UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

GENDER, EMPLOYMENT AND THE LIFE COURSE: THE CASE OF WORKING DAUGHTERS IN AMMAN, JORDAN

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at
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Abstract

This thesis addresses two main gaps within social science research: the relative neglect of the household within general labour market theories and the relative neglect of the impact of life course changes in approaches to female labour force participation. In empirical terms, nowhere is the later gap more clear than the current research on female employment in the Middle East.

Therefore, this thesis aims to identifiy changing female employment patterns in Jordan with particular reference to young single urban women. Unlike previous generations, women currently marry at a later age, have relatively high education levels and have access to expanding employment opportunities. The result is that women are experiencing a new life course trajectory: single employed adulthood. Given that Jordanian society has traditionally been based on rigid gender and generation hierarchies, the study explores the implications of the new trends at two main and inter-related levels: the workplace and the household. The research methodology utilises both quantitative and qualitative tools and consists of an employer survey of 36 private sector institutions, a questionnaire survey of 302 households, and a sub-sample of 40 semi-structured interviews with young women.

At the workplace level it explores the bases of gender differentiated recruitment and occupational segregation and how this structures young women's work opportunities. At the household level the investigation assesses the characteristics that are likely to influence young female labour supply and considers inter-generational patterns of household income management. Synthesising these perspectives, the research then goes on to explore the ways in which normative patriarchal relations are responding to young women's prolonged single adulthood as well as young women's perceptions of their work. One of the main findings of the research is that single adulthood may have expanded opportunities and the aspirational horizon for some young women but it had not brought about a significant redistribution of either power relations or gender divisions in society at large.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This study explores the disproportionally high workforce participation of young unmarried women[1] in Amman, Jordan, a group effectively experiencing a new life course[2] trajectory of single employed adulthood and who have as yet received little attention in the debates on women's work in developing countries. Indeed, although there is a considerable amount of research on women's positions in the labour market and the impact of work on their lives and gender division of labour (see for example, Barrett, 1980; Blumberg, 1991a; Dex, 1985; Scott, 1994; Stichter, 1990; Walby, 1988a), the lack of attention to life course changes has meant that most these analyses have considered female employment from the generalised stereotype of married women with young children. Studies on women's employment which have focused upon the reproductive roles[3] of married women have in turn tended to emphasise the negative influence these have on their employment opportunities. Yet, in light of empirical evidence from both industrialised and developing countries which suggest that childbearing absorbs fewer and fewer years of an average woman's life and that there is considerably more flexibility in the timing of these years than in the past (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a: 164-6; Hanson and Pratt, 1993:28), greater attention has been paid more recently to the impact of life course changes on women's lives (see Allatt et al, 1987; Katz and Monk, 1993). This increased attention has also arisen as a challenge to tendencies that universalised women's experiences both in terms of space and time and which have portrayed them in the context of a western framework of the nuclear family with a male breadwinner (H.Standing, 1991:6). Research addressing the life course attempts to go beyond the notion that women represent a homogeneous group. The life course approach also examines women's lives as:

> ...extended so that they are not only mothers, wives and workers but also in relation to other generations - as daughters, grandmothers and so on - and in domains outside the family and workplace, their wider community of friends as well as in relation to various social and political institutions, which will vary in significance over the life course (Katz and Monk, 1993:20).

One of the rationales for looking at the intersections between the life course and women's work is because women seem to display distinct patterns of age-related economic activity, which are not apparent among men (Stichter, 1990:23-4; Momsen, 1993:124). Yet, despite acknowledgment of the fact that women's work is contingent upon their age (not to mention other factors such as race, religion and class), the life course stage of single employed adulthood has neither been sufficiently recognised nor adequately researched.

In placing the concerns of this study within the context of the conceptual interrelationships between gender, the life course and employment, the main argument is that young working women in Amman are experiencing a new 'niche' in the life course, a stage which their predecessors rarely passed through. In this context we need to know how this came about;[4] the extent to which it is accommodated within existing personal and familial norms and expectations; the implications employment as single adults have for women's lives and identities, and the extent to which increasing levels of employment are related to rising levels of education and postponement of marriage. Additional questions include whether employment among young women will continue into their later, married and childbearing years, or whether the employment patterns of young women are primarily determined by employers' needs for a cheap, unskilled and temporary workforce. In the present study, these questions are broached by looking at women's employment in a holistic manner (comprising economic, social and ideological dimensions) both in the workplace itself, and in the arena of the household.

Given the growth in young women's employment in Amman, the remainder of this chapter situates the concerns of the study within recent trends in female employment in developing countries in general and in the Middle East more specifically (more detailed analysis of theories relating to the study are dealt with in Chapter Two). The chapter goes on to provide a brief outline of the research methodology utilised, the circumstances of conducting the field research and concludes with an explanation of the organisation of the thesis.

1.1 Recent Trends in Female Employment in Developing Countries

In the past two decades there has been a steady upward trend in the participation of women in the labour force in developing countries (Bruce and Dwyer, 1988:4; Moore, 1988:97; Stichter, 1990:1). The context of this increase includes the inter-related factors of recession, debt crises and economic globalisation.[5] The roots of globalisation lie in the global economic recession in the early 1980s, where many developing countries became entrapped in debt repayment. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations debt repayment should be approached through increasing the production of tradables as opposed to non-tradables. Competitiveness among countries with large debt became so significant that labour market regulations have been eased in order to increase productivity (Standing, 1989:1078). This primarily meant the erosion of minimum wage and other labour benefits and securities. With the decreased role of the state and the increased role of the private sector women have been increasingly recruited in the labour force, especially in the export manufacturing sector. Concurrent with this increase, is what has come to be known in the literature as the 'feminisation' of the labour force (Joekes, 1987, Standing 1989).[6]

With the open economy and export-led industrialisation the 'family wage' in many developing countries is being replaced with the 'individual wage,' and conditions of the industrial workforce are increasingly informalised (Standing, 1989:1078). Dominant perceptions of women's cheaper labour power has been an important element within strategies to stimulate economic growth (ibid, 1989:1078).[7] Other explanations for the rise in female employment in manufacturing industry are attributed to perceptions of women's docility, subservience and manual dexterity (Elson and Pearson, 1981:93), and as Susan Joekes (1995:3) has summed up:

> In the contemporary era, no strong export performance in manufactures by any developing country has ever been secured without the reliance on female labour.

Within this context, there has been considerable documentation of the fact that rises in female employment have largely been concentrated among young, single women (see for example, Heyzer, 1986; Salaff, 1981; Kung; 1983; Wolf, 1992, 1990b). It has been suggested that young women are preferred by employers because they are assumed to lack consciousness of their rights and labour regulations, are less likely to join labour unions or actions, and will accept lower wages than married women (Safa, 1990:77; Wolf, 1992).

The consequences of export-led industrialisation on women's employment have been largely viewed negatively, with evidence to suggest that working conditions in export-led industries are unsafe and insanitary, with long working hours, low wages and minimum long term job security (see for example, Elson and Pearson, 1982; Eviota, 1992; Férnandez-Kelly; Joekes, 1987). From a political standpoint it is argued that such firms involve the transfer of low skilled, unstable jobs to the Third World where perceptions of male authoritarianism over a submissive female labour are reinforced (Eviota, 1992:125). However, the extent to which manufacturing employment entrenches female subordination has been a matter of debate, for there are those who argue that increasing working opportunities for poor women (despite inferior positions in poorly paid jobs), helps them to improve other aspects of their lives (Kabeer, 1995; Lim, 1990; Wolf 1990a). For example, women workers' contribution to family income may lead to improved family well-being, and increased personal status and decision making power within their households (Safa, 1995). Moreover, the extent to which women's inferior working conditions in manufacturing employment is unvaried has been brought into question. Writing on the Philippines, for example, Chant and McIlwaine (1995b) demonstrate that women's working conditions significantly differ from one manufacturing firm to another, in terms of wages and benefits as well as job satisfaction among workers.

1.2 Recent Trends in Female Employment in the Middle East

Although many non-oil producing Middle Eastern countries, like other developing countries, have been undergoing structural adjustment programmes, this has not been accompanied by import substitution industrialisation, nor have they evolved into mainstream export manufacturing economies although, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are possibly exceptions.[8] Jordan for example has only recently tried to adopt development strategies based on export-manufacturing and still is a long way from competing in the global market. Much of the economy is still maintained by government intervention that inadvertently reduces private (especially foreign) sector investment and most employment is concentrated in the public sector (World Bank, 1995:124; also Chapter Three). In terms of female employment, unlike other developing countries, the Middle East has not experienced the same upward trend as other developing regions (Moghadam, 1995:2). In fact, it is widely accepted that female employment rates in the Middle East tend to be lower than most other regions in world (United Nations, 1991:83).[9]

Concerning Jordan, more specifically, female labour force participation has indeed been consistently low. The rate of growth has also been slow. In 1979 female labour force participation rates were 7.7% and although this had increased by 1991 (13.4%) it is still low compared with other developing countries.[10] However, currently, the rate of growth of female employment exceeds the rate of growth of male employment (see Al-Qudsi et al. 1993:3; see also Chapter Three). In addition, the current age structure of the female labour force is quite young, where the majority (68%) are below the age of 30 years. There is also evidence to suggest that increasing employment opportunities for women seem to be in the industrial sector (Abu Amra, 1994; World Bank, 1994c; see also Chapter Three). Therefore, the focus of this study, on young women workers, represents a group that has emerged relatively recently in significant numbers in the Jordanian labour market, a trend which is not too dissimilar from other developing countries, although relatively less obvious in quantitative terms.

Yet because Middle Eastern women have not been influenced by industrialisation, in the same manner as South East Asian countries for example, and did not experience a visible increase in the labour force, the region in general, and Jordan in particular, have tended to be ignored in the debates revolving around the impacts of employment on women's lives.[11] The reasons that are commonly cited for the shortage of women workers in the Middle East are: conservative cultural and/or religious attitudes (see Mernissi, 1975; Minces, 1982); early age at marriage and prolonged childbearing (see Azzam et al, 1985; Youssef, 1978), and lack of education and training (see Azzam et al, 1985; Doctor and Khoury, 1991; Moghadam 1993).

In addressing first, the matter of cultural and religious constraints, discussions on the social and economic position of Middle Eastern women have traditionally been analysed within the framework of Islam, the dominant religion in the area. This, unfortunately, has often involved misinformed conceptions that have 'sealed off' Muslim women from the theoretical mainstream within the social sciences (Kandiyoti, 1995:11).[12] However, and as Valentine Moghadam (1993:7) claims:

> By examining changes over time and variations within societies and by comparing Muslim and non-Muslim gender patterns, one recognises that the status of women in Muslim societies is neither uniform, nor unchanging nor unique.

As for the second factor of age at marriage, there is evidence to suggest that this has been consistently rising.[13] As for prolonged childbearing, some research suggest that women have an increased desire and ability to achieve lower family size (Nawar et al, 1995 on Egypt). Finally, in terms of education and training, growing levels of female education in the Middle East are increasingly becoming visible (see Al-Qudsi et al, 1993; Farrag, 1991; Fergues, 1995; Nawar et al, 1995, United Nations, 1995; see also Chapter Three).[14]

Within this framework, therefore, there is a need to re-address the reasons that lie behind the marginalisation of research on Middle Eastern women relative to others in the developing world. One of the aims of this study is to bring in the experience of Middle Eastern women in line with the global processes of recession and globalisation by demonstrating the increasing, as well as changing patterns, of female labour force participation.

1.3 Gender Employment and the Life Course: A Review of Literature

Conceptually, literature on women and employment has long since acknowledged the interdependencies of the household and the workplace arenas (see Beechey, 1987, Hartmann, 1979; Walby, 1988a, 1988b; also Chapter Two). The importance of these interactions has been increasingly borne out empirically as well (see for example, Chant 1991a; Hanson and Pratt, 1995; McIlwaine, 1993; Safa, 1995). Parallel to household - workplace linkages, there is also increasing recognition of the impact of life course trajectories on women's employment (see Katz and Monk, 1993, Masini, 1991; Saraceno, 1991). However, within this field of inquiry, few studies have directly addressed the experiences of young working women.

By and large, studies that look at the workplace have highlighted the participation of young women (see for example, Safa, 1995 on the Caribbean; Elson and Pearson, 1981, Heyzer, 1986 on South East Asia). However, the general assumption, that employers' preferences for young single women determine their high participation, has resulted in little attention to household factors that influence labour force involvement (for exceptions, see Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung, 1983; Wolf, 1990a, 1991). Another reason for the exclusion of young single women is perhaps due to the fact that they are not perceived to be as involved in the gender assigned duties of reproduction as their older married counterparts (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a:20). Despite some exceptions, therefore, it is rare, for research on workforce participation among young women to explore the linkages between labour market factors and household level influences. The following will elucidate on this gap through a review of relevant literature that looks at both the demand and supply of female labour. It has to be noted, however, even though they will be discussed separately, labour demand and supply factors are significantly interrelated.

1.3.1 Demand for Female Labour

Analyses of labour demand for young women have suffered from two main limitations. The first is a sectoral limitation whereby most literature has looked at the participation of young women in labour intensive manufacturing (see Elson and Pearson, 1981; Fernández-Kelly, 1983; Heyzer and Kean, 1988; Humphrey, 1984; Kung, 1983; Lim 1983; amongst others). This has resulted in the portrayal of young women workers as synonymous with 'factory girls'. A second limitation, and which in some respects is a by-product of the focus on manufacturing industry, is a regional bias. Most of the literature on this subject has been carried out in Southeast Asia (see for example, Heyzer and Kean, 1988; Kung, 1983; Lim, 1983; Salaff, 1990; Stivens, 1987; Wolf, 1991) and to a lesser degree in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Fernândez-Kelly, 1983; Pearson, 1990; Safa, 1995; Tiano, 1990), which reflects the preponderance of export manufacturing in these regions.

Although evidence from the Middle East suggests that the majority of working women are also young and single (Farrag, 1991; Ibrahim, 1985; Moghadam, 1994; Mujahid, 1985; Rockwell, 1985), as stated earlier, this cannot be linked to industrialisation as they tend to be concentrated in the service sector (Moghadam, 1993:52). The present investigation will therefore help to redress an occupational and regional imbalance that exists in the literature on the workforce participation of young single women. By looking beyond the manufacturing industry at other sectors, it is also hoped to identify the extent to which stereotypes common in industrial employment have wider relevance or not. For example, it has been pointed out that employers seem to prefer young female labour in the service sector (for example in tourism employment), but for reasons such as 'good looks' as well as 'energy' (see Chant, 1990a on Mexico; Chant and McIlwaine 1995a on the Philippines) (see also Chapter Four).

Moving on to the literature on the Middle East, existing studies fall short of fully exposing the range of factors influencing female labour demand. For example, there is limited information on gender differentials in wages and labour recruitment practices (Papps, 1992). In addition, the existing research acknowledging the prevalence of gender discrimination and segregation remains largely descriptive in scope. For example, evidence of wage discrimination is mostly concerned with the issue of measurement and does not fully account for the reasons behind male-female wage differentials (see Hosni and Al-Qudsi 1988; Malkawi, 1990). Research that investigates employers' attitudes and practices regarding gender in terms of recruitment, promotions and benefits remains deficient in accounting for sectoral differences or variations based on age and marital status (see Al-Meer 1988; Amerah et al. 1992; although for an exception see Papps, 1993).

Moreover, technological change and its effects on female labour demand have not been fully explored. While some studies have analysed the increased participation of women in manufacturing employment (see Ibrahim, 1985; Joekes, 1985;

Moghadam, 1994; Rockwell, 1985), few have addressed the changing and modernising occupational structures of labour markets in general. Within this context, rising demand for technically skilled workers or the changing nature of the service and manufacturing sectors and how this affects demand for female labour need to be examined.

In conclusion, therefore, because little is known about the mechanisms and changes of gender discrimination and segregation in employment in the Middle East in general, this study will attempt to bridge some of this gap through exploring the significance of age in the occupational segregation of labour in Amman (see Chapter Four). One of the main concerns here is to situate the increasing demand for young female labour, especially in newly emerging occupations, within the context of the traditional notions of gender segregation in society at large.[15] It further attempts to investigate whether distinct patterns of female employment are emerging as a result.

1.3.2 Supply of Female Labour

Moving on to supply side factors that influence female employment, in empirical studies, these have tended to fall into three main groups: (1) personal characteristics; (2) household level material and demographic characteristics;[16] and (3) social/ideological dimensions of family organisation (see Chant, 1991a:13; Stichter, 1990:39-40). While the present study will examine all these factors conceptually (see Chapter Two) and empirically (see Chapters Five and Six) it is important to highlight a few issues here.

As stated earlier, the majority of empirical supply side research has tended to concentrate on married women and emphasised the tensions between women's reproductive and productive activities and the gender division of labour between spouses (see for example, Benería and Sen, 1986; Hammam, 1986; Safa, 1995 among others). The continuous changes occurring in individuals' life course stages and how this affects their roles and employment prospects are somewhat neglected, however. In addition, these changes are usually accompanied by transitions in the life span of households as well. Therefore, analysis of female labour supply, also need to take into account the stage of the household domestic cycle (see Chapter Two).

The fact that most working daughters in the present study are in households in the 'advanced' stages of their domestic cycles, when numbers of adult members are at their largest (see González de la Rocha, 1993), means that attention to gender divisions of labour or the ideological issues regarding family organisation have to address age as well as gender inequalities. In general, studies focusing on spousal relations have widely documented married women's disadvantaged positions vis-à-vis household decision-making, power relations, and the resulting tension and conflict between spouses (see Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Kabeer 1995; Kandiyoti, 1988; Sen, 1988). However, the fact that daughters could be doubly disadvantaged and face conflicts arising from gender as well as age and seniority relations have received less attention (for exceptions see, Blanc-Szanton, 1990 on Thailand; Greenhalgh, 1988 on Taiwan and Wolf, 1990a on Java and Hong Kong).

The studies that have looked at daughters' workforce participation have suggested for example, that as households resort to multiple earning strategies, it is daughters, rather than wives, who are sent out to work (Fernández-Kelly 1983:220; Stichter, 1990:23). The reason for this is that the employment of daughters seems to be less threatening to patriarchal authority and the gender division of labour between spouses (Lamphere, 1986). Nevertheless, the focus on relations between spouses has clearly posed limits on a broader understanding of how household division of labour affects all family members. In addition, what little research there is on young working women has tended to look at migrant workers; especially those who leave home for industrial processing zones (see Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a; Eviota, 1992; Kung, 1983, Salaff, 1990), or who migrate abroad, usually for work in the service sector (see Eviota, 1992; Tacoli, 1996). Yet, although these women usually remit money, being away form their natal homes they are, to a certain extent, outside the immediate authority of household relations. There are fewer studies that look at working daughters who still live at home. The few studies which do look at daughters residing with their families reveal contrasting evidence as to the impacts of young women's work on their own lives and those of other household members. For example, while research on Java (Wolf 1992, 1991, 1990b), shows that parents exert little control over their daughters employment, income or social freedom, other research based on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, indicates that parents control their daughters' decisions, employment and income (Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung, 1983; Salaff, 1981).

Moving on to literature on the Middle East, there is a body of research that addresses the reasons behind the limited workforce participation of women in the region. One strand of such research focuses on the supply of female labour as statistically measured against single determining variables. These variables tend to be fertility (see for example, Abdalla 1987; Youssef, 1978) and education (see, for example, Azzam et al, 1985; Doctor and Khoury, 1991; Farrag, 1991; Mujahid, 1985). In fact, most of the research on Jordanian women, which in it self is limited in numbers, seem to search for such 'determinants' (see Amra and Takriti, 1994; Mujahid, 1985; Shakatreh, 1995; Toubeh, 1994). One of the uncertainties cited for this kind of analysis is that such linear causal investigations remain deficient in addressing the full scale of reasons behind the limited supply of female labour (Papps 1992:603). In other words, when investigating female employment against one single determinant there is a danger of misinterpreting and/or overestimating the outcome. In addition, any set of 'determinants' is likely to affect different women differently and this approach fails to capture this diversity by aggregating women's experiences. The current study will attempt to discount the notion that female employment patterns can be explained by a pre-determined set of variables. Instead, it will attempt to reveal that reality is complex and multi-layered even when focusing on one age group who supposedly share a similar life experience.

The second strand of research attempts to demonstrate the complex and diverse factors behind women's limited work force participation through explanations of gender roles and relations in the domestic sphere and how these interact with those operating at broader societal, economic and state levels (see for example Aleene Early, 1993; Lazreg, 1990; Shami and Taminian, 1989). These generally argue that patriarchal authority in the Middle East, is not as rigid and oppressive as is usually assumed and that there are continuous negotiations between men and women (El-Solh and Mabro 1994; Kandiyoti, 1988; Moghadam, 1992; Wikan 1982). Although valuable in providing information on existing patterns of female employment, this research has tended to concentrate overwhelmingly on low income married women and left out comparative data on working women from different economic strata and marital status (for an exception see Macleod, 1991). The result of this is limited information about the relation between family income and female employment in the region.

Moving on to the impact of work on young women's lives and their families, although there is valuable research that explores the diversity of women's experiences and household circumstances, much of this remains fragmentary (Rassam, 1984a). For example, there are surprisingly very few studies that address what happens to working women's incomes and the extent to which there are gender differentials in income distribution and access to household resources. The studies that address household resource management and consumption, reveal that women's secondary status vis-à-vis men's in terms of consumption rights is not as passive as it seems and that is precisely why their access to production is usually hampered by the men (see Hoodfar, 1988; Maher, 1981). For example, writing on the rural Moroccan context Vanessa Maher (1981:143) claims that:

> Women are likely to use money in ways which would reduce their dependence on men, or would subvert the patterns of consumption which symbolise the high social value of men and low social value of women.

Moreover, given existing patriarchal power relations there are few studies that address the impact of work on women's autonomy and decision making capacities. One study, based on Egypt, that attempts to assess female autonomy in relation to female roles in general, rather than employment in particular, concludes that overall levels of female autonomy are low (Nawar et al, 1995). However, the same study also asserts that within the complexities of family relations women usually manage to influence family decisions particularly in issues pertaining to their lives (ibid:174).

Finally, one of the factors which has received most attention in studies of young women workers in the Middle East is the increase in veiling (El-Guindi 1981; Hoffman-Ladd, 1987; Watson, 1994; Zuhur, 1992). These studies indicate that the increasing presence of young women in 'male spaces' is posing conflicts between the normative ideology of gender segregation and a reality of increasing male-female interaction in everyday life, and that Islamic dress serves as a shield to emphasise female modesty in new circumstances (Macleod, 1991). However, such analyses of increasing presence of young working women in 'male spaces' should be broadened beyond young women's bodily concealment in reaction to increased public participation. As yet, there are few studies that scrutinise the impact of increasing female employment on normative gender relations, beyond the framework of veiling (for an exception see Shaefer Davies 1993).

In conclusion, the main concerns of this study in terms of female labour supply are to stress the importance of the temporal setting of both women's and their respective households' life course stages. Concentrating on one age cohort of women will show similarities and differences as a result of current economic and social processes at a micro-level. More specifically, the research examines the causes, characteristics and consequences of the increase in young women's workforce participation. It attempts to reveal the extent to which this is accompanied by changes in household organisation and/ or flexibility in gender roles and relations and whether employment enables young women to achieve some measure of personal autonomy. Finally, it questions the notion of the 'traditional family' and asks about its place within an on-going process of change in gender roles and relations. Within this it attempts to reveal how young women adapt to expanding mobility and experiences and the impacts this has on other social/psychological aspects of their current and future lives.

1.4 Methods of Research

This study is based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research techniques. Quantitative research helps us to see patterns, while qualitative in-depth research provides insight into some of the reasons behind these patterns (see Appendix One for a fuller discussion). In addition, corresponding with the study's main objective of looking at the intersections between the female employment, the life course and the household, research methodology is devised to cover these three different areas.

The first aspect of the study involves the extraction of the baseline data on the labour force from the 1991 Government of Jordan's 'Employment, Unemployment and Poverty Survey.' This was deemed necessary due to the limited availability of statistical information on Jordanian women. The workplace aspect of the study, is based on an employer survey of 36 establishments in Amman. These were chosen to represent a wide range of private sector activities. Interviews were conducted through structured questionnaires with either the employers themselves or, in the cases of large establishments, personnel managers (see Chapter Four and Appendix Three).

The household arena is explored through quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative survey was based on questionnaires administered in face-to-face interviews in 14 locations across the city of Amman with 302 households. The sample was drawn through the random sorting of households previously visited in the above-mentioned 'Employment, Unemployment and Poverty Survey.' The questionnaire was administered to women working or non-working between 20 and 30 years of age, who were single, and not enrolled in education at the time of the interview (see Appendix Two). In addition to this, 40 households from this survey were revisited for more in-depth semi-structured interviews. This was with young women and, depending on household circumstances, other family members as well. The interviews explored family relations, income distribution and management, life and work history, social activity, and views on marriage and work (see Appendix Two).

1. 5 Locating the Research and the Researcher

Aside from outlining the research methodology, it is also important to discuss the circumstances of conducting research, in light of current post-modern calls for researchers to locate themselves and their personal objectives and experiences with the context of their research (see Lal, 1996; Wolf, 1996). Aiwha Ong (1988) for example, has confronted the ways in which Third World women have been represented by Western scholars as illiterate poor and powerless in relation to themselves who are educated, better-off and in control of their lives (see also Parpart, 1993). In other words, we must be careful to recognise the inequalities in power between the researcher and the researched and how these affect representation. Given increasing self awareness by feminists/gender researchers of their limitations as researchers, many are focusing on the reflective mode or simply depicting women's voices rather then representing their own (Wolf, 1996:34)

However, how should the issue of representation and the supposed power relations or hierarchy between the researcher and the researched be approached when the researcher is a compatriot and not a Westerner? This does not diminish the above mentioned dilemmas but poses a different set of issues. Researchers who study their own societies have been dubbed as 'indigenous' researchers (see AlTorki and El-Solh, 1988).[17] Sometimes they are also described as 'insiders' (see Zavella, 1996). At other times, however, the term 'outsider' is used to denote the person of indigenous status but who is not a member of the specific sub-culture of the study (El-Solh, 1988). In placing my 'indigenous' status in the current research the following will illustrate how I was always in a schism between an 'insider' and an 'outsider' (El-Solh 1988, Zavella, 1996). Rather than justify my 'insider/outsider' position, in the following, I will discuss what it means to conduct research on Arab women as an Arab women.

Obtaining official data and permission

Due to my position as an 'indigenous' researcher and awareness that this might put academic objectivity into question I was determined to plan a research methodology with the maximum randomness possible. Therefore, for the household questionnaire survey this was thought to be the official channels of the Department of Statistics (see above). Ironically, striving towards this goal put me in a situation that evolved to signify my 'otherness' vis-à-vis my compatriots.

Initial contact with the Department of Statistics proved that my request for a computer printout from one of their previous samples of locations and addresses was possible. However, since it is uncommon to give official information to individuals like myself, a prerequisite was that my research assistants and I would need a security clearance and an official permission from the Ministry of Interior. The six week experience of achieving this was nerve-racking (see also El-Solh, 1988 on a similar experience in Iraq).

The Ministry of Interior is possibly the largest and the busiest of the government ministries. There, also on behalf of my research assistants, I was sent from one office to the next in order to get various departments' approvals, signatures, stamps, fees and photocopies. Throughout, there were insinuations about my gender and sexuality. Sometimes I had the sense that I was sent from one office to the next *because* I was a woman. In addition, the jokes that were made about the research topic were innumerable. The most common were: 'You are going to all this trouble because of a study on women? What for?' 'Researching young women? You should find me a bride.' 'Can I conduct this research with you?' After completing the documentation at the Ministry of Interior my research assistants and myself had to get approvals from the intelligence headquarters, as well as the public security department and where the above described experiences was replicated twice over.

Conducting Fieldwork

It is a fact that fieldwork is constructed through the personality of the fieldworker (Friedl, 1994:93). Each fieldworker brings with him/her a set of questions, assumptions and even agendas. My own case is an example of this. Besides the intellectual exercise, my research represented a personal commitment to the empowerment of Jordanian women. Within this context, the focus on young single women is by no means accidental as it reflected my own identity. I am aware of the problematic of youth in the life course of Arab women both from personal and previous work experience.[18] Indeed, at the onset of the fieldwork, there was an undeniable interactive spirit between the research assistants, respondents, and myself, despite respective differences amongst us, since we collectively belonged to this sensitive life course stage. As one young woman exclaimed as I was unwittingly addressing her problems through busily filling out a questionnaire: 'You are God sent! I am in need of a friend who understands.'

Despite this collectivity, however, I was acutely aware of my 'otherness'. At the outset of the fieldwork I would say my name (i.e. proclaim a Christian identity), that I was pursuing a Ph.D. in London and when asked would reveal the area I lived in which, more often than not, signified class difference. These facts were hard to accept for some of the women, and had I been a foreign researcher the 'difference' would have been more easily accepted. Often, I spent the first half of the interview answering questions about myself: How could my parents allow me to travel abroad? How could I live alone? Would I possibly marry a foreigner? In the early stages of the fieldwork I saw this as a reciprocal interchange. Mothers, especially, took an acute interest in me. They usually asked about my mother through inquiring about her health and sending her their greetings. They did not know my mother, of course, but I felt this was perhaps a life stage linkage that legitimised their interchange with me.[19]

In addition, there was often sympathy for I was frequently told: 'May God help you. What makes you do such work?' Indeed, for women young and old, who's autonomy is controlled by varying degrees of segregation, my position was seen as particularly difficult This sympathy sometimes worked to my advantage since it extended itself to people going out of their way to make me feel welcome. In addition, however, the gender conditioning of most women saw my work as not only strenuous but according to some even dangerous.[20] A few times, as it was getting dark there was genuine concern for my safety.

On occasion I was asked to give my home phone number which sometimes I saw as a challenge to my authenticity (I am who I say I am) and at other times I saw as a sincere desire to become 'friends'. I usually conceded since I felt it was a gesture that I was more than a researcher and that they were more than mere respondents, until one incident when I received a phone call from a woman who was very hurt because I did not instantly recognise her. After this incident, I became Mariam (the Arabic and less Christian version of my name), did not easily volunteer information about myself and rarely gave my telephone number. I could not possibly become a friend to each and every respondent, nor could I hope to gain everyone's trust. After all, it was not an equal relationship. I needed their responses on which to base my study and reciprocity could not be integrated into this framework beyond giving back the information at a later stage. I resigned myself to the fact that I represent the 'other' for most of the women interviewees. Some wanted to know my 'otherness' and others distrusted it. The singularity I first felt about our collective life course stage gradually eroded as the fieldwork progressed.

1.6 Thesis Organisation

The thesis contains seven chapters where the first and present chapter has outlined the main research objectives and their rationale. The second chapter sets out the theoretical parameters of the study, and places them within the context of wider debates on gender labour market analysis, female labour force participation and the life course. Chapter Three is divided into two parts, the first, provides background to the Jordanian political economy and situates the growth of the city of Amman within the larger changes occurring within the country in the past two decades. The second part looks at the labour market and employment in particular. It reviews major characteristics of the labour force as well as highlighting the nature of employment and unemployment in the different sectors of the labour market. This review also situates female employment trends within the context of the wider economy.

Chapter Four focuses on the demand for young female labour in Amman and is based on the employer survey. It examines the attitudes and strategies of employers in different private sector establishments in Amman and reveals their rationalisations for current patterns of labour composition. It examines the levels of gender typing of jobs and how this contributes to the reproduction of gender inequality. It focuses on the differences in gender segregation at work between sectors as well as within sectors which demonstrates differentials in employers interests and how this results in a variation in demand for young female labour.

Chapter Five, through the analysis of the household survey data, focuses on gender and age differences in the labour supply of adult household members. The main aim of the chapter is to identify the household circumstances that induce the workforce participation of daughters. The chapter also explores household divisions in the management and appropriation of wages. It reveals how despite waged employment, some young women continue to have little power in negotiating their own labour or the control of their earnings.

Chapter Six which is largely based on qualitative data examines the implications of young women's work on gender and generation relations at both household and workplace levels. The aim of the chapter is to explore the notion that Jordanian women are experiencing a new life course trajectory: single employed adulthood, and how gender relations are reconstructed in order to accommodate young women's prolonged singlehood. The Chapter also examines young women's own experiences and perceptions of their new life course trajectory. One of the major findings of this chapter is that single adulthood may have expanded opportunities and aspirational horizons for some young women, but it has not brought about either a redistribution of power relations or gender divisions in society at large. The seventh and final chapter brings together the findings of the study with particular attention to its theoretical implications, questions for future research and its insights for policy

Notes to Chapter One

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[1] The target population of young single women in the study are aged 20-30 years.

[2] The life course approach implies that societies are structured by age as much as they are structured by gender or class. According to David Kertzer (1991:22) it provides a broad framework for the study of how women's lives and family relations have generally changed in the Third World. See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion.

[3] Women's reproductive roles involve 'biological 'reproduction which is giving birth, 'physical' reproduction which involves cooking ,washing, cleaning and taking care of household members whether old or young, and 'social' reproduction which refers to the maintenance of ideological conditions that maintain and actually regenerate family relations and hierarchies (Brydon and Chant, 1989:10-11).

[4] One obvious reason is demographic, since the proportion of young adults in the population age pyramid in Jordan is now larger than it has ever been in the past (see Chapters Two and Three).

[5] Globalisation is a result of rapid growth in world trade and flows in foreign investment together with rapid technological change and increasing efficiency of communications and transport. As more and more countries join the economic mainstream of free trade and integration, benefits seem to be unevenly distributed between countries and between different groups within countries. Moreover, globalisation seems, in some places, to have led to massive job losses, whether due to the relocation of some firms to countries with cheaper labour, or as a result of new technologies that replace labour (International Labour Organisation: 1995:48-49; World Bank, 1995:50-51).

[6] Guy Standing (1989) has proposed that the globalisation of production and increasing flexibility of labour markets favours the 'feminisation of employment' in the double sense that women's involvement in industrial occupations is increasing and the conditions of employment are deteriorating.

[7] For example, a study of Moroccan clothing industry showed that the proportion of women workers was higher both within and between firms when the product was for foreign markets (Joekes, 1985). See also Tiano (1990) on Mexican border areas and Ward (1990) for a global analysis.

[8] See Richards and Waterbury (1990) and Moghadam (1993) for fuller discussions on industrialisation in the Middle East.

[9] Female labour force participation rates for the Middle East and North Africa as a region were 17% in the early Nineties. This is compared with 31% for Latin America and the Caribbean, 37% for sub-Saharan Africa and 43% for South East Asia (United Nations 1995).

[10] Female labour force participation here refers to the percentage of workers among the total female population between the working ages of 15 to 65 years.

[11] For example, Valentine Moghadam (1992:2) has pointed out that the topic of female employment in the Middle East is under-researched outside Middle Eastern studies and that the region is frequently left out of books on women workers in world economy.

[12] According to Marnia Lazreg (1988:82) research conducted by Western and Western trained scholars, represents Arab women as: 'passive pawns trapped in a world dominated by hopelessly outdated and regressive religious traditions.' (see also Afshar, 1993:6-7).

[13] Age at marriage among Jordanian women has been steadily increasing in the last 20 years. While it was 17.8 years in 1972, it had increased to 21 years by 1979 and again to 24.7 years by 1991 (Department of Statistics, 1972, 1979 and 1991; see also Nawar et al, 1995 on Egypt).

[14] According to the United Nations (1995) between 1970 and 1991, the gender gap, in the Arab region, in school enrollement at the secondary level was reduced from 54% to 32% making it the fastest closing of such gaps in the developing world. In addition, the annual percentage rate of growth in enrollment in tertiary levels, in the Arab region in the early nineties, was 5.3% for females compared with 3.7% for males.

[15] Gender segregation as identified by Fatima Mernissi (1975:51) is the 'systematic prevention of interaction between men and women not related to each other by marriage or by blood. Gender segregation divides all social space into male spaces and female spaces.'

[16] A household is defined here as a residential and consumption unit (Brydon and Chant, 1989:8-9).

[17] The issue of the indigenous researcher versus the foreign researcher has received some attention. Indigenous researchers are supposed to have indisputable advantage of being able to attach meanings and uncover processes much faster than non-indigenous researchers (Altorki and El-Solh, 1988:7). This is because they share the same body of knowledge and cognitive world. On the other hand, some suggest that common language and culture makes it more difficult to maintain the

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social distance that a foreign researcher is able to do and that it is difficult for the researcher to distinguish between his/her own values in the research community (Altorki and El-Solh, 1988:8).

[18] Besides this relation with my own identity as young and single the choice is also based on previously difficult field work experience among married women in childbearing ages in southern Jordan. The research which focused on women's reproductive health usually left respondents shocked and unaccepting of the fact that I, a single woman, was inquiring about pregnancy, child birth and family planning methods. This is because it is a subject closely linked to sexuality which is a taboo for unmarried women.

[19] Seteny Shami (1988) during her fieldwork in squatter areas in Amman actually introduced her mother to her research community since an unmarried woman working on her own needed some authentication through kinship ties and consequently would gain more acceptability. Similarly, in my case, the fact that the mothers asked after my mother was perhaps a demonstration of the fact they accepted me as a respectable person with respective kinship ties.

[20] During the household questionnaire survey I continuously explained that I was not alone but part of a research team who are in the neighbourhood. However, during the semi-structured interviews I was often alone.

CHAPTER TWO
GENDER, EMPLOYMENT AND THE LIFE COURSE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

While the last chapter was concerned with outlining the objectives of the study and situating them within the framework of related research on gender and employment, this chapter sets out the conceptual and theoretical parameters. As one of the main objectives of this study is to investigate the complex interrelations between gender, employment and the life course, it is difficult to adopt a single theoretical orientation. Instead, and in accordance with the multi-dimensional approach of this study, the present chapter attempts to provide a framework drawn from an amalgamation of different theories and approaches.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with identifying core concepts in the study, namely the labour market, gender, gender ideology and the life course. Gender and the labour market is the focus of the second section. This reviews labour market theories and approaches to gender inequality in employment and attempt to situate the study within them. Since conventional theories mostly neglect the household arena in influencing female employment, the third section considers conceptual frameworks which have been developed to explain household level influences on female workforce participation. This section also makes particular reference to the life course and to the Middle East in order to reveal the significance of life course changes for female employment and household organisation and relations.

The overall aim of this chapter is not only to provide a framework for this study, but also to reveal the importance of moving away from the rigidity of structured, universal theoretical parameters and the importance of interweaving elements from different approaches to capture the complexities of young women's rising labour force participation.

2.1 Labour Markets, Gender, and the Life Course: Conceptual Considerations

Since this study is based on the interrelations between gender, labour markets and the life course, the present section clarifies these terms and how they will be utlitised in the current study.

2.1.1 The Labour Market

The first term that requires clarification is that of the labour market since it provides the platform in which the interrelationships between employment, gender and the life course occur. One universal definition of a labour market is difficult to provide since it depends on the nature of the theory adopted. Labour markets can be defined in a number of ways. The neo-classical approach, for example, essentially treats the labour market like any other market, as summed up by Loveridge and Mok (1979:27) who define a labour market as:

> (A) unified entity in which allocation is regulated by the price mechanism. That is in an exchange system where buyers and sellers of labour meet each other individually as equals

Standing and Tokman (1991:1) provide a wider definition of than neo-classical approach by including the role of policy and state regulation:

> Forces of supply and demand should be enabled to operate to ensure the efficient allocation of resources, so that policies should be implemented to ensure high levels of labour mobility at low cost and flexible labour markets.

Despite their differences, the above definitions of labour market highlight the issue of 'price' and regard labour as a 'commodity'. However, Standing and Tokman (1991:1) go on to explain that such definitions actually contradict one of the International Labour Organisation's founding principles that 'labour is not a commodity'. They proceed to stress the importance of recognising the quest for labour security and how such market mechanisms may need to be circumvented in the interest of social values.

According to John Weeks (1991:55-6) neo-classical definitions of the labour market, when applied to developing countries, 'break(s) down.' This is because they assume that the labour market is based on institutional arrangements, where employers have obligations to employees and vice versa. According to Weeks a major characteristic of urban labour markets in developing countries is that the:

> ...pursuit of livelihoods involves a chaotic collection of different employment relations, frequently operating according to conflicting principles of rationality.... The foregoing analysis indicates that the central characteristic of urban labour markets in underdeveloped countries is that they are comprised of heterogeneous collection of subordinate relations which, while they coexist and overlap, cannot be effectively integrated. Their non-integration is the result of different adjustment mechanisms, not all of which are economic.

Other definitions of the labour market extend to include territorial and social criteria (see Duncan and Savage; 1989, Massey, 1994). Such definitions draw attention to the fact that labour markets are spatial areas where people work and develop social relations. This larger social/spatial boundary makes it more possible to fully capture the complexity of female employment and its interrelations with familial and ideological factors (see below). In addition, Doreen Massey (1994) goes on to explain that despite the importance of the socio-spatial dimensions of labour markets, they are far from being autonomous spatial structures. This is because they change according to political and economic circumstances. This is especially so with the increasing international division of labour and its globalising influences on local level labour markets (Massey, 1994: Chapter Six).

2.1.2 Gender

Gender is a social construct, whereas sex refers to physical distinctions (see Brydon and Chant, 1989:2; Mackintosh 1981:4; Rogers 1980:12). As a construct, gender varies considerably in relation to other axis of social differentiation such as age, class, race and geographical specificity (Eviota, 1992:29; Momsen, 1993:127). Therefore, the category 'woman' has no unitary definition and indeed consists of multiple realities that need to be consistently specified and not assumed (Parpart and Marchand, 1996:7, Moore, 1988:189). The present study also departs from the fact that gender is a homogeneous category, and is particularly concerned with age's differentiating impacts upon the different relations women have with male counterparts, whether fathers, brothers, employers or male work colleagues.

This study is also concerned with gender ideologies, which refer to meanings that are lived by social individuals and constitute a 'way of life' (Oakley, 1972). The term is closely linked with the above argument regarding gender as a social construct and how far it affects women's lives. Ideologies of gender are:

> ...lived through consciousness, motive, and emotionality in a continuing process of producing, challenging, reproducing and transforming meanings of gender-based social order (Eviota 1992:25).

Gender ideologies are the locus of power relations between men and women (Humm, 1995:107) By and large this functions through three main areas of social relations: First, is the extent to which either sex is denied access to positions of control (see Afshar, 1992:206; Moore, 1988: 149-50; Walby, 1988a). Second, is the division of labour between the sexes regarding what work is considered appropriate for either sex (see Adkins, 1995: Chapter Two; Moghadam, 1993:15; Young, 1993;72). And third, are the structural arrangements separating men and women (Afshar, 1987b:73-5, 1992; Mernissi, 1975:51).

In the context of the present study, this term often intersects with patriarchy which is a form of systematic dominance of men over women in all areas of social and economic relations (see Hartmann, 1981; Humm, 1995; Kandiyoti, 1988). Indeed, the terms gender ideology and patriarchy, will be used inter-changeably in the study.

2.1.3 The Life Course

'Life course' is a term associated with a method of analysis which has been used to frame the life stages and which emphasises individuals' transitions into different stages in changing historical conditions (Allatt, et al. 1987:2).[1] The essence of the life course approach, therefore, lies in the continuous interplay between social change and the lives of individuals (Kertzer, 1991:19).

A closely related term is the 'life cycle approach' which refers to the analysis of life span through predictable biological transitions and inevitable changes in social status. The life course, on the other hand, allows for the interaction of the individual with social structures and historical change (Allatt et al, 1987:2; Monk and Katz, 1993:19). While Allatt et al (1987:10) distinguish these differences and identify them as contrasting, they nevertheless state that the two frameworks should go hand in hand in order to enhance the appreciation of the complexities which accompany an individual's progression. Monk and Katz (1993:19), on the other hand, stress the use of life course since it allows the emphasis on the diversity of experiences within one age group and the lack of clear associations between chronological age, perceptions, and behaviour (see also Rossi, 1980). Throughout this study the term life course rather than life cycle will be used. This is because the former term encompasses the diversity of women's experiences even among those in the same age cohort.

In terms of gender, the life course approach provides an opportunity to enlarge the understanding of the interdependent life trajectories of men and women (Oakley, 1987:13). Consequently, it draws heavily on gender ideologies. For example, there are differentiated gender trajectories where men's and women's transitions from one life stage to the next are affected, controlled and/or legitimised by societal norms and agencies (ibid:4). This is a focal point for the present study in that it investigates a group of women who are in a previously non-existent life course trajectory and which is more a result of economic and demographic, rather than ideological, change.

2.2 Theories of Gender and Labour Markets

The present study does not adopt one theoretical orientation on gender and the labour market, but rather attempts to draw some aspects from different approaches that enhance the depth of analysis. The use of one theoretical framework is difficult for the following reasons: first, conventional theories do not provide adequate explanations for the relations between gender, employment and the life course; second, few theoretical frameworks address relations between workplace and household arenas which are deemed as crucial in the present study; and third, conventional economic theories assume universal applicability when in reality they are western oriented (Redclift, 1985; Standing, 1991). None the less, it is helpful to review existing theoretical approaches to the gender segmentation of the labour market and female labour force participation in turn and to pull out elements which may be applicable to the present study.

2.2.1 The Neo-Classical Approach

Neo-classical labour market theory is essentially a theory of markets and market interdependencies without reference to its societal context (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:27-28). The behaviour of individuals is the primary unit of analysis. In this sense individuals have 'tastes' and 'preferences' and on the basis of those they respond to market signals. Therefore, there are assumptions that the individual exercises freedom of choice and behaves rationally in order to maximise utility (Amsden, 1980:13).

Notions of utility maximisation under the neo-classical framework are extended from the individual to the family unit. It is assumed that because families allocate resources rationally through a gender division of labour, women will stay at home and assume primary responsibility for reproductive work, the underlying assumption being that there is an economic return to women's lack of participation (Anker and Hein, 1987:7). Also, women are said to have a natural comparative advantage in domestic work. As Amsden (1980:15) puts it:

> Women hire men as breadwinners since men earn more than women in the market (women's earning power is diminished by their childbearing activities). Men hire women as nursemaids since women bear children and are superior in rearing them

> (men's childrearing capacities are diminished by their market earning activities). This division of labour is concluded to be consistent with economic maximising principles.

Gender divisions of labour and persistent labour market gender inequalities are, in turn, the backbone of a related neo-classsical approach which is usually referred to as the 'human capital approach.' This approach analyses the individual's 'capital' in terms of education, skill, productivity potential and experience (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:46). Since women tend to have lower average level of skill and training, they are considered to be, less productive which also results in lower average wages than men. The reasons why women are thought to have lower human capital lie in the time they spend out of the labour force during which they have children (Mincer and Polachek, 1980). In addition, it is said that they choose jobs which require less education and training because of 'prospective discontinuity' (ibid:177). As a result, employers assume that women have less attachment to work than men, and prefer to train male workers who will work continuously (Sinclair, 1991:5) According to this reasoning, therefore, women's low human capital seems to be both the cause and consequence of their employment conditions (ibid:5).

These neo-classical paradigms are not particularly relevant to the present study, primarily because ideological factors which mould the supply and demand for labour are not taken into account (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:28). In other words, people's behaviour according to are termed as 'tastes' and 'preferences' are considered exogenous factors. Furthermore labour market behaviour is viewed as constant regardless of any changes in the underlying social relationships that may take place over time (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:28). These approaches tend to homogenise human experience and within this context it is not possible to look at interrelations between gender, employment and the life course. The notions that could be helpful for the present context, however, include the analysis of human capital differences which enables comparisons of the changes occurring in the supply and demand of male and female labour (Sinclair, 1991:6). In the specific context of this study this would include changes in the supply of and demand for young women as opposed to older women or young men in the same age cohorts. This could shed some light on particular aspects of young women's emerging employment characteristics Despite this, however, it has to be cautioned that such an undertaking will not account for labour market's 'social prejudices and preconceptions' that lead to these human capital differences (Sen, 1990:138).

2.2.2 Labour Market Segmentation Theories

The roots of this approach lie in concerns about the explanatory adequacy of the neo-classical approach. Labour market segmentation theories are often referred to as 'Institutional' or 'Structural' approaches. According to these approaches the labour market is not a single, open competitive market but instead divided into different segments where access is restricted (Reich et al, 1980). Therefore, they basically challenge the human capital theory of wage determination, although assumptions regarding competition remain closely aligned with previous neo-classical conceptions (Sinclair, 1991:7). These approaches developed to include several 'off-shoots' with divergent views on the causes behind segmentation.

One 'off-shoot' is the 'dual labour market approach' which distinguishes between primary and secondary sector labour forces. According to Barron and Norris (1991) primary sector workers receive higher wages, better working conditions, promotions and training and are filled by men. Secondary sector jobs, on the other hand, are less stable, lower paid and are usually filled by women. The reason behind this is that women, as a result of their socialised domestic orientations, are perceived by employers to have less commitment to work and consequently the characteristics of secondary workers (Stichter, 1990). Barron and Norris (1991) also describe how employers base recruitment on gender stereotypes because these are seen as 'natural' by society at large. That is to say employers' gender stereotyping is not consciously premeditated. Even so, segregation seems to be useful for employers since it allows them to minimise competition between groups (it allows one dominant group to have higher status and remuneration) while at the same time maintain a cheap source of labour (Walby, 1990:53-4).

The applicability of this approach to the present study lies in that it identifies and attempts to assess inequality between different groups of workers in the various sectors/segments of the labour market. The limitation, however, lies in that age is seldom considered as a basis for segregation. However, if age, which connotes less experience, is coupled with the inferior status of women, it can only exacerbate their secondary positions. Therefore, notions of job segregation that are useful for this study lie in what is identified as vertical and horizontal segregation. Horizontal segregation refers to the concentration of women in some occupations and men in others, while vertical segregation refers to women who occupy the lower rungs of the job hierarchy (Walby, 1988a:2-3).

Since 'dual labour market' theorists have not provided an adequate explanation for the question why men are recruited and trained for primary sector jobs while women are recruited as secondary sector employees, 'cultural theorists' attempted to bridge this gap through focusing on job typing and the system in which jobs are allocated. This approach stresses the fact that people choose jobs which are in line with their beliefs and which are perceived as appropriate to prevailing masculine or feminine norms (Walby, 1988b:16). In other words, some of the determinants of gender segregation lie outside the workplace. The importance of this approach arises in that, first it draws attention to the fact that gender typing of jobs is usually taken for granted (see Walby, 1988b; Oppenheimer, 1970). Second, it explains how increased rates of female labour force participation can be an outcome of the growth in 'women's jobs.' That is increasing female employment rates should not necessarily be equated with decreasing labour market segregation (for reviews see Amsden, 1980; Oppenheimer, 1970; Matthai, 1982; Walby, 1988a).

A relevant issue here is the impact of technological change. Although, it is assumed that changes in occupations may lead to desegregation, it has been repeatedly acknowledged that skill itself is a gendered attribute and that new skills arising from technological change become ascribed as feminine or masculine (see Cockburn 1985; Phillips and Taylor, 1980). Thus, gender typing of occupations is largely based on employers' gendered recruitment decisions (Chant, 1991a:99-101; Jenson, 1989:146). This includes, first, employers perceptions of differences in the physical capacity of the sexes and where women are considered weaker in muscular strength. Secondly, it includes definitions of skill, where female skills are usually considered to be an extension of their domestic roles (Anker and Hein 1986; Chant, 1991a). Thus, the suitability of men and women for different jobs result from social, and not factual, definitions of skills and biological differences (Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991).

Moving on to the 'radical theory' of segmented labour markets, this emphasises the role of socialisation of workers prior to entering the labour market in determining their future roles in paid work (Sinclair, 1991:9). This is closely related to Marxist analysis that identifies the role of class conflict in the historical determination of labour markets (Amsden, 1980). Marxists see the way in which income is reproduced and distributed as a function of social forces and ideology (ibid:24). Therefore, segmentation of the labour market into hierarchical primary and secondary sectors is functional for the reproduction and monopoly of capitalism (Reich et al. 1980:239). According to these theorists, in order to control capital and to avoid labour disruption, employers segregate the workforce into different segments which result in different class factions. Although other dividing lines such as gender and race could be encompassed as well, it is suggested that these are considerably less important than the issue class (Dex, 1985).

In general, criticisms of labour market segmentation theories, include the fact that they provide more of a critique of neo-classical theories than a comprehensive alternative. In addition, and despite the fact that labour market segmentation theories, unlike neo-classical theories, attempt to reveal the inherent complexities of labour markets and worker-employer relations, they remain largely limited in utility as far as the present study is concerned. This is because in explaining women's employment, one basic weakness, in all of the above approaches persist and that is they do not take fully into account the intricate relations between women's employment and the household arena (Sinclair, 1991:10). In fact, and according to Lisa Adkins (1995:21), most of these theories have adopted a 'masculine conception of work and workers.' Needless to say, life course changes, and even the issue of age, are difficult to incorporate in any of the above theories.

However, in attempting to draw out some aspects that could be helpful for this analysis, it appears that while 'cultural' and 'radical' theorists look at barriers specifically affecting women (gender ideology and capitalist interests) and relegating them to factors outside the workplace, 'dual labour market' theorists focus on the institutional barriers within the workplace that determine inequalities such as wage differentials. Therefore, the 'cultural' approach's emphasis on ideology will be drawn upon in this study and the 'dual labour market' approach's emphasis on management's' selective procedures, provides an analysis for discrimination not only by sex but also by age (see Chapter Four).

The 'Female Marginalisation' Thesis

Before moving on to the feminist approaches that emphasise the interconnections between women's paid labour and the home, it is important to highlight the female marginalisation debate which is related in some ways to labour market segmentation concepts. From the above review it would seem that women remain at the margins of the labour market as a result of their economic positions and the development of capitalist growth and interest. However, Alison MacEwen Scott (1986:653-4) challenges that 'female marginalisation' has come to be utilised in an undifferentiated manner in research on women's employment. Scrutinising the concept more deeply, Scott identifies diverse elements: (1) marginalisation as exclusion from productive employment (2) marginalisation as concentration on the margins of the labour market (i.e. informal sector), (3) marginalisation as feminisation of certain occupations, and (4) marginalisation as economic inequality in terms of wage and benefit differentials between men and women. Scott then proceeds to question the bases for these presumptions and the criterea used to analyse trends over time (p.655-56). Moreover, she discusses the issue of causality and where marginalisation is considered a result of capital's needs to maintain low wage levels. Through case study material based on Latin America she illustrates that female marginalisation may apply to certain kinds of occupations but not to others where there is a selective incorporation of women, for a variety of reasons, such as docility, domestication, subordination, and not just lower wages: 'Thus it is not just marginalisation that needs to be distinguished, but dimensions of gender (p.673).'

The re-evaluation of the female marginalisation thesis has been followed up by other authors (Blumberg, 1991b; Safilios Rothchild, 1990; Safa, 1995). For example, Anne Faulkner and Victoria Lawson (1991) provide a case study from Ecuador that illustrates the diverse ways in which women are integrated into the labour market. They demonstrate how there is no uniformity across sectors between women's incorporation into the labour force and their empowerment within employment. They further identify a need for research that explores the extent to which economic power in the workplace engenders changes in family power relations (p.40).

The importance of these debates for the present case study lie in combining labour market segmentation theories, which explain the emergence of low level occupations, with feminist theories (see below) which explain why and how women become concentrated in low level occupations. They further address crucial questions for this study which are the relations between women's occupational status, their individual autonomy and household positions (Faulkner and Lawson, 1991:41).

2.2.3 Feminist Approaches to the Labour Market

Moving on to feminist approaches per se, the exclusion of the household in the above mentioned mainstream labour market theories and their failings to explain gender inequality have led to a considerable number of feminist criticisms. Many of these are Marxist-oriented and tend to draw from (as well as critique) Freidrich Engel's (1972 [1884]) *The Origin of the Family, Private property and the State* which argued that male owned private property and the development of the family are the root causes of women's subordination. Feminist critics alternatively argue that women's positions in the labour market are the product of the complex interconnections between the productive and reproductive spheres of life (Moore, 1988:136).

One Marxist feminist concept is the 'domestic labour debate' which addresses the relations between household production and market economy (see Beechey, 1977). In this view, the confinement of women to domestic work and their secondary status in the labour market are seen as a function of capitalism (Stichter, 1990:31). This concept has been influential in feminist theorising as it draws attention to the sexual division of labour and highlights the interrelationships between women's economic and non-economic activities and the ideological construct of the 'male breadwinner.' Critics of this approach, however, have pointed out that this still does not explain why women, in particular, are the ones subordinated (see Barrett, 1980).

Other approaches like Heidi Hartmann's (1979) 'dual systems theory,' attempt to address this by positing the idea that there are autonomous patriarchal relations in the production of gender inequalities and that gender segregation at work is best understood by accepting the existence of an alliance between capitalism and patriarchy. This approach assumes that job segregation is created by men to keep the better jobs for themselves and hence more power, not only in the workplace, but at home since women who earn less wages are encouraged to get married and hence become the unpaid domestic workers for their husbands (Adkins, 1995:23).[2] In other words, the control of women's labour in the labour market by men constitutes a material basis for domestic patriarchy. At the expense of underestimating the friction between both systems, this alliance is considerably useful for the present study insofar as patriarchy not only privileges men over women but also the old over the young, thereby enhancing the power and authority of elder males. Therefore, if gender inequality is constructed on women's dependence on men and where younger women are especially dependent, then, such an approach allows us, to some extent, to incorporate age inequality into labour market and family relations.

Another Marxist conceptualisation of capitalism's interrelations with women's employment relates to the notion of a 'reserve army of labour' (Beechey, 1978, 1987). This approach argues that women form a reserve army of labour that is pulled into, and pushed out of, the labour market according to the need of capitalism. Moreover, an 'excess' of female labour supply (for certain occupations) allow employers can keep wages down. Within this framework, women's family roles give them in this reserve army status.

Feminist approaches therefore go further than other labour market theories in acknowledging the existence of inequality between men and women in the labour market and household domains. They search for connections between divisions of labour at home and in the workplace and explore the processes by which women are assigned to domestic labour. In attempting to adapt these concepts to the current study, however, some drawbacks emerge. First, Marxist feminists have tended to stipulate universalistic assumptions about gender roles and relations, notably that men are the primary earners (breadwinners) and that women are the reproducers and secondary earners. Second, because female labour is usually associated with the stereotype of the married dependent women with young children the implications of changes in productive and reproductive relations across women's and households' life courses is not adequately explored. Third, despite the fact that they take into account household power relations, they do not address the role that other adult family members might play in influencing female employment. In fact, when other household members, such as daughters for example, are addressed, it is to point out that they are dependent in exactly the same way as married women on their families (see Beechey 1977). Such treatment of both women's and household's' life courses are a reflection of how gender relations are undifferentiated and even 'collectivised' by Marxist feminists. Thus, while adopting some insights from the Marxist feminist approaches regarding the household-labour market linkages, we might have to recognise that these approaches are limited in terms of understanding the life course.

2.2.4 Post-modernism

Although not a labour market theory, it is important to consider, at this stage, post-modernist debates especially as they advocate a shift away from the role of economic relations in explaining the functioning of society. Post-modernism cannot be easily encapsulated into one phrase for it refers to a variety of ideas. According to Michele Foucault the false power of hegemonic knowledge can be challenged by alternative discourses which offer other explanations of reality (as cited by Scott, 1988:35). Thus, post-modernism is concerned with the concepts of 'difference,' the 'other' and the deconstruction of meaning. It rejects universal definitions of social phenomena arguing that these definitions essentialise reality and fail to reveal the complexity of life as a lived experience (Parpart, 1993:441). Within this context, the need to deconstruct the category of women is increasingly being acknowledged. Yet, although Fraser and Nicholson (1990:20) believe that feminist and post-modern approaches complement each other since the fusion provides an opportunity to investigate women's diversity without sacrificing the larger complexity of, and causes for, female oppression, others have felt uneasy about this potential alliance, for example, Sylvia Walby (1990:2) argues:

> postmodernism in social theory has led to the fragmentation of the concepts of sex, race and class and the denial of the pertinence of overarching theories of patriarchy, racism and capitalism.

While post-modernism may at some level dilute the theoretical status of gender, it is felt to be helpful in the context of the present study since it provides an opportunity to understand the divergent experiences of women which feminism until now has attempted to unify. Second, post-modernism's interest in diversity acknowledges women's differential experiences across the life course. Perhaps one of the landmarks exemplifying this is the collection of studies edited by Katz and Monk (1993) which looks at how women's lives develop and change with reference to the life course but also in the context of the cultural specificity of these changes. They stress how the emphasis on women's diversity has been previously limited to differences based on race, ethnicity or class and that interest in diversity across the life course is only recent (ibid:17).[3] The importance of looking at gender and the life course arose because women's responsibility for household organisation and care ensures that entry and re-entry into employment never represents a straight-forward commitment to a particular career trajectory (Allatt et al. 1987:2). In other words women, typically experience more complex interactions with the labour market over the life course than men especially as larger historical, economic and social forces influence them differently (Moen, 1987; Saraceno 1991).[4] Therefore, the life course perspective allows us to look at working women, by examining both their household and workplace relations through specific temporal conditions that shape their particular experiences. However, and as mentioned in Chapter One, the life course stage that this study is concerned with: single employed adulthood, has received little specific attention within the existing conceptual and empirical literature on the life course.[5]

2.3 The Life Courses of Households and Household Members With Reference to the Middle East

This chapter has thus far attempted to reveal the importance of the household and the life course in looking at female employment. The following section will further review these two important variables by attempting to locate them within the context of female labour force participation in the Middle East. Here it is useful to consider the conceptual frameworks which have been developed to explain female employment patterns through the analysis of household level characteristics (Anker and Hein, 1986, Chant 1991a, Stichter, 1990). For example, Stichter (1990:39) identifies the most important groups of household level factors as the following: (1) reproductive work, which includes both fertility and domestic labour; (2) intra-household productive factors, which include the sexual and age division of labour, (3) income and resource allocation within the household, (4) household composition, and (5) decision-making and power relations.

However, it is important to recognise at this stage that households are not static. Just as much as there are continuous changes in individuals' life courses there are transitions in the life courses of households as well.[6] Both of these are also subject to external economic situations that require continuous adjustment (Jelin, 1991:21-2). Therefore, household labour supply, or the ability of different members to generate income, is determined, to a large extent, by the stage in the domestic cycle. Writing on Mexico, Mercedes González de la Rocha (1994:25) identifies three major stages in household domestic cycles that may well reflect the situation in Jordan. The first, is the 'expansion' phase where the domestic unit grows and increases its number of members. The second is the 'consolidation' or 'equilibrium' phase, during which the unit becomes more economically balanced as children shift from being dependent consumers to becoming income earners or participants in domestic work. The third is the 'dispersion' phase where members of the household separate and form their independent units. This model is central to the argument in the current study which situates the household in a specific stage of this evolving framework.

The investigation of the 'consolidation' phase in Arab households in general is of particular pertinence at this moment in time given that the population in the Middle and East and North Africa is at a point in history where the largest age cohort is between 20 and 29 years old (Fergues, 1995:188).[7] Furthermore, as already mentioned, age at marriage in the Middle East in general, and Jordan in particular, has substantially increased for both sexes. As a result, young adults co-exist with their elders for longer periods than previous generations. Another significant fact is that young adults living with their families have had more access to schooling than their elders and as a result tend to move in different kinds of occupations (see Chapter Five).

These changes can conceivably result in potential conflict between the generations (Fergues 1995:188). Young educated adults have different life experiences and expectations from their elders and live for longer under the authority of their male elders within their households. In light of this, Arab households are effectively passing through a stage where demographic changes are affecting the internal structure, organisation and economic balance, on the one hand, and family ideologies and the behaviour of individuals on the other. It is within this context that the following will review the household level factors that seem to influence young women's increasing employment rates.

Reproduction and Sexual Division of Labour

As mentioned at various junctures, female labour supply is conditioned to a greater extent than men by household/family factors. The majority of studies that have investigated this relationship have mainly looked at women's reproductive roles and the gendered divisions of labour between spouses within households (see earlier). The likelihood of married women entering the labour market depends on practical matters such as numbers and ages of children, household size and so on. It also depends on women's abilities to combine household responsibilities with income earning activities. Yet, households in the 'consolidation' phase of the domestic cycle include adult children who are likely to bring changes to women's reproductive burdens and the sexual division of labour. Usually, in this domestic cycle, adult female children may take part in some of the domestic burdens and therefore diminish the amount of reproductive work of mothers. In addition, there is the potential for expanding a household's resource base as adult children move from being dependents to potential or actual income earners (Gonzâlez de la Rocha, 1994:85). Within this context, and in order to further explore Jordanian households' organisation at this stage in the domestic cycle, it is imperative to find out who is released into the labour force and why.

In terms of the gender divisions of labour in Arab/Jordanian households, men are usually responsible for income earning activities and, as a result, are more in control of productive resources. This is rooted in the regional patriarchal attitudes that result in the delineation of labour and power relations between males and females. The ideology of the male economic provider together with norms of sex segregation significantly constrain female employment (Hoodfar, 1988; Youssef 1978). In light of this situation, how can the current increasing release of young female labour in Amman be explained? Although young women may be forced to work by male elders in order to supplement household income in some cases (see Chapter Five), on the whole, young women need permission from male elders to take employment and may be refused (see also Hein 1986:288-9, on Mauritius; Ibrahim, on Egypt, as cited in Papanek, 1985:327). Regardless of the forces determining young women's employment, however, the stark differentials between the release of daughters vis-á-vis wives into the labour force are significant.

Data outside the Middle East suggests that there is a greater acceptance of daughters' employment than wives, as this is perceived to be less destabilising to hierarchical male-female relations (Lamphere 1986). Several case studies also reveal that daughters are in a doubly weak position within the household because of both gender and age hierarchies (Greenhalgh, 1988:69; Wolf: 1990a:57). A daughter, for example, is expected to continue to defer to her father, even if he is not working, especially if he owns the house (Safa, 1990:82). This empirical evidence, which is mostly based on Asia, reveals that daughters' employment does not necessarily alter their household positions (see Salaff, 1981 on Hong Kong; Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung 1983; on Taiwan). This is likely to be the case in the context of Jordan, where daughters are allowed to work as long as they do not openly challenge patriarchal authority and relations; in other words, as long as they abide by ascribed gender roles and normative codes of moral conduct (see Chapter Six).

Resource Allocation and Power Relations

Gender divisions of labour within households not only influence women's access to paid employment, but also how their work is perceived and valued inside the household unit. Since women are supposed to shoulder domestic burdens and men income earning activities, there is wide-ranging evidence to suggest that inequality arises as men have more control of income and consequently, greater shares of decision-making power (see Blumberg, 1991b; Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Brydon and Chant, 1989; Papanak, 1990; Sen, 1990; Wilson 1991 among others). What is more, this inequality seems to persist (and even intensify) even when women are income earners (Scott, 1991; Standing 1985; Whitehead, 1981). Such empirical evidence, which incidentally, is rarely based on Middle Eastern countries, has given rise to the questioning of the neo-classical economic theories that view the household in light of joint welfare maximising functions. The ensuing research expanded on household relations and considered the important connections between control of money and control of decisions as opposed to views that household relations revolve around altruism and joint welfare (see Kabeer, 1994b for a fuller discussion). These came to be labelled as 'bargaining models' or 'cooperative conflict models' (see Kabeer, 1994b, Sen, 1990; Wilson 1991).

The current study attempts to adapt household bargaining models to a life course perspective in Amman by looking at inter-generational gender stratification in control over income and decision making in the light of the male breadwinner ideology. This involves two interconnected levels of investigation. The first is the role of the above mentioned 'consolidation phase' of the domestic cycle and how much the existence of other adult members affects labour arrangements, control of income and decision-making powers. In other words, does household capacity to generate income vary across time and, in the presence of other adult family members, and is control over resources likely to be affected? The second strand of investigation involves extending the bargaining models from relations between spouses to relations between daughters and male elders. What impacts are daughters' life course stages and occupations exerting upon household bargaining and negotiation, and how does this affect the appropriation of sons' versus daughters' wages and consequently their roles and status within their households? In Amman, an income earning daughter does not necessarily fully control her income neither does her income allow her more control over her life. Sons on the other hand, are more in control of their income (see Chapter Five). So, the unequal distribution of resources and power relations between spouses extends to children on the basis of gender inequality .

Household Composition

In addition to the factors operating within households, a significant influence on the supply of female labour is household composition and structure. Comparative empirical research has revealed that different household structures place individual household members in different positions in the labour market (Stichter, 1990:49). Several studies indicate that female labour force participation in nuclear households (comprising spouses and children) is more limited than in extended households (see Chant 1991a; Benería and Roldan, 1987 on Mexico; Safa on the Caribbean; and Fapohunda, 1986 on Nigeria). One of the rationales for this has to do with the practicalities of child care and domestic responsibilities where in extended households other female members can share the burdens (Chant 1991a on Mexico; Safa, 1990 on the Caribbean). Other rationales include the fact that in extended households husbands' authority over wives' and daughters' labour power may be abated by the presence of other family members (Chant, 1991a). Finally, extended households are often more economically secure than nuclear households since there are usually multiple earners and household incomes can be expanded (Gonzãlez de la Rocha, 1994:86). However, the predominant evidence on how extended household forms influence female employment is based on examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, and it has to be pointed out that this relation is not necessarily similar in other cultural contexts (i.e. the Middle East).

There are also those households which are headed by women. Recent attention to female headed households reveal that in the absence of a male economic provider, women have little option but to find employment (Chant, 1997; Chant, 1991a; Folbre, 1991; Moore, 1994). Yet, the absence of a male provider also entails access to autonomous decision making especially in terms of whether to work or not (see Chant, 1991a:162-171 for a fuller discussion). However, women in this type of structure are often in disadvantaged positions especially in terms of social status and state policies and may well be poor (see Chant 1997; Folbre, 1991; Moore 1994 for fuller discussions).

It is important to point out, however, that household structure is in continuous change as members leave and enter (González de la Rocha, 1994:86 on Mexico; Shami and Taminian, 1985 on Jordan).[8] Household composition, for example, changes in response to employment opportunities (see Stichter, 1990:52). These opportunities for different members are affected by the domestic cycle and results in shifts in labour arrangements and income earning strategies (González de la Rocha, 1994:86-7).

Moving on more specifically to the Middle East, households have been usually portrayed as extended in structure, large in size, and where relations revolves around a patriarchal and patrilocal kinship system (see Sharabi 1988; Moghadam 1993; White 1994). These assertions about 'typical forms' of Arab households have been recently re-addressed since evidence suggest that social change and increasing urbanisation is weakening traditional patriarchal kinship systems (Moghadam, 1993:24). In addition, there are signs that households are increasingly becoming nuclear (see ESCWA, 1992:5-7; Nawar et al, 1995:150; Shorter and Zuryak 1988:83). Could, this nuclearisation mean that the multiple earning strategies common of extended households are now being replaced by daughters' workforce participation in nuclear households? Evidence from respondents reveal that indeed daughters are significant contributors to household income (see Chapter Five).

2.4 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to reveal the significance of adopting an integrated holistic approach for understanding the relations between, gender, employment and the life course. This was done through reflecting on the conceptual issues and critically reviewing theoretical approaches to gender segmentation of the labour market and female labour force participation. This has demonstrated the limited utility of conventional labour theories to the present context and established the need to consider household impacts on patterns of female employment. In taking into account the multiplicity of household factors, this chapter attempted to demonstrate how the life course stage of individuals as well as households also play significant roles in influencing female employment patterns. The attempt to adapt this to the cultural specificity of the Middle East was a means to signal the relevance of the life course and young female employment in other settings. In short, this review has revealed the importance of avoiding structured parameters in research and the significance of broader frameworks that are formulated on the basis of interactions between the different economic, social and ideological dimensions that influence female employment.

Notes to Chapter Two

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[1] The life course approach has demographic roots. It was first used by demographers in order to capture population changes (see for example Bongaarts et al. 1987). With time, interest in the life course approach developed into a multi-disciplinary area of research including inputs from psychologists, family historians (see Hareven, 1978), sociologists (see Rossi, 1980) and economists (see Oppenheimer 1970).

[2] There are many criticisms of this approach. One such example is Sylvia Walby (1988b:23), who claims that this approach overstates the relations between patriarchy and capitalism. She maintains that the conflicts between the interests of capital in utilising cheap labour and those of patriarchy in restricting women to domestic labour are underestimated. In other words, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the systems.

[3] It could also be added here that, until recently, this limited interest in the life course has been predominantly based in industrialised countries as opposed to developing countries (see for example Saraceno, 1991 on Italy; Hareven, 1982 and Oppenheimer, 1970 on the United States).

[4] An illustration to this is a study of Italian women which demonstrates how three age cohorts of women reveal different patterns of labour force participation. These differences reflect changes in gender ideologies, marriage laws, educational provisions, fertility trends and a restructuring of the Italian economy (Saraceno, 1991).

[5] For example, in the research edited by Monk and Katz (1993) and cited above as a 'landmark,' single employed adulthood, while addressed in some of the articles, is not signaled as a distinct life course stage.

[6] Changes in households across time are usually referred to as the 'developmental cycle,' the 'household life span' or the 'domestic cycle.' The term life course which is adopted here to refer to changes in individuals' lives, has rarely been applied to the household arena. Since the former terms refer to inevitable, and perhaps chronologically occurring changes, reference to the household life course will be introduced here, alongside the other terms.

[7] The reason behind this is the fact that mortality decline, as a result of improved health care, has been significant yet fertility rates have remained at high levels. It is expected that in the coming decade fertility will decline and diminish the relative weight of this age group within the population as a whole (Fergues, 1995). For more on the changing urban demographic structures of Middle Eastern cities see Assaad (1995).

[8] In a study of squatter areas in Amman, Shami and Taminian (1985) observe: '...it was interesting to note how rapidly the composition of family and household members changed over a period of few months. Given large family size, high infant mortality, early age at marriage and so on, it appeared as though members of the household were in constant flux. The demographic survey of these squatter areas identified 75 different types of households. Collapsing these forms into three types: single, extended and multiple, tends to obscure the dynamics of relationships within households.' See also, Fonseca (1991) on Brazil; Chant (1991b) on Costa Rica and Chant (1996a) for a comparative overview.

CHAPTER THREE

JORDAN: POLITICAL ECONOMY, LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT

Jordan's short history has been one of continuous upheavals. The major events that shaped the country were to a great extent due to external forces based on Jordan's geographic location. It witnessed three major crises: the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars and the 1990 Gulf crisis. Yet, it also benefited tremendously from the oil boom in neighbouring countries. Indeed, due to the lack of natural resources within the country, Jordan has always looked beyond its borders both for economic support and political legitimacy (Brand, 1994). This chapter is concerned with the interaction between external influences and the domestic development of Jordan. It aims to delineate the factors that affected the country's political economy and proceeds to discuss labour force evolution. The overarching objective, however, is to describe the background under which young urban women seek employment in Amman today.

The first and second sections of this chapter provide geographical and historical background to Jordan. The third section investigates the political economy by providing an overview of the major events in the last few decades which shaped the country generally and influenced its labour market in particular. This commences with the boom years in the early 1970s into the debt crisis of the late 1980s, the shock of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, and finally, on a more speculative note, the impact of the peace accords with Israel which are currently underway. This part also reviews the development of Amman as a city which is the location of the present case study and the capital of Jordan. The fourth section is concerned more specifically with the labour force. It provides background information on the size, education and unemployment levels of the labour force and the trends in female labour force participation. The fifth and final section outlines the major employment sectors in Jordan, which include the public, private and informal sectors.

3.1 Geography and Natural Resources

Jordan is situated at the northwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula and to the east of the Mediterranean Sea (see Map 3.1). It is almost entirely land-locked except for the 26 kilometers on the Red Sea's Gulf of Aqaba. In terms of area, Jordan is

Map 3.1 Jordan: Political Boundary and Main Cities


LEBANON
SYRIA
Mediterranean Sea
IRAQ
Irbid
West Bank
Jordan River
Zarqa
AMMAN
Dead Sea
ISRAEL
Ma'an
SAUDI ARABIA
EGYPT
Aqaba
Gulf of Aqaba
0
km
200
Red Sea

about 92,000 square kilometers (Jordan Media Group 1995). It has a population of 4.1 million of whom 1.6 million live in Amman, the capital (Department of Statistics 1995).

In terms of topography, the country can be divided into three distinguishable regions (Jordan Media group 1995). The first is semi-arid desert and steppe land which covers almost 80% of Jordan and lies to the east and southeast. Traditionally, animal husbandry together with limited cultivation has been common in these areas. The second is the highland region in the north and north west which is mountainous and rocky together with deep valleys. Agriculture in the highlands is limited to grains, olive trees and grape vines which generally depend on rain water. The population distribution is unevenly concentrated in this region with the city of Amman in the centre of the area. The third region is of the Jordan rift valley in the west of the country. This faces the Jordan river that runs from the Golan Heights in Syria towards the Dead Sea and eventually into the Red Sea. The northern part of the Jordan valley is fertile. The country's agricultural production, for both domestic consumption as well as export, consists of citrus fruits and vegetables and is concentrated in the northern part of the Jordan valley. The southern part of the valley, by contrast, is dry and arid and includes the Dead Sea which is the lowest spot on earth.

Jordan is a relatively dry country, but rainfall varies throughout the different regions of the country. It ranges from 50 millimeters per year in the eastern parts to between 400 and 600 in the highlands (Jordan Media Group, 1995). With population increase, water scarcity is one of the principle problems facing the country. Chronic water shortages in the summer months are common in many parts of the country. In terms of natural resources, Jordan's wealth is limited to minerals such as phosphate or potash which are its major exports. In fact, Jordan has reserves of 1.5 billion tons of phosphate and is the third largest exporter in the world (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1989). However, unlike most of its neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria, no oil has ever been found.

3. 2 Historical Context

Jordan is a young nation. It was part of the Ottoman empire until 1921 when it gained independence after the Arab revolt.[1] Soon afterwards, in 1923, the British took control of what became known as 'Trans-Jordan.'[2] By 1928 the area became known as the Emirate of Trans-Jordan under Emir Abdalla. At the time, the Emirate was largely populated by nomads and pastoralists and its only commercial centre was Salt which linked trade with Palestine.[3]

Throughout the years of the British Mandate (1921-1946) Jordan's economic growth was slow. Yet, economic activity increased as a result of World War Two as Britain' expanded its military bases in Amman and other cities (Tell, 1994:5). This in turn stimulated imports and the emergence of a new merchant class and led to the establishment of industries such as cement as well as increasing commercial activities (ibid:5). By 1946, the new Kingdom of Jordan:

> Appeared to be the most successful of Britain's experiments in empire by mandate in the Middle East. British influence sat lightly on the country, disguised by trappings of Sharifian rule, and the collaboration of a nascent bureaucratic bourgeoisie which owed all to the imperial connection (ibid:7).

Despite this, however, Jordan remained under-developed in terms of infrastructure, education and agriculture (Sayigh 1978:180). In contrast to the rest of the population, therefore, it was only the new urban elites of Amman, the ruling Hashimites, and some of the Bedouin leaders, who aligned themselves with the new rule and thus benefited from Amman's growth.

Following World Two Britain relinquished its mandate over 'Trans-Jordan,' which became the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. Two years later Britain also relinquished its mandate over Palestine which was immediately followed by first Arab-Israeli war.[4] The creation of Israel in 1948 led to an influx of 375,000 Palestinian refugees into Jordan.[5] This together with the 1948 War in which Jordan participated, had drastic economic consequences on Jordan since it was faced with providing housing, infrastructure as well as employment for the Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, Jordan had lost its trading routes linking it with the Mediterranean (Sayigh 1978:189) (see map 3.1).[6]

By 1951 Jordan unified the part of Palestine which had not been occupied by Israel in 1948 and which came to be known as the West Bank. Both refugees and residents of the West Bank, who amounted to 460,000, were given Jordanian citizenship. Migration of Palestinians from the West Bank continued through to the 1960s as people who lost their lands came to settle mostly in Amman. Thus, after the creation of the state of Israel and Jordan's annexation of the West Bank the Jordanian population increased by more than 800,000 almost overnight. Sudden population increases such as these have been common in Jordan's short history.

During the 1950s Jordan was considered an 'economic basket case' (Gubser, 1988:107). It was a resource-poor country with an artificially large population, a weak economic infrastructure and a labour force characterised by unemployment and underemployment.[7] However, in another light, the influx of Palestinian refugees is seen to have had a positive long term economic and social impact. Palestinians were skilled, educated and more urbanised compared with the Jordanians (Kanovsky 1989:1). Some of them brought capital with them which facilitated their economic integration (Gubser, 1988:107).

Between the mid-1950s and 1966, and despite pessimistic predictions regarding Jordan's future, GDP growth rates grew to reach an average of 6.5% in real terms (Khader 1990:85). During this time Jordan was dependent on foreign aid.[8] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)[9] contributed considerably to the welfare of Palestinian refugees. The British who were later succeeded by the Americans contributed to budgetary economic development (Gubser 1988:107; Khader 1990:89). Other sources of economic aid were the United Nations agencies and several bilateral aid agencies as well as private groups (ibid, 1988:107). In 1964 external aid reached as much as 54% of government receipts (Sayigh, 1978:197).

The second crisis in Jordan's history was losing the West Bank in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The West Bank included half of Jordan's economy at the time and the religious shrines in Jerusalem and Bethlehem had attracted substantial tourism (Gubser, 1988:110). The war resulted in yet another influx of refugees who fled the hostilities. The estimates were 280,000 refugees of which many had already been displaced, as a result of the 1948 war. Again, Jordan depended on foreign aid which now included large grants from the Arab oil producing states (Kanovsky, 1989:5). Meanwhile, the number of Jordanians working abroad in the Arab oil producing States was increasing and this helped to reduce unemployment and to increase remittances.

3.3 The Political Economy of Jordan

The current political economy of Jordan is marked by the boom years where growth was phenomenal due to the remittances from workers in the oil-producing

Arab states. This was followed by two economic shocks the first being the debt crisis and the ensuing stablilisation policies and the second being the Gulf Crisis where Jordan lost its main trading partner, Iraq, and severed ties with other oil rich Arab countries. The last and still evolving aspect of Jordan's political economy is the peace process with Israel which is currently underway.

3.3.1 The Boom Years

Between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, Jordan enjoyed remarkable economic prosperity. This was mainly due to the oil boom in neighbouring Arab states which resulted in the transfer of oil wealth from Gulf States following the 1973 War. This came in three ways: direct aid; the growth of Jordanian exports to these countries and the remittances of expatriate labour.

During this period, Arab assistance to Jordan was stepped up. This coincided with decreasing US aid (which followed British aid). Between the late 1960s and mid 1980s assistance from oil-rich Arab countries accounted for over 80% of external aid to Jordan (World Bank 1994a:1).[10] One of the main reasons for this was Jordan's geographic location as the front-line with Israel. However, Arab aid was dependent upon the price of crude oil and the region's volatile economic and political circumstances. Nevertheless, aid was still high enough to allow Jordan to embark upon far-reaching development and infrastructure projects. The standard of living also rose as Jordan became 'the only oil economy without oil' (Satloff 1986:38). During this period the economy grew rapidly, rising to 10% per annum in real terms (Satloff, 1986:8).

Other regional events also helped Jordan's economic growth. These included the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 which prompted businesses to relocate to Jordan and caused, among other things, a boom in the real estate market. The reopening of the Suez Canal, in the same year, also gave a boost to Jordan's only port of Aqaba (Kanovsky 1989:6). Another regional factor was the Iran-Iraq war which started in 1980 and in which Jordan became the only alternative route to Iraq. Transit trade between Aqaba and Iraq increased Jordan's earnings as well as the export of Jordanian goods to Iraq.

Under these circumstances, foreign exports grew and from the mid-1970s onwards manufacturing industry grew by 17% per annum along with considerable growth of exports to Arab oil producing countries (Weiss, 1987:147). This included both major capital intensive industry such as potash and cement as well as a diversified consumer goods industry including small and medium-scale plants (Weiss, 1987:147; Kanovsky, 1989:57). During this period, and as a consequence of government capital expenditure, the service sector, especially health and education, grew to provide 61% of GDP and 62% of jobs.[11]

During the 1970s, however, Jordan also became increasingly reliant on transfer payments and remittances from workers in the oil producing Gulf States. By the end of the 1970s, 350,000 or 40% of the Jordanian labour force was working in the Gulf. The net gain from the remittances jumped from US $15 million in 1970 to US $900 million in 1981 (Satloff, 1992:130). During the 1980s this averaged 16% of GDP (World Bank, 1994a:4).[12] At this time there was almost no unemployment in Jordan. In fact, there was actually labour shortage as skilled labour left for better paying jobs in the Gulf and labour was imported for the menial jobs that Jordanians refused to perform (Birks, Holt and Sinclair, 1990:5; Kirwan, 1981:677; Satloff, 1986:2).

Table 3.1 Sources of Revenue 1973- 1981 (in million $US)*

Revenue Source	1973	1981
Direct Arab aid	71.8	1179.0
Workers' remittances	37.6	1032.0
Exports (goods)	57.6	734.9
GDP	665.5	3531.2
Total	167.0	2945.9

Source: The World Bank, *World Tables.* 3rd. edition, vol. 1, Economic Data
* $US at constant prices

In short, three main factors, Arab aid, increasing exports and labour remittances (see Table 3.1) were the causes behind the boom. These three sources of revenue amounted to 84% of Jordan's GDP by 1981 (Satloff, 1992:130). Thus, this period of growth is primarily dependent on external factors. Accordingly, it could be stated that this economic prosperity was merely an illusion. As noted by Birks and Sinclair (1978:20):

> A rapid change in perspective of aid donors or in the propensity of Jordanian workers to remit would cripple the economy.

Indeed, there was a major downside to such a heavily dependent economy. The high levels of foreign transfers (both aid and workers remittances) had not financed investment for growth and development but consumption which totaled to 109% of domestic production (World Bank, 1994a:5). Furthermore, despite the growth in the industrial base, there was an increasing trade deficit. This is because of disproportionate levels of imports, especially of foodstuffs. In other words, Jordan was consuming more than it was producing. Imports also meant growth in inflation rates and escalating costs of living (Satloff 1990:12). According to the Central Bank, the national cost of living index rose by 168% between 1973 and 1981. Wages did not rise due to the influx of guest workers from abroad who were ready to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions (Sha'ban, 1990:58).

The fall of oil prices by 1981 and the ensuing regional depression resulted in severe consequences by the late 1980s. However in the early recession years, until 1986, even with decreased Arab aid, government spending did not decrease. In fact, the government continued to support heavy subsidies, especially in food items, and foreign exchange reserves were used to finance budget deficits (Satloff, 1992:132).

3.3.2 The Debt Crisis

From the beginning of the oil recession to the end of the 1980s Jordan accumulated billions of dollars in debt (Satloff, 1992:132) (see Table 3.2). In the early 1980s, after the oil shock, decreased Arab aid and decreasing workers' remittances, Jordan continued its spending mainly on military and large development projects.[13] By the second half of the decade foreign savings were significantly reduced and debt service obligations increased. However, the government resisted adopting harsh stabilisation measures, first seeking to cover its problem with commercial borrowing from abroad. However, sources were quickly depleted and the result was a massive reduction in the flow of foreign savings to the public sector by 1988. The government then turned to domestic sources, borrowing heavily from the banking sector at regulated prices rather then market prices. Between the beginning and the end of the 1980s, GDP growth declined from an average of 9.9% a year to an average of 1.2% (World Bank, 1994c:6).

Table 3.2 Government total external debt, Expenditure, and revenue 1981-1988
(in millions of Jordanian Dinars)*

Year	External Debt	Government Expenditure	Government Revenue
1981	540,90	576,17	309,20
1982	632,53	643,65	362,04
1983	815,04	630,04	400,58
1984	959,73	640,64	415,01
1985	1,054,57	713,44	440,81
1986	1,110,70	770,13	514,39
1987	1,215,99	825,71	531,53
1988	1,726,58	910,87	544,34

Sources: Column 1 Ministry of Planning, Amman. Column 2 and 3 IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
* Jordanian Dinars at constant prices

It was during this period that wealthier Arab states failed to fulfill their previous commitments to Jordan. However, there were also other external factors that exacerbated the situation. First was Jordan's dramatic decision to sever all ties with the West Bank in 1988.[14] The disengagement meant the cancellation of the West bank development plan, the cancellation of all salaries to West Bank bureaucrats and teachers. It is arguable that this move was instigated in order to alleviate Jordan's financial burden. However, the move backfired in two ways: the first was the reaction of Palestinians in Jordan, (who controlled a substantial part of Jordan's wealth in banking, trade and commerce) as their confidence and security over their position plummeted and resulted in decreasing investments. Second, West Bank funds usually invested in Jordan began to be diverted elsewhere (Brand, 1992:183; Satloff, 1992:136). Another blow to Jordan's economic well-being was the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq had been Jordan's largest trading partner with transit trade and exports. During the war overall Iraqi debt to Jordanian exporters reached US $600 million which was a large amount for Jordan's fragile economy.

For the first time in its history, Jordan's crisis were not due to external political events and could not be solved on the basis of international accords.[15] Jordan had to 'turn inward' for a change rather then seek temporary external support (Satloff, 1992:134). In November 1988 the government unveiled its first IMF dictated austerity programme, involving the freezing of expenditure on development projects, a ban on imports of luxury goods, a sharp rise on customs duties and taxes on hotels and restaurants. The most drastic measure, however, was the devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar which devalued several times between 1987 and 1989 to fall to 50% of its former value (Brand, 1992:184). This however, proved to be 'too little too late'[16] (Satloff, 1992:136).

In early 1989 an IMF team arrived in Amman to work out a fuller adjustment programme. The goals of the plan were the recovery of economic growth to 4% by 1991, a 50% drop in inflation rates by 1993, and the elimination of the external current account deficit by 1993. The ways to achieve this were through further cuts in spending and imports and the raising of revenue from exports. The government committed itself to reducing total expenditure from 54% of GDP in 1988 to 46% in 1993 and to increasing revenue during the same period from 32% of GDP to 36% of GDP. It also agreed to limit imports and pursue export promotion policies to boost exports by 11% (Khader 1990:94).

According to the IMF, freezing government spending and subsidies and imposing new duties and taxes was still insufficient to reduce the deficit. Additional measures were imposed one of which included price increases on a wide variety of goods and a reduction of subsidies on staples such as bran, barley and powdered milk. When the Jordanian government implemented these measures in April 1989 it regained the IMF's approval and obtained another US $275 million in loans and credits and entitled it to reschedule its former loans.

However, all these drastic measures came as a shock to the Jordanian public and spurred widespread protests in the same month of April 1989. These protests came later to be known as the 'food riots' or the 'IMF riots'.[17] Key demands of the protests were increased accountability of the government and a more equitable distribution of government services by reducing the concentration of services in Amman. King Hussein responded to these protests by dissolving the government and promising parliamentary elections which, due to martial law, were the first in 20 years. Shortly after these riots, however, it was revealed to the public that the government had sold 25% of the Kingdom's gold reserves to service its debt burden and that the debt was US $8.3 billion, nearly US $2 billion more than had been previously reported (Andoni 1989; Satloff, 1992:140).[18]

During this time, the Jordanian government made considerable efforts to rectify the deteriorating economic situation. Government expenditure was curtailed, inflation was reduced and the Jordanian Dinar remained stable after a period of fluctuation. Imports fell and exports were increased. Consequently, the budget deficit was reduced. As a result of this Jordan was able to reschedule a large portion of its external debt. However, during these efforts at rectifying its macro-economic imbalances, Jordan was faced with another and a more dramatic upheaval: The Gulf Crisis of August 1990.

3.3.3 The Gulf Crisis

Other then Iraq and Kuwait, there is no doubt that Jordan was the most adversely affected country by the Gulf Crisis. The Gulf Crisis, which started with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and culminated in the war in January 1991 was a devastating blow to Jordan and reversed much of the progress made in the performance of the economy. Besides this setback there was an alarming influx of an estimated 300,000 'returnees' into the country with tremendous economic and demographic implications. This section will review these implications by first looking at the macro-economic imbalances (including employment and balance of payments) and then at the impact of the returnees on infrastructure such as housing, education and health services.

During the early months of the crisis Jordan was faced with an emergency situation with the influx not only of Jordanians working in the Gulf, but the evacuation of thousands of (mainly Asian) workers, fleeing the hostilities between Iraq and Kuwait through Jordan before being repatriated. It is estimated that the Jordanian government spent an estimated JD 30 million to accommodate 800,000 non-Jordanian migrant workers as they passed through Jordan (Abdalla 1991:15).[19] This effort put pressures on food supplies which were already limited in the country given the lack of foreign exchange at the time due to the economic crisis, as well as water supply which is one of Jordan's chronic problems.

The Gulf Crisis was a blow to the Jordanian economy in several ways. The first was the loss of export markets for both agricultural and manufactured goods. In 1989, 23% of Jordanian exports went to Iraq. Jordan lost this market due to the embargo imposed by the international community on Iraq. The other export markets Saudi Arabia (9%), and Kuwait (3%) were lost as a result of Jordan's supposed alliance with Iraq during the Crisis.[20] Second, as a result of the imposition of a trade embargo, as called for by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (1990),[21] Jordan suffered significant trade and financial losses.[22] Jordan was forced to import oil at higher market prices, instead of receiving Iraqi oil which was expected as partial repayment of Iraqi debt.[23]

Jordan's losses in the transport sector as a result of the embargo was immense. Land transport was a booming industry in Jordan because of its strategic position next to both Iraq and the Gulf States but the sector simply came at a standstill. Shipping was also hit hard especially as the US Navy began searching ships going to Aqaba as part of the blockade on Iraq. Inadvertently this caused ships to avoid the port of Aqaba altogether. There was also an imposition of war risk insurance on all incoming sea freight and air traffic which increased cost of imports and caused delays of essential goods to the Jordanian markets. Jordan's Central Bank estimates indicate that the loss of exports, remittances and other earnings in 1990 cost Jordan US $2 billion. GNP fell by 10% having grown by 1.5% prior to the Crisis (Ministry of Planning, 1991) and income per person tumbled by 12-13% (Abdalla, 1991:16).

Thus, Jordan, which was undergoing painful austerity measures, was faced with the loss of export markets, dwindling remittances and the numerous burdens of accommodating returnees. With these circumstances, the government found itself unable to meet scheduled debt payments. The World Bank, recognising that it was impossible for Jordan to comply with the structural adjustment programme suspended it until after the crisis.[24]

Besides the macro-economic impact of the Gulf Crisis the most pressing problem facing Jordan was the accommodation of the 300,000 returnees, that is those Jordanians who lost their homes and jobs in the Gulf states. Given that the country's population was 3.2 million in 1990, the returnees resulted in a sudden 6.9% increase in population size and about 10% increase in its labour force (Ministry of Planning, 1991:10-11).

This increase in labour force had, and continues to have, a substantial impact on the Jordanian labour market. In the wake of the Crisis, unemployment peaked at 18.8% in 1991 but fell to 13% by the end of 1994 (Ministry of Planning, 1991:4). In fact, the returnees exacerbated an already serious unemployment problem. Before the Gulf Crisis, Jordan's labour force was growing at 6.5% annually while the Jordanian economy's demand for labour was growing at 2.5% annually (Roy and Irelan, 1992:185). The financial requirements for creating jobs for the returnees were estimated at US $1,730 million (Ministry of Planning, 1991:11). This is a figure that is beyond Jordan's limited financial resources.

The returnees' situations varied significantly. Many were highly skilled and had considerable amounts of savings. A large number of them already had houses in Jordan. However, many of them were unskilled with no savings at all. A 1990 UNICEF study estimated that 33% of the returnees were living in abject poverty. Most of the returnees settled in Amman or Zarqa[25] which caused pressure on housing and a subsequent increase of 50-70% in rents in 1991 (ESCWA, 1991:16). Water supplies were also strained which forced the government to ration water (ibid:19). In addition to the problems of absorbing the returnees, however, were the families who subsisted on income derived from the Gulf States whether directly through remittances of relatives or indirectly through employment sectors that depended on trade with the Gulf (especially transport and agriculture).

Furthermore, 40% of the returnees were under the age of 15 years (UNICEF, 1990b). This put pressure on the educational system at a time of government cutbacks on social expenditure. The private sector was supposed to absorb a large number of returnee students. But it was estimated that 95% of returnee students were enrolled in the government schools. This caused congestion in government schools in Amman and Zarqa. Finally, the pressures on the public health services was another issue that the government had to address.[26] In short, the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Jordan was immense. It had to deal with the returnees who lost their life savings and jobs as well as adjust to the increasing pressures on infrastructure and the loss of export markets. This came at a time of political isolation and during the implementation of austerity measures.[27] Jordan did receive emergency financial aid, mainly from the European Community and Japan. However, this was hardly an adequate compensation for the damage caused by the Crisis.

3.3.4 The Peace Process: New Economic Prospects?

The aftermath of the Gulf Crisis had left Jordan in severe economic crisis. There was widespread deterioration of living standards. The crisis, and Jordan's support of Saddam Hussein, left Jordan politically isolated with the severance of ties with the Arab Gulf States, the United States (whose navy was continuing to search ships going to Aqaba) and, lastly, other Arab neighbouring countries such as Syria and Egypt.

These factors led Jordan into a period of political *rapprochement*. This culminated in its participation in the 1993 Madrid peace conference which basically ended the 40 year hostility with Israel and with the July 1994 Israel-Jordan Washington Declaration. Jordan's major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process was an act closely tied with its revival of US relations. It is said that the peace accord which Jordan signed alone without the other concerned parties (i.e. Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese) was due to US pressure which basically tied to easing of Jordan's debt problem to its 'good behaviour' in the peace process.

Upon signing the 1994 Washington Declaration, Jordan and Israel, agreed on basic pressing issues such as water sharing, border demarcation, and economic cooperation. However, there were also a number of more tangible benefits to Jordan following King Hussein's signing of the agreement, including the full restoration of US-Jordanian relations, and the lifting of Saudi Arabia's boycott. Immediately after signing the agreement, US $90 million of Jordan's US $275 million debt to the US was written off as a first step to waiving the full amount within a two year period. At the same time Britain announced that it was scrapping some US $90 million of Jordan's debt. As the then prime minister, Abdul Salam Majali, stated at the time, in a clear reference to the problems the Kingdom had faced since the Gulf War 'All doors that were closed have been opened to Jordan' (Hawatmeh, 1994:5).

These 'open doors' include a wide range of economic benefits as seen by the government and the international community. It was expected that through trade with Israel, the peace process was itself opening up new investment opportunities (Economic intelligence Unit, 1994). The open links between Israel and Jordan were expected to improve sectors such as tourism especially because of the open borders between Aqaba and Eilat.

Other benefits that the peace process were expected to achieve included the alleviation of unemployment in Jordan. This was partly through economic growth but also through the return migration of Palestinian refugees to Palestinian autonomous regions. According to World Bank analysts the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would experience substantial investments which would increase labour demand and create incentives for migration (1994d). In other words, peace was supposed to reduce the supply of labour in Jordan. It is noteworthy here, however, that such assumptions and aspirations for reducing unemployment rest on a subject that was missing in the Jordan-Israel 1993 Agenda.[28] To date, the Israelis and the Jordanians have not discussed the future status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Moreover, Jordan's aspirations for economic prosperity through peace with Israel have not been fulfilled as expected. The lifting of the trade embargo with Israel (the so-called 'normalisation' process), is worrying Jordanian producers and traders who anticipate high competition. Neither has it caused a boom in the tourism industry as was hoped. In addition, a large part of the Jordanian public including private sector establishments are still hesitant to cooperate with Israel for ideological reasons. Finally, the US $275 million debt relief promised by the American Administration did not come through as it was not approved by the American Congress in March of 1995. Despite all this, at official levels, the government remains optimistic while a large part of the public remain skeptical. It is arguably too early at this stage to foresee the real impact of the peace process.

3.3.5 Amman: Growth Within a Dependent Economy

Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated how Jordan's development was dependent on external factors such as the influx of refugees, aid from oil rich Arab States and the inflow of capital from migrant labour. The modern development of the city of Amman reflect these factors clearly. Janet Abu Lughod (1984:101) in a classification of urbanisation patterns of Middle Eastern and North African countries categorises Jordan, through its capital, Amman, as a 'charity state.' This refers to countries dependent on welfare for their development or when:

> The key consequence for urbanisation of the welfare mode of production is that settlement patterns *need not* (author's emphasis) have any relationship to internal economic development.[29]

Indeed, the development of Amman reflects not only the 'charity State' concept but also a haphazard and uncontrolled pattern. Amman's growth in the last three decades has been unprecedented. According to Robert Satloff (1987:8), for example:

> Statistics cannot quite capture the sense of growth, affluence, and easy money that characterised Amman in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Amman, has grown from a small market town into a teeming metropolis over the course of a few decades. Amman's early history saw the settlement of Circassian[30] farmers and the completion of the Hejaz railway in 1908 that passed through Amman on it's way from Medina and Damascus. By 1928, after the success of the Arab revolt and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Amman became the capital of the new Emirate of Trans-Jordan as Emir Abdalla settled there. During the British Mandate, Amman's importance grew. This in turn stimulated imports and attracted a merchant community through immigration from Syria and Palestine (Tell, 1994:5).

However, it is the influx of refugees, mostly Palestinian, that characterises the phenomenal growth of Amman (1948, 1967, 1990/1). From a population of 33,000 in 1947, the population of Amman grew to 108,000 in 1952. From 1952 to 1963 migration of Palestinians from the West Bank to Amman continued at an average annual rate of 30,000 migrants. In addition, as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war another 100,000 Palestinian refugees settled in Amman (Doan, 1992:27). Amman attracted other refugees including those from Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War between 1975-84[31] and from Iraq during the 1990/91 Gulf Crisis.[32] Thus, population growth in Amman is a result of external political conditions where refugees mostly settled in Amman and to a lesser extent in Zarqa.[33] This artificial population growth is also accompanied by high total fertility rates (6 children per woman in childbearing years), low levels of infant mortality (35 per 1000) and an annual population growth rate of 3.3% during the 1980s which dropped to 2.8% in the early 1990s (Shakhatreh, 1994:3). In short, the population growth rate of Amman has far exceeded that of any other place in Jordan.

Since 1948, economic development in Jordan has also been mainly concentrated in Amman (Doan, 1992:29). During the 1950s there seems to have been an official policy to develop Amman at the expense of Jerusalem (Gubser, 1983:26). After the unification of the West Bank all government services were located in Amman which drew civil servants working in government institutions to the city (Doan, 1992:27). The public sector grew in size and until today is a major employer (see below).

By the 1970s the inflow of oil wealth enriched the commercial elite in Jordan, with the growth of the banking sector in particular. Both aid and remittances, during this period, financed a massive expansion in education and health services. Infrastructure development projects further encouraged Amman's growth (Kliot and Soffer, 1986). This resulted in the incorporation of neighbouring villages within the city. The expansion of both infrastructure and social and health services was accompanied by a stark urban bias in the distribution of these services. At this time, for example, there was a relative neglect of agricultural policy (Kanovsky, 1989:4). In fact, Amman was expanding at the expense of agricultural lands (Tewfik, 1983:79). With scarce water being diverted to the expanding city through piping. There was also an evident maldistribution in health and educational services compared with the rest of the country.

Thus, Amman is a city that can be characterised by oil wealth. However, although oil wealth was not confined to one class, it did not come without its inequalities. In fact, one study demonstrates that between 1973 and 1980, during the boom years, inequality (differences between rich and poor) among urban households increased (Sha'ban 1990). Inequality between the years 1980-86, on the other hand, decreased in urban households as a result of recession (that is better-off households were adversely affected by the recession rather than an increase in the standard of living in general) (ibid:67-8). The urban sprawl of Amman was accompanied by rising consumer prices where, in just three years (1975-1977), inflation in Amman jumped 51%, with food prices alone advancing more than 75% (Satloff, 1986:115). This was accompanied by scarcity of housing and increasing prices on rents. Not everyone, therefore, benefited from the boom years, and many were left out.

There is also a geographic dimension to inequality in Amman. The influx of refugees to Amman following the 1967 war has resulted in the uncontrolled growth of squatter settlements largely in East Amman. Official refugee camps run by UNRWA are surrounded by unofficial camps which lacked many essential services and were often overcrowded (Razzaz, 1993:11). In the early 1970s the municipality of Amman estimated that 12% of the population of Amman were living in squatter areas and the conditions and quality of housing has deteriorated since the 1960s (United Nations, 1974 as quoted by DeJong, 1993:112). In 1983, 7% of the total Jordanian urban population lived in squatter settlements and 11% lived in refugee camps (Doan, 1992:29).

With time, this has developed into a social differentiation between West and East Amman that starkly characterises the city today. West Amman and its suburbs, are characterised by upper income neighbourhoods, open spaces and good infrastructure while East Amman is characterised by middle and lower income neighbourhoods, over-crowded conditions and poor infrastructure (see DeJong, 1993; Kliot and Soffer, 1986; Razzaz, 1993). In 1980 the government, realising these disparities established the Urban Development Department (UDD). The task of the UDD was to provide services for the underprivileged in terms of housing and infrastructure and its main beneficiaries were those living in squatter areas.[34] Disparities between West and East Amman were decreasing by the 1990s. This is mainly because during the last two parliamentary elections (1989 and 1994), residents of these areas became more vocal and demanding. Unfortunately these changes came at a time of increased fiscal pressures on the state.

In sum, this chapter has thus far provided a chronology of Jordan's political economy and highlighted its dependence and fragility. It has also integrated the development of Amman within this framework. The following sections will investigate the structure of the labour force and the principle employment sectors in Jordan and how these political and economic factors have shaped much of the labour market.

3.4 Labour Force and Employment in Jordan

Having outlined the context of political economy in Jordan this section will provide an account of characteristics of the Jordanian labour force. This will highlight its growth and age structure, female labour force participation patterns, education and unemployment levels.

3.4.1 Size and Age Structure of the Labour Force

A critical feature in Jordan is the high number of young people in proportion to the total population. In 1979 51% of Jordanians were below the age of 15 years. By 1991 this dropped to 42% of the population. One of the results of this is that the rate of growth of the labour force far exceeds the rate of growth in the population. This is due to the increasing numbers of young people who are entering the labour force. The rate of population growth between 1979 and 1991 was 3.4% while the rate of growth for the labour force for the same period of time was 6.1%. There is a continual increase in the percentage of the working age population. In the 1970s the number of those entering the labour market was 15,000 per year. During the 1980s this increased to 25,000 and again during the 1990s to 46,000 per year (Ministry of Planning, 1992:37-8).

Concomitant to this is the age structure of the Jordanian labour force which is quite young. According to Table 3.3, in 1991, 49.5% of the male workforce and 68.6% of females were below the age 30 years. This has consistently been the case since 1979, when 41.2% of male workers and 68.5% of female workers were below the age of 30 years. Two observations can be made from Table 3.3. The first is the persistently disproportionate workforce participation levels of young women compared with other age groups of women. The second, is the dramatic decline in the labour force participation of women below the age of 20 years, which dropped from 11.2% in 1979 to 5.3 % in 1991, especially as there are no significant alterations in the participation of men in these age cohorts. Women's participation is therefore becoming increasingly compressed between the ages of 20 to 29 years. This is probably due to the fact that women stay in education for longer years before joining the labour force.

Table 3.3 Distribution of Labour Force by Age Group and Sex 1979, 1987, 1991 (%)

Age Group	1979		1987		1991	
	male	female	male	female	male	female
13-15	-	-	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3
15-19	10.9	11.2	10.9	6	9.4	5
20-24	16.3	35	22.3	40.7	21.8	36.4
25-29	14	22.3	14.4	24.2	17.9	26.9
30-39	24.6	21	17.6	18.7	20.1	21
40-49	18.5	6.4	16.6	6.6	15.3	7.6
50-59	10.2	2.4	11.8	1.8	10.2	2.3
60-64	2.7	0.4	3.1	0.4	2.6	0.5
65+	2.8	0.4	2.7	0.3	2.2	0.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1979 Housing and Population Census
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey
1991 Employment, Unemployment, Poverty and Returnees Survey

The urbanisation of the formal labour force is another feature, with the growth of Amman and the size of the service sector meaning increased employment opportunities. Indeed, Amman's share of employment in comparison to the rest of the country is as much as 69% of the total Jordanian labour force (Amerah et al, 1993:12). Not all of this labour force necessarily live in Amman, however. It is common for people to commute from neighbouring towns to Amman on a daily basis. Another reason for this increasing urbanisation is the increasing education levels (see below) and the fact that the labour force are becoming increasingly skilled professionals. In 1991, for example, 20% of males and 38% of females were in technical and professional occupations.

3.4.2 Female Labour Force Participation

In 1991 female labour force participation rates in Jordan were 14.1%. This is substantially lower than many other developing countries. However, these rates are a characteristic of the region where neighbouring countries report more or less the same rates.[35] One of factors behind the low labour force participation rates of females in Jordan is the high total fertility rates (see earlier).

Table 3.4 illustrates the growth rates of the Jordanian labour force by sex. It reveals that the rate of growth of the female labour force has exceeded the rate of growth of the male labour force. It is also evident from this Table that there has been a consistent increase in female labour force participation since 1961 while, on the other hand, there is a slight drop in the growth of the male labour force rates. This phenomenon, of female labour force growth outstripping male labour force growth has been documented for many other developing countries (See Brydon and Chant, 1989:162; Moore, 1988:97; Joekes, 1987:17) and in Middle Eastern countries as well (see, Al-Qudsi et al, 1993:3).

Table 3.4 Labour Force Participation Rates, 1961,1976, 1987, 1991 (%)

	1961		1976		1987		1991	
	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	female
Crude Participation Rate[36]	50.9	2.2	33.3	4.1	38.9	5	36.3	6.4
Participation Rates	83.2	3.3	73.3	8.4	69	10.6	81	14.1

Sources: 1961 First Census of Housing and Population
1976 The Multi-purpose Household Survey
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey
1991 Employment, unemployment, Returnees and Poverty Survey

As indicated above, and in Chapter One, most of the female labour force are young and below the age of 30 years. In addition, there is the women's marital status: 65% in 1991 were single (compared to 37% of males). Therefore, a related issue here is the increasing age at marriage of women in Jordan and its relation with the increasing rates of female labour force participation. In 1990, age at marriage for males was 27 years and for females 24.7 years. For females this is a significant increase since in 1972 age at marriage was 18 years and in 1979, 21 years.

3.4.3 Education Levels of the Labour Force

For a country poor in natural resources, Jordan has invested heavily in its human resources, in the past few decades. The oil boom brought Jordan unprecedented opportunities for its educated manpower which reinforced the country's commitment to education but made it increasingly dependent on remittances from abroad. Today, Jordan has one of the most advanced and sophisticated educational systems in the region (Kanovsky, 1989; Roy and Irelan, 1992; Richards and Waterbury, 1992). It has been noted that there are few less developed countries with such a large number in higher education in relation to size of the population (Kanovsky, 1989:47).

The development of the education system was one if the government's priorities since the 1950s. The emphasis then was to provide enough schools to serve the whole population and to eliminate high illiteracy rates. By the 1960s elementary education became compulsory. It was during this period that education policy became geared towards labour export to oil producing countries in need of technical labour. Therefore, education became not only targeted toward Jordan's labour market needs but of those of the Gulf States. During the 1970s, education policy became more directly linked with government's general development plans and emphasis shifted towards improving quality rather than expanding services. This continued throughout the 1980s by which time Jordan had developed an extensive educational infrastructure. Whereas primary school enrollment in the 1950s was 50% of school-age population this increased to 91% during the 1970s and almost a 100% during the 1980s. Enrollment of girls during the 1980s was 90% (Roy and Irelan, 1992:193).

As for higher education, during the 1970s Jordan had the highest ratio of students in the Arab world (Sayigh 1978: 193) However, there was an increasing mismatch between graduates and local labour demand. Training was geared towards skills needed in oil producing industries since skilled Jordanians were mostly migrating to these countries. The result of this was an increasing shortage in local skilled labour. It was the first time in Jordan's history where there was virtually no unemployment. Here, the government attempted to fill the void left by this skilled male out-migration by encouraging female recruitment into the public sector (Hijab, 1988).

Higher education policies became largely geared towards the export of labour insofar as the 1981-1985 National Development Plan anticipated that 27% of new entrants to the labour force would be university graduates and another 26% graduates of post-secondary levels (i.e. diplomas and polytechnics). Neither planners nor students anticipated that the demand for foreign labour in the Gulf states would end. What is worse is that during the same period the recession in Jordan itself reduced domestic demand for educated manpower. While there were plenty of graduates seeking work in Jordan there was a shortage of middle level practical skills. For example, Jordan has about three times as many physicians as nurses. With the increasing unemployment of university graduates, 40% of nurses were expatriate labour (Kanovsky, 1989:48). Indeed, the numbers of foreign workers, mainly Syrian and Egyptian was swelling as they took on the low paid jobs the Jordanians were refusing to do (ibid:49).

Data from 1991 reveals that the education levels of the Jordanian labour force are, hardly surprisingly, quite, high but this is also accompanied by high graduate unemployment (see below). Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates the increasing education levels of the labour force during the past two decades for both men and women. More important, however, it reveals that the education levels of the female labour are considerably higher than the male labour force.

Table 3.5 Distribution of Labour Force By Level of Education and Sex, 1979, 1987, 1991 (%)

Education Level	1979		1987		1991	
	male	female	male	female	male	female
Illiterate	20.6	8.7	12.4	8.2	7.9	5.6
Read and Write	21.5	4.2	20.4	5	13.8	3.8
Primary	24	7.3	17.9	3.8	18.1	4.1
Preparatory	12.6	8.1	20	9	22.4	7.9
Vocational	-	-	1.7	0.9	2	1.3
Secondary	10.6	26.4	12.5	18.8	14.6	14.9
Mid. Diploma	4.4	32.5	7.9	41.9	9.8	45
Bachelors	5.4	11.57	6.9	11.5	9.7	16
Higher Education	0.7	1.7	0.5	0.3	1.4	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: 1979 Housing and Population Census
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey
1991 Employment, unemployment, Returnees and Poverty Survey

For example, according to Table 4.5 post secondary education for males increased from 11% in 1979 to 16% in 1987 and again to 19% in 1991. In contrast, the education levels of females increased from 44% in 1979 to 56.5% in 1987 and to 62% in 1991. The reasons for this is that unlike males, the higher the female education the more likely they will participate in the labour force (See Chapter Five for fuller discussion).

3.3.4 Unemployment

The above review of the increasing size, young age structure and high education levels of the labour force leads to a discussion of unemployment. In tracing unemployment trends in Jordan during the last three decades it becomes obvious how these are contingent not only on demographic determinants but also on regional and external influences as well. Jordan had high unemployment rates in the early sixties, with the influx of Palestinian refugees. This evolved into a labour shortage during the oil boom years, as Jordan became a regional labour supplier. For example, in 1976 at the height of the oil boom, unemployment was as low as 2%. However, since the beginning of the recession years in the early eighties, unemployment has been steadily increasing. In 1987 it was 15% and by 1991 it reached 17.%. It can be argued that this is the result of education policy which has produced a highly skilled labour force for which there is not enough market demand. This is also coupled with a short-sightedness of education policy that assumed that the demand for skilled Jordanian labour abroad would continue and that the local labour market, which is small, would be able to absorb the remaining graduates.

Perhaps because the female labour force has higher education levels than the male labour force, there are significant gender differentials in unemployment levels. In 1987, male unemployment was 13% compared with 27% among women. By 1991 these differences were exacerbated as male unemployment increased to 14.7% while female unemployment became as high as 34.4%. Another possible reason for these differentials is the fact that female labour supply is limited to a few gender ascribed jobs (such as teaching and secretarial work) (see Chapter Six). However, regardless of the reasons behind these differentials, the fact remains that the gap between males and females has been increasing. The role of labour market discrimination or segmentation will be the focus of discussion in Chapter Four.

Generally, unemployment levels by age groups reveal that the problem is of youth unemployment, which is expected as it is linked to the initial search for employment. However, yet again the problem is greater among females than males. In 1991, 84% of unemployed females were between 20-29 years of age compared to 50% of the males. Furthermore, 76.8% of unemployed females in the same age groups had post secondary education compared to 34.8% of the unemployed males.

3.5 An Overview of Employment in Jordan

Employment opportunities in Jordan can be described through a categorisation into three main sectors: the public, private and informal. These sectors differ in terms of employment conditions, remuneration levels and job security and benefits. However, as the following will demonstrate, this does not mean that different employment sectors do not overlap.

3.5.1 The Public Sector

One of the main characteristics of employment in Jordan in general and Amman in particular is the size of the public sector. In 1991 the public sector alone accounted for almost half of employment (46%) in Jordan (World Bank, 1994b:35). The reasons behind the growth of the public sector are several. First, the growth in social sectors accompanied the demands of a swelling population whether in health, education and other services. Second, the government was obliged to provide jobs for the expanding labour force. Third, in order to boost economic growth in a resourceless country with a sizable number of refugees, the government became a main shareholder in the productive sector. Fourth, regional instability required resources to be moblised towards security and defense (ibid:34).[37]

The state is not only a major employer in Jordan but also owns large shares of the major industries. According to Laurie Brand (1994:490):

> The picture that emerges is that of a domestic economy with a public sector component that is deceptively large for a country with an avowedly free market orientation such as Jordan.

The government owns 42% of mining, 23% of manufacturing, 27% of tourism and 20% of transport and finally as much as 90% of the phosphate mines which are Jordan's main export (Richards and Waterbury, 1990: 209). The government also runs the Pension and Social Security funds, and the Housing and Industrial Development Banks which are main funders for housing and industrial loans for citizens. This state-led growth can be understood through the Marxist concept of state capitalism, whereby the state acts as the private sector without any change in the relations of production.[38] However, even though the Jordanian state has large stakes in the means of production, this does mean that it is run by state capitalism in the Marxist sense. This is because public sector enterprises in Jordan largely operate at a loss and carry more workers then they need. It is the provision of jobs that is their main objective rather than profit and controlling the means of production. Furthermore, upon adopting the stabilising measures, in the early 1990s, it was recommended by the IMF that the government sell its shares in public enterprises, but to date, such measures have not been taken.

The state thus remains a major employer in Amman and recruitment is centralised through the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Recently the CSC has only recruited graduates, however, and leaves unskilled labour to be hired by the relevant Ministries or institutes which need it. In recent years there has been changes in public sector employment as government expansion has reached its limits with significant over-staffing (World Bank, 1994b:40). The result of this is reflected in changes between the number of those appointed compared with those who have applied in recent years. For example, in 1981 86% of applicants to the CSC were appointed, but by 1994 the proportion had dropped to 6.5% of applicants.[39]

Public sector employment is very attractive, even though the government is viewed as a low wage employer compared with the private sector. This is because compensations exist with respect to job security and fringe benefits.[40] Wage determination is closely linked to education and a civil servant's grade might increase with years of experience. There are thus several allowances and benefits to public sector employment which in effect decrease the wage differential between public and private sectors.

Women are particularly attracted to public sector employment and form 31% of the total employees of this sector (Akel et al, 1993:22-3). While males in the public sector earn 10% less than males in the private sector, these differentials are only 2% for females (World Bank, 1994a:37). Besides the earnings advantages women might prefer public sector employment due to factors such as flexibility of work conditions, shorter working hours and stricter compliance with maternity leave and relevant labour legislation compared with the private sector. In addition, there are general attitudes in society at large, whereby public sector employment is considered 'respectable' and 'secure' for women (see Chapter Five for a fuller discussion). In other words, public sector employment is prestigious for women. Typically, they are school teachers. In 1991, 58% of the total female employment in the public sector was teaching followed by 26% in administration and another 16% in health services (Akel et al, 1993:22-3). Most men in the public sector besides civil servants in government ministries are in the military (Brand, 1994:73).

3.5.2 The Private Sector

Attempts to signal out the private sector are complicated by the fact that in Jordan official statistics do not differentiate between private sector and public sector activity especially as the government is a major shareholder in the major Jordanian industries (see earlier). In addition, there is also an overlap between the private sector and the informal sector employment in official statistics as self-employed and family workers are usually quantified as private sector employees. This is compounded by the fact that private sector employers utilise, on occasion, employees on a temporary informal basis (see below) who might otherwise be described as informal sector employees.[41]

Given these limitations in the differentiation between the sectors, in 1991 it was estimated that the private sector accounts for 50% of the working population, (including the self employed and family workers) (World Bank, 1994c:115). This has been usually described as small.[42] The low rate of job creation in the private sector can be traced to the predominance of the public sector in terms of both employment policies and government shares in private sector companies (see above). On the other hand, the beginning of the 1990s showed an increased dependence on the private sector for new job opportunities in light of the inability of the public sector to absorb more labour, and owing to the decrease in foreign demand for Jordanian labour (Ministry of Planning, 1992:38)

The private sector does not have the fringe benefits or the various securities that exist in the public sector, although it can be argued that wages in general are higher than the public sector. Having said this, the private sector is largely governed by a comprehensive labour legislation and regulation which provides employment conditions, trade unions, industrial relations, processes of negotiations, labour inspection, occupational health and safety. These laws, which were established in 1960, cover all workers irrespective of nationality and sex. Some of these regulations are now outdated as labour market conditions have changed during the previous 30 years. A draft for the re-organisation of labour laws has been on the parliament's agenda since 1984 but there have been no amendments since then except for some ad hoc decisions to regulate labour.

The Jordanian labour law in principle does not discriminate on the basis of gender. There are also several elements that specifically address women workers. These include maternity leave of 40 days with full pay and a prohibition of the employment of women in 'dangerous' jobs and a ban on night work.[43] Although these measures are seen as protection to women workers this can sometimes work against them in terms of finding work (see also, Akel et al. 1993; Government of Jordan, 1995).

Besides the Jordanian labour law there is the Social Security Scheme that provide worker protection in the private sector. This was established in 1978 and is basically a state-run corporation. It collects fees from employers and employees and provides health insurance, compensation for disability or death and unemployment benefit. Pensions are paid for men at the age of 60 years and women at the age of 55 years. It also covers public sector employees who do not benefit from the pension law for civil servants (i.e. those not employed through the Civil Service Commission). The Social Security scheme includes private sector establishments employing 5 persons or more. However, small establishments are entitled to join if they choose.

It has to be mentioned here, however, that even though such schemes were devised to regulate private sector employment and to ensure worker rights and benefits this is not always the case. Private sector employers employ their workers on three different terms. The first is formal contract terms in which workers are permanent, fully protected by the labour laws and get full Social Security benefits. The second type of workers are those who are employed on a no-contract basis. These workers have no job security in terms of permanence of employment but do have access to the Social Security Scheme. The third are casual informal workers who have no benefits whatsoever. This absolves the employers of the responsibility of including such employees in the social security scheme which is costly to them (employers have to contribute to the social security of their workers) and/or providing the various rights and benefits. It is here that formal\informal sector employment intersects.

The main economic activities of the private sector in Jordan are commerce and manufacturing. In terms of commerce, almost two-thirds of commercial activity in Jordan takes place in the Greater Amman area. The commercial sector includes the largest number of workers after the government sector. In 1991, it employed 23% of the male labour force and 17% of the female labour force (Department of Statistics 1991). The Jordanian Chamber of Commerce plays a major role in regulating this sector as each establishment engaged in any form of commercial or services activities is required to register and obtain a permit. In 1990, there were 70,000 members belonging to branches in the different cities of the country of which 24,000 were in Amman.

The manufacturing sector also represents a large share of Jordan's economy. During the last few years the manufacturing sector has grown substantially and its contribution to GDP (at 1985 prices) went up from 11.1% in 1986 to 13.1% in 1992 (Ministry of Planning, 1992:70). The Amman Chamber of Industry is another is another body that regulates this sector. Its members are both public, private and mixed sector companies. In 1990, membership totaled 6,000 (Brand, 1994:57). The major problem with industrialisation in Jordan is that most Jordanian industries are major importers of most of their raw materials due to the paucity of natural resources in the country. This has limited Jordan's competitiveness in the world market and increased the vulnerability of the sector. For example, during the Gulf Crisis and the embargo on ships bound for Aqaba, industries were hit hard as they had no access to their raw materials. Despite this, within the industrial sector there are those that concentrate on the Jordanian market, especially in foodstuffs and clothing, while others are export oriented, especially those producing pharmaceuticals, clothing and electronics.

In 1991, 54% of manufacturing employment in Jordan was in Amman. In addition, in recent years this sector has experienced the largest increase in employment generation (see Ministry of Planning, 1992).[44] In particular, manufacturing employment has created new job opportunities for women as it accounts for 61% of female recruitment between the years 1988 and 1990 (World Bank, 1994c:121). Moreover, it has been projected that the future demand for female employment in this sector will outpace that for men (see Amerah et al, 1992).

3.5.3 The Informal Sector

Distinguishing the informal sector is problematic because of an overlap with the private sector. Perhaps as a result, there is a relative paucity of information on informal sector employment in Jordan. The available data vary according to specific definitions and approaches to the informal sector.[45] In the absence of extensive or uniform data, therefore, this section first outlines characteristics of the informal sector in Amman as identified through official data and then through two micro level studies conducted in low income areas in Amman. The official approach for differentiating between the formal and informal sectors in Jordan is through size of establishments. Thus, employment surveys as well as other sources of national level data define the formal sector as those establishments employing more than five persons and the informal sector as those establishments employing less than 5 persons. According to this approach 45% of such informal micro-enterprises are in the city of Amman (Akel et al, 1992:11). Typically, these small establishments are in the construction, transport and service sectors. Wages in this sector are lower then either the public or private sectors where in 1991, as much as 91% of those engaged in this sector earned less then 150 JD ($219 US) per month. Furthermore, female participation is quite low at 7.2% (ibid:45). These figures may reveal some aspects of employment in small establishments but are by no means exhaustive and representative of the informal sector per se.

Other approaches in defining the urban informal sector in Jordan discounts the size of the enterprise and utilise different parameters. Rebecca Doan (1992:29) in a study based in squatter areas in Amman defines the informal sector as the:

> Labour without contractual arrangements or legal protection whether the self employed, petty traders and producers.

This approach describes the informal sector in Amman as generated by the formal sector which resorts to informal, sometimes temporary, arrangements of labour recruitment (see also Ozar, 1996 on Turkey). This is due to the fact that demand for the services or product of the formal sector fluctuates and such methods of recruitment fill their needs according to current levels production. Another reason is to curtail costs as well since such informal employees are paid less and receive no benefits. As for the employees, this is simply a survival strategy in an environment of weakly enforced labour legislation, lack of minimum wage legislation and weak labour unions (Doan, 1992:36). Apart from the informal work in formal establishments, the informal sector depends largely on what can be termed the 'traditional economy' and the accessibility to this sector is easier then the formal sector. Although less desirable in terms of its lower wages, the flexibility of this sector is considerable especially for women who can work at home.

While the numbers of economically active women in this sector in the official data outlined above were low, a study of female labour force participation in three low income communities in Amman reveals significantly high economic activity that takes place inside the household (see Toubeh, 1994). In these communities it was found that 87% of working women are engaged in the informal sector.[46] Of those, 68% worked at home mainly in embroidery and sewing and another 17% in the immediate neighbourhood (ibid:99). This study also revealed that young women tend to work in the formal sector compared to older women who are engaged in informal and home based productive activities (see also Chapter Five).

Having outlined employment in the three sectors in Amman the question is their interaction or more specifically the mobility of workers between sectors. It has been pointed out that the public sector provides long term security and the private sector's wages are higher, and, finally, that the informal sector is more flexible and possibly more accessible. In fact, workers in Amman aspire to move between these sectors to maximise their benefits. For example, someone might be engaged in the informal sector until he/she can secure a more permanent public sector job.

Also, a common phenomenon in Amman is that of multiple jobs. That is, a public sector employee will have a small private business after hours or could be engaged in some informal activity. In this way an employee will enjoy the various fringe benefits of the public sector as well as extra wage. It has to be mentioned here, however, that the phenomenon of multiple jobs is more prevalent among male employees then female employees.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how Jordan's short history is based on a series of external influences as a result of its lack of resources and its location within the Arab system. Having depended on the export of labour and economic aid for prosperity, this proved to be unsustainable when these sources of income diminished dramatically. A more recent factor is the peace process with Israel. It is hoped that unlike the oil boom years, this will bring a more lasting stability rather than a temporary and fictive one.

Within these general trends the Jordanian labour force has evolved as young in age, highly educated and urban which also means that there are high rates of youth unemployment. What is also significant is that the growth rates in the female labour force are outpacing the growth rates of the male labour force. Employment opportunities for this youthful labour force revolve around the public sector ,which is currently contracting and no longer able to absorb the growing labour force, a private sector, that is too small in size but is experiencing change in its occupational structures (see Chapter Four), and an informal sector, that has a low demand for an educated or skilled labour force.

Notes to Chapter Three

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[1] The great grandfather of King Hussein' (the present king of Jordan) led the revolt against the Ottomans with the assistance of the British. This helped to free Arab lands from Ottoman control in World War One (Gubser, 1988:98).

[2] At the end of the First World War and the defeat of the Ottoman empire, the French and the British took control of regions that were previously under Ottoman rule. Syria and Lebanon became under the French mandate during this period while Palestine and Jordan under the British mandate. Britain had also some control over Iraq and Egypt.

[3] According to Mary Wilson (1987:3) '...Abdalla's domain as it was created in 1921, had a population of only some 230,00, no real city, no natural resources, and no importance to trade except as a desert thoroughfare.'

[4] During the British Mandate in Palestine, Jewish immigration from Europe was escalating especially following the 1916 Balfour declaration in which the British promised the Jews a home in Palestine. In Jordan, during the British mandate, land was allegedly being bought by Jewish colonists who considered Jordan as part of ancient Israel. However, unlike Palestine, a Jewish homeland in Jordan was not a tangible threat.

[5] Jordan has absorbed about one half of Palestinian refugees after the creation of the state of Israel. Almost all the other refugees were in Gaza Strip, (then under Egyptian rule) Syria and Lebanon (Kanovsky, 1989:1).

[6] Aqaba, which is Jordan's current port city on the Red Sea was undeveloped at the time and most commercial links were dependent on the Palestinian port cities of Haifa and Jaffa.

[7] For example, a World Bank mission visiting Jordan in the mid 1950's arrived at very pessimistic conclusions. The only expected improvements were either the discovery of oil or the union of Jordan with other Arab States (Kanovsky, 1989:1).

[8] Indeed foreign aid has been one of the most important factors in Jordan's economy since its creation.

[9] UNRWA was set up temporarily in 1950 as means of addressing the needs of Palestinian refugees. Although its mandate is renewed every three years it still operates today in Jordan as well as in countries with Palestinian refugees such as Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[10] Satloff (1992:130-1) distinguishes between pre-1970s Western aid and Arab aid, stating that the latter was of a completely different magnitude. According to him there were different rationales where the offer of Western aid grew out of a politically motivated agenda to assist moderate anti-communist regimes and that it was just adequate to maintain a 'controlled' level of development. Arab aid on the other hand was unconditional and reflected the economic circumstances of the region: as oil prices increased, so too did the level of aid.

[11] For more on the expansion of education during this period see Roy and Irelan (1992) and Richards and Waterbury (1992). For more on the expansion of health services in Jordan see DeJong (1993).

[12] This is compared to an average of 3% of GDP in other non-oil producing Arab countries (World Bank, 1994a:5).

[13] Most debt was incurred during the period 1979-1990 (i.e. the recession years). It increased from below US 1 billion in 1979 to nearly US 8 billion in 1990 (World Bank, 1994c:6).

[14] After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 Jordan continued to administer public services in the West Bank. Also, private sector ties continued to function. Relinquishing such control was a symbolic gesture that the West Bank is a Palestinian and not a Jordanian entity.

[15] It seems that Jordan still had hopes that it will be bailed out of their debt by funds from the Gulf States. Although the Gulf donors gave Jordan 350 million in emergency aid following the crash of the Dinar in 1989, this was not enough (Satloff: 1992:138).

[16] In January 1989 Jordan was forced to withdraw a 150 million US Dollars loan days before it was opened for syndication in Europe because it had virtually no subscribers. The Kingdom's lack of creditworthiness came as a shock to the government as well as to local bankers and speculators (Satloff, 1992:136-7).

[17] There were similar protests in other parts of the region, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, as a response to austerity measures (Richards and Waterburry, 1992:286)

[18] This was a further embarrassment for the government which was aiming to restore confidence through a change in government and cabinet together with changes in electoral law that been under martial law since 1967.

[19] In 1991 a Jordanian Dinar roughly equaled $1.46 US Dollars.

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[20] Officially Jordan's declared position was of neutrality, and the government repeatedly declared its interest in the peaceful resolution of conflict. However, both the Jordanian government and people had cultivated close relations with Iraq. Jordan (along with Gulf states and the US) has supported Saddam Hussein during the 8 year long war against Iran. As a result Jordan had built economic ties with Iraq and in a way had come to identify politically with it. Thus, during the Gulf Crisis Jordanian people's sentiments were largely pro-Iraq (Power-Stevens 1994::23). Indeed, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were slow to 'forgive' Jordan its positions, and political and economic relations, which were previously Jordan's life-line, were slow to recover (Power-Stevens, 1994:25).

[21] In response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Security Council in its Resolution 661, decided that all states should prevent all kinds of trade from and into Iraq including any transfer of funds for the purpose of any business related trade, commerce, industry or public utility undertaking (Abdalla: 1991:1). Currently in late 1996 and five years after the war, this embargo is still in place except for some humanitarian aid.

[22] Indeed it was not only Jordan that suffered because of this embargo but many other developing countries. See Abdalla (1991) for impact of Gulf Crisis on developing and East European countries

[23] This was later rectified and Jordan was allowed to receive oil as part of debt incurred during the Iran-Iraq war.

[24] This was to be renewed by October 1991 and within a different framework as assumptions and projections had been altered. The new conditions were more lenient and ran for 8 years rather 5 years. The reasons behind this are assumed to be Jordan's anticipated participation in the peace conference with Israel in Madrid in late 1991 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1992).

[25] Zarqa is Jordan's second largest city.

[26] For more on the impact of structural adjustment as well as the Gulf Crisis on public health services in Amman see DeJong (1993).

[27] Aid during this period was closely tied to political affiliation. Egypt for example, although adversely affected in terms of remittances, had been compensated through debt forgiveness for its stand with the Allied Forces during the War. Syria as another example was also compensated through grants and soft loans from Western as well as Arab funders (Abdalla, 1991:14-20)

[28] It has been suggested by analysts that this may have been a trade-off against King Hussein being given a prominent role in the future status of Jerusalem's holy sites (Power-Stevens, 1994:46).

[29] Countries included in this classification are Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Occupied Territories and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. For an elaboration on the classification of Arab cities and mode of production see Abu Lughod (1984).

[30] Circassians are an ethnic group originating from the Caucacus. It is said that they fled Russian rule in the late 19th century. Today they comprise approximately 5% of Jordan's population.

[31] Between 1974-84 approximately, 30,000 to 50,000 Lebanese settled in Amman. Most were involved in finance and commercial enterprises which boosted Amman's economy (Kliot and Soffer, 1986).

[32] The number of Iraqis in Amman fleeing the war during 1990-91 was estimated at 10,000 (Ministry of Planning 1991).

[33] Between 1965 and 1980 more than 50% of urbanisation in Jordan can be explained by migration (Richards and Waterbury, 1990:265).

[34] The Urban Development Department was originally part of the Amman Municipality. It was renamed in 1992 as the Urban Development Corporation. The main objective was to upgrade squatter areas through giving beneficiaries legal tenure and building materials. In return, the beneficiaries were bound by contract to repay the cost of upgrading on a phased basis over 10-15 years (see Bisharat and Zagha, 1986; DeJong 1993 for further discussions).

[35] 1990 data reveal that female labour force participation in Egypt was 11%, in Syria 15% and in Iraq 6%. The highest female participation rates in the region were in Lebanon at 27% (UNDP 1993).

[36] Crude labour force participation rates refers to percentage of workers from the total population.

[37] Military expenditure in 1986 was 14% of GNP. The ratio of military expenditure to health and education was 2:1 and the ratio of armed forces to teachers was 2.5:1 (UNDP, 1990, Table 18 as cited in World Bank, 1994a:34).

[38] State capitalism refers to the fact that public ownership does not mean that the profit motive disappears or that the workers gain control of the surplus value of their own labour. In other words, worker-owner exploitation still prevails (see Richards and Waterbury, 1990:219-223).

[39] These figures are calculated from the Civil Service Commission data. It should be noted that numbers of applicants have increased dramatically in recent years. In 1981 there were 7175

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applicants of which 6188 were appointed while in 1994 there were 110890 applicants of which 7278 were appointed.

[40] The allowances and benefits of public sector employees are extensive. They include family allowance, transport allowance; annual leave of 30 days for university graduates and 21 days for those with lower education; pensions after 15 years of service for females and 20 years of service for males; health insurance for family including parents; access to subsidised government stores. Other benefits that apply to all civil servants include housing loans, education grants, preferential tax treatment and provident fund. For more details on these benefits, see World Bank (1994b: 37-8).

[41] For a fuller discussion on the problems of labour classification see Tokman, 1991.

[42] Laurie Brand (1994:53) estimates that the private sector which is small in size can be credited with producing only 50-60% of Jordan's GDP.

[43] These are supposed to provide 'protection' for women workers. What is meant by 'dangerous' jobs are conditions that might endanger the foetus of pregnant women. In terms of night work the ban is in effect between 7 pm to 6 am.

[44] Manufacturing employment increased by 11% per annum in the 1980s or by 1 2000 jobs per annum. This growth is significantly greater then the rate of increase in total employment (6.9%) (World Bank 1994c:120).

[45] For definitions of informal sector employment as adopted by the International Labour Organisation see Mehran (1996). For a review of informal sector employment in the Latin American context see Tokman (1989).

[46] This is perhaps a result of a Save the Children income generating project of sewing and embroidery that operates among the three communities of Al-Natheef, Al-Mahata and Al-Misdar. This might explain the high participation rates of women in the informal sector in the sample of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR
GENDER, AGE AND LABOUR DEMAND

Having examined the political economy of Jordan, the characteristics of the labour force and nature of employment, this chapter focuses specifically on labour demand for young women in Amman. It explores the degree to which there is gender typing of jobs and the implications for young women who enter the labour market. Labour demand is evaluated here on the basis of current composition of the labour force and attitudes and policies towards gender in labour recruitment (see Chant, 1991a).

The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section briefly outlines the employer survey from which the bulk of data for the current chapter is drawn. Section two analyses the employer survey data through four different sectors: manufacturing, trade and services, retail, and community and personal services. In each sector it considers the composition of the labour force, employer recruitment strategies and occupational and spatial segregation. This demonstrates the existing differences in segregation within as well as between sectors. Finally, section three synthesises a profile of gender and age segmentation in labour demand in Amman through the analysis of gender stereotyping, on part of the employers, occupational segregation and workplace spatial arrangements.

4.1 The Employer Survey

As noted earlier, the employer survey is based on 36 interviews of private sector establishments in Amman. Limiting the survey to the private sector is motivated by the recent retrenchment in public sector employment and the expansion of the private sector (see Chapters One and Three). In addition, since public sector employment is centralised and organised around rules and regulations it would have been difficult to reach an insight into gender and age segregation in labour demand. Excluding informal and family based activities here is based on the fact that youth employment is concentrated in the modern sectors and not informal and traditional activities (see Chapter Five).

The establishments chosen represent wide ranging private sector activities in Amman. Interviews were conducted through questionnaires with either the employers themselves or, in the cases of large establishments, personnel managers (see Appendix One and Three). It is important to point out, at this stage, that the number of cases are too few to be representative of formal economic activity as a whole in Amman. Nevertheless, despite the limitations that this poses, the following is an attempt to provide illustrative data on case study material in relation to the role of gender and age in labour market demand.

In general, the composition of the labour force in the private sector is predominantly male. The total female labour force in the sample was 28% which is quite high compared with the national average of 14.1% (see Table 4.1). However, this may be due to the small size and nature of the study rather than a reflection of higher female participation rates in Amman's private sector. Furthermore, due to the objectives of the study it would have been counter-productive to include a majority of firms with no female employees. There are four firms, in the survey sample, with no females and there are no establishments with no male employees. The firms which have a majority of female employees, have at least a male owner and/or manager.

The sex of the owners and personnel managers is predominantly male with the exception of five establishments. Female employers/personnel managers are in the education and retail sectors with one in the manufacturing sector. These female employers are as much influenced by the gender typing of jobs as males and based much of their recruitment and job allocation accordingly.[1] Therefore, the sex of employers is not utilised as a significant criterion of analysis.

Table 4.1 Total Number of Employees, Percentage of Women Employed and Average Age According to Sector in Employer Survey

Sector	Total Number of Firms in Sample	Total Number of Employees	Percentage of Women Employed	Average Age	
				Male	Female
Manufacturing	12	1704	28 (488)*	31	22
Trade and Services	11	612	26 (161)	37	27
Retail	7	288	26 (34)	28	26
Community Services	6	257	48 (124)	42	27
Total	36	2861	28% (807)	31	24

Source: Employer Survey
* Absolute numbers in brackets

The sectoral distribution of the sample includes a wide range of activity which in the current analysis will be grouped into four categories (see Table 4.1). These include 12 establishments in the manufacturing sector, consisting mainly of large export oriented manufacturing, such as two electronics factories and a hygienic paper production, and food processing, although it also included small workshops in clothing and a shoe production. Another 11 establishments are in trade and services. These include a variety of service-oriented firms such as real estate, travel agent, construction company, cleaning agency, dry cleaners and a bank. Another seven establishments are in retail. These include an optician, a supermarket, a bookshop, and a tea wholesaler among others. Finally, a further six establishments are in community and personal services. These are largely schools, a hospital and a community fitness centre.

4.2 Sectoral Differences in Labour Demand In Amman

While Chapter Three has outlined the structure of employment in Amman, the following will specifically address gender and age segregation within and across the different sectors. Therefore, within each sector, the following analysis will examine gender composition of the labour force, employers' recruitment preferences and practices, working conditions, occupational segregation and wage differentials within firms and finally spatial segregation.

4.2.1 Manufacturing Sector

According to the Amman Chamber of Industry, in 1994 there were 7500 manufacturing establishments in Amman.[2] These vary from large scale export oriented firms to firms with only two workers. The firms interviewed differ in terms of employer needs, recruitment strategies and working conditions. In investigating these differences the following analysis divides the manufacturing sector into three firm types.

The first firm type is large scale manufacturing which include two electronics factories, hygienic paper production and vegetable canning. The proportion of women in some of these industries is quite high (see Table 4.1). Employers in such industries openly talk about the 'advantages of hiring girls.' The second firm type is mechanised production. These high technology firms depend largely on a skilled labour force and include an edible oil refinery, a plastic moulds and paint factories. Apart from a limited number of clerical and administrative workers, the number of women in these factories is limited.[3] The employer in the paints industry explained that in the past his workforce included a high proportion of women, but there was so much 'trouble'[4] that they eventually switched to an all male hiring practices. The third firm type are the small and medium-scale workshops. These do not only differ from the above two types of firms but are themselves varied in terms of the gender composition of labour. One clothing workshop depend on a majority of male labour 'to avoid trouble' as well, while all the others depend on a majority of female labour. The bakery and the shoe workshop have a more or less roughly equal number of men and women.

Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices

Most employers do not only have gender preferences for different jobs but also different preferences based on age and marital status. In terms of the male labour force, large scale manufacturing employers prefer young men. This is because they believe that shop floor work is strenuous and it is important to have young and able men performing these tasks (see Table 4.2). In contrast, employers do not regard the marital status of the male labour, as significant. As for the mechanised factories, age and marital status of the male workforce is not important. This is because in the operation of sophisticated machinery, it is skill rather than muscular strength that is important. Finally in terms of the workshops, whether clothing, shoes or food neither the age nor the marital status of men is of any apparent significance to employers.

Table 4.2 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female Workers in the Manufacturing Sector

Type of Firm	Males		Females	
	Age*	Marital Status	Age	Marital Status
Large Scale				
Electrical goods (refrigerators, televisions etc.)	20-30	n.i	18-20	single
Electronics (electrical fuses, cassettes, videotapes)	20-35	n.i	18-20	single
Hygienic paper	18-35	n.i	18-25	single
Vegetable canning	n.i	n.i	16-25	single
Mechanised Production				
Plastic shapes and moulds	n.i	n.i	n.i	single
Edible oil refinery	n.i	n.i	n.i	n.i
Paints	18-35	n.i	n.a	n.a
Workshops				
Shoes	n.i	n.i	n.i	n.i
Clothing	n.i	n.i	below 30	single
Clothing	n.i	n.i	15-25	single
Clothing	n.i	n.i	16-22	single
Bakery	n.i	n.i	n.i	n.i

Source: Employer Survey
* Age in years
n.i = not important/no preference
n.a = not applicable

As for the female labour force, employers' preferences seem to be much more specific. In large scale assembly manufacturing, there is a unanimous preference for young and single women. In fact, among some it is not a preference but an imperative to all intents and purposes. Employers seem to believe that young single women are more energetic and more committed to work than married women who are burdened with household responsibilities. In terms of the mechanised production firms, in the edible oil refinery which has a limited number of women workers, employers have no particular preference for age and marital status. On the other hand, the plastic moulds firm, has no preferences in terms of age, but do prefer single women. According to the employer this is because they are a new firm and they want to avoid the extra cost of maternity benefits, finding replacements and/or the assumed higher absenteeism of married women.

In terms of the small workshops, on the other hand, youth and single marital status are an essential criterion for the clothing workshops but not in the shoe production or the bakery. Like large manufacturing industries owners of small workshops perceive young single women as better workers. They are supposed to be quieter and less confident which makes them more obedient to employers authority and to work regulations.

Other entry criteria apart from age and marital status include education levels. In large scale assembly work, employers seem to pay more attention to women's education than men's. An employer will not employ an illiterate woman but is ready to employ an illiterate man. As the canning factory employer explained:

> It is not that I want educated girls but illiterate girls are difficult to deal with and slower at learning. Illiterate boys, on the other hand, are not that much different from boys with some form of education.

This employer prefers to recruit women who have, at least, a preparatory level education.[5] The reason behind this added education requirement for the mostly unskilled female labour is that women are perceived as less qualified than men who are better at acquiring new skills and have an advantage in coping, not just with machinery, but also to new working environments. Among the mechanised industries a majority of male workers are skilled and many are university graduates of engineering sciences. The few women in these industries also tend to be university graduates as well. In terms of the small workshops, education could be an added asset for entry for either sex but remains largely insignificant.

In terms of employer recruitment practices, there are no formal methods. The employer in the large electronics factory stated that when they first opened the factory they advertised in the newspaper. The result was huge numbers of unskilled female applicants and a smaller number of male technical labour. That was the last time they had formally advertised. Most establishments utilise social networks and word-of-mouth search strategies. This often relates to paternalism evident in Jordanian working environments, summed-up by one employer who said: 'we are a family here.' So when employing a new recruit he first asks 'his girls' if they can recommend someone.[6]

Differences in Working Conditions

Working hours among most establishments vary between seven am at the earliest and four pm at the latest except for one of the electronics factories that work continuously and include night shifts utilising male labour.[7] In the large industries and some of the mechanised ones, transportation of women workers is available through company buses from specific pick-up points in the city, and the plastic moulds industry offers transportation for both men and women. Employers provide this extra incentive to attract young female labour who are otherwise socially restricted and would find it hard to commute to the industrial part of the city where most of these large industries are located (see Chapter Six).

In terms of worker security and type of contract, almost all establishments in the manufacturing sector depend on three types of working conditions: formal contract, non-contract and informal labour (see Chapter Three). This means that workers have varying degrees of job security and benefits.[8] Among large establishments such as electronics, hygienic paper and vegetable canning, labour consists of a core of formal contract and non-contract based permanent employees together with informal based temporary workers at times of high demand. For example, the large electronics firm (refrigerators and televisions) frequently hires an extra 50 -100 workers during periods of the year when demand of the level of production is highest. Furthermore, all the small workshops depend on informal based labour. No workshop was part of the Social Security Scheme. In terms of the gender breakdown of the contract non-contract based employment in the manufacturing sector, the majority of females seem to work on no contract basis while men are more evenly distributed among the three types of working conditions.

Occupational Segregation Within Firms

Manufacturing employment is the most horizontally and vertically segregated form of employment. Table 4.3 reveal that the overall wage differential between men and women in the manufacturing sector as a whole was 132 JD ($195 US) for men and 79 JD ($117 US) for women. This wage differential is the widest among the sectors included in this survey. The reasons behind this are perhaps because the vast majority of women, 64%, are unskilled workers. Typically, these are either assembly line workers in the large industries or casual labour in the clothing workshops. A substantial number of men are unskilled labour, at 38%, yet this still remains considerably less than women. Semi skilled labour consisted of a substantially lower number of women, 15.6% compared to 30% men. The reason behind this is the fact that men's and women's jobs are perceived differently regardless of skills. For example, men's work which includes muscular strength and the operation of machinery is perceived as semi-skilled or skilled. Women's work, which requires patience and manual dexterity is perceived as unskilled. The result is a construction of gender distinctions in the workplace. Employers in manufacturing boasted of how the accuracy and precision of 'their girls' reduce their costs. However, men are almost always paid more, because they do work that require 'muscular strength.' It was interesting how often employers confused men's supposed physical strength with increased worker productivity.[9] The fact that assembly line work was strenuous for women even if it did not require muscular strength was not a consideration among employers. This accords with data elsewhere that suggest that the gendering of unskilled jobs are part of employers strategies to segregate men from women and maintain wage differentials (see Ecevit, 1991 on Turkey; Heyzer, 1986 on South East Asia; Pollert, 1981 on the United Kingdom).

Table 4.3 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and females in the Manufacturing sector

Occupation			Average Wages (in JD)	
	Males %	females %	Males	Females
Unskilled (assembly line, packers, etc.)	38 (450)*	63.5 (310)	78	58
Semi-skilled (simple machine operators and other)	30 (367)	15.6 (76)	103	78
Skilled (mechanics, large machine operators)	12.5 (152)	5 (24)	147	102
Technical (engineers, lab technicians quality control, etc.)	7 (88)	2 (9)	270	195
Supervisors, formen	4.6 (56)	5 (25)	250	115
Administration and management	4 (48)	2.8 (14)	378	198
Clerical	0.4 (5)	3.6 (18)	150	120
Sales and marketing	3 (36)	1 (5)	200	180
Other	0.4 (5)	1.4 (7)	-	-
Total	100 (1216)	100 (488)	132	79

Source: Employer Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

In general, therefore, men and women almost never perform the same tasks. In cases when men do engage in the same jobs as women, which is sometimes the case in the clothing workshops, their pay arrangements would differ. In these establishments women are paid an average monthly wage of JD 60 ($89 US). Men doing the same job are paid per piece and can earn up to JD 250 ($370 US) per month. Therefore, women's pay remains lower than men's even in the same occupations (see also Phillips and Taylor, 1980).

Clothing workshops also provide examples of vertical gender segregation. These workshops tend to be female dominated apart from fabric cutters and management. Fabric cutting, which is designated as skilled work, comes after managerial posts in the occupational hierarchy and is always performed by highly paid males. In contrast, the lowest in the hierarchy in these workshops are those who do the 'finishing' (sorting loose threads, attaching buttons and ironing). These are the least paid and are always women. Employers claim that only women can do the task of preparing the end product for the market because they are cleaner and neater.

In terms of vertical mobility, unlike men, women performing manual labour have few chances for mobility in most industries. The most that women can aspire to in such occupations is the post of supervisor. Such cases are limited to supervising other females and pay is only marginally higher. Women are not thought to be authoritative enough to be in charge of men.[10] There is one case, however, among the mechanised industries whose demand for specialised labour seem to favour women. The quality control department of the edible oil refinery is occupied by four females. Apart from management, these women had more skill, education, pay and prestige than any of the other male workers. It has to be noted however, that despite this, these women were not directly in charge of men workers. Other examples of vertical mobility for women in the manufacturing sector include some women who are in management, administration and marketing. These women, although few in number seem to be able to achieve the same vertical mobility as men. In other words, the entry point of women largely determines the opportunities for upward mobility, with the higher up the occupational hierarchy having greater chances of ascending to higher-rank positions. Theoretically, this applies to men as well. However, first it has to be kept in mind that proportionally more women than men enter as unskilled labour. Second, there is the intervening variable of employers' assumptions that men are more qualified to operate machinery or to supervise others and that men stay longer in employment and are therefore more worthy of promotion and training.

Spatial Segregation Within Firms

Employers gender typing of jobs also includes a variety of spatial arrangements. The most blatant are the single sex working environments that are assumed to be more harmonious and therefore more efficient and productive. This includes the all-male staff of the paint industry. It also includes the all female staff of the three clothing workshops. The employer of the only male-dominated clothing workshop claimed that he tried to switch to an all male workforce since women were causing too many problems. However, he was unable to get rid of all his female employees because some had to perform the finishing touches (sewing buttons, sorting loose threads and ironing) that the men refuse to perform. His solution was to accommodate them in the attic in order to limit their interaction with the males.

There are a variety of arrangements to do with spatial segregation other than single sex employment or separate work spaces, however. By and large, this worked to women's disadvantage as it entailed performing lower skilled jobs and hence less pay than the men. One such example is the electronics factory where the majority of assembly line workers are women and men who are permanently technicians. The women occupy the centre of the large hall and the men work on the periphery so that although they are within view, there is no direct communication. In addition, the women are not allowed to leave their machines nor the factory premises during break times. These restrictions, according to the employer are necessary in order to minimise interaction between male and female workers and maintain a 'respectable working environment.' This same establishment relied on a further form of spatial segregation through different shifts. Women work from seven am to three pm where only the male technicians would be present. The men have two other shifts one that starts at three p.m. and another at ten pm that would continue overnight. Although men and women in the different shifts performed identical tasks, the afternoon and night shifts means higher wages for the men

However, there are examples where spatial segregation worked for women's advantage. The edible oils refinery has 36 men in various occupations from managerial to unskilled labour. They also have four women who are the laboratory technicians and controlled the quality of the factory's output. These women are in advantaged positions and no men apart from management were able to enter their laboratory. The reason behind this is that the supply of well-qualified female laboratory technicians convinced the employer to have an all female staff in order to maintain a congenial atmosphere. These women never interact with other male workers except for the management. This is an example of occupational segregation which is based on spatial segregation rather than the gendering of jobs.

4.2.2 Trade and Services Sector

The trade and services sector has been earlier identified as the largest within the private sector in Amman (see Chapter Three). According to the Chamber of Commerce in 1993 it included 19957 members (this also includes retail firms, see below). Women comprise of 26% of the total employees of the firms interviewed. The gender composition of the firms varied. Out of the 11 firms, three have no female workers at all. These include what are perceived as male domains of a storage, movers and packing firm, a restaurant and a dry cleaners. Other firms have a very limited number of women. This includes a real estate firm and a travel agents where female employees consist of one secretary in each firm. A hotel and a cleaning agency also have a limited number of women but in these cases it is considered a problem. The employers need more female workers but social stigmas relating to women in hotel and cleaning occupations hinders their availability.[11] Other firms such as the shipping agents, bank and computer consultancy has a fair amount of female workers who are often professionals. Finally, one establishment in this sector is dependent on a predominantly female workforce which is a hairdresser.

Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices

On the whole, although age and marital status of employees are a consideration for employers in trade and services they are of less significance than in other sectors (see Table 4.4). Skill and education are equally if not more important. Furthermore, unlike employers in the manufacturing sector who predominantly prefer young men but are not concerned about marital status, several firms in the trade and services sectors prefer married men. As for women workers, two firms prefer single women. The hotel prefers single women because they are more flexible in their working hours which is necessary for hotel work. Also, according to the manager, young women are more: 'energetic, livelier and better looking.'[12] The computer consultancy also prefers single women because according to the manager they invest too much in their employees to tolerate the high absenteeism and turn-over rates of married women. According to him: 'We expect total commitment and married women are not able to provide that.' When asked what happens to women who get married while in their employment, it transpired that those who have achieved good positions usually stay in employment after marriage.

Table 4.4 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female Workers in the Trade and Services Sector

Type of Firm	Males		Females	
	Age*	Marital Status	Age	Marital Status
Travel agent	n.i	n.i	below 40	n.i
Real estate	n.i	married	n.i	n.i
Bank	n.i	n.i	n.i	n.i
Shipping agents	22-35	n.i	22-35	n.i
Movers and storage	18-30	n.i	n.a	n.a
Coffee house/restaurant	n.i	n.i	n.a	n.a
Hotel	18-40	married	18-28	single
Cleaning services	17-25	n.i	n.i	n.i
Hairdresser	n.i	n.i	18-25	n.i
Dry cleaners	n.i	n.i	n.a	n.a
Computer consultancy	23-28	married	23-28	single

Source: Employer Survey
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference
n.a = not applicable

In terms of the importance of education as a recruitment criterion, some of the above services related occupations do not require a high amount of education from either sex, but emphasise previous work experience. These are the hotel, hairdressers, dry cleaners, restaurant, and movers and packers. In contrast, for the bank, computer consultancy and shipping agents, education for both males and females is equally important but will vary according to the specific job they will perform. In general however, it consists of specialised university education and a working knowledge of the English language.

Other recruitment criterion include what employers describe as appearance and/or behaviour of women workers which does not apply to men workers. Trade related occupations especially those employing secretaries and receptionists seem to want women with 'good appearance' and 'pleasing character.' Both these attributes refer to a split in the ideological construction of Jordanian employers. This is between 'modern' employers looking for a western image of the workplace and 'traditional' employers who prefer not to recruit female employees at all, or to segregate them from male workers. In the trade and services related firms that employ women, employers are more likely to prefer women employees that wear western dress styles and who are ready to interact freely with male superiors and clients. What this means is that veiled women are disadvantaged in obtaining jobs in this sector. Employers in modernising firms such as the travel agency, computer consultancy and the shipping agency will not employ a veiled receptionist or secretary.

Differences in Working Conditions

The working conditions within the trade and service sector vary considerably. Except for the bank and the computer consultancy, working hours are long, usually from eight am till around six pm, although people have lunch breaks of one to two hours. None of the firms in this sector has a two day weekend. Only the shipping and travel agents take Sunday afternoons off, which amounts to one and half days off. The restaurant, hairdressers and dry cleaners do not close on weekends and working hours are the longest and can amount to 12 per day.

The working conditions for most of the employees in this sector are relatively secure in comparison to other sectors. The bank, travel agency, shipping agency, and computer consultancy work on formal contract basis, and provide, social security and health insurance. In addition, the computer consultancy and the shipping agency has a provident fund, while the bank provides loans (especially for housing or education of children) and family increments (an extra amount of money for each dependent child). However, gender differentials are clear in the health insurance schemes and family increments. These benefits are given to men who are supposedly the family breadwinners. Since women are not the main breadwinners they are not entitled to either health insurance for their families or family increments for their dependents. This bias is in effect legally endorsed since Jordanian labour laws, guided by the 'male breadwinner ideology,' do not mention the fact that the families of working women are entitled to such work benefits. It makes an exception, however, for divorced or widowed women, who therefore can claim such benefits.

In other firms, notably the hairdresser, hotel restaurant and travel agent, employees work on an informal contract basis which means that apart from the social security scheme, they have no job security or benefits. In some cases benefits depend on the employers' attitudes and/or benevolence. The owner of the restaurant, for example, reported that one of his employees asked for a holiday and: 'I gave him a permanent one.' On the other hand, the owner of the hairdresser claimed that he likes to keep his employees happy and tries to accommodate their holidays or give them their monthly wages in advance when they need it in order to foster long term loyalty and a better working environment.

Occupational Segregation within Firms

The trade and services sector is varied in terms of gender segregation within firms. Within the bank, computer consultancy and shipping agents, both vertical and horizontal segregation are comparatively less pronounced than in the smaller firms. In terms of specific occupations these three larger firms have women who work alongside men, albeit fewer in numbers, as managers, accountants, and in marketing and public relations. The wage differentials in these occupations are not particularly pronounced (see Table 4.5). It is of note that women in these occupations are young professionals who are highly educated. In contrast, other occupations are evolving as 'female occupations,' such as the case of the increasing numbers of female bank tellers which is a relatively recent phenomenon in Amman and is developing as a prestigious female occupation.

Table 4.5 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the Trade and Services Sector

Occupation	Males %	Females %	Average Wages (in JD)	
			Males	Females
Administrative	12 (53)*	12.4 (20)	210	195
Managers/executives	7.4 (33)	3.7 (6)	450	419
Accountants	6 (26)	5 (8)	214	209
Computer technicians	15 (68)	13.6 (22)	400	400
Clerks/ secretaries	0.8 (4)	25 (40)	190	180
Marketing/sales	7 (31)	2.5 (4)	294	281
Public relations	4.4 (20)	2.5 (4)	315	298
Beautician/hairdresser	0.2 (1)	2 (3)	200	150
Cleaner/ waiter/cook	23 (104)	8 (13)	79	65
Packer/janitor/driver	5 (22)	-	178	-
Receptionist/telephone operator	2.6 (12)	2.5 (4)	186	121
Bank tellers	15 (70)	22.3 (36)	210	210
Other	1.6 (7)	0.6 (1)	-	-
Total	100 (451)	100 (161)	231	220

Source: Employer Survey
* Absolute numbers in brackets

If we look at the smaller firms, both vertical and horizontal segregation become more pronounced. Despite the fact that the restaurant, dry cleaners, and movers and storage company do not hire women at all, the real estate agency and travel agency only hire women as secretaries and receptionists. The hairdresser's is owned by a man who is the principle haircutter while the women employees perform everything else.[13] According to him men are better at using scissors. So, women workers in these firms rarely achieve upward mobility. Wage differentials in these occupations are also more pronounced. Male secretaries, for example, earn marginally higher than females but male receptionists, telephone operators and hairdressers earn substantially higher than females (see Table 4.5).

Finally, in terms of occupations that entail cleaners washers and cooks it is important to point out that the number of women performing these jobs are few not only in this sector but throughout the different sectors in Amman. The hotel owner for example, expressed his frustration at the lack of availability of women willing to work as chambermaids or waitresses due to the pre-existing social stigmas (see earlier). A related factor here is age. It is possible to find older women who work as cleaners and cooks but for younger women this would be considered a compromising profession (i.e. draws attention to their propriety and could avert marriage prospects) (see Chapter Six).

Spatial Segregation Within Firms

Apart from the firms that do not employ women, spatial segregation in this sector is virtually impossible and is not in the interests of employers. This sector demands that even with occupational segregation spatial integration is necessary. Women who work as professionals are more likely to interact in the same workspace as men. This includes the bank, computer consultancy and shipping agency. In fact, in these cases, the desegregation of work spaces are part of employers' interests who's quest for promoting a 'modernised' atmosphere includes open-plan workspaces. This also includes promoting some women to senior positions which according to employers reflects positively on the image of their firms. Despite this, however, concepts of gendered space persist. For example, the employer in the shipping agency stated that they are currently looking for a new recruit as a computer analyst. Since the computer team is already comprised of three women, he plans to employ a woman although there are many qualified male applicants. According to him the women will be more comfortable together and this will make a more congenial team work.

4.2.3 Retail Sector

According to the Amman Chamber of Commerce, retail firms are part and parcel of trade and commerce (see above and Chapter Three). However, since employer strategies and practices in labour recruitment vary considerably, the following will explore retail firms separately. The gender composition of this sector in Amman is predominantly male. From the firms interviewed the proportion of women working in retail is 12% (see Table 4.1). It has to be noted here, that until recently and apart from shops that deal with women's items, it would have been difficult to find women working as shop assistants in Amman, since the amount of exposure to strangers that such occupations entail was deemed culturally unacceptable. In many respects, therefore, the young women working in this sector reflect recent changes in attitudes to gender in sales related occupations.

Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices

Employers' preferences of the age and marital status of their employees in the retail sector vary (see Table 4.6). For example, the florist does not consider age or marital status of male or female employees important. The supermarket, on the other hand, prefers young men who are needed for their muscular strength in moving and shelving items. In contrast, they do not pay attention to the age of women who are at the pay tills. The pharmacy does not pay attention to the age of men but prefers young women from the point of view that they are better skilled and educated than older women. The tea and coffee wholesalers prefer both older and married women and men because according to the employer this provides a more stable and mature workforce. Finally, in terms of the food wholesalers the employer prefers young men and women because door-to door-marketing requires energy and patience plus attractive physical appearance. While the marital status of the male labour is unimportant the employer prefers single women on the pretext that door-to-door marketing is: 'not a respectable job for a married woman.'

Table 4.6 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female Workers in the Retail Sector

Type of Firm	Males		Females	
	Age*	Marital Status	Age	Marital Status
Florist	n.i	n.i	n.i	n.i
Optician	n.i	n.i	(20-30)	n.i
Bookshop	(18-30)	n.i	(20-25)	n.i
Supermarket	(18-25)	n.i	n.i	n.i
Pharmacy	n.i	n.i	below 30	n.i
tea/coffee wholesalers	above 35	married	above 35	married
Food wholesalers and distributors	below 30	n.i	below 30	single

Source: Employer Survey
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference
n.a = not applicable

In terms of other entry requirements, education seems to be an important factor with the pharmacist as well as the optician but is largely insignificant for both sexes in the other retail firms. For the bookshop as well as the wholesale marketers some form of education is important but not specialised education. Other requirements for the wholesale food marketing and optician include good appearance for women. A pleasing character is of importance for the optician, florist and supermarket.

Differences in Working conditions

Working hours in the retail sector are the longest of most sectors interviewed. All except for the tea and coffee wholesalers and door to door marketers work from eight am till at least eight pm. Furthermore, some retail firms, the supermarket and the florist, do not close on Fridays, the weekend. So basically, in spite of lunch breaks and the rotation of days off, employees in this sector work the longest hours. As a young woman optician explained: 'I do not see the daylight.'

Next to the manufacturing sector it can be said that this sector is the least protected form of employment as most workers are non-formal contract or no contract employees. It is only the pharmacists and opticians, who work on formal contract basis with social security benefits. Most of the employees of this sector are semi-informal labour with limited job security and benefits. In terms of health insurance it largely depends on the benevolence of the employer. The owner of the supermarket explained that he paid the hospital bill of a work-related injury of one of his men but refused to be 'blackmailed' in paying for further compensation. Perhaps due to this lack of labour protection, gender differentials in working conditions are not very perceptible in this sector. In fact, if anything women seem to be in more advantaged positions since they tend to be the specialised pharmacists or opticians and therefore more likely to be work on formal contract basis.

Occupational Segregation Within Firms

It appears that occupational segregation within the firms in this sector is also not as marked as other sectors. One of the reasons for this is that perhaps skill differences are not as varied and mostly includes sales. In addition, firm size tends to be small which adds to the lack of variation in occupations. One salient observation is that a substantial proportion of women workers work as specialised sales persons, compared to more men who work as non-specialised sales workers (see Table 4.7).

In fact, in Amman today, most pharmacies and opticians are run by young women. These specialised sales occupations have evolved as culturally acceptable, if not prestigious, female occupations, despite the fact that until recently sales occupations were traditionally male occupations. One of the reasons for this transition is the fact that such occupations usually require a college degree, which in turn has tended to 'professionalise' these types of sales work. In addition, a substantial number of florists are increasingly becoming run by women. Again this is a result of changing attitudes where such an occupation is increasingly perceived as requiring 'taste' (i.e. a female trait) as well as a certain amount of expertise and/or education. The two women workers in the florist were those who managed the shop and did the flower arranging leaving the men to do the cleaning, delivering and general assistance. Thus, in general, occupations in the retail sector are becoming increasingly desegregated although numbers of women are still limited in quantitative terms.

Table 4.7 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the Retail Sector

Occupation	Males %	Females %	Average Wage (in JD) Males	Average Wage (in JD) Females
Sales Person (in shop)	20.6 (20)*	14.7 (5)	190	140
Marketing and promotions (door to door)	34 (33)	29.4 (10)	200	**100
Managers/executives	9.2 (9)	3 (1)	600	550
Secretaries/ clerks	4.2 (4)	12(4)	180	110
Janitors/cleaners/packers	19.6 (19)	5.8 (2)	90	80
Specialised sales person	7.2 (7)	29.4 (10)	190	195
Other	5.2 (5)	5.8 (2)	-	-
Total	100 (97)	100 (34)	212	150

Source: Employer Survey
* Absolute numbers in brackets
** Added to monthly wages are commissions

Despite this occupational desegregation, however, wage differentials between men and women persist (see Table 4.7). While these differences are minimal among the specialised sales persons, the men who work as door-to-door sales and promotions earn double the amount that women earn in the same occupations. According to the employer, this is because the men have been longer in this type of employment and have thus acquired skills over the years. Women, on the other hand, have less experience. In addition, the employer was clear in explaining that women's pay is not less but on different terms. Apparently, they earn a commission on the amount they sell which can add up to be equal if not more of the men's wages. The employer explained this difference on the basis that, compared to men, women tend to be shy and need an incentive to become better door-to-door marketers. He later conceded to the fact that he needed women workers because during the day time, when most males are at work, women have an easier access to housewives than men to sell their products.

Spatial Segregation Within Firms

There are no firms in this sector that depend on single sex employment. Spatial segregation at work is also limited. In some ways, the bookshop and the coffee and tea wholesalers had occupational segregation that amounted to spatial segregation. In the bookshop, the only female is the accountant/secretary who sits in an office in the back of the shop. In the tea and coffee wholesalers the only female also sits in the back room packaging the products before distribution. In the other firms, one equally encounters women and men. In fact, in the pharmacy and the florist it is the women who deal with clients while the men are the invisible labour.

4.2.4 Community and Personal Services Sector

This sector includes health, education and community services. Its particular size either, in terms of number of establishments or size of employment is difficult to ascertain. This is because unlike the above sectors, which are governed by the Amman Chambers of Industry and Commerce, there are no governing bodies. Such establishments generally follow Ministry of Health or Education rules and regulations. For health workers, there are also the professional syndicates.[14]

The gender composition of this sector has a relatively high proportion of women (see Table 4.1). This is because it includes the profession that is seen as most appropriate for women: teaching. It also includes health professionals who despite the social stigmas on nursing (see Chapter Six) include a substantial amount of female workers in other health related occupations besides nursing. Finally, it includes a community fitness centre that has equally divided services between a men's section and a women's section.

Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices

There seems to be a definite preference for young women in the schools and nurseries interviewed in the survey. Out of the four educational institutions, two prefer unmarried women (see Table 4.8). There are no preferences for either young or single men in the schools that do hire men teachers. In fact, one school prefers married men since they are seen as more dependable with regard to their behaviour towards young female colleagues. The community fitness centre prefer both young men and women because of the nature of their work which requires physical fitness. The marital status of the employees, however, is not considered of any importance to work performance and workplace behaviour. As far as the hospital is concerned, marital status also seems to be unimportant for both sexes while all applicants are preferred to be below the age of 30 years. The reason, like the community fitness centre, is due to the nature of the job that needs physical energy.

Other entry criteria such as education levels are not gender specific and vary according to the different occupations. Education qualifications for both education and health professionals and training qualifications for fitness instructors are equally required from both men and women. The two nurseries hire women who have limited qualifications since it is not seen as a job that needs specialisation, only patience and love of children. Female nurses' aids also do not require high qualifications.

Table 4.8 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female Workers in the Community Services Sector

Type of Firm	Males		Females	
	Age*	Marital Status	Age	Marital Status
Elementary school	n.i	married	n.i	single
Day care centre	n.a	n.a	(20-30)	n.i
Elementary and secondary school	n.i	n.i	(20-28)	single
Kindergarten	n.i	n.i	below 35	n.i
Hospital	below 30	n.i	below 30	n.i
Community fitness centre	20-32	n.i	20-28	n.i

Source: Employer Survey
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference
n.a = not applicable

Differences in Working Conditions

Differences in working conditions between men and women are minimal in this sector. They consist of 8 hour shifts in the hospital, reasonably short working hours in the schools and quite flexible hours in the fitness centre. In terms of type of contract it appears that women tend to be more concentrated in jobs that are based on informal contract than men. Among the institutions interviewed it is the hospital that mostly hires its professional staff on a formal contract basis while the semi-professional and the unskilled staff are hired on an informal contract basis. Almost all the workers in the community fitness centre are formal contract employees. Most of the schools, on the other hand, have loose hiring practices with high turn-over rates. Only the teachers that taught older students in the secondary school had formal contracts and were paid throughout the summer vacation.

Due to the high supply and crowding of young women teachers there are some reports of exploitation in the schools and nurseries. One of the most common involves young women who are graduates of teacher training programmes and are employed as unpaid trainees, which supposedly is due to their young age and lack of experience, before the employee can guarantee permanent employment. At the end of the training period, which is usually a month, the employer switches to another trainee rather than take on the previous trainee as a permanent staff thus utilising a source of a free labour.

Occupational Segregation Within Firms

Occupational segregation in this sector revolves around a clear skill hierarchy. There are professional nurses and health related occupations and teachers who are university graduates and there are semi-professional teachers and nurses who have either finished school or attended some form of non-university training. While in the firms interviewed there are two women school headmistresses and the fitness centre had a woman manager (for the female section), this does not diminish the existence of vertical segregation. There is only one male who is a nurse's aid and no males who were not fully qualified teachers. Furthermore, there are no women doctors in the hospital despite increasing numbers of women health professionals (see Table 4.9).

Horizontal segregation in this sector is closely related to skill but also to cultural practices. While vertical segregation exists between predominantly skilled males and predominantly semi-skilled females, vertical segregation also exists between those females performing semi-skilled work, such as nurses and teachers' aids, and the male cooks, drivers, janitors. In other words, because of social stigmas regarding such jobs, in terms of vertical segregation, women tend to be sandwiched between the all male lower and upper rungs of the hierarchical ladder.

Finally, in terms of the other health professionals (see Table 4.9), these include the hospital, x-ray technicians, lab technicians, nutritionists, pharmacists and so on. Although there are more men than women in these occupations, the number of women is on the increase because these occupations are becoming prestigious especially as they involve specialised educational qualifications and memberships in syndicates. However, one cannot help but speculate on the reasons behind this increase in female health professionals while there are limited numbers of female doctors. One of the reasons could be the result of culture and practice where female students who are inclined towards medicine, upon entering university, are not encouraged to pursue such careers by their families.

Table 4.9 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the Community and Personal Services Sector

Occupation			Average Wages (in JD)	
	Males %	Females %	Males	Females
Qualified teachers	10.5 (15)*	17 (21)	210	175
Assistant teachers (no qualification)	-	23.3 (29)	-	100
Doctors	6.8 (9)	-	800+	
Qualified nurses	20.3 (27)	14.5 (18)	208	200
Practical nurses (limited training)	0.8 (1)	7.3 (9)	140	140
Other health related occupations	9 (12)	6.4 (8)	248	240
Fitness trainers	7.5 (10)	7.3 (9)	205	205
Administrative workers	16.5 (22)	6.5 (8)	154	150
Managers and executives	3.8 (5)	2.4 (3)	550	480
Secretaries and clerks	-	6.5 (8)	-	139
Receptionist/telephone operator	2.2 (3)	2.4 (3)	128	125
Janitors/cleaners/ drivers cooks	19.5 (26)	3.2 (4)	130	80
Total	100 (133)	100 (124)	231	158

Source: Employer Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

Wage differentials in the teaching occupations are closely linked to the horizontal and vertical segregation. When men and women perform the same tasks, men are still paid more as a result of perceived gender differences. Male teachers tend to teach older children and subjects such as mathematics and science. They are seen as those who prepare the students for national the national level examinations (*Tawjihi*). In this sense, female teachers have less prestige attached to their job, even when they teach older children. One of the results of this is that male teachers are paid more. Furthermore, teachers can even be paid less than other unskilled male school staff. In one nursery and elementary school, as an example, where all teachers were female and earned as little as 80 JD ($118 US) per month, the bus drivers earned 100 JD ($148 US). According to the headmistress this was due to the fact that bus drivers:' Have more responsibility' (i.e. children's safety). However, it is more likely to be that bus drivers do not accept a lower wage but young female teachers will!

In terms of health professionals the same rationale exists. Semi-skilled female professional staff earn as much if not less than unskilled male staff such as the janitors, cooks and cleaners. Finally, in the community fitness centre there are no wage differentials based on the fact that divisions between men's and women's sections are identical.

Spatial Segregation Within Firms

It is inherently difficult for a hospital to have any form of spatial segregation. For the schools, the dominance of female teachers, and the lesser numbers of male teachers, result to some extent in de facto segregated working environments. As for the divided services of the community fitness centre, spatial segregation in this case is not based on occupational segregation but on providing identical but separate facilities for men and women.

4.3 Gender Segregation at Work in the Jordanian Context

In synthesising the above, it has to be stated that while gender segregation at work in Jordan closely follows other cultural contexts in terms of gender typing of jobs and female attributes on the part of employers, culturally specific influences emerge as well. The first is that a large part of segregation at work rests on the conservative societal codes of custom and practice that influence the nature of female labour supply in terms of notions of 'appropriate' and 'respectable' occupations (see Chapter Six). The second is the spatial organisation of work which, in congruence with the larger societal norms of sex segregation, influences the gender composition of the labour force within firms. Furthermore, it has to be reiterated here that employers' demand for female labour is a relatively new phenomenon in certain sectors. Therefore, employers find themselves adapting to increasing female employment despite the above mentioned conservative cultural norms. In this sense, the interconnections between workplaces, households, and ideologies in determining female employment in Amman cannot be underestimated.

Within this context, the chapter now turns to a detailed account of employers' roles in determining the current patterns of gender composition in the firms interviewed in Amman. The first dimension of this is looking at how employers perceive gender differences and how perceptions influence gender segregation. Secondly it explores the extent to which new patterns of female employment are emerging and how these intersect with employers' interests in the different sectors. Finally it investigates the particular links between spatial and occupational segregation at work which are deemed necessary in a culture where interaction between the sexes is closely guarded.

4.3.1 Employers' Perceptions of and Rationales for Gender Differences

Employers usually have rather fixed ideas about male and female characteristics. Many of these directly relate to the wider concepts of gender differences (particularly in terms of roles and skills) regardless of whether they have any direct relevance to work performance. These perceptions are the basis of employers' rationale for gender and age segregation at work. According to Table 4.10 most employers interviewed claim that by nature men are more productive at work (36%) and remain longer in employment (47.2%) (see also Papps, 1993 on Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey). Women's attachment to work, in contrast, is perceived as weak. It is important to point out, however, that employers see this as an 'inherent' female characteristic rather than a result of low level kinds of occupations that women tend to be in (see also Chant, 1991a, on Mexico; Humphrey, 1984, on Brazil). The same Table illustrates that employers are ready to concede to a set of 'positive' attributes to female employees. Women, for example, are considered to be more punctual (41.6%), more accurate in work (38.8%), and more likely to accept orders (44.4%). The attribute with the least gender gap, according to most employers, is adherence to rules and regulations (44.4% claimed no gender differences).[15]

Table 4.10 Employers Perceptions of Male and Female Work Performance

	No Difference	Males Better	Females Better	Not Applicable*	Total
Productivity	27.7 (10)	36% (13)	25% (9)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)
Punctuality	27.8% (10)	19.4% (7)	41.6% (14)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)
Duration in Employment	22.2% (8)	47.2%(17)	19.4% (7)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)
Adherence to Rules	44.4% (16)	13.9% (5)	30.5% (11)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)
Accuracy in Work	27.8% (10)	25% (9)	38.8% (14)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)
Accepting Orders	30.6% (11)	13.9% (5)	44.4% (16)	11.1% (4)	100% (36)

Source: Employer Survey

*Single sex establishments where comparisons could not be made.

One point that should be raised here is that most of the positive attributes assigned to female workers have to do with the fact that they include women performing 'female' jobs. These attributes are perceived to be part of their 'nature' and/or an extension of their domestic roles. For example, women are inherently more punctual because due to norms of sex segregation their social freedoms are more limited than men's (see Chapter Six). Therefore, they are more likely to adhere to working hours and less likely to skip work since the repercussions of tardiness include raising suspicions and risking public reputation, and for young women this may have long term implications especially in marriage prospects. In other words, since women are accountable for their movements outside of family control, they make sure that they are at work on time and afterwards at home.

Women are also thought to accept orders more readily than men because: 'they are used to it at home.' In the hierarchical power structures within households women are expected to obey men's authority and young people are expected to obey older people (see Chapter Six). Employers, who are aware of this power structure see young women as more likely to be obedient. On the other hand, it is almost tolerated by employers that males do not accept orders since it is part of their 'manliness' to resist being ordered.

Lastly, employers in the manufacturing sector in particular perceive women as more accurate and patient in manual work than men.[16] This reflects the widespread stereotype of women's 'nimble fingers' that has been documented in many other countries (see for example, Elson and Pearson, 1981; Joekes, 1995). It is such perceptions that have increased women's share of employment in manufacturing industries worldwide. Thus, in general, employers' perceptions of women's positive attributes revolve around their passivity and assumed position as secondary earners, as well as, secondary status at home which in effect increases their exploitability at the work place, particularly in terms of lower wages.[17]

A further dimension of employers' perceptions of the performance of women workers has to do with their age and marital status. Young single women are considered more productive than married women. Their lack of household and child care responsibilities are perceived to make them better workers. In fact, according to some employers marriage is incompatible with the concentration needed on the job. Single women are also identified as more docile and more willing to accept orders than married women. Employers are aware that young women are not usually exposed to male 'strangers' before starting work and therefore are perceived as more timid and passive. Married and older women, on the other hand, are regarded as more exposed, vocal and willing to fight for their rights (see also Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a on the Philippines and Safa, 1990 on the Caribbean). Indeed, the socialisation of women prior to entering the labour market, via education, family community makes them less confident and more in line with employers' stereotypes (Jenson, 1989:149). Having said this, differences in the work performance of men based on the age and marital status are seldom considered by employers.

Therefore, because the jobs that many women perform conform to social stereotypes about women's abilities, gender divisions of labour, perceptions of women's demure behaviour and obedience to authority, most employers reinforce this by inserting young women workers in jobs that are seen appropriate and where their 'female advantages' can be of use. The suitability of men and women for different jobs thus results from social definitions of skills and biological differences regardless if they are verifiable in practice (Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991). In addition, jobs are more likely to be defined as unskilled when held by women than by men (Philips and Taylor, 1980). This gender bias in the definition of skill feeds into the grading of jobs where men are recruited and trained for primary sector jobs while women are recruited to the secondary sector. This in turn defines the persistence of gender wage differentials. Therefore, the underlying factor in the various beliefs about the character and ability of women workers is: 'employers' persistent unpreparedness to pay women equal wages to men's (Joekes, 1995:15).'

Finally, when assessing the male female wage gap as related to differentials in skills, conventional labour market theories, such as the neo-classical and the institutional approaches, do not fully address the distinctions between actual and perceived skills. As a result, they have failed to recognise the ways in which perceptions of women's roles affect employers' decisions and the extent to which this influences women's positions in the labour market (Joekes, 1995:16; Sinclair, 1991:14).

4.3.2 Occupational Segregation Within Firms

Gender and age segregation within firms in Amman can be described through three generalised occupational groupings. The first are occupations that have traditionally been seen as 'female' occupations such as teaching and clerical work. Such occupations are probably not only the most gendered in Amman but also world-wide (see for example, Crompton and Jones, 1984; Game and Pringle, 1984). The reasons that lie behind the fact that these occupations are designated as 'female' vary. Teaching is seen as an extension of women's natural roles as mothers and nurturers. Clerical work, however, is a reflection of women's secondary status in society at large, where secretarial skills, which entail repetitive tasks, have somehow become feminised skills (Crompton et al, 1981). Both these occupations can be described as vertically and horizontally segregated with limited mobility. We have seen how male teachers, for example, are invariably perceived as more specialised and earn more on that basis. In contrast, the exploitability of young female teachers in terms of pay and conditions of work is quite visible (see above).

In terms of clerical workers, it has been noted in other cultural contexts that the increase in the number of female clerks has been accelerated by the widespread introduction of computerised word processing where clerical workers have become increasingly identified with simple routine tasks (Crompton et al, 1981:44; Pringle, 1989:50-1). In addition, and related to the case of firms in Amman, the hierarchical designation of clerical jobs depend on a gendered occupational classification and women's place as secretaries within it. This is partly because the actual boundaries between clerical work per se and administrative or managerial work are usually unclear and differ from one establishment to the next. Therefore, the men in the sample who perform clerical work, unlike the women, are not perceived as secretaries and in many instances are paid more on that basis. The result is that male clerical workers have more occupational mobility than female clerical workers. Although some women may have achieved a certain status within their firms as a result of competence, the classification of their job as 'secretary' (i.e. traditional female job), and the secondary status that this entails, persist.

The second occupation group includes a relatively new group of young female manufacturing workers whose existence partly relates to global trends towards the feminisation of the industrial workforce (see Chapters One and Three). Employers' interests in this sector are closely linked with an expansion in the numbers of young low paid unskilled and dispensable female workers. The reasons behind this are stereotypes about women's abilities as manually dexterous, patient, capable of performing repetitive work, precision and so on. So, because women are perceived as more suited for labour intensive tasks they are assigned to positions that reinforce their secondary status at the workplace and are consistently paid less than men even when skill differences are minimal (see above). In addition, job security and worker benefits in such jobs are usually limited. The result is that there are some aspects within manufacturing employment that are inherently discriminatory as a result of employers' perceptions and stereotypes.

The third occupation group is linked to new occupations as a result of technological and economic change, that are resulting in new employment opportunities for women such as, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, opticians, computer technicians, engineers and so on. Women's involvement in such occupations is, to a large extent, a result of increasing education levels. Not only have these jobs not yet been gendered by employers stereotyping but they are socially acceptable and even prestigious for women in society at large. Horizontal and vertical segregation between men and women is less pronounced in these cases. There are also no significant gaps in work benefits and pay. One of the reasons for this is perhaps that employers' current interests lie in obtaining a skilled workforce.[18] This does not mean, however, that with time, as the forces of supply and demand change, these occupations will remain non-gendered and desegregated. As Shirely Dex (1989:299) points out:

> New jobs and new technologies only modify the gendered distribution of jobs, and when new jobs are created, old symbolism is drawn on to decide whose jobs they are.

Therefore, in short there seems to be two divergent paths in occupational segregation within firms. The first includes a variety of occupations that are highly segregated and reveal strong patterns of gender typing. These include both traditional occupations, such as teachers and clerical workers, as well as the new emerging occupations within the manufacturing sector. Most of these jobs are masculinised or feminised even if skill differences are marginal or non-existent (see also Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991). This extends to include wage levels where average male earnings are consistently higher even within the same occupations. Indeed, gendered employment in these occupations goes beyond a simple reference to skill and relates to the content status and identification of different types of work with wider cultural mores (see also Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a:288). The second trend includes less segregated occupations that require modern and technologically advanced skills. This demonstrates that employers stereotyping and gender ideologies regarding male and female work are not static and in fact can actually be flexible when they serve their business interests. Also, in such situations women are relatively well represented in the higher grades of employment. It has to be noted however, that this encompasses a more limited number of occupations and includes educated and/or skilled workers only.

4.3.3 Spatial Segregation Within firms

Spatial segregation at work is constructed around symbolic social and economic boundaries between men and women in society at large and exists in almost all cultural contexts. Some studies on the subject maintain that spatial segregation is simply a by-product of occupational segregation and women's positions as the secondary workers (see Hanson and Pratt, 1995, on the United States; Massey, 1994 on Britain). Other studies further discuss spatial segregation as a means of maintaining staff morality and harmonious working environment as well as increasing staff efficiency (see Chant, 1991a, on Mexico; Dex, 1989 on Britain; Hein, 1986 on Mauritius). However, an underlying factor in discussions of spatial segregation is the extent to which sexuality structures work relations and power hierarchies (Adkins, 1995). According to Lisa Adkins (1995:18) sexuality is the key to understanding both the gendered organisation of work and the forms of control to which women workers are subject. Indeed, in Jordan, space is sexualised. For women, this means working in occupations that do not risk their sexual reputations (see Chapter Six). As far as demand for female labour is concerned this has various implications for employers especially in terms of workspace arrangements and the gender composition of labour. The differences in the spatial organisation of firms in the different sectors outlined above, reveals that the gendered nature of work goes beyond occupational segregation per se. Having said this, the following synthesises types of spatial arrangements in the firms interviewed in Amman that reveals the variety of options available for employers and employees.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates the various forms of segregation based on both spatial and occupational arrangements. The extent of segregation within these firms is that men and women workers rarely communicate or socialise with one another. This does not necessarily mean that women are disadvantaged, however. Although this arrangement mostly includes low paid manufacturing assembly line women workers, it also includes spatially segregated women professionals.

It is important to mention here that sometimes it is the employees in large firms who prefer sex segregation. In one large electronics factory where there is occupational segregation but no spatial segregation the employer mentioned the fact that women workers had requested a separate cafeteria. Since this requires a commitment of time and money on part of the management, an alternative arrangement, where women will have separate breaks from the men, was being considered. This is an example of how spatial segregation, which revolves around dominant social mores and appropriate behaviour of the sexes, creates social boundaries between workers and acts to exacerbate, rather than diminish, the gendered nature of social interaction in society at large (see also Hanson and Pratt, 1995).

Figure 4.1



Source: Employer Survey

Occupational segregation and spatial integration is the second most common workspace organisation (see Figure 4.1). This includes shared workspaces but where women are assigned to some occupations and men to others. The most common are female clerks and male managers which reinforces hierarchical gender relations between men and women. In addition, there are also those establishments with occupational and spatial integration. In such cases, desegregation somehow works hand in hand with employers' interests. For example, some employers are keen to promote a modernised image of their firms and achieve this through spatial and occupational desegregation and the promotion of women to senior positions.

Finally, there are firms with spatial segregation only. This includes firms that provide services for one sex, with single sex employees. An elucidation on this type of spatial and occupational arrangement is important here. This is because the ideology of spatial segregation in society at large has resulted in women entering 'masculine' occupations in order to provide services for the women who prefer to function within sex segregated environments. The prevalence of this has increased with religious revivalism and increasing emphasis on women's veiling in recent years (see Chapter Six). Such examples are photographers, where women want to be photographed without their veil by another woman, and entertainment professionals, such as singers, musicians and comedians who attend women-only activities such as the traditional female-only parties prior to weddings. There are also women doctors and health professionals that operate in women-only environments (usually these services are provided by Islamic charitable organisations). These are examples, where spatial segregation could possibly be seen to have expanded female employment opportunities. Perhaps quantitatively the number of women professionals in such non-traditional occupations are limited, but ideologically it signifies that there is a certain flexibility in the gender definition of occupations under the circumstances of spatial segregation.[19]

Finally, another dimension of spatial segregation, especially in terms of its relevance to sexuality, is the age and marital status of female employees. Employers are more keen to spatially segregate young women than older women. It is assumed that young single women need to be 'protected' while older married women can take care of themselves. Now, of course, since many jobs are already gendered older and younger women tend to perform the same tasks. The ideology of guarding young female labour is visible and in some cases employers stated that if they need to fill a job that requires close interaction with men they will choose an older woman. Finally, a young age structure of the female labour force helps to form a particular working relationship between employers, male employees and young women. In congruence with the patriarchal nature of society, respectable men are supposed to behave towards women as fathers or brothers. Women appear to accept this quite readily since they themselves are confined to their roles as daughters or sisters within the home (see Chapter Six).

4.4 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the ways in which labour demand reflects perceived gender differences and gender ideologies in Jordanian society. It has demonstrated how gender and age considerations influence employers' behaviour in recruitment and job allocation. It had also exposed how employers' interests as well as gender stereotyping differ between as well as within different occupational sectors.

One of the major findings of the investigation is that there seems to be two general directions in occupational segregation within firms. One is towards less segregation, but is limited to occupations that require modern and technical skills. The second, includes a variety of occupations that are highly segregated. Within these occupations, gendered recruitment practices and job allocation on the part of employers often act to reproduce and even exacerbate gender inequality. Rationalisations for gendered employment are reflected in women's concentration in occupations which are predominantly associated with their domestic roles or perceived 'female' attributes and larger cultural notions of what constitutes appropriate work for women. Moreover, within firms, women are concentrated in the lowest levels of hierarchy with few opportunities for training or promotion. Therefore, even as more women join the labour market, employers still tend to regard them as secondary and temporary employees, compared with men. To exemplify this, one employer said: 'When a man wants to leave we look into the matter and try to dissuade him. When a woman wants to leave we say may God be with her.'

On a broader level, it can be maintained here that future employment conditions and opportunities for young women are largely dependent on the embeddedness of gender ideologies in society at large. As we shall see in the following chapters women's roles as secondary workers and their limited earnings do not empower them to assert themselves among their families or society as a whole. As a result patriarchal authority and traditional gender roles remain largely unchanged. This, conceivably, will reinforce existing gender stratification in employment in years to come.

Notes to Chapter Four

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[1] Elsewhere it has been suggested that there is a positive relationship between women managers and the number of women in the same firm (see Chant, 1991a:70). This is because women in higher status supervisory positions are likely to recruit higher than average numbers of women at other levels of the firm. This is not the case in Jordan.

[2] Source from personal communication with research and information department at the Amman Chamber of Industry.

[3] It has been repeatedly noted elsewhere that employers prefer men to operate machinery. These assumptions are influenced by the nature of female employment worldwide. For further discussion on the relation between gender and mechanised production see Cockburn (1985) on the United Kingdom; Chant (1991a) and Pearson (1990) on Latin America; Chant and McIlwaine (1995a) and Scott (1987) on Southeast Asia.

[4] The word 'trouble' repeated by many employers referred to relationships between male and female colleagues. A fact that employers seek to curtail for the sake of maintaining 'respectful' working environments.

[5] Both Helen Safa (1995) writing on export manufacturing in the Caribbean and Susan Joekes (1985) writing on clothing industry in Morocco, found that female assembly line workers have higher education levels then males which points to gender-based selective recruitment by employers.

[6] For more on the impact of social networks in obtaining jobs see Hanson and Pratt (1995:7-8) who writing on the United States discuss how non-economic knowledge affects the economic practices of individuals and groups as well as access to particular occupations. See also Chant and McIlwaine on the Philippines (1995a).

[7] The Jordanian labour law forbids the employment of women between 7 pm and 6 am. This is supposed to be for safety reasons (for more on labour laws see Akel et al. 1993; government of Jordan 1995) (see also Chapter Three).

[8] By law, employers can acquire labour through three ways. Formal contract employees who are protected from indiscriminate layoffs, have to be registered with the Social Security Scheme where some can benefit from health insurance, provident funds and so on. Non-contract based formal employees have some benefits such as inclusion in the social security scheme but they have no securities against layoffs and the employer is not obliged to cover them in company benefits. Another type of employees are temporary and informal workers. These have no securities or benefits whatsoever. It is a way for employers to cut costs on benefits and social security payments (see Chapter Three for fuller discussion).

[9] Although the relationship between male muscular strength and the recruitment of men is plausible in some cases, according to Shirely Dex (1989:229), this is not always founded on objective skill levels and is usually a result of pressure upon employers from male dominated trade unions to maintain control over production. In other words that this association is another device to exclude women from male dominated sectors and or skills.

[10] It is important to point out that women themselves have hesitation in assuming such roles. Supervisory positions require close contact with males a fact that could threaten their reputations and their relations with male kin. Men have undeniably higher positions both at home and the factory. Thus, it is almost unthinkable for women to be in a position to supervise a group that includes men (see also Ecevit 1991 for similar observations on Turkey).

[11] There is a social stigma surrounding domestic service and waitressing for women in Jordan. These occupations do not have general societal approval especially as they involve direct interaction with strange men in unprotected environments (i.e. inside homes and hotel rooms). Similarly waitressing involves constant exposure and interaction. It is commonly assumed, for example, that prostitutes function in hotels and restaurants, and therefore, respectable women avoid such occupations. Domestic service is usually performed by women migrant workers, mainly from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and waitressing is performed by Jordanian men or Egyptian migrant men. For more on how women in jobs, such as waitressing, tend to become sexualised objects by men, see Adkins (1995) who writes on the context of the United Kingdom.

[12] For more on hotel workers and employers preference for 'charming and good looking' female employees, see Chant and McIlwaine (1995a:Chapter Five) on tourism workers in the Philippines.

[13] It has to be noted here that despite the male ownership of the hairdresser interviewed here, there are many female owned hairdressers and beauty centres that provide a segregated female-only environment for their clients.

[14] Membership of syndicates is required by law of health professionals but not teaching professionals (although a teachers syndicate exists). In addition to the numbers of membership in

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such syndicates does not help in estimating the size of the sector since members are not necessarily currently employed as health professionals.

[15] See question 7.1 in Employer Survey, Appendix Three.

[16] Susan Joekes (1987) who writes on Morocco and John Humphrey (1987) on Brazil, have also observed that employers believe that the quality of women's work is superior to men's, while men's work rate is higher.

[17] This is by no means particular to Jordan. For similar observations, see for example, Chant (1991a) on Mexico.

[18] An example of this is the computer consultancy firm where the employer was keen to recruit more males since the number of females in his firm was outnumbering the males. However, since recruitment depends on an entry examination, and the women were invariably ahead he is ending up by recruiting more females despite his preference for males.

[19] This is an interesting phenomenon in need of further investigation. Ironically, although much of it is supposedly based on religious/cultural principles, it is not unlike feminist demands in the West for safer female-only environments such as women's rooms in large institutions, women's health clubs, taxi drivers and buses and so on.

CHAPTER FIVE

GENDER, AGE AND LABOUR SUPPLY

Households are rooted in social networks which provide support and solidarity as well as exchange of goods and services (Moore 1994:3). Yet, households are not homogeneous units. Household members have individual interests as well as different experiences and expectations. Furthermore, they are dispersed throughout the labour market in terms of their occupations and wages which has significant implications for each member's relative position within the household (González de la Rocha, 1994:8). Households are also dynamic units. There are continuous changes as a result of the transitions in individuals' life courses, as well as the evolving life span of the household itself (Kertzer, 1991:19). Gender and generation are among the lines that mark this diversity and changing nature of households. Within this context, the main aim of the present chapter is to investigate the positions of working daughters, who are in a specific life course trajectory, as well as at a specific stage of the household domestic cycle when the number of adult members is usually at its largest.

Through the analysis of the household survey data, this chapter explores household level factors that influence the labour supply of young women. The organisation of the chapter is as follows. The first section outlines the characteristics of the study settlements and the respondents. The second section focuses on gender and age differences in the labour supply of household members. This investigates the individual characteristics of employed adults within households including employment status, education levels, occupations and wages. Section three investigates household characteristics linked to female employment such as household size, structure and income. This is followed by an exploration of young women's own explanations of their reasons for working in section four. The fifth and final section investigates household divisions in the management of income. It attempts to provide a typology of patterns of management of young women's income and compares this with that of young men's income which ultimately gives an insight into patterns of inter-generational gender stratification in Jordanian households.

Map 5.1 Amman: Location of Study Areas


Hai Hamzeh
Marka
Marka
Al-Junubieh
Al-Hashimi
Al-Nuzha
Jabal
Al-Hussein
Jabal
Al-Weibdeh
Jabal Al-Taj
Jabal Al-Nasr
Jabal
Al-Akhdar
Hai Nazzal
Jabal
Al-Nathif
Wihdat
Al-Queismeh
Study areas
Municipal boundary
Main roads
Railway
0
miles
2
0
km
2

5.1 The Household Survey

The household survey included 14 locations across the city of Amman (see Map 5.1). The sample could be argued to be reasonably representative since it is a sub-sample of an earlier national level survey conducted in 1991 (see Chapter One and Appendix Two). In total, out of 2877 households in the 14 locations, 302 (10.5%) were interviewed (see Table 5.1). All households in each location were visited but only those with unmarried daughters were interviewed. All the households that were interviewed were family based.[1] The interviews were conducted with adult women aged between 20 and 30 years, who were living with their parents, not married and were not enrolled in education at the time of the interview. In other words, these were daughters who were working, unemployed or economically inactive. Since many households contained sisters (more than one woman between 20-30 years) the number of respondents was 402. The following section outlines the study areas and the socio-economic characteristics of the female respondents and their households.

5.1.1 Study Locations

The study locations were quite varied in terms of income levels (see Table 5.1). The income distribution of the 14 locations varied with an average per capita income of 651 JD ($963 US) per annum for the entire sample population. The lowest per capita income was found to be in Al Qweismeh at 376 JD per annum ($557 US). The highest per capita income was in Jabal Al Hussein at 1667 JD ($2467 US) per annum.[2] This coincides with the average family size where in Qweismeh it was the largest at 10.2 and in Jabal Al-Hussein the smallest at 5.4 persons. The average household size for the entire sample population was 7.9.

The percentage of home owners in the sample was quite high at 70%, although home ownership in Jordan is not necessarily indicative of higher income levels. As an example, in Jabal Al-Hussein and Jabal El-Weibdeh, both of which are middle and upper income areas, home ownership was less than lower income areas such as Qweismeh and Wihdat (see Table 5.1). The reasons for this are as follows: some Jordanians of tribal origin actually live on their tribal lands and thus already own land. Palestinians in areas designated as refugee camps have also been provided with their homes by the Jordanian government and UNRWA on the assumption of their refugee status. Other reasons for this are that some low income areas are actually squatters and who's claims of home ownership inflates the above mentioned percentage.[3] Finally, there is a high priority attached to home ownership in general in Jordan since it is regarded as a form of security. Thus, even when resources are limited, these are directed to building a home.

Table 5.1 Study Areas, Sample Size, and General Characteristics

Location	Number of households	Number of households interviewed	Percentage of sample	Average annual income per capita (in JD)	Average family size	Percentage of home owners
Hai Nazzal	250	29	9.6	636	7.4	69
Jabal Al-Akhdar	284	27	8.9	420	10	74
Wihdat	141	27	8.9	435	9.5	93
Jabal Al-Nathif	193	19	6.3	683	7.7	42
Jabal Al-Weibdeh	290	24	7.9	954	6.1	45.8
Al-Qweismeh	103	12	4	376	10.2	91.7
Marka Al Junubieh	114	12	4	402	8.1	75
Jabal Al-Nasr	381	40	13.2	472	7.9	80
Al- Hashimi	348	36	12	909	7.4	72
Marka Al-Shamalieh	116	13	4.3	736	8.1	92
Jabal Al-Taj	130	14	4.6	497	8.3	42
Al-Nuzha	194	21	7	564	9.1	76
Jabal Al-Hussein	217	22	7.3	1667	5.4	54.5
Marka	116	18	6	656	7.1	72
Total	2877	302	100	651	7.9	70

Source: Household Survey

There were ethnic variations within the sample as well. Some locations were in the midst of a Palestinian refugee camp, such as Wihdat. Others were not refugee camps per se but exclusively inhabited by Palestinians such as Hai Nazzal, Jabal Al-Nathif, Al Nuzha and Jabal Al-Taj. These areas were inhabited according to the same town of origin in Palestine. For example in Jabal al-Nathif, people were mostly from Hebron while in Wihdat they were from Jaffa. Other areas were inhabited by Jordanians of tribal origin. These are Marka Al-Junubieh and Marka Al-Shamalieh. The inhabitants of these locations were actually occupying their traditional tribal lands that are now in the midst of the city. Therefore, they belonged to the same lineage with most families sharing the same family name.

The other locations were mixed and apart from Palestinians included Kurdish families in Qweismeh, Armenian and Circasean families in Marka and El-Weibdeh.

5.1.2 Female Respondents

Female respondents were mostly daughters living with their parents, at 98% (n=296). The other 2% included cases where the respondents were the household head (n=2),[4] or lived with their brothers (n=4). The highest work force participation was found in Hai Nazzal, followed by Al- Hashimi (see Table 5.2).[5] Highest unemployment rates were found also in Al-Hashimi followed by Jabal Al-Nasr. In terms of the economically inactive women, these consisted of the least number of respondents. A large proportion were in Jabal Al-Nasr.

Table 5.2 Female Respondents According to Employment Status and Study Area

Location	Working %	Unemployed %	Economically Inactive %
Hai Nazzal	13.1 (33)*	4.9 (5)	11.8 (6)
Jabal Al- Akhdar	10.8 (27)	4.9 (5)	3.9 (2)
Al-Wihdat	4.8 (12)	5.8 (6)	5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Nathif	6.8 (17)	5.8 (6)	5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Weibdeh	9.2 (23)	4.9 (5)	2 (1)
Al-Qweismeh	2.8 (7)	2.9 (3)	7.8 (4)
Marka Al-Junubieh	1.6 (4)	5.8 (6)	5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Nasr	10.8 (27)	13.7 (14)	19.6 (10)
Al-Hashimi	12 (30)	15.7 (16)	11.8 (6)
Marka Al-Shamalieh	4.8 (12)	6.8 (7)	2 (1)
Jabal Al-Taj	4.4 (11)	0.9 (1)	5.8 (3)
Al-Nuzha	5.6 (14)	9.8 (10)	13.7 (7)
Jabal Al-Hussein	7.6 (19)	6.8 (7)	-
Marka	5.2 (13)	10.8 (11)	3.9 (2)
Total	100 (249)	100 (102)	100 (51)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

It is important to note here how the employment status of respondents sometimes reflected personal definitions that did not always translate into their actual employment status. During the interviews, the young women were asked to identify their work status and many described themselves as unemployed. However, further questioning revealed that a substantial number of these were not actively seeking employment.[6] These women wished to work but were either not qualified for their desired area of work or faced family objection (see Chapter Six).[7] Others were adamant to obtain public sector employment and were on long waiting lists where jobs will probably never materialise given the contraction of employment opportunities in this sector (see Chapter Three). However, it is not possible to consider these women as economically inactive since they described themselves as wishing to work. Other women, who also might wish to work were resigned to the fact that they will not be able to and hence identify themselves as inactive.

The ethnic variation in female labour force participation, although not one of the objectives of the current study, revealed that women of Palestinian origin are more likely to work than Jordanian women. The areas of Marka Al-Shamalieh for example, has the lowest participation rates at 1.8% and Qweismeh at 2.8%. These areas represent a homogeneous population of people with the same Jordanian tribal origin. In these locations, opposition to female employment are very marked. The only acceptable work for women is the civil service. Factory work, on the other hand, is considered shameful. These attitudes are also reflective of male employment in these areas as manual work is uncommon. Most men are public sector employees or in military service. The areas of Hai Nazzal and Jabal El-Akhdar have the highest percentage of female employment in the sample and are inhabited by a largely Palestinian population. Opposition to female employment is also visible in these areas. Despite this fact, however, female employment seems to be more readily accommodated through restrictions on types and forms of work (see Chapter Six). Thus, women in these areas engage in a wider variety of occupations including factory work.

5.2 Gender and Age Differences in the Labour Supply of Household Members

This section constructs a profile of the employment characteristics of different adult household members in Amman with a view to exploring the intersecting influences of gender and age on household labour supply and the specific positions of daughters. As mentioned in Chapter Two most of the households in the following discussion tend to be in the consolidation phase of their life courses (i.e. when there is a maximum number of adults).

5.2.1 Employment Status of Household Members

Among adult family members the highest economic activity is that of sons aged between 20 and 30 years, at 71.7%. This is followed by 64.4% among fathers and 62% among daughters. The economic activity of mothers is significantly lower at 5% (see Table 5.3). Unemployment rates seem to be significant for sons and daughters and negligible among parents (see Table 5.3). Youth unemployment has been an increasingly visible phenomenon in Jordan (see Chapter Three). One of the major reasons are the increasing education levels where the supply of skilled workers is outpacing demand.

Table 5.3 Household Members According to Employment Status

Employment Status	Father %	Mother %	Son %	Daughter %
Currently employed	64.4 (170)*	5 (14)	71.7 (205)	62 (249)
Unemployed, previously emp.	7 (18)	-	16.8 (48)	15.4 (62)
Unemployed, never emp.	-	-	6.3 (18)	10 (40)
Retired	12.5 (33)	0.7 (2)	-	-
Old & does not work	9.3 (24)	-	-	-
Own income & other sources	6.8 (18)	3.6 (10)	2.1 (6)	-
Housewife	-	87.5 (245)	-	-
Does not plan to work	-	0.3 (1)	-	12.6 (51)
Other	-	2.8 (8)	3.1 (9)	
Total	100 (263)	100 (280)	100 (286)	100 (402)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets.

The classification of employment status among family members by the young women respondents, however, is largely determined by perceptions embedded in gender and family ideologies. For example, non-working mothers were invariably described as housewives, at 87.5%, and non-working daughters describe themselves as not planning to work, despite the fact that such women, whether mothers or daughters, could be active in a range of home-based productive activities.[8] On the other hand, no men, whether fathers or sons, would be described as not planning to work (let alone as housewives!). This is largely because of the dominant male breadwinner ideology where men do not stay at home. Non-working fathers were described a either unemployed, at 7%, retired, at 12.5%, or old and unable to work, at 9.3%. Non-working sons, on the other hand, were described as unemployed, at 23%, even if they were not actively seeking employment. So the perceived employment status of family members is directly influenced by their perceived gender roles .

The age specific economic participation of both males and females in the household survey indicates that the majority are concentrated between the ages of 20 to 30 years (see Figure 5.1). For the males this substantially decreases but is still apparent among the older age groups. Among the women, however, economic participation is virtually non-existent after the age of 30. This distribution is largely reflective of the stage in the domestic cycle of most survey households. This specific life stage includes the following: the existence of economically active young adults, the relative absence of members between the age groups of 30-40 years and the decreasing economic activity of older men (due to retirement).

Figure 5.1 Male and Female Household Members According to Age-Specific Economic Participation



Source: Household Survey

However, one of the more significant observations in Figure 5.1 is the difference between the labour force participation between older and younger women. In other words, between mothers and daughters. Almost all the economically active females are daughters below the age of 30 years. This is probably a result of the substantial increase in the age at marriage. In Amman young women today are not replicating their mothers' early age at marriage, and accordingly live for longer in their parents' households. This raises the much discussed question on the relation between female employment and increasing age at marriage (see Lazreg 1990; Salaff 1990). Indeed, the work force participation of young women peaks at 24 years then gradually drops until 30 years. It is probably not coincidental that 24 years happens to be the average age at marriage for females in Jordan which indicates that a number of young women drop out of the labour force at this age.

5.2.2 Education Levels of Household Members

Education levels are commonly considered to be one of the important individual 'human capital' variables that influence female labour force participation (Anker and Hein 1986). In the context of a household domestic cycle it is important to investigate the gender as well as age differentials in the educational attainment of adult family members. It is a fact that education has been one of Jordan's major achievements in the past two decades (see Chapter Three). School enrollment of both boys and girls has been steadily increasing. Therefore, in investigating the education levels of household members in Amman the main issue is not so much the gender gap as the generation gap: adult daughters and sons within households have higher education levels than their parents. Illiteracy is almost non-existent among daughters and sons while it is quite high for mothers, at 35.%, and even among fathers, at 11.4% (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, the substantial difference between daughters' and mothers' education signify a major transition in gender disparities in the education levels of households in Amman.

Table 5.4 Education Levels of Household Members*

Education level	Father %	Mother %	Son %	Daughter %
Illiterate	11.4 (30)**	35 (95)	0.6 (2)	0.5 (2)
Read/Write	19.4 (51)	11.8 (33)	0.6 (2)	-
Elementary	24.7 (65)	20 (56)	3.1 (9)	5 (20)
Preparatory	15.2 (40)	16.7 (47)	22.3 (64)	11.3 (45)
Vocational	1.1 (3)	1 (3)	5.2 (15)	1.2 (5)
Secondary	12.9 (34)	11.4 (32)	29.3 (84)	24.4 (98)
Diploma	6.8 (18)	3.2 (9)	23.4 (67)	43 (173)
Higher educ.	8.4 (22)	1.7 (5)	15 (43)	14.6 (59)
Total	100 (263)	100 (280)	100 (286)	100 (402)

Source: Household Survey
* This is based on all adult household members who are not currently enrolled in education
**Absolute numbers in brackets

In addition, within the same generation, daughters have higher education levels than sons and consequently have the highest education levels within their households. As many as 82% of daughters in the sample survey have secondary education or more, compared with 67.7% among sons (see Table 5.4). This phenomenon where the gender gap among the same generation has been reversed is likely to continue as school enrollment of girls currently outweighs the enrollment of boys in Jordan as a whole. In 1994, the primary level enrollment rate of boys was 90% compared with 92% for girls (UNICEF, 1995:17). Furthermore, drop-out rates in Jordan, unlike many other Arab countries, are higher among males than among females (ibid:18).

The reasons behind the fact that daughters achieve higher education levels than sons are several. First, the public school system in Jordan is free of charge and generally segregated by sex. Thus, parents find no objection to daughters' schooling because it entails minimal cost and does not challenge the ideology of sex segregation. In fact, it is becoming prestigious for parents to keep their daughters in school, especially as it could entail better marriage options for them in the future (see Abu Lughod, 1993). Second, boys have a gender advantage within the household as opposed to girls and this leaves girls in continuous need to gain the approval and acceptance of their parents.[9] One of the ways for achieving this includes good school performance. A third factor, is the greater emphasis on girls' propriety and restricted social freedom compared to boys which could translate into lesser distractions and better school performance and attendance. A fourth factor is that girls are more likely to respond to school authority and discipline than boys as a result of their gender conditioning at home.

Moreover, schooling has taken on a different meaning for some of the young women themselves. In general, choices concerning their own lives are limited. There are many forms of restrictions especially in choosing careers and partners (see Chapter Six). Within this context, education becomes a major route to personal achievement and fulfillment. Also, for the young women who are adamant on breaking away from ascribed gender roles, higher education becomes a tool. These women do their best in the national school exams (*Tawjihi*) in order to secure admittance or scholarships at university or in their desired area of study.[10] In contrast, however, higher educational attainment for some young women is linked with the prevalent ideology that educated women make better wives and mothers.[11]

Regardless of the reasons as to why daughters have the highest education levels within their households, the fact remains that these education levels are closely linked to young women's increasing labour force participation. One of the striking observations from the household survey data is that economically active young women have higher education levels than inactive women (see Table 5.5). As many as 84% of employed women and 91% of unemployed women have at least a secondary education. This compares to 53% of the economically inactive women.

Table 5.5 Female Respondents Education Levels According to Employment Status

Education Level	Working %	Unemployed %	Inactive %
Illiterate	0.4 (1)*	0.9 (1)	-
Read/Write	-	-	-
Elementary	4.8 (12)	0.9 (1)	13.7 (7)
Preparatory	8.8 (22)	6.9 (7)	31.4 (16)
Vocational	2 (5)	-	-
Secondary	21.6 (54)	26.5 (27)	33.4 (17)
Diploma	44.2 (110)	53 (54)	17.6 (9)
University and higher	18.1 (45)	11.8 (12)	3.9 (2)
Total	100 (249)	100 (102)	100 (51)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

University education in particular is closely linked with economic activity. Only 3.9% of inactive women have university degrees compared with 18.1% of those working and 11.8% of the unemployed (see Table 5.5).[12] This finds parallels with evidence elsewhere of a significant relationship between female education and employment (see Anker and Hein 1986 for a general overview; Bustani and Mufarrej 1995 on Lebanon; Farrag 1991 on Arab region; Lazreg 1990 on Algeria).

On one level, this relation between education and employment for young women is determined by family and community. It is considered respectable for women with higher professional degrees to work in what would be viewed as prestigious occupations. In contrast, it is 'shameful'[13] for uneducated women to work since the only occupations they can join are much lower in status (see also Macleod, 1991; Rugh, 1985 on Egypt).[14] On another level, however, this positive relation is related to young women's increasing aspirations. Higher education positively affects women's desires to participate in public life and improve their standard of living (Moghadam, 1993:19).

In short, it is clear that there is an expanding generation gap in the education levels of household members. What is more significant however, is the reversal in the gender gap where young women seem to be attaining the highest education levels within their households. We have also seen that salaried work for women is generally a function of education, especially post secondary education. However, as noted in Chapter Four, high education levels do not necessarily result in women attaining positions of responsibility at work nor equal pay. The rest of this chapter will also reveal that, at household levels, daughters' high human capital does not necessarily result in diminishing gender and generation inequalities (see also Chapter Six).

5.2.3 Occupational Distribution of Household Members

Within any household, members are likely to be distributed throughout different sectors of the labour market. This section investigates the extent to which it is possible to see patterns of public/private and formal/informal distribution along lines of age and gender, and then goes on to consider key occupations in more detail.

In terms of the distribution of household members between private and public sectors, Table 5.6 reveals that more sons and daughters hold government jobs than their parents. The reason for this owes to the nature of the current study itself, which situates household members in a specific life course trajectory, many parents, especially fathers, are already retired from the public sector. There are also stark differences, however, between the public sector employment of young women and men. The vast majority of young men, are in the military or the civil defense, which often does not require higher education qualifications. In comparison, most young women in the public sector are professionals with higher education levels and are mostly teachers.

As for the distribution of family members in the private sector, differences between those who work as employees or employers provide a key point for exploring gender and age differences. According to Table 5.6, there is a higher proportion of sons and daughters who are employees (49.2% and 62.2% respectively) than fathers and mothers (39.4 % and 35.7% respectively). These differences are clearly a function of age where sons and daughters, owing to their young age, are more likely to be employees as compared to their parents. Concurrently, according to the same Table, the highest proportions of employers, that is people owning their own businesses, are the fathers, at 26.5%. This is followed by sons at 11.7%. In comparison there are no mothers who are employers and a mere 3% of daughters.[15]

In other words, men are more likely to set up their own businesses than women. Young men for example are often encouraged to set up their businesses and scarce family resources are often channeled into such endeavors. Women, on the other hand, old or young, are rarely encouraged likewise. In addition, very few women have independent resources for any potential venture. Besides, when they do own resources they usually put it in a family project that is controlled by men. One mother, as an example, inherited an amount of money from her father. She gave it to her son who bought a taxi cab and who is not expected to give her any of the profits but to contribute occasionally to household expenditure (see below). In addition, very few women are able to obtain credit to embark on any business venture since many do not have resources and therefore are not able to provide collateral for loans.[16]

Table 5.6 Work Status of Family Members

Work Status	Father %	Mother %	Son %	Daughter %
Public sector employee	11.7 (20)*	14.3 (2)	21 (43)	20 (50)
Private sector employee	39.4 (67)	35.7 (5)	49.2 (101)	62.2 (155)
Private sector employer	26.5 (45)		11.7 (24)	2.8 (7)
Self employed/informal sector	22.4 (38)	50 (7)	15.2 (31)	11.2 (28)
Trainee/unpaid worker	-	-	2.9 (6)	3.6 (9)
Total	100 (170)	100 (14)	100 (205)	100 (249)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

There is also a substantial proportion of household members who are self employed and in the informal sector (see Table 5.6). This consists of as many as 50% of working mothers and 22.4% of working fathers. The participation of sons and daughters in the informal sector is substantially less at 15.2% and 11.2% respectively. These differences are a function of age where parents are more likely to engage in the informal traditional sector than young people. Due to their levels of education and skills, young people are more likely to be formally employed in the modern sector. Therefore, in some ways the changing occupational structures within the labour market in Amman, especially those pertaining to new technologies, are influencing sons and daughters more than their parents.

In addition, unlike men, the nature of informal sector activities among women seems to interact with the life course stage. For younger and older men alike it ranges from all forms of petty trade to casual labour on construction sites or in manufacturing. For older, and a minority of younger women, it includes home-based sewing, embroidery or food production, or jobs outside the home as cooks and cleaners.[17] There is a substantial number of self employed young women, however, who engage in typing and translation services at home or private tuition for neighbourhood children. Furthermore, the dividing line between employed young women and those engaged in home-based production is not palpable. Women within households often engage in collective income generating activities such as embroidery that all female members partake in finishing.[18] Thus, there are gender and age differences in the work status of household members. Within this framework it is the daughters whose participation in the informal sector is the least and daughters who mostly work as employees.

The specific occupations of household members are marked by gender and age diversity. A high proportion of fathers and brothers are workers in the service sector (37% and 29.3% respectively). For fathers this is followed by a significant number who are sales workers (at 21%). As for sons this is followed by 20% who are professional and technical workers. As for the limited participation of mothers, most seem to engage in the manufacturing sector followed by the service sector (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Distribution of Family Members According to Occupation Groups

Occupation	Father %	Mother %	Son %	Daughter %	*Row Total*
Professional and Technical	14 (23)*	21 (3)	21 (44)	40.2 (100)	27%
Administrative	12 (21)	-	8 (17)	8 (19)	9%
Clerical	5 (8)	-	7 (14)	14 (35)	9%
Sales	21 (36)	7 (1)	15 (31)	6 (14)	13%
Services	37 (63)	36 (5)	31 (63)	12.9 (32)	26%
Agricultural	2 (3)	-	0.5 (1)	-	1%
Manufacturing	9 (16)	36 (5)	17 (35)	20 (49)	16%
Column Total	100 (170)	100 (14)	100 (205)	100 (249)	100 (638)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

As for daughters, the most striking fact is that as many as 40.2% work in professional and technical occupations (Table 5.7). This is probably a result of their high educational levels. The vast majority of women in this category are teachers. In fact, as many as 21.3% of employed women respondents as a whole are in teaching occupations (see also Chapter Four). This is followed by 11.2% of women in medical occupations including doctors,[19] nurses, pharmacists, laboratory and x-ray technicians or dental assistants. Following professional occupations are young women in manufacturing occupations, at 20% of the sample survey (also see Chapter Four). Female manufacturing labour are mostly in unskilled jobs in textile, food and electronics production. It is of note here that young women in sales related occupations are as little as 4.8%. This minimal participation of young women in sales related occupations is unlike other parts of the world where this is considered a 'female occupation' (see Chant 1991a, on Mexico; Dennis, 1990 on Nigeria; Game and Pringle, 1983 on the United Kingdom). This has to do with traditional notions of female propriety in Jordan (see Chapter Four).

In light of the above, the rest of this section investigates how this occupational distribution of households and the concentration of young women in technical and professional occupations is largely determined by family ideology regarding gender and age. There is a general attitude that young women need protection and this sometimes involves restrictions in job selection. In many instances, therefore, women are only encouraged to engage in what is considered as appropriate work (see also Chapter Six).

Sales and service related occupations, for example, are deemed by many households as inappropriate for young women. Such occupations imply a certain amount of interaction with unknown men whether colleagues or customers. Also, workspaces are also rarely segregated by sex (see Chapter Four). Therefore, there is a general attitude that a job as a sales person, for example, is not 'respectable' owing to the exposure that it entails. Teaching, by contrast, is deemed appropriate, and even prestigious, since it does not only reinforce women's roles as the nurturers but it also ensures minimum interaction with men. Within this vein, factory work although not prestigious in terms of skill and pay is acceptable since most workspaces are spatially sex segregated.

In other words, women's access to employment revolves around notions of female protection and gendered space. The result of this is that there are differences in the symbolic meaning of occupations for the different sexes within households. In addition, life course trajectories play a crucial part in the gendering of space. For example, it would be acceptable for a young man to be earning a living through street vending but it is unthinkable for a young woman. It is also common for a father to be a petty trader with limited or no education while the daughter is a teacher. Therefore, because of daughters' young age and the perceived need for protection together with the general notions of gender division of space, young women become limited to occupations such as teaching or manufacturing work. These notions of gender and space are somehow non-existent in public sector or banking employment, however. It is likely that the benefits and securities provided by work in such establishments outweigh and diminish the general inhibitions towards gendered space. The relation between gender occupational and spatial segregation in female labour demand has been discussed in Chapter Four. However, households also play a role in releasing an already segregated female workforce (see also Chapter Six).

5.2.4 Differences in Wages Among Household Members

Given these occupational differences along gender and generation, it is hardly surprising that there are also differences in the average earnings of household members. The average monthly earnings of males are 168 JD ($249 US) compared to an average monthly earning of 105 JD ($155 US) for females. These are notably wider than the official national statistics for 1993 where the average male wage was 195 JD ($289 US) per month compared with 157 JD ($232 US) per month for females.[20] The reasons behind this are unclear especially as the household survey was not limited to interviewing low income groups but mixed income groups. One justification is the formal/informal sector divide and where wages in the informal sector, not quantified by official statistics, tend to be lower than the formal sector. Indeed, many household members who are engaged in informal sector activities, not only earn less but also have unstable incomes and can only provide rough estimates of their earnings.

Examination of age differences within household members reveals further gender disparities in earnings. Within households, mothers and daughters earn the least, and fathers earn the most, followed by the sons. As many as 71.4% of mothers and 54.2% of daughters earn less than 100 JD per month ($148 US) (see Table 5.8). Most fathers and sons, on the other hand, earn between 100 and 299 JD ($148 US and $442 US) (at 52.8% and 57.1% respectively). Therefore, wage differentials between household members reveal a gender gap rather than a generation gap. There are more similarities between the education and skills of brothers and sisters. Yet, it is mothers and daughters who share similar earning levels. In other words, there are clear age cohort similarities between brothers and sisters but it is the gender differences that seem to influence earning levels.

Table 5.8 Distribution of Employed Family Members According to Monthly Wages

Monthly Wages (in JD)	Father %	Mother %	Son %	Daughter %	*Row total*
0-99	17.1 (29)*	71.4 (10)	38 (78)	54.2 (135)	38% (225)
100-199	28.1 (48)	28.6 (4)	47.8 (98)	36.1 (90)	13% (80)
200-299	24.7 (42)	-	9.3 (19)	7.6 (19)	4% (28)
300-399	11.2 (19)	-	3.4 (7)	0.8 (2)	2% (10)
400-499	4.7 (8)	-	-	0.8 (2)	3% (20)
500-699	9.4 (16)	-	1.5 (3)	0.4 (1)	3% (20)
700+	4.7 (8)	-	-	-	1% (8)
Column Total	100 (170)	100 (14)	100 (205)	100 (249)	100 (638)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

In addition, as many as 25% of young women with post secondary education earn less than 100 JD ($148 US) per month. This compares to 9% for young men and 0.5% for male household heads. Therefore, household data from Amman reveals that while wages are positively affected by increased education levels and skills for men this is not the case for women. Young women have higher education levels compared with other family members and this has not translated into higher wages. This contradicts the precepts of human capital theory which assumes that wage differentials between men and women can be explained by differences in levels of education (for example, see Anker and Hein 1986) (see Chapter Two). [21]

The household survey data also reveals that skill differences do not explain wage differences between men and women either. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, compare the wages of family members who are professional and technical workers and manufacturing operatives. These occupation groups represent starkly different skill and education requirements. Wages in these different occupation groups seem to vary for men but remain low for women.

Figure 5.2a Monthly Wages of Family Members in Professional and Technical Occupations



Source: Household Survey

Figure 5.2b Monthly Wages of Family Members in Manufacturing Occupations



Source: Household Survey
Note: The absolute number of Fathers who earn more than 300 JD per month is limited.

In terms of family members who are professional and technical workers, most fathers and sons fall in the higher earning categories (see Figure 5.2a). The majority of daughters and all mothers, on the other hand, fall in the lower earning categories. As for household members who work as manufacturing labour, all mothers and daughters fall in the lower earning categories. The sons fall in the middle, leaving fathers exclusively in higher earning categories (see Figure 5.2b). The distribution of the monthly wages of family members in manufacturing occupations reveals an obvious segmentation of wages.

Therefore, although young women have high human capital in comparison to other household members this has not translated into an increase in earning power. The reasons behind this as discussed in Chapter Four pertain to employers' roles in maintaining a gender division of labour through the sex-typing of jobs and relegating women to the lower paid jobs, especially in the manufacturing sector. Not all the wage differentials between men and women can be explained as a result of labour demand factors, however. Some of these differentials are a result of gendered household constraints on individual choices that result in differential employment opportunities for men and women (see Chapter Six). Furthermore, women's lower earning power acts to reinforce definitions of male breadwinner ideology, whereby, women's labour is consigned to a supplementary status (see below). The result is that gender divisions and roles within households remain largely intact despite the increasing labour force participation of young women. Yet, the age-specific labour participation of women reveals distinctive roles since daughters emerge from the household survey data as those with the highest human capital in terms of skill and education and those most involved in the formal modern sector. None the less, daughters' earning powers remain considerably weak in comparison to men in both generations. Therefore, it seems that the increasing participation of young women is a result of two factors: First, their high human capital is directly influencing increases in household labour supply. Second, their low wages ensure that the status quo of the male provider ideology is not threatened. In other words, it appears that the connections between these polarised differences of high human capital and low wages that are facilitating women's entry into the labour force.

5.3 Household Factors Affecting Female Labour Supply

The focus of this chapter thus far has been a particular trajectory of the household domestic cycle. While the previous section looked at the differences between adult household members in terms of their individual employment characteristics, the current section looks at household level characteristics that shape young female labour supply. This includes variables such as household size, composition and income which have been considered in other studies to explain women's entry into labour markets (see, Chant, 1991a; Safa 1995; Stichter 1990).

5.3.1 Household Size and Dependency Ratios

Household size in the study sample is comparatively large. The mean average is 7.9 persons (see Table 5.9). Given that the economic participation rate of the whole sample population is only 32%, this means there is a relatively high dependency ratio of 3.1:1 (i.e. 3.1 non earners per worker).

One reason for the high dependency ratio relates to the fact that 24% of the sample population are aged 15 years and below (only 5.5% of the sample population were aged 60 years and above). So, the high dependency ratio is largely a result of the large family size and the number of small children within it. This might seem to contradict the fact that this study focuses on households in the advanced stages of the domestic cycle and where there are adult children in working age. However, it has to be kept in mind that two decades ago the age at marriage for women was low. This meant that women had children across a wide range of their life span. So the existence of adult working children does not mean that there are no young children present.

Table 5.9 Mean Household size, Number of Income Earners and Dependency Ratio by Young Women's Work Status

Employment Status of Daughter	Average Household Size	Number of Workers	Number of Young Women Respondents	Dependency Ratio
Employed	7.4	504	249	1:2.9
Unemployed	8.1	205	102	1:3.1
Inactive	8.4	61	51	1:3.3
Total	7.9	770	402	1:3.1

Source: Household Survey

Household size and number of workers may be influential in whether daughters work or not. Yet this relationship between household size and female labour force participation has been usually the subject of research that only looks at married women. Some of these case studies, many of which are based on countries outside the Middle East, suggest that women in larger households may be more likely to be employed than those in small households (Chant, 1991a on Mexico; Fapohunda, 1986 on Nigeria; Moser and Sollis 1989 on Equador). Other case studies suggest that these variations are dependent on the kinds of employment in which women are involved. Women in professional and modern occupations tend to belong to smaller households than women in the informal sector (see Brydon and Chant 1989:155-6). Within this, there has been little attention to the variations across women's life course. Household size as well as women's employment status are likely to vary across the different stages of their life span. With this mind, it is pertinent that the household survey in Amman reveals that the labour force participation of young single women is higher among smaller households.[22] In contrast, unemployed and inactive young women belong to larger households (see Table 5.9). Consequently, the dependency ratio in households of employed women is less than the dependency ratio of in those households with either unemployed and inactive women. However, it has to be noted here that some women with different employment status may belong to the same household (i.e. sisters). Therefore, household size alone is not clearly indicative of all factors that influence the household labour supply of young women.

5.4.2 Household Composition

For example, household composition is affected by different residential as well as income earning arrangements throughout a household's domestic cycle. Therefore, possibly as a result of the particular stage in the domestic cycle of households in the current study, household types are relatively homogeneous. Of the total sample survey, 78% of households are male headed nuclear units (see Table 5.10) (see also Shami and Taminian, 1989:44). In terms of the extended households, a majority of these consist of married sons and their respective families. This is also a result of the specific stage of the domestic cycle. It is common for sons in Jordan to start their married lives with their families (see also Hatem, 1986:291 on Egypt). Some of these sons, however, will eventually separate from their natal households (see also Shami and Taminian, 1989:43).

Table 5.10 Distribution of Households According to Family Types

Household Type	%
Nuclear	
Male headed	78 (236)*
Female headed**	4 (12)
Elder son headed	1.3 (4)
Extended***	
Polygamous	0.7 (2)
Married sons	10.3 (31)
Relatives (grandparents, uncles, etc.)	0.7 (2)
Married sons and relatives	5 (15)
Total	100 (302)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets
** These are mostly mothers except for two cases headed by daughters.
***All extended households are male headed except for one case where a married son lived with his mother.

In terms of female headed households only 4% of the survey sample could be described as such. This is even lower than national level statistics which in 1991 estimated female headed households at 6.4%. Female headed households are mostly widows, or wives of male migrant workers in the Arab Gulf region.[23] Desertion by husbands, or single motherhood (phenomena noted in other parts of the world) are rare in Jordan (see Fonseca 1991 on Brazil; Chant 1997, on Mexico, Costa Rica and Philippines). In addition, it is not uncommon, for divorced women to return to their natal homes, and widowed women to live with their husband's kin (see Sawalha, 1993 for a fuller discussion on Jordan).

Finally, young women and men, irrespective of income levels, never set up home on their own before marriage so there are almost no single person households (Shami and Taminian, 1989:43). In some circumstances young men who come from rural areas and work in the city may reside on their own. Most of these young men reside in rooms within houses during the week and spend their weekends and holidays in their family homes. If young single men or women live independently of their parents, for reasons other than work, it is assumed that they are 'deviants' first, in terms of being likely to have problematic relations with their families and second, in terms of their likelihood of engaging in extra-marital relations (see also White 1994 on Turkey).[24] In fact, landlords usually refuse to rent to single people and/or insist on meeting their parents to ascertain the circumstances behind their living apart, as work-related reasons provide the only legitimate grounds.

Therefore, there is a prevalence of nuclear household forms in Amman a fact which contradicts general assumptions that describe the Arab family as extended and dependent on kin relations (see Minces 1982; Sharabi, 1988; White 1994, see also Chapter two). If, we are to accept the fact, however, that in Amman there is a broadly linear transition from extended towards nuclear household forms, then it is not inconceivable that the increasing work force participation of young women is a response to a situation where extended households which were characterised by a greater number of male income earners are in decline.[25] In other words, changing household structure is resulting in a re-organisation of labour arrangements. Income earning is currently distributed between members of a nuclear family irrespective of gender while previously (i.e. in extended households) it was distributed between male members.

In addition, attempts to categorise households into specific forms (nuclear, extended, female headed or single) often intersects with identifying a household head who is usually assumed to be the main breadwinner and decision maker. Household headship, which revolves around a patriarchal ideology assumes that fathers are the 'natural' source of authority (see Chapter Six for discussion on patriarchy in Jordan).[26] During the questionnaire survey in Amman when the father was not present, young women respondents would state that the eldest brother was the household head. This identification was persistent in circumstances when the mother was present, when the sister was older in age or when the son was not an income earner. In other words, the ideology of the male head of household is resilient even when circumstances might challenge it. An illustration of this is one household where the father is deceased and the mother is economically inactive. There are two unemployed sons and a daughter who is the only member of the family with a stable income. The head of the household was identified as the elder of the two sons even though the working woman was older. In other words, male household headship revolves around the gender ideology of a male protector as well as the male provider. This is also an example where gender considerations, as a result of patriarchal ideology, eclipses age considerations (i.e. the presence of the mother and age of working daughter).

To a large extent, the ideology of the male head extends itself beyond the physical confines of households. Household organisation in Amman may be increasingly contained to one family but the symbolism and social relations that revolve around the extended family are still prevalent (Shami and Taminian, 1989:44). In other words, changes in family arrangements revolve around material changes in the organisation of the residential unit and income earning activities but not on social and symbolic levels. Because of the primacy of kin relations, therefore, there are fluid boundaries between households and the term head of family has greater relevance than head of household in Jordan. Married sons, for example, who move out of their parents homes often live in adjacent dwellings (ibid:44). So although a married son has a separate living unit the real head of the family is his father. Furthermore, in many areas in Amman, extended kin groups live in the same vicinity. Within these kin groups there is always a male elder to whom different individuals in the different living units defer to for decisions and problem solving.

Therefore, it could be said that in terms of household structure there are two conflicting forces that affect the supply of young female labour. The first is the fact that the decreasing numbers of male income earners in nuclear households is pushing young women into the labour force. The second, is the persistence of the ideology of extended family networks which puts constraints on the supply of female labour. These constraints revolve around the symbolic patriarchal control of female kin and will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

5.3.3 Household Income

The effects of household income on women's employment has been addressed fairly extensively in the literature. On the whole, empirical evidence suggests that the lower the household income the greater women's economic participation (Bruce and Dwyer 1988; Chant, 1991a; Gonzâlez de la Rocha 1994; Stichter 1990). Perhaps, because of this, many studies look at this relationship between women's work force participation and household incomes within low-income settlements (see for example, Rugh, 1985; H.Standing, 1991; Toubeh, 1994). Yet, in the context of young women's participation in Amman, this relationship does not apply. Indeed, there is a significant work force participation among women in middle and upper income households.

According to Table 5.11 the mean annual household income of working daughters is significantly higher than either the unemployed or inactive daughters.[27] There are two possible and mutually reinforcing explanations for this. The first is that women from higher income and socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to work, possibly as a result of better education and employment opportunities. The second is that the involvement of young women in paid work generates higher levels of overall family income.

Table 5.11 Mean Average Annual Household Income According to Daughters Employment Status

Employment Status	Average annual household income (in JD)	Standard deviation	Number of cases
Employed daughters	5,591	5,727,51	249
Unemployed daughters	4,557	3,718,20	102
Inactive daughters	4,557	3,389,59	51
Entire sample	5,145	5,407,70	2393

Source: Household Survey

In general, the impact of household income on female employment can be understood as an outcome of the domestic cycle, since different stages are characterised by varying capacity of the households to generate income (Gonzâlez de la Rocha 1994:10). The average household income of the sample population is relatively high. This is precisely because most households are at a stage in the domestic cycle when they are likely to have maximum number of income earners. At the same time it is a stage where current household income could decrease quite rapidly with the marriage of any of its younger members or retirement of older members.

Despite this, however, the precise relation between household income and the labour supply of daughters is hard to ascertain in Amman. This is because first, in some cases sisters in the same household my have different employment status with would slightly alter the above Table which calculated household income according to number of respondents. Second, young women's wages tend to be low irrespective of the overall household income. The majority of working women, 90.3% (n= 225) earn less than 200 JD ($296 US) per month irrespective of their household income. In contrast, males with higher wage levels usually reflect in higher household income levels.[28] Therefore, the overall impact of daughters' wages on household income is not significant. In other words, even in low income households where daughters waged employment is necessary, the sole dependence on daughters wages is not complete.

Class position, rather than household income, can also be related to female employment. Class differentiation encompasses a wider criterion than mere differences in income levels between households. This includes education level of heads, area of residence, type of work of head, level of urbanisation, and so on. In Amman, class position affects household attitudes towards female employment, and consequently female labour supply, more than household income per se. Restrictions on female employment seem to be much stronger among those whose class positions are considered lower. Despite their low earnings, the necessity for their contributions is perhaps threatening to the dominant male breadwinner ideology.[29]

Thus far, this chapter has looked at a variety of both individual and household level characteristics that influence the supply of female labour. In terms of individual characteristics, it has been found that young women have relatively higher human capital as compared to other household members. Despite this however, their earning power is weaker than male family members. The occupations of household members are diverse with a concentration of young women in professional and technical jobs and manufacturing work. In terms of household characteristics, young women from smaller households are more likely to work than others. As far as household forms are concerned, there is a general transition towards nuclear forms. The latter may be increasing labour supply of young women in so far as young women's incomes are substituting for those formally provided by additional male members. Finally, it has also been found that compared to male household members there is no significant correlation between household income and female labour supply.

In some respects, the findings depart from factors that are often cited as significant in influencing women's entry into the labour force in other contexts. For example, an increase in female labour supply, is usually linked to extended forms of household structure (see for example Chant 1991a and González de la Rocha 1994 on Mexico; Safa 1995 on the Caribbean) and likewise, to lower household income (see for example Bruce and Dwyer 1988; Stichter 1990 for general discussion). Notwithstanding the fact that the distinct findings of the current study are due to its cultural specificity in Jordan, it is also due to the emphasis on a particular, and less researched, trajectories in both women's lives and households' domestic cycle. Young women in Jordan are more likely to work than women in other parts of their life course. In addition, the presence of young adults significantly affects domestic organisation and income earning strategies in households. So, despite this comparative dissimilarity, and apart from education, there is no single overriding variable that appears to be linked to women's entry into the labour force in Amman.

5.4 Reasons for Young Women's Work

There is a need, therefore, to further analyse the reasons for young women's work. For that we turn to their personal rationalisations and explanations and investigate possible household circumstances that may act to facilitate young women's work.

5.4.1 Young Women's Views on Reasons for Work

A substantial number of young women, 28.5%, claimed they work in order to increase family income (see Table 5.12).[30] As one young woman explained:

> My parents brought me up and spent on me all my life. It is not wrong if I help them out now.

Not all young women, however, worked to increase family income willingly. In a substantial number of households young women are required to surrender all their income. One young woman describes this:

> Basically I see my money for an hour each month because as soon as I get home on pay days my wages are handed over to my father. On those days when I am walking home and my money is my pocket I think how wonderful it would be if I could keep it.

A further 20% of women worked to achieve economic independence. These young women worked to fulfill their personal financial needs rather than those of their families. As one young woman stated:

> At my age, I am not capable of asking my father for money every time I need a new dress.

Others, however work for financial independence with a view to the future, as one young woman explained:

> I try to save my wages because these days women need their independent income. The future is uncertain for us. Husbands do not provide for their families like they used to. Who knows how my future will turn out?

This young woman was referring to an uncertainty that was present throughout the interviews. Young women seem to think that 'today's' men are no longer capable of fulfilling their traditional roles as providers. Indeed, unemployment, inflation and falling real wages have made it more difficult for young men to get married and fully provide for their brides as is the tradition. In fact, young men usually depend on their parents' financial support for marriage. However, some young women seem to perceive these economic constraints as a decline in men's 'masculinity.' In other words, it appears that the masculine identity grounded in the role of the economic provider is in doubt. There is an evident anxiety among young women that involves a decreasing certainty in getting married and/or that marriage does not provide the financial security for them as women.

Table 5.12 Working Women's Reasons for Labour Force Participation

Reasons for Work	%
Increase household income	28.5 (71)*
Cover personal expenses/ economic independence	20 (50)
Gain personal confidence, exposure, and motivation	15.5 (39)
Establish social relations and/or fill free time	21 (52)
Use education qualifications obtained	15 (37)
Total	100 (249)

Source: Household Survey

* Absolute numbers in brackets

The rest of working women do not work for financial reasons but for personal reasons such as gaining confidence, access to new social networks outside their households or just breaking the monotony of their otherwise restricted lives (see Table 5.12). This is illustrated by the following:

> If I do not work I will forget who I am and the years of hard work I spent to obtain my degree. Work is part of life's experience.
>
> I do not work for money. I work in order to get out of the house. My father is old and spends his days ordering us around and my mother would expect me to do more of the domestic work if I stayed home. So instead I go to work.
>
> You know how it is in our society. A girl cannot go here and there. A girl cannot do this or that. Work has become my life. I have friends and we always arrange outings and activities during lunch breaks or after work. My friends at work are currently the most important thing in my life.

In light of the above, it would seem that there are a group of women who work for material reasons and another for non-material reasons. These are not necessarily exclusive of each other and in some cases can overlap. We can also detect evidence both of work motivated by personal needs and household needs which again are not easily disentangled. The economic well-being of households and young women's individual interests can be intertwined (see Chant, 1996a:10; Kabeer, 1994b:108). For example, women who apparently work for reasons relating to their households' well-being may do so in order to gain long term assurance of their families' attention and support (see below).

5.4.2 Daughters Paid Labour and Mother's Domestic labour

Research on women's employment has repeatedly acknowledged that women's reproductive and domestic burdens reduce their access to employment (Jelin 1982; Stichter 1990). What needs to be explored in the context of the current study is whether daughters' paid employment is facilitated through the existence of mothers as full time domestic workers.

Domestic labour in Jordan is solely identified with women. In the majority of households mothers carry out the daily domestic labour. Daughters, regardless of their employment status are substantially involved as well. Of the total of daughters interviewed, 76% performed daily domestic responsibilities (see Table 5.15). Within this there are some considerations that mainly have to do with household income. It has been noted elsewhere that the burden of housework varies according to type of housing and as the quality improves the burdens decrease (Chant, 1984:14 and 1996a:13). The household data in Amman reveals that the lower the family income the more daughters share domestic responsibilities with their mothers. It is important to note that in low income households young women face the highest obstacles in entering the labour force. In poor crowded neighbourhoods, female employment is more likely to be considered shameful. The reasons behind this, which are mostly related to gender ideologies, are diverse and will be discussed in the next chapter. However, in terms of domestic labour and the gender division of labour, it is not inconceivable that the increased domestic burdens, as a result of poor housing conditions, inhibits the release of daughters into the labour force (see also Wolf 1990a:48). In one particular household where 10 family members share 3 rooms in Wihdat refugee camp this rationale was clearly put forth:

> My father is old and does not work. My married brothers, who live with us, are financially burdened by their own children. My mother is diabetic and frequently ill. Therefore, I stay home and perform the cleaning, and cooking with my sisters-in-law. Whenever I mention my desire to work my parents get furious.

In terms of the relation between domestic labour and daughters' workforce participation, Table 5.13 reveals that unemployed and inactive women perform more domestic labour on daily basis than young women who are employed. This could be seen as a natural consequence of staying at home. However, unemployed male family members rarely perform any domestic labour and as much as 48.5% of working daughters perform work on daily basis. A number of working women claim that at the weekend they are expected to perform all forms of chores and, as a result, do not get a day off. One particular young woman spends her weekend cleaning up her uncle's house who is unmarried (it was her mother who instigated this arrangement).

Table 5.13 Daughters Involvement in Domestic Work According to Work Status

Domestic Work	Employed %	Unemployed %	Inactive %
Daily	48.5 (121)*	86.2 (88)	98 (50)
Occasionally/irregularly	43.3 (108)	9.8 (10)	2 (1)
Seldom/never	8 (20)	3.9 (4)	-
Total	100 (249)	100 (102)	100 (51)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

On the whole, therefore, young women continue to be identified with domestic roles despite their employment. Yet, a crucial factor in the release of young women to the labour force is household domestic organisation and the presence of other adult females. For example, in the absence of an able mother in some households, one daughter would be released to the labour market while another would be assigned the household management.[31] Indeed, non-working daughters are de facto household managers. It is also common for mothers in the later stages of their courses to hand over all responsibilities to daughters. Such mothers claim that they are getting older and it is time for their daughters to give them a 'rest.'[32] Besides this, however, there is also the notion of housework as 'good practice' for young women. Many mothers are quite proud of their daughters' performance as it reflects on their own roles in training them, or more precisely, engendering them.

In other words, it is only through the existence of mothers as full time housewives that daughters are able to work (see also Safa 1995:79 on the Caribbean). Because of this, the acquiescence and support of mothers of daughters' employment is crucial. In this way daughters are relieved of the double burden which working wives usually face.

5.4.3 Daughters as Contributors to Household Income

One important aspect that needs to be addressed is the extent to which the labour supply of young women is regarded by parents a means of increasing the income available for household expenditure. Indeed, daughters are extra income earners and a substantial number of women contribute to household expenditure in some form or another. However, attempts to assess daughters' specific amount or form of contribution is problematic.

As outlined above, 28.5% of daughters stated that they work to increase family income. However, when questions about income expenditure were posed, the number of those who contributed to family income vary substantially.[33] For example, when daughters were asked to specify how they tended to spend their income, 43% stated that they contribute to household expenditure. When they were asked to specify the size of their contribution, 57% stated that more than half went to household expenditure. Finally when they were asked to specify the form of their contribution, 77% responded with a range of items such as monthly bills, education of siblings, food, luxury items and so on.[34] Therefore, regardless of the exact form, it appears that a substantial number of daughters contribute to household expenditure in some way or another. However, the extent to which this makes a difference to potential household expenditure and family-well being, and how this contribution in managed in light of existing household gender divisions is discussed in the following section.

5.5 Gender and Age in Household Management of Income

The issue of household management of income has been continuously highlighted not only as reflecting gender divisions of labour but in acting as a primary basis of household inequality as well:

> The control and allocation of resources within the household is a complex process which has to be seen in relation to a web of rights and obligations. The management of labour, income and resources is something which is crucially bound up with household organisation and the sexual division of labour (Moore, 1988:56).

Besides gender divisions in control of resources, working daughters also succumb to the divisions based on age. The current section argues that because of their gender and age, the value of daughters' employment and wages are symbolically minimised by other family members. Daughters' generally low remuneration from paid employment gives material reinforcement to ascribed gender divisions. Simultaneously, this legitimises the appropriation of their income.

To illustrate this, the following section first looks at general patterns of household resource management and how they relate to intra-household hierarchies. Secondly, it considers patterns of daughters income management and, third, compares this with sons' income management. The overall aim is to demonstrate how household gender divisions result in engendering daughters' labour and wages.

5.5.1 Patterns of Household Resource Management

Research has drawn attention to the importance of household management systems which structure the distribution of rights, resources and responsibilities between members (Kabeer, 1994b:117).[35] These have tended to look at gender divisions in household responsibilities and resource management between spouses and where according to Anne Whitehead (1981:117), there is a 'conjugal contract' between husbands and wives in terms of right and obligations. It has also been suggested that household management systems are dependent on factors beyond spousal relations, such as the family domestic cycle, age of members, the nature of subsistence activities and the level of aggregate household income (González de la Rocha 1994:113; Hoodfar, 1988:126).

Patterns of household resource management in Amman vary which suggests that they cannot follow a rigid typology (see Kabeer, 1994b:116). The following will describe household resource management according to broad classifications. This is because it is difficult to capture the complexity and variation in the social and economic life of each individual household.

Male Head Management

In 43% of households interviewed in Amman, the male head both manages and controls resources. In such households, it is the male head who also performs the daily shopping. The reasons behind this are twofold. The first is that shopping provides a means for greater control over household expenditure (see also Chant 1991b on Costa Rica). The second is that, traditionally, market places were male dominated spaces and male heads who are still not accustomed to the increasing presence of women in market places do the shopping themselves.

Female Head Management

In another 34% of the households men as well as other working members give the elder female (wife/mother) a substantial amount of their earnings for household use and only keep a little for themselves. In such households the responsibility for monthly expenditure and daily shopping falls on the elder women. This group of women can be divided into those that are considered household 'financial managers' and 'keepers of housekeeping allowance' (Hoodfar, 1988). The differences between these two groups reflect the existing power relations within the household. 'Household managers' are women who are acknowledged to be 'good with money' or have a 'tight hand' (i.e. do not dispense of money easily). The management skills of these women are recognised and they usually have active roles in family decisions. These cases reflect more trust in spousal relations where a wife would know, how much her husband, or other working members, are earning. The 'keepers of household allowance', on the other hand, do not necessarily know how much the husband or other family members earn. The amount of money they receive, unlike women managers, does not enable them to actively participate in family financial decisions, since it is exclusively for household expenditure.

Shared Management

Finally, in 23% of the households adult working daughters and sons take part in managing resources and performing daily shopping (see also González de la Rocha 1994:113 on Mexico).[36] These cases reflect a specific stage in the domestic cycle where there is more than one adult working member and where resource management is not necessarily exclusively controlled by spouses. The lack of centralised control of household income management is another reflection of less authoritarian household forms. In many instances, however, this type of management system included a father/family head who was retired or unemployed. To a large extent, therefore, gender and generation variations in resource management reflect different bases of power relations amongst the different households which also influence the ability of different members to participate in the intra-family decisions.

5.5.2 Patterns of Daughters' Money Management

Having identified the general tendencies in household resource management we now turn to how these affect the management of daughters' wages. Here, typologies developed by Jan Pahl (1989) that describe how income is managed between spouses in Britain is helpful in identifying how daughters income is managed in Amman. The following classifies the different systems within two of Jan Pahl's categories: 'whole wage management' and 'independent wage management.'

Within this framework, however, it is also important to identify individual and family centered perceptions of daughters wages. Here we will utilise Amaryta Sen's (1990:126-27), distinctions between 'perception,' 'personal interest and welfare' and 'agency.' 'Perception' is one of the important parameters in the determination of intra-family divisions and inequalities. In the present study this functions on two levels. The first is household perception of young women's work and the second is young women's own perceptions of their income and contribution to family maintenance. In this sense, daughters' self identification in terms of the value of their work is mediated by the overall perceptions of women's subordinate roles which resisted identifying them as income earners (see also Bruce and Dwyer, 1988:8-9). Secondly 'personal interest and welfare' in the context of the present study functions in the sense that young women's 'self interest' is intertwined with the well-being of their families as a whole and therefore their financial contributions are seen as part of their 'self interest.' The third influencing factor 'agency' denotes a situation where a person may have various goals and objectives other than the pursuit of individual and family well-being, although it would be hard to imagine no links of 'other factors' with an individual's interest/well being. In the present study this refers to daughters who see their contributions to household expenditure as facilitators for a certain goals.

Whole Wage Management

In the 'whole wage management' system, daughters, as well as other working members, hand over their entire wage to one parent, who is responsible for household expenditure. Only a portion of the income is retained for daily expenses and transportation while the rest is pooled with household income. The variation within this system depends on whether it is the father or the mother who controls daughters' income. When fathers control daughters' income the management or disposal of that income tends to include an expansion of capital assets. There are two relevant case studies that illustrate this particular pattern. The first is of two sisters working in a toy factory. These women were working to enable their father, a petty trader of vegetables, to finish building the family home. The young women were unhappy in their work because their father had more or less forced them to work and appropriated their income. They also considered their job as below their educational standards and therefore, demeaning in some ways. The second case is that of a family of nine sisters. The father, who is a teacher, had opened a hairdressing salon for them and as each daughter becomes old enough, they join the enterprise, leaving only on marriage. Meanwhile, the father, enriched by his daughters' efforts, has built a four storey building that he rents out. The income of this family has substantially increased over the years. These are examples of fathers expanding their own resource base from their daughters' wages. In other words, when daughters' earning capacity increase so does male interest in the control of their labour.

Yet, it is also important to recognise that daughters may get returns from fathers' control over their income and therefore there is clearly an element of 'personal interest' involved. In some cases, for example, fathers' control means that daughters can achieve a certain amount of status either in family or in personal decision-making (see also Salaff, 1990:126; and Chapter Six). One working daughter, for example, explained how she has recently interjected in a family decision for her unemployed brother to get married as she thought it was not an economically sound decision and her father had apparently agreed with her. In other cases, however, fathers control over daughters' income means increased patriarchal authority where daughters have few visible returns and in fact may experience heightened control over their lives especially if they have no say in the decision to work or not. This relates to 'perception' of female wage which is bound by larger family gender divisions and inequalities. This was the case cited above of the two daughters working in the toy factory:

> So our father is proud of his new building that our wages helped him to finish. But what did we get? He does not even allow us to join the social activities with our workmates or even visit our neighbours, after work.

When mothers fully control daughters' income its management is significantly different. It mainly includes poorer households and where daughters' incomes are directly pooled to daily family needs and as a result there is more recognition of daughters' contributions to the family well-being. Also, more often than not, mothers put some money aside for their daughters needs and occasionally buy them gold as a form of saving.[37] These same mothers are usually very meticulous in household expenditure as they are always keen on saving the extras for their daughters. In general, the daughters who give their incomes to their mothers feel more at ease than those who give it to their fathers. Mothers are more concerned about their daughters' hard labour and often state: 'I am spending the sweat of my girl.'

The difference between father's and mother's control of daughters' income stems from the fact that fathers already have access to, and control of, their own personal resources and within this context daughters wages are an addition. Therefore, fathers often use daughters' wages to supplement investments beyond immediate household needs. Although theoretically this entails an improvement in the standard of living of the young women's families which can only reflect positively on themselves, it has to be mentioned that within the context of prevailing ideologies, any expansion of capital assets usually reflects on the status and power base of the male head. Other fathers might not necessarily use daughters income to build on family resources but again as a result of the male provider ideology, simply control it as an expression of authority within the household. Mothers on the other hand, rarely have any other source of independent income and are more likely to spend daughters' wages on immediate family needs. So in general, mothers' management of daughters' income occurs in situations where it is not likely to threaten the established role of the male provider since it is pooled within the overall household resources. In other words, the main distinction to be made here is that mothers pool and/or manage daughters income while fathers control it.[38]

It is important to point out, however, that mothers' or fathers' 'full wage management' is not always a predetermined fact and intra-spousal conflicts can result through attempts to control young women's earnings. A daughter can become personally embroiled in her parents' struggle over her income. One such case is a working woman whose parents both demand that she give them her income in full. Apparently, the father squanders the money and leaves the mother to manage the family. For a while, the young woman would give half her income to the father and the other half to the mother keeping for herself an amount enough for her transportation to work. For this her father gave her a beating for disobeying him and her mother stopped talking to her as she saw that her daughter, who is the eldest, did not support her in her problems with the abusive husband.

Independent Wage Management

In terms of 'independent wage management' a distinction must be made between daughters who control their income and contribute to household expenditure with those who do not. The methods of daughters' control and contribution to household income varies. Some women give an unspecified amount of money to their parents on a monthly basis. The amount is usually determined by their personal needs as well as their perceptions of household needs. Another group of women 'help out' through making specific monthly payments such as electricity and telephone bills or paying off family loans. Finally, there are the women who do not contribute on either a regular basis or for specific items but contribute now and then in response to need or desire. This includes a variety of items ranging from education expenses for brothers and sisters,[39] to luxury items such as a new television or stove. Daughters' control of wages in such cases means that it is within their power to increase the standard of living of their households. The result is that some gain the family's affection and respect as well as personal satisfaction in fulfilling filial duties (see also, Kabeer, 1995:24; Salaff, 1990:126). In other words, this reflects cases when family 'well-being' is closely related to 'self interest'

Other women's contributions go further than meeting family needs and achieving 'self interest'. Some see this as an 'agency' factor to improve life's options for themselves. The plans of one young woman lab technician exemplifies this:

> This summer, God willing, I plan to re-tile our courtyard and the entrance to our house. I have this plan where the sides along the wall will be planted with flowers. My sister had a suitor last month. It is important for the house to look good if we are to have suitors.

This young woman's contribution was part of an 'agency' factor to better marriage prospects. Another form of 'agency' is when young women contribute parts of their wages to family expenditure as a measure of future assurance of family support against insecurity once they are married. This is especially so when daughters contribute at times when their families' are in need of material input. In these cases contributions are not regarded as temporary but part of long term reciprocal exchanges . These reflect cases when young women's 'self interest' and family well-being' are closely tied to the 'agency' of future emotional and financial security through family ties.

As for the daughters who do not contribute to household income, the majority belong to middle and upper income households. Although theoretically these daughters control their incomes however, in many cases, this is not without the involvement of parents. Many daughters give their incomes to their mothers (surprisingly few gave it to the fathers) who would either save it and buy gold jewellery for their daughters or open a savings account in the bank in the mother's name.[40] This is reflective of the fact that daughters do not want to bother themselves with financial matters and regard their mothers as better equipped to take over. This could be in part as a result of their own gendered 'perceptions' of their incomes. On part of the mothers, however, this could be a form of social control over their daughters whereby they make sure that daughters' wages and consequently behaviour is closely monitored. So, on closer examination, these daughters do not have full control over their incomes. If they need money their mothers have to provide it. In effect, therefore, their spending power is not that much different from those women who hand their wages to their parents.

Very few daughters in the sample survey who do not contribute to household income have a bank account. This might be reflective of their low earning capacity (see above). In fact, the standard of living and spending patterns of some women sometimes forces them to take money from their parents at the end of the month. The result is that even when women do not contribute to household income they rarely become self sufficient in money matters. This extends itself to many other aspects of their lives (see Chapter Six).

5.5.3 The Income of Sons Compared to Daughters

The existing variation in daughters' money management in Amman is largely determined by the mixed income sample and the relative need for daughters' income in each household. It is also reflective of the ideological differences between the individual households in terms of the appropriation of the female wage. What needs to be further analysed, especially in terms of lower income households where daughters wages are part of family maintenance, is whether inter-generational gender stratification is being reproduced through differentials in sons' and daughters' income management.

An underlying factor in differentiating the disposal of sons' and daughters' incomes in Amman are differences in gender role expectations and this is closely tied to differential 'perceptions' of the male and female wage. Unlike daughters who are expected to marry and live elsewhere, parents consider their sons as their old age security. As such, daughters' earnings are considered temporary, not to mention supplementary (because of their low monetary value). Sons' earnings, on the other hand, are considered permanent and are therefore guarded more carefully.[41] So gender role expectations result in the appropriation of daughters' earnings more often than sons'.

Within this context, sons tend to be provided with the freedom to develop skills and contacts that enhance their future earning potential. Expanding economic opportunities not only ensure a better future for sons but also for parents who are careful to cultivate their sons' loyalties (see also Greenhalgh, 1988:50 on Taiwan). This, however, coincides with a time in daughters' lives when parents exercise increased control over their lives and play a major role in choice of employment (see Chapter Six). Therefore, as sons are free to explore income earning opportunities daughters' labour as well as wages become increasingly controlled. The result of this asymmetry is that daughters contribute to household income more than sons (see also Joekes, 1985:204-7 on Morocco). Although many sons do contribute as well, it is generally on a different basis than daughters. A son could be implicitly expected to contribute. Of course, the extent to which this occurs varies according to the economic needs and class positions of the individual households. However, irrespective of this variation, there is a uniformity in the differential treatment of sons' and daughters' wages across most households.

Beyond sons' expected roles as the parents' future security, sons have to save in order to get married. In Jordanian society a man is expected to provide brideprice as well as housing upon marriage (see Chapter Six for fuller discussion on marriage customs). Therefore, marriage is costly for men and it is customary for parents to facilitate their sons' marriages through financial help. This, together with the importance of marriage itself, makes the marriage of a son a costly affair that involves all family members. Within this context, there are several cases in the household survey of young working women contributing to their brothers' costs of marriage. Often, daughters with steady jobs take out loans that they have to repay from their own wages to cover some of the matrimonial expenses of their brothers. Such daughters regarded their contribution as going to the household 'well-being' in general rather than to the brother as a separate entity, however.

In addition, since in Jordanian society sons have more social freedom than daughters, it is generally accepted that sons' daily expenditure is higher as they need to spend on recreational activities. Daughters' restricted social lives and emphasis on modesty, on the other hand, are translated into a perceived lack of need to control income. When daughters do spend their money on personal needs they are considered frivolous by other family members. This is particularly interesting since employers and parents alike often describe young working women as spending their incomes on personal luxury items such as clothes and makeup (see also Joekes, 1985 on Morocco). In reality, as compared to young women, it is the young men who are more inclined to spend their income on personal consumption and recreational activities.[42]

Therefore, notions about appropriate gendered behaviour are mediated through the disposal of sons' and daughters' incomes. Men are supposed to have individual consumption needs and, as a result, develop individual expenditure patterns. On the other hand, women have been conditioned to perceive their individual well-being as part and parcel of their households'. An example of this is found in a case of a young woman factory worker who for three months had been subsidising her younger brother's unemployment by giving him 20 JD ($30 US) per month of her 80 JD ($118 US). According to her:

> He's a man. How can he go out with his friends with no money in his pockets?[43]

In short, we have seen that households maximise the use of daughters wages and expand benefits and advantages for sons at this specific stage of the domestic cycle. However, the advantageous position of sons compared to daughters at the present stage of their life courses is because there are high expectations from sons and no expectations from daughters in the future (i.e. as the household domestic cycle progresses).

6. Conclusions

Through the analysis of the household survey data, the main concern of this chapter was to explore household level factors that influence female labour supply at a specific stage in households' domestic cycle as well as young women's life courses. It highlighted the fact that gender and age places different household members in different positions in the labour market. Aside from education levels, no particular supply side factor could be systematically linked to the increased waged employment of daughters. However, it is a significant fact that daughters are not replicating their mothers' early age at marriage and limited labour force participation. Compared with other family members, they have the highest education levels, and, compared with male family members, their earnings are lower. In other words, there are stark differences between daughters and mothers as well as stark differences between young women's high human capital and limited earnings.

Despite their waged employment, however, young women continue to be identified with restrictive gender roles. It has been revealed, for example, that daughters work because they do not threaten spousal relations. In addition, their low wages do not threaten power relations that are dominated by gender and age hierarchies. Finally, the appropriation of their wages, compared with their brothers', is legitimised because wages become engendered.

Finally, it has to be mentioned here that the engendering of young women's work and wages is not consciously calculated. Young women's work is a new phenomenon that is occurring hand in hand with many other changes in the lives and organisation of Jordanian households. These include, first, economic changes through decreases in real wages, rising costs of living and rising unemployment. Second, there are changes in social relations, such as the decline of the extended family, which has an impact on household level labour supply and income management. Third, there are demographic changes where one of the results is that more daughters and sons live with their parents for longer years as single adults which, until recently, was a non-existent life course trajectory in the lives of both Jordanian men and women. Finally, and related to the above, Jordanian households find themselves faced with changes in gender and generation household relations. For the implications of this we now turn to Chapter Six.

Notes to Chapter Five

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[1] Given this fact, the terms family and household are used interchangeably here. However, it should be noted that a household usually refers to a unit of residence and shared consumption while a family encompasses broader concepts of kinship and ideology. For more detailed discussions on the social organisation of households, see Barrett (1980), Harris, (1981), Moore (1994).

[2] A *jabal* translates as mountain. Since Amman was originally built on several mountains different parts of the city are named after the mountains.

[3] For more detail on squatters, land conflicts and property rights in the metropolitan Amman area see Razzaz, 1991.

[4] These cases are not young woman living independently, but an orphaned family where the elder sister is the breadwinner, and a young woman whose parents are migrant workers living in Kuwait and who is entrusted with younger siblings and ailing grandparents.

[5] 'Work force participation', 'employment' and so on are used throughout this chapter to describe involvement in income earning activities of all kinds including informal labour and family based activities. The term 'economically active,' also describes those who are unemployed provided they were actively seeking employment. 'Economically inactive' refers to women who are unemployed but are not seeking employment.

[6] Officially the unemployed are defined as those individuals who are actively seeking employment. The study here does not adopt this definition and instead relies on the young women's self identification of their employment status (See Chapter Six).

[7] As an example, one young woman in the sample identified herself as an unemployed nurse. Her father, sitting in the next room during the interview interjected that he would never consent to her working as a nurse. Yet, this particular woman was defined as unemployed and not as inactive in the survey sample because she wanted to work despite family opposition. If she continues negotiating her employment conditions, possible accommodation might be reached where her father would eventually consent to her employment.

[8] Upon discovering home based productive activities during the household interviews, the women involved were then described as economically active and usually asked a different set of questions (see Appendix Two).

[9] Preferences for sons in Middle Eastern societies is a widely accepted fact. Male children are considered a source of prestige for parents since they are supposed to carry on the family lineage and provide security for parents in old age. For more on son preference in the Middle East see Beck and Keddie (1978); Maher, (1981); UNICEF (1990a). See also Chapter Six.

[10] Admission to one of the public universities is quite difficult for both men and women. There are always more applicants than places in universities although new public and private institutions are being opened. Furthermore, the sole admission criterion in public universities is the results of the national school exam (*Tawjihi*). The cumulative average determines the area of study. Higher averages secure admittance to the sciences and lower averages to the arts and social sciences.

[11] In the household questionnaire survey (see questions 53 and 54 in Appendix Two), respondents were asked to state if and why they think education is important for women. They were free to choose any answer and 6.2% (n=25) thought that education was a precondition for finding an educated husband and for being better mothers (see also Hatem 1987:293 on Egypt; Papps, 1993:103 on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey; Zuhur 1992:93 on Egypt).

[12] This strong relationship between female higher education levels and employment has been identified in previous studies based on Jordan. One such study reveals that the probability for female employment increases by 26 times if women have post secondary education (Abu Amra and Takriti, 1994:30-1).

[13] For more on the concept of 'shame' in Arab societies see Khayatt (1990) on Iraq; Rugh (1985) on Egypt; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 1993 on Palestine; Wikan, 1982 on Oman and Mernissi, 1975 for a general discussion. See also Chapter Six for a further discussion in the Jordanian context.

[14] As an illustration, one woman respondent who has not completed school and was working in a food manufacturing firm claimed that apart from her immediate family no one knows that she works as an unskilled factory worker. Neighbours and friends believe that she is a clerk in an office.

[15] These were women who owned hairdressing salons. The relatively low cost of setting up a hairdressing business together with the fact that it is strictly sex segregated has made this profession popular among women.

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[16] In an investigation of the three major credit institutions in Amman, the Housing Bank, Cooperative Bank and Industrial Development Bank, Kawar and Takriti (1992) found that women were the beneficiaries of approximately 4% of the total number of extended loans.

[17] Until recently women engaged in agriculture for home-based consumption of seasonal vegetables. With increasing congestion and scarcity of land this is no longer a common activity. Only one mother in the household survey still plants an empty lot of land not far from her home.

[18] Embroidery is a traditional female activity especially among women of Palestinian origin. This is especially the case in the areas of Al-Nathif, Al-Taj where a Save the Children income generating project operates and pays for finished items. Another area was Hai Nazzal where the Hai Nazzal Community Centre markets the finished items on behalf of the women.

[19] These were only two in number. One was a general practitioner and the other a dentist.

[20] These figures are drawn from the 1993 Employment Survey that include establishments which employ five people and above in both the private and public sectors. In other words, these figures are based on formal sector employment only and excludes the informal sector.

[21] An analysis of variance estimation reveals that only 16% of daughters' variance in monthly income can be explained by their educational achievement. The adjusted R(2) when running the same regression for brothers' income is even less significant at 9.2%. For fathers the result gives an adjusted R(2) of 10.8%. Therefore there is no significant relation between daughters', sons' and fathers' education achievement and wage levels.

[22] A correlation analysis reveals that the probability of women from smaller households (less than 7 members) to work, increases by 28%.

[23] Until the mid-1980s male out-migration to oil-rich Gulf states was significant (see Chapter Three) which caused an increase in de-facto female headed households during that period. For example, 1986 study in Amman revealed that 12% of households were female headed (see Bisharat and Zagha 1986). However, as a result of recession and the 1990 Gulf War, work opportunities for males decreased and many were repatriated decreasing the number of female headed households.

[24] Another reason, to be discussed further in Chapter Six, is the universality of marriage.

[25] In terms of social history, there is little evidence that documents the pervious prevalence of extended household forms as compared to nuclear forms in present day Amman. The speculation here is based on the household survey results as compared to traditional notions which describe households. It is also derived from parents' descriptions of their living arrangements in the past, much of which was in rural areas (i.e. before urbanisation). In addition, evidence that suggest that this transition towards nuclear households is likely to continue came from the women respondents. During discussions of future marriage prospects many women stated their desire for a future husband who has his own home. Living in an extended household is generally not desired by young women today.

[26] For a fuller discussion on definitions of household headship see Chant (1997: Chapter One), Folbre (1991) and Harris (1981).

[27] In a study on female employment in Puerto Rico, Helen Safa (1995:78) also found that the annual income of households with working daughters was higher than the rest of her sample.

[28] The correlation coefficient between monthly wages and household income for males is (0.2889) and significant at 5% level. For females the correlation is less significant, although positive at (0.1301). Therefore, there is a stronger relation between male monthly wages and household income.

[29] In a study based on Greece, Constantina Safilios-Rothschild (1990:223) found that husbands from middle and upper social classes are less threatened by their wives income earning activities. Yet among lower social classes, where income is needed, women's employment is threatening to the husband's role as the breadwinner and protector. As a result, their income earning activities are minimised in order to avoid destabilising ascribed gender relations.

[30] See Question 17 in household questionnaire survey in Appendix Two. Further details (i.e. quotes) were obtained through the semi-structured interviews, also Appendix Two.

[31] The percentage of households in which one sister is in employment and another is economically inactive are 5.6% (n=17). The reasons behind this, however, vary. Some economically inactive women choose not to work, while in other cases it is out of an obligation to perform domestic work.

[32] A considerable amount of mothers complained of physical ailments such as rheumatism, heart conditions and so on. In other words, that there was a legitimate need for daughters to take over domestic maintenance.

[33] See questions 25-27 in the household questionnaire survey in Appendix Two. Further details on specific expenditure patterns were obtained through the semi-structured interviews.

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[34] It has to be noted here that these contributions to household income may have been over-stated in some cases and under-stated in others.

[35] In a study of money allocation and power relations between spouses in the United Kingdom, Jan Pahl (1989) identifies four types of income management and allocation systems. These are the 'whole wage management', the 'allowance,' the 'shared management' and the 'independent management' system. For a comprehensive review of different types of household wage and expenditure management between spouses see also Kabeer (1994b) and Young (1992).

[36] There is a household gender and age division in shopping when expenditure is not solely controlled by the male head. On the whole, women buy the vegetables and fruits; young boys or girls buy bread and adult men buy meat. Meat is bought in less frequency and is higher in cost then fresh produce. Perhaps this is the cause behind the gender divide. In terms of the age divide, bread is bought most frequently and usually entails queuing, therefore, because children's time is seen as more disposable they are often assigned to this task. Some children have the additional task of being sent out as scouts to find the day's bargains in seasonal vegetables and fruits and report back to their mothers (Shami and Taminian, 1985)

[37] There are prevalent views that gold jewellery are the best form of saving for women. This stems form the fact that traditionally gold jewellery is one of the only from of wealth that women had exclusive ownership rights (see also Kabeer 1995:23 on Bangladesh).

[38] Compared with other research on male versus female control of wages, the differences between mothers' and fathers' control of their daughters wages is noteworthy. It is consistent with evidence elsewhere that women's spending is more focused on household needs as opposed to men who invariably keep some of their income for their own expenses (see Blumberg, 1991b; Bruce and Dwyer 1988 for general discussions; Engle 1995 on Guatemala; Hoodfar, 1988 on Egypt). In Amman, therefore, these differences are extended to spouses' inter-generational control of daughters' wages.

[39] Kabeer (1995) writing on Bangladesh and Greenhalgh (1988) writing on Taiwan also found that working daughters often fund or part-fund sibling education.

[40] The difference between those mothers who buy jewellery and those who open bank accounts for their daughters is education levels as well as class position. Lower income mothers attach more importance to jewellery as the best form of saving for women than middle income mothers.

[41] Despite the fact that nowadays sons tend to move to independent homes after marriage. Yet, parents still tend to expect their support in old age.

[42] Indeed, this is not restricted to Jordan for as Judith Bruce (1989:986) observes with reference to spousal relations cross-culturally :'...although the specifics of women's consumption responsibilities vary, it is quite commonly found that gender ideologies support the notion that men have a right to personal spending money, which they are perceived to need or deserve, and that women's income is for collective purposes.'

[43] Nevertheless, this young woman was upset because instead of going out to search for work her brother was spending her money and his time on his hobby which was a pigeon-house on the rooftop of their house.

CHAPTER SIX

PATRIARCHY, GENDER AND GENERATION IN AMMAN

This chapter examines the implications of young women's work on gender and generation relations at both household and workplace levels. Given the fact that women were previously married at an earlier age, the existence of adult daughters, for a longer number of years within natal households is a relatively new phenomenon. These women have also been allowed and even encouraged to acquire education and a substantial number work as a result of expanding labour opportunities. One of the main aims of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the implications of Jordanian women's new life course trajectory: single employed adulthood. In this light, and since Jordanian society is based on rigid gender and generation hierarchies, it is imperative to examine how gender and generation relations are manifested and negotiated.

In addressing these issues it is necessary to look at the over-arching system of patriarchy and in particular its dynamic interaction with the evolving life course stage of young single women. In order to do this, the chapter utilises case study material and to a lesser extent quantitative data, and is divided into the following sections. The first section sets out the normative/ideal life course stages of Jordanian women. The second section deconstructs these ideal life course stages of women through highlighting changing interactional patterns between gender and age relations in the home and in the workplace. The third section focuses on patriarchy's adaptation to young women's new life course stage. It will examine how elements of patriarchy are currently being renegotiated, not to mention reconstructed, in order to control young women's prolonged singlehood and possible autonomy. The fourth section investigates the issue of young women's dress and the particular uses and causes of the current trend of veiling. This will illustrate how young women's dress is evolving as an integral part of gender negotiations during this trajectory of women's lives. Having identified the changing gender and generation hierarchies, section five turns to women's experiences of this new life course stage. It assesses how they see employment and income earning affecting their roles within their households. It also assesses the impact of their employment on their personal autonomy, social freedom and self-differentiation. The sixth and final section explores dominant attitudes towards young women's future gender roles. It considers marriage expectations and how young women's attitudes are evolving in divergent directions from that of their parents. One of the main findings of the chapter is that single adulthood may have expanded opportunities and aspirational horizons for some young women but it has not brought about a substantial redistribution of either power relations or gender divisions in society at large.

6.1 Patriarchy and the Life Course of Jordanian Women

Before any discussion of the challenges that gender and generation relations are facing, it is important to set out a scheme of the normative/ideal life course stages of women in Jordan and how these interact with the overarching system of patriarchy. However, while the following describes normative gender relations it has to be kept in mind that, like in any society, there are considerable variations. Moreover, while it describes the typical sequences of women's life course stages, there is no way of predicting the precise age a particular woman will experience these stages, only the order in which they occur.

As a definition, patriarchy is a system of male dominance that is not only rooted in the family, where it determines gender roles and relations, but also in the belief systems of a culture and in the functioning of an economy as well (see Benería and Roldán, 1987; Chant, 1991a; Lim, 1983). In the Arab world, in particular, besides the male privilege that patriarchy ascribes there is a strong age privilege as well. Females are taught to defer to fathers, brothers and other male kin and young people are taught to respect and defer to older kin. In turn, males are taught to take responsibility of female kin and elders are taught to protect and take responsibility of those younger than themselves (Joseph, 1994a:2).[1]

In terms of Jordanian women's life course stages, from the onset of family formation, it is more desirable for parents to have boys (UNICEF, 1995, also Chapter Five).[2] One of the reasons for this is that societal norms of family honour make girls more of a burden than boys. Family honour is based upon the fact that every household member is accountable for his/her public behaviour which ultimately reflect on the status, dignity, and identity of the family as a whole, but especially on male elders who are deemed responsible for their kin's behaviour (Joseph, 1994a:5-6). In this respect parents see themselves as responsible for controlling the potential sexuality of their unmarried daughters, which poses the greatest threat to family honour (see also, Shalhoub Kevorkian, 1993 on Palestine).

Therefore, from a life course perspective, gender differentials and female dependence on male protection are created not in adulthood but much earlier during childhood and adolescence. Unlike boys, girls are taught from an early age the rules of moral behaviour and shame. For example, while boys and girls need to be obedient towards elder family members, disobedience on the part of sons is more easily tolerated (see Wikan, 1982 on Oman). As young children, girls are conditioned to stay at home and help their mothers in household tasks which includes cleaning-up after their brothers, while boys can freely play with neighbourhood children and spend as much time in the male world of their fathers and the female world of their mothers (see also, Gulick and Gulick, 1978 on Iran; Wikan, 1982 on Oman). Unlike girls, therefore, boys are allowed to develop their socio-spatial autonomy early on in their life course.

At puberty, pressures and expectations of girls' behaviour takes a new shape (see also Katz, 1993 on Sudan). Menarche is the age at which a young girl spends more time with other women and children and becomes increasingly isolated from the public sphere. In some cases, girls are expected to wear longer dresses or cover their hair and no longer have the same freedom in playing with neighbourhood children. It is also the age when girls become fully endorsed as assistants to their mothers in both housework and taking care of younger siblings. Traditionally, this is also an age at which girls tended to be withdrawn from schools. Adolescence is thus the life course stage in which girls are actively prepared for their future roles by both of their parents. Fathers consider their relationships with their daughters as a model for their relationships with other men as adults. Therefore, the father-daughter relationship becomes formal and distant as fathers attempt to instill male respect and deference into their daughters (see also Wikan 1982 on Oman). In this way fathers do not just teach daughters gender roles but relations too (see also White, 1994 on Turkey). The basis of father-daughter relationship develops into one of irrefutable authority and conditions girls into accepting obedience to men. Meanwhile, mothers not only teach girls their responsibilities but also inculcate them into accepting male authority (see also Manasra, 1993 on Palestine). At this age, in order to ensure girls' eventual virginal marriages, both parents increase their control of girls' social freedom.

Just as adolescent girls' freedom are restricted, adolescent boys gain more freedom as they are increasingly drawn by their fathers into the public and 'masculine' world. As a result, fathers are usually considered the idols of young sons, and their greatest aspiration is usually to become like their fathers (see also White 1994 on Turkey). Within this vein, brothers attempt to replicate their fathers' behaviour towards their sisters. Because of their gender, brothers feel that they are the legitimate guardians of their sisters. According to Suad Joseph (1994b), who writes on Lebanon, brother-sister relationships are central to the reproduction of patriarchy in Arab families. Joseph (p.52) asserts that it is culturally acceptable for brothers to control their sisters which results in brothers' empowerment and 'masculinisation' and sisters' domestication and 'feminisation'. In other words, a brother is encouraged to learn to become a patriarch through disciplining his sister, and, in the process, a young woman learns submissiveness to male authority (ibid.).

Marriage prospects for girls start earlier than for boys. Parents (and elder brothers and other male kin) are eager to discharge their responsibility for daughters' chastity through an early marriage (see also Wikan, 1982:60-1 on Oman). For the same reasons parents prefer young brides for their sons. Young men, on the other hand, are not under the same pressures, although traditionally they are also encouraged to marry young as parents are anxious to secure male grandchildren and the continuation of the family lineage. Early age at marriage does not only ensure female chastity but also preserves patterns of male dominance and female seclusion since women are placed at a young age in positions dependent upon their husbands and very often mothers-in-law (Gulick and Gulick, 1978:517). Marriage, therefore, is in one sense an aspect of gender relations that cannot be isolated from the ideology of control and family honour (Tapper and Tapper, 1992:4).

In accordance with patriarchy's emphasis on male lineage, traditional marriage partners in the Arab region are paternal cousins (see Peters, 1978; Rugh, 1984; Tapper and Tapper, 1992). This ensures that young women are not 'strangers' in their new household and that they will be well-treated. This strengthens the pre-existing ties between the brothers who are betrothing their children and also ensures that the bride price (*mahr*) is not too high (Tapper and Tapper, 1992). Arranged marriages are usually instigated by the parents of the future groom where his family chooses either the suitable paternal cousin and/or a number of other potential brides of which he can state his preference (see Rugh 1984).

Generally, choice of marriage partners are made on the girl's behalf by the men who represent her (Wikan, 1982:196). By and large, this is motivated to ensure a daughters' happiness (see Rugh, 1984; Wikan, 1982) but family interest, which includes political and economic alliances, are some of the other considerations that encompass these choices (Tapper and Tapper, 1992; Wikan, 1982). In religious terms young women cannot be forced into marriage as their assent is necessary for the marriage contract. Therefore, women have the right to refuse any suitor. However, it is not tolerated if she keeps refusing with no justification and occasionally coercion and threats can be posed upon young women to accept particular suitors (Manasra 1993). Upon a marriage proposal, therefore, a young woman's family take their time in answering in order to consult with their daughter and larger kin group about the potential match. If the groom is unknown to them, they might make inquiries about his social, financial and educational position. After a positive answer, discussion and negotiation will turn to brideprice and more specific arrangements for the marriage.

When women marry they move from dependence on their families to dependence on their husbands. It is their husbands who make decisions which can cover issues such as what the wife wears, whom she is in contact with and so on. Young brides in traditional settings who live in extended households also have to adapt to the authority of their mother-in-law (Kandiyoti, 1987:331). In other words, by virtue of their age and gender the status of young brides is considerably lower than other family members (it is here that marrying cousins is advantageous). A good daughter-in-law is supposed to be obedient and perform her domestic duties under the supervision of her mother-in-law.

It is only after married women bear male children and after they progress in age that they can assume some authority over their children and daughters-in-law (Kandiyoti, 1987:331). In turn, they often replicate their own restricted life cycles on both their daughters and daughters-in-law (see also Mernissi, 1975).

6.2 The Deconstruction of Gender and Generation Relations in Amman

Although normative/ideal life course stages of Jordanian women include variations, it is clear that single employed adulthood, has traditionally been a non-existent life course stage. Women are daughters as children and adolescents, after which they are wives and mothers as adults. So assuming that young Jordanian women are now encountering a new life course stage, what challenges does this pose for normative and actual patriarchal relations within urban Jordanian society? And what does it mean in the context of the household?

6.2.1 Fathers and Daughters: Negotiating Patriarchy

Young women's later age at marriage means that fathers' (and brothers', see below) roles in protecting female kin lasts for a longer period of time then any previous generation. Young women today also pursue higher education and a substantial number work (see Chapter One and Five). This not only challenges fathers' authority but also makes their roles in controlling the behaviour of female kin more elusive. The result is that single working daughters are likely to be either in negotiation or conflict with their fathers. These negotiations or conflicts sometimes include access to education and employment and in other cases include the conditions or accommodations that this access to education and/or employment entails (see below). Another point of negotiation or potential conflict is the question of choice in marriage. Many young women no longer accept arranged marriages and insist on knowing potential husbands (see also Schaefer Davies, 1993 on Morocco).

It is evident from the case study material that fathers are in a dilemma as to appropriate behaviour and/or expectations from their adult daughters. The result is a variety of reactions including fathers who, by denying their daughters' choices, become severe and repressive. These cases sometimes end up in family conflicts often involving other family members and relatives. For example, one young woman wanted to work with her school friend who had opened a hairdressing salon but her father did not see this as a respectable occupation. As a response the young women went to her maternal uncle's house one night and refused to go back home unless her father relented. This spiralled into a family confrontation, where old conflicts between the young woman's father and maternal uncles re-surfaced. More often, however, fathers concede to daughters wishes but demand a set of conditions. For example, a young woman may be allowed to choose a desired career if her working place is close to home and/or employment is in a segregated workplace, or she might be required to wear the veil (see below).

Finally, the basis of the father-daughter relationship which is also based on a daughter's moral obligations and values towards her elders means that any accommodations and even conflicts usually occur in a clandestine fashion. If they can help it, daughters do not openly challenge their fathers' authority. They normally adopt strategies of long term negotiation and persuasion. Therefore, on the surface, daughters still behave with deference and servitude towards their fathers and an onlooker may not detect any conflict. One case study illustrates this. During an interview with a family of five daughters living with their mother and who's father has taken on a second wife and rarely visits them, the main focus of the discussion was his semi-desertion but also his restrictive attitude towards their lives. During this discussion the father arrived, after an extended absence, bringing with him a considerable amount of food items. Upon his appearance the 5 daughters rushed, out some helping him with the packages, others in preparing coffee in the kitchen. With such commotion it was difficult to believe that moments ago they were complaining about an existing conflict.

6.2.2 Mothers and Daughters: Gender Bonding and Generational Conflicts

Compared to their daughters, a large percentage of mothers are illiterate, few had ever contemplated working for wages and were married at a young age. Today, while mother-daughter relationships may be based on some cooperation, as a result of their common gender, there is also conflict, as a result of their different generations and life expectations. In terms of cooperation, mothers see the need to support their daughters in their endeavours whether education, work, social life or choice in marriage. Perhaps because their own life options were more limited they feel the need to expand such options for their daughters. The conflict, however, arises from the fact that 'good mothers' are those who succeed in nurturing girls who abide by ascribed gender roles. In other words, daughters are supposed to become like their mothers. As a result, mothers see themselves as often pressuring their daughters on appropriate behaviour in some issues and supporting their independence in others. For example, one young woman complained how her mother actively negotiated with her father, and even borrowed money from her relatives, in order that she would be sent to university. After completing her degree in engineering, however, the mother remained passive when the father refused to allow the daughter to work.

The social norms that revolve around concepts of 'good motherhood' are extended to the role of a 'good wife' who not only provides comforts for her husband, but also maintains a harmonious household by not bothering and involving him in irksome daily details. This actually provides women with the powers of conveying household conditions to their husbands as they please. Therefore, as far as the mother-daughter relation is concerned, a mother becomes the mediator between father and daughter. This is important since daughters rarely approach their fathers independently. If a daughter desires something that she expects her father to oppose, the mother will provide all forms of preambles before the actual demand is put forward. One such example is of a young woman government school teacher who was transferred to Jerash, a town about 50 km outside Amman, which entailed living away from home. For a while, the mother would tell the father of cases of friends' and neighbours daughters' who had to work away from home, starting with the neighbour who works in Saudi Arabia and whose family has benefited tremendously from her wages. The mother finally informed him of their daughter's predicament. Many mothers use such tactics to appease their daughters and to maintain household harmony.

Issues that are seen as unnecessary or disturbing for the father are kept away from him. Therefore, some mother-daughter conflict occurs simply because mothers are more aware of their daughters' plans or activities than fathers. A father's wrath at a daughter's misbehaviour is supposed to be more severe than that of a mother's. A conflict with a mother, therefore, minimises the scale of the confrontation and family harmony is more easily restored, even if superficially. In a way, therefore, raising conflicts with daughters is partially a strategy, albeit inadvertent, of mothers protecting daughters' relations with their fathers.

However, it is also within mothers' powers to hide facts from their husbands in support of their daughters, with the following case study being an illustration. One young woman was a talented singer and belonged to a musical group during her college years. The father was vehemently against this as it meant that his daughter was in public view. The mother realising the daughter's talents, kept this fact from the father. In order to justify the late nights that performing in a music group entailed, the mother always accompanied the daughter and later found all forms of excuses to give to the father, such as visits to relatives outside of town and/or difficulties in finding transportation. Yet, this type of subterfuge is also accompanied by the fact that mothers usually feel a need to protect their daughters. In this case, the mother felt it imperative to accompany her daughter in order to preserve her moral/sexual reputation. In other words, the mother was lenient enough to understand her daughter's talents and desire to sing, but was also bound by broader social rules where it is not respectable for women to be performers and also to be alone at night. By her presence she was making a statement that her daughter's public reputation (i.e. chastity) remained intact.[3]

Within the above context of both conflicts and cooperation between mothers and daughters which are a result of the larger restrictions on gender roles, it is notable that mothers invariably encourage their daughters' education and rarely oppose their employment. Indeed, in lower income households, the need for income is such that mothers would often actively negotiate their daughters' employment with their husbands. Other mothers, however, although not opposed to daughters' employment are not ready to negotiate with their husbands as they do not deem the conflict it is likely to engender worth it. Indeed, mothers are actually in awkward positions since they want their daughters' happiness but need to fulfill their own culturally ascribed roles as good mothers and wives. This tends to become especially contradictory where providing daughters with a certain amount of freedom may result in them risking their daughters' reputations, and hence chances for marriage, not to mention damaging their own credibility as 'good mothers.'

6.2.3 Brothers and Sisters: Threatening Ascribed Gender Roles

Brother-sister relationships in the sample survey could be described as being fraught with conflict. Sons, who are reared to be in power, are currently facing obstacles and challenges in assuming their ascribed gender roles. In other words, they are also facing changes in their life course trajectories. Young men live longer at home as single men under the authority of their fathers (due to father's longevity). High unemployment rates, inflation and falling real wages make it harder for them to start their own families and assume their roles as family heads (regardless of whether they continue to live in their parental home or not). On the whole, this lack of access to ascribed gender roles that they have been reared to assume causes great frustration (Fergues, 1995:188). The overwhelming reaction is that brothers try to increase their control over their sisters who are regarded as subordinate by virtue of their gender if not their age (see also Wikan, 1982:85 on Oman).

Many young women interviewees reported that brothers are a greater threat to them than fathers. Fathers are distant and not concerned with everyday household details especially as many do not spend much time at home. Together with the generation gap, it is easy for fathers to be unaware of daughters' daily activities or plans. Brothers however, by belonging to the same generation and spending more time at home, are more aware of their sisters' daily lives and can try to exercise control over their sisters' movements or behaviour (see Joseph, 1994b:54 on Lebanon; Rugh, 1984:97 on Egypt). Some young women tried to justify their brothers' behaviour on the basis that they are more aware of the 'perils' of modern life, than their fathers, and therefore feel the need to protect them. What this entails is that there are gender differentiated codes of permissible behaviour, where brothers feel entitled to more social/sexual freedom than their sisters. One particular case study is of a woman nurse who, after a lot of persuasion, convinced her father to be allowed to work night shifts at a distant hospital. The brother was vehemently against this and after two months of work managed to persuade the father to forbid his sister from working. The young woman's explanation for her brother's behaviour is that he has had several liaisons with his women co-workers and does not want his sister to enter a similar situation at her workplace.[4]

Two major points can be made about brothers. The first is that they influence their fathers' decisions not only by virtue of their gender but by their generation. By their gender they have privileged access to intimate exchange with fathers and to influence decision-making; by their generation they can claim to 'know better'. In other words, because of similar education levels and involvement in modernised occupational sectors, they are exposed to the same kind of world as a young woman. Within this vein a father is likely to take a brother's opinion regarding a young woman seriously. For young men living at home, this provides a major route to exercise power over their sisters. Second, it is likely that brothers find excuses to control their sisters as a means of compensating for their lack of household authority as single men. Given the disadvantage of their young age, the control over sisters' behaviour represent an avenue of control that also outline their future relations with their sisters.[5]

So the fact that brothers and sisters belong to the same generation and where both live in their natal homes for longer years is producing a new and more problematic set of gender relations within households in Amman. Within the narrowing of the gender gap among Jordanian youth, young women's potential equality is posing a threat to the status quo of brothers which can result in sibling discord.

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to mention how family control over young women is backed up in the workplace where patriarchal household relations are in many respects replicated and reproduced. Indeed, it is during the last two decades that female employment in modern sectors in Amman has become visible and that some employers have resorted to an all-female workforce (see Chapter Four). Within this context, employers, young women and their families alike are intent on creating work relations that reflect the correct behaviour and social order that is expected from all parties. Replicating a family relationship, can be a strategy to adapt to such a new situation where 'strange' men and women have to interact. Since gender relations are based on women being daughters, sisters or wives, young women become automatically the daughters at work and in the case of age similarity, the sisters (see also Kabeer, 1994:179 on Bangladesh).[6] Male employers overwhelmingly wish to be regarded as guardians or 'symbolic fathers' and most of them refer to young women working for them as *banati* which translates as both 'my girls' or 'daughters' (see Ecevit, 1991 on Turkey; also Chapter Four). Therefore, the workplace has therefore evolved in many situations as symbolic family domain marked by fictive kin relations.

In sum, this section has attempted to reveal that young women's changing life course stages as a result of prolonged age at marriage and employment are creating conflicts and negotiations over normative gender relations. Within this context each member, kin or non-kin, is searching for circumstances whereby this new life course trajectory can be accommodated within normative codes of acceptable behaviour.

6.3 The Reconstruction of Gender and Generation Relations in Amman

In examining changes in women's positions following migration Tienda and Booth (1991:56) refer to 'restructured asymmetries,' whereby the relative position of women remains unequal vis-à-vis men but the concrete circumstances of their participation are drastically changed. They further state:

> ...few changes in women's positions are so clear and linear that obvious improvements or deterioration result. Rather, and because social change is a long-term historical process that continuously restructures social relations, we can only explore and contrast the mechanisms through which the circumstances defining women's position interact with migratory patterns to shape changes in gender asymmetries.

The following elaborates on the concept of 'restructured asymmetries' in the context of changing gender and generation relations in Amman, bearing in mind that patriarchy operates at domestic and extra-domestic levels and in addressing the reconstruction of patriarchy in Amman these levels have to be disentangled. The first, includes the household concessions in terms of expanding young women's opportunities in education, employment and marriage options and which had inadvertently facilitated young women's new life course stage. The second extra-domestic level, however, revolves around notions of family honour, which in the case of young women means preserving sexual reputation (see Joseph, 1994a:5-6). These have been brought to the forefront as a result of the former accommodations which seem to threaten family honour.

Therefore, to illustrate the resulting cross-currents between patriarchy's intra-household concessions and extra-domestic resistance and the resulting 'restructured asymmetries' we have to take on board a spectrum of seemingly unrelated issues. Some of these reveal that young women's employment is resulting in new expectations and conditions which are in effect new forms of control. On the other hand, others reveal that traditional values concerning family honour are being reinstated. Both of these, ultimately result in the reconstruction of patriarchal relations. Relevant issues include the relation between education and employment, acceptable types and conditions of work, sexual harassment at work and family honour and young women's public behaviour.

6.3.1. Education and Employment

The positive relation between higher female education and increasing employment rates has been already established (see Chapter Five). However, what remains to be addressed is whether young women freely choose their areas of higher education or whether education type is conditional upon accepted gender roles? Also, how aware are families of the linkages between higher education and future employment? Are young women free to choose employment type after finishing their education or is this also filtered through the accepted norms of gender roles?

Most parents take a more or less egalitarian attitude towards promoting sons' and daughters' basic education with the rationale that it is their duty in fulfilling their roles as good parents.[7] Basically, the interviewees are the first generation of beneficiaries of the education policies of the country that provides equal education to all as well as subsidised colleges and universities (see Chapter Three). However, after basic schooling, choices for young women who plan to continue any form of higher education, are filtered through their families. This is mainly because the rationale for giving girls education may be different from boys and as a result, parents will interfere in the type of education a woman may acquire while sons are free and even encouraged to choose for themselves.[8]

In the sample survey, higher education of daughters across all income groups was linked to prestige. Employment, on the other hand, was not (see also Rugh 1985 on Egypt). On the whole, women are encouraged to embark on studies related to their gender roles. This primarily involves acquiring teacher skills which includes a 'mothering' element and tend to entail sex segregated working environments. The result is that many young women enroll in teacher training programmes.

In other situations, however, young women insist on studying specialisations that are considered by parents as problematic in terms of ascribed gender roles. In such cases young women are usually allowed to continue with their studies. However, when it comes to finding employment all forms of restrictions and obstacles tend to be put forward. To illustrate parents' contradictory attitudes towards education and employment of girls, the rest of this section reveals some of the restrictions posed.

In some cases young women are categorically denied access to employment after completing their education or training, one case being a nurse who after obtaining her degree and training was not allowed by her father to work in an environment where she is bound to be in constant physical contact with men (i.e. patients and male co-workers). Another case was a woman mechanic who was actually encouraged to pursue a government-sponsored youth training scheme. Later, she was not allowed to seek employment as her skill is considered a 'male' job and therefore inappropriate for a young women. In such situations the parents are actually proud of their daughters' achievements despite the fact that the daughters remain unemployed. In fact, the young mechanic was almost regarded as a hero within her household and neighbourhood for symbolically breaking gender barriers as far as she did.

In other situations the employment of young women who complete higher levels of education is dependent on many parental conditions that inadvertently make it impossible for the young women to find employment. For example, they tend to have to find employment that is within the geographical vicinity of their homes; working hours that will always get them home before dark; or single sex working environments (see below). Of course, whether all or some of these restrictions apply is dependent on the different standards of acceptable behaviour of young women among the different households.

Finally, another set of restrictions is dependent on a very narrow view of educational attainment. This is to do with the fact that if a young woman insists on specialising in something she is confined to work within that specific framework. An example is a young woman who has a two year degree in finance. According to her parents she could only work in a bank. A bank is viewed as a respectable working environment. This particular young woman has had many opportunities to work as an assistant accountant in private sector firms. This was prohibited by her parents who see small firms as areas of potential risk for their daughters' reputation (see below).

So there are a variety of restrictions put on women in looking for employment even though these are minimal when embarking on education. Indeed, this is one of the perplexing cross-currents in parents', and particularly fathers', behaviour regarding young women's single adulthood. Higher education, even if it means interacting with men, living away from home and so on, is regarded in a positive light. Employment on the other hand, is regarded as a potential threat to the traditional norms that encourage sex segregation and control of female autonomy. The problem with these cross-currents, however, is that higher education in itself entails that young women are exposed to new ideas, different ways of life and social freedom. It also nurtures ambition and aspirations for economic and social independence. However, this exposure, which could be quickly reversed in terms of employment opportunities, has already changed the attitudes and life expectations of the young women themselves. This often leaves the young women resentful and can result in family friction. As one young woman voiced her frustration:

> I wanted to be an engineer. My parents convinced me that nursing is better for a girl. After obtaining my degree and training I started applying for jobs but found out that my parents never intended to allow me to work. I do not understand why did they let me go to university if they knew very well that I will not work?

6.3.2. Acceptable Types and Conditions of Work

Having looked at the disjuncture between the education and employment of young women in Amman, we now turn to what parents see as acceptable work and for what reasons (see also Chapter Five). The overarching concern of most parents is the preservation of young women's chastity and social reputations. Acceptable employment for young women in Amman therefore, revolves first, around notions of gender segregation at work. Chapter Four has already established the existing strict gender division of labour as a result of the gender typing of jobs among firms in Amman. Second, it involves notions of 'respectable' working environment which includes the conditions of work for young women. The following will discuss these restrictions and illustrate how they are circumvented.

One predominant concern among many families is that a daughter should be home before dark (which could be as early as five o'clock in the winter). There is a general attitude that since a workday is supposed to be finished by early evening, any woman who is not home by then draws suspicion to her behaviour. In general, women working as teachers do not face such problems since school days are short. So besides the fact that teaching is considered a respectable female job short working hours provide another incentive. Most manufacturing industries and workshops who employ young women also have reasonable working hours. Such employers are aware of the taboos of women working in evenings and their day-light working hours are more than coincidental.

Another form of restriction placed on young women by their families is the location of their workplaces (see also Kabeer, 1995:171 on Bangladesh). Social restrictions on women's movement and the importance of women's public behaviour, mean that some parents do not allow their daughters to utilise public transportation which include predominantly male passengers. However, there are solutions to this obstacle. For example, if there is a well known establishment and several women from the same community join it becomes acceptable. The young women who commute together daily are seen as serving many purposes: they keep an eye on one another's behaviour; they tend not to be harassed by strangers since they are in a group; and, because more than one woman commutes, it is hard for the larger community to disapprove of their employment in distant parts of the city.

Another form of restriction is that a young woman's family should know the prospective employer of their daughter. Thus, where possible, daughters work for relatives, family friends or neighbours. If an employer happens to be unknown, the family will make inquiries about him; that is try to ascertain his 'reputation' (mainly of his attitude and treatment of women workers). So when a young woman finds work, sometimes either her brother or father will accompany her to finalise the work conditions of her employment and meet the employer face to face (see also Maher, 1981:123 on Morocco). Sometimes it is stated verbally, and not just symbolically, where fathers tell the employer: 'I am entrusting you with my daughter.' and the employer answers: 'Do not worry. She will be like my own daughter as long as she is working here.' In other words, that he will not take advantage of here and protect her chaste sexual reputation.

On part of the employers, there are two strategies that accommodate family restrictions on female mobility. The first is that employers who depend on young female labour set-up their business in proximity to labour supply, usually near congested low income neighbourhoods where women need to work.[9] The second strategy, which involves large manufacturing employers, is to provide transportation for their women workers. These factories have several pick up points from areas with potential female labour. This is seen as appropriate by parents since such large industries are far from residential areas and located on the periphery of the city. So employers who are aware of the mobility restrictions put on young women and are also in need of young female labour adopt several strategies in accordance with these restrictions.

In other types of employment, specifically small private sector establishments, many families find the working conditions unacceptable. The reasons for this are several, one being that working hours are longer. Also, unlike the public sector, banks, teaching professions or manufacturing jobs, employers do not provide concessions for female labour such as transport or daylight working hours. Finally, very few private sector firms have sex segregated work spaces. So, there are family inhibitions about small, unknown working environments. This attitude was summed by one father who said:

> Work in small private companies is wrong. People do not know each other these days.

According to this father, if an employer does not know who his female employee is, he will take advantage of her. The job of a secretary in particular is regarded by many as unacceptable since it entails working for a male boss and exposing oneself to sexual harassment. As far as a family is concerned, when their daughter works at a school, bank, an industry, or the public sector, everyone knows where and who she works for and this provides a safety valve for her public image and sexual reputation. In contrast, when a daughter is working for some small unknown private sector firm the lack of avenue to clear the reputation of this employer act as an impediment for many parents to allow their daughters to work in such establishments.

However, this does not include all families since there are a substantial number of young women in Amman who work in small private sector establishments. Within such firms the general attitude of employers towards young women is that they are rarely ready to put in the working hours involved. They generally assume that this is due to their lack of motivation towards work. Few employers realise that these working hours are devised to suit the males' work patterns and that they are actually problematic for young women and virtually impossible for married women. Private sector establishments in Amman work a morning shift that is usually eight am to one pm with a long lunch break till three or four pm and an afternoon shift that lasts to about six pm or more. This is usually with a one day weekend or, at the most, one and the half days.[10] This tends to be problematic for some young women especially those who are in sales, secretarial or administrative jobs. The long lunch breaks are actually devised for married men who go home have a ready lunch and take a siesta. Younger unmarried men are more socially mobile and therefore have options to spend their time at coffee houses with friends. This is definitely not the case for young women, first because young women's wages are often less then men's; this limits the chances of owning a car, and extra trips on public transport, to go home for lunch, become unaffordable. Second, young women are less likely to go regularly to restaurants or entertain themselves daily like the young men during this period not only because of the costs but also because it is not common for young women to be in public places on daily basis. This would attract unwanted attention and threaten their reputation.[11] The end result is that they stay at their desks during the long lunch break and are effectively at work for 10 hours a day, six days a week.

Because such hours leave young women with little private time, many become unhappy and dissatisfied. Indeed, even the most ambitious of the young women report being disenchanted and unmotivated and that they are on the look-out for better opportunities. The consequent high turn-over rates works to marginalise them in such private sector establishments and feed employers' stereotyped assumptions about the temporality of female labour (see Chapter Four).

6.3.3 Sexual Harassment and Gender Ideology

Many of the above restrictions put on the conditions of young women's work are patriarchal means of preserving the sexual reputation of young women. Within this context it is important to know the extent to which employment exposes young women to sexual harassment. It is also just as important to know whether this pre-existing control of female sexuality acts as a deterrent to sexual harassment at the workplace, notwithstanding that in a socially restricted society such as Jordan any subject pertaining to sexuality is taboo and therefore the issue of sexual harassment was difficult to address. First, young women might not be aware of the undertones that could constitute sexual harassment.[12] Second, even those who are exposed to outright sexual harassment are not ready to admit to it in the fear that not only they will lose their jobs or their parents will permanently withdraw them from employment, but also damage their sexual reputation. As for those young women who are aware and ready to discuss the issue of sexual harassment there is a general attitude that such incidences could only occur when the women themselves invite them.[13] However, the following discussion will reveal that the pertinent issue is not as much the occurrence of sexual harassment, it is more the preoccupation with preventing it.

Although, sexual harassment is never discussed openly, parents and guardians control of women's sexuality, which is primarily intended to prevent pre-marital sexual relationships, somehow act as a deterrent. In addition, although women exposed to forms of sexual harassment are essentially victims, their reputations, and consequently their families', will be tarnished regardless. Therefore, the concern regarding employers' reputation, location of work and so on are supposed to protect the young women from being taken advantage of.

In some ways, all male employers are perceived as potential threats to the reputation of the female labour in their charge. As a result, any employer who needs female labour has to prove his innocence among the young women themselves as well as their families. As an illustration, sometimes in small workshops with exclusively female labour the wife of the employer works as the general supervisor. It was mentioned that the wife's presence was essential for making the working environment and the interaction with the male employer more comfortable.

Many employers adopt the father figure model to deter attention from themselves as possible harrassers (see earlier and Chapter Four). This, however, can sometimes allow employers to hide behind the father figure in their harassing endeavors as the following case study illustrates:

> One day my boss who I respect very much touched my hand and then my hair. I screamed. He then said: 'what's the matter you are like my daughter.' He never touched me again. I think he was testing how I would react and my reaction made him treat me like a daughter. He takes care of me and recently asked the management to give me a raise. All the other secretaries are jealous of me and started rumours about me and my boss. He is a very good man and when he was sick I visited him in hospital and gave him flowers. His wife does not like me.

The contradictions in this case illustrate that, besides the fact that employers use their father figure image as an excuse, young women who are exposed to very few men, apart from fathers brothers and relatives, not only find it hard to distinguish between harassment and filial relations but could themselves become attracted to men they work with. Like this case it is innocent, and usually takes the form of admiration or respect.

Finally, young women's psycho-social conditioning as the vulnerable sex who also need to guard their chastity necessitates them taking preventive measures. For example, some young women claim that they applied to jobs where they did not trust the boss or co-workers and refused the employment opportunity as a result. In other words, that they relied on their intuition. It is also common belief that women in dire economic need are more exposed to harassment since employers, upon realising this, are more likely to take advantage of them. So the overwhelming attitude among the young women is the relief that their own families will not put them in such situations no matter what their economic needs are. The need to protect their sexual reputation, therefore, seem to function as a reinforcement of their economic and psychological dependence on their families. And finally, young women always assert their readiness to leave their jobs at the vaguest reference to their sexuality by employers or colleagues. An example is a young woman who left her assembly line job in a textile workshop after four years of employment in solidarity with a colleague who left because the male supervisor was making advances towards her. This young woman did not only leave in sympathy with her friend and denouncement of the employer but also to protect herself from the possibility of this occurring to her. Also, both women's actions was a public statement of their honourable behaviour should anyone start gossiping about them.

The preoccupation of keeping young women's sexual reputations intact, and indeed young women's own concerns regarding their reputations, has resulted in a rather rigid form of male-boss female-worker relations in the workplace: employers *need* to act like fathers and young women *need* to act as daughters, and it is necessary for young women and employers alike to constantly prove their innocence.[14] Within this formula it is male co-workers who remain unaccountable for their behaviour and therefore pose the real threat. However, to minimise this, employers resort to spatial segregation as well as division of labour (see Chapter Four).

However, it should be noted here that young women's fears of sexual harassment would seem to be somewhat out of proportion to its actual occurrence. Young working women are constantly exposed to accounts about unknown women who are taken advantage of in unknown workplaces (there was no way of telling the extent to which such accounts are factual or fictional). None the less, for the young working women in Amman who are at a trajectory in their life course where chastity is paramount, the term sexual harassment which is broadly identified with physical or verbal abuse need to be redefined. Women's vulnerability is extended to the threat of sexual harassment or mere gossip both of which have far reaching implications for their own and their families' reputations. The result is a fear of victimisation that could be just as damaging as experiencing it (see also, Salhoub Kevorkian on Palestine, 1993: 174).

6.3.5 Family Honour, Employment and Young Women's Public Behaviour

The increasing public visibility of young women is bringing the subject of family honour in Amman to the forefront of family relations. The fact that so many women are working and are consequently outside the immediate control of male kin during large parts of the day is causing anxiety. Therefore, young women's employment does not only involve relinquishing some of male powers within the home but also an increasing emphasis on the males roles' as the public protectors of female kin. Since single adulthood is a new phenomenon in terms of life course stages, their public behaviour, which is considered as the prime threat to family honour is continuously monitored.

The reactions of male kin to the sense that losing control over the behaviour of female relatives and becoming publicly disgraced varies, of course, between different households. However, one of the stringent reactions to those women who breach the family honour codes are what are termed as 'honour crimes'.[15] The victims of these crimes are young women suspected of illicit sexual relations outside of marriage and where death is the only way to cleanse and restore the family honour (see also, Joseph, 1994b on Lebanon; Manasra, 1993 on Palestine; Rugh 1984 on Egypt). In the past decade (1986-1996) the annual average number of such crimes were 23 cases for the country as a whole.[16] The alarming fact is that there seems to be a gradual increase in such crimes (Husseini, 1994).

Although this is an extreme reaction and generally meets negative media coverage and public disdain, it is reflective of current crisis among Jordanian families relating to changing gender and generation relations. These crimes tend to occur in poor rural or urban areas and against young women (Mansur 1996). It appears that economic need and high male unemployment result in men seeing young women's work as weakening their own power base. In the urban context, crowded housing conditions expose families to increased contact with people outside the immediate family which puts more pressures on male family members to protect female kin. As a result, women's behaviour becomes increasingly scrutinised in order to help avert the tarnishing of family honour. As for middle and upper income families, however, there is perhaps less need to publicly reassert their honourable family reputation as a result of their already established economic prestige. Another factor could be that such families have more means of disguising such incidences when they occur. The result is that in families where the daughter's work is necessary for survival their public behaviour under utmost scrutiny.

It is of note here that a great majority of honour crimes are committed by brothers against their sisters (often, with the father's knowledge) (Husseini, 1994; Mansur, 1996). This alludes to discussions earlier that brothers who are anxious to assume power, but are deterred by the presence of their fathers, become themselves the greatest propagators of patriarchy and where the sisters become the victims in such extreme cases. Yet, as with sexual harassment, honour crimes as far as the interviewees are concerned, happen to other women and not themselves. They are, however, conditioned to be horrified by their occurrence. Therefore, the young women who are intent on gaining certain freedoms are themselves adamant on preserving their chaste sexual reputations. So, ironically, the few advances that young women have gained in terms of re-negotiations of gender roles within their families has increased the significance of their public behaviour. Women who exist as single employed adults, an unrecognised life course stage as far as traditional familial patriarchy is concerned, need to abide by strict moral conduct in order to maintain and/or expand their new life opportunities, such as employment.

To conclude this section, the cross-currents between the intra-household and extra-domestic aspects of patriarchy has to be reiterated. Accommodations are being made internally within households which has resulted in female education and access to employment. Male family members however need to ensure their authority over female kin publicly. In some instances, this is triggering new forms of control over young working women while in others it involves re-asserting old forms. These new forms of control include putting limitations and conditions on young women's education and work. The re-assertion of old forms of control relate to heightened emphasis on female honour and chastity. The result is a 'restructuring of asymmetries' where male authority patterns have not been significantly reduced with young women's employment, but instead, function in altered circumstances.

6.4 Religious Ideology, Veiling and Young Women's Work

The above section has outlined the adjustments occurring within households' power structures and publicly as related to young women's behaviour vis-à-vis family honour. Within this context, women's dress in public spaces has evolved to be one of the foremost symbolic gestures that embodies these tensions. This is because women's dress reflects the interface between private intra-household power negotiations and the public representation of male dominance.

The veiling of women in Muslim societies has always been a contentious matter with respect to women's rights and status. The veil has been depicted as a symbol of women's oppression, seclusion and consequently subordinate role within society (see Minces 1982). It has also been depicted from pragmatic viewpoints. These suggest that with women's recent increased presence in public spheres, the veil acts as a shield that symbolises women's respectability in conditions where they have to interact with strange men (El-Guindi, 1981:465-85, Macleod 1991; Zuhur 1992). In other words, the veil actually facilitates women's mobility and freedom and therefore participation in public life (Afshar, 1992:12). While the following discussion largely adopt the later view, the concern is not so much the arguments regarding how the veil constrains or liberate women, but to illustrate that women's dress has evolved into an integral part of the gender re-negotiations that are part of the evolving forms of patriarchal relations. In addition, the current section will distance the veil from its assumed relation with Islam. This is because, the issues of veiling and its causes encompass larger ideologies than religious doctrine per se.[17]

Therefore, to illustrate how women's dress is part of the reconstruction of patriarchal forms, the following will discuss the types and different meaning of dress. It will then investigate the relation of veiling with age, family and personal belief, class, and finally, employment.

6.4.1 Types and Meaning of Different Dress Among Young women

It is important to recognise at this stage that there are different types of dress, with different meanings and relations to social status as well as religious ideology. There are three basic dress codes among young women. The differences between them reflect among other things social and economic connotations. The first might be called 'western' and is adopted as a mode of dress by 35% of survey respondents. The majority of these young women come from higher income backgrounds (see below) and those who were currently employed tend to be in the service sector (see Chapter Four). The second type is what might be termed 'conservative-western', where western style clothing is worn with a head scarf. This represents 39% of the sample survey. These young women are not religious per se but wear the head scarf and the loose long clothing more to reflect respectability than abidance with religion. This style of dressing reflects young women's adaptation to the concept of fashion in the midst of pressures to conform and be modest. The third type might be called Islamic[18] and which represents 26% of the women in the sample survey. This consists of a long coat-like garment called *jilbab* with a head scarf both of which tend to be plain and in subdued colours such as beige or gray. The stricter dress code within this group, which consisted of a fewer number of women, include those that wore an all black attire covering their faces except for their eyes and wearing gloves. Unlike other Muslim dress, this particular group of women represent a politisiced form of Islam as they might belong to religious groups. The objective of such groups is to return to a pure form of religion which includes strict sexual segregation. However, because in this day and age women cannot practically be confined to their homes, they adopt this strict dress code where they are unrecognisable in public. Therefore, what needs to be stressed here is that not all veiled women belong to an Islamist movement and certainly that the veil does not represent a uniform group of women. These differences have to be kept in mind especially in order to capture the multiple implications of veiling.

6.4.2 Age and Veiling

Recent research on veiling use the term of 'new veiling' (see El-Guindi, 1981; Macleod, 1991; Zuhur, 1992). This refers to both a new *type* of veiling as well as new *reasons* for veiling. The new type of veiling refers to the above mentioned *jilbab*. The dominant issue with the new veiling is the age dimension as it is most prevalent among young women (see also Zuhur 1992 on Egypt). One of the explanations for this are assumptions that older and married women do not need to protect their sexual reputation as much (Zuhur, 1992:62). Also, older women, on the whole, either wear traditional attire or conservative western clothing, both of which are integrally modest. In fact, not only are young women veiled more than older women but the relation between age and gender is reflected in a differential attitude of men towards veiling with consequently different requirements and expectations between wives' and daughters' attire. As one mother explained:

> My husband insisted that our daughter puts on the Islamic dress when she started working. At work, my daughter got to know religious friends who invited us to religious lessons. It was very comforting and I decided to change my *thob* (traditional long embroidered dress) for the *jilbab*. My husband who insisted that our daughter wears the *jilbab* was furious with me and made me go back to my old dresses.

So, age is a criterion for the 'new veiling.' The fact that older women, such as the one mentioned here, are not transgressing the established patriarchal norms, in comparison to their daughters, should not be underestimated. In this respect, a daughter's dress code may be a response to their prolonged single adulthood and where emphasis on their modesty and chastity is at its highest during this life course stage.

6.4.3 Family Conditioning, Personal Belief and the Veil

On inquiring why and how young women adopt covered dress (in any of its forms), a whole range of intra-household generational conflicts, self differentiation and power friction surface. On the one hand there are women who adopt covered dress as a result of family obligation, which sometimes results with resistance and conflict. On the other hand, there are those who adopt covered dress as part of personal belief.

Some women who wear covered dress out of family obligation start during their teens. In these cases veiling is considered the norm since all women in the immediate environment abide by the same rules. These women, therefore, regard their covered dress as part of general moral codes and because of their young age few pose any resistance. However, there are exceptions. One young woman who wears western style clothes explained how when she was 15 years old and going to school her father insisted that she adopt the veil if she wanted to continue her schooling. She would put her head scarf on in the morning while leaving home to school and take it off once she was out of sight. Problems with her father ensued as he found out, and now at the age of 24 years she is not veiled and her relations with her father are restored.

Other parents insist on covered dress when young women start employment. Many young women who feel vulnerable in public spaces as a result of their psycho-social conditioning assent to this willingly (see also Kandiyoti, 1991:18). However, having to adopt the veil at a young age differs from having to adopt it at an older age when young women are more likely to have their own opinion about the matter. Fathers tend to see the attire of their adult daughters as reflections of themselves as good Muslims. For example one father, during an argument with his working daughter who wears western dress and refuse to veil said:

> How will God allow me into heaven if my own daughter is dressed like this?

It is in such cases that generational conflicts are most prevalent for they represent the re-negotiation of personal power and authority between fathers (and often brothers) and daughters. When a daughter goes to work, fathers are actually relinquishing some of the powers that they have always held, and through the symbolic adoption of the veil, they hope that their daughters will be protected and preserve her own and ipso facto family honour. Young women who refuse to wear the veil in such cases are therefore not only challenging their fathers' authority within the household but also their public standing vis-à-vis society at large as demonstrated by the following case study:

> When I started work my father insisted that I wear not only a head scarf, which I was ready to do, but also the *jilbab*. I refused to wear it and I refused to leave work. During this time he gave me several beatings for disobeying him. Finally I took refuge in my married sister's house. I stayed there for three months. As a result, my father stopped talking to my sister and her husband and would not let my mother visit us. Only she (the mother) always managed to come when he was away. Eventually things were patched up and I returned home. My father is not better and still ill-tempered but both my sister and my mother were getting into trouble because of me. I am working now. I am not veiled and I rarely talk to my father.

This example reveals a father's insistence on his daughter's symbolic use of the veil and a daughter's resistance to its symbolic meaning. This particular young woman did not face restrictions in going to school, college or work. The one concession that her father demanded upon employment was the veil which she refused. For her she expects her father's trust when she is in public spaces. As for her father, he wants to safeguard his and her reputation and hold on to a form of control over his daughter.

The other group of young veiled women are those that wear the *jilbab* as a result of personal conviction. For such women covered dress represents a measure of self respect. Socially, these women tend to be more confident at school, work or public spaces and as a result attract other young women and form groups. This can develop into becoming a peer pressure group that target potential women. In this context, when an acquaintance adopts a veil this group of women would sometimes have a party and everyone will congratulate her for 'finding her path.' One young woman who was getting friendly with a group of veiled women at work explained how she was actually coerced into wearing the veil:

> I was new at work. It was my first job. All the others were veiled except me and another girl. The veiled women were very nice to me and convinced me how hateful the other unveiled woman was. She kept to herself and never talked to anyone. Then one morning, the one who I knew to be their leader came up to me and said: 'we have a present for you.' She gave me a bag which contained a *jilbab* and a head scarf. Then she said: 'my mother stayed up late last night sewing this for you.' I went home that day in a *jilbab*. I have not taken it off since. Once you're veiled it is shameful to take it off.

An emotional blackmail was exercised by the veiled women in the case study here. This reveals that in some ways, covered dress has provided these women with a power that was employed against this new work colleague. The other factor involved here is that the decision to veil is irreversible. Once a woman adopts a veil it is considered shameful to discard it. Unlike women who never wear it, those who wear it and then take it off are viewed as abandoning religion itself, which is judged harshly in Islam.[19]

6.3.3 Class and Veiling

Class and family income level play a significant role in young women's dress. Indeed, the lower the family income the more prevalent covered dress becomes and the higher the family income the less prevalent. Within this context the question arises as to what extent are a family's or community's moral and religious values class based? In other words, how is religious ideology filtered through class?

Dress in the Middle East has always been linked to class and education as well as level of urbanisation. Linkages between mothers and daughters seems pertinent here. Urban middle and upper income mothers who have some education are unlikely to have daughters who will adopt covered dress. As a result of the broadening liberalisation and westernisation of such communities, religious conservatism itself is less visible. In contrast, lower income mothers with no or little education and who are recently urbanised tend to wear traditional dress. It is the daughters of these women that are more likely to wear covered Islamic dress. In such environments religious ideology is much more dominant and apparent in daily life. Therefore, religion seems to have different meanings among different income groups.

Covered dress among the middle and upper income groups is predominantly a result of personal choices and tend to happen at an older age. In contrast, covered dress for lower income women has several wide ranging purposes. First, it signals increased prestige and status and therefore represent women's aspirations for upward class mobility (see Macleod, 1991:34-7; Watson 1994:142). In other words, a young woman who has achieved a dramatically altered life from her family and community through her education and employment can, by adopting the veil, symbolically set herself apart from her own community. It is also likely that it will attract an educated husband, since religion is often equated with learning. Second, for single women it attracts suitors for marriage (see Zuhur, 1992:130). It is thought that even men who are not religious prefer to marry religious women because they are considered to make better (i.e. obedient) wives and mothers. Third, as the unveiled women argue, it is cheaper. When young working women wear a *jilbab* they do not have to use their earnings to buy fashionable clothes. Finally, as an ideology, Islam provides poorer women (and men) hope, collective solidarity and probably comfort (see Moghadam, 1991:270), besides financial support for the very poor. Indeed, Islamic political groups have gained popularity in the context of the economic crisis during the late 1980's. Support for such groups can to some extent be understood as a response to problems arising in every day life from austerity measures (Moghadam, 1993:136). Therefore, covered Muslim dress fulfills wide-ranging practical and symbolic dimensions for low income women.

The relation between veiling and class has caused a significant variation in the geographical distribution of dress codes in Amman. In middle and upper class neighbourhoods where both mothers and daughters are predominantly in western dress, it is common to find some women in covered dress. In low income areas it is the norm for young women to be covered and older women to wear traditional dress. There would virtually be no uncovered women. Indeed, it becomes uncomfortable for any uncovered woman to be in such an environment. This has also caused differences between working women in professional modernised sectors who tend to wear western style clothing and women in manufacturing or low paid jobs who predominantly wear covered dress (see also employers' attitudes in Chapter Four).

6.3.4 Work and Veiling

The main question here is does the covered dress induce or hinder female work force participation? That is, does it allow young women more freedom to participate in public life while continuing to adhere to the traditional codes of modesty? Or is it really a new form of oppression that symbolises the fact that women in public have not transgressed male control (Keddie 1991:12)? Recent research, predominantly based in Egypt, suggest that the veil is actually both: liberating as well as constraining. It has been suggested that working women in new environments are veiling as a reaction to a new situation. According to Arlene Macleod (1992:547) there are two conflicting forces at play: an economic ideology, that revolves around the improvement of the standard of living and is pushing women into the workplace, and a gender ideology that continues to frame women's place within the home as wives and mothers. Therefore, adopting the veil upon working is a personal response for such a conflicting situation:

> The paradox of women seeming to support their own subordination and even to reproduce it under new conditions is part of the generally perplexing story of women's participation in the interactions of tradition and modernity, and the related re-negotiations of power (Macleod, 1991:93).

We have seen, however, that this friction between economic need and gender ideology that results in women's veiling does not encompass all veiled women. Covered dress among young women in Amman represents the larger transformations occurring within households. Within this vein, women's employment may exacerbate and popularise the prevalence of covered dress but it does not necessarily represent the root cause of it. The destablisation of patriarchal relations is bringing young women's public image to the forefront and particular efforts are made to re-establish, at least symbolically, male authority. Therefore, the relation between employment and covered dress is part and parcel of the restructuring of patriarchal ideology in general.

Furthermore, if young women's work is to be understood as a form of transition in gender and generation relations than the dress code could be understood as part of a collective negotiating process rather then a personal response to these changing relations. Here, it would be helpful to outline from the survey sample young women's dress type according to their employment status. Table 6.1 reveals that the majority of both working and economically inactive women wear a head scarf only (41% and 45.3% respectively) as opposed to Muslim dress (*jilbab*) or western dress. This reveals that the relation between employment and type of dress is not a straight-forward matter. These women whether working or economically inactive represent a reaffirmation of female modesty as well as a toned-down symbol of religious ideology. In other words, they maintain their femininity while abiding by the general framework of respectability and public reaffirmation of male authority.

Table 6.1 Type of Dress According to Work Status of Young Women

Type of Dress	Working %	Unemployed %	Inactive %
Islamic Dress	24.4 (61)*	26.5 (27)	18.9 (10)
Head Scarf Only	41 (103)	33.3 (34)	45.3 (24)
Modern/Western	34 (85)	40.1 (41)	32.1 (17)
Total	100 (249)	100 (102)	100 (51)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

On the other hand, Table 6.1 also reveals that the majority of unemployed women wear western style clothing (at 40.1%). Some of these women maybe unemployed as a result of family restrictions on type and conditions of employment (see above). The fact that this group consists of the highest percentage of those who wear western dress signify that perhaps this is another form of family restriction that they have not met (bearing in mind, of course, the class differences within this group of women).

In short, young women's dress and employment provides another example of the private and public face of gender ideologies. While it could be a personal response to new conditions with conflicting ideologies like the case of Egypt, in the case of Amman, it is more likely to be part of household negotiations that aim to accommodate patriarchal authority into young women's new life course stage and increased public participation.

6.5 Perspectives from Working Women

Thus far the study has looked at the impact of gender ideologies in households and workplaces in influencing young women's employment opportunities and patterns. Among the major observations are that employers tend to see young women as a temporary uncommitted workforce. As far as households are concerned young women provide a supplementary income. As a result of these attitudes in both household and workplace, young women's employment conditions have in some ways become temporary and supplementary. It could be argued therefore, that the dominant gender ideology of women's secondary status is regenerating itself through young women's employment patterns.

However, despite these general attitudes, the numbers of young women who are joining the labour force are increasing and it is important to know their own thoughts on that matter. Thus, the following section explores the perceptions of the young women themselves. How do they perceive the existing gender divisions of employment? What are their views on their employment experiences? How is their employment affecting their perceived roles within the power hierarchy of their households? And finally, how is work affecting their personal autonomy?

6.5.1 Attitudes Towards Acceptable Female Work

A substantial number of women in the sample survey believe that women should work in professions consistent with their 'nature' as women (44%).[20] This particular attitude was similar among women in different employment status.[21] Not surprisingly, 66% of the sample survey thought that the most appropriate profession for a woman is teaching (see also Hatem, 1986:293, on Egypt; Papps, 1993:104, on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey). The reasons given were identical to those provided by parents and employers who maintain that teaching is consistent with women's roles as nurturers and mothers. Also, 65% of the sample survey thought that women should work in sewing and embroidery. Again, the reasons given were consistent with the fact that such professions are an extension of women's 'natural' abilities in handiwork.

It appears, therefore, that young women are influenced by the wider ideological constructions of their gender that defines them through their maternal natures and domestic skills. The point to make here, however, is that such attitudes are not necessarily determined by what these young women think about female ability. They are likely to be determined by the options that they perceive are available for women (Nawar et al. 1995). After all, the gender division of labour within homes and workplaces remains more or less absolute. So, even those who believe that women can perform any kind of occupation, would not necessarily take up the challenge of any unacceptable occupation. In assessing young women's attitudes of the gender typing of jobs, therefore, differences must be made between beliefs and actual behaviour.

6.5.2 Work Satisfaction

In looking at young women's job satisfaction, there are two major issues which we might consider. The first, is employment conditions, including pay, hours of work, and social relations. The second, is personal fulfillment and sense of achievement.

In terms of the former, the various constraints placed on finding appropriate employment means that women are more likely to work in places which they and/or their families deem suitable. As such, very few women are in what they perceive to be 'unsatisfactory' working conditions. Here, of course, the young women are themselves influenced by other peoples' views about what is, or is not, a 'satisfactory' workplace. As a result, a substantial number of them are in what can be termed as gender ascribed jobs. The overwhelming compromise for these appropriate working conditions, however, is accepting low pay. Therefore, a number of young women believe that they are under-paid (at 17%). However, since other factors, such as family's satisfaction, take more precedence many young women assent to becoming underpaid. Women in such situations rarely demand a pay raise since they realise that their working conditions are attractive to a large supply of female labour in the same position as themselves. So in finding appropriate working environments, women are effectively constrained from expanding their earning powers. This, in some ways, acts to reinforce their secondary status at the workplace as well as prevent them from asserting themselves amongst their families.

As far as personal fulfillment, however, it can be stated here that very few young women in low paid gender ascribed jobs are in positions that nurture any sense of achievement. The majority, who are in the manufacturing sector or in the lower echelons of the services sector, do not really enjoy their work. The only, and consequently the greatest, satisfaction for the young women is the alleviation of boredom in their restrictive home environments and establishing friends and social contacts (see below). Most of them realise the lack of future opportunities in their occupations and they do not aspire for more anyway.

Women who are in professional occupations and ideally can establish a career are defined by their employers and families within the framework of their gender roles which effectively limits not only their opportunities but their own ambitions as well. In fact, any ambitious and confident woman would be described by her employers and colleagues: 'she is like a man.'[22] In other words, the aspirations that make an enthusiastic or efficient worker are considered 'masculine' traits. As a result ambitious young women would be inadvertently marginalising themselves from their female and male colleagues as well as deterring marriage prospects if they are perceived as overtly serious and professional. In other words, in a society with clear gender distinctions such accusations may have a far reaching impact on a young woman's life.

Within this general framework, however, aspiring young women need to accommodate their personal ambitions without threatening their ascribed gender roles. Many young women professionals in non-segregated occupations have to work hard and yet remain carefully feminine and avoid being described as similar to men in their behaviour. Achieving this balance is strategised through working hard, securing employers' approval while remaining generally undemanding, unassertive and not threatening to male superiors. In other words, young women's ambitions have to be accommodated to maintaining the balance of the gender hierarchy within society. As one young woman architect explains:

> I am the only woman architect in our firm. Before my arrival the other women were the secretaries. I work the hardest and currently have the heaviest load. However, when we need to go to the site my boss sends my male colleagues. He says the labourers on the construction sites will not take me seriously. When clients come he never lets me sit in meetings but male colleagues are usually invited in. For this he always has excuses like he does not want to waste my precious time. I feel that if I want to continue with my current work which I enjoy and am given a lot of responsibility I need to undermine my achievement especially in front of my male colleagues. As for my boss, he does appreciate me and never stops praising me, but only when we are alone.

This is an example, where a young woman feels she has to over-achieve in order to be recognised as a professional yet she remains defined by her gender. Her boss who seems to acknowledge her hard work is very careful to maintain the ascribed gender roles that exist at all levels: on the construction site where the young woman is in a superior position and will have to give orders; at the level of her relations with her male colleagues who are supposedly her equals; and at the level of the clients who are likely to question her capability.

Other examples reveal that employers do not expect young women to be ambitious and when they are they are surprised and perplexed. One young woman who became a head of a section in a private sector firm related what her boss said about her to another male colleague:

> My boss told my colleague how pleased he is with my work but he also said: 'I do not understand why she is such a hard worker. She comes from a good family and does not need to work.'

So job satisfaction and ambition for young women seems to be filtered through the existing gender ideology of male supremacy. Young women who are adamant on proving themselves are also wary of not challenging ascribed gender roles and marginalising themselves. Therefore, like their employers who maintain a balance between young women's achievement and gender relations at work, young women have to strike a balance between their own personal ambitions and conforming to normative gender identity.

6.5.3 Impact of Income Earning

The impact of income earning on women's roles in terms of decision making and power relations within households has been addressed extensively in other cultural contexts. Most of the findings discuss how female income earning affects relations between spouses (see for example Blumberg 1991a; Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Kabeer, 1994b; Safilios-Rothchild, 1990; Sharma, 1990; Whitehead, 1981). The limited research that looks at the effects of income earning on daughters as compared to wives reveals conflicting evidence. Some suggest that daughters' employment is less threatening to male supremacy than that of adult married women who are more likely to gain power from employment because of their higher ranking in the generation hierarchy (Lamphere 1986). Others, on the other hand, suggest that parental patriarchal authority is more resistant to change than marital patriarchy (Kung, 1983; Salaff, 1981).

These arguments are hard to explore in the case study of Amman because a very small number of mothers are actually engaged in paid employment which makes cross-generation comparisons difficult. Furthermore, it has been revealed that young women's wages are too low to allow them to assert themselves as independent individuals within their households. When assessing young women's own perceptions of the impact of their income earning, some seem to gain a certain amount of status within their families, whereas others do not.

Perhaps the most revealing assessment among young women were those with previous work experience but who were unemployed at the time of the interview. These young women had the most poignant perspective on the impact of income earning on status and roles within their households. Several such women stated that when they were income earners they were more involved in family decisions and felt that they were treated with more respect than their current situation. In general, it seemed that some fathers, especially those that took part of their working daughters' wages, would involve a daughter more in discussions relating to household expenditure.

In most cases it seems that mothers also treated their working daughters differently from non-working children. In several cases the working daughter is regarded by the mother as the favourite. These mothers do their utmost to provide comforts when the daughter is at home after a long day's work. These comforts include having the meal ready and sometimes, among poorer families, saving the best piece of meat for them. Younger siblings are also not supposed to bother the working daughters at this time. In general, mothers, who had married young and had a different life experience from their daughters, hold respect and admiration for their working daughters. Furthermore, relations with brothers are even affected where money sometimes gave sisters power. This is exemplified by one young woman who was unemployed at the time of the interview:

> These days my brothers keep interfering in my life. They want to know where I go and who I see. When I used to work things were different. They were hard up and I used to loan them money. It gave me so much pleasure because they could never interfere in my life and I even controlled their expenses. As soon as they tried to assume the big brother role, I would threaten that I would not give them any more money. One day, as I was leaving to visit a friend, my brother wanted to know where I was going. I said: 'Listen, one more question and you hand back every penny you owe me right now.' Now, things have changed. It is them who are working and I am unemployed.

There are also many young women who did not feel that income earning had any effect on their status within the household. Several even thought that they would be better off if they were not working. As one case study stated:

> Work has only brought me a headache. My mother expects me to do all the housework after my return from work. She thinks that since she always cared for us now its my turn to care for her. She does not realise that I am exhausted and accuses me that I am lazy. All my father cares about is my money. One month I could not give him any and he Screamed: 'damn you and your money.' He did not talk to me until I gave him money the following month. My married sisters continuously expect me to loan them money and give them presents. When I don't they accuse me of being stingy. Work has brought me nothing.

In short, the impacts of income earning on role and status of young women differ from household to household. Indeed the two conflicting case studies above are both based on low income families where young women's pay is limited. Income earning sometimes increases status, and at other times increases subjugation. Perhaps these differences have to do with parents' adaptations to their dependence on daughters wages. Some parents, resign themselves to this fact and gratefully acknowledge their daughters' contributions, while others see this as a threat to their positions as household heads and therefore become more authoritative. In higher income households the dependence on daughters' wages is not an issue and therefore does not pose threats to the position of males (see also Safilios-Rothchild, 1990 on Greece). In these cases, daughters' education and occupation become the determining factor in status. In other words, type of daughters' education and occupation becomes a source of prestige for the male head. Therefore, among middle and upper income households, an increased status for daughters connotes increased prestige for male family members outside of their households.

6.5.4 Impact on Personal Autonomy

This section addresses the impact of employment on young women's personal autonomy through looking at two elements: the impact of work on physical mobility and social freedom; and, young women's personal aspirations and whether they manage to fulfill them within restricted social boundaries. Before proceeding however, it is important to point out that the degree to which an individual achieves personal autonomy is relative to his/her specific social context (Nawar, at al., 1995:152). In the following, young women's autonomy, often interacts with their class position and, as it has been previously suggested, the liberalisation of gender norms among the urban middle and upper classes in Amman, means that relative to others some young women already exercise a certain amount of personal autonomy.

Impact on Mobility and Social Freedom

In addressing whether employment has expanded young women's social freedoms despite the various restrictions on their working conditions these have to be contrasted with non-working women. Physical freedom, in particular, is closely related to young women's psycho-social development as girls, irrespective of current work status. Girls learn to fear being alone in certain places from a young age and this, in effect, excludes them from the public sphere as adults (see also Katz on Sudan, 1993) (see earlier).

Despite this however, there are stark generational differences in concepts regarding freedom of movement between mothers and daughters.[23] While a mother can regard a daughter's employment as freedom of movement (as it compares to her youth), a daughter might feel constrained by the fact that she is still accountable for all her movements. It is also important to point out that concepts of freedom of movement differ among the young women who are in the same age cohort. Freedom of movement by one respondent may be perceived as visiting relatives while for another, it may mean being able to travel abroad. Therefore, the young women were asked to describe their ability to go to various specific destinations and their dependence on being escorted or not.

Table 6.2 reveals that working women are more mobile than inactive women, and also indicates that there are similarities between the freedom of movement of working and unemployed women. This suggests that freedom of movement may be expanded through employment. It is certainly consistent with the fact that employment in itself provides an opportunity for increased physical mobility. It is likely, therefore, that some women who cease to work can maintain the same amount of freedom that they had gained through their employment.

Table 6.2 Young Women's Freedom of Movement According to Employment Status

Destination	Market %	Doctor %	Friends %	Relatives %	Abroad %
Employed					
Cannot go	1.6 (4)*	3.2 (8)	11.6 (29)	4.4 (11)	36.5 (91)
Can go escorted	22 (55)	33.7 (84)	12 (30)	42.6 (106)	44.9 (112)
Can go alone	76.3 (190)	63 (157)	76.3 (190)	53.4 (133)	18.5 (46)
Total	100 (249)	100 (249)	100 (249)	100 (249)	100 (249)
Unemployed					
Cannot go	2.9 (3)	2.9 (3)	8.8 (9)	2.9 (3)	38.2 (39)
Can go escorted	25 (26)	31.4 (32)	19.6 (20)	44 (45)	43 (44)
Can go alone	72 (73)	65.6 (67)	71.6 (73)	52.9 (54)	18.6 (19)
Total	100 (102)	100 (102)	100 (102)	100 (102)	100 (102)
Inactive					
Cannot go	12 (6)	4 (2)	22 (11)	4 (2)	19.6 (10)
Can go escorted	39.2 (20)	43 (22)	22 (11)	53 (27)	80.4 (41)
Can go alone	49 (25)	53 (27)	57 (29)	43 (22)	-
Total	100 (51)	100 (51)	100 (51)	100 (51)	100 (51)

Source: Household Survey
*Absolute numbers in brackets

However, Table 6.2 also points to a factor that is well engraved in the societal codes of acceptable behaviour which is the significant number of women, regardless of employment status, whose freedom of movement is dependent on being escorted by a family member or close friend. In general, parents' attitudes towards their daughters' social freedom and the necessity on being escorted, is not a sign of distrust but a form of protection of their public image. Lone women in public spaces are a source of gossip which can be damaging to a young girl's reputation (see earlier). Therefore, as far as many parents are concerned young women have the relative freedom to choose to go anywhere as long as they are escorted.

Within this atmosphere of minimised male-female social contact there is a general trepidation among the young women themselves to be on their own in public spaces. As one young woman stated:

> When I am walking alone in the street I feel everyone is watching me.

This is typically felt by young women who see themselves as vulnerable and liable to attract unwanted attention. So, in general, young women will avoid venturing on their own not because they are prohibited from doing so but because many lack the self confidence to do so. Therefore, the conditioning of women as the vulnerable sex acts as a deterrent to any increase in women's physical freedom. Having said this, it is important to mention that women's public presence in Amman is starkly visible and this presence does not necessarily mean that they are subject to unwanted male attention. It is significant, therefore, that public spaces remain to be ideologically constructed as male spheres which women continue to regard themselves as vulnerable.

Furthermore, young women's freedom of movement differs between actual and symbolic levels. For example, some women state that they are free to go anywhere they like but that they do not because they do not see the need to. Often, the same interview would reveal that a woman who claims to have freedom of movement has never been downtown (city centre and market), or that the last time she went on an independent outing was six months previously. It transpired, for example, that many women who stated they have freedom of movement, had no knowledge of the city outside their immediate geographic vicinity. Thus, there are contradictions between the perceptions of both parents and daughters and the actual amount of physical freedom that a young woman has.

Moving on to the inter-connections between physical and social freedoms, what of young women's autonomy in establishing social relations? For most women these revolve around relatives and female friends. Female friends are acquired in three main ways. The first are female friends within the immediate vicinity of their homes. These could be relatives (normally cousins) or just neighbours. Such relations are usually intimate. For example, women, who normally wear covered dress can go to neighbours houses uncovered as long as they avoid male members. Second, there are school friends. These are an extension of neighbourhood friends, since schools are usually within the vicinity of households, and therefore largely include friends who belong to the same community. Those who proceed to higher education, however, are able to acquire friends from different parts of the city and possibly different income groups. The third way of acquiring friends is through colleagues at work who could also come from diversified backgrounds. Therefore, employed women especially those with higher education levels, tend to be able to acquire a larger and more diversified base of friends and acquaintances, besides their immediate relatives and neighbours, than non-working women.

Nevertheless, there are variations in the actual amount of social contact between women, even among those within the same employment status. Given limitations on physical mobility, social relations are predominantly based on visiting each other's homes. Some women face problems even in this. One unemployed woman quoted her father as saying:

> Why do you need to go to your friends? They can come here.

This attitude is problematic because visits among friends usually rotate and if a young woman does not reciprocate the friendships are likely to dwindle. A substantial amount of young women's social lives, therefore, revolve around family and relatives and outside this is dependent on 'special occasions'. This includes attending birthday, engagement or wedding parties. Social activities beyond home visits are largely confined to working women. These activities are adapted to the framework of their work routines. This includes women work colleagues going out to lunch together or shopping especially on pay day.

Autonomy and Personal Aspirations

Having looked at young women's physical and social freedom, we now turn to young women's personal aspirations and how attitudes towards women's social freedom affects them. In other words, this section addresses young women's personal aspirations vis-à-vis their existing reality.[24] Most young women have individual hopes and aspirations. These range from the seemingly simple ability to be able to go swimming to more complex ambitions such as wanting to become a politician. These aspirations often reflect women's repressed needs for personal autonomy.

The context behind this is that the acknowledged stages of Arab women's life course excludes youth and single adulthood. Therefore, since youth itself is squeezed out of Arab women's life courses, young women learn to suppress their personal hopes and aspirations even if they continue, at a deep level, longing to realise them. Although the majority of this revolves around romantic ideals, a lot of it relates to the actual limitations on their social freedom and mobility, as revealed by the following cases:

> I used to be a basket ball champion at school and my teachers recommended that I join the national Jordanian team. My parents, of course, refused. Since finishing school I have not played any sport. I have such an urge to exercise that sometimes I lock myself in my room and just jump till I am exhausted.
>
> My dream is to learn to drive and own a car. Do you drive? What kind of car do you drive? Can you take me for a ride?[25]
>
> The happiest days in my life was when I used to sing with the college music group. Singing for me is so natural. I am born to sing.
>
> My dream is to be a poet. I write secretly and have to hide my notebooks. My brother tore my poems once. He said they were blasphemous.

Examples like these are ample. They do not just represent abstract youthful dreams but deeply felt needs and aspirations. Young women rarely find avenues to express themselves. Their physical and social restrictions deny them any form of expression. The irony is that they usually consist of things they are exposed to at school, on television or, in the case of the women who wants a car, on the street on daily basis. One factor here is that such aspirations are particular to their age group. Parents, fathers and mothers alike, have a different life experience and are likely to misunderstand and consequently block their daughters' desires. Most young women understand this gap between themselves and their parents and rarely attempt to challenge it. In addition, they are usually left with no social confidence to challenge their parents. However, they are well aware of their predicament and when they do get a chance for free expression they are fully capable of articulating themselves.[26]

Finally, it is in this way that work for many young women becomes a way of expressing themselves and breaking the monotony of their restricted lives and perhaps boredom. Therefore, despite the fact that young women can sometimes be exploited labour (see Chapter Four) or the fact their wages are too little to assert themselves within their households, employment opportunities remain of paramount importance at this stage in their life courses. For many, it represents a symbol of their desires to become independent adults, as well as a means for filling their free time.

6.6 Attitudes Towards Work, Marriage and Future Gender Roles

Having positioned the experiences of young women as a new life course trajectory within a framework of changing gender and generational relations we now explore dominant attitudes towards future gender roles. What are women's attitudes regarding choice on marriage partners and how do these contrast with their parents' expectations? What are young women's views on marriage and work? And finally, how does the employment of young women affect their marriage prospects in terms of male views on female employment? Before addressing these questions, an important factor needs to be reiterated; namely the universality of marriage in Jordanian society and its inevitability for the young single women in the current sample survey.

6.6.1 Parents and Daughters Attitudes Towards Marriage

Traditionally, parents prefer to arrange their children's marriages whether for sons or daughters. Most parents prefer to marry their daughters to relatives or at least someone from the same community (see earlier). In fact, a large majority of parents in the sample survey were themselves cousins. This however, is no longer desirable for young women. Young women want to marry non-relatives so that they will have new lives outside of their communities which they often perceive as less constraining.[27]

In addition, a substantial number of young women want to marry men they have met independently, usually at work or at university (see also Shaefer Davies, 1993 on Morocco). Such situations raise the suspicions of family members and are usually met with rejection. This is because young men and women are not supposed to get to know each other outside of the family domain.[28] Besides, the fact that a young man is willing to act independently of his parents tends to reflect negatively on his disposition. Finally, an independent suitor could be seen as an insult to male family members. As one father who will only consider suitors who are relatives explained:

> My daughter is not cheap! I will not just give her away to anyone.

However, this is causing increasing conflict in households, as the following exemplifies:

> My colleague at work wants to marry me. His father is dead and he does not have many male relatives. He came and visited my father and brothers four times. On two occasions his mother came and brought us gifts. Until now my father has rejected his demand. Lately, even my uncles interfered and confirmed to my father that in our family, no girl is given away to strangers. Meanwhile, I have been refusing the suitors from my family. As a result I have embarrassed my father with the rest of the family as he has to give reasons for my refusal. Young people today should know each other. Unlike our parents who had no choice and had their marriages arranged at a young age, we get married to be happy.

The real problem here is that this young man came from a small family that is unknown to the young woman's family. Although the latter's family is by no means wealthy or powerful they have a large network of relatives and it is expected that she should marry from within the larger kin group. Her obstinacy is problematic for her father as it endangers his relations with his kin group. It is also a source of public embarrassment for him because it reflects his lack of authority over his daughter.

Generational differences mean that parents' and daughters' attitudes towards marriage have developed in divergent ways. Generally, daughters want to be able to choose their partners and they idealise the notion of love within marriage (see also Shaefer Davies ,1993:211 on Morocco; Manasra, 1993:14 on Palestine; Zuhur, 1992:93 on Egypt). This contrasts with parents' attitudes where marriages are arranged and security and reputation rather than love is important.

For parents, the universality of marriage, makes any dependence on daughters' wages from work dispensable among low income families. Daughters' income, although in many cases important to household economy, is rarely fully depended on for survival (see Chapter Five). The households where parents objected to daughters marriage in order to retain their income were minimal in number.[29] These included two destitute families. One of those was a family where both parents were deceased and the five siblings lived with an ailing grandmother. At the time of the interview, the eldest daughter was the only one gainfully employed. This woman claimed that her brothers and uncles refused the marriage proposals of one of her colleagues at work. The young woman quoted her grandmother as saying:

> You'd better stay home and take care of us.

The other case was of a family where the father has taken a second wife and abandoned them. The family consisted of two sisters in their twenties and four other younger siblings. Family survival was dependent on the limited income of both the young women. The mother confessed that one of her daughters was previously engaged and that she encouraged her to leave her fiancé since she was in desperate need of her income. The rationale that the mother gave was that since their family circumstances are shameful (i.e. poverty and husband's desertion) any, future husband of her daughters is likely to mistreat them since they have 'no one to protect them.' She, therefore, wants them to retain their dignity by not getting married.

6.6.2 Young Women's Views on Work and Marriage

The restructuring of gender relations in Amman today have resulted in ill-defined attitudes to work after marriage among the young women interviewed. At one level, workforce participation appears to positively affect young women's attitudes towards work after marriage. More employed and unemployed women agree with the concept of work after marriage than women who are inactive (see Figure 6.1). At another level, however, when attitudes of work after having children is approached, the differences between economically active and inactive women substantially narrows (see Figure 6.2). In other words, when the issue is pressed further and the presence of children is posed, women's perceived 'natural' roles as mothers takes precedence.

So, in assessing young women's attitudes towards work and marriage the distinction that must be made is between a working wife and a working mother. A number of working women stated that ideally they would like to continue with their work until their first child. Even those who thought that women should not withdraw from the workforce as a result of motherhood would qualify themselves:

> As long as a woman fulfills her duties as mother and wife she should be able to continue with work.

It is apparent, therefore, that the redistribution of gender divisions of labour within households, as a result of female employment, is not in question for the young women. What is in question is women's ensuing dual roles. In addition, behind all this is the persistence of the male breadwinner ideology. According to most women respondents employment after marriage is largely dependent on their husband's consent. There is a general belief that if a husband provides his wife with her needs then it is his right to keep her at home (see also Hoodfar, 1988 on Egypt).

Figure 6.1 Do You Agree With Work After Marriage?



Source: Household Survey

Figure 6.2 Do You Agree With Work After Marriage for Women With Children?



Source: Household Survey

The women who claim that marriage and work 'depends on circumstances' (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2) feel that it is family financial needs that should determine married women's work (see also Nawar et al. 1995:157-8 on Egypt). For example, young women thought that a mothers' employment is legitimate when it is 'for her family' or 'to help her husband.' Moreover, actually needing to work was not the ideal situation for many women. As one working woman stated:

> I work hard now and I am usually tired. May God send me a husband that is able to support a family.

This leads to a the related issue of attitudes towards women's incomes. The general attitude from above is that work does not involve a redistribution of gender roles and/or relations within households and married women's employment is only legitimate within the context of family need. However, when women were asked whether women with an independent income have more status and personal power within their households, a majority answered in the affirmative (see Figure 6.3). Working and unemployed women again were more sure about this positive relationship than the inactive women. Many young women had ready examples from their lives' experiences to substantiate this positive relation. One young woman recounted her neighbours' example:

> It is obvious that a married woman with their own income will have a more equal relation with her husband. Our

> neighbour had an abusive husband. We all knew how badly he treated her. Then she started her own little sewing business at home and became successful. Now he is a different man. He respects her and consults with her on everything.

Perhaps most women thought that women's income is imperative for more equal relations between spouses and empowerment. Most of them however, still regard their interests to be bound by male protection which is necessary for future security and this includes continuous deference to male authority. One of the consequences of the importance of male protection, however, is that the women themselves are likely to undermine the significance of their income earning or drop employment altogether in order to maintain practical as well as emotional security derived from male consent. Therefore, a distinction should be made between young women's independent thinking and actual behaviour vis-à-vis marriage and income. To capture this difference the young women were asked the hypothetical question of if they had an ideal job with a good income would they agree to marry someone who would not allow them to work.[30]

Figure 6.3 Do you believe that married women with their own income have more status and power in their households?



Source: Household Survey

Figure 6.4 Would you agree to marry someone who's pre-condition is that you stop working?



Source: Household Survey

Surprisingly, the majority of young women would agree to such conditions (see Figure 6.4). Young women generally consider it as part of a husband's role to be able to provide for their families. Therefore, as outlined above, the work of married women is primarily to help the family and their earnings can thus only be supplementary to family survival. Of course more inactive women would agree to such preconditions than active women. After all the inactive women are not working and are unlikely to ever work. However, the active women who by and large perceive the need for an independent income would assent to a situation where they will be denied the access to this income. What is involved here is a difference between what young women believe and what they will do given the limited life options available. This study has thus far portrayed what it means to be a young unmarried woman in Amman today. So it is not too illogical for young women to forsake their income earning capacity for the socially acceptable role of economically dependent wife and full-time mother. Young women's life experiences that have exposed them to different ideas, and perhaps empowered them in some respects, have also resulted in new and problematic dilemmas, mainly their existence as single adults in an overwhelmingly married society. Therefore, young women may realise the importance of female economic autonomy but at the same time they feel a need to ascribe to 'traditional' gender roles.

6.6.3 Young Men's Views on Women's Work and Marriage

In addition to the above, it is also important to explore young men's views on working women. How does employment affect young women's chances of marriage? Do young men prefer to marry a working or a non-working women? The investigation of male attitudes was not one of the objectives of this study especially as the presence of young males during the household interviews was limited (see Chapter One). Thus, male views are largely derived here from the young women and/or their mothers.[31] It has to be borne in mind, therefore, that the following discussion is filtered through women's (young and old), perceptions of male views.

It has been usually assumed that Arab men prefer to marry younger uneducated wives in order to ensure their chastity and obedience. It is also usually assumed that Arab mothers-in-law prefer young and 'naïve' daughters-in-law for their sons who will be in subordinate positions from themselves (see earlier). Both are not the case in Amman today. Young men do not prefer young and naïve girls and the centrality of mother-in-law's domination over young brides is diminishing especially with the decline of the extended family household (see Chapter Five).

According to female respondents, both young men and their families are more likely to prefer to marry educated girls. In fact, some young men do not seem to mind if their future wife is more educated than themselves. As far as employment is concerned few young men seem to believe that female employment before marriage reduces female virtue. Young men's views on women's work after marriage, on the other hand, seem to be influenced by the ideology of the male protector and breadwinner both of which harbour women's dependence. However, it was particularly hard to decipher what the young men exactly thought or what is expected from young women who are about to get married. The fact that young men were portrayed as largely unperturbed by young women's working experience before marriage casts doubt on their actual personal opposition to employment after marriage.

Generally, young men's views can be more specifically summed up according to the type of employment a young woman holds. If a young woman has a prestigious and secure job such as government or banking employment or is a skilled professional, it is likely that the young man considers this an asset and allow her to continue with her work after marriage. In fact, young women respondents claim that young men actually want to marry women with such secure jobs since these days it is difficult for young families to live on a single wage. So, young men with ambitions for upward mobility will seek working women only, but since some jobs are socially unacceptable and/or not prestigious for married women, it is those with good positions who end up receiving the marriage suitors. This is largely resented by the single women. The anxiety of one particular woman who is employed in a government ministry illustrates this:

> My cousin asked me about my colleague who is also a close friend. He first asked about how much she earned, and only afterwards asked whether I can introduce him to her. I was disgusted that this is his criterion for choosing a wife. Now I do not know what is the right thing to do. I do not want to stand in my friend's way of marriage prospects, but then again, he seems to be only interested in her government salary and pension.

As for the young women who do not have prestigious employment, such as factory workers, for example, it is taken for granted by everyone around them, including themselves, that they will leave their jobs upon marriage. For the young men, besides the low prestige, there are low economic returns from such employment since wages and benefits are limited. What is interesting is that women in such low level employment are themselves willing, if not eager, to leave their jobs. In one particular family, for example, a woman respondent humorously recounted how her sister who is now married, had hastily left her job in a toy factory as soon as she realised that a young man was interested in her and long before she got officially engaged. So it is difficult to locate, as far as low level jobs are concerned, who decides on the future employment status of women.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has focused on the changes occurring within gender and generation hierarchies in Amman as a result of prolonged marriage age and increasing levels of education and employment among young women. It illustrated how this can be described as a new life course trajectory of single employed adulthood and how patriarchal relations, as a result, are being reconstructed.

The reconstruction of patriarchal relations tend to arise from cross-currents occurring between patriarchy's intra-household relations and extra-domestic levels. At the household level there seems to be increased flexibility in terms of female education, employment, and in some cases, an expansion of status and more choice in marriage. As for the extra-domestic level, which involves patriarchy's public image, young women's potential independence and possible deviance from social norms is posing threatening. Therefore, gestures that at least symbolise control over female kin have become a main focus. These gestures involve notions of appropriate employment for young women and heightened emphasis on their behaviour and public image.

Therefore, despite this new life course stage young women are facing limitations which in some ways are influencing their access to employment opportunities. The impact of this is also visible in the workplace, where some employers, in order to appease male family members and gain access to female labour, adjust their working conditions in order to dovetail more clearly with familial approval. Furthermore, in order to ensure access to young female labour and deflect doubts on their own positions, employers usually replicate familial hierarchical relations in the workplace.

Further, from the perspectives of the young women, this life course trajectory may have expanded their aspirational horizons but it has not altered gender divisions in the home or in society at large. Low paid women performing gendered jobs do not really achieve much job satisfaction or self fulfillment. Professional women, on the other hand, find their job satisfaction filtered through gender ideologies where ambition itself is a masculinised trait and where abidance by the gender hierarchy at the workplace remains necessary to appease male colleagues.

In terms of impact of working women's income earning on their roles within their households as well as on their personal autonomy, it can be said that their new life course trajectory has resulted in two contrasting situations: one, exposure to new ideas and ways of thinking, but to counter this, limited freedom to actualise their aspirations. Therefore, the attitudes of the young women towards their future roles reveals that although they possess independent views, they continue to define their future roles within the context of the ascribed gender roles of marriage and motherhood. In other words, changes in gender relations have resulted in stark discrepancies between young women's beliefs and behaviour. Finally, the reconstruction of patriarchy in Amman has not reorganised gender roles or power relations in any significant ways, but simply expanded and restructured young women's lives in comparison to their older counterparts.

Notes to Chapter Six

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[1] Due to the limited references on the life course stages of Jordanian women, this section draws on references from the Middle Eastern region in general.

[2] This however, does not mean that families desire sons only. Families are keen to have at least one daughter to help them with household chores, child rearing and keep their mothers' company (Taminian, 1990:3; see also Hoodfar, 1988).

[3] At the time of the interview this particular young women was unemployed and largely confined to her home. The leniency provided to her during her college years where she could justify her absence from home and therefore practice and perform in a musical band was over. When her father eventually found out that she had performed in the college music group, he beat her and her mother who tired to protect her.

[4] The extent to which women in the sample survey managed to engage in such relationships however, was difficult to assess since they were unlikely to report about behaviour that is considered deviant to social norms.

[5] One important point to be made here is that traditionally, brother-sister relationships has been important within Jordanian families. Brothers continue to be women's foremost protectors throughout their life courses. After marriage, and in the absence of parents, when a woman has problems with a husband or in-laws it is the brothers who will negotiate on her behalf. In addition, divorced, abandoned or battered women usually have recourse to their brothers homes. For more on brother-sister relationships see Joseph (1994b).

[6] Indeed these familial gender relations are even embedded in everyday language. Men always refer to women as 'daughters' or 'sisters' or in the cases of older women 'aunts'. Women likewise refer to men as 'brothers' or 'uncles.' This is not confined to the workplace but to society at large that translates gender relations into familial relations.

[7] In describing the changing attitudes towards female education among a Bedouin community in Egypt, Lila Abu Lughod (1993:220) aptly describes the situation which is similar to Amman. One of Abu Lughod's informants explains to her: 'for example, my father sees Aisha's father, who has educated all his daughters, so my father looks at him and says: why should he educate his daughters and not me? I have to educate my daughters.' In other words, what happened in terms of female education in both Egypt and Jordan is that people began competing over the education of girls as it has evolved to reflect prestige.

[8] Writing on Taiwan, Greenhalgh (1988) suggests that investment in daughters' education among lower income families increases daughters obligations to them and therefore increases family resources. Among wealthy families daughters education is a 'status investment' where daughters will get better husbands and this reflects on the status of the parents. In the case of Jordan , parents rarely expect to be repaid materially from daughters education but the investment of status whether among poorer of wealthier families is applicable.

[9] One such example is the area of Hai Nazzal which has high rates of female employment in clothing and food production enterprises. Most workshops were literally down the hill from this area. In the mornings and afternoons it is possible to see groups of young women walking to and from work together.

[10] Very few establishments in Jordan have a two-day weekend.

[11] Instead young women go to public places on special occasions only, most commonly on pay day or on a female colleague's birthday. In other words, public spaces are accessible for women but not on the same terms as for men.

[12] One incident that demonstrates this is during an interview with an employer who called one of his sales women to illustrate how attractive she was and that someone like her should be married immediately as she is a temptation to all the male workers and customers. The young woman was, of course, uncomfortable, but when later on she was asked whether she was aware of any 'moral harassment' in her job, she said no and even described her employer as a 'fair person'.

[13] This form of blaming-the-victim has been a prevalent argument in the West surrounding rape That is a woman invites the rapist by dressing provocatively or walking alone in deserted places. So, likewise, in Amman it is thought that a woman at work can invite sexual harassment by her behaviour and dress.

[14] Naila Kabeer (1995:176-178) in describing manufacturing industries in Bangladesh describes this as the 'desexualisation' of workplace communities. She states that men and women seek to de-emphasise the sexual connotations of their proximity and thus defuse the threat to their reputation.

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[15] The Jordanian criminal law is based on the French law that included clauses on 'crimes of passion.' These are supposed to be based on irrational and temporary insanity and thus treated with leniency by the law. Those who commit such crimes get 6 months to 2 year jail terms. The French have long since canceled this but it still exists in many Arab countries who adopted the French Law.

[16] For Jordan which has low crime rates this also amounts to 31% of all reported murders in the country in the past decade (see Husseini, 1994).

[17] Indeed, there are different types of veiling as there are different types of Islam. The origins of the veil in religious doctrine comes from the Quran that advocates covering the hair and shoulders and upper arms. This was in a form of advice given to the wives of the prophet Mohammed who, due to their social standing, were permanently in the public eye. The implications for all women are unclear, however, and have been interpreted in a variety of ways (Macleod, 1992:538-539).

[18] It is important to clarify that this represents a new image of Islamic women which should not be confused with traditional forms of dress worn by older women (see also Zuhur, 1992:7 on Egypt).

[19] Adopting the religion of Islam is irreversible. If a Muslim were to change his/her religion he/she would be condemned to death.

[20] The respondents were asked to list three most suitable professions for women. Non were named and they were free to mention any job. See questions 55 and 56 in the household questionnaire survey in Appendix Two.

[21] This was one of the few questions in the household questionnaire survey with no significant variation between the three groups of women interviewed. The frequencies were 42% for employed women, 44% for unemployed women, and 46% for inactive women.

[22] There is a term in everyday Arabic language that describes such a woman as *mistarjileh.* This has the double meaning of she is like a man or she would rather be a man.

[23] A study based on Palestinian society, in which the current section draws from, also reveals that freedom of movement means different things for different generations. The majority of young women in the sample reported that they generally feel socially and physically restrained. The older women, on the other hand, perceived activities such as visiting a neighbour as a measure of social freedom (see FAFO, 1993:301-5).

[24] Studies that address the impact of employment on women's lives have paid limited attention to personal aspirations. Writing on Bolivian households Colin Sage (1993:243) states: 'Feminists regarded the household as a site of subordination and domination and warned against characterising the household with reference to sharing and pooling. More recently other critical approaches have recognised the importance of connecting internal structures with social relations and commodity relations. Yet despite a greater sensitivity to changing gender and other divisions of labour based on age and marital status within the household, attention to individual activities and aspirations frequently remain subsumed to a pre-occupation with the characteristics of the collective unit.'

[25] Two years after this statement, in 1996, this young woman has begun to take driving lessons. Being unemployed, however, makes it unlikely that she will be able to buy a car.

[26] Within this context, it is relevant to mention here a project that is currently being implemented by CARE International in Zarqa, a city that is 30 km from Amman, called Social and Economic Self Sufficiency for Disadvantaged Youth. This is a pioneering project that targeted young unemployed women and saw it necessary to aim at increasing young women's social confidence and expression before focusing on their economic empowerment. One of the activities was allowing the participants to write, direct and perform a play. The play which was performed in an Islamic centre for an all female audience was based on the women's actual experiences and tackled the following issues: brother's dominance, lack of choice in education, forced marriages, domestic violence, loneliness and lack of communication between parents and daughters.

[27] This applies to young men as well. It is appropriate to mention here that some parents blame their daughters' delayed age at marriage on male cousins who are choosing to marry women outside the family. It is considered easier to 'take' a wife who is not a relative for a son, than to 'give' a daughter to a non-relative. In fact, a substantial amount of discord between relatives can be based on decreasing alliance that was previously achieved through children's marriages.

[28] Despite the strict social rules that limit male-female contact, therefore, young people do manage to meet and develop relationships that might, in some cases, lead to marriage. These meetings however, are usually clandestine, especially on part of the young women. For more on male-female relations prior to marriage see Shaefer Davies (1993) who writes on the rural Moroccan context.

[29] Diane Wolf (1990a) writing on working daughters in Java and Taiwan found that in Java, similar to the situation in Jordan, daughters' input to family economy does not affect their marriage

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prospects (see also Scott and Tilly, 1980 on 19th century Europe). In Taiwan, on the other hand, daughters later age at marriage is encouraged in order to prolong the economic benefits from their wages.

[30] Of course, a hypothetical question is likely to yield a hypothetical answer. However, the above is not in any way supposed to provide statistical relevance, merely an illustration of the differences between young women's views and actual behaviour.

[31] A number of young women got engaged between the two month period that separated the quantitative household questionnaire survey and the in-depth interviews. It was in such circumstances, that male views on marriage and work were extensively discussed (i.e. fiancé's views).

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

The present and final chapter focuses on the broad findings of the study and evaluates them in light of the original research questions and existing theoretical perspectives. Given the limited amount of current research that frames women's employment within life course changes in developing countries, the chapter goes on to outline suggestions for future research and other areas of inquiry. Finally, it assesses the implications of the study for policy formulation.

7.1 Cross-Currents Between Employment, Gender and Generation: Critical Findings of the Research

One of the main objectives of this research was to identify changing patterns of female employment in Jordan through focusing on young, single, urban women. The study attempted to show that unlike previous generations, young women today marry at a later age, have relatively high education levels and have access to expanding employment opportunities. Given that Jordanian society has traditionally been based on rigid gender and generation hierarchies with women's roles and identities restricted to being children, adolescents and then dependent wives and mothers, rising labour force participation has brought with it a new life course stage in Jordanian women's lives: single employed adulthood. With this in mind, the study proceeded to explore whether this is leading to changes in normative gender and generation hierarchies in the workplace and at household levels.

At the workplace level, analysis revealed an increased demand for female labour, most of which is a result of changing occupational structures and technological shifts, especially in the manufacturing industry. Employers' stereotypes and perceptions regarding women means that they are viewed as temporary workers and are thus placed in jobs with limited scope for upward mobility. In this context, employers have clear preferences for young unmarried females who are perceived to have fewer household and child care responsibilities than older women. At the same time, assumptions about women's possession of domestic skills and associated attributes (patience, dexterity, nurturing qualities etc.), mean that most young women remain within the bounds of occupations that are labeled as 'female' occupations (i.e. teachers, secretaries, seamstresses and assembly line workers). However, gender desegregation appears to be evident in a minority of firms. This includes modern and technical occupations (i.e. medical and computer related fields). Employers concerns in such firms are skill and proficiency and some young women's high education levels make them appropriate candidates. Labour market segregation in Amman is therefore developing into two divergent paths. One that is becoming less segregated and which employs a minority of technically skilled female workers, and, a second, which remains highly segregated and includes the majority of women workers.

Within these two emerging paths, the analysis attempted to assess how the wider societal custom of sexual segregation intersects with the increasing demand for female labour, bearing in mind that women's participation in some occupations is a relatively recent phenomenon. This reveals that there is a split in the ideological construction of Jordanian employers, although this is rarely in contradiction with their interests. Manufacturing employers, for example, tend to promote sex segregated workspaces for two main reasons: first because of the assumption that this increases work efficiency, and second, because female workers are expected to come from home environments which advocate sex segregation, and therefore, it is a means of attracting female labour. In terms of commercial enterprises, spatial segregation is limited, first because it is inefficient and second because some employers want to promote a modernised image of their firms with male-female interaction being part of this. Part of this image-building also includes promoting women to managerial positions in some cases. Third, female employees in such firms tend to be professional or administrative workers and are unlikely to face family restriction in interacting with men. In conclusion, spatial and occupational segregation, in the Jordanian context, are closely intertwined.

At the household level, the analysis found that compared with other family members, young single women have higher education levels. Indeed, some may be becoming more qualified than their brothers with a substantial number in professional and technical occupations. However, compared with male family members, their earnings tend to be less, regardless of occupation type. In addition, household factors often cited as significant in influencing female labour supply in other cultural contexts, such as extended household forms (see Chant, 1991a; Safa, 1995) and lower household income (see Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Stichter, 1990) are not as significant in the present context. The reasons for this may well owe in part to the fact that the study concentrated on a younger group of women compared to other studies.

In searching for the reasons behind young women's increasing work force participation it is necessary to consider both young women's personal rationalisations and household level influences. While it is useful to look at these separately, the analysis has shown clearly that personal and household needs and/or interests often overlap. In terms of personal rationalisations, however, some young women who are educated feel the need to utilise their skills, some are adamant on some form of economic independence and/or future savings, although this is not always possible, and finally, some feel the need to break the monotony of their daily lives and establish wider social networks through work. In terms of household level influences, it appears that older male family members encourage female education, as it is evolving to represent prestige and better marriage options for daughters. One of the inadvertent results of this, however, has been concessions in allowing daughters to seek employment after obtaining education. This increased flexibility appears to be linked to the fact that working daughters are perceived as unlikely to challenge existing hierarchical relations, but instead to abide by existing power relations and continue to defer to their male elders. In other words, work is not expected to empower them. Finally, in some families, young women's wages are regarded as an opportunity to expand family income.

Moving on to the consequences of young women's work, in respect to young women's personal gains and the impacts on their households, again there are a multiplicity of interactions which can often result in contradictions. In terms of the impacts on young women, for example, in a number of cases, there is expansion of daughters' status and household roles plus more choice in marriage. It is also evident that some young women have developed, as a result of work and changing interactional patterns, new self images which might lead in some cases to a form of 'self differentiation.'[1] The contradiction here lies in the fact that these young women feel the strong pull of family loyalties. As such, gender role conditioning, family expectations, the various forms of limitations they experience as a result of power relations, makes their predicament, in terms of self actualisation, a difficult one.

In terms of the impacts on the household, there is little doubt that daughters wages are valuable given the much greater likelihood that their wages will be appropriated for household use than those of their brothers. Although many sons do contribute to family maintenance, they are given much greater leeway both to choose their employment (and thereby maximising earnings), and to retain their income. The reasons behind this gender differential are firstly, that sons' are parent's future security, so a favour in youth is likely to be reciprocated in later life. A second reason is that men's primary role in households mean that they need to save for their future marriages. A third factor is that sons have greater social freedom and need money for expenditure on recreational activities, whereas daughters, with their limited social lives, do not.

In terms of ideological impacts, at the household level, one might expect some diminution of patriarchal relations as a result of women's employment. Women's waged work, however, is perceived by some males, who no longer can sufficiently provide for their families, as a loss of their position and power as family heads. In turn this poses a threat to both their identities and their self esteem (see also Safilios-Rothchild, 1990). In addition, the social standing of male kin, which revolves around the preservation of family reputation/honour, is clearly challenged by women's potential independence and possible deviance from social norms. Therefore, gestures that at least symbolise control over female kin have become a major pre-occupation among fathers and brothers. These gestures mainly involve a devaluation of the female wage as well as heightened emphasis on young women's appropriate social behaviour. Therefore, young women in some ways face increased social pressure, and are rarely allowed to enter into what may be deemed 'inappropriate' employment.

However, between the cross-currents of young women's personal aspirations and attempts at the household level to re-assert social control, are some measures, not only of conflict but also, re-negotiation of patriarchal relations. These often reveal that there are considerably different social arrangements that can emerge from household level tensions. Indeed, young women's work has placed some of them in a position where they can participate and negotiate the circumstances that makes their new realities acceptable with the context of normative gendered behaviour and expectations. Examples of this are veiling or finding employment close to home and/or with colleagues/employers from the same community. Although the re-negotiation of power is problematic, one can claim, however, that the seeds for 'self differentiation' were present among some of the women interviewed in this study.

In some ways these re-negotiations of gender and generation hierarchies in Amman are themselves signals that at a personal, relational and societal levels change is obvious enough to cause concern, not to mention havoc, in relations within some families. This also indicates that this new generation of working women will face more pressures with each step that they take forward in the future. In the long-term, however, once these hierarchical boundaries have been re-negotiated at the parental level, they may facilitate a re-negotiation at the spousal level, once these young women are married.

Finally, perhaps one of the more important conclusions is the extent to which the relationship between women's employment and the increased social and economic autonomy of women is a complex one and how the greatest changes for women workers are more likely to occur within the home, rather than at the workplace or through political change (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995:301; Moore, 1988:111). The centrality of the family in the elaboration and enforcement of male and female behaviour here cannot be overestimated (Tucker, 1993: xv) (see below).

7.2 Intersecting Gender, Employment and the Life Course: Theoretical Implications

As pointed out in Chapter Two, most existing labour market theories have limited utility in that they do not sufficiently explain gender inequality in the workplace, let alone the impact of the life course. Having said this, however, some notions in particular theories were helpful. For example, although labour market segmentation theories largely ignore the gender and age dimensions that affect labour recruitment, placement and promotions, yet, it is possible to integrate gender and age in certain offshoots of the segmentation theories. The dual labour market theories identify the primary, male dominated, sectors and the secondary, female concentrated and less advantageous, sectors (Scott, 1991; Walby, 1988). Even though these do not fully account for the reasons why women and young people are relegated to the secondary sectors, it nevertheless, provides a broad framework for analysing gender and age segmentation in Amman. In addition, radical labour market segmentation theories explain how the co-existence of privileged and disadvantaged sectors serve to reduce worker solidarity and class consciousness which in turn keeps wages low are also relevant (see Amsden, 1980). However, although this approach can be helpful in revealing how privilege develops and how barriers are constructed between the different hierarchical sectors of the labour market, its neglect of gender and age are less illuminating. Finally, one of the most obvious drawbacks of most conventional labour market theories, is their views of the role of the household in influencing labour supply. They mostly assume, for example, rather than explain gender differentiated roles within households which in turn give rise to different degrees of participation and different rewards from work in the labour market.

Feminist approaches to female employment have taken on board these crucial household-labour market interconnections (see Beechey, 1987; Moore, 1988). In addition, empirical research illustrating the embeddedness of gender in all social relations at both the labour market and the family have been recently emerging (see Chant, 1991a, Chant and McIlwaine, 1995; McIlwaine, 1993; Hanson and Pratt, 1994). These studies reveal that gender not only affects employment patterns but that it is part and parcel of productive and reproductive relations in much wider ways (Stichter, 1990, Scott, 1994). However, despite increasing acknowledgment of the linkages between female employment and the household, these have not adequately addressed the life course. The value of the present study therefore lies in demonstrating that life course trajectories are critically important for understanding female employment. The present study reveals how women in a specific age cohort (20-30 years) have a different relationship to both the labour market and the household than women in other age cohorts. As a result of historical, economic and social change, age positions these young women in a specific context vis-à-vis their households, as unmarried and employed youth. Furthermore, this age cohort positions women in a specific relation with the labour market in terms of preferential labour demand. Nevertheless, this must not lead to the idea of young women as a homogeneous group, as they have different circumstances and/or aspirations as well as different household characteristics. Moreover, the age cohort of 20-30 years is large, and could be further desegregated to reveal difference.

The emphasis in the current study on the multiplicity of women's experiences accords closely with recent developments in post-modern debates. Post-modernists search for ways social meanings are constructed and highlight the importance of 'difference.' They reject simplified definitions of social phenomena, which essentialise reality and fail to reveal the complexity of life (Parpart and Marchand, 1996:4). In addition, post-modern feminists recognise the differentiation of the category 'women.' One mode of exploring this differentiation has been attention to the life course, and the ways in which gender and age ideologies affect individual opportunities and structure collective experience (Katz and Monk, 1993:265; Momsen, 1993). One drawback remains that there is a danger of emphasising difference and fragmenting the causal factors that are often at the core of women's inequality (Walby: 1992:48). Indeed, in the present case the idea of causal power factors include employment differentiation as well as hierarchical household relations. Because of this, the analysis has tried to heed Cindi Katz's and Janice Monk's (1993:277) warning that:

> It is important not to get lost in the kaleidoscope of diversity, or sunk in the mire of homogeneity if we are to understand the significant issues at the heart of women's geographies over the life course.

7.3 Differences and Similarities Across Time and Space: Suggestions for Future Research

In looking at changes in the labour force participation of an age cohort of women in a specific historical, geographical and cultural context, the study was able to reveal both similarities and differences in the lives of young women in Amman in terms of the reasons for, and impacts of, their work (see above). The drawback is that it did not reveal how these circumstances shape other women's experiences in other age cohorts. Therefore, because the current study cannot establish the conditions of *all* Jordanian women, we need further research on other age groups and the relations between them. By focusing upon young single women's experiences, we are perhaps missing other important factors influencing female employment, for example, the impact of the retrenchment in public sector employment which has traditionally been a major employer of older, usually married, women.

The second area is longitudinal research of households, women and employment, which involves the collection of life history data across an extended period of time. This would enable us to detect the impact, and ideally, to compare the life course trajectories of other groups of women (e.g. those who are not yet working and older women). Integral to this is the need of a follow-up study of the young women interviewed in the present research in order to assess their future decisions and roles regarding their family lives and employment status.

The third area of relevance is the need for more comparative cross-cultural data on young women workers. Employers' preferences for young female labour, as a result of globalisation and market demand for cheap labour, is well documented in many contexts (see Heyzer, 1986; Salaff, 1981; Standing, 1989; Wolf 1990a, 1992). However, we know less of the impacts this has on their own and their families' lives, one of the main reasons being that these impacts are more difficult to detect and requires, the above mentioned, longitudinal research. However, by building a more comprehensive picture over time and by considering the differences and similarities between young women workers in their cultural and historical contexts it may be possible to assess the significance of young women's employment. This might enable us to better understand how women themselves might influence labour demand, to detect changes in family organisation, and, finally, to identify some common elements in the processes and results of change cross-culturally.

In addition to the above, we should highlight here directions of future research on Middle Eastern women. It is a fact that in no geographical region is the research on women, employment and the household as incomplete. Again, despite some seminal work (see Hijab, 1988; Mernissi, 1975, 1991; Youssef, 1974), there are general tendencies to exclude Middle Eastern women from research that outlines changing global patterns and processes (see Chapter One). Indeed, new research is needed that reveals the greater complexity of the process of women's integration into the economy. As Haleh Afshar (1993:14) states:

> If research is to be linked to the process and progress of development, then it must transcend the barriers. What is needed is more work with working women in the Middle East

On a more specific level, although this study looked at young women's participation at both the workplace and household levels, it did not by any means address every relevant issue. Among the missing, for example, is the role of the state which is crucial in the context of Muslim countries. Although this has received some attention by researchers (see Afshar, 1987a, 1987b, 1992; Kandiyoti, 1991; Moghadam, 1993), more is needed. This is because it is necessary to address how the state regards, and could manipulate, change and consequently whether young women will be able to sustain their gains.

Another area of research, that is beyond the scope of this study but of relevance to the understanding of current socio-economic change in the Middle East, is women's roles in history. This newly emerging area of research, historically establishes Arab women as economic producers and political actors and also questions the normality of the 'traditional Muslim family,' that is usually portrayed as a societal ideal and promoted at policy levels (see Keddie, 1991; Mernissi, 1991; Tucker, 1993). The importance of such research lies in the fact that it corrects pervasive assumptions about the static nature of gender roles in the Middle East, and enables us to better assess the significance of women's roles and how they have been able to negotiate and influence the development of family life in the past (Tucker, 1993:206). In addition, addressing women's employment from a historical perspective, although the validity of data on female workforce participation (including home production) is questionable, would be highly informative in terms of assessing the relative value accorded to women within the economy over time, as well as documenting shifts in what work is acceptable for women over time.[2]

7.4 Towards Equality: Policy Implications

The gap between Jordanian women and men in terms of education and employment seems to be in the process of closing, but equality is still a long way off. Given this fact, it is important to consider policies that might be adopted to enhance women's positions particularly in the spheres that are relevant to the present study. These are education policy, employment generation and the household arena. First, however, it is imperative to review official Jordanian policies towards women and their achievements to date.

Government policy and Achievements in Gender Equality

In recent years, both governmental and non-governmental organisations in Jordan, have increasingly addressed the issue of 'women in development.' Back in 1977, the first Department of Women was established in the Ministry of Labour. Among its duties was the monitoring of the conditions of women workers. Between the late seventies and until the early nineties, the Higher Steering Committee for Women's Affairs was established. This was supposed to devise an integrated approach to women's issues and programmes and to enhance their developmental integration. However, it remained ineffectual as it faced several impediments and was finally dissolved in 1991. In 1992 the National Committee for Women's Affairs was established. This was composed of representatives from both official and private organisations concerned with women's issues. One of the tasks of this committee was the preparation of the first national strategy for women, which was completed in 1993. It was also the coordinating body for Jordan's involvement in the United Nations Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.[3]

Apart from the official/governmental level, there are basically two influential non-governmental organisations (NGOs): the Queen Alia Fund for Social Work, which provides credit extension and income generation projects and training for women, and the Queen Noor Foundation which operates programmes for health, and social development.[4] A third, and smaller NGO, is the Society for Professional and Business Women which provides legal advice for working women and business consultancy for enterprises owned by women.

In light of the above, it is clear that there are government intentions to integrate women within the development process. The drawback, however, is that they remain guided by a 'welfarist' approach.[5] At the NGO level, it is clear that these are not grassroots organisations that represent women's felt needs, but quasi-official NGOs which actually represent government policies towards women (with the exception of the Society of Professional and Business Women). In other words, they do not go beyond stressing the need for literacy, health and sanitary awareness and home production of food and handicrafts as a source of income. So, the disjuncture between governmental committees and semi-official NGOs and the findings of the current study, is that government policies are currently too narrow to address the needs of this emerging generation of young working women. Therefore, rather than fragmenting women through isolated development projects and special governmental committees, a broader framework which integrates the needs of these young women into actual government policies is needed.

Education Policies

This study has shown that education is a significant area of policy achievement as far as young women are concerned. Yet, impacts will be limited as long as they are not really accompanied by other changes at the local level, such as career advice for students, job creation policies or job placement centres and so on. In other words, higher education have not been maintained or reinforced by changes in other relevant arenas. In addition, distinctions should be made between the educational levels per se and the subjects in which young women obtain their educational qualifications, which tend to be concentrated in teaching, for example. This reveals that education itself is not enough to change women's relation to employment because educational systems usually reflect cultural biases and values of society at large. Therefore, it is unlikely that increasing education levels of women will cause radical change in the conservative attitudes towards appropriate female employment (Bourque and Warren 1990: 95).

In addition, the government, caught currently in financial strains, is using public expenditure on educating a youthful labour force who have a high probability of unemployment (of course, this could be a short-term policy measure to reduce unemployment rates). Higher education policies need to be redirected to dovetail more closely with types of occupations that seem to have higher demand in the labour market. This also includes widening the scope of education itself to include an increasing amount of vocational and entrepreneurial training, for example.

Employment Generation

The discussion of education leads to the issue of what should be done to absorb the ever increasing size of the labour force many of whom are university educated and increasingly female? The obvious suggestion on part of policy is employment generation measures. Government policies can shape women's access to wage employment and determine to a great extent the conditions under which women work. Job creation can be achieved through the government providing incentives for private investors and reforming labour legislation so that it responds better to women's needs as well as to employers' (Ibrahim, 1989:1101).

In recent years, it seems that most new working opportunities, especially women's, has been in the industrial sector (see Chapter Three). There are three major problems with this expansion, however. First, this sector is highly segregated with the wage gap between men and women workers at its widest (see Chapter Four). Second, demand in this sector is for unskilled female labour while the majority of young female workers are highly educated. Third, although workers in the formal sector typically enter contractual relationships, the line between formal and informal employment is becoming blurred as some industrial jobs depend on casual labour thus allowing employers to keep wages down and avoid upholding legal entitlements for workers (see Chapter Four). So, what is happening is that women's access to wage employment may be improving but the conditions of women's work in many cases seems to be getting worse (see Moghadam, 1994; Standing, 1989).

Therefore, protective labour laws seem highly pertinent in view of the expansion of industrialisation. The government recognises the unequal relationship between workers and employers which is why there is a range of legal constraints on employers treatment of workers by requiring them to provide a certain minimum level of services and safety measures. One weakness of labour legislation, however, is that there is no minimum wage. The reason behind this is that it might reduce Jordan's competitiveness at the world market level.

The government also recognises the circumstances of women and provides further legislation such as protection from jobs that are seen as dangerous with regards to their presumed physical weakness, or that endanger pregnant women. This also includes a maternity leave and a mandatory crèche at any workplace that hires more than ten mothers. Jordan had also ratified the ILO Equal remuneration convention which relates to the promotion of equal pay for equal work for men and women (Doctor and Khoury, 1991:36). Despite this, however, there is a need for the government to better enforce these existing measures and adopt further policies that could improve women's status in the labour market. Such policies may include better interaction between private employers and government, an improvement of the information available to decision makers about current trends and conditions of employees and perhaps a strengthening of labour organisations that could address women's needs (Ibrahim, 1989).[6]

The Family Arena

A final area for policy relates to the family. This study has demonstrated the extent to which gender ideologies are deeply rooted within households and how this is usually extended into workplace arrangements. In addition to that it has to be mentioned how the Jordanian state regards the family as the central form of moral guidance which also represents coherence within society. This functions at a range of ideological levels. For example, in the speeches of King Hussein of Jordan to the nation, he often addresses: 'our Jordanian family' as a symbol of national unity. Also, it has been previously stated how familial relations are used at the workplace and on the street with people referring to each others as uncles and aunts, when there is an age difference, and sisters and brothers, when there is age similarity. The use of the family as a social foundation is also used in state administration as well, with one example being a use of the 'family card' as an identification for citizens which assumes that every Jordanian individual is part of a male headed household.[7]

Indeed, the family is an ideological fixture in most societies, even if the normative family has little to do and may be at odds with people's actual situations (Moore, 1994:3).[8] Within this context the Jordanian family, in its idealized form, is facing a time of change and tensions because the behaviour of its individuals (primarily daughters) no longer corresponds with the acceptable norms of hierarchical relations and gender segregation. The reason behind this is not that family members are revolting, far from it, it is just that change have occurred in such a manner that these ideals are impossible to fulfill. This is mainly because social and economic change have created situations where the interests and needs of all individuals cannot be easily accommodated within the household/family.

It might be argued therefore, that an important source of change in Jordanian society lies in the attitudes of men who have the upper hand at the household level (see also Chant and McIlwaine, 1995a:301-2 for parallel argument on the Philippines). In this sense, family and gender policies should not only address women but also men, since they need to realise and accept the new positions of women as income earners, and not dependent consumers. However, the extent to which this is possible to implement, in the case of Jordan, is questionable. This is because household level gender and age divisions and power structures are actually reinforced by state policy which promotes a male dominant family form, especially in the field of social benefits.

In light of the above, one starting point for changing gender ideologies may be a re-orientation of state policies towards the rights of individual citizens as opposed to whole families. If the state decreases its emphasis on the family unit, perhaps with time, and at a micro level, current challenges to the ideal shape of the family, will take root and flourish. Therefore, in terms of gender equality and in light of the increasing levels of female employment what is currently needed in the Jordanian context is a symbolic de-linking of 'family ties' which may well lead to a 'de-gendering,' albeit gradual, of women's employment.

Notes to Chapter Seven

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[1] Self differentiation can be described as taking responsibility of one's life, including making decisions about goals, values and life styles amidst pressures to conform to family rules (Stansberry et al, 1992:61). It is self differentiation that often leads to personal authority .

[2] This kind of approach has been already addressed in the relevant area of education. Khattab and El Daeif (1984) document historical change as well as changing attitudes towards female education in Egypt over a 100 year span.

[3] See Alami (1994) for a fuller discussion on the role of the Jordanian state in integrating gender policy.

[4] The Queen Alia Fund was established in 1978 by a special law and Queen Noor Foundation was established in 1985 by a Royal decree (Alami, 1994:34)

[5] The welfare policy approach is linked to the residual model of social welfare (i.e. top-down approach) and is non-challenging to gender norms. According to Caroline Moser (1993:61-2) it is based on three assumptions: (1) women are passive recipients rather than active participants in the development process (2) motherhood is the most important role for women in society and (3) childrearing is their most effective role in the different aspects of development.

[6] It has to be noted however that labour organisations in Jordan are relatively weak and do not constitute a major political force. In addition to that most labour unions have a predominantly male membership.

[7] This card is essential for varying official procedures such as elections, obtaining passports, driving licenses and state benefits (such as food subsidies for the poor) and is discriminatory by nature. For example, women abandoned by their husbands cannot obtain food subsidies or money stipends as the card holder (head of household) is the only one who can claim such benefits. Another example is that women need the approval and often the presence of male heads on their family cards in order to obtain a passport.

[8] Moore (1994:3) goes on to explain how in the United Kingdom, the ideology if the nuclear family is still very powerful, even of the number of individuals resident in such households represents only one quarter of the population.

APPENDIX ONE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

One of the main aims of this dissertation is to explore both the causes and consequences of the increasing labour force participation of young women. In methodological terms this involves a strategy of multiple research techniques including both quantitative and qualitative levels. It also involves different domains of research: the workplace and the household. Since Chapters One, Four and Five have already elaborated on the field surveys in terms of sample selection, size and so on, and since there are other aspects of the field research not mentioned previously, the following matrix provides a synthesis of the different levels of field research, as well as the relations between them.

Research Methods Matrix

Macro level	(1) Analysis of national Survey (1991 Employment, Unemployment and Poverty survey) as well as surveys/censuses of earlier years.
	sub-sample
Micro level	(2) Quantitative household survey (N = 302)
	sub-sample
	(3) Qualitative household interviews (N = 40)
	(4) Employer Survey of private sector firms (N = 36)
Other	(5) Interviews with staff at Ministry of Planning and Labour
	(6) Interviews with staff at Amman Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Industry
	(7) Interviews with staff in community development centres (e.g. Hai Nazzal, Urban Development Department's Wihadat Centre)
	(8) Visits and observations of NGO projects (e.g. Care International youth training project in Zarqa)

The advantages of choosing a mix of research techniques, however, is because both levels of research are mutually reinforcing when used in conjunction of one another. Quantitative techniques (such as representative sampling and descriptive data), provide researchers with significant and important indicators especially with trends overtime. This is deemed especially important in the case of young Jordanian women who were not the focus of any previous research. Qualitative techniques (such as intensive interviewing) are necessary since they document non-quantifiable aspects of women's lives especially the power relations that often control their lives. This allows more room for women's 'voices' (i.e. their own interpretation of gender relations) (Lawson, 1995:450-51; see also Nicholson, 1990). Yet, there are also problems in both of qualitative and quantitative techniques. For example, qualitative techniques run the risk of fragmenting women's lives through localised examples that do not necessarily explain processes or practices (Meis, 1990). In addition, these techniques do not necessarily get us nearer to the 'truth' since this is usually 'constructed' by the researcher (Chant, 1997: Chapter One). Quantitative techniques on the other hand, remain descriptive and homogenise women's experiences (Lawson 1995; Meis, 1990). However, despite these shortcomings and polar differences, the current research is guided by Victoria Lawson's (1995) statement that the statistical measurement of social life in particular case studies that are able to outline the multi-faceted cultural webs that control women's lives coupled with qualitative material is indeed possible and can be insightful .

APPENDIX TWO
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Access to Information and Family Organisation

The household questionnaire survey was conducted by myself and research assistants while the in-depth interviews were mostly by myself. These interviews took place in the afternoons, early evenings and sometimes during weekends, since we wanted to find working women at home. This meant, however, that other adult members were home as well. Although gender segregation was a theme throughout this thesis, most households we interviewed were not segregated once inside. This meant that our access to the young women had to be mediated through this. Ideally, I had wanted to interview young women alone during the quantitative part of the survey. In the qualitative interviews the presence of other family members was important but I also wanted the young women alone in order to discuss personal issues that they might not discuss in the presence of other family members. The end result was that we never controlled the situation and had to be pragmatic. In some households, as soon as we came in and explained the research topic the fathers would take their leave from the room. Brothers, especially in middle class families, were more curious and would stay in the room. They thought that the research which looked at young adults concerned them as well. However, as soon as we got to more personal questions some would politely leave. Mothers sat in on the interviews most of all. This was not curiosity or interference in their daughters' answers as much as a sense of duty to us as guests, since some saw it rude to get up and leave the room.

Who eventually sat during the interviews, or whether other household members were within listening distance, was largely mediated by existing relations/circumstances within each household. Sometimes I felt that as soon as I entered a house and made my interest in the daughter clear this gave some young women a sense of pride vis-à-vis other household members. Since parents and society at large see this life course stage as transitory, and indeed problematic, the fact that young women were the focus of the study was an inadvertent tribute to them. In this sense I was sometimes whisked away by some young women who would use my presence to drive away all other family members who were curious to talk to me and have my undivided attention. Such women would take me to the rooftop or to the furthermost corner of the courtyard or garden and would aggressively shout at any younger sibling who came close. These women thought I wanted to solely talk about *mu'jabin* (admirers) or marriage suitors. However, it has to be noted that this does not mean that they were totally candid, for they were not likely to report to me on behviour and/or action that would be considered socially/morally unacceptable. However, I sometimes sensed that they were trying to safely convey situations that would not incriminate them and, as a result there were often contradictory statements and I knew I was receiving one 'half' of the truth.

At other times however, I felt that my presence could actually reiterate existing forms of mistreatment within families. In one household four aggressive looking brothers did not take well to the fact that I wanted to talk to their sister and not to them. 'You want to talk to her? What for? She's illiterate.' At my insistence, a shy young woman was dragged from her room amidst jokes and bickering and literally pushed to the floor next to my feet. I had actually become an agent for her abuse by her brothers who were adamant on proving that she 'knew nothing.' I did not continue with the interview and took my leave but this was not without a sense of helplessness and guilt.

Rarely did young women refuse to be interviewed. In the few cases that they did I felt it was a form of resistance against their parents, especially fathers. In a couple of cases where fathers were very welcoming they kept calling out for their daughters to come in but who never did. This was a statement that symbolised a challenge to the authority of the father, in order to embarrass him in front of me, a subject discussed in Chapter Six.

Analysis of Quantitative Data

The household questionnaires which were mostly coded prior to the survey were entered onto a data base designed by myself, with some professional help, after the survey was conducted. This is because there were several open-ended questions in the questionnaire and we had to finish the survey in order for such questions to be grouped according to frequency of answers and thereafter coded. During this process it transpired that there were quite a few 'missing values' in the questionnaires. For this in some cases I had to revisit households in order to complete the missing information, but in others incomplete questionnaires were dropped from the sample. Frequencies, cross-tabulations, and means were used on the data with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Further statistical tests (e.g. correlation and multiple regression) were also attempted but revealed either to be statistically insignificant or not more revealing than basic cross-tabulations (see footnotes 21, 22, and 28 in Chapter Five).

Analysis of Qualitative Data

These interviews were conducted after the quantitative survey and the inputing of coded responses onto computer forms (approximately two months separated both levels of research). These interviews would largely follow topics of discussion and could take up to two hours and in some cases more than one visit. However, I found early on that taping or taking detailed notes during the interviews made the young women and their families uncomfortable and self conscious about their responses. Therefore, I used to take the quantitative, previously filled, questionnaire to the specific household I was revisiting, where also the young woman would have the liberty to look at her previous answers, and only write highlights on the margins and sometimes write down a quote (after asking the young woman's permission), but generally relying on mental notes and observations throughout the interview. This meant that immediately after each interview, I transcribed everything in full on paper. Most of the material of the semi-structured data was used as illustrative case study material and therefore integrated into the analysis more or less as reported from the respondent.

Household Questionnaire
(translation from Arabic)

(All questions addressed to women working, seeking employment or inactive between the ages of 20- 30 years unmarried and living in Amman)

NEIGHBOURHOOD..

FAMILY NUMBER..

NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN FAMILY...

DATE OF INTERVIEW...

INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY...

RESPONDENT'S NAME...

ADDRESS..

Section One: Data on Family

A. General Family Information

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial no.	Name	Relation to head of household	Sex	Age	Level of education	Marital status	Relation to labour force
		1. husband/wife 2. son/daughter 3. mother/father 4.grandchildren 5. sister/brother 6. grandparents 7. other	1. male 2. female		1. illiterate 2. read/ write 3. primary 4. preparat. 5. technical 6. second. 7. diploma 8.higher ed.	1. single 2. married 3. divorced 4. widowed	1. work in gov. 2. private sector 3. NGO 4.unemp/seek 5.unemp/not s. 6. retired/seek 7. retired/not s. 8. older/n. work 9. own income 10. housewife 11. do not wish 12. student 13. other
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							
13							
14							
15							

B. Working Members

	8	9	10	11
Serial no.	Main econ. activity	Main occupation	Employment status	Monthly income from main occup.
	1. agriculture 2. mining 3. elect. water 4. construction 5. transport. comm. 6.finance, insurance 7. community ser. and gov.	1. technical and prof. 2. administration 3. clerical 4. sales 5. agriculture 6. production	1. employee 2. employer 3. self emp. 4.unpaid family worker 5. unpaid/ trainee 6. other	
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				

C. Unemployed Members

	12	13	14
	Prev. econ. activity	Previous occupation	Prev. emp. status
	1. agriculture 2. mining 3. elect. water 4. construction 5. transport. com. 6. finance, insurance 7. community ser. and gov.	1. technical and prof. 2. administration 3. clerical 4. sales 5. agriculture 6. production	1. employee 2. employer 3. self emp. 4.unpaid family worker 5. unpaid/ trainee 6. other
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			

Section Two: Data on Single Women

A. Single Women Currently Working

15. If previously employed, how many jobs have you had?

16. What was the main reason for leaving previous job?

1. work place was not segregated by sex (prefer single sex environment)
2. objection of family
3. termination of project
4. location of work place too far from residence
5. wages too low
6. long working hours
7. other. specify
8. not applicable

17. Give two reasons for your main desire to work

1. because I am the main income earner in the family
2. head of household is unemployed
3. to increase family income
4. to support myself
5. it was my parents decision that I work
6. in order to benefit from my education and put it to use
7. in order to fill free time
8. in order to improve/increase social status
9. for personal fulfillment and building self esteem and confidence
10. in order to be financially independent
11. in order to make friends and have a social life
12. other. Specify

First Reason:

Second Reason:

18. Give date of starting current job (in months):

19. Give hours of work (weekly):

20. How did you obtain current job?

1. through family
2. through friends
3. on my own
4. other. Specify

21. Are there any drawbacks/problems in your current work?

1. job below educational qualifications
2. pay not satisfactory
3. work is too boring
4. ill treatment by the superiors and employers
5. sexual harassment
6. job too tough and tiring
7. discrimination in relation to men (go to q.22)
8. no drawbacks or problems
9. other. Specify

22. (if 21=7) What kind of discrimination do you face?
1. in training opportunities
2. in incentives given to women
3. in promotions
4. in pay
5. other. Specify

23. Are you happy/content in your current job?
1. yes
2. no

24. Are you looking for better work opportunities or different working conditions?
1. part time
2. productive work at home
3. single sex work environment
4. within neighbourhood
5. not looking for different conditions
6. other. Specify

25. How do you mainly spend your income?
1. contributing to household income
2. personal expenditure
3. saving
4. saving and personal expenditure
5. other. Specify

26. How much do you contribute to household income?
1. all income
2. half
3. less than half
4. inconsistent (varies from one month to the next)
5. rarely
6. no contribution at all

27. How is this contribution to family income spent?
1. on rent and amenities
2. siblings education
3. food
4. clothes
5. differs according to need
6. other, specify

28. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you most?
1. yes
2. No

29. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on your own?
1. finding work
2. leaving/changing work

3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education
5. siblings marriage
6. Selling and buying of family or personal assets
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other. specify

First:
Second:
Third:

30. Can you go to the following places on your own?
(I cannot =1, I can with others =2, I can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel

31. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress (*jilbab*)
2. head scarf and modern clothes
3. modern clothing

32. Do you perform any domestic work?
1. daily
2. sometimes
3. non

B. Unemployed Single Women

33. If previously employed, how many jobs have you had?

34. What are the main reasons preventing you from working?
1. lack of job opportunities
2. wages are too low
3. termination of project (cases of short term employment or bankruptcy)
4. laid- off
5. parents' objection
6. most work places are mixed (prefers to be in a single sex environment)
7. most work places are too far
8. Working hours too long
9. other. Specify

35. How much did you earn in your previous job?

36. How long have you been unemployed (in months)?

37. What were the average weekly hours in your last job?

38. Give two reasons for your main desire to work?
1. because I am the main income earner in the family
2. head of household is unemployed
3. to increase family income **First Reason:**
4. to support myself
5. it was my parents decision that I work **Second Reason:**
6. in order to benefit from my education and put it to use
7. in order to fill free time
8. in order to improve social status
9. for personal fulfillment and building self esteem and confidence
10. in order to be independent financially independent
11. in order to make friends and have a social life
12. other. Specify

39. Are there specific jobs that you would refuse to do?
1. yes
2. no (go to 41)

40. If yes, which kind of jobs?
1. clerical jobs
2. factory work
3. sales
4. services
5. other

41. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you most?
1. yes
2. no

42. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on your own?
1. finding work
2. leaving/changing work
3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education **First:**
5. siblings marriage **Second:**
6. selling and buying of family or personal assets **Third:**
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other. specify

43 . Can you go to the following places on your own:
(I cannot =1, I can with others =2, I can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel

44. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress *(jilbab)*
2. head scarf and modern clothes
3. modern clothing

45. How often do you do housework?
1. daily
2. sometimes
3. non

C. Economically Inactive Single Women

46. State the reasons for not working
1. no financial need
2. family's objection to work
3. too much household responsibilities
4. employment does not suit women's roles
5. educational qualification too low for satisfactory employment
6. other. Specify

47. How do you spend your time
1. domestic chores and caring for siblings
2. Various courses (sewing, language....)
3. social activities
4. Productive work at home for domestic consumption
5. other. specify

48. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you most?
1. yes
2. no

49. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on our own?
1. finding Work
2. leaving/changing work
3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education
5. siblings marriage
6. Selling and buying of family or personal assets
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other. specify

First:
Second:
Third:

50. Can you go to the following places on your own?
(I cannot =1, I can with others =2, I can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel

51. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress *(jilbab)*
2. head scarf and modern clothes
3. modern clothing

52. How often do you do housework?
1. Daily
2. sometimes
3. non

Sestion Three: Attitudes and Future Directions of Young Women (addresed to all women regardless of work status)

A. Female Education

53. In your opinion, is higher education for females necessary?
1. yes
2. no

54. If yes, why?
1. it is essential in this day and age
2. it is important for self confidence and personal development
3. in order to find job opportunities
4. in order to be an active member in society
5. in order to be a better mother
6. to achieve higher social status
7. to marry an educated man
8. other. Specify

55. In your opinion, are there specialisations, after basic schooling, that are more suitable for women?
1. yes
2. no (go to 57)

56. If yes, what are they?
1. teaching professions
2. crafts and artisan work (embroidery, weaving etc.)
3. medical professions
4. technical work (e.g. engineering)
5. clerical and administrative
6. Sales
7. services

57. If a young woman is in the midst of her education and a suitor proposed on condition that she leaves her education. In your opinion should she:
1. marry him
2. reject him
3. other. Specify

B. Female Employment

58. Do you think it appropriate for women to work after marriage?
1. yes
2. no
3. other, specify

59. Do you think it appropriate for women to work after having children?
1. yes
2. no
3. other, specify

60. In your opinion, when a woman works does she have more say in household matters and decision making?
1. yes
2. no
3. no difference

C. Marriage, Family and Future Directions

61. In your opinion, what is the appropriate age at marriage for women?
1. 15-19 years
2. 20-24 years
3. 25-29 years
4. 30-34 years
5. 35 or more years

62. In your opinion what is the ideal family size?
1. 1-2 children
2. 3-4 children
3. 5-6 children
4. 7 or more

63. How do you see yourself in the future?
1. mother and housewife
2. working women
3. mother and working women

64. If you have a daughter would you:
1. encourage her to go to university
2. encourage her to work
3. encourage both university and work
4. discourage her from work

Section Four: Family Income, Household Expenditure and Living Conditions

65. Do you own your residence or is it rented?
1. own
2. rented
3. rented with furniture
4. other

66. If rented, what is the annual value of rent

66. What is the average monthly expenditure in your household?

68. What is the average annual income?

69. Who is in charge of family budget?
1. father
2. mother
3. both parents
4. respondent herself
5. respondent and siblings
6. shared between all household members.

70. Who buys the groceries on daily basis?
1. father
2. mother
3. both parent
4. respondent
5. siblings
6. respondent and siblings
7. shared between all household members

Semi Structured Interviews Guideline

- Work history personal and for adult family members
- Details on current job
- The formation of current household structure and previous living arrangements
- Family relations. Current conflicts/negotiations etc.
- Detail on family income and expenditure
- Dress and the issue of veiling
- Social life including frequency of social outings independent of family occasions
- Views on marriage, marital relations and other social values
- Housework and other responsibilities (of respondent only)
- Political participation/Voting (These interviews were conducted directly after the 1992 parliamentary elections and where the first woman parliamentarian was elected).
- Future hopes and ambitions

APPENDIX THREE
EMPLOYER QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

Access to Information and Private Sector Employees

The employer survey interviews were all conducted by myself through pre-arranged appointments with either the employers themselves or personnel managers. In making the appointment I usually explained the research objectives but emphasised my interest in youth employment rather then young women. This was a means to avoid employers' preconceived ideas, and therefore, withholding information on gender inequality. Nevertheless, obtaining information from employers was not always a straight-forward matter.

There were three problematic areas in access to information that somehow influenced the data obtained. The first, related to employers withholding information on the pretext of confidentiality. This was mainly a problem with larger employers and included information on working capital, size of output, marketing strategies and so on. I felt that there were fears that I would extract information to replicate their operations as a competitor. In order to gain their trust I never persisted and therefore have incomplete information on such matters. The second problem related to my insistence in obtaining gender desegregated data about wages, turnover rates, duration of employment, and so on. Here, I sensed that many employers became defensive and proceeded to prove the extent to which they operated equal employment strategies. In such cases I felt the information I had was not completely sincere. However, other defensive employers in explaining why there are gender disparities inadvertently ended up revealing a great amount of information on gender stereotyping and the resulting segregation. The third main problem was that many employers, although voluntarily conceding to the interview, were either too busy, or actually lacked the detailed information that I required, especially on employee numbers, wages, turnover rates and so on. Larger employers, in particular, would refer me to personnel departments for such information but others claimed that instead of wasting their and/or their staff's time, can provide me with quick 'estimations.' In a few cases, I had to accept this.

Analysis of Data

After completing the survey the questionnaire was mostly coded (except for the open ended questions in section 8) and entered into a data base that was designed by myself, with some professional help, with the intention of analysing the data on

SPSS. However, after one run of all frequencies and a few cross-tabulations it appeared that the sample was too small for more sophisticated analysis and even some data could be extracted manually. Analysing some of the data directly from the questionnaires, rather than from a computer statistical package, actually proved to be important since during the interviews I wrote a lot of observations and direct quotes on the margins. It is these observations that guided the direction of the analysis.

Employer Questionnaire
(translation from Arabic)

Date of Interview..
Employer Questionnaire Number...

Name of Establishment...
Name and Position of Respondent...

Section One: General Information

1.1 Year of establishment...

1.2 Establishment's main activity...

1.3 Are the owners nationals or foreign?..

1.4 What is the approximate working capital?..

1.5 Are products exported? (for industrial firms)...

1.6 Are materials imported? (for industrial firms).......................................

Section Two: Structure of the Labour Force

2.1 What is the number of employees currently working in the firm?
Total No. of males.......   Total No. of females........

2.2 List Departments and Sections within the firm, number of male and female employees within each section according to occupational and age groups.

Department	Number of employees		Occupational group	Age group
	Male	Female		

2.3 How many women are employed in managerial and supervisory positions?

Section Three: Recruitment Policies and Practices

3.1 In general, what entry requirements does the establishment demand of male applicants?

a. age..
b. marital status.........................
c. education...............................
d. work experience...
e. references from previous employers..
f. other characteristics..

3.2 In general, what entry requirements does the establishment demand of female applicants?

a. age..
b. marital status.........................
c. education...............................
d. work experience...
e. references from previous employers..
f. other characteristics..

3.3 If entry requirements differ for male and female applicants explain reasons...
....
....
....
....
....

3.4. If females are preferred for certain jobs identify which jobs and why?..
....
....

Section Four: Labour Conditions and Turnover Rates

4.1 What type of contracts do the majority of employees have? How many are permanent and how many are temporary?

for males...

for females...

4.2 Does the establishment operate a trial period system for workers?

Yes No

4.3 If yes, why, for how long and what conditions must be fulfilled.

Reasons..

Time period...

Conditions...

4.4 For the bulk of the labour force, what is the average duration of employment?

for males...

for females...

4.5 How many employees have been recruited during the past 12 months in the following occupations?

Occupation group	Males	Females	Age group
Professional and technical			
Administrative			
Clerical			
Sales			
Services			
Production			
Skilled			
Semi-skilled			
Unskilled			

4.6 How many employees have left in the past 12 months in the following occupations and why (e.g. layoffs or voluntary departure)

Occupation group	Males	Females	Age group	Reasons
Professional and tech.				
Administrative				
Clerical				
Sales				
Services				
Production:				
Skilled				
Semi-skilled				
Unskilled				

Section Five: Training and Promotions

5.1 Does the establishment operate on-the-job training for employees?

Yes No

5.2 If yes, list type conducted in the past 12 months and for whom (i.e. occupation group, sex, age)?

....
....
....
....

5.3 How many employees have been promoted in the past 12 months and in which occupations?

Occupation group	No. of Males	No. of Females
Professional and technical		
Administrative		
Clerical		
Sales		
Services		
Production:		
Skilled		
Semi-skilled		
Unskilled		

5.4 Who makes decisions on promotions and on what criteria?

....
....
....
....

Section Six: Wages and Salaries

6.1 List the average wages of male and female employees in the following occupations

Occupation	Males	Females
Professional and technical		
Administrative		
Clerical		
Sales		
Services		
production:		
Skilled		
Semi-skilled		
Unskilled		

6.2 If there are any differences between male and female employees in similar positions? Explain reasons.

....
....
....
....

Section Seven: Employer Attitudes

7.1 How do you evaluate female performance compared to that of males?

	Males better	Females better	No difference
Productivity			
Punctuality			
duration in employment			
Adherence to rules			
Accuracy			
willingness to take orders			
Other. Specify			

7.2 In your opinion, are there specific factors related to your establishment that restrict you from employing women?

Yes No

7.3 If yes, could you explain why?

1. Lack of appropriate training and education
2. Lack of appropriate experience
3. Location of work too far
4. Hours of work too long
5. Job too strenuous (not suitable for women)
6. Required skills are Culturally inappropriate for women
7. Women do no stay long enough (because of marriage and children)
8. Other

7.4 In terms of female employees, do you think there are differences between young and single women compared with older married women?

Yes No

7.5 If yes, explain why...
....
....
....

Section 8: General Comments

8.1 Do you currently face any problems regarding the employees in your firm? (e.g. high turn-over rates, lack of qualified labour) ?

....

....

....

....

8.2 Do you foresee an increase in youth employment in your establishment...

....

....

....

....

8.3 Do you foresee an increase in female employment in your establishment in future?

....

....

....

....

8.4 What is your general impression of young working women in your establishment?

....

....

....

....

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