Fragmented Diplomacy: The Impact Of Russian Governing Institutions on Foreign Policy, 1991-1996

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union and Russia starting in the Soviet era and continuing through the end of Boris Yeltsin's first term as president. Whereas during the period of rule under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko the bureaucratic politics model could be applied with some success (albeit differently than in the United States), the institutional breakdown of the Gorbachev era saw a deterioration of the model's explanatory power which continued in independent Russia.

For the Gorbachev period and policy formulation in the Russian Federation, an alternative model provides a more illuminating explanation of the process. The transition model emphasizes the particular characteristics of democratizing states. By taking into account the excessive accumulation of power by the executive, the prevalence of winner-take-all solutions, the contested and relative nature of laws, the instability or absence of procedures, and the influence of the military on the political process, the transition model offers a better explanation than the bureaucratic politics model for the way in which policy was formulated in Russia in the period 1991-1996.

Given the hurdles Russia still faces in its democratic development, and the frequency with which institutions, individuals, and procedures change in the upper echelons of the political elite, it appears that the transition model will retain significant explanatory power for many years to come.
For Klaus

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS STUDY

AFP  Agence France Press
CC   Central Committee
CFE  Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CPD  Congress of People's Deputies
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EXOP Executive Office of the President
FAPSI Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (Federalnoe Agentsvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii)
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FIS  Foreign Intelligence Service
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
GRU  Main Intelligence Administration (Glavnoye Razvevayatelnoye Upravlenie)
ID   International Department
IID  International Information Department
INF  Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IR   International Relations
KGB  Committee of State Security (Komitet Gosudardstvenii Bezopastnosti)
KPSS Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza)
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGIMO Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Moskovskii Gosudarstvenii Institut Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC  National Security Council
NTV (Berlin) News Television (Germany)

NTV Independent Russian Television Network

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

RF Russian Federation

RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RSFSR Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic

SC Russian Federation Security Council

SS-23 The name of a Soviet/Russian missile

TASS Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye Agenstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza)

UN United Nations

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Croatia

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Chapter 1

The Framework of Theory

An observer of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s would be struck by two phenomena: the openness with which Russian policymakers debated foreign policy and the disarray in Russian diplomacy. In contrast to the expression of strict unity in Soviet foreign policy, Russian foreign policy seemed disorganized and fragmented.

How could Russia's foreign policy best be explained and understood? And what did Russia's foreign policy behavior between 1991 and 1996 (the period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Yeltsin's first term as president) presage for the long term?

This study, which focuses on the period 1991-1996, attempts to answer these questions by analyzing how Russian governing institutions participated in the foreign policymaking process and affected (or failed to affect) policy outcomes. Two lines of inquiry are pursued. First, can the bureaucratic politics model help explain Russian foreign policy? Second, to what extent do the patterns of foreign policy formulation established during the Soviet period affect post-Soviet Russia and how does an understanding of the process of transition from communism to democracy help to explain Russian foreign policy behavior?

Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) attempts to understand foreign policy output through the analysis
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory

of domestic input into foreign policy behavior. FPA focuses on the activity occurring below the level of the state or international system. It assumes that "in the social universe, events often have more than one cause, and causes can be found in more than one type of location." More specifically, it is the recognition that within-state processes can sometimes offer complementary, if not better, explanations for foreign policy behavior than explanations of processes at the international level. As Light and Hill put it: "While not the focal point of International Relations (IR), it is an indispensable level of analysis."  

As a field of inquiry within IR, foreign policy analysis can be traced back to the 1954 study by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin: Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics. What was new about their approach was their emphasis on the domestic aspects of foreign policy behavior. In a 1962 article refining their work, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin emphasized the importance of understanding the makers of foreign policy as "participants in a system of actions" taken in a specific context which must be considered to understand a country's foreign policy.

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Thus the emphasis was not on outcome alone but on the process that led to that particular outcome.

FPA became more prominent as a subfield of International Relations as a result of inquiry into the level of analysis problem -- the effort to differentiate between policies taken at the level of individual, state, and international system. The level of analysis problem became prominent in the 1960s, having been popularized through the work of Singer.\(^5\) It reflected the desire to apply scientific rigor, as utilized in the study of the natural sciences, to social science research.\(^6\) By looking at the components of the foreign policymaking process in a disaggregated form, it was believed that analysis of foreign policy outcomes could be made more precise and foreign policy behavior more understandable.

Foreign policy analysis seemed particularly useful in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, a time which saw much questioning of authority and searching for reasons to explain what many considered home-made fiascoes in US behavior, both at home and abroad. "What went wrong?" and "how could this have happened?" were questions underpinning the popular debate as well as inquiry into US foreign policy undertaken by scholars of International Relations.\(^7\) These questions yielded academic studies such as Robert Jervis's *Perception and

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\(^6\)Barry Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 190.

\(^7\)David Halberstam's, *The Best and the Brightest*. (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1969), a work discussing the U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking during the Vietnam War, was a bestseller.
Misperception in International Politics, which highlighted the role of perception in the behavior of states. One point made by Jervis is particularly pertinent to this study: There is an exaggerated tendency to assume that well-laid plans underpin policy. While Jervis had in mind the tendency of one state to devise its foreign policy toward another state on this assumption, observers of Russian foreign policy are also well-served by the warning: "Accidents, chance, and lack of coordination are rarely given their due by contemporary observers." As the discussion throughout the present study indicates, this is an important point to keep in mind when analyzing Russian foreign policy.

Irving Janis's Victims of Groupthink looked at the role of psychology in foreign policy formulation. Janis recalled in the preface to his book the question prompting him to undertake the study: "How could bright, shrewd men like John F. Kennedy and his advisers be taken in by the CIA's stupid, patchwork plan" to invade the Bay of Pigs in Cuba? He argued that many of the shortcomings of individual decisionmaking are actually exacerbated by group decisionmaking and that group decisionmaking can cause a tendency to take excessive risks. Conformity, which is only one feature of "groupthink," can cause policymakers to accept policy proposals of a group without subjecting them to adequate scrutiny and criticism.

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9Ibid., p. 321.
11Ibid., p. 3.
Availability of information about the process involved in the making of foreign policy, especially American foreign policy, prompted deeper inquiry into the decisionmaking behind foreign policy outcomes. In his explanation of factors inducing social scientists to analyze the internal aspects of foreign policy, Freedman suggested that one reason for the increase in insider information might have been the "existence of a large number of former bureaucratic practitioners in university departments of government after the departure of the Johnson administration" in the United States.\(^{12}\) Indeed, officials' revelations about policymaking in the form of memoir material and interviews can offer valuable information for foreign policy analysis as long as these are viewed with attention to possible bias.

By itemizing the components of foreign policy, it was hoped that foreign policy analysis could become more systematic. Building blocks of knowledge and analysis, if standardized in some way, could facilitate cross-country comparisons.\(^{13}\) Furthermore, cross-country comparisons could be undertaken more easily if the building-blocks of analysis were uniform and could be applied across a range of countries.\(^{14}\) Thus, the goal of


\(^{14}\)This was a proposal for future research set out by Raymond Tanter, who suggested using international system-level analysis as well as foreign policy analysis across a spectrum of similar international events. "International System and Foreign Policy Approaches: Implications for Conflict Modelling and Management," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, Supplement (Spring 1972), pp. 38-39.
FPA was two-fold: to achieve better explanations of foreign policy outcomes and to arrive at better comparisons of foreign policy mechanisms from one country to another.

For both of these purposes, it is useful to identify stages in the policymaking process, of which decisionmaking is only a part. Potter broke the process down into four stages in an attempt to create stages which can be compared across time and across countries.\textsuperscript{15} The first is the policy initiation phase, or the point at which problems are defined and agendas are set. The second stage is the policy controversy stage, or the time when the process of bargaining and consensus building among policymakers occurs. The third stage is the formal decision stage, or the point when an authoritative individual or body makes a commitment to a course of policy action (which can include doing nothing). The fourth and final stage is the implementation stage, or the point at which a policy is actually carried out, or not carried out.

At first glance, these stages might appear to provide a comprehensive framework for application to foreign policy formulation. Yet a strict delineation may underestimate the extent to which the stages in the process overlap. Such a four-stage division may also assume too much specificity in what is actually a much looser process.

A different framework has been suggested by Zelikow and will be employed to illuminate the

empirical material in the present study. Zelikow has pointed out:

During the year of American diplomacy associated with German unification, for example, President Bush never received an options paper. But this did not mean that options were not considered.\(^{16}\)

Zelikow proposes a set of three streams -- problem recognition, politics ("the way choices are made"), and policy engineering -- which "interact constantly" with each other. Policy engineering includes components such as national interest, objectives, strategy, design, implementation, maintenance, and review.\(^{17}\) In the case of Russia, Zelikow's stages can better accommodate the chaotic nature of Russia's foreign policy process. Furthermore, the employment of more fluid categories offers the advantage of more comfortably comparing foreign policy behavior across countries with very different patterns of policymaking.

As the discussion of stages illustrates, a critical element in employing FPA to compare countries is defining the components of the political process. It was a disagreement about how to define the Soviet political process that made comparisons of Soviet and Western foreign policy behavior so difficult during much of the Soviet period.

In his 1965 study, Alfred Meyer called the Soviet Union a "bureaucracy writ large," a description designed to emphasize the preponderant role of


\(^{17}\)Ibid., pp. 156-159.
bureaucracy in the Soviet system. This view was widely shared by analysts of the Soviet Union, especially those who saw great continuity between governing habits of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Other analysts focused on the presence of conflict within the Soviet system of government, referring to the system of policymaking as one consisting first and foremost of the "struggle for power" and linking policymaking organically with the succession struggle.

Yet despite the recognition of the large role of the Soviet bureaucracy, analysts were at first reluctant to do the kind of studies which would break down the Soviet system of government into its constituent parts to lay the groundwork for the application of the bureaucratic politics model. The initial scarcity of such studies contrasted with the large body of literature using an historical-descriptive approach to analyze Soviet foreign policy.

It was only in the 1970s that the pluralist approach gained some sway in Soviet studies. At the heart of the discussion was disagreement about the nature of the Soviet system. The totalitarian model, which viewed the Soviet Union as a state whose central feature was the absence of autonomous institutions, was

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exemplified in the writings of Wolfe and Leites. This model dominated Sovietology until the Khrushchev era, and it remained persuasive to many analysts, albeit fewer, following Khrushchev's de-Stalinization.

The first major alternative to the totalitarian model was pluralism in the form of interest group theory. In their 1971 edited volume *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Skilling and Griffiths emphasized institutional interests. While the study was not about foreign policy specifically, it aided in the study of Soviet policymaking in all areas, foreign policy included, by identifying institutional interests. Their work on interest groups provided, as Light argues, the "impetus for an extension within the bureaucratic politics model." Griffiths' "tendency analysis" approach argued that various interest tendencies could be identified within Soviet official organs and bureaucracies and that such tendencies produced patterns in policymaking. Specifically, Griffiths offered this as an analytical framework which could be employed to examine the activities of party apparatchiki, economists, jurists, military officers, writers, and other

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politically relevant individuals who occupy an intermediate position, broadly speaking, between the Soviet leadership and the mass of the led.25

By the nature of the object of his study, the emphasis shifted from the struggle for power and succession issues, in the immediate sense, toward the more differentiated target of policymakers below the top Soviet leadership. The interest group approach was further refined as more information became available about the way the Soviet system functioned. This information was presented in systematic descriptions of the system, with a view to the interests of various institutions, in works such as Hough and Fainsod's How the Soviet Union is Governed.26

Yet there was no consensus on whether the interest group approach could be applied to the USSR. The disagreement centered around whether and how observers could differentiate between the interests of the government, the Party, the military, the legislature and the various ministries. Petrov asked rhetorically whether the Soviet leadership's increased interest in the work of academics might merely signal an attempt to line up scapegoats for failed foreign policy initiatives.27 Odom argued in 1976 against the interest group approach on the grounds that Soviet government institutions could not be viewed as interest groups. As applied to the United States, interest group theory had focused on groups which were unified by a common interest but not necessarily by a common organization.

or bureaucracy. Odom held that such groups were difficult to identify in the Soviet Union and that the essential weakness of applying the model to the Soviet case was the absence of multiple power centers in the Soviet Union capable of receiving the pressure of interest groups.²⁸ In his view, this neglected the "critical importance of dictatorship and the center's policy initiative."²⁹

The debate about interest group theory in many ways prefigured and paralleled the discussion of the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model to the Soviet Union (discussed below). In both interest group theory and the bureaucratic politics model, at issue was whether models applied to democracies could successfully explain an undemocratic system like that of the Soviet Union. The politics of anti-communism in the United States brought nearly automatic criticism to works differentiating between interests in the USSR and therefore implicitly downgrading the control of the Communist Party. Kolkowicz recalled in a 1985 reprint of his 1967 study of conflict and tension between the Soviet military and Communist Party how his study antagonized those who viewed the Soviet Union as a "fully integrated, unified and dangerous system whose leaders and institutions are singleminded in their design to threaten and ultimately to dominate the West and the world."³⁰

²⁹Ibid., p. 566.
The information gap created by the closed nature of Soviet society meant that analysis of Soviet politics and foreign policy had to be based on different types of data than those used in analysis of democratic foreign policy. This further removed Soviet studies from mainstream political science. But there were disagreements as to the extent to which Soviet studies was a unique endeavor. Rosenau offered a glimpse into the sharp differences of opinion among political scientists and Sovietologists:

[I]n trying to fathom modern-day Russia, analysts need to come to terms at the outset with an overriding question: namely, how willing are they to treat the Soviet Union as a case among many and to what extent are they inclined, on the other hand, to treat it as a unique polity, with a unique history, culture, and circumstances? Virtually all of the literature on the USSR is crucially shaped by the answer to this question. And since it involves the proper route to understanding, it is a question that divides analysts in harsh ways, leading often to fruitless disputes that intensify the divisiveness without clarifying the question.31

Rosenau's preferred solution was an amalgam of the comparative and single-country approaches with the aim of gleaning the best of each. But the debate was not so easily settled.32

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32It has even outlived the USSR: New assessments are being made about the Soviet period based on the arrival of new data about the period.
After the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary in 1985, much more information became available about how Soviet foreign policy was made and about the Soviet political system in general. The influx of information occasioned studies focusing in whole or part on the domestic context of Soviet foreign policy. Hudson's edited volume contained a great deal of new information about how national security policy was made under Gorbachev.33 Perhaps the most valuable studies resulting from Gorbachev's new era of openness came in the form of memoirs by key players, some of which are used in the present study.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

In the classic work on bureaucratic politics, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison sought to explain the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis through the use of three different models. The purpose of using different models or lenses for viewing the Cuban missile crisis was to sharpen the analysis and highlight the contours of policymaking, goals which reflected the larger goals of FPA. Allison's three-lens approach made clear that the analytic tools used can profoundly affect the resulting analytic conclusions.

The first prism was the rational actor model, in which each state's actions are viewed as responses to those of another monolithic state.34 Since this can be said to represent the traditional realist model, the weaknesses of which Allison sought to demonstrate, the

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The two remaining models or paradigms, as Allison often called them, were the organizational politics paradigm and the governmental politics paradigm. The characteristics of these paradigms (which were ultimately melded into one paradigm) are of primary interest to the present study because these were the new approaches which Allison sought to advocate as an alternative to the traditional rational actor model in *Essence of Decision* and subsequent works. The following is a summary of the core characteristics of the bureaucratic politics model:

-- Disagreement in the policymaking process is a given: "If a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government." 

-- "The actor is not a monolithic 'nation' or 'government' but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit."

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35Allison made no attempt to show the strength of the rational actor model, since it had earned a prior place in International Relations theory. Critics pointed to this as a sign that his test of the bureaucratic politics models was unfair. See Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), p. 302.


38Ibid., p. 80.
-- Problems are "cut up and parceled out to various organizations." 39

-- Decisions are understood as a mixture of conflicting preferences or a resultant of competing views among policymakers. 40

-- The behavior of government can be understood as a series of organizational "outputs" possessing a "preprogrammed" character. 41

In addition to these core features of decisionmaking, Allison identified specific types of actions and behavior characterizing bureaucratic politics:

-- Standard operating procedures "permit concerted action by large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic cues." Without these procedures, "it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks," but because of them "certain behavior in particular instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and often inappropriate." These procedures are "grounded in the incentive structure of the organization or even in the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes and operating style of its members." 42

-- The term "action channels," or "regularized means of taking government action on a specific kind of issue," 43 focused on the preselection of major players and standardized ways of "playing the game" on any given foreign policy issue.

39 Ibid., p. 80.
40 Ibid., p. 145.
41 Ibid., p. 81.
42 Ibid., p. 83.
43 Ibid., p. 169.
A "dominant inference pattern" was detected: "If a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing...an action only marginally different...."\(^4^4\)

The bureaucratic politics model did not focus on the interplay between the executive and legislative branches. Instead, it concentrated on policy conflict within the executive branch.

Allison and Halperin were ambiguous as to the applicability of the model to authoritarian systems. They noted that systems of government are affected by factors such as whether central players do or do not have a reasonable aspiration to become chief executive, whether the government is open to expressions of interest and pressures from outside, and whether it was freely elected.\(^4^5\) But, at the same time, they seemed to expect the model to apply to authoritarian systems such as that of the Soviet Union, expressing the hope that

> the framework is sufficiently general to apply to the behavior of most modern governments in industrialized nations, though it will be obvious that our primary base is the U.S. government...\(^4^6\)

Allison demonstrated his assumption of the model's broader applicability with references throughout *Essence of Decision* to "governments" and "organizations," not "the American government" or "American organizations." Ultimately, as is discussed

\(^4^4\)Ibid., p. 87.
\(^4^5\)Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," op. cit., p. 49.
\(^4^6\)Ibid., p. 43.
in more detail below, these were some of the more troublesome points for applying the model to the USSR and post-Soviet Russia.

One of the most controversial hypotheses of the bureaucratic politics model was the notion that a policymaker's behavior is determined by his or her institutional affiliation, a concept captured in the aphorism, "where you stand depends on where you sit." Each participant in government plays a distinct role and has specific responsibilities which are dependent on his or her institutional affiliation. Policy preferences are thus determined by institutional role and responsibilities.

Critics of this aspect of the bureaucratic politics argument pointed to the importance of beliefs, which may not necessarily depend on a policymaker's institutional affiliation. This was the argument made in a study of US Navy force posture planning. Rhodes found the bureaucratic politics model lacking on the grounds that "where decisionmakers stand depends not on where they sit or whom they represent, but on what they think -- and what they think is independent of where they sit." While Allison emphasized institutions and responsibilities as determining factors in the process of "responsible men" fighting "for what they are convinced is right," Rhodes' emphasis was on the notion that "doing right" was independent of one's institutional affiliation.

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This conclusion was also implicit in a refinement of the bureaucratic politics model offered by Hollis and Smith. In a 1990 study, they argued that it is not enough to discuss the actions of policymakers in terms of their institutional affiliation. Rather, there is a relationship between "roles and reasons" which indicates that role can be only a starting point for analysis of the dynamic process of policy choice. In addition to role, the bureaucratic politics model assumes "normative expectations constituting the role of each incumbent of a position," "obedience" among the policymakers, and "an area of indeterminacy, governed only by a broad duty to act so as to be able to justify oneself afterwards and to keep both one's job and one's credibility." This area of indeterminacy could well prompt a policymaker to eschew his institutional responsibilities in favor of a higher good justified on the basis of protecting the national interest.

This raises a related question: how does a policymaker determine whether or not he is doing the right thing? This question underpinned Freedman's criticism of the presentation of the bureaucratic politics model as somehow being opposite or contrary to the rational actor. Freedman argued that it would be more correct to view the two models as two points on a continuum:

[T]he random clashes of fragmented, selfishly motivated actors are, in fact, reasonably patterned and linked to conceptions of the national interest. The structure and patterns can only be discerned by standing back

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52 Ibid.
from the immediate battles with a long-term rather than a short-term perspective."\(^{53}\)

Freedman thus implicitly viewed the individual policymaker as a representative of the state's national interest, not as a narrow-minded bureaucrat seeking merely to further the goals of his immediate organization. In Freedman's view, the bureaucratic politics model as described by Allison had included a "mis-specification of the core political relationships" which focused attention on immediate bureaucratic battles rather than on the structure of -- and struggle for -- power at the center of the state apparatus.\(^{54}\)

Thus, the framework for interaction stands out as consisting not only of the various institutions (and their personnel) which participate in policymaking, but also of the culture in which these institutions and individuals interact.

An important part of that culture or atmosphere, in the view of both Freedman and Allison, is what they call the "rules of the game." Allison describes them as such:

The rules of the game stem from the Constitution, statutes, court interpretations, executive orders, conventions, and even culture. Some rules are explicit, others implicit. Some rules are quite clear, others fuzzy. Some are very stable; others are ever changing. But the collection of rules, in effect, defines the game... Rules constrict the range of governmental decisions and actions that are acceptable.\(^{55}\)


\(^{54}\)Ibid., p. 437, 444.

In Allison's view, the rules of the game are both flexible over time and vary from state to state. Freedman viewed the rules of the game as background elements which participants "take for granted" in their day-to-day conduct of policymaking.\(^{56}\) Allison, on the other hand, was less explicit. His description seemed aimed at covering all possibilities rather than finding the essence of the elements described. As the discussion of Russia in subsequent chapters argues, the way in which the rules of the game function (or fail to function) can be of critical importance in foreign formulation.

Some of the earliest explicit applications of the bureaucratic politics model to the Soviet Union were undertaken with reference to specific crisis situations. For example, Valenta's studies of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia tested Soviet decisionmaking against Allison's bureaucratic politics model and held that Soviet policymaking indeed reflected the same sort of tug-of-war among Soviet officials as described by Allison.\(^{57}\) Valenta argued that the shift in the Soviet response to the crisis from moderation to the decision to invade represented the ability of pro-interventionists to prevail in the debate among Soviet officials. He noted that other factors, in addition to the pulling and hauling of bureaucrats, were also at play and had an effect on the decision, but that bureaucratic politics was

\(^{56}\)Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes," op. cit., p. 449.

responsible for the shift of the Soviet strategy from soft to hard.

Karen Dawisha, notably, did not employ the bureaucratic politics model in her study, *The Kremlin and Prague Spring*, opting to focus on how decisions are made in a crisis instead. In a subsequent study, Karen Dawisha argued against the applicability of Allison's bureaucratic politics model to the Soviet Union. She did not agree with Allison's contention that it is possible to speculate about Soviet behavior by keeping in mind the behavior of the Soviet Union's American counterparts, arguing that extrapolating from American experience means overlooking factors unique to the USSR which have important bearing on the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model. She pointed out distinctions between the US system and the Soviet system, such as the unique role of the CPSU, the function of ideology, the amorphous nature of political groups, and the peculiarity of Soviet action channels. Dawisha concluded that "the distinctive features can only be accommodated within the periphery of the model, and that the central premises of the model are equally peripheral to an understanding of Soviet decisionmaking."

Perhaps the greatest problem area pointed out by Karen Dawisha was in the realm of democracy. Allison and Halperin had, in fact, placed an important restriction on their model when they said that only in

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60Ibid., p. 303.
61Ibid., p. 318.
those systems which are relatively open "as the result of elections" will players be subject to pressure from a wider circle of individuals, which forces them to adopt "a larger conception of their own interest."\textsuperscript{62} Since free elections were not a feature of the Soviet system, it would appear that Allison and Halperin themselves believed their model could not be well applied in the USSR. But this was not the case, as the foregoing discussion reveals. Moreover, in his comment appended to Dawisha's article, Allison pointed out that his model was designed to provide "an overall theme" for an approach which could be applied to all countries. Elaborating on this thought, Allison wrote:

I am still convinced that...when people who share power disagree, the mechanism of resolution will be a process of political bargaining among principles [which] holds true across various political systems.\textsuperscript{63}

Thus Allison rejected the notion that his model contained elements or assumptions rendering it inapplicable to Soviet foreign policy.

Emphasis on consensus rather than conflict among Soviet policymakers provided an interesting alternative to the bureaucratic politics model. The work of Ross on crisis decisionmaking stressed factors in the Soviet polity which were contrary to those raised by Allison:

More than anything else, it is the emergence of those uncodified norms as a means to control conflict that reflects (and indeed probably requires) the operation of what might be called coalition maintenance in the Soviet setting... For example, the factor

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., p. 301.
considered most crucial to the survival or maintenance of coalitions is the actors' fear of the alternative -- that is, the fear that the breakup of the coalition may trigger potentially devastating results...\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, rather than conflict, Ross found consensus and a desire to avoid failure (and eschew risks whenever possible) the most salient elements of Soviet foreign policy formulation. The picture of the Soviet system presented by Ross was one in which entirely different rules of the game were in operation than those described by Allison.

The Transition Model

The second line of inquiry follows the first in that it attempts to make up for any deficits in the first by using a different approach. If the first question is "is the bureaucratic politics model useful in understanding Russian foreign policy," the second question is "what else must the observer understand about Russia?" The answer surrounds Russia's transition to democracy.

The growing body of literature about post-communist transitions provides a useful starting point for this line of inquiry. This literature does not generally focus on foreign policy (with the notable exception of the relationship between democratization and belligerence).\textsuperscript{65} However, patterns in the behavior


\textsuperscript{65}For example, Easter has examined connections between institutional choice and old regime elites. Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 49 No. 2 (January 1997), p. 187. Mettenheim has analyzed the impact of presidential systems
of states in transition from authoritarianism to rule-of-law, democratic systems as discussed in this literature can be useful as components of the analysis of foreign policy formulation.

The discussion of states in transition in the present study focuses on post-communist transitions. While these have been compared to democratic transitions in South America and southern Europe, consensus is emerging that post-communist transitions are significantly different than other transitions. Bunce summarizes the arguments:

[T]he international context of these transitions is very different from the context of the recent transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America. For Eastern Europe, so much more is in flux: national identities, state boundaries, political-military alliances, and the relationship to the international economy. Political leaders in these new regimes thus face enormous international responsibilities.66

The length of the period of authoritarianism is another consideration. In the case of Russia, for example, there were no participants in the political transitions to democracy. Kurt von Mettenheim, "Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics," in Kurt von Mettenheim, ed. Presidential institutions and Democratic Politics, (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 2-15. The effect of economic reform on the transition process, and vice versa, is also a focus of transition literature. See, for example, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 66

process who had lived under a liberal democratic system of government. Similarly, the way in which authoritarianism was imposed in the first place can have an impact on the way that its legacy is overcome. Finally, Russia stands out as a special case of transition because of its weight in global affairs and its position as the former center of the Soviet empire, characteristics which cannot be found in any other state which has made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

An exception to the view that post-communist transitions belong in a separate category is presented in the arguments of Bova. He sees as much variation on either side of the non-communist/post-communist transition divide. This therefore makes the notion of post-communist exceptionalism beside the point, in Bova's view.

As already noted, the relationship between democratization and belligerence is one of the most studied foreign policy questions under the rubric of states in transition. The concentration on this question can be explained by the eruptions of hostilities within the emerging new democracies. It can also be attributed to the important and unresolved debate about the absence of war among democracies.

The recent revival of the debate about liberal peace, as well as the increasing analysis of a connection between democratization and belligerence,

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has occurred because of the established democracies' advocacy of democratic systems to replace the collapsed communist regimes in the former Soviet bloc. The notion of democratic peace, or the proposition that democratic states do not fight wars against other democratic states, was first presented by Small and Singer in 1976,\(^6\) being based on Kant's theory of perpetual peace.\(^7\) The revival of the debate over democratic peace currently follows two strains of discussion: One focuses on the debate about liberal peace; the other on the correlation between democracy-building and war.

Critics of the proposition of liberal peace have argued that the absence of war between democracies cannot so much be attributed to democratic institutions or culture, but to interests\(^7\) if not mere coincidence.\(^7^2\) But defenders of the liberal peace argument argue that there are elements about democracy, such as liberal ideology and democratic institutions, which account for democratic peace.\(^7^3\) This is why peace among democratic states has been cited by American policymakers such as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,\(^7^4\) to support their advocacy of the enlargement

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\(^7^1\)Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," op. cit., pp. 5-49.


\(^7^4\)Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the International Interest." Speech on the Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and
of the world's democratic community, especially in the former communist bloc.

The nexus of democratization and war brings with it a different set of statistics for the international relations scholar. Statistically, as has been argued by Mansfield and Snyder, the process of democratization is associated with a volatile mix of nationalism and authoritarian politics which can make countries more aggressive and prone to start wars.\textsuperscript{75}

In response to the discussion of democratization and war, Malcolm and Pravda examined the case of Russia, especially the way in which the "political landscape of Russia in transformation" affects foreign policy formulation. They focus on the following questions:

How vulnerable has the executive been to policy pressures from the democratizing political environment? What impact has the electoral success of opposition parties using nationalist slogans had on the government's statements about, and its actions in relation to, the 'near abroad' and 'far abroad'? In what ways has 'fragmentation' in the executive affected Russian foreign policy? More broadly, how dangerous does the current constellation of weak government and conflicting elite groups appear in the light of earlier cases of belligerence in a context of democratization and regime change?\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75}Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May-June) 1995, pp. 79-97.

The conclusion reached by Malcolm and Pravda is that the effect of democratization on Russia is limited and mixed.\textsuperscript{77} While the bleak scenario of war has not yet come to pass, a close partnership based on common democratic values has not emerged in Russia's relations with developed democracies.

The discussion of democratization and Russian foreign policy is also of interest to those concerned about democratization and Russia's nuclear capability (and whatever remains of its conventional military capability). Kissinger pointed to the nexus of the problem of Russian foreign policy formulation and war-proneness when he said:

To base all our policies on the assumption of Russian democracy is either to be dealing with illusions or with a timeframe that is beyond most current issues. The problem of Russian foreign policy is to see whether it is possible to convince Russian leaders that their historic pattern of identifying security with expansion in all directions has only brought disaster to the Russian people.\textsuperscript{78}

Kissinger's comments suggest that influencing the Russian policymaking community is a top priority among American and other Western policymakers. By putting in the conditional the matter of influencing these leaders ("if it is possible"), Kissinger made clear that one of the key problems in coping with this volatile mix is understanding how the Russian foreign policymaking mechanism works. In other words, it is

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 552.

not enough to view Russia as "an unruly adolescent" at a stage of "bewilderering transformation from one status to another" and exhibiting "patterns of behavior that are annoying, even threatening...but not necessarily permanent." Rather, policymakers constructing approaches to deal with Russia must have a good grasp of the internal dynamic, as well as notions of the best way to work with it.

The foregoing discussion indicates an imbalance in the study of the foreign policy of democratizing states. The question of the relationship between democratization and war has been examined, but the rest of the spectrum of foreign policy activity as a function of the political transition has been neglected -- to the detriment of developing a stronger understanding of the elements of Russian foreign policy formulation.

The apparent fragmentation of Russian foreign policy is the focus of this study, and the underlying question is whether this fragmentation can simply be explained by the bureaucratic politics model or whether it becomes understandable only after factoring in Russia's transition to democracy.

Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies offers an important discussion about the development of institutional procedures and organizational devices during transitions. Huntington has argued:

Historically, political institutions have emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces, and the gradual development of procedures and

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organizational devices for resolving those disagreements.\textsuperscript{80}

Huntington, thus, places emphasis on the incremental nature of the process.

In the case of Russia, the creation of new institutions and procedures was rapid, starting in the Gorbachev era and continuing into the period of Russia's second republic. The rapidity of development meant that Russia's new institutions and procedures faced the dual challenge of creating new identities and accumulating authority within the same short span of time. As is demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, this challenge was not always met.

Several characteristics of the transition from communism to democracy are relevant to the study of foreign policy:

-- An excessive use of foreign policy for domestic political purposes is one characteristic. As Skak has pointed out, foreign policy will always be occasionally used for domestic purposes, even in established democracies. The danger arises "when external considerations are brushed aside in the reckless pursuit of popularity at home."\textsuperscript{81} To this might be added -- when external considerations are brushed aside in the pursuit of maintaining a grip on power at home. Nationalism is thus an omnipresent danger.

\textsuperscript{80}Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{81}Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Postcommunist Foreign Policy and International Relations. (London: Hurst & Company, 1996), p. 55.
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-- An excessive accrual of power to the executive, especially in presidential systems is another characteristic. This can be caused by factors as diverse as the fear of a military coup, the pressure on the executive to produce socio-economic improvement, successful political jockeying on the part of the chief executive or a deficit of experience in the rule-of-law.

-- The stakes in achieving one's policy goals tend to be very high. As O'Donnell and Schmitter have argued, players are aware "that their momentary confrontation, expedient solutions, and contingent compromises are in effect defining rules which may have a lasting but largely unpredictable effect on how and by whom the 'normal' political game will be played in the future."82

-- There tends to be little willingness to compromise when conflicts arise within governing institutions. Winner-take-all solutions replace the bureaucratic politics phenomenon of amalgamating solutions.

-- The "division of functions and authority between the executive and the legislature might remain highly contested."83

-- Laws are relative and contested.84

84Ibid., p. 227.
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-- Legalism substitutes for the rule of law. As Ahdieh has argued, the Soviet tradition of the supremacy of laws created an intricate network of laws, and this pattern of hypercodification continued through the Gorbachev era. What was lacking was a concept of the supremacy of the law and a respect for law by civil society.\(^{85}\) Mommsen has commented that Russia's most urgent need at this stage of its democratization is a set of legal ethics.\(^{86}\)

-- Procedures are ad hoc and not established. Some survive from the previous regime, even though new institutions are present.

-- Praetorianism can become an important feature of the political process. Huntington has highlighted the problem of curbing the political power of the armed forces and making their focus the protection of the external security of the country. Speaking not so much about the danger of coups but of rampant political participation among the armed forces, Huntington offered "Guidelines for Democratizers" to curb the political power of the armed forces, including clarifying the chain of command and removing ambiguities and re-orienting the military for military missions.\(^{87}\)


Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory

Perhaps the most useful portrayal of the characteristics of a state in transition is offered in the metaphor presented by O'Donnell and Schmitter -- that of a multi-layered chess game which is played by an unknown number of players. It is a tumultuous game in which certain people will continually challenge the rules, cheat, threaten, and perhaps even tip over the board. 88

The characteristics of the transition model are all, to some extent, present in Russia. Furthermore, all have influenced the formulation of foreign policy. As the discussion in the following chapters shows, consideration of these characteristics of states in transition is essential for understanding Russian foreign policy. To understand contemporary Russian foreign policy, the present study's "transition model" represents, to paraphrase Light and Hill, an indispensable level of analysis. This study concludes that a combination of the two lines of inquiry -- the bureaucratic politics model and the transition model -- offers the best approach for understanding Russian foreign policy.

Russia's transition to democracy is a continuing process and one whose difficulty cannot be overestimated. It is difficult to predict when this process of transition will end and when Russia will become a stable, democratic state. O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest that the end point is reached when

[T]he transition is over when
"abnormality" is no longer the central feature of political life, when actors

have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules defining the channels they may use to gain access to governing roles, the means they can legitimately employ in their conflicts with each other, the procedures they should apply in taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to exclude others from the game. Normality, in other words, becomes a major characteristic of political life when those active in politics come to expect each other to play according to the rules -- and the ensemble of these rules is what we mean by a regime.89

This ensemble also implies an established, functioning democracy. While it is not possible to suggest a time frame for Russia's completion of its transition, it does seem likely that the process of democratization -- especially the creation of a rule-of-law system -- will continue for some time to come.90 Therefore, analysts of Russian foreign policy formulation are served well by a framework which takes this process into account.

Structure and Methodology

Information about policymaking and the way the Russian government functions is readily available in the Russian media. To be sure, the Russian media frequently carries "suspicious information" -- sensational reports in which exaggeration and conspiracy theories masquerade as news. At the same time, though, the media represents a bountiful source of "reliable information" such as the texts of Russian laws, major policy statements, statutes of government agencies, presidential decrees, and extensive question-

89Ibid., p. 65.
and-answer format interviews with key Russian policymakers.\textsuperscript{91} These types of reliable information are used as a significant sources of information in this study. When news reports are utilized, care has been taken both to discuss the authenticity of particularly sensational news reports or simply to avoid them altogether.

In spite of the care which must be taken in relying on the Russian media, it undoubtedly offers more information about policymaking than was available during Soviet times. In many ways the heavy press coverage makes the functioning of Russia's government more transparent than that of its Western counterparts. Public discussion of intra-governmental policy conflicts among policymakers is also more prevalent than during Soviet times and more frequent than in Western countries. The public discussion in Russia offers a glimpse into the kinds of arguments being made by officials and perhaps even the kinds of debates which go on behind closed doors (if the statements published in the press are an indication of the policy disputes which happen outside of the public domain).

On this point, it should be noted that there is a tendency to pay more attention in the Russian media to dissonance rather than to harmony among Russian officials. As in the established democracies, insider accounts of policy disputes make interesting reading. The relative over-reporting of friction is reflected in this study owing to the nature of the data available about policymaking in Russia. In an attempt to make up

\textsuperscript{91}In this study, question-and-answer format interviews with key policymakers are highlighted in footnotes with the words "interview with." My interviews with are denoted "author's interview with."
for the tendency to over-report conflict, one of the case study subjects was selected with a view to its reflection of broad agreement about policy goals among Russian policymakers.

Despite the relatively abundant data about Russian foreign policymaking, there are still informational gaps, especially in the realm of input into policymaking by the military and security agencies. While this shortage of information makes Russia comparable to its established-democratic counterparts in many respects, the information that is available about the activities of these Russian agencies suggests that they are far more involved in devising foreign policy than Western military and intelligence organizations. As a result, the informational gaps regarding the input of Russia's military and security agencies would appear to be more problematic.

The sources of information used for this study are a selective reading of the Russian media (with special emphasis on official government information and question-and-answer format interviews with key policymakers), Russian memoir materials and Western media. A few interviews with key policymakers are also used in this study. Secondary sources have been examined and acknowledged.

The study begins with the Soviet era because Russia's political structures and foreign policy did not develop in a vacuum: While Boris Yeltsin came to power jettisoning much of what characterized the Soviet system, independent Russia's political system nonetheless grew out of that system. Furthermore, one of the key arguments in this study is that past political behavior has an impact on the way that democratization proceeds as well as its pace of
success. Thus, chapters two and three discuss how policy was made in the era of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, as well as during the Gorbachev era.

Chapters four and five examine the political institutions involved in foreign policy formulation in contemporary Russia. The first analyzes policy formulation during the first republic, when post-Soviet Russia was still living under the amended Soviet-style constitution (December 1991 to December 1993). The second analyzes policy formulation during the first years of the second republic through the end of Yeltsin's first term as president (December 1993 to July 1996). Chapters six and seven are case studies of specific foreign policy choices. Chapter six examines how various Russian institutions influenced the Russian policy on sanctions toward Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995, and chapter seven analyzes the input into the push for amendment of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty between 1992 and 1996. In contrast to the preceding chapters, the case studies provide a sustained discussion of individual issues so as to test the conclusions and hypotheses drawn in chapters four and five. In chapter eight, I compare Russian foreign policy formulation to that of France and the United States, two countries whose institutions have been explicit models for Russia. Chapter 9 discusses the outlook for Russian foreign policy formulation.

The emphasis of this study is on foreign and security policy, not on foreign economic relations or other international financial issues. For this reason, and because of limitations of space, the study includes no discussion of the roles of business interests and banks in the making of foreign policy. While these are certainly important in some areas, they are beyond the scope of this study. The private sector is represented
in the discussion of research institutes and advisory groups. This exception to the focus on governing institutions is made because discussing only government-sponsored and run research institutes would present an incomplete impression of their input into foreign policy.

Throughout the study, the analysis attempts to take a broad brush approach in order to capture a relatively full picture of the interaction of Russian institutions in the making of foreign policy. By examining the roles of institutions, such as the Foreign Ministry, the legislature, the presidency, and others, the focus is on how, if at all, these institutions affect the process of making Russia's foreign policy. A better understanding of how these institutions operate, it is hoped, will yield a better understanding of Russia's foreign policy behavior.
CHAPTER 2

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION
UNDER BREZHNEV, ANDROPOV, AND CHERNENKO

Understanding the handling of foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, Yurii Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, the last three general secretaries before Mikhail Gorbachev, is a necessary starting point for examining how foreign policy is formulated in Russia today. In spite of the fact that Boris Yeltsin came to power jettisoning the chief attributes of the Soviet system, independent Russia's political culture has inevitably been influenced by the preceding decades of Soviet rule. That system has been replaced by an inchoate democracy and market economy, but several years after the collapse of the USSR, Russia was still coping with a difficult recovery from Soviet communism. For these reasons, understanding contemporary Russia's polity depends on understanding how the Soviet system functioned.

The period during which Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko ruled, 1964 to 1985, has been chosen to provide an overview of Soviet foreign policy formulation. The extreme domestic upheavals of the Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev periods look anomalous in comparison to the subsequent years of "normal" rule under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko (although the latter period was a shorter span of time). The issue of illness was a recurrent theme during this period, just as it was during Yeltsin's rule, a further reason to study how Yeltsin's predecessors coped with this
issue. It is not enough to start with the Gorbachev period, with its many political transformations, because this period was not typical of the preceding decades. Gorbachev's reforms were catalyzed by the nearly 20 year-long period of relative calm in Soviet politics, known subsequently as the "era of stagnation." Thus, the mode of operation during the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko periods is crucial to understanding the environment to which Gorbachev responded. The larger inquiry is whether and to what extent Russia bears the imprint of operational modes established during the era of stagnation.

The Role of the Central Committee Membership and Secretariat

In the simplest terms, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) provided the ideological, intellectual, financial, and administrative basis for making foreign policy and all other policies. Owing to its omnipresence, the Party also enjoyed overarching control over the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the USSR. Starting in the Stalin period this control existed in practice, and it was codified in the 1977 USSR constitution, which stated that "the Communist Party determines general outlines for the development of society and the line of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy," a statement, which if anything understated the role of the Party.1

In the Soviet system there was no meaningful choice in elections at any level. This also meant that

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the average Soviet citizen had no opportunity to influence foreign policy through the ballot box. He or she was expected to accept and support the foreign policy line pursued by the top leadership of the Soviet Union. The same can be said of primary Party organizations (the cells of the Party to which all members of the CPSU belonged), and local Party organizations.

It was only at the regional and republican levels that Party leaders might be able to influence the making of policy at the pinnacle of Soviet power, and this influence derived from their access to all-union\(^2\) bodies and officials. The first secretaries of regional and republican Party organizations were considered outposts of Soviet central power, a status which conferred upon them membership in the CPSU Central Committee. A few key republican Party first secretaries were regularly included in the Politburo, although they could not always play significant roles in its regular weekly meetings owing to their distance from Moscow.

Notwithstanding this limitation, there is evidence of their input in a significant foreign policy decision — to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Top Party officials from Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania lobbied for intervention in the summer of 1968, presumably out of a fear that unchecked liberalization in Czechoslovakia would make ruling their own republics more difficult. This phenomenon

\(^2\)That is, USSR-wide. The term all-union is preferable to "national" level owing to the multinational nature of the Soviet Union and better than the term "federal" since the USSR did not fit accepted definitions of a federation.
was cited by Valenta as evidence of bureaucratic modes of policymaking in operation in the USSR.³

But using the 1968 invasion as a test case of republic Party leaders' influence generally in foreign policy matters exaggerates their input. As will be discussed in more detail below, the top Soviet officials tended to have responsibilities for specific areas and did not welcome intrusions from outsiders. Therefore, a republican Party chief would normally be out of bounds if he concerned himself with everyday foreign affairs issues.

Real power in the Party system started at the level of the Central Committee. Within the Central Committee, there were two groups: first, selected Central Committee members and, second, staffers of its apparatus (apparatchiki).⁴ Central Committee members were chosen by the top Soviet leadership by virtue of their status in the Party, government, legislature, or military.⁵ As Jerry Hough put it, with the exception of 15 or 20 members whose inclusion was mainly symbolic, the Central Committee was a "collection of the approximately 250 most powerful posts in the Soviet system."⁶ The Central Committee membership held plenary meetings twice yearly to discuss overall policy and approve important Party decisions. Owing to the size of the Central Committee and the six-month

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⁴In some cases, such as at the higher echelons of the apparatus, there was overlap.
⁵In 1971 there were 241 full and 155 candidate members; in 1976 there were 287 full and 139 candidate members. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed. (London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 457.
⁶Ibid., pp. 455-458.
spans of time between its regular meetings, it was not a suitable body to make day-to-day policy decisions or those requiring speedy action.

The Central Committee apparatus acted as the Party's main bureaucratic arm and exercised broad influence over much of Soviet policymaking. Despite the fact that the Central Committee membership was nominally superior to the appointed apparatchiki, it was the latter who held sway over policy because of their proximity to the policymaking process. Thus it was the apparatus, rather than the Central Committee membership, which made most use of the broad powers and responsibilities of the Central Committee.

Defined by Party statutes as the "highest organ directing the Party in the periods between congresses," (which were normally held every five years) the Central Committee was the base of political leadership and the Party's theoretical and ideological center. It was responsible for directing the activities of the [central] Party and local Party organs, selecting and appointing leading functionaries, directing the work of the central government and public organizations by means of the Party groups within them; establishing various Party organs, institutions, and enterprises and directing their activities, naming the editors of the central newspapers and magazines working under Party control, distributing the funds of the Party's budget and controlling their distribution. The Central Committee represents the

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Given the amount of work to be handled by the Central Committee's 20-odd departments (four concerned mainly with foreign policy), it is not surprising that the power of the Central Committee bureaucracy effectively came to outstrip that of the Central Committee itself.

The Central Committee apparatus was headed by Central Committee secretaries, a group of about 12 officials elected by the Central Committee, and known collectively as the Secretariat. The Party rules charged the Secretariat with directing work, selecting cadres, and verifying the fulfillment of Party decisions. In addition, each secretary supervised one or more departments of the Central Committee apparatus, sometimes serving directly as a department head. These departments, in turn, supervised various ministries and state committees of the Soviet government. In addition, secretaries were charged with ensuring that policy decisions were actually implemented.

The membership in the Politburo and the Secretariat frequently overlapped. It was entirely possible for a Central Committee Secretary who sat on the Politburo to guide a decision from beginning to end. As a member of the Secretariat, that CC Secretary had the authority to decide what to do with analyses or initiatives issuing from ministries, state committees, Central Committee departments, or research institutes. If he sought and secured enough support for initiating a new policy, it could be taken up by the Secretariat and then the Politburo for formal

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8Ibid.
treatment. In these situations, where so much of the policymaking process was in the hands of one or a few individuals, the policy process was not segmented, or "cut up and parceled out," in the sense described by Allison.\(^9\) Rather, it could be monopolized by a single individual.

One person who enjoyed multiple responsibilities was Mikhail Suslov, for many years the Party's ideology secretary, head of the Secretariat, supervisor of Soviet foreign policy, culture, education, and science, as well as the chairman of a legislative foreign affairs commission, discussed below.\(^10\) The story of his telephone calls to Gromyko, in which Suslov would bark out an instruction and then hang up without waiting for a response, illustrates who was commanding whom.\(^11\) Suslov's role gave him the authority to dictate many of his foreign policy preferences not only to Gromyko but to the relevant Central Committee departments. Considering his authority, it is not surprising that many of his ideas on how to spread communism in the Third World, especially Africa, held sway. He dismissed the possibility that Soviet involvement in Angola or Ethiopia would have an effect on Soviet relations with the United States and Western Europe, and this was the

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view that Brezhnev accepted, despite Gromyko's thinking to the contrary.  

Boris Ponomarev was another example of someone working in the realm of foreign affairs who held more than one significant position. He was the head of the International Department (ID), a non-voting member of the Politburo, and like Suslov, the head of a foreign affairs commission in the Soviet legislature, positions which enabled him to participate in international discussions with other senior parliamentarians.

In spite of their expansive roles, Suslov and Ponomarev could be overruled on important questions related to the international communist movement, as they were in their initial opposition to the use of force against Czechoslovakia in 1968. Their arguments, that the invasion would damage the international image of communism, did not prevail. So while the examples of Suslov and Ponomarev highlight the power that could accrue to individuals holding a few important positions, the case of Czechoslovakia demonstrates that they could lose out to coalitions holding other views. Their numerous "action channels" were no guarantee of seeing their preferences through, even in critical decision situations such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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It may have been the case that their multiple roles put them in advantageous positions to conceive and realize their own policies, but not to block that of others. On the other hand, Suslov and Ponomarev may have been perceived by other top Soviet officials as authorities on the matter of spreading communism but not necessarily as experts on how to maintain the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc, the central issue of Prague Spring.

The examples of Suslov and Ponomarev also raise the question of what happened to organizational roles -- "where you stand depends on where you sit" -- in situations where officials held more than one significant position. In other words, to which organization did an individual owe loyalty? In the case of the Soviet Union, where the Party played an overarching role, the question of organizational roles may seem moot. But at least one anecdote suggests that organizational roles were not suppressed completely. Ponomarev recalls:

[A]t the end of the 1960s or at the beginning of the 1970s, I [Ponomarev] was summoned to the office one night by Brezhnev, as a communist coup was taking place in Sudan. 'I was sitting in my office...and thinking fearfully: what if they really won? They have millions of people there, and we would have to feed them all... This was a real nightmare. Luckily for us, they lost.'

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The anecdote, if not apocryphal, suggests that Communist Party officials' loyalties might not have been as absolute as might have appeared on surface.

Unity and loyalty among top Soviet officials were important considerations under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. The maintenance of a certain equilibrium within the Secretariat and the Politburo was considered critical to consensus and the avoidance of conflicts among top officials. As Andropov told Gorbachev upon his election to the Secretariat, "the most important thing is unity."\(^{16}\) By this, Andropov was trying to warn Gorbachev against creating a stir by suggesting new approaches which could disrupt the delicate equilibrium achieved under Brezhnev.

The Role of the Politburo

It was the Politburo which controlled most important decisions of Soviet life for decades. CPSU Party rules said relatively little about the Politburo's membership and modes of operating, despite the power it wielded. Only a few regularities in its membership could be traced over time, the most obvious of which was the General Secretary's role as the head of the Politburo and the second secretary's responsibility as the leader of the Secretariat. Members of the Politburo frequently included the first secretaries of the Party organizations in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moscow, sometimes Leningrad, or other key regional Party secretaries. Important figures in the all-Union and Russian republican governments were also

frequently Politburo members.\textsuperscript{17} Whereas the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was regularly a member, the foreign minister, KGB chief, and minister of defense only became regular members starting in 1973.\textsuperscript{18}

The Politburo's agenda included a large range of matters, but major policy debates were not a regular feature of meetings during the late Brezhnev era. According to the memoirs of former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, meetings lasted for hours with no breaks during parts of the Andropov era.\textsuperscript{19} Such discussions took place prior to the meetings among the competent Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members, and their consensus on the best policy was generally accepted in the form of a Politburo decision.\textsuperscript{20} According to one defector:

\begin{quote}
I would say that eighty to ninety percent of the proposals are never discussed in the Politburo.... By the time of the meeting of the Politburo, it's a very routine procedure. The Politburo is not a place where they fight each
\end{quote}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{17}In addition to the CC General Secretary, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers was a position constantly represented in the Politburo from 1941 onwards. For lists of positions held by full Politburo members between 1941 and 1981, as well as for the positions represented in the Politburo from 1917 to 1991, see John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo.} (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), pp. 88 and 90-91.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 88.


\textsuperscript{20}John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit.}, p. 88.
other...[f]or the simple reason that there is no time to do that.\textsuperscript{21}

This was especially true during the later Brezhnev years and the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum as the successive general secretaries suffered from ill health.

Voting in the Politburo took place in two forms. Decisions were finalized either at meetings via discussions and sometimes formal voting or outside of meetings through "interrogatory voting" (oprosy) whereby full members indicated their consent to written policy proposals by signing their initials on a memorandum circulated to voting members.\textsuperscript{22} In both types of voting, if more than half of the voting members expressed support, the decision was considered passed.\textsuperscript{23}

Between 1981 and 1986 about 90 percent of the decisions were accomplished by the collection of initials.\textsuperscript{24} Of the ten or so items discussed at each meeting, the Politburo generally sought to reach consensus through discussion rather than deciding through a formal tallying of votes. In the case of serious disputes, the matter might be settled by setting up a study commission.\textsuperscript{25} For less serious

\textsuperscript{21}Arkady Shevchenko in Uri Ra'an and Igor Lukas, Inside the Apparat. (Lexington Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1990), p. 60.

\textsuperscript{22}Candidate members did not have a vote, but were permitted to speak at meetings. John Löwenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit., p. 115.

\textsuperscript{23}Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., p. 43.


\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 114.
matters of dispute, the Politburo could refer the issue back to the Secretariat for review.\textsuperscript{26} (Alternatively, it sometimes gathered to decide matters when a dissenting member was ill or out of town.\textsuperscript{27}) After each meeting, a list of agenda items and decisions was compiled. From this list, forms were prepared for each decision and sent through the General Department of the Central Committee to the organization or organizations charged with implementation.\textsuperscript{28}

Politburo voting behavior during crisis decisionmaking -- such as during the period before the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- was different. No vote was taken in the Politburo with regard to the invasion of Czechoslovakia: During the weeks prior to the decision to invade, some high-level Soviet officials, including Suslov and Ponomarev, expressed doubts that the use of force would bring the desired results. But as the tension increased, Ponomarev later claimed, there was unanimity on intervention.\textsuperscript{29} The decision to invade Afghanistan, in contrast to the Czech invasion, was made by a subset of the Politburo, and was later handed to the Supreme Soviet for ratification\textsuperscript{30} in

\textsuperscript{26}Mikhail Voslensky, former employee of USSR Central Committee apparatus, in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes. \textit{Inside the Apparat}, op. cit., p. 62.

\textsuperscript{27}This occurred, for example, in 1967 when Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin was ill and his protege, KGB chief Vladimir Semichastnii, was removed from his position by a decision of the Politburo. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, \textit{KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev}. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), p. 398.

\textsuperscript{28}John Löwenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo}, op. cit., p. 103.


\textsuperscript{30}Accounts vary but normally include Brezhnev, Gromyko, Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov (Defense Minister), and Kosygin
order to extend responsibility for the decision beyond the confines of the Politburo to a much larger group.

Prior consultation in the realm of foreign affairs apparently played a key role in making decisions. Gromyko submitted draft proposals for major foreign-policy decisions to the Politburo only after having discussed them and gathered support from senior Politburo members. This was probably because of the role of Suslov and Ponomarev in the Politburo and because Gromyko needed the support of others in order to stand up to them. It may also have been due to the habit of deciding matters among subsets of people who had an institutional interest or expertise in a specific policy. In foreign affairs, a subset might have included Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko, the head of the KGB, as well as the Minister of Defense.

Politburo subsets, or "troikas" as they were called in Brezhnev's time because they typically consisted of three people, were attractive because the Politburo often dealt with questions that aroused controversy between various sectors of the Soviet ruling establishment. Arms control was one such area where institutional interests of the MFA, the Defense Ministry, and the defense industries could easily clash. But once those directly involved in the decision could agree, then the outsiders, for example, in the agricultural or construction sectors were hardly in a position to dislodge accord.


31Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 220-221.
The use of troikas encouraged the development of territoriality, and delving into others' areas was frowned upon. Gorbachev, reflecting on his time as Central Committee secretary for agriculture, referred disparagingly to the "amateur agrarians" in the Secretariat who expressed opinions in his area of expertise. As for foreign policy, it was long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatolii Dobrynin's recollection:

For most Politburo members, America and foreign policy were not part of their domain; each had his bureaucratic territory and would not welcome an invasion from another member, so they acted accordingly in foreign territories that were not their own...

But the rule was not universal, as Gorbachev's comment shows.

In addition to issue areas, troikas appear to have been useful for very critical issues, such as top personnel appointments. Gorbachev refers to the discussions among the "smaller circle" of four top Politburo members over the question of filling the general secretary's post after Brezhnev's and Andropov's deaths in 1982 and 1984 respectively. Likewise, the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 was also apparently decided by a subset of the

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32Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 35. He specifically mentioned Ponomarev.

33Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 219.

34The smaller circle deciding on Andropov's nomination as general secretary included Ustinov, Gromyko, Tikhonov, and Andropov. Chernenko may or may not have been present. The smaller circle deciding Chernenko's nomination to become general secretary consisted of Gromyko, Ustinov, Tikhonov, and Chernenko. Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 215, 241.
Chapter 2  
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko

Politburo and presented to the remaining members as a fait accompli.\(^{35}\) Notably, this was not the case in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was handled through an enlargement of the policymaking circle, as noted above. The difference between the handling of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan can likely be attributed to the differences in the degree to which Brezhnev felt comfortable in power in 1968 and 1979 and the extent to which he could decide matters in a smaller circle without experiencing a backlash from those excluded.

The power of the general secretary fluctuated depending on the leader and the degree to which he had established himself in office. Stalin used the post to act as a dictator, while Brezhnev, even at the height of his power, preferred to amplify his power by the achievement of consensus. While Soviet general secretaries were theoretically first among equals, their influence far exceeded this description. To be sure, the deterioration of the terror apparatus meant that Brezhnev's power was not as absolute as Stalin's, but Brezhnev achieved his own cult of personality by constructing a loyal coalition and allowing flattery and egotism to influence his policy preferences.

The individual traits of general secretaries were also relevant in policymaking. Health, as mentioned above, was an important factor: An elaborate system of compensating for the general secretary's illness developed as a result. Experience was another factor: Born in 1906, 1914, and 1911 respectively, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko all experienced Stalin's

terrors and world war as adults and Party officials, which meant that they learned how to work in the Soviet system when it was characterized by complex political intriguing, fear, and paranoia.

Principal officials relied heavily on staffs of aides to provide advice and analysis since principals could not be expected to analyze all of the information originating from the Central Committee departments or ministries for which they were responsible. These pomoshchniki (aides) were charged with writing speeches, preparing documents, helping to formulate decisions, suggesting participants in special groups studying specific issues, as well as attending and addressing Politburo and Secretariat sessions.36

Starting with the latter part of Brezhnev's rule, the role of aides grew. The failing health of Politburo and Secretariat members increased requirements for assistance. Brezhnev's aides reportedly "rescued" him if he failed to reply or respond clearly in discussions with foreign officials,37 or they "prompted" him during speeches at home.38 This situation was exacerbated by the sheer ambition of aides who, like provincial leaders and others, enjoyed the latitude for action provided by the leadership's growing debility. Thus, paradoxically, the situation which developed to

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37Ibid., p. 20.
accommodate the needs of the aging leadership ultimately may have had the effect of weakening the authority of their posts.\(^\text{39}\)

The role of aides also increased because of the sheer workload with which the Politburo had to cope. It was involved in all manner of decisions, many of which would have been handled at a much lower level in Western political systems. The high degree of centralization in the Soviet system was one reason for this concentration of decisionmaking at the top. In some cases, it resulted simply from lower-echelon staffers' reluctance to take on more responsibility.\(^\text{40}\)

Thus the concentration of decisionmaking power in the hands of a few at the top was not simply a matter of power-mongering by Party hierarchs. Rather, it resulted from the inclination of some lower-level elites to ensure that they enjoyed plausible deniability.

To be sure, it was not the case that every policymaker below the Politburo level sought to avoid taking decisions. The opposite example is readily available in the form of Anatolii Dobrynin's back-channel diplomacy. Even accounting for hubris, Dobrynin's memoirs suggest that he readily assumed responsibility in determining Soviet policy toward the United States. This contrasts sharply with the depiction of shrinking from accountability described above, so perhaps Dobrynin's conclusion that "[t]his willingness to improvise was fairly rare in our diplomatic service and indeed in our bureaucracy in

\(^\text{39}\)For an elaboration on this theme see Barbara Ann Chotiner, "Oligarchy and Illness," op. cit.
\(^\text{40}\)Shevchenko in Uri Ra'anana and Igor Lukes, Inside the Apparat, op. cit., p. 175.
general, but I developed it gradually," can be taken at face value.41

For most, Politburo membership meant that the highest career stage had not only been achieved but had to be retained. Since Brezhnev's preference was to decide matters through consensus, this meant that members were under pressure to accept the decision pre-arranged by the relevant troika. Agreement was not the absolute rule, but rather a tendency. Even as a tendency, though, the behavior of the Politburo contrasts sharply with the character of the US president's Cabinet, which frequently confronts the president with so many conflicting viewpoints that after entering office US presidents progressively restrict the role played by the Cabinet in decisionmaking.42

Rather than viewing the Politburo as a place where the head of each bureaucracy had a say and a chance to defend its interests, it is perhaps easier to understand the Politburo as a collection of officials falling into the category of what Jiri Valenta called "uncommitted thinkers," -- people whose interests were so varied that they did not represent bureaucratic constituencies.43 Another way of viewing the Politburo would be to consider it a sort of collective executive in which most players had no goal other than to stay in their job as Politburo member or to rise within its small ranks to general secretary.

41Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 231.
The Role of the Central Committee Departments

The Central Committee apparatus, the bureaucratic arm of the Central Committee, was the assembly of some 20 departments -- ranging from Agriculture to Propaganda -- which ran the affairs of state. The departments of the Central Committee played an important part in the flow of information upwards to the top levels of policymaking.

Four of the Central Committee departments were concerned primarily with foreign policy or matters related to it. The Cadres Abroad Department (after 1972 known formally as the Central Committee "Department for Work with Cadres Abroad and for Travel Abroad") was involved in organizing foreign travel for Soviet delegations and vetting membership of those delegations. The first task consisted of ensuring that trips were politically justified; the second, that members of the delegation could be trusted from the standpoint of security. For the latter, the Cadres Abroad Department relied to some extent on the input of other organizations, especially the KGB, and the International Department. The Cadres Abroad was significant for those individuals involved in foreign affairs because being rejected for travel abroad on security grounds, whether for reasons well-founded or not, could hinder advancement in a diplomatic career.

The Central Committee's International Information Department (IID) was recreated in 1978 and charged

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44 See the comments of Mark Kramer attached to Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., 1995, p. 119.

45 For a more detailed discussion of the Cadres Abroad Department's role, see ibid.
with improving the "timing, responsiveness, and coordination of the major overt propaganda channels," with an emphasis on the domestic audience more than the foreign one. Its officials were responsible for a range of tasks including writing articles, editing speeches of top figures, and generally serving as press secretaries for the higher leadership. The department was not tasked with overseeing the work of official Soviet mass media organizations, as this job was entrusted to the International Department.

The IID reportedly went beyond its brief in the 1980s and became a "locus of planning and organization" in arms control. It was apparently responsible for fueling the failed campaign in Western Europe against the deployment of intermediate-range missiles. IID chief Leonid Zamiatin was connected with the Soviet walkout from the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations in 1983. The recollections contained in the memoirs of Valentin Falin, who for four years was Zamiatin's first deputy, indicate that Zamiatin was highly ambitious and aggressive, bragging that he reported directly to Leonid Brezhnev and hoping to increase the power and

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50 Ibid.
prestige of the IID to a position comparable to that of the International Department.

Given these traits, it is not surprising that Zamiatin was hostile and condescending to the Foreign Ministry, an institution with which the IID's responsibilities could and did overlap. To Falin's comment that the best course of action, and one which might benefit the IID, was to try to have good relations with the MFA, Zamiatin reportedly retorted: "It is the MFA which should make an effort to have good relations with us." 51

The Central Committee's Socialist Countries Department (formally known as the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries) was responsible for policy toward countries ruled by Communist parties. This task had previously been the responsibility of the International Department, and what became the Socialist Countries Department had in fact been a part of the International Department. Even when it became a separate entity, the Socialist Countries Department never gained as much prominence within the Central Committee as the ID.

The International Department's special role as a liaison between the Party and the KGB (as is discussed in more detail below) was an important factor in helping to determine the scope of its work. Freedom to express thoughts more freely, more abundant information, rigorous debate, and a "democratic atmosphere" were things which characterized the conditions in parts of the International Department,

51Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 389.
such as at its Prague-based publication, the World Marxist Review, according to the recollections of some of its more luminary former staff members.52 Their recollections were certainly not without basis. The staff of the World Marxist Review was predominately Soviet, but included nationals from both communist and non-communist countries.53 This meant that Soviet staffers were in many cases for the first time exposed not only to critical information about the real state of affairs in their country and in its relations with the outside world, but also faced an intellectually more challenging environment where arguments were not determined by the Party line but by analysis.

Given these conditions, it is not surprising that the competence of the ID as a whole, which included a component of World Marxist Review alumni, was much higher than that of most other Central Committee departments. Former ID staffer Andrei Grachev, who later became Gorbachev's press secretary, emphasized in an interview that the ID was a "reservoir of free-thinking and free-speaking people," and he stressed that the opportunity to work at the World Marxist Review in Prague was an important factor in shaping these ID staffers' views, outlook, and thinking, because of contact with foreigners.54

In addition to its official responsibilities, the ID acquired a role in vetting MFA policy proposals for

52 Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya publishing house, 1995), p. 226. The magazine was known in English and translation by the name World Marxist Review. (Translated literally, it would have been called Problems of Peace and Socialism.)
53 Ibid.
54 Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, Ebenhausen, Germany, 18 December 1992.
virtually any geographic area of the world, approving high-level (and sometimes low-level) MFA appointments, and as mentioned above, determining the suitability of certain individuals for foreign travel. As Sergei Grigoriev, a former ID staffer, has noted: The ID had the exclusive right to prepare the "experts' conclusion" on the situation in a given country, and the International Department was always included on the list of Central Committee departments responsible for approving policy initiatives. Given these expansive powers, the ID had much control over the activities of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Gromyko gained more power to defend his territory and approach in 1973 when he was promoted over the head of Ponomarev into full Politburo membership. For the rest of his career, Ponomarev remained in the candidate status which he acquired the year before Gromyko's advancement. But while the International Department chief never acquired a vote in the Politburo, he did enjoy a seat on the Secretariat, which Gromyko did not. Gromyko, on the other hand, went hunting with Brezhnev and could count him as a friend, whereas Brezhnev not only disliked Ponomarev, but reportedly made a point of showing it. Given the importance of loyalty and access, one can assume that Gromyko benefited from his better connections to the general secretary. It was perhaps in this connection that Brezhnev authorized Gromyko in 1973 to be personally in charge of Soviet policy toward the

56Ibid., p. 43.
57Gromyko was never a candidate member.
58Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya, op. cit., p. 260.
United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France.\footnote{Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., p. 124.}

But, of course, Soviet policy in the Third World, the part of the world where the International Department could run its own policy, affected Soviet policy toward the countries for which the MFA was granted full responsibility. Thus the MFA and ID continued to clash, especially as Soviet interest in the developing world increased in the 1970s. Anatolii Dobrynin, noting that his efforts to improve Soviet-American relations were often spoiled by the ID, offers this portrait of relations between the International Department and the MFA:

In order to understand our sometimes bizarre policy in the Third World, it is important to know how the decision-making mechanism in foreign affairs operated in the Kremlin. On a day-to-day basis it was the Foreign Ministry which gave recommendations for dealing with current problems... But the Third World was not [Gromyko's] domain. He believed that events there could not in the final analysis decisively influence our fundamental relations with the United States; that turned out to be a factor which he definitely underestimated. More than that, our Foreign Ministry traditionally was not really involved with the leaders of the liberation movements in the Third World, who were dealt with through the International department of the party, headed by Secretary Boris Ponomarev. He despised Gromyko; the feeling was mutual.\footnote{Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 404.}
Dobrynin indicated that the KGB and military were generally supportive of the ID's initiatives in the Third World while many professional diplomats opposed the deep involvement in these remote areas.

The extent to which the ID trespassed on the territory of the MFA has been debated in Western literature. Dobrynin's comments tend to give credence to the view that the ID's influence was indeed decisive, especially in Third World policy. Dobrynin, after all, could be expected to underplay the influence of the ID and overplay that of the MFA. Furthermore, as the long-serving ambassador to the United States, one would not expect him to concede that the US-Soviet relationship had been in some ways captive to ID meddling in the Third World unless he truly believed it.

The ID's apparent success in controlling Third World policy was certainly attributable to its role as a liaison between the Party and the KGB. But it may have been due to a lack of interest in that part of the world on Gromyko's part, as Dobrynin and others claim. On the other hand, it is also possible that Gromyko did not want what he knew he could not have. Given the overarching role of the Party, however, it is reasonable to conclude that Gromyko was willing for this reason to cede this part of the world to the ID. Supporting this tentative conclusion is Dobrynin's contention that there could be no question of "openly

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objecting when all this was done in the name of the party." Objection was difficult in light of the fact that the ID, hoping to impress Brezhnev with the success and importance of its work, had for many years falsified data on the size and significance of Third World communist movements. Therefore, advocating a curtailment of the ID's Third World projects would have carried with it the unhappy task of disabusing the general secretary of the image of a thriving, Soviet-led international communist movement.

The practice of providing the top leadership with the information it apparently wanted to hear was rampant throughout the Soviet system, whether in the ID, the MFA or any other department. Gorbachev recalled his disgust at the atmosphere in the Central Committee when he saw how in many cases the "creme de la creme" of the Soviet system was "churned into butter" upon entering the corridors of the Central Committee building on Old Square. Making matters worse, some were not very bright but merely had the connections necessary to secure these much sought-after Central Committee jobs. Salaries were not necessarily high, but affiliation with the Central Committee meant access to preferred stores, special medical treatment, exclusive vacation resorts, better housing, and many other perquisites, which in the Soviet Union money could not always buy. This suggests that stepping outside of the standard

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63 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 405.
64 Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., p. 26-27.
65 Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 125.
interpretation of events or promoting a policy which would be considered unorthodox could mean not only the loss of one's job, but also of one's lifestyle, and probably the foreclosure of the opportunity to serve in a similar position anywhere else.

An exception to this "butter" could be found in members enjoying the elevated staff rank of "consultant." In the International Department as elsewhere, the Konsultanti were considered the upper echelon of the staff, producing work which tended to be more academic than that of other ID staffers.\(^67\) According to Chernyaev, who directed the ID's 20-strong group of consultants for some time, they were far brighter than other Central Committee apparatus employees.\(^68\)

While he was the head of the Socialist Countries Department in the late 1950s, Yurii Andropov reportedly told his consultants: "In this room you can come clean and speak absolutely openly, don't hide your opinions. Now, once you get outside the door, that's different. Then you obey the general rules!"\(^69\) Likewise, Chernyaev reports that the consultants observed the Central Committee apparatus "rules of the game while outside" -- meaning outside of free discussions -- "but they didn't like it."\(^70\) 

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\(^67\)Euvgeni Novikov, "Two Levels of Soviet Foreign Policy," Lecture prepared for delivery in United States Naval War College seminar (unpublished), p. 10; and Sergei Grigoriev, *The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee*, op. cit., p. 32.


\(^70\)Anatolii Chernyaev, *Moya zhizn i moe vremya*, op. cit., p. 267.
Grachev reports that the consultants were the people to whom top officials turned when they wanted the "real picture" of the given situation. Such freedom of expression was rare in the Soviet system, and it stood in sharp contrast to the prevailing habit of shaping data and analysis to fit pre-established conclusions and presumed expectations of superiors.

That consultants played such a role seems understandable since the top leadership undoubtedly needed to have some discrete source of untainted information. But it was precisely the peculiar environment of the Central Committee which raises questions as to how far these consultants' full analyses traveled in the information ladder and whether they made it all of the way up to the top Party leadership. Although consultants were granted a sort of immunity in specific settings for presenting unorthodox and dire analyses, it is far from clear that their superiors would have felt comfortable passing on unabridged versions of these analyses to the Politburo. The importance of unity at the top discussed above would suggest that complete openness was not the general rule. The image of the environment is further clarified by a comment by Dobrynin:

Members of the Soviet political leadership often spoke in the language of ideology even when conversing between themselves, falling into the language of official newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia. The way and form in which they expressed their thoughts inevitably affected its content.

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71 Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, 18 December 1992.
72 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 474.
This suggests that facades did not disappear in closed settings at the top.

Dobrynin indicates that the reason for such behavior might have been rooted in sheer incompetence among some of the country's top officials. Whatever the reason, Dobrynin's remarks would suggest that it was unlikely that a detailed and critical analysis of Soviet foreign policy would have been raised for discussion under general secretaries Brezhnev or Chernenko. Andropov, who was one of the better-read general secretaries, might have been willing to entertain such discussions, especially owing to his attitude toward free-thinking analysis mentioned above. But it is unclear that he was in the same state of mind as a terminally-ill and perhaps mentally-impaired general secretary as he was in his role as the head of the Socialist Countries Department a few decades earlier.73

The Role of the Legislature

The Party, which the constitution described as "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society [and] the nucleus of its political system and of state and public organizations," was charged with determining the "general outlines for the development of society and the line of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy."74 But certain responsibilities were assigned

73 Valentin Falin's memoirs include bitter and emotional passages which suggest that Andropov was overcome by paranoia in his final days. Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 391-416. While Gorbachev's memoirs do not suggest that Andropov was paranoid, they do portray him throughout as weakened and weary from political struggles. Mikhail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit.

74 Konstitutsiya, op. cit., p. 6.
to the legislature, in spite of the Party's overarching role. The USSR Supreme Soviet was named in the 1977 Soviet Constitution as the highest organ of state power in the USSR. The 1,500-deputy bicameral body (consisting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities) held regular sessions only twice yearly.

At an initial joint session, the Supreme Soviet elected a Presidium to be the "continuously functioning agency" of the Supreme Soviet. There was a distinct parallel between the way the Soviet legislature and the Central Committee functioned as institutions. In both cases, a smaller body came to outstrip the parent body's power by being called upon to act on its behalf. The Presidium, not the full Supreme Soviet, had the right to ratify and denounce treaties, appoint and recall diplomatic personnel, accept the credentials of and recall diplomatic representatives of foreign states, proclaim general or partial military mobilization; and, during the periods when the Supreme Soviet was not in session, the Presidium could proclaim a state of war in the event of attack on the USSR or in accordance with treaty obligations of the USSR. (The Supreme Soviet as a whole did not have the right to confirm or reject this decision.)

The larger question surrounds the relationship between the legislature and the Party. There were major discrepancies between the constitutionally-guaranteed prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet and those that it enjoyed in practice, thus resulting in a less powerful Supreme Soviet. For example, while it

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75 Konstitutsiya, op. cit., 30-32.
was the only body with the right to enact laws, the Supreme Soviet enacted only the laws drafted and agreed upon by the Party at Central Committee Plena. The most important factor in the Supreme Soviet's behavior was the significant overlap in the membership of its Presidium and top CC organs. There was virtually no doubt that the Party's decisions would be confirmed by the Presidium (or the broader Supreme Soviet, in the instances when necessary). Unlike the Central Committee and its potential role in saving or bringing down a general secretary, the Soviet legislature did not enjoy any such power.

The Role of the Government

The role of the USSR Council of Ministers -- the body gathering the heads of ministries and state committees as well as the heads of government from the union republics -- was similarly decorative. The Constitution described it as the "highest executive and administrative body of state power in the USSR," with responsibility (when it did not come under the purview of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium) for exercising "general guidance in the field of relations with foreign states, foreign trade and economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries," taking "steps to ensure the fulfillment of the USSR's international treaties," and "confirming and denouncing intergovernmental international treaties." In addition, the Council of Ministers was officially empowered to "resolve all questions of state administration (where this did not conflict with

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76 Ibid., p. 34.
77 Ibid., p. 36.
the powers of the Supreme Soviet)," either through its full membership or through its Presidium when the Council was not in session.

But like the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers was captive to the Party in many respects. Soviet ministries were closely supervised by the apparatus of the Central Committee. In addition, a ministry's top positions were often assigned not to people on its professional staff but to people making careers in the Party. Transfers between top ministerial jobs and Party jobs were frequent, reinforcing the identification of ministers with views represented in the Party.

The Role of the Foreign Ministry

As the foregoing discussion would suggest, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs' authority in the making of foreign policy was limited in important respects. Much of the MFA's margin for action and initiative was overshadowed by the Party, especially, as has been discussed, by the Central Committee apparatus. The relevant Central Committee departments could formulate foreign policy initiatives and pose them directly to members of the Central Committee Secretariat or Politburo. They could also execute foreign activities independent of the MFA.

As mentioned above, Gromyko was given personal control over certain foreign-policy sectors. As a Politburo member, he was able to contribute to a broader range of decisions. At the same time, he was also bound to accept the body's decisions, even if he did not agree with them. According to Dobrynin, Gromyko did express disagreement, but "once the final decision was taken, he would conscientiously and
stubbornly fulfill all the instructions of the Politburo and the CPSU general secretary, not allowing himself to deviate from them even an inch..."78 Given this level of reliability, it is understandable that Gromyko's breadth of action was expanded by Brezhnev. In addition, Gromyko's reputation for fulfilling policy to the letter suggests that this was one method of staying in good standing in the Soviet system. Therefore, it appears that tinkering with foreign policy during policy engineering phase, while possible, was a risky thing to do.

A set of underlying assumptions in the Soviet system formed the basis of the roles in foreign policy as performed by the MFA and, for example, the International Department. There was a distinction made in the Soviet Union between the terms diplomacy and foreign policy. Diplomacy, as defined in the 1960 edition of the Diplomaticheskii slovar' (Diplomatic Dictionary) consisted of "the official activity of the heads of state, government, and special organizations in charge of external policy." Foreign policy, on the other hand, represented an extension of domestic policy and included the use of military force, deception, and other means to defend a country's interests.79 Diplomacy was thus merely a part of foreign policy. The MFA was in charge of diplomacy, not foreign policy. This distinction is critical in understanding how the MFA operated and its relationship to the International Department.

78 Dobrynin seeks to dispel the impression that Gromyko was simply a "yes-man" to Soviet general secretaries, noting twice that Gromyko did generally express his opinions frankly. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 32, 52.

In the early days following the 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks declared their rejection of traditional diplomacy. Trotsky, the first head of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, announced that he would "issue a few revolutionary proclamations and then shut up shop." But as a result of the failure of the communist revolution to spread in Europe, the Bolsheviks rethought their rejection of diplomacy, realizing the practical utility of maintaining foreign relations with the outside world. At the same time, however, Russia's revolutionaries had not abandoned their dream of world communist revolution and their intention to do everything necessary to bring it about. Thus, at this early stage in the development of what was to become the USSR, there already existed two parallel lines in foreign relations, the one pursued by the revolutionaries and the one pursued by the diplomats. The influence of these two lines varied depending on the period, but both existed until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The division of diplomacy and foreign policy highlights the role played by ideology in Soviet foreign relations. In the minds of Soviet theorists, Marxist-Leninist theory played the important role of "organizing, mobilizing and transforming" as well as providing the foundation for scientifically-based policies in the future. While it is clear that

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ideology was often massaged so as to justify policies in conflict with the theoretical construct, this fact in itself is not sufficient to discount the role of ideology. To invoke ideology was to invoke the CPSU, and policymakers often had difficulty disagreeing with policy proposals made in the name of Lenin or the Party. Ideology was effectively trump.

Owing to the overlap of duties between the Foreign Ministry and the foreign departments of the Central Committee (especially the International Department), disputes could and did arise because policies sometimes ran at cross purposes. But competition between the heads of Smolenskaya Square (the location of the MFA) and Old Square over who had the ear of the Kremlin was sometimes mitigated by the behavior of second- and third-echelon staff. As veterans of the Soviet system have observed, both the MFA and the International Department took pains to downplay disagreements.

There are tensions between [the ID and MFA], but at the same time both are very cautious not to bring differences to open conflict because the bureaucrats in the MFA understand that the ID is very close to the leadership and that they are not so close. At the same time, the ID... [considers] the MFA to be a useful organization...83

Similarly, Grigoriev reports that ID staffers, especially those with lower-level jobs, considered good relations with MFA staffers important because they wanted to hold in reserve the chance of a diplomatic posting abroad either in the event of a

83Voslensky in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, Inside the Apparat, op. cit., p. 168.
conflict with their superiors at the ID or "to raise personal savings" on the eve of retirement from the ID. The same held for securing an MFA job for ID staffers' children. Shevchenko, referring to the settlement of policy disputes, claims that "despite tensions that sometimes arise from overlapping each other's turf, diplomats and ideologues in the Central Committee more often than not try to compromise their differences rather than let them break into open conflict that must be arbitrated by the Politburo." These comments suggest that these lower-echelon staffers managed to reach accommodation through cooperation rather than a winner-take-all approach.

It is clear that the Soviet system was institutionally biased in favor of the Party and that the MFA was often destined to be sidelined by the ID. But at the same time, Gromyko's long time in office is a phenomenon which must be considered. The qualities that ensured Gromyko longevity in his post, which he held from 1957 to 1986, were apparently his flexibility in policymaking and his loyalty to the leaders he served. He was a firm believer in the communist system, describing himself even in the late 1980s as "a communist to the marrow of my bones." At the same time, Gromyko was apparently content under Khrushchev to serve unabashedly as the mere conveyor of the foreign policies of the Soviet leadership. According to an anecdote from Averell Harriman, during

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84 Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
85 Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, op. cit., p. 189.
a meeting between Harriman, Khrushchev, and Gromyko in 1959,

Khrushchev made it abundantly clear that Gromyko is nothing more than a mouthpiece. While Gromyko sat silent and glum at the foot of the table, Khrushchev said, 'Gromyko only says what we tell him to. At the next Geneva meeting he will repeat what he has already told you. If he doesn't, we'll fire him and get someone who does.'

Owing to his willingness to play this role and his agreement with the goals of the Party, Gromyko gained considerable latitude in running the affairs of the Foreign Ministry. By 1973, when he was made a full member of the Politburo, Gromyko was able to command considerably more influence within the Soviet ruling circle. His relationship with Leonid Brezhnev afforded him much more room for influence in policymaking than did his relationship with Khrushchev, especially as Brezhnev's health failed.

The relationship between Gromyko and the Party appeared to suit both sides. Gromyko anticipated the Party's wishes and the Party gave him progressively more control over the MFA organization. Considering the utility of this relationship, it is not surprising that Gromyko turned down the offer allegedly made by Brezhnev in the early 1970s to take on a job as a Central Committee Secretary. In such a position, he would have lost his own private fiefdom at the MFA and would have had to work more closely with his two

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89Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, op. cit., p. 188.
rivals, Suslov and Ponomarev, to whom he would have presumably remained subordinate.

The Role of the Military

The strategic goals, worldview, and experience of the Soviet state meant that defense was a matter of high priority in foreign affairs and in general. The influence of the uniformed military and military industrialists was variable depending on who occupied the post of general secretary and which issues were at stake. Generally speaking, owing to the preoccupation with secrecy in the Soviet Union, uniformed military and military industrialists enjoyed a monopoly on information and could pass it to the top leadership directly, without the filtration of other official departments.

The military's near monopoly on classified information about military holdings and programs was a key element of the preservation of its influence. Soviets involved in the negotiations for arms control agreements complained of their lack of access to information except that parceled out by the military in amounts barely sufficient to conduct negotiations. According to Dobrynin: "Not even most Politburo members were fully informed [of military programs] because the Defense Ministry and Defense Industry Ministry were only accountable to the general secretary, who was also commander in chief and chairman of the Defense Council." Thus the secretive nature of military activities extended upwards through the Politburo as well.

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90Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 474.
At the level of policy engineering, however, military officials (both in the services and in the defense industries) were not necessarily guaranteed a vote. Like the foreign minister, the defense minister became a full Politburo member in 1973. Ustinov, the only defense minister who was a civilian (albeit a defense industrialist) retained full Politburo membership when he became defense minister in 1976, but his successor (a professional military officer), was not granted candidate Politburo membership for some time, leaving no military representative on the Politburo roster until 1985 when the defense minister again received candidate membership.91

Brezhnev relied heavily on advice from both uniformed officers and defense industry managers. By some accounts, he not only deferred to the military, he also feared it and sought to avoid confrontation with it. Georgii Arbatov, the long-time director of the USA-Canada Institute, argues for example that Brezhnev was politically indebted to the military, having come to the top Soviet leadership after having served as Central Committee secretary for the defense industries.92 Under Brezhnev, Arbatov contends: "Our military policy and arms industry had completely escaped political control. The leadership made the decisions, but the military and the military industrial agencies prompted those decisions and even managed to 'preprogram' the political leadership." That is to say, the military supplied information, statistics, and advice that prompted the political

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leadership to make decisions favored by the military.93

A body combining the military and political leadership was the Defense Council. The 1977 Constitution said only that the Defense Council was to be formed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its membership to be confirmed by that body.94 Lev Zaikov, formerly Central Committee Secretary for the Defense Industries Department under Gorbachev and presumably a member of Council, said that the Defense Council's mission was "to implement supreme organizational, executive, and control functions on specific issues of the country's defense capacity and security and to coordinate the activities of the competent departments."95

While Zaikov's description of the Defense Council's role suggested that it enjoyed extensive powers, the testimony of others offered a different impression. According to Soviet defectors interviewed in Inside the Apparat, the Defense Council was an organization whose importance was grossly overestimated in Western literature. Voslensky claims that the Defense Council existed only to make explicit the role of the general secretary as commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces. Shevchenko argues that the Council was designed for wartime or crisis decisionmaking, and it did not play a role outside of

93Ibid., p. 189.
94Konstitutsiya, op. cit., p. 33.
such circumstances.\textsuperscript{96} One way of reconciling these conflicting reports is to consider the size of the Soviet military industrial complex and of the Soviet Party bureaucracy as a whole: The Defense Council could well have done many of the things that Zaikov described without accounting for a large part in the Soviet national-security policymaking process.

\textbf{The Role of the Intelligence Services}

The role of security organizations in Soviet foreign policy is, because of the secretive nature of the object of study, perhaps the most difficult to gauge. As Waller has pointed out, the role of the KGB was almost entirely neglected in some of the major studies of Soviet foreign policy formulation.\textsuperscript{97} Some points can be pieced together about the security organs' roles in foreign affairs, however.

At the outset, it is important to note that oversight of the security organs was more theoretical than real. It was performed by the Party (the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department), and intelligence officers themselves participated in the oversight. The absence of institutional independence rendered the oversight meaningless and meant that security organs had a wide margin for action. More generally, the KGB's role as defender and guardian of the Party and Party interests meant that the KGB's direct overseers relied on the KGB's work for their survival and were in a difficult position to curb its activities.

\textsuperscript{96}Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, \textit{Inside the Apparat}, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

Intelligence officers were stationed under diplomatic or other cover in Soviet missions abroad both to gather intelligence and to monitor the activities of compatriots. The First Chief Directorate maintained 11 geographical departments and various specialized services. In the mid-1980s there were 12,000 employees in the First Chief Directorate, and places among its ranks were much sought after.\textsuperscript{98} It was the most prestigious of the KGB's directorates (others being Signals and Cryptography, Economic Security, and Counter-intelligence, for example)\textsuperscript{99}, and its prestige and high salaries reportedly attracted the best qualified recruits -- people with not only higher education and language skills, but also no small degree of sophistication.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, KGB operatives were serious competition for the Soviet diplomatic corps, even excepting their access to instruments of violence and terror. Détente saw a major increase in the number of Soviet and Soviet bloc officials in the West, a trend which was paralleled by a marked increase in intelligence gathering efforts of the KGB -- especially in the realm of technology.\textsuperscript{101}

There was a great deal of interaction between the First Directorate and the International Department. Waller characterizes the amount by saying that the First Chief Directorate spent "most of its resources to satisfy the desires of the CPSU International

\textsuperscript{98}Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, \textit{KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev}, op. cit., pp. 512-513.

\textsuperscript{99}For more information, see Michael Waller, \textit{Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today}, op. cit., pp. 14-17.


\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 281-282
Department."\textsuperscript{102} A director of the KGB follow-on organization said that the ID had been the First Chief Directorate's "main consultant and client."\textsuperscript{103} Former KGB officer Stanislav Levchenko described the KGB and the ID as being the two main actors in carrying out foreign active measures\textsuperscript{104} -- operations designed to weaken foreign regimes.\textsuperscript{105}

In the Politburo, the KGB chairmen holding full membership had full rights to contribute to foreign policy decisions. But even prior to their acquisition of full membership, KGB chiefs were vested with a great deal of influence in policymaking due to the closeness of the intelligence-police forces to the top leadership.\textsuperscript{106} It was therefore moot to some degree whether the KGB chairman was a full member of the Politburo or not. Simply by virtue of holding the top KGB job, its holder had a respected voice in policymaking. Tellingly, the same cannot be said for the head of the Foreign Ministry.

\textsuperscript{102}Michael Waller, \textit{Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today}, op. cit., p. 137.
\textsuperscript{103}The official was Vadim Bakatin. see \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{104}Shultz and Godson define active measures as: "A Soviet term that came into use in the 1950s to describe certain overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents..." Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, \textit{Dezinformatsia}, op. cit., 193.
\textsuperscript{105}Interview with Stanislav Levchenko in appendix of \textit{ibid}., p. 182.
The KGB was institutionally even more interested in domestic policing and acting as the guardian of the regime as it was in foreign policy, it was poised to play a role in top personnel and succession issues, things which had an impact on foreign policy formulation. The KGB also had a chance, via its intelligence, to ingratiate itself with the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's KGB was later criticized by an insider for failing to pay attention to major international events and regularly reporting the positive reaction of Third World communist parties to Brezhnev's speeches.\textsuperscript{107} Perhaps it was this type of reporting which helped to convince Brezhnev of the need to expand the KGB's role and presumably budget.

The KGB was one of the key players abroad, and this was an important component of foreign policy implementation. Involvement of officers ranged from participation in active measures and support of wars of national liberation to gathering intelligence under cover as diplomats, trade representatives or journalists. Given the covert nature of the KGB's field activity, it would appear that officers enjoyed some margin for improvising on orders from Moscow. One defector noted that while there "was a great deal of room for innovation...we generally would not take the initiative without first receiving authorization from the center."\textsuperscript{108} On the other hand, exceeding authority in the field was not necessarily easy for the center to detect. He admitted, while success of field operations was of vital importance in evaluations of personnel, "measuring success is sometimes

\textsuperscript{107}Michael Waller, \textit{Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today}, \textit{op. cit.}, 137.

\textsuperscript{108}Stanislav Levchenko interview in appendix of Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, \textit{Dezinformatsia, op. cit.}, p. 183.
which sounds both as if some of the "innovation" he refers to could have gone undetected and as if officers could have claimed that their efforts had led to the occurrence of events abroad considered good for the Soviet Union.

The KGB's and ID's common interests -- serving and strengthening the Party -- meant that they reinforced each other institutionally in influencing foreign affairs policymaking. They both had recourse to the argument that their actions served the interests of extending the influence of the CPSU and Soviet Union around the world, an argument that the MFA was unable to counter, for example, when MFA officials disapproved of some Soviet efforts in the Third World.

The Role of Research Institutes and the Media

Social science research institutes such as the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (hereafter, USA-Canada Institute) or the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (known commonly by its acronym from the Russian, IMEMO) played only limited roles in Soviet foreign policymaking. Specialists served in various capacities: as the source of ideas for policy, as the exponents of intellectual arguments supporting existing policy, and as the publicists of existing policy.

Typically, the input of research institutes occurred in two ways: on an ad hoc basis, for example, after being called upon to produce a report on a specific foreign-policy issue or through the research

\[^{109}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 183.\]
output of these institutes, in the form of published journals, books, and unpublished analyses. These publications were sent to the Central Committee International Department, which could request specific studies as well as determine the direction of research through participation on the journals' editorial boards. The MFA and staff of the general secretary could also commission work. The final say over what the institute published was held by the CC Propaganda Department, although its role was more of a formal nature than one of day-to-day control.

In addition to the work of academic institutions as organizations, some top institute officials enjoyed access to the Soviet leadership. A good example is Georgii Arbatov, who was frequently called upon to advise Brezhnev and his two immediate successors. Arbatov, who was also a member of the Central Committee and a former consultant in the Socialist Countries Department under Andropov, enjoyed access to

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114Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., p. 18. The Propaganda Department's role was not universally evaluated by the defectors from which this RAND study draws its information. Some claimed that the Propaganda Department was responsible for evaluating the impact of foreign affairs articles on the domestic Soviet audience.
the top Soviet leadership up to the level of general secretary.

Access to policymakers was only one measure of the impact of academics on foreign policy. Another question was whether these researchers had latitude or inclination to tell the top leadership anything other than what it supposedly wanted to hear. Here it appears much of the analytic output was aimed at rationalizing existing policy and finding a basis for it in Marxism-Leninism. Such an approach could sometimes be attributed to the presence of censorship, but other factors could also not be excluded, such as the ingrained role of ideology or the researchers' preoccupation with retaining access and their prized place in academic research, which often featured the chance to travel abroad for longer periods. 115 Malcolm has highlighted the tension between the scholars and the politicians, noting that while Soviet society laid emphasis on the contribution of science to policymaking, the relationship between foreign policy specialists and politicians was complicated by the systemic pressure to keep advocacy of change to a minimum.116

The attractiveness of the academic jobs meant the presence in institutes of no small number of children of Party officials, and they were likely to remain docile and supportive of existing approaches.117 This was especially the case of the MFA's own Moscow State Institute of Foreign Affairs, the training school for Soviet diplomats, and a fertile recruiting ground for

116 Ibid., p. 160.
117 Ibid, pp. 16, 150-161.
Therefore many of the same problems that existed in other parts of the Soviet system could be found in the relationship between academic research and policymaking: Deviation from the norm was discouraged.

There were, of course, exceptions to the general pattern, as can be found at various times and in various institutions. At IMEMO in the 1960s, analyses differed in obvious ways from official Soviet thinking offering a "more nuanced image of capitalism... a more complex view of the international system... [and] arguing for a 'scientific approach' to foreign policy." The latter point may have been aimed at increasing the role of researchers' analyses in policymaking, just as was the USA-Canada Institute's encouragement of greater contacts with and knowledge of the United States as a method of improving US-Soviet relations.

The work of the research institutes would have benefited by access to diplomatic post, classified information, and significant amounts of information from abroad. Institutes, as a whole, were considered too large and insufficiently secure to be entrusted with the necessary classified information from which to produce realistic analysis.

Different types of limitations hindered the influence by the Soviet media over foreign policy.
choices. The role of the mass media was to represent official views -- either those that originated from top Party figures or those which percolated to the top from specialists and were sanctioned by top Party figures. The position of editor-in-chief of publications was controlled by Party hierarchs (at the Politburo, CC Secretariat, or CC Department level), and editors-in-chief were primarily responsible for censorship. General guidelines for the views to be published were communicated to senior editors of the central press in biweekly instructional conferences held by CC Propaganda Department officials.

The proximity of the media to Soviet officialdom could also be seen in career patterns. It was not unusual to see top officials traveling in an orbit of senior positions in the media, at the Foreign Ministry, in research institutes, or in some of the Central Committee Departments.

The use of the mass media as a forum for genuine debate of foreign policy issues -- either among top officials or among journalists attempting to influence policy -- was a relatively rare event. Occasionally, debates on specific foreign policy issues were encouraged by the top leadership when officials felt that alternative policy options might be unearthed and

122 Ibid., p. 15.
123 One example can be found in Valentin Falin (CC Information Department, CC International Information Department, Foreign Ministry/Ambassador to West Germany, head of Novosti News Agency and Gostelradio, and head of International Department).
that a debate would not harm the situation. More rarely, splits in the top leadership were argued out in the mass media. The Brezhnev era leadership imposed a strict clearance system on the utterances of official statements in public and their publication. Any published statements could be assumed to have been cleared by central Party officials, and unsanctioned leaking of information or showing disunity was a serious transgression which could be linked to the decline of some top figures during the Brezhnev era.

While obvious, it bears emphasizing that the subservience of the media to top officials meant that whatever foreign policy move was initiated, the media would publish something in support of it. The Soviet leadership thus enjoyed a far wider choice of action than its Western counterparts, whose policies had to be considered in light of the bureaucrat's maxim: "Don't do or say anything that you wouldn't want to appear on the front page of the New York Times."

How Useful is the Bureaucratic Politics Model?

This chapter is used as a basis for assembling information about the legacy of Soviet foreign policy formulation and how it might affect democratizing Russia. At the same time, for the relevance of future

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125 On the behavior of Soviet newspapers and journals during the period before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, op. cit., pp. 34-36.

discussions, it is useful to analyze the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model to Soviet foreign policy.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we can expect the bureaucratic politics model to aid in the analysis of Soviet foreign policy. The way in which institutional interests operated in the USSR was certainly different than the way they operated in the West, mainly because of authoritarian, one-party rule. But these differences do not render the bureaucratic politics model useless.

The most important element of the Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko period making the bureaucratic politics model a useful tool was the orderly nature of intragovernmental conflict. Action channels and standard operating procedures, as described by Allison, could be detected. These, as Allison hypothesized, gave way to "concerted action by large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic cues."127 The frank discussions of foreign policy decisions in the International Department, the habit of pre-arranging Politburo decisions through so-called interrogatory voting, and the division of labor between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Department all indicated a rather strict delineation of functions determining the role played by each institution.

While the bureaucratic politics model can be applied to Soviet foreign policy formulation, it cannot be applied as fully as it has been to US foreign policy formulation. The participation of

Soviet intelligence officers in the oversight of their agencies meant that intelligence organs enjoyed a wide range for action unencumbered by serious outside oversight.

The potential for decisions to be taken by one or a few individuals is another aspect of the Soviet system which does not mesh well with the bureaucratic politics model. As noted above, the overlapping membership in the Politburo and Secretariat meant that it was entirely possible for a Central Committee Secretary who sat on the Politburo to guide a decision from beginning to end -- making decisions, for example, ranging from whether to promote or bury the Foreign Ministry's analysis of a foreign policy problem to deciding whether to lobby for the issue to be taken up by the Politburo. In this way, the "cutting up" and "parceling out" of decisions, as described by Allison, would not occur or only occur in a much smaller circle of participants. The handling of the decision to invade Afghanistan by a subset of the Politburo is an example of this phenomenon. The pattern of working in policymaking "troikas" also exemplifies this shrinking of the circle of decisionmakers, although the term "troika" undoubtedly understates the number of people involved in the vast array of day-to-day issues handled by these troikas.

A notable exception to the pattern of small groups dominating single foreign policy issues was the tendency to avoid responsibility and therefore to distribute it. This derived not only from the element of fear resulting from the political repression of the

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128 Ibid., p. 80.
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Soviet system but also from the fact that so much of a bureaucrat's livelihood accrued from his position.

There was another important exception to the notion that foreign policy issues could be dominated by an individual well placed to play a role at all three levels of policymaking: Playing multiple roles was no guarantee to prevailing in the policymaking process. As the case of Ponomarev's and Suslov's failed opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia shows, influence did not necessary increase in proportion to the quantity of responsibilities an official enjoyed.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the absence of democracy and the rule of law in the Soviet system affected the applicability of the bureaucrat politics model. Allison and Halperin noted the importance of the government being freely elected and open to expressions of public interest and pressure,129 and Soviet officials were not constrained by public opinions.

At the same time, the presence of authoritarian rule enhanced the applicability of the model in unexpected ways. Authoritarian rule was responsible in part for the internal logic of Soviet foreign policy formulation system, prompting institutions and individuals to function in many of the same ways described by Allison. Standard operating procedures, action channels, and least-common-denominator solutions were all features of Soviet foreign policy formulation not because of fear that the media might

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publicize information about a botched foreign policy decision, but because an apparatchik might be held accountable for his failures by his superior in the Soviet Union's unforgiving authoritarian system.
Between 1985 and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, governing institutions changed radically in the USSR. All-union structures as well as republic-level governing organs were partially democratized, the control of the Party was weakened and then virtually eliminated, and the circle of people involved in policymaking in general, and foreign policy in particular, was expanded. It was in this climate of change that Russia began to develop its own independent foreign policy from the platform of Russian republican governing structures.

The changes introduced during the Gorbachev period stand out as a watershed in the history of the Soviet Union. The breaking down of the old order, even when one recognizes the disorganized and halting process under which it occurred, meant a sea change for the Soviet system unparalleled by any other period of reform in Soviet history.

While the process of breaking down the pre-Gorbachev structures can be readily analyzed, the implications of the process of building up new institutions during the Gorbachev period are more difficult to judge. There was not one set of changes under Gorbachev but many, meaning little time for sustained functioning of new bodies and routines. Thus, without minimizing the monumental nature of Gorbachev's
changes, it must also be noted that many of the new institutions he established were eliminated by a new wave of change before they could be tested. Ultimately, the collapse of the USSR meant that the polity created by Gorbachev also collapsed before any sustained functioning of the new institutions could be observed.

In terms of applying the bureaucratic politics model, this situation of rapid and profound institutional change is generally problematic, for reasons which will become more obvious below. Rapid and profound change means the disruption if not elimination of standard operating procedures and action channels. Allison's maxim, "if a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing...an action only marginally different," frequently loses its descriptive power in analysis of the Gorbachev period if only for the reason that organizations did not always exist "yesterday" and therefore could not have been performing an action "only marginally different."

The handling of foreign policymaking under Gorbachev is, in spite of the unfinished nature of the reforms, a major point of interest in studying contemporary Russia's foreign policy. The Gorbachev period, understood as part of Russia's transition away from totalitarianism and toward democracy, represents a vital historical link between the "era of stagnation" and the birth of independent Russia. Furthermore, the way that the Soviet system responded to reform is instructive in understanding the continuing reform process in independent Russia.

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This chapter analyzes the roles of the dominant actors in foreign policymaking first at the all-Union level and then at the Russian republic level during the last years of the Soviet Union's existence. The primary question this analysis seeks to answer is whether the process of foreign policymaking under Gorbachev can be explained with reference to the bureaucratic politics model. In addition, this chapter lays the groundwork for understanding how independent Russia's foreign policymaking institutions were reformed or created.

The Political Backdrop

"New political thinking" was the term which came to stand for the new approach to politics pursued under Gorbachev. In foreign relations, its central ideas can be summarized as follows: First, the world is living in the threat of nuclear war. Second, global problems -- including unresolved social problems -- will find solution only in joint approaches and solutions. Third, the nations of the world are more interdependent than ever before. Fourth, the spiraling arms race makes conventional and nuclear war more likely. Finally, the latter would leave no survivors, thus war can no longer be viewed as the continuation of politics by other means.2

These broad guidelines, in some cases new and in other cases re-tooled, came to dislodge previous principles established by the CPSU about how the Soviet Union should conduct its foreign relations. It was under these headings that other changes were introduced into the Soviet Union's foreign relations.

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In essence, the ideas and writings challenging the standard ideological interpretations and approaches had the effect of putting Soviet ideology itself, and foreign affairs conduct more generally, on the political agenda for discussion, debate, and action. Thus by turning to such basic questions as these, the problem recognition phase of foreign policymaking under Gorbachev came to encompass a much larger range of issues.

The emphasis on the threat of social problems -- ills which were no longer attributed exclusively to capitalism and imperialism -- marked a major departure from the rhetoric of previous leaders. Major speeches by Soviet leaders in the late 1970s or early 1980s would have argued that Western countries could expect to pay for the problems unleashed by capitalism and imperialism. The notion that the arms race was increasing the threat of war was not entirely new, but it laid the ideological basis for the Soviet Union's acceptance of disproportionately large cuts in its arsenal in the process of arms control, something that would have been unthinkable in the past. It also opened the way for the abandonment of the Soviet Union's claim to possess an arsenal capable of combating the largest coalition of its enemies.

What was entirely new under Gorbachev was the concept of joint solutions to global problems, notwithstanding the socio-economic orientation of a given country. Gorbachev placed particular emphasis in his speeches on the need for cooperative solutions for environmental problems. With these new principles, Gorbachev started to change the Soviet Union's view of the world and its own image in world politics.
Such a radical departure from previous ways of thinking did not happen suddenly and could only occur after a certain amount of dissatisfaction had built up among the country's elite. Gorbachev identified the evolutionary nature of new political thinking in his book *Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World*, remarking:

> I would like to emphasize here that this analysis began a long time before the April [1985 Central Committee] Plenary Meeting. It would be a mistake to think that a month after the Central Committee...elected me General Secretary, there suddenly appeared a group of people who understood everything and knew everything....Such miracles do not occur... [T]he energy for revolutionary change has been accumulating amid our people and in the Party for some time.³

Gorbachev thus tapped into the feelings of dissatisfaction which he shared with other members of the Soviet elite.

The evolutionary nature of the new thinking meant that many of the "new" ideas were not altogether new. They had been expressed in various publications, often obscure ones, and in various shapes, often encoded in the form of a new interpretation of history or an alternative analysis of problems in another socialist country. Some of the best examples of this can be found in Soviet analysts' criticism of China, which could in many cases be applied to the Soviet Union itself.⁴

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Fyodor Burlatsky, the one-time speechwriter for Khrushchev and head of Andropov's Central Committee Consultants Group, had been a prime exponent of this form of esoteric analysis following his clash with Brezhnev's Kremlin. Under Gorbachev, Burlatsky, whose star had already begun to rise under Andropov, found an attentive ear in Gorbachev. Gorbachev is known to have read Burlatsky's newspaper commentaries and probably took these non-traditional ideas into account when forming official policy.

Gorbachev's main method of reforming the Soviet system was to move power away from Party institutions to new or reconstituted governmental structures. By the summer of 1991, the role of the Party in making Soviet foreign policy had been curtailed in a number of ways. Even before March 1990, when the Party lost its constitutional guarantee to a leading role, its participation in decisionmaking had been greatly reduced because of the transfer of power to other institutions.

The Role of the Politburo

The Politburo gradually stopped functioning in the way that it had during the Brezhnev-Chernenko-Andropov period. Meetings lasted much longer in the first years of the Gorbachev era -- up to 10-12 hours rather than the one-hour-long meetings which had previously been the norm. This reflected the vitality of the new Soviet leader. Grinevsky recalled the pattern of "having the little boys fight and the big boys

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intervene." By this he referred to a device used by principle players to open discussion: They arranged for a lower level player (the "little boys") to raise an issue in a controversial way. The "big boys" (or principal players) would then be forced to intervene, providing them an opportunity to express their views more openly. Grinevsky described himself as one of the "little boys" who was regularly pitted by Gorbachev against Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev (another "little boy") on arms control issues. Grinevsky claims that Akhromeyev ultimately lost his temper, at which point Gorbachev would request that he rethink his position. This device enabled Gorbachev to achieve major arms control cuts, according to Grinevsky.

At a certain point, however, Politburo meetings had lost their utility for Gorbachev. In the process of reducing the influence of the Party and working toward making the Soviet policy more democratic, Gorbachev increased the membership of the Politburo. It had become, by July 1990, a much larger body including a member from each of the 15 union republics. At the same time, the Politburo's new composition also excluded many prominent, Moscow-based policymakers. This new composition inclined the body to meet less frequently since most members resided outside of Moscow. Likewise, it was more prone to discussing domestic political issues not only because foreign policy questions frequently followed a timetable set by international events rather than by Moscow, but also because the

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7 Author's interview with Oleg Grinevsky, 17 December 1993, Ebenhausen, Germany.
8 Ibid.
question of the republics' relationship with the center was all important by this time.

Between July 1990 and April 1991, the Politburo reportedly met no more than four or five times. But even before its enlargement, its impact on foreign policy formulation had been reduced. The elimination of the Party's leading role largely dissolved the basis of the Politburo's claim to power. Furthermore, Gorbachev had little use of the advice of a body that included some of his staunchest political foes, especially when he had created other forums with which he could consult and from which he could rule.

As will be discussed in more detail below, Gorbachev had assumed control of many major and minor foreign policy questions early on, making decisions on the spot with foreign partners, often without consulting his associates in the Politburo or against their preferences. This reflected a number of circumstances: the institutional decay which resulted from the disruption or elimination of action channels and standard operating procedures, Gorbachev's desire to control the agenda (and even manage his own calendar), and Gorbachev's personal frustration with the domestic resistance to reform. When presented with an opportunity in a one-on-one meeting with a top foreign leader to push forward on a foreign policy issue, Gorbachev's inclination was to do so, sometimes in ways that had not been discussed with the top Soviet leadership in advance.

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A good example of this can be found in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in April 1987 when Gorbachev agreed, in discussions with US Secretary of State George Shultz, to scrap missiles that the Soviet side had previously excluded from the negotiations (the SS-23s). According to Anatolii Dobrynin, who was present at the Gorbachev-Shultz meeting, Gorbachev alone decided to take this step, going against the advice of both Dobrynin and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev. When Akhromeyev later asked Gorbachev about the change of position, Gorbachev reportedly said that he had forgotten about the advice Akhromeyev had given him. Akhromeyev reportedly joked later, at the conclusion of the INF treaty talks in November 1987, that "he might have to seek asylum in neutral Switzerland," perhaps because of his frank opposition to Gorbachev's approach to the INF treaty.

The Role of the Central Committee

The Central Committee's functions were reduced. The International Department's role had been disrupted by various organizational and personnel changes. The appointment of Anatolii Dobrynin in 1986 to head the ID meant that it was abruptly put in the hands of someone who had not only been skeptical of its past utility, but who was also largely unfamiliar with the day-to-day workings of the Central Committee departments and their

13George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, op. cit., p. 1006.
channels of influence.\textsuperscript{14} Having spent nearly his entire career in the MFA and the previous 22 years as the USSR's ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin seemed not to have known what to do in this job. He was reluctant to accept Gorbachev's appointment to the position, and at first attempted to turn it down.\textsuperscript{15}

Gorbachev's insistence that Dobrynin take the job probably had as much to do with the general secretary's plans for US-Soviet relations as it did with his plans for the International Department. It seems clear that Gorbachev wanted to dislodge Dobrynin from Washington in order to remove his powerful influence over US-Soviet relations. Gorbachev had first attempted to bring Dobrynin back to Moscow in 1985, suggesting that a position as deputy foreign minister might open up for him, a position which Dobrynin diplomatically declined. Dobrynin had been the backbone of US-Soviet relations for decades and was accustomed to working via the back channel with relative independence from Moscow. His good relationship with his long-time boss, Andrei Gromyko, whose influence was being curtailed by Gorbachev, meant that Dobrynin might prove resistant to taking instructions from his new bosses, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, both of whom had little experience in foreign affairs.

Given the importance of relations with the United States and the fact that nuclear arms control was the key foreign policy issue in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev preferred to have someone in Washington with less experience and more inclination to follow instructions

\textsuperscript{14}Anatoly Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, op. cit., pp. 404-405.
\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 601.
from Moscow rather than trying to push Soviet policy in specific directions of his own choosing. Yurii Dubinin, Dobrynin's replacement, was no newcomer to diplomacy, but in Washington he was far less experienced than his predecessor.¹⁶

Dobrynin's disinclination to head the International Department was reflected in his performance. Former staffers claimed that he never became comfortable in the job.¹⁷ It appears that since he had been an outsider in Moscow for so many years and did not value the efforts of the ID, he and the organization remained alien to each other. After two years he was replaced by Valentin Falin, who had experience in both Central Committee and MFA work. Falin had worked at the Central Committee's Information Department during its two years of existence from 1958 to 1959. He served as the Soviet ambassador to West Germany in the 1970s and then returned to Central Committee work as the deputy director of the International Information Department.¹⁸

Not only did the circumstances within the International Department change, the Central Committee as a whole was reorganized as well. In 1988, Gorbachev created six commissions to supervise a reduced number of Central Committee departments. The Commission on Questions of International Policy was created to handle foreign policy matters, and it was put under the leadership of Alexander Yakovlev, a full member of the


¹⁷Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, 18 December 1992.

Politburo and Gorbachev's closest adviser. The Commission was mandated to meet quarterly and was assigned 23 members, all with full-time jobs elsewhere. Its membership was mixed in terms of expertise. Among its foreign policy experts were Evgenii Primakov (Head of the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations), Georgii Arbatov (Head of Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada), Anatolii Chernyaev (Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser), Valentin Falin (Head of the International Department), Anatolii Kovalev (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Valentin Nikiforov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), as well as Yakovlev. Other top officials included Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev, Vice President of the Academy of Sciences Evgenii Velikhov, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Izvestiya editor Ivan Laptev. Several members also represented the republics.

The Commission was charged with analyzing and discussing problems of foreign policy, and it was expected to make decisions collectively during meetings. It was also envisaged that working groups could be created to discuss specific issues. But in practice, the Commission never actually functioned in any serious way that could be said to have affected, much less controlled, the Soviet Union's foreign policy formulation. It met only a few times during its brief existence. This example shows that new institutions did not simply take up where old ones left off by adopting previously-existing patterns of behavior or by

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20 Ibid.
fulfilling the same or similar policy tasks. Nor, as this example shows, were all of the new institutions quick to establish new patterns of behavior or even a role in policymaking. In such a situation, it is easy to understand why new standard operating procedures and action channels were never developed.

During the series of reforms in September 1988, the International Department took over the functions of two other Central Committee departments dealing with foreign affairs: the Cadres Abroad Department and the Socialist Countries Department. (The International Information Department, the fourth of the four CC departments dealing with foreign policy, had already been eliminated in a reorganization taking place in March 1986 at the 27th Party Congress.) Thus while the ID had become the only remaining Central Committee department dealing with foreign affairs, the restructuring had thrown the ID into such a state of flux that it was unable to mobilize its potential new influence over foreign affairs policy and translate it into actual policy.

The ID's failure to move quickly into a new role was not entirely the result of its institutional inertia. The ID was, despite the accretion of its responsibilities, also disadvantaged by the concomitant exclusion from some of the perquisites it had previously enjoyed. Gorbachev's goal of moving power away from the Party meant the weakening of Central Committee departments. This had a decisive impact on day-to-day operations of the International Department. Among other things, it stopped receiving diplomatic

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cable traffic, meaning it was cut off from valuable information about the latest developments and undertakings in Soviet diplomacy.\textsuperscript{22} Over the next two years, the number of International Department employees shrank to one-third of its size in 1987.\textsuperscript{23} The final blow for the ID as an institution came after the August coup, when Gorbachev disbanded the Central Committee. What remained of the staff went to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, which later became the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{The Role of the Legislature and Government}

The new legislative bodies were the primary recipients of the power lost by the Party, making lawmakers suddenly meaningful players in the political process as opposed to mere pawns of the CPSU as they had been in the past. The Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) had become in 1989 the new "supreme organ of state power," with the exclusive powers, among other things, to determine changes in the USSR's internal and external borders and to decide the general direction of domestic and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{25} The Congress of People's Deputies was mandated to meet only once per year, thus the day-to-day legislative work was to be handled by the reconstituted Supreme Soviet which was elected from the membership of the CPD, to act as "the permanently

\textsuperscript{22}Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 454.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 478.
\textsuperscript{24}Author's interview with Evgeni Novikov, 20 December 1991.
\textsuperscript{25}The amendments to the constitution defining the role of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet presidium are found in "USSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution," Stroitel'naya gazeta, 3 December 1988, pp. 1-2. The amendments to the constitution defining the role of the USSR president are found in "Law on the Creation of the Post of President of the USSR and Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution," Pravda, 16 March 1990, pp. 1-3.
The composition of the CPD and Supreme Soviet was determined by multi-candidate elections and secret ballot, making these elections not fully democratic, but far more democratic than before.26 When taken as a whole, the new procedures for electing legislative organs meant that the legislative branch would be more representative and more accountable than its predecessors. In contrast to the previously-existing legislative organs, which did not even utilize their limited powers as granted by the Constitution, the new legislative bodies were given and utilized actual policymaking authority.

Since the day-to-day work of the legislature was done by the Supreme Soviet, many practical powers relating to foreign policy formulation were vested in this body. Its committees became involved in discussing foreign policy matters for the purpose of actually analyzing foreign policy questions, not simply confirming decisions taken by the Party. The Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs viewed its new role as a serious one, far different from that of the old Supreme Soviet's committee. As Alexander Dzasokhov, the chairman of the new committee, told the Soviet journal International Affairs about a year after the new parliamentary structures had been set up that deputies were "working to elaborate, realize, prognosticate, and control foreign policy," in contrast

26Secret balloting had been possible under the old system, but it was rarely used. Slots were reserved for public organizations including a large share for the CPSU, which gave the Party a guaranteed bloc of seats.
to the past, when "serious discussions were confined to one sector of the political system, the Party."  

Evidence that the Supreme Soviet took its role seriously could be seen in deputies' lengthy debates and sharp criticism of certain policy choices. They viewed negatively the Soviet Union's condemnation of Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Similarly, they questioned whether the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations was empowered to vote in the Security Council regarding the use of international force without the Supreme Soviet's approval. The Supreme Soviet also showed that it took its powers of treaty ratification seriously on the question of approving the treaties associated with German reunification.

The Role of the President

In some ways, the process of creating an independent, democratic legislature with real policymaking powers was interrupted by the establishment, one year later, of the institution of the presidency. Many of the powers assigned to the chairman of its Presidium, a position occupied by Gorbachev, followed him to the position of USSR president, created in March 1990.

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30"USSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution," Stroitel'naya gazeta, 3 December 1988, pp. 1-2, and "Law on the Creation of the Post of President of the USSR and Changes and
The new distribution of powers, related to foreign policy formulation, was as follows: The Supreme Soviet had the right to confirm, but no longer name, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. It retained the right to deliver votes of confidence in the Council of Ministers at its request. It retained the right to confirm and oversee the implementation of the state budget, to ratify and denounce international treaties, and to determine basic measures in defense and state security. But it lost to the president the right to conduct international negotiations, to declare partial or full mobilization of military forces, as well as to declare war. As for using Soviet troops to fulfill international treaty obligations, the Supreme Soviet retained the right to make decisions on this.

In addition to the powers vested in the presidency mentioned above, the president also acted as the head of the USSR government and had the right to issue decrees with mandatory force throughout the territory of the country. He was empowered to "take the necessary measures to preserve the sovereignty of the [USSR and its] republics, the security and territorial integrity of the country." He had the right to represent the USSR in domestic and foreign relations, and he was called upon to "guarantee the coordination and cooperation of the highest organs of government power and administration of the USSR." The president was also made the coordinator of the state security organs and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was explicitly empowered to carry out international


31 "Law on the Creation of the Post of President of the USSR and Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution," Pravda, 16 March 1990, pp. 1-3.
negotiations and sign treaties for the USSR, and only at the president's discretion could these powers be transferred to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet or chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Executive bodies were also added to the president's purview to aid him in governing. The USSR Federation Council, headed by the president, was set up to study and make recommendations on the nationalities policy of the Soviet government.32 The Presidential Council of the USSR, which was attached to the president, was charged with "working out measures to realize the basic direction of internal and foreign policy of the USSR and guarantee the security of the country."33 Members were named by the president, the only statutory member being the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Gorbachev appointed his 16-member Presidential Council in March 1990, a few weeks after the CPD elected him to the post of executive president. It was an eclectic grouping of intellectuals and policymakers.34

The Security Council came into operation in March 1991 and was headed by Gorbachev. It replaced the Presidential Council, which, owing to its size and composition, had not functioned in the way that Gorbachev wanted it to. The Security Council, which was chaired by Gorbachev, gathered prominent policymakers, who were confirmed by the Supreme Soviet.35

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 They were Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov, Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Vice
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Security Council was intended to be concerned broadly with security affairs. Gorbachev expected it to play a major role in policymaking, saying, on the occasion of the confirmation of its nine members, that the new body would "operate day-to-day with a brief of security in the widest possible sense."\(^{36}\) In fact, though, since many of its members were later implicated in the August 1991 coup attempt, the Security Council effectively doomed the USSR presidency to short existence.

According to the constitutional amendments setting up the body, it was intended to draft recommendations for implementing the all-Union policies in the realms of defense and security, including questions in the realms of economics, the environment, and the law and order of the country, thus giving the body extensive powers.\(^{37}\) It was also given the authority to set up interagency commissions on key issues.\(^{38}\) As it turned out, though, the most pressing threat to the security of the country was emerging in the domestic political arena: separatism. Thus the Security Council's actual work (with the exception of the August coup attempt) between the confirmation of its nine members in March 1991 and its reconstitution following the August coup was coordinating the central government's efforts to

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President Gennady Yanaev, Interior Minister Boriss Pugo, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, former Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, Foreign Policy Adviser Yevgenii Primakov, who was rejected on the first round of voting. One other candidate (Gorbachev's Chief of Staff Valerii Boldin) did not receive confirmation or membership. Michael Parks, "Legislature Fights Gorbachev on Security Council Nominees," Los Angeles Times, 8 March 1991, dateline Moscow.  
\(^{36}\)Ibid.  
hold the union together. A similar problem befell independent Russia's Security Council, as will be discussed in more detail in chapters four and five.

Gorbachev’s creation of presidential structures also included an expansion of his executive staff. Valerii Boldin became his chief of staff in early 1990 after Gorbachev’s election to the executive presidency. Boldin came to the post from the Central Committee’s General Department (where he continued working concurrently). In both positions, Boldin held a great deal of sway in terms of determining which information would flow to Gorbachev. Boldin gained even more power when he was named to the Presidential Council and would have acquired still more had he been confirmed a member of the Security Council, as Gorbachev sought without success.

As president of the USSR, Gorbachev’s reliance on personal aides grew. Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, who had been the foreign policy adviser to Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, was dismissed by Gorbachev during his first year in power because the veteran adviser had the tendency to lecture Gorbachev. Instead, Gorbachev relied on his own hand-picked team, some of whom were quite influential in the reform of the Soviet worldview and system. Alexander Yakovlev’s role in reforming

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Soviet domestic and international policy was paramount from the beginning of Gorbachev's term. As a top adviser on domestic and foreign-policy issues, Yakovlev was from early on the author of many of the ideas that went into new political thinking. Significantly, his influence over Gorbachev preceded the accrual of a significant official role in the Soviet system, although this came rapidly as well. (Yakovlev was elevated from the position of director of a respected Moscow research institute to a full member in the Politburo within four years.)

The personal ties between Gorbachev and Yakovlev played a significant part in the latter's rising influence. Yakovlev had come to know Gorbachev in the summer of 1983, when the former was in his tenth year as Soviet ambassador to Canada and the latter was on an official visit in Ottawa. Some observers believe that it was Gorbachev who arranged for Yakovlev to take over the directorship of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in September 1983, a few months after their meeting in Ottawa. Whatever the genesis of this appointment, it soon became clear that Yakovlev was a major source of Gorbachev's ideas about reform, channeling not only his own ideas but also analyses of researchers at IMEMO. Between 1983 and 1985, IMEMO began publishing articles more forcefully advocating the kinds of ideas that became part of Gorbachev's program. Even before Yakovlev became a Central

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Committee secretary in early 1986, he worked closely with Gorbachev on policy formation and the writing of speeches having to do with domestic and foreign affairs.46

Yakovlev's background gave him qualities that had previously not been characteristic of top figures in the Soviet hierarchy. He had lived for many years abroad,47 and had shown a willingness to challenge the system both in his early days as a party functionary and while running the Soviet embassy in Canada. In the 1970s, he had lost favor within the Party as the acting head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, at which point he was honorably exiled to an ambassadorial post, by his own request, to an English-speaking country.48 Having experienced life abroad, Yakovlev could compare the Soviet system to that of other countries in the world, especially the capitalist world, about which information in the Soviet Union was skewed. His early discontent with the Party apparently fueled his enthusiasm for domestic political reform.

Anatolii Chernyaev was Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser from early 1986 until Gorbachev's resignation. Gorbachev and Chernyaev had been acquainted prior to 1986, but it was Alexander Yakovlev's recommendation which determined Chernyaev's appointment to replace long-time Kremlin foreign policy adviser Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov.49 Chernyaev, like Gorbachev, met Yakovlev during a trip to Ottawa; there, Chernyaev recalls, he discovered that he and Yakovlev were

47He had also studied at Columbia University in New York.
49Anatolii Chernyaev, Shest' Let s Gorbachevim, op. cit., p. 7.
"kindred souls." Chernyaev had been the deputy director of the International Department from the early 1950s following a period of teaching at Moscow State University. During his time at the Central Committee he also worked both as a konsultant and on the staff of the World Marxist Review, experiences which exposed Chernyaev to uncensored information and to the opportunity to speak his mind freely in an official setting.

Georgii Shakhnazarov joined Gorbachev's staff only in 1988, but there is evidence that the work of this former Central Committee apparatchik (in the department for socialist countries) and leading scholar played a part in the development of Gorbachev's reform program prior to that. Brown has noted that upon meeting Gorbachev for the first time, Shakhnazarov "was surprised to discover that the latter already knew him from his books, which, quite untypically for a secretary of the Central Committee, Gorbachev had read." Like Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov had served on the staff of the World Marxist Review in Prague and had been a member of Andropov's Consultant's Group in the Central Committee's Socialist Countries Department. All of these experiences taken together meant that Shakhnazarov, like other members of Gorbachev's team, approached problems from an untraditional perspective.

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Gorbachev's corps of aides grew to a high of some 200 people before tapering off to about 50 by the end of his presidency. His aides were an important source for discussions about policy, substituting in many cases for the discussions with his ministers and legislators. This may be why the latter were dissatisfied with Gorbachev's frequent failure to consult or to accept their advice. In some cases, Gorbachev took the opposite approach after hearing advice, much to the disappointment of other Soviet officials. As discussions in subsequent chapters will reveal, the tendency by Gorbachev to rely on people within his presidential staff was repeated in an even more elaborate form by Boris Yeltsin.

Offering a post-Gorbachev era review of his former boss's personal leadership style, Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser Anatolii Chernyaev remarked that Gorbachev had a "tendency to seek compromise..., bring peace everywhere... [and] a readiness to accept what he does not really approve of." If Chernyaev's analysis is correct, this may explain why Gorbachev sometimes listened to but then ignored the advice of his ministers and aides during discussions with foreign leaders.

The Role of the Intelligence Services

The KGB maintained many of its previous channels for influencing foreign policy formulation under Gorbachev. Security services were virtually untouched by reform, despite the reorganization of most other domestic structures. Rather than shrinking, additional personnel was absorbed from CPSU structures as they were scaled back. As was noted above, following the August 1991 coup, the KGB's First Chief Directorate began taking over some of the staff and assets of the International Department. Owing to their close collaboration in the past, the First Chief Directorate was a natural place for these people to go after the Central Committee was disbanded.

The reduction of Soviet interest in the Third World presumably meant an overall lessening of security organs' operations there, albeit, with some exceptions.\(^{58}\) One thing is certain, however: There was additional work to be done in other areas. The intense warming in relations with the West as a result of Gorbachev's new thinking redounded to the KGB's activities in the West. Thus, as with the period of détente, the relaxation of East-West relations under Gorbachev opened the way for more responsibilities and opportunities for the KGB rather than fewer.

The KGB's position as an actor in domestic and foreign-affairs policymaking continued to give it a unique, dual role. The KGB had an ambivalent relationship to Gorbachev's overall reform program: On the one hand, the KGB had much to gain in terms of international operations through the opening of

relations with the West. But on the other hand, relaxation of the Soviet totalitarian system stood to threaten the KGB's domestic status as the guardian of the Party. There was KGB resistance to domestic change, which had an impact on its contribution to foreign policy formulation. For example, the KGB sought to use its participation in the foreign policy formulation process to influence Soviet domestic politics. Gorbachev said that on occasions when he was on the verge of a major decision, he would receive warnings from both the KGB's First Chief Directorate as well as from military intelligence about some dire Western threat to the Soviet Union. After a certain point, Gorbachev claimed he could predict "absolutely" what they were going to send him and when.59 If Gorbachev's claims are true, it must mean that at some point KGB information became of dubious value to him, causing the organization's influence to decline. Thus, the KGB reduced rather than expanded its influence.

Significantly, there was not a dramatic increase in oversight of security organs' activities. The role of the Party in the oversight process was reduced and taken up by the newly-formed bodies such as the reconstituted Supreme Soviet and the USSR Security Council. But both were in their own ways ineffective. Legislative committees concerned with intelligence oversight were populated by former intelligence personnel who were disinclined to place controls on the KGB. The USSR Security Council, nearly all of whose members either participated in or supported the August 1991 putsch, proved to be more interested in reversing reform rather than moving forward with it. New controls

on the intelligence services were thus not a concern for the Security Council.

A few months after the August 1991 coup attempt, the KGB was officially abolished (in November 1991) and five separate follow-on agencies replaced it, but most of the staff was retained, even after Russia took over control of the KGB's successors in December 1991. The result was the retention of old personnel.

Without detailed information about how much or what aspects of the old KGB operations survived, it is difficult to determine how much of the institutional memory of the KGB was retained or which established patterns of participation in foreign policy formulation were carried over. It is possible to surmise, however, that the closed nature of intelligence organizations in general, and of KGB follow-on organizations in particular, meant that they were under no public pressure to change patterns of behavior established in the past.

The Role of the Military

During the Gorbachev period, the influence of the uniformed military and defense industry first went through a period of radical decline and then resurgence. During the first part of the Gorbachev era, the military establishment's role in foreign policy formulation was downgraded from its previously predominant position in making national security policy. Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, was not prone to defending the interests of the defense industrial complex. Nor did Gorbachev feel beholden to the uniformed military during his first years in power.

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60Ibid., p. 22.
In practical terms, the expansion of the circle of decisionmakers in foreign policy meant that the military establishment lost its virtual guarantee of political support for its programs. In the realm of arms control, where the military had previously enjoyed predominant sway, civilians took over most of the policymaking. Owing to the prominence of arms control as an international relations issue during Gorbachev's period in power, the Soviet leader took a great interest in formulating the Soviet Union's position himself, sometimes on the spot with foreign leaders, as discussed above. This reflected Gorbachev's dynamism and eagerness to achieve breakthroughs in foreign policy, a process which could have been slowed-down with each additional layer of bureaucracy.

The more decisive role played by Soviet legislative bodies under Gorbachev meant that the uniformed military's participation in lawmaking took on more significance. Some of the Supreme Soviet's best known conservative deputies wore the uniforms of the Soviet armed forces, a feature of the Soviet system which made it stand apart from other legislatures around the world.

More significantly, the legislature became the venue for intra-military debates about reform. As Holoboff notes:

Initially there existed an idea that these deputies would form a cohesive lobby in the Soviet parliament for military interests. However, what occurred was in fact the opposite. By late autumn [1989] it became clear that

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specific interest groups within the military existed, and that this would be the main fuel for firing debates on military reform.\textsuperscript{62}

Thus, rather than serving as a platform for monolithic armed forces interests, the legislature became the forum for debating what those interests were.

The military's voice in politics was far from lamed by its own internal discussion, even if that discussion was one conducted publicly in the chambers of the legislature. The fact that Boris Yeltsin chose the Afghanistan war hero Alexander Rutskoi to be his vice presidential candidate in the June 1991 Russian republic presidential elections was a sign that the military's politicization could reach high into positions of executive power.

The downgrading of the Soviet military in Soviet society as a whole and in the Soviet Union's foreign policy formulation was radically reversed toward the end of the Gorbachev era. As Gorbachev came under domestic political pressure, he started making concessions to the military, attempting to win its support in politics. An example of the impact of Gorbachev's politicization of the military can be found in relation to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Following the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, the military insisted that a large portion of CFE-limited equipment be redeployed east of the Urals, out of the geographic range of the treaty. The Soviet Foreign Ministry fiercely refused to accept

such a redeployment, but Gorbachev granted the military its way.63

The Role of the Foreign Ministry

The Soviet Foreign Ministry became a more important player in foreign policy formulation during the Gorbachev period. This was in part due to the occupant of the post of foreign minister from July 1985 to December 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze. There were a number of factors enabling Shevardnadze to bring the Foreign Ministry to the forefront of foreign policymaking. At the outset, his closeness to Gorbachev politically seemed particularly decisive. Shevardnadze shared Gorbachev's disillusionment with the state of the Soviet system and could convey to the outside world the sincerity of the leadership's desire to change that system. Shevardnadze recalled in his memoirs his early days with Gorbachev, before either of them reached international prominence, when they "scarcely talked of anything else" except the "many absurdities of our life."64 This statement revealed the continuing importance of interpersonal contact among Soviet leaders in the process of policy initiation. Discussions taking place in the informal setting of a vacation resort -- not a high-level policy meeting in the Politburo -- were events which shaped the later overhaul of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev.

The solidarity between Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meant that at least initially, before Shevardnadze resigned feeling betrayed by Gorbachev, that foreign

partners could see that Shevardnadze was an interlocutor close to the top leader. In contrast to Gromyko, Shevardnadze was not an inflexible mouthpiece of the Soviet government. Rather, he was someone close enough to Gorbachev to be able to take initiatives with foreign partners, confident, for the most part, that Gorbachev would support these initiatives.

Andrei Gromyko's departure from the Foreign Ministry itself contributed significantly to the change in the Soviet approach to foreign affairs. While Gromyko had shown himself willing to support Gorbachev, delivering a glowing speech nominating Gorbachev to the position of general secretary, he exemplified the type of foreign relations and international image that Gorbachev sought to jettison. Equally important, the change of command at the Foreign Ministry meant that Gromyko's accumulated personal power there could be neatly eliminated and the process of ensuring loyalty to someone of Gorbachev's own choosing begun.

One of the early changes at the Foreign Ministry was to bring academics and institute researchers into the policy engineering phase of the policymaking process. The idea behind the creation of the MFA's Scientific Coordinating Center was to institutionalize the cooperation between institutes and diplomats, although this Center never managed to gain much influence. Other innovations in the Foreign Ministry included the publication of information-rich reports about the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, including detailed chronicles of Soviet foreign relations and

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65See Gromyko's speech to the Central Committee nominating Gorbachev as general secretary in Materiali Vnechernogo Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS. (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 11 March 1985), pp. 6-8.
analysis of topical issues, such as the redefinition of Soviet national interests.\textsuperscript{66} The MFA's structure -- the way geographical lines were drawn between departments -- also changed, thus dividing the world into regions which corresponded more readily to the political map of the world as it appeared during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{67}

The MFA's Moscow State Institute of International Relations, which used to be the channel for entry into a diplomatic career for many children of Party officials, eliminated the requirement for enrollees to be CPSU or Komsomol members. The Institute also officially abolished the quotas designed to ensure various sectors of society would be represented (collective farm workers, factory workers, etc.) and based admission on merit.\textsuperscript{68}

More generally, the upgrading of the MFA in foreign policy decisionmaking occurred because the role of the Party and its institutions had been downgraded. As the above discussion of the International Department indicated, this key Party institution lost much of its access to top decisionmaking early in Gorbachev's tenure. The MFA was thus rid of one of its most serious rivals in determining the USSR's foreign policy course. Ultimately, though, it was the persistent meddling in foreign policy by another rival, the military, which


prompted Shevardnadze to give up his position as foreign minister.⁶⁹

The Role of Research Institutes and the Media

Soviet research institutes acquired new roles in the Gorbachev era owing to the opening up of the Soviet system to increased criticism, information, and input from people outside the inner circle of policymakers. A major change in the flow of information occurred with the partial lifting of secrecy in areas such as data on Soviet force levels and defense budget.⁷⁰ Researchers and journalists were poised to benefit from glasnost and used their fora as platforms to promote new ideas. The change did not occur immediately or completely, but steadily, meaning that Soviet foreign policy was becoming an issue area where outsiders could publicly voice opinions and possibly gain a say in policymaking.

In addition to the impact of glasnost, Gorbachev's reliance on scholars as advisers meant that the academic community was playing a much more active role in policymaking than before. For example, a team of researchers in the Academy of Sciences headed by Vitalii Zhurkin appears to have instigated a discussion of unilateral conventional arms cuts, an idea which ultimately held sway over policy, against the wishes of the military.⁷¹ Whereas earlier, scholars received requests for reports and studies from top Party

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⁶⁹When Shevardnadze resigned in December 1990, he did so with thinly veiled protests about the incursions of the military in politics and warnings of dictatorship. See his resignation speech in Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, op. cit., pp. 201-204.


⁷¹Ibid., p. 19.
officials, academics' work had more clout after their former bosses had become part of the ruling elite.\textsuperscript{72} The channels between Yakovlev and IMEMO were natural ones since he had directed the institute's work, knew its researchers, and was open to contacts with them.

Academy of Sciences research institutions were guaranteed a bloc of votes in the first round of elections to the reconstituted Supreme Soviet.\textsuperscript{73} The aforementioned MFA Scientific Coordinating Center was another new channel for researchers to influence policymaking. The Center's director, Vladimir Shustov, placed emphasis on including more academic researchers in embassies and on negotiating teams\textsuperscript{74}, but as noted above, this Center did not manage to gain much influence primarily because of rapid unraveling of control in the Soviet Union as a whole.

The fact that the new leadership in the Kremlin was more interested in improving East-West relations meant that researchers had the chance to increase contacts with the objects of their study -- countries in the West. The so-called \textit{mezhdunarodniki} (internationalists) who dealt with Western countries would better positioned to make trips abroad and receive information from foreign counterparts in the climate of détente.

Of course, the impact of the Kremlin's policy preferences on the output of scholarly research was, at

\textsuperscript{73}Jeanette Voas, \textit{Preventing Future Afghanistans: Reform in Soviet Policymaking on Military Intervention Abroad}. (Alexandria, Virginia: Center For Naval Analyses, 1990), p. 35.
\textsuperscript{74}Vladimir Shustov, "Diplomacy and Science," \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), April 1990.
some level, still being felt. In the broadest terms, researchers were still telling the leadership what they thought it wanted to hear. The feeling among researchers that they were having only a minimal impact on policy continued. In some cases, they found fulfilling zakazi (orders) for reports from the top leadership a meaningless exercise because "they don't pay attention to them anyway." 75 The migration of some uniformed military strategists into the institutes to study military policy and arms control probably also irritated the veteran civilian analysts, who had long been sidelined on strategic issues by military strategists. 76

The sometimes triangular relationship between academic research, journalism, and positions in policymaking continued to exist in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. As before, prominent journalists sometimes turned up in academic research and then in official policymaking positions. Evgenii Primakov, who went from research to journalism and back to research (as head of IMEMO) before becoming a full-time policymaker is a good example of this.

As was the case in academia, pluralism left some of the media feeling excluded from policymaking. New newspapers were created either by the government or in the small but developing private sector. Moreover, existing newspapers, feeling the decrease in government control, began to editorialize along political lines which were developing in the USSR.

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75 "Inside Gorbachev's Think Tank," World Monitor, op. cit., p. 36.
The media became the forum for all manner of questions, from Stalin's collectivization to the invasion of Afghanistan. As Tolz has pointed out, the eagerness of the media to tackle difficult questions was not surprising given the debates which had taken place in samizdat (underground) literature for years.77

To be sure, the Soviet press did not become completely free under Gorbachev, and irresponsible journalism began to become a problem as state control diminished. For example, news stories sometimes contained more opinion than fact. But, taken as a whole, under Gorbachev the Soviet press was far freer to report and offer policy advocacy than it had been in the past.

The Russian Republic's Foreign Policy Structures

Thus far, this study has said little about the role of the republics in the making of Soviet foreign policy. This reflects the fact that for most of the USSR's existence, the 15 republics' power to contribute to Soviet foreign policy formulation was limited.78

The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), like the other republics, had acquired in 1944 the right to maintain foreign relations and to create its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.79 In addition, the

78 Even the Ukrainian and Belarusian republics, which enjoyed independent seats in the United Nations, were not able to conduct an independent foreign policy contrary to the wishes of the central Soviet government.
1977 RSFSR Constitution included provisions granting limited powers to the Russian republic to maintain its own diplomatic relations. Article 75 of the RSFSR constitution said: "The RSFSR has the right to enter into relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties with them and to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives, and to participate in the activities of international organizations." Article 115 elaborated the provisions for actually doing this: "The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR...ratifies and denounces treaties to which the RSFSR is a party; appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the RSFSR to foreign states and at international organizations; accepts credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited to it." But the USSR constitution made it clear (in Article 73) that the Russian republic could take actions only to the extent that they did not interfere with the central government's preferences. In addition, the margin for the RSFSR to conduct its own foreign policy was obviously limited due to the strictly centralized nature of the USSR, the close identification of goals among officials at the USSR and RSFSR level, and the RSFSR's legal disadvantage if it sought to take any action that challenged the preferences of the USSR leadership.

This situation for Russia and the other republics changed dramatically during the Gorbachev era, as the

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81 Ibid.
levers of Soviet power shifted and began to disintegrate. The RSFSR had the capacity to assert control over the bulk of the USSR's wealth, territory, and population, and it was able, when the time came, to challenge the Soviet authorities for a greater say in the making of foreign policy. It was the authority over the Soviet Union's budget that gave Russia the political power -- including in the realm of foreign policy -- which it needed to assert itself on the global stage. Within a short period of time, Russia was able to displace the USSR as the master of the Kremlin and its foreign policy.

The Russian Foreign Ministry was a small and rather inconsequential organ until the last years of the Soviet Union's existence. Russia had about 30 diplomats during the 1980s, and much of their work was limited to preparing for visits between republican functionaries and provincial counterparts from other federal states. Anything signed on the part of a USSR republic contained the notation that the republic was part of a unitary state, the USSR, and subordinated its policy to that of the central state.82

The Russian MFA was considered a backwater for most in the Soviet diplomatic community. Salaries and privileges were much lower than those that came with jobs at the USSR MFA.83 The Russian Foreign Ministry also received very little information: TASS, some of

82Dmitri Rurikov, "How It All Began: An Essay on New Russia's Foreign Policy," in Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller, Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow. (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 128-128.
83Ibid., p. 136.
the special TASS for government officials, and a few foreign publications.84

While working there often meant being cut off from Soviet diplomatic decisionmaking, positions at the level of deputy minister or higher were not entirely unacceptable and could be considered a form of promotion. Anything lower than that level was to be considered a dishonorable demotion.85 Perhaps the one attraction of the Russian MFA was the position of foreign minister: He was extended the right to sit on the Collegium of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But even at this level, it was not the RSFSR Foreign Ministry work itself which was attractive, but the access that this work provided to Soviet institutions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry became a more interesting place to work as Boris Yeltsin's reformist team in the Russian republic began to challenge Gorbachev's central authorities. Russia had declared its sovereignty in June 1990, and this declaration of sovereignty held the seeds of an independent foreign policy. The sovereignty declaration established that the RSFSR maintained the "complete authority for the RSFSR in resolving all questions relating to state and public life with the exception of those which it voluntarily hands over to USSR jurisdiction." It also asserted "the primacy of the RSFSR constitution and laws on the territory of the RSFSR," deeming those Union laws contravening RSFSR laws defunct. Even in those areas that Russia decided could be handled by the Union, the republic maintained the right to participate

84Ibid., p. 127.
in exercising that power. The sovereignty declaration also pointed out that RSFSR borders could not be changed against the will of the Russian people and confirmed that Russia maintained the right to secede from the USSR.  

More generally, Russia and the other republics began to assert unilaterally more control over their foreign policies during the tenure of Mikhail Gorbachev, both as a result of the changes in the USSR's political structures and as a result of the republican leaders' growing awareness of their ability to exert greater control over affairs at the republican level. The increasing latitude for the republics to determine their own foreign policy lines increased the appetites of republican officials for more control. Ultimately, as the USSR's demise drew near, the republics, especially Russia, went beyond their strict legal limits to act. At this point though, the central authority no longer had the cohesion to oppose them. By the end of 1990, all of the USSR republics had declared independence or some form of sovereignty which challenged the authority of the center by proclaiming supremacy of all-Union laws and republican ownership of natural resources. Much of their initial foreign policy activity occurred between the USSR republics themselves, as sovereign and independent republics.

But Russia's sights were also set on the outside world. A case in point was the visit of Boris Yeltsin, then chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, to the Kurile Islands in August 1990. There, Yeltsin proposed

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that the islands remain under Soviet control but should be demilitarized. This kind of activity showed the extent of Russia's ambitions in playing a global role independent of Soviet central power.

Foreign trade was among the first areas to be addressed both in Russia's agreements with other Soviet republics and in accords with foreign countries. In November 1990, the RSFSR signed its first direct trade agreement with a foreign government, a five-year accord with Malta to exchange surplus Russian coal to that country for consumer goods.\(^8\) The economic aspect of foreign affairs, both in terms of what Russia could bring in and which of its resources were going out, became the focal point of discussions between RSFSR and Soviet officials. Russia's new, independent foreign policy thus contained a strong domestic political component.

This became increasingly clear in late 1990, when Yeltsin and Gorbachev agreed to hold talks before any major new laws and edicts were issued. In December 1990 the war of the budgets began with the Russian parliament voting to cut its contribution to the federal USSR budget by some 80 percent.\(^9\) As part of the settlement in January 1991 between Russian and Soviet authorities to increase Russia's contribution to the budget, Boris Yeltsin extracted the agreement that Russia would be kept informed about foreign agreements signed by Moscow, and called for regular consultations to be held between RSFSR and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials.\(^10\) Russia's concern was not only to establish

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\(^8\)Reuters, 4 November 1990.
\(^9\)AFP, 8 January 1991.
\(^10\)Radio Moscow, 13 November 1990.
its authority as a player in global affairs, but also to ensure that it would not be burdened with debts incurred by central government officials.\textsuperscript{91} By this point, it was unclear where domestic policy ended and foreign policy began. The blurring of the lines between Russia's domestic and foreign policy was to persist well into Russian independence.

As Russia's foreign policy began to develop, so did the Russian foreign ministry as an institution. In October 1990, the post of RSFSR foreign minister, which had been vacant,\textsuperscript{92} was taken over by Andrei Kozyrev, a department director at the USSR MFA. This development suggested that the Russian Foreign Ministry was no longer considered the backwater that it once had been. When Andrei Kozyrev gave up his position as director of the USSR MFA's department of International Organizations and accepted the post of Russian Foreign Minister in October 1990, he did so out of the conviction that he was joining the forces that favored democracy. In a June 1994 interview, Kozyrev said:

\begin{quote}
My feeling was that the momentum of democratic reform in the country was shifting from the group around Gorbachev to the group around Yeltsin. I had not dreamed of the dissolution or disappearance of the Soviet Union. But I did have in mind a notion of a commonwealth or integrated structure of more or less independent states substituting for the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{93}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{91}Statement by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, \textit{Komsomolskaya pravda}, 26 December 1990. \\
\textsuperscript{92}M. Bezrukov, "Forging the Russian Federation Foreign Policy," \textit{Current Politics and Economics of Russia}, op. cit., p. 45. \\
\end{flushright}
Chapter 3  Foreign Policy Decisionmaking under Gorbachev

Others apparently had the same feelings. During the first half of 1991, the Russian MFA's staff tripled in size and three deputy ministers were added. The Russian MFA's development accelerated as the Soviet authority weakened in all areas following the August coup. By the end of 1991, the leadership of the Russian MFA had taken control of the Soviet MFA's personnel and office space. More importantly, Russia took over the USSR's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and all of its international commitments.

Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition Models

During the Gorbachev period, a process of political reformation and liberalization was clearly underway. Therefore, this chapter serves both as a source of possible policy traits in Russia and as the beginning of the transition period.

The bureaucratic politics model still holds some explanatory power for the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev period. In contrast to the situation under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, foreign policy formulation under Gorbachev became progressively less of a context in which one would expect the bureaucratic politics model to be a useful tool. The institutional interests which had existed prior to Gorbachev's arrival in power were damaged because of the institutional reforms undertaken during his tenure in power. The situation became one of governmental chaos.

While Gorbachev declared the goal of developing a rule of law state, and some progress in this direction was made, the legal framework's development could not keep pace with institutional decay and the concomitant deterioration of rules and standard operating
procedures. This meant that the internal logic of the Soviet system had dissipated, but had not been replaced by features seen in democratic systems such as investigative journalism, accountability of public officials, and, of course, the rewards and punishments dealt out by the ballot box.

Here, features of the transition model are instructive. There was, as in transition states, an excessive accretion of power to the chief executive. Whereas the pre-Gorbachev period had seen power concentrate in a top group, this power was re-allocated by Gorbachev, much of it ending up in the hands of the USSR president.

Systemic change, irrespective of its content, was a major factor in the way foreign policy decisions were made under Gorbachev. Profound and nearly-constant change was the *Leitmotiv* of the Gorbachev era. This fact makes it a difficult subject for the bureaucratic politics model to explain. With its focus on procedure, routine, and patterns of institutional behavior, the bureaucratic politics model is deprived of some of its strongest inputs because of the institutional flux of the Gorbachev period.

It is noteworthy that foreign policy was very much a tool of Gorbachev's reform. However, this occurred not in a retrograde fashion but in a progressive fashion. That is, liberal foreign policy positions were among the foremost examples of Gorbachev's liberalization. Gorbachev sought to use this liberalization simultaneously to convince domestic reformers of his willingness to make deep-seated reforms of the Soviet system and to convince foreign partners of the same.
Conflict, an essential element of the bureaucratic politics approach, was present in foreign policy formulation under Gorbachev. In contrast to the Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko era, conflict over policy choice was more pronounced and clearly more public. The arrival of new categories of voices in the public debate about foreign policy, including those in the legislature, the media, and the military, added an entirely new dimension to the Soviet foreign policy discussion.

While there was certainly more policy conflict and a more public debate about foreign policy, this did not always translate into influence over policy output. Gorbachev often took decisions alone, without reference to the advice and opinions of his advisors, ministers, or deputies in the legislature, and he appears to have begun ignoring the analysis and warning of his intelligence services. Thus the role of Gorbachev as a lone actor in foreign policy stands out as a difficult problem for the bureaucratic politics model to incorporate.

Indeed, in some cases Allison's statement, "the actor is not a monolithic 'nation' or 'government' but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit," rings distinctly untrue when considering Gorbachev's on-the-spot decisions with foreign leaders. In such cases, decisions were not the resultant of competing views but the opinion of a single individual bearing the imprimatur of official policy.

Chapter 3  Foreign Policy Decisionmaking under Gorbachev

The Gorbachev period suggests that the bureaucratic politics model relies more on the presence of order in foreign policy formulation than on the presence of bureaucratic conflict. This hypothesis is examined in greater detail in chapters four and five, as are the other characteristics of the transition model.
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin described the situation in Russia in early 1993 as one characterized by a "catastrophic loss of manageability." Chernomyrdin was probably thinking more of the uncollected taxes and the stalemate between the president and the legislature, but his description would have been apt for the conditions of Russia's foreign policymaking as well. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev offered a glimpse of his frustration with the question: "Why is the military deciding the most important political issues?" This question signaled that independent Russia was still experiencing problems plaguing Kozyrev's Soviet predecessors in the Foreign Ministry.

The fragmentation of foreign policy formulation in Russia manifested itself in a public competition over policy options among policymakers. Russia's foreign policy debates took place in the open and in some cases even involved foreign partners in Russia's internal policymaking struggles. Frequently more than one option was pursued simultaneously, making the government of Boris Yeltsin appear an unreliable interlocutor.

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2Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992, p. 3.
The internal workings of Russia's foreign policy formulation were opened up for outside view offering a new opportunity to subject Russian foreign policy to the kind of analysis that Kremlinologists had been unable to perform on Soviet foreign policy owing to extreme Soviet secrecy. The fragmentation of Russia's foreign policy made it a particularly interesting context in which to test the bureaucratic politics model because it was this type of "pulling and hauling" described by Allison which provided the data to plug into the model. The Russian case was especially enticing because it offered almost real-time information about policymaking, not historical data about events of years past.

To a large extent, the faulty or incomplete division of powers among Russia's governing institutions was to blame for the fragmentation of the foreign policy formulation process during the first republic. The possession of extensive powers by both the legislative and president was compounded in independent Russia by competition between the ministries and other policymaking bodies. In addition, the memory of the collapse of the central Soviet authority was fresh enough in the minds of independent Russia's official class to leave policymakers preoccupied with the acquisition and defense of institutional power. Internal Russian power struggles within and between the various branches of government intensified.

No small part in the conflict over policy was played by the dilemma about identity facing the Russian government in general and Russian foreign policy in particular. Russia set out to remake itself as a state, seeking to overcome the effects of a long history of totalitarianism. This was an extraordinary undertaking
by any measure, one that affected all aspects of life in Russia, and one that also had important implications for Russia's interaction with other states. Russia was compelled to redefine its national interests and make major adjustments in the sphere of foreign policy. In some ways, Russia's search for a new set of national interests resembled that of the USSR during Mikhail Gorbachev's years in power. In other ways, however, the question of national interests was much more complicated for Russia than it had been for the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Unlike their Soviet predecessors, Russian policymakers had to factor an entirely new region into their outlook on the world -- that comprising the other former republics of the USSR in their role as newly independent, often self-assertive states. These issues had an impact at all three stages of the policymaking process -- problem recognition, politics, and policy engineering.

These enormous tasks, together with an attendant polarization of opinion about how to deal with them, pitted Russia's policymakers against one another. The enormity of the undertaking meant that in many cases their struggles were not merely over one specific policy but over which worldview would prevail in Russia. Indeed, as Braun has noted, in Russia it is not only difficult to predict the future but also to 'predict the past' -- a reference to the many blank spots and cataclysms in Russian history.3

Russia's problems in identifying its national interests and elaborating foreign policy did not stop with identity and worldview. Exacerbating the situation

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was a lack of clear definition of which actors had the right to participate in the policymaking process. Lines of authority crossed in many areas, and it was unclear to what extent, if at all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the legislature, supraministerial bodies associated with the executive presidency, or other agencies and groups should be involved in making decisions. Russian President Boris Yeltsin himself wavered on the question of where jurisdictional lines were drawn, thus muddling the situation even more.

Just as the Soviet leadership had experienced difficulty in managing the affairs of the country as its governing architecture was restructured, Russia's leadership encountered similar obstacles to running the Russian Federation. These obstacles were to be found in nearly all realms of policymaking, foreign policy included. The result was a competition between the executive and legislative branches culminating in the dissolution of the Russian parliament in September 1993, and the holding of new elections with the adoption of a new constitution in December of that year.

The Distribution of Power

The division of power between Russia's executive and legislative branches of government paralleled the system of power sharing in place in the later years of the Gorbachev era as described in the previous chapter. That is, the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies enjoyed significant powers over foreign-policy making. At the same time, just prior to the Soviet Union's collapse, President Boris Yeltsin was granted by the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) emergency powers to handle the exceptional situation on the eve of and following the collapse of the USSR.
But as Yeltsin and the legislature continued to clarify ambiguities in the situation and distribute the powers necessary to run the country, the two branches of government came more and more into conflict. The Congress of People's Deputies was granted the power to determine the general guidelines of foreign policy. The Supreme Soviet was responsible for directing defense and security policy; confirming candidates for minister of defense, security, internal affairs, foreign affairs, as well as the prime minister; voting confidence or no-confidence in the government; and suspending and overturning (with Constitutional Court approval) edicts of the president. The president's powers included heading the Security Council (which had not yet been established); conducting negotiations in the name of the Russian Federation, naming candidates for minister of defense, security, internal affairs, foreign affairs, as well as the prime minister; and taking measures to ensure state and public security.

The power to direct and supervise the work of the ministries was shared by the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the president. The powers required to defend Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity were contested by each of the executive and legislative branches of government. In the December 1992 version of the Russian constitution, the question of which branch had the right to mobilize the Russian armed forces was simply left unanswered.4

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4Article 29 said only that the defense of the fatherland was "a most important function of the state and was the cause of the entire people." For the December 1992 version of the Russian constitution, see W. E. Butler, Collected Legislation of Russia. Booklet I 1-9, Oceana Publications, Inc. London, 1993.
The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment

The influence of the Russian Foreign Ministry on foreign policy formulation was not constant. Recalling the situation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry under Gromyko, as discussed in chapter two, the Russian Foreign Ministry was frequently sidelined on an issue by another player. In some situations, for example, in Russia's official policy toward the sanctions against rump Yugoslavia, Russia's diplomats had a great deal of say over how policy was handled. (This is the subject of chapter six.) In other cases the Foreign Ministry was effectively subordinated to other government departments. While foreign ministers in most countries, Russia included, cannot claim to be sole decisionmaker on foreign-policy questions, their ministries are normally the only government institution whose main purpose is to study questions of foreign relations, suggest foreign policy positions in discussions with the chief executive and other key officials, and implement policy after it is decided. During Russia's first republic, the Foreign Ministry did not, for various reasons, utilize its unique institutional position.

In terms of exercising leadership in foreign policy, the MFA came under constant challenge, and its voice was not considered authoritative on foreign policy questions. The MFA was unable to coordinate the other Russian ministries' actions relevant to foreign policy, in spite of the fact that Boris Yeltsin gave to the MFA explicit coordinating powers in the form of two presidential decrees in 1992. The first decree, signed in April, charged the Foreign Ministry with coordinating Russia's policies toward the other members
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic

of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The second decree, signed by Yeltsin in November, expanded on the first set of powers and put the MFA in charge of coordinating all foreign policy activity of the Russian Federation. By December, both decrees had been effectively overturned, and the Security Council's Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission (discussed in more detail below) was formally given the coordinating function. Foreign Minister Kozyrev had been seriously undermined.

This shift in powers did not boost the MFA's already weak institutional identity. In such an unstable situation, the creation of new standard operating procedures and actions channels was depressed. This, in turn, left the MFA less and less capable of handling the levers of control which remained at its disposal.

In terms of providing information and analysis to support its policy goals, the MFA also displayed shortcomings. Boris Yeltsin complained in a speech to the Foreign Ministry Collegium (a body comprising top MFA officials) in October 1992 that the MFA's analysis was not "sufficiently analytical and is more at the level of high-school students." Yeltsin indicated that there was simply not enough information coming out of the MFA. He also complained that the MFA was lagging

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5"Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Coordination of Activity in Relations with Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States," Moskovskie novosti, No. 19, 10 May 1992, p. 7.
7"This is What President Boris Yeltsin Said to the Meeting of the MFA Collegium," Krasnaya zvezda, 28 October 1992.
behind events rather than anticipating them and was missing opportunities in foreign affairs as a result.\(^8\)

Most notably, Yeltsin faulted the MFA for failing to show leadership in Russian foreign policy and block outside intrusions:

> Whatever the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was, everyone will remember that the Foreign Ministry set the tone in everything. In this connection I would like to commend it. As far as everything to do with the course of foreign policy was concerned, the Foreign Ministry cooperated with everyone, but did not let them interfere in matters that were the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry of the former Soviet Union [sic.]. Now, however, everyone who feels like interfering does so, and all the Russian Foreign Ministry does is to shut itself up in its own diplomatic debates...\(^9\)

Yeltsin's praise of the Soviet Foreign Ministry probably hit a nerve and may have harmed rather than enhanced the MFA's command of foreign policy. It likely widened any lingering rifts between Soviet and Russian MFA staffers, a step backwards for the Russian MFA's institutional development. Yeltsin's harsh approach, while perhaps warranted, seemed ill-advised if his desire was to see the MFA act more authoritatively.

Boris Yeltsin's improvisations while abroad have also meant some reversals if not embarrassments for the MFA. When Yeltsin announced in Bulgaria that Russia would recognize Macedonia, MFA officials were thrown off balance and had to admit that they knew nothing of

\(^8\) Ibid.

the proposal. Similar confusion occurred during a trip to China in December 1992, when Yeltsin made a surprise announcement of a Russian-American summit to be held the following month. The announcement seemed to be as much of a surprise to the Americans as to policymakers in Moscow. Yeltsin's reputation for improvisation during trips abroad led to press speculation during Yeltsin's visit to India in January 1993 that the unexpected conclusion of an agreement on India's debt was an impromptu decision on Yeltsin's part. Yeltsin's spontaneous policymaking in some ways resembled Gorbachev's tendency to take advantage of his meetings with foreign counterparts to bypass or circumvent the policymaking function of his government.

If the MFA's influence on President Yeltsin was imperfect, its success in securing the legislature's support for foreign policy decisions was even more limited. At one point, the Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov made ratification of START II explicitly contingent on Andrei Kozyrev's removal from the position of foreign minister, thus personalizing the discussion of foreign policy. Kozyrev's handling of deputies was sometimes arrogant and abusive, which reduced further the chances that the MFA and the legislature could reach a modus vivendi. But the problem of the struggle between the president and the legislature was a much larger one, and the Foreign Ministry's failure to convince the parliament to

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support foreign policy decisions was only one part of a much larger struggle between "old communists" in the legislature, on the one side, and "young Turks" appointed by the president, on the other.

In terms of the Foreign Ministry's ability to play a key role in setting the foreign-policy agenda through policy planning and the drafting of general foreign policy goals (i.e., the problem recognition phase), the MFA was frequently upstaged by other players. It managed to submit numerous drafts of the Foreign Policy Concept, the name given to the document outlining Russia's foreign policy priorities and goals. But the Concept was hardly the sole domain of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev only reluctantly agreed on the need for such a document, probably making it more difficult for him to control the final draft of the document. Ultimately, the final version of the document approved by Boris Yeltsin in April 1993 bore only the outline of the Foreign Ministry version with the addition of sections on economic and military security, defense policy, and modifications and additions on basic points prepared by the Foreign Ministry, as is discussed in more detail below.

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14Yeltsin described the purpose of the Concept thus: "Until we understand full well what these [foreign policy] principles are, we cannot provide for our state to operate in the international arena and pursue our national interests." Interfax, 3 March 1993.


16Ibid., pp. 61-69 and Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki rossiskei federatsii, Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as presented to the Committee on Foreign and Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, January 25, 1993.
Why the Foreign Ministry was unable to prevail in some key policymaking situations during the first republic can be explained by a few circumstances. First, it possessed imperfect tools. The staff consisted of about three-quarters of the former USSR Foreign Ministry staff (about 3,000 people), merged into the former staff of the RSFSR Foreign Ministry (about 240 people). Animosity between some of the RSFSR and USSR staff existed for some time because the RSFSR staff inherited nearly all of the leadership positions within the transformed MFA, sidelining their former "betters" from the USSR MFA. Second, when the 40-year-old Andrei Kozyrev took over the Soviet MFA apparatus and began reorganizing and cutting staff, he and the former RSFSR diplomats who had taken over the MFA leadership were viewed as unqualified usurpers both within the MFA and among a wider circle of Russian elites.

Even within the Foreign Ministry, a struggle was going on over its assets. Its Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, which controlled sizable foreign assets in the form of foreign trade organizations established during Soviet times, was split off from the MFA bureaucracy after a bitter struggle, thus depriving the MFA of an important economic base. As Stavrakis has noted, this came not only at a time when the MFA was having difficulty defending its foreign policy line but also as the MFA was trying to define global economic integration as a major feature of its foreign policy.\(^\text{17}\) It must be noted that this was a relatively new area of interest for the MFA. The foreign economic relations

branch had been added to the Russian MFA's responsibilities just prior to the USSR's collapse in an attempt to ensure that these assets could be retained by Russia. In the past, foreign economic relations had been handled by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, not by the Soviet MFA, so the brief period in which this was done by the Russian MFA was itself an anomaly. Nonetheless, the struggle over this competency was important because it was part of the overall process of institution- and authority-building on the part of the MFA.

Much of the impression of the MFA's incompetence derived from negative views about Andrei Kozyrev personally. He and his staff had distinguished themselves as Russian patriots during the August 1991 coup, but Kozyrev was considered by many to be unqualified for the job as Russia's chief diplomat. Many of his critics' views have to be considered in light of the fact that they wanted the job for themselves, but at the same time, given the challenges of taking over all of the Soviet Union's international commitments, establishing foreign relations with the other former Soviet republics, carving out a new place for Russia in world politics, and defending the MFA as an institution, it is reasonable to speculate that the post would have been better filled by a more experienced diplomat or prominent political figure. As a person, Kozyrev conveyed a certain amount of diffidence if not weakness, traits which made him -- and his ministry -- seem an easy target for attacks.18

18This was the impression gathered by the author in her interview with Andrei Kozyrev, 14 June 1994, Moscow. This interview is published: Suzanne Crow, Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, "An Interview with Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3 No. 28 (July 1994).
Pay at the Foreign Ministry was very low and many of the younger, intellectually more flexible, and better qualified staff members left for jobs in the private sector. Those who stayed were often forced to hold a second job to supplement their incomes. The situation of staff posted abroad was not much better; in late 1992 embassies were told to seek alternative sources of funding such as renting out space within embassy buildings and providing mediation services. Such financial problems reduced morale and distracted the staff from their work. Considering these conditions and staff issues, it is not surprising that the reports prepared by MFA staffers were considered so poor by Yeltsin.

Another source for the MFA's failures derived from the politicization of certain prominent ambassadors and their failure to follow the policy guidelines set by their superiors in the Foreign Ministry. The most visible example was Ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin, who became well-known in Washington for his independent foreign policy line. When a replacement for him was sought, it was on the grounds that Kozyrev could not rely on him.

In many respects, the obstacles to the Russian MFA's participation in policymaking are not unique to Russia. Diplomats in many countries are forced to defend their turf from encroachments by other ministries. In the United States, for example, the prerogatives of the Secretary of State have sometimes been usurped by the US President's National Security Adviser. In Russia's case, however, there is a

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19 Interfax, 3 November 1992.
20 Interfax, 16 September 1993.
significant difference in terms of visibility and degree. Conflicts among Russian policymakers were open to public view, with principal players turning to the media and even foreign interlocutors for support in struggles with other Russian players.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev was particularly prone to showing his disgruntlement in public, and he, in turn, was publicly criticized by both the president and the parliament. This made the Russian foreign policymaking process seem much more open-ended both in terms of its participants and in terms of the length of the discussion period. Rather than achieving a policy resultant, as described in the bureaucratic politics model, the lengthy discussions about how policy was achieved, and whether it was right, gave made Russian foreign policy seem at odds with itself.

The Roles of Presidential Structures

Boris Yeltsin offered some general clues about policymaking patterns in 1993 when he described his typical weekly schedule to a reporter at a news conference. On Mondays he met for one hour each with all of the major agencies and services of the Russian government. As far as relevance to foreign affairs was concerned, this would include the Foreign Intelligence Service. On Tuesdays he and the Prime Minister met to "consult with each other" and, as Yeltsin put it, discuss "the questions I want to ask the government and the questions the government wants to ask me." On Tuesday afternoons Yeltsin met with "different

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specialists," depending on the most pressing issue of the day. Yeltsin described these meetings as being "very, very useful." On Wednesdays he met with either the members of the Security Council or with its Interdepartmental Commissions. "Thursday is government day," Yeltsin said, apparently referring to meetings with the deputy prime ministers and heads of ministries. Friday was the day to work with the "presidential services," that is, his aides and other officials from the presidential staff. Saturday was the day for analysis and meetings "with analysts" and for the study of information and analysis. About once per month, Yeltsin met with the heads of regional administrations and legislatures.

Yeltsin's account of his schedule is very general, but his description of a typical week suggests a few things. First, it provides information about the channels through which the president received information from numerous places: the agencies and services, the prime minister, the Security Council, the ministries, the presidential apparatus, specialists, and regional leaders. Second, the absence of regular meetings with representatives of the legislature or Vice President Alexander Rutskoi is noteworthy. Owing to the hostile relations between them and Yeltsin, the Russian president appears to have been avoiding direct discussions with them and possibly sought only to receive their views indirectly, through a third party. Yeltsin used these channels to block himself off from opponents.

The overall situation in Russia during the first republic meant that domestic policy questions dominated Boris Yeltsin's schedule and therefore much of the content of the meetings he described. The most enduring policy questions in 1992 and 1993 had to do with the
struggle between Yeltsin and the legislature, economic reform, and the cohesion of the Russian Federation. These were urgent issues, far outweighing most foreign-policy questions.

Boris Yeltsin's political priorities were determined not only by the situation but also by the things that he personally found interesting. In contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin was not drawn to international diplomacy. If it was the international stage on which Mikhail Gorbachev thrived, it was the domestic stage that quickened Boris Yeltsin's pulse. Some of Yeltsin's finest political performances were played out not with foreign leaders but in the domestic political arena, often during crises. His lack of time and interest in foreign affairs affected his handling of policymaking and the way in which Russian foreign policy was formulated in general. Since he was at the pinnacle (albeit, a shaky one) of policymaking, it was the way he delegated foreign policy questions to others which had the most impact on its content and execution.

A good example of Yeltsin's casual approach to delegating authority came even before the USSR's collapse in the summer of 1991, when Yeltsin ordered his spokesman, Pavel Voshchanov, to prepare a statement to the leaders of the other independence-seeking Soviet republics attempting to dampen their enthusiasm for a break with the central Soviet authorities. The statement issued in Yeltsin's name warned that Russia would reserve the right to reopen discussions about borders and disputed territories.

This deeply upset Yeltsin, who told Voshchanov that he had "made a grave error" and dispatched presidential envoys to Ukraine and Kazakhstan to offer
reassurances that it was not Yeltsin's intention to redraw borders.\textsuperscript{22} Even accounting for the possibility that Yeltsin concluded that the statement was an error only after hearing the negative international reaction, it is difficult to deny that Yeltsin had been quite free in extending his authority to his spokesman.

**Presidential Aides and Advisers.** The role of Yeltsin's aides to some extent epitomized Yeltsin's own preference for concentrating on domestic issues. All but one of his foreign policy assistants at this time served simultaneously as domestic advisers. As examples in this and later chapters will show, this situation impelled them to use foreign policy issues to solve domestic political problems.

Gennadii Burbulis, who had held various positions on the Yeltsin team including chief of the group of aides, played an important part in both domestic and foreign policy formulation in 1992.\textsuperscript{23} Yeltsin, via a February 1992 decree, put Burbulis in charge of managing the day-to-day operations of the Russian Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{24}

Burbulis's role was not simply one of explaining Russian foreign policy to the press or defending certain foreign policy decisions. In addition, Burbulis made official visits abroad. In August 1992, he headed a Russian delegation to talk about military and


\textsuperscript{23}Burbulis had been first deputy prime minister from November 1991 until March 1992. Afterwards, until his dismissal in December 1992, he held the post of State Secretary, which could be considered the equivalent of presidential assistant or aide. The position of State Secretary was eliminated in November 1992.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Rossiiskaya gazeta}, 27 February 1992, p. 5.
political cooperation with Turkey. During this visit, he made major pronouncements about the state of Russian-Turkish relations and Russia's expectations of Turkey, all the while speaking on behalf of the Russian president. Burbulis's role in foreign policy questions appears to have been one of dealing with the foreign policy issues which Yeltsin did not have the time or inclination to handle himself.

Sergei Stankevich, who was Yeltsin's adviser for political affairs until December 1993 was, more than Burbulis, an outspoken advocate of certain foreign policy positions. He called for the imposition of international sanctions on Moldova in June 1992 because of the "genocide" against ethnic Russians. Furthermore, Stankevich did not refrain from criticizing the Russian foreign minister in public. In a July 1992 newspaper interview, Stankevich accused Kozyrev of being "overly defensive" and "inaccurate," adding: "The minister is hardly right to claim that the Foreign Ministry's current 'moderate' line is opposed by the 'Party of War.'... There is no such party!" The criticism of Kozyrev launched by Stankevich came from the platform of his position as adviser to the president, thus raising questions about the cohesiveness of the Yeltsin team or whether the criticism was initiated by Yeltsin himself.

Stankevich concentrated his focus on the rights of ethnic Russians, especially in the Baltic states, and repeatedly threatened Latvia and Estonia with a sharp worsening of relations if civil rights issues

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26Interview with Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiya, 8 July 1992, p. 3.
Stankevich used emotional language, characterizing policies in the Baltic states as "ethnocratic insanity," and warning that ethnic Russians would seek national territorial autonomy in the Baltic states if they were not treated better. Stankevich's rhetoric was not meant only for the Russian domestic audience: He also sent a letter to the head of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in October 1992, trying to get the Council of Europe's attention on the matter.

Stankevich's views influenced Yeltsin. The rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states was one of the few foreign policy issues in which Boris Yeltsin took a keen interest. It was probably Stankevich who convinced Yeltsin that civil rights issues, which became known as "human rights abuses," in Estonia had to be addressed. The ostensible occasion for the heating up of the campaign came with the September 1992 parliamentary elections in Estonia, in which many ethnic Russians could not participate owing to the fact that they did not possess Estonian citizenship. The citizenship law in question had been passed seven months earlier, in February 1992, and had granted automatic citizenship only to those who were citizens of inter-war Estonia or their descendants. The law became a contested matter in Estonia because even if non-citizens had applied for citizenship, they would not have received it in time for the September 1992 parliamentary balloting.


In October 1992, Boris Yeltsin declared that the signing of troop withdrawal agreements with Estonia and Latvia would be put on hold until the "violations of human rights" in those countries had ceased. Just a few months earlier, in July, he had downplayed the potential for friction on the ethnic Russian question and stressed that Russians must be defended through political, diplomatic means, not through the use of force.

The way that the Russian president's rhetoric changed on the question of troop withdrawals suggests that the notion of shifting to a tougher line originated with Stankevich and was adopted by Yeltsin. It is therefore possible to surmise that Boris Yeltsin could be convinced to adopt a certain stance on a leading foreign policy issue by an aide even if it went against the advice of his foreign minister.

Another adviser, the only one on Yeltsin's staff during his first term as president who worked almost exclusively in the foreign affairs realm, was Dmitrii Ryurikov, a lawyer in the Russian Foreign Ministry's Treaty and Legal Affairs Department prior to the USSR's collapse. Based on his background and the low-profile he kept as a Yeltsin adviser, Ryurikov appears to have played the role of a foreign-affairs technocrat, not someone who would be inclined to view foreign policy issues in terms of how they could be employed for domestic political purposes. It may have been Ryurikov's tendency to stay in the background that gave him such longevity in the job and allowed him to

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29 Interfax, 8 October 1992.
achieve one of the longest tenures of Yeltsin's advisers. But there might also have been a price to be paid for not playing politics in terms of influence over Yeltsin. As a technocrat, Ryurikov may not have been able -- or willing -- to employ nuances and domestic political angles to persuade Yeltsin to adopt certain foreign policy positions.

The Presidential Bureaucracy. The presidential apparatus, the bureaucratic arm of the Russian presidency, was another contributor to Yeltsin's foreign-policy views. The presidential apparatus consisted of numerous administrations and staffs which were responsible to the chief of the president's administration. (The aides, in contrast, reported to the president rather than to the chief of the administration.) The presidential apparatus included the head of the administration and his staff, the presidential press service, archives, publishing house, information-analytic services, the presidential security services, the staff of the vice president, and many other arms. It was the hub for Yeltsin's closest political allies, who enjoyed, as Russian policymakers put it, "direct access to the president." Significant growth in the presidential apparatus occurred after Yeltsin replaced his initial chief of staff (Yurii Petrov) with Sergei Filatov in January 1993. Filatov, who had been the first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet since November 1991, was one of the few allies Yeltsin had in the recalcitrant Russian parliament. It was Filatov who believed that the presidential apparatus had to be expanded in order to

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help the president cope with his duties, in the absence of a normally-functioning legislature.

The number of analytic centers within the presidential apparatus quadrupled by June 1993, five months after Filatov took over. In addition to the operational-information center created under Petrov, three additional centers researched political problems, social-economic issues, and "special presidential programs." The purpose of these centers was to provide information to the president and his presidential structures to facilitate policy formulation.\textsuperscript{32} Despite their bland names, the influence of these centers was extensive. Their task was to filter and channel information going to the president and to prepare analyses which could decisively influence his preferences. They also wrote policy proposals. Unlike the ministries, the presidential staff had the advantage of being in or near the Kremlin. In terms of political atmospherics, parts of the presidential apparatus may have even benefited by the real estate they occupied: the former Central Committee headquarters building at Old Square, the venue of much important decisionmaking in Soviet times.

Two structures within the Russian presidential apparatus became known for their influence on policymaking during the first republic: the Presidential Council and the Security Council. Like the analytic centers discussed above, these structures enjoyed proximity to the president. Owing to Boris Yeltsin's deficit of time and interest in foreign

\textsuperscript{32}Elena Dikun, interview with First Deputy Chief of the presidential administration Sergei Krasavchenko, \textit{Megalopolis-\-Ekspress}, No. 25 (30 June) 1993, p. 13.
policy generally, the role of these structures was important in influencing his foreign policy views.

The Presidential Council. The Presidential Council was a consultative body consisting of top politicians, scientists, economists, writers and otherwise well-known public figures, all with full-time jobs elsewhere, selected by the president to advise him on domestic and foreign policy issues. It was created, in the official words of the president's spokesman in early 1993, to "work out strategic proposals in internal and external policy which aid in the carrying out of reform in Russia" and to "specify mechanisms for pursuing a strategy for national development." In some ways, the role of the Presidential Council appears to have been to represent the public at large (albeit through elite figures) in order to replace the excluded legislative bodies with which Yeltsin did not or could not work. In hindsight, it appears that Yeltsin wanted to have a well-respected group of figures in place to support him when he took decisive action against the legislature.

Since members of the Presidential Council all had full-time jobs elsewhere, their membership in the body gave them the opportunity to bring to the Kremlin's attention matters of interest to them professionally. Members like Vladimir Volkov, the Director of the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies; Andranik Migranyan, Professor of political science at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations; or Sergei Karaganov, the Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe, had an opportunity to put before the president their own particular policy.

33Interfax, 22 February 1993.
proposals. Migranyan, for example, indicated that his arguments had won out over those of the Foreign Ministry on the question of whether Russia could afford to take sides in any of the armed conflicts in the CIS, presumably as a result of his access to Boris Yeltsin via the Presidential Council. Of course, members of the Council had no guarantee that Yeltsin would listen to or adopt their proposals, but their access to the innermost corridors of policymaking was reason enough for them to accept unpaid membership in the body.

The Security Council. In contrast to the Presidential Council, the Security Council was a standing body, with its own bureaucracy, which contributed to the actual making of policy and writing of decisions (if not actually taking them). The Security Council was established by Section III of the Russian Federation Law on Security, promulgated in May 1992. The envisioned scope of the council's powers could be gauged from the following provisions of the law:

The council's purpose:

The Security Council is a constitutional organ that performs the task of preparing decisions for the president of the Russian Federation.

Its sphere of jurisdiction:

The Security Council considers questions of domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the sphere of guaranteeing security: strategic problems of the state, as well as economic, social, military, information, ecological and other types

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34Andranik Migranyan, "Russia and the Near Abroad," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 January 1994, pp. 4-5, 8.
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of security; preserving public health; long-range planning; averting emergency situations and overcoming their consequences; guaranteeing stability, order, and responsibility to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for the condition of the defensibility of the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state from external and internal threat.\textsuperscript{35}

As these provisions of the law made plain, the organization was given authority to become involved in almost any sphere of Russian life. But such a broad legal mandate promised to bring the council into conflict with the ministries. Such a situation was ironic because both the council and the ministries belonged to the executive branch of the Russian government.

The membership of the Security Council was specified partially by the Law on Security. The statutory permanent members were the president of the Russian Federation (who was the \textit{ex officio} chairman of the Security Council), his appointed Security Council secretary (subject to legislative confirmation), the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the prime minister. Other members were not specified in the law but could come from the ministries and other branches of government. Permanent members were given the right to vote; non-permanent members did not have a vote, but they were permitted a consultative voice. The law specified that decisions would be taken by simple majority vote "and enter into force after announcement by the chairman of the Security Council," that is, the Russian president. Owing to the way the law was

written, the Security Council vote could be considered definitive by the president, but it could also simply be ignored. Thus, at least initially, the president could accept and be sheltered by the Security Council's decisions (spreading responsibility or blame to other Russian officials), but he was not bound to accept their decisions.

Yeltsin said after the first meeting of the Security Council that the purpose of the organization was to provide "real assistance in implementing the course of reform that we are all pursuing."\(^{36}\) He offered assurances at the outset that the new Security Council would have nothing in common with the "sinister" security operations of the Soviet era. In contrast to previous security organizations, Russia's Security Council would, he guaranteed, strictly observe the law "and nothing but the law."

Related to this pledge, Yeltsin vowed to make it his duty "to avoid any conflicts between the Security Council and legislative, executive, and judicial institutions" and to prevent the elevation or domination of the Security Council over these organs.\(^{37}\) On the contrary, Yeltsin asserted: "The council must enlist professionals and representatives of the regions and of the legislative and executive branches as widely as possible in its work and maintain constant contact with the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the ministries and departments." He also promised that the Security Council would be a very small organization with no cumbersome structures. These pledges were in some ways mutually exclusive, and as time went on it

\(^{36}\)Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 May 1992, p. 5.

\(^{37}\)Ibid.
became clear that neither would be fulfilled. The Security Council became a tool with which Yeltsin could avoid dealing with legislators and ministers, and its bureaucracy grew.

The powers of the Security Council grew rapidly as well. A major change came in July 1992 with a presidential decree increasing the authority of the Council and of its secretary. The decree stated that all Council decisions would be backed up by a presidential decree and that all heads of ministries and local governing organs affected would have to obey them.\(^{38}\) This change meant that Yeltsin was, in theory, obliged to accept Security Council decisions, a departure from the original law, as discussed above. What is more, the new decree gave the secretary of the Security Council authorization to coordinate and control the activities of organizations involved in carrying out its decisions in order to ensure that these decisions were fulfilled.

As for the expansion of the Security Council's membership (as distinct from its full-time staff), two new voting members were added to its five statutory members, thus bringing the total of permanent members to seven in late 1992. Sergei Shakhrai, a close adviser of Yeltsin who was serving as deputy prime minister at the time, was made a member of the council. Shakhrai was charged with running the Security Council's newly created North Caucasus Commission. In January 1993 Yurii Nazarkin, a well-respected career diplomat specializing in arms control and disarmament, was also made a member of the council.\(^{39}\) Nazarkin was put in

\(^{38}\)Kommersant, No. 28 (6-13 July) 1992.

\(^{39}\)Shakhrai was also serving as chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities Policy and headed a temporary
charge of the Security Council's Strategic Security Department. At the same time, Nazarkin was made deputy chairman of the Security Council, a position which simultaneously expanded both its membership and bureaucracy. In addition to the North Caucasus Commission and the Strategic Security Department, the Security Council established its own press service to handle public relations and liaison with the media; a Department of Analysis and Preparation of Foreign-Policy Decisions; and an Administration for Strategic Security. According to Nazarkin, the number of principal staff members amounts to "several dozen," all with the attendant support staff.

The person propelling the work of the Security Council in 1992 and the first half of 1993 was its secretary, Yurii Skokov. A veteran of the Soviet military-industrial complex, Skokov, was described as "a military-industrial general director to the marrow of his bones," and was chosen by Yeltsin for the post precisely because of these credentials. He represented a link between Yeltsin's administration and the so-called power ministries -- defense, security, and administration for a state of emergency imposed in North Ossetia. His nomination to the Security Council was approved by the Russian parliament on 24 November. ITAR-TASS, 24 November 1992.

40 ITAR-TASS in English, 14 January 1993.
internal affairs. This link extended to the factory managers associated with the defense industry.

Yeltsin entrusted Skokov, as secretary of the Security Council, with a great deal of authority. Among other things, Skokov was named chief of a commission to approve appointments of high-level officials in the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federation's armed forces by a presidential decree signed in September 1992;\(^{44}\) and he was given responsibility for coordinating and controlling the activities of Russian state delegations to negotiations for Baltic troop withdrawals by a presidential directive signed in October 1992. Besides all this, Yeltsin was rumored to have considered Skokov as someone he might choose to manage a state of emergency in Russia, if a provision for such a contingency were to be introduced.\(^{45}\) As can be seen from this list of special assignments, Skokov was involved in domestic as well as foreign affairs from the outset. This was partially because Skokov enjoyed considerable popularity with the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies.\(^{46}\) But by May 1993, when Yeltsin fired Skokov, it was clear that it was precisely the former factory director's political ambitions, skills, and duplicity that Yeltsin could not accept: Skokov had "found it quite difficult to throw in his lot with us".


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said in his memoirs, lamenting that Skokov had not been a straightforward player.\(^{47}\)

From the standpoint of being able to exercise influence on the formulation of Russian foreign policy, Skokov's potentially most important assignment came with his appointment as chairman of the Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission, which was set up in December 1992 as an arm of the Security Council. The establishment of this Commission effectively subordinated the Foreign Ministry to the Security Council. According to its statute, "[t]he activity of the Commission extends to the whole sphere of Russian foreign policy, including relations with the member states of the CIS."\(^{48}\) Its tasks were described as:

analyzing the situation and tendencies of developments in international relations from the point of view of their influence on the position of the Russian Federation in the world community and of guaranteeing [Russia's] national interests; exposing potential and real threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the international arena and working out timely proposals to neutralize them; elaborating analysis of crisis situations arising at the global or regional level and planning action that enables their prevention or localization; coordinating foreign-policy moves, the realization of which is connected with the activities of various ministries and agencies, and planning the possible consequences of these moves; preparing draft decisions for the president of the Russian Federation and Security Council of the


\(^{48}\)Sobranie aktov, April 1993, pp. 401-4.
Russian Federation on foreign policy questions; preparing supporting materials for reports of the president of the Russian Federation to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on questions of foreign policy; compiling, analyzing, and processing information on political situations around the world [and] on the functioning of the system for implementing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and working out recommendations for its implementation; informing the Security Council of the Russian Federation on the course of executing its decisions on questions of foreign policy and practice.49

In addition, the Commission's mandate specified, among other things, that it was to: "control the implementation of decisions taken by the president of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and the Security Council of the Russian Federation on foreign policy questions." The members of the Commission were specified as being the head of the following organizations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Ministry of Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice, State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Member States of the CIS. Additional members included: representatives of committees of the Supreme Soviet for questions of defense and security, international affairs, and foreign economic relations; the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Yeltsin's aide on foreign policy questions.

49Ibid.
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The Commission was supposed to meet at least once per month.

The decision to create the Commission, itself a contradiction of the previous presidential edicts on foreign policy coordination discussed above, doubtless had to do with the mounting criticism of Yeltsin's reformist foreign policy course as personified and implemented by Foreign Minister Kozyrev. The decision represented an attempt by Yeltsin to put control over the coordination of the various competing elements in the decision-making process into a supraministerial structure. In this respect, the decision was partially related to the controversy stirred by Yeltsin's resolution of November 1992 granting the Foreign Ministry such sweeping powers of coordinating control over the relevant work of other ministries, discussed above. "The Foreign Ministry is not an agency capable of controlling the international activity of Russian ministries and departments," a Defense Ministry official was anonymously quoted as saying in response to the creation of the Commission. 50 Discussion of the shortcomings of the Foreign Ministry, in particular with regard to coordination and control, was also heard within the Foreign Ministry itself.

The cause of Yeltsin's decision to remove some of the MFA's authority is debatable. There is a case to be made that Yeltsin created the Commission in response to Kozyrev's so-called shock diplomacy speech at a conference in Stockholm. 51 In this speech, Kozyrev used the podium to create the impression of sharp changes in Russian foreign policy. He took the podium again within

the hour and retracted the statements, explaining that he had attempted to dramatize the conservative threat to Russia's moderate foreign policy line. The stunt undoubtedly put pressure on Yeltsin to relieve Kozyrev of some of his power, and the creation of the Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission did just that.

There is another interpretation which cannot be discounted, however. While the edict for the Commission was signed two days after Kozyrev's shock diplomacy speech, it is fully possible that Kozyrev knew of the edict before it was signed and made his speech in response to it. In support of this interpretation is Yeltsin's calm reaction to Kozyrev's stunt. Yeltsin said that while he did not agree with Kozyrev's actions, he could understand them: "Kozyrev rushed a little, although it is possible to understand him psychologically. He was striving to explain to the world community the size of the threat from the reactionary forces."53

Whatever the genesis of the Commission, by January 1993 Yeltsin had signed an elaborate statute describing its work. According to the statute, the Commission would operate as "a permanent working organ of the Security Council" with the purpose of "preparing draft decisions on the basic direction of Russian foreign policy for the president..."54 Its functions were to be wide-ranging, from conducting research into foreign

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54The Interdepartmental Foreign-Policy Commission's mandate was published in Sobranie aktov, No. 4 (January 1993) pp. 400-404.
policy matters to prioritizing questions of Russia's foreign relations and carrying out long-range foreign policy planning. Most significantly, the Commission was given authority to coordinate the work of other ministries in the sphere of foreign policy.

Like the Security Council as a whole, the Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission accrued a wide range of authority in its area of responsibility and held the potential to exert a great deal of influence on foreign policy. Also like its parent organization, the Commission's broad range of responsibilities left the way open for it to trespass on the work of the ministries, especially that of the Foreign Ministry. The powers of the Security Council and the instruments at its disposal meant that it could, as it deemed necessary or desirable, circumvent the Foreign Ministry and revise Moscow's foreign policy stances.

One example of the Council's interference in the work of the Foreign Ministry could be found in the cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan. According to Kozyrev's memoirs, Security Council Secretary Yuri Skokov, Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, and Security Minister Viktor Barannikov succeeded in persuading Yeltsin that he could not be protected and called for the cancellation of the trip on the grounds that his personal security was the "highest interest of national security."55 Kozyrev disapproved of the decision and openly stated that the official reasons given for canceling the visit -- concerns for Yeltsin's safety -- were specious: "It

was simplest to say Japan could not ensure Yeltsin's security, although it is obvious this was not true," Kozyrev said.  

Kozyrev blamed the cancellation of the trip on "the failure of our government to get a hold on the apparat." When asked to clarify his use of the term "apparat," which in the past referred to the Central Committee apparatus of the CPSU and came to signify unreconstructed former Party functionaries, Kozyrev said that he meant Yeltsin's presidential apparatus, "minus his personal aides." Thus the Security Council, the most prominent agency within the presidential apparatus, seemed responsible in Kozyrev's view.

He argued that the apparat had managed to interfere in the making of foreign policy for the purpose of consolidating its own power. Specifically, Kozyrev said, in aborting the trip to Japan, the apparat wanted (among other things) "to create a different image for Yeltsin." Instead of the image of Yeltsin standing on a tank in front of the Russian White House at the time of the coup, it wanted "an image of a president who is not even capable of doing something that Gorbachev did -- going to Japan." It is noteworthy that Kozyrev provided these frank views about the decision openly, while he was still foreign minister. He seemed unconcerned about the effect of exposing what he considered a flawed process, in spite of the fact that it meant admitting that he and his ministry had failed to prevail on this important issue. Kozyrev was clearly frustrated with the absence of

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clarity as to which institutions enjoyed a role in the policymaking process.

The cancellation of the Japan visit marked a milestone in the intermingling of Russian foreign and domestic policy. As one prominent Russian analyst put it, this trip cancellation was a "turning point" in Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{57}

The forces of conservatism gained their first victory since the days of the State Emergency Committee [of the August 1991 putsch]... This was the first indication of the transformation of foreign policy into one of the key problems in [the] increasing domestic confrontation.\textsuperscript{58}

To be sure, there was a domestic political aspect to Russian-Japanese relations owing to the fact that a territorial dispute -- one involving lands populated by Russian citizens but claimed by Japan -- was the focal point of bilateral relations. However, the fact that "the apparat" (as Kozyrev put it) was able to accomplish such a dramatic reversal in policy suggested that they were ascendant in a broader sense.

The Security Council had substantial influence over the rewriting of the MFA's Foreign Policy Concept, discussed above, a document which Yeltsin had defined as an essential basis for making foreign policy.\textsuperscript{59} The Foreign Policy Concept was largely re-drafted by the Security Council's Inter-Departmental Foreign Policy

\textsuperscript{57}Sergei Rogov, "Three Years of Trial and Error in Russian Diplomacy," (unpublished manuscript). Centre for Problems of National Security and International Relations, Moscow, 1994, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.

Commission, after several drafts had been penned by the MFA.60 A sign that finalizing this document did not represent a truce among Russian policymakers was evident in the Foreign Ministry's continued disgruntlement with the contents of the document and its reluctance to take responsibility for the Concept before parliament.61 The completion of the Concept did not mark the conclusion of the debate about Russian foreign policy priorities and certainly did not represent any sort of 'peace treaty' settling the 'war of ideas' and providing the basis for common approaches in the future.

The Security Council's influence was at points strong but the body did not sustain this level of involvement in foreign policy formulation. After peaking in late 1992, the Council's influence began rapidly to dissipate. It had fallen out of favor with Yeltsin because of his disagreements with Yurii Skokov and Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. In his book The Struggle for Russia, Yeltsin dates his alienation from Skokov from the end of 1992.62 Yeltsin's aide for defense industry conversion Mikhail Malei said that Skokov had frightened Yeltsin by running the Security Council secretively and apparently trying to use its vast authority against Yeltsin.63

Precisely the greed for power which induced Skokov to embellish the Security Council with levers of authority brought about his undoing and the effective

60Ibid.
62Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 173.
laming of the Security Council. Meetings of the Security Council thus became sporadic starting in early 1993, departing from the weekly schedule, as the dispute between Yeltsin and the legislature grew worse. The position of Secretary remained vacant for brief periods before the appointment of Skokov's successor (Evgenii Shaposhnikov), his rapid and unexpected departure, and before the appointment of Yeltsin crony Lobov in the fall of 1993. These personnel decisions suggested that Yeltsin sought to keep the potential authority of the Security Council in the hands of someone who enjoyed the president's trust.64

It is clear that the Security Council was not guaranteed a weighty voice in policymaking. For example, there is some evidence that the Council's objections to parts of the draft military doctrine were simply ignored by the Ministry of Defense, which enjoyed the backing of the president on the issue.65

It is probable that Yeltsin not only sought to avoid contact with his political foes in the Security Council, but also simply did not have the time to meet with a body which would be of so little use to him in his struggle with the parliament. It was only after the denouement -- Yeltsin's dissolution of the Russian Supreme Soviet in September 1993 and the subsequent political disquiet -- that the Security Council got back to work. Its new leader was Oleg Lobov, a long-time political ally of Yeltsin who could be trusted not to use the extensive powers of the Security Council.

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65Ibid. p. 156 note 51.
secretaryship to take actions which would displease Yeltsin. As in Brezhnev's time loyalty had become a paramount consideration in the Kremlin.

After Yeltsin's defeat of the Supreme Soviet, he appointed new members to the Security Council and it resumed its weekly meetings, which indicated that Yeltsin was again interested in using the body in the aftermath of the defeat and his political foes' departure from office. The number of members was increased to 14. But the legality of the Security Council had become questionable since one of its statutory member's jobs (that of the vice president) no longer existed, there was no sitting legislature (nor one by the name mentioned in the original law) to confirm the members. It also appears that the distinction between permanent members (those with a vote) and ordinary members (who did not have a vote) was simply ignored starting at this point, a situation which continued into the second republic and through Yeltsin's first term as president. A literal reading of the old law would have meant that Yeltsin, Lobov, and Chernomyrdin were the only ones with a vote, a strange and unlikely situation in which the body seems unlikely to have operated.

This murky legality was significant in terms of policymaking because it contributed to the climate in which the law was viewed as a malleable commodity. The fact that this kind of climate existed after the defeat of the parliament, when a fresh start could have been made -- if only to make clear that Yeltsin's illegal dissolution of parliament was the end of actions of this sort -- set a precedent that precisely this kind of behavior would remain the order of the day.

More generally, it signified that the previous mishandling of the law had not been a reaction to the extreme situation, one in which the legislature and president could not work together, nor had it been a temporary phase following the shedding of decades-old Soviet habits. Rather, it loomed as a tried and proven way of using governing structures. This climate of illegality and neglect for procedure emanating from the presidential structures was to become the most profound influence on foreign policy formulation for years to come.

Yeltsin's proclivity to create a large executive apparatus, parallel and in competition with the ministries, suggested that the legacy of dual power established during Soviet times persisted in Russia. As was discussed in chapter two, it was a situation in which an oversized executive apparatus (the Central Committee, its Departments, and the Politburo and aides) tended to trespass on the work of the various ministries.
The Role of the Intelligence Services

Russia had assumed control over the five KGB successor agencies in December 1991. Despite the general impetus after the August 1991 coup to dismantle the Soviet KGB, substantial curtailment of most of the KGB's foreign and domestic functions did not take place. In addition, new forms of international contacts, such as cooperation with intelligence services of former adversaries, became commonplace, giving intelligence officers in independent Russia the opportunity to affect foreign policy in new ways.

Of most relevance to foreign affairs was, as before, the foreign intelligence operation. The First Chief Directorate (in charge of foreign intelligence) had been separated from the KGB in November 1991 and was renamed the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) in December 1991. Evgenii Primakov, who had become the head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate in September 1991, remained the head of the FIS, signaling further the continuity with its role during the Soviet period. While the question of whether Primakov had actually worked as a KGB operative or had merely provided information to the KGB from early in his academic and journalistic career remains unanswered, it seems likely

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67 Prior to the takeover, Russia's intelligence operations were effectively nil: Russia had created its own KGB only a few months earlier, and it had a staff of less than 30. Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 30.
68 Ibid., pp. 61-64.
69 For approximately one month between the partition from the KGB and the takeover by Russia, it was known as the USSR Central Intelligence Service. Primakov was the single director of the variously-named bodies from September 1991 until January 1996.
that Primakov, as Waller put it, was "the perfect 'outsider'" to head foreign intelligence.\textsuperscript{71}

In a significant break with past practice, Yeltsin made professionalism rather than loyalty the main criterion for his choice of head of foreign intelligence. Primakov was the only key figure from Gorbachev's team retained by Yeltsin. It was a sign of Yeltsin's preoccupation with retaining the favor of foreign intelligence officers as a group when he put the choice to them of whom they favored as a boss during a convocation of staffers at FIS headquarters. While less powerful than during Soviet times, this was a sign that the intelligence community remained a group to be cultivated by the top leadership. Primakov received a resounding vote of confidence.\textsuperscript{72}

The FIS, like the First Chief Directorate, continued to operate under dubious outside oversight. Yeltsin's assurance in late 1992 that the service was "openly subordinate to the president and sincerely reliable" was hardly credible given Yeltsin's inclination to generously delegate authority.\textsuperscript{73} Despite the passage of the Law on Security in 1992 putting the intelligence services under the control of the president, legislature, and prosecutor-general, there was still no clear idea among top policymakers of how day-to-day activities of the intelligence bodies would be monitored.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, an overview of the Supreme

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71}Michael Waller, \textit{Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today}, op. cit., p. 70.
\item \textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 132.
\item \textsuperscript{73}Russian Television, 1720 GMT, 10 November 1992 and "Address by Russian President to British Parliament," ITAR-TASS in English, 11 November 1992.
\end{itemize}
Soviet's debates in 1992 and 1993 revealed little preoccupation with the activities of the security organs. This fact, and the ambiguity surrounding the laws on intelligence oversight, reflected the impact of voices of former KGB staff in the legislature. It further suggested that intelligence agencies' activities in foreign policy were being ignored by legislative bodies. The peculiarity of the situation was captured by the fact that Filipp Bobkov worked directly for Supreme Soviet speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. Bobkov had been a deputy to ex-KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, the mastermind of the August 1991 coup attempt.  

Had a climate of seeking to uproot and eliminate the legacy of the secret police prevailed, such an appointment would not have been possible for someone possessing such experience.

The FIS shifted its emphasis in the post-Cold War world toward industrial espionage, a move which paralleled a post-Cold War shift seen in Western countries. This was understandable since FIS foreign agents lost some of their platforms in the Third World as a result of the closing of many consulates and some embassies there. By the end of 1993 more than 30 foreign stations had been closed. The sharpened focus on industrial espionage also reflected the FIS's desire to take advantage of the continuing relaxation of East-West relations after the collapse of the USSR. It may also have been the case that the FIS could bring in more funding for itself if it succeeded in these

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The first law on Foreign Intelligence was published in Vedomst Syezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 32, 1992, p. 1869.


76 "Russian Intelligence Closes Thirty Branches Abroad," Interfax, 23 November 1993.
missions. Finally, Primakov found the new focus on companies easily justifiable on the grounds of national security: "We have stepped up our activities in support of economic measures that are helping the protection of our country. We must have knowledge about critical technologies." 

Most significantly, in terms of foreign policy formulation, the FIS emerged as a strong voice in long-range thinking about foreign policy strategy. It was the FIS, not the Foreign Ministry, which followed up on an October 1992 meeting in Moscow with US Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates with a publication in January 1993 of a report on nuclear proliferation called "The New Challenge after the Cold War." What made this report distinct from the routine analytic reports prepared by the FIS, was that a public version of it was issued and presented at a press conference. The report seems to have become the leading policy statement on the questions on non-proliferation which were broached during the Gates visit. More significantly, the FIS reportedly issued the report entirely on its own initiative and without either the instruction or prior knowledge of any other government agency, thus effectively starting its own public diplomacy campaign. That the FIS took over this issue from the Foreign Ministry showed the extent to which the foreign intelligence apparatus was a player in

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79"FIS, CIA To Cooperate in Areas of 'Common Concern,'" Interfax, 30 July 1993.
strategic thinking alongside, if not above, the Foreign Ministry.

The frequent travels of Primakov around the world also showed him to be a key player in foreign policy matters since only some of these trips dealt with cooperation on intelligence issues. For example, when Primakov traveled to Tehran in August 1993, he met with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va' ezi, not with someone whose title was similar to his own. The purpose of the visit was also more in line with foreign policy than with FIS work: to discuss Iranian cooperation to settle the conflict in Tajikistan. They also discussed the situation in the Middle East and Russia's views on that part of the world.  

Given Primakov's academic specialization in these areas (the Middle East and Iran, among other Oriental topics), it is logical to conclude that Primakov was sent there by Yeltsin as a special envoy not because of his role as Foreign Intelligence Service chief but because of his academic background, connections, and previous experience as a special envoy during the Gorbachev era, and possibly earlier.

In general terms, the role of FIS director Primakov in foreign relations was much more public than was typical of KGB leaders in the Soviet period, both under Gorbachev and earlier. In comparison to the behavior of his counterpart in the United States (the director of the CIA), Primakov's public presence in foreign policy formulation was much more evident. Not only his agency's analytic reports but also his high-

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81 Islamic Republic News Agency in English, 1 August 1993.
profile foreign affairs announcements (such as the pledge not to spy on other members of the CIS) and visits (such as his call on Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in January 1993) made him a regular and forceful contributor to Russian foreign policy discussions.83

Primakov's background as an academic and journalist with a specialty in oriental studies and fluency in English and Arabic most likely contributed to his tendency to function as a diplomat. Having worked in and headed two of the Soviet Union's most prestigious research institutes, Primakov had, as he put it, spent his "whole life dealing with international matters."84 It was his background as an academic which compelled him to "strengthen the analytical accents" of the FIS's work.85 Primakov's inclination to play a high-profile role in foreign affairs prior to 1996 might also have been due to a perception on his part that Kozyrev's MFA was not coping well with all issues. And, of course, Primakov's appointment to the position of foreign minister in 1996 was a further sign of his skills and desire to function as a top representative of Russian diplomacy.

Despite his leading role in foreign affairs, Primakov, as head of the FIS, was not officially on a par with the foreign minister or any other minister for a few key reasons. Primakov's agency did not have ministerial status, and he was himself not a member of

83 Interfax, 23 November 1993.
85 Interview with Evgenii Primakov, Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik, No. 50 (December 9) 1991.
the government. Nor was he a voting member of the Security Council during the first republic. His contribution to this body's work could only be made informally, via voting members or via his own membership in the Security Council's Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission. That said, his personal authority probably made up for any deficit in terms of legal claim on participation.

Before closing the discussion of the role of intelligence agencies in policymaking in the first Russian republic, a word must be said about FAPSI, the Russian acronym for the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (Federalnoe Agentsvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii). It grew out of and exceeded the significance of its KGB predecessors, the Eighth Chief Directorate and various other smaller directorates of the KGB.\(^{86}\) In addition to being responsible for signals and cryptography work, controlling some 16,000 communications troops as well as satellites, and maintaining its own analysis and information section, FAPSI was put in charge of all intragovernmental telecommunications. Considering that the Eighth Chief Directorate alone used to be allocated one-quarter of the entire KGB budget, FAPSI's significance should not be underestimated.\(^{87}\) It continued to be the electronic eyes and ears of Russia's intelligence efforts and was in the powerful position within the Russian political scene of overhearing communications between the various parts of the government. Former presidential spokesperson Vyacheslav Kostikov referred to the "acoustic

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\(^{86}\) It was known from November to December 1991 as the USSR Government Communications Committee.

transparency of the Kremlin" and noted that top officials regularly pass each other notes to evade the security service's microphones.\(^{88}\) The implication was, that FAPSI was using its knowledge to meddle in the policymaking process. Thus, here, too, there existed a potential for using foreign policy issues to fight domestic political battles.

**The Role of Legislative Bodies**

The most public challenges to the role of the Russian Foreign Ministry and to Russia's foreign policy coherence in general was mounted by deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet. Most of this opposition was put forth in the form of non-binding resolutions expressing dissatisfaction with the government's handling of (or failure to address) a specific foreign policy question. Examples of this included the Supreme Soviet's July 1993 resolution claiming that the Crimean port of Sevastopol belonged not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and the Supreme Soviet's numerous resolutions pleading with the Russian government to halt Russia's participation in various international sanctions.\(^{89}\)

The Supreme Soviet also issued orders for the Russian government to take certain actions, as in July 1993 when deputies ordered the Russian government to suspend withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and impose "a complex of measures" in the political and

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\(^{89}\)For the text of the resolution on Sevastopol, see *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 13 July 1993, p. 1.
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economic sphere. The Supreme Soviet was dissatisfied with Estonia's treatment of the Russian community there. The Russian government's response was simply to ignore the legislature's orders, at first, and downplay the question. Only later did Yeltsin order a halt to the troop withdrawal, apparently under the influence of Stankevich, as described above.

The Russian legislature also attempted to put forth its own foreign policy on occasion by addressing foreign counterparts (or governments) to request that a certain foreign policy action be taken. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia was a favorite theme of the Russian deputies. They criticized the Foreign Ministry for pursuing what they regarded as an uncritically anti-Serbian policy that was a consequence of excessive emphasis on cultivating good relations with Western Europe and the United States. Besides this, they called for a reconsideration of UN sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia, demanded that Moscow veto any proposals for military intervention in Bosnia, and proposed that Russia provide humanitarian aid to Serbia. The Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations issued an advisory "On the Attitude of the Russian Federation toward the Yugoslav Crisis," specifying the above concerns and calling for the Foreign Ministry to heed deputies' recommendations. The document was adopted in the form of a resolution by an overwhelming majority of the Supreme Soviet. But the


91 Izvestiya, 18 December 1992, p. 4.

92 Ibid.
Foreign Ministry rejected the legislature's proposals, saying only that they could not be implemented for various, unnamed reasons.  

Direct foreign policy action was taken during deputies' trips abroad, when they made promises to foreign leaders on various issues. In mid-April 1993, a Supreme Soviet delegation headed by the chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Evgenii Ambartsumov, traveled to the former Yugoslavia. The stated purpose of the trip was to gain more information about the situation with a view to supporting efforts to find a peace settlement. The delegation met with deputies from the Socialist Party of Serbia, parliamentary leaders, and military and Defense Ministry officials. While there, Ambartsumov gave assurances of Moscow's willingness to stand by Belgrade. Taken aback by the UN Security Council's vote on 17 April in favor of tightening economic sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia, he sought to reassure Serbia, saying that the decision would "not be the world community's last word" on the subject and expressing confidence that it would be revised. He added that any international military intervention under the auspices of NATO would be an unprecedented adventure in the history of this international organization.  

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Upon returning to Moscow, Ambartsumov called a news conference at which he demanded that Russia use its weight in the UN Security Council to bring about a moratorium on the imposition of additional economic sanctions. He also stated his belief that Russia would resort to using its veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent any international military action against the rump Yugoslavia. Ambartsumov was quickly rebuffed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vitalii Churkin, who rejected the proposed moratorium, indicated that military action could well enter the realm of possibility, and allowed that Russia would not oppose it. Undeterred, Ambartsumov and his parliamentary committee drafted a resolution calling sanctions and military intervention "counterproductive." In particular, the resolution warned that military action would lead not to a reconciliation and a settlement but to "a continuation of the conflict and possibly a new European war." In one instance, Kozyrev balked at the parliament's issuance of a resolution that called for the government to give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specific instructions for devising new policies on Bosnia and Herzegovina. "The resolution appears to constitute direct interference in the affairs of the executive authorities," Kozyrev said, adding:

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96Sergey Ryabikin, "Russia to Veto UN 'Military Action' in Yugoslavia," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 23 April 1993.


98The resolution called for the extension of sanctions to all three warring parties in Bosnia, the use of veto power in the UN Security Council in the event of the introduction of military force, and the start of humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia in the form of supplies within a period of two weeks. See Izvestiya, 18 December 1992, p. 4.
"President Yeltsin himself never gives [the Foreign Ministry] such detailed instructions."\(^9^9\) Such a statement probably strengthened deputies' conviction that their participation in the foreign policy policymaking process was necessary.

The Russian legislature's actions during the first republic appear to have been aimed primarily at the Russian domestic audience. Deputies sought to show their patriotism and increase their chances of being re-elected by sounding alarms about the treatment of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union or by warning that Russia's international prestige and honor were being slighted by Russia's official foreign policy. In its zeal to participate and influence policy, the Russian parliament sometimes seemed bent on establishing authority above and beyond that of the Russian Foreign Ministry and even that of the Russian president. Kozyrev, while himself guilty of dramatizing domestic infighting, warned:

> It is important for us to ensure that our domestic political battles do not spill over into clumsy attempts by various politicians to settle accounts with their opponents by pursuing their own foreign policies in the international arena, without giving a second thought to the fact that they are thereby undermining respect for and trust in their own country.\(^10^0\)

But it appeared that deputies, like many other official Russians, were more concerned with immediate gain at

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\(^9^9\)Izvestiya, 18 January 1993, p. 2.

home than with the way domestic struggles made Russia appear on the world stage.

To his credit, Kozyrev did on occasion seek to reconcile differences with the legislature by drawing some of its members into the Foreign Ministry's policymaking process. For example, Kozyrev invited the chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Ambartsumov, to travel with the Russian delegation to the conference on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia that was held in London in August 1992; and even asked Ambartsumov to take part in formulating Russia's position on the situation. By his own admission, Ambartsumov was at first reluctant to go because he did not want, as he put it, "to become a captive of Kozyrev's approaches." Kozyrev reportedly told Ambartsumov that no such thing would happen and that he might even play a role in "modifying Russia's policy." In fact, as Ambartsumov later claimed, Russia's policy had become "more adequate" as a result of his presence at the conference, meaning that he felt that Russian policy had moved more into line with the positions preferred by himself and other members of the Supreme Soviet. Ambartsumov was so satisfied with Moscow's diplomatic shifts in the fall and winter of 1992-1993 that he rejected the deputies' continued attempts to bring about the removal of Kozyrev and objected to efforts by some of his colleagues to maintain a constant level of confrontation with the ministry: "One should not treat Minister Kozyrev as a Carthage that absolutely must be destroyed."


\[102\] Interview with Ambartsumov by announcer Nosovets, Parliamentary Herald Program, Russian Television, 1500 GMT, 3 April 1993.
Ambartsumov advocated instead that problems should be "solved by practical work." He also expressed confidence legislators' views were having an impact on Russian foreign policy, a view which over time would appear to have been too optimistic.\textsuperscript{103}

Whether deputies in 1992 and 1993 were actually expressing the sentiments of their electorates is questionable. Polls of deputies' attitudes toward their roles as representatives of constituencies showed very weak feelings of obligation to represent constituents' opinions. When asked whether they viewed themselves as delegates bound to carry out the wishes of their electors or trustees who should follow their own consciences rather than the strict opinions of their electors, deputies generally identified with the latter category.\textsuperscript{104} Furthermore, contact between lawmakers and constituents was not particularly intense.\textsuperscript{105}

A small portion (14\%) of the deputies surveyed said they relied on information from public opinion polls.\textsuperscript{106} But there was a gap between the deputies' statements and respondents' opinions. In 1993, polls showed that the public was far less strident on foreign policy questions than was the Supreme Soviet on certain foreign policy issues. Only seven percent of the Russians polled in a December 1992 survey said that Russia should pursue a rigid policy toward the Baltic states. In a separate question, there was an equal

\textsuperscript{103}Sergei Nikishchov, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 13 March 1993.


\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., pp. 62-63.

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., p. 61.
three-way split between those who thought the troops should be withdrawn as quickly as possible from the Baltic states, those who thought withdrawals should be halted, and those who had no opinion.\textsuperscript{107}

While it is rather doubtful that deputies were expressing the views of a broad segment of the Russian population, it seems likely that their continual harping on themes about the humiliation of Russia and the need to protect ethnic Russians in the near abroad could gradually have an impact on the foreign policy debate in Russia and on public opinion. The kinds of actions taken by deputies and the sheer repetition of their arguments in the media helped to define the parameters of debate in society and to determine which issues are politicized.

The Role of the Military

While the Russian parliament's and Security Council's jockeying for influence over foreign policy was exposed to general view and knowledge, what is known about the role of the Russian military establishment in this realm is of a much more anecdotal nature. This makes the extent of that role difficult to assess. For the most part, the influence of military officials on Russian foreign policy is discernible in cases of trespassing by individual military officials on what properly should be Russian diplomats' sphere of responsibility. In addition, it can be inferred from various initiatives taken by military officials that Yeltsin condoned these actions. Sometimes he even authorized interference by the military in foreign policy matters.

\textsuperscript{107}The poll was done by the respected Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research. Interfax, 23 December 1992.
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The First Russian Republic

One area in which Russian military officials regularly encroached on the work of the Russian Foreign Ministry was in policy toward the other members of the CIS, especially in places where the Russian military viewed bases as important, such as in Moldova and in the Caucasus. The explanation for this could only partially be found in the emergence of new security questions in the aftermath of the USSR's collapse. Further explanations could be found in the failure of many of those in uniform to have developed a sufficient appreciation of the status of the other former Soviet republics as independent states and the MFA's institutional weakness, frequent inattention to the region, and lack of expertise in dealing with these countries.

That negotiations on how to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh took place in September 1992 under the direction of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was highly unusual, but it was indicative of the military's growing influence in the making of foreign policy.108 As Grachev himself said the day after an agreement for a new two-month-long cease-fire had been announced: "We deliberately set out to have a meeting behind closed doors, away from the press and with the participation of only a limited circle of experts."109 The group taking part in the talks seems indeed to have been very small, and the fact that it had been formed at all took

109 Ibid.
some high-level Russian diplomats by surprise.\textsuperscript{110} According to Grachev, he had been working on instructions from the Russian president "for some time," having started by holding separate talks with each of the defense ministers involved. Grachev sought to de-emphasize the political aspects of the agreement, presumably out of concern that he might be criticized for doing the work of diplomats: "There is not one political statement in our agreement. We talked about purely military aspects."\textsuperscript{111} But obviously, he understated the political elements.

Grachev and other top military officials were active in Georgia as well. Numerous meetings took place there between high-level Russian military officials and either military or political officials from Georgia to discuss the conflict in Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia.\textsuperscript{112} In January 1993 Russian Deputy Defense Minister Georgii Kondratev declared that high-level talks on the status of Russian troops in Georgia would have to be held before an interstate treaty between Russia and Georgia could be concluded, thus interposing himself between the Russian Foreign Ministry and its Georgian counterpart.\textsuperscript{113}

The work of the Russian Foreign Ministry was complicated further by a trip of Defense Minister Grachev in February 1993 to Abkhazia and also to Adzharia, another separatist region, both of which

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{110}Author's interviews with former First Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev on 14 and 15 January 1993, Munich.


\textsuperscript{113}RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 8, 14 January 1993.
\end{footnotesize}
Tbilisi suspected were receiving Russian military support. Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze protested that the Russian defense minister's visit to these sensitive areas was made without consultation or notification of the relevant Georgian authorities. By citing the Russian military's out-of-turn activity, Shevardnadze was confirming the sense of Kozyrev's complaints about the military's trespassing in the affairs of diplomats. Thus, Shevardnadze, an outsider, effectively became a participant in the internal Russian policymaking process.

By the summer of 1993, the Georgian military had suffered major defeats by the Abkhaz forces. In the early fall, the Abkhaz launched an offensive to recapture areas under the control of the Georgian military, an attack which Shevardnadze accused Russia of instigating, organizing, and coordinating. Shevardnadze's allegation of Russian military aid to the Abkhaz was confirmed by Russian sources: A former Russian military intelligence commander has offered detailed data about equipment transferred to Abkhaz units by Russian forces, presumably done with the idea of economic gain in mind. According to estimates by Evgenii Kozhokin, the director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, the Abkhaz used no less than 1,000 railway cars of military supplies, most of which came from Russian forces' supplies. According to Trenin, "the Russians assisted in the Abkhazian seizure

116Cited in Ibid., footnote 2.
117Ibid.
of the capital, Sukhumi, and the expulsion of Georgians.\textsuperscript{118}

It was not only in the former Soviet Union that the Russian military went beyond its mandate and got involved in politics. Grachev also showed that he was either unwilling or unable to appreciate the distinction between the duties of a defense minister and those of a foreign minister in an interview in a South Korean publication. Asked about the possibility of military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul being expanded, Grachev boldly replied: "I am willing to exchange opinions and cooperate with all Asian countries and their military leaders on all issues falling under the jurisdiction of our business." He went on to say he believed that, even in those instances in which politicians and diplomats were at a loss to solve problems between two countries, soldiers were capable of finding common ground within the framework of military cooperation between the two.\textsuperscript{119}

Such a philosophy opened a number of questions: Were Russian military officials becoming the preferred interlocutors of foreign partners? Were military-to-military relations driving bilateral political relations? Was the military developing the capacity to spoil bilateral political relations? If these questions could be answered in the affirmative, this would provide further evidence that the military was becoming


or had become an agent rather than a tool of Russia's foreign policy.

On security matters, Yeltsin showed a willingness to grant military officials a say in the formulation of foreign policy both because of his habit of loosely delegating authority and because his domestic political struggles required him to curry favor with the military. An example of this can be found in his acceptance in July 1992 of a proposal from the Ministry of Defense that it negotiate military cooperation agreements with the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak Ministries of Defense. Yeltsin signed over the authority that Russian military officials needed to conduct such negotiations, explicitly giving them approval to conclude defense agreements with their East European colleagues. The proposal also stipulated that these negotiations could take place irrespective of the state of progress in negotiating political treaties with the respective countries.\(^{120}\) The handling of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the subject of chapter seven, represents an even better example of Yeltsin's politicization of the military and the effect of this on foreign policy.

Defense Minister Grachev was not the only official in uniform with political convictions and a desire to steer Russian foreign policy in new directions. Major General Viktor Filatov of the Russian General Staff traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a fact-finding mission so that he could subsequently "convey to our comrade officers and generals in Moscow that true aggression has been launched against the Serbs, whose

position is good but who need the help of the Russians."\textsuperscript{121}

Another example was General Aleksandr Lebed, who as commander of Russia's Fourteenth Army in Moldova,\textsuperscript{122} issued inflammatory statements and military support for the breakaway "Dniester Republic."\textsuperscript{123} Chisinau even submitted official protests to Moscow over some of Lebed's pronouncements. Notwithstanding his contravention of official Russian policies in Moldova, Lebed was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on orders signed by Yeltsin in September 1992.\textsuperscript{124} His effective dismissal in 1995 could be explained more by his growing popularity as a Russian politician and his potential threat to Boris Yeltsin's hold on power than by the general's actions in Moldova.

The military establishment was accused not only of interfering in the making of Russian foreign policy but, in some instances, of having sole control over the policymaking process on certain issues. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze accused Yeltsin on a number of occasions of becoming captive to the Russian military and of frequently not even being aware of what actions his generals were taking on their own

\textsuperscript{121}Dateline Zagreb, Novi vjesnik (Zagreb), 8 November 1992, p. 7. Translated in FBIS Daily Report, 8 November 1992, transmitted electronically. Russia's ambassador to Croatia, Leonid V. Kerestedzhiyants expressed regret over Filatov's remarks and said that they did not reflect the position of the Russian government.

\textsuperscript{122}The Fourteenth Army's military support of Russified separatists in the self-proclaimed "Dniester Republic" stood out as an example of military interference in Russia's official policies. For a discussion of this topic, see Vladimir Socor, "Russian Forces in Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 34 (28 August 1992), pp. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.

Kozyrev sharply reproved the military for pursuing a political course out of line with the political direction of Russia. "The party of war, the party of neobolshevism, is rearing its head in our country," he remarked, adding:

Maybe we need a radical reform of our strong-arm structures, the former KGB and the military departments... Wholesale transfers of arms are taking place in the Transcaucasus and in Moldova. A certain quantity of arms is indeed making its way to Moldova from Romania, but the bulk comes from the army. Under what agreement is this effected, I would like to ask: Who signed such an agreement? Why is the military deciding the most important political issues? When tanks become an autonomous political force, this is a disaster!126

Kozyrev, like his predecessor Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, was showing intense frustration about the chief executive's failure to keep the military out of foreign-policy affairs. Both foreign ministers had to cope with the military's participation in foreign relations as an independent agent rather than as a tool of diplomacy. In contrast to the situation of foreign ministers in Western Europe or the United States, laments about the military's trespassing in foreign affairs had become commonplace in Moscow, an indicator of the institutional chaos which reigned.

125 Shevardnadze accused the Russian Defense Ministry of having "created its own military state" in Abkhazia and said the Russian generals may be acting without the Russian president's sanction. ITAR-TASS in English, 5 October 1992 and Novosti program interview with Eduard Shevardnadze on Ostankino Television, 5 October 1992, 1800 GMT, FBIS Daily Report, 5 October 1992.

126 Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992, p. 3.
In such a situation, it is important not to underestimate the role played by the military's possession of instruments of force. The willingness of Russian commanders regularly to take actions abroad which were not in line with Russian foreign policy gave them a far more important voice in the policymaking process than their counterparts in the West. In terms of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, this element must be factored into the analysis. Allison had assessed the military's weight in the policymaking process primarily in terms of the inflexibility of its routines. The conduct of the military could be characterized by the larger bureaucratic problem which Allison summed up in the statement: "organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally." In the case of Yeltsin's Russia (and Gorbachev's Soviet Union), the military's weight in the policy-making process is of an entirely different magnitude.

There was also a pattern of opposition on the part of the Russian military to proceeding with troop withdrawals. Such opposition affected and may have led to the reversal of certain decisions made by political leaders. For example, resistance in the upper echelons of the armed forces to troop withdrawals from bases on the Kurile Islands (and to the return of those disputed islands to Japan) evidently played a role in changing the Russian government's proposed timetable for a phased withdrawal from these islands. In turn, owing to the centrality of the Kurile Islands question in

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Russo-Japanese relations, the military's contrary stance on the troop withdrawals may also have played a supporting role in the last-minute cancellation of Yeltsin's trip to Japan.

With regard to the Baltic States as well, defense officials' objections to political decisions on troop withdrawals are a matter of public record and probably helped Yeltsin to become convinced of the staunch positions promoted by his aide, Sergei Stankevich. A few weeks after the signing of an agreement between Russia and Lithuania in the fall of 1992, the Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it was going to suspend the pullout of troops from the Baltic States because "proper conditions" had not yet been created for them in the areas to which they were to be redeployed. Two weeks later, Yeltsin signed a directive temporarily stopping the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States and tasking the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the Russian Security Council, and officials at local levels with resolving questions related to troop disengagements.

It is, of course, important to distinguish between rhetoric and practice, especially on the question of troop withdrawals from the Baltic States. Military officials often asserted that the withdrawal of troops from this area could not and would not be rushed. But

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130Krasnaya zvezda, 21 October 1992, as reported by ITAR-TASS in English, 21 October 1992.

while making these statements, the withdrawals continued apace.

The Role of Other Government Members

A prominent role in the conduct of Russia's foreign relations was played by members of the government including the vice president, the prime minister, and his deputies. Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi on occasion showed himself to be an outspoken opponent of Kozyrev's conduct of foreign policy. One of the most striking examples of this was Rutskoi's advocacy of the use of strong-arm tactics against Moldova and his expression of support for the breakaway "Dniester Republic." The vice president even publicly called for Kozyrev's dismissal.

Deputy prime ministers and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin were also frequently involved in foreign policy questions, not so much as public critics, but as assistants. There was simply more foreign-affairs work than the Foreign Ministry alone could handle: The continuing divorce process among former USSR republics involving many unresolved financial questions, as did the attempt to repair broken economic ties. Top members of the government were thus involved in the various foreign affairs issues in this region. Complaints from the Foreign Ministry about their involvement were not heard, suggesting that the MFA welcomed this assistance.

The Role of Research Institutes and the Media

Research institutes came to play an entirely new role in independent Russia. Many of the changes in the role of institutes had to do with the shortage of public money to support, or pay adequately for, state research institutes. Similarly, the market for analysis increased as foreign and Russian businesses' requirements for political analysis grew. Thus, private research institutes became more prevalent in Russia. 133

A unique advocacy group, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, was established during the first republic and gathered together prominent businessmen, former officials, media commentators, and foreign policy analysts. The group seemed intent on influencing foreign policy. Members of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy included people such as Evgenii Ambartsumov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations; Georgii Arbatov, the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' USA and Canada Institute; Sergei Yegorov, the president of the Association of Russian Banks; presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich, and Sergei Karaganov, the Director of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and the deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was also a member, although considering that the Council was mainly preoccupied with advocating a foreign policy line different from the one being pursued officially (and advocating to some extent a change of command at

the Foreign Ministry), it seems unlikely that Kozyrev's participation in the group was regular or intense.

In August 1992 several members of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, published in Nezavisimaya gazeta an extensive report under the headline, "A Strategy for Russia," which was intended to supply a comprehensive program for Russia's international relations. The report was designed to challenge the Russian government to make public a comprehensive document on Russia's foreign policy goals which would serve as a reference in all stages of the policymaking process. As a contributing author and council member, Vitalii Tretyakov said in his foreword to the report:

There is a certain provocative aspect to this publication in its relation to the authorities.... Even their silence (the most likely anticipated reaction) would mean something quite definite -- above all, agreement. However, it would naturally be more interesting and useful to hear comments on the various theses.134

The authors seem to have hoped that their blueprint for Russian foreign policy would prevail over the drafts of the Foreign Policy Concept being prepared by the Foreign Ministry and later by the Security Council.

It is difficult to assess whether the Committee had a direct impact on Russian foreign policy at this time. But as an assembly of many prominent people interested in foreign affairs, it was in a good position to influence not only the public debate but also the official debate about foreign policy.

The appearance of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy's report in a major daily newspaper reflected a change in the Russian media. The media had become the forum for opposing ideas, and more importantly, the source of far more information than in the past. To be sure, there were imperfections in the operation of the Russian media which accompanied its liberation from Soviet rule: As James F. Brown described the problem indigenous to democratizing states in the region in 1992:

There is an excess of opinion over fact, vilification over criticism, tendentiousness over moderation, and rumor over reality. Much of the trouble lies with communist propagandist tradition, whereby the journalist's job was to harangue rather than inform and the whole profession became debased (much of it willingly) beyond recognition.\textsuperscript{135}

Since many of the journalists active in Russia had learned their profession in Soviet times, their work was influenced by past practices. As was noted in chapter one, however, if care is taken to avoid hyperbole and sensationalism, the Russian media can be a bountiful source of information.

Another important aspect of the media's work was the use of it as a forum for policymakers to discuss their views, to elaborate about policymaking in detail, and often to continue policy debates. Interviews with the foreign-policy elite were prevalent in the media because of the linkage between Russia's foreign relations with its self-image, its national pride, and

its status in the world. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was especially eager to give interviews to explain and defend his much-maligned policies. Thus, the Russian media became a major source of information about policymakers' views and policy debates.

As during Soviet times, in independent Russia there continued to be movement of specialists between academia, politics, policymaking, and media.\textsuperscript{136} In Russia, though, policy entrepreneurs needed to find access to policymakers within a much more competitive marketplace for the ideas of policy entrepreneurs.

Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition Models

In chapter one, a series of characteristics identifiable in the bureaucratic politics and transition models were enumerated. How applicable are these characteristics to the first Russian republic? Based on the foregoing analysis of Russia's foreign policy formulation process, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Allison took disagreement in the policymaking process as a given: "If a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government."\textsuperscript{137} In the first Russian republic, disagreement was a basic component of the policymaking process. But the interim step between disagreement and policy outcome was all too often not intragovernmental negotiation to harmonize disparate programs or paste parts of them

\textsuperscript{136}Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{137}Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 173.

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together into a single policy. Rather, two different patterns were evident in Russia.

The first and more prevalent pattern -- a "winner take all" situation -- fits clearly into the transition model. The "loser's" policy preference was completely and often publicly rejected. Examples of this pattern can be found in the decision to cancel the Yeltsin visit to Japan and the Security Council's fundamental redrafting of the Foreign Policy Concept. This pattern indicated an unwillingness to compromise on the part of Russia's policymakers, perhaps out of the belief that the stakes are so high in the making of foreign policy that even the slightest compromise would be detrimental to the future of an individual career or an institution's authority.

The second pattern was one in which actors pursued multiple foreign policies. This meant that the result of intergovernmental disagreement was a situation in which various Russian actors pursued a position which suited them the best, as could be seen in the military's assistance to separatists in the Caucasus, a policy which contradicted that of the MFA.

This second pattern could also be linked with an attribute of the transition model -- praetorianism. There was a clear tendency in the behavior of the Russian armed forces -- especially its habit of playing its own game on the international stage, irrespective of Russia's official policy. The ascendency of the armed forces in democratizing Russia was different from the phenomenon seen during the Soviet period in that it was unclear to what extent the Russian military enjoyed the support of the chief executive. While evidence is difficult if not impossible to come by, the overall picture of Russian foreign policy suggested that the
behavior of the armed forces was more closely linked with political disorder and the absence of clear-cut procedure (as discussed by Huntington\textsuperscript{138}) than to the wishes of the commander in chief.

This meant that conflicts over foreign policy choice did not conclude with compromise or agreement between the various Russian ministries. Conflicts often simply moved to a new venue, such as the international stage (as was shown by Kozyrev's shock diplomacy speech). As with the problem of winner-take-all solutions, this posed the danger that disagreements between policymakers could accumulate and spill-over from one issue to another. This type of behavior indicated that the process of consolidation -- reaching the end of the transition process -- could actually become more distant because of the ill-will produced by the traumas of foreign policymaking during the transition. Indeed, the process of settling down could not be expected merely to occur with the passage of time.

This practice of maintaining more than one of foreign policy approach on a single issue gave Russia's foreign policy the flavor of being at odds with itself. As will be seen in chapter five, the pattern of pursuing multiple policies was to become more prevalent as time went on. This, too, could be affected by elements of the transition. As was noted in chapter one, the danger of nationalism and belligerence are ever-present ones in the process of democratization. Both nationalism and belligerence can be intricately connected with questions of identity and prestige of a

state. The pursuit of a disorderly foreign policy on the world stage could well impact on a country's prestige and add to the list of complaints launched by nationalists against reformers, thus further limiting the chances of settling down and stabilization in foreign policy.

The structure of the Russian government during the first republic itself did not favor turning intragovernmental disagreements into policy resultants. The division of power was unclear (for example, on the question of who enjoyed the prerogative to deploy troops abroad). Power was also distributed in a faulty manner (as could be seen in the possession of extensive and overlapping powers by the executive and the legislature). Rather than providing checks and balances on each other, the executive and legislative could each make a claim to control policymaking. Finally, the presence of the dual executive, consisting of the ministries and the extensive presidential apparatus, meant a great blurring of the delineation of duties within the executive branch. The situation was not remedied by the numerous decrees defining which agency was in charge of foreign policy because actors had little incentive to follow procedure or even observe the law. In short, there was no fixed system forcing actors to work together to make policy.

All of these problems are characteristics of the transition model. As is discussed in chapter one, laws are relative and contested, legalism substitutes for the rule of law, there is an excessive accrual of power to the executive, procedures are ad hoc and not established, and the division of power between the executive and legislature are highly contested.
Allison said: "The actor is not a monolithic 'nation' or 'government' but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit." This statement is partially descriptive of the first Russian republic. To be sure, Russia was not monolithic, and its organizations were numerous, conjuring up the image of a constellation. But it is difficult to imagine them as being even "loosely allied" owing to their struggles to preserve or create institutional identities.

These struggles, thus, went far beyond the budget battles and wrestling to control various issues, things which can be seen in virtually any government bureaucracy. The bureaucratic infighting in Russia's first republic was sometimes a matter of institutional survival (as in the case of the Security Council and its Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission). These characteristics are all components of the transition model, which discusses the problem of the very high stakes to be won or lost in the policymaking process.

Even if an institution's existence was not strictly or immediately at stake, there was the potential for negative precedents, as the transition model noted: Could the continuous trespassing on the turf of independent Russia's first Foreign Ministry set a precedent for the future? Such a question would not normally be asked in a country whose foreign ministry's institutional identity was fixed and could only be slightly altered, depending on events or on the holder of the office of foreign minister.

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139Ibid., p. 80.
In Russia, however, there was a danger of negative precedents which could sideline the MFA from policymaking on certain foreign questions, (such as in policy toward the Caucasus). What is more, the history of the Soviet MFA's exclusion from Third World policy during the period of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko loomed over the Russian Foreign Ministry. As all of these points demonstrate, the new and weak identities of Russia's governing institutions played a powerful role in the way that Russian officials dealt with each other. More significantly, it influenced the way that they viewed policy choices.

Allison argued that problems are "cut up and parceled out to various organizations,"140 creating the image of foreign policy being mechanically put together on an assembly line. The chaotic nature of interaction between Russia's governing institutions does not support this description. There appears to have been too little organization and too little clarity about who was in charge to expect this kind of division of responsibility. In addition, Yeltsin's laissez-faire management style and tendency to let his dual executive fight problems out among themselves sooner suggested an image of a cock fight rather than one of an assembly line.

Allison argued that the behavior of government can be understood as a series of organizational "outputs" possessing a "preprogrammed" character.141 In Russia's first republic, this was only minimally on display. (An example can be found in the military's continuation of the troop withdrawals from the Baltic, apparently

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140Ibid., p. 80.
141Ibid., p. 81.
because of the difficulty of even temporarily stopping a process of such complexity.) Far more often, however, Russia's foreign policy seemed not preprogrammed but unprogrammed and unpredictable not only to the outside observer, but also to high-level Russian foreign policymakers themselves (as the military's agreement on the Russian troop withdrawals from Lithuania made clear).

In addition to these core features of policymaking, Allison identified specific types of actions and behavior characterizing bureaucratic politics. Among them, Allison discussed standard operating procedures, which "permit concerted action by large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic cues." 142 Without these procedures, "it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks," but because of them "certain behavior in particular instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and often inappropriate." These procedures are "grounded in the incentive structure of the organization or even in the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes and operating style of its members." 143 Such standard operating procedures were not characteristic of Russia's first republic, owing to the chaotic organizational and political situation. The day-to-day operation of the Foreign Ministry was one example. In a situation of internal institutional chaos, rapid personnel attrition, budgetary instability, and weak institutional identity, it is difficult to imagine the creation of standard operating procedures. Even under the best of organizational conditions, such procedures are by definition formed only over time. In the case of

142 Ibid., p. 83.
143 Ibid., p. 83.
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic

the first Russian republic, the conditions for creating such an array of procedures simply were not present. The absence of these standard operating procedures had precisely the profound effect on policy that Allison expected: Without these standard operating procedures, "it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks."¹⁴⁴

Allison's "action channels," or "regularized means of taking government action on a specific kind of issue,"¹⁴⁵ focused on the preselection of major players and standardized ways of "playing the game" on any given foreign policy issue. In Russia's first republic, the selection of players was extremely fluid and the means of taking action could sooner be depicted as "ad hoc" rather than "regularized." An example of this can be found in the handling of the decision to cancel Yeltsin's visit to Japan. This type of behavior was more in keeping with the characteristics of the transition model, which stressed the ad hoc nature of procedures -- indeed, the absence of them.

Finally, Allison's "dominant inference pattern" -- "[i]f a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing...an action only marginally different..."¹⁴⁶ was not prevalent in Russia. Foreign policy actions taken 'today' might have had far more to do with the identity of the person with President Yeltsin's ear than with a previous foreign policy action. Further, today's action might simply reflect the impulse of an agency to get involved. (Examples of

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 83.
¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 169.
¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 87.
this could be found in the Foreign Intelligence Service's public diplomacy campaigns and the tendency of its director to strike a profile while abroad more reminiscent of that of a foreign minister than that of Foreign Intelligence chief.)

To some extent, this type of behavior can occur in any country -- even in well-established democracies. In Russia's case, the deviation from the dominant inference pattern was excessive and public. Therefore, analyzing Russia's foreign policy in terms of the transition model -- an its emphasis on disorder and lack of procedure -- offers more insight into the Russian foreign policy formulation process.

Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, one would expect the bureaucratic politics model to offer little explanatory power for understanding foreign policy formulation during the first republic. To be sure, conflicting policy priorities among Russian officials were present, in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model, but the way that policymakers coped with their conflicting goals did not match Allison's description of the way that bureaucratic conflict is typically played out. The defining characteristic of foreign policy formulation during this time was its chaotic manner, not one of persistent procedures and excessive compartmentalization.

The bureaucratic politics model is less applicable to Russia's first republic than it was to Gorbachev's Soviet Union. The model became less enlightening because of the continuing and deepening institutional disorganization, the weakening of presidential leadership in foreign affairs (except for isolated cases of spontaneous activity), and the incomplete or
faulty division of power among Russia's governing institutions. The underdevelopment of standard operating procedures and action channels meant that policymaking was chaotic and unpredictable. The rule of law offered little or no recourse for settling intragovernmental disputes because of the tendency to view the law as a tool of convenience.

By employing the transition model, Russia's foreign policy formulation becomes more explainable. The cancellation of Yeltsin's trip to Japan takes on added contours when one views the decision not simply as a standoff between the president's men and the diplomats, but as a foreign policy issue which was intricately bound up with domestic political questions, institution-building, the prestige of the president, and the prestige of the nation.

Kozyrev's motives in giving his "shock diplomacy" speech are more easily clarified if one thinks of the foreign policymaking process as the multi-layered chess board described by O'Donnell and Schmitter. Kozyrev's speech seems not so much to be an anomaly but, rather, appears to be a natural reaction to the frustration attendant to being a player in such a chaotic game.

Much of this chaos continued in the second republic. While Russia's political order would be codified in a new constitution, the instability of the political establishment persisted.
In December 1993, Russia elected a new legislature and adopted, via referendum, a new constitution. The elections resulted in a surprisingly strong showing for the ultra-conservative Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDP), headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. With the LDP winning 22.9 percent of the popular vote, it appeared that Boris Yeltsin's forceful attempt to break the deadlock between his pro-reform forces in the executive branch and the conservative forces in the legislature did not bring the sort of radical change in Russia's political landscape that he sought. With pro-reform parties capturing less than one-third of the seats in the new State Duma (the lower house of parliament), Yeltsin could not count on reformers to carry the legislature. Indeed, it was unclear whether the Duma's pro-reform deputies would be able to unite enough to vote as a bloc.1

While the new constitution clarified the division of power, the polarization of Russia's political forces was not resolved, and in some ways it was exacerbated, by the new delineation of authority. The constitution of the second republic was written with a view to the existing political challenges faced by Boris Yeltsin.

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It was not so much an attempt to set up a political system which would withstand controversies and provide the legal basis of political life for decades to come. Rather it was an attempt to ensure that Boris Yeltsin would not encounter serious challenges from the legislative and judicial branches of government.

Controversies over foreign policy questions continued through the end of Yeltsin's first term as president. As before, they derived from a lack of agreement within Russian society and among Russia's elites as to the nature of Russia's identity: Was Russia a part of the East or the West? Was capitalism or socialism Russia's destiny? Was Russia still a great power or merely a failed superpower? In a 1994 poll, Russian elites, including members of the executive and legislative branches as well as the military, were split as to whether Russia was moving in the right or wrong direction. This was a sign of the polarization of Russia's elite and society which continued to weigh down the foreign policy debate, adding gravity to issues which were far from grave and sustaining disputes over policy issues which could otherwise have been resolved.

**The New Division of Authority**

Generally speaking, the Russian constitution of December 1993 shifted power from the legislature to the executive branch of government. Among the powers of the Russian president directly relevant to foreign policy formulation were: determining the basic guidelines of

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2The responses were "Right Direction" - 36 percent, "Wrong Direction" - 32 percent, "No Direction" - 19 percent, "Don't Know" - 13 percent. Michael Haney, "Decisionmakers Divided," Transition, 11 August 1995, p. 60-64.
country's foreign and domestic policy, representing Russia in international relations, conducting international negotiations, exercising leadership in foreign policy, appointing Russia's diplomatic representatives, forming the Security Council and the presidential apparatus, and issuing edicts. The president's right to appoint the prime minister was practically unencumbered by the need for legislative approval because, if the Duma rejected his candidate three times, it put itself at risk of dissolution.\(^3\) The president's power to write and enact his own laws, in the form of decrees, made Russia's one of the most powerful presidencies in the world.

The powers of the State Duma (directly relevant to foreign policy formulation) included ratifying international treaties, writing laws (which required the president's signature), and providing non-binding advice on the president's diplomatic appointees. The upper house, or Federation Council, had jurisdiction over the utilization of Russia's armed forces beyond its borders, as well as the right to examine the Duma's handling of treaty ratification.\(^4\)

While Russia's new system featured a president, a prime minister, and a parliament, this could not be described as a semi-presidential system as much as a presidential one. Russia's second republic lacked the strong parliament characteristic of a semi-presidential system: The Russian parliament had the authority to vote no-confidence in the prime minister only at the


\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 36-40.
risk of being dissolved itself by the president.\textsuperscript{5} It was the weakness of the new Russian legislative bodies as much as the strength of the presidency which stood out in the first years of the constitution of the second republic.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment}

The Russian Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev did not significantly improve its control over Russian foreign policy in the second republic. While the new constitution gave greater powers to the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislative, Kozyrev's MFA did not routinely benefit in practice from the new delineation of authority. As one critic of the Russian Foreign Ministry's work put it: "Foreign policy...is under terrific pressure from all sorts of lobbies [including] the Foreign Ministry lobby.... That lobby is one of the most civilized but not the most influential."\textsuperscript{7} The writer included the military as one of more powerful "lobbies" because it could alter the Foreign Ministry's policy line toward any given country in the former USSR with relative ease. But other influential "lobbies" could be found in the presidential apparatus, other parts of the Russian government, and the legislature, as well.

The institutional difficulties of the MFA continued. While Yeltsin allocated extra funding to the


\textsuperscript{6}The cut-off point for this study is the end of Boris Yeltsin's first term as president, July 1996.

\textsuperscript{7}Vitalii Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya gazeta in a roundtable discussion, "Russia's Foreign Policy Should Be Multidimensional," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5, 1994.
Foreign Ministry in early 1994, the attrition of diplomats continued. The additional budgetary support was designed to bring salaries up to levels more competitive with the private sector. In fact though, pay remained extremely low, even for someone with the rank of ambassador.\(^8\)

The MFA's institutional status changed once again in early 1995 when Yeltsin signed a decree putting the ministry under direct presidential oversight. (Previously, the MFA had been subordinate to the prime minister.) In addition, the decree said that the MFA was authorized to coordinate and control any actions taken by other federal, executive-branch organs dealing with Russia's foreign relations.\(^9\) This aspect of the decree resembled past attempts to define a chain of command for foreign policy formulation. As in 1992, the MFA was charged with coordinating the foreign-policy actions of other ministries. The 1995 attempt was approximately as unsuccessful as the previous attempts: Kozyrev complained in late 1995, prior to leaving his position as foreign minister, that one of the main problems in foreign policy was the lack of presidential control over various ministries. From Kozyrev's point of view, his coordination of the other ministries' actions in foreign relations could only be effective if it was backed up by presidential power. Kozyrev cited as an example, the Defense Ministry's interference with Foreign Ministry work in Georgia, where military officials both blocked the conclusion of a Russo-Georgian treaty and spoiled relations between

\(^8\)I. L. "Diplomats To Rake in Some Money," Moskovskie novosti, No. 7 (29 January) 1995, p. 3.

the two countries by aiding separatists in the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia (discussed in chapter four).\textsuperscript{10}

Policy toward the CIS continued to be one of the most controversial in Russian politics and therefore one of the most difficult for the MFA to steer. This was especially true of the question of the Russian Diaspora. Attempting to have its say on the subject, the MFA presented a report in mid-February 1994 outlining a program for the protection of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union. The report was drafted by the MFA's Department of International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights and presented at a news conference.\textsuperscript{11} Among other things, it called for applying economic sanctions to states where the rights of Russians were violated. In addition, the MFA program made Russian loans to its neighbors contingent on one-third of the funding being used for the development of Russian-language schools and aid to the Russian Diaspora. The content and presentation of the report suggested that the MFA was attempting to retain control over the most significant political aspect of Russia's policy toward the CIS -- the question of ethnic Russians.

During the run-up to the December 1995 parliamentary elections, in which Foreign Minister Kozyrev was a candidate, Kozyrev began increasingly to view foreign policy through the narrowest prism of domestic politics. The visit to Russia by NATO's North

\textsuperscript{10}\textsuperscript{10}Interview of Kozyrev by Sergei Dorenko on "Versions" program, 2120 GMT, NTV television (Russia), 30 November 1995. FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 30 November 1995, transmitted via Internet.
Atlantic Assembly gave Kozyrev the opportunity to assert his opposition to NATO enlargement for reasons possibly related to his political career. Referring to NATO enlargement as a "killer" of Russian-Western partnership, Kozyrev explained that he would have great difficulty drawing support for it from his constituents in Murmansk, who included a large number of men in navy uniform. His statements contrasted sharply with his position of a few years earlier, when he warned Russia's new leaders that they "cannot think, for instance, of NATO as Russia's adversary." It was at that time that Kozyrev spoke of NATO as an organization which Russia itself wanted to join.

Kozyrev's metamorphosis on NATO paralleled a much more general hardening of his foreign policy views during his tenure as foreign minister. Nowhere was this more evident than on the question of the treatment of ethnic Russians in the CIS. In 1992, Kozyrev warned that playing the ethnic Russian card could backfire on ethnic Russians in the near abroad, "giving rise to Russophobia -- a real national treason committed by national patriots." But in 1995, a year of parliamentary elections, he himself played politics with the ethnic Russian question, warning that "there

14Kozyrev said that Russia did not "view NATO as an aggressive military bloc but as one of the mechanisms of stability in Europe and in the world in general. Therefore it is our wish to cooperation with this mechanism and to join it." "Press Conference of Burbulis, Shakhrai, and Kozyrev," Diplomaticeskii vestnik, No. 1, January 15, 1992, p. 11.
15Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992, p. 3.
may be cases when the use of direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots abroad."\textsuperscript{16} Both the Russian and Western media picked up on the shift in Kozyrev's position, poking fun at what they considered an attempt to show that Zhirinovsky does not have a "monopoly on nationalism," as one Western diplomat put it.\textsuperscript{17}

In parallel with Kozyrev's personal metamorphosis, the MFA began to pay more attention to the question of a common CIS foreign policy. In February 1994, Kozyrev, who was the head of the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers, wrote to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requesting that the CIS be granted observer status at the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{18} He also promoted the idea of having the CIS recognized as a regional structure by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union.\textsuperscript{19} In March 1994, Kozyrev wrote to other CIS foreign ministers reminding them of the need to circulate CIS documents to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{20} Russia's diplomats probably reckoned that Russia, owing to its preponderance in the CIS and its status as a world power, would continue to play an overarching role in the CIS region and organization, and the ascendancy of the CIS as an international organization could only amplify Russia's voice in world affairs.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Ibid. See also} Ibid. See also, "Andrei Kozyrev: The Fading Allure of Mr. Yes," Moscow Times, 27 June 1995, p. 1.
\bibitem{Briefing at Russia's Foreign Ministry} "Briefing at Russia's Foreign Ministry," Interfax, 10 February 1994.
\bibitem{Kozyrev Sends Message to CIS Foreign Ministers} "Kozyrev Sends Message to CIS Foreign Ministers," Interfax, 4 March 1994.
\bibitem{Ibid.} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
Policy toward the CIS had become a matter of heated debate within Russian politics. The frequent criticism of Kozyrev's attention to the "far abroad" was a comment on his allegedly excessive attention to the established democracies. But it was also a complaint about his relative inattention to Russia's "near abroad." By paying more attention to the CIS organization and region, the Foreign Ministry was showing that this home to ethnic Russians was taken seriously in Russian foreign policy.

The MFA's heightened attention to the CIS as a region may also have been occasioned by the upgrading of the State Committee for Cooperation with the Member States of the CIS to ministerial status in January 1994. Text of Edict on Federal Restructuring, ITAR-TASS, 10 January 1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 10 January 1994, transmitted via Internet. Its elevation to the status of ministry might have raised concerns in the MFA that those responsibilities might be increased, especially since critics of Kozyrev's foreign policy had been calling for responsibility for relations with the CIS to be removed from the Foreign Ministry. In fact, though, the CIS Ministry did not pose a threat to the MFA's policy toward the region because it concerned itself with economic questions, an area not typically managed by the MFA. It appears that the CIS Ministry was itself controversial and did not start functioning fully for some time. There was no full-time minister initially and very little press coverage of the ministry's work.

22Ibid.
23There was no full-time minister initially and very little press coverage of the ministry's work.
been prompted to increase its activity toward the CIS region in response to the potential threat from the new ministry. This would suggest that the mere threat of change in foreign policy formulation resulting from the creation of the CIS Ministry could have an effect on Russia's foreign policy behavior.

The coordination question remained an issue after Andrei Kozyrev's departure from the post of foreign minister and the arrival of Evgenii Primakov in January 1996. Primakov said in one of his first interviews as foreign minister that one of the top duties of the MFA would be to coordinate the foreign-policy actions of the other ministries: "[The Foreign Ministry] should coordinate all other agencies with regard to foreign policy matters. It won't do if every ministry carries out its own international policy." Primakov based his judgment on the evidence of foreign policy fragmentation which occurred under Kozyrev during the previous few years.

Another decree putting the MFA in charge of foreign policy coordination was signed by Boris Yeltsin in March 1996. With the new decree, it became mandatory for foreign policy proposals initiated by federal bodies other than the Foreign Ministry to receive MFA approval before submitting these proposals to the president. Similarly, the decree called for MFA representatives to be present within all commissions


and working groups within federal bodies dealing with foreign policy issues. Only certain top officials in the MFA were permitted to make public statements on general foreign policy questions; others could make public statements on specific issues, but only if what they said reflected official policy.

The March 1996 decree went further than previous decrees in attempting to regulate foreign policy formulation by pinpointing areas of difficulty in foreign policy coordination. Rather than simply stating that the MFA was responsible for coordinating foreign policy, the decree laid down specific guidelines for behavior. The content of these restrictions suggested that Primakov himself, in the interest of defending his position as foreign minister, pushed Yeltsin to impose such restrictions to ensure that the MFA would be able to coordinate foreign policy.

It seems to have been the case that the situation required someone of Primakov's stature to secure Yeltsin's signature under such a detailed set of instructions as the ones contained in the decree. One Russian media commentator compared Kozyrev's pleas to Yeltsin for better foreign policy coordination with Primakov's action, saying: "The example of Evgenii Primakov shows that authority is not given, it is taken." In other words, Kozyrev's inability to control Russian foreign policy was not a matter of lacking the requisite official authority, but of lacking the ability to obtain others' respect for his authority.

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26 Ibid.
Chapter 5  The Second Russian Republic

The Role of Other Government Members

The role played by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in foreign affairs began to increase during the second republic. It became noticeable early in 1994 that Chernomyrdin was voicing opinions about foreign policy matters with which he had previously not concerned himself. More importantly, his views on these matters differed from those of Foreign Minister Kozyrev. One of the early examples of divergence could be found in early 1994 over Moscow's handling of the use of air-strikes on Bosnian Serb targets. Whereas Kozyrev's approach had been to express the opinion that air-strikes could not be ruled out, Chernomyrdin's stance was to oppose fiercely the use of air-strikes.28

Another example could be found in the issuance of an edict, signed by Chernomyrdin, on the "Main Areas of Russian Federation State Policy in Respect to Compatriots Resident Abroad," which listed immediate measures to be taken in the former Soviet Union including the creation of a government Commission for the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad, to address, among other things, the popular political issue of ethnic Russians' rights. The Commission was to be entrusted with coordinating the activities of Russian government organs towards protecting ethnic Russians. The effect of this edict was to subordinate the work of the Foreign Ministry to the Commission.29

It appeared that in early 1994, having one eye on the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections and one on the post-Yeltsin presidency, Chernomyrdin was attempting to distinguish himself by becoming more involved in foreign affairs. Since Chernomyrdin was nominally superior to Kozyrev and weighed in with significantly more clout than Kozyrev both at home and abroad, the prime minister could easily enjoy the influence over foreign policy formulation which he apparently sought. Chernomyrdin was careful to deliver his unequivocal support of Boris Yeltsin, especially during the run-up to the 1996 presidential elections. At the same time, though, Chernomyrdin probably realized that his foreign-policy activities strengthened his political stock at home and would help him as a presidential candidate, whenever his political career would require a more presidential posture.

By working with US Vice President Al Gore in the so-called Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, Chernomyrdin became one of the key interlocutors in the Russian-American dialogue. The Commission had held six sessions as of January 1996, giving Chernomyrdin regular opportunities to influence Russia's handling of bilateral questions such as the disposal of nuclear weapons and materials, financial aid and assistance, and security questions. The prime minister's heavy involvement in Russian economic matters, trade questions, and financial assistance issues, meant that

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30 It is formally known as the Russian-U.S. Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.  
he met regularly with foreign leaders, situations which gave him the opportunity to make general foreign policy statements and to offer statesman-like assurances about Russia's progress toward reform and stability as a state. In these situations, Chernomyrdin acted much like a second head of state.

Other members of the Russian government, such as the first deputy and deputy prime ministers, also had contact with foreign partners, but to a lesser extent than Chernomyrdin. Deputy prime ministers sometimes also accompanied Boris Yeltsin on state visits, to provide expert advice on economic issues. When traveling without Yeltsin, their discussions did not normally exceed the limits of economic questions, and owing to the fact that they occupied lower-level positions than the prime minister, they were not normally called upon to make broad foreign-policy statements or to assume the statesman-like posture of the prime minister.

The Role of Presidential Structures

Owing to the expansion of presidential authority in the second republic's constitution, there was initially a substantial increase in the size and duties of presidential structures. The growth of the apparatus was legitimized by the reference in the constitution to the president's right to "form the administration of the president," a vague expression which emboldened

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Yeltsin and his top aides to increase massively the size and duties of the staff. Since neither the constitution nor any other law limited the size and functions of presidential structures, the reference in the constitution effectively gave Yeltsin and his team carte blanche to develop the presidential bureaucracy in any way they saw fit. Some structures were carried over from the first republic, such as the Security Council and the Presidential Council. Yeltsin also retained a group of aides, including foreign policy adviser Dmitrii Ryurikov. New organizations were also created, including the office of the Russian Federation National Security Adviser and the President's Foreign Policy Council. In addition to these, the presidential apparatus was expanded to include numerous administrations and directorates dealing directly or indirectly with foreign policy issues.

The pattern of expansion in the presidential apparatus marked a worsening of the trend toward executive sprawl already present in the first Russian republic. As noted in the previous chapter, this pattern paralleled the situation of dual executive power seen during the Soviet period. The persistence of the problem suggested that it was a durable legacy -- a form of political normalcy in Moscow which would therefore be difficult to overcome.

Boris Yeltsin himself continued to be far more interested in domestic politics than in foreign affairs. His preference for the domestic political scene, which was evident during the first republic, was if anything more pronounced during the first years of the second republic, when he was under political pressure to regain the confidence of that portion of the population which disapproved of his handling of the October Events.
Yeltsin recognized that his popularity at home depended on his attention to domestic problems. He recalled in a May 1994 interview that Mikhail Gorbachev's popularity as Soviet leader had suffered because of the amount of time he spent abroad and on foreign affairs: "[Gorbachev] paid more attention to foreign policy than to his people's internal problems. That is why, moreover, our people feel less respect for him than foreigners [do]."³⁴ In addition, Yeltsin continued to appear to be more comfortable on the domestic stage than on the international one.

The Security Council. During the second republic, it continued to be evident that the role of the Security Council depended to a great extent on who occupied the position of Security Council Secretary. Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov had significantly less desire to control foreign affairs than his predecessor, Yuri Skokov, and Lobov was more inclined toward involvement in economic-industrial issues. The Interdepartmental Foreign-Policy Commission fell into disuse. Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Commission, said in October 1995 that the Security Council Secretary had not called a meeting for 18 months.³⁵ Overall, this meant that the issues the Security Council studied depended not so much on the provisions of its statutes but on the preferences of its leadership. This circumstance had the effect of politicizing policy. In terms of the bureaucratic


politics model, the heavy impact of personality on the functioning of the Security Council meant the stifling of the development of standard operating procedures and action channels.

For the most part, Lobov can be said to have favored a low-profile for the Security Council, something which Yeltsin probably preferred given his experience with the ambitious Yurii Skokov. There were some instances of Security Council involvement in foreign policy issues. For example, the Security Council staff drafted Moscow's approach on the questions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the Security Council was put in charge of elaborating Moscow's approach to the G-7 summit on terrorism in Moscow. But under Lobov, the Security Council's involvement in foreign policy declined, and there was no hint of realizing the foreign-policy ambitions for the body developed by Skokov. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Skokov's goal was to make the Security Council a significant power base to serve himself, not the president. Lobov's priority, on the other hand, was Boris Yeltsin.

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One reason for the Security Council's limited involvement in foreign policy issues may have been the war in Chechnya. The decision to invade Chechnya had been finalized at a Security Council meeting, apparently in an attempt by Boris Yeltsin to distribute responsibility for the invasion among other top members of the government.\textsuperscript{39} The continuation of discussions about Chechnya at Security Council meetings was one way to ensure that the blame for the botched military campaign would not be placed on Yeltsin personally. At the same time, though, the domination of Security Council meetings by the Chechnya issue meant that what Russia considered among the most important foreign policy issues -- NATO enlargement -- had not been assessed at the Security Council even as late as April 1995.\textsuperscript{40}

Considering the amount of energy Russian politicians put into addressing and opposing NATO enlargement, as well as their blurring of Russia's position by making contradictory remarks on the issue (some linked it with the CFE treaty, others with the START II treaty, others with a new military alliance in the CIS), Russia's position might have benefited by some discussion at Security Council meetings.\textsuperscript{41} The Security Council's neglect of the NATO enlargement

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issue suggested that the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction: In contrast to its stance during the first republic, the Security Council appeared to have too little interest in important foreign policy questions in the first years of the second republic.

As the example of NATO enlargement demonstrated, such a situation encouraged foreign powers to decide which voices in Russia were the legitimate ones, as US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did when she invoked the opinion of "ordinary Russian citizens," and their lack of concern about NATO enlargement, as a sign that the alliance was correct to pursue enlargement.\(^{39}\)

The appointment of General Alexander Lebed to head the Security Council following the first round of presidential elections in June 1996 was significant for a number of reasons. First, Lebed's desire to hold the post -- effectively his price for sending his supporters to Yeltsin in the runoff election -- showed that the power of the Security Council, while not fully exploited under Lobov, was still desirable to a politician with a seemingly bright political future. Lebed thought that he could accomplish something from his position in the Security Council. Second, it is telling that Lebed wanted to combine the position of Security Council Secretary with that of National Security Adviser.\(^{40}\) Apparently Lebed wanted not only to

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have the power of the Security Council at his disposal, but also to ensure that he would have regular and direct access to Yeltsin (something that came with the position of National Security Adviser).

The handling of the Lebed appointment was illustrative of the larger legal problem surrounding the functioning of the Security Council in the second republic. The Lebed appointment was passed by a vote of the Security Council membership, despite the fact that there was no requirement for such a vote. If any body was required to approve Lebed's candidacy, then, extrapolating from the original law on security, it would have been the legislature, since the Supreme Soviet was charged with confirming the person in this position.

The weak legal basis of the Security Council was noteworthy for its illustration of the lax attitude toward the rule of law which persisted in the second republic. The December 1993 constitution said that the president "forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation, whose status is defined by federal law," but there was no rush to modify that law or delete the parts of it (such as references to the vice president and Supreme Soviet) which could no be longer applied in Russia's second republic. The distinction

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47Vladimir Shumeiko said in January 1995 that a new law was being drawn up. Lyudmila Yermakova, "Shumeiko on Role of Security Council in Russia," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 20
between voting and non-voting members was simply dropped, and the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service was included in its membership without legislative confirmation, as specified in the original law.48

The way that the vote was taken on Chechnya was itself remarkable and might signal how the body would operate in a foreign-policy crisis situation of that magnitude. Yeltsin reportedly insisted that the Security Council vote on the invasion before discussion was held, a circumstance which made more obvious the use of the Security Council as a political shield rather than as a responsible, consultative body. The notion of voting before discussing the decision seemed to be an attempt to bully members into supporting the invasion. It apparently worked since, according to one member present, no one dared to vote against it, although some suggested variations to the military response in the discussion that followed.49

January 1995. No amendments to the law had been observed by mid-1996.

48 As of January 1995, the members included Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, Federation Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeiko, State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, Federal Counterintelligence Service Director Sergei Stepashin, Foreign Intelligence Service Director Yevgenii Primakov, Commander of the Border Guards Andrei Nikolaev, Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, and Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov. Only the first five members had permanent member status. ITAR-TASS in English, 25 January 1995, transmitted via Internet.

49 Justice Minister Yuriy Kalmykov said in an interview after resigning from his position and membership on the Security Council that "when the official Security Council session was held, all the documents had already been prepared and the Security Council members only had to vote -- to either adopt or reject the 'force option.' This very much surprised me. I said -- 'let's discuss things first, I want to speak.' But I was told that we would vote first. I again tried to put my view. The president again said --
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The Presidential Council. The Presidential Council, consisting of prominent experts, politicians, scientists, writers, and economists, continued to function during the second republic, and initially at least, in much the same way as before.\(^{50}\) For example, its members, who had full-time positions elsewhere, consulted with the president and offered him ideas on domestic and foreign policy with the aim of strengthening civic accord. They were expected to explain and justify the president's policies to the public. Presidential Council members occasionally took on a more direct role in the policymaking process during the second republic, for example, by serving as an advance team for presidential travel, as several of them did prior to Yeltsin's visit to the United States in September 1994. The delegation included foreign-affairs professionals Sergei Karaganov and Emil Pain. According to Pain, the goal of the advance team's visit was to "persuade the American general public that Russia has resolutely taken the course of democracy."\(^{51}\) The deployment of Presidential Council members to do this work rather than employees of the Foreign Ministry was a sign that Yeltsin continued to feel comfortable turning to his own presidential apparatus, which

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\(^{50}\) For a list of Presidential Council members, see Appendix 2. 

\(^{51}\) Tamara Zamyatina, "Advance Team to Address US Public," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 19 September 1994, transmitted via Internet.
continued to operate parallel to his ministries and unaccountable to the public.

The invasion of Chechnya changed the function of the Presidential Council somewhat because some of its prominent members were fiercely opposed to the invasion and eager to distance themselves publicly from that decision, even at the cost of losing whatever access to the top Russian leadership which was offered by Presidential Council membership. Aleksei Salmin, director of the Center of Political Technology, along with seven other Presidential Council members, wrote a letter to Boris Yeltsin requesting a meeting to discuss their opposition to the invasion of Chechnya. Similarly, Emil Pain, gave a number of interviews criticizing the use of force against Chechnya. Several members resigned. Pain charged in an interview that the military was taking actions without informing the Kremlin. The fact that some Presidential Council members began acting more like the opponents rather than the supporters of Boris Yeltsin suggests that at some point some of them realized that membership did not offer the kind of influence they thought that they had and that their positions might just as well be used as platforms for criticizing what they considered faulty policy.

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By 1995, the situation in the Presidential Council returned to the way it had been before the Chechnya invasion. To be sure, some Presidential Council members had left its ranks, unwilling to serve as the promoters of Yeltsin's program as long as it included the use of force against Chechnya. Others, however, must have become satisfied once again that they were having an impact on policymaking, at least in some areas. Those involved in foreign policy matters were, for example, included in discussions about who should be the replacement for Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Doubtless, some of them promoted themselves for the job, such as Sergei Karaganov, who urged that the new foreign minister should be someone who would be accepted by the diplomatic corps, who could be counted as a professional, and who would not "cause an allergic reaction in the world outside." Karaganov's description of his ideal candidate sooner fit himself rather than Primakov, whose appointment did cause some controversy in the West.

More generally, the chance of having some influence on policymaking was something that kept members interested in staying on the Council. As Emil Pain put it:

Frankly I do not really know what my functions are in the area of political decisionmaking... I get all sorts of papers marked 'Urgent!' which require that I evaluate and analyze a particular proposal. What happens to

55According to a statement by Sergei Karaganov, see Tamara Zamyatina, "Kozyrev's Replacement Discussed More than Once," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 19 October 1995.
56Ibid.
this analysis next, and how it will be used in decisionmaking, that I do not know. Sometimes, though, I have a feeling that I do have some indirect influence on political decisionmaking... I always realized that people who hold rallies at Pushkin Square have no influence on events. Even with the uncertainty of my status, I have immeasurably more levers of influence.  

It was probably with this in mind that Presidential Council members lent their support to Yeltsin in the presidential elections. Likewise, it was their potential to bring him a victory which probably inclined Yeltsin to ignore members' criticism of Chechnya and not simply to dissolve the Presidential Council. The Presidential Council's influence on foreign policy was nonetheless diminished because of its preoccupation with achieving a peace plan for Chechnya and Yeltsin's re-election campaign.

Presidential Aides and Advisers. In January 1994, the new position of national security adviser was created, supposedly modeled on the position of the same name in the United States. But whereas the US national security adviser is primarily concerned with foreign-policy and security issues, in Russia he and his staff spend more time dealing with domestic issues. This is probably simply due to the fact that some of Russia's most serious security concerns in recent years have

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been of domestic origin. Examples include the reform of
the armed forces, the situation in Chechnya, nuclear
proliferation, and the maintenance of Russia's
territorial integrity. Another of the main tasks of the
national security adviser was to coordinate the work of
the intelligence agencies and ministries commanding
sizable troops. He was also supposed to function as
these agencies' link to the president.

Yeltsin filled this important post with Yurii
Baturin, who was Yeltsin's legal adviser at the time of
the appointment. Baturin was widely considered one of
the most democratically-minded members of Yeltsin's
team. Therefore, Baturin may have been selected by
Yeltsin in order to function as a sort of fire wall
between the so-called power ministers and the
president's office. This would prevent situations
similar to the one that occurred in December 1992 when
Yeltsin, about to board a plane, was rushed a set of
papers to sign by interim Soviet Interior Minister
Viktor Barannikov. The papers included an order to
merge a number of security service organs, a disastrous
organizational change which was ultimately reversed by
Yeltsin.60

But Baturin does not seem to have been entirely
effective in preventing Yeltsin from endorsing other
such ill-conceived documents: As Baturin himself noted
in 1995:

Some politicians bring to the
decisionmakers proposed solutions....
Those of us who work with the president
suffer because of these cases, not only
because we do not monitor the documents
but because this places in an awkward

60 Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today.
situation the head of state, who signs insufficiently worked out decrees without guarantees concerning the negative consequences.\textsuperscript{61}

It thus appears that Baturin's filtering roles ended up being more theoretical than real. As Baturin lamented after over one year of working as Yeltsin's aide, "the process of making political decisions is confused, complicated, and to some extent unknown."\textsuperscript{62} Baturin concluded that the unpredictability of policymaking by the country's hierarchy loomed as one of the main threats to Russia.

Baturin lost the position of national security adviser in June 1996 when Alexander Lebed took over the job. Lebed's time in this position prior to the runoff election (the cut-off point for this study) was too brief to offer significant insights into how the post was used by this prominent politician. It is noteworthy, though, that Yeltsin retained Baturin as a close adviser after his departure from the post of national security adviser. Bearing the title of "presidential aide," Baturin continued to function in much the same way as he had as national security adviser.

Dmitrii Ryurikov continued to serve as Yeltsin's foreign policy adviser in the second republic. He dealt with a range of matters such as working out agreements between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and Georgia, or participating in meetings between Yeltsin and foreign leaders. Ryurikov continued to be


\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
the only senior aide dealing with foreign policy who was not regularly involved in domestic politics. Ryurikov's only known involvement in domestic politics came with regard to Chechnya and the 1996 presidential campaign. He was charged with revamping Russian foreign policy in the run-up to the election campaign starting in December 1995. This meant that he spent more time than previously giving interviews to the media and writing his own articles on the president's foreign policy priorities.

Perhaps the most significant observation to be made about Yeltsin's foreign-policy and security advisers in the first years of the second republic is that his reliance on them seemed not to be related to the person occupying the position of foreign minister. Yeltsin appears to have consulted his advisers just as much under the strong Foreign Minister Primakov as under the weak Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

The Foreign Policy Council. The perception that Primakov was in a stronger position to manage Russian foreign policy perhaps explains why the presidential Foreign Policy Council failed to materialize as an operating institution between its creation in December 1995 and July 1996, the cut-off point for this study. The Foreign Policy Council was established by a presidential decree in December 1995. The stated purpose of the Council was to "increase the effectiveness of Russian Federation foreign policy and to implement the Russian Federation president's powers in determining the main areas of the state's foreign policy." It was to consist of the heads of the

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Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Foreign Economic Relations, Cooperation With Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Finance, as well as the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Border Service, and the president's foreign policy assistant. Decisions were to be taken by simple majority.

The idea of creating a Foreign Policy Council was probably inspired by the failure of foreign policy to receive sustained attention in the Security Council, the Presidential Council, or by some of Yeltsin's own security-policy staff. Thus the Foreign Policy Council was to be given its own Secretariat, a standing body which was to administer the work of the Council and provide a repository for discussion papers, proposals, and decisions. But it was precisely the reasoning behind the creation of the Council which prevented it from beginning to meet and act as it was intended to: Few top decisionmakers beyond Primakov had time to devote sustained attention to the full gamut of Russia's foreign policy issues. While the Foreign Policy Council Secretariat began functioning, no meetings of the Council itself were reported between its creation and the presidential elections.

The Foreign Policy Council's pattern of development echoed some of the institutional developments seen under Gorbachev. As during that period, the creation of
new institutions was sometimes not followed by the actual, functioning of those institutions as planned. The Central Committee Commission on Questions of International Policy was one such example. This suggests that Moscow policymakers had become accustomed to the process of overhauling the system in word but not in deed, a situation which posed a further obstacle to the establishment of accountable and effective institutions.

The Presidential Bureaucracy. The Foreign Policy Council and Secretariat were but two of many new bodies created within the presidential bureaucracy during the first years of the second republic. So many new directorates and administrations emerged under the heading of the president's administration as to constitute a new branch of government -- the presidential branch. Most of these bodies were involved in domestic political issues, and foreign policy matters figured only peripherally in their work. For example, in late 1993 a new analytic center to process information going to the president and to identify core problems was created.65 This body enjoyed a significant gatekeeping role in channeling information, ideas, and solutions to the president. The creation of the Presidential Administration's Directorate for Interaction With Political Parties, Public Associations, Groupings, and Deputies of the Federal Assembly in mid-1994 was another innovation which expanded the size and responsibilities of the presidential administration. The purpose of this new organ was to research public opinion and to explain the president's decisions to society.

65ITAR-TASS, 12 December 1993.
In fact, though, the bureaucratic sprawl in the presidential apparatus had a great deal to do with personal rivalries and bureaucratic empire-building of the most extreme form. The price was, of course, effectiveness.

The Russian media was becoming more critical of the presidential apparatus by this point. The newspaper Kuranty argued that "half of the functions for which the newly-created directorate is responsible are normally fulfilled by a free press," and the paper blamed the mammoth size of the presidential administration for the ineffectiveness and delays in executive-branch policymaking.66 The paper's analysis seemed to be accurate but neglected further dangers of the new presidential organ: that through it the presidential administration would increasingly be used for the purpose not of helping the president to run the country but for the purpose of getting him re-elected. It also neglected to note the danger posed by the split of the executive branch into two full-blown and competing sources of policy, a situation which weakened the government and the country.

Analytic intelligence structures also grew up within the presidential guard, which was not only directly subordinate to the president, but also physically nearby in order to provide for the president's personal protection. Boris Yeltsin had for many years relied on his body guard, Alexander Korzhakov and made him the head of the Main Protection Directorate (commonly known as the presidential

security service). But it was the growth of an analytic apparatus within Korzhakov's realm which was new and had become influential in domestic policymaking and presumably in foreign policy formulation as well. These analytic intelligence structures were controversial both in terms of their ready access to Yeltsin and in their access to sensitive intelligence information.

The fact that these structures were present at such a high level in the Russian policymaking community was reminiscent in some ways of the role played by the International Department in the Soviet era. Both the ID and the analytic intelligence structures enjoyed a combination of special privileges: access to sensitive intelligence information and proximity to the top leadership.

Both of these privileges suggested the particular danger of groupthink tendencies in policymaking. The compartmentalization of the analytic intelligence structures (and therefore deficiency in terms of policy oversight) meant that policy initiatives could spin out of control. While there was no overarching ideology through which to impose groupthink, the lack of accountability and compartmentalization were factors which still meant that it was an ever-present danger.

Korzhakov's first deputy and the second in command of the Presidential Security Service, Georgii Rogozin, enjoyed the reputation of being the gray cardinal in the Kremlin because of the analysis produced by his unit. Rogozin, who had worked in Soviet and Russian intelligence structures (primarily the KGB) for some 30 years, was trained as a lawyer, and specialized in computerization and the protection of state secrets. Rogozin's unit reportedly received information from all of the security organs and turned out reports which
were different from those of other departments in that they did not shy away from reporting "reliable information to the president."\textsuperscript{67} Such a statement suggests that the problem of telling the top leader what it was thought he wanted to hear was still a problem, as it had been in the Soviet period.

The fact that the unit enjoyed access to so much information, and that it was located physically so close to the president, meant that it was in a good position to have input, if not influence, in policymaking. There was no guarantee of influence though: Its advice against invading Chechnya was reportedly not heeded.\textsuperscript{68}

One reason for the growth in size of the presidential apparatus was the rivalry among Yeltsin's top aides. That they were Yeltsin's oldest and most-trusted political allies did not mean that they could get along with each other. Thus each worked toward building up his own fiefdom, a factor contributing to the bureaucratic sprawl. The constant reorganization of the presidential staff was also apparently the result of intra-elite infighting. Owing to the complexity of the organism, it was difficult even for Yeltsin to control.\textsuperscript{69} It is not even clear whether Yeltsin tried. The Russian president's staff even outgrew the substantial office space once occupied by the entire Central Committee headquarters at Old Square. Apart from regular assurances that reorganizations of the


\textsuperscript{68}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69}Bolsheviks Failed to Cope with Bureaucracy: Democrats Seem no More Successful," New Times, No. 7 1994., p. 3
presidential staff were underway and that reductions were planned, the impression left by the steady stream of decrees establishing new presidential structures, all signed by Boris Yeltsin, was growth rather than shrinkage of the presidential bureaucracy.

The Russian president's apparatus differs substantially from that of the American president. The Russian president is not beholden to his ministers as the American president is to his cabinet, many of whom personify, represent, or satisfy the wishes of the political benefactors who helped the US president get elected. More specifically, the history of a parallel power during Soviet times (in which the strong Party bureaucracy worked parallel to the government ministries) has made the situation of parallel bureaucracies the norm in Moscow. Most importantly, there is no regulation or limitation of the number of new organizations which can be created within the presidential staff. This raises questions not only about the ability of the government to govern in such mercurial conditions, but also about democratic representation and the accountability of Russia's governing class.

The absence of legal accountability among a large and influential part of the Russian political class is difficult to analyze through the lens of the bureaucratic politics model. The model's bureaucrats act according to standard operating procedures and rules of conduct, among other things, because of the threat of exposure if their actions do not conform to statutes governing their agency and enacted by the legislature. While many of the Russian presidential structures are governed by statutes, these were decrees signed by the president and subject only to his approval.
In such a climate of bureaucratic proliferation, it is not difficult to understand why foreign policy formulation was so chaotic. The situation was worsened by the fact that Yeltsin was prone to delegating foreign policy decisions to many different people, a situation which seemed to be aggravated in proportion to his ill health -- the worse his health, the more he delegated.

Yeltsin's continuing health problems meant that many of the procedures and habits of dealing with an ailing Soviet leader could be transferred to independent Russia. For example, the pattern of going to extreme lengths to downplay health problems had clearly survived from Soviet times and been put to use in Yeltsin's Russia.

Another Soviet-style method of coping with an ailing leader could be found in the transfer of executive authority in some situations to members of the presidential staff. This could be seen in Yeltsin's use of his chief-of-staff, Sergei Filatov, in elaborating and executing foreign policy. He made official visits abroad on Yeltsin's behalf, as was the case when he traveled to Germany in both 1994 and 1995, and he met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Filatov was also responsible for a major diplomatic debacle when he secured, in April 1994, Yeltsin's signature on a document which proposed creating military bases in the CIS states and Latvia. The publication of the document caused an uproar in Moscow and Riga and was only worsened by the complaints of the Russian Defense and Foreign Ministers that they had allegedly not been consulted about the proposal. The Kremlin managed to

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70 Tamara Zamyatina, ITAR-TASS in English, 6 April 1995.
resolve the situation by claiming that it had been a drafting error.\textsuperscript{71} It was, nonetheless, clear that the haphazard policymaking mechanism was to blame.\textsuperscript{72}

The Role of the Military

Yeltsin's reliance on the military to solve his political problems in the fall of 1993 meant that the armed forces had acquired additional political clout. As will be discussed in the case study on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in chapter seven, military preferences were having even more influence on Russian foreign policy. This was a long-familiar pattern which had been well-established in Soviet times, especially under Brezhnev, as discussed in chapter two.

The military also showed some shrewdness in supporting topical political issues. Prior to the invasion of Chechnya, the military made the question of protecting ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union a priority issue. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev asserted Russia's right to defend ethnic Russians in various "hot spots" of the region militarily, despite the fact that the Russian military doctrine and constitution referred to protecting citizens, not simply ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{73}

Problematic relations between the diplomatic and military establishments were persistent in the first

\textsuperscript{73}"Grachev Thinks None of Former Soviet Republics Has Proper Army," Interfax, 23 February 1994.
years of the second republic. Grachev became more active in establishing contacts with foreign partners without consultation with the Foreign Ministry. In keeping with his practice in earlier years, Grachev's foreign interests extended beyond the confines of the former Soviet Union and into Asia, where he visited and concluded agreements with top military leaders. In 1994, he traveled to South Korea and proposed setting up a new collective security system in Asia.\footnote{ITAR-TASS in English, 29 April 1994.} At a press conference in May 1994 he claimed that no international actions could succeed without Russia's cooperation and approval, as the situation in Yugoslavia showed. He also argued that without Russia's participation, NATO's Partnership for Peace program could not succeed.\footnote{Vladimir Klimov, "Proposing Our Own Partnership Program," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 7 May 1994, p. 1.} It was commonplace for Grachev's meetings with foreign partners to include not only military counterparts but also top political leaders.\footnote{For example, he met with Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin in May 1995 during a trip to Beijing. Grigory Arslanov and Vyacheslav Tomilin report, dateline Beijing, ITAR-TASS in English, 16 May 1995.}

As before, Yeltsin appears to have approved of this situation. It was Yeltsin who dispatched Grachev to Georgia to mediate between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in September 1994. As Grachev put it, his instructions were to "get the leaders together and to sort out once and for all what we are striving for."\footnote{Vladimir Gondusov report, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 16 September 1994.} Not only did this sound like the kind of activity for which a diplomat would be better suited, it seemed, given the allegations that the Russian military had previously exceeded its orders on behalf of the

74ITAR-TASS in English, 29 April 1994.
76For example, he met with Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin in May 1995 during a trip to Beijing. Grigory Arslanov and Vyacheslav Tomilin report, dateline Beijing, ITAR-TASS in English, 16 May 1995.
77Vladimir Gondusov report, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 16 September 1994.
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Abkhaz,\textsuperscript{78} as if the defense minister was not the most suitable person to serve as the president's envoy. Grachev seemed all the less appropriate for the mission considering that he had scathingly criticized Eduard Shevardnadze by name only a few weeks earlier for the "profound political mistake" of promising the Soviet army's withdrawal from Germany within four years.\textsuperscript{79} Grachev's clear grudge against Shevardnadze may have contributed to the obvious political convictions which drove the Russian defense minister to exceed his mandate and become involved in Georgia's domestic political affairs.

A sign that relations between the Foreign and Defense Ministries continued to be characterized more by rivalry rather than by cooperation came in early 1995 with the transfer of Deputy Defense Minister, Colonel-General Boris Gromov, to the position of Chief Military Expert at-Large as an adviser to the Russian foreign minister. Gromov was to be in charge of managing military cooperation with the other former Soviet republics.\textsuperscript{80} He was also involved in the discussion of military issues with other countries outside of the CIS, as his participation in an MFA delegation to Japan in March 1995 demonstrated.\textsuperscript{81} From Kozyrev's perspective, Gromov's primary qualification was probably his hostile relationship with Pavel Grachev. In addition, Gromov's past experience in the Defense Ministry made him an asset because he was a

\textsuperscript{78}Yelena Dikun, "An Adviser Whose Advice is Not Sought," Interview with Emil Pain, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 9 (2-8 March) 1995, p. 8, Translated in FBIS Daily Report 20 March 1995, transmitted via Internet
\textsuperscript{79}Vladimir Gondusov report, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 1 September 1994.
\textsuperscript{80}ITAR-TASS in English, dateline Moscow, 13 February 1995.
\textsuperscript{81}ITAR-TASS in English, dateline Moscow, 3 March 1995.
former Defense Ministry insider who knew how the organization operated and would know how it might have an impact on Russian foreign policy in the future.

Gromov's presence did not appear to have made a major improvement in consultation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Kozyrev remained in the dark about Defense Ministry actions. In November 1995, an exasperated Kozyrev told the press that he had learned of the Defense Ministry's agreements with Ukraine via the media and lamented that in this instance Grachev had once again spoken directly with Yeltsin, bypassing and not even informing Kozyrev.82

The Role of Intelligence and Security Services

Intelligence services continued to have an important voice in the making of Russian foreign policy in the second republic. The Foreign Intelligence Service's (FIS) work became more prominent due to the personal engagement of Evgenii Primakov, its director until January 1995. His official status rose when he was named a voting member of the reconstituted Security Council in early 1994.83 (Significantly, Primakov's successor as the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, did not receive voting status in the Security Council when he was made a member in February 1996.84) More significantly, Boris Yeltsin expressed unalloyed praise of the work done by

Yeltsin's fulsome praise rang both of sincere appreciation and of concern for keeping the ranks of the Foreign Intelligence Service on his side.

Building on the success of its first public report, discussed in chapter four, the FIS made another major contribution to Russia's foreign policy debate in late 1993 when it published its second major report, an analysis of the question of NATO enlargement. It effectively took issue with the MFA's nuanced handling of the question, declaring NATO's eastward expansion a threat to Russia's national interests. The fact that the report openly criticized the Foreign Ministry is remarkable, as is the fact that the FIS was playing a public role -- not a typical stance for an intelligence agency.

Another example of the FIS's public role came in September 1994 when Primakov unveiled the report, "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Need
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Correction?" As the title itself indicated, the FIS authors were addressing foreign partners directly in the hope that the report would result in a change of attitude in the West toward Russia's attempts to increase integration with CIS partners. Naturally, the report was intended for Russian policymakers as well, since it was released just prior to a visit by Boris Yeltsin to the US and Great Britain.

The quality and quantity of the FIS's routine analysis (that is, analysis that was not meant for public consumption and debate) continued to exceed that produced by the Foreign Ministry, according to important indicators. For example, Boris Yeltsin himself highlighted the value of the FIS's analysis, which contrasted with his negative comments about MFA analysis at the MFA Collegium in 1992. According to an interview with an unnamed Security Council staffer, FIS reports were valuable to the Security Council, whereas the MFA "didn't send any materials at all." The MFA's denial of information was probably an effort to better control policy by keeping information to itself and away from the hands of its competitors. But it appears that the effect of the approach was sooner to deny the MFA influence among other key policymakers: Without

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88 Speech by B. N. Yeltsin to leadership and staff of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service published in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 29 April 1994; and Ekho Moskvy Radio (Moscow), 27 October 1992.
providing its own analysis (and information), the MFA could scarcely expect to have its say in a policymaking process in which agencies other than itself were involved.

FIS Director Primakov continued to be active in what would be traditionally understood as a diplomat's turf. He traveled and met with foreign leaders, in addition to meeting his opposite numbers in intelligence operations. The former category of official visits was peculiar in the sense that Primakov was meeting foreign partners with positions significantly higher than his own. This came about in part simply because of the situation ensuing after the collapse of the Soviet Union when former colleagues (and sometimes subordinates) had become top officials in the other newly independent states. But it was also a sign that Primakov had a great deal of say in the making of Russian foreign policy, even before he became foreign minister.

There were attempts to make intelligence oversight more effective in the second republic. As noted above, a new position of national security adviser with responsibilities for coordinating and overseeing the work of the military and security services from the vantage point of the presidential administration was created in early 1994. Baturin was initially confident of his position and his ability to make a difference, commenting in early 1994 that "the new office of security adviser marks the beginning of civilian control over Russia's army and security structures." 

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90See, for example, Primakov's visit to Turkmenistan in December 1994.
But it was questionable whether the task of overseeing these ministries and agencies could be tackled by a single individual. Even with a staff of about 100, it seems unlikely that Baturin would have been in a realistic position to oversee these ministries adequately.

Baturin's task was not only extremely large, it was also not adequately governed by law. The legal mechanism on which Baturin needed to rely to control these ministries was an exceedingly weak construct. Oversight continued to be a problem of the intelligence and security services generally. A law governing federal security services in general was adopted in April 1995, and the president, government, legislature, and judiciary were all given some say in intelligence oversight. But the provisions of the law discussing when and how the security services could act to protect state security were so vague as to make virtually any activity legally defensible.92 In late 1995 the Duma passed a law on the Foreign Intelligence Service, but its provisions were also vague enough to give the FIS a broad margin for conducting its activities.93

As during the first republic, the ability of the intelligence services to function under few outside restraints meant that they could, in theory, act

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without the knowledge of other members of the government. This was in keeping with the mood set by Russia's leaders at the time: Rather than stepping back from the legacy of the police state left by the Soviet Union's KGB, Russia's intelligence services were called upon to act with renewed vigor to ensure Russia's security. As Boris Yeltsin told the Foreign Counterintelligence Service in May 1994:

> I categorically disagree with the view that the information and analysis work of the counterintelligence service should be performed only on instructions from above... I demand that you act energetically, boldly, and decisively.\(^{94}\)

As these comments and the balance of Yeltsin's speech made clear, he was not intent on curbing the activities of the intelligence services or increasing outside oversight of their activities. This situation makes it difficult to employ a bureaucratic politics model to explain Russian foreign policy formulation. The excessively wide margin for action among Russia's intelligence services meant that their position in policymaking was significantly removed from the characteristic "pulling and hauling" of players in Allison's model.

**The Role of the Legislature**

The second republic did not solve the problem of frequent conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government. Russia had a new system of government, but the December 1993 elections produced a

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lower house, the State Duma, dominated by opponents of the president, a situation which did not change after the December 1995 elections. Since it was the lower house which had the most day-to-day contact with foreign policy issues, its actions are treated here as having more relevance to foreign policy formulation than the work of the Federation Council, the upper house.

The first major souring of relations between the executive and legislature occurred in February 1994 when the Duma voted to amnesty the participants of the 1991 coup attempt as well as the anti-Yeltsin forces of the so-called October Events (the armed clashes in Moscow which followed Yeltsin's dissolution of parliament in September 1993). These amnesties showed that the new legislature would be no less difficult to work with than the old Supreme Soviet.

The fact that the Duma created four committees concerned with foreign policy and security issues (the Committee on Defense, Committee on International Affairs, the Committee on CIS affairs and Relations with Compatriots, and the Geopolitical Affairs Committee set up independently by the Liberal Democratic Party) could be explained by the competing foreign policy preferences. But it also indicated that foreign affairs would figure prominently in the Duma's work. Committees not only maintained their own staffs to study foreign policy issues, they also utilized and became the channel for studies done by various research institutes in Moscow.\footnote{Interview with Georgii Arbatov, director of Russian Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, Rabochaya tribuna, 14 December 1994, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 14 December 1994, transmitted via Internet.}
The reduced role of the legislative branch as prescribed by the new constitution produced disgruntlement among many of the deputies. Duma members felt disadvantaged by the distribution of powers and began immediately to search for ways to increase their influence over policy. Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Duma's Committee on Legislative Affairs and Juridical Reform, pointed out the constitution's provision that the president determines foreign policy "in accordance with federal laws," and tried in April 1994 to unite deputies around the idea of securing more influence over foreign policy by passing laws on foreign policy issues.96 For example, he proposed making participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program subject to Duma ratification. Ultimately the vote fell nine votes short of achieving a simple majority.97 In other cases, though, the Duma did muster the majorities required to pass laws aimed directly at changing Russian foreign policy, such as those passed in August 1995 on the situation in Yugoslavia.98 But these majorities were not always strong enough to overcome a presidential veto.99 The Duma's August 1995 law on humanitarian aid to the rump Yugoslavia was one of its few laws demanding a specific action in foreign affairs which was not blocked or simply ignored by the executive branch.100

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The bulk of the Duma's activity in foreign affairs took the form of non-binding resolutions, or statements about foreign policy which did not require the Russian government to take any particular action. These resolutions criticized Moscow's handling of policy or, in some cases, its failure to address a certain issue. In keeping with the Duma's role, these resolutions were frequently addressed to other parliaments around the world, as was the case in the April 1995 Duma resolution on the crisis in former Yugoslavia.\footnote{Russian Federation Council Appeal to the World 'On the Crisis in Former Yugoslavia,' 12 April 1995 published in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 April 1995, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 26 April 1995, transmitted via Internet.}

The Duma's non-binding resolutions on foreign policy matters frequently had domestic political aims, such as deputies' apparent efforts to preserve Russia's great power status and national honor. This was the case in March 1996 when the Duma passed two resolutions regarding the dissolution of the USSR. The first canceled the 12 December 1991 decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which scrapped the 1922 agreement forming the USSR.\footnote{ITAR-TASS in English, 15 March 1996, transmitted via Internet.} The second instructed the Russian government to "take the necessary measures to preserve a single economic, political, and information area and to develop and strengthen integration ties among the states created on USSR territory," pointing to the legality of the 17 March 1991 Russian referendum on the preservation of the USSR as evidence that the Russian

people favored the preservation of the USSR. These actions were aimed at hurting Boris Yeltsin's reelection campaign by appealing to nostalgia among the Russian electorate and reminding voters of the current leadership's role in the dissolution of the USSR.

The international reaction to the Duma's resolutions showed, though, that actions designed for the domestic Russian audience nonetheless had resonance abroad. Many of the new independent states responded harshly to the Duma's vote, telegraphing Yeltsin to condemn the action. Russia's executive branch quickly put out a statement by Boris Yeltsin assuring that Moscow favored integration, but only through voluntary measures, and that it rejected "politically explosive and juridically unsound unilateral decisions." Chernomyrdin said simply of the Duma's action that he "didn't take it seriously." Once again the executive branch was not only publicly at odds with the legislature, but was in the position of reassuring international partners that what the Duma called for would not be heeded by the Kremlin.

In the end, the Duma's resolutions damaged its own prestige in the eyes of many at home and of foreign partners as well. The Russian news agency ITAR-TASS

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105 "Yeltsin Rejects Duma Decision on USSR," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 16 March 1996, transmitted via Internet.
parodied the Duma's vote by issuing an April Fool's story claiming that the Duma was drafting a document on the reactivation of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{107} NATO Secretary General Javier Solana told one Duma member, in response to criticism about NATO's planned enlargement, that "you have not done very much to maintain the balance in Europe through your decision to restore the USSR either."\textsuperscript{108} US Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the vote "highly irresponsible" and warned, while visiting Ukraine, that "any attempt to change [the] status of [these countries] should be rejected by the international community."\textsuperscript{109} The international reaction to the Duma's resolutions indicated that in spite of Yeltsin's assurances that the Duma's resolutions did not represent Russia's official policy, foreign partners took the Duma seriously enough to respond. So while the Duma did not have direct impact on the policy engineering stage of Russian foreign policy formulation, it did have a direct effect on the way foreign partners viewed Russia.

This example demonstrated that the Duma could indeed make the Foreign Ministry's work more difficult. It was the Duma's strident tones in foreign policy which occasioned Foreign Minister Kozyrev to call deputies opposing him "traitors" and "political

\textsuperscript{107}Aleksandr Nechayev, "Duma 'Experts' Drafting Documents to Restore Warsaw Pact," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 1 April 1996.


bastards" seeking to "return Russia to isolation."\textsuperscript{110} Whether Kozyrev's comments were justified at some level by the Duma's actions is open to debate, but his sharp words did little to encourage deputies to take more responsible and constructive positions.

Despite generally bad relations between the executive and legislative branches, there continued to be instances when the MFA attempted to lobby and cajole deputies to cooperate. The executive branch recognized that the Duma could have an impact on public opinion through its issuance of emotional decrees and resolutions. As the Russian foreign minister made clear, while he and probably other members of the Russian political elite did not understand the feelings of sympathy toward Serbia in the wars of Yugoslav succession, these feelings on the part of the Russian population had to be considered: "[W]hatever the reason is, it is a fact of life that a considerable part of Russian public opinion believes that Serbs are the closest peoples to Russia in the Balkans, and they have to be protected. We have to take that into account."\textsuperscript{111} If Kozyrev's impression of public opinion was correct, the public support for Serbia he detected could well have derived from the legislature's continuous harping on the need to protect Serbia.

Another example of harmonious relations between the Duma and the executive can be found in the postponement of US-Russian joint military exercises in Totsk training ground in Russia. The Duma had asked Yeltsin

\textsuperscript{110}"Kozyrev Blasts 'Political Bastards' Opposed to NATO Pact," dateline Moscow, AFP, 27 June 1994.

to reconsider holding the exercises, and Yeltsin expressed his "understanding" and asked his defense minister to hold additional consultations with the US and to reconsider the matter taking due regard of the Duma's and Totsk citizens' opinion. In the end, the exercises were held two months later than originally scheduled, with assurances to the Duma and the public that they would not damage Russian security or environment.

These examples may suggest a process of settling down in the conflict between the executive and the legislature. Clearly, recent Russian history had seen enough of such conflict, and the new legislature's reduced powers brought an end to its claims on contested power.

But, at the same time, these examples may overstate the executive's interest in taking the Duma's foreign-policy views into account. Just after these two examples of executive interest in cooperation, the Duma voted in favor of the draft budget for 1994, something that the executive branch needed and wanted. Russian observers identified a pattern prior to Duma budget votes in which the executive attempts to ingratiate itself with the Duma. This example shows that foreign policy as well as domestic issues can be used by the executive branch as bargaining chips at budget time.

The Duma and Federation Council each have a part to play in the ratification of international treaties,

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which represents a powerful instrument by which the legislature can exercise influence over foreign policy. The Duma, supported by the Federation Council, successfully blocked the implementation of the START II treaty by refusing to ratify it.\textsuperscript{114} (Signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in January 1993, START II had not been ratified by mid-1998.) In addition, a Duma deputy linked START II ratification to NATO enlargement, making NATO's eastern expansion a reason for the Duma to refuse START II ratification.\textsuperscript{115} Thus, the Federal Assembly has also attempted to use its powers regarding treaty ratification to influence other issues.

In some cases, the Duma's use of its ratification and budgetary powers fell short of success. The Duma's policies were overturned twice with regard to the treaty between Russia and Moldova on the withdrawal of troops. The Federation Council rejected the Duma's law providing additional funding to keep Russian troops in Moldova.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, the executive branch started to withdraw some of the withdrawal of troops contrary to the treaty's provision that withdrawal start upon ratification of the treaty.\textsuperscript{117} Thus, not only can the Duma run into obstacles put up by the Federation


Council's review of its work, the executive branch can circumvent the Duma's ratification powers by proceeding with policies that have not yet been ratified.

A persistent problem of the Duma and Federation Council has been the frequent departure from rules of procedure. According to a study of legislative activity between 1993 and 1995, there were frequent instances of repeat voting on one and the same subject, voting on behalf of absent colleagues, and failure to consult the government on federal spending issues, none of which are allowed according to the Russian constitution.  

A question which arose at the start of the second republic was the attitude of the public toward foreign policy. The December 1993 election showed a sizable portion of the Russian electorate supporting Vladimir Zhirinovsky and other conservative opposition politicians. It was not immediately clear whether these voters were supporting these politicians for their foreign policy views, their domestic policy views, or simply out of a desire to punish the incumbent government for the pain of domestic economic and political change.

Public opinion polls do not support the notion that these conservative politicians were elected for their foreign policy views. Public views on foreign policy as reported by Russian polling agencies tended to be more moderate in nature and almost always featured a sizable percentage of respondents without any opinion on a given foreign policy question. For example, when asked

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in 1994 what kind of position Russia should take in response to the NATO air-strikes on Serb targets in Yugoslavia, 47 percent said that Russia should remain neutral, 21 percent said that Russia should support the Serbs, eight percent indicated that Russia should support NATO, and 24 percent said they did not know.  

Furthermore, it remained questionable whether deputies took their representational roles any more seriously in the second republic than they had in the first. Then, as was discussed in the previous chapter, it was clear that deputies imagined their mandate to consist not so much of being a delegate representing public opinion but of being a trustee of public opinion, a position in which they were expected to vote according to what they considered right, not necessarily according to what their constituents preferred.

Research Institutes and the Media

The situation for Russian research institutes during the first years of the second republic remained a difficult one. Their ability to influence foreign policy was decreased by the proliferation of analysis units within the presidential apparatus. While these new organs often hired top people from the former state-run research institutes, there were far more...
people who were left behind.\textsuperscript{120} Russian analysts were frequently in a situation of needing to supplement their meager incomes by doing research for private consulting firms. This meant that they had that much less time to try to find paths to participate in the official policymaking process.

One avenue for analysts to participate in the problem recognition stage was through conferences and meetings sponsored by the Foreign Ministry. Such meetings became more prevalent during the second republic, apparently because of the MFA's continuing search for a \textit{modus vivendi} with the many critics of its policies. The MFA held a conference on the situation of the Russian Diaspora in the former Soviet Union in mid-1995. To it were invited not only those specializing in the Eurasian region but also researchers interested in other parts of the world. For example, the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, A. M. Vasiliev, was invited to offer a comparative perspective and because of his institute's methodological experience.\textsuperscript{121}

The experience of the Africa Institute, which has been transformed into a center for the study of Muslim-majority CIS states as well as Africa, was typical of that of other government sponsored institutes. They were forced to get away from highly specialized analysis and to treat a much larger range of issues in order to stay competitive. As Vasiliev noted, his

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\textsuperscript{120}Oksana Antonenko, \textit{New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking}. An occasional paper of the Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1996, p. 4.

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institute had redirected a good portion of its research to the problems of relations with the former Soviet Union. The reason for this was obvious -- many of Russia's most pressing foreign policy issues were now in the former Soviet Union, not in Western Europe or the United States. But as Light has noted, the Russian academic community was unprepared for this development, having been concerned during the Soviet period with Soviet foreign policy, none of which included what became the former Soviet Union in 1991.\textsuperscript{122} Now, those researching this part of the world could be termed the vast majority.\textsuperscript{123}

The group of top institutchiki which did enjoy access to the government, for example, through membership in the Presidential Council or through working directly for the presidential apparatus, was perhaps the best channel for other analysts to have a voice in policymaking.\textsuperscript{124} Those with access to policymakers effectively had a foot in each world and could convey research findings to the people whose jobs consisted of regular participation in the policymaking process. Whether their findings actually had an impact on policy was another matter entirely.

The Russian media's influence in the policymaking process during the first years of the second republic was not radically different than its role during the first republic. The media, continued to be much freer than during the Soviet period. It remained a forum for


\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124}Oksana Antonenko, \textit{New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking}, op. cit., p. 4.
policy advocacy from foreign policy entrepreneurs. The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy published a second long treatise on foreign policy, elaborating and refining points it had made two years earlier, as discussed in the previous chapter. Most significantly, the media became an even more bountiful source for insider accounts about policymaking through interviews with participants in the policymaking process. The most useful of these were done in question-and-answer format and therefore not distorted by editorial comment.

**Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition Models**

Referring to the series of characteristics identifiable in the bureaucratic politics and transition models enumerated in chapter one, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Allison's argument that "[i]f a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government," continued to provide little explanatory power in the second republic. As in the first Russian republic, disagreement continued to be a basic ingredient of the policymaking process. But the interim step between

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disagreement and policy outcome continued to follow a pattern different than the one described by Allison. Rather than parts of policy preferences being melted into a single policy amalgam, there appeared to be more evidence of the Foreign Ministry being sidelined from the policymaking circle. While akin to the "winner-take-all" situation seen in the first republic, this exclusion of the MFA seemed more subtle and was certainly less public. One example was Kozyrev's claim that the MFA had learned only through the media of the Defense Ministry's agreements with Ukraine in November 1995.

The transition model explains these winner-take-all situations in terms of the sharp struggle over policy options within the democratizing state. Stakes in achieving one's policy goals tend to be high because of the power the transition period holds for setting precedents for future policymaking.

The second pattern seen in the second republic, one in which actors pursued various foreign policies, also continued to be a problem in the second republic. One example could be found in the contradictory remarks about possible repercussions of NATO enlargement. As before, this meant that the intragovernmental negotiation process had failed. This problem was connected with the deficit in procedures and the failure of policymakers to stick to a shared set of guidelines for discussing policy in public. Without a mechanism for developing and using such guidelines, the pursuit of multiple foreign policy positions is an ever-present risk. It is noteworthy that mechanisms do not simply have to exist, they also must be respected by the players. This is one aspect of an established bureaucracy which makes it function more effectively.
The blurred lines of authority of the first republic were replaced by greater clarity in the delineation of power in the second republic. But, there were new problems in the Russian polity brought on by the new constitution, including excessive powers accruing to the president, the unchecked growth of the presidential apparatus, and the related problem of competing centers of power within the executive. Additional decrees defining which agency was in charge of foreign policy continued to offer no remedy for a situation in which the chain of command was unclear. There continued to be no fixed system forcing actors to work together to make policy. All of these characteristics can be accommodated by the transition model.

Allison's description of "a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit," remained unsuitable in the second republic. The size of the presidential apparatus grew, creating additional struggles to preserve or create institutional identities. The bureaucratic infighting in Russia's second republic continued to be perceived by players as a matter of institutional survival (as in the case of the rivalry between the MFA and the CIS Ministry) -- not simply winning or losing this or that policy battle. As had been the case in the first republic, these institutional rivalries were more pronounced in Russia than in other established democracies because Russia's institutions had not yet become established and had not developed procedures to fit together in a predictable policymaking environment.

129Ibid., p. 80.
Chapter 5  The Second Russian Republic

Allison's depiction of problems being "cut up and parceled out to various organizations," continued to be out of harmony with the chaotic nature of interaction between Russia's governing institutions. There remained too little organization and too little clarity about who was in charge to expect this kind of division of responsibility. In addition, Yeltsin's declining health in the second republic meant that his laissez-faire management style became even freer. This increased his tendency to let members of his dual executive fight problems out among themselves. Yeltsin was quite comfortable putting his appointed aides -- who enjoyed no popular mandate or were not accountable to the public -- to work in making Russian foreign policy, as could be seen in his dispatch of Presidential Council members to the United States as an advance team for his presidential visit in September 1994, and his chief of staff's representation of him abroad.

Allison argued that the behavior of government can be understood as a series of organizational "outputs" possessing a "preprogrammed" character. In Russia's second republic, it was difficult to detect any action of this nature. Far more often, Russia's foreign policy seemed random and unprogrammed. As was made clear by Baturin's statement -- "the process of making political decisions is confused, complicated, and to some extent unknown" -- even those at the highest echelons of

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130Ibid., p. 80.
131Ibid., p. 81.
power were not privy to the intricacies of how policy was made.

Allison's standard operating procedures, which "permit concerted action by large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic cues,"\(^{133}\) remained undeveloped. Such standard operating procedures were not characteristic of Russia's first republic, owing to the chaotic organizational and political situation, and this situation persisted into the first years of the second republic. While Russia had had more time to develop as an independent state in the two years between the collapse of the USSR and the start of the second republic, this time was far too short to have seen much progress in creating these procedures. Furthermore, the political upheaval involved in the transition from the first to the second republic was a trauma to the polity which probably damaged any procedures that had managed to take hold between 1991 and 1993. It was also a trauma to the creation of a rule-of-law society.

The development of "action channels," or "regularized means of taking government action on a specific kind of issue,"\(^{134}\) continued to be inhibited by extremely fluid and ad hoc involvement of personnel in foreign policy issues. The military continued to trespass on the MFA's organizational turf, as could be seen in Grachev's travels abroad and discussion of subjects which would sooner belong to a diplomat's agenda (for example, Grachev's proposal for a new collective security system in Asia, in 1994).

\(^{134}\)Ibid., p. 169.
Finally, Allison's "dominant inference pattern" -- "[i]f a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing...an action only marginally different..."\textsuperscript{135} remained undescriptive of foreign policy formulation in the second republic. There was still too much instability in Russia's governing structures for patterns to be identified. The unchecked growth of the presidential apparatus -- which saw the president's security services become involved in policy analysis and policymaking -- meant that much of the activity took place among people and within agencies removed from public view and accountability. Standardized decisionmaking depends to a great extent on the presence of enforceable, legal mechanisms, and these were simply not present within the presidential structures.

The executive also operated largely unchecked by legislative or judicial oversight. This was especially a problem with regard to the work of the intelligence agencies. New laws purporting to make them more accountable were written, but they were too vague to exert serious control over the actions of intelligence agencies.

The foreign policy formulation mechanism became more entangled in domestic politics in the second republic, a characteristic of the transition model. Policymakers grew inured to the situation in which intragovernmental disagreements were aired in public and debates behind closed doors were finished on the pages of the press. The metamorphosis of Foreign Minister Kozyrev's views, as seen in his shift on NATO

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., p. 87.
enlargement, could be traced to his ambition to be re-elected as a deputy. The legislature made the most blatant use of foreign policy for domestic political gain, as was clear in its emotional appeals about the war in former Yugoslavia and its resolutions on the restoration of the USSR. While such activity may occur in any country, it is worthy of note in Russia's case because it is part of an already-pronounced pattern of domestic politics being played out in the international arena.

Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, one would expect the transition model to offer much more explanatory power than the bureaucratic politics model for understanding foreign policy formulation during the second republic.
A Russian lawmaker commented in early 1993 that "it is clear that only two persons in Russia make decisions" on the Russian position toward sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia: President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. The clarity with which this Russian deputy viewed the situation was lacking among other observers, namely, the anonymous US policymaker who in late 1992 described Russia's policy toward Bosnia as being "indecipherable." The two statements indicate the complexity of the policymaking situation in Russia on the question of sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia between May 1992, when the United Nations Security Council imposed an international economic embargo against the rump Yugoslavia, and November 1995, when the same body voted to lift these sanctions.

In May 1992, Russia voted in the United Nations Security Council to support the international economic embargo against the rump Yugoslavia. This decision marked a controversial step in Russian foreign policy,

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1Interfax, 15 February 1993.
3Resolution 757 said "...that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution." Transmitted via Internet from United Nations.
arguably independent Russia's first major challenge in foreign affairs. During the three years that followed, when the sanctions question was revisited by the UN both for tightening and lifting, it became clear that the issue evoked conflicting responses from the various branches of the Russian government. It also became clear that Russia's policy toward this key issue in the wars of Yugoslav succession would become intertwined with Russia's day-to-day domestic political infighting, much more that it did in other countries involved in brokering a settlement in the Balkans. This chapter discusses how prominent Russian actors influenced Russian policymaking on the sanctions issue between 1992 and 1995 in an attempt to test the conclusions about the bureaucratic politics model drawn thus far.

The Role of Presidential Institutions

Throughout the period in question (1992-1995), Boris Yeltsin made relatively few public statements about the sanctions question. In one of his first statements, the president showed an unhesitating willingness to voice support for the use of sanctions. In late 1992, during a state visit of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Moscow, Yeltsin said:

In connection with Yugoslavia, that is, in particular with Serbia, I would like to state that we, together with the international community, are prepared to fulfill the UN resolutions, although naturally we hope for peace and that Serbia will end its advance there.4

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Yeltsin's statement was noteworthy not only because he did not waver on the sanctions issue, but because he singled out Serbia as the aggressor in the region, a stance that many politicians in Russia argued against. Yeltsin's posture could be explained as an attempt to harmonize with the position of Germany, Russia's most important bilateral relationship in Western Europe. Harmonization with Germany did not require too much stretching of the Russian position since the German government at the time was adamantly opposed to German participation in the use of military force and had been urging the use of diplomatic methods to solve the crisis.

By early 1993, the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia had prompted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which Russia supported. But in Washington, President-elect Clinton, who had campaigned pledging a more active US policy in Bosnia, was talking about the need to become more assertive if ethnic cleansing did not cease. The popular sentiment in Germany, which was experiencing increased flows of refugees, was also

7Named after Cyrus Vance and David Owen and outlining a three-part package of ten constitutional principles, a cessation of hostilities agreement and a map delineating a ten-province structure reconstituting Bosnia-Herzegovina. For more information, see, David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, (London: Indigo, 1996), pp. 94-95.
8Uwe Knüpfer, "On the Question of Bosnia, Clinton is Between Stools," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 5 February 1993; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 101.

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shifting toward more sympathy for the use of military force.\(^9\)

It was against this backdrop that Yeltsin began several weeks later to couch his stance on the sanctions question with more sympathy toward the Serb side. He contrasted Russia's support of the sanctions with its staunch rejection of the international community's use of force against Serb targets.\(^10\) In addition, Yeltsin stressed that Russia's attitude toward the sanctions was more "restrained" than that of its international partners. He refrained from blaming Serbia singly, and made a point of positioning Russia as Serbia's protector.\(^11\)

Yeltsin's shift in stance could be explained by a number of factors both internal and external to Russia. Increased US attention to the conflict\(^12\) -- especially the debate about lifting the arms embargo which disproportionately hindered Bosnia's defense capability -- likely meant an increase in US involvement in peace settlement efforts. The situation in Bosnia, especially around Srebrenica, was deteriorating rapidly,\(^13\) itself an indication that action might come forcefully and swiftly. The question of the use of air-power to stop Serbia was particularly troublesome.

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\(^9\)See, for example, comment by Lothar Rühl, "Eingreifen ist möglich" ("Military Intervention is Possible," ) Die Welt (Berlin), 5 January 1992.

\(^10\)ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1993.

\(^11\)Ibid.

\(^12\)The White House was the home of a lame-duck president between early November 1992 and late January 1993.

\(^13\)"The War in Bosnia is Heating Up," Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt-am-Main), 2 February 1993.
Sensitive to questions of Russia's international status, Yeltsin hoped to distinguish Russia's position clearly from that of the US. Significantly, Yeltsin was also bringing himself in line with a popular and vocal pro-Serb stance within Russia (discussed in more detail below).

By March and April 1993, when the issue became one of whether the UN should tighten sanctions, Yeltsin linked Russia's position on the matter to his domestic political situation. Russia's support of the sanctions had become a controversial subject in Russian politics and was being barraged by criticism in the more conservative Russian media and in the Supreme Soviet (discussed in more detail below).

This was a bad time for Yeltsin to deepen Russia's commitment to a foreign policy decision which would undoubtedly be unpopular with Russia's pro-Serb voices, the Russian parliament being the leading home of these voices. Yeltsin was about to go to the Russian public for support of his program and his presidency in the form of a referendum. In addition, Yeltsin had suffered a domestic political blow the previous month when the Congress of People's Deputies passed resolutions intended to limit Yeltsin's decisionmaking authority in economic and personnel questions. Yeltsin needed to find ways of distancing himself from criticism that his administration was being too obsequious toward the United States and the West in general.

It was therefore both for domestic political reasons and in the context of international maneuvering that Yeltsin sent a letter to US President Bill Clinton on 11 April 1993 requesting that the UN Security Council (UNSC) vote be postponed until one day after the Russian referendum, which was scheduled to take place on 25 April. Such a delay would prevent Russia's voting behavior on the sanctions question from having an impact on the referendum.

The linkage between Russian domestic politics and the UNSC vote was denied by Russian diplomats. This is not surprising considering their natural inclination to have foreign policy issues viewed on their merits, not to become hostage to unrelated (domestic) subjects.

The stance of Russian diplomats might also be attributed to a difference of opinion between them and the presidential apparatus, with diplomats rejecting linkage and elite of the presidential apparatus favoring it. As the discussion in previous chapters illustrates, it is within the realm of possibility that Russian diplomats had been sidelined by the Presidential apparatus on the decision to write the letter. As already noted, Yeltsin's foreign policy aides frequently doubled as domestic politics advisers, a situation which impelled them to view foreign policy issues excessively in light of their impact on domestic political problems. The fact that the sanctions vote

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15 "Yeltsin Presses Clinton on Vote," The New York Times, 12 April 1993. In the referendum of April 25, voters were asked whether they approved of Yeltsin's presidency and whether there should be new elections. It was an attempt to break the deadlock between the president and legislature, and Yeltsin claimed victory despite an ambiguous result. Wendy Slater, "No Victors in the Russian Referendum," RFE/RL Research Report, No. 21, 21 May 1993.

16 Yulii Vorontsov said, "We are not coupling [the vote with] any type of problems at home." Reuter, 13 April 1993.
would not be put off (apparently owing to French adamancy) until after the referendum thus enforced the inclination to view Russia's vote in a domestic political light.

Irrespective of whether it was the Foreign Ministry or the Presidential apparatus which wrote the Yeltsin letter, the Russian position (an abstention) turned on the question of Russian domestic politics. Meanwhile, Serb assaults on Bosnian targets continued, making Russia's abstention look like obstructionism to critics of the policy.

Shortly after the UN vote, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic signed (with reservations) the Vance-Owen peace plan after much delay, bringing new, if cautious, optimism into the peace process. The discussion of the use of force centered around an international contingent put in place to guarantee the fragile peace agreement. Russia, along with the United States, France and Great Britain, was willing to provide troops. At the same time, Russia continued to reject proposals for the use of air strikes to convince the Bosnian Serbs to ratify the peace plan. (The plan was scheduled to be put to a referendum.)

17According to Lord Owen, the French, unlike the British and Americans, were not willing to let the Russians have an extra day. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 144.


20"Russia Wants to Send Troops," Die Welt (Berlin), 6 May 1993.

21"Grachev is Against Airstrikes," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt-am-Main), 12 May 1993.

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continued to be the case even after Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic declared the Vance-Owen plan "dead." 22

In the spring of 1993, a gap between the positions of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had become perceptible. Milosevic was critical of Karadzic's reservations and had urged the Bosnian Serbs to back the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. 23

The change in Serbia's stance gave Russia a reason to shift its position on sanctions once again. In August 1993, Yeltsin suggested that the lifting of sanctions be raised at the UN. 24

In addition to the change in the situation on the ground in former Yugoslavia, there were also domestic Russian political reasons for Russia's shift in stance. Yeltsin knew that he would soon enter a fierce battle with the Supreme Soviet, a battle which came to pass with his September 1993 dissolution of that body. Yeltsin therefore sought to show himself favorable toward a position considered popular with many in Russia (especially among his political opponents) -- the lifting or easing of sanctions against rump Yugoslavia. 25

In late February 1994, the use of NATO air strikes became a further factor to be considered by Russia in its making of sanctions policy. Air strikes were used

23David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 163.
24Interfax, 19 August 1993.
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the first time against Serb planes flying in a UN-declared no-fly zone, a scenario which Russia had agreed to when it supported UN Security Council resolution 836 in June 1993. But when Serb planes were actually hit, Yeltsin was adamant that the air strikes stop, warning that they could lead to a wider war. Yeltzin's discomfort with the use of punitive force by NATO was undoubtedly connected with concerns that NATO was becoming operational in ways that could have an impact on Russian security and internal affairs. This broader desire to curb NATO's activity inevitably made itself felt in terms of Russia's treatment of sanctions -- namely to make the lifting of sanctions a catechism of Russia's policy toward the former Yugoslavia.

The creation of the Contact Group in April 1994 helped to institutionalize Russia's participation in decisionmaking on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. While decisions (for example, on military action) continued to be taken by members without prior consultation with Russia, the Contact Group did give Yeltsin and his ministers a forum for voicing views on all subjects related to the former Yugoslavia, including the sanctions question.

It is noteworthy that Boris Yeltsin's policy statements on the sanctions question and the range of issues related to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia did not tend to emphasize arguments about a special relationship with Serbia. Yeltsin took no

26Resolution 836 authorized UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Croatia) to use force to reply to bombardments in safe areas. The resolution was adopted on 4 June 1993.
28The Contact Group included Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States.
particular pains to make statements like those of Russian nationalists about Russian-Serb kinship. One example of Russian nationalist rhetoric was provided by Aleksandr Sterligov, head of the ultra-nationalist Russian National Assembly and a former KGB general, who claimed that "[v]olunteer battalions, which will help out our brothers in Yugoslavia, are being formed by advocates of Slavic nationalism." Sterligov also warned that in the event of UN-sponsored military intervention in Yugoslavia, "a vast number of volunteers ready to protect their Slavic brethren" would emerge in Russia. Other examples included Russia's more conservative newspapers, which published appeals for Russians to help their fellow Slavs in Serbia. Yeltsin, on the other hand, downplayed the historical ties that many in Russia had made a focal point of their political platforms.

For example, Yeltsin said in August 1995 that

the ideas of the "Slav alliance" belong to the past. But even at that time they never held dominant positions in Russia's foreign policy. And they are not in any way related to the conflict in question. After all, the war in Bosnia is waged exclusively between Slav peoples -- Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. They are all close to the Russian people.

Yeltsin's statement is noteworthy because it shows how clearly he refused to take up the rhetoric of his...
opponents. His statements in support of Russian-Serb friendship were positive, but restrained. By pointing out that the pan-Slav alliance was a thing of the past, he debunked one of the core concepts of Russia's nationalists. Yeltsin's behavior gave the impression that he was being pushed by the parliament and perhaps public opinion, but that he could only be pushed so far in his pro-Serbia rhetoric.

Not to be entirely discounted in considering the overall explanation for Yeltsin's stance was his poor personal relationship with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. The Serb leader had expressed support for the putschists during the August 1991 coup attempt in the USSR, placing himself directly opposed to Boris Yeltsin's reformist opposition. It may have been Yeltsin's personal contempt for the authoritarian Milosevic, along with his lack of belief in the historic, Russian-Serb kinship, which impelled him to stop short of adopting the kind of rhetoric about Slavic kinship which would have been well received among Russia's vocal nationalists.

Yeltsin's goal seems to been to do just enough to please Russia's pro-Serbia contingent -- be they in parliament or in the public at large -- but not to do any more than necessary to avoid alienating them. For example, the decision to abstain from the sanctions tightening vote in April 1993 was clearly driven by the Russian referendum scheduled for the next day. But when the Russian State Duma voted in the summer of 1995 for Russia to unilaterally lift the sanctions, Yeltsin responded with his veto powers.\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\)ITAR-TASS, 14 September 1995.
Another example can be found in the a decree enabling trade between Russia and rump Yugoslavia to resume -- a decree which was signed by Yeltsin only on 28 December 1995, a full month after the United Nations Security Council voted to suspend sanctions with immediate effect. Rump Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic was puzzled at the Russian delay, expressing surprise on behalf of his government.

Yeltsin's actions were driven to some extent by the debt to Yugoslavia which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Payments had not been made owing to the sanctions, and by resuming trade, Russia would reopen the debt issue. A further possible explanation for the delay in resuming trade might be in the profit that could be made by breaking the embargo, a situation which would end when the embargo was lifted. While there is only anecdotal evidence of this (as is discussed below), the possibility must be factored into an analysis of Russia's sanctions policy.

The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment

There was a strong similarity between the positions of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev on the sanctions question. Kozyrev, too, viewed askance the arguments of special Slavic ties between Moscow and Belgrade. In a June 1994 interview, Kozyrev elaborated at length:

Somehow it is a common belief, or it seems to be a common belief, that Russia has a particular interest or

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34 Yeltsin had been recovering from heart problems in November and December 1995, but he had signed other decrees during this period. He signed the sanctions decree one day before returning to work. ITAR-TASS in English, 29 December 1995.

35 ITAR-TASS in English, 1 February 1996.
particular historical ties with the Serbs. That's probably true. My first reaction to that though was that in the 45 or 50 years since the Second World War, Yugoslavia, which was dominated by the Serbs and Belgrade, was a bad name. Some portrayed it as a fascist regime; some portrayed it as a not-so-good communist regime; others called it a dissident communist regime. So it was badly criticized and treated with a kind of scorn in Moscow. Yet all of a sudden recently, people have started to love Serbia, that is, Belgrade. But you know that's probably what happens. Historical memories come back after 40 years. You have to take it into account. The opposition has succeeded in exaggerating this feeling toward the Serbs, toward Belgrade. Now, whatever the reason is, it is a fact of life that a considerable part of Russian public opinion believes that Serbs are the closest peoples to Russia in the Balkans, and they have to be protected. We have to take that into account.36

Kozyrev was referring to the fact that there were a number of indicators in recent history which contradicted the theory of a special relationship with Serbia. The decades-long rift between Moscow and Belgrade was healed under Gorbachev only in the context of the larger East-West rapprochement.37 Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, in addition to having supported the August 1991 putschists, had expressed support for the

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37It was in March 1988 that Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Yugoslavia and admitted that the diplomatic rift between the two countries, which began in 1948, had been the fault of the USSR. At the end of the visit the two countries signed a declaration saying that neither would impose their concepts of "social development" on the other and that they would also refrain from interfering in the affairs of other states.
Supreme Soviet after Yeltsin dissolved it in September 1993, actions that made him a difficult figure for Yeltsin or Kozyrev to embrace. Kozyrev's and Yeltsin's views about the nature of the Russian-Serbian relationship were strikingly similar, suggesting close contact and agreement with each other on how to handle the sanctions question.

That Kozyrev enjoyed the trust of Yeltsin on this issue was also suggested in the way the Russian position for the initial sanctions vote was handled in May 1992. Much information about the processing of the decision was contained in a telegram written by Russia's permanent representative to the United Nations, Yulii Vorontsov. The telegram was classified as "secret," but copies of it were leaked to the ultra-conservative Russian weekly, Den' (Day), which published it in June 1992. Virtually all concerns that the newspaper's account was a forgery can be put to rest by the facts that the Russian foreign minister made little if any attempt to deny the authenticity of the cable and implicitly confirmed it, among other things, by scorning the newspaper's publication of a secret document. The ministry's spokesman reacted similarly calling the publication of the cable "a flagrant violation of the law" and "a crime."

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39 "Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!" Den', No. 23 (7-13 June), 1992.
41 AFP, 10 June 1992.
In the cable, dated 28 May 1992, Vorontsov discusses his meeting that day with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on the question of a draft resolution on sanctions against rump Yugoslavia. He explains the positions expressed by the United States and Western Europe to the effect that a full economic embargo against Serbia-Montenegro including oil supplies should be introduced because Belgrade had shown itself to be the aggressor in the conflict. He notes that during the meeting, China indicated that it would have to seek instructions from Beijing before making a move. Vorontsov, too, told his counterparts that the draft resolution would have to be looked over by his superiors in Moscow, a point which was later to become a matter of major debate by Russian opponents of the sanctions resolution.

The cable warned that "many delegates have, in conversations with us, made it clear that Russia's continuing support of Belgrade in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and UN will be incorrectly interpreted by Belgrade as encouragement for its attempt to create a 'Greater Serbia.'" Vorontsov concluded that the only action appropriate for Russia to take would be to vote in favor of the resolution. Only this approach would provide unambiguous proof that Russia was not supporting Serbia. He added that

"it is very important for us not to oppose the Western countries and the United States on this point, where public opinion is decidedly against Milosevic, the 'last communist leader in Europe.' We should by no means allow our country to be associated personally with him, especially on the eve of the
[16 to 17 June 1992] summit in the United States.\(^{42}\)

What Vorontsov did not mention, but what must also have been factored into the analysis of Russian policymakers, was the Group of Seven (G-7) meeting in Munich in early July, to which Russia sought an invitation.

Vorontsov assured his readers that the vote in favor of sanctions would hardly mean a total break in the dialogue with Belgrade. This had not occurred as a result of Soviet votes with regard to UN decisions regarding Iraq and Libya, he noted, in support of his argument. He also noted that any Supreme Soviet opposition to the Russian vote in favor of sanctions could be dealt with by reminding the Russian legislature that even if Russia were to abstain, it would still have to abide by the UN embargo. With his full analysis in place, Vorontsov asked for instructions, noting that the vote was scheduled to take place on 30 May.\(^{43}\)

The Den' publication showed a note attached to the Vorontsov cable, which, judging by the contents, was the Russian Foreign Ministry's reaction, most likely the foreign minister's, given the content. (Hereafter it will be referred to as the "Kozyrev note.") The "Kozyrev note" included suggestions about how to sell Russia's support of the sanctions against Serbia to the Russian public, arguing that Russia should make clear that it had done more for Serbia than other country, but that it had simply run out of patience. "Russia is

\(^{42}\)"Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!" Den', No. 23 (7-13 June), 1992.

\(^{43}\)Ibid.
a great power, something even its friends have to
reckon with," the note argued. Both statements sounded
like the suggestions of someone who had personally been
frustrated by the Serb refusal to make peace, a
category which would have included, prominently,
Kozyrev. They also appeared to be an attempt to preempt
the arguments of Russian nationalists who would argue
that Moscow had succumbed to pressure from the United
States and Western Europe.

The "Kozyrev note" concluded that the Foreign
Ministry considered it expedient to agree with the
assumptions of Vorontsov's cable. It advised that "if
no other instructions are received, we will vote
tomorrow in favor of the resolution." (The annotation
did not indicate who its intended recipients were or
where instructions might be expected to come from, but
it appears that the "Kozyrev note" was circulated to
the same list of people who received Vorontsov's
original cable.)

If the reprinted cable and note are authentic, as
seems likely, a few interpretations are possible. One
is that the matter had been discussed thoroughly before
Vorontsov's cable arrived, thus enabling Kozyrev simply
to confirm Vorontsov's analysis and suggested action
plan. An alternative explanation is that Kozyrev
effectively decided alone to give Vorontsov his
approval without input from other ministers or the
Russian president.

Supporting this explanation is the fact that
Kozyrev was aware of Yeltsin's trust in Vorontsov and
his opinions. Yeltsin's favorable view of Vorontsov was
evident in August 1992, when Yeltsin named him adviser
to the president for foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{44} Vorontsov was rumored on a number of occasions to have been in the running to replace Kozyrev as foreign minister but was said not to have been interested in returning to Moscow.\textsuperscript{45} After his posting at the United Nations, he was named ambassador to the United States, one of Russia's most important embassies and a position which would go only to someone enjoying the Russian president's confidence.

The text, processing, and policy outcome of the Vorontsov cable provide important information about the way the first sanctions decision was handled. So, too, does its list of addressees. In all, there were some 35 recipients listed on the address list including all top foreign ministry officials, Yeltsin, his chief of staff, the vice president, the speaker and deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, as well as the heads of the following: the Security Council, Ministry of Security, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Defense Ministry. The fact that so many officials were listed as recipients was itself significant. If all were expected to take part in the policymaking process, and if all were granted an equal voice in the matter, then Russia's circle of top decisionmakers was large enough to be cumbersome, burdening rather than easing the process of making policy choices.

\textsuperscript{44}ITAR-TASS, 12 August 1992. Vorontsov either never accepted the job or played this role remotely from New York without giving up his position as Russia's permanent representative to the UN.

\textsuperscript{45}"A Lot of People Want Kozyrev's Job," Moskovskie novosti, No. 32 (9 August), 1992.
An alternative interpretation might be that the cable was expected to be taken as information only by some of the recipients. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, who was an addressee, would have been asked to voice an opinion about the Vorontsov cable. He would, on the other hand, have benefited by having access to Vorontsov's analysis and information about affairs at the UN Security Council when facing journalists' questions.

To judge by the time the cable was sent, it did not reach very many of its addressees before the UN vote. As the copy published in Den' shows, it was dispatched from New York only on Friday, 29 May, one day before the question was to come to a vote before the UN Security Council. Even if the cable had been sent from New York at 9:00 a.m. local time, it would not have arrived in Moscow until after the close of business in Russian offices. While this hardly seems to have been intentional, since it is unlikely that Vorontsov controlled the timing of the UN meetings and vote, it may explain why so many officials were included on the addressee list: because Vorontsov expected to miss many of them.\(^46\)

The timing of the cable as well as the arguments in the cable and "Kozyrev note" suggest that the point of including such a large list of addresses was not to involve them in the policymaking process but to sell them on a decision which was ultimately made by a much smaller group. Three of the addressees from the Supreme Soviet were clearly targeted by these remarks in the

\(^{46}\text{This assumes that Russian diplomats, like their American counterparts, determine who will be included on the list of addressees accompanying the cables they write.}\)
hope of winning their support. (As is discussed below, the attempt failed.) There were probably more than three who needed convincing among the 35 addresses. The fact that the cable and "Kozyrev note" were leaked to the press was itself an indication that at least one of the addressees disapproved.

On 30 May 1992, Russia, like the US, France, Britain and nine other permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 757, the first sanctions vote. Had Russia abstained, it would have been in the company of only China and Zimbabwe; no country voted against the resolution.

Kozyrev came under swift criticism in the Russian media and legislature for the Russian support of Resolution 757. The MFA countered protests that Russia was losing money because of the sanctions with the argument that had Russia vetoed the sanctions, it would have not been offered Western aid or the chance to defer and restructure its debt payments.\textsuperscript{47} This, of course, left the MFA open to criticism that it had sold out Russian interests to Western creditors. Within a few months, Kozyrev was under so much pressure from nationalist opponents both inside the Supreme Soviet and in Russian public organizations to abrogate the decision that he began to talk about the need to ease the sanctions.\textsuperscript{48}

Kozyrev quickly grew frustrated with the friction caused by Russia's support of Resolution 757. The sanctions question was one of the key features of his so-called shock diplomacy speech in Stockholm delivered

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{47}ITAR-TASS, 27 November 1992.  \\
\textsuperscript{48}ITAR-TASS, 10 October 1992.}
in December 1992, in which Kozyrev mouthed sharp changes of policy. In that speech, Kozyrev said:

We demand that [the sanctions] be abolished, and if this does not happen, we reserve the right to take necessary unilateral measures in protecting our interests, especially as the sanctions are inflicting economic damage upon us. Serbia can count on the support of great Russia in its struggle with the current government.49

Kozyrev returned to the podium within one hour of making these and other statements to say that they had been designed to dramatize the danger of conservative-nationalism in Russia. The speech made clear the origins of Kozyrev's other attempts to distance Russia from the sanctions.

The fact that Kozyrev felt the need to appeal to an international audience in order to make a point to his domestic political foes (to show them the negative response to their views) was itself telling of the way the Russian policymaking process worked -- or at least of Kozyrev's perception of it. This was one of the many examples of attempts to involve participants from outside Russia in the foreign policy formulation process.

The continuing problem of mixing domestic politics and foreign-policy choices was evident during spring of 1993 when relations between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet worsened. Following Russia's abstention in the UN Security Council vote on tightening the sanctions in April 1993, Kozyrev seemed to link Yeltsin's struggle

with the parliament to Russia's abstention. Yeltsin's claimed victory in the 25 April 1993 referendum on his presidency, meant, according to Kozyrev, that the voters' support of Yeltsin signified their support of his foreign policy course. Kozyrev said that the referendum results "should give us confidence to act in the international arena," a statement which presaged a return to his previous enthusiasm toward using the sanctions instrument against rump Yugoslavia.50

Kozyrev expressed regret at the intrusion of domestic politics into Russian foreign policy, saying he was "sick at heart" at Russia's abstention. "Although in principle it was the right decision [to abstain], in the future Russia must side with the world community, not with the nationalists who are escalating the war in former Yugoslavia."51 Kozyrev was admittedly pushed toward this judgment not only by internal Russian politics. Serb attacks on Bosnian targets had increased substantially around this time and had made Russia's previous calls for easing sanctions look foolish.

The Role of the Legislature

As the memorandum published in Den' showed, the chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as well as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations, had been listed as addressees, thus indicating that the Supreme Soviet had been consulted, formally at least. Kozyrev himself pointed this out -(also thereby effectively

authenticating the cable) and complained that if the Supreme Soviet had not developed a mechanism for dealing rapidly with urgent foreign policy questions, it was not the fault of the Foreign Ministry.\(^{52}\) It might have been Kozyrev's cavalier attitude toward deputies, whose support he only infrequently attempted to enlist, which caused them to make the sanctions question a Leitmotiv for legislation.

The original UNSC sanctions resolution caused the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee to hold hearings on the policymaking process leading up to Russia's vote in the UN Security Council. But deputies' complaints, which included an attempt to impose "personal responsibility" on Andrei Kozyrev for "inflicting serious damage to Russia's national interests," were designed more with a view to sharpening the conflict with the Foreign Ministry than with finding a better working relationship on future foreign policy questions.\(^{53}\)

In an attempt to undo Russia's original sanctions vote (Resolution 757), conservative members of parliament demanded on 26 June 1992 that Russia suspend the sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro. In addition, the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations accused the Foreign Ministry of excessive haste in taking the decision and demanded that in the future the committee be consulted on matters of Russian national interest. The feeling of that committee was that the Russian Foreign Ministry

\(^{52}\) Kozyrev remarks in interview on "How Will We Live" program, Russian Television, 4 July 1992, Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 4 August 1992, transmitted electronically.

had been unduly influenced by pressure from the United States.\textsuperscript{54}

It appears that the Supreme Soviet's reaction derived in large part from the contents of the Vorontsov cable. It was there that deputies learned of the extent to which Russia's decision was indeed influenced by its relations with the West. In addition, deputies learned from the cable that the Foreign Ministry had assumed the right to take action unless instructed otherwise, as the "Kozyrev note" on the cable made clear. Given the unpopularity of the youthful Kozyrev, deputies must have been angered to discover the breadth of his decisionmaking powers.

Despite the Supreme Soviet's failure to achieve a change in policy, it continued to pen resolutions demanding, in one form or another, that UN sanctions be lifted. These resolutions were typically passed by large majorities, indicating that these views were not held by a mere fringe group of deputies.\textsuperscript{55} In fact, the opposite was the case. Deputies who opposed the resolutions and spoke out about the illogic of them were few. Evgenii Kozhokin, a member of the pro-Yeltsin camp of the Supreme Soviet, remarked: "It is simply stupid to try to dictate decisions to the UN Security Council."\textsuperscript{56} But his colleagues probably felt that they had no other recourse, owing to their perception that they had been excluded from any meaningful role in the policymaking process.

\textsuperscript{54}"The Russian Parliament Explained to Kozyrev Why It was Not Appropriate to Rush with the Sanctions Against Serbia," \textit{Izvestiya}, 29 June 1992.

\textsuperscript{55}The resolution of December 1992, for example, was passed by a vote of 151 for, 5 against, and 13 abstaining. \textit{ITAR-TASS}, 17 December 1992.

\textsuperscript{56}Associated Press, 18 February 1993.  

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The Foreign Ministry, for its part, did make some effort to undo the damage caused by its dismissive attitude toward the Supreme Soviet. As was discussed in chapter four, Kozyrev invited Evgenii Ambartsumov, head of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, to join the Russian delegation to the Bosnia conference held in London in August 1992.

Ambartsumov, who had visited the former Yugoslavia along with other members of the Supreme Soviet, was at first admittedly skeptical of the invitation:

At the beginning, I reacted to this proposal with hesitation. It was Kozyrev's initiative, supported by Yeltsin, I wavered, because...I did not want to become a hostage to [Kozyrev's] approaches.57

But after the conference, Ambartsumov praised the work of Russia's diplomats and claimed that Russian policy toward the former Yugoslavia had become "more adequate."58 Kozyrev's overture toward Ambartsumov indicated that at some level, there was the kind of pushing and pulling between the legislature and the Foreign Ministry that had an impact on policy.

Ambartsumov remained a critic of the policymaking process, apparently an indication of his desire to continue having influence. He called for more control over the executive branch's foreign policy decisions, claiming, for example, that the economic impact of Russia's participation in the sanctions had not been thoroughly examined there.59

57 Trud, 3 September 1992, p. 3.
58 Ibid.
The role of the legislature in determining Russia's stance on the sanctions issue seems to have been mixed. At terms of rhetoric exchanged during the problem recognition stage and the politics stage of the policymaking process, the legislature did have an impact. But at the level of practical policymaking, its influence seems to have been negligible. Some of the legislature's resolutions on the sanctions required no particular response from the government, and others that did were simply thrown out by a presidential veto. Deputies' visits to the former Yugoslavia and promises to do all in their power to have the sanctions lifted were decorative gestures with no immediate impact on Russian policy.

While it is true that deputies of the Supreme Soviet and then the State Duma were effective in keeping the sanctions issue on the agenda and in the headlines -- that is, in the problem recognition stage and politics stage -- it is difficult to know how much their concentration on the issue influenced the way the Russian public viewed the international handling of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the one hand, their resolutions might have been persuasive to some Russians. On the other hand, deputies' harangues may have been irritating enough to be dissuasive to the public. As for the impact of public opinion on the deputies' behavior, it appears to have been modest. As was discussed above, Russian deputies typically viewed themselves as trustees unbound by public opinion, and they met with their constituents infrequently.

The Role of Other Actors

Perhaps the most difficult area to gauge in Russian policymaking toward the sanctions issue between 1992 and 1995 is the compliance issue. No matter what
the official Russian policy toward the sanctions was, if Russian agencies were involved in breaking the sanctions either directly or indirectly, such behavior must be factored into the discussion of Russian policymaking on the sanctions issue.

The first claims that Russia was breaking the sanctions came within months of the first UN Security Council vote. In August 1992, the Russian MFA spokesman responded to news reports to this effect saying that while he had no information that Russia was violating the sanctions, "it is a difficult and complicated matter" and "it is not easy to control the situation." Such a statement raised more questions than it answered about Russia's compliance with the sanctions. Reports of Russian violations surfaced regularly in the Russian and Western media either in the form of allegations or denials. One report said that "among Western diplomats, it is considered a certainty that Russia is providing material support to the Serbs, including military goods."

The behavior of Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister, would coincide with the theory that the Defense Ministry was a willing participant in sanctions violations, although there is no incontrovertible evidence to this effect. Grachev made relatively few statements about the sanctions, but those that he did make were often supportive. He made these statements even in the context of rejecting the use of NATO

60AFP, 11 August 1992.
63Associated Press, 10 May 1993.
military force to stop Serb aggression, a situation in which one would not expect the expression of support for a policy unfavorable to Serbia. Grachev headed a Russian delegation of high-level Defense Ministry officials to meet with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in July 1994, thus indicating possible discussion of arms transactions. Moreover, Russian-Serbian military cooperation and consultation had continued throughout the war, suggesting that if any arms transactions were made, there were ample opportunities for servicing and training for any equipment sold.

The behavior of the Russian military forces stationed as part of the international peacekeeping contingent suggested that some portion of the officer corps there was not neutral and was engaged in questionable activities. The United Nations dismissed Russian Major-General Alexander Perelyakin in April 1995 for poor leadership and connivance with the Serb side. He was allegedly selling UN kerosene supplies to the Serbs, in addition to granting passage to a shipment of artillery and tank-destroying vehicles from Serbia into Serb-occupied Croatia. This marked the first instance of a senior officer in the peacekeeping force being removed from his post, an indication of the seriousness of the alleged offense.

The Russian Defense Ministry resisted attempts on the part of the UN to quietly remove Perelyakin,

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64 Tanjug, 26 July 1994.
65 Tanjug, 9 February 1996.
67 "Sacked Russian General Refuses to Go," The European, 14 April 1995.
reportedly a close friend of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Furthermore, during the UN inquiry, Grachev promoted Perelyakin to the rank of Major-General, apparently in order to discourage the UN from pursuing his ouster. After initially refusing to leave his command, Perelyakin ultimately did so, but the incident strongly suggested that Russian peacekeepers were using their positions for personal profit by helping the Serb side.

If this was the case, it would not have been the first incident of military free-lancing nor probably the first time that the uniform and position of a member of the Russian military were used to earn a profit. Whether there was an element of political support for the Serbs on the part of the Russian military remains unknown.

If the anecdotal evidence that Russia was in some way or another violating the sanctions against Serbia is accurate, this raises many questions, most importantly, whether the violations occurred with the knowledge of or under the direction of officials in Moscow. Such questions cannot be answered in the present study, owing to the absence of reliable, public-domain information on the matter. Given its presence in the international peacekeeping contingent, however, the potential for the Russian military establishment to aid in the violation of UN sanctions was great.

69 One of Perelyakin's predecessors remained in the region after his tour of duty was up to run a trading company with a Serbian military leader. "UN Ousts Russian From Croatia Forces," International Herald Tribune, 12 April 1995.
Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition Models

Thus far, this study has found the bureaucratic politics model to be of diminished utility in understanding independent Russia's foreign policy choices and has proposed the transition model as an alternative to analyzing Russian foreign policy. The institutional chaos which began in the Gorbachev era and continued into Russia's second republic meant that key elements described by the model -- for example, standard operating procedures, action channels, and rules of conduct -- were not key features of Russia's foreign policy formulation.

Russia's handling of the sanctions question between 1992 and 1995 both supports and detracts from this overall conclusion. The Foreign Ministry's attempts to involve the legislature in Russia's sanctions policy were infrequent and inconsistent (albeit, understandably so, given the behavior of deputies). The activities of the legislature, while frequent and vocal, did have an effect on Russian rhetoric, but did not play an influential role in the policy engineering stage of Russia's sanctions policy -- for example, the determination of its vote in the UNSC or its decision to resume trade with rump Yugoslavia. In other words, deputies' activities were frequently ignored by the executive branch when it was time to take a position directly affecting Russia's support or compliance with sanctions.

At the same time, deputies' sensitivities were accommodated at the level of rhetoric, that is, during the problem recognition and politics phases. Examples of this can be found in the April 1993 abstention and in Kozyrev's remarks about the feeling of kinship in
Russia toward Serbia. Deputies' views are not to be discounted because, as their vocal protests demonstrated, they can conceivably influence public perception and debate. Yet, as the discussion in the previous chapters indicates, there is no definitive proof that deputies either represented or influenced public opinion.

The transition model discusses the contest between the executive and legislation over authority. This case study suggests that this conflict can have an impact on the rhetoric surrounding issues (the problem recognition stage and the politics stage) while not immediately affecting the policy engineering stage.

The behavior of the Foreign Ministry and its handling of the Vorontsov cable and the "Kozyrev note" certainly might be called Byzantine, but they were not necessarily in keeping with what the bureaucratic politics model stressed in terms of policy output. The Vorontsov cable and the "Kozyrev note" seemed designed to discourage participation of a wide spectrum of government elements, while the large list of addressees pretended to do just the contrary. But the exclusion of many participants meant that few people and institutions controlled decisions at the policy engineering stage. Therefore policy engineering did not so much represent a compromise based on competing views within the government, but, once again, the winner-take-all outcome characteristic of the transition model. The process was not the amalgam of competing views predicted by Allison, but the race to control policy engineering (the final stage of policymaking), irrespective of the views of other institutions and players.
The anecdotal evidence of sanctions violations by Russian military officers further supports this study's finding thus far that the transition model offers more explanatory power than the bureaucratic politics model through the first years of Russia's second republic. If the Russian military was indeed taking actions in direct violation to Russia's official policy (with or without the knowledge of Moscow), this would indicate the existence of two Russian policy positions: one supporting sanctions, the other violating them. Such a situation is not in keeping with Allison's model because it means that two different Russian foreign policy positions were active on the international state; Allison's model focused on the intragovernmental compromise which went into creating one foreign policy position -- the policy resultant. Such a situation also points to the problem of praetorianism discussed in the transition model -- that of a military which does not operate within the clear limit of guaranteeing the country's security against external threats and instead, becomes an instrument of and player in the domestic political process.

The problem of factoring in the unaccountable presidential branch of government described in the previous chapter may be affirmed in this case study. Yeltsin's letter to Clinton pressing for a delay in the sanctions tightening vote may have originated with the presidential apparatus, where Yeltsin's aides bridged the domestic politics and foreign policy divide. If this interpretation is correct, the fact that Foreign Minister Kozyrev regretted Russia's abstention offers supporting evidence that the Foreign Ministry was not fully behind this decision, if at all. Whereas the Foreign Ministry did manage to control the handling of
the first sanctions vote, it appears to have been unable to prevail on the second one.
CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDY TWO:
THE CFE TREATY'S FLANK LIMITS

There appears to have been broad agreement among the Russian elite that the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty required some sort of modification. But the way in which that modification was to be achieved was the point of competition among various segments of the Russian policymaking community.

The subject of this chapter has been selected, as was noted in chapter one, because of the level of agreement between Russian policymakers (on the policy goal, not the way to achieve that goal). By selecting an issue in which basic agreement on the policy goal was present, the aim is to minimize problems associated with looking only at issues in which clashes of worldview are part of the policymaking process.

It should be noted that the selection of a topic which is less tendentious in Russia does not invalidate the test of the bureaucratic politics model. There was still enough disagreement over how to achieve the policy goal among Russian policymakers to accommodate the bureaucratic politics model's presumption of conflict in the policymaking process.

Background

In May 1992, Russia and the other former Soviet republics whose military holdings were affected by the CFE Treaty gathered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan to finalize the subdivision of the Soviet Union's entitlement under
the treaty. This was already the second subdivision of treaty, an agreement which had originally been signed in November 1990. As written, the treaty effectively divided the reductions in specific categories of conventional armaments among NATO forces on one side, and those of the Warsaw Pact on the other.\textsuperscript{1} The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact meant that the total levels permitted for that side had to be divided up.

The same idea guided the subdivision of Soviet forces after the USSR's demise. The sharing out of the Soviet quotas in the CFE Treaty was calculated according to a formula including the following elements: the overall USSR quota, the area of the territory of the new state, the size of its population, and the length of its land frontiers.\textsuperscript{2}

The controversy over the CFE Treaty which later erupted concerned the limitations on equipment in so-called flank areas. At the time of the CFE's original drafting, the flanks referred to areas within Warsaw Pact and NATO territory which could be used to stage operations and concentrate equipment for quick resupply in the event of a major conflict in Central Europe. As one expert noted, the flank limits had been included in the CFE Treaty "largely owing to concern on the part of Norway and Turkey that the Soviet Union might divert forces squeezed out of Central Europe to their vicinities."\textsuperscript{3}


The concern about Soviet pressure on the flanks had been a focal point of NATO discussions in the mid- and late 1980s, and the inclusion of the flank limits in the treaty represented an attempt on NATO's part to calm concerns of Norway and east Mediterranean members that their security would not suffer for the sake of increasing the security of countries like Germany and the Benelux, the presumed primary targets of a Soviet attack in the event of a conventional European war.

When Russia raised the issue of changing the treaty in 1993, precisely these concerns prompted NATO members to react negatively. NATO members were thus opposed to lifting the particular restrictions that Russia inherited as the overall treaty limits were reapportioned, namely the flank limit on Russia's Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts.

At the time of the treaty's negotiation, the Warsaw Pact negotiators resisted NATO attempts to limit equipment on the flanks and sought either to increase the amount of treaty-limited equipment in these parts or to limit the geographical areas included in these flank zones. The Warsaw Pact's resistance was partially successful, and NATO backed down from some of its demands several weeks before the treaty was signed. As

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5The fact that there was a single flank limit for these two seemingly unrelated geographical areas derives from the structure of the CFE treaty as originally written. It put one collective limit on the Northern and Southern Flank areas of Europe which included Norway, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as all of the following Soviet Military Districts: Odessa, Transcaucasia, Leningrad and North Caucasus. Only the latter two were located in Russia.
a result of the compromise reached, parts of the Ukrainian republic were excluded from the flank zone and special allowances for storage of treaty-limited equipment were made for the Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts. Ultimately, however, these concessions brought little benefit to Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

As Russians were later to argue, with particular emphasis on the flank limits, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union meant that the bloc-to-bloc structure of the treaty rendered it incompatible with the new situation in Europe and in the war-torn Trans-Caucasus in particular. Western policymakers frequently agreed that the bloc-to-bloc structure was out-dated. But, as they were quick to point out, tampering with the basic structure of the treaty would threaten its existence, and achieving such ambitious reductions might not again be possible. Furthermore, Western policymakers were, unlike Russia, still negotiating as a bloc, and important members of that bloc (Norway and Turkey) were applying pressure against a renegotiation of the flank limits.

At the time of the reallocation of Soviet CFE entitlements, Russian officials did not show signs of


being troubled by the flank limits. Moscow was undoubtedly worried that too much of the USSR's military equipment would end up in neighboring former Soviet republics which had suddenly become independent states, with soon-to-be independent military forces, although this was not definite at the time. But ultimately, the Russian military establishment came to realize that it could not use one formula for dividing up assets and another for dividing up treaty restrictions. Thus in Tashkent, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova -- all of the countries affected in whole or part by the flank limits -- adopted the limits in Table 1 (below) and codified them in the agreement to redistribute the CFE limits.9

Table 1: Flank Limits in Former USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored Combat Vehicles</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia (North Caucasus and Leningrad MDs)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (Odessa Military MD)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ease of subdividing the treaty's limits was surprising not only in light of Russia's later actions but also in light of earlier responses to the treaty registered by the Soviet and then the Russian military. During its negotiation, Soviet military officials had been decisively opposed to the agreement and achieved concessions from NATO in exchange for agreeing to flank limits. Despite these concessions, the Soviet military establishment still considered the Treaty a bad deal for Moscow. In 1990, USSR Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov greeted the completion of negotiations for the

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treaty with the ominous pronouncement: "We have lost World War Three without a shot being fired."\textsuperscript{11}

At the end of 1990, one month after the CFE Treaty was signed, Soviet military leaders started to show reluctance to implement some of the treaty's provisions. They succeeded in convincing co-signatories to exempt some equipment from CFE limits by assigning it either to coastal defense forces or to naval infantry units, neither of which were covered by the treaty.

In addition, the Soviet Union violated the treaty by moving tanks out of the CFE Treaty's geographical range to the east of the Ural mountains instead of destroying them, as the treaty required. This abuse of the treaty on the part of the military was one of the prominent reasons for Shevardnadze's resignation.

NATO officials were disturbed in the fall of 1992 when they discovered that Russian Federation military officials continued to restrict access of CFE Treaty inspectors, in violation of the treaty. High-level members of the Atlantic alliance believed Russia's behavior showed an "intent to codify the restrictive practice" started by Soviet military officials.\textsuperscript{12} While the problem was ultimately solved, the persistence of Soviet and Russian attempts to avoid full implementation of the treaty suggested strongly that from Soviet times onward, it was disliked by the military establishment.

\textsuperscript{11}As reported by former chief Soviet CFE negotiator Oleg Grinevsky in Newsweek, 22 November 1993.
In spite of these difficulties, the subdivisions of the CFE Treaty were accomplished. Just over one month after this agreement in Tashkent in July 1992, the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the treaty by an overwhelming majority. The lack of controversy surrounding the ratification is striking considering Russia's subsequent campaign to change the treaty. It can, perhaps, be explained by the pressure from other CFE signatories to conclude ratification expeditiously. Even these signatories, however, viewed the timetable as a challenge.

The speediness of ratification, as well as the relative ease of agreement in Tashkent, can be explained by the political environment at the time. In the spring of 1992, the main order of business in Russia was coping with the divorce from the other former Soviet republics. The CFE allocations were, from that point of view, one of a number of assets to be divided. Furthermore, during these first days following the achievement of Russian statehood, there were far fewer voices than were later to be heard lamenting the collapse of the Soviet Union and advocating a reintegration of its former republics.

From a more practical standpoint, the ease of ratification can be explained by the prevailing attitude in the Russian parliament at the time. As one observer has noted:

...The Committee on Foreign Affairs (of the Russian Federation parliament) was one of the most-reform oriented. ...[A]t least initially, international

13ITAR-TASS, 8 July 1992.
relations had not been an important battle-field in the war between Russian Federation reformers and communist hardliners. The latter preferred to concentrate on parliamentary committees dealing with economic matters, institutional reforms, etc.\textsuperscript{15}

The members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs could have played a significant role in criticizing the agreement had they been opposed to it, but there was no evidence of significant opposition.

Nor was it the case that the Russian parliament as a whole had not developed a critical voice on matters of delivering advice and consent on international documents. Parliamentary opposition to agreement with the United States to pursue deep cuts in nuclear weapons in a second START treaty was in full swing in June 1992, even before the treaty was signed.\textsuperscript{16}

No such criticism was heard from the Russian parliament about the CFE treaty. Far from being critical, parliament seemed intent on ratifying the agreement according to the schedule set by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), namely before the 9 July 1992 CSCE\textsuperscript{17} summit in Helsinki to commemorate the sealing of new security arrangements.


\textsuperscript{17}The CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in December 1994.
Following Russia's failure in November 1995 to come into compliance with the flank limits of the treaty, discussions among the signatories yielded tentative agreement to realign the map that is associated with the treaty in order to assist Russia with complying with the treaty. Russia would also be granted (with the consent of other signatories) additional time to reduce its equipment in the realigned flank area.\textsuperscript{18} Discussions did not move beyond this point by the end of Yeltsin's first term (the concluding point for this study).\textsuperscript{19}

The Role of the Military Establishment

By early 1993, this period characterized by a generally sanguine attitude toward the CFE Treaty had been displaced by indications that the military elite was reassessing the country's strategic security requirements, especially to the south. In an interview with Russian Television, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev described Georgia's Black Sea Coast as an area of "strategic importance" for Russia:

Just imagine the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the section where our troops are stationed. ...I will only say that this is a strategically important area for the Russian Army. We have certain strategic interests there and must take every measure to ensure

\textsuperscript{18}CFE Treaty Issues Fact Sheet, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 1996. Transmitted via Internet.

\textsuperscript{19}CFE Treaty Fact Sheet on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1996. Transmitted via Internet.
that our troops remain there, otherwise we will lose the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{20}

The next day Izvestiya published an interview with Grachev in which he stressed the same point:

\begin{quote}
We are strengthening our southern borders, particularly the North Caucasus [area]. If a local conflict is a possibility, it will flare up in the south.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

As time would tell, Grachev's comments were meant to broach the subject of changing the flank limits. By stressing the strategic importance and vulnerability of the area -- one which would become the locus of armed conflict between Russia and Chechnya by December 1994 -- Grachev was establishing the need and justification for modifying the treaty.

The military establishment's re-thinking of the implications of the CFE Treaty's flank limits appears to have been occasioned by the broad discussions about Russian security that went into writing Russia's new defense doctrine. NATO enlargement was being considered in NATO capitals, and Chechen separatism and interethnic conflict were erupting at or near Russia's southern border. In general, the insecurity that came with the breakup of the Soviet Union went to the heart of the Russian military's concerns.

It was during this time, in early 1993, that the leadership of Russia's armed forces was determining the

\textsuperscript{20}Russian Television, 22 February 1993, as transcribed by RFE/RL media monitoring unit.

country's new defense requirements and assets and apparently coming to some disturbing conclusions. As Pavel Baev, an analyst from the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe, described it:

In early 1993, the Russian General Staff discovered a very unpleasant problem, namely a deficit of combat-ready units... At the strategic level, the first requirement was the concentration of effort in certain regions. Accordingly, Russian military leaders decided that the withdrawal first from Lithuania and then from Latvia and Estonia was unavoidable and should be completed as soon as possible. The strategic retreat from Central Asia was perhaps also decided, though with some compromises. The key strategic direction for the short term became Georgia and the North Caucasus...22

With a dearth of units in fighting condition, the military leadership reckoned, Russia would have to narrow its focus and concentrate only on those areas which were deemed most critical. The south was considered Russia's most vulnerable geographic region, and the CFE flank limits chafed.

That these were very plainly rational actor considerations does not automatically suggest that the rational actor model might represent a good alternative to the bureaucratic politics model in this instance. As becomes clear in the discussion below, the way that military leaders handled the issue -- taking advantage of the opportunities presented by Russia's deficit in democratic development -- was more easily explained by the transition model.

Chapter 7  Case Study Two

Given that the military leaders viewed Russia's security needs from a global perspective, linking the Baltic troop withdrawals with future deployments elsewhere, they probably also calculated that the time to start pushing for a change in the CFE flank limits was in 1993, while Russian troops were still stationed in the Baltic states. Until their withdrawal, Moscow could use its presence there as leverage on states in the West concerned that the withdrawal be completed.

Further evidence of the concerns of the Russian military establishment was found in its activities in Georgia. The Russian military was putting pressure on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to grant basing rights for Russian troops. As discussed in chapters four and five, the Abkhaz conflict pitted Georgian government forces against Abkhaz separatists receiving tacit and sporadic military support from Russia. For example, in the early fall of 1993, the Abkhaz launched an offensive to recapture areas under the control of the Georgian military, an attack which Shevardnadze accused Russia of instigating, organizing, and coordinating. His accusation was confirmed by a former Russian military intelligence commander, who offered

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detailed data about equipment transferred to Abkhaz units by Russian forces.26

Russia's assistance to the Abkhaz rebels was designed, among other things, to prevent the involvement of other outside powers. It was around this time that press reports circulated in the United States about a document which discussed potential peacekeeping initiatives in the former Soviet Union. A confidential White House policy paper, Presidential Decision Directive 13 (PDD-13), indicated that the United States sought to play an active role in conflict mediation in the former Soviet Union and to increase the capacity of the United Nations to do the same, according to press reports.27 The Russian Foreign Ministry rushed to deny the accuracy of the PDD-13 leaks in the Western and Russian press, assuring that the US would be permitted to play no such role. Despite the MFA's denials, and Washington's attempts to control the damage, fears of US involvement in the region bolstered the arguments of those in Russia who pointed to the need for Moscow to be vigilant of the southern threat -- before some outside power would step in to fill the vacuum.

As Russia's position on the CFE Treaty flank limits gelled, the Russian military's strategy in dealing with foreign partners vis-a-vis the CFE question also hardened. The Defense Ministry did not stop short of issuing veiled ultimatums and threats. For example, Defense Minister Grachev linked the issue with the controversial issue of NATO enlargement, warning in September 1994 that were NATO to take on new

26Cited in Ibid, footnote 2.
members, this would "jeopardize our fulfillment of the CFE Treaty, especially its flank restrictions."28 This statement not only linked CFE and enlargement, it also called into question whether Russia would implement other aspects of the conventional forces treaty. Non-compliance with the flank limits was thus just one possible type of retaliation to an enlarged NATO.

In May 1995, the Russian military turned threats into practical measures as was seen when the chief of the Russian ground forces, General Vladimir Semenov, announced that Russia would establish a new 58th Army in the Caucasus as of 1 June, thus making a mockery of diplomats' statements that Russia sought to preserve the treaty, albeit in an amended form. The new 58th Army meant that Russia, far from attempting to come to some sort of compromise and understanding with the West on the flank issue, was already taking steps that would mean never meeting the flank limits.

**The Role of the President**

Starting in mid-September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin became actively involved in the CFE flank issue. He wrote a letter to the leaders of the United States, Norway, Britain, France, Denmark, and Turkey requesting their understanding of Russia's position on the CFE Treaty. (At about the same time, he wrote a second letter to Western leaders asking for a rethinking of NATO enlargement.)

In the letter, Yeltsin called for the lifting of the flank limits on the grounds that Russia had assumed

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more than half of these limits and this disturbed the balance of the treaty. He also warned that a refusal to satisfy Russia's request to change the flank limits would threaten the implementation of the treaty. His tough approach showed that he was willing to push the issue to the fullest, not simply proposing a change but also threatening consequences if Russia's demands were not met.

The Yeltsin letter was a significant benchmark in the Russian decision to push for a change of the flank limitations for three reasons. First and most obviously, it indicated that the Russian desire to change the treaty went to the highest levels of the government and was not merely an example of foreign policy free-lancing on the part of the military. Second, it showed that Yeltsin considered the issue important enough to be pursued by the president himself, not merely by his ministers. Third, it indicated that the Russian president was prepared to take full responsibility for the position, one which was sure to continue putting stress on Russia's relationship with the dozens of co-signatories, some of whom were well on their way to completing their implementation of the weapons destruction required by the treaty.

Significantly, the timing of Yeltsin's initiative suggested that his sudden public interest in the CFE issue emerged as a result of his domestic political concerns. Yeltsin's popularity had plummeted in the summer due to his currency reform (the decision in July 1993 to replace the old-type banknotes with new ones

29Wolf J. Bell, "Yeltsin Letter Throws European Arms Agreement Into Question," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 1 October 1993; and AFP, 15 October 1993.
over a period of two weeks.) This measure had been poorly implemented and caused cash shortages, creating havoc in Russia and among Russian vacationers in other CIS countries. What is more, it recalled the even more unpopular currency reform undertaken under Gorbachev).\textsuperscript{30} Yeltsin's economic reform policies, especially the economic shock therapy, had left the population sour and sick of reform.

The overriding political event in Russia in the fall of 1993 was Yeltsin's struggle with the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet. This struggle had its origins in the faulty division of power left by the much-amended Soviet-era constitution which was still in use by Russia, as discussed in chapters four and five.

The public's patience was being strained by the continuing struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament. Yeltsin claimed in his memoirs that he was concerned at the time that a continuation of the standoff would mean the population's loss of faith in the democratic system. Yeltsin and his advisers had tried in various ways to bring the recalcitrant legislature around in 1993, but with no success. In April, Yeltsin claimed victory in his referendum, giving him a claim to the popular mandate he needed to justify taking severe action against the legislature.

The option of merely dissolving the parliament and voting in a new constitution and legislature was something that Yeltsin considered as early as March 1993. As the Russian president states in his book, The Struggle For Russia, it was during German Chancellor

\textsuperscript{30}Interfax, 24 July 1993.
Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow in early March 1993, that Yeltsin raised the issue. Yeltsin asked the German leader about "a matter of fundamental importance for me: if I were to restrict the activity of the parliament, how would the West react?" Kohl reportedly responded that he would support Yeltsin. He also expressed confidence that leaders of the United States, Japan, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy would sympathize with "harsh but necessary measures for the stabilization of Russia" at the upcoming meeting of the G-7.31

Several months later, during his visit to Poland in Yeltsin also considered the idea of dissolving the Congress attractive when Lech Walesa proposed it:

[Walesa] joked: 'Why don't you disband your Supreme Soviet and elect a new one around them? Let those old deputies sit there and go on meeting and playing parliament. Everyone will very soon forget them.' I [Yeltsin] smiled at this appealing idea.32

Thus with these international assurances, Yeltsin decided to go forward with the dissolution of the Russian parliament. But to do this, he needed to make sure that the Russian military was on his side.

Yeltsin was in need of the military's support to retain his grip on power, and he was thus under pressure to give the military what it wanted. The time at which he took up the CFE issue suggests that his

31Boris Yeltsin The Struggle for Russia, Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia. Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. (New York: Times Books Random House, 1994, 1995), p. 135. Interfax of 1 March 1993 also reported that the struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament was an item on the agenda for Kohl's brief visit.
32Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 139.
need to cultivate the military determined his position, rather than his concern about the treaty.

Yeltsin appears to have exchanged his support of the military's wishes on the flank issue for assurances of their support during his dissolution of the parliament. This was evident in Yeltsin's letters regarding the CFE Treaty, which were dispatched in mid-September, before his dissolution of parliament. It was also evident in his attempt to gain favor among the lower ranks of the military in the weeks prior to the crisis, seeking to ensure maximum support. As he later recalled:

It was early September: I had made a decision to dissolve the parliament... Throughout the remainder of September, I reviewed all previously scheduled meetings, negotiations, and trips within the context of this forthcoming decree [to dissolve parliament]. Many appointments had been set as far back as June, July, or August. Some items I postponed, others had to be dealt with immediately; but I used these activities to better prepare myself for the coming events. For example, a preliminary schedule had included a visit to the army's Taman and Kantemir divisions. I had long been promising Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to come and take a look at these elite military units. After work on the decree [to dissolve parliament] began, this visit took on new meaning for me. When I spoke with the soldiers and reviewed the fine professional work of the divisions, when I met with the officers and commanders after the exercise, I kept thinking of the enormous, worrisome event that loomed ahead. How
would these military people behave? How would they react? (Emphasis added.)\textsuperscript{33}

Yeltsin hastened to add that he felt confident that the military would support him and that "there would be no betrayal."

But events were far from clear cut during the crisis. The dissolution of the parliament was followed not by the quiet return of deputies to their homes but by their refusal to leave the White House and a deadlock in negotiations with Yeltsin. Not only did the popular Afghanistan war hero Alexander Rutskoi declare himself acting President in the crisis that followed Yeltsin's dissolution of parliament, signs of potential unreliability on the part of the armed forces came when top military officials were split on how to react to the armed standoff and whether to allow the army to be further politicized by breaking the siege on the White House and the television tower.\textsuperscript{34} Pavel Grachev wanted the responsibility for the military's actions to be assumed entirely by the political leadership, much to Yeltsin's irritation.\textsuperscript{35} Ultimately, when on October 4, the military did carry out the assault on the White House, the result was well over one-hundred dead.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., pp. 242-243.
\textsuperscript{35}Grachev asked for explicit instructions from Yeltsin to use tanks in Moscow. Yeltsin responded by immediately drafting for the defense minister a written order to take action to lift the siege of the Russian White House. But he refused to say how it should be done. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 278.
The fact that Yeltsin's letter on the CFE flank limits was sent in the midst of what was to become a violent stand-off with parliament underscores the argument that the Russian president was attempting to use the CFE treaty to gain the support of the military. This argument is further supported by consideration of the fact that an acute domestic political crisis was hardly an appropriate time for a major foreign policy initiative, unless it was somehow linked to the crisis.

The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev implicitly linked the issue of peacekeeping to the CFE Treaty in early 1993, when he described Russia's security priorities in the post-Cold War environment. In response to a question on the US television news program "Meet the Press" about whether further nuclear arms cuts might hurt Russian security, Kozyrev said:

If there is something to care about, it is [the] economy and well-being and probably also [the] ability to deal with local crises, but you don't need nuclear offensive weapons to deal with local crises. Sometimes we feel totally helpless when we are confronted with situations like in Bosnia or in other places in the former Soviet space... Some other techniques, some other weapons, probably persuasion, political skills, and other things are needed to respond to real changes, so I don't think it's something we lose.37

Three days later, Kozyrev's arguments seemed even more directed toward asserting the need for a reliable conventional weapons response toward inter-ethnic conflicts:

The real challenge to our security today lies in regional conflicts. ...[O]ur parity in security terms is fully maintained under [the START II] agreement. It is the challenge of local wars that we still have to find the answer to, and that has caught us totally unawares... So, there is the real challenge to our security, and that's where we should direct our efforts, attention, and resources to really equip these rapid deployment forces, so that we can make use of them in regional conflicts when necessary and when it is possible (for peacekeeping purposes, of course).38

The issue of increasing Russia's security in the south was also raised in the programmatic statement on Russian foreign policy -- the Russian Foreign Policy Concept:

Russia's long-term interests...consist of ensuring the country's national security on the southern flank, preventing negative consequences of the conflict situations retained and emerging there for international and confessional relations within the confines of the CIS...

The Concept also called for promoting economic relations aimed at the development of the region and Russian economy.39 The region was viewed by a broad spectrum in Russia, if not across the entire political spectrum, as critical to Russian security.

It thus appears that between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs there was consensus at least on the point that Russia's greatest security challenges came from ethnic conflicts from the south, if not that the CFE flank limits needed to be changed.

By late March 1993, Russian diplomats were adding specific requests for changing the treaty to this basic argumentation about Russia's changed security needs. On 23 March, during a meeting between Andrei Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington, aides to the two top diplomats discussed Russia's concerns about complying with the treaty. At issue, according to the Kozyrev aide, was that "planned redeployments of troops to Russian territory in the Black Sea region would conflict with their CFE flank zone limitations." In addition to discussing the matter bilaterally with the United States, Russian negotiators at the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna had also raised the issue.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense agreed that the CFE Treaty needed to be modified. The gap between their positions came in relation to how that modification should be achieved. For example, Kozyrev stressed that Moscow did "not want to jeopardize the CFE Treaty." Thus rather than threatening to unilaterally alter its provisions, Kozyrev stressed the positive side of the argument -- the preservation of the treaty.

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The military, on the other hand, sought to convince international partners by using blunt threats and ultimatums, such as those about unilaterally disregarding certain limitations or seceding from the treaty. The Foreign Ministry then rushed to control the damage done by such statements and offer assurances that Russia sought to preserve the treaty, albeit in a slightly modified form.42

The difference in approach between the Defense and Foreign Ministry positions became more obvious as time went on. This was not because the Foreign Ministry lost enthusiasm for amending the treaty. On the contrary, when Russia sent a new ambassador to Turkey in September 1994, he declared his first priority to be convincing Ankara to accept Russia's position on the flank limits.43 Rather, the difference of approach became more evident because the Ministry of Defense had begun to increase its pressure for changing the treaty by linking the modification of the CFE flank limits to other issues.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was put in less and less tenable positions because of the military's increasingly rough handling of the CFE issue. The May 1995 announcement that Russia would establish a new 58th Army in the Caucasus, discussed above, was particularly disturbing for members of the diplomatic establishment: Just two weeks before the announcement, MFA spokesman Grigorii Karasin had tried to undo the

42See the comments of Mikhail Shelepin, head of the Conventional Weapons Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, "Foreign Ministry's Shelepin: Moscow Seeks CFE Revision," Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), 7 October 1993.

damage done by the military's bluster by assuring that Grachev's threats not to fulfill the treaty should be taken as a sign of Russia's real concerns about security in the region. 44

Whereas diplomats appreciated the kind of changes that could be accommodated by exploiting loose treaty language in some cases, the military community was intent on rejecting outright any objections to its demands. Western diplomats offered repeated assurances that a temporary deployment in excess of the treaty limits was explicitly allowed by the treaty and that the West would express some understanding for Russia's position because of the war in Chechnya. Such a position, after all, was in Western interests because it was widely believed among policymakers that a slightly modified CFE was far better than no CFE. Rather than taking this implicit concession for temporary deployments and quieting his demands, Pavel Grachev pushed even harder, swaggering: "Temporary is forever minus one day." 45

There are two ways of understanding the differences between the MFA and MOD approaches. They could either represent a division of labor or they could indicate stubborn unwillingness to compromise and pursue a common approach.

The notion of a division of labor is in some ways a persuasive argument. With the diplomats pursuing the soft line and the military taking the hard line, the role assignments certainly mimic the use of soft instruments and hard instruments. And indeed, if the

44 ITAR-TASS, 18 April 1995.
MFA and MOD agreed on the bottom line, it could also be argued that there was a certain logic in pursuing all available avenues of argument. This explanation breaks down somewhat in judging the effectiveness of the approach. By threatening to abrogate the treaty the Russian military elite was damaging Russia's reputation and potentially causing treaty partners to become less accommodating to Russian wishes. Western media reaction to the Yeltsin letter, for example, found fault with the tough approach, while noting that the request for a flank alteration had itself been nothing new.46

The other interpretation -- that the military and diplomatic elite simply could not find a way to compromise on a common tactic -- seems more persuasive. This is mainly because the military exercised its tactics via diplomatic channels, not simply on the ground, as would be in keeping with the division of labor theory. For example, the Yeltsin letter, as discussed above, shows all the indications of being driven by the military's wishes. There is no evidence that his diplomats were involved in the preparation of this letter.

Another example can be found in the military's presence at the negotiating table. Shortly after the September and October political struggle, Russia's diplomats appeared to be crowded out of international discussions of the CFE Treaty by Russian military officials. Two top generals appeared in Vienna at the Joint Consultative Group, the standing body charged with observing the implementation of the CFE Treaty, in

46See, for example, Wolf J. Bell, "Dangerous Wishes" and "Yeltsin Letter Throws European Arms Agreement Into Question," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 1 October 1993
October 1993. Normally this standing body was the venue for discussions about CFE implementation questions among civilians, mostly diplomats and arms control experts. Thus the appearance of two uniformed officers gave the appearance that Russian arms control policy had been turned over to -- or usurped by -- the military establishment.

Overall, the September-October 1993 political crisis seems to have affected the military's standing in Russian politics -- and its relationship with the MFA. This is a point made by Adieh in his analysis of Russia's constitutional development. Addressing the issue of the impact of Yeltsin's attack on the White House on the legal consciousness of Russian elites, Adieh notes that in "its aftermath, the elites' safety and security appeared as tenuous under democracy as it had been under Stalinism. The stability of the bureaucracy... now seemed threatened." In other words, the possession of the tools of violence by the military was making it a more potent player in Russian politics.

The Role of Research Institutes

Research institutes reflected a slightly wider spectrum of opinion on the CFE question than was present within the government. Aleksei Arbatov, both a head of a research center and a member of parliament, seized on the divergence between the Foreign and

47AFP, 15 October 1993.
The first imperative of Russian security is that the [CFE Treaty] is in Russia's interest. The political and strategic advantages of the treaty outweigh its few flaws. Because of economic factors, and for many other reasons, Russia would be unlikely, even in the absence of this treaty, to be capable of maintaining larger armed forces than it envisages in the foreseeable future. Other states, on the other hand, with sufficient political motivation could quickly build up their armed forces and achieve colossal military superiority to Russia on the strength of their economic, military-technical, and demographic potential, convenient geostrategic locations, and ability to unite forces for collective defense. It would be a sign of extreme imprudence if Moscow were to issue ultimatums and threaten to denounce the treaty, even if the rapidly changing situation were to put some of its provisions into question. (For example, there were disagreements over the quotas for the flank zones, which kept Russia from increasing its troop strength in the North Caucasian Military District.) Incidentally, it is not completely clear whether these questions were that serious and could not have been settled by some other means. Under favorable political conditions, it would be possible to go further and conclude new agreements on more dramatic reductions of forces in Europe, in line with the new geopolitical realities on the continent.49

49Arbatov is the director of the Geopolitical and Military Forecasting Center. This statement comes from his article, "Russia: National Security in the 1990s," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 7 (July, August, September 1994), translated by FBIS.
Arbatov's argument thus boiled down to this: Perhaps the solution to the flank problem lies not in increasing Russia's quota but in further arms control to reduce the quotas of others.

Such an approach echoed the thinking of others who sought to view the solution to the flank problem in combination with solutions to other, larger problems. The notion that further conventional arms control regimes might help solve the CFE flank problem complemented notions prevalent in Russia that the CSCE should become a more important institution guiding European security issues.

Such a development would give Russia greater decisionmaking authority in European security questions than it would have if questions were handled solely by NATO and the European Union. For example, Sergei Rogov, the deputy director of the Historical Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Deputy Director of the USA and Canada Institute, argued:

First, we need to update the arms control regime, which is based on the obsolete principle of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Expansion of NATO must lead not to a new arms race but to a decrease of the persisting high level of militarization in Europe. Rather than floundering in the wake of events, we need to take the initiative into our own hands, for example by proposing a new Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to replace the CFE Treaty. The CFE-2 Treaty must substitute bloc-based arms levels by national limits. All European states, and not just members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, must become its participants.50

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50Sergei M. Rogov, "Russia and the West," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 3 (March 1995), translated by FBIS.
By elevating the flank issue to the level of problem-solving for major European security questions, Rogov was essentially trying to solve Moscow's perceived isolation from important European security decisionmaking.

Other think-tank voices focused on security in Russia's south -- a concern shared by the MFA and MOD. For example, the potential threats from the south were highlighted in the report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, "A Strategy for Russia," discussed in chapter four. In the analysis of this report, the best approach for Russia would be to draw on assets in all areas, political and military.

[The threats'] military and political containment requires flexible power instruments which could support a diplomacy of possible involvement in police operations aimed at encouraging divisions and peace-making operations, preferably coordinated within the framework of a common policy pursued by the Euro-Atlantic community. As a whole, Russia's possibilities of controlling the situation in this potentially dangerous area are limited. Efficient control requires flexible diplomacy and cooperation with the West. At the same time, cooperation with many countries in Asia is not only advantageous in itself but also could greatly contribute to the preservation and even strengthening of foreign policy opportunities in other directions. This particularly applies to India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel.51

Such thinking later underpinned Russian suggestions that a rapid reaction peacekeeping force controlled by

Russia and outside of CFE Treaty limits would be the optimal solution to meeting the challenges of the south.

Other analysts focused on the argument that the changed world situation meant that the CFE Treaty no longer corresponded to reality. Boris Zhelezov, an expert at the Center for National Security and International Relations in Moscow, argued that Russia had shifted a great proportion of its defenses to the south and that the CFE flank limits did not correspond to these needs.\textsuperscript{52} Similar arguments were made by Anton Surikov, an expert at the Center for Military, Strategic, and Technological Studies of the USA-Canada Institute (Russian Academy of Sciences). He stressed the need to modify the CFE Treaty on similar grounds.\textsuperscript{53} These arguments were similar to the shared MOD-MFA policy goal of securing a change in the treaty.

The Role of the Legislature

Throughout the discussions about amending the CFE Treaty, the Russian Supreme Soviet and State Duma stayed very much in the background. As was discussed above, the Supreme Soviet had ratified the treaty in 1991, raising no concerns about possible damage to Russia's strategic interests.

The relative disinterest on the part of lawmakers (with the exception of Arbatov, quoted above) can, of course, be partially explained by the fact that they would appear foolish to criticize the treaty after they (or their predecessors) had ratified it. More importantly, their relative inactivity on the issue can

\textsuperscript{52}ITAR-TASS, 18 April 1995.
\textsuperscript{53}ITAR-TASS, 27 April 1995.
be attributed to their probable agreement with the executive branch's attempt to amend the treaty, one way or another.

Given the tendency of the Russian legislature to pursue nationalist and patriotic issues, support of the CFE Treaty's amendment would fit into the pattern of arguments frequently used by that body, such as those suggesting that Russia's interests had been too easily compromised in negotiations with Western powers, that Turkey and other powers were attempting to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus region to challenge Russia's security, and, more generally, that Russia would be militarily threatened by the proposed changes in Europe's security structures and was thus required to boost, not cut, its conventional armaments.

The near silence on the part of the legislature suggests that lawmakers did not always demand a voice in policymaking simply for the sake of having input. As the CFE case demonstrates, members of the legislative branch were largely content not to involve themselves in an issue if they thought that policy undertaken by the executive branch was already aimed in the right direction.

Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition Models

As noted in chapter one, this case study was chosen because it presented an area of relative policy harmony within the Russian government. By examining an issue of comparatively weak policy conflict, it was hoped to minimize any bias inherent in examining only issues characterized by sharp bureaucratic conflict. This is in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model, for while it assumes that policy conflict is a
regular feature of policymaking, it does not assume that each policy output represents the result of all-out battles between and within government agencies.

Some of the most difficult aspects of Russia's foreign policy formulation to explain with reference to the bureaucratic politics model are those in which more than one foreign policy is active simultaneously. In the case of the CFE Treaty flank limits, the basic agreement among policymakers meant that one policy goal was being pursued. At the same time, there were clearly different tactics at play and little sign of compromise by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. This is not in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model because the way that Russia pursued its goal on the international stage was not so much an amalgam, but an assembly of different approaches.

The possibility that this assembly represented an intended division of labor has been considered and found to be less likely than interpreting it as a failure of the MFA and MOD to compromise. Had the former interpretation (the division of labor) been valid, however, this could be explained by both the bureaucratic politics and the transition models. The dual approach would fit into the bureaucratic politics model's hypothesis that problems are cut up and parceled out. In this case, the problem of taking the hard line had been parceled out to the MOD whereas the soft line had been parceled out to the MFA. The transition model, on the other hand, would explain the Russian armed forces' behavior as an example of praetorianism and the pursuit of two approaches as evidence of a deficit of procedures.

This points to the larger problem of utilizing this case study to understand the relationship between
Yeltsin and the armed forces. By assuming control of an initiative or forum which would normally be the domain of diplomats, the military showed that it was using its possession of the instruments of force in order to acquire more control over policy.

The extent to which the domestic political crisis influenced Russia's CFE behavior suggests that the transition model is more appropriate for understanding Russia's dual approach. The clear linkage between the executive-legislative stand-off and the CFE issue cannot be explained by the bureaucratic politics model. On the other hand, this playing out of domestic politics on the international stage goes to the heart of the issues at stake in a democratizing state as discussed in the transition model.
In some ways, Russia's style of foreign policy decisionmaking between the collapse of the USSR and the end of Yeltsin's first term as president looks like a caricature of foreign policy decisionmaking in Western states. The ministries in Russia are engaged in a struggle over control of policy, players are bitter when they lose a policy battle, and nothing seems to work as it should. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: Is Russia merely behaving the way that any Western state would if it had recently been reborn in the manifold ways that Russia has?

To address this question, this chapter compares the functioning of Russian decisionmaking with policymaking in the United States and, to a lesser extent, France, the countries on which some of Russia's most important institutions (the Security Council and Federal Assembly, for example) were modeled. It is hoped, that by comparing these systems, the distinctions in Russian foreign policy formulation can be brought into higher relief. The American president possesses something only remotely similar to Russia's presidential branch of government. The US president, like his Russian counterpart, shows a tendency to seek an alternative to his ministries and bureaucracies. Relations between the US president and his Cabinet (that is, the secretaries

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of key bureaucracies such as the Department of State, Department of Defense, etc.) often sour early in the president's first term. The American Cabinet quickly becomes a forum in which top bureaucrats argue and seek presidential mediation rather than one in which they work out solutions among themselves in a cooperative manner. Thus, instead of making the US president's job easier, by helping him with policy problem-solving, they make his job more difficult by adding questions about which bureaucracy deserves to win or lose a given policy battle.

The Executive Office of the President (commonly known by the acronym EXOP), is the US president's answer to this problem. EXOP consists of some 11 agencies or offices, the largest of which is the Office of Management and Budget. Other components of EXOP include the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, and the Office of the US Trade Representative. Some of the approximately 1,000 positions in EXOP are filled by permanent staffers which are carried over from one presidential administration to the next. But the most powerful positions are filled with the president's most loyal aides and advisers. They are expected to keep a low profile and to avoid open conflict with Cabinet secretaries. And, most significantly, EXOP officials are expected to deliver solutions, not add to the additional problems and inefficiencies caused by bureaucratic conflicts.

Significantly, the US president's EXOP has avoided compartmentalization and has retained a great deal of

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Chapter 8 Russia in the Comparative Perspective

flexibility. This derives partly from the attempt to keep EXOP unburdened by bureaucratic subdivisions which might slow down its reaction to crises. At the same time, though, what is at play is an underlying reluctance among US presidents to allow parts of the president's staff to develop bureaucratic identities of their own.

The American president is under political pressure both to make certain that EXOP maintains a low profile and to keep its size small. Presidents cannot afford to alienate Cabinet secretaries to the extent that their positions become decorative, with the departments under them becoming the tools of EXOP officials. In some situations, the policy preferences of the president's National Security Council will indeed differ from those of the Department of State and will indeed prevail. But cases of heavy NSC encroachment on the State Department's work stand out as exceptions, the most prominent example being found in the person of Henry Kissinger in the administration of Richard Nixon.4 A further political limitation on the role of the national security adviser derives from the fact that he is not subject to Senate confirmation, unlike the secretary of state. Thus, owing to his accountability, the latter enjoys greater legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Unlike his Russian counterpart, a US president does not normally grant his foreign policy aides a public role in the form of addressing foreign partners or heading delegations abroad. This is in keeping with the desire to keep aides largely out of the public eye and

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3Ibid., p. 213.
to avoid trespassing on the role of the State Department. The public, international role would normally be performed by presidential envoys -- prominent figures or career diplomats who are selected by the US president to tackle specific foreign policy missions or issue areas.

The political limits on the size of the staff derive from the legal ambiguity of EXOP. Until recently in US history, owing to the historical reluctance to allow unchecked growth of the chief executive and the executive branch of the federal government, presidential staffs were exceedingly small. It was only in the 1940s that the staff of the president grew to what was considered the swollen level of 50-some people. In order to avoid being criticized for creating a "presidential branch" of government, which is unelected, not confirmed by the Senate, and in many ways unaccountable, American presidents have tended to keep their staffs small. This has been especially true in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the excesses of the Nixon White House EXOP. These political limits on the presidential staff are effective enough to obviate the need for legislative oversight of the presidential staff: There have been few attempts by the US Congress to subject EXOP to oversight or to challenge its actions. By the same token, each American president knows that the dubious legal basis for the EXOP means that he should be careful not to give the Congress any reason to probe.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 On the initial regulations of the presidential staff, see John Hart, "The President and His Staff," in Malcolm Shaw, ed. Roosevelt to Reagan: The Development of the Modern Presidency.
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The Russian president's apparat is very different. It has grown rapidly, especially since the start of the second republic, after Russia's establishment of a presidential system of government. The Russian president is under little or no political pressure to keep his staff small. Some complaints have been registered by journalists in the Russian media about the growth of the presidential branch of government, but the constitutional provision granting the Russian president the right to form his presidential staff means that his actions are virtually beyond legal reproach.

Apart from being very large, the Russian president's staff is highly compartmentalized. The president is under no legal or political constraints with regard to creating agencies and departments within his apparat, and each new chief of staff has embarked on a process of reorganization which has seen the creation of new agencies (along with the disposal of some, but not all of, the old ones). Owing to its growth in size and compartmentalization, the Russian president's staff risks duplicating the struggles seen among the ministries rather than rising above them.

Problems in the Russian executive branch between the president's apparat and the ministries are frequent. The Security Council under Yurii Skokov attempted to work contrary the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The president's chief of staff tried to make policy about Russian military bases in Latvia without consulting the Latvian government (discussed in chapters four and five, respectively), to mention only two.


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The Russian president's reliance on his staff has important elements in common with the US president's recourse to his EXOP (the reluctance or inability to cope with bureaucratic infighting among the departments, and the tendency to feel more comfortable relying on trusted loyalists). Yet the behavior of EXOP and the apparat are quite different due to the divergent historical, legal, and political constraints on the Russian and American presidents. One example is the Russian president's reliance on aides, in addition to presidential envoys, to perform public and international roles in foreign policy. The Russian president is under no political pressure to limit or at least veil the power exercised by his aides, unlike the US president.

Much of the friction between the Russian executive and legislative branches of government over foreign policy, such as deputies' attempts to undermine the foreign minister with the aim of his dismissal, linkage of treaty ratification to unrelated issues, attempts to win over public opinion by taking emotional stances, not to mention the use of the budget weapon, are common to other countries as well. In the United States, despite periods of deference by the Congress to the president on foreign policy issues, the necessity to conduct negotiations between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy issues has been common a feature of American politics, especially since the 1970s. The 1990s saw the Clinton administration experience a sharp increase in Congressional use of

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trade sanctions as tools to isolate rogue states in international relations.

But the Russian system is different. While it has frequently been compared to the French Fifth Republic in terms of its division of power,9 this comparison is more misleading than enlightening. In Russia, it is relatively unimportant if the Federal Assembly is in the hands of the president's opponents. In France, on the other hand, no President can exercise power without the support of a majority party in the National Assembly.10

The French president enjoys far-reaching powers only to the extent that his party controls the National Assembly; his role in periods of cohabitation has often been to defer to his prime minister, even on foreign policy matters. This is because the French Fifth Republic's semi-presidential system effectively changes into a parliamentary system during periods of cohabitation.11 In Russia, the legislature serves very much at the pleasure of the president. This affects -- and in many cases defines -- the way the legislature behaves, no matter how much of it is controlled by parties opposing the president. The Russian president holds the fate of the Russian State Duma in his hands, enjoying the power to dissolve it if it becomes too obstreperous. There is no legal requirement to submit

9Yeltsin compared the current constitution to that of the French Fifth Republic in an interview with Politique Internationale, reproduced in Rossiskiye vesti and Le Figaro on 30 April 1996. Translated by FBIS.
his foreign minister candidate for a vote of approval. Furthermore, the Russian president has the right to write his own decrees.

In comparison, the US president's powers seem meager. The American president has the right to conclude executive agreements with foreign countries, without Congressional approval. But the atmosphere of executive-legislative relations is different in the United States because, unlike in Russia, no one side has enough constitutional power to regularly make foreign policy unilaterally. This is why, despite the fact that he is under no legal obligation to do so, the American president has frequently sought Congressional approval for executive agreements.\(^\text{12}\)

In Russia, the uneven balance of power between the executive and legislative branch means that the legislature is disadvantaged vis-a-vis the executive branch (especially as a result of its oversized presidential apparat). The legislature, as an institution, does not have enough legal levers to exert enough influence over policy. Russian deputies, even more than their comparatively better off (in the institutional sense) American counterparts, are also more likely to resort to emotional appeals which politicize foreign policy issues. Deputies apparently reason that if they do not have the means to influence policy directly, then they will do so indirectly by attempting to whip up public opinion with sensational foreign policy issues (such as the Duma's "USSR decrees" discussed in chapter five). Here as well, the

institutional arrangement has an immediate impact on the legislature's diplomatic initiatives.

What gives deputies' activities greater resonance is the possibility in post-Soviet Russia of linking foreign policy to national self-esteem, pride, and status in world politics. In this regard, Russian lawmakers, like other participants in Russian politics, have far more extensive opportunities to politicize foreign policy issues than their American counterparts do: Questions about the nature of the polity, its status in the world, and its territorial integrity do not figure into daily discussions in Washington as they do in Moscow.

The most basic difference between France and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia on the other, is the level of democratic development. This is not surprising given the length of time in which the American and French systems have developed. The more important consideration in Russia's case is the absence of a democratic history. Russia's deficit of democratic tradition suggests that it will take a long time to achieve the level of democratic stability enjoyed in France and the United States.
CHAPTER 9

THE OUTLOOK FOR RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

This study has analyzed the utility of the bureaucratic politics and transition models in analyzing foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union and Russia starting in the Gorbachev era and continuing through the end of Boris Yeltsin's first term as president. Whereas during the period of rule under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko the bureaucratic politics model could be applied with some success (albeit differently than in the United States) the institutional breakdown of the Gorbachev era saw a deterioration of the model's explanatory power which continued in independent Russia.

The bureaucratic politics model stressed that actions performed by a nation in international politics were the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. In Gorbachev's Soviet Union, this bargaining began to subside as more and more of the power traveled to the USSR presidency. It was also then that Soviet foreign policy began to look less like a series of "preprogrammed outputs," as Allison put it and more like lurches of policy in one direction or another, and perhaps back again.¹ Soviet behavior on the CFE Treaty, discussed in chapter seven, is one example. Standard operating procedures, which had been a useful aspect of the bureaucratic politics model in studying the pre-Gorbachev period, had become more difficult to

¹Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 81.

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identify in the Gorbachev period. For example, the division of labor between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Department shifted as the ID's role changed. It was, in short, less and less the case that a standardized way of "playing the game" existed in making foreign policy.

This declining utility of the bureaucratic politics model continued in independent Russia. Once again, foreign policy often represented not the resultant of bargaining, but the composite of various views. Even on an issue characterized by basic agreement among policymakers, such as the modification of the CFE Treaty, there were clearly different tactics at play and little sign of compromise among the players. This was not in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model because the way that Russia pursued its goal on the international stage was not so much an amalgam, but an assembly of different approaches.

Other aspects of the bureaucratic politics model were similarly unable to explain Russian foreign policy behavior. Policy was not so much a mixture or resultant, but a record of which personality or institution had won a given policy battle. An example can be found in the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Japan (chapter four). Standard operating procedures were not a characteristic of independent Russia's foreign policy. Formalized procedures were laid out on the books, as the discussion of statutes in chapters four and five reveals, but these procedures were frequently ignored.

The transition model speaks to the deficiencies of the bureaucratic politics model. Excessive power accrued to the executive in Gorbachev's Soviet Union and in Yeltsin's Russia, especially the second republic. At various points in both cases, the division of authority
between the executive and the legislature was contested. Similarly, procedures were ad hoc and not fixed. Or as was the case in the naming members of the Security Council, legal procedures were often simply ignored (chapter five).

Just as the bureaucratic politics model became of declining utility starting in the Gorbachev era, the transition model offered more illumination. This trend is connected with the sluggish development of democracy in Russia and the failure of new institutions to become established in place of those that had been eliminated. This indicates that the bureaucratic politics model cannot be expected to apply to states in transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

The legacy of the Soviet Union's flawed political system has also hampered Russia's development as a functioning democracy. The tradition of parallel executive organs, one connected to the chief executive(s) and one consisting of the ministries, is strong in Moscow and a perfectly normal environment in which to function. It is therefore unlikely that political, legal, or political-cultural constraints, broadly construed, will impinge on the behavior of Russia's executive in limiting the presidential branch of government in the near future, even though the effects of the current system can be destructive.

The substitution of legalism for the rule of law meant that there was simply too little interest in creating a culture supporting the respect for the rule of law. What is more, the pattern of hypercodification evident in Soviet times persisted in Russia, as could be seen in Russia's use of laws as ornaments of the political system rather than as actual rules.
The tendency of the military to expect a role in the political process was a feature of the Soviet system which has continued into independent Russia's political milieu. Many of the intrusions by the Ministry of Defense into the work of the Foreign Ministry can be explained by the lack of tradition in civilian control over the military. In Russia, the Ministry of Defense has been run by a uniformed military officer, not by a civilian. Such was the case for much of the Soviet period as well. The notion of Communist Party control over the military was flawed because the Party viewed the Soviet armed forces as its protector. Brezhnev, as was discussed in chapter two, was uninterested in denying the military anything. Gorbachev, who initially sought to reduce the role of the military in policymaking and its receipt of state resources, ultimately felt so vulnerable politically as to attempt to repair his relations with the military by giving in to its demands. The Soviet system, with the exception of the August 1991 putsch, was not susceptible to a military coup because the military's wishes were largely satisfied by the political leadership.

It has proven very difficult to get the Soviet and then the Russian military out of political life. As Russia's handling of the CFE Treaty case study demonstrates, the political leadership has required the support of the armed forces to stay in power. The military has become more openly politicized by the political upheavals of the post-Soviet period and by the opportunity to serve as legislators, a novel feature of the Russian system which began during Soviet times.

Significantly, Yeltsin has shown an unwillingness to discourage the military from trespassing on diplomacy. Indeed, by calling in the military to help resolve a political conflict, Yeltsin caused grave
damage to the already delicate process of creating a rule of law system in Russia. In the words of Fyodor Burlatsky, this was a "huge trauma to Russian legal consciousness." For Russian foreign policy, this meant that the process of stabilizing the Russian polity was set back.

Another aspect of the Soviet legacy can be seen in personnel policy. While Yeltsin gave the Foreign Ministry the right to coordinate the foreign policy actions of other Russian agencies, he did not give the MFA any means to exert this right, including, until 1996, a foreign minister authoritative enough to do so. The MFA, like the diplomatic apparatus of any country, could not be expected to compete with a Defense Ministry that knew it could resort to the use of arms to achieve its own foreign policy aims.

The appointment of Primakov as foreign minister seemed to hold great promise for the Russian Foreign Ministry. While his time in office came at the end of the time period covered by this study, Primakov's prestige and authority in the Russian policymaking community suggested that his leadership of the MFA might bring that institution the prestige and clout that it needed to accomplish its task.

The Outlook

The question raised by these conclusions is: When will Russia's foreign policy evolve from one which can be best explained by the transition model to one for

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which the application of the bureaucratic politics model can be useful?

In answering this question, it is useful to pause and consider the extent to which the patterns described in the bureaucratic politics model are ones to which a government should aspire. Clearly, Allison's discussion was aimed at highlighting the flaws in this pattern of policymaking.

As the same time, there is a middle ground to be achieved between the chaos of transitional Russia and the inefficiency often attendant to the type of bureaucratic foreign policymaking modeled by Allison. That middle ground is the development of a functioning, responsible bureaucracy based in a rule-of-law system.

Given the hurdles Russia still faces in its democratic development, and the frequency with which institutions, individuals, and procedures change in the upper echelons of the political elite, it appears that the transition model will retain significant explanatory power for many years to come.


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US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (USA)
US Foreign Broadcast Information Service Trends (USA)
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Washington Post (USA)
Washington Times (USA)
World Monitor (USA)
APPENDIX 1:
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR THIS STUDY

Vyacheslav Dashichev, 7 July 1992
At the time Dashichev was an exchange scholar at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University, from the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies in Moscow. Previously Dashichev had been the head of the Academic Consultative Council of the Central Office for Socialist Countries of Europe of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1987-1989) and the head of the division for international politics at the Institute of East European and Foreign Policy Studies in Moscow (1972-1990).

Andrei Grachev, 18 December 1992
At the time, Grachev was a visiting scholar at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany. Previously he had been Mikhail Gorbachev's Press Secretary and the Deputy Director of the International Department of the CPSU.

Oleg Grinevsky, 17 December 1993
At the time, Grinevsky was Ambassador to Sweden. Previously he had been the chief Soviet negotiator to the Mutual Balance Force Reductions talks and the speechwriter to Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Andrei Kozyrev, 14 June 1994
At the time, Kozyrev was Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

Eugeny Novikov, 20 December 1991
At the time, Novikov was a visiting scholar at the Russian Language School in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Before defecting from the Soviet Union, he had been on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department.

Alexander Rahr, 17 June 1997
Head of the Study Center on German-Russian/CIS Relations, German Society for Foreign Affairs.

Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, 14 and 15 January 1993

Former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.
APPENDIX 2:
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

According to a September 1994 presidential decree, the Presidential Council consisted of the following members:

S.S. Alekseyev, Chairman of the Council of the Research Center for Civil Law attached to the president of the Russian Federation;

S.E Blagovolin, Deputy Director of the Institute Of World Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy Of Sciences;

V.K. Volkov, Director of the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences;

D.A. Volkogonov, Federation Council Deputy;

E.T. Gaydar, Federation Council Deputy;

D.A. German, writer;

A.M. Yemelyanov, President-Rector of the Russian Academy of the State Service attached to the Russian president;

M.A. Zakharov, Artistic Director of the "Lenkom" theater;

V.V. Karddannikov, Director General of the "AvtoVAZ" company;

S.A. Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;

Y.F. Karyakin, Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for Comparative Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences;

O.V. Kiselev, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the "Mosekspo" Joint-Stock Company;

S.A. Kovalyov, Federation Council Deputy;

V.M. Kokov, President of the Republic of Kabarda-Balkaria;
O.R. Latsis, Political Commentator for Izvestiya;

R.Z. Lifshits, Head Researcher at the Institute of State and Law at Russian Academy of Sciences;

Y.M. Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow;

A.M. Migranyan, Head Researcher at the Institute of International Economic and Political Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences;

Y.A. Nozhikov, Head of Irkutsk Oblast administration;

E.A. Pain, Head of Analytical Research at the Analytical Center under the Russian Federation President;

Y.A. Ryzhov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Russian Federation to France;

A.M. Salmin, Director of the Center of Political Technology;

N.V. Sevryugin, Head of Tula Oblast Administration;

A.A. Sergeyev, Chairman of the Independent Miners' Union L.V. Smirnyagin, Head of Analytical Research at the Analytical Center under the Russian Federation President;

A.A. Sobchak, Mayor of St. Petersburg;

M.O. Chudakova, Professor at the A.M. Gorkiy Institute for Literature;

A.A. Yaroshinskaya, Secretary of the Russian Federation Union of Journalists. "Further on Council's Composition,"