, 1573; STC 25710) and (London, 1576; STC 18448).
34 (London: 1572; STC 18441), title-page.
35 STC 25710, title-page.
36 STC 25710, sigs. A2v-A3r.
By the middle of the decade, the titular rhetoric of many English titles had become far less accommodating. In 1575, Golding’s translated *A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge* – which featured three psalms on its title-page – enjoined God to “destroye them that speake lyes,” condemning those who “imbattell them selves against the soule of the righteous.”37 These imprecations were held to mirror the beliefs of Orange’s own forces, associating their cause securely with those of the Dutch-speaking Calvinists of Holland and Zeeland. Having sacked Delft, a contingent of his soldiers excused their actions – which included massacring the Catholic priests they found – by asserting that their leader “could not be victorious as long as the aforesaid [priests] persisted with their idolatry in the town.”38 The fact that a sizeable minority – if not the silent majority – of Orange’s forces were not Calvinist, and that the prince himself had only just converted, exposes these misleading claims to orthodoxy. But mapping religious dichotomies onto the revolt was clearly intended to further legitimate Orange’s cause and to secure international backing. In this sense, the purpose of the translated Dutch pamphlets may be compared to French Calvinist attempts to frame accounts of Coligny’s murder unequivocally as a Protestant martyrdom.39

**ii) Justifying the revolt: representations of Spanish rule and proto-patriotic rhetoric**

A grossly distorted image of Habsburg rule was disseminated in Orangist print from the earliest years of the revolt. As Alistair Duke has shown, prior to 1570, works of rebel propaganda invoked a unified national consciousness, with Orange and his polemicists addressing their appeals to “the whole of the Low Countries,” “the common fatherland” (*vaderland*), and to “lovers of the liberties of the fatherland.”40 Typical Orangist proclamations of the 1560s enjoined their readers to rise up against a foreign oppressor in order to ensure the “well-being, freedom and law of your dear fatherland as well as your own welfare, life, your wife, children, property and heirs.”41

The ubiquity of these claims was – in line with those of French Calvinist literature – quick to percolate into English print. Orange’s 1568 manifesto, *A declaration and publication of the most worthy prince of Orange, containing the cause of his necessary defence against the duke of Alva*, and the 1571 edition of *A defence and true declaration of the things lately done in the lowe Countrey*, both published by Day, a client of Leicester’s, stated that Orange’s opposition was driven purely by love of

37 Title page to STC 25712, citing psalms 5, 17 and 94. See appendix 8 of this thesis.
39 Cf. Ch. 3, section 3: iii) of this thesis.
41 Ibid., p. 228.
his country. The former contained references to the prince’s “allies and frendes” being “constrained... to take in hand this our defence” – thus aiming to legitimate Orange’s cause as one of communal defence.  

The translator of A defence and true declaration (pub. 1571/72) went one step further, fashioning his text into the form of a learned tract, including a table of contents at the beginning and numerous scholarly notes and references in the margins. (Following Gelderen’s identification, the scholar Newcomen was clearly skilled enough to produce such a work, having matriculated for his M.A. studies at Magdalene College in 1572.) This use of academic rubric might work to support Guaras’s claims that those at court had backed the publication of the pamphlet in order to incite élite support, given their appeal to an educated, and therefore more limited, readership.

The content of the text also heralded the revolt as a defence of native freedoms. It extended the account of the revolt’s origins provided in the 1568 tract back to “before the Duke of Alva his coming.” Condemning attempts by Granvelle (“this stranger and upstart, born of a base degree and most obscure parentage”) to usurp civil government, the treatise reiterated that Phillip was bound by contractual obligations under Roman law as well as local custom: by swearing an oath at his Joyeuse Entrée, the king had agreed to maintain the “will and assent of the estates of the whole country.”

Although it was not baldly stated, the tract implied that Philip had dishonoured his promises to appoint native governors with an avowed interest in maintaining civic freedoms.

A reimagining of the revolt in the Low Countries as a licit defence of traditional privileges – in essence, as a constitutionally-grounded struggle – was reiterated throughout. A key passage called for the revocation of harmful edicts (such as those curtailing Calvinist religious practices) and for the convocation of “some lawful assembly of the estates or Parliament.” Gelderen argues that Newcomen selected the word “parliament” for the Latin “ordinum legitima comitia ad Rempublicam” to imply a form of proto-republican sovereignty vested in a centralised body. The choice of this term

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42 STCs 25708 and 18441.
43 Anon.,A declaration and publication of the most worthy prince of Orange, contayning the cause of his necessary defence against the duke of Alva... (London: J. Day, 1568; STC 25708), sig. A3.
44 Not present in the original Latin tract, entitled “Libellus supplex imperatoriae maiestati caeterisque”, dated 1570. For the text of A defence and true declaration, see Van Gelderen’s modern English translation in The Political thought of the Dutch Revolt, pp. 1-77.
47 A defence and true declaration (modern ed.), tittlepage.
48 Ibid., p. 20.
49 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
50 A defence and true declaration (modern ed.), p. 50.
51 Ibid., p. 50. Cf. Libellus Supplex (1570), fol. 58b.
also seems designed, however, to associate the rebel struggle with the (supposed) checks and balances of Elizabeth’s government. *A defence and true declaration* then followed the Latin original in citing a letter supposedly sent from Philip’s ambassador to an unnamed official, which read:

> [T]here will arise unto the king great fruit and commodity by the incommodious tumults of Belgium, because by this occasion, the king will bring them to full obedience and subjection, and reduce the state into that form and order of government unto the which his ancestors could never attain.\(^52\)

This passage constitutes the earliest surviving claim in English print that Philip would seek to advance and justify his own *monarchia* by appealing to the chaos caused by the recent wars. The English wording is telling – by supplying “state” for the Latin “status,” the translator suggested that Philip had always had the intention of undermining his subjects’ native traditions, being unwilling to anticipate the “tumults” that would ensue.\(^53\) These charges would become increasingly strident as the 1570s progressed: by 1576, the English translation of the Pacification of Ghent was claiming that, before Philip, “no Spanish Lord or King has ever subjected our country unto himself.”\(^54\)

The text of *A defence and true declaration* also denied that the revolt had explicitly religious objectives. Rather, it condemned nameless “Spanish Inquisitors” for employing arguments about religious uniformity in order to violate customary privileges. Using the third person to suggest that the king’s mind had been poisoned against his own subjects, one passage stated: “[the inquisitors] think that they may lawfully enforce upon us the Spanish laws and ordinances, Spanish manners and the Spanish yoke of inquisition, abrogating all our laws.”\(^55\) This reveals as much a concern with cultural hegemony as with political or religion oppression. After pages of rather tedious narrative describing the political backdrop to the wars, the text then harangued the reader:

> Can any man now doubt, what it is that these men have heretofore laboured to bring to pass[?]... Or is there any man so blind that can not see what has been the cause and origin of these aforesaid tumults[?]... I mean the good masters and bishops of the Spanish Inquisition, [who] have from the beginning, only gone about to alienate the King’s mind from his subjects, and ... accuse them of rebellion.\(^56\)

By purporting to appeal to an impartial reader, *A defence* promoted a shared moral standpoint in favour of a rebellion aimed against tyrannical clerics. It also alluded to the imprisonment of Don Carlos, Philip’s mad son, as a consequence of his father’s susceptibility to evil counsel. The text claimed that, just as those at the Spanish court had moved “his Majesty against his ... onely sonne... so

\(^{52}\) *A defense and true declaration* (modern ed.), p. 66.


\(^{54}\) In Gelderen: *A treatise of the peace made and concluded between the states of the lowe Countries ... and the Prince of Orenge, the states of Holland and Zeland ... published the 8. day of November. With the agreement and confirmation of the King’s maiestie as followeth* (London: W. Booth, 1576; STC 18448), p. 108.

\(^{55}\) *A defense and true declaration* (modern ed.), p. 19.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., pp. 64-65.
farre as to committe [Don Carlos] to prison,” so they had stopped Orange’s “complaintes and supplications” from reaching the king and prevented “any audience geven unto us.”

The above passage, with its metaphorical allusions to royal blindness, foreshadowed Golding’s preamble to A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge (pub. 1575), which argued that the Catholic officials of the Low Countries “do so stoppe the eares and blynd the eyes of Princes with their horrible leazynges... as they nother can see the wronges done to their subjectes by those ministers of Antichrist, nor herken to their just complayntes, that they might understand them and redresse them.” Just as the text of A justification argued that Alba’s administration had enforced “men either to most miserable thraldom, of conscience ... and of body,” so A defence reserved its wrath for those Spanish Habsburg officials who “under the colour of defending the Pope’s religion... might oppress the whole liberty of the citizens in Belgium” just as they had done in Naples, Sicily, Milan, the Americas, Spain, and the German provinces. Both pamphlets analogised the situation of Calvinist dissidents in the Low Countries with the suffering of those supposedly oppressed in other Habsburg domains, serving to stress the cruelty and self-interestedness of Spanish rule. They thereby worked to revive the anti-hispanism of several materials published in English at the time of Mary Tudor’s Spanish marriage in 1553-54, suggesting a revival of the Black Legend tradition that had lain relatively dormant in English print.

A dubious distinction was thus long maintained in English print regarding just whom the rebels were fighting: until at least 1575, the casus belli was deemed to be the tyrannical conduct of Philip’s viceroys and their immediate advisors, rather than the king himself. Monarchic prestige was upheld with the use of formalities addressed “to the Kinges Majestie of Spayne... from his faithfull subjects of the low Countreys.” To what extent this was simply a construct of rebel propaganda or a sincere acknowledgment of Philip’s sovereignty is uncertain. In his 1573 Supplication, Orange appealed to his “moste Soveraigne Lorde,” making the tall claim that “these your naturall low countreys...

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57 Ibid., 18441, sig. B1.
58 [Anon.], A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge (London, 1575; STC 25712), sigs. A4v. The preface is not in the original Dutch I have consulted (Knuttel 163) – although the French original remains untraced.
59 Ibid., sig. A4v.
60 A defense and true declaration, pp. 64-65.
61 Ibid. and STC 25712, sig. A6.
62 See Hillgarth The Mirror of Spain, pp. 353-57, for discussion of A supplicacyon to the Quenes Majestie (place of pub. stated to be London, but likely published abroad; 1555); A Warnynge for Enlande, conteyning the horrible practises of the Kyng of Spayne in the Kyngdome of Naples… (1555); and John Bradforth’s Letter sent to... the Erles of Arundel, Darbie, Shrewsburye and Penbroke, declaring the nature of Spaniardes (1556?).
63 Christopher Goodman, How superior powers oght to be obeyd (Geneva, 1558) and John Ponet, A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power (Strasbourg?, 1556); Loades, Philip and Mary, p. 24 and fn. 30.
64 N.B. sources in the Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (ed. Kossmann and Mellink) pp. 87, 199, 209, suggest that the rebels initially attempted to legitimate their resistance by appealing to Philip as his true subjects.
always have been most faithful and obedient, both to your Majesty, and also [to] your Graces predecessors. The tract averred that Phillip’s “subjectes” did not “desire to be dissolved from the obedience of your Majestie,” but only freed from “the yoke and bondage of forayne nations and Spanish Souldiours.” Similarly, the author of A true rehersall of the honorable & tryumphant victory: which the defenders of the trueth have had againste the ... Albanists...[at] Harlam (1573) maintained that he had only penned his account to “set before the eyes of all” the deeds of those who “from their hartes doe hate the intolerable yoke of bondage and Spanysh tirannie.” Such assertions worked to portray the rebels as Philip’s true vassals, struggling to maintain his sovereignty by ousting elements of a corrupt and tyrannous administration. These and other texts also suggested that the Calvinist rebel movement was neither inimical to overlordship nor monarchical rule, per se, but rooted in a sense of civic liberties.

iii) Depictions of Alba and St. Bartholomew’s

From the time of Alba’s appointment as governor-general in 1567, works of Orangist propaganda published in English directed considerable vitriol at the so-called ‘Iron Duke’ – a moniker coined as Alba was held to embody all the worst attributes of military brutality. While a fixation with the crimes of “the Alban Duke” is demonstrated in A defence and true declaration of 1571/2, it threatens to overwhelm the text of the 1573 Supplication, which is focussed largely on the doings of the “Albanish tyrant.” Allusions to the executed noblemen Egmont and Hoorne, and references to the Council of Troubles (1567-74), were used to evoke terrible images of indiscriminate persecution. Looming large as a metatextual threat, these give impetus to feverish accounts of battles and sieges also narrated in the pamphlets. One example, A brief and true rehersall of the noble victory... against the Duke of Alba ... the xii. of October. 1573, presented Alba as a “proude Philistine” who “continually thirsteth” after the “bloude of the innocent.” In this context, the description worked to justify the pamphlet-writer’s condemnation of the universal “tyranny of the Spaniards,” which, personified by the duke, would call down the “just judgement of God.”

These claims were undoubtedly influenced by news of St. Bartholomew’s, read as proof by many commentators of the perfidious, sadistic nature of all “papists.” As noted in chapter 3, the motif of

64 A Supplication to the Kinges Majestie of Spayne, made by the Prince of Orange... with all other his faithfull subjects of the low Countreys, presented suppressed by the tyranny of the Duke of Alba and the Spaniards (London: Henry Middleton, 1573; STC 25710), sig. A2v.
65 STC 25710, sig. F2.
66 STC 13578, sigs. A7v.
67 The first allusion is taken from A defense and true declaration (STC 18441) in Van Gelderen, Political thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 51; pp. 55-64 on Alba’s crimes. The second is from A Supplication (STC 25710), sig. F3v. Alba’s crimes are catalogued on sigs. E2-E4.
68 STC 13570, sigs. A2v, A3v, A7v.
69 STC 13570, sig. A6v.
Catholic leaders drinking the blood of the innocent had already been used in reference to Charles IX (whose “thirst” for blood had been stressed by one English news gatherer). Alba and his soldiers were readily tarred with the same brush – Walter Morgan’s manuscript account of Naarden’s destruction mocked those “silly” townsmen who thought they could appease “spanishe” fury with “raensishe wine” – noting that their attackers “thurstyd so mooche [more] for bloode.” The account was unambiguous in its identification of St. Bartholomew’s as the catalyst behind Alba’s strategy. Morgan noted that the duke, upon receiving letters from Charles IX concerning “the massaquer at parys,” had concluded that this was “the utter destruction of the cheeffest danger of the sivill warres in the lowe countrye,” that the French king had stooped “by hys owne force too cutte hys owne throtte.” The duke had then advised that the time was ripe for a similar attack on religious “newters” in the Low Countries – meaning those who appeared insufficiently zealous in their Catholic faith and/or who stood neutral in the conflict between the king and Orange.

The massacre clearly had an impact on how the cause of peace negotiations was phrased by Philip II’s rebels – despite the fact that the Spanish crown made consistent efforts to achieve a negotiated peace. In a meeting of the States-General in 1573, Orange declared that Catholic rulers, according to the doctrine of Constantine, were not obliged to keep their promises to heretics and that Charles IX himself had alluded to this when he ordered the killings of his own subjects. Shortly thereafter, rumours began circulating that a similar massacre would now occur in the Low Countries, at Philip’s instigation. A Latin pamphlet of 1574 even attributed the failure of Orange’s second uprising (in 1572) to the massacre alone, with which Alba was thought to have been involved. This was used to query the wisdom of trusting Requesens’ offer of a universal pardon, using the “Lutetianum Latrocinium” [‘the French war without just cause’] to warn against the perfidy of the Spanish: just as a peace treaty was signed in France and exploited for a massacre, so this too would occur in the Low Countries. In French language pamphlets of the period, printed by Orange’s supporters in the Low Countries, St. Bartholomew’s was also linked to the reintroduction of a “foreign” inquisition in the Low Countries, although these claims were slower to percolate into English print.

71 All Souls College, Codrington MS. CXXIX, fol. 19.
72 Ibid., fol. 11.
74 Geurts, Nederlandse Opstand in de Pamfletten, p. 174.
75 KL, Relations Politiques, VI, 534. 30 Sept. 1572; Ibid., VII. 8 July 1575.
But what of those works of Dutch and French news translated into English? Before 1576, it seems that there were no direct allusions to the massacre *per se* in news tracts relating to the Low Countries. This is a surprising omission but may be explained one of two ways: either the source record for these years is incomplete – and lost works may well have alluded more directly to the atrocity – or it may have taken several years for pamphleteers to fully yoke together their analysis of events. Nonetheless, as discussed below, many works of translated news published in English still seemed to imply that the kinds of violence being used by Alba’s army in the Low Countries were akin to the outrages employed by the French crown in 1572, and as such, representative of the murderous perfidy of all Catholic princes.

**iv) Demonising the “Spanish” soldiery (1572-76)**

The content of most early rebel / Orangist propaganda translated into English from 1572-76 repeatedly focused on the wickedness of Philip’s army. Collective allusions to “Spaniards” or, even more pejoratively, “the Spanyard,” collapsed distinctions between Philip’s governor-generals, the government at Brussels, and the manifold soldiers serving in the king’s ranks. This was wilful oversimplification: although a nucleus of Philip’s Flanders army was Italian and Spanish, thousands of German and Swiss mercenaries were drafted in to bolster Alba’s forces, besides the mustering of local (i.e. French Walloon and Dutch-speaking) troops. Duncan Caldecott-Baird has calculated that in 1567, 8,652 Spanish infantry and 1,250 cavalry were mobilised from their base in Italy to form the core of the army in Flanders: these can have constituted only three or four “Spanish” *tercios* in total. This figure was augmented by some 2,427 Spaniards who arrived in the autumn of 1568, and some 1,260 who accompanied the Duke of Medina Celi’s arrival in June 1572. Yet by 1572, of a total fighting force of 67,259, only 9,100 of Alba’s infantry were native Spaniards (a number dwarfed by the 24,440 Germans and 19,500 Dutch soldiers who fought alongside them). These latter were comprised of German mercenaries (*landsknechts* and *reiters*), native Burgundians and Walloons. But English pamphlets make only passing reference, at best, to the presence of non-Spanish soldiers in the king’s ranks, electing instead to supply xenophobic generalisations about the “Spanish” army.

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79 As is suggested by the spate of “alarum” pamphlets of the later 1570s. See my analysis in Ch.8, 3.
80 The *tercio*, a Spanish regiment, was likely so called because it consisted of three elements – pike-carriers, musketeers and harquebusiers. Each *tercio* contained 1,200 to 1,800 men drawn into 10 to 12 companies. See Caldecott-Baird, *Expedition in Holland*, p. 35, fn. 5.
81 Ibid., p. 35 and appendix C of the same.
82 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, appendices A and C for data on the size and composition of the army of Flanders, from 1567-1661, and 1567-1640, respectively, from where I have drawn these figures. See appendix B for information on the army’s military organisation.
83 For passing allusions to Germans and Walloons in Philip’s armies, see STC 13578, sigs. A6<sup>c</sup>v. STC 13570, sigs. A5, [A7].
During the campaigning seasons of 1572 and 1573, Elizabethan news pamphlets started to report Protestant victories against the “Spaniards” using increasingly sensationalistic language. Dated 12 March 1573, *An answer and true discourse to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba* – one of the pamphlets owned by Bedford who, in the spring of 1574, would be entrusted with readying West Country defences in expectation of a Spanish invasion – condemned the pitiless “tirannie of these blood suckers” and “bloudie houndes” in sacking towns which had surrendered on presumption of pardon (namely, Dendermonde, Mechelen and Oudenaarde in Flanders, and Bergen/Mons in Hainault). Philip’s army were therein continuously referred to as “the Spaniardes” and the “Albanistes,” perpetuating the myth of a politically and religiously united army all invested with shared characteristics.

The text also alleged that divisions of the king’s army sought the destruction of all neutral towns, including Rotterdam and Naarden, who had not yet “commenced any alteration either of religion or government” – echoing a charge made by Walter Morgan in his manuscript account addressed to Burghley. The pamphlet argued that one regiment, commanded by Don Fadrique (Alba’s son), had instructed the burgomaster and commons of Naarden to congregate in a townhouse off the market place, where they were “like a sort of Lambes” murdered *en masse*. The image of the slaughtered lambs carried obvious overtones of Protestant martyrdom, notwithstanding the author’s own admission that most of the townspeople were not Calvinist. The commentator also highlighted the plundering of religious objects, bitterly noting that these *soi-disant* avengers of Protestant wrongdoing themselves engaged in the looting and destruction of sacred objects and spaces: as Catholic counterparts, in a sense, of the much-condemned 1566 iconoclasts. He maintained that Fadrique’s army had vanquished and ransacked other towns in Holland with like force, hanging or enslaving those burgesses who would be “used as a sort of sheepe brought to ye shambles.” The animal imagery used here echoes that used by Hotman, and other Calvinist pamphleteers, in their writings on the St. Bartholomew’s massacre: as one English tract of 1579 would note, the massacre saw “the seyntes of God ledde to the shambles.” In *An answer and true discourse*, while Don Fadrique is said

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85 STC 540, sigs. C3[—C4], D.
86 Ibid., sigs. [C4], D.
87 Ibid., sig. [C4]. Cf. Codrington MS. CXXIX, fol. 11r, which notes that in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s, the time was ripe for an immediate attack on all those deemed “newters.”
88 Ibid., sig. [C4].
89 STC 540, sigs. C2-D.
90 STC 540, sig. D2.
91 STC 13847, lxxii.
92 STC 23400, [B.5]. See also Paschal lamb allusions to Elizabeth’s anticipated martyrdom on sig. [A2].
to have killed burgomaster Gissebert, his troops were said to have “ravished” the townsmen’s daughters “in presence of the[ir fathers’] dead carcases.”

From 1572 onwards, pervasive images of death and bloodletting multiplied in English Protestant news imported from the Low Countries and translated into English. The anonymous author of the 1573 pamphlet *A true rehersall of the honorable ... victory: which the defenders of the truthe have had ... [at] Harlam in Holland* lambasted Philip’s army’s “great pryde & intolerable Tirranie and crueltie,” characterising its soldiers as “ungodly ... Bloodhounds.”

A brief and true rehersall of the noble victory ... [of] the Protestantes of the north partes of Holland (1573) echoed these charges, associating the king’s army with the bestial forces of Antichrist. The latter also portrayed the army of Flanders – including Catholic civilians mustered at Amsterdam – as “tyrannicall Monsters, more like Tygres than reasonable men.” Such declarations served to emphasize the exceptional courage of the rebel forces who, despite being comparatively ill-equipped for battle, were said to have had “good stomakes like noble Lions, willingly to venture their lives against the Spaniardes and those of Amsterdam.” The text outlined the manner in which a Protestant naval force, commanded by Nicholas Ruychauer, engaged the enemy from noon on Sunday 11 October until noon the following day; the soldiers’ courage reflecting their determination “either by the grace of God to obtain the victory, or els not to leave off so longe as they had ... one man left alive.” Crucially, the text stressed that God’s hand had worked to secure the victory, as “the Lord beholding their constancy against his & their enemie[s], caused... the boystrous and unquiet seas... [to] vomiteth or casteth out ... these wicked and uncleane persons, (the Papistes I meane).”

The author of *A true rehersall* offered a distinctly ambivalent portrait of the enemy’s prowess, noting that Philip’s soldiers had previously “never ... attempted any thynge, but that they have thereby gotten both Honour & prayse.” These begrudging allusions to the enemy’s skill and valour worked to bolster assertions that God stood squarely on the rebels’ side: rendering the rebels’ struggle akin to a David and Goliath contest. Elsewhere in print, allusions to the arrogance of the Spanish derided their spurious pride. The text of *An answer ... to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba* claimed that recent victories by Orange’s forces had led to the loss of “[Alba’s] best Captaynes and Souldiours” as

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93 STC 540, sig. D.
94 STC 13578, sig. A5
95 STC 13570, sigs. A4, [A6].
96 STC 13570, sig. [A7].
97 Ibid. , sig. A4. The reference to soldiers’ leonine courage was also evoked – albeit with respect to the Spanish tercios – in French pamphleteering on the Sack of Antwerp. See Chappuys, *Briefvehistoire des guerres*, p. 205.
98 Ibid., sig. [A6].
99 STC 13578, sig. A4v.
God had determined to “scorne ... their great power and force.” The text crowed that “old Spanish souldiours (the like of whom they thought were not in the world) remained there slain as wel as ye other.” In contrast, the spiritual resilience of Orange’s men was stressed: their having “no neede to feare the haultie words of those who have so long beaten their braynes against [the walls of Haarlem].”

These reports may be compared with the ambivalent recollections of Elizabethan soldiers who wrote about their own experiences fighting both for and against Philip’s forces. A privy council report of 1572 concerning a minor skirmish that took place near Flushing, relayed the news that “the Ingelis ... dyd serve very valiently ... and dyd kyll divers Spanerdes and maed them rune awaye 3 myeles lyeyecke pesantes throuyng awaye ther armors and wepons” – a disparaging allusion to the enemy’s sudden, apparently cowardly, retreat. Other recollections betray a grudging admiration: the adventurer Thomas Churchyard, who fought against Philip’s army in the Low Countries, referred on more than one occasion to the Spaniards’ “pride” and “sternness.” Sir Roger Williams, who was captured by and then fought for Philip’s Flanders army from January 1574 to December 1577, held an undeniable esteem for the tercios’ military discipline. As though to assert his ideological loyalties, however, he stressed that Spanish rule was “so vile and tyrannous that no people is able to abide it, unless they be ... base minded.” These sentiments were depicted in manuscript accounts also: Walter Morgan associated the “servilitie [imposed by] the spanishe government” with the crude barbarism of its soldiers, who were said to have “stranglyd [the townsmen of Alkmaar] uppon a gibett lyke dogs acordynge to theyr deserts.” Interestingly, Morgan depicted Alba as twice the size of the other military captains in his accompanying ink drawings, as though to capture the disproportionate terror he inspired in his enemies.

v) **Representations of Protestant princes and foreign volunteer forces versus the Catholic League**

Many of the Orangist tracts printed in English directed their appeals for military or financial aid at Protestant princes. The 1568 text of *A declaration and publication of ... Orange contaynyng the cause of his necessary defence against ... Alba* was the first to call for the assistance of German princes.

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100 STC 540, sig. F3v.
101 Ibid., sig. [F4].
102 Quotation from KL, RP, VI, 483-86, instructions to Pickman to be passed to Gilbert, [8 Aug.] 1572. An account of a skirmish at Ramekins is recorded in R. Williams, *Actions*, pp. 101-4.
105 Codrington MS. CXXIX, fol. 1r’ and 33r’ (respectively).
106 Ibid., fol. 9v-10f, which describes the battle at “Mounts” (Mons) in 1572; Ibid., fol. 19v-20r, which records the attack on Naarden. See appendix 6 of this thesis for the first of these MS illustrations.
appealing to “all those that have Germans harts as well high as lowe, that love honor and virtue...
[who] hate all tyranny and shedding of innocent bloud, especially of those that are of our true
Christian religion.” Yet the pamphlet clearly aimed at attracting support from both sides of the
religious divide, given that it cited secular as well as religious grounds for the sending of aid: “Chiefly
considering the great daunger and peril... into the whiche the whole Empire may undoubtedly fall...
[i]f this horrible tyranny ... and extirpation of our Christian religion” is allowed to continue. If the
German princes chose to act in concert with Orange’s followers, they would not only effect the
preservation of God’s word and the security of good Christians; they would ensure a “good continuall
and durable peace” for “the whole Empyre of Germanye.”

Over time, Organist print began to address calls for aid specifically to England, where Orange clearly
enjoyed a high degree of popular prestige. Arguably, this was not solely due to perceptions of his
Protestant commitment – which, until 1573 remained doubtful – but rather to the portrait of his
leadership painted by the tracts themselves, which endowed him with both an innately royal moral
and political authority. The text of the 1568 Declaration opened with a roll call of his aristocratic
titles, investing him with the requisite authority to challenge the king’s governor:

We William by the grace of God Prince of Orange, Earle of Nassaw, Catsenellebogen, Vianem, Dietz, Bueren, and Leerdam, Baron of Breda. &c. After all due and friendly commendations, give to weete to all those that shall see or read this present declaration.

To the same end, the text employed the third person to justify those causes which “moveth us with our
Allies & confederates” to fight enemies of king and country, “first and chiefly to the advauncing of
the honor of God and his word, [then] to the profit of his Majesty, countrey, and subjects.”

As the 1570s progressed, arguments raised by Orangist polemicists increasingly stressed the danger
posed to all Protestant realms by the formation of a Catholic League. The text of A defence and true
declaration (1571/72) insisted that such a league had been forged between the crowns of France and
Spain at Bayonne in 1565, focussing on Elizabeth as the prime target of its conspiracy:

It is ... manifest ... what persecutions they have done in Italy, what conspiracies they have
made in England, what seditious tumults and murders they have caused in Scotland, and what
rebellions they have raised in Ireland ... [E]ven in England, setting up their Pope’s bulls
coviously to call the most noble and virtuous Queen ... the servant of all wickedness... a
heretic and favourer of all heretics, and do pronounce her cursed by the Pope’s curse, to

109 Ibid., sig. [B3].
111 As noted in Ch. 5 of this thesis, Orange did not formally convert to Calvinism until 1573.
112 STC 25708, sig. A2. For this and following.
deprive her of the right of her kingdom, and jurisdiction to absolve her subjects and people from the bond of their loyalty and oath towards her.\textsuperscript{113}

Here and elsewhere, the tract stressed that Elizabeth’s right to rule was being questioned, and that she (and those influential Protestants she favoured) might be destroyed by her Catholic enemies, thus aiming to associate her cause directly with that of the rebels.\textsuperscript{114} This line of argument not only echoed the views privately expressed by councillors such as Walsingham, it reproduced lines of argument development in printed works published in the wake of the Northern Rebellion of 1569 and Ridolfi plot of 1571 – namely, those associated with Burghley’s circle and influence.\textsuperscript{115}

Dutch pamphleteers also lionized the courage of Englishmen, alongside other Protestant foreigners, in order to secure as broad an international base as possible. Acknowledging the disparity in armed strength between Philip’s army and that of his rebels, they yet implied that English valour was more than a match for their enemy’s superior manpower. Englishmen featured prominently in the anonymous tract, \textit{A true rehearsall of the honorable & tryumphant victory}, which claimed:

Our men makynge themselves cheerful and courageous, and havynge respecte unto their tyme and purpose, (and chieflye) unto their just quarrel: So that of Wallones, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, & Englishmen: about .ix. or a x. hundredth men, aboute two of the Clocke in the afternoon, yssued oute of [Haarlem] againe, and without any stoppe or feare, and without any noyse making, ranne straight unto their Trenches.\textsuperscript{116}

The allusion to “our men” serves to expand the interests of Orange’s native supporters to include all of their foreign allies, said to have been galvanised not only by a sense of military opportunity – e.g. harkening to their “time and purpose” as soldiers – but by an unassailable confidence in God’s blessing (their “just quarrel”). The author’s relentlessly optimistic tone trumpeted the stalwart courage of a heavily outnumbered force, presenting an image of individual and collective heroism.\textsuperscript{117} Quite how English readers would have reacted to such portrayals is uncertain, but it is likely that it worked to reinforce a growing support base for the revolt.

Other tracts were also used to secure English aid around the time that a Spanish invasion of England seemed imminent. The pamphlet \textit{Certayne newes of the ... ayde, and helpe of the Christian Princes and Nobles... for the comfort and deliveraunce of the poor Christians in the low Countries} drew, by implication, an unfavourable comparison between Elizabeth’s apparent lack of support and that provided by a concert of Calvinist and Lutheran princes – including the staunchly Calvinist Johan Casimir of the Palatinate-Simmern; the Lutheran William IV, Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel; the

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{A Defence and True Declaration} in Gelderen, \textit{Political thought}, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp.64, 74, 78.
\textsuperscript{115} BL Harley 168, fols 54'-57', undated memo, discussed in Ch 1. Pamphlets discussed in Ch 2.
\textsuperscript{116} STC 13578, sig. A5'.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., sig. A5'-A7.
Calvinist Louis of Nassau and his brothers; and the Lutheran Augustus, Elector of Saxony (d.1586). This tract (dated 12 April 1574), said to have been “drawen and copied out of a letter, sent unto us out of” Maastricht, was published around the same time that news of Philip’s naval preparations first reached England (i.e. around April 1574). Its sensational charges would likely have resonated with a jittery English readership: particularly Granvelle’s supposed advice to Charles V and Philip II to “raise all hatred and discord” between the Protestant princes of Europe so that “the Eagle [of the Habsburg empire] might eate and devour them all.” Besides general references to the supposedly avaricious divide and conquer strategy of Spanish Habsburg rule, the pamphlet also condemned “that hellish Dragon” which would “have drowned and devoured us up” – a stark allusion to Alba’s attempts to flood the dykes of Holland. Further sensational claims included the author’s charge that the “subtle practices” which had characterised the encroachment of papal authority into the Low Countries since 1567, and in France for over a decade, would extend into all other Protestant realms, until “all those that denie the Pope” had been entirely “rooted out.” This echoed the wording of Walsingham’s contention, outlined to Elizabeth in 1575, that the war in the Low Countries offered concrete proof of the existence of a Catholic League, formed “for the rooting out by violence of all such who profess the Gospel.”

4. 1575: a step-change or turning point?
From 1575 onwards, the genre of ‘revolt’ news published in English appears to have measurably improved in terms of both material and literary quality. The four later works which I have verified as being translations from French originals were issued in a larger quarto format; aside from being well laid out, they are printed on thick, good quality paper and employ a sophisticated array of fonts (c/f the quality of STCs 692, 5791, 15207.5, 25712 far exceeds the flimsier and more perishable work of STCs 540, 5182 and 17865, all derived from Dutch language originals). With two exceptions, the trend appears to have spanned the course of the 1570s: while the cheaper pamphlets date from 1573-74, the finer volumes date from the second half of the decade (respectively, 1575, 1577, 1580 and 1581). This might suggest that Francophone members of the English elite were becoming increasingly interested in, and more closely involved with, the publication of news concerning the revolt in the Low Countries. This is a finding supported by my own and wider research: besides the

118 (London: 1574; STC 5182), fols 7-9 on the composition of the Protestant armies levied near Maastricht and in Westphalen.
119 Ibid., fols 1-2.
120 Ibid., fols 3-4; TNA: PRO, SP 70/136, fol. 461. Discussed on p. 132 of this thesis.
121 See Appendices 2 and 3 for full titles and print information.
122 The exceptions to the relatively poor quality of works published before 1575 include both the English and Latin editions of the “Libellus Supplex” issued by John Day (STCs 18440 and 18441) – which, as argued in Ch. 2 of this thesis, may have had court backing.
many works concerning the wars in France associated with Leicester and Warwick, a later history of the Low Countries by the Swiss jurist Adam Henricpetri was dedicated to Leicester in 1583, while John Wolfe (who published part of the seminal work *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* in English translation in 1588) described himself as “servant to the celebrated Philip Sidney.”

One of the more finely produced of the later, longer news items is Arthur Golding’s 1575 rendition of *A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge against... sclaunders*, supposedly translated from a French original, and published by John Day in an attractive quarto format. Although an original Dutch copy is catalogued in Knuttel (c163), I have found no evidence of the French-language original Golding supposedly used. While it is certainly plausible that the original French title may have been lost, one might speculate that an allusion to a phantom French Ür-text was held to confer greater impartiality than if a Dutch language text had been referenced (the language being more closely affiliated with the earlier, and considerably cheaper, pro-Orangist print). *A justification* was probably a bestseller judging by the number of copies which survive today: the ESTC records six in the British Isles and seven in North America. At 176 pages, *A justification* is, like *A defence and true declaration*, far longer than any of the earlier pamphlets and tracts translated from the Dutch-language Ür-texts (which average between 12-48 pages). It was also prefaced by a letter to the reader, implying that it was glossed to be read by members of the political élite. Golding’s involvement here, and his association with Day, suggests a possible link with Oxford’s or Leicester’s circles: the latter of whom, as we have seen, was actively seeking military intervention in the Low Countries by the summer of 1575.

The preface of *A justification* purported to act as both a summary and a clarification of its overall argument, but in reality served to emphasize anti-monarchist strands prevalent within the text. Specifically, it asserted that Philip was bound by contractual obligations implicit in his princely investiture (i.e. the oaths sworn during his *Joyeuse Entrée* at Louvain, Ghent, and other cities in 1549). The preface focused on the significance of the oaths’ wording, by which it averred that Philip pledged to do nothing “contrary or prejudiciall” to provincial liberties. The popular mystique surrounding this *de facto* “resistance article” had existed in pro-Orangist print since the late 1560s. But the preface to *A justification* took this argument a step further, arguing that should any prince of

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123 See Ch 4, section 4 of this thesis, which outlines connections between Leicester’s network and the enterprise of Huguenot print published in England.
125 (London, 1575; STC 25712).
126 See Ch. 5, section 3 of this thesis.
127 STC 25712, sig. [A7’].
the Low Countries violate its “natural” laws, his subjects would have “full authoritie and free liberty” to adopt means of active resistance: “both to ... hym and his Officers... and also to chooze... any other head or Soveraigne that wyll be more friendly and beneficiall to their Countrey.” This mythical right to rebel – and, crucially, for the rebels to appoint their own prince in Philip’s place – was a distortion of the wording of the Joyeuse Entrée and Philip’s oaths of investiture, which promised only that he would uphold the rights and privileges bestowed by his ancestors. Nonetheless, the preface-writer justified his claims by asserting that “the state of the lowe Countreys is not an absolute Monarchie or heritable kingdom, after the maner of this Realm [i.e. England], and of Fraunce... but a State with condition, terminable, and not to continue any longer than the Lorde who they doo so accept... dooth continue in reignyng and ruling accordyng to his oth.” Again, the implications of this argument are clear – namely, that it is paving the way for a repudiation of Philip’s sovereignty and for the transference of his princely title to Elizabeth. This suggests that the timing of the text’s publication was more than accidental, coinciding as it did with the visit of Orange’s ambassadors to Elizabeth’s court.

Direct references to events at court also suggest that Protestant figureheads and/or court personnel were involved in the production of pro-interventionist, Orangist news print. The anonymous preface writer and translator of Certein letters wherein is set forth a Discourse of the peace ... attempted and sought ... by the Lords and States of Holland and Zelande... in ... 1574 claimed to have acted “because some of the parties and authors [of the events narrated] bee now here [in England], as Mounsieur Sainct Aldegond, and Mounsier Champagny and others, who may justify” the claims presented in print. Indeed, he claims to have “talked at lardge with Mon. de Monte S. Aldegonde” about the legitimacy of a rebellion that would seek to make the king a “Warde” of his own “lawes”: concluding, despite having played devil’s advocate, that the revolt is fully justified. The preface-writer’s various allusions to Aldegonde suggest that his efforts coincided with, or shortly followed, the arrival of the Dutch emissaries at court, who proceeded to offer the countship of Holland to Elizabeth: perhaps bringing with them a copy of the text expressly for translation into English.

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129 STC 25712, sig. [A8’].
131 Ibid., sigs. [A7’-A8’].
132 Explored in more depth in Ch. 7 of this thesis, especially in the work of G. Gascoigne.
134 Ibid., p. 32. See appendix 10 of this thesis for a digital image.
135 See Ch. 5, section 3 of this thesis on the arrival of the Dutch embassy in early January 1576.
Like the preface to *A justification*, the preface to *Certein letters* dismissed the argument that rebellion was always illegitimate. Noting that it was “sayd by some, which are loth that Spaine should be weaker or Englande stronger, that the Prince of Orendge & his adherents are rebels in Armes ... and maintayners of a most daungerous president against all Princes,” the author associated Orange’s cause directly with that of Protestant England. He added that “Lords electable upon pacts & conditions are also rejectible accordinge to the same,” marking a shift in degree from earlier tracts which, despite appealing to Philip to uphold his princely duties, did not characterise his government as “rejectible.” Moreover, *Certein Letters*, unlike earlier tracts, accused Philip himself of tyranny and cruelty. Defending his claim that Orange’s opposition is just, one passage read:

This maintenaunce of law by the Prince of Orenge, is right, against the breaker of Lawe and bringer in of Tyrannie, the Spanish kinge... he altereth the whole state of governmente, leaveth no law but his own wil... [acting as though he were] an absolute conquerour.  

The text also accused Philip of breaking laws with impunity and advised “all states and Princes” against allying with him or any other Catholic prince (“I meane they will make no leagues nor take anye othes of the Pope or any Princes and States of his adherents, seing they have so plaine a president in this case, that their othes may & shalbe dispensed wythall ... how oftesoever they liste.”) The British Library copy of the text features a manicule inked into the margin next to start of this sentence, suggesting that at least one contemporary (or near-contemporary) reader considered the argument of import. This occurs immediately above a passage stressing that Elizabeth and her realm now stood excommunicate and dangerously vulnerable to a concerted Catholic invasion.

Yet the key message of the tract, in English translation, may be seen to lie in its preface. This concluded with, perhaps, the strongest argument in favour of intervention yet to appear in Elizabethan print: namely, the threat of French geoterritorial expansion. Its writer argued that, should the English queen fail to accept their offer of sovereignty, the Low Countries would “much rather ... yeld them toFraunce, that hath now so many armies ready to take hold of them” than return to Spanish rule. Arguing that such a “consequence may prove ill for us” given that there was no likelihood of ongoing civil war in France, it added “it maye be that God after the bloud of so many Martirs, wil give peace to his church in Fraunce... ther is but one life betwene them & the successive raigne of many tolerable Princes.” If peace were to be agreed or Henry III were to die – allowing for Francis of Anjou’s and then, perhaps, Henry of Navarre’s succession – “how easily upon our refusal, will the alliaunce of the Prince of Orenge wyth the house of Fraunce, drawe Holland and Zeland to Fraunce. O merveylous advancement of Fraunce by Sea and land! Shall they be lords of Trafique ... furniture, or Shipping...

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136 STC 15527, sig. A2.
137 Ibid., sigs. A5v - A6v.
138 Ibid., sig. B3.
139 Copy of STC 15527. BL shelf-mark 8027.a.17.
140 STC 15527, sigs. B4-B6.
[having ships and harbours] so greate, so neere us? I pray God it never be, that may be so daunegrous.\textsuperscript{141} These arguments rehearsed those proposed to Elizabeth as grounds for intervention as early as 1572, and repeatedly stressed by her councillors in 1575/76.\textsuperscript{142}

My research suggests that \textit{Certein letters}, far from being an article of popular news printed simply to entertain and inform Elizabethan readers, was ushered into print for a politically sensitive purpose. It was published at a key time – with Orange’s emissaries either at court or recently departed, and with the threat of French impatronisation and Spanish domination both looming large in English minds. The tract’s condemnation of Philip as an “absolute conqueror” clearly worked to substantiate calls for Elizabeth to aid Orange, and also to accept the controversial offer of sovereignty made to her – demonstrating a close, even direct, correlation between the political and print spheres of the era. The views expressed in the \textit{Certein Letters} also chimed with the fears of the diplomats Paulet and Wilson that the Spanish crown was conspiring with Mary Stewart (“to advaunce ye pretensed title of the competitrice of her Maiesties crowne”),\textsuperscript{143} the rulers of France, the Italian states and the papacy to depose Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{144} One might speculate that any of the queen’s core group of pro-interventionist councillors – headed by Leicester and Walsingham – spurred the publication of this tract in order to press the queen to accept the countship and/ or take military action. If so, they were sorely frustrated: as chapter 5 has shown, despite offering Orange some financial assistance in 1576, Elizabeth quelled parliamentary debate on intervention in March and decided the offer of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{145}

To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, one might ask: what overlap, if any, did the content and tone of English pamphlets on the revolt in the Low Countries have with wider political debates about intervention on behalf of Protestant communities abroad? How were the key figureheads represented and in what sense did the summer of 1572, or the winter of 1575/76, mark significant turning points or merely step changes with regard to what had gone before? My findings demonstrate that the enterprise of English Protestant news print in support of Orange’s cause strengthened considerably over the period 1572-76. The growth of English news concerning the Low Countries from 1572 onwards is, moreover, in line with the ‘mini boom’ of translated French Calvinist print being translated into English (discussed in chapter 4).

While 1572-76 seems to have marked a general step change in the production of pro-Orangist news in English, a specific turning point seems to have occurred over winter of 1575/76: contemporaneous

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., sig. B8\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Ch. 5, 5.
\textsuperscript{143} STC 15527, sig. [B5].
\textsuperscript{144} E.g. CSPF, XI, 1370, 1382, 1393, 1395, 1408, 1448 and 1457.
with the offer of Dutch sovereignty made to Elizabeth. Prior to this date, Orange’s polemicists developed indirect lines of veiled monarchic critique, enabling them to condemn Alba’s and Requesens’ regimes without openly dishonouring Philip II. In contrast, from the winter of 1575/76 onwards, the body of printed works translated into English began to portray the revolt as a confessional struggle and a principled, proto-patriotic rebellion: i.e. a defence of privileges against a tyrannical king. The vilification, and progressive demonization, of Philip, Granvelle, Alba and nameless other “Spaniards”, reflects an increasing dichotomisation in both English print and political discourse, strengthening an association of Spanish Habsburg rule with “Catholic” cruelty and oppression. To what extent this association hardened in the wake of the Sack of Antwerp of November 1576 remains to be determined. I turn now to examine English political reactions to this atrocity, before analysing the pamphlet comment produced in its wake.
Part IV


The Sack of Antwerp (4-7 Nov. 1567) has been described by a leading contemporary historian as “one of the worst atrocities of the sixteenth-century.”\(^1\) Contemporaries also judged it to be so. Both Philip II’s governor-general, Don Luis de Requesens, and the Swiss Protestant jurist, Adam Henricpetri, saw the mutiny which triggered it as a *deus ex machina*, beyond the scope of human understanding, or indeed, prevention.\(^2\)

To what extent did the sack mark a turning-point in Elizabethan history, specifically with respect to the queen’s policy vis-à-vis the Low Countries? George Ramsay has concluded that the sack *per se* was not the primary catalyst for the decline in 16\(^{th}\) century Anglo-Dutch trade, privileging instead the tariff disputes of the 1560s; the iconoclastic riots of 1566; and Alba’s repressive measures as governor-general (1567-73).\(^3\) Other historians have inferred a link between the atrocity and the growth of a militantly Protestant and predominantly anti-Spanish nationalism, citing the proliferating number of “alarum” pamphlets, plays and ballads published in its wake.\(^4\) Before I examine these printed sources, I shall consider the formal English diplomatic response and related political debates. Did the sack alone engender more virulent forms of anti-Spanish comment in English politics as well as print? Was it regarded in largely ideological, providentialist terms, akin to St. Bartholomew’s, or was the nature of the government’s response fundamentally pragmatic?

1. The background to the Sack

As the capital of Brabant and a nucleus of northern European trade, Antwerp derived great wealth from its thriving commodity markets, rendering it a target for pillage over the course of the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries.\(^5\) Developments in the 1570s suggested that it could be subject to further assault: Philip’s army was owed at least eighteen months’ pay when the revolt reignited in 1572, with wage arrears provoking an assault on Haarlem (1573), a largely bloodless attack on Antwerp (1574), and the sacking of other urban settlements in Holland (1574-75).\(^6\) The Spanish crown’s bankruptcy of

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\(^1\) Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, p. 178.
\(^3\) Ramsay, *The Queen’s Merchants*.
\(^5\) J. J. Murray, *Antwerp: In the Age of Plantin and Brueghel* (Oklahoma, 1970), Ch. 2 provides a broad summary of Antwerp’s treatment at the hands of armed forces in the early modern period.
1575 led to the collapse of its machinery of credit, resulting in military wages being months, if not years, in arrears by 1576.\(^7\)

Critically, Requesens’ death on 5 March 1576 had left the king’s provinces, as well as his armed forces, without the command of a governor.\(^8\) The Council of State at Brussels, convened as an interim government, was now profoundly divided. As a constitutional crisis loomed, anti-Spanish feeling in the southern provinces intensified. After Zierikzee surrendered to a combined force of Spaniards, Germans and Walloons on 2 July, several tercios mutinied and departed for Brabant. Serving under elected commanders, they took Aalst in Flanders on 2 July, prompting the Walloon contingent to propose an alliance of forces (a multinational uprising which was only narrowly averted by the States General’s offer to pay the Walloons’ arrears).\(^9\) Shortly afterwards, seemingly at the instigation of Orange and the States of Holland, all the members of the Council of State were arrested by a small force of Brabantine nobles. Only the Spanish councillor Jeronimo de Roda, and the Flemish governor-general Philippe de Croÿ, Duke of Aerschot, escaped.\(^10\) Subsequently, the States of Brabant mustered troops to guard Brussels and convened the States General, which in turn issued edicts outlawing the mutineers on 26 July, 2 August and 22 September.\(^11\) As demands rose for the recall of all “Spaniards” – suggesting all those who served in Philip’s army and government, not just the mutinied tercios – Roda concentrated organised bodies of mutineers in and around Antwerp’s Italian-style citadel.\(^12\) There was a measure of dramatic irony in this situation given that, to its detractors, the citadel already symbolised the imposition of Spanish Habsburg tyranny.\(^13\)

The actions of the States General had a devastating impact on the mutinous encampments around Antwerp. Notwithstanding that their means of obtaining payment was severely curtailed, all serving in Philip’s army now feared for their lives. Denying economic grievance as a viable motive, hostile

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\(^7\) Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, p. 172. While much of the infantry were owed around two years’ pay, the light cavalry were owed up to six.

\(^8\) Ramsay, *Queen’s merchants*, p. 183.


\(^10\) TNA: PRO SP 70/140, fol.212r-15r, Wilson to the PC, 19 Nov. 1576. Wilson later reported that the grand bailiff of Brabant, M. de Glymes, assisted by several young gentlemen, had broken into the Council of State chamber in Brussels to arrest its members, with the “great good backing of the people.” The arrest was done upon suspicion that the members had had intelligence of a “Spanish” attack on the town.


\(^12\) Historians typically refer to “the Spanish troops” suggesting that all the mutineers, and those who made common cause with them, were Spanish born. Cf. Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 231, which notes that in May 1576, out of a total of 51,457 infantry serving in Philip’s army, only 6,125 were native Spaniards, in contrast to 21,000 German and 22,000 Walloon/Netherlandish troops. Other sources suggest that the “Spanish” tercios who attacked Antwerp in November were of mixed nationality.

commentators were quick to attribute the resulting sack to the nefarious self-interest of Spanish commanders. One prominent eyewitness, the English agent George Gascoigne, insisted that the sack had been premeditated for months by Roda with an eye to extorting maximum profit from its civilian population. Antwerp’s Catholic governor, Champagny (a slippery operator who subsequently threw in his lot with the king’s opponents), claimed the city had fallen prey to murderous “Espagnols” with no regard for the age, sex or nationality of their victims. The Dutch chronicler Philip Galle also stressed that the city’s attackers had acted out of pure malice: just as they had ransacked Maastricht, so they converged on Antwerp with the intention to commit “infiniz crimes & abominations.”

Habsburg apologists also argued – albeit on different grounds and to contrary ends – that the sack was premeditated. Both the historian Pedro Cornejo and the military commander Bernardino de Mendoza denied that royal authority in Flanders had irreparably broken down and that the assault on Antwerp was, by extension, mutinous. In his history of events published in 1592, Mendoza cast the sack as an attempt to re-impose royal control, stressing that most civilian lives were lost by accidental, natural means (i.e. drowning and burning). Notwithstanding this, he referred to Antwerp’s citizens as “amotinados” (rebels/insurgents) as though to legitimate their deaths.

The premeditation argument was inherited by generations of Protestant historians. The arch-villains were identified as: Sancho Dávila, maestre de campo and commander of Antwerp’s citadel, and Captain Julián de Romero. The historian Pierre Génard, who drew correspondences between the 1574 assault and the 1576 “Spanish Fury,” contended that the latter was only “le couronnement sanglant” of fifty years’ of Spanish oppression. Recent studies have tended to illuminate the perspectives of the mutineers themselves: while Ramsay claims that these were sophisticated brokers, willing to accept bills of exchange in lieu of cash, Trim suggests that captains invariably sought to

14 Discussed at length in Ch. 8: 1, ii.
15 [Champagny] Anon., Recueils d’Arétophile, contensans—Par quels moyens les gens de guerre Espaignols ammenez es Pays Bas par le Duc d’Alve, s’estans mutinez en icheux diverses fois, entrèrent en Anvers le xxvi d’Aprvil xveclxxitij [1574], ou ils committent innumerable desordres... (Lyons: N. Guérin, 1578).
17 Bernardino de Mendoza, Comentario de lo sucedido en las guerras de los Países Bajos (Madrid, 1592; 2 vols). In outline, Mendoza’s narrative appears to draw heavily from Pedro Cornejo’s earlier account: Sumario de las guerras civiles (Lyon: Phelipe Tinghi, 1577).
18 Mendoza, Comentario, XV, p. 316: “muchedumbre de gente a embarcarse en los navios, y allí se ahogaron millares de hombres, sin los q[ue] no quemo el fuego y mataron los edificios que cajan con el.”
19 Mendoza, Comentario, pp. 314, 315.
20 P. Génard, La furie espagnole, Documents pour server à l’histoire du sac d’Anvers en 1576 (Antwerp, 1876). Génard’s account is largely followed by the pro-Orangist historians C. Wilson and C. V. Wedgwood in, respectively, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands and William the Silent (London, 1944).
21 Génard, La furie espagnole, pp. 7, 9.
obtain honourable remedies for their men. Parker argues that the seeds of Antwerp’s “holocaust” indisputably lay in its attackers’ desperate need for immediate payment and not in their inherent cruelty.  

2. The Sack of Antwerp (4–7 November 1576)

There is little coverage of the sack in histories of Elizabeth’s reign – with Wernham summarising it only as “the Spanish soldiery... running wild.” Parker’s narrative, as one would expect, is more detailed: noting that mutinous regiments of Philip II’s army converged on the city over several weeks, being reinforced by units of light cavalry from Hainault and infantry from Aalst, Lier and Maastricht. Although Antwerp’s magistrates anticipated an assault, and had admitted some detachments of the States-General’s forces over 2-3 November, their defences were only part-finished (hindered by the citizens’ decision not to work on a Sunday). The city’s militia was also only partially assembled by the time of the mutineers’ assault at dawn on 4 November. Progressing from the citadel and across the barricades in the central yard, the attacking forces soon reached the centre of the city, wounding and killing thousands of citizens and holding many others to ransom.

There are various contemporary accounts narrating the development of the sack (notwithstanding the fact that all are skewed by forms of authorial bias). Gascoigne’s *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* (London; 1577) provides a logical sequence of events, starting from the first canon shot fired from the castle on 19 or 20 October to the final attack on Sunday, 4 November. The *Spoyle* states that around 4,000 troops dispatched by the States General (comprising 21 ensigns of footmen, and six cornets of horsemen, of assorted nationality) arrived at the castle on 2 November, when the town’s governor Champagny, and the colonel of the king’s garrison, the Count of Everstein (“Oberstein”), dithered over their admittance. The authorities’ decision to delay their entry until 3 November may have proved fatal, giving the mutineers time to draw reinforcements from Aalst, Lier and Maastricht. (Although other accounts do not mention the delay, they cite similar figures in terms of the troop numbers involved. Modern historians have estimated that approximately 5,000 mutineers, of

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27 STC 11644, sig. A6v.
28 Ibid., sig. A7v.
German, Spanish, Flemish and Walloon origin were drawn up against 8,000 of the city militia.)

Gascoigne suggests that the defenders had succeeded in erecting barricades around the castle yard, with “trenches as highe as the length of a pike,” although an impressive “Counterskarfe” running along the castle wall was left incomplete. While most other accounts confirm the quality of the defences, Génard’s sources suggest that the States troops were lax in their preparations, being too busy bribing Spanish-occupied households within the city walls.

All contemporary sources concur that the ensuing attack on the city was swift and professional. Gabriel Chappuys’ *Briefve histoire des guerres... advenues en Flandre*, a translation of Cornejo’s chronicle, notes that the townspeople were stunned by their opponents’ discipline. This concludes that the sack was done “par le vouloir de Dieu plustot que par industrie humaine,” with 6,000 of the town’s defenders succumbing to their leonine attackers’ “grand furie” in less than an hour. These claims are seconded in other sources: *The Spoyle* states that the assault began at around 10am in the midst of a thick fog, that the attackers had reached the castle yard by 11am, and that they had breached the defenders’ trenches by noon. Gascoigne expressed considerable admiration for the mutineers’ discipline: noting that they had proceeded in a “good order which wanted no direction” even in “their greatest furye.” This backhanded compliment was echoed by the queen’s ambassador in Brussels, Sir Thomas Wilson, who also wrote of the attackers’ “valiaunte courage ... policie and manhode” in overrunning the town “wholly and quietlie w'in two houres.”

English print and manuscript sources claim that, following their entry into the town proper, the attackers began indiscriminately killing or holding civilians to ransom. Gascoigne records that, before six hours were passed, “every house” had been “sacked or raumsomed at the uttermost valley.” Chappuys stresses that the attacking force, comprising Spaniards and Germans, seized a vast sum of goods from the 800 or so richest houses in the city (“la merchandise qui s’y perdit est estimee à plus de trois millions d’or”), cutting down any civilians who attempted to escape. All printed accounts refer to the burning of the Palladian townhouse, extolled by one Florentine as an “edificio bellissimo

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31 Murray, *Antwerp*, p. 40. Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 231. Although there are no figures on the precise breakdown of nationality of those involved in the assault on Antwerp, primary sources make clear that some German and Walloon troops were present as well as Spaniards.
32 STC 11644, sig. A7v.
34 Génard, *Furie espagnole*, pp. 449-51 which records that the troops accepted bribes of beer and food stuffs in return for not looting these residences.
35 Cornejo, *Samario de las guerras civiles*.
36 Chappuys, *Briefve histoire*, pp. 201-2. The attackers are compared to lions on p. 201.
38 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140 fol. 214v, Wilson to PC, 19 Nov. 1576. Wilson proceeds to condemn the unmerciful actions of the mutineers.
39 STC 11644, sig. C7v.
et superbissimo.”

The loss of human life was catastrophic: those killed over the three days of the sack exceeded those who died in the Mechelen, Zutphen and Naarden assaults of 1572, and the 2,000 or so residents of Haarlem massacred under orders in 1573. Gascoigne estimated “seventeen thousand carcases,” a grossly inflated claim echoed by Chappuys and Mendoza, of which he claimed over 5,000 or so were killed “because they had not readye money.” Modern historians have estimated that around 8,000 civilians were killed – still well in excess of the numbers of Huguenots murdered in Paris over St. Bartholomew’s.

Parker notes that, when reports of the sack reached Brussels, a panicked States General outlawed all of Philip’s soldiers, working in unison to drive any remaining “Spanish troops” from the Low Countries. To this end, the draft Pacification of Ghent (8 Nov. 1576), in which the States General reached a compromise with Orange, was signed by most of the rebel and loyalist provinces (excluding Luxembourg – where Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto and Philip’s half-brother, had arrived to assume the post of governor-general). Seeking to resolve two of the provinces’ major internal differences, the Pacification suspended the edicts against Calvinist heresy; acknowledged the entrenchment of Calvinism in Holland and Zeeland and Catholicism in the remaining provinces; and recognized the States-General as the sole organ of government. It also proposed the raising of a “native” army to deal with the “forrain troops.” While an English edition of the Pacification was issued in London, it looks as though the privy council consulted the French edition published at Brussels – probably the earliest copy they could get their hands on. The mutineers at Antwerp, meanwhile, laid down their arms around mid-November as commanded by Roda, having been promised the arrival of their wage arrears from Spain. Parker records their average settlement as being 232 florins, distributed amongst 1,329 light horse and 4,005 infantry.

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43 Murray, *Antwerp*, p.14 and Parker, “Mutiny and discontent,” p. 114 report 8,000 deaths. Yet Génard, *Furie espagnole*, pp. 553-82 found the names of only a few hundred victims in the archives – suggesting either that historical estimates are grossly inflated or, more likely, that most deaths went unrecorded.

44 STC 18448).

45 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fols 159-170, French pamphlet endorsed in a contemporary hand: “The Pacification of Gants 8 No. 1576 made att Brussells printed,” fol.170”.

46 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fols 99-100, Don John to Rodas, 26 Nov. 1576 [Spanish].

3. The Sack and the English: Gascoigne’s mission

To what extent did the sack hasten a decline in Anglo-Spanish relations and abet the emergence of a militantly Anglo-Protestant nationalism? Although Antwerp remained a primary centre for English finance and trade until the 1590s, Ramsay and other historians have shown that the tumult engendered by the intermissions of 1565 and 1569-73 had already led the Merchants Adventurers to seek new marts in Emden.\(^50\) As for the Elizabethan diplomatic response to the events of November 1576, this has been only cursorily examined: Wernham makes only a brief allusion to the sack, despite arguing that (alongside Requesens’ death) it overtook all Elizabeth’s efforts at securing peace in the Low Countries.\(^51\) MacCaffrey, who makes only one passing reference in his political biography of the queen, duly emphasises other factors which led to the collapse of Spanish power in the Low Countries in his more detailed account of the decade.\(^52\)

The gap is not explainable by lack of information alone. The privy council had monitored the restive situation in Brabant and Flanders from early August, when an agent wrote that some of Aerschot’s captains had expressed anger over their wage arrears.\(^53\) The agent added that the situation was now “in no better state than att the first but rather worse,” with the near-mutinous captains threatening to sack Aalst, and the French-speaking Walloon troops, Zierikzee.\(^54\) By September, Walsingham had instructed the soldier-poet George Gascoigne to depart on a reconnaissance mission. This was not atypical: Gascoigne’s literary skills placed him on a par with other political agents at Elizabeth’s court, including men of business such as Beale, who used their assimilation into news networks as the first step up the ladder of a formal political career.\(^55\) As Mark Taviner has shown, these characters were often engaged in unofficial, front-line foreign diplomacy, despite their nominal “second tier” status.\(^56\) Moreover Gascoigne, who had already served as a volunteer in Orange’s 1572 campaign and as a captain in his engagements of 1573 and 1574,\(^57\) had strong court connections.\(^58\) He reported to

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\(^51\) Wernham, *Before the Armada*, p. 329.
\(^53\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/139, fol.78\(^r\), containing intelligence from Antwerp, 12 Aug. 1576. The author may have been Robert Corbett, to whom the PC had written on 20 and 22 Nov. 1575 concerning the case of “certain merchauntes spoiled by suche as serve under forraine Commission.” See PC 2/10 fol.404\(^v\) and PC 2/10 fol.406\(^v\). Corbett, who had travelled extensively on the continent, was the elder brother of one of Sidney’s schoolmates.
\(^54\) TNA: PRO, SP 70/139, fol.78\(^r\).
\(^57\) See Prouty, “Gascoigne in the Low Countries and the Publication of *A Hundred Sundrie Floowres*,” *RES* 12 (1936), pp.139-46. This work had attracted controversy for its suggestions of court scandal and had led to Gascoigne’s temporary fall from favour.
\(^58\) See Chap. 8, 2:iv for Gascoigne’s association with Leicester and other leading Protestant patrons.
Walsingham throughout the summer of 1576 while serving in Condé’s army, forwarding letters to both Condé and John Casimir of the Palatinate.\textsuperscript{59}

The State Papers confirm that Gascoigne remained in close contact with both Burghley and Walsingham throughout September, although he seems to have reported to Walsingham with greater frequency (his letters thrice referring Burghley to the latter for information). Since none of his reports to Walsingham survive, his two letters to Burghley alone provide evidence of his charge.\textsuperscript{60} The first, dated 15 September and sent from Paris, offers intelligence with respect to French military preparations, noting that 25 “Cornettes of Rytters, w\textsuperscript{ch} Duke Cassimire brought ynto these partes” were encamped at Champagne. Gascoigne added that an additional 500 of “the bravest soldyers yn france well apoynted” remained under the command of Montmorency and other French captains in “the lower p\[ar\]tes of germanye” – i.e. the Low Countries – and that Henry III and his brother, being friends “ex intimo corde,” had sent an “Emyssarye towards Germanye for the levyes of a power.” He concluded by expressing his intention to abandon a visit to Guise’s court at Tours, to become “an eyed witnesse of the styrre yn flaundres.” In the first of two postscripts, the agent directed Burghley “to make Mr Secretarye acqueynted with this my good wyll to dyscharge my dewtye & ... to performe desyre.” Gascoigne’s recommendation to Walsingham suggests – as has been noted of William Herle – that news-writers recognized the close collaboration between senior members of the privy council, expecting them to pool their intelligence.\textsuperscript{61} Gascoigne’s eagerness to “performe desyre” may capture a sense of the man’s hunger for preferment or simply reflect his readiness to follow orders.

In a second letter to Burghley dated 7 October, containing important information on the manoeuvres of Henry III’s army (“his Rytters marche and are alreddy beyond Verdune w\textsuperscript{ch} is the direct waye towards the Lowe Contreys”), Gascoigne reported that the levy was known to agents of Aerschot. He confirmed that he would soon depart in the same direction, where he meant “to spend a moneth, two, or three (as yor honor shall lyke) in those partes.”\textsuperscript{63} There is no evidence of any reply to these two letters, or any evidence of how they were read – although the fact that Burghley endorsed the letter “the preparacion towards y\textsuperscript{e} Lowe Countries”, suggests he privileged news of the French manoeuvres. This silence frustrates attempts to clarify Gascoigne’s exact position with respect to

\textsuperscript{60} Passages from these letters are transcribed in Austen, \textit{Gascoigne}, pp. 184-86.
\textsuperscript{61} TNA: PRO, SP 70/139, fol.169\textsuperscript{r}, Gascoigne to Burghley, 15 Sept. 1576. Cited in Austen, Cunliffe and Prouty.
\textsuperscript{63} TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol.23\textsuperscript{r}, Gascoigne to Burghley, 7 Oct. 1576.
court influence. Clearly, however, he was known to the English ambassador in Paris for, on 13 October, Paulet wrote to Walsingham that Gascoigne “had departed towards Flaunders.”

English statesmen remained wary of the situation in Brabant throughout the autumn. On the eve of the sack, Wilson wrote to Burghley concerning the intercepted correspondence of Philip II: “whose letteres original I have seen decrypted and do perceive the greate love he bareth to the Spanyardes and the small care he hath of this people [i.e. his subjects in the Low Countries].”

Wilson added that the rebel provinces were busy soliciting Orange’s (and perhaps Anjou’s) engagement, the former being “the man that al this Countrie dependeth upon, and in whom Monsieur [Anjou] hath most especial trust.” The diplomat’s sources of information appear to have been accurate: Parker has found that Anjou was approached by the deputies of the States-General at Brussels as early as 16 September, asking him to offer military and financial aid. Owing to the outbreak of warfare in France, Anjou was unable to respond favourably, but there was clearly a concern that he would. Wilson himself predicted that “b Lodie warre wil folowe, and Monsieur wil not ... be longe from hence” – a situation which would lead the country to “ruine.” He concluded, without any sense of dramatic irony, that “Rodas hath founde a fine device for monie, which is that merchaunts in Antwarrpe having credit in Spaine may give their bills of exchange to all souldiors who will lose xxx in the c [on the exchange].”

4. Elizabethan diplomacy in the wake of the sack (Nov. 1576 – Jan. 1577)

The English conception of the events of 4-6 November may be retraced by comparing Gascoigne’s account with other manuscript sources, all of which present varying claims. By 10 November, Gascoigne was engaged to return to London bearing letters from the Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp to the privy council. How he managed to depart without safe conduct is uncertain, although Wilson later referred to a Walloon gentlemen who successfully fled the city in the sack’s wake. Amidst these letters, Thomas Heton, the Merchants Adventurers’ governor, wrote of “the pitiful slaughter and... miserable spoil” which had seen his House entered by twelve mutineers, who then

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64 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fols 182-89, Paulet to Walsingham, 13 Oct. 1576. This suggests Gascoigne can have arrived in Antwerp no later than 22 October.

65 Cf. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, IV, pp. 369-71, Philip to Roda, 11 Sept. 1576, which was intercepted and published by Orange on 13 Oct. See Parker notes, Dutch Revolt, p. 302, n.5.

66 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140 fol.139v”, Wilson to Burghley, 3 Nov. 1576.

67 Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 191.

68 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140 fol.139v.

69 Namely: TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 191, Heton to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1576; BL Add. MS. 48000 (Yelverton MS.1), 53. 1576, fol. 467: “Iniuries done at the last sack in Antwirpe” [Nov. 1576]; TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fols 43-44, instructions to Horsey concerning prosecution of the injuries done at Antwerp [14 Dec.1576].

70 Cf. TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 5’, Wilson to Burghley, 1 May 1577, which mentions “Mons. de Bercelly, a verie yonge gentleman that ... escaped out of Antwerpe after the massacre.”
held its occupants to ransom for 15,000 crowns.\textsuperscript{71} Other sources confirm that the English House was attacked by a band of soldiers but vary as to how much its occupants were ransomed for. The Yelverton MS states that the soldiers – led by the Spaniard “Cavodes Quadra” – demanded 16,000 “ducatte” off the merchants in specie, besides seizing another 7,000 ducats’ worth of goods.\textsuperscript{72} Gascoigne states that the merchants’ lives were ransomed for 12,000 crowns, of which they had less of a third to hand.\textsuperscript{73} The instructions sent upon Horsey’s embassy to Don John also stated that the initial ransom was set at 12,000 crowns, but that bond was given for an additional 5,000 crowns which they could not pay.\textsuperscript{74}

In his letter of 10 November, Heton enclosed an appeal that Elizabeth’s council would intercede with the queen for their welfare, noting bitterly that if the merchants had had “passports [to leave Antwerp] when he first required them of the states and then of M. Champagny,” they “would have avoided this great peril of life and miserable spoyle.” Heton asked that a representative be sent over to impart news of their sufferings personally to Don John, alluding to the “further discourse of these tragedies” borne by “Mr. George Gascon, whose humanity in this time of trouble we... have experimented.”\textsuperscript{75} It is significant that Heton herein made no mention of any English lives lost: only a vague allusion to the “peril of life” and his ongoing fear of “the like spoyle” erupting anew. While Gascoigne was later to claim that one “poore English marchant (who was but a servaunt)” had been hanged for failing to procure his ransom,\textsuperscript{76} Horsey’s instructions in December stretched the truth somewhat by stating: “whereas in these troubles at Anwarppe between the towne and the spaniards of the castell there, our Englishe merchants have not only been some of them murdred, but all verie ill entreated & spoyled.”\textsuperscript{77}

Gascoigne appears to have returned to England with due celerity: a letter from Count Lalaing of Ghent dated 16 November apologised to the queen for having opened letters born by “un gentilhomme Anglois de la ville d’Anvers,” suspecting that the bearer may have been one of “les espaignols.”\textsuperscript{78} This hiatus apparently had no bearing on Gascoigne’s progress: Walsingham’s journal records that the agent arrived at Hampton Court on 21 November,\textsuperscript{79} where he was paid twenty pounds upon a warrant signed by the secretary, “for bringing of Lettres in post for her Majesties affaires from

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{71} TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 191\textsuperscript{r}, Heton to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1576.
\bibitem{72} BL Add. MS. 48000 (Yelverton MS.1), 53. 1576, fol. 467\textsuperscript{v}.
\bibitem{73} STC 11644, sig. C\textsuperscript{v}.
\bibitem{74} TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fol.44\textsuperscript{r}.
\bibitem{75} TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 191, Heton to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1576.
\bibitem{76} STC 11644, sig. C2.
\bibitem{77} TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fol.44\textsuperscript{r}, instructions to Horsey [14? Dec.1576].
\bibitem{78} TNA: PRO SP 70/140 fol.208\textsuperscript{r}, Lalain to Eliz., 16 Nov. 1576.
\bibitem{79} C. T. Martin (ed.), “Journal of Sir Francis Walsingham,” \emph{Camden Miscellany}, VI, p.36.
\end{thebibliography}
Andwarpe.” 80 As the literary scholar Gillian Austen has noted, Gascoigne’s association with Walsingham would tend to cast doubt on the author’s published claim to have been “in the sayde towne of Antwerpe upon certeine private affaires of myne owne,” 81 an assertion that is also contradicted by one of his earlier book dedications. 82

Other sources suggest that the privy council received word of the sack before Gascoigne’s arrival, suggesting they had anticipated its likely significance. On 19 November, the agent Jacques Taffin informed Walsingham that the atrocity had occurred, although his letter did not contain details of note. 83 Walsingham then wrote the following day to Leicester, informing him of his efforts to persuade Elizabeth to dispatch an ambassador immediately to Don John to intercede on her merchants’ behalf. 84 On 19 November, Wilson sent the privy council a report of his doings, including an audience with Aerschot on 12 November and a meeting with Roda five days later. Wilson reported that he had told Aerschot that there might be a breach of amity between Elizabeth and Philip unless the king offered immediate redress for English losses, stressing the queen’s great “sorowe” when she should hear “of the horrible and unmerciful massacre doone latelie in Andwarpe.” Aerschot apparently deferred answering any of Wilson’s requests – including his demand that Philip accept Elizabeth’s mediation – only reassuring him that the arrival of “don Jon d’ Austria ... would quyet al things.” 85

Wilson then reported the heads of his meeting with Roda, in which the later blamed the mutiny “on the yonge heads at Bryssels, and the furie of the people” who had unlawfully imprisoned most of Philip II’s council. In response to Roda’s justifications that it had been necessary to “kyl rather than to be kylled” and to not “lose the kynges piece comitted to our charge,” Wilson asked why his troops should kill “people of al sortes, that did beare no armoure at all... to spare no nation, although they ... wer [not] dealers in any practise at al against the kynges minsters or the Spanyardes?” 86 Notwithstanding the violence meted out to Philip’s own subjects, Wilson claimed in a long justification that Roda was honour-bound to offer restitution to the “English nacion.” He noted that

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80 Extracts from Office Books of the Treasurers of the Chamber in Extracts from the Accounts of the Revels at Court, in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I, ed. P. Cunningham (London, 1842), p. xxxi. The warrant is dated 21 Nov. 1576.
81 STC 116644, sig. A7v; Austen, Gascoigne, p. 186.
82 Dedicatory epistle to A Delicate Diet (London, 1576), dated 22 August, which stated the author’s desire to return home in October: i.e. prior to his departure to Antwerp. J. W. Cunliffe, “The Spoyle of Antwerp”, Modern Language Review, No. 6 (1911), pp.88-92.
83 TNA: PRO SP 70/140 fol.210v, Taffin to Walsingham, 19 Nov. 1576 [French], requesting an audience.
84 BL Galba MS, C. V, fols 303r-304r, Walsingham to Leicester, 20 Nov. 1576, from Hampton Court.
85 TNA: PRO SP 70/140, fols212r-215r, fol. 212v, Wilson to the PC, 19 Nov. 1576
86 Ibid., fol. 214r. This part of the document is exceptionally dialogic, with multiple allusions to “q[uo]th I” and “q[uo]th he”, suggesting that Roda and Wilson had a vigorous debate on the matter of both the violence of the initial “furie” and the excessiveness of the mutineers’ ransoming.
Roda promised to cancel the outstanding sum of 5,000 crowns ransom and to discharge all the merchants’ bonds, in addition to issuing them a safe conduct.87

To what extent Elizabeth succumbed to a “greate grief” upon hearing of the atrocity – as Wilson claimed – is questionable. Her actions suggest that she swiftly used the opportunity presented by the sack to press for a mediated peace in the Low Countries. Indeed, before the privy council could have received Wilson’s report dated 19 November [OS], or Orange’s letters of credence for one “M. de Villiers” to report certain affairs of the Low Countries to the privy council (dated 16 November [NS]),88 Elizabeth dispatched the Catholic courtier Sir John Smith into Spain. The heads of Smith’s instructions aimed to rebut any past objections to an English mediation or a negotiated peace – including a far-fetched justification for Elizabeth’s past wars in France and Scotland as similarly benevolent, rather than confessionally-motivated, interventions. Whilst professing his queen’s “good and sisterly” dealing towards the “K. of S. ... synce the begynninge of the first troubles of the lowe contryes,” Smith’s commission guided him to address “certain causes that may induce [Philip] to pardon the errors of his subjects to ... and to call awaye all souldiours straungers” that had been “unto them a most heavie yoke.” Although these instructions did not mention the sack directly, they unambiguously alluded to Philip’s troops as foreign occupiers, and to the presence of thousands of “straungers” as defenders of native privileges, in an attempt to enjoin the king to accept the terms of the proposed pacification. The importance of the diplomatic situation clearly overshadowed longstanding concerns over the treatment of English merchants in Spain by tribunals of the Inquisition: although Smith was instructed to take up these matters at some point, he was explicitly ordered not to raise them during his first audience with Philip.89

Around this time, the States General dispatched its own envoy, Baron d’Aubigny to Elizabeth’s court, reporting their need to defend themselves against those “cruaultes ... tirannies... viollences de femmes et filles,” etc. for which they had not obtained redress. Aubigny’s arrival in late November coincided with Smith’s departure for Spain, thus apparently fulfilling the States General’s request that the queen send “quelque gentilhomme” to show Philip II “les forces et oppressions” of his subjects, to desire him to “retirer et remander les Espagnols” and to restore his subjects “droits (et) previlleges...
This polarised rhetoric of privilege and liberty versus oppression and tyranny was beginning to percolate into Elizabethan conciliar discourse, just as it was in English print. In 1576, Burghley annotated a list of grievances raised by the States General in their initial peace negotiations with Don John. This included the flimsy assertion that the king had acted “sy tyrannicquesment” that he ought to be deposed and the matter judged by the chamber of the Holy Roman Empire: a direct allusion to the traditional High and Low German unity first articulated (in English) in Orange’s 1568 Declaration. Yet, in proposing Philip’s deposition, claims of the Spanish crown’s “tyranny” went beyond even those heretofore expressed in Elizabethan print. The grievances annotated by Burghley recorded that Philip would only retain his domains if he immediately resolved to recall his forces; return their plunder; and execute the military commanders Dávila, Roda, Romero, Alonso de Vargas as the prime “auteurs de ceste tyrannique oppression.”

What did Elizabeth and her ministers do to pursue redress for mercantile losses? Philip’s ambassador Guaras recorded that “all the English merchants are warned by the Court to withdraw their property from Antwerp” in expectation of “some fresh trouble.” He concluded that Englishmen “are surprised at recent events in Antwerp, and are in fear that London itself may be assailed some day in a similar manner.” This appears to have been a prescient reading of popular attitudes, at least, for fears of this nature were indeed voiced in several contemporary “alarum” texts. English sources, meanwhile, suggest that the queen’s councillors busied themselves with obtaining passports for her merchants in Antwerp and financial redress for their losses. As referenced above, one report claimed that a band of “Spanyshe souldiers” had seized twenty bolts of “tapiestres, velvitte, damasks, and other thinges [bought] for the furniture of Sir Christopher Hatton hys house,” – presumably, the gatehouse, long hall and other rooms of Ely Palace, newly leased by Richard Cox, Bishop of Ely to the Lord Chancellor – and goods valued at 1,200 crowns, taken from a depot other than the English House (the losses of which are discussed immediately below). While “Johan Romero” is named as having distributed Hatton’s materials amongst his men, “Cavodes Quadra” is identified as having led the

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90 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 246v, instructions for M. D’Aubigny, Nov. 1576.
91 Cf. Ch. 6, section 3: ii of this thesis.
92 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol.248r, Burghley’s annotated copy of the States’ negotiations with Don John [Nov. 1576].
93 STC 25708, sigs. B2v-B3, discussed in Ch. 6, 3:v.
94 Cf. STC 18448 which only notes that though Philip may wish to be a “just King” he “does not even want to allow the States to discuss the matter to make peace with their neighbours without his command.”
95 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol.248v. Articles 1 and 2.
96 CSP Sp, II, 453, Guaras to Zayas, 3 Dec. 1576.
97 Discussed in Ch. 8, section 3 of this thesis.
98 W. Thornbury, Old and New London (London, 1878), pp. 514-26. Hatton thereafter petitioned Elizabeth to order Cox to alienate the whole of the property and grounds to him, on very favourable terms, suggesting he intended using it as a lavish personal residence.
attack on the English House.\textsuperscript{99} This claim tallies with what is stated in Gascoigne’s published pamphlet and with Horsey’s instructions.\textsuperscript{100} However, the Yelverton MS embellishes the detail provided in other reports by noting that the mutineers “entreated [the English merchants] verie evill ... setting harquebusses to their heades, cryinge they would kill them, if they would not give them that they demaunded.” Its final paragraph records Philip II’s answer that “Don Juan d’Austria” would provide “just” restitution – suggesting this document may have accompanied Smith on his Spanish embassy.\textsuperscript{101}

The accounts examined so far suggest that Elizabeth’s government took standard action in pursuit of redress and that, aside from some flashes of pique, did not regard the sack as serious grounds for a diplomatic breach with Spain.\textsuperscript{102} If anything, Elizabeth seems to have been more preoccupied by the threat of French intervention in the Low Countries should a permanent peace not be achieved. To this end, Horsey was sent on 14 December to monitor the negotiations between Don John and the United Provinces, and to inform Don John that Elizabeth would assist Orange’s forces in the event of constraint of Calvinist worship. If Orange’s party insisted upon “termes not fytt for subjects to ask of their prince,” however, the queen vowed to aid Don John “w[ith] her forces agaynst the States.”\textsuperscript{103}

Horsey’s instructions demonstrated Elizabeth’s overriding desire to force both parties to a peace: in effect, promoting a form of status quo in which the Low Countries would remain ruled by Philip II, their legal sovereign, but in which the largest Protestant denomination (the Calvinists) would be free to worship. Another list of considerations in Horsey’s hand stressed “the peril that is likely to grow from the French practises.” Tacked on to these was a note that he should prosecute the English merchants’ suit, dealing “earnestly” with Don John to instruct “Roda & the Spaniards at Antwarppe to repaye the sayd xii\textsuperscript{v} crownes” of ransom money. The only vaguely heated rhetoric came with the aside that Horsey should “playnly declare” that the “ill usage of our merchants” was a matter potentially damaging “to the current amitie and entercourse between us and the howse of Burgundie,” which the queen could not “passe ... lightly over.”\textsuperscript{104}

Wilson was also actively engaged in obtaining restitution for English losses, to which Don John had provisionally agreed on 15 December.\textsuperscript{105} The diplomat referred the “serenisimo principe” to Roda’s

\textsuperscript{99} BL Add. MS. 48000 (Yelverton MS.1), 53. 1576, fol. 467\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{100} STC 11644, sig. C; TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fol.44v.
\textsuperscript{101} BL Add. MS. 48000 (Yelverton MS.1), 53. [Nov-Dec.?] 1576, fol. 467\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Ch. 8, section 1, i of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{103} TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fols43\textsuperscript{r}-44\textsuperscript{r}, instructions for Horsey sent to Don John, 14 Dec. 1576. This is a copy of SP 70/141, fols 39\textsuperscript{r}-42\textsuperscript{r}, with additional instructions (on fol.44\textsuperscript{v}) to prosecute the suit of the merchants at Antwerp.
\textsuperscript{104} TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fols 44\textsuperscript{v}-45v, entitled ‘Certain considerations set down by Mr. Horsey concerning the Conferences to be had with Don John’ [14] Dec. 1576.
\textsuperscript{105} TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fol. 47\textsuperscript{v}, ‘Articles on which Don John is willing to treat for peace’, 15 Dec. 1576.
promise to recompense all goods seized in the sack and the ransom charges imposed, and to offer English merchants immediate safe conduct out of Antwerp.106 Like Horsey, Wilson stressed the mutual friendship between Elizabeth and Philip (“[l]a mutua amicitia tra il Re catholico et la Regina”), which might suffer if restitution was not forthcoming – a claim also rehearsed in the preface to Gascoigne’s newly published The Spoyle of Antwerpe.107 In response, Don John professed pleasure to hear of Elizabeth’s commitment to a negotiated peace, but denied permission for her merchants to leave Antwerp until he had received Philip’s personal assent.108 Wilson appealed that this was in contravention of Roda’s earlier promise and enquired at whose orders the stay was done.109

Horsey himself did not fare much better in his efforts. On 29 December, he wrote to Burghley from Luxembourg, writing of his first audience with Don John: “I let hym understand rather than the States should be found to call the French to there ayd as or that the Spaniardes should subverte the government of these low countries hir Ma[257]tie would ymploy her powris in the sayd States behalf.” Horsey pressed the governor on this point in the afternoon, reiterating that Elizabeth “could not permit ether the entering of the french or the spaniardes to subverte the ancient government of the low countries.” Although Don John agreed to the departure of the Spanish soldiers, and to remit the bond of 5,000 crowns that the merchants were still bound to pay, Horsey added “by, no meanes I could get hym to cause the shippes and goods of our nacion to be sett at lybertie.”110 Although English sources are quiet on the exact level of restitution offered, it appears that by early 1577 – after which the losses are no longer referred to – that a financial settlement had been reached.111

By late December, the queen’s attention – and conciliar business – had returned to the threat of French intervention and not primarily, as Guaras claimed, the expulsion of Philip’s army. On 22 December, a warrant drawn up under Elizabeth’s privy seal was made for the transportation of “certain pieces of cast-iron ordnance and of iron bullets” to unnamed recipients in Flanders: either to the rebels or to the remnants of her own ‘volunteer’ forces who may still have been protecting the maritime provinces from French occupation.112 On 24 December, Paulet informed Walsingham that Aubigny had left France (where he had gone following his embassy to England),113 to secure a composition between Don John and the United Provinces. Paulet added that with the summoning of

106 TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fol. 121r, Wilson to Don John, 15 Dec. 1576.
108 TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fol. 123v, Don John to Wilson, 17 Dec. 1576.
109 TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fol. 120r, Wilson to Rodas, 17 Dec. 1576.
110 TNA: PRO, SP 70/141 fol. 85rTv, Horsey to Burghley, 29 Dec. 1576, from Luxembourg.
111 Cf. TNA: PRO SP 70/140, fols 212v-215v and SP 70/140, fol.218v. Roda’s initial promise of 5,000 crowns compensation was probably honoured.
112 Cecil Papers, II, no. 428, warrant for the transportation of ordnance, dated 22 Dec. 1576.
113 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fol. 233, instructions for D’Aubigny to meet with Alençon, requesting military assistance [Dec. 1576].
the States General, the ‘cause of religion’ looked in jeopardy: noting sarcastically that, with their ongoing disagreements over whether or not to grant Calvinists freedom of worship, “their good myndes muste be [kept] fightinge eyther against god and his religion, or against honnor and equytie.”

Wilson put a more sensationalist gloss on events: writing on 2 January that Anjou would now be invested as “protector” of the Low Countries, and that the French would gain a stranglehold over the maritime provinces. Wilson had told Aubigny on 30 December “that the receevynge of Frenshemen woulde ... doe more harme than good... neyther mother, nor soonne wer apte instrumentes for the welfayre of this cowntrie... [which were] to commite the sheepe to the gouvernemnt of the wolfe.”

Wilson’s language implied a strongly confessional aversion to the rise of French Catholic involvement in the Low Countries.

For all that Elizabeth now appeared committed to forcing both parties to a negotiated peace, it is apparent that the driving force of her policy towards the Low Countries remained fear of France. As a corollary, she endeavoured to maintain her amity with Philip, strenuously denying that she was his avowed enemy. In response to charges that had appeared in Italian print, Walsingham worked on a draft declaration (endorsed by Burghley) “on the subject of a pamphlet printed at Milan,” in which the queen was “charged not only with ingratitude to the King of Spain (who... saved her life when justly sentenced to death in her sister’s time) but also with an intended attempt” against his own. The declaration attributed the charges to men who are “maliciously bent in this declyninge Age of the World both to judge and speake maliciously and unreverently of Princes.”

5. English policy developments and the revival of the Anjou match (Feb. 1577 – Dec. 1578)

Notwithstanding the queen’s professions of neutrality, it is apparent that the sequence of events kick-started by the sack signalled a new era in her foreign affairs. These events may be linked to an ongoing mistrust of Spanish intentions harboured by many of her leading councillors, alongside other external factors. As the historians Wernham and Wilson have noted, the deaths of the Emperor Maximilian of the HRE and Frederick III, Elector Palatine, in October 1576, provoked an immediate reassessment of Elizabeth’s policy, encouraging the queen to revive the prospect of a Protestant league. The significance of the Elector’s death to English Protestant sensibilities may be gleaned from the fact that the queen’s printer published an account of Frederick’s deathbed “confession” in

114 TNA: PRO, SP 70/141, fol. 69r, Paulet to Walsingham, 24 Dec. 1576.
115 TNA: PRO, SP 70/142, fol. 15r, Wilson to Burghley, 2 Jan. 1577.
116 CP 138/155 in Murdin, pp. 294-96, entitled “an addition to the declaration” on the ‘Novo Aviso’ in Walsingham’s hand.
117 Ibid., Murdin, p. 294.
118 Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 332-34; Wilson, Elizabeth and the ... Netherlands, pp. 64-70.
March 1577, followed by an appeal from the Lutheran Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel for Henry III to
maintain peace in his realm.\textsuperscript{119}

To what extent Elizabeth herself was sincerely committed to this league remains uncertain: although
she created the new Emperor Rudolf a knight of the garter in late 1576, she reiterated her stance that
the Low Countries should recognise Philip as their lawful king and accept his state religion.\textsuperscript{120} The
Perpetual Edict, signed by Don John and the States on 12 February 1577, without Orange’s assent,
bound the governor to accept the terms of the Pacification of Ghent: namely, the suspension of edicts
against Calvinists and an acknowledgement that the States were the primary organ of government.
The States, in turn, agreed to maintain the king’s religion, swearing to freely admit the new governor
and to dissolve themselves as a governing assembly once all the tercios around Antwerp had departed
for Italy.\textsuperscript{121} News of the edict was almost immediately known in England, where a copy of the
agreement was published on 7 March and sold at the printer William Ponsonby’s shop in Paul’s
churchyard.\textsuperscript{122} To a certain extent, the Pacification met the aims and hopes of English Protestants –
namely, to see persecution of Calvinists suspended in the Low Countries. As such, its publication in
English might be seen as something of a celebratory act

It was against this backdrop that Elizabeth dispatched the young, and zealously Protestant, Philip
Sidney – Leicester’s nephew and Philip II’s godson – carrying letters of condolence to the new
Catholic Emperor Rudolf (Maximilian’s heir), the Lutheran Count Ludwig VI (Frederick’s heir), and
Ludwig’s brother, the staunchly Calvinist John Casimir of the Palatinate-Simmern.\textsuperscript{123} Sidney was
accompanied by Leicester’s man, Sir Jerome Bowes; the queen’s champion, Sir Henry Lee; and
Daniel Rogers, Walsingham’s agent. Leaving Louvain, where he had delivered his compliments to
Don John,\textsuperscript{124} Sidney journeyed to Heidelberg, where he expressed to the “brethren Palatins” the
queen’s wish that he should “perswade them to brotherly love necessary for the publique weale”:
namely, to set aside their confessional differences and support the establishment of a trans-European
Protestant League. Noting their responses, Sidney offered a pragmatic reading of the German political

\textsuperscript{119} [Anon.], \textit{A Christian confession of the late moste noble ... Friderich ... Count Palatine ... Taken ... out of his
last will and testament. Whereunto is added the Lantgrawe his answere to the French King} (London: C. Barker,
Anno 1577; STC 11348). The Landgrave’s “answer” runs from sigs. E4'-F8.
\textsuperscript{120} As outlined in Smith’s instructions: TNA: PRO, SP 70/140, fols220r-221r, dated 20 Nov. 1576.
\textsuperscript{121} Parker, \textit{Dutch Revolt}, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{122} [Anon.], \textit{The Perpetuall edict, concerning the agreement concluded betweene Sir John of Austria... in the
name of the Catholick King of Spain ... and the generall estates of the Low Countryes ... published at Brussels the
17. of February 1577} (London: W. Posonbye; 7 March 1577; no STC given).
\textsuperscript{123} A narrative of Sidney’s mission may be found in: J. van Dorsten, \textit{Poets, Patrons and Professors} (Leiden,
\textsuperscript{124} TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 39r. Don John to Eliz., 7 March 1577; TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 44r. Wilson
wrote to Burghley on 10 March claiming that, despite his fair words, Don John was paying pensions to the
rebels. Cf. KL, \textit{RP}, IX, pp. 224-25, Eliz. to Don John, 18 March 1578, which complains about English exiles at
Don John’s court.
landscape. He alerted Walsingham to the fact that John Casimir and his brother were disunited in religion, but that there was hope that John Casimir’s wisdom could “temper well... the others weaknesses.” Sidney’s constant allusions to the “public weal” echoes the terminology used only two years earlier by Meru, the youngest Montmorency brother, to drum up international aid for his brother’s cause in the fifth French civil war (in which the Calvinist Frederick III had himself financed a mercenary force).

From Heidelberg, Sidney departed to Nuremburg and Prague, where he was granted an audience with the Emperor Rudolf on 8 April. Sending a report of his dealings to Walsingham on May 3, Sidney noted that the new emperor and his brother were “extreemely Spaniolated” – meaning, inclined to support the interests of Philip II in the Low Countries, and those of the Catholic faith in general. His letter included a summary of his reception by the Lutheran Elector Ludwig VI in Heidelberg, in which Sidney had urged Ludwig to have “mercyfull consideration of the churche of the religion” and to consider “the wronge he shoolde doe his worthy father utterly to abolishe [the Calvinist church] that he had instituted.” Sidney also wrote to the Landgrave of Hesse, outlining Elizabeth’s proposal for a trans-European Protestant League and rehearsing a somewhat hypocritical distinction (considering Elizabeth’s own less than benign treatment of her own Catholic subjects) commonly employed by the queen: that of acknowledging a crown which permitted freedom of religion yet which actively resisted religious persecution. Sidney used by now standard tropes – such as references to the “yoke” of papal tyranny – in his attempt to unite a disparate group of Protestant princes, who also employed such terms in their correspondence with the queen.

Departing from Germany to Antwerp, and thence to Breda and St. Geertruidenberg, where talks between Orange, the States and Don John ground on, Sidney’s next stop was to visit Orange and his wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, to act as Leicester’s proxy at their daughter’s christening. It was then that he probably authored “Certain notes concerning the present state of the Prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, as they were in the month of May 1577” – a report which outlined Orange’s proposal that the named parties sign a treaty of mutual defence with the queen.

125 A. Feuillerat, *The Prose Works of Philip Sidney* (Cambridge, 1962), III, pp. 105-8, Sidney to Walsingham, 22 March 1577. Sidney also sent a short note to Burghley: TNA: PRO SP 70/144, fol. 107r, which draws his attention to Walsingham’s letter. As with Gascoigne’s reports, it suggests that Walsingham had now superseded Burghley as the hub of Elizabeth’s intelligence network.
126 Cf. Ch. 3, section 7 of this thesis.
127 Discussed in Osborn, *Young Philip Sidney*, Ch. 23.
128 BL Cotton MS. Sidney to Walsingham, 3 May 1577.
129 CSPF: Sidney to Landgrave of Hesse, 13 May 1577.
130 TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 24r, Casimir to PC, 8 May 1577; SP 70/145, fol. 51v, Landgrave to Eliz., 20 May 1577.
131 There are three surviving copies of this report: two in the state papers and one in BL, Galba MS, C.VI, i, 52. In appendix 4 of *Young Philip Sidney* Osborn makes a convincing case for Sidney’s authorship.
would this bring England commercial profit, it would ensure that neither Philip II nor Henry III could “make warre upon ... Englende if Englende, Hollande, and Zelande be linked together in amitie.”

Clearly Sidney’s embassy was considered a success: shortly after he was recalled on 5 June, the privy council drew up the heads of a league to be agreed between Elizabeth “and such princes as make profession of the Gospell.” The proposed treaty was defined as a “league defensive against yé pope and his Adherents” – implying figureheads such as Philip II, Henry III, Mary Stewart, etc. – with the original members (the dukes of Saxony, Brandenburg and Brunswick, the free Swiss towns and cantons) instructed to “draw [in] other princes of yé religion.” Even though the Protestant convention held at Frankfurt in September ended without reconciliation between the Calvinist and Lutheran delegates, Sidney’s efforts had clearly not been wasted. This is evidenced by the fact that Elizabeth later signed defensive treaties with the conservatively Lutheran electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and the Duke of Brunswick, who had previously been suspicious of the queen’s ‘meddling’ motives with respect to the religious policies of their own states.

A confessional alignment – even with Protestants of such varying hues as the Lutheran and Calvinist princes of Germany – was clearly of utmost importance to Elizabeth’s councillors. As Sidney and Leicester continued to pursue an agenda of trans-European Protestant alliance, Wilson reiterated that Elizabeth should not trust in the pacific promises of any Catholic power. He informed Walsingham on 5 April that “neyther [Spain nor France] shall perswade me to beleve their wordes... never wil I think that ever any partye or assured amitie wyl bee emongest any that are divided in religion,” exhorting Burghley on 18 April that “good care wer had in Englande to the Scottishe Queenes dooings and to the person of our soverayne.” The same day, writing to Walsingham, he reported the Bishop of Liège’s comment that: “What doe prynces... deale with a Kynge of Navarre, a Prynce of Condie or a Prynce of Orange? Let them begynne first with the Queene of Englende, and, when she is ones subdewed, al others wyl yeelde” – a sinister statement which the diplomat claimed “was assented unto by al partes.” Wilson’s letter also brought news of an intended marriage between Don John and Mary Stewart, engineered by the Duke of Guise. On 8 June, he wrote with more optimism to Burghley that with Champagny’s defection to Orange’s party, the ex-governor of Antwerp had joined “them that are thought to bee the best patriotes and lovers of their cowntrie.”

Notwithstanding the absence of the term in contemporary print, it would appear that the notion of the

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132 BL, Galba MS, C.VI, i, 54r.
133 TNA: PRO, PC 2/12, fol.191r, meeting at Greenwich, 5 June, 1578.
134 TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 253r (English); SP 70/145, fol. 254r (Latin).
135 Trim, “Seeking a Protestant Alliance,” p. 159 which summarises this arrangement.
136 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144 fol.37, Leicester to Orange, 7 Mar. 1577, stressing Orange’s favour with the queen.
137 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 128r, Wilson to Walsingham, 5 Apr. 1577.
138 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 175r, Wilson to Burghley, 18 Apr. 1577.
139 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 179v, Wilson to [Walsingham], 18 Apr. 1577.
140 TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 87r, Wilson to Burghley, 8 June 1577.
revolt as a “patriotic” struggle was now emerging in Elizabethan political discourse. The same day, Wilson reported to Walsingham (with considerable hyperbole) that some anti-patriotic action was being concerted between the ultra-Catholics in France and Don John’s party, adding that “the Queene of Navarre cummeth shortlie to the Spawe... This cummynghe hether of the dowghter is like her mothers beeinge at Bayon, whereupon folowed the massacre.” The stark allusion to St. Bartholomew’s served, in Wilson’s view, to evidence a link between Franco-Spanish alliance and Protestant mass murder.

Throughout the spring of 1577, Paulet echoed Wilson’s warnings, reporting to Leicester that the French sought to “ground their doings upon the title of a third person” (i.e. perhaps an allusion to a prospective match between Mary Stewart and Don John, which would see both pursue the former’s claim to the throne of England). Wilson himself associated the earl with a “fit and apt remedy” for the Low Countries: implying that Leicester was gearing up to lead a military expedition. English fears of an armed intervention to free Mary Stewart from captivity and seat her on Elizabeth’s throne may have been heightened by rumours, as MacCaffrey has noted, that Don John was set upon this very objective. On 28 April, Paulet informed Walsingham that a marriage had been agreed between Philip II’s half-brother and the Scottish queen, and that the allied Catholic crowns of Europe would act in concert to procure the latter’s release. (Burghley added his thoughts in a marginal notation, which read: “the kk of fr. & sp to require / the delyveration of the Q. of Sc if peace ensew./ If not, then to assay by force.”) In their bid to set their kinswoman on the English throne, Paulet argued, the Guisians would be assisted by their Spanish and Italo-papal allies. In May, he informed the queen that the pro-Marian Hamiltons had travelled from Don John’s court to visit Guise’s, and thence to Philip’s in Madrid, who was making preparations by sea – which he interpreted as a direct threat to England. Of this Paulet wrote to the queen: “yt maye be feared leaste these Spanishe practices tende to the trouble of your Ma’y and your State.” Other letters between Paulet, Burghley, Elizabeth, Mildmay and Walsingham suggest that the unresolved English succession – and the threat posed by Mary Stewart – remained of paramount concern.

141 The OED notes that “patriot” was first used in English print to denote a lover of one’s country in 1605.
142 TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 89v, Wilson to Walsingham, 8 Jun. 1577.
143 CSPF, XI, 1382, Paulet to Leicester, 10 Apr. 1577. TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 152r, a copy sent to Walsingham.
144 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 179v, Wilson to [Walsingham], 18 Apr. 1577.
145 MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, p. 239, which notes that Don John’s plans were widely known in England, although I have not found much evidence in support of this besides Paulet’s correspondence.
146 TNA: PRO, SP 70/144, fol. 206r, Paulet to Walsingham, 28 Apr. 1577. Early parts of this passage in cipher. TNA: PRO, SP 70/145, fol. 73v, Paulet to Elizabeth, May 1577.
Developments in the Low Countries clearly worked to aggravate these anxieties. After a tense summer, which saw war renewed with Don John’s capture of Namur, Aerschot’s politque faction appointed the irenic Archduke Matthias of Austria, Philip II’s nephew, as their governor – hoping that he would usher in a new era of toleration and political stability.\textsuperscript{149} Yet constantly changing circumstances gave rise to a host of different contingencies for the English. Orange’s stock was clearly riding high: on 23 September, Don John wrote, the prince was welcomed in Brussels “like the Messiah.”\textsuperscript{150} Around the time of Matthias’s formal entrance into Maastricht, Davison reported that Anjou had approached the States with an offer of military engagement.\textsuperscript{151} The threat of Anjou’s interference particularly troubled the queen, for it would force her to ally with one or other of the antagonists in a desperate attempt to keep the French out. She may also have received intelligence that Don John had urged Philip to instigate another commercial war against both her subjects and his rebels: a scenario that threatened to catalyse a rupture in Anglo-Spanish relations.\textsuperscript{152} Finally, it was known that French troops under Guise’s command were now massing along the southern Netherlandish borders. In response to an appeal by the Marquis of Havré (on embassy from the States General), Elizabeth finally agreed to stand credit for a sizeable loan and to send 5,000 horse and 1,000 horse under the command of a leading English noble. From September onwards, Leicester busied himself with plans for mobilisation.\textsuperscript{153}

At the same time, the proposed Anglo-German defensive alliance was looking distinctly untenable. In October, Beale (who had gone to treat further with John Casimir in pursuit of a trans-European Protestant defensive league) wrote that Ludwig suspected the queen of “intermedlinge” in German affairs – complaining “that the princes ... knew what they had to doe wth out being prescribed, as her Ma would also be loth to be in her owne Realme.”\textsuperscript{154} Ludwig’s outburst may well have helped to dissuade the queen from her path: on 31 October, Walsingham informed Rogers that she had decided to forgo a trans-European Protestant alliance, “seing the overhastiness of some ... & the litle care and regarde that others have to the preservation of them selves & others.”\textsuperscript{155}

Some of Elizabeth’s advisors now disparaged the disunity of the German princes, voicing their disdain in strongly confessional language. Leicester wrote to Beale that: “I see the devil hath his

\textsuperscript{149} On the political failure of irenicism, see H. Louthan, The Quest for Compromise (Cambridge, 1997), Ch. 9. Aerschot had, in fact, already begun covert negotiations with Matthias following Maximilian’s death in October 1576. See Ibid., p. 145.
\textsuperscript{150} Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{151} TNA: PRO, SP 83/3, fol. 78\textsuperscript{r}, Davison to Burghley, Antwerp 30 Oct. 1577; SP 83/3, fol. 87\textsuperscript{r} and SP 83/5, fol. 67\textsuperscript{v}, both Davison to Walsingham, dated 4 Nov. 1577 and 8 Mar. 1578.
\textsuperscript{152} AGS Estado 572, 15 Nov. 1577. Cited in Croft, Spanish Company, p. xxii.
\textsuperscript{153} MacCaffrey, Elizabeth, p. 192; KL, X, 14T16.
\textsuperscript{154} TNA: PRO, SP 81/1, fol. 85’–86’, Beale to Walsingham, 11 Oct. 1577, concerning his meeting with Ludwig on the 28 and 29 Sept.
\textsuperscript{155} TNA: PRO, SP 81/1, fol. 98\textsuperscript{r}, Walsingham to Rogers, 31 Oct. 1577.
instruments stirring in all places [to disturb] this practise ... to defend his flock & owr members now
afflicted.” Leicester’s letter was also markedly critical of the vacillating States General, informing
Beale of “ye proceedings of our busy neighbours whom ye left at y’ departure in no small garboil,”
respecting the lack of “any substantiall resistance” shown to Don John. The earl complained:
“assuredly they shew so great Iressoluteness in all their doings as they make all their friends desparate
of any good success... I fear don John will very shortly so occupie their dull heads as they will never
hardly resolve on any thing. God direct them to the last.” That Leicester’s frustration stemmed from
his own thwarted ambitions is suggested in his aside that if the States “had ayd of our men [i.e. as the
queen had promised Havré] I think I shall be the man y’ shall have the charge of them.”

Leicester’s bellicose predictions that “we should be well able to look the enemys [of religion] well in
the face and not to suffer any to pass w’th out our ... listing” duly came to naught. Following
Matthias’s entry into Brussels on 18 January 1578, Orange checked the new governor’s authority by
encouraging the States General to pass limitations on his jurisdiction, compelling Matthias to accept
drastic limitations on his power. Bowing to popular pressure, Orange was appointed Matthias’s
deputy and chief advisor when the archduke took the oath of governorship on 20 January. Yet
Orange’s triumph was not to last long: following the Battle of Gembloux on 31 January 1578, Don
John embarked upon a campaign that saw him recover swathes of rebel-occupied territory, including
the redoubt of Maastricht in 1579. Philip II, meanwhile, looked for a way to have Matthias removed
and pressured Emperor Rudolf to this end.

What did such developments signal for the direction of Elizabethan policy? As Howard Louthan has
noted, there were only short-lived signs that public order in the Low Countries could be restored:
notably, when Matthias, Orange and the States General issued an edict of toleration (the
Religionsvrede) on 22 July, the implementation of which was soon defeated by Orange’s
opponents. Don John’s military revival, and the growing dissension between Catholic leaders in the
States General and Orange’s supporters, thus continued to feed the queen’s fear of French
intervention. In March 1578, the privy council met to discuss whether or not their mistress should
pursue a mediated peace between Philip and the States General (an agreement that was to be

157 BL Add. MSS 48149, fols 39v.
158 Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 186.
159 Louthan, Quest for compromise, pp. 146-47. Matthias was ultimately to leave the Low Countries in January
1581.
160 Ibid., pp. 148-49.

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attempted, but not achieved, via imperial mediation at Cologne the following year). In June 1578, Elizabeth dispatched the seasoned diplomats Cobham and Walsingham to assess the probability of a lasting accommodation between Philip and the States General; if peace were unlikely, they were to discern what role Anjou and the French intended to play in the Low Countries, before holding out the faint promise that the queen might send military aid to bolster that provided by John Casimir to Orange.

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In light of the fact that Anjou had entered Mons at the invitation of its governor, Count Lalaing, on 10 July, being proclaimed “Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries” by the States General shortly thereafter, the queen made a provisional offer to stand surety on a loan of £100,000 to the States or to advance £40,000 to finance Casimir’s mercenaries, then in the States General’s employ. Resolving to advance the smaller sum, she could only watch as Casimir embroiled himself in confessional and political disputes in Calvinist-controlled Ghent, failing to coordinate his army with that of the States (to whom she had also loaned £25,000). As Parker has noted, the deep divisions in his enemies’ ranks gave Philip II the opportunity to recover crucial political and territorial ground.

Cobham and Walsingham were recalled from their posts and arrived back in England on 5 October, returning to court two days later: a sign that, for the time being at least, the project of mediation was likely to fail. Soon afterwards, Don John’s death precipitated the complete rupture of the Catholic and Calvinist leaderships and the temporary appointment of Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, as Philip’s new governor-general, before Margaret of Parma became established in that office. An English pamphlet entitled The Popes pittiful lamentation, for the death of his deere darling Don Ioan of Austria, which blazoned Don John as Gregory XIII’s “Champion cheefe,” mocked death for not hitting “these Huguenots” with his poisoned “dart.”

The queen’s councillors, however, were too aware of the political contingencies of Don John’s death to celebrate it as a liberation from the claws of papal tyranny. As MacCaffrey has observed, the events of late 1578 marked “a critical turning point”, and not necessarily for the better, in England’s

162 MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, p. 231.
163 Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 191.
164 Ibid., pp. 192-93.
165 APC. X, pp. 369-70.
166 Anon., The Popes pittiful lamentation, for the death of his deere darling Don Ioan of Austria, and deaths aunswer to the same (London: J. Charlwood, 1578; STC 12355). The ESTC identifies the author of the pamphlet to be Henry Chettle (d.1603x7), a printer and playwright who was bound as an apprentice to the printer Thomas East in Michaelmas 1577. See Chettle’s entry in ODNB.
167 STC 12355, sigs. A1’-A2’.
unsettled relations with her most powerful neighbours. Although Don John’s death removed the feared prospect of his marriage to Mary Stewart and their combined assault upon England, it left the door open for Francis, Duke of Anjou to gain a secure foothold in the Low Countries. Moreover, the revival of the Elizabeth-Anjou marriage negotiations – largely inspired by the fear that the duke would now seek to extend his power in the Low Countries – marked the collapse of an Elizabethan conciliar consensus regarding both the direction of English policy and the succession. The matter of Francis of Anjou’s “true” intentions was central to these debates: did his power render him a wholly desirable, albeit opportunistic, ally to the Protestant cause, as Paulet averred; or was he a puppet of the perpetrators of St. Bartholomew’s, as Walsingham feared? Walsingham’s distrust was palpable: on 22 May he wrote to Davison: “as for Monsieur’s intention, I am fully persuaded that yt is treacherous.” Meanwhile, the diplomat Sir Edward Stafford – sent to intercede with Catherine de’ Medici against Anjou’s acceptance of sovereignty over the Low Countries – feared that he would become the figurehead of an anti-English Catholic league. These concerns were only aggravated by universal perceptions of Anjou’s shifty behaviour: “so deepe hath bene the French dissimulation these late yeres” Walsingham wrote, that he was unsure whether or not to trust him. Davison was also cynical, pointing out both Henry III and Anjou’s “readynes to fishe in the troubled streames of their neyghbours, [and] the occasion wch this war offers ... to make their proffit abroad.” These concerns were not directly expressed in the English pamphlet literature of 1576-78 suggesting that, for the time being at least, the spheres of high political and print discourse were not closely aligned.

The prospect of an Anjou marriage was thus fraught with uncertainty from the start. Although the queen made the first move in the summer of 1578, her interest cooled when she learnt of rumours to wed Anjou to Orange’s daughter, prompting Anjou to send over a stream of envoys to her court – including Quissé, who stressed to Sussex that his master would be directed by the queen “in [all] his actions in the lowe countreyes.” Quissé’s comment marked an acknowledgement of what political
motivations, at least, lay behind the queen’s desire for marriage. A few English councillors remained in favour of the match: as William Tighe has observed, Sussex wrote three letters to Walsingham in the late summer of 1578, the first two expressing that the marriage was Elizabeth’s best means of protecting her estate and of resolving the succession dynastically, and the last his concern that she would not assent. If she did not marry Anjou, her only hope was to trust that the contending parties in the Low Countries should be forced to a peace, for the other outcome was that she should find herself at war with Philip II. \(^{176}\) Sussex expressed his “simpell opynon” to this effect on 20 September, arguing that “peace is the surest waye for your mayestye in these causes & therfor all good meanes [are] to be sought that maye bryng it.”\(^{177}\) Wilson appears to have endorsed Sussex’s arguments, noting to Walsingham that without a marriage – even to the Catholic Anjou – Elizabeth’s regime and the possibility of a Protestant succession would be destroyed.\(^{178}\)

The views of the queen’s other councillors were also distinctly alarmist. Walsingham wrote to Sussex that if Elizabeth decided to withdraw the military assistance she had promised Orange’s party, “I see apparently that this country [the Low Countries] will become French.”\(^{179}\) Leicester wrote to Walsingham on 1 August bemoaning the fact that “our travall” will “fall out to no better effect,” adding that he had found “no small alteration” in Elizabeth’s “disposition” to withdraw all military aid.\(^{180}\) Burghley, who was supposedly wary of endorsing any form of direct armed intervention,\(^{181}\) wrote in August that “we of hir Counsell ar forced gretly to offend hir in these [Low Countries and Scottish] matters” and that, without “hir Ma\(^{19}\) royall assent, we can not delyver [aid] to them.”\(^{182}\) This would suggest that he was just as concerned with the broader implications of recent events – including both the queen’s reluctance to aid Orange’s party and to the Scots Protestants in the wake of the Earl of Morton’s fall in March.\(^{183}\) As Burghley had first suggested in 1560, and had attempted to pursue in 1572-73, his primary commitment tended towards an Anglo-Scottish alliance and a constitutional

\(^{176}\) Respectively: TNA: PRO SP 83/8, fol. 13\(^{1}\), 6 Aug. 1578; SP 83/8, fol. 59\(^{1}\), 29 Aug. 1578; SP 83/9, fol. 20\(^{1}\), 12 Sept. 1578. See W. Tighe, “The Counsel of Thomas Radcliffe ... to Queen Elizabeth I ... September 1578”, Sixteenth Century Journal, 18: 3 (1987), pp. 323-31, p. 326.


\(^{178}\) TNA: PRO, SP 83/8/8, Wilson to Walsingham, 3 Aug. 1578.


\(^{180}\) Ibid., p. 678, Leicester to Walsingham, 1 August 1578.

\(^{181}\) Burghley made a case for complete non-intervention in the Dutch Revolt as late as 18 March 1584 or 1585. See: Tighe, “The Counsel of Thomas Radcliffe”, p. 324, fn. 2, citing BL Harleian MS. 168, fols 102r-105v, which is dated confusingly.

\(^{182}\) TNA: PRO, SP 83/8, fol. 62r. KL, X, 783, Burghley to Walsingham, 31 Aug. 1578.

\(^{183}\) MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, pp. 409-10. Morton’s fall precipitated the rise of the king’s new favourite, the French Catholic Esmé Stewart, Sieur d’Aubigny, created Earl of Lennox in March 1580.
solution to the succession crisis. Meanwhile, Knollys (now Treasurer of the Household) argued that if the queen did “not suppress and subject her own will ... unto sound advice of open counsayle in matters touching the preventing of her danger, she will be utterly overthrown.” While Knollys referred to the threat posed by Mary Stewart, he also – by extension – urged his mistress to employ military aid to prevent the wars ravaging Scotland and the Low Countries from engulfing her realm.

Returning to the questions posed at the start of this chapter, it is clear that the Sack of Antwerp did not, by itself, mark a definitive political turning point in Elizabethan history. Forms of anti-Spanish comment were no more virulent than those which had appeared throughout the mid-1570s in print and political comment on the revolt in the Low Countries. There was a marked difference between the fears of the popular majority (as noted by Guaras), the abhorrence of men such as Wilson, and the largely unemotive tone of the negotiations led by Elizabeth and Burghley. This disconnect was unsurprising: the queen and her chief minister knew that all states suffered from mutinies and that Philip was, quite clearly, not to blame for this one – even though his government should be relied upon to provide restitution. As the queen and her councillors recognized, the sack was an unfortunate commonplace of war, without explicitly confessional overtones, and one which demonstrated no special malice towards the English community in Antwerp – given that, it would appear, only a single English servant had died. Moreover, the English crown recognised that any attempt to frame the massacre as an instance of Spanish oppression – i.e. as grounds for the overthrow of Philip’s government in the Low Countries – only courted the risk that the region would be annexed by France, and French Catholics at that.

Having outlined the sack as one, but certainly not the overriding, factor behind the key developments in Elizabethan diplomacy of 1576-78, it is now necessary to look at the English pamphlets, ballads and military treatises produced in its wake. Does the scope of coverage suggest there was widespread public interest in the atrocity – and was there recognition of it as a turning-point? How far did the printed sources concern themselves with the practical mechanics of the sack, or with discussions of English security respecting the ambitions of Don John, Anjou, Mary Stewart, etc.? To what extent can these concerns be seen to address the court-centric debates concerning the new direction of the queen’s policy? The next chapter will also cover the emergence of an “alarum” genre in the late 1570s, which included specific comment on both the Sack of Antwerp, St. Bartholomew’s and the ongoing wars engulfing France and Flanders.

184 Alford, Early Elizabethan Polity, pp. 192-201.
Chapter 8. The Sack of Antwerp and Elizabethan “alarum” print (Nov.1576-Dec.1578)

The Sack of Antwerp of 1576 attracted wide print coverage across Europe. It is possible that
Elizabethans may have seen some of Frans Hogenburg’s famous woodcuts or read some foreign prose
accounts.1 These included Cornejo’s Sumario de las guerras civiles y causas de la rebellion en
Flandes (Lyon, 1577), translated into French by Gabriel Chappuys, which presented a version of
events more favourable to Philip II’s interests.2 It is likely that French-language accounts were also
read by Francophone Englishmen: such as the Discours veritable sur ce qui est advenu touchant
l’alborote et esmption des Espaignols mutinez ès Îles de Zelande (Brussels, 1576), and Champagny’s
chronicle, published in 1578.3 Both of these attributed the violence to the nefarious ambitions of the
“Spanish” high command, making little distinction between the actions of the mutinous forces and the
wider objectives of Philip’s army. Meanwhile, Philip Galle’s Sommaire annotation des choses plus
memorables advenues ... dès l’an LXVI. jusques au ... LXXIX (Antwerp, 1579) – cast the atrocity as
the inevitable consequence of the Spaniards’ cruel and rapacious nature.4

However, given the lack of any evidence to suggest that these accounts were read by Elizabethans, it
is necessary to privilege English accounts when assessing English responses. Two appeared in the
near-aftermath of the sack: George Gascoigne’s pamphlet, The Spoyle of Antwerpe,5 and Ralph
Norris’s ballad A warning to London by the fall of Antwerp.6 A short summary of the sack, apparently
derived from Gascoigne’s account, appeared in Thomas Churchyard’s 1578 prose history: A
Lamentable... Description of the wofull warres in Flaunders.7 Besides these, generic allusions to the
sack also featured in several ballads, histories and military treatises of the later 1570s.8 My analysis of
these printed references will consider the whole spectrum of responses as they evolved over the late
1570s. It will also consider the following key question, raised in my analysis of the political sources:
did the pamphlets pick up on the fear of French intervention in the Low Countries? And how were the
key figures of Philip II, Pope Gregory XIII, Francis of Anjou, Mary Stewart and Don John
represented, if at all?

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1 Some are printed in FOL. W. H. Hollstein et al, Dutch and Flemish Etchings, Engravings and Woodcuts ca.
1450-1700 (Amsterdam, 1949), vol. 9, pp. 50-55. A copy of one is reproduced in appendix 11 of this thesis.
2 G. Chappuys, Briefve histoire des guerres... advenues en Flandre (1559-1577) (Lyon, J. Beraud: 1577).
3 Anon., Recueils d’Arétophile. The appendix of this text includes the letters of Roda to Philip II glossed with
Champagny’s comments, refuting Roda’s claims not to have incited the mutiny.
4 Galle, Sommaire Annotation.
6 R. Norris, A warning to London by the fall of Antwerp (London: J. Allde, 1577; STC 18656).
7 T. Churchyard, A Lamentable, and pitifull Description, of the wofull warres in Flaunder, since the foure last
years of the Emperor Charles the fift his raigne (London: R. Newberie, 1578; STC 5239).
8 STCs 3128; 5235; 5239; 5243; 11644; 18656 and 20979, discussed below.
1. George Gascoigne’s ‘The Spoyle of Antwerpe’ (Nov. 1576)

Gascoigne’s *The Spoyle of Antwerp* (London, 1576) has long attracted attention as an eyewitness source of the sack. Literary scholars have tended to interpret it as an obvious forerunner of a Black Legend tradition, marking an attempt to dehumanize all Spaniards and foreigners as “Other.” The Gascoigne scholar Gillian Austen has more convincingly contextualised it as part of the author’s quixotic pursuit of court patronage and a lucrative political career. Yet the awkwardly confessionalised aspects of the text and its politicized preface are still, in my view, underappreciated.

The chronology of *The Spoyle*’s publication suggests that it was written, if not by direct order of the privy council, then at least with the backing of certain of its members. With the text designated “scene and allowed”, the printer Richard Jones applied for recognition of copyright on 26 November 1576. This was only five days after Gascoigne’s return to England and only a day after the text’s dated postscript, suggesting that he must have received permission from representatives of the privy council rather than the Bishop of London. The speed of the text’s publication corroborates the author’s claim that his work was written in “haste,” substantiated by the fact that the “model” of the battle, which the stationer’s entry states would accompany the text, is absent in both surviving British copies. Although other sources confirm that news pamphlets could be hstily published – Gascoigne’s own obituary was entered into registers on 15 November 1577, a little over a month after his death – this is the fastest turnaround I have found for the publication of a news pamphlet concerning contemporary events in the Low Countries.

Seeming to confirm its official status, the full wording of the registered entry – i.e. “the spoile of Andwarpe faithfullie reported by a true Englisheman that was put at the same, and also a platfourme of the whole battaile thereunto annexed” – reads almost as an intelligence report. Gascoigne’s claim to be a “true Englisheman” is also of interest, for I have discovered only one other titular allusion of this kind in a 17th century tract. The author’s decision to remain anonymous may have been an

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10 L. B. Salamon, “Gascoigne’s Globe.”
12 *Stationers Registers*, II. 305.
14 BL shelf-mark 115.a17 and Oxford Bodleian: Tanner 42.
15 *Stationers Registers*, II. 319. On 15 November 1577, Edward Aggas licensed the work “a Remembraunce of the well employed life and godlie ende of GEORGE GASCOIGN[E] esquire whom deceased at Stalmford in Lincolnshire the vijth of October 1577 reported by George Whestston.”
16 *Stationers Registers*, II. 305.
17 The other instance is R. Kilvert’s *A discourse of a true English-man, free from selfe-interest, concerning the interest England hath in the Siege of Graveling* (London, 1644). In the main part of his text, *A Gaping Gulf* (1579) the polemicist John Stubbs also use the phrase to justify his attack on Elizabeth’s proposed marriage to Anjou. See Ch. 9, section 1 of this thesis.
attempt to shield himself from personal attack, given past allegations of espionage and heresy, although it also works to trumpet a new form of zealous nationalism.\textsuperscript{18}

The inclusion of a woodcut depicting the raped Roman matron Lucretia on the text’s final leaf – in which the remains of a ruined city may also be glimpsed – suggests an attempt to attract a popular audience.\textsuperscript{19} In invoking one of the most notorious assaults of antiquity, \textit{The Spoyle}’s publishers seem to be reifying the sack as a form of epic violation. Yet the use of this particular woodcut was also a canny mode of recycling: being an impress of the printer’s mark of Thomas Berthelet (d.1555), who had traded under the sign of the “Lucretia Romana” in his shop on Fleet Street (and whose sales outlet was occupied by Ralph Newbery in 1560).\textsuperscript{20} It is possible that Charlwood (working in Jones’s print house on Fleet Lane) borrowed Berthelet’s device from Newbery specifically for \textit{The Spoyle}’s publication: serving as a ready-made, moralising – perhaps even titillating – illustration for the hastily printed pamphlet.\textsuperscript{21} It may also have served as a powerful symbol of the Spanish campaign against civic rights: French pamphlets routinely used the metaphor of a “city raped” to represent and condemn excessive violence.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{i) The preface: political comment and authorial claims of impartiality}

A sense of disgust engendered by the assault on Antwerp was strongly conveyed in \textit{The Spoyle}’s preface, despite the author’s claims “to speake wythout parciality.”\textsuperscript{23} Such claims were standard for the period: expressions of an author’s objectivity and veracity were intended to highlight his trustworthiness and lack of aesthetic contrivance.\textsuperscript{24} But the ambivalence of this preface is unusual, implying that the sack could damage Anglo-Spanish diplomatic relations if Philip II were to deny restitution for English merchant losses.\textsuperscript{25} In order to maintain the “firme & unviolate amytye” between the crowns of England and Spain, the preface claimed that the “King, their [i.e. the mutineers] Maister” must “take ... good order for redresse thereof, as our countrymen in the end, shall rest satisfied.”\textsuperscript{26} In this sense, the argument of the preface chimes in with the English crown’s policy of negotiation with Philip II and his representatives in the Low Countries.

\textsuperscript{18} TNA PRO SP Dom. 12/86, 59. “Against George Gascoyne y' he ought not to be Burges”: anonymous letter sent to the PC, discussed below.
\textsuperscript{19} STC 11644, sig. C8'. See appendix 12 of this thesis. This device appears in no other surviving work published by Charlwood or Jones.
\textsuperscript{20} Ebook: W. Roberts, \textit{Printers’ Marks, A chapter in the history of typography} (Project Gutenberg, 2008), p. 34. See \textit{ODNB} entry for Ralph Newbery (d.1603/4).
\textsuperscript{21} Neither Charlewood nor Jones appear to have used this device in any other of their surviving works.
\textsuperscript{22} E.g. Anon., \textit{Discours du pillage de Malines fait le 2e Octobre 1572}. Cited in P. Arnade, “The city defeated and defended”, pp. 211-12.
\textsuperscript{23} STC 11644, sig. B4’.
\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Prefaces to STCs 22241.5 and 22248.
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Ch. 7, 4.
\textsuperscript{26} STC 11644, sig.*2\textsuperscript{r}, Preface.
The terminology used elsewhere was considerably more sensationalistic, as Gascoigne/the preface-writer noted that the “outrages and disordered cruelties done to our nation, proceeded but from the common Souldiers: neither was there any of the twelve which entred the englishe house, a man of any charge or reputacion.”27 In stressing that it had been ordinary soldiers who had attacked his countrymen, the preface claimed that national honour had been tainted: a dubious assertion, given that no Englishman of any status had, in fact, been killed.28 Moreover, the author’s purported objectivity did not extend to accepting claims that the sack was the tragic consequence of chronic troop underpayment, noting in the main body of his pamphlet that “the sacking & spoyle of Antwerpe hath been (by all lykelyhoode) long pretended by the Spanyerds” – suggesting all of Philip’s military and political high command – who “have done nothing else but lien in wayte continually to fynde any least quarrell to put ye same in execution.”29

**ii) Comment in the text: the sack as premeditated design**

In his main narrative, Gascoigne reiterated that the attack on Antwerp was long premeditated by “Spanish” officials, citing “the cruell pretence of the sayd Spanierdes” on numerous other occasions.30 Overlooking the mutineers’ desperate desire for payment – which he dismissed as only one of their “unresonable demaunds”31 – he argues that Antwerp had always stood loyal to the crown, despite the provocation afforded by “the intollerable burden of theyr tyrannies.” He analogised the city’s dishonourable treatment to the equally outrageous attack on Maastricht, which having “perteyned” to the Bishop of Liege, had also “medled nothing at all in these actions.”32

At this stage, the tract sensationally departed from other pro-Spanish apologias available in contemporary print. Chappuys’ *Briefve histoire* recounted that a troop of Spanish cavalrymen, commanded by Alonzo de Vargas and drawn from the surrounding area, were offered rest and refreshment by Dávila, commander of Antwerp’s citadel. Chappuys noted that these men refused to pause in their attack, being “enflammez & transportez de colere” to punish a disloyal town, although they did set aside time to pray.33 He attributed the success of the ensuing assault (“la victoire”) to the grace of God, noting that “les ennemis... ont esté vaincuz.”34 In contrast, Gascoigne’s account insisted that the attackers’ strategy was motivated by baser instincts. He too recorded Dom Vegas’s arrival

27 Ibid., sig. *2*.
28 There is a reference to one English servant being hanged at sig. C2, discussed below.
29 STC 11644, sigs. A3-A4. The inserted leaf of “Faultes escaped” acknowledges that “Fuora villiavo” should read “Fuora villiacco” for the mutineers’ war-cry.
30 Ibid., sigs. A4 and B6.
31 Ibid., A8.
32 Ibid., sigs. A4-A5*.
34 Ibid., p. 206. “Parquoy peut on voir de combien il importe scavoir suivre la victoire, quand Dieu l’envoye.”
with 1,000 cavalry, joined by 2,000 footmen from Aalst, who “had none other conductour then their Electo (after the maner of such as mewtine & rebel) but were of sundry companies: as Dom Emanuels & others.” Rather than stressing the determination of these forces to punish a “disloyal” town, Gascoigne stressed that they were wholly avaricious, boasting that they “would neyther stay to refresh themselves ... nor yet to conferre of any thing, but only of ... how they should ... assaile [the town]... vowing neyther to eat nor drinke until they mighte at liberty and pleasure in Antwerp.” The terminology he used to describe the ensuing violence is telling – besides frequently alluding to the sack as a “calamitie,” he twice referred to it as a “massacre,” a term carrying strongly providentialist overtones. The wording of intelligence reports and diplomatic sources of the period suggests that “massacre” – connoting indiscriminate and senseless brutality – was considered particularly inflammatory and used only when the audience was considered antipathetic to the perpetrators. It also, of course, links the tone of Gascoigne’s pamphlet to Calvinist reports of St. Bartholomew’s. Just as Hotman had vilified the senseless “fury” of the Parisians involved in the 1572 atrocity, whom he termed “outragious savage beastes in shape of men,” so Gascoigne condemned Antwerp’s attackers for not sparing people according to “age, nor sexe: time nor place: person nor countrey: profession nor religion,” adding “as great respect they had to the church and churchyeard,... as the Butcher hath to his shambles or slaughterhouse.” This description also recalled that of Don Fadrique’s sacking of Rotterdam and Naarden, recorded in an anonymous 1573 news pamphlet, which had lambasted the attackers “barbarous cruelty” and sacrilegious desecrations.

The Spoyle’s middle section then catalogues the depredations supposedly committed by the mutineers following their attack on the town, including a reference to “the infinite nombres of poore Almains, who lay burned in their armour: som [with their] entrailes skorched out &... some their head and shoulders burnt of.” Following an exposition of these and other horrors, comes an allusion to the rape of a young woman who had fled to a convent for sanctuary. This anecdote accompanied Gascoigne’s account of the burning of the famous Palladian stadhuis, as though to underscore the conjoined nature of civic and family honour. The tone of the narrative became steadily more censorious: “I may not

35 STC 11644, sig. A8v.
37 Multiple occasions to “this calamitie” on sigs. A2-A3v. Besides a reference to the sack as a “massacre” on sig. A3v, a reference to it as a “pytteous massacre” appears on sig. [C8]. As noted in Ch. 3, these are the earliest usages of the term I have found in English print.
38 Cf. TNA: PRO SP 70/140, fols212v, Wilson to the PC, 19 Nov. 1576, in which Wilson records referring to the sack as a “massacre” – when meeting with Aerschot – and a “bloodie victorie” – when addressing Roda. The author of BL Cotton Caligula MS E, VI fol. 328v – part of a badly damaged intelligence report dated 22 Nov. 1576 – refers to the sack as a “calamitie.”
39 STC 13847, fols lix; lxxxii.
40 STC 11644, sig. B8v. Italics in original.
41 STC 540, sigs. [C4v] and D2. Cf. Ch. 6, 3:iv of this thesis.
passe over with silence, the wylfull burning and destroying of the stately Townehouse, & all the monuments and records of the Citie: neither can I refraine to tel their shamful rapes & outrageous forces presented unto sundry honest Dames & Virgins.\textsuperscript{42}

Having thus prepared his readers for the ultimate act of atrocity, Gascoigne’s pamphlet narrated an assault upon an English servant who, having redeemed his master’s goods for three hundred crowns, was hanged “untyl he were halfe dead, because he had not two hundredth more to geve” his attackers. Having begged “on knees with bytter teares” for more time to obtain the ransom, the man was tortured for failing to procure the remainder, after which his attackers “hong him again outright: and afterwards (of exceeding curtesie) procured the friars Minors to burie him.”\textsuperscript{43} Gascoigne’s sarcastic portrayal of the ‘Spanish’ malefactors – hanging a man for a ransom he could not advance and then displaying a hypocritical “courtesy” in ensuring his burial, perhaps to disguise their crime – was designed to outrage his readers.\textsuperscript{44} As the political sources suggest, there was no formal corroboration of this servant’s – or any other – Englishman’s death.\textsuperscript{45} Yet Gascoigne’s anecdotal description acted to highlight the Spaniards’ supposedly “malicious and cruel intent” against not only the people of the Low Countries, but also against Englishmen.\textsuperscript{46} His evidence in support of this contention was suspiciously scant: compared to what happened to thousands of Antwerp’s citizens, the death of one English servant, if true, appears comparatively paltry. Other accounts also contradict Gascoigne’s claims that the vast majority of dead citizens were left unburied: Chappuys’ \textit{Briefve histoire des guerres} noted that Roda and other Spanish commanders (who desperately attempted to impose order on their troops) instructed local parishioners to bury the dead.\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{iii) Antwerp’s destruction: an act of fortune or providential retribution?}

Gascoigne’s attempts to attribute Antwerp’s sacking to the tyrannical cruelty of Spanish Hasburg rule were partly offset by his critique of Antwerp’s defenders, suggesting that the ‘Spanish’ were not his only targets. While the author noted that both the Francophone Walloons and Germanic “High Duches” shamefully fled in the wake of the initial onslaught, he also lambasted the town’s garrison commanders: Everstein was mocked for having drowned while fleeing from the new town (a claim supported by Chappuys),\textsuperscript{48} and the Marquis of Havré (“Havrey”) and Champagny were scorned for

\textsuperscript{42} STC 11644, sig. C1\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., sig. C2.
\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Ch. 7, section 4, which notes that despite Horsey’s claims, there is no concrete evidence of English deaths.
\textsuperscript{46} STC 11644, sig. A4.
\textsuperscript{47} On the burying of bodies, see Chappuys, \textit{Briefve histoire des guerres}, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{48} Chappuys, \textit{Briefve histoire des guerres}, p. 204. This account condemns Everstein – “le Conte Obristeyn” – as a traitor to Philip II, noting that he met a dishonourable end.
having escaped on one of Orange’s ships. Antwerp’s citizens were thus left to defend themselves as best they could, standing “every man armed in readynes before his doore, they dyed theren ... fighting manfully.” Gascoigne also accused the city’s semi-professional porters of incompetency, adding that many of those who were called on to assist “came stragling and loose... from drinking and carousing.” In a sense, Gascoigne castigated the city for its own moral failings, describing “one of the rycheast Townes in Europe” being reduced “within three daies” to an abode of “murderers and strompets.” Chappuys put a rather different spin on events: noting that it was a thing “merveilleuse & estrange” to see that the town, whose streets one could not ordinarily walk “pour la grande ... multitude des marchans & nations estrangeres,” was now filled only with “soldats Espagnols... plus furieux que lions.” These claims were clearly influential: Gascoigne’s friend and fellow soldier, Barnabe Rich, would later castigate Antwerp’s citizens for living “in vile excess... their paunches stuffed with double beer.” The ballad-writer Ralph Norris also noted that the city’s sacking – “Antwerp’s plague” – was sui generis, a “rod prepared for to scourge the pride” of its own “devlish drunken trade.”

Gascoigne’s attempt to frame his narrative as an allegory of divine judgement was reiterated in a striking analogy towards the end of his account, where he claimed to have seen “17,000 men, women and children” lying in “as many sundry shapes and forms of mans motion at time of death: as ever Mighel Angelo dyd portray in his tables of Doomes day.” This reference to Michelangelo’s fresco of the Last Judgement, painted on the altar wall of the Sistine chapel, is an interesting reference – suggesting that Gascoigne knew this work and expected his readers to also. The author then represented himself as an agent of God’s work, noting “I thank the Lord God, who made me an instrument to appease [the mutineers’] devilish furies” in safeguarding the English merchants, and in leaving on “the 12th of this instant November... to solicit their rueful causes” at Elizabeth’s court. Gascoigne also employed providentialist rhetoric to suggest that Antwerp’s attackers would themselves become targets of God’s punishment. Initially, the ambiguous phrasing of the preface leaves readers to determine whether “the wickednesse” used in Antwerp “doo seeme ... a sufficient cause of Gods so just a scorge and plague.” The main part of the narrative seems to contest this assertion by stating “wee [must not] thinke (although it hath pleased God for some secrete cause ... to yeelde Anwarpe and Maestrecht, thus into their handes) that he wyll spare to punish this theyr

49 STC 11644, sig. B7.
50 Ibid., sig. B3r.
51 STC 11644, sig. C3.
52 Chappuys, Breve histoire des guerres, p. 205.
54 R. Norris, A warning to London by the fall of Antwerp (London: 1577; STC 18656), [n.p].
55 STC 11644, sig. C7v.
56 Ibid., sig. A2r.
outrageous crueltie... for surely their boasting and bragging ... is over great to escape long unskorged.” This implies that the mutineers were not simply instruments of God’s vengeance but rather, sinners who would provoke His wrath. Such an argument adopted a strand of Calvinist ideology well known to Elizabethans, which averred that while God “often permits the guilty to exult for a time ... and the innocent... to be wickedly ... oppressed, this ought not to produce any uncertainty as to [His] uniform justice.” Gascoigne’s tract clearly harkened to a future act of “uniform justice” in concluding that “though some, which favour the Spanish faction, will aleadge ... reasons to the contrary: yet when the blood is cold, and the fury over, me thinkes that a true Christian hearte should ... refrayne to provoke Gods wrath by sheadding of innocente blood.” This condemnation was ideologically very close to that delivered by Wilson to Aerschot in the immediate wake of the sack.

The evidence presented by the pamphlet as a whole would thus have left English readers with an uncertain moral message: namely, that Antwerp may have been simply a target of restive soldiery, and that it had sinned no worse than other cities of the era (London included). Rather pointedly, Gascoigne’s specific reference to those “which favour[ed] the Spanish faction” worked to undermine the political credibility of those at Elizabeth’s court – including, presumably, councillors such as Croft – who remained pro-Spanish in their leanings. That there was an Elizabethan “Spanish faction” may be inferred from a comment made by Champagny – at this point loyal to Philip II – in March 1576 concerning Walsingham’s rumoured embassy to the French court to pursue an anti-Spanish alliance. Champagny had reassured Requesens that “our friends [at Elizabeth’s court] are even trying to get him dismissed.”

iv) Gascoigne’s patronage

It is uncertain whether anyone of higher political or social status encouraged Gascoigne to publish his report of the sack. Heton, an ex-Marian exile with strong evangelical sympathies and close associations with London’s exile churches, clearly played a role in endorsing the author’s version of events. A member of the Mercer’s Company who had settled in the parish of St. Lawrence Jewry upon Elizabeth’s succession, Heton had been closely involved in attempts to establish a broadcloth mart at Emden in 1562, designed to free England’s mercantile interests from their dependency on Antwerp. His hasty note praising Gascoigne’s “humanity” and authorising him to report directly to

57 Ibid., sig. C3v.
58 At least ten English editions of Calvin’s Institutes appeared between 1561 and 1582. Quotation from H. Beveridge (tr.), John Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion (Peabody, 2008), I, Ch. 5, v.7, p. 20.
59 STC 11644, sigs. B7-B8.
60 TNA: PRO, SP 70/140 fol. 214v, Wilson to PC, 19 Nov. 1576. Discussed in Ch. 7.
the privy council may be read as a *bona fide* of the author’s integrity (and perhaps Protestant fervour) by a man known to harbour a mistrust of Catholic-controlled Brabant.  

Gascoigne also had personal connections with several high-ranking persons, including the Earl of Bedford and Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton, both vigorous proponents of military action in favour of a Protestant internationale. Gascoigne dedicated two accounts of his adventures to Grey in 1572 and his tract *The Droome of Doomesday* to Bedford in 1576, perhaps to mark the resolution of a land dispute. Another moralistic tract of 1576, *The Steele Glasse*, was also dedicated to Grey and prefaced with commendatory verses by Walter Raleigh (an associate from Gascoigne’s years at Grey’s Inn). Gascoigne also had – and wished to extend – his links with the Leicester/Warwick circle: upon his return from military service in late 1574, he dedicated two accounts of his adventures to Grey, who was perhaps his conduit to Leicester’s circle. Although there is no evidence that he dedicated a work to Leicester personally, the earl’s influence likely lay behind two of Gascoigne’s major commissions: devising the masques performed at Kenilworth in 1575, from whence the latter accompanied the royal progress to Woodstock, and his commission to travel to Paris and Antwerp in 1576. Gascoigne also declared his intention to court Warwick’s patronage in his verse treatment on war, the *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, in which Leicester’s brother is blazoned as “woorthisie Warwyke he, in whose good grace I covet sore to be.” By early 1576, Gascoigne clearly stood in high enough favour at court to present Elizabeth with a New Year gift (a manuscript of *The Tale of Hemetes the Heremyte* translated into Latin, Italian and French): a practice which he was to repeat in 1577.

What, then, are we to make of Gascoigne’s role in the political life of the Elizabethan court – and, by extension, the purpose of his pamphlet? The agent might be seen to belong to the shadowy hinterland

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63 TNA PRO SP 70/140, fol. 191r. Heton to the PC, 10 Nov. 1576.
64 These were *The fruites of warre* and *Gascoignes voyage into Holland*.
66 Gascoigne was admitted to Grey’s Inn in 1555, where he was made an ancient in 1565. See G. W. Pigman’s *ODNB* entry for George Gascoigne (d.1577).
67 Austen, pp. 64, 67. Interestingly, however, Gascoigne based his *Devise of a maske for the right honorable Viscount Mountacut* (1571) on a translated account of the battle of Famagusta which was itself dedicated to Leicester [William Malim’s *The true reporte of all the successe of Famagostia* (1572)].
68 Gascoigne wrote an account of the festivities, published in March 1576 by Richard Jones and entitled: *The princely Pleasures, at the Courte at Kenelwoorth... as were there devised, and presented... before the Queenes Majestie in... 1575*, which survives in three printed editions of 1821. On accounts of the Kenilworth performances, see Prouty, pp. 177-80 and Austen, pp. 117-33.
70 *Dulce bellum inexpertis* first published in Gascoigne’s *Poesies* (London, 1575; STC 11637), p. 197.
71 On the content of *Hemetes the Heremyte* see Austen, pp. 134-50. The text was published after Gascoigne’s death as an annex to a translation of Synesius’s *A paradoxe, prouing... that baldnesse is much better than bushie hair...* (London, 1579; STC 23603).
of intelligence gatherers – with a status analogous to that of William Herle, a man more concerned with information-gathering and transmission than with court-centred activities. Yet Gascoigne’s obvious desire for a parliamentary seat, and his thirst for court patronage, suggest that he might have sought to channel his literary efforts into a form of political service. Although the evidence is patchy, it is possible that one or more of his court contacts, such as Walsingham, Burghley, Leicester or Warwick, advanced The Spoyle’s publication with an eye to securing its author political advancement and/or casting Philip’s army in the Low Countries as inherently tyrannous. And yet there are caveats to be added if one assumes this level of backing. Although highly critical of the troops which sacked Antwerp, The Spoyle is not easily classifiable as a piece of stridently confessionalised, anti-Spanish propaganda: despite the politicised wording of its preface, the text’s meaning is neither unambiguously anti-Spanish nor unequivocally pro-Protestant. This may, of course, have been precisely the type of vague message that Gascoigne’s court backers wished to see disseminated: fearing to push the queen too crudely on the point of military intervention for the sake of religion alone, the tract suggested that the behaviour of Philip’s army was of itself a cause for political concern.

2. Later accounts of the sack, news coverage of the revolt in the Low Countries and associated “alarum” sermons and tracts (1576-78)

Traditionally, English responses to the sack have been read in relation to a fixed set of literary and biblical motifs associated with the development of an “alarum” genre in English print – following the lines of the de casibus mould. Works of this nature tended to stress that a vengeful God would wreak vengeance on London and other cities, just as He had once destroyed Jerusalem and Rome for their sins. The literary historian Simon Pratt has demonstrated that, prior to the sack, a belief in divine retribution had been popularised by numerous English editions of Joseph Ben Gorion’s Compendious and most marveilous historie of the latter tymes of the Jewes common weale (published over the course of the 1560s and 1570s). As noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, a native de casibus tradition was also undoubtedly influenced by the sermons of some reformist clerics of the period, who drew associations between urban sin and the inevitability of God’s punishment. The Protestant divines Thomas Drant and William Fulke (Leicester’s chaplain) regularly articulated an apocalyptic vision of the Reformation as a struggle between Christ and Antichrist. The published text of Fulke’s 1570 Hampton Court sermon, reprinted

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73 Austen, pp. 65-66; Prouty, pp. 58-65 on Gascoigne’s attempt to secure a Midhurst seat.
75 See R. Bauckham’s entry for William Fulke (d.1589) in the ODNB.
in 1571, 1572, 1574 and 1579, analogised Babylon to Rome “by the just judgement of God... fallen,” condemning all Catholics as “dروونکی with the heretical doctrine of Papistrie... so imprisoned in corrupt affection and foolish fantastie.” The popularity of this sermon, which prefigured many of the charges made by English commentators in the wake of the sack, suggests that certain constructions of sin – i.e. zealous Catholicism, Protestant complacency, and the hedonism of city dwellers – were closely associated with ideas of divine vengeance.

i) “Alarum” ballads and moralising allusions to the sack
Besides Gascoigne’s pamphlet, the Stationers’ Registers suggest that at least four ballads on the sack were soon issued in English print. This relatively high number is interesting given that, owing to the transitory nature of single-leaf folios, ballads are generally underrepresented in the English source record.

What, if any, moral or political function did these ballads serve? There are significant problems with attribution and chronology if one posits, as Pratt does, that alarum ballads emerged as a direct consequence of the sack, largely as a means of educating an unrepentant populace. Whereas, in fact, only a few survive which date from 1572-79, the weight of evidence from the 1560s suggests that these were already a thriving feature of English print culture. The titles Sapartons alarum, to all such as do beare the name of true soldiery, in England and Of the horrible and woffull destruction of Sodome and Gomezora, both positing a link between moral laxity and the collapse of a strong state, were issued by Richard Jones several years before the sack. Whilst the latter promoted the appeasement of God’s wrath by godly living, the former instructed England’s “lustie laddes” to do their duty for England – urging them to “Encounter sharply with thy foe, / Make havoce of the spoyle.” Three years later, John Carr’s bombastic ballad A larume belle for London, with à caveat or warning to England advanced a similar message. One might infer that these works prepared the ground for the spate of verse ballads on the 1576 sack, having already established that a market existed for the production of “alarmist” literature.

76 W. Fulke, A sermon preached at Hampton Court, on Sunday... the 12. day of November... 1570. Wherein is plainly proved Babylon to be Rome (London, 1570; STC 11449.5), sigs. A2, A3, G3-G4.
77 As noted in Ch. 2 of this thesis. Cf. Huth (ed.), A Collection of Seventy-nine Black-Letter Ballads, and Watt, Cheap print, pp. 11-37, 40-2. In contrast to the thousands of longer works catalogued by the ESTC for Elizabeth’s reign, as few as 250 out of 3,000 ballads may have survived.
79 Huth, Black-Letter Ballads, xi.
80 (London, 1569; STC 21745). Huth, pp. 118-120.
82 Ibid., p. 120; p. 125.
83 (London, 1573; STC 4684).
Verse ballads on the sack certainly seem to have been written in a pre-established vein of moralising tradition. On 25 January 1577, Richard Jones and John Charlwood obtained a license to print the title “A warnynge songe to Cities all to beware by Andwerps fall.” On 1 July of that year, the printer Hugh Jackson paid the standard 4d. fee and submitted a copy of “heavie newes to all Christendom from the woofull towne of Antwerp comme” to the Registers. Marking the sack’s two-year anniversary in 1578, Thomas Man entered “A godlie exhortacon unto Englande to repent him of the evill and sinfull waies / shewinge the example and distruccon of Jerusalem and Andwerp,” alongside three other works with similarly proselytizing titles.

In analogising London’s downfall with Antwerp’s sack, the writers of these ballads also conveyed pragmatic messages that touched on political concerns. The text of Norris’s 1577 A warning to London by the fall of Antwerp developed from a condemnation of “vain excess” and “devilish drunken trade” into an apostrophe to Londoners to defend their city. It reads:

Let Antwerp warning be,
Thou stately London, to beware,
Lest, resting in thy glee,
Thou wrapp’st thy self in wretched care.

Simply structured in rhymed couplets, the tone of Norris’s ballad was stridently fatalistic; his description of London as “stately” conflated grandiosity with pride, and seems directed at the governing élite. But the action of the ballad was restricted to evocations of stock personae, such as the vigilant English soldier guarding his trench. There was not much in the way of vivid action or engaging detail; the sack itself was not described, suggesting either that the author did not know what had occurred in Antwerp (unlikely, given the circulation of reports such as Gascoigne’s), or that specific details were flattened out in the interests of moralising generalisations.

Arguably, the ballad’s simple, almost childlike rhyme scheme, served to throw its menacing subtext into greater relief. Norris emphasized that London, like Antwerp, was vulnerable to sudden attack and fired imperatives at its citizens as though they were already besieged:

Keep sure thy trench, prepare thy shot,
Watch well, so shall no foil be got;
Stand fast, play thy part,
Quail not, but show an English heart;
Doubt, dread, still fear,
For Antwerp’s plague approacheth near.

84 Stationers Registers, II. 308.
85 Ibid., II. 313.
86 Ibid., II, 341. Two of these, entitled “A pretie songe of the Judgement day when death shall fetche all awaie” and “A most profitable patterne to all Christian men forwarnyng the day of Judgement” may well have referenced Antwerp’s sacking, or been read /sung with it in mind.
87 (London, 1577; STC 18656).
Metaphors of pestilence were generally rife in Elizabethan print, featuring in biblical, classical and contemporary works. But, invested with connotations of both physical contamination and spiritual decay, Norris’s ballad employed a discomforting reversal of the Old Testament plagues visited upon Pharaoh. The strength of his appeal was heightened when one recalls (as his contemporaries would have) that the third, sixth and ninth plagues arrived entirely without warning as punishments from God. As Norris concluded: “the scourge which late on Antwerp fell, thy wrack and ruin doth foretell.” No mention was made here of Catholics or Spaniards, specifically – rather, the author begged God to protect Elizabeth “from those that seek by sword to bring her grace’s reign to end.” His warning: “rejoice not if thou see thy neighbour’s house set on a flame” for London “shall [not] escape the foreign foe,” paraphrases Gascoigne’s claim that only a fool would “bewayle the burning houses of so neare neighbours” without taking preventative action.

But the Sack of Antwerp was not unique in garnering ballad-writers’ attention. Jones himself had published *A frendly larum, or faythfull warnynge to the true harted subiectes of England. Discoveryng the actes, and malicious myndes of those obstinate and rebellious papists in the wake of the Northern Rebellion.* From the late 1570s onwards, others would continue to invoke an impending catastrophe to promote the cause of English religious reform. Of five ballads entered into the Stationers Registers in 1580, at least three interpreted a recent earthquake in England as evidence of God’s wrath. Their titles included “quake quake yt is tyme to quake / when towers and townes and all Doo shake” and “an earnest admonycon to repentance unto England especially to London” – the latter entered for copyright by Jones. Another entitled “the encouragement of an Englishe soldior to his fellow mates,” was published shortly thereafter. This would seem to indicate that the 1576 sack was not unique in eliciting prompts for religious reform or remilitarisation; rather, having served as a catalyst, it became incidental to longstanding concerns regarding domestic insecurity.

**ii) Translated foreign Protestant news tracts: representations of “Spanish” tyranny and English valour in the late 1570s**

What messages were seeded in English print regarding developments in the Low Countries following the sack? It is clear that, in the wake of 1576, Philip II himself was increasingly cast as a persecutory

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90 (London: 1570; STC 19870).
91 *Stationers Registers*, II. 369 and 370.
92 Ibid., II. 366.
“Nebuchadnezzar” in English news pamphlets. This was in line with developments in pro-Orangist pamphleteering: during Don John’s tenure as governor-general (May 1577- Oct. 1578), printed debates became even more polarised and embittered. While royalist and Orangist propagandists alike accused the other side of violating the Pacification, the former disseminated propaganda depicting the Prince as a Devil while the latter represented Don John as a tyrant. As noted in chapter 5 of this thesis, a similar watershed seems to have been crossed in English print when, in 1576, the text of the pamphlet entitled *Certein Letters...* identified Philip’s despotism as the primary cause of his subjects’ resistance.

While the Pacification and the Perpetual Edict had, in essence, outlined a settlement that the queen was only too eager to maintain, English published comment on these agreements was decidedly less enthusiastic. In *The advise and answer of my lord ye Prince of Orenge*, Orange’s reasons for rejecting the Pacification were given as follows: “certain byewayes are found, which tend greatly to the abridging of the same [rights], so that the power and libertie of gathering the generall states together ... covertly is taken away, as also that the states of the land are bound unto new bonds.” The tract also denied that the Perpetual Edict signed by Don John was any guarantee or safeguard against an inherently tyrannical government. Noting that no assurances had been offered respecting Holland and Zeeland’s privileges, it noted that the articles afforded insufficient “respect, honour and thankfulness ... to the right noble and most mightie Queen of England,” who alongside Anjou had shown such “redines... in helping us with ... goods [and] in pulling us out from the oppressions and slavery, wherein we found ourselves.” While its acknowledgment of “goods” received from Elizabeth is vague – owing, perhaps, as much to the unofficial traffic of men and arms from England – the text’s observation that this was essential to the survival of Orange’s cause was reasonably accurate.

Other works of pro-Orangist news translated into English continued to condemn Philip’s governors as tyrants. One anonymous work published in 1578, entitled *A Request presented to the King of Spayn and the Lordes of the Counsel*, followed in outline the propagandistic template of earlier news.

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93 A term used in a prayer accompanying the tract by “W.C.”, entitled *The True Reporte of the Skirmish fought betwene the States of Flaunders and Don Joan* (London, 1578; STC 4322), sig. [B3].
94 Jan Machielson: IHR Low Countries Seminar on 18 Oct. 2009, argued that this marked a turning point in the propaganda war.
95 Geurts, *De Nederlandsse Opstand*, Ch. 4, pp. 61-82. Loyalist pamphleteers such as Martin del Rio even figured opponents of the king as witches: see Ibid., pp. 31, 62, 67.
96 Cf. Ch. 6, section 4 of this thesis.
97 Anon., *The advise and answer of my lord ye Prince of Orenge... made by the estates generall on this side... upon the Articles conceived and after concluded ... in fourm of a perpetuall edict between Lord Don Iohn ... and the said generall Estates of the other* (London, 1577: John Jugge and John Alde; STC 25710.5), sig. A2'.
98 STC 25710.5, sig. A4'. Orange’s catalogue of complaints are itemised on signs. A3'-A4'.

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It claimed that Alba “hath surpassed the bloodiest Tirantes in all manner of crueltie,” overseeing the executions of over 18,000 people, while Requesens had superintended the setting of “such devices... as were forecast for the overthrow of the said Protestants.”

This historicized approach – harkening back to the atrocities of several years before – attempted to weave a scarlet thread of Spanish cruelty and tyranny back into the recent past.

Works of pro-Orangist, Protestant news translated into English in the later 1570s also stressed the material, as well as spiritual, advantages to be obtained in war, with a notable focus on the valorous exploits of Orange’s men and their English allies. An anonymous work from 1578, entitled *The true reporte of the skirmish fought betwene the states of Flaunders, and Don Ioan*, recounted a “skirmish” fought between Don John’s forces and the army of Flanders, stressing the spoil that could be obtained from conflict. Its author asked his readers to “imparte these newes unto all our Country men” about the battle of Rymenant fought on “the first day of August,” identifying some of the Englishmen (besides other Scots, Welsh and Irish troops) involved. Having noted the disparity in casualties between Don John’s and the rebels’ forces (namely, 500 or so of the former, versus 80 or 100 of the latter, largely “Englishmen and Skots”), the text stressed the courage of English officers such as Colonel Norris: “my Lorde Norrisses Sonne... [who] fought valiantlye against the enemy, having three Horses slaine under him.”

This is likely to have been Sir John Norris or Norreys (d.1597), a soldier of considerable experience who fought in Ireland, France and the Low Countries. Known for his massacre of women and children at the island of Rathlin in 1575, Norris won Leicester’s favour by fighting valorously for the army of the States General in 1577 and 1578, before rising to become the earl’s second in command.

The author of the news tract appears to have attempted to flatter English readers in an effort to secure continued support for the revolt in the Low Countries. He employed the exaggerated apostrophe:

O valiant wightes of Brittaine blood, whome strangers rightlye terme, a second Hercules, a second Hector, nay a second Sampson. For sure in some of theyr letters, this description the States have made of them for theyr valyencies.

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99 Based on the Requeste presente a son alteze ... par les habitans des pais Bas, protestans vouloir vivre selon la reformation de l'evangile, le xxije. jour de juin 1578 (K362, K365 and K366) or its Dutch version (K363).
100 (London: 1578; STC 18445), sigs. A2v.
101 Cf. one work, licensed to Charlwood and entered into the Stationers Registers on 21 July, was entitled “a true declaration of ye greate valiancye of ye noble towne of Mastricht.”
103 Ibid., sigs. A4r-B1.
104 Carew MS 628, p230a. Elizabeth to the Earl of Essex, 12 Aug. 1575 which acknowledges the service of “the young gentleman John Norrice, the executioner of your well devised enterprise.”
105 ODNB entry for Sir John Norreys/Norris (d.1597). Norreys later became marshal of the queen’s camp at Tilbury in 1588.
This worked to impart a message of national solidarity as well as soldierly courage: rather than a beleaguered force, the rebel army was represented as a haven for English heroes. The author reiterated the courage of his countrymen, recording the tale of an English soldier, “a simple felowe whiche was counted but a strageler comming after [the main assault].” Witnessing the “cowardly” antics of an enemy soldier, which resulted in the death of his English pursuer, the author noted that the outraged infantryman:

Immediatlye with his sworde thrust [the Spaniard] throw the backe, and so ... he got the spoyle of them both which did much advantage and profit him for he was but poore, as afore time it did appeare.

This passage, like the rest of the text, offered a vision of military service in the Low Countries as a path to material profit and social advancement. Like the English martial treatises published over the course of the 1570s (discussed below), it suggested that not only was fighting both worthy and profitable, it was also an ideal way to express and implement a Protestant confessional ideology.

iii) Wider forms of “alarum” print (prose, verse and sermons) and Calvinist polemic published Jan.1577-Jan. 1579

As David Trim has noted, changes in the art of 16th century warfare reinforced long-held cultural assumptions that noblemen should best exercise their virtus in war. My research suggests that, although these ideas had been articulated in the 1560s, they became prominent in print from the mid-1570s onwards – with the decade witnessing a mushrooming of treatises promoting both moral reform at home and martial prowess abroad. Many titles appear to have held particular topical relevance in light of outbreaks of mass violence abroad. Seven (including several verse ballads and Gascoigne’s pamphlet) were clearly authored in response to the assault on Antwerp, reflecting a rising concern with the perceived threat to England posed by Don John’s governorship. Others – such as the sermons of Edwin Sandys and Thomas White preached in 1578, and a military treatise by the ex-soldier Thomas Proctor – were not explicitly related to the sack, but shared key characteristics of the “alarum” tracts published in its wake. These works echoed appeals made in polemics of a Calvinist or radically Protestant nature, which insisted either that the queen and her leading subjects should be succouring oppressed Protestant communities abroad and /or working to revive a torpid English martial culture.

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109 STCs 3128; 5235; 5239; 5243; 11644; 18656 and 20979.
110 Cf. appendix 4 of this thesis for the titles of English-language military treatises published from 1558-81 (as distinct from those works of military foreign news listed in Appendices 1-3). Note the apparent rise in military treatises printed in the late 1570s.
Burghley’s son-in-law and ex-ward, Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford – a young favourite of the queen’s – became a target for the expression of militantly Protestant frustration at the perceived ‘over-mercifulness’ of Elizabeth’s policy. The Cambridge scholar John Brooke’s translation of Guy de Brès’ *The staffe of Christian faith, profitable to all Christians, for to arme themselves against the enemys of the Gospell*, was dedicated to Oxford and published at some point after 11 February 1577 (when John Day entered it into the Registers). Its epistle, extolling both the earl’s patronage and his “excellent virtues and rare learning,” framed Brooke’s efforts as an appeal to unify the English Protestant nation [“To the ende that such profit as by this my travels may growe to my countrey and common wealth.”]111 The following year, Brooke dedicated his translation of another Calvinist polemic, entitled *A Christian discourse vpon certeine poynts of religion. Presented vnto ... the Prince of Conde*, to Anne, Countess of Oxford (née Cecil), perhaps in an attempt to influence Burghley himself (being that, from 1576 to 1581, Oxford was largely estranged from his wife). Although the epistle to *A Christian discourse* maintained that the “immunitie, protection & defence [of my native countrie men] resteth in almightie God the high ludge of all,” the text advanced the message that the chief duty of all Protestants – and their princes – was to “succour and helpe... principally our poore neighbours at home, and those yt be of pure religion [abroad].”112

Clerics propounded a similar message in their sermons and published work. Archbishop Sandys of York, preaching at the queen’s 1578 accession day ceremonies in his own see, began by celebrating twenty years of peace, prosperity and religious purity in England.113 However, he switched tack halfway through, taking as his source the text of Canticles ii: 15 (“Take us the little foxes which destroy the vines...”) to call for a renewed surge of anti-Catholic persecution. Calling for stricter penalties to be imposed on “papist” recusants, Sandys claimed that Christian (i.e. Protestant) princes must not recoil from oppressing idolaters and executing false prophets. He reiterated the threat that, should Elizabeth fail to fulfil these duties, God’s vengeance would reign down upon her realm, noting “God hath not dealt thus with all nations as he hath dealt with us.”114 In a similar vein, Thomas White’s sermon, preached at St. Paul’s Cross on 9 December 1578 and dedicated in print to the queen and “all hir moste honourable Counsellers,” was notably alarmist in tone.115 One passage read:

> It is not ynough to saye GOD SAVE THE QUEENE, & yet by our disobedience, cause hym to take hyr awaye... Englande hathe peace... and [we should] open oure eyes, to see the thynges that belong unto it, as well in pietie and religion, as in policie and reason... If

112 (London: T. East, 1578; STC 5158), sig. A3r; fol 151r. Imprecations to Protestant princes to send military aid to assist the Huguenots are also found on: fols 11v-12r; 50r-54r; 151v-
113 This sermon is discussed in A. Walsham’s essay, “‘A Very Deborah?’ The Myth of Elizabeth I as a Providential Monarch” in Doran and Freeman (eds), *Myth of Elizabeth*, p. 149.
Fraunce, Flaunders, Spayne, and all the whole Worlde besides, can not bee a fayre and sufficient warning to us, lette us take heede we be not made an example to all the world.\textsuperscript{116}

White’s text implied that England’s secular and spiritual security might be jeopardized by the passivity of its people, allowing the “example” of Catholic hegemony to take root in the realm. The text of White’s published sermon used a rhetorical conceit to illustrate the fact that the queen (“a Lambe and no Lion”), needed “many Lions, I meane men of courage and valour” to defend her.\textsuperscript{117} His elaboration of this conceit was clearly intended to evoke images of Spanish “tyranny” in the Low Countries – which White compared to a “Wolfe [with] a ravenous nature... ful of spoyle.”\textsuperscript{118} White later identified the threat posed to England as emanating – specifically – from the papacy and the crown of Spain (here represented as conjoined or bicephalous), conspiring “the thing that is concluded agaynst us.” At the same time, he condemned the sins of London, including prodigality and pride, deceit, fraud and debt, as prompts for his auditors’ “timely repentaunce... generall lamentation & mourning.”\textsuperscript{119} For White, it would appear, the honourable “public man” was formed as much by a strong dose of Calvinist morality as by his classical-humanist education.

Propounding a far more pragmatic message, Barnabe Rich’s cautionary \textit{Allarme to England}, foreshewing what perilles are ... where the people live without regarde of Martiall lawe, for which the author-soldier Thomas Churchyard acted as publisher, ignored the precise details of Antwerp’s sacking or the nefarious dealings of Roman Catholics across Europe to focus on the need for pre-emptive action at home. One of the text’s many prefatory materials, a dedicatory epistle by the ex-soldier Barnabe Googe, cited Sir William Drurie’s aphorism that “the soldiers of England had always one of these three ends to look for: to be slain, to beg, or to be hanged.”\textsuperscript{120} Googe, whose court connections saw him later receive a number of favours and posts from Burghley, clearly saw writing as a tool for moral reform.\textsuperscript{121} In his preface to \textit{Allarme to England}, he lamented the lack of care shown towards the common English soldier, upon whose thread of life the security of the commonwealth would rest:

\begin{quote}
When the rage of warres doth suddeinly burst out, and the enemie at hand, gaping for the spoyle of the countrey, then both Safety, Religion, faith and Libertie resteth wholy in the hand of the souldiours: who are the onely terrour to the enemie, defende their country from present danger, and bring the common wealth to safety and quietnesse.
\end{quote}

Googe’s allusion to patriotic, unambiguously Protestant soldiers defending an imperilled citizenry from “spoyle” embodied notions of Ciceronian civic virtue. His text concluded with a wish that a
(Catholic) invasion of England “be not nearer than men looke for,” hoping Rich’s “larum” would “awake ... the minde of those, in whose handes it lies to redresse” the dangerous complacency of Elizabeth’s subjects.  

A long section of Rich’s address to the reader then related Antwerp’s fate to the “spoyle” of England: a term that, perhaps deliberately, evoked the title of Gascoigne’s pamphlet. Following an address to those “gentlemen... desirous by service, to seeke their owne deserved prayse, and the preservation of their countrey,” the tract was dedicated to Sir Christopher Hatton – captain of the queen’s bodyguard (from 1571), and privy councillor and vice-chamberlain of her household (from 1578), who had himself suffered financial losses during the sack. The appeal was both personal and political. As a captain in charge of protecting the queen, Hatton was lauded as a watchman for the English commonwealth, having: “care and consideration ... as well of the maners and conditions... [as of the] personage and abilitie” of anyone admitted to his troop, “whereby her Maiestie is guarded with a bande of men ... indued with activitie & honestie.” Rich fashioned an ecclesiastical metaphor to reiterate his appeal for both confessional and national unity – employing the image of a campanologist ringing the parish “larum bell” in “friendly warning.” This metaphor also served to figure England as a virtuous realm, yet one wholly dependent on the courage and solidarity of its soldiery.

Another tract, carrying subtextual confessional messages similar to the writings of Rich and Googe, challenged English Protestant readers to reengage with military affairs. In his 1578 treatise Of the knowledge and conducte of warres, “T. P.” (likely the soldier Thomas Procter, although the evidence is circumstantial) conflated the study of history with that of martial exploits, it being directed at those readers “as delight in Hystoryes, or martyall affayres ... necessarie for this present tyme.” Owned by the Earl of Bedford, whose library also contained at least four pamphlets on topical events in the Low Countries, Proctor’s tract sought to advance an English martial tradition (espousing a classical-humanist virtue) in line with that of the best French and Spanish manuals. Emblazoned with Proctor’s coat of arms – crested by a lion rampant assailing a column with the motto “vitus superat ardua” – the verse epistle avers:

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122 STC 20979, sig.**1.
123 Ibid., sig.**3. Author’s address to the reader.
124 BL Add. MS. 48000 (Yelverton MS.1), 53. 1576, fol. 467v. Discussed in Ch. 7, 4.
125 STC 20979, ‘The Epistle Dedicatorie’, sig.*2r.
126 Ibid., ‘To the gentle and friendly reader’, sig. 3.
127 (London, 1578; STC 20403), Preface.
128 Namely, Anon., An answer and true discourse to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba (1572; STC 540); Anon., 24. of August. 1578. A discourse of the present state of the wars in the lowe countries (1578; STC 18438); Orange’s Apologie (1581; STC 15207.5); and a work catalogued as “The daunger of princes of orenge p[er]son 1582 by assault” (doubtfully identified as STC 25713 or 4). See St. Clare Byrne and Thompson, “My Lord’s Books”, Nos. II, 41, 55 and 61.
Englyshe noble ensygnes shall,
In foreyne countreys farre,
Advaunced be, and martyall Brute,
Shalbee the kynge of warre.130

The author then proceeded to blazon the martial genius of the English nobility, celebrated as a “race
undegenerate” who would cultivate a “victorious mynde, affectinge fame, soveraigntie, and honour
above other nations.”131 Procter’s contention that the English nobility were racially distinct – not only
from other nations, but from the queen’s common subjects – elaborated the train of thought developed
by Lawrence Humfrey in 1563 that the former were “descended of that reverende, auncient, and
Goddishe race: whyche... is deemed to have ... glyded from the skies.”132

However, Procter was more pointedly critical of his intended target audience than Humpfrey had
been, signalling a growing concern with the country’s marginal status in Europe’s two main theatres
of war. The text identifies two “defectes” endemic to the English nobility: apathetic complacency
(“negligence or securitie”) and fickleness (“mutabilitie, and variable changing of mynde.”) To this
e nd, the author urged aristocrats to forgo their mannered tastes in food, fashion and architecture,
drawing on classical exempla to demonstrate that “securitye and longe peace breadeth idleness,
whiche sucketh the valure out of noble myndes.”133 Like Rich’s Allarme to England, Procter’s tract
appears to revel in alarmist sentiment by referring to the “troublesome state of the worlde” and his
countrymen’s conspicuous lack of warlike “endeavour, & discipline.” In contrast, Procter sought to
invest the English nobility with the duty of financing feats of arms as well as inculcating martial
valour in commoners, “for ... whiche, [noble men] were firste ordained and preferred into that place,
to be a wall and defence for their countrye.”134 Such imprecations implied that, in light of the wars
ravaging the states of their neighbours, English nobles – and perhaps, even, their Protestant queen –
were failing both in their God-given duty to lead in the defence of their realm.

Although not conspicuously associated with events in Antwerp, Procter’s treatise employed terms that
readers must have associated with the recent sack. The author concluded with an appeal to protect the
godly English commonweal th and to subsidise veteran soldiers: just as Rich had petitioned Hatton for
the “reliefe and encouragement” of ex-soldiers,135 so Procter appealed for “a house ordained for
maimed soulidours, & men wore in the warres” in every parish, so that veterans could train others in

130 STC 20403, Preface, sig. ¶2v.
131 Ibid., sig. ¶3.
132 L. Humfrey, The Nobles or of Nobilitye. The original nature, dutyes, right, and Chriftian Institucion thereof
(London, 1563; STC 13964), sig. A3v.
133 STC 20403, sigs. ¶3v-¶4v.
134 Ibid., sigs. ¶3-¶4v.

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the “orders & arraye of warre.” The final passage contained a thinly-veiled condemnation of Spanish exactions in the Low Countries, cast – yet again – as precedent for an attack on England:

An horrible miserye more odious then anye deathe, to haveoure Lawes, lyves, goodes, and what soever is deare unto us... under the contempt and rule of the insolent and cruell enemeye, to bee spoyled by force... [and] to live laden with servitude & villanies. If we will have these avoided, then must theare be defence prepared.. Els is the same by peace enriched unto spoile, and fatend ... for the tothe of the enemie.

The significance of references to the “spoile” exacted by a “cruell” and rapacious enemy, ready to force his captives into “servitude,” encapsulated a strengthening spirit of urgency that suffused English pamphleteering and sermonising in the late 1570s. To what extent Proctor was successful in his appeal for a martial renaissance is uncertain, although it is suggestive that – in his post as Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall, Devon and Dorset – his dedicatee Bedford made regular inspections of England’s southwestern defences. It is thus likely that Proctor directed his plea to sympathetic ears.

It is also possible that a wider audience of English nobles and gentry, being influenced by the ideals of classical humanism via their social and educational backgrounds, may have read Proctor’s work as a manual for societal reform and, perhaps, as an implicit criticism of their militarily passive queen. But classical republicanism and aristocratic militarism were not a straightforward guise for anti-monarchism; rather, following contemporary interpretations of Cicero, these ideologies advocated the active participation of all citizens in defending the state. We might deduce from this that tracts such as Proctor’s and Rich’s were not only read by those in close proximity to the court or high up in the political establishment. Such works may also be interpreted as attempts to circulate ideas about civic humanism, virtue and the vita activa to a wider community of “middling” Protestant readers – ideally, coextensive with the sort of educated “public men” who would rise to prominence in the later decades of the reign.

There is other evidence to suggest that much alarmist print was directed at just this class of learned reader. The lawyer and satirist Edward Hake (d.1604), by this time Under Steward for Leicester at Windsor, wrote his 1578 title *A joyfull continuance of the ... reigne of our gratious and deare Soveraigne Lady Elizabeth* both to praise the queen and to allude to the dangers posed by her

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136 STC 20403, fol. 48v.
137 Ibid., fol. 48rv.
138 Cf. The animal imagery and allusions to spoil in *A Sermon preached at Pawles Crosse on Sunday the ninth of December. 1576. by T. W...* (London: [H. Bynneman] for Francis Coldock, 1578; STC 25405), discussed below.
139 Pulman, *Privy council*, pp. 28, 70.
140 M. Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640* (Cambridge, 1995) which challenges the traditional contention that classical humanism was defunct in late 16th c. England.
Although the text made only vague allusions to the Sack of Antwerp, and no direct comment on St. Bartholomew’s, the French religious wars or the Anjou match, portions of it may be read as an equivocal assessment of the queen’s policy in light of these key policy issues. The text opened by enjoining Elizabeth to “the full finishyng” of her ecclesiastical reformation, implying that this was why God had continually rescued her from “the rage of her adversaries ... her Maiestie beyng ever since placed, as it were in a Goshen, environed about with Egyptians.”

By inference, Hake suggested, Elizabeth was trusting in the continuance of divine favour which her own spirit of inaction now called into doubt. After several verse elegies praising the queen’s godly commonwealth, a “humble” prose addressed to her “most honourable Counsaylers,” enjoined readers to “beware of forrein fraude and false pretended love... Geven heede to peace, but lyve not unprepared; / The strongest state the longest time is sparde.”

The rhetoric of public duty and patriotism, elided with Protestant virtue, directly appealed to those “good commonwealthmen” who might thereby – in Thomas North’s words – become “animated to the better service” of their country.

Although less explicitly concerned with confessional struggle than with his own experiences of war, works by Thomas Churchyard (d.1604) also demonstrated an alarmist concern with foreign atrocities, stressing the need for more robust spiritual and military defences at home. Churchyard, who fought in Scotland, France, Ireland and the Low Countries over the course of a 25-year military career, used his retirement to solicit a small royal pension and to promote the cause of the English common soldier. The preface to his 1578 account of Martin Frobisher’s last voyage to the New World, dedicated to Wilson, inveighed against “the coward spirite of those that dare attempt no hazardes comes from a feble judgement, or a weake womanish bodie that trembles to take in hande any stoute or manly enterprise.” Churchyard’s remarks could well be interpreted as a thinly-veiled condemnation of the queen’s apparent lack of martial zeal, a message that he also advanced in his subsequent tract, A Lamentable and Pitifull Description of the wofull Warres in Flaunders, dedicated to Walsingham.

This work contained an account of the Sack of Antwerp, in which Churchyard attributed the death of so many citizens (“manye a silly soule”) to their own credulous natures: “the simple people that
trusted to the wisedome of their leaders, fell all by their owne follie to mercie of the Spaniardes.” It concluded with a broader “warning to all wanton Cities, hereafter to give and keepe better watche of their libertie and wealth” rather than in trusting in their governors to do so. Not all messages of this nature were welcome: Churchyard’s trenchant critique of Elizabeth’s martial passivity may well have been judged impertinent, given that he ultimately failed to procure either Walsingham’s patronage or Wilson’s “credit.”

The writings analysed above, although not all directly concerned with the Sack of Antwerp, may thus be associated with the genre of “alarmist” comment that developed in its wake. Wider evidence of the scope of printed titles published from 1576-78 suggests that the atrocity gave new impetus, and topical focus, to calls for Elizabeth to adopt a more militant domestic and foreign policy. Gascoigne’s *The Spoyle of Antwere* trod a very careful line between representing the author as a true patriot, intensely loyal to his queen and country, and as a seasoned soldier who accurately read the sack as an act of “Spanish” tyranny and brutality – even, it may be said, as a veiled attack on England. Despite the ambivalent messaging of the text proper, its preface sought to spur support for Orange’s cause and to discredit those who favoured Philip’s cause in England. Like the *Certein Letters* which preceded it, *The Spoyle* suggested there was a simple ethno-political, rather than more complex ideological-confessional, aspect to the wars in the Low Countries – thus justifying any aid Elizabeth might choose to send to Orange’s forces.

From the writings of Churchyard, Gascoigne, Googe, Norris, Proctor and Rich, one might also conclude that the sack helped catalyse a martial revival in English popular culture. Their writings fused premonitions of divine punishment with forebodings of England’s vulnerability to foreign invasion, enjoining the aristocracy to take up arms in its defence. The preponderance of several sensationalistic ballads – drawing on a set of well-established *topoi* – also suggests that there was popular interest in the sack as a *de casibus* tragedy, not just a happenstance of war. Finally, allusions in contemporary sermons to the queen as overly mild and merciful – a lamb amongst lions – also worked to critique the supposed laxness of her policy. My findings are thus in step with Margaret Christian’s and Patrick Collinson’s assessments that, from the 1560s onwards, Elizabeth’s preachers

150 Cf. Morgan’s comments in: All Soul’s College, Codrington MS. CXXIX, fol. 19v, as discussed in Ch. 6, 3:iii. 151 STC 5239, sig. H2v. 152 See preface to STC 5251, sigs. A2v-A3v, in which Churchyard extols Walsingham as “a singuler Proppe and Piller” for injured soldiers, but notes that his previous “work neither found free passage nor acces to his noble judgment.” 153 Discussed in Ch. 5 of this thesis.
openly critiqued the queen’s failure to fulfil the heavy responsibilities attached to her high office.\footnote{M. Christian, “Elizabeth’s Preachers and the Government of Women,” \textit{Sixteenth Century Journal}, 24:3 (1993), pp. 561-576; P. Collinson, “Windows into a Woman’s Soul: Questions about the religion of Queen Elizabeth” in his edited \textit{Elizabethan Essays} (London, 1994).} Just as these preachers enjoined the queen to acknowledge her dependency on God for both her life and her high office, so the alarmist comment published in the wake of the sack implied a “note of conditionality” as to the continuance of both.\footnote{Collinson, “Windows into a Woman’s Soul,” pp. 104-8, 116-17.}

However, the apparent growth of alarum literature in the late 1570s should not be read as proof that the sack alone preyed upon the Elizabethan mind, triggering unprecedentedly apocalyptic fears. Pratt draws too generalising a conclusion in declaring that “the alarm resulting from the trials of Antwerp [alone] manifested itself in numerous writings” evidenced “the revelation of a national state of mind.”\footnote{Pratt, “Antwerp and the Elizabethan Mind,” p. 53.} The increasingly combative public mood was not sparked just by the sack, nor did it have an unvarying anti-Spanish focus: a rising tide of anti-Catholic sentiment, and its articulation in various ballads and pamphlets, antedated and succeeded the events of November 1576. As noted in chapter 7, the degree of conciliar interest in the atrocity appears to have been limited, no doubt because it was hard for commentators to frame the sack along clear-cut confessional lines. This may help to explain why, in contrast to the strongly polemical nature of pamphlets relating to St. Bartholomew’s, the sack did not receive nearly the same breadth or depth of coverage in English print or English politics, or result in the explosive growth of an explicitly anti-Spanish ‘Black Legend’ genre in English. The sermons and military treatises published in 1577 and 1578 seem just as focussed on the threat posed by fifth columnists within England, and on the activities of Catholic forces in France and across the continent, as on the doings of malevolent ‘Spanish’ forces in the Low Countries.

As the next chapter will show, a series of other political developments in 1579 helped advance the dissemination of a militant discourse in English print, in which representations of both the sack and St. Bartholomew’s became increasingly over-simplified, one-dimensional accounts of Catholic barbarity. As a coda to my analysis of print comment in the 1570s, I turn now to examine the political tracts and news pamphlets published in England in 1579, focussing specifically on their anti-Angevin; anti-Marian; and anti-Guisian dimensions.

155 Collinson, “Windows into a Woman’s Soul,” pp. 104-8, 116-17.
Coda. “Alarmist” comment upon the occasion of the Anjou match (1579)

Thanks in part to the revival of Elizabeth’s marriage negotiations to Francis of Anjou, 1579 witnessed an outburst of alarmist, stridently anti-Catholic, print comment. Its topical focus was as much retrospective – recalling the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s and the supposed crimes of rampaging Catholic armies in France and the Low Countries – as prospective, anticipating a perceived rise in fifth-columnist Catholic activity at home. There was a heated, paranoid quality to much of this comment which has, excepting one key tract, not been closely examined.

Elizabethan perceptions of Anjou’s motives and intentions were heavily coloured by the duke’s close links both to the ultra-Catholic nobility in France and to Orange’s supporters in the Low Countries. As I noted in chapter 7, certain privy councillors were deeply troubled by Anjou’s “real” motivations, assuming him to be anything from Orange’s last hope and a committed Protestant champion, to a fundamentally annexationist, self-interested Catholic dynasty.¹ What gave grounds to Davison’s, Stafford’s and Walsingham’s suspicions was, undoubtedly, the fractious situation in the Low Countries: a kaleidoscopic theatre of war in which Anjou’s own forces were deserting through lack of pay or defecting to the army of Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma (captain general of the king’s army, 1578-92). As Doran has noted, this awareness may have conditioned a shift in Elizabeth’s own attitude towards the marriage.² By January 1579, the queen and her council knew that the unity of the States General was irreparably shattered. The Union of Utrecht, signed on 23 January, committed the allied leaderships of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Gelderland and the Ommelanden to reject any accommodation with Philip II. On 21 February, the southern provinces of Hainault and Artois seceded from the States General in their own Union of Arras, thereafter agreeing to open talks with Farnese.³

These events formed the backdrop to, and were the animating principle behind, the revival of Elizabeth’s courtship with the duke. The same month as the Union of Utrecht was signed, Anjou’s envoy Jehan de Simier arrived in London to further the proposed match with the queen. Personally charmed by Simier, but doubtless aware of the potential domestic and international consequences of the match, Elizabeth referred the matter to her privy council for consideration in May. The council’s lack of a definitive response prompted the queen to postpone all further negotiations until the duke had visited her in person. Subsequently, the situation in the Low Countries became yet more

¹ Cf. Ch. 7, section 5 of this thesis.
² Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony, p. 154.
³ Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 210-11.
polarised, with the provinces of Hainault and Artois, bolstered by Walloon Flanders, being formally reconciled with Philip II in February 1579. As Parker has observed, abortive peace talks held at Cologne between delegates of the king and the States General established that the former would never concede formal toleration for Calvinists or guarantee what the States considered to be their constitutional liberties. In response, Orange’s party pressed for the States to reject the king’s sovereignty – suggesting that Anjou, invested as “Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries,” should become their ruler: a scenario feared by Elizabeth herself and most of her leading advisors. A second, likely unofficial, privy council meeting to discuss the Anjou marriage was called in October, after which the councillors formally requested that Elizabeth “shew hir own mynd... that the[ir] resolutions might not be to the Contrary.” As Mears has noted, challenging Conyers Read’s construction of ‘matrimonial diplomacy’, the queen’s own actions suggest a measure of uncertainty about the match. Not only did she “vacillate” between drawing up a marriage treaty and having it signed, leaving key articles in draft form, she also considered other alternative policy routes and did not present the marriage treaty to parliament within the two month window she had outlined to Simier.

The controversy the proposed match occasioned extended far beyond the environs of the court and council chamber, into the city of London and country at large. Sir Philip Sidney wrote a long discourse against it, which he presented to Elizabeth in late 1579, terming Anjou “a Papist in profession [who] neither can nor will greatly stead you” and comparing him to Ajax, whose shield would only weary “those that bore it.” Sidney was perhaps alluding here – however indirectly – to the outlook of his uncle, the earl of Leicester, whose long-desired commission to lead an English army into the Low Countries would likely be scuppered in the event of the queen marrying Anjou. Although there is no evidence of how the queen reacted to Sidney’s appeal, there is nothing to suggest that he was punished for his actions. Indeed, the courtier’s deferential praise of Elizabeth’s virtues – emblazoning her as “the ornament of this age... the delight of your people” – conformed with the parameters of counsel that the queen wholly endorsed. She also appears to have taken no punitive action against Burghley’s eldest son, Sir Thomas Cecil, who presented her with his own advice paper arguing against the Anjou match.

4 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
5 CP 140, fol. 7v. Quoted in Mears, “Elizabeth I and the Anjou Negotiations”, p. 444.
6 Ibid., p. 459.
8 BL Harleian MS 1323, fols 44r-56v; Sidney to Elizabeth, c. Nov. 1579; K. Duncan-Jones and J. Van Dorsten (eds), Miscellaneous Prose of Sir Philip Sidney (Oxford, 1973), pp. 56-57.
9 Cf. Mears, Queenship, p. 125.
1) John Stubbs’s “The Discoverie of A Gaping Gulf” (1579)

In contrast, a printed pamphlet which openly denigrated Anjou and his relatives as murderers, strumpets and tyrants, aroused Elizabeth’s wrath. *The discoverie of a gaping gulf whereinto England is like to be swallowed by another French mariage*, written by Thomas Cartwright’s zealously Protestant brother-in-law, John Stubbs, appeared in the early autumn of 1579. The tract was suppressed by royal proclamation on 27 September, resulting in both its author and its distributor having their right hands severed by the public executioner at Westminster Hall. Stubbs also received a jail term of 14 to 18 months, reflecting the perceived severity of his offence. Meanwhile, the tract’s printer, Hugh Singleton – who printed Edmund Spenser’s *The shepheardes calendar* in 1579 – received no punishment, which may be attributed to his loose connections with Leicester.\(^{11}\)

The furore surrounding *A Gaping Gulf* has attracted some scholarly comment, ranging from considerations of censorship and theories of monarchic counsel, to broadening modes of public comment and appeals to public opinion. While Clegg has read the whole episode as an instance of opportunistic realpolitik,\(^{12}\) Kenneth Barnes has argued that “Page,” Stubbs’s distributor (who sent 50 copies to Sir Richard Grenville) was in fact William Page M.P., a gentleman servant of Bedford’s.\(^{13}\) In the same vein, Lake has read Stubbs’s tract as an instance of emergency politics, arguing that the author adopted a mode of counsel compatible with that of many Protestant councillors.\(^{14}\) Others have argued that Stubbs’s obvious familiarity with debates at court – especially, his knowledge of Sussex’s arguments expressed in council in support of the Anjou match, which *A Gaping gulf* systematically refutes – suggests that one or more councillors commissioned his pamphlet.\(^{15}\) The evidence for this assertion is inconclusive: Stubbs certainly had indirect links with Burghley, via the Lord Treasurer’s secretaries Vincent Skinner and Michael Hickes, and was later to obtain patronage from both Burghley and Leicester, becoming an Associate to the Lincoln’s Inn bench in 1587. The same year, he was also commissioned to draft a reply to William Allen’s attack on Burghley’s *The Execution of Justice in England*;\(^{16}\) and was returned to Parliament in 1588 as member for Great Yarmouth.\(^{17}\) Yet, as Mears has contested, the assumption that Stubbs was a mere puppet of Leicester and Walsingham

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\(^{11}\) Clegg, *Censorship*, p. 129.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., pp. 123-137.


\(^{14}\) Lake, “The politics of ‘popularity’”, pp. 70-77.


\(^{16}\) L. E. Berry, *John Stubbs’s ‘Gaping Gulf’*, xlii-xlili.

in 1579, and that his work was an instance of court-sponsored propaganda, prevents us from reading it as an independent action by a man ideologically opposed to the match.\textsuperscript{18}

My concern here is not to explore the dynamics of the political debate or public comment that \textit{A Gaping Gulf} aroused, which have received considerable attention from the historians cited above – demonstrating that contemporary politics and print could enjoy close, if complicated, links. Instead, I will review the links between the “alarmist” tropes and motifs used to frame comment on the wars in France and the Low Countries, including Stubbs’s evocation of St. Bartholomew’s. Beyond Stubbs, I will also examine other texts which appeared around this time and which also seem to be critical of strands of the queen’s policy.

It is evident from Stubbs’s line of argument in \textit{A Gaping Gulf} that he regarded the Anjou match as something of a Trojan horse, analogous to the “other” French/Navarre marriage which had preceded the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s.\textsuperscript{19} From the start, Stubbs openly condemned any interreligious marriage as a breach of divine law, susceptible to divine punishment.\textsuperscript{20} Although his depiction of St. Bartholomew’s did not depart in broad outline from those earlier tracts discussed in chapter 4 (e.g. Hotman’s \textit{A true and plaine report} and the anonymous \textit{A Mervaylous lyfe}), it was vastly oversimplified, erasing standard equivocations regarding causation. One key passage in \textit{A Gaping Gulf} summarised the massacre thus:

\begin{quote}
A King falsifyed hys sworne word: The mariage of a kings sister [was] embrued with blood... innocents put to death: wemen and children without pitye tossed upon halberds and throwne downe wyndowes and into Rivers; learned men killed by barbarous soyliders: the seyntes of God ledde to the shambles... and, that which was worst, those that lived were compelled to forswear their God: and little ones Christened before to Christ were now dipped agayne to Antichrist.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The allusion to murdered “learned men” here echoed the passage in Foxe’s \textit{Actes and Monuments} prophesying the destruction of saints by satanic forces; the reference to children “dipped again” to Satan recalled Crespin’s account of the Gastines’ girl’s immersion in her own parents’ blood.\textsuperscript{22}

Yet the charges embedded at the heart of \textit{A Gaping Gulf} moved beyond those of earlier Calvinist tracts to universally condemn all the Valois royal family. Catherine de’ Medici was cast as the massacre’s primary architect, described as a spiritless corpse which “the Pope moveth... even as Necromancers are sayde to carry about a dead body by the motion of some unclean spirit.”\textsuperscript{23} She

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Mears, “Stubbs’s \textit{The Discoverie}”; Idem., \textit{Queenship}, Ch. 6.
\item STC 23400, sgs. B3-[B6]; [E5]-[E6].
\item Ibid., sgs. A2- [A6]; Mears, “Stubbs’s \textit{The Discoverie},” p. 631.
\item STC 23400, sig. [B5].
\item B. Diefendorf, \textit{Beneath the Cross}, pp. 100-2; Holt, \textit{French Wars of Religion}, p. 86.
\item STC 23400, sig. [B4’].
\end{thebibliography}
allegedly assigned specific roles to each of her children, all of whom were accounted guilty by either
direct action or indirect connivance:

In thys tragedy [Catherine] played her part naturally, and shewed how she gouvernes all
Fraunce. Her daughter Margarit was the stale to lure and allure them ... her son, then King
[Charles IX], was in all the haste to become a father to the Admirall and those of the religion.
Monsieur that then was, and now king [Henry III], he played false semblant... Monsieur that
now is [Francis of Anjou], he played the childes part, or weeping part ... while the mother, as
setter forth of thys earnest game, stoode holding the booke (as it were) upon the stage and
told her children and every other player what he should say.24

While Catherine was painted as a sadistic Machiavel,25 Stubbs’s reference to Marguerite of Navarre as
a “stale” derogated her as both dumb bait and a woman of easy virtue.26 Just as seriously, Elizabeth’s
intended husband was depicted as a weeping idiot, unable to act with any honour.

Following this, Stubbs averred that Elizabeth’s marriage to Anjou would necessarily harm the English
Church and commonwealth. He implored: “God graunt we harken not in thys match to the present
French King and his brother: least by abusing us also in marriage through our sinnes, we thorough
unadvised policie fall in the same snare with our good brethren.”27 This counterblast to “unadvised
policy” stressed the futility of the queen’s official alliance with Catholic France. In offering the
massacre as proof of Valois perfidy and Catholic cruelty, Stubbs said nothing that had not been said
before. However, in tying his libel to modes of royal counsel he was being dangerously provocative –
even, in Elizabeth’s view, seditious. Unlike earlier tracts, which extolled the stability of Elizabeth’s
rule while traducing those of foreign “tyrants,” Stubbs’s dared to contend with constitutional affairs at
a time of great national insecurity, acting as a “traitorous device to discredit Her Majesty both with
other princes and with her good subjects, and to prepare their minds to sedition.”28 In Elizabeth’s
eyes, Stubbs’s defamation of French royal honour diminished respect for all monarchic authority, as a
subject dared to encroach so publicly on her arcana imperii.

From his point of view, in presenting his fictive voice as that of the patriotic English citizen, “a true
Englishman” – a phrase adopted by George Gascoigne in his eyewitness account of the Sack of
Antwerp – Stubbs assumed a higher, religiously-inspired authority to critique the queen.29 He
anticipated, with a considerable degree of alarmism, “the verye foundations of our common weall
dangerously digged at by the French: & our deere Queene Elizabeth (I shake to speake) ledd

24 Ibid., sigs [B4v-B5].
25 Clegg, Press Censorship, p.131. As Clegg notes, the attacks on Anjou elsewhere in the text pale into
insignificance compared with those on his mother.
26 Cf. Borachio’s allusion to Hero as “a contaminated stale” in Much Ado About Nothing, II.ii.xx.
27 STC 23400, sig. [B5].
28 Appendix 1 of Berry (ed.), “Gaping Gulf,” [Royal proclamation of 1579], pp. 148, 152.
29 Cf. Ch. 8, 1.
blyndfold as a poore Lambe to the slaughter.”

Adopting the feint of the fearstruck prophet, Stubbs’s biblical analogy created a binary opposition between the active, sinful murderer (Anjou / all Catholic princes) and his passive, witless victim (Elizabeth as Paschal lamb / all Protestant commonwealths). It shows how powerful invocations of St. Bartholomew’s remained in sustaining the image of the “bloody papist” in the cultural memory of Elizabethan readers.

As noted above, to what extent Stubbs was or was not acting on his own initiative may never be fully resolved. Nonetheless, a letter from Mendoza suggested that the queen believed some of her closest councillors to have been involved, including Hatton – who hastily departed from court; Knollys – who was told he “might pay dearly for the zeal he was displaying in the cause of religion”; and Walsingham – whom the queen accused of being “a protector of heretics.”

Other evidence suggests that Hatton took steps to dampen down the impact of the “seditious pamphlet.” Bishop Aylmer of London wrote to him in September concerning a Paul’s Cross sermon preached by one Mr. Bond against Stubbs’s pamphlet, noting that, despite widespread support for Elizabeth in London, there was still much “grudging and groaning” in the countryside at Stubbs’s punishment.

2) Other ‘alarmist’ works: translated French pamphlets and English-authored works (Jan.-Dec. 1579)

Although Stubbs’s tract has attracted the lion’s share of attention, it was only the most visible – and extreme – element of an increasingly rich seam of print culture which, by 1579, was invoking popular opinion in favour of a more overtly militant, anti-Catholic domestic and foreign policy.

As he had first done in 1578, the ex-soldier Thomas Churchyard advanced a distinctly alarmist message in his verse tract: The Miserie of Flaunders, Calamitie of Fraunce … and the blessed state of Englande. Churchyard’s verse anthology contained generic depictions of both St. Bartholomew’s and the Sack of Antwerp: all subtleties of causation and political context being lost in a black-and-white condemnation of rapacious foreign armies and religious disorder. It is interesting to note that Churchyard cited “spoile” as a motive for each atrocity, thus inferring causative links between the two events. His description of the 1576 sack (which came first, suggesting an awareness of the need to engage with topical concerns) noted that “death dwells in eche mans dore” where “the Soldiour liv’s by spoile” – evoking Gascoigne’s description of each citizen standing before the door to his own life.
Although Churchyard’s versification is poor and his imagery generic, his simple de casibus subtext is clear: namely, that chaos and violence were poised to descend on religiously disunified realms. This basic message is encapsulated in moralising statements such as “The ire of God, the people could not shunne” and “God [shall] shield eache lande, that loves and fears the Lorde” (i.e. is suitably reformed).

Churchyard was not alone in framing his account of foreign wars – and specifically, the notorious 1572 and 1576 massacres – as an appeal for domestic reform. Another tract, Sir Jerome Bowes’s (d.1616) rendition of Innocent Gentillet’s An apology or defence for the Christians of Fraunce which are of the ... reformed religion, for the satisfying of such as wil not live in peace ... with them, was published by Day in the early months of 1579, perhaps with high political backing. Bowes had links to high military and political circles during Elizabeth’s reign, particularly those surrounding Leicester. His name appears in a list of gentlemen who followed Edward Clinton, Earl of Lincoln, during his expedition to avenge the fall of Calais in 1558, and in Churchyard’s account of Sir William Drury’s expedition to Scotland in 1560. It is possible that Bowes translated the Apology as an attempt to regain Leicester’s favour by advancing the cause of international interventionism: a reference in Stowe’s Annales implies that Bowes was the earl’s client from as early as 1571, and that he may have been rusticated from court from 1577-79 for “a slanderous speech” against the favourite.

Although the English translation of An apology or defence... did not address the vexed questions of Francis of Anjou’s involvement in the St. Bartholomew’s day massacre, its address to Henry of Navarre may be read as an indirect supplication to Elizabeth not to abandon her policy of aiding the persecuted Huguenots of France:

I am sure that your majestye (being naturally enclined to the peace of Fraunce) will not onely take more pleasure to heare the sound of these Canons, than the sound of those which have so often times terribly thundered, to the destruction of this desolate Kingdome ... but also be moved to maintaine the same Religion constantly more and more.

Just as pagan Roman emperors had vouchsafed to relieve and favour the early Christians, whose faith did not break any civil law, so: “how much more ought we to hope for the like at the handes of our most Christian King, by your intercession[?]” Such calls subtly echoed others addressed to the queen for defence of the faith, comprising both reform of her own church and military intervention abroad.

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36 T. Churchyard, The Miserie of Flandres, Calamitie of Fraunce, Misfortune of Portugall... And the blessed State of Engelande (London, 1579; STC 5243), sig. [A4].
37 Ibid., sigs. B2”, [B4]”.
38 Cal. of Hatfield MS: p. 146.
41 Ibid., Preface.
Other, domestically-authored tracts, were far more strident in their rhetoric. The ex-soldier Geoffrey Gates, about whom I have discovered little, dedicated his *Defence of Militarie profession* to the young Earl of Oxford, arguing that “the experience of forren evils, warneth England to waken it selfe out of securitie, and to be watchfull, and wisely to take it selfe.” Although not explicitly related to the Sack of Antwerp, St. Bartholomew’s, or to Elizabeth’s match with Anjou, Gates seemed to refer to the threat of Catholic invasion when his text declared that “such slouth, and securitie [that Londoners exhibit] hath brought many a famous citie of the worlde to ruin, desolation, and servitude.” The *Defence* also contained the politically-loaded assertion that the English nobility should stand as “fathers to their Prince, people, and common wealth” – implying that the queen, a vulnerable woman, needed their political and spiritual guidance as much as their physical protection.

The text also contained snippets of the latest news from the Low Countries, focussing on the service of “highly esteemed,” “valiant” Englishmen fighting “the defensory warres in the lowe Countrie.” This would suggest that the wars across the channel – even more so than recent events in France – were being represented as a bridgehead in the defence of Protestant England. One passage narrated the doings of those English, Welsh and Scottish volunteers who had fought the “Spaniards” on Lammas day [August 1] in Brabant – news of which Gates may have gleaned from the recently-published *The true reporte of the skirmish fought betwene the states of Flaunders, and Don Ioan* (1578), cited in the last chapter. A concluding statement in *The Defence of Militarie Profession* read: “Looke wisely to your selves [readers], and as ye love the advancement of Gods kingdome in England, so will you pray and labour for the preferment of the same amongst the French & Dutch [Protestants].” As noted in chapter 8, Oxford’s patronage was seemingly extended to those who represented him as a godly champion, with John Brooke dedicating at least two Calvinist tracts to him and his wife. In 1579, Brooke dedicated another polemic to Oxford’s father-in-law, Burghley, with a dedication enumerating the latter’s “godlye zeale” and “servencie of true fayth” as props to secure the realm.

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42 Gates has no entry in the ODNB. Intertextual allusions to his adventures in France and Flanders suggest he served in some military capacity in the wars abroad.
44 STC 11683, p. 53. See also p. 54 for more in this vein.
46 STC 11683, pp. 58-62.
47 Discussed in Ch. 8, 2: ii. This provides a more detailed outline of the battle of the Lammas day skirmish which appears in *The Defence*, pp. 58-63.
48 STC 11683, p. 63.
By the late 1570s, the myth of Guisian treachery had further strengthened in English print, associating the threat posed by Mary Stewart with the spectre of English civil war. The anonymous preface-writer of *A Summe of the Guisian Ambassage to the Bishop of Rome*, reputedly an intercepted piece of Guisian propaganda, rehearsed the long-standing charge that the papacy and the Guises had contracted a murderous alliance at Trent: a “holy league... against all the professours of the Gospell in Christendome,” in which they vowed “to use all Treachery, deceite, perjury, violence and crueltye against heretickes.” The tract framed its argument in starkly apocalyptic terms: the Guises and the Pope had formed a cabal to raze Christendom, from which had risen “the Fyre and Flame of discentions, mutynes, and tumults in all Christendome.” It also stated that those at Trent had agreed to pursue a genocidal objective long before St. Bartholomew’s. These concerns were couched as appeals to English readers to remain firm in their faith and to sharpen their perception of “popish practices” at home, that “[w]e mightest ... looke into the popish practises therein... [making] us wise in foreseeing their pernitious counsels... and malitious intents, so mynd they to do the like, it is to be feared in England, if God doo not of his mercy let them.” In another passage, Post-Tridentine Catholicism was represented as an infectious tide overwhelming all of Western Europe (“as from a Fountaine flowing into all Christendome”), oppressing Protestants, and inciting rebellion. Specific allusions to St. Bartholomew’s formed a key part of a catalogue of terrorizing crimes and the Roman Catholic slaughter of Protestant “brethren.”

The texts outlined above would tend to suggest that 1579 witnessed the ongoing production of anti-Catholic polemic, focussed in large part on the intemperate violence manifest at Paris in 1572 and Antwerp in 1576. These tracts, in various ways, all worked to highlight the wily reasoning, treachery and deceit that could be expected from all “papists” – not least, Francis of Anjou, Mary Stewart and her Guisian allies, as well as the seemingly bicephalous threat posed by the papacy and Philip II. Framing Elizabeth as the target of innumerable “papist” plots and conspiracies framed her as a Protestant icon and served to bolster the arguments of those who would not tolerate her marriage to a foreign Catholic prince.

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50 (London: 1579; STC 6319), unpaginated preface.
51 Ibid. Cf. STC 13847, p. xxiii which records that the pope sent a cardinal to convince Charles IX to join the Holy League.
52 STC 6319, unpaginated preface.
53 Ibid. Italics in original.
54 STC 6319, sigs. A2'-A4'; B1.
Conclusion

1. Elizabethan foreign policy in the 1570s

This study has reconfirmed that, prior to the French massacre of August 1572, Elizabeth’s foreign policy encompassed both traditional and innovative strands: whilst her military campaigns in France and Scotland were in line with the state enmities of her predecessors, the decline in her relations with Philip II, as ruler of Spain and the Low Countries, was not. The failure of the Le Havre expedition cast a long shadow over Elizabeth’s future involvement in the French wars, notwithstanding her and her subjects’ ongoing, covert support for the Huguenots. Yet the queen’s own confessional sympathies were not, in themselves, the overriding determinant of her policy. Following the outbreak of civil war in the Low Countries, she maintained two, distinctly secular, primary objectives: to curtail French geoterritorial expansion and to secure the provinces forms of ‘native’ self-governance. In pursuit of these aims, she endorsed the departure of English and Welsh volunteer forces to ensure that the French did not gain a secure foothold and pushed for a mediated settlement.

Although the queen herself played an active role in the formation of her own policy (as evidenced by the occasions when she ignored conciliar and parliamentary advice), it is fair to say that Cecil wielded disproportionate influence. As his justifications for the early interventions in Scotland and France demonstrate, Cecil could reconcile nakedly confessional objectives with more pragmatic, geo-strategic ones, suggesting that Read’s portrait of a cautious Cecil, and a bullishly interventionist Leicester and Walsingham, is heavily overdrawn. Burghley’s close management of the 1572 parliamentary session, and his involvement with the anti-Marian propaganda published at this time, confirms his commitment to a unified, Protestant Britain and to the elimination of Mary Stewart. Notwithstanding this and earlier pushes (i.e. the print campaign during the invasion of Scotland in 1560; and the court-connected Calvinist tracts translated and published in 1562-63), Elizabeth remained reluctant to legitimate her reign in starkly confessional terms. As *A Declaration of the Quenes Proceedings since her Reigne* suggests, official propaganda tended to eschew any trace of confessional language in order to avoid inciting religious civil war in England.

What influence did the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s have on shaping English political debates of the 1570s? Both historical and sociological perspectives indicate that there are always multiple factors, and layers of complicity, behind outbreaks of mass violence, and that St. Bartholomew’s should be considered no exception. However, English Protestant commentators tended not to

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1 Read, Secretary Cecil; Idem., *Walsingham*.
acknowledge this complexity when discussing the causes and impact of the massacre: Burghley, Leicester, Smith and Wilson, struggling to comprehend its underlying dynamics, all framed it as an outrageous act demanding divine retribution. Despite the “confusion” of reports available to them, nearly all the queen’s councillors were quick to attribute the massacre to the malice of the king and leading Catholic courtiers. I have found that the term “massacre” was not used by native English speakers until at least 1573, and that it was initially applied to any form of brutal or senseless murder - i.e. individual or collective. Hence Coligny’s death – the “massacre of the Admiral” as Killigrew wrote – was directly analogous to the deaths of thousands of civilians: all being held to be martyrs to God’s cause. This message was borne out in contemporary pamphlets, which from 1572-76 gave as much weighting to the manner and significance of Coligny’s demise as to all the other deaths combined. The various editions of Hotman’s *De furoribus Gallicis* and the anonymous *Vita Colignii*, in particular, eulogised the Admiral as a form of ‘hero-martyr’ while introducing new charges of war guilt and anti-monarchism into English print.3

In the wake of St. Bartholomew’s, the political evidence – like the print sources – suggests that English conceptions of “tyranny” as a degenerative form of monarchy became increasingly confessionalised: i.e. linked to binary notions of Protestant good versus Catholic evil. Elizabethan political correspondence suggests that St. Bartholomew’s was seen by many of those with clerical or political office as a harbinger of religious apocalypse in England, bolstering several attempts to make statutory changes to the 1559 ‘settlement’ legislation.4 Within this context, the new prayer service marked an attempt to counter the growing ‘papist’ threat to Protestant England. Yet Parker’s text may also be read as expressing faintly ambivalent sentiments that Elizabeth’s overly ‘passive’ realm had invited the visitation of God’s wrath.

In line with the pamphlet comment of the era, many of the queen’s ministers and advisors repeatedly rehearsed anti-papal fears that her realm, person and estate were now prime targets for a Catholic attack.5 In the eyes of many, the martyrs of St. Bartholomew’s bore witness to the inherent justice of the Protestant cause, offering ‘proof positive’ of murderous Catholic intentions and, by extension, promoting the adoption of a more robust foreign policy. Yet lines of argument varied wildly with respect to the defences the queen should adopt: while Mary Stewart’s execution was widely mooted, opinions conflicted as to whether Elizabeth should pursue an alliance with the Calvinist Scots, the German Lutherans, or even the crown of Spain. Before the Earl of Mar’s death in 1573, Burghley directed most of his energies towards harnessing news of the massacre to pursue an alliance with the

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3 STCs 13845, 13846, 13847, 13846.5 and 22248.
5 Cf. STCs 13847 (preface to), 22248,
Protestant regime in Scotland – with, perhaps, some sort of print campaign to support it. Few of the queen’s councillors appeared to place much trust in an alliance with Catholic France. Walsingham propounded a zealously apocalyptic outlook, suggesting that a political demarcation should be drawn between the powers of Protestant and Catholic Europe. With the accession of the ultra-Catholic Henry III in 1574, the terminology of Elizabethan political discourse, in line with the language and tone of contemporary print, became more stridently confessionalised. Reflecting a Calvinist disdain for the Italianate nature of the French court, a discernibly anti-Italian (and often anti-Florentine) bias in English politics reinforced a growing perception of Valois rule as nefariously Machiavellian.

English reactions to St. Bartholomew’s also heavily conditioned perceptions of the significance of the revolt in the Low Countries. An analysis of political correspondence with respect to the latter throws up some significant findings. St. Bartholomew’s was not only regarded by Protestant commanders as a major strategic setback to Orange’s cause, but exerted a powerful psychological hold over those who now feared copy-cat style massacres. Yet Elizabeth remained overridingy concerned with bridling any future French aggrandisement there and with maintaining some pretence of diplomatic neutrality. Even in the face of a possible Spanish invasion in the summer of 1574, an ‘empresa’ that had the support of her own rebels, she was wary of taking any steps that might be interpreted as hostile to Philip II. She remained ever-conscious that, should the crown of Spain ally with that of France, a new Catholic axis could then justify the invasion of her own realm on religious grounds.

As chapter 7 has demonstrated, political sources of late 1576-78 suggest that Elizabethan reactions to the Sack of Antwerp by the Protestant élite were different in both degree and in kind from those elicited by St. Bartholomew’s. There was a marked distinction between the fears of the popular majority and the far less emotive approach adopted by the English crown, which by its actions (or lack thereof) appeared to acknowledge that all states suffered from mutinies and that Philip was not personally to blame for this one. Any condemnation of the killings as an act of “Spanish” oppression would have been read as such, given that neither Philip nor any of his associates or proxies had ordered the attack. Despite Wilson’s initially vehement denunciation of Antwerp’s “horrible and unmerciful massacre,” Horsey’s instructions to pursue the redress of English losses were only a footnote (albeit a significant one) to the queen’s stated aims of achieving stability in the Low Countries. Fearing that the French, under Francis of Anjou, now sought to gain a foothold in the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland, it is understandable that Elizabeth remained reluctant to alienate Philip by harping on a point of dishonour. This may explain why Smith, on embassy to Philip’s court, referred only to “fear[s] of being put to the sword by the Spaniards” and not to the sack per se. Indeed, despite the impression afforded by some of the political and printed sources, my

6 STC 22203.
findings vis-à-vis the queen’s foreign policy run counter to the “inevitabilist” school of thought that has suggested there was an inexorable drift towards war between the crowns of England and Spain.

Elizabeth’s own response to the sack was thus palpably muted – once it emerged that no Englishman of means had been killed and that redress for English losses had been secured, the atrocity seems to have dropped from her agenda, being overshadowed by other key events such as the appointment of Don John as governor-general. The broader scope of English comment quickly moved beyond the sack to focus on broader issues of national defence, specifically the ongoing threat posed by Mary Stewart, and the possibility of constructing a pan-European Protestant league. Allusions to St. Bartholomew’s and Antwerp are to be found only rarely in the political correspondence of these years, although they crop up repeatedly in the topical pamphlet literature. This would suggest that, although elements at court may have been involved in backing particular titles – such as Gascoigne’s *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* – the driving force for others stemmed from those beyond the innermost circle of power – e.g. ex-soldiers such as Churchyard, Nash and Proctor.

2. **Features of English news pamphlets, pre- and post the massacres of 1572 and 1576**

It is notable that, while the early modern news pamphlet is undergoing something of a historical rehabilitation, the historiography of Elizabethan political culture is still largely silent on those titles published before the 1580s. Writing on late Elizabethan pamphleteering on the French religious wars, Lisa Parmelee has contended that 1585 marks a watershed of sorts, demarcating a steady stream of news titles translated before that date from a “surge” of 130 imported over the ten years thereafter.\(^7\) Other historians have also observed that English pamphlets on the wars overseas were not produced on any scale until after 1585, and that this form of commentary only really expanded in the fervently confessionalised atmosphere of the 17th century.\(^8\)

Yet my research suggests that the news production of the 1570s deserves closer attention. Although the spate of Elizabethan foreign news pamphlets and titles produced in the 1570s might not be comparable in scale to the post-1585 influx, their claims and assumptions intersected – in important ways – with contemporary political debates. My research into the print titles published in the wake of both the 1572 and 1576 massacres suggests that ‘popular’ news sources were beginning to be regarded by their backers as a tool for the manipulation of public opinion. Whatever their form – i.e. works of political propaganda, religious polemic, formal petitions, reports of war news, ballads,

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\(^7\) Parmelee, *Good newes*, p. 31. This was prompted by the death of Francois of Anjou (the last surviving Valois heir) and the radical policies pursued by the French Catholic League.

commentaries or a blend of several subgenres – the purpose of many titles appears to have been to disseminate the concerns of various Protestant groupings to a wider popular readership.

Just as with the court-centric debates of the period, the majority of Elizabethan news print titles from the 1570s relate either to the wars in France and/or to those in the Low Countries. Supporting Shaaber’s contention that translated French and Dutch-language news dominated the market,9 I have found that, of around 127 pamphlets entered into the Stationers Registers before 1579, at least 84 relate (or appear to relate) to either state.10 The vast majority of the sources I have read (over 95%) are translations of foreign originals: in many cases (65%), deriving from a still surviving Ür-text issued in French, Dutch or Latin. Omitting numerous devotional writings (e.g. of Theodore de Bèze, Jean Calvin and Guillaume du Bartas) the spread of English coverage on the French religious wars still remains wide: 78 works by my count, including titles entered into the registers for which no surviving copy remains. Although any statistical quantification must be imprecise owing to the shadowy processes of Elizabethan distribution, licensing, and the factors influencing survival rates, the data suggests a lively market emerging in the 1560s and strengthening in the 1570s. Two primary factors seem to have prompted this growth – a groundswell of public interest in purchasing exciting, topical “news” and a top-down concern with enshrining Protestant “history,” both to promote a newly confessionalised politics and to influence the queen’s foreign policy.

Despite their claims at stringent impartiality, many of these works were heavily didactic in tone, their authors employing a range of literary strategies to drum their assumptions home to their readers. These included the use of subjective as well as quasi-fictional content; forms of lively dialogue and present-tense narration; paternalistic attempts to offer the reader, and the ruling authorities, advice; and other forms of moralising sentiment.11 News pamphlet authors embedded sensational highlights within conventional narratives of Protestant piety, creating a hybrid form that interwove features of hagiography, historical chronicle, martyrology, and satire.12

As stated in the introduction to this thesis, my research into forms of Protestant pamphleteering in the 1560s and early 1570s has proved crucial with respect to evaluating the impact of the St. Bartholomew’s massacre. I have discovered that many English pamphlets and ballads dating from 1560-64 concerned the doings of Mary Stewart and her Guisian kinsmen, conflating the threat of

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9 Shaaber, Some Forerunners of the Newspaper, p. 169.
10 This count includes both STC entries and titles entered into the Stationers Registers where the text itself no longer survives. The expense incurred in entering a title for publication is a strong indicator that it would have been published. All figures are likely to be underestimates owing to both the fact that Registers are missing for 1571-76 and that it only became obligatory to register a title in 1585.
Catholic extremism abroad with political concerns over England’s unresolved succession. Although condemnations of both the French Valois and Spanish Habsburg crowns remained indirect for most of the 1560s, Cecil’s propagandist drive of 1568-72 marked a clear attempt to render the tone of popular print explicitly anti-Marian and increasingly anti-Spanish. Largely owing to his close involvement, there was a clear overlap at this stage between the contemporary print and political discourse, which saw Mary Stewart vilified as a “Hispanized” serpent in Elizabeth’s bosom.

Following St. Bartholomew’s, it is understandable that English news print concerning France was dominated by questions of accountability for the massacre. Some Puritan commentators – such as the authors of the Admonition and its sequels – used the massacre as a means of enlisting support for their own evangelical agenda: seeking to inspire popular support for reforms that were now given both moral impetus and topical focus. The spate of translated Calvinist accounts published c.1572-74 also throws up some interesting findings, presenting deeply contradictory accounts of the massacre’s causation and significance. Charges of guilt were levelled, with varying degrees of emphasis and accuracy, at Charles IX, Catherine de’ Medici, the dukes of Anjou, Guise, Nevers and Nemours, and René Birague, all of whom were represented as having perfidious Italianate instincts and being affiliated with the papacy and/or Spain. While most printed accounts were correct in asserting that the massacre marked the end of a two-year hiatus in Guisian dominance (effective since the 1570 peace of Saint-Germain), all titles tended to cast the emerging Guisian/Bourbon rivalry in overly simple binary terms of ultramontane, Italo-papal perfidy versus patriotic Gallican/Calvinist loyalty. There was a noticeable shift around 1575 towards broader ad hominem biographical coverage, evincing the roles played by individual, ‘Machiavellian’ figureheads such as Catherine and Henry III (e.g. STCs 13744, 13746, 13747 compared with STCs 10550 and 22248) in works of translated Calvinist polemic. Judging from several comments made in English political correspondence of the 1570s, the heavily anti-Medician construction of events expressed in print was in line with the ingrained Italophobic prejudices of the English élite.

Another key finding of this thesis is that the range of prefaces and appendices appended to translated Calvinist titles show that Elizabethan publishers, translators and printers did not blindly reissue unglossed French or Latin Ür-texts. Rather, they sought to link the arguments expressed in the original texts to various native Protestant agendas (whether of a diplomatic, military or religious nature). English print networks, and the degree to which individuals involved in the print trade had court backing, are harder to establish. Bedford’s inventory suggests that even privy councillors owned the most sensational pamphlets, but it does not necessarily follow that he or others were their patrons or sponsors. Nonetheless, Leicester’s close association with the printers Henry Bynneman and
Thomas Vautrollier, and his affiliation with the polemicist Hotman and his son, provides a tangible link between the spheres of Elizabethan high politics and popular print.

In terms of quantitative changes, the English source record suggests that there was a small, yet significant, rise in the production of Calvinist polemic c.1574-76. This would qualify Dickens’s contention that the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre “did not result... in an explosion of pamphlets by indignant Englishmen.”

Clearly there was no rapid increase comparable to that in the later reign, when Elizabeth’s war with Philip II and Henry IV’s military campaigns received unprecedented attention in print. However, it would seem that, following 1574, the English enterprise of Calvinist print grew substantially.

This would accord with the general increase of anxiety occasioned by Henry of Anjou’s accession to the French throne in 1574, and with a rising fear of a Spanish naval ‘empresa’ against England. The body of Calvinist pamphlets translated into English and published from 1574 onwards univocally cast the crown of France as a tyrannical power in which Elizabeth should place no trust. As later accounts evidence, this sense of Anglo-Protestant fear and paranoia only became less factually grounded with time, as many commentators feared that Elizabeth’s marriage to Anjou would reanimate English Catholicism. There was also a distinct trend by the end of the decade for sweeping discussions of St. Bartholomew’s into broader treatments of European wars (e.g. Churchyard’s The Miserie of Flaunders; his A generall rehearsall of warres; and Serres’ The fourth parte of Commentaries of the civill warres in Fraunce, and ... Flaunders). This was both a case of broader historical perspective, and a means by which St. Bartholomew’s could be used to buttress appeals for financial and military assistance to be sent to Orange’s forces in Flanders.

Another key finding of this thesis is that, running parallel to their interest in France, Elizabethans developed a fascination with events in the Low Countries. From the outset of the revolt, Elizabethan print emerged as distinctly pro-Orangist, with Philip’s proxies and governor-generals being vilified as tyrannical usurpers of traditional freedoms. From 1569 onwards, pro-Orangist pamphlets available in English print began to bestow paternalistic and regal epithets upon William of Orange – including that of “Father of the Fatherland,” a designation once deemed exclusively royal. These pamphlets began to extol the atavistic and unchanging nature of the Low Countries’ native privileges and liberties, bewailing their despoilation under ‘tyrannous’ Spanish rule. From 1572 onwards, and lasting until at least 1577, one may discern a tendency towards anonymous authorship, translation and publication in

15 Cf. Ch. 9 of this thesis.
English print on the Low Countries revolt: hardly surprising given that Elizabeth was, for most of this period, trying to maintain a position of ‘plausible deniability’ with respect to her involvement.

The winter of 1575-76 seems to have marked a distinct turning point in terms of the charges levelled at Philip II in English print. Significantly, this was around the time that Elizabeth was offered the countship of Holland and Zeeland, and well before the rebel provinces formally agreed to reject Philip as their sovereign (in 1579). Prior to this date, Philip II had not been vilified as the evil mastermind of Spanish Habsburg rule in the Low Countries. After this date, in line with his rebels’ attempt to find a royal ‘protector’, the claims of Spanish Habsburg ‘tyranny’ became explicitly, and personally, associated with the king. Both the improved quality of the paper and typesetting of this genre of news, and the number of surviving copies of titles such as the Justification of 1575 (published by the royal John Day); the Certein Letters of 1576; and A treatise of the peace ... concluded between the states... and Orenge (1576) – suggests that their publication was being financed by Englishmen of means, perhaps with an eye to influencing court debates. Accompanying this development was the beginnings of a gradual, but widespread, transference of English cultural enmity from France and onto Spain. As the preface to Certein letters reveals, this was not an immediate, axiomatic shift: while Spanish Habsburg rule was increasingly cast as annexationist and tyrannous, French interests continued to be classified as most inimical to those of England.

English print titles concerning the Sack of Antwerp published in the late 1570s reinforced a growing perception of the Spanish as innately cruel and treacherous – establishing, in order words, the roots of a Black Legend tradition in English. The prose and verse accounts available to Englishmen drew an unnerving contrast between the puissance of Philip’s “Spanish” armies and the passivity of their victims. Ballads, being simpler in design and more strident in rhetoric, framed the sack as an instance of providential justice that would now be visited upon England, and specifically Protestant London, if its citizens continued to wallow in their spiritual torpor. Neither the pamphlets nor the ballad representations sit well with historical assessments of the sack as the near-unavoidable consequence of a desperate, impoverished soldiery. Yet, given that the later 1570s witnessed the arrival of Jesuit missionaries in England; the beginning of papal-backed enterprises in Ireland; and issues surrounding the disputed Portuguese succession; it is perhaps unsurprising that English print continued to present a neatly polarised view of its significance.

3. The political purpose of pamphlets?
As noted above, the balance of the historiographical coverage implies that English news pamphlets prior to the 1580s were too ephemeral and few in number to be of much political import or to have
shaped any kind of public discourse. This stands in contrast to findings for the later reign where, as Huffman has observed, news pamphlets helped to “popularise and confirm the highly charged partisan political atmosphere of the 1580s and 1590s.” Why should the topical print of the 1570s not be similarly important? It could be argued that, given that many early news pamphlets were reproductions of material printed or translated from foreign sources (i.e. coming to English readers second hand), they cannot serve as a reliable barometer of native Elizabethan attitudes. But, as noted above, this imitative culture did not mean that purveyors of foreign news simply rehearsed strands of foreign-authored debate. While some translated works featured prefaces appealing directly to English readers, others narrated the wars in France and Flanders as being of key significance to Englishmen, using both means to promote the adoption of a more stridently confessionalised domestic and foreign policy.

My findings concerning the print response to the two major massacres of the 1570s should contribute to filling a gap in the historiography of Elizabethan news, still analyzed largely in relation to modern newspapers – i.e. stressing schematisation, credibility and veracity as the only benchmarks of progress, and ignoring their political dimensions. As David Randall has observed, partiality in Elizabethan news was taken to mean putting the best possible construction on events, rather than wilfully disseminating lies, and as historians we should adjust our criteria accordingly. Moreover, as Mears has argued, it is anachronistic to apply modern notions of periodicity and serialisation to such media: topicality remained the sine qua non.

Yet one should not assume that Elizabethans only valued topicality with respect to foreign news, or that it was not shaped by longer-term trends. As I have demonstrated, printed comment on St. Bartholomew’s and the Sack of Antwerp continued to be published in England several years after the atrocities themselves. Moreover, the titles and prefaces of several pamphlets suggests that the purported accuracy of their information – even if several years out of date – was highly prized. The preface to Thomas Timme’s 1574 translation of Serres’ The Three partes of Commentaries... with an

18 E.g. Prefaces to STCs 13578; 13847; 11742; 15527; 18441; 22243; 22248; 25708, relating the wars abroad to England, Englishmen and/or Elizabeth.
19 E.g. References within the text of STCs 4322; 5235; 5239; 5243; 7166; 11036; 11644; 18656; 20979; 23400; 25405 relating the wars abroad to England, Englishmen and/or Elizabeth.
20 See: Shaaber, Some Forerunners of the Newspaper; P. Voss, Elizabethan News Pamphlets, pp. 66-75.
22 Mears, Queenship, p. 149; Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering, Ch. 4.
23 This is most obviously the case with the many versions of Hotman’s De Furoribus and the anonymous 1576 tract, Certein letters.
addition of the cruell murther of the Admirall Chastilion stated that its account of St. Bartholomew’s was reported “the same as they were lately written by a diligent eye witness.” The author also claimed that his account was fit to be published as much “for the truth and indifferencie of the author” as for the “qualitie and freshnesse” – i.e. significance and novelty – of its news (just as well, given that most of its contents were two years old!)²⁴ Likewise, The Spoyle of Antwerpe was billed as an objective news report written by “a true Englishman,” and the titles to other news pamphlets of the era prominently featuring the claims: “a true rehersall,” “a true declaration,” “a true discourse”, etc.²⁵

Were the political contents of these pamphlets sui generis or did they derive from court-centric debates? My findings repeatedly show that the two realms of discourse were, if not exactly synchronous, far from unrelated. Although print schedules in the 16th century could not allow for simultaneity between political developments and immediate printed commentary,²⁶ I have found occasions where the speedy issuance of certain titles was clearly grasped as an opportunity to advance a particular political agenda. Examples include: the appearance of Orange’s first manifesto A defence and true declaration of the thinges lately done in the lowe countrey in the heated spring of 1572; the preface to the English translation of Hotman’s De furoribus Gallicis, strongly endorsing an Anglo-Scottish Protestant alliance; Anville’s declaration of 1575, which coincided with the visit of his younger brother, Meru, to Elizabeth’s court; and the Certein letters of 1576, published around the time when Elizabeth was offered the countship of Holland and Zeeland.²⁷

More generally, it should be stressed that works of English printed news repeatedly conflated calls for moral reform with the need to adopt a more activist stance in the religious wars, suggesting that religious violence abroad was ‘read’ by Englishmen as a cautionary example of what might well happen in England. These echoed fears which came up time and again in the writings of leading politicians and clerics such as Burghley, Leicester, Parker and Walsingham. Judging by the wording of many tracts dedicated to nobles such as Bedford, Burghley, Leicester and Warwick, the theatre of religious war was also promoted in print as a theatre for the expression of aristocratic might and virtue.²⁸ The writings of soldier-poets such as Churchyard, Gascoigne, Morgan, and Rich, stressed that the “disipline of marciall affairs” could also afford Protestants of middling and gentle status a “contentacion of the mind” and spiritual solace.²⁹ This suggests that – for the hotter sort of Protestants at least – domestic and foreign policy agendas were more closely interconnected than historians have typically acknowledged.

²⁴ STC 22241.5, sig. A2¹v.
²⁵ STCs: 540; 13570; 13578; 11644; 18441.
²⁶ Kingdon, Myths, p. 203.
²⁷ STCs 18441, 13847, 18051.7, 15527.
²⁸ As expressed in STCs 13964, 17450.3, 24777.
²⁹ Codrington MS. CXXIX, fol. 1°.
Although news of reader-responses is slender (excepting the odd manicule and marginal annotation, which are always of significance), the content of English news print of the 1570s shows that public opinion operated not simply as an instrument called into use by the authorities for their own ends, but as an autonomous force in its own right. In this sense, the pamphlets I have studied form a crucial link between an official level of discourse and that of wider society – traversing the increasingly porous divide both the élite and middling orders. Unfortunately, the limitations of this thesis have not allowed for comparison with oral news comment, which Mears has shown to be a key component of Elizabethan news transmission. Nonetheless, my findings challenge the assumptions of Habermas and his followers that the rise of an English “public sphere” occurred no earlier than the mid-17th century, and that it was necessarily always manipulated by those at the pinnacle of power.

On the other hand, although it is seldom sufficient to prove beyond doubt, there is some evidence to suggest that key figures were involved in pamphlet production. Although I cannot confirm that there was an organised, “top down” campaign steered by specific councillors to force Elizabeth into certain lines of action in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s, to assume sovereignty over the maritime provinces in 1575/76, or to bolster her own defences in the wake of the Sack of Antwerp, the timing of publication and content of certain tracts suggest that this was so. From the start of the reign, it is clear that Elizabeth’s more zealous councillors and diplomats, including men such as Burghley, Beale, Middlemore and Throckmorton, were involved in the import and export of Protestant polemic. Arguably, this enterprise accelerated in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s. Leicester, chief of the Protestant hawks, seems to have become involved by the 1570s: an inference derived from his literary interests and patronage connections, including his close connections with François and Jean Hotman. The earl’s network may well have cultivated the mode of popular print in the 1570s to prepare for an armed intervention in the Low Countries, although the evidence is circumstantial at best. In this respect it is worth noting that Leicester actively used broadsides and works of news print in 1586, whilst in command of the queen’s army in the Low Countries, to promote his legitimacy as a Protestant governor-general.

It is clear that the connections between politics and print were not exclusively of a “top tier” nature and that attachment to the values of chivalry and a Protestant commitment to a form of vita activa clearly extended beyond the immediate affinities of the Elizabethan élite. My research has shown that a wider network of second tier authors, translators and men of business – including men such as

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30 Cf. N. Mears, *Queenship*, Ch. 5 addresses the oral transmission of news in Elizabethan culture.
31 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*.
Bowes, Gascoigne, Gates and Golding – were involved in the output of titles calling for the moral reform and martial renaissance of English society. These men (most of whom aimed to serve the queen in a semi-official or unofficial capacity) were well placed to act as conduits between the power bases of privy council, court and city. Despite their shared Protestant commitment, their personal motives were arguably manifold – ranging from an attempt to secure their own placement at court by demonstrating their loyal service to a governing elite (Gascoigne); to securing aid and succour for Protestant communities abroad (Bowes/Golding); to securing an English military renaissance (Gates).

What role did individual printers play in this enterprise? It seems likely that young stationers – responding to growing popular interest in the wars abroad – were driven by the dual motives of personal ideology and profit. Bynneman, whose role in producing Hotman’s works I have discussed in chapter 4, likely acted at the behest or encouragement of members of the Leicester/Warwick circle. Likewise, Vautrollier’s output suggests an even closer link to this circle at home and its Huguenot contacts abroad. With respect to news concerning the Low Countries, Richard Jones appears to have carved out a lucrative niche in publishing ballads and shorter works relating to the Sack of Antwerp. Jones’s commercial instincts were seemingly as keen as his Protestant convictions, given that he had the nous to borrow Berthelet’s old printer’s mark to serve as a frontispiece to Gascogine’s *Spoyle of Antwerpe*. Significantly, Bynneman, Jones and Vautrollier, three of the most prolific stationers who printed titles on wars in France and Flanders, all went on to enjoy successful careers producing military treatises – the prefaces to which demonstrated their ongoing links to court patrons such as Leicester.33

While works of topical print focussed on the precarious situation of foreign Protestants, they implicitly – and in some cases explicitly – acknowledged the temporality of the queen’s hold on power, suggesting that the Elizabethan polity was not stable enough to guarantee the permanence of its own Protestant laws. Working to challenge her status of inviolability as monarch, the print comment of the late 1570s also implied, as never before, the distinct provisionality of Elizabeth’s rule. Amongst other texts, this claim was made in White’s 1576 sermon, and the writings of ‘second-tier’ figures such as Churchyard, Norris, Proctor and Rich.34 1579, in particular, saw the publication of various writings enjoining English readers – and Protestant patrons – to look to the defence of their realm. This trend culminated with the publication of Stubbs’s polemic, an instance when topical print was used to marshal popular opinion in order to forcibly alter the direction of the queen’s policy.

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33 Bynneman printed *An Ancient Historie and Exquisite Chronicle of Romanes Warre* (1578), a translation of the original by Appian, and *An Arithmetical Militare Treatise, named Stratioticos* (1579). Jones produced the ballad *A Ditty of Encouragement to English men to be bold to fight in Defence of prince and country* (1588); George Whetstone’s *The Honourable Reputation of a Souldier* (1585); and Sir John Smythe’s treatises *Certain discourses military* (1590) and *Certain Instructions* (1594; 1595).

34 STCs 5239; 5243; 11742; 18656; 20403; 20979; 25405.
4. **Elizabethan censorship and press control**

Early English news titles shaped, and were shaped by, forms of state censorship. Yet historians have contested just how efficacious the latter were. While most have concluded that the English crown was primarily concerned with works of heresy and sedition, specifically those demonstrating Roman Catholic or pro-Marian sympathies, titles which contained “unfavourable representations of friendly foreign powers” have also been seen as inherently controversial.\(^{35}\) While this may perhaps be true for the early 17th century, the situation in Elizabeth’s reign seems less clear-cut. As this thesis has shown, although the crown claimed to discourage any criticism of a living monarch, perceptions of what constituted criticism, favourable representation, and “friendly powers” were clearly in flux, and not always neatly confessionally-marked. As my analysis of the pamphleteering of the mid 1570s suggests, Catholic Spain was not singled out as being any more exploitative and inhumane than Catholic France, if one factors in the amount and nature of the print comment elicited by St. Bartholomew’s. Generally speaking, few Protestant tracts – excepting *A justification or cleering of the Prince of Orendge against the false sclaunders*, condemned by proclamation in 1570 – were suppressed. I have found no other evidence of Protestant-authored news pamphlets (including those defaming Philip II and the Valois kings) being suppressed prior to 1579.\(^{36}\) In contrast, forms of pulpit censorship appear to have been more proactive: Sandys, for instance, ensuring that only approved preachers appeared at St. Paul’s Cross in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s.\(^{37}\)

My study also confirms that the vast majority of English news pamphlets published in the 1570s did not receive formal authorization in the form of an ecclesiastical commissioners’ license or a royal warrant, suggesting it was a largely unofficial branch of the print industry. Only two articles of French news published between 1572 and 1579 were printed *cum privilegio* – a form of copyright conferring economic and legal benefits on the printer.\(^{38}\) These were Golding’s translation of Charles IX’s peace edict, legislated on 13 May 1576, and Bowes’s 1579 translation of Gentillet’s *An Apology or Defence for the Christians of France*.\(^{39}\) Of the remainder, only the editions of Jean de Serres’ *Commentaries* stated on their title-pages that they had been “seene and allowed.”\(^{40}\) With respect to the shorter news titles concerning the Low Countries, only Geoffrey Fenton’s translation of Antonio de Corro’s 1569 *Epistle or godlie admonition... sent to the Pastoures of the Flemish Church in Antwerp* and the

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\(^{36}\) Cf. Mears, “John Stubbs’s *The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf*, 1579.”

\(^{37}\) E.g. after the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s. See Ch.3, 4.

\(^{38}\) See Clegg, *Press censorship*, pp. 8-11, 139 and 176 for a fuller discussion of this term.

\(^{39}\) Respectively: (London: 1576; STC 13091) and (London: 1579; STC 11742).

\(^{40}\) STCs: 22241.5; 22242 and 22243. A religious pamphlet of 1580 – a second edition of Du Plessis Mornay’s *A notable treatise of the church* – was also declared “perused [and] corrected.”
1571/72 English edition of Orange’s manifesto, *A defence and true declaration of the thinges lately done in the lowe countrey*... were designated “cum privilegio.” This suggests that printers neither consistently submitted tracts to the Bishop of London or the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor entered their titles into the Stationers’ Registers, as the 1559 injunctions and 1566 Ordinances stipulated.

Proposing a lack of consistent regulation helps to account for the heterogeneity of English Protestant works concerning France and the Low Countries (ranging from translations of Beza and Bullinger, to items of Calvinist polemic and eyewitness accounts by military adventurers such as Churchyard and Gascoigne). It might be argued that official licensing of Protestant news tracts appears to have been of minor importance to the authorities, even in those instances where these titles pushed for Elizabeth’s military involvement in France, Scotland or the Low Countries. This would fit with Cyndia Clegg’s conclusion that Elizabethan censorship, for the most part, remained an “ad hoc – albeit authoritarian – response to particular texts” rather than an inflexible, absolutist mechanism of state control. On the other hand, this does not preclude the possibility that the publication of many shorter news tracts was being covertly encouraged by leading statesmen, government officials, or their clients. The absence of several key monarchomach tracts – such as the 1572 *Le Tocsain contre les massacreurs* and the 1574 *Reveille-matin*, which castigated both Elizabeth’s “unreformed” church and the queen for her insufficient involvement in the French wars – may be explained either by the fact that London’s stationers did not take the risk of publishing them or that Elizabeth’s leading officials did not wish to see them published. A degree of cautious self-regulation on the part of English officials, printers and publishers, etc. may well have obviated the need for more heavy-handed forms of state censorship.

In contrast, the evidence suggests that the most controversial Catholic news titles – particularly those of a pro-Marian nature – elicited stern reprisals. Bishop Aylmer of London wrote to Burghley in December 1579, reporting one William Carter as “a very Lewd fellowe, who hath byne Dyvers tymes before in prison for printing of Lewde pamphlettes.” Aylmer’s letter hints at the opportunities pamphlets afforded to voice political, as well as morally or religiously questionable, sentiments. The bishop also recounted that a detailed search of Carter’s house had revealed “naughtye papystycall Bookes” including a French tract “inty[ti]ed the innocency of the Scotysshe Quene ... wherin he calleth her the heire apparent of this Crowne.” Yet Carter would not be attainted for treason at the Old Bailey until 1584 – for printing libels explicitly against Elizabeth. His case underscores the staunch commitment of many of Mary Stewart’s supporters in England, and the increasing severity of the government’s response to Catholic polemic in the late 1570s and 1580s.

42 *Stationers Registers*, I, pp. 749-750.
5. *The evolution of key strands of Elizabethan Protestant nationalism*

There were clearly broader motivations, besides a religiously-inspired interest in foreign affairs, driving the enterprise of Elizabethan print in the wake of the 1572 and 1576 massacres, not least widespread xenophobia and the fear that Elizabeth’s régime was dangerously open to princely alteration. Underlying the bitter rhetoric of many news pamphlets lay a wall of distrust and suspicion, which grew into a near-paranoid fear of invasion as the decade progressed. At the beginning of the French civil wars, pamphlet portraits of the Guises – cast as violent, blinkered dynasts who were to blame for the loss of Calais and the hegemonic pretentions of their Catholic niece – encapsulated the idea of England’s external, “papist” foes. At the same time, the powerful horizontal solidarity of Protestant ideological ties began to raise the spectre of new, confessionally-grounded, Anglo-French and Anglo-Scottish alliances: alliances that were hinted at, or directly referenced, in prefaces to some printed comment.\(^{44}\)

Over time, English presses (replicating the biases inherent in Calvinist and Orangist Ür-texts) shifted their anxieties southwards, decrying Spanish Habsburg “tyranny” in the Low Countries; the amorality of all Italians and the papacy; and ultramontane French Catholicism. Both the pamphlets, ballads and news tracts published in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s and the Sack of Antwerp, reflected a clear step-change in fashioning new, more rigid, Protestant certainties. From an English Protestant perspective, in which Elizabeth’s realm was inevitably the target of a Roman Catholic insurrection and invasion, the powerful ties of continental Protestantism intersected in complex ways with vertical solidarities of nationhood. This helped furnish an English Protestant identity that was distinct from those of continental Calvinism and Lutheranism, yet seemingly dependent upon them for its own survival. The evolution of this new strand of nationalism can be detected in the pamphlets and ballads of the 1570s, which began to anticipate the cultural and political developments of the 1580s. These worked to demarcate not just notions of secular and religious loyalty, but even conceptions of “Englishness” itself: defined largely in opposition to Roman Catholicism.

Although their literary quality is variable, these titles merit closer study with respect to the major political and religious developments of their day. Elizabethan news print on the two mega massacres of the 1570s marked an attempt not only to forge a shared sense of godly suffering among a Protestant internationale, but to fashion England as a leading, self-determined Protestant nation. In the words of the later pamphlet collector George Thompson: “actions y’ may be presidents to posteritie, ought to

\(^{44}\) STCs: 13847; 22203.
have their records, & merit a careful preservation.™45 Despite their patchy survival rate, English pamphlets of the 1570s indeed stand as “precedents to posterity,” exhibiting the complex and conflicted mentalities of the era.

45 Inscribed by Thompson in the margin of the first page of entries of volume 1 of his manuscript catalogue (two copies) [BL C.38.h.21 and BL C.37.h.13].
## Appendix 1: Tracts published in England relating to France and St. Bartholomew’s (1572-76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of author or translator if known</th>
<th>Category of source</th>
<th>Full title</th>
<th>Lang.</th>
<th>Printer and date of publication</th>
<th>STC/Cat. no.</th>
<th>Format &amp; Pages</th>
<th>General notes - ESTC and other resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudonym: Ernest Varamundo'</strong> [i.e. François Hotman, 1524-1590.]</td>
<td>Calvinist pamphlet</td>
<td>De furoribus Gallicis, horrenda &amp; indigna Amiraliji Castillionei, nobilium atq[ue] illustrium cosmogtaphie [sic] de Monster. totวลe verité de Dieu enuers ses esceults. Et le seigneur se retournant regarda Pierre, &amp; Pierre se souvint de la parole du seigneur, comme il luy aict dit. Deuant que le coq cante, tu me renieres trois fois, Adonc Pierre fortis hors, &amp; pleura amainement.</td>
<td>Latin.</td>
<td>Edinburgh [i.e. London: Printed by Henry Bynneman]. Anno salutis humanæ 1573.</td>
<td>3545</td>
<td>8o. CXXII.</td>
<td>There are seven surviving copies of this in the British Isles, giving some idea of its popularity. STC notes that this is apparently a missive of the edition with Bynneman’s name in the imprint and colophon, with A1.9 reprinted and quire O reimpessed to omit his name and supply a false imprint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudonym: Ernest Varamundo'</strong> [i.e. François Hotman, 1524-1590.]</td>
<td>Calvinist pamphlet</td>
<td>De furoribus Gallicis, horrenda &amp; indigna Amiraliji Castillionei, nobilium atq[ue] illustrium vironum caede, scelerata ac inaudita pionum passagio edita per complices Galliae cielates, sine vfo discrimine generis, sexus, atalis &amp; conditionis hominum: vera &amp; simplex narratio. Ernesto Varamundo Friso autore.</td>
<td>Latin.</td>
<td>Londini: ex officina Henrici Bynneman, 1573.</td>
<td>3846</td>
<td>8o. CXXII. [Title- page; CXXII.]</td>
<td>There are twelve surviving copies of this at repositories in the British Isles, giving some idea of its popularity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudonym: Ernest Varamundo'</strong> [i.e. François Hotman, 1524-1590.]</td>
<td>Calvinist pamphlet</td>
<td>A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of France, &amp; the horrible and shamefull slaughter of Chastillon the admiral, and divers other noble and excellent men, and of the wicked and strange murder of godlie persons, committed in many cities of France, without any respect of sorte, kindie, age, or degree.</td>
<td>English from Latin.</td>
<td>At Striveling in Scotlande [i.e. London: Printed by Henry Bynneman]. 1573.</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>8o. CXXIII. [1] p.</td>
<td>Kingdon, Myths, p. 256 notes that this translation was republished as an appendix to Timme’s translation of Serres’s Three Parts of Commentaries.... several times in 1574, and once in an abridged form in the 1576 Continuation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author: Serres, Jean de, 1540?-1598. Trans.: Thomas Tyrme, d. 1620.</strong></td>
<td>Calvinist pamphlet</td>
<td>The three partes of Commentaries, containing the whole and perfect discours of the Cuii warres of Fransoie, under the regnes of Henry the second, Frances the second, and of Charles the ninth. With an Addition of the cruel murder of the Admiral Chastillon, and dier other nobles, committed the 24. dayes of August. Anno 1572. Translated out of Latine into English by Thomas Timme minister. Seene and allowed.</td>
<td>English from Latin.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London, by (Henry Middleton for) Frances Colsocke, 1574.</td>
<td>22441.5</td>
<td>40. [16]- 494 p., 38 leaves.</td>
<td>As the STC notes, A Translation of parts 1-3 of Commentariorum de statu religiosi et republicae in regno Galliae acriby Jean de Serres. Part 1 is actually an abridged translation of Commentarii de statu de la religion by Pierre de La Place. The first part was often misattributed to Petrus Ramus. STC 22242.2 is another copy of this edition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon. [Likely Innocent Gentillet, d. 1585.]</td>
<td>Calvinist pamphlet.</td>
<td>A declaration concerning the needfulnesse of peace to be made in Fraunce; and the means for the making of the same: exhibited to the most Christian king, Henrie the second of that name, King of Fraunce and Polande, ypon two edictes, put forth by his Maistrie, the one the tenth of September, the other the thritenth of October: Anno. 1574. Translated out of Frenche by G. H. Esquire.</td>
<td>English from French (G. H.)</td>
<td>Imprinted at London: By Henrie Bynmenner, for Raufe Newberry, dwelling in Fletstrett, a little aboue the Conduit, [1575].</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>60. [160]p.</td>
<td>A translation of Innocent Gentillet's &quot;Remonstrance au roy ... sur le faict des deux edictes ... touchant la necessite de paix et moyens de la faire.&quot; There is no other evidence to suggest that Harte translated other works of French news.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author given as Henri, duc de Montmorency (1534-1614).</td>
<td>No trans. given.</td>
<td>A declaration of the protestation of Monseigneur the Mareschal d'Anuille.</td>
<td>English from French.</td>
<td>(London: s.n. [Vautrollier?], 1575).</td>
<td>18051.7</td>
<td>80. 15 p.</td>
<td>Only one surviving copy of this tract exists in the British Library. It is bound with The Destruction and racke cruelly committed by the Duke of Guayfe in .. Vassy (London,1562; STC 11312). Although the STC does not identify publisher, it is identical to Vautrollier edition of Francois of Anjou’s Protestation (STC 11311).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon. author. [Likely, Henri Estienne, d. 1598.]</td>
<td>No trans. given.</td>
<td>A servayious discourse upon the lyfe, deedes, and behaviours of Katharine de Medics, Queene mother: wherin are displayed the meanes which she hath practised to alethylene into the usurping of the kingedome of France, and to the bringing of the estate of the same into vitter ruine and destruction.</td>
<td>English from French.</td>
<td>At Heydelbange [i.e. London: Printed by H. Middleton?], 1575.</td>
<td>10550.</td>
<td>80. 166p.</td>
<td>Cf. STC 1464.7 for a German translation. BL copy is incorrectly bound: pp. 81-96 are inserted between pp. 112 &amp; 113. As Kingdon notes, Myths, p.256, copies of two other Eng. editions survive, both printed by J. Ross in Edinburgh, stating Cracow (STC 10051) and Paris (STC 10551.5) as place of publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon. author.</td>
<td>Trans: Arthur Golding.</td>
<td>The lyfe of the most godly, valeant and noble capiteine and maintainer of the trew Christian religion in Fraunce, Jasper Colignie Shatilion, sometime great admirall of Fraunce. Translated out of Latin by Arthur Golding.</td>
<td>English from Latin.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London: By Thomas Vautrollier, 1576.</td>
<td>22248</td>
<td>80. 128 p.</td>
<td>The STC notes this has been attributed to Jean de Serres, Jean Holman, seigneur de Villers-Saint-Paul, and Francois Holman. Chaux, Geneve, p.84 identifies one Genevan edition. Kingdon, Myths, p.257 has also discovered a German and a French language edition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth: Sermes, Jean de, 15407-1598.</td>
<td>Trans: Thomas Tymme, d. 1620.</td>
<td>The fourth parte of Com[memorations] of the ciuit warres in Fraunce, and of the lovve countie of Flanders: translated out of Latine into English, by Thomas Tymme minister. Seene and allowed.</td>
<td>English from French.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London: By Henrie Binneman, for Humfrey Toy, Anno. 1576.</td>
<td>22243</td>
<td>44. 8.[35,1], 1410 (i.e. 190), [90] p. folded plate.</td>
<td>Dedicated to Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick, by Thomas Tymme. As STC notes, a copy of &quot;A supplication to the Kings Majesty of Spain, made by the Prince of Orange&quot; (caption title, unpaginated), 247-222 is inserted at the end. This is a translation of: Sandbrief, in forme van supplicatie aan die Conincklikke Majesteyt van Spaengien.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 2: Tracts published in England relating to the revolt in the Low Countries (1571-76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of author or translator</th>
<th>Category of source</th>
<th>Full title</th>
<th>Lang.</th>
<th>Printer and date of publication</th>
<th>STC: 2nd edn</th>
<th>Format &amp; Pages</th>
<th>General notes - ESTC and other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth: Aldegonde? Trans: Elias Newcomen,</td>
<td>Political propaganda on the occasion of the 1570 Imperial Diet.</td>
<td>A defens[o]o[ and true declaration of the things lately done in the lowe countrey, whereby may easily be seen to whom all the beginning and cause of the late troubles and catarraties is to be imputed. And wherefore also the straunners wherewith the adversaries do burden the churches of the lowe countrey are plainly confusioned.</td>
<td>English from Latin.</td>
<td>London: John Daye, 1571 [n.b, likely to be Jan-March, 1572] Cum privilegio Legatio Regiae.</td>
<td>15641</td>
<td>80. 152 p.</td>
<td>A translation of &quot;Libellus supplex imperatoris maiestati cæteris[que] sacri imperi ejus reipublicae, principibus, atque ordinibus, nomine Belgaetiae ex Inferiori Germania, evangeliæ religione causis per Albani Ducis tyrannidem electorum in comitibus foederebus, exhibitus.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>A true reversall of the honorable &amp; worthy[m]p[p]ar[ty] victory: which the defenders of the trueth haue had againste the tyrannical and bloodthirsty heape of ye Albanists. Which came to passe withoute the worthy cyttle of Harlam in Holland. the xvii. day of Marche, 1573. Translated out of Dutch into English, the thyrde day of Aprilly: the which copy in Dutch, was printed at Delft, the xvi. day of March laste paste.</td>
<td>English from Dutch.</td>
<td>[London]: Richard Jones, the vi. Day of Aprilly. 1573.</td>
<td>15678</td>
<td>80. [12] p. Sigs. (A1, 8).</td>
<td>One copy in Folger Shx of this pamphlet is used: Microfilm surrogate is provided: Early English books, 1475-1640 (639:12). Mic. A. 990. (10) Microfilm reel 639.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>A brief and true reversall of the noble victory and ouerthrow, which (by the grace of God) the Protestantes of the north partes of Holland had against the Duke of Alba, his ships of Amsterdam, with the taking of the Earle of Bossu, and their Admiraal Brooshuyen, with duens other gentlemen of the. of October-1573.</td>
<td>English from English</td>
<td>Imprinted at London in Fleetestreete, at the signe of the fauncon by Henrie Middleton, and are to be sold at his shop in S. Dunstones Churchyarde, anno 1573, Nouemb. 2.</td>
<td>15670</td>
<td>80. [14] p. Sigs. A-All.</td>
<td>One surviving copy in North America: I have used: Microfilm surrogate. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 2007. 7 microfilm reel; 35 mm. (Early English books, 1475-1640, 2310:09).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author presented as: William Prince of Orange, d.1584</td>
<td>Political treatise / Orangist propaganda.</td>
<td>A supputation to the Kinges Majestie of Spayne, made by the Prince of Orange, the states of Holland and Zeland, with all other his faughtfull subjectes of the low Countreys, presently suppressed by the tyranny of the Duke of Alba and Spaniards. By which is declared the original beginning of all the commotions [and] troubles happened in the sayd lowe Countrie: to the relief whereof, they require his Maiesties speedy redresse and remedie.</td>
<td>English from Dutch.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London By Henry Middleton, [1573?].</td>
<td>15670</td>
<td>80. [48] pp.</td>
<td>Copies in British Library and Lambeth Palace library. An English translation of Sendbrief. In forme van supplicatie aen die Consolatieke Majesteyt van Spayngen K. 213. Oranges cost of arms on title page. Muller 127 for a partial translation see Kosman &amp; Mellink, doc. 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author presented as: Fernando Alvarez, Duke of Alba, d.1582.</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda.</td>
<td>An answer and true discourse to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba (in manner of a pardon) to those of Amsterdam, to be by them conueyed and distributed into the other towne in Holland. Set forth by certain true lovers of their natue country, namely desirous to lye under the dure obeyance of the King of Spayne, according to the old customes and privileges of their saide countie: faithfully translated out of the Dutch into English, by T.W.</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Imprinted at London By Henry Middleton, [1573?].</td>
<td>15670</td>
<td>80. [48] pp.</td>
<td>Copies held by Lambeth library and Lincoln Cathedral. The French or Dutch original has not been traced. Suggested publication date from ESTC. A copy of this pamphlet is itemized in Bedford’s inventory (#172).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Transl.</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>Place of publication</td>
<td>Date of publication</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>(\text{Imprinted at London: By Richardo } \text{ Jones, } \text{1574})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>(\text{Imprinted at Dordrecht, } \text{1574})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>(\text{Imprinted at London: By W. } \text{Williamson, } \text{1574})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Dutch or French</td>
<td>(\text{Imprinted at London: In Fleetestreate by Thomas Marsh, Anno } \text{1576})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>(\text{ Imprinted at Brussels: } \text{1576})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Orangist propaganda</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>(\text{Imprinted in } \text{1576})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- The French original has not been traced. Publication date is taken from the colophon. The first two leaves are blank. There are seven surviving copies held at the British, Cambridge, Lambeth Palace, Oxford, and Peterborough cathedral libraries. Cf. Knuttel c163.
- Dutch or French original not traced. There are five copies in British Isles, held at the British, Edin. Lib; Lambeth; Oxford Bodleian and Westminster Abbey libraries. The pamphlet includes Junius' *Discourse van Johannes Junijs de Jonghe op den briefe van den hert van Champagney.* K. 224.
### Appendix 3: Later tracts which reference or concern the wars in France and Flanders (1577-80)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of author or translator</th>
<th>Category of source</th>
<th>Full title</th>
<th>Lang.</th>
<th>Printer and date of publication</th>
<th>STC: 2nd edn</th>
<th>Format &amp; Pages</th>
<th>General notes – ESTC and other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author presented as: The Estates of the Low Countries.</td>
<td>Political document.</td>
<td>A treatise of the peace made and concluded between the states of the lowe Countries, assembled within the Citie of Brussels, and the Prince of Oranje, the states of Holland and Zeland, with the Associates, published the 8. day of November. With the agreement and confirmation of the King’s maistie as followeth. Translated out of the dutch.</td>
<td>English from Dutch.</td>
<td>London: W. Booth.</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>8o. 16 p.</td>
<td>English Experience facsimile no. 615. Kossmann and Mellink, doc. 23. K. 260 f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author presented as: the States General of the Low Countries.</td>
<td>Prose treatise.</td>
<td>A treatise of the peace made and concluded between the states of the lowe countries, assembled within the cith of Bruxelles, and the Prince of Oranje, the states of Holland and Zeland, with the associates, published the viij. day of November. 1570. With the agreement and confirmation of the kings maistie. Translated out of a dutch copy printed in Bruxelles by the Kings printer.</td>
<td>English from Dutch.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London: By [J. Alde for] William Broome, [1577].</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>8o. [40] p.</td>
<td>Publication date from STC. Entered into the Stationer’s Register on 1 July 1577. Two known surviving copies in BL and Folger Shx library. BL shelfmark: 721.a.6. (4.) <em>Pacification of Ghent, Kossmann &amp; Mellink, doc. 23; Knuttel 260.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth: Antonio del Corro.</td>
<td>Subject: doctrinal theology.</td>
<td>A supplication exhibited to the moste noble Prince Philip king of Spain &amp;c. VVhich is contained the summe of our Christian religion, for the profession whereof the Protestants in the lowe Countries of Flandres, &amp;c. There is annexed An epistle written to the ministers of Antwerp, which are called of the confession of Auspurge, concerning the Super of our saouour Iesus Christ. Vvritten in French and Latine, by Anthonie Corronus of Sught, professor of Divinite.</td>
<td>English from French.</td>
<td>Imprinted at London: By Francis Codocke, and Henrie Bynnyman, Anno 1577.</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>8o. [4]. 284 p.; [3].</td>
<td>Stationer’s Register: Entered 4 August [1577]. Original Dutch title not traced. Two copies survive: BL and Folger Shx. “An epistle or godlye admonition, sente to the pastors of the Flemish Church in Antwerp”, is reprinted from STC 5787, with separate title page.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Auth: Barnabe Rich. English treatise containing verse. Allarme to England, foreshewing what perillies are procured, where the people liue without regardes of martiall lawe. With a short discourse conteyning the decay of warlike discipline, convenient to be perused by gentlemen, such as are desirous by service, to seke their owne desirous prayse, and the preseruation of their countreys. Newly deused and written by Barnabe Rich Gentleman. English. Imprinted at London. By Henrie Middleton, for C. Blanter[i]e Pressed and allowed. 1578. 12079. 40. [120 p.]

Dedicated to Christopher Hatton. Entered into Stationers Register: 26 April, 1578. Probably the first edition. Printer’s name from colophon.

Auth: Edward Hake (d. 1604) Verse elegy. A Cynthia continuation of the commemoration of the most prosperous and peaceable reigne of our gratiouse and deare Soueraigne Lady Elizabeth, by the grace of God of Englaund... Nowe newly enlarged with an exhortation applied to this present tyme. Set forth this xvii. day of November. Hereunto is added a thanksgivinge of the godly, for her Maesties prosperous hitherto...

English. Imprinted at London: by Richard Thones, and are to be sould at his shop without Newgate, [1578]. 22006-5 8o. [49 p.]

This is an expanded edition of a work with the same title published in 1575 (STC 12005).

Auth: W. C. Military news. The true reporte of the skirmish fought betweene the states of Flaunderes, and Don loan, duke of Austria, with the number of all them that were assynde on both sides, which battle was foughte the first day of August being Laj[m]mas day 1578 Battle of Ryemenat 1578. Eng. from? Imprinted at London: By [H. Bynneman for] William Bartlet. [1578?] 3322 8o. [16 p.]

Printer’s name from and publication date conjectured by STC. Misidentified as STC 12605. Entered into Stationers Register: 2 June 1578. ESTC notes that the French original has not been published in 1575. Probably the first edition. Printer’s surviving copy: Folger Shi library. “A prayer vnto almighty God, to defend vs in these daungerous dayes.” has caption title.

Anon. Prose treatise. 24. of August. 1578. A discourse of the present state of the wars in the lowe countreys. Whereas is containyd the pitifull spoyle of Askot: and the articles of peace to bee concluded betwixt the states, and Don lohn de Austree.


Publication place, publication date, actual printer’s name and publisher’s name from STC. Printer’s surviving copy: Bodleian.

Auth: T. P. [Thomas Proctor] Military treatise. Of the knowledge and conducte of warres, two booke, lately and sett forth, profitable for suche as delight in hystories, or martiall affayres, and necessarie for this present tyme.


Entered into Stationers Registers: 2 June 1578. ESTC notes that the French original has not been traced.


Title page states date of publication to be 6 June 1578. Dedicated to the Countess of Oxford. ESTC notes that the French original has not been traced.

Auth: Thomas Churchyard (d. 1604). Military history. A lamentable, and pitifull description, of the woffull troubles in Fraunce... By the Emperor Charles the fifth his raigne. With a state of the wars in the lowe countryes. Wherein is contayned the pittifull spoyle of Askot: and the present tyme.


Geoffrey Gates. Military treatise. The Defence of Militarie profission. Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commemation of Martiall prowess, and plainly proved how necessary the exercise of Armes is for this our age.


Anon. Calvinist. Innocent, ca. 1535-ca. 1566. Huguenot apologia. An apology or defence for the Christians of Fraunce[.]e which are of the eua[n]gelical or reformed religion, for the satisfying of such as wil not liue in peace and concord with them. Whereby the surenes of the same religion in the chiefe poyntes that are in variance, is evidently shewen, not onely by the holy scripture, and by reason: but also by the Popes owne canons. Written to the king of Navarre and translated out of French into English by Sir therom Bowes Knight.

English from French. At London: printed by John Day dwelling ouer Aldersgate. And are to be sold at his shop vnder the gate, 1579. Cum privilegio Regiae Maiestatis. 1742 8o. [11], 132 leaves. One of only two articles of either French or Dutch news c. 1572-80 to receive royal authorisation. The other is Arthur Goldberg’s translation of The edict or proclamation set forth by the Frenche Kynge upon the pacifying of the troubles in France (London. 1576; STC 13091).

Anon. Huguenot apologia. A notable treatise of the church, in which are handled all the prinicipall questions, that have beene mouned in our time concerning that matter. By Philip de Mornay, Lord of Plessis Martyn, gentleman of France.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anon. [Auth: John Stubbs]</td>
<td>Anti-Anjevin polemic.</td>
<td>The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf whereinto England is like to be swallowed by an other French marriage, if the Lord forbid not the banes, by letting her majestie see the sin and punishment thereof.</td>
<td>English.</td>
<td>[London: Printed by H. Singleton for W. Page. 1579].</td>
<td>2340</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88 p.</td>
<td>Likely printed and distributed in August 1579, upon the occasion of Anjou’s visit to England.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth: presented as William of Orange (d. 1584) Trans: Richard Day.</td>
<td>Political alliance/Orangist propaganda.</td>
<td>Antverpes Vritye. An Accord or Peace in Religion and Government, concluded by his Highnes [i.e. William I.], and the members of the Cite, to the common weale and quietness thereof there lately proclaimed the 12. of June Anno. 1579. Printed in French, and Dutch, by the Kings Printer, and Englished by the Printer hereof [i.e. R. Day].</td>
<td>English from Dutch.</td>
<td>At London: Printed by Richard Daye, dwelling at Aldersgate, An. 1579.</td>
<td>30711</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24 p.</td>
<td>The ESTC cites three known surviving copies: BL. Lambeth, Huntington (US). BL Shelfmark: 9414.a.3. This is an English translation of Muller no. 194. De religieusvoordee and Pointen ende artclen by syn Hoochoeyt,ende by syjn Execlte,ende by de leden van Antwerpen gesloten.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: List of Elizabethan military treatises or works concerning martial deeds (1558-81) Taken from works listed in the English Short Title Catalogue and cross-referenced in the Stationers Registers (vols. I and II) and other sources.

1562

1563

Lawrence Humfrey, *The Nobles or of Nobilitye. The original nature, dutyes, right, and Christiant Inistitution thereof* (T. Marsh; STC 13964).

1569

1570

1571
Tregurius Chelidonius (trans. James Chillester), *A most excellent hystorie, of the institution ... of Christian princes, and the originall of kingdoms: wherunto is annexed a treatise of peace and warre... Very necessarie to be red, not only of all nobilitie and gentlemen, but also of every publice persone. ... Seen and allowed according to the order appointed* (London: H. Bynneman; STC 5113).

1572
Flavius Vegetius Renatus (trans. John Sadler), *The foure bookes of Flauius Vegetius Renatus, briefelye containinge a plaine forme, and perfect knowledge of martiall policye, feates of chialalrie, and whatsoever pertayneth to warre... Seene and allowed, accordinge to the order appointed* (Thomas Marsh; STC 24631).

1573
Peter Whithorne, *Certaine wayes for the ordering of souldiours in battelray, and setting of battayles, after diuers fashions, with their maner of marching... howe to make saltpeter, gunpouder, and diuers sortes of ... other thinges appertayning to the warres* (London: [W. Williamson for] J. Wight; STC 2274).

1574
Niccolo Machiavelli (trans. Peter Whitehorne), *The arte of warre ... with an addicio[n] of other like marcialle feates and experiments...* ([J. Kingston for] N. Inglande, 1574; STC 17165). Issued with Girolamo Catanec’s *Most briefe tables to knowe redily howe many ranckes of footemen armed with corsslettes, as unarmed, go to the making of a just battayle.*

1575


1576


1578
Appianus of Alexandria (trans. ‘W. B’), *An auncient historie and exquisite chronicle of the Romanes warres, both ciuile and foren...* (London: R. Newberry and H. Bynneman; STC 713.5). No Register information.


‘T. P’, *Of the knowledge and conduct of warres* (R. Tottell; STC 20403). Entered into the Registers on 2 June 1578.


1579

Geoffrey Gates, *The defence of militarie profession. Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commendation of Martiall prowess, and plainly prooved how necessary the exercise of Armes is for this our age* ([H. Middleton for] J. Harrison; STC 11683). Entered into Registers on 3 Dec. 1578.


1580


1581


Thomas Syward, *The pathwaie to martiall discipline, deuided into two booke, verie necessarie for young souldiers, or for all such as loueth the profession of armes...* (London: [T. East for] M. Lenyngs; STC 23413.5)
Appendix 5: Contemporary depictions of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s

An oil painting by Francois Dubois (1529-84), c. 1572 [Musée cantonal des Beaux-Arts]:

Although Dubois was not a witness to the events he depicts, he includes some of the most shocking elements of the massacre narrated in Calvinist print. Coligny’s body is shown being defenestrated in the top right hand corner. Directly below, Henry, Duke of Guise stands over Coligny’s decapitated corpse, witnessing its mutilation. Towards the rear of the picture, Catherine de’ Medici stands before the gates of the Louvre, examining a pile of Huguenot corpses.

Colour print, c. 1572, of an engraving by Frans Hogenburg with notes in verse detailing Coligny’s shooting on 22 August and murder on 24 August [the Mansell Collection]:

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Appendix 6: A depiction of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva (d.1582), taken from the Walter Morgan manuscript, All Souls College, Oxford (Codrington MS. CXXIX, f.9v), c. 1572
A briefe Rehersall of the accorde and agreement, that the... armie of Middleborow... have made...[with] the Lord William Prince of Orange... 1574 (London, 1574; STC 17865)
Appendix 8: Title-page to *A justification and cleering of the Prince of Orendge agaynst the false sclauders, wherwith his ilwillers goe about to charge him wrongfully* (London: J. Day, 1575; STC 25712): showing improved paper quality, type-face and increased size.
Appendix 9: Titlepage to Certein Letters wherein is set forth a Discourse of the Peace that was attempted and sought to have bin put in effecte by the Lords and States of Holland and Zelande... 1574 (London: T. Marsh, 1576).
Appendix 10: The preface to Certein Letters wherin is set forth a Discourse of the Peace that was attempted and sought to have bin put in effecte by the Lords and States of Holland and Zelande... 1574 (London: T. Marsh, 1576), p. 32.
Appendix 11: Printed illustration of a woodcut depicting the 1576 Sack of Antwerp, the original by Frans Hogenburg, first published in Michael von Eytzinger’s *De leone Belgico* (Cologne, 1583)

Despite the general chaos and destruction of the scene – which includes the Palladian town house burning – this print hints at the relative order of the tercios’ attack, as recorded by George Gascoigne.
Appendix 12: The printer’s mark of Thomas Berthelet used as the frontispiece to Anon., *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* (London, 1577; STC 11644)
Appendix 13: Anonymous drawing of Elizabeth I greeting ambassadors, c. 1575

Appendix 14: The obverse and reverse of a gold medal commemorating Elizabeth’s recovery from smallpox in 1572 [Science Museum, London]
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