The London School of Economics and Political Science

Rationalities of Government in Contemporary America: A Foucaultian Study of Domestic and Foreign Policy (1960-2008)

Philippe Fournier

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Declaration

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Abstract

The thesis aims to evaluate the critical potential of a foucaultian approach to Politics and International Relations by looking at the main rationalities of government in the last 45 years in the United States. In order to investigate the practical and ideational elements that shape the formation of subjectivity in contemporary America, I explore the possible combinations between the various forms of power that Foucault talks about, most notably governmentality, discipline and sovereign power. By addressing the existing attempts to combine the above forms of power in IR and sociological literature, I intend to qualify the scope and applicability of governmentality. The thesis therefore works on two levels. First, it attends to the theoretical expositions and problematizations of governmentality. Second, it concentrates on the technical and intellectual transformations that have taken place across domestic and foreign policy domains in contemporary America. In spite of the need to qualify the use of governmentality, I argue that the foucaultian understanding of the transformation of subjectivity through the reproduction of social, cultural and economic criteria and practices, offers the best possible perspective to engage with present-day political forms.

Throughout the history of American rationalities of rule, a reliance on the development of individual qualities and the ongoing suggestion of civic responsibilities have battled out to constitute governmental arrangements at any given time. In the transformation from a welfare oriented rationale to a neoliberal governance through community, two of the most important political rationalities, neoconservatism and neoliberalism, have produced compelling versions of social behaviour as well as discourses which have influenced foreign and domestic policy courses. A look at the governmental shifts in recent American history shows that the understandings of both freedom and responsibility have become increasingly narrow and specific. Disciplinary measures on welfare recipients and developing countries receiving American assistance have intensified, and security imperatives have periodically upset the normal operation of governmentality.
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Introduction

The primary purpose of this study is to evaluate the critical potential of a foucaultian approach to politics and International Relations. Although I refer to Foucault’s oeuvre as a coherent set of interrelated concerns, the thesis will mainly explore the potentialities and critical functions of one of his later analytical projects; governmentality. To do this, I survey the practices, calculations, techniques and ideas within the political rationalities of the last 45 years in the United States. I identify these rationalities through looking at particular policy papers, secondary sources and ideological formulations surrounding welfare, foreign assistance and security programs. While traditional International Relations see domestic and foreign policy as governed by different conditions and exigencies, a look at those sources seems to confirm that the general critiques which have guided reforms and governmental experiments in both realms appear to be very similar.

I will argue that Foucault’s account of governmental rationalities provides the best possible assessment of contemporary material and ideational transformations in the United States as it details the processes through which contemporary American subjects are constituted. In contrast with traditional historical and social scientific approaches, governmentality gets at the heart of the intrinsic requirements and expectations that bear upon individual subjects. The thesis then attempts to excavate some of the technical and intellectual processes through which contemporary American subjects are made and hopes to provide the beginnings of a critical reflection on the main rationalities that are internalized and reproduced by individuals. While I engage with existing theoretical work on the content and scope of governmentality throughout the thesis, the policies and practices surrounding welfare and foreign assistance are taken as the primary material to chart important shifts in ways to think about the place and strategic roles of state institutions, individuals, the community and other governmental actors.

In order to tease out the analytical potentialities of governmentality, I engage with and organize some of the existing insights about governmentality. My use of Foucault calls upon several different, seemingly paradoxical aspects of his work. Although he does not

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1 Throughout the thesis, I look at various sources such as administrative reports, program summaries and policy reform plans. I also look at a variety of presidential speeches and at writings and quotes of influential policy advisers.
offer a theoretical system which can be applied indiscriminately, most of Foucault's insights may be used in concert. I contend that studies on governmentality benefit from the integration of disciplinary and sovereign forms of power in its analytical remit. Although I do not derive a systematic model from the above combinations, I try to provide some initial theoretical pointers as to how sovereign power and biopower may intersect. With the help of a slightly revised foucaultian framework, I move on to interrogate the governmental developments in recent American history. More specifically, I look at the history of one of the United States' main social programs; the AFDC (Assistance to Families with Dependent Children) and at the history of the US' main foreign assistance program; the Agency for International development (AID). The use of Foucault's analytics to study the above programs constitutes one of the thesis' original contributions. To illustrate the persistence of sovereign power throughout the deployment of governmentality in recent US history, I discuss the major wars (Vietnam, Iraq 1991 and 2003) and a selection of presidential orders and tactics which exemplify specific relationships between decisional moments and biopolitical strategies. Since my main intention is to provide empirical manifestations of the above theoretical relationship, the examples I use are necessarily selective. I do not mean to offer an extensive account of recent American foreign policy ventures. The study then mainly attempts to identify the rationalities at work in particular programs and to illustrate the production, organization and circulation of moral and governmental conceptions at the domestic and foreign policy levels. That is to say, the thesis hopes to draw out the main practices of government, most of which revolve around efficiency, individual responsibility, freedom and security, by examining a series of specific policies found in both primary and secondary sources. The administrative reports, policy recommendations and official decisions that have to do with specific areas of government such as welfare and foreign policy contain the seed of more general practices, that is a conflation of techniques and intellectual constructs that contribute to shape the specific roles and responsibilities of individuals and institutions. I argue that the recent understandings of the later practices in domestic and foreign policy programs have gradually incorporated uncompromising moral certainties and enabled stricter disciplinary measures.

Foucault's own critical enterprise emerged from a particular intellectual context. In the midst of Marxism's progressive demise as a critical and political project from the 1960's onwards, the very foundations of the great humanisms were put in doubt. The unity of thought purported by the Enlightenment and its progressive variants was dismissed as
another guise of the modern will to power. Spurred on by Nietzsche's critique of Western moral philosophy and Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic inquiries, a handful of theorists, most of them French, endeavoured to collapse what they saw as questionable truths and dichotomies. As opposed to referring to fixed points of origin from which to anchor claims to truth, morality and reason, thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Beaudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari were interested in investigating the discontinuities, silences and contradictions inherent to Western philosophy's foundational precepts and in undoing the entrenched distinctions between object and subject, rationality and irrationality, identity and otherness. Rather than posing Man as the source of cognition and history, they presented subjectivity as a fragmented and shifting amalgam which could not be wholly assimilated into rigid categories of representation. For them, language no longer mirrored the physical world, it was an open-ended field of signification, which constantly (re)defined itself in relation to what it could not know or represent (Derrida, 1978). What's more, history was for them no longer considered, after Hegel and Marx, as leading to the attainment of Spirit or Communism. Rather, history did no more or no less than setting the conditions of possibility for meaningful claims and particular subjectivities. For so-called postmodernists, the way we understand ourselves depends upon immediate and local determinations. We cannot transcend the linguistic, cultural and political data which surrounds and traverses us at any given time. The above thinkers expressed their suspicion and incredulity towards metanarratives as they no longer believed in their ability to contain the contradictions of lived experience and the fragmentation of consciousness and identity in contemporary times (Lyotard, 1984). Enlightenment's trust in the ability of science and reason to grasp the totality of human experience was giving way to radical uncertainty.

Most of these intellectuals wrestled with the expressions of Marxism in the political arena of their time. Although many harboured sympathies for the Marxian analysis, at least in the initial part of their careers, they were uncomfortable with its totalizing design and with its narrow focus on economics as the ultimate source of social and intellectual production. Thinkers who have somewhat prefigured the preoccupations of postmodern thinkers, in particular Theodor Adorno, reflected on the modern quest for instrumental and organizational control. In *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* (2002), Adorno and Horkheimer argue that Enlightenment's promise to liberate humanity from fear and superstition through the power of reason turned into its opposite; reason was appropriated and directed towards purely instrumental ends which greatly enabled the perpetuation of capitalist exploitation. They insisted that the bureaucratic state and the ever more sophisticated modes of
communication and cultural production combined to impress false desires and representations in the minds of social subjects, so much so that they were no longer aware of their own subjection. Importantly, they argue that Enlightenment has imposed its own truth, namely its particular kind of unreflexive rationalization and its self-legitimating maintenance of capitalist relations, by violently discarding alternative conceptions of the purposes of technical progress. This concern with the modern will to truth and with how powerful metanarratives were reproduced and disseminated through the organization of knowledge and discourse was also shared by Foucault. However, instead of seeing the death of man and individuality as a result of the ‘capitalist economy, its culture industries, bureaucracies, and modes of social control,’ as critical theorists do, Foucault saw it as a ‘discursive event occurring within the emergence of new sciences and discourses, and the sociological fate of individuals in a normalizing, disciplinary society’ (Kellner 1991: 218).

Beyond the critique of metanarratives, then, Foucault was interested in reconstituting the modalities of major epistemological shifts through the inventory of specific discourses and practices. As opposed to attributing humanity’s acceptance of its own servitude to a departure from an uncontaminated kind of reason, Foucault observes that a series of rationalities emerge in the various processes of subjugation initiated through particular institutional and administrative necessities.

In contrast with people like Derrida and Lyotard who are primarily interested in language, Foucault focuses on the interplay of discursive and non-discursive elements, and it is precisely the attention he accords to practice and materiality which makes his work all the more cogent and compelling. Although he did not subscribe to critical theory’s diagnostic of the death of individuality, Foucault tried to retrace the precise means through which liberal capitalism maintained and perpetuated itself with such success. Again, it is not so much the surreptitious imposition of falsehoods that makes us who we are, it is our reproduction of what is presented to us as making sense. Foucault’s brand of critical theory is novel in that it attempts to describe the establishment of dominant forms of knowledge, categorization and administration from the inside, that is, through the silent struggles that inform the adoption of a particular understanding and the unseen relays of institutional and discursive practices. Instead of proceeding from the unseen universal to the particular, Foucault reconstitutes the grand schemes of rationality which organize human life through the observation of seemingly unimportant details. The critical purchase of his approach mainly consists in the attentive observation and patient reconstruction of the dominant discourses that guide our behaviour.
Foucault defines governmentality as 'the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security' (in Burchell, 1991: 102). Clearly, this understanding differs from the traditional definition of government as the institutional structure through which a political body functions and exercises authority. At any given time, governmentality consists in the intellectual constructs and techniques which aim to best induce the productivity and happiness of a national population. At the end of the 18th century, in and amongst the political transformations which led to the progressive displacement of royal authority, the 'population' emerged as an object to observe, manage and secure. As a result of these developments, 'Western man was gradually learning what it meant to... have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner. For the first time in history... biological existence was reflected in political existence' (1978: 142). Efforts towards ensuring the population's well-being required the expansion of specific domains of knowledge and of methods of compilation and categorization. A flurry of human sciences developed in correspondence with the increased need to control and discipline particular elements of the population. The establishment of thresholds of normality meant that individuals were selected according to their ability to participate in social life and, ultimately, to contribute the population's ongoing productivity and contentment. The particular kind of power which 'brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformations of human life' is what Foucault terms biopower (1978: 143). Biopower therefore encrypts life by rendering it into a calculable, modifiable matter. Biopolitics, another analytical term used throughout the thesis, is then the mode of government which regulates life through biopower.

In his lectures on governmentality (Foucault, 2004a, 2004b), Foucault identified the main paradigmatic shifts in the history of the West's political rationalities. This thesis is concerned with the most recent shift from a welfare-oriented rationality of government to a neoliberal one. Before applying governmentality to specific practices, however, I attempt to rehabilitate and extend some of Foucault's reflections on a form of power which is seemingly absent from the self-perpetuating motions of biopolitics, that is, sovereign power. Indeed, the direct violence that continues to be deployed in contemporary liberal
democracies, from the death penalty in the United States to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, begs to reconsider the apparent occlusion of the state’s continuing ability to decide who lives or dies in governmentalized societies. However, determining the part of sovereign power within a foucaultian framework, both theoretically and empirically, remains an uncertain and difficult task. The suggestions I offer in the thesis as to how government relates to power-as-imposition are still very tentative. I contend that the decisions made by certain powerful agents may change or orient the content of governmentality. As I show with the example of American governmentality, other rationales such as neoconservatism are more explicit about their will to wage state power and impose truths through discursive injunctions. Fluctuations in rationalities of government are therefore not solely organic; economic and political authorities may occasionally reverse or interrupt existing processes in the name of necessity. As Foucault argued in a series of lectures entitled *Society Must be Defended* (2003), once the role of the state changes from the preservation of its own authority to the facilitation and safeguard of the lives of citizens towards the end of the 18th century, the state continues to distinguish between those forms of life that are necessary to the perpetuation of the biopolitical whole and those that are not. Biopower can therefore 'make live' and 'let die' (Rose and Rabinow, 2006: 203). In a foreign policy context, that is, in the handling of risks that come from outside the boundaries of the state, sovereign authorities are charged with estimating what constitute acceptable and unacceptable threats to a national population, and with deciding upon the appropriate measures to avert those threats.

The exclusion of certain forms of life from the biopolitical whole in a domestic context and the estimation of threats to a national population from other countries, invariably involve discursive instantiations that legitimize the measures adopted to deal with security problematiques. Agencies of authority in the US such as the presidential office are absolutely central in the diffusion and perpetuation of these discursive distinctions. Presidential speeches and a myriad of other cultural and social agencies then contribute to the formation of responsive cultural subjectivities in parallel to the objectifying work of governmental rationalities. The constitution of national identity, particularly in the US, relies on the continual assertion of American distinctiveness and its connections with particular values and principles. The American predilection to equate its national character with universally shared values is partly a function of its intensive repetition in public addresses. The role of political and public agencies to inspire moral uprightness in a partly liberalized culture is again greatly emphasized by neoconservatives.
In the lecture series and published works that followed *Society Must be Defended*, Foucault left behind his schematic but promising insights on violence and sovereignty to focus almost entirely on governmentality, that is, on the self-sustaining productions of biopower. Although I agree with Foucault that direct orders bearing upon the lives of subjects in advanced liberal societies have become fewer, I argue that executive estimates as to the nature of internal and external threats and decisions to use or suspend law in the name of securing the biopolitical whole, still speak of the permanence of sovereign power. Again, I agree with Foucault that the traditional philosophical and political justifications surrounding the appropriate position of rights-endowed individuals versus the duties and authority of the state are of little help to understand the constitution of subjectivity in contemporary times. The processes of subjectification intrinsic to advanced liberalism have more to do with a myriad of norms and requirements that are impressed in our minds whilst we go about our daily lives, that is, when we are working, entertaining ourselves, soliciting services, etc. In spite of this, we must pay attention to the ongoing expressions of violence within contemporary government, how they come about and are legitimated. The realm of international relations also brings the problematique of sovereign power to the fore simply by outlining the evident durability of the struggles among states, which often involve brute force and influence. At a basic level, it is also clear that the very existence and maintenance of biopolitical processes requires a bounded territory, on which a central authority has claimed jurisdiction. The application of a foucaultian framework to International Relations must therefore take account of these particularities.

As he developed it, Foucault’s study of rationalities of government focused almost entirely on Western states, in particular France, Great Britain and the United States. The application of governmentality outside of a domestic context is a recent occurrence. At this stage, it is important not to overstate the existence of a fully-fledged governmentality on a global scale. Even if the dissemination of ethical norms and performance standards through the ever more present and numerous agencies of international development suggests that a transnational form of governmentality is beginning to emerge, the effectiveness of advanced liberal norms depends on pre-existing dispositions to internalize specific requirements.

Studies on governmentality initiated by Foucault but pursued by many other commentators usually present neoliberalism, understood here as a technology of government rather than an ideology, as a general mode of doing things which applies across a variety of national
contexts in the Western world. However, I think the ideological inflections of American neoliberalism need to be outlined. For one, the special importance allocated to individual liberty and the belief that the market constitutes an exemplary logic for all social relations means that contemporary American governmentality presents itself as an intensified form of neoliberalism. What’s more, in an American context, any contest taking place between the state and the individual refers back to individual rights. As Simon comments; ‘when sovereignty is fragmented... the key problem becomes the reconcilability of individual liberty with social order and cohesion’ (Simons, 1995: 52). Skeptical about the overextension of the rights and creative energies of individuals, several political groupings concerned themselves with bringing about greater social order and cohesion. One of these political forces, loosely labelled as neoconservatism, has been a particularly effective governmental corrective to the presumed shortcomings of neoliberalism. Through their remarkable intellectual output, organizational skills and tireless lobbying efforts, neoconservatives have had considerable success in impressing the need to curtail some of the cultural and political expressions allowed to have their course within a neoliberal rationality of government. They argue that it is the central state’s responsibility to issue the moral commands that will bring about social order and cohesion. This particular feature of neoconservatism indicates that it cannot wholly be seen as a rationality of government. As it seeks to further patriotic sentiments, self-restraint and moral uprightness, neoconservatism attempts to modify neoliberalism through inducements and suggestions at the same as it tries to impose the kind of moral authority which beckons the return of antiquated forms of rule.

Throughout chapters three to seven, I argue that the ideological features of both neoliberalism and neoconservatism feed into the constitution of political narratives in the US and contribute to the formation of contemporary American subjectivity. This of course departs from Foucault’s version of ideology, which, as he contends, wrongly refers to an elemental truth hidden by an extraneous apparatus of power. Rather, I understand ideology as a more or less unified discourse which combines a certain number of ideas on how to best organize political and social agencies. As I see it, the fight for the soul of individual Americans is divided among the representations of appropriate forms of citizenship suggested by a variety of ideological strands as much as the requirement of liberal technologies of government. My emphasis on power as part intentionality and decision, which somewhat relates to my use of ideology, also departs from Foucault’s understanding of sovereign power. With Foucault, biopolitical exigencies generate exclusion in and of
themselves by insuring the security of particular life processes and ignoring others. Seen in this way, violence is inherently necessary and justifiable. In contrast with Foucault, I suggest that the exclusion of particular social elements is, to an extent, wilfully orchestrated by individuals familiar with the discursive and technical modalities of governmental power.

The thesis is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter elaborates on the progression of Foucault’s thought and attempts to incorporate some of his earlier concerns about epistemology and discourse to the governmentality framework. I move on to explore the various rationalities of government Foucault talks about from the pastoral state to neoliberalism. In the second part of the chapter, I survey and critically engage with the uses of Foucault in International Relations theory. By the same token, I try to situate the current work within the interpretations and applications of Foucault in International Relations.

Chapter 2 seeks to interrogate the apparent absence of violence and coercion in the self-perpetuating motions of governmentality. By looking at Foucault’s own account of sovereignty in Society Must be Defended (2003) and that of others interested in the play of sovereignty as force rather than as legitimate institutional framework, I suggest potential ways in which the relationship between sovereign power and biopower may be understood. Secondly, departing from a foucaultian version of sovereign power, I attempt to clarify the conceptual links between law, security and government and look at the possible role of official instances in deciding upon the appropriate means to deal with security problematiques. In the second part of the chapter, I critically engage with existing reflexions on the above combinations in international relations.

After having presented existing work on governmentality and sovereign power in the two first chapters, chapter three begins to look at specifically American ideational,
governmental and practical configurations. The chapter's main objective is then to contextualize the discussion of contemporary American governance by defining some of the main rationalities (liberal art of governing, welfare rationale, neoliberalism and neoconservatism) which have come to feature throughout its history. It also situates governmentality's peculiar way of writing history and of understanding the role of ideas among alternative interpretations. In addition, I explore some of the overlaps between ideology and governmentality in the US context, an analytical claim that I pursue in the following chapters. To represent the governmental diagram of 1960's America, which I take to be a peculiar combination of welfare and neoliberal rationales, I look at two specific programs; the AFDC on the domestic front and USAID on the foreign policy one. Secondly, I give an account of the interaction of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power in the conduct of the war effort in Vietnam.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the progressive permeation of efficiency standards into existing governmental arrangements. Throughout the 1970's, the focus of governmental strategies is beginning to shift from the collective determinations of the welfare model to the development of individual energies. A look at some of the AFDC and USAID's policy papers of the time shows the growing importance of autonomy and responsibilization in the administrative plans orchestrated through public and private agencies. Domestically, work becomes a particularly crucial instance of regulation and incentives to move welfare recipients unto the labour become more forceful. At the foreign policy level, the responsibility for development appears to be progressively devolved to countries receiving assistance. Following the Vietnam War, however, displays of military force abroad are rather limited.

Chapter 5 looks at the ideas and practical transformations which participated in furthering neoliberal governance in the 1980's. It also points to the disciplinary content of welfare and foreign aid reforms, conveyed by the increasingly narrow definition of freedom and responsibility. I argue that the disciplinary turn of the Reagan era partly results in the conflation of neoconservative exhortations to self-restraint and neoliberal incitements to efficiency and self-regulation. Ever more focused on the person of the poor, governmental schemes sought to lift the destitute out of poverty by impressing the psychological dispositions for successful living and by being more severe with those fail to internalize those requirements. Sovereign power therefore manifests itself through the punishment or neglect of subjects deemed to have failed to integrate standards of self-regulation. In the
last part of the chapter, I attempt to trace the ideas that presided to Reagan's aggressive foreign policy stance. Although Reagan did not engage in all out war, his rhetorical addresses insisted on the inherent benevolence of American power, a tendency which partly mirrored the neoconservative belief in the moral and existential necessity of American leadership in the world.

Chapter 6 charts the emergence of governmental correctives which sought to manage neoliberal subjects through their specific ethical identifications. While exhortations to performance and autonomy continued to be central axes of government in the 1990's, strands of thought like communitarianism and neoconservatism proposed to temper the cultural effects of the self-interested rationality of neoliberalism with a series of ethical provisions. Welfare as much as foreign aid reforms continued to be informed by standards of administrative efficiency, but more and more political and normative conditions were attached to state assistance. In both the domestic and foreign policy spheres, the array of regulative agencies with only minimal ties to the state was rapidly expanding. Domestically, private agencies, community organizations and neighbourhood groups began to assume normalizing functions. Similarly, moral and administrative responsibilities surrounding international development continued to be displaced and organized among a variety of actors, including multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations, global firms and recipients of foreign assistance themselves. Ultimately, although the 1990's marked a timely discussion of the bounds and sources of ethical commitments, I argue that the definition of morality which is actual through many of the discursive and legislative injunctions of the time is rather inflexible.

As the thesis intends to analyse various domains of activity to demonstrate the extension of both biopolitical and sovereign forms of power, Chapter 7 departs from the exploration of welfare and foreign aid to focus on the security practices that followed 9/11. The chapter aims to show how the dispositions described in the previous chapter are integrated within an emerging discourse of threat. To do so, it looks at new legislation and security measures and at the ways in which they are used and combined with existing governmental arrangements. On the foreign policy front, I discuss the conscious extension of armed and biopolitical strategies in Iraq from 2003. Faced with an uncertain threat, the US executive has enacted a wide ranging strategy of pre-emption which includes greater powers to surveil and prosecute at home, and the extension of its own governmental standards abroad. The operation of decisional instances was greatly enabled by a sustained discursive
campaign. Freedom, celebrated in public discourse without being given a substantive definition, was said to be in great danger. The enactment of univocal interpretations and hurried decisions pointed to the reestablishment of central authority in the US. The unfolding narrative of security, fuelled by the constant production of immaterial threats, legitimized the extensive control of individual activities and spawned potentially dangerous foreign policy doctrines.

By using a revised version of governmentality, the thesis hopes to uncover the hidden requirements and the direct commands that participate in the formation of subjectivity in contemporary America. The work of rationalities of government can be detected in many areas of individual existence as well as in many policy domains. I content that their investigation is the first step in a realistic assessment of who we are and of the modes of knowledge that organize human life.
Chapter One:
Foucault, Governmentality and International Relations.

Introduction

This chapter aims to present and contextualize Foucault’s studies on government. Starting from his earlier work, I trace the trajectory of his thought and highlight some of the theoretical premises of governmentality. In the first subsection, I explore the ontological and epistemological bases of Foucaultian analysis and move on to discuss the combination of the practical, discursive and philosophical elements which informs governmentality. Secondly, I define some of primary terms of Foucault’s critical enterprise, more particularly his representation of power and knowledge and the ways in which they are connected. Third, I look at governmentality itself and present the various political rationalities that Foucault and his followers have talked about. In the second part of the chapter, I appraise the interpretations and uses of Foucault in International Relations. While many IR scholars have adhered to Foucault’s work on epistemology, discourse and discipline, others have begun to apply governmentality to transnational processes. The chapter’s main task is then to establish some of the theoretical arguments that will inform the rest of the thesis.

Foucault’s thought is more often than not used sparingly, as a kind of ‘toolkit’ to study particular discourses or institutions. Over the last decade or so, Foucault’s studies on government in particular have served as an inspiration to scholars across a wide range of disciplines, including International Relations. Given the partial and experimental character of Foucault’s lectures and few writings on the matter, its success has been remarkable. Governmentality is primarily concerned with demonstrating how the activity of government is understood by the participants in relation to their own selves, as well as in relation to impersonal constraints and social institutions (Gordon, 1991: 2). It is at once centred on the subject’s internalization of social standards and on the encompassing rationalities behind the distribution of political authority. This does not mean, however, that it replicates political theory’s concern for sovereignty, in other words for the question of who governs and of what are the limits of authority. Rather, it considers signifiers such as legitimacy, freedom, responsibility and security as abstract spaces, which are defined, calculated and combined according to momentary exigencies. Governmentality’s critical
purpose is to command awareness about the ways in which individuals are objectified in their everyday lives through their participation in social, cultural and political exchanges. But while governmentality effectively synthesises and integrates a variety of Foucault's insights, it is necessary to examine and in a sense preserve some of his earlier concerns. Foucault's historicism, critique of modern knowledge constructions and interest in the discursive formation of subjectivity are all crucial elements to the understanding of governmentality. One of the tasks of this chapter will then be to integrate Foucault's primary axes of critique to a governmental framework in a more explicit fashion. The objective here is not to take his work as a watertight philosophical system but as a fairly coherent set of interrelated concerns. This approach allows for the presentation of a more extensive array of contemporary forms of power and the ways in which they combine and interact.

The same tortuous, yet coherent path of critique applies to the work Foucault has inspired in International Relations. Even if it is fair to say that he did not pay much attention to the international, governmentality and discourse analysis are now widely used in the field. Generally speaking, poststructural scholars of International Relations have all endeavoured to expose the arbitrary nature of the theoretical division between the domestic and the international, the first being traditionally presented as the only realm in which individuals may enjoy a reasonably ordered and safe existence, the second as a realm of perpetual disorder and insecurity. This would suggest that some of Foucault's earlier work on the constitution of modern discourses along differentiated modes of exclusion is indeed relevant to the study of International Relations. While this is certainly the case, the application of governmentality is more problematic. Initially conceived to study the rationalities of government in developed western countries, and to survey the range of sophisticated incitements to subjective transformations throughout the recent stages of liberalism, it is difficult to see how it may be relevant to poor, institutionally weak countries. However, it can also be said that the recent extension of economic, developmental and political programs through an increasing array of private and governmental actors, presents us with the beginnings of a transnational form of governmentality.
1. Foucault's Earlier Work and the Idea of Critique

Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an extensive presentation of Foucault’s work prior to his more pragmatically inclined studies on the individual body and government, a brief account of the philosophical critique and method he develops in the *Order of Things* (1970) and the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) is necessary to introduce some of the assumptions that lie behind governmentality. Foucault’s critique of the modern quest for unambiguous and linear accounts of the history of ideas has inspired many contemporary theorists in IR and elsewhere. Equally, his focus on the exclusionary modalities of a variety of socio-scientific discourses has been influential on a number of research domains, not least on critical IR studies looking into the constitution of national identities. This section is then concerned with situating Foucault’s critique within larger philosophical problems and with exploring the evolution and transformation of his thought towards the combination of philosophical, discursive and practical elements which has punctuated his studies on discipline and government.

Foucault’s first publication, *Madness and Civilization* (1965) prefigures some of the defining concerns of his later work. Although still tending to present historical materialism as one of the defining causes of social organization, Foucault’s analysis includes the cultural changes inherent to the internment of a whole category of people, namely the poor, the mad and the criminal (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 5). His depiction of the categorization of otherness through a series of new institutional and administrative procedures, how such processes translate at a local level and how individual behaviour begins to be isolated and observed, sets the scene for later important work like *Discipline and Punish* (1977). Furthermore, *Madness and Civilization* (1965) already hints at a more fundamental kind of Otherness; the lurking existence of a realm contrary and external to modern reason. Manifestations of unreason, impossible to discover or articulate, represent the elusive point of reference against which secure ontological foundations must guard us. Foucault’s historical studies of madness and medical practices therefore still hinted at some fundamental experience of unreason found standing at the outer edge or outside of modern discourse. He will later abandon this enterprise to eventually define objects of knowledge as almost entirely constituted by the discourse that designates and specifies them.

In the *Order of Things* (1970), Foucault goes back to the fundamental task of rediscovering ‘on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order
knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical *a priori*... ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault, 1970: xxi, xxii). He begins by exposing the basic conditions of possibility of knowledge and representation in the classical age. From the 17th century up to perhaps the end of the 18th century, all of which presents itself to human perception, the observable natural world and the existence of Man itself, is already included in a perfectly ordered cosmological plan. The sum of representations is laid out on a plane surface of ordered relations, and man is but another empirical being within it. His task is limited to specifying the pre-established logic of the universe and its component parts. He can reconstitute the order of the world through the faculty of reason, an innate force which progressively reveals itself in the activity of representing. Within such an epistemic space, man is but the ‘locus of clarification’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 20); he is not the self-conscious origin and object of representation. Accordingly, language, the main instrument available to Man to survey or clarify the workings of the external world, is taken to be equivalent to the thing it designates. Towards the end of the 18th century, however, Foucault insists that a crucial epistemic change is taking place; Man is suddenly thought of as ‘the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge’ (1970: 310). As the interested source and object of representation, Man can no longer rely on the pre-established web of ordered relations characteristic of the classical *episteme*. He is left alone to confront the limitations of his knowledge about himself and the world. The physical world and the language that replicates it are no longer transparent; the precise historical origin of language is unknown and the exact properties of nature remain largely un-chartered. Kant, fully conscious of the inherently problematic character of representation, attempts to ground and legitimize claims to knowledge. By doing this, he initiates what Foucault describes as the typically modern propensity to ‘affirm man’s finitude and at the same time completely deny it’ (Rabinow and Dreyfus 1982: 31).

What Foucault calls the modern ‘analytic of finitude’ takes three different but equally self-defeating forms. The first one is the conception of Man as an empirical/transcendental doublet (1970: 319). Kant attempts to establish Man as both an empirical being, subject to historical and intellectual contingency, and as a transcendental entity which would allow for a an ‘account of man as a self-producing source of perception, culture, and history’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow,1982: 33). Foucault argues that the tension between the two poles will never be fully resolved until we let go of our anthropological discourse. The second,
somewhat related doublet, is that between the cogito and the unthought. Man's consciousness of his own limitations supposes the need to think the unthought in order to 'reconcile him with his own essence,' to reappropriate the acknowledged conditions that make thought possible (Foucault, 1970: 35). Foucault sees this to be a futile attempt as the almost infinite inventory of the background practices that render thought and action possible will always depend upon yet another background. Thirdly, as exemplified in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger, is the hesitation between the retreat and return of the origin. As Foucault puts it; 'man is cut off from the origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are born in time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there' (1970: 332). However, Foucault argues that in Heidegger, the ever elusive origins of thought and the limitation of man through his essential historicity become the transcendental source of that very history.

Through his critique of the often convoluted modern attempts to locate transcendental sources of meaning, Foucault claims to have discovered a space which is not reducible to either a-historical Man or to the interpretation of human action against the background of shared practices. He develops this new avenue in Archeology of Knowledge (1969), and begins by presenting an element central to this unexplored analytical direction; the statement. He defines the latter not as a proposition, an utterance or a speech act, but as the network of rules that makes such things as propositions, utterances or speech acts meaningful. A statement's meaning then depends entirely on 'the field of use in which it is placed' (Foucault, 1969: 104). It may be placed in a variety discursive formations, themselves constituted through the aggregation of a great variety of statements. These create relatively autonomous logical spaces in which the individual parts (the statements) are defined through their position in a system (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 49). Such a theoretical formulation presents striking similarities with structuralism. However, Foucault maintains that the archaeologist 'only claims to be able to find the local, changing rules which at a given period in a particular discursive formation define what counts as an identical meaningful statement' while 'the structuralist claims to find cross-cultural, a-historical, abstract laws defining the total space of possible permutations of meaningless elements' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 55). As much as he does not want to uncover an extensive field of possibilities and permutations, Foucault is not interested in trying to uncover a hidden meaning or a deeper signification in the movement of history. Rather, he claims do no more than to describe how the statement appears in all its materiality.
In the *Archeology of Knowledge*, however, Foucault does not seem to be able to shake off his association with structuralism. He does not fully specify whether the description of historical *transformations* in discursive formations may be informed by atemporal systemic rules or not. There are many other issues with Foucault’s often difficult and meandering theses in the Archeology, but some of the more valid criticisms have to do with the status that the rules of discursive formations have in the minds of those who use them; the speakers or writers. Here the rules not only describe how discursive formations come together in a coherent whole, they are also prescriptive, meaning that they require of the speaker to use certain formulations as opposed to others in order to make sense (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 90). Furthermore, the very condition of possibility of discourse as it appears to the eyes of the archaeologist depends on that same individual’s standing inside and outside of the discourse he or she observes. Simply put, ‘the system works so long as everyone does not share the enlightened position of the archaeologist,’ thus the archaeologist, refusing to see himself or herself as the source of historical consciousness, is nonetheless in an imprecise location between history and a sort of transcendental void which allows for the possibility of an archaeology of discourse. Foucault somehow replicates the modern doublets he is at pains to criticize as he ‘seems to both affirm and deny his finitude’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 95-96). Moreover, the idea of ‘making sense’ cannot be limited to the replication of discursive rules, it also has to do with a series of institutional validations, that is non-discursive elements. Here, Foucault maintains that non-discursive elements such as economic institutions, techniques, systems of norms and modes of classification, do indeed have a role to play but that they only acquire full signification insofar as they are included in discursive formations. In later work, he will lend more importance to non-discursive elements and insist on the involvement of the genealogist in the historical practices he or she is describing. Although it does not come up with a satisfactory theory of discourse or with a position totally emancipated from the problems Foucault detects in modern philosophy, the archaeology nonetheless provides a ‘tool for attaining a relative degree of detachment from the practices and theories of the human sciences’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 103) and offers a cogent critique of modern narratives’ pretension to truth.

After several years of pondering, and assessing the criticisms directed at his work, Foucault turned his attention to social practices as opposed to formal rule-based systems. He becomes more interested in the way social practices inform the constitution of knowledge about Man. In his revised framework, theory becomes at once subordinated to
practice and implicated in the constitution of the larger organizational practices underwritten by notions like biopower. In so doing, Foucault uses a new method; genealogy. Partly inspired by Nietzsche, the latter records the history of the interpretations, and the incumbent material and technical dispositions they have inspired, that have successively established themselves in modernity. As opposed to identifying a linear progression in a variety of study areas, as is commonly done by the majority of social scientists, Foucault’s genealogies show that the interpretations that have currency in a particular time in fact result from the arbitrarily imposed resolution of a great many unspoken struggles. In order to explain how particular modes of understanding and technical arrangements come to prevail at a specific time, Foucault introduces a revised notion of power.

1.1 Power and Knowledge

Equipped with a revamped method which straddles unorthodox forms of structuralism and hermeneutics, Foucault begins to explore the possibility of defining subjects, knowledge categories and techniques of government through the actual historical practices in which they are involved. In order to account for the possibility of subjective and epistemological transformations within historical practices, Foucault suggests a new understanding of power, which he will develop in *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978). In the former, he maintains that the establishment of disciplinary regimes in the later part of 18th century France and England is not so much the result of an imposition by a sovereign authority as it is a particular configuration of subjects of knowledge and institutional spaces. No one person or group of persons is responsible for shifts in disciplinary technologies, they emerge through ‘dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity’ (1977: 26). For Foucault, power is not only defined by an external imposition allowing or disallowing for particular kinds of behaviour and practices but is inherent to the constitution of knowledge and its objects. He suggests that it be understood as;

‘the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization: as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them: as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another: and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or
institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of possibility, in the various social hegemonies' (Foucault, 1978: 92-93).

Foucault’s power, which can be at once local, mobile, purposeful and non-intentional, is not without its complexities and ambiguities. Firstly, it can be inferred that the individual is not passive with regards to the various modes of objectification to which it is subjected; he or she internalises and reproduces various criteria of behaviour in order to be able to live, work and communicate. In the form of technical knowledge and expertise especially, power can also be appropriated strategically by political and economic elites. Within the increasing variety of domains of enquiry, particularly since the emergence of the normalizing sciences in the 1800’s, power is beginning to inform more clearly the struggles, inclusions and exclusions implicit to the establishment of what counts as true knowledge about man. However, despite the fact it can be used strategically by specific actors or is at work in the formation of knowledge systems, it cannot be crystallized in a definite form as it is in a state of constant flux dictated by local and immediate necessities. As soon as a stable knowledge-configuration or rationality seems to establish itself, it is likely to be challenged, transformed, reaffirmed or discarded. Active in the most minute designs of daily life and in the most general strategies of government, it can neither be possessed or exercised by a single entity. It is a creative and productive force that ‘traverses and produces things, induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse’ (Foucault, 1980: 119). Its effectiveness does not lie in placing a mere limit on desire but in constituting social rites and instruments of domination that are both tolerable and efficient (1980: 86). Again, power mechanisms can be used ideologically, but they are first and foremost directed at producing ‘effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge_ methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control’ (1980: 102). In whatever domain of knowledge, the organizational capacities of power are continually reviewed and refined.

By defining power in this way, Foucault clearly opposes its understanding in more traditional forms of political theory. He is decidedly not interested in trying to locate the nucleus of legitimate political authority and associates the will to do so with political philosophy’s ongoing preoccupation with the person of the King, in other words with the perpetuation of a ‘juridico-discursive’ paradigm (1978: 82-85). Again, he contends that the analysis ‘should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms.
and institutions’ (1980: 96) rather than with characterizing various forms of vertical domination. Accordingly, rather than being defined negatively through the prohibitive decrees of external authorities, the formation of subjectivity has to do with assimilating and perpetuating the local requirements of power. In both *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault insists on the importance of the body as a nexus for the operation of power. What he is mainly concerned with is the interstitial space between larger institutional strategies and the body as a discrete object of study and intervention. The prison and the confessional are here seen as locations where the manipulation of the biological body and the individual soul conflate with general schemes of rule. These encounters constitute what Foucault calls a ‘political technology of the body’ (1977: 26). Again, punitive measures are not solely explained and justified by the fact that a crime has been committed and that it must be punished. They are not ‘simply ‘negative’ mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but they are linked to a whole series of positive effects which it is their task to support’ (1977: 24). Similarly, the ongoing valorization of the confession of sexual desires in modern history is not the story of a progressive liberation or of a triumph over repressive cultural forms. Rather, through the extensive development of confessional modes, sex ‘becomes an issue; a whole web of discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions settled upon it’ (1978: 26). Importantly, punitive modes and sex are both implicated a larger economy of power, which ties in to the security, health and prosperity of the population as a whole. The democraticization of right transpiring in the constitutional experiments of the end of the 18th and 19th centuries in the Western world, also contributed to the fact that life and modes of behaviour became inscribed and administered through self-produced norms rather than left at the discretion of an all-powerful sovereign.

As Foucault’s general project consists in making apparent the claims to knowledge that have been displaced or discarded by the dominant paradigms in each discursive formation, he specifies how the general, yet strategically specific logic of ‘truth’ directs relations of power. Truth, Foucault says, ‘is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements… (and) is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it’ (1980: 133). There are rules as to what constitutes a valid statement in linguistic constructions, clinical psychology or economic sciences. The consolidation of paradigms of knowledge, especially when it comes to non-exact sciences, is a consequence of a series of power effects that in turn
reinforce and perpetuate certain criteria of validity. It follows that individuals who have a greater command of those criteria are more able and authorized to 'speak the truth.' The power effects that culminate in truth tend to present the history of particular social sciences as a linear progression towards an ever more perfected form of knowledge. But Foucault intends to demonstrate that these coherent and evolutionary histories conceal the struggles inherent to the establishment of truth and his genealogies are precisely an effort to render those omissions and struggles more visible. Through painstaking documentary research, they aim to 'rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is designed to mask' (1980: 82). A genealogy of rationalities of government, discipline or sex therefore entails a willingness to look beyond humanistic, coherent and progressive histories in order to reinstate the claims to knowledge that have been subjugated and forgotten. Equally, a genealogical perspective suggests that foundational notions of Western political theory such as freedom, legitimacy and morality have been constituted through a mixture of coercions, struggles and strategic incitements that have taken different forms according to historical context. Foucault then subverts the traditional requirement of philosophy to discover the essence of being human, free or moral to assert that truths and essences are in fact 'things of this world' (1980: 131), borne out of ever changing conditions of intelligibility and strategic necessities.

For Foucault, it is truth itself, truth as 'already power,' which is the political problem (1980: 133). He invites us to 'detach the power of truth from the social, economic and cultural forms of hegemony' (1980: 133). Again, Foucault is not entirely clear about what this means in concrete terms. It may be taken to mean that the present requirements to be successful, happy, effective and free must not be accepted as self-evident and inescapable but it may also be interpreted as the validation of an indiscriminate suspicion of the primary rules that make social life possible. Either way, what is most important with regards to this questioning of truth is that it should be not be considered as an external standard by which current hegemonic forms can be judged but an already present configuration of power. Possibilities of resistance are therefore conditional to local and immediate modes of subjectification as opposed to general strategies orchestrated by a willing, knowing external power with its own vision of true freedom and humanity. As soon as one relates truth to a perpetually contested, unstable and reversible thing in the present, it becomes possible to assess the degree of domination involved in the establishment of a particular truth. As an example of the practical application of such a line of critique, Foucault's enquiry into rationalities of government consisted more in...
determining what had made liberal capitalism so enduring and effective than suggesting standards from which it could be justified, improved or invalidated.

1.2 Governmentality

Foucault’s (1977) work on the administration of surveillance, discipline and punishment in the 19th century was criticized by many on the left for its failure to represent the more general relations between state and society (Gordon, 1991: 4). Somewhat receptive to this objection, but without continuing the long tradition of political theory attached to the person of the sovereign, Foucault extended the method he had perfected in the examination of how individuals were ‘separated, studied, aggregated and scrutinized’ according to new institutional and organizational grids, to regularities than could be observed within the population as a whole (Foucault, 1977: 139). In a certain sense, governmentality points to a more general design relating the ideational and material structures of governmental power with the regulation of individual behaviour. Biopower is incidentally found at the intersection of the techniques and systems of thought that apply to the social and to the individual body as an object of manipulation and classification (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 134). For example, the distribution of state benefits encompasses personalized techniques for work incentive as much as overarching intellectual constructions determining the place of market, state and individual within a rationality of government. Throughout the 19th century and beyond, discipline and the associated sciences of normalization (sociology, psychology, etc) become important domains of activity as the security of socio-economic processes ultimately depends on their effective functioning. Clearly, the kind of power at work in disciplinary and governmental processes seems to have little to do with a direct, prohibitive form of authority. Even if sovereignty, on Foucault’s own admission3 never entirely disappears, he does not consider it as an overly important element in modern day governance. I will therefore give a succinct account of governmentality as Foucault and many of his followers understand it before attempting to incorporate sovereign power to the analysis.

The emergence of governmentality somewhat depends on the successful establishment of a central political authority over a bounded territory and population. Around the end of the 18th century, it is reasonable to say that government, particularly in France and England, is less concerned with the preservation of the sovereign’s right to command obedience from its subjects through coercive methods than it is with the means by which the population

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3 See Michel Foucault (2003) Society Must be Defended
can be kept relatively happy, organized and productive. As Colin Gordon puts it, government consists in the 'conduct of conduct'; 'that is to say, a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some persons or persons' (Gordon, 1991: 2). This form of activity generates an ever-widening range of administrative necessities that in turn require new ways of obtaining and compiling information about the population. The pervasive mode of knowledge in this survey of personal habits and statistical generalities of society is political economy. Individuals come to be defined as subjects of interest responding to the economic logic of loss and benefit. As Graham Burchell writes; ‘the prototype of ‘economic man’ becomes ‘the correlate and instrument of a new art of government’ (1991: 127). Several responsibilities are transferred to the citizen from then on deemed capable of looking after their own well-being. Individuals must familiarize themselves with an expanding array of political institutions, domestic measures (hygiene, health etc) and commercial regulations if they are to function adequately. Governmental mechanisms must simultaneously integrate novel subjective aspirations and encourage the division of tasks in smaller social units that are not directly linked to state institutions. The integration of subjective aspirations into schemes of governance is closely related to the transformation of sovereignty into right. As the main preoccupation of the nascent liberal art of government is to obtain a satisfactory ratio of contentment and productivity, it functions by producing political and economic freedoms (Foucault, 2004a: 65). More precisely, the liberal state’s purpose is to provide the conditions under which the freedom not just of individuals, but of the processes borne out their interaction, may thrive. Clearly the kind of liberty being alluded to has more to do with an abstract space in which the relations and limits between governors and governed are calculated than a primary essence that is translated in constitutional forms. However, the production of political and economic freedoms is counterbalanced by mechanisms of security. Government must also have the inbuilt ability to determine the moment at which practices of liberty become prejudicial to the ensemble of society. This interplay between security and liberty is precisely what animates the economy of power of liberalism in the centuries to follow (Foucault, 2004a: 67).

As several philosophers of the Enlightenment attest, the market and its potentially unlimited extension, is an important point of reference for both normative arguments and the limitation of political authority. At the time economic activity, like many other domains of knowledge, was mainly conceptualised through the lens of nature. Kant’s

4 All references drawn from Foucault (2004a, 2004b) are my translations.
Perpetual Peace, as Foucault tells us, is not so much premised on the political institutions that men have wilfully constructed but on nature itself (2004a: 59). Apart from its association with universal notions of justice and fairness that go beyond race, religion or nationality, the extension of commerce throughout the world is a sign of the irresistible march toward a more perfect correspondence of human activity with nature and ultimately reason. Economic exchange may eventually lead to cosmopolitan right over and above the juridical independence of states (2004a: 59). Exchange is therefore reason’s means to extend the moral and juridical obligations impressed on Man beyond national borders. In the Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith describes the natural equilibrium that emerges out of the expression of individual interests in the economic sphere. The hidden hand of the market is likened to a force of nature which cannot be fully grasped or calculated but which nonetheless regulates forms of interaction that are outside of the juridical relation between state and individual. Smith incidentally points to the state’s incapacity, as a form of detached abstraction, to know and control the consequences of economic exchange. To a great extent, The Wealth of Nations is an advice to statesmen on how to secure the perpetuation of ‘natural’ economic processes.\(^5\) A more intimate knowledge of how these processes function should lead the state both to a cautious disengagement from the economy and a keener ability to determine when intervention is necessary. Despite the problematization of authority in 18\(^{th}\) century philosophy, Foucault argues that thinkers like Kant and Smith see more benefits in the cautious management of natural processes than the universal extension of juridical rights to individuals. As has been said above, liberalism is primarily defined by the recognition of the market as a model of nature, as a standard for the limitation of political authority and as a boundless potentiality to profit for European powers (Foucault, 2004a: 62). Understood in this way, liberalism is more a ‘manner of doing things’ and an ‘ethos of governing’ than a political philosophy or ideology (Foucault in Dean, 1999: 58). Again, governance in the 18\(^{th}\) century is no longer a question of prohibiting gestures disrespectful to the sovereign’s authority but one of determining whether government is intervening too much or too little in the safeguard of partially autonomous spheres of activity (Rose, 1999: 70). In other words, what becomes objectionable is an excess of government, not of sovereignty (Foucault, 2004a: 15). To a great extent, liberalism’s success at managing society depends on its flexibility; on a capacity to accept its own inadequacies and correct them through increasingly refined techniques and thought constructions. As Mitchell Dean notes, the liberal mode of

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\(^5\) On this particular point, see McNamara (1998) Political Economy and Statesmanship.
governance 'is a polymorphous and permanent instrument of critique which can be turned against the previous forms of government' (1999: 190).

The workings of commercial exchange, so central to the new mode of government in the 18th century, is related to a protean association mentioned in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment; the polymorphous sphere of civil society, in which self-interested individuals engage in social and economic relations. Although unrelated to the state, it provides government with markers as to how 'economic men' may be placed in order to be adequately managed (Gordon, 1991: 23). If self-interest is generally thought to be the principal socializing force in civil society, there are other qualities like 'sympathy' and 'disinterested interest' at work in human communities, as several treaties (e.g Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals* (1751), Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767)) on the sources and modalities of individual morality attest. For Ferguson, Hume and Smith, the above qualities have not developed out of a certifiable conception of the good or of a human nature, but through a long history of social interaction. Those thinkers are already more concerned with the sociological incentive of knowing 'how beliefs come to be held and work' (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 126) than grounding ontological truths. Aside from their historicist outlook, dissertations on the unwritten norms of social interaction also explicitly encouraged the cultivation of civility and restraint to balance the pursuit of self-interest. In fact, there was a sustained interest in a renewed version of civic republicanism in 18th century thought which perhaps disproves or at least unsettles the association of thinkers like Adam Smith with a purely liberal creed. Reflexions on the nature and boundaries of individual morality are also inevitably associated with rules beneficial to the ensemble of society. Theorizations about civil society are in a sense preparing the emergence of disciplinary institutions through the conscious observation and isolation of individual behaviour and of 'society' as an object of government. As an abstract designation, civil society is the site where a great variety of governmental requirements are contested and negotiated but it also serves as a reference point for rule. This simultaneous tendency of government to 'totalize' and 'individualize,' or to discipline and governmentalize, has endured to our day (Gordon, 1991: 3).
The Welfare State:

Throughout the 19th century, the individualizing rationality of early liberalism comes to be problematized in terms of the state’s disengagement from the welfare of the population. Problems and discrepancies occasioned by the extraordinary advances of capitalism are the source of much discontent, as the growing communist movements across Europe attest. Increasingly aware that economic and technological developments carry certain risks, liberal government is attempting to make those risks more ‘calculable’ and to tame ‘insecurity with solidarity and the laws of large numbers.’ (Rose, 1999: 81). The main unit of analysis shifts from the ‘individual’ to identifiable social groups or associations that may be familial, professional, political or religious (Gordon, 1991: 33). Importantly, previously established distinctions between civil society and government are dissolved in favour of a more organic link between the state and the ‘people.’ Government’s role has no longer to do with ensuring the perpetuation of natural processes from a distance but to actively manipulate the main socio-economic variables behind the realization of collective welfare. The state becomes absolutely central in this process and there is an unprecedented proliferation of its administrative agencies throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Concurrently to those general shifts, the individual subject of government is no longer conceived as autonomous and self-interested but through its fundamental appurtenance to the various institutions to which he or she is obliged. As Nikolas Rose tells us, ‘the subject of welfare was a subject of needs, attitudes and relationships, a subject who was embraced within, and governed though, a nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies’ (Rose, 1996: 40). Individual aspirations are now irrevocably tied to collective notions of freedom and happiness.

In the codification of these new modes of subjectivity and government, the state furnishes its ranks with an expertly trained bureaucracy and becomes an increasingly complex and imposing structure. The relationships identified in society are also documented through a much more extensive and sophisticated form of knowledge. Disciplinary institutions and the associated sciences of normalization are transformed both by the refinements of technique and the specification of ‘normality’ within the wider domain of the social. Personal habits enter into the calculations of generalized standards of behaviour, and the terms for inclusions, exclusions and distinctions are set according to the requirements for collective welfare. The transitional form of governmentality between classic and welfare liberalism is a peculiar combination of disciplinary and philanthropic practices. The
expression of the moral responsibility of private citizens is accompanied by an intensification of the control of individual behaviour. The institutions created by the combined forces of the state and philanthropic organizations are at once expressions of Christian charity and of rigorous programs of social integration. As Rose advances along similar lines; 'the conduct of individual members of the population became the object of philanthropic, medical, architectural and hygienic programmes, and the moral domain became traversed by innumerable interventions from industrial schools to sewers, from police force to lady missionaries, from friendly societies to model housing schemes' (1999: 106). The increasing array of institutional forms preoccupied with individual habits, are progressively subsumed under the more general object of society.

In itself, the designation of the state as guarantor of social progress and collective happiness denotes a Christian sentiment. Foucault actually begins his history of government with a discussion of 'pastoral power,' (Foucault, 2004a: 168) which essentially consists in guiding both individual and community toward salvation. Transported by Christian notions of sacrifice and obligation, pastoral power is characterized by an emotional form of solidarity, a sense of empathy and connectedness. To some extent, measures adopted by the social state mark the surge of a tendency that has never been entirely repressed. However, for all the coherent and integrated aims of the welfare rationality, the latter is the site of a lasting struggle between government through individual liberty and government through the representation of collective aspirations in institutions which beg obedience (Dean, 1999: 82).

Neo-liberalism and Governance Through Community:

The idea that the well-being of the individual is best ensured by the wider community, whose needs are represented in state institutions, is criticized from several perspectives. The most important and effective of these critiques is 'neo-liberalism,' as understood by Foucault and his followers. Neo-liberalism's final end is to extend the logic of the market to state institutions and individual behaviour. Some of the criticisms which informed the transformation of the welfare state are exposed most clearly in the work of Friedrich Hayek (1944). Wary of the ongoing bureaucratisation and militarization of the state in the early 20th century, he argues for a limitation of the state's functions to a preservation of historically determined cultural and social processes. Economic rationality, in conjunction with the fundamental capacity of the individual to exercise his or her autonomy within a
reasonably advanced mode of social interaction, is a model for the exercise of political power and individual choice. However, and this is the crucial difference with 'classical' liberalism, processes like concurrence are not natural; they are produced by certain circumstances and facilitated through active intervention (Foucault, 2004a: 123-124). Notions of moral identity are also displaced from a collective determination to a private one in order to allow citizens to exercise their freedom and rationality in the marketplace. Choice becomes the cornerstone of the emerging rationality of government. The act of choosing among the increasing variety of goods and services simultaneously expresses social identity, rationality and autonomy (Rose, 1999: 85).

In contrast with both classical and welfare liberalism, neo-liberal subjects are governed through the 'communities' they have freely chosen to belong to and are categorized according to their lifestyles, sexual orientation or consuming habits (Rose, 1996: 40-41). In late modernity, individuality becomes a layered and complex reference point for the calculations of governmental power. Neoliberal government is at once keenly aware of the subjective transformations at work in post war consumerism and of the need to shape subjectivity through more discrete and sophisticated means. In other words, while it assumes the individual's inclination to reasonable judgement and autonomy, it must produce those same qualities through a variety of institutional incitements. As Rose points out, neoliberal means of government intend to persuade, educate and seduce rather than to prescribe (Rose, 1996: 50). Concurrently to those subjective transformations, the provision of social services is becoming the responsibility of private bodies contracted by the state. Government's involvement in the delivery of services is increasingly limited to 'setting targets, promulgating standards, monitoring outputs, allocating budgets, undertaking audits' (Rose, 1999: 146). Emerging modes of administration are once again based on the logic of the market. Private bodies compete for funding and strive to attain performance targets set by the state. Private citizens are considered as consumers of either 'health services, education, training, transport' who must in turn 'enterprise themselves' in order to maximize their quality of life' (Rose, 1998: 8). This double bind of autonomization and responsibilization is what drives the perpetuation of neoliberal standards and it applies equally to administrative institutions and individual behaviour.

As Rose (1998) reminds us, the role of psychology in the ongoing transformation of subjectivity is important. In effect, neo-liberalism operates through a combination of behavioural psychology and economic rationality (Gordon, 1991: 43). The exercise of
liberty being bound to an economic logic, self-actualization, personal happiness and wealth all depend on the ability to make the right decisions in a competitive environment. The proliferation of techniques of self-regulation like meditation, talk therapy, self-help books etc, indicates a fairly widespread desire to do away with impediments to success. Success, performance, hard work and tenacity are becoming self-evident regulators of social life and potentialities to which individuals aspire to in their quest for self-actualization. Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, enterprises are hiring personnel to survey their workers’ preferences and devise motivational programs in order to create a happier, more productive workforce (Foucault, 2004b: 229-2).

Governmental programs applied in the 1980’s, particularly in their more drastic forms in the US and Great Britain, were widely interpreted as overemphasizing the economic, self-interested aspects of liberty. Along with the perceived erosion of moral norms following three decades of hedonistic individualism, citizens and state agencies began to assess the cultural consequences of neoliberal governance on society. While maintaining most of the criteria instated by a neoliberal rationality, government is starting to integrate a multiplicity of ethical initiatives led by ‘third sector’ organizations (Rose, 1999: 176). Schemes such as community policing, voluntary work, local and international development projects are becoming part and parcel of the re-organization of governance along particular moral identifications. The state’s role within these emerging networks of solidarity and allegiances is to act as a kind of ‘enabler’ and to incite self-management. Individuals are therefore no longer solely responsible for their own well-being, they are held responsible for the social consequences of their actions. Governance through community is based on the ongoing internalization of a double-edged responsibility; ‘a responsibility to oneself and one’s obligations to others’ impressed upon the individual through his or her membership in local and international networks of association (1999: 88).

The above version of governmentality is quite clearly confined to the spatial and temporal limits of the state. It can argued that governmentality, presented and understood in this way, has little to tell us about international relations. But even if there are several difficulties in applying the approach to contemporary international politics, recent historical developments and research projects prove that it is both possible and fruitful to do so. The next section will proceed much in the same way as the first part of the chapter. It will first briefly present the International Relations studies which partly drew on Foucault’s view of modernity, particular brand of anti-foundationalism and enquiries into
the constitution of 'identity.' Secondly, it will present some of the more notable applications of governmentality to International Relations.

2. Post structural IR and Governmentality

Although many of the critically inclined studies in International Relations display some Foucaultian influence, scholars loosely grouped under the banner of poststructuralism are inspired by a wealth of other sources. Most of them also draw from French deconstructionists and literary theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes. However, this section is mainly concerned with expounding Michel Foucault's legacy within the discipline. For this purpose, I will limit my discussion to a few of the more significant contributions to the strands of critique bearing a foucaultian influence. The first one can be traced in the critique of 'scientific' and rationalist approaches to International Relations, the second in accounts of the discursive strategies that delimitate cultural and national identity and the last one in the application of governmentality to international institutional developments. Although I argue that governmentality represents an advance over the applications of Foucault’s earlier work to international relations, these three 'stages' of critique are essentially interrelated and complementary. In general terms, poststructuralism's objective is to destabilize the narratives upon which traditional studies of international relations are based and to open up analytical possibilities.

2.1 The Critique of Neorealism

The main target of early critical theory in international relations was the dominant paradigm of realism/neorealism. One of the first texts to question the neorealist orthodoxy from a poststructuralist perspective is Richard K. Ashley's The Poverty of Neorealism (1984). In his lengthy article, Ashley indicts neorealism as 'a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments' (1984: 228). He presents neorealism's brand of structuralism as theoretically flawed and as a conscious attempt to neutralize the complexities inherent to the study of international relations. Firstly, the 'deep structure' identified by a structuralist analysis is intended to have an 'autonomous existence independent of, prior to, and constitutive of the elements' (1984: 254). However, Waltz (1979) maintains that the anarchical system emerges as a result of the 'external joining of states-as-actors,' a conclusion which obscures the primordial role of the meaning-giving structure in shaping the subjective relations and characteristics of
states (1984: 255). Neorealism's coherence as a theory is therefore based on the conception of the sovereign state as a self-evident, stable unit of analysis. The refusal to recognize that the internal coherence of the state may be at least disputable is a manoeuvre without which the structural determinant of anarchy, based on the differentiation of capabilities among functionally similar units, could not hold. Other possible factors in the explanation of state behaviour, such as cultural and economic variables, are not considered relevant to the fundamental workings of world politics and are altogether excluded from the analysis. What's more, if structural realism claims to do nothing more than provide a scientific explanation for international relations, in other words a detached representation of 'reality,' it implicitly aims to produce certain institutional outcomes. An immediate example would be the pressing necessity of great powers to maintain or enhance their military capabilities in a perpetually dangerous environment. It could also be argued that influential groups or classes have an interest in upholding the military and bureaucratic structures that a constant state of alertness requires.

However, poststructuralism is generally more interested in interrogating the fundamental assumptions upon which mainstream IR approaches (such as Liberalism, Marxism, Realism and Neorealism) are based than it is in exposing their unavowed interests or ideological tendencies. In subsequent works, Ashley (1988, 1989) argues that neorealism's pretension to objectivity relies on unacknowledged assumptions about 'Rational Man' and 'Sovereignty.' Looking for stable beginnings upon which to ground the knowledge of man as an independent being or in social relationships, Enlightenment thinkers attempted to discover primary 'truths,' which would contribute to organize and unify representation, and offer the promise of a more complete understanding of technological as much as human processes. The more positivistic tendencies of the Enlightenment, recognizable in approaches like neorealism, sought to bring human cognition and social activity ever more amenable to prediction and instrumental control. However, throughout the relationship between knowledge and the observable world, and in this case the explanation of the latter through structural factors, Ashley argues that the unity of the modern phenomenological subject is preserved. He maintains that state sovereignty, as one of the fundamental modern constructs, is consciously defined as a valid ontological term by critical reason. In his words, sovereignty 'invokes a figure of man who recognizes some specific limitations on his doing and knowing, not as external constraints, but as a virtually constitutive of his autonomous being as the necessary centre of historical narrative' (Ashley, 1989: 266). As the rational centre of reflexion, man imposes boundaries as to the conditions of possibility
for an ordered and peaceful life within the international realm. Neorealists therefore insist on the dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy, between coherent pacified units, and an external environment which remains unchecked by a central authority (Ashley, 1988: 238). The absoluteness of the state as a mode of organizing political and social beings implies an abstract ideal of internal order preserved from the vicissitudes of the outside. What lies outside of state boundaries is to be suspected as a potentially ill-intentioned ‘Other.’ Postructuralist writers associate this strategic exclusion with the broader modern tendency to segregate between what is amenable to knowledge and what is best left to the external realm of indecision and disorder.

While modern investigations in political philosophy have long hinted at reason’s inability to encompass every aspect of human understanding, International Relations has remained characteristically steeped in absolute distinctions for epistemological purposes (Ashley, 1988: 131 and Walker, 1993: 10). In itself, the variety, uncertainty and volatility implied in the term ‘international’ seems to require the strategic closure of nearly infinite analytical possibilities. State sovereignty therefore provides a secure ontological ground for the interpretation of world politics. Concurrently, it assigns particular conceptual, spatial and temporal limits to identity. As Walker asserts; ‘it is this proliferation, affirmed by accounts of the modern state as ... container of all cultural meaning, and the site of sovereign jurisdiction over territory, property and abstract space, and consequently over history, possibility and abstract time, that still shapes our capacity to affirm both particular and collective identities’ (1993: 162). According to accounts like Walker’s and Ashley’s, the continuing insistence on state sovereignty as the basis for international relations theory participates in the creation of mutually exclusive identities bound to oppose each other in an anarchical environment.

On other counts, the voluntary epistemological closure operated by neorealism may seem difficult to reconcile with the contemporary movement in the international sphere towards an increased fluidity of goods, people and technological advances. Sovereignty no longer appears to be able to contain the lived experience of hybrid identities, temporal acceleration and spatial extension (Walker, 1993). However, in the face of these criticisms and potential difficulties, neorealism actually asserts and perpetuates its criteria as to what constitutes a truthful explanation of international relations. Partly inspired by foucaultian genealogy, some commentators have sought to expose the various strategies through which
international politics has been constructed as a ‘regime of truth,’ and, in so doing, to make silenced discourses and alternative interpretations re-emerge.6

Through their assessment of the more fundamental assumptions upon which scientifically inclined theories of political reality rest, poststructuralists scholars of international relations aim to ‘denaturalize’ commonly accepted distinctions between theory and practice, object and subject as well as domestic and international. Subsequently to the openings brought about by the critique of metanarratives at work in the neorealist conception, a portion of postmodern or postructuralist scholars turn their attention to the analysis of discourse and more specifically to the ways in which discursive power-strategies constitute national identities. By doing that, they move to more historically and practically oriented research programs.

2.2 Discourse analysis and Identity Formation

Within international relations, much of the work inspired by foucaultian genealogy in particular, has given way to the study of the discursive modalities of identity formation. Of course, identity is not taken here to mean the manifestation of individuality or freedom, but takes shape according to a highly developed array of purposeful and hierarchical discursive strategies. For genealogists, subjectivity and identity are constituted through historically specific configurations of power. They are the result of regularly repeated gestures and narratives that either perpetuate a positive definition of a particular identity or a more negative one based on ongoing processes of differentiation. In general, the source material of these studies consists in either bureaucratic reports, journalistic pieces, academic texts or official speeches and the focus is more often than not put on the contrasting games of identity formation. The critical purpose of these studies is to expose the arbitrary nature of the distinctions purported by traditional accounts of world politics, with a particular emphasis on deconstructing the notion of fixed cultural and national identities.

In Writing Security (1998), David Campbell describes the historical and discursive processes by which American identity has been constituted. He argues that in the historical

becoming of the United States up to the present times, the consolidation of American identity has been informed by a series of localized and generalized differentiations. The inherent instability of the United States' identity, composed almost exclusively of immigrants, requires the constant use of powerful symbols and unifying historical narratives ‘so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent’ (Campbell, 1998: 31). Campbell argues that American identity itself partly overcomes its own internal contradictions by externalising them in a highly charged differentiation with ethnic, cultural or ideological opponents. He draws the history of the internal constitution of the U.S. through a succession of stark exclusions, starting with the English settlers’ brutal encounter with Amerindian tribes. Convinced that their mission was to materialize God’s kingdom on earth, Puritans identified the untamed wilderness of North America and its original inhabitants as obstacles to their religious and cultural project. The settlers’ own attributes of purity, industriousness and civilization were articulated and enhanced through the characterization of Amerindians as licentious, stupid and barbaric. The advancing colonization of the West, depicted in most textbooks on American history as a manifestation of the ‘frontier spirit,’ symbol of courage and perseverance, is also one of bloody encounters with the Other. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the mounting number of immigrants from continental Europe and Ireland and of black slaves transported from Africa, contributed to the delimitation of a superior identity; characteristically white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. Throughout the 20th century, however, American ‘nationhood’ endeavoured to overcome or sideline its own internal contradictions by externalizing them in a highly charged differentiation with ideological and, more recently, cultural opponents (both at home and abroad), all the while re-asserting the universality of its founding principles. The discursive constructions that follow 9/11 essentially draw on the same historically constituted modalities of exclusion.7

As against the assumptions of mainstream international relations theory, Campbell insists that ‘the state’s reality holds, not to a pre-determined conception of being, but to the combination of regularly repeated acts’ (Campbell, 1998: 10). He makes clear that the constitution of American identity within a bounded territorial space depends on the continual performance of rituals of exclusions and positive characterizations. The general lines of American nationhood and subjectivity emerge out of their integration and perpetuation of dominant discourses, themselves bound to struggles, reversals, novel

combinations and historical transformations. If Campbell offers a powerful genealogical account of American identity; of the forgotten historico-political discourses beneath the surface of unitary interpretations, his characterization of otherness is often set in radically oppositional terms, which results in the occlusion of the degrees of differentiation (Hansen, 2006: 51). In *Security as Practice*, Lene Hansen proposes to specify how the ‘Selves’ and the ‘Others’ referred to in Campbell’s book are constituted and to determine the degrees of difference between seemingly opposite poles. What’s more, she suggests to examine how ‘difference is constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical identities’ (2006: 51). Hansen’s analysis of identity-formation then proceeds around the necessary construction of a delimited space (spatial), in which certain cultural and intellectual standards prevail (temporal), and where there are particular views as to the moral (non)responsibility towards other nations (ethical) (2006: 51). All of these aspects tend to vary significantly according to cultural, geographic and historical contexts.

Others like Henrik Larsen, using Foucault’s understanding of discourse, set out to offer an alternative approach to the ‘traditional’ foreign policy analysis, which he associates with people like Rosenau and Holsti. Starting from Foucault’s analysis in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, he asserts that meaning and language are situational, self-referential and not exterior for the analyst to untangle; they are both part of the manner in which the researcher will emit hypotheses. If ideas are considered at all in the analysis of foreign policy decisions, they are so as static ‘variables’ in an array of other variables (1997: 7). Larsen takes the case of ‘Europe’ as a discursive formation and shows how France and Britain each undergo modifications in their conceptual relations with ‘Europe’ at the close of the 1980’s. With Foucault’s help, he shows the dynamic integration of sub-discourses to the more general statements on Europe and surveys the changes of outlook as regards to the idea of Europe in both countries at the institutional and discursive levels.

In her study of the U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines, Roxanne Lynn Doty’s (1993) examines how the subjectivity of both Filipinos and Americans is constituted through language. She argues that the discursive positioning of both protagonists involves a hierarchy of identities; Americans are associated with benevolence, efficiency and moral responsibility while Filipinos are seen as precisely the opposite. The formation of identity here works in an oppositional logic that can be traced in the linguistic construction of the ‘Other’. In contrast to traditional approaches of foreign policy analysis and international relations, discourse analysis assumes that ‘words, language and discourse have a force
which is not reducible to either structures or cognitive attributes of social actors' (1993: 301). As with Larsen, language possesses its own rules of constitution without being an unchanging object that can be invariably appropriated by individuals for their own motivations. Individuals are not 'the loci of meaning' (1993: 302), their subjectivity is constructed through linguistic and conceptual categories that are assigned specific positions within larger discursive formations. Specific political interventions are made possible through the conceptual association of needs, characteristics and aspirations to groups and subjects.

In an effort to systematize the study of discourse in critical international relations at the end of the 1990’s, Jennifer Milliken (1999) reviews the various ‘theoretical commitments’ of post-structuralism. Typically, ‘discourses are understood to work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude, for example, by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified’ (1999: 229). Following Milliken’s argument, political practices are permeated by dominant discourses that define subjectivity and meaningful objects. This understanding of discourse draws heavily on Foucault’s conception of power and truth. Throughout a discontinuous series of historical struggles, particular forms of knowing and studying social reality assert themselves over others. Identities or knowledges that do not correspond to these momentary ‘regimes of truth’ are resisted and discarded. ‘Difference’ is subject to linguistic categorization and the constitution of identity is once again established in oppositional terms. The study of International Relations according to this model would involve looking at the linguistic constitution of the ‘enemy’ and at the formal authority of experts and policy makers to speak correspondingly to their mastery of dominant paradigms (1999: 229). For all the discontinuities and breaks that Foucault identifies in the study of discursive formations, however, Milliken is struck by how ‘dominant discourses have been largely continuous’; frameworks of binary opposition seem to repeat themselves steadily (1999: 246). She insists on the ability of post-structural discourse analysis to identify continuity and propose coherent research programs in contrast to other more static treatments of discourse. Along similar lines, Ole Waever (2002) argues that post-structural advances in the analysis of discourse should provide a more systematic study of language and identity in foreign policy. He suggests a notion of discursively produced identity that is ‘both structured and more unstable’ (2002: 22). The discontinuities found in discursive formations, just as much
as political practices, can be understood according to a set of basic concepts and codes that prevail in a political culture (2002: 30). According to Waever, the explanation of change and continuity must rely on a series of identifiable and lasting concepts in order to escape the Foucaultian juxtaposition of disjointed histories.

Even though the play of material structures is invoked in many discursive analyses, they are rarely integrated in a systematic fashion. Consequently, discourse analysis in International Relations often remains at the level of language and text. In doing so, it is likely to be preoccupied with identifying the elements of official discourses that assert and perpetuate distinctions based on standard oppositions between inclusion/exclusion, national and foreign, normal and deviant, good and evil, etc. While the use of those discursive strategies by political elites has proven to be pervasive in the justification of wars, as well as domestic and foreign policies, an analysis of the formation of identity must go beyond the reassertion of oppositional terms, however moderated by more precise differentiations. This is not to say that this form of analysis has nothing to offer, but that it needs to be supplemented with an examination of the role material and institutional factors in the constitution of subjectivity. As Waever points out; 'identities are often involved in contrasting games, (but) it definitely does not follow from a post-structuralist starting point, that antagonisms should be the main source of meaning. Quite the contrary, pure dichotomies are not very information rich' (Waever, 1996: 3).

2.3 Governmentality and International Relations

The two first stages of critique inspired by Foucault opened the way to an alternative understanding of International Relations by questioning the distinctions between domestic and international, sovereignty and anarchy as well as Rational Man versus Irrational Man. Discourse analysis has endeavoured to identify the textual and verbal instantiations of the above distinctions. Both of these critical enterprises remain valid in their own rights, but if we are to provide a more complete, more complex picture of contemporary subjectivity in an intra-national context, several elements must be integrated to the analysis. By following the development of Foucault’s thought, more particularly his redefinition of power in Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, we can begin to associate the rules of formation of discursive spheres with tactics surrounding the actual disposition of subjects and governmental institutions. Again, the relatively few commentators who have applied governmentality to International Relations have uncovered the unspoken requirements in
transnational strategies of governance from a patient inspection of reports and policy papers as well as interviews with development agents and local civil society activists. They have done so in order to reconstitute the ‘practices, programmes, techniques and strategies,’ that guide state intervention and subjective choices in particular contexts (Larner and Williams, 2004: 4). However, in spite of the analytical possibilities offered by such an application, several problematic elements also need to addressed.

Certainly, with the liberal democratic protocols (good governance, transparency, free trade, human rights, local democracy, governmental accountability, etc) applied in post-communist states and third world countries, post war reconstruction projects (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and so on) and the innumerable incentives to build active civil societies throughout the world, it is clear that a particular model of governance and its associated institutional channels are beginning to take hold across national boundaries. Following Foucault’s conception of power, Jacob Sending and Ivar Neumann point out that ‘the ascendance of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors…(but is rather an) expression of a change in governmentality by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of governance to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government’ (2006: 658). Governmentality sees the recent re-orientation of world governance not as a straightforward transfer of authority from sovereign states to civil society institutions, but as a strategic displacement of managerial techniques and functions. The role of the state and of multinational corporations in international development schemes is increasingly taking the form of supervision and partnership. Far from arguing that recognizable sources of economic and political power acting upon the subjectivity of recipient countries and individuals have disappeared, it can nonetheless be said that performance criteria and normative expectations are being carried through a greater multiplicity of intermediary, more surreptitious agencies. The form of power inherent to emerging patterns of global governance is at once more dispersed, decentred and far-reaching.

Ronnie Lispchutz argues that international institutions and NGO’s are formulating particular methods of governance, standards and norms that are beginning to shape state action. He defines ‘global governance’ as an ‘arrangement of actors and institutions, of rules and rule, through which the architecture of the global articulation of states and capitalism is maintained’ (Lispchutz, 2005: 237). Most of those who use governmentality
to talk about global governance, although they differ in their emphasis on the kind of power at work in the process, aim to unwrap the global liberal strategies implied in the institutional promotion of rights, obligations and values to the readers’ attention. More specifically, they aim to bring forth the political, economic and legal criteria which individual subjects are invited to comply with if they are to become successful participants in the expanding network of global norms and institutions. As Michael Merlingen attests, ‘IGO’s (International Governmental Organization) discursively constitute phenomena as problems whose solution requires international interventions’ (2003, 368). Agents of international development therefore constitute institutionally weak and economically deprived countries as spaces of intervention. In so doing, they objectify and assess them according to specific performance criteria and of knowledge practices. Statistical and formal reports as to indexes of prosperity, rates of participation in civil society projects, the relative success or shortcomings of democracy workshops in faraway towns and villages, construct a multitude of micro standards that regulate the activities of individual subjects directly involved in development projects. International governmental and non-governmental organizations monitor the behaviour of recipient countries as much as local participants and coordinators, and if the latter fail to comply with some of the more basic standards set in program guidelines, a set of disciplinary measures are put in place (Merlingen, 2003: 369). Typically, within a neoliberal rationality, these measures involve a mixture of normalizing, positive incitements and more strictly punitive gestures. As we will see in chapter five, conditionality exemplifies this double-edged means of intervention.

Although governmentality can tell us quite a lot about the developing modes of intervention into the lives of citizens in third world countries, there are several problems as to its application to International Relations. Even without mentioning it explicitly, Foucault’s study of the various historical combinations pertaining to the liberal rationality of government presuppose the nation-state as the delimited space within which governmental relations can take place. As will be emphasized in the next chapter, governmentality rests on the more fundamental assertion of a delimitative and coercive power inherent in the territorialization of states. What’s more, Foucault is clearly focused on technologically advanced Western countries, and, to a large extent, the effectiveness of advanced liberal norms depends on the existing capacity of subjects to internalize a great array of subtle normalizing practices. Governmentality would then seem to be at pains to show the subjective transformations involved in the integration of extraneous standards of
development in non-Western countries (Mosse and Lewis, 2005: 14). The risk is that accounts of standardized systems of international governance remain at the level of describing procedural-institutional norms and requirements as opposed to how the latter are integrated, forced upon, ignored or rejected by the actual subjects of governmental intervention; individuals in third world countries. This points to a problem regarding the definition of the object and scale of a governmental analysis of international relations. States and international organizations, as subjects of governmental objectification and intervention, cannot be said to internalize norms and requirements in the same way individuals do.

Conclusion

Apart from clarifying the logical progression of Foucault's thought, the purpose of presenting his move from a critique of modern knowledge paradigms strained between radical hermeneutics and holistic structuralism (Rabinow and Dreyfus, 1982) to a reconstitution of power/knowledge assemblages which objectify both individual subjects and the population as a whole, is to identify and preserve some of the insights that supplement a governmental perspective. Governmentality's main strength consists in making explicit the often-unacknowledged requirements for a successful adaptation, both institutionally and subjectively, to specific technical, cultural and economic standards. However, its analytical remit must also explicitly include the discursive instantiations and disciplinary institutional spaces through which modern identities are constructed.

In the context of the critical redefinition and opening of International Relations theory, Foucault's influence, either with regards to his enemies or his supporters, has been considerable. The foucaultian-inspired critique of dominant, supposedly scientific theoretical strands like neorealism has opened to a number of interesting research projects starting from studies on the discursive constitution of national identities to accounts on global governmentality. Although Foucault's thought offers several promising avenues for future analysis, we have seen that the application of his ideas to International Relations is not without its difficulties. International Relations, as a discipline which justifiably takes states as its main object of study, actually problematizes the kind of power emphasized in disciplinary and governmental modes of social control. Indeed, it is difficult to sustain that the definition of threats to national security and of the measures required to address them, do not emanate from a centralized political authority at some point or the other. This problématique has recently been the subject of much discussion. The next chapter will
present the attempts to re-evaluate the governmentality framework according to the persistence of sovereign power and suggest some of the ways in which the two seemingly heterogeneous forms of power may combine and interact.
Chapter Two:
Biopolitics and Sovereignty

Introduction

If we adhere strictly to a governmental account, the thesis that sovereign power is increasingly irrelevant to analyze the perpetuation of governmental power holds good. However, Foucault himself never stopped hesitating between various forms and combinations of power, even if at first impression, the elements of domination present in his earlier work seem to have receded in favour of the more surreptitious and subtle form of power characteristic of governmentality. This chapter aims to present some of the work in which Foucault considers the relationship between discipline, government and sovereign power more closely, most particularly in a series of published lectures entitled Society Must be Defended (2003). Following on from Foucault’s own account and that of others interested in the play of sovereignty as force rather than as legitimate institutional framework, I will suggest potential ways in which the relationship between the above forms of power may be understood. Further on, I will draw the consequences of such combinations for the study of International Relations. The main task of this chapter is to extend the analytical reach of governmentality and to critically engage with some of its premises. My account of sovereign power breaks away from a strictly foucaultian understanding by incorporating decision, intentionality and ideological features to a governmentality framework.

1. Government and Violence

It is legitimate to ask why Foucault did not dwell on the sometimes violent and authoritarian means by which liberal states have maintained themselves (Dean, 2007). There are glaring examples of direct and indirect forms of violence deployed within penal systems, disciplinary institutions, welfare reforms and foreign policies. Part of the answer lies with Foucault’s hostility towards the juridico-political conception of power. For him, political theory had remained trapped in an antiquated formula in which the individual right holder is invariably pitted against the power of the state. This suggests a perpetual contest between two abstract entities that is based on the ability of the one to limit the other’s power, understood here as a capability which is possessed and exercised in order to
produce a particular result. Foucault maintains that sovereignty epitomizes the latter conception and is above all characterized by the king's ownership and display of violence. According to his historical analysis, once the authority, legitimacy and structure of the state are entrenched within early modern times, the self-legitimating violence characteristic of royal power is transformed and displaced through disciplinary apparatuses and the management of life at the individual and societal levels.

In other words, around the end of the 18th century, men's happiness, health and security become more pressing concerns for government than commanding the obedience of subjects through violence. Although he does not deny the permanence of coercive state organs or influential social groupings, Foucault sets aside the historical transformations of sovereign power itself and considers the ongoing attempts to define the bounds of political power as flawed and obsolete modes of analysis. This brings us to consider what the political may mean within such a framework. Foucault disputes the conception of a political history in which individuals have progressively become free through the reassertion of their fundamental juridical entitlements. Political theory, traditionally occupied with setting the legitimate bounds of authority and individual claims, produces and nurtures moral aspirations which lie beyond the contingencies of the present. Foucault finds this suspect and dangerous, implying that that the paradigm of liberation/oppression, based on the notion of an unscathed human essence, is severely mistaken in its understanding of politics and subjectivity. More importantly for him, however, is the fact that competing conceptions of Man, or radical humanisms, have been the source of great destruction. (Foucault, 1997: 31).

Foucault then insists that power does not only originate from an abstract centre such as the sovereign, the state or the people, but from a variety of discrete domains concerned with individual behaviour and the manner in which it may be evaluated with respect to autonomously generated norms. The emergence of normalizing sciences in the 19th century illustrates the progressive dissolution of state power throughout increasingly specific, self-sustaining fields of human activity. Individuals are thus defined more by their objectification within different normalizing practices than by their juridical status in a political system. In such a context, resistance can no longer be solely conceived through the assertion of individual rights against a central power but rather through the assimilation and refusal of local modes of objectification. My view is that sovereign power remains integral to the deployment of governmental power and that we are constituted by our
juridical position in a political system to a greater extent than Foucault would have admitted. On the other hand, in agreement with Foucault, the citizen/state game of conquests and defeats is far from telling the whole story. Games of power are played on a daily basis by individuals acquainting themselves with the present conditions of subjection intrinsic to both political and extra-political realms. A conception of resistance of foucaultian inspiration should therefore combine the subject's engagement with a variety of modes of subjection which straddle the cultural-aesthetic and political-legal spheres. The regulative aim inherent to such an engagement is that games of power be played with a minimum of domination (Foucault, 1997: 299). In contrast with power, states of domination are not relational; they cancel out the fluidity and reversibility normally allowed and encouraged within the liberal way of government. Domination is akin to starker expressions of power such as juridical subjection and deployments of force. The variety of means through which sovereign power assets itself during, for example, the establishment of exceptional security measures, are each manifestations of strategic attempts to limit and consolidate the space within which individual freedom usually plays out. In order for individuals to ensure that a minimum of domination be brought upon them, there is an initial necessity to identify and assimilate the rules of social, cultural and institutional interaction. Attentive observation is therefore an essential part of critique (Simons, 1995: 78), but it is only the first step in a transformation of both the self and socio-political arrangements. To a great extent, studies in governmentality excel at teasing out the processes and rationalities implicit in a variety of micro-practices, but the great majority of those studies tend to offer a reiteration of the 'real' that has much in common with an objective kind of historical sociology. It is in my opinion important to explicitly link the attentive observation of subjectifying mechanisms with the possibility of ethics and resistance.

1.1 Foucault and Sovereign Power

The relationship between discipline, sovereignty and governmentality is somewhat unclear in Foucault's writings but he comes closest to work out how these different types of power intersect in a series of lectures entitled *Society Must be Defended* (2003). Proceeding from a typically extensive historical overview and in a somewhat experimental fashion, Foucault retells the troubled emergence of the constructs of sovereignty and nationhood. Instead of analysing the history of political relations from the perspective of succeeding central powers, he exposes the tensions and omissions intrinsic to the conquest of sovereignty as
an ordering principle for Western polities. However, more importantly for us, he also suggests that discipline, biopower and sovereign power come together in the identification of elements, either internal or external, deemed threatening to the biological integrity of a national population. Following Foucault, I will consider sovereignty as an expression of ongoing modes of subjection inside the state and as the basis from which exceptional measures are enacted when the constructs of order and security are deemed threatened. Considered in this way, it is at once ontologically prior to power relations because it establishes territorial units in which the latter relations become possible, and is manifest in the disciplinary and securitizing objectives of government. Moving away from Foucault, however, I also see sovereignty as the expression of decisional and ideological instances who have to authority to speak through their familiarity with power and to determine at which point the security of the biopolitical whole is threatened. This section will therefore not dwell on the norms and laws that have developed out of the progressive democratization of right, but on sovereignty as fundamentally related to decision and violence. This is why Schmitt and Agamben’s insights are complementary to Foucault’s discussion of the relation between race, sovereignty and biopolitics.

1.2 ‘Society Must be Defended’

Foucault suggests that in ancient and early medieval times, history usually assumed the role of justifying the rule of a monarch, who most likely vanquished the enemy through heroic deeds. These glorious and mythical stories were eventually supplemented with the history of distinctive groups struggling against the imposition of a rule by a foreign monarch. Foucault mentions the example of the Saxons, who proudly asserted their traditional attachment to freedom as opposed to that of the Normans, who brought with them the tradition of a divinely appointed king. The articulation of a nation’s rights against a central power and the interpretation of history as a series of struggles rather than as the recounting of an unbroken line of kings, releases a potentially disruptive element in the constitution of sovereignty. Foucault identifies these undercurrents as historico-political discourses unsettling the establishment of a centralizing philosophico-juridical discourse. Further into the lecture, he presents Boulainvillier’s account of the erosion of the nobility’s rights and privileges under Louis XIV as an example of the increasingly acute self-understanding of the various ‘nations’ constituting the kingdom. By criticizing the Third Estate’s (bourgeois, peasants and workers) lack of historical consciousness and its understanding of sovereign authority in technical and legal terms rather than as the
legitimate entitlement of a superior and more spiritual class (Neal, 2004: 14), Boulainvillers somehow alluded to the possibility of political change through of a group's realization of its own position and aim in the historical development of the state. At the time of the French revolution, the Third Estate was able to articulate its own historical mission very clearly and to declare its own guiding principles as universal.

In the midst of the religious wars plaguing the 17th century, Hobbes' theorization of sovereignty essentially aimed to 'block' the historico-political discourses that recalled the bloody battles and struggles endured by the various warring nations (Foucault, 2003: 111). The potentially explosive expression of opposing rights and truth claims had to be disarmed by a single legitimate power that would incorporate the entire social body and provide for the basic needs of security and order. Hobbes asserted the right of the victorious party to rule as long as it fulfilled the dual duty of protecting its subjects and securing the kingdom. Tied to the existential necessity of order, the sovereign is invariably justified in its decisions over the life and death of its subjects as much as in the means it chooses to preserve its integrity. As Foucault indicates, the acceptance of the basic juridical principle of sovereignty marks the beginning of political philosophy, from then on framed in terms of rights and legitimacy. It is the latter formulation of political history as a contest between rights-endowed citizens and sovereign states that he disputes. Against this understanding, he attempts to show the inherent violence and the multiplicity of forces contained in the establishment and perpetuation of sovereign power; 'laws are born in the middle of expeditions, conquests and burning cities; but also continues to rage within the mechanisms of power... or at least, to constitute the secret driving force of institutions of law and order' (Foucault, 2003: 61). This is what leads Foucault to invert Clausewitz's aphorism and to present war as a potentially more appropriate referent for the analysis of political power.

Here, one might contend that in Foucault's historical account, the violence intrinsic to the earlier stages of sovereignty's establishment progressively conceals and disperses itself through the eventually bounded social body. However, as Foucault emphasizes, the incipient manifestation of repressive power is still actual in social relations and sovereignty is perpetually re-inscribing itself 'through a form of unspoken warfare... in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and

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8 From Clausewitz's 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' to 'politics is the continuation of war by other means' (Foucault, 2003: 15).
everyone of us’ (Foucault, 1980: 90). Furthermore, in spite of the later Foucault’s insistence on the ubiquity of biopower as a means to make and preserve life, the sovereign’s right to take life or impose discipline never entirely disappears. In the domestic realm, biopolitics can be also said to exercise violence on the subjects whose lives it decides not to preserve by exposing them to greater risks than the rest of the population (Kelly, 2004: 60-65). Biopower can therefore also ‘let die’ through its internal processes as opposed to ‘make die’ through an unwavering external power (Rose and Rabinow, 2006: 203). The degree and visibility of violence becomes even greater when a population is deemed threatened by another. One of the means by which the notion of a war of all against all came to recede, apart from the establishment of a juridical order, was the progressive displacement of violence to the state’s borders. The historico-political discourses of race rumbling underneath the surface of state formation from the 17th to the late 18th century were integrated to the necessity of preserving a given population. As Foucault remarks, the historico-political discourse of race eventually became a way of;

‘turning that weapon against those who had forged it, of using it to preserve the sovereignty of the state, a sovereignty whose luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals but by medico-normalizing techniques. Thanks to the shift from law to norm, from races plural to race in the singular, from the emancipatory project to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able to invest or take over the discourses of race struggle and re-utilize it for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race’ (Foucault, 2003: 81).

As we have looked at the emergence of biopolitics in chapter one, the insight relevant to our present enterprise is Foucault’s reference to a nostalgic longing for the ‘magico-juridical rituals’ inherent in contemporary forms of nationalism and sovereignty’s notable capability to re-invigorate itself by strategically assimilating other discursive forms.

As Andrew Neal remarks, one of the innovations of Society Must be Defended and incidentally one of the more useful points for international relations, is Foucault’s ‘recovery of the union between modern sovereignty and collective subjectivity in the nation-state’ of which the French Revolution is a prime example (2004a: 18). Once the sovereign and the national population are forced and incorporated into one coherent entity, sovereignty can also be more easily democratized (Foucault, 1980: 105). As we have seen, the democratization of sovereignty is concomitant to the development of public right, itself the outcome of liberalism’s negotiation of the boundaries of state authority. Again, with
the apparent dissolution of sovereignty into multiple sites of power including individuals and institutions, the necessity to ground and legitimate it diminishes and what remains is a governmental preoccupation with the population’s well-being and, ultimately, survival. It then becomes a matter of identifying and formulating threats, which can be located both inside and outside of the state, in terms of the biological survival of the population. The constitution of extensive disciplinary and military-diplomatic apparatuses from the late 17th to early 19th centuries translated in great part the need to identify, interpret and defuse those dangers. In effect, the identification of a threat to the ‘biological survival’ of the nation amounts to racism. However, the kind of racism alluded here is not ‘ethnic’ racism, which associates particular characteristics to a dangerous other, but ‘state’ racism.9

The notion of state racism is intimately linked with the emergence of a new political right in the 19th century, which begins to complement and interpenetrate the previously established right of the sovereign to kill. Foucault characterizes this new right as the power to ‘make live’ and ‘let die’ (Foucault, 241: 2003). If through the end of the 18th century and into the next century, the role of the modern state is increasingly to protect and improve the lives of national citizens as opposed to solely preserve its authority over subjects, ‘racism’; the ‘fundamental distinction between who must live and who must die’ (254: 2003)10 for the benefit of the biopolitical whole, becomes both an obligation for the sovereign and a logic that is acceptable to the population (256-258: 2003). The exercise of sovereignty through racism manifests itself in the permanence of disciplinary apparatuses but also in the way wars are being justified. As Foucault maintains; ‘wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the

9 Here it is important to distinguish between state racism and nationalism. Foucault maintains that the struggles in and around the French revolution were taking place between ‘nations’ (in this case between the Third Estate and the Nobility), which he defines as the ‘collections, societies, groupings of individuals who share a status, mores, customs, and a certain particular law’ (2003: 134). Throughout the process of the historical fusion of conflicting ‘nations’ into representative constitutional orders, apparent in many European countries toward the mid 19th century, two main discourses attempt to recast race struggles according to novel identifications. One of these is the transformation of race struggle into class struggle. The other is the emerging conception of ‘racial purity, with all its monistic, Statist and biological implications’ (2003: 81). Broadly speaking, nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries tends to oscillate somewhere in between state-sponsored aspirations to racial purity and inclusive republican constitutions. But, as Foucault notes, the crucial development has less to do with nationalism than with the biological integration of the already bounded population, not so much to preserve the pure ethnic, cultural and linguistic make up of the state than the population already within the state. Nation as republican unit where troubles and differences must be remedied.

10 This is, as will see later, very close to Agamben’s argument about the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of life which underpins Western political history.
name of life necessity’ (2003: 137). State racism is therefore enacted as soon as the perception of a threat, however unspecified, faces a national population (Kelly, 2004: 61-62). To some extent, the vague and all encompassing notion of a ‘threat to the population’ leaves substantial license to the sovereign as to what justifies an intervention. This lack of specificity also obscures the sources of the said danger and the complexity of its nature. Quoting Foucault again; ‘the enemies are not political adversaries but those identified as external and internal threats to the population’ (Foucault in Stoler, 1995: 265).

The receding of ethnic racism in favour of state racism is a feature of contemporary Western societies which refers both to the ongoing liberal pledge to universalism and to the biopolitical promise to improve the ‘quality of life.’ Through processes of self-critique and correction, the liberal art of government continually recaptures and codifies suppressed histories on sex, gender, violence and race in Law. As has been said, these processes also work through the subject’s own desire for social inclusion, health and safety. When looking at the ability of government to work through the ‘liberty’ of the subject and to negotiate the norms bounding its expression without necessarily relying on juridical or disciplinary power, the ‘unspoken warfare’ permeating institutions and individual bodies Foucault is talking about can become difficult to trace. Although the threat of death through capital punishment or ‘state negligence’ still remains, life in advanced biopolitical societies is generally safer and easier.

Following Foucault’s lead, it is reasonable to assume that situations requiring visible and prolonged sovereign interventions in advanced biopolitical societies have become fewer. However, there is no reason to think that they will stop occurring altogether. In times of ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency,’ the sovereign, in the form of a variety of authorized agencies, ultimately assesses the nature and orientation of biopolitical needs. As has already been mentioned, it is the decisional moment involved in this re-orientation which must be added to Foucault’s treatment of sovereignty in Society Must be Defended.

1.3 Population, Security and the Exception

The presumed lack of emphasis on sovereign power in Foucault’s oeuvre is pointed out with particular force by Giorgio Agamben. Relying upon Carl Schmitt’s notion of the state of exception and on the obscure figure of Homo Sacer in Roman law, Agamben provides a provocative account of the fundamental premises of life and politics in Western history. At
the risk of simplifying Agamben and Schmitt's ideas, it is necessary to give a brief account of their arguments in order to extract a particular version of sovereign power and to outline the manner in which it interacts with biopolitics.

In *Homo Sacer* (1998), Agamben sets out to determine the point at which 'the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power' (Agamben, 1998: 6). He poses the question as a result of Foucault's presumed 'expulsion' of law and sovereignty through the advent of biopolitics (Hunt and Wickham, 1994). Instead of situating the inclusion of bare life into Government at the end of the 18th century like Foucault, Agamben places its initial inclusion as far back as Ancient Greece. Starting from Aristotle's formulation of Man as a political animal, Agamben argues that Bare Life is entrapped in this originary characterization of political activity. In other words, the initial condition of possibility for political activity is precisely the simultaneous integration and exclusion of life. The original impetus behind this inclusion is located in sovereign power and law is nothing other than that power's means to continually re-inscribe itself. With modernity, the confusion of bare life and political existence, of the rule and the exception, becomes ever more complete. Within modern constitutional orders, citizens are invested with the principle of sovereignty through the simple fact of being born into nation-states and included into increasingly extensive regimes of rights (Agamben, 1998: 128). The total encryption of the citizen's existence invariably involves a primary distinction between who is part of the political community and who isn't. Taken to its extreme yet logical limit, Agamben maintains that the sovereign activity of managing inclusion and exclusion is epitomized in the concentration camp or the refugee camp; a space in which the rule and the exception, life and political existence, become indistinguishable (1998: 59). Sovereign power can ultimately kill without ceremony or justification. Agamben illustrates this point through the figure of *Sacred Man* in Roman Legal texts, he who remains outside the law but is nonetheless subject the fatal embrace of sovereign power.

While he lends a more sinister significance to it, Agamben borrows some his reflections on the nature of sovereignty from Carl Schmitt. The latter contends that the juristic domain rests on two different elements; the norm and the decision (Schmitt, 1985: 13). The application of the legal norm requires that a 'normal' situation exist but it is the sovereign whom decides on whether such a situation actually exists. This is to say that the sovereign ultimately determines 'what constitutes public order, public interest and security' (1985: 9)
and how the latter must be preserved. For Schmitt, the decision on contentious and consequential matters such as distinguishing between friend and foe and, more generally, the entertaining of a perpetual awareness of the fragility of the constitutional order, is what constitutes the 'political.' The norm and the normal situation during which it applies have for him no real interest or political value. As Schmitt maintains, the exception 'proves everything; it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception (1985: 15). The firm hand of the sovereign is therefore essential to the existence and survival of the juridical order. In asserting this, Schmitt launches a devastating critique on the parliamentary democracy of his time by charging it with relegating decisions on essential political matters to endless discussion and 'cautious half measures' (1985: 63). As Agamben argues, Schmitt is trying to give a juridical form to the state of exception, and despite pretensions to the contrary, the logical outcome of this position is at best politically dubious. Other thinkers reflecting on sovereignty during that period such as Walter Benjamin, from whom Derrida (1992), Agamben (1998) and perhaps Foucault (1980) have taken their lead, also invite us to reconsider the violence intrinsic to the establishment and preservation of law (Benjamin, 1996: 244 and Agamben, 2005: 131), but they rightly point to sovereignty as a limit-concept, as a foundational construct with no other ground or justification than itself.

Schmitt's attempt to extract a political element from what he describes as the stultified and self-perpetuating motions of parliamentary politics provides valuable insights. The degeneration of a discussion of the bounds of the political into static institutional forms somehow relates to Foucault's own analysis of the progressive internalization of social norms. To my mind, Schmitt also provides us with an analytics of decision which adequately complements Foucault's version of sovereign power. The notion of intentionality carried through the whole of the thesis has actually more in common with a schmittian approach than a foucaultian one. But if Schmitt and Agamben force us to think beyond the confines of biopower, there are a number of issues with their respective theses. Schmitt's critique clearly leaves us with a politically dangerous bid for order at the expense of democratic deliberation. Despite pointing to the disturbing continuity of the state's power to 'command under the threat of death,' (Rose and Rabinow, 2006: 201) and by this correcting Foucault's near omission of the concentration camp as a paradigm of modernity, I think Agamben provides an exaggeratedly fatalistic and unitary account of the nature of Western political history. He presents sovereign violence as the essential character of all forms of exclusion and decisions over life without distinguishing between the
characterization of human beings in a concentration camp and individuals on life support in a hospital (Lemke, 2003: 7). Ultimately, such a radical account of power makes it nearly impossible to find a way out of the sovereign ban. With the total confusion of zoe and bios, the very possibility of politics is cancelled out. If Agamben enjoins us to rethink the initial sovereign distinction and its reproduction in the exclusionary practices of modern statehood and rights regimes, the precise means as to which this power may be opposed are less than clear.

2. The Sovereignty/Biopower nexus in International Politics

In the context of a growing interest for governmentality as an approach to International Relations and of a concern for the modalities of national and international security strategies after a series of terrorist attacks on Western soil, a number of writers, all in their particular manner, have begun to explore the possible interrelations of governmentality and sovereignty in the international realm. Importantly, if most poststructuralists working in the field today would still insist on the arbitrary and exclusionary features of sovereignty, few would go so far as to completely discard the state as a major player in the creation and perpetuation of global liberal governance. States are still generally seen as the main source of biopolitical production. In what follows, I will give a brief critical account of how this problematique has been presented in international relations and in Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000).

Even if poststructuralists aim to unveil and destabilize the assumptions behind modern knowledge constructions of which International Relations theory is a representation, they can hardly deny the permanence of political and territorial units in the contemporary world. Julian Reid and Michael Dillon maintain that ‘sovereignty remains an important aspect of the organization and operation of international power, including that of contemporary liberal peace’ (2000: 127). When speaking of biopolitical regimes in their national as much

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11 Lemke argues that ‘Agamben limits his argument that everyone is susceptible to being reduced to the status of ‘bare life’ without clarifying the mechanism of differentiation that distinguishes between different values of life. It remains woefully unclear to what extent and in what manner the comatose in the hospitals share the fate of prisoners in concentration camps; whether the asylum seekers in the prisons are bare life to the same degree and in the same sense as the Jews in the Nazi Camps’ (paper first presented at the University of Hannover in 2003).

as their international guises, it is indeed difficult to ignore the initial delimitation of the territories and populations upon which government acts nor can we ignore, I would add, the decisions as to the needs and the means by which the latter are kept safe. As Dillon maintains, governmentality necessarily relies on ‘the forceful delimitation of the spaces in which it can operate. These, of course, are precisely what all the spectacles, assertions, legislative, territorializing, and identifying practices of sovereignty itself help to furnish and establish’ (1995: 333). The constitution of a juridical ensemble supposes, as Foucault demonstrates, the forceful unification of warring ‘nations’ in a state and the forceful delimitation of territorial boundaries. These boundaries are perpetually reasserted through powerful discursive and legislative injunctions. A variety of exclusionary modes and practices are used strategically in order to defuse the inherent fragility of national identity and physical borders; practices of exclusion are integral to presumably stable forms of cultural and national identification. The performance of sovereign power is therefore visible in the discursive formulation and institutional validations of what constitutes an ‘imminent threat’ to the population as well as in the specification of preventive or defensive measures needed to secure it. The material objectives regarding national security, in terms of institutional and military preparedness, are intimately related with the necessary consolidation of an object to secure, that is, a population bound by emotional solidarity and in accord with the political responses adopted by its governing bodies.

Taking after both Foucault and Agamben, Dillon attests that ‘any power over death, such as that which classically characterized sovereign power, must nonetheless also be implicated simultaneously in the specification of the life whose life it is that it ultimately desires to command’ (2004: 59). Here, sovereign power’s initial gesture to capture life is intimately bound with its specification through biopolitical calculations. Power over death and decisions to enact security measures are at once prior and contemporaneous to biopolitical stratagems. Following Foucault’s lead, Dillon rightly insists on the specification of life as a crucial aspect in the understanding of subjectivity.

In his recently published book, Julian Reid (2006) makes use of Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s aphorism in order to explore the war-like strategies through which liberal regimes have asserted and perpetuated themselves globally. Aiming to unsettle the normative claims of cosmopolitan liberalism and the democratic practices it intends to promote globally, he refers back to Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinary methods and rationalities in 19th century France and England. Reid argues that the disciplinary
techniques developed to pacify and regulate domestic populations of developed Western states are now being applied to objectify and correct the behavior of the countries where terrorism or other forms of defiance take hold. As he contends, the current reaction of liberal states to the threat posed by terrorism only confirms their continuing 'willingness to wager on their abilities to suborn the life of their enemy to the superiority of the forms of peace and humanity on which their own ways of life are founded' (Reid, 2006: 11). The reintroduction of the more disciplinarian elements inherent in the promotion of cosmopolitan democracy lends a welcome critical edge to Reid's account. However, presented with the problematic conjunction of sovereignty and biopolitics in international relations, Reid contends, following both Deleuze and Guatarri and Hardt and Negri, that the projection of the disciplinary modes and juridical endowments of advanced liberal states through the institutional channels of international development, reconstitutes a sovereign space of sorts according to which tactical interventions can be directed (2006: 57). For reasons I will explain when discussing Empire, I disagree with Reid's idea of the global inscription of rights as the corresponding sign of the existence of a global kind of sovereignty and governmentality.

Although Dillon and Reid, in their critique of liberal cosmopolitanism, recognize the continuing relevance of sovereignty within contemporary assemblages of power, they do not account for the precise ways in which they are either abstractly related or strategically combined in particular contexts. Sovereign power is manifest in the delimitation of territory as well in the definition of the object and content of security measures. It is also at work in the very intention of either extending or subscribing to a multiplicity of development targets and in the strategic use of law in case of liberal regimes' premonition of threat. Of course, I do not mean to say that this is an easy task or to say that Reid and Dillon do not provide useful analytical trails, but some suggestions as to the precise ways in which security, law and government combine at a conceptual and practical level are needed.

Among the interesting attempts to elucidate the kinds of power at work in the contemporary world within International Relations is Edkin's and Pin-Fat's introduction to their edited volume Sovereign Lives (2004). Following Foucault, they distinguish between a 'relationship of power [which] “acts upon [the subject’s] actions” and a ‘relationship of violence [which] acts directly and immediately on the other' (2004: 9). The reversibility and flexibility that characterizes biopower is contrasted with the immobility and starkness
of sovereign power. For Edkins and Pinfat, the proper consideration of sovereign power’s primordial hold on bare life is an opportunity to both accept bare life as it is and contest the ban imposed upon it. If, as they contend, the resistance to the sovereign ban reintroduces the possibility of posing properly political gestures, it is impossible to conceive of such an intimation within a relationship of power, as any subjective action is already presupposed and integrated in a schema of biopolitical potentialities.

One of the more incendiary and thought provoking works of the last ten years, *Empire* (2000), looks at the issue from a rather different angle. The authors’ ambitious objective is to re-articulate the multiplicity of human struggles in our age unto a new plane of immanence, which opposes the intangible yet compelling power of Empire to that of the multitude. Whilst the book is self-consciously experimental and offers a projection of future struggles that is largely theoretical and hypothetical, it provides a stimulating reflection on the possibility of resistance and politics. It is also a brave attempt to make sense of the diffuse and confusing nature of contemporary reality through a collage of the more important currents of thought of our day. While I cannot go into a detailed appraisal of this imposing work, I will single out some of the issues that are relevant to our present discussion.

Against a liberal understanding of global changes as the result of spontaneous interaction between market forces and civil society, and in contrast with the thesis that a single power centre is orchestrating the disposition of global forces, Hardt and Negri suggest that Empire ‘stands clearly over the multitude and subjects it to the rule of its overarching machine, as a new leviathan. At the same time, however, from the perspective of social productivity and creativity (ontological), the hierarchy is reversed’ (2000: 62). They argue that sovereignty, as one of the main ordering functions of modernity and as one of the main vectors of the extension of capital, is being subsumed unto the plane of immanence/empire (2000: 332). This plane of immanence is constituted through the self perpetuating activity of what Hardt and Negri call a ‘new economic-industrial-communicative machine_ in short of a global biopolitical machine’ which is in it of itself the source of an emerging ‘imperial normativity’ (2000: 40). A new transnational form of power is created through the mutually reinforcing dissemination of the all-pervasive legal and normative requirements of cosmopolitan governance and of the technological and financial advances within global capitalism. Apart from being characterized by the spatial and temporal accelerations (in terms of the flows of goods, capital and people) brought about by technological advances,
Empire presupposes a new notion of right. Where the old modern sovereign right was intent on drawing lines and boundaries, right is now constituting a global assemblage of power in which differences and particularities are actually endorsed, replicated and utilized (2000: 138). This new universal right is characterized by a seemingly boundless ethos of acceptance and inclusion and is premised upon the conviction that a set of fundamental ethical and moral rules apply to humanity as a whole. Imperial biopolitics, in keeping with Foucault’s definition, simultaneously individualizes subjects of governance by transcribing and controlling particularities, and totalizes by relating and integrating these specificities to globalized normative expectations.

When the virtual, self-perpetuating biopolitical machine encounters breakdowns or serious derogations to its universal ethical codes, however, imperial right rears its head to redress the problem. In Hardt and Negri’s words, ‘Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace’ (2000: 15). In theoretical terms, the presentation of sovereign power as a rapid-response instance which resurges when the security of certain global biopolitical processes is put in doubt is, I think, correct. However, there are several issues with some of the claims Hardt and Negri are making.

Drawing from a great variety of sources, among them Spinoza, Marx and Deleuze, Hardt and Negri describe their method as immanence rather than dialectics. They explain that its aim is both to ‘subvert the hegemonic languages and social structures’ through deconstruction and to produce alternative forms of socio-political subjectivity, in other words to construct ‘a new constituent power’ (2000: 47). Here, Hardt and Negri’s problematization of modern metanarratives, typical of postmodern criticism, seems to give way to an identification of the yet-to-be realized historical forces that are nurtured within imperial formation and that will, in turn, inaugurate new emancipated political subjectivities. This move, bearing a strong tinge of Marxian teleology, operates the sort of ontological closure which they are arguing against in the first place (Walker, 2002). As Agnew and Coleman highlight, Hardt and Negri also fall into the teleological trap by presenting the modern and postmodern sovereign orders as temporally distinct (2007:329). The shift being operated in Empire from a territorial to a boundless international biopolitical space is too drastic and seems to, perhaps consciously, project itself unto a future state of existence. Second, as Barkawi and Laffey (2002) point out, it is less than certain that traditional forms of imperial domination have disappeared or that a hegemon
such as the US is just one more cog, although Hardt and Negri acknowledge it is an important one, in a decentred biopolitical machine rather than the direct instigator of many biopolitical stratagems. Further, I do not think that imperial right, as described in Empire and Reid’s latest book, is concomitant to the existence of a global sovereign/biopolitical order. The juridical objectification of subjects remains more complete within states, which retain a more important role as to the circulation of people, goods and money than Hardt and Negri would recognize. Moreover, the degree to which life is invested by biopolitics varies greatly from one context to the other. When applied to recipient countries, these requirements are not supported and conveyed by the same cultural and psychological means of subjectification as in the states from where they mainly originate. In all, there are only limited segments of the population, as objectified in global liberal governance, whose subjectivity is being constituted and transformed through the cultural, moral and bureaucratic standards they are replicating on a daily basis.

As many critics have noted, the definition and purpose of the new constituent power; the multitude, is very problematic. Here, the forms of resistance to the new imperial order that Hardt and Negri identify, whether it is the struggle of the Zapatistas or of migrant labourers across the world, are all conflated in their opposition to a global power centre. Against such an assertion, Laclau argues that these struggles are primarily local and particular and that they can only be understood and perhaps solved if they are considered as such (2003: 54-55). As he rightly points out, Hardt and Negri’s presentation of struggles as primarily contextualized and incommunicable, partly inspired by the adoption of a foucaultian approach, sits uncomfortably with the reconnection of those different struggles to a single source of authority.

Having looked at how the interrelation of bio and sovereign power is understood in both Foucault and Agamben, and at the treatment of this same problem in international relations, it is now necessary to try and further specify the complexity of their relationship within the triad of law, security and government.

3. Law, Security and Government

Foucault’s alternate contrasting and correlation of juridical and governmental power speaks of the difficulty in identifying and characterizing the precise points at which they intersect. If government functions by producing and integrating freedom, is it also true to
say that security practices, which we can reasonably associate with the work of sovereign power, function through a degree of subjective participation and replication? Although I certainly do not mean to offer a settlement to the latter question or to solve the problematic conjunction of bio and sovereign power, I will attempt to highlight the complications involved in such a correlation and to identify the contexts in which these modes of power are called upon.

As mentioned above, re-enactments of sovereign power are not considered here, like in Agamben, as the essence of the West’s political history. The numerous states of exception depicted by Agamben in *State of Exception* (Agamben, 2005) surely represent perturbing and thought provoking occasions, but the sovereign tends to surface more visibly when established governmental techniques and systems of signification are momentarily interrupted or fail. If Sovereignty, as the necessary other of biopolitics, is no longer as visible as it once was, there are particular, often unexpected conditions under which its reanimation can take place. Throughout the last four centuries, the way in which sovereignty has been practiced and understood changed radically. It is evidently more bounded and less assertive in contemporary forms of governance, although not, I would say, to the extent that the sources of its operation become entirely hidden. However, considering the historical development of its uses and limitations, it can generally be said that the discretion or salience of sovereign power depends on self-determined strategic necessities at any given time. The closer unfolding events point to an apparent threat to fundamental pillars of the state, that is, the integrity of life, goods and territory, the less discrete and the more powerful the sovereign becomes. Yet, the idea that the sovereign’s decision as to the necessity to preserve the biopolitical entity is to some extent proportional to the perceived need for security by governmental subjects introduces further complexities.

In contrast with the times where the sovereign could take life away at will, the possibility of death in advanced liberal societies has become slightly more remote but the fear of mortality and physical harm has increased. As Mark Kelly remarks referring to post 9/11

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13 I agree with Butler’s idea that post 9/11, sovereignty is *reanimated*, but I am more sceptical about her assertion that it is an *anachronism* (2004: 53). Although it may appear to belong to a distant past, sovereign power has both undergone historical transformations and endured through disciplinaiy measures and decisions to go to war.

14 It is not so much that crime has increased drastically but our fear of crime that sky rocketed. On this see chapter 6 in David Garland (2001) *The Culture Of Control.*
security measures, our need for security has become so great that we may consent to the enactment of unusually extensive powers to the sovereign for our own protection (Kelly, 2004: 65). This is one of the central ambiguities of the governmental tactics of the recent years. From the perspective of governmentality, the definition and delimitation of security is both conducted and premised upon a population’s ‘need’ for security. However, there is a simultaneous enactment of distinctively un-liberal measures, somehow disruptive of the normal subjectifying processes of the citizenry.

The 1976 lectures show that Foucault at least hesitated in his theorization of sovereignty. Whilst in History Of Sexuality, Foucault tends to argue for the demise of sovereignty as a unifying mode of analysis for political relations, we have seen that in Society Must be Defended his argument is more nuanced. If Foucault maintains that the object of the sovereign’s power changes from the preservation of royal authority itself to the preservation of the biopolitical body or ‘race,’ the identification, observation, classification and disciplining of individuals and personal habits deemed prejudicial to social health, and the identification of an external danger which potentially compromises the survival of the population, are both practices that illustrate the persistence of sovereign power. As Mitchell Dean remarks, this also relates to the persistence of an authoritarian element within the liberal art of government; ‘the liberal governing through freedom, or in a manner consistent with individual liberty, does not necessarily mean that individuals should be governed as if they were already capable of such autonomy’ (2007: 119). Considering the often broad and unspecified definition of freedom and social norms in political theory, in practice, these terms are qualified through a series of precise technical and intellectual requirements, themselves purported and validated by particular public and private authorities.

Sovereign power then effectively endures through the biopolitical age in the form of security practices that aim to shield the population from deviant elements inside the state and threatening foes outside of it. As much as a case for particular security measures can be made, its justification must rely on the rational presentation of a threat and of a necessity to adopt specific means to counter it. It follows that sovereign power is exercised with a degree of awareness or even consent from individual members of a population. However, it is also clear that, regardless of consent and opposition, the sovereign’s right to kill or detain without disclosing limitations or justifications, is not yet proscribed from the political life of contemporary liberal societies. Security practices then oscillate between
naked violence and relatively consensual and non-violent measures. Consequently, it is the sovereign’s estimate of what is deemed necessary for the population’s preservation which must be carefully examined. If Foucault points the way to the location of sovereign power in a biopolitical age, further investigation is needed as to how it operates at the intersection of law, security and government.

For Judith Butler, law becomes an essential part of the governmental strategies through which ‘populations are monitored, detained, regulated, inspected, interrogated, rendered uniform in their action fully ritualized and exposed to control and regulation in their daily lives’ (2004: 97). From the perspective of state authorities who ‘temporarily’ usurp and apply legislation, these measures are deemed a necessity. But as Agamben remarks, the theory of necessity ‘is a theory of exception. It is the particular case where the law does not apply ... It does not occur as an objective given, it clearly entails a subjective judgment, and the only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared so’ (Agamben, 2005: 25, 30). For example, politicians in Washington and military personnel in Guantanamo Bay are given the discretionary power to decide on the duration and on the conditions of internment for prisoners.

However, the surge of sovereign power through the state of exception does not entail that law suddenly resurges with it as the principal means of its enforcement. The fact that law is used by the sovereign in exceptional circumstances does not reveal its invariably prohibitive nature. Foucault’s view of law as always ‘armed’ obscures the fact that it is still included in the multilayered complex of regulatory techniques (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 67). Law remains important as a means of setting boundaries to the functioning of normalizing institutions and not only as a strict mechanism of enforcement. As Valverde and Rose argue, ‘the legal complex has itself become wedded to substantive, normalizing, disciplinary and bio-political objectives having to do with the re-shaping of individual and collective conduct in relation to particular substantive conception of desirable ends’ (1998: 543). A substantial part of the contemporary uses of law has to do with the formalization of governmental expectations within the social whole. When speaking about law, however, it is important to distinguish between two techniques; that of the norm and of juridical rule (Valverde and Rose, 1998: 544). On the one hand, law can contribute to set the procedural modalities of the norm, which itself emerges out of the ‘group’s observation of itself’

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15 Foucault’s reference to Law as always ‘armed’ appears to be very close to Marx’s own idea that Law is the instrument capitalists use to assert their control over production and profit with a semblance of legitimacy.
In a normalizing society, the social collective’s own assessment of what constitutes dangerous or improper behaviour translates into legally codified protections. The regulation of conduct therefore obtains from historically specific material and inter-subjective actualities rather than from external referents. On the other hand, juridical rule embodies the armed hand of the sovereign that casts its violence, and the latter form of power is premised on nothing but its own justification. In the case of a state of exception, law is either willfully disregarded or used in a strategic way by specific agencies. Where such a situation arises, law ‘ceases to function as a legitimating ground’ and ceases to act as a boundary of sorts to the forceful intervention of the state, exposing the violence and unjustifiability of sovereignty in full force (Butler, 2004: 94). If both techniques are directed at realizing biopolitical objectives, the sources and the means of legal injunctions must be carefully examined and differentiated.

Throughout the sovereign’s initial decision to reconfigure governmental objectives in times of emergency, law becomes tactically subordinate to the imposed necessity of high level security and it is the sovereign imperative of security rather than the existing regulatory codes which determines the means by which this objective can be attained. This is a highly effective technique of governance ‘precisely to the extent that no person (or state) can be assured of being secure’ (Dumm, 1996: 131). It confers a potentially limitless mandate to increase the state’s knowledge of individual activities, to create extra legal spaces in the name of necessity and to project violence inside and outside of its borders. The determination of security is extended to a vast array of objects likely to include individual citizens, foreign nationals, foreign countries and even immaterial constructs such as ‘freedom.’ The identity of the ‘We’ that suffered the 9/11 attacks resulted in the conflation of these disparate elements; the victims and the offended were not just the indistinct mass of American nationals but all those who endorsed truly universal values. In their own coup de force, neoconservatives present and justify their democratizing project by regarding the abstract and infinitely expandable border of ‘freedom’ as absolutely threatened and in need of being defended rather than using the existing institutional networks to initiate and preserve it. This association with unspecified universals, formulated by various authoritative voices, provides the sovereign with yet another powerful means to legitimize its own existence and its strategic choices without actually having to refer to the legal codification that usually bounds its operation.
One of the problems at hand in initiating a critique of sovereign power is that in advanced liberalism, as Butler and Foucault before her maintained, ‘the problem of legitimacy (and therefore sovereignty) becomes less important than that of effectivity’ (Butler, 2004: 95). Through government’s ever more intense and meticulous preoccupation with the management of life, sovereignty becomes less visible and is also progressively depoliticized. The re-emergence of executive power spearheaded by state authorities during exceptional times such as wars, epidemics and attacks on national territory, come to be seen as occurrences that the state can manage, rather than as issues pertaining to the bounds and modalities of ‘legitimacy,’ ‘rights’ and ‘democracy.’ This is why states of exception present timely opportunities to question and (re)negotiate the premises of political community. As Foucault reminds us, the fact that we are no longer discussing or questioning the founding violence of sovereignty and how it is reproduced in social relations, means that it is in serious need of being discussed.

**Conclusion**

As violence is still wrought in many different guises within advanced liberal societies, a consideration of the relation between power as force and imposition and government is necessary. As much as individuals find themselves oppressed or simply left out through disciplinary sanctions, the enactment of security problematiques appeals to modalities which lie outside of the normal flows of governmentality. When a threat is considered serious enough by ‘expert’ agencies, the operation of law may be suspended and re-oriented for the purposes of state security. The playing-out of security issues also mobilizes discursive and cultural continuities (Jabri, 1996) in order to reaffirm the coherence of identities under attack. Identity, associated with order and unity, is typically contrasted with what lies outside, that which threatens. As noted in the last chapter, poststructural International Relations emphasized the constitution of identity by maintaining artificial distinctions based on state sovereignty. However, in spite of the arbitrary nature of those distinctions, the waging of power in the name of territorial and political integrity is still actual in contemporary politics. In the end, by establishing territorial units with developed administrative relays, sovereign power poses the founding gesture that makes governmentality possible.

An event like 9/11 certainly contributed to challenge the governmentality framework and accounted for part of the resurgence in popularity of authors like Schmitt and Agamben. In
spite of the radical analyses sparked by the terrorist attacks and the ensuing security measures, post 9/11 governance should be understood as one more manifestation in a long line of historicized combinations of sovereignty, discipline and government.

In chapter one, I argued that a comprehensive reading of Foucault from his early considerations on language, epistemology and power to his studies on discipline and government enabled a richer, more complex portrayal of contemporary rationalities of government. As we have seen, one of governmentality’s main functions is to explicate the material and intellectual conditions which subjects have to internalize in order to lead successful lives. The inclusion of discourse and discipline to the governmentality framework then contributed to broaden the range of conditions that individuals are encouraged to assimilate. However, the apparent occlusion of centres of authority that impose particular outcomes and determine the strategic uses of law, security and government from Foucault’s studies on governmentality was problematic. In this chapter, I addressed this issue by looking at what Foucault and some his followers had to say about the role of sovereign power in the formation of subjectivity. I found that expressions of authority such as conscious decisions to exclude particular members of the population and to pre-empt threats from foreign enemies constituted important aspects of biopolitical creation. The objective of the two first chapters was then to lay the basis for a more holistic perspective on contemporary rationalities of government, one which included coercion and discipline as much as suggestive and subtle means of control.

The revised understanding of governmentality I proposed above will inform the main part of the thesis, which broadly consists in tracing the historical transformations of the key practices and ideas that have informed the content of both the domestic and foreign policy realms in recent American history. Starting from the beginning of the 1960’s to the end of George W. Bush’s second term, I trace the changing roles and locations of freedom, responsibility and security by looking at discourses, policy papers and executive decisions across various policy domains. Since I argue that government comprises the greater part of the intellectual and technical requirements upon subjectivity, I will mainly dwell on the history of welfare and foreign assistance programs. However, I also look at the various president’s decisions and discursive strategies surrounding the survival and defense of the biopolitical whole.
Chapter Three:
The 1960’s; The Welfare State versus Individualism

Introduction

This chapter will first look at the intellectual and governmental context which has given way to current rationalities of rule in the US. Since the birth of the American Republic, several ideational and cultural strands have fought out to define the boundaries and content of individual freedom, morality and responsibility. It is important to recall them as they prefigure contemporary rationalities of government and ideologies such as neoliberalism and neoconservatism. The chapter will then move on to explore the historical period that the thesis is mainly concerned with. It will present a series of different domains of activity such as welfare, foreign assistance and foreign policy in order to reconstitute the major governmental enactments that have had their course in the period spanning from JFK’s brief term in office through to Nixon’s election in 1969. The specific as much as the more general examples I use aim to highlight the actual content and interactions of sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power in contemporary America. I will firstly dwell on a specific program that emerged in the early 1960’s; the AFDC (the Aid to Families of Dependent Children). The AFDC is particularly significant as it has as its object the moral and economic configuration of both the family and the wage earner. Since its inception, as one of the more important welfare programs in the US, it has undergone a myriad of reforms which bear out the larger shifts in governmental rationalities. To survey those same changes in the foreign policy domain, I look at the Agency for International Development (USAID). Examining a combination of historical studies and policy papers in both the domestic and foreign policy realms, I find that the conceptualizations informing governmental shifts in the domestic domain are intimately related to the means and strategies deployed in foreign policy programs. As an example of the coexistence and combination of sovereign and biopolitical power during that particular period, I show that USAID was involved in the development of strategically chosen enclaves throughout the war effort in Vietnam. Further on, I look at the ways in which the war expressed the executive branch’s assessment of a threat to the national population, thereby lending due importance to the decisions and assessments of individuals in determining specific governmental strategies. Throughout the chapter, I also emphasize the ideational components of what I take to be the main rationalities of government in contemporary
American history; neoconservatism and neoliberalism. In some ways, the notion that ideological articulations and executive decisions bind and reinforce governmental practices constitutes a departure from a foucaultian rendering of power. Through the ongoing discussion of neoconservatism and neoliberalism in this chapter and the ones that follow, I hope to spell out my understanding of sovereign power as associated with intention, decision and ideology, and to offer an original contribution to the existing body of work on governmentality.

Importantly, the aim of the chapter is not to provide an exhaustive historical overview of 1960’s America but to disclose the shifts, disjunctions, struggles and continuities within the cultural and governmental domains through the lens of specific cultural manifestations, executive decrees and bureaucratic programs. I argue that throughout the 1960’s, the formation of subjectivity is divided between a general preoccupation for collective welfare standards and a concern for the development of individual potentialities.

1. American Governmentality

Since there are hardly any studies on the history of government in the United States, this section will introduce some of the themes and ideas that are recurrent through America’s governmental history. My ambition here is not to provide a complete picture of the ideational currents and rationalities of government that have had their course before the 1960’s but to present a selection of ideas relevant to the disposition of freedom, authority and responsibility in contemporary representations of rule. Borrowing from historiographic studies, I look at the ways in which freedom and responsibility in particular have been articulated from the Founding onwards. This section will therefore discuss the specificities of American governmentality and contextualize the expressions of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power in contemporary America.

16 Here, I mean Government in the foucaultian sense. Studies on American governmentality as a whole are few and far between. One of the most notable efforts to study contemporary American governance through the lens of citizenship is Barbara Cruishank (1999) *The Will to Empower*. Other accounts include Hannah (2000) *Governmentality and The Mastery of Territory in 19th Century America* that concentrate of conceptions of subjectivity and governmental control in the second half of the 19th century though the figure of the famous legislator Francis Walker. Catherine Holland (2001) *The Body Politic* is a provocative account of the sources of prejudice in the American political thought. Another account is Lee Quinby (1991) *Freedom, Foucault, and the Subject of America*. Many of these studies focus on important issues such as race and gender, but my own work has more to do with the practical effects of certain ideas on culture and governance.
In contrast with drawing the history of constitutional arrangements between rights endowed individuals and political authorities, the genealogical and historiographic perspectives I use point to important ideational currents which may have been obscured in the constitution of a unified ideological account, usually liberal, about the American Republic. The above perspectives highlight elements of a republican ethos in the political and constitutional thought of the Founding Fathers. Arguing that the constitutional provisions that fragment political power into many locations and institutions are insufficient checks on individual behaviour, the Founders and neoconservatives after them hinted at the state's responsibility in suggesting models of appropriate behaviour. These conceptions have to do with a lingering distrust in the ability of certain American citizens to regulate themselves or to orient their behaviour according to a notion of the common good. This long-standing tradition of thought sustains that the articulation of the public good and decisions as to the safety and well-being of the population should be left to an enlightened elite. The decisions of particular agents of authority to exclude those who constitute a threat or an impediment to the well-being and productivity national population have then always been a part of liberal rationalities of government in US history.

1.1 Freedom and Responsibility in pre-1960’s America

While the reconfiguration of political authority in 18th and 19th century Europe was being carried out through an already developed administrative apparatus, in the US, administrative and governmental systems were very partial. The economic and political organization of many American communities, at least in their early history, relied more heavily on the existing dispositions of the labouring population and local civil society networks than on state wide initiatives to provide a variety of essential services. To this day, the local sense of distinctiveness and independence from the powers to be in Washington is still strong. As I see it, the seemingly inherent characters of the American people were generated through the mutually reinforcing bind of the philosophical ideas propounded by the Founders and the ongoing discursive emphasis on freedom and autonomy as almost mythical goods. On the one hand, freedom was the subject of meticulous legal and political definitions and on the other, it was an undefined symbol of hope and inspiration for many Americans and Americans to be. Along with the valuation of freedom in all governmental arrangements and innovations, however, was a more or less

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17 For a classic account of the fundamentally liberal character of the United States' constitutional bases and political history see Louis Hartz (1955) *The Liberal Tradition in America.*
persistent preoccupation with the excesses of liberty, which was expressed through injunctions to what I would broadly term 'responsibility.' These ideological features are here added to a strictly governmental account in the hope of further detailing the available representations of political and social behaviour in American history.

It is reasonable to assume that from the late nineteen hundreds, rationalities of government operate much in the same way across of the Western world. However, it is useful to outline some of the peculiarities of American governmentality. Firstly, the distinctive geography and ideational bases of the American Republic have rendered the centralization of political authority that we observe in many parts of Europe difficult if not impossible. What's more, Liberalism, when considered as a political ideology rather than a 'way of doing things,' does have a somewhat different ring in the United States. It is not, as in Western Europe, a doctrine of limitation of the state, it is, as Foucault rightly asserts, the very 'foundation of the state' (2004a: 223-2). The starting point of the American political community is the distinctive importance accorded to individual freedom. In the United States, citizens oppose the government on the basis of the kind of prejudice caused to their freedom while in a country like France, Foucault tells us, contentions between governed and governors take place around the provision of particular services (2004a: 224). Although Foucault would not have overly insisted on the discursive and ideational content of the major governmental shifts in Europe, I think that these aspects are of particular importance in the American context.

Foucault seems to present successive rationalities of government in the West (mainly Britain and France) as coherent, unitary ensembles. The definition of subjectivity through the liberal art of governing as much as later welfarist and neoliberal models usually revolves around producing and nurturing a limited set of managerial guidelines and individual dispositions. In the American case as much as in Britain and France, the emergence of governmentality in the 19th century entailed the development of means and techniques to observe, discipline and regulate the activities, choices and desires of economic men. However, as historians from the Skinnerian school have pointed out,18 liberal cannons exposed in the works of John Locke, Adam Smith and the Federalists are riddled with references to a republican ethos, that is, to a notion of the common good and to valued traits of character. As Pocock affirms,

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18 For Adam Smith see Winch (1978); for Locke see Tully (1993); for the Federalists see Wood (1992).
‘It has long been the principal criticism of the liberal synthesis that because it defined
the individual as rights bearer and proprietor, it did not define him as possessing a
personality adequate to participation in self-rule, with the result that the attempt to
ground sovereignty in personality was not thoroughly carried out... But there existed
alongside liberalism, which is a matter of law and right, a history of republican
humanism, in which personality was considered in terms of virtue’ (1985: 45).

In spite of the commonplace reading of American political thought as thoroughly liberal,
there are plenty of allusions to elements of a republican theory from the Founding Fathers
to modern-day neoconservatives. I suggest that the various injunctions to moral behaviour
in either political discourse or legislation that have had their course in American political
history must be looked at to complement the history of governmental developments in the
US. Even as liberalism is generally assumed to prioritize ‘fair procedures over particular
ends’ (Sandel, 1996: 4), some of the liberal state’s policies over the years appeared to have
been be based on the assumption that select individuals were unable to govern themselves.
The disciplinary measures undertaken by the state must then be studied alongside the
technologies of government which take the perpetuation and manipulation of liberty as
their principal objects.

From the earliest days of the American republic, political elites were particularly
concerned with the moral content of citizenship. As Graham Burchell points out, 18th
century political thought was ‘marked by a dilemma arising from the challenge posed to
this ideal of the self-aware and self-defining citizen’s (civic) virtue by what were identified
as newly emergent, essentially historical and uncertain (civil) forms of the individual’s
private and professionalized subjectivity and conduct’ (1991: 121). The free, enterprising
individual which lay at the heart of the American ideal was also expected to lead a frugal
and virtuous existence, away from the vices and temptations of the old continent. The
popular aspirations to open commercial exchange, freedom of religion, of speech and of
conscience, which embodied the liberal and democratic instincts of the nascent state, were
to be counterbalanced by a sober, selfless and assiduous ethos. The informal domain where
relationships between citizens, whether commercial or civic, were taking place, was
therefore constituted as a governmental object of sorts. As Burchell points out, civil society
is a ‘transactional reality existing at the mutable interface of political power and that which
permanently outstrips its reach’ (1991: 141). Whilst political power in the United States
was and still is both maligned and distant, regulatory functions have been assumed by a
variety of character building institutions such as churches, local clubs and associations. As Hamilton recognized in the early days of the Republic, the national government ‘depended for its success on its capacity to shape the habits of the people, to interest their sensations, to win their affections, to ‘circulate through those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind naturally flow’ rather than on the genius of the national constitution (Sandel, 1996: 133).

Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (2000), written nearly two centuries ago, still is one of the more cogent attempts to understand America’s political institutions as well as the character of its inhabitants. Among many other counsels, de Tocqueville warned that democracy could easily be confused with despotism. As much as citizens in a democracy were separated, each with their own private interests and values, they were willingly kept apart in despotism. Wary of the dangers of general indifference, American legislators organized political activity among different states, counties and districts, thereby multiplying the ‘occasions for citizens to act together and to make them feel everyday that they depend on one another’ (2000: 487). Self-interested citizens in a democracy then had to associate with their fellow citizens by necessity. Local infrastructure projects, for example, solicited the participation of all those affected. But what was at first a necessity, de Tocqueville tells us, became a choice; ‘what was calculation becomes instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one’s fellow citizens, one finally picks up the habit and taste of serving them’ (2000: 488). Aside from their multiple political associations, American citizens were also involved in a dizzying array of ‘religious, moral, grave, futile, very general, very particular, immense associations’ (2000: 489). If we look at Foucault’s studies on discipline and government, which mainly concentrated on post 18th century France and Britain, the structure of political authority and the means of subjectification in early 19th century America presents very distinct characteristics. In the United States, the absence of visible embodiments of the central state or of extensive carceral, medical or scientific institutions, meant that standards of socio-cultural behaviour were to an extent generated and monitored through civic associations. Whereas in France and Britain, the state had a more direct role in perpetuating the natural, already-existing processes of civil society, in the US, economic and social exchanges were reproduced through more localized and self-contained contexts. Through the development of standardized institutional relays, social sciences and socio-cultural mediums, however, the interchange between the state and techniques of self-regulation became greater.
Accordingly, as Barbara Cruikshank attests, ‘the capacity of citizens to exercise self-governance itself (eventually became) a matter of government’ (1999: 97).

As de Tocqueville maintained, the individual qualities required for the maintenance and survival of democracy in such a large country did not necessarily refer to the Greco-roman tradition of civic virtue, they rather developed from a notion of ‘self-interest well-understood.’ This doctrine would not ‘produce great devotion; but it suggests little sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, master of themselves’ (Tocqueville, 2000: 502). Bearing in mind that liberal economy and political democracy were both extending their empire across Western nations, political thinkers like the Founding Fathers or de Tocqueville could only hope that self-interest be exercised reflectively with a careful consideration for the use and value of selfless association. According to the fundamentally liberal designs of the Constitution, the state was not and should never be the enforcer of morality. Particular individual qualities were then required to sustain the liberal democratic spirit of the republic. However, as industrialization progressed at a rapid pace after the end of the Civil War, this kind of self-conscious liberalism somehow lost out to narratives of political rights, social protection and economic growth. As Eric Foner remarks, constitutional amendments that followed the Reconstruction had to do with asserting individual rights, including that of the recently freed black slaves, and to enable the federal state to define and defend those rights (1998: 107). The impressive development of the US’ industrial output at the end of the 19th century was made possible by a growing population of labourers and consumers. During was termed the progressive era, which spanned roughly from the 1890’s to the 1920’s, one of the principle political concerns was to ensure that this growing pool of workers be treated humanely and lawfully.

As Woodrow Wilson asserted in his article The Study of Administration (1887), in a strikingly similar fashion to Foucault’s own analysis, ‘political history has been a history, not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight not of progress of governmental organization, but of advancement in law-making and political criticism’ (1887: 206). Wilson believed that the study of public administration was essential to the development of effective state action. The progressive interlinking of industrial labour with human and administrative sciences suggested the contours of a fully fledged American governmentality. Throughout the first few decades of the 20th century, F. W. Taylor’s
influential theories on industrial management contributed to reorganize factory work according to fixed standards of efficiency, whereby specific tasks and responsibilities were divided among workers and managers (Taylor, 1911). These impersonal guidelines would be arrived at through the meticulous observation of the worker’s daily activities in the factories. In order to increase worker productivity, a set of incentives such as monetary rewards in exchange for higher outputs were implemented. Taylor even envisaged applying variations of his criteria of efficiency to the ‘management of our homes; the management of our farms; the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of our churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our governmental departments’ (1911: 7). To this day, efficiency criteria have played an essential role in the constitution of subjectivity and in the organization of governmental strategies in the US. In conjunction with the discursive and cultural association of work with self-realization, efficiency models contributed to create hard-working, autonomous subjects.

Following the crash of 1929, Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a sweeping set of relief plans and social reforms which came to be known as the New Deal. The plan, which involved a disjointed composite of infrastructural projects, state pensions and unemployment insurances, was concocted by cabinet members as well as prominent intellectuals, lawyers and journalists (Jones, 1995: 458-464). The orchestration of these plans and reforms embodied a different conception of government. Whilst before the risks and consequences of industrial development were left at the discretion of enterprising individuals, risks to the population were being aggregated and insecurity was tamed ‘with solidarity and the laws of large numbers. In the process the free citizen was locked into the web of social solidarities and interdependencies’ (Rose, 1999: 81-82). This new ethos of government sought to objectify the already existing propensities to association and solidarity in civil society as opposed to solely the self-interested dispositions of individuals. A new vocabulary intent on addressing the reality of impoverished and helpless masses ‘sought to locate the law, and the juridical subject of right, as but one region within the wider, concrete and more fundamental evolution of society’ (Dean, 1999: 129).

In the United States, the welfare-oriented rationale that was initiated during the New Deal and lasted perhaps until the end of the 1970’s, was very much tempered by the lasting belief in the creative and entrepreneurial energies of the individual. Indeed, many neoliberals like Hayek and members of the Chicago School of economics like Gary Becker and Milton Friedman have repudiated the state’s extensive role in the management and
regulation of economic but also social life. In the last 60 years of so, neo-liberalism, as a peculiar art of government, has been hugely influential in the transformation of social scientific methodology and in the administration of services to the population. Most importantly, it has progressively imposed itself as a tacit model for self rule. Notions of self-realization, choice and empowerment have become particularly meaningful referents in the everyday lives of Americans as well as in the elaboration of effective social programs. However, the progressive integration of these criteria has been counterbalanced by a concern to limit and orient individual choices.

1.2 Beginnings of a Conservative Backlash

In this sub-section, the objective is to briefly document the historical and intellectual context of neoconservatism’s emergence. In addition, I propose a particular understanding of neoconservatism as both an ideology, which relates it to expressions of sovereign power, and a rationality of government, which connects it to more suggestive tactics. Since the relevance of both neoconservatism and neoliberal in practical schemes of government is at its utmost at the end of the 1970’s and beyond, I will discuss their ideational contents further in chapter five.

Since the juridical interpretation of freedom, that is, the state’s gradual recognition and defence of the rights of the marginalized and less endowed, has made considerable advances since the Civil War and has been particularly prevalent since the 1960’s, neoconservatives sounded the alarm to reassert the state’s moral authority. While the state’s direct participation in defining or imposing collective moral standards is at best questionable, particularly in a country like the US, neoconservative strategies would have to be more suggestive than forceful. To the extent that neoconservatives have sought to create moral and responsible citizens, they have attempted to do so through a mixture of incitements, rewards and punishments as much as through direct, coercive means. Dean rightly suggests that ‘the ethos of welfare is located within webs of sovereign powers by which subjects are bound to do certain things including deductive and coercive powers of taxation, of systems of punishment, detention, expulsion and disqualification, and of compulsion in drug rehabilitation, child support, immunization, workfare programmes and so on for the achievement of various goals of national government’ (Dean, 2007: 95). As I will argue throughout, the exclusion of dangerous individuals for the benefit of the biopolitical whole is as much an effect of disciplinary and governmental mechanisms as it is the product of conscious decisions from a variety of authoritative agencies. The willed
exclusion of individuals or groups from the realms of national identity and political participation, the foremost expression of sovereign power, also requires a sustained appeal to discursive constructions. The exercise of sovereign power, as a form of power which is more visible and immediate than either government or discipline, then requires sustained discursive assertions and differentiations.

In the 1960's, in the midst of unprecedented prosperity and stability, a rather unexpected surge of refractory cultural and political forces rocked the foundations of American society. If American civil society had until then remained quietly observing of values like temperance and family unity, although there was evidence of a waning involvement in civic and political associations, radically new forms of political involvement and cultural mores were beginning to collapse the long established and tacit reliance on self-government. Some of the conceptions emerging from sections of the American youth actively opposed the mentality of rule, technocratic consciousness and the foreign policy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although the aesthetic and political manifestations of the 1960's would not be formally included in governmental analysis and would largely be interpreted as cultural instantiations, I think that they are essential to understand the kind of governmental correctives brought about by a neoconservative rationality of rule over the last 40 years or so. As Wendy Brown rightly remarks, current governmental arrangements result from the varied and complex combination of a ‘market-political rationality’ (neoliberalism) and ‘moral-political rationality’ (neoconservatism) (2006: 698). If neoconservatives like Kristol recognize the importance of the market and of efficient managerial techniques, they are more critical of neoliberalism’s lack of explicit moral content19. In the face of what they saw as the liberal elite’s complacency toward outright individualism, consumerism, permissiveness and depravity, various conservative groupings, neoconservatives among them, began to call for the reassertion of state authority and for the renewal of a public minded and self-disciplined ethos. The re-establishment of state prestige and authority supposed that elected representatives had to have the moral qualities and intellectual abilities to articulate and even dictate the national interest. As the Founders and de Tocqueville before them, neoconservatives believed that democracy was best preserved through minimizing the hold of public opinion on the elite (Devigne, 1994: 56). As the Federalists put it, the general effect of representation should

19 For a good account of the neoconservative critique of Hayek’s neoliberalism see Drolet (2007).
be 'to refine and enlarge public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and who patriotism and love of justice' (Federalists, 2005: 52). While individuals have the incumbent responsibility to cultivate 'virtue' in order to realize that purpose, administrators must relentlessly ask themselves, as the founding fathers did; 'What kind of common man does our popular government produce?' (Kristol, 1995: 317).

It is not so much that neoconservatives are overtly hostile to liberal thought. In fact, they aim to rescue or re-adapt earlier forms of liberal philosophy. As Kristol advances that in Adam Smith's thought, both in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, 'the primordial individualism of modern political and social thought generally culminate(d) in some vision of a good community' (Kristol, 1983: 149). For neoconservatives, codes of behaviour developed and practiced in the earlier, more self-aware forms of American liberalism became points of reference for the perpetuation of a society threatened at its very core. Since the influence of institutions such as the family, churches and voluntary associations was rapidly waning, neo-conservatives proposed to rejuvenate these institutions through all available means. As against the procedural and mechanical conception of democracy in contemporary social science, neo-conservatives believe that the 'purpose of any political regime is to achieve some version of the good life and the good society' (Kristol, 1983: 50-51). This objective required that citizens be able to govern themselves and that the state act on manifestations of collective decadence and corruption.

2 The AFDC and the Great Society

The substance of governmentality in the 1960's mostly had to do with a complex amalgam of welfare and neoliberal rationalities. The estimated minimum of state assistance needed to sustain collective well being was almost invariably complemented with incentives to individual responsibility. In contrast with New Deal policies, Kennedy and Johnson's social engineering encouraged, at least rhetorically, the pursuit of personal growth and 'empowerment.' As Barbara Cruikshank attests, 'self-help,' which she defines as a 'technique of government...which aims to make the poor into citizens through their voluntary subjection to their own interest,' (1999: 54) become one of the central dynamics of the welfare programs instated in the 1960's. The free and rights-endowed individual, independently of colour or creed, then came to be the unequivocal basis for governmental
intervention. At the same time, however, subjectivity was defined through collectively agreed substantive ends. Through those new governmental configurations, subjects were disciplined and formed according to the dual requirement of collectively beneficial ends and of efficiency standards bearing on productivity. Towards the end of the 1960’s, however, strategies aiming to discourage welfare dependency were already attempting to work through ‘the capacities of citizens to act on their own behalf’ (1999: 39). Although the juridical qualifications of social solidarity allowed minimal social insurance for all individuals, other governmental and cultural tendencies were advancing alternative paths to self-realization. The conflicting visions of a citizen with basic rights and entitlements, and of another with private and social responsibilities, battled out and combined to create the governmental landscape of the 1960’s.

Kennedy and Johnson’s programs identified poverty and the poor as objects of observation and transformation. Concretely, the US government’s ambition to eliminate poverty and prejudice required a massive overhaul of administrative capabilities and juridical reforms. Developing out of the concerted effort of a flurry of academics and civil servants, the Great Society was in large part made possible through the elaboration and implementation of standardized systems of management which had much in common with the efficiency models developed by F.W. Taylor a few decades earlier. In this section, I look at the interlinking operations of power and knowledge in a specific welfare program throughout the 1960’s, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

Before the 1929 financial crash, care for the poor was relegated to philanthropic endeavours and local community associations (almshouses, orphanages, and charities). From 1911, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program mainly provided income for white widows. The Social Security Act of 1935, part of the sweeping New Deal legislation, remained focused on the ‘deserving poor,’ namely the elderly and the disabled. Initially, the amount of federal aid available for states that chose to assist unemployables was very limited. The AFDC was introduced as a reform of the ADC through the Public Welfare Amendment (1962). Assistance was from then on extended to family members or relatives living under the same roof as the children whose upbringing was said to require more

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20 The Great Society was a broad ranging set of planned reforms in health care, education, economic inequality and civil rights to be undertaken by President Johnson with the help of the best minds of the time. In that sense, it bore great resemblance to modernization theory. Its objective was no less than ridding the United States from ignorance, poverty and discrimination. A wealth of social programs like Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Community Action Program and Project Head Start developed from Johnson’s ambitious and broad ranging initiative.
favourable conditions. This was one federal initiative among many (among which are the Office for Economic Opportunity, Maximum Feasible Participation, Community Action Program) in the general attempt to eliminate poverty. Subject to unprecedented visibility and increased political will, inequality became one of the main preoccupations in American public life during the 1960's. Indeed, the extensive program of social protection under John F. Kennedy was concomitant with the American people's 'rediscovery' of poverty (Axin and Levin 1992; 239). Best selling books such as Michael Harrington's *The Other America* (1962) and MacDonald's *Our Invisible Poor* (1963) revealed the unseen harms of American capitalism and the social problems which needed to be addressed by the state.

In the statement of intent of the Office of Economic Opportunity, created in 1965, poverty is defined as 'a condition of need, helplessness and hopelessness' (Cruikshank, 1999: 73). The discursive constitution of poverty as an object of urgent intervention prepared the ground for new governmental strategies. The delivery of an increasing array of services and programs dealing with poverty, but also with crime and unemployment, did require the creation of many new governmental agencies and of improved means to circulate information between the various administrative tiers. In order to conceive and implement its ambitious welfare plans, the Kennedy administration enlisted a wealth of academics and experts. The latter contributed to the mapping out, division and classification of the different areas of intervention and to the introduction of stricter efficiency quotas. Key governmental advisers like Robert McNamara and Charles J. Hitch introduced programs like the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), essentially a handbook for industrial management techniques and effective budgeting, in order to streamline governmental activity. Concurrently with the dominance of behaviouralism and structuralism in American academic circles, quantitative research and other scientific methodologies were readily applied to social policy. The initial projections of the democrat's welfare plans also displayed a remarkable unity of purpose, which brought together a great variety of knowledge communities all intent on eradicating political and economic inequalities. This outlook was characteristic of 'modernization,' which David Apter defines as 'the process of consciously directing and controlling the social consequences of the increased role of differentiation and organizational complexity in society' (1965: 56). Modernization was then a way to cope with the managerial, technological and infrastructural exigencies that emerged in the context of a rapidly growing economy and of an expanding welfare state. It was also associated with the belief
that knowledge and scientific progress had to be used to improve human life (Apter, 1965: 433).

In the American case, however, the realization of general welfare rested heavily on the development of individual qualities. Even as government in the 1960's intervened on the general 'nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies,' one of the specific objectives of these sweeping reforms was to reverse the individual attitudes normally associated with poverty and instil a new ethos of self-sufficiency, optimism and motivation (Rose, 1996: 40). Concurrently to the looming influence of neoliberal economists like Hayek and members of Chicago School such as Gary S. Becker, the notion of rational choice became one of the cornerstones of governmental intervention not only in the economic domain but in a variety of other spheres like social security and family life. The more radical proponents of American neoliberalism tended to apply economics to 'all purposive conduct entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means, and instruments' (Gordon, 1991: 43). Within the constraints of their personal traits and aptitudes, it is assumed that individuals will seek to maximize the rewards of a particular choice, whether it be the choice of a life partner or of a job. If economics was indeed capable 'of addressing the totality of human behaviour,' it could surely be used to program 'the totality of governmental action' (Gordon, 1991: 43).

The above discussion of self interested economic actors and the balance that results from their individual pursuits has much in common with classical liberalism. The specificity of the neoliberal rationality of government, however, lies in the conscious manipulation of the environment in which choices are made. In this context, the state's specific function is to uphold the conditions in which rational economic agents may thrive. Ultimately, the establishment of optimal conditions may entail the manipulation or rectification of individual desires (Dean, 1994: 57). As rational agents, individuals are encouraged to develop the particular qualities required for a successful adaptation to changing economic circumstances. As an example, towards the late 1960's, unemployed and unskilled Americans had a choice to either remain on welfare, with the associated stigma of dependency and the risk of seeing their benefits reduced, or to enrol in work programs that offered wages marginally higher than welfare checks but were presented as a much more dignified alternative. Middle-class Americans, on the other hand, were offered the...

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21 For a prime example of this mode of thinking, see Becker (1964). With his concept of human capital, Becker states that he is concerned with the 'activities that influence future monetary and psychic income by increasing the resources in people' (1964: 11).
possibility to re-train and acquire the skills that would allow them to choose among a
greater variety of occupations. The extent of choice then also depends on an individual’s
socio-economic status; if the upper layer of American society could attain greater wealth
and happiness by enterprising itself, the poor were basically left to choose between shame
and honourable poverty. In any case, the values of hard work, optimism, autonomy and sobriety were all warranted signs of rational choice.

In conjunction with the growing civil rights movement, the democratic administrations of
the 1960’s famously extended social and political rights to the black minority. Throughout
the decade, impoverished African Americans emigrated from the South in masses and settled in the already destitute inner city communities of the Northern industrial centres. This contributed to an unprecedented surge in welfare rolls. From 1960 to 1970 the AFDC roll tripled from 787 000 families to 2 208 000 at the end of the decade. Average monthly payments increased by 35 % from 1960 through to 1968 (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 88). Between 1965 and 1971, there was a 15% increase in African American women receiving AFDC payments. By 1971, only 4.3 % were widows, the first legitimate beneficiaries of assistance. From its inception, the Public Welfare Amendment of 1962 was concerned with dependency. For the government, the solution was to be found in the development of individual capabilities through training, counselling and personalized case management. Kennedy’s message to Congress on welfare in 1962 presented a novel approach to dependency by tracing the sources of poverty to the individual and proposing measures that encouraged welfare recipients to participate in economic activities (Axin and Levin, 1992: 241, 243). As stated by the US congress, the objectives of the 1962 Amendments with regards to the ADC were to ‘strengthen family life’ and help ‘parents and relatives with whom they are living to attain or retain capability for the maximum self support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection’ (Social Security Act, 1962: 42, USC 601, 1964 supp IV). Federal assistance therefore exercised its responsibility to preserve (nuclear) families by developing the potential of each of its members to attain self-reliance. In another piece of legislation, the President explained that;

‘The US can achieve can achieve its full economic and social potential as a nation only
if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities
and to participate in the workings of our society. It is therefore the policy of the United
States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by
opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity' (Kennedy, 1962).

In spite of the unprecedented federal assistance offered to the American people at the time, it is once again apparent that the individual still constituted the basis of a well functioning and well ordered society. The hard fought liberties of the American people were built and would be preserved through the combined strength of its individuals. Furthermore, work and education were represented as basic fulfilments of dignity and self esteem. However, if state sponsored welfare and education were considered a right throughout most of the 1960’s, it was a right that needed to be earned. The state’s duty was to provide an opportunity to those evolving in conditions unfavourable to the development of their potential, but those same individuals had to account for their efforts through periodical evaluations.

If the provision of aid to dependent children took into account the erosion of traditional moral pillars and changes in sexual mores during most of the 1960’s, legislators become concerned about the effects of the program on the rates of divorce, illegitimacy and employment. The growing number of people on rolls eventually prompted the government to impose more restrictions and conditions to assistance. As early as 1962, when Kennedy More background information and more reference on this signed the CWT (Community Work and Training program), he maintained that this particular initiative was to provide ‘rehabilitation instead of relief, and training for useful work instead of prolonged dependency.’ (Quoted in Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 92). Two years later, another program entitled WET (Work Experience and Training) stated similar objectives. The latter initiatives prepared the way for a more lasting plan named Work Incentive (WIN) in 1967, part of the Social Security Amendments, more directly concerned with the rising caseload of the AFDC. Until its revocation in the 1990’s, restrictions, punitive measures and work requirements were steadily imposed (Nancy Rose E., 1995: 89). As opposed to its predecessors, the WIN program was compulsory for selected recipients and directly encouraged work experience by not deducing the first 30 dollars of earned income from state benefits (Social Security Amendments, 1967: 119). Again, these measures overtly impressed the value of goals like independence and self-esteem on the recipient and discouraged attitudes leading to dependency and hopelessness.
Some of the issues reflected in the multiple reforms and experiments around the AFDC program were identified by neoconservatives as early as the mid-1960's. In their eyes, the liberal elite's definition of poverty as a 'paradox' to be eliminated rather than as a normal and acceptable feature of market capitalism was a recipe for disaster. They argued that high levels of social protection would raise expectations beyond the state's capacity to meet them and insisted that it would only encourage the disintegration of the nuclear family, particularly in impoverished black and Latino communities (Moynihan, 1965). They also saw the AFDC as a pathway to illegitimacy, divorce and desertion (Axin and Levin, 1992: 240). Equally, the form of personal empowerment advocated by liberal egalitarians, presumably based on nothing more than good will, was considered naïve and ineffectual. Some warned that if the poor were provided with the organizational skills and political consciousness of the liberal elites, a series of intractable social problems would unfold (Moynihan, 1969: 111). Ultimately, if the Great Society's hope to engender independence, self-reliance, empowerment and responsibility was to come true, conservative intellectuals believed that governmental authorities had to act on the 'character' of welfare recipients by changing their expectations and imposing stricter work incentives (Wilson, 1985: 9). The governmental rationality informing the domestic reforms of the 1960's was a highly complex hybrid. One of the one hand, it carried the idea that poverty was a structural consequence of capitalism and that assistance to the victims of this imbalance was the state's responsibility. On the other hand, contemporary economic thought was adopted to further technocratic efficiency and to nurture self-reliance through incentives to a strong work ethic and a sober and reasonable outlook. The definition and delimitation of choice and freedom, the focal points of governmental plans and state rhetoric, was also being fought out in the cultural realm. In response to expanding welfare rolls and to the disintegration of traditional family units, various conservative strands began to suggest punitive measures for those who were not deemed to show enough good will or moral restraint.

For all the potential difficulties it was encountering in the domestic realm, modernization, as a model for economic, technical and moral development, was enthusiastically applied to many foreign policy programs. Equally, the belief in the inherent benevolence of American moral and political aspirations legitimated wide ranging efforts to implement a particular model of development throughout the world.
3. AID Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Era

On the whole, the techniques, calculations and rationalities devised to develop domestic socio-economic structures were applied to international development programs. The backdrop of aid policy in the early to mid 1960's comprised three main elements; all of which replicated the neoliberal/welfare rationality observed in the domestic realm. First, scientific methods would make the management and implementation of aid and development programs more effective by setting standards, producing accurate information on targeted countries and increasing the coherence between different aid agencies. Second, the implementation of foreign assistance objectives as to political participation, welfare programs, institutional capacity and economic growth introduced particular requirements and dispositions for recipient states and for individuals participating in the projects. Third, national identity would be consolidated not only through its opposition to communism but through a demonstration of the superiority of American Welfare Capitalism as a model of development and a way of life. All three elements were part and parcel of modernization theory which offered a measure of 'civilization' and material development as much as it validated the economic and social institutions of the United States. Poor countries were constituted as objects of intervention upon which specific norms, criteria and techniques were applied. In spite of a few specific differences, the diffusion of standards of development in poorer countries followed the outlook of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations which was put to work domestic anti-poverty strategies. As Gilman notes 'modernization theory was the foreign policy counterpart to 'social modernism' at home, namely the idea that a meliorist, rationalizing, benevolent, technocratic state could solve all social and economic ills' (2003:16). In what follows, I look at the techniques and guidelines informing the Agency for International Development’s (USAID) programs in order to reconstitute the governmental combinations that had their course in the 1960's.

The passing into law of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act represented a considerable change from the aid policy of the previous administrations. Under Eisenhower and Truman, aid programs were dispersed, poorly organized and served a mainly ideological purpose. President Kennedy’s main objective was to regroup and reorganize the various agencies (International Cooperation Agency, Development Loan Fund, Export-Import Bank, Food for Peace Program responsible for foreign assistance in one centralized, effectively managed organization; USAID. Kennedy asserted that Foreign Aid was important because the ‘economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations…would
be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity and offensive to our conscience' (Kennedy, 1961). He also believed that the prosperity and political will generated in 1960's America presented a timely opportunity to elevate poorer countries to self-sufficiency and stability. It was also clear for Kennedy that Americans were morally responsible to lead the free world and that international security could be insured through a wide ranging increase in living standards. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act stated the intention to 'promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes' (Committees on International Relations and Foreign Relations, 2001: 1). The pursuit of peace and prosperity at home was therefore reflected in its pursuit abroad.

The AID Program Guidance Manual of 1962 stated that the purpose of foreign assistance consisted in developing 'a community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual concern, basing their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and social justice. Such a world offers the best prospect of security and peace for the United States' (in Mason, 1964: 37). The attainment of common welfare depended upon the construction of an institutional structure that allowed for the realization of sovereign duties and the formulation of an equitable model of development, both domestically and in concert with a community of states committed to global welfare. Even if the institutional frameworks regulating international trade and politics were not as developed as they are today, the majority of Western powers agreed on the necessity and value of state assistance. In general, the elaboration of a social state first entailed the creation and education of a bureaucratic core. Secondly, it required elaborate methods to conceive and evaluate an increasing variety of social programs. Third, technical and financial means were needed for large infrastructural improvements. Fourth and last, a variety of informal and culturally sensitive means had to be devised in order to predispose local populations to the supposed benefits of industrialization and liberal democracy (in Mason, 1964: 37).

The objective of this renewed aid impetus was no less than transforming the social structure of underdeveloped countries through political education, institution-building and infrastructure projects. Nils Gilman notes that ‘as development projects began to take as their object not the palimpsest of traditional practices, but rather the ‘human material’ itself conceived as a universal subject whose needs, prospects, and norms could be discovered, interpreted, and fixed by science modernization theory began to take a more
revolutionary aspect that aimed at remaking the identities of traditional people and societies' (2003: 10). Concrete measures such as progressive tax reforms, land reforms, voluntary work and political participation were actively encouraged, organized and monitored (Guess, 1987: 38). Depending on the ‘willingness’ of specific countries to ‘help themselves,’ US development programs would strive to instil desirable qualities such as entrepreneurship, efficiency and self-reliance. Foreign assistance encouraged initiatives at the level of ‘society’ and empowered those individuals who showed a desire to improve their lives by participating in sound economic and political schemes. Assistance programs in the 1960's therefore emphasized the training and education of local populations in view of their integration in a working network of institutions related to the central state. Development aid was then given to state administrations and civil society associations in an effort to enable ‘the transition into self-sustained growth’ (Kennedy, 1961) as opposed to a permanent contract of assistance. The treatment of recipient countries, much like that of individuals in domestic welfare programs, rested on incentives to self-help. This meant that aid would serve as a ‘catalyst for local self-sufficiency and (eventually) contribute to its own self-elimination’ (Guess, 1987: 38). As Lyndon B. Johnson asserted in his special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid in 1967, aid should not be provided as a ‘substitute,’ it had to be applied to and integrated in the fabric of social, economic and political development of poor countries. Again, in the 1960’s, the substantial responsibility of the state in facilitating the attainment of ‘self-help’ was taken for granted. It was also made possible, in part, by the distinct unity of moral purpose translated in the solidarist ethos of the Kennedy-Johnson era. In a reference to the innate character of the American people, the President claimed that the 1961 Act reaffirmed ‘the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renew(ed) its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance’ (Kennedy, 1961). Increased foreign assistance was presented as the natural expression and extension of a common national purpose.

In effect, development aid was part of an integrated system of thought which included goals as varied and ambitious as the use of scientific methods for administrative purposes, the repelling of communism and the promotion of international peace and prosperity through the extension of welfare capitalism. As one commentator put it, foreign aid became ‘a handy multipurpose instrument of foreign policy, which we have been tempted to use in an increasingly wide variety of ways, for an increasingly broad range of purposes’ (Millikan, 1963: 91). Michael E. Latham (2000) associated these aspirations with the
ideology of ‘modernization.’ A group of talented intellectuals such as Walt Whitman Rostow, Lucien Pye and Gabriel Almond were hired to participate in the conception of foreign assistance programs. Civil servants, social scientists and government officials worked in concert to produce a more effective bureaucracy, generate economic growth, generate orderly liberal democratic institutions and improve services in selected countries. The extension of technological and bureaucratic know how and the increase of welfare standards throughout the world were viewed both as a duty and in the interest of the United States. Amongst the developed nations, America began to assume a leading role in;

‘building infrastructure, furnishing technology, providing training, and even demonstrating the virtues of efficiency, long term planning, pluralist politics and personal discipline (in order to) promote progress in a world imperilled by communist insurgencies.’ (All this would be made possible) through an ‘achievement-oriented ethos’ (Latham, 2000: 7)

Sophisticated political systems and developed economic infrastructures were of course characteristic of Western nations. As subjects of governmental intervention, underdeveloped countries were constructed as culturally and materially backward and judged according to indicators of ‘modernity’ such as the state of the infrastructure, public institutions and economic performance (2000: 5). Rostow’s influential formulation of the five stages of growth provided a classificatory scheme for national economies referred to by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Rostow, 1971: 4-10). Once levels of development were determined, a series of specific requirements could be elaborated. The populations, resources and existing institutions of less developed countries (LDC’s) were also mapped out more rigorously and an unprecedented amount of data compiled by field workers was put to work in an effort to tease out the productive capacities of poor, often recently decolonised countries. Specific factors impeding or enabling development such as population growth were isolated and studied through ‘censuses and demographic (reports), surveys of knowledge practices of conception control, fertility patterns, and methods of evaluating family planning programs’ (Agency for International Development, 1968a: 8).

Apart from providing technical assistance and amassing an ever greater variety of information, local project managers posted in various countries were also expected to transmit some of the personal qualities required for a healthy economic and political life. Invested with a dutiful professional ethos, American representatives were made to demonstrate the virtues of social engineering and comprehensive planning. The dedication,
diligence and competence of the personnel on the ground would serve to validate American aspirations to welfare and justice in other countries. Animated with an almost missionary zeal, the cause volunteers and program managers were associated to was to build a prosperous and free world against the advances of the communist enemy.

It was in the spirit of countering the perceived emergence of a communist threat in Latin America, South East Asia and elsewhere as well as to enhance the image of America abroad that organizations like the Peace Corps\footnote{The Peace Corps consists of a 2 year voluntary service in development projects abroad. Chosen individuals had to have the necessary 'qualities of character,' in Peace Corps (1962) Memorandum.} and initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress were created in 1961.

To some extent, the ethos permeating the US' assistance plans translated the welfarist assumption that it was the wealthier states' responsibility to transfer some of their wealth to deprived countries. Eminent economists such as Gunnar Myrdal (1970) insisted on the West's moral obligation to redistribute capital in the absence of a world state. He partly attributed the causes of underdevelopment to the economic legacy of colonialism; third world countries had a very limited amount of segregated development enclaves brought about by colonial enterprises and generally lacked the infrastructure and the means to generate capital. Within such a mindset, poverty was identified as an undesirable phenomenon which required immediate intervention for both security and humanistic purposes. The State was the principal agent charged with this task and it accordingly had to be given the legitimacy and the means to instate justice and prosperity.

In order to further integrate his foreign policy program, Kennedy assimilated development aid with security assistance. By linking aid with national security, he provided it with more legitimacy, importance and funding. Americans were asked to 'help prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feeds' (quoted in Eberstadt, 1988: 33). Strategic and altruistic objectives were then fused together in a complex system in which counterinsurgency plans and agricultural aid worked to the same objectives (1988: 33-34). Improving the lives and extending the liberties of citizens in poorer countries was considered the surest method to quell social unrest and to stop the advances of communism. Many believed that the sole demonstration of the capacities of American liberalism to empower and inspire the destitute throughout the world would
vindicate the superiority of American values over communist ones. In fact, Kennedy’s initial approach to communism was not to ‘fight it negatively’, but to respond with ‘a historical demonstration that in the 20th century, as in the 19th in the southern half of the globe as in the north economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand’ (Quoted in Packenham, 1973: 54). The perpetuation of a way of life through peaceful means was a defensive measure in itself. Furthermore, the United States, as the most authentic and successful embodiment of liberal principles in the 20th century, was the example to follow and to promote. This confidence in the founding principles of the United States was clearly stimulated by the perceived threat of totalitarianism and its contemporary manifestation, Soviet communism. American liberal intellectuals like Ehrman, Schlesinger, Niebuhr, speaking in the aftermath of Nazism and warning against the emergence of a new totalitarian power, urged for a defence of the ‘vital centre,’ which lied in a passionate attachment to individual liberty. The defence of liberty and of the institutions that have preserved it was both a moral and a security imperative. In Schlesinger’s words, ‘free societ(ies) survive in the last resort only if enough people believed in it deeply enough to die for it’ (1970: 245).

4. The Vietnam War and US foreign policy

War-making counts as an obvious expression of power as might rather than as productive force. Well-worn accounts of world politics usually survey the comparative ability of one country to make other countries act according to its will and analyse the considerations and tactics involved in various states’ quest for power. Rather than seeing the Vietnam War according to the bipolar model of Cold War politics, I am more interested in the discursive tactics that prepare the decision to intervene in another country. The decision to make war is itself conditioned by the assessment of threats to a national population by foreign policy experts and executive authorities. These assessments are processed through a series of discursive strategies which typically present intervention as morally worthy and, more particularly, as essential to the security of national citizens. Looking at the processes of legitimization surrounding American interventions in countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq, US foreign policy has largely functioned according to the same modalities of exclusion and differentiation as in the domestic realm. What’s more, the tacitly held sentiment of ‘manifest destiny’ appears to have been a lasting driving force in the extension and validation of American models, whether economic, technical or political.
The US did not really commit men or resources to realize its emerging ambitions on the world stage before the very end of the 19th century. The missionary spirit that drove thousands of Americans across the planes and onto the pacific coast was beginning to outgrow the now fixed national boundaries. In an attempt to throw off Spanish rule in Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam, Mckinley initiated a series of armed interventions in 1898 and 1899. Newspapers like *Journal* and *World* incensed the American public by exaggerating or even inventing Spanish atrocities in Cuba (Jones, 1995: 400). Those reports contributed to exacerbate an already simmering nationalistic fever and to drive the American public's demand for the annexation of Spanish colonies. The Spanish-American War of 1898, as David Campbell remarks, was justified ‘in the same terms that had rationalized the oppression of the Indians and others at home: the need (if not duty) to civilize, educate, and look after primitive peoples, and the anarchy, barbarism, and danger that would flourish if the United States did not act’ (1998: 135). American interventions were then largely made possible through the constitution of a realm of signification in which identities were defined in a hierarchical, mutually exclusive way. As Campbell says, the objectification of internal as much as external enemies was ‘animated by a moral concern to distinguish between the normal and the pathological, and largely impervious to the characteristic and qualities of the other, these figurations instantiate a fictive self that has meaning principally as the negation of difference, and which then performs as a regulative ideal by which contingency can be domesticated and identity enframed’ (Campbell, 1998: 136). In the case of the US intervention in the Philippines, which resulted in a drawn out and violent colonial struggle, Americans consistently viewed themselves as diligent, organized and principled all the while representing Filipinos as lazy, backward and barbaric. As Roxanne Lynn Doty observes, ‘the reality 'instantiated' in this (racist) discourse facilitated practices that led to the death of more than a million Filipinos and the subsequent denial of their right to self-government’ (1996: 48). These discursive instantiations contributed to enable murderous American tactics against the Filipino insurrection but also to force the infrastructural beginnings of a governmentalized space.

Whilst Woodrow Wilson vowed to overturn the US' imperial ambitions, he held a strong belief in the inherent value of liberal democratic principles. Although the run up to the American entry into the First World War enjoyed the usual flaring of nationalistic sentiments, Wilson was determined to extend some of the principles of progressivism he had put forth at home to foreign policy. In his famous 14 points speech, Wilson expressed
his wish that standards such as free trade, open agreements, democracy and self-determination be extended and respected by all international players. These wishes translated into a proposal to form the League of Nations which would presumably see to the preservation of peace, fair exchanges and territorial integrity among its members. The idea that the principles espoused by the United States are of universal validity has been echoed throughout American history. Neoconservatives have notably embraced this nation albeit in a less conciliatory manner than Wilson idealism.  

4.1 The Vietnam War; Extending the American Model by force

The Vietnam War was the longest and most divisive war in US history. Although Indochina had been a strategic concern for American policy makers since after the end of World War Two, the war did not formally begin before the end of 1964, early 1965 under Lyndon B. Johnson’s tenure. The evaluation of the stakes either in terms of national security, strategic interests or international credibility were carried out, as is usually the case, by the president, highly ranked officers and influential political advisers. Interestingly, however, military operations were supplemented by a colossal development effort. Bearing the visible imprint of modernization, US policy in Vietnam was an attempt to instate working liberal democratic institutions and a prosperous economy in order to minimize the appeal of communism. The following discussion of American involvement in Vietnam is by no means an exhaustive historical account of the war, its aim is rather to illustrate the particular entanglements of executive decisionism with the extension of domestic governmental rationalities to another land.

As early as 1956, John F. Kennedy affirmed that Vietnam represented ‘the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia’ (Kennedy, 1956). Soon after leading his revolutionary troops to victory in Dien Bien Phu and forcing the French colonists to capitulate, Ho Chi Minh became president of North Vietnam and instated land reforms inspired by Stalin and Mao. Fearful that South Vietnam might also succumb to communism, US policy makers vowed to extend American influence in the region. A series of American presidents would support Ngo Dinh Diem, although not unreservedly, in his attempts to defeat the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), made up of nationalist and increasingly numerous communist elements. In conjunction with the growing discontent of the South Vietnamese with Diem’s authoritarianism and elitism as well as with the increasingly

23 On the parallel between Wilsonian idealism and neoconservatism, see Boot (2002).
visible US presence, the NLF, otherwise known as the Viet Cong, captured substantial parts of the countryside. Seeing that most of President Kennedy’s efforts to overturn the insurgency such as Strategic Hamlets and large scale development projects, had had minimal success, Lyndon Johnson opted for outright military intervention. Even though the events are still clouded in mystery, Johnson reportedly reacted to an attack on the USS Maddox by North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf (Herring, 2002: 142). After hesitating to heed to his foreign policy advisers about military escalation, Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnamese targets in February 1965.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and others such as Walt Whitman Rostow, McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara initially believed that the fall of South Vietnam would incur a domino effect and accelerate the spread of communism in South East Asia. Even if public officials, the President included, frequently stated that the US’ main objective was to ‘assist the people and government’ of South Vietnam in ‘their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy’ (NSCA 273 Memorandum in Herring, 2002: 132), a series of other justifications were given. As a former high ranking officer recalls, Secretary of State Rusk first invoked the ‘defense of Vietnamese freedom, then... national interest, and finally a defense against the yellow peril in the World’ (in Lind, 1999: 33). If the variety of rationales to intervene in Vietnam represented the multifaceted strategic game of the Cold War, with its imprecise estimates of intentionality, threat and risk, it was also indicative of the American population’s increasing scepticism about the war. The mobilization of public support did require a wide ranging discursive campaign, which depicted the danger of a communist aggression as not only possible but real. Equally, what was presented to be at stake was the defence of freedom itself against the tide of oppressive forces, not only in South Vietnam but throughout the entire world. American intervention in foreign soil involved, as it often has, the discursive association of an innate individual and national attachment to freedom with a belief in its universal character. Typically, it also labelled the communist enemy as bloodthirsty, evil and immoral.

The need to defend freedom demanded greater efforts and sacrifices from ordinary Americans. By the summer of 1967, draft calls exceeded 30 000 per month and a ten percent surtax was instituted to finance the war (Herring, 2002: 211). In a fully fledged show of executive power, several bills amending existing conscription laws were passed to allow for the enrolment of more young combatants, the majority of whom were either poor
white working class or African American. As difficulties started to emerge on the ground and as domestic discontent grew, the Vietnam War became a real test of strength for President Johnson and his close advisers. In a private communication, Johnson said the loss of Vietnam would 'shatter (his) Presidency, kill (his) administration, and damage our democracy' (Kearns, 1976: 252). From the mid to late 1960’s, the Vietnam Quagmire was seen as a direct threat to executive authority and the political structure it upheld; decisive action was therefore seen as urgent. An increase in the influx of troops, military equipment as much as developments funds and agents was the US government’s response to the crisis.

As early as 1959, the US mission in Saigon was the largest in the world (Herring, 2002: 69). In 1966, 43% of the US’ international development funds and a similar proportion of personnel went to Vietnam (Eberstadt, 1988: 34). In keeping with a modernizing outlook, the improvement of the South Vietnamese population’s welfare would be the most effective means to prevent all-out insurgency. Throughout the sixties, most of the AID reports submitted to Congress alluded to the need to build a strong central government, capable of overseeing the distribution of wealth and services through all levels of society. As stated in the 1971 AID document *US Foreign Aid in Vietnam*, one of the organization’s principal objective was to provide technical assistance in fields like ‘taxation, customs, statistics and manpower utilization’ to help the government increase its revenue and capabilities (Agency for International Development, 1971: 8). On a more general level, AID’s function would consist in demonstrating to the Vietnamese population that the state could be trusted and contribute to its well-being. As the agency’s 1968 report *Population Program Assistance* illustrated, some programs aimed to ‘directly reach the people’ such as health, education and agriculture, while others concentrated on improving the state’s capacity to deliver services and manage infrastructure projects like electrification (Agency for International Development, 1968a: 55-63).

In conjunction with these strategies to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, USAID eventually had to compose with wartime conundrums such as refugees, the reconstitution of crops and villages and the organization of self-defence forces. Targeted rural populations, more inclined to sympathise with the Viet Cong, were also placed in ‘strategic hamlets’ from the early 1960’s. These consisted in enclosed spaces where peasants would build modern homes and instigate community activities under the supervision of American soldiers, aid workers and South Vietnamese officials. Such a strategy was intended to demonstrate the benefits of organization, effective public
administration, new and advanced agricultural technologies and political participation. The
extension of central government to previously overlooked rural areas transformed ‘passive
farmers... into active, empowered citizens through voting in local elections, forming
committees, and undertaking projects to meet community needs’ (Latham, 2000: 154).
Those governmental experiments acted directly upon the cultural and personal character of
the individuals concerned. They aimed to supplement, some would say replace, traditional
cultural behaviour with new attitudes and desires. Monitored community initiatives would
eventually; ‘make them want better things, clean wells, a school, improved crop practices,
a road’ (Staley in Latham, 2000: 172). Targeted countries were represented as having a
clear interest in adopting American institutional, economic and political forms. To make
local populations appreciate that it was indeed in their interest to follow particular models
of growth and public representation, American aid agencies had to skilfully balance the
disciplinarian element involved in organizing ‘development communities’ with the
justification of such efforts based on the promise of more freedom, prosperity and
contentment for the local population.

Even if in operative in very different contexts, the freedom of either the welfare recipient at
home in the US or that of the South Vietnamese peasant are both subject to a variety of
calculations and adjustments. To some extent, the targeted individuals’ expectation of the
state’s commitment to personal freedom and of its responsibility to organize resources and
deliver services equitably, also informed governmental projects. Interventions in particular
countries often amounted to establishing standardized forms of governance informed by an
ethos of bureaucratic, administrative and individual efficiency. Not without certain
difficulties, the rationality informing development projects in countries like Vietnam,
meaning the rules and modes of classification of different domains of intervention, was
transposed unto local structures.

Conclusion

The 1960’s witnessed an active reconsideration of the state’s role as to the provision of
welfare and the development of individual potential. The complex combination of
efficiency based models for state administration and of strategies of responsibilization and
self empowerment for individuals largely constituted the governmental landscape of the
1960’s. Modernization, with its belief in progress, rationality and human flourishing was
perhaps the decade’s most typical brand of governmental thinking. Guided by an
unprecedented number of intellectuals, Kennedy and Johnson’s policies applied scientific expertise and collective good will to the perennial problems of prejudice, poverty and underdevelopment. In both domestic and foreign policy realms, the poor at home and deprived countries abroad were represented as objects of intervention through a range of new plans and targets orchestrated by the central state. The poor were also made into subjects faced with the necessity to internalize certain attitudes and requirements, particularly in domestic welfare programs. While some penalties were imposed upon those who failed to comply with the conditions of welfare assistance, these were counterbalanced by the state’s responsibility to provide for minimal standards of living. During the first half of the decade, the United States’ sense of self was shaped by its unparalleled wealth and its stable and open political system, but also by its opposition to the main alternative model of development; communism. Confident in the superiority of its own values and methods, the US planned to extend the rationale informing its Great Society programs to the rest of the world. In a show of both its military power and its determination to outshine communists in South Vietnam, the US attacked with a massive development effort and military strikes.

As I have shown in this chapter, the constitution of personhood throughout most of the 1960’s was torn between multifarious forces and rationales such as a pastoral-welfare ethos, a reliance on individual impetus, clear manifestations of executive authority and the liberalization of cultural mores. The next chapter will trace the transformations of the above forces and rationales and focus more particularly on the gradual validation of individual effort and self-realization in rationalities of government throughout the 1970’s. The 1970’s marked the further erosion of the welfare ethos, the intensification of efficiency standards, the introduction of more disciplinary measures on recipients of state assistance and the dissolution of protest movements, all of which were part and parcel of the changing governmental mindset throughout the decade.
Chapter Four:
The 1970's; The Welfare Model Under Pressure.

Introduction

This chapter will address the gradual shift from the welfare oriented rationale of the 1960’s to the emerging neoliberal governmentality which was apparent in many administrative reforms throughout the 1970’s. The definition of subjectivity, that is, the development of the personal aptitudes necessary to thrive in particular governmental and cultural contingencies, was being pulled in opposite directions. If Americans were expecting a certain threshold of state assistance, the requirements of higher productivity pointed to self-reliance as the more reasonable expectation. Similarly, if poor nations of the world were expecting first world countries to contribute a larger share in the contest against global poverty, the terms of responsibility for foreign assistance were restricted and redefined. The chapter will dwell on these emerging tendencies and complex combinations by looking at the reforms of the AFDC and USAID in the 1970’s. It will also look at a selection of political decisions in both the foreign and domestic realms which were enacted through discourses of exclusion.

The modernizing outlook of the 1960’s, characterized by the use of technology for human betterment and by the state’s central role in creating the conditions for individual productivity and insuring standards of collective welfare, was beginning to wane into the next decade. If the state was still expected to provide care for the destitute throughout much of the 1970’s, governmental plans seemed to be putting a sharper focus on the individual. The individual was indeed becoming the object of more conscientious observation. Managerial plans to reform the American labour market were increasingly taking into account the desires and habits of workers in order to suggest more productive arrangements for factory workers as much as civil servants. Through the right kinds of perks and incentives, individuals could potentially be made more productive and conscientious in their daily tasks. In the competitive labour market of the 1970’s, rationales of rule concentrated on creating the conditions for self-realization and happiness in the workplace. Similarly, the logic behind welfare reforms was to impress the necessity and obligation to work in the minds of welfare recipients who were now being labelled as ‘dependent’ and ‘irresponsible.’ As Nixon insisted; ‘let us remember that America was
built not by government, but by people—not by welfare, but by work—not by shirking responsibility, but by seeking responsibility’ (Nixon, 1973). Throughout welfare reforms in the 1970’s, more punitive measures were enforced and eligibility for state assistance was restricted. Work was slowly becoming one of the main conditions for welfare assistance. It was both the object of experiments in governmental thought and represented as having intrinsic normative and regulatory value. This re-orientation of subjectivity around notions of individual effort was supplemented by exhortations to moral responsibility. In public discourse, stable family life was presented as one of the more viable forms of social existence. Part of the reason for the steady rise in AFDC caseloads was attributed to the disintegration of the nuclear family in many impoverished communities. Neoconservative intellectuals and practitioners, Pat Moynihan among them, were particularly concerned with this cultural turn and tried their hardest to reverse it.

Once again, the programmatic shifts in rationales of liberal rule observed in the domestic realm were also manifest in many aspects of foreign policy. Reforms towards administrative efficiency cut across policy domains and affected the intellectual and technical make-up of foreign assistance perhaps even more than domestic programs. Administrative cuts and re-arrangements as well as experiments in privatization, already under way in the delivery of social care to Americans, were bolder and more extensive in foreign aid programs. The responsibility for development was clearly being delegated to the individual citizens and administrative units of recipient countries. The objectives of foreign aid were also considerably more modest, focusing more on relief efforts towards the truly destitute than on wide ranging developmental plans. Just as the state was beginning to crack down on the poor at home, the US government inflicted more disciplinary measures on countries who were not fulfilling their obligations.

In spite of the increasingly refined incitements toward economically and socially productive behaviour, the imprint of state power had all but receded. The establishment of employment and eligibility quotas as much as the objective to make welfare recipients become conscious of what was in their own interest contained traces of direct and indirect commands. From the perspective of the security problematique expressed by Foucault in *Society Must be Defended*, protests against the Vietnam war were deemed dangerous to the security and stability of the nation. The boundaries of normality were being defined according to general differentiations between the politicized elements of the counter-
culture and patriotic and law-abiding citizens. The presidency of Richard Nixon in particular was marked by a series of forceful interventions.

1. Welfare and Work in the 1970's

As noted by Judith Sklhar (1991), work has been a particularly important part of American identity. In popular consciousness, work is the gateway to freedom, itself traditionally associated with autonomy and self-reliance. In the midst of the transformation of obsolete economic and industrial structures throughout the 1970's, workers had to adapt to new conditions of production and performance quotas. Concurrently, the workplace was invested with a flurry of new psychological techniques. Managerial expertise integrated these new techniques in the hope of making workers more fulfilled and satisfied with their tasks in order to increase productivity. The values associated with work, namely self-discipline and effort, served as an inspiration for what the state now saw as the problem of 'welfare dependency.' Reforms of the welfare system in the 1970's were more and more intent on turning recipients into job seekers, in other words to make them more actively engaged in providing for their own welfare. This renewed focus on developing personal aptitudes and encouraging contentment and self-realization through work announced a more drastic shift in governmental thinking. However, responsibilization was not solely associated with work ethic, it was also implicitly related to family life. In what follows, I look at the reforms of the AFDC throughout the 1970's and discuss the combinations of power that emerge in the progressive remaking of subjectivity in post welfare governance.

From 1969 to 1976, the Nixon and Ford administrations evolved through what was dubbed a welfare crisis. Profound divisions as to what the extent and function of welfare should be took place between the ruling parties. During his first term, Nixon called on neoconservative politician Patrick Moynihan to reform the AFDC. As a result of his endeavours, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) was proposed to Congress in 1971. In the proposal, Moynihan vowed to reduce the number of social workers, whom he saw as unnecessary intermediaries between families and the federal government. The FAP had two main components; first it was to set a fixed federal allowance to families which would be distributed by states at their discretion and second, it aimed to establish work as a primary condition to receive benefits (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 100-101). Although it was

24 It was inspired by a report from Bob Finch which recommended introducing a fixed income for families, itself modelled on Milton Friedman's idea of a negative income tax. He suggested sending payments to families directly.
rejected by Congress because of the liberals' complaint that the minimal federal allowance was too low and the conservatives' objection that it was too high, the report announced a shift in how the subject of governance was thought of and how it could be shaped. Concurrently with Nixon’s proclivity for traditional values, market economy, corporate interests and a general politics of stability, government plans hinted at a transfer of responsibility towards the individual and local authorities. But if Nixon’s social policy was more conservative, it was by no means a complete demotion of the welfare state (Banfield, 1973: 33). A substantial part of the American population was not willing to accept a radical decrease in government spending. Once again, Moynihan put most of the blame for the permanence of a large welfare apparatus on left leaning Democrats, who he assumed did not want to lose their jobs in community programs or share their benefits with the needy (Moynihan in Steinfels, 1979: 135).

In Moynihan’s view, the social engineering of the previous decade had accustomed citizens to overly generous state benefits and had allowed for the disintegration of the moral fabric of civil society. In *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* (1973a), he implied that stronger measures had be taken to reverse the worrying trends that were developing within the underclass;

> 'Among a large and growing lower class, self-reliance, self-discipline, and industry are waning; a radical disproportion is arising b/t reality and expectations concerning job, living standard, and so on: unemployment is high but a lively demand for unskilled labour remains unmet; illegitimacy is increasing; families are more and more matrifocal and atomized; crime and disorder are sharply on the rise.' (1973a: 76)

Again, neoconservatives, with Moynihan as their political ambassador, advocated interventions which could have a direct effect on the morality of welfare clients. In order to modify the character of complacent and amoral welfare recipients, obligatory work was seen as a legitimate measure. Throughout the seventies, many experimental work programs like the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP), known as workfare, were introduced. Welfare recipients were now obliged to register with state employment services, sign up for training and support sessions as well as carry out community work. Those who did not meet these conditions simply saw their benefits reduced (Nancy E. Rose, 1995:100). However, the first phase of the work incentive program (WIN I) came under criticism for failing to increase participation. The program was eventually replaced by WIN II, which stressed immediate job placement over individualized training and
counselling services. AFDC applicants as young as 16 years old were obliged to register, and deregistration from the program would incur serious sanctions (US Department of Labor, 1979: 51). The remaining programs for the unemployed also became increasingly binding. It was slowly becoming apparent that the 1960’s ideas of empowerment through rehabilitation and training were being replaced with more coercive measures to end ‘welfare dependency.’ In the 1970’s, paid labour was increasingly considered as an effective means to regulate a range of social ills associated with welfare dependency such as alcoholism, idleness and delinquency. Work came to assume the function of social and psychological integration previously offered by the immaterial solidarity of Great Society programs. The kind of qualities required of a productive, well adapted worker, provided a model to follow for welfare recipients.

Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1995) argue that accounts of economic transformations in the 1970’s are incomplete without surveying the psychological expertise that developed around the person of the worker. Elaborate representations of the states of mind, needs and aspirations of the worker as well as incentives to productivity and satisfaction have become an integral part of managing economic activity, labour relations and social behaviour. During the Taylorist and Post World War I years, industrial production was based on efficiency-driven scientific models in which labourers featured as little more than lifeless instruments. Concomitantly, the pre WWII social movements decried the dehumanising effects of work and a separation between the sphere of productivity and that of the workers’ rights and aspirations started to appear. As Jacques Donzelot suggests, this dissociation of ‘the social from the economic’ led to an effort to recreate a ‘community of labour where each individual understands his or her place in the enterprise, and the enterprise itself attains the status of an institution seen as serving a common idea which transcends the individual’ (1991: 258, 259). During the war and the immediate years that followed, the creation of corporations with distinctive identities contributed to reclaim the allegiance of individuals estranged from their work. Workers became involved in the management of the enterprise and the state acknowledged the workers’ rights to advantages like family health plans, paid holidays and leisure activities. Most Great Society programs of the 1960’s were informed by this same commonly agreed ‘right’ to social protection. However, the renewal of the subject’s emotional bond with his or her workplace and of the extensive role of the state in realizing the common good, soon gave way to a reflection on the adverse effects of uniform integration. Somehow, the
counterculture exposed the conformism of American society partly brought about by corporatism and pleaded for the expression of individuality.

The solidarist ethos of enterprise and the focus on harmonious group relations began to slip away in the 1970's. The concern to increase productivity required that responsibilities be allocated according to competency. This meant that a hierarchy of skills and managerial experience was being progressively instituted in the workplace. The possibility to acquire new skills and be promoted were also inviting prospects for workers (Rose, 1989: 98). In the few decades that followed the war, the Marxist-inspired critique of work as a series of dull and compulsive motions, and of the severance of labour and self-fulfilment, gave way to all kinds of psychological surveys on how to increase happiness in the workplace. Research institutions in Europe, Scandinavia and North America published various studies on the 'quality of working life' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 439). Experts on work relations, government officials and psychologists joined forces to represent the worker's needs and aspirations and make them consistent with prevailing conceptions of democracy and liberty. A lot of CEOs found that getting workers more involved in the production process and making work more interesting increased productivity.

In a historical overview of the Work Incentive program (WIN) from 1968 to 1978, a congressional report vowed to increase the 'quality and range of jobs', provide 'high quality training, help youth to make transition between work and reliance on welfare, further refine self help techniques' in 'order to enable WIN registrants to acquire the skills necessary for successful participation in the job market' (US Department of Labor, 1978: 38). As Donzelot points out, the articulation of an emerging subject demanding personal fulfilment, independence, humane and interesting tasks, opens the way for a formation permanente; 'a continuous process of retraining, from the cradle to the grave, designed to provide the individual with a feeling of autonomy in relation to work, and at work' (Donzelot, 1991: 273). Through the careful identification of the individual's feelings, ambitions and misgivings, work was to become an integral part of personal life.

As a result of the budgetary pressures on the welfare system, international competition and technological advances in the production sector, a series of adjustments were required.

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25 On this, see Miller and Rose's historical study of the Tavistock Institute (1988) in which they assess the effect of psychological and managerial techniques on the reconceptualization of the workplace and the families from the welfare to the advanced liberal state.
New management schemes were being developed in order to increase efficiency, reduce waste and streamline services. Training programs also had to be implemented to keep up with a flurry of technological ameliorations. Government studies compared the American workforce with that of countries with higher productivity indicators like Japan. In a congressional report published in 1982, an assortment of academics, scientists, government officials and company representatives concluded that the U.S. labour force was struggling to adapt to technological developments, lacked the necessary training and skills and suffered from poor relations with management (Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 1982: 2-4). The proliferation of psychological studies and government reports intent on discovering what makes workers' happy and therefore productive, meant that human relations were now the object of conscientious calculation and manipulation (Miller and Rose, 1990: 22 and 1995: 441). On the one side, the productivity of each worker was measured by attributing the roles of specific characteristics like age, sex and race (Baumol and McLennan, 1985: 106). On the other, each individual's behaviour was monitored through personalized counselling sessions and remedies customized to the worker’s needs or problems were made available.

The drive for efficiency characteristic of the emerging entrepreneurial culture of the 1970's also affected state operation. Throughout the 1970's, social programs were subject to closer scrutiny. Quality Control Programs conceived for the AFDC consisted in 'producing a better administration of the Program by requiring States and localities to measure, identify and correct errors in administration. As stated in the 1978 administrative report, it is also directed at 'reducing Federal matching of erroneous payments to a minimum’ (Committee on Government Operations, 1978: 202). Some reforms then vowed for a transfer of responsibility from the central state to smaller administrative units. In order to avoid administrative mistakes such as undeservedly high welfare checks, accountants and local civil servants were instructed to be more scrupulous. Quality control programs began to investigate suspected fraudsters and devised formal selection processes between deserving and undeserving recipients. In conjunction with high inflation, these various efforts to monitor individual cases and payments more closely actually succeeded in slowing and reversing enrolment (Axinn and Levin, 1992: 279).

Again, the impetus towards efficiency across economic and administrative realms entailed a central role for the individual. It also insisted on the importance of paid labour as a means to restore self-confidence and facilitate social integration. Within the emerging
entrepreneurial culture of the 1970's, the multiplication of positive incentives like promotion and negative ones like redundancy, clearly impressed the value of hard work in the individual’s psyche. This valuation was also enabled by the concerted discursive production of many different agencies from local government offices to multinational corporations. For welfare recipients, however, the suggestion of labour’s intrinsic value was backed up by disciplinary measures. Work was the obligatory first step on the road to self-realization. If governmental rationality in 1970’s America was oscillating between meeting individual desires and dealing with structural necessities, the poor usually bore the brunt of the latter adjustments. For the more fortunate, the attraction of rewards and bonuses in a competitive environment clearly associates happiness with effort and a measure of self-sacrifice. In typical neoliberal fashion, the quest for individual happiness could at once increase general economic output and regulate social behaviour.

However, at the end of the decade with Carter as President, a substantial portion of the American public and of its elected officials still considered poverty and unemployment as a consequence of the economic structure. For example, the 1977 Report of the WIN Program and Related Experiences persists in blaming the American economy for ‘its inability to provide jobs’ (US Department of Labor, 1978: 37) and states that ‘most persons are on welfare because they cannot earn enough in spite of their efforts to support their dependents (US Department of Labor, 1978: 11). Responsibility here mostly lies outside of the individual’s reach and what is lacking is neither a desire to work nor succeed, but the adequate context to do so. The general aspirations of the social state such as the even distribution of ‘opportunity’ and the provision of welfare as a ‘right’ then seemed to endure. In 1974, about 1/4th of subsidized opportunities for employment and training programs were provided through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), which supplied jobs within the public sector (US Department of Labor, 1978: 36). Even if welfare recipients had to demonstrate their motivation to overcome the obstacles inherent to a competitive and rapidly changing labour market, there was no real political emphasis on imparting responsibility to the individual for his or her poverty. However, this was to change with the election of Ronald Reagan in the early eighties, as his administration actively favoured the transfer of ‘the social and economic risks of unemployment from state bureaucracies to the individual’ (McDonald and Marston, 2005; 374-401).
Throughout the 1970’s, welfare was subject to contrasting conceptualizations. On the one hand, the individual’s own efforts were considered to be the surest means to quell unemployment and welfare dependency. On the other hand, in the immediate aftermath of Great Society projects, the state was still expected to provide care for the destitute. These rationales battled out and combined until neoliberal governance produced more visible effects in the 1980’s. Another of the realms which was said to affect the distribution of welfare around the same time was the family. In addition to an appraisal of the regulatory capacities of both state and individual, in terms of either providing opportunity or seeking to enterprise oneself, the nuclear family was subjected to an increasingly thorough governmental and moral assessment.

2. The American Family

The family has always been an ambiguous area of governance. On the one hand, it has been considered beyond the reach of government, particularly in the United States where the public and the private realms have traditionally been kept apart. On the other, it has been seen as a crucial stage of social integration. As an area of governance, it has also marked the symbolic limit of the state’s moral authority. While it could in theory encourage lasting marriages, the state could not directly coerce individuals into preserving their unions. The liberalization of cultural mores and the increasing preoccupation with self-realization from the 1960’s on, did play a part in unsettling the institution of marriage. Traditional sources of moral authority, the state included, were seen to have suffered a loss in legitimacy. Once the family could no longer be relied on for the moral education of its members, the state could only enjoin individuals to ponder on the consequences of desertion. In what follows, I will present the changing representations of the family as an object of knowledge and its moral problematization in schemes of governance.

In Policing the Family (1980), Donzelot draws a historical account of the rationalities behind the institutional treatment of the family. Throughout the industrial revolution in France and England, working class families became subject to more scrutiny. Educative campaigns around hygiene, reproduction and education were led by doctors in an effort to advise mothers on how to manage their households. These measures were instated to counter the effects of industrialization on each members of a family by teaching them self-preservation and autonomy (Donzelot, 1980: 57). The regulation of working class families through philanthropy and medical attention was to foster a climate of mutual surveillance.
conducive to moral behaviour. It also had a more clearly economic purpose because the means for autonomy were associated with hard work and thrift. From the philanthropic organizations of the second half of the nineteenth century to the social state of the first half of the 20th century, medical and civil authorities progressively invested the family with various modes of observation and regulation. An inventory of the internal dynamics and habits (sexual or others) of families was made possible by a network of institutions such as schools and hospitals. The state's newfound responsibility to ensure welfare required a more extensive knowledge of the various social domains, and the further introduction of the family as an object of government was enabled in great part by developments in medicine and psychology. In the 19th century, the family became a privileged site of observation to discern between normal and abnormal behaviour at the early stages of an individual's life. The forms of subjectivity observed in the private realm constituted essential referents as to what had to be changed or simply taken into consideration. As Rose notes, 'the private family has, on the one hand, been linked into new forms of political rationality which have developed over the last century, and, on the other hand, has been central to transformations in subjective realities and desires' (Rose, 1987: 66).

In 1935, the ADC set out to assist children and mothers living in poverty. One of the main objectives of the program was to enable mothers to stay at home for their children's education. The provision of attentive emotional support was represented by state agencies as the mother's natural duty (Rose, 1989). In parallel, the abuse of children became one of the instances where the state could intervene in the name the young person's newly acquired right to grow up in a stable environment. In dealing with cases, governmental agencies determined whether the child lived in a 'suitable home' and disqualified mothers who hadn't been married (Blank and Blum, 1997: 30). With the introduction of the AFDC program in the early sixties, benefits were extended to one or two unemployed, often unmarried parents with children under their care, including relatives living under the same roof. By the end of the 1960's, the greater portion of recipients were either unmarried or divorced. The government began to focus on neighbourhoods where children born out of wedlock were a common place. A 1965 report from Pat Moynihan portrayed the alarming rate of illegitimacy in Puerto Rican and Black communities and recommended measures to discourage family breakdowns. Issues such as teenage pregnancy and cohabitation were subject to prevention campaigns and social workers were asked to offer individualized counselling to young persons in deprived communities.
Throughout the 1970's and 80's, the White House organized a series of conferences to discuss the disintegration of traditional households. People across the country were invited to voice their concerns about the general relationship between the government and the family. They were encouraged to share what they expected, disliked or wanted from the government. For example, a summary of 1980 conference revealed that many participants wanted to be given courses and workshops on married life. We can infer from this that a number of Americans still wished for some sort of institutional guidance on how to behave rationally in their professional and personal lives. Here again, there is evidence that the transfer of responsibility to the individual was far from complete. Revealing one of the government's lasting preoccupation, the report also stated that 'the American family (was) disintegrating because of a break down in the moral structure. The family of today is in need of something to believe in that would give it substance, cohesiveness and the ability to withstand pressure' (White House Conference on Families, 1980: 160). In spite of these concerns, successive administrations did not manage to reverse the steady rise in family breakdowns. Reflecting the complexity and ambiguity of the moral problematique at hand, the report also attests that 'what we are witnessing is not the break up of traditional family patterns but the emergence of a pluralism in family ways' (White House Conference on Families, 1980: 70). This meant that in spite of the government's displeasure with family breakdowns, both for instrumental and perhaps moral reasons, governmental plans also had to operate through readily constituted family structures. If the nuclear family was then implicitly valued as a preferable arrangement, nascent forms of subjectivity in the shape of self-realization tended towards the opposite pole. The emerging subjective propensities for performance, self-realization and happiness entered in contradiction with the rather more static and limiting structure of the family. Equally, the explicitly moral objective of encouraging lasting marriages was held back by a widespread recognition that the prevailing forms of family arrangements were seen as a private matter.

At the end of the 1970's and though the 1980's, the workplace and family life become permeated with the same modes of subjectivity. As exemplified in a study for the Russell Sage Foundation, a Democrat think tank, Rosabeth Moss Kanter argues that both could be studied according to the same principle of the maximization of happiness. Following the economic logic, the level of satisfaction in relationships and at work can be assessed in terms of performance;
emphasis on performance standards as an indication of membership and contribution, measurement of performance by 'objective' standards derived from more universalistic and impersonal notions of minimum and ideal performance (grades at school, frequency of intercourse, number of orgasms, etc.), rewards and contributions controlled by each person given or withheld depending on performance, achievement rather intrinsic qualities as the measure of the person, an expectation of more (goods, services, rewards, comforts) with increasing seniority and a legitimate ability to 'fire' or 'trade in' spouses if they do meet standards. (Kanter, 1977: 72)

A cost and benefit analysis is here presented as a standard to judge of the validity of personal and socio-economic relations. Individuals should choose on the basis of the best possible alternatives presented to them in terms of services or potential partners. The application of more thorough standards of performance is linked to enhancing 'quality of life,' which is ultimately what scientists, social workers, psychologists, company executives and government officials are interested in generating and sustaining. The governmentalization of family life then includes everything from the labouring activities of the parents to the psychological troubles of the children. Affects as much as work should therefore be integrated, studied and remedied in order to guide the various agencies that come into contact with families.

Once again, a look at the changes in the representation of the family in governmental schemes shows that the economic logic was being progressively adopted to regulate many socio-cultural expectations. In response to an existing disposition to pleasure and self-realization, the emerging subject of advanced liberalism is made freer and happier through his or her ability to choose from the best available avenues. He or she is also held responsible for his own well-being and delivered from the belief that higher authorities should guide individuals on the way to happiness and prosperity. However, the acceptance of a new subjectivity suggested by dispersed agencies and behaviours is supplemented by more coercive elements; the conquering rationality of self-realization provides the legitimacy to coerce those who fall short of these requirements.

Following the thesis that governmental shifts in the domestic domain are intimately related to the means and strategies deployed in foreign policy programs, the peculiar combination of welfare and neoliberal rationales in American governance of the 1970's was reproduced in the various reforms of foreign assistance plans.
3. New Directions for American Aid (1973)

The all-embracing ambitions of modernization proved difficult to realize. The willingness to increase living standards throughout the world was thwarted by a lack of resources and organization. Concurrently to material limitations, the content of responsibility was shifting. Throughout the modernizing era, the representation of poverty as the product of economic imbalances meant that most of the responsibility for international development lied with rich countries. However, in the early moments of the 1970’s, states who received financial assistance were beginning to be held accountable for their own shortcomings. As a result, US foreign assistance focused on the most deprived individuals of a designated country instead of trying to build up infrastructural capabilities. As with domestic welfare programs, the conceptualization and the techniques pertaining to the US development effort were also informed by more rigorous efficiency standards. As I show here, poor countries receiving aid became objectified according to new power and knowledge configurations; an efficiency driven mentality was effectively impressing normative expectations upon recipient countries by suggesting a series of warranted models of subjectivity and development. Again, the failure to comply to performance standards could involve certain penalties and informed the processes of selection as to who was deemed fit to receive aid and who was not.

In the early 1970’s, the growing gap between the expectations of foreign aid bodies in Washington and that of the personnel on the ground became apparent (Packenham, 1966: 212). Program officials were seen as more concerned with attaining quotas and respecting regulations than with fulfilling the original intentions of assistance projects. Those responsible for conceptualising aid policies were also criticized for paying exaggerated attention to economic, institutional and industrial ‘outputs,’ instead of focusing on the ‘real’ needs of the poor. Seeing that costly infrastructural projects were doing little in the way of improving the conditions of life in targeted countries, Congress passed the New Directions legislation in 1973. As was made clear in the 1980 report on US assistance to developing countries, the legislation’s main objective was to redirect development funds towards ‘basic human needs’ (United States Congressional Budget Office, 1980: iv).

In many cases, the transfer of funds for infrastructure projects did not seem to reach its intended beneficiaries. Corrupt and ineffective state apparatuses absorbed most of the money and development opportunities were not evenly distributed. In response to these
assessments, the general purpose of foreign aid changed from promoting self-sustaining growth and trying to raise living standards, to the distribution of basic means of survival like food, clothing and shelter in situations of emergency (Eberstadt, 1988: 38). While the initial aid strategy consisted in augmenting the state’s operational capacity to provide growth, interventions now focused on attending to the needs of the population in mainly poor rural areas. Since the philosophy of development in the sixties was now viewed with suspicion, Congress started to scrutinize the decisional structure and funding of US-AID more closely. Detailed budgets and implementations as well as economic and financial analysis were demanded in the reorganization of the development effort (Hoben, 1989: 259).

In times of fiscal restraint, foreign assistance programs were among the first ones targeted for budgetary cuts. The U.S. government was no longer justified in allocating funds to endeavours that advanced neither American interests nor the causes of peace and prosperity. Much like the programs of the 1960’s such as the War on poverty, the aspirations of the aid effort were seen as too hasty, far-reaching and ambitious. However, if international involvement was seen neither as a moral obligation nor a budgetary priority, the conservation of the domestic welfare system benefited from a more solid consensus. This lack of public will exposed foreign assistance to experimental reforms such as privatisation, new evaluation methods and selective budget cuts earlier than welfare programs. Aside from the variations in degrees of priority, both governmental areas were transformed by increasingly strict standards of efficiency and performance. In the early 1970’s, the organization of USAID was also considered seriously ineffective. A variety of reports to Congress, notably the Pearson commission and the Paterson study group which culminated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, suggested that programs and missions be evaluated and monitored more closely as well as better coordinated with existing civil and state institutions. This could be done through; ‘specifying and elaborating quantitative and behavioural models, constructing and testing hypotheses in the field of local action capabilities and providing consulting assistance to field missions and local collaborating entities’ to enhance their ability to collect, analyse and utilize local data to improve the effectiveness of rural development programs (Michelwait, 1979: 4). Criticism was levelled at the decisional structure of the organization; the allocation of funding was deemed far too complex and lengthy and the ‘discretionary and arbitrary’ nature of its administration obscured the rules of implementation for many field workers. There were appeals to
proscribe congressional restrictions on particular programs and to impart more decisional power to local bureaus (1979: 226-230).

In an effort to improve the administrative and implementation capacities of US Foreign Assistance, administrators then agreed on separating Aid into what were considered as the most important areas of intervention namely health, education, agriculture and population planning. Concurrently to these reforms, security assistance, previously connected to development objectives under Kennedy, was reassigned to the military component of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. In the mid-1970’s, the Middle-East (primarily Egypt and Israel) replaced Southeast Asia as the primary recipient of security assistance (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1983: 1), demonstrating the administration’s pragmatic orientations toward securing vital economic resources. Apart from facilitating the administration of assistance programs, the aim behind the separation of development and security aid was to soften the ‘ideological’ tones of the previous administrations’ strategy.

Underneath the linear history of new legislations and administrative techniques, lies a more general rethinking of the activity of government and the individual requirements for life. The separation of centralized aid programs in specialized areas of intervention, the increase of effectiveness through the reduction of bureaucratic impediments to decision-making, the increase of coordination between existing institutions and the evaluation of project performance, are all measures which in some way also modified the attitudes, roles and expectations of states and individuals alike. This focus on administrative efficiency translated the progressive loss of coherence in the foreign assistance logic of the 1960’s. The unity of purpose implicit to the active diffusion of liberal democratic technologies of government was tainted by the failure of the American war effort in Vietnam. Consequently, foreign assistance programs became less outward and were subjected to a host of internal reforms. The multiplication of evaluation reports, performance indicators and quality control programs set stricter conditions for assistance, which now required that particular dispositions be cultivated in order for countries receive aid and for projects to stay afloat. A new development rationale was progressively seeping in through various practical changes. These covert governmental transformations formed new identities, validated new credos, generated new practices and created new requirements, one of which was the diffusion of responsibility.
3.1 The Distribution of Responsibility

In his address to Congress in 1970, Nixon insisted that developing countries had to 'assume a larger role in defining their own development strategies' (quoted in Rutton, 1996: 96). Countries that proved unable to make good use of the aid money saw their assistance reduced or in more extreme cases withdrawn. The earlier governmental priority of increasing general economic output meant that issues surrounding accountability and quality control had not yet surfaced to the fore. But around the mid 1970's, assistance would be directed toward 'deserving' countries which, through the comparative assessment of their performance, had shown that they could 'help themselves' (United States Congressional Budget Office, 1980: xviii). If the larger portion of aid was still being channelled through state institutions, the latter were held more accountable and were subject to more scrutiny. The world was now increasingly seen as a collection of responsible sovereign nations deemed capable of looking after their own populations. Their success or failure to do so was a matter of their making the right kinds of choices. In its effort to make aid more direct, visible and effective, American Foreign Assistance held indigenous state institutions responsible for identifying 'high priority' development and relief needs.

Yet, at the same time, the New Directions (1973) approach for bilateral aid was to 'be carried out to the maximum extent possible through the private sector, particularly those institutions which already have ties in the developing areas, such as educational institutions, cooperatives, credit unions and voluntary agencies' (Smith, 1990: 5). The responsibility for the colossal task of developing third world countries especially in times of fiscal restraint, had to be distributed through a greater array of agencies. Asked to increase their contribution to international development, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF substantially augmented their operational capacities. The growing internationalisation of life at the financial and institutional levels in the mid-1970's is well documented. In order to further coordinate and organize USAID in an increasingly interdependent world, President Carter created the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) in 1979. Governmental initiatives at the end of the 1970's essentially continued the reforms of 1973 by multiplying evaluation programs,

26 The most famous example in International Relations in the 1970's is Keohane and Nye (1977).
decentralizing decision-making overseas, encouraging the private sector and soliciting international donors.

Through the IDCA, the Security Supporting Assistance of 1971 was renamed as the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in 1979, still in existence today. The ESF put renewed emphasis on the economic as opposed to the military component of security assistance. As foreign policy experts in government stated, the ESF was more discretionary, had a simpler administrative structure and its reworked objective was to support the US' political, economic and security interests through the promotion of economic and political stability in particular countries (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1983: 2). A clearly more malleable foreign policy instrument, it was alternatively used by the state department for both economic and strategic purposes without too much interference from Congress. Following the 1979 reforms, American Foreign Assistance was also formally divided between Development Assistance (DA), the ESF and the Food Program (PL 480), and it remains so to this day.

The humanitarian and pacifist leanings of the Carter Administration also transpired in the inclusion of human rights and democratic practices as incentives for US assistance; 'in distributing the scarce recourses of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development' (Carter, 1977). The emphasis on Human Rights and democracy represented an important development in foreign policy practices because it raised the questions of governmental accountability and of the rights of individuals. Some states were now criticized by the US for failing to respect the social, political and economic rights of their citizens. Individuals, and not solely governments, became objects of value, concern, observation and regulation. Before any appurtenance to political communities, there were rights bearers, worthy of being rescued from cruel, incompetent and corrupt governments. The degree of adherence to international treaties pertaining to the treatment of individuals required improving the capacity to monitor and compile human rights records and an increasing number of country specific reports were drawn. The Carter doctrine, even if applied in a very limited way, entailed a form of political conditionality not dissimilar to the 'good governance' covenants of the 1990's, albeit integrated within a different set of relationships. The interest for human rights in the 1970's was of course not enmeshed in as diffuse and complex a network of civil institutions as we have today. Yet, the limited institutional support for human rights policies, the statist nature of assistance contracts and
the jealous preservation of national sovereignty in a lot of third world countries represented major obstacles to Carter’s agenda.

In response to the perceived amorality of Kissinger and Nixon’s realpolitik and to the cultural fragmentation taking hold of the country, Carter proposed to rejuvenate the spirit of unity and optimism latent in the American psyche. He also hoped to restore the US’ international reputation by displaying a conciliatory attitude toward the demands and criticisms of some third world countries, who blamed the regimes of trade spearheaded by the United States for world poverty. Through the United Nations, LDCs articulated demands for a New International Economic Order

‘based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations’ (UN, 1974).

This plea for a general framework to achieve international welfare advocated the sovereign right to choose between modes of economic development and insisted on the fundamental right to redistribution and welfare for all members of the nascent international community. In this context, foreign assistance was seen more as a formal moral obligation than a charitable act. However, such a plan required transformations which received little support in the West and by the end of the decade, it was becoming clear that the United States was relinquishing its more selfless tendencies to bring about justice and welfare on a larger scale. The growing emphasis on institutional and personal responsibility as well as on economic performance was announcing a peculiar turn in US foreign relations. From the welfarist covenant of the late 1960’s, where poverty and violence were identified as consequences of world capitalism and colonial rule, third world countries started to be indicted for their inability to govern themselves.

Whilst the New Directions legislation and the continuing efforts to address the real ‘needs’ of poor rural populations involved the participation of sovereign states, the 1980’s translated a deep suspicion of centralized institutions. The self-interested actions of enterprising individuals, private firms and non-governmental organizations were deemed both more effective and legitimate instances of development. Furthermore, states that did
not meet specific criteria of performance, for whatever reason, became increasingly marginalized and held accountable for their failures. Reagan also adopted a more belligerent stance toward nations unyielding to capitalist forms of development and insisted on the defence of American values abroad as a moral imperative.

4. Leadership, Order and Morality

The conflicted mixture of cultural subjectivities in late 1960’s, early 1970’s America affected some of the governmental considerations pertaining to family breakdowns and, to a lesser extent, welfare dependency. Coupled with renewed notions of self-realization, changes in mores and cultural habits called for the integration of new variables in the definition of self-government. As conservative and neoconservative commentators readily admitted, it was necessary to restrict behaviours which threatened the social order. Concurrently to the disciplinary measures and moral injunctions enforced upon welfare recipients throughout the 1970’s, both of which conveyed the conscious exclusion of particular individuals from the usual entitlements of citizenship, other manifestations of sovereign power had their course. President Nixon attempted to reassert presidential authority by adopting heavy-handed tactics against campus protests, increasing the surveillance of suspicious political groups and reclaiming discretionary powers to formulate foreign policy. This reaffirmation included both legislative changes and the ongoing objectification of socially prejudicial elements. In what follows, I look at Nixon and Carter’s respective orientations of governmentality and at the discursive and legislative strategies used to order the domestic and foreign policy realms. Secondly, I discuss the beginnings of a conservative reaction to the progressive institutionalization of countercultural values.

Even though he was mindful of the legitimacy gap opened by Johnson’s disastrous handling of Vietnam and aware of the American public’s sensitivity to presidential abuses, Nixon believed that ‘a strong use of executive power was not only within his constitutional prerogative but would eventually restore the presidential ‘glory’ that had been squandered’ by the previous commander in chief (Greene, 1992: 234). The aesthetic and political forms of resistance initiated in the mid 1960’s were spilling over into the next decade. With race riots taking place in various cities, anti war feelings still soaring and political violence at an unprecedented high, Nixon vowed to bring back a semblance of domestic order. He promised to bring peace with honour in Vietnam, to deal with radical militancy in an
effective way and to restore public trust in political institutions. In contrast with his pledge
to reach a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, Nixon went ahead with the invasion of
Cambodia and the bombing of several areas of Indo-China without the approval of
Congress.\textsuperscript{27} Again, the assessment of the ‘security situation’ and of the measures it
required as much as the suspension of normal legal procedures were all indications of the
actuality of sovereign power either within or alongside governmental and disciplinary
schemas.

Nixon’s decision sparked a series of protests across American campuses. Spurred on by the
Kent State shootings, which saw four demonstrators killed by the National Guard, students
embarked on a national strike in which as many as four million participated. Following the
strike and a 100 000 strong demonstration in Washington DC to protest against the killings
and the administration’s continuing offensive in Southeast Asia, leaders of the main
intelligence agencies’ (CIA, the FBI and the NSA) met to discuss ways to investigate and
hinder militant groups. As a result of their consultation, the Huston plan was drawn up.
The proposal basically demanded clearance ‘for opening mail and tapping telephones
without warrants, breaking into homes and offices, and spying on Student Groups through
electronic surveillance and campus informants’ (Slocum-Schaffer, 2003: 15). In spite of
the plan being vetoed, several of its provisions were implemented and the President used a
multiplicity of other channels to spy on groups deemed to have foreign affiliations.\textsuperscript{28} Nixon
endorsed the Huston Plan because ‘he felt they were necessary and justified by the
violence we faced’ (Colodny and Gettlin’s, 1991: 125). He also declared, when asked about
a series of decisions regarding national security issues, that ‘when the president does it that
means that it is not illegal’ (Nixon, 1977). Combined with the president’s estimate of the
reach of executive power and of the necessary moment to enact exceptional surveillance
powers, the justification and implementation of concrete measures was made possible by
the discursive objectification of dangerous militants. Nixon often distinguished between
student protesters and young soldiers sent to Vietnam; ‘you see these bums, you know,
blowing up the campuses. Listen, the boys that are on the college campuses today are the
luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities...out there (in Vietnam)
we’ve got kids who are just doing their duty. I have seen them. They stand tall, and they are
proud... when it really comes down to it, they stand up and, boy, you have to talk up to

\textsuperscript{27} On this see Caldwell (1973), Shaw (2005) and Schlesinger (1973: 192).

\textsuperscript{28} On CHAOS see Athan Theoharis, \textit{Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the
those men’ (Nixon, 1970). The discursive designation of a clear boundary between appropriate modes of being and thinking is again part and parcel of decisions pertaining to the security of the biopolitical order.

If domestic politics occasionally proved to be a difficult arena to bring under the Oval Office’s all-embracing control, foreign policy, said to be Nixon’s strong suit, presented opportunities for more discretionary forms of influence. As Nixon himself asserted, in contrast with his presumed inclination for a strong hand in domestic politics; ‘this country could run itself domestically without a president, all you need is a competent Cabinet to run the country at home. You need a president for foreign policy’ (Nixon in Evans and Novak 1971: 11-12). Along with his trusted adviser Henry Kissinger, Nixon vowed to overturn the underlying principles of Kennedy and Johnson’s foreign policy. In contrast with the ambitions of modernization, Kissinger declared that US foreign policy could no longer be based on ‘enthusiasm, belief in progress, and the invincible conviction that American remedies can work everywhere’ (Brown, 1979: 6). According to the new administration, the bureaucracy in charge of creating and implementing foreign policy programs was too costly, scattered and ineffective. In his 1971 State of the Union address, President Nixon vowed to ‘focus and concentrate the responsibility for getting problems solved’ rather than ‘scattering responsibility by adding new levels of bureaucracy’ (Nixon, 1971). As the president vowed to transfer responsibility for security and development to individual states and local communities, he considered that the establishment of a stable world order was too important an objective to be left to the convoluted foreign policy establishment.

The planned displacement of responsibility to smaller administrative units and individuals was then counterbalanced by a reinforcement of presidential authority. More specifically, the reconfiguration of US foreign policy under Nixon was informed by renewed ideas on the role and nature of executive power. What was deemed necessary was a selection of individuals with the ability to make quick and even-handed decisions. As Kissinger mentioned, bureaucracy ‘avoids risks, awaits results, and base decisions on quantifiable factors. Leadership requires above all else, decisiveness, the willingness to act when facts are ambiguous and when opportunities to affect events are great’ (Strong, 1986: 51). Kissinger believed that heads of state and diplomats had to have a good knowledge of history and local traditions as well as the cogent ability to manipulate events in their favour (Strong, 1986: Xiv). Many of Nixon’s foreign policy ventures, from the treaty on arms
limitation with the Soviet Union to the support of General Pinochet’s coup, relied on
discretionary power and diplomatic dealings which were carefully tucked away from the
American public and the bureaucratic foreign policy elite. In line with the realist school of
International Relations, the administration’s general goal was to enhance the ‘nation’s
capacity to act purposefully in international affairs and resist being controlled by others’
(Brown, 1979: 2). Whilst the elaboration and implementation of aid and development
packages could be taken up by multi-tiered trans-national bureaucracies, decisions as to the
beneficiaries and strategic purposes of foreign aid were best left to a few well informed
individuals. The reorientation of governmentality and therefore of the respective tasks and
responsibilities of either private entrepreneurs or state agencies, fell to executive decrees.
The initiation of secret surveillance programs, secret diplomatic dealings and of covert
military operations were all indications that executive power had a hand in inaugurating,
directing and limiting governmental and security schemes.

Until the Watergate scandal in 1972, which saw the arrest of five men attempting to burgle
and wiretap the Democratic National Committee’s office, Nixon was able to make a few
inroads into the Congress’ ability to restrict presidential power. However, following a
string of journalistic and federal investigations into the scandal and the uncovering of a
growing list of ‘dirty tricks’ which were very likely to have involved the President himself,
Nixon resigned. In the midst of these machinations, however, acute tensions appeared
between what were identified as serious threats in official discourse and the population’s
willingness to accept the authorities’ assessments. With Americans still pondering the
Watergate scandal, President Jimmy Carter vowed to reignite public trust in political
institutions. In contrast with Nixon, Carter admitted that he was confident enough in the
‘good sense of American people... (to) let them share in the process of making foreign
policy decisions’ (Carter, 1977). The President’s aspirations also seemed to tap into the
long standing penchant for liberal idealism in US foreign policy. In the vein of Woodrow
Wilson’s internationalism, Carter called for ‘nothing less than a sustained architectural
effort to shape an international framework of peace within which our own ideals gradually
can become a global reality’ (Carter, 1976). Once again, the extension of America’s
founding principles and institutional structures in view of the universal good was presented
as a self-evident formula. As Carter maintained; ‘our support for human rights in other
countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character... our
policy is rooted in our moral values, our policy is designed to serve mankind’ (Carter,
1980). The willing confusion of national and universal interest could certainly have
entailed a forceful approach to foreign policy or even a concerted effort to extend American governmentality abroad, but Carter favoured inspirational rhetoric and conciliatory diplomacy over imperial pursuits. In contrast with the functionalist, deliberately amoral realism of Nixon and Kissinger, US foreign policy at the end of the 1970’s aspired to be guided by moral rather than strategic ends.

5. The Counter-Culture and its Offsprings

In the 1970’s, the experiments and dissensions which had taken place at the margins of institutional structures in the 1960’s were becoming part and parcel of the personal lives and legal entitlements of Americans. Save perhaps race relations, which Nixon carefully neglected, several domains such as environmental protection, gender equality and gay rights benefited from important legislative advances. In contrast with the previous decade, a growing number of activists considered that there were enough institutional channels to carry particular issues through. As Todd Gitlin points out, a large portion of the New Left were now willing to think of themselves as ‘unabashed reformers, availing themselves of whatever room they found for lobbying, running for office, creating local, statewide, and regional organizations’ (1987: 422). Where countercultural values were so widespread as to become institutionalized, some intellectual groupings believed that it was the state’s responsibility to resist the liberal colonization of the political sphere. Particularly active in the reconfiguration of the republican party in the late seventies, neoconservatives brought issues of cultural subjectivity to the fore. Convinced that the dissemination of liberal mores at home and of a conciliatory liberal internationalism abroad were prejudicial to the country’s moral standing, neoconservatives began to advise political officials on more aggressive retaliatory strategies. For them, the definition of cultural subjectivity could partly be influenced by the state, which would have to tread carefully between suggestions and outright commands.

29 In terms of environmental protection, several statutes were passed; the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972), the Endangered Species Act (1972) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976). One of the most important victories for Women’s Rights was the ratification of the Equal Right Amendment in 1972. One of the crucial Supreme Court decisions of the decade was in the Roe v. Wade case, which outlawed impediments on abortion (Slocum-Schaffer, 2003: 132-138 and 155-167). Between 1969 and 1973, six states removed laws that banned same sex relationships. Several gay rights ordinances were signed, most famously in Miami and San Francisco, but the legal and cultural recognition of homosexuality remained very partial throughout the 1970’s and beyond (Berkowitz, 2006).
In *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976), Daniel Bell commented that the yearning for a liberating spiritual experience in the work of modernists like Beaudelaire and Nietzsche had begun to seep in the consciousness of a larger number of American youths, albeit in a diluted form. Modernist remnants, which had to do with an 'idolatry of the self-life as a work of art' that could only 'express itself against the conventions of (bourgeois) society' (Bell, 1976: 19) were considered dangerous influences which could put the cohesiveness and stability of the country at risk. Concerned with these tendencies and with the growing influence of liberals within the Democratic party in the early 70's, neoconservative intellectuals like Irving Kristol were calling on the state to restore national prestige, curb immorality and drug taking in urban areas, and to actively challenge left-leaning liberals for their part in the degradation of American values. Neo-conservatives suspected that this 'adversary culture,' constituted by what they saw as a fairly large number of American intellectuals, was also steadily infiltrating the educational system. The 'Left' had for them retreated into universities, transmitting its version of seditious thought to a widening array of students (Hoeveler, 2004: 36). Kristol claims that the anti-war, libertarian and anti-capitalist ethos of an educated elite had been adopted by a sufficiently large portion of Americans as to drive a 'president out of office (Johnson, 1968) and nominate its own candidate (McGovern, 1972)' (Kristol, 1983: 211-212).30

To some extent, the ethos of self-realization through work and individual effort was tied to the numerous practices of self-improvement which former countercultural agitators were now abiding by. The pastoral solidarity of the welfare era was effectively dissolving into a multitude of private versions of contentment. Somewhat disenchanted about the possibility of drastic political and social changes, left-leaning middle class individuals were withdrawing into settled family lives, academic jobs and capital ventures. What's more, personal happiness and fulfilment was no longer to be found in collective articulations of pleasure and rebellion, they could be achieved through careful introspection and personalized psychological and spiritual remedies. In his best selling book *The Culture of Narcissism*, Christopher Lasch attested that having failed to transform society in any meaningful way, Americans 'convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self-improvement, getting in touch with their feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet or belly-dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the East, jogging, learning how to 'relate,' overcoming the 'fear of pleasure' (1979: 4). The quest for individual

30 George McGovern was famously described by journalist Michael Novak as the 'candidate for abortion, amnesty and acid.'
fulfilment was catered for by a burgeoning industry of personal trainers, peaceful country retreats, spiritual guidance centres, popular psychology books and individualized therapy. If those inclinations reinforced current governmental criteria, other forces extraneous to liberal governance were beginning to bear down on the constitution of subjectivity. Neoconservatives deemed that values associated with the counterculture such as promiscuity and idleness were having a serious effect on society, not least on the provision of social services.

Conclusion

The 1970's saw a variety of contests about how and where to set the adequate boundaries of freedom in the governmental as much as in the cultural and political realms. On the one hand, the social engineering of the 1960's, with its faith in science, progress, welfare and liberal democracy, remained a promise awaited by a large number of underprivileged Americans. On the other, an ethos of hard work, self-sufficiency and personal responsibility, was presented as a more viable way of being, particularly in light of a faltering national economy. On the whole, the American welfare state was being partially reformed according to criteria of administrative efficiency and able bodied welfare recipients were instructed to find work instead of relying on the state. Those who failed to comply with the increasingly numerous requirements to be eligible for assistance were disciplined in due course. Like the domestic welfare system, the US' main development agency, AID, was reformed according to criteria of efficiency and many of the responsibilities for development were devolved to recipient countries. In terms of the US' relations with the rest of the world, the modernizing outlook which guided the American strategy in Vietnam was receding. In the early 1970's with Kissinger and Nixon, US foreign policy pursued international stability rather than the transformation of local political, cultural and economic structures. Back room diplomacy and carefully weighted decisions by a few select individuals were preferred to drawn out bureaucratic plans and forceful displays.

In response to structural constraints on the world market, the push for technical proficiency, performance and productivity seeped into individual consciousness. As the decade went on, personal calculations of pleasure and benefit proved more alluring than thinking about means to bring about collective welfare. Governmental impetus to shape the subject's behaviour was becoming increasingly personalized, more and more in touch with
one's own desires and needs. On the other hand, as we have seen with the White House Conferences on the Family, the objectification of the family as an object of government was a testament to the incorporation of private mores into governmental plans. Although not formally orchestrated by neoconservatives, these concerns reflected their own preoccupation with the state and the wider consequences of liberalized cultural habits. In some sense, expressions of selfhood through particular aesthetic displays and demands for political recognition were part and parcel of the continuities and renewals characteristic of rationalities of government. If the new left’s public outbursts eventually faded, its anti-authoritarian ethos developed into occurrences ranging from left leaning corporuses in universities to a change in sexual mores and an increase in drug taking. The extension of these trends through a variety of socio-cultural spheres like educational institutions, mass consumption but also inner city communities, were subject to much concern from neoconservative intellectuals. In response to those trends, they admonished on the need to reform what they saw as ‘character-forming’ institutions like schools and community organizations.

As highlighted throughout the chapter, sovereign power was integral to the orientation of governmentality or the enforcement of disciplinary measures upon welfare recipients and foreign countries. As obvious embodiments of sovereign power, American presidents and their closest aides could decide upon the direction of particular governmental plans or foreign policies. Whether through Nixon’s own views on the rights and responsibilities of the President, his illegal tactics to quell domestic dissent, or through Carter’s performative confusion of national and international interest, the sovereign’s arm was extended to a variety of important endeavours. Governmental plans were in a way made possible by conscious decisions to apply and encourage particular rationales of rule. Equally, sovereign power was inherent to the discursive objectifications of internal and external enemies which participated to legitimize certain security measures and warrant particular social and cultural identities. Although occupying an uncertain space between governmentality and sovereign decrees, neoconservative exhortations were aiming to legislate on the moral and psychological development of individual subjects in view of generating an ordered social body.

So far, I have argued that the rationalities of rule which had their course in the 1960’s and 1970’s presented a mixture of collectively agreed welfare standards and of cultural and political propensities to accept a wider range of individual mores. In order to expose the
various criteria of subjectivity actual throughout this period in detail, I made use of the triadic conception of power (sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics) presented in the two first chapters. In chapter five, I examine the decisive shift from the welfare rationale that lingered on through the 1970’s to a combination of neoliberal and neoconservative exhortations. The emerging requirements on individual subjects included an intensification of individual obligations and the materialization of an ethos of competition. Newly elect President Ronald Reagan saw the executive office an inspirational pulpit which combined incitements to free enterprise, national greatness and moral uprightness.
Chapter Five:
Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism in the Reaganite Era

Introduction

This chapter aims to illustrate the peculiar combination of governmentality, discipline and sovereign power at work during most of the 1980's. First, government was further operating through the subject's ability to assess its own needs and to identify and choose the means to personal health, success and happiness. Second, the subject’s failure to self-regulate incurred punishments which were administered by the state and the economic and institutional agencies that were beginning to carry out its work. Lastly, the propensity of the executive and of other authoritative agencies to identify and suppress threats to the stability and security of the country became more intensified both in discourse and in practical measures. In all, evidence suggests that a disciplinary turn which is concomitant to the dominance of conservative politics throughout the 1980's was taking place across several policy domains. As I argue throughout the chapter, this disciplinary turn was informed by the peculiar combination of neoconservative and neoliberal rationalities of government. Although reforms of the domestic welfare and foreign assistance programs were largely informed by the same rationales, I will point to the specificity of their interpretation and application in both the domestic and foreign policy realms. To do so, I continue to look at administrative reports and policy reforms in both AFDC and USAID programs.

With the arrival of Reagan in office, governmental experiments of the 1970’s such as the regulation of workers' behaviour through the establishment of performance criteria were furthered. The qualities required for professional success like motivation and self-restraint were impressed even more forcefully on both entrepreneurs and welfare recipients. Even if several of the governmental instantiations which were developing in the two previous decades were pursued in the 1980’s, the Reagan presidency did mark an important shift not only in the rationality and practice of government, but also in the discursive framing of both freedom and responsibility. The almost unprecedented number of references to the Founding Fathers and de Tocqueville in Reagan’s speeches conveyed a will to guide American citizens back towards moral values, by which he meant religion, participation in community associations and a renewed commitment to family, land and nation (Busch, 2001). Reagan’s rhetoric pointed to the vision of an ordered community sustained by a
belief in common principles, but it also supposed a transfer of moral responsibility to the individual in line with the affirmation of an economic ethos. The valuation of rational individual choice, central to the neo-liberal turn of the 1980's, was effectively being supplemented with clearer moral boundaries, as the liberalization of mores was still gaining ground in most facets of American cultural life. Neoconservatives argued that individual tastes and choices, taken as unproblematic variables in neoliberal schemas of social regulation, did not always correspond to the optimal image of an ordered social body. On other counts, there was also a growing concern about the moral and cultural consequences on the increasingly individualistic, fragmented and self-interested proclivities of many Americans.31

The neoconservative intellectual critique, combined with the policy-making credentials of many of its advocates,32 maintained that when the regulatory ideals of neoliberalism failed in particular instances, the state could use its authority to clamp down on those individuals who proved unable to govern themselves. In other words, the state was justified in claiming the moral authority to regulate the behaviour of individuals who had repeatedly failed to conform to the minimal requirements of employment, lawfulness and enterprise. In the case of welfare recipients and of countries receiving American assistance, the norm of behaviour was primarily dictated by the notion that each were held responsible for their failures and

31 The progressive cultural shift toward individualism in contemporary America, particularly after the 1960's, was also discussed by prominent sociologists like Bellah (1985), Etzioni (1993) and Putnam (2000), all of which tap in to the Tocquevillian concern with the excesses of individualism in American political, cultural and moral life and with the need to elaborate common moral standpoints for an increasingly atomized and utilitarian society. What makes neoconservatives particularly important and influential in terms of actual governmental effects is that they are very much involved in social policy.
32 Neo-conservatives had a lot to do in convincing business leaders and conservative politicians to delve into technical and managerial politics. Huge sums of money were invested in conservative policy think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Manhattan Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Hoover Institute, to name but a few prestigious ones. These non-profit organizations were meant to create a space for discussion between the various conservative interests and to articulate a conservative agenda (Steinfels, 1993: 29). With the exception of the AEI, the latter organizations had predominantly conservative views especially as regards to state intervention. Over the years, the AEI has become one of the most important think tanks in Washington and is widely seen as the major base for neo-conservative intellectuals. Traditionally a conservative pro market organization, it began to integrate slightly more liberal views in the 1970's by hiring a number of intellectuals, among which were James Q. Wilson and Irving Kristol. The organization's current work covers nearly all aspects of domestic and foreign politics and all major neo-conservatives and Straussianists (Novak, Nisbet, Berns, Kristol, Wilson, Glazer, Banfield, Lipset, etc.) have either participated in its research projects, given speeches or have joined as fellows. Their essays are generally highly praised and well renumerated (Steinfels, 1979: 13). Clearly displaying sympathy for business interests, its board of trustees includes former C.E.O.s and executives of the biggest American companies. Seventy-eight percent of its funding comes from private donors either corporations, foundations and individuals. Its research on the advancement of freedom and democratic government at home and abroad, private enterprise and defence policy is aimed at officials as much as the educated public. As an indicator of its neo-conservative dispositions, the highest annual research award is named after Irving Kristol. George W. Bush estimated that the research fellows and other staff at the AEI have been doing 'such good work, that (his) administration has borrowed twenty such minds' (AEI, 2006).
that each had a duty, to a certain extent, to uphold particular ethical standards. Governmental intervention in the 1980's was even more focused on observing and disciplining the poor, the irresponsible and the deviant than in previous decades. Concurrently, the discursive justification of state intervention both at home and abroad relied heavily on stark differentiations between idle and productive, moral and immoral, good and evil. The executive had a skilful hand in producing idle welfare recipients and secretive Russian policy makers as serious threats to the integrity of the biopolitical order.

1. Moral and Economic Discipline at Home

In this section, I pursue the discussion on neoconservatism and neoliberalism initiated in chapter three in order to introduce the practical manifestations of both rationalities of government. The changes instigated in the conceptualization and administration of welfare which were beginning to emerge in the 1970's were given their full intellectual articulation and justification during Reagan's terms in office. Before describing the practical changes operative in both realms during the 1980's, it is useful to reiterate some of the constitutive elements of both the 'market-political rationality' that is neoliberalism and the 'moral-political rationality' that is neoconservatism (Brown, 2006: 698). As much as they are rationalities of government which frame normative and administrative expectations, neoliberalism and neoconservatism are intellectual movements which articulate the positions and roles of governmental actors. I argue that the ideas circulated by individuals of both persuasions through mediums like books, conferences and television addresses actually feed into techniques of rule. As political rationalities, neoconservatism and neoliberalism did not impose their version of truth on unknowing subjects but rather suggested articulations of the specific roles, strategic locations and requirements pertaining to society, the individual and the state. As opposed to simply imposing budgetary cuts and parental guidance programs upon a pre-determined subject whom either welcomed these measures as rational or deplored them as unjust and exploitative, they produced and enabled certain kinds of subjectivity. If, however, subjects who had internalized the plausibility and necessity of specific political interventions failed to practice what they knew was required of them, sovereign power was given the legitimacy to intercede. Neoconservatism, in spite of its functioning as a rationality of government, ultimately aspired to moral ends which required the modification of individual behaviour in a more or less direct way. The authoritarian edge of neoliberal policies under Reagan was certainly reflected and encouraged by neoconservatism's programmatic interventionism. In what follows, I will
point to some of the ways in which the above ideational strands may have intersected and combined to produce not a unified and coherent rationality but 'the contemporary landscape of political intelligibility and possibility' (Brown, 2006: 693). It will progressively become apparent how ideas regarding the definition of freedom and responsibility became operative in technical and practical programs.

Even if they seem at odds on a theoretical level and if they propose different means to reach their objectives, neoconservatism and neoliberalism ultimately value the same ends of order and stability. For neoconservatives, the question was 'whether we can arrive at a set of normative rules which seek to protect liberty, reward achievement, and enhance the social good, within the constraints of 'economics'' (Bell, 1976: 26). Accepting the basic value of free enterprise, of protecting business interests and of applying a cost/benefit rationale to many areas of social life, they nonetheless found that the neoliberal hesitancy to legislate on matters of personal morality was likely to create serious problems. It is no so much that neoconservatives blamed the neoliberal ethos developed by people like Hayek and Friedman for generating nefarious cultural habits, but they did infer that the lack of an explicit formulation of political and moral responsibility in neoliberal philosophy left room for many kinds of cultural behaviour, some of which were prejudicial to social stability. As other thinkers like Habermas have gathered, the neoliberal 'conception of the person as a 'rational decider' is not only independent of the idea of the moral person who determines her will through an insight into what is in the equal interests of all those affected; it is also independent of the concept of the citizen of a republic, who participates in the public practice of self-legislation' (Habermas, 1992: 94).

The notions of individual choice, self-interest and rationality, central to American neoliberalism, were to be re-examined and modified according to moral standards which bound the entire community. The gap opened by neoliberalism, which begged for the formulation of civic duties as well as restrictions on dangerous thought, excessive pleasure and reckless behaviour, was adequately filled by neoconservatism because of its propensity to encourage responsibility through concrete policy. In practical terms, whereas freedom in the neoliberal sense was being furthered through tax cuts, privatization and devolution, responsibility was being promoted through community schemes and incentives to family unity. There is, however, a precise juncture at which neoconservative inputs and interventions began to apply. For neoliberals, morality was essentially a private matter and it had no real effect on social order unless it hampered the capacity of the subject to act rationally, in which case...
some form of intervention was warranted. Given that neoliberalism was ill-equipped to justify state intervention in its own terms, especially since it was openly distrustful of an overly interventionist state, neoconservatives hurried to give it solid moral underpinnings. As James Q. Wilson said; ‘moral philosophy simply supplies a fuller statement of the uses to (economy) can and should be put’ (1985a: 15). What’s more, the object of intervention for both rationalities was the individual. As a governmental combination, the liberation of individual potential from excessive state control and the limitation of individual expression according to socially beneficial ends, seemed to go hand in hand. Borne out of a variety of contrasting premises, the multifarious make of governance in the 1980’s produced strategies to transform subjects into agents of their own regulation. The combined influence of neoconservatism and neoliberalism contributed not a little to the sharper shift away from the welfare-oriented rationale which took hold throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The following picture of government in the 1980’s will begin by presenting part of the intellectual framework which enabled Reagan’s reforms to then give examples of how the above ideas and rationalities played out in practice.

1.1 Intellectuals and Social Policy

In the process of operationalizing its economic and social reforms, the Republican Party solicited the help of many intellectuals. Inasmuch as subjectivities were formed through changing governmental practices, the ideas disseminated by a handful of public intellectuals did have some sort of influence on the architecture of those governmental shifts and, perhaps more indirectly, on the constitution of personhood itself.

While the reconsideration of morality and character had borrowed from neoconservative intellectuals, ‘Reaganomics’ vindicated the ideas of prominent political economists and sociologists like Milton Friedman, Charles Murray and George Gilder. As Friedman asserted, not in a dissimilar fashion to classical economists, ‘economic freedom (was) an essential requisite for political freedom’ (Friedman, 1980: 2). Liberty was the access to social mobility and the possibility to express qualities such as innovation. Friedman argued that the creative spirit of the individual should not be weighted down by the demands for equality, as the most dynamic areas of production in the American economy proceeded from unrestrained competition. For him, welfare programs should be judged not according to their good intentions but to the actual evils they produced such as weakening families, reducing ‘the incentive to work, save, and innovate’ and limiting freedom (Friedman, 1980: 125).
While claiming the responsibility to provide equal opportunity, the state’s ideal of justice was tainted by its actual incompetence, leniency and tyranny. The expression of liberty also required that the government recognize the transcendent qualities of nature in order for individual potential to thrive. As Friedman says; ‘life is not fair. It is tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned. But it is also important to recognize how much we benefit from the very unfairness we deplore’ (1980: 137). This idea of ‘nature’ has a long association with liberal economics. The deregulation of talent and innovation and the consequent liberation of markets, would lead to the re-establishment of a ‘natural’ hierarchy and equilibrium. Friedman also claimed that ‘moral responsibility is an individual matter, not a social matter’ (1980: 106). Some critics, neoconservatives among them, pointed to the rather optimistic estimation of the individual’s capacity for self-regulation. Seemingly aware of these shortcomings, and in a bid to appose ethical boundaries to neoliberal economics, Reagan advocated traditional values in his public addresses and a strong hand against those who lacked personal discipline.

In the early 1980’s, the welfare state came under attack from all sides. The left acknowledged its dehumanizing and exclusionary nature while the right, its more pungent and influential critic, decried its harmful effects on the personality of recipients. In his best selling book *Loosing Ground* (1984), Charles Murray insisted on the necessity to change individual attitudes as to the acceptability of state assistance. In line with what he saw as tested psychological verities, Murray asserted that ‘changing human behaviour depends heavily on the use of negative reinforcement’ (1984: 217). In order to modify the recipient’s attitude toward welfare and put an end to ‘dependency,’ social benefits simply had to be reduced. The responsibility to calculate the risks of unemployment had to be entrusted to the individual. Consequently, while it was up to individuals to identify their own worth, it was the government’s duty to ‘protect a society in which the worthy can identify themselves’ (1984: 234). Again, specific conditions had to be in place for this kind of self-identification to be possible. The levelling nature of a welfare-oriented rationale had to be formally replaced with the valuation of individual potential up to then shackled by an artificial concern for equality. Another influential conservative thinker of the early eighties, George Gilder, presented poverty as an individual choice which was actively encouraged by an irrational and irresponsible welfare system. Gilder blamed programs like the AFDC for breaking up families and failing to provide monetary incentives to maintain family unity. In *Wealth and Poverty*, he attests that the welfare system has been creating ‘moral hazards because the benefits have risen to a higher level than the ostensible returns of an unbroken
home and a normal job’ (Gilder, 1981: 118). Even in purely economic terms, the stability of social structures like the family was for him desirable as it reduced public spending. To this end, the state should then try to provide incentives towards both employment and marital stability.

At the economic and political levels, the state began to rely increasingly on the market to stabilize and ‘re-naturalize’ traditional domains of intervention. Through the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1981, Reagan devolved many federal competences to states and to the business sector. The administration of social services was passed on to private agencies and decisional capability was brought back to local and state authorities. In privatisation schemes, the government effectively delegated the ‘production’ of services to lower agencies but ultimately retained financial responsibility (Handler, 1996: 89). The state then acted as an investor choosing from the most competitive agencies in the private sector, at once setting performance quotas and allocating budgets. In the same spirit, the 1980’s and 1990’s marked the introduction of vouchers for services such as housing, child care, education and food programs (Bendick, 1989: 110). Consumers and parents were given the possibility to use their income freely and the responsibility to choose amongst service providers based on their respective merits. An increase in purchasing power, disposable income and therefore social mobility became preferable to preserving the entitlement to certain social and economic rights. On the other hand, those who failed to comply were punished more severely. Importantly, the devolution of federal powers and the major budgetary cuts in the 1980’s, did not amount to a ‘retreat’ or disappearance of the state but rather to a different configuration of its activity. The state’s role was to stimulate incentives toward a particular mode of being from a distance and to consciously organize the delegation of public competences to other economic and social actors.

In the welfare reforms of the 1980’s, the transfer of responsibility from the state to the individual was accompanied by a revocation of unproductive and culturally undesirable behaviour. The Reagan administration marked an especially sharp turn in the conceptualization and administration of the American underclass. More than ever before, governmental action was specifically directed at the poor and uneducated. While educated middle class professionals could continue to enjoy irreverent art forms and could choose among a variety of lifestyles, the poor and the marginal were to be controlled more closely. As Garland asserts; ‘the new conservatism proclaimed a moral message exhorting everyone to return to the values of family, work, abstinence, and self-control, but in practice its real
moral disciplines fastened onto the behaviour of unemployed workers, welfare mothers, immigrants, offenders, and drug users' (Garland, 2001: 100). Direct state control, as opposed to an approach which enabled individual potential, was what these objectives required.

The notion of individual responsibility also became increasingly isolated from the determining influence of the social structure. For example, governmental strategies towards criminality changed from considering the importance of social conditions such as unemployment, income and race, to holding individuals responsible for not having the moral or intellectual qualities to comply with the law. This shift coincided with a move away from a social scientific approach concerned with identifying the 'root causes' of crime like that adopted throughout the 1960's and 1970's toward the credence that individuals were largely to blame for their inclinations, choices and actions. As prominent neoconservative sociologist James Q. Wilson affirmed; 'wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent people' (Wilson in Garland, 2001: 131). However, governmental concerns about individual propensities to violent behaviour had to translate into effective modes of observation. To do this, strategies to prevent crime from the 1980's on have been enlisting the help of local citizens and municipal officials. In an influential article published in the 1980's entitled 'Broken Windows,' (Wilson, 1982) Wilson proposed a form of intervention which tied the perception local inhabitants have of their neighbourhoods to the assessments of local authorities. Wilson's main argument was that getting rid of the signs of disorder in particular areas, which would mean either graffiti, prostitution or gangs of youth standing on a street corner, would go a long way in encouraging more 'decent people' to use the streets (Wilson, 2004: 7). Citizens and community officials would then be encouraged to meet and discuss their neighbourhoods' specific needs. Equally, police officers had to be assigned specific areas to patrol on foot in order to develop closer ties with local communities. Admittedly, each and every community could develop its own rules as what constituted acceptable behaviour and what justified an intervention. Throughout the 1990's and beyond, the Broken Windows theory was actually used by several municipal administrations, most famously and successfully by Rudolph Giuliani in New York City.

The tense combination of governmental rationalities throughout the 1980's had as its core the individual. Intellectual projects and practical measures were specifically devised to enable individual subjects to behave both morally and rationally. The definition of moral
and rational behaviour was no longer dictated by the social collective’s determination of its own needs like in the welfare rationality but by the discursive constitution of the individual as capable of rational choice and as compelled to follow a series of extrinsic, yet undeniably worthy moral standards. There was also a marked change in the epistemology of social insurance. Dean observes that in the gradual shift from a welfare-oriented liberalism to a more strictly neoliberal mentality of rule, ‘needs formations is no longer a matter of the scientifically informed production of truth by professionals employed under the welfare state; it is allowed to enter into a space negotiated settlement conducted in the name of user rights’ (1994: 169). This notion of personal responsibility and consumer’s choice reigned over and above ideological divisions and became a standard of sorts for the governmental changes that followed in the 1990’s. Government was from then on overseeing from a distance while simultaneously exerting its power over those who failed to self-regulate.

1.2 Reagan’s Welfare Reforms

The above ideas on freedom and responsibility were manifest within the practical strategies that disciplined and governmentalized welfare subjects. The representations, incitements and punishments brought upon the person of the recipient reproduced an amalgam of power specified through the roles, relays and locations of government, disciplinary institutions and executive decisions. Seemingly absent from the diagram, sovereign power actually seeped in through punitive measures and the wilful neglect of particular individuals.\(^{33}\) Beyond the transfer of legislative power to states, tax cuts and budget cuts, there was a series of strategies to encourage the individual to evaluate himself or herself according to the internalized necessities of performance on the one hand and self-restraint on the other. Following the assumptions at work in the welfare reforms of the 1970’s, work was still presented as the basis for self-realization but was backed up by stronger discursive injunctions and disciplinary measures.

\(^{33}\) As much many welfare recipients were left out in the cold in the midst of Reagan’s reforms, the homeless population also increased dramatically during his years in office. Lynn Hecht Schafran of the NY Times noted that ‘according to the National Coalition for the Homeless, since 1981 the Federal Government has cut back on housing funds by nearly 80 percent. In 1981, this country was spending $32 billion to build and subsidize low-income housing. In 1988, the figure is $7 billion. According to the Children’s Defense Fund, many of the small numbers of new low-income units being built were authorized in the 1970’s. Virtually no new units have been funded since 1980’ New York, Aug. 21, 1988 New York Times.
Reagan blamed the US' poor economic performance in the 1970's on excessive federal interference and vowed to bring freedom of choice back to individuals, local authorities and state legislatures. For him, a partial withdrawal of the state from economic and policy domains was long overdue because the Great Society had failed to deliver on its promises of equality, employment, education and crime control. By the time Reagan came into office in 1980, work for welfare programs had generally failed to enrol recipients in permanent jobs. Most states were finding federal targets difficult to meet and recipients were subjected to growing resentment from the rest of the population. The administration was particularly determined to end welfare dependency and put a number of discursive and practical injunctions to work. On the discursive level, it objectified the welfare client as potentially idle and dishonest. On the practical level, it imposed a variety of sanctions and obligations on applicants. With regards to welfare, the OBRA focused on three areas: targeting those in need, improving administration and strengthening work requirements (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 15). The AFDC was directly targeted by the reform, more specifically through the restriction of eligibility requirements, the reduction of payments and the obligation of individual states to develop WIN demonstration Programs (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 129). Due in part to high inflation and economic recession, benefit payments actually dropped between 1981 and 1982. A glance at the history AFDC during the 1980's shows substantial restrictions on the eligibility to assistance and on its duration. State administrations were also given more responsibilities and stricter federal targets were instituted to move recipients from the rolls unto the labour market.

Single welfare mothers in particular were subject to intense moral profiling. They were identified by a large part of the American public as black and Hispanic women giving birth outside of wedlock and imposing the consequences of their lifestyles on the rest of society (Nancy E. Rose, 1995). From the inception of state-sponsored assistance and even philanthropy before it, the underclass was at the very heart of sociological surveys and private or public forms of governmental intervention. As Foucault remarked, the very existence of an underprivileged class seemed rather important to the maintenance of institutions and modes of control that were politically and economically profitable to

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34 During his presidential campaign of 1976, Ronald Reagan used the following anecdote about a supposed 'Welfare Queen' from Chicago; 'She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. And she is collecting Social Security on her cards. She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names.' Reagan used the anecdote through the rest of his political career.
dominant social groups (Foucault, 2003: 33). Minorities, who generally constituted a large proportion of welfare recipients, were represented, monitored and spoken about by political elites, whom constituted their political programs on the basis of the problems and possible solutions concerning the regulation of the underclass. The voiceless poor more often than not provided fertile terrains for experimental reforms from family planning initiatives to work for welfare programs. As Connolly observes 'the dispensable subjects of political representation (that) become indispensable objects of political disposability;' they were the principal target of a host of political agendas (Connolly, 1991: 208, 209). The institutionalization of the racial underclass in the United States also amounted to the denial of its claims to identity. The excluded other’s identity was ‘born out of alienation and desire’ (Renwick, 2000: 18) and was only recognized in reference to what it aspired to be, namely morally irreproachable, hard-working and financially independent. Claims to welfare entitlement or to institutional discrimination were represented as deviant and worthless expressions of identity.

The government became increasingly concerned with the marital and educational habits of welfare recipients. In the federal programs of the 1980’s and 1990’s, participation in paid labour and enjoyment of a normal family life constituted the explicit foundations of a healthy social body. In a report before Congress on the state of the AFDC in 1986, Jo Anne B. Ross, the associate commissioner on family assistance, explained that ‘a child who sees his parent get up every morning and go to work learns the rewards _ both financial and non financial_ that come from work. And he learns that goals are reached through work’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 7). Ross continued; ‘with regular benefit payments, however small, recipients tend to lose sight of their obligation to work toward self-sufficiency. This is not to say that recipients would not prefer to provide for their families themselves; it is just that it is hard to know how to start and many give up. They give up on themselves’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 4). A premature descent into desperation was precisely what was to be avoided if underprivileged citizens were to make it unto the labour market. Defeatism had to make way for optimism and the state was bound to reward those who show such inclinations. However, a clearer obligation was bestowed on the recipient to recognize his or her part in the contract between himself and the government. This contract took the form of an ‘obligation (of the recipients) to move toward self-sufficiency, (and of an) obligation of government to help them toward their goal’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 4).
Unlike in the 1960's, the government's responsibility had now less to do with motivating people to work than to assist those who were already motivated. The targeted individual was 'capable of self-sufficiency' and could no longer be given the option to choose social benefits over employment (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 5). Whilst before the rationale of governance acted upon the social communities formed out of disparate individuals, it now sought to stimulate the innate capability of each individual to respond to criteria of happiness and collective prosperity. Within this ethos, work once again occupied a central function as the purveyor of self-worth and purpose. Unless they were incapacitated, individuals could not reasonably oppose the fulfillment of their humanity through labour.

But if choices were valued as essential components of self-realization in a competitive economy, they also had to be oriented in the right direction. Dependency could no longer be a choice as it was both morally wrong and economically unproductive. Substantive moral education then took place through the control of incentives and choices. Recipients were eventually brought to prioritize specific values and concrete institutional measures intent on inspiring uprightness, family cohesion, stability and pride were implemented. Yet, in spite of their disciplinary leanings, governmental programs continued to display great optimism as to the abilities of individual to overcome deprivation. As Ross observed 'the work ethic that shaped our nation and drives our lives is alive in AFDC recipients (but they don't know it yet, and it's our job to make them realize it) The fact is they want to work as much as any American but they lack the essential tools, skills and equipment and something more basic like motivation and self-confidence' (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 19). Once again, the individual was presented as the source of national character. If he or she was not already contributing to the creativity, energy and prosperity of the nation, nearly every American had the innate ability to do so.

The Family Support Act of 1988 continued the OBRA's devolutionary initiatives and required states to produce their own guidelines for the attribution of benefits. It computerized individual dossiers and child support payments, introduced paternity tests in order to identify who had to pay child support and withdrew payments from non-custodial parents. Welfare reforms through the FSA were also directly associated with work requirements in the form of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS). The JOBS obliged non-exempt AFDC recipients to participate in the program, required states to comply with quotas of 20% participation by 1995 and provided job training and job 'readiness' activities. The successful transition from welfare to work incurred several rewards such as free Medicaid for a year, coverage of travel expenses and
earned income disregards (Family Support Act, 1989: 2-3). The rewards associated with work were made as clear as the disadvantages of unemployment and the rhetoric employed reinforced that opposition. By the end of the 1980’s with the introduction of the FSA, liberal and conservative platforms alike represented the American Public’s distaste for what was viewed as the inappropriate lifestyle of the poor. Recipients needed public support, it was argued, because women were having children out of wedlock, men were sidestepping their responsibilities as fathers and because very few showed enough motivation to work (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 139). While the introduction of work as a mandatory condition to receive benefits was obtained by conservatives, liberals added a variety of training programs. The FSA, in conjunction with the JOBS program, ultimately vowed to eliminate long-term dependency and attempted to inculcate determination, independence and responsibility to demoralized welfare recipients. However, aside from the occasional training program in community schemes, the governance of both crime and welfare in the 80’s and 90’s was largely informed by the exclusion of individuals considered beyond the reach of state assistance. Some individuals were simply seen as irrevocably corrupt and ultimately responsible for making the wrong kinds of choices (Wilson, 1983). Accordingly, penal and welfare institutions had no other option but to exclude them from the rest society. Individuals had to calculate the risks of their own actions, be they crimes, drug deals or the desertion of their wives, husbands or children. The regulatory instances of individual responsibility, self-control and self-management were to become governmental standards for years to come.

Through multiple discursive injunctions, the legitimacy of minimal state assistance dwindled in favour of assistance to the ‘deserving,’ who had to prove that they were doing everything in their power to find work or that they were seriously incapacitated. As we have seen, the incentives and rewards surrounding employment, as much as the consequences of failing to find a job, marked an intensification of the disciplinary currents observed in the previous decades.

2. Moral and Economic Discipline Abroad

Even as the scale and object of intervention were different, the intellectual reasoning behind the reform of foreign assistance programs followed the same logic as that of domestic

35 Congressional Hearings and Reports on the FSA were conducted by neoconservative senator Patrick Moynihan
welfare programs. However, since neoconservatism and neoliberalism constitute modes of being and governmental critiques that take root at the domestic level, their conceptual extension to the international requires a little more qualification. In the foreign aid programs of the 1980's, responsibility for economic development and the constitution of effective political structures was clearly being displaced unto recipient countries. Much like in the domestic realm, foreign aid programs began to identify and encourage the elements which could potentially enable national economies to become productive and self-sustaining. Development programs suggested a variety of means to liberate the potential contribution of individuals and private firms in particular. Instead of transferring funds from one state administration to the other in order to bolster infrastructure, foreign aid programs started to fund local initiatives and to rely on intermediary institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to administer structural adjustments. Again, these developments were very much influenced by the valuation of freedom, self-interest and rationality expounded in the neoliberal textbooks of the 1980's. However, as argued in chapter one, the extent to which individuals, private firms and state administrations in recipient countries could self-regulate was determined by existing standards of cultural, economic and political development. In other words, countries targeted for assistance were expected to demonstrate the same ability to self-regulate as welfare recipients in the United States without the support and enablement of highly developed institutional, infrastructural and informational channels. Accordingly, the kinds of adjustments required of many Third World countries were limited to fiscal and budgetary reforms. The requirements of a world economy succumbing to a wave of deregulation had grave consequences for most poor countries throughout the 1980's.

In conjunction with the virtual imposition of fiscal discipline on recipient countries, the rationale guiding America's international involvement included a more interventionist, morally assertive foreign policy. Somewhat in line with the neoconservative exhortation to restore the confidence and prestige of the US on the world stage, Reagan adopted a more embattled rhetoric and a bolder foreign policy outlook. In a bid to improve national self-perception and rebuilt a sense of common purpose, the president and his close advisers elaborated on the emergence of serious threats to national security and on the moral and strategic justifiability of specific interventions. Decision makers couched the necessity of military escalation and security related assistance in existential terms. They presented the

36 On this, see Bello (1994).
very survival of freedom, right and truth as fundamentally endangered by the forces of
darkness, evil and unfreedom. Tapping into the long standing perception of America’s
distinctive predilection for freedom and righteousness, Reagan succeeded in sparking a
patriotic revival.  

Although the principal goal of foreign assistance in the two previous decades was to
courage national self-sufficiency and responsibility, the rationale behind attempting to
realize this objective changed from promoting administrative and infrastructural capability
to nurturing the energies of individuals and private firms. Along with this shift in
governmental targets of intervention, the attribution of foreign aid in the 1980’s was more
avowedly dictated by strategic necessities and development packages were frequently
accompanied by substantial military assistance. The decision to assist specific countries or
national factions compliant with the US’ own ideological and economic model, and the
presentation of the moral-discursive justification to do so, remained in the hands of a small
group of state officials, not least Reagan himself. Faced with an increasingly deregulated
world market, countries receiving money from the US government were also obliged to
discipline their national economies to meet standards of economic viability. The make up of
governmental intervention in the 1980’s then was characterized by a more visible
disciplinary turn generated through a mixture of executive decisionism and de-centred
regulatory instances such as international financial institutions and market mechanisms.

2.1 USAID in the 1980’s

Just as he did with domestic welfare, Reagan identified the size of the least developed
countries’ governments as one of the main impediments to economic progress and adopted
measures to increase the contribution of the private sector. In fact, the very notions of
government-sponsored welfare and foreign assistance were put in doubt, as they generally
seemed to ‘undercut the recipient’s ability for sustained growth’ (in Osterfeld, 1990: 12).
The administration broadly based its reform of foreign aid on the four pillars laid out by the
then head of USAID, Peter McPherson. These suggestions were designed to generate
sustainable development mainly through the stimulation of private enterprise. More
precisely, the first pillar consisted in instigating ‘dialogue’ with Third World Nations over
the radical reform of their social and economic structures. Second, a reorientation of

assistance programs towards de-centralization and a renewed stress on the private and voluntary sectors was put in motion. Third, the American public and private sectors would initiate direct technology transfers and, finally, indigenous private sectors would be targeted for development and assistance (Rutton, 1996: 122). Heeding these recommendations, USAID set up the Bureau for Private Enterprise, intent on the ‘growth of productive, self-sustaining income and job-producing private sectors in developing countries using the financial, technological expertise of the U.S.’ private sector, indigenous resources, multilateral institutions and agency resources’ (1996: 135). In practical programs, this meant identifying the domains which would benefit from being managed by the private sector such as marketing, heavy industry and utilities. Again, the involvement of private individuals and firms in development schemes did not mean that the state disengaged completely from these programs. It would rather concentrate on bringing about the appropriate environment, legal framework and requisite public services to conduct development activities. The renewed importance of the private sector in development policy then resulted in the widespread perception that centralized administrations neither had the will nor the capacity to generate growth, and that enterprising individuals were better suited to contribute to their country’s economic output.

Various commentators concluded that there were major problems in the distribution of aid such as the diversion of funds by unscrupulous states officials and single party dictatorships, wasteful infrastructure projects and disincentives created by the ‘dumping’ of food or other surpluses from the West. A number of free market ideologues such as Nicholas Eberstadt, Doug Bandow and Peter Bauer hinted at a more fundamental problem. The basic fact being that ‘even when public officials are not corrupt they are human. Relief from the economic constraint of serving consumers enables public officials to substitute their own priorities, however well intentioned, for those of consumers’ (Osterfeld, 1990: 9). For these development experts, the motivations and calculations of individual consumers served as the basic materials for economic growth. They blamed foreign assistance programs such Food for Peace (PL 480), introduced in the 1950’s, for discouraging the local production and consumption of agricultural stocks. Following a plain cost/benefit calculation, individual consumers were naturally inclined to choose free goods over those that were not. Furthermore, the initial provision of aid had only created a subsequent need for more aid and generated an unbroken circle of dependency (Bandow, 1985: xiv). According to radical proponents of free market ideals, the very notion of foreign assistance or welfare benefits (apart for seriously impaired individuals) was irrational and had to be abolished. This new
outlook was part of the intellectual ascendancy of neoliberal thought. As early as the 1950's, thinkers like Milton Friedman (1958) and Irving Kristol (1957) warned against the adverse effects of foreign assistance. As Friedman advanced, the provision of bilateral economic aid would encourage some foreign governments to devote their capital to 'economically wasteful projects' and indulge in 'monument-building' as opposed to substantial development (Friedman, 1958: 505-506). The state, he maintained, had to do no more than provide the basic functions of law and security for people and for goods. Individuals therefore had to be allowed and encouraged to participate in a consciously unconstrained market because;

'Private individuals' risk their own funds and thus have for that a much stronger incentive to choose wisely and well... What is required in the underdeveloped countries is the release of the energies of millions of able, active, and vigorous people who have been chained by ignorance, custom, and tradition... What is required is rather an atmosphere of freedom, of maximum opportunity for individuals to experiment, and of incentive for them to do so in an environment in which there are objective tests of success and failure_ in short a vigorous, free capitalistic market' (Friedman, 1958: 509).

Particular conditions then had to be set to liberate the natural creativity and ability of individuals. The new governmental reason striving to establish itself through the critique of previous rationales of development was firmly set on the individual as a site of intervention and referent of social change. From a macro structural approach to development mainly working through state institutions, the strategy was reversed and energies were now expected to come from the primary units of society. This required developing and encouraging qualities such as self-reliance and entrepreneurship, as was explicitly recognized in USAID programs. Those who used their abilities successfully would in turn set the right example and involve others in the pursuit of profitable enterprises. On a practical level, private entrepreneurs, presumably disposing of more information, of a greater determination to succeed and in some cases of more funds, would instill life in inefficient and stagnant economies.

Local development projects in the 1980's began to foster the participation of the poor. As stated in a congressional report on countries receiving US assistance, one of the objectives of the organization was to 'improve the fundamental life skills of adults' (USAID, 1982: 43), which presumably meant enhancing their ability to organize their own lives, start viable enterprises and take responsibility for the welfare of their families and communities.
As a governmental disposition, the free expression of individual energies in the market place seemed to apply as a rational solution to economic and political problems across time and space. Means for neoliberal economic development included 'encouraging individuals to capitalize themselves, to invest in the management, presentation, promotion and enhancement of their own economic capital as a capacity of their selves and as a lifelong project' (Rose, 1999:162). As targets of intervention, individual subjects in poor countries were at once free to pursue their own economic goals and made responsible to integrate the guidelines for economic success. They became inserted in new systems of relations and their treatment and definition in project reports changed almost suddenly. As one commentator on USAID agricultural programs put it; ‘farmers suddenly become rural entrepreneurs’ (Newfarmer, 1975: 45).

Holding the oversized welfare states responsible for the poor economic performance of the past decade, the Reagan administration imposed stricter conditions for foreign assistance. While USAID was careful not to support conditionality with too much enthusiasm, it nevertheless participated in the implementation of structural adjustment programs put in motion by the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980’s. Considering its delicate nature, the task of requiring deep-seated changes in economic and social management was attributed to international financial bodies rather than bilateral institutions. By the beginning of the 1980’s, dependency on bilateral and multilateral aid was so firmly entrenched that rigorous requirements were introduced. In order to borrow money from the above institutions, underdeveloped countries now had to accept macro economic transformations such the devaluation of their currency, the removal of subsidies on basic food items as well as wage and salary freezes. Needless to say, these measures were deeply unpopular with recipient countries. In recognition of these difficulties, USAID used alternative means such as ‘side letters’ in order to enforce a set of specific requirements or simply waited for the adjustments to be implemented before starting the project (Rothschild, 1982).

2.2 Conditionality

The implementation of fiscal discipline in countries receiving foreign assistance marked a change in governmental representation. The very possibility of development in third world countries was made to depend upon meeting procedural rules. The development compact was effectively shifting from the provision of enabling funds and technologies to the
imposition of financial reforms. Even as the state’s role in using and distributing aid money was waning, the intervention of international financial bodies like the IMF and the World Bank in various national economies had a very real effect on the livelihoods of many citizens in third world countries. The disciplining of national economies was facilitated by the fact that these modifications were presented as being in the interest of those targeted by the reforms. However, in the case of foreign assistance, it was a less a matter of inducing compliance as in domestic welfare programs and more to impose an extraneous vision of self-interest upon entire nations. The incipient neoliberal logic was not merely suggesting new and improved standards of rationality; it was setting a basic threshold as to who was fit to participate in a neoliberal economy and who was to be excluded from it. Only once international actors had adopted a certain rationality and specific techniques of rule could they participate in the world economy.

Initially, conditionality was only used by the IMF in the 1970’s. Its objective was to increase the role of markets relative to the public sector, improve incentive structures, augment the efficiency of the public sector and mobilize additional domestic resources (Killick, 1998). Towards the end of the 1970’s and through the 1980’s, the US government started to apply it more decisively through the co-financing of the World Bank’s policy-based operations. Through the ESF, American bilateral aid also began to set particular conditions for its grants (Gordon in Killick, 1998: 42). USAID, not associating directly with the Structural Adjustment programs of International Financial Institutions, used program headings such as ‘policy dialogue’ to further macro-structural reforms in some countries. Conditionality was rarely applied integrally in practice but its apparition was a major development in the conceptual relationships pertaining to foreign assistance. Towards the end the 1980’s and through the 1990’s, American bilateral initiatives were further refined through the incipient representation of economic and political reforms as being in the interest of the poor countries. Once those interests were constituted in a rudimentary form in the subjects’ cognition or that contractual obligations for aid were firmly established, more conditions such as ‘good governance’ could be added.

In practice, the implementation of conditionality in USAID programs amounted to drawing more performance reviews and negotiating loans more thoroughly. It also entailed more punitive actions in case of a recipient’s non-compliance. As stated in a policy paper issued by the Agency in 1982, the modalities of negotiation had to be carefully thought through and carried out with great prudence; ‘credibility can be established through a combination
of tact with firmness' (USAID, 1982a: 15). The granting and lending procedures were also more stringent; recipient countries had to 'develop comprehensive public investment programs, with full economic justification in their budgets,... that the structure of industrial protection be rationalized, and the average level of tariffs reduced and that a comprehensive export promotion procedure be worked out’ (Mosley, 1986: 109). Reports enjoined USAID to hire more trained economists on the ground in order to maximize the loans' performance and provide first hand knowledge of micro economic modifications (USAID, 1982a: 26). Even if the adjustment programs had limited success in the majority of cases, the neoliberal model of strict fiscal discipline became the standard for international development, a fact poor countries were not in a position to ignore.

Between 1985 and 1988, secretary of State Baker's plan for debt relief in the Third World increased the availability of loans from multilateral and American banks provided that recipient countries agreed to major structural transformations including privatization, deregulation and a reduction of state spending. This involved defining and expanding the international role of the IMF and the World Bank. Multilateral institutions, previously considered unimportant and potentially prejudicial to American interests, were now actively embraced and utilized. The very notion of conditions for assistance, namely a forced adaptation of state and society structures to the mechanisms of international financial markets, was a defining development of the 1980's. The poor countries who failed to take appropriate action for their own development were penalized. Again, this had striking similarities with the disciplining of welfare recipients. However, if the exchange of welfare for work in Reagan’s time was done progressively and within a relatively developed institutional frame, structural adjustments programs demanded highly sophisticated neoliberal reforms from states unable provide adequately for their citizens’ basic needs. Once again, and this is one of the ongoing differences between the domestic and the foreign assistance realms, the lack of supporting networks of knowledge, basic infrastructure and mechanisms of cultural diffusion (consumption culture, psychological and therapeutic services, media, etc.) in Third World countries could not produce the same sort of responsive subjects as in the US, and the implementation of new market policies were often seen as controversial, alien and ineffective.

Neoliberal measures in the 1980's firmly marked the passage from the modern development theory espoused by Kennedy to the regulation of individuals and institutions through market mechanisms and performance criteria. As Neumann and Sending argue; 'rational,
knowledge-based planning and social engineering had been replaced by a conceptualisation of development as best promoted by establishing an institutional framework within which the self-regulating mechanisms of the market and of civil society could be realized' (2006: 661). The world market and the financial institutions' attempts to manage and regulate recipient countries began to displace the richer states’ responsibility in developing infrastructure and encouraging reforms in the Third World. Economic development was simultaneously becoming the responsibility of recipient countries as sovereign entities as well as that of individual entrepreneurs, and not wholly that of donor countries. This perspective was carried through by the administrators of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Consequently, the responsibility for inadequate economic and social policies had to be formally recognized by third world countries themselves and those who refused or failed to reform their economies according to specific standards were subjected to punitive measures. However, in the American case, the celebration of the market’s capacity to solve problems incurred by the state’s failings was to be supplemented by distinctive moral premises.

3. The Restoration of American Grandeur Under Reagan

Taking full advantage of the presidential pulpit as a means to inspire the American people, Reagan cut an imposing figure as a US leader without getting too involved in the details of policy making. Itself an embodiment of negative power, the disciplinary turn observed across domains of social policy was enabled by a web of discursive categorizations fomented by the political elite. The designation of internal enemies was replicated with even more virulence in the designation of foreign enemies. Frustrated with the unprincipled functionalism of Nixon and Ford’s foreign policy as much as with the sentimental and conciliatory musings of Jimmy Carter, some established neoconservatives began to make a case for a more decisive and self-confident American foreign policy. Although Reagan’s own muscular reaction to the presumed expansionism of soviet communism was not necessarily informed by neoconservative advisers, the president’s articulation of the US own interests and moral responsibilities was in some ways very similar to the neoconservative outlook. The logic of affirmation which dominated Reagan’s rendering of foreign policy helped consolidate American identity by appealing to in-temporal values. The confusion of the United States’ founding principles with the plight of the rest of humanity was purposefully repeated in public addresses and the violence of the affirmation was accompanied by more aggressive militarism. The work of political authorities in defining
governmental directions and in creating collective identifications is again important to mention, it evolves with and alongside governmentality in the formation of subjectivity. Although the *realpolitik* of the previous decade was still very much actual in Reagan's foreign policy, the rationale of comparative advantage against the Soviet Union was supplemented by the pressing moral necessity to defeat the 'evil empire.' However, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and throughout the Nixon, Ford and Carter presidencies, the deployment of executive authority in foreign policy was limited to a series of secretive military ventures and diplomatic deals. Still mindful of these impediments, Reagan was nonetheless firmly disposed to prevent the spread of communism throughout the world by actively supporting anticommunist guerillas (Cannon, 1991: 335-336). Without engaging in full scale war and without publicly suspending law, Reagan managed to reassert a strong American identity by mobilizing and furthering the lingering sentiment that Americans had always stood for what was good and true. As David Campbell maintains, 'the (re)production of American identity has relied on a recurrent logic of foundation and augmentation such that performative statements are presented as constitutive utterances' (1998: 131). Not relying on the usual ties of blood and nation, American identity has been perpetuated through continuing references to a series of immaterial principles such as freedom. Clearly, the founding attributes of the United States have also been constituted through their perpetual contrasting with the loathsome attributes of their opponents.

The familiar discursive strategies of exclusion and affirmation were enacted to neutralize the potential contradictions and asperities that emerged in the historical constitution of American identity. The tendency to equate US foreign policy with patent benevolence or to universalize American values and endeavours, once again expressed with particularly vigour during Reagan's terms, also resulted from these performative declarations. Here, difference, dissent and alternative historical narratives were wilfully submitted to the necessity for permanence and coherence. However, this form of identification was not entirely self perpetuating, official instances made the conscious choice to (re)constitute a specific identity and to justify the need to defend it. The presumed unity and benevolence associated with American identity was further strengthened by the construction of a variety of threats, ranging from Soviet Leaders to welfare recipients. Keenly aware of the cultural and political forms of dissent propagated by liberals at home, and of the doubts and misgivings expressed towards US foreign policy both domestically and internationally, neoconservative thinkers and policy makers provided the intellectual backdrop for Reagan's
rhetorical addresses and contributed to perpetuate an ‘evangelism of fear’ that led to a more aggressive posture towards domestic and foreign ‘enemies’ (Campbell, 1998: 166).

As Jeane Kirkpatrick insisted, it was a necessity to re-establish ‘the conviction that American power is necessary for the survival of liberal democracy in the modern world’ (Kirkpatrick, 1983:14). Importantly, neoconservatives saw foreign policy as one of the last possible mediums through which state legitimacy and the moral unity of the country could be rekindled. Whilst the governmental reasoning of the 1980’s nurtured and reflected the fragmentation of the social body into self-reliant units, the ongoing danger of licentious individualism decried by neoconservatives would have to be countered. Believing that the mediating institutions of civil society had become ineffective and that the government’s prestige was at an all time low, the crisis of confidence in public and political institutions could be displaced to the outer limits of state’s realm of action. If a fundamental change in American cultural mores was difficult to envisage, a collective re-alignment toward patriotism, a celebration of fundamental American values and the drawing of clearer lines of enmity with the Soviet Union could serve the revitalization of the nation and its founding principles. This strategic re-moralisation of the domestic sphere through foreign policy had to be adopted as a complement to the thin normative content, lack of ‘vision’ and conciliatory tones of neoliberal doctrines.

After nearly two decades of simmering national fragmentation and self-doubt, Reagan believed that the country needed to reconnect with its vital purposes and reclaim a meaningful and important international role. He maintained that the abstract and fragile equilibrium of the realpolitik adopted by previous administrations as well as the culture of appeasement through economic cooperation and political compromise, had been prejudicial to the self-confidence, power and prestige of the United States (Dorrien, 2004: 49). Reagan’s arrival in office certainly marked a change of tone toward the Soviet Union and its allies. It also put an end to the strategy of appeasement and arms control pursued by previous American presidents. From 1980 to 1985, spending on defense increased from 134 to 253 billion dollars (Busch, 2001: 190). Reagan was particularly successful in presenting the Soviet Union and the several communist-inclined insurrections throughout Latin American and elsewhere, as a threat to the security of the United States. A select group of officials and political advisers then worked to identify the sources of a threat to national
security and decided upon the appropriate means to guarantee it.38 Aside from its decision to enhance the US's military capabilities, however, authoritative agencies executive made a willful attempt to modify the perception of American foreign policy both at home and abroad.

Carter's liberal internationalism, based on the extension of individual rights and commercial ties, was castigated by neoconservatives for its inability to engender national solidarity, propose compelling moral injunctions and respond to existential threats. Picking up on the potentially costly disengagement of the US from the international scene, not least because of the ensuing dissolution of national pride, neoconservatives advanced a critique of Nixon and Carter's foreign policies which took two forms. The first one indicted the policy of containment pursued during most of the decade, which, neoconservatives argue, had effectively resulted in the loss of American pre-eminence in the Cold War and in the ensuing moral degeneration of the country. The second one consisted in resisting the tendency to depreciate the United States' international efforts by some sections of the American public and by a number of third world representatives. Importantly, the neoconservative impulse was also an attempt to re-legitimize the use of force in foreign policy after what they saw as several years of self-defeating hesitation and moral confusion.

Whereas Carter famously derided the 'inordinate fear of communism,' the Reagan administration based itself on anti communism to justify its foreign interventions. The reinvigorated sense of optimism and national pride in the President's public addresses was combined with the identification of clearer lines of enmity. Reagan's address to British Parliament in 1982 stated that the 'the march of freedom and democracy...(would) leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history' (Reagan, 1982). Again, Reagan's anti-Soviet posture was influenced by a number of intellectuals and legislators such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhorezt and Patrick Moynihan, all of whom understood communism as an inherently totalitarian and expansionist ideology that would never rest until the inevitability of the revolution would be insured. As Kirkpatrick asserts in her famous paper

38 Here, I do not wish to go into a presentation of the historical intricacies of the Reagan doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments (whom Reagan also called 'Freedom Fighters' in his Second State of the Union Address in 1985) or to detail the military/nuclear escalation initiated throughout the mid-1980's but rather to outline the intellectual justifications behind the re-moralization of US foreign policy. For more details on Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) derided by his critics as star wars see Fitzgerald (2001). There are countless books on Reagan's foreign policy but among the more readable and informative accounts are Gaddis (2006), Halliday (1986), Cannon (1991), Patterson (2005) and Bell (1989).
Dictatorships and Double Standards (1982), the reason socialism represented a very serious threat to modern liberal nations was that it invoked the same values of freedom and equality. Against such a challenging but also uncompromising and treacherous foe, which had demonstrated its ambitions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the United States would have to interrupt the misguided policy of appeasement of the previous administrations and assume its responsibility in leading and defending the free world. The threat posed by the Soviet Union and its sympathizers was therefore recalibrated in urgent existential terms. This reaffirmation of the world as a realm of enmity and of the U.S.’ role as the guardian of liberal values required the reassessment of security needs.

If neoconservatives did not write or legislate on foreign assistance as such, they provided its association with security objectives with a powerful moral justification. Overall, during the 1980’s, foreign assistance was mainly used as a means to promote the national interest. In 1984, the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, headed by deputy secretary of defence Frank Carlucci, concluded that ‘the instrumentalities of foreign assistance are potent and essential tools that advance our interests... On balance, it is the judgment of the Commission that U.S. assistance programs make an indispensable contribution to achieving foreign policy objectives’ (Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1984: 1). At this stage, the thinking behind foreign assistance had more to do with countering the enemy with covert military assistance than demonstrating the benefits of collective organization. The Economic Support Fund created in 1979, which included a portion of military and development expenses, received considerably more funding under Reagan than previous administrations (Lebovic, 1988: 121). The ESF became the most important bilateral aid program in the pursuit U.S. strategic and security interests. Within the total of aid funding, the share of security-oriented assistance went from 55% in 1981 to 67% in 1985, which accounted for an increase of 1700 million dollars (Sewell and Contee, 1985: 98). The paradigmatic association of security and foreign assistance was not, however, similar to the one proposed by President Kennedy 20 years before. In the 1960’s, development assistance was used as a kind of ‘soft weapon,’ and was an integral part of the strategy to discourage communism. With Reagan, foreign assistance was less judged through the concrete demonstration of altruistic intentions but according to the national interest, which was presented as serving universally valid political and economic aims.

39 The only exception is the (Henry ‘Scoop’) Jackson-Vanick agreements on the limitation of foreign aid to 300 million to the Soviet Block which asserted the generally ill-intentioned posture of the Soviets.
From the mid-1970’s, the Third World Block at the United Nations voiced their discontent with the United States’ international policies. They denounced what they saw as the imperialistic nature of American involvement and claimed that U.S. assistance programs were plainly unjust and self-serving. Some representatives also lamented what seemed like the progressive demise of welfare-foreign assistance programs, to which the United States was a major contributor. Patrick Moynihan, then ambassador at the United Nations, was one of the first to adopt a more embattled stance and firmly assert the benevolent role of the U.S; ‘the US should stop apologizing for an imperfect democracy’ and proclaim the American case: ‘those nations who have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing better… than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be shouted at the heavens in the years now upon us. This is our case’ (quoted in Ehrman, 1995: 83). As Moynihan remarked, there was no time to waste on either guilt, self-flagellation or on trying to win hearts and minds in a peaceful and quiet fashion; it was crucial that the superiority of American values be recognized by its own people and carried out through a more visible and forceful engagement with its ideological opponents. For Moynihan and other neoconservatives, it was also time that the unprecedented international prosperity stimulated by American liberalism be recognized and that poorer countries who blamed the United States for their problems assume responsibility for the failure of their own socio-economic choices. As Kirkpatrick commented, in a similar vein as her predecessor at the U.N., the overly critical attitude to the US’ international purpose was symptomatic of the ‘New liberal Class’; ‘liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defence of freedom and the national interest’ (Kirkpatrick, 1982: 45). Naturally, the appreciation of the successes of American liberalism put into practice in Reagan’s foreign policy stood in firm opposition to the kind of internationalism which was developing at the UN forums in the 1970’s. In terms of foreign assistance too, the more confident outlook on the US’ international role meant concentrating on its achievements; namely what it claimed to be the substantial improvements in standards of living across the world.

Conclusion

During the 1980’s, it was becoming apparent that the individual was becoming the central component of new conceptualizations of government. Conditions were set to allow entrepreneurial instincts to thrive and provide the impetus to regenerate the dynamics of social activity. Responsibility for one’s own welfare and economic status was impressed
strongly through a variety of administrative and cultural incitements as much as disciplinary measures. Through techniques and diagrams which took the individual as the focus of categorization and transformation and through the intellectual articulation of the value of free enterprise and the disadvantages of state assistance, the new conditions of rule and subjectivity were laid out. The logic of the market was heralded as the highest form of rationality, one which had to be maintained by the state and other regulatory agencies. Services traditionally provided by the state were becoming delivered through private agencies and individual consumers were encouraged to choose among competing service providers. Freedom was no longer being free from want or ill-health, it now had to do with fulfilling one’s potential. Neoliberal texts and techniques of rule conveyed the belief that individuals were sufficiently knowledgeable to make enlightened choices. However, other forces and rationales, neoconservatism being one of the more important ones, disputed the ability of individuals to regulate themselves. Remnants of state power bore down on those who persistently failed to espouse new standards of conduct. What’s more, the lack of explicit directives in neoliberal philosophy as to how one must live his or her life, and the apparent progression of liberalized mores in American society, made neoconservatives concerned about the effects of cultural expressions on the stability of the political order. The governmental landscape of the 1980s’ therefore expressed a complex combination of enabling and constraining rationales. On the whole, however, the penalty for not internalizing the new requirements for life was more severe. Many individuals were purposefully left at the margins of the biopolitical whole.

The valuation of self-reliance was no longer left as a choice, it was both actively encouraged and enforced through concrete programs. Domestic welfare programs and foreign assistance programs reflected these demands. Foreign policy under Reagan was a mixture of self-interested ventures, structural adjustments in shattered national economies of the third world and of moral crusading against communist foes. To a large extent, the aggressive tone and neoliberal injunctions of US foreign ventures replicated the mixture of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power in the domestic realm, which alternatively imparted forceful sanctions and seductive suggestions upon subjects of government. What’s more, the discursive objectifications justifying those impositions both appealed to the same modalities of exclusion. Elements of domestic society which put the health of the population at risk and foreign enemies who were deemed a threat to the security of the biopolitical whole were presented as wicked and immoral. Reagan’s rhetorical arsenal, although pursuing the long tradition of inspirational speech-making among American leaders, somehow succeeded in
re-injecting national self-confidence and to legitimize an aggressive foreign policy by asserting the inherent benevolence of US actions abroad. If questions surrounding morality and ethics were introduced as a counterpart to neoliberal government in the 1980's, the rationality of rule that was developing in the beginning of the 1990's actively integrated the ethical preoccupations of individuals to its designs.
Chapter Six:
The 1990's; Community and Global Governance

Introduction

This chapter will first attempt to qualify the content and practices characteristic of the ethical turn in American neoliberal governance throughout the 1990's. Secondly, it will specify the particular combinations of power at work in the domestic and foreign policy domains, focusing on the ways in securitizing, disciplinary and de-centered regulatory agencies shape and control life in advanced liberal societies. In what follows, I argue that the constitution of American subjectivity is becoming more complex as government is integrating an ever greater range of personal identifications, ranging from ethical inclinations to consumer preferences.

The co-ordination of local initiatives to prevent crime and to improve community relations that took place in the 1980's was announcing a larger shift in governmental rationalities. In the 1990's, ethical identifications among citizens, community leaders and local politicians became an important aspect of political involvement. Along with the perceived loss of meaning, community spirit and moral standards which had followed from three decades of individualism, citizens, politicians and intellectuals were involved in the remaking and rethinking of the premises of neoliberal governance. The attribution of responsibility for social ills to the individual, which typified the neoliberal reliance on rationality and self-interest, was to be complemented by the recognition of standards by which communities should abide and by which individual behaviour should be judged. In other words, responsibility was given an increasingly specific content, which went beyond insuring one's own benefit to include a notion of collective well-being. In 1990's America, the long-standing libertarian hesitancy to intercede on matters of personal morality, seemed to be receding in favour of an ever closer monitoring and control of mores through a variety of self-regulating instances as well as through direct legislation. Culture was becoming an integral part of governmental calculations because of its potentially detrimental or beneficial effects on self-sustaining governmental logics such as neoliberalism. Two of the modes of thought which were instrumental in recognizing the influence of cultural mores on social stability, neoconservatism and communitarianism, suggested ways to understand the nature
and content of moral responsibility which contributed to shape community-oriented governance.

Governmental programs of the 1990’s were essentially conveying the century old attempt to properly conceptualize and balance the twin exigency of social integration and productivity. However, the progressive reliance on specific forms of responsibility and on political technologies working through community affiliations was novel. Following Nikolas Rose’s definition, community 'is a space of emotional relationships through which individual identities are constructed through their microcultures of values and meanings' (2000: 1401).

As complex objects of representation within governmental plans, individuals are considered part of singular communities of taste with their own ethical and cultural identifications. Individuals are no longer seen as isolated, purely self-interested beings but as fully aware of their situation in society and capable of posing moral judgments on the consequences of their own behaviour. Vowing to 'end welfare as we know it,' the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) was signed by Clinton in 1996. Its provisions, clearly oriented towards encouraging family unity both because of its intrinsic ethical value and its useful regulatory function, were largely carried out by private and community-based agencies. Importantly, the Act now officially regarded welfare assistance as a transitory state on the way to full employment. In other words, work became a formal obligation on the part of individuals receiving benefits. The proliferation of ethically-driven agencies was perhaps even more pronounced within the emerging networks of global governance. Already conveying and monitoring the financial reforms brought about by the regime of conditionality, international development agencies like USAID began to add political requirements to their assistance. Community-oriented governance at home and abroad therefore integrated entrepreneurial language and ethico-political standards to existing concerns about responsibility, bureaucratic efficiency and economic growth.

Bush senior’s invasion of Iraq in 1990, an example of the continuing use of force in foreign policy in and amongst what some called a postnational constellation (Habermas, 2001 and Walker, 1993), presented a series of novel combinations between government and sovereign power. Not only did the use of force seem to be constrained through the increased recognition of binding legal and normative underpinnings, but war itself, insofar as its public legitimacy and its operational and technological coordination went, was beginning to change radically.
1. Neoliberalism with an Ethical Twist

Following the important change in governmental paradigm in the 1980's, governance in the 1990's furthered the ethos of minimal state intervention and sustained the development of individual responsibility. As Bill Clinton admitted in his Second Inaugural Address (1997), ‘government is no longer the solution. We, the American people, we are the solution.’ Now firmly entrenched in most areas of government and psychic life, economic rationality was dictating the terms of maximum efficiency and insisting on the vital necessity of effort and performance. The objectives of economic prosperity, personal security and social stability now relied on the simultaneous responsibilisation and autonomisation of the individual. The distinctive feature of post-Reagan governance, however, had to do with lending a specifically ethical content to the mobilization of individual energies. That is, individuals who, for example, sought to actualize themselves through increasing their productivity at work, could no longer see themselves as coincidental agents of collective prosperity, they had to be made aware that their striving toward success and prosperity could not be divorced from the duties citizens owed to each other. As Clinton insisted, ‘each and every one of us, in our own way, must assume personal responsibility—not only for ourselves and our families, but for our neighbors and our nation. Our greatest responsibility is to embrace a new spirit of community for a new century’ (1997). The kindling of this ‘spirit of community’ was meant to temper the consequences of greed and naked self-interest perceived to have reigned over American society during the 1980’s.

Freedom and justice were made to depend on ‘responsible citizenship,’ which, in contemporary terms meant ‘teaching children to read; hiring people off welfare rolls; coming out from behind locked doors and shuttered windows to help reclaim our streets from drugs and gangs and crime; taking time out of our own lives to serve others’ (Clinton, 1997). The above tasks, vital to restore a sense of community, civic pride and social harmony, were no longer the burden of a state administration with limited resources and public legitimacy, they were the lot of citizens willing to recognize the need for collective standards of behaviour and to find constructive ways to divulge them. The recognition that readily formed communities and identities constituted potential means of effective governance gave way to a series of changes in practical political programs. As Rose maintains; ‘in the institution of community, a sector is brought into existence whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, of
personal ethics and collective allegiances’ (1999: 176). During the 1990's, a multiplicity of initiatives such as community policing, voluntary work, charitable efforts, local and international civil society projects were being carried out through a complex of non-state agencies which provided and promoted particular ethical identifications. Clinton’s political programs referred explicitly to a third sector in which renumerated and non-renumerated services to fellow citizens were taking place (Rose, 1999: 171). The state’s role within these emerging networks of solidarity and allegiances, was to act as a kind of referee and ‘enabler,’ to incite social and self-management through the development of an inclination to moral responsibility. Nikolas Rose qualifies this kind of morally-charged government at a distance as ‘ethopower,’ a kind of power which ‘works through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the management of one’s obligations to others’ (2000: 1399).

The development of self-governing spaces and instances, somewhere in between the unforgiving rule of the marketplace and the administrative control of the state, therefore modified the diagram of contemporary government. This is not to say that there had been no previous reflection on the effects of capitalism and state intervention (or lack of) on social communities. Indeed, the perception that the withering of traditional bonds such as family, church and local community were jeopardizing social cohesiveness dates back from the 19th century if not before. In effect, civil society was already the ‘correlate of a political technology of government’ (Burchell, 1991: 141). Outside of their bare determination as economic and political subjects, individuals became increasingly governed through their own preferences, tastes and emotional ties. Government no longer acted upon ‘society’ as a thick object of scientifically calculated ebbs, flows and regularities nor through the dispositions of atomized individuals competing for their survival on the marketplace, but through readily formed communities, to which individuals chose to belong to. Far from operating in a vacuum of power, the extensive and complex networks of civility which were beginning to develop within and beyond the borders of the state were invested with regulatory functions in line with the paradigmatic shift toward ethical government and were monitored according to those intrinsic standards.
Two of the main strands of thought which argued for the re-moralization of the public and political realms in contemporary America, communitarianism\(^{40}\) and neoconservatism, proposed contrasting solutions to the presumed degeneration of the country’s moral fabric. If American communitarians like Etzioni, Galston and Glendon fostered dialogue and aimed to find commonalities among existing moral and cultural codes, neoconservatives militated for the re-establishment of fixed moral standards over and above diverging points of view. While the neoconservative articulation of cultural unease in stark, oppositional terms called for the forceful exclusion and correction of particular identities and attitudes, the communitarian valuation of dialogue and compromise had a more suggestive and voluntary character. In practice, neoconservatives invested the state with the duty to establish and enforce fixed moral standards. According to this duty, the state was justified in defining the boundaries and obligations involved in issues of private morality such as marriage. Communitarians, on the other hand, called upon educational programs in schools, community associations and elsewhere to teach the value of marriage and to transmit the skills required for a lasting union, as well as for responsible fatherhood and motherhood.\(^{41}\)

For all their differences, however, both neoconservatives and communitarians agree on a desirable set of qualities for the citizen; responsibility, self-restraint and uprightness are traits that ought to be valued in order to counterbalance the ongoing atomisation and amoralization of American society. Their diagnostic of isolation, hedonism and—all around apathy usually revolved around the familiar scourges of drug-taking, family-breakdowns, suburbanization and the multiplication of specific cultural and educational backgrounds and preferences. However, as Rose maintains, their answer to the crisis of values is different; for

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\(^{40}\) Communitarianism is not a unified strand of thought. There are at least two different forms of communitarian thinking. The first one, which could be qualified as ‘philosophical,’ commonly takes its starting point as a critique of liberal thinker John Rawl’s *Theory of Justice*’s (1971) ontological and epistemological premises. Authors associated with this task are Charles Taylor (1989), Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Michael Waltzer (1983). For an excellent overview of the Liberal-Communitarian debate, see Mulhall and Swift (1992). The other strand of communitarianism, which is the one I am more concerned with here, is rather more policy oriented. Usually bemoaning the disintegration of community ties in post 1960’s America, people like Amitai Etzioni (1993, 1995, 2004), Robert Bellah (1985), Robert Putnam (2000), William Galston (1991) and Benjamin Barber (1998) have argued in favour of empowering local and intermediary institutions in order to re-instil a sense of civic engagement. Many of these analysts propose practical means to teach ethically sound and socially useful attitudes and many of them were also more or less affiliated to the Clinton administration. Among the various domains of social policy and cultural institutions are education, marriage, criminal justice, faith based initiatives, etc. For more information, see the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies’ website; http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/.

\(^{41}\) For a communitarian perspective on marriage see Whyte (Ed.) (2000)
communitarians 'moral order cannot rest on legal codes enforced and upheld by guardians; it is embodied and taught through the rituals and traditions and the everyday life of communities' (2000: 1403). As Etzioni himself makes clear 'for a society to be communitarian, much of the social conduct must be 'regulated' by reliance on the moral voice rather than on the law, and the scope of the law itself must be limited largely to that which is supported by the moral voice' (1995: 139). What is at issue in the difference between the two modes of political intervention is both the source of moral behaviour and the appropriate means to produce it. For neoconservatives, there are extrinsically defined ethical standards which must be enshrined in law. As neoconservative William Bennett, former Secretary of Education under Reagan and Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under Bush senior affirmed, government can supply 'through policy and law..., a vivid sense of what we as a society expect of ourselves, what we hold ourselves responsible for, and what we ourselves answerable to' (1995: 28). For communitarians, these standards must be borne out of an accord between a multiplicity of cultural, political, social and economic voices as well as perpetuated through ethical agencies which coax participants into socially beneficial behaviours.

When looking at the reforms propounded by the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, the virtual abolition of federal assistance clearly emphasized the notions of obligation and responsibility over that of rights and opportunity. As Dean points out, 'the limited sphere of the political ('the state') and the different conceptions of what is exterior to it ('civil society') interlace(d) to turn the injunction to govern through freedom into a set of binding obligations potentially or actually enforceable by coercive or sovereign instruments' (2007: 111). The reforms of the mid-1990's exposed welfare recipients who had proved untrustworthy and had faltered on the path to freedom and self-realization, to intensified modes of observation and coercion. They were more or less forced, as it were, to attain self-management through the mandatory transfer from welfare to employment. Non-state agencies in charge of administering welfare were then effectively exercising a delegated form of sovereignty (Dean, 2007: 144) by managing and securing a specific object, in this instance the undisciplined and economically passive welfare recipient, for the benefit of the biopolitical whole. The other crucial component of the Act, also indicative of a disciplinary and authoritarian shift, had to do with the explicit valuation of heterosexual marriage as the foundation for a good society. Here, sovereign power acts through the legislative commendation of a specific kind of morality but also through the agencies that perpetuate the requirements for a successful union or the disincentives associated to its collapsing. As
one form of supreme power established models of moral responsibility over and above the biopolitical whole, other more specialized instances promoted these criteria and enforced them on individual recipients. This governmental turn presumed a more direct intervention on mores and a greater propensity to invest educational, civil and civic institution with normative functions and to enjoin them to consciously espouse their role as formative institutions in the fight against the degradation of values in American society.

Throughout the reforms, there remained a tension between the pact of civility proposed by communitarians and the authoritative enforcement of morality of neoconservatives. What can be said, however, is that the notion of choice promoted in the programs of the past few decades, which was tied to the cultivation of individual potentiality and energy, became increasingly sparse in the novel configuration of welfare. The obligation to work was now more or less entrenched over and above ideological divisions, and failure to do so incurred nothing less than the termination of welfare checks.

2. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR)

As with most of the previous reforms of the AFDC since the early 1960’s, the changes instated through the PRWOR were based on the assumption that welfare generated a state of helplessness, low self-esteem and dependency among recipients (Rose, 2000: 1407 and Cruikshank, 1999). The discursive objectification of individuals on welfare asserted the intrinsic value of labour, independently of the recipient’s own idea of what constituted a rewarding activity. Work as well as marriage, were presented as undeniable providers of self worth and as the essential pillars of an ordered society. They lent meaning, pride and identity in an otherwise confusing and egotistical social environment. In her empirical study of the effects of marriage on quality of life, Linda J. Waite found that it was associated to increased purchasing power, greater health and had a moderating effect on children’s propensity to either drop out of school or commit crimes (Waite, 1998). Work and marriage were not only distant ideals proclaimed by nostalgic conservatives or well-meaning presidents; they were concrete regulatory instances which permeated the technical elaboration of welfare programs and the training of a multitude of case workers, precisely because of their effect on a great variety of potentially prejudicial behaviours. As Rose

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42 Someone like Lawrence Mead, a well-known advocate of the state’s role in progressive social policy argues in his book Beyond Entitlement (1996) that in spite of the state’s duty to care for the most destitute, obligation to work must be at the core of any welfare reform.
attests, ‘the technologies of welfare-to-work deploy a mixture of re-moralizing therapies, pedagogies for inculcating citizenship competencies and punitive measures’ (2000: 1407). Individuals had to integrate and apply the guidelines learnt in parenting classes, marriage preparation workshops and job seeking programs and their progress was routinely assessed by individual case workers. Such a governmental effort in the shape of persuasive educational schemes, was ultimately made possible by the American public’s exasperation with the long-term ‘dependency’ of some elements (majoritarily Black and Latino) of the underclass. In the years that followed Reagan’s rhetorical assault on ‘undeserving’ recipients, academic and popular debate about welfare had effectively shifted toward a preoccupation with ‘dependency’ (Bane and Elwood, 1994: 67).

Furthering the devolutionary efforts initiated through the OBRA in the 1980’s, the PRWOR formally released the federal government from its responsibility to care for the poor and displaced it unto individual states and local authorities. In line with the ever increasing role of the private sector in the delivery of welfare, the Act also appealed to the marketplace to provide competitive and high quality services. Having seen his plan for universal healthcare foiled by a republican Congress in 1994, Clinton vowed to preserve some Great Society programs (food stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, etc.) at the cost of restricting eligibility (Katz, 2001: 292). However, anti-poverty strategies of the 1990’s were explicitly reliant on the market and set work as a condition for any sort of reward or assistance. In an attempt to find a policy which would content both Congress and a portion of the Democratic Party, Clinton expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit, introduced in 1975. This measure was designed to lift individuals who already worked above the poverty line by exempting a larger portion of their income from taxation (Clinton, 2000). In 1999, Clinton also announced tax cuts and other incentives to encourage private investment in inner city and rural areas.

Throughout the 1990’s, the restrictive and punitive measures instigated during the Reagan era were actively sustained. The signing into law of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) in 1996 once again tightened work requirements. Clinton’s vow to ‘end welfare as we know it’ basically meant exchanging welfare for work after two years for all ‘able bodied adults,’ and terminating benefits altogether after a period of five years on the rolls. Welfare provision was indeed completely transformed by those measures. Any reference to the notion of assistance as entitlement had formally disappeared and welfare was officially defined as a transitional and ‘temporary’ state (PRWOR, 1996: 156).
104-193). The work-related component of the PRWOR, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), applied ever stricter performance quotas for states in the attempt to move recipients unto the labour market. The Act also required states to develop ‘personal employability plans,’ which taught recipients about the necessary manners and qualities required to obtain and hold down a job. To stimulate performance, the various local instances in charge of welfare provision competed for monetary rewards allocated to those agencies that devised the best motivational programs and achieved the highest work placement percentages.

A number of Community Organisations, Interfaith Partnerships and community service institutions like AmeriCorps participated in the effort to assist, educate and restore underprivileged communities. Influential alliances like the Coalition of Human Needs, formed in 1993 out hundreds of labour, religious and Women’s groups, laid out a series of principles that were presented to Congress (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 177). In terms of work placements, large organizations such as the Goodwill coalition contributed to employ and train thousands of recipients. The ‘third sector,’ composed of private, public and voluntary organizations, constituted both an outlet for governmental goals regarding welfare and crime control, and an alliance of regulatory agencies that provided civic education in the hope of eliminating the need for direct state intervention. Responsibility for the management and implementation of basic state functions was in effect diffused to individuals and communities. The goals of safety and well-being, represented as commonly accepted goods in local and national life, required the collaboration, involvement and notification of each and every citizen. Individuals were beginning to see themselves in terms of their respective ethical commitments; as proud contributors to the changing outlooks on specific issues in local, national and international contexts.

The other crucial component of the Personal Responsibility Act is its conceptualisation of marriage and family. For the first time in a text of law, marriage was acknowledged as ‘the foundation of a successful society’ (PRWOR, 1996 HR 3734-6, Sec 101). Fathers and mothers were made responsible to manage the social risk of engendering an unruly child, and their ability to preserve their marriage as well as to rear children, were subject to increased scrutiny and regulation. Furthermore, to impress the consequences of

\[43 \text{ 25\% of recipients were to be work by 1997 and 50\% by 2002.}\]

\[44 \text{ For a good example on the notification of citizens in safety related schemes see the discussion of Megan’s Law in Rose (1999: 174) and especially Levi (2000).}\]
irresponsible behaviour reflected in the high rates of divorce and teenage out-of-wedlock pregnancies, measures and programs insisting on ‘male responsibility’ were enacted. The government allocated competitive grants for the development of programs like ‘Fathers Work,’ concerned with assisting fathers ‘who owe child support and help(ing) them connect with their children.’ Again, the management of these programs would be ensured by ‘one stop career centres, community groups and faith-based organizations under contract to local and state workforce investment boards.’ Parents were here represented as having the important responsibility to prevent the perpetuation of social ills like crime, delinquency and teenage pregnancy by transmitting clear ethical principles to their children. If parents failed to assume that responsibility by, for example, deserting their family or refusing to pay child support, they ran the risk of having their wages reduced, their bank accounts seized and their tax refunds withheld (Clinton, 2000: 9).

The PRA also included a ‘program for abstinence education’ in which restraint from sexual activity outside of marriage was posed an as explicit norm. The plan ‘teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected standard of human sexual activity’ and that sex outside of marriage ‘is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects’ (PRWOR, 1996, HR 3734-250, sec 502). This representation of marriage not only entails that it is the only legitimate institution to accommodate sexual activity and child rearing, but also, as is made explicit elsewhere in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), that it can only take place between a man and a woman (Smith, 2001: 308). Accordingly to this conception of marriage as an essential means for social and moral regulation, a myriad of training programs were put in place to safeguard and promote it. Under George W. Bush, the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act (2003), essentially following on from Clinton’s initiatives, proposed public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and workshops on how to develop ‘marriage’, ‘relationship’ and ‘budgeting’ skills (HR4735-1, sec. 103: 2002). The united two-parent heterosexual family was consistently presented as a primary example and a nucleus of morality. The valuation of one particular form of family, which induces particular qualities and produces a certain kind of citizen (drug free, emotionally balanced, responsible, hard-working and principled), was not altogether new, but the fact that this function was explicitly recognized in law as opposed to simply suggested in rhetorical addresses was.
3. The dawn of Global Governance

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the contribution, role and agency of the state were more clearly delimited and the programming of the economic and social structures of developing states was more direct. Similarly, the institutional measures toward ‘self-government’ which appeared in the governmental programs of the late 70’s early 80’s could barely conceal the disciplinary components of conditionality. If Structural Adjustment Programs managed by the IMF and the World Bank very much endured throughout the 1990’s, the consequences of their zealous application in the 1980’s were widely criticized and addressed in a variety of reforms. The neoliberal turn in the administration of international economy was being reconsidered according to new normative covenants put forth by governments, civil society institutions and individuals alike. The shift to global governance was marking the progressive disappearance of ‘coordinated, hierarchical structures and processes of societal steering’ and the emergence of ‘a network-based process of exchange and negotiation’ (Salskov-Iversen, Hansen and Bislev, 2000: 184). In contrast with the transposition of modernizing planning or with the imposition of fiscal discipline unto recipient countries, the emerging compact of development appealed to the inherent ability of state and non-state actors to integrate the universal norms of economic growth and good governance. As Archer maintains, whereas neoliberalism ‘exploded the relationship between government, the economy and ‘society’, the new covenant for development (aimed) to re-unite society’s political, economic and social dimensions’ (Archer, 1994: 8-11). In line with the progressive displacement of state functions toward self-regulatory spaces such as the market and the third sector, International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations took a more active part in elaborating and implementing particular criteria for targeted countries.

Importantly, as Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann point out, ‘the ascendance of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions (was) not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors... (but rather the) expression of a change in governmentality by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of governance to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government’ (2006: 658). Indeed, the shift toward global governance does not result entirely from the conscious delegation of administrative capabilities from one tiers to another. Although states may still decide to assist or fund specific countries or NGO’s, the object and spectrum of international liberal governance emerge as a result of both the intellectual objectification of a field of intervention, that is, poverty, and the proposed technical
solutions to underdevelopment. In the 1990’s, poverty became increasingly defined as a universal moral wrong and was represented, along with a range of other issues such as global warming, family-planning and epidemics, as a threat to the well-being and security of the world population. Although it is still difficult to determine the degree of correspondence between individual consciousness and the transnational subjectifying processes of development discourse, something like a global biopolitical whole, as an object to preserve and secure, was emerging.

Ironically, the treatment of poverty did not result in an increase in development funding but rather in the active consideration of all the possible causes, factors and agents involved in its perpetuation and its prevention. Civil societies, state administrations, private firms and individuals were represented as the main instances of their countries’ economic and political development. In line with the widespread recognition in donor countries of neoliberal criteria of efficiency and self-regulation, development schemes were beginning to work through the existing dispositions of the individuals and states concerned and ultimately served ‘to infuse self-governmental disciplinarian techniques on the recipient side’ (Sande Lie, 2005: 2). Often making abstraction of structural factors like the world economy or the lack of local infrastructures, development strategies tended to focus on the potential of individuals and states in poor countries to integrate standards of entrepreneurship, ethical behaviour and organizational efficiency. Those state-administrations or those individuals that performed well in a variety of projects conducted through the international cooperation, eventually benefited from more assistance.

The economies, civil societies and political institutions of underdeveloped countries were then progressively constituted into objects of observation, evaluation and intervention. NGO’s, International Organizations such as the World Bank as much as grass roots organizations, conveyed standards of efficiency and self-reliance through the circulation of technical competencies like budgeting, voting procedures, project auditing and community organization. Conditions for assistance did not only include the liberalization of national economies but also the compliance to environmental and good governance standards. A notable effect of the widening array of conditions for development aid was to bring ‘increased powers of surveillance and control over sovereign states, and more invasive

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45 'In 1996, developed countries gave the lowest share of their combined GNPs in assistance (0.27 percent) since comparable statistics on aid first became available in 1950, this, however, does not include private donations which are hard to calculate’ in Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997).
monitoring of liberalization through the International Financial Institutions' (Mosse and Lewis 2005: 8). Throughout the 1990’s and beyond, the agencies in charge of carrying out the objectives of conditionality and good governance became increasingly involved in the daily lives of individuals in poor countries. As Merlingen attests, the projects and platforms of International Governmental Organizations (IGO’s) like the OECD ‘render(ed) visible the space brought under their governance by monitoring countries, comparing their behaviour to international institutional standards of normal statehood and developing the meticulous knowledge through which countries (could) be corrected and controlled’ (Merlingen, 2003: 369). In 1990’s, the amount of information about specific countries, whether it had to do with the performance of a particular ministry or of a local project funded by the European community, increased dramatically. With new and improved techniques of data collection, each countries’ performance could be assessed more effectively. When particular countries or local communities failed to meet the targets of political and economic ‘efficiency’ that they were advised to internalize (Dillon and Reid, 2000: 119), disciplinary measures and occasionally a complete withdrawal of assistance, were enacted. For some recipient countries, the withdrawal of assistance meant nothing less than a slow descent into abject poverty and oppressive conditions. The new regime of recipient countries’ responsibilization was often enforced at the expense of its national populations. Even a wide ranging development initiative like the United Nations Millennium Development Goals4 6 forced aid beneficiaries to demonstrate real improvements in their economic and political management. A failure to measure up to stringently observed performance criteria meant the collapse of the compact of mutual responsibility and, in foucaultian terms, meant that some states and large parts of their populations were left to die.

In spite of the multiplication of regulatory agencies, there was a surprising homogeneity in the concerns, themes and intentions stated in the platforms of institutions ranging from American bilateral aid agencies to Amnesty International. Apart from mandatory structural adjustments to national economies, the constructs of sustainable development, good governance and human rights became the enforceable norms of international government. These norms and ideas surrounding local and national development were largely devised and reproduced through the interlinking of institutions like the UNDP, regional development banks, the IMF, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Development Assistance Committee to name but a few important ones (Bøås and McNeill, 2004: 3), with the ‘transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations’

Ethically driven objectives such as 'sustainable development,' which have come to include not solely environmental and economic components but also social, cultural and political issues, are perpetuated through an ever greater array of actors who all adhere to vaguely defined projections of democratic participation, local and national consultation, nation-wide educational campaigns, greater transparency, etc. Similarly, ubiquitous headings such as 'good governance' (UNESCAP) include standards of administrative efficiency, political participation and legal integrity which are tirelessly reasserted in development compacts with third world countries. As Hardt and Negri attest, NGO's and the ideals that drive their efforts 'are completely immersed in the biopolitical context of the constitution of Empire; they anticipate the power of its pacifying and productive intervention of justice' (2000: 36). Organizations such as Amnesty International and Oxfam that are hoping to quell poverty and oppression through moral injunctions, are in effect contributing to establish universally valid criteria (such as Human Rights) for forceful intervention. In the complex, multitier and incomplete diagram of global governance, criteria of universal ethics and technical guidelines towards transparent, diligent and equitable governance, work to produce a single entity of rule. Although Empire has yet to materialize and although forceful interventions in the name of human rights abuse are still few and far between, the language of universal goodness, economic and political liberalism which surrounded the American interventions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 were strikingly similar to that used by humanitarian agencies.

Much in the same way as the requirements impressed upon welfare recipients in the US, the enabling agencies for democracy and development solicited the active participation of countries, local communities and citizens in order to establish their responsibility in contributing to their own well-being. However, if the language of global governance in the 1990's marked the beginning of an objectification of groupings of citizens in third world countries as terrains to organize and regulate, means to evaluate compliance and the extent to which individual citizens in the third world were able to self-regulate were and still are far from extensive. The admonitions to community empowerment, political participation, health and environmental awareness which filled development projects often remained at

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47 on the implementation of sustainable development through Grass Roots Organizations see Fisher (1993).
the level of admonitions. Equally, coordination of the various actors which propounded ethical, social and economic objectives was often very partial and fragmented.48

In truth, throughout the 1990’s, struggles for economic and military dominance in local, national and international contexts affected the lives of citizens in third world countries in a more direct and brutal way. State power could still curb particular initiatives towards democracy and development as sovereignty still reigned in international law. Equally, state administrations could often limit or direct specific efforts in accordance with their support of political sympathizers or ethnic affiliations.49 What’s more, the progress reports compiled by NGO’s and IGO’s often depended on the unreliable figures and statistics of national and local administrations. Stuck between attempting to reform intra-governmental agencies such as ministries of trade or environment and initiating governance from below by stimulating local empowerment, international development efforts have consistently run into difficult and complex situations.

While the spectre of global governance appeared through the universalization of ethical standards in the form of human rights, good governance and environmental politics and through the partial extension of technical knowledge and of a performance based ethos, it had yet to impress itself as a set of clear and enforceable requirements in the consciousness of all human beings. Again, if international aid and development initiatives relied on the market and on nurturing personal responsibility and ethical obligations, the extent to which these criteria were followed and integrated was much greater in the domestic realm.

4. USAID Reforms in the 1990’s

Although the extension of global governance, which circulated a set of mutually-sustaining requirements for development in the shape of market economics and local political empowerment, permeated the governmental thinking that informed American foreign assistance in the 1990’s, reforms towards encouraging local participation progressed rather slowly. What’s more, since foreign aid had been in great part guided by ideological considerations until the end of the 1980’s, there was a wide spread feeling among the

48 On the difficulties of coordination between various governmental instances, see Helling, Serrano and Warren (2005).

49 The permanence of the statist model and the obstacles to Global Civil Society are highlighted by Richard Falk (2005).
American public and its political representatives that USAID was now purposeless and ineffective. The US government, under the general pledge to render administration more efficient and cost effective in the 1990's (Gore, 1993), vowed to drastically re-organize the agency according to stringent performance criteria. On the other hand, the agency was beginning to integrate some of the ethical standards set by multilateral development coalitions and to modify the conceptualization and practical implementation of its aid effort. Development was beginning to be constituted in and among the mutually beneficial regulatory ideals of administrative efficiency, decentralization, market economics and liberal democracy. The governmental rationale behind the transformations of foreign assistance programs of the 1990's then stood at the intersection of managerial techniques and ethical criteria, as well as between domestic hesitations and cosmopolitan sentiments. In what follows, I will give examples of how these criteria were assimilated in practical reforms and attempt to determine whether the re-moralization of the governmental field in the domestic realm was replicated, if at all, in the governmental changes of US aid policy.

In 1993, President Clinton launched the National Performance Review (NPR) (Gore, 1993) intent on streamlining state administration according to efficiency-driven managerial models. USAID was designated as a prime target for reform by national officials. As the agency’s administrator affirmed, the agency was going to serve as a ‘re-invention laboratory’ closely guided by the NPR’s standards (USAID, 1996: 1). Having long been criticized for its complicated and rigid bureaucratic structure, the agency was compelled to modify its general outlook as much as its cumbersome data collection, procurement and evaluation procedures. USAID was now ‘obliged to define programme objectives, create annual performance plans specifying measurable goals and publish reports showing results’ (Corneille and Shiffman, 2004: 258). The emphasis was put on clearly articulated goals and simplified guidelines and procedures, all of which had to lead to producing ‘results.’ USAID’s employees were subjected to new evaluation systems, which sought information about a specific individual’s performance by consulting his or her ‘peers, support personnel, supervisors and customers’ (USAID, 1996: 17). Where results or professionalism were lacking, disciplinary actions or dismissals took place. These disciplinary measures were of course applied equally, if not more so, to recipient countries who did not reach projected targets. These new stringent criteria transformed the agency into a competitive and highly-skilled environment. Along with the general reduction of US military and development assistance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, drastic cutbacks to USAID’s workforce, which went from 11096 in 1992 to 8638 in 1996, were enacted (USAID, 1996: 12). Second,
those countries 'who (had) proven not to present the conditions needed for fruitful cooperation with (USAID's) sustainable development efforts' were simply cut off (USAID, 1996: 8). Between 1992 and 1996, USAID closed 25 missions. The solution of withdrawing eligibility for recipients who did not comply with standardized rules and obligations then also applied across the boundaries of domestic and foreign policy.

In line with the readily established governmental tendency towards advancing entrepreneurship and responsibilization, the agency also had to become more focused on its clients, in this case, the poor people. In the beginning of the 1990's, the notions of decentralization and local empowerment in developing countries were introduced by a variety of major international organizations. In 1990, the World Bank reunited several IGO's and NGO's, among which was USAID, and formed 'participation learning groups' intent on discussing how best to involve and empower the local beneficiaries of development projects. Following the movement of decentralization in donor countries, which was intimately tied to the governmental objective of delivering services effectively and at a minimal cost, USAID progressively began to encourage a participatory approach in client countries. For example, when a study found that few local actors were getting involved in a decentralized water project in Nicaragua, USAID 'trained municipal officials in ways to increase participation, resulting in a campaign that brought about the involvement of students, teachers, community members and religious leaders' (Corneille and Shiffman, 2004:259). Through thorough reporting and auditing, solutions were reached more quickly and efficiently. What’s more, the active involvement of local communities entailed the development of competencies to do with planning, organizing and budgeting as well as the long-term establishment of standards of participation and accountability. In the general spirit of opening government and of inducing the participation of American citizens, USAID development and investment programs were made accessible on the internet. Both the recipients and the purveyors of foreign aid then had to feel involved and 'empowered'; conditions and wordings were set for them to believe that the skills they were either transmitting or acquiring were meaningful steps towards peace, prosperity and democracy. By impressing the correct ethical and procedural practices, USAID could transform the poor into agents of their own regulation. In spite of the increased popularity of participatory methods, however, impediments such as the lack of funding, the reluctance of central administrations in recipient countries to cede powers and the doubts on the part of some USAID officials that the poor could indeed have 'the requisite knowledge to understand
their own needs and to select and carry out the relevant projects,' (Corneille and Shiffman, 2004: 260) still remained.

With the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal capitalism which prompted Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis, standards such as market economics but also freedom, democracy and opportunity gained a wider acceptance in the realm of bilateral and multilateral development organizations. However, deprived of the impetus to support the cause of freedom and democracy in countries under communist threat, the American public and its representatives began to doubt the very necessity of foreign aid. Misgivings as to the agency's legitimacy and effectiveness somewhat hampered its ability to integrate and meet the emerging standards of humanitarian internationalism. On the one hand, the coordination of US foreign assistance required an improved linkage with the expanding array of aid agencies and International Financial Institutions. It also had to assimilate the 'good governance agenda,'\(^5\) considered as the 'prevailing paradigm of development' comprising of 'democracy, human rights, transparency and political decentralization.' The 1995 statement of the administrator presented six mutually reinforcing objectives as part of the new guidelines for foreign assistance; promoting sustainable development, building democracy, promoting peace, providing humanitarian assistance to those in need, promoting U.S. prosperity through trade, investment and employment and advancing diplomacy (USAID, 1995: 3). For the most part, these objectives corresponded to those of other bilateral and multilateral agencies. Sustainable development, for example, was a heading found in almost every large-scale regional projects initiated by the international cooperation and became the most important component of American foreign assistance. On the other hand, one of the core objectives of Clinton's foreign policy program was to expand international markets and to use this expansion as groundwork for peace and democracy. Overall, save the partial coordination of the American aid effort with international organizations and a limited amount of highly conditional development projects, the economic aspects of sustainable development received more attention.

Apart from the individual qualities which were nurtured through commercial dealings, the opening of markets and the improvement of business practices in other parts of the world presented direct benefits for the US economy. Clinton's foreign policy was largely informed by the promotion of what he called 'the new fabric of commerce' (Clinton, 1993). Each of

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the four points in his foreign policy strategy, entitled ‘From Containment to Enlargement’ (Lake, 1993), referred to the need to promote, extend and defend market economy. The central role of the market in international development policies has led some of the commentators interested in governmentality such as Hardt and Negri, (2000, 2004) Lipschutz (2005, 2006) and Rupert (1995) to argue that very little remained outside the bounds of the regulatory and disciplinary mechanisms of the globalized economy. Clinton’s liberal internationalism did translate a belief in the ‘civilizing’ virtues of the market. But unlike classical liberalism, the marketplace of the 1990’s was a highly controlled and regulated environment, and economic transactions as much as infrastructure projects were subject to greater scrutiny; transparency and efficiency were often posed as conditions to do business. The extension of the virtues of market economy required specific moral and technical competencies but also a political system which accommodated enterprise and innovation. It was therefore worthwhile to form a small number of individuals in developing countries to diffuse governmental norms through educational forums on human rights, corruption and democratic organization. Again, the resulting emergence of a civil society aware of common rules for economic and non-economic development constituted a field of intervention which regulated itself in parallel and in cooperation with state institutions. The essential objective of the diffuse and often contradictory sources of power found in civil society came in full circle through the objective of bilateral assistance; the attainment of self-reliance.

By furthering global neoliberal economics, perhaps Clinton was hoping to minimize the potential contradictions between the national interest and universal values. Towards the end of the 1990’s, however, a group of neoconservatives specialized in foreign policy, articulated the equivalence of universal values with US national interest and criticized President Clinton’s cutbacks in the defence budget (PNAC). The preservation of American and therefore global interests, wherever they were seriously threatened, required a high-level of military preparedness. In the following decade, in light of the terrorist attacks of 2001, these recommendations would be implemented by the incumbent president with more conviction.

5. The Gulf War and International Governance

Global governmentality’s propagation of the means to attain self-regulation and self-reliance without the use of direct violence was not matched by the end of outright hostilities
between sovereign entities and 'ethnic' groups. From the perspective of the deployment of sovereign authority in contemporary US history, the Gulf War was remarkable because it reasserted the president’s ability to declare war, a power which had been severely compromised after the American defeat in Vietnam. The Gulf War also marked new standards as to the discursive constitution of a consensual national response; an ABC poll on January 18 1991 showed that 83% of Americans supported the war, and that 71% of them opposed anti war demonstrations (Summers Jr., 1992: 19). Importantly, the US’ military reprisal was also conducted in the name of international law and condoned by a majority of UN members. In all, the Gulf War presented a (worrying) new kind of entanglement between force, discursive performance and universal right.

Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, foreign policy ventures were mainly limited to arms treaties, diplomatic missions, covert operations and to military and economic assistance to its allies. After the Vietnam War, not only were the presidency’s war-making powers restricted by Congress (WPA, 1973) but the public was less than disposed to put American soldiers in harm’s way. In Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, George Bush was presented with an ideal opportunity for the US to demonstrate its military might and deter any eventual challengers to its newly consolidated hegemony. For this to be a successful undertaking, Bush and some of his closest advisers had to propose clear goals, a precise estimate of the duration and of the resources needed to achieve them and the establishment of an international coalition who would share some of the financial and military costs of the operation (Summers Jr., 1992: 18). Along with amassing public support, the iteration of clear political and strategic aims suggested that the administration did not want to repeat the mistakes of the Vietnam War. As Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. attested, the president explained the US’ political objectives ‘at every opportunity.’ These were; the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory, the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty, the pursuit of stability and security in the Gulf and the protection of American nationals abroad (1992: 18). On August the second 1990, president Bush declared a national emergency to ‘address the threat to national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq’ (Bush, 1990). Reliant on the commander in chief’s authority to declare war in section II of the constitution, the president sent 230 000 US troops to Saudi Arabia (operation Desert Shield) as a pre-emptive measure. At that point, some members of Congress started to question the legality of the operation and vowed to prevent further presidential actions without the explicit authorization of Congress.
But it wasn’t long before war was declared by a near unanimous congress and an acquiescent American public.

The production of an assenting political body through the establishment of the legality, moral legitimacy and instrumentality of the war showed signs of a renewal of the government’s capacity for leadership and responsibility. The relative ease with which the country accepted to go to war prompted Bush’s to affirm that the US had finally ‘kicked the Vietnam Syndrome.’ Beyond the traditional strategic and economic motivations of Bush’s war making cabinet, however, lay a tremendous discursive effort which sought to convince the American public as well as the international community of the legitimacy of an armed intervention. As David Campbell attests, it was the ‘political discourse of moral certitude that mobilized the coalition led by the United States’ (1993: 17). In a string of efforts to characterize the threat at hand, Bush proclaimed that Saddam was ‘worse than Hitler.’ American legislators insisted that any hesitation to confront the tide of evil conjured up by this crazed and irrational tyrant could prove fatal. Along with the traditional distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, rational and irrational, the construction of a consensual national response depended on the almost unequivocal support of the US media. A large number of antiwar protests were unreported and journalists had very limited access to the battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq.51 The American intervention in the Gulf was channelled, perpetuated and performed through discursive rituals which constructed a unified narrative of legitimate retribution. By the same token, alternative narratives were practically shut down. Perhaps still riding the wave of Ronald Reagan’s patriotic exhortations, Americans seemed pre-disposed to validate the principles which they associated with their national identity both forcefully and confidently.

In Baudrillard’s view, the Gulf War was the first war to be ‘conducted legally and globally with a view of putting an end to war and liquidating any confrontation likely to threaten the hence-forward unified system of control’ (1995: 84). By organizing and leading the international coalition, the US claimed its responsibility as the guardian of a unitary system of rule. This role could not only be developed through force but through ‘the production of international juridical norms’ which would perpetuate the US’ hegemonic status (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 180). One of the principle juridical norms invoked in the discursive justification of the American response was of course sovereignty. Through resolution 670,

51 There abundant literature on this question but for the best accounts see; Morrison (1992), Muller (1994) and Taylor (1998).
the UN sanctioned the use of force against Iraq primarily because of its infringement of the territorial and political integrity of one of its members. Sovereignty was then still being presented as the primary condition for a secure and ethical form of life. As David Campbell notes, this obstinate reassertion of sovereignty in political discourse was pursued 'in an environment where it was (and is) constantly challenged, transgressed, erased, and reinscribed' (Campbell, 1993: 80). The violation of sovereignty as a cause for intervention still appeared to carry more weight than a universal ethics based on human rights. However, to consolidate their case, the US also appealed to an emerging international order bounded by liberal democratic values which corresponded with its own plight. Bush told a joint session of Congress before the Gulf War that 'the crisis in the Persian Gulf... offer(ed) a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation ... and opened the way for the UN Security Council to operate as its founders had envisioned' (in Mann, 2004: 194). The intervention of an international coalition in the Gulf seemed to announce the fate of a global system of rules enforced by an American world police. Again, this new world order was being imposed not solely through force but through 'the virtual violence of consensus' (Beaudrillard, 1995: 84). Untroubled by the potential tensions between particularistic and universal interests, the post cold war narrative conjured up a hopeful rhetoric which sought to create a unified notion of humanity around the precepts of security, prosperity and justice. Those who flaunted those requirements ran the risk of being excluded and disciplined. For example, as Beaudrillard cogently expressed; one the Gulf War's 'crucial stake ... (was) the reduction of Islam to the global order.' The goal was 'to domesticate it, by whatever means: modernization, even military, politisation, nationalism, democracy, the Rights of Man, anything at all to electrocute the resistances and the symbolic challenge that Islam represents for the entire West' (1995: 85).

Despite talk of a new world order, both Bush and Clinton were to careful not to substitute US national interest for universal interest in too obvious a manner. Both presidents were inclined to prudent coalition building and careful, especially in Clinton’s case, not to overextend American commitments abroad. American-led interventions were often made on a highly selective basis (Iraq was not the only country threatening its neighbour’s sovereignty) and after much deliberation (Bosnia). For the most part, US leaders in the 1990’s were content to facilitate the extension of a market rationality unto emerging networks of global governance. However, a group of neoconservative policy advisers made up of Wolfowitz, Cheney, Perle and Rumsfeld, to name but the most famous, were beginning to elaborate a more aggressive strategy to promote American interests and values
abroad and to deter any potential challengers to the US’ rightful hegemony. As will be made clear in the next chapter, the foreign policy ideas expressed in documents like the Defense Planning Guidance in 1992 and the Project for a New American Century in 1997 came to prominence after the attacks of September 11.

Conclusion

In the 1990’s, it was no longer solely a matter of ensuring one’s own material and spiritual benefit but to reconnect with collective endeavours and to do good in the community. After the fairly drastic reshuffling of individual and institutional roles in the 1980’s, governance was being reengineered according to the ethical identifications of individuals, some of which reached beyond local and national contexts. New governmental arrangements strove to involve citizens in government, to make them participate even further in their own subjection and regulation. Volunteers and non-profit organizations swelled the ranks of self-managed, ethically-inclined agencies of authority. Concurrently to this ethical turn, more aspects of subjectivity such as personal tastes and opinions were readily included into governmental calculations. Knowledge about consumer’s habits, sexual preferences, political opinions and sub-cultural affiliations was garnered through increasingly sophisticated surveys and data collection techniques. The further colonization of the individual soul through the mediums of advanced liberal societies was supplemented by a debate around the sources of morality and the practical means to enforce it. Having both questioned the social and cultural consequences of neoliberal government, communitarians and neoconservatives each proposed solutions to overturn the seemingly apathetic, confused and isolated dispositions of the American people. A look at the AFDC’s demise in 1995-1996 shows that concrete welfare reforms did reflect both sets of concerns. While community organizations and private agencies were getting more and more involved in the provision of welfare, certain pieces of legislation conveyed authoritative judgements on moral matters. On the whole, in spite of the ethical inroads in the delivery of particular social services, the large majority of welfare recipients were compelled to work at some point or the other. What’s more, the now established standards of competition and administrative efficiency were imposing additional requirements on both welfare recipients and service providers. On the foreign assistance front, USAID reforms showed that the stringent criteria of managerial efficiency informing aid programs were combined with a further displacement of managerial and decisional responsibilities.
The multiplication of efficiency-driven and ethically-oriented governmental agencies could also be observed in international relations. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many countries subscribed to the protocols of advanced liberal government and individual citizens as much local and national institutions were integrated in a number of monitoring and facilitating schemes in cooperation with international bodies. An increasing variety of international organizations helped to establish national objectives around good governance, transparency, environmental laws and local democracy. Standardized processes of political and economic interaction were gaining ground across the globe and outlined the beginnings of a global kind of liberal governmentality. In such a context, the precedence of state power seemed to be receding. In general, US foreign policy in the 1990's mainly sought to facilitate the extension of standards of liberal governance. Clinton’s rhetoric, although expectedly laudatory of American values, was rarely sustained by aggressive discourses or military enterprises. However, with Bush senior’ intervention in the Gulf in 1991, there were signs of a will to enforce international norms, prompting some commentators to argue that America was simply ensuring its position as leader of the new global liberal order. Expressions of sovereign power were therefore still actual not only in the decision to go to war but also in the discursive categorizations that led to its legitimization. These manifestations were also noticeable in the objectification of drug addiction, welfare dependency and divorce as deviant and threatening modes of subjectivity. In 2001, an unexpected event only intensified the legitimacy of state power.

In chapter five, I argued that a combination of neoconservative and neoliberal standards of rule compelled individuals to abide by stricter notions of responsibility. This disciplinary turn, concomitant with the demise of the welfare state, became a lasting criterion for governmental operation. Throughout the 1980’s and the 1990’s, expectations of minimal state assistance for all were replaced by expectations of increased self-reliance. In this chapter, I maintained that a critical assessment of what was seen as an excessive concern for self-realization introduced ethical questions within the neoliberal rationality of government. The diffusion of responsibility for both productivity and ethical conduct that followed the downfall of the welfare state led to the emergence of a multiplicity of self-governing agencies. As I will show in the next chapter, the security measures initiated in the aftermath of 9/11 worked alongside and through the various agencies endowed with moral and administrative authority.
Chapter 7:
Security and Government after 9/11

Introduction

So far, I have detailed the ideational and practical formulation of the specific roles and responsibilities pertaining to welfare recipients and developing countries receiving assistance. This has enabled me to draw out some of the main constituents of responsible citizenship and individual efficiency across various policy realms. Pursuing my initial intention to examine the various forms of power ranging from biopolitics to executive power and in keeping with their historical emergence and particular visibility at any given time, this chapter is concerned with the ways in which the security problematique introduced by 9/11 has integrated and perpetuated advanced liberal forms of governance.

The combination of power in the post 9/11 seems to lean more clearly towards the executive usurpation of law and a greater involvement of sovereign authorities in assessing security concerns. Although the thesis argues that sovereign power is actual through a great variety of moments and instances in recent American history, the particular salience of security practices and the ways in which they have been reconfigured in the last 8 years, is a development that cannot be overlooked. This chapter is then concerned with emerging expressions of sovereign power in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the ways in which they relate to law, government and discipline.

Up to this point, the examples of welfare and foreign assistance programs have not presented major problems for the application of governmentality; the transformations, continuities, intensifications or reversals identified in the basic conceptualizations and techniques of governance have shown striking similarities. Looking at the way in which forms of governance have been alternatively dominant, criticized, supplemented, reformulated and replaced in the American governance of the past 40 years, it appears that the increasing normalization of society has transformed political problems into management issues and that political alternatives have been successfully integrated almost as soon as they have emerged. Despite the continuing influence of neoconservatism as a governmental corrective and an ideal of subjectivity, the fluctuating but steady movement of integration showed in the previous chapters seems to have gone undisturbed. Although actual through the intentional disciplining and exclusion of particular individuals as well as the waging of
presidential powers in foreign policy ventures, sovereign power participates less and less in the formation of complex subjectivities.

However, we could rightfully ask if the events of 9/11 have introduced a novel element in the usual configuration of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. In this chapter, I contend that the executive’s suspension of the ‘normal’ operation of law in the form of exceptional security measures and extra legal spaces of detention (not seen since the Second World War) has marked a sharp turn as to the role and visibility of sovereign power. As I will show, this development announces a novel combination of governmental, disciplinary and sovereign power. It also suggests, as I argue here, a more restrictive definition of subjectivity through the control of emotional reactions and political outcomes after the attacks of 9/11.

In the temporal and spatial interstice between the event and its appropriation through revised governmental plans, there was a decision in the name of the survival of the state and the values of which it was a symbol that governmentality could not have accounted for. This moment was one of the sovereign’s interpretation as to what had happened, what were the common values of the nation, what now constituted a threat and what kind of retributive action was appropriate. The constitution of the biopolitical order was no longer simply facilitated but dictated. Momentarily obliterating the self-perpetuating motions of biopolitics, sovereign power extracted itself from both law and norm to establish temporary and ‘exceptional’ security measures as permanent. The decision to fix security parameters was enabled by powerful discursive injunctions and was eventually conveyed within the pre-existing modalities of government through community. This mode of security extended itself from a domestic to a foreign policy context. In the first place, the US government put in motion a series of legal changes to manage the risk of terrorism which included extended surveillance and decisional powers. Linking national security with regime change in Iraq, the administration also opted for an armed invasion, which was followed by a reconstruction effort mobilizing a great variety of transnational actors. In both the domestic and foreign policy realms, the fabrication of coherent responses to the attacks, such as the reassertion of national unity and the legitimation of security measures, depended heavily on forceful discursive performances.
The US government’s response to the attacks on New York was swift and decisive. The only interpretation that stood was that the US had been the victim of an unprovoked attack by what were likely to be Islamic fundamentalists. It was therefore necessary to take exceptional steps to ensure the security of American citizens and to avenge (Walker, 2003: 64) those who had died in the two towers. At home, these measures included extending the power of a variety of law agencies to apprehend individuals that they deemed suspicious. Usual limitations of the state’s ability to surveil and prosecute individuals were substantially relaxed and the legal language pertaining to suspicion and terrorism was deliberately vague and inclusive. Law effectively became subordinate to the imperative of high level security and the normal subjectifying processes of the citizenry were temporarily interrupted to be eventually reoriented according to new priorities. The reorganization of the governmental map after 9/11 included the increased use of technologies of identification to monitor and categorize specific individuals often on the basis of specific racial characteristics. This marked a shift in how the offender is conceptualized. As Hudson argues, ‘the classification of suspected terrorists fits within a wider net, cast to identify offenders by risk values rather than addressing them as rational actors’ (Hudson, 2003: 42) which can rehabilitated. Since the threat of terrorism was difficult if not impossible to quantify, it conferred a potentially limitless mandate to increase the state’s knowledge of individual activities. The instrumentalist and legalistic nature of the government’s response also implied that a political approach, that is a problematization of the causes and possible responses to the attacks, was altogether excluded. The sovereign’s hand could thus be clearly seen in the exclusion of particular individuals from the socio-political realm, the modification and suspension of law, the extension of security to an increasing array of daily activities and, finally, in the choice of unitary interpretations and technical responses over political means throughout its dealings with terrorism. This section aims to expose some of the ways in which the sovereign deployed and normalized security measures on the basis on ‘necessity.’

After the attacks, the American executive branch then swiftly enacted measures that facilitated the identification and apprehension of terrorist suspects. Means of surveillance and identification as well as legislative changes were extended to several areas of daily life.

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52 As Agamben remarks, the theory of necessity ‘is a theory of exception. It is the particular case where the law does not apply ... It does not occur as an objective given, it clearly entails a subjective judgment, and the only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared so’ (Agamben, 2005: 25, 30).
and government. Concretely, the immediate assessment of the US government after 9/11 was that security systems had failed because of a lack of communication between intelligence agencies and of the lack of access to information held by a great variety of public and private sources. New departments such as Homeland Security were then set up to coordinate intelligence agencies, and legislation such as the USA PATRIOT ACT was adopted to facilitate access to private communications, records and documents. The gathering of data on particular individuals also required the modernization of border control and surveillance technologies and the relaxation of legal restrictions to do with investigating and prosecuting suspects.

The USA PATRIOT ACT mainly consists in the modernization of existing surveillance and security technologies in view of increasing the ability of intelligence agencies to access information such as financial records, electronic communications and telephone calls. In parallel, new biometric and face recognition technologies, aiming to better identify individuals moving in and out of US borders, have also been devised and tested.53 As David Lyon advances, the effect of these newly expanded surveillance technologies is less to 'anticipate violence than to increase the stock of available information' (2003: 37). It is a matter of debate among security experts whether the collection of data on an increasingly large number of American and foreign citizens is more effective than the improvement of intelligence-gathering on specific leads and suspects. Nonetheless, it can be said that the US government's pursuit of security since 9/11 has largely been premised upon a kind of 'generalized suspicion' as opposed to intensified intelligence work on particular cases. Several legislators and civil liberties groups have criticized wide-ranging governmental initiatives such as the Total Information Awareness (TIA) programme, which basically intended to have the entire American population on computer dossiers.54 These criticisms actually resulted in the termination of funding for several federal initiatives of this kind, most of them grouped under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Some experts also deplored that the categorization and discrimination programmed into the computerized systems of identification that are currently being used, funded and developed, is often conducted without oversight by human agents and can therefore lead to more mistakes and arbitrary classifications. Furthermore, the majority of technologies such as

53 On these improvements, particularly in the case of biometrics, see Kelly Gates' article Identifying The 'Faces Of Terror' (2006: 417-418).

inkless fingerprinting devices and digital photography, which are the main instruments for entry systems like US VISIT, have been much more effective at identifying and intercepting criminals than terrorists. This means that legislation and technological advances formally directed at preventing terrorism are now widely used for other purposes, most notably crime and border control. Whilst surveillance tools have been developing steadily over the past 30 years, their use has always been limited by strict legislative guidelines. After 9/11, subtle alterations in the latter's formulation have allowed considerably more license to law enforcement agencies.

Initially, title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, allowed warrantless federal surveillance for matters concerning national security but did allow it for those concerning criminal activity. Following the government's abuses during the 1960's and 70's, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act specified that wiretaps could not take place without a warrant if the 'primary purpose' of the investigation was not proven to be the collection of foreign intelligence information. However, under the same act, the President could still authorize warrantless wiretaps when national security was deemed under threat. Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended the FISA in the following way; a federal investigator no longer has to demonstrate that the purpose of surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, it is now enough to say that the 'significant purpose' (of which a definition is not provided) of an investigation is to obtain such information. The risk is that both intelligence and law enforcement agents will submit and be granted applications for electronic surveillance of criminal as opposed to foreign intelligence investigations. As Lawyer Sharon H. Rackow argues, it is the language used in the PATRIOT ACT which is likely affect the daily lives of millions of Americans (2002: 1680).

On the whole, it is the legislative changes around the investigation and prosecution of terrorist suspects that have generated the most controversy. On the basis of 'reasonable suspicion' that terrorist activity is taking place, local or federal authorities can now investigate and request personal data (commercial transactions, travel bills, library dossiers, etc) without a court order. The ACT also allows the government to confiscate the assets of foreign terrorist organizations, terrorists themselves and those who aid them. Section 412, one of the more debated provisions of the Act, widens the grounds for 'deeming' an alien inadmissible to or deportable from the US for terrorist activity. This means that aliens who are 'believed' to pose a serious threat to national security by the attorney general or the
commissioner of immigration are to be detained for an undisclosed period of time or deported.55 Finally, it pledges to strengthen criminal laws and increase penalties for those suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. Importantly, the expansion of the means to apprehend suspects, whether discursive or technical, rests on a new definition of terrorism that now includes all ‘groups that have used or threatened to use violence for political ends.’56 An individual who is contributing financially or in some cases vaguely associated with any of the campaigns or members of the above institutions is likely to be arrested.57 This broadens the scope for the identification and investigation of ‘suspicious activity’ and ‘suspicious individuals’ in a significant way and leaves discretionary powers and potential abuses in the hands of not only federal but also law enforcement agencies. One of such abuses was the targeting of citizens and especially non-citizens of a particular religious and ethnic background (Muslim and Middle Eastern). In the year following the attacks, as many as 2000 detentions of predominantly Muslim nationals and non-nationals took place, often without charges or justifications. Again, this clearly contravenes to proper judicial procedures (Chang, 2002: 67, 70, 77).

As Judith Butler remarks, the suspension of standard legal procedures and the changes in legislative language do not in themselves constitute the exceptional circumstance, they rather are ‘the means by which the exceptional becomes established as a naturalized norm’ (2003: 67). Presumably subtle modifications to texts of law and circumventions of constitutional rights expose the use of law as an instrument that can be modified, directed or overturned on the basis of self-justified necessities and subjective judgments. Indeed, this rewriting of the law effectively invests governmental bureaucrats with ‘an extraordinary power over life and death’ (2003: 59), by allowing them to determine how long someone may be detained or if he or she is to be deported or exonerated. It also validates the official’s subjective sense that someone ‘may’ be dangerous and the power of this same official to act upon his or her suspicion.

The great majority of works analyzing the security failings before 9/11 and producing recommendations to improve it for the future (including the 9/11 Commission) share the

55 However, Vermont’s democratic senator Patrick Leahy was able to negotiate some restrictions and protections.

56 This includes a wide range of organizations that can be put on file such as pro-life lobbies, the African National Congress, academic dissenters, anti-globalization and anti-war protesters.

same assumptions. First, they recognize that the Federal government’s efforts toward national security are for the most part correct and that technological and administrative efficiency are the surest means to preserve the United States from further attacks. If some of these reports express concerns about civil liberties and the right to privacy, they generally suggest that the creation of more committees, audits and oversights can help provide the necessary balance between liberty and security. In the same spirit, they argue that automated surveillance and the collection of personal information should be monitored and decided upon by human beings. As one commentator noted, summing up the US government’s rationale in the face of the events; ‘US security depends on being smarter’ (Steinberg: 49 in Northouse, 2006). The discursive emphasis on a unitary interpretation to the attacks contributed to occlude the presentation, discussion and adoption of alternative political strategies, but it also laid the grounds to legitimize the executive’s reliance on both law and expertise (Rose and Valverde, 1998: 550). Terrorism is construed as an unavoidable, potentially ceaseless and unquantifiable phenomenon that requires continual legal and technical modifications. As Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede argue; ‘the dilemmas of war on terror (are) being framed as problems of risk management or, more specifically, as uncertainties that can be resolved via information technologies’ (2005: 139). The very notion that an attack is difficult if not impossible to predict requires that all the possible discrepancies and vulnerabilities within the infrastructural, technological and legal apparatuses relating to terrorist acts be identified and remedied. This means that an increasing array of daily activities have to be incorporated within a dispositif of risk further developed by the war on terror.\(^{58}\) It has become apparent that everything from crime control to travelling, shopping and library use is being invested with increasingly sophisticated technologies of control, whose operation is facilitated by new legal provisions.

However, the extension of surveillance was partly enabled by individual citizens agreeing that security be improved and widened. It is not only a matter for the sovereign authority to impose and use fear as a means to govern; stricter security measures are seen as legitimate by genuinely fearful Americans. Accordingly, the responsibility to extend security can be assumed by willing individuals. The US government encouraged such initiative by, for example, granting 1.9 million dollars to an array of Neighbourhood Watches across the country. Participants were offered training to detect suspicious individuals in their own

\(^{58}\) Risk management is an integral part of advanced liberal strategies of government and has been studied by many scholars interested in governmentality such as Pat O’Malley (2004), Francois Ewald (1990), Jacques Donzelot (1977), Claudia Aradau and Reus Van Munster (2007).
neighbourhoods (Lyon, 2003: 57). In addition, many professions relating to public security were created and Americans enlisted by the tens of thousands. Particular emotional states were being given institutional outlets and rendered productive; ‘if Americans are busy helping to guard our waters resources, dams, borders, airports, and other vital public resources and spaces, they will transform their nagging anxieties into socially productive activities’ (Etzioni, 2003: Xvi). Along with many other public officials, the famed Communitarian writer Emitai Etzioni saw in these manifestations the expression of a newfound civic responsibility. However, the public-mindedness and civic duty that Etzioni is talking about has more to do with assuaging fear through security-oriented tasks than with participating in a political dialogue as to the content and limits of security measures that affect each individual citizen.

The re-authorization of the PATRIOT ACT in 2005 has extended surveillance powers to domains other than foreign intelligence such as smuggling, drug trafficking and crime. This suggests that a large portion of the legislative and technological changes instated after 9/11 have been normalized and will endure. The increasing use and development of sophisticated diagrams and technologies to ordain and tame future insecurities is an indication that contemporary governments rely primarily on technical means to resolve problems such as crime and terrorism. So far, the governmental response to 9/11 has demonstrated that the improvement of data-collection methods is a solution that is largely preferred to a socio-political understanding and management of violence. Clearly, the constitution of a secure and unitary interpretation was essential to the US’ government’s rationale, which can be formulated as the undisputable necessity to ‘defeat’ terror. Technical solutions are evidently more effective when there are few doubts about the legitimacy of their purpose. As former Attorney General John Ashcroft once said to senator Patrick Leahy, with rather Schmittian accents; ‘talk won’t stop terrorism.’ This way of understanding and practicing security intentionally precludes both the political nature the US’ relationship with the rest of the world and a discussion on the bounds of legitimate governmental action at home. This is not to say that critical arguments have not been presented by academics, legislators themselves or private citizens or that provisions limiting the power of the executive to collect information have not been obtained, but to insist that technical solutions and unitary interpretations have been overwhelmingly applied to matters such as security, which have difficult but vitally important political implications.
What is most striking about post 9/11 governance has been the surprising ability of the central state, in a time where government is said to operate from a respectful distance to momentarily regroup diverse centres of authority and information. This capacity for rapid mobilization, organization and decision makes a strong case for the permanence of state power after the much touted globalization thesis of the 1990's.

2. Governance through community after 9/11

As we have seen in chapter six, the 1990's saw the emergence of a new form of governance. This governmental reason posited the individual as morally responsible and self-interested. Through a variety of inducements produced and reproduced by cultural and political agents, he or she was endowed with a capacity for self-discipline and to appraise the risks and benefits involved in social life. This form of subjectivity was linked to the general critique of an overzealous application of neoliberal political philosophy through the 1980's. Manifestations of self-interested individualism generated cultural and administrative problems which were put through the critical lens of novel and reflexive governmental standards. The latter standards combined the neoliberal distrust for the state after the apparent failure of the welfare model with a renewed concern for excessive individualism and widening inequalities. As we have seen, this was translated in the revival of ethical associations like the family, of civic involvement in issue based organizations and more generally, of involvement in activities not directly related to the state or the private sector. These ethical associations were identified as units that can govern themselves and generate socially productive behaviour. Their work is done in parallel and more often than not, in collaboration with the state. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a desire among Americans to know more about politics and government, to get more involved in community networks and public service careers and to strengthen emotional bonds with friends, families and lovers. Although it has done so only in a limited way, the US government channelled this newfound energy by providing more opportunities for individuals wanting to participate in ethical community schemes. This section aims to show the extent to which emotional reactions to 9/11 were integrated in political discourse and contemporary forms of governance.

Clearly, the events of 9/11 provoked a surge in demonstrations of solidarity, both at the emotional and institutional levels. The importance of relationships (love, friendship and family life) was underlined in many accounts of how the tragedy was experienced. As Joan
Ford, responding to an online NBC survey, says; ‘having children brings you back to the basics, back to the essence of life, back to what’s really important just as September 11 did but more than anything, children give you hope, which is something we all desperately need after 9/11’ (MSNBC.com, 2007). Another respondent, Martha Ott Jennings, said this; ‘the events made me launch into an ‘email and call everyone you care about’ mode just to say I cared and to make sure all were alright. I also emailed my high school sweetheart, whom I had not seen or spoken to in over 30 years. That one email precipitated a 4.5 year unbelievably romantic and tumultuous affair with him. We both felt so vulnerable after 9/11, and like so many people, felt that life was too short to not act upon such strong feelings’ (MSNBC.com, 2007). Of course, the media played a crucial role in constituting collective grief by diffusing either the personal accounts of the friends and families of the victims or of how the tragedy was experienced by individuals across the country. Faced with the fragility of life, ordinary Americans seemed to be making bold choices and to be returning to what really mattered; love, family and friendship. The myriad of individual stories brought into the public realm contributed to a unified narrative of grief. Highly subjective experiences can be here recuperated in official discourse and made politically productive. George W. Bush’s urged his fellow Americans to ‘love a neighbor, mentor a child, go see shut-ins. Tell somebody you love them on a daily basis’ (Americorps website). The government emotionally identified with the people and proposed means to express its inclinations in a way that would be profitable for the ensemble of society.

Analysts (Putnam 2002, Skocpol 2002, John and Mary Kirlin 2002) surveying the history of civic engagement in the US found that if Americans were feeling more compassionate, responsible and emotionally responsive after the attacks, popular participation in community organizations and social clubs did not increase substantially. On the one hand, this new attitude translated a heightened interest in politics and government and a desire to volunteer in local and federal initiatives. On the other, as Putnam and Skocpol note, the American people’s favourable attitude towards the government and greater will to get involved in public affairs did not actually result in a proportional involvement in local and federal initiatives. What’s more, the visible increases in forms of civic behaviour such as contributing to charities, donating blood and volunteering were concentrated on relief operations for 9/11 victims and their families. More than 70% percent of Americans were said to have given some of their time or money to the cause. Yet, such demonstrations were seen by many legislators as an opportunity to extend civic inclinations to other matters. In the 2002 state of the Union address, a speech usually concerned with bread and butter
issues, President Bush highlighted the possibilities involved in the revival of community spirit and encouraged the extension of compassion and responsibility to other domains of domestic life; 'September the 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in Congress... Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home' (Bush, January 29, 2002: 3). Republican senator John McCain also noted that the times were ripe to provide institutional outlets to convey this renewed sense of national purpose. As McCain says; 'public service is a virtue. This is the right moment to issue a new call to service and give a new generation a way to claim the rewards and responsibilities of active citizenship' (in Etzioni, 2003: 136).

Federal initiatives such as the Freedom Corps, created in 2002 by President Bush, generated new organizational channels for 'the countless acts of service, sacrifice, and generosity that followed September 11th.' The USAFC's states that its mission is to create 'a culture of service, citizenship, and responsibility in America.' The program essentially aims to provide more opportunities to volunteer and to increase collaboration between governmental agencies and non-profit organizations (Freedom Corps, 2002). On July 3rd 2003, President Bush signed the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act, (A program which was created by Bill Clinton in 1994) which nearly doubled the number of volunteers and administrators in the organization. AmeriCorps' objective is to 'provide grants to public and nonprofit organizations that sponsor service programs around the country, including hundreds of faith-based and community organizations, higher education institutions, and public agencies. Grants assist these groups in recruiting, training and placing AmeriCorps members to meet critical community needs in education, public safety, health, and the environment' (AmeriCorps, 2003). Where the federal government cannot adequately support individual citizens and local communities, it can nonetheless encourage local participation and self-governance by allocating dynamic volunteers to strategically chosen organizations. AmeriCorps volunteers do everything from 'tutoring and mentoring youth' to 'assisting crime victims, building homes, and restoring parks' and are expected to motivate and train other volunteers and community workers. However, if initiatives like AmeriCorps and Freedom Corps appear to convey the leanings of civic-minded individuals, the space in which such a spirit can be expressed is often strictly regimented. Even if it does so from a distance, the state has a powerful influence on the content of voluntary work and the behaviour of its convenors, not least because it chooses to allocate funding to the more competitive programs. The increasing array of delocalised centres of authority which carry out governmental tasks, from large corporations to individuals themselves, are all aware, or
made aware, of their own responsibilities through strict directives and performance standards.

Ultimately, 9/11 presented the US government with the potentiality of increased civic involvement, but the latter’s effort to re-invigorate existing civil society channels was not as extensive as some might have expected. In fact, most of the president’s public addresses rather encouraged Americans to shop, travel, and go about their daily lives as normally as possible rather than to get directly involved in public affairs. Following the disastrous intervention in Iraq and the increasingly distant memory of 9/11, polls taken in 2005 and 2006 show that the patriotic fever and the surge of involvement in community schemes have died down (CNN, 2007). The kind of civic engagement that has taken place in the aftermath of 9/11 has more to do with a proliferation of exchanges between highly professional agents and agencies than between individuals deciding to form their own clubs, discussion groups or neighbourhood associations (Skocpol, 2002). In general, participation in ethical projects is likely to involve joining a non-governmental organization that must be at once recognized, accredited and coordinated by one or more state agencies. It is arguable whether the state would actually want to see the development of a genuine civic culture, which would not necessarily be conducive to prevalent state and governmental requirements.

Most of the above examples show that the main paradigms of advanced liberalism and governance through community go rather undisturbed after the events of 9/11. On the whole, emotional reactions and changes in popular dispositions have been successfully identified and integrated to existing apparatuses of power. It once again appears that in advanced liberal societies, government is flexible enough and disposes of sufficient means and information to get into the citizens’ ‘soul’ (Rose, 1989), thereby facilitating the integration of a wide array of reactions. Security measures and governmental strategies recuperating the individual proclivities for safety and compassion were also made possible by the discursive production of a unified narrative.

3. Discourse after 9/11

Discourse played an essential part in constituting both the emotional and political interpretations that led to enacting exceptional security measures at home and military actions abroad. In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, there was a basic need to reaffirm the unity of the United States around the principles it espoused and around the grief
and anger caused by the attacks. In order to be politically effective, the otherwise ambiguous and open-ended constructs of nationhood and freedom, whose integrity was said to be under threat, had be circumscribed and ‘decontested’ (Freeden, 1996). In the political discourse that followed 9/11, however, freedom and nationhood were rarely given substantive definitions, their effectiveness and coherence rather came from being endlessly reasserted in public mediums and from being put in contrast with what they are not. The diffusion of dominant narratives was ensured through the political elite’s interpretations and existing cultural dispositions (Croft, 2006: 9). The latter subjects were constituted by those narratives by actively integrating and perpetuating them. The ‘war on terror’ was more than a series of legislative changes and military actions; it was and still is a sphere of meaning in which retributive actions and exceptional security measures are constructed as legitimate by the subjects who devise and assent to them. Strategically, the ‘war on terror’ required the discursive construction and re-affirmation of the American population’s existence, the purpose and values that unified it, and the identification of the entity that was threatening it. The American national identity was endowed with particular character traits such as ‘freedom-loving,’ ‘innocent’ and ‘peace-loving’ determined in their opposition to the traits of an enemy whom is ‘freedom-hating’ and ‘murderous.’ Through repetition and differentiation, the positive attributes of that identity were extended through an intense validation of America’s own political and moral creed (Jackson, 2005). The enduring readiness of the United States to protect itself and extend its articles of faith abroad has also necessitated a discursively enhanced awareness of danger. As has been duly emphasized by poststructural International Relations scholars, threat is the single most important catalyst in the formation of national identities. However, this readiness has also been fed by the constitution of an enduring feeling of grief and offence. The perpetuation of the ‘war on terror’ has been relying heavily on the cultivation of memory, of the constant re-enactment of the atrocities and of the ensuing grief in the political present.

The intensity of mourning after 9/11, at once private, national and international, translated a particular estimation of life and of the ‘human.’ The lives of the victims and of the professionals involved in rescue operations were reconstituted through extensive individual profiling in the media, which detailed their hobbies, occupations, the names of their family members, their wedding and graduation photos, etc.59 The pain and the grief caused by the attacks were not only related to the fact that ‘freedom’ and a ‘way of life’ had been

59 An example of portraits of the victims can be found in the NY times’ online Portrait of Grief. (http://www.nytimes.com/pages/national/portraits/index.html)
attacked; it had also to do with the killing of innocent men and women with whom ‘we’ could easily identify. By being re-told and exposed through film, newspapers and television, lives and actions connected to 9/11 were given content and value. But as Butler warns, ‘we have to ask the conditions under which a grievable life is established and maintained, and through what logic of exclusion, what practice of effacement and denominalization’ (2004: 38). Civilians who are losing their lives, showing heroism or enduring loss in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine are not individualized, mourned and remembered in the same way as those who died or participated in rescue operations in the twin towers.

After 9/11, the sovereign requirements for national cohesion and security mobilized existing discursive resources with great effectiveness and intensity. Since my present purpose is to outline the interlinking operations of discourse and rationalities of government rather than to provide a detailed study of official discourse after 9/11, 60 I will limit myself to a mention of the main discursive spheres utilized and processed by governmental strategies. The first of these necessary discursive constructions is the appeal to national unity. In the face of despair and fear, the United States had to come together. Signs that read ‘we came over in different ships, but we’re in the same boat now,’ (in Silberstein, 2002: 112) were put up on billboards across the country. America became a unified subject by engulfing all the struggles and alternative histories of its various constituting ‘nations.’ People of all faiths and ethnic backgrounds were reunited in the same grief and shock. Second, an interpretation on the cause of the attacks had to be immediately provided; president Bush asserted that ‘America was targeted for attack because it was the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity… in the world’ (Bush, 2001). Bush depicts the United States as the most successful example of democratic capitalism and attests that it was attacked by an enemy whom is both jealous and resentful of its success. This characterization further emphasizes the irrational and unjustified nature of the offence. Third, references to past historical events and demonstrations of leadership were reiterated in order to generate discursive continuities (Jabri, 1996) contributing to normalize the executive’s appropriation of responsibility in cases of emergency and to reassert nation’s courage, determination and unity in the face of danger. President Bush echoed the voice of other American leaders in times war and strife; ‘today we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity’ (Bush, 2001). Throughout the President’s addresses to the nation in the months that followed 9/11, there were also numerous references to the Cold War, Pearl Harbor and American

60 This has been done in much greater detail elsewhere see for example Silberstein (2002), Jackson (2005) and Croft (2006).
involvement in the two great wars in order to recreate the resilience of the United States in
the face of ruthless and amoral enemies. Fourth, the enemy is invariably represented as
irrational and 'evil' because of its senseless hatred of freedom, peace and democracy. It is
therefore not possible to engage politically with the terrorists as 'they' do not share 'our'
normative and procedural frameworks. The only means to defeat those who operate outside
of conventional frameworks is through extra legal and violent means. Fifth and last is the
need to re-inscribe dominant narratives through discursive repetition as well as to discipline
and circumscribe alternative interpretations, political strategies and narratives. Talking
about the war in Afghanistan with Art Fleisher, former White House Press Secretary, an
American television show host hinted that it was "us" (Americans) who were the
'cowards...staying in the airplane (when missiles) hit the building,' to which Fleisher
replied; 'Americans should watch what they say, this is not a time for remarks like that'
(quoted in Chang, 2002: 93). Academic freedom was also restricted and watchdogs such as
the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) (founded in 1995 by Dick Cheney's
wife Lynn), which supervise and guide higher education programs, produced a list of
individuals that allegedly 'blamed America first' (Silberstein, 2002: 18, 127) in their
lectures or publications. Accordingly to strategic objectives, the 'war on terror' also
required alterations to political denominations and conventional understandings; importantly
for the whole enterprise, what was effectively the pursuit of a few individuals responsible
for plotting and carrying out acts of terrorism was transformed into a 'war,' thereby
increasing the need for exceptional security measures, military and technological resources
and popular commitment. Admittedly, the above examples are all taken from the year that
followed the attacks. Since the troublesome invasion of Iraq in particular, patriotic displays
and calls to condemn and censor dissenting voices have become less forceful.

Even through the few examples stated above, it is easy to conceive of a great variety of
binary characterizations reproducing delimited identities and interpretations. Ultimately,
the latter discursive processes all provide the groundwork for what is 'deemed' necessary
for the safety and well being of the American people. The sovereign's definition of
meaning, language and action after the terrorist attacks, itself chosen out of a variety of
other possible narratives inherent to America's own cultural and political tradition (Jackson,
2005), relies on discursive repetitions and differentiations and is intimately linked with
basic modes of social, economic and cultural subjectivities aligned on governmental
reasoning.
4. American Foreign Policy after 9/11 and the Iraq War

After 9/11, the extension of neoliberal economics and of standards of ethical and effective governance characteristic of US foreign policy in the 1990’s was momentarily re-appraised. Without interrupting efforts towards making subjects of development more responsible and autonomous, more emphasis was put on strategies which would prevent further attempts on the security of US citizens. In some sense, as Michael Dillon maintains, the war on terror launched and perpetuated by the United States only intensified the mechanisms of security that were already investing biopolitical life (Dillon, 2003: 3). However, the designation of the terrorist threat as subject to ‘a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other,’ to borrow from Francois Ewald (2002: 282), implied that the sovereign had considerable license to determine the extent to which the population should to be shielded from virtual, unquantifiable threats. Faced with imperfect expert evidence about risks to the population, sovereign authorities may well decide that any kind of risk is unacceptable, thereby warranting a greater degree of control upon biopolitical fluxes. Here again, the ‘necessity’ of absolute security, embedded as it is in subjective expectations, presents itself as an inexorable logic that implicitly excludes political debate. After 9/11, the balance between government through freedom and government through security seemed to tip in favour of the latter. In the state of exception which has been unfolding in the aftermath of the attacks, the usual means deployed to secure biopolitical processes, which rely on calculable risks, are no longer sufficient. The sovereign therefore claims responsibility to determine the extent of the threat and the strategies to prevent it. It appears that the Bush administration made the most of this opening by implementing technologies premised on generalized suspicion at home and by giving a forceful impetus to the ‘necessity’ of extending liberal democratic modes of government to a selection of rogue states. Some of Bush junior’s close foreign policy advisers argued that the projection of the American model abroad was one of the surest means to prevent the emergence of terrorism. Turned into a security issue, the extension of good governance could be seen as necessary and as legitimating the use of force.

This section will attempt to show how the decisions pertaining to national security have been integrated within the existing governmental make-up of US foreign relations. In the first instance, I will look at the ideas which have fed into the re-assertion of American values and the promotion of its institutions as a universally valid pre-emptive strategy. I argue that the foreign policy outlook of a younger generation of neoconservatives like
William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and others closer to the presidential office like Cheney and Rumsfeld, did have an influence on President Bush’s more muscular foreign policy, at least in its initial phases. Secondly, through looking at some of USAID’s reports and documents, I will try and determine how the war on terror was integrated into pre-existing projections of American governmentality. The invasion of Iraq and the ensuing circulation of neoliberal rationales through the reconstruction effort serve as example of the novel combinations between sovereign and biopolitical power.

4.1 Second Generation Neoconservatives and US Foreign Policy

By the late 1990’s, it was becoming apparent that a new generation of neoconservatives was replacing the old guard, made up of people like Irving Kristol, Norman Podhorezt and Daniel Bell (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 99). In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the original neoconservatives were suddenly deprived of their most feared and loathed enemy. Many of them argued that the United States no longer had a reason to cast its military power abroad. Throughout the 1990’s, however, a group of dedicated officials and intellectuals began to devise a more unapologetic kind of internationalism. In the midst of what they saw as the tepid consensus of post cold war American foreign policy, William Kristol and Robert Kagan aired their views on what a conservative foreign policy should look like. They essentially argued that American hegemony was a good in itself, and one which had to be sustained through strong political leadership and increased military spending. Along with several others, they weaved a powerful institutional network, which included the PNAC and the American Enterprise Institute, in an attempt to convert Washington officials to their ideas. Neoconservatives essentially aimed to reignite political leaderships’ ability to command an appreciation among American citizens that ‘they have never had it so good’ (Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 22). Americans had to be reminded of the inherent benevolence of the value system which made their lives what they were and neoconservatives hoped that this recognition would translate into its active appreciation, promotion and defence. As Kristol an Kagan asserted, adding a complement to their peers’ gloomy diagnostic of contemporary American culture, ‘the remoralization of American at home ultimately require(d) the remoralization of American foreign policy’ (1996: 31).

Second generation neoconservatives then regarded ‘freedom’ as fundamentally undervalued by its main proponents and threatened by those countries who disregarded it. However, in order to be politically and morally effective, the definition of freedom could not confused
with mere rights, nor could it be contaminated by ambiguity. For the sake of clarity, it should neither be given a specific content nor defined through political debate. In line with a kind of Straussian noble lie, leaders who stood for what was right had to 'defend verities so long accepted that they are no longer fully understood,' they had to 'routinely explain why certain ideas are right or wrong, and why the distinctions matter' (Kristol in Dorrien, 2004: 132). Political authorities were responsible to define the terms of political discourse. Beyond their technical and legalistic designations, freedom and democracy were unassailable metaphysical goods. Importantly, such a discursive strategy could provide the sovereign with powerful means to legitimize its own existence and its strategic choices without actually having to refer to the legal codification that usually bounds its operation. The role of political leaders was then to render the importance of freedom as a good which inspired selfless devotion and to educate 'the citizenry to the responsibilities of global hegemony' (Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 26). In what seemed like an appreciative nod to pre-modern martial republicanism, Kagan and Kristol also suggested expanding forms of 'reserve service' to give Americans 'an appreciation of military virtues' as there 'was no more profound responsibility than the defence of the nation and its principles' (1996: 27). As an ideational and governmental force, this renewed, outward-looking neoconservatism invested political authority with the mission to inspire moral clarity and to produce a specific kind of citizen, who would be both appreciative of moral principles and willing to defend them.

In the latter part of the 1990's, neoconservatives already benefited from substantial financial backing and had put together an extensive institutional network. Conservative thinktanks like the Heritage foundation, the Hudson Institute, the American Enterprise Institutions, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Center for Security Policy provided platforms for an exchange of views between various conservative factions on both domestic and foreign policy issues (Steinfels, 1979: 29). Reasonably influential in political circles, neoconservative intellectuals 'spoke at congressional hearings, took an active role in the mainstream media discourse, sent open letters to the White House, published articles regularly in the major newspapers, and produced a stream of books' (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 103). Resulting from Kagan and Kristol's initiative, the Project for the New American Century (1997), signed by many intellectuals, military personnel and government officials with neoconservative sympathies, was put together. It main recommendations stressed the need to increase defence spending, restrain regimes hostile to American interests and values, promote political and economic freedom abroad and extend an international order friendly
to the security and prosperity of the United States. One of project’s reports, *Building America’s Defenses* (2000) manifested an acute anxiety about an American loss of military pre-eminence, attributed to President Clinton’s general ‘defense neglect’ (PNAC, 2000: 4). Countries like Iraq, North Korea, Iran and even China had to be actively deterred from mounting a challenge to American power. As neoconservatives saw it, one of the ways to prevent such ambitions was to provide the respective civil societies of these countries with ‘democratic freedoms and individual political rights’ (PNAC, 2000: 4). American foreign policy should then endeavour to bring about regime change in these zones of tyranny. A universal order of sameness, united in the practice of liberal democratic values, would supposedly command the peaceful cooperation of all nations.

In the few months that followed the attacks, George W. Bush’s foreign policy initiatives showed distinctive neoconservative influences. The pre-fabricated moral certainty purported by neoconservatives seemed suited to the impatient and angry mood of the nation. The president presented a clear rationale for the projection of American force abroad, often couched in aggressive, Manichean terms. A true commitment to defend national values had to be met by the means to defend them. In late 2001, the President called for a 48 billion increase in military spending, making national security his number one priority (Bush, 2002). However, arms were not the only means to repel terrorism. Bush expressed the conviction that ‘the advance of freedom (was) the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world’ (Bush, 2002). The administration then deployed an all-embracing logic which confounded pre-emptive militarism with value-laden expansionism. In the face of an unquantifiable threat not only to the United States, but to all who stood for goodness in this world, this logic was potentially boundless and government through security would likely become the norm for the foreseeable future. Because it was unknown, the terrorist threat was all the greater. As mentioned in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, ‘the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction_ and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively’ (NSS: 15).

In the midst of a threat greatly accentuated by political leaders, fear of terrorism firmly set in. Independently of the ‘real’ motivations behind the American invasion of Iraq, which would typically cover a range of economic to strategic interests, the course of action adopted by the administration was made possible through the great violence exercised on
political discourse. The US invasion was underwritten by a stupendous discursive effort which, at least for a time, made extremely dubious claims and connections seem reasonable. Alternative interpretations of the administration’s official justifications to attack Iraq were all but forbidden and the American media succumbed to a high patriotic fever. Along with establishing the necessity to preserve the existential attributes of freedom and democracy at all cost, fear once again ‘provided the necessary glue to meld otherwise uncorroborated statements, assumptions, predictions, and ideas in the case of war. Official discourse turned the assessment of a hypothetical danger into the absolute proof of real danger’ (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 232). Through all sorts of other incentives such as the color coded scale of threat (yellow, orange, red), fear was produced and perpetuated. As Zizek comments ‘we should therefore interpret the different levels of the Alert Code (red, orange) as a strategy to control the necessary level of excitation, and it is precisely through such a permanent state of emergency, in which we are interpellated to participate through our readiness, that power asserts its hold over us’ (Zizek 2003: 98-99). The political use of these discursive strategies was substantial, as it enabled the adoption of technical and legal provisions deemed necessary for the greater control of people and goods inside and outside of the US. But perhaps the boldest and potentially most consequential discursive coup was the establishment of an equivalence between national and international interest. Through it, the United States can not only be absolved of any wrongdoing in its self-interested foreign ventures, it represents itself created as a monolithic entity which confuses its national identity for abstract principles like freedom. Any imperfections that may arise from a political or even plainly realistic assessment of the United States’ cultural and economic differentiations are therefore pushed out by insistent discursive machinations, which many Americans come reproduce in their own notion of identity and politics.

4.2 American Governmentality in Iraq

Once political authorities had substituted the uncertainty of the terrorist threat with the necessity of ousting Saddam Hussein, the mission to democratize Iraq begun. The safety of American nationals was made to depend on transforming the mindset and institutional make-up of Iraq. Here, the investing of a specific space and population with an advanced liberal framework was not intrinsic to the circulation of standards of global governance through NGO’s, trade and other vectors, it was the product of a conscious decision by the United States government, which was enabled by particular intellectual and discursive forces. The decision to go to war was part of a wider pre-emptive logic, which aimed to
instate a particular kind of government in the interest of the moral good and national security. War therefore produces biopower in that its final purpose is to regulate and control rather than react and repel. As Hardt and Negri attest; 'whereas “defense” involves a protective barrier against external threats, “security” justifies a constant martial activity equally in the homeland and abroad' (2004: 21). Government through security is then a creative task which extends itself into a limitless future. The use of force to bring about regime change is seen as legitimate so long as it is successful in producing a certain kind of domestic order in line with the self-evident principles espoused by the American administration. As Hardt and Negri sustain, the American venture of ‘nation building’ in Iraq has less to do with assisting internal forces in their quest for self determination than with imposing external administrative, political and economic models (2004: 23). In the end though, the project of universal democratization, concocted by neoconservatives and partially adopted by the Bush administration, required a territorial anchor to come into effect. Sovereign power therefore designates a space upon which to introduce specific governmental plans, but it is also actual in the daily enforcement of these extraneous practices. Initiatives coordinated by the US army and by local police and military forces aim to secure private, public and non-governmental agencies, which go about the business of diffusing the means and standards for self-government, efficiency and transparency.

Up to 9/11, the rationality behind the allocation of foreign aid involved an increasing array of economic and political requirements, which ultimately aimed at making recipient countries self-managing. After 9/11, development is formally included in the president’s National Security Strategy (2002) as the third pillar of national security after defense and diplomacy. Development, good governance, economic growth and humanitarian assistance are then no longer solely morally commendable objectives fostered by the free market and issue based organizations, they have become crucial assets to the security of the United States. Again, the association of political and economic endeavours with security provides a powerful justification for promoting the liberal democratic model abroad. Equally, the association of aid with the pre-emptive strategy of global democratization provides it with more legitimacy. In line with the Millennium goals for development, US foreign assistance was set to rise from 10 billion in 2002 to 15 billion in 2006. As the administrator of USAID attested in a 2002 document entitled Foreign Aid in the National Interest; Promoting freedom, Security and Opportunity, ‘U.S. assistance can do much to shape the 21st century’ (USAID, 2002).
The implementation of security measures at home amounts to restricting usual freedoms. However, the extension of freedom abroad is itself a security measure. This represents a dual state of exception, which forfeits the normal legal and governmental operations of national and international neoliberal forms of governance. These developments seem to confirm the historical shift towards a more restrictive kind of politics in the United States of which neoconservatism is an indication. The outward projection of particular governmental forms and its linkage with security has, as Mark Duffield (2005) argues, has a lot in common with colonialism. In a show of military and political force, US policy makers designated Iraq as a threat to national security, thereby marking a territorial space and a population to transform according to its own technical and intellectual benchmarks. In coordination with the Iraqi government and the international community, the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, released in 2005, laid out the three main ‘tracks’ to victory; the security track, which ‘emphasizes the capacity of Iraqis to secure themselves,’ the ‘economic track,’ which will help ‘the Iraqi government set the foundation for a sound and self-sustaining economy with the capacity to deliver essential services,’ and finally the ‘political track’ which ‘works to forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic governance’ (USAID, 2006). The three tracks all insist on achieving self-sustaining administrative structures. In contrast with the foreign aid strategies that strove to make some states and local communities self-regulating in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the attainment of self-sustenance is here subject to the direct and forceful intervention of American troops and political operatives. Iraqi self-sustenance is all the more important as it is linked to the security of the American state as well as its military and its political credibility.

USAID’s effort in Iraq is substantial. In 2003, the portfolio for the transition to a ‘stable, democratic, and prosperous’ Iraq was estimated at 5.2 billion. The ambition of the agency’s assistance program is first to defeat the insurgency by changing the mindset of frustrated young Iraqis, employing local people in infrastructural projects and by developing a participatory civil society as well as educational campaigns about human rights. Second, USAID is committed to providing expertise in the drafting of a national constitution which would include the representation of women and of the main ethnic groups. At the request of local electoral commissions partly set up by USAID, the UN was also called in to supervise the 2005 elections (USAID, 2005: 10). The concerted effort of American bilateral assistance and international organizations then amounts to transforming, although one could also say ‘creating,’ an entire political structure by establishing working central and decentralized authorities. Thirdly, the American administration intends to create a functioning market
economy in Iraq. To do so, it seeks to privatize many state-owned enterprises, open up the Iraqi market to international investment and instate the appropriate business skills and regulations to generate a thriving private sector (USAID, 2005: 20). Most of the plans concerning the transition to a market economy insist on engaging Iraqis in the process. However, Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority from May 2003 to June 2004, set very favorable conditions for foreign firms and foreign workers. Executive order 39 on foreign investment stipulates that 100% of businesses in sectors except oil, mineral extraction, banks and insurance companies must be under foreign ownership. It also issues ownership licenses for up to 40 years and allows firms to repatriate all their profits (Juhasz, 2004: 3, 5). As a laboratory for the fabrication of a pacified political space, where market capitalism and democracy reinforce each other in the pursuit of constant betterment, Iraq is subject to the imposition of an extraneous ideal. Even as they take account of cultural sensitivities, the spirit of these reforms effectively requires Iraqis to embrace an alien subjectivity in order to function adequately within the new rules of life in their country.

Just as it would rather dismiss suggestions of lasting democratic and economic imbalances inside the US, the administration, USAID included, is notably averse to criticism of the reconstruction effort. As Journalist Bob Woodward (2006) attests, White House representatives like former secretary of state Donald Rumsfeld persistently denied the failure of plans for Iraq. In fact, despite the sustained optimism of the White House with regards to progress in Iraq, even at the height of violence in 2006, the reconstruction effort was punctuated by several irregularities. A congressional investigation into Halliburton’s Billing system found that the company had been consistently overcharging for its services (Chatterjee, 2004: 56-57). USAID’s main contractor, San Francisco based Bechtel, second only to Halliburton in total awards, was criticized for botching the repair of many schools (Chatterjee, 2004: 74-80). Another example is the coalition’s allocation of a 4.8 million contract to Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), a notoriously anti-union corporation, over capable Iraqi administrators to manage Umm Qasr seaport (Juhasz, 2004: 5). In a similar vein, European contractors who had dealt with the Iraqi government in the past were barred from obtaining contracts, thereby preventing local engineers from getting the necessary parts and expertise. The projected involvement of individual, local and international partners for the reconstruction of Iraq has therefore been hampered by the prioritization of American interests. As yet, the objective of making Iraq into a pacified, self-governing space, has relied less on encouraging the individual propensities towards self-government from a distance, than with imposing rigid archetypes of freedom,
entrepreneurship and political representation. As Mitchell Dean argues, in reference to the authoritarian elements of advanced liberalism which bear down on the poor both domestically and beyond national borders; ‘governing through freedom... does not necessarily means that individuals should be governed as if they were already capable of such autonomy’ (Dean, 2007: 119). In spite of the governmental developments conveyed by the multiplication of regulatory and decisional instances on Iraqi soil, the orchestration of the reconstruction effort remains under the control of a few major political, security and economic actors. As we have seen above, the US’ democratizing mission seems to have more to do with transposing extraneous states of mind and structures than with encouraging the ability of foreign subjects to respond to criteria of good governance and efficiency. Again, this enjoins us to further qualify the existence of a global kind of governmentality, which would suppose the obsolescence of economic and political power.

Conclusion

The visible resurgence of sovereign power through the normalization of exceptional security measures, as expressed in the suspension of law and in the enactment of pervasive surveillance systems, seemed to introduce a rupture in the modes of power that have currency in a ‘normalized’ society. Sovereign power is in many ways necessary to the operation of biopower as it provides the initial motivation behind the disposition of things and the means to protect and manage people. Through an initial assessment of security needs, the sovereign may governmentalize, that is to say render normal, a set of exceptional security measures. To do this in modern liberal democracies, the population’s own expectations of and desire for health and security must, to some extent, be met. This is where discursive injunctions as to the nature of the threat and the means required to defuse it were put to good use by a variety of authoritative voices. Once certain interpretations were chosen and legitimated, responses to 9/11 showed a preference for executive style politics, narrowly understood ideas of moral obligation, widespread suspicion and instrumental solutions over political problematizations. In some way, these choices were announced by the conservative and neoconservative turn in the recent governmental history of the United States. However, the hand of neoconservative ideas in particular can be seen much more clearly in the foreign policy choices that have followed the attacks.

In the aftermath of the attacks, a series of effective discursive injunctions strove to bind political discourse on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. The identity of the
attackers, their reason to do so and the retaliatory strategy needed to repair the offense were widely agreed upon. Concretely, the US' general response required circumventing freedoms at home at the same time as extending those same freedoms abroad in a bid to pre-empt the very temptation of terror. Since the means, locations or intentions of the terrorists were difficult to assess or predict, the risk of a permanent state of exception which is forsaking usual legal protections at home and motivating the expansion of American governmentality abroad, still haunts America's future.
Conclusion

The thesis’ main objective was to evaluate the critical potential of governmentality by looking at the practices, calculations, techniques and ideas within the political rationalities of the last 40 years in the United States. In the hope of unveiling the unseen requirements for adapted and successful forms of subjectivity in the American context, it was first necessary to interrogate and qualify governmentality’s theoretical premises. While a lot of those who have used Foucault in various social sciences have done so sparingly or for very precise purposes, I tried to look at the totality of his work in order to contextualize and strengthen his studies on government. While the right to kill, to neglect or to oppress remained effectual within the American polity, notions such as territorial integrity and centralized political authority remained vital in any understanding of International Relations. The retrieval of Foucault’s thoughts on sovereignty, but also on discipline and discourse, helped to further qualify some of the governmental strategies that applied to both the domestic and foreign policy realms.

We have seen that Foucault has had considerable influence on a variety of poststructural strands in International Relations. However, the extension of governmentality to International Relations in particular, although promising, cannot be applied with the same efficacy as it is to national contexts throughout the Western world. The degree to which cultural, institutional and discursive channels relay neoliberal rationalities of rule changes drastically from one state to the other. The development of global governmentality signifies that narrowly defined spaces of subjectification, which include the cultural and institutional transmission of particular dispositions like democratic consciousness, honesty and personal motivation, are emerging across a great variety of contexts. However, individuals in various geographical and cultural contexts do not perceive norms of neoliberal governance in the same way, which means that they may not integrate them evenly. In the thesis, I limited my enquiry to the development and projection of American conceptions of rule. Considering the political, economic and cultural influence of the US in the world, however, it can be said that the technical and intellectual models observed in international governance have been largely inspired by American ones. One of the thesis’ main findings was that the general critiques which guided reforms and governmental experiments in both realms appeared to be very similar, as was shown through the examination of secondary sources and policy papers in both areas. This discovery refutes the claim of traditional International Relations that domestic and foreign policy are governed by different conditions and exigencies.
Admittedly, the analysis of foreign assistance constitutes only one aspect of the larger field of foreign policy but it does give a good indication of the bureaucratic, geopolitical and governmental strategies conveyed through the foreign policy apparatus.

Whilst traditional historical scholarship seeks to include all the ‘key’ political, social, economic and cultural events in order to construct an intelligible narrative, a foucaultian take on history writing will usually mean looking at very precise policy domains. In the thesis, I traced the history of governmental shifts by looking at specific practices on welfare and foreign assistance. The application of foucaultian analytics to the AFDC and US-AID as much as the parallel I’m establishing between domestic and international governmentality constitute a novel contribution to the existing research on rationalities of government.

While a foucaultian approach cannot be confused with traditional historical scholarship, nor is it a kind of historiography or study of ideology. What Foucault brings to the fore is an identification of the conditions of both subjection and objectification that does not refer to the usual analytical anchors of individual rationality or structural determinism. With Foucault, I contend that a theorization of the main rationalities of government, which constitute the greater part of who we are, what we are doing and expected to do as individuals, depends on looking at their internal rules of formation, which are characterized by a variety of struggles, combinations and discontinuities.

The historical make up of American governmentality presented several particularities. The emphasis on individual liberty as the cornerstone of the republican ideal was willfully counterbalanced by the specification of moral responsibilities tied to the appurtenance to the political community. Various manifestations of these currents battled out throughout American history. Neoconservatism and communitarianism can be interpreted as contemporary instantiations of debates around the definition of freedom and responsibility in a staunchly liberal nation. As non liberal rationalities of government, they combined with existing governmental arrangements to create a series of requirements for appropriate kinds of cultural subjectivity.

Modernization, with its belief in progress, rational planning and political democracy, established itself as the principal mentality of rule in the 1960’s. Carried through by a great many experts on social policy, Kennedy and Johnson’s plans sought to purge American society of poverty and prejudice. This concerted governmental project implied the
objectification of poverty as a ‘condition of need, helplessness and hopelessness’ (Cruikshank, 1999: 73). The poor then needed to become empowered, that is, to integrate a range of personal qualities which would enable their incorporation into the labour market and the political sphere. However, even if self-help was the primary normative and governmental target of the age, the state assumed most of the responsibility for facilitating the process. The peculiar combination of welfare modalities, which in the American context meant a state-sponsored effort to create the conditions for ‘opportunity,’ and neoliberal ones, which referred to the individual’s capacity for rational choice, constituted the realm of intelligibility of the governmental reasoning in the 1960’s. Modernization was applied with even more enthusiasm to foreign policy. Poor countries were constructed and evaluated according to a fixed scale of development. The US administration believed that it was both a moral and strategic duty to bring underdeveloped countries up to standard. The US then concentrated its development efforts on countries tempted to collectivize their national economies and potentially move within the Soviet sphere of influence. By demonstrating the concrete benefits of American style welfare capitalism, the underdeveloped world subscribe with what US administrators saw as the foremost model of development. As we have seen, the exercise of American military power in Vietnam was supplemented by the transfer of a particular kind of governmentality in designated parts of the country.

The self-perpetuating logic of modernization, which according to its proponents would bring about material and political improvements to people across the globe, began to falter towards the end of the 1960’s. The expectations generated by Great Society ideals could no longer be met by the state. While the emphasis on individual responsibility was already in motion throughout governmental schemes of the 1960’s, revised notions of effective and fair governance proclaimed the individual as the main source of collective development. In a context of diminishing abundance, dispositions such as hard work, self-sufficiency and self-realization became increasingly valued. Welfare and foreign assistance reforms in the 1970’s then conveyed a shift from a preoccupation for universal entitlements to the manipulation of individual incentives. Domestically, more and more requirements were attached to welfare payments and disciplinary sanctions awaited recipients who did not comply. Just as with the domestic welfare system, the US’ main development agency, AID, was reformed according to criteria of efficiency and many of the responsibilities for development were devolved to recipient countries.
The strategy of nurturing individual energies in order to lessen dependency and increase economic output was given its full articulation by some of the influential exponents of neoliberal philosophy such as Murray, Friedman and Gilder. The 1980’s saw the validation of a market rationality across many domains of social life. However, some of the cultural manifestations that began in the 1960’s were said to impede upon the realization of a prosperous and orderly society. Having reacted to those forces from the very beginning, neoconservatives aimed to supplement the neoliberal reliance on the work of a cost and benefit rationale with a more assertive role for the state in transmitting and enforcing desirable moral qualities. In keeping with the above recommendations, the Reagan administration strove to provide a favourable context for the expression of individual energies, particularly in the marketplace, and to promote, at least rhetorically, a measure of self-restraint, patriotism and family unity. Throughout the governmental schemes of the 1980’s, the assumption was that welfare subjects and recipient countries were able to regulate their own conduct without any other assistance than the prospect of severe sanctions on the one side, and the widely diffused image of a successful, stable and virtuous existence on the other. Throughout Reagan’s tenure, the state then expressed its violence through ever stricter controls on welfare eligibility but also through the discursive intensification of the supposed threats posed by internal and external enemies. This disciplinary turn, which had at its core the institutional stimulation and enforcement of individual responsibility, was to become a lasting foundation for the governmental rationalities that followed. In the foreign policy realm, Reagan asserted the inherent goodness of American endeavours and contrasted them with the malevolence of Soviet deeds. The insistent constitution of enmity as a means to deploy power upon internal and external enemies was also periodically called upon in the following decades.

In the 1990’s, the expressions of an undiluted neoliberal rationality of government generated doubts as to the ability of a market based logic to involve and empower local, regional and national communities. Many commentators saw that the excessive emphasis on the liberation of the individual’s creative energies had in fact accelerated the disintegration of traditional community networks and family life. Although individual responsibility and market deregulation had become established pillars of government, other individual longings for selfless involvement in ethical initiatives began to enter governmental calculations. In the multilayered and complex governmental image of contemporary subjectivity, individuals were endowed not only with the capacity to choose among a variety of services provided by private agents who competed for their custom, but also associated
with a variety of cultural tastes and ethical identifications. As a result of the moralization of
the governmental sphere, development was progressively taken up by organizations with
specific political, economic and humanitarian aims. However, the introduction of this
ethical questioning was subject to a variety of competing claims. Among the more
consequential interpretations of the ethical were advanced by communitarian and
neoconservative commentators. While communitarians usually favoured popular
consultation to work through contemporary challenges in multicultural societies,
neoconservatives continued to promote fixed standards of moral behaviour. As we saw with
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the legal
validation of heterosexual marriage and abstinence went alongside the provision of
community-based assistance. Overall, governance in the 1990's carried through the general
demand for administrative efficiency and integrated the ethical identifications of individual
citizens. However, as opposed to formulating a radical critique of neoliberalism,
government through community actually furthered the establishment of effective
management as the most meaningful and consequential political criteria.

Although the greater license to punish and exclude in the 1980’s denoted the subtle
manoeuvres of sovereign power and confirmed the authoritarian features of advanced
liberalism (Dean; 2007), it is really after the attacks of 9/11 that sovereign power extended
itself more completely alongside the usual operations of governmentality. I argue that, to an
extent, the disciplinary turn initiated in the 1980’s as well as the incremental restrictions on
the meaning of the main terms of political discourse, prepared the ground for the discursive
and political responses to 9/11. The resurgence of sovereign power was actual through the
normalization of exceptional security measures. The estimations of threat issued by a series
of discursive authorities came to constitute the necessity to pre-empt insecurity through
increased surveillance at home and regime change abroad. In both realms, the logic of
securitizing strategies was presented as unequivocal. As a culmination of the movement
towards the closure of political potentialities and of the progressive stultification of relations
of power, I argue that post 9/11 politics confirm worrying trends in recent American
governmentality.

In chapters one and two, I attempted to specify the content and role of both governmental
and sovereign power. While governmentality appeared to present relatively straightforward
analytical claims and empirical applications, the investigation of sovereign power, as
conceived by Foucault, introduced some difficulties. So far, few theorists have attempted to
work through this problematic conjunction. Mitchell Dean’s *Governing Societies* (2007), to which I have referred throughout the thesis, offers one of the more serious attempts to problematize and integrate sovereign power to the governmentality framework from a sociological perspective. In his book, Dean highlights the authoritarian features through which an advanced liberal rationality of rule has maintained and perpetuated itself. Judith Butler’s *Precarious Life* (2003) explores the ways in which the recent war on terror has rejuvenated the state’s ability to ‘extend its own domain, its own necessity, and the means by which its self-justification’ (2003: 55). Butler’s account of the suspension of law after 9/11 and of the consequent extension of decisional powers to unelected government officials is close to my own understanding of sovereign power, which I associate with the permanence of decisionism and intentionality in an amongst the general governmental preoccupation with generating and maintaining freedom.

In International Relations scholarship, several commentators have also attempted to reinscribe sovereign power within the globalization of liberal governmentality. Jabri’s *War and the Transformation of Global Politics* points to late modern wars as multifaceted power containers which do not only suggest ‘a sovereign capacity to kill, but the power to discipline and to regulate social life’ (2007a: 61). In the context of contemporary wars, of which Iraq is a prime example, the modification of local structures and behaviours through extensive regulatory designs has become intimately linked with the physical violence wrought on designated populations. Importantly, the extension of liberal peace is now conducted in the name of humanity and relies on the discursive categorization of those who oppose the perpetuation of the cosmopolitan project as ‘monstrous’ or ‘inhuman’ (2007a: 65). As Jabri points out; ‘crucial to present day modes of colonization and their display of sovereign power is that such display combines with legitimizing discourses that constitute the recipient, or target, populations as subjects of humanitarian concern’ (2007a: 151). Expressions of sovereign power are then accompanied by discursive objectifications that lend legitimacy to the destruction or modification of populations constructed as threatening or unethical. Jabri’s emphasis on the necessity to integrate sovereign power to a governmental analysis and on the role of discourse in constituting objects of governmental intervention or in legitimizing humanitarian interventions, is close to my own interpretation of the intimate link between discourse, sovereign power and government.

In the *Politics of Insecurity* (2007), Jef Huysmans examines the question from the perspective of migration and asylum in the European Union. He does so by drawing the
differences and possible overlaps between a 'juridical-territorial rendering' of the European Union with its inbuilt definition of legal and illegal movement, and a 'biopolitical technique' which monitors the European population and identifies the elements that are potentially prejudicial to its overall health and prosperity (Huysmans, 2007: 103-104). In his analysis, Huysmans combines the linguistic and existential constitution of objects of insecurity with the technocratic rendering of security issues that concern the European Union as a territorial and 'cultural' entity. Aside from looking at the discursive and institutional productions of fear, Huysmans lends attention to the 'development of and application of technological devices, such as European visa and databases, professional knowledge and skills, and technocratic routines' (2007: 86) involved in the generation and management of both freedom and security. Both Huysmans and Jabri's work go some way into extending and reinforcing the governmentality framework in International Relations by integrating sovereign power, discursive categorizations and institutional practices to their analyses. Where my analysis differs slightly is in the inclusion of ideological constructions as important discursive resources that feed into the constitution of subjectivity as well as in the attribution of a role to agencies of authority in determining threats and measures to prevent them.

Although some headway has been made, more theoretical and empirical work is needed to explore the subtleties of juridical power. As hinted in chapter two, sovereignty is not solely a means to express commands, it may also be 'a form of joint undertaking in pursuit of a common substantive objective' (Loughlin, 2003: 16). The aspects of sovereignty associated with regulatory and normalizing mechanisms imply that some of the political and cultural experiments that have taken place outside of the conventional political channels have eventually been integrated into law. As I see it, further analysis of sovereign power's relationship to law, political theory and ideology would alleviate its frequent associations with purely prohibitive features.

In the thesis, I have suggested that the now famous foucaultian formula, that is the persistence of a power to kill and let live alongside a power to govern, discipline and regulate, should be reinforced by the identification and examination of the sources of authority that are applying their knowledge and expertise to determine the nature of a threat to the security of the biopolitical order and to take the measures that they deem necessary to pre-empt it. Having said that, the thesis does not claim to have fully elucidated the complex conjunction between the two either at the national or the international level. My objective
was to propose a workable theoretical interpretation of sovereign power within a governmental framework and connect it to empirical manifestations in contemporary American history. I have also suggested, moving away from Foucault and governmentality, that the ideological features of rationalities of government like neoliberalism and neoconservatism were important elements in the constitution of governmental strategies at any given time. The elaboration and choice of particular policies do not solely derive from the internal constitution of governmentality, they are partly a function of the ideologues and policy makers whom either criticize previous rationalities of government or facilitate the extension of particular governmental strategies. One of the main ambitions of the thesis was to balance the investigation of policy papers and secondary sources with a variety of theoretical claims about governmentality. Incidentally, this hesitation between archival work and a number of tentative theoretical claims constitute some of the limitations of the project. On the one hand, the thesis could have benefited from a more extensive consultation of primary sources and greater access to US government archives, particularly before the 1990’s. Perhaps it could also have examined a wider range of practices in areas such as security, health care or philanthropy in order to further highlight the circulation of governmental standards across policy realms. On the other hand, were it not for the temptation to anchor my analytical claims empirically, the thesis could well have turned out into a theoretical exploration of the possible combinations, pitfalls or possibilities involved in the conflation of sovereign power and government. Also, since I was more interested in outlining how the operation of specific practices, in the form of either ingenious suggestions or outright impositions, generated various conceptualizations of personhood in contemporary America, I did not address the question of the possibility of transgressing the rules and incitements that pointed to particular kinds of subjectivity. The full articulation of an ethics of resistance inspired by foucaultian premises would be the subject of another project. However, in a partial response to Foucault’s critics about the inescapability of power and in a bid to highlight the strengths of his philosophical position, I suggest a preliminary account of Foucault’s reflexions on freedom, resistance and ethics.

Clearly, Foucault was more concerned with how basic distinctions between normal and abnormal, guilt and innocence come about than how particular ills may be remedied through political intervention. However, towards the end of his life, in a series of texts and interviews grouped under the heading *Ethics and Subjectivity* (1984), Foucault specified his position on the conditions of political change;
‘since the 19th century, great political institutions and great political parties have confiscated the process of political creation; that is, they have tried to give political creation the form of apolitical program in order to take over power. I think what happened in the sixties and early seventies is something to be preserved. One of the things that I think should be preserved, however, is the fact that there has been political innovation, political creation, and political experimentation outside the great political parties, and outside the normal or ordinary program. It’s a fact that people everyday lives have changed from the early sixties to now. It has changed the attitude of people who do not belong to these movements’ (Foucault, 1997: 172-173).

On the one hand, Foucault argues for innovative political experiments developing out of the subject’s refusal of present institutional and cultural modes and on the other, he seems to favour the legal integration of the claims that derive from those refusals. Even though he hesitates to see the emancipation of marginal social elements throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s in juridical terms, he explicitly prefers those ‘partial transformations in certain cultural domains ... to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the 20th century’ (1997: 316). What preoccupies him is not so much the ongoing struggles expressed in the political arena than the a-historical visions of Man from which many of them develop. Cultural projects of humanistic inspiration, with definite ideas about appropriate modes of individual morality and political participation, foreclose aesthetic but also political experimentation. Recent history in the West from the 1960’s to our day illustrates that cultural experiments on the self outside of conventional institutional channels, have had considerable influence on a series and important legal and political changes. However, such aesthetic and political expressions are almost always, if sometimes only partially, recuperated in law. A permanent awareness of the actuality of these ongoing assimilations is required if there is any hope of fashioning new forms of subjectivity. Resistance, Foucault maintains, can and should only develop out of the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary that is, toward what is or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects’ (1997: 313). Any notion of resistance begins with the individual subject’s encounter with power in its specific and immediate forms. However, this encounter only becomes ethical when the subject reflects upon and analyses the limits of his or her own constitution within current assemblages of power.

Foucault sees ethics as a constant process of self-creation, a conscientious evaluation of the self and of its location and definition within conventional social interaction. The perpetual awareness and possible transgression of what constitutes us is also what informs the modern idea of critique. Following one of Kant’s lesser known essays What is Enlightenment?,
Foucault describes Enlightenment as a critical ethos. He argues that Enlightenment no longer has to do with ‘the search for formal structures with universal value’ but rather with ‘a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying’ (1997: 315). The conscious articulation of ourselves and the appreciation of the limits of our understanding is a typically modern, enlightened attitude. Referring to Baudelaire’s aestheticized figure of the dandy, Foucault depicts modernity as an attitude to the present and an acceptance of its contingency, which may be transfigured and transgressed in an imaginary and poetic extension of itself. The ethical subject of modernity fashions itself as a work of art, as an object in perpetual becoming which surfaces out of an agonistic encounter with the real. The possibility of resistance therefore emerges from the simultaneous assimilation and transgression of the current norms that define individuality. However, the question remains to determine if this ethos of aesthetic and political criticism can be transformed into some kind of normative appraisal of particular social, cultural and historical developments.

Although it would often appear that Foucault allocates more importance to aesthetic forms of refusal and experimentation, his last texts contain signs what I would call a minimalist normativity. While he insists that subjects must play the games of truth deployed within modern governmentality, nowhere does he deny the importance of being aware of the peculiar games of truth played out in the realms of law and politics. To be sure, Foucault does not provide a positive appreciation of the liberal state, but he nonetheless hints at the liberal art of government’s flexibility and at its uncanny ability to accommodate different political claims. Foucault therefore remains at the limit of the moral promise of the enlightenment, of which liberalism is an embodiment, by refusing to give in to a reformulation and pursuit of its universal ideals. By adopting an ethos of absolute caution, against the crystallization of power relations, he settles for less domination as a principle of minimal ethics in the political realm. As Simon puts it ‘a regime is judged unfavourably as dominative because it minimizes the possibilities for strategic reversal and thereby confines practices of liberty’ (Simons, 1995: 86). Essentially, Foucault insists on the contingency of the political, and seems to suggest that it is less dangerous to pursue changes in the disposition of political power according to the requirements of the present situation than to subsume it through the externally generated ethical rules.

To bring Foucault’s claim a little further, I would suggest that an ethos of perpetual awareness, even if it is bound by juridical objectifications, must also apply to a distinctly
political realm in order to avoid a complete withdrawal of critical theory unto aesthetics. Despite the hindrance of political creativity by big-party politics, it is equally important that local forms of resistance generate actual political grievances and that individuals be acquainted with the rules of parliamentarian democracy. Technologies of government are themselves found in between power relations, understood here as 'strategic games between liberties,' and states of domination, understood as a capacity to have others act according to our will (Foucault, 1997: 299). If the cultural and psychological requirements for success and happiness have to do with a strategic game between liberties, states of domination are more akin to an executive decision to suspend law. Both of these realms open up possibilities of resistance. Manifestations of state power may then create the conditions for resistance and public scrutiny (Jabri, 2007b). When manipulated and called upon by sovereign authority in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, security measures, which aim to preserve life and liberty through technical means, can become politicised, resisted and changed.
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