Mobilization and Union Leadership in Labour Organisations: the Case of the Public Corporate Sector in Cyprus

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ABSTRACT

Mobilization within the industrial relations literature, has so far been considered in the context of campaigns aimed at mobilising individuals to participate in collective action. What is hereby proposed is an alternative approach to mobilization, one that emerged by considering existing approaches to mobilization in two main strands of literature: the literature on social movements, and the social-psychological literature on union participation. Mobilization is being conceptualised as the continuous process of transforming individuals into collective actors, following the socialisation of members into the organisation. This is also an attempt to introduce a quantitative element into the study of mobilization, as previous attempts have been restricted to case studies, which albeit valuable in providing insights into the mobilization process, do not provide a basis on which to formulate a proper theoretical framework that can be employed in different settings to explore the issue. The willingness to become involved in the union is employed as a measure of the outcome from such a process. Member attitudes are examined as the antecedents of willingness to participate within a mobilization setting. Significance is attached to the role of leaders as 'mobilising agents'. The impact of leadership behaviour on the outcome of the mobilization process is explored, an issue which has not as yet been empirically addressed. It is hypothesised that leadership will predict member attitudes and willingness to participate. This approach is tested in the public corporate sector, a setting representing an emerging form of unionism, one which raises a series of concerns and poses as a challenge for 'traditional' trade unions. The findings reveal the importance of leadership within a mobilization setting, in achieving and maintaining favourable attitudes towards the union, and influencing members' intention to become involved in the union. The findings also reveal a variation in leader attitudes and behaviours, as well as member responses, within different groups of unions, classified on the basis of their identity and structural characteristics. Furthermore, the most important predictors of willingness to participate within a mobilization setting are identified.
To my parents
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of mobilization and the dynamics of mobilization campaigns have been extensively explored in the literature on social movements, with significant contributions from political scientists, social psychologists and sociologists (e.g. Tilly, 1978; Klandermans 1984a, 1989a,b, 1997; McAdam, 1988). In contrast, within the industrial relations literature mobilization has been subject to little research interest. Available literature on mobilization campaigns and instances of collective action, has been predominantly descriptive (e.g. Batstone et al., 1978; Fantasia, 1988; Johnston, 1994, but see Klandermans, 1984a as an exception), involving a series of case studies in different research settings. While this type of research is valuable for providing useful insights into the mobilization process, it does not allow one to construct a theoretical framework that could be employed and validated in different settings to assess the relative contribution of specific factors within the mobilization context.

Kelly (1998) has argued for the importance of mobilization in industrial relations, as an area that deserves and should receive more research interest. Acknowledging the scarcity of theoretical and empirical work on mobilization within the industrial relations literature, this is precisely what the present thesis has sought to address. At the same time, given the predominance of descriptive studies it was decided to adopt a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach, and attempt to construct a theoretical framework that would subsequently be tested within a suitable research setting.

The current state of trade unionism, especially within the European scene, has considerably influenced the present approach to mobilization. As Visser (1994) indicates, the 1980’s decline in unionization levels in Western Europe was unprecedented, as far as post-war trends are concerned. A poignant example cited is the fall in membership and unionization which occurred in France, where union membership in 1988 was estimated at half the number in 1976, while union density dropped to around an estimated 10 per cent of the dependent labour force. Although unionization and membership changes have not been as dramatic in other countries as in the case of France, they were sufficiently worrying to induce an attempt by academics and practitioners alike to address the reasons...
for the decline, as well as the challenges that lie ahead, and reassess the role and identity of trade unions for the future. A number of macro-, as well as micro-factors have been identified as reasons for the decline. Amongst these, are a tougher economic environment, the dynamics of the global economy and internationalisation of capital, a notable transformation in employment structures, for example the declining numbers of manual labour and the expansion of white-collar work within an ever-growing private service sector, “...often involving ‘a-typical’ employment status” Hyman (1996), and also the shifting emphasis in the fundamentals of societal relations, from collective relations to an almost triumphant individualism.

The very last point has been the subject of considerable debate on what has been termed as the ‘decline of collectivism’ (e.g. Brown, 1990), and subsequently the idea that unions need to move towards a more ‘service-oriented’ type of unionism to accommodate these changes (see for example Bassett and Cave, 1993). In a way, this debate directs attention to existing or potential union members and their attitudes towards trade unionism, precisely because of its emphasis on collective principles and values, as well as collective methods of representation and action. While contextual factors such as changes in employment structures and internationalisation of capital, are outside the trade unions’ span of control, the attitudes of its membership are well within reach and could be influenced. Even if a growing culture of individualism is in the making, that does not necessarily mean the end of collectivism. It might be that collectivism needs to be redefined in such a way as to incorporate the increasing diversity, but it is by no means a romantic notion of the past. Behavioural manifestations of persistent collectivist attitudes, disputing the ‘decline of collectivism’ thesis are to be found in recent examples of large-scale, worker-initiated protest such as the demonstrations in France and Germany as a result of the government’s proposed cuts in public spending.

In the context of labour organisations then, member attitudes can be influenced in a process of transforming individual members into collective actors. This is the main underlying premise of the current approach, which proposes that mobilization should be defined in a wider sense, outside the confines of individual mobilization campaigns as the ‘continuous process of transforming individuals into collective actors’. Such an approach
acknowledges: (i) the critical importance of members within labour organisations, and (ii) the need for labour organisations to consciously direct efforts towards generating a sustainable collective base, rather than inferring its probable existence from instances of collective action. Such a collective base can only be constructed if trade unions actively engage resources in educating members and in consistently exposing and reinforcing the principles on which trade unionism is founded. As has been argued above, the proposed approach presupposes the belief that membership is a critical resource, and a genuine power base for trade unions. However, this is not always accepted to be the case. Visser (1994) cites the view of the French sociologist Rosanvallon, who argues that:

The role and influence of trade unions derives more from their institutional status, and less and less from their sociological quality. Membership does not manifest itself directly as a means of strengthening trade unionism. Thrust from fellow workers, and support from the law seem sufficient for a small number of militants to play their role as interlocutors of company management. (Rosanvallon, 1988: 39-40)

Nevertheless, Visser (1994) himself believes that membership is a critical resource, and highlights the idea that even the ability of trade unions to successfully mobilise their membership for collective action, can be significantly undermined when union leaders have estranged themselves from their following, citing Britain in the early 1980’s as an example, or when membership is forced upon members as in the case of Eastern Europe before 1989. He goes on to argue that any such attempts will certainly fail when “...unions have no members or have not accumulated trust and resources which can be offered as selective incentives to members in order to influence workers’ decisions to come out on strike or go back to work”. It should also be noted however, that although the question of membership might be naively reduced to one of size, that does not necessarily reveal the extent to which members are supportive of their organisation and its values, and the extent to which they favour collective forms of representation and action, and thus the union’s mobilization capacity. As Pontusson (1992) points out, “In France or Italy, belonging to a union tends to imply a fairly high level of commitment and activism. This is less true of Sweden, where virtually everyone belongs to a union” (ibid.:11). So, membership data do
not necessarily reflect the power resources and the mobilization capacity of unions for collective action.

The current approach to mobilization utilises the contributions made by existing literature on social movements, as well as the psychological literature on union participation. It is argued that by considering different perspectives from different strands of literature one is able to enrich the conceptual basis on which one’s theoretical framework is to be constructed. It is then hereby advocated that one could potentially benefit enormously from reviewing a range of intellectual solutions to conceptual problems put forward by different disciplines, in gaining a deeper understanding of challenging theoretical issues.

As has been argued earlier, this thesis also attempts to avoid a descriptive approach to mobilization, and so the need to introduce a quantitative element into developing the proposed framework directed me to the literature on trade union participation, and the debate between actual participation and the intention to participate. Given mobilization has been defined as the ‘process of transforming individuals into collective actors’, the outcome of such a process will be the intention (willingness) to participate in union activities. The rationale for employing the intention to participate as the outcome of the mobilization process is discussed in the ensuing chapters.

Visser (1994) cited above, briefly touches upon the importance of leadership within a trade union setting, in maintaining a favourable climate towards the union amongst members. At the same time, existing literature on mobilization consistently refers to the importance of leaders as agents of the process, although the effects of leadership on mobilization have rarely been theorised (see Klandermans, 1989c and Marwell and Oliver, 1993 for rare exceptions). Subsequently, a model of mobilization needs to incorporate a leadership component, to enable an assessment of the leaders’ contribution to the success of a mobilization process. A fruitful basis for gaining theoretical and empirical insights into the leadership process is provided by the vast leadership literature. A long-standing fascination with the idea of leadership has led to the development of a number of theoretical approaches that have been employed for its study (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; House 1971; Vroom and Yetton, 1973; Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985). However, despite substantial
empirical work using the approaches mentioned above within commercial organisations, the applicability of such approaches in the case of labour organisations has only rarely been considered. As Fullagar et al. (1992) have indicated, "...since Stagner and Rosen's (1956) suggestions concerning the suitability of leadership theory to labour organisations, little empirical endeavour has been undertaken to investigate the effects of the leadership behaviours of union officers".

The vast majority of union leadership research has focused on "...the role of the union leader rather than the behaviours required for successful performance of that role" (Barling et al., 1992). However, existing research on the behavioural aspects of local leaders (stewards) supports the view that the local leader's behaviour is vital for fostering positive attitudes towards the union (e.g. Kahn and Tannenbaum, 1954; Clark, 1986; Thacker et al., 1990), as well as for translating such attitudes or members' favourable disposition to participation in union activities, into actual participation (e.g. Nicholson et al., 1981). More recent research has focused on "...the process of attitude formation and the way in which attitudes towards the union are shaped" (Fullagar et al., 1994) by investigating the impact of union socialisation on early attitudes towards the union, as well as union participation (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994; Fullagar et al., 1995). The leadership characteristics of the socialising agent were also explored in two of the studies mentioned, and were found to be important for influencing union socialisation (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994) as well as general attitudes towards organised labour (Fullagar et al., 1992).

The current approach to mobilization employs both traditional, as well as more recent approaches to leadership behaviour, such as Bass's (1985) transformational leadership theory, so that their individual and combined contribution within a mobilization context can be adequately addressed. It is also argued that increasing interaction with leaders, as part of the process of transforming individuals into collective actors would allow one to more clearly assess members' perceptions of their leaders.

As far as the choice of setting for carrying out the current research project is concerned, the public corporate sector in Cyprus appeared particularly attractive for a number of reasons. First, it is a highly unionised setting, which might appear to suggest a
strong power base. However, it should be noted that union membership in Cyprus, and especially in the public corporate sector as well as the broad public sector, resembles the case of Sweden and the Netherlands, where almost everybody is a union member. It does not necessarily reflect high levels of activism and participation in the union; rather, union membership is regarded as an inevitable fact of one's working experience. At the same time, as strike incidence in the public corporate sector remains at low levels in contrast with other sectors, no inference can be drawn regarding members' attitudes towards the union and collective forms of representation and action, as well as leaders' influence upon members. Second, the overwhelming majority of the workforce in the organisations of the public corporate sector are white-collar staff, who constitute an expanding employment group. The interest also lies in the fact that this sector attracts a large number of young university graduates, detached from past traditions, and firmly seeking both professional advancement and personal growth as part of their employment experience. Therefore, the psychology of individuals in these organisations, and the implications it might have on the dynamics of their relationship with their unions is of particular importance. Third, the size of the setting posed as an opportunity, since it would allow one to conduct a relatively large-scale research project within the existing resource constraints. Finally, this is a highly under-researched setting in industrial relations issues.

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 is a background chapter on the industrial relations system in Cyprus, whereby it is attempted not simply to provide a descriptive account of the system and its institutions, but also construct an argument around the weaknesses of the present system, the challenges it faces in the near future, and possible responses to such challenges. Essentially, it is argued that the developments in recent years in the industrial relations scene, appear to suggest a crisis in the tradition of 'voluntary tripartism'. It is also argued that one of the inherent pitfalls of the system, which has not been sufficiently emphasised is its inability to encourage and promote direct co-operation between the two main parties in the system, employers and trade unions. The thesis put forward then, focuses on introducing a neocorporatist dynamic or 'bargained corporatism' (Crouch, 1993) into the system. It is argued that to facilitate such an initiative, local
structures should be incorporated in an otherwise centralised system of negotiations. This would take into account the increasing heterogeneity characterising economic activity, by rendering the system more flexible and more effective to deal with issues pertaining to individual employers and (or) groups of employers, and by promoting and enabling direct co-operation between employers and trade unions.

Chapter 2 is devoted to reviewing the available literature on mobilization and leadership, in an attempt to illustrate and justify the need for the proposed approach to mobilization. Review of existing approaches to mobilization and collective action, reveals that this issue has been confined to studying individual mobilization campaigns, in pursuit of specific, desired outcomes, attempting to obtain support and motivate individuals for collective action. It is therefore proposed that an alternative approach to mobilization should allow one to assess the level of support of the organisation itself, its principles and values, rather than support for individual outcomes, and as such mobilization is conceptualised as the continuous process of transforming individuals into collective actors. As part of this process, one is then able to assess the role of leaders as 'mobilising agents' in maintaining an environment conducive to mobilization, and inducing willingness to participate in trade union activities, the outcome of the mobilization process. Attention is then directed to the role of leaders in the mobilization process, a relatively neglected research area as evident from the literature review, while it is argued that the emphasis on willingness to participate within a mobilization setting provides the opportunity to distinguish it from actual participation and examine its antecedents. It should be noted that review of the literature is not exclusively confined to this chapter. Studies regarded as particularly relevant in facilitating the construction of the theoretical arguments underlying the relationships in the proposed model, are reviewed in more detail in the appropriate sections.

Chapter 3 follows on from chapter 2, to fully develop what is termed as the ‘group approach’ to mobilization. This approach emerges from considering both the individual, and the context in which individual choices and decisions are made. It is argued that individuals are mobilised on the basis of their social identity, and that individual-level responses are a result of group affiliations and a product of group influence. The
theoretical relationships and arguments underlying the main components of the proposed approach—leader behaviour, member attitudes and willingness to participate—are discussed. The emerging research propositions focus on the influence of leader behaviour on both member attitudes and willingness to participate, as well as the impact of member attitudes on willingness to participate.

Chapter 4 provides a description of the setting and the participants in the study, presents the structure and contents of the questionnaire employed, as well as the interview schedule used to conduct a series of interviews with union representatives and officials. As part of the description of the setting, trade unions represented in the study are classified according to their identity and structural features, which generates two dichotomies of union type. This chapter also presents and discusses the initial treatment of interview data, whereby a sample of union representatives and officials responded to the questions comprising the interview schedule developed for the present study. In turn, a set of categories representing leader attitudes and behaviours is extracted from the data, and a typology of leader behaviour is developed to explore individual differences between leaders, as well as to enable inter-union comparisons of leader behaviour. Also, the procedures employed as part of the data collection process are outlined and briefly discussed.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the analysis and findings of the study. As leader behaviour constitutes an important factor of the mobilization process, chapter 5 addresses the issue of inter-union comparisons of leader behaviour, using the union type dichotomies mentioned above. Also, the association between leader behaviour and member perceptions of leader behaviour—one of the main components of the mobilization model—is also examined. The findings support the idea that union type influences the observed patterns of leader behaviour within different unions, while leader behaviour emerges as a potentially significant factor in shaping member perceptions of leader behaviour. The determining influence of leader behaviour continues in chapter 6, where the propositions underlying the mobilization model are tested. Member perceptions of leader behaviour emerge as important predictors of both member attitudes and willingness to participate. Also, the most significant attitudinal predictors of willingness to participate are identified.
Chapter 7 reviews the findings and considers them in the context of existing research, while Chapter 8 discusses the study's implications for current theory and practice, and makes recommendations for future research. The study's implications for industrial relations in the public corporate sector are also discussed.
Chapter 1  Industrial Relations in Cyprus: The 'Voluntarist' Tradition

The aim of this chapter is not merely to provide a descriptive account of the industrial relations framework and institutions, but also to present an assessment of the existing system as it has evolved over a thirty-year period, evaluate the current situation, and argue in favour of a slightly modified arrangement between the three partners in the system that could provide a more solid and stable basis for the future industrial relations scene.

1.1 The socio-economic context and the labour market: past and present

The 'voluntary tripartism' idea has featured as the dominant characteristic of the industrial relations system in Cyprus throughout its relatively short history. It could be argued that such a system of tripartite co-operation was regarded as the only possible means of achieving economic and industrial development, both in the post-independence period as well as in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion.

In this section, a review of the economic and political conditions which serve as the backdrop of the industrial relations system in Cyprus will be presented, with the principal aim of setting the scene for discussing the development and maturity of the system in the next section.

Following independence from Britain in 1960, the newly formed Government of Cyprus inherited an economy which exhibited most of the symptoms of underdevelopment, with agriculture as the dominant sector accounting for 16 per cent of GDP and 45 per cent of gainful employment. Unemployment was high, underemployment was widespread and mass emigration was taking place, while financial capital was also flowing out of the country.

In this climate of uncertainty and instability the government adopted the basic principles of indicative planning with a view to achieving 'rapid economic and social development, while maintaining conditions of external and internal economic stability'.

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1 Due to the scarcity of both literature and research on Cypriot industrial relations, it became necessary to rely to a large extent on qualitative material, such as interviews, for supporting the arguments put forward in this chapter.
3 Ibid., p. 4.
With an emphasis on private initiative as the basic motivating force of the economy, and the state as the facilitator of the process, creating the necessary physical and social infrastructure, a stable and favourable economic environment, guiding the private sector and administering social policy, two successive Five-Year Development Plans were implemented which resulted in rapid economic growth. Agricultural production doubled, while industrial production and exports of goods and services more than trebled, with tourism the main foreign exchange earner. 'Between 1961-73, Gross Domestic Product grew at an average annual rate of around 7 per cent in real terms. Earnings of employees more than doubled in real terms, while unemployment was negligible, and in fact it could be said that the late sixties and early seventies were characterised by conditions of full employment'.

This surge of economic expansion, however, was abruptly halted by the 1974 invasion which also considerably altered the demographic character of the island. As Neocleous (1992) notes, almost all of the 43,000 Turkish Cypriots who lived in the free part of the republic were subsequently moved to the occupied north, whilst in addition a fair number of illegal settlers from Turkey inhabited the occupied area during the following years. At the same time, mass migration of Greek Cypriots occurred, whilst more than 200,000 Greek Cypriots- a third of the country’s population and about 40 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population- became refugees in their own country.

A severe blow to the economy was the occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus which was also the country’s most developed and productive part. This area accounted for 70 per cent of productive potential with important sources of raw materials, the bulk of industry, a heavy concentration of tourist facilities and infrastructural investment. The size of the economic catastrophe was reflected in the unemployment figure for the latter part of 1974 which averaged 30 per cent of the economically active population, as well as in the sharp decrease of the country’s GDP which in 1975 was 33 per cent below the level of 1973 in real terms.

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4 Ibid., p. 5.
Under these conditions, it was imperative not only to implement measures which would lay solid foundations for economic recovery, but also perhaps most importantly, to provide temporary relief to the displaced and the needy to meet their basic subsistence needs. During the period 1974-1981, three Emergency Economic Action Plans were designed and implemented with considerable success. As a result, the economy moved from conditions of massive unemployment, relatively low savings and investment, to exhibiting an impressive rate of growth over this period, averaging approximately 10 per cent per annum in real terms, restoring conditions of full employment by 1978 and achieving an unemployment rate of 2.6 per cent by 1981.9

The success of this economic recovery process, as well as the ensuing development and growth has been described by observers as an ‘economic miracle’.10 A number of favourable exogenous factors have been frequently cited as contributing to the restoration of the economy, such as the booming Arab markets, the Lebanese crisis of 1975, high international market prices for some of the major agricultural products, as well as foreign aid which helped bridge the financing gap. However, internally, effective government policy, co-operation between government, employers and trade unions, and agreement on a virtual wage freeze as well as the establishment of special dispute settlement procedures to maintain the number of disputes as well as the number of mandays lost at low levels,11 the entrepreneurial instinct and ability, which exploited the arising export opportunities, along with the diligence, determination, self-sacrifice and hard work of the people, have been cited to have formed the basis for economic recovery.

Since the early eighties, Cyprus has managed to sustain an overall successful economic performance record, with low levels of unemployment and satisfactory growth rates. For the period 1982-86 an average real growth rate of 6 per cent per annum was attained, with the period 1989-93 surpassing the 5 per cent target and reaching an average growth rate of 5.5 per cent. Unemployment in 1995 fell to 2.6 per cent from 2.7 per cent in 1994 (appendix A, table A1) and inflation fell to 4.7 per cent in 1994 from 4.9 per cent in 1993, and further to 2.6 in 1995 (appendix A, table A2), the largest decrease in recent

9 Ibid.
years. The standard of living of the population exhibited sustained improvement since the early eighties, with national income per capita increasing considerably from $2823 in 1978 to $11812 in 1992, a level that places Cyprus ahead of other European countries.12

Overall, the total labour force in Cyprus amounted to 272,000 in 199413, after a stagnation observed in 1993, out of a population of 633,900.14 Over the years, development of and reliance on the services sector, especially tourism, has increased, with workers in the tertiary sector reaching 62.8 per cent of the gainfully employed, as compared with 25.9 per cent and 11.3 per cent in the secondary and primary sector respectively by 1994 (appendix A, table A3).15 The broad public sector is also very important, consisting of general government, the local authorities and semi-government organisations16, accounting for 18 per cent of the gainfully employed in 1995 (appendix A, table A5).

Despite the overall positive outlook of the Cypriot economy, a slow-down in economic growth was observed in the early 1990's as compared to the 1980's. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on Cyprus (1995), following a strong recovery from the effects of the Gulf war in 1992, GDP growth decelerated in 1993 to its lowest level. This was mainly attributed to a significant drop in tourist arrivals associated with the recession in Europe and with losses in cost competitiveness.

The problem of the gradual erosion of competitiveness has been repeatedly emphasised in recent years, particularly in relation to the manufacturing industry.17 Low productivity, inadequate technology, lack of proper management of enterprise are only some of the factors cited as reasons for the inability of this sector to compete both in the European Union and internationally. However, what has also been regarded as worthy of

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12 Archival data, Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance.
13 Source: Labour Statistics op cit.
14 Source: Statistical Abstract op cit.
15 The Primary sector consists of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining and Quarrying; the Secondary sector consists of Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas and Water and Construction; the Tertiary sector consists of Trade, Restaurants and Hotels, Transport, Storage and Communication, Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services, and Community, Social and Personal Services.
16 Semi-government organisations are set-up by special law and their capital is either provided or guaranteed by the government. The government also exercises general financial and administrative control over them mainly through approving their annual budgets before they are submitted to the House of Representatives and gives grants to most of them. Other examples of semi-government organisations are the Cyprus Ports Authority, the Water Boards, the Tourism Organisation, Industrial Training Authority and the Agricultural Marketing Boards.
careful consideration is changes in inflation rates and unit labour costs, as contributing factors to loss in competitiveness. In this context, the importance of the 'social dialogue' on productivity and the system of wage indexation between the actors in the system has been highlighted, in the attempt to improve competitiveness and in facilitating efforts to increase productivity.  

Also, according to the IMF (1995) report in an assessment of labour market flexibility in Cyprus, it was argued that although in many respects the labour market in Cyprus is substantially more flexible than in other economies, one possible source of rigidity can be identified: wage indexation- particularly in combination with the long duration of wage contracts in some sectors. The argument emphasised the role of wage indexation in lowering labour market flexibility and further raised concerns that this rigidity may impede the economy's ability to respond to 'negative shocks in the more volatile environment' of the 1990's.

The above shortcomings of the Cypriot economy should be considered in light of prospective full membership of the European Union. Such issues need to be addressed effectively in order to bridge the gap even further, between Cyprus and other European member states, so as to enhance Cyprus' bargaining power in negotiating full membership.

Since Cyprus applied for full membership in 1990, the pressure has been mounting for implementing policies that would enable Cyprus to successfully meet the criteria for accession to the EU. In the government's Strategic Development Plan covering the period 1994-1998, the major objectives were the restructuring and modernisation of the Cyprus economy in order to successfully face existing challenges, as well as preparing the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

So, having presented the setting in which the industrial relations system developed and matured, the next section will discuss this evolutionary process of the institutions and actors within the system, as well as their interaction up until the present day. A response to future challenges will also be discussed.

18 Speech by the Minister of Finance before the House of Representatives on the 1995 Budgets, 22.12.94, Ministry of Finance.
1.2 The ‘Cypriot Model’ of industrial relations: ‘Voluntary Tripartism’

A voluntarist tradition, limited state regulation and tripartite negotiations have persisted as the main characteristics of the industrial relations system in Cyprus from the post-independence period up until the present day. It could be argued that such a system bares similarities with particularly the Swedish variant of the ‘Nordic Model’ of industrial relations which had long been distinguished by remarkably limited state regulation, at least up until the 1970’s. Neither collective agreements nor codes of conduct are legally binding. According to Neocleous (1992) voluntarism has a dual meaning; on the one hand, it refers to the voluntary enforcement of norms, and on the other hand, it refers to a practice of extensive and thorough consultation prior to legislating.

In the case of Cyprus, the founding core of such a system of voluntary cooperation appears to have been the overarching goal of economic recovery and expansion, in the troubled years of both the post-independence period as well as the period after the 1974 Turkish invasion. The perceived need for the ‘parties’ to foster labour peace, as well as preserve stability in industrial relations were the two main aspects of such a goal. It could be argued that this tripartite philosophy of industrial relations, a form of ‘societal corporatism’ (Schmitter, 1981), where the actors in the system are not subordinate to the state, but are allowed some freedom of manoeuvre under a system of voluntary cooperation, was considered to be the best recipe for growth. Industrial action was institutionalised, but remained free from legislation, whilst at the same time employers and unions could count on government intervention- largely through mediation- to facilitate dispute resolution. Also, in light of rapid union growth and increasing union power, with weak employer associations, the government felt that there was a need for a system which would act to counterbalance union power and strengthen the employers’ position so as to achieve a balance of power between the actors.19 This would allow recovery and growth to proceed unhindered along the basic principles of tripartite co-operation. The state would assume the limited role of (a) encouraging and promoting unionisation, (b) facilitator in the procedures for dispute resolution and (c) maintaining a balance of power between employers and trade unions. An additional reason why the government might

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19 Material obtained from the Ministry of Labour, on the system of tripartite co-operation and collective negotiations.
have favoured the path of ‘self-regulation’ as opposed to ‘state regulation’ in industrial relations- although this has not been explicitly cited as a reason for the government’s choice- is the idea that union members would be more likely to accept labour peace and wage restraint if the unions preserved a degree of autonomy.

The significance attributed to preserving this system is demonstrated in Slocum (1972):

> Since Cyprus attained its independence in 1960, one of the basic tenets of its philosophy of labour relations has been that all major proposals of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance shall follow tripartite discussions of labour, employers, and government and that to the extent possible under the laws of the Republic, tripartite bodies shall be used in the execution of these programs. Adherence to this policy has been strict, even at the cost of hundreds of man hours for Ministry officials, and scarcely an activity of the Ministry is without its tripartite board, committee, or council” (ibid.:54).

It is generally accepted that the existing industrial relations system characterised by tripartite co-operation, has proved satisfactory and has contributed significantly to economic recovery and growth and to the rising living standards of all social groups, while also maintaining low levels of industrial conflict, as illustrated by the number of work stoppages in the economy, and the number of workdays lost. Nevertheless, it should be noted that by 1992 the number of disputes reaching the Ministry of Labour for mediation had increased substantially, demonstrating the need for government intervention in resolving labour disputes.

In view of the worsening economic conditions especially since the early 1990’s, the climate of co-operation between unions and employers has been substantially undermined, with relations between the two actors becoming highly antagonistic. Feelings of suspicion and uneasiness begun to dominate the industrial relations scene, especially after the rise of the conservative government to power in 1992. The government brought to the fore a

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21 Another reason cited for the government’s choice is the mentality of the Cypriots and their attitude towards legalisation (Slocum, 1972).


23 Ibid.

24 Interviews with union officials, March 1995 (see appendix C.5). Union officials perceived a potential implicit “alliance” between employers and the conservative government, to curb union power.
number of issues it felt should be addressed in order to deal with the structural weaknesses of the Cypriot economy, if the ‘economic miracle’ of the post-1974 period was to be sustained.

A process of negotiation and dialogue was initiated in the latter part of 1994, between employers and unions, under the auspices of the state, referred to as the ‘Social Dialogue’, whose agenda consisted of two major issues, the system of wage indexation and productivity. The state also participated in this process due to its identity as employer. At the same time, the government appeared supportive of privatisation of organisations in the public corporate sector, as a route to combating inefficiency and institutional rigidity, but also in light of prospective European Union membership, indicating the need to liberalise the Cypriot economy. An additional issue still occupying the industrial relations arena is a recent parliamentary bill on the regulation of strikes in essential services. These issues are being debated with no concrete outcomes as yet.

The labour movement has advocated strong feelings against any privatisation attempts in the public corporate sector, as well as state regulation of strikes in essential services, deemed as unnecessary in light of the low levels of strike incidence in this area. As far as the issue of wage indexation is concerned, the degree of opposition varies but there has been an overall support for the idea that it is unthinkable that the system should be abandoned, since it is the most treasured achievement of the labour movement and has secured a decent standard of living for the working population since its introduction in 1941. At the same time, it has been argued that any attempts to modify the system warrant caution and careful consideration, so as to avoid drastic changes that could cause the system to fall into disuse. Employers on the other hand, argue that in light of the

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25 The bill defines an essential service as “any service the uninterrupted operation of which is necessary for the protection of the Republic or constitutional order or public order, or public safety or the maintenance of the supplies and services necessary for the life of the people, or the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of any person”. Such services have been argued to be electricity, telecommunication and radio-telecommunications, air transport, operation of ports, prisons, customs, public hospitals and medical institutions, the operation of the sewerage system etc.

26 The cost of living allowance (COLA) which has guaranteed full indexation of wages to the CPI for decades, was first introduced as a war bonus to civil servants in 1941 and became a regular part of their remuneration in 1944. In 1947 the COLA was granted to employees in the construction sector, and in 1951 it was extended to cover all employees.

27 Interviews with union officials (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
losses in competitiveness changes are imminent since the existing system leads to increases in labour costs and thus the worsening of competitiveness.\textsuperscript{28}

Evidently, the long-standing tradition of tripartism and voluntarism is currently undergoing a trial period and an endurance test. The existing industrial relations climate generates questions as to the ability of the system to respond effectively to shifts in the balance of power between the actors within it, more so whether this is perceived to be the case by the actors themselves and of course, whether voluntary co-operation is acknowledged as a win-win situation by all interested parties. There is no doubt that the parties feel that since the system has served them well for over three decades, there is no reason why it shouldn't continue to do so.\textsuperscript{29} However, the fact that the system has been operating within 'protective walls', challenges the view that it can operate as effectively within a more liberal, volatile environment, under the pressures of international competition. It could also be argued that conditions of full employment and thus a tight labour market, have so far provided the unions with additional bargaining leverage.

Institutional adjustments will gradually have to be made, for reasons mentioned above, and the question is whether the resulting power potential of the different parties can be employed in such a way as to serve as the basis for a new era of 'tripartism' with the overarching goal of achieving further development and successfully responding to future challenges. According to Theophanous (1994b), what should be aimed at is a social contract to be brought about through the 'tripartite' mechanism, with open negotiations between the unions, the employers' associations and the government. Whether such an approach will be successful however, also depends on the main actors'-unions and employers- willingness to review their position and their policies in the challenging context of the 1990's, firstly in an attempt to identify potential shortcomings that need to be dealt with, and secondly in an attempt to reconcile their own specific demands with the wider objectives. Despite recent attempts by the government to regulate aspects of the system, it is unlikely that increasing legalisation will become the norm. In addition to reasons cited above, it could also be argued that jeopardising industrial peace and stability in industrial

\textsuperscript{28} Interviews with representatives of employer associations and industrialists (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
\textsuperscript{29} Interviews with union officials, representatives of employer associations, and industrialists (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
relations under the existing socio-economic conditions would severely penalise further development.

An indication of the preferred choices by employers and unions can be obtained through an overview of the existing trade union and employer associations, their interaction since the establishment of a formal system of industrial relations in 1962, and an assessment of the rationale behind a ‘corporatist’ arrangement for the future. This will serve as a basis for identifying the main challenges facing these parties, especially in light of the prospect of European Union membership.

1.2.1 Trade unions and employer associations: development, prospects and the dynamic of co-operation

As indicated earlier, the history of industrial relations in Cyprus is relatively short-lived, partly due to successive foreign occupation and partly due to the lack of favourable socio-economic conditions for the development of industrial relations institutions. According to Neocleous (1992), in 1931, a census year, there were 134,000 gainfully employed, occupied in agriculture, traditional crafts and industry, with only about 15,000 or 11 per cent termed as ‘workers’. These were employed by master craftsmen or worked as seasonal agricultural labour on small farms.

In the absence of a ‘genuine’ working class, there was no real attempt at forming a workers’ association until 1918,30 with the formation of the Limassol Masons Trade Union. What followed a few years later in 1924, was an attempt by a group of civil servants to form a ‘professional association’, which although it did not prove fruitful a second attempt was made, and in January 1931 the first constitution was approved.31 However, associations of this type were not regarded favourably by the British authorities, and so in 1931 they were declared illegal.

Following a 1932 Trade Union Law which recognised trade unions but granted them no rights, a total of 46 unions were formed by 1939 (Neocleous, 1992) with 2,544 registered members, although the growth of unionism proceeded in a slow pace. This has

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30 According to Neocleous (1992) workers’ clubs did appear as early as 1910, although these were often set up by politicians during elections and therefore did not last very long.
31 As documented by Kontolemis (1994).
been attributed to the absence of a strong working class and a tradition of activism, inexperienced organisers, the ideological prejudice against trade unionism (i.e. anti-communism\(^2\)) and the general economic gloom of the 1930's. Rapid union growth occurred during World War II, when the colonial government embarked on a progressive policy towards trade unionism, with the establishment for the first time of a Labour Department, in 1941 and the enactment of labour legislation. This included the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, legislation on minimum wages, working conditions, such as weekly hours of work, conciliation and arbitration mechanisms etc. The number of registered trade unions increased from 46 in 1939 to 143 in 1945 (Slocum, 1972). A co-ordinating union body, the Pancyprian Trade Union Committee (PTUC), an all-encompassing organisation, was established in 1941, but a political split gave way to the emergence of 'New Unions', which formed their own co-ordinating body, the Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK) in 1944, whilst the Turkish Trade Union Confederation was also formed during the same period. The Cyprus Civil Servants' Union was also founded in 1946, but was not officially registered until 1966.\(^3\)

In the post-war period up until independence in 1960, the labour movement developed into an influential force, comprising 50 per cent of the workforce at the time (Neocleous, 1992). This period saw the formation of a number of public sector unions, as well as a number of independent unions in the public corporate sector which later on founded the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (OHO) that subsequently joined the Cyprus Workers' Confederation.

Another notable feature of this period is the formation of the Labour Advisory Board (LAB), a tripartite, non-statutory body in 1948. It was responsible for studying labour relations, advising and offering guidance for the promotion of industrial peace, and proposing labour legislation. It has been argued that the formation of the LAB signalled a change in policy on the part of both employers and government towards trade unions,

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\(^2\) Trade unionism was associated with communism in many peoples' minds, especially with the formation a Communist party in 1926.

\(^3\) Christodoulou (1992), p.35.
from one of suppression at the earlier stages, and tolerance later on, to one of full recognition and co-operation.34

Cyprus can be regarded as fairly highly unionised by international standards. Figure B1 (appendix B) shows unionisation patterns, as well as collective bargaining coverage rates, in seventeen OECD countries (1990) and Cyprus (1994). The figure reveals how Cyprus compares favourably with the highly unionised Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, having the second highest union density rate overall. Over a ten year period, from 1984 to 1994, trade union density fell from 86 per cent to 76 per cent, a small but stable decline, although in the public sector it still rests as high as 96 per cent.35

The two largest confederations are the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO), the former PTUC, which is of leftist orientations, and the Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK), which adheres to a social democratic ideology. Both PEO and SEK organise employees in the private sector, local authorities, manual workers in the public sector and also employees in organisations of the public corporate sector, such as the large public utilities, e.g. the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, the Electricity Authority, the Water Boards, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, although in this sector SEK covers the majority of employees. Additional national union centres in the private sector, although much smaller in size, are the socialist Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus (DEOK) and the Pancyprian Organisation of Independent Trade Unions (POAS). Other unions, not affiliated to national centres are the Cyprus Civil Servants’ Union (PASYDY), the Teachers’ Unions (POED and OELMEK), and the only trade union of bank employees (ETYK). There’s also a handful of occupational unions which do not belong to any of the national centres.

Non-affiliated unions such as the public sector unions, the bank employees union, as well as the airline pilots and flight engineers union, and the electricity professional employees union, comprise of tightly-knit, well-paid and privileged groups of employees, which are closer to the established decision centres and are thus strong enough to even at

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34 From material presented at a series of seminars of the Institute of Labour Administration’s Training Program (1990).
35 Source: Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance. Trade union density refers to the number of trade union members as a percentage of wage and salary-earners.
times pursue their corporate interests without seeking the support of or showing solidarity with other workers.\textsuperscript{36}

Despite established communication channels with the rank-and-file, workplace structures are weak and decision making is confined to the higher levels of the union hierarchy. Workplace representatives are insufficiently trained to deal with workplace issues, which is probably why they are reluctant to take on responsibility, resulting in limited autonomy and influence on the shop floor.\textsuperscript{37} They have no negotiating powers, and their role is confined to informing the full time officers, in the case of the private sector, of problems at the workplace. Local union representatives are not full time officers, but are individuals employed by the organisation or enterprise, who voluntarily agree to undertake this role.\textsuperscript{38} Unions are organised mainly at industry level, and each union is affiliated to a peak organisation, a federation or confederation.\textsuperscript{39} According to Kontolemis (1994), a limiting factor to the development of unions at firm level has been the distribution of employees across establishments. In 1995 for example, around 70 per cent of all employees were engaged in establishments of less than 50 employees, and 30 per cent in establishments of less than five employees.\textsuperscript{40} Such ratios have persisted throughout the post-invasion period, that is approximately since 1976. Naturally then, a much stronger mobilising base has been created at the industry level, as compared to the firm level, also due to the predominant industry-wide character of collective bargaining.

On the basis of a distinction made in the literature between 'centralised' and 'articulated' labour organisations, one could characterise the peak organisations in Cyprus as more 'centralised' than 'articulated'. Although Crouch (1994) confines himself to the use of the term 'centralised' to describe structures where power is concentrated in the hands of a central leadership, with a \textit{passive} membership, the term 'centralised' could also be used to refer to insufficient organisation on the shop floor, which impedes the transformation of a \textit{potentially active} membership to an \textit{active} one, and subsequently to an

\textsuperscript{36} See Christodoulou (1992). Although, the Public Servants' Union (PASYDY), along with PEO and SEK have co-operated in some instances in pursuit of important shared goals, e.g. defending the system of wage indexation in the late 1980's.

\textsuperscript{37} This information mainly concerns the two main peak organisations, PEO and SEK.

\textsuperscript{38} Interviews with union officials and representatives (see appendix C.5), November/December 1995.

\textsuperscript{39} With the exception of the unaffiliated unions in the public and broad public sector.

\textsuperscript{40} Source: Labour Statistics (1995).
active shop floor movement. In the case of Cyprus, any reaction from the members to the existing centralised system of authority lacks the dynamics of translating itself into a co-ordinated shop floor movement.

The labour movement has been and still is ideologically fragmented, with peak organisations being associated with different political parties. The only unions that have managed to distance themselves from the political arena are the public sector unions, and the banking employees union. Specifically, the banking employees union (ETYK) managed to impose a ‘closed shop’ in this sector, something which no other organisation was able to do. The political character of the labour movement is undeniably a product of its party affiliations and its active involvement in the main historical outbreaks that marked the island, prior to independence as well as in the post-independence period. Nevertheless, ideological differences aside, the main peak organisations have co-operated in various instances over the years on issues of concern for the whole of the labour movement, although the degree of co-operation varies in different sectors. Still, an element of ‘inter-union rivalry’ has always existed between the main national centres in the private sector, with the phenomenon also extending to sectors or organisations where other unions have managed to gain presence. This issue will be discussed further in a later section concerned with the development and state of institutions in the public corporate sector.

Over the years, the trade union movement has made substantial contributions to the welfare and overall standard of living of its membership. The particularly militant character of the labour movement in the colonial years, in a climate of political adversity and social unrest, resulted in major achievements such as the Cost of Living Adjustment (C.O.L.A) adopted in 1950, the Social Insurance Scheme set up in 1957, compulsory for all persons employed under a contract, working hours, pay and benefit improvements. See Neocleous (1992) and Christodoulou (1992).

41 Interviews with union officials (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
42 As Theophanous (1994) notes, even after the 1974 Turkish invasion, the rivalry between the two main confederations, PEO and SEK continues, while DEOK tries to challenge both by adopting a harder, more ‘syndicalist’ rhetoric. It should also be noted that each one of the three organisations is affiliated to a political party: PEO to AKEL (the left-wing) party, SEK to the right wing groups and DEOK to the Socialist Party (EDEK).
43 This reference is made especially in relation to the semi-government organisations, where until recently SEK dominated the scene. However, since the late 1980’s PEO has been claiming a share of the membership, but only a very small one, up until now, while a wave of independent unions has also managed to gain presence.
to cater for their members through the established system of tripartite co-operation, but also acted as a voice for labour in designing labour legislation, whilst also being involved in the introduction and implementation of major labour policies. Examples of the trade unions' legislative achievements are the 1967 Termination of Employment Law, which set up a national redundancy fund with employers' contributions to protect workers against arbitrary dismissal, as well as securing annual paid holiday. The unions' role in the 'recovery' years, both in the post-independence period, at times of inter-communal conflict, as well as in the reconstruction period after the 1974 invasion, has been argued in the literature to be one of 'self-restraint' in their demands, in an integrated effort to restore the economy's vitality and vigour. More specifically, it has been argued that the moderated approach adopted by trade unions has undoubtedly contributed to what has been termed as an 'economic miracle'.

From the figures presented above, it could be argued that unions remain highly influential within the industrial relations scene, and according to one commentator 'the only serious threat that unions at present face, is the power that they have acquired over the years'. Within a climate of change, restructuring and readjustment of the economy, unions need to think wisely about deployment of their resources, the most important of which is argued to be their large-scale membership.

'Inter-union rivalry' also constitutes a potential threat to the movement's cohesiveness and unity, which could subsequently undermine its ability to respond effectively to changes and/or developments in different areas of economic activity, as well as in relation to specific issues, whilst also possibly leading to membership disenchantment. The creation of a 'labour aristocracy', as it has been characterised, in the broad public sector, where unions have achieved an overall package of benefits and salaries 'considered as excessive by a sizeable portion of the population and beyond the means of the economy', should also constitute an issue worthy of careful consideration by trade unions. Such a situation could well intensify rivalry between the main peak

47 From material presented at a series of seminars, as part of the Institute of Labour Administration’s Training Program (1990).
48 Theophanous (1994).
organisations, PEO and SEK, and the public sector unions, resulting in alienation of the private sector membership of the two peak organisations, as well as possibly breeding feelings of resentment towards their unions.

What also warrants attention is the changing demographics of the workforce, which stands alongside the expansion of the tertiary sector. Younger and better educated employees entering the workforce, especially in the tertiary sector and more specifically in the public corporate sector, are becoming increasingly more sceptical about the effectiveness of trade unions and the efficiency of union action, whilst also emphasising the value of individual action and personal initiative. The challenge for the two main peak organisations is to convince such potential members that it is worthwhile being part of a co-ordinated labour movement, particularly in light of the uncertain future of the secondary sector, especially manufacturing, which could lead to membership losses. This essentially identifies the core of the problem, i.e. the ability of centralised labour movements to address diverse interests effectively. According to Visser (1992) “...the continuing shift of production and employment from manufacturing to services, as it is accompanied by a process of deconcentration of employment and more white-collar, female...jobs, challenges the recruitment and organising methods of trade unions”.

On the other side of the spectrum, employers' associations appeared in the industrial relations scene much later than trade unions, with the formation of the Cyprus Employers' Consultative Association in 1959, later known as the Employers' and Industrialists' Federation (OEB), although associations in the form of Chambers of Commerce made their appearance as early as 1927. OEB today has 2,000 members employing over 60 per cent of the workforce in the private sector. The members of OEB are either direct, as individual enterprises, or members of Trade Associations and represent all sectors of economic activity. The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KEBE) should also be mentioned, as an organisation which has had great influence on the progression of labour relations in Cyprus. KEBE has assumed a consultative role over the years, in an attempt to protect the interests of trade and industry, although it does also

49 Findings from fieldwork, Autumn 1995.
50 There are now five Chambers of Commerce and Industry operating under the umbrella of a central federation (KEBE).
represent its members in the negotiation process if the member so wishes. Although there is no explicit reference to labour relations in the Chamber's constitution, its active and decisive role amongst employers in the formulation of terms and conditions of work and the overall system of industrial relations in Cyprus has been frequently acknowledged. Most employers do belong in either or both of the aforementioned associations.

The need for the establishment of an employers’ association is traced back to the colonial days, when the imbalance of power between employers and trade unions generated major concerns in the then Department of Labour. At a time when the labour movement had gained substantial ground, was well organised and its resilience and influence had been repeatedly affirmed, the Department of Labour issued a statement in December 1956, emphasising its agreed policy to promote the development of both employer and employee associations. After extensive negotiations, and within a climate of political upheaval, the formation of the Cyprus Employers’ Consultative Association (CECA) was realised three years later, in 1959. By 1979 it had changed its name to Cyprus Employers Federation and its membership comprised twelve associations accounting for 21 per cent of the total membership. Whilst initially assuming a consultative role, it then proceeded to actively representing its members’ interests within the established system of industrial relations. By 1986 it had doubled the number of member associations, which overall represented 1596 enterprises, and was renamed the Federation of Employers and Industrialists (OEB).

It has been argued by Christodoulou (1992) that ‘the employers have not been a cohesive force any more than the employees...’. However, the strength and increasing influence of the employers’ associations can hardly be questioned. Since the mid-1980’s employers have maintained a firmer stance on a number of crucial issues, such as the issue of wage indexation, which subsequently led to the initiation of a process of dialogue and consultation between the main actors. Worsening macro-economic conditions and problems of competitiveness intensified the situation, with three consecutive breakdowns in collective negotiations in 1986, 1987 and 1995, and the need for government

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51 Industry, construction, services, trade and education are all represented by OEB.
52 The struggle of independence begun in 1955 and lasted until 1959. Employers were bound to be suspicious of the colonial government’s real motives.
intervention in order to prevent industrial unrest. Following a more ‘favourable’ political environment for employers since 1992, with the rise of the conservative government to power, and the announcement of a number of ‘employer-favoured’ policies, the employer offensive became even more apparent. This continued well into the 1990’s with clear disturbances in the long-standing, familiar climate of ‘co-operation’.

Despite the overall support on the part of employers for the existing system of collective negotiations, there exists a feeling that union power should be contained and that unions should behave more responsibly in light of the crisis facing the economy. According to employer representatives, ‘trade unions have made such demands over the years, that there is simply not much room for anything more... it is crucial that further escalation of labour costs is prevented... unions should improve and adjust their approach to labour issues according to the changing economic environment...’ 54 More specifically, in relation to the problems faced by industry, one representative argued that ‘...unions should abandon the tendency to adopt extreme, unrealistic positions and co-operate with business in order to regain the losses in competitiveness, rather than perceiving the workplace as a battleground...if unions refuse to change their approach they will gradually be marginalised...’ 55

Nevertheless, according to one industrialist, in the growth years of especially the post-invasion period, employers ‘yielded to excessive demands by the powerful trade unions without considering the long term consequences of their decisions, and so year after year labour costs were building up resulting in the situation we are witnessing today’. It appears then, that the short-term approach adopted by both parties, leading to short term gains, renders both equally responsible for the existing situation. Of course, whether this sense of responsibility will be acknowledged by both parties in such a way as to allow them to pursue the avenue of co-operation rather than confrontation, is very much dependent on the cost of favouring one rather than the other, given the present economic and political context. The question is whether the tradition of ‘voluntary co-operation’ can survive the tensions that have been building up since the mid-1980’s, and under what

53 See Christodoulou, op cit.
54 Interviews with employer representatives (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
55 See ibid.
conditions the cornerstone of this tradition, free and open collective negotiations, can be preserved and sustained.

Prior to addressing the above question directly, it would be advisable to consider more closely the fundamental elements of the industrial relations system in Cyprus: collective bargaining and the Industrial Relations Code, and discuss the developments that have been taking place since the mid-1980's.

1.2.2 Collective bargaining: development and prospects

As it has been mentioned earlier, the industrial relations system in Cyprus has long been characterised by limited legislative regulation, wholeheartedly embracing the principles of free collective bargaining and voluntarism. Since independence in 1960, workers' rights, that is the right to organise, the right to enter collective negotiations freely and the right to strike, previously protected indirectly by British law, have been guaranteed by the constitution. Collective bargaining is fully affirmed by the Code of Industrial Relations (see below), the legally non-binding agreement at the heart of the industrial relations system in Cyprus, that sets the framework for collective bargaining.

Figure B1 (appendix B) shows how favourably Cyprus compares with other countries in terms of collective bargaining coverage. Collective agreements cover 80 per cent of the workforce in the private and the public corporate sector, but not the public sector, and are not legally enforceable contracts, but rather "...‘gentlemen’s agreements’ binding in honour only." In the public sector, which occupies approximately 17 per cent of the total workforce, collective bargaining is recognised both in theory and practice, although the relevant procedural rules for deciding terms and conditions of work have no explicit reference to collective bargaining, they rather speak of 'consultations'.

Due to the limited scope of labour market legislation, the contents of these collective agreements generally cover a wide array of topics. These include, apart from wages and salary scales, bonuses, overtime pay, the distribution of working hours through the week, holidays, sickness pay, with a change of emphasis more recently to issues such as health and safety, job security, redundancy payments and longer-term benefits such as

provident funds and other retirement benefits. Procedural issues such as recruitment and dismissal rules are also deliberated. An important element of wage agreements is the Cost of Living Allowance (C.O.L.A), which has been mentioned earlier as a cause of intense debate between employers and unions in the context of the 'Social Dialogue'. The COLA is always paid over and above the basic pay rates, in both the private and public sectors. It is paid automatically every six months and its level depends on changes in the Consumer Price Index the previous six-month period. The duration of collective agreements is usually two years, with occasional exceptions of one year contracts. As an example, the collective agreement expiring on 31/12/94 was a one-year contract, reflecting the firm position of employers with regards to the issue of wage indexation. They refused to accept a two-year contract while this issue was still pending, and so the majority of industry-wide agreements were renewed for only one year. This led to a decision on 12/5/94 reached at national level, to initiate a dialogue between the parties, on wage indexation and productivity.

Bargaining takes place at either firm or industry level, although the latter appears to be more common. Approximately 60 per cent of the total number of collective agreements are reached at the industry level, with approximately the remaining 40 per cent at firm level.\textsuperscript{57} The majority of industry level agreements are found among others in the clothing, shoe and baggage industries, the metal goods industry, the construction and woodworking industries, hotels and banks, while firm level agreements form the norm in wholesale and retail trade, and in some subsectors of manufacturing. The nature of these agreements is by no means uniform. Although national level agreements do not constitute frequent practice, there have been occasions where bargaining took place at national level to define a framework for sectoral discussions, or in cases where issues of broad concern and influence, such as the indexation of wages and the reduction of working hours were negotiated. In the former case, consecutive national framework agreements were signed in 1986, 1987, and also in 1995- quite a rare event in Cypriot industrial relations- "...to emphasise national productivity as a bargaining criterion"\textsuperscript{58}, after negotiations for the renewal of several industry-wide agreements reached a deadlock and industrial action was

seriously considered by both sides. What has also been observed in recent years, is that
industry-wide agreements are becoming more frequent even in sectors where only a few
firm level agreements had been concluded in the past (Neocleous, 1987). What is more, in
the public corporate sector there has been an increasing tendency for collective
negotiations to be concluded at the national level, favouring more centralised
arrangements, which could be argued to reflect increasing government intervention in
these organisations and tighter guidelines for the issues being negotiated.59

Legislation is limited to areas such as social security, unfair dismissal, annual leave,
maternity leave, health and safety, equal pay, the functioning of trade unions. Legislation
also guarantees minimum conditions of work and minimum pay in sectors where
unionisation is either weak or practically non-existent. An Industrial Disputes Tribunal
deals with cases of individual labour law such as unfair dismissal and Gender
discrimination, as Demetriou (1995) notes. Either for designing new legislation or
reviewing existing legislation, the interested parties are consulted through the LAB
(Labour Advisory Board) prior to processing any new or modified legislation.

Collective bargaining has been under considerable strain since the mid-1980’s. The
first major breakdown in collective bargaining was brought about by the issue of wage
indexation discussed above. According to the 1986 framework agreement, “...benefits to
be granted through collective agreements at the industry level should be in line with
national productivity increases, collective agreements should be of one year duration, and
the Government should appoint a Commission of Inquiry to study the issue of indexation”. Following the publication of the Commission’s report, the issue was set aside until 1992,
when rising problems of competitiveness led the employers to bring the issue back to the
negotiating table. Increased tensions then led to a national level agreement, under
government auspices, for initiating a process of dialogue on the issue of wage indexation,
with productivity as the second issue on the agenda. Productivity was identified by trade
unions as the main reason for losses in competitiveness, naturally refuting the claims made
by employers about the relevance of the system of wage indexation in this context.

58 See Neocleous, op cit.
59 Interviews with union officials in this sector and Industrial Relations Officers in the Ministry of Labour (see
Although it was originally agreed that this dialogue would be concluded by 30/11/1994, as yet no conclusive agreement has been reached. A recent proposal put forward by the government on the issue of wage indexation, was accepted by the interested parties as a short-term solution, while it is expected that this issue will re-emerge in the context of the ‘Social Dialogue’, after the presidential elections in February 1998.

What can also be argued to signal a crisis in collective bargaining is the increasing number of national framework agreements, reflecting the need for government intervention to prevent industrial unrest. Negotiations for such agreements should occur only after both direct negotiations between employers and unions, and a process of mediation, where an Industrial Relations Officer of the Ministry of Labour acts as a mediator, have reached a deadlock. As it has been noted earlier, such agreements had been quite rare, since in most cases collective agreements had been resolved at the mediation stage, when direct negotiations failed. However, it appears that in recent years changes in the climate between unions and employers, with employers hardening their stance in collective negotiations and emphasising sensitive issues at the heart of the labour movement’s existence, have undermined the whole character of collective bargaining and have generated questions as to its effectiveness. Nevertheless, according to one industrialist, the way in which negotiations are carried out at least ensures industrial peace once the agreements are signed, and in turn prevents wildcat strikes by employees, as well as arbitrary decisions by employers which could be damaging to the industry as well as the economy. However, he does go on to argue that although he finds co-operation with unions beneficial, since the employer can discuss issues with them in a more responsible manner, the idea of free collective negotiations is undermined by the unions’ perception that negotiation means pay rises. He believes that unions should develop a more flexible approach during negotiations, accepting that fact that they might not always lead to rises.60

Despite the ‘conflictual’ character of collective bargaining, especially in recent years, it is expected that collective bargaining will remain ‘the backbone of the industrial relations system’ (Neocleous, 1992). However, it is argued that it will almost definitely need to be modified in such a way as to incorporate into the system the flexibility required

60 Interviews with industrialists (see appendix C.5), March 1995.
to respond to a more volatile and complex economic environment. The flexibility could
emerge from setting up workplace structures to follow up on and negotiate issues at
workplace level, not necessarily on a single-employer basis, bearing in mind the
predominantly small size of establishments, but on a group basis, with groups consisting of
employers with similar needs, opportunities and problems. This does not mean that
centralised, industry-wide negotiations would be abandoned. On the contrary, this level
might serve best as the platform for pay determination and in setting broad guidelines on
important issues such as productivity, efficiency, quality and so on. Nevertheless, as such
issues receive increasing attention, with various proposals for the introduction of incentive
payment schemes, as well as the implementation of TQM and other innovative methods of
work, and as different sectors exhibit different needs, opportunities and prospects,
leading to growing heterogeneity, the idea of discussing such issues at a lower level
becomes almost unavoidable. Similar realisations and objectives have led for example the
Swedish employers to demand greater flexibility, although it should be noted that the
centralised system of negotiations in Sweden has been much more rigid than is the case in
Cyprus.

Naturally, the relative inexperience of both employers and unions in dealing with
such issues at 'local level', means that they would have to adequately equip themselves
with well-trained representatives on both sides to facilitate these processes. In the case of
unions, the highly centralised character of the labour movement and the absence of active
shop floor structures is an issue that should receive careful consideration, as this is most
likely to impede unions' effective participation and constructive contribution within such
structures.

Although the real objective of this section is not to suggest potential modifications
to the existing system of collective bargaining, but assess the potential for voluntary co-
operation between the two parties within this system, it is worthwhile noting that failure
by the unions to develop adequate structures for representation within a changing context,
could result in loss of influence and also legitimacy in the eyes of its membership. Now, as
far as the potential for co-operation through collective bargaining is concerned, it is

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argued that collective bargaining can be preserved provided a change of attitudes also takes place, from both sides. Short term gains should be sacrificed for the achievement of long term objectives. It does seem that the cost of non co-operation is much higher than the benefits of confrontation, since in the former case the economy would be seriously threatened by potential instability in industrial relations and industrial unrest, at a critical point in the country’s economic and political future.

In order to form a more integrated and credible view of the real potential for co-operation, one would also need to discuss the existing framework for collective bargaining, the Industrial Relations Code, and the developments that have been recently taking place.

1.2.3 The ‘Code of Industrial Relations’: sustained co-operation?

Since independence in 1960, employer associations co-operated closely with trade unions and the state, for economic recovery and growth within a system of tripartite co-operation as it was initially set up with the ‘Basic Agreement on Standard Rules for the Negotiations of Agreements and for Settlement of Disputes and/or Grievances’ (hereinafter called the Basic Agreement) in 1962. This non-legally binding agreement was designed along the voluntarist dimension, fully endorsing free collective bargaining principles and setting out procedures for dispute settlement. In the introduction of the agreement the interested parties undertook “...to recommend to their members and affiliated organisations to have this Agreement voluntarily ratified; whereupon the negotiating parties concerned will abide by it”.

Signed by the Employers and Industrialists Federation (OEB) then known as the Cyprus Employers’ Consultative Association, the main peak organisations at the time PEO, SEK, POAS and the Turkish Trade Unions Federation (TTUF), it “...was successfully introduced to promote collective bargaining in good faith and to reduce industrial antagonism in the interest of faster socio-economic development” (Neocleous, 1992). As Slocum (1972) notes, prior to the parties’ acceptance of the Basic Agreement, the following were not uncommon practices: (i) wildcat strikes; (ii) picketing before submission of claims; (iii) submission of claims without justification; (iv) refusal of
employers to recognise or bargain with unions; (v) referral of disputes directly to the Ministry without approaching the employer. The agreement also confirmed the role of the state as mediator and facilitator in industrial relations.

As it is argued in the available writings on the period in which the Basic Agreement governed the industrial relations arena, constructive co-operation prevailed and as both employers and unions were ready to agree, by 1968, that the Basic Agreement had promoted and maintained a climate of trust and co-operation which contributed substantially to economic development (Slocum, 1972), heightened industrial strife in that same year following a devaluation of the Cyprus pound, generated considerable pressures for the industrial relations arena and exposed the need to review the agreement.

The impetus for initiating the process of drafting a new Code was given by a proposal of the employers' federation for changes in the Basic Agreement, which "...called for legally enforceable agreements and a law covering procedures for bargaining in 'essential services'". It went on to argue that "...serious industrial unrest and loss of confidence in the field of industrial relations" is what had given rise to such demands.62 Consequently, a proposed Code of Industrial Relations was drafted by the Industrial Relations Section of the Ministry of Labour and furthered to the Labour Advisory Board for consideration on December 1, 1970. The process was interrupted by the events of 1974, but resumed in the post-invasion period and in April 1977 the Industrial Relations Code63 was signed by the two largest peak organisations, SEK and PEO, the employers' federation OEB and the Minister of Labour.

This 1977 accord preserved the underlying features of the earlier one, i.e. was a voluntary, non-legally binding agreement, but was broader in scope and substance and more detailed in procedures, also embodying a set of principles for negotiations. It has been argued however, that once all the apparent differences in principle and procedure were set aside, the state of affairs remained much the same as under the Basic Agreement.64 Slocum (1972) argues that the seeming reluctance of the parties to agree

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63 Hereafter referred to as the Code.
64 See Slocum cited.

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voluntarily to significant concessions, despite the Minister’s plea to do so, did not augur well for industrial peace.

The 1977 Code consists of two parts: Part I deals with substantive provisions, whilst Part II deals with procedural provisions, setting out procedures for dispute settlement.

Part I contains an explicit and positive statement on the rights of association of both employers and employees—completely absent in the Basic Agreement—and emphasises the significance of free collective bargaining and joint consultations as the "basic way for the determination of conditions of employment and remuneration." A distinction was also introduced for the following three types of issues: (a) Negotiable issues, where decisions should be taken jointly by the two parties, such as wages, hours of work, overtime rates, fringe benefits; (b) Consultative issues, where the decision rests with the employer, having consulted the union. Examples of such issues are training, organisational structure etc.; (c) Prerogatives of management, where the decision rests with the employer, but where the employer is not obliged to consult the union prior to reaching a decision. Examples of such issues are production methods, machinery etc. Although the above issues are not defined in the Code, it advises that it is desirable that they should be specified, if possible, in collective agreements; also, the Code clearly does not allow industrial action (strike or lock-out) in the case of consultative issues.

Part II of the Code, where dispute settlement procedures are set out, distinguishes between two types of disputes: disputes about interests, arising out of negotiations for the renewal of an existing collective agreement, or the conclusion of a new collective agreement, or in general out of the negotiation of a new claim; disputes about rights (grievances), emanating from the interpretation and/or implementation of an existing collective agreement, or from a personal complaint, including a complaint over a dismissal. According to the Code, in both cases, if direct negotiations between the parties do not lead to an agreement once all possibilities have been exhausted, then the disputes are submitted to the Industrial Relations Service (Ministry of Labour) for mediation within a specified period after the expiration of an existing agreement, or from the commencement

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65 Industrial Relations Code, p.5.
of first time negotiations for the conclusion of a new agreement. Even if after the mediation stage, a mutually accepted solution is still pending, then in the case of disputes over interests, a deadlock is declared and the two parties have the right to resort to any prescribed lawful measures, not excluding industrial action, “...in furtherance or support of their claims and interests”. However, in the case of interest disputes, the Code also provides for arbitration or a public inquiry if both parties agree to pursue such procedures, in which case the parties undertake to accept the arbitrator’s award as binding. In the case of rights disputes, if a deadlock is reached at the mediation stage, the dispute must be submitted to binding arbitration, and any form of industrial action is prohibited.

The code applies in the private sector and the public corporate sector, but not in the public sector. In the public sector, although the rights to organise and to undertake industrial action also apply, procedures for dispute resolution as well as collective bargaining provisions are set out in the rules of Joint Staff Committees. Interestingly enough, according to these rules all labour issues may be regarded as “joint consultation” issues with the decision resting on the employer, i.e. the government. Essentially then industrial action can be taken at any stage of the consultation process, since there are no explicit procedural restrictions or provisions for exercising the right to strike. However, if the Code had applied in the public sector, industrial action would have been prohibited since the Code states that industrial action is not allowed in the case of joint consultation issues.

Strikingly enough, arbitration featured prominently, both in the earlier accord, the ‘Basic Agreement’, as well as in the Industrial Relations Code as an optional last resort for the parties, in the case of interest disputes, and as a compulsory last resort in the case of rights disputes. Nevertheless, despite relative prominence it has been very rarely employed in practice. According to figures cited in Kontolemis (1994), from a total of 373 disputes

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66 Industrial Relations Code, p.8.  
67 There is the Joint Staff Committee for the Civil Service (J.S.C) covering all public servants, the Joint Labour Committee covering government manual workers, the Joint Staff Committee for the Educational Service covering all government teachers. Joint Staff Committees similar to the ones mentioned also operate in a small number of semi-government organisations such as the Cyprus Land Development Organisation, the Cyprus Home Finance Organisation and the Cyprus Agricultural Insurance Organisation.  
68 With the exception of the Civil Service, where the rules of the Joint Staff Committee forbid the right to strike at any stage during the period in which a dispute is being examined by an ad hoc dispute resolution committee, a mechanism introduced in 1993, resembling non-binding arbitration, to resolve such cases.
referred to the Ministry for mediation in 1991, 208 were settled at the mediation stage, 73
were referred to direct negotiations, 11 were referred to arbitration, 5 were withdrawn and
the remaining 63 were still pending by the end of 1991. Consequently then, excluding
those disputes pending at the end of 1991, 67 per cent of the disputes were settled at the
mediation stage, with only approximately 3 per cent referred to arbitration. It could be
argued that government preoccupation with maintaining a system devoid of legislation,
and eagerly aiming at reaffirming the principles of voluntary co-operation both in the post-
independence as well as the post-invasion period, has resulted in preserving a system of
arbitration that has been highly unpopular among the parties from the time it was first
introduced. This is reflected in the general lack of confidence in the arbitration process
shared by both sides, preventing either side from unconditionally accepting an arbitrator’s
award, notwithstanding of course the greater risk associated with arbitration once parties
agree to it. Unfortunately, in addition to the absence of a solid basis for building
confidence and trust around the arbitration process, possible attempts to legitimise it in the
eyes of the parties appear to have been fruitless. As Demetriou (1995) notes, arbitration
rules have not yet been drawn up despite a Code provision that the Ministry should
prepare such rules in consultation with the parties.

Consequently then, on the one hand the excessive reliance on the mediation stage
has had the effect of discouraging real bargaining at the earlier stages of negotiation, as
indicated by rising numbers of disputes referred to mediation at least up until the early
1990’s, with a declining trend from 1992 onwards interrupted by the 1995 figure (see
appendix B, figure B2), while the unpopularity of arbitration has overburdened the
mediation stage, as the parties sought to avoid any form of arbitration, especially in the
case of rights disputes where industrial action is prohibited. It might well be that if the
parties could have been induced to resort more frequently to binding arbitration, once all
other procedures have been exhausted, the gains for industrial peace would have been
considerable and far-reaching government intervention which essentially impairs the spirit
of free collective negotiations, could have been avoided. The national framework
agreements of 1986, 1987 and 1995 are examples of this level of intervention.

69 As indicated by Slocum, op cit.
Although as it has been argued earlier, it is generally accepted that the industrial relations system in Cyprus has proved satisfactory, contributing significantly to economic recovery and growth while also maintaining low levels of industrial conflict, it should also be accepted that there has been evidence in recent years to suggest that the system is entering a period of crisis. This has exposed weaknesses that need to be dealt with. Particularly alarming is the figure for workdays lost in 1995, which reached an unprecedented high, a more than threefold increase from the previous year, while the actual number of work stoppages decreased from 32 in 1994 to 26, with 10 of those recorded in manufacturing. Figure B3 (appendix B) shows the number of work stoppages and the workdays lost in the whole economy from 1976 to 1995. Work stoppages have not exhibited major fluctuations in this period. The 1995 figure for workdays lost has interrupted an otherwise declining trend in the number of workdays lost, which has been argued to be the most severe loss in strikes since 1980. It is worth noting that more than 61 per cent of the workdays lost were in Construction, while 32 per cent was in Manufacturing (appendix A, table A4). This phenomenal increase in 1995 could be argued to reflect the hardening of the employers' stance, alongside the persistence of trade unions, resulting in the breakdown of negotiations and the 1995 framework agreement. As far as the extent to which Cyprus compares favourably with other countries on strike records, especially those with corporatist arrangements such as Germany and Sweden, figure B4.1 (appendix B) shows that rather disappointingly Cyprus compares favourably with the more strike-prone countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy than the less strike-prone ones such as Germany and Sweden.

It is also interesting to note, that although a considerable proportion of work stoppages are unofficial, i.e. occur in violation of the Industrial Relations Code, their legality has so far not been disputed. According to the existing Trade Unions Law a strike is lawful if the decision to strike is taken by the affected members of a registered trade union via a secret ballot and endorsed by its executive committee. Also, there is no restriction on secondary action. However, as Demetriou (1995) notes, it seems that no such case has gone to court which shows that so far the legality of strikes has not been questioned.
Given the above, one is tempted to pose the question of whether 'genuine co-operation' has ever really underlain the relationship between employers and unions. What certainly becomes evident is a creeping militancy and an element of confrontation, merely disguised by a profound eagerness to preserve 'tripartism' and a co-operative climate. The stability in industrial relations professed by corporatist arrangements seems to have been severely threatened in the case of Cyprus, especially in the last decade or so, which leads one to seriously question the viability of the existing system in a changing economic and industrial environment.

1.3 A 'Corporatist Arrangement' for the future?

Does a system of voluntary tripartism still present itself as an option for industrial relations in Cyprus and under what conditions can it be sustained? How are the changes proposed by government likely to shift the balance of power between the parties in the system and what implications might that have for the strategic choices available to the actors?

The evidence presented above suggest a potential crisis in the industrial relations system, as it emerges when considering the increasing number of disputes reaching mediation, the less tolerant stance by employers, the reaction of the labour movement to government proposals in the case of strikes in essential services and privatisation of organisations in the public corporate sector, increasing militancy in private sector disputes, as well as the need for significant government intervention to prevent industrial unrest after a series of breakdowns in negotiations since the mid-1980's. However, despite the need to review the Industrial Relations Code to deal with potential weaknesses, voluntary tripartism continues to present itself as the best option for at least the immediate future. Cyprus finds itself yet again in need of industrial peace and stability in industrial relations to further economic development and sustain growth, in order to effectively respond to the challenges of international competition and the more general changes in the economic environment. Given the political tension observed at this stage, additional turmoil and unrest in the industrial sphere must be avoided. State regulation of industrial relations is likely to generate fierce opposition from trade unions and lead to industrial unrest, while at
the same time employers seem to favour the voluntary character of the system, not least due to its inherent flexibility. Also, according to one employer representative "...since the cornerstone of our Industrial Relations System is voluntarism, and this system has functioned adequately, we believe that any new measures and regulations ought to be the result of tripartite consultation and not of unilateral decision making".70

However, one of the pitfalls of the system which hasn’t been sufficiently emphasised is precisely the excessive reliance on mediation for dispute settlement, which as has been argued earlier tends to discourage direct negotiations and also prevents both employers and unions from discovering common ground for agreement, while also reinforcing the confrontational element in their relationship. It is argued that possible changes to the existing system should strengthen and support the first stage of direct negotiations, since as both the labour market and economic activity become more heterogeneous, it is imperative that a solid basis for negotiating is built at the 'local level', which as noted earlier need not refer to a single enterprise, but could also be a group of enterprises or different sectors/industries facing similar challenges, opportunities and threats.

A neocorporatist dynamic, or 'bargained corporatism' as Crouch (1993) refers to it is "observed when capital, C and labour, L try to play their conflicts in the context of the pursuit of certain joint interests". This system is most likely to be effective, according to Crouch, when L is strong and also when both sides possess strategic capacity, by which is meant the capacity of central leaderships to commit memberships to a course of action. As Crouch (1993) further argues, in the pursuit of mutual interests for mutual gains the main basic problems for, say L, are: the inability to trust C, inadequacy of information available to judge the character of an issue, and the contingent, future nature of gains in comparison with present sacrifices. According to Crouch, L can try to reduce these by (a) extending its share of control over aspects of its exchange with C, (b) by similarly extending its access to relevant information and (c) by developing a dense network of exchanges with C so that both sides become caught in a continuous flow of contacts. This last element in the relationship is argued to be particularly important as it "reduces the imbalance of timing

70 Antoniou (1992), Industrial Relations Officer, Employers and Industrialists Federation (OEB).
between sacrifice and gains’. In the case of Cyprus, the system does resemble a form of necorporatism as is described above, but devoid of this dense web of exchanges, that would allow the parties to acknowledge that they stand to gain from the continuation of the relationship, also incorporating an element of interdependence in the relationship. As has been argued above, the compulsory mediation stage offered an easy way out to obstacles in direct negotiations, thus discouraging real bargaining at the early stages. Consequently, with L faced with the problems described above, such as lack of trust as well as sufficient, relevant information to be able to distinguish zero-sum issues, from positive-sum issues, potential future gains could not be clearly identified and in effect, cooperation had been compromised throughout.

However, as Crouch (1993) recognises, such a system is not assured of success. Conflict can still pose as an option at any stage of the relationship, as the perceived net gains from conflict can exceed those from the pursuit of common objectives, since as Crouch notes, it is also the case that in practice, not all problems of mistrust or of identification of zero- and positive-sum issues can be resolved. Nevertheless, as Crouch (1993) further argues such a system once it is established contains certain self-reinforcing elements71 which allow it to be maintained solely by the efforts of the parties within.

One crucial element of the above system is the existence of strategic capacity which focuses attention on leaders’ ability to commit their memberships to a course of action, whether that is conflict or co-operation. Yates (1992) employs the concept of strategic capacity, but in a slightly different context, to refer to the “unions’ ability to successfully pursue their chosen course of action”. She argues that this strategic capacity is influenced by two sets of factors: the existing political-economic conditions, and the unions’ effectiveness in employing available resources, at which point she identifies large-scale memberships as the unions’ most important resource. The ability of unions to successfully mobilise any group of workers into collective action is considered as one of the dimensions that determine the unions’ effectiveness in employing available resources. What is argued further by considering both Crouch’s and Yates’s work is that the extent to which unions are able to successfully mobilise their members is largely dependent on the

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71 For a more detailed discussion see Crouch (1993).
existence of leaders able to influence memberships and commit them to a course of action, in this case collective action. Yates (1992) does not explicitly focus on the importance of leaders, although she does consider the leadership process in the context of organisational structure.

In the case of Cyprus, the extent to which leaders, and in turn unions can successfully mobilise their members for collective action becomes an important issue, especially in light of the existing challenges posed by changes proposed by the government, as well as the hardening of the employers’ stance. As it has been mentioned earlier, the absence of legislation has been one of the fundamental elements of this system of voluntary tripartism. In designing both the Basic Agreement, in 1962 as well as the Industrial Relations Code in 1977 an explicit aim was to allow the parties to negotiate freely, with the state assuming the role of ‘facilitator’. However, since the mid-1980’s the government has been increasingly assuming a more active role in the field of industrial relations. Government intervention to prevent industrial unrest led to the conclusion of national framework agreements in 1986, 1987 and 1995, something which has been argued to undermine free collective negotiations. The move by the present government to promote a parliamentary bill on the restriction of strikes in essential services, as well as calls for the privatisation of organisations in the public corporate sector, has given rise to strong objections and criticisms on the part of the labour movement, and one could argue might also have contributed to intensifying the antagonistic climate between employers and unions.

Although the above proposals are still being discussed and debated with no concrete conclusions or agreements reached as yet, their potential impact on stability in industrial relations is already beginning to show. For example, the fact that the government chose the legislative route on the issue of strikes in essential services, bypassing the tradition of tripartite consultations in the Labour Advisory Board resulted in strong criticisms by the trade unions, culminating in threats to withdraw from the process of social dialogue on productivity and wage indexation. On the privatisation issue, trade unions have again expressed their opposition to privatising any of the public corporations, arguing that it would endanger the level and quality of services offered to the public. As
far as the issue of wage indexation is concerned, it is expected that it will cause further unrest in the near future. At the same time, the inability of the main national centres to agree to a unified position on these issues would expose potential divisions in the labour movement, which in these changing times should be avoided.

In the very likely occasion that the government proceeds with the above proposals, unions will be faced with the dilemma of conflict versus co-operation. Given the available membership data, showing union density resting as high as 76 per cent overall, with the public sector at 96 per cent one could argue that indeed unions are quite powerful, which has been admitted to be the case. However, ultimately the test for every labour movement is its ability to *mobilise* this large-scale membership to act. As Pontusson (1992) argues: "...In France or Italy, belonging to a union tends to imply a fairly high level of commitment and activism. This is less true of Sweden, where virtually everyone belongs to a union". In the absence of the membership’s support the unions will be unable to pursue their desired course of action. At the same time however, it is important to identify the importance of the unions’ ability to ‘mobilise’ its large-scale membership in a wider context, one that has implications for the survival of the organisations themselves and which goes beyond individual instances of collective action. That is, unions’ ability to sustain a membership committed to the principles of trade unionism, having internalised collective values and the need for collective action, and thus willing to become involved in the organisation and actively offer its services towards effective organisational functioning. In this context, the important role of leaders is also evident, as agents of such a process. It is also argued that in general, the importance of members’ true support of their union has been largely downplayed in the case of Cyprus, by the leaderships themselves, although this is certainly not true of all unions. In a sense then, leaders’ ability to maintain favourable attitudes towards the union and influence member involvement becomes a crucial issue.

One of the aims of this project then, is to assess the extent to which leaders and unions are able to influence their memberships, and examine their role and ability in committing members to a particular course of action. It is argued that the importance of such a project is reinforced by the idea that the degree of membership support will largely
influence unions’ responses to the challenges ahead, which will in turn constitute a
determining factor in the balance of power between the actors in the system, with
implications for the future of industrial relations in Cyprus. The public corporate sector
presented itself as the most suitable setting to carry out this project, since this is where
attention will be focused, with the strike bill on essential services and the calls for
privatisation. According to one Industrial Relations Officer:
“...given the existing status quo governing industrial relations in the public corporate
sector, privatisation will dramatically alter power relations in favour of employers,
since...the unions’ negotiating power will be substantially undermined...Also, given that
the public corporate sector consists to a large extent of organisations providing essential
services, the whole system of industrial relations, i.e. the right to organise, the right to
strike, the bargaining mechanisms etc., which should be emphasised, is characterised by
voluntarism, will be greatly affected ”.

Even within a system of ‘bargained corporatism’ as Crouch (1993) argues, it
remains impossible in practice to resolve all problems of mistrust and of the correct
identification of zero- and positive-sum issues, so in effect the dilemma of co-operation
versus confrontation remains, albeit the likelihood of resorting to conflict within such a
system is gradually minimised. However, the decision to resort to conflict in the case of
trade unions, would be largely determined by their ‘mobilising capacity’, that is their
ability to effectively employ their large-scale memberships. By exploring member attitudes
towards the union, their willingness to become actively involved in the union and the
leaders’ ability to influence such tendencies, one begins to address the issues discussed
above.

1.4 Industrial relations in the public corporate sector

The public corporate sector consists of independent, autonomous, non-profit
making organisations set up by special legislation to provide public utility services, such as
electricity, water, telecommunications, transport etc. These organisations are subsidised by
the government through the public budget, and they are governed by bodies appointed by
the government, the so called Administrative Boards. The government exercises general
financial and administrative control mainly through approving their annual budgets before they are submitted to the House of Representatives. The public corporate sector is part of the broad public sector which comprises the Government, the Local Authorities and the Semi-Government organisations (or public corporations).

Employment in the broad public sector has been steadily rising since the early 1980's, accounting for approximately 17 per cent of the gainfully employed by 1995, with employment in semi-government organisations showing a similar trend. Also, employment in semi-government organisations has also been steadily rising as a percentage of total employment in the broad public sector (appendix A, table A5). Table A6 (appendix A) shows employment in semi-government organisations over the period 1991-1995. Clearly, the two largest organisations accounting for approximately 52 per cent of employment in this area of economic activity are, the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority and the Cyprus Electricity Authority. The superior pay and benefits package, along with stable and lifetime employment offered in the broad public sector attracts, especially in the public corporate sector, large numbers of young graduates, thus generating a significant pool of professionals in these organisations.

This gap in the overall package between the public and broad public sector on the one hand, and the private sector on the other has, according to Theophanous (1994) 'created, over time, serious sociopolitical and economic problems', by encouraging nepotism and thus leading to the 'loosening of social cohesion and alienation'. Also, the politicisation of semi-government organisations with the increasing involvement of government and political parties in both the hiring and dismissal procedures has restricted the organisations' autonomy, which in theory are supposed to possess, and has also given rise to phenomena such as favouritism, encouraging a 'patronage and client relationship system between citizens and political parties'.72 The prevalent culture then in these organisations has led to problems of rigidity, inefficiency and over-staffing, damaging to overall organisational effectiveness.

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72 See Theophanous (1994).
1.4.1 The system

As it has been briefly discussed earlier, the public corporate sector is governed by the Industrial Relations Code, which distinguishes it from the public sector, affirming the right to organise and resort to industrial action, endorsing the principles of free collective bargaining and setting out procedures for dispute settlement.

Increasing government intervention, especially in recent years, in setting strict guidelines for collective agreements, as well as in the more general process of dispute settlement has led to major criticisms by the trade unions. According to one trade union representative: "...the organisation is not allowed to negotiate anything with the trade unions anymore. Everything is usually predetermined, so what is the point of negotiating?..."73. This centralised character of negotiations seems to extend to the resolution of disputes. According to trade union representatives, procedures are inefficient and lead to substantial delays in the process of grievance resolution. The majority of union representatives and officials argue that lack of authority and avoidance of responsibility result in even minor disputes being referred to the Administrative Board, the governing body of the organisation, or even the Ministry of Labour for a solution. As one union official argues: "...we might feel that a simple problem could have been resolved by the Personnel Manager, but in reality the problem might even go beyond the General Manager, to the Authority's Administrative Board".74 What also appears to generate uneasiness is the fact that there is a strong association between what is negotiated in the public sector with what is negotiated in the public corporate sector, which essentially undermines the whole idea of free collective negotiations. Once a favourable agreement is concluded by the unions in the public corporate sector, the public sector is then bound to follow with similar demands which are usually satisfied for reasons of 'equal treatment' (Theophanous, 1994) and *vice versa*. All these issues have clouded over the functioning of an otherwise 'adequate' system, for years, without being explicitly addressed and dealt with.

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73 Interviews with union representatives and officials (see appendix C.5), November/December 1995.
74 See ibid.
Employee participation at board-level has featured in the unions' demands during recent years, in the public corporate sector, although the idea of workers' participation at enterprise level has been gaining much ground in other areas of economic activity as well, but has not been attempted as yet (Neocleous, 1992). However, according to one disenchanted union representative: "...Although I do not think that that would change things considerably, it would at least help to shift 'favouritism' towards the union...”

Though employees in the public corporate sector enjoy the same right to strike as their private- and public-sector counterparts, actual strikes have been quite rare, the main reason being that due to the vital nature of the services provided in this sector, every effort is expended by both sides to averting industrial action and reaching an agreement. As an example, in 1995 out of 270 new disputes referred to the Ministry of Labour for mediation, 26 occurred in the public corporate sector and of those, 1 resulted in industrial action.75 Nevertheless, other forms of industrial action are frequently employed, such as one-day work stoppages, overtime bans etc. The rarity of strikes in the public corporate sector is the main argument employed by the unions in opposing the government's position on the issue of the legal regulation of strikes in essential services. What has also been observed is a number of disputes caused by inter-union rivalry and union recognition, with the formation of other unions apart from those affiliated to the Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK) in recent years. SEK organised the majority of employees in the public corporate sector up until the late 1980's, when the Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO) joined the scene. Also, in the early 1990's existing and newly formed independent unions set up a co-ordinating committee.

The main issues concerning the public corporate sector such as privatisation and the bill on essential services are currently on hold due to the forthcoming presidential election. A potential change in government will naturally affect the state's responses to the dilemmas facing both the economy and industrial relations, which might in turn have an impact on the power relationships between the actors within the system. However, even if a change in government is not realised, these issues will re-emerge to set the climate for the immediate future in the industrial relations scene.

1.5 Conclusions

The discussion in the present study revealed that, the tradition of 'voluntary tripartism' is entering into a period of crisis, probably its second major one since the review of the Basic Agreement in the late 1960's, and the decision to set up a new accord later known as the Industrial Relations Code. For the system to be sustained, direct cooperation between the parties should be emphasised and promoted. Faced with the socio-economic challenges of the 1990's, the existing industrial and economic problems, as well as prospective EU membership, there is a need for a system as adaptable and as flexible to changing conditions, perhaps as the German system of industrial relations has proved itself to be in recent decades. Local structures as discussed earlier, would have to be incorporated into an otherwise centralised system of negotiations.

Ultimately, within any system 'conflict versus co-operation' poses as a dilemma, which in turn raises the question of strategic choices and decisions. In the case of trade unions, considerable interest is focused on the ability of these organisations, especially the main peak ones, to commit their members to a preferred course of action, while at the same time convincing members of the benefits of being a union member and influencing members' decision to become involved in the union. Trade unions also need to deal with inter-organisational challenges and the problem of resources, in order to respond effectively. With the changes in the labour market, such as the influx of females in the workforce as well as the increase in highly skilled employees (University, College graduates) unions need to find ways to reconcile such diverse interests. Especially in the public corporate sector, where there is a predominantly male presence, a status quo has been generated preventing adequate representation of the interests of females in the workforce by discouraging the participation of females in trade union bodies.

The interest in the existence of a favourable climate towards unions amongst their large-scale memberships, in the case of trade unions in the public corporate sector, and the leaders' ability to influence their memberships, is what unfolds in the remaining chapters. This is argued to be a determining factor in future developments in the character and structure of the system of industrial relations, across sectors, with implications for the survival of the long-standing tradition of 'voluntary tripartism'.
Despite the fact that mobilization lies at the centre of workplace industrial relations, it appears to have been a relatively neglected research area. In the absence of a single theory of mobilization, one is inclined to turn to existing theories of collective action for insights into the mobilization process.

In this chapter it is proposed that by bringing together different strands of literature, such as the literature on social movements, and the social psychological literature on union participation, one can construct a fruitful basis for exploring the issue of mobilization in industrial relations. This could provide satisfactory answers to important theoretical questions and resolve some of the impediments and dilemmas in studying the mobilization process.

Although the emphasis centres around mobilization, what emerges from within the union literature, is the overwhelming importance of leaders as ‘mobilising agents’. Nevertheless, though often mentioned, the effects of leadership on mobilization have not as yet been adequately explored. In turn then, leadership constitutes an integral part of the proposed thesis and as such will be discussed accordingly.

2.1 Reaching out: insights into the mobilization process

The work of people such as Douglas McAdam, Bert Klandermans and Charles Tilly can provide a solid basis for taking the issue of mobilization further. What will be attempted therefore is to review existing perspectives, and identify the way in which they could facilitate the construction of a single framework for the present study.

2.1.1 A social-psychological approach to social movements

Klandermans’s (1984) rationalist approach to willingness to participate in a social movement resides in the underlying principles and assumptions of value-expectancy theory. Klandermans’s theory rests on the assumption that an individual’s willingness to engage in collective action will result from calculating the costs and benefits of the proposed action, under three headings: goal, social and reward motives. The individual’s willingness to
participate in collective action is a weighted sum of these three motives. Evidence from three mobilization campaigns (Klandermans, 1984a) of members of the Industrial Workers’ Trade Union- the largest trade union of industrial workers in the Netherlands- appears to support the theory. That is, it has been reported that the measures of the three motives employed in the study, accounted for between 40 and 60 per cent of the variance in willingness to participate.

Although Klandermans’s work could be argued to have provided an alternative to the ‘macro-tradition’ prevalent within the social movement literature, its rational, calculative character and the return to the ‘micro-level’ of analysis gave rise to criticisms. Such criticisms also revolved around the relevance of the context within which individual decision-making processes occur. As McAdam (1988) points out, an individual’s decision to participate is not formulated within a ‘social vacuum’. Since this is a collective phenomenon, it could not be adequately explained out of individual decisions. A similar point is made by Marwell and Oliver (1993), who argue that the problem of collective action is a group phenomenon, and as such requires a model of group process, and cannot be deduced from simple models of individual behaviour.

Despite acknowledging that the perceived efficacy of participation is dependent on expectations about the behaviour of others, at the same time in Klandermans (1984a), the individual is divorced from the collective setting in which such expectations will be shaped and decisions will be made. As Gamson (1992) argues, “…even in more sophisticated rational actor models that postulate a collective actor making strategic judgements of cost and benefit about collective action, the existence of an established collective identity is assumed”, albeit not explicitly accounted for and explored. He then goes on to cite Melucci (1989) who argues that “only if individual actors can recognise their coherence and continuity as actors will they be able to write their own script of social reality and compare expectations and outcomes”, as “expectations are socially constructed and outcomes can be evaluated only by actors who are capable of defining themselves and the field of their action”. Also, in the case of Klandermans’s (1984) work, there is no reference to the ways in which people are mobilised or the role of union leaders in attempting to mobilise people.

76 See McAdam (1988) and McAdam et al. (1988).
It has also been argued that the underlying premise of the theory, the idea that an individual’s decision to participate in collective action is guided solely by self-interest and thus instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of collective action, is only one possibility, as has recently been acknowledged by Klandermans himself (1989b). Individuals could also be mobilised on the basis of social identity, by increasing its saliency during a mobilization campaign, as Kelly (1998) points out. This provides one with an ‘affective’ route to mobilization, in contrast to the ‘instrumental’ route proposed by Klandermans.

In addition, what has also not been addressed by Klandermans, is whether the importance attached by the individual to each set of motives varies. That is, are they all equally significant for deciding on participation or are for example, social motives more important than goal or reward motives, and if this is the case what determines the degree of importance attached to a particular set of motives? It might be the case for example, that for a person who is very close to the union, and is committed to the principles of collective action, reward motives are not likely to influence his/her decision substantially, whereas the reactions of his/her family (social motives) will.

One other issue that I feel needs to be raised, relevant not only to Klandermans’s work, but also to other studies providing insights to the mobilization process (for e.g. Fantasia, 1988), is whether the way in which the mobilization process is approached should be reassessed. Although on the one hand, the study of individual mobilization campaigns significantly contributes to our understanding of the mobilization process, at the same time, absence of a suitable conceptualisation and a proper framework for studying the process, restricts the ability to generalise and present arguments valid across different campaigns. A broader conceptualisation of mobilization, would allow one to explore the issue of mobilization independent of the dynamics of individual mobilization campaigns.

2.1.2 Building bridges: the ‘micromobilization context’

McAdam’s work provides in a way, a step forward in the process of constructing a broader conceptualisation of mobilization, as proposed above.
Critical of both a strictly macro- or a strictly micro- approach to social movement dynamics, he has provided "...the crucial conceptual 'bridge' of the micromobilization context" (McAdam, 1988; McAdam et al., 1988). Unions for example, are such organised settings where "...processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organisation to produce mobilization for collective action" (McAdam, 1988). However, as McAdam points out, the concept is not synonymous with the union as a formal, bureaucratic entity, but also embraces informal groups within the union, organised on the basis of task, seniority etc. which might provide a solid ground for the organisation of a mobilization attempt.

By introducing the concept of a micromobilization setting, McAdam in a way satisfies his own objections to Klandermans's work, as far as divorcing the individual actor from the collective setting which would inform and shape his/her choice to engage in collective action, is concerned. A crucial aspect of the 'micromobilization' context vital for mobilization, as identified by McAdam, is interaction. The individual processes -cognitive liberation and collective attribution- which as he argues would ultimately lead to participation in collective action, will occur through discussions among group members and arguments put forward to justify resorting to the particular course of action. Interaction overcomes a number of impediments that feature in isolation, which would prevent the creation of a solid basis for collective action. For example, even if individuals do generate the necessary 'cognitions', isolation would prevent diffusion to the 'critical mass' (Marwell and Oliver, 1993) of people required to form a basis for successful collective action.

What is more, expectations about the level of support for collective action, as well as expectations about the efficacy of the action are likely to be better informed within such a context, due to the ready access to information available to members. The issue of expectations was also raised by Klandermans, and its importance acknowledged, although his approach generates doubts as to the reliability and value of such expectations for a decision to engage in collective action, given that an individual in 'isolation' is unlikely to possess the same amount or quality of information.

At the same time, interaction within such a group setting allows other motivational forces to arise, for example by reinforcing individuals' social (group/collective) identity and
subsequently loyalty to the group, as well as increasing the salience of collective principles and
promoting group cohesion. Given that the decision-maker is rational, but up to a point (Simon,
1955) such motivational forces could well overtake any attempts at rational decision-making.
Nevertheless, McAdam (1988) does not discuss how such forces might come about and what
might influence such forces and facilitate their firm establishment, in turn generating favourable
conditions for collective action. His discussion does not sufficiently explore the relationship
between the individual and this group setting (‘micromobilization context’), which means that
his approach remains short of constituting a clear alternative to Klandermans’s approach. The
evidence reviewed in McAdam (1988), as part of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer
project, serve to emphasise the importance of micromobilization contexts for individual
recruitment to activism, rather than to explore the dynamics of such contexts.

What is also worthwhile mentioning in relation to the issue of rationality in decision-
making processes, is that a group setting such as the micromobilization context is able if not to
resolve, at least to mitigate the effects of the “free rider problem” first discussed by Olson
(1965). Olson’s work implies that participation in collective action is an irrational act if
approached from a narrow economic angle, since “rational, self-interested individuals will not
act to achieve their common group interests” (1965:2), given that they would be able to benefit
anyway without having to incur the costs of participation. As the answer to this problem, Olson
cites the provision of ‘selective incentives’ that could induce participation, otherwise precluded
by rational, economic calculus. Although the intention is not to offer a critique of Olson’s
work, it was necessary to briefly go through the fundamentals of his theory so as to introduce
the following argument.77 Within a micromobilization context nevertheless, the use of selective
incentives to induce participation would seem unnecessary, as McAdam (1988) points out. By
identifying movement participation with membership of the particular group setting, organisers
are able to employ the same set of incentives rooted in such organisations, to call for member
support for action. In essence then, the motivating forces that led to group membership are
now simply transferred to the movement, which incidentally means that organisers need not
expend resources in searching for new incentives. The idea of group membership, central to the

77 For a more detailed discussion, see Olson (1965).
above reasoning, forms the basis of the present thesis’ approach to mobilization, to be discussed in the next chapter.

To demonstrate the importance of interaction within a union setting, in an attempt to apply the ideas discussed above to the current research context, I turn to the existing trade union literature on mobilization. In Fantasia’s case studies (1988) interaction was crucial, especially in the cases where strike action was illegal and workers faced certain dismissal if the action was unsuccessful. In the Taylor Casting Company case study, not only was the action illegal but also workers had little experience with any form of collective action: “The only previous strikes that anyone remembered were over renegotiation of contracts, the last one having occurred four years earlier” (ibid.1988: 82). Interaction legitimated the action, promoted group cohesion and generated strong solidarity among the workforce. At the same time, interaction served to firmly establish group boundaries and promote outgroup stereotyping, once in contact with management (the outgroup), as social identity and realistic conflict theories would predict. A strong collective identity was also very important in the second case study of a union organising campaign at Springfield hospital, especially in the face of attempts by management to intimidate nurses involved in the campaign. Leadership also features as a crucial factor in the context of mobilization, but it will be discussed in a later section.

Further evidence on the importance of interaction can be found in Batstone et al.’s (1978) work, whereby within a mobilization setting leaders were able to imbue members with a sense of grievance, and subsequently create a collective consciousness that would induce members to engage in collective action. Discussions and the use of specific vocabularies relating to the full implications of management’s proposals, took place in order to educate members and legitimate the proposed action. Such vocabularies were also employed by members once the decision to strike had been taken, that served to legitimate and justify that decision.

Again as has been suggested earlier, although studies such as Fantasia’s provide useful insights into the mobilization process, they are merely descriptive and so do not allow generalisation or the construction of a framework that could be employed in a number of different settings to explore this issue. Case studies are indispensable, especially given the
importance of social interaction at the workplace, but provided they employ a general theoretical framework that can be tested using multiple research methods. What is more, the need to take into consideration both the individual and the collective setting where decisions are made, which has also been strongly emphasised, reinforces the argument for an alternative approach to mobilization. It is argued then, and will be discussed at a later stage, that a new approach to mobilization should take into account both the individual actor as well as the context within which decision-making processes occur, while at the same time developing a broader conceptualisation of mobilization.

To sum up, McAdam's work emphasises the importance of the context within which individual choice processes occur, thus complementing the view put forward by Klandermans which focuses solely on the individual actor. However, at the same time McAdam is not very clear about the actual processes that occur within the micromobilization context and so in essence, how individuals are mobilised into participating in collective action within such a context remains to be addressed. The issue of a broader, more 'flexible' conceptualisation of mobilization is discussed in the section that follows.

2.2 Getting started: an attempt at conceptualising and measuring mobilization

Mobilization has been defined in a number of ways, but all share a common conceptual basis. What will be attempted in this section is to provide adequate justification for shifting the emphasis in defining mobilization, in an effort to provide a more solid conceptual basis and subsequently a more stable definition.

2.2.1 Conceptualising

What induced me to consider the possibility of approaching mobilization in a broader sense, outside individual mobilization campaigns for the achievement of specific goals, was precisely the centrality of this process to the functioning of SMOs (social movement organisations) as McAdam (1988) refers to them, and more specifically labour organisations.

Tilly (1978) defines mobilization as the "process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action...and makes them available for collective action" (ibid.: 7). Such resources include time, money, effort, skills etc. At the same time, Klandermans
(1984a) distinguishes between two components of mobilization attempts: consensus mobilization and action mobilization. **Consensus** mobilization is the process through which a social movement tries to gather support for its goals of action, and thus aims to influence attitudes and beliefs. **Action** mobilization follows consensus mobilization, and is aimed at motivating individuals to participate in collective action, for achieving the movement’s goals, and as such is directed towards influencing behaviour. What Klandermans also points out is that both collective goods and types of action are changeable quantities, not fixed, and so that means that each time a renewed consensus mobilization is required, which would be followed by a renewed action mobilization.

In my view, two problematic issues emerge from existing conceptualisations of mobilization:

(i) By relating the mobilization process strictly to the provision of specific, collective goods, an SMO, for example a union, can only assess the potential for the successful mobilization of its membership in relation to the goals at hand. The issue becomes then, that such an assessment does not say anything about the members’ support of the organisation as a whole, its principles and values. Now, the question is, would it not be preferable for such an organisation to be able to assess its membership’s support irrespective of the appeal (or not) of specific goals? And would it not be a useful quantity to explore at different stages of an individual’s union experience?

(ii) The second point more or less follows from the first one. Given the above, it could be argued that since membership support can only be assessed through the appeal of specific collective goods, organisers would be unable to make predictions about the expected level of support prior to spreading information on the collective good. That essentially means that the organisers could only speculate about the level of support and the attitudes of the membership towards collective action. Although one might argue that organisers could draw inferences from previous campaigns, as such campaigns are inextricably linked to specific goods, this reasoning inevitably assumes a constancy in members’ priorities and needs at different points in time. This is not a valid assumption to make however, since members’ needs and priorities are expected to vary over time, with fluctuating levels of support for collective action directed at attaining specific collective goods. For example, demands about improvements in health and
safety might become a crucial issue in deteriorating working conditions, and thus command strong support and willingness to engage in collective action, but that would not necessarily suggest a similar level of support at a different point in time, or in the case of a campaign for a different collective good. In a sense then, there exists no solid and reliable basis on which to conduct a mobilization campaign, since that is beginning to form only after the mobilization campaign has been initiated.

The first point directs attention to the idea of mobilization as a continuous process, rather than a recurring process. Conceptualising mobilization in this way, would allow an organisation to assess the mobilization potential of its membership at different points in time irrespective of individual campaigns. This would in turn provide organisers with firm indications about how they should be conducting any upcoming campaigns and would subsequently increase the probability of successful mobilization of members.

The proposed definition then, should be broad enough to escape the confines of individual mobilization campaigns and should identify mobilization as a continuous process. By focusing on what the underlying objective of every mobilization campaign is, these two criteria can be satisfied. According to Tilly (1978:69) “…mobilization conveniently identifies the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life”. It is argued then that mobilization can be defined as the transformation of individuals into collective actors. Such a process does not necessarily end with the completion of a mobilization campaign, it is ongoing and acts as a background to these campaigns. Transforming individuals into collective actors is regarded as the ultimate objective of any SMO, not simply trade unions. However, since the current project will only deal with labour organisations, one should argue on the significance of this broader definition for mobilization within these organisations.

Given the debates surrounding the decline of trade unionism, as well as the decline of collectivism (e.g. Brown, 1990, Bassett and Cave, 1993) and the challenges facing trade unions in the future, I would argue that it has become even more important for trade unions to approach mobilization in the way it has been defined above, and so in a sense acknowledge the significance of ensuring membership support not simply in the case of individual mobilization attempts, but throughout members’ union experience. For trade unions to preserve their
identity, they should consist of members supportive of their values and principles. Individuals enter trade unions with a range of different influences and predispositions, for some more positive than others, but once they are socialised into the organisation, what should follow is an educational process, a *mobilization* process to involve them into the workings of the organisation with the objective to gradually transform them into collective actors.

Looking back to Fantasia's (1988) case studies, one finds evidence to suggest that in the absence of mechanisms for the continuous 'mobilization' of members, as defined above, 'cultures of solidarity' as Fantasia refers to them, formed as part of individual mobilization campaigns are unlikely to be sustained once such campaigns have been terminated. In the context of Fantasia's case studies, the solidarity and strong collective identity that prevailed during the campaigns gradually evaporated in the face of adversity, and in the absence of solid foundations and an organised setting that would continue to promote such principles and values.

2.2.2 Operationalising

Having conceptualised mobilization as an ongoing process of transforming individuals into collective actors, naturally one might argue that within such a process a number of activities would be taking place to achieve the desired outcome. However, at the same time the aim here is to introduce a quantitative element into the process, preventing the adoption of a purely descriptive approach, as has been the case in the literature so far. This would lead to the construction of a theoretical framework for the systematic analysis of mobilization processes, one that could be used in a number of different settings to explore the potential for mobilization.

Since the focus of the current project is labour organisations, existing literature on mobilization and trade union participation can provide the necessary foundations for developing a measure of mobilization as defined above. It has been suggested that the mobilization process should follow the socialisation of individuals into the organisation, with the ultimate objective of transforming individuals into collective actors. The questions then arise, how could one assess the progress made at different stages of the mobilization process,
and what would be suitable indicators to employ for measuring the success (or not) of such a process?

Turning briefly to Klandermans's work, and the context of individual mobilization campaigns, willingness to participate in collective action is presented as the outcome of mobilization attempts. In other words, willingness to participate in collective action acts as a measure of the successful mobilization of members. Taking this point further, it is argued that outside the confines of mobilization campaigns, willingness to participate can act as a measure of successful mobilization as defined above, that is as a measure of the transformation of individuals into collective actors. What should be taken into consideration however, is that willingness to participate in collective action is but one aspect of an individual's union experience, so all other forms of action likely to occur in a union setting should also be regarded as relevant for the purpose of the proposed thesis.

One would need to consider the whole spectrum of union participation, if one is to construct an adequate measure of willingness to participate, as an indicator of the transformation of individuals into collective actors. It should also be noted, that although in the literature on union participation an issue arises about the need to distinguish between the intention to participate and actual participation (Klandermans, 1986), in this case such an issue is of no real relevance. Since the thesis explores mobilization and not participation, one can only be concerned with the intention to participate as it reveals itself at different stages of the mobilization process. Whether the intention to participate translates (or not) to actual participation is an issue that falls within a different strand of research.

By employing willingness to participate within a mobilization context, the importance of the intention to participate is emphasised, and a suitable conceptual setting is provided whereby it can be adequately explored. While the participation literature focuses mostly on actual participation rather than the intention to participate, the latter could occupy a central role within the mobilization literature. By explicitly distinguishing between intention to participate and actual participation, one clarifies the underlying implications for employing one rather than the other to measure participation, in an attempt to prevent them from being used interchangeably. This is significant since, as Klandermans (1986) has pointed out, although they have sometimes been used interchangeably they may not have the same determinants. Despite
the fact that Klandermans (1986) was referring to one specific form of union participation, collective action, his reasoning could extent to cover other forms of participation as well. What is more, by identifying the determinants of the intention to participate, one would then be able to identify what in addition, influences actual participation. It might be that participation could then be viewed as the process of translating the intention to participate into actual participation (Klandermans, 1986).

On the issue of antecedents of participation, it has been argued that demographic variables such as age, Gender, education, marital status, income have little influence (Klandermans, 1986). However in Nicholson et al.'s study (1981), of all the demographic variables, Gender was the only one that emerged as highly significant. It seems to me that it is important to explore the issue of gender further in relation to participation, especially in light of the increasing presence of females in the workforce, and the need for unions to operate in female-dominated sectors, such as services. It would be interesting to examine whether females are simply unwilling to participate in unions, or whether their willingness does not translate into actual participation, because for example of the male-dominated character of unions that is perceived as restricting access to women. By employing the distinction provided above it would be possible to explore gender as an antecedent of the intention to participate, and to assess the willingness of females to participate at different levels of the union. It is suggested that the relative absence of a formal distinction between the intention to participate and actual participation, has to some extent prevented researchers from adequately addressing the issue of gender within the context of trade union involvement.

Also, it could be argued that the intention to participate is not subject to the same fluctuations as actual participation. In addition to the fact that many forms of participation are opportunity based (e.g. holding elected office, ratification votes etc.) as Parks et al. (1995) point out, it is also not obvious that participation is stable over time or that its intensity remains invariable (Kryl, 1990). In contrast, the intention to participate can be argued to be more of a stable quantity, since it is not exposed to the external variables that might restrict one's actual participation, such as family responsibilities, social pressures etc. By focusing on the intention to participate as the more 'stable component' of participation, and as the outcome of a

78 An issue that has been picked up by writers on gender and trade unions, e.g. Lawrence (1994).
successful mobilization process, a solid basis will be generated for unions to then concentrate their efforts in translating that willingness to participate into actual participation. Taking this point further, while different forms of actual participation may be more or less important at different stages of a union's life cycle (Parks et al., 1995), willingness to participate in different activities should be maintained throughout. This can be achieved through a consistent and properly targeted mobilization process.

With the proposed approach then: (i) a firm distinction between intention to participate and actual participation is provided, as well as (ii) a context (mobilization) for exploring the former and identifying its antecedents.

2.3 Moving along: the antecedents of willingness to participate

Having 'operationalised' mobilization in terms of the willingness to participate in union activities, and discussed the rationale for doing so, the next step would be to explore the existing literature on the antecedents of trade union participation. Although the present study employs willingness to participate within a mobilization setting, existing studies of participation provide a fruitful basis for discussing the current approach. Two issues pertaining to existing research on union participation will be discussed: (i) the dimensionality of union participation, and (ii) the link between member attitudes, such as union commitment, and union participation, as it emerges from individual studies.

As has been mentioned earlier, studies of trade union participation have focused predominantly on measuring actual participation, rather than the intention (willingness) to participate, although occasionally willingness to participate has been used as a proxy for participation (e.g. Kelly and Kelly, 1994). In addition to exploring demographic, as well as socialisation variables as determinants of behavioural participation, more recently attention has been directed to exploring the links between employee attitudes, such as union commitment, and union participation (Fullagar and Barling, 1989; Fullagar and Barling, 1991; Kelloway and Barling, 1993 etc.), following the development of a criterion for union commitment by Gordon et al. (1980). At the same time, increasing interest has been directed at establishing the nature of union participation. One could distinguish between two main positions, those researchers
favouring a unidimensional view of participation (e.g. Barling et al., 1992; Kelloway and Barling, 1993), and those favouring a multidimensional view of union participation (e.g. McShane, 1986; Parks et al., 1995). Consequently, lack of agreement concerning the nature of participation has been inevitably introduced in the study of the link between various antecedents, such as union commitment and participation, with different studies employing either a multidimensional or a unidimensional measure, depending on the perspective adhered to by the researchers. Examples to illustrate this point are discussed below.

McShane (1986) in an attempt to provide support for the notion of a multidimensional measure of participation, performed factor analysis on items measuring three types of participation as identified by previous research, i.e. administration of the union branch, union voting participation and union meeting attendance. These were all self-report measures, with the exception of meeting attendance, where the author was able to also obtain data of attendance at general union meetings, from union records. However, due to the high correlation between self-report measures and the record data, it was decided to employ the self-report measures. The factor analysis revealed three factors, and subsequent multiple regression analysis to explore the construct validity of these factors revealed a different pattern of results for each of the factors. Nevertheless, a number of criticisms have been raised in relation to McShane's work, such as the choice of highly unrealistic models (Barling et al., 1992), the applicability of factor analysis to dichotomously scored behavioural data (e.g. Kelloway and Barling, 1993), the reliability of one- and two-item factors (e.g. Barling et al., 1992). McShane (1986) found that general attitude towards trade-unionism significantly predicted administrative participation, but not meeting attendance or voting participation.

On the other hand, Kelloway and Barling (1993) employed a unidimensional measure of behavioural participation based on a number of union activities identified in the literature, from meeting attendance to holding union office. Their measure relied on the notion of union participation as a continuum, initially put forward by Nicholson (1978). Despite acknowledging that little attention had been paid to conceptualising union participation, and that the construct of participation has been defined primarily through operationalisation, their approach remained highly empirical and as such conceptually deficient. At the same time, no justification was given, theoretical or otherwise for including specific union activities and excluding others.
What is more, their brief discussion on the interdependency of the ‘chosen’ union activities was not entirely convincing. They employed linear structural modelling techniques to confirm the proposed unidimensional structure of union participation, as well as to evaluate a model of union participation. The results appeared to support a unidimensional measure for union participation. Willingness to work for the union, employed to measure behavioural intention, was confirmed as a direct, significant predictor of participation in union activities, while union loyalty emerged as direct, significant predictor of willingness to work for the union.

Fullagar and Barling (1989) in a longitudinal study on the antecedents and consequences of union loyalty, established a link between union loyalty and formal union participation. A single composite index of participation was employed, in line with the unidimensional view of union participation, which concentrated on ‘formal’ union activities, such as participation in union elections, frequency of attendance at union meetings, etc. In this same study, union instrumentality was found to act both as a strong predictor of union participation, as well as a moderator in the relationship between union loyalty and participation.

Thacker et al. (1990) in an attempt to construct antecedent and outcome models of union commitment adopted a different measure of participation, one that they argued supported the position that participation is not unidimensional. However, they employ Huszczo’s (1980) single composite index of union participation, consisting of behaviours that in themselves might require different explanations and motivations, along with two single item measures. This index did not appear to resemble what has been termed as ‘administrative’ (McShane, 1986) or ‘formal’ participation (e.g. Fullagar and Barling, 1989). As Parks et al. (1995) argue, the use of such measures is inappropriate when one assumes that participation is multidimensional in nature. They further argue, that the use of such inappropriate measures is a consequence of the unclear conceptualisation and inadequate validation of the union participation construct, and as such is endemic to the majority of the research involving union participation. What is more, the results of factor analysis in relation to the participation measure, that could serve as an indication of the validity of the measure, are not discussed.

As far as the statistical method employed to explore the hypothesised relationships is concerned, intercorrelations were computed to assess the relationship between a multivariate

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79 For more information on the measure used, see Fullagar and Barling (1989) and Fullagar (1986).
model of commitment and its behavioural outcomes, as identified above. However, correlational analysis prevents any assessment of the importance of individual commitment factors for specific outcomes, that could have been explored only within a regression framework. Also, given that the causal link between commitment attitudes and behaviours remains unclear, the hypothesis that union commitment causes behavioural outcomes cannot be adequately assessed using a cross-sectional design. Nevertheless, total union commitment, union loyalty and all the other factors of union commitment (willingness to work for the union, belief in unionism, responsibility towards the union) emerged as strongly and significantly associated with the participation index above, while union loyalty was also correlated with voting behaviour.

The strong relationship between union instrumentality and behavioural participation highlighted in the study by Fullagar and Barling (1989), supports findings from other studies that have explored the links between union instrumentality and other aspects of unionisation, such as propensity to vote (e.g. De Cotiis and LeLouarn, 1981). In the study cited, union instrumentality was also found to be strongly associated with intent to vote, which would then lead to actual vote. This study in a sense, emphasises the importance of both intent to vote and actual vote and distinguishes between the two within a model of the unionisation process.

In a recent attempt to emphasise and demonstrate the need for a multidimensional measure of union participation, Parks et al. (1995) employed a broader range of union activities, including day-to-day activities that represent involvement in the union, apart from traditional measures of participation such as office holding, voting and meeting attendance. They also divided their responses in three time periods. Their results appeared to demonstrate support for a multidimensional measure of participation comprising three dimensions: administrative, supportive and intermittent participation, although the cross-sectional nature of their data directs attention to the temporal stability of their findings. Even though this study attempts to be more inclusive in the range of activities considered, the absence of a conceptual basis linking these activities remains an issue. Interestingly enough, the authors emphasise the need for a clear conceptualisation of the participation construct, but do not appear to respond to the challenge.

A shorter version of the criterion developed by Gordon et al.(1980) was employed.
On the basis of the evidence presented above one could argue the following: (i) lack of agreement on the nature of union participation has led to different operationalisations being employed, which resulted in a series of inconclusive findings on the link between union participation and its antecedents. What is more, as Parks et al. (1995) argue, in the absence of a clear conceptualisation and precise definition of the construct of interest, that is union participation, research in this area falls as they call it "...into the domain of potentially premature substantive research". Measuring different behaviours and classifying them all under the heading of union participation does not provide one with an adequate and reliable measure of union participation. Although this appears to be acknowledged by researchers, at the same time the treatment of participation remains empirical, with no real attempts at providing a clear conceptualisation. A widely accepted conceptual definition of the construct would at least provide researchers with a common basis to proceed on, which is at present not the case, and thus facilitate progress in substantive research in this area; (ii) the majority of studies exploring the link between member attitudes and participation, have been restricted to exploring union commitment and its various factors as antecedents, rather than also exploring other attitudes important for union participation, such as stereotypical attitudes towards management. The idea of examining a set of attitudinal measures and assessing their independent and/or combined contribution to predicting participation has not been sufficiently addressed.

One study that attempted to consider a range of factors associated with participation is a study by Kelly and Kelly (1994). In this study, a set of social psychological factors (group identification, collectivist orientation, outgroup stereotyping, perceived inter-group conflict, egoistic and collective relative deprivation, political efficacy) are examined in the context of trade union involvement, as antecedents to willingness to participate, not actual participation. It found that group identifications, collectivist orientation as well as stereotypical perceptions of the outgroup (management) were significant predictors of willingness to participate in union activities. This directs attention to the significance of 'them and us' attitudes, as well as group identifications and collectivist orientation as determinants of the intention to participate. Although the study explored the relationships as part of research in union participation (involvement) it would be worthwhile to consider such factors within a mobilization setting, as the current approach instructs.
In the introduction to the study, however, Kelly and Kelly (1994) set up the rationale for the proposed research by only considering one form of participation in union activities, and that is willingness to participate in collective action, while the actual study employs a two-dimensional index of willingness to participate, consisting of a range of behaviours. It is argued therefore, that it is not necessarily obvious that potential determinants of willingness to take part in collective action are also determinants of the willingness to participate in other union activities, unless there exists an underlying conceptual basis that provides an association between different forms of behaviours. Such a basis is not discussed by the authors.

Alongside the debate on the multidimensional or unidimensional nature of participation, researchers offered other alternatives for distinguishing between union activities. For example, Fullagar and Barling (1989) employed a typology of union participation that distinguished between formal and informal union activities, also employed in a study by Gordon et al. (1995), where they found union commitment to be predictive of participation. One study that employed a broader conceptualisation of union participation is Anderson (1979) who focused on members' degree of involvement in and influence over, union decision making. However, there were no further research attempts to explore this definition.

By providing a proper conceptual basis for the intention to participate, and a setting whereby to explore the concept, one avoids to a large extent the phenomena described above. Although the proposed thesis deals with willingness to participate rather than actual participation, by clarifying the former this might contribute further to paving the way for rethinking the latter.

The material for the sections that follow concentrates, I would argue, on another crucial determinant of the intention to participate, especially within a mobilization setting, union leadership. Although the current approach explores willingness to participate as the outcome of the mobilization process, i.e. the transformation of individuals into collective actors, leadership is also an important antecedent to participation. In these sections, emphasis will be placed on the relative absence of studies assessing the importance of leadership within the mobilization literature, but the existing literature on the relationship between union leadership and participation, as well as on other aspects of union leadership, will also be reviewed and its implications discussed.
2.4 Thinking about leadership: assessing implications for research

As Kelly (1998) argues, though there has often been reference to the nature and effects of leadership on mobilization, they have rarely been theorised. Evidence for the critical role leaders play as agents of the mobilization process, can be found in Fantasia’s studies (1988), also cited above, as well as in Batstone et al. (1978) and in the writings by McAdam (1988) and Marwell and Oliver (1993).

It appears from Fantasia’s case studies that both formal and informal leaders play a vital role at the mobilization stage, once they have imbued workers with a sense of grievance by (i) promoting group cohesion and identity, (ii) urging workers to participate in collective action, especially in cases where the action was illegal, (iii) legitimating collective action, functions also identified by Kelly (1998). What is also worthwhile noting is the emergence of an informal ‘leadership’ network in the case of wildcat strikes, actively involved in mobilising workers for action, at the same time as formal leadership sought to prevent the action altogether. As a result the legitimacy of the formal leadership had been questioned. However, as Fantasia argues, workers’ criticism of the union’s leadership did not represent an overall anti-union sentiment. On the contrary, their actions were aimed at protecting the union, by redefining it outside the confines of the formal organisational context in which it operated on a day-to-day basis, since they had no faith in pursuing their demands through routine channels.

Taking this point further, one might argue that the formalisation and institutionalisation of procedures and individuals within organisations, not least within trade unions, that is likely to come about as organisations grow larger and as they become firmly established over time, can influence the effectiveness of formal leaders in their handling and resolution of grievances, as well as in instances of mobilization for collective action. This idea is associated with the issue of union democracy, and the union’s ability to maintain and preserve democratic procedures as its organisational complexity increases, over time. As Strauss (1991) argues, “...on balance democracy increases union effectiveness in representing members’ interests and in mobilising these members to support its collective bargaining objectives”. Consequently, following Strauss’s argument, a decline in union democracy can lead to a decrease in the union’s
effectiveness. As unions become more bureaucratic, and as their structural complexity increases, one indication of a decline in union democracy is limited member influence, and lower levels of participation in union meetings (Anderson, 1978). This in turn leads to less leader-member contact and thus the leadership loses touch with the needs and expectations of the rank-and-file, rendering the union ineffective in adequately representing its members.

According to Fantasia (1988), the ‘bureaucratization’ of American trade unionism has given rise to a generation of trade union leaders that ‘…have been schooled in the pragmatic ethos of the social contract’, and as a result in light of the violation of the social contract by employers, most leaders had little knowledge about or experience in offering an effective response.

This has implications for studies exploring the impact of leadership on mobilization, directing attention to the need for a distinction between informal and formal leaders and their influence over members. This is probably more relevant though, within the context of individual mobilization campaigns, where there is an opportunity for informal leaders to emerge, rather than within a mobilization setting as it has been defined for the current study. Nevertheless, this is an important issue for consideration by future studies in this area, even though the nature of the present study does not allow one to explore this issue.

In Batstone et al. (1978), an additional role for leaders may be discerned, that of increasing the salience of stereotypical attitudes to management, by attributing blame for the action to management and the company, as was the case in one of Fantasia’s case studies. Essentially leaders had to persuade workers that there was no other choice, but to take action, since management had not been able to resolve their grievances even though numerous opportunities had been given. At the same time, feelings of loyalty to the union were made more salient by employing past/present comparisons and in turn, emphasising the union’s past successes. This could also intensify perceptions of the union’s instrumentality in achieving desired outcomes. According to one steward talking to members within the context of a mobilization campaign:

"You compare what things are like now with what they were twenty years ago… it was the strength of trade unionists in the old days that won what we enjoy now…" (Ibid. : 158).
Also, as Batstone et al. (1978) notes, leaders “… had succeeded in altering the perspectives of their members and developing a trade-union-oriented collective consciousness” (ibid.: 171). What is more, the role of leaders and more specifically stewards, is also highlighted in Batstone et al. (1977), outside the strict boundaries of mobilization campaigns, whereby it is argued that stewards concentrate on fostering collective principles and resort to collective means among members as a routine, while occasionally they go on to create a collective consciousness involving an awareness of opposition to management, usually in relation to specific management strategies (ibid.:266-267). This then directs attention to the importance of leaders throughout members’ union experience and not simply within individual mobilization campaigns.

In McAdam’s work, leaders are referred to as simply one of the essential resources within a micromobilization setting, with members and what he terms ‘communication network’, being the two other resources that are needed to translate attributions into collective action (McAdam et al., 1988). These were argued to deserve particular attention and their contribution was discussed (McAdam et al., 1988). However, the precise mechanisms of interaction between these resources, which would ultimately lead to participation in collective action, are not sufficiently explored. More to the point, despite acknowledging the importance of leaders or organisers, their impact and influence on members within such a group setting is not addressed. What is also not directly addressed in McAdam’s discussion of the micromobilization context, is potential consequences from the absence, or even limited availability of any one of the resources deemed as essential for “staging” a social movement. For example, in the absence of leaders (organisers) is it likely that an instance of activism remains a possibility? Given that the absence of a mobilising leadership has been identified as one factor explaining the absence of collective identification and action (e.g. Kelly, 1998), the above is an issue that needs to be addressed. The question posed above then, could only be answered if the functions served by leaders had been discussed, so that the implications from their absence could be identified. This brings us back full circle to a point made earlier, about the importance of exploring the mechanisms of interaction between resources within a ‘micromobilization context’.
Marwell and Oliver’s (1993) approach to collective action, explicitly identifies the importance of leaders or organisers as they refer to them, for mobilising individuals for collective action. Although their approach focuses on the cost and benefit calculations associated with collective action, arguing that group members will agree to participate/contribute if the total benefit they would experience exceeds their own share of the cost, the role of the ‘organiser’ as co-ordinator of the action clearly emerges. As they argue, organisers are no different from anyone else, in that they have available resources and an interest in the collective good. However, they differ in that they devote their resources in mobilising efforts, making sure others will contribute to the collective good.

Although then in the writings cited above, the role of leaders is discussed and their importance highlighted as part of the mobilization process, there has been limited discussion as to how they do it. How is it that leaders manage to obtain the desired responses from members, and what aspects of leadership behaviour lead to such responses? What are the mechanisms through which leaders are able to create a sense of collective consciousness among members, and an overall favourable climate for mobilization and collective action? For useful insights into the leadership process one can turn to the theoretical and empirical literature on organisational leadership. However, prior to doing that, the available literature on union leadership will be reviewed and its implications for the current study discussed.

2.4.1 Union leadership: theory and research

Research on union leadership within a mobilization setting has been surprisingly absent in the trade union literature. At the same time, attention has focused around the role of union leaders, rather than the behaviours required for successful performance of that role (Barling et al., 1992), while a good deal of research has been devoted to developing ‘typologies’ of union leadership (e.g. Batstone et al., 1977). As Fullagar et al. (1992) have indicated, “...little empirical endeavour has been undertaken to investigate the effects of the leadership behaviours of union officers”. However, more recently attention has been directed to the followers and their emotional responses to the leaders, investigating the effects of leadership behaviours on union members (e.g. Fullagar et al., 1992; Kelloway and Barling, 1993). Despite different levels of union leadership, studies exploring this area have focused on the shop steward, precisely
because as Peck (1963) argues “...the shop steward is the rank-and-file leader in the shop. No other level of leadership possesses such intimate, direct contact with the membership...”. And also, a greater understanding of the shop steward role may generalise to other levels of leadership, since many full-time officials do begin their involvement in union leadership as union stewards (Barling et al., 1992).

Indications as to a possible conceptual link between steward behaviour and members’ commitment to the union were found in Gordon et al.’s (1980) study, whereby a criterion for union commitment was developed. In this study, attitudes toward both the local union and its officers were found to highly correlate with union loyalty. Subsequent research supported the view that local leaders’ behaviour is vital for fostering positive attitudes towards the union. For example, a study by Clark (1986) found that union members’ evaluation of the skill and availability of the steward was an important predictor of the two dimensions of union commitment, union loyalty and willingness to work for the union. Another study by Thacker et al. (1990) distinguished between different levels of leadership (steward, chief steward, officer) and found positive and significant correlations between leader accessibility and all factors of union commitment. Once multivariate analysis was employed to examine the variables, chief steward accessibility came out as the strongest predictor of both union loyalty and overall union commitment. At the same time, steward accessibility did not even enter the regression equation.

Although the Thacker et al. (1990) study does introduce leadership as a potential antecedent of union commitment, at the same time it restricts itself in exploring only one aspect of steward behaviour, accessibility. It is argued that there are other aspects of leader behaviour that may be hypothesised to be antecedents of union commitment, such as effectiveness in handling grievances, negotiating with management etc. Local leaders’ effectiveness has been associated with positive union attitudes, such as union satisfaction (e.g. Glick et al., 1977). Also, members’ assessment of the union’s handling of the grievance process -not the outcome, a primary responsibility of shop stewards, has been found to act as an antecedent to members’ commitment to the union. More specifically, the strongest relationship was found in the case of union loyalty, as compared with the other two factors (Responsibility to the union and Willingness to work for the union).
What is more, given the more recent developments in the organisational leadership literature, and the emphasis on the emotional responses of followers to the leader (Bass, 1985), this is probably one other aspect of leader behaviour that should have been considered. If other aspects of steward behaviour had been considered, it is argued that the distinction between different levels of leadership would have been more meaningful, as this would have allowed a comparative account of the importance attached to different aspects of leader behaviour as antecedents of overall commitment, or different factors of commitment. It is argued, for example, that contrary to the result that steward accessibility does not seem to have an impact on union commitment, steward effectiveness might have had, since stewards are the ones primarily responsible for grievance handling. At the same time, affective attachment to higher-level officials, such as local officers, could also have an impact on the different dimensions of union commitment and/or overall commitment.

The Thacker et al. (1990) study, also examined the possibility that commitment mediates in the relationship between antecedents and outcomes, by employing a rather crude mathematical process, and found that commitment does act as an intervening variable in the above relationship. Although this is an important finding, the method used to assess the proposition is not satisfactory, primarily due its correlational nature and thus the fact that it does not provide any information about the direction of the relationship. This is mentioned in the authors' discussion of the results. They argue nevertheless, that their study supports the results of a Fullagar and Barling (1989) study, which found that union loyalty acted as an intervening variable between antecedents and behavioural participation. However, I would argue that even if union loyalty has been found to account for the most variance in union commitment (Gordon et al., 1980), it is not necessarily obvious that the intervening effect of union loyalty would also apply for total union commitment.

One other study that has employed the concept of steward accessibility, is a study by Nicholson et al. (1981). Here, a broader conceptualisation of steward accessibility dealt with interest shown in members and their input, and leadership style, and explored the frequency and ease of contact with the steward, the steward’s communicativeness, interest in members’ well-being at work and style of decision making. Steward accessibility was hypothesised to mediate in the relationship between antecedents and behavioural participation. In fact, it was found to
act as a moderator in the relationship between need for involvement and actual participation. That is, a need for involvement in the union is required, before steward accessibility can have an impact on actual participation. As an independent predictor, steward accessibility did have a significant impact on overall participation, although not as strong as in the case of need for involvement and union friends, and more specifically on voting behaviour.\textsuperscript{81}

These are significant findings in that they direct attention to the potential moderating effect of leader behaviour in translating favourable attitudes, such as union loyalty, to participative behaviours. However, the study has restricted itself in examining only one aspect of steward behaviour, accessibility. At the same time, it might have been interesting to introduce the distinction between different levels of leadership, as in the Thacker et al., (1990) study, to compare their potential contribution as moderators. Also, as steward accessibility did not have that strong an effect on behavioural participation, it would have been useful to explore whether other aspects of leader behaviour, such as steward effectiveness would.

More recent studies have turned to the developments in the organisational leadership literature, and Bass's (1985) work on transformational and transactional leadership. A study by Fullagar et al. (1992) aiming to investigate the effects of union socialisation on union attitudes and loyalty, hypothesised that the leadership characteristics of the socialising agent would come out as significant predictors of union attitudes, loyalty and socialisation. Leadership characteristics were measured using the transformational leadership factor from Bass (1985). This was the first real attempt to investigate the impact of transformational leadership characteristics on commitment to the union, and also provide a proper conceptual framework within which they could be examined, the socialisation process.

Despite the caution raised in relation to the generalisability of the results, referring to the analysis as an exploratory one and the findings as constrained by the nature of the research setting and the kind of socialisation and training process explored, which is specific to certain craft-based unions and may not be appropriate to other union settings, (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994), the study demonstrated the importance of perceived transformational leadership characteristics for influencing the union socialisation process and attitudes to organised labour. More specifically, the study found that the \textit{individualised consideration} and

\textsuperscript{81} For a discussion see Nicholson et al. (1981).
attention that the socialising agent (journeyman) offered the apprentice, significantly influenced both union socialisation and the development of positive union attitudes. The charismatic behaviour of the journeyman, in this instance, was also found to significantly affect socialisation into the union, while intellectual stimulation, the extent to which the leader was perceived as intellectually stimulating and innovative, was found to have an impact on the development of attitudes toward the unions. That is, the journeyman was an important factor in the formulation of members’ ideas regarding unions.

Contrary to the hypothesised relationship between transformational leadership characteristics and union loyalty, none of the leadership characteristics came out as direct, significant predictors of union loyalty. Rather, the relationships appeared to be indirect. One explanation for this might be the nature of the setting in which these relationships were assessed. Within a socialisation setting specific attitudes towards the union, such as union loyalty or union commitment, are the outcomes of the socialisation process. Therefore, it could be argued that the influence of the socialising agent is directed more at convincing members of the benefits of unionisation, and as such targeting any misconceptions or stereotypes related to unionisation that the member might adhere to, which would facilitate the development of more favourable attitudes towards unionisation and subsequently to attitudes of loyalty to the union, rather than directly influencing the outcomes of the socialisation process. What becomes then a potentially interesting theoretical and empirical question is what the impact of perceived leadership characteristics is at later stages of the members’ union experience, i.e. within a mobilization setting and as part of the mobilization process, as has been defined above, which has been argued to follow socialisation into the union. This would provide a conceptual basis for examining the importance of leadership characteristics at later stages of one’s union membership, once individual attitudes toward the union have been formed. It might be for example, that through daily contact with leaders, as mobilising agents, different aspects of leader behaviour become an important determinant of attachment to the union.

Other limitations of the study that have been mentioned in the literature (Fullagar et al., 1994) referred to the small size of the sample (N=71) that has been argued to prevent conclusive statements in relation to the findings, as well as the statistical establishment of the

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82 This was operationalised in terms of the cost and benefits associated with unionisation, rather than general
construct validity of the measures employed. In addition, the study explored only one dimension of union commitment, union loyalty, although evidence in the literature clearly points to the multidimensional nature of the construct (e.g. Gordon et al., 1980; Fullagar et al., 1986 etc.). Clearly then, insights into the socialisation process would be enriched by operationalising union commitment in line with this multidimensional conceptualisation. Nevertheless, this study has provided us with a theoretical model that could be tested in different settings and with larger samples, and has also made a significant contribution to research on union leadership by directing attention to the applicability of recent leadership theories to labour organisations.

A study which has been referred to as an extension to the one reviewed above, is a study by Fullagar et al. (1994). They based their model of early union commitment on Fullagar et al.’s (1992) model of the socialisation of union loyalty, which they expanded by: (i) incorporating the distinction between individual and institutional socialisation practices; (ii) employing a multidimensional operationalisation of union commitment and (iii) broadening the definition of union attitudes to include both attitudes about unions in general and specific beliefs about one’s union. As far as steward characteristics are concerned, they used just two of the dimensions in Bass’s (1985) transformational leadership scale: charisma and individualised consideration. It was hypothesised that both individual and institutional socialisation practices, as well as steward characteristics would have a significant impact on union attitudes, which would in turn predict union commitment.

Their findings however, did not confirm Fullagar et al.’s (1992) findings in that the perceived transformational leadership characteristics did not have a significant impact on the development of positive union attitudes, and also were not significantly associated with union commitment. However, in the case of the earlier study, the leadership characteristics associated with union attitudes were individual consideration and intellectual stimulation, the latter omitted from this later study. In turn then, a different factor structure to the one proposed by Bass (1985) was used and items were selected, in contrast to the earlier study that employed the same factor structure as Bass (1985). Consequently, this might simply be a measurement issue, in the way individual consideration was actually operationalised. On the other hand, it attitudes toward the union (i.e. that unions are blue-collar organisations, too politically active and so forth).
could be the case that intellectual stimulation is a potentially important predictor of general union attitudes, especially in settings where the relationship between members and socialising agents is not as intimate as in the case of the Fullagar et al. (1992) study, and as such should not have been excluded from this later study. Nevertheless, steward characteristics were found to be significantly associated with individual socialisation, as anticipated and in agreement with the findings of the Fullagar et al. (1992) study.

Also, a statistical issue that the authors themselves raise stems from the use of a form of causal modelling to establish causal links between the variables in the study. As they themselves argue, at best the results suggest that the proposed model has not been disconfirmed, but this in itself is no proof of the causal model. It might be that alternative models could fit the data better. This is an issue also highlighted in the earlier study that employed causal modelling and would appear to suggest that alternative models should also be tested. However, the practical limitations of exploring alternative models has meant that this is not as yet common practice among social science researchers.

The two studies reviewed above have focused on the perceived transformational leadership characteristics, given that the conceptual basis for the development of the model was the socialisation process. This did not allow one to incorporate other aspects of leader (steward) behaviour, such as accessibility or effectiveness, since these appear to be related to later stages of members' union experience, when members begin to interact with their leaders on a daily basis, and issues such as adequate representation, ease of contact etc. become relevant. The need then emerges for a setting whereby different leadership characteristics will be relevant and could be explored. Such a setting is being provided by the current approach, which has identified and demonstrated with the discussion so far, the potential usefulness of the relatively neglected mobilization process in exploring different aspects of members' union experience. The proposed model will be developed fully in the next chapter.

However, there has been one other study which explored the impact of transformational leadership characteristics on member attitudes at later stages of one's union experience. Kelloway and Barling (1993) constructed a model of members' participation in local union activities and used linear structural modelling techniques to test the model. They tested two models, one for what they called the study sample and another which they referred
to as the replication sample. Participants in the samples were members of three locals of a large union of government employees. They found that shop steward transformational leadership characteristics significantly predicted union loyalty and actual participation in union activities, although the path for union loyalty was significant only in the case of the replication sample. The researchers attributed this to 'sample-specific characteristics' (see Kelloway and Barling, 1993).

These findings are important since they support an earlier assertion that leadership transformational characteristics, albeit not significant predictors of union loyalty at the early stages of members' union experience, do predict union loyalty at later stages. Also, they direct attention to the significance of leadership behaviour for members' participation in union activities, although the fact that during the data collection process the union called for a strike vote might have increased the salience of leaders and their behaviour, thereby exaggerating the strength of the relationship. Given in addition, the cross-sectional nature of the data, the above issue is further highlighted as potentially problematic for the consistency of the findings over time. What is more, the cross-sectional nature of the data in combination with reliance on survey measures may have contributed to the magnitude of the relationships observed, although the pattern of the findings would not have been affected.

Nevertheless, the findings argue for a more pervasive role of leadership, highlighting the need for more research into the impact of leadership both on member attitudes, as well as behaviours. It could be argued that by employing both traditional (accessibility, availability, etc.) as well as more recent formulations of leadership behaviour (transformational leadership) in tandem, one could assess their relative contribution in predicting member attitudes and behaviours, thus providing further insights into the leadership process within labour organisations.

All in all, it could be argued that research in union leadership, as has been said about research in union participation, is in its infancy. The current thesis aims at taking the debate on leadership in labour organisations further, by assessing the importance of different aspects of leader behaviour, and at the same time establishing a conceptual basis within which such an assessment could occur. Utilising organisational leadership theories, such as Bass's transformational leadership alongside the more 'traditional' approaches to leader behaviour
discussed above, generates a deeper understanding of the leadership process within labour organisations. Also, as research in organisational leadership develops further, one would wish a corresponding trend being set in the case of research on union leadership that could eventually lead to the theoretical and empirical establishment of a union leadership body of theory and research.

As has been noted earlier, given that the most recent studies in union leadership have adopted approaches formulated within the organisational leadership literature, the following section will deal with theory and research in organisational leadership and discuss the implications for the present study.

2.4.2 Organisational leadership: theory and research

The fascination with the idea of leadership goes as far back as the late 1930’s. Lewin et al. (1939) focused on a single dimension of leadership style which varied along a continuum from participative/democratic to autocratic/authoritarian.

Since then a number of theoretical approaches to leadership have been developed, most of them falling into the realm of leadership behaviour. According to Guest (1995) leadership behaviour is regarded as the traditional area of theory and research in organisational leadership. Most of the available research has been concerned with leaders and what they do, and as such focused on leadership style, and variations in the style of different leaders. Theory and research on leadership style (e.g. Fleishman, 1953; Likert, 1961, 1967; Smith et al., 1989) subsequently led to situational theories of leadership (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; Vroom and Yetton, 1973), once the need to take the context in which leadership takes place was highlighted.

A number of problems with the above approaches have been identified in the literature, including the fact that studies of leadership style accounted for only a small amount of the variation in subordinate outcomes, such as performance and satisfaction,\textsuperscript{83} which have partly led to a change in emphasis since the early 1980’s. Instead of concentrating on what the leader does, attention shifted to the followers and their emotional responses to the leader. The growing interest in charismatic leadership reflected the prevailing climate at a time when issues of organisational change and human resources came to the fore, and the need for leaders with a

\textsuperscript{83} For a full discussion see Guest (1995).
vision and the ability to generate support among staff and their commitment to organisational change was identified.

Despite the mystique surrounding the concept of charisma and the elusive quality it conveys, as evident from Weber's (1925, 1947) writings early this century, organisational psychologists have attempted to define and measure it, so that its true influence could be assessed empirically using existing psychological methods (House, 1977; Bass, 1985; Conger and Kanungo, 1994). Most theoretical approaches to charisma identify it as the result of follower perceptions and attributions influenced by leader qualities and behaviours.

Conger and Kanungo (1987, 1994) define charisma as an attributional phenomenon based on followers’ perceptions of leader’s observed behaviour. They argue that “...to develop a deeper understanding of this complex phenomenon, it is important that we begin to strip this impression of mysticism from charisma. Charismatic leadership, like any other type of leadership, should be considered as an observable behavioural process...”. However, as Conger and Kanungo favour ‘rationalisation’ of charisma, Bass (1985) appears to favour maintaining the mystical and romantic elements of the concept. In contrast to Conger and Kanungo’s conceptualisation, whereby subordinates may display liking, trust, obedience and the desire to follow and emulate a charismatic leader, Bass attributes a supernatural quality to charismatic leaders, which may in turn induce followers to worship the leader as a supernatural hero or spiritual figure.

Bass (1985) also went further and developed a theory of transformational leadership which he viewed as distinct from charismatic leadership. He argued that charismatic individuals, such as pop stars or film stars do not necessarily have a transformational effect on followers. Followers may become emotionally attached to the celebrities, identify with them and seek to imitate their appearance, but it is unlikely that such charismatics can motivate followers to transcend their self-interest for a wider cause, or transform their beliefs and values. He argued that charisma is a necessary ingredient for transformational leadership, but by itself is not sufficient to account for the transformational process (Bass, 1985). His more broadly defined concept of transformational leadership consisted of two other components aside from charisma, individualised consideration and intellectual stimulation. At the same time, building on the ideas of Burns (1978), who introduced the distinction between transactional and
transformational leadership, he presented a model of leadership consisting of five main components. In contrast to Burns (1978), Bass (1985) treated the two types of leadership as complementary, and argued that while conceptually distinct, they are likely to be displayed by the same individual.

Most of the studies testing the theory have involved use of Bass's MLQ (Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire) to measure dimensions of transformational and transactional leadership. Since the development of the measure in Bass (1985), very few studies have actually sought to examine the validity of the measure, as well as its stability and dimensionality across samples and settings. According to Yukl (1994), research into components of transformational leadership was limited because knowledge on the subject was primitive, and thus it was not possible to identify suitable items for the transformational component. One other issue that has been identified as a weakness in the early versions of the questionnaire, is that most items in the charisma and intellectual stimulation scales measure follower outcomes, rather than perceived leader behaviour. In response to this criticism, in the revised version of the questionnaire, Bass and his colleagues have included items that measure discrete behaviours (e.g. Bass and Avolio, 1990).

Another issue that has been discussed in the literature, relates to the distinction between transformational and charismatic leadership. While Bass (1985) has obviously favoured such a distinction, his empirical work does not really support this contention. In the exploratory factor analysis carried out on the original set of items, charisma came out as the main component of transformational leadership, accounting for 66 per cent of the common variance. What is more, in his discussion of transformational and charismatic leadership, it could be argued that certain common elements can be identified, such as a sense of strategic vision. Taking this point further, Conger and Kanungo (1994) have argued that transformational and charismatic leadership essentially refer to the same phenomenon, and are highly complementary, but what differs is the perspective employed to approach and measure the concepts. Bass's transformational leadership follows Burn's original conceptualisation, as a process that focuses on elevating leaders and followers to higher levels of motivation and morality, that is then focusing on follower outcomes, as discussed above. At the same time, in charismatic leadership
formulations the emphasis is on leader *behaviours*, and what behaviours generate follower responses.

Nevertheless, by focusing on follower outcomes rather than observed leader behaviours, a requirement inherent in the latter formulation is eliminated, that of leader-member contact. This essentially enables the broader application of transformational leadership, in situations where direct contact is not possible, such as the case of chief executive officers in organisational settings, who are unlikely to have direct contact with regular employees, or in the case of political leaders who again are unlikely to have direct contact with followers.84 Conger and Kanungo’s (1994) measure of charismatic leadership attempts to operationalise the charismatic leadership role of *managers* in organisations, which agrees with the emphasis on perceived behavioural attributes.

In my opinion then, there are two main issues that need to be addressed in future research: (i) the distinction between the two formulations, transformational and charismatic leadership and the extent to which both approaches should be utilised, and (ii) the relevance of the idea of contact between leaders and followers, and the extent to which it should be explicitly incorporated in future formulations of transformational/charismatic leadership. Although Conger and Kanungo (1994) seem to imply that future research should focus on identifying behavioural dimensions of charismatic leaders, which seems to also be shared by Bass and his colleagues, given their recent work which identified discrete behaviours associated with the factors of transformational leadership, I feel that Bass’s original approach of focusing on follower outcomes should not be abandoned. Such an approach might provide one with useful insights into the leadership process, especially in settings where leader-member contact is predominantly absent.

Studies that have employed Bass’s MLQ, have found leadership behaviour to be associated with various criteria of leadership effectiveness, such as perceived effectiveness and satisfaction, as well as task commitment, reported by subordinates (e.g. Bass et al., 1987; Hater and Bass, 1988; Yammarino and Bass, 1990). In all these studies, both transformational and transactional leadership were positively correlated with the criteria mentioned above, but in general, the relationships were stronger in the case of transformational leadership than those

84 For a discussion of the issue of social distance in the context of charismatic leadership, see Shamir (1995).
found for transactional leadership. However, these studies have employed correlational analysis to examine the hypothesised relationships, which prevents assessment of the predictive power of these factors and does not allow causal inferences to be made. At the same time, a survey design which utilises self-report measures may lead to the problem of common method variance. What is more, despite Bass’s (1985) proposition, that both transformational and transactional leadership are likely to be displayed by the same individual, this has not been explored in existing studies. The emphasis within existing research has remained with transformational leadership, and the additional variance accounted for by this factor. However, the possible interaction effect of the two has not been examined. It seems then, that existing research leaves a lot to be desired from future studies.

2.4.3 Organisational leadership approaches within the trade union literature: further insights

The idea of transformational leadership has recently been employed in studies taking place within trade union settings, concerned with union socialisation and the formation of union attitudes at the early stages of a member’s union experience, as discussed above. Transactional leadership was regarded as inappropriate for use in union settings, due to its emphasis on equitable exchange, whereby the leader provides rewards in exchange for compliance (Fullagar et al., 1992). On the other hand, transformational leadership could be used for obtaining identification with the union’s goals, motivate members to do more than originally expected for the union, intensify their sense of identification with the union and organised labour.

Having explored transformational leadership within a socialisation setting, where it has been found to be associated with both socialisation practices and the formation of positive attitudes towards the union at the early stages of members’ ‘acquaintance’ with the organisation, Kelly (1998) has directed attention to employing transformational leadership within a mobilization setting. He argued that within a mobilization setting transformational leaders activate particular social identities, enhancing the sense of collective identity among the group, and generating behaviour in terms of this group identity. Of course, mobilization as used by Kelly (1998) refers to the process through which individuals are urged to participate in collective action for the achievement of desired goals, rather than the broader formulation that
has been suggested for the present thesis. However, the question that follows, of precisely how do transformational leaders achieve this outcome, is relevant in both cases. In an attempt to answer the above question, Kelly (1998) cites Rule (1989) who argued that emotional appeals could be regarded as:

"... efforts to increase the salience of particular interests, values, identifications or concerns... Such appeals are most likely to succeed in conjunction with dramatic public events that seem to cry out for an expressive response - ... the role of leaders in mobilization is to engender in followers just such dramatic responses" (ibid.: 154).

At the same time though, this directs attention to whether one should concentrate on the observed behaviours that can bring about such responses, or simply satisfy oneself with exploring the outcomes that result from the transformational leadership process. In a sense, identifying specific behaviours would allow training to take place, in this case of trade union leaders, that would be aimed at ensuring the necessary behaviours on behalf of leaders which would in turn generate the required responses from members.

One final point that should be discussed is concerned with the transactional leadership component in Bass’s theory. Transactional leadership has been regarded as inappropriate for use in trade union settings, for the reasons discussed above. However, I would argue that within a context of mobilization, as broadly defined for the purpose of the current study, there are aspects of the leader-member relationship that cannot be captured by the ‘emotional’ factor of transformational leadership. These occur on a daily basis, and are clearly more ‘instrumental’ than emotional in nature, in that they mainly consist of ‘services’ provided to the members by leaders, in exchange of their support and commitment to the union, although this is conceptually different from Bass’s transactional leadership. Leader accessibility, availability and effectiveness, as discussed above, are such aspects of leader behaviour, and it is suggested that it would be beneficial to explore the relevance of these aspects of leader behaviour within a mobilization setting. As argued by Thacker et al. (1990), the hypothesis that perceived leader accessibility will lead to the development of commitment to the union is supported by Homans’s (1958) exchange theory, according to which individuals’ expectations regarding the
ability of their union to fulfil certain needs will determine feelings of commitment towards the union.

This latter component of leadership is probably more so relevant within a mobilization setting that defines mobilization as the ‘transformation of individuals into collective actors’, which is a long-term and continuous process during which members interact with their leaders on a daily basis, and are thus able to evaluate the leaders’ behaviour in their role as representatives of members, in addition to their perceived inspirational and ‘transformational’ qualities.

2.5 Conclusions

As postulated at the beginning of the chapter, the discussion has employed existing work on mobilization and collective action to generate a conceptual basis that would facilitate the development of the present approach to mobilization.

Following a review of existing work on mobilization, a case was made for a broader conceptualisation of mobilization outside the confines of individual campaigns. Mobilization was therefore defined as the transformation of individuals into collective actors. Although the importance of case studies of individual campaigns was highlighted, and certainly not in any way underestimated, the need for a general framework to act as the backdrop for such studies was emphasised. There was then the issue of developing a measure for mobilization, and for that attention turned to the literature on union participation, and more specifically the suitability of behavioural intent within a mobilization setting. As previous research has not explicitly acknowledged the distinction between willingness to participate, and actual participation, rather the two have mostly been used interchangeably, findings from available studies are inconclusive as to the nature of the two concepts and their antecedents. Therefore, by identifying willingness to participate as the outcome of the mobilization process, it was given a conceptual standing from which its significance could be properly assessed.

The significance of antecedents to actual participation or willingness to participate was discussed, as well as their relevance for the new approach to mobilization. It was argued that as existing research has focused almost exclusively to union loyalty and(or) union commitment as predictors of willingness to participate or actual participation, other attitudinal variables that

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might have been important for explaining these two constructs have not been incorporated into the analysis. This is another area that the present study seeks to address.

Leadership was also identified as a potential, but relatively neglected, antecedent of willingness to participate, and again a case was made for the value of its contribution to the proposed approach. Research in union leadership was reviewed, and the absence of empirical research exploring the effect of leadership on mobilization was highlighted. Therefore, the need for providing a conceptual framework that incorporates different aspects of leader behaviour was argued, as a basis for assessing their potential, distinct contribution to the mobilization process. The literature on organisational leadership was explored to provide insights into the leadership process, and the usefulness of recent approaches to leadership for the purpose of the present study, was identified and discussed.

In the next chapter the theoretical framework which will incorporate all the above elements will be constructed, the various components will be discussed and the research propositions to be examined will be posited.
Chapter 3  Mobilization Revisited: Developing a Theoretical Framework

The arguments necessary for the development of the proposed mobilization model will be outlined and discussed in the present chapter. These arguments build on the conceptual basis formulated during the previous chapter, in the process of reviewing the relevant literature on the issues in question, and subsequently identifying the scope for a new approach to mobilization. As in the previous chapter, here as well the valuable contribution of existing approaches is acknowledged, which after all has guided the construction of a rationale for the current approach.

In this chapter, the rationale for a 'group approach' to mobilization will be discussed, and the conceptual framework developed. Also, the more specific theoretical and empirical relationships between the components comprising the model will be identified and discussed.

3.1 A ‘group approach’ to mobilization

Mobilization has been defined as the process of transforming individuals into collective actors, and the significance of this shift in emphasis within the mobilization debate has been discussed in the previous chapter. What has also been established is the association between trade union participation and mobilization, and in turn the reasoning behind using the intention (willingness) to participate in trade union activities as a measure of the transformation of members into collective actors has been presented and discussed.

By conceptualising mobilization as above, the issue of mobilising other resources apart from members, such as financial or political ones, particularly relevant during individual mobilization campaigns targeted at specific objectives, becomes irrelevant. The emphasis on members within a mobilization setting reflects the view that, members as the most importance resource for trade unions deserve particular attention and research interest. Successfully mobilising members in accordance with the proposed definition, is argued to lead to an active and better informed membership, involved with the trade union and espousing trade union principles and values.
At the same time, having emphasised the importance of considering both the individual and the setting in constructing a framework for mobilization, an attempt to develop the conceptual basis for such an approach follows.

By considering both Klandermans's and McAdam's writings in tandem, what becomes evident is a contrast between an **individual-centred** approach and a **context-centred** approach. Nevertheless, it is argued that the two approaches could complement one another once the individual is observed in terms of his/her membership of this group setting, rather than as a purely independent entity. While maintaining the individual as the unit of analysis, one is able to incorporate a group effect by inextricably binding individual reactions to group culture. This relates to interactionist theories for explaining union participation, whereby the importance of the individuals' social context is emphasised and where individual decisions to participate are influenced by the group to which an individual belongs (e.g. Kerr and Siegel, 1954; Goldthorpe et al., 1969). This is also consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) *theory of reasoned action*, which emphasises the importance of what is termed as subjective norms, as well as the opinions of significant others (e.g. family, friends and colleagues) in both formulating attitudes, and also transforming these attitudes into behavioural intentions and actual behaviours. However, whereas in the case of interactionist theories the social context, networks and groups, is considered as an external, determining factor of union participation, in the current approach group membership behaves as the conceptual foundation to the approach. Essentially, it is argued that individuals would perceive and make sense of their environment in group terms, which would act as the basis for their responses and would underlie the development of attitudes toward the group(s), as well as any behavioural expressions.

An underlying premise of the approach then, is the idea that individual attitudes and behaviours within a mobilization setting emerge as a result of the individual’s group affiliations. In this sense, individual attitudes and behaviours or behavioural intentions, are regarded as a product of group influence and as such reflect the interdependency characterising the relationship between individual and group. According to the proposed approach, what becomes crucial within a ‘micromobilization context’ (McAdam, 1988), such as a union, is the ability to increase the salience of specific attitudes stemming from an individual’s group memberships. It is argued that an individual's working environment comprises a number of
different social units (groups)- union, management, workgroup, departmental group etc.- that can be associated with specific attitudes considered as relevant within a mobilization setting, and crucial for the development of a favourable climate between the union and its members.

The current approach should not be conceived as implying the individual's subordination to the group. What is being highlighted is the interdependency between the two, especially within a trade union setting, and more so as part of the mobilization process. The collective principles underlying the whole philosophy of trade unionism, as well as the activities individuals undertake to perform within these organisations, reinforce a collective approach to mobilization.

Nevertheless, an issue arises that should be addressed, which concerns a comparison between mobilization dynamics in both the case of individual mobilization campaigns, as well as within the mobilization process as the continuous effort of transforming individuals into collective actors. Both Klandermans (1984a) and McAdam (1988) identify 'cost and benefit' calculations as a factor that influences participation in collective action, although they differ in the emphasis assigned to it, and the context within which that occurs. While for Klandermans this appears to be a purely calculative process guided by self-interest, McAdam seems to believe that group membership does have some relevance to it, although it is not clear in what sense and how. The current approach, emphasising interdependency and not subordination, as discussed above, advocates that while cost-benefit calculations might be taking place within a mobilization setting, these would be guided by perceived group gains and losses rather than self-interest. This reflects the underlying premise of the approach, the fact that individual attitudes and behaviours are bound to group membership, which acts as the reference point for any process that might be occurring.

A second point relates to the change in emphasis evident in the new approach, whereby the objective is to transform individuals into collective actors, rather than induce participation in collective action. In the latter case, cost-benefit calculations occupy a more central role, since mobilization campaigns are targeted at achieving particular, tangible objectives, with clear costs and benefits. However, in the former the emphasis revolves around generating the willingness to participate in the whole organisation by enhancing group identifications. In such a context,
cost-benefit calculations occupy more of a subordinate role, as the intention to participate does not really entail any identifiable costs to the individual.

In social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) terms, social identity becomes dominant within a mobilization setting, while personal identity remains dormant. What occurs within a mobilization setting, is a process of defining issues in line with collective principles, so that individuals are persuaded to act collectively. This is why the salience of one’s identity as a trade unionist, for example, could trigger a process of social identification that would eventually lead to collective as opposed to individual action. It should be noted that a person’s social identity might consist of a number of different categories such as engineer, trade unionist, socialist, for instance. The process of social identification would also inevitably lead to categorisation and stereotyping in an attempt to protect group identity and arrive at ‘the establishment of positive distinctiveness’ (Tajfel, 1978a: 83). In this sense, the stronger the identification with one’s union (ingroup) for example, the stronger the degree of stereotyping that occurs towards management (outgroup). Consequently, what are also likely to emerge within a mobilization setting, apart from positive attitudes towards the ingroup resulting from group membership, are stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup. The motivating forces that emerge as a result of group identification will be discussed in a later section.

One other, more implicit assumption of the proposed ‘group approach’ to mobilization, concerns the link between a collectivist/individualist cultural setting and individuals’ attitudes and behaviours within a mobilization setting. Hofstede’s (1980) pioneering work on individualism and collectivism classified countries as either individualist or collectivist, depending on where they ranked on his country individualism index (IDV). Since then, this area has received considerable attention amongst cultural psychologists, and a number of different approaches to the two concepts have been identified (see e.g. Kim et al., 1994). It is argued that one can draw a link between the idea of a collectivist/individualist culture and the current approach. It is posited that individuals within, for example, collectivist cultures in which ‘people from birth onwards are integrated into strong cohesive groups’ (Hofstede, 1991), are more likely to make sense of the surrounding environment through their membership of
different groups, and as such behave in an allocentric\textsuperscript{85} manner (Triandis, 1989) in other settings apart from the cultural one (e.g. occupational setting), as opposed to those individuals that were brought up within individualist societies. In essence, a collectivist orientation would be maintained across settings. The same argument would hold in the case of individuals within individualist cultures. What follows from the above argument is the idea that individuals with a collectivist orientation at the cultural level, would be expected to maintain that within a mobilization setting, developing attitudes and behaviours on the basis of group memberships.

However, as part of the debate on individualism/collectivism, it has been argued that the two concepts do not necessarily form polar opposites, but may coexist in different situations or with different groups (Kagitcibasi, 1994), such that individuals brought up within collectivist cultures might behave in an idiocentric manner (Triandis, 1989) in different circumstances, settings, or in reference to particular groups. In this case, this gives rise to the idea that for example within a mobilization setting, an individual brought up in a collectivist culture might well behave in an idiocentric manner, identifying him/herself in strictly individualistic terms, and espousing individualistic principles and values. Nevertheless, it is argued that given the argument that the two coexist, accentuated by the emphasis on collective principles and values within a ‘micromobilization context’, the collectivism part of the continuum is the one likely to be made more salient and direct the development of attitudes and behaviours.

The proposed theoretical approach to mobilization then, is based on the following main assumptions: (i) individual attitudes and behaviours or behavioural intentions emerge as a result of group affiliations and are a product of group influence; (ii) social identity becomes dominant within a mobilization setting, and thus individuals are mobilised on the basis of their social identity; (iii) individuals ‘nurtured’ in collectivist cultural settings, would be expected to carry their collectivist orientation through to other settings aside from the cultural one.

3.2 Behavioural intent within a mobilization setting

Traditionally, the link between attitudes and behaviours has been viewed as proceeding through what has been termed as behavioural intention (Fishbein, 1967). Although my

\textsuperscript{85} Triandis (1989) has identified the dimensions of idiocentrism/allocentrism at the individual level, to correspond to the dimensions of individualism/collectivism at the cultural level.
objective is not to provide a comprehensive critique of research linking attitudes and behaviours within the organisational literature, I am tempted to observe that amidst their fascination with and heightened enthusiasm in relation to the valuable implications of such a link, researchers did not attempt to sufficiently explore the ‘intervening’ concept, behavioural intention, and its research implications. This has also been the case within the union participation literature, where actual participation and willingness to participate have been used interchangeably, and although often mentioned (e.g. Klandermans, 1986), there has been no real attempt to distinguish between the two.

The present approach seeks to provide a conceptual framework within which the intention (willingness) to participate can be adequately explored. Willingness to participate has already been identified as the outcome of a successful mobilization process, aimed at ‘transforming individuals into collective actors’. This section seeks to discuss the nature of the construct from a mobilization perspective and the theoretical arguments that follow from this.

As evident from the previous section, the proposed approach to mobilization identifies the processes that take place within a mobilization setting as having one common source-group membership, and one underlying objective-transforming individuals into collective actors. Essentially, group membership gives rise to group identifications, associated with the development of specific attitudes, that in turn lead to behavioural intentions; in this case, the willingness to participate in union activities. In essence, it is the motivational effect of group identifications that manifests itself in willingness to participate.

The idea of associating group identifications with involvement in collective activities is not a novel one (e.g. Triandis et al., 1988), nor for that matter is the application of this idea in the context of trade union involvement (e.g. Kelly and Kelly, 1994). However, the current approach provides a theoretical continuity to the above idea, by considering it as part of the mobilization process. The motivational effect of group identifications also features in what Yates (1992) terms ‘collective identity’: “the shared values and interests of a group, those that forge bonds of solidarity among its members such that these members are motivated by their identification with the collectivity to which they belong”(ibid.:115). Yates argues that collective identity is one of the factors that determines the unions’ ability to successfully mobilise its membership. Although Yates refers to mobilization in the narrower sense, i.e. within the
context of collective action, the motivational effect of group identifications is also the key element in the current approach.

An underlying implication of the current approach is that intent to participate precedes actual participation, and it is a closer approximation of behaviour than is its attitudinal referent (DeCotiis and Lelouarn, 1981). This draws attention to the idea that favourable attitudes toward the union, albeit necessary, are not a sufficient condition for actual participation. In turn, it could be argued that predicting actual behaviour would be more accurate with both attitudinal and intent data than with attitudinal data alone. As an example, a member fostering positive attitudes toward the union would not necessarily participate in union activities, if he(she) is not willing to do so. In such a case, the link between attitudes and actual behaviour would not be confirmed, due to the absence of behavioural intent. In essence then, positive attitudes towards the union are a necessary but not sufficient condition for actual behaviour. At the same time though, necessary and sufficient conditions are seen to be both positive intent and the 'freedom' to behave according to one's intentions, as situational factors, often times outside one's locus of control, might prevent one from behaving in the desired manner. For example, even if a member is willing to stand for elected office, he(she) will not be able to do so without a nomination from his(her) colleagues.
Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action supports the above view concerning the link between behavioural intention and actual behaviour. In their model, they assume that behavioural intention is the immediate determinant of actual behaviour. As far as the determinants of behavioural intention are concerned, they identify two distinct factors, the attitude towards the behaviour and the subjective norm- the person's judgement of the likelihood that relevant others, like friends, family etc. would expect the person to exhibit the predicted behaviour. The subjective norm is in turn determined by normative beliefs, what significant others expect the person to do, and motivation to comply with these expectations (figure 3.1).

In the group approach to mobilization developed here, it could be argued that the motivation to comply emerges as a result of an individual's interpretation of his (her) environment in group terms, which in turn gives rise to a strong sense of group identification. In turn, the attitude towards the behaviour which determines behavioural intention, is formulated on the basis of the motivational effect described above. In essence, the group approach to mobilization considers the attitude towards the behaviour and the influence of significant others as interdependent. Consequently, given the underlying premise of group
membership, the attitude towards the behaviour that determines behavioural intention, depends on the motivational effect of group identifications.

An implicit assumption of the above reasoning is the idea that the collectivity(ies) of which the individual is a member, values the predicted behaviour positively. This in turn is expressed as willingness to participate, given the motivating effect of identification with the group(s). However, if participation is viewed negatively by the group, a strong sense of group identity is likely to discourage not only actual involvement in the union, but also an expression of willingness to become involved in the union. This point relates more to membership of the departmental group and(or) workgroup, since the union as the other main group is naturally supportive of active union involvement. A similar point is raised in Klandermans (1992), citing DeWitte (1988) and Hoyman and Stallworth (1987), and arguing that a sense of community or solidarity among the workforce will promote union participation only if the collectivity values participation in a positive manner.

As argued in the previous chapter, the measure of willingness to participate should incorporate different forms of participation, not just participation in collective action. By conceptualising mobilization as a continuous process, initiated once members have been socialised into the organisation, what becomes important is members’ overall experience of the union. Members’ involvement in the union might range from simply helping others learn about the union to holding union office, and so one could argue that a measure of their willingness to become involved in the union should precisely reflect this multifaceted nature of participation.

However, it has also been indicated that each activity requires different explanations and motivations (Parks et al., 1995). In turn, a measure of willingness to participate within a mobilization setting should incorporate those behaviours that are consistent with the group approach to mobilization as developed above. Essentially, they should denote individuals’ successful transformation into collective actors, and as such should reflect firm adherence to collective principles and the philosophy of trade unionism. While more or less all forms of union participation are underlined by a belief in collective representation and the principles of trade unionism, for some activities the indications are much stronger than others. An ideological commitment to trade unionism has been frequently identified as characteristic of union representatives (e.g. Nicholson, 1976) as well as more active union members (e.g. Fosh,
1981). It should also be noted that for example, the fact that some forms of participation are opportunity based (e.g. holding an elected union office etc.) and as such are not stable over time, does not really present an issue in this context. Since what is measured within a mobilization setting is willingness to participate, and not actual participation, it is argued that the former should be expected to remain stable over time and be preserved throughout members' union experience.

Although an individual's contribution to the union's effective functioning is not restricted to office holding, attending meetings, and serving on union committees, it could be argued that these are functions that are absolutely vital for unions to function at all. At the same time, it is argued that such activities pronounce more strongly members' commitment to collective principles and values, and probably also to the union as an institution founded upon such principles. As Klandermans (1992) notes, individuals who hold a position in the union are those "...who believe in the union as an organisation and in the necessity and effectiveness of collective action". Serving on union committees, as well as frequently attending union meetings, are also more visible forms of active involvement in the union, which very clearly state one's disposition towards unionism with all the features mentioned above.

All the above activities fall into what has been termed as 'administrative' participation (e.g. Parks et al., 1995). Recent work on the dimensionality of union participation has also emphasised the need to consider what has been termed as 'supportive' participation (Parks et al., 1995). This comprises activities that make small, but important contributions to the day-to-day functioning of the union (e.g. helping others learn about the union etc.). However, these behaviours do not convey the intensity of group identification and attachment to the organisation that administrative ones do. In a mobilization setting, it is the willingness to participate in 'administrative' activities that would essentially denote whether individuals have been successfully transformed into collective actors. It could be argued that 'supportive' participation reflects more a sense of 'citizenship' behaviour, rather than a true belief in the philosophy of trade unionism and the effectiveness of collective action, especially where the union is the only available channel for grievance resolution.

Another form of participation that lies at the heart of trade unionism is participation in collective action. Although willingness to participate in collective action most definitely denotes
support for collective forms of representation and adherence to collective principles, it might also reflect an instance of self-perception (Bem, 1965, 1972). In responding to a question relating to one’s willingness to participate in collective action, an individual member might infer his/her behavioural intention from external cues, past instances of relevant behaviour, in the absence of internal ones. Consequently, the mere fact that the individual has joined the union could serve as an indication that one favours collective action and would be willing to participate, since collective principles and action lie at the core of the organisation they have become members of. Nevertheless, even if this might be the case, members’ willingness to participate in collective action is central to the very survival of trade unions, as well as to the mobilization process, and should be included in the present measure of willingness to participate. It is argued that the extent to which a union can preserve its power base, is conditioned by the members’ willingness to take part in collective action, which would be promoted and reinforced within a mobilization setting.

3.3 Leadership, member attitudes and willingness to participate within a mobilization setting

The mechanism characterising the process of transforming individuals into collective actors is presented in figure 3.2.

The following main groups have been identified as part of the individual’s working environment that become salient within a mobilization setting, and in turn initiate the processes described above: the union, the workgroup and (or) departmental group. However, other groupings such as the sectoral group for example, are also part of an individual’s working environment, albeit not of the immediate one, and as such might also contribute to the motivating effect of group identifications. It has also been argued that group identification is expected to lead to categorisation and stereotyping towards the outgroup, for example management. Consequently, the motivational effect of outgroup stereotyping should also be considered, expressed in the form of stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup.
Given the above, it is hypothesised that the determinants of willingness to participate within a mobilization setting are *union loyalty*, *union instrumentality*, ‘*them and us*’ attitudes and what is termed as *workplace collectivism*. These attitudes are argued to be the ones primarily responsible for the members’ willingness to participate in the union, as part of a continuous attempt to transform these individual members into collective actors. Leadership has also been identified, in the previous chapter, as a potential antecedent of willingness to participate in the union. Its role within a mobilization setting as well its link with willingness to participate are discussed in the following section.

### 3.3.1 Leaders as mobilising agents

The role of leadership within the mobilization process, although often mentioned has not been explored empirically within a proper conceptual framework. The current thesis advocates that leaders are as vital for transforming individuals into collective actors (mobilization), as for socialising individuals into the organisation. Chapter 2 has reviewed research in the area of individual mobilization campaigns (e.g. Batstone et al., 1977, 1978; Fantasia, 1988) which directed attention to the important role leaders assume in mobilising workers for collective action. The leaders’ ability to promote a strong sense of group identity, generate and sustain group cohesion, persuade workers to engage in collective action, and legitimise collective action have all been identified as leadership functions in attempting to mobilise workers for collective action. What has not really been addressed though, is how leaders manage to induce such responses from members, what aspects of leaders’ behaviour can induce such responses.
To address the above, Kelly (1998) suggests that the literature on organisational leadership, and especially more recent work on transformational leadership might be a fruitful basis for exploring this issue. In contrast to the traditional role of leaders, as rational agents seeking to engage in a process of equitable exchange with their ‘subordinates’, exchanging rewards for performance, the idea of transformational leadership focuses on the emotional responses that leaders might be able to elicit from ‘subordinates’. Bass (1985) identifies three dimensions of transformational leadership: *charisma*: whereby the leader would instil a sense of pride in the organisation, and arouse a strong sense of identification with the organisation, *individualised consideration*: whereby the leader would treat each subordinate as an individual and would provide support, encouragement to the subordinate, and an environment conducive to individual development, and *intellectual stimulation*: whereby the leader would challenge existing ideas, and provide subordinates with new ways of looking at existing problems. However, Bass (1985) also incorporates the concept of transactional leadership in his leadership theory, and argues that the two do not necessarily form polar opposites, but rather both might be exhibited by the same individual. According to Burns (1978) and Bass (1985) transformational leaders are able to motivate individuals to do more than they originally expected to do, and fulfil the following functions:

1. raise the awareness of followers about the importance of achieving valued outcomes, a vision and the required strategy;

2. get followers to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of the team, organisation or larger collectivity; and

3. expand followers’ portfolio of needs by raising their awareness to improve themselves and what they are attempting to accomplish (Bass, 1985: 20)

One indication as to the influence of transformational leaders within individual mobilization campaigns, is presented in Rule (1989), who argues that this relates to the extent to which leaders are able to increase the salience of particular interests, values, identifications or concerns, ultimately persuading members to engage in collective action. And one might then argue, as Kelly (1998) does, that transformational leaders are more likely to behave in such a way, than transactional leaders. At the same time, it could be argued that members internalise
the transformational leaders’ attitudes and values as guiding principles for behaviour, or behavioural intentions. Although this is discussed in the context of charismatic leadership, by Yukl (1994), it could also be employed as an explanation for the influence of transformational leadership. As an example, a leader that is able to articulate the union’s mission in such a way that is relevant to members, is likely to influence members to internalise attitudes and beliefs that will subsequently serve as a source of intrinsic motivation to behave, or express a willingness to behave in a way that would benefit the organisation, such as being willing to participate in trade union activities.

To examine the role of leadership for the purpose of the current study, it is argued that both the ‘emotional’ factor of transformational leadership, as well as a component resembling, albeit very slightly, Bass’s transactional leadership should be employed. The latter one would incorporate aspects of the leader-member relationship that cannot be captured by transformational leadership, and are more pragmatic than emotional in nature. These are, as discussed earlier, ‘services’ provided by leaders to members, such as the extent to which the leader is accessible to members, available whenever members wish to raise issues, effective in handling grievances, negotiating with management etc., in exchange for members’ support and commitment to the union. This will be termed ‘pragmatic’ leadership, while the factor based on Bass’s transformational leadership component will be referred to hereafter as ‘emotional’ leadership. In the current research setting, ‘emotional’ leadership would comprise two dimensions: charisma, whereby the leader is able to instil members with a sense of pride in the union, and transmit a sense of the union’s mission, and intellectual stimulation: whereby the leader is perceived as innovative and stimulating, providing new ways of looking at existing problems.

What should be mentioned is the fact that ‘emotional leadership’, as it is based on Bass’s transformational leadership, describes follower outcomes rather than discrete, observable actions by the leader that would cause these outcomes. This has been identified as a weakness of Bass’s transformational leadership factor (e.g. Yukl, 1994). However, for the purpose of the current thesis, it has been decided that the ‘emotional’ leadership factor would be based on Bass’s transformational leadership, and consequently describe follower outcomes, as that would allow one to draw comparisons with the role of leadership in a socialisation
setting, explored in the study by Fullagar et al. (1992) and also Fullagar et al. (1994). Although Conger and Kanungo (1994) provide a measure of charismatic leadership comprising perceived behavioural attributes of leaders, I am more interested in the concept of transformational leadership as put forward by Bass (1985), which besides charisma directs attention to other aspects of leadership, such as individualised consideration and intellectual stimulation, essential for bringing about a transformation. At the same time, the transformational leadership factor has not been as yet properly developed to measure leader behavioural attributes, although this has been attempted in a more recent version of the questionnaire (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yammarino and Bass, 1990), and so such a measure does not appear to be available.

It is argued that once individual members have been socialised into the organisation, and the process of transforming them into collective actors (mobilization) has been initiated, both the ‘emotional’ as well as the ‘pragmatic’ leadership qualities of union representatives at different levels become essential. On the one hand, the extent to which they are able to get members to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of the group, and the union at large, motivate them to do more for the union than they were originally expected to do, and also get them to identify with goals of the unions, as well as embrace the principles of trade unionism. On the other hand, their ability to adequately ‘serve’ members on a day-to-day basis, and be perceived as taking an interest in members’ views, consulting members, being effective in handling grievances, negotiating with management etc. In essence, both aspects of leader behaviour are vital in order to induce favourable attitudes towards the union and generate a climate of willingness to become actively involved in the organisation. It should be noted that these two forms of leadership behaviour are not considered as polar opposites, but rather as mutually inclusive, and so they are likely to be displayed by the same individual depending on the circumstances at different points in time.

At the same time, it is argued that there are two possibilities for the way in which leadership behaviour can influence willingness to participate in union activities, as the outcome of the mobilization process: (i) as a direct antecedent of willingness to participate, and (ii) through its influence on member attitudes. Both will be addressed in turn in the section that follows.
3.3.1.1 The impact of leadership on willingness to participate

Given the absence of studies exploring the role of leadership behaviour in relation to union participation, as well as the intention (willingness) to participate, there is limited guidance for the forthcoming discussion. Nevertheless, work on individual mobilization campaigns and the role of leaders in mobilising workers for collective action, can serve to direct the arguments that follow.

Willingness to participate in collective action, as the outcome of a successful mobilization campaign, follows the establishment of a strong sense of group identity and the establishment of a collective consciousness, as members are urged to engage in collective action and leaders attempt to legitimise such action in the eyes of the members. Examples of the influence of leaders in the above process can be found in writings cited earlier in this chapter, and in previous chapters (e.g. Fantasia, 1988; Batstone et al., 1978). Similarly, in the process of transforming individuals into collective actors within trade unions, the construction of such a collective culture is sought, albeit a more sustainable one, and members are urged to participate in activities that embrace collective principles and values. Leaders then, as agents of the mobilization process need to promote, cultivate and maintain such a culture within labour organisations. The question being asked of course, is how they can do it and what aspects of leader behaviour are necessary in achieving this transformation.

As developed earlier, both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership are argued to influence members’ willingness to participate in union activities. The ‘emotional’ leadership factor, as discussed above consists of two dimensions, charisma and intellectual stimulation, based on Bass’s (1985) dimensions. Individualised consideration was not regarded as relevant to the research setting, since it identifies a type of intimacy between leaders and followers, with the leader as teacher and mentor, not necessarily applicable in the case of union leaders and members, and especially as part of the mobilization process. However, it was deemed relevant and was employed within a socialisation setting (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994).

Intellectual stimulation on the other hand, is argued to be particularly essential, especially as part of a mobilization process, since what is attempted is a definite change in members’ “...conceptualisation, comprehension, and discernment of the problems they face and their solutions” (Bass, 1985: 99). The union leader needs to possess the intellectual ability to
communicate a vision, in a way that members can respond to it. This is essentially what distinguishes a transformational leader from a charismatic one, as described in Bass (1985). The 'pragmatic' leadership factor, as again discussed earlier consists of leader accessibility, availability and effectiveness. These are aspects of leader behaviour that have been found to act as significant predictors of favourable union attitudes, as well as behavioural participation, in studies exploring the impact of shop stewards or different levels of shop stewards, within the union literature (e.g. Glick et al., 1977; Clark, 1986; Nicholson et al., 1981). They cover different forms of interaction between leaders and members, as part of the unions’ day-to-day functioning. However, the influence of these aspects of leader behaviour has been assessed separately in different studies. There has been no comprehensive study employing all different aspects, and examining their combined effect, which is what is being attempted as part of the proposed thesis.

What has not been extensively discussed is the influence mechanism involved in ‘emotional’ leadership. In the previous section, possible mechanisms have been explored, stemming primarily from the influence process that occurs in the case of charismatic leadership. At this stage, the specific question of how ‘emotional’ leadership can lead to willingness to participate in union activities will be addressed. The mobilization process, as the transformation of individuals into collective actors, aims at inducing a willingness to participate in union activities bound by a sense of collective purpose, principles and values. It is suggested that ‘emotional’ leaders can motivate members to respond in precisely such a way, by means of either personal fascination or organisational identification, or both. Personal fascination represents members’ affective attachment to the leader, rather than the organisation, resulting from ‘emotional’ leadership. This corresponds to the internalisation process described earlier. The leader’s perceived charisma and intellectual stimulation, as reflected in the way he (she) communicates the union’s mission to members, the ability to stimulate an innovative approach to problems, as well as in the effect of individual personality features, leads to a certain extent to idolisation of the leader and to members’ internalising the leaders’ attitudes and values. Internalisation has an intrinsic motivating effect, serving as a guiding principle for members’ intention to participate, which ultimately translates, in this case, in the willingness to participate in activities that embrace the leaders’ attitudes and values, i.e. trade union activities. On the
other hand, by means of the same type of behaviour, ‘emotional’ leaders may succeed in enhancing identification with the organisation and its values, achieving the same results as in the personal fascination case. At the same time, both mechanisms could occur in tandem, which means that the member would be willing to participate in union activities because of both personal fascination with the leader, as well as identification with the union’s goals, principles and values.

The influence of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, focusing on distinct actions by leaders rather than member outcomes, can be explained by means of a very different mechanism to that of ‘emotional’ leadership. As has been discussed earlier, it is conceived in terms of ‘services’ offered to members by leaders ‘in exchange’ for both favourable attitudes towards the union, such as union commitment, as well as the willingness to participate in trade union activities. Given the above, attention turns to the theory of social exchange and its possible contribution in explaining the influence of ‘pragmatic’ leadership. However, the underlying premise of the theory, that rational, self-interest drives peoples’ social interactions, depicts individual actors in a manner unsuited to the dynamics of the current approach. What drives individuals within the proposed mobilization framework is identification with the organisation, its principles and values, not pure cost-benefit calculations, as is the case within a social exchange framework (e.g. Homans, 1974). The idea of exchange for the present approach, is perhaps best depicted by Eisenberger et al.’s (1986) notion of organisational support, arrived at by extending the notion of social exchange in its traditional form. While organisational commitment, within the traditional social exchange perspective, is based on a cognitive assessment of the costs and benefits of maintaining one’s membership of an organisation, Eisenberger et al. (1986) note that social exchange is not entirely economic. Individuals within organisations also form perceptions of organisational support: “…beliefs about the extent to which the organisation is committed to them as individuals, values their contributions, and is concerned with their needs and well-being” (Sinclair and Tetrick, 1996). In turn, they proposed that company support perceptions would predict company commitment.

In the present framework, it is argued that the extent to which the union leader is perceived as accessible, available and effective would lead to perceptions of organisational support that would translate in favourable attitudes towards the union, as well as in the
willingness to become involved in the union. It could be argued that in a way, members are bound to feel a sense of obligation towards an organisation that values its membership and their contribution, to the extent that it deserves their support and commitment, as it appears to be committed to them. Leaders’ actions on a day-to-day basis, such as being available for members to raise issues of concern to them, informing members on union affairs, consulting members etc., serve to crystallise members’ perceptions of the union as an organisation, and the extent to which the organisation values and supports its membership. This in turn would motivate members to become involved in the union, so as to contribute towards effective organisational functioning.

What is evident from the above analysis, is the different mechanisms involved in the two different forms of leader behaviour, as noted above. The influence in the case of ‘pragmatic’ leadership is exclusively centred around the organisation rather than individual personalities, whereas in the case of ‘emotional’ leadership the influence can emerge by means of both mechanisms, occurring either separately or in tandem.

Bass’s (1985) proposition that the unique qualities of transformational leaders would be responsible for performance beyond ordinary expectations, as leaders communicate a sense of mission, contribute to self-development and enriched learning experiences, and also excite followers to adopt innovative ways of thinking will also be explored within the current research framework. It is thus proposed that ‘emotional’ leadership will contribute further to the predictive power of ‘pragmatic’ leadership in explaining willingness to participate in trade union activities. This will allow one to assess the real importance of ‘emotional’ leadership in determining members’ intention to become involved in the union.

Although Bass (1985) argued that both transformational and transactional leadership are likely to be displayed by the same individual, his analysis does not appear to address the issue of whether both need to be displayed by the same individual, and what effect that would have on outcome variables, such as performance. His work seems to imply that a transformational leader does not necessarily need to be transactional to achieve the desired goals, whereas a transactional leader would also need to possess transformational qualities to achieve performance beyond expectations. The latter is also, more or less, the underlying premise of Bass’s leadership theory. What is proposed however, in relation to the current
theoretical framework, is the idea that both 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership are essential to maximise the effect of leadership on willingness to participate. In essence, the interactive effect of 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership is argued to contribute further to explaining the remaining variance in willingness to participate, once both factors have been independently assessed. In a way, while 'emotional' leadership provides the excitement and fascination, 'pragmatic' leadership provides a sense of security, resulting from familiarity with organisational norms, principles, responsibilities and expectations, reflected in the 'pragmatic' leaders' actions. Both ingredients are argued to be essential for developing a favourable disposition to trade union involvement among members.

As noted above, leadership behaviour can also influence willingness to participate indirectly, through its impact on member attitudes. In the context of the mobilization process, leaders in their capacity as mobilising agents, increase the salience of member attitudes, such as union loyalty, union instrumentality, etc. This is based on the mechanism proposed by Rule (1989) cited earlier.

The section that follows proceeds with further development of the theoretical framework underlying the current study. The possible antecedents of willingness to participate have already been identified. Leadership, due to its rather more complex role within a mobilization setting, has preceded the discussion on the rest of the antecedents and willingness to participate. The ensuing analysis will consider the two leadership dimensions- 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership- separately in their relationship with different attitudes, since different arguments are relevant for each of the leadership components. No study in the union literature has explored both dimensions of leadership 'behaviour', while two studies have employed Bass's transformational leadership factor (Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994) in an attempt to study the impact of leadership within a socialisation setting. Also, only one study so far has employed Bass's transformational leadership factor to explore the impact of leadership at later stages of members' union experience, in the context of union participation (Kelloway and Barling, 1993). This study aims at extending the latter body of research, while also drawing comparisons with results from research on the influence of leadership in a socialisation setting. What also follows, is a detailed discussion of the theoretical arguments.

86 'Emotional' leadership describes follower outcomes, rather than distinct, observable leader actions.
that underlie the relationship between willingness to participate and its other antecedents—union loyalty, union instrumentality, 'them and us' attitudes and workplace collectivism—as outlined above. Existing research will be used to provide a backdrop for the hypothesised relationships.

Unfortunately, as in the case of leadership, in the attempt to construct the theoretical arguments underlying the relationships between attitudes and behavioural intentions within a mobilization setting, there is little guidance from existing research. The reasons for this are as follows: (i) no other study has explored willingness to participate within a mobilization setting. In previous studies willingness to participate was employed as a proxy measure of actual participation, and thus the conceptual basis for developing the theoretical relationships with its antecedents, as well as the arguments themselves were very different; (ii) the overwhelming majority of existing studies have explored the antecedents of expressed behavioural intention for only one form of participation, willingness to participate in collective action. In turn, it follows that the same arguments would not necessarily apply when considering a range of union activities. A rationale for considering particular activities within a mobilization setting has already been discussed. Employing willingness to participate in a mobilization setting, essentially allows one to also include other activities, while at the same time providing a theoretical justification for doing so.

### 3.3.2 Union loyalty and instrumentality...

#### 3.3.2.1 As antecedents of willingness to participate

Union loyalty has been introduced by Gordon et al. (1980) as a result of their attempt to develop a criterion for union commitment. Union loyalty came out as the single, most important factor accounting for 39 per cent of the variance in union commitment. The items comprising the union loyalty factor in Gordon et al.'s (1980) study measured the following: (a) a sense of pride in the association with the union and its membership, and (b) a clear awareness of the benefits to the individual from union membership. This instrumentality aspect of labour organisations came out as a separate factor in a study by Fullagar (1986) aimed at testing the stability and dimensionality of the Gordon et al. scale. The scale developed by Gordon et al. (1980) was replicated twice (Ladd et al., 1982; Gordon et al., 1984), while other studies have developed and validated different versions of Gordon et al.'s (1980) scale (e.g. Kelloway et al.,
1992), but all of them found union loyalty to be the most stable factor of union commitment across samples. It also consistently accounted for most of the variance in union commitment.

In the proposed framework, it is attempted to distinguish between a clearly affective attachment to the union—union loyalty—as well as a more ‘instrumental’ one, union instrumentality. Both emerge, as discussed earlier, from members’ group identifications and denote positive attitudes towards the ingroup. Union loyalty reflects an emotional bond between the individual and the institution, and an overwhelming adherence to its principles and values. Union instrumentality on the other hand, denotes a belief in collective representation for achieving desired outcomes, and thus a belief in the ability of the union to improve the working lives of its members by achieving desired outcomes. More studies have explored union loyalty as an antecedent of participation in the union, rather than union instrumentality, while the latter has been employed more within the context of the unionisation process, associated with the propensity to unionise and voting behaviour (e.g. Kochan, 1978; DeCotiis and LeLouarn, 1981).

It is proposed that the extent to which members feel emotionally attached to the union would influence their intention to participate in union activities. The extent to which members feel a sense of pride in the association with the union and its membership, would be expressed in members’ willingness to participate in union activities. Studies have consistently found a significant and positive association between union loyalty and actual participation (Gordon et al., 1980; Fullagar, 1986; Thacker et al., 1990). Fullagar and Barling (1989) found that union loyalty predicted participation in what they termed, ‘formal union activities’. The latter was a unidimensional index of participation, and comprised items such as participation in union elections, frequency of attendance at union meetings, knowledge of the union contract, attitudes to grievance filing, and current union status. However, there was no clear conceptual link between these items, or a discussion of why union loyalty should influence participation in such activities. On the other hand, within a mobilization setting, what has been emphasised is the importance of reinforcing collective principles and group identity as the motivating force for willingness to participate in activities that precisely reflect such tendencies. In essence, this would also strengthen individual attachment to the organisation (loyalty) and result in willingness to become more actively involved in its day-to-day functioning.
Kelly and Kelly (1994) indicate that the concept of union commitment has some affinity with the concept of social identity. According to the group approach to mobilization, group identifications resulting from an attempt to achieve a positive social identity, are expressed in the form of specific attitudes towards the union. In essence, union commitment is argued to reflect individual members' identification with the union. The above reasoning also applies to union loyalty, as the most stable component of union commitment, and the one accounting for most of the variance in union commitment.

Kelly and Kelly (1994) found the individual's identification with the union to be a positive and significant predictor of the willingness to participate in the union. They employed a two-dimensional index of participation, comprising what they termed as more 'easy' (less visible) and more 'difficult' (more visible) forms of trade union activity. Their more 'difficult' dimension comprised to a large extent of activities that have been termed as 'administrative' (Parks et al., 1995), such as standing as an elected union official, being a union delegate etc. These findings then also support the proposition stated above, that union loyalty will predict willingness to participate in trade union activities.

As part of the group identification processes taking place within a mobilization setting, it is also hypothesised that union instrumentality will have an impact on willingness to participate in union activities. Union instrumentality also results from a strong sense of identification with the union. It could be argued that while union loyalty reflects the emotional attachment to the organisation, union instrumentality reflects the evaluative attachment to the organisation, as part of the attempt to achieve a positive social identity. The evaluative component of identification with the union would involve reinforcing the perception that the union is able to adequately represent its members, and improve their working lives.

Union instrumentality has been found to be significantly and positively associated with voting intent in the study by DeCotiis and Lelouarn (1981). Perceived union instrumentality also predicted actual voting behaviour. Apart from its role as an antecedent, its potential role as a moderator in the relationship between union loyalty and its antecedents and consequences has been assessed by Fullagar and Barling (1989). They hypothesised for example, that the extent to which attitudes of loyalty towards the union would translate into actual participation in union activities, would be contingent on workers' perception of instrumentality concerning the
union’s ability to satisfy various needs and bring about change at the workplace. The above hypothesis was confirmed.

As far as the applicability of these results to a mobilization setting is concerned, the following points should be made: (i) the Fullagar and Barling (1989) study cited above explores actual participation, not willingness to participate. It is argued that union loyalty by itself would be sufficient to induce an expression of willingness to participate, while to translate union loyalty to actual participation, it could indeed be argued that there might be a need for a facilitator, such as union instrumentality; (ii) one question that does emerge within a mobilization setting, however, is whether perceived union instrumentality is best depicted as an independent predictor of willingness to participate, or whether it intervenes in the relationship between union loyalty and willingness to participate. It might be the case for example, that attitudes of loyalty strengthen perceptions of instrumentality, which in turn further contribute to explaining the variance in willingness to participate. It is proposed that both possibilities are equally plausible within a mobilization setting.

3.3.2.2 And leadership

As part of the transformation of individuals into collective actors, leaders would also have an impact on the individual members’ affective attachment to the union. It is essential that leaders enhance members’ sense of pride in the organisation and desire to maintain their membership. A strong sense of loyalty to the union will then lead to willingness to participate in union activities. At the same time though, it is important to distinguish between the two different components of the leadership criterion, since each one can influence union loyalty in a different way, and also the degree of influence varies between the two.

The affective nature of the ‘emotional’ leadership factor would elicit an emotional response from members, in the form of union loyalty. The extent to which the leader could instil a sense of pride in the union, and transmit the unions’ mission, as well as generate respect and provide inspiration, through his charismatic and intellectual qualities, would lead to a sense of pride in the union and its membership, desire to maintain one’s membership of the union and overall positive feelings towards the union. Fullagar at al. (1992) did not find a direct link between the different dimensions of Bass’s transformational leadership factor (charisma,
intellectual stimulation, individualised consideration) and union loyalty. However, they did find intellectual stimulation to affect the development of favourable attitudes towards the union, while charismatic behaviour was associated with the socialisation into the union. It could be argued, that at the early stages of union experience, members are still striving to consolidate their ideas concerning unions, before developing any type of affective attachment to the organisation. This is where leaders’ influence focuses, so that favourable attitudes towards the union can then act as a basis for the development of attitudes of loyalty to the union, as the above study found. Nevertheless, at later stages of members’ union experience leader influence is directed at drawing members closer to the union and to developing an emotional attachment to the organisation, as part of the next stage of union experience: the transformation of individual members into collective actors. Kelloway and Barling (1993) established a link between shop stewards’ transformational leadership characteristics and union loyalty.

In the case of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, the impact on union loyalty emerges from a sense of respect and appreciation towards leaders, evident in their day-to-day interaction with members. The extent to which leaders are perceived as taking an interest in members and their well-being, consulting members etc. would lead to a sense of pride in the union, as an organisation that values its members and invests time and effort in ‘serving’ its members. This is an aspect of leader behaviour that has not been explored within a socialisation setting, since at the early stages of a members’ union experience, this type of interaction is absent, or it is not sufficiently present for it to be identified and assessed in relation to its impact on union attitudes.

Given the above, it is also proposed that ‘emotional’ leadership will have a stronger influence on union loyalty than ‘pragmatic’ leadership, mainly due to its affective nature, as union loyalty clearly denotes the individuals’ emotional bond with the organisation. Nevertheless, as the discussion above shows, ‘pragmatic’ leadership also contributes in enhancing members’ positive feelings towards the union.

Union instrumentality has been referred to earlier as the evaluative attachment to the organisation, which stems again from identification with the union, as is the case with union loyalty. In this context then, it does not bear the calculative connotations of other formulations, since it does not only refer to the unions’ ability to secure strictly economic outcomes for its
members, but embraces a wider conceptualisation, identified as the unions’ ability to improve the working lives of its members, such as maintaining a fair and just environment for members to work in, and ensuring that this is respected by both employers and employees.

It is argued that as part of the mobilization process, leaders would need to enhance the evaluative attachment to the organisation, alongside the emotional attachment to the organisation (union loyalty) for a consistent social identity. Apart from preserving the emotional affinity with the organisation, for individuals to favour participation in union activities, they also need to feel that the union is the most effective channel for protecting their interests and improving their employment conditions. It is important then for leaders to be able to influence the perception that the union is indeed instrumental for members’ well-being at the workplace.

While both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership are argued to influence union instrumentality, the stronger effect of ‘pragmatic’ leadership is acknowledged, since it provides a more direct link with union instrumentality than ‘emotional’ leadership. ‘Pragmatic’ leadership, the extent to which the leaders are perceived as carrying out their prescribed role efficiently and effectively, would influence the perception that the union is able to adequately represent its members and deliver on their behalf. Taking an interest in members, consulting members, being perceived as effective in handling grievances etc. would increase the salience of the unions’ ability to improve the terms and conditions of employment, as well as adequately protect their members’ interests, especially in the case of unfair labour practices by employers.

On the other hand, the influence of ‘emotional’ leadership on union instrumentality resides in the leaders’ ability to articulate the unions’ mission and what the union could achieve with members’ support. This would increase members’ awareness of what the union is trying to achieve, and how it could be achieved, which would in turn reinforce the perception that its presence is required at the workplace and is instrumental in improving their working lives. It is argued then that ‘emotional’ leadership does not necessarily only give rise to emotional responses, but also contributes towards a positive assessment of the union’s ability to carry out its mission.
3.3.3 ‘Them and Us’ attitudes...

3.3.3.1 As an antecedent of willingness to participate

What also emerges as part of a strong sense of group identification, is the development of stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup. It has been argued earlier that in the process of striving to achieve positive distinctiveness, individuals are bound to become involved in a process of categorisation and stereotyping, through what is known as social comparisons. In turn, outgroup stereotyping, in the form of stereotypical attitudes, and group identification, in the form attitudes of union loyalty, are argued to reinforce one another and consequently have an impact on willingness to participate. In essence, within the context of trade union involvement, stereotypical attitudes towards management are argued to predict willingness to participate in trade union activities. Few studies have actually conceptualised and measured stereotypical attitudes towards management in the context of trade union involvement. The examples cited below employ social psychological factors that are argued to correspond to ‘them and us’ attitudes, and as such their findings have implications for the current thesis.

Allen and Stephenson (1983) found that strong group identification was associated with the tendency to view the outgroup in a stereotypical manner, once the salience of group identification was enhanced. In a similar manner, it could be argued that within a mobilization setting, where the activities taking place are aimed at strengthening collective principles and group identity, and where collective achievement is highlighted, stereotypical perceptions towards the outgroup are likely to emerge alongside a strong sense of group identification. A positive association between inter-group stereotyping and measures of inter-group conflict, such as frequency of strike action, was found in a follow-up study by Allen and Stephenson (1985).

However, within a mobilization setting, the objective is inducing the willingness to participate in activities covering the organisation as a whole, not just willingness to participate in collective action, and so the above association is not immediately obvious. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier a conceptual link can be argued to exist between different activities, and so the above association could apply to a wider range of activities. Kelly and Kelly (1994) found that outgroup stereotyping acted as a predictor of willingness to participate in what they referred to
as more ‘easy’ (less visible) forms of trade union activity (e.g. ‘discuss union affairs’, ‘take part in union action’, ‘attend union meetings’ etc.), as well as of their total participation measure.

Although ‘them and us’ attitudes might appear as more relevant in attempting to induce willingness to participate in collective action, in the context of individual mobilization campaigns, it has been argued that, viewing management in a stereotypical fashion will also influence members’ willingness to become involved in the union. The reasoning behind this, is that the more employees perceive management in the manner described above, the more likely it is that they will perceive injustice and(or) illegitimacy in management’s daily conduct, and so the more willing they will be to participate in the union, in order to prevent such behaviour by management and protect their interests.

Kelly and Kelly’s (1990) definition of ‘them and us’ identified three components to the concept: (a) the perception of a clear division between management and workers; (b) a belief that the groups have conflicting interests and (c) a feeling of identification with one of these groups, leading to the expression of positive or negative feelings towards the perceived ‘outgroup’. Although the above definition has not been employed within the context of trade union involvement or for that matter within a mobilization setting, it could be argued that all of the above elements would be essential in cultivating a strong sense of ingroup identity and distinguishing the union, as a body representing workers’ interests, from management. Also, implicit in this definition is the link between group identification and outgroup stereotyping.

Another issue that should be addressed concerns the relationship between group identification and outgroup stereotyping. In the discussion above, the emphasis focused on the union, as the ingroup, and management as the outgroup, and the argument that a strong sense of union loyalty (group identification) would at the same time bring about stereotypical attitudes towards management (outgroup stereotyping). However, as identification with other groups beside the union, has been argued to influence the willingness to participate, one might argue that identification with any one of these groups could lead to the development of stereotypical attitudes towards any other group, perceived as the outgroup. For example, identification with one’s occupational group might lead to stereotypical perceptions towards a different occupational group, whose members are also represented by the union. This would essentially lead to a situation of ‘dual loyalties’, with implications for willingness to participate
in the union. To illustrate this point, if loyalty to one’s occupational group overshadows loyalty to the union, this would in turn weaken the salience and awareness of ‘them and us’ attitudes towards management, and would subsequently have a negative impact on the individual’s willingness to participate in the union, unless he (she) is convinced that the union is able to adequately represent his (her) group’s interests.

However, given the collectivist character of a mobilization setting, and the emphasis on inter-group co-operation and collective achievement, as well as the union’s ability to represent diverse interests, it is proposed that stereotypical attitudes as the ones described above are unlikely to emerge, but even if they do they are not likely to adversely affect the willingness to participate in union activities. The union would still be perceived as the forum of integrating such diverse interests.

3.3.3.2 And leadership

Outgroup stereotyping in the form of ‘them and us’ attitudes, would also be influenced by both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership. It is argued that within a mobilization setting, whereby the outcome is considered to be the willingness of members to participate in union activities, leaders would also need to increase members’ awareness of the conflict of interests between the two groups and the need for members to protect their interests through the union. As an example, shop stewards in Batstone et al. (1977) were involved in frequent discussions with members aimed at eroding managerial legitimacy. While this does not necessarily advocate an adversarial relationship between management and workers, it does advocate that as a result of a strong sense of identification with the union within a mobilization setting, perceptions of a conflict of interests between management and workers would arise. Such perceptions should be taken advantage of by leaders, in their attempt to capitalise on their potential effect on members’ willingness to become involved in the union.

As stereotypical perceptions towards management have been discussed most frequently in the context of individual mobilization campaigns, whereby leaders in their attempt to legitimise instances of collective action in the eyes of the members, attribute blame to management for not addressing members’ grievances earlier to avoid unrest (e.g. Fantasia, 1988; Batstone et al., 1977, 1978), it is not immediately obvious what would the ‘benefits’
would be from enhancing 'them and us' attitudes in an attempt to induce willingness to become involved in the organisation. However, identifying the 'outgroup' within a mobilization setting is as important as when members are urged to participate in collective action, since it clarifies the unions' mission and provides a sense of orientation for the union and its membership.

Although both aspects of leadership are proposed to influence 'them and us' attitudes, it is also proposed that 'emotional' leadership will have a stronger impact on 'them and us' than 'pragmatic' leadership. The affective attachment to the leader and the organisation resulting from 'emotional' leadership, is argued to enhance the tendency to distance oneself from the outgroup (management) and reinforce stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup. On the other hand, in the case of 'pragmatic' leadership, the extent to which the leader is perceived as devoting time and effort to 'serve' members, and taking a genuine interest in members, would again lead to members' getting closer to the union, and consequently distancing themselves from management, without though the emotional intensity that characterises the influence of 'emotional' leadership. The effect of 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership results in a sense, in maintaining the perceived distance between the two groups, and reinforcing the salience of category membership, which is subsequently expressed in the form of stereotypical attitudes towards management.

3.3.4 'Workplace collectivism'…

Prior to discussing the above concept within the context of the present thesis, it should be noted that it has been the subject of considerable debate in a number of academic disciplines. Introduced by Hofstede (1980) as a cultural trait, collectivism featured on one end of a polar continuum, with what was termed as individualism at the other end. It has been presented as an individual and political attitude (Rentoul, 1989), as well as in the form of a historical argument with its origins in class solidarity (Brown, 1990). Within the field of industrial relations the concept has frequently been employed, not least by trade unionists, to describe what they perceive as the progressively prevalent mood among their members, with implications for the survival and future identity of labour movements (e.g. Basset and Cave, 1993). That is, an increasing concern for individual gains and preoccupation with preserving self-interest, rather than a genuine collective spirit. At a different level, it has been employed within the context of
human resource management to refer to the decline of institutions such as collective bargaining, and the introduction of different systems of appraisal targeted at the individual.

All in all, this has been and still is an intensely vibrant debate, from which different perspectives for approaching this concept have emerged, in different areas and at different levels. However, it is argued that the debate especially within the industrial relations literature has been lacking conceptual as well as empirical rigour. Collectivism has not been properly defined, and no real attempt has been made at empirically testing the propositions emerging from existing theoretical perspectives. In assessing the proposition that the decline of the trade union movement reflects a corresponding decline in collectivist values, Kelly (1998) strongly emphasises the fact that “despite some telling and critical reviews of the lack of evidence for this proposition, its popularity seems undiminished”. He then moves on to critically review Brown’s (1990) essay on the “Counter-revolution of our time”, and discuss the underlying premise and implications of his approach, concluding that Brown’s “…collectivism of poverty is just one form, not the form of collectivism, and that labour movements in Britain, and elsewhere, have been able to construct collective identities and organisation amongst a wide range of workers at many different levels of affluence”.

Bearing in mind the above, the current approach to ‘collectivism’ will attempt to define the concept and subsequently operationalise it, so that it can be employed in settings where mobilization and collective action are vital. The current thesis very much reflects what has been concluded by Kelly (1998). It suggests that, given the distinction between a personal and social identity, which implies that both collective and individual action is possible for each person, collectivism should not be dismissed as representing the romantic idealism and solidarity of a past age. Rather, the likelihood of collective action occurring, would very much depend on which aspect of one’s identity is more salient in specific instances. What is also posited in a sense, is the idea discussed earlier, that individualism and collectivism do not form polar opposites, but rather they coexist in individuals or groups, in different situations or with different target groups (e.g. Kagitcibasi, 1994).

In essence, the rise of individualism does not necessarily preclude collectivism. This has been evident through a number of collective outbursts in the Western world, such as for
example the massive demonstration in France recently, in opposition to the government's spending plans, that emerged from within the working community. Another more relevant example, might be white-collar staff, perceived as more individualistic in their concerns, and in the character of their employment terms and conditions. Waddington and Winston (1996) found in a study they carried out among white-collar staff, that although their bargaining agenda incorporates individual aims, such as issues relating to career development, they wish to pursue these within a collective framework. In a sense then, the idea of service-oriented unionism (e.g. Bassett and Cave, 1993) was shown to be rejected. However, what is acknowledged is that for white-collar workers, especially those with individualised career expectations, there is a far more complex relationship between individual and collective interests, as discussed by Hyman (1994).

3.3.4.1 As an antecedent of willingness to participate

Within a trade union setting and as part of the mobilization process, as presented here, the aim is to increase the awareness and salience of group identifications in such a way as to highlight the effectiveness of collective forms of representation and action, which would then induce the willingness to participate in collective activities. As has been mentioned earlier, this element of motivation emerging from group identifications features in Yates's (1992) definition of what she terms 'collective identity': "the shared values and interests of a group, those that forge bonds of solidarity among its members such that members are motivated by their identification with the collectivity to which they belong" (ibid.:115). A collectivity means any social unit within an individual's working environment, predominantly those with which the individual is in direct contact, such as one's workgroup and (or) departmental group. The union, as one such group has already been discussed.

It would seem then, that a definition of 'collectivism' within a mobilization setting would need to incorporate not simply the group identification element, but also the solidarity and motivation resulting from such feelings of group identification. It is proposed then that the concept of 'workplace collectivism' as conceived above, is defined as: " identification with different social units/groups/collectivities within the individual's working environment with

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87 Apart from the context of labour movements and union involvement and participation, another example would be a social movement setting.
which he(she) shares values and interests such that forge bonds of solidarity between the individual and the social unit(s), motivating the individual to favour collective action”. Collective action is employed here in its broader sense, referring not simply to strike action, overtime bans etc., but also any type of activity which is characterised by a collectivist orientation. Implicit in this definition is the element of collective representation, which would have to be favoured by members, for a consistent collectivist orientation, expressed as the extent to which members favour collective action.

This definition, in a way combines two of the psychological factors explored in Kelly and Kelly’s (1994) study, as predictors of willingness to participate in trade union activities, namely group identification and collectivist orientation. This is an attempt to explore the idea that these two concepts are in reality part of one multi-dimensional construct, that I chose to refer to as ‘workplace collectivism’ for the purpose of the current thesis. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, it is also noted that collectivism is treated here as an individual attitude, which distinguishes it from collectivism as a cultural trait conceptualised at the macro-level, although the discussion so far employed the same term for both concepts. The reason for this is that other terms, such as for example collective identity or collectivist orientation, do not fully capture the complexity of the concept and the extent of the proposed definition.

In essence, it is hypothesised that within the mobilization process, the extent to which individuals identify with certain ingroups, develop feelings of solidarity and in turn are motivated by their identification with these collectivities would ultimately have a positive impact on the willingness to participate in trade union activities. The reasoning behind this follows the same logical sequence as in the case of union loyalty. However, in this case, there exists the implicit assumption that the collectivities themselves actually favour involvement in the union. Another implicit assumption is that members feel that their interests can be adequately represented by the trade union, even if the level at which interests are defined in the union’s case is different from the individual. For example, if group interests for the individual are defined at the level of one’s departmental group, whereas the union represents members’ interests at the organisational level, the above factors of collectivism are unlikely to have a determining impact on willingness to participate, unless the individual member feels that his
(her) group interests can be adequately represented within a collective framework, where diverse interests are integrated.

In accordance with Triandis et al.'s (1988) position that individuals characterised by a collectivist orientation would be more likely to participate in collective activities, Kelly and Kelly (1994) found both collectivist orientation and group identification to be significant, positive predictors of willingness to participate in 'more easy' (less visible) forms of trade union activity, such as attend meetings, participate in collective action etc. At the same time, collectivist orientation did not predict willingness to participate in 'more difficult' (more visible) forms of activity, such as standing as an elected union official, assuming a position as union delegate etc. However, in the context of the current approach it is argued that both collectivist orientation and group identifications, as dimensions of 'workplace collectivism', will have a significant, positive effect on willingness to participate in trade union activities. Given that the emphasis within a mobilization process rests on collective principles and the effectiveness of collective representation and action, it is this that will essentially lead to the willingness to become involved in the union, to ensure adequate functioning of this institution as it strives to serve its members.

3.3.4.2 And leadership

Workplace collectivism as defined above, highlights the importance of other groups within the organisation of which the individual is a member, apart from the union, with which he (she) is in frequent contact, such as for example one’s workgroup or departmental group. What will now be attempted is to identify the significance of leaders’ influence in increasing the salience of identification with these groups as part of the mobilization process.

Promoting and preserving a strong sense of group identity within a mobilization setting is crucial, since this is the fundamental principle on which trade unionism is founded. It is essential for individual members to perceive their interests in group terms and identify collective representation as the most effective method for acquiring desired outcomes. Leaders then would need to increase the salience of group identifications, promote solidarity of interests and values among members, and highlight the effectiveness of collective forms of representation and action.
As workplace collectivism consists of three main components, all significant as part of the mobilization process, it would be preferable to explore the impact of the two different types of leadership behaviour separately for each dimension. As such an analysis runs the risk of becoming repetitive, I will restrict myself to those arguments that I feel are absolutely essential for explaining the above relationships.

Although both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership are argued to have an impact on all three dimensions of workplace collectivism, it is also argued that ‘pragmatic’ leadership would command stronger influence than ‘emotional’ leadership. In the case of ‘emotional’ leadership, it is proposed that the extent to which the leader is able to instil a sense of pride in the union, excite members about what can be achieved if members work together, indirectly emphasising and promoting a strong sense of group identification, is likely to increase members’ awareness of group membership, and reinforce identification with one’s own ingroup. In the same way, ‘emotional’ leadership is likely to influence the perception that there is agreement between the individual’s own values and interests and those of the group. The extent to which the leader can articulate the union’s mission, highlighting the union’s ability to adequately represent diverse interests, would increase the salience of common interests and values among members of one’s group. The impact of ‘emotional’ leadership on the extent to which members would favour collective forms of representation and action in achieving desired outcomes, resides in the leaders’ ability to obtain identification with the union and its goals and objectives. As trade unions epitomise activities underlined by collective principles, identifying with the union would increase the salience of the latter, and subsequently reinforce the extent to which the individual member would favour collective forms of representation and action.

As far as the impact of ‘pragmatic’ leadership is concerned, the influence resides in the perception that the union is able to adequately represent its members’ interests and is effective in doing so. The extent to which leaders are viewed as efficient in their handling of grievances, receptive to members’ needs and demands, always willing to inform members of any developments on issues of concern etc., would influence all three dimensions of workplace collectivism. More specifically, in the case of group identifications, the unions’ perceived effectiveness in representing their members would increase the salience of group interests, which would in turn reinforce group identifications. In the case of perceived solidarity between
members' values and interests, the reasoning follows a similar sequence to the one above, whereby enhancing the salience of group interests strengthens solidarity of interests and values. However, there is one underlying assumption to the above reasoning, the idea that the individual member's level of interest definition coincides with that of the union's. If on the other hand, leaders represent interests at a level with which the member does not identify, and in turn feels that the union is unable to adequately represent members' interests at that level, then it is reasonable to assume that the above relationships are unlikely to hold, unless leaders are able to demonstrate solidarity of interests at all levels, and convince members of the unions' ability to effectively represent diverse interests within a collective framework. This also directs attention to potential differences between unions in the leaders' ability to do so. As far as the impact of 'pragmatic' leadership on whether members favour collective forms of representation and action is concerned, the leaders' perceived ability in adequately representing members, in the way described above, would enhance members' faith in the methods of representation and action employed by the leader, and the union at large.

So far then, the relationships between the main components in the mobilization model, i.e. member attitudes, leadership and willingness to participate, have been developed. As has been argued at the beginning of this section, member attitudes also assume a mediating role in the relationship between leadership and willingness to participate. In a sense then, leadership would influence member attitudes as described above, which in turn would influence willingness to participate in trade union activities. Also, the potential influence of the interaction effect for the two leadership factors, 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership, as well as the idea that 'emotional' leadership contributes beyond 'pragmatic' leadership in explaining outcome variables of interest, will also be explored in relation to member attitudes, alongside willingness to participate, as an attempt to further examine the importance of 'emotional' leadership within a mobilization setting.

Aside from leadership however, there is one other concept that could potentially influence member attitudes, as well as willingness to become involved in the union within a mobilization setting, and that is trade union identity. Its role within the mobilization process, as well as the arguments underlying its association with member attitudes and willingness to participate will be discussed in the next section.
3.4 Trade union identity and the mobilization process

Trade union identity is becoming an increasingly important issue, especially in light of the recent debate on changing union identities. Hyman (1996) views identities as "...inherited traditions which structure current choices, which in turn in normal circumstances reinforce and confirm identities". However, recent developments in the economic sphere with implications for labour markets and employment structure, mean that unions have to again address the question 'What are we here for?' posed by the general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress in the 1960’s (Hyman, 1996), partly breaking away from long-standing traditions. The challenge for trade unions is once again imminent and it is a challenge that unions need to confront. Although trade union identities are associated with the unions’ heritage, in periods of crisis choices may be dictated partly at odds with their heritage, as probably is the case with any organisation identifying the need for identity changes, and as Hyman (1996) again notes, identities can change. As unions in different countries find themselves at different stages of the change process, assuming an identity that is shared by the members is also a crucial issue faced by these organisations.

The discussion on formulating suitable trade union identities for the future, has led to the development of different theoretical perspectives that direct attention to the possibilities available for trade unions to follow (e.g. Hyman, 1994, 1996). However, the significance of a trade union identity at the micro, individual level has not been empirically assessed. The possible impact of union identity on member attitudes and (or) behavioural intentions, has not as yet been explored, despite the crucial implications this might have for the process of changing existing identities and (or) formulating new ones.

In relation to the current research context, it is argued that the importance of trade union identity can only be identified and examined at the later stages of members’ union experience, once members have been socialised into the organisation, and have begun to formulate their own views about the union through daily interaction with its representatives and officials, and through familiarising themselves with the day-to-day code of conduct, both written and verbal. At this stage, the mobilization stage, the process of transforming individuals...
into collective actors would have been initiated, aiming at the development of favourable attitudes towards the union, which would subsequently lead to the willingness to become involved in the union and participate in trade union activities. It is proposed that one of the factors that will determine the success of this process is the identity projected by the union to the members. In essence, it is argued that the identity of the union would influence member attitudes, as well as the intention to participate in trade union activities, which implies the need for trade unions to ensure early on that their established identity corresponds to member expectations.

Hyman (1996) developed five alternative trade union identities based on four different models combining trade union interests and agenda. In these four different models, he identifies two different orientations for trade unions: Individual vs. Collective, and two possible directions for the focus of representation: Work vs. Society (figure 3.3).

![Figure 3.3 Models of interests/agenda](source)

He argues that the above two dimensions give rise to a variety of alternative trade union identities, but he concentrates on those he feels are of significance in contemporary Europe, and so his typology of trade union identity comprises the following five ‘ideal types’ of trade union identities: Guild, Friendly Society, Company Union, Social Partner and Social Movement (figure 3.4).
The first type is concerned with a form of collectivism found amongst relatively privileged occupational groups, such as skilled production and service workers, especially those associated with advanced technology, as Hyman (1996) notes. By preserving a monopoly of representation such groups feel that they can best reap the benefits of union membership, “...without the need to ‘dilute’ distinctive interests within a bargaining sector covering other, numerically preponderant occupational groups” (Hyman, 1996). Another important element of this type of identity, as highlighted by Hyman (1996) is the idea that elite interests can be pursued either in parallel or in opposition to other group interests. To the extent that the latter is the case, the success of the guild model denotes failure for the trade union movement, as a wider movement representative of a variety of diverse interests.

The second type of unionism, as discussed by Hyman (1996) bears strong resemblance to early forms of trade unionism, where benefits and support were provided for distinct occupational groups. This form of unionism falls into the category of ‘service unionism’ (Bassett and Cave, 1993) with purely individualistic connotations, in contrast to those earlier forms, whereby providing advice and support to individual workers involved in a dispute with their employers denoted a relationship characterised by collective principles and values, and as such had a collective significance. As Hyman (1996) again notes, it is doubtful whether such an organisation can be easily regarded as a trade union.

In the third model, the union “...becomes part of a ‘productivity coalition’ with management, collaborating in policies to enhance competitive performance” (Hyman, 1996). Here the union responds to shifts in the balance of power towards employers, with the threat of intensified competition and the pressures for survival. Unions enter into a partnership at the

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<tr>
<th>Focus of Action</th>
<th>Key Function</th>
<th>Ideal Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Occupational Elite</td>
<td>Exclusive Representation</td>
<td>Guild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Worker</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Friendly Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Productivity Coalition</td>
<td>Company Union</td>
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<td>Government</td>
<td>Political Exchange</td>
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<td>Mass Support</td>
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Figure 3.4 Five alternative trade union identities
Source: Hyman (1992, 1996)
micro, company level, an increasingly prevalent trend in the process of decentralisation of industrial relations. According to Hyman (1996) the risk in such coalitions resides in that it could undermine the unions’ ability to fully align its goals with member expectations and demands in periods of economic turmoil, intensifying divisions of employee interests.

In his fourth model, the union enters into a partnership with government, and engages in a process of political exchange. According to Hyman (1996) this form of unionism has “...a firm basis in countries where state benefits for unemployment, sickness and retirement are explicitly regarded as elements in a ‘social wage’, in the determination of which the unions possess a legitimate representative status”. However, at the same time it is also pointed out that the risk in this case is unions supporting and legitimising government policies at the expense of their memberships, i.e. without obtaining sufficient compensation for their ‘contribution’. Unless unions actively participate in shaping the agenda, to reflect the specific interests of those they claim to represent, they are likely to fail in mobilising support from their constituents, without which they would not be adequately equipped to pursue a particular agenda.

In his final model, trade unions are depicted as organisations which command mass support and function as campaigning organisations. According to Hyman (1996), although this model would previously be associated with class or populist politics it is now being revived. He goes on to argue that this model or at least some elements of it are likely to be adopted by unions with an unstable membership base and unreliable power resources. For example, the French trade union movement, with a traditionally low membership, and limited influence, preoccupied with external recognition which led to its politicisation and rejection by its membership, has recently formed the critical mass for a demonstration that resulted in social upheaval. Such a trade union movement would be likely to embrace this social movement model.

While in reality no trade union movement can fully adopt any of the identities outlined, as argued by Hyman (1996), it might be the case that different types might be assumed at different circumstances. Which ones, might well depend on the movement’s heritage and tradition. However, Hyman (1996) does appear to promote the idea that trade unions are no longer consistent in their choices, as these are dictated by developments in the environment in
which trade unions operate, and are taken reactively and opportunistically, rather than reflecting genuine goals and objectives set at the top of the organisations to guide their policies.

Turning again to the role of trade union identity within a mobilization setting, it is argued that depending on the type of identity, one might observe a corresponding effect on different attitudes. For example, members of a union that embraces the guild model, emphasising belonging as a function of benefits, are more likely to perceive the union as instrumental for improving their working lives, rather than feel loyal to the union. On the other hand, in the case of more traditional unions with their basis in class politics, whereby some or most elements of the social movement model form its identity, more affective responses would be anticipated by members, such as a stronger impact on union loyalty than union instrumentality. At the same time, it could also be argued that a significant result for the impact of trade union identity on member attitudes, might also be an indirect indication of the extent to which the unions’ existing identity is shared by its membership. For instance, if members do not share the union’s identity this might be reflected in the extent to which they are loyal to the union, or the extent to which they perceive the union as instrumental in improving their working lives. As far as the impact on willingness to participate in union activities is concerned, union identity is again proposed to be a determining factor. A significant impact of union identity on willingness to participate, would indicate that the intention to participate varies across unions. One possibility for this result might be again, the fact that the union’s projected image is not shared by its membership, and so individual members are unlikely to seek to legitimise the existing union identity by indicating a willingness to participate in activities that reinforce and preserve such an identity, thus facilitating the union’s ability to function and survive.

Having explored trade union identity as a possible antecedent of willingness to participate and member attitudes, what will be presented next is the theoretical framework underlying the current research attempt, incorporating all the different components identified above, and outlining the theoretical propositions to be tested.
3.5 Laying the foundations for research: proposed theoretical framework and research propositions

Prior to presenting the theoretical framework forming the basis of my research, the broader objectives of the current research project will be summarised, which will serve as a background to the study. These are as follows:

1. to provide an alternative approach to the issue of mobilization, in an attempt to direct attention to the significance of membership as one of the most valuable resources of trade unions, vital for their survival, and therefore the need to engage in a constructive process of interaction with members to obtain their commitment and support. This is also the primary aim of the present study. Alongside the significance of the methods employed in socialising members into the organisation, with implications for favourable attitudes towards the union at the early stages of a members’ union experience, the significance of pursuing the development of such attitudes at the later stages of union experience is highly emphasised.

2. to examine the combined effect of union attitudes in the context of trade union involvement. Previous research has not been comprehensive enough to allow a comparative assessment of different attitudes, in their role as predictors of the intention to become involved in the union.

3. to distinguish between the intention to participate and actual participation, and provide an appropriate setting for exploring the former. Actual participation and the intention to participate have been used interchangeably in research on trade union participation, despite caution raised by some researchers relating to the idea that these two do not necessarily have the same determinants (e.g. Klandermans, 1986)

4. to examine the potential instrumentality of leadership behaviour in predicting member responses. Evidence has so far provided some indication as to the above, but it has been restricted to exploring the impact of leadership behaviour at the early stages of

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88 Klandermans (1986) focuses specifically on collective action, but his argument could also be employed in the context of wider trade union involvement.
members' union experience (e.g. Fullagar et al., 1992; Fullagar et al., 1994). Even in these studies findings have proved inconclusive. At the same time, research on leader influence at the later stages of one’s union membership would provide an additional dimension to the impact of leadership, outside the artificial conditions of a socialisation setting, once members have had the opportunity to engage in an interactive process with leaders, on a daily basis. Also, employing a conceptualisation of leadership that embraces different aspects of leader behaviour, in agreement with the proposed definition, would contribute further to shaping a comprehensive theory of union leadership.

3.5.1 Proposed theoretical framework: a process model of mobilization

In an attempt to integrate all the preceding arguments and analysis into a single theoretical framework, the chain of reasoning that led to the proposed framework (see figure 3.5) should be recapitulated, starting from the conceptualisation of mobilization as the 'transformation of individuals into collective actors'. One could distinguish three main components in this model: leadership, member attitudes and willingness to participate. The individual member's working environment comprises different social units (collectivities, groups) that formulate the member's responses. Within a mobilization setting, the following collectivities become salient: union, management, and more immediate social units such as one's workgroup, departmental group etc. Identification with these groups is expressed in the form of attitudes towards the various groupings, such as union loyalty and union instrumentality emerging from identification with the union, 'them and us' attitudes stemming again from identification with the union which gives rise to a process of outgroup stereotyping, and 'workplace collectivism', emerging from identification with the more immediate groupings mentioned above. The motivating effect of such identifications then translates in the member's willingness to participate in trade union activities, bound by collective principles and values, as the outcome of the mobilization process. Leaders in this model are depicted as the 'mobilising' agents, facilitating the progress of this process of transformation. Leadership behaviour can directly influence the outcome of the mobilization process, and also indirectly by increasing the
salience of member attitudes, i.e. group identification, which would then transform the individual member into a collective actor, willing to participate in union activities. In the present study, trade union identity as developed in this chapter, will be explored as a control variable.⁸⁹

As evident from the above, the intention is to offer a broader conceptualisation of mobilization, outside individual mobilization campaigns targeted at specific outcomes. Also, by employing a social-psychological perspective, to explore the individual processes that occur as part of the attempt to transform individual members into collective actors. Instead of focusing on how to construct a temporary collective culture, the emphasis should be on how to generate a sustainable collective base as the background for any individual campaign.

Figure 3.5 Mobilization Model

3.5.2 Propositions

Based on the above theoretical framework and the preceding analysis, the following are predicted:

1. Both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership are argued to have a significant positive effect on union loyalty, union instrumentality, ‘them and us’ attitudes and ‘workplace collectivism’

2. ‘Emotional’ leadership will have a stronger impact than ‘pragmatic’ leadership on union loyalty and ‘them and us’ attitudes

⁸⁹ It was decided not to include trade union identity as an antecedent of member attitudes and willingness to
3. ‘Pragmatic’ leadership will have a stronger impact than ‘emotional’ leadership on union instrumentality and ‘workplace collectivism’.

4. ‘Emotional’ leadership will add beyond ‘pragmatic’ leadership in predicting member attitudes.

5. Trade union identity will be significantly associated with member attitudes: union loyalty, union instrumentality, ‘them and us’, ‘workplace collectivism’.

6. Both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership will have a significant, positive effect on willingness to participate in union activities.

7. The ‘emotional’ leadership factor will add to the prediction of willingness to participate in union activities, beyond that of the ‘pragmatic’ leadership factor.

8. The interaction effect of ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership will add to the prediction of willingness to participate in union activities, beyond that of their independent effect.

9. Member attitudes will have a significant, positive effect on willingness to participate.

10. Member attitudes will mediate the relationship between the leadership measure and willingness to participate.

11. Trade union identity will be significantly associated with willingness to participate in union activities.

participate, as this could dilute the argumentation relating to leadership behaviour within a mobilization setting.
3.6 Conclusions

This chapter aimed at identifying and discussing the theoretical arguments underlying the relationship between willingness to become involved in the union and its antecedents, within the mobilization process, as a continuous process for transforming individual members into collective actors. The arguments emerging from discussion and analysis have been incorporated into a model for the mobilization process, emphasising the need to adopt a wider conceptualisation of mobilization, as well as introducing leadership as one of the crucial factors influencing the process. The propositions that emerge from such an analysis have also been postulated.

Leadership has been argued to act as a direct antecedent of willingness to participate within a mobilization setting, but at the same time due to the nature of the process being explored, leaders have been identified as the agents of the process, increasing the salience of group identifications, and reinforcing member attitudes, to ultimately induce willingness to participate in trade union activities. What has also been discussed is the interaction effect of the two leadership factors, ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, as contributing further to explaining the remaining variance in both member attitudes and willingness to participate, beyond their independent effect. At the same time, the proposition that the type of union identity aspired to by different organisations influences involvement in the organisation, while also contributing to the development of a strong sense of group identification has also been assessed. It has been argued, that the image projected to members within a mobilization setting influences members’ attitudes towards the union, as well as their willingness to become involved in the union. However, for reasons identified earlier trade union identity will be treated as a control variable in the current study, rather than as an antecedent.

Evidently, the conceptual foundations of the approach discussed early in the chapter, as well as the ensuing development of theoretical relationships and arguments rest on the idea of group identification, and the coexistence of both a personal and social identity that directs the development of attitudes and behaviours, or more to the point, behavioural intentions. What has been constantly emphasised in the above discussion is the motivating effect of group identifications, as a determining factor in developing the willingness to participate in trade union activities. At the same time, the motivating effect of outgroup stereotyping was also
identified and addressed. It is expected, according to social identity theory, that a strong sense of group identification will give rise to stereotypical perceptions of the outgroup. The formation of such stereotypical attitudes towards management, the outgroup in this case, will also contribute to the members' intention to become involved in the union, as well as reinforcing group identification.

As part of the discussion on antecedents of willingness to participate, there also emerged the issue of 'collectivism', both in the context of the current approach as well as in a broader sense. The proposition that individualism has taken over collectivism, has been questioned and support for the thesis of coexistence has been advocated. Examples of collective efforts have been cited, where individuals identified and acted on the basis of a common cause, preserving individual interests within a collective framework. Here it is also implied that this is a natural process, as individuals are already members of groups, but perhaps do not perceive themselves as such. Consequently, what becomes vital is to promote awareness of group membership and at the same time increase the salience of group identification, where collective values and principles need to be cultivated and preserved. A trade union setting is one such setting, and what has just been described constitutes the objective of the mobilization process.

The next chapter deals with the methodological aspect of research, presenting the measures that have been employed for the various components of the model, as well as the procedures involved in gaining access, distributing and collecting questionnaires. What is also presented and discussed is the initial treatment of interview data.
Chapter 4 Research Setting and Methods

One of the many challenging and fascinating tasks in any research project early on, is the task of translating what is naturally considered by the researcher to be an original set of ideas worthwhile exploring, into a feasible 'plan of action'. Ultimately, what will largely determine the success of any study is the suitability and effectiveness of such a plan.

This chapter will deal precisely with the steps that were involved in conducting the current research project. Section 4.1 will describe the research setting and the source and number of respondents, section 4.2 will deal with the measures employed for the variables in the study, including a discussion of the initial treatment of interview data, and finally, section 4.3 will provide a detailed account of the procedures in contacting the participants, obtaining access and finally administering the research instruments.

The current research project utilised a cross-sectional survey design in testing the propositions outlined in the previous chapter, employing two main research instruments: self-administered questionnaires and structured interviews.

4.1 Subjects and setting

4.1.1 The setting

The study was carried out in the three largest organisations in the public corporate sector in Cyprus, which altogether accounted for 61 per cent of total employment in this sector at the time (1994).90 The Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA), the Cyprus Electricity Authority (CEA) and the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) employed 2387, 1843 and 565 staff respectively.91

The majority of employees in these organisations were organised by unions belonging to the Federation of Semi-Government Organisations (OHO), affiliated to the Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK), while the rest belonged to either the more recently

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90 Source: Labour Statistics(1994), since at the time of preparing for the fieldwork, the 1995 issue was not yet available.
91 These figures were obtained from company records (1995). The figure for the CBC includes employees having temporary status.
founded unions affiliated to the Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO), or to smaller independent unions. There were three established unions in the Cyprus Telecoms Authority, the Free Pancyprian Telecommunication Workers Union (EPOET), affiliated to SEK, and organising approximately 65 per cent of the total workforce, the Pancyprian Independent Telecommunication Workers Union (PASE), a member of the Pancyprian Co-ordinating Committee for Independent Trade Unions, organising approximately 23 per cent of the total workforce, and the Pancyprian Public and Semi-Government Workers Union (SIDIKEK), affiliated to PEO, organising approximately 8 per cent of the total workforce. Non-union members were a very small minority of employees as the figures show. In the case of the Electricity Authority the majority of the workforce were again organised by the union affiliated to SEK, the Free Pancyprian Electricity Workers Union (EPOPAI) with a density of around 74 per cent. However, there were three other unions present as well, the PEO-affiliated union SIDIKEK with a density of around 8 per cent, the Professional Employees Union (SEPAIK), and the Shift Workers Union (SYVAIK) with a density of 10 and 5 per cent respectively, both members of the Pancyprian Co-ordinating Committee for Independent Trade Unions. Again non-union members were confined to an insignificant minority. In contrast to these two organisations, the workforce at the CBC was exclusively organised by unions affiliated to SEK. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Employees Union (EVRIK) and the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Technical Employees Union (SYTYRIK) organised around 52 and 21 per cent respectively, giving them an overall lower density compared to union density in the other organisations92,93

Apart from the strictly occupational unions, SEPAIK, SYVAIK and SYTYRIK, the other unions across all three organisations represent employees throughout the occupational spectrum, with their membership as diverse as blue-collar workers, clerical and technical staff, supervisors, and managers in some occasions. SEPAIK's membership is exclusive to university degree holders, most of whom are engineers and the rest computing officers. Its membership also includes the higher levels of the managerial hierarchy, with area and departmental managers. It should also be noted that SEPAIK's

92 This might reflect the relatively large proportion of temporary employees in the CBC.
members felt that on the basis of salary scales, they could be considered as ‘management’, entering the organisation at the lower levels of the managerial hierarchy. Their career paths are very different from those of the rest of the employees since their career ladder extends all the way up to the top general management position. This is why as their General Secretary argued, their concerns and subsequently their demands are quite different from other occupations in the organisation, oriented more towards professional advancement, rather than pay and benefits, especially for the union’s younger cohort.94

These unions vary in their structures (see appendix C.1), not least because of the differences in size. However, although the differences in size appear to influence the specialisation and formalisation element in roles and procedures, to use Child’s (1973) classification of structural characteristics, also influenced by the unions’ culture, i.e. the principles and values regarding the role of the membership and the relationship between leaders and members, the degree of hierarchy is almost uniform, independent of size. It could be argued, however, that the degree of hierarchy in the case of trade unions reflects an equally hierarchical and bureaucratic structure in the three professional organisations.

Although one runs the risk of becoming tediously elaborate in identifying the differences in member representation between unions, such differences serve the purpose of familiarising the reader with the idiosyncratic character of the setting. The unions represent members in four districts including, in the case of the Electricity Authority, the two power stations. SYVAIK is an exception since it only organises workers in the two power stations. The same holds for EVRIK and SYTYRIK at the CBC since the organisation operates exclusively from Nicosia. As far as the other two organisations are concerned they maintain their headquarters in Nicosia, but also have offices in all the other districts, which in turn provide services in different areas in the district from different buildings. Members in these organisations are represented in the various buildings by elected union representatives who also participate in the unions’ wider bodies. In turn, in every district there is a District (or Local) Committee, and the District (Local) Secretary is the one officially in charge of handling grievances in that particular district, along with the District Committee, by taking them up with local management. However, the differences

93 The figures for all unions were obtained from union records (1995) and thus might have been inflated.
arise in member representation in Nicosia. While in the case of EPOPAI (Electricity Authority) there are two district committees and Secretaries, one based at the headquarters and the other at the organisation’s district office, representing all members independent of occupation, but ensuring that they are representative of the broad occupational categories (office, technical staff), in the case of EPOET and PASE (Telecoms Authority) members are organised in different divisions according to occupation and each one of these divisions elects its own committee in charge of handling grievances on behalf of that division. EVRIK and SYTYRIK (CBC) are organised in the same way. SIDIKEK operates in a rather more centralised manner than any one of the other unions and again does not distinguish between occupations but represents members as a whole, ensuring nevertheless that representatives reflect the composition of the workforce in every location (building, district). It should be noted that union representatives and officials are employees of the organisation and not full-time union officers, although there exists an unwritten ‘code of conduct’ for higher level officials (i.e. President and General Secretary) that allow them to carry out union duties during working hours. Collective agreements are negotiated by the unions’ Executive committees, with General Management on the other side of the bargaining table.

One could distinguish between two main types of unions, on the basis of the degree of formalisation and specialisation in roles and procedures, which also reflects the overall culture of the organisation, termed here as the unions’ ‘structural features’: the traditional ones, and the progressive ones. The traditional ones, EPOET, EPOPAI and SIDIKEK appear quite strict about role definition and deviations from the prescribed role. Union representatives and lower level officials are very reluctant to deviate from the status quo, and the prevailing culture within trade unions does not encourage them to do so. In contrast, the progressive unions, such as PASE and SEPAIK possess an element of flexibility not observed by those termed as traditional ones, which manifests itself in less formalised roles and less standardised procedures, providing the opportunity for lower level officials and representatives to engage more actively in the trade union process. It

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94 Interview with the General Secretary of the union, Mr Tasos Gregoriou.
95 It should be noted that these are ideal types and unions are more likely to fall into these categories in varying degrees.
should be noted that even within these categories there are different degrees of the phenomena described above, and subtle differences can be identified, but a clear distinction does emerge between the two groups.

Another important feature, observed in all unions is the centralisation of decision making. Decisions, even on what can be regarded as 'simple' issues tend to be confined to the higher levels of union structure, negotiated by the unions' Executive committees and top management. This however does not originate in the unions themselves, although they have adjusted to it over the years quite successfully one might add, but it mainly arises from the complex, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the organisations in the public corporate sector and their inherent rigidity, impeding effective dispute resolution, with substantial delays in the processing of grievances and their subsequent resolution at the right level. The unions' excuse is lack of authority in the proper decision making centres, while management's excuse is increasing government intervention that restricts efficient organisational functioning. Both parties have been reinforcing such arrangements for years, causing frustration and discontent among staff. Strangely enough, although not unexpectedly, what has also contributed to strengthening such a system of centralisation is the tendency by the members themselves to frequently approach the higher level officials rather than their officially assigned representatives, with their grievances. The informal code of conduct and the degree of proximity in some occasions, is what allows something like this to occur. Members are convinced that most of the problems would reach the higher level officials and union bodies anyway prior to being resolved, so they choose to by-pass existing channels and take their grievances themselves, directly to the individual(s) who is likely to be in charge of dealing with them.

The eight different unions represented in the study, could also be classified on the basis of their assumed identity, using Hyman's (1996) typology discussed in the previous chapter. Employing two of the five main types of union identity offered by Hyman (1996), one could distinguish between *Guild* unions and *Social Partner* unions in the current setting. Unions such as SEPAIK, SYVAIK and SYTYRIK exclusively represent and cater for specific occupational groups and thus interests, while unions such as EPOPAI,
EPOET, PASE, EVRIK, SIDIKEK represent a range of diverse interests, deriving their legitimacy from their status as interlocutors of government.

Increasing government intervention has placed considerable strain on industrial relations in the public corporate sector, not least in the case of the three organisations included in the study. Imposed government restrictions on negotiated pay rises and benefits, especially in the recently concluded collective agreement (1996), resulted in an intense negotiating climate, but strike action was avoided. This agreement was negotiated and agreed to by the largest union (EPOET) in the Cyprus Telecoms Authority, which usually leads negotiations. Once it was agreed to by this union, this meant that it would most definitely be accepted by the other unions in the other organisations. Although this angered staff in all unions, they did note disappointingly that once it was accepted by EPOET, there was nothing more that could be done by the other unions. As one local representative in the smaller union PASE argued: "...We are not happy with the government’s proposal, but we will go along with it since the largest union has already agreed...It is easier to follow rather than take measures...One cannot really be sure about the gains from collective action, especially when the strong union has already agreed. For collective action to be effective there needs to be one, united voice". Other issues are also likely to cause further disturbance in the near future, such as calls for privatisation and the bill on the regulation of strikes in essential services, although whether the labour movement will be unanimous in its responses on these issues remains to be seen. Another pending issue is a demand from trade unions for representation at board level, an issue which apparently, has so far not been responded to adequately by the present government.

The threat of collective action has been frequently employed, and given the large-scale memberships one is inclined to accept that unions do possess the required potential, although almost always collective action has been averted. More frequent are isolated one-hour or 24-hour work stoppages, overtime bans etc. than co-ordinated collective action attempts. Members’ real disposition towards the unions, leaders’ influence on members and members’ willingness to participate both in collective action, as well as their willingness to become involved in trade unions, are issues that have not been explored. I believe that these are crucial elements in the relationship between unions and members that
will largely determine the unions’ influence in current and future industrial relations debates in the public corporate sector.

4.1.2 The participants

It was initially considered that a representative sample be drawn from a population comprising the organisations mentioned above, i.e. CYTA, CEA and CBC. However, the relatively small size of the research setting provided a rare opportunity for studying the whole population, even within the set resource (time, cost) constraints, and so it was decided to do so. There was nevertheless one main obstacle, the geographical dispersion of the organisations, apart from the CBC. Within the constraints mentioned above, it appeared impossible to cover all four districts, and so it was decided to restrict the study to the two main districts, Nicosia and Limassol. Naturally, it was ensured that abandoning the two remaining districts would not affect the representativeness of the study, by evaluating through available evidence, potential differences between districts that might have been relevant for this study, such as the geographical proximity to the organisations’ headquarters in Nicosia, degree of contact with union officials etc. It was concluded that such issues would be addressed anyway even if the study were to be restricted in the way mentioned above, and so evidently, there appeared be no additional benefits from including the two other districts. What is more, the excluded districts accounted for quite a small proportion of the overall employment in both the CYTA and the CEA.96

Once the necessary constraints were ‘imposed’, the population studied contained 3200 participants, excluding higher management97, across the two main districts Nicosia and Limassol, and the different buildings in these districts. The overwhelming majority of participants were employed in white collar occupations with a very small proportion in blue-collar work. They covered a wide spectrum of occupational grades from the lowest technical/clerical grade, through to senior officer (higher supervisory) grades and up to the

96 In the case of the CEA, apart from the Nicosia and Limassol district, the two power stations (Dekeleia and Moni) were also included in the study.
97 General management, departmental/area managers, assistant managers were regarded as the higher managerial levels and were excluded. However, by lower management one refers to those individuals at the borderline between the managerial hierarchy and the rest of the staff, whose job title does not indicate a managerial position, but their classification in the organisational hierarchy reveals their closeness to management.
highest supervisory rank (lower management). It should be noted that although there were variations in occupational structure between the three organisations, the above distinctions reflected the main occupational divisions. In the case of the CBC for example, there is a shorter occupational hierarchy in comparison to the CYTA and the CEA, principally due to the difference in size. Participants were unionised employees and were represented by all the different unions in the organisations. Union officials and local union representatives were excluded from the study. The male dominant character of these organisations was reflected in the population studied, with approximately 80 per cent of participants being male. What is more, in contrast to males, females were predominantly found in clerical positions, with a very small number in technical or professional positions, while no females were found at management level.

Of the 3200 questionnaires distributed to the participants in the various locations, exactly 945 completed questionnaires were collected, a response rate of 30 per cent. This was the anticipated response rate, given the complex and idiosyncratic nature of the setting. A similar response rate (33 per cent) has been argued to be characteristic of survey research on unions (Fullagar et al., 1994). However, a total of 79 respondents had to be excluded from the analysis due to incomplete or inconsistent data, which left a final sample of 866 respondents. Comparisons with demographic data for the population studied, obtained from personnel records, provided sufficient grounds for arguing that the final sample (N=866) was broadly representative in age, Gender, level of education and job status. The sample was also representative of the different unions, as well as the organisations.

4.2 Research instruments and measures

As was mentioned in the introduction two main survey instruments were employed for the purpose of this study, and in this section both will be dealt with in turn.

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98 According to data from the Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance (1994): Cyprus Electricity Authority- 92 per cent males and 8 per cent females; Cyprus Telecoms Authority- 81 per cent males and 19 per cent females; Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation- 60 per cent males and 40 per cent females. Overall figure for all three organisations: 83 per cent males and 17 per cent females.

99 With the exception of the CBC, where there was a more balanced ratio of male: female in the various departments and occupations.
4.2.1 Questionnaire

The main source of data for the study was a self-administered questionnaire. It consisted of five different sections that measured the variables in the study. At the top right hand corner of the questionnaire, a case ‘number’ denoted the location (district) and the name of the organisation, which was based on a coding frame for both districts and organisations. Except where indicated, all questions were answered on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Instructions for answering each section were also provided accordingly. There were two versions of the questionnaire, both of which are provided in appendix C, C.2.1 and C.2.2. The second version emerged after a pilot study, which was carried out to identify the questionnaire’s suitability for the particular setting. The questionnaire was written in English, and the method of back translation was used to translate the questionnaire to the language of the setting (Greek). The original questionnaire was in the first instance translated to Greek, and then the Greek version was translated back to English, by a different translator. In this way the translations were cross-checked to insure accuracy. For all the following measures, the coefficients of internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha) are provided and discussed in chapter 6.

The first section consisted of a group of variables acting as control variables. Apart from a set of demographic variables (age, Gender, level of education, tenure), a number of other variables were also included which fell into the following categories: (a) Union experience, measured by the length of union membership, (b) Union structural features, measured by the size of both national and local union branches, (c) Union communication processes with an emphasis on the union representatives’ contact system, measured by the ratio of union representatives to total membership, and (d) Organisational variables such as job title, pay level and organisational size. These variables were selected after reviewing a number of relevant, existing sources on unions, as well as professional organisations (Anderson, 1978; Thacker et al., 1990; Barling et al., 1992; Cisson, 1994 etc.). Trade union identity was also employed as a dichotomous, control variable in this study, to capture potential differences in members’ responses reflecting the group of unions they belonged to.
Section II dealt with Union Loyalty, Union Instrumentality and Willingness to Participate. **Union Loyalty** was measured by ten items, including four negatively worded items, to denote: (i) a sense of pride in the association with the union and its membership (e.g. “I feel a sense of pride being part of this union”); (ii) a desire to maintain one’s membership of the union (e.g. “I plan to be a member of the union the rest of the time I work for the organisation”), and (iii) positive attitudes towards the union and its values (e.g. “I tell my friends that the union is a great organisation to be a member of”) (Fullagar and Barling, 1989). Items for the present scale were largely obtained from Gordon et al. (1980) where a criterion for union commitment was developed, and were selected in terms of their relevance to the population to be studied, as well as in terms of how heavily they loaded on the union loyalty factor. Items were also obtained from other factor analytic studies which attempted to test the dimensionality and stability of the union commitment scale (Fullagar, 1986; Kelloway et al., 1992). The Union Loyalty factor appeared as the most stable dimension of union commitment across different samples, in all these studies.

The current scale of **Perceived Union Instrumentality** consisted of five items, including negatively worded items, denoting the extent to which members perceived the unions as ‘instrumental in improving the working lives of their members’ (Kochan, 1979) (e.g., “Workers need unions to protect them against unfair labour practices of employers/management”). This is a much broader conceptualisation of union instrumentality that refers to the instrumentality of trade unions as institutions, in contrast with other narrower definitions of instrumentality such as the “perceived influence of unions” (Glick, 1977) or the “perceived value and effectiveness of unions” (Anderson, 1979; Kolchin and Hyclak, 1984). The latter two definitions treat instrumentality as an evaluative process carried out on the basis of the unions’ performance in specific areas, whereas the former definition refers to a more generalised assessment of the role of unions as representatives of employees at the workplace. Items were derived from Fullagar (1986), as well as from studies exploring union instrumentality as conceptualised above (De Cotiis and Lelouarn, 1981; Kochan, 1979), and were again selected on the basis of their relevance to the population to be studied. The wording on some of these items was
modified to clarify the meaning conveyed to the respondents, a problem identified during the pilot work.

The four items comprising the *Willingness to Participate* measure were obtained from existing measures of union participation, or willingness to participate (Glick et al., 1977; Nicholson et al., 1981; Kelly and Kelly, 1994). In line with a definition of mobilization as the 'process of transforming individuals into collective actors', an indication of the success of such a process may be expressed by the individuals' willingness to be involved in a range of union activities, such as standing as an elected union official, frequently attending union meetings and so forth. In effect, such willingness pronounces one's adherence to collective principles and values, and consequently one's active support of trade unions as collective institutions, as discussed in the previous chapter. The items chosen for the current scale measure *behavioural intent* rather than actual behaviour, but this was sufficient for the purposes of the present study. The items were selected on the basis of their relevance to the population to be studied and covered key union activities. The respondents were asked to indicate the degree of their willingness to participate in union activities using a five-point response format, *not willing* (1), *not sure* (3), *very willing* (5).

Section III dealt with ‘*Them and Us*’ attitudes. The conceptualisation of ‘them and us’ attitudes was largely based on Kelly and Kelly’s (1990) definition which identified three components to the concept: (a) the perception of a clear division between management and workers; (b) a belief that the groups have conflicting interests and (c) a feeling of identification with one of these groups, leading to the expression of positive or negative feelings towards the perceived ‘outgroup’. The current scale utilised two of the three components in an attempt to identify feelings of division and a perception of a conflict of interests between the two groups. Ten items in total were used to measure this concept, derived mainly from Jowell et al. (1986) and Kelly and Kelly (1994) (e.g. “Workers and managers are really on opposite sides in my organisation”). The pilot study revealed a tendency to perceive competing interests between different occupational groups (clerical, technical etc.) within the organisations, and so an additional item was included in this section, aimed at uncovering such perceptions; this was derived from Guest et al. (1993)
"I believe that I share the same interests with the following group(s) of workers", yes=1; no=2).

The following section comprised a set of items measuring what was termed as *Workplace Collectivism*. Existing conceptualisations of this concept feature prominently in the field of cross-cultural psychology, where this concept was first developed (Hofstede, 1980). For the purpose of this study a different conceptualisation was provided, that could be employed within the field of social and industrial psychology, also discussed in the previous chapter. In this first attempt collectivism is defined as: "identification with different social groups within an individual's working environment, with which he (she) shares values and interests, such that forge bonds of solidarity between them, motivating the individual to favour collective action". Based on this definition, the proposed measure of 'workplace collectivism' comprised the following dimensions: (i) identification with different social units (groups) present within the individual's work setting; (ii) solidarity resulting from identification with these groups, expressed as individual perceptions of shared values and interests; (iii) motivational effect of group identifications, expressed as the extent to which individuals favour collective action, referred to hereafter as members’ 'collectivist orientation'.

A total of nineteen items were in the end used to measure the dimensions above. The items measuring the first dimension, group identifications, were obtained from Brown et al.'s (1986) scale of group identification (alpha=0.710). This scale measured three facets of group membership: awareness of group membership (e.g. "I am a person who identifies with the — group"), evaluation (e.g. "I am a person who considers the — group important) and affect (e.g. “I am a person who is glad to belong to the — group"). Since the identification dimension referred to identification with different social groups within one’s work setting, during the pilot study a cross section of the participants were asked a series of questions designed to explore which groupings they perceived, including possible groupings outside their organisation, and which they felt most a part of. The majority of respondents identified their immediate workgroup and(or) departmental group. These

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100 This definition could also apply to different social settings, such as social movement, political settings, where individuals identify with different groups or collectivities and where mobilization and collective action are of relevance. The idea of a 'work setting' above however, serves the purpose of the present study.
groups were already those used in the identification items, although there were also three other items exploring identification with wider groups such as the group of workers in the same sector ("I identify with other workers in the same sector") and groups of blue-collar and white-collar workers (e.g. "I am a person who tries to hide belonging to the group of blue-collar workers"). Not only was there no indication that such groupings were perceived by the respondents, but there was also a problem in translating white-collar and blue-collar workers in a way that would be clear for the respondents, so it was decided to exclude these items from the identification scale. The pilot study also revealed problems with the wording of the items, and so that had to be slightly modified. The final version of the identification scale consisted of eleven items.

The second dimension, assessing the emerging solidarity between individuals and groups, was measured using four items (e.g. "I have the same interests as my colleagues in the department"). These items were constructed on the basis of items already used to measure union loyalty (section II) and perceived division between groups of workers (section III). The five items measuring the third dimension, motivation, were partly selected from items used to measure 'collectivist orientation', in Kelly and Kelly (1994) (e.g. "Improvements in terms and conditions at work will only be achieved through collective action"), and partly constructed after reviewing studies in this area (Triandis et al., 1988; Kelly and Kelly, 1994). An additional item included in the initial version of this factor, i.e. "The only way to protect the interests of the white collar workers is through collective action", was excluded in the final version due to the difficulty of providing an adequate translation for 'white-collar workers', but also due to the apparent lack of identification with this broader group.

The last section dealt with leadership and explored two main components of leadership behaviour with a potential impact on member attitudes. The first one, emotional leadership, was based on the transformational component in Bass's (1985) leadership theory. This component comprised three main dimensions in Bass's work: (i) charisma, concerned with faith and respect in the leader, and inspiration and encouragement provided by his/her presence (Bass, 1985). This factor accounted for 66 per cent of the

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101 See Brown et al. (1986).
common variance; (ii) *intellectual stimulation*, concerned with the extent to which the leader is intellectually innovative and stimulating, and challenges old ways of thinking and (iii) *individualised consideration*, concerned with considerate and supportive leadership behaviour directed toward the individual subordinate (Bass, 1985). The last two factors each accounted for 6.3 per cent of the common variance. For the purpose of this study, appropriate items from Bass’s (1985) Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire were selected, measuring *charisma* and *intellectual stimulation*, to assess what was termed as the *emotional* leadership factor. Individualised consideration was not regarded as relevant for this study. In the present study, charisma was defined as above, and intellectual stimulation as: “the leader’s ability to be perceived as intellectually innovative and stimulating by members, providing them with new ways of looking at problems and union issues”. Initially, ten items were used to measure the charisma dimension and four to measure the intellectual stimulation dimension. However, in the final questionnaire version following the pilot study, five items were in the end used to measure charisma (e.g. “Has a special gift of seeing what is important for the rank and file”) while the number of items for the intellectual stimulation dimension remained the same (e.g. “His ideas have forced me to rethink some of my own ideas which I had never questioned before”). The problem with some of the excluded items appeared to be their implied emotional intensity in the relationship between union leaders and members, which was not shared by the respondents (e.g. “Makes me proud to be associated with him”; “I have complete faith in the union’s leadership”). With the rest, attributing ‘qualities’ to the leader that the respondents felt did not apply to their leaders, caused difficulty in responding to questions such as “Has a sense of the union’s mission which he transmits to me”.

The second component of leadership behaviour explored in this section was referred to as *pragmatic* leadership. This component explored the more ‘instrumental’ aspects of the leader-member relationship, such as leader *availability, accessibility* and *effectiveness*. Leader availability, accessibility and effectiveness are essentially aimed at inducing desired attitudes and behaviours by members, such as loyalty to the union, perceived union instrumentality and so forth. The present study’s measure of *accessibility* was based on Nicholson et al.’s (1981) one, focusing on the extent to which stewards’ styles of
membership consultation can inhibit or facilitate membership participation (Nicholson et al., 1981), and looking at physical accessibility, frequency of interactions with members, informational openness, interest shown in members and consultative style ($\alpha=0.73$). This is conceptually similar to Thacker et al.'s (1990) measure of steward, chief steward and officer accessibility, which focused on the distinct contribution of union officials at different levels in the union hierarchy (e.g. "On issues not directly spelled out in the contract, the steward will consult with many of the rank-and-file to obtain their viewpoint"); "My chief steward responds to my suggestions"). Nevertheless, Nicholson's measure has been effectively utilised on white-collar workers which reinforces its suitability for the present study. A total of nine items, including four negatively worded items, were used to measure accessibility, selected from Nicholson et al. (1981) on the basis of their relevance to the population of interest. In some cases, the wording had to be slightly modified. Availability was measured using two items, looking at the degree of physical availability ("He is always available when members wish to raise an issue") and priority given to members ("He always has time to listen to the rank-and-file"). These items were constructed. Items to measure effectiveness were derived from Glick et al.'s (1977) leadership effectiveness scale ($\alpha=0.94$). A total of six items, including two negatively worded items were initially used to measure leadership effectiveness, assessing leaders' effectiveness in handling grievances, sticking up for members, negotiating with management, and also the extent to which leaders were trusted, respected and relied on for solving grievances (e.g. "He is very effective in handling grievances"; "He always sticks up for the rank-and-file").

However, the pilot study revealed problems with the items aimed at assessing effectiveness in handling grievances, negotiating with management and solving grievances. Due to the bureaucratic and time consuming procedures followed in grievance handling, which result in the majority of grievances being settled at the top levels, respondents felt that it was very difficult, almost impossible to evaluate the leaders' contribution to these procedures. It was decided then, to exclude the items dealing with these aspects of a leader's role performance, so as to avoid any contamination of the data. Consequently, it was also decided to exclude the whole set of items measuring effectiveness, since
eliminating core items from the scale had a considerable effect on its validity, as well as its value to the study.

Overall then, the 'emotional' leadership factor comprised nine items and the 'pragmatic' leadership factor comprised eleven items, measuring leader accessibility and availability, a total of twenty items.

Respondents were instructed at the beginning of the leadership section, to answer the questions that followed about their local union representative. However, there were a number of individuals, including union officials, who were regarded as 'local union representatives', who were approached by members frequently, and were fulfilling that role. Subsequently, confusion was revealed during the pilot study as to the identity of the 'local union representative'. Therefore, in order to make the identity of a local leader more salient for members for the purpose of answering the questions in this section, they were asked to identify the person whom they approached more frequently and they regarded as their local union representative, and to answer the questions with that person in mind. Also, at the end of the leadership section, they were asked to identify (if they knew) the office of the person whom they regarded as their local union representative. The reason for this, was an attempt to confirm speculation that the majority of members approach top level officials with their grievances. Unfortunately, such a request was regarded as suspicious by the respondents, not an unusual phenomenon in the organisations of the public corporate sector, and so only about 32 per cent of respondents provided this information. As for the rest, it can only be assumed that they did identify the relevant individual, but were simply very reluctant to reveal his (her) office. However, the speculation is probably confirmed amongst 32 per cent of respondents, since of those, approximately 50 per cent revealed that they contact either the President or the General Secretary of their union. It should also be mentioned that the last three items in the leadership section- two in the final version of the questionnaire- were aimed at assessing members' perceptions of the unions' national leadership, i.e. the union's secretariat.
4.2.2 Interview schedule

In addition to the questionnaire survey, an interview schedule was devised (see appendix C.3) and used to conduct structured interviews with union representatives/officials at different levels of the unions' hierarchy, including top level officials. Twenty seven interviews were conducted altogether. The aims of the interview schedule were: (i) to provide an additional data source on leader behaviour to complement the questionnaire, (ii) to explore member attitudes from a different perspective, and (iii) identify differences between leaders, along the dimensions of leader behaviour explored in the interview schedule, that could then serve as a basis for inter-union comparisons. The interview data also served a wider objective, which was to provide a qualitative insight to the nature of the setting. As indicated in chapter 1, interview data was employed to support the arguments put forward in a discussion of the setting, due to the relative absence of research in industrial relations issues. Also, as will become evident later on, interview data was used to facilitate interpretation of the survey findings.

The interview schedule consisted of seven sections. The first section provided a brief introduction to the interview by considering the length of service to the union as a representative/official, loyalty to the union and perceptions of the impact of one's union role on career prospects. The second section focused on leader accessibility and availability by asking questions on the leader's contact/communication system. At the same time, leadership styles were explored along the consultative/participative vs. autocratic dimension. The third section dealt with the process of grievance handling, emphasising perceived leader effectiveness in grievance handling and grievance resolution. Also, the notion of representative vs. delegate leadership was also explored (Batstone et al., 1977; Barling et al., 1992). In the fourth section, perceived leader effectiveness in negotiating with management was explored, as well as leaders' attitudes towards management. Leaders' attitudes towards management were regarded as crucial for identifying: (i) the prevalent climate between union representatives/officials and management (co-operative vs. confrontational) and (ii) the image of management promoted among members by union leaders. The fifth section focused on leaders' perceptions of member attitudes (commitment, stereotypical perceptions towards
management etc.). The aims were to assess the leaders' ability to effectively communicate with their memberships, but also to determine the degree to which leaders sought to cultivate and secure such attitudes among their members. In the sixth section union participation was explored, by looking at leaders' perceptions of the proportion of members likely to take part in collective action, frequently attend union meetings, stand as elected union officials or representatives and vote in union elections. The last section consisted of only one question and aimed at identifying the reasons for one's decision to stand as an elected union official/representative.

### 4.2.2.1 Categorising and coding interview data

Due to the structured character of the interview data, the categories of interest were already set out in the interview schedule used to conduct the interviews, as presented above. However, it was subsequently decided to treat the interview material in a 'less structured' manner. The existing structure was reassessed prior to extracting categories from the data. The reason for this was the impression that there was a lot more information in the leaders' responses, that could provide useful material for further exploring one of the main objectives of the study, the importance of leadership behaviour within a union setting. Prior to proceeding with the actual categorisation of the data, i.e. identification of text segments that belonged in each assigned category, two broader groupings for the data were identified and used as the starting point for the process. These broader groupings were: (i) leader-member relationship, and (ii) attitudes of leaders towards management and towards trade union principles and values. These broad categories served to justify the inclusion (or exclusion) of particular text segments. Once the segments were assigned to the two categories, the need for narrower categories to distinguish between clusters of segments became evident. Once all the possible categories were extracted, i.e. those that represented distinct conceptual units, titles were given to each one of the categories, to capture the essence of the rule for inclusion of text segments into these categories. The categories obtained are set out in appendix C.4.

A three-point response format was utilised to classify leaders' responses within the above categories. Table 4.1 shows the category and the corresponding response format.
Although it is not entirely possible to remove any subjective biases in coding the responses, it was attempted to minimise this effect by employing a set of criteria for each category.

Table 4.1 Categories and corresponding response format for leader perceptions and aspects of leader behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Response Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Contact (Individual- Collective)</td>
<td>1=Not so frequent  2=Frequent  3=Very frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Contact</td>
<td>1=Mostly informal  2=The same  3=Mostly formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication method (written vs. oral)</td>
<td>1=Mostly written  2=The same  3=Mostly oral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Effectiveness of Communication System</td>
<td>1=Not so effective  2=Effective  3=Very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Involvement</td>
<td>1=Low involvement  2=Moderate involvement  3=High involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Value of Consultation</td>
<td>1=Not so useful  2=Useful  3=Very useful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Antagonism between Management and Workers</td>
<td>1=Not so antagonistic  2=Antagonistic  3=Very antagonistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiasm for Collective Action</td>
<td>1=Not so enthusiastic  2=Enthusiastic  3=Very enthusiastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern about rank-and-file</td>
<td>1=Not so concerned  2=Concerned  3=Very concerned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, in the case of ‘frequency of contact’, daily individual contact was classified as *very frequent*, contact on a weekly basis or every fortnight was classified as *frequent*, while anything less than this was classified as *not so frequent*. In the case of collective contact, regular meetings, either formal or informal, taking place every month or once every two months, was classified as frequent contact, anything less than this as not
so frequent, while anything more than this as very frequent. Taking another example, the ‘degree of concern about rank-and file’ with a three-point response format, leaders were classified as not so concerned if they expressed their concerns but did not feel that there was anything that could be done about it. Leaders were classified as concerned if alongside their concerns they identified what should be done, in the form of generalised objectives, while leaders were classified as very concerned if they outlined specific ways in which the more general objectives could be realised. In the case of those classified as very concerned, the assumption was that their concern was such as to lead them to thinking through specific steps that the union could take to deal with the identified issues. It was also observed that those who were classified as not so concerned, according to the above scheme, cited reasons outside their control for the phenomena that were observed. A process of external attribution appeared to be operating in those cases, employed as a mechanism for justifying their passive response to what was taking place. Given that problems of meeting attendance, willingness to work for the union etc. presented themselves in all the unions, this facilitated the process of distinguishing between the different types of leaders.

4.2.2.2 Developing a typology of leadership behaviour

Both the unions’ assumed identity, as well as their procedural arrangements and organisational structures, undoubtedly influence leader attitudes and behaviours. However, Barling et al. (1992) identify three reasons why research should focus more directly on individual differences in union representatives, and in this case shop stewards: (i) the variation in steward behaviour, where structural factors are constant; (ii) the fact that ‘structural factors’102 might be an indirect cause of steward behaviour through their influence on stewards’ leadership styles and role perceptions; (iii) the ease with which individual factors might be changed (e.g. through training), as compared to structural factors.

102 For Barling et al. (1992) structural factors are those cited by McCarthy (1967), i.e. (1) labour market conditions, (2) the socio-technical system, (3) the level of decision making, (4) the wage structure, (5) the scope of collective agreements, and (6) employer, union and workgroup attitudes.
Given that both Hyman's (1996) and Child's (1973) classification revolve around existing 'contextual factors', that could potentially influence leadership behaviour, it was decided to explore the idea of individual differences between union representatives. Consequently, the conceptual categories extracted from the interview data were employed to construct a typology of leadership behaviour. This was based on the observed variation between leaders along these dimensions. As this was a typology of leader behaviour, the attitudinal categories were excluded, i.e. attitudes towards management and collective action. The rest of the categories were then employed to classify leader behaviour along two dimensions: first, whether the leader was active or passive, as it emerged from two categories, i.e. 'degree of concern about rank-and-file' and 'leaders' own initiatives'; second, whether leaders emphasised more participative than paternalistic leadership\textsuperscript{103}, as it emerged from the following categories: 'frequency of contact', 'perceived value of contact', 'leader availability', 'member involvement', 'perceived value of consultation'. In combination, these two dimensions produced the following four ideal types of leaders, namely, the 'initiator', the 'task-oriented' leader, the 'follower' and the 'negotiator' (see figure 4.1).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node at (-1,0.5) {Active};
\node at (1,0.5) {Participant};
\node at (1,-0.5) {Passive};
\node at (0.5,1) {Negotiator};
\node at (0.5,0) {Leader availability};
\node at (0.5,-1) {Paternalistic};
\node at (0.5,0.5) {Initiator};
\node at (0.5,-0.5) {Task-oriented};
\node at (0,-0.5) {Follower};
\end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Typology of union leader behaviour}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{103} A distinction between participative and paternalistic leadership is provided in Lane (1989)
The first dimension deals with the degree of responsiveness to member needs. Leaders were classified as ‘active’ if they were sufficiently concerned about different aspects of rank-and-file life to try and identify ways in which their problems could be addressed, and at the same time whether they were sufficiently proactive in defining and processing workplace issues. ‘Passive’ leaders were those who were reactive than proactive in defining and processing workplace issues, while also not seriously attempting to address problematic aspects in members’ union experience, characterised by a tendency to consistently resort to a process of external attribution. The second dimension dealt with the leaders’ approach towards the membership. That is, leaders were displaying a more paternalistic role if they did not recognise the value of members’ potential contribution in the unions’ effective functioning, and rather believed that members were somehow less capable than their leaders, and had to be protected from themselves and treated like children. In contrast, those classified as participative leaders acknowledged the significance of members’ contribution for the unions’ effective functioning, and appeared keen to encourage members to become involved in day-to-day decision-making processes and union affairs, put forward their suggestions etc.

The intersection of these two dimensions produced the ideal types depicted in figure 4.1. ‘Initiators’ are those leaders who are active in their responsiveness to member needs, but who foster a more paternalistic approach towards members, and as such are likely to fail to encourage member involvement in the union. ‘Negotiators’ are those leaders who are both active in their responsiveness to members’ needs, but also wish to maximise on members’ experience and expertise by encouraging their daily involvement in the union. ‘Task-oriented’ leaders are those who are more concerned with ‘getting on with the job’, rather than provide members with a genuine voice at the workplace. They are the leaders who are detached from members, and are engulfed in the status quo. Followers on the other hand are characterised by a more participative approach towards members, but are more reactive than proactive in their relationship with members, and as such follow rather than lead their members.
4.3 Procedures

Naturally, gaining access to the population was an issue that had to be resolved relatively quickly for the study to take place as planned. It therefore featured prominently early on in the study, and contacts with the organisations begun approximately seven months before the actual study took place. Given the size and complexity of at least two of the organisations, the support of both management and unions was vital, and so the explicit endorsement of the survey by both parties was absolutely essential. What is more, since the climate in these organisations fostered scepticism and mistrust, to achieve a good response rate participants would have to be able to trust the researcher and be reassured about the identity of the researcher and the purpose of the study.

The negotiations for access begun with unofficial meetings with top level union officials, as well as personnel managers, where the object of the study was explained and their support was sought. It was suggested that an official letter were sent to the General Manager of the organisation requesting access to carry out the study. The degree of encouragement and enthusiasm by union officials varied, but in general they appeared interested in the study and advocated their support. Access was obtained from all three organisations without any major problems, or delays.

The fieldwork was carried out over a period of five weeks and occurred in two main parts: Part I lasted three weeks during which the questionnaire survey took place, while in Part II the interviews were conducted over the remaining two-week period.

Each organisation facilitated the distribution and collection of questionnaires in a different way, although in all three there was one key individual assigned to facilitate the study, by providing any information required and advising on possible ways of distributing and collecting the questionnaires. In the case of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) a letter was prepared by the Personnel Department which stated that access was granted to the researcher, and that the department could be contacted if anything else was required. However, the responsibility of distributing and collecting the questionnaires remained exclusively with the researcher. In the case of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) a similar letter was prepared by the department of Labour Relations, although in this case it was explicitly stated that the organisation could not facilitate either
the distribution or the collection of the questionnaires in any way, and that the decision for
distributing the questionnaires rested with the managers in each department. Copies of this
letter were made and the researcher was advised to present this letter to the individuals
contacted in each department. Finally, in the case of the Cyprus Electricity Authority
(CEA) a letter was prepared by the Commercial Services Department and sent to the
various departmental and area managers, as well as the unions’ General Secretaries. This
letter stated that access was granted by the Authority for carrying out the study, as well as
the objective and purpose of the study, and asked that assistance is provided for the
distribution and collection of the questionnaires.

Questionnaires were distributed in person to the participants, since high visibility of the
researcher was thought to be the best way of eliminating any doubts about the purpose of
the study and who it was ‘commissioned’ by. Also, personal contact was thought to
further contribute towards obtaining a good response rate. Emphasis was placed on the
anonymity and confidentiality of responses. It was impossible to identify individual
respondents from any of the demographic data anyway, but it was also emphasised that
the information contained in the questionnaire would remain exclusively with the
researcher. Nevertheless, even when respondents were convinced that this was a genuine
doctoral research to be completed in a foreign country, there were those who in the
absence of ‘home-grown conspiracies’, were contemplating foreign ones: “Why do the
British need to know what we are up to? What is this?...”. In light of this, a response rate
of 30 per cent was considered satisfactory, not only by the researcher but also by those
employees closer to the study.

At the various locations where questionnaires were distributed, the help of local union
representatives and (or) willing employees was secured. Union officials and local union
representatives were identified at each location, so that they were excluded from the
distribution process. Participation in the study was voluntary, and that was made clear to
the participants. In any case, the overwhelming majority responded in a very positive
manner to ‘helping a hardworking student’! Participants were given a brief introduction on
the study and the questionnaire, they were then allowed some time to read the
questionnaire and put forward any queries. Subsequently, they were asked to fill it in
within the next 48 hours, at which time the researcher would return to collect the completed questionnaires. The researcher was advised to specify a time interval during which the participants could complete the questionnaire, since otherwise it was most likely that they would forget about it! However, collecting questionnaires in person proved to be a time-consuming process, and so where arrangements had been made, the questionnaires were collected from each office using the internal mail system. They were then collected by the researcher from an agreed location. Since the participants were not allowed time off work to complete the questionnaire, it was necessary to do it in their own spare time, unless of course they found an opportunity to do it during working hours.

There was a problem however, in relation to a particular section of staff, the maintenance staff, in both the CEA and CYTA, due to their work schedule. Not only did they work in shifts, but they also worked outdoors throughout the day. In this case, the shift schedule was requested and the researcher ensured that she was present, either when staff were getting ready to depart in the morning, or when they reported back in the afternoon. Questionnaires were distributed during those times and were either completed there and then in the presence of the researcher, or were handed to a volunteer two days later and were in turn collected by the researcher. The same problem occurred with most of the staff at the Electricity Authority’s Power Stations, as well as technical staff at the CBC. Although it was attempted to distribute the questionnaires in person to all shift employees, that was not entirely possible. In the cases where the researcher could not be present, an individual from that shift was sent a letter explaining the object and purpose of the study, along with the required number of questionnaires, and was asked to distribute these to his (her) colleagues. Unfortunately, it was observed that where personal contact was absent, the response rates dropped from approximately 30 per cent to about 10-15 per cent.

The interviews were planned during the first three weeks, while the questionnaire survey was being carried out, and were arranged to take place in the last two weeks of the study. All interviews were recorded, although some of the interviewees did initially express reservations about having the interviews recorded. However, in some cases during
the interview the researcher was asked to turn the cassette recorder off, for the information that was to follow was regarded as highly confidential.

4.4 Conclusions

This chapter dealt with the measures employed in the present study as well as the procedures involved in carrying out the study, while at the same time discussing the nature of the setting and the participants. In order to expose differences between individual unions represented in the study, in a more systematic manner, they were distinguished according to their identity, by employing Hyman's (1996) typology of trade union identities, and according to what has been termed as their 'structural features', focusing on the formalisation and specialisation in roles and procedures, based on Child's (1973) work on unions' structural characteristics, which also reflects the culture of the organisation, i.e. principles and values regarding the membership's role and the relationship between leaders and members. The unions in the sample could be classified according to both dimensions.

Initial treatment of the interview data was also presented, with the categories extracted from the data, and the corresponding response format. To capture individual differences between union leaders, a typology of leader behaviour was also developed, on the basis of the behavioural categories extracted from the data. The typology distinguished between four types of leaders: Negotiators, Initiators, Followers and Task-centred leaders.

The chapter that follows focuses precisely on exploring the link between union type and leader behaviour, employing the classifications discussed above, while it also attempts to associate these factors with member responses, and more specifically member perceptions of leader behaviour, using the leadership criterion also discussed in the present chapter.
Chapter 5  ‘Mobilising Agents’ in perspective

As the main objectives of interview data were to provide an additional source of leader behaviour, from a leaders’ perspective, and in turn to address the issue of inter-union comparisons along the dimensions of leader behaviour explored in the interview schedule, the present chapter will deal with the following issues: (i) identifying variation in patterns of leader behaviour in the context of trade union identity (Hyman, 1994, 1996) and the unions’ ‘structural features’, and (ii) examining a potential link between (a) leaders’ perceptions of their behaviour and members’ perceptions of leader behaviour, explored by ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership in the present study, as well as (b) trade union identity and structural characteristics, and members’ perceptions of leader behaviour.

In essence, this chapter will attempt to associate macro- characteristics of unions, such as identity and structural features, to individual responses, in this case leader behaviour as perceived by both leaders and members. The present chapter also aims at exploring the nature and origins of member perceptions of leader behaviour, by identifying factors that could influence the development of such perceptions. A schematic representation of the present chapter is shown in figure 5.1.

![Figure 5.1 Structure of chapter 5](image)

104 This is defined by both the formalisation and specialisation in roles and procedures (Child, 1973), which has also been argued to reflect the overall ‘culture’ of the organisation, i.e. principles and values regarding the role of the membership and the relationship between leaders and members.
5.1 Inter-union comparisons of leader behaviour

As discussed in the previous chapter, the unions represented in this study can be distinguished along the conceptual dimensions presented in figure 5.1, resulting in the following union dichotomies: social partner vs. guild (union identity) and traditional vs. progressive (structural features). To briefly recapitulate, social partner unions are those unions involved in a process of political exchange with government, deriving their legitimacy mainly from this relationship rather than their membership. They represent a diverse range of occupational interests within an integrated collective framework.

Although the issue of interest representation does not feature explicitly in Hyman (1994, 1996), it is implicit in his analysis, given that it is the unions' broader-based constituency that allows them to become involved in a process of reciprocal interaction with government. In contrast, guild unions represent specific occupational interests, and they seek to maximise benefits for their membership, to whom they are accountable. In the present study, they include highly skilled professionals, skilled technical and production workers.

In the case of the second dichotomy, traditional unions are those characterised by comprehensive rules and procedures guiding the behaviour of union representatives, restricting personal initiative especially at the lower leadership ranks. As a result, there is no desire and consequently no attempt to deviate from prescribed roles and assume a wider range of duties and responsibilities. On the contrary, in the case of progressive unions although roles are defined, and responsibilities and duties are assigned accordingly, there is more scope for deviating from prescribed roles and procedures, thus encouraging lower level officials and representatives to participate more actively in the trade union process.

In order to address the first issue, which is identifying patterns of leader behaviour in different types of unions, the broader patterns can be found in appendix A, tables A12 and A13. However, for a more systematic comparison in the present chapter, the typology of leader behaviour developed in the previous chapter (p.153) was employed. As the typology was developed using the behavioural dimensions extracted from the interview data, the ensuing analysis examines the extent to which the unions' identity and structural
features influence the likelihood of observing specific instances of leader behaviour in different unions. Leader behaviour was classified along two dimensions: (i) degree of responsiveness to member needs: active vs. passive, and (ii) leaders' approach towards the membership: participative vs. paternalistic leadership. Frequencies were obtained for the four leader types: Negotiator, Initiator, Follower and Task-centred by type of union, as shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2 below.

**Table 5.1 Leadership behaviour by Union type: Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology of leader behaviour</th>
<th>Traditional unions a</th>
<th>Progressive unions b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task-centred</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Traditional unions: EPOPAI, EPOET, SIDIKEK, SYTYRIK, SYVAIK
b Progressive unions: PASE, SEPAIK, EVRIK

In table 5.1, a clear pattern can be observed across unions in relation to different types of leadership behaviour. More specifically, the Initiator and Task-centred types are more likely to be found within traditional unions, and as evident from the figures above, are dominant within this group of unions. At the same time, a completely different pattern emerges in the case of progressive unions, where the Negotiator and Follower types appear to be the norm. Consequently, the distinct patterns obtained above, would seem to suggest that leaders operating in traditional unions would adopt a more paternalistic leadership style, discouraging rather than promoting and facilitating member involvement in union affairs, an element characteristic of both Initiator and Task-centred leaders. On the other hand though, what distinguishes the two types of leaders present in traditional unions is the degree of responsiveness to member needs. While Initiators are proactive to member needs, demands and concerns, Task-centred leaders tend to react to potential calls from the membership rather than preoccupy themselves with identifying issues of concern.
to members and acting to ensure that they are promptly and adequately addressed. As far as progressive unions are concerned, their inherent structural flexibility appears to facilitate more participative leadership styles, as evident from the high incidence of the Negotiator and Follower leader types. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the closer contact and communication with members, would only give rise to leaders who are sufficiently proactive in defining and processing issues of concern to members. A large proportion of leaders, as evident from the table above, belong in the category of Followers, who although are keen to encourage participation and involvement, they are not likely to set their own agenda of problematic issues relating to members’ union experience, unless these are identified and raised by the members themselves. This would in turn suggest that while the unions’ structural features can facilitate or impede more participative leader behaviours, they cannot influence the degree of responsiveness to members’ needs and concerns in the same manner.

Apart from the behaviour pattern observed within the two groups of unions, there is also a clear pattern emerging between the two groups of unions in relation to individual types. It appears that the existence of particular types of leader behaviour precludes the incidence of others. More specifically, Negotiator leaders constitute the majority of leaders within progressive unions, while in traditional unions no leaders belong to this group. This would seem to suggest that in the absence of structural arrangements that seek to promote greater participation and involvement by the membership, the leaders themselves in turn, cannot be expected to encourage such behaviours. Accordingly, Task-centred leaders constitute the majority in traditional unions, while no leader falls in this leader behaviour category in the case of progressive unions. In a sense, this further demonstrates how the unions’ structural features can facilitate or impede the occurrence of more participative leader behaviours.
Table 5.2 Leadership behaviour by Union type: Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology of leader behaviour</th>
<th>Social Partner unions (^a)</th>
<th>Guild unions (^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task-centred</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Social Partner unions: EPOPAI, PASE, EVRIK, SIDIKEK
\(^b\) Guild unions: SEPAIK, SYVAIK, SYTYRIK

The pattern of leader behaviour is not as clear in the case of social partner and guild unions (table 5.2), as in the case of traditional and progressive unions. While particular leader types feature more prominently than others, there is a more even distribution of the different leader types. More specifically, in guild unions, Negotiators and Followers constitute 75% of leaders, while approximately 67% of leaders in social partner unions belong to the Initiator and Task-centred types. At the same time though, within social partner unions about a third of leaders belong to the Negotiator and Follower types. In turn, although particular types feature more prominently than others, they do not dominate the patterns of leader behaviour as in the case of traditional and progressive unions.

However, a closer look at the figures above reveals that in unions where a diversity of interests is represented, and where the unions' legitimacy mainly derives from engaging in the political process rather than their membership (social partner), leaders are less inclined to adopt a participative style of leadership in their relationship with members. On the other hand, within guild unions where a range of common interests are represented, and where member support is the basis for union power, leaders are more likely to encourage involvement and participation in union affairs and the union process. It might also be the case, that the homogeneity in terms of interests within guild unions may
foster occupational community (Strauss, 1977) which would induce leaders to adopt a
more positive approach towards their membership, and as a result encourage greater
member participation and involvement inside the union. According to a union
representative from SEPAIK, one of the guild unions: “Our union possesses two main
advantages...One is...The other is that it is clearly a professional union, and so we all
have a lot of things in common, we are more homogeneous than other unions...being a
small and homogeneous union ensures frequent and constructive contact, and it makes it
easier for us to represent our members’ interests effectively”. Also, in Hyman’s (1994)
discussion of Streeck’s (1988) critique of union democracy: “In his view, increasing
differentiation of interests within trade union constituencies means that intra- and inter-
union conflict can be contained only where centralized authority rather than rank-and-file
democracy prevails. This thesis could be related to Turner’s distinction...activist
democracy was viable only in small unions with an occupationally homogeneous
membership; larger, more heterogeneous unions could be held together only with strong
central discipline, often given legitimacy by membership loyalty to a charismatic leader”.

At the same time though, as in the case of the unions’ structural features, trade
union identity does not seem to influence the degree of responsiveness to member needs.
The dominant types of leader behaviour within social partner and guild unions also include
follower and task-centred leaders, who are precisely not particularly alert to member needs
and their union experience.

To sum up, trade unions’ structural features, as well as trade union identity seem
to influence leader behaviour patterns in different unions. More specifically, they mainly
influence the extent to which leaders adhere to a paternalistic rather than a participative
style of leadership, while no obvious pattern emerged in relation to the degree of
responsiveness to member needs. This then could lead one to suggest that any variation in
the latter, could be attributed to individual differences between union leaders. It should
also be noted however, that the sample of leaders interviewed for the purpose of this
study, consisted of higher level officials such as General Secretaries and Presidents105, as
well as lower level officials and union representatives, such as District and Division/Local
Secretaries. Consequently, it could be argued that any differences in the dimension 'degree of responsiveness to member needs' might reflect the person's leadership rank and 'role description', in the sense that higher level officials are more inclined to be active rather than passive in responding to member needs than lower level officials and union representatives. However, it should also be emphasised that Negotiator and Initiator leader types, characterised as active in their responsiveness to member needs, also included leaders from lower leadership ranks.

Although the above results are by no means conclusive, and certainly no causal inferences can be drawn due to the nature of the analysis, what lends additional validity to the patterns identified above is the fact that other factors which could have influenced leader behaviour, e.g. workplace characteristics, are to a large extent constant. That is, due to the *modus operandi* of organisations in the public corporate sector, as discussed particularly in chapter 1, factors that could influence leader behaviour such as: labour market conditions, the wage structure, the scope of collective agreements, the level of decision making, as identified by McCarthy (1967) and discussed in Barling et al. (1992) do not vary significantly across organisations.

As far as the process through which the unions' structural features and identity influence leader behaviour, it could be argued that the above macro-factors might be an indirect cause of leader behaviour through their influence on leaders' role perceptions and leadership styles. Already from the findings presented above, there is evidence to suggest the influence on leadership styles, in relation to the extent to which leaders adopt a more participative than paternalistic style of leadership.

### 5.2 Associating leader behaviour and union type with member responses

Having identified the influence of the unions' structural features and identity on patterns of leader behaviour, what will be attempted in this section is to associate these leader behaviour patterns, stemming from leader perceptions of their behaviour, to members' perceptions of leader behaviour. Given that 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership are the two dimensions employed in the questionnaire to assess member

105 The reason for this was that members also identified, when asked, higher level officials as the people they are mostly in contact with and whom they regard as their 'local union representatives'.

165
perceptions, these are the ones to be employed here as well. What will also be explored is a potential link between unions' structural features and identity, and members' perceptions of leader behaviour.

5.2.1 Leader behaviour and member responses

To explore the idea that individual differences in leader behaviour influence member responses, and more specifically their own perceptions of leader behaviour, one-way analysis of variance was performed. Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics for 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership by leader type, as well as the results from one-way analysis of variance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Leadership</td>
<td>12.789</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.263</td>
<td>7.039***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task-centred</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Leadership</td>
<td>3.985</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.328</td>
<td>2.457</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task-centred</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001

In examining the patterns in member perceptions of 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership, what is immediately evident is that in the case of the former, for three out of the four leader groups (Negotiator, Initiator, Task-centred), the scores closely resemble one another, with a dramatically lower score for Followers. On the other hand, in the case of the latter ('pragmatic' leadership) the variation in scores is much clearer, without dramatic deviations, as in the former.

The proposed explanation for the above results focuses on how different leader behaviours might induce (or not) 'emotional' or 'pragmatic' leadership, or both. More specifically, in the case of 'emotional' leadership the stark contrast between scores for Followers and the rest of the leader groups suggests that, not surprisingly, the least likely
to induce perceptions of ‘emotional’ leadership, are those leaders who follow rather than
lead their members. As a brief reminder, Negotiators not only encourage members to
come involved in the union, put forward suggestions etc., but are also readily identifying
and addressing issues of concern to members. In comparison, Initiators while ‘active’ in
addressing and responding to issues of concern to members, foster a more ‘paternalistic’
style in their relationship with members, and Followers while fostering a more
‘participative’ style of leadership are ‘passive’ in approaching and dealing with issues of
concern to members. Finally, Task-centred leaders exhibit a ‘paternalistic’ style of
leadership, and as in the case of Followers are ‘passive’ in responding to issues of concern
to members. The contrasting influence of Followers in inducing perceptions of ‘emotional’
leadership is also reflected in the results from Bonferroni’s test of multiple comparisons,
identifying which group means are significantly different from each other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(I)</th>
<th>(J)</th>
<th>Mean (I)-(J)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Emotional’ Leadership</td>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>-.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>- .82'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task-centred</td>
<td>- .82'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.05

In essence, the results in table 5.4 suggest that for inducing affective attachment to
the leader, emanating from the leaders’ charismatic features and their ability to articulate
and communicate a vision to their membership, exhibiting a ‘participative’ leadership style
might be one condition, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient one. Rather a
necessary condition is being perceived by members as providing a sense of direction and
purpose, as that manifests itself either in a more paternalistic approach towards members,
or in the leaders’ responsiveness to member needs, showing initiative in setting an agenda
for addressing issues relating to members’ union experience.

On the other hand, in the case of ‘pragmatic’ leadership it appears that a wider
range of behaviours are likely to generate perceptions of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, albeit to
varying degrees. More specifically, the results suggest that exhibiting a ‘participative’
leadership style, alongside being sufficiently responsive to member needs clearly induces stronger perceptions of 'pragmatic' leadership (Negotiators) than other types of behaviour. However, while perceptions emerge as sufficiently distinct, and clearly weaker in the remaining groups, they do not suggest, as in the case of 'emotional' leadership that certain behaviours are highly unlikely to generate 'pragmatic' leadership. There is a much clearer pattern of variation between leader types, unlike the case of 'emotional' leadership.

In turn, the discussion above is argued to be suggestive of a conceptual distinction between 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership. The observed pattern in member responses also demonstrates that these types of leader behaviour are perceived as conceptually distinct by the members. Consequently, this reinforces the proposed dimensionality of leader behaviour. The structure of the leadership criterion is discussed further in chapter 6, in the context of factor analysis.

In sum, what has been demonstrated is a link between leader behaviour and member perceptions of such behaviour. Before discussing the findings further, it should be remembered that this is an exploratory analysis and as such its purpose is not to generate causal statements. Rather, the aim is to identify issues and relationships, potentially causal ones, for further debate and research, also bearing in mind the absence of a union leadership body of theory and research. Most importantly, it appears that certain patterns of behaviour are more or less likely to induce particular member perceptions of leader behaviour, i.e. 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership, which in turn reinforces the idea that the two are conceptually distinct. While 'emotional' leadership requires a clear sense of purpose and direction to be provided by the leaders, in the case of 'pragmatic' leadership different types of behaviour to varying degrees appear to lead to such perceptions. That is, exhibiting a participative style of leadership is as likely to lead to perceptions of 'pragmatic' leadership, as a paternalistic one, contrary to what one might have anticipated, while it is not suggested that particular behaviours will considerably increase or reduce the likelihood of generating 'pragmatic' leadership perceptions.

106 It should be noted that it is leaders' perceptions of their behaviour that has been used here, as a proxy for actual behaviour.
107 As the measure of 'pragmatic' leadership includes behaviours that have also been employed to classify leaders as participative or paternalistic, one might have anticipated the 'participative-pragmatic' link, rather than the 'paternalistic-pragmatic' link.
5.2.2 Union type and member responses

What has been demonstrated so far is how trade union identity and the unions' structural features influence the patterns of leader behaviour found in different unions, which in turn influence members' perceptions of leader behaviour, in this case 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership. Of course, a question remains as to whether the two macro-characteristics of unions can directly influence member perceptions of leader behaviour. It could be argued, for example, that once individuals have been socialised into the organisation and have familiarised themselves with how the unions operate, and with the principles and values underlying organisational functioning, mainly resulting from trade union identity, they might be inclined to formulate expectations about the behaviours of their leaders, even before coming into contact with union representatives and officials. Preconceived notions of leader behaviour, or even leader stereotypes could prevent an unbiased evaluation of leader behaviour at later stages of members' union experience.

As Barling et al. (1992) note, the structural characteristics of organisations have long been known to influence individual attitudes and behaviours, and this has also been examined in the case of unions, although the idea that the unions' structural characteristics might have an impact on members' perceptions of leader behaviour has not as yet been explored.108 At the same time, the link between trade union identity and member attitudes and behavioural intentions is dealt with in the next chapter, along with the impact of structural characteristics such as union size, the ratio of local leaders to members etc. on member attitudes and behavioural intentions.

The analysis that follows however, explores what has not been empirically addressed as yet, which is the potential link between trade union identity and unions' structural features, and members' perceptions of leader behaviour.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the means obtained for the two measures of leader behaviour, 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership by union type, and the two-tailed t-tests performed to assess the significance of the difference between unions.

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108 Research on unions' structural characteristics has focused on their link with union democracy (e.g. Strauss, 1997, 1991) and collective bargaining effectiveness (Kochan, 1980; Fiorito and Hendricks, 1987), more so than their link with individual responses such as member attitudes and behaviours, as well as member perceptions of leader behaviour.
Despite the observed differences in means between unions, for ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, these did not emerge as significant neither in the case of traditional and progressive unions, nor in the case of social partner and guild unions. These findings would appear to suggest that trade union identity and structural features do not have a direct, significant effect on member perceptions of leader behaviour.

However, if one wishes to examine these differences, especially in the case of ‘emotional’ leadership where these are more evident, it could be argued that the stronger perceptions of ‘emotional’ leadership that emerge within social partner unions as compared to guild unions, as well as within traditional as compared to progressive unions, reflect more the influence of patterns of leader behaviour, or loyalty to particular charismatic leaders, on member responses, rather than the direct influence of trade union identity and the unions’ structural features. Nevertheless, given that certain patterns of leader behaviour are more likely to be found in some unions than others, and that a more
restrictive set of leader behaviours induces ‘emotional’ than ‘pragmatic’ leadership, as discussed earlier, it is not surprising that these mean differences should emerge in this inter-union analysis. As an example, given the dominance of Initiator and Task-centred leaders within traditional unions, as compared to progressive unions, where Followers and Negotiators feature most prominently, one would be more likely to find differences in ‘emotional’, rather than ‘pragmatic’ leadership. The reason being that, as shown earlier, Followers are the least likely to generate ‘emotional’ leadership, while Task-centred and Initiator leaders are most likely to do so.

To further illustrate the absence of a direct link between trade union identity and unions’ structural features, on ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, and provide additional support for the arguments put forward, regression analysis was performed. The results are shown in table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Regression results: The impact of Trade Union Identity and Unions' Structural Features on ‘Emotional’ and ‘Pragmatic’ Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>'Emotional Leadership'</th>
<th>'Pragmatic Leadership'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig T</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Structure dummy</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=Progressive unions, 2=Traditional unions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Identity dummy</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=Guild unions, 2=Social partner unions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 \) (adj.) = 0.004; F=1.448 (Sig F=.238)

\( R^2 \) (adj.) = -0.05; F=0.243 (Sig F=.785)

The coefficients for both the union structure dummy variable, as well as the union identity dummy do not emerge as significant in predicting either ‘emotional’ or ‘pragmatic’ leadership. That is, members within progressive unions are not likely to foster significantly different perceptions of either ‘emotional’ or ‘pragmatic’ leadership, than members in traditional unions. The same holds for guild and social partner unions. This in turn suggests that union identity and unions’ structural features do not have a direct impact on member perceptions of leader behaviour. Therefore, according to the earlier
discussion, the influence is more likely to be an indirect one, through the influence of leader behaviour.

In summing up, what emerges from the analysis above is the importance of leaders and their behaviour in influencing member perceptions. It has been demonstrated that any influence the unions' identity and (or) structural features might have on member perceptions, is indirect, and occurs through the impact of leader behaviour. This reinforces the view that for members it is their 'local leaders', or the individuals with whom they mostly come in contact with and they consider their local union representatives, who constitute the union. It is their behavioural patterns that determine to a large extent, the development of any perceptions regarding leader behaviour within particular unions.

5.3 Discussion of findings and conclusions

The importance ascribed to leaders and their behaviour within a trade union setting, and as part of the mobilization process has been demonstrated in the present chapter. Leaders as 'mobilising' agents have been hypothesised to influence member attitudes and behavioural intentions, and their effect will be assessed in the next chapter. However, what has already been established is their importance in influencing members' perceptions of their behaviour. In essence, what has emerged is that members' perceptions are not likely to be conditioned or constrained by factors such as the unions' identity or structural features, but rather that it is the behaviour of leaders themselves that has the determining influence.

However, at the same time leader behaviour is not exclusively defined by the styles of individual personalities, but rather it appears to be influenced by both the structural features of the union, as well as its projected identity. It should be noted though, that due to the nature of the analysis it was not possible to identify the causal direction in the above relationships, and so one might argue that it is leader behaviour that influences identities and the flexibility in roles and procedures, rather than the other way around, or even that the relationship between the two might be one of 'reciprocal causality' (Bryman, 1992). Nevertheless, this would appear to be more likely in the case of structural features rather than union identity, since union identity is mainly formulated on the basis of the type and
diversity of interests the union represents, as well as its relationship with other actors within the system such as employers, and (or) government. On the other hand, in the case of traditional and progressive unions, it should be noted that the distinction based on the degree of formalisation and standardisation in roles and procedures, does not simply reflect the preferred structural arrangements within the unions, but it also reflects the culture of the organisation, that is its principles and values regarding the role of the membership and the relationship of leaders with members. Consequently, both these two factors should be considered when examining the influence on patterns of leader behaviour observed within the two groups. Of course, further research would be required to confirm how robust the proposed dichotomies of union type are, and also the direction of the relationship between union type and leader behaviour.

The analysis in the present chapter has also provided evidence to suggest that, in agreement with the proposed thesis, one could distinguish between two different types of leader behaviour as perceived by members, ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, that are influenced by different patterns of leader behaviour. One of the aims in the present chapter was to explore the origins of member perceptions, and in this respect the importance of a ‘paternalistic’ style and the leaders’ responsiveness to member needs were identified as factors influencing the development of ‘emotional’ leadership, while at the same time a broader range of behaviours, including those mentioned above, as well as a ‘participative’ leadership style, were identified as factors influencing the development of ‘pragmatic’ leadership. What in turn emerges, is that a more democratic relationship between leaders and members is not likely to induce affective attachment to the leader, which might have implications for the ability of certain leaders, as well as unions, to influence different member attitudes and behavioural intentions. The relative importance of ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership in predicting member attitudes and behavioural intentions is the focus of the next chapter, and so the present analysis could also facilitate interpretation of these relationships.

Concluding, this chapter has explored the influence of unions themselves in facilitating or impeding certain patterns of behaviour in both their leaders and subsequently their membership. However, most importantly, what has been demonstrated is the capacity
of leader behaviour to influence member responses. Leaders, in their capacity as agents of the various processes taking place within a trade union setting, and more specifically in this case, the process of transforming individual members into collective actors, appear to have considerable influence in shaping member perceptions. To further demonstrate the ‘mobilising potential’ of leaders, what follows is an assessment of their ability to influence member attitudes, and members’ willingness to become involved inside the unions.
Chapter 6 A Process Model of Mobilization: Leadership behaviour, Member Attitudes and Willingness to Participate

This chapter will deal with the findings of the study, as they emerge from testing the propositions outlined in chapter 3. Prior to addressing the aforementioned propositions, the method and results from exploratory factor analysis will be presented, aimed at identifying and establishing data structure. This chapter tests the research propositions within a regression framework, using hierarchical multiple regression analysis, also exploring the potential mediating and moderating effect of variables.

6.1 Factor analysis of measures

The means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients of the variables used, as well as the correlations between variables are presented in table A7 (appendix A). The table shows that although most of the correlations were statistically significant at the 1 per cent significance level, only one exceeded 0.70— an accepted threshold for the presence of multicollinearity (Fullagar et al., 1992) – that between the emotional leadership factor and the pragmatic leadership factor. So, overall, multicollinearity was not regarded as posing a serious problem. As far as the correlation between the two leadership factors is concerned, it did not appear to affect the regression results, as will be discussed later on. Furthermore, all scales were sufficiently reliable, as all Cronbach’s alphas ≥ 0.70, except one for which Cronbach’s alpha=0.60.

Exploratory factor analysis (principal components method, varimax rotation) was performed on the items used to measure the variables in the study. For some of the variables, a certain number of underlying dimensions were expected on the basis of previous research that validated such solutions. However, for other variables in the study theory pointed to possible underlying dimensions, but as there had been no previous research examining the measures, this was essentially an attempt to explore data structure. The factor extraction criteria for deciding on the minimum number of common factors characterising the data, were the size of the eigenvalue and the Scree test (Cattell, 1965). Factor analysis was performed on groups of items as they appeared in the second version.
of the questionnaire: section 2 comprised items measuring union loyalty, union instrumentality and willingness to participate in union activities, section 3 comprised items measuring stereotypical attitudes towards management ('them and us' attitudes), section 4 measured 'workplace collectivism' and consisted of items measuring group identifications, perceived solidarity of values and interests and the motivational effect of group identifications- 'collectivist orientation'- i.e. the extent to which members favour collective forms of representation and action, and finally section 5 measured aspects of leader behaviour. The factor analysis results will be presented in the same order as that in which the analysis was conducted.

6.1.1 Section II: Union Loyalty, Union Instrumentality, Willingness to Participate

Initially, analysis of these items revealed a four-factor structure. Union loyalty emerged as the first factor, with high factor loadings for five of the six items hypothesised to comprise this factor. Union instrumentality emerged as the second factor, with three items loading substantially on it, Willingness to Participate as the third factor, consisting of four main items that loaded substantially on it, and a fourth factor was also obtained comprising the negatively worded items, which clustered out as a separate factor throughout.

It has been argued in previous studies (Kelloway et al., 1992) that negatively worded items could be giving rise to a "methodological artefact stemming from item wording" and so clearer results may be obtained if negatively worded items are not used at all. This applies especially in cases where negatively worded items have not been properly validated. Therefore, it was decided to exclude the negatively worded items from the analysis. As far as the union loyalty factor is concerned, one item (ul8) did not load satisfactorily on this factor, but rather loaded more substantially on the willingness to participate factor. A possible explanation might be the wording of the item and its structural similarity with the items loading on the willingness to participate factor. However, its loading on the willingness to participate factor was relatively low as compared to the rest of the items on the scale, and at the same time the internal reliability of the scale increased once this item was removed. So, it was decided to remove this item
from the analysis. In turn then, once all of the above items were removed, factor analysis revealed a three-factor structure as shown in table A8 (appendix A).

6.1.2 Section III: ‘Them and Us’ attitudes

In line with the proposed definition adopted from Kelly and Kelly (1990), whereby two of the three aspects of the definition were utilised, a two-factor structure was expected. Analysis of the items revealed a two-factor structure, confirming expectations and denoting (i) the perception of a clear division between management and workers, and (ii) a belief that the groups have conflicting interests and the need for union presence (appendix A, table A9). These factors also included two negatively worded items. However, given the comments made earlier on negatively worded items, it was decided to assess the possibility of excluding these two items. The resulting two-factor solution, excluding the negatively worded items, revealed a significant improvement in the percentage of total variance explained, from 51.4 per cent to 59.3 per cent. At the same time, the reliability coefficients for both scales also showed significant improvement. Consequently, it was decided to exclude the negatively worded items from the analysis.

6.1.3 Section IV: ‘Workplace Collectivism’

A three-factor solution was expected on the basis of the proposed definition which identified three aspects of the concept: (i) multiple identifications, (ii) solidarity of values and interests, and (iii) members’ ‘collectivist orientation’. A clear structure was in the end obtained (appendix A, table A10), once the negatively worded items that clustered together throughout were excluded from the analysis. It should be noted however, that two of the negatively worded items loaded highly on the ‘solidarity’ factor as shown in table A10. Again, the idea that negatively worded items might be giving rise to a “methodological artefact stemming from item wording”, should be considered carefully when devising such items. Despite the fact that the negatively worded items measuring group identifications had been obtained from Brown’s (1986) group identification scale, and as such had been validated, the way in which they were modified to measure multiple identifications could have affected their validity.
6.1.4 Section V: Leadership behaviour

A two-factor structure was expected for the items in the leadership section, with the two components of leadership behaviour being emotional leadership, and pragmatic leadership. However, in the first attempt to obtain a solution there seemed to be no clear structure underlying the data. Nevertheless, it was decided to assess the effect of the negatively worded items by excluding them from the analysis.\(^{109}\) What emerged then was a clear two-factor solution that represented the two dimensions identified above. At the same time though, the factor structure obtained was not a very distinct one, as some items loaded significantly on both factors. As a next step, it was attempted to maximise the difference between the two factors so as to obtain a more distinct factor structure. It should be remembered at this stage, that as this was also an exploratory analysis of factor structure for the leadership criterion, it was important to try and identify the best possible solution that could perhaps be validated in future research. In order to maximise the difference between the two factors, items that loaded highly on both factors, and also correlated highly with the items comprising the factors were excluded from the analysis. The final structure is shown in table A11 (appendix A). From the twenty items initially employed in the analysis, fourteen were maintained in the final solution. It should also be mentioned, however, that on the basis of standards in social science research, the two leadership factors were rather highly correlated with one another (\(r_{em,pr}=0.73\)). Nevertheless, it was decided to employ the two factors in subsequent analysis, as their degree of association did not appear to adversely affect those results.\(^{110,111}\)

The 'emotional' leadership factor consisted of selected items obtained from Bass’s transformational leadership measure. However, although charisma and intellectual stimulation emerged as distinct dimensions in Bass’s work\(^{112}\), in the present study the items measuring the two dimensions came out as a single factor. This result is not entirely at

\(^{109}\) The majority of negatively worded items in the leadership section had been constructed, and as such had not been previously validated. In turn then, the issue of item wording as discussed above, posed more seriously as a potential problem in this case.

\(^{110}\) The tolerance criterion and the VIF factor were consistently used in regression analysis to determine the presence of multicollinearity and therefore any adverse effects on the significance levels of variables.

\(^{111}\) Also, given the evidence from the analysis of interview data, there is additional support for a two-dimensional structure of the leadership criterion.

\(^{112}\) Although charisma accounted for 66 per cent of the total variance (Bass, 1985).
odds with Bass’s results, as he argues that “…although intellectual stimulation emerged as a distinct factor, both our item correlations…and the literature on charisma note the overlap and the lack of independence of one with the other” (Bass, 1985: 101). Also in a study by Kelloway and Barling (1993), where their transformational leadership criterion was based on Bass’s (1985) leadership measure, the researchers argued that the high intercorrelations between the three dimensions proposed by Bass (1985) led them to interpreting the leadership scale as a single dimension. The present findings then suggest an alternative factor structure, which albeit not conclusive and in need of further analysis to confirm it, it does direct attention to potential methodological weaknesses in the factor structure of Bass’s measure of transformational leadership. It should also be mentioned that the two items in the emotional leadership factor presented separately at the end of the leadership section in the questionnaire, in an attempt to assess members’ perceptions of the union’s national leadership, i.e. the union’s secretariat, came out as part of the emotional leadership factor that measured perceptions of the person members identified as their ‘local union representative’. An explanation for this might be that the person members identified as their local union representative was also a member of the union’s secretariat, such as the President or General Secretary of the union, and so there was no variation in members’ perceptions of the two. Given that approximately 50 per cent of the respondents that denoted the office of the person they regarded as their local union representative, identified either the President or the Secretary of the union as that person, the above reasoning could serve as an adequate explanation for the results.

The ‘pragmatic’ leadership factor comprised items measuring leader accessibility and availability. A discussed earlier, items measuring leader effectiveness had been excluded from the final version of the questionnaire. Although it was decided to exclude negatively worded items, one of these items was included in the analysis, as it appeared to serve the objective of maximising the difference between the two factors, and was also less ambiguous in its wording and to the meaning it conveyed as compared to the rest of the negatively worded items, and as such more reliable. At the same time, testing the internal

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113 Criticisms of Bass’s transformational leadership measure can be found in Yukl (1994), and Conger and Kanungo (1994).

114 At the same time, methodological similarities, such as similarities in item wording cannot be entirely dismissed.
reliability of this factor revealed a decrease in the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) if that item were to be excluded.

Composite measures of the factors described above were constructed to measure ‘them and us’ attitudes, workplace collectivism and leadership behaviour, although in the ensuing analysis it was preferred to employ the individual factors rather than their composite counterparts, as that would ensure a more meaningful assessment of their contribution in explaining the dependent variables.

6.2 Leadership as an antecedent of member attitudes

As identified earlier, one of the objectives of this research project was to assess the impact of leadership behaviour on the development of favourable attitudes toward the union, and in generating and sustaining an environment conducive to mobilization. So, prior to addressing the impact of leadership behaviour on willingness to become involved in the union, the above issues will be addressed. The propositions (1-4) for the relationship between ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership and member attitudes have been outlined in chapter 3 (p.129).

The hypothesised relationships were assessed within a regression framework by employing hierarchical multiple regression analysis. There was satisfactory evidence to suggest that there was no serious violation of the linearity and normality assumptions of regression analysis. However, even in case of violation of the assumptions by the data, the method may still be quite robust (Knoke and Bohmstedt, 1994: 191). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the results obtained from regressing the two factors of leadership on union loyalty, union instrumentality, ‘them and us’ attitudes comprising two factors: ‘perceived division between management and workers’ and ‘perceived conflict of interests and the need for union presence’, and ‘workplace collectivism’ comprising three factors: group identification, perceived solidarity of values and interests, and ‘collectivist orientation’. The control variables hypothesised as having an impact on the variables under consideration were also included in the equation: age, gender, union representative ratio, union tenure, union size (district, total), pay level, organisational size (district, total), and trade union identity. Trade union identity will be considered more closely than the rest of
the control variables as discussed earlier. Proposition 5 (p.129) deals with the potential link between trade union identity and member attitudes.

Table 6.1 Regression results: The impact of Leadership on Union Loyalty, Union Instrumentality and 'Them and Us'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Union Loyalty</th>
<th>Union Instrumentality</th>
<th>'Them and Us': Perceived division</th>
<th>'Them and Us': Perceived conflict of interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age dummies (25-34)</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35-44)</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(45-55)</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Over 55)</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender dummy (Male)</td>
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<td>.047</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union representative ratio</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union tenure</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.14*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.19*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Total size</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
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<td><strong>Organisational Experience</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<td>-.11*</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Income</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>-.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Union Identity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy (Guild unions)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic' Leadership</td>
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<td>.47***</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² square (Adj.)</td>
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<td>.23</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
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### Step 2

#### Demographics

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<th>p</th>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35-44)</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.23*</td>
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<td>.26*</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Over 55)</td>
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<td>.16*</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
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#### Union Experience

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<td>.01</td>
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<table>
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<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
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#### Organisational Experience

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<th>Organisation District size</th>
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<th>t</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>.07</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Total size</th>
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<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Beta</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Trade Union Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dummy (Guild unions)</th>
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<th>t</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>.09</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Pragmatic' Leadership</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Emotional' Leadership</th>
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<th>p</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.10*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R2 square (Adj.)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.53^b</td>
<td>.24^c</td>
<td>.07^d</td>
<td>.14^e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R2 change</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* The above coefficients are standardised (beta) regression coefficients.

*b* F (15, 758) = 58.19***;  
*c* F (15, 758) = 17.24***;  
*d* F (15, 758) = 4.64***;  
*e* F (15, 758) = 9.19***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

#### 6.2.1 Union loyalty.

It was anticipated that both 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership would have a significant effect on union loyalty. The findings confirmed the above proposition, as both factors emerged as strong, positive predictors of union loyalty. That is, the more the leaders were perceived as charismatic, intellectually innovative and stimulating, able to transmit a sense of purpose and excitement about the union, the higher the level of loyalty to the union. Also, the more the leader was perceived as adequately serving members,
consulting members on issues of concern to them, informing members of developments on union issues and activities within the union etc., the higher the level of loyalty to the union. The present model, consisting of the two leadership factors and the control variables, accounted for 53 per cent of the variance in union loyalty. This further highlights the importance of leadership as a predictor of union loyalty.

At the same time, it was proposed that in line with Bass’s discussion on transformational and transactional leadership, emotional leadership would add to the prediction of union loyalty over and above that of ‘pragmatic’ leadership. This proposition was also confirmed, as evident from the significant change in $R^2$ once the ‘emotional’ leadership factor was entered in the regression equation. However, it should be noted that such an effect might be more related to the affective nature of both union loyalty and emotional leadership, rather than constitute a genuine contribution from the ‘emotional’ leadership factor. Nevertheless, judging from the size of the regression coefficients, ‘emotional’ leadership does emerge as the stronger predictor of union loyalty, again as anticipated. This is also illustrated by the substantial decrease in the regression coefficient for ‘pragmatic’ leadership, once ‘emotional’ leadership was entered in the equation.

As far as the effect of the control variables is concerned, contrary to the results of previous studies that found for example, Gender and union tenure to be significantly associated with union loyalty (e.g. Gordon et al., 1980), no such associations emerged from the present analysis. Rather, the results suggest that females are likely to be as loyal to the union as their male counterparts, while time spent as a union member does not seem to influence the degree of loyalty to the union. Age emerged as significantly associated with union loyalty only in the case of the 25-34 group, as compared to the under 25’s (reference group). This suggests that those in the former category foster weaker attitudes of union loyalty than those in the latter.

In the case of the relationship between trade union identity and union loyalty, the results did not confirm a significant association between the two, as was proposed. The

\[115 \text{It should be noted that once pragmatic leadership was entered in the regression equation containing the control variables, a change of .34 was observed in } R^2 \text{, significant at } p<0.001. \text{ This then suggests that the two leadership factors alone account for 44 per cent of the variance in union loyalty. This result is not shown in table 6.1 to avoid adding further complexity.}\]
results indicated instead that members within guild unions would not foster significantly
different attitudes of loyalty to the union, in comparison to members in social partner
unions. It might be that this result reflects more the occurrence of different patterns of
leader behaviour within social partner and guild unions, rather than a direct influence of
trade union identity. In the previous chapter, it was shown that different patterns of leader
behaviour were more prominent within social partner than guild unions, although there
were no dominant patterns, and that in turn leader behaviour influenced member
perceptions of leader behaviour, i.e. ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership. Consequently,
given that both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership are strong, positive predictors of
union loyalty, and also given that no dominant patterns of leader behaviour are observed
within the two groups of unions, which might have induced stronger perceptions of one
rather than the other, one would not be inclined to anticipate any significant differences in
union loyalty for members in these union groups. However, as such indirect effects cannot
be assessed in the context of the present analysis, the above remains a tentative
explanation.

6.2.2 Union instrumentality

Again as anticipated, the two leadership factors emerged as strong, positive
predictors of union instrumentality, which again emphasises the importance of perceived
leader behaviour in obtaining favourable attitudes towards the union. The results indicate
that the more positive the perceptions of both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, the
stronger will be members’ union instrumentality perceptions. At the same time, the beta
coefficients show ‘pragmatic’ leadership as a more powerful predictor of union
instrumentality, as was proposed. In the case of union instrumentality though, the
regression model consisting of the two leadership factors and the control variables,
accounted for 24 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable, which could lead one
to suggest that leadership is of lesser importance, albeit still quite important, in predicting
union instrumentality than union loyalty.\[116\]

\[116\] Again, as discussed previously, the highest, significant increase in R square was observed when pragmatic
leadership was entered in the equation (.19) This then suggests that the two factors alone account for 20 per cent of
the variance in union instrumentality.
'Emotional' leadership added again to the prediction of union instrumentality beyond that of 'pragmatic' leadership, as the significant change in $R^2$ shows. However, this does not necessarily prove the proposition, since one would expect an increase in $R^2$ when a new variable is added to the regression equation, so one should also observe the effect that has on the standard error of estimate. In this case, the change is infinitesimal, in contrast to the change observed in the case of union loyalty$^{117}$, which undermines the result. This in turn, suggests that 'emotional' leadership is not as important a variable in the case of union instrumentality, as it is for union loyalty. This is further illustrated by the change in the regression coefficient of 'pragmatic' leadership once 'emotional' leadership is entered in the equation, which is clearly considerably smaller than in the case of union loyalty, while 'pragmatic' leadership remains the stronger predictor.

There was overall no significant contribution from control variables, although an interesting result might be the weaker, significant association of pay level and union instrumentality ($p<0.1$)$^{118}$ which suggests that as salary grade increases, perceived union instrumentality decreases. In a sense, individual members do not perceive the union as instrumental in improving their working lives once they find themselves at higher earning levels, either through seniority, which is most frequently the case, or professional advancement. However, those individuals closest to retirement (over 55's), appear to foster stronger union instrumentality perceptions, in comparison to the youngest cohort of employees (under 25's), as evident from the significant age coefficients in table 6.1. This suggests then that given the unions' seniority provisions, for employees who approach retirement age the union becomes significantly more instrumental, than for other age-groups, independent of whether they have (or not) reached the top salary grade.

The proposition that trade union identity would be associated with member attitudes, was also not confirmed in the case of union instrumentality. While one might have anticipated that the stronger occupational communities within guild unions, where members share common interests would lead to stronger perceptions of union instrumentality, that was not the case. The explanation employed for union loyalty, could

$^{117}$ For union instrumentality, change in the standard error of estimate: 0.0028, while in the case of union loyalty, change in the standard error of estimate: 0.056

$^{118}$ It is not shown in table 6.1, since it falls outside the set significance criteria for the study.
also account for these results. However, this result might also reflect the widely held view, both among members and leaders, that it is more necessary rather than desirable to belong to the union, since as one member argued: “…the way things are in the public corporate sector, we need to belong to a trade union if we are to gain anything…”. In turn, instrumentality perceptions are independent of union type.

6.2.3 ‘Them and Us’ attitudes

The two factors comprising ‘them and us’ attitudes were individually regressed on ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership and the control variables.

Neither of the two leadership factors significantly predicted the ‘perceived division between management and workers’ dimension119. This in turn suggests that the behaviour of union leaders is not an important factor in explaining this aspect of ‘them and us’ attitudes. However, some of the control variables did emerge as having strong relationships to this dimension, although the overall coefficient of determination $R^2$ (Adj.) was evidently particularly low.

Interestingly enough, the coefficient for trade union identity emerged as significantly associated with the ‘perceived division between management and workers’. That is, members within guild unions where narrow occupational interests are represented, perceived less division between management and workers as compared to members in social partner unions where a membership with a diverse spectrum of interests is represented. This result seems to suggest that unions representing ‘elite’ occupational groups are strictly concerned with obtaining benefits for their members, rather than being involved in a process of eroding managerial legitimacy. It appears that highlighting the perceived division between the two actors at the workplace is more a feature of unions that represent a wider range of interests. This is possibly employed as a strategy for integrating heterogeneous interests within a collective framework, by convincing members that within such a framework their interests can be represented effectively against possible violations or abuses by management.

119 Only results significant at $p<0.05, 0.01, 0.001$ were considered.
At the same time, as leader behaviour does not appear to influence the ‘perceived division between management and workers’, the above result could not be argued to reflect the indirect influence of trade union identity through leader behaviour. However, it could reflect the influence of leaders’ attitudes towards management, on member attitudes. To illustrate this idea, table 6.1.1 below presents a crosstabulation of leaders’ perception of an antagonistic relationship between management and workers, by union type. The information has been extracted from the available sample of interview data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Antagonism between Management and Workers</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Antagonistic</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Antagonistic</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Due to the small size of the sample (N=27) it was not possible to examine, using a χ² test, whether the above patterns would also emerge in the population.

What emerges in the table above is a clear pattern of variation between leaders in social partner and guild unions, in relation to their perceptions of an antagonistic relationship between management and workers. More specifically, no leaders within guild unions view the relationship as either very antagonistic or antagonistic, while approximately 27 per cent of leaders within social partner unions do. At the same time, 27 per cent more leaders in guild unions view the above relationship as not antagonistic, as compared to social partner unions. Consequently, this is evidence to support the result that members within guild unions would foster weaker perceptions of a division between management and workers, than members in social partner unions.

Two other control variables worthwhile discussing are age and pay level. In the case of age, all the coefficients emerged as highly significant and indicated that compared to the youngest age group (under 25’s), employed as the reference group, members in the rest of the groups were more likely to perceive a division between management and workers. This difference appears more noticeable for the younger members, rather than
the older ones, given the size and significance of the coefficients for the four groups, suggesting that older members foster weaker perceptions of division between management and workers than younger ones. One explanation for this might be that older members, with longer periods of employment and greater awareness of the determining influence of external agents, such as the government, in the management of organisations in the public corporate sector, no longer identify management as the ‘outgroup’ to the degree that younger members might do.

At the same time though, the significance of the coefficient for pay level denotes that the higher the earnings, the less the perceived division between management and workers. This might be attributed to the fact that higher earnings indicate a higher position in the occupational hierarchy, and thus closer contact with management. It might be that closer and increased contact with management facilitates eroding of stereotypes, (Hewstone and Brown, 1986) and helps uncover common ground. Another explanation might be that members with higher earnings at higher levels in the occupational hierarchy, identify themselves as part of the group which is in closest proximity to them, i.e. management, and so once they are aware of their membership of this group, and evaluate themselves in terms of the group, it is unlikely that they would act in a way that would endanger the positive social identity that emerges from their group membership. Also, considering these results with those on age, it could be argued that younger members with higher earnings would foster weaker perceptions of a division between management and workers, than younger members with low earnings. This could be argued as the case for professional staff120 in organisations of the public corporate sector, whose career progression is much faster and their career span is much shorter. A number of them already enter the organisation at ‘lower management’ levels at approximately early thirties, and can reach higher management positions by early forties.121

In the case of the second dimension which denoted a ‘perceived conflict of interests and the need for union presence’, the ‘emotional’ leadership factor emerged as a significant predictor, albeit not a very powerful one, while ‘pragmatic’ leadership had a

120 These are highly skilled employees, mostly university graduates, such as engineers, computer scientists, management graduates etc.
121 Of course, the situation varies from organisation to organisation, but this is broadly the identified pattern.
much weaker significant effect which did not fall within the levels of significance that has been set for this study. In a sense, this result also confirmed the proposition that 'emotional' leadership would have a stronger effect on 'them and us' than 'pragmatic' leadership. The potency of 'emotional' leadership as a predictor is also illustrated by the considerable decrease in the 'pragmatic' leadership coefficient once 'emotional' leadership is entered in the regression equation (step2). Again, the overall coefficient of determination $R^2$ (Adj.) remained at low levels. As far as the extent to which 'emotional' leadership added beyond 'pragmatic' leadership to the prediction of this dimension, the small change in the standard error of estimate again suggested that there was no real, additional contribution from 'emotional' leadership in explaining 'perceived conflict of interests'.

As far as the control variables are concerned, significant associations were observed in the case of age and pay level, whereas the trade union identity coefficient did not fall within the set significance criteria. However, its potential effect should not be disregarded, since it directs attention to an important difference in the idiosyncrasy of members in the two groups of unions. The direction of the relationship in the case of trade union identity, was the same as in the case of the first dimension of 'them and us': perceived division between management and workers discussed above. Again, the fact that trade union identity was not significantly associated with 'perceived conflict of interests', would suggest that its influence might be indirect, through leader behaviour. Therefore, as no dominant leader behaviour patterns have been observed within either social partner or guild unions that would be more likely to induce 'emotional' leadership in one group rather than the other, a significant association would not have been likely to emerge.

Age and pay level, were also significantly associated with this second dimension. For pay level, the same arguments employed above could also be used here. However, it should also be added that members at higher earnings levels, and therefore higher in the occupational hierarchy and closer to management, may feel more able to influence the decision-making centres of the organisation, outside the union, which could explain

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122 Standard error of estimate change: 0.0014. However, this small change is more indicative of the fact that leadership behaviour is not such an important variable in explaining 'them and us' attitudes.
weaker perceptions of the need for union presence. For age the results suggested that older members (last two groups), in comparison to under 25’s, would be more likely to perceive a conflict of interests and a need for union presence, than younger ones (first two groups). One explanation might be the unions’ strong advocacy for seniority provisions in wages and advancement policies, especially within the public corporate sector, which might also account for the positive, significant association of union tenure with this dimension. Union tenure emerged as having a positive, significant association, which denotes that the longer one has been a union member the stronger the perception of conflict of interests and the need for union presence.

At the same time, other union-related control variables also emerged as being significantly associated to the ‘perceived conflict of interests’, probably due to the strong references to unions in the items comprising this factor. The union representative communication system, measured by the ratio of stewards to total membership was also significantly associated to the above dimension, denoting that the higher the union representative ratio the lower the perceived conflict of interests. This appears to suggest that the closer the members are to the union representatives, the lower their perception of a conflict of interests, which would indicate that office-holders inside the union, in close contact with management, do not seek to convey and foster strong stereotypical attitudes of management among members. This contention is supported by the interview data, where the majority of leaders reported that fostering stereotypical attitudes towards management would impede the unions’ effectiveness, as members would be more reluctant to accept management proposals for grievance resolution, which would in turn result in delayed resolution of grievances.

In addition, the coefficient for union size denotes that the larger the union, the lower the perception of a conflict of interests, suggesting that members within large unions are not as close to the union as in the case of smaller unions, and as such do not share the stereotypical attitudes of management associated with union membership. However, considering the case of large unions with high steward ratios, it would follow from the above arguments that the same result would be observed: a lower perceived conflict of interests. This in turn highlights the effect of leadership in influencing such perceptions.
6.2.4 ‘Workplace Collectivism’

The three factors comprising this concept were regressed individually on the two leadership factors and the control variables, as in the case of ‘them and us’ attitudes above. The reason was, that each one of the factors was considered equally important in providing insights into the influence of leadership behaviour on collectivist tendencies. The results are shown in table 6.2 below.

For group identification, ‘pragmatic’ leadership emerged as a strong, positive predictor, while ‘emotional’ leadership had no significant effect. That is, the more the leader is perceived as adequately serving members on a day-to-day basis, the stronger their identification with the identified ingroup(s). At the same time, ‘emotional’ leadership did not add to the prediction of group identifications beyond that of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, as shown in table 6.2 (step 2).

Some of the control variables were also associated with group identifications, such as trade union identity, gender and steward ratio. In the case of trade union identity, the coefficient denotes that members in the unions representing narrow occupational units (Guild unions), identify more strongly with their ingroup(s), than members within unions representing a diverse array of groups and thus a wider range of interests (Social Partner). This would seem to suggest, as one would anticipate, that since belonging in narrow groupings and also fostering narrow group interests is much more salient within the former, members as a result, would tend to identify more with the identified organisational groupings (departmental group, workgroup), than members in the latter type, where belonging is a function of wider groupings and also interests are defined at a higher level. This result suggests a direct effect of trade union identity on group identification, while one could not entirely dismiss an indirect effect through leader behaviour. However, the latter would not have been expected to result in a significant difference between social partner and guild unions, for reasons discussed earlier.123 In any

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123 As perceptions of ‘pragmatic’ leadership can be induced via a range of leader behaviours, and also given that no dominant patterns of leader behaviour emerge within either social partner and guild unions, which might have been more likely to generate ‘pragmatic’ leadership perceptions within either one of the two groups, a significant result would not have been anticipated.
case, the present analysis does not allow one to disentangle direct from indirect effects, and so it can only be suggestive of a possible indirect effect.

The coefficient for gender denotes that males identify more strongly with their ingroup(s) than females. One explanation for this might be the male dominated character of the organisation that prevents female interests and concerns from being adequately addressed, and from developing a sense of belonging in such male-dominated groups. Union representative ratio was negatively associated with group identification. This denoted that the higher the ratio, and thus the closer the contact of members with union representatives, the lower the identification with one’s ingroup(s). This appears to suggest that the closer the contact with the union representative, and thus the union, the more the members will tend to identify with the groups made salient by the union and its representatives, rather than their own perceived ingroup(s).

In the case of ‘perceived solidarity of shared values and interests’ between the individual and the group, both ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership emerged as positive, significant predictors. As anticipated, ‘pragmatic’ leadership was a stronger predictor of perceived solidarity than ‘emotional’ leadership, as evident from the size of the beta coefficients at step 2, although both were highly significant. ‘Emotional’ leadership added beyond ‘pragmatic’ leadership to predicting perceived solidarity, although again judging from the change in the standard error of estimate the contribution was particularly moderate.\(^{124}\)

As in the case of ‘group identification’, union representative ratio and trade union identity were also significantly associated with this factor, although it should be noted that the strength of the relationship between trade union identity and ‘perceived solidarity...’ was much more notable than in the case of the previous factor. The direction of the relationship was the same as above, and so the arguments explaining these relationships would strongly resemble the arguments employed above. This leads one to suggest that members in guild unions have a stronger perception of solidarity of values and interests as compared to social partner unions; also, the higher the union representative ratio, the

\(^{124}\) Change in standard error of estimate: 0.003
lower the perception of solidarity of values and interests with one's identified ingroups, i.e. workgroup/departmental group.

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<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<th>Workplace Collectivism: Collectivist Orientation</th>
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Gender dummy (Male) .12*** .07 .05

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### Trade Union Identity

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### 'Pragmatic' Leadership

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### 'Emotional' Leadership

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*The above coefficients are standardised (beta) regression coefficients;

b F(15, 758) = 11.96***; c F(15, 758) = 8.62***; d F(15, 758) = 6.94***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

'Pragmatic' leadership was the only leadership factor to emerge as a significant predictor of 'members' collectivist orientation'. Also, 'emotional' leadership did not add to the variance explained beyond that of 'pragmatic' leadership, as evident from the non-significant change in R².

At the same time, of the control variables trade union identity was not significantly associated with the extent to which members favour collective action, which would suggest that this is independent of union identity, or again that such an effect might be indirect, through the impact of leader behaviour. The reasons why such an indirect effect might not have been significant have been discussed in the previous sections, although given the type of analysis, it is not possible to test any indirect effects.
Age and pay level, however, were strongly associated with members' collectivist orientation. In the case of age, the dummy coefficients were significant for three out of the four age groups. The coefficients were stronger for the older rather than the younger members. In turn, this would suggest that older members identify with this fundamental principle of trade unionism more strongly than younger members, probably because they have a longer-standing faith in the gains from collective action. The highest beta coefficient was obtained for the group of members in their mid-forties to mid-fifties (group 4), which have been in the organisation for at least twenty years, suggesting that they have witnessed the benefits from collective action over a long period, and were probably also convinced that collective action is the most effective form of action for gaining desired outcomes within the public corporate sector. This is also supported by the interview data, where higher-level officials with considerable union experience, argued that members tend to be more individualistic in recent times than they used to be. However, the highly significant coefficient for pay level suggests that the higher the earnings the less positive the attitudes towards collective forms of representation and action. This in turn suggests that members at higher salary grades, and as such at higher levels of the occupational hierarchy, are more individualistic. A reason for this might be their closeness to the decision making centres of the organisation, and thus the perception that their interests can be more effectively pursued outside a collective framework. So, given the above discussion one would anticipate that older members at higher levels in the occupational hierarchy, would favour collective forms of representation and action less than those at lower levels.

Union representative ratio was also significantly associated with this factor, as with the two other factors, although the negative coefficient did not confirm expectations. It was anticipated that the higher the union representative ratio, and thus the closer the member to the union, the more strongly one would favour collective action. However, the coefficient denotes that the higher the union representative ratio, the lower the extent to which members would favour collective action. Although this result might appear as contrary to expectations, it could be argued that the fact that the member is closer to the union representative and the union does not necessarily lead to a more favourable attitude
towards collective action. This would also depend on whether for example, the member has had direct or indirect experience of the effectiveness of collective action, or even on a preconceived view of collective methods and their effectiveness. In a sense, positive attitudes toward collective action might be more dependent on leader behaviour as shown, rather than simply closer contact with the leaders and the union. A possible explanation of this negative result, on the other hand, might be that the closer members are to the union representatives and the union, the more likely they are to observe the inadequacies and shortcomings of a system of collective representation and action, resulting in less positive views of such a system.

6.2.5 The interactive effect of leader behaviour in explaining member attitudes

The analysis so far has considered the two leadership factors as independent, additive predictors, in explaining member attitudes. However, 'emotional' leadership has been shown to contribute further to explaining attitudes such as union loyalty and 'them and us', while it has already been proposed that the interactive effect of 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership would explain willingness to participate further, once their independent effect has been accounted for. Consequently, it was considered worthwhile to also explore the two factors' potential interactive effect in explaining member attitudes. It might be that the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and member attitudes varies at different values of 'emotional' leadership, or vice-versa.

In order to examine the above proposition, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed, whereby the degree of interaction between 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership was assessed. Discussion and the findings from moderated regression analysis are found in appendix C.6. Briefly, the results appear to suggest that the strength of the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and 'them and us': perceived division, 'them and us': perceived conflict of interests, and members' 'collectivist orientation' is contingent on perceptions of 'emotional' leadership. More specifically, 'pragmatic' leadership is more predictive of members' 'them and us' attitudes, as well as of members' 'collectivist orientation' for those members who foster strong perceptions of 'emotional' leadership.
To sum up then, the preceding analysis has tested propositions 1-4 set out in chapter 3, as discussed earlier. The results confirmed expectations as to the defining role of leadership behaviour as a predictor of member attitudes. More specifically, 'emotional' leadership emerged as a significant predictor of members' affective responses, such as attitudes of union loyalty, 'them and us' and perceived solidarity of group values and interests. 'Pragmatic' leadership, again as anticipated was a weaker predictor of union loyalty, albeit a highly significant one, but a stronger predictor than 'emotional' leadership for union instrumentality and perceived solidarity of values and interests. It emerged as the only predictor of group identification, and members' collectivist orientation. 'Emotional' leadership emerged as clearly contributing further to explaining criterion variables, only in the case of attitudes of union loyalty. This is not surprising, given the affinity in the nature of the concepts. Also, in predicting 'them and us' attitudes, control variables such as age and income emerged as significant, while leadership behaviour did not prove to be such a powerful predictor.

A potentially important predictor of member attitudes, trade union identity, examined here as a control variable for reasons discussed earlier, was significantly associated with the two factors comprising 'workplace collectivism', that is group identification and perceived solidarity of values and interests, as well as with 'them and us': perceived division. However, there was no significant association with union loyalty, union instrumentality, members' collectivist orientation and 'them and us': perceived conflict of interests. In turn, it could be argued that trade union identity might be more relevant in accounting for collectivist tendencies at the workplace, rather than different aspects of attachment to the union.
6.3 Predicting willingness to participate: the influence of leader behaviour and member attitudes

In the present section, the results from propositions 6-11 (p.130) outlined in chapter 3 will be presented, assessing the antecedents of the intention to participate, with leadership introduced as a potential antecedent. At the same time, the results from exploring the mediating effect of member attitudes in the relationship between leadership and willingness to participate will be presented, along with the interactive effect of 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership in contributing further to explaining willingness to participate, beyond their independent effect.

The findings from hierarchical multiple regression analysis are summarised in table 6.3 where union loyalty, union instrumentality, 'them and us' attitudes, workplace collectivism and 'pragmatic' leadership were entered at step 1, followed by 'emotional' leadership at step 2.
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Experience</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation District size</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation Total size</td>
<td>-.22***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Income</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union Identity dummy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Guild unions)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Union Loyalty             | .37***  |         |         |           |
| Union Instrumentality     | .04     |         |         |           |

| ‘Them and Us’: Perceived division |         |         |         |           |
| ‘Them and Us’: Perceived conflict of interests | .04 |         |         |           |

| ‘Workplace Collectivism’: |         |         |         |           |
| Identification           | .04     |         |         |           |
| ‘Workplace Collectivism’: | -.07    |         |         |           |
| Solidarity               |         |         |         |           |
| ‘Workplace Collectivism’: |         |         |         |           |
| Collectivist Orientation | .10*    |         |         |           |

| ‘Pragmatic’ Leadership   | .11*    |         |         |           |
| ‘Emotional’ Leadership   | -.04    |         |         |           |

| R² square (Adj.)         |         |         |         |           |
| F (22, 751) = 15.88***   | .30     |         |         |           |

R² change: .00

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
* The above are standarised (beta) regression coefficients
Union loyalty, the motivation factor of 'workplace collectivism', i.e. members' 'collectivist orientation' and 'pragmatic leadership' emerged as significant predictors of willingness to participate. Thus, the more loyal members are to the union the more willing they will be to become involved in the union and participate in union activities, highlighting the importance of affective attachment for reinforcing behavioural intention. Also, the significant effect of members' 'collectivist orientation', suggests that the more favourable members' attitudes towards collective methods of representation and action are, in achieving desired outcomes and protecting their interests, the more willing they will be to participate in union activities. Union loyalty had by far the strongest effect of the three on willingness to participate, as evident in the size of the beta regression coefficient. Perceived solidarity of values and interests emerged as a weak and negative predictor of willingness to participate ($p<0.1$). Although this result does not fall within the set significance criteria for the present study, given its negative coefficient it might be worthwhile discussing. This result appears to suggest that the stronger the perception of shared values and interests with members' departmental group or workgroup, the less willing they will be to become involved in the union and participate in union activities. While this might appear at first, as contradictory to the rest of the findings, it merely directs attention to the distinction between occupational groups and organisational groups. Given that the union organises its members on the basis of occupational divisions, it is perceived solidarity with these groups that could have an influence on willingness to participate. On the other hand, if members perceive solidarity with their identified organisational groupings, this does not necessarily mean that they would be more willing to become involved in the union, as defining one's interests along the lines of very narrow groups such as their workgroup and (or) departmental group suggests that they would be less likely to perceive shared interests with the wider groupings represented by the majority of the unions in the study, and as such be less supportive of an organisation that seeks to represent diverse interests within a collective framework. In turn then, what becomes a more important and determining factor is members' collectivist orientation. That is, the extent to which members perceive collective forms of representation and
action as adequately and effectively representing these group interests. It could also be argued that if perceived solidarity of values and interests was measured using the wider groupings, i.e. technical, office staff etc. different results might have been obtained.

The significant effect of only one of the two leadership factors, indicates that what determines willingness to become involved in the union is strong perceptions of 'pragmatic' leadership, and as such the extent to which union leaders are perceived favourably in their day-to-day role as representatives of members and their interests, rather than their more charismatic and intellectual features, comprising 'emotional' leadership. Although one possible explanation for obtaining a significant effect for only one of the two factors might have been the presence of multicollinearity, the size of the tolerance coefficients did not suggest that multicollinearity posed a problem.125 At the same time, the proposition that 'emotional' leadership will add to the prediction of willingness to participate in union activities, was not confirmed, as is evident from the non-significant $R^2$ change in table 6.3, when 'emotional' leadership is entered in the regression equation (step 2). This in turn further demonstrates that 'emotional' leadership is not such an important, direct predictor of willingness to participate.

In addition to the effect of the independent variables discussed above, age, gender and both union and organisation size, were also significantly associated with willingness to participate. The coefficient for gender denoted that males are more willing than females to participate in trade union activities. At this stage, it was regarded worthwhile to explore whether the reluctance by females to become involved in the union reflected a uniform attitude towards union involvement or it was only relevant in the case of particular aspects of union involvement. A frequency count of the different union activities comprising the willingness to participate measure was obtained for females, which indicated that while 40.5 and 34.6 per cent of females are willing to participate in collective action and/or frequently attend union meetings, respectively, only 19.5 and 17.6 per cent are willing to be elected on the union's administrative bodies or as union officials, respectively. This then suggests that while females adhere to the principles of trade unionism and wish to become involved in the union, they are unwilling to do so at the higher, administrative levels of the
organisation, assuming positions of responsibility. This might be attributable to a woman’s customary family obligations, which interfere with her opportunities to participate in union affairs, the most frequently-cited explanation for the absence of females within unions. On the other hand, another explanation, quite plausible in this case might be that the male-dominated character of such organisations acts as a barrier to more female presence and discourages women from becoming involved with the union. The latter is also supported by material obtained from an interview with the only female official, I came across, who argued that “… on the part of men there is willingness to take up responsible positions inside the union, but not on the part of women…as a woman I had to go through a lot before I was accepted as an equal! This might justify the unwillingness among women to become involved…”.

In the case of age, two of the age groups in the regression equation emerged as significantly different in their involvement within the union, those members between mid-twenties and mid-forties, as compared to the youngest members, the under 25’s. This denotes that, a higher degree of union activity would characterise the younger members, and as such the earlier stages of members’ union experience. For the last two age groups, the older members, mid-forties to the over 55’s, there would appear to be a decline in union activity, as evident from the non-significant coefficients. One explanation for this might be that the closer a member gets to the official retirement age (60), the lower their willingness to become involved in the union.

Also, contrary to expectations, the number of union members in district offices was positively associated with willingness to participate, which suggests that the larger the district office, the more willing the members are to become involved in the union. A negative direction for the relationship was expected, to indicate that the larger and therefore also the more bureaucratic the union, the less willing the members would be to participate, as research in union participation has shown (e.g. Anderson, 1978). However, an explanation for this result might be that as the largest district offices are those found in the district where the headquarters of both the unions and the organisations are located.

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125 A tolerance coefficient of<0.3 would be an indication of multicollinearity. Tolerance coefficients in this case were: 0.4 and 0.35 for ‘pragmatic’ and ‘emotional’ leadership respectively.

126 General Organising Secretary, Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (interview: 11th December).
members in these offices might feel closer to the decision-making centres, and as such more able to influence decisions of concern to them, while also having access to more information. According to a trade union representative in one of the smaller district offices: “I think there is lack of information. Although here in... I try to inform members through a special information sheet whenever there are serious problems being discussed, I feel that the information we receive is insufficient”. This view was put forward by other union representatives, as well as officials operating in similar conditions.

At the same time, the coefficients for organisational size also emerged as significantly associated with willingness to participate, denoting that the larger the size of the organisation (district, total) the less willing the members would be to participate. This agrees with evidence from existing studies cited in Barling et al. (1992), where it was shown that the size of the organisation influences participation in union activities through the intimacy of the work community and the closeness of working relations (e.g. Lipset et al., 1956; Seidman, 1953; Seidman et al., 1958; Spinrad, 1960). In turn, the larger the organisation the weaker the above conditions, and so the less willing the members to participate in union activities.

At the same time, another variable that should be discussed is trade union identity. It did not emerge as significantly associated with willingness to participate, indicating that there exists no significant difference between members in social partner and guild unions in their willingness to participate in union activities. This in turn suggests that the union’s identity does not directly influence members’ willingness to become involved in the union. Of course, the possibility of an indirect effect through leader behaviour remains, although it cannot be identified and assessed in the context of the present analysis.

Given that aside from ‘pragmatic’ leadership, union loyalty and members’ collectivist orientation emerged as the only attitudinal predictors of willingness to participate, the potential mediating effect of member attitudes in the relationship between leadership and willingness to participate was subsequently explored by employing these two variables as mediators.
6.3.1 The mediating effect of union loyalty

The hypothesis was that ‘pragmatic’ leaders, as mobilising agents would influence union loyalty which would in turn have an impact on willingness to participate. When attempting to establish mediation, there are two possible mediation models: *partial mediation* and *complete mediation*. In this case, a partial mediation model is argued to characterise the relationship between ‘pragmatic’ leadership, union loyalty and willingness to participate (figure 6.1).

![Partial Mediation Model for Union Loyalty](image)

To test the above model, the following three regression equations were computed: first, the mediator was regressed on the independent variable; second, the dependent variable was regressed on the independent variable; and third, the dependent variable was regressed on both the independent variable and on the mediator. To establish partial mediation: (i) the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first equation; (ii) the independent variable must be shown to affect the dependent variable in the second equation; (iii) the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third equation. Given that all the above conditions hold in the predicted direction, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be *less* in the third equation than in the second (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The overall effect, then of the independent variable on the dependent variable would be given by the product of paths a and b (see figure 6.1) added to the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable in equation 2, $c^*$ i.e. total effect = $c^* + (a \times b)$.

Following the above, union loyalty was first regressed on ‘pragmatic’ leadership, willingness to participate was regressed on ‘pragmatic’ leadership, and willingness to participate was regressed on 'pragmatic' leadership, as mobilising agents would influence union loyalty which would in turn have an impact on willingness to participate.
participate was regressed on both 'pragmatic' leadership and union loyalty. All the above conditions necessary for establishing mediation held, and there was a substantial drop in the effect of transactional leadership on willingness to participate, once union loyalty was introduced into the regression equation, from beta=0.34 (p<0.001) to beta=0.10 (p<0.05). This then suggests that part of the overall effect of 'pragmatic' leadership on willingness to participate, is due to the intervening effect of union loyalty. From a theoretical perspective, a significant decrease in path c "...demonstrates that a given mediator is indeed potent, albeit not both a necessary and a sufficient condition for an effect to occur..." (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Table 6.4 presents the direct, indirect and total effect of 'pragmatic' leadership on willingness to participate, with union loyalty as an intervening variable. The direct effect of 'pragmatic' leadership on willingness to participate is given by equation 2 above. The indirect effect of 'pragmatic' leadership on willingness to participate is given by axb (the product of paths a and b), while the total effect is given by the expression above. To establish whether the indirect effect was significant, the standard error of the indirect effect was computed using the following formula: √ b's_a^2 + a^2*s_a^2 + s_b^2*s_b^2 (Baron and Kenny, 1986).

In essence then, the results reinforce previous results on the role of leaders as 'mobilising' agents, manifested in this case in their ability to influence member attitudes, such as union loyalty, which in turn determine willingness to participate. However, it has been hypothesised that members' 'collectivist orientation' will also assume a mediating role in the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate.

6.3.2 The mediating effect of members' 'collectivist orientation'

Figure 6.2 represents the partial mediation model for the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate with members' collectivist orientation as the intervening variable.
Following the method described above, the three regression equations were computed and all the necessary conditions examined. Once the intervening variable, ‘collectivist orientation’ was entered in the regression equation, there was again a drop in the coefficient of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, from beta=0.34 \((p<0.001)\) to beta=0.31 \((p<0.001)\), although this was not as significant a drop as in the case of union loyalty. ‘Collectivist orientation’ then, also intervenes in the relationship between ‘pragmatic’ leadership and willingness to participate. However, the findings would suggest that union loyalty is a more powerful mediator than ‘collectivist orientation’, not least due to its strong relationship with willingness to participate. The direct, indirect and total effect of ‘pragmatic’ leadership on willingness to participate, with ‘collectivist orientation’ as the intervening variable are shown in table 6.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union Loyalty as Intervening variable</th>
<th>'Workplace Collectivism': collectivist orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Effect</strong></td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect Effect</strong></td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Effect</strong></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Coefficients are standardised (beta) regression coefficients

**b Coefficients are standardised (beta) regression coefficients

***p<0.001

6.3.3 Assessing the interactive effect of ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership on willingness to participate

Finally, to test the proposition that the interactive effect of ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership will add to the prediction of willingness to participate beyond their independent effect, two stepwise regression equations were computed, where ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership were entered at step 1, and the product of the two (interaction...
term) at step 2. To control for the effects of the remaining antecedents on willingness to participate, these variables were treated as covariates and entered into the regression equation first (Fullagar and Barling, 1989). Table 6.5 summarises the findings from this analysis by presenting the significant change in $R^2$ once the interaction term is entered at step 2, as well as the interaction term itself.

**Table 6.5 Hierarchical Multiple Regression results: Interaction terms for Two-Term Interactions among 'Emotional' and 'Pragmatic' Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables and interaction term $^a$</th>
<th>Willingness to Participate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Loyalty</td>
<td>.37*** $^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Instrumentality</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Them and Us': Perceived division</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Them and Us': Perceived conflict of interests</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace Collectivism: Identification</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace Collectivism: Solidarity</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace Collectivism: Collectivist Orientation</td>
<td>.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic’ Leadership</td>
<td>.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional’ Leadership</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_1$ square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 $^c$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic’ Leadership</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional’ Leadership</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional’ $\times$ ‘Pragmatic’ $^d$</td>
<td>.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_2$ square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F (22, 751) = 16.65***$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td>.01***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$For convenience, control variables are not shown in the table above

$^b$ Coefficients are standardised regression coefficients (beta)

$^c$ As the emphasis is on the interaction term, covariates are not shown

$^d$ Interaction term computed from Z-scores (standard scores) for both the independent variable and the moderator

$p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001$
The findings above, appear to support the proposition that together 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership contribute further in explaining willingness to participate, once their independent effect as well as the effect of the other antecedent variables has been accounted for. In essence, this provides support for the arguments put forward as part of the earlier theoretical discussion, relating to the importance of both leadership factors in maximising the impact of leadership on willingness to participate within a mobilization setting.

6.4 Summary of findings and conclusions

The present chapter tested the propositions underlying the proposed mobilization model. Leadership behaviour, member attitudes and willingness to participate were identified as the three main components of the model. The results confirmed the important role of leadership behaviour in predicting member responses, i.e. member attitudes and behavioural intentions. 'Emotional' leadership, as a component of leadership behaviour more likely to induce emotional responses from members, emerged as an important explanatory variable for members' affective attachment to the union, i.e. union loyalty and stereotypical attitudes towards management, whereas 'pragmatic' leadership was a powerful predictor of members' collectivist tendencies, as explored by the factors comprising 'workplace collectivism', and union instrumentality.

The influence of leader behaviour also extended to its role as a significant direct, as well as indirect predictor of willingness to participate. It was theorised that leaders as mobilising agents would have an impact on member attitudes which would in turn influence willingness to participate. Analysis of the mediating effects of member attitudes confirmed the intervening effect of union loyalty and members' collectivist orientation in the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate. However, while both variables intervened in the above relationship, the direct influence of 'pragmatic' leadership persisted in both cases, highlighting further the importance of 'pragmatic' leadership in predicting willingness to participate. These two attitudinal variables also emerged as significant, direct predictors of willingness to participate.
On the other hand, union instrumentality and 'them and us' attitudes did not emerge as significant, direct predictors of the criterion variable. This will be discussed further in the next chapter, where the present results will be discussed in the context of existing literature and comparisons will be drawn with previous studies.

At the same time, exploratory analysis assessed the interactive effect of the two leadership factors in further explaining member attitudes. Although a moderating effect did emerge for members' collectivist orientation, and 'them and us' attitudes, suggesting that the strength of the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and these attitudes was contingent on 'emotional' leadership, caution should be raised when interpreting these results. Given the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the two variables in explaining member attitudes, as well as the absence of either theoretical or empirical work to provide support for these results, they should be seen as representing an initial attempt at addressing these issues. The interactive effect of the two leadership factors in adding further to the prediction of willingness to participate was also explored and emerged as significant. The same limitations apply to these results as discussed above, although in this case there exists a sound theoretical basis for supporting the results, which emerges from Bass's work on transformational leadership. As discussed earlier, in cases where both aspects of leadership behaviour might be displayed by the same individual the results appear to suggest that this will indeed maximise the effect of leadership on willingness to participate.

Finally, attention is also directed at trade union identity, employed in the present study as a control variable. The results suggest that trade union identity might have a direct impact on member attitudes, but not on behavioural intentions. Its influence emerged in the case of 'them and us' attitudes and 'workplace collectivism', although it featured more prominently in the latter rather than the former. The distinction of social partner and guild unions employed in the present study to assess the influence of trade union identity, focuses to a large extent on the structure and nature of interest representation within these two groups of unions, which subsequently defines their relationship with their members and other external parties, such as the government, and conditions the principles and values guiding the unions' functioning. As such, members
within guild unions identified more strongly with perceived organisational groupings, such as their workgroup and departmental group, as compared to social partner unions, while they also perceived greater solidarity of group values and interests. The possible indirect influence of trade union identity on member attitudes will be discussed in the next chapter, where the results from both the analysis of interview data and quantitative analysis will be discussed.

Having tested and established the significant relationships in the proposed mobilization model, I am tempted to propose a modified version of the model presented in chapter 3. However, given that these relationships have not been assessed using linear structural modelling techniques that would allow me to confidently present causal relationships, I will refrain from doing so.
Chapter 7 Transforming Individuals into Collective Actors: Leadership and Member Attitudes in a Mobilization Context

The present chapter will discuss the findings of the study in the context of existing literature, and draw comparisons with previous studies. The results from multivariate analysis will be considered in conjunction with the findings from the more qualitative analysis of interview data (chapter 5). The objectives of the study as set out in chapter 3, will serve to guide the following discussion.

7.1 Examining the potential instrumentality of leadership behaviour in predicting member responses: attitudes and behavioural intentions

The above objective reflected the study’s attempt to contribute to the available union literature on the influence of leadership behaviour, especially at later stages of members’ union experience. The results from the present study as presented in the previous chapter, revealed the overarching importance of leadership behaviour for predicting member attitudes. The two leadership factors emerged as strong, positive predictors of member attitudes, while at the same time leadership behaviour also influenced willingness to participate.

More specifically, ‘emotional’ leadership emerged as a strong, positive predictor of union loyalty, which is consistent with the results of the study by Kelloway and Barling (1993), who found that shop stewards’ transformational leadership characteristics significantly predicted union loyalty. Their measure of transformational leadership was a shorter version of Bass’s transformational leadership criterion. Kelloway and Barling (1993) explored the above relationship in the context of union participation, at later stages of members’ union experience, in contrast to Fullagar et al. (1992) who explored leaders’ transformational leadership characteristics at earlier stages of union membership. No direct relationship was established between leadership and union loyalty in the latter study. This then suggests that leaders might be fulfilling different roles in the two settings. That is, leaders as socialising agents would be more likely to influence members’ general attitudes towards the union, in an attempt to alleviate any negative predispositions regarding trade unions, while within a mobilization setting as well as a participation one, their influence focuses on generating and maintaining favourable attitudes towards the union.

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At the same time, 'pragmatic' leadership also emerged as a strong, positive predictor of union loyalty. The notion of 'pragmatic' leadership introduced in this study resembles Nicholson et al.'s (1981) accessibility measure, which had not been previously explored as an antecedent of member attitudes. This finding, highlights the potential contribution of the quality of daily interaction between leaders and members, usually taken for granted, for maintaining positive attitudes towards the union. This aspect of leadership behaviour, as it has been conceptualised in the current research setting, can be distinguished from the traditional notion of transactional leadership (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985), in that it signals union support for the individual member rather than an instrumental exchange process between the union and its members. This notion of leadership relates to the idea of union support (Singlair and Tetrick, 1995) based on Eisenberger et al.'s (1986) organisational support, which also assumes that for the majority of members their 'local leader' is the union. As Singlair and Tetrick (1995) argue: "...support perceptions most likely arise from day to day experiences with the union and its agents (stewards etc.)". Singlair and Tetrick (1995) found union support to be highly associated with union loyalty, as well as all other factors of union commitment, which provides indirect support for the significant link between 'pragmatic' leadership and union loyalty.

In addition to union support perceptions arising from daily interaction with union leaders, perceptions of union instrumentality, relating to the extent to which members perceive the union as effectively fulfilling its role, and as such, as able to improve their working lives, will also emerge. This is reflected in the significant link between 'pragmatic' leadership and perceptions of union instrumentality, established in the present study. The results reveal the stronger influence of 'pragmatic' leadership behaviours, as compared to 'emotional' leadership in giving rise to perceptions of union instrumentality. However, the significant effect of 'emotional' leadership supports the idea that this type of leader behaviour does not simply generate emotional responses, but also contributes to more pragmatic assessments of the unions' role.

As this study focused on later stages of members' union experience, it was also possible to empirically assess implications from case study work on mobilization campaigns, which suggested the importance of leadership behaviour in reinforcing and sustaining a sense of collective identity amongst members (e.g. Batstone et al., 1978; Fantasia, 1988). 'Pragmatic' leadership emerged as a strong
and positive predictor of all three dimensions of workplace collectivism, i.e. group identification, perceived solidarity of values and interests, and members' 'collectivist orientation'-the extent to which members favour collective forms of representation and action at the workplace. Although it was anticipated that 'emotional' leadership would also influence the workplace collectivism dimensions, earlier theoretical discussion identified the commanding influence of 'pragmatic' leadership. 'Emotional' leadership emerged as a significant predictor only in the case of perceived solidarity of group values and interests. It appears that to generate strong perceptions of group identification, solidarity of group values and interests and a belief in collective methods of representation and action, what is required is for leaders to demonstrate that this is the case, through their daily interaction with members. This does not seem to come about as a result of members' affective attachment to the organisation. An explanation for this might be the prevailing culture within white-collar unions in the public-corporate sector, which generates a more profound need for leaders to be perceived as being concerned about their members, and valuing their input and their contribution inside the union, than for leaders to exhibit 'emotional' leadership. In this setting, politicisation of the unions, along with a long-standing status quo especially within the larger, more influential and traditional unions, discouraging member involvement in union affairs, leads to the disenchantment of the rank-and-file, and in turn to a more pragmatic approach by members towards trade unions and their leaders. As a result, what becomes essential and more salient is the perception of genuine interest and concern about members, reflected in the leaders' approach in their daily interaction with members, rather than any transformational qualities the leader might possess.

The present results, in a sense, contrast with case-study work (e.g. Batstone et al., 1977, 1978) which identified as one of the shop stewards' functions, the erosion of managerial legitimacy and the reinforcement of the perceived division between management and workers, as a factor that would facilitate mobilization of members for collective action. In the current study, leadership behaviour emerged as having limited influence on 'them and us' attitudes, with 'emotional' leadership influencing only one of the factors, and 'pragmatic' leadership having no significant effect. It appears that 'emotional' leadership, as the affective attachment to the leader generates an emotional response from members, manifesting itself as perceived conflict of interests between management and workers. However, one explanation for the above results might be
that an antagonistic relationship with management is a permanent feature of a more traditional, adversarial form of trade unionism, while white-collar unionism as it emerges within the public sector supports and fosters a more ‘co-operative’ relationship between management and workers. At the same time, it could be argued that as both leaders and members acknowledge the defining role of government in issues at the workplace, promoting stereotypical attitudes towards management would not be likely to generate a more favourable climate for the union.

Overall then, by considering two different aspects of leader behaviour, the present study allowed a comparative assessment of the contribution from each one of the leadership factors in predicting member attitudes. The discussion above, suggests that both aspects are necessary for maintaining favourable attitudes towards the union, as they target different facets of members’ attachment to the union, such as for example members’ affective attachment (union loyalty) and evaluative attachment (union instrumentality). Also, alongside the independent and additive contribution of ‘emotional’ and ‘pragmatic’ leadership, there emerged evidence to suggest that the interaction between the two contributes further to explaining ‘them and us’ attitudes and members’ collectivist orientation. Although these results are by no means conclusive, they direct attention to the complementary nature of the two concepts, suggesting that once displayed together at any one time can contribute further to generating desired responses. These results in a way, address an issue put forward by Bass (1985), who argued that both transactional and transformational leadership could be displayed by the same individual, but in different circumstances. However, he did not explore what their interactive effect could mean for performance, or for obtaining desired responses, if both were displayed at any one time. It should also be mentioned that analysis of interview data (chapter 5) provided support for the idea that the two concepts are conceptually distinct, as they were induced by different patterns of leader behaviour. This two-dimensional structure of leadership behaviour was further supported by the results from factor analysis (chapter 6).

The impact of leadership on member responses was not restricted to member attitudes, but also emerged in the context of willingness to participate. The results highlighted the importance of ‘pragmatic’ leadership in predicting willingness to participate. This suggests that what induces willingness to participate is a perception of interest and concern about members, and an acknowledgement of their value to the
union, rather than affective attachment to the leader. While ‘transformational’ leadership was found to predict actual participation in a study by Kelloway and Barling (1993), this might have been related more to the fact that the study took place at a time when members were preparing to vote for collective action. In such instances, a sense of excitement and enthusiasm provided by transformational leadership would have been more readily associated with participation in union activities. However, for a continuous process of transforming individuals into collective actors, what becomes essential is a form of leadership that explicitly values membership and its potential contribution to the effective and democratic functioning of the union.

On the other hand, there might be a genuine argument underlying the Kelloway and Barling (1993) results, which revolves around the importance of transformational, or ‘emotional’ leadership in the current research setting, for actual participation rather than the intention to participate. Such an argument would agree with the definition proposed by Burns (1978), and employed in the analysis of Bass (1985), the fact that a transformational leader motivates us to do beyond what we originally expected to do, and as such has implications for performance, actual behaviour, not just the intention to perform (behave). In turn, it might be that ‘emotional’ (transformational) leadership should be considered as a direct predictor, in the context of actual participation, than the intention to participate. At the same time, Nicholson et al. (1981) found leader accessibility, on which the current measure of ‘pragmatic’ leadership is based, to act as a moderator in the relationship between need for involvement and behavioural participation. Therefore, it might be the case that ‘pragmatic’ leadership, aside from its role as a direct antecedent of the intention to participate, is also able to translate favourable attitudes towards the union to actual participation. Although ‘emotional’ leadership might be more relevant within a union participation setting, as a direct predictor of actual participation, it was also found to contribute towards predicting willingness to participate through its interactive effect with ‘pragmatic’ leadership. This analysis again, explored suggestions stemming from the discussion on transformational and transactional leadership in Bass (1985). According to the findings above then, the two different aspects of leadership identified in the current setting, might have different consequences. While ‘emotional’ leadership is argued to be more relevant for actual behaviour, ‘pragmatic’ leadership is necessary to generate the intention to participate, although this might be contingent on ‘emotional’ leadership.
At the same time, it could be argued that these results might also reflect the culture and prevailing conditions within a white-collar union setting, as discussed above.

As Rule (1989) argued, the influence of 'transformational' leadership rests in the leaders' ability to increase the salience of particular identifications, interests, values and concerns. Of course, his discussion focused on mobilization campaigns for collective action, hence the emphasis on transformational leadership. However, in the context of a mobilization process aimed at transforming individuals into collective actors, the emphasis shifts from inducing instant, dramatic responses towards generating a sustainable collective consciousness, and as such the ability of 'pragmatic' leadership to increase the salience of particular identifications, interests, values and concerns which would in turn lead to willingness to participate in union activities. This idea was explored by testing two models of mediation involving union loyalty and members' collectivist orientation. The mediating effect of union loyalty in the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate was established. Specifically, the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate appears to be enhanced by members' affective attachment to the union. At the same time though, the mediating effect of union loyalty was only partial, indicating that the link between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate persists in the absence of union loyalty. This in turn, further highlights the importance of 'pragmatic' leadership for predicting willingness to participate. The mediating effect of members' collectivist orientation was also established. Specifically, members' faith in collective forms of representation and action reinforces the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and willingness to participate. Also, in comparison to the mediating effect of union loyalty this emerged as much weaker highlighting the significance of union loyalty as an antecedent of willingness to participate. It appears then, that as part of the mobilization process, leaders through their daily interaction with members are able to increase the salience of union identification, and through their representative role to reinforce collective values, and as such positive attitudes towards collective forms of representation and action, which would in turn influence willingness to become involved in the union.
7.2 Examining the combined effect of union attitudes in the context of trade union involvement

Although leadership behaviour emerged as an important variable in predicting willingness to participate, the contribution of member attitudes had not been sufficiently explored in existing literature. A polarised interest in union commitment characterised studies exploring antecedents of union participation. The present thesis attempted to extend the focus from union commitment, and more specifically union loyalty, to other attitudes that could potentially influence willingness to participate. The proposed approach to mobilization allowed one to also explore 'them and us' attitudes, and collectivist attitudes in the context of trade union involvement.

Union loyalty emerged as the strongest predictor of willingness to participate, with members' collectivist orientation and 'pragmatic' leadership as the other two significant predictors. The predictive power of union loyalty in the context of union participation has been widely explored and confirmed (e.g. Gordon et al., 1980; Fullagar, 1986; Barling and Fullagar, 1989; Thacker et al., 1990). At the same time though, its impact on willingness to participate has not been as widely researched. Nevertheless, studies have been suggestive of the potential link between union loyalty and willingness to participate (e.g. Kelly and Kelly, 1994). It could be argued that a strong sense of identification with the union is as important for predicting the intention to participate, as it has been shown to be for actual participation. The willingness to become involved in union activities, in this case, is the expression of the individual members' identification with, and commitment to identified groupings, one of which is the union.

Closely related in theoretical terms with union loyalty, as far as group identification in concerned, is members' collectivist orientation, i.e. the extent to which members favour collective forms of representation and action for resolving disputes and attaining desired outcomes, which also emerged as a significant predictor of willingness to participate. In an earlier theoretical discussion, this measure was argued to constitute the motivational effect of identification with groups identified by individual members as important in informing their intention to act, and subsequently the action itself. This finding is supported in part, by the findings of a study by Kelly and Kelly (1994), who found that collectivist orientation was a significant predictor of
the willingness to become involved in what they termed as more ‘easy’ forms of activity. It should be noted that their measure of collectivist orientation was targeted at a more general sense of collectivist orientation than the one employed in the current study, which is more directly relevant to a trade union setting. The present findings also provide further empirical support for the thesis put forward by Waddington and Whitston (1996) who argue that while the bargaining agenda for white-collar staff might also incorporate more individual aims, such as issues relating to career development, they wish to pursue such issues within a collective framework and clearly support a basis for collective organisation, as indicated by the evidence they cite to support their propositions.

At the same time though, contrary to hypotheses, group identification and perceived solidarity of values and interests did not emerge as direct significant predictors of willingness to participate in union activities. An explanation for this result might be the way in which the two variables were measured. The measures dealt with the departmental group and workgroup, as the groups with which members identified and perceived solidarity of values and interests with, which despite increasing the salience of group interests and group identity, do not reflect the structure of interest representation present in most unions. Therefore, it does not immediately follow that for example, a telephone operator who strongly identifies with her own departmental group, i.e. other telephone operators, should be willing to participate in union activities, given that his/her union represents telephone operators’ interests under a wider interest division. In turn then, what becomes a determining factor is members’ collectivist orientation as has been discussed above. That is, the extent to which any member identifying strongly with his/her departmental group or workgroup, favours collective forms of representation and action as adequately representing those group interests. Of course, if group identification and perceived solidarity of group values and interests employed occupational groupings, instead of organisational groupings, this might have led to significant results, as occupational groupings are more directly relevant to trade union activities.

Considering the above arguments in conjunction with the findings on members’ collectivist orientation, the suggestion appears to be that unless members favour collective forms of representation and action, a strong sense of group identity and/or perceived solidarity of group values and interests would not be likely to lead to
willingness to participate in union activities. This then implies that members might not select the union as a channel for representing their group’s interests, unless they have faith in the means employed by the union to protect these interests. In turn, this highlights the need for unions to convince both members and potential members that the collective means through which unions seek to represent and safeguard workers’ interests are effective and can deliver desired gains.

It could be argued that the above is particularly relevant for settings with high union densities and large-scale memberships, such as the current research setting. Although joining a union and being a union member might suggest that one favours collective forms of representation and action, this might not necessarily be the case. An alternative justification for one’s union membership might be the absence of alternative channels for effectively representing one’s or the group’s interests, reflecting a certain element of inevitability in one’s membership rather than a genuine belief in trade unionism. Consequently, such a member would not be readily willing to become involved in the union, but would rather foster a more instrumental approach towards the union, reaping the benefits without actually becoming involved. It is particularly in these settings that a stronger need arises for union leaders to emphasise the effectiveness and potential benefits from collective forms of representation and action.

In turn, it could be argued that one of the reasons why trade unions in the current research setting are overall facing low levels of participation in union activities, as reported by the sample of union representatives and officials interviewed for the purpose of the current research project, might be the unions’ inability to reinforce collectivist values amongst their members, and actively demonstrate the effectiveness of collective methods of representation and action. The latter, as discussed earlier is influenced by ‘pragmatic’ leadership, the day-to-day behaviours of leaders in their relationship with members. Consequently, it might be that leaders, through their behaviours are unable to generate strong perceptions of ‘pragmatic’ leadership that would in turn influence members’ collectivist orientation and willingness to participate.

According to one local union representative: “...the tendency nowadays...is that members are reluctant to participate in collective action. (name of a union)...has managed to be unanimous...they found a leader who they believe serves their interests. The leaders of other unions may not be that able to convince their members of the benefits from collective action”.

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Again, a related issue to group identification is outgroup stereotyping. As it was argued in previous chapters, a strong sense of union loyalty would lead to stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup (i.e. management) that would in turn predict willingness to participate in trade union activities. However, the hypothesis was not confirmed. Neither perceived division between management and workers, nor a perceived conflict of interests was found to act as an antecedent of willingness to participate. It might be that while stereotypical attitudes towards the outgroup, and in this instance management, are important within the context of individual mobilization campaigns, and as such for participation in collective action, this is not the case within a mobilization context, and the intention to become involved in union activities that cover a wider spectrum of union life. The motivation to become involved in the union does not appear to emerge as a result of a conflictual relationship with management. While members in the context of mobilization campaigns, aimed at inducing participation in collective action, need to identify an agency, i.e. management, the company etc. (Kelly, 1995) 'who is to be blamed for the troubling situation' (Klandermans, 1996) and subsequently afford the necessary rationale for collective action, this does not seem to be the case for willingness to become involved in the union.

Another explanation, relevant to the nature of the research setting, might be that due to extensive government intervention in the organisations of the public corporate sector, the motivation to become involved in the union stems from the need to defend one's interests against government, rather than from stereotypical attitudes towards management. In a sense then, government would appear to be more salient as the 'outgroup', than management.

As far as union instrumentality is concerned, it did not emerge as a significant predictor of willingness to participate. Union instrumentality has been found to act as an antecedent of voting behaviour (DeCotiis and LeLouarn, 1981) and as a moderator in the relationship between union loyalty and behavioural participation (Fullagar and Barling, 1989). Therefore, it could be argued that it might be a more useful variable within a participation setting rather than a mobilization one. In comparison to union loyalty, the affective attachment to the union, union instrumentality as the evaluative attachment would become more salient in deciding whether or not to actually participate in union affairs, when the perceived ability of the union to achieve certain
valued outcomes becomes more relevant, along with the costs and benefits of participation.

Overall, exploring different member attitudes in the context of trade union involvement allowed a comparative assessment of their role within a mobilization setting, as predictors of willingness to participate in union activities. This was also an opportunity to explore in more detail the rationale for considering those not significant within the current setting, such as union instrumentality and ‘them and us’ attitudes as part of the process aimed at generating actual participation, rather than the intention to participate.

Of the control variables employed in the study, one that is worthwhile discussing here, is gender. The results confirmed a highly significant relationship between gender and willingness to participate, indicating that females are less willing than males to become involved in union affairs. Although as Klandermans (1986) argues, demographic variables seem to be of little use in predicting participation in union activities, it is argued that gender is one of these variables that should receive more research interest in the context of trade union involvement. As Gallagher and Clark (1989) note, studies that have explored the relationship between gender and more behaviourally oriented measures of commitment to the union, such as willingness to work for and responsibility to the union, found women to be less willing to work for the union, and with less of a responsibility to the union than their male counterparts (e.g. Thacker et al.). This provides support for the findings of the present study. At the same time though, while studies have found females to be more loyal to the union than men, that was not the case in the present study.

It is argued that the difference between males and females in relation to trade union involvement is even more relevant in the case of white-collar unions, given the increasing feminisation of the workforce in sectors where unions are attempting to gain presence, such as services. What also emerged from the results is that females are less willing to assume positions of responsibility inside the union than to attend union meetings and participate in collective action, which as has already been discussed reflects the male-dominated character both of the organisations and the unions in the public corporate sector. It is argued that it would be to the benefit of trade unions to address this imbalance.
7.3 Trade union identity within a mobilization setting

Although the above was not an explicit objective of the present study, the concept of trade union identity was introduced in chapter 3, in relation to member responses: attitudes and behavioural intentions, and its potential role within a mobilization setting was discussed. By means of the interview data, trade union identity was employed to explore differences between unions in leader behaviour, as well as member perceptions of leader behaviour.

Hyman's (1996) typology was used to distinguish between different groups of unions within the current research setting. These unions could be classified on the basis of their union identity, in two groups: social partner unions and guild unions. Although these constitute only two out of the five trade union identities proposed by Hyman (ibid.), this is argued to reflect the nature of industrial relations in the particular country setting, and the industrial relations system itself, which has so far not 'encouraged' diversity in types of unions. Centralised labour movements have been, and to a large extent still are the dominant form of trade unionism. Also, given the centralised collective bargaining arrangements and high trade union density, unlike most other European countries nowadays, the friendly society and company union types could not have emerged. Essentially, the crisis of political economism which has brought about the dilemmas currently facing European unions, as Hyman (1996) argues, has not as yet 'shown its face' in the current research setting, although recent disturbances in the industrial relations arena and the government's preoccupation with generating the conditions that would facilitate the process of accession to the European union, would seem to indicate that a crisis is looming.

At present, one could distinguish between those unions representing specific occupational groups (guild), and the majority, those representing a diversity of interests and acting as interlocutors of government (social partner). Analysis of the interview data revealed variation in patterns of leader behaviour between these two groups of unions, as discussed in chapter 5. In turn, different patterns of leadership behaviour influenced member perceptions of leader behaviour, i.e. 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership. This appears to suggest an indirect influence of union identity on member perceptions, through leader behaviour, and since a direct influence was not confirmed, this reinforces the importance of leader behaviour as an intervening...
variable. However, the nature of the interview data did not allow an assessment of the possible mediating effects identified above.

At the same time though, in the context of multivariate analysis results did suggest a direct relationship between trade union identity and member attitudes. As a control variable, trade union identity was significantly associated both with ‘them and us’ attitudes and ‘workplace collectivism’. In the case of the other attitudinal variables, no direct, significant association emerged. It has already been suggested nevertheless, that there might be an indirect relationship, with leader behaviour and member perceptions of leader behaviour as intervening variables, given the evidence supporting an indirect relationship between trade union identity and member perceptions of leader behaviour.

The potential, direct effect of trade union identity on workplace collectivism, draws attention to the importance of trade union identity in generating and sustaining a strong sense of group identity. At the same time though, assessing the potential intervening effect of leader behaviour in the above relationship, would allow one to identify the extent to which influencing group identifications and perceived solidarity of values and interests is a task that can be successfully undertaken by union leaders, or whether leaders would also have to deal with the influence stemming from the unions’ macro-choices of interests and agenda (Hyman, 1996). If that should be the case, the differences between social partner and guild unions would be more prominent, and maintaining a strong sense of group identity would prove much harder in the former than the latter, given that it is easier to demonstrate solidarity of interests where interests are more homogeneous, than where a diverse spectrum of interests are represented.

Contrary to expectations, as revealed through an earlier discussion, there was no significant association between trade union identity and willingness to participate. This then suggests that it might be through the influence of member attitudes that trade union identity influences willingness to participate, rather than as a direct predictor. That is, an indication as to whether the union’s identity is shared by its membership will be more likely to manifest itself in terms of member attitudes towards the union, rather than behavioural intentions. However, the possible intervening effects of member attitudes, as well as leader behaviours have not been assessed in the present study, as this did not constitute an objective of the present study.
All in all then, the above discussion demonstrates the contribution of union identity in shaping leader behaviours, as well as member responses, and reinforced the case for focusing attention in assessing the role of trade union identity within a mobilization setting.

7.4 Limitations and delimitations

Having reviewed the substantive findings from the study, it is also necessary to discuss its limitations. First, the relationships in the study were examined in a cross-sectional design. This restricts any cause-and-effect interpretations of the findings. Although there has been longitudinal research evidence to support the direction of causality in the relationship between attitudes and behaviours, the relationship remains ambiguous (Fullagar and Barling, 1989). However, the logic of causal order could be applied in this case to posit a form of causal priority. That is, while in the case of actual participation there are two plausible causal directions, i.e. enacting committed behaviours causes commitment attitudes, and commitment attitudes cause committed behaviours, in the case of behavioural intent one could argue in favour of only one such direction. Given that behavioural intent constitutes the behavioural component of an attitude (Fishbein, 1967), it would have to ensue rather than precede the attitude. Nevertheless, the problem of causality still applies in the case of leadership and member attitudes, where it is not clear whether strong perceptions of leadership behaviour cause union loyalty, or vice-versa, or even whether there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. While a longitudinal design would be required for a full understanding of the role of leadership behaviour and member attitudes within a mobilization setting, this was unfortunately not feasible within the context of the current research project.

Second, the bulk of the data was collected using survey instruments, and thus relied mainly on self-report measures. Common method variance can be a problem in research which utilises self-report measures. In order to partially alleviate the problem, interview data was used as an additional source of information on leader behaviour. The findings from analysis of the interview data could be argued to complement, rather than corroborate the findings from multivariate analysis. The interview data was employed to address the issue of inter-union comparisons, and as such identify differences between unions in leader behaviours and member perceptions of leader
behaviours, while evidence was also provided as to the conceptual distinctiveness between 'emotional' and 'pragmatic' leadership. Therefore, it could be argued that analysis of interview data facilitated interpretation of the findings from multivariate analysis, in some instances, but not that they corroborated them. Consequently, although method bias may have contributed to the magnitude of the relationships observed, it would not have affected the pattern of findings.

Third, although the response rate of 30 per cent is not uncommon, especially within the union literature (Fullagar and Barling, 1989), it warrants caution when interpreting the external validity of the results. However, there was considerable variance in the responses, and also the final sample was sufficiently large (N=866) to provide some reassurance on the issue of generalisability of results. It has long been realised that it is extremely difficult to generalise from one union or group of unions to another (Fullagar and Barling, 1989). However, what enables 'generalisation with caution' in this case, is the character of the unions within the public corporate sector, influenced by the prevailing conditions in this sector. Extensive government intervention, restrictions on the organisations’ autonomy and an element of rigidity underlying the organisations’ activities have influenced the culture, and *modus operandi* of the majority of unions in this sector. One could distinguish two main types of unions, those representing a range of interests, and those representing specific occupational groups. Both types were represented in the study sample. At the same time, the issue of generalisability across different samples of workers does not necessarily pose as a problem in this case, since this study was interested in exploring the white-collar unions in the public sector, and so this was in a sense an imposed restriction. Of course, the variability across country settings is probably more relevant, as the current country setting has not been previously explored within the trade union literature. It could be that some of the phenomena observed are specific to the particular country setting, although this is up to future research to establish.

Finally, in relation to the interview data, there were two main limitations: (i) the small size of the sample (N=27) constituted a limitation to the generalisibility of results, although different levels of representatives were included in the sample; (ii) it was also not possible to generate causal statements for the observed relationships due to the qualitative nature of the data.
7.5 Conclusions

The principal aim of the study was to develop a model of the mobilization process which shifted the emphasis from individual mobilization campaigns to a continuous process of transforming individual members into collective actors. The current approach centred around members, as one of the most important resources for unions. What follows is a summary of the study’s main findings.

7.5.1 Summary of findings

Overall, one could distinguish four main findings:

(i) As part of the process of transforming individuals into collective actors, leaders as mobilising agents, have been found to increase the salience of particular group identifications and values (union loyalty, members’ ‘collectivist orientation’), in an attempt to induce willingness to participate in trade union activities;

(ii) As part of the process mentioned above, leadership behaviour is highly instrumental in inducing both favourable member attitudes towards the union, as well as a willingness to become involved in the union. This is evident from the significant contribution of both types of leadership behaviour in predicting member attitudes, as well as the influence of ‘pragmatic’ leadership in predicting willingness to participate;

(iii) Members’ ‘collectivist orientation’, i.e. the extent to which members favour collective forms of representation and action, as well as affective attachment to the organisation, emerged as the two significant attitudinal predictors of willingness to participate in trade union activities. This reinforces the argument that both union instrumentality perceptions, as well as ‘them and us’ attitudes might be more relevant as antecedents of actual participation, than the intention to participate. These results also challenge the thesis on the individualism of white-collar staff, as the decision to become involved in the union was determined by highly collectivist motives.
(iv) Trade union identity as well as the unions' structural features emerged as having an influence on the process of transforming individuals into collective actors, through their association with leader behaviours, as well as member responses. Attention is directed especially at the influence of trade union identity in effectively generating, and also demonstrating a solidarity of values and interests, as well a strong sense of collective identity. These two factors also influenced the occurrence of different patterns of leader behaviours among leaders within the two groups of unions: social partner vs. guild, and traditional vs. progressive. Although the findings relating to the above, are by no means conclusive, they demonstrate the importance of these variables within a mobilization setting.
Chapter 8  What Next?: Implications from Present Study and Recommendations for Future Research

Having discussed the main findings from the study, and reviewed them in the context of existing literature, the next and final task is to assess the implications for future theory, research and practice and outline recommendations for further research. The implications for industrial relations in the public corporate sector will also be discussed.

8.1 Implications for union leadership: theory, research and practice

Several substantive conclusions may be derived from the present study. First, by integrating both ‘traditional’ approaches to leader behaviour found in the union literature, as well as recent approaches originating in the organisational leadership literature, the present study was able to distinguish between two aspects of leader behaviour, instrumental for the mobilization of members within a trade union setting. One derives from members’ daily interaction with union representatives and officials (‘pragmatic’), while the other centres around the affective attachment of members to union leaders (‘emotional’). Both were shown to contribute towards explaining members’ willingness to participate within a mobilization setting, with ‘pragmatic’ leadership directly influencing the intention to participate, and their interactive effect also adding further in explaining willingness to participate. This then directs attention to a more complex mechanism underlying the relationship between different aspects of leader behaviour, which would not have been revealed if only one aspect had been explored, as has been the case with available literature (Fullagar et al., 1992; Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Fullagar et al., 1994).

The pervasive effect of leader behaviour is not only evident in its relationship with willingness to participate, but also in its influence on member attitudes. Most notably, in its impact on union loyalty, a variable considered as essential in the study of unions, and widely researched both in the context of union participation, as well as union socialisation.
Leader behaviour was also shown to significantly influence members’ collectivist attitudes, i.e. the extent to which members favour collective forms of representation and action. This would in turn suggest that it is through the behaviours of leaders themselves that members evaluate the unions’ ability to adequately represent their interests, again highlighting the importance of leadership behaviour within a mobilization setting.

The results on the role of leader behaviour also suggest that different aspects of leader behaviour might be more influential than others in fostering a favourable climate towards the union, at different stages of members’ union experience. While the leaders’ transformational characteristics have been identified in existing literature as having a significant impact during the socialisation process and the early stages of attitude formation (Fullagar et al., 1992), as well as in the case of actual participation in union activities (Kelloway and Barling, 1993), during the mobilization stage a different aspect of leader behaviour, one that emerges more from within leaders’ daily contact with members, appears to gain prominence. This could be a logical continuation to the relationship between leaders and members, since the socialisation setting is more of an artificial setting designed to convince members to join, and so issues relating to leader-member interaction become more salient at later stages.

With respect to variation in leader behaviour, the study suggests that union type has an impact on the different patterns of leader behaviour observed within particular unions. Specifically, the results indicate that in unions with more flexible roles and procedures and as such a greater degree of autonomy for union representatives and officials, leaders exhibit a more participative and democratic style in their relationship with members, characterised by a more positive approach towards members and their potential contribution to the union. This in turn would imply that the structural arrangements of the union facilitate the presence of a closer and more effective leader-member relationship, which would subsequently influence members’ responses towards the union. This suggests then that unions should ensure appropriate and effective arrangements both at the macro and micro levels, in order to sustain a supportive and willing membership. Of course, at the same time the importance of providing a sense of direction for the membership, for inducing affective attachment to union leaders, has also been shown. This in turn implies
that, to successfully induce both emotional, as well as pragmatic perceptions of leader behaviour, what is required in addition to the necessary organisational arrangements, is a focus on leaders’ individual attributes and characteristics to promote the desired behaviours.

Also, the evidence suggesting that union type does not directly influence member perceptions of leader behaviour, but apparently that it is the behaviours of leaders themselves that shape such perceptions, supports the idea that obtaining desired responses from members is well within the unions’ influence.

There are a number of practical implications for labour organisations emerging from the above. For one, the results suggest that unions would need to extend leadership training beyond the traditional focus on grievance handling and contract interpretation and negotiation, to include training in leadership styles and behaviours, and the application of these in generating favourable responses towards leaders, attitudes towards the union, as well as inducing willingness to become involved in the union. Unions should make representatives aware of the significance of their interaction with members, not only at the early stages of their experience, but more so at later stages, for sustaining members’ interest in and support for the union. An alienated and apathetic union representative is what would eventually lead to the disenchantment of members. Also, to facilitate the application of leadership styles and behaviours effectively, unions would also need to set up a supporting organisational structure that would incorporate the flexibility required for representatives and officials to effectively carry out their duties.

8.2 Implications for the literature on mobilization and union involvement, and union practice

These results could also be argued to suggest that, intervening between the socialisation process of individuals into the organisation, where members consolidate their attitudes towards the organisation (Fullagar et al., 1992), and actual participation in union activities, is a process of transforming members into collective actors. That is, a mobilization process aimed at precipitating early attitudes towards the union and reinforcing attitudes essential for inducing the willingness to become involved in the union.
and participate in union activities, which could then be translated into actual participation. In turn, this implies that participation may be viewed as a separate process of translating willingness to participate into actual participation, as Klandermans (1986) suggested in relation to participation in collective action.

With respect to member attitudes and willingness to participate, the results suggest that apart from affective attachment to the union, positive attitudes towards collective action also contribute to inducing the willingness to become involved in the union. Research so far has concentrated on union loyalty and total union commitment, not exploring any other member attitudes that could influence either willingness to participate or actual participation. Consequently, for a successful mobilization outcome, not only do members need to foster affective attachment to the union, but they also need to favour and support the methods employed by the union to represent member interests, as well as the principles underlying those methods.

As the present study explored the intention to participate rather than actual participation, the results could be argued to suggest that there are different antecedents to these two concepts, supporting the view that although they have sometimes been used interchangeably they might in fact have different determinants (Klandermans, 1986).

The practical implications for labour organisations are that an attempt to generate and sustain affective attachment to the organisation, as well as positive attitudes towards collective forms of representation and action should be an ongoing, continuous process, and not one that is terminated once members have been socialised into the organisation. At the same time, it would be to the unions’ benefit to increase awareness of the need for member involvement in the union, as well as the benefits stemming from individual involvement. Unions should be more aware of the need to sustain a climate that fosters affective attachment to the organisation and willingness to contribute towards the effective and democratic functioning of the organisation. It should be noted at this point that union loyalty should not be employed to convey the meaning of ‘blind devotion’ to the organisation, rather it should emerge from a genuine belief that a collective approach to improving one’s working experience constitutes an effective method for doing so, and is thus worth working towards.
8.3 Recommendations for future research

Future research would need to employ a longitudinal design for further investigation of the relationships outlined in the present model, and in order to strengthen any causal inferences made. Also, as it has already been indicated, to fully assess the impact of different aspects of leader behaviour and styles on member attitudes and willingness to participate, an experimental, or quasi-experimental design would need to be employed. Individual members could then be exposed to different leadership styles or leader behaviour, so that the hypothesised cause-effect relationship between leadership-member attitudes- behavioural intentions could be more clearly defined. At the same time, future research would need to test the dimensionality and construct validity of the leadership criterion. Specifically, in relation to ‘pragmatic’ leadership, future research should seek to assess the contribution of aspects of leader behaviour that have not been included in the present study, e.g. *leader effectiveness*, to the ‘pragmatic’ leadership criterion. Finally, it would be worthwhile to explore the relationship between the mobilization process and actual participation, by incorporating a measure of participation into the existing process model of mobilization.

At the same time, given the role of trade union identity within a mobilization setting, as discussed in earlier chapters, exploring the impact of trade union identity, as both a direct and an indirect predictor of member responses should be one of the aims for future research. This would seek to address more closely the intervening effects of leader behaviour, as well as member perceptions of leader behaviour in explaining member attitudes and willingness to participate.

All in all, by developing an approach to mobilization which focuses on members, as one of the most important resources of trade unions, it is hoped that a case has been made for the merits stemming from focusing on *their* contribution within a trade union setting. Given that the mobilising capacity of trade unions rests on members’ willingness to support the organisation, its principles and values, a comparative assessment of the mobilising capacity for different unions could be obtained, regardless of the appeal of individual outcomes. This could in turn serve to account for successes and/or failures of different unions in the context of individual mobilization campaigns, which would also
depend on the unions’ ability to translate willingness to participate into actual participation, given a successful outcome from the mobilization process.

8.4 Implications for industrial relations in Cyprus’ public-corporate sector

But, how to the findings from this study relate to the context of industrial relations in Cyprus’ public corporate sector? As has been argued earlier, the organisations in the public corporate sector have been characterised, especially in recent years, by extensive government intervention which has restricted both the unions’ and the organisations’ ability to negotiate terms and conditions at the workplace. This has only intensified a long-standing status quo which has left the membership disenchanted with both the unions and management within these organisations. The politicisation of trade unions, and a centralised and hierarchical form of trade unionism which at the same time undermined the role of its membership all have been contributing factors to the phenomena described above. However, membership has been maintained at high levels especially within the larger, more traditional unions. Given the prevailing conditions within these organisations, members feel that being a union member affords some sort of security. According to one union member: “...no union is any good. But in the end, we need to belong somewhere”. More recently, calls for privatisation in organisations of the public corporate sector, as well as a recent parliamentary bill on regulating strikes in essential services, which incidentally are likely to directly affect the organisations included in the present sample, has intensified tensions within this sector.

Given the above, it is therefore plausible to argue that in this type of environment what would have been more salient for members would be a more supportive type of leadership behaviour, manifesting itself in the behaviours that comprise ‘pragmatic’ leadership. In turn, the willingness to become involved in the union would not have emerged as a result of members’ affective attachment to union leaders, but rather as a result of leader behaviours which demonstrate that the unions recognise the importance of members’ contribution and the unions’ willingness to represent their interests as best as possible. At the same, government approach in relation to the future of organisations in the public corporate sector would have reinforced identification with the union and the
belief that collective activity would allow employees to respond to the challenges that lie ahead and provide a sense of security.

However, the enthusiasm about collective action does not seem to be shared equally by all unions. The analysis of interview data revealed that what have been termed as guild unions, those unions representing specific occupational groups, as well as what have been termed as progressive unions emerged as less enthusiastic about collective action. Would this mean that these two types of unions would not enjoy wide membership support? Not necessarily, since at the same time they emerged as promoting a more participative, democratic style of unionism, responding more positively to members than both social partner and traditional unions. In turn, as Fairbrother (1996) argues, in the context of restructuring within the public sector, more participative forms of unionism are critical in effectively responding to the observed changes. Accordingly then, this directs attention to the idea that the two types of unions identified above, guild and progressive, would be better equipped to respond to any future challenges in the status quo, such as for example changes in the organisation of work associated with privatisation, or different bargaining and negotiating arrangements. While for guild unions their legitimacy would be most likely to be derived from the strong sense of solidarity underlying the interests they represent, for progressive unions that would emerge from their more participative style of unionism. This in turn has implications relating to the ability of the more centralised and hierarchical forms of unionism characterising the traditional unions, which at the same time represent a diverse range of occupational interests, to command sufficient member support for an effective and influential response in light of organisational change. As the present results also suggest that the perception of solidarity of interests within social partner unions is also rather weak, and definitely weaker than in the case of guild unions, one could argue that unless they reassess and perhaps also redefine their identity, culture and structural arrangements and procedures, which amounts to no less than an organisational change attempt, they would be unable to effectively respond to potential challenges.

What is also identified by Fairbrother (1996) as playing a central role in the process of developing more participative forms of unionism, "...in articulating and
expressing these developments..." (ibid., p.112) is leadership. This again highlights the critical importance of leadership behaviour in generating member support and building a sustainable culture of collective consciousness, and as such the need for the different unions to invest resources in promoting and facilitating behaviours, conducive to a successful outcome in the process of transforming individual members into collective actors.
### APPENDIX A: TABLES

#### Table A1

**Unemployment, 1980-1995**

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*Source: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance*

#### Table A2

**Inflation, 1980-1995**

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Table A3 Gainfully Employed Population by Broad Sector, 1980-1995 *

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<tr>
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<th>Primary&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Secondary&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Tertiary&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total Gainfully Employed (percentage)</th>
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<th>Secondary</th>
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Source: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance

* Provisional figure

a. The data refer to the Government controlled areas only, not the whole island
b. The Primary sector consists of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying
c. The Secondary sector consists of Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas and Water, and Construction
d. The Tertiary sector consists of Trade, Restaurants and Hotels, Transport, Storage and Communication, Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services, Community, Social and Personal Services
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<th>Electricity, Gas, Water</th>
<th>Construction</th>
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Source: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance
### Table A5 Employment in Broad Public Sector

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Total Employment in the broad public sector (BPS) (thousands)</th>
<th>Employment in Semi-Government Organisations (SGO's) (thousands)</th>
<th>Total Employment in BPS, as % of Total GEP</th>
<th>Employment in SGO's as % of Total Employment in BPS</th>
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Source: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance
## Table A6 Employment in Semi-Government Organisations

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employment in Semi-Government Organisations</th>
<th>Cyprus Telecommunication Authority (CYTA)</th>
<th>Cyprus Electricity Authority (CEA)</th>
<th>Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)</th>
<th>All other Organisations (AO)</th>
<th>Total Employment in SGO's (percentages)</th>
<th>CYTA, CEA, CBC</th>
<th>AO *</th>
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Source: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance

*Examples are the Cyprus Ports Authority, the Water Boards, the Tourism Organisation, Industrial Training Authority etc.*
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Union Loyalty</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Union Instrumentality</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'Them and Us': Perceived division</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>(.79)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'Them and Us': Perceived Conflict of interests</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 'Workplace Collectivism': Identification</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 'Workplace Collectivism': Solidarity</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 'Workplace Collectivism': 'Collectivist Orientation'</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 'Emotional' Leadership</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 'Pragmatic Leadership'</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>(.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Range = 1-5 on all scales; decimal points have been omitted from correlation coefficients; coefficients <0.1, not significant, except 0.09, p<0.05; coefficients 0.1-0.73, p<0.01; Pearson correlation coefficient, two-tailed; Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) in brackets
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel a sense of pride being part of this union (ul1)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel I will be gaining a lot by being a union member (ul2)</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tell my friends that the union is a great organisation to be a member of (ul6)</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I plan to be a member the union the rest of the time I work for the organisation (ul11)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have complete trust in my union (ul15)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers need unions to protect them against unfair labour practices of employers/mgt (ui10)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The achievements of the union are a good example of what dedicated members can get done (ui12)</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real improvements in wages and job security can only be achieved with the help of the union (ui13)</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How willing would you be to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be elected as a union official (wp16.a)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be elected as a member on one of the union's administrative bodies (wp16.b)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently attend union meetings (wp16.c)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in collective action</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO = .87; cumulative percentage of variance: 69.6; union loyalty factor (pct of variance = 44.6); union instrumentality factor (pct of variance = 15.9); willingness to participate factor (pct of variance = 9.1)
Table A9 Factor structure of the 'Them and Us' scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Them and Us': Perceived division</td>
<td>'Them and Us': Perceived conflict of interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and managers are really on opposite sides in my organisation (thus1)</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can never really trust mgt (thus3)</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and managers have conflicting interests (thus4)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel a strong sense of 'them and us' between workers and managers at work (thus6)</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td></td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management does not understand the needs of the worker (thus9)</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers need strong unions to protect their interests (thus5)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there wasn't a union, management would take advantage of the workforce (thus7)</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers should be represented on the board of directors to protect their interests (thus10)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO = .85; cumulative percentage of variance: 59.3; 'perceived division' factor (pct of variance=43.5); 'perceived conflict of interests' factor (pct of variance=15.9)
Table A10 Factor structure of the 'Workplace Collectivism' scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I see myself as belonging to my workgroup/department (coll11)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel strong ties with my workgroup/department (coll3)</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify with my workgroup/department (coll7)</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am glad that I am a member of this department (coll11)</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify with my colleagues in the department (coll21)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The best way to solve problems at work is collectively (coll4)</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements in terms and conditions at work will only be achieved through collective action (coll9)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group action is much more effective than individual action in achieving improvements in work benefits (coll12)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The only way to protect the group's interests is through collective action (coll19)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My values are different from those of my workgroup department (coll20r1)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have the same interests as my colleagues in the department (coll16)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel that my interests are best represented individually (coll20r1)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have the same values as my colleagues in the department (coll25)</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO = .87; cumulative percentage of variance: 55.5; 'workplace collectivism': identification factor (pct of variance=7.8); 'workplace collectivism': solidarity (pct of variance=13.4); 'workplace collectivism': collectivist orientation (pct of variance 34.2)

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Table A11 Factor structure of the Leadership scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Pragmatic'</td>
<td>'Emotional'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can contact him easily if I want to (leac1)</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is always available when members wish to raise an issue (lava3)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He keeps me well informed about what is going on in the union (leacc6)</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He usually welcomes suggestions from the rank-and-file (leacc8)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He always has time to listen to the rank-and-file (leava10)</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts without consulting the rank-and-file (leac23rl)</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages the rank-and-file to express their opinions (leac25)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspires loyalty to him (lech20)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a special gift of seeing what is important for the rank-and-file (lech21)</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His ideas have forced me to rethink some of my own ideas which I had never questioned before (leis24)</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enables me to think about existing problems in new ways (leis26)</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has provided me with new ways of looking at things which used to be a puzzle for me (leis28)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union’s leadership is an inspiration to me (lech33)</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union’s leadership excites me with its visions of what dedicated members can achieve if they work together (lech34)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO = .94; cumulative percentage of variance: 61.9; 'pragmatic' leadership factor (pct of variance=52.7); 'emotional' leadership factor (pct of variance=9.1)
A12. Crosstabulations for Leaders in Guild and Social Partner unions

Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Frequency of Collective contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of collective contact (degree of)</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Frequent</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Frequent</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Frequency of Individual Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of individual contact (degree of)</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Frequent</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Frequent</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Type of Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contact (formal vs. informal)</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Formal</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Informal</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member Involvement (degree of)</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Involvement</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Involvement</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Involvement</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Value of Consultation</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Useful</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Useful</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Antagonism between Management and Workers</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Antagonistic</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Antagonistic</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enthusiasm about Collective Action</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Enthusiastic</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiastic</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Enthusiastic</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader Type and Enthusiasm for Collective Action</th>
<th>Leaders in Guild Unions</th>
<th>Leaders in Social Partner Unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A13. Crosstabulations for Progressive and Traditional Leaders

**Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Frequency of Collective Contact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of collective contact (degree of)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Frequent</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Frequent</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of individual contact (degree of)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Frequent</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Frequent</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Type of Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contact (formal vs. informal)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Formal</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Informal</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

250
### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Communication system (written vs. oral)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication system (written vs. oral)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Oral</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Written</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Perceived Effectiveness of Communication system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Effectiveness of Communication system</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Effective</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Effective</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Member Involvement (degree of)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member Involvement (degree of)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Involvement</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Involvement</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Involvement</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Perceived Value of Consultation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Value of Consultation</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Useful</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Useful</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Perceived Antagonism between Management and Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Antagonism between Management and Workers</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Antagonistic</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Antagonistic</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Enthusiasm for Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enthusiasm about Collective Action</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Enthusiastic</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiastic</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Enthusiastic</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentaged Bivariate Table showing the relationship between Leader Type and Concern about Rank-and-File

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern about rank-and-file (degree of)</th>
<th>Progressive Leaders</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Concerned</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Concerned</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

252
APPENDIX B: FIGURES

Figure B1

Trade Union density and collective bargaining coverage rates, 1990a,b

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Cyprus
Finland
France
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

□ Bargaining coverage rate ■ Union density rate


a) Figures have been rounded. The trade union density rate refers to the number of trade union members as a percentage of wage and salary earners. The collective bargaining coverage rate refers to the number of workers covered by collective agreements as a percentage of wage and salary earners. Coverage rates have been adjusted for employees excluded from bargaining rights.

b) Data refer generally to 1990, except for the coverage rates in France, Germany, Japan and Portugal, which refer to 1985, 1992, 1989 and 1991 respectively, and for Cyprus where data for both rates refer to 1994.
Labour disputes referred to the Ministry of Labour for mediation, 1976-1995

Workdays lost and Work stoppages, 1976-1995

Working days lost per 1,000 workers: all industries and services
(annual averages, 1986-1995)

Source: For all countries except Cyprus: UK Department of Employment Gazette, April 1997
For Cyprus: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance

256
Working days lost per 1,000 workers: all industries and services
(annual averages 1985-1994)

Source: For all countries except Cyprus: UK Department of Employment Gazette, April 1997
For Cyprus: Labour Statistics (1995), Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance
APPENDIX C

C.1 Structure of Unions in Cyprus’ Public Corporate Sector

I. Cyprus Telecoms Authority

a. Free Pancyprian Telecommunication Workers' Union (EPOET)

This union is affiliated to the Semi-government Organisations Federation (O.I.O), who is in turn affiliated to the Cyprus Workers Confederation (S.E.K)- known as the ‘right wing’ confederation. This used to be the only union in the Authority until the late 1980's, when the left-wing federation, P.E.O, formed their own union, the Pancyprian Public and Semi-government Workers’ Union (S.I.D.I.K.E.K). This is the biggest union in the organisation, with 15341 members.

![Organisational Structure Diagram]

The **General Secretariat**, the supreme body of the union, consists of the President, the Vice-President, the General Secretary, the Assistant General Secretary, the General Treasurer, the General Organising Secretary, the Assistant General Organising Secretary and the Research Secretary. The General Secretariat’s term of office is four years. It meets regularly, twice a month, and whenever it is regarded as necessary.

The **Executive Board**, consists of the members of the General Secretariat, the members of the Professional Division Committees, and the members of the District Office Committees. It meets every three months and whenever a written request is made by the General
Secretariat - the President or the General Secretary - or by 1/3 of its members.

**Professional Divisions** operate only in Nicosia, and they promote the interests of the various occupational groups within the organisation. These are as follows: 1. the Administrative staff’s professional division, which consists of the Administrative, Commercial and Clerical employees 2. the Financial Service staff’s professional division 3. the External Telecommunication staff’s professional division 4. the Telephone Operator’s professional division 4. the Specialised staff’s professional division 5. the Technical staff’s professional division 6. the Higher Technical staff’s professional division 7. the Higher IT staff’s professional division. Regular General Assemblies of the professional divisions, take place every four years. Emergency General Assemblies are called by the division’s committee whenever it is regarded as necessary, or when a written request is made by 1/3 of the members, where the agenda of the Assembly should also be outlined. The professional divisions are governed by a three-member committee when the number of members is 45 and below, and by a five-member committee when the number of members is 46-150; for every 1-30 members an additional member is elected on the committee. The members of the committee are elected every four years at the division’s regular General Assembly, prior to the Pancyprian Congress. The committee meets right after the Pancyprian Congress to elect the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Treasurer.

**District Offices** are founded in the various districts, excluding Nicosia in order to promote the interests of employees in those districts. The District Office is governed by a three-member committee, when the number of members is 45 and below, and by a five-member committee when the number of members is 46-150. Offices with more than 150 members elect an additional representative for every 1-30 members. The members of the committee are elected every four years at the office’s regular General Assembly, prior to the Pancyprian Congress. The committee meets right after the Pancyprian Congress to elect the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Treasurer. The committee meets regularly every month and whenever it is regarded as necessary. Regular General Assemblies take place annually. Emergency General Assemblies are called by the office’s committee whenever it is regarded as necessary, or when a written request is made by 1/3 of the members, where
the agenda of the Assembly should also be outlined. **Branch committees** or representatives, are elected only in the District Offices, in order to promote the interests of particular occupational groups in the organisation, to the corresponding professional division committees in Nicosia. Where the number of members is less than 15, only one representative is elected, but if it is more than 15, a three-member committee is elected, of which one should be the Branch Secretary.

The **Pancyprian Congress** takes place every four years and the **Pancyprian Conference** takes place annually, between two congresses. They consist of the General Secretariat, the General Representatives of the professional divisions and district offices, who are elected every four years prior to the Pancyprian Congress, at the regular General Assemblies, and the members of the professional division and district office committees.

**b. Pancyprian Independent Telecommunication Workers Union (PASE)**

This union was founded in the early nineties and is the second biggest union in the organisation, with 616 members. This union is a member of the Co-ordinating Committee for Independent Unions, which also consists of the Cyprus Electricity Authority Professional Employees Union, the Electricity Shift Workers Union and other independent unions in the public corporate sector.

Its organisational structure greatly resembles EPOET’s structure with minor changes:
The **Central Secretariat**, the supreme body of the union, consists of the President, the Vice-President, the General Secretary, the Assistant General Secretary, the General Treasurer, the General Organising Secretary, the Assistant General Organising Secretary. The Central Secretariat's term of office is two years. It meets regularly, once every fortnight, or whenever it is regarded as necessary by the General Secretary. The members of the Central Secretariat are elected by the Pancyprian Congress every two years.

The **Administrative Board** consists of the General Secretariat and the Secretary or another member of the professional division and district committees. It meets regularly, once a month or whenever it is regarded as necessary, after a request from the General Secretary.

The **General Board** consists of the Central Secretariat, and the professional division and district committees. The General Board meets every month, or whenever it is requested by the Administrative Board, the President, the General Secretary, or by a third of the members of the General Board.

**Professional Divisions** operate only in Nicosia, and they promote the interests of the various occupational groups within the organisation. The divisions are quite similar to
those of the other union, EPOET. Each professional division is governed by a five-
member committee, which is elected every two years at the division’s General Assembly. If the number of members is over 50, then an additional member is elected for every 25 members. The committees meet regularly every month. The committees can call General Assemblies whenever they regard it as necessary.

**District Offices** are founded in the various districts, excluding Nicosia in order to promote the interests of employees in those districts. The District Office is governed by a five-member committee, which is elected every two years at a regular General Assembly of the office. If the number of members is over 50, then an additional member is elected for every 25 members. The committee meets regularly every month and whenever it is regarded as necessary. Regular General Assemblies are held annually and emergency General Assemblies are held whenever it is regarded as necessary, or with a written request from 1/3 of the office’s members, where the agenda for the assembly should also be outlined.

The **Pancyprian Congress** takes place every two years and the **Pancyprian Conference** takes place between two congresses. They consist of the General Secretariat, the General Representatives of the professional divisions and district offices, who are elected every two years prior to the Pancyprian Congress, at the regular General Assemblies, and the members of the professional division and district office committees, which have already established themselves as a body, with a Secretary, a Deputy Secretary and a Treasurer.

c. Pancyprian Public and Semi-government Workers’ Union (SIDIKEK)

This ‘union’ is different from all the other unions in the Telecoms Authority in that it covers the employees in all the organisations in the public corporate sector. Telecoms Authority is one Branch of the union. This union is affiliated to the Pancyprian Labour Federation (P.E.O)- known as the ‘left wing’ federation. Its Telecoms Authority Branch is the third smallest ‘union’ with 248 members.

The structure of the whole union is very similar to that of the unions above, however the functions, rights and duties of each one of the bodies differ.
This union operates in a much more centralised manner than the other unions. The professional branches are not independent of the union, but are closely accountable to the union. The professional branch in the Telecoms Authority is governed by a 3-7 member committee depending on the number of members, and consists of the Secretary and advisors. This committee operates under the supervision and guidance of the Pancyprian Branch Board, the District Office committee and the union’s Administrative Board.

The Pancyprian Branch Board is elected by the members of the professional branch, in order to co-ordinate and promote the Branch’s problems, cypruswide. The Board consists of 7-13 members, a Secretary, a three-member Secretariat and advisors, all operating under the guidance and supervision of the union’s Administrative Board.

II. Cyprus Electricity Authority

a. Free Pancyprian Electricity Workers Union (EPOPAI)

This union is the largest one in the Cyprus Electricity Authority (CEA), with 1362 members and is affiliated to the Semi-government Organisations Federation (O.I.O), who is in turn affiliated to the Cyprus Workers Confederation (S.E.K)– fostering a ‘social democratic’ ideology. This is the oldest union in the CEA, founded in the early sixties.

Its structure resembles that of P.A.S.E in the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, with minor modifications:
The Secretariat consists of the President, the General Secretary, the Assistant General Secretary, the General Organising Secretary and the General Treasurer. The Secretariat’s term of office is four years. The President and General Secretary are elected directly by the members in the Pancyprian Conference every four years, whereas the Assistant General Secretary, the General Organising Secretary and the General Treasurer are elected by the members of the General Board. It meets regularly, twice a month and whenever it is deemed as necessary, after a request by the General Secretary.

The Administrative Board consists of the members of the Secretariat, the District Secretaries and the representatives of the occupational divisions: Graduates (university and others), Office staff, Technical staff, Shift workers and retired staff. These representatives are elected by the General Board. The Administrative Board meets every month, or whenever it is deemed as necessary by the General Secretary, or is requested by 2/3 of its members.
The **General Board** consists of the members of the Secretariat, the District Secretaries, the representatives elected at the regular General Assemblies of the District Offices every two years. One representative is elected for every 50 members. The General Board meets regularly every three months or whenever it is deemed necessary by the Secretariat, the President or the General Secretary, or when requested in writing by ½ of its members. Its term of office is four years, covering the period from one Congress to another.

**District Offices** are founded in a district or group of villages, when 20 or more members decide to do so, and their decision is approved by the General Board. The District Office is governed by a 3-7 member committee, elected by the members of the district office at a regular General Assembly, every two years. The committee then meets to elect the District Secretary, the Assistant District Secretary and the District Treasurer. The District Committee meets immediately after a meeting of the General and Administrative Board, and whenever it is deemed necessary. The District Offices hold regular General Assemblies of their members every two years, prior to the Pancyprian Conference or Congress. Emergency General Assemblies are called by the District committee when that is deemed necessary, or when it is requested by at least of the members in a written application containing the reasons and the agenda for the General Assembly. If it is possible, a member of the Secretariat also takes part in the General Assemblies.

The **Pancyprian Congress** takes place every four years, and the **Pancyprian Conference** takes place every year, between two congresses. The members of the Secretariat, the District Secretaries, representatives of all the district offices, elected by the members at the General Assemblies of the Offices, whereby one representative is elected for every ten members, and the members of the Central Committee of the Union of Retired Employees, take part in these two bodies.

**b. Cyprus Electricity Professional Employees Union (SEPAIK)**

This union differs from all the other so far, since it is an 'elite' union, representing the so called 'scientific' staff at the Cyprus Electricity Authority. Its membership consists of university graduates or equivalent, mostly engineers, as well as Information Technology
staff. It is the second ‘largest’ union in the CEA, with 217 members, and it is a member of the Co-ordinating Committee for Independent Unions.

It has a much flatter hierarchy, with only three main levels as follows:

**ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE**

- **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**
- **GENERAL BOARD**
- **LOCAL OFFICES**
- **GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

The **Executive Secretariat** is elected directly by the members at the Regular General Assembly, every two years. The members of the three main occupational divisions are represented according to the number of their members. These three divisions are: Engineers, Production Engineers and Information Technology staff. The Executive Secretariat is arranged into a body which consists of the President, the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, the General Organising Secretary, the Treasurer and the rest of the members, by a secret ballot of the members of the General Board. The Executive Secretariat meets once a month and whenever it is deemed necessary by the President or the Secretary, or the majority of its members.

The **General Board** consists of the members of the Executive Secretariat, the Secretaries of the Local Committees, the representative of the Information Technology staff, in addition to their representatives in the Executive Secretariat, and the Secretary of the division of retired staff. The term of office of the General Board is two years. This body meets regularly every two months, or when deemed necessary by the Executive Secretariat, or by 1/3 of its members.

**Local Offices** are founded after a decision by the General Board in any workplace where 7 or more of the union’s members are permanently occupied. Each office is governed by a
three-member local committee elected directly by the members at a regular Local General Assembly, every two years. The committee then meets to arrange itself into a body, consisting of a Local Secretary, Assistant Local Secretary and one member. The committee meets regularly every month, and whenever necessary. The Regular Local General Assembly takes place every two years, and emergency local assemblies when it is deemed necessary by the local committees, or after a written application by 3 constitutionally accepted members of the local office.

The Regular General Assembly, regarded as the supreme body of the union, is held annually, and all members take part in it. An Emergency General Assembly is held when deemed necessary by the Executive Secretariat, or the General Board, when it is requested in writing by at least 10% of the constitutionally accepted members, or by the majority of the members of any local office or occupational division.

c. Pancyprian Public and Semi-Government Workers’ Union (SIDIKEK) (see I(c) above). It should only be noted that this branch of the union has 164 members.

d. Cyprus Electricity Shift Workers Union (SYVAIK)

This union is the smallest union in the CEA, with 81 members. It operates exclusively at the two power stations (Moni, Dekeleia) and represents shift workers only. It is a member of the Co-ordinating Committee for Independent Unions. Two bodies are responsible for governing the union, in contrast to all the other unions, the General Assembly and the Administrative Board.

**ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE**

```
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
```

The Administrative Board consists of 7 members elected by the General Assembly. The members then meet to elect the General Secretary, the Assistant General Secretary, the General Organising Secretary, the Treasurer and three advisors. The term of office of the
Administrative Board is two years. It meets regularly, every three months and when deemed necessary, or when there is a written request by ½ of the members.

The General Assembly, the supreme body of the union, is held annually and all the union’s members take part. Emergency General Assemblies are held when deemed necessary by the Administrative Board or when requested in writing by 1/3 of those members with a right to vote.

III. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (not available)
a. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Employees Union
b. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Technical Employees Union

11 The figures quoted for union membership have been obtained from union records (1995), and as such might have been inflated. They refer to full-time employees registered as union members, excluding part-time employees, retired staff and those employees classified as ‘missing’ in the unions’ and companies’ records.
C.2.1 Questionnaire Version 1

The London School of Economics and Political Science

CASE No.

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE SHALL REMAIN COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. NO ONE WITHIN THIS ORGANIZATION OR THE UNION WILL SEE ANY OF YOUR RESPONSES.

SECTION 1

Could you please supply the following information about yourself:

1. How long have you been working for this organization? __________
   (Please state the number of completed years)

2. How many years have you been a union member? __________

3. Which of the following age categories do you fall into? (Please tick one)
   Under 25 [ ]1  25-34 [ ]2  35-44 [ ]3  45-55 [ ]4  Over 55 [ ]5

4. Are you male or female?  Male [ ]1  Female [ ]2

5. Please state level of education:  Elementary [ ]1
   Secondary General [ ]2
   Secondary Technical [ ]3
   Higher [ ]4
   University [ ]5

6. Please state your job title: __________

7. Gross annual income: __________
SECTION 2
Below is a series of statements about unions. Please circle the number on the scale that best shows how you feel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I feel a sense of pride being part of this union.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel that I will be gaining a lot by joining the union.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I have little confidence and trust in most members of my union.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Very little that I, as a union member, want has any real importance to the union.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I feel little loyalty toward the union.</td>
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<td>6. I tell my friends that the union is a great organization to be a member of.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. I, as a union member, do not get enough benefits for the money taken by the union for dues.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I am willing to put a great deal of effort in making the union successful.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. My values are not very similar to the union's.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Workers need unions to protect them against unfair labour practices of employers/mgt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I plan to be a member of the union the rest of the time I work for the organization.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The achievements of the union are a good example of what dedicated members can get done.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Real improvements in wages and job security can only be achieved with the help of the union.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. My beliefs are not very similar to the union's. 

15. I have complete trust in my union. 

16. How willing would you be to:
(a) Be elected as a union official 
(b) Be elected as a member in one of the union's administrative bodies. 
(c) Frequently attend union meetings 
(d) Participate in collective action.

SECTION 3
Below is a series of statements about management (General Management + Managers). Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the most appropriate number on the scale.

1. Workers and managers are really on opposite sides in my organisation. 

2. It is management's unquestionable right to manage without interference from trade unions. 

3. You can never really trust management. 

4. Workers and managers have conflicting interests. 

5. Workers need strong unions to protect their interests. 

6. I feel a strong sense of "them and us" between workers and managers at work. 

7. If there wasn't a union, management would take advantage of the workforce. 

8. Management and workers basically have common aims and objectives.
9. Management does not understand the needs of the worker. | Strongly Disagree | Not sure | Agree | Strongly agree |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Workers should be represented on the board of directors of companies in order to be able to protect their interests. | Strongly Disagree | Not sure | Agree | Strongly agree |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION 4**

In this section please indicate your opinion about each of the statements which follow by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I see myself as belonging to my workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My values are different from those of my workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I feel strong ties with my colleagues in the workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The best way to solve problems at work is collectively.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I have nothing in common with the rest of the members in my workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I am annoyed to say that I am a member of this workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I identify with my workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. There's not much to be won by being a member of this workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Improvements in terms and conditions at work will only be achieved through collective action.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Not sure Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I identify with other workers in the same sector.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I am glad that I am a member of this workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Group action is much more effective than individual action in achieving improvements in work benefits.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Collective action is not the best way to resolve disputes on terms and conditions at work.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I have the same interests as my colleagues in the workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I feel held back by my workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. I consider the departmental/workgroup important.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The only way to protect the group's interests is through collective action.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I feel that my interests are best represented individually.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. I identify with my colleagues in the workgroup/department.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I try to hide that I belong to the group of blue-collar workers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. I identify with other groups of white-collar workers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. The only way to protect the interests of the white collar workers is through collective action.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. I have the same values as my colleagues in the workgroup/department.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I can contact him easily if I want to.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. There is no union representative within easy reach.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. He is always available when members wish to raise an issue.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. He is always interested to know how I am getting along in my job.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. You cannot really trust the local union representative.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. He keeps me well informed about what is going on in the union.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. He is very much respected by the rank-and-file.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. He usually welcomes suggestions from the rank-and-file.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. He is very effective in handling grievances.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. He always has time to listen to the rank-and-file.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. You cannot really rely on the local union representative to solve grievances.</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. He responds to suggestions made by the rank-and-file. 1 2 3 4 5
13. He always sticks up for the rank-and-file. 1 2 3 4 5
14. He makes decisions and informs me about them afterwards. 1 2 3 4 5
15. He is very effective in negotiating with management. 1 2 3 4 5
16. I never see him. 1 2 3 4 5
17. Makes me proud to be associated with him. 1 2 3 4 5
18. Makes me feel proud to be a member of the union. 1 2 3 4 5
19. Has a sense of the union's mission which he transmits to me. 1 2 3 4 5
20. Inspires loyalty to him. 1 2 3 4 5
21. Has a special gift of seeing what is important for the rank-and-file. 1 2 3 4 5
22. Increases my optimism for the future. 1 2 3 4 5
23. Acts without consulting the rank-and-file. 1 2 3 4 5
24. His ideas have forced me to rethink some of my own ideas which I had never questioned before. 1 2 3 4 5
25. Encourages the rank-and-file to express their opinions. 1 2 3 4 5
26. Enables me to think about existing problems in new ways. 1 2 3 4 5
27. He makes me feel confused when he is trying to explain his views to us.

28. Has provided me with new ways of looking at things which used to be a puzzle for me.

Concerning national leadership:

33. I have complete faith in the union's leadership.

34. The union's leadership is an inspiration to me.

35. The union's leadership excites me with its visions of what dedicated members can achieve if they work together.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
C.2.2 Questionnaire Version 2

The London School of Economics and Political Science  CASE No.

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE SHALL REMAIN COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. NO ONE WITHIN THIS ORGANIZATION OR THE UNION WILL SEE ANY OF YOUR RESPONSES.

SECTION 1

Could you please supply the following information about yourself:

1. How long have you been working for this organisation? __________
   (Please state the number of completed years)

2. How many years have you been a union member? __________

3. Which of the following age categories do you fall into? (Please tick one)
   Under 25 [ ] 25-34 [ ] 35-44 [ ] 45-55 [ ] Over 55 [ ]

4. Are you male or female? Male [ ] Female [ ]

5. Please state level of education:
   - Elementary [ ]
   - Secondary General [ ]
   - Secondary Technical [ ]
   - Higher [ ]
   - University [ ]

6. Please state your job title: __________

7. Gross annual income: __________
SECTION 2
Below is a series of statements about unions. **Please circle the number on the scale that best shows how you feel.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. I feel a sense of pride being part of this union.</td>
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<td>2. I feel that I will be gaining a lot by joining the union.</td>
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<td>3. I have little confidence and trust in most members of my union.</td>
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<td>4. Very little that I, as a union member, want has any real importance to the union.</td>
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<td>7. I, as a union member, do not get enough benefits for the money taken by the union for dues.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10. Workers need unions to protect them against unfair labour practices of employers/mgt.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. My beliefs are not very similar to the union's.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. I have complete trust in my union.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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16. How willing would you be to:  

(a) Be elected as a union official  
(b) Be elected as a member in one of the union's administrative bodies.  
(c) Frequently attend union meetings  
(d) Participate in collective action.  

<table>
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<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 3  
Below is a series of statements about management (General Management + Managers). Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the most appropriate number on the scale.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Workers and managers are really on opposite sides in my organisation.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. It is management's unquestionable right to manage without interference from trade unions.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. You can never really trust management.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Workers and managers have conflicting interests.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Workers need strong unions to protect their interests.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. I feel a strong sense of "them and us" between workers and managers at work.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. If there wasn't a union, management would take advantage of the workforce.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Management and workers basically have common aims and objectives.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Management does not understand the needs of the worker. 

Strongly Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly disagree agree 

1  2  3  4  5

10. Workers should be represented on the board of directors of companies in order to be able to protect their interests. 

1  2  3  4  5

11. I believe that I share the same interests with the following group(s) of workers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office/clerical staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other group(s)- please specify: ________________________

SECTION 4
In this section please indicate your opinion about each of the statements which follow by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree disagree</th>
<th>Not sure Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I see myself as belonging to my workgroup/department. 

2. My values are different from those of my workgroup/department. 

3. I feel strong ties with my colleagues in the workgroup/department. 

4. The best way to solve problems at work is collectively. 

5. I have nothing in common with the rest of the members in my workgroup/department. 

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6. I am annoyed to say that I am a member of this workgroup/department.

7. I identify with my workgroup/department.

8. There's not much to be won by being a member of this workgroup/department.

9. Improvements in terms and conditions at work will only be achieved through collective action.

11. I am glad that I am a member of this workgroup/department.

12. Group action is much more effective than individual action in achieving improvements in work benefits.

13. Collective action is not the best way to resolve disputes on terms and conditions at work.

14. I have the same interests as my colleagues in the workgroup/department.

15. I feel held back by my workgroup/department.

16. I consider the departmental/workgroup important.

17. The only way to protect the group's interests is through collective action.

18. I feel that my interests are best represented individually.

19. I identify with my colleagues in the workgroup/department.

20. I have the same values as my colleagues in the workgroup/department.
### SECTION 5

Below is a series of statements about union leadership. **Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the most appropriate number on the scale.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning the person you approach more frequently and you regard as **your local union representative:**

1. I can contact him easily if I want to.  
2. There is no union representative within easy reach.  
3. He is always available when members wish to raise an issue.  
4. He is always interested to know how I am getting along in my job.  
5. He keeps me well informed about what is going on in the union.  
6. He usually welcomes suggestions from the rank-and-file.  
7. He always has time to listen to the rank-and-file.  
8. He responds to suggestions made by the rank-and-file.  
9. He makes decisions and informs me about them afterwards.  
10. I never see him.  
11. Inspires loyalty to him.  
12. Has a special gift of seeing what is important for the rank-and-file.

14. His ideas have forced me to rethink some of my own ideas which I had never questioned before.

15. Encourages the rank-and-file to express their opinions.

16. Enables me to think about existing problems in new ways.

17. He makes me feel confused when he is trying to explain his views to us.

18. Has provided me with new ways of looking at things which used to be a puzzle for me.

Please indicate (if you know) the office of the person you approach most frequently and regard as your local union representative: __________________

Concerning national leadership:

19. The union's leadership is an inspiration to me.

20. The union's leadership excites me with its visions of what dedicated members can achieve if they work together.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
C.3 Steward interview schedule

Section 1: General Background questions

1. How many years have you been a local union representative?

2. Have you ever been a steward of another trade union?

3. Did being a shop steward have any effect on your job/career prospects?

Section 2: Steward Contact/Communication system

A. Contact System

1. (a) On average how often do the members get to see you?
   (b) How (easily) can the members contact you if they wish to?
   (c) When are you available to members should they wish to raise an issue?
   (d) What type of issues do members usually raise when they come to see you?
      (examples)
   (e) Is there usually enough time to listen to the members? If NO, why is this case?
      (examples)

2. (a) How frequently do you attempt to come into contact with the members (on average)?
   (b) What form does this contact take? (e.g. informal talks, formal meetings etc...)
   (c) How important do you think frequent contact with the members is?

B. Communication System

3. (a) Do you consult with members at all before reaching decisions on certain issues?
   (b) If YES, on what type of issues are members consulted? (examples)
   (c) How useful/valuable do you think suggestions from the members are?
      (examples if possible)
4. (a) Do members actually participate in reaching decisions on certain issues?

(b) If YES, what type of issues are these? (examples)

(c) What form does their participation take? e.g. voting,... (examples)

5. (a) How well informed are the members kept about what is going on in the union?

(b) What more could the local union representatives be doing to improve this information system?

Section 3: Grievance handling

1. (a) Do you have a standard or routine procedure for dealing with members’ grievances? If YES, what is it? If depending on issue, what are the procedures for different issues? (examples); If NO, why is it that there are no such procedures?

(b) Do you think that this procedure has been effective/successful? Can you think of cases where you haven’t been very successful? (Why haven’t you been successful in these cases?)

(c) Do you also involve other local representatives when processing grievances?

2. (a) In addition to members’ grievances have you ever put forth a grievance of your own? (might have been important for other members as well- examples)

3. Have you ever formed and expressed a grievance which you thought should have been expressed as a grievance by the members? Have you ever mobilised workers on such a grievance? (examples)

Section 4: Negotiations with Management

1. Who do you regard as management in this organisation?

2. (a) On what type of issues have you negotiated with management locally? (examples)

(b) Have there been cases where you also involved other local union representatives in the negotiations?

(c) How would you characterise management’s reaction during negotiations?

(d) Would you say that you have been successful in negotiating with management?
(e) Can you think of cases where you haven’t been very successful? (examples)
Why was that?

3. How would you characterise management’s working practices in general?

Section 5: Membership attitudes and Leadership

1. (a) Do you think that the members are committed to the union? (If NO, who is to blame?)

   (b) What does that mean to the members?

   (c) How committed are they to the union?

   (d) Do you think that you could have done more than you are already doing in securing commitment? (If YES, what more?)

2. (a) How willing do you think members are to work for the union? (assume positions of responsibility, etc...)

   (b) (Depending on answer in 2a) Why do you think this is the case?

   (c) What do you think could be done (if anything) to motivate members to work for the union?

3. (a) “Collective action is the only effective means for improving workers’ employment conditions”. To what extent would you agree with this statement?

   (b) To what extent do you think members would agree with it?

   (c) How important is it to preserve this notion of collectivism amongst members?

4. (a) What do you think the members really want from the union?

   (b) What do you think is most important for the members- in terms of what the union has to offer?

5. (a) How do you think workers perceive management?

   (b) Does that facilitate or impede the union’s effectiveness?

   (c) Do you think you should be cultivating and preserving a specific image of management among members so as to maximise union influence and success?
Section 6: Union participation

1. What proportion of the members do you think would participate in any of its administrative bodies,...?

2. What proportion of the members would participate in collective action?

Section 7: Concluding remarks

1. Bearing in mind the responsibilities involved in being a shop steward, why did you choose to become one?
C.4 Categories extracted from interview data

(i) Frequency of contact (individual-collective) This category deals with the contact system of leaders with members, and distinguishes between individual contact, and collective contact. Frequency of individual contact, represents the frequency with which leaders meet with individual members, either in a union or organisational setting. Frequency of collective contact on the other hand, represents the frequency with which leaders organise meetings, not designated in the union’s charter, or have talks, with groups of members. The distinction between these two types of contact is important for the ability of leaders to influence members at both an individual, as well as a group level, especially in situations where members’ support is vital.

(ii) Type of contact (formal-informal) Two main types of contact were identified, formal and informal. The former includes informal talks and meetings with members, either in a union or an organisational setting, while the latter deals with more formal, structured meetings, organised by the leaders, where members are called upon to decide on specific issues, or express their views and put forward suggestions. An underlying assumption to this category is the idea that formal contact is collective rather than individual, and therefore one should not exclude the other; rather a balance should be observed between the two. As in the case of the above category, the distinction between formal and informal contact is crucial, since it reveals how the leader approaches members’ involvement in union affairs and decision-making processes, and the importance he (she) attaches to it.

(iii) Perceived value of contact This category deals with the value attached to frequent contact with members. The reasons cited by leaders as to the importance of frequent contact with members could serve as qualitative indicators of their impact on members. For example, some of the leaders viewed frequent contact as an information-exchange process between leaders and members, whereas others emphasised its importance for
building a strong, trusting relationship with members. The perspective which leaders adopt can enable inferences about their behaviour patterns in their relationship with members.

(iv) **Member involvement** The emphasis in this category was on the 'democratic' element of the relationship between leaders and members, i.e. the extent to which leaders consulted members prior to making decisions, encouraged members to put forward suggestions, and the perceived usefulness and value of their involvement. This also included more active involvement by members such as voting, to accept or reject decisions, but not in cases where this is prescribed by the union’s charter, such as in the case of voting to accept or reject a collective agreement, but rather in cases where a departmental or division problem has arisen and leaders seek input from members in reaching a decision. Naturally, leaders’ attempts to involve members into the organisation and encourage them to become actively involved, could affect the degree of loyalty to the organisation, as well as their willingness to become involved.

(v) **Written vs. Oral communication system** The extent to which leaders employed one form of communication over another was the focus of this category. What was ultimately sought was the extent to which leaders preferred and emphasised the merits of one form over another, or whether they focused on the use of both in tandem.

(vi) **Perceived effectiveness of communication system** On the basis of the above category, the degree to which leaders perceived their communication system with members to be effective also emerged from the data. This could serve as an indication of whether leaders can actually identify and appreciate potential weaknesses in the system, that prevent them from achieving optimum results in their communication with members and thus in getting closer to members. This would allow one to draw inferences about leaders’ views on the role of the membership within the union, and as such their behaviour patterns in their relationship to members.
(vii) Leader availability
This category primarily deals with the time allowed by leaders in their contact with members, although it was also attempted to uncover the extent to which leaders were also physically available for members to come into contact with them. Of course, in some occasions the nature of their organisational duties prevented them from being physically available, or from devoting sufficient time to listen to members.

(viii) Degree of concern about rank-and-file
Two basic elements comprise this category: (a) concern expressed by leaders about different aspects of union life, such as members' participation in union activities, willingness to work for the union, their perceived commitment/loyalty to the union etc., and (b) the degree of concern, that would lead to proposing ways of dealing with these issues. This would allow one to infer leaders' willingness to deal with the potential need for change in the status quo, and at the same time their ability to read any such signals from within their membership.

(viv) Perceived antagonism between management and workers
In this case, the extent to which leaders perceive an antagonistic relationship between management and workers serves to explore the confrontational element in the relationship between the leaders and management. At the same time it allows one to infer the type of image of management promoted amongst their members, which in turn might have an effect on members' own stereotypical attitudes towards management.

(x) Enthusiasm about collective action
This category deals with the leaders' enthusiasm about collective action and the philosophy of collectivism. Such attitudes and beliefs would influence their choice of action and could ultimately, also influence members' attitudes towards collective action and its perceived effectiveness.

(xi) Leader's own initiatives (reactive vs. proactive)
The extent to which leaders were more reactive, rather than proactive to members' needs, as well as to problems faced by the union as a whole, constitutes the theme in this category. A distinction between two aspects of leaders' initiatives has been made: (a) initiatives relating to individual members,
and (b) initiatives relating to the union’s functioning, i.e. organisational-level initiatives. This distinction would serve to identify the leaders’ perception of their role, as well as their contribution within the union.
C.5 INTERVIEWEES

1. MARCH 1995

(A). Union Officials- Pancyprian Workers Confederation

General Secretary of Confederation
General Secretary of the Construction Industry Federation
General Secretary of the Footwear and Clothing Industry Federation
General Organising Secretary
General Secretary of the Semi-Government Organisations Federation

(B). Union Officials- Pancyprian Labour Federation

General Secretary of Federation
General Secretary of the Construction Industry Union
General Secretary of the Shoe and Clothing Industry Union
General Secretary of the Semi-Government Organisations Union

(C). Representatives of Employer Associations and Industrialists

Industrial Relations Officer, Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Industrial Relations Officer, Employers and Industrialists Federation
General Manager, Footwear Industry

(D). Government representatives

Industrial Relations Officers, Industrial Relations Services, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance
2. NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1995

(I). Free Pancyprian Telecommunication Workers' Union (EPOET)-
(Cyprus Telecommunications Authority- CYTA)

President

General Secretary

Secretary of the Financial Services division

Secretary of the Specialised staff division

District Secretary (Limassol)

(II). Pancyprian Independent Telecommunication Workers Union (PASE-
CYTA)

President

General Secretary

Treasurer

District Secretary (Limassol)

Secretary of the Higher Technical Staff division

(III). Pancyprian Public and Semi-government Workers’ Union
(SIDIKEK-CYTA/CEA: Cyprus Electricity Authority)

Secretary of the Pancyprian Board for the CYTA Branch

Secretary of the CYTA Branch committee

Assistant Secretary of the Pancyprian Board for the CEA Branch

(IV). Free Pancyprian Electricity Workers Union (EPOPAI-CEA)

District Secretary (Central Offices-Nicosia)

District Secretary (District Office- Nicosia)

District Secretary (Limassol)

District Secretary (Dekeleia)
(V). Cyprus Electricity Professional Workers Union (SEPAIK-CEA)

General Secretary

Local Secretary (Central Offices- Nicosia)

Local Secretary (District Office-Nicosia))

Local Secretary (Limassol)

Local Secretary (Dekeleia)

Local Secretary (Moni)

(VI). Cyprus Electricity Shift Workers Union (SYVAIK-CEA)

President (Moni Power station)

General Secretary (Moni Power station)

(VII). Cyprus Broadcasting Employees Union
(EVRIK-CBC: Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation)

President

General Organising Secretary

(VIII). Cyprus Broadcasting Technical Employees Union (SYTYRIK-CBC)

General Secretary
C.6 The Interactive effect of 'Emotional' and 'Pragmatic' Leadership

In a three variable stepwise regression equation for independent, moderator and dependent variables, the independent variable is entered at step 1, followed by the moderator at step 2, and finally the product of the independent and moderator variables at step 3. The moderator hypothesis is supported if: (i) the F ratio for added variance at step 3 is significant (see Zedeck, 1971), and (ii) the interaction (Path c in figure 5.1) itself is significant (see Baron and Kenny, 1986). For the purpose of this analysis, 'emotional' leadership was employed as the moderator, partly due to the absence of existing theory that could have provided support for the nature of moderator effects.

The interaction term satisfied the conditions outlined above, in three out of the seven relationships where the interactive effects of the two leadership factors were assessed. More specifically, 'emotional' leadership was found to moderate the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and 'them and us' attitudes, as well as that between 'pragmatic' leadership and one of the 'workplace collectivism' factors, i.e. the extent to which members favour collective action. Both the change in variance explained, $R^2$ was significant as shown in table 1, as well as the interaction term itself.
Table 1: Hierarchical Multiple Regression results: Interaction terms for Two-Term Interactions among 'Emotional' and 'Pragmatic' Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables and interaction terms</th>
<th>Union Loyalty</th>
<th>Union Instrumentality</th>
<th>'Them and Us': Perceived Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic' Leadership</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional' Leadership</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic' Leadership</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional' Leadership</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional'× 'Pragmatic' c</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; change</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For convenience, control variables are not shown in the table above

b Coefficients are standardised regression coefficients (beta)

Interaction term computed from Z-scores (standard scores) for both the independent variable and the moderator

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2: Hierarchical Multiple Regression results: Interaction terms for Two-Term Interactions among 'Emotional' and 'Pragmatic' Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables and interaction terms</th>
<th>Workplace Collectivism Identification</th>
<th>Workplace Collectivism: Solidarity</th>
<th>Workplace Collectivism: Collectivist Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic' Leadership</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional' Leadership</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pragmatic' Leadership</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional' Leadership</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Emotional'× 'Pragmatic' c</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; square (Adj.)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; change</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For convenience, control variables are not shown in the table above

b Coefficients are standardised regression coefficients (beta)

Interaction term computed from Z-scores (standard scores) for both the independent variable and the moderator

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
However, to determine the meaning of the interaction term, and demonstrate the moderating influence of 'emotional' leadership, in other words that the higher the level of 'emotional' leadership the stronger the relationship between 'pragmatic' leadership and the above predictor variables, significant interactions were plotted. To plot the above interactions, the regression equation containing the interaction term was restructured to express the regression of Y(criterion) on X(predictor) at levels of Z (moderator), i.e. $Y = (b_1 + b_2Z)X + (b_2Z + b_0)$, with $(b_1 + b_2Z)$ referred to as the *simple slope* of the regression of Y on X, conditional on a single value of Z (Aiken and West, 1991). Three *simple regression equations* were then obtained, for three different values of Z, a high, medium and low value128, for each one of the dependent variables. The results of the computations of simple regression equations for the three values of Z, are given in table 2.

---

128 On the basis of Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations, regression equations were computed for a high value of Z- one standard deviation above the mean, a medium value of Z-mean, and low value of Z- one standard deviation below the mean.
Table 2 Simple regression equations for interactions

a) Regression of 'Pragmatic' Leadership (X) on 'Them and Us': Perceived division (Y), at particular values of 'Emotional' Leadership (Z)

In general: \[ Y = (-0.081 + 0.109Z)X + (0.026Z + 3.79) \]

- At \( Z = 3.87 \) \( Y = 0.34X + 3.89 \)
- At \( Z = 3.11 \) \( Y = 0.26X + 3.87 \)
- At \( Z = 2.35 \) \( Y = 0.18X + 3.85 \)

b) Regression of 'Pragmatic' Leadership (X) on 'Them and Us': Perceived conflict of interests (Y), at particular values of 'Emotional' Leadership (Z)

In general: \[ Y = (0.110 + 0.082Z)X + (0.093Z + 4.03) \]

- At \( Z = 3.87 \) \( Y = 0.43X + 4.39 \)
- At \( Z = 3.11 \) \( Y = 0.37X + 4.32 \)
- At \( Z = 2.35 \) \( Y = 0.30X + 4.25 \)

b) Regression of 'Pragmatic' Leadership (X) on 'Workplace Collectivism': collectivist orientation (Y), at particular values of 'Emotional' Leadership (Z)

In general: \[ Y = (0.135 + 0.044Z)X + (0.047Z + 3.99) \]

- At \( Z = 3.87 \) \( Y = 0.31X + 4.17 \)
- At \( Z = 3.11 \) \( Y = 0.27X + 4.14 \)
- At \( Z = 2.35 \) \( Y = 0.24X + 4.10 \)

Note: all coefficients are unstandardised, regression coefficients
Impact of 'Pragmatic' Leadership on 'Them and Us': Perceived Division, by levels of 'Emotional' Leadership

Impact of 'Pragmatic' Leadership on 'Them and Us': Perceived Conflict of Interests, by levels of 'Emotional' Leadership
Impact of 'Pragmatic' Leadership on 'Workplace Collectivism':
collectivist orientation, by levels of 'Emotional' Leadership

The figures above reveal the effect of the independent variable on the three
dependent variables, for two different levels of the moderator. Although there are no
changes in the direction of the relationship between the criterion and predictor
variable, with the introduction of the moderator, there is definitely a variation in the
strength of the relationship due to the moderator. That is, the relationship between the
predictor and the criterion is weaker at low levels of the moderator, and stronger at
high levels of the moderator. More specifically, in the case of ‘them and us’ attitudes,
the results suggest that the stronger the perceptions of ‘emotional’ leadership, and the
stronger the perceptions of ‘pragmatic’ leadership, the higher the level of both
perceived division between management and workers, and perceived conflict of
interests between management and workers. At the same time, the weaker their
perceptions of ‘emotional’ leadership, the weaker the above, positive relationship
between ‘pragmatic’ leadership and ‘them and us’. The same pattern is observed in the
case of the extent to which members favour collective action, referred to hereafter as
members’ ‘collectivist orientation’.

Once plotting was accomplished, two important questions had to be answered:
(i) whether for a specified value of Z, the regression line of Y on X was significantly
different from zero, i.e. whether the *slopes* of the regressions presented above were significantly different from zero, and (ii) whether for any pair of the simple regression equations their slopes differed from one another. To answer the first question, a method cited in Aiken and West (1991) was employed, which calculates the standard error of the *simple slope* for each regression, using values from the variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients. The results, summarised in table 5.7 show that all slope coefficients are significantly different from zero. As far as the second question is concerned, to establish whether any two slopes significantly differ from one another, Aiken and West (1991) show that the t-test for the significance of the interaction term coefficient in the overall analysis, is the only test required to establish the significance of the slopes. In this case, as shown in table 5.5, all interaction terms in the overall analysis were significant. This suggests that for any two simple slopes calculated at two different values of *Z*, their difference would be significant, which in turn indicates that the regression of *Y* on *X* varies across the range of *Z*-values. More specifically there is a significant difference between 'pragmatic' leadership and the dependent variables examined above, at high and low values of 'emotional' leadership.

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129 For a more detailed discussion, see Aiken and West (1991), ch.2.
### Table 3 Computation of Standard Errors and t-Tests for Simple Slopes

a) For regression of ‘Pragmatic’ Leadership (X) on ‘Them and Us’: Perceived division (Y), at particular values of ‘Emotional’ Leadership (Z)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple slope</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b_H = 0.34)</td>
<td>(s_H = 0.11)</td>
<td>(t = 0.34/0.11 = 3.09^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_M = 0.26)</td>
<td>(s_M = 0.098)</td>
<td>(t = 0.26/0.098 = 2.65^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_L = 0.18)</td>
<td>(s_L = 0.085)</td>
<td>(t = 0.18/0.085 = 2.12^*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) For regression of ‘Pragmatic’ Leadership (X) on ‘Them and Us’: Perceived conflict of interests (Y), at particular values of ‘Emotional’ Leadership (Z)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple slope</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b_H = 0.43)</td>
<td>(s_H = 0.09)</td>
<td>(t = 0.43/0.09 = 4.78^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_M = 0.37)</td>
<td>(s_M = 0.08)</td>
<td>(t = 0.37/0.08 = 4.63^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_L = 0.30)</td>
<td>(s_L = 0.07)</td>
<td>(t = 0.30/0.07 = 4.29^{**})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) For regression of ‘Pragmatic’ Leadership (X) on ‘Workplace Collectivism’: collectivist orientation (Y), at particular values of ‘Emotional’ Leadership (Z)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple slope</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b_H = 0.31)</td>
<td>(s_H = 0.07)</td>
<td>(t = 0.31/0.07 = 4.43^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_M = 0.27)</td>
<td>(s_M = 0.06)</td>
<td>(t = 0.27/0.06 = 4.50^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b_L = 0.24)</td>
<td>(s_L = 0.056)</td>
<td>(t = 0.24/0.056 = 4.29^{**})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-tailed t-test; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
REFERENCES


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